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diff --git a/old/12002.txt b/old/12002.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e66a699 --- /dev/null +++ b/old/12002.txt @@ -0,0 +1,2300 @@ +The Project Gutenberg EBook of Review of the Work of Mr John Stuart Mill +Entitled, 'Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy.', by George Grote + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Review of the Work of Mr John Stuart Mill Entitled, 'Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy.' + +Author: George Grote + +Release Date: April 12, 2004 [EBook #12002] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK REVIEW OF MR JOHN STUART MILL *** + + + + +Produced by The Online Distributed Proofreading Team. + + + + +REVIEW OF THE WORK OF MR JOHN STUART MILL + +ENTITLED, 'EXAMINATION OF SIR WILLIAM HAMILTONS PHILOSOPHY' + +BY GEORGE GROTE + +AUTHOR OF + +'THE HISTORY OF ANCIENT GREECE,' + +'PLATO AND THE OTHER COMPANIONS OF SOCRATES,' ETC. + +1868 + +_Reprinted from the 'Westminster Review,' January 1, 1866._ + + +JOHN CHILDS AND SON, PRINTERS + + + + +_An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy, and of the +Principal Philosophical Questions discussed in his Writings_. By JOHN +STUART MILL. London: Longmans. 1865. + +The work bearing the above title is an octavo volume, consisting of +twenty-eight chapters, and five hundred and sixty pages. This is no +great amount of print; but the amount of matter contained in it is +prodigious, and the quality of that matter such as to require a full +stretch of attention. Mr Mill gives his readers no superfluous +sentences, scarcely even a superfluous word, above what is necessary to +express his meaning briefly and clearly. Of such a book no complete +abstract can be given in the space to which we are confined. + +To students of philosophy--doubtless but a minority among the general +circle of English readers--this work comes recommended by the strongest +claims both of interest and instruction. It presents in direct +antithesis two most conspicuous representatives of the modern +speculative mind of England--Sir W. Hamilton and Mr John Stuart Mill. + +Sir W. Hamilton has exercised powerful influence over the stream of +thought during the present generation. The lectures on Logic and +Metaphysics delivered by him at Edinburgh, for twenty years, determined +the view taken of those subjects by a large number of aspiring young +students, and determined that view for many of them permanently and +irrevocably.[1] Several eminent teachers and writers of the present day +are proud of considering themselves his disciples, enunciate his +doctrines in greater or less proportion, and seldom contradict him +without letting it be seen that they depart unwillingly from such a +leader. Various new phrases and psychological illustrations have +obtained footing in treatises of philosophy, chiefly from his authority. +We do not number ourselves among his followers; but we think his +influence on philosophy was in many ways beneficial. He kept up the idea +of philosophy as a subject to be studied from its own points of view: a +dignity which in earlier times it enjoyed, perhaps, to mischievous +excess, but from which in recent times it has far too much +receded--especially in England. He performed the great service of +labouring strenuously to piece together the past traditions of +philosophy, to re-discover those which had been allowed to drop into +oblivion, and to make out the genealogy of opinions as far as negligent +predecessors had still left the possibility of doing so. + +The forty-six lectures on Metaphysics, and the thirty-five lectures on +Logic, published by Messrs Mansel and Veitch, constitute the biennial +course actually delivered by Sir W. Hamilton in the Professorial Chair. +They ought therefore to be looked at chiefly with reference to the minds +of youthful hearers, as preservatives against that mischief forcibly +described by Rousseau--'L'inhabitude de penser dans la jeunesse en ote +la capacite pendant le reste de la vie.' + +Now, in a subject so abstract, obscure, and generally unpalatable, as +Logic and Metaphysics, the difficulty which the teacher finds in +inspiring interest is extreme. That Sir W. Hamilton overcame such +difficulty with remarkable success, is the affirmation of his two +editors; and our impression, as readers of his lectures, disposes us to +credit them. That Sir W. Hamilton should have done this effectively is +in itself sufficient to stamp him as a meritorious professor--as a +worthy successor to the chair of Dugald Stewart, whose unrivalled +perfection in that department is attested by every one. Many a man who +ultimately adopted speculative opinions opposed to Dugald Stewart, +received his first impulse and guidance in the path of speculation from +the lasting impression made by Stewart's lectures. + +But though we look at these lectures, as they ought to be looked at, +chiefly with a view to the special purpose for which they were destined, +we are far from insinuating that they have no other merits, or that they +are useless for readers who have already a metaphysical creed of their +own. We have found them both instructive and interesting: they go over a +large proportion of the field of speculative philosophy, partly from the +point of view (not always the same) belonging to the author, partly from +that of numerous predecessors whom he cites. We recognize also in Sir W. +Hamilton an amount of intellectual independence which seldom accompanies +such vast erudition. He recites many different opinions, but he judges +them all for himself; and, what is of still greater moment, he +constantly gives the reasons for his judgments. To us these reasons are +always of more or less value, whether we admit them to be valid or not. +Many philosophers present their own doctrine as if it were so much +ascertained and acknowledged truth, either intimating, or leading you to +suppose, that though erroneous beliefs to the contrary formerly +prevailed, these have now become discredited with every one. We do not +censure this way of proceeding, but we prefer the manner of Sir W. +Hamilton. He always keeps before us divergence and discrepancy of view +as the normal condition of reasoned truth or philosophy; the +characteristic postulate of which is, that every affirmative and every +negative shall have its appropriate reasons clearly and fully +enunciated. + +In this point of view the appendix annexed to the lectures is also +valuable; and the four copious appendixes or dissertations following +the edition of Reid's works, are more valuable still. How far Sir W. +Hamilton has there furnished good proof of his own doctrines on External +Perception, and on the Primary Qualities of Matter, we shall not now +determine; but to those who dissent from him, as well as to those who +agree with him, his reasonings on these subjects are highly instructive: +while the full citations from so many other writers contribute +materially not only to elucidate the points directly approached, but +also to enlarge our knowledge of philosophy generally. We set particular +value upon this preservation of the traditions of philosophy, and upon +this maintenance of a known perpetual succession among the speculative +minds of humanity, with proper comparisons and contrasts. We have found +among the names quoted by Sir W. Hamilton, and, thanks to his care, +several authors hardly at all known to us, and opinions cited from them +not less instructive than curious. He deserves the more gratitude, +because he departs herein from received usage since Bacon and Descartes. +The example set by these great men was admirable, so far as it went to +throw off the authority of predecessors; but pernicious so far as it +banished those predecessors out of knowledge, like mere magazines of +immaturity and error. Throughout the eighteenth century, all study of +the earlier modes of philosophizing was, for the most part, neglected. +Of such neglect, remarkable instances are pointed out by Sir W. +Hamilton. + +While speaking about the general merits and philosophical position of +Sir William Hamilton, we have hitherto said nothing about those of Mr +Mill. But before we proceed to analyze the separate chapters of his +volume, we must devote a few words to the fulfilment of another +obligation. + +Mr John Stuart Mill has not been the first to bestow honour on the +surname which he bears. His father, Mr James Mill, had already ennobled +the name. An ampler title to distinction in history and philosophy can +seldom be produced than that which Mr James Mill left behind him. We +know no work which surpasses his 'History of British India' in the main +excellencies attainable by historical writers: industrious accumulation, +continued for many years, of original authorities--careful and +conscientious criticism of their statements--and a large command of +psychological analysis, enabling the author to interpret phenomena of +society, both extremely complicated, and far removed from his own +personal experience. Again, Mr James Mill's 'Elements of Political +Economy' were, at the time when they appeared, the most logical and +condensed exposition of the entire science then existing. Lastly, his +latest avowed production, the 'Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human +Mind,' is a model of perspicuous exposition of complex states of +consciousness, carried farther than by any other author before him; and +illustrating the fulness which such exposition may be made to attain, by +one who has faith in the comprehensive principle of association, and has +learnt the secret of tracing out its innumerable windings. It is, +moreover, the first work in which the great fact of Indissoluble +Association is brought into its due theoretical prominence. These are +high merits, of which lasting evidence is before the public; but there +were other merits in Mr James Mill, less publicly authenticated, yet not +less real. His unpremeditated oral exposition was hardly less effective +than his prepared work with the pen; his colloquial fertility on +philosophical subjects, his power of discussing himself, and of +stimulating others to discuss, his ready responsive inspirations through +all the shifts and windings of a sort of Platonic dialogue--all these +accomplishments were, to those who knew him, even more impressive than +what he composed for the press. Conversation with him was not merely +instructive, but provocative to the dormant intelligence. Of all persons +whom we have known, Mr James Mill was one who stood least remote from +the lofty Platonic ideal of Dialectic--[Greek: _Tou didhonai kahi +dhechesthai lhogon_]--(the giving and receiving of reasons) competent +alike to examine others, or to be examined by them, on philosophy. When +to this we add a strenuous character, earnest convictions, and +single-minded devotion to truth, with an utter disdain of mere +paradox--it may be conceived that such a man exercised powerful +intellectual ascendancy over younger minds. Several of those who enjoyed +his society--men now at, or past, the maturity of life, and some of them +in distinguished positions--remember and attest with gratitude such +ascendancy in their own cases: among them the writer of the present +article, who owes to the historian of British India an amount of +intellectual stimulus and guidance such as he can never forget. + +When a father, such as we have described, declining to send his son +either to school or college, constituted himself schoolmaster from the +beginning, and performed that duty with laborious solicitude--when, +besides full infusion of modern knowledge, the forcing process applied +by the Platonic Socrates to the youth-Theaetetus, was administered by Mr +James Mill, continuously and from an earlier age, to a youthful mind not +less pregnant than that of Theaetetus--it would be surprising if the son +thus trained had not reached even a higher eminence than his father. The +fruit borne by Mr John Stuart Mill has been worthy of the culture +bestowed, and the volume before us is at once his latest and his ripest +product. + +The 'Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy' is intended by Mr +Mill (so he tells us in the preface to the sixth published edition of +his 'System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive') as a sequel and +complement to that system. We are happy to welcome so valuable an +addition; but with or without that addition, the 'System of Logic' +appears to us to present the most important advance in speculative +theory which the present century has witnessed. Either half of it, the +Ratiocinative or the Inductive, would have surpassed any previous work +on the same subject. The Inductive half discriminates and brings into +clear view, for the first time, those virtues of method which have +insensibly grown into habits among consummate scientific inquirers of +the post-Baconian age, as well as the fallacies by which some of these +authors have been misled. The Ratiocinative half, dealing with matters +which had already been well handled by Dutrieu and other scholastic +logicians, invests their dead though precise formalism with a real life +and application to the actual process of finding and proving truth. But +besides thus working each half up to perfection, Mr Mill has performed +the still more difficult task of overcoming the repugnance, apparently +an inveterate repugnance, between them, so as chemically to combine the +two into one homogeneous compound; thus presenting the problem of +Reasoned Truth, Inference, Proof, and Disproof, as one connected whole. +For ourselves, we still recollect the mist which was cleared from our +minds when we first read the 'System of Logic,' very soon after it was +published. We were familiar with the Syllogistic Logic in Burgersdicius +and Dutrieu; we were also familiar with examples of the best procedure +in modern inductive science; but the two streams flowed altogether apart +in our minds, like two parallel lines never joining nor approaching. The +irreconcilability of the two was at once removed, when we had read and +mastered the second and third chapters of the Second Book of the 'System +of Logic;' in which Mr Mill explains the functions and value of the +Syllogism, and the real import of its major premiss. This explanation +struck us at the time as one of the most profound and original efforts +of metaphysical thought that we had ever perused, and we see no reason +to retract that opinion now.[2] It appears all the more valuable when we +contrast it with what is said by Mr Mill's two contemporaries--Hamilton +and Whately: the first of whom retains the ancient theory of reasoning, +as being only a methodized transition from a whole to its parts, and +from the parts up to the whole--Induction being only this ascending part +of the process, whereby, after having given a complete enumeration of +all the compound parts, you conclude to the sum total described in one +word as a whole;[3] while the second (Whately) agrees in subordinating +Induction to Syllogism, but does so in a different way--by representing +inductive reasoning as a syllogism, with its major premiss suppressed, +from which major premiss it derived its authority. The explanation of Mr +Mill attacks the problem from the opposite side. It subordinates +syllogism to induction, the technical to the real; it divests the major +premiss of its illusory pretence to be itself the proving authority, or +even any real and essential part of the proof--and acknowledges it +merely as a valuable precautionary test and security for avoiding +mistake in the process of proving. Taking Mr Mill's 'System of Logic' as +a whole, it is one of the books by which we believe ourselves to have +most profited. The principles of it are constantly present to our mind +when engaged in investigations of evidence, whether scientific or +historical. + +Concerned as we are here with Mr Mill only as a logician and +philosopher, we feel precluded from adverting to his works on other +topics--even to his 'Elements of Political Economy,' by which he is +probably more widely known than by anything else. Of the many +obligations which Political Economy owes to him, one only can be noticed +consistent with the scope of the present article: the care which he has +taken--he alone, or at least, he more explicitly and formally than any +other expositor--to set forth the general position of that science in +the aggregate field of scientific research; its relation to sociology as +a whole, or to other fractions thereof, how far derivative or +co-ordinate; what are its fundamental postulates or hypotheses, with +what limits the logical methods of induction and deduction are +applicable to it, and how far its conclusions may be relied on as +approximations to truth. All these points will be found instructively +handled in the Sixth Book of Mr Mill's 'System of Logic,' as well as in +his smaller and less known work, 'Essays on Some Unsettled Questions in +Political Economy.' We find him, while methodizing and illustrating the +data of the special science, uniformly keeping in view its relation to +philosophy as a whole. + +But there is yet another work in which the interests of philosophy, as a +whole, come into the foreground and become the special object of +vindication in their largest compass and most vital requirements. We +mean Mr Mill's 'Essay on Liberty,' one half of which takes for its +thesis the _libertus philosophandi_. He maintains, emphatically, in this +book, the full dignity of reasoned truth against all the jealous +exigencies of traditional dogma and self-justifying sentiment. He claims +the most unreserved liberty of utterance for negative and affirmative on +all questions--not merely for the purpose of discriminating truth from +falsehood, but also to keep up in individual minds the full sense and +understanding of the matters controverted, in place of a mere partial +and one-sided adhesion. At first sight, indeed, it might seem as if Mr +Mill was fighting with a shadow; for liberty of philosophizing is a +postulate which, in general terms, every one concedes. But when you come +to fathom the real feelings which underlie this concession, you discover +that almost every man makes it under reserves which, though acting in +silence, are not the less efficacious. Every one has some dogmas which +he cannot bear to hear advocated, and others which he will not allow to +be controverted in his presence. A writer has to consider not merely by +what reasons any novelty of belief or disbelief may be justified, but +also how much it will be safe for him to publish, having regard to the +irritable sore places of the public judgment. In July, 1864, we were +present at the annual meeting of the French Academy at Paris, where the +prizes for essays sent in, pursuant to subjects announced for study +beforehand, are awarded. We heard the titles of various compositions +announced by the President (M. Villemain), with a brief critical +estimate of each. Their comparative merits were appreciated, and the +prize awarded to one of the competitors. Among the compositions sent to +compete for the prize, one was a work by M. Taine, upon which the +President bestowed the most remarkable encomiums, in every different +point of view: extent of knowledge, force of thought, style, +arrangement, all were praised in a manner which we have rarely heard +exceeded. Nevertheless, the prize was not awarded to this work, but to +another which the President praised in a manner decidedly less marked +and emphatic. What was here the _ratio decidendi_? The reason was, and +the President declared it in the most explicit language, that the work +of M. Taine _was deeply tainted with materialism_. 'Sans doute,' said +the esteemed veteran of French literature in pronouncing his award, +'sans doute les opinions sont libres, _mais_'--It is precisely against +this _mais_--ushering in the special anathematized or consecrated +conclusion which it is intended to except from the general liberty of +enforcing or impugning--in matters of philosophical discussion, that Mr +Mill, in the 'Essay on Liberty,' declares war as champion of Reasoned +Truth. + +He handles this grand theme--_eleythheroys eleythheros +philosophein_--involving as it does the best interests of philosophy, +as an instructress to men's judgments, and a stimulus to their +intelligence--with great depth of psychological analysis sustained by +abundant historical illustration. And he in the same volume discusses +most profitably another question akin to it--To what extent, and by what +principles, the interference of others is justifiable, in restraining +the liberty of taste and action for each individual? A question at once +grave and neglected, but the discussion of which does not belong to our +present article. + +A new work from one who has already manifested such mastery of +philosophy, both in principle and in detail, and a work exhibiting the +analysis and appreciation of the philosophical views of an eminent +contemporary, must raise the highest expectation. We think no reader +will be disappointed who peruses Mr Mill's 'Examination,' and we shall +now endeavour to give some account of the manner in which he performs +it. Upon topics so abstract and subtle as the contents of this volume, +the antithesis between two rival theories is the best way, and often the +only way, for bringing truth into clear view; and the 'Examination' here +before us is professedly controversy. But of controversy in its +objectionable sense--of captious or acrimonious personality--not a trace +will here be found. A dignified, judicial equanimity of tone is +preserved from first to last. Moreover, though the title and direct +purpose of the volume is negative and critical, yet the destructive +criticism is pervaded by many copious veins of constructive exposition, +embodying Mr Mill's own views upon some of the most intricate problems +of metaphysics. + +Mr Mill begins his work by analyzing and explaining the doctrine called +the Relativity of Human Knowledge: + + 'The doctrine (chap. ii. p. 5) which is thought to belong in + the most especial manner to Sir W. Hamilton, and which was + the ground of his opposition to the transcendentalism of the + later French and German metaphysicians, is that which he and + others have called the Relativity of Human Knowledge. It is + the subject of the most generally known and impressive of + all his writings--the one which first revealed to the + English metaphysical reader that a new power had arisen in + philosophy. Together with its developments, it composes the + Philosophy of the Conditioned, which he opposed to the + French and German philosophies of the Absolute, and which is + regarded by most of his admirers as the greatest of his + titles to a permanent place in the history of metaphysical + thought. But, "the relativity of human knowledge," like most + other phrases into which the words _relative_ or _relation_ + enter, is vague, and admits of a great variety of meanings,' + &c. + +Mr Mill then proceeds to distinguish these various meanings, and to +determine in which of them the phrase is understood by Sir W. Hamilton. + +One meaning is, that we only know anything by knowing it as +distinguished from something else--that all consciousness is of +difference. It is not, however, in this sense that the expression is +ordinarily or intentionally used by Sir W. Hamilton, though he fully +recognizes the truth which, when thus used, it serves to express. In +general, when he says that all our knowledge is relative, the relation +he has in view is not between the thing known and other objects compared +with it, but between the thing known and the mind knowing--(p. 6). + +The doctrine in this last meaning is held by different philosophers in +two different forms. Some (e.g. Berkeley, Hume, Ferrier, &c.), usually +called Idealists, maintain not merely that all we can possibly know of +anything is the manner in which it affects the human faculties, but that +there is nothing else to be known; that affections of human or of other +minds are all that we can know to exist--that the difference between the +ego and the non-ego is only a formal distinction between two aspects of +the same reality. Other philosophers (Brown, Mr Herbert Spencer, Auguste +Comte, with many others) believe that the ego and the non-ego denote two +realities, each self-existent, and neither dependent on the other; that +the Noumenon, or 'thing _per se_,' is in itself a different thing from +the Phenomenon, and equally or more real, but that, though we know its +existence, we have no means of knowing what it is. All that we can know +is, relatively to ourselves, the modes in which it affects us, or the +phenomena which it produces--(pp. 9--11). + +The doctrine of Relativity, as held by Kant and his many followers, is +next distinguished from the same doctrine as held by Hartley, James +Mill, Professor Bain, &c., compatible with either acceptance or +rejection of the Berkeleian theory. Kant maintains that the attributes +which we ascribe to outward things, or which are inseparable from them +in thought, contain additional elements over and above sensations _plus_ +an unknowable cause--additional elements added by the mind itself, and +therefore still only relative, but constituting the original furniture +of the mind itself--inherent laws, partly of our sensitive, partly of +our intellectual faculty. It is on this latter point that Hartley and +those going along with him diverge. Admitting the same additional +elements, these philosophers do not ascribe to the mind any innate forms +to account for them, but hold that place, extension, substance, cause, +and the rest, &c., are conceptions put together out of ideas of +sensation, by the known laws of Association--(pp. 12--14). + +Partial Relativity is the opinion professed by most philosophers (and by +most persons who do not philosophize). They hold that we know things +partly as they are in themselves, partly as they are merely in relation +to us. + +This discrimination of the various schools of philosophers is highly +instructive, and is given with the full perspicuity belonging to Mr +Mill's style. He proceeds to examine in what sense Sir W. Hamilton +maintained the Relativity of Human Knowledge. He cites passages both +from the 'Discussions on Philosophy' and from the Lectures, in which +that doctrine is both affirmed in its greatest amplitude, and enunciated +in the most emphatic language--(pp. 17, 18, 22, 23). But he also +produces extracts from the most elaborate of Sir W. Hamilton's +'Dissertations on Reid,' in which a doctrine quite different and +inconsistent is proclaimed--that our knowledge is only partially, not +wholly, relative; that the secondary qualities of matter, indeed, are +known to us only relatively, but that the primary qualities are known to +us as they are in themselves, or as they exist objectively, and that +they may be even evolved by demonstration _a priori_--(pp. 19-26, 30). +The inconsistency between the two doctrines, professed at different +times, and in different works, by Sir W. Hamilton, is certainly +manifest. Mr Mill is of opinion that one of the two must be taken 'in a +non-natural sense,' and that Sir W. Hamilton either did not hold, or had +ceased to hold, the doctrine of the full relativity of knowledge (pp. +20-28)--the hypothesis of a flat contradiction being in his view +inadmissible. But we think it at least equally possible that Sir W. +Hamilton held both the two opinions in their natural sense, and enforced +both of them _at different times_ by argument; his attention never +having been called to the contradiction between them. That such +forgetfulness was quite possible, will appear clearly in many parts of +the present article. His argument in support of both is equally +characterized by that peculiar energy of style which is frequent with +him, and which no way resembles the qualifying refinements of one +struggling to keep clear of a perceived contradiction. + +From hence Mr Mill (chap. iv.) proceeds to criticise at considerable +length what he justly denominates the celebrated and striking review of +Cousin's philosophy, which forms the first paper in Sir W. Hamilton's +'Discussions on Philosophy.' According to Mr Mill-- + + 'The question really at issue is this: Have we or have we + not an immediate intuition of God? The name of God is veiled + under two extremely abstract phrases, "The Infinite and the + Absolute," perhaps from a reverential feeling; such, at + least, is the reason given by Sir W. Hamilton's disciple, Mr + Mansel, for preferring the more vague expressions; but it is + one of the most unquestionable of all logical maxims, that + the meaning of the abstract must be sought for in the + concrete, and not conversely; and we shall see, both in the + case of Sir William Hamilton, and of Mr Mansel, that the + process cannot be reversed with impunity.'--p. 32. + +Upon this we must remark, that though the 'logical maxim' here laid +down by Mr Mill may be generally sound, we think the application of it +inconvenient in the present case. Discussions on points of philosophy +are best conducted without either invoking or offending religious +feeling. M. Cousin maintains that we have a direct intuition of the +Infinite and the Absolute: Sir W. Hamilton denies that we have. Upon +this point Mr Mill sides entirely with Sir W. Hamilton, and considers +'that the latter has rendered good service to philosophy by refuting M. +Cousin,' though much of the reasoning employed in such refutation seems +to Mr Mill unsound. But Sir W. Hamilton goes further, and affirms that +we have no faculties capable of apprehending the Infinite and the +Absolute--that both of them are inconceivable to us, and by consequence +unknowable. Herein Mr Mill is opposed to him, and controverts his +doctrine in an elaborate argument. + +Of this argument, able and ingenious, like all those in the present +volume, our limits only enable us to give a brief appreciation. In so +far as Mr Mill controverts Sir W. Hamilton, we think him perfectly +successful, though there are some points in his reasoning in which we do +not fully concur. + +In our opinion, as in his, the Absolute alone (in its sense as opposed +to relative) can be necessarily unknowable, inconceivable, incogitable. +Nothing which falls under the condition of relativity can be declared to +be so. The structure of our minds renders us capable of knowing +everything which is relative, though there are many such things which we +have no evidence, nor shall ever get evidence, to enable us to know. Now +the Infinite falls within the conditions of relativity, as indeed Sir W. +Hamilton himself admits, when he intimates (p. 58) that though it cannot +be known, it is, must be, and ought to be, _believed_ by us, according +to the marked distinction which he draws between belief and knowledge. +We agree with Mr Mill in the opinion that it is thinkable, conceivable, +knowable. Doubtless we do not conceive it adequately, but we conceive it +sufficiently to discuss and reason upon it intelligibly to ourselves and +others. That we conceive the Infinite inadequately, is not to be held as +proof that we do not conceive it at all; for in regard to finite things +also, we conceive the greater number of them only inadequately. + +We cannot construe to the imagination a polygon with an infinite number +of sides (i.e. with a number of sides greater than any given number), +but neither can we construe to the imagination a polygon with a million +of sides; nevertheless, we understand what is meant by the first +description as well as by the second, and can reason upon both. There +is, indeed, this difference between the two: That the terms used in +describing the first, proclaim at once in their direct meaning that we +should in vain attempt to construe it to the imagination; whereas the +terms used in describing the second do not intimate that fact. We know +the fact only by trial, or by an estimate of our own mental force which +is the result of many past trials. If the difference here noted were all +which Sir W. Hamilton has in view when he declares the Infinite to be +unknowable and incogitable, we should accede to his opinion; but we +apprehend that he means much more, and he certainly requires more to +justify the marked antithesis in which he places himself against M. +Cousin and Hegel. Indeed, the facility with which he declares matters to +be incogitable, which these two and other philosophers not only cogitate +but maintain as truth, is to us truly surprising. The only question +which appears to us important is, whether we can understand and reason +upon the meaning of the terms and propositions addressed to us. If we +can, the subjects propounded must be cogitable and conceivable, whether +we admit the propositions affirmed concerning them or not; if we cannot, +then these subjects are indeed incogitable by ourselves in the present +state of our knowledge, but they may not be so to our opponent who +employs the terms. + +In criticising the arguments of Sir W. Hamilton against M. Cousin, Mr +Mill insists much on a distinction between (1) the Infinite, and (2) the +Infinite in any one or more positive attributes, such as infinite +wisdom, goodness, redness, hardness, &c.[4] He thinks that Sir W. +Hamilton has made out his case against the first, but not against the +last; that the first is really 'an unmeaning and senseless abstraction,' +a fasciculus of negations, unknowable and inconceivable, but not the +last. We think that Mr Mill makes more of this distinction than the +case warrants; that the first is not unmeaning, but an intelligible +abstraction, only a higher reach of abstraction than the last; that it +is knowable inadequately, in the same way as the last--though more +inadequately, because of its higher abstraction. + +As the finite is intelligible, so also is its negation--the Infinite: we +do not say (with M. Cousin) that the two are conjointly given in +consciousness--but the two are understood and partially apprehended by +the mind conjointly and in contrast. Though the Infinite is doubtless +negative as to a degree, it is not wholly or exclusively negative, since +it includes a necessary reference to some positive attribute, to which +the degree belongs; the positive element is not eliminated, but merely +left undetermined. The Infinite (like the Finite, [Greek: to +peperasmhenon--to hapeiron]) is a genus; it comprehends under it the +Infinitely Hard and the Infinitely Soft, the Infinitely Swift and the +Infinitely Slow--the infinite, in short, of any or all positive +attributes. It includes, doubtless, 'a farrago of contradictions;' but +so, also, does the Finite--and so, also, do the actual manifestations of +the real, concrete universe, which manifestations constitute a portion +of the Finite. Whoever attempts to give any philosophical account of the +generation of the universe, tracing its phenomena, as an aggregate, to +some ultra-phenomenal origin, must include in his scheme a _fundamentum_ +for all those opposite and contradictory manifestations which experience +discloses in the universe. There always have been, and still are, many +philosophers who consider the Abstract and General to be prior both in +nature and time to the Concrete and Particular; and who hold further +that these two last are explained, when presented as determinate and +successive manifestations of the two first, which they conceive as +indeterminate and sempiternal. Now the Infinite (Ens Infinitum or Entia +Infinita, according to the point of view in which we look at it) is a +generic word, including all these supposed indeterminate antecedents; +and including therefore, of course, many contradictory agencies. But +this does not make it senseless or unmeaning; nor can we distinguish it +from 'the Infinite in some one or more given attributes,' by any other +character than by greater reach of abstraction. We cannot admit the +marked distinction which Mr Mill contends for--that the one is +unknowable and the other knowable. + +It may be proper to add that the mode of philosophizing which we have +just described is not ours. We do not agree in this way either of +conceiving, or of solving, the problem of philosophy. But it is a mode +so prevalent that Trendelenberg speaks of it, justly enough, as 'the +ancient Hysteron-Proteron of Abstraction.' The doctrine of these +philosophers appears to us unfounded, but we cannot call it unmeaning. + +In another point, also, we differ from Mr Mill respecting that inferior +abstraction which he calls 'the Infinite in some particular attribute.' +He speaks as if this could be known not only as an abstraction, a +conceivable, an ideal--but also as a concrete reality; as if 'we could +know a concrete reality as infinite or as absolute' (p. 45); as if there +really existed in actual nature 'concrete persons or things possessing +infinitely or absolutely certain specific attributes'--(pp. 55--93). To +this doctrine we cannot subscribe. As we understand concrete reality, we +find no evidence to believe that there exist in nature any real concrete +persons or things, possessing to an infinite degree such attributes as +they do possess: _e.g._ any men infinitely wise or infinitely strong, +any horses infinitely swift, any stones infinitely hard. Such concrete +real objects appear to us not admissible, because experience not only +has not certified their existence in any single case, but goes as far to +disprove their existence as it can do to disprove anything. All the real +objects in nature known to us by observation are finite, and possess +only in a finite measure their respective attributes. Upon this is +founded the process of Science, so comprehensively laid out by Mr Mill +in his 'System of Logic '--Induction, Deduction from general facts +attested by Induction, Verification by experience of the results +obtained by Deduction. The attributes, whiteness or hardness, in the +abstract, are doubtless infinite; that is, the term will designate, +alike and equally, any degree of whiteness or hardness which you may +think of, and any unknown degree even whiter and harder than what you +think of. But when perceived as invested in a given mass of snow or +granite before us, they are divested of that indeterminateness, and +become restricted to a determinate measure and degree. + +Having thus indicated the points on which we are compelled to dissent +from Mr Mill's refutation of Sir W. Hamilton in the pleading against M. +Cousin, we shall pass to the seventh chapter, in which occurs his first +controversy with Mr Mansel. This passage has excited more interest, and +will probably be remembered by a larger number of readers, than any +portion of the book. We shall give it in his own words (pp. 99--103), +since the energetic phraseology is quite as remarkable as the thought:-- + + 'There is but one way for Mr Mansel out of this difficulty, + and he adopts it. He must maintain, not merely that an + Absolute Being is unknowable in himself, but that the + Relative attributes of an Absolute Being are unknowable + also.[5] He must say that we do not know what Wisdom, + Justice, Benevolence, Mercy, &c., are, as they exist in God. + Accordingly, he does say so. "It is a fact" (says Mr Mansel) + "which experience forces upon us, and which it is useless, + were it possible, to disguise, that the representation of + God after the model of the highest human morality which we + are capable of conceiving, is not sufficient to account for + all the phenomena exhibited by the course of his natural + Providence. The infliction of physical suffering, the + permission of moral evil, the adversity of the good, the + prosperity of the wicked, the crimes of the guilty involving + the misery of the innocent, the tardy appearance and partial + distribution of moral and religious knowledge in the + world--these are facts, which no doubt are reconcilable, we + know not how, with the Infinite Goodness of God, but which + certainly are not to be explained on the supposition that + its sole and sufficient type is to be found in the finite + goodness of man." + + 'In other words' (continues Mr Mill commenting) 'it is + necessary to suppose that the infinite goodness ascribed to + God is not the goodness which we know and love in our + fellow-creatures, distinguished only as infinite in degree; + but is different in kind, and another quality altogether. + Accordingly Mr Mansel combats as a heresy of his opponents, + the opinion that infinite goodness differs only in degree + from finite goodness.--Here, then, I take my stand upon the + acknowledged principle of logic and of morality; that when + we mean different things we have no right to call them by + the same name, and to apply to them, the same predicates, + moral and intellectual. If, instead of the glad tidings that + there exists a Being in whom all the excellences which the + highest human form can conceive, exist in a degree + inconceivable to us, I am informed that the world is ruled + by a being whose attributes are infinite, but what they are + we cannot learn, except that the highest human morality does + not sanction them--convince me of this and I will hear my + fate as I may. But when I am told that I must believe this, + and at the same time call this being by the names which + express and affirm the highest human morality, I say, in + plain terms, that I will not. Whatever power such a being + may have over me, there is one thing he shall not do; he + shall not compel me to worship him. I will call no being + good who is not what I mean when I apply that epithet to my + fellow-creatures; and if such a being can sentence me to + hell for not so calling him, to hell I will go.' + +This concluding declaration is memorable in many ways. Mr Mill announces +his resolution to determine for himself, and according to his own reason +and conscience, what God he will worship, and what God he will not +worship. For ourselves, we cordially sympathize with his resolution. But +Mr Mill must be aware that this is a point on which society is equally +resolved that no individual shall determine for himself, if they can +help it.[6] Each new-born child finds his religious creed ready +prepared for him. In his earliest days of unconscious infancy, the stamp +of the national, gentile, phratric, God, or Gods, is imprinted upon him +by his elders; and if the future man, in the exercise of his own +independent reason, acquires such convictions as compel him to renounce +those Gods, proclaiming openly that he does so--he must count upon such +treatment as will go far to spoil the value of the present life to him, +even before he passes to those ulterior liabilities which Mr Mill +indicates in the distance. We are not surprised that a declaration so +unusual and so impressive should have been often cited in critical +notices of this volume; that during the month preceding the last +Westminster election, it was studiously brought forward by some +opponents of Mr Mill, and more or less regretted by his friends, as +likely to offend many electors, and damage his chance of success; and +that a conspicuous and noble-minded ecclesiastic, the Dean of +Westminster, thought the occasion so grave as to come forward with his +characteristic generosity, for the purpose of shielding a distinguished +man suspected of heresy. + +The sublime self-assertion, addressed by Prometheus to Zeus, under whose +sentence he was groaning, has never before been put into such plain +English.[7] Mr Mill's declaration reminds us also of Hippolytus, the +chaste and pure youth, whose tragic fate is so beautifully described by +Euripides. Hippolytus is exemplary in his devotions to the Goddess +Artemis; but he dissents from all his countrymen, and determines for +himself, in refusing to bestow the smallest mark of honour or worship +upon Aphrodite, because he considers her to be a very bad Goddess.[8] In +this refusal he persists with inflexible principle (even after having +received, from an anxious attendant, warning of the certain ruin which +it will bring upon him), until the insulted Aphrodite involves him, +along with the unhappy Phaedra and Theseus himself, in one common abyss +of misery. In like manner Mr Mill's declaration stands in marked +contrast with the more cautious proceeding of men like Herodotus. That +historian, alike pious and prudent, is quite aware that all the Gods are +envious and mischief-making, and expressly declares them to be so.[9] +Yet, far from refusing to worship them on that account, he is assiduous +in prayer and sacrifice--perhaps, indeed, all the more assiduous in +consequence of what he believes about their attributes;[10] being +persuaded (like the attendant who warned Hippolytus) that his only +chance of mollifying their ungentle dispositions in regard to himself +is, by honorific tribute in words and offerings. + +When, however, after appreciating as we are bound to do Mr Mill's +declaration of subjective sentiment, we pass to its logical bearing on +the controversy between him and Mr Mansel, we are obliged to confess +that in this point of view it has little objective relevancy. The +problem was, how to reconcile the actual evil and suffering in the +universe (which is recited as a fact by Mr Mansel, though in terms +conveying a most inadequate idea of its real magnitude) with the +goodness of God. Mr Mill repudiates the explanatory hypothesis tendered +by Mr Mansel, as a solution, but without suggesting any better +hypothesis of his own. For ourselves, we are far from endorsing Mr +Mansel's solution as satisfactory; yet we can hardly be surprised if he +considers it less unsatisfactory than no solution at all. And when we +reflect how frequently and familiarly predicates applicable to man are +applied to the Supreme Being, when they cannot possibly be understood +about Him in the same sense--we see no ground for treating the +proceeding as disingenuous, which Mr Mill is disposed to do. Indeed, it +cannot easily be avoided: and Mr Mill himself furnishes us with some +examples in the present volume. At page 491, he says:-- + + 'It would be difficult to find a stronger argument in favour + of Theism, than that the eye must have been made by one who + sees, and the ear by one who hears.' + +In the words here employed, _seeing_ and _hearing_ are predicted of God. + +Now when we predicate of men, that they _see_ or _hear_, we affirm facts +of extreme complexity, especially in the case of _seeing_; facts partly +physical, partly mental, involving multifarious movements and agencies +of nerves, muscles, and other parts of the organism, together with +direct sensational impressions, and mental reconstruction of the past, +inseparably associated therewith; all which, so far as they are known, +are perspicuously enumerated in the work of Professor Bain[11] on the +'Senses and the Intellect,' Again, Mr Mill speaks (in p. 102 and +elsewhere) of 'the veracity of God.' When we say of our neighbour that +he is a veracious man, we ascribe to him a habit of speaking the truth; +that is, of employing his physical apparatus of speech, and his mental +power of recalling and recombining words lodged in the memory, for the +purpose of asserting no other propositions except such as declare facts +which he knows, or beliefs which he really entertains. But how either +_seeing_, or _hearing_, or _veracity_, in these senses, can be +predicated of God, we are at a loss to understand. And if they are to +be predicated of God in a different sense, this admits the same license +as Mr Mansel contends for in respect to Goodness, when he feels that +undeniable facts preclude him from predicating that epithet univocally +respecting God and respecting man.[12] + +On the whole, it seems to us, that though Mr Mill will consent to +worship only a God of perfect goodness, he has thrown no new light on +the grave problem--frankly stated though imperfectly solved, by Mr +Mansel--how such a conception of God is to be reconciled with the extent +of evil and suffering actually pervading human life and animal life +throughout the earth. We are compelled to say, respecting Mr Mill's +treatment of this subject--what we should not say respecting his +treatment of any other--that he has left an old perplexing problem not +less perplexing than he found it. + +Reverting, not unwillingly, from theology to philosophy, we now pass on +to Mr Mill's ninth chapter (p. 128 seq.), of the Interpretation of +Consciousness. There is assuredly no lesson more requiring to be taught +than the proper mode of conducting such interpretation; for the number +of different modes in which Consciousness has been interpreted is +astonishing. Mr Mill begins by citing from Sir W. Hamilton's lectures a +passage of some length, upon which he bestows considerable praise, +regarding it as-- + + 'One of the proofs that, whatever may be the positive value + of his (Sir W. Hamilton's) achievements in metaphysics, he + had a greater capacity for the subject than many + metaphysicians of high reputation; and particularly than + his two distinguished predecessors in the same school of + thought--"Reid and Stewart."'--p. 131. + +This is one of the greatest compliments to Sir W. Hamilton that the book +contains, and as such we are glad to cite it. + +On the subject of Consciousness, Mr Mill has cited from Sir W. Hamilton +other good observations besides the one last alluded to; but, +unfortunately, these are often neutralized by opposite or inconsistent +opinions also cited from other parts of his works. The number of such +inconsistencies produced is indeed one remarkable feature in Sir W. +Hamilton's philosophical character. He seems to follow out energetically +(as Plato in his various dialogues) the vein of thought pervading his +mind at each particular moment, without troubling himself to look back +upon his own prior speculations. Even compared with the best views of +Sir W. Hamilton, however, Mr Mill's mode of handling the subject of +Consciousness exhibits signal improvement. To some of his observations +we shall call particular attention. + +All philosophers agree that what Consciousness testifies is to be +believed; but they differ much on the question--To what points +Consciousness does testify? and even on the still deeper question--How +shall we proceed to ascertain what _are_ these attested points? What is +the proper method of studying or interrogating Consciousness? Upon this +Mr Mill remarks (pp. 145--147):-- + + 'Here emerges the distinction between two different methods + of studying the problems of metaphysics; forming the radical + difference between the two great schools into which + metaphysicians are divided. One of these I shall call for + distinction, the _introspective_ method; the other, the + _psychological_. M. Cousin observes that Locke went wrong + from the beginning, by placing before himself, as the + question to be first resolved, the origin of our ideas. + This (he says) was commencing at the wrong end. The proper + course would have been to begin by determining what the + ideas now are; to ascertain what it is that Consciousness + now tells us; postponing till afterwards the attempt to + frame a theory concerning the origin of any of the mental + phenomena. + + 'I accept the question as M. Cousin states it; and I contend + that no attempt to determine what are the direct revelations + of Consciousness can be successful, or entitled to any + regard, unless preceded by what M. Cousin says ought only to + follow it--an inquiry into the origin of our acquired ideas. + For we have it not in our power to ascertain, by any direct + process, what Consciousness told us at the time when its + revelations were in their pristine purity. It only offers + itself to our inspection, as it exists now, when those + original revelations are overlaid and buried under a + mountainous heap of acquired notions and perceptions. + + 'It seems to M. Cousin, that if we examine with care and + minuteness our present states of Consciousness, + distinguishing and defining every ingredient which we find + to enter into them--every element that we seem to recognize + as real, and cannot "by merely concentrating our attention + upon it analyze into anything simpler--we reach the ultimate + and primary truths, which are the sources of all our + knowledge, and which cannot be denied or doubted without + denying or doubting the evidence of Consciousness + itself--that is, the only evidence that there is for + anything. I maintain this to be a misconception of the + condition imposed on inquirers by the difficulties of + psychological investigation. To begin the inquiry at the + point where M. Cousin takes it up is, in fact, to beg the + question. For he must be aware, if not of the fact, at least + of the belief of his opponents, that the laws of the + mind--the Laws of Association, according to one class of + thinkers, the Categories of the Understanding, according to + another--are capable of creating, out of those data of + Consciousness which are uncontested, purely mental + conceptions, which become so identified in thought with all + our states of Consciousness, that _we seem, and cannot but + seem, to receive them by direct intuition_. For example, the + belief in matter in the opinion of these thinkers is, or at + least may be, thus produced:-- + + '"The proof that any of the alleged Universal Beliefs, or + Principles of Common Sense, are affirmations of + Consciousness--supposes two things: that the beliefs exist, + and that they cannot possibly have been acquired. The first + is, in most cases, undisputed; but the second is a subject + of inquiry which often taxes the utmost resources of + psychologists. Locke was therefore right in believing that + 'the origin of our ideas' is the main stress of the problem + of mental science, and the subject which must be first + considered in forming the theory of the Mind."' + +This citation from Mr Mill's book is already almost too long, yet we +could have wished to prolong it still more, from the importance of some +of the succeeding paragraphs. It presents, in clear discrimination and +contrast, two opposite points of view according to which the phenomena +of mind are regarded by different philosophers, and the method of +studying them determined: the _introspective_ method, adopted by M. +Cousin and others--the _psychological_ or analytical method, pursued by +Locke and by many other eminent men since Locke--'the known and approved +method of physical science, adapted to the necessities of +psychology'--(p. 148). + +There are passages of Sir W. Hamilton's writings in which he appears to +feel that the _introspective_ method alone is insufficient for the +interpretation of Consciousness, and that the analytical method must be +employed to reinforce it. But on this as on other points he is not +always consistent with himself. For in laying down the principle upon +which the primary truths of Consciousness, the original data of +intelligence, are to be ascertained and distinguished from +generalizations out of experience and custom, he declares that the one +single and certain mark is Necessity--they must be beliefs which we are +under the necessity of believing--of which we cannot get rid by any +mental effort. He decides this, of course, for himself, by the +_introspective_ method alone. He (with M. Cousin and other philosophers +who take the same view) does not apply the analytical method to inquire +whether his necessity of belief may not be a purely acquired necessity +and nowise congenital. It is, indeed, remarkable that these philosophers +do not even seek to apply the introspective method as far as that method +will really go. They are satisfied with introspection of their own +present minds; without collecting results of the like process as applied +to other minds, in different times and places. They declare various +beliefs to be necessary to the human mind universally, merely because +such is the actual fact with their own minds and with those immediately +around them; sometimes even in defiance of proof that there are (or have +been) persons not sharing such beliefs, and occasionally even believing +the contrary; therefore, when even the introspective method really +disallows their affirmative instead of sustaining it. This is, in +truth, an abuse of the introspective method; yet even if that method +were employed in its fullest extent--if the same incapability of +believing otherwise could be shown as common to all mankind--it might +still be only the effect of a strong association. The analytical method +must still be called in to ascertain whether we are forced to suppose +such incapability to be an original fact of consciousness, or whether it +may not have been generated in the mind by circumstances under the +natural working of the laws of association. It is certain that these +laws not only may, but must, give birth to artificial inconceivabilities +in the mind--and that some of these may be equal in strength to such, if +any, as are natural. + + 'The History of Science' (says Mr Mill, following out the + same train of reasoning which we read in the third Book of + his 'System of Logic') 'teems with inconceivabilities which + have been conquered; and with supposed necessary truths, + which have first ceased to be thought necessary, then to be + thought true, and have finally come to be deemed + impossible.'--p. 150. + +After various observations, chiefly exhibiting the rashness of many +censures bestowed by Sir W. Hamilton on Brown, Mr Mill gives us three +valuable chapters (xi., xii., xiii.), wherein he analyzes the belief in +an External World, the Belief in Mind as a separate substance or +Noumenon, and the Primary Qualities of Matter. To each of these topics +he applies what he calls the _psychological_ method, as contrasted with +the simply _introspective_ method of Sir W. Hamilton (the Ego and +Non-Ego affirmed to be given together in the primary deliverance of +Consciousness) and so many other philosophers. He proves that these +beliefs are no way intuitive, but acquired products; and that the known +laws of Association are sufficient to explain how they are acquired; +especially the Law of Inseparable Association, together with that of +_Obliviscence_--a very useful, discriminating phrase, which we first +find employed in this volume--(p. 259 et passim). He defines Matter to +be a _permanent possibility of Sensation_; he maintains that this is +really all which (apart from philosophical theories) mankind in general +mean by it; he shows that mere possibilities of sensation not only may, +but must, according to the known Laws of Association, come to present +'to our artificialized Consciousness' a character of objectivity--(pp. +198, 199). The correlative subject, though present in fact and +indispensable, is eliminated out of conscious notice, according to the +Law of Obliviscence. + +These chapters will well repay the most careful perusal. We can only +find room for one passage (pp. 214, 215):-- + + 'Throughout the whole of our sensitive life, except its + first beginnings, we unquestionably refer our sensations to + a _me_ and _not-me_. As soon as I have formed, on the one + hand, the notion of Permanent Possibilities of Sensation, + and on the other, of that continued series of feelings which + I call my life--both these notions are, by an irresistible + association, recalled by every sensation I have. They + represent two things, with both of which the sensation of + the moment, be it what it may, stands in relation; and I + cannot be conscious of the sensation without being conscious + of it as related to these two things. They have accordingly + received relative names, expressive of the double relation + in question. The thread of consciousness which I apprehend + the relation as a part of, is called the _Subject_; the + group of Permanent Possibilities of Sensation to which I + refer it, and which is partially realized and actualized in + it, is called the _Object_ of the sensation. The sensation + itself ought to have a correlative name, or rather ought to + have two such names--one denoting the sensation as opposed + to its Subject, the other denoting it as opposed to its + Object; but it is a remarkable fact that this necessity has + not been felt, and that the need of a correlative name to + every relative one has been considered to be satisfied by + the terms Object and Subject themselves. It is true that + these two are related to one another, but only through the + sensation. We have no conception of either Subject or + Object, either Mind or Matter, except as something to which + we refer our sensations, and whatever other feelings we are + conscious of. _The very existence of them both, so far as + cognizable by us, consists only in the relation they + respectively bear to our states of feeling._ Their relation + to each other is only the relation between those two + relations. The immediate correlatives are, not the pair, + _Object, Subject,_ but the two pairs, Object, _Sensation + objectively considered_--Subject, _Sensation subjectively + considered_. The reason why this is overlooked might easily + be shown, and would furnish a good illustration of that + important part of the Laws of Association, which may be + termed the Laws of Obliviscence.' + +This chapter, on the Primary Qualities of Matter, controverts the +opinion of Sir W. Hamilton, that extension, as consisting of +co-existent _partes extra partes_, is immediately and necessarily +apprehended by our consciousness. It cites, as well as confirms, the +copious proof given by Professor Bain (in his work on the Senses and the +Intellect) that our conception of extension is derived from our muscular +sensibility: that our sensation of _muscular motion impeded_ constitutes +that of filled space: that our conception of extension, as an aggregate +of co-existent parts, arises from the sense of sight, which comprehends +a great number of parts in a succession so rapid as to be confounded +with simultaneity--and which not only becomes the symbol of muscular and +tactile succession, but even acquires such ascendancy as to supersede +both of them in our consciousness. Confirmation is here given to this +important doctrine, not merely by observations from Mr Mill himself, but +also from the very curious narrative, discovered and produced by Sir W. +Hamilton, out of a work of the German philosopher, Platner. Platner +instituted a careful examination of a man born blind, and ascertained +that this man did not conceive extension as an aggregate of simultaneous +parts, but as a series of sensations experienced or to be experienced in +succession--(pp. 232, 233). The case reported from Platner both +corroborates the theory of Professor Bain, and receives its proper +interpretation from that theory; while it is altogether adverse to the +doctrine of Sir W. Hamilton--as is also another case, which he cites +from Maine de Biran:-- + + 'It gives a very favourable idea of Sir W. Hamilton's + sincerity and devotion to truth (remarks Mr Mill, p. 247), + that he should have drawn from obscurity, and made generally + known, two cases so unfavourable to his own opinions.' + +We think this remark perfectly just; and we would point out besides, in +appreciating Sir W. Hamilton's merits, that his appetite for facts was +useful to philosophy, as well as his appetite for speculation. But the +person whose usefulness to philosophy we prefer to bring into the +foreground, is Platner himself. He spent three weeks in patient +examination of this blind man, and the tenor of his report proves that +his sagacity in interpreting facts was equal to his patience in +collecting them. The rarity of all such careful and premeditated +observation of the facts of mind, appears to us one main reason why +(what Mr Mill calls) the _psychological_ theory finds so little +acceptance; and why those who maintain that what now seems a mental +integer was once a multiplicity of separate mental fragments, can +describe the antecedent steps of the change only as a _latens +processus_, which the reader never fully understands, and often will not +admit. Every man's mind is gradually built up from infancy to maturity; +the process is always going on before our eyes, yet the stages of +it--especially the earliest stages, the most pregnant with +instruction--are never studied and put on record by observers trained in +inductive logic, knowing beforehand what they ought to look for as the +_sine qua non_ for proving or disproving any proposed theory. Such cases +as that cited by Platner--cases of one marked congenital defect of +sense, enabling us to apply the Method of Difference--are always within +reach; but few Platners are found to scrutinize and record them. +Historians of science describe to us the laborious and multiplied +observations, and the elaborate precaution for ensuring accuracy of +observation, which recent chemical and physical inquirers have found +indispensable for the establishment of their results. We cannot, +therefore, be surprised that mental philosophers, dealing with facts +even more obscure, and careless about enlarging, varying, +authenticating their records of particular facts, should have had +little success in establishing any results at all. + +But if even those, who adopt the psychological theory, have been remiss +in the observation of particular mental facts,--those who deny the +theory have been far more than remiss; they have been blind to obvious +facts contradicting the principles which they lay down. Mr Mill, in +chap, xiv., deals with this denial, common to Mr Mansel with Sir W. +Hamilton. That philosophers so eminent as both of them should declare +confidently--'what I cannot but think must be _a priori_, or original to +thought; it cannot be engendered by experience upon custom' (p. +264)--appears to us as extraordinary as it does to Mr Mill. Though no +one ever surpassed Sir W. Hamilton in large acquaintance with the actual +diversities of human belief, and human incapacities of believing--yet he +never seems to have thought of bringing this acquaintance into account, +when he assured the students in his lecture-room, that custom, +experience, indissoluble association, were altogether insufficient to +engender a felt necessity of believing. Such forgetfulness of well-known +mental facts cannot be reproached to the advocates of the psychological +theory. + +In chap. xv. Mr Mill examines Sir W. Hamilton's doctrine on unconscious +mental modifications. He points out the confused manner in which Sir W. +Hamilton has conceived _mental latency_, as well as the inconclusive +character of the reasoning whereby he refutes the following doctrine of +Dugald Stewart--That in the most rapid trains of association, each +separate item must have been successively present to consciousness, +though for a time too short to leave any memory. Sir W. Hamilton thinks +that the separate items may pass, and often do pass, unconsciously; +which opinion Mr Mill also, though not approving his reasons, is +inclined to adopt. + + 'I am myself inclined (p. 285) to admit unconscious mental + modifications, in the only sense in which I can attach any + very distinct meaning to them--namely, unconscious + modifications of the nerves. It may well be believed that + the apparently suppressed links in a chain of association, + those which Sir W. Hamilton considers as latent, really are + so: that they are not even momentarily felt, the chain of + causation being continued only physically--by one organic + state of the nerves succeeding another so rapidly, that the + state of mental consciousness appropriate to each is not + produced.' + +Mr Mill gives various illustrations in support of this doctrine. He at +the same time calls attention to a valuable lecture of Sir W. +Hamilton's, the thirty-second lecture on Metaphysics; especially to the +instructive citation from Cardaillac contained therein, noting the +important fact, which descriptions of the Law of Association often keep +out of sight--that the suggestive agency of Association is carried on, +not by single antecedents raising up single consequents, but by a mass +of antecedents raising up simultaneously a mass of consequents, among +which attention is very unequally distributed. + +We shall say little upon Mr Mill's remarks on Sir W. Hamilton's Theory +of Causation--(chap. xvi.). This theory appears to Mr Mill absurd; while +the theory of Mr Mill (continued from Hume, Brown, and James Mill) on +the same subject, appears to Sir W. Hamilton insufficient and +unsatisfactory--'professing to explain the phenomenon of causality, but, +previously to explanation, evacuating the phenomenon of all that +desiderates explanation'--(p. 295). For ourselves we embrace the theory +of Mr Mill:[13] yet we are aware that the remark just cited from Sir W. +Hamilton represents the dissatisfaction entertained towards it by many +objectors. The unscientific and antiscientific yearnings, prevalent +among mankind, lead them to put questions which no sound theory of +Causation will answer; and they are ready to visit and trust any oracle +which professes to deliver a confident affirmative solution of such +questions. Among all the terms employed by metaphysicians, none is used +in a greater variety of meanings than the term Cause. + +In Mr Mill's next chapter (xvi.) he comments on Sir W. Hamilton's +doctrine of Concepts or General Notions. There are portions of this +chapter with which we agree less than with most other parts of the +volume; especially with his marked hostility to the term _Concept_, and +the reasons given for it, which reasons appear to us not very consistent +with what he has himself said in the 'System of Logic,' Book IV. chap. +ii. Sec. 1--3. The term _Concept_ has no necessary connection with the +theory called Conceptualism. It is equally available to designate the +idea called up by a general name, as understood either by Mr Bailey or +by James Mill. We think it useful as an equivalent to the German word +_Begriff_, which sense Sir W. Hamilton has in view when he introduces +it, though he does not always adhere to his profession. And when Mr Mill +says (p. 331)-- + + 'I consider it nothing less than a misfortune, that the + words Concept, General Notion, or any other phrase to + express the supposed mental modification corresponding to a + general name, should ever have been invented.' + +we dissent from his opinion. To talk of 'the Concept of an individual,' +however, as Mr Mansel does (pp. 338, 339), is improper and inconsistent +with the purpose for which the name is given. + +We are more fully in harmony with Mr Mill in his two next chapters +(xviii. et seq.) on Judgment and Reasoning; which are among the best +chapters in this volume. He there combats and overthrows the theory of +Reasoning laid down by Sir W. Hamilton; but we doubt the propriety of +his calling this 'the Conceptualist theory' (pp. 367, 368); since it has +nothing to do with Conceptualism, in the special sense of antithesis to +Realism and Nominalism,--but is, in fact, the theory of the Syllogism as +given in the Analytics of Aristotle, and generally admitted since. Not +merely Conceptualists, but (to use Mr Mill's own language, p. 366) +'nearly all the writers on logic, taught a theory of the science too +small and narrow to contain their own facts.' Such, indeed, was the +theory constantly taught until the publication of Mr Mill's 'System of +Logic;' the first two books of which corrected it, by arguments which +are reinforced and amplified in these two chapters on Judgment and +Reasoning, as well as in the two chapters next following--chaps, xx. and +xxi.--('Is Logic the Science of the Forms of Thought--On the +Fundamental Laws of Thought.') The contrast which is there presented, in +many different ways, between the limited theory of logic taught by Sir +W. Hamilton and Mr Mansel, and the enlarged theory of Mr Mill, is +instructive in a high degree. We consider Mr Mill as the real preserver +of all that is valuable in Formal Logic, from the unfortunate +consequences of an erroneous estimate, brought upon it through the +exaggerated pretensions of logicians. When Sir W. Hamilton contrasts it +pointedly with physical science (of which he talks with a sort of +supercilious condescension, in one of the worst passages of his +writings, p. 401)--when all its apparent fruits were produced in the +shape of ingenious but barren verbal technicalities--what hope could be +entertained that Formal Logic could hold its ground in the estimation of +the recent generation of scientific men? Mr Mill has divested it of that +assumed demonstrative authority which Bacon called 'regere res per +syllogismum;' but he has at the same time given to it a firm root amidst +the generalities of objective science. He has shown that in the great +problem of Evidence or Proof, the Laws of Formal Logic, though bearing +only on one part of the entire procedure, yet bear upon one essential +part, proper to be studied separately: and that the maintenance of +consistency between our affirmations (which is the only special province +of Formal Logic), has great importance and value as a part of the +process necessary for ascertaining and vindicating their truth, or +exposing their character when false or uncertified--but no importance or +value except as a part of that larger exigency. + +While Mr Mill was amending the Syllogistic theory so as to ensure for +Formal Logic its legitimate place among the essentials of scientific +procedure, Sir W. Hamilton was at the same time enlarging it on its +technical side, in two modes which are highly esteemed both by himself +and by others: 1. The recognition of two kinds of Syllogisms; one in +Extension, the other in Comprehension: 2. The doctrine of the +Quantification of the Predicate.--Both these novelties are here +criticised by Mr Mill in chapter xxii., which we recommend the reader to +peruse conjointly with Lectures 15 and 16 of Sir W. Hamilton on Logic. + +Now whereas the main objection, by which the study of the syllogistic +logic has been weighed down and discredited in modern times, is this, +that it encumbers the memory with formal distinctions, having no useful +application to the real process and purposes of reasoning--the procedure +of Sir W. Hamilton might almost lead us to imagine that he himself was +trying to aggravate that objection to the uttermost. He introduces a +variety of new canons (classifying Syllogisms as Extensive and +Intensive, by a distinction founded on the double quantity of notions, +in Extension and in Comprehension) which he intimates that all former +logicians have neglected--while it plainly appears, even on his own +showing, that the difference between syllogisms, in respect to these two +sorts of quantity, is of no practical value; and that 'we can always +change a categorical syllogism of the one quantity into a categorical +syllogism of the other, by reversing the order of the two premises, and +by reversing the meaning of the copula' (Lect. xvi. p. 296); nay, that +every syllogism is already a syllogism in both quantities (Mill, p. +431). Against these useless ceremonial reforms of Sir W. Hamilton, we +may set the truly philosophical explanation here given by Mr Mill of the +meaning of propositions. + + 'All judgments' (he says--p. 423), 'except where both the + terms are proper names, are really judgments in + Comprehension; though it is customary, and the natural + tendency of the mind, to express most of them in terms of + Extension. In other words, we never really predicate + anything but attributes; though, in the usage of language, + we commonly predicate them by means of words which are names + of concrete objects--because' (p. 426)--'we have no other + convenient and compact mode of speaking. Most attributes, + and nearly all large bundles of attributes, have no names of + their own. We can only name them by a circumlocution. We are + accustomed to speak of attributes, not by names given to + themselves, but by means of the names which they give to the + objects they are attributes of.' 'All our ordinary + judgments' (p. 428) 'are in Comprehension only; Extension + not being thought of. But we may, if we please, make the + Extension of our general terms an express object of thought. + When I judge that all oxen ruminate, I have nothing in my + thoughts but the attributes and their co-existence. But when + by reflection I perceive what the proposition implies, I + remark that other things may ruminate besides oxen, and that + the unknown multitude of things which ruminate form a mass, + with which the unknown multitude of things having the + attributes of oxen is either identical or is wholly + comprised in it. Which of these two is the truth I may not + know, and if I did, took no notice of it when I assented to + the proposition, all oxen ruminate; but I perceive, on + consideration, that one or other of them must be true. + Though I had not this in my mind when I affirmed that all + oxen ruminate, I can have it now; I can make the concrete + objects denoted by each of the two names an object of + thought, as a collective though indefinite aggregate; in + other words, I can make the Extension of the names (or + notions) an object of direct consciousness. When I do this, + I perceive that this operation introduces no new fact, but + is only a different mode of contemplating the very fact + which I had previously expressed by the words, all oxen + ruminate. The fact is the same, but the mode of + contemplating it is different. There is thus in all + Propositions a judgment concerning attributes (called by Sir + W. Hamilton a Judgment in Comprehension) which we make as a + matter of course; and a possible judgment in or concerning + Extension, which we _may_ make, and which will be true if + the former is true.' + +From the lucid explanation here cited (and from a following paragraph +too long to describe p. 433), we see that there is no real distinction +between Judgments in Comprehension and Judgments in Extension; that the +_appearance_ of distinction between them arises from the customary mode +of enunciation, which custom is here accounted for; that the addition to +the theory of the Syllogism, for which Sir W. Hamilton takes credit, is +alike troublesome and unprofitable. + +The like may also be said about his other innovation, the Quantification +of the Predicate. Still more extensive are the changes (as stated by +himself) which this innovation would introduce in the canons of +Syllogism. Indeed, when we read his language (Appendix to 'Lectures on +Logic,' pp. 291--297) censuring generally the prior logicians from +Aristotle downwards, and contending that 'more than half the value of +logic had been lost' by their manner of handling it--we may appreciate +the magnitude of the reform which he believed himself to be introducing. +The larger the reform, the more it behoved him to be sure of the ground +on which he was proceeding. But on this point we remark a serious +deficiency. After laying down, with appropriate emphasis, the valuable +logical postulate, _to state explicitly what is thought implicitly_, on +which, Sir W. Hamilton says, + + 'Logic ever insists, but which logicians have never fairly + obeyed--it follows that logically we ought to take into + account the quantity, _always understood in thought_, but + usually, and for manifest reasons, elided in expression, not + only of the _subject_, but also of the _predicate_, of a + judgment.'--('Discussions on Philos.,' p. 614.) + +Here Sir W. Hamilton assumes that the quantity of the predicate is +always understood in thought; and the same assumption is often repeated, +in the Appendix to his 'Lectures on Logic,' p. 291 and elsewhere, as if +it was alike obvious and incontestable. Now it is precisely on this +point that issue is here taken with Sir W. Hamilton. Mr Mill denies +altogether (p. 437) that the quantity of the predicate is always +understood or present in thought, and appeals to every reader's +consciousness for an answer:-- + + 'Does he, when he judges that all oxen ruminate, advert even + in the minutest degree to the question, whether there is + anything else that ruminates? Is this consideration at all + in his thoughts, any more than any other consideration + foreign to the immediate subject? One person may know that + there are other ruminating animals, another may think that + there are none, a third may be without any opinion on the + subject; but if they all know what is meant by ruminating, + they all, when they judge that every ox ruminates, mean + precisely the same thing. The mental process they go + through, _as far as that one judgment is concerned_, is + precisely identical; though some of them may go on farther, + and _add other judgments_ to it.' + +The last sentence cited from Mr Mill indicates the vice of Sir W. +Hamilton's proceeding in quantifying the predicate, and explains why it +was that logicians before him declined to do so. Sir W. Hamilton, in +this proceeding, insists on stating explicitly, not merely all that is +thought implicitly, but a great deal more;[14] adding to it something +else, which _may_, indeed, be thought conjointly, but which more +frequently _is not_ thought at all. He requires us to pack two distinct +judgments into one and the same proposition: he interpolates the meaning +of the Propositio Conversa _simpliciter_ into the form of the Propositio +Convertenda (when an universal Affirmative), and then claims it as a +great advantage, that the proposition thus interpolated admits of being +converted _simpliciter_, and not merely _per accidens_. Mr Mill is, +nevertheless, of opinion (pp. 439-443) that though 'the quantified +syllogism is not a true expression of what is in thought, yet writing +the predicate with a quantification may be sometimes a real help to the +Art of Logic.' We see little advantage in providing a new complicated +form, for the purpose of expressing in one proposition what naturally +throws itself into two, and may easily be expressed in two. If a man is +prepared to give us information on one Quaesitum, why should he be +constrained to use a mode of speech which forces on his attention at the +same time a second and distinct Quaesitum--so that he must either give +us information about the two at once, or confess himself ignorant +respecting the second? + +The two next chapters of Mr Mill, noticing some other minor +peculiarities (all of them unfortunate, and one, p. 447, really +unaccountable) of Sir W. Hamilton's Formal Logic; and some Fallacious +Modes of Thought countenanced by Sir W. Hamilton (chs. xxiii., +xxiv.--pp. 446, 478), we are compelled to pass over. We must find space, +however, for a few words on the Freedom of the Will (ch. xxv.), which +(in Mr Mill's language, pp. 488--549), 'was so fundamental with Sir W. +Hamilton, that it may be regarded as the central idea of his system--the +determining cause of most of his philosophical opinions.' Prior to Sir +W. Hamilton, we find some writers who maintain the doctrine of +Free-will, others who maintain that of Necessity: each supporting their +respective conclusions by reasons which they deem sufficient. Sir W. +Hamilton declares that both the one doctrine and the other are +inconceivable and incomprehensible; yet that, by the law of Excluded +Middle, one or other of them must be true: and he decides in favour of +Free-will, of which he believes himself to be distinctly conscious; +moreover, Free-will is essential (he thinks) to moral responsibility, of +which also he feels himself conscious. He confesses himself, however, +unable to explain the possibility of Free-will; but he maintains that +the same may be said about Necessity also. 'The champions of both the +two opposite doctrines are at once resistless in attack, and impotent in +defence'--(Hamilton's 'Footnotes on Reid,' p. 602.) Mr Mansel also +asserts, even more confidently than Sir W. Hamilton, that we are +directly conscious of Free-will--(p. 503). + +Sir W. Hamilton has himself given some of the best arguments against the +doctrine of Free-will, in refutation of Reid: arguments, some of which +are here cited by Mr Mill with praise which they well deserve--(pp. 497, +498). But Mr Mill's own reasoning on the same side is of a still higher +order, enlarging the grounds previously urged in the last book of his +'System of Logic,' He protests against the term _Necessity_; and +discards the idea of Necessity, if it be understood to imply anything +more than invariability of antecedence and consequence. If it mean +_that_, experience proves thus much about antecedents in the world of +mind, as in the world of matter: if it mean more, experience does not +prove more, either in the world of matter or in the world of mind: nor +have we any grounds for affirming it in either--(p. 501.) If it were +true, therefore, that consciousness attested Free-will, we should find +the testimony of consciousness opposed to a full proof from experience +and induction. But does consciousness really attest what is called +Free-will? Mr Mill analyzes the case, and declares in the negative. + + 'To be conscious of Free-will, must mean to be conscious, + before I have decided, that I am able to decide either way; + exception may be taken _in limine_ to the use of the word + _consciousness_ in such an application. Consciousness tells + me what I do or feel. But what I am _able_ to do, is not a + subject of consciousness. Consciousness is not prophetic; we + are conscious of what is, not of what will or can be. We + never know that we are able to do a thing, except from + having done it, or something similar to it. Having acted, we + know, as far as that experience reaches, how we are able to + act; _and this knowledge, when it has become familiar, is + often confounded with, and called by, the name of + consciousness._ But it does not derive any increase of + authority from being misnamed: its truth is not supreme + over, but depends upon, experience. If our so-called + consciousness is not borne out by experience, it is a + delusion. It has no title to credence, but as an + interpretation of experience; and if it is a false + interpretation, it must give way.'--pp. 503, 504 + +After this salutary and much-needed warning against the confusion +between consciousness as an infallible authority, and belief upon +experience, of which we are conscious as a belief--Mr Mill proceeds to +sift the alleged self-evident connection between Free-will and +Accountability. He shows, not merely that there is no connection, but +that there is a positive repugnance, between the two. By Free-will is +meant that a volition is not determined by motives, but is a spontaneous +mental fact, neither having a cause, nor admitting of being predicted. +Now, the very reason for giving notice that we intend to punish certain +acts, and for inflicting punishment if the acts be committed, is, that +we trust in the efficacy of the threat and the punishment as deterring +motives. If the volition of agents be not influenced by motives, the +whole machinery of law becomes unavailing, and punishment a purposeless +infliction of pain. In fact, it is on that very ground that the madman +is exempted from punishment; his volition being presumed to be not +capable of being acted upon by the deterring motive of legal sanction. +The _free_ agent, thus understood, is one who can neither feel himself +accountable, nor be rendered accountable, to or by others. It is only +the _necessary_ agent (the person whose volitions are determined by +motives, and, in case of conflict, by the strongest desire or the +strongest apprehension) that can be held really accountable, or can +feel himself to be so. + + 'The true doctrine of the Causation of human actions (says + Mr Mill, p. 516) maintains, in opposition both to pure and + to modified Fatalism, that not only our conduct, but our + character, is in part amenable to our will: that we can, by + employing the proper means, improve our character: and that + if our character is such that, while it remains what it is, + it necessitates us to do wrong--it will be just to apply + motives which will necessitate us to strive for its + improvement. We shall not indeed do so unless we desire our + improvement, and desire it more than we dislike the means + which must he employed for the purpose.' + +It thus appears that of the two propositions, 1, volitions are +necessary, or depend on causes; 2, volitions are free, or do not depend +on causes--neither the one nor the other is inconceivable or +incomprehensible, as Sir W. Hamilton supposed them to be. That the first +is true, and the second false, we learn by experience, and by that +alone; just as we learn the like in regard to the phenomena of the +material world. Indeed, the fact that human volitions are both +predictable and modifiable, quite as much as all those physical +phenomena that depend upon a complication of causes--which is only a +corollary from what has just been said--is so universally recognized and +acted upon by all men, that there would probably be little difference of +opinion about this question, if the antithesis were not obscured and +mystified by the familiar, but equivocal, phrases of Free-will and +Necessity. + +Passing over chapter xxvii., in which Mr Mill refutes Sir W. Hamilton's +opinion that the study of mathematics is worthless, or nearly so, as an +intellectual discipline--we shall now call attention to the concluding +remarks which sum up the results of the volume. After saying that he +'differs from almost everything in Sir W. Hamilton's philosophy, on +which he particularly valued himself, or which is specially his own,' +Mr Mill describes Sir W. Hamilton's general merits as follows:-- + + 'They chiefly consist in his clear and distinct mode of + bringing before the reader many of the fundamental questions + of metaphysics: some good specimens of psychological + analysis on a small scale: and the many detached logical and + psychological truths which he has separately seized, and + which are scattered through his writings, mostly applied to + resolve some special difficulty, and again lost sight of. I + can hardly point to anything he has done towards helping the + more thorough understanding of the greater mental phenomena, + unless it be his theory of Attention (including + Abstraction), which seems to me the most perfect we have; + but the subject, though a highly important, is comparatively + a simple one.'--p. 547. + +Agreeing in this general view of Sir W. Hamilton's merits, we should be +disposed to describe them in language stronger and more emphatic as to +degree, than that which has just been cited. But what is stated in the +pages immediately following (pp. 550, 551)--That Sir W. Hamilton's +doctrines appear to be usually taken up under the stimulus of some +special dispute, and often afterwards forgotten; That he did not think +out subjects until they were thoroughly mastered, or until consistency +was attained between the different views which the author took from +different points of observation; That accordingly, his philosophy seems +made up of scraps from several conflicting metaphysical systems--All +this is literally and amply borne out by the many inconsistencies and +contradictions which Mr Mill has brought to view in the preceding +chapters. It would appear that the controversial disposition was +powerful with Sir W. Hamilton, and that a present impulse of that sort +(as has been said respecting Bayle, Burke, and others) not only served +to provoke new intellectual combinations in his mind, but also +exercised a Lethaean influence in causing obliviscence of the old. But we +can hardly follow Mr Mill in ascribing the defect to 'excessive +absorption of time and energy by the study of old writers' (p. 551). If +this study did no other good, it at least kept the memory in exercise. +Now, what surprises us most in Sir W. Hamilton's inconsistencies, is the +amount of self-forgetfulness which they imply. + +While the laborious erudition of Sir W. Hamilton cannot be fairly +regarded as having produced any of his intellectual defects, it +undoubtedly stamped upon him his special title of excellence as a +philosopher. This is fully recognized by Mr Mill; though he treats it as +belonging not so much to a philosopher as to an historian of philosophy. +He concludes (pp. 552--554):-- + + 'It is much to be regretted that Sir W. Hamilton did not + write the history of philosophy, instead of choosing, as + the direct object of his intellectual exertions, philosophy + itself. He possessed a knowledge of the materials such as no + one, probably for many generations, will take the trouble of + acquiring again. Independently of the great interest and + value attaching to a knowledge of the historical development + of speculation, there is much in the old writers on + philosophy, even those of the middle ages, really worth + preserving for its scientific value. But this should be + extracted, and rendered into the phraseology of modern + thought, by persons as familiar with that as with the + ancient, and possessing a command of its language: a + combination never yet so perfectly realized as in Sir W. + Hamilton. This, which no one but himself could have done, he + has left undone, and has given us, instead, a contribution + to mental philosophy, which has been more than equalled by + many not superior to him in powers, and wholly destitute of + erudition. Of all persons in modern times entitled to the + name of philosophers, the two, probably, whose reading on + the subject was the scantiest, in proportion to their + intellectual capacity, were Archbishop Whately and Dr Brown. + Accordingly they are the only two of whom Sir W. Hamilton, + though acknowledging their abilities, speaks with some + tinge of superciliousness. It cannot be denied that both Dr + Brown and Whately would have thought and written better than + they did, if they had been better read in the writings of + previous thinkers; but I am not afraid that posterity will + contradict me when I say, that either of them has done far + greater service to the world in the origination and + diffusion of important thought, than Sir W. Hamilton with + all his learning; because, though indolent readers, they + were both of them active and fertile thinkers. + + 'It is not that Sir W. Hamilton's erudition is not + frequently of real use to him on particular questions of + philosophy. It does him one valuable service: it enables him + to know all the various opinions which can be held on the + questions he discusses, and to conceive and express them + clearly, leaving none of them out. This it does, though even + this not always; but it does little else, even of what might + be expected from erudition when enlightened by philosophy. + He knew, with extraordinary accuracy, the [Greek: hoti] of + each philosopher's opinions, but gave himself little trouble + about the [Greek: dihoti]. With one exception, I find no + remark bearing upon that point in any part of his writings. + I imagine he would have been much at a loss if he had been + required to draw up a philosophical estimate of the mind of + any great thinker. He never seems to look at any opinion of + a philosopher in connection with the same philosopher's + other opinions. Accordingly he is weak as to the mutual + relations of philosophical doctrines. One of the most + striking examples of this inability is in the case of + Leibnitz,' &c. + +Here we find in a few sentences the conclusion which Mr Mill conceives +to be established by his book. We shall state how far we are able to +concur with it. He has brought the matter to a direct issue, by weighing +Sir W. Hamilton in the balance against two other actual cotemporaries; +instead of comparing him with some unrealized ideal found only in the +fancy of critics and reviewers. + +Comparing Sir W. Hamilton with Dr Brown, we cordially subscribe to the +opinion of Mr Mill. We think that Dr Brown has 'done far greater +service to the world than Sir W. Hamilton, in the origination and +diffusion of important thought.' To speak only of two chief subjects in +the field of important thought--Causality and the Freedom of the +Will--we not only adopt the conclusions of Dr Brown, but we admire both +his acuteness and his originality in vindicating and illustrating the +first of the two, while we dissent entirely from the views of Sir W. +Hamilton. This alone would be sufficient to make us approve the +superiority assigned by Mr Mill to Dr Brown. We discover no compensating +item to be placed to the credit of Sir W. Hamilton: for the great +doctrine of the Relativity of Knowledge, which is our chief point of +philosophical brotherhood with him, was maintained by Brown also. + +But in regard to Dr Whately, our judgment is altogether different. We +cannot consent to admit him as a superior, or even as an equal, to Sir +W. Hamilton, 'in the origination and diffusion of important thought.' He +did much service by reviving an inclination and respect for Logic, and +by clearing up a part of the technical obscurity which surrounded it: +but we look upon him as an acute and liberal-minded English theologian, +enlarging usefully, though timidly, the intellectual prison in which +many orthodox minds are confined--rather than as a fit aspirant to the +cosmopolitan honours of philosophy. 'An active and fertile thinker,' Mr +Mill calls Whately; and such he undoubtedly was. But such also we +consider Sir W. Hamilton to have been in a degree, at least equal. If +the sentence which we have quoted above be intended to deny the +predicate, 'active and fertile thinker,' of Sir W. Hamilton, we cannot +acquiesce in it. His intellect appears to us thoroughly active and +fertile, even when we dissent from his reasonings--nay, even in the +midst of his inconsistencies, when a new growth of opinions is +unexpectedly pushed up on ground which we supposed to be already +pre-occupied by another both older and different. And we find this same +judgment implied in the discriminating remarks upon his philosophical +procedure made by Mr Mill himself--(pp. 271, 272). For example, +respecting Causality and the Freedom of the Will, we detect no want of +activity and fertility, though marked evidence of other +defects--especially the unconditional surrender of a powerful mind to +certain privileged inspirations, worshipped as 'necessities of thought.' + +While thus declaring how far we concur in the parallel here drawn of Sir +W. Hamilton with Brown and Whately, we must at the same time add that +the comparison is taken under circumstances unduly favourable to these +two last. There has been no exposure of _their_ errors and +inconsistencies, equal in penetration and completeness to the crushing +volume which Mr Mill has devoted to Sir W. Hamilton. To make the odds +fair, he ought to furnish a similar systematic examination to Brown and +Whately; enabling us to read their works (as we now do those of Sir W. +Hamilton) with the advantage of his unrivalled microscope, which detects +the minutest breach or incoherence in the tissue of reasoning--and of +his large command of philosophical premisses, which brings into full +notice what the author had overlooked. Thus alone could the competition +between the three be rendered perfectly fair. + +We regret, as Mr Mill does, that Sir W. Hamilton did not undertake the +composition of a history of philosophy. Nevertheless we must confess +that we should hardly feel such regret, if we could see evidence to +warrant Mr Mill's judgment (p. 554) that Sir W. Hamilton was +'indifferent to the [Greek: dihoti] of a man's opinions, and that he was +incompetent to draw up an estimate of the opinions of any great +thinker,' &c. Such incompetence, if proved to be frequent and +considerable, would deprive an author of all chance of success in +writing a history of philosophy. But the study of Sir William Hamilton's +works does not prove it to us, though Mr Mill has convicted him of an +erroneous estimate of Leibnitz. We say _frequent_ and _considerable_, +because no historian of philosophy is exempt from the defect more or +less; or rather (to pass out of the self-confidence of the Absolute into +the modesty of the Relative) we seldom find any historian whose estimate +of great philosophical thinkers does not often differ from our own. +Hence we are glad when ample original extracts are produced, enabling us +to test the historian, and judge for ourselves--a practice which Sir W. +Hamilton would have required no stimulus to enforce upon him. There +ought, indeed, to be various histories of philosophy, composed from +different points of view; for the ablest historian cannot get clear of +a certain exclusiveness belonging to himself. But, so far as we can +conjecture what Sir W. Hamilton _would_ or _could_ have done, we think +that a history of philosophy composed by him would have surpassed any +work of the kind in our language. + +We trust that Sir W. Hamilton's works will long continue to be read, +along with Mr Mill's examination of them; and we should be glad if the +works of other philosophers could be read along with a comment of equal +acuteness and impartiality. Any point of view which could command the +adherence of such a mind as Sir W. Hamilton's, deserves to be fully +considered. Moreover, the living force of philosophy, as directress of +human intelligence, depends upon keeping up in each of her devotees a +full mastery of many divergent and opposite veins of reasoning--a +knowledge, negative and affirmative, of the full case of opponents as +well as of his own. + +It is to Philosophy alone that _our_ allegiance is sworn; and while we +concur mostly with Mr Mill's opinions, we number both him and Sir W. +Hamilton as a noble pair of brethren, serving alike in her train. + +_Amicus Hamilton; magis amicus Mill; amica ante omnes Philosophia._ +FOOTNOTES: + +[Footnote 1: Mr Mansel and Mr Veitch, the editors of Sir W. Hamilton's +Lectures on Metaphysics, posthumously published, say in their preface +(p. xiii.)-- + +'For twenty years--from 1836 to 1856--the courses of logic and +metaphysics were the means through which Sir William Hamilton sought to +discipline and imbue with his philosophical opinions the numerous youth +who gathered from Scotland and other countries to his classroom; and +while, by these prelections, the author supplemented, developed, and +moulded the national philosophy, leaving thereon the ineffaceable +impress of his genius and learning, he, at the same time and by the same +means, exercised over the intellects and feelings of his pupils an +influence which, for depth, feeling, and elevation, was certainly never +surpassed by that of any philosophical instructor. Among his pupils +there are not a few who, having lived for a season under the +constraining power of his intellect, and been led to reflect on those +great questions regarding the character, origin, and bounds of human +knowledge, which his teaching stirred and quickened, bear the memory of +their beloved and revered instructor inseparably blended with what is +highest in their present intellectual life, as well as in their +practical aims and aspirations.'] + +[Footnote 2: We are happy to find such high authorities as Dr Whewell, +Mr Samuel Bailey, and Sir John Herschel concurring in this estimation of +the new logical point of view thus opened by Mr Mill. We will not call +it a _discovery_, since Sir John Herschel thinks the expression +unsuitable.--See the recent sixth edition of the 'System of Logic,' vol. +i. p. 229.] + +[Footnote 3: See Sir William. Hamilton's 'Lectures on Logic' (Lect. +xvii. p. 320, 321; also Appendix to those Lectures, p. 361). He here +distinguishes also formal induction from, material induction, which +latter he brings under the grasp of syllogism, by an hypothesis in +substance similar to that of Whately. There is, however, in Lecture xix. +(p. 380), a passage in a very different spirit, which one might almost +imagine to have been written by Mr Mill: 'In regard to simple +syllogisms, it was an original dogma of the Platonic school, and an +early dogma of the Peripatetic, that science, strictly so called, was +only conversant with, and was exclusively contained in, universals; and +the doctrine of Aristotle, which taught that all our general knowledge +is only an induction from an observation of particulars, was too easily +forgotten or perverted by his followers. It thus obtained almost the +force of an acknowledged principle that everything to be known must be +known under some general form or notion. Hence the exaggerated +importance attributed to definition and deduction; it not being +considered that we only take out of a general notion what we had +previously placed therein, and that the amplification of our knowledge +is not to be sought for from above but from below--not from speculation +about abstract generalities, but from the observation of concrete +particulars. Bat however erroneous and irrational, the persuasion had +its day and influence, and it perhaps determined, as one of its effects, +the total neglect of one half, and that not the least important half of +the reasoning process.' + +These very just observations are suggested to Sir William Hamilton by a +train of thought which has little natural tendency to suggest them, +viz., by the distinction upon which he so much insists, between the +logic of comprehension and the logic of extension, and by his anxiety to +explain why the former had been exclusively cultivated and the latter +neglected. + +That which Sir William Hamilton calls here truly the doctrine of +Aristotle (enunciated especially at the close of the Analyt. Post.), and +which he states to have been forgotten by Aristotle's followers, was not +always remembered by Aristotle himself.] + +[Footnote 4: The distinction is given by Stier and other logicians. 1. +Infinitum simpliciter. 2. Infinitum secundum quid, sive in certo +genere.] + +[Footnote 5: This doctrine has been affirmed (so far as reason is +concerned, apart from revelation) not merely by Mr Mansel, but also by +Pascal, one of the most religious philosophers of the seventeenth +century, in the 'Pensees':-- + +'Parlons selon les lumieres naturelles. S'il y a un Dieu, il est +infiniment incomprehensible; puisque, n'ayant ni principes ni bornes, il +n'a nul rapport a nous; nous sommes done incapables de connaitre ni ce +qn'il est, ni s'il est.'--(See Arago, Biographie de Condorcet, p. +lxxxiv., prefixed to his edition of Condorcet's works.)] + +[Footnote 6: The indictment under which Socrates was condemned at +Athens, as reported by Xenophon at the commencement of the Memorabilia, +ran thus--'Socrates is guilty of crime, inasmuch as he does not believe +in those Gods in whom the City believes, but introduces other novelties +in regard to the Gods; he is guilty also, inasmuch as he corrupts the +youth.' + +These words express clearly a sentiment entertained not merely by the +Athenian people, but generally by other societies also. They all agree +in antipathy to free, individual, dissenting reason; though that +antipathy manifests itself by acts, more harsh in one place, less harsh +in another. The Hindoo who declares himself a convert to Christianity, +becomes at the same time an outcast ([Greek: _aphrhetor, athhemistos, +anhestios_]) among those whose Gods he has deserted. As a general fact, +the man who dissents from his fellows upon fundamentals of religion, +purchases an undisturbed life only by being content with that +'semi-liberty under silence and concealment,' for which Cicero was +thankful under the dictatorship of Julius Caesar. 'Obsecro--abiiciamus +ista et semi-liberi saltern, simus; quod assequemur _et tacendo et +latendo'_ (Epist. ad Attic, xiii. 31). Contrast with this the memorable +declaration of Socrates, in the Platonic Apology, that silence and +abstinence from cross-examination were intolerable to him; that life +would not be worth having under such conditions.] + +[Footnote 7: Aeschyl. Prometh., 996-1006-- + + pros tauta, rhipthestho men aithaloussa phlox, + leykoptherps de niphadi kai bronthemasin + chthonhiois kykhato phanta kahi tarassheto + gnhampsei gar ouden tondhe m'---- + eiseltheto se mhepot, hos ego, Dios + gnhomen phobetheis, thelhynoys genhesomai, + kai liparheso ton mhega stygohymenon + gynaikomhimois hyptihysmasin cherhon, + lyshai me dhesmon tonde toy pantos oheo. + +Also v. 1047, et seq. The memorable ode of Goethe, entitled +_Prometheus_, embodies a similar vein of sentiment in the finest +poetry.] + +[Footnote 8: Euripid Hippol., 10-- + + (Aph) oh gar me thaeseos pais, 'Amazonos tokos + monos politon taesde gaes Troizaenias + legei kakistaen daimonon pephukenai + Phoibou d' adelphaen Artemin,-- + tima, megiotaen daimonon aegoumenos-- + + (Hipp.) taen saen dhe Khyprin pholl' hego Chairein lhego-- + (112.) + +See also v. 1328--1402.] + +[Footnote 9: Herodot. t. 32. O Kroise, epistumenon me to theion pan eohn +phthonerohn te kai taraxodes, epeirotas ahnthropaeion pragmhaton pheri; +also iii. 40] + +[Footnote 10: See Eurip. Hipp., 6-96-149. The language of the attendant, +after his affectionate remonstrance to Hippolytus had been disregarded, +supplicating Aphrodite to pardon the recalcitrancy of that virtuous but +obstinate youth, is characteristic and touching (114-120.)] + +[Footnote 11: See especially his chapter ii. on the Sensations of Sight, +pp. 222, 241--247, in the second edition of this work.] + +[Footnote 12: Descartes says, in his 'Principia Philosophiae,' i 51--'Et +quidem substantia quae nulla plane re indigeat, unica tantum potest +intelligi--nempe Deus. Alias vero omnes, non nisi ope concursus Dei +existere posse perspicimus. Atque ideo nomen substantiae non convenit Deo +et illis _univoce_, ut dici solet in scholis, hoc est, nulla ejus +nominis significatio potest distincte intelligi, quae Deo et creaturis +sit communis.'] + +[Footnote 13: At the same time, we cannot go along with Mr Mill in the +following affirmation (p. 201):-- + +'This natural probability is converted into certainty when we take into +consideration that universal law of our experience which is termed the +Law of Causation, and which makes us _unable to conceive the beginning +of anything without_ an antecedent condition, _or cause.'_ Such +'inability to conceive' appears to us not in correspondence with facts. +First, it cannot be properly either affirmed or denied, until agreement +is obtained what the word _cause_ means. If three persons, A, B, and C, +agree in affirming it--A adopting the meaning of Aristotle, B that of +Sir William Hamilton, and C that of Mr Mill--the agreement is purely +verbal; or rather, all three concur in having a mental exigency pressing +for satisfaction, but differ as to the hypothesis which satisfies it. + +Next, if we reason upon Mr Mill's theory as to Cause, certainly those +who deny his theory can have no difficulty in conceiving events without +any cause (in that sense): nor have those who adopt this theory any +greater difficulty. These latter _believe_ that there are, throughout, +constant and uniform conditions on which the occurrence of every event +depends; but they can perfectly _conceive_ events as occurring without +any such uniform sequence. In truth, the belief in such causation, as +pervading _all nature_, is an acquired result of scientific training. +The greater part of mankind believe that some events occur in regular, +others in irregular succession. Moreover, a full half of the +metaphysical world espouse the doctrine of free-will, and consider that +all volitions occur without any cause at all.] + +[Footnote 14: Among the various authorities (upon this question of +quantifying the predicate) collected by Sir W. Hamilton in the valuable +Appendix to his 'Lectures on Logic,' we find one (p. 311) which takes +the same ground of objection as Mr Mill, in these words:--'The cause why +the quantitative note is not usually joined with the predicate, is, that +there would thus be two _quaesita_ at once; to wit, whether the predicate +were affirmed of the subject, and whether it were denied of everything +beside. For when we say, _all man is all rational_, we judge that _all +man is rational_, and judge likewise _that rational is denied of +everything but man_. But these are, in reality, two different _quaesita_; +and therefore it has become usual to state them, not in one, but in two +several propositions. And this is self-evident, seeing that a +_quaesitum_, in itself, asks only--_Does or does not this inhere in +that?_ and _not_ Does or does not this inhere in that, _and at the same +time inhere in nothing else?_' + +The author of this just and sagacious remark--much surpassing what the +other writers quoted in the Appendix say--was a Jew who died at +Perpignan in or near 1370, named Levi Ben Gerson or Gersonides. An +interesting account of this man, eminent as a writer and thinker in his +age, will be found in a biography by Dr Joel, published at Breslau in +1862, 'Levi Ben Gerson als Religions--philosoph.' He distinguished +himself as a writer on theology, philosophy, and astronomy; he was one +of the successors to the free speculative vein of Maimonides, and one of +the continuators of the Arabic Aristotelian philosophy. He both +commented on and combated the doctrines of Averroes. Dr Joel thinks that +he died earlier than 1370.] + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Review of the Work of Mr John Stuart +Mill Entitled, 'Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy.', by George Grote + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK REVIEW OF MR JOHN STUART MILL *** + +***** This file should be named 12002.txt or 12002.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + https://www.gutenberg.org/1/2/0/0/12002/ + +Produced by The Online Distributed Proofreading Team. + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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