initial commit of ebook 12002HEADmain

6 files changed, 7247 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/old/12002-8.txt b/old/12002-8.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..718cd48
--- /dev/null
+++ b/old/12002-8.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,2300 @@
+The Project Gutenberg EBook of Review of the Work of Mr John Stuart Mill
+Entitled, 'Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy.', by George Grote
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+Title: Review of the Work of Mr John Stuart Mill Entitled, 'Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy.'
+
+Author: George Grote
+
+Release Date: April 12, 2004 [EBook #12002]
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1
+
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK REVIEW OF MR JOHN STUART MILL ***
+
+
+
+
+Produced by The Online Distributed Proofreading Team.
+
+
+
+
+REVIEW OF THE WORK OF MR JOHN STUART MILL
+
+ENTITLED, 'EXAMINATION OF SIR WILLIAM HAMILTONS PHILOSOPHY'
+
+BY GEORGE GROTE
+
+AUTHOR OF
+
+'THE HISTORY OF ANCIENT GREECE,'
+
+'PLATO AND THE OTHER COMPANIONS OF SOCRATES,' ETC.
+
+1868
+
+_Reprinted from the 'Westminster Review,' January 1, 1866._
+
+
+JOHN CHILDS AND SON, PRINTERS
+
+
+
+
+_An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy, and of the
+Principal Philosophical Questions discussed in his Writings_. By JOHN
+STUART MILL. London: Longmans. 1865.
+
+The work bearing the above title is an octavo volume, consisting of
+twenty-eight chapters, and five hundred and sixty pages. This is no
+great amount of print; but the amount of matter contained in it is
+prodigious, and the quality of that matter such as to require a full
+stretch of attention. Mr Mill gives his readers no superfluous
+sentences, scarcely even a superfluous word, above what is necessary to
+express his meaning briefly and clearly. Of such a book no complete
+abstract can be given in the space to which we are confined.
+
+To students of philosophy--doubtless but a minority among the general
+circle of English readers--this work comes recommended by the strongest
+claims both of interest and instruction. It presents in direct
+antithesis two most conspicuous representatives of the modern
+speculative mind of England--Sir W. Hamilton and Mr John Stuart Mill.
+
+Sir W. Hamilton has exercised powerful influence over the stream of
+thought during the present generation. The lectures on Logic and
+Metaphysics delivered by him at Edinburgh, for twenty years, determined
+the view taken of those subjects by a large number of aspiring young
+students, and determined that view for many of them permanently and
+irrevocably.[1] Several eminent teachers and writers of the present day
+are proud of considering themselves his disciples, enunciate his
+doctrines in greater or less proportion, and seldom contradict him
+without letting it be seen that they depart unwillingly from such a
+leader. Various new phrases and psychological illustrations have
+obtained footing in treatises of philosophy, chiefly from his authority.
+We do not number ourselves among his followers; but we think his
+influence on philosophy was in many ways beneficial. He kept up the idea
+of philosophy as a subject to be studied from its own points of view: a
+dignity which in earlier times it enjoyed, perhaps, to mischievous
+excess, but from which in recent times it has far too much
+receded--especially in England. He performed the great service of
+labouring strenuously to piece together the past traditions of
+philosophy, to re-discover those which had been allowed to drop into
+oblivion, and to make out the genealogy of opinions as far as negligent
+predecessors had still left the possibility of doing so.
+
+The forty-six lectures on Metaphysics, and the thirty-five lectures on
+Logic, published by Messrs Mansel and Veitch, constitute the biennial
+course actually delivered by Sir W. Hamilton in the Professorial Chair.
+They ought therefore to be looked at chiefly with reference to the minds
+of youthful hearers, as preservatives against that mischief forcibly
+described by Rousseau--'L'inhabitude de penser dans la jeunesse en ôte
+la capacité pendant le reste de la vie.'
+
+Now, in a subject so abstract, obscure, and generally unpalatable, as
+Logic and Metaphysics, the difficulty which the teacher finds in
+inspiring interest is extreme. That Sir W. Hamilton overcame such
+difficulty with remarkable success, is the affirmation of his two
+editors; and our impression, as readers of his lectures, disposes us to
+credit them. That Sir W. Hamilton should have done this effectively is
+in itself sufficient to stamp him as a meritorious professor--as a
+worthy successor to the chair of Dugald Stewart, whose unrivalled
+perfection in that department is attested by every one. Many a man who
+ultimately adopted speculative opinions opposed to Dugald Stewart,
+received his first impulse and guidance in the path of speculation from
+the lasting impression made by Stewart's lectures.
+
+But though we look at these lectures, as they ought to be looked at,
+chiefly with a view to the special purpose for which they were destined,
+we are far from insinuating that they have no other merits, or that they
+are useless for readers who have already a metaphysical creed of their
+own. We have found them both instructive and interesting: they go over a
+large proportion of the field of speculative philosophy, partly from the
+point of view (not always the same) belonging to the author, partly from
+that of numerous predecessors whom he cites. We recognize also in Sir W.
+Hamilton an amount of intellectual independence which seldom accompanies
+such vast erudition. He recites many different opinions, but he judges
+them all for himself; and, what is of still greater moment, he
+constantly gives the reasons for his judgments. To us these reasons are
+always of more or less value, whether we admit them to be valid or not.
+Many philosophers present their own doctrine as if it were so much
+ascertained and acknowledged truth, either intimating, or leading you to
+suppose, that though erroneous beliefs to the contrary formerly
+prevailed, these have now become discredited with every one. We do not
+censure this way of proceeding, but we prefer the manner of Sir W.
+Hamilton. He always keeps before us divergence and discrepancy of view
+as the normal condition of reasoned truth or philosophy; the
+characteristic postulate of which is, that every affirmative and every
+negative shall have its appropriate reasons clearly and fully
+enunciated.
+
+In this point of view the appendix annexed to the lectures is also
+valuable; and the four copious appendixes or dissertations following
+the edition of Reid's works, are more valuable still. How far Sir W.
+Hamilton has there furnished good proof of his own doctrines on External
+Perception, and on the Primary Qualities of Matter, we shall not now
+determine; but to those who dissent from him, as well as to those who
+agree with him, his reasonings on these subjects are highly instructive:
+while the full citations from so many other writers contribute
+materially not only to elucidate the points directly approached, but
+also to enlarge our knowledge of philosophy generally. We set particular
+value upon this preservation of the traditions of philosophy, and upon
+this maintenance of a known perpetual succession among the speculative
+minds of humanity, with proper comparisons and contrasts. We have found
+among the names quoted by Sir W. Hamilton, and, thanks to his care,
+several authors hardly at all known to us, and opinions cited from them
+not less instructive than curious. He deserves the more gratitude,
+because he departs herein from received usage since Bacon and Descartes.
+The example set by these great men was admirable, so far as it went to
+throw off the authority of predecessors; but pernicious so far as it
+banished those predecessors out of knowledge, like mere magazines of
+immaturity and error. Throughout the eighteenth century, all study of
+the earlier modes of philosophizing was, for the most part, neglected.
+Of such neglect, remarkable instances are pointed out by Sir W.
+Hamilton.
+
+While speaking about the general merits and philosophical position of
+Sir William Hamilton, we have hitherto said nothing about those of Mr
+Mill. But before we proceed to analyze the separate chapters of his
+volume, we must devote a few words to the fulfilment of another
+obligation.
+
+Mr John Stuart Mill has not been the first to bestow honour on the
+surname which he bears. His father, Mr James Mill, had already ennobled
+the name. An ampler title to distinction in history and philosophy can
+seldom be produced than that which Mr James Mill left behind him. We
+know no work which surpasses his 'History of British India' in the main
+excellencies attainable by historical writers: industrious accumulation,
+continued for many years, of original authorities--careful and
+conscientious criticism of their statements--and a large command of
+psychological analysis, enabling the author to interpret phenomena of
+society, both extremely complicated, and far removed from his own
+personal experience. Again, Mr James Mill's 'Elements of Political
+Economy' were, at the time when they appeared, the most logical and
+condensed exposition of the entire science then existing. Lastly, his
+latest avowed production, the 'Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human
+Mind,' is a model of perspicuous exposition of complex states of
+consciousness, carried farther than by any other author before him; and
+illustrating the fulness which such exposition may be made to attain, by
+one who has faith in the comprehensive principle of association, and has
+learnt the secret of tracing out its innumerable windings. It is,
+moreover, the first work in which the great fact of Indissoluble
+Association is brought into its due theoretical prominence. These are
+high merits, of which lasting evidence is before the public; but there
+were other merits in Mr James Mill, less publicly authenticated, yet not
+less real. His unpremeditated oral exposition was hardly less effective
+than his prepared work with the pen; his colloquial fertility on
+philosophical subjects, his power of discussing himself, and of
+stimulating others to discuss, his ready responsive inspirations through
+all the shifts and windings of a sort of Platonic dialogue--all these
+accomplishments were, to those who knew him, even more impressive than
+what he composed for the press. Conversation with him was not merely
+instructive, but provocative to the dormant intelligence. Of all persons
+whom we have known, Mr James Mill was one who stood least remote from
+the lofty Platonic ideal of Dialectic--[Greek: _Tou didhonai kahi
+dhechesthai lhogon_]--(the giving and receiving of reasons) competent
+alike to examine others, or to be examined by them, on philosophy. When
+to this we add a strenuous character, earnest convictions, and
+single-minded devotion to truth, with an utter disdain of mere
+paradox--it may be conceived that such a man exercised powerful
+intellectual ascendancy over younger minds. Several of those who enjoyed
+his society--men now at, or past, the maturity of life, and some of them
+in distinguished positions--remember and attest with gratitude such
+ascendancy in their own cases: among them the writer of the present
+article, who owes to the historian of British India an amount of
+intellectual stimulus and guidance such as he can never forget.
+
+When a father, such as we have described, declining to send his son
+either to school or college, constituted himself schoolmaster from the
+beginning, and performed that duty with laborious solicitude--when,
+besides full infusion of modern knowledge, the forcing process applied
+by the Platonic Socrates to the youth-Theætêtus, was administered by Mr
+James Mill, continuously and from an earlier age, to a youthful mind not
+less pregnant than that of Theætêtus--it would be surprising if the son
+thus trained had not reached even a higher eminence than his father. The
+fruit borne by Mr John Stuart Mill has been worthy of the culture
+bestowed, and the volume before us is at once his latest and his ripest
+product.
+
+The 'Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy' is intended by Mr
+Mill (so he tells us in the preface to the sixth published edition of
+his 'System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive') as a sequel and
+complement to that system. We are happy to welcome so valuable an
+addition; but with or without that addition, the 'System of Logic'
+appears to us to present the most important advance in speculative
+theory which the present century has witnessed. Either half of it, the
+Ratiocinative or the Inductive, would have surpassed any previous work
+on the same subject. The Inductive half discriminates and brings into
+clear view, for the first time, those virtues of method which have
+insensibly grown into habits among consummate scientific inquirers of
+the post-Baconian age, as well as the fallacies by which some of these
+authors have been misled. The Ratiocinative half, dealing with matters
+which had already been well handled by Dutrieu and other scholastic
+logicians, invests their dead though precise formalism with a real life
+and application to the actual process of finding and proving truth. But
+besides thus working each half up to perfection, Mr Mill has performed
+the still more difficult task of overcoming the repugnance, apparently
+an inveterate repugnance, between them, so as chemically to combine the
+two into one homogeneous compound; thus presenting the problem of
+Reasoned Truth, Inference, Proof, and Disproof, as one connected whole.
+For ourselves, we still recollect the mist which was cleared from our
+minds when we first read the 'System of Logic,' very soon after it was
+published. We were familiar with the Syllogistic Logic in Burgersdicius
+and Dutrieu; we were also familiar with examples of the best procedure
+in modern inductive science; but the two streams flowed altogether apart
+in our minds, like two parallel lines never joining nor approaching. The
+irreconcilability of the two was at once removed, when we had read and
+mastered the second and third chapters of the Second Book of the 'System
+of Logic;' in which Mr Mill explains the functions and value of the
+Syllogism, and the real import of its major premiss. This explanation
+struck us at the time as one of the most profound and original efforts
+of metaphysical thought that we had ever perused, and we see no reason
+to retract that opinion now.[2] It appears all the more valuable when we
+contrast it with what is said by Mr Mill's two contemporaries--Hamilton
+and Whately: the first of whom retains the ancient theory of reasoning,
+as being only a methodized transition from a whole to its parts, and
+from the parts up to the whole--Induction being only this ascending part
+of the process, whereby, after having given a complete enumeration of
+all the compound parts, you conclude to the sum total described in one
+word as a whole;[3] while the second (Whately) agrees in subordinating
+Induction to Syllogism, but does so in a different way--by representing
+inductive reasoning as a syllogism, with its major premiss suppressed,
+from which major premiss it derived its authority. The explanation of Mr
+Mill attacks the problem from the opposite side. It subordinates
+syllogism to induction, the technical to the real; it divests the major
+premiss of its illusory pretence to be itself the proving authority, or
+even any real and essential part of the proof--and acknowledges it
+merely as a valuable precautionary test and security for avoiding
+mistake in the process of proving. Taking Mr Mill's 'System of Logic' as
+a whole, it is one of the books by which we believe ourselves to have
+most profited. The principles of it are constantly present to our mind
+when engaged in investigations of evidence, whether scientific or
+historical.
+
+Concerned as we are here with Mr Mill only as a logician and
+philosopher, we feel precluded from adverting to his works on other
+topics--even to his 'Elements of Political Economy,' by which he is
+probably more widely known than by anything else. Of the many
+obligations which Political Economy owes to him, one only can be noticed
+consistent with the scope of the present article: the care which he has
+taken--he alone, or at least, he more explicitly and formally than any
+other expositor--to set forth the general position of that science in
+the aggregate field of scientific research; its relation to sociology as
+a whole, or to other fractions thereof, how far derivative or
+co-ordinate; what are its fundamental postulates or hypotheses, with
+what limits the logical methods of induction and deduction are
+applicable to it, and how far its conclusions may be relied on as
+approximations to truth. All these points will be found instructively
+handled in the Sixth Book of Mr Mill's 'System of Logic,' as well as in
+his smaller and less known work, 'Essays on Some Unsettled Questions in
+Political Economy.' We find him, while methodizing and illustrating the
+data of the special science, uniformly keeping in view its relation to
+philosophy as a whole.
+
+But there is yet another work in which the interests of philosophy, as a
+whole, come into the foreground and become the special object of
+vindication in their largest compass and most vital requirements. We
+mean Mr Mill's 'Essay on Liberty,' one half of which takes for its
+thesis the _libertus philosophandi_. He maintains, emphatically, in this
+book, the full dignity of reasoned truth against all the jealous
+exigencies of traditional dogma and self-justifying sentiment. He claims
+the most unreserved liberty of utterance for negative and affirmative on
+all questions--not merely for the purpose of discriminating truth from
+falsehood, but also to keep up in individual minds the full sense and
+understanding of the matters controverted, in place of a mere partial
+and one-sided adhesion. At first sight, indeed, it might seem as if Mr
+Mill was fighting with a shadow; for liberty of philosophizing is a
+postulate which, in general terms, every one concedes. But when you come
+to fathom the real feelings which underlie this concession, you discover
+that almost every man makes it under reserves which, though acting in
+silence, are not the less efficacious. Every one has some dogmas which
+he cannot bear to hear advocated, and others which he will not allow to
+be controverted in his presence. A writer has to consider not merely by
+what reasons any novelty of belief or disbelief may be justified, but
+also how much it will be safe for him to publish, having regard to the
+irritable sore places of the public judgment. In July, 1864, we were
+present at the annual meeting of the French Academy at Paris, where the
+prizes for essays sent in, pursuant to subjects announced for study
+beforehand, are awarded. We heard the titles of various compositions
+announced by the President (M. Villemain), with a brief critical
+estimate of each. Their comparative merits were appreciated, and the
+prize awarded to one of the competitors. Among the compositions sent to
+compete for the prize, one was a work by M. Taine, upon which the
+President bestowed the most remarkable encomiums, in every different
+point of view: extent of knowledge, force of thought, style,
+arrangement, all were praised in a manner which we have rarely heard
+exceeded. Nevertheless, the prize was not awarded to this work, but to
+another which the President praised in a manner decidedly less marked
+and emphatic. What was here the _ratio decidendi_? The reason was, and
+the President declared it in the most explicit language, that the work
+of M. Taine _was deeply tainted with materialism_. 'Sans doute,' said
+the esteemed veteran of French literature in pronouncing his award,
+'sans doute les opinions sont libres, _mais_'--It is precisely against
+this _mais_--ushering in the special anathematized or consecrated
+conclusion which it is intended to except from the general liberty of
+enforcing or impugning--in matters of philosophical discussion, that Mr
+Mill, in the 'Essay on Liberty,' declares war as champion of Reasoned
+Truth.
+
+He handles this grand theme--_eleythheroys eleythherôs
+philosophein_--involving as it does the best interests of philosophy,
+as an instructress to men's judgments, and a stimulus to their
+intelligence--with great depth of psychological analysis sustained by
+abundant historical illustration. And he in the same volume discusses
+most profitably another question akin to it--To what extent, and by what
+principles, the interference of others is justifiable, in restraining
+the liberty of taste and action for each individual? A question at once
+grave and neglected, but the discussion of which does not belong to our
+present article.
+
+A new work from one who has already manifested such mastery of
+philosophy, both in principle and in detail, and a work exhibiting the
+analysis and appreciation of the philosophical views of an eminent
+contemporary, must raise the highest expectation. We think no reader
+will be disappointed who peruses Mr Mill's 'Examination,' and we shall
+now endeavour to give some account of the manner in which he performs
+it. Upon topics so abstract and subtle as the contents of this volume,
+the antithesis between two rival theories is the best way, and often the
+only way, for bringing truth into clear view; and the 'Examination' here
+before us is professedly controversy. But of controversy in its
+objectionable sense--of captious or acrimonious personality--not a trace
+will here be found. A dignified, judicial equanimity of tone is
+preserved from first to last. Moreover, though the title and direct
+purpose of the volume is negative and critical, yet the destructive
+criticism is pervaded by many copious veins of constructive exposition,
+embodying Mr Mill's own views upon some of the most intricate problems
+of metaphysics.
+
+Mr Mill begins his work by analyzing and explaining the doctrine called
+the Relativity of Human Knowledge:
+
+     'The doctrine (chap. ii. p. 5) which is thought to belong in
+     the most especial manner to Sir W. Hamilton, and which was
+     the ground of his opposition to the transcendentalism of the
+     later French and German metaphysicians, is that which he and
+     others have called the Relativity of Human Knowledge. It is
+     the subject of the most generally known and impressive of
+     all his writings--the one which first revealed to the
+     English metaphysical reader that a new power had arisen in
+     philosophy. Together with its developments, it composes the
+     Philosophy of the Conditioned, which he opposed to the
+     French and German philosophies of the Absolute, and which is
+     regarded by most of his admirers as the greatest of his
+     titles to a permanent place in the history of metaphysical
+     thought. But, "the relativity of human knowledge," like most
+     other phrases into which the words _relative_ or _relation_
+     enter, is vague, and admits of a great variety of meanings,'
+     &c.
+
+Mr Mill then proceeds to distinguish these various meanings, and to
+determine in which of them the phrase is understood by Sir W. Hamilton.
+
+One meaning is, that we only know anything by knowing it as
+distinguished from something else--that all consciousness is of
+difference. It is not, however, in this sense that the expression is
+ordinarily or intentionally used by Sir W. Hamilton, though he fully
+recognizes the truth which, when thus used, it serves to express. In
+general, when he says that all our knowledge is relative, the relation
+he has in view is not between the thing known and other objects compared
+with it, but between the thing known and the mind knowing--(p. 6).
+
+The doctrine in this last meaning is held by different philosophers in
+two different forms. Some (e.g. Berkeley, Hume, Ferrier, &c.), usually
+called Idealists, maintain not merely that all we can possibly know of
+anything is the manner in which it affects the human faculties, but that
+there is nothing else to be known; that affections of human or of other
+minds are all that we can know to exist--that the difference between the
+ego and the non-ego is only a formal distinction between two aspects of
+the same reality. Other philosophers (Brown, Mr Herbert Spencer, Auguste
+Comte, with many others) believe that the ego and the non-ego denote two
+realities, each self-existent, and neither dependent on the other; that
+the Noumenon, or 'thing _per se_,' is in itself a different thing from
+the Phenomenon, and equally or more real, but that, though we know its
+existence, we have no means of knowing what it is. All that we can know
+is, relatively to ourselves, the modes in which it affects us, or the
+phenomena which it produces--(pp. 9--11).
+
+The doctrine of Relativity, as held by Kant and his many followers, is
+next distinguished from the same doctrine as held by Hartley, James
+Mill, Professor Bain, &c., compatible with either acceptance or
+rejection of the Berkeleian theory. Kant maintains that the attributes
+which we ascribe to outward things, or which are inseparable from them
+in thought, contain additional elements over and above sensations _plus_
+an unknowable cause--additional elements added by the mind itself, and
+therefore still only relative, but constituting the original furniture
+of the mind itself--inherent laws, partly of our sensitive, partly of
+our intellectual faculty. It is on this latter point that Hartley and
+those going along with him diverge. Admitting the same additional
+elements, these philosophers do not ascribe to the mind any innate forms
+to account for them, but hold that place, extension, substance, cause,
+and the rest, &c., are conceptions put together out of ideas of
+sensation, by the known laws of Association--(pp. 12--14).
+
+Partial Relativity is the opinion professed by most philosophers (and by
+most persons who do not philosophize). They hold that we know things
+partly as they are in themselves, partly as they are merely in relation
+to us.
+
+This discrimination of the various schools of philosophers is highly
+instructive, and is given with the full perspicuity belonging to Mr
+Mill's style. He proceeds to examine in what sense Sir W. Hamilton
+maintained the Relativity of Human Knowledge. He cites passages both
+from the 'Discussions on Philosophy' and from the Lectures, in which
+that doctrine is both affirmed in its greatest amplitude, and enunciated
+in the most emphatic language--(pp. 17, 18, 22, 23). But he also
+produces extracts from the most elaborate of Sir W. Hamilton's
+'Dissertations on Reid,' in which a doctrine quite different and
+inconsistent is proclaimed--that our knowledge is only partially, not
+wholly, relative; that the secondary qualities of matter, indeed, are
+known to us only relatively, but that the primary qualities are known to
+us as they are in themselves, or as they exist objectively, and that
+they may be even evolved by demonstration _à priori_--(pp. 19-26, 30).
+The inconsistency between the two doctrines, professed at different
+times, and in different works, by Sir W. Hamilton, is certainly
+manifest. Mr Mill is of opinion that one of the two must be taken 'in a
+non-natural sense,' and that Sir W. Hamilton either did not hold, or had
+ceased to hold, the doctrine of the full relativity of knowledge (pp.
+20-28)--the hypothesis of a flat contradiction being in his view
+inadmissible. But we think it at least equally possible that Sir W.
+Hamilton held both the two opinions in their natural sense, and enforced
+both of them _at different times_ by argument; his attention never
+having been called to the contradiction between them. That such
+forgetfulness was quite possible, will appear clearly in many parts of
+the present article. His argument in support of both is equally
+characterized by that peculiar energy of style which is frequent with
+him, and which no way resembles the qualifying refinements of one
+struggling to keep clear of a perceived contradiction.
+
+From hence Mr Mill (chap. iv.) proceeds to criticise at considerable
+length what he justly denominates the celebrated and striking review of
+Cousin's philosophy, which forms the first paper in Sir W. Hamilton's
+'Discussions on Philosophy.' According to Mr Mill--
+
+     'The question really at issue is this: Have we or have we
+     not an immediate intuition of God? The name of God is veiled
+     under two extremely abstract phrases, "The Infinite and the
+     Absolute," perhaps from a reverential feeling; such, at
+     least, is the reason given by Sir W. Hamilton's disciple, Mr
+     Mansel, for preferring the more vague expressions; but it is
+     one of the most unquestionable of all logical maxims, that
+     the meaning of the abstract must be sought for in the
+     concrete, and not conversely; and we shall see, both in the
+     case of Sir William Hamilton, and of Mr Mansel, that the
+     process cannot be reversed with impunity.'--p. 32.
+
+Upon this we must remark, that though the 'logical maxim' here laid
+down by Mr Mill may be generally sound, we think the application of it
+inconvenient in the present case. Discussions on points of philosophy
+are best conducted without either invoking or offending religious
+feeling. M. Cousin maintains that we have a direct intuition of the
+Infinite and the Absolute: Sir W. Hamilton denies that we have. Upon
+this point Mr Mill sides entirely with Sir W. Hamilton, and considers
+'that the latter has rendered good service to philosophy by refuting M.
+Cousin,' though much of the reasoning employed in such refutation seems
+to Mr Mill unsound. But Sir W. Hamilton goes further, and affirms that
+we have no faculties capable of apprehending the Infinite and the
+Absolute--that both of them are inconceivable to us, and by consequence
+unknowable. Herein Mr Mill is opposed to him, and controverts his
+doctrine in an elaborate argument.
+
+Of this argument, able and ingenious, like all those in the present
+volume, our limits only enable us to give a brief appreciation. In so
+far as Mr Mill controverts Sir W. Hamilton, we think him perfectly
+successful, though there are some points in his reasoning in which we do
+not fully concur.
+
+In our opinion, as in his, the Absolute alone (in its sense as opposed
+to relative) can be necessarily unknowable, inconceivable, incogitable.
+Nothing which falls under the condition of relativity can be declared to
+be so. The structure of our minds renders us capable of knowing
+everything which is relative, though there are many such things which we
+have no evidence, nor shall ever get evidence, to enable us to know. Now
+the Infinite falls within the conditions of relativity, as indeed Sir W.
+Hamilton himself admits, when he intimates (p. 58) that though it cannot
+be known, it is, must be, and ought to be, _believed_ by us, according
+to the marked distinction which he draws between belief and knowledge.
+We agree with Mr Mill in the opinion that it is thinkable, conceivable,
+knowable. Doubtless we do not conceive it adequately, but we conceive it
+sufficiently to discuss and reason upon it intelligibly to ourselves and
+others. That we conceive the Infinite inadequately, is not to be held as
+proof that we do not conceive it at all; for in regard to finite things
+also, we conceive the greater number of them only inadequately.
+
+We cannot construe to the imagination a polygon with an infinite number
+of sides (i.e. with a number of sides greater than any given number),
+but neither can we construe to the imagination a polygon with a million
+of sides; nevertheless, we understand what is meant by the first
+description as well as by the second, and can reason upon both. There
+is, indeed, this difference between the two: That the terms used in
+describing the first, proclaim at once in their direct meaning that we
+should in vain attempt to construe it to the imagination; whereas the
+terms used in describing the second do not intimate that fact. We know
+the fact only by trial, or by an estimate of our own mental force which
+is the result of many past trials. If the difference here noted were all
+which Sir W. Hamilton has in view when he declares the Infinite to be
+unknowable and incogitable, we should accede to his opinion; but we
+apprehend that he means much more, and he certainly requires more to
+justify the marked antithesis in which he places himself against M.
+Cousin and Hegel. Indeed, the facility with which he declares matters to
+be incogitable, which these two and other philosophers not only cogitate
+but maintain as truth, is to us truly surprising. The only question
+which appears to us important is, whether we can understand and reason
+upon the meaning of the terms and propositions addressed to us. If we
+can, the subjects propounded must be cogitable and conceivable, whether
+we admit the propositions affirmed concerning them or not; if we cannot,
+then these subjects are indeed incogitable by ourselves in the present
+state of our knowledge, but they may not be so to our opponent who
+employs the terms.
+
+In criticising the arguments of Sir W. Hamilton against M. Cousin, Mr
+Mill insists much on a distinction between (1) the Infinite, and (2) the
+Infinite in any one or more positive attributes, such as infinite
+wisdom, goodness, redness, hardness, &c.[4] He thinks that Sir W.
+Hamilton has made out his case against the first, but not against the
+last; that the first is really 'an unmeaning and senseless abstraction,'
+a fasciculus of negations, unknowable and inconceivable, but not the
+last. We think that Mr Mill makes more of this distinction than the
+case warrants; that the first is not unmeaning, but an intelligible
+abstraction, only a higher reach of abstraction than the last; that it
+is knowable inadequately, in the same way as the last--though more
+inadequately, because of its higher abstraction.
+
+As the finite is intelligible, so also is its negation--the Infinite: we
+do not say (with M. Cousin) that the two are conjointly given in
+consciousness--but the two are understood and partially apprehended by
+the mind conjointly and in contrast. Though the Infinite is doubtless
+negative as to a degree, it is not wholly or exclusively negative, since
+it includes a necessary reference to some positive attribute, to which
+the degree belongs; the positive element is not eliminated, but merely
+left undetermined. The Infinite (like the Finite, [Greek: to
+peperasmhenon--to hapeiron]) is a genus; it comprehends under it the
+Infinitely Hard and the Infinitely Soft, the Infinitely Swift and the
+Infinitely Slow--the infinite, in short, of any or all positive
+attributes. It includes, doubtless, 'a farrago of contradictions;' but
+so, also, does the Finite--and so, also, do the actual manifestations of
+the real, concrete universe, which manifestations constitute a portion
+of the Finite. Whoever attempts to give any philosophical account of the
+generation of the universe, tracing its phenomena, as an aggregate, to
+some ultra-phenomenal origin, must include in his scheme a _fundamentum_
+for all those opposite and contradictory manifestations which experience
+discloses in the universe. There always have been, and still are, many
+philosophers who consider the Abstract and General to be prior both in
+nature and time to the Concrete and Particular; and who hold further
+that these two last are explained, when presented as determinate and
+successive manifestations of the two first, which they conceive as
+indeterminate and sempiternal. Now the Infinite (Ens Infinitum or Entia
+Infinita, according to the point of view in which we look at it) is a
+generic word, including all these supposed indeterminate antecedents;
+and including therefore, of course, many contradictory agencies. But
+this does not make it senseless or unmeaning; nor can we distinguish it
+from 'the Infinite in some one or more given attributes,' by any other
+character than by greater reach of abstraction. We cannot admit the
+marked distinction which Mr Mill contends for--that the one is
+unknowable and the other knowable.
+
+It may be proper to add that the mode of philosophizing which we have
+just described is not ours. We do not agree in this way either of
+conceiving, or of solving, the problem of philosophy. But it is a mode
+so prevalent that Trendelenberg speaks of it, justly enough, as 'the
+ancient Hysteron-Proteron of Abstraction.' The doctrine of these
+philosophers appears to us unfounded, but we cannot call it unmeaning.
+
+In another point, also, we differ from Mr Mill respecting that inferior
+abstraction which he calls 'the Infinite in some particular attribute.'
+He speaks as if this could be known not only as an abstraction, a
+conceivable, an ideal--but also as a concrete reality; as if 'we could
+know a concrete reality as infinite or as absolute' (p. 45); as if there
+really existed in actual nature 'concrete persons or things possessing
+infinitely or absolutely certain specific attributes'--(pp. 55--93). To
+this doctrine we cannot subscribe. As we understand concrete reality, we
+find no evidence to believe that there exist in nature any real concrete
+persons or things, possessing to an infinite degree such attributes as
+they do possess: _e.g._ any men infinitely wise or infinitely strong,
+any horses infinitely swift, any stones infinitely hard. Such concrete
+real objects appear to us not admissible, because experience not only
+has not certified their existence in any single case, but goes as far to
+disprove their existence as it can do to disprove anything. All the real
+objects in nature known to us by observation are finite, and possess
+only in a finite measure their respective attributes. Upon this is
+founded the process of Science, so comprehensively laid out by Mr Mill
+in his 'System of Logic '--Induction, Deduction from general facts
+attested by Induction, Verification by experience of the results
+obtained by Deduction. The attributes, whiteness or hardness, in the
+abstract, are doubtless infinite; that is, the term will designate,
+alike and equally, any degree of whiteness or hardness which you may
+think of, and any unknown degree even whiter and harder than what you
+think of. But when perceived as invested in a given mass of snow or
+granite before us, they are divested of that indeterminateness, and
+become restricted to a determinate measure and degree.
+
+Having thus indicated the points on which we are compelled to dissent
+from Mr Mill's refutation of Sir W. Hamilton in the pleading against M.
+Cousin, we shall pass to the seventh chapter, in which occurs his first
+controversy with Mr Mansel. This passage has excited more interest, and
+will probably be remembered by a larger number of readers, than any
+portion of the book. We shall give it in his own words (pp. 99--103),
+since the energetic phraseology is quite as remarkable as the thought:--
+
+     'There is but one way for Mr Mansel out of this difficulty,
+     and he adopts it. He must maintain, not merely that an
+     Absolute Being is unknowable in himself, but that the
+     Relative attributes of an Absolute Being are unknowable
+     also.[5] He must say that we do not know what Wisdom,
+     Justice, Benevolence, Mercy, &c., are, as they exist in God.
+     Accordingly, he does say so. "It is a fact" (says Mr Mansel)
+     "which experience forces upon us, and which it is useless,
+     were it possible, to disguise, that the representation of
+     God after the model of the highest human morality which we
+     are capable of conceiving, is not sufficient to account for
+     all the phenomena exhibited by the course of his natural
+     Providence. The infliction of physical suffering, the
+     permission of moral evil, the adversity of the good, the
+     prosperity of the wicked, the crimes of the guilty involving
+     the misery of the innocent, the tardy appearance and partial
+     distribution of moral and religious knowledge in the
+     world--these are facts, which no doubt are reconcilable, we
+     know not how, with the Infinite Goodness of God, but which
+     certainly are not to be explained on the supposition that
+     its sole and sufficient type is to be found in the finite
+     goodness of man."
+
+     'In other words' (continues Mr Mill commenting) 'it is
+     necessary to suppose that the infinite goodness ascribed to
+     God is not the goodness which we know and love in our
+     fellow-creatures, distinguished only as infinite in degree;
+     but is different in kind, and another quality altogether.
+     Accordingly Mr Mansel combats as a heresy of his opponents,
+     the opinion that infinite goodness differs only in degree
+     from finite goodness.--Here, then, I take my stand upon the
+     acknowledged principle of logic and of morality; that when
+     we mean different things we have no right to call them by
+     the same name, and to apply to them, the same predicates,
+     moral and intellectual. If, instead of the glad tidings that
+     there exists a Being in whom all the excellences which the
+     highest human form can conceive, exist in a degree
+     inconceivable to us, I am informed that the world is ruled
+     by a being whose attributes are infinite, but what they are
+     we cannot learn, except that the highest human morality does
+     not sanction them--convince me of this and I will hear my
+     fate as I may. But when I am told that I must believe this,
+     and at the same time call this being by the names which
+     express and affirm the highest human morality, I say, in
+     plain terms, that I will not. Whatever power such a being
+     may have over me, there is one thing he shall not do; he
+     shall not compel me to worship him. I will call no being
+     good who is not what I mean when I apply that epithet to my
+     fellow-creatures; and if such a being can sentence me to
+     hell for not so calling him, to hell I will go.'
+
+This concluding declaration is memorable in many ways. Mr Mill announces
+his resolution to determine for himself, and according to his own reason
+and conscience, what God he will worship, and what God he will not
+worship. For ourselves, we cordially sympathize with his resolution. But
+Mr Mill must be aware that this is a point on which society is equally
+resolved that no individual shall determine for himself, if they can
+help it.[6] Each new-born child finds his religious creed ready
+prepared for him. In his earliest days of unconscious infancy, the stamp
+of the national, gentile, phratric, God, or Gods, is imprinted upon him
+by his elders; and if the future man, in the exercise of his own
+independent reason, acquires such convictions as compel him to renounce
+those Gods, proclaiming openly that he does so--he must count upon such
+treatment as will go far to spoil the value of the present life to him,
+even before he passes to those ulterior liabilities which Mr Mill
+indicates in the distance. We are not surprised that a declaration so
+unusual and so impressive should have been often cited in critical
+notices of this volume; that during the month preceding the last
+Westminster election, it was studiously brought forward by some
+opponents of Mr Mill, and more or less regretted by his friends, as
+likely to offend many electors, and damage his chance of success; and
+that a conspicuous and noble-minded ecclesiastic, the Dean of
+Westminster, thought the occasion so grave as to come forward with his
+characteristic generosity, for the purpose of shielding a distinguished
+man suspected of heresy.
+
+The sublime self-assertion, addressed by Prometheus to Zeus, under whose
+sentence he was groaning, has never before been put into such plain
+English.[7] Mr Mill's declaration reminds us also of Hippolytus, the
+chaste and pure youth, whose tragic fate is so beautifully described by
+Euripides. Hippolytus is exemplary in his devotions to the Goddess
+Artemis; but he dissents from all his countrymen, and determines for
+himself, in refusing to bestow the smallest mark of honour or worship
+upon Aphroditê, because he considers her to be a very bad Goddess.[8] In
+this refusal he persists with inflexible principle (even after having
+received, from an anxious attendant, warning of the certain ruin which
+it will bring upon him), until the insulted Aphroditê involves him,
+along with the unhappy Phædra and Theseus himself, in one common abyss
+of misery. In like manner Mr Mill's declaration stands in marked
+contrast with the more cautious proceeding of men like Herodotus. That
+historian, alike pious and prudent, is quite aware that all the Gods are
+envious and mischief-making, and expressly declares them to be so.[9]
+Yet, far from refusing to worship them on that account, he is assiduous
+in prayer and sacrifice--perhaps, indeed, all the more assiduous in
+consequence of what he believes about their attributes;[10] being
+persuaded (like the attendant who warned Hippolytus) that his only
+chance of mollifying their ungentle dispositions in regard to himself
+is, by honorific tribute in words and offerings.
+
+When, however, after appreciating as we are bound to do Mr Mill's
+declaration of subjective sentiment, we pass to its logical bearing on
+the controversy between him and Mr Mansel, we are obliged to confess
+that in this point of view it has little objective relevancy. The
+problem was, how to reconcile the actual evil and suffering in the
+universe (which is recited as a fact by Mr Mansel, though in terms
+conveying a most inadequate idea of its real magnitude) with the
+goodness of God. Mr Mill repudiates the explanatory hypothesis tendered
+by Mr Mansel, as a solution, but without suggesting any better
+hypothesis of his own. For ourselves, we are far from endorsing Mr
+Mansel's solution as satisfactory; yet we can hardly be surprised if he
+considers it less unsatisfactory than no solution at all. And when we
+reflect how frequently and familiarly predicates applicable to man are
+applied to the Supreme Being, when they cannot possibly be understood
+about Him in the same sense--we see no ground for treating the
+proceeding as disingenuous, which Mr Mill is disposed to do. Indeed, it
+cannot easily be avoided: and Mr Mill himself furnishes us with some
+examples in the present volume. At page 491, he says:--
+
+     'It would be difficult to find a stronger argument in favour
+     of Theism, than that the eye must have been made by one who
+     sees, and the ear by one who hears.'
+
+In the words here employed, _seeing_ and _hearing_ are predicted of God.
+
+Now when we predicate of men, that they _see_ or _hear_, we affirm facts
+of extreme complexity, especially in the case of _seeing_; facts partly
+physical, partly mental, involving multifarious movements and agencies
+of nerves, muscles, and other parts of the organism, together with
+direct sensational impressions, and mental reconstruction of the past,
+inseparably associated therewith; all which, so far as they are known,
+are perspicuously enumerated in the work of Professor Bain[11] on the
+'Senses and the Intellect,' Again, Mr Mill speaks (in p. 102 and
+elsewhere) of 'the veracity of God.' When we say of our neighbour that
+he is a veracious man, we ascribe to him a habit of speaking the truth;
+that is, of employing his physical apparatus of speech, and his mental
+power of recalling and recombining words lodged in the memory, for the
+purpose of asserting no other propositions except such as declare facts
+which he knows, or beliefs which he really entertains. But how either
+_seeing_, or _hearing_, or _veracity_, in these senses, can be
+predicated of God, we are at a loss to understand. And if they are to
+be predicated of God in a different sense, this admits the same license
+as Mr Mansel contends for in respect to Goodness, when he feels that
+undeniable facts preclude him from predicating that epithet univocally
+respecting God and respecting man.[12]
+
+On the whole, it seems to us, that though Mr Mill will consent to
+worship only a God of perfect goodness, he has thrown no new light on
+the grave problem--frankly stated though imperfectly solved, by Mr
+Mansel--how such a conception of God is to be reconciled with the extent
+of evil and suffering actually pervading human life and animal life
+throughout the earth. We are compelled to say, respecting Mr Mill's
+treatment of this subject--what we should not say respecting his
+treatment of any other--that he has left an old perplexing problem not
+less perplexing than he found it.
+
+Reverting, not unwillingly, from theology to philosophy, we now pass on
+to Mr Mill's ninth chapter (p. 128 seq.), of the Interpretation of
+Consciousness. There is assuredly no lesson more requiring to be taught
+than the proper mode of conducting such interpretation; for the number
+of different modes in which Consciousness has been interpreted is
+astonishing. Mr Mill begins by citing from Sir W. Hamilton's lectures a
+passage of some length, upon which he bestows considerable praise,
+regarding it as--
+
+     'One of the proofs that, whatever may be the positive value
+     of his (Sir W. Hamilton's) achievements in metaphysics, he
+     had a greater capacity for the subject than many
+     metaphysicians of high reputation; and particularly than
+     his two distinguished predecessors in the same school of
+     thought--"Reid and Stewart."'--p. 131.
+
+This is one of the greatest compliments to Sir W. Hamilton that the book
+contains, and as such we are glad to cite it.
+
+On the subject of Consciousness, Mr Mill has cited from Sir W. Hamilton
+other good observations besides the one last alluded to; but,
+unfortunately, these are often neutralized by opposite or inconsistent
+opinions also cited from other parts of his works. The number of such
+inconsistencies produced is indeed one remarkable feature in Sir W.
+Hamilton's philosophical character. He seems to follow out energetically
+(as Plato in his various dialogues) the vein of thought pervading his
+mind at each particular moment, without troubling himself to look back
+upon his own prior speculations. Even compared with the best views of
+Sir W. Hamilton, however, Mr Mill's mode of handling the subject of
+Consciousness exhibits signal improvement. To some of his observations
+we shall call particular attention.
+
+All philosophers agree that what Consciousness testifies is to be
+believed; but they differ much on the question--To what points
+Consciousness does testify? and even on the still deeper question--How
+shall we proceed to ascertain what _are_ these attested points? What is
+the proper method of studying or interrogating Consciousness? Upon this
+Mr Mill remarks (pp. 145--147):--
+
+     'Here emerges the distinction between two different methods
+     of studying the problems of metaphysics; forming the radical
+     difference between the two great schools into which
+     metaphysicians are divided. One of these I shall call for
+     distinction, the _introspective_ method; the other, the
+     _psychological_. M. Cousin observes that Locke went wrong
+     from the beginning, by placing before himself, as the
+     question to be first resolved, the origin of our ideas.
+     This (he says) was commencing at the wrong end. The proper
+     course would have been to begin by determining what the
+     ideas now are; to ascertain what it is that Consciousness
+     now tells us; postponing till afterwards the attempt to
+     frame a theory concerning the origin of any of the mental
+     phenomena.
+
+     'I accept the question as M. Cousin states it; and I contend
+     that no attempt to determine what are the direct revelations
+     of Consciousness can be successful, or entitled to any
+     regard, unless preceded by what M. Cousin says ought only to
+     follow it--an inquiry into the origin of our acquired ideas.
+     For we have it not in our power to ascertain, by any direct
+     process, what Consciousness told us at the time when its
+     revelations were in their pristine purity. It only offers
+     itself to our inspection, as it exists now, when those
+     original revelations are overlaid and buried under a
+     mountainous heap of acquired notions and perceptions.
+
+     'It seems to M. Cousin, that if we examine with care and
+     minuteness our present states of Consciousness,
+     distinguishing and defining every ingredient which we find
+     to enter into them--every element that we seem to recognize
+     as real, and cannot "by merely concentrating our attention
+     upon it analyze into anything simpler--we reach the ultimate
+     and primary truths, which are the sources of all our
+     knowledge, and which cannot be denied or doubted without
+     denying or doubting the evidence of Consciousness
+     itself--that is, the only evidence that there is for
+     anything. I maintain this to be a misconception of the
+     condition imposed on inquirers by the difficulties of
+     psychological investigation. To begin the inquiry at the
+     point where M. Cousin takes it up is, in fact, to beg the
+     question. For he must be aware, if not of the fact, at least
+     of the belief of his opponents, that the laws of the
+     mind--the Laws of Association, according to one class of
+     thinkers, the Categories of the Understanding, according to
+     another--are capable of creating, out of those data of
+     Consciousness which are uncontested, purely mental
+     conceptions, which become so identified in thought with all
+     our states of Consciousness, that _we seem, and cannot but
+     seem, to receive them by direct intuition_. For example, the
+     belief in matter in the opinion of these thinkers is, or at
+     least may be, thus produced:--
+
+     '"The proof that any of the alleged Universal Beliefs, or
+     Principles of Common Sense, are affirmations of
+     Consciousness--supposes two things: that the beliefs exist,
+     and that they cannot possibly have been acquired. The first
+     is, in most cases, undisputed; but the second is a subject
+     of inquiry which often taxes the utmost resources of
+     psychologists. Locke was therefore right in believing that
+     'the origin of our ideas' is the main stress of the problem
+     of mental science, and the subject which must be first
+     considered in forming the theory of the Mind."'
+
+This citation from Mr Mill's book is already almost too long, yet we
+could have wished to prolong it still more, from the importance of some
+of the succeeding paragraphs. It presents, in clear discrimination and
+contrast, two opposite points of view according to which the phenomena
+of mind are regarded by different philosophers, and the method of
+studying them determined: the _introspective_ method, adopted by M.
+Cousin and others--the _psychological_ or analytical method, pursued by
+Locke and by many other eminent men since Locke--'the known and approved
+method of physical science, adapted to the necessities of
+psychology'--(p. 148).
+
+There are passages of Sir W. Hamilton's writings in which he appears to
+feel that the _introspective_ method alone is insufficient for the
+interpretation of Consciousness, and that the analytical method must be
+employed to reinforce it. But on this as on other points he is not
+always consistent with himself. For in laying down the principle upon
+which the primary truths of Consciousness, the original data of
+intelligence, are to be ascertained and distinguished from
+generalizations out of experience and custom, he declares that the one
+single and certain mark is Necessity--they must be beliefs which we are
+under the necessity of believing--of which we cannot get rid by any
+mental effort. He decides this, of course, for himself, by the
+_introspective_ method alone. He (with M. Cousin and other philosophers
+who take the same view) does not apply the analytical method to inquire
+whether his necessity of belief may not be a purely acquired necessity
+and nowise congenital. It is, indeed, remarkable that these philosophers
+do not even seek to apply the introspective method as far as that method
+will really go. They are satisfied with introspection of their own
+present minds; without collecting results of the like process as applied
+to other minds, in different times and places. They declare various
+beliefs to be necessary to the human mind universally, merely because
+such is the actual fact with their own minds and with those immediately
+around them; sometimes even in defiance of proof that there are (or have
+been) persons not sharing such beliefs, and occasionally even believing
+the contrary; therefore, when even the introspective method really
+disallows their affirmative instead of sustaining it. This is, in
+truth, an abuse of the introspective method; yet even if that method
+were employed in its fullest extent--if the same incapability of
+believing otherwise could be shown as common to all mankind--it might
+still be only the effect of a strong association. The analytical method
+must still be called in to ascertain whether we are forced to suppose
+such incapability to be an original fact of consciousness, or whether it
+may not have been generated in the mind by circumstances under the
+natural working of the laws of association. It is certain that these
+laws not only may, but must, give birth to artificial inconceivabilities
+in the mind--and that some of these may be equal in strength to such, if
+any, as are natural.
+
+     'The History of Science' (says Mr Mill, following out the
+     same train of reasoning which we read in the third Book of
+     his 'System of Logic') 'teems with inconceivabilities which
+     have been conquered; and with supposed necessary truths,
+     which have first ceased to be thought necessary, then to be
+     thought true, and have finally come to be deemed
+     impossible.'--p. 150.
+
+After various observations, chiefly exhibiting the rashness of many
+censures bestowed by Sir W. Hamilton on Brown, Mr Mill gives us three
+valuable chapters (xi., xii., xiii.), wherein he analyzes the belief in
+an External World, the Belief in Mind as a separate substance or
+Noumenon, and the Primary Qualities of Matter. To each of these topics
+he applies what he calls the _psychological_ method, as contrasted with
+the simply _introspective_ method of Sir W. Hamilton (the Ego and
+Non-Ego affirmed to be given together in the primary deliverance of
+Consciousness) and so many other philosophers. He proves that these
+beliefs are no way intuitive, but acquired products; and that the known
+laws of Association are sufficient to explain how they are acquired;
+especially the Law of Inseparable Association, together with that of
+_Obliviscence_--a very useful, discriminating phrase, which we first
+find employed in this volume--(p. 259 et passim). He defines Matter to
+be a _permanent possibility of Sensation_; he maintains that this is
+really all which (apart from philosophical theories) mankind in general
+mean by it; he shows that mere possibilities of sensation not only may,
+but must, according to the known Laws of Association, come to present
+'to our artificialized Consciousness' a character of objectivity--(pp.
+198, 199). The correlative subject, though present in fact and
+indispensable, is eliminated out of conscious notice, according to the
+Law of Obliviscence.
+
+These chapters will well repay the most careful perusal. We can only
+find room for one passage (pp. 214, 215):--
+
+     'Throughout the whole of our sensitive life, except its
+     first beginnings, we unquestionably refer our sensations to
+     a _me_ and _not-me_. As soon as I have formed, on the one
+     hand, the notion of Permanent Possibilities of Sensation,
+     and on the other, of that continued series of feelings which
+     I call my life--both these notions are, by an irresistible
+     association, recalled by every sensation I have. They
+     represent two things, with both of which the sensation of
+     the moment, be it what it may, stands in relation; and I
+     cannot be conscious of the sensation without being conscious
+     of it as related to these two things. They have accordingly
+     received relative names, expressive of the double relation
+     in question. The thread of consciousness which I apprehend
+     the relation as a part of, is called the _Subject_; the
+     group of Permanent Possibilities of Sensation to which I
+     refer it, and which is partially realized and actualized in
+     it, is called the _Object_ of the sensation. The sensation
+     itself ought to have a correlative name, or rather ought to
+     have two such names--one denoting the sensation as opposed
+     to its Subject, the other denoting it as opposed to its
+     Object; but it is a remarkable fact that this necessity has
+     not been felt, and that the need of a correlative name to
+     every relative one has been considered to be satisfied by
+     the terms Object and Subject themselves. It is true that
+     these two are related to one another, but only through the
+     sensation. We have no conception of either Subject or
+     Object, either Mind or Matter, except as something to which
+     we refer our sensations, and whatever other feelings we are
+     conscious of. _The very existence of them both, so far as
+     cognizable by us, consists only in the relation they
+     respectively bear to our states of feeling._ Their relation
+     to each other is only the relation between those two
+     relations. The immediate correlatives are, not the pair,
+     _Object, Subject,_ but the two pairs, Object, _Sensation
+     objectively considered_--Subject, _Sensation subjectively
+     considered_. The reason why this is overlooked might easily
+     be shown, and would furnish a good illustration of that
+     important part of the Laws of Association, which may be
+     termed the Laws of Obliviscence.'
+
+This chapter, on the Primary Qualities of Matter, controverts the
+opinion of Sir W. Hamilton, that extension, as consisting of
+co-existent _partes extra partes_, is immediately and necessarily
+apprehended by our consciousness. It cites, as well as confirms, the
+copious proof given by Professor Bain (in his work on the Senses and the
+Intellect) that our conception of extension is derived from our muscular
+sensibility: that our sensation of _muscular motion impeded_ constitutes
+that of filled space: that our conception of extension, as an aggregate
+of co-existent parts, arises from the sense of sight, which comprehends
+a great number of parts in a succession so rapid as to be confounded
+with simultaneity--and which not only becomes the symbol of muscular and
+tactile succession, but even acquires such ascendancy as to supersede
+both of them in our consciousness. Confirmation is here given to this
+important doctrine, not merely by observations from Mr Mill himself, but
+also from the very curious narrative, discovered and produced by Sir W.
+Hamilton, out of a work of the German philosopher, Platner. Platner
+instituted a careful examination of a man born blind, and ascertained
+that this man did not conceive extension as an aggregate of simultaneous
+parts, but as a series of sensations experienced or to be experienced in
+succession--(pp. 232, 233). The case reported from Platner both
+corroborates the theory of Professor Bain, and receives its proper
+interpretation from that theory; while it is altogether adverse to the
+doctrine of Sir W. Hamilton--as is also another case, which he cites
+from Maine de Biran:--
+
+     'It gives a very favourable idea of Sir W. Hamilton's
+     sincerity and devotion to truth (remarks Mr Mill, p. 247),
+     that he should have drawn from obscurity, and made generally
+     known, two cases so unfavourable to his own opinions.'
+
+We think this remark perfectly just; and we would point out besides, in
+appreciating Sir W. Hamilton's merits, that his appetite for facts was
+useful to philosophy, as well as his appetite for speculation. But the
+person whose usefulness to philosophy we prefer to bring into the
+foreground, is Platner himself. He spent three weeks in patient
+examination of this blind man, and the tenor of his report proves that
+his sagacity in interpreting facts was equal to his patience in
+collecting them. The rarity of all such careful and premeditated
+observation of the facts of mind, appears to us one main reason why
+(what Mr Mill calls) the _psychological_ theory finds so little
+acceptance; and why those who maintain that what now seems a mental
+integer was once a multiplicity of separate mental fragments, can
+describe the antecedent steps of the change only as a _latens
+processus_, which the reader never fully understands, and often will not
+admit. Every man's mind is gradually built up from infancy to maturity;
+the process is always going on before our eyes, yet the stages of
+it--especially the earliest stages, the most pregnant with
+instruction--are never studied and put on record by observers trained in
+inductive logic, knowing beforehand what they ought to look for as the
+_sine quâ non_ for proving or disproving any proposed theory. Such cases
+as that cited by Platner--cases of one marked congenital defect of
+sense, enabling us to apply the Method of Difference--are always within
+reach; but few Platners are found to scrutinize and record them.
+Historians of science describe to us the laborious and multiplied
+observations, and the elaborate precaution for ensuring accuracy of
+observation, which recent chemical and physical inquirers have found
+indispensable for the establishment of their results. We cannot,
+therefore, be surprised that mental philosophers, dealing with facts
+even more obscure, and careless about enlarging, varying,
+authenticating their records of particular facts, should have had
+little success in establishing any results at all.
+
+But if even those, who adopt the psychological theory, have been remiss
+in the observation of particular mental facts,--those who deny the
+theory have been far more than remiss; they have been blind to obvious
+facts contradicting the principles which they lay down. Mr Mill, in
+chap, xiv., deals with this denial, common to Mr Mansel with Sir W.
+Hamilton. That philosophers so eminent as both of them should declare
+confidently--'what I cannot but think must be _à priori_, or original to
+thought; it cannot be engendered by experience upon custom' (p.
+264)--appears to us as extraordinary as it does to Mr Mill. Though no
+one ever surpassed Sir W. Hamilton in large acquaintance with the actual
+diversities of human belief, and human incapacities of believing--yet he
+never seems to have thought of bringing this acquaintance into account,
+when he assured the students in his lecture-room, that custom,
+experience, indissoluble association, were altogether insufficient to
+engender a felt necessity of believing. Such forgetfulness of well-known
+mental facts cannot be reproached to the advocates of the psychological
+theory.
+
+In chap. xv. Mr Mill examines Sir W. Hamilton's doctrine on unconscious
+mental modifications. He points out the confused manner in which Sir W.
+Hamilton has conceived _mental latency_, as well as the inconclusive
+character of the reasoning whereby he refutes the following doctrine of
+Dugald Stewart--That in the most rapid trains of association, each
+separate item must have been successively present to consciousness,
+though for a time too short to leave any memory. Sir W. Hamilton thinks
+that the separate items may pass, and often do pass, unconsciously;
+which opinion Mr Mill also, though not approving his reasons, is
+inclined to adopt.
+
+     'I am myself inclined (p. 285) to admit unconscious mental
+     modifications, in the only sense in which I can attach any
+     very distinct meaning to them--namely, unconscious
+     modifications of the nerves. It may well be believed that
+     the apparently suppressed links in a chain of association,
+     those which Sir W. Hamilton considers as latent, really are
+     so: that they are not even momentarily felt, the chain of
+     causation being continued only physically--by one organic
+     state of the nerves succeeding another so rapidly, that the
+     state of mental consciousness appropriate to each is not
+     produced.'
+
+Mr Mill gives various illustrations in support of this doctrine. He at
+the same time calls attention to a valuable lecture of Sir W.
+Hamilton's, the thirty-second lecture on Metaphysics; especially to the
+instructive citation from Cardaillac contained therein, noting the
+important fact, which descriptions of the Law of Association often keep
+out of sight--that the suggestive agency of Association is carried on,
+not by single antecedents raising up single consequents, but by a mass
+of antecedents raising up simultaneously a mass of consequents, among
+which attention is very unequally distributed.
+
+We shall say little upon Mr Mill's remarks on Sir W. Hamilton's Theory
+of Causation--(chap. xvi.). This theory appears to Mr Mill absurd; while
+the theory of Mr Mill (continued from Hume, Brown, and James Mill) on
+the same subject, appears to Sir W. Hamilton insufficient and
+unsatisfactory--'professing to explain the phenomenon of causality, but,
+previously to explanation, evacuating the phenomenon of all that
+desiderates explanation'--(p. 295). For ourselves we embrace the theory
+of Mr Mill:[13] yet we are aware that the remark just cited from Sir W.
+Hamilton represents the dissatisfaction entertained towards it by many
+objectors. The unscientific and antiscientific yearnings, prevalent
+among mankind, lead them to put questions which no sound theory of
+Causation will answer; and they are ready to visit and trust any oracle
+which professes to deliver a confident affirmative solution of such
+questions. Among all the terms employed by metaphysicians, none is used
+in a greater variety of meanings than the term Cause.
+
+In Mr Mill's next chapter (xvi.) he comments on Sir W. Hamilton's
+doctrine of Concepts or General Notions. There are portions of this
+chapter with which we agree less than with most other parts of the
+volume; especially with his marked hostility to the term _Concept_, and
+the reasons given for it, which reasons appear to us not very consistent
+with what he has himself said in the 'System of Logic,' Book IV. chap.
+ii. § 1--3. The term _Concept_ has no necessary connection with the
+theory called Conceptualism. It is equally available to designate the
+idea called up by a general name, as understood either by Mr Bailey or
+by James Mill. We think it useful as an equivalent to the German word
+_Begriff_, which sense Sir W. Hamilton has in view when he introduces
+it, though he does not always adhere to his profession. And when Mr Mill
+says (p. 331)--
+
+     'I consider it nothing less than a misfortune, that the
+     words Concept, General Notion, or any other phrase to
+     express the supposed mental modification corresponding to a
+     general name, should ever have been invented.'
+
+we dissent from his opinion. To talk of 'the Concept of an individual,'
+however, as Mr Mansel does (pp. 338, 339), is improper and inconsistent
+with the purpose for which the name is given.
+
+We are more fully in harmony with Mr Mill in his two next chapters
+(xviii. et seq.) on Judgment and Reasoning; which are among the best
+chapters in this volume. He there combats and overthrows the theory of
+Reasoning laid down by Sir W. Hamilton; but we doubt the propriety of
+his calling this 'the Conceptualist theory' (pp. 367, 368); since it has
+nothing to do with Conceptualism, in the special sense of antithesis to
+Realism and Nominalism,--but is, in fact, the theory of the Syllogism as
+given in the Analytics of Aristotle, and generally admitted since. Not
+merely Conceptualists, but (to use Mr Mill's own language, p. 366)
+'nearly all the writers on logic, taught a theory of the science too
+small and narrow to contain their own facts.' Such, indeed, was the
+theory constantly taught until the publication of Mr Mill's 'System of
+Logic;' the first two books of which corrected it, by arguments which
+are reinforced and amplified in these two chapters on Judgment and
+Reasoning, as well as in the two chapters next following--chaps, xx. and
+xxi.--('Is Logic the Science of the Forms of Thought--On the
+Fundamental Laws of Thought.') The contrast which is there presented, in
+many different ways, between the limited theory of logic taught by Sir
+W. Hamilton and Mr Mansel, and the enlarged theory of Mr Mill, is
+instructive in a high degree. We consider Mr Mill as the real preserver
+of all that is valuable in Formal Logic, from the unfortunate
+consequences of an erroneous estimate, brought upon it through the
+exaggerated pretensions of logicians. When Sir W. Hamilton contrasts it
+pointedly with physical science (of which he talks with a sort of
+supercilious condescension, in one of the worst passages of his
+writings, p. 401)--when all its apparent fruits were produced in the
+shape of ingenious but barren verbal technicalities--what hope could be
+entertained that Formal Logic could hold its ground in the estimation of
+the recent generation of scientific men? Mr Mill has divested it of that
+assumed demonstrative authority which Bacon called 'regere res per
+syllogismum;' but he has at the same time given to it a firm root amidst
+the generalities of objective science. He has shown that in the great
+problem of Evidence or Proof, the Laws of Formal Logic, though bearing
+only on one part of the entire procedure, yet bear upon one essential
+part, proper to be studied separately: and that the maintenance of
+consistency between our affirmations (which is the only special province
+of Formal Logic), has great importance and value as a part of the
+process necessary for ascertaining and vindicating their truth, or
+exposing their character when false or uncertified--but no importance or
+value except as a part of that larger exigency.
+
+While Mr Mill was amending the Syllogistic theory so as to ensure for
+Formal Logic its legitimate place among the essentials of scientific
+procedure, Sir W. Hamilton was at the same time enlarging it on its
+technical side, in two modes which are highly esteemed both by himself
+and by others: 1. The recognition of two kinds of Syllogisms; one in
+Extension, the other in Comprehension: 2. The doctrine of the
+Quantification of the Predicate.--Both these novelties are here
+criticised by Mr Mill in chapter xxii., which we recommend the reader to
+peruse conjointly with Lectures 15 and 16 of Sir W. Hamilton on Logic.
+
+Now whereas the main objection, by which the study of the syllogistic
+logic has been weighed down and discredited in modern times, is this,
+that it encumbers the memory with formal distinctions, having no useful
+application to the real process and purposes of reasoning--the procedure
+of Sir W. Hamilton might almost lead us to imagine that he himself was
+trying to aggravate that objection to the uttermost. He introduces a
+variety of new canons (classifying Syllogisms as Extensive and
+Intensive, by a distinction founded on the double quantity of notions,
+in Extension and in Comprehension) which he intimates that all former
+logicians have neglected--while it plainly appears, even on his own
+showing, that the difference between syllogisms, in respect to these two
+sorts of quantity, is of no practical value; and that 'we can always
+change a categorical syllogism of the one quantity into a categorical
+syllogism of the other, by reversing the order of the two premises, and
+by reversing the meaning of the copula' (Lect. xvi. p. 296); nay, that
+every syllogism is already a syllogism in both quantities (Mill, p.
+431). Against these useless ceremonial reforms of Sir W. Hamilton, we
+may set the truly philosophical explanation here given by Mr Mill of the
+meaning of propositions.
+
+     'All judgments' (he says--p. 423), 'except where both the
+     terms are proper names, are really judgments in
+     Comprehension; though it is customary, and the natural
+     tendency of the mind, to express most of them in terms of
+     Extension. In other words, we never really predicate
+     anything but attributes; though, in the usage of language,
+     we commonly predicate them by means of words which are names
+     of concrete objects--because' (p. 426)--'we have no other
+     convenient and compact mode of speaking. Most attributes,
+     and nearly all large bundles of attributes, have no names of
+     their own. We can only name them by a circumlocution. We are
+     accustomed to speak of attributes, not by names given to
+     themselves, but by means of the names which they give to the
+     objects they are attributes of.' 'All our ordinary
+     judgments' (p. 428) 'are in Comprehension only; Extension
+     not being thought of. But we may, if we please, make the
+     Extension of our general terms an express object of thought.
+     When I judge that all oxen ruminate, I have nothing in my
+     thoughts but the attributes and their co-existence. But when
+     by reflection I perceive what the proposition implies, I
+     remark that other things may ruminate besides oxen, and that
+     the unknown multitude of things which ruminate form a mass,
+     with which the unknown multitude of things having the
+     attributes of oxen is either identical or is wholly
+     comprised in it. Which of these two is the truth I may not
+     know, and if I did, took no notice of it when I assented to
+     the proposition, all oxen ruminate; but I perceive, on
+     consideration, that one or other of them must be true.
+     Though I had not this in my mind when I affirmed that all
+     oxen ruminate, I can have it now; I can make the concrete
+     objects denoted by each of the two names an object of
+     thought, as a collective though indefinite aggregate; in
+     other words, I can make the Extension of the names (or
+     notions) an object of direct consciousness. When I do this,
+     I perceive that this operation introduces no new fact, but
+     is only a different mode of contemplating the very fact
+     which I had previously expressed by the words, all oxen
+     ruminate. The fact is the same, but the mode of
+     contemplating it is different. There is thus in all
+     Propositions a judgment concerning attributes (called by Sir
+     W. Hamilton a Judgment in Comprehension) which we make as a
+     matter of course; and a possible judgment in or concerning
+     Extension, which we _may_ make, and which will be true if
+     the former is true.'
+
+From the lucid explanation here cited (and from a following paragraph
+too long to describe p. 433), we see that there is no real distinction
+between Judgments in Comprehension and Judgments in Extension; that the
+_appearance_ of distinction between them arises from the customary mode
+of enunciation, which custom is here accounted for; that the addition to
+the theory of the Syllogism, for which Sir W. Hamilton takes credit, is
+alike troublesome and unprofitable.
+
+The like may also be said about his other innovation, the Quantification
+of the Predicate. Still more extensive are the changes (as stated by
+himself) which this innovation would introduce in the canons of
+Syllogism. Indeed, when we read his language (Appendix to 'Lectures on
+Logic,' pp. 291--297) censuring generally the prior logicians from
+Aristotle downwards, and contending that 'more than half the value of
+logic had been lost' by their manner of handling it--we may appreciate
+the magnitude of the reform which he believed himself to be introducing.
+The larger the reform, the more it behoved him to be sure of the ground
+on which he was proceeding. But on this point we remark a serious
+deficiency. After laying down, with appropriate emphasis, the valuable
+logical postulate, _to state explicitly what is thought implicitly_, on
+which, Sir W. Hamilton says,
+
+     'Logic ever insists, but which logicians have never fairly
+     obeyed--it follows that logically we ought to take into
+     account the quantity, _always understood in thought_, but
+     usually, and for manifest reasons, elided in expression, not
+     only of the _subject_, but also of the _predicate_, of a
+     judgment.'--('Discussions on Philos.,' p. 614.)
+
+Here Sir W. Hamilton assumes that the quantity of the predicate is
+always understood in thought; and the same assumption is often repeated,
+in the Appendix to his 'Lectures on Logic,' p. 291 and elsewhere, as if
+it was alike obvious and incontestable. Now it is precisely on this
+point that issue is here taken with Sir W. Hamilton. Mr Mill denies
+altogether (p. 437) that the quantity of the predicate is always
+understood or present in thought, and appeals to every reader's
+consciousness for an answer:--
+
+     'Does he, when he judges that all oxen ruminate, advert even
+     in the minutest degree to the question, whether there is
+     anything else that ruminates? Is this consideration at all
+     in his thoughts, any more than any other consideration
+     foreign to the immediate subject? One person may know that
+     there are other ruminating animals, another may think that
+     there are none, a third may be without any opinion on the
+     subject; but if they all know what is meant by ruminating,
+     they all, when they judge that every ox ruminates, mean
+     precisely the same thing. The mental process they go
+     through, _as far as that one judgment is concerned_, is
+     precisely identical; though some of them may go on farther,
+     and _add other judgments_ to it.'
+
+The last sentence cited from Mr Mill indicates the vice of Sir W.
+Hamilton's proceeding in quantifying the predicate, and explains why it
+was that logicians before him declined to do so. Sir W. Hamilton, in
+this proceeding, insists on stating explicitly, not merely all that is
+thought implicitly, but a great deal more;[14] adding to it something
+else, which _may_, indeed, be thought conjointly, but which more
+frequently _is not_ thought at all. He requires us to pack two distinct
+judgments into one and the same proposition: he interpolates the meaning
+of the Propositio Conversa _simpliciter_ into the form of the Propositio
+Convertenda (when an universal Affirmative), and then claims it as a
+great advantage, that the proposition thus interpolated admits of being
+converted _simpliciter_, and not merely _per accidens_. Mr Mill is,
+nevertheless, of opinion (pp. 439-443) that though 'the quantified
+syllogism is not a true expression of what is in thought, yet writing
+the predicate with a quantification may be sometimes a real help to the
+Art of Logic.' We see little advantage in providing a new complicated
+form, for the purpose of expressing in one proposition what naturally
+throws itself into two, and may easily be expressed in two. If a man is
+prepared to give us information on one Quaesitum, why should he be
+constrained to use a mode of speech which forces on his attention at the
+same time a second and distinct Quaesitum--so that he must either give
+us information about the two at once, or confess himself ignorant
+respecting the second?
+
+The two next chapters of Mr Mill, noticing some other minor
+peculiarities (all of them unfortunate, and one, p. 447, really
+unaccountable) of Sir W. Hamilton's Formal Logic; and some Fallacious
+Modes of Thought countenanced by Sir W. Hamilton (chs. xxiii.,
+xxiv.--pp. 446, 478), we are compelled to pass over. We must find space,
+however, for a few words on the Freedom of the Will (ch. xxv.), which
+(in Mr Mill's language, pp. 488--549), 'was so fundamental with Sir W.
+Hamilton, that it may be regarded as the central idea of his system--the
+determining cause of most of his philosophical opinions.' Prior to Sir
+W. Hamilton, we find some writers who maintain the doctrine of
+Free-will, others who maintain that of Necessity: each supporting their
+respective conclusions by reasons which they deem sufficient. Sir W.
+Hamilton declares that both the one doctrine and the other are
+inconceivable and incomprehensible; yet that, by the law of Excluded
+Middle, one or other of them must be true: and he decides in favour of
+Free-will, of which he believes himself to be distinctly conscious;
+moreover, Free-will is essential (he thinks) to moral responsibility, of
+which also he feels himself conscious. He confesses himself, however,
+unable to explain the possibility of Free-will; but he maintains that
+the same may be said about Necessity also. 'The champions of both the
+two opposite doctrines are at once resistless in attack, and impotent in
+defence'--(Hamilton's 'Footnotes on Reid,' p. 602.) Mr Mansel also
+asserts, even more confidently than Sir W. Hamilton, that we are
+directly conscious of Free-will--(p. 503).
+
+Sir W. Hamilton has himself given some of the best arguments against the
+doctrine of Free-will, in refutation of Reid: arguments, some of which
+are here cited by Mr Mill with praise which they well deserve--(pp. 497,
+498). But Mr Mill's own reasoning on the same side is of a still higher
+order, enlarging the grounds previously urged in the last book of his
+'System of Logic,' He protests against the term _Necessity_; and
+discards the idea of Necessity, if it be understood to imply anything
+more than invariability of antecedence and consequence. If it mean
+_that_, experience proves thus much about antecedents in the world of
+mind, as in the world of matter: if it mean more, experience does not
+prove more, either in the world of matter or in the world of mind: nor
+have we any grounds for affirming it in either--(p. 501.) If it were
+true, therefore, that consciousness attested Free-will, we should find
+the testimony of consciousness opposed to a full proof from experience
+and induction. But does consciousness really attest what is called
+Free-will? Mr Mill analyzes the case, and declares in the negative.
+
+     'To be conscious of Free-will, must mean to be conscious,
+     before I have decided, that I am able to decide either way;
+     exception may be taken _in limine_ to the use of the word
+     _consciousness_ in such an application. Consciousness tells
+     me what I do or feel. But what I am _able_ to do, is not a
+     subject of consciousness. Consciousness is not prophetic; we
+     are conscious of what is, not of what will or can be. We
+     never know that we are able to do a thing, except from
+     having done it, or something similar to it. Having acted, we
+     know, as far as that experience reaches, how we are able to
+     act; _and this knowledge, when it has become familiar, is
+     often confounded with, and called by, the name of
+     consciousness._ But it does not derive any increase of
+     authority from being misnamed: its truth is not supreme
+     over, but depends upon, experience. If our so-called
+     consciousness is not borne out by experience, it is a
+     delusion. It has no title to credence, but as an
+     interpretation of experience; and if it is a false
+     interpretation, it must give way.'--pp. 503, 504
+
+After this salutary and much-needed warning against the confusion
+between consciousness as an infallible authority, and belief upon
+experience, of which we are conscious as a belief--Mr Mill proceeds to
+sift the alleged self-evident connection between Free-will and
+Accountability. He shows, not merely that there is no connection, but
+that there is a positive repugnance, between the two. By Free-will is
+meant that a volition is not determined by motives, but is a spontaneous
+mental fact, neither having a cause, nor admitting of being predicted.
+Now, the very reason for giving notice that we intend to punish certain
+acts, and for inflicting punishment if the acts be committed, is, that
+we trust in the efficacy of the threat and the punishment as deterring
+motives. If the volition of agents be not influenced by motives, the
+whole machinery of law becomes unavailing, and punishment a purposeless
+infliction of pain. In fact, it is on that very ground that the madman
+is exempted from punishment; his volition being presumed to be not
+capable of being acted upon by the deterring motive of legal sanction.
+The _free_ agent, thus understood, is one who can neither feel himself
+accountable, nor be rendered accountable, to or by others. It is only
+the _necessary_ agent (the person whose volitions are determined by
+motives, and, in case of conflict, by the strongest desire or the
+strongest apprehension) that can be held really accountable, or can
+feel himself to be so.
+
+     'The true doctrine of the Causation of human actions (says
+     Mr Mill, p. 516) maintains, in opposition both to pure and
+     to modified Fatalism, that not only our conduct, but our
+     character, is in part amenable to our will: that we can, by
+     employing the proper means, improve our character: and that
+     if our character is such that, while it remains what it is,
+     it necessitates us to do wrong--it will be just to apply
+     motives which will necessitate us to strive for its
+     improvement. We shall not indeed do so unless we desire our
+     improvement, and desire it more than we dislike the means
+     which must he employed for the purpose.'
+
+It thus appears that of the two propositions, 1, volitions are
+necessary, or depend on causes; 2, volitions are free, or do not depend
+on causes--neither the one nor the other is inconceivable or
+incomprehensible, as Sir W. Hamilton supposed them to be. That the first
+is true, and the second false, we learn by experience, and by that
+alone; just as we learn the like in regard to the phenomena of the
+material world. Indeed, the fact that human volitions are both
+predictable and modifiable, quite as much as all those physical
+phenomena that depend upon a complication of causes--which is only a
+corollary from what has just been said--is so universally recognized and
+acted upon by all men, that there would probably be little difference of
+opinion about this question, if the antithesis were not obscured and
+mystified by the familiar, but equivocal, phrases of Free-will and
+Necessity.
+
+Passing over chapter xxvii., in which Mr Mill refutes Sir W. Hamilton's
+opinion that the study of mathematics is worthless, or nearly so, as an
+intellectual discipline--we shall now call attention to the concluding
+remarks which sum up the results of the volume. After saying that he
+'differs from almost everything in Sir W. Hamilton's philosophy, on
+which he particularly valued himself, or which is specially his own,'
+Mr Mill describes Sir W. Hamilton's general merits as follows:--
+
+     'They chiefly consist in his clear and distinct mode of
+     bringing before the reader many of the fundamental questions
+     of metaphysics: some good specimens of psychological
+     analysis on a small scale: and the many detached logical and
+     psychological truths which he has separately seized, and
+     which are scattered through his writings, mostly applied to
+     resolve some special difficulty, and again lost sight of. I
+     can hardly point to anything he has done towards helping the
+     more thorough understanding of the greater mental phenomena,
+     unless it be his theory of Attention (including
+     Abstraction), which seems to me the most perfect we have;
+     but the subject, though a highly important, is comparatively
+     a simple one.'--p. 547.
+
+Agreeing in this general view of Sir W. Hamilton's merits, we should be
+disposed to describe them in language stronger and more emphatic as to
+degree, than that which has just been cited. But what is stated in the
+pages immediately following (pp. 550, 551)--That Sir W. Hamilton's
+doctrines appear to be usually taken up under the stimulus of some
+special dispute, and often afterwards forgotten; That he did not think
+out subjects until they were thoroughly mastered, or until consistency
+was attained between the different views which the author took from
+different points of observation; That accordingly, his philosophy seems
+made up of scraps from several conflicting metaphysical systems--All
+this is literally and amply borne out by the many inconsistencies and
+contradictions which Mr Mill has brought to view in the preceding
+chapters. It would appear that the controversial disposition was
+powerful with Sir W. Hamilton, and that a present impulse of that sort
+(as has been said respecting Bayle, Burke, and others) not only served
+to provoke new intellectual combinations in his mind, but also
+exercised a Lethæan influence in causing obliviscence of the old. But we
+can hardly follow Mr Mill in ascribing the defect to 'excessive
+absorption of time and energy by the study of old writers' (p. 551). If
+this study did no other good, it at least kept the memory in exercise.
+Now, what surprises us most in Sir W. Hamilton's inconsistencies, is the
+amount of self-forgetfulness which they imply.
+
+While the laborious erudition of Sir W. Hamilton cannot be fairly
+regarded as having produced any of his intellectual defects, it
+undoubtedly stamped upon him his special title of excellence as a
+philosopher. This is fully recognized by Mr Mill; though he treats it as
+belonging not so much to a philosopher as to an historian of philosophy.
+He concludes (pp. 552--554):--
+
+     'It is much to be regretted that Sir W. Hamilton did not
+     write the history of philosophy, instead of choosing, as
+     the direct object of his intellectual exertions, philosophy
+     itself. He possessed a knowledge of the materials such as no
+     one, probably for many generations, will take the trouble of
+     acquiring again. Independently of the great interest and
+     value attaching to a knowledge of the historical development
+     of speculation, there is much in the old writers on
+     philosophy, even those of the middle ages, really worth
+     preserving for its scientific value. But this should be
+     extracted, and rendered into the phraseology of modern
+     thought, by persons as familiar with that as with the
+     ancient, and possessing a command of its language: a
+     combination never yet so perfectly realized as in Sir W.
+     Hamilton. This, which no one but himself could have done, he
+     has left undone, and has given us, instead, a contribution
+     to mental philosophy, which has been more than equalled by
+     many not superior to him in powers, and wholly destitute of
+     erudition. Of all persons in modern times entitled to the
+     name of philosophers, the two, probably, whose reading on
+     the subject was the scantiest, in proportion to their
+     intellectual capacity, were Archbishop Whately and Dr Brown.
+     Accordingly they are the only two of whom Sir W. Hamilton,
+     though acknowledging their abilities, speaks with some
+     tinge of superciliousness. It cannot be denied that both Dr
+     Brown and Whately would have thought and written better than
+     they did, if they had been better read in the writings of
+     previous thinkers; but I am not afraid that posterity will
+     contradict me when I say, that either of them has done far
+     greater service to the world in the origination and
+     diffusion of important thought, than Sir W. Hamilton with
+     all his learning; because, though indolent readers, they
+     were both of them active and fertile thinkers.
+
+     'It is not that Sir W. Hamilton's erudition is not
+     frequently of real use to him on particular questions of
+     philosophy. It does him one valuable service: it enables him
+     to know all the various opinions which can be held on the
+     questions he discusses, and to conceive and express them
+     clearly, leaving none of them out. This it does, though even
+     this not always; but it does little else, even of what might
+     be expected from erudition when enlightened by philosophy.
+     He knew, with extraordinary accuracy, the [Greek: hoti] of
+     each philosopher's opinions, but gave himself little trouble
+     about the [Greek: dihoti]. With one exception, I find no
+     remark bearing upon that point in any part of his writings.
+     I imagine he would have been much at a loss if he had been
+     required to draw up a philosophical estimate of the mind of
+     any great thinker. He never seems to look at any opinion of
+     a philosopher in connection with the same philosopher's
+     other opinions. Accordingly he is weak as to the mutual
+     relations of philosophical doctrines. One of the most
+     striking examples of this inability is in the case of
+     Leibnitz,' &c.
+
+Here we find in a few sentences the conclusion which Mr Mill conceives
+to be established by his book. We shall state how far we are able to
+concur with it. He has brought the matter to a direct issue, by weighing
+Sir W. Hamilton in the balance against two other actual cotemporaries;
+instead of comparing him with some unrealized ideal found only in the
+fancy of critics and reviewers.
+
+Comparing Sir W. Hamilton with Dr Brown, we cordially subscribe to the
+opinion of Mr Mill. We think that Dr Brown has 'done far greater
+service to the world than Sir W. Hamilton, in the origination and
+diffusion of important thought.' To speak only of two chief subjects in
+the field of important thought--Causality and the Freedom of the
+Will--we not only adopt the conclusions of Dr Brown, but we admire both
+his acuteness and his originality in vindicating and illustrating the
+first of the two, while we dissent entirely from the views of Sir W.
+Hamilton. This alone would be sufficient to make us approve the
+superiority assigned by Mr Mill to Dr Brown. We discover no compensating
+item to be placed to the credit of Sir W. Hamilton: for the great
+doctrine of the Relativity of Knowledge, which is our chief point of
+philosophical brotherhood with him, was maintained by Brown also.
+
+But in regard to Dr Whately, our judgment is altogether different. We
+cannot consent to admit him as a superior, or even as an equal, to Sir
+W. Hamilton, 'in the origination and diffusion of important thought.' He
+did much service by reviving an inclination and respect for Logic, and
+by clearing up a part of the technical obscurity which surrounded it:
+but we look upon him as an acute and liberal-minded English theologian,
+enlarging usefully, though timidly, the intellectual prison in which
+many orthodox minds are confined--rather than as a fit aspirant to the
+cosmopolitan honours of philosophy. 'An active and fertile thinker,' Mr
+Mill calls Whately; and such he undoubtedly was. But such also we
+consider Sir W. Hamilton to have been in a degree, at least equal. If
+the sentence which we have quoted above be intended to deny the
+predicate, 'active and fertile thinker,' of Sir W. Hamilton, we cannot
+acquiesce in it. His intellect appears to us thoroughly active and
+fertile, even when we dissent from his reasonings--nay, even in the
+midst of his inconsistencies, when a new growth of opinions is
+unexpectedly pushed up on ground which we supposed to be already
+pre-occupied by another both older and different. And we find this same
+judgment implied in the discriminating remarks upon his philosophical
+procedure made by Mr Mill himself--(pp. 271, 272). For example,
+respecting Causality and the Freedom of the Will, we detect no want of
+activity and fertility, though marked evidence of other
+defects--especially the unconditional surrender of a powerful mind to
+certain privileged inspirations, worshipped as 'necessities of thought.'
+
+While thus declaring how far we concur in the parallel here drawn of Sir
+W. Hamilton with Brown and Whately, we must at the same time add that
+the comparison is taken under circumstances unduly favourable to these
+two last. There has been no exposure of _their_ errors and
+inconsistencies, equal in penetration and completeness to the crushing
+volume which Mr Mill has devoted to Sir W. Hamilton. To make the odds
+fair, he ought to furnish a similar systematic examination to Brown and
+Whately; enabling us to read their works (as we now do those of Sir W.
+Hamilton) with the advantage of his unrivalled microscope, which detects
+the minutest breach or incoherence in the tissue of reasoning--and of
+his large command of philosophical premisses, which brings into full
+notice what the author had overlooked. Thus alone could the competition
+between the three be rendered perfectly fair.
+
+We regret, as Mr Mill does, that Sir W. Hamilton did not undertake the
+composition of a history of philosophy. Nevertheless we must confess
+that we should hardly feel such regret, if we could see evidence to
+warrant Mr Mill's judgment (p. 554) that Sir W. Hamilton was
+'indifferent to the [Greek: dihoti] of a man's opinions, and that he was
+incompetent to draw up an estimate of the opinions of any great
+thinker,' &c. Such incompetence, if proved to be frequent and
+considerable, would deprive an author of all chance of success in
+writing a history of philosophy. But the study of Sir William Hamilton's
+works does not prove it to us, though Mr Mill has convicted him of an
+erroneous estimate of Leibnitz. We say _frequent_ and _considerable_,
+because no historian of philosophy is exempt from the defect more or
+less; or rather (to pass out of the self-confidence of the Absolute into
+the modesty of the Relative) we seldom find any historian whose estimate
+of great philosophical thinkers does not often differ from our own.
+Hence we are glad when ample original extracts are produced, enabling us
+to test the historian, and judge for ourselves--a practice which Sir W.
+Hamilton would have required no stimulus to enforce upon him. There
+ought, indeed, to be various histories of philosophy, composed from
+different points of view; for the ablest historian cannot get clear of
+a certain exclusiveness belonging to himself. But, so far as we can
+conjecture what Sir W. Hamilton _would_ or _could_ have done, we think
+that a history of philosophy composed by him would have surpassed any
+work of the kind in our language.
+
+We trust that Sir W. Hamilton's works will long continue to be read,
+along with Mr Mill's examination of them; and we should be glad if the
+works of other philosophers could be read along with a comment of equal
+acuteness and impartiality. Any point of view which could command the
+adherence of such a mind as Sir W. Hamilton's, deserves to be fully
+considered. Moreover, the living force of philosophy, as directress of
+human intelligence, depends upon keeping up in each of her devotees a
+full mastery of many divergent and opposite veins of reasoning--a
+knowledge, negative and affirmative, of the full case of opponents as
+well as of his own.
+
+It is to Philosophy alone that _our_ allegiance is sworn; and while we
+concur mostly with Mr Mill's opinions, we number both him and Sir W.
+Hamilton as a noble pair of brethren, serving alike in her train.
+
+_Amicus Hamilton; magis amicus Mill; amica ante omnes Philosophia._
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 1: Mr Mansel and Mr Veitch, the editors of Sir W. Hamilton's
+Lectures on Metaphysics, posthumously published, say in their preface
+(p. xiii.)--
+
+'For twenty years--from 1836 to 1856--the courses of logic and
+metaphysics were the means through which Sir William Hamilton sought to
+discipline and imbue with his philosophical opinions the numerous youth
+who gathered from Scotland and other countries to his classroom; and
+while, by these prelections, the author supplemented, developed, and
+moulded the national philosophy, leaving thereon the ineffaceable
+impress of his genius and learning, he, at the same time and by the same
+means, exercised over the intellects and feelings of his pupils an
+influence which, for depth, feeling, and elevation, was certainly never
+surpassed by that of any philosophical instructor. Among his pupils
+there are not a few who, having lived for a season under the
+constraining power of his intellect, and been led to reflect on those
+great questions regarding the character, origin, and bounds of human
+knowledge, which his teaching stirred and quickened, bear the memory of
+their beloved and revered instructor inseparably blended with what is
+highest in their present intellectual life, as well as in their
+practical aims and aspirations.']
+
+[Footnote 2: We are happy to find such high authorities as Dr Whewell,
+Mr Samuel Bailey, and Sir John Herschel concurring in this estimation of
+the new logical point of view thus opened by Mr Mill. We will not call
+it a _discovery_, since Sir John Herschel thinks the expression
+unsuitable.--See the recent sixth edition of the 'System of Logic,' vol.
+i. p. 229.]
+
+[Footnote 3: See Sir William. Hamilton's 'Lectures on Logic' (Lect.
+xvii. p. 320, 321; also Appendix to those Lectures, p. 361). He here
+distinguishes also formal induction from, material induction, which
+latter he brings under the grasp of syllogism, by an hypothesis in
+substance similar to that of Whately. There is, however, in Lecture xix.
+(p. 380), a passage in a very different spirit, which one might almost
+imagine to have been written by Mr Mill: 'In regard to simple
+syllogisms, it was an original dogma of the Platonic school, and an
+early dogma of the Peripatetic, that science, strictly so called, was
+only conversant with, and was exclusively contained in, universals; and
+the doctrine of Aristotle, which taught that all our general knowledge
+is only an induction from an observation of particulars, was too easily
+forgotten or perverted by his followers. It thus obtained almost the
+force of an acknowledged principle that everything to be known must be
+known under some general form or notion. Hence the exaggerated
+importance attributed to definition and deduction; it not being
+considered that we only take out of a general notion what we had
+previously placed therein, and that the amplification of our knowledge
+is not to be sought for from above but from below--not from speculation
+about abstract generalities, but from the observation of concrete
+particulars. Bat however erroneous and irrational, the persuasion had
+its day and influence, and it perhaps determined, as one of its effects,
+the total neglect of one half, and that not the least important half of
+the reasoning process.'
+
+These very just observations are suggested to Sir William Hamilton by a
+train of thought which has little natural tendency to suggest them,
+viz., by the distinction upon which he so much insists, between the
+logic of comprehension and the logic of extension, and by his anxiety to
+explain why the former had been exclusively cultivated and the latter
+neglected.
+
+That which Sir William Hamilton calls here truly the doctrine of
+Aristotle (enunciated especially at the close of the Analyt. Post.), and
+which he states to have been forgotten by Aristotle's followers, was not
+always remembered by Aristotle himself.]
+
+[Footnote 4: The distinction is given by Stier and other logicians. 1.
+Infinitum simpliciter. 2. Infinitum secundum quid, sive in certo
+genere.]
+
+[Footnote 5: This doctrine has been affirmed (so far as reason is
+concerned, apart from revelation) not merely by Mr Mansel, but also by
+Pascal, one of the most religious philosophers of the seventeenth
+century, in the 'Pensées':--
+
+'Parlons selon les lumieres naturelles. S'il y a un Dieu, il est
+infiniment incompréhensible; puisque, n'ayant ni principes ni bornes, il
+n'a nul rapport à nous; nous sommes done incapables de connâitre ni ce
+qn'il est, ni s'il est.'--(See Arago, Biographie de Condorcet, p.
+lxxxiv., prefixed to his edition of Condorcet's works.)]
+
+[Footnote 6: The indictment under which Socrates was condemned at
+Athens, as reported by Xenophon at the commencement of the Memorabilia,
+ran thus--'Socrates is guilty of crime, inasmuch as he does not believe
+in those Gods in whom the City believes, but introduces other novelties
+in regard to the Gods; he is guilty also, inasmuch as he corrupts the
+youth.'
+
+These words express clearly a sentiment entertained not merely by the
+Athenian people, but generally by other societies also. They all agree
+in antipathy to free, individual, dissenting reason; though that
+antipathy manifests itself by acts, more harsh in one place, less harsh
+in another. The Hindoo who declares himself a convert to Christianity,
+becomes at the same time an outcast ([Greek: _aphrhêtôr, athhemistos,
+anhestios_]) among those whose Gods he has deserted. As a general fact,
+the man who dissents from his fellows upon fundamentals of religion,
+purchases an undisturbed life only by being content with that
+'semi-liberty under silence and concealment,' for which Cicero was
+thankful under the dictatorship of Julius Cæsar. 'Obsecro--abiiciamus
+ista et semi-liberi saltern, simus; quod assequemur _et tacendo et
+latendo'_ (Epist. ad Attic, xiii. 31). Contrast with this the memorable
+declaration of Socrates, in the Platonic Apology, that silence and
+abstinence from cross-examination were intolerable to him; that life
+would not be worth having under such conditions.]
+
+[Footnote 7: Aeschyl. Prometh., 996-1006--
+
+  pros tauta, rhipthesthô men aithaloussa phlox,
+  leykoptherps de niphadi kai bronthêmasin
+  chthonhiois kykhatô phanta kahi tarasshetô
+  gnhampsei gar ouden tôndhe m'----
+  eiselthetô se mhêpot, hôs egô, Dios
+  gnhômên phobêtheis, thêlhynoys genhêsomai,
+  kai liparhêsô ton mhega stygohymenon
+  gynaikomhimois hyptihysmasin cherhôn,
+  lyshai me dhesmôn tônde toy pantos oheô.
+
+Also v. 1047, et seq. The memorable ode of Goethe, entitled
+_Prometheus_, embodies a similar vein of sentiment in the finest
+poetry.]
+
+[Footnote 8: Euripid Hippol., 10--
+
+  (Aph) oh gar me thaeseos pais, 'Amazonos tokos
+  monos politon taesde gaes Troizaenias
+  legei kakistaen daimonon pephukenai
+  Phoibou d' adelphaen Artemin,--
+  tima, megiotaen daimonon aegoumenos--
+
+  (Hipp.) taen saen dhe Khyprin pholl' hegô Chairein lhego--
+  (112.)
+
+See also v. 1328--1402.]
+
+[Footnote 9: Herodot. t. 32. O Kroise, epistumenon me to theion pan eohn
+phthonerohn te kai taraxodes, epeirotas ahnthropaeion pragmhaton pheri;
+also iii. 40]
+
+[Footnote 10: See Eurip. Hipp., 6-96-149. The language of the attendant,
+after his affectionate remonstrance to Hippolytus had been disregarded,
+supplicating Aphroditê to pardon the recalcitrancy of that virtuous but
+obstinate youth, is characteristic and touching (114-120.)]
+
+[Footnote 11: See especially his chapter ii. on the Sensations of Sight,
+pp. 222, 241--247, in the second edition of this work.]
+
+[Footnote 12: Descartes says, in his 'Principia Philosophiæ,' i 51--'Et
+quidem substantia quæ nullâ planè re indigeat, unica tantum potest
+intelligi--nempe Deus. Alias vero omnes, non nisi ope concursûs Dei
+existere posse perspicimus. Atque ideo nomen substantiæ non convenit Deo
+et illis _univocè_, ut dici solet in scholis, hoc est, nulla ejus
+nominis significatio potest distinctè intelligi, quæ Deo et creaturis
+sit communis.']
+
+[Footnote 13: At the same time, we cannot go along with Mr Mill in the
+following affirmation (p. 201):--
+
+'This natural probability is converted into certainty when we take into
+consideration that universal law of our experience which is termed the
+Law of Causation, and which makes us _unable to conceive the beginning
+of anything without_ an antecedent condition, _or cause.'_ Such
+'inability to conceive' appears to us not in correspondence with facts.
+First, it cannot be properly either affirmed or denied, until agreement
+is obtained what the word _cause_ means. If three persons, A, B, and C,
+agree in affirming it--A adopting the meaning of Aristotle, B that of
+Sir William Hamilton, and C that of Mr Mill--the agreement is purely
+verbal; or rather, all three concur in having a mental exigency pressing
+for satisfaction, but differ as to the hypothesis which satisfies it.
+
+Next, if we reason upon Mr Mill's theory as to Cause, certainly those
+who deny his theory can have no difficulty in conceiving events without
+any cause (in that sense): nor have those who adopt this theory any
+greater difficulty. These latter _believe_ that there are, throughout,
+constant and uniform conditions on which the occurrence of every event
+depends; but they can perfectly _conceive_ events as occurring without
+any such uniform sequence. In truth, the belief in such causation, as
+pervading _all nature_, is an acquired result of scientific training.
+The greater part of mankind believe that some events occur in regular,
+others in irregular succession. Moreover, a full half of the
+metaphysical world espouse the doctrine of free-will, and consider that
+all volitions occur without any cause at all.]
+
+[Footnote 14: Among the various authorities (upon this question of
+quantifying the predicate) collected by Sir W. Hamilton in the valuable
+Appendix to his 'Lectures on Logic,' we find one (p. 311) which takes
+the same ground of objection as Mr Mill, in these words:--'The cause why
+the quantitative note is not usually joined with the predicate, is, that
+there would thus be two _quæsita_ at once; to wit, whether the predicate
+were affirmed of the subject, and whether it were denied of everything
+beside. For when we say, _all man is all rational_, we judge that _all
+man is rational_, and judge likewise _that rational is denied of
+everything but man_. But these are, in reality, two different _quæsita_;
+and therefore it has become usual to state them, not in one, but in two
+several propositions. And this is self-evident, seeing that a
+_quæsitum_, in itself, asks only--_Does or does not this inhere in
+that?_ and _not_ Does or does not this inhere in that, _and at the same
+time inhere in nothing else?_'
+
+The author of this just and sagacious remark--much surpassing what the
+other writers quoted in the Appendix say--was a Jew who died at
+Perpignan in or near 1370, named Levi Ben Gerson or Gersonides. An
+interesting account of this man, eminent as a writer and thinker in his
+age, will be found in a biography by Dr Joel, published at Breslau in
+1862, 'Levi Ben Gerson als Religions--philosoph.' He distinguished
+himself as a writer on theology, philosophy, and astronomy; he was one
+of the successors to the free speculative vein of Maimonides, and one of
+the continuators of the Arabic Aristotelian philosophy. He both
+commented on and combated the doctrines of Averroes. Dr Joel thinks that
+he died earlier than 1370.]
+
+
+
+
+
+End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Review of the Work of Mr John Stuart
+Mill Entitled, 'Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy.', by George Grote
+
+*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK REVIEW OF MR JOHN STUART MILL ***
+
+***** This file should be named 12002-8.txt or 12002-8.zip *****
+This and all associated files of various formats will be found in:
+        https://www.gutenberg.org/1/2/0/0/12002/
+
+Produced by The Online Distributed Proofreading Team.
+
+Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions
+will be renamed.
+
+Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no
+one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation
+(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without
+permission and without paying copyright royalties.  Special rules,
+set forth in the General Terms of Use part of this license, apply to
+copying and distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works to
+protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm concept and trademark.  Project
+Gutenberg is a registered trademark, and may not be used if you
+charge for the eBooks, unless you receive specific permission.  If you
+do not charge anything for copies of this eBook, complying with the
+rules is very easy.  You may use this eBook for nearly any purpose
+such as creation of derivative works, reports, performances and
+research.  They may be modified and printed and given away--you may do
+practically ANYTHING with public domain eBooks.  Redistribution is
+subject to the trademark license, especially commercial
+redistribution.
+
+
+
+*** START: FULL LICENSE ***
+
+THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG LICENSE
+PLEASE READ THIS BEFORE YOU DISTRIBUTE OR USE THIS WORK
+
+To protect the Project Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting the free
+distribution of electronic works, by using or distributing this work
+(or any other work associated in any way with the phrase "Project
+Gutenberg"), you agree to comply with all the terms of the Full Project
+Gutenberg-tm License (available with this file or online at
+https://gutenberg.org/license).
+
+
+Section 1.  General Terms of Use and Redistributing Project Gutenberg-tm
+electronic works
+
+1.A.  By reading or using any part of this Project Gutenberg-tm
+electronic work, you indicate that you have read, understand, agree to
+and accept all the terms of this license and intellectual property
+(trademark/copyright) agreement.  If you do not agree to abide by all
+the terms of this agreement, you must cease using and return or destroy
+all copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in your possession.
+If you paid a fee for obtaining a copy of or access to a Project
+Gutenberg-tm electronic work and you do not agree to be bound by the
+terms of this agreement, you may obtain a refund from the person or
+entity to whom you paid the fee as set forth in paragraph 1.E.8.
+
+1.B.  "Project Gutenberg" is a registered trademark.  It may only be
+used on or associated in any way with an electronic work by people who
+agree to be bound by the terms of this agreement.  There are a few
+things that you can do with most Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works
+even without complying with the full terms of this agreement.  See
+paragraph 1.C below.  There are a lot of things you can do with Project
+Gutenberg-tm electronic works if you follow the terms of this agreement
+and help preserve free future access to Project Gutenberg-tm electronic
+works.  See paragraph 1.E below.
+
+1.C.  The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation ("the Foundation"
+or PGLAF), owns a compilation copyright in the collection of Project
+Gutenberg-tm electronic works.  Nearly all the individual works in the
+collection are in the public domain in the United States.  If an
+individual work is in the public domain in the United States and you are
+located in the United States, we do not claim a right to prevent you from
+copying, distributing, performing, displaying or creating derivative
+works based on the work as long as all references to Project Gutenberg
+are removed.  Of course, we hope that you will support the Project
+Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting free access to electronic works by
+freely sharing Project Gutenberg-tm works in compliance with the terms of
+this agreement for keeping the Project Gutenberg-tm name associated with
+the work.  You can easily comply with the terms of this agreement by
+keeping this work in the same format with its attached full Project
+Gutenberg-tm License when you share it without charge with others.
+
+1.D.  The copyright laws of the place where you are located also govern
+what you can do with this work.  Copyright laws in most countries are in
+a constant state of change.  If you are outside the United States, check
+the laws of your country in addition to the terms of this agreement
+before downloading, copying, displaying, performing, distributing or
+creating derivative works based on this work or any other Project
+Gutenberg-tm work.  The Foundation makes no representations concerning
+the copyright status of any work in any country outside the United
+States.
+
+1.E.  Unless you have removed all references to Project Gutenberg:
+
+1.E.1.  The following sentence, with active links to, or other immediate
+access to, the full Project Gutenberg-tm License must appear prominently
+whenever any copy of a Project Gutenberg-tm work (any work on which the
+phrase "Project Gutenberg" appears, or with which the phrase "Project
+Gutenberg" is associated) is accessed, displayed, performed, viewed,
+copied or distributed:
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+1.E.2.  If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is derived
+from the public domain (does not contain a notice indicating that it is
+posted with permission of the copyright holder), the work can be copied
+and distributed to anyone in the United States without paying any fees
+or charges.  If you are redistributing or providing access to a work
+with the phrase "Project Gutenberg" associated with or appearing on the
+work, you must comply either with the requirements of paragraphs 1.E.1
+through 1.E.7 or obtain permission for the use of the work and the
+Project Gutenberg-tm trademark as set forth in paragraphs 1.E.8 or
+1.E.9.
+
+1.E.3.  If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is posted
+with the permission of the copyright holder, your use and distribution
+must comply with both paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 and any additional
+terms imposed by the copyright holder.  Additional terms will be linked
+to the Project Gutenberg-tm License for all works posted with the
+permission of the copyright holder found at the beginning of this work.
+
+1.E.4.  Do not unlink or detach or remove the full Project Gutenberg-tm
+License terms from this work, or any files containing a part of this
+work or any other work associated with Project Gutenberg-tm.
+
+1.E.5.  Do not copy, display, perform, distribute or redistribute this
+electronic work, or any part of this electronic work, without
+prominently displaying the sentence set forth in paragraph 1.E.1 with
+active links or immediate access to the full terms of the Project
+Gutenberg-tm License.
+
+1.E.6.  You may convert to and distribute this work in any binary,
+compressed, marked up, nonproprietary or proprietary form, including any
+word processing or hypertext form.  However, if you provide access to or
+distribute copies of a Project Gutenberg-tm work in a format other than
+"Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other format used in the official version
+posted on the official Project Gutenberg-tm web site (www.gutenberg.org),
+you must, at no additional cost, fee or expense to the user, provide a
+copy, a means of exporting a copy, or a means of obtaining a copy upon
+request, of the work in its original "Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other
+form.  Any alternate format must include the full Project Gutenberg-tm
+License as specified in paragraph 1.E.1.
+
+1.E.7.  Do not charge a fee for access to, viewing, displaying,
+performing, copying or distributing any Project Gutenberg-tm works
+unless you comply with paragraph 1.E.8 or 1.E.9.
+
+1.E.8.  You may charge a reasonable fee for copies of or providing
+access to or distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works provided
+that
+
+- You pay a royalty fee of 20% of the gross profits you derive from
+     the use of Project Gutenberg-tm works calculated using the method
+     you already use to calculate your applicable taxes.  The fee is
+     owed to the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark, but he
+     has agreed to donate royalties under this paragraph to the
+     Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation.  Royalty payments
+     must be paid within 60 days following each date on which you
+     prepare (or are legally required to prepare) your periodic tax
+     returns.  Royalty payments should be clearly marked as such and
+     sent to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation at the
+     address specified in Section 4, "Information about donations to
+     the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation."
+
+- You provide a full refund of any money paid by a user who notifies
+     you in writing (or by e-mail) within 30 days of receipt that s/he
+     does not agree to the terms of the full Project Gutenberg-tm
+     License.  You must require such a user to return or
+     destroy all copies of the works possessed in a physical medium
+     and discontinue all use of and all access to other copies of
+     Project Gutenberg-tm works.
+
+- You provide, in accordance with paragraph 1.F.3, a full refund of any
+     money paid for a work or a replacement copy, if a defect in the
+     electronic work is discovered and reported to you within 90 days
+     of receipt of the work.
+
+- You comply with all other terms of this agreement for free
+     distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm works.
+
+1.E.9.  If you wish to charge a fee or distribute a Project Gutenberg-tm
+electronic work or group of works on different terms than are set
+forth in this agreement, you must obtain permission in writing from
+both the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation and Michael
+Hart, the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark.  Contact the
+Foundation as set forth in Section 3 below.
+
+1.F.
+
+1.F.1.  Project Gutenberg volunteers and employees expend considerable
+effort to identify, do copyright research on, transcribe and proofread
+public domain works in creating the Project Gutenberg-tm
+collection.  Despite these efforts, Project Gutenberg-tm electronic
+works, and the medium on which they may be stored, may contain
+"Defects," such as, but not limited to, incomplete, inaccurate or
+corrupt data, transcription errors, a copyright or other intellectual
+property infringement, a defective or damaged disk or other medium, a
+computer virus, or computer codes that damage or cannot be read by
+your equipment.
+
+1.F.2.  LIMITED WARRANTY, DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES - Except for the "Right
+of Replacement or Refund" described in paragraph 1.F.3, the Project
+Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the owner of the Project
+Gutenberg-tm trademark, and any other party distributing a Project
+Gutenberg-tm electronic work under this agreement, disclaim all
+liability to you for damages, costs and expenses, including legal
+fees.  YOU AGREE THAT YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE, STRICT
+LIABILITY, BREACH OF WARRANTY OR BREACH OF CONTRACT EXCEPT THOSE
+PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH F3.  YOU AGREE THAT THE FOUNDATION, THE
+TRADEMARK OWNER, AND ANY DISTRIBUTOR UNDER THIS AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE
+LIABLE TO YOU FOR ACTUAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE OR
+INCIDENTAL DAMAGES EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH
+DAMAGE.
+
+1.F.3.  LIMITED RIGHT OF REPLACEMENT OR REFUND - If you discover a
+defect in this electronic work within 90 days of receiving it, you can
+receive a refund of the money (if any) you paid for it by sending a
+written explanation to the person you received the work from.  If you
+received the work on a physical medium, you must return the medium with
+your written explanation.  The person or entity that provided you with
+the defective work may elect to provide a replacement copy in lieu of a
+refund.  If you received the work electronically, the person or entity
+providing it to you may choose to give you a second opportunity to
+receive the work electronically in lieu of a refund.  If the second copy
+is also defective, you may demand a refund in writing without further
+opportunities to fix the problem.
+
+1.F.4.  Except for the limited right of replacement or refund set forth
+in paragraph 1.F.3, this work is provided to you 'AS-IS' WITH NO OTHER
+WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO
+WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTIBILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PURPOSE.
+
+1.F.5.  Some states do not allow disclaimers of certain implied
+warranties or the exclusion or limitation of certain types of damages.
+If any disclaimer or limitation set forth in this agreement violates the
+law of the state applicable to this agreement, the agreement shall be
+interpreted to make the maximum disclaimer or limitation permitted by
+the applicable state law.  The invalidity or unenforceability of any
+provision of this agreement shall not void the remaining provisions.
+
+1.F.6.  INDEMNITY - You agree to indemnify and hold the Foundation, the
+trademark owner, any agent or employee of the Foundation, anyone
+providing copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in accordance
+with this agreement, and any volunteers associated with the production,
+promotion and distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works,
+harmless from all liability, costs and expenses, including legal fees,
+that arise directly or indirectly from any of the following which you do
+or cause to occur: (a) distribution of this or any Project Gutenberg-tm
+work, (b) alteration, modification, or additions or deletions to any
+Project Gutenberg-tm work, and (c) any Defect you cause.
+
+
+Section  2.  Information about the Mission of Project Gutenberg-tm
+
+Project Gutenberg-tm is synonymous with the free distribution of
+electronic works in formats readable by the widest variety of computers
+including obsolete, old, middle-aged and new computers.  It exists
+because of the efforts of hundreds of volunteers and donations from
+people in all walks of life.
+
+Volunteers and financial support to provide volunteers with the
+assistance they need, is critical to reaching Project Gutenberg-tm's
+goals and ensuring that the Project Gutenberg-tm collection will
+remain freely available for generations to come.  In 2001, the Project
+Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation was created to provide a secure
+and permanent future for Project Gutenberg-tm and future generations.
+To learn more about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation
+and how your efforts and donations can help, see Sections 3 and 4
+and the Foundation web page at https://www.pglaf.org.
+
+
+Section 3.  Information about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive
+Foundation
+
+The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation is a non profit
+501(c)(3) educational corporation organized under the laws of the
+state of Mississippi and granted tax exempt status by the Internal
+Revenue Service.  The Foundation's EIN or federal tax identification
+number is 64-6221541.  Its 501(c)(3) letter is posted at
+https://pglaf.org/fundraising.  Contributions to the Project Gutenberg
+Literary Archive Foundation are tax deductible to the full extent
+permitted by U.S. federal laws and your state's laws.
+
+The Foundation's principal office is located at 4557 Melan Dr. S.
+Fairbanks, AK, 99712., but its volunteers and employees are scattered
+throughout numerous locations.  Its business office is located at
+809 North 1500 West, Salt Lake City, UT 84116, (801) 596-1887, email
+business@pglaf.org.  Email contact links and up to date contact
+information can be found at the Foundation's web site and official
+page at https://pglaf.org
+
+For additional contact information:
+     Dr. Gregory B. Newby
+     Chief Executive and Director
+     gbnewby@pglaf.org
+
+Section 4.  Information about Donations to the Project Gutenberg
+Literary Archive Foundation
+
+Project Gutenberg-tm depends upon and cannot survive without wide
+spread public support and donations to carry out its mission of
+increasing the number of public domain and licensed works that can be
+freely distributed in machine readable form accessible by the widest
+array of equipment including outdated equipment.  Many small donations
+($1 to $5,000) are particularly important to maintaining tax exempt
+status with the IRS.
+
+The Foundation is committed to complying with the laws regulating
+charities and charitable donations in all 50 states of the United
+States.  Compliance requirements are not uniform and it takes a
+considerable effort, much paperwork and many fees to meet and keep up
+with these requirements.  We do not solicit donations in locations
+where we have not received written confirmation of compliance.  To
+SEND DONATIONS or determine the status of compliance for any
+particular state visit https://pglaf.org
+
+While we cannot and do not solicit contributions from states where we
+have not met the solicitation requirements, we know of no prohibition
+against accepting unsolicited donations from donors in such states who
+approach us with offers to donate.
+
+International donations are gratefully accepted, but we cannot make
+any statements concerning tax treatment of donations received from
+outside the United States.  U.S. laws alone swamp our small staff.
+
+Please check the Project Gutenberg Web pages for current donation
+methods and addresses.  Donations are accepted in a number of other
+ways including including checks, online payments and credit card
+donations.  To donate, please visit: https://pglaf.org/donate
+
+
+Section 5.  General Information About Project Gutenberg-tm electronic
+works.
+
+Professor Michael S. Hart was the originator of the Project Gutenberg-tm
+concept of a library of electronic works that could be freely shared
+with anyone.  For thirty years, he produced and distributed Project
+Gutenberg-tm eBooks with only a loose network of volunteer support.
+
+Project Gutenberg-tm eBooks are often created from several printed
+editions, all of which are confirmed as Public Domain in the U.S.
+unless a copyright notice is included.  Thus, we do not necessarily
+keep eBooks in compliance with any particular paper edition.
+
+Each eBook is in a subdirectory of the same number as the eBook's
+eBook number, often in several formats including plain vanilla ASCII,
+compressed (zipped), HTML and others.
+
+Corrected EDITIONS of our eBooks replace the old file and take over
+the old filename and etext number.  The replaced older file is renamed.
+VERSIONS based on separate sources are treated as new eBooks receiving
+new filenames and etext numbers.
+
+Most people start at our Web site which has the main PG search facility:
+
+     https://www.gutenberg.org
+
+This Web site includes information about Project Gutenberg-tm,
+including how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary
+Archive Foundation, how to help produce our new eBooks, and how to
+subscribe to our email newsletter to hear about new eBooks.
+
+EBooks posted prior to November 2003, with eBook numbers BELOW #10000,
+are filed in directories based on their release date.  If you want to
+download any of these eBooks directly, rather than using the regular
+search system you may utilize the following addresses and just
+download by the etext year.
+
+     https://www.gutenberg.org/etext06
+
+    (Or /etext 05, 04, 03, 02, 01, 00, 99,
+     98, 97, 96, 95, 94, 93, 92, 92, 91 or 90)
+
+EBooks posted since November 2003, with etext numbers OVER #10000, are
+filed in a different way.  The year of a release date is no longer part
+of the directory path.  The path is based on the etext number (which is
+identical to the filename).  The path to the file is made up of single
+digits corresponding to all but the last digit in the filename.  For
+example an eBook of filename 10234 would be found at:
+
+     https://www.gutenberg.org/1/0/2/3/10234
+
+or filename 24689 would be found at:
+     https://www.gutenberg.org/2/4/6/8/24689
+
+An alternative method of locating eBooks:
+     https://www.gutenberg.org/GUTINDEX.ALL
+
+
diff --git a/old/12002-8.zip b/old/12002-8.zip
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..664db60
--- /dev/null
+++ b/old/12002-8.zip
diff --git a/old/12002-h.zip b/old/12002-h.zip
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bd821c7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/old/12002-h.zip
diff --git a/old/12002-h/12002-h.htm b/old/12002-h/12002-h.htm
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..12ea8bb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/old/12002-h/12002-h.htm
@@ -0,0 +1,2647 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN">
+
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta name="generator" content=
+  "HTML Tidy for Windows (vers 1st February 2004), see www.w3.org">
+  <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content=
+  "text/html; charset=iso-8859-1">
+
+  <title>The Project Gutenberg eBook of Review Of The Work Of Mr
+  John Stuart Mill, by George Grote.</title>
+  <style type="text/css">
+  /*<![CDATA[  XML blockout */
+  <!--
+    P {  margin-top: .75em;
+         text-align: justify;
+         margin-bottom: .75em;
+         }
+    H1,H2,H3,H4,H5,H6 {
+         text-align: center; /* all headings centered */
+         }
+    HR { width: 33%;
+        margin-top: 1em;
+        margin-bottom: 1em;
+       }
+    BODY{margin-left: 10%;
+         margin-right: 10%;
+        }
+    .linenum  {position: absolute; top: auto; left: 4%;} /* poetry number */
+    .note     {margin-left: 2em; margin-right: 2em; margin-bottom: 1em;} /* footnote */
+    .blkquot  {margin-left: 4em; margin-right: 4em;} /* block indent */
+    .pagenum  {position: absolute; left: 92%; font-size: smaller;} /* page numbers */
+    .sidenote {width: 20%; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-top: 1em; padding-left: 1em; font-size: smaller; float: right; clear: right;}
+
+    .poem             {margin-left:10%; margin-right:10%; text-align: left;}
+    .poem .stanza     {margin: 1em 0em 1em 0em;}
+    .poem p           {margin: 0; padding-left: 3em; text-indent: -3em;}
+    .poem p.i2        {margin-left: 2em;}
+    .poem p.i4        {margin-left: 4em;}
+    .poem .caesura    {vertical-align: -200%;}
+    // -->
+    /* XML end  ]]>*/
+  </style>
+</head>
+
+<body>
+
+
+<pre>
+
+The Project Gutenberg EBook of Review of the Work of Mr John Stuart Mill
+Entitled, 'Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy.', by George Grote
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+Title: Review of the Work of Mr John Stuart Mill Entitled, 'Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy.'
+
+Author: George Grote
+
+Release Date: April 12, 2004 [EBook #12002]
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1
+
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK REVIEW OF MR JOHN STUART MILL ***
+
+
+
+
+Produced by The Online Distributed Proofreading Team.
+
+
+
+
+
+</pre>
+
+  <h1>REVIEW OF THE WORK OF MR JOHN STUART MILL</h1>
+
+  <h1>ENTITLED, 'EXAMINATION OF SIR WILLIAM HAMILTONS
+  PHILOSOPHY'</h1>
+
+  <h2>BY GEORGE GROTE</h2>
+
+  <center>
+    AUTHOR OF
+  </center>
+
+  <center>
+    'THE HISTORY OF ANCIENT GREECE,'
+  </center>
+
+  <center>
+    'PLATO AND THE OTHER COMPANIONS OF SOCRATES,' ETC.
+  </center>
+
+  <center>
+    1868
+  </center>
+
+  <center>
+    <i>Reprinted from the 'Westminster Review,' January 1,
+    1866</i>.
+  </center><br>
+
+  <center>
+    JOHN CHILDS AND SON, PRINTERS
+  </center>
+  <hr style="width: 65%;">
+
+  <p><i>An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy, and of
+  the Principal Philosophical Questions discussed in his
+  Writings</i>. By JOHN STUART MILL. London: Longmans. 1865.</p>
+
+  <p>The work bearing the above title is an octavo volume,
+  consisting of twenty-eight chapters, and five hundred and sixty
+  pages. This is no great amount of print; but the amount of matter
+  contained in it is prodigious, and the quality of that matter
+  such as to require a full stretch of attention. Mr Mill gives his
+  readers no superfluous sentences, scarcely even a superfluous
+  word, above what is necessary to express his meaning briefly and
+  clearly. Of such a book no complete abstract can be given in the
+  space to which we are confined.</p>
+
+  <p>To students of philosophy&mdash;doubtless but a minority among
+  the general circle of English readers&mdash;this work comes
+  recommended by the strongest claims both of interest and
+  instruction. It presents in direct antithesis two most
+  conspicuous representatives of the modern speculative mind of
+  England&mdash;Sir W. Hamilton and Mr John Stuart Mill.</p>
+
+  <p>Sir W. Hamilton has exercised powerful influence over the
+  stream of thought during the present generation. The lectures on
+  Logic and Metaphysics delivered by him at Edinburgh, for twenty
+  years, determined the view taken of those subjects by a large
+  number of aspiring young students, and determined that view for
+  many of them permanently and irrevocably.<a name=
+  "FNanchor_1_1"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_1"><sup>[1]</sup></a>
+  Several eminent teachers and writers of the present day are proud
+  of considering themselves his disciples, enunciate his doctrines
+  in greater or less proportion, and seldom contradict him without
+  letting it be seen that they depart unwillingly from such a
+  leader. Various new phrases and psychological illustrations have
+  obtained footing in treatises of philosophy, chiefly from his
+  authority. We do not number ourselves among his followers; but we
+  think his influence on philosophy was in many ways beneficial. He
+  kept up the idea of philosophy as a subject to be studied from
+  its own points of view: a dignity which in earlier times it
+  enjoyed, perhaps, to mischievous excess, but from which in recent
+  times it has far too much receded&mdash;especially in England. He
+  performed the great service of labouring strenuously to piece
+  together the past traditions of philosophy, to re-discover those
+  which had been allowed to drop into oblivion, and to make out the
+  genealogy of opinions as far as negligent predecessors had still
+  left the possibility of doing so.</p>
+
+  <p>The forty-six lectures on Metaphysics, and the thirty-five
+  lectures on Logic, published by Messrs Mansel and Veitch,
+  constitute the biennial course actually delivered by Sir W.
+  Hamilton in the Professorial Chair. They ought therefore to be
+  looked at chiefly with reference to the minds of youthful
+  hearers, as preservatives against that mischief forcibly
+  described by Rousseau&mdash;'L'inhabitude de penser dans la
+  jeunesse en &ocirc;te la capacit&eacute; pendant le reste de la
+  vie.'</p>
+
+  <p>Now, in a subject so abstract, obscure, and generally
+  unpalatable, as Logic and Metaphysics, the difficulty which the
+  teacher finds in inspiring interest is extreme. That Sir W.
+  Hamilton overcame such difficulty with remarkable success, is the
+  affirmation of his two editors; and our impression, as readers of
+  his lectures, disposes us to credit them. That Sir W. Hamilton
+  should have done this effectively is in itself sufficient to
+  stamp him as a meritorious professor&mdash;as a worthy successor
+  to the chair of Dugald Stewart, whose unrivalled perfection in
+  that department is attested by every one. Many a man who
+  ultimately adopted speculative opinions opposed to Dugald
+  Stewart, received his first impulse and guidance in the path of
+  speculation from the lasting impression made by Stewart's
+  lectures.</p>
+
+  <p>But though we look at these lectures, as they ought to be
+  looked at, chiefly with a view to the special purpose for which
+  they were destined, we are far from insinuating that they have no
+  other merits, or that they are useless for readers who have
+  already a metaphysical creed of their own. We have found them
+  both instructive and interesting: they go over a large proportion
+  of the field of speculative philosophy, partly from the point of
+  view (not always the same) belonging to the author, partly from
+  that of numerous predecessors whom he cites. We recognize also in
+  Sir W. Hamilton an amount of intellectual independence which
+  seldom accompanies such vast erudition. He recites many different
+  opinions, but he judges them all for himself; and, what is of
+  still greater moment, he constantly gives the reasons for his
+  judgments. To us these reasons are always of more or less value,
+  whether we admit them to be valid or not. Many philosophers
+  present their own doctrine as if it were so much ascertained and
+  acknowledged truth, either intimating, or leading you to suppose,
+  that though erroneous beliefs to the contrary formerly prevailed,
+  these have now become discredited with every one. We do not
+  censure this way of proceeding, but we prefer the manner of Sir
+  W. Hamilton. He always keeps before us divergence and discrepancy
+  of view as the normal condition of reasoned truth or philosophy;
+  the characteristic postulate of which is, that every affirmative
+  and every negative shall have its appropriate reasons clearly and
+  fully enunciated.</p>
+
+  <p>In this point of view the appendix annexed to the lectures is
+  also valuable; and the four copious appendixes or dissertations
+  following the edition of Reid's works, are more valuable still.
+  How far Sir W. Hamilton has there furnished good proof of his own
+  doctrines on External Perception, and on the Primary Qualities of
+  Matter, we shall not now determine; but to those who dissent from
+  him, as well as to those who agree with him, his reasonings on
+  these subjects are highly instructive: while the full citations
+  from so many other writers contribute materially not only to
+  elucidate the points directly approached, but also to enlarge our
+  knowledge of philosophy generally. We set particular value upon
+  this preservation of the traditions of philosophy, and upon this
+  maintenance of a known perpetual succession among the speculative
+  minds of humanity, with proper comparisons and contrasts. We have
+  found among the names quoted by Sir W. Hamilton, and, thanks to
+  his care, several authors hardly at all known to us, and opinions
+  cited from them not less instructive than curious. He deserves
+  the more gratitude, because he departs herein from received usage
+  since Bacon and Descartes. The example set by these great men was
+  admirable, so far as it went to throw off the authority of
+  predecessors; but pernicious so far as it banished those
+  predecessors out of knowledge, like mere magazines of immaturity
+  and error. Throughout the eighteenth century, all study of the
+  earlier modes of philosophizing was, for the most part,
+  neglected. Of such neglect, remarkable instances are pointed out
+  by Sir W. Hamilton.</p>
+
+  <p>While speaking about the general merits and philosophical
+  position of Sir William Hamilton, we have hitherto said nothing
+  about those of Mr Mill. But before we proceed to analyze the
+  separate chapters of his volume, we must devote a few words to
+  the fulfilment of another obligation.</p>
+
+  <p>Mr John Stuart Mill has not been the first to bestow honour on
+  the surname which he bears. His father, Mr James Mill, had
+  already ennobled the name. An ampler title to distinction in
+  history and philosophy can seldom be produced than that which Mr
+  James Mill left behind him. We know no work which surpasses his
+  'History of British India' in the main excellencies attainable by
+  historical writers: industrious accumulation, continued for many
+  years, of original authorities&mdash;careful and conscientious
+  criticism of their statements&mdash;and a large command of
+  psychological analysis, enabling the author to interpret
+  phenomena of society, both extremely complicated, and far removed
+  from his own personal experience. Again, Mr James Mill's
+  'Elements of Political Economy' were, at the time when they
+  appeared, the most logical and condensed exposition of the entire
+  science then existing. Lastly, his latest avowed production, the
+  'Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind,' is a model of
+  perspicuous exposition of complex states of consciousness,
+  carried farther than by any other author before him; and
+  illustrating the fulness which such exposition may be made to
+  attain, by one who has faith in the comprehensive principle of
+  association, and has learnt the secret of tracing out its
+  innumerable windings. It is, moreover, the first work in which
+  the great fact of Indissoluble Association is brought into its
+  due theoretical prominence. These are high merits, of which
+  lasting evidence is before the public; but there were other
+  merits in Mr James Mill, less publicly authenticated, yet not
+  less real. His unpremeditated oral exposition was hardly less
+  effective than his prepared work with the pen; his colloquial
+  fertility on philosophical subjects, his power of discussing
+  himself, and of stimulating others to discuss, his ready
+  responsive inspirations through all the shifts and windings of a
+  sort of Platonic dialogue&mdash;all these accomplishments were,
+  to those who knew him, even more impressive than what he composed
+  for the press. Conversation with him was not merely instructive,
+  but provocative to the dormant intelligence. Of all persons whom
+  we have known, Mr James Mill was one who stood least remote from
+  the lofty Platonic ideal of Dialectic&mdash;[Greek: <i>Tou
+  didhonai kahi dhechesthai lhogon</i>]&mdash;(the giving and
+  receiving of reasons) competent alike to examine others, or to be
+  examined by them, on philosophy. When to this we add a strenuous
+  character, earnest convictions, and single-minded devotion to
+  truth, with an utter disdain of mere paradox&mdash;it may be
+  conceived that such a man exercised powerful intellectual
+  ascendancy over younger minds. Several of those who enjoyed his
+  society&mdash;men now at, or past, the maturity of life, and some
+  of them in distinguished positions&mdash;remember and attest with
+  gratitude such ascendancy in their own cases: among them the
+  writer of the present article, who owes to the historian of
+  British India an amount of intellectual stimulus and guidance
+  such as he can never forget.</p>
+
+  <p>When a father, such as we have described, declining to send
+  his son either to school or college, constituted himself
+  schoolmaster from the beginning, and performed that duty with
+  laborious solicitude&mdash;when, besides full infusion of modern
+  knowledge, the forcing process applied by the Platonic Socrates
+  to the youth-The&aelig;t&ecirc;tus, was administered by Mr James
+  Mill, continuously and from an earlier age, to a youthful mind
+  not less pregnant than that of The&aelig;t&ecirc;tus&mdash;it
+  would be surprising if the son thus trained had not reached even
+  a higher eminence than his father. The fruit borne by Mr John
+  Stuart Mill has been worthy of the culture bestowed, and the
+  volume before us is at once his latest and his ripest
+  product.</p>
+
+  <p>The 'Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy' is
+  intended by Mr Mill (so he tells us in the preface to the sixth
+  published edition of his 'System of Logic, Ratiocinative and
+  Inductive') as a sequel and complement to that system. We are
+  happy to welcome so valuable an addition; but with or without
+  that addition, the 'System of Logic' appears to us to present the
+  most important advance in speculative theory which the present
+  century has witnessed. Either half of it, the Ratiocinative or
+  the Inductive, would have surpassed any previous work on the same
+  subject. The Inductive half discriminates and brings into clear
+  view, for the first time, those virtues of method which have
+  insensibly grown into habits among consummate scientific
+  inquirers of the post-Baconian age, as well as the fallacies by
+  which some of these authors have been misled. The Ratiocinative
+  half, dealing with matters which had already been well handled by
+  Dutrieu and other scholastic logicians, invests their dead though
+  precise formalism with a real life and application to the actual
+  process of finding and proving truth. But besides thus working
+  each half up to perfection, Mr Mill has performed the still more
+  difficult task of overcoming the repugnance, apparently an
+  inveterate repugnance, between them, so as chemically to combine
+  the two into one homogeneous compound; thus presenting the
+  problem of Reasoned Truth, Inference, Proof, and Disproof, as one
+  connected whole. For ourselves, we still recollect the mist which
+  was cleared from our minds when we first read the 'System of
+  Logic,' very soon after it was published. We were familiar with
+  the Syllogistic Logic in Burgersdicius and Dutrieu; we were also
+  familiar with examples of the best procedure in modern inductive
+  science; but the two streams flowed altogether apart in our
+  minds, like two parallel lines never joining nor approaching. The
+  irreconcilability of the two was at once removed, when we had
+  read and mastered the second and third chapters of the Second
+  Book of the 'System of Logic;' in which Mr Mill explains the
+  functions and value of the Syllogism, and the real import of its
+  major premiss. This explanation struck us at the time as one of
+  the most profound and original efforts of metaphysical thought
+  that we had ever perused, and we see no reason to retract that
+  opinion now.<a name="FNanchor_2_2"></a><a href=
+  "#Footnote_2_2"><sup>[2]</sup></a> It appears all the more
+  valuable when we contrast it with what is said by Mr Mill's two
+  contemporaries&mdash;Hamilton and Whately: the first of whom
+  retains the ancient theory of reasoning, as being only a
+  methodized transition from a whole to its parts, and from the
+  parts up to the whole&mdash;Induction being only this ascending
+  part of the process, whereby, after having given a complete
+  enumeration of all the compound parts, you conclude to the sum
+  total described in one word as a whole;<a name=
+  "FNanchor_3_3"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_3"><sup>[3]</sup></a>
+  while the second (Whately) agrees in subordinating Induction to
+  Syllogism, but does so in a different way&mdash;by representing
+  inductive reasoning as a syllogism, with its major premiss
+  suppressed, from which major premiss it derived its authority.
+  The explanation of Mr Mill attacks the problem from the opposite
+  side. It subordinates syllogism to induction, the technical to
+  the real; it divests the major premiss of its illusory pretence
+  to be itself the proving authority, or even any real and
+  essential part of the proof&mdash;and acknowledges it merely as a
+  valuable precautionary test and security for avoiding mistake in
+  the process of proving. Taking Mr Mill's 'System of Logic' as a
+  whole, it is one of the books by which we believe ourselves to
+  have most profited. The principles of it are constantly present
+  to our mind when engaged in investigations of evidence, whether
+  scientific or historical.</p>
+
+  <p>Concerned as we are here with Mr Mill only as a logician and
+  philosopher, we feel precluded from adverting to his works on
+  other topics&mdash;even to his 'Elements of Political Economy,'
+  by which he is probably more widely known than by anything else.
+  Of the many obligations which Political Economy owes to him, one
+  only can be noticed consistent with the scope of the present
+  article: the care which he has taken&mdash;he alone, or at least,
+  he more explicitly and formally than any other expositor&mdash;to
+  set forth the general position of that science in the aggregate
+  field of scientific research; its relation to sociology as a
+  whole, or to other fractions thereof, how far derivative or
+  co-ordinate; what are its fundamental postulates or hypotheses,
+  with what limits the logical methods of induction and deduction
+  are applicable to it, and how far its conclusions may be relied
+  on as approximations to truth. All these points will be found
+  instructively handled in the Sixth Book of Mr Mill's 'System of
+  Logic,' as well as in his smaller and less known work, 'Essays on
+  Some Unsettled Questions in Political Economy.' We find him,
+  while methodizing and illustrating the data of the special
+  science, uniformly keeping in view its relation to philosophy as
+  a whole.</p>
+
+  <p>But there is yet another work in which the interests of
+  philosophy, as a whole, come into the foreground and become the
+  special object of vindication in their largest compass and most
+  vital requirements. We mean Mr Mill's 'Essay on Liberty,' one
+  half of which takes for its thesis the <i>libertus
+  philosophandi</i>. He maintains, emphatically, in this book, the
+  full dignity of reasoned truth against all the jealous exigencies
+  of traditional dogma and self-justifying sentiment. He claims the
+  most unreserved liberty of utterance for negative and affirmative
+  on all questions&mdash;not merely for the purpose of
+  discriminating truth from falsehood, but also to keep up in
+  individual minds the full sense and understanding of the matters
+  controverted, in place of a mere partial and one-sided adhesion.
+  At first sight, indeed, it might seem as if Mr Mill was fighting
+  with a shadow; for liberty of philosophizing is a postulate
+  which, in general terms, every one concedes. But when you come to
+  fathom the real feelings which underlie this concession, you
+  discover that almost every man makes it under reserves which,
+  though acting in silence, are not the less efficacious. Every one
+  has some dogmas which he cannot bear to hear advocated, and
+  others which he will not allow to be controverted in his
+  presence. A writer has to consider not merely by what reasons any
+  novelty of belief or disbelief may be justified, but also how
+  much it will be safe for him to publish, having regard to the
+  irritable sore places of the public judgment. In July, 1864, we
+  were present at the annual meeting of the French Academy at
+  Paris, where the prizes for essays sent in, pursuant to subjects
+  announced for study beforehand, are awarded. We heard the titles
+  of various compositions announced by the President (M.
+  Villemain), with a brief critical estimate of each. Their
+  comparative merits were appreciated, and the prize awarded to one
+  of the competitors. Among the compositions sent to compete for
+  the prize, one was a work by M. Taine, upon which the President
+  bestowed the most remarkable encomiums, in every different point
+  of view: extent of knowledge, force of thought, style,
+  arrangement, all were praised in a manner which we have rarely
+  heard exceeded. Nevertheless, the prize was not awarded to this
+  work, but to another which the President praised in a manner
+  decidedly less marked and emphatic. What was here the <i>ratio
+  decidendi</i>? The reason was, and the President declared it in
+  the most explicit language, that the work of M. Taine <i>was
+  deeply tainted with materialism</i>. 'Sans doute,' said the
+  esteemed veteran of French literature in pronouncing his award,
+  'sans doute les opinions sont libres, <i>mais</i>'&mdash;It is
+  precisely against this <i>mais</i>&mdash;ushering in the special
+  anathematized or consecrated conclusion which it is intended to
+  except from the general liberty of enforcing or
+  impugning&mdash;in matters of philosophical discussion, that Mr
+  Mill, in the 'Essay on Liberty,' declares war as champion of
+  Reasoned Truth.</p>
+
+  <p>He handles this grand theme&mdash;<i>eleythheroys
+  eleythher&ocirc;s philosophein</i>&mdash;involving as it does the
+  best interests of philosophy, as an instructress to men's
+  judgments, and a stimulus to their intelligence&mdash;with great
+  depth of psychological analysis sustained by abundant historical
+  illustration. And he in the same volume discusses most profitably
+  another question akin to it&mdash;To what extent, and by what
+  principles, the interference of others is justifiable, in
+  restraining the liberty of taste and action for each individual?
+  A question at once grave and neglected, but the discussion of
+  which does not belong to our present article.</p>
+
+  <p>A new work from one who has already manifested such mastery of
+  philosophy, both in principle and in detail, and a work
+  exhibiting the analysis and appreciation of the philosophical
+  views of an eminent contemporary, must raise the highest
+  expectation. We think no reader will be disappointed who peruses
+  Mr Mill's 'Examination,' and we shall now endeavour to give some
+  account of the manner in which he performs it. Upon topics so
+  abstract and subtle as the contents of this volume, the
+  antithesis between two rival theories is the best way, and often
+  the only way, for bringing truth into clear view; and the
+  'Examination' here before us is professedly controversy. But of
+  controversy in its objectionable sense&mdash;of captious or
+  acrimonious personality&mdash;not a trace will here be found. A
+  dignified, judicial equanimity of tone is preserved from first to
+  last. Moreover, though the title and direct purpose of the volume
+  is negative and critical, yet the destructive criticism is
+  pervaded by many copious veins of constructive exposition,
+  embodying Mr Mill's own views upon some of the most intricate
+  problems of metaphysics.</p>
+
+  <p>Mr Mill begins his work by analyzing and explaining the
+  doctrine called the Relativity of Human Knowledge:</p>
+
+  <div class="blkquot">
+    <p>'The doctrine (chap. ii. p. 5) which is thought to belong in
+    the most especial manner to Sir W. Hamilton, and which was the
+    ground of his opposition to the transcendentalism of the later
+    French and German metaphysicians, is that which he and others
+    have called the Relativity of Human Knowledge. It is the
+    subject of the most generally known and impressive of all his
+    writings&mdash;the one which first revealed to the English
+    metaphysical reader that a new power had arisen in philosophy.
+    Together with its developments, it composes the Philosophy of
+    the Conditioned, which he opposed to the French and German
+    philosophies of the Absolute, and which is regarded by most of
+    his admirers as the greatest of his titles to a permanent place
+    in the history of metaphysical thought. But, "the relativity of
+    human knowledge," like most other phrases into which the words
+    <i>relative</i> or <i>relation</i> enter, is vague, and admits
+    of a great variety of meanings,' &amp;c.</p>
+  </div>
+
+  <p>Mr Mill then proceeds to distinguish these various meanings,
+  and to determine in which of them the phrase is understood by Sir
+  W. Hamilton.</p>
+
+  <p>One meaning is, that we only know anything by knowing it as
+  distinguished from something else&mdash;that all consciousness is
+  of difference. It is not, however, in this sense that the
+  expression is ordinarily or intentionally used by Sir W.
+  Hamilton, though he fully recognizes the truth which, when thus
+  used, it serves to express. In general, when he says that all our
+  knowledge is relative, the relation he has in view is not between
+  the thing known and other objects compared with it, but between
+  the thing known and the mind knowing&mdash;(p. 6).</p>
+
+  <p>The doctrine in this last meaning is held by different
+  philosophers in two different forms. Some (e.g. Berkeley, Hume,
+  Ferrier, &amp;c.), usually called Idealists, maintain not merely
+  that all we can possibly know of anything is the manner in which
+  it affects the human faculties, but that there is nothing else to
+  be known; that affections of human or of other minds are all that
+  we can know to exist&mdash;that the difference between the ego
+  and the non-ego is only a formal distinction between two aspects
+  of the same reality. Other philosophers (Brown, Mr Herbert
+  Spencer, Auguste Comte, with many others) believe that the ego
+  and the non-ego denote two realities, each self-existent, and
+  neither dependent on the other; that the Noumenon, or 'thing
+  <i>per se</i>,' is in itself a different thing from the
+  Phenomenon, and equally or more real, but that, though we know
+  its existence, we have no means of knowing what it is. All that
+  we can know is, relatively to ourselves, the modes in which it
+  affects us, or the phenomena which it produces&mdash;(pp.
+  9&mdash;11).</p>
+
+  <p>The doctrine of Relativity, as held by Kant and his many
+  followers, is next distinguished from the same doctrine as held
+  by Hartley, James Mill, Professor Bain, &amp;c., compatible with
+  either acceptance or rejection of the Berkeleian theory. Kant
+  maintains that the attributes which we ascribe to outward things,
+  or which are inseparable from them in thought, contain additional
+  elements over and above sensations <i>plus</i> an unknowable
+  cause&mdash;additional elements added by the mind itself, and
+  therefore still only relative, but constituting the original
+  furniture of the mind itself&mdash;inherent laws, partly of our
+  sensitive, partly of our intellectual faculty. It is on this
+  latter point that Hartley and those going along with him diverge.
+  Admitting the same additional elements, these philosophers do not
+  ascribe to the mind any innate forms to account for them, but
+  hold that place, extension, substance, cause, and the rest,
+  &amp;c., are conceptions put together out of ideas of sensation,
+  by the known laws of Association&mdash;(pp. 12&mdash;14).</p>
+
+  <p>Partial Relativity is the opinion professed by most
+  philosophers (and by most persons who do not philosophize). They
+  hold that we know things partly as they are in themselves, partly
+  as they are merely in relation to us.</p>
+
+  <p>This discrimination of the various schools of philosophers is
+  highly instructive, and is given with the full perspicuity
+  belonging to Mr Mill's style. He proceeds to examine in what
+  sense Sir W. Hamilton maintained the Relativity of Human
+  Knowledge. He cites passages both from the 'Discussions on
+  Philosophy' and from the Lectures, in which that doctrine is both
+  affirmed in its greatest amplitude, and enunciated in the most
+  emphatic language&mdash;(pp. 17, 18, 22, 23). But he also
+  produces extracts from the most elaborate of Sir W. Hamilton's
+  'Dissertations on Reid,' in which a doctrine quite different and
+  inconsistent is proclaimed&mdash;that our knowledge is only
+  partially, not wholly, relative; that the secondary qualities of
+  matter, indeed, are known to us only relatively, but that the
+  primary qualities are known to us as they are in themselves, or
+  as they exist objectively, and that they may be even evolved by
+  demonstration <i>&agrave; priori</i>&mdash;(pp. 19-26, 30). The
+  inconsistency between the two doctrines, professed at different
+  times, and in different works, by Sir W. Hamilton, is certainly
+  manifest. Mr Mill is of opinion that one of the two must be taken
+  'in a non-natural sense,' and that Sir W. Hamilton either did not
+  hold, or had ceased to hold, the doctrine of the full relativity
+  of knowledge (pp. 20-28)&mdash;the hypothesis of a flat
+  contradiction being in his view inadmissible. But we think it at
+  least equally possible that Sir W. Hamilton held both the two
+  opinions in their natural sense, and enforced both of them <i>at
+  different times</i> by argument; his attention never having been
+  called to the contradiction between them. That such forgetfulness
+  was quite possible, will appear clearly in many parts of the
+  present article. His argument in support of both is equally
+  characterized by that peculiar energy of style which is frequent
+  with him, and which no way resembles the qualifying refinements
+  of one struggling to keep clear of a perceived contradiction.</p>
+
+  <p>From hence Mr Mill (chap. iv.) proceeds to criticise at
+  considerable length what he justly denominates the celebrated and
+  striking review of Cousin's philosophy, which forms the first
+  paper in Sir W. Hamilton's 'Discussions on Philosophy.' According
+  to Mr Mill&mdash;</p>
+
+  <div class="blkquot">
+    <p>'The question really at issue is this: Have we or have we
+    not an immediate intuition of God? The name of God is veiled
+    under two extremely abstract phrases, "The Infinite and the
+    Absolute," perhaps from a reverential feeling; such, at least,
+    is the reason given by Sir W. Hamilton's disciple, Mr Mansel,
+    for preferring the more vague expressions; but it is one of the
+    most unquestionable of all logical maxims, that the meaning of
+    the abstract must be sought for in the concrete, and not
+    conversely; and we shall see, both in the case of Sir William
+    Hamilton, and of Mr Mansel, that the process cannot be reversed
+    with impunity.'&mdash;p. 32.</p>
+  </div>
+
+  <p>Upon this we must remark, that though the 'logical maxim' here
+  laid down by Mr Mill may be generally sound, we think the
+  application of it inconvenient in the present case. Discussions
+  on points of philosophy are best conducted without either
+  invoking or offending religious feeling. M. Cousin maintains that
+  we have a direct intuition of the Infinite and the Absolute: Sir
+  W. Hamilton denies that we have. Upon this point Mr Mill sides
+  entirely with Sir W. Hamilton, and considers 'that the latter has
+  rendered good service to philosophy by refuting M. Cousin,'
+  though much of the reasoning employed in such refutation seems to
+  Mr Mill unsound. But Sir W. Hamilton goes further, and affirms
+  that we have no faculties capable of apprehending the Infinite
+  and the Absolute&mdash;that both of them are inconceivable to us,
+  and by consequence unknowable. Herein Mr Mill is opposed to him,
+  and controverts his doctrine in an elaborate argument.</p>
+
+  <p>Of this argument, able and ingenious, like all those in the
+  present volume, our limits only enable us to give a brief
+  appreciation. In so far as Mr Mill controverts Sir W. Hamilton,
+  we think him perfectly successful, though there are some points
+  in his reasoning in which we do not fully concur.</p>
+
+  <p>In our opinion, as in his, the Absolute alone (in its sense as
+  opposed to relative) can be necessarily unknowable,
+  inconceivable, incogitable. Nothing which falls under the
+  condition of relativity can be declared to be so. The structure
+  of our minds renders us capable of knowing everything which is
+  relative, though there are many such things which we have no
+  evidence, nor shall ever get evidence, to enable us to know. Now
+  the Infinite falls within the conditions of relativity, as indeed
+  Sir W. Hamilton himself admits, when he intimates (p. 58) that
+  though it cannot be known, it is, must be, and ought to be,
+  <i>believed</i> by us, according to the marked distinction which
+  he draws between belief and knowledge. We agree with Mr Mill in
+  the opinion that it is thinkable, conceivable, knowable.
+  Doubtless we do not conceive it adequately, but we conceive it
+  sufficiently to discuss and reason upon it intelligibly to
+  ourselves and others. That we conceive the Infinite inadequately,
+  is not to be held as proof that we do not conceive it at all; for
+  in regard to finite things also, we conceive the greater number
+  of them only inadequately.</p>
+
+  <p>We cannot construe to the imagination a polygon with an
+  infinite number of sides (i.e. with a number of sides greater
+  than any given number), but neither can we construe to the
+  imagination a polygon with a million of sides; nevertheless, we
+  understand what is meant by the first description as well as by
+  the second, and can reason upon both. There is, indeed, this
+  difference between the two: That the terms used in describing the
+  first, proclaim at once in their direct meaning that we should in
+  vain attempt to construe it to the imagination; whereas the terms
+  used in describing the second do not intimate that fact. We know
+  the fact only by trial, or by an estimate of our own mental force
+  which is the result of many past trials. If the difference here
+  noted were all which Sir W. Hamilton has in view when he declares
+  the Infinite to be unknowable and incogitable, we should accede
+  to his opinion; but we apprehend that he means much more, and he
+  certainly requires more to justify the marked antithesis in which
+  he places himself against M. Cousin and Hegel. Indeed, the
+  facility with which he declares matters to be incogitable, which
+  these two and other philosophers not only cogitate but maintain
+  as truth, is to us truly surprising. The only question which
+  appears to us important is, whether we can understand and reason
+  upon the meaning of the terms and propositions addressed to us.
+  If we can, the subjects propounded must be cogitable and
+  conceivable, whether we admit the propositions affirmed
+  concerning them or not; if we cannot, then these subjects are
+  indeed incogitable by ourselves in the present state of our
+  knowledge, but they may not be so to our opponent who employs the
+  terms.</p>
+
+  <p>In criticising the arguments of Sir W. Hamilton against M.
+  Cousin, Mr Mill insists much on a distinction between (1) the
+  Infinite, and (2) the Infinite in any one or more positive
+  attributes, such as infinite wisdom, goodness, redness, hardness,
+  &amp;c.<a name="FNanchor_4_4"></a><a href=
+  "#Footnote_4_4"><sup>[4]</sup></a> He thinks that Sir W. Hamilton
+  has made out his case against the first, but not against the
+  last; that the first is really 'an unmeaning and senseless
+  abstraction,' a fasciculus of negations, unknowable and
+  inconceivable, but not the last. We think that Mr Mill makes more
+  of this distinction than the case warrants; that the first is not
+  unmeaning, but an intelligible abstraction, only a higher reach
+  of abstraction than the last; that it is knowable inadequately,
+  in the same way as the last&mdash;though more inadequately,
+  because of its higher abstraction.</p>
+
+  <p>As the finite is intelligible, so also is its
+  negation&mdash;the Infinite: we do not say (with M. Cousin) that
+  the two are conjointly given in consciousness&mdash;but the two
+  are understood and partially apprehended by the mind conjointly
+  and in contrast. Though the Infinite is doubtless negative as to
+  a degree, it is not wholly or exclusively negative, since it
+  includes a necessary reference to some positive attribute, to
+  which the degree belongs; the positive element is not eliminated,
+  but merely left undetermined. The Infinite (like the Finite,
+  [Greek: to peperasmhenon&mdash;to hapeiron]) is a genus; it
+  comprehends under it the Infinitely Hard and the Infinitely Soft,
+  the Infinitely Swift and the Infinitely Slow&mdash;the infinite,
+  in short, of any or all positive attributes. It includes,
+  doubtless, 'a farrago of contradictions;' but so, also, does the
+  Finite&mdash;and so, also, do the actual manifestations of the
+  real, concrete universe, which manifestations constitute a
+  portion of the Finite. Whoever attempts to give any philosophical
+  account of the generation of the universe, tracing its phenomena,
+  as an aggregate, to some ultra-phenomenal origin, must include in
+  his scheme a <i>fundamentum</i> for all those opposite and
+  contradictory manifestations which experience discloses in the
+  universe. There always have been, and still are, many
+  philosophers who consider the Abstract and General to be prior
+  both in nature and time to the Concrete and Particular; and who
+  hold further that these two last are explained, when presented as
+  determinate and successive manifestations of the two first, which
+  they conceive as indeterminate and sempiternal. Now the Infinite
+  (Ens Infinitum or Entia Infinita, according to the point of view
+  in which we look at it) is a generic word, including all these
+  supposed indeterminate antecedents; and including therefore, of
+  course, many contradictory agencies. But this does not make it
+  senseless or unmeaning; nor can we distinguish it from 'the
+  Infinite in some one or more given attributes,' by any other
+  character than by greater reach of abstraction. We cannot admit
+  the marked distinction which Mr Mill contends for&mdash;that the
+  one is unknowable and the other knowable.</p>
+
+  <p>It may be proper to add that the mode of philosophizing which
+  we have just described is not ours. We do not agree in this way
+  either of conceiving, or of solving, the problem of philosophy.
+  But it is a mode so prevalent that Trendelenberg speaks of it,
+  justly enough, as 'the ancient Hysteron-Proteron of Abstraction.'
+  The doctrine of these philosophers appears to us unfounded, but
+  we cannot call it unmeaning.</p>
+
+  <p>In another point, also, we differ from Mr Mill respecting that
+  inferior abstraction which he calls 'the Infinite in some
+  particular attribute.' He speaks as if this could be known not
+  only as an abstraction, a conceivable, an ideal&mdash;but also as
+  a concrete reality; as if 'we could know a concrete reality as
+  infinite or as absolute' (p. 45); as if there really existed in
+  actual nature 'concrete persons or things possessing infinitely
+  or absolutely certain specific attributes'&mdash;(pp.
+  55&mdash;93). To this doctrine we cannot subscribe. As we
+  understand concrete reality, we find no evidence to believe that
+  there exist in nature any real concrete persons or things,
+  possessing to an infinite degree such attributes as they do
+  possess: <i>e.g.</i> any men infinitely wise or infinitely
+  strong, any horses infinitely swift, any stones infinitely hard.
+  Such concrete real objects appear to us not admissible, because
+  experience not only has not certified their existence in any
+  single case, but goes as far to disprove their existence as it
+  can do to disprove anything. All the real objects in nature known
+  to us by observation are finite, and possess only in a finite
+  measure their respective attributes. Upon this is founded the
+  process of Science, so comprehensively laid out by Mr Mill in his
+  'System of Logic '&mdash;Induction, Deduction from general facts
+  attested by Induction, Verification by experience of the results
+  obtained by Deduction. The attributes, whiteness or hardness, in
+  the abstract, are doubtless infinite; that is, the term will
+  designate, alike and equally, any degree of whiteness or hardness
+  which you may think of, and any unknown degree even whiter and
+  harder than what you think of. But when perceived as invested in
+  a given mass of snow or granite before us, they are divested of
+  that indeterminateness, and become restricted to a determinate
+  measure and degree.</p>
+
+  <p>Having thus indicated the points on which we are compelled to
+  dissent from Mr Mill's refutation of Sir W. Hamilton in the
+  pleading against M. Cousin, we shall pass to the seventh chapter,
+  in which occurs his first controversy with Mr Mansel. This
+  passage has excited more interest, and will probably be
+  remembered by a larger number of readers, than any portion of the
+  book. We shall give it in his own words (pp. 99&mdash;103), since
+  the energetic phraseology is quite as remarkable as the
+  thought:&mdash;</p>
+
+  <div class="blkquot">
+    <p>'There is but one way for Mr Mansel out of this difficulty,
+    and he adopts it. He must maintain, not merely that an Absolute
+    Being is unknowable in himself, but that the Relative
+    attributes of an Absolute Being are unknowable also.<a name=
+    "FNanchor_5_5"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_5"><sup>[5]</sup></a>
+    He must say that we do not know what Wisdom, Justice,
+    Benevolence, Mercy, &amp;c., are, as they exist in God.
+    Accordingly, he does say so. "It is a fact" (says Mr Mansel)
+    "which experience forces upon us, and which it is useless, were
+    it possible, to disguise, that the representation of God after
+    the model of the highest human morality which we are capable of
+    conceiving, is not sufficient to account for all the phenomena
+    exhibited by the course of his natural Providence. The
+    infliction of physical suffering, the permission of moral evil,
+    the adversity of the good, the prosperity of the wicked, the
+    crimes of the guilty involving the misery of the innocent, the
+    tardy appearance and partial distribution of moral and
+    religious knowledge in the world&mdash;these are facts, which
+    no doubt are reconcilable, we know not how, with the Infinite
+    Goodness of God, but which certainly are not to be explained on
+    the supposition that its sole and sufficient type is to be
+    found in the finite goodness of man."</p>
+
+    <p>'In other words' (continues Mr Mill commenting) 'it is
+    necessary to suppose that the infinite goodness ascribed to God
+    is not the goodness which we know and love in our
+    fellow-creatures, distinguished only as infinite in degree; but
+    is different in kind, and another quality altogether.
+    Accordingly Mr Mansel combats as a heresy of his opponents, the
+    opinion that infinite goodness differs only in degree from
+    finite goodness.&mdash;Here, then, I take my stand upon the
+    acknowledged principle of logic and of morality; that when we
+    mean different things we have no right to call them by the same
+    name, and to apply to them, the same predicates, moral and
+    intellectual. If, instead of the glad tidings that there exists
+    a Being in whom all the excellences which the highest human
+    form can conceive, exist in a degree inconceivable to us, I am
+    informed that the world is ruled by a being whose attributes
+    are infinite, but what they are we cannot learn, except that
+    the highest human morality does not sanction
+    them&mdash;convince me of this and I will hear my fate as I
+    may. But when I am told that I must believe this, and at the
+    same time call this being by the names which express and affirm
+    the highest human morality, I say, in plain terms, that I will
+    not. Whatever power such a being may have over me, there is one
+    thing he shall not do; he shall not compel me to worship him. I
+    will call no being good who is not what I mean when I apply
+    that epithet to my fellow-creatures; and if such a being can
+    sentence me to hell for not so calling him, to hell I will
+    go.'</p>
+  </div>
+
+  <p>This concluding declaration is memorable in many ways. Mr Mill
+  announces his resolution to determine for himself, and according
+  to his own reason and conscience, what God he will worship, and
+  what God he will not worship. For ourselves, we cordially
+  sympathize with his resolution. But Mr Mill must be aware that
+  this is a point on which society is equally resolved that no
+  individual shall determine for himself, if they can help
+  it.<a name="FNanchor_6_6"></a><a href=
+  "#Footnote_6_6"><sup>[6]</sup></a> Each new-born child finds his
+  religious creed ready prepared for him. In his earliest days of
+  unconscious infancy, the stamp of the national, gentile,
+  phratric, God, or Gods, is imprinted upon him by his elders; and
+  if the future man, in the exercise of his own independent reason,
+  acquires such convictions as compel him to renounce those Gods,
+  proclaiming openly that he does so&mdash;he must count upon such
+  treatment as will go far to spoil the value of the present life
+  to him, even before he passes to those ulterior liabilities which
+  Mr Mill indicates in the distance. We are not surprised that a
+  declaration so unusual and so impressive should have been often
+  cited in critical notices of this volume; that during the month
+  preceding the last Westminster election, it was studiously
+  brought forward by some opponents of Mr Mill, and more or less
+  regretted by his friends, as likely to offend many electors, and
+  damage his chance of success; and that a conspicuous and
+  noble-minded ecclesiastic, the Dean of Westminster, thought the
+  occasion so grave as to come forward with his characteristic
+  generosity, for the purpose of shielding a distinguished man
+  suspected of heresy.</p>
+
+  <p>The sublime self-assertion, addressed by Prometheus to Zeus,
+  under whose sentence he was groaning, has never before been put
+  into such plain English.<a name="FNanchor_7_7"></a><a href=
+  "#Footnote_7_7"><sup>[7]</sup></a> Mr Mill's declaration reminds
+  us also of Hippolytus, the chaste and pure youth, whose tragic
+  fate is so beautifully described by Euripides. Hippolytus is
+  exemplary in his devotions to the Goddess Artemis; but he
+  dissents from all his countrymen, and determines for himself, in
+  refusing to bestow the smallest mark of honour or worship upon
+  Aphrodit&ecirc;, because he considers her to be a very bad
+  Goddess.<a name="FNanchor_8_8"></a><a href=
+  "#Footnote_8_8"><sup>[8]</sup></a> In this refusal he persists
+  with inflexible principle (even after having received, from an
+  anxious attendant, warning of the certain ruin which it will
+  bring upon him), until the insulted Aphrodit&ecirc; involves him,
+  along with the unhappy Ph&aelig;dra and Theseus himself, in one
+  common abyss of misery. In like manner Mr Mill's declaration
+  stands in marked contrast with the more cautious proceeding of
+  men like Herodotus. That historian, alike pious and prudent, is
+  quite aware that all the Gods are envious and mischief-making,
+  and expressly declares them to be so.<a name=
+  "FNanchor_9_9"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_9"><sup>[9]</sup></a>
+  Yet, far from refusing to worship them on that account, he is
+  assiduous in prayer and sacrifice&mdash;perhaps, indeed, all the
+  more assiduous in consequence of what he believes about their
+  attributes;<a name="FNanchor_10_10"></a><a href=
+  "#Footnote_10_10"><sup>[10]</sup></a> being persuaded (like the
+  attendant who warned Hippolytus) that his only chance of
+  mollifying their ungentle dispositions in regard to himself is,
+  by honorific tribute in words and offerings.</p>
+
+  <p>When, however, after appreciating as we are bound to do Mr
+  Mill's declaration of subjective sentiment, we pass to its
+  logical bearing on the controversy between him and Mr Mansel, we
+  are obliged to confess that in this point of view it has little
+  objective relevancy. The problem was, how to reconcile the actual
+  evil and suffering in the universe (which is recited as a fact by
+  Mr Mansel, though in terms conveying a most inadequate idea of
+  its real magnitude) with the goodness of God. Mr Mill repudiates
+  the explanatory hypothesis tendered by Mr Mansel, as a solution,
+  but without suggesting any better hypothesis of his own. For
+  ourselves, we are far from endorsing Mr Mansel's solution as
+  satisfactory; yet we can hardly be surprised if he considers it
+  less unsatisfactory than no solution at all. And when we reflect
+  how frequently and familiarly predicates applicable to man are
+  applied to the Supreme Being, when they cannot possibly be
+  understood about Him in the same sense&mdash;we see no ground for
+  treating the proceeding as disingenuous, which Mr Mill is
+  disposed to do. Indeed, it cannot easily be avoided: and Mr Mill
+  himself furnishes us with some examples in the present volume. At
+  page 491, he says:&mdash;</p>
+
+  <div class="blkquot">
+    <p>'It would be difficult to find a stronger argument in favour
+    of Theism, than that the eye must have been made by one who
+    sees, and the ear by one who hears.'</p>
+  </div>
+
+  <p>In the words here employed, <i>seeing</i> and <i>hearing</i>
+  are predicted of God.</p>
+
+  <p>Now when we predicate of men, that they <i>see</i> or
+  <i>hear</i>, we affirm facts of extreme complexity, especially in
+  the case of <i>seeing</i>; facts partly physical, partly mental,
+  involving multifarious movements and agencies of nerves, muscles,
+  and other parts of the organism, together with direct sensational
+  impressions, and mental reconstruction of the past, inseparably
+  associated therewith; all which, so far as they are known, are
+  perspicuously enumerated in the work of Professor Bain<a name=
+  "FNanchor_11_11"></a><a href=
+  "#Footnote_11_11"><sup>[11]</sup></a> on the 'Senses and the
+  Intellect,' Again, Mr Mill speaks (in p. 102 and elsewhere) of
+  'the veracity of God.' When we say of our neighbour that he is a
+  veracious man, we ascribe to him a habit of speaking the truth;
+  that is, of employing his physical apparatus of speech, and his
+  mental power of recalling and recombining words lodged in the
+  memory, for the purpose of asserting no other propositions except
+  such as declare facts which he knows, or beliefs which he really
+  entertains. But how either <i>seeing</i>, or <i>hearing</i>, or
+  <i>veracity</i>, in these senses, can be predicated of God, we
+  are at a loss to understand. And if they are to be predicated of
+  God in a different sense, this admits the same license as Mr
+  Mansel contends for in respect to Goodness, when he feels that
+  undeniable facts preclude him from predicating that epithet
+  univocally respecting God and respecting man.<a name=
+  "FNanchor_12_12"></a><a href=
+  "#Footnote_12_12"><sup>[12]</sup></a></p>
+
+  <p>On the whole, it seems to us, that though Mr Mill will consent
+  to worship only a God of perfect goodness, he has thrown no new
+  light on the grave problem&mdash;frankly stated though
+  imperfectly solved, by Mr Mansel&mdash;how such a conception of
+  God is to be reconciled with the extent of evil and suffering
+  actually pervading human life and animal life throughout the
+  earth. We are compelled to say, respecting Mr Mill's treatment of
+  this subject&mdash;what we should not say respecting his
+  treatment of any other&mdash;that he has left an old perplexing
+  problem not less perplexing than he found it.</p>
+
+  <p>Reverting, not unwillingly, from theology to philosophy, we
+  now pass on to Mr Mill's ninth chapter (p. 128 seq.), of the
+  Interpretation of Consciousness. There is assuredly no lesson
+  more requiring to be taught than the proper mode of conducting
+  such interpretation; for the number of different modes in which
+  Consciousness has been interpreted is astonishing. Mr Mill begins
+  by citing from Sir W. Hamilton's lectures a passage of some
+  length, upon which he bestows considerable praise, regarding it
+  as&mdash;</p>
+
+  <div class="blkquot">
+    <p>'One of the proofs that, whatever may be the positive value
+    of his (Sir W. Hamilton's) achievements in metaphysics, he had
+    a greater capacity for the subject than many metaphysicians of
+    high reputation; and particularly than his two distinguished
+    predecessors in the same school of thought&mdash;"Reid and
+    Stewart."'&mdash;p. 131.</p>
+  </div>
+
+  <p>This is one of the greatest compliments to Sir W. Hamilton
+  that the book contains, and as such we are glad to cite it.</p>
+
+  <p>On the subject of Consciousness, Mr Mill has cited from Sir W.
+  Hamilton other good observations besides the one last alluded to;
+  but, unfortunately, these are often neutralized by opposite or
+  inconsistent opinions also cited from other parts of his works.
+  The number of such inconsistencies produced is indeed one
+  remarkable feature in Sir W. Hamilton's philosophical character.
+  He seems to follow out energetically (as Plato in his various
+  dialogues) the vein of thought pervading his mind at each
+  particular moment, without troubling himself to look back upon
+  his own prior speculations. Even compared with the best views of
+  Sir W. Hamilton, however, Mr Mill's mode of handling the subject
+  of Consciousness exhibits signal improvement. To some of his
+  observations we shall call particular attention.</p>
+
+  <p>All philosophers agree that what Consciousness testifies is to
+  be believed; but they differ much on the question&mdash;To what
+  points Consciousness does testify? and even on the still deeper
+  question&mdash;How shall we proceed to ascertain what <i>are</i>
+  these attested points? What is the proper method of studying or
+  interrogating Consciousness? Upon this Mr Mill remarks (pp.
+  145&mdash;147):&mdash;</p>
+
+  <div class="blkquot">
+    <p>'Here emerges the distinction between two different methods
+    of studying the problems of metaphysics; forming the radical
+    difference between the two great schools into which
+    metaphysicians are divided. One of these I shall call for
+    distinction, the <i>introspective</i> method; the other, the
+    <i>psychological</i>. M. Cousin observes that Locke went wrong
+    from the beginning, by placing before himself, as the question
+    to be first resolved, the origin of our ideas. This (he says)
+    was commencing at the wrong end. The proper course would have
+    been to begin by determining what the ideas now are; to
+    ascertain what it is that Consciousness now tells us;
+    postponing till afterwards the attempt to frame a theory
+    concerning the origin of any of the mental phenomena.</p>
+
+    <p>'I accept the question as M. Cousin states it; and I contend
+    that no attempt to determine what are the direct revelations of
+    Consciousness can be successful, or entitled to any regard,
+    unless preceded by what M. Cousin says ought only to follow
+    it&mdash;an inquiry into the origin of our acquired ideas. For
+    we have it not in our power to ascertain, by any direct
+    process, what Consciousness told us at the time when its
+    revelations were in their pristine purity. It only offers
+    itself to our inspection, as it exists now, when those original
+    revelations are overlaid and buried under a mountainous heap of
+    acquired notions and perceptions.</p>
+
+    <p>'It seems to M. Cousin, that if we examine with care and
+    minuteness our present states of Consciousness, distinguishing
+    and defining every ingredient which we find to enter into
+    them&mdash;every element that we seem to recognize as real, and
+    cannot "by merely concentrating our attention upon it analyze
+    into anything simpler&mdash;we reach the ultimate and primary
+    truths, which are the sources of all our knowledge, and which
+    cannot be denied or doubted without denying or doubting the
+    evidence of Consciousness itself&mdash;that is, the only
+    evidence that there is for anything. I maintain this to be a
+    misconception of the condition imposed on inquirers by the
+    difficulties of psychological investigation. To begin the
+    inquiry at the point where M. Cousin takes it up is, in fact,
+    to beg the question. For he must be aware, if not of the fact,
+    at least of the belief of his opponents, that the laws of the
+    mind&mdash;the Laws of Association, according to one class of
+    thinkers, the Categories of the Understanding, according to
+    another&mdash;are capable of creating, out of those data of
+    Consciousness which are uncontested, purely mental conceptions,
+    which become so identified in thought with all our states of
+    Consciousness, that <i>we seem, and cannot but seem, to receive
+    them by direct intuition</i>. For example, the belief in matter
+    in the opinion of these thinkers is, or at least may be, thus
+    produced:&mdash;</p>
+
+    <p>'"The proof that any of the alleged Universal Beliefs, or
+    Principles of Common Sense, are affirmations of
+    Consciousness&mdash;supposes two things: that the beliefs
+    exist, and that they cannot possibly have been acquired. The
+    first is, in most cases, undisputed; but the second is a
+    subject of inquiry which often taxes the utmost resources of
+    psychologists. Locke was therefore right in believing that 'the
+    origin of our ideas' is the main stress of the problem of
+    mental science, and the subject which must be first considered
+    in forming the theory of the Mind."'</p>
+  </div>
+
+  <p>This citation from Mr Mill's book is already almost too long,
+  yet we could have wished to prolong it still more, from the
+  importance of some of the succeeding paragraphs. It presents, in
+  clear discrimination and contrast, two opposite points of view
+  according to which the phenomena of mind are regarded by
+  different philosophers, and the method of studying them
+  determined: the <i>introspective</i> method, adopted by M. Cousin
+  and others&mdash;the <i>psychological</i> or analytical method,
+  pursued by Locke and by many other eminent men since
+  Locke&mdash;'the known and approved method of physical science,
+  adapted to the necessities of psychology'&mdash;(p. 148).</p>
+
+  <p>There are passages of Sir W. Hamilton's writings in which he
+  appears to feel that the <i>introspective</i> method alone is
+  insufficient for the interpretation of Consciousness, and that
+  the analytical method must be employed to reinforce it. But on
+  this as on other points he is not always consistent with himself.
+  For in laying down the principle upon which the primary truths of
+  Consciousness, the original data of intelligence, are to be
+  ascertained and distinguished from generalizations out of
+  experience and custom, he declares that the one single and
+  certain mark is Necessity&mdash;they must be beliefs which we are
+  under the necessity of believing&mdash;of which we cannot get rid
+  by any mental effort. He decides this, of course, for himself, by
+  the <i>introspective</i> method alone. He (with M. Cousin and
+  other philosophers who take the same view) does not apply the
+  analytical method to inquire whether his necessity of belief may
+  not be a purely acquired necessity and nowise congenital. It is,
+  indeed, remarkable that these philosophers do not even seek to
+  apply the introspective method as far as that method will really
+  go. They are satisfied with introspection of their own present
+  minds; without collecting results of the like process as applied
+  to other minds, in different times and places. They declare
+  various beliefs to be necessary to the human mind universally,
+  merely because such is the actual fact with their own minds and
+  with those immediately around them; sometimes even in defiance of
+  proof that there are (or have been) persons not sharing such
+  beliefs, and occasionally even believing the contrary; therefore,
+  when even the introspective method really disallows their
+  affirmative instead of sustaining it. This is, in truth, an abuse
+  of the introspective method; yet even if that method were
+  employed in its fullest extent&mdash;if the same incapability of
+  believing otherwise could be shown as common to all
+  mankind&mdash;it might still be only the effect of a strong
+  association. The analytical method must still be called in to
+  ascertain whether we are forced to suppose such incapability to
+  be an original fact of consciousness, or whether it may not have
+  been generated in the mind by circumstances under the natural
+  working of the laws of association. It is certain that these laws
+  not only may, but must, give birth to artificial
+  inconceivabilities in the mind&mdash;and that some of these may
+  be equal in strength to such, if any, as are natural.</p>
+
+  <div class="blkquot">
+    <p>'The History of Science' (says Mr Mill, following out the
+    same train of reasoning which we read in the third Book of his
+    'System of Logic') 'teems with inconceivabilities which have
+    been conquered; and with supposed necessary truths, which have
+    first ceased to be thought necessary, then to be thought true,
+    and have finally come to be deemed impossible.'&mdash;p.
+    150.</p>
+  </div>
+
+  <p>After various observations, chiefly exhibiting the rashness of
+  many censures bestowed by Sir W. Hamilton on Brown, Mr Mill gives
+  us three valuable chapters (xi., xii., xiii.), wherein he
+  analyzes the belief in an External World, the Belief in Mind as a
+  separate substance or Noumenon, and the Primary Qualities of
+  Matter. To each of these topics he applies what he calls the
+  <i>psychological</i> method, as contrasted with the simply
+  <i>introspective</i> method of Sir W. Hamilton (the Ego and
+  Non-Ego affirmed to be given together in the primary deliverance
+  of Consciousness) and so many other philosophers. He proves that
+  these beliefs are no way intuitive, but acquired products; and
+  that the known laws of Association are sufficient to explain how
+  they are acquired; especially the Law of Inseparable Association,
+  together with that of <i>Obliviscence</i>&mdash;a very useful,
+  discriminating phrase, which we first find employed in this
+  volume&mdash;(p. 259 et passim). He defines Matter to be a
+  <i>permanent possibility of Sensation</i>; he maintains that this
+  is really all which (apart from philosophical theories) mankind
+  in general mean by it; he shows that mere possibilities of
+  sensation not only may, but must, according to the known Laws of
+  Association, come to present 'to our artificialized
+  Consciousness' a character of objectivity&mdash;(pp. 198, 199).
+  The correlative subject, though present in fact and
+  indispensable, is eliminated out of conscious notice, according
+  to the Law of Obliviscence.</p>
+
+  <p>These chapters will well repay the most careful perusal. We
+  can only find room for one passage (pp. 214, 215):&mdash;</p>
+
+  <div class="blkquot">
+    <p>'Throughout the whole of our sensitive life, except its
+    first beginnings, we unquestionably refer our sensations to a
+    <i>me</i> and <i>not-me</i>. As soon as I have formed, on the
+    one hand, the notion of Permanent Possibilities of Sensation,
+    and on the other, of that continued series of feelings which I
+    call my life&mdash;both these notions are, by an irresistible
+    association, recalled by every sensation I have. They represent
+    two things, with both of which the sensation of the moment, be
+    it what it may, stands in relation; and I cannot be conscious
+    of the sensation without being conscious of it as related to
+    these two things. They have accordingly received relative
+    names, expressive of the double relation in question. The
+    thread of consciousness which I apprehend the relation as a
+    part of, is called the <i>Subject</i>; the group of Permanent
+    Possibilities of Sensation to which I refer it, and which is
+    partially realized and actualized in it, is called the
+    <i>Object</i> of the sensation. The sensation itself ought to
+    have a correlative name, or rather ought to have two such
+    names&mdash;one denoting the sensation as opposed to its
+    Subject, the other denoting it as opposed to its Object; but it
+    is a remarkable fact that this necessity has not been felt, and
+    that the need of a correlative name to every relative one has
+    been considered to be satisfied by the terms Object and Subject
+    themselves. It is true that these two are related to one
+    another, but only through the sensation. We have no conception
+    of either Subject or Object, either Mind or Matter, except as
+    something to which we refer our sensations, and whatever other
+    feelings we are conscious of. <i>The very existence of them
+    both, so far as cognizable by us, consists only in the relation
+    they respectively bear to our states of feeling.</i> Their
+    relation to each other is only the relation between those two
+    relations. The immediate correlatives are, not the pair,
+    <i>Object, Subject,</i> but the two pairs, Object, <i>Sensation
+    objectively considered</i>&mdash;Subject, <i>Sensation
+    subjectively considered</i>. The reason why this is overlooked
+    might easily be shown, and would furnish a good illustration of
+    that important part of the Laws of Association, which may be
+    termed the Laws of Obliviscence.'</p>
+  </div>
+
+  <p>This chapter, on the Primary Qualities of Matter, controverts
+  the opinion of Sir W. Hamilton, that extension, as consisting of
+  co-existent <i>partes extra partes</i>, is immediately and
+  necessarily apprehended by our consciousness. It cites, as well
+  as confirms, the copious proof given by Professor Bain (in his
+  work on the Senses and the Intellect) that our conception of
+  extension is derived from our muscular sensibility: that our
+  sensation of <i>muscular motion impeded</i> constitutes that of
+  filled space: that our conception of extension, as an aggregate
+  of co-existent parts, arises from the sense of sight, which
+  comprehends a great number of parts in a succession so rapid as
+  to be confounded with simultaneity&mdash;and which not only
+  becomes the symbol of muscular and tactile succession, but even
+  acquires such ascendancy as to supersede both of them in our
+  consciousness. Confirmation is here given to this important
+  doctrine, not merely by observations from Mr Mill himself, but
+  also from the very curious narrative, discovered and produced by
+  Sir W. Hamilton, out of a work of the German philosopher,
+  Platner. Platner instituted a careful examination of a man born
+  blind, and ascertained that this man did not conceive extension
+  as an aggregate of simultaneous parts, but as a series of
+  sensations experienced or to be experienced in
+  succession&mdash;(pp. 232, 233). The case reported from Platner
+  both corroborates the theory of Professor Bain, and receives its
+  proper interpretation from that theory; while it is altogether
+  adverse to the doctrine of Sir W. Hamilton&mdash;as is also
+  another case, which he cites from Maine de Biran:&mdash;</p>
+
+  <div class="blkquot">
+    <p>'It gives a very favourable idea of Sir W. Hamilton's
+    sincerity and devotion to truth (remarks Mr Mill, p. 247), that
+    he should have drawn from obscurity, and made generally known,
+    two cases so unfavourable to his own opinions.'</p>
+  </div>
+
+  <p>We think this remark perfectly just; and we would point out
+  besides, in appreciating Sir W. Hamilton's merits, that his
+  appetite for facts was useful to philosophy, as well as his
+  appetite for speculation. But the person whose usefulness to
+  philosophy we prefer to bring into the foreground, is Platner
+  himself. He spent three weeks in patient examination of this
+  blind man, and the tenor of his report proves that his sagacity
+  in interpreting facts was equal to his patience in collecting
+  them. The rarity of all such careful and premeditated observation
+  of the facts of mind, appears to us one main reason why (what Mr
+  Mill calls) the <i>psychological</i> theory finds so little
+  acceptance; and why those who maintain that what now seems a
+  mental integer was once a multiplicity of separate mental
+  fragments, can describe the antecedent steps of the change only
+  as a <i>latens processus</i>, which the reader never fully
+  understands, and often will not admit. Every man's mind is
+  gradually built up from infancy to maturity; the process is
+  always going on before our eyes, yet the stages of
+  it&mdash;especially the earliest stages, the most pregnant with
+  instruction&mdash;are never studied and put on record by
+  observers trained in inductive logic, knowing beforehand what
+  they ought to look for as the <i>sine qu&acirc; non</i> for
+  proving or disproving any proposed theory. Such cases as that
+  cited by Platner&mdash;cases of one marked congenital defect of
+  sense, enabling us to apply the Method of Difference&mdash;are
+  always within reach; but few Platners are found to scrutinize and
+  record them. Historians of science describe to us the laborious
+  and multiplied observations, and the elaborate precaution for
+  ensuring accuracy of observation, which recent chemical and
+  physical inquirers have found indispensable for the establishment
+  of their results. We cannot, therefore, be surprised that mental
+  philosophers, dealing with facts even more obscure, and careless
+  about enlarging, varying, authenticating their records of
+  particular facts, should have had little success in establishing
+  any results at all.</p>
+
+  <p>But if even those, who adopt the psychological theory, have
+  been remiss in the observation of particular mental
+  facts,&mdash;those who deny the theory have been far more than
+  remiss; they have been blind to obvious facts contradicting the
+  principles which they lay down. Mr Mill, in chap, xiv., deals
+  with this denial, common to Mr Mansel with Sir W. Hamilton. That
+  philosophers so eminent as both of them should declare
+  confidently&mdash;'what I cannot but think must be <i>&agrave;
+  priori</i>, or original to thought; it cannot be engendered by
+  experience upon custom' (p. 264)&mdash;appears to us as
+  extraordinary as it does to Mr Mill. Though no one ever surpassed
+  Sir W. Hamilton in large acquaintance with the actual diversities
+  of human belief, and human incapacities of believing&mdash;yet he
+  never seems to have thought of bringing this acquaintance into
+  account, when he assured the students in his lecture-room, that
+  custom, experience, indissoluble association, were altogether
+  insufficient to engender a felt necessity of believing. Such
+  forgetfulness of well-known mental facts cannot be reproached to
+  the advocates of the psychological theory.</p>
+
+  <p>In chap. xv. Mr Mill examines Sir W. Hamilton's doctrine on
+  unconscious mental modifications. He points out the confused
+  manner in which Sir W. Hamilton has conceived <i>mental
+  latency</i>, as well as the inconclusive character of the
+  reasoning whereby he refutes the following doctrine of Dugald
+  Stewart&mdash;That in the most rapid trains of association, each
+  separate item must have been successively present to
+  consciousness, though for a time too short to leave any memory.
+  Sir W. Hamilton thinks that the separate items may pass, and
+  often do pass, unconsciously; which opinion Mr Mill also, though
+  not approving his reasons, is inclined to adopt.</p>
+
+  <div class="blkquot">
+    <p>'I am myself inclined (p. 285) to admit unconscious mental
+    modifications, in the only sense in which I can attach any very
+    distinct meaning to them&mdash;namely, unconscious
+    modifications of the nerves. It may well be believed that the
+    apparently suppressed links in a chain of association, those
+    which Sir W. Hamilton considers as latent, really are so: that
+    they are not even momentarily felt, the chain of causation
+    being continued only physically&mdash;by one organic state of
+    the nerves succeeding another so rapidly, that the state of
+    mental consciousness appropriate to each is not produced.'</p>
+  </div>
+
+  <p>Mr Mill gives various illustrations in support of this
+  doctrine. He at the same time calls attention to a valuable
+  lecture of Sir W. Hamilton's, the thirty-second lecture on
+  Metaphysics; especially to the instructive citation from
+  Cardaillac contained therein, noting the important fact, which
+  descriptions of the Law of Association often keep out of
+  sight&mdash;that the suggestive agency of Association is carried
+  on, not by single antecedents raising up single consequents, but
+  by a mass of antecedents raising up simultaneously a mass of
+  consequents, among which attention is very unequally
+  distributed.</p>
+
+  <p>We shall say little upon Mr Mill's remarks on Sir W.
+  Hamilton's Theory of Causation&mdash;(chap. xvi.). This theory
+  appears to Mr Mill absurd; while the theory of Mr Mill (continued
+  from Hume, Brown, and James Mill) on the same subject, appears to
+  Sir W. Hamilton insufficient and unsatisfactory&mdash;'professing
+  to explain the phenomenon of causality, but, previously to
+  explanation, evacuating the phenomenon of all that desiderates
+  explanation'&mdash;(p. 295). For ourselves we embrace the theory
+  of Mr Mill:<a name="FNanchor_13_13"></a><a href=
+  "#Footnote_13_13"><sup>[13]</sup></a> yet we are aware that the
+  remark just cited from Sir W. Hamilton represents the
+  dissatisfaction entertained towards it by many objectors. The
+  unscientific and antiscientific yearnings, prevalent among
+  mankind, lead them to put questions which no sound theory of
+  Causation will answer; and they are ready to visit and trust any
+  oracle which professes to deliver a confident affirmative
+  solution of such questions. Among all the terms employed by
+  metaphysicians, none is used in a greater variety of meanings
+  than the term Cause.</p>
+
+  <p>In Mr Mill's next chapter (xvi.) he comments on Sir W.
+  Hamilton's doctrine of Concepts or General Notions. There are
+  portions of this chapter with which we agree less than with most
+  other parts of the volume; especially with his marked hostility
+  to the term <i>Concept</i>, and the reasons given for it, which
+  reasons appear to us not very consistent with what he has himself
+  said in the 'System of Logic,' Book IV. chap. ii. &sect;
+  1&mdash;3. The term <i>Concept</i> has no necessary connection
+  with the theory called Conceptualism. It is equally available to
+  designate the idea called up by a general name, as understood
+  either by Mr Bailey or by James Mill. We think it useful as an
+  equivalent to the German word <i>Begriff</i>, which sense Sir W.
+  Hamilton has in view when he introduces it, though he does not
+  always adhere to his profession. And when Mr Mill says (p.
+  331)&mdash;</p>
+
+  <div class="blkquot">
+    <p>'I consider it nothing less than a misfortune, that the
+    words Concept, General Notion, or any other phrase to express
+    the supposed mental modification corresponding to a general
+    name, should ever have been invented.'</p>
+  </div>
+
+  <p>we dissent from his opinion. To talk of 'the Concept of an
+  individual,' however, as Mr Mansel does (pp. 338, 339), is
+  improper and inconsistent with the purpose for which the name is
+  given.</p>
+
+  <p>We are more fully in harmony with Mr Mill in his two next
+  chapters (xviii. et seq.) on Judgment and Reasoning; which are
+  among the best chapters in this volume. He there combats and
+  overthrows the theory of Reasoning laid down by Sir W. Hamilton;
+  but we doubt the propriety of his calling this 'the Conceptualist
+  theory' (pp. 367, 368); since it has nothing to do with
+  Conceptualism, in the special sense of antithesis to Realism and
+  Nominalism,&mdash;but is, in fact, the theory of the Syllogism as
+  given in the Analytics of Aristotle, and generally admitted
+  since. Not merely Conceptualists, but (to use Mr Mill's own
+  language, p. 366) 'nearly all the writers on logic, taught a
+  theory of the science too small and narrow to contain their own
+  facts.' Such, indeed, was the theory constantly taught until the
+  publication of Mr Mill's 'System of Logic;' the first two books
+  of which corrected it, by arguments which are reinforced and
+  amplified in these two chapters on Judgment and Reasoning, as
+  well as in the two chapters next following&mdash;chaps, xx. and
+  xxi.&mdash;('Is Logic the Science of the Forms of
+  Thought&mdash;On the Fundamental Laws of Thought.') The contrast
+  which is there presented, in many different ways, between the
+  limited theory of logic taught by Sir W. Hamilton and Mr Mansel,
+  and the enlarged theory of Mr Mill, is instructive in a high
+  degree. We consider Mr Mill as the real preserver of all that is
+  valuable in Formal Logic, from the unfortunate consequences of an
+  erroneous estimate, brought upon it through the exaggerated
+  pretensions of logicians. When Sir W. Hamilton contrasts it
+  pointedly with physical science (of which he talks with a sort of
+  supercilious condescension, in one of the worst passages of his
+  writings, p. 401)&mdash;when all its apparent fruits were
+  produced in the shape of ingenious but barren verbal
+  technicalities&mdash;what hope could be entertained that Formal
+  Logic could hold its ground in the estimation of the recent
+  generation of scientific men? Mr Mill has divested it of that
+  assumed demonstrative authority which Bacon called 'regere res
+  per syllogismum;' but he has at the same time given to it a firm
+  root amidst the generalities of objective science. He has shown
+  that in the great problem of Evidence or Proof, the Laws of
+  Formal Logic, though bearing only on one part of the entire
+  procedure, yet bear upon one essential part, proper to be studied
+  separately: and that the maintenance of consistency between our
+  affirmations (which is the only special province of Formal
+  Logic), has great importance and value as a part of the process
+  necessary for ascertaining and vindicating their truth, or
+  exposing their character when false or uncertified&mdash;but no
+  importance or value except as a part of that larger exigency.</p>
+
+  <p>While Mr Mill was amending the Syllogistic theory so as to
+  ensure for Formal Logic its legitimate place among the essentials
+  of scientific procedure, Sir W. Hamilton was at the same time
+  enlarging it on its technical side, in two modes which are highly
+  esteemed both by himself and by others: 1. The recognition of two
+  kinds of Syllogisms; one in Extension, the other in
+  Comprehension: 2. The doctrine of the Quantification of the
+  Predicate.&mdash;Both these novelties are here criticised by Mr
+  Mill in chapter xxii., which we recommend the reader to peruse
+  conjointly with Lectures 15 and 16 of Sir W. Hamilton on
+  Logic.</p>
+
+  <p>Now whereas the main objection, by which the study of the
+  syllogistic logic has been weighed down and discredited in modern
+  times, is this, that it encumbers the memory with formal
+  distinctions, having no useful application to the real process
+  and purposes of reasoning&mdash;the procedure of Sir W. Hamilton
+  might almost lead us to imagine that he himself was trying to
+  aggravate that objection to the uttermost. He introduces a
+  variety of new canons (classifying Syllogisms as Extensive and
+  Intensive, by a distinction founded on the double quantity of
+  notions, in Extension and in Comprehension) which he intimates
+  that all former logicians have neglected&mdash;while it plainly
+  appears, even on his own showing, that the difference between
+  syllogisms, in respect to these two sorts of quantity, is of no
+  practical value; and that 'we can always change a categorical
+  syllogism of the one quantity into a categorical syllogism of the
+  other, by reversing the order of the two premises, and by
+  reversing the meaning of the copula' (Lect. xvi. p. 296); nay,
+  that every syllogism is already a syllogism in both quantities
+  (Mill, p. 431). Against these useless ceremonial reforms of Sir
+  W. Hamilton, we may set the truly philosophical explanation here
+  given by Mr Mill of the meaning of propositions.</p>
+
+  <div class="blkquot">
+    <p>'All judgments' (he says&mdash;p. 423), 'except where both
+    the terms are proper names, are really judgments in
+    Comprehension; though it is customary, and the natural tendency
+    of the mind, to express most of them in terms of Extension. In
+    other words, we never really predicate anything but attributes;
+    though, in the usage of language, we commonly predicate them by
+    means of words which are names of concrete
+    objects&mdash;because' (p. 426)&mdash;'we have no other
+    convenient and compact mode of speaking. Most attributes, and
+    nearly all large bundles of attributes, have no names of their
+    own. We can only name them by a circumlocution. We are
+    accustomed to speak of attributes, not by names given to
+    themselves, but by means of the names which they give to the
+    objects they are attributes of.' 'All our ordinary judgments'
+    (p. 428) 'are in Comprehension only; Extension not being
+    thought of. But we may, if we please, make the Extension of our
+    general terms an express object of thought. When I judge that
+    all oxen ruminate, I have nothing in my thoughts but the
+    attributes and their co-existence. But when by reflection I
+    perceive what the proposition implies, I remark that other
+    things may ruminate besides oxen, and that the unknown
+    multitude of things which ruminate form a mass, with which the
+    unknown multitude of things having the attributes of oxen is
+    either identical or is wholly comprised in it. Which of these
+    two is the truth I may not know, and if I did, took no notice
+    of it when I assented to the proposition, all oxen ruminate;
+    but I perceive, on consideration, that one or other of them
+    must be true. Though I had not this in my mind when I affirmed
+    that all oxen ruminate, I can have it now; I can make the
+    concrete objects denoted by each of the two names an object of
+    thought, as a collective though indefinite aggregate; in other
+    words, I can make the Extension of the names (or notions) an
+    object of direct consciousness. When I do this, I perceive that
+    this operation introduces no new fact, but is only a different
+    mode of contemplating the very fact which I had previously
+    expressed by the words, all oxen ruminate. The fact is the
+    same, but the mode of contemplating it is different. There is
+    thus in all Propositions a judgment concerning attributes
+    (called by Sir W. Hamilton a Judgment in Comprehension) which
+    we make as a matter of course; and a possible judgment in or
+    concerning Extension, which we <i>may</i> make, and which will
+    be true if the former is true.'</p>
+  </div>
+
+  <p>From the lucid explanation here cited (and from a following
+  paragraph too long to describe p. 433), we see that there is no
+  real distinction between Judgments in Comprehension and Judgments
+  in Extension; that the <i>appearance</i> of distinction between
+  them arises from the customary mode of enunciation, which custom
+  is here accounted for; that the addition to the theory of the
+  Syllogism, for which Sir W. Hamilton takes credit, is alike
+  troublesome and unprofitable.</p>
+
+  <p>The like may also be said about his other innovation, the
+  Quantification of the Predicate. Still more extensive are the
+  changes (as stated by himself) which this innovation would
+  introduce in the canons of Syllogism. Indeed, when we read his
+  language (Appendix to 'Lectures on Logic,' pp. 291&mdash;297)
+  censuring generally the prior logicians from Aristotle downwards,
+  and contending that 'more than half the value of logic had been
+  lost' by their manner of handling it&mdash;we may appreciate the
+  magnitude of the reform which he believed himself to be
+  introducing. The larger the reform, the more it behoved him to be
+  sure of the ground on which he was proceeding. But on this point
+  we remark a serious deficiency. After laying down, with
+  appropriate emphasis, the valuable logical postulate, <i>to state
+  explicitly what is thought implicitly</i>, on which, Sir W.
+  Hamilton says,</p>
+
+  <div class="blkquot">
+    <p>'Logic ever insists, but which logicians have never fairly
+    obeyed&mdash;it follows that logically we ought to take into
+    account the quantity, <i>always understood in thought</i>, but
+    usually, and for manifest reasons, elided in expression, not
+    only of the <i>subject</i>, but also of the <i>predicate</i>,
+    of a judgment.'&mdash;('Discussions on Philos.,' p. 614.)</p>
+  </div>
+
+  <p>Here Sir W. Hamilton assumes that the quantity of the
+  predicate is always understood in thought; and the same
+  assumption is often repeated, in the Appendix to his 'Lectures on
+  Logic,' p. 291 and elsewhere, as if it was alike obvious and
+  incontestable. Now it is precisely on this point that issue is
+  here taken with Sir W. Hamilton. Mr Mill denies altogether (p.
+  437) that the quantity of the predicate is always understood or
+  present in thought, and appeals to every reader's consciousness
+  for an answer:&mdash;</p>
+
+  <div class="blkquot">
+    <p>'Does he, when he judges that all oxen ruminate, advert even
+    in the minutest degree to the question, whether there is
+    anything else that ruminates? Is this consideration at all in
+    his thoughts, any more than any other consideration foreign to
+    the immediate subject? One person may know that there are other
+    ruminating animals, another may think that there are none, a
+    third may be without any opinion on the subject; but if they
+    all know what is meant by ruminating, they all, when they judge
+    that every ox ruminates, mean precisely the same thing. The
+    mental process they go through, <i>as far as that one judgment
+    is concerned</i>, is precisely identical; though some of them
+    may go on farther, and <i>add other judgments</i> to it.'</p>
+  </div>
+
+  <p>The last sentence cited from Mr Mill indicates the vice of Sir
+  W. Hamilton's proceeding in quantifying the predicate, and
+  explains why it was that logicians before him declined to do so.
+  Sir W. Hamilton, in this proceeding, insists on stating
+  explicitly, not merely all that is thought implicitly, but a
+  great deal more;<a name="FNanchor_14_14"></a><a href=
+  "#Footnote_14_14"><sup>[14]</sup></a> adding to it something
+  else, which <i>may</i>, indeed, be thought conjointly, but which
+  more frequently <i>is not</i> thought at all. He requires us to
+  pack two distinct judgments into one and the same proposition: he
+  interpolates the meaning of the Propositio Conversa
+  <i>simpliciter</i> into the form of the Propositio Convertenda
+  (when an universal Affirmative), and then claims it as a great
+  advantage, that the proposition thus interpolated admits of being
+  converted <i>simpliciter</i>, and not merely <i>per accidens</i>.
+  Mr Mill is, nevertheless, of opinion (pp. 439-443) that though
+  'the quantified syllogism is not a true expression of what is in
+  thought, yet writing the predicate with a quantification may be
+  sometimes a real help to the Art of Logic.' We see little
+  advantage in providing a new complicated form, for the purpose of
+  expressing in one proposition what naturally throws itself into
+  two, and may easily be expressed in two. If a man is prepared to
+  give us information on one Quaesitum, why should he be
+  constrained to use a mode of speech which forces on his attention
+  at the same time a second and distinct Quaesitum&mdash;so that he
+  must either give us information about the two at once, or confess
+  himself ignorant respecting the second?</p>
+
+  <p>The two next chapters of Mr Mill, noticing some other minor
+  peculiarities (all of them unfortunate, and one, p. 447, really
+  unaccountable) of Sir W. Hamilton's Formal Logic; and some
+  Fallacious Modes of Thought countenanced by Sir W. Hamilton (chs.
+  xxiii., xxiv.&mdash;pp. 446, 478), we are compelled to pass over.
+  We must find space, however, for a few words on the Freedom of
+  the Will (ch. xxv.), which (in Mr Mill's language, pp.
+  488&mdash;549), 'was so fundamental with Sir W. Hamilton, that it
+  may be regarded as the central idea of his system&mdash;the
+  determining cause of most of his philosophical opinions.' Prior
+  to Sir W. Hamilton, we find some writers who maintain the
+  doctrine of Free-will, others who maintain that of Necessity:
+  each supporting their respective conclusions by reasons which
+  they deem sufficient. Sir W. Hamilton declares that both the one
+  doctrine and the other are inconceivable and incomprehensible;
+  yet that, by the law of Excluded Middle, one or other of them
+  must be true: and he decides in favour of Free-will, of which he
+  believes himself to be distinctly conscious; moreover, Free-will
+  is essential (he thinks) to moral responsibility, of which also
+  he feels himself conscious. He confesses himself, however, unable
+  to explain the possibility of Free-will; but he maintains that
+  the same may be said about Necessity also. 'The champions of both
+  the two opposite doctrines are at once resistless in attack, and
+  impotent in defence'&mdash;(Hamilton's 'Footnotes on Reid,' p.
+  602.) Mr Mansel also asserts, even more confidently than Sir W.
+  Hamilton, that we are directly conscious of Free-will&mdash;(p.
+  503).</p>
+
+  <p>Sir W. Hamilton has himself given some of the best arguments
+  against the doctrine of Free-will, in refutation of Reid:
+  arguments, some of which are here cited by Mr Mill with praise
+  which they well deserve&mdash;(pp. 497, 498). But Mr Mill's own
+  reasoning on the same side is of a still higher order, enlarging
+  the grounds previously urged in the last book of his 'System of
+  Logic,' He protests against the term <i>Necessity</i>; and
+  discards the idea of Necessity, if it be understood to imply
+  anything more than invariability of antecedence and consequence.
+  If it mean <i>that</i>, experience proves thus much about
+  antecedents in the world of mind, as in the world of matter: if
+  it mean more, experience does not prove more, either in the world
+  of matter or in the world of mind: nor have we any grounds for
+  affirming it in either&mdash;(p. 501.) If it were true,
+  therefore, that consciousness attested Free-will, we should find
+  the testimony of consciousness opposed to a full proof from
+  experience and induction. But does consciousness really attest
+  what is called Free-will? Mr Mill analyzes the case, and declares
+  in the negative.</p>
+
+  <div class="blkquot">
+    <p>'To be conscious of Free-will, must mean to be conscious,
+    before I have decided, that I am able to decide either way;
+    exception may be taken <i>in limine</i> to the use of the word
+    <i>consciousness</i> in such an application. Consciousness
+    tells me what I do or feel. But what I am <i>able</i> to do, is
+    not a subject of consciousness. Consciousness is not prophetic;
+    we are conscious of what is, not of what will or can be. We
+    never know that we are able to do a thing, except from having
+    done it, or something similar to it. Having acted, we know, as
+    far as that experience reaches, how we are able to act; <i>and
+    this knowledge, when it has become familiar, is often
+    confounded with, and called by, the name of consciousness.</i>
+    But it does not derive any increase of authority from being
+    misnamed: its truth is not supreme over, but depends upon,
+    experience. If our so-called consciousness is not borne out by
+    experience, it is a delusion. It has no title to credence, but
+    as an interpretation of experience; and if it is a false
+    interpretation, it must give way.'&mdash;pp. 503, 504</p>
+  </div>
+
+  <p>After this salutary and much-needed warning against the
+  confusion between consciousness as an infallible authority, and
+  belief upon experience, of which we are conscious as a
+  belief&mdash;Mr Mill proceeds to sift the alleged self-evident
+  connection between Free-will and Accountability. He shows, not
+  merely that there is no connection, but that there is a positive
+  repugnance, between the two. By Free-will is meant that a
+  volition is not determined by motives, but is a spontaneous
+  mental fact, neither having a cause, nor admitting of being
+  predicted. Now, the very reason for giving notice that we intend
+  to punish certain acts, and for inflicting punishment if the acts
+  be committed, is, that we trust in the efficacy of the threat and
+  the punishment as deterring motives. If the volition of agents be
+  not influenced by motives, the whole machinery of law becomes
+  unavailing, and punishment a purposeless infliction of pain. In
+  fact, it is on that very ground that the madman is exempted from
+  punishment; his volition being presumed to be not capable of
+  being acted upon by the deterring motive of legal sanction. The
+  <i>free</i> agent, thus understood, is one who can neither feel
+  himself accountable, nor be rendered accountable, to or by
+  others. It is only the <i>necessary</i> agent (the person whose
+  volitions are determined by motives, and, in case of conflict, by
+  the strongest desire or the strongest apprehension) that can be
+  held really accountable, or can feel himself to be so.</p>
+
+  <div class="blkquot">
+    <p>'The true doctrine of the Causation of human actions (says
+    Mr Mill, p. 516) maintains, in opposition both to pure and to
+    modified Fatalism, that not only our conduct, but our
+    character, is in part amenable to our will: that we can, by
+    employing the proper means, improve our character: and that if
+    our character is such that, while it remains what it is, it
+    necessitates us to do wrong&mdash;it will be just to apply
+    motives which will necessitate us to strive for its
+    improvement. We shall not indeed do so unless we desire our
+    improvement, and desire it more than we dislike the means which
+    must he employed for the purpose.'</p>
+  </div>
+
+  <p>It thus appears that of the two propositions, 1, volitions are
+  necessary, or depend on causes; 2, volitions are free, or do not
+  depend on causes&mdash;neither the one nor the other is
+  inconceivable or incomprehensible, as Sir W. Hamilton supposed
+  them to be. That the first is true, and the second false, we
+  learn by experience, and by that alone; just as we learn the like
+  in regard to the phenomena of the material world. Indeed, the
+  fact that human volitions are both predictable and modifiable,
+  quite as much as all those physical phenomena that depend upon a
+  complication of causes&mdash;which is only a corollary from what
+  has just been said&mdash;is so universally recognized and acted
+  upon by all men, that there would probably be little difference
+  of opinion about this question, if the antithesis were not
+  obscured and mystified by the familiar, but equivocal, phrases of
+  Free-will and Necessity.</p>
+
+  <p>Passing over chapter xxvii., in which Mr Mill refutes Sir W.
+  Hamilton's opinion that the study of mathematics is worthless, or
+  nearly so, as an intellectual discipline&mdash;we shall now call
+  attention to the concluding remarks which sum up the results of
+  the volume. After saying that he 'differs from almost everything
+  in Sir W. Hamilton's philosophy, on which he particularly valued
+  himself, or which is specially his own,' Mr Mill describes Sir W.
+  Hamilton's general merits as follows:&mdash;</p>
+
+  <div class="blkquot">
+    <p>'They chiefly consist in his clear and distinct mode of
+    bringing before the reader many of the fundamental questions of
+    metaphysics: some good specimens of psychological analysis on a
+    small scale: and the many detached logical and psychological
+    truths which he has separately seized, and which are scattered
+    through his writings, mostly applied to resolve some special
+    difficulty, and again lost sight of. I can hardly point to
+    anything he has done towards helping the more thorough
+    understanding of the greater mental phenomena, unless it be his
+    theory of Attention (including Abstraction), which seems to me
+    the most perfect we have; but the subject, though a highly
+    important, is comparatively a simple one.'&mdash;p. 547.</p>
+  </div>
+
+  <p>Agreeing in this general view of Sir W. Hamilton's merits, we
+  should be disposed to describe them in language stronger and more
+  emphatic as to degree, than that which has just been cited. But
+  what is stated in the pages immediately following (pp. 550,
+  551)&mdash;That Sir W. Hamilton's doctrines appear to be usually
+  taken up under the stimulus of some special dispute, and often
+  afterwards forgotten; That he did not think out subjects until
+  they were thoroughly mastered, or until consistency was attained
+  between the different views which the author took from different
+  points of observation; That accordingly, his philosophy seems
+  made up of scraps from several conflicting metaphysical
+  systems&mdash;All this is literally and amply borne out by the
+  many inconsistencies and contradictions which Mr Mill has brought
+  to view in the preceding chapters. It would appear that the
+  controversial disposition was powerful with Sir W. Hamilton, and
+  that a present impulse of that sort (as has been said respecting
+  Bayle, Burke, and others) not only served to provoke new
+  intellectual combinations in his mind, but also exercised a
+  Leth&aelig;an influence in causing obliviscence of the old. But
+  we can hardly follow Mr Mill in ascribing the defect to
+  'excessive absorption of time and energy by the study of old
+  writers' (p. 551). If this study did no other good, it at least
+  kept the memory in exercise. Now, what surprises us most in Sir
+  W. Hamilton's inconsistencies, is the amount of
+  self-forgetfulness which they imply.</p>
+
+  <p>While the laborious erudition of Sir W. Hamilton cannot be
+  fairly regarded as having produced any of his intellectual
+  defects, it undoubtedly stamped upon him his special title of
+  excellence as a philosopher. This is fully recognized by Mr Mill;
+  though he treats it as belonging not so much to a philosopher as
+  to an historian of philosophy. He concludes (pp.
+  552&mdash;554):&mdash;</p>
+
+  <div class="blkquot">
+    <p>'It is much to be regretted that Sir W. Hamilton did not
+    write the history of philosophy, instead of choosing, as the
+    direct object of his intellectual exertions, philosophy itself.
+    He possessed a knowledge of the materials such as no one,
+    probably for many generations, will take the trouble of
+    acquiring again. Independently of the great interest and value
+    attaching to a knowledge of the historical development of
+    speculation, there is much in the old writers on philosophy,
+    even those of the middle ages, really worth preserving for its
+    scientific value. But this should be extracted, and rendered
+    into the phraseology of modern thought, by persons as familiar
+    with that as with the ancient, and possessing a command of its
+    language: a combination never yet so perfectly realized as in
+    Sir W. Hamilton. This, which no one but himself could have
+    done, he has left undone, and has given us, instead, a
+    contribution to mental philosophy, which has been more than
+    equalled by many not superior to him in powers, and wholly
+    destitute of erudition. Of all persons in modern times entitled
+    to the name of philosophers, the two, probably, whose reading
+    on the subject was the scantiest, in proportion to their
+    intellectual capacity, were Archbishop Whately and Dr Brown.
+    Accordingly they are the only two of whom Sir W. Hamilton,
+    though acknowledging their abilities, speaks with some tinge of
+    superciliousness. It cannot be denied that both Dr Brown and
+    Whately would have thought and written better than they did, if
+    they had been better read in the writings of previous thinkers;
+    but I am not afraid that posterity will contradict me when I
+    say, that either of them has done far greater service to the
+    world in the origination and diffusion of important thought,
+    than Sir W. Hamilton with all his learning; because, though
+    indolent readers, they were both of them active and fertile
+    thinkers.</p>
+
+    <p>'It is not that Sir W. Hamilton's erudition is not
+    frequently of real use to him on particular questions of
+    philosophy. It does him one valuable service: it enables him to
+    know all the various opinions which can be held on the
+    questions he discusses, and to conceive and express them
+    clearly, leaving none of them out. This it does, though even
+    this not always; but it does little else, even of what might be
+    expected from erudition when enlightened by philosophy. He
+    knew, with extraordinary accuracy, the [Greek: hoti] of each
+    philosopher's opinions, but gave himself little trouble about
+    the [Greek: dihoti]. With one exception, I find no remark
+    bearing upon that point in any part of his writings. I imagine
+    he would have been much at a loss if he had been required to
+    draw up a philosophical estimate of the mind of any great
+    thinker. He never seems to look at any opinion of a philosopher
+    in connection with the same philosopher's other opinions.
+    Accordingly he is weak as to the mutual relations of
+    philosophical doctrines. One of the most striking examples of
+    this inability is in the case of Leibnitz,' &amp;c.</p>
+  </div>
+
+  <p>Here we find in a few sentences the conclusion which Mr Mill
+  conceives to be established by his book. We shall state how far
+  we are able to concur with it. He has brought the matter to a
+  direct issue, by weighing Sir W. Hamilton in the balance against
+  two other actual cotemporaries; instead of comparing him with
+  some unrealized ideal found only in the fancy of critics and
+  reviewers.</p>
+
+  <p>Comparing Sir W. Hamilton with Dr Brown, we cordially
+  subscribe to the opinion of Mr Mill. We think that Dr Brown has
+  'done far greater service to the world than Sir W. Hamilton, in
+  the origination and diffusion of important thought.' To speak
+  only of two chief subjects in the field of important
+  thought&mdash;Causality and the Freedom of the Will&mdash;we not
+  only adopt the conclusions of Dr Brown, but we admire both his
+  acuteness and his originality in vindicating and illustrating the
+  first of the two, while we dissent entirely from the views of Sir
+  W. Hamilton. This alone would be sufficient to make us approve
+  the superiority assigned by Mr Mill to Dr Brown. We discover no
+  compensating item to be placed to the credit of Sir W. Hamilton:
+  for the great doctrine of the Relativity of Knowledge, which is
+  our chief point of philosophical brotherhood with him, was
+  maintained by Brown also.</p>
+
+  <p>But in regard to Dr Whately, our judgment is altogether
+  different. We cannot consent to admit him as a superior, or even
+  as an equal, to Sir W. Hamilton, 'in the origination and
+  diffusion of important thought.' He did much service by reviving
+  an inclination and respect for Logic, and by clearing up a part
+  of the technical obscurity which surrounded it: but we look upon
+  him as an acute and liberal-minded English theologian, enlarging
+  usefully, though timidly, the intellectual prison in which many
+  orthodox minds are confined&mdash;rather than as a fit aspirant
+  to the cosmopolitan honours of philosophy. 'An active and fertile
+  thinker,' Mr Mill calls Whately; and such he undoubtedly was. But
+  such also we consider Sir W. Hamilton to have been in a degree,
+  at least equal. If the sentence which we have quoted above be
+  intended to deny the predicate, 'active and fertile thinker,' of
+  Sir W. Hamilton, we cannot acquiesce in it. His intellect appears
+  to us thoroughly active and fertile, even when we dissent from
+  his reasonings&mdash;nay, even in the midst of his
+  inconsistencies, when a new growth of opinions is unexpectedly
+  pushed up on ground which we supposed to be already pre-occupied
+  by another both older and different. And we find this same
+  judgment implied in the discriminating remarks upon his
+  philosophical procedure made by Mr Mill himself&mdash;(pp. 271,
+  272). For example, respecting Causality and the Freedom of the
+  Will, we detect no want of activity and fertility, though marked
+  evidence of other defects&mdash;especially the unconditional
+  surrender of a powerful mind to certain privileged inspirations,
+  worshipped as 'necessities of thought.'</p>
+
+  <p>While thus declaring how far we concur in the parallel here
+  drawn of Sir W. Hamilton with Brown and Whately, we must at the
+  same time add that the comparison is taken under circumstances
+  unduly favourable to these two last. There has been no exposure
+  of <i>their</i> errors and inconsistencies, equal in penetration
+  and completeness to the crushing volume which Mr Mill has devoted
+  to Sir W. Hamilton. To make the odds fair, he ought to furnish a
+  similar systematic examination to Brown and Whately; enabling us
+  to read their works (as we now do those of Sir W. Hamilton) with
+  the advantage of his unrivalled microscope, which detects the
+  minutest breach or incoherence in the tissue of
+  reasoning&mdash;and of his large command of philosophical
+  premisses, which brings into full notice what the author had
+  overlooked. Thus alone could the competition between the three be
+  rendered perfectly fair.</p>
+
+  <p>We regret, as Mr Mill does, that Sir W. Hamilton did not
+  undertake the composition of a history of philosophy.
+  Nevertheless we must confess that we should hardly feel such
+  regret, if we could see evidence to warrant Mr Mill's judgment
+  (p. 554) that Sir W. Hamilton was 'indifferent to the [Greek:
+  dihoti] of a man's opinions, and that he was incompetent to draw
+  up an estimate of the opinions of any great thinker,' &amp;c.
+  Such incompetence, if proved to be frequent and considerable,
+  would deprive an author of all chance of success in writing a
+  history of philosophy. But the study of Sir William Hamilton's
+  works does not prove it to us, though Mr Mill has convicted him
+  of an erroneous estimate of Leibnitz. We say <i>frequent</i> and
+  <i>considerable</i>, because no historian of philosophy is exempt
+  from the defect more or less; or rather (to pass out of the
+  self-confidence of the Absolute into the modesty of the Relative)
+  we seldom find any historian whose estimate of great
+  philosophical thinkers does not often differ from our own. Hence
+  we are glad when ample original extracts are produced, enabling
+  us to test the historian, and judge for ourselves&mdash;a
+  practice which Sir W. Hamilton would have required no stimulus to
+  enforce upon him. There ought, indeed, to be various histories of
+  philosophy, composed from different points of view; for the
+  ablest historian cannot get clear of a certain exclusiveness
+  belonging to himself. But, so far as we can conjecture what Sir
+  W. Hamilton <i>would</i> or <i>could</i> have done, we think that
+  a history of philosophy composed by him would have surpassed any
+  work of the kind in our language.</p>
+
+  <p>We trust that Sir W. Hamilton's works will long continue to be
+  read, along with Mr Mill's examination of them; and we should be
+  glad if the works of other philosophers could be read along with
+  a comment of equal acuteness and impartiality. Any point of view
+  which could command the adherence of such a mind as Sir W.
+  Hamilton's, deserves to be fully considered. Moreover, the living
+  force of philosophy, as directress of human intelligence, depends
+  upon keeping up in each of her devotees a full mastery of many
+  divergent and opposite veins of reasoning&mdash;a knowledge,
+  negative and affirmative, of the full case of opponents as well
+  as of his own.</p>
+
+  <p>It is to Philosophy alone that <i>our</i> allegiance is sworn;
+  and while we concur mostly with Mr Mill's opinions, we number
+  both him and Sir W. Hamilton as a noble pair of brethren, serving
+  alike in her train.</p>
+
+  <p><i>Amicus Hamilton; magis amicus Mill; amica ante omnes
+  Philosophia.</i> FOOTNOTES:</p><a name=
+  "Footnote_1_1"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_1">[1]</a>
+
+  <div class="note">
+    <p>Mr Mansel and Mr Veitch, the editors of Sir W. Hamilton's
+    Lectures on Metaphysics, posthumously published, say in their
+    preface (p. xiii.)&mdash;</p>
+
+    <p>'For twenty years&mdash;from 1836 to 1856&mdash;the courses
+    of logic and metaphysics were the means through which Sir
+    William Hamilton sought to discipline and imbue with his
+    philosophical opinions the numerous youth who gathered from
+    Scotland and other countries to his classroom; and while, by
+    these prelections, the author supplemented, developed, and
+    moulded the national philosophy, leaving thereon the
+    ineffaceable impress of his genius and learning, he, at the
+    same time and by the same means, exercised over the intellects
+    and feelings of his pupils an influence which, for depth,
+    feeling, and elevation, was certainly never surpassed by that
+    of any philosophical instructor. Among his pupils there are not
+    a few who, having lived for a season under the constraining
+    power of his intellect, and been led to reflect on those great
+    questions regarding the character, origin, and bounds of human
+    knowledge, which his teaching stirred and quickened, bear the
+    memory of their beloved and revered instructor inseparably
+    blended with what is highest in their present intellectual
+    life, as well as in their practical aims and aspirations.'</p>
+  </div><a name="Footnote_2_2"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_2">[2]</a>
+
+  <div class="note">
+    <p>We are happy to find such high authorities as Dr Whewell, Mr
+    Samuel Bailey, and Sir John Herschel concurring in this
+    estimation of the new logical point of view thus opened by Mr
+    Mill. We will not call it a <i>discovery</i>, since Sir John
+    Herschel thinks the expression unsuitable.&mdash;See the recent
+    sixth edition of the 'System of Logic,' vol. i. p. 229.</p>
+  </div><a name="Footnote_3_3"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_3">[3]</a>
+
+  <div class="note">
+    <p>See Sir William. Hamilton's 'Lectures on Logic' (Lect. xvii.
+    p. 320, 321; also Appendix to those Lectures, p. 361). He here
+    distinguishes also formal induction from, material induction,
+    which latter he brings under the grasp of syllogism, by an
+    hypothesis in substance similar to that of Whately. There is,
+    however, in Lecture xix. (p. 380), a passage in a very
+    different spirit, which one might almost imagine to have been
+    written by Mr Mill: 'In regard to simple syllogisms, it was an
+    original dogma of the Platonic school, and an early dogma of
+    the Peripatetic, that science, strictly so called, was only
+    conversant with, and was exclusively contained in, universals;
+    and the doctrine of Aristotle, which taught that all our
+    general knowledge is only an induction from an observation of
+    particulars, was too easily forgotten or perverted by his
+    followers. It thus obtained almost the force of an acknowledged
+    principle that everything to be known must be known under some
+    general form or notion. Hence the exaggerated importance
+    attributed to definition and deduction; it not being considered
+    that we only take out of a general notion what we had
+    previously placed therein, and that the amplification of our
+    knowledge is not to be sought for from above but from
+    below&mdash;not from speculation about abstract generalities,
+    but from the observation of concrete particulars. Bat however
+    erroneous and irrational, the persuasion had its day and
+    influence, and it perhaps determined, as one of its effects,
+    the total neglect of one half, and that not the least important
+    half of the reasoning process.'</p>
+
+    <p>These very just observations are suggested to Sir William
+    Hamilton by a train of thought which has little natural
+    tendency to suggest them, viz., by the distinction upon which
+    he so much insists, between the logic of comprehension and the
+    logic of extension, and by his anxiety to explain why the
+    former had been exclusively cultivated and the latter
+    neglected.</p>
+
+    <p>That which Sir William Hamilton calls here truly the
+    doctrine of Aristotle (enunciated especially at the close of
+    the Analyt. Post.), and which he states to have been forgotten
+    by Aristotle's followers, was not always remembered by
+    Aristotle himself.</p>
+  </div><a name="Footnote_4_4"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_4">[4]</a>
+
+  <div class="note">
+    <p>The distinction is given by Stier and other logicians. 1.
+    Infinitum simpliciter. 2. Infinitum secundum quid, sive in
+    certo genere.</p>
+  </div><a name="Footnote_5_5"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_5">[5]</a>
+
+  <div class="note">
+    <p>This doctrine has been affirmed (so far as reason is
+    concerned, apart from revelation) not merely by Mr Mansel, but
+    also by Pascal, one of the most religious philosophers of the
+    seventeenth century, in the 'Pens&eacute;es':&mdash;</p>
+
+    <p>'Parlons selon les lumieres naturelles. S'il y a un Dieu, il
+    est infiniment incompr&eacute;hensible; puisque, n'ayant ni
+    principes ni bornes, il n'a nul rapport &agrave; nous; nous
+    sommes done incapables de conn&acirc;itre ni ce qn'il est, ni
+    s'il est.'&mdash;(See Arago, Biographie de Condorcet, p.
+    lxxxiv., prefixed to his edition of Condorcet's works.)</p>
+  </div><a name="Footnote_6_6"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_6">[6]</a>
+
+  <div class="note">
+    <p>The indictment under which Socrates was condemned at Athens,
+    as reported by Xenophon at the commencement of the Memorabilia,
+    ran thus&mdash;'Socrates is guilty of crime, inasmuch as he
+    does not believe in those Gods in whom the City believes, but
+    introduces other novelties in regard to the Gods; he is guilty
+    also, inasmuch as he corrupts the youth.'</p>
+
+    <p>These words express clearly a sentiment entertained not
+    merely by the Athenian people, but generally by other societies
+    also. They all agree in antipathy to free, individual,
+    dissenting reason; though that antipathy manifests itself by
+    acts, more harsh in one place, less harsh in another. The
+    Hindoo who declares himself a convert to Christianity, becomes
+    at the same time an outcast ([Greek: <i>aphrh&ecirc;t&ocirc;r,
+    athhemistos, anhestios</i>]) among those whose Gods he has
+    deserted. As a general fact, the man who dissents from his
+    fellows upon fundamentals of religion, purchases an undisturbed
+    life only by being content with that 'semi-liberty under
+    silence and concealment,' for which Cicero was thankful under
+    the dictatorship of Julius C&aelig;sar.
+    'Obsecro&mdash;abiiciamus ista et semi-liberi saltern, simus;
+    quod assequemur <i>et tacendo et latendo'</i> (Epist. ad Attic,
+    xiii. 31). Contrast with this the memorable declaration of
+    Socrates, in the Platonic Apology, that silence and abstinence
+    from cross-examination were intolerable to him; that life would
+    not be worth having under such conditions.</p>
+  </div><a name="Footnote_7_7"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_7">[7]</a>
+
+  <div class="note">
+    <p>Aeschyl. Prometh., 996-1006&mdash;</p>
+
+    <p><br>
+    <span style="margin-left: 1em;">pros tauta, rhipthesth&ocirc;
+    men aithaloussa phlox,</span><br>
+    <span style="margin-left: 1em;">leykoptherps de niphadi kai
+    bronth&ecirc;masin</span><br>
+    <span style="margin-left: 1em;">chthonhiois kykhat&ocirc;
+    phanta kahi tarasshet&ocirc;</span><br>
+    <span style="margin-left: 1em;">gnhampsei gar ouden
+    t&ocirc;ndhe m'&mdash;&mdash;</span><br>
+    <span style="margin-left: 1em;">eiselthet&ocirc; se
+    mh&ecirc;pot, h&ocirc;s eg&ocirc;, Dios</span><br>
+    <span style="margin-left: 1em;">gnh&ocirc;m&ecirc;n
+    phob&ecirc;theis, th&ecirc;lhynoys genh&ecirc;somai,</span><br>
+    <span style="margin-left: 1em;">kai liparh&ecirc;s&ocirc; ton
+    mhega stygohymenon</span><br>
+    <span style="margin-left: 1em;">gynaikomhimois hyptihysmasin
+    cherh&ocirc;n,</span><br>
+    <span style="margin-left: 1em;">lyshai me dhesm&ocirc;n
+    t&ocirc;nde toy pantos ohe&ocirc;.</span></p>
+
+    <p>Also v. 1047, et seq. The memorable ode of Goethe, entitled
+    <i>Prometheus</i>, embodies a similar vein of sentiment in the
+    finest poetry.</p>
+  </div><a name="Footnote_8_8"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_8">[8]</a>
+
+  <div class="note">
+    <p>Euripid Hippol., 10&mdash;</p>
+
+    <p><br>
+    <span style="margin-left: 1em;">(Aph) oh gar me thaeseos pais,
+    'Amazonos tokos</span><br>
+    <span style="margin-left: 1em;">monos politon taesde gaes
+    Troizaenias</span><br>
+    <span style="margin-left: 1em;">legei kakistaen daimonon
+    pephukenai</span><br>
+    <span style="margin-left: 1em;">Phoibou d' adelphaen
+    Artemin,&mdash;</span><br>
+    <span style="margin-left: 1em;">tima, megiotaen daimonon
+    aegoumenos&mdash;</span></p>
+
+    <p><br>
+    <span style="margin-left: 1em;">(Hipp.) taen saen dhe Khyprin
+    pholl' heg&ocirc; Chairein lhego&mdash;</span><br>
+    <span style="margin-left: 1em;">(112.)</span></p>
+
+    <p>See also v. 1328&mdash;1402.</p>
+  </div><a name="Footnote_9_9"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_9">[9]</a>
+
+  <div class="note">
+    <p>Herodot. t. 32. O Kroise, epistumenon me to theion pan eohn
+    phthonerohn te kai taraxodes, epeirotas ahnthropaeion
+    pragmhaton pheri; also iii. 40</p>
+  </div><a name="Footnote_10_10"></a><a href=
+  "#FNanchor_10_10">[10]</a>
+
+  <div class="note">
+    <p>See Eurip. Hipp., 6-96-149. The language of the attendant,
+    after his affectionate remonstrance to Hippolytus had been
+    disregarded, supplicating Aphrodit&ecirc; to pardon the
+    recalcitrancy of that virtuous but obstinate youth, is
+    characteristic and touching (114-120.)</p>
+  </div><a name="Footnote_11_11"></a><a href=
+  "#FNanchor_11_11">[11]</a>
+
+  <div class="note">
+    <p>See especially his chapter ii. on the Sensations of Sight,
+    pp. 222, 241&mdash;247, in the second edition of this work.</p>
+  </div><a name="Footnote_12_12"></a><a href=
+  "#FNanchor_12_12">[12]</a>
+
+  <div class="note">
+    <p>Descartes says, in his 'Principia Philosophi&aelig;,' i
+    51&mdash;'Et quidem substantia qu&aelig; null&acirc;
+    plan&egrave; re indigeat, unica tantum potest
+    intelligi&mdash;nempe Deus. Alias vero omnes, non nisi ope
+    concurs&ucirc;s Dei existere posse perspicimus. Atque ideo
+    nomen substanti&aelig; non convenit Deo et illis
+    <i>univoc&egrave;</i>, ut dici solet in scholis, hoc est, nulla
+    ejus nominis significatio potest distinct&egrave; intelligi,
+    qu&aelig; Deo et creaturis sit communis.'</p>
+  </div><a name="Footnote_13_13"></a><a href=
+  "#FNanchor_13_13">[13]</a>
+
+  <div class="note">
+    <p>At the same time, we cannot go along with Mr Mill in the
+    following affirmation (p. 201):&mdash;</p>
+
+    <p>'This natural probability is converted into certainty when
+    we take into consideration that universal law of our experience
+    which is termed the Law of Causation, and which makes us
+    <i>unable to conceive the beginning of anything without</i> an
+    antecedent condition, <i>or cause.'</i> Such 'inability to
+    conceive' appears to us not in correspondence with facts.
+    First, it cannot be properly either affirmed or denied, until
+    agreement is obtained what the word <i>cause</i> means. If
+    three persons, A, B, and C, agree in affirming it&mdash;A
+    adopting the meaning of Aristotle, B that of Sir William
+    Hamilton, and C that of Mr Mill&mdash;the agreement is purely
+    verbal; or rather, all three concur in having a mental exigency
+    pressing for satisfaction, but differ as to the hypothesis
+    which satisfies it.</p>
+
+    <p>Next, if we reason upon Mr Mill's theory as to Cause,
+    certainly those who deny his theory can have no difficulty in
+    conceiving events without any cause (in that sense): nor have
+    those who adopt this theory any greater difficulty. These
+    latter <i>believe</i> that there are, throughout, constant and
+    uniform conditions on which the occurrence of every event
+    depends; but they can perfectly <i>conceive</i> events as
+    occurring without any such uniform sequence. In truth, the
+    belief in such causation, as pervading <i>all nature</i>, is an
+    acquired result of scientific training. The greater part of
+    mankind believe that some events occur in regular, others in
+    irregular succession. Moreover, a full half of the metaphysical
+    world espouse the doctrine of free-will, and consider that all
+    volitions occur without any cause at all.</p>
+  </div><a name="Footnote_14_14"></a><a href=
+  "#FNanchor_14_14">[14]</a>
+
+  <div class="note">
+    <p>Among the various authorities (upon this question of
+    quantifying the predicate) collected by Sir W. Hamilton in the
+    valuable Appendix to his 'Lectures on Logic,' we find one (p.
+    311) which takes the same ground of objection as Mr Mill, in
+    these words:&mdash;'The cause why the quantitative note is not
+    usually joined with the predicate, is, that there would thus be
+    two <i>qu&aelig;sita</i> at once; to wit, whether the predicate
+    were affirmed of the subject, and whether it were denied of
+    everything beside. For when we say, <i>all man is all
+    rational</i>, we judge that <i>all man is rational</i>, and
+    judge likewise <i>that rational is denied of everything but
+    man</i>. But these are, in reality, two different
+    <i>qu&aelig;sita</i>; and therefore it has become usual to
+    state them, not in one, but in two several propositions. And
+    this is self-evident, seeing that a <i>qu&aelig;situm</i>, in
+    itself, asks only&mdash;<i>Does or does not this inhere in
+    that?</i> and <i>not</i> Does or does not this inhere in that,
+    <i>and at the same time inhere in nothing else?</i>'</p>
+
+    <p>The author of this just and sagacious remark&mdash;much
+    surpassing what the other writers quoted in the Appendix
+    say&mdash;was a Jew who died at Perpignan in or near 1370,
+    named Levi Ben Gerson or Gersonides. An interesting account of
+    this man, eminent as a writer and thinker in his age, will be
+    found in a biography by Dr Joel, published at Breslau in 1862,
+    'Levi Ben Gerson als Religions&mdash;philosoph.' He
+    distinguished himself as a writer on theology, philosophy, and
+    astronomy; he was one of the successors to the free speculative
+    vein of Maimonides, and one of the continuators of the Arabic
+    Aristotelian philosophy. He both commented on and combated the
+    doctrines of Averroes. Dr Joel thinks that he died earlier than
+    1370.</p>
+  </div>
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+<pre>
+
+
+
+
+
+End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Review of the Work of Mr John Stuart
+Mill Entitled, 'Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy.', by George Grote
+
+*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK REVIEW OF MR JOHN STUART MILL ***
+
+***** This file should be named 12002-h.htm or 12002-h.zip *****
+This and all associated files of various formats will be found in:
+        https://www.gutenberg.org/1/2/0/0/12002/
+
+Produced by The Online Distributed Proofreading Team.
+
+Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions
+will be renamed.
+
+Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no
+one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation
+(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without
+permission and without paying copyright royalties.  Special rules,
+set forth in the General Terms of Use part of this license, apply to
+copying and distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works to
+protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm concept and trademark.  Project
+Gutenberg is a registered trademark, and may not be used if you
+charge for the eBooks, unless you receive specific permission.  If you
+do not charge anything for copies of this eBook, complying with the
+rules is very easy.  You may use this eBook for nearly any purpose
+such as creation of derivative works, reports, performances and
+research.  They may be modified and printed and given away--you may do
+practically ANYTHING with public domain eBooks.  Redistribution is
+subject to the trademark license, especially commercial
+redistribution.
+
+
+
+*** START: FULL LICENSE ***
+
+THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG LICENSE
+PLEASE READ THIS BEFORE YOU DISTRIBUTE OR USE THIS WORK
+
+To protect the Project Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting the free
+distribution of electronic works, by using or distributing this work
+(or any other work associated in any way with the phrase "Project
+Gutenberg"), you agree to comply with all the terms of the Full Project
+Gutenberg-tm License (available with this file or online at
+https://gutenberg.org/license).
+
+
+Section 1.  General Terms of Use and Redistributing Project Gutenberg-tm
+electronic works
+
+1.A.  By reading or using any part of this Project Gutenberg-tm
+electronic work, you indicate that you have read, understand, agree to
+and accept all the terms of this license and intellectual property
+(trademark/copyright) agreement.  If you do not agree to abide by all
+the terms of this agreement, you must cease using and return or destroy
+all copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in your possession.
+If you paid a fee for obtaining a copy of or access to a Project
+Gutenberg-tm electronic work and you do not agree to be bound by the
+terms of this agreement, you may obtain a refund from the person or
+entity to whom you paid the fee as set forth in paragraph 1.E.8.
+
+1.B.  "Project Gutenberg" is a registered trademark.  It may only be
+used on or associated in any way with an electronic work by people who
+agree to be bound by the terms of this agreement.  There are a few
+things that you can do with most Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works
+even without complying with the full terms of this agreement.  See
+paragraph 1.C below.  There are a lot of things you can do with Project
+Gutenberg-tm electronic works if you follow the terms of this agreement
+and help preserve free future access to Project Gutenberg-tm electronic
+works.  See paragraph 1.E below.
+
+1.C.  The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation ("the Foundation"
+or PGLAF), owns a compilation copyright in the collection of Project
+Gutenberg-tm electronic works.  Nearly all the individual works in the
+collection are in the public domain in the United States.  If an
+individual work is in the public domain in the United States and you are
+located in the United States, we do not claim a right to prevent you from
+copying, distributing, performing, displaying or creating derivative
+works based on the work as long as all references to Project Gutenberg
+are removed.  Of course, we hope that you will support the Project
+Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting free access to electronic works by
+freely sharing Project Gutenberg-tm works in compliance with the terms of
+this agreement for keeping the Project Gutenberg-tm name associated with
+the work.  You can easily comply with the terms of this agreement by
+keeping this work in the same format with its attached full Project
+Gutenberg-tm License when you share it without charge with others.
+
+1.D.  The copyright laws of the place where you are located also govern
+what you can do with this work.  Copyright laws in most countries are in
+a constant state of change.  If you are outside the United States, check
+the laws of your country in addition to the terms of this agreement
+before downloading, copying, displaying, performing, distributing or
+creating derivative works based on this work or any other Project
+Gutenberg-tm work.  The Foundation makes no representations concerning
+the copyright status of any work in any country outside the United
+States.
+
+1.E.  Unless you have removed all references to Project Gutenberg:
+
+1.E.1.  The following sentence, with active links to, or other immediate
+access to, the full Project Gutenberg-tm License must appear prominently
+whenever any copy of a Project Gutenberg-tm work (any work on which the
+phrase "Project Gutenberg" appears, or with which the phrase "Project
+Gutenberg" is associated) is accessed, displayed, performed, viewed,
+copied or distributed:
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+1.E.2.  If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is derived
+from the public domain (does not contain a notice indicating that it is
+posted with permission of the copyright holder), the work can be copied
+and distributed to anyone in the United States without paying any fees
+or charges.  If you are redistributing or providing access to a work
+with the phrase "Project Gutenberg" associated with or appearing on the
+work, you must comply either with the requirements of paragraphs 1.E.1
+through 1.E.7 or obtain permission for the use of the work and the
+Project Gutenberg-tm trademark as set forth in paragraphs 1.E.8 or
+1.E.9.
+
+1.E.3.  If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is posted
+with the permission of the copyright holder, your use and distribution
+must comply with both paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 and any additional
+terms imposed by the copyright holder.  Additional terms will be linked
+to the Project Gutenberg-tm License for all works posted with the
+permission of the copyright holder found at the beginning of this work.
+
+1.E.4.  Do not unlink or detach or remove the full Project Gutenberg-tm
+License terms from this work, or any files containing a part of this
+work or any other work associated with Project Gutenberg-tm.
+
+1.E.5.  Do not copy, display, perform, distribute or redistribute this
+electronic work, or any part of this electronic work, without
+prominently displaying the sentence set forth in paragraph 1.E.1 with
+active links or immediate access to the full terms of the Project
+Gutenberg-tm License.
+
+1.E.6.  You may convert to and distribute this work in any binary,
+compressed, marked up, nonproprietary or proprietary form, including any
+word processing or hypertext form.  However, if you provide access to or
+distribute copies of a Project Gutenberg-tm work in a format other than
+"Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other format used in the official version
+posted on the official Project Gutenberg-tm web site (www.gutenberg.org),
+you must, at no additional cost, fee or expense to the user, provide a
+copy, a means of exporting a copy, or a means of obtaining a copy upon
+request, of the work in its original "Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other
+form.  Any alternate format must include the full Project Gutenberg-tm
+License as specified in paragraph 1.E.1.
+
+1.E.7.  Do not charge a fee for access to, viewing, displaying,
+performing, copying or distributing any Project Gutenberg-tm works
+unless you comply with paragraph 1.E.8 or 1.E.9.
+
+1.E.8.  You may charge a reasonable fee for copies of or providing
+access to or distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works provided
+that
+
+- You pay a royalty fee of 20% of the gross profits you derive from
+     the use of Project Gutenberg-tm works calculated using the method
+     you already use to calculate your applicable taxes.  The fee is
+     owed to the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark, but he
+     has agreed to donate royalties under this paragraph to the
+     Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation.  Royalty payments
+     must be paid within 60 days following each date on which you
+     prepare (or are legally required to prepare) your periodic tax
+     returns.  Royalty payments should be clearly marked as such and
+     sent to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation at the
+     address specified in Section 4, "Information about donations to
+     the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation."
+
+- You provide a full refund of any money paid by a user who notifies
+     you in writing (or by e-mail) within 30 days of receipt that s/he
+     does not agree to the terms of the full Project Gutenberg-tm
+     License.  You must require such a user to return or
+     destroy all copies of the works possessed in a physical medium
+     and discontinue all use of and all access to other copies of
+     Project Gutenberg-tm works.
+
+- You provide, in accordance with paragraph 1.F.3, a full refund of any
+     money paid for a work or a replacement copy, if a defect in the
+     electronic work is discovered and reported to you within 90 days
+     of receipt of the work.
+
+- You comply with all other terms of this agreement for free
+     distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm works.
+
+1.E.9.  If you wish to charge a fee or distribute a Project Gutenberg-tm
+electronic work or group of works on different terms than are set
+forth in this agreement, you must obtain permission in writing from
+both the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation and Michael
+Hart, the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark.  Contact the
+Foundation as set forth in Section 3 below.
+
+1.F.
+
+1.F.1.  Project Gutenberg volunteers and employees expend considerable
+effort to identify, do copyright research on, transcribe and proofread
+public domain works in creating the Project Gutenberg-tm
+collection.  Despite these efforts, Project Gutenberg-tm electronic
+works, and the medium on which they may be stored, may contain
+"Defects," such as, but not limited to, incomplete, inaccurate or
+corrupt data, transcription errors, a copyright or other intellectual
+property infringement, a defective or damaged disk or other medium, a
+computer virus, or computer codes that damage or cannot be read by
+your equipment.
+
+1.F.2.  LIMITED WARRANTY, DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES - Except for the "Right
+of Replacement or Refund" described in paragraph 1.F.3, the Project
+Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the owner of the Project
+Gutenberg-tm trademark, and any other party distributing a Project
+Gutenberg-tm electronic work under this agreement, disclaim all
+liability to you for damages, costs and expenses, including legal
+fees.  YOU AGREE THAT YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE, STRICT
+LIABILITY, BREACH OF WARRANTY OR BREACH OF CONTRACT EXCEPT THOSE
+PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH F3.  YOU AGREE THAT THE FOUNDATION, THE
+TRADEMARK OWNER, AND ANY DISTRIBUTOR UNDER THIS AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE
+LIABLE TO YOU FOR ACTUAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE OR
+INCIDENTAL DAMAGES EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH
+DAMAGE.
+
+1.F.3.  LIMITED RIGHT OF REPLACEMENT OR REFUND - If you discover a
+defect in this electronic work within 90 days of receiving it, you can
+receive a refund of the money (if any) you paid for it by sending a
+written explanation to the person you received the work from.  If you
+received the work on a physical medium, you must return the medium with
+your written explanation.  The person or entity that provided you with
+the defective work may elect to provide a replacement copy in lieu of a
+refund.  If you received the work electronically, the person or entity
+providing it to you may choose to give you a second opportunity to
+receive the work electronically in lieu of a refund.  If the second copy
+is also defective, you may demand a refund in writing without further
+opportunities to fix the problem.
+
+1.F.4.  Except for the limited right of replacement or refund set forth
+in paragraph 1.F.3, this work is provided to you 'AS-IS' WITH NO OTHER
+WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO
+WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTIBILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PURPOSE.
+
+1.F.5.  Some states do not allow disclaimers of certain implied
+warranties or the exclusion or limitation of certain types of damages.
+If any disclaimer or limitation set forth in this agreement violates the
+law of the state applicable to this agreement, the agreement shall be
+interpreted to make the maximum disclaimer or limitation permitted by
+the applicable state law.  The invalidity or unenforceability of any
+provision of this agreement shall not void the remaining provisions.
+
+1.F.6.  INDEMNITY - You agree to indemnify and hold the Foundation, the
+trademark owner, any agent or employee of the Foundation, anyone
+providing copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in accordance
+with this agreement, and any volunteers associated with the production,
+promotion and distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works,
+harmless from all liability, costs and expenses, including legal fees,
+that arise directly or indirectly from any of the following which you do
+or cause to occur: (a) distribution of this or any Project Gutenberg-tm
+work, (b) alteration, modification, or additions or deletions to any
+Project Gutenberg-tm work, and (c) any Defect you cause.
+
+
+Section  2.  Information about the Mission of Project Gutenberg-tm
+
+Project Gutenberg-tm is synonymous with the free distribution of
+electronic works in formats readable by the widest variety of computers
+including obsolete, old, middle-aged and new computers.  It exists
+because of the efforts of hundreds of volunteers and donations from
+people in all walks of life.
+
+Volunteers and financial support to provide volunteers with the
+assistance they need, is critical to reaching Project Gutenberg-tm's
+goals and ensuring that the Project Gutenberg-tm collection will
+remain freely available for generations to come.  In 2001, the Project
+Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation was created to provide a secure
+and permanent future for Project Gutenberg-tm and future generations.
+To learn more about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation
+and how your efforts and donations can help, see Sections 3 and 4
+and the Foundation web page at https://www.pglaf.org.
+
+
+Section 3.  Information about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive
+Foundation
+
+The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation is a non profit
+501(c)(3) educational corporation organized under the laws of the
+state of Mississippi and granted tax exempt status by the Internal
+Revenue Service.  The Foundation's EIN or federal tax identification
+number is 64-6221541.  Its 501(c)(3) letter is posted at
+https://pglaf.org/fundraising.  Contributions to the Project Gutenberg
+Literary Archive Foundation are tax deductible to the full extent
+permitted by U.S. federal laws and your state's laws.
+
+The Foundation's principal office is located at 4557 Melan Dr. S.
+Fairbanks, AK, 99712., but its volunteers and employees are scattered
+throughout numerous locations.  Its business office is located at
+809 North 1500 West, Salt Lake City, UT 84116, (801) 596-1887, email
+business@pglaf.org.  Email contact links and up to date contact
+information can be found at the Foundation's web site and official
+page at https://pglaf.org
+
+For additional contact information:
+     Dr. Gregory B. Newby
+     Chief Executive and Director
+     gbnewby@pglaf.org
+
+Section 4.  Information about Donations to the Project Gutenberg
+Literary Archive Foundation
+
+Project Gutenberg-tm depends upon and cannot survive without wide
+spread public support and donations to carry out its mission of
+increasing the number of public domain and licensed works that can be
+freely distributed in machine readable form accessible by the widest
+array of equipment including outdated equipment.  Many small donations
+($1 to $5,000) are particularly important to maintaining tax exempt
+status with the IRS.
+
+The Foundation is committed to complying with the laws regulating
+charities and charitable donations in all 50 states of the United
+States.  Compliance requirements are not uniform and it takes a
+considerable effort, much paperwork and many fees to meet and keep up
+with these requirements.  We do not solicit donations in locations
+where we have not received written confirmation of compliance.  To
+SEND DONATIONS or determine the status of compliance for any
+particular state visit https://pglaf.org
+
+While we cannot and do not solicit contributions from states where we
+have not met the solicitation requirements, we know of no prohibition
+against accepting unsolicited donations from donors in such states who
+approach us with offers to donate.
+
+International donations are gratefully accepted, but we cannot make
+any statements concerning tax treatment of donations received from
+outside the United States.  U.S. laws alone swamp our small staff.
+
+Please check the Project Gutenberg Web pages for current donation
+methods and addresses.  Donations are accepted in a number of other
+ways including including checks, online payments and credit card
+donations.  To donate, please visit: https://pglaf.org/donate
+
+
+Section 5.  General Information About Project Gutenberg-tm electronic
+works.
+
+Professor Michael S. Hart was the originator of the Project Gutenberg-tm
+concept of a library of electronic works that could be freely shared
+with anyone.  For thirty years, he produced and distributed Project
+Gutenberg-tm eBooks with only a loose network of volunteer support.
+
+Project Gutenberg-tm eBooks are often created from several printed
+editions, all of which are confirmed as Public Domain in the U.S.
+unless a copyright notice is included.  Thus, we do not necessarily
+keep eBooks in compliance with any particular paper edition.
+
+Each eBook is in a subdirectory of the same number as the eBook's
+eBook number, often in several formats including plain vanilla ASCII,
+compressed (zipped), HTML and others.
+
+Corrected EDITIONS of our eBooks replace the old file and take over
+the old filename and etext number.  The replaced older file is renamed.
+VERSIONS based on separate sources are treated as new eBooks receiving
+new filenames and etext numbers.
+
+Most people start at our Web site which has the main PG search facility:
+
+     https://www.gutenberg.org
+
+This Web site includes information about Project Gutenberg-tm,
+including how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary
+Archive Foundation, how to help produce our new eBooks, and how to
+subscribe to our email newsletter to hear about new eBooks.
+
+EBooks posted prior to November 2003, with eBook numbers BELOW #10000,
+are filed in directories based on their release date.  If you want to
+download any of these eBooks directly, rather than using the regular
+search system you may utilize the following addresses and just
+download by the etext year.
+
+     https://www.gutenberg.org/etext06
+
+    (Or /etext 05, 04, 03, 02, 01, 00, 99,
+     98, 97, 96, 95, 94, 93, 92, 92, 91 or 90)
+
+EBooks posted since November 2003, with etext numbers OVER #10000, are
+filed in a different way.  The year of a release date is no longer part
+of the directory path.  The path is based on the etext number (which is
+identical to the filename).  The path to the file is made up of single
+digits corresponding to all but the last digit in the filename.  For
+example an eBook of filename 10234 would be found at:
+
+     https://www.gutenberg.org/1/0/2/3/10234
+
+or filename 24689 would be found at:
+     https://www.gutenberg.org/2/4/6/8/24689
+
+An alternative method of locating eBooks:
+     https://www.gutenberg.org/GUTINDEX.ALL
+
+
+
+
+</pre>
+
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/old/12002.txt b/old/12002.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e66a699
--- /dev/null
+++ b/old/12002.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,2300 @@
+The Project Gutenberg EBook of Review of the Work of Mr John Stuart Mill
+Entitled, 'Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy.', by George Grote
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+Title: Review of the Work of Mr John Stuart Mill Entitled, 'Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy.'
+
+Author: George Grote
+
+Release Date: April 12, 2004 [EBook #12002]
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ASCII
+
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK REVIEW OF MR JOHN STUART MILL ***
+
+
+
+
+Produced by The Online Distributed Proofreading Team.
+
+
+
+
+REVIEW OF THE WORK OF MR JOHN STUART MILL
+
+ENTITLED, 'EXAMINATION OF SIR WILLIAM HAMILTONS PHILOSOPHY'
+
+BY GEORGE GROTE
+
+AUTHOR OF
+
+'THE HISTORY OF ANCIENT GREECE,'
+
+'PLATO AND THE OTHER COMPANIONS OF SOCRATES,' ETC.
+
+1868
+
+_Reprinted from the 'Westminster Review,' January 1, 1866._
+
+
+JOHN CHILDS AND SON, PRINTERS
+
+
+
+
+_An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy, and of the
+Principal Philosophical Questions discussed in his Writings_. By JOHN
+STUART MILL. London: Longmans. 1865.
+
+The work bearing the above title is an octavo volume, consisting of
+twenty-eight chapters, and five hundred and sixty pages. This is no
+great amount of print; but the amount of matter contained in it is
+prodigious, and the quality of that matter such as to require a full
+stretch of attention. Mr Mill gives his readers no superfluous
+sentences, scarcely even a superfluous word, above what is necessary to
+express his meaning briefly and clearly. Of such a book no complete
+abstract can be given in the space to which we are confined.
+
+To students of philosophy--doubtless but a minority among the general
+circle of English readers--this work comes recommended by the strongest
+claims both of interest and instruction. It presents in direct
+antithesis two most conspicuous representatives of the modern
+speculative mind of England--Sir W. Hamilton and Mr John Stuart Mill.
+
+Sir W. Hamilton has exercised powerful influence over the stream of
+thought during the present generation. The lectures on Logic and
+Metaphysics delivered by him at Edinburgh, for twenty years, determined
+the view taken of those subjects by a large number of aspiring young
+students, and determined that view for many of them permanently and
+irrevocably.[1] Several eminent teachers and writers of the present day
+are proud of considering themselves his disciples, enunciate his
+doctrines in greater or less proportion, and seldom contradict him
+without letting it be seen that they depart unwillingly from such a
+leader. Various new phrases and psychological illustrations have
+obtained footing in treatises of philosophy, chiefly from his authority.
+We do not number ourselves among his followers; but we think his
+influence on philosophy was in many ways beneficial. He kept up the idea
+of philosophy as a subject to be studied from its own points of view: a
+dignity which in earlier times it enjoyed, perhaps, to mischievous
+excess, but from which in recent times it has far too much
+receded--especially in England. He performed the great service of
+labouring strenuously to piece together the past traditions of
+philosophy, to re-discover those which had been allowed to drop into
+oblivion, and to make out the genealogy of opinions as far as negligent
+predecessors had still left the possibility of doing so.
+
+The forty-six lectures on Metaphysics, and the thirty-five lectures on
+Logic, published by Messrs Mansel and Veitch, constitute the biennial
+course actually delivered by Sir W. Hamilton in the Professorial Chair.
+They ought therefore to be looked at chiefly with reference to the minds
+of youthful hearers, as preservatives against that mischief forcibly
+described by Rousseau--'L'inhabitude de penser dans la jeunesse en ote
+la capacite pendant le reste de la vie.'
+
+Now, in a subject so abstract, obscure, and generally unpalatable, as
+Logic and Metaphysics, the difficulty which the teacher finds in
+inspiring interest is extreme. That Sir W. Hamilton overcame such
+difficulty with remarkable success, is the affirmation of his two
+editors; and our impression, as readers of his lectures, disposes us to
+credit them. That Sir W. Hamilton should have done this effectively is
+in itself sufficient to stamp him as a meritorious professor--as a
+worthy successor to the chair of Dugald Stewart, whose unrivalled
+perfection in that department is attested by every one. Many a man who
+ultimately adopted speculative opinions opposed to Dugald Stewart,
+received his first impulse and guidance in the path of speculation from
+the lasting impression made by Stewart's lectures.
+
+But though we look at these lectures, as they ought to be looked at,
+chiefly with a view to the special purpose for which they were destined,
+we are far from insinuating that they have no other merits, or that they
+are useless for readers who have already a metaphysical creed of their
+own. We have found them both instructive and interesting: they go over a
+large proportion of the field of speculative philosophy, partly from the
+point of view (not always the same) belonging to the author, partly from
+that of numerous predecessors whom he cites. We recognize also in Sir W.
+Hamilton an amount of intellectual independence which seldom accompanies
+such vast erudition. He recites many different opinions, but he judges
+them all for himself; and, what is of still greater moment, he
+constantly gives the reasons for his judgments. To us these reasons are
+always of more or less value, whether we admit them to be valid or not.
+Many philosophers present their own doctrine as if it were so much
+ascertained and acknowledged truth, either intimating, or leading you to
+suppose, that though erroneous beliefs to the contrary formerly
+prevailed, these have now become discredited with every one. We do not
+censure this way of proceeding, but we prefer the manner of Sir W.
+Hamilton. He always keeps before us divergence and discrepancy of view
+as the normal condition of reasoned truth or philosophy; the
+characteristic postulate of which is, that every affirmative and every
+negative shall have its appropriate reasons clearly and fully
+enunciated.
+
+In this point of view the appendix annexed to the lectures is also
+valuable; and the four copious appendixes or dissertations following
+the edition of Reid's works, are more valuable still. How far Sir W.
+Hamilton has there furnished good proof of his own doctrines on External
+Perception, and on the Primary Qualities of Matter, we shall not now
+determine; but to those who dissent from him, as well as to those who
+agree with him, his reasonings on these subjects are highly instructive:
+while the full citations from so many other writers contribute
+materially not only to elucidate the points directly approached, but
+also to enlarge our knowledge of philosophy generally. We set particular
+value upon this preservation of the traditions of philosophy, and upon
+this maintenance of a known perpetual succession among the speculative
+minds of humanity, with proper comparisons and contrasts. We have found
+among the names quoted by Sir W. Hamilton, and, thanks to his care,
+several authors hardly at all known to us, and opinions cited from them
+not less instructive than curious. He deserves the more gratitude,
+because he departs herein from received usage since Bacon and Descartes.
+The example set by these great men was admirable, so far as it went to
+throw off the authority of predecessors; but pernicious so far as it
+banished those predecessors out of knowledge, like mere magazines of
+immaturity and error. Throughout the eighteenth century, all study of
+the earlier modes of philosophizing was, for the most part, neglected.
+Of such neglect, remarkable instances are pointed out by Sir W.
+Hamilton.
+
+While speaking about the general merits and philosophical position of
+Sir William Hamilton, we have hitherto said nothing about those of Mr
+Mill. But before we proceed to analyze the separate chapters of his
+volume, we must devote a few words to the fulfilment of another
+obligation.
+
+Mr John Stuart Mill has not been the first to bestow honour on the
+surname which he bears. His father, Mr James Mill, had already ennobled
+the name. An ampler title to distinction in history and philosophy can
+seldom be produced than that which Mr James Mill left behind him. We
+know no work which surpasses his 'History of British India' in the main
+excellencies attainable by historical writers: industrious accumulation,
+continued for many years, of original authorities--careful and
+conscientious criticism of their statements--and a large command of
+psychological analysis, enabling the author to interpret phenomena of
+society, both extremely complicated, and far removed from his own
+personal experience. Again, Mr James Mill's 'Elements of Political
+Economy' were, at the time when they appeared, the most logical and
+condensed exposition of the entire science then existing. Lastly, his
+latest avowed production, the 'Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human
+Mind,' is a model of perspicuous exposition of complex states of
+consciousness, carried farther than by any other author before him; and
+illustrating the fulness which such exposition may be made to attain, by
+one who has faith in the comprehensive principle of association, and has
+learnt the secret of tracing out its innumerable windings. It is,
+moreover, the first work in which the great fact of Indissoluble
+Association is brought into its due theoretical prominence. These are
+high merits, of which lasting evidence is before the public; but there
+were other merits in Mr James Mill, less publicly authenticated, yet not
+less real. His unpremeditated oral exposition was hardly less effective
+than his prepared work with the pen; his colloquial fertility on
+philosophical subjects, his power of discussing himself, and of
+stimulating others to discuss, his ready responsive inspirations through
+all the shifts and windings of a sort of Platonic dialogue--all these
+accomplishments were, to those who knew him, even more impressive than
+what he composed for the press. Conversation with him was not merely
+instructive, but provocative to the dormant intelligence. Of all persons
+whom we have known, Mr James Mill was one who stood least remote from
+the lofty Platonic ideal of Dialectic--[Greek: _Tou didhonai kahi
+dhechesthai lhogon_]--(the giving and receiving of reasons) competent
+alike to examine others, or to be examined by them, on philosophy. When
+to this we add a strenuous character, earnest convictions, and
+single-minded devotion to truth, with an utter disdain of mere
+paradox--it may be conceived that such a man exercised powerful
+intellectual ascendancy over younger minds. Several of those who enjoyed
+his society--men now at, or past, the maturity of life, and some of them
+in distinguished positions--remember and attest with gratitude such
+ascendancy in their own cases: among them the writer of the present
+article, who owes to the historian of British India an amount of
+intellectual stimulus and guidance such as he can never forget.
+
+When a father, such as we have described, declining to send his son
+either to school or college, constituted himself schoolmaster from the
+beginning, and performed that duty with laborious solicitude--when,
+besides full infusion of modern knowledge, the forcing process applied
+by the Platonic Socrates to the youth-Theaetetus, was administered by Mr
+James Mill, continuously and from an earlier age, to a youthful mind not
+less pregnant than that of Theaetetus--it would be surprising if the son
+thus trained had not reached even a higher eminence than his father. The
+fruit borne by Mr John Stuart Mill has been worthy of the culture
+bestowed, and the volume before us is at once his latest and his ripest
+product.
+
+The 'Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy' is intended by Mr
+Mill (so he tells us in the preface to the sixth published edition of
+his 'System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive') as a sequel and
+complement to that system. We are happy to welcome so valuable an
+addition; but with or without that addition, the 'System of Logic'
+appears to us to present the most important advance in speculative
+theory which the present century has witnessed. Either half of it, the
+Ratiocinative or the Inductive, would have surpassed any previous work
+on the same subject. The Inductive half discriminates and brings into
+clear view, for the first time, those virtues of method which have
+insensibly grown into habits among consummate scientific inquirers of
+the post-Baconian age, as well as the fallacies by which some of these
+authors have been misled. The Ratiocinative half, dealing with matters
+which had already been well handled by Dutrieu and other scholastic
+logicians, invests their dead though precise formalism with a real life
+and application to the actual process of finding and proving truth. But
+besides thus working each half up to perfection, Mr Mill has performed
+the still more difficult task of overcoming the repugnance, apparently
+an inveterate repugnance, between them, so as chemically to combine the
+two into one homogeneous compound; thus presenting the problem of
+Reasoned Truth, Inference, Proof, and Disproof, as one connected whole.
+For ourselves, we still recollect the mist which was cleared from our
+minds when we first read the 'System of Logic,' very soon after it was
+published. We were familiar with the Syllogistic Logic in Burgersdicius
+and Dutrieu; we were also familiar with examples of the best procedure
+in modern inductive science; but the two streams flowed altogether apart
+in our minds, like two parallel lines never joining nor approaching. The
+irreconcilability of the two was at once removed, when we had read and
+mastered the second and third chapters of the Second Book of the 'System
+of Logic;' in which Mr Mill explains the functions and value of the
+Syllogism, and the real import of its major premiss. This explanation
+struck us at the time as one of the most profound and original efforts
+of metaphysical thought that we had ever perused, and we see no reason
+to retract that opinion now.[2] It appears all the more valuable when we
+contrast it with what is said by Mr Mill's two contemporaries--Hamilton
+and Whately: the first of whom retains the ancient theory of reasoning,
+as being only a methodized transition from a whole to its parts, and
+from the parts up to the whole--Induction being only this ascending part
+of the process, whereby, after having given a complete enumeration of
+all the compound parts, you conclude to the sum total described in one
+word as a whole;[3] while the second (Whately) agrees in subordinating
+Induction to Syllogism, but does so in a different way--by representing
+inductive reasoning as a syllogism, with its major premiss suppressed,
+from which major premiss it derived its authority. The explanation of Mr
+Mill attacks the problem from the opposite side. It subordinates
+syllogism to induction, the technical to the real; it divests the major
+premiss of its illusory pretence to be itself the proving authority, or
+even any real and essential part of the proof--and acknowledges it
+merely as a valuable precautionary test and security for avoiding
+mistake in the process of proving. Taking Mr Mill's 'System of Logic' as
+a whole, it is one of the books by which we believe ourselves to have
+most profited. The principles of it are constantly present to our mind
+when engaged in investigations of evidence, whether scientific or
+historical.
+
+Concerned as we are here with Mr Mill only as a logician and
+philosopher, we feel precluded from adverting to his works on other
+topics--even to his 'Elements of Political Economy,' by which he is
+probably more widely known than by anything else. Of the many
+obligations which Political Economy owes to him, one only can be noticed
+consistent with the scope of the present article: the care which he has
+taken--he alone, or at least, he more explicitly and formally than any
+other expositor--to set forth the general position of that science in
+the aggregate field of scientific research; its relation to sociology as
+a whole, or to other fractions thereof, how far derivative or
+co-ordinate; what are its fundamental postulates or hypotheses, with
+what limits the logical methods of induction and deduction are
+applicable to it, and how far its conclusions may be relied on as
+approximations to truth. All these points will be found instructively
+handled in the Sixth Book of Mr Mill's 'System of Logic,' as well as in
+his smaller and less known work, 'Essays on Some Unsettled Questions in
+Political Economy.' We find him, while methodizing and illustrating the
+data of the special science, uniformly keeping in view its relation to
+philosophy as a whole.
+
+But there is yet another work in which the interests of philosophy, as a
+whole, come into the foreground and become the special object of
+vindication in their largest compass and most vital requirements. We
+mean Mr Mill's 'Essay on Liberty,' one half of which takes for its
+thesis the _libertus philosophandi_. He maintains, emphatically, in this
+book, the full dignity of reasoned truth against all the jealous
+exigencies of traditional dogma and self-justifying sentiment. He claims
+the most unreserved liberty of utterance for negative and affirmative on
+all questions--not merely for the purpose of discriminating truth from
+falsehood, but also to keep up in individual minds the full sense and
+understanding of the matters controverted, in place of a mere partial
+and one-sided adhesion. At first sight, indeed, it might seem as if Mr
+Mill was fighting with a shadow; for liberty of philosophizing is a
+postulate which, in general terms, every one concedes. But when you come
+to fathom the real feelings which underlie this concession, you discover
+that almost every man makes it under reserves which, though acting in
+silence, are not the less efficacious. Every one has some dogmas which
+he cannot bear to hear advocated, and others which he will not allow to
+be controverted in his presence. A writer has to consider not merely by
+what reasons any novelty of belief or disbelief may be justified, but
+also how much it will be safe for him to publish, having regard to the
+irritable sore places of the public judgment. In July, 1864, we were
+present at the annual meeting of the French Academy at Paris, where the
+prizes for essays sent in, pursuant to subjects announced for study
+beforehand, are awarded. We heard the titles of various compositions
+announced by the President (M. Villemain), with a brief critical
+estimate of each. Their comparative merits were appreciated, and the
+prize awarded to one of the competitors. Among the compositions sent to
+compete for the prize, one was a work by M. Taine, upon which the
+President bestowed the most remarkable encomiums, in every different
+point of view: extent of knowledge, force of thought, style,
+arrangement, all were praised in a manner which we have rarely heard
+exceeded. Nevertheless, the prize was not awarded to this work, but to
+another which the President praised in a manner decidedly less marked
+and emphatic. What was here the _ratio decidendi_? The reason was, and
+the President declared it in the most explicit language, that the work
+of M. Taine _was deeply tainted with materialism_. 'Sans doute,' said
+the esteemed veteran of French literature in pronouncing his award,
+'sans doute les opinions sont libres, _mais_'--It is precisely against
+this _mais_--ushering in the special anathematized or consecrated
+conclusion which it is intended to except from the general liberty of
+enforcing or impugning--in matters of philosophical discussion, that Mr
+Mill, in the 'Essay on Liberty,' declares war as champion of Reasoned
+Truth.
+
+He handles this grand theme--_eleythheroys eleythheros
+philosophein_--involving as it does the best interests of philosophy,
+as an instructress to men's judgments, and a stimulus to their
+intelligence--with great depth of psychological analysis sustained by
+abundant historical illustration. And he in the same volume discusses
+most profitably another question akin to it--To what extent, and by what
+principles, the interference of others is justifiable, in restraining
+the liberty of taste and action for each individual? A question at once
+grave and neglected, but the discussion of which does not belong to our
+present article.
+
+A new work from one who has already manifested such mastery of
+philosophy, both in principle and in detail, and a work exhibiting the
+analysis and appreciation of the philosophical views of an eminent
+contemporary, must raise the highest expectation. We think no reader
+will be disappointed who peruses Mr Mill's 'Examination,' and we shall
+now endeavour to give some account of the manner in which he performs
+it. Upon topics so abstract and subtle as the contents of this volume,
+the antithesis between two rival theories is the best way, and often the
+only way, for bringing truth into clear view; and the 'Examination' here
+before us is professedly controversy. But of controversy in its
+objectionable sense--of captious or acrimonious personality--not a trace
+will here be found. A dignified, judicial equanimity of tone is
+preserved from first to last. Moreover, though the title and direct
+purpose of the volume is negative and critical, yet the destructive
+criticism is pervaded by many copious veins of constructive exposition,
+embodying Mr Mill's own views upon some of the most intricate problems
+of metaphysics.
+
+Mr Mill begins his work by analyzing and explaining the doctrine called
+the Relativity of Human Knowledge:
+
+     'The doctrine (chap. ii. p. 5) which is thought to belong in
+     the most especial manner to Sir W. Hamilton, and which was
+     the ground of his opposition to the transcendentalism of the
+     later French and German metaphysicians, is that which he and
+     others have called the Relativity of Human Knowledge. It is
+     the subject of the most generally known and impressive of
+     all his writings--the one which first revealed to the
+     English metaphysical reader that a new power had arisen in
+     philosophy. Together with its developments, it composes the
+     Philosophy of the Conditioned, which he opposed to the
+     French and German philosophies of the Absolute, and which is
+     regarded by most of his admirers as the greatest of his
+     titles to a permanent place in the history of metaphysical
+     thought. But, "the relativity of human knowledge," like most
+     other phrases into which the words _relative_ or _relation_
+     enter, is vague, and admits of a great variety of meanings,'
+     &c.
+
+Mr Mill then proceeds to distinguish these various meanings, and to
+determine in which of them the phrase is understood by Sir W. Hamilton.
+
+One meaning is, that we only know anything by knowing it as
+distinguished from something else--that all consciousness is of
+difference. It is not, however, in this sense that the expression is
+ordinarily or intentionally used by Sir W. Hamilton, though he fully
+recognizes the truth which, when thus used, it serves to express. In
+general, when he says that all our knowledge is relative, the relation
+he has in view is not between the thing known and other objects compared
+with it, but between the thing known and the mind knowing--(p. 6).
+
+The doctrine in this last meaning is held by different philosophers in
+two different forms. Some (e.g. Berkeley, Hume, Ferrier, &c.), usually
+called Idealists, maintain not merely that all we can possibly know of
+anything is the manner in which it affects the human faculties, but that
+there is nothing else to be known; that affections of human or of other
+minds are all that we can know to exist--that the difference between the
+ego and the non-ego is only a formal distinction between two aspects of
+the same reality. Other philosophers (Brown, Mr Herbert Spencer, Auguste
+Comte, with many others) believe that the ego and the non-ego denote two
+realities, each self-existent, and neither dependent on the other; that
+the Noumenon, or 'thing _per se_,' is in itself a different thing from
+the Phenomenon, and equally or more real, but that, though we know its
+existence, we have no means of knowing what it is. All that we can know
+is, relatively to ourselves, the modes in which it affects us, or the
+phenomena which it produces--(pp. 9--11).
+
+The doctrine of Relativity, as held by Kant and his many followers, is
+next distinguished from the same doctrine as held by Hartley, James
+Mill, Professor Bain, &c., compatible with either acceptance or
+rejection of the Berkeleian theory. Kant maintains that the attributes
+which we ascribe to outward things, or which are inseparable from them
+in thought, contain additional elements over and above sensations _plus_
+an unknowable cause--additional elements added by the mind itself, and
+therefore still only relative, but constituting the original furniture
+of the mind itself--inherent laws, partly of our sensitive, partly of
+our intellectual faculty. It is on this latter point that Hartley and
+those going along with him diverge. Admitting the same additional
+elements, these philosophers do not ascribe to the mind any innate forms
+to account for them, but hold that place, extension, substance, cause,
+and the rest, &c., are conceptions put together out of ideas of
+sensation, by the known laws of Association--(pp. 12--14).
+
+Partial Relativity is the opinion professed by most philosophers (and by
+most persons who do not philosophize). They hold that we know things
+partly as they are in themselves, partly as they are merely in relation
+to us.
+
+This discrimination of the various schools of philosophers is highly
+instructive, and is given with the full perspicuity belonging to Mr
+Mill's style. He proceeds to examine in what sense Sir W. Hamilton
+maintained the Relativity of Human Knowledge. He cites passages both
+from the 'Discussions on Philosophy' and from the Lectures, in which
+that doctrine is both affirmed in its greatest amplitude, and enunciated
+in the most emphatic language--(pp. 17, 18, 22, 23). But he also
+produces extracts from the most elaborate of Sir W. Hamilton's
+'Dissertations on Reid,' in which a doctrine quite different and
+inconsistent is proclaimed--that our knowledge is only partially, not
+wholly, relative; that the secondary qualities of matter, indeed, are
+known to us only relatively, but that the primary qualities are known to
+us as they are in themselves, or as they exist objectively, and that
+they may be even evolved by demonstration _a priori_--(pp. 19-26, 30).
+The inconsistency between the two doctrines, professed at different
+times, and in different works, by Sir W. Hamilton, is certainly
+manifest. Mr Mill is of opinion that one of the two must be taken 'in a
+non-natural sense,' and that Sir W. Hamilton either did not hold, or had
+ceased to hold, the doctrine of the full relativity of knowledge (pp.
+20-28)--the hypothesis of a flat contradiction being in his view
+inadmissible. But we think it at least equally possible that Sir W.
+Hamilton held both the two opinions in their natural sense, and enforced
+both of them _at different times_ by argument; his attention never
+having been called to the contradiction between them. That such
+forgetfulness was quite possible, will appear clearly in many parts of
+the present article. His argument in support of both is equally
+characterized by that peculiar energy of style which is frequent with
+him, and which no way resembles the qualifying refinements of one
+struggling to keep clear of a perceived contradiction.
+
+From hence Mr Mill (chap. iv.) proceeds to criticise at considerable
+length what he justly denominates the celebrated and striking review of
+Cousin's philosophy, which forms the first paper in Sir W. Hamilton's
+'Discussions on Philosophy.' According to Mr Mill--
+
+     'The question really at issue is this: Have we or have we
+     not an immediate intuition of God? The name of God is veiled
+     under two extremely abstract phrases, "The Infinite and the
+     Absolute," perhaps from a reverential feeling; such, at
+     least, is the reason given by Sir W. Hamilton's disciple, Mr
+     Mansel, for preferring the more vague expressions; but it is
+     one of the most unquestionable of all logical maxims, that
+     the meaning of the abstract must be sought for in the
+     concrete, and not conversely; and we shall see, both in the
+     case of Sir William Hamilton, and of Mr Mansel, that the
+     process cannot be reversed with impunity.'--p. 32.
+
+Upon this we must remark, that though the 'logical maxim' here laid
+down by Mr Mill may be generally sound, we think the application of it
+inconvenient in the present case. Discussions on points of philosophy
+are best conducted without either invoking or offending religious
+feeling. M. Cousin maintains that we have a direct intuition of the
+Infinite and the Absolute: Sir W. Hamilton denies that we have. Upon
+this point Mr Mill sides entirely with Sir W. Hamilton, and considers
+'that the latter has rendered good service to philosophy by refuting M.
+Cousin,' though much of the reasoning employed in such refutation seems
+to Mr Mill unsound. But Sir W. Hamilton goes further, and affirms that
+we have no faculties capable of apprehending the Infinite and the
+Absolute--that both of them are inconceivable to us, and by consequence
+unknowable. Herein Mr Mill is opposed to him, and controverts his
+doctrine in an elaborate argument.
+
+Of this argument, able and ingenious, like all those in the present
+volume, our limits only enable us to give a brief appreciation. In so
+far as Mr Mill controverts Sir W. Hamilton, we think him perfectly
+successful, though there are some points in his reasoning in which we do
+not fully concur.
+
+In our opinion, as in his, the Absolute alone (in its sense as opposed
+to relative) can be necessarily unknowable, inconceivable, incogitable.
+Nothing which falls under the condition of relativity can be declared to
+be so. The structure of our minds renders us capable of knowing
+everything which is relative, though there are many such things which we
+have no evidence, nor shall ever get evidence, to enable us to know. Now
+the Infinite falls within the conditions of relativity, as indeed Sir W.
+Hamilton himself admits, when he intimates (p. 58) that though it cannot
+be known, it is, must be, and ought to be, _believed_ by us, according
+to the marked distinction which he draws between belief and knowledge.
+We agree with Mr Mill in the opinion that it is thinkable, conceivable,
+knowable. Doubtless we do not conceive it adequately, but we conceive it
+sufficiently to discuss and reason upon it intelligibly to ourselves and
+others. That we conceive the Infinite inadequately, is not to be held as
+proof that we do not conceive it at all; for in regard to finite things
+also, we conceive the greater number of them only inadequately.
+
+We cannot construe to the imagination a polygon with an infinite number
+of sides (i.e. with a number of sides greater than any given number),
+but neither can we construe to the imagination a polygon with a million
+of sides; nevertheless, we understand what is meant by the first
+description as well as by the second, and can reason upon both. There
+is, indeed, this difference between the two: That the terms used in
+describing the first, proclaim at once in their direct meaning that we
+should in vain attempt to construe it to the imagination; whereas the
+terms used in describing the second do not intimate that fact. We know
+the fact only by trial, or by an estimate of our own mental force which
+is the result of many past trials. If the difference here noted were all
+which Sir W. Hamilton has in view when he declares the Infinite to be
+unknowable and incogitable, we should accede to his opinion; but we
+apprehend that he means much more, and he certainly requires more to
+justify the marked antithesis in which he places himself against M.
+Cousin and Hegel. Indeed, the facility with which he declares matters to
+be incogitable, which these two and other philosophers not only cogitate
+but maintain as truth, is to us truly surprising. The only question
+which appears to us important is, whether we can understand and reason
+upon the meaning of the terms and propositions addressed to us. If we
+can, the subjects propounded must be cogitable and conceivable, whether
+we admit the propositions affirmed concerning them or not; if we cannot,
+then these subjects are indeed incogitable by ourselves in the present
+state of our knowledge, but they may not be so to our opponent who
+employs the terms.
+
+In criticising the arguments of Sir W. Hamilton against M. Cousin, Mr
+Mill insists much on a distinction between (1) the Infinite, and (2) the
+Infinite in any one or more positive attributes, such as infinite
+wisdom, goodness, redness, hardness, &c.[4] He thinks that Sir W.
+Hamilton has made out his case against the first, but not against the
+last; that the first is really 'an unmeaning and senseless abstraction,'
+a fasciculus of negations, unknowable and inconceivable, but not the
+last. We think that Mr Mill makes more of this distinction than the
+case warrants; that the first is not unmeaning, but an intelligible
+abstraction, only a higher reach of abstraction than the last; that it
+is knowable inadequately, in the same way as the last--though more
+inadequately, because of its higher abstraction.
+
+As the finite is intelligible, so also is its negation--the Infinite: we
+do not say (with M. Cousin) that the two are conjointly given in
+consciousness--but the two are understood and partially apprehended by
+the mind conjointly and in contrast. Though the Infinite is doubtless
+negative as to a degree, it is not wholly or exclusively negative, since
+it includes a necessary reference to some positive attribute, to which
+the degree belongs; the positive element is not eliminated, but merely
+left undetermined. The Infinite (like the Finite, [Greek: to
+peperasmhenon--to hapeiron]) is a genus; it comprehends under it the
+Infinitely Hard and the Infinitely Soft, the Infinitely Swift and the
+Infinitely Slow--the infinite, in short, of any or all positive
+attributes. It includes, doubtless, 'a farrago of contradictions;' but
+so, also, does the Finite--and so, also, do the actual manifestations of
+the real, concrete universe, which manifestations constitute a portion
+of the Finite. Whoever attempts to give any philosophical account of the
+generation of the universe, tracing its phenomena, as an aggregate, to
+some ultra-phenomenal origin, must include in his scheme a _fundamentum_
+for all those opposite and contradictory manifestations which experience
+discloses in the universe. There always have been, and still are, many
+philosophers who consider the Abstract and General to be prior both in
+nature and time to the Concrete and Particular; and who hold further
+that these two last are explained, when presented as determinate and
+successive manifestations of the two first, which they conceive as
+indeterminate and sempiternal. Now the Infinite (Ens Infinitum or Entia
+Infinita, according to the point of view in which we look at it) is a
+generic word, including all these supposed indeterminate antecedents;
+and including therefore, of course, many contradictory agencies. But
+this does not make it senseless or unmeaning; nor can we distinguish it
+from 'the Infinite in some one or more given attributes,' by any other
+character than by greater reach of abstraction. We cannot admit the
+marked distinction which Mr Mill contends for--that the one is
+unknowable and the other knowable.
+
+It may be proper to add that the mode of philosophizing which we have
+just described is not ours. We do not agree in this way either of
+conceiving, or of solving, the problem of philosophy. But it is a mode
+so prevalent that Trendelenberg speaks of it, justly enough, as 'the
+ancient Hysteron-Proteron of Abstraction.' The doctrine of these
+philosophers appears to us unfounded, but we cannot call it unmeaning.
+
+In another point, also, we differ from Mr Mill respecting that inferior
+abstraction which he calls 'the Infinite in some particular attribute.'
+He speaks as if this could be known not only as an abstraction, a
+conceivable, an ideal--but also as a concrete reality; as if 'we could
+know a concrete reality as infinite or as absolute' (p. 45); as if there
+really existed in actual nature 'concrete persons or things possessing
+infinitely or absolutely certain specific attributes'--(pp. 55--93). To
+this doctrine we cannot subscribe. As we understand concrete reality, we
+find no evidence to believe that there exist in nature any real concrete
+persons or things, possessing to an infinite degree such attributes as
+they do possess: _e.g._ any men infinitely wise or infinitely strong,
+any horses infinitely swift, any stones infinitely hard. Such concrete
+real objects appear to us not admissible, because experience not only
+has not certified their existence in any single case, but goes as far to
+disprove their existence as it can do to disprove anything. All the real
+objects in nature known to us by observation are finite, and possess
+only in a finite measure their respective attributes. Upon this is
+founded the process of Science, so comprehensively laid out by Mr Mill
+in his 'System of Logic '--Induction, Deduction from general facts
+attested by Induction, Verification by experience of the results
+obtained by Deduction. The attributes, whiteness or hardness, in the
+abstract, are doubtless infinite; that is, the term will designate,
+alike and equally, any degree of whiteness or hardness which you may
+think of, and any unknown degree even whiter and harder than what you
+think of. But when perceived as invested in a given mass of snow or
+granite before us, they are divested of that indeterminateness, and
+become restricted to a determinate measure and degree.
+
+Having thus indicated the points on which we are compelled to dissent
+from Mr Mill's refutation of Sir W. Hamilton in the pleading against M.
+Cousin, we shall pass to the seventh chapter, in which occurs his first
+controversy with Mr Mansel. This passage has excited more interest, and
+will probably be remembered by a larger number of readers, than any
+portion of the book. We shall give it in his own words (pp. 99--103),
+since the energetic phraseology is quite as remarkable as the thought:--
+
+     'There is but one way for Mr Mansel out of this difficulty,
+     and he adopts it. He must maintain, not merely that an
+     Absolute Being is unknowable in himself, but that the
+     Relative attributes of an Absolute Being are unknowable
+     also.[5] He must say that we do not know what Wisdom,
+     Justice, Benevolence, Mercy, &c., are, as they exist in God.
+     Accordingly, he does say so. "It is a fact" (says Mr Mansel)
+     "which experience forces upon us, and which it is useless,
+     were it possible, to disguise, that the representation of
+     God after the model of the highest human morality which we
+     are capable of conceiving, is not sufficient to account for
+     all the phenomena exhibited by the course of his natural
+     Providence. The infliction of physical suffering, the
+     permission of moral evil, the adversity of the good, the
+     prosperity of the wicked, the crimes of the guilty involving
+     the misery of the innocent, the tardy appearance and partial
+     distribution of moral and religious knowledge in the
+     world--these are facts, which no doubt are reconcilable, we
+     know not how, with the Infinite Goodness of God, but which
+     certainly are not to be explained on the supposition that
+     its sole and sufficient type is to be found in the finite
+     goodness of man."
+
+     'In other words' (continues Mr Mill commenting) 'it is
+     necessary to suppose that the infinite goodness ascribed to
+     God is not the goodness which we know and love in our
+     fellow-creatures, distinguished only as infinite in degree;
+     but is different in kind, and another quality altogether.
+     Accordingly Mr Mansel combats as a heresy of his opponents,
+     the opinion that infinite goodness differs only in degree
+     from finite goodness.--Here, then, I take my stand upon the
+     acknowledged principle of logic and of morality; that when
+     we mean different things we have no right to call them by
+     the same name, and to apply to them, the same predicates,
+     moral and intellectual. If, instead of the glad tidings that
+     there exists a Being in whom all the excellences which the
+     highest human form can conceive, exist in a degree
+     inconceivable to us, I am informed that the world is ruled
+     by a being whose attributes are infinite, but what they are
+     we cannot learn, except that the highest human morality does
+     not sanction them--convince me of this and I will hear my
+     fate as I may. But when I am told that I must believe this,
+     and at the same time call this being by the names which
+     express and affirm the highest human morality, I say, in
+     plain terms, that I will not. Whatever power such a being
+     may have over me, there is one thing he shall not do; he
+     shall not compel me to worship him. I will call no being
+     good who is not what I mean when I apply that epithet to my
+     fellow-creatures; and if such a being can sentence me to
+     hell for not so calling him, to hell I will go.'
+
+This concluding declaration is memorable in many ways. Mr Mill announces
+his resolution to determine for himself, and according to his own reason
+and conscience, what God he will worship, and what God he will not
+worship. For ourselves, we cordially sympathize with his resolution. But
+Mr Mill must be aware that this is a point on which society is equally
+resolved that no individual shall determine for himself, if they can
+help it.[6] Each new-born child finds his religious creed ready
+prepared for him. In his earliest days of unconscious infancy, the stamp
+of the national, gentile, phratric, God, or Gods, is imprinted upon him
+by his elders; and if the future man, in the exercise of his own
+independent reason, acquires such convictions as compel him to renounce
+those Gods, proclaiming openly that he does so--he must count upon such
+treatment as will go far to spoil the value of the present life to him,
+even before he passes to those ulterior liabilities which Mr Mill
+indicates in the distance. We are not surprised that a declaration so
+unusual and so impressive should have been often cited in critical
+notices of this volume; that during the month preceding the last
+Westminster election, it was studiously brought forward by some
+opponents of Mr Mill, and more or less regretted by his friends, as
+likely to offend many electors, and damage his chance of success; and
+that a conspicuous and noble-minded ecclesiastic, the Dean of
+Westminster, thought the occasion so grave as to come forward with his
+characteristic generosity, for the purpose of shielding a distinguished
+man suspected of heresy.
+
+The sublime self-assertion, addressed by Prometheus to Zeus, under whose
+sentence he was groaning, has never before been put into such plain
+English.[7] Mr Mill's declaration reminds us also of Hippolytus, the
+chaste and pure youth, whose tragic fate is so beautifully described by
+Euripides. Hippolytus is exemplary in his devotions to the Goddess
+Artemis; but he dissents from all his countrymen, and determines for
+himself, in refusing to bestow the smallest mark of honour or worship
+upon Aphrodite, because he considers her to be a very bad Goddess.[8] In
+this refusal he persists with inflexible principle (even after having
+received, from an anxious attendant, warning of the certain ruin which
+it will bring upon him), until the insulted Aphrodite involves him,
+along with the unhappy Phaedra and Theseus himself, in one common abyss
+of misery. In like manner Mr Mill's declaration stands in marked
+contrast with the more cautious proceeding of men like Herodotus. That
+historian, alike pious and prudent, is quite aware that all the Gods are
+envious and mischief-making, and expressly declares them to be so.[9]
+Yet, far from refusing to worship them on that account, he is assiduous
+in prayer and sacrifice--perhaps, indeed, all the more assiduous in
+consequence of what he believes about their attributes;[10] being
+persuaded (like the attendant who warned Hippolytus) that his only
+chance of mollifying their ungentle dispositions in regard to himself
+is, by honorific tribute in words and offerings.
+
+When, however, after appreciating as we are bound to do Mr Mill's
+declaration of subjective sentiment, we pass to its logical bearing on
+the controversy between him and Mr Mansel, we are obliged to confess
+that in this point of view it has little objective relevancy. The
+problem was, how to reconcile the actual evil and suffering in the
+universe (which is recited as a fact by Mr Mansel, though in terms
+conveying a most inadequate idea of its real magnitude) with the
+goodness of God. Mr Mill repudiates the explanatory hypothesis tendered
+by Mr Mansel, as a solution, but without suggesting any better
+hypothesis of his own. For ourselves, we are far from endorsing Mr
+Mansel's solution as satisfactory; yet we can hardly be surprised if he
+considers it less unsatisfactory than no solution at all. And when we
+reflect how frequently and familiarly predicates applicable to man are
+applied to the Supreme Being, when they cannot possibly be understood
+about Him in the same sense--we see no ground for treating the
+proceeding as disingenuous, which Mr Mill is disposed to do. Indeed, it
+cannot easily be avoided: and Mr Mill himself furnishes us with some
+examples in the present volume. At page 491, he says:--
+
+     'It would be difficult to find a stronger argument in favour
+     of Theism, than that the eye must have been made by one who
+     sees, and the ear by one who hears.'
+
+In the words here employed, _seeing_ and _hearing_ are predicted of God.
+
+Now when we predicate of men, that they _see_ or _hear_, we affirm facts
+of extreme complexity, especially in the case of _seeing_; facts partly
+physical, partly mental, involving multifarious movements and agencies
+of nerves, muscles, and other parts of the organism, together with
+direct sensational impressions, and mental reconstruction of the past,
+inseparably associated therewith; all which, so far as they are known,
+are perspicuously enumerated in the work of Professor Bain[11] on the
+'Senses and the Intellect,' Again, Mr Mill speaks (in p. 102 and
+elsewhere) of 'the veracity of God.' When we say of our neighbour that
+he is a veracious man, we ascribe to him a habit of speaking the truth;
+that is, of employing his physical apparatus of speech, and his mental
+power of recalling and recombining words lodged in the memory, for the
+purpose of asserting no other propositions except such as declare facts
+which he knows, or beliefs which he really entertains. But how either
+_seeing_, or _hearing_, or _veracity_, in these senses, can be
+predicated of God, we are at a loss to understand. And if they are to
+be predicated of God in a different sense, this admits the same license
+as Mr Mansel contends for in respect to Goodness, when he feels that
+undeniable facts preclude him from predicating that epithet univocally
+respecting God and respecting man.[12]
+
+On the whole, it seems to us, that though Mr Mill will consent to
+worship only a God of perfect goodness, he has thrown no new light on
+the grave problem--frankly stated though imperfectly solved, by Mr
+Mansel--how such a conception of God is to be reconciled with the extent
+of evil and suffering actually pervading human life and animal life
+throughout the earth. We are compelled to say, respecting Mr Mill's
+treatment of this subject--what we should not say respecting his
+treatment of any other--that he has left an old perplexing problem not
+less perplexing than he found it.
+
+Reverting, not unwillingly, from theology to philosophy, we now pass on
+to Mr Mill's ninth chapter (p. 128 seq.), of the Interpretation of
+Consciousness. There is assuredly no lesson more requiring to be taught
+than the proper mode of conducting such interpretation; for the number
+of different modes in which Consciousness has been interpreted is
+astonishing. Mr Mill begins by citing from Sir W. Hamilton's lectures a
+passage of some length, upon which he bestows considerable praise,
+regarding it as--
+
+     'One of the proofs that, whatever may be the positive value
+     of his (Sir W. Hamilton's) achievements in metaphysics, he
+     had a greater capacity for the subject than many
+     metaphysicians of high reputation; and particularly than
+     his two distinguished predecessors in the same school of
+     thought--"Reid and Stewart."'--p. 131.
+
+This is one of the greatest compliments to Sir W. Hamilton that the book
+contains, and as such we are glad to cite it.
+
+On the subject of Consciousness, Mr Mill has cited from Sir W. Hamilton
+other good observations besides the one last alluded to; but,
+unfortunately, these are often neutralized by opposite or inconsistent
+opinions also cited from other parts of his works. The number of such
+inconsistencies produced is indeed one remarkable feature in Sir W.
+Hamilton's philosophical character. He seems to follow out energetically
+(as Plato in his various dialogues) the vein of thought pervading his
+mind at each particular moment, without troubling himself to look back
+upon his own prior speculations. Even compared with the best views of
+Sir W. Hamilton, however, Mr Mill's mode of handling the subject of
+Consciousness exhibits signal improvement. To some of his observations
+we shall call particular attention.
+
+All philosophers agree that what Consciousness testifies is to be
+believed; but they differ much on the question--To what points
+Consciousness does testify? and even on the still deeper question--How
+shall we proceed to ascertain what _are_ these attested points? What is
+the proper method of studying or interrogating Consciousness? Upon this
+Mr Mill remarks (pp. 145--147):--
+
+     'Here emerges the distinction between two different methods
+     of studying the problems of metaphysics; forming the radical
+     difference between the two great schools into which
+     metaphysicians are divided. One of these I shall call for
+     distinction, the _introspective_ method; the other, the
+     _psychological_. M. Cousin observes that Locke went wrong
+     from the beginning, by placing before himself, as the
+     question to be first resolved, the origin of our ideas.
+     This (he says) was commencing at the wrong end. The proper
+     course would have been to begin by determining what the
+     ideas now are; to ascertain what it is that Consciousness
+     now tells us; postponing till afterwards the attempt to
+     frame a theory concerning the origin of any of the mental
+     phenomena.
+
+     'I accept the question as M. Cousin states it; and I contend
+     that no attempt to determine what are the direct revelations
+     of Consciousness can be successful, or entitled to any
+     regard, unless preceded by what M. Cousin says ought only to
+     follow it--an inquiry into the origin of our acquired ideas.
+     For we have it not in our power to ascertain, by any direct
+     process, what Consciousness told us at the time when its
+     revelations were in their pristine purity. It only offers
+     itself to our inspection, as it exists now, when those
+     original revelations are overlaid and buried under a
+     mountainous heap of acquired notions and perceptions.
+
+     'It seems to M. Cousin, that if we examine with care and
+     minuteness our present states of Consciousness,
+     distinguishing and defining every ingredient which we find
+     to enter into them--every element that we seem to recognize
+     as real, and cannot "by merely concentrating our attention
+     upon it analyze into anything simpler--we reach the ultimate
+     and primary truths, which are the sources of all our
+     knowledge, and which cannot be denied or doubted without
+     denying or doubting the evidence of Consciousness
+     itself--that is, the only evidence that there is for
+     anything. I maintain this to be a misconception of the
+     condition imposed on inquirers by the difficulties of
+     psychological investigation. To begin the inquiry at the
+     point where M. Cousin takes it up is, in fact, to beg the
+     question. For he must be aware, if not of the fact, at least
+     of the belief of his opponents, that the laws of the
+     mind--the Laws of Association, according to one class of
+     thinkers, the Categories of the Understanding, according to
+     another--are capable of creating, out of those data of
+     Consciousness which are uncontested, purely mental
+     conceptions, which become so identified in thought with all
+     our states of Consciousness, that _we seem, and cannot but
+     seem, to receive them by direct intuition_. For example, the
+     belief in matter in the opinion of these thinkers is, or at
+     least may be, thus produced:--
+
+     '"The proof that any of the alleged Universal Beliefs, or
+     Principles of Common Sense, are affirmations of
+     Consciousness--supposes two things: that the beliefs exist,
+     and that they cannot possibly have been acquired. The first
+     is, in most cases, undisputed; but the second is a subject
+     of inquiry which often taxes the utmost resources of
+     psychologists. Locke was therefore right in believing that
+     'the origin of our ideas' is the main stress of the problem
+     of mental science, and the subject which must be first
+     considered in forming the theory of the Mind."'
+
+This citation from Mr Mill's book is already almost too long, yet we
+could have wished to prolong it still more, from the importance of some
+of the succeeding paragraphs. It presents, in clear discrimination and
+contrast, two opposite points of view according to which the phenomena
+of mind are regarded by different philosophers, and the method of
+studying them determined: the _introspective_ method, adopted by M.
+Cousin and others--the _psychological_ or analytical method, pursued by
+Locke and by many other eminent men since Locke--'the known and approved
+method of physical science, adapted to the necessities of
+psychology'--(p. 148).
+
+There are passages of Sir W. Hamilton's writings in which he appears to
+feel that the _introspective_ method alone is insufficient for the
+interpretation of Consciousness, and that the analytical method must be
+employed to reinforce it. But on this as on other points he is not
+always consistent with himself. For in laying down the principle upon
+which the primary truths of Consciousness, the original data of
+intelligence, are to be ascertained and distinguished from
+generalizations out of experience and custom, he declares that the one
+single and certain mark is Necessity--they must be beliefs which we are
+under the necessity of believing--of which we cannot get rid by any
+mental effort. He decides this, of course, for himself, by the
+_introspective_ method alone. He (with M. Cousin and other philosophers
+who take the same view) does not apply the analytical method to inquire
+whether his necessity of belief may not be a purely acquired necessity
+and nowise congenital. It is, indeed, remarkable that these philosophers
+do not even seek to apply the introspective method as far as that method
+will really go. They are satisfied with introspection of their own
+present minds; without collecting results of the like process as applied
+to other minds, in different times and places. They declare various
+beliefs to be necessary to the human mind universally, merely because
+such is the actual fact with their own minds and with those immediately
+around them; sometimes even in defiance of proof that there are (or have
+been) persons not sharing such beliefs, and occasionally even believing
+the contrary; therefore, when even the introspective method really
+disallows their affirmative instead of sustaining it. This is, in
+truth, an abuse of the introspective method; yet even if that method
+were employed in its fullest extent--if the same incapability of
+believing otherwise could be shown as common to all mankind--it might
+still be only the effect of a strong association. The analytical method
+must still be called in to ascertain whether we are forced to suppose
+such incapability to be an original fact of consciousness, or whether it
+may not have been generated in the mind by circumstances under the
+natural working of the laws of association. It is certain that these
+laws not only may, but must, give birth to artificial inconceivabilities
+in the mind--and that some of these may be equal in strength to such, if
+any, as are natural.
+
+     'The History of Science' (says Mr Mill, following out the
+     same train of reasoning which we read in the third Book of
+     his 'System of Logic') 'teems with inconceivabilities which
+     have been conquered; and with supposed necessary truths,
+     which have first ceased to be thought necessary, then to be
+     thought true, and have finally come to be deemed
+     impossible.'--p. 150.
+
+After various observations, chiefly exhibiting the rashness of many
+censures bestowed by Sir W. Hamilton on Brown, Mr Mill gives us three
+valuable chapters (xi., xii., xiii.), wherein he analyzes the belief in
+an External World, the Belief in Mind as a separate substance or
+Noumenon, and the Primary Qualities of Matter. To each of these topics
+he applies what he calls the _psychological_ method, as contrasted with
+the simply _introspective_ method of Sir W. Hamilton (the Ego and
+Non-Ego affirmed to be given together in the primary deliverance of
+Consciousness) and so many other philosophers. He proves that these
+beliefs are no way intuitive, but acquired products; and that the known
+laws of Association are sufficient to explain how they are acquired;
+especially the Law of Inseparable Association, together with that of
+_Obliviscence_--a very useful, discriminating phrase, which we first
+find employed in this volume--(p. 259 et passim). He defines Matter to
+be a _permanent possibility of Sensation_; he maintains that this is
+really all which (apart from philosophical theories) mankind in general
+mean by it; he shows that mere possibilities of sensation not only may,
+but must, according to the known Laws of Association, come to present
+'to our artificialized Consciousness' a character of objectivity--(pp.
+198, 199). The correlative subject, though present in fact and
+indispensable, is eliminated out of conscious notice, according to the
+Law of Obliviscence.
+
+These chapters will well repay the most careful perusal. We can only
+find room for one passage (pp. 214, 215):--
+
+     'Throughout the whole of our sensitive life, except its
+     first beginnings, we unquestionably refer our sensations to
+     a _me_ and _not-me_. As soon as I have formed, on the one
+     hand, the notion of Permanent Possibilities of Sensation,
+     and on the other, of that continued series of feelings which
+     I call my life--both these notions are, by an irresistible
+     association, recalled by every sensation I have. They
+     represent two things, with both of which the sensation of
+     the moment, be it what it may, stands in relation; and I
+     cannot be conscious of the sensation without being conscious
+     of it as related to these two things. They have accordingly
+     received relative names, expressive of the double relation
+     in question. The thread of consciousness which I apprehend
+     the relation as a part of, is called the _Subject_; the
+     group of Permanent Possibilities of Sensation to which I
+     refer it, and which is partially realized and actualized in
+     it, is called the _Object_ of the sensation. The sensation
+     itself ought to have a correlative name, or rather ought to
+     have two such names--one denoting the sensation as opposed
+     to its Subject, the other denoting it as opposed to its
+     Object; but it is a remarkable fact that this necessity has
+     not been felt, and that the need of a correlative name to
+     every relative one has been considered to be satisfied by
+     the terms Object and Subject themselves. It is true that
+     these two are related to one another, but only through the
+     sensation. We have no conception of either Subject or
+     Object, either Mind or Matter, except as something to which
+     we refer our sensations, and whatever other feelings we are
+     conscious of. _The very existence of them both, so far as
+     cognizable by us, consists only in the relation they
+     respectively bear to our states of feeling._ Their relation
+     to each other is only the relation between those two
+     relations. The immediate correlatives are, not the pair,
+     _Object, Subject,_ but the two pairs, Object, _Sensation
+     objectively considered_--Subject, _Sensation subjectively
+     considered_. The reason why this is overlooked might easily
+     be shown, and would furnish a good illustration of that
+     important part of the Laws of Association, which may be
+     termed the Laws of Obliviscence.'
+
+This chapter, on the Primary Qualities of Matter, controverts the
+opinion of Sir W. Hamilton, that extension, as consisting of
+co-existent _partes extra partes_, is immediately and necessarily
+apprehended by our consciousness. It cites, as well as confirms, the
+copious proof given by Professor Bain (in his work on the Senses and the
+Intellect) that our conception of extension is derived from our muscular
+sensibility: that our sensation of _muscular motion impeded_ constitutes
+that of filled space: that our conception of extension, as an aggregate
+of co-existent parts, arises from the sense of sight, which comprehends
+a great number of parts in a succession so rapid as to be confounded
+with simultaneity--and which not only becomes the symbol of muscular and
+tactile succession, but even acquires such ascendancy as to supersede
+both of them in our consciousness. Confirmation is here given to this
+important doctrine, not merely by observations from Mr Mill himself, but
+also from the very curious narrative, discovered and produced by Sir W.
+Hamilton, out of a work of the German philosopher, Platner. Platner
+instituted a careful examination of a man born blind, and ascertained
+that this man did not conceive extension as an aggregate of simultaneous
+parts, but as a series of sensations experienced or to be experienced in
+succession--(pp. 232, 233). The case reported from Platner both
+corroborates the theory of Professor Bain, and receives its proper
+interpretation from that theory; while it is altogether adverse to the
+doctrine of Sir W. Hamilton--as is also another case, which he cites
+from Maine de Biran:--
+
+     'It gives a very favourable idea of Sir W. Hamilton's
+     sincerity and devotion to truth (remarks Mr Mill, p. 247),
+     that he should have drawn from obscurity, and made generally
+     known, two cases so unfavourable to his own opinions.'
+
+We think this remark perfectly just; and we would point out besides, in
+appreciating Sir W. Hamilton's merits, that his appetite for facts was
+useful to philosophy, as well as his appetite for speculation. But the
+person whose usefulness to philosophy we prefer to bring into the
+foreground, is Platner himself. He spent three weeks in patient
+examination of this blind man, and the tenor of his report proves that
+his sagacity in interpreting facts was equal to his patience in
+collecting them. The rarity of all such careful and premeditated
+observation of the facts of mind, appears to us one main reason why
+(what Mr Mill calls) the _psychological_ theory finds so little
+acceptance; and why those who maintain that what now seems a mental
+integer was once a multiplicity of separate mental fragments, can
+describe the antecedent steps of the change only as a _latens
+processus_, which the reader never fully understands, and often will not
+admit. Every man's mind is gradually built up from infancy to maturity;
+the process is always going on before our eyes, yet the stages of
+it--especially the earliest stages, the most pregnant with
+instruction--are never studied and put on record by observers trained in
+inductive logic, knowing beforehand what they ought to look for as the
+_sine qua non_ for proving or disproving any proposed theory. Such cases
+as that cited by Platner--cases of one marked congenital defect of
+sense, enabling us to apply the Method of Difference--are always within
+reach; but few Platners are found to scrutinize and record them.
+Historians of science describe to us the laborious and multiplied
+observations, and the elaborate precaution for ensuring accuracy of
+observation, which recent chemical and physical inquirers have found
+indispensable for the establishment of their results. We cannot,
+therefore, be surprised that mental philosophers, dealing with facts
+even more obscure, and careless about enlarging, varying,
+authenticating their records of particular facts, should have had
+little success in establishing any results at all.
+
+But if even those, who adopt the psychological theory, have been remiss
+in the observation of particular mental facts,--those who deny the
+theory have been far more than remiss; they have been blind to obvious
+facts contradicting the principles which they lay down. Mr Mill, in
+chap, xiv., deals with this denial, common to Mr Mansel with Sir W.
+Hamilton. That philosophers so eminent as both of them should declare
+confidently--'what I cannot but think must be _a priori_, or original to
+thought; it cannot be engendered by experience upon custom' (p.
+264)--appears to us as extraordinary as it does to Mr Mill. Though no
+one ever surpassed Sir W. Hamilton in large acquaintance with the actual
+diversities of human belief, and human incapacities of believing--yet he
+never seems to have thought of bringing this acquaintance into account,
+when he assured the students in his lecture-room, that custom,
+experience, indissoluble association, were altogether insufficient to
+engender a felt necessity of believing. Such forgetfulness of well-known
+mental facts cannot be reproached to the advocates of the psychological
+theory.
+
+In chap. xv. Mr Mill examines Sir W. Hamilton's doctrine on unconscious
+mental modifications. He points out the confused manner in which Sir W.
+Hamilton has conceived _mental latency_, as well as the inconclusive
+character of the reasoning whereby he refutes the following doctrine of
+Dugald Stewart--That in the most rapid trains of association, each
+separate item must have been successively present to consciousness,
+though for a time too short to leave any memory. Sir W. Hamilton thinks
+that the separate items may pass, and often do pass, unconsciously;
+which opinion Mr Mill also, though not approving his reasons, is
+inclined to adopt.
+
+     'I am myself inclined (p. 285) to admit unconscious mental
+     modifications, in the only sense in which I can attach any
+     very distinct meaning to them--namely, unconscious
+     modifications of the nerves. It may well be believed that
+     the apparently suppressed links in a chain of association,
+     those which Sir W. Hamilton considers as latent, really are
+     so: that they are not even momentarily felt, the chain of
+     causation being continued only physically--by one organic
+     state of the nerves succeeding another so rapidly, that the
+     state of mental consciousness appropriate to each is not
+     produced.'
+
+Mr Mill gives various illustrations in support of this doctrine. He at
+the same time calls attention to a valuable lecture of Sir W.
+Hamilton's, the thirty-second lecture on Metaphysics; especially to the
+instructive citation from Cardaillac contained therein, noting the
+important fact, which descriptions of the Law of Association often keep
+out of sight--that the suggestive agency of Association is carried on,
+not by single antecedents raising up single consequents, but by a mass
+of antecedents raising up simultaneously a mass of consequents, among
+which attention is very unequally distributed.
+
+We shall say little upon Mr Mill's remarks on Sir W. Hamilton's Theory
+of Causation--(chap. xvi.). This theory appears to Mr Mill absurd; while
+the theory of Mr Mill (continued from Hume, Brown, and James Mill) on
+the same subject, appears to Sir W. Hamilton insufficient and
+unsatisfactory--'professing to explain the phenomenon of causality, but,
+previously to explanation, evacuating the phenomenon of all that
+desiderates explanation'--(p. 295). For ourselves we embrace the theory
+of Mr Mill:[13] yet we are aware that the remark just cited from Sir W.
+Hamilton represents the dissatisfaction entertained towards it by many
+objectors. The unscientific and antiscientific yearnings, prevalent
+among mankind, lead them to put questions which no sound theory of
+Causation will answer; and they are ready to visit and trust any oracle
+which professes to deliver a confident affirmative solution of such
+questions. Among all the terms employed by metaphysicians, none is used
+in a greater variety of meanings than the term Cause.
+
+In Mr Mill's next chapter (xvi.) he comments on Sir W. Hamilton's
+doctrine of Concepts or General Notions. There are portions of this
+chapter with which we agree less than with most other parts of the
+volume; especially with his marked hostility to the term _Concept_, and
+the reasons given for it, which reasons appear to us not very consistent
+with what he has himself said in the 'System of Logic,' Book IV. chap.
+ii. Sec. 1--3. The term _Concept_ has no necessary connection with the
+theory called Conceptualism. It is equally available to designate the
+idea called up by a general name, as understood either by Mr Bailey or
+by James Mill. We think it useful as an equivalent to the German word
+_Begriff_, which sense Sir W. Hamilton has in view when he introduces
+it, though he does not always adhere to his profession. And when Mr Mill
+says (p. 331)--
+
+     'I consider it nothing less than a misfortune, that the
+     words Concept, General Notion, or any other phrase to
+     express the supposed mental modification corresponding to a
+     general name, should ever have been invented.'
+
+we dissent from his opinion. To talk of 'the Concept of an individual,'
+however, as Mr Mansel does (pp. 338, 339), is improper and inconsistent
+with the purpose for which the name is given.
+
+We are more fully in harmony with Mr Mill in his two next chapters
+(xviii. et seq.) on Judgment and Reasoning; which are among the best
+chapters in this volume. He there combats and overthrows the theory of
+Reasoning laid down by Sir W. Hamilton; but we doubt the propriety of
+his calling this 'the Conceptualist theory' (pp. 367, 368); since it has
+nothing to do with Conceptualism, in the special sense of antithesis to
+Realism and Nominalism,--but is, in fact, the theory of the Syllogism as
+given in the Analytics of Aristotle, and generally admitted since. Not
+merely Conceptualists, but (to use Mr Mill's own language, p. 366)
+'nearly all the writers on logic, taught a theory of the science too
+small and narrow to contain their own facts.' Such, indeed, was the
+theory constantly taught until the publication of Mr Mill's 'System of
+Logic;' the first two books of which corrected it, by arguments which
+are reinforced and amplified in these two chapters on Judgment and
+Reasoning, as well as in the two chapters next following--chaps, xx. and
+xxi.--('Is Logic the Science of the Forms of Thought--On the
+Fundamental Laws of Thought.') The contrast which is there presented, in
+many different ways, between the limited theory of logic taught by Sir
+W. Hamilton and Mr Mansel, and the enlarged theory of Mr Mill, is
+instructive in a high degree. We consider Mr Mill as the real preserver
+of all that is valuable in Formal Logic, from the unfortunate
+consequences of an erroneous estimate, brought upon it through the
+exaggerated pretensions of logicians. When Sir W. Hamilton contrasts it
+pointedly with physical science (of which he talks with a sort of
+supercilious condescension, in one of the worst passages of his
+writings, p. 401)--when all its apparent fruits were produced in the
+shape of ingenious but barren verbal technicalities--what hope could be
+entertained that Formal Logic could hold its ground in the estimation of
+the recent generation of scientific men? Mr Mill has divested it of that
+assumed demonstrative authority which Bacon called 'regere res per
+syllogismum;' but he has at the same time given to it a firm root amidst
+the generalities of objective science. He has shown that in the great
+problem of Evidence or Proof, the Laws of Formal Logic, though bearing
+only on one part of the entire procedure, yet bear upon one essential
+part, proper to be studied separately: and that the maintenance of
+consistency between our affirmations (which is the only special province
+of Formal Logic), has great importance and value as a part of the
+process necessary for ascertaining and vindicating their truth, or
+exposing their character when false or uncertified--but no importance or
+value except as a part of that larger exigency.
+
+While Mr Mill was amending the Syllogistic theory so as to ensure for
+Formal Logic its legitimate place among the essentials of scientific
+procedure, Sir W. Hamilton was at the same time enlarging it on its
+technical side, in two modes which are highly esteemed both by himself
+and by others: 1. The recognition of two kinds of Syllogisms; one in
+Extension, the other in Comprehension: 2. The doctrine of the
+Quantification of the Predicate.--Both these novelties are here
+criticised by Mr Mill in chapter xxii., which we recommend the reader to
+peruse conjointly with Lectures 15 and 16 of Sir W. Hamilton on Logic.
+
+Now whereas the main objection, by which the study of the syllogistic
+logic has been weighed down and discredited in modern times, is this,
+that it encumbers the memory with formal distinctions, having no useful
+application to the real process and purposes of reasoning--the procedure
+of Sir W. Hamilton might almost lead us to imagine that he himself was
+trying to aggravate that objection to the uttermost. He introduces a
+variety of new canons (classifying Syllogisms as Extensive and
+Intensive, by a distinction founded on the double quantity of notions,
+in Extension and in Comprehension) which he intimates that all former
+logicians have neglected--while it plainly appears, even on his own
+showing, that the difference between syllogisms, in respect to these two
+sorts of quantity, is of no practical value; and that 'we can always
+change a categorical syllogism of the one quantity into a categorical
+syllogism of the other, by reversing the order of the two premises, and
+by reversing the meaning of the copula' (Lect. xvi. p. 296); nay, that
+every syllogism is already a syllogism in both quantities (Mill, p.
+431). Against these useless ceremonial reforms of Sir W. Hamilton, we
+may set the truly philosophical explanation here given by Mr Mill of the
+meaning of propositions.
+
+     'All judgments' (he says--p. 423), 'except where both the
+     terms are proper names, are really judgments in
+     Comprehension; though it is customary, and the natural
+     tendency of the mind, to express most of them in terms of
+     Extension. In other words, we never really predicate
+     anything but attributes; though, in the usage of language,
+     we commonly predicate them by means of words which are names
+     of concrete objects--because' (p. 426)--'we have no other
+     convenient and compact mode of speaking. Most attributes,
+     and nearly all large bundles of attributes, have no names of
+     their own. We can only name them by a circumlocution. We are
+     accustomed to speak of attributes, not by names given to
+     themselves, but by means of the names which they give to the
+     objects they are attributes of.' 'All our ordinary
+     judgments' (p. 428) 'are in Comprehension only; Extension
+     not being thought of. But we may, if we please, make the
+     Extension of our general terms an express object of thought.
+     When I judge that all oxen ruminate, I have nothing in my
+     thoughts but the attributes and their co-existence. But when
+     by reflection I perceive what the proposition implies, I
+     remark that other things may ruminate besides oxen, and that
+     the unknown multitude of things which ruminate form a mass,
+     with which the unknown multitude of things having the
+     attributes of oxen is either identical or is wholly
+     comprised in it. Which of these two is the truth I may not
+     know, and if I did, took no notice of it when I assented to
+     the proposition, all oxen ruminate; but I perceive, on
+     consideration, that one or other of them must be true.
+     Though I had not this in my mind when I affirmed that all
+     oxen ruminate, I can have it now; I can make the concrete
+     objects denoted by each of the two names an object of
+     thought, as a collective though indefinite aggregate; in
+     other words, I can make the Extension of the names (or
+     notions) an object of direct consciousness. When I do this,
+     I perceive that this operation introduces no new fact, but
+     is only a different mode of contemplating the very fact
+     which I had previously expressed by the words, all oxen
+     ruminate. The fact is the same, but the mode of
+     contemplating it is different. There is thus in all
+     Propositions a judgment concerning attributes (called by Sir
+     W. Hamilton a Judgment in Comprehension) which we make as a
+     matter of course; and a possible judgment in or concerning
+     Extension, which we _may_ make, and which will be true if
+     the former is true.'
+
+From the lucid explanation here cited (and from a following paragraph
+too long to describe p. 433), we see that there is no real distinction
+between Judgments in Comprehension and Judgments in Extension; that the
+_appearance_ of distinction between them arises from the customary mode
+of enunciation, which custom is here accounted for; that the addition to
+the theory of the Syllogism, for which Sir W. Hamilton takes credit, is
+alike troublesome and unprofitable.
+
+The like may also be said about his other innovation, the Quantification
+of the Predicate. Still more extensive are the changes (as stated by
+himself) which this innovation would introduce in the canons of
+Syllogism. Indeed, when we read his language (Appendix to 'Lectures on
+Logic,' pp. 291--297) censuring generally the prior logicians from
+Aristotle downwards, and contending that 'more than half the value of
+logic had been lost' by their manner of handling it--we may appreciate
+the magnitude of the reform which he believed himself to be introducing.
+The larger the reform, the more it behoved him to be sure of the ground
+on which he was proceeding. But on this point we remark a serious
+deficiency. After laying down, with appropriate emphasis, the valuable
+logical postulate, _to state explicitly what is thought implicitly_, on
+which, Sir W. Hamilton says,
+
+     'Logic ever insists, but which logicians have never fairly
+     obeyed--it follows that logically we ought to take into
+     account the quantity, _always understood in thought_, but
+     usually, and for manifest reasons, elided in expression, not
+     only of the _subject_, but also of the _predicate_, of a
+     judgment.'--('Discussions on Philos.,' p. 614.)
+
+Here Sir W. Hamilton assumes that the quantity of the predicate is
+always understood in thought; and the same assumption is often repeated,
+in the Appendix to his 'Lectures on Logic,' p. 291 and elsewhere, as if
+it was alike obvious and incontestable. Now it is precisely on this
+point that issue is here taken with Sir W. Hamilton. Mr Mill denies
+altogether (p. 437) that the quantity of the predicate is always
+understood or present in thought, and appeals to every reader's
+consciousness for an answer:--
+
+     'Does he, when he judges that all oxen ruminate, advert even
+     in the minutest degree to the question, whether there is
+     anything else that ruminates? Is this consideration at all
+     in his thoughts, any more than any other consideration
+     foreign to the immediate subject? One person may know that
+     there are other ruminating animals, another may think that
+     there are none, a third may be without any opinion on the
+     subject; but if they all know what is meant by ruminating,
+     they all, when they judge that every ox ruminates, mean
+     precisely the same thing. The mental process they go
+     through, _as far as that one judgment is concerned_, is
+     precisely identical; though some of them may go on farther,
+     and _add other judgments_ to it.'
+
+The last sentence cited from Mr Mill indicates the vice of Sir W.
+Hamilton's proceeding in quantifying the predicate, and explains why it
+was that logicians before him declined to do so. Sir W. Hamilton, in
+this proceeding, insists on stating explicitly, not merely all that is
+thought implicitly, but a great deal more;[14] adding to it something
+else, which _may_, indeed, be thought conjointly, but which more
+frequently _is not_ thought at all. He requires us to pack two distinct
+judgments into one and the same proposition: he interpolates the meaning
+of the Propositio Conversa _simpliciter_ into the form of the Propositio
+Convertenda (when an universal Affirmative), and then claims it as a
+great advantage, that the proposition thus interpolated admits of being
+converted _simpliciter_, and not merely _per accidens_. Mr Mill is,
+nevertheless, of opinion (pp. 439-443) that though 'the quantified
+syllogism is not a true expression of what is in thought, yet writing
+the predicate with a quantification may be sometimes a real help to the
+Art of Logic.' We see little advantage in providing a new complicated
+form, for the purpose of expressing in one proposition what naturally
+throws itself into two, and may easily be expressed in two. If a man is
+prepared to give us information on one Quaesitum, why should he be
+constrained to use a mode of speech which forces on his attention at the
+same time a second and distinct Quaesitum--so that he must either give
+us information about the two at once, or confess himself ignorant
+respecting the second?
+
+The two next chapters of Mr Mill, noticing some other minor
+peculiarities (all of them unfortunate, and one, p. 447, really
+unaccountable) of Sir W. Hamilton's Formal Logic; and some Fallacious
+Modes of Thought countenanced by Sir W. Hamilton (chs. xxiii.,
+xxiv.--pp. 446, 478), we are compelled to pass over. We must find space,
+however, for a few words on the Freedom of the Will (ch. xxv.), which
+(in Mr Mill's language, pp. 488--549), 'was so fundamental with Sir W.
+Hamilton, that it may be regarded as the central idea of his system--the
+determining cause of most of his philosophical opinions.' Prior to Sir
+W. Hamilton, we find some writers who maintain the doctrine of
+Free-will, others who maintain that of Necessity: each supporting their
+respective conclusions by reasons which they deem sufficient. Sir W.
+Hamilton declares that both the one doctrine and the other are
+inconceivable and incomprehensible; yet that, by the law of Excluded
+Middle, one or other of them must be true: and he decides in favour of
+Free-will, of which he believes himself to be distinctly conscious;
+moreover, Free-will is essential (he thinks) to moral responsibility, of
+which also he feels himself conscious. He confesses himself, however,
+unable to explain the possibility of Free-will; but he maintains that
+the same may be said about Necessity also. 'The champions of both the
+two opposite doctrines are at once resistless in attack, and impotent in
+defence'--(Hamilton's 'Footnotes on Reid,' p. 602.) Mr Mansel also
+asserts, even more confidently than Sir W. Hamilton, that we are
+directly conscious of Free-will--(p. 503).
+
+Sir W. Hamilton has himself given some of the best arguments against the
+doctrine of Free-will, in refutation of Reid: arguments, some of which
+are here cited by Mr Mill with praise which they well deserve--(pp. 497,
+498). But Mr Mill's own reasoning on the same side is of a still higher
+order, enlarging the grounds previously urged in the last book of his
+'System of Logic,' He protests against the term _Necessity_; and
+discards the idea of Necessity, if it be understood to imply anything
+more than invariability of antecedence and consequence. If it mean
+_that_, experience proves thus much about antecedents in the world of
+mind, as in the world of matter: if it mean more, experience does not
+prove more, either in the world of matter or in the world of mind: nor
+have we any grounds for affirming it in either--(p. 501.) If it were
+true, therefore, that consciousness attested Free-will, we should find
+the testimony of consciousness opposed to a full proof from experience
+and induction. But does consciousness really attest what is called
+Free-will? Mr Mill analyzes the case, and declares in the negative.
+
+     'To be conscious of Free-will, must mean to be conscious,
+     before I have decided, that I am able to decide either way;
+     exception may be taken _in limine_ to the use of the word
+     _consciousness_ in such an application. Consciousness tells
+     me what I do or feel. But what I am _able_ to do, is not a
+     subject of consciousness. Consciousness is not prophetic; we
+     are conscious of what is, not of what will or can be. We
+     never know that we are able to do a thing, except from
+     having done it, or something similar to it. Having acted, we
+     know, as far as that experience reaches, how we are able to
+     act; _and this knowledge, when it has become familiar, is
+     often confounded with, and called by, the name of
+     consciousness._ But it does not derive any increase of
+     authority from being misnamed: its truth is not supreme
+     over, but depends upon, experience. If our so-called
+     consciousness is not borne out by experience, it is a
+     delusion. It has no title to credence, but as an
+     interpretation of experience; and if it is a false
+     interpretation, it must give way.'--pp. 503, 504
+
+After this salutary and much-needed warning against the confusion
+between consciousness as an infallible authority, and belief upon
+experience, of which we are conscious as a belief--Mr Mill proceeds to
+sift the alleged self-evident connection between Free-will and
+Accountability. He shows, not merely that there is no connection, but
+that there is a positive repugnance, between the two. By Free-will is
+meant that a volition is not determined by motives, but is a spontaneous
+mental fact, neither having a cause, nor admitting of being predicted.
+Now, the very reason for giving notice that we intend to punish certain
+acts, and for inflicting punishment if the acts be committed, is, that
+we trust in the efficacy of the threat and the punishment as deterring
+motives. If the volition of agents be not influenced by motives, the
+whole machinery of law becomes unavailing, and punishment a purposeless
+infliction of pain. In fact, it is on that very ground that the madman
+is exempted from punishment; his volition being presumed to be not
+capable of being acted upon by the deterring motive of legal sanction.
+The _free_ agent, thus understood, is one who can neither feel himself
+accountable, nor be rendered accountable, to or by others. It is only
+the _necessary_ agent (the person whose volitions are determined by
+motives, and, in case of conflict, by the strongest desire or the
+strongest apprehension) that can be held really accountable, or can
+feel himself to be so.
+
+     'The true doctrine of the Causation of human actions (says
+     Mr Mill, p. 516) maintains, in opposition both to pure and
+     to modified Fatalism, that not only our conduct, but our
+     character, is in part amenable to our will: that we can, by
+     employing the proper means, improve our character: and that
+     if our character is such that, while it remains what it is,
+     it necessitates us to do wrong--it will be just to apply
+     motives which will necessitate us to strive for its
+     improvement. We shall not indeed do so unless we desire our
+     improvement, and desire it more than we dislike the means
+     which must he employed for the purpose.'
+
+It thus appears that of the two propositions, 1, volitions are
+necessary, or depend on causes; 2, volitions are free, or do not depend
+on causes--neither the one nor the other is inconceivable or
+incomprehensible, as Sir W. Hamilton supposed them to be. That the first
+is true, and the second false, we learn by experience, and by that
+alone; just as we learn the like in regard to the phenomena of the
+material world. Indeed, the fact that human volitions are both
+predictable and modifiable, quite as much as all those physical
+phenomena that depend upon a complication of causes--which is only a
+corollary from what has just been said--is so universally recognized and
+acted upon by all men, that there would probably be little difference of
+opinion about this question, if the antithesis were not obscured and
+mystified by the familiar, but equivocal, phrases of Free-will and
+Necessity.
+
+Passing over chapter xxvii., in which Mr Mill refutes Sir W. Hamilton's
+opinion that the study of mathematics is worthless, or nearly so, as an
+intellectual discipline--we shall now call attention to the concluding
+remarks which sum up the results of the volume. After saying that he
+'differs from almost everything in Sir W. Hamilton's philosophy, on
+which he particularly valued himself, or which is specially his own,'
+Mr Mill describes Sir W. Hamilton's general merits as follows:--
+
+     'They chiefly consist in his clear and distinct mode of
+     bringing before the reader many of the fundamental questions
+     of metaphysics: some good specimens of psychological
+     analysis on a small scale: and the many detached logical and
+     psychological truths which he has separately seized, and
+     which are scattered through his writings, mostly applied to
+     resolve some special difficulty, and again lost sight of. I
+     can hardly point to anything he has done towards helping the
+     more thorough understanding of the greater mental phenomena,
+     unless it be his theory of Attention (including
+     Abstraction), which seems to me the most perfect we have;
+     but the subject, though a highly important, is comparatively
+     a simple one.'--p. 547.
+
+Agreeing in this general view of Sir W. Hamilton's merits, we should be
+disposed to describe them in language stronger and more emphatic as to
+degree, than that which has just been cited. But what is stated in the
+pages immediately following (pp. 550, 551)--That Sir W. Hamilton's
+doctrines appear to be usually taken up under the stimulus of some
+special dispute, and often afterwards forgotten; That he did not think
+out subjects until they were thoroughly mastered, or until consistency
+was attained between the different views which the author took from
+different points of observation; That accordingly, his philosophy seems
+made up of scraps from several conflicting metaphysical systems--All
+this is literally and amply borne out by the many inconsistencies and
+contradictions which Mr Mill has brought to view in the preceding
+chapters. It would appear that the controversial disposition was
+powerful with Sir W. Hamilton, and that a present impulse of that sort
+(as has been said respecting Bayle, Burke, and others) not only served
+to provoke new intellectual combinations in his mind, but also
+exercised a Lethaean influence in causing obliviscence of the old. But we
+can hardly follow Mr Mill in ascribing the defect to 'excessive
+absorption of time and energy by the study of old writers' (p. 551). If
+this study did no other good, it at least kept the memory in exercise.
+Now, what surprises us most in Sir W. Hamilton's inconsistencies, is the
+amount of self-forgetfulness which they imply.
+
+While the laborious erudition of Sir W. Hamilton cannot be fairly
+regarded as having produced any of his intellectual defects, it
+undoubtedly stamped upon him his special title of excellence as a
+philosopher. This is fully recognized by Mr Mill; though he treats it as
+belonging not so much to a philosopher as to an historian of philosophy.
+He concludes (pp. 552--554):--
+
+     'It is much to be regretted that Sir W. Hamilton did not
+     write the history of philosophy, instead of choosing, as
+     the direct object of his intellectual exertions, philosophy
+     itself. He possessed a knowledge of the materials such as no
+     one, probably for many generations, will take the trouble of
+     acquiring again. Independently of the great interest and
+     value attaching to a knowledge of the historical development
+     of speculation, there is much in the old writers on
+     philosophy, even those of the middle ages, really worth
+     preserving for its scientific value. But this should be
+     extracted, and rendered into the phraseology of modern
+     thought, by persons as familiar with that as with the
+     ancient, and possessing a command of its language: a
+     combination never yet so perfectly realized as in Sir W.
+     Hamilton. This, which no one but himself could have done, he
+     has left undone, and has given us, instead, a contribution
+     to mental philosophy, which has been more than equalled by
+     many not superior to him in powers, and wholly destitute of
+     erudition. Of all persons in modern times entitled to the
+     name of philosophers, the two, probably, whose reading on
+     the subject was the scantiest, in proportion to their
+     intellectual capacity, were Archbishop Whately and Dr Brown.
+     Accordingly they are the only two of whom Sir W. Hamilton,
+     though acknowledging their abilities, speaks with some
+     tinge of superciliousness. It cannot be denied that both Dr
+     Brown and Whately would have thought and written better than
+     they did, if they had been better read in the writings of
+     previous thinkers; but I am not afraid that posterity will
+     contradict me when I say, that either of them has done far
+     greater service to the world in the origination and
+     diffusion of important thought, than Sir W. Hamilton with
+     all his learning; because, though indolent readers, they
+     were both of them active and fertile thinkers.
+
+     'It is not that Sir W. Hamilton's erudition is not
+     frequently of real use to him on particular questions of
+     philosophy. It does him one valuable service: it enables him
+     to know all the various opinions which can be held on the
+     questions he discusses, and to conceive and express them
+     clearly, leaving none of them out. This it does, though even
+     this not always; but it does little else, even of what might
+     be expected from erudition when enlightened by philosophy.
+     He knew, with extraordinary accuracy, the [Greek: hoti] of
+     each philosopher's opinions, but gave himself little trouble
+     about the [Greek: dihoti]. With one exception, I find no
+     remark bearing upon that point in any part of his writings.
+     I imagine he would have been much at a loss if he had been
+     required to draw up a philosophical estimate of the mind of
+     any great thinker. He never seems to look at any opinion of
+     a philosopher in connection with the same philosopher's
+     other opinions. Accordingly he is weak as to the mutual
+     relations of philosophical doctrines. One of the most
+     striking examples of this inability is in the case of
+     Leibnitz,' &c.
+
+Here we find in a few sentences the conclusion which Mr Mill conceives
+to be established by his book. We shall state how far we are able to
+concur with it. He has brought the matter to a direct issue, by weighing
+Sir W. Hamilton in the balance against two other actual cotemporaries;
+instead of comparing him with some unrealized ideal found only in the
+fancy of critics and reviewers.
+
+Comparing Sir W. Hamilton with Dr Brown, we cordially subscribe to the
+opinion of Mr Mill. We think that Dr Brown has 'done far greater
+service to the world than Sir W. Hamilton, in the origination and
+diffusion of important thought.' To speak only of two chief subjects in
+the field of important thought--Causality and the Freedom of the
+Will--we not only adopt the conclusions of Dr Brown, but we admire both
+his acuteness and his originality in vindicating and illustrating the
+first of the two, while we dissent entirely from the views of Sir W.
+Hamilton. This alone would be sufficient to make us approve the
+superiority assigned by Mr Mill to Dr Brown. We discover no compensating
+item to be placed to the credit of Sir W. Hamilton: for the great
+doctrine of the Relativity of Knowledge, which is our chief point of
+philosophical brotherhood with him, was maintained by Brown also.
+
+But in regard to Dr Whately, our judgment is altogether different. We
+cannot consent to admit him as a superior, or even as an equal, to Sir
+W. Hamilton, 'in the origination and diffusion of important thought.' He
+did much service by reviving an inclination and respect for Logic, and
+by clearing up a part of the technical obscurity which surrounded it:
+but we look upon him as an acute and liberal-minded English theologian,
+enlarging usefully, though timidly, the intellectual prison in which
+many orthodox minds are confined--rather than as a fit aspirant to the
+cosmopolitan honours of philosophy. 'An active and fertile thinker,' Mr
+Mill calls Whately; and such he undoubtedly was. But such also we
+consider Sir W. Hamilton to have been in a degree, at least equal. If
+the sentence which we have quoted above be intended to deny the
+predicate, 'active and fertile thinker,' of Sir W. Hamilton, we cannot
+acquiesce in it. His intellect appears to us thoroughly active and
+fertile, even when we dissent from his reasonings--nay, even in the
+midst of his inconsistencies, when a new growth of opinions is
+unexpectedly pushed up on ground which we supposed to be already
+pre-occupied by another both older and different. And we find this same
+judgment implied in the discriminating remarks upon his philosophical
+procedure made by Mr Mill himself--(pp. 271, 272). For example,
+respecting Causality and the Freedom of the Will, we detect no want of
+activity and fertility, though marked evidence of other
+defects--especially the unconditional surrender of a powerful mind to
+certain privileged inspirations, worshipped as 'necessities of thought.'
+
+While thus declaring how far we concur in the parallel here drawn of Sir
+W. Hamilton with Brown and Whately, we must at the same time add that
+the comparison is taken under circumstances unduly favourable to these
+two last. There has been no exposure of _their_ errors and
+inconsistencies, equal in penetration and completeness to the crushing
+volume which Mr Mill has devoted to Sir W. Hamilton. To make the odds
+fair, he ought to furnish a similar systematic examination to Brown and
+Whately; enabling us to read their works (as we now do those of Sir W.
+Hamilton) with the advantage of his unrivalled microscope, which detects
+the minutest breach or incoherence in the tissue of reasoning--and of
+his large command of philosophical premisses, which brings into full
+notice what the author had overlooked. Thus alone could the competition
+between the three be rendered perfectly fair.
+
+We regret, as Mr Mill does, that Sir W. Hamilton did not undertake the
+composition of a history of philosophy. Nevertheless we must confess
+that we should hardly feel such regret, if we could see evidence to
+warrant Mr Mill's judgment (p. 554) that Sir W. Hamilton was
+'indifferent to the [Greek: dihoti] of a man's opinions, and that he was
+incompetent to draw up an estimate of the opinions of any great
+thinker,' &c. Such incompetence, if proved to be frequent and
+considerable, would deprive an author of all chance of success in
+writing a history of philosophy. But the study of Sir William Hamilton's
+works does not prove it to us, though Mr Mill has convicted him of an
+erroneous estimate of Leibnitz. We say _frequent_ and _considerable_,
+because no historian of philosophy is exempt from the defect more or
+less; or rather (to pass out of the self-confidence of the Absolute into
+the modesty of the Relative) we seldom find any historian whose estimate
+of great philosophical thinkers does not often differ from our own.
+Hence we are glad when ample original extracts are produced, enabling us
+to test the historian, and judge for ourselves--a practice which Sir W.
+Hamilton would have required no stimulus to enforce upon him. There
+ought, indeed, to be various histories of philosophy, composed from
+different points of view; for the ablest historian cannot get clear of
+a certain exclusiveness belonging to himself. But, so far as we can
+conjecture what Sir W. Hamilton _would_ or _could_ have done, we think
+that a history of philosophy composed by him would have surpassed any
+work of the kind in our language.
+
+We trust that Sir W. Hamilton's works will long continue to be read,
+along with Mr Mill's examination of them; and we should be glad if the
+works of other philosophers could be read along with a comment of equal
+acuteness and impartiality. Any point of view which could command the
+adherence of such a mind as Sir W. Hamilton's, deserves to be fully
+considered. Moreover, the living force of philosophy, as directress of
+human intelligence, depends upon keeping up in each of her devotees a
+full mastery of many divergent and opposite veins of reasoning--a
+knowledge, negative and affirmative, of the full case of opponents as
+well as of his own.
+
+It is to Philosophy alone that _our_ allegiance is sworn; and while we
+concur mostly with Mr Mill's opinions, we number both him and Sir W.
+Hamilton as a noble pair of brethren, serving alike in her train.
+
+_Amicus Hamilton; magis amicus Mill; amica ante omnes Philosophia._
+FOOTNOTES:
+
+[Footnote 1: Mr Mansel and Mr Veitch, the editors of Sir W. Hamilton's
+Lectures on Metaphysics, posthumously published, say in their preface
+(p. xiii.)--
+
+'For twenty years--from 1836 to 1856--the courses of logic and
+metaphysics were the means through which Sir William Hamilton sought to
+discipline and imbue with his philosophical opinions the numerous youth
+who gathered from Scotland and other countries to his classroom; and
+while, by these prelections, the author supplemented, developed, and
+moulded the national philosophy, leaving thereon the ineffaceable
+impress of his genius and learning, he, at the same time and by the same
+means, exercised over the intellects and feelings of his pupils an
+influence which, for depth, feeling, and elevation, was certainly never
+surpassed by that of any philosophical instructor. Among his pupils
+there are not a few who, having lived for a season under the
+constraining power of his intellect, and been led to reflect on those
+great questions regarding the character, origin, and bounds of human
+knowledge, which his teaching stirred and quickened, bear the memory of
+their beloved and revered instructor inseparably blended with what is
+highest in their present intellectual life, as well as in their
+practical aims and aspirations.']
+
+[Footnote 2: We are happy to find such high authorities as Dr Whewell,
+Mr Samuel Bailey, and Sir John Herschel concurring in this estimation of
+the new logical point of view thus opened by Mr Mill. We will not call
+it a _discovery_, since Sir John Herschel thinks the expression
+unsuitable.--See the recent sixth edition of the 'System of Logic,' vol.
+i. p. 229.]
+
+[Footnote 3: See Sir William. Hamilton's 'Lectures on Logic' (Lect.
+xvii. p. 320, 321; also Appendix to those Lectures, p. 361). He here
+distinguishes also formal induction from, material induction, which
+latter he brings under the grasp of syllogism, by an hypothesis in
+substance similar to that of Whately. There is, however, in Lecture xix.
+(p. 380), a passage in a very different spirit, which one might almost
+imagine to have been written by Mr Mill: 'In regard to simple
+syllogisms, it was an original dogma of the Platonic school, and an
+early dogma of the Peripatetic, that science, strictly so called, was
+only conversant with, and was exclusively contained in, universals; and
+the doctrine of Aristotle, which taught that all our general knowledge
+is only an induction from an observation of particulars, was too easily
+forgotten or perverted by his followers. It thus obtained almost the
+force of an acknowledged principle that everything to be known must be
+known under some general form or notion. Hence the exaggerated
+importance attributed to definition and deduction; it not being
+considered that we only take out of a general notion what we had
+previously placed therein, and that the amplification of our knowledge
+is not to be sought for from above but from below--not from speculation
+about abstract generalities, but from the observation of concrete
+particulars. Bat however erroneous and irrational, the persuasion had
+its day and influence, and it perhaps determined, as one of its effects,
+the total neglect of one half, and that not the least important half of
+the reasoning process.'
+
+These very just observations are suggested to Sir William Hamilton by a
+train of thought which has little natural tendency to suggest them,
+viz., by the distinction upon which he so much insists, between the
+logic of comprehension and the logic of extension, and by his anxiety to
+explain why the former had been exclusively cultivated and the latter
+neglected.
+
+That which Sir William Hamilton calls here truly the doctrine of
+Aristotle (enunciated especially at the close of the Analyt. Post.), and
+which he states to have been forgotten by Aristotle's followers, was not
+always remembered by Aristotle himself.]
+
+[Footnote 4: The distinction is given by Stier and other logicians. 1.
+Infinitum simpliciter. 2. Infinitum secundum quid, sive in certo
+genere.]
+
+[Footnote 5: This doctrine has been affirmed (so far as reason is
+concerned, apart from revelation) not merely by Mr Mansel, but also by
+Pascal, one of the most religious philosophers of the seventeenth
+century, in the 'Pensees':--
+
+'Parlons selon les lumieres naturelles. S'il y a un Dieu, il est
+infiniment incomprehensible; puisque, n'ayant ni principes ni bornes, il
+n'a nul rapport a nous; nous sommes done incapables de connaitre ni ce
+qn'il est, ni s'il est.'--(See Arago, Biographie de Condorcet, p.
+lxxxiv., prefixed to his edition of Condorcet's works.)]
+
+[Footnote 6: The indictment under which Socrates was condemned at
+Athens, as reported by Xenophon at the commencement of the Memorabilia,
+ran thus--'Socrates is guilty of crime, inasmuch as he does not believe
+in those Gods in whom the City believes, but introduces other novelties
+in regard to the Gods; he is guilty also, inasmuch as he corrupts the
+youth.'
+
+These words express clearly a sentiment entertained not merely by the
+Athenian people, but generally by other societies also. They all agree
+in antipathy to free, individual, dissenting reason; though that
+antipathy manifests itself by acts, more harsh in one place, less harsh
+in another. The Hindoo who declares himself a convert to Christianity,
+becomes at the same time an outcast ([Greek: _aphrhetor, athhemistos,
+anhestios_]) among those whose Gods he has deserted. As a general fact,
+the man who dissents from his fellows upon fundamentals of religion,
+purchases an undisturbed life only by being content with that
+'semi-liberty under silence and concealment,' for which Cicero was
+thankful under the dictatorship of Julius Caesar. 'Obsecro--abiiciamus
+ista et semi-liberi saltern, simus; quod assequemur _et tacendo et
+latendo'_ (Epist. ad Attic, xiii. 31). Contrast with this the memorable
+declaration of Socrates, in the Platonic Apology, that silence and
+abstinence from cross-examination were intolerable to him; that life
+would not be worth having under such conditions.]
+
+[Footnote 7: Aeschyl. Prometh., 996-1006--
+
+  pros tauta, rhipthestho men aithaloussa phlox,
+  leykoptherps de niphadi kai bronthemasin
+  chthonhiois kykhato phanta kahi tarassheto
+  gnhampsei gar ouden tondhe m'----
+  eiseltheto se mhepot, hos ego, Dios
+  gnhomen phobetheis, thelhynoys genhesomai,
+  kai liparheso ton mhega stygohymenon
+  gynaikomhimois hyptihysmasin cherhon,
+  lyshai me dhesmon tonde toy pantos oheo.
+
+Also v. 1047, et seq. The memorable ode of Goethe, entitled
+_Prometheus_, embodies a similar vein of sentiment in the finest
+poetry.]
+
+[Footnote 8: Euripid Hippol., 10--
+
+  (Aph) oh gar me thaeseos pais, 'Amazonos tokos
+  monos politon taesde gaes Troizaenias
+  legei kakistaen daimonon pephukenai
+  Phoibou d' adelphaen Artemin,--
+  tima, megiotaen daimonon aegoumenos--
+
+  (Hipp.) taen saen dhe Khyprin pholl' hego Chairein lhego--
+  (112.)
+
+See also v. 1328--1402.]
+
+[Footnote 9: Herodot. t. 32. O Kroise, epistumenon me to theion pan eohn
+phthonerohn te kai taraxodes, epeirotas ahnthropaeion pragmhaton pheri;
+also iii. 40]
+
+[Footnote 10: See Eurip. Hipp., 6-96-149. The language of the attendant,
+after his affectionate remonstrance to Hippolytus had been disregarded,
+supplicating Aphrodite to pardon the recalcitrancy of that virtuous but
+obstinate youth, is characteristic and touching (114-120.)]
+
+[Footnote 11: See especially his chapter ii. on the Sensations of Sight,
+pp. 222, 241--247, in the second edition of this work.]
+
+[Footnote 12: Descartes says, in his 'Principia Philosophiae,' i 51--'Et
+quidem substantia quae nulla plane re indigeat, unica tantum potest
+intelligi--nempe Deus. Alias vero omnes, non nisi ope concursus Dei
+existere posse perspicimus. Atque ideo nomen substantiae non convenit Deo
+et illis _univoce_, ut dici solet in scholis, hoc est, nulla ejus
+nominis significatio potest distincte intelligi, quae Deo et creaturis
+sit communis.']
+
+[Footnote 13: At the same time, we cannot go along with Mr Mill in the
+following affirmation (p. 201):--
+
+'This natural probability is converted into certainty when we take into
+consideration that universal law of our experience which is termed the
+Law of Causation, and which makes us _unable to conceive the beginning
+of anything without_ an antecedent condition, _or cause.'_ Such
+'inability to conceive' appears to us not in correspondence with facts.
+First, it cannot be properly either affirmed or denied, until agreement
+is obtained what the word _cause_ means. If three persons, A, B, and C,
+agree in affirming it--A adopting the meaning of Aristotle, B that of
+Sir William Hamilton, and C that of Mr Mill--the agreement is purely
+verbal; or rather, all three concur in having a mental exigency pressing
+for satisfaction, but differ as to the hypothesis which satisfies it.
+
+Next, if we reason upon Mr Mill's theory as to Cause, certainly those
+who deny his theory can have no difficulty in conceiving events without
+any cause (in that sense): nor have those who adopt this theory any
+greater difficulty. These latter _believe_ that there are, throughout,
+constant and uniform conditions on which the occurrence of every event
+depends; but they can perfectly _conceive_ events as occurring without
+any such uniform sequence. In truth, the belief in such causation, as
+pervading _all nature_, is an acquired result of scientific training.
+The greater part of mankind believe that some events occur in regular,
+others in irregular succession. Moreover, a full half of the
+metaphysical world espouse the doctrine of free-will, and consider that
+all volitions occur without any cause at all.]
+
+[Footnote 14: Among the various authorities (upon this question of
+quantifying the predicate) collected by Sir W. Hamilton in the valuable
+Appendix to his 'Lectures on Logic,' we find one (p. 311) which takes
+the same ground of objection as Mr Mill, in these words:--'The cause why
+the quantitative note is not usually joined with the predicate, is, that
+there would thus be two _quaesita_ at once; to wit, whether the predicate
+were affirmed of the subject, and whether it were denied of everything
+beside. For when we say, _all man is all rational_, we judge that _all
+man is rational_, and judge likewise _that rational is denied of
+everything but man_. But these are, in reality, two different _quaesita_;
+and therefore it has become usual to state them, not in one, but in two
+several propositions. And this is self-evident, seeing that a
+_quaesitum_, in itself, asks only--_Does or does not this inhere in
+that?_ and _not_ Does or does not this inhere in that, _and at the same
+time inhere in nothing else?_'
+
+The author of this just and sagacious remark--much surpassing what the
+other writers quoted in the Appendix say--was a Jew who died at
+Perpignan in or near 1370, named Levi Ben Gerson or Gersonides. An
+interesting account of this man, eminent as a writer and thinker in his
+age, will be found in a biography by Dr Joel, published at Breslau in
+1862, 'Levi Ben Gerson als Religions--philosoph.' He distinguished
+himself as a writer on theology, philosophy, and astronomy; he was one
+of the successors to the free speculative vein of Maimonides, and one of
+the continuators of the Arabic Aristotelian philosophy. He both
+commented on and combated the doctrines of Averroes. Dr Joel thinks that
+he died earlier than 1370.]
+
+
+
+
+
+End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Review of the Work of Mr John Stuart
+Mill Entitled, 'Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy.', by George Grote
+
+*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK REVIEW OF MR JOHN STUART MILL ***
+
+***** This file should be named 12002.txt or 12002.zip *****
+This and all associated files of various formats will be found in:
+        https://www.gutenberg.org/1/2/0/0/12002/
+
+Produced by The Online Distributed Proofreading Team.
+
+Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions
+will be renamed.
+
+Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no
+one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation
+(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without
+permission and without paying copyright royalties.  Special rules,
+set forth in the General Terms of Use part of this license, apply to
+copying and distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works to
+protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm concept and trademark.  Project
+Gutenberg is a registered trademark, and may not be used if you
+charge for the eBooks, unless you receive specific permission.  If you
+do not charge anything for copies of this eBook, complying with the
+rules is very easy.  You may use this eBook for nearly any purpose
+such as creation of derivative works, reports, performances and
+research.  They may be modified and printed and given away--you may do
+practically ANYTHING with public domain eBooks.  Redistribution is
+subject to the trademark license, especially commercial
+redistribution.
+
+
+
+*** START: FULL LICENSE ***
+
+THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG LICENSE
+PLEASE READ THIS BEFORE YOU DISTRIBUTE OR USE THIS WORK
+
+To protect the Project Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting the free
+distribution of electronic works, by using or distributing this work
+(or any other work associated in any way with the phrase "Project
+Gutenberg"), you agree to comply with all the terms of the Full Project
+Gutenberg-tm License (available with this file or online at
+https://gutenberg.org/license).
+
+
+Section 1.  General Terms of Use and Redistributing Project Gutenberg-tm
+electronic works
+
+1.A.  By reading or using any part of this Project Gutenberg-tm
+electronic work, you indicate that you have read, understand, agree to
+and accept all the terms of this license and intellectual property
+(trademark/copyright) agreement.  If you do not agree to abide by all
+the terms of this agreement, you must cease using and return or destroy
+all copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in your possession.
+If you paid a fee for obtaining a copy of or access to a Project
+Gutenberg-tm electronic work and you do not agree to be bound by the
+terms of this agreement, you may obtain a refund from the person or
+entity to whom you paid the fee as set forth in paragraph 1.E.8.
+
+1.B.  "Project Gutenberg" is a registered trademark.  It may only be
+used on or associated in any way with an electronic work by people who
+agree to be bound by the terms of this agreement.  There are a few
+things that you can do with most Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works
+even without complying with the full terms of this agreement.  See
+paragraph 1.C below.  There are a lot of things you can do with Project
+Gutenberg-tm electronic works if you follow the terms of this agreement
+and help preserve free future access to Project Gutenberg-tm electronic
+works.  See paragraph 1.E below.
+
+1.C.  The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation ("the Foundation"
+or PGLAF), owns a compilation copyright in the collection of Project
+Gutenberg-tm electronic works.  Nearly all the individual works in the
+collection are in the public domain in the United States.  If an
+individual work is in the public domain in the United States and you are
+located in the United States, we do not claim a right to prevent you from
+copying, distributing, performing, displaying or creating derivative
+works based on the work as long as all references to Project Gutenberg
+are removed.  Of course, we hope that you will support the Project
+Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting free access to electronic works by
+freely sharing Project Gutenberg-tm works in compliance with the terms of
+this agreement for keeping the Project Gutenberg-tm name associated with
+the work.  You can easily comply with the terms of this agreement by
+keeping this work in the same format with its attached full Project
+Gutenberg-tm License when you share it without charge with others.
+
+1.D.  The copyright laws of the place where you are located also govern
+what you can do with this work.  Copyright laws in most countries are in
+a constant state of change.  If you are outside the United States, check
+the laws of your country in addition to the terms of this agreement
+before downloading, copying, displaying, performing, distributing or
+creating derivative works based on this work or any other Project
+Gutenberg-tm work.  The Foundation makes no representations concerning
+the copyright status of any work in any country outside the United
+States.
+
+1.E.  Unless you have removed all references to Project Gutenberg:
+
+1.E.1.  The following sentence, with active links to, or other immediate
+access to, the full Project Gutenberg-tm License must appear prominently
+whenever any copy of a Project Gutenberg-tm work (any work on which the
+phrase "Project Gutenberg" appears, or with which the phrase "Project
+Gutenberg" is associated) is accessed, displayed, performed, viewed,
+copied or distributed:
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+1.E.2.  If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is derived
+from the public domain (does not contain a notice indicating that it is
+posted with permission of the copyright holder), the work can be copied
+and distributed to anyone in the United States without paying any fees
+or charges.  If you are redistributing or providing access to a work
+with the phrase "Project Gutenberg" associated with or appearing on the
+work, you must comply either with the requirements of paragraphs 1.E.1
+through 1.E.7 or obtain permission for the use of the work and the
+Project Gutenberg-tm trademark as set forth in paragraphs 1.E.8 or
+1.E.9.
+
+1.E.3.  If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is posted
+with the permission of the copyright holder, your use and distribution
+must comply with both paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 and any additional
+terms imposed by the copyright holder.  Additional terms will be linked
+to the Project Gutenberg-tm License for all works posted with the
+permission of the copyright holder found at the beginning of this work.
+
+1.E.4.  Do not unlink or detach or remove the full Project Gutenberg-tm
+License terms from this work, or any files containing a part of this
+work or any other work associated with Project Gutenberg-tm.
+
+1.E.5.  Do not copy, display, perform, distribute or redistribute this
+electronic work, or any part of this electronic work, without
+prominently displaying the sentence set forth in paragraph 1.E.1 with
+active links or immediate access to the full terms of the Project
+Gutenberg-tm License.
+
+1.E.6.  You may convert to and distribute this work in any binary,
+compressed, marked up, nonproprietary or proprietary form, including any
+word processing or hypertext form.  However, if you provide access to or
+distribute copies of a Project Gutenberg-tm work in a format other than
+"Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other format used in the official version
+posted on the official Project Gutenberg-tm web site (www.gutenberg.org),
+you must, at no additional cost, fee or expense to the user, provide a
+copy, a means of exporting a copy, or a means of obtaining a copy upon
+request, of the work in its original "Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other
+form.  Any alternate format must include the full Project Gutenberg-tm
+License as specified in paragraph 1.E.1.
+
+1.E.7.  Do not charge a fee for access to, viewing, displaying,
+performing, copying or distributing any Project Gutenberg-tm works
+unless you comply with paragraph 1.E.8 or 1.E.9.
+
+1.E.8.  You may charge a reasonable fee for copies of or providing
+access to or distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works provided
+that
+
+- You pay a royalty fee of 20% of the gross profits you derive from
+     the use of Project Gutenberg-tm works calculated using the method
+     you already use to calculate your applicable taxes.  The fee is
+     owed to the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark, but he
+     has agreed to donate royalties under this paragraph to the
+     Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation.  Royalty payments
+     must be paid within 60 days following each date on which you
+     prepare (or are legally required to prepare) your periodic tax
+     returns.  Royalty payments should be clearly marked as such and
+     sent to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation at the
+     address specified in Section 4, "Information about donations to
+     the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation."
+
+- You provide a full refund of any money paid by a user who notifies
+     you in writing (or by e-mail) within 30 days of receipt that s/he
+     does not agree to the terms of the full Project Gutenberg-tm
+     License.  You must require such a user to return or
+     destroy all copies of the works possessed in a physical medium
+     and discontinue all use of and all access to other copies of
+     Project Gutenberg-tm works.
+
+- You provide, in accordance with paragraph 1.F.3, a full refund of any
+     money paid for a work or a replacement copy, if a defect in the
+     electronic work is discovered and reported to you within 90 days
+     of receipt of the work.
+
+- You comply with all other terms of this agreement for free
+     distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm works.
+
+1.E.9.  If you wish to charge a fee or distribute a Project Gutenberg-tm
+electronic work or group of works on different terms than are set
+forth in this agreement, you must obtain permission in writing from
+both the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation and Michael
+Hart, the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark.  Contact the
+Foundation as set forth in Section 3 below.
+
+1.F.
+
+1.F.1.  Project Gutenberg volunteers and employees expend considerable
+effort to identify, do copyright research on, transcribe and proofread
+public domain works in creating the Project Gutenberg-tm
+collection.  Despite these efforts, Project Gutenberg-tm electronic
+works, and the medium on which they may be stored, may contain
+"Defects," such as, but not limited to, incomplete, inaccurate or
+corrupt data, transcription errors, a copyright or other intellectual
+property infringement, a defective or damaged disk or other medium, a
+computer virus, or computer codes that damage or cannot be read by
+your equipment.
+
+1.F.2.  LIMITED WARRANTY, DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES - Except for the "Right
+of Replacement or Refund" described in paragraph 1.F.3, the Project
+Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the owner of the Project
+Gutenberg-tm trademark, and any other party distributing a Project
+Gutenberg-tm electronic work under this agreement, disclaim all
+liability to you for damages, costs and expenses, including legal
+fees.  YOU AGREE THAT YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE, STRICT
+LIABILITY, BREACH OF WARRANTY OR BREACH OF CONTRACT EXCEPT THOSE
+PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH F3.  YOU AGREE THAT THE FOUNDATION, THE
+TRADEMARK OWNER, AND ANY DISTRIBUTOR UNDER THIS AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE
+LIABLE TO YOU FOR ACTUAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE OR
+INCIDENTAL DAMAGES EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH
+DAMAGE.
+
+1.F.3.  LIMITED RIGHT OF REPLACEMENT OR REFUND - If you discover a
+defect in this electronic work within 90 days of receiving it, you can
+receive a refund of the money (if any) you paid for it by sending a
+written explanation to the person you received the work from.  If you
+received the work on a physical medium, you must return the medium with
+your written explanation.  The person or entity that provided you with
+the defective work may elect to provide a replacement copy in lieu of a
+refund.  If you received the work electronically, the person or entity
+providing it to you may choose to give you a second opportunity to
+receive the work electronically in lieu of a refund.  If the second copy
+is also defective, you may demand a refund in writing without further
+opportunities to fix the problem.
+
+1.F.4.  Except for the limited right of replacement or refund set forth
+in paragraph 1.F.3, this work is provided to you 'AS-IS' WITH NO OTHER
+WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO
+WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTIBILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PURPOSE.
+
+1.F.5.  Some states do not allow disclaimers of certain implied
+warranties or the exclusion or limitation of certain types of damages.
+If any disclaimer or limitation set forth in this agreement violates the
+law of the state applicable to this agreement, the agreement shall be
+interpreted to make the maximum disclaimer or limitation permitted by
+the applicable state law.  The invalidity or unenforceability of any
+provision of this agreement shall not void the remaining provisions.
+
+1.F.6.  INDEMNITY - You agree to indemnify and hold the Foundation, the
+trademark owner, any agent or employee of the Foundation, anyone
+providing copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in accordance
+with this agreement, and any volunteers associated with the production,
+promotion and distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works,
+harmless from all liability, costs and expenses, including legal fees,
+that arise directly or indirectly from any of the following which you do
+or cause to occur: (a) distribution of this or any Project Gutenberg-tm
+work, (b) alteration, modification, or additions or deletions to any
+Project Gutenberg-tm work, and (c) any Defect you cause.
+
+
+Section  2.  Information about the Mission of Project Gutenberg-tm
+
+Project Gutenberg-tm is synonymous with the free distribution of
+electronic works in formats readable by the widest variety of computers
+including obsolete, old, middle-aged and new computers.  It exists
+because of the efforts of hundreds of volunteers and donations from
+people in all walks of life.
+
+Volunteers and financial support to provide volunteers with the
+assistance they need, is critical to reaching Project Gutenberg-tm's
+goals and ensuring that the Project Gutenberg-tm collection will
+remain freely available for generations to come.  In 2001, the Project
+Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation was created to provide a secure
+and permanent future for Project Gutenberg-tm and future generations.
+To learn more about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation
+and how your efforts and donations can help, see Sections 3 and 4
+and the Foundation web page at https://www.pglaf.org.
+
+
+Section 3.  Information about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive
+Foundation
+
+The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation is a non profit
+501(c)(3) educational corporation organized under the laws of the
+state of Mississippi and granted tax exempt status by the Internal
+Revenue Service.  The Foundation's EIN or federal tax identification
+number is 64-6221541.  Its 501(c)(3) letter is posted at
+https://pglaf.org/fundraising.  Contributions to the Project Gutenberg
+Literary Archive Foundation are tax deductible to the full extent
+permitted by U.S. federal laws and your state's laws.
+
+The Foundation's principal office is located at 4557 Melan Dr. S.
+Fairbanks, AK, 99712., but its volunteers and employees are scattered
+throughout numerous locations.  Its business office is located at
+809 North 1500 West, Salt Lake City, UT 84116, (801) 596-1887, email
+business@pglaf.org.  Email contact links and up to date contact
+information can be found at the Foundation's web site and official
+page at https://pglaf.org
+
+For additional contact information:
+     Dr. Gregory B. Newby
+     Chief Executive and Director
+     gbnewby@pglaf.org
+
+Section 4.  Information about Donations to the Project Gutenberg
+Literary Archive Foundation
+
+Project Gutenberg-tm depends upon and cannot survive without wide
+spread public support and donations to carry out its mission of
+increasing the number of public domain and licensed works that can be
+freely distributed in machine readable form accessible by the widest
+array of equipment including outdated equipment.  Many small donations
+($1 to $5,000) are particularly important to maintaining tax exempt
+status with the IRS.
+
+The Foundation is committed to complying with the laws regulating
+charities and charitable donations in all 50 states of the United
+States.  Compliance requirements are not uniform and it takes a
+considerable effort, much paperwork and many fees to meet and keep up
+with these requirements.  We do not solicit donations in locations
+where we have not received written confirmation of compliance.  To
+SEND DONATIONS or determine the status of compliance for any
+particular state visit https://pglaf.org
+
+While we cannot and do not solicit contributions from states where we
+have not met the solicitation requirements, we know of no prohibition
+against accepting unsolicited donations from donors in such states who
+approach us with offers to donate.
+
+International donations are gratefully accepted, but we cannot make
+any statements concerning tax treatment of donations received from
+outside the United States.  U.S. laws alone swamp our small staff.
+
+Please check the Project Gutenberg Web pages for current donation
+methods and addresses.  Donations are accepted in a number of other
+ways including including checks, online payments and credit card
+donations.  To donate, please visit: https://pglaf.org/donate
+
+
+Section 5.  General Information About Project Gutenberg-tm electronic
+works.
+
+Professor Michael S. Hart was the originator of the Project Gutenberg-tm
+concept of a library of electronic works that could be freely shared
+with anyone.  For thirty years, he produced and distributed Project
+Gutenberg-tm eBooks with only a loose network of volunteer support.
+
+Project Gutenberg-tm eBooks are often created from several printed
+editions, all of which are confirmed as Public Domain in the U.S.
+unless a copyright notice is included.  Thus, we do not necessarily
+keep eBooks in compliance with any particular paper edition.
+
+Each eBook is in a subdirectory of the same number as the eBook's
+eBook number, often in several formats including plain vanilla ASCII,
+compressed (zipped), HTML and others.
+
+Corrected EDITIONS of our eBooks replace the old file and take over
+the old filename and etext number.  The replaced older file is renamed.
+VERSIONS based on separate sources are treated as new eBooks receiving
+new filenames and etext numbers.
+
+Most people start at our Web site which has the main PG search facility:
+
+     https://www.gutenberg.org
+
+This Web site includes information about Project Gutenberg-tm,
+including how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary
+Archive Foundation, how to help produce our new eBooks, and how to
+subscribe to our email newsletter to hear about new eBooks.
+
+EBooks posted prior to November 2003, with eBook numbers BELOW #10000,
+are filed in directories based on their release date.  If you want to
+download any of these eBooks directly, rather than using the regular
+search system you may utilize the following addresses and just
+download by the etext year.
+
+     https://www.gutenberg.org/etext06
+
+    (Or /etext 05, 04, 03, 02, 01, 00, 99,
+     98, 97, 96, 95, 94, 93, 92, 92, 91 or 90)
+
+EBooks posted since November 2003, with etext numbers OVER #10000, are
+filed in a different way.  The year of a release date is no longer part
+of the directory path.  The path is based on the etext number (which is
+identical to the filename).  The path to the file is made up of single
+digits corresponding to all but the last digit in the filename.  For
+example an eBook of filename 10234 would be found at:
+
+     https://www.gutenberg.org/1/0/2/3/10234
+
+or filename 24689 would be found at:
+     https://www.gutenberg.org/2/4/6/8/24689
+
+An alternative method of locating eBooks:
+     https://www.gutenberg.org/GUTINDEX.ALL
+
+
diff --git a/old/12002.zip b/old/12002.zip
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..859b7d4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/old/12002.zip