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diff --git a/10827-0.txt b/10827-0.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e1e4a50 --- /dev/null +++ b/10827-0.txt @@ -0,0 +1,13709 @@ +*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 10827 *** + +Discourses on the First Decade of Titus Livius + +by Niccolo Machiavelli + +CITIZEN AND SECRETARY OF FLORENCE + +TRANSLATED FROM THE ITALIAN BY + +NINIAN HILL THOMSON, M.A. + + +LONDON KEGAN PAUL, TRENCH & CO., 1, PATERNOSTER SQUARE 1883 + + +TO PROFESSOR PASQUALE VILLARI. + +DEAR PROFESSOR VILLARI, + + +Permit me to inscribe your name on a translation of Machiavelli’s +Discourses which I had your encouragement to undertake, and in which I +have done my best to preserve something of the flavour of the original. +Yours faithfully, + +NINIAN HILL THOMSON. + + +FLORENCE, May 17, 1883. + +BOOK I. + +PREFACE + +CHAPTER + + +I. Of the beginnings of Cities in general, and in particular of that of +Rome + +II. Of the various kinds of Government; and to which of them the Roman +Commonwealth belonged + +III. Of the accidents which led in Rome to the creation of Tribunes of +the People, whereby the Republic was made more perfect + +IV. That the dissensions between the Senate and Commons of Rome made +Rome free and powerful + +V. Whether the guardianship of public freedom is safer in the hands of +the Commons or of the Nobles; and whether those who seek to acquire +power, or they who seek to maintain it, are the greater cause of +commotions + +VI. Whether it was possible in Rome to contrive such a Government as +would have composed the differences between the Commons and the Senate + +VII. That to preserve liberty in a State, there must exist the right to +accuse + +VIII. That calumny is as hurtful in a Commonwealth as the power to +accuse is useful + +IX. That to give new institutions to a Commonwealth, or to reconstruct +old institutions on an entirely new basis, must be the work of one Man + +X. That in proportion as the founder of a Kingdom or Commonwealth +merits praise, he who founds a Tyranny deserves blame + +XI. Of the Religion of the Romans + +XII. That it is of much moment to make account of Religion; and that +Italy, through the Roman Church, being wanting therein, has been ruined + +XIII. Of the use the Romans made of Religion in giving institutions to +their City; in carrying out their enterprises; and in quelling tumults + +XIV. That the Romans interpreted the auspices to meet the occasion; and +made a prudent show of observing the rites of Religion even when forced +to disregard them; and any who rashly slighted Religion they punished + +XV. How the Samnites, as a last resource in their broken fortunes, had +recourse to Religion + +XVI. That a People accustomed to live under a Prince, if by any +accident it become free, can hardly preserve that freedom + +XVII. That a corrupt People obtaining freedom can hardly preserve it + +XVIII. How a free Government existing in a corrupt City may be +preserved, or not existing may be created + +XIX. After a strong Prince a weak Prince may maintain himself: but +after one weak Prince no Kingdom can stand a second + +XX. That the consecutive reigns of two valiant Princes produce great +results: and that well-ordered Commonwealths are assured of a +succession of valiant Rulers by whom their power and growth are rapidly +extended + +XXI. That it is a great reproach to a Prince or to a Commonwealth to be +without a National Army + +XXII. What is to be noted in the combat of the three Roman Horatii and +the three Alban Curiatii + +XXIII. That we should never hazard our whole fortunes, where we put not +forth our entire strength; for which reason to guard a defile is often +hurtful + +XXIV. That well-ordered States always provide rewards and punishments +for their Citizens; and never set off deserts against misdeeds + +XXV. That he who would reform the institutions of a free State, must +retain at least the semblance of old ways + +XXVI. That a new Prince in a city or province of which he has taken +possession, ought to make everything new + +XXVII. That Men seldom know how to be wholly good or wholly bad + +XXVIII. Whence it came that the Romans were less ungrateful to their +citizens than were the Athenians + +XXIX. Whether a People or a Prince is the more ungrateful + +XXX. How Princes and Commonwealths may avoid the vice of ingratitude; +and how a Captain or Citizen may escape being undone by it + +XXXI. That the Roman Captains were never punished with extreme severity +for misconduct; and where loss resulted to the Republic merely through +their ignorance or want of judgment, were not punished at all + +XXXII. That a Prince or Commonwealth should not defer benefits until +they are forced to yield them + +XXXIII. When a mischief has grown up in, or against a State, it is +safer to temporize with it than to meet it with violence + +XXXIV. That the authority of the Dictator did good and not harm to the +Roman Republic; and that it is, not those powers which are given by the +free suffrages of the People, but those which ambitious Citizens usurp +for themselves that are pernicious to a State + +XXXV. Why the creation of the Decemvirate in Rome, although brought +about by the free and open suffrage of the Citizens, was hurtful to the +liberties of that Republic + +XXXVI. That Citizens who have held the higher offices of a Commonwealth +should not disdain the lower + +XXXVII. Of the mischief bred in Rome by the Agrarian Law: and how it is +a great source of disorder in a Commonwealth to pass a law opposed to +ancient usage with stringent retrospective effect + +XXXVIII. That weak Republics are irresolute and undecided; and that the +course they may take depends more on Necessity than Choice + +XXXIX. That often the same accidents are seen to befall different +Nations + +XL. Of the creation of the Decemvirate in Rome, and what therein is to +be noted. Wherein among other matters it is shown how the same causes +may lead to the safety or to the ruin of a Commonwealth + +XLI. That it is unwise to pass at a bound from leniency to severity, or +to a haughty bearing from a humble + +XLII. How easily men become corrupted + +XLIII. That men fighting in their own cause make good and resolute +Soldiers + +XLIV. That the Multitude is helpless without a head: and that we should +not with the same breath threaten and ask leave + +XLV. That it is of evil example, especially in the maker of a law, not +to observe the law when made: and that daily to renew acts of severity +in a City is most hurtful to the Governor + +XLVI. That men climb from one step of ambition to another, seeking at +first to escape injury, and then to injure others + +XLVII. That though men deceive themselves in generalities, in +particulars they judge truly + +XLVIII. He who would not have an office bestowed on some worthless or +wicked person, should contrive that it be solicited by one who is +utterly worthless and wicked, or else by one who is in the highest +degree noble and good + +XLIX. That if Cities which, like Rome, had their beginning in freedom, +have had difficulty in framing such laws as would preserve their +freedom, Cities which at the first have been in subjection will find +this almost impossible + +L. That neither any Council nor any Magistrate should have power to +bring the Government of a City to a stay + +LI. What a Prince or Republic does of necessity, should seem to be done +by choice + +LII. That to check the arrogance of a Citizen who is growing too +powerful in a State, there is no safer method, nor less open to +objection, than to forestall him in those ways whereby he seeks to +advance himself + +LIII. That the People, deceived by a false show of advantage, often +desire what would be their ruin; and that large hopes and brave +promises easily move them + +LIV. Of the boundless authority which a great man may use to restrain +an excited Multitude + +LV. That the Government is easily carried on in a City wherein the body +of the People is not corrupted: and that a Princedom is impossible +where equality prevails, and a Republic where it does not + +LVI. That when great calamities are about to befall a City or Country, +signs are seen to presage, and seers arise who foretell them + +LVII. That the People are strong collectively, but individually weak + +LVIII. That a People is wiser and more constant than a Prince + +LIX. To what Leagues or Alliances we may most trust, whether those we +make with Commonwealths or those we make with Princes + +LX. That the Consulship and all the other Magistracies in Rome were +given without respect to Age + +BOOK II. + +PREFACE + + +I. Whether the Empire acquired by the Romans was more due to Valour or +to Fortune + +II. With what Nations the Romans had to contend, and how stubborn these +were in defending their Freedom + +III. That Rome became great by destroying the Cities which lay round +about her, and by readily admitting Strangers to the rights of +Citizenship + +IV. That Commonwealths have followed three methods for extending their +power + +V. That changes in Sects and Tongues, and the happening of Floods and +Pestilences, obliterate the memory of the past + +VI. Of the methods followed by the Romans in making War + +VII. Of the quantity of land assigned by the Romans to each colonist + +VIII. Why certain Nations leave their ancestral seats and overflow the +Countries of others + +IX. Of the Causes which commonly give rise to wars between States + +X. That contrary to the vulgar opinion, Money is not the sinews of War + +XI. That it were unwise to ally yourself with a Prince who has +reputation rather than strength + +XII. Whether when Invasion is imminent it is better to anticipate or to +await it + +XIII. That Men rise from humble to high fortunes rather by Fraud than +by Force + +XIV. That Men often err in thinking they can subdue Pride by Humility + +XV. That weak States are always dubious in their resolves; and that +tardy resolves are always hurtful + +XVI. That the Soldiers of our days depart widely from the methods of +ancient Warfare + +XVII. What importance the Armies of the present day should allow to +Artillery; and whether the commonly received opinion concerning it be +just + +XVIII. That the authority of the Romans and the example of ancient +warfare should make us hold Foot Soldiers of more account than Horse + +XIX. That conquests made by ill governed States and such as follow not +the valiant methods of the Romans, lend rather to their ruin than to +their aggrandizement + +XX. Of the dangers incurred by Princes or Republics who resort to +Auxiliary or Mercenary Arms + +XXI. That Capua was the first City to which the Romans sent a Prætor; +nor there, until four hundred years after they began to make war + +XXII. That in matters of moment Men often judge amiss + +XXIII. That in chastising their Subjects when circumstances required it +the Romans always avoided half measures + +XXIV. That, commonly, Fortresses do much more harm than good + +XXV. That he who attacks a City divided against itself, must not think +to get possession of it through its divisions + +XXVI. That Taunts and Abuse breed hatred against him who uses them, +without yielding him any advantage + +XXVII. That prudent Princes and Republics should be content to have +obtained a victory; for, commonly, when they are not, their victory +turns to defeat + +XXVIII. That to neglect the redress of Grievances, whether public or +private, is dangerous for a Prince or Commonwealth + +XXIX. That Fortune obscures the minds of Men when she would not have +them hinder her designs + +XXX. That really powerful Princes and Commonwealths do not buy +Friendships with money, but with their valour and the fame of their +prowess + +XXXI. Of the danger of trusting banished men + +XXXII. In how many ways the Romans gained possession of Towns + +XXXIII. That the Romans entrusted the Captains of their Armies with the +fullest Powers + +BOOK III. + + +I. For a Sect or Commonwealth to last long, it must often be brought +back to its beginnings + +II. That on occasion it is wise to feign folly + +III. That to preserve a newly acquired freedom we must slay the Sons of +Brutus + +IV. That an Usurper is never safe in his Princedom while those live +whom he has deprived of it + +V. How an Hereditary King may come to lose his Kingdom + +VI. Of Conspiracies + +VII. Why it is that changes from Freedom to Servitude, and from +Servitude to Freedom, are sometimes made without bloodshed, but at +other times reek with blood + +VIII. That he who would effect changes in a Commonwealth, must give +heed to its character and condition + +IX. That to enjoy constant good fortune we must change with the times + +X. That a Captain cannot escape battle when his Enemy forces it on him +at all hazards + +XI. That one who has to contend with many, though he be weaker than +they, will prevail if he can withstand their first onset + +XII. A prudent Captain will do what he can to make it necessary for his +own Soldiers to fight, and to relieve his Enemy from that necessity + +XIII. Whether we may trust more to a valiant Captain with a weak Army, +or to a valiant Army with a weak Captain + +XIV. Of the effect produced in Battle by strange and unexpected Sights +or Sounds + +XV. That one and not many should head an Army; and why it is +disadvantageous to have more leaders than one + +XVI. That in times of difficulty true Worth is sought after whereas in +quiet times it is not the most deserving but those who are recommended +by wealth or connection who are most in favour + +XVII. That we are not to offend a Man, and then send him to fill an +important Office or Command + +XVIII. That it is the highest quality of a Captain to be able to +forestall the designs of his adversary + +XIX. Whether indulgence or severity be more necessary for controlling a +Multitude + +XX. How one humane act availed more with the men of Falerii than all +the might of the Roman Arms + +XXI. How it happened that Hannibal pursuing a course contrary to that +taken by Scipio, wrought the same results in Italy which the other +achieved in Spain + +XXII. That the severity of Manlius Torquatus and the gentleness of +Valerius Corvinus won for both the same Glory + +XXIII. Why Camillus was banished from Rome + +XXIV. That prolonged Commands brought Rome to Servitude + +XXV. Of the Poverty of Cincinnatus and of many other Roman Citizens + +XXVI. How women are a cause of the ruin of States + +XXVII. How a divided City may be reunited; and how it is a false +opinion that to hold Cities in subjection they must be kept divided + +XXVIII. That a Republic must keep an eye on what its Citizens are +about; since often the seeds of a Tyranny lie hidden under a semblance +of generous deeds + +XXIX. That the faults of a People are due to its Prince + +XXX. That a Citizen who seeks by his personal influence to render +signal service to his Country, must first stand clear of Envy. How a +City should prepare for its defence on the approach of an Enemy + +XXXI That strong Republics and valiant Men preserve through every +change the same spirit and bearing + +XXXII. Of the methods which some have used to make Peace impossible + +XXXIII. That to insure victory in battle, you must inspire your +soldiers with confidence in one another and in you + +XXXIV. By what reports, rumours, or surmises the Citizens of a Republic +are led to favour a fellow-citizen: and whether the Magistracies are +bestowed with better judgment by a People or by a Prince + +XXXV. Of the danger incurred in being the first to recommend new +measures; and that the more unusual the measures, the greater the +danger + +XXXVI. Why it has been and still may be affirmed of the Gauls, that at +the beginning of a fray they are more than Men, but afterwards less +than Women + +XXXVII. Whether a general engagement should be preceded by skirmishes; +and how, avoiding these, we may get knowledge of a new Enemy + +XXXVIII. Of the Qualities of a Captain in whom his Soldiers can confide + +XXXIX. That a Captain should have good knowledge of Places + +XL. That Fraud is fair in War + +XLI. That our Country is to be defended by Honour or by Dishonour, and +in either way is well defended + +XLII. That Promises made on compulsion are not to be observed + +XLIII. That Men born in the same Province retain through all times +nearly the same character + +XLIV. That where ordinary methods fail, Hardihood and Daring often +succeed + +XLV. Whether in battle it is better to await and repel the enemy’s +attack, or to anticipate it by an impetuous onset + +XLVI. How the Characteristics of Families come to be perpetuated + +XLVII. That love of his Country should lead a good Citizen to forget +private wrongs + +XLVIII. That on finding an Enemy make what seems a grave blunder we +should suspect some fraud to lurk behind + +XLIX. That a Commonwealth to preserve its Freedom has constant need of +new Ordinances. Of the services in respect of which Quintius Fabius +received the surname of Maximus + + +NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI + +TO + +ZANOBI BUONDELMONTI AND COSIMO RUCELLAI + +HEALTH. + + +I send you a gift, which if it answers ill the obligations I owe you, +is at any rate the greatest which Niccolò Machiavelli has it in his +power to offer. For in it I have expressed whatever I have learned, or +have observed for myself during a long experience and constant study of +human affairs. And since neither you nor any other can expect more at +my hands, you cannot complain if I have not given you more. + +You may indeed lament the poverty of my wit, since what I have to say +is but poorly said; and tax the weakness of my judgment, which on many +points may have erred in its conclusions. But granting all this, I know +not which of us is less beholden to the other: I to you, who have +forced me to write what of myself I never should have written; or you +to me, who have written what can give you no content. + +Take this, however, in the spirit in which all that comes from a friend +should be taken, in respect whereof we always look more to the +intention of the giver than to the quality of the gift. And, believe +me, that in one thing only I find satisfaction, namely, in knowing that +while in many matters I may have made mistakes, at least I have not +been mistaken in choosing you before all others as the persons to whom +I dedicate these Discourses; both because I seem to myself, in doing +so, to have shown a little gratitude for kindness received, and at the +same time to have departed from the hackneyed custom which leads many +authors to inscribe their works to some Prince, and blinded by hopes of +favour or reward, to praise him as possessed of every virtue; whereas +with more reason they might reproach him as contaminated with every +shameful vice. + +To avoid which error I have chosen, not those who are but those who +from their infinite merits deserve to be Princes; not such persons as +have it in their power to load me with honours, wealth, and preferment, +but such as though they lack the power, have all the will to do so. For +men, if they would judge justly, should esteem those who are, and not +those whose means enable them to be generous; and in like manner those +who know how to govern kingdoms, rather than those who possess the +government without such knowledge. For Historians award higher praise +to Hiero of Syracuse when in a private station than to Perseus the +Macedonian when a King affirming that while the former lacked nothing +that a Prince should have save the name, the latter had nothing of the +King but the kingdom. + +Make the most, therefore, of this good or this evil, as you may esteem +it, which you have brought upon yourselves; and should you persist in +the mistake of thinking my opinions worthy your attention, I shall not +fail to proceed with the rest of the History in the manner promised in +my Preface. _Farewell_. + + + + +DISCOURSES + +ON THE FIRST DECADE OF + +TITUS LIVIUS. + + + + +BOOK I. + + +PREFACE. + + +Albeit the jealous temper of mankind, ever more disposed to censure +than to praise the work of others, has constantly made the pursuit of +new methods and systems no less perilous than the search after unknown +lands and seas; nevertheless, prompted by that desire which nature has +implanted in me, fearlessly to undertake whatsoever I think offers a +common benefit to all, I enter on a path which, being hitherto +untrodden by any, though it involve me in trouble and fatigue, may yet +win me thanks from those who judge my efforts in a friendly spirit. And +although my feeble discernment, my slender experience of current +affairs, and imperfect knowledge of ancient events, render these +efforts of mine defective and of no great utility, they may at least +open the way to some other, who, with better parts and sounder +reasoning and judgment, shall carry out my design; whereby, if I gain +no credit, at all events I ought to incur no blame. + +When I see antiquity held in such reverence, that to omit other +instances, the mere fragment of some ancient statue is often bought at +a great price, in order that the purchaser may keep it by him to adorn +his house, or to have it copied by those who take delight in this art; +and how these, again, strive with all their skill to imitate it in +their various works; and when, on the other hand, I find those noble +labours which history shows to have been wrought on behalf of the +monarchies and republics of old times, by kings, captains, citizens, +lawgivers, and others who have toiled for the good of their country, +rather admired than followed, nay, so absolutely renounced by every one +that not a trace of that antique worth is now left among us, I cannot +but at once marvel and grieve; at this inconsistency; and all the more +because I perceive that, in civil disputes between citizens, and in the +bodily disorders into which men fall, recourse is always had to the +decisions and remedies, pronounced or prescribed by the ancients. + +For the civil law is no more than the opinions delivered by the ancient +jurisconsults, which, being reduced to a system, teach the +jurisconsults of our own times how to determine; while the healing art +is simply the recorded experience of the old physicians, on which our +modern physicians found their practice. And yet, in giving laws to a +commonwealth, in maintaining States and governing kingdoms, in +organizing armies and conducting wars, in dealing with subject nations, +and in extending a State’s dominions, we find no prince, no republic, +no captain, and no citizen who resorts to the example of the ancients. + +This I persuade myself is due, not so much to the feebleness to which +the present methods of education have brought the world, or to the +injury which a pervading apathy has wrought in many provinces and +cities of Christendom, as to the want of a right intelligence of +History, which renders men incapable in reading it to extract its true +meaning or to relish its flavour. Whence it happens that by far the +greater number of those who read History, take pleasure in following +the variety of incidents which it presents, without a thought to +imitate them; judging such imitation to be not only difficult but +impossible; as though the heavens, the sun, the elements, and man +himself were no longer the same as they formerly were as regards +motion, order, and power. + +Desiring to rescue men from this error, I have thought fit to note down +with respect to all those books of Titus Livius which have escaped the +malignity of Time, whatever seems to me essential to a right +understanding of ancient and modern affairs; so that any who shall read +these remarks of mine, may reap from them that profit for the sake of +which a knowledge of History is to be sought. And although the task be +arduous, still, with the help of those at whose instance I assumed the +burthen, I hope to carry it forward so far, that another shall have no +long way to go to bring it to its destination. + + + + +CHAPTER I.—_Of the Beginnings of Cities in general, and in particular +of that of Rome._ + + +No one who reads how the city of Rome had its beginning, who were its +founders, and what its ordinances and laws, will marvel that so much +excellence was maintained in it through many ages, or that it grew +afterwards to be so great an Empire. + +And, first, as touching its origin, I say, that all cities have been +founded either by the people of the country in which they stand, or by +strangers. Cities have their origins in the former of these two ways +when the inhabitants of a country find that they cannot live securely +if they live dispersed in many and small societies, each of them +unable, whether from its situation or its slender numbers, to stand +alone against the attacks of its enemies; on whose approach there is no +time left to unite for defence without abandoning many strongholds, and +thus becoming an easy prey to the invader. To escape which dangers, +whether of their own motion or at the instance of some of greater +authority among them, they restrict themselves to dwell together in +certain places, which they think will be more convenient to live in and +easier to defend. + +Among many cities taking their origin in this way were Athens and +Venice; the former of which, for reasons like those just now mentioned, +was built by a scattered population under the direction of Theseus. To +escape the wars which, on the decay of the Roman Empire daily renewed +in Italy by the arrival of fresh hordes of Barbarians, numerous +refugees, sheltering in certain little islands in a corner of the +Adriatic Sea, gave beginning to Venice; where, without any recognized +leader to direct them, they agreed to live together under such laws as +they thought best suited to maintain them. And by reason of the +prolonged tranquility which their position secured, they being +protected by the narrow sea and by the circumstance that the tribes who +then harassed Italy had no ships wherewith to molest them, they were +able from very small beginnings to attain to that greatness they now +enjoy. + +In the second case, namely of a city being founded by strangers, the +settlers are either wholly independent, or they are controlled by +others, as where colonies are sent forth either by a prince or by a +republic, to relieve their countries of an excessive population, or to +defend newly acquired territories which it is sought to secure at small +cost. Of this sort many cities were settled by the Romans, and in all +parts of their dominions. It may also happen that such cities are +founded by a prince merely to add to his renown, without any intention +on his part to dwell there, as Alexandria was built by Alexander the +Great. Cities like these, not having had their beginning in freedom, +seldom make such progress as to rank among the chief towns of kingdoms. + +The city of Florence belongs to that class of towns which has not been +independent from the first; for whether we ascribe its origin to the +soldiers of Sylla, or, as some have conjectured, to the mountaineers of +Fiesole (who, emboldened by the long peace which prevailed throughout +the world during the reign of Octavianus, came down to occupy the plain +on the banks of the Arno), in either case, it was founded under the +auspices of Rome nor could, at first, make other progress than was +permitted by the grace of the sovereign State. + +The origin of cities may be said to be independent when a people, +either by themselves or under some prince, are constrained by famine, +pestilence, or war to leave their native land and seek a new +habitation. Settlers of this sort either establish themselves in cities +which they find ready to their hand in the countries of which they take +possession, as did Moses; or they build new ones, as did Æneas. It is +in this last case that the merits of a founder and the good fortune of +the city founded are best seen; and this good fortune will be more or +less remarkable according to the greater or less capacity of him who +gives the city its beginning. + +The capacity of a founder is known in two ways: by his choice of a +site, or by the laws which he frames. And since men act either of +necessity or from choice, and merit may seem greater where choice is +more restricted, we have to consider whether it may not be well to +choose a sterile district as the site of a new city, in order that the +inhabitants, being constrained to industry, and less corrupted by ease, +may live in closer union, finding less cause for division in the +poverty of their land; as was the case in Ragusa, and in many other +cities built in similar situations. Such a choice were certainly the +wisest and the most advantageous, could men be content to enjoy what is +their own without seeking to lord it over others. But since to be safe +they must be strong, they are compelled avoid these barren districts, +and to plant themselves in more fertile regions; where, the +fruitfulness of the soil enabling them to increase and multiply, they +may defend themselves against any who attack them, and overthrow any +who would withstand their power. + +And as for that languor which the situation might breed, care must be +had that hardships which the site does not enforce, shall be enforced +by the laws; and that the example of those wise nations be imitated, +who, inhabiting most fruitful and delightful countries, and such as +were likely to rear a listless and effeminate race, unfit for all manly +exercises, in order to obviate the mischief wrought by the amenity and +relaxing influence of the soil and climate, subjected all who were to +serve as soldiers to the severest training; whence it came that better +soldiers were raised in these countries than in others by nature rugged +and barren. Such, of old, was the kingdom of the Egyptians, which, +though of all lands the most bountiful, yet, by the severe training +which its laws enforced, produced most valiant soldiers, who, had their +names not been lost in antiquity, might be thought to deserve more +praise than Alexander the Great and many besides, whose memory is still +fresh in men’s minds. And even in recent times, any one contemplating +the kingdom of the Soldan, and the military order of the Mamelukes +before they were destroyed by Selim the Grand Turk, must have seen how +carefully they trained their soldiers in every kind of warlike +exercise; showing thereby how much they dreaded that indolence to which +their genial soil and climate might have disposed them, unless +neutralized by strenuous laws. I say, then, that it is a prudent choice +to found your city in a fertile region when the effects of that +fertility are duly balanced by the restraint of the laws. + +When Alexander the Great thought to add to his renown by founding a +city, Dinocrates the architect came and showed him how he might build +it on Mount Athos, which not only offered a strong position, but could +be handled that the city built there might present a semblance of the +human form, which would be a thing strange and striking, and worthy of +so great a monarch. But on Alexander asking how the inhabitants were to +live, Dinocrates answered that he had not thought of that. Whereupon, +Alexander laughed, and leaving Mount Athos as it stood, built +Alexandria; where, the fruitfulness of the soil, and the vicinity of +the Nile and the sea, might attract many to take up their abode. + +To him, therefore, who inquires into the origin of Rome, if he assign +its beginning to Æneas, it will seem to be of those cities which were +founded by strangers if to Romulus, then of those founded by the +natives of the country. But in whichever class we place it, it will be +seen to have had its beginning in freedom, and not in subjection to +another State. It will be seen, too, as hereafter shall be noted, how +strict was the discipline which the laws instituted by Romulus, Numa, +and its other founders made compulsory upon it; so that neither its +fertility, the proximity of the sea, the number of its victories, nor +the extent of its dominion, could for many centuries corrupt it, but, +on the contrary, maintained it replete with such virtues as were never +matched in any other commonwealth. + +And because the things done by Rome, and which Titus Livius has +celebrated, were effected at home or abroad by public or by private +wisdom, I shall begin by treating, and noting the consequences of those +things done at home in accordance with the public voice, which seem +most to merit attention; and to this object the whole of this first +Book or first Part of my Discourses, shall be directed. + + + + +CHAPTER II.—Of the various kinds of Government; and to which of them +the Roman Commonwealth belonged. + + +I forego all discussion concerning those cities which at the outset +have been dependent upon others, and shall speak only of those which +from their earliest beginnings have stood entirely clear of all foreign +control, being governed from the first as pleased themselves, whether +as republics or as princedoms. + +These as they have had different origins, so likewise have had +different laws and institutions. For to some at their very first +commencement, or not long after, laws have been given by a single +legislator, and all at one time; like those given by Lycurgus to the +Spartans; while to others they have been given at different times, as +need rose or accident determined; as in the case of Rome. That +republic, indeed, may be called happy, whose lot has been to have a +founder so prudent as to provide for it laws under which it can +continue to live securely, without need to amend them; as we find +Sparta preserving hers for eight hundred years, without deterioration +and without any dangerous disturbance. On the other hand, some measure +of unhappiness attaches to the State which, not having yielded itself +once for all into the hands of a single wise legislator, is obliged to +recast its institutions for itself; and of such States, by far the most +unhappy is that which is furthest removed from a sound system of +government, by which I mean that its institutions lie wholly outside +the path which might lead it to a true and perfect end. For it is +scarcely possible that a State in this position can ever, by any +chance, set itself to rights, whereas another whose institutions are +imperfect, if it have made a good beginning and such as admits of its +amendment, may in the course of events arrive at perfection. It is +certain, however, that such States can never be reformed without great +risk; for, as a rule, men will accept no new law altering the +institutions of their State, unless the necessity for such a change be +demonstrated; and since this necessity cannot arise without danger, the +State may easily be overthrown before the new order of things is +established. In proof whereof we may instance the republic of Florence, +which was reformed in the year 1502, in consequence of the affair of +Arezzo, but was ruined in 1512, in consequence of the affair of Prato. + +Desiring, therefore, to discuss the nature of the government of Rome, +and to ascertain the accidental circumstances which brought it to its +perfection, I say, as has been said before by many who have written of +Governments, that of these there are three forms, known by the names +Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Democracy, and that those who give its +institutions to a State have recourse to one or other of these three, +according as it suits their purpose. Other, and, as many have thought, +wiser teachers, will have it, that there are altogether six forms of +government, three of them utterly bad, the other three good in +themselves, but so readily corrupted that they too are apt to become +hurtful. The good are the three above named; the bad, three others +dependent upon these, and each so like that to which it is related, +that it is easy to pass imperceptibly from the one to the other. For a +Monarchy readily becomes a Tyranny, an Aristocracy an Oligarchy, while +a Democracy tends to degenerate into Anarchy. So that if the founder of +a State should establish any one of these three forms of Government, he +establishes it for a short time only, since no precaution he may take +can prevent it from sliding into its contrary, by reason of the close +resemblance which, in this case, the virtue bears to the vice. + +These diversities in the form of Government spring up among men by +chance. For in the beginning of the world, its inhabitants, being few +in number, for a time lived scattered after the fashion of beasts; but +afterwards, as they increased and multiplied, gathered themselves into +societies, and, the better to protect themselves, began to seek who +among them was the strongest and of the highest courage, to whom, +making him their head, they tendered obedience. Next arose the +knowledge of such things as are honourable and good, as opposed to +those which are bad and shameful. For observing that when a man wronged +his benefactor, hatred was universally felt for the one and sympathy +for the other, and that the ungrateful were blamed, while those who +showed gratitude were honoured, and reflecting that the wrongs they saw +done to others might be done to themselves, to escape these they +resorted to making laws and fixing punishments against any who should +transgress them; and in this way grew the recognition of Justice. +Whence it came that afterwards, in choosing their rulers, men no longer +looked about for the strongest, but for him who was the most prudent +and the most just. + +But, presently, when sovereignty grew to be hereditary and no longer +elective, hereditary sovereigns began to degenerate from their +ancestors, and, quitting worthy courses, took up the notion that +princes had nothing to do but to surpass the rest of the world in +sumptuous display and wantonness, and whatever else ministers to +pleasure so that the prince coming to be hated, and therefore to feel +fear, and passing from fear to infliction of injuries, a tyranny soon +sprang up. Forthwith there began movements to overthrow the prince, and +plots and conspiracies against him undertaken not by those who were +weak, or afraid for themselves, but by such as being conspicuous for +their birth, courage, wealth, and station, could not tolerate the +shameful life of the tyrant. The multitude, following the lead of these +powerful men, took up arms against the prince and, he being got rid of, +obeyed these others as their liberators; who, on their part, holding in +hatred the name of sole ruler, formed themselves into a government and +at first, while the recollection of past tyranny was still fresh, +observed the laws they themselves made, and postponing personal +advantage to the common welfare, administered affairs both publicly and +privately with the utmost diligence and zeal. But this government +passing, afterwards, to their descendants who, never having been taught +in the school of Adversity, knew nothing of the vicissitudes of +Fortune, these not choosing to rest content with mere civil equality, +but abandoning themselves to avarice, ambition, and lust, converted, +without respect to civil rights what had been a government of the best +into a government of the few; and so very soon met with the same fate +as the tyrant. + +For the multitude loathing its rulers, lent itself to any who ventured, +in whatever way, to attack them; when some one man speedily arose who +with the aid of the people overthrew them. But the recollection of the +tyrant and of the wrongs suffered at his hands being still fresh in the +minds of the people, who therefore felt no desire to restore the +monarchy, they had recourse to a popular government, which they +established on such a footing that neither king nor nobles had any +place in it. And because all governments inspire respect at the first, +this government also lasted for a while, but not for long, and seldom +after the generation which brought it into existence had died out. For, +suddenly, liberty passed into license, wherein neither private worth +nor public authority was respected, but, every one living as he liked, +a thousand wrongs were done daily. Whereupon, whether driven by +necessity, or on the suggestion of some wiser man among them and to +escape anarchy, the people reverted to a monarchy, from which, step by +step, in the manner and for the causes already assigned, they came +round once more to license. For this is the circle revolving within +which all States are and have been governed; although in the same State +the same forms of Government rarely repeat themselves, because hardly +any State can have such vitality as to pass through such a cycle more +than once, and still together. For it may be expected that in some sea +of disaster, when a State must always be wanting prudent counsels and +in strength, it will become subject to some neighbouring and +better-governed State; though assuming this not to happen, it might +well pass for an indefinite period from one of these forms of +government to another. + +I say, then, that all these six forms of government are pernicious—the +three good kinds, from their brief duration the three bad, from their +inherent badness. Wise legislators therefore, knowing these defects, +and avoiding each of these forms in its simplicity, have made choice of +a form which shares in the qualities of all the first three, and which +they judge to be more stable and lasting than any of these separately. +For where we have a monarchy, an aristocracy, and a democracy existing +together in the same city, each of the three serves as a check upon the +other. + +Among those who have earned special praise by devising a constitution +of this nature, was Lycurgus, who so framed the laws of Sparta as to +assign their proper functions to kings, nobles, and commons; and in +this way established a government, which, to his great glory and to the +peace and tranquility of his country, lasted for more than eight +hundred years. The contrary, however, happened in the case of Solon; +who by the turn he gave to the institutions of Athens, created there a +purely democratic government, of such brief duration, that he himself +lived to witness the beginning of the despotism of Pisistratus. And +although, forty years later, the heirs of Pisistratus were driven out, +and Athens recovered her freedom, nevertheless because she reverted to +the same form government as had been established by Solon, she could +maintain it for only a hundred years more; for though to preserve it, +many ordinances were passed for repressing the ambition of the great +and the turbulence of the people, against which Solon had not provided, +still, since neither the monarchic nor the aristocratic element was +given a place in her constitution, Athens, as compared with Sparta, had +but a short life. + +But let us now turn to Rome, which city, although she had no Lycurgus +to give her from the first such a constitution as would preserve her +long in freedom, through a series of accidents, caused by the contests +between the commons and the senate, obtained by chance what the +foresight of her founders failed to provide. So that Fortune, if she +bestowed not her first favours on Rome, bestowed her second; because, +although the original institutions of this city were defective, still +they lay not outside the true path which could bring them to +perfection. For Romulus and the other kings made many and good laws, +and such as were not incompatible with freedom; but because they sought +to found a kingdom and not a commonwealth, when the city became free +many things were found wanting which in the interest of liberty it was +necessary to supply, since these kings had not supplied them. And +although the kings of Rome lost their sovereignty, in the manner and +for the causes mentioned above, nevertheless those who drove them out, +by at once creating two consuls to take their place, preserved in Rome +the regal authority while banishing from it the regal throne, so that +as both senate and consuls were included in that republic, it in fact +possessed two of the elements above enumerated, to wit, the monarchic +and the aristocratic. + +It then only remained to assign its place to the popular element, and +the Roman nobles growing insolent from causes which shall be noticed +hereafter, the commons against them, when, not to lose the whole of +their power, they were forced to concede a share to the people; while +with the share which remained, the senate and consuls retained so much +authority that they still held their own place in the republic. In this +way the tribunes of the people came to be created, after whose creation +the stability of the State was much augmented, since each the three +forms of government had now its due influence allowed it. And such was +the good fortune of Rome that although her government passed from the +kings to the nobles, and from these to the people, by the steps and for +the reasons noticed above, still the entire authority of the kingly +element was not sacrificed to strengthen the authority of the nobles, +nor were the nobles divested of their authority to bestow it on the +commons; but three, blending together, made up a perfect State; which +perfection, as shall be fully shown in the next two Chapters, was +reached through the dissensions of the commons and the senate. + + + + +CHAPTER III.—Of the Accidents which led in Rome to the creation of +Tribunes of the People; whereby the Republic was made more perfect. + + +They who lay the foundations of a State and furnish it with laws must, +as is shown by all who have treated of civil government, and by +examples of which history is full, assume that ‘all men are bad, and +will always, when they have free field, give loose to their evil +inclinations; and that if these for a while remain hidden, it is owing +to some secret cause, which, from our having no contrary experience, we +do not recognize at once, but which is afterwards revealed by Time, of +whom we speak as the father of all truth. + +In Rome, after the expulsion of the Tarquins, it seemed as though the +closest union prevailed between the senate and the commons, and that +the nobles, laying aside their natural arrogance, had learned so to +sympathize with the people as to have become supportable by all, even +of the humblest rank. This dissimulation remained undetected, and its +causes concealed, while the Tarquins lived; for the nobles dreading the +Tarquins, and fearing that the people, if they used them ill, might +take part against them, treated them with kindness. But no sooner were +the Tarquins got rid of, and the nobles thus relieved of their fears, +when they began to spit forth against the commons all the venom which +before they had kept in their breasts, offending and insulting them in +every way they could; confirming what I have observed already, that men +never behave well unless compelled, and that whenever they are free to +act as they please, and are under no restraint everything falls at once +into confusion and disorder. Wherefore it has been said that as poverty +and hunger are needed to make men industrious, so laws are needed to +make them good. When we do well without laws, laws are not needed; but +when good customs are absent, laws are at once required. + +On the extinction of the Tarquins, therefore, the dread of whom had +kept the nobles in check, some new safeguard had to be contrived, which +should effect the same result as had been effected by the Tarquins +while they lived. Accordingly, after much uproar and confusion, and +much danger of violence ensuing between the commons and the nobles, to +insure the safety of the former, tribunes were created, and were +invested with such station and authority as always afterwards enabled +them to stand between the people and the senate, and to resist the +insolence of the nobles. + + + + +CHAPTER IV.—That the Dissensions between the Senate and Commons of +Rome, made Rome free and powerful. + + +Touching those tumults which prevailed in Rome from the extinction of +the Tarquins to the creation of the tribunes the discussion of which I +have no wish to avoid, and as to certain other matters of a like +nature, I desire to say something in opposition to the opinion of many +who assert that Rome was a turbulent city, and had fallen into utter +disorder, that had not her good fortune and military prowess made +amends for other defects, she would have been inferior to every other +republic. + +I cannot indeed deny that the good fortune and the armies of Rome were +the causes of her empire; yet it certainly seems to me that those +holding this opinion fail to perceive, that in a State where there are +good soldiers there must be good order, and, generally speaking, good +fortune. And looking to the other circumstances of this city, I affirm +that those who condemn these dissensions between the nobles and the +commons, condemn what was the prime cause of Rome becoming free; and +give more heed to the tumult and uproar wherewith these dissensions +were attended, than to the good results which followed from them; not +reflecting that while in every republic there are two conflicting +factions, that of the people and that of the nobles, it is in this +conflict that all laws favourable to freedom have their origin, as may +readily be seen to have been the case in Rome. For from the time of the +Tarquins to that of the Gracchi, a period of over three hundred years, +the tumults in Rome seldom gave occasion to punishment by exile, and +very seldom to bloodshed. So that we cannot truly declare those tumults +to have been disastrous, or that republic to have been disorderly, +which during all that time, on account of her internal broils, banished +no more than eight or ten of her citizens, put very few to death, and +rarely inflicted money penalties. Nor can we reasonably pronounce that +city ill-governed wherein we find so many instances of virtue; for +virtuous actions have their origin in right training, right training in +wise laws, and wise laws in these very tumults which many would +thoughtlessly condemn. For he who looks well to the results of these +tumults will find that they did not lead to banishments, nor to +violence hurtful to the common good, but to laws and ordinances +beneficial to the public liberty. And should any object that the +behaviour of the Romans was extravagant and outrageous; that for the +assembled people to be heard shouting against the senate, the senate +against the people; for the whole commons to be seen rushing wildly +through the streets, closing their shops, and quitting the town, were +things which might well affright him even who only reads of them; it +may be answered, that the inhabitants of all cities, more especially of +cities which seek to make use of the people in matters of importance, +have their own ways of giving expression to their wishes; among which +the city of Rome had the custom, that when its people sought to have a +law passed they followed one or another of those courses mentioned +above, or else refused to be enrolled as soldiers when, to pacify them, +something of their demands had to be conceded. But the demands of a +free people are hurtful to freedom, since they originate either in +being oppressed, or in the fear that they are about to be so. When this +fear is groundless, it finds its remedy in public meetings, wherein +some worthy person may come forward and show the people by argument +that they are deceiving themselves. For though they be ignorant, the +people are not therefore, as Cicero says, incapable of being taught the +truth, but are readily convinced when it is told them by one in whose +honesty they can trust. + +We should, therefore, be careful how we censure the government of Rome, +and should reflect that all the great results effected by that +republic, could not have come about without good cause. And if the +popular tumults led the creation of the tribunes, they merit all +praise; since these magistrates not only gave its due influence to the +popular voice in the government, but also acted as the guardians of +Roman freedom, as shall be clearly shown in the following Chapter. + + + + +CHAPTER V.—_Whether the Guardianship of public Freedom is safer in the +hands of the Commons or of the Nobles; and whether those who seek to +acquire Power or they who seek to maintain it are the greater cause of +Commotions._ + + +Of the provisions made by wise founders of republics, one of the most +necessary is for the creation of a guardianship of liberty; for +according as this is placed in good or bad hands, the freedom of the +State will be more or less lasting. And because in every republic we +find the two parties of nobles and commons, the question arises, to +which of these two this guardianship can most safely be entrusted. +Among the Lacedæmonians of old, as now with the Venetians, it was +placed in the hands of the nobles, but with the Romans it was vested in +the commons. We have, therefore, to determine which of these States +made the wiser choice. If we look to reasons, something is to be said +on both sides of the question; though were we to look to results, we +should have to pronounce in favour of the nobles, inasmuch as the +liberty of Sparta and Venice has had a longer life than that of Rome. + +As touching reasons, it may be pleaded for the Roman method, that they +are most fit to have charge of a thing, who least desire to pervert it +to their own ends. And, doubtless, if we examine the aims which the +nobles and the commons respectively set before them, we shall find in +the former a great desire to dominate, in the latter merely a desire +not to be dominated over, and hence a greater attachment to freedom, +since they have less to gain than the others by destroying it. +Wherefore, when the commons are put forward as the defenders of +liberty, they may be expected to take better care of it, and, as they +have no desire to tamper with it themselves, to be less apt to suffer +others to do so. + +On the other hand, he who defends the method followed by the Spartans +and Venetians, may urge, that by confiding this guardianship to the +nobles, two desirable ends are served: first, that from being allowed +to retain in their own hands a weapon which makes them the stronger +party in the State, the ambition of this class is more fully satisfied; +and, second, that an authority is withdrawn from the unstable multitude +which as used by them is likely to lead to endless disputes and +tumults, and to drive the nobles into dangerous and desperate courses. +In instance whereof might be cited the case of Rome itself, wherein the +tribunes of the people being vested with this authority, not content to +have one consul a plebeian, insisted on having both; and afterwards +laid claim to the censorship, the prætorship and all the other +magistracies in the city. Nor was this enough for them, but, carried +away by the same factious spirit, they began after a time to pay court +to such men as they thought able to attack the nobility, and so gave +occasion to the rise of Marius and the overthrow of Rome. + +Wherefore one who weighs both sides of the question well, might +hesitate which party he should choose as the guardian of public +liberty, being uncertain which class is more mischievous in a +commonwealth, that which would acquire what it has not, or that which +would keep the authority which it has already. But, on the whole, on a +careful balance of arguments we may sum up thus:—Either we have to deal +with a republic eager like Rome to extend its power, or with one +content merely to maintain itself; in the former case it is necessary +to do in all things as Rome did; in the latter, for the reasons and in +the manner to be shown in the following Chapter, we may imitate Venice +and Sparta. + +But reverting to the question which class of citizens is more +mischievous in a republic, those who seek to acquire or those who fear +to lose what they have acquired already, I note that when Marcus +Menenius and Marcus Fulvius, both of them men of plebeian birth, were +made the one dictator, the other master of the knights, that they might +inquire into certain plots against Rome contrived in Capua, they had at +the same time authority given them by the people to investigate +whether, in Rome itself, irregular and corrupt practices had been used +to obtain the consulship and other honours of the city. The nobles +suspecting that the powers thus conferred were to be turned against +them, everywhere gave out that if honours had been sought by any by +irregular and unworthy means, it was not by them, but by the plebeians, +who, with neither birth nor merit to recommend them, had need to resort +to corruption. And more particularly they accused the dictator himself. +And so telling was the effect of these charges, that Menenius, after +haranguing the people and complaining to them of the calumnies +circulated against him, laid down his dictatorship, and submitted +himself to whatever judgment might be passed upon him. When his cause +came to be tried he was acquitted; but at the hearing it was much +debated, whether he who would retain power or he who would acquire it, +is the more dangerous citizen; the desires of both being likely to lead +to the greatest disorders. + +Nevertheless, I believe that, as a rule, disorders are more commonly +occasioned by those seeking to preserve power, because in them the fear +of loss breeds the same passions as are felt by those seeking to +acquire; since men never think they hold what they have securely, +unless when they are gaining something new from others. It is also to +be said that their position enables them to operate changes with less +effort and greater efficacy. Further, it may be added, that their +corrupt and insolent behaviour inflames the minds of those who have +nothing, with the desire to have; either for the sake of punishing +their adversaries by despoiling them, or to obtain for themselves a +share of those riches and honours which they see the others abuse. + + + + +CHAPTER VI.—_Whether it was possible in Rome to contrive such a +Government as would have composed the Differences between the Commons +and the Senate._ + + +I have spoken above of the effects produced in Rome by the +controversies between the commons and the senate. Now, as these lasted +down to the time of the Gracchi, when they brought about the overthrow +of freedom, some may think it matter for regret that Rome should not +have achieved the great things she did, without being torn by such +disputes. Wherefore, it seems to me worth while to consider whether the +government of Rome could ever have been constituted in such a way as to +prevent like controversies. + +In making this inquiry we must first look to those republics which have +enjoyed freedom for a great while, undisturbed by any violent +contentions or tumults, and see what their government was, and whether +it would have been possible to introduce it into Rome. Of such +republics we have an example in ancient times in Sparta, in modern +times in Venice, of both which States I have already made mention. +Sparta created for herself a government consisting of a king and a +limited senate. Venice has made no distinction in the titles of her +rulers, all qualified to take part in her government being classed +under the one designation of “Gentlemen,” an arrangement due rather to +chance than to the foresight of those who gave this State its +constitution. For many persons, from causes already noticed, seeking +shelter on these rocks on which Venice now stands, after they had so +multiplied that if they were to continue to live together it became +necessary for them to frame laws, established a form of government; and +assembling often in their councils to consult for the interests of +their city, when it seemed to them that their numbers were sufficient +for political existence, they closed the entrance to civil rights +against all who came afterwards to live there, not allowing them to +take any part in the management of affairs. And when in course of time +there came to be many citizens excluded from the government, to add to +the importance of the governing body, they named these “Gentlemen” +(_gentiluomini_), the others “Plebeians” (_popolani_). And this +distinction could grow up and maintain itself without causing +disturbance; for as at the time of its origin, whosoever then lived in +Venice was made one of the governing body, none had reason to complain; +while those who came to live there afterwards, finding the government +in a completed form, had neither ground nor opportunity to object. No +ground, because nothing was taken from them; and no opportunity, +because those in authority kept them under control, and never employed +them in affairs in which they could acquire importance. Besides which, +they who came later to dwell in Venice were not so numerous as to +destroy all proportion between the governors and the governed; the +number of the “Gentlemen” being as great as, or greater than that of +the “Plebeians.” For these reasons, therefore, it was possible for +Venice to make her constitution what it is, and to maintain it without +divisions. + +Sparta, again, being governed, as I have said, by a king and a limited +senate, was able to maintain herself for the long period she did, +because, from the country being thinly inhabited and further influx of +population forbidden, and from the laws of Lycurgus (the observance +whereof removed all ground of disturbance) being held in high esteem, +the citizens were able to continue long in unity. For Lycurgus having +by his laws established in Sparta great equality as to property, but +less equality as to rank, there prevailed there an equal poverty; and +the commons were less ambitious, because the offices of the State, +which were held to their exclusion, were confined to a few; and because +the nobles never by harsh treatment aroused in them any desire to usurp +these offices. And this was due to the Spartan kings, who, being +appointed to that dignity for life, and placed in the midst of this +nobility, had no stronger support to their authority than in defending +the people against injustice. Whence it resulted that as the people +neither feared nor coveted the power which they did not possess, the +conflicts which might have arisen between them and the nobles were +escaped, together with the causes which would have led to them; and in +this way they were able to live long united. But of this unity in +Sparta there were two chief causes: one, the fewness of its +inhabitants, which allowed of their being governed by a few; the other, +that by denying foreigners admission into their country, the people had +less occasion to become corrupted, and never so increased in numbers as +to prove troublesome to their few rulers. + +Weighing all which circumstances, we see that to have kept Rome in the +same tranquility wherein these republics were kept, one of two courses +must have been followed by her legislators; for either, like the +Venetians, they must have refrained from employing the commons in war, +or else, like the Spartans, they must have closed their country to +foreigners. Whereas, in both particulars, they did the opposite, arming +the commons and increasing their number, and thus affording endless +occasions for disorder. And had the Roman commonwealth grown to be more +tranquil, this inconvenience would have resulted, that it must at the +same time have grown weaker, since the road would have been closed to +that greatness to which it came, for in removing the causes of her +tumults, Rome must have interfered with the causes of her growth. + +And he who looks carefully into the matter will find, that in all human +affairs, we cannot rid ourselves of one inconvenience without running +into another. So that if you would have your people numerous and +warlike, to the end that with their aid you may establish a great +empire, you will have them of such a sort as you cannot afterwards +control at your pleasure; while should you keep them few and unwarlike, +to the end that you may govern them easily, you will be unable, should +you extend your dominions, to preserve them, and will become so +contemptible as to be the prey of any who attack you. For which reason +in all our deliberations we ought to consider where we are likely to +encounter least inconvenience, and accept that as the course to be +preferred, since we shall never find any line of action entirely free +from disadvantage. + +Rome might, therefore, following the example of Sparta, have created a +king for life and a senate of limited numbers, but desiring to become a +great empire, she could not, like Sparta, have restricted the number of +her citizens. So that to have created a king for life and a limited +senate had been of little service to her. + +Were any one, therefore, about to found a wholly new republic, he would +have to consider whether he desired it to increase as Rome did in +territory and dominion, or to continue within narrow limits. In the +former case he would have to shape its constitution as nearly as +possible on the pattern of the Roman, leaving room for dissensions and +popular tumults, for without a great and warlike population no republic +can ever increase, or increasing maintain itself. In the second case he +might give his republic a constitution like that of Venice or Sparta; +but since extension is the ruin of such republics, the legislator would +have to provide in every possible way against the State which he had +founded making any additions to its territories. For these, when +superimposed upon a feeble republic, are sure to be fatal to it: as we +see to have been the case with Sparta and Venice, the former of which, +after subjugating nearly all Greece, on sustaining a trifling reverse, +betrayed the insufficiency of her foundations, for when, after the +revolt of Thebes under Pelopidas, other cities also rebelled, the +Spartan kingdom was utterly overthrown. Venice in like manner, after +gaining possession of a great portion of Italy (most of it not by her +arms but by her wealth and subtlety), when her strength was put to the +proof, lost all in one pitched battle. + +I can well believe, then, that to found a republic which shall long +endure, the best plan may be to give it internal institutions like +those of Sparta or Venice; placing it in a naturally strong situation, +and so fortifying it that none can expect to get the better of it +easily, yet, at the same time, not making it so great as to be +formidable to its neighbours; since by taking these precautions, it +might long enjoy its independence. For there are two causes which lead +to wars being made against a republic; one, your desire to be its +master, the other the fear lest it should master you; both of which +dangers the precaution indicated will go far to remove. For if, as we +are to assume, this republic be well prepared for defence, and +consequently difficult of attack, it will seldom or never happen that +any one will form the design to attack it, and while it keeps within +its own boundaries, and is seen from experience not to be influenced by +ambition, no one will be led, out of fear for himself, to make war upon +it, more particularly when its laws and constitution forbid its +extension. And were it possible to maintain things in this equilibrium, +I veritably believe that herein would be found the true form of +political life, and the true tranquility of a republic. But all human +affairs being in movement, and incapable of remaining as they are, they +must either rise or fall; and to many conclusions to which we are not +led by reason, we are brought by necessity. So that when we have given +institutions to a State on the footing that it is to maintain itself +without enlargement, should necessity require its enlargement, its +foundations will be cut from below it, and its downfall quickly ensue. +On the other hand, were a republic so favoured by Heaven as to lie +under no necessity of making war, the result of this ease would be to +make it effeminate and divided which two evils together, and each by +itself, would insure its ruin. And since it is impossible, as I +believe, to bring about an equilibrium, or to adhere strictly to the +mean path, we must, in arranging our republic, consider what is the +more honourable course for it to take, and so contrive that even if +necessity compel its enlargement, it may be able to keep what it gains. + +But returning to the point first raised, I believe it necessary for us +to follow the method of the Romans and not that of the other republics, +for I know of no middle way. We must, consequently, put up with those +dissensions which arise between commons and senate, looking on them as +evils which cannot be escaped if we would arrive at the greatness of +Rome. + +In connection with the arguments here used to prove that the authority +of the tribunes was essential in Rome to the guardianship of freedom, +we may naturally go on to show what advantages result to a republic +from the power of impeachment; which, together with others, was +conferred upon the tribunes; a subject to be noticed in the following +Chapter. + + + + +CHAPTER VII.—_That to preserve Liberty in a State there must exist the +Right to accuse._ + + +To those set forward in a commonwealth as guardians of public freedom, +no more useful or necessary authority can be given than the power to +accuse, either before the people, or before some council or tribunal, +those citizens who in any way have offended against the liberty of +their country. + +A law of this kind has two effects most beneficial to a State: _first,_ +that the citizens from fear of being accused, do not engage in attempts +hurtful to the State, or doing so, are put down at once and without +respect of persons: and _next,_ that a vent is given for the escape of +all those evil humours which, from whatever cause, gather in cities +against particular citizens; for unless an outlet be duly provided for +these by the laws, they flow into irregular channels and overwhelm the +State. There is nothing, therefore, which contributes so much to the +stability and permanence of a State, as to take care that the +fermentation of these disturbing humours be supplied by operation of +law with a recognized outlet. This might be shown by many examples, but +by none so clearly as by that of Coriolanus related by Livius, where he +tells us, that at a time when the Roman nobles were angry with the +plebeians (thinking that the appointment of tribunes for their +protection had made them too powerful), it happened that Rome was +visited by a grievous famine, to meet which the senate sent to Sicily +for corn. But Coriolanus, hating the commons, sought to persuade the +senate that now was the time to punish them, and to deprive them of the +authority which they had usurped to the prejudice of the nobles, by +withholding the distribution of corn, and so suffering them to perish +of hunger. Which advice of his coming to the ears of the people, +kindled them to such fury against him, that they would have slain him +as he left the Senate House, had not the tribunes cited him to appear +and answer before them to a formal charge. + +In respect of this incident I repeat what I have just now said, how +useful and necessary it is for republics to provide by their laws a +channel by which the displeasure of the multitude against a single +citizen may find a vent. For when none such is regularly provided, +recourse will be had to irregular channels, and these will assuredly +lead to much worse results. For when a citizen is borne down by the +operation of the ordinary laws, even though he be wronged, little or no +disturbance is occasioned to the state: the injury he suffers not being +wrought by private violence, nor by foreign force, which are the causes +of the overthrow of free institutions, but by public authority and in +accordance with public ordinances, which, having definite limits set +them, are not likely to pass beyond these so as to endanger the +commonwealth. For proof of which I am content to rest on this old +example of Coriolanus, since all may see what a disaster it would have +been for Rome had he been violently put to death by the people. For, as +between citizen and citizen, a wrong would have been done affording +ground for fear, fear would have sought defence, defence have led to +faction, faction to divisions in the State, and these to its ruin. But +the matter being taken up by those whose office it was to deal with it, +all the evils which must have followed had it been left in private +hands were escaped. + +In Florence, on the other hand, and in our own days, we have seen what +violent commotions follow when the people cannot show their displeasure +against particular citizens in a form recognized by the laws, in the +instance of Francesco Valori, at one time looked upon as the foremost +citizen of our republic. But many thinking him ambitious, and likely +from his high spirit and daring to overstep the limits of civil +freedom, and there being no way to oppose him save by setting up an +adverse faction, the result was, that, apprehending irregular attacks, +he sought to gain partisans for his support; while his opponents, on +their side, having no course open to them of which the laws approved, +resorted to courses of which the laws did not approve, and, at last, to +open violence. And as his influence had to be attacked by unlawful +methods, these were attended by injury not to him only, but to many +other noble citizens; whereas, could he have been met by constitutional +restraints, his power might have been broken without injury to any save +himself. I might also cite from our Florentine history the fall of +Piero Soderini, which had no other cause than there not being in our +republic any law under which powerful and ambitious citizens can be +impeached. For to form a tribunal by which a powerful citizen is to be +tried, eight judges only are not enough; the judges must be numerous, +because a few will always do the will of a few. But had there been +proper methods for obtaining redress, either the people would have +impeached Piero if he was guilty, and thus have given vent to their +displeasure without calling in the Spanish army; or if he was innocent, +would not have ventured, through fear of being accused themselves, to +have taken proceedings against him. So that in either case the bitter +spirit which was the cause of all the disorder would have had an end. +Wherefore, when we find one of the parties in a State calling in a +foreign power, we may safely conclude that it is because the defective +laws of that State provide no escape for those malignant humours which +are natural to men; which can best be done by arranging for an +impeachment before a sufficient number of judges, and by giving +countenance to this procedure. This was so well contrived in Rome that +in spite of the perpetual struggle maintained between the commons and +the senate, neither the senate nor the commons, nor any single citizen, +ever sought redress at the hands of a foreign power; for having a +remedy at home, there was no need to seek one abroad. + +Although the examples above cited be proof sufficient of what I affirm, +I desire to adduce one other, recorded by Titus Livius in his history, +where he relates that a sister of Aruns having been violated by a +Lucumo of Clusium, the chief of the Etruscan towns, Aruns being unable, +from the interest of her ravisher, to avenge her, betook himself to the +Gauls who ruled in the province we now name Lombardy, and besought them +to come with an armed force to Clusium; showing them how with advantage +to themselves they might avenge his wrongs. Now, had Aruns seen that he +could have had redress through the laws of his country, he never would +have resorted to these Barbarians for help. + +But as the right to accuse is beneficial in a republic, so calumny, on +the other hand, is useless and hurtful, as in the following Chapter I +shall proceed to show. + + + + +CHAPTER VIII.—_That Calumny is as hurtful in a Commonwealth as the +power to accuse is useful._ + + +Such were the services rendered to Rome by Furius Camillus in rescuing +her from the oppression of the Gauls, that no Roman, however high his +degree or station, held it derogatory to yield place to him, save only +Manlius Capitolinus, who could not brook such glory and distinction +being given to another. For he thought that in saving the Capitol, he +had himself done as much as Camillus to preserve Rome, and that in +respect of his other warlike achievements he was no whit behind him. So +that, bursting with jealousy, and unable to remain at rest by reason of +the other’s renown, and seeing no way to sow discord among the Fathers, +he set himself to spread abroad sinister reports among the commons; +throwing out, among other charges, that the treasure collected to be +given to the Gauls, but which, afterwards, was withheld, had been +embezzled by certain citizens, and if recovered might be turned to +public uses in relieving the people from taxes or from private debts. +These assertions so prevailed with the commons that they began to hold +meetings and to raise what tumults they liked throughout the city. But +this displeasing the senate, and the matter appearing to them grave and +dangerous, they appointed a dictator to inquire into it, and to +restrain the attacks of Manlius. The dictator, forthwith, caused +Manlius to be cited before him; and these two were thus brought face to +face in the presence of the whole city, the dictator surrounded by the +nobles, and Manlius by the commons. The latter, being desired to say +with whom the treasure of which he had spoken was to be found, since +the senate were as anxious to know this as the commons, made no direct +reply, but answered evasively that it was needless to tell them what +they already knew. Whereupon the dictator ordered him to prison. + +In this passage we are taught how hateful a thing is calumny in all +free States, as, indeed, in every society, and how we must neglect no +means which may serve to check it. And there can be no more effectual +means for checking calumny than by affording ample facilities for +impeachment, which is as useful in a commonwealth as the other is +pernicious. And between them there is this difference, that calumny +needs neither witness, nor circumstantial proof to establish it, so +that any man may be calumniated by any other; but not impeached; since +impeachment demands that there be substantive charges made, and +trustworthy evidence to support them. Again, it is before the +magistrates, the people, or the courts of justice that men are +impeached; but in the streets and market places that they are +calumniated. Calumny, therefore, is most rife in that State wherein +impeachment is least practised, and the laws least favour it. For which +reasons the legislator should so shape the laws of his State that it +shall be possible therein to impeach any of its citizens without fear +or favour; and, after duly providing for this, should visit +calumniators with the sharpest punishments. Those punished will have no +cause to complain, since it was in their power to have impeached openly +where they have secretly calumniated. Where this is not seen to, grave +disorders will always ensue. For calumnies sting without disabling; and +those who are stung being more moved by hatred of their detractors than +by fear of the things they say against them, seek revenge. + +This matter, as we have said, was well arranged for in Rome, but has +always been badly regulated in our city of Florence. And as the Roman +ordinances with regard to it were productive of much good, so the want +of them in Florence has bred much mischief. For any one reading the +history of our city may perceive, how many calumnies have at all times +been aimed against those of its citizens who have taken a leading part +in its affairs. Thus, of one it would be said that he had plundered the +public treasury, of another, that he had failed in some enterprise +because he had been bribed; of a third, that this or the other disaster +had originated in his ambition. Hence hatred sprung up on every side, +and hatred growing to division, these led to factions, and these again +to ruin. But had there existed in Florence some procedure whereby +citizens might have been impeached, and calumniators punished, +numberless disorders which have taken there would have been prevented. +For citizens who were impeached, whether condemned or acquitted, would +have had no power to injure the State; and they would have been +impeached far seldomer than they have been calumniated; for calumny, as +I have said already, is an easier matter than impeachment. + +Some, indeed, have made use of calumny as a means for raising +themselves to power, and have found their advantage in traducing +eminent citizens who withstood their designs; for by taking the part of +the people, and confirming them in their ill-opinion of these great +men, they made them their friends. Of this, though I could give many +instances, I shall content myself with one. At the siege of Lucca the +Florentine army was commanded by Messer Giovanni Guicciardini, as its +commissary, through whose bad generalship or ill-fortune the town was +not taken. But whatever the cause of this failure, Messer Giovanni had +the blame; and the rumour ran that he had been bribed by the people of +Lucca. Which calumny being fostered by his enemies, brought Messer +Giovanni to very verge of despair; and though to clear himself he would +willingly have given himself up to the Captain of Justice he found he +could not, there being no provision in the laws of the republic which +allowed of his doing so. Hence arose the bitterest hostility between +the friends of Messer Giovanni, who were mostly of the old nobility +(_grandi_), and those who sought to reform the government of Florence; +and from this and the like causes, the affair grew to such dimensions +as to bring about the downfall of our republic. + +Manlius Capitolinus, then, was a calumniator, not an accuser; and in +their treatment of him the Romans showed how calumniators should be +dealt with; by which I mean, that they should be forced to become +accusers; and if their accusation be proved true, should be rewarded, +or at least not punished, but if proved false should be punished as +Manlius was. + + + + +CHAPTER IX.—_That to give new Institutions to a Commonwealth, or to +reconstruct old Institutions on an entirely new basis, must be the work +of one Man_. + + +It may perhaps be thought that I should not have got so far into the +history of Rome, without some mention of those who gave that city its +institutions, and saying something of these institutions themselves, so +far as they relate to religion and war. As I have no wish to keep those +who would know my views on these matters in suspense, I say at once, +that to many it might seem of evil omen that the founder of a civil +government like Romulus, should first have slain his brother, and +afterwards have consented to the death of Titus Tatius the Sabine, whom +he had chosen to be his colleague in the kingship; since his +countrymen, if moved by ambition and lust of power to inflict like +injuries on any who opposed their designs, might plead the example of +their prince. This view would be a reasonable one were we to disregard +the object which led Romulus to put those men to death. But we must +take it as a rule to which there are very few if any exceptions, that +no commonwealth or kingdom ever has salutary institutions given it from +the first or has its institutions recast in an entirely new mould, +unless by a single person. On the contrary, it must be from one man +that it receives its institutions at first, and upon one man that all +similar reconstruction must depend. For this reason the wise founder of +a commonwealth who seeks to benefit not himself only, or the line of +his descendants, but his State and country, must endeavour to acquire +an absolute and undivided authority. And none who is wise will ever +blame any action, however extraordinary and irregular, which serves to +lay the foundation of a kingdom or to establish a republic. For +although the act condemn the doer, the end may justify him; and when, +as in the case of Romulus, the end is good, it will always excuse the +means; since it is he who does violence with intent to injure, not he +who does it with the design to secure tranquility, who merits blame. +Such a person ought however to be so prudent and moderate as to avoid +transmitting the absolute authority he acquires, as an inheritance to +another; for as men are, by nature, more prone to evil than to good, a +successor may turn to ambitious ends the power which his predecessor +has used to promote worthy ends. Moreover, though it be one man that +must give a State its institutions, once given they are not so likely +to last long resting for support on the shoulders of one man only, as +when entrusted to the care of many, and when it is the business of many +to maintain them. For though the multitude be unfit to set a State in +order, since they cannot, by reason of the divisions which prevail +among them, agree wherein the true well-being of the State lies, yet +when they have once been taught the truth, they never will consent to +abandon it. And that Romulus, though he put his brother to death, is +yet of those who are to be pardoned, since what he did was done for the +common good and not from personal ambition, is shown by his at once +creating a senate, with whom he took counsel, and in accordance with +whose voice he determined. And whosoever shall well examine the +authority which Romulus reserved to himself, will find that he reserved +nothing beyond the command of the army when war was resolved on, and +the right to assemble the senate. This is seen later, on Rome becoming +free by the expulsion of the Tarquins, when the Romans altered none of +their ancient institutions save in appointing two consuls for a year +instead of a king for life; for this proves that all the original +institutions of that city were more in conformity with a free and +constitutional government, than with an absolute and despotic one. + +In support of what has been said above, I might cite innumerable +instances, as of Moses, Lycurgus, Solon, and other founders of kingdoms +and commonwealths, who, from the full powers given them, were enabled +to shape their laws to the public advantage; but passing over these +examples, as of common notoriety, I take one, not indeed so famous, but +which merits the attention of all who desire to frame wise laws. Agis, +King of Sparta, desiring to bring back his countrymen to those limits +within which the laws of Lycurgus had held them, because he thought +that, from having somewhat deviated from them, his city had lost much +of its ancient virtue and, consequently much of its strength and power, +was, at the very outset of his attempts, slain by the Spartan Ephori, +as one who sought to make himself a tyrant. But Cleomenes coming after +him in the kingdom, and, on reading the notes and writings which he +found of Agis wherein his designs and intentions were explained, being +stirred by the same desire, perceived that he could not confer this +benefit on his country unless he obtained sole power. For he saw that +the ambition of others made it impossible for him to do what was useful +for many against the will of a few. Wherefore, finding fit occasion, he +caused the Ephori and all others likely to throw obstacles in his way, +to be put to death; after which, he completely renewed the laws of +Lycurgus. And the result of his measures would have been to give fresh +life to Sparta, and to gain for himself a renown not inferior to that +of Lycurgus, had it not been for the power of the Macedonians and the +weakness of the other Greek States. For while engaged with these +reforms, he was attacked by the Macedonians, and being by himself no +match for them, and having none to whom he could turn for help, he was +overpowered; and his plans, though wise and praiseworthy, were never +brought to perfection. + +All which circumstances considered, I conclude that he who gives new +institutions to a State must stand alone; and that for the deaths of +Remus and Tatius, Romulus is to be excused rather than blamed. + + + + +CHAPTER X.—_That in proportion as the Founder of a Kingdom or +Commonwealth merits Praise, he who founds a Tyranny deserves Blame._ + + +Of all who are praised they are praised the most, who are the authors +and founders of religions. After whom come the founders of kingdoms and +commonwealths. Next to these, they have the greatest name who as +commanders of armies have added to their own dominions or those of +their country. After these, again, are ranked men of letters, who being +of various shades of merit are celebrated each in his degree. To all +others, whose number is infinite, is ascribed that measure of praise to +which his profession or occupation entitles him. And, conversely, all +who contribute to the overthrow of religion, or to the ruin of kingdoms +and commonwealths, all who are foes to letters and to the arts which +confer honour and benefit on the human race (among whom I reckon the +impious, the cruel, the ignorant, the indolent, the base and the +worthless), are held in infamy and detestation. + +No one, whether he be wise or foolish, bad or good, if asked to choose +between these two kinds of men, will ever be found to withhold praise +from what deserves praise, or blame from what is to be blamed. And yet +almost all, deceived by a false good and a false glory, allow +themselves either ignorantly or wilfully to follow in the footsteps +such as deserve blame rather than praise; and, have it in their power +to establish, to their lasting renown, a commonwealth or kingdom, turn +aside to create a tyranny without a thought how much they thereby lose +in name, fame, security, tranquility, and peace of mind; and into how +much infamy, scorn, danger, and disquiet they run. But were they to +read history, and turn to profit the lessons of the past, it seems +impossible that those living in a republic as private citizens, should +not prefer, in their native city, to play the part of Scipio rather of +Cæsar; or that those who by good fortune or merit have risen to be +rulers, should not seek rather to resemble Agesilaus, Timoleon, and +Dion, than to Nabis, Phalaris and Dionysius; since they would see how +the latter are loaded with infamy, while the former have been extolled +beyond bounds. They would see, too, how Timoleon and others like him, +had as great authority in their country as Dionysius or Phalaris in +theirs, while enjoying far greater security. Nor let any one finding +Cæsar celebrated by a crowd of writers, be misled by his glory; for +those who praise him have been corrupted by his good fortune, and +overawed by the greatness of that empire which, being governed in his +name, would not suffer any to speak their minds openly concerning him. +But let him who desires to know how historians would have written of +Cæsar had they been free to declare their thoughts mark what they say +of Catiline, than whom Cæsar is more hateful, in proportion as he who +does is more to be condemned than he who only desires to do evil. Let +him see also what praises they lavish upon Brutus, because being +unable, out of respect for his power, to reproach Cæsar, they magnify +his enemy. And if he who has become prince in any State will but +reflect, how, after Rome was made an empire, far greater praise was +earned those emperors who lived within the laws, and worthily, than by +those who lived in the contrary way, he will see that Titus, Nerva, +Trajan, Hadrian, Antoninus and Marcus had no need of prætorian cohorts, +or of countless legions to guard them, but were defended by their own +good lives, the good-will of their subjects, and the attachment of the +senate. In like manner he will perceive in the case of Caligula, Nero, +Vitellius, and ever so many more of those evil emperors, that all the +armies of the east and of the west were of no avail to protect them +from the enemies whom their bad and depraved lives raised up against +them. And were the history of these emperors rightly studied, it would +be a sufficient lesson to any prince how to distinguish the paths which +lead to honour and safety from those which end in shame and insecurity. +For of the twenty-six emperors from Cæsar to Maximinus, sixteen came to +a violent, ten only to a natural death; and though one or two of those +who died by violence may have been good princes, as Galba or Pertinax, +they met their fate in consequence of that corruption which their +predecessors had left behind in the army. And if among those who died a +natural death, there be found some bad emperors, like Severus, it is to +be ascribed to their signal good fortune and to their great abilities, +advantages seldom found united in the same man. From the study of this +history we may also learn how a good government is to be established; +for while all the emperors who succeeded to the throne by birth, except +Titus, were bad, all were good who succeeded by adoption; as in the +case of the five from Nerva to Marcus. But so soon as the empire fell +once more to the heirs by birth, its ruin recommenced. + +Let a prince therefore look to that period which extends from Nerva to +Marcus, and contrast it with that which went before and that which came +after, and then let him say in which of them he would wish to have been +born or to have reigned. For during these times in which good men +governed, he will see the prince secure in the midst of happy subjects, +and the whole world filled with peace and justice. He will find the +senate maintaining its authority, the magistrates enjoying their +honours, rich citizens their wealth, rank and merit held in respect, +ease and content everywhere prevailing, rancour, licence, corruption +and ambition everywhere quenched, and that golden age restored in which +every one might hold and support what opinions he pleased. He will see, +in short, the world triumphing, the sovereign honoured and revered, the +people animated with love, and rejoicing in their security. But should +he turn to examine the times of the other emperors, he will find them +wasted by battles, torn by seditions, cruel alike in war and peace; +many princes perishing by the sword; many wars foreign and domestic; +Italy overwhelmed with unheard-of disasters; her towns destroyed and +plundered; Rome burned; the Capitol razed to the ground by Roman +citizens; the ancient temples desolated; the ceremonies of religion +corrupted; the cities rank with adultery; the seas covered with exiles +and the islands polluted with blood. He will see outrage follow +outrage; rank, riches, honours, and, above all, virtue imputed as +mortal crimes; informers rewarded; slaves bribed to betray their +masters, freedmen their patrons, and those who were without enemies +brought to destruction by their friends; and then he will know the true +nature of the debt which Rome, Italy, and the world owe to Cæsar; and +if he possess a spark of human feeling, will turn from the example of +those evil times, and kindle with a consuming passion to imitate those +which were good. + +And in truth the prince who seeks for worldly glory should desire to be +the ruler of a corrupt city; not that, like Cæsar, he may destroy it, +but that, like Romulus, he may restore it; since man cannot hope for, +nor Heaven offer any better opportunity of fame. Were it indeed +necessary in giving a constitution to a State to forfeit its +sovereignty, the prince who, to retain his station, should withhold a +constitution, might plead excuse; but for him who in giving a +constitution can still retain his sovereignty, no excuse is to be made. + +Let those therefore to whom Heaven has afforded this opportunity, +remember that two courses lie open to them; one which will render them +secure while they live and glorious when they die; another which +exposes them to continual difficulties in life, and condemns them to +eternal infamy after death. + + + + +CHAPTER XI.—_Of the Religion of the Romans._ + + +Though Rome had Romulus for her first founder, and as a daughter owed +him her being and nurture, nevertheless, when the institutions of +Romulus were seen by Heaven to be insufficient for so great a State, +the Roman senate were moved to choose Numa Pompilius as his successor, +that he might look to all matters which Romulus had neglected. He +finding the people fierce and turbulent, and desiring with the help of +the peaceful arts to bring them to order and obedience, called in the +aid of religion as essential to the maintenance of civil society, and +gave it such a form, that for many ages God was nowhere so much feared +as in that republic. The effect of this was to render easy any +enterprise in which the senate or great men of Rome thought fit to +engage. And whosoever pays heed to an infinity of actions performed, +sometimes by the Roman people collectively, often by single citizens, +will see, that esteeming the power of God beyond that of man, they +dreaded far more to violate their oath than to transgress the laws; as +is clearly shown by the examples of Scipio and of Manlius Torquatus. +For after the defeat of the Romans by Hannibal at Cannæ, many citizens +meeting together, resolved, in their terror and dismay, to abandon +Italy and seek refuge in Sicily. But Scipio, getting word of this, went +among them, and menacing them with his naked sword, made them swear +never to abandon their country. Again, when Lucius Manlius was accused +by the tribune Marcus Pomponius, before the day fixed for trial, Titus +Manlius, afterwards named Torquatus, son to Lucius, went to seek this +Marcus, and threatening him with death if he did not withdraw the +charge against his father, compelled him to swear compliance; and he, +through fear, having sworn, kept his oath. In the first of these two +instances, therefore, citizens whom love of their country and its laws +could not have retained in Italy, were kept there by the oath forced +upon them; and in the second, the tribune Marcus, to keep his oath, +laid aside the hatred he bore the father, and overlooked the injury +done him by the son, and his own dishonour. And this from no other +cause than the religion which Numa had impressed upon this city. + +And it will be plain to any one who carefully studies Roman History, +how much religion helped in disciplining the army, in uniting the +people, in keeping good men good, and putting bad men to shame; so that +had it to be decided to which prince, Romulus or Numa, Rome owed the +greater debt, I think the balance must turn in favour of Numa; for when +religion is once established you may readily bring in arms; but where +you have arms without religion it is not easy afterwards to bring in +religion. We see, too, that while Romulus in order to create a senate, +and to establish his other ordinances civil and military, needed no +support from Divine authority, this was very necessary to Numa, who +feigned to have intercourse with a Nymph by whose advice he was guided +in counselling the people. And this, because desiring to introduce in +Rome new and untried institutions, he feared that his own authority +might not effect his end. Nor, indeed, has any attempt ever been made +to introduce unusual laws among a people, without resorting to Divine +authority, since without such sanction they never would have been +accepted. For the wise recognize many things to be good which do not +bear such reasons on the face of them as command their acceptance by +others; wherefore, wise men who would obviate these difficulties, have +recourse to Divine aid. Thus did Lycurgus, thus Solon, and thus have +done many besides who have had the same end in view. + +The Romans, accordingly, admiring the prudence and virtues of Numa, +assented to all the measures which he recommended. This, however, is to +be said, that the circumstance of these times being deeply tinctured +with religious feeling, and of the men with whom he had to deal being +rude and ignorant, gave Numa better facility to carry out his plans, as +enabling him to mould his subjects readily to any new impression. And, +doubtless, he who should seek at the present day to form a new +commonwealth, would find the task easier among a race of simple +mountaineers, than among the dwellers in cities where society is +corrupt; as the sculptor can more easily carve a fair statue from a +rough block, than from the block which has been badly shaped out by +another. But taking all this into account, I maintain that the religion +introduced by Numa was one of the chief causes of the prosperity of +Rome, since it gave rise to good ordinances, which in turn brought with +them good fortune, and with good fortune, happy issues to whatsoever +was undertaken. + +And as the observance of the ordinances of religion is the cause of the +greatness of a State, so their neglect is the occasion of its decline; +since a kingdom without the fear of God must either fall to pieces, or +must be maintained by the fear of some prince who supplies that +influence not supplied by religion. But since the lives of princes are +short, the life of this prince, also, and with it his influence, must +soon come to an end; whence it happens that a kingdom which rests +wholly on the qualities of its prince, lasts for a brief time only; +because these qualities, terminating with his life, are rarely renewed +in his successor. For as Dante wisely says:— + +“Seldom through the boughs +Doth human worth renew itself; for such +The will of Him who gives it, that to Him +We may ascribe it.”[1] + + + [1] Rade volta risurge per li rami +L’umana probitate: e questo vuole +Quei che la dà, perchè da lui si chiami. + _Purg_. vii. 121-123.] + + +It follows, therefore, that the safety of a commonwealth or kingdom +lies, not in its having a ruler who governs it prudently while he +lives, but in having one who so orders things, that when he dies, the +State may still maintain itself. And though it be easier to impose new +institutions or a new faith on rude and simple men, it is not therefore +impossible to persuade their adoption by men who are civilized, and who +do not think themselves rude. The people of Florence do not esteem +themselves rude or ignorant, and yet were persuaded by the Friar +Girolamo Savonarola that he spoke with God. Whether in this he said +truth or no, I take not on me to pronounce, since of so great a man we +must speak with reverence; but this I do say, that very many believed +him without having witnessed anything extraordinary to warrant their +belief; his life, his doctrines, the matter whereof he treated, being +sufficient to enlist their faith. + +Let no man, therefore, lose heart from thinking that he cannot do what +others have done before him; for, as I said in my Preface, men are +born, and live, and die, always in accordance with the same rules. + + + + +CHAPTER XII.—That it is of much moment to make account of Religion; and +that Italy, through the Roman Church, being wanting therein, has been +ruined. + + +Princes and commonwealths that would save themselves from growing +corrupted, should before all things keep uncorrupted the rites and +ceremonies of religion, and always hold them in reverence; since we can +have no surer sign of the decay of a province than to see Divine +worship held therein in contempt. This is easily understood when it is +seen on what foundation that religion rests in which a man is born. For +every religion has its root in certain fundamental ordinances peculiar +to itself. + +The religion of the Gentiles had its beginning in the responses of the +oracles and in the prognostics of the augurs and soothsayers. All their +other ceremonies and observances depended upon these; because men +naturally believed that the God who could forecast their future weal or +woe, could also bring them to pass. Wherefore the temples, the prayers, +the sacrifices, and all the other rites of their worship, had their +origin in this, that the oracles of Delos, of Dodona, and others +celebrated in antiquity, held the world admiring and devout. But, +afterwards, when these oracles began to shape their answers to suit the +interests of powerful men, and their impostures to be seen through by +the multitude, men grew incredulous and ready to overturn every sacred +institution. For which reason, the rulers of kingdoms and commonwealths +should maintain the foundations of the faith which they hold; since +thus it will be easy for them to keep their country religious, and, +consequently, virtuous and united. To which end they should countenance +and further whatsoever tells in favour of religion, even should they +think it untrue; and the wiser they are, and the better they are +acquainted with natural causes, the more ought they to do so. It is +from this course having been followed by the wise, that the miracles +celebrated even in false religions, have come to be held in repute; for +from whatever source they spring, discreet men will extol them, whose +authority afterwards gives them currency everywhere. + +These miracles were common enough in Rome, and among others this was +believed, that when the Roman soldiers were sacking the city of Veii, +certain of them entered the temple of Juno and spoke to the statue of +the goddess, saying, “_Wilt thou come with us to Rome?_” when to some +it seemed that she inclined her head in assent, and to others that they +heard her answer, “_Yea_.” For these men being filled with religious +awe (which Titus Livius shows us by the circumstance that, in entering +the temple, they entered devoutly, reverently, and without tumult), +persuaded themselves they heard that answer to their question, which, +perhaps, they had formed beforehand in their minds. But their faith and +belief were wholly approved of and confirmed by Camillus and by the +other chief men of the city. + +Had religion been maintained among the princes of Christendom on the +footing on which it was established by its Founder, the Christian +States and republics had been far more united and far more prosperous +than they now are; nor can we have surer proof of its decay than in +witnessing how those countries which are the nearest neighbours of the +Roman Church, the head of our faith, have less devoutness than any +others; so that any one who considers its earliest beginnings and +observes how widely different is its present practice, might well +believe its ruin or its chastisement to be close at hand. + +But since some are of opinion that the welfare of Italy depends upon +the Church of Rome, I desire to put forward certain arguments which +occur to me against that view, and shall adduce two very strong ones, +which, to my mind, admit of no answer. The first is, that, through the +ill example of the Roman Court, the country has lost all religious +feeling and devoutness, a loss which draws after it infinite mischiefs +and disorders; for as the presence of religion implies every +excellence, so the contrary is involved in its absence. To the Church, +therefore, and to the priests, we Italians owe this first debt, that +through them we have become wicked and irreligious. And a still greater +debt we owe them for what is the immediate cause of our ruin, namely, +that by the Church our country is kept divided. For no country was ever +united or prosperous which did not yield obedience to some one prince +or commonwealth, as has been the case with France and Spain. And the +Church is the sole cause why Italy stands on a different footing, and +is subject to no one king or commonwealth. For though she holds here +her seat, and exerts her temporal authority, she has never yet gained +strength and courage to seize upon the entire country, or make herself +supreme; yet never has been so weak that when in fear of losing her +temporal dominion, she could not call in some foreign potentate to aid +her against any Italian State by which she was overmatched. Of which we +find many instances, both in early times, as when by the intervention +of Charles the Great she drove the Lombards, who had made themselves +masters of nearly the whole country, out of Italy; and also in recent +times, as when, with the help of France, she first stripped the +Venetians of their territories, and then, with the help of the Swiss, +expelled the French. + +The Church, therefore, never being powerful enough herself to take +possession of the entire country, while, at the same time, preventing +any one else from doing so, has made it impossible to bring Italy under +one head; and has been the cause of her always living subject to many +princes or rulers, by whom she has been brought to such division and +weakness as to have become a prey, not to Barbarian kings only, but to +any who have thought fit to attack her. For this, I say, we Italians +have none to thank but the Church. And were any man powerful enough to +transplant the Court of Rome, with all the authority it now wields over +the rest of Italy, into the territories of the Swiss (the only people +who at this day, both as regards religion and military discipline, live +like the ancients,) he would have clear proof of the truth of what I +affirm, and would find that the corrupt manners of that Court had, in a +little while, wrought greater mischief in these territories than any +other disaster which could ever befall them. + + + + +CHAPTER XIII.—_Of the use the Romans made of Religion in giving +Institutions to their City, in carrying out their Enterprises, and in +quelling Tumults._ + + +Here it seems to me not out of place to cite instances of the Romans +seeking assistance from religion in reforming their institutions and in +carrying out their warlike designs. And although many such are related +by Titus Livius, I content myself with mentioning the following only: +The Romans having appointed tribunes with consular powers, all of them, +save one, plebeians, it so chanced that in that very year they were +visited by plague and famine, accompanied by many strange portents. +Taking occasion from this, the nobles, at the next creation of +tribunes, gave out that the gods were angry with Rome for lowering the +majesty of her government, nor could be appeased but by the choice of +tribunes being restored to a fair footing. Whereupon the people, +smitten with religious awe, chose all the tribunes from the nobles. +Again, at the siege of Veii, we find the Roman commanders making use of +religion to keep the minds of their men well disposed towards that +enterprise. For when, in the last year of the siege, the soldiers, +disgusted with their protracted service, began to clamour to be led +back to Rome, on the Alban lake suddenly rising to an uncommon height, +it was found that the oracles at Delphi and elsewhere had foretold that +Veii should fall that year in which the Alban lake overflowed. The hope +of near victory thus excited in the minds of the soldiers, led them to +put up with the weariness of the war, and to continue in arms; until, +on Camillus being named dictator, Veii was taken after a ten years’ +siege. In these cases, therefore, we see religion, wisely used, assist +in the reduction of this city, and in restoring the tribuneship to the +nobles; neither of which ends could well have been effected without it. + +One other example bearing on the same subject I must not omit. Constant +disturbances were occasioned in Rome by the tribune Terentillus, who, +for reasons to be noticed in their place, sought to pass a certain law. +The nobles, in their efforts to baffle him, had recourse to religion, +which they sought to turn to account in two ways. For first they caused +the Sibylline books to be searched, and a feigned answer returned, that +in that year the city ran great risk of losing its freedom through +civil discord; which fraud, although exposed by the tribunes, +nevertheless aroused such alarm in the minds of the commons that they +slackened in their support of their leaders. Their other contrivance +was as follows: A certain Appius Herdonius, at the head of a band of +slaves and outlaws, to the number of four thousand, having seized the +Capitol by night, an alarm was spread that were the Equians and +Volscians, those perpetual enemies of the Roman name, then to attack +the city, they might succeed in taking it. And when, in spite of this, +the tribunes stubbornly persisted in their efforts to pass the law, +declaring the act of Herdonius to be a device of the nobles and no real +danger. Publius Rubetius, a citizen of weight and authority, came forth +from the Senate House, and in words partly friendly and partly +menacing, showed them the peril in which the city stood, and that their +demands were unseasonable; and spoke to such effect that the commons +bound themselves by oath to stand by the consul; in fulfilment of which +engagement they aided the consul, Publius Valerius, to carry the +Capitol by assault. But Valerius being slain in the attack, Titus +Quintius was at once appointed in his place, who, to leave the people +no breathing time, nor suffer their thoughts to revert to the +Terentillian law, ordered them to quit Rome and march against the +Volscians; declaring them bound to follow him by virtue of the oath +they had sworn not to desert the consul. And though the tribunes +withstood him, contending that the oath had been sworn to the dead +consul and not to Quintius, yet the people under the influence of +religious awe, chose rather to obey the consul than believe the +tribunes. And Titus Livius commends their behaviour when he says: +“_That neglect of the gods which now prevails, had not then made its +way nor was it then the practice for every man to interpret his oath, +or the laws, to suit his private ends_.” The tribunes accordingly, +fearing to lose their entire ascendency, consented to obey the consul, +and to refrain for a year from moving in the matter of the Terentillian +law; while the consuls, on their part, undertook that for a year the +commons should not be called forth to war. And thus, with the help of +religion, the senate were able to overcome a difficulty which they +never could have overcome without it. + + + + +CHAPTER XIV.—_That the Romans interpreted the Auspices to meet the +occasion; and made a prudent show of observing the Rites of Religion +even when forced to disregard them; and any who rashly slighted +Religion they punished._ + + +Auguries were not only, as we have shown above, a main foundation of +the old religion of the Gentiles, but were also the cause of the +prosperity of the Roman commonwealth. Accordingly, the Romans gave more +heed to these than to any other of their observances; resorting to them +in their consular comitia; in undertaking new enterprises; in calling +out their armies; in going into battle; and, in short, in every +business of importance, whether civil or military. Nor would they ever +set forth on any warlike expedition, until they had satisfied their +soldiers that the gods had promised them victory. + +Among other means of declaring the auguries, they had in their armies a +class of soothsayers, named by them _pullarii_, whom, when they desired +to give battle, they would ask to take the auspices, which they did by +observing the behaviour of fowls. If the fowls pecked, the engagement +was begun with a favourable omen. If they refused, battle was declined. +Nevertheless, when it was plain on the face of it that a certain course +had to be taken, they would take it at all hazards, even though the +auspices were adverse; contriving, however, to manage matters so +adroitly as not to appear to throw any slight on religion; as was done +by the consul Papirius in the great battle he fought with the Samnites +wherein that nation was finally broken and overthrown. For Papirius +being encamped over against the Samnites, and perceiving that if he +fought, victory was certain, and consequently being eager to engage, +desired the omens to be taken. The fowls refused to peck; but the chief +soothsayer observing the eagerness of the soldiers to fight and the +confidence felt both by them and by their captain, not to deprive the +army of such an opportunity of glory, reported to the consul that the +auspices were favourable. Whereupon Papirius began to array his army +for battle. But some among the soothsayers having divulged to certain +of the soldiers that the fowls had not pecked, this was told to Spurius +Papirius, the nephew of the consul, who reporting it to his uncle, the +latter straightway bade him mind his own business, for that so far as +he himself and the army were concerned, the auspices were fair; and if +the soothsayer had lied, the consequences were on his head. And that +the event might accord with the prognostics, he commanded his officers +to place the soothsayers in front of the battle. It so chanced that as +they advanced against the enemy, the chief soothsayer was killed by a +spear thrown by a Roman soldier; which, the consul hearing of, said, +“_All goes well, and as the Gods would have it, for by the death of +this liar the army is purged of blame and absolved from whatever +displeasure these may have conceived against it_.” And contriving, in +this way to make his designs tally with the auspices, he joined battle, +without the army knowing that the ordinances of religion had in any +degree been disregarded. + +But an opposite course was taken by Appius Pulcher, in Sicily, in the +first Carthaginian war. For desiring to join battle, he bade the +soothsayers take the auspices, and on their announcing that the fowls +refused to feed, he answered, “_Let us see, then, whether they will +drink,_” and, so saying, caused them to be thrown into the sea. After +which he fought and was defeated. For this he was condemned at Rome, +while Papirius was honoured; not so much because the one had gained +while the other had lost a battle, as because in their treatment of the +auspices the one had behaved discreetly, the other with rashness. And, +in truth, the sole object of this system of taking the auspices was to +insure the army joining battle with that confidence of success which +constantly leads to victory; a device followed not by the Romans only, +but by foreign nations as well; of which I shall give an example in the +following Chapter. + + + + +CHAPTER XV.—_How the Samnites, as a last resource in their broken +Fortunes, had recourse to Religion._ + + +The Samnites, who before had met with many defeats at the hands of the +Romans, were at last decisively routed by them in Etruria, where their +armies were cut to pieces and their commanders slain. And because their +allies also, such as the Etruscans, the Umbrians, and the Gauls, were +likewise vanquished, they “_could now no longer_” as Livius tells us, +“_either trust to their own strength or to foreign aid; yet, for all +that, would not cease from hostilities, nor resign themselves to +forfeit the liberty which they had unsuccessfully defended, preferring +new defeats to an inglorious submission._” They resolved, therefore, to +make a final effort; and as they knew that victory was only to be +secured by inspiring their soldiers with a stubborn courage, to which +end nothing could help so much as religion, at the instance of their +high priest, Ovius Paccius, they revived an ancient sacrificial rite +performed by them in the manner following. After offering solemn +sacrifice they caused all the captains of their armies, standing +between the slain victims and the smoking altars, to swear never to +abandon the war. They then summoned the common soldiers, one by one, +and before the same altars, and surrounded by a ring of many centurions +with drawn swords, first bound them by oath never to reveal what they +might see or hear; and then, after imprecating the Divine wrath, and +reciting the most terrible incantations, made them vow and swear to the +gods, as they would not have a curse light on their race and offspring, +to follow wherever their captains led, never to turn back from battle, +and to put any they saw turn back to death. Some who in their terror +declined to swear, were forthwith slain by the centurions. The rest, +warned by their cruel fate, complied. Assembling thereafter to the +number of forty thousand, one-half of whom, to render their appearance +of unusual splendour were clad in white, with plumes and crests over +their helmets, they took up their ground in the neighbourhood of +Aquilonia. But Papirius, being sent against them, bade his soldiers be +of good cheer, telling them “_that feathers made no wounds, and that a +Roman spear would pierce a painted shield;_” and to lessen the effect +which the oath taken by the Samnites had upon the minds of the Romans, +he said that such an oath must rather distract than strengthen those +bound by it, since they had to fear, at once, their enemies, their +comrades, and their Gods. In the battle which ensued, the Samnites were +routed, any firmness lent them by religion or by the oath they had +sworn, being balanced by the Roman valour, and the terror inspired by +past defeats. Still we see that, in their own judgment, they had no +other refuge to which to turn, nor other remedy for restoring their +broken hopes; and this is strong testimony to the spirit which religion +rightly used can arouse. + +Some of the incidents which I have now been considering may be thought +to relate rather to the foreign than to the domestic affairs of Rome, +which last alone form the proper subject of this Book; nevertheless +since the matter connects itself with one of the most important +institutions of the Roman republic, I have thought it convenient to +notice it here, so as not to divide the subject and be obliged to +return to it hereafter. + + + + +CHAPTER XVI.—_That a People accustomed to live under a Prince, if by +any accident it become free, can hardly preserve that Freedom._ + + +Should a people accustomed to live under a prince by any accident +become free, as did the Romans on the expulsion of the Tarquins, we +know from numberless instances recorded in ancient history, how hard it +will be for it to maintain that freedom. And this is no more than we +might expect. For a people in such circumstances may be likened to the +wild animal which, though destined by nature to roam at large in the +woods, has been reared in the cage and in constant confinement and +which, should it chance to be set free in the open country, being +unused to find its own food, and unfamiliar with the coverts where it +might lie concealed, falls a prey to the first who seeks to recapture +it. Even thus it fares with the people which has been accustomed to be +governed by others; since ignorant how to act by itself either for +attack or defence, and neither knowing foreign princes nor being known +of them, it is speedily brought back under the yoke, and often under a +heavier yoke than that from which it has just freed its neck. These +difficulties will be met with, even where the great body of the +citizens has not become wholly corrupted; but where the corruption is +complete, freedom, as shall presently be shown, is not merely fleeting +but impossible. Wherefore my remarks are to be taken as applying to +those States only wherein corruption has as yet made no great progress, +and in which there is more that is sound than unsound. + +To the difficulties above noticed, another has to be added, which is, +that a State in becoming free makes for itself bitter enemies but not +warm friends. All become its bitter enemies who, drawing their support +from the wealth of the tyrant, flourished under his government. For +these men, when the causes which made them powerful are withdrawn, can +no longer live contented, but are one and all impelled to attempt the +restoration of the tyranny in hopes of regaining their former +importance. On the other hand, as I have said, the State which becomes +free does not gain for itself warm friends. For a free government +bestows its honours and rewards in accordance with certain fixed rules, +and on considerations of merit, without which none is honoured or +rewarded. But when a man obtains only those honours or rewards which he +seems to himself to deserve, he will never admit that he is under any +obligation to those who bestow them. Moreover the common benefits that +all derive from a free government, which consist in the power to enjoy +what is our own, openly and undisturbed, in having to feel no anxiety +for the honour of wife or child, nor any fear for personal safety, are +hardly recognized by men while they still possess them, since none will +ever confess obligation to him who merely refrains from injury. For +these reasons, I repeat, a State which has recently become free, is +likely to have bitter enemies and no warm friends. + +Now, to meet these difficulties and their attendant disorders, there is +no more potent, effectual, wholesome, and necessary remedy than _to +slay the sons of Brutus_. They, as the historian tells us, were along +with other young Romans led to conspire against their country, simply +because the unusual privileges which they had enjoyed under the kings, +were withheld under the consuls; so that to them it seemed as though +the freedom of the people implied their servitude. Any one, therefore, +who undertakes to control a people, either as their prince or as the +head of a commonwealth, and does not make sure work with all who are +hostile to his new institutions, founds a government which cannot last +long. Undoubtedly those princes are to be reckoned unhappy, who, to +secure their position, are forced to advance by unusual and irregular +paths, and with the people for their enemies. For while he who has to +deal with a few adversaries only, can easily and without much or +serious difficulty secure himself, he who has an entire people against +him can never feel safe and the greater the severity he uses the weaker +his authority becomes; so that his best course is to strive to make the +people his friends. + +But since these views may seem to conflict with what I have said above, +treating there of a republic and here of a prince, that I may not have +to return to the subject again, I will in this place discuss it +briefly. Speaking, then of those princes who have become the tyrants of +their country, I say that the prince who seeks to gain over an +unfriendly people should first of all examine what it is the people +really desire, and he will always find that they desire two things: +first, to be revenged upon those who are the cause of their servitude; +and second, to regain their freedom. The first of these desires the +prince can gratify wholly, the second in part. As regards the former, +we have an instance exactly in point. Clearchus, tyrant of Heraclea, +being in exile, it so happened that on a feud arising between the +commons and the nobles of that city, the latter, perceiving they were +weaker than their adversaries, began to look with favour on Clearchus, +and conspiring with him, in opposition to the popular voice recalled +him to Heraclea and deprived the people of their freedom. Clearchus +finding himself thus placed between the arrogance of the nobles, whom +he could in no way either satisfy or correct, and the fury of the +people, who could not put up with the loss of their freedom, resolved +to rid himself at a stroke from the harassment of the nobles and +recommend himself to the people. Wherefore, watching his opportunity, +he caused all the nobles to be put to death, and thus, to the extreme +delight of the people, satisfied one of those desires by which they are +possessed, namely, the desire for vengeance. + +As for the other desire of the people, namely, to recover their +freedom, the prince, since he never can content them in this, should +examine what the causes are which make them long to be free; and he +will find a very few of them desiring freedom that they may obtain +power, but all the rest, whose number is countless, only desiring it +that they may live securely. For in all republics, whatever the form of +their government, barely forty or fifty citizens have any place in the +direction of affairs; who, from their number being so small, can easily +be reckoned with, either by making away with them, or by allowing them +such a share of honours as, looking to their position, may reasonably +content them. All those others whose sole aim it is to live safely, are +well contented where the prince enacts such laws and ordinances as +provide for the general security, while they establish his own +authority; and when he does this, and the people see that nothing +induces him to violate these laws, they soon begin to live happily and +without anxiety. Of this we have an example in the kingdom of France, +which enjoys perfect security from this cause alone, that its kings are +bound to compliance with an infinity of laws upon which the well-being +of the whole people depends. And he who gave this State its +constitution allowed its kings to do as they pleased as regards arms +and money; but provided that as regards everything else they should not +interfere save as the laws might direct. Those rulers, therefore, who +omit to provide sufficiently for the safety of their government at the +outset, must, like the Romans, do so on the first occasion which +offers; and whoever lets the occasion slip, will repent too late of not +having acted as he should. The Romans, however, being still uncorrupted +at the time when they recovered their freedom, were able, after slaying +the sons of Brutus and getting rid of the Tarquins, to maintain it with +all those safeguards and remedies which we have elsewhere considered. +But had they already become corrupted, no remedy could have been found, +either in Rome or out of it, by which their freedom could have been +secured; as I shall show in the following Chapter. + + + + +CHAPTER XVII.—_That a corrupt People obtaining Freedom can hardly +preserve it._ + + +I believe that if her kings had not been expelled, Rome must very soon +have become a weak and inconsiderable State. For seeing to what a pitch +of corruption these kings had come, we may conjecture that if two or +three more like reigns had followed, and the taint spread from the head +to the members, so soon as the latter became infected, cure would have +been hopeless. But from the head being removed while the trunk was +still sound, it was not difficult for the Romans to return to a free +and constitutional government. + +It may be assumed, however, as most certain, that a corrupted city +living under a prince can never recover its freedom, even were the +prince and all his line to be exterminated. For in such a city it must +necessarily happen that one prince will be replaced by another, and +that things will never settle down until a new lord be established; +unless, indeed, the combined goodness and valour of some one citizen +should maintain freedom, which, even then, will endure only for his +lifetime; as happened twice in Syracuse, first under the rule of Dion, +and again under that of Timoleon, whose virtues while they lived kept +their city free, but on whose death it fell once more under a tyranny. + +But the strongest example that can be given is that of Rome, which on +the expulsion of the Tarquins was able at once to seize on liberty and +to maintain it; yet, on the deaths of Cæsar, Caligula, and Nero, and on +the extinction of the Julian line, was not only unable to establish her +freedom, but did not even venture a step in that direction. Results so +opposite arising in one and the same city can only be accounted for by +this, that in the time of the Tarquins the Roman people were not yet +corrupted, but in these later times had become utterly corrupt. For on +the first occasion, nothing more was needed to prepare and determine +them to shake off their kings, than that they should be bound by oath +to suffer no king ever again to reign in Rome; whereas, afterwards, the +authority and austere virtue of Brutus, backed by all the legions of +the East, could not rouse them to maintain their hold of that freedom, +which he, following in the footsteps of the first Brutus, had won for +them; and this because of the corruption wherewith the people had been +infected by the Marian faction, whereof Cæsar becoming head, was able +so to blind the multitude that it saw not the yoke under which it was +about to lay its neck. + +Though this example of Rome be more complete than any other, I desire +to instance likewise, to the same effect, certain peoples well known in +our own days; and I maintain that no change, however grave or violent, +could ever restore freedom to Naples or Milan, because in these States +the entire body of the people has grown corrupted. And so we find that +Milan, although desirous to return to a free form of government, on the +death of Filippo Visconti, had neither the force nor the skill needed +to preserve it. + +Most fortunate, therefore, was it for Rome that her kings grew corrupt +soon, so as to be driven out before the taint of their corruption had +reached the vitals of the city. For it was because these were sound +that the endless commotions which took place in Rome, so far from being +hurtful, were, from their object being good, beneficial to the +commonwealth. From which we may draw this inference, that where the +body of the people is still sound, tumults and other like disorders do +little hurt, but that where it has become corrupted, laws, however well +devised, are of no advantage, unless imposed by some one whose +paramount authority causes them to be observed until the community be +once more restored to a sound and healthy condition. + +Whether this has ever happened I know not, nor whether it ever can +happen. For we see, as I have said a little way back, that a city which +owing to its pervading corruption has once begun to decline, if it is +to recover at all, must be saved not by the excellence of the people +collectively, but of some one man then living among them, on whose +death it at once relapses into its former plight; as happened with +Thebes, in which the virtue of Epaminondas made it possible while he +lived to preserve the form of a free Government, but which fell again +on his death into its old disorders; the reason being that hardly any +ruler lives so long as to have time to accustom to right methods a city +which has long been accustomed to wrong. Wherefore, unless things be +put on a sound footing by some one ruler who lives to a very advanced +age, or by two virtuous rulers succeeding one another, the city upon +their death at once falls back into ruin; or, if it be preserved, must +be so by incurring great risks, and at the cost of much blood. For the +corruption I speak of, is wholly incompatible with a free government, +because it results from an inequality which pervades the State and can +only be removed by employing unusual and very violent remedies, such as +few are willing or know how to employ, as in another place I shall more +fully explain. + + + + +CHAPTER XVIII.—_How a Free Government existing in a corrupt City may be +preserved, or not existing may be created._ + + +I think it neither out of place, nor inconsistent with what has been +said above, to consider whether a free government existing in a corrupt +city can be maintained, or, not existing, can be introduced. And on +this head I say that it is very difficult to bring about either of +these results, and next to impossible to lay down rules as to how it +may be done; because the measures to be taken must vary with the degree +of corruption which prevails. + +Nevertheless, since it is well to reason things out, I will not pass +this matter by, but will assume, in the first place, the case of a very +corrupt city, and then take the case of one in which corruption has +reached a still greater height; but where corruption is universal, no +laws or institutions will ever have force to restrain it. Because as +good customs stand in need of good laws for their support, so laws, +that they may be respected, stand in need of good customs. Moreover, +the laws and institutions established in a republic at its beginning, +when men were good, are no longer suitable when they have become bad; +but while the laws of a city are altered to suit its circumstances, its +institutions rarely or never change; whence it results that the +introduction of new laws is of no avail, because the institutions, +remaining unchanged, corrupt them. + +And to make this plainer, I say that in Rome it was first of all the +institutions of the State, and next the laws as enforced by the +magistrates, which kept the citizens under control. The institutions of +the State consisted in the authority of the people, the senate, the +tribunes, and the consuls; in the methods of choosing and appointing +magistrates; and in the arrangements for passing laws. These +institutions changed little, if at all, with circumstances. But the +laws by which the people were controlled, as for instance the law +relating to adultery, the sumptuary laws, the law as to canvassing at +elections, and many others, were altered as the citizens grew more and +more corrupted. Hence, the institutions of the State remaining the same +although from the corruption of the people no longer suitable, +amendments in the laws could not keep men good, though they might have +proved very useful if at the time when they were made the institutions +had likewise been reformed. + +That its original institutions are no longer adapted to a city that has +become corrupted, is plainly seen in two matters of great moment, I +mean in the appointment of magistrates and in the passing of laws. For +the Roman people conferred the consulship and other great offices of +their State on none save those who sought them; which was a good +institution at first, because then none sought these offices save those +who thought themselves worthy of them, and to be rejected was held +disgraceful; so that, to be deemed worthy, all were on their best +behaviour. But in a corrupted city this institution grew to be most +mischievous. For it was no longer those of greatest worth, but those +who had most influence, who sought the magistracies; while all who were +without influence, however deserving, refrained through fear. This +untoward result was not reached all at once, but like other similar +results, by gradual steps. For after subduing Africa and Asia, and +reducing nearly the whole of Greece to submission, the Romans became +perfectly assured of their freedom, and seemed to themselves no longer +to have any enemy whom they had cause to fear. But this security and +the weakness of their adversaries led them in conferring the +consulship, no longer to look to merit, but only to favour, selecting +for the office those who knew best how to pay court to them, not those +who knew best how to vanquish their enemies. And afterwards, instead of +selecting those who were best liked, they came to select those who had +most influence; and in this way, from the imperfection of their +institutions, good men came to be wholly excluded. + +Again, as to making laws, any of the tribunes and certain others of the +magistrates were entitled to submit laws to the people; but before +these were passed it was open to every citizen to speak either for or +against them. This was a good system so long as the citizens were good, +since it is always well that every man should be able to propose what +he thinks may be of use to his country, and that all should be allowed +to express their views with regard to his proposal; so that the people, +having heard all, may resolve on what is best. But when the people grew +depraved, this became a very mischievous institution; for then it was +only the powerful who proposed laws, and these not in the interest of +public freedom but of their own authority; and because, through fear, +none durst speak against the laws they proposed, the people were either +deceived or forced into voting their own destruction. + +In order, therefore, that Rome after she had become corrupted might +still preserve her freedom, it was necessary that, as in the course of +events she had made new laws, so likewise she should frame new +institutions, since different institutions and ordinances are needed in +a corrupt State from those which suit a State which is not corrupted; +for where the matter is wholly dissimilar, the form cannot be similar. + +But since old institutions must either be reformed all at once, as soon +as they are seen to be no longer expedient, or else gradually, as the +imperfection of each is recognized, I say that each of these two +courses is all but impossible. For to effect a gradual reform requires +a sagacious man who can discern mischief while it is still remote and +in the germ. But it may well happen that no such person is found in a +city; or that, if found, he is unable to persuade others of what he is +himself persuaded. For men used to live in one way are loath to leave +it for another, especially when they are not brought face to face with +the evil against which they should guard, and only have it indicated to +them by conjecture. And as for a sudden reform of institutions which +are seen by all to be no longer good, I say that defects which are +easily discerned are not easily corrected, because for their correction +it is not enough to use ordinary means, these being in themselves +insufficient; but recourse must be had to extraordinary means, such as +violence and arms; and, as a preliminary, you must become prince of the +city, and be able to deal with it at your pleasure. But since the +restoration of a State to new political life presupposes a good man, +and to become prince of a city by violence presupposes a bad man, it +can, consequently, very seldom happen that, although the end be good, a +good man will be found ready to become a prince by evil ways, or that a +bad man having become a prince will be disposed to act virtuously, or +think of turning to good account his ill-acquired authority. + +From all these causes comes the difficulty, or rather the +impossibility, which a corrupted city finds in maintaining an existing +free government, or in establishing a new one. So that had we to +establish or maintain a government in that city, it would be necessary +to give it a monarchical, rather than a popular form, in order that men +too arrogant to be restrained by the laws, might in some measure be +kept in check by a power almost absolute; since to attempt to make them +good otherwise would be a very cruel or a wholly futile endeavour. +This, as I have said, was the method followed by Cleomenes; and if he, +that he might stand alone, put to death the Ephori; and if Romulus, +with a like object, put to death his brother and Titus Tatius the +Sabine, and if both afterwards made good use of the authority they thus +acquired, it is nevertheless to be remembered that it was because +neither Cleomenes nor Romulus had to deal with so corrupt a people as +that of which I am now speaking, that they were able to effect their +ends and to give a fair colour to their acts. + + + + +CHAPTER XIX.—_After a strong Prince a weak Prince may maintain himself: +but after one weak Prince no Kingdom can stand a second._ + + +When we contemplate the excellent qualities of Romulus, Numa, and +Tullus, the first three kings of Rome, and note the methods which they +followed, we recognize the extreme good fortune of that city in having +her first king fierce and warlike, her second peaceful and religious, +and her third, like the first, of a high spirit and more disposed to +war than to peace. For it was essential for Rome that almost at the +outset of her career, a ruler should be found to lay the foundations of +her civil life; but, after that had been done, it was necessary that +her rulers should return to the virtues of Romulus, since otherwise the +city must have grown feeble, and become a prey to her neighbours. + +And here we may note that a prince who succeeds to another of superior +valour, may reign on by virtue of his predecessor’s merits, and reap +the fruits of his labours; but if he live to a great age, or if he be +followed by another who is wanting in the qualities of the first, that +then the kingdom must necessarily dwindle. Conversely, when two +consecutive princes are of rare excellence, we commonly find them +achieving results which win for them enduring renown. David, for +example, not only surpassed in learning and judgment, but was so +valiant in arms that, after conquering and subduing all his neighbours, +he left to his young son Solomon a tranquil State, which the latter, +though unskilled in the arts of war, could maintain by the arts of +peace, and thus happily enjoy the inheritance of his father’s valour. +But Solomon could not transmit this inheritance to his son Rehoboam, +who neither resembling his grandfather in valour, nor his father in +good fortune, with difficulty made good his right to a sixth part of +the kingdom. In like manner Bajazet, sultan of the Turks, though a man +of peace rather than of war, was able to enjoy the labours of Mahomet +his father, who, like David, having subdued his neighbours, left his +son a kingdom so safely established that it could easily be retained by +him by peaceful arts. But had Selim, son to Bajazet, been like his +father, and not like his grandfather, the Turkish monarchy must have +been overthrown; as it is, he seems likely to outdo the fame of his +grandsire. + +I affirm it to be proved by these examples, that after a valiant prince +a feeble prince may maintain himself; but that no kingdom can stand +when two feeble princes follow in succession, unless, as in the case of +France, it be supported by its ancient ordinances. By feeble princes, I +mean such as are not valiant in war. And, to put the matter shortly, it +may be said, that the great valour of Romulus left Numa a period of +many years within which to govern Rome by peaceful arts; that after +Numa came Tullus, who renewed by his courage the fame of Romulus; and +that he in turn was succeeded by Ancus, a prince so gifted by nature +that he could equally avail himself of the methods of peace or war; who +setting himself at first to pursue the former, when he found that his +neighbours judged him to be effeminate, and therefore held him in +slight esteem, understood that to preserve Rome he must resort to arms +and resemble Romulus rather than Numa. From whose example every ruler +of a State may learn that a prince like Numa will hold or lose his +power according as fortune and circumstances befriend him; but that the +prince who resembles Romulus, and like him is fortified with foresight +and arms, will hold his State whatever befall, unless deprived of it by +some stubborn and irresistible force. For we may reckon with certainty +that if Rome had not had for her third king one who knew how to restore +her credit by deeds of valour, she could not, or at any rate not +without great difficulty, have afterwards held her ground, nor could +ever have achieved the great exploits she did. + +And for these reasons Rome, while she lived under her kings, was in +constant danger of destruction through a king who might be weak or bad. + + + + +CHAPTER XX.—_That the consecutive Reigns of two valiant Princes produce +great results: and that well-ordered Commonwealths are assured of a +Succession of valiant Rulers by whom their Power and Growth are rapidly +extended_. + + +When Rome had driven out her kings, she was freed from those dangers to +which, as I have said, she was exposed by the possible succession of a +weak or wicked prince. For the chief share in the government then +devolved upon the consuls, who took their authority not by inheritance, +nor yet by craft or by ambitious violence, but by the free suffrages of +their fellow-citizens, and were always men of signal worth; by whose +valour and good fortune Rome being constantly aided, was able to reach +the height of her greatness in the same number of years as she had +lived under her kings. And since we find that two successive reigns of +valiant princes, as of Philip of Macedon and his son Alexander, suffice +to conquer the world, this ought to be still easier for a commonwealth, +which has it in its power to choose, not two excellent rulers only, but +an endless number in succession. And in every well ordered commonwealth +provision will be made for a succession of this sort. + + + + +CHAPTER XXI.—_That it is a great reproach to a Prince or to a +Commonwealth to be without a national Army_. + + +Those princes and republics of the present day who lack forces of their +own, whether for attack or defence, should take shame to themselves, +and should be convinced by the example of Tullus, that their deficiency +does not arise from want of men fit for warlike enterprises, but from +their own fault in not knowing how to make their subjects good +soldiers. For after Rome had been at peace for forty years, Tullus, +succeeding to the kingdom, found not a single Roman who had ever been +in battle. Nevertheless when he made up his mind to enter on a war, it +never occurred to him to have recourse to the Samnites, or the +Etruscans, or to any other of the neighbouring nations accustomed to +arms, but he resolved, like the prudent prince he was, to rely on his +own countrymen. And such was his ability that, under his rule, the +people very soon became admirable soldiers. For nothing is more true +than that where a country, having men, lacks soldiers, it results from +some fault in its ruler, and not from any defect in the situation or +climate. Of this we have a very recent instance. Every one knows, how, +only the other day, the King of England invaded the realm of France +with an army raised wholly from among his own people, although from his +country having been at peace for thirty years, he had neither men nor +officers who had ever looked an enemy in the face. Nevertheless, he did +not hesitate with such troops as he had, to attack a kingdom well +provided with officers and excellent soldiers who had been constantly +under arms in the Italian wars. And this was possible through the +prudence of the English king and the wise ordinances of his kingdom, +which never in time of peace relaxes its warlike discipline. So too, in +old times, Pelopidas and Epaminondas the Thebans, after they had freed +Thebes from her tyrants, and rescued her from thraldom to Sparta, +finding themselves in a city used to servitude and surrounded by an +effeminate people, scrupled not, so great was their courage, to furnish +these with arms, and go forth with them to meet and to conquer the +Spartan forces on the field. And he who relates this, observes, that +these two captains very soon showed that warriors are not bred in +Lacedæmon alone, but in every country where men are found, if only some +one arise among them who knows how to direct them to arms; as we see +Tullus knew how to direct the Romans. Nor could Virgil better express +this opinion, or show by fitter words that he was convinced of its +truth than, when he says:— + +“To arms shall Tullus rouse +His sluggish warriors.”[2] + + + [2] Residesque movebit +Tullus in arma viros. _Virg. Aen_. vi. 814. + + + + +CHAPTER XXII.—_What is to be noted in the combat of the three Roman +Horatii and the three Alban Curiatii_. + + +It was agreed between Tullus king of Rome, and Metius king of Alba, +that the nation whose champions were victorious in combat should rule +over the other. The three Alban Curiatii were slain; one of the Roman +Horatii survived. Whereupon the Alban king with all his people became +subject to the Romans. The surviving Horatius returning victorious to +Rome, and meeting his sister, wife to one of the dead Curiatii, +bewailing the death of her husband, slew her; and being tried for this +crime, was, after much contention, liberated, rather on the entreaties +of his father than for his own deserts. + +Herein three points are to be noted. _First_, that we should never +peril our whole fortunes on the success of only a part of our forces. +_Second_, that in a well-governed State, merit should never be allowed +to balance crime. And _third_, that those are never wise covenants +which we cannot or should not expect to be observed. Now, for a State +to be enslaved is so terrible a calamity that it ought never to have +been supposed possible that either of these kings or nations would rest +content under a slavery resulting from the defeat of three only of +their number. And so it appeared to Metius; for although on the victory +of the Roman champions, he at once confessed himself vanquished, and +promised obedience; nevertheless, in the very first expedition which he +and Tullus undertook jointly against the people of Veii, we find him +seeking to circumvent the Roman, as though perceiving too late the rash +part he had played. + +This is enough to say of the third point which I noted as deserving +attention. Of the other two I shall speak in the next two Chapters. + + + + +CHAPTER XXIII.—_That we should never hazard our whole Fortunes where we +put not forth our entire Strength; for which reason to guard a Defile +is often hurtful_. + + +It was never judged a prudent course to peril your whole fortunes where +you put not forth your whole strength; as may happen in more ways than +one. One of these ways was that taken by Tullus and Metius, when each +staked the existence of his country and the credit of his army on the +valour and good fortune of three only of his soldiers, that being an +utterly insignificant fraction of the force at his disposal. For +neither of these kings reflected that all the labours of their +predecessors in framing such institutions for their States, as might, +with the aid of the citizens themselves, maintain them long in freedom, +were rendered futile, when the power to ruin all was left in the hands +of so small a number. No rasher step, therefore, could have been taken, +than was taken by these kings. + +A like risk is almost always incurred by those who, on the approach of +an enemy, resolve to defend some place of strength, or to guard the +defiles by which their country is entered. For unless room be found in +this place of strength for almost all your army, the attempt to hold it +will almost always prove hurtful. If you can find room, it will be +right to defend your strong places; but if these be difficult of +access, and you cannot there keep your entire force together, the +effort to defend is mischievous. I come to this conclusion from +observing the example of those who, although their territories be +enclosed by mountains and precipices, have not, on being attacked by +powerful enemies, attempted to fight on the mountains or in the +defiles, but have advanced beyond them to meet their foes; or, if +unwilling to advance, have awaited attack behind their mountains, on +level and not on broken ground. The reason of which is, as I have above +explained, that many men cannot be assembled in these strong places for +their defence; partly because a large number of men cannot long subsist +there, and partly because such places being narrow and confined, afford +room for a few only; so that no enemy can there be withstood, who comes +in force to the attack; which he can easily do, his design being to +pass on and not to make a stay; whereas he who stands on the defensive +cannot do so in force, because, from not knowing when the enemy may +enter the confined and sterile tracts of which I speak, he may have to +lodge himself there for a long time. But should you lose some pass +which you had reckoned on holding, and on the defence of which your +country and army have relied, there commonly follows such panic among +your people and among the troops which remain to you, that you are +vanquished without opportunity given for any display of valour, and +lose everything without bringing all your resources into play. + +Every one has heard with what difficulty Hannibal crossed the Alps +which divide France from Lombardy, and afterwards those which separate +Lombardy from Tuscany. Nevertheless the Romans awaited him, in the +first instance on the banks of the Ticino, in the second on the plain +of Arezzo, preferring to be defeated on ground which at least gave them +a chance of victory, to leading their army into mountain fastnesses +where it was likely to be destroyed by the mere difficulties of the +ground. And any who read history with attention will find, that very +few capable commanders have attempted to hold passes of this nature, as +well for the reasons already given, as because to close them all were +impossible. For mountains, like plains, are traversed not only by +well-known and frequented roads, but also by many by-ways, which, +though unknown to strangers, are familiar to the people of the country, +under whose guidance you may always, and in spite of any opposition, be +easily conducted to whatever point you please. Of this we have a recent +instance in the events of the year 1515. For when Francis I. of France +resolved on invading Italy in order to recover the province of +Lombardy, those hostile to his attempt looked mainly to the Swiss, who +it was hoped would stop him in passing through their mountains. But +this hope was disappointed by the event. For leaving on one side two or +three defiles which were guarded by the Swiss, the king advanced by +another unknown pass, and was in Italy and upon his enemies before they +knew. Whereupon they fled terror-stricken into Milan; while the whole +population of Lombardy, finding themselves deceived in their +expectation that the French would be detained in the mountains, went +over to their side. + + + + +CHAPTER XXIV.—_That well-ordered States always provide Rewards and +Punishments for their Citizens; and never set off Deserts against +Misdeeds_. + + +The valour of Horatius in vanquishing the Curiatii deserved the highest +reward. But in slaying his sister he had been guilty of a heinous +crime. And so displeasing to the Romans was an outrage of this nature, +that although his services were so great and so recent, they brought +him to trial for his life. To one looking at it carelessly, this might +seem an instance of popular ingratitude, but he who considers the +matter more closely, and examines with sounder judgment what the +ordinances of a State should be, will rather blame the Roman people for +acquitting Horatius than for putting him on his trial. And this because +no well-ordered State ever strikes a balance between the services of +its citizens and their misdeeds; but appointing rewards for good +actions and punishment for bad, when it has rewarded a man for acting +well, will afterwards, should he act ill, chastise him, without regard +to his former deserts. When these ordinances are duly observed, a city +will live long in freedom, but when they are neglected, it must soon +come to ruin. For when a citizen has rendered some splendid service to +his country, if to the distinction which his action in itself confers, +were added an over-weening confidence that any crime he might +thenceforth commit would pass unpunished, he would soon become so +arrogant that no civil bonds could restrain him. + +Still, while we would have punishment terrible to wrongdoers, it is +essential that good actions should be rewarded, as we see to have been +the case in Rome. For even where a republic is poor, and has but little +to give, it ought not to withhold that little; since a gift, however +small, bestowed as a reward for services however great, will always be +esteemed most honourable and precious by him who receives it. The story +of Horatius Cocles and that of Mutius Scævola are well known: how the +one withstood the enemy on the bridge while it was being cut down, and +the other thrust his hand into the fire in punishment of the mistake +made when he sought the life of Porsenna the Etruscan king. To each of +these two, in requital of their splendid deeds, two ploughgates only of +the public land were given. Another famous story is that of Manlius +Capitolinus, to whom, for having saved the Capitol from the besieging +Gauls, a small measure of meal was given by each of those who were shut +up with him during the siege. Which recompense, in proportion to the +wealth of the citizens of Rome at that time, was thought ample; so that +afterwards, when Manlius, moved by jealousy and malice, sought to +arouse sedition in Rome, and to gain over the people to his cause, they +without regard to his past services threw him headlong from that +Capitol in saving which he had formerly gained so great a renown. + + + + +CHAPTER XXV.—_That he who would reform the Institutions of a free +State, must retain at least the semblance of old Ways._ + + +Whoever takes upon him to reform the government of a city, must, if his +measures are to be well received and carried out with general approval, +preserve at least the semblance of existing methods, so as not to +appear to the people to have made any change in the old order of +things; although, in truth, the new ordinances differ altogether from +those which they replace. For when this is attended to, the mass of +mankind accept what seems as what is; nay, are often touched more +nearly by appearances than by realities. + +This tendency being recognized by the Romans at the very outset of +their civil freedom, when they appointed two consuls in place of a +single king, they would not permit the consuls to have more than twelve +lictors, in order that the old number of the king’s attendants might +not be exceeded. Again, there being solemnized every year in Rome a +sacrificial rite which could only be performed by the king in person, +that the people might not be led by the absence of the king to remark +the want of any ancient observance, a priest was appointed for the due +celebration of this rite, to whom was given the name of _Rex +sacrificulus_, and who was placed under the orders of the chief priest. +In this way the people were contented, and had no occasion from any +defect in the solemnities to desire the return of their kings. Like +precautions should be used by all who would put an end to the old +government of a city and substitute new and free institutions. For +since novelty disturbs men’s minds, we should seek in the changes we +make to preserve as far as possible what is ancient, so that if the new +magistrates differ from the old in number, in authority, or in the +duration of their office, they shall at least retain the old names. + +This, I say, should be seen to by him who would establish a +constitutional government, whether in the form of a commonwealth or of +a kingdom. But he who would create an absolute government of the kind +which political writers term a tyranny, must renew everything, as shall +be explained in the following Chapter. + + + + +CHAPTER XXVI.—_A new Prince in a City or Province of which he has taken +Possession, ought to make Everything new._ + + +Whosoever becomes prince of a city or State, more especially if his +position be so insecure that he cannot resort to constitutional +government either in the form of a republic or a monarchy, will find +that the best way to preserve his princedom is to renew the whole +institutions of that State; that is to say, to create new magistracies +with new names, confer new powers, and employ new men, and like David +when he became king, exalt the humble and depress the great, “_filling +the hungry with good things, and sending the rich empty away_.” +Moreover, he must pull down existing towns and rebuild them, removing +their inhabitants from one place to another; and, in short, leave +nothing in the country as he found it; so that there shall be neither +rank, nor condition, nor honour, nor wealth which its possessor can +refer to any but to him. And he must take example from Philip of +Macedon, the father of Alexander, who by means such as these, from +being a petty prince became monarch of all Greece; and of whom it was +written that he shifted men from province to province as a shepherd +moves his flocks from one pasture to another. + +These indeed are most cruel expedients, contrary not merely to every +Christian, but to every civilized rule of conduct, and such as every +man should shun, choosing rather to lead a private life than to be a +king on terms so hurtful to mankind. But he who will not keep to the +fair path of virtue, must to maintain himself enter this path of evil. +Men, however, not knowing how to be wholly good or wholly bad, choose +for themselves certain middle ways, which of all others are the most +pernicious, as shall be shown by an instance in the following Chapter. + + + + +CHAPTER XXVII.—_That Men seldom know how to be wholly good or wholly +bad_. + + +When in the year 1505, Pope Julius II. went to Bologna to expel from +that city the family of the Bentivogli, who had been princes there for +over a hundred years, it was also in his mind, as a part of the general +design he had planned against all those lords who had usurped Church +lands, to remove Giovanpagolo Baglioni, tyrant of Perugia. And coming +to Perugia with this intention and resolve, of which all men knew, he +would not wait to enter the town with a force sufficient for his +protection, but entered it unattended by troops, although Giovanpagolo +was there with a great company of soldiers whom he had assembled for +his defence. And thus, urged on by that impetuosity which stamped all +his actions, accompanied only by his body-guard, he committed himself +into the hands of his enemy, whom he forthwith carried away with him, +leaving a governor behind to hold the town for the Church. All prudent +men who were with the Pope remarked on his temerity, and on the +pusillanimity of Giovanpagolo; nor could they conjecture why the latter +had not, to his eternal glory, availed himself of this opportunity for +crushing his enemy, and at the same time enriching himself with +plunder, the Pope being attended by the whole College of Cardinals with +all their luxurious equipage. For it could not be supposed that he was +withheld by any promptings of goodness or scruples of conscience; +because in the breast of a profligate living in incest with his sister, +and who to obtain the princedom had put his nephews and kinsmen to +death, no virtuous impulse could prevail. So that the only inference to +be drawn was, that men know not how to be splendidly wicked or wholly +good, and shrink in consequence from such crimes as are stamped with an +inherent greatness or disclose a nobility of nature. For which reason +Giovanpagolo, who thought nothing of incurring the guilt of incest, or +of murdering his kinsmen, could not, or more truly durst not, avail +himself of a fair occasion to do a deed which all would have admired; +which would have won for him a deathless fame as the first to teach the +prelates how little those who live and reign as they do are to be +esteemed; and which would have displayed a greatness far transcending +any infamy or danger that could attach to it. + + + + +CHAPTER XXVIII.—_Whence it came that the Romans were less ungrateful to +their Citizens than were the Athenians_. + + +In the histories of all republics we meet with instances of some sort +of ingratitude to their great citizens, but fewer in the history of +Rome than of Athens, or indeed of any other republic. Searching for the +cause of this, I am persuaded that, so far as regards Rome and Athens, +it was due to the Romans having had less occasion than the Athenians to +look upon their fellow-citizens with suspicion. For, from the expulsion +of her kings down to the times of Sylla and Marius, the liberty of Rome +was never subverted by any one of her citizens; so that there never was +in that city grave cause for distrusting any man, and in consequence +making him the victim of inconsiderate injustice. The reverse was +notoriously the case with Athens; for that city, having, at a time when +she was most flourishing, been deprived of her freedom by Pisistratus +under a false show of good-will, remembering, after she regained her +liberty, her former bondage and all the wrongs she had endured, became +the relentless chastiser, not of offences only on the part of her +citizens, but even of the shadow of an offence. Hence the banishment +and death of so many excellent men, and hence the law of ostracism, and +all those other violent measures which from time to time during the +history of that city were directed against her foremost citizens. For +this is most true which is asserted by the writers on civil government, +that a people which has recovered its freedom, bites more fiercely than +one which has always preserved it. + +And any who shall weigh well what has been said, will not condemn +Athens in this matter, nor commend Rome, but refer all to the necessity +arising out of the different conditions prevailing in the two States. +For careful reflection will show that had Rome been deprived of her +freedom as Athens was, she would not have been a whit more tender to +her citizens. This we may reasonably infer from remarking what, after +the expulsion of the kings, befell Collatinus and Publius Valerius; the +former of whom, though he had taken part in the liberation of Rome, was +sent into exile for no other reason than that he bore the name of +Tarquin; while the sole ground of suspicion against the latter, and +what almost led to his banishment, was his having built a house upon +the Cælian hill. Seeing how harsh and suspicious Rome was in these two +instances, we may surmise that she would have shown the same +ingratitude as Athens, had she, like Athens, been wronged by her +citizens at an early stage of her growth, and before she had attained +to the fulness of her strength. + +That I may not have to return to this question of ingratitude, I shall +say all that remains to be said about it in my next Chapter. + + + + +CHAPTER XXIX.—_Whether a People or a Prince is the more ungrateful._ + + +In connection with what has been said above, it seems proper to +consider whether more notable instances of ingratitude are supplied by +princes or peoples. And, to go to the root of the matter, I affirm that +this vice of ingratitude has its source either in avarice or in +suspicion. For a prince or people when they have sent forth a captain +on some important enterprise, by succeeding in which he earns a great +name, are bound in return to reward him; and if moved by avarice and +covetousness they fail to do so, or if, instead of rewarding, they +wrong and disgrace him, they commit an error which is not only without +excuse, but brings with it undying infamy. And, in fact, we find many +princes who have sinned in this way, for the cause given by Cornelius +Tacitus when he says, that “_men are readier to pay back injuries than +benefits, since to requite a benefit is felt to be a burthen, to return +an injury a gain_.”[3] + + [3] Proclivius est injuriæ quam beneficio vicem exsolvere, quia gratia + oneri, ultio in quastu habetur. _Tacit. Hist._ iv. 2. + + +When, however, reward is withheld, or, to speak more correctly, where +offence is given, not from avarice but from suspicion, the prince or +people may deserve some excuse; and we read of many instances of +ingratitude proceeding from this cause. For the captain who by his +valour has won new dominions for his prince, since while overcoming his +enemies, he at the same time covers himself with glory and enriches his +soldiers, must needs acquire such credit with his own followers, and +with the enemy, and also with the subjects of his prince, as cannot be +wholly agreeable to the master who sent him forth. And since men are by +nature ambitious as well as jealous, and none loves to set a limit to +his fortunes, the suspicion which at once lays hold of the prince when +he sees his captain victorious, is sure to be inflamed by some arrogant +act or word of the captain himself. So that the prince will be unable +to think of anything but how to secure himself; and to this end will +contrive how he may put his captain to death, or at any rate deprive +him of the credit he has gained with the army and among the people; +doing all he can to show that the victory was not won by his valour, +but by good fortune, or by the cowardice of the enemy, or by the skill +and prudence of those commanders who were with him at this or the other +battle. + +After Vespasian, who was then in Judæa, had been proclaimed emperor by +his army, Antonius Primus, who commanded another army in Illyria, +adopted his cause, and marching into Italy against Vitellius who had +been proclaimed emperor in Rome, courageously defeated two armies under +that prince, and occupied Rome; so that Mutianus, who was sent thither +by Vespasian, found everything done to his hand, and all difficulties +surmounted by the valour of Antonius. But all the reward which Antonius +had for his pains, was, that Mutianus forthwith deprived him of his +command of the army, and by degrees diminished his authority in Rome +till none was left him. Thereupon Antonius went to join Vespasian, who +was still in Asia; by whom he was so coldly received and so little +considered, that in despair he put himself to death. And of cases like +this, history is full. Every man living at the present hour knows with +what zeal and courage Gonsalvo of Cordova, while conducting the war in +Naples against the French, conquered and subdued that kingdom for his +master Ferdinand of Aragon; and how his services were requited by +Ferdinand coming from Aragon to Naples, and first of all depriving him +of the command of the army, afterwards of the fortresses, and finally +carrying him back with him to Spain, where soon after he died in +disgrace. + +This jealousy, then, is so natural to princes, that they cannot guard +themselves against it, nor show gratitude to those who serving under +their standard have gained great victories and made great conquests on +their behalf. And if it be impossible for princes to free their minds +from such suspicions, there is nothing strange or surprising that a +people should be unable to do so. For as a city living under free +institutions has two ends always before it, namely to acquire liberty +and to preserve it, it must of necessity be led by its excessive +passion for liberty to make mistakes in the pursuit of both these +objects. Of the mistakes it commits in the effort to acquire liberty, I +shall speak, hereafter, in the proper place. Of mistakes committed in +the endeavour to preserve liberty are to be noted, the injuring those +citizens who ought to be rewarded, and the suspecting those who should +be trusted. Now, although in a State which has grown corrupt these +errors occasion great evils, and commonly lead to a tyranny, as +happened in Rome when Cæsar took by force what ingratitude had denied +him, they are nevertheless the cause of much good in the republic which +has not been corrupted, since they prolong the duration of its free +institutions, and make men, through fear of punishment, better and less +ambitious. Of all peoples possessed of great power, the Romans, for the +reasons I have given, have undoubtedly been the least ungrateful, since +we have no other instance of their ingratitude to cite, save that of +Scipio. For both Coriolanus and Camillus were banished on account of +the wrongs which they inflicted on the commons; and though the former +was not forgiven because he constantly retained ill will against the +people, the latter was not only recalled, but for the rest of his life +honoured as a prince. But the ingratitude shown towards Scipio arose +from the suspicion wherewith the citizens came to regard him, which +they had not felt in the case of the others, and which was occasioned +by the greatness of the enemy whom he had overthrown, the fame he had +won by prevailing in so dangerous and protracted a war, the suddenness +of his victories, and, finally, the favour which his youth, together +with his prudence and his other memorable qualities had gained for him. +These qualities were, in truth, so remarkable that the very +magistrates, not to speak of others, stood in awe of his authority, a +circumstance displeasing to prudent citizens, as before unheard of in +Rome. In short, his whole bearing and character were so much out of the +common, that even the elder Cato, so celebrated for his austere virtue, +was the first to declare against him, saying that no city could be +deemed free which contained a citizen who was feared by the +magistrates. And since, in this instance, the Romans followed the +opinion of Cato, they merit that excuse which, as I have said already, +should be extended to the prince or people who are ungrateful through +suspicion. + +In conclusion it is to be said that while this vice of ingratitude has +its origin either in avarice or in suspicion, commonwealths are rarely +led into it by avarice, and far seldomer than princes by suspicion, +having, as shall presently be shown, far less reason than princes for +suspecting. + + + + +CHAPTER XXX.—_How Princes and Commonwealths may avoid the vice of +Ingratitude; and how a Captain or Citizen may escape being undone by +it._ + + +That he may not be tormented by suspicion, nor show ungrateful, a +prince should go himself on his wars as the Roman emperors did at +first, as the Turk does now, and, in short, as all valiant princes have +done and do. For when it is the prince himself who conquers, the glory +and the gain are all his own; but when he is absent, since the glory is +another’s, it will seem to the prince that he profits nothing by the +gain, unless that glory be quenched which he knew not how to win for +himself; and when he thus becomes ungrateful and unjust, doubtless his +loss is greater than his gain. To the prince, therefore, who, either +through indolence or from want of foresight, sends forth a captain to +conduct his wars while he himself remains inactive at home, I have no +advice to offer which he does not already know. But I would counsel the +captain whom he sends, since I am sure that he can never escape the +attacks of ingratitude, to follow one or other of two courses, and +either quit his command at once after a victory, and place himself in +the hands of his prince, while carefully abstaining from every +vainglorious or ambitious act, so that the prince, being relieved from +all suspicion, may be disposed to reward, or at any rate not to injure +him; or else, should he think it inexpedient for him to act in this +way, to take boldly the contrary course, and fearlessly to follow out +all such measures as he thinks will secure for himself, and not for his +prince, whatever he has gained; conciliating the good-will of his +soldiers and fellow-citizens, forming new friendships with neighbouring +potentates, placing his own adherents in fortified towns, corrupting +the chief officers of his army and getting rid of those whom he fails +to corrupt, and by all similar means endeavouring to punish his master +for the ingratitude which he looks for at his hands. These are the only +two courses open; but since, as I said before, men know not how to be +wholly good or wholly bad, it will never happen that after a victory a +captain will quit his army and conduct himself modestly, nor yet that +he will venture to use those hardy methods which have in them some +strain of greatness; and so, remaining undecided, he will be crushed +while he still wavers and doubts. + +A commonwealth desiring to avoid the vice of ingratitude is, as +compared with a prince, at this disadvantage, that while a prince can +go himself on his expeditions, the commonwealth must send some one of +its citizens. As a remedy, I would recommend that course being adopted +which was followed by the Roman republic in order to be less ungrateful +than others, having its origin in the nature of the Roman government. +For the whole city, nobles and commons alike, taking part in her wars, +there were always found in Rome at every stage of her history, so many +valiant and successful soldiers, that by reason of their number, and +from one acting as a check upon another, the nation had never ground to +be jealous of any one man among them; while they, on their part, lived +uprightly, and were careful to betray no sign of ambition, nor give the +people the least cause to distrust them as ambitious; so that he +obtained most glory from his dictatorship who was first to lay it down. +Which conduct, as it excited no suspicion, could occasion no +ingratitude. + +We see, then, that the commonwealth which would have no cause to be +ungrateful, must act as Rome did; and that the citizen who would escape +ingratitude, must observe those precautions which were observed by +Roman citizens. + + + + +CHAPTER XXXI.—_That the Roman Captains were never punished with extreme +severity for Misconduct; and where loss resulted to the Republic merely +through their Ignorance or Want of Judgment, were not punished at all_. + + +The Romans were not only, as has been said above, less ungrateful than +other republics, but were also more lenient and more considerate than +others in punishing the captains of their armies. For if these erred of +set purpose, they chastised them with gentleness; while if they erred +through ignorance, so far from punishing, they even honoured and +rewarded them. And this conduct was well considered. For as they judged +it of the utmost moment, that those in command of their armies should, +in all they had to do, have their minds undisturbed and free from +external anxieties, they would not add further difficulty and danger to +a task in itself both dangerous and difficult, lest none should ever be +found to act with valour. For supposing them to be sending forth an +army against Philip of Macedon in Greece or against Hannibal in Italy, +or against any other enemy at whose hands they had already sustained +reverses, the captain in command of that expedition would be weighted +with all the grave and important cares which attend such enterprises. +But if to all these cares, had been added the example of Roman generals +crucified or otherwise put to death for having lost battles, it would +have been impossible for a commander surrounded by so many causes for +anxiety to have acted with vigour and decision. For which reason, and +because they thought that to such persons the mere ignominy of defeat +was in itself punishment enough, they would not dishearten their +generals by inflicting on them any heavier penalty. + +Of errors committed not through ignorance, the following is an +instance. Sergius and Virginius were engaged in the siege of Veii, each +being in command of a division of the army, and while Sergius was set +to guard against the approach of the Etruscans, it fell to Virginius to +watch the town. But Sergius being attacked by the Faliscans and other +tribes, chose rather to be defeated and routed than ask aid from +Virginius, who, on his part, awaiting the humiliation of his rival, was +willing to see his country dishonoured and an army destroyed, sooner +than go unasked to his relief. This was notable misconduct, and likely, +unless both offenders were punished, to bring discredit on the Roman +name. But whereas another republic would have punished these men with +death, the Romans were content to inflict only a money fine: not +because the offence did not in itself deserve severe handling, but +because they were unwilling, for the reasons already given, to depart +in this instance from their ancient practice. + +Of errors committed through ignorance we have no better example than in +the case of Varro, through whose rashness the Romans were defeated by +Hannibal at Cannæ, where the republic well-nigh lost its liberty. But +because he had acted through ignorance and with no evil design, they +not only refrained from punishing him, but even treated him with +distinction; the whole senate going forth to meet him on his return to +Rome, and as they could not thank him for having fought, thanking him +for having come back, and for not having despaired of the fortunes his +country. + +Again, when Papirius Cursor would have had Fabius put to death, +because, contrary to his orders, he had fought with the Samnites, among +the reasons pleaded by the father of Fabius against the persistency of +the dictator, he urged that never on the occasion of the defeat of any +of their captains had the Romans done what Papirius desired them to do +on the occasion of a victory. + + + + +CHAPTER XXXII.—_That a Prince or Commonwealth should not delay +conferring Benefits until they are themselves in difficulties._ + + +The Romans found it for their advantage to be generous to the commons +at a season of danger, when Porsenna came to attack Rome and restore +the Tarquins. For the senate, apprehending that the people might choose +rather to take back their kings than to support a war, secured their +adherence by relieving them of the duty on salt and of all their other +burthens; saying that “_the poor did enough for the common welfare in +rearing their offspring._” In return for which indulgence the commons +were content to undergo war, siege, and famine. Let no one however, +relying on this example, delay conciliating the people till danger has +actually come; or, if he do, let him not hope to have the same good +fortune as the Romans. For the mass of the people will consider that +they have to thank not him, but his enemies, and that there is ground +to fear that when the danger has passed away, he will take back what he +gave under compulsion, and, therefore, that to him they lie under no +obligation. And the reason why the course followed by the Romans +succeeded, was that the State was still new and unsettled. Besides +which, the people knew that laws had already been passed in their +favour, as, for instance, the law allowing an appeal to the tribunes, +and could therefore persuade themselves that the benefits granted them +proceeded from the good-will entertained towards them by the senate, +and were not due merely to the approach of an enemy. Moreover, the +memory of their kings, by whom they had in many ways been wronged and +ill-treated, was still fresh in their minds. But since like conditions +seldom recur, it can only rarely happen that like remedies are useful. +Wherefore, all, whether princes or republics, who hold the reins of +government, ought to think beforehand of the adverse times which may +await them, and of what help they may then stand in need; and ought so +to live with their people as they would think right were they suffering +under any calamity. And, whosoever, whether prince or republic, but +prince more especially, behaves otherwise, and believes that after the +event and when danger is upon him he will be able to win men over by +benefits, deceives himself, and will not merely fail to maintain his +place, but will even precipitate his downfall. + + + + +CHAPTER XXXIII.—_When a Mischief has grown up in, or against a State, +it is safer to temporize with than to meet it with Violence_. + + +As Rome grew in fame, power, and dominion, her neighbours, who at first +had taken no heed to the injury which this new republic might do them, +began too late to see their mistake, and desiring to remedy what should +have been remedied before, combined against her to the number of forty +nations. Whereupon the Romans, resorting to a method usual with them in +seasons of peril, appointed a dictator; that is, gave power to one man +to decide without advice, and carry out his resolves without appeal. +Which expedient, as it then enabled them to overcome the dangers by +which they were threatened, so always afterwards proved most +serviceable, when, at any time during the growth of their power, +difficulties arose to embarrass their republic. + +In connection with this league against Rome we have first to note, that +when a mischief which springs up either in or against a republic, and +whether occasioned by internal or external causes, has grown to such +proportions that it begins to fill the whole community with alarm, it +is a far safer course to temporize with it than to attempt to quell it +by violence. For commonly those who make this attempt only add fuel to +the flame, and hasten the impending ruin. Such disorders arise in a +republic more often from internal causes than external, either through +some citizen being suffered to acquire undue influence, or from the +corruption of some institution of that republic, which had once been +the life and sinew of its freedom; and from this corruption being +allowed to gain such head that the attempt to check it is more +dangerous than to let it be. And it is all the harder to recognize +these disorders in their beginning, because it seems natural to men to +look with favour on the beginnings of things. Favour of this sort, more +than by anything else, is attracted by those actions which seem to have +in them a quality of greatness, or which are performed by the young. +For when in a republic some young man is seen to come forward endowed +with rare excellence, the eyes of all the citizens are at once turned +upon him, and all, without distinction, concur to do him honour; so +that if he have one spark of ambition, the advantages which he has from +nature, together with those he takes from this favourable disposition +of men’s minds, raise him to such a pitch of power, that when the +citizens at last see their mistake it is almost impossible for them to +correct it; and when they do what they can to oppose his influence the +only result is to extend it. Of this I might cite numerous examples, +but shall content myself with one relating to our own city. + +Cosimo de’ Medici, to whom the house of the Medici in Florence owes the +origin of its fortunes, acquired so great a name from the favour +wherewith his own prudence and the blindness of others invested him, +that coming to be held in awe by the government, his fellow-citizens +deemed it dangerous to offend him, but still more dangerous to let him +alone. Nicolò da Uzzano, his cotemporary, who was accounted well versed +in all civil affairs, but who had made a first mistake in not +discerning the dangers which might grow from the rising influence of +Cosimo, would never while he lived, permit a second mistake to be made +in attempting to crush him; judging that such an attempt would be the +ruin of the State, as in truth it proved after his death. For some who +survived him, disregarding his counsels, combined against Cosimo and +banished him from Florence. And so it came about that the partisans of +Cosimo, angry at the wrong done him, soon afterwards recalled him and +made him prince of the republic, a dignity he never would have reached +but for this open opposition. The very same thing happened in Rome in +the case of Cæsar. For his services having gained him the good-will of +Pompey and other citizens, their favour was presently turned to fear, +as Cicero testifies where he says that “it was late that Pompey began +to fear Cæsar.” This fear led men to think of remedies, and the +remedies to which they resorted accelerated the destruction of the +republic. + +I say, then, that since it is difficult to recognize these disorders in +their beginning, because of the false impressions which things produce +at the first, it is a wiser course when they become known, to temporize +with them than to oppose them; for when you temporize, either they die +out of themselves, or at any rate the injury they do is deferred. And +the prince who would suppress such disorders or oppose himself to their +force and onset, must always be on his guard, lest he help where he +would hinder, retard when he would advance, and drown the plant he +thinks to water. He must therefore study well the symptoms of the +disease; and, if he believe himself equal to the cure, grapple with it +fearlessly; if not, he must let it be, and not attempt to treat it in +any way. For, otherwise, it will fare with him as it fared with those +neighbours of Rome, for whom it would have been safer, after that city +had grown to be so great, to have sought to soothe and restrain her by +peaceful arts, than to provoke her by open war to contrive new means of +attack and new methods of defence. For this league had no other effect +than to make the Romans more united and resolute than before, and to +bethink themselves of new expedients whereby their power was still more +rapidly advanced; among which was the creation of a dictator; for this +innovation not only enabled them to surmount the dangers which then +threatened them, but was afterwards the means of escaping infinite +calamities into which, without it, the republic must have fallen. + + + + +CHAPTER XXXIV.—_That the authority of the Dictator did good and not +harm to the Roman Republic: and that it is not those Powers which are +given by the free suffrages of the People, but those which ambitious +Citizens usurp for themselves, that are pernicious to a State._ + + +Those citizens who first devised a dictatorship for Rome have been +blamed by certain writers, as though this had been the cause of the +tyranny afterwards established there. For these authors allege that the +first tyrant of Rome governed it with the title of Dictator, and that, +but for the existence of the office, Cæsar could never have cloaked his +usurpation under a constitutional name. He who first took up this +opinion had not well considered the matter, and his conclusion has been +accepted without good ground. For it was not the name nor office of +Dictator which brought Rome to servitude, but the influence which +certain of her citizens were able to assume from the prolongation of +their term of power; so that even had the name of Dictator been wanting +in Rome, some other had been found to serve their ends, since power may +readily give titles, but not titles power. We find, accordingly, that +while the dictatorship was conferred in conformity with public +ordinances, and not through personal influence, it was constantly +beneficial to the city. For it is the magistracies created and the +powers usurped in unconstitutional ways that hurt a republic, not those +which conform to ordinary rule; so that in Rome, through the whole +period of her history, we never find a dictator who acted otherwise +than well for the republic. For which there were the plainest reasons. +In the first place, to enable a citizen to work harm and to acquire +undue authority, many circumstances must be present which never can be +present in a State which is not corrupted. For such a citizen must be +exceedingly rich, and must have many retainers and partisans, whom he +cannot have where the laws are strictly observed, and who, if he had +them, would occasion so much alarm, that the free suffrage of the +people would seldom be in his favour. In the second place, the dictator +was not created for life, but for a fixed term, and only to meet the +emergency for which he was appointed. Power was indeed given him to +determine by himself what measures the exigency demanded; to do what he +had to do without consultation; and to punish without appeal. But he +had no authority to do anything to the prejudice of the State, as it +would have been to deprive the senate or the people of their +privileges, to subvert the ancient institutions of the city, or +introduce new. So that taking into account the brief time for which his +office lasted, its limited authority, and the circumstance that the +Roman people were still uncorrupted, it was impossible for him to +overstep the just limits of his power so as to injure the city; and in +fact we find that he was always useful to it. + +And, in truth, among the institutions of Rome, this of the dictatorship +deserves our special admiration, and to be linked with the chief causes +of her greatness; for without some such safeguard a city can hardly +pass unharmed through extraordinary dangers. Because as the ordinary +institutions of a commonwealth work but slowly, no council and no +magistrate having authority to act in everything alone, but in most +matters one standing in need of the other, and time being required to +reconcile their differences, the remedies which they provide are most +dangerous when they have to be applied in cases which do not brook +delay. For which reason, every republic ought to have some resource of +this nature provided by its constitution; as we find that the Republic +of Venice, one of the best of those now existing, has in cases of +urgent danger reserved authority to a few of her citizens, if agreed +among themselves, to determine without further consultation what course +is to be followed. When a republic is not provided with some safeguard +such as this, either it must be ruined by observing constitutional +forms, or else, to save it, these must be broken through. But in a +republic nothing should be left to be effected by irregular methods, +because, although for the time the irregularity may be useful, the +example will nevertheless be pernicious, as giving rise to a practice +of violating the laws for good ends, under colour of which they may +afterwards be violated for ends which are not good. For which reason, +that can never become a perfect republic wherein every contingency has +not been foreseen and provided for by the laws, and the method of +dealing with it defined. To sum up, therefore, I say that those +republics which cannot in sudden emergencies resort either to a +dictator or to some similar authority, will, when the danger is +serious, always be undone. + +We may note, moreover, how prudently the Romans, in introducing this +new office, contrived the conditions under which it was to be +exercised. For perceiving that the appointment of a dictator involved +something of humiliation for the consuls, who, from being the heads of +the State, were reduced to render obedience like every one else, and +anticipating that this might give offence, they determined that the +power to appoint should rest with the consuls, thinking that when the +occasion came when Rome should have need of this regal authority, they +would have the consuls acting willingly and feeling the less aggrieved +from the appointment being in their own hands. For those wounds or +other injuries which a man inflicts upon himself by choice, and of his +own free will, pain him far less than those inflicted by another. +Nevertheless, in the later days of the republic the Romans were wont to +entrust this power to a consul instead of to a dictator, using the +formula, _Videat_ CONSUL _ne quid respublica detrimenti capiat_. + +But to return to the matter in hand, I say briefly, that when the +neighbours of Rome sought to crush her, they led her to take measures +not merely for her readier defence, but such as enabled her to attack +them with a stronger force, with better skill, and with an undivided +command. + + + + +CHAPTER XXXV—_Why the Creation of the Decemvirate in Rome, although +brought about by the free and open Suffrage of the Citizens, was +hurtful to the Liberties of that Republic_ + + +The fact of those ten citizens who were chosen by the Roman people to +make laws for Rome, in time becoming her tyrants and depriving her of +her freedom, may seem contrary to what I have said above, namely that +it is the authority which is violently usurped, and not that conferred +by the free suffrages of the people which is injurious to a republic. +Here, however, we have to take into account both the mode in which, and +the term for which authority is given. Where authority is unrestricted +and is conferred for a long term, meaning by that for a year or more, +it is always attended with danger, and its results will be good or bad +according as the men are good or bad to whom it is committed. Now when +we compare the authority of the Ten with that possessed by the +dictator, we see that the power placed in the hands of the former was +out of all proportion greater than that entrusted to the latter. For +when a dictator was appointed there still remained the tribunes, the +consuls, and the senate, all of them invested with authority of which +the dictator could not deprive them. For even if he could have taken +his consulship from one man, or his status as a senator from another, +he could not abolish the senatorial rank nor pass new laws. So that the +senate, the consuls, and the tribunes continuing to exist with +undiminished authority were a check upon him and kept him in the right +road. But on the creation of the Ten, the opposite of all this took +place. For on their appointment, consuls and tribunes were swept away, +and express powers were given to the new magistrates to make laws and +do whatever else they thought fit, with the entire authority of the +whole Roman people. So that finding themselves alone without consuls or +tribunes to control them, and with no appeal against them to the +people, and thus there being none to keep a watch upon them, and +further being stimulated by the ambition of Appius, in the second year +of their office they began to wax insolent. + +Let it be noted, therefore, that when it is said that authority given +by the public vote is never hurtful to any commonwealth, it is assumed +that the people will never be led to confer that authority without due +limitations, or for other than a reasonable term. Should they, however +either from being deceived or otherwise blinded, be induced to bestow +authority imprudently, as the Romans bestowed it on the Ten, it will +always fare with them as with the Romans. And this may readily be +understood on reflecting what causes operated to keep the dictator +good, what to make the Ten bad, and by observing how those republics +which have been accounted well governed, have acted when conferring +authority for an extended period, as the Spartans on their kings and +the Venetians on their doges; for it will be seen that in both these +instances the authority was controlled by checks which made it +impossible for it to be abused. But where an uncontrolled authority is +given, no security is afforded by the circumstance that the body of the +people is not corrupted; for in the briefest possible time absolute +authority will make a people corrupt, and obtain for itself friends and +partisans. Nor will it be any hindrance to him in whom such authority +is vested, that he is poor and without connections, for wealth and +every other advantage will quickly follow, as shall be shown more fully +when we discuss the appointment of the Ten. + + + + +CHAPTER XXXVI.—_That Citizens who have held the higher Offices of a +Commonwealth should not disdain the lower_. + + +Under the consuls M. Fabius and Cn. Manlius, the Romans had a memorable +victory in a battle fought with the Veientines and the Etruscans, in +which Q. Fabius, brother of the consul, who had himself been consul the +year before, was slain. This event may lead us to remark how well the +methods followed by the city of Rome were suited to increase her power, +and how great a mistake is made by other republics in departing from +them. For, eager as the Romans were in the pursuit of glory, they never +esteemed it a dishonour to obey one whom before they had commanded, or +to find themselves serving in the ranks of an army which once they had +led. This usage, however, is opposed to the ideas, the rules, and the +practice which prevail at the present day, as, for instance, in Venice, +where the notion still obtains that a citizen who has filled a great +office should be ashamed to accept a less; and where the State itself +permits him to decline it. This course, assuming it to lend lustre to +individual citizens, is plainly to the disadvantage of the community, +which has reason to hope more from, and to trust more to, the citizen +who descends from a high office to fill a lower, than him who rises +from a low office to fill a high one; for in the latter no confidence +can reasonably be placed, unless he be seen to have others about him of +such credit and worth that it may be hoped their wise counsels and +influence will correct his inexperience. But had the usage which +prevails in Venice and in other modern commonwealths and kingdoms, +prevailed in Rome whereby he who had once been consul was never +afterwards to go with the army except as consul, numberless results +must have followed detrimental to the free institutions of that city; +as well from the mistakes which the inexperience of new men would have +occasioned, as because from their ambition having a freer course, and +from their having none near them in whose presence they might fear to +do amiss, they would have grown less scrupulous; and in this way the +public service must have suffered grave harm. + + + + +CHAPTER XXXVII.—_Of the Mischief bred in Rome by the Agrarian Law: and +how it is a great source of disorder in a Commonwealth to pass a Law +opposed to ancient Usage and with stringent retrospective Effect._ + + +It has been said by ancient writers that to be pinched by adversity or +pampered by prosperity is the common lot of men, and that in whichever +way they are acted upon the result is the same. For when no longer +urged to war on one another by necessity, they are urged by ambition, +which has such dominion in their hearts that it never leaves them to +whatsoever heights they climb. For nature has so ordered it that while +they desire everything, it is impossible for them to have everything, +and thus their desires being always in excess of their capacity to +gratify them, they remain constantly dissatisfied and discontented. And +hence the vicissitudes in human affairs. For some seeking to enlarge +their possessions, and some to keep what they have got, wars and +enmities ensue, from which result the ruin of one country and the +growth of another. + +I am led to these reflections from observing that the commons of Rome +were not content to secure themselves against the nobles by the +creation of tribunes, a measure to which they were driven by necessity, +but after effecting this, forthwith entered upon an ambitious contest +with the nobles, seeking to share with them what all men most esteem, +namely, their honours and their wealth. Hence was bred that disorder +from which sprang the feuds relating to the Agrarian Laws, and which +led in the end to the downfall of the Roman republic. And although it +should be the object of every well-governed commonwealth to make the +State rich and keep individual citizens poor it must be allowed that in +the matter of this law the city of Rome was to blame; whether for +having passed it at first in such a shape as to require it to be +continually recast; or for having postponed it so long that its +retrospective effect was the occasion of tumult; or else, because, +although rightly framed at first, it had come in its operation to be +perverted. But in whatever way it happened, so it was, that this law +was never spoken of in Rome without the whole city being convulsed. + +The law itself embraced two principal provisions. By one it was enacted +that no citizen should possess more than a fixed number of acres of +land; by the other that all lands taken from the enemy should be +distributed among the whole people. A twofold blow was thus aimed at +the nobles; since all who possessed more land than the law allowed, as +most of the nobles did, fell to be deprived of it; while by dividing +the lands of the enemy among the whole people, the road to wealth was +closed. These two grounds of offence being given to a powerful class, +to whom it appeared that by resisting the law they did a service to the +State, the whole city, as I have said, was thrown into an uproar on the +mere mention of its name. The nobles indeed sought to temporize, and to +prevail by patience and address; sometimes calling out the army, +sometimes opposing another tribune to the one who was promoting the +law, and sometimes coming to a compromise by sending a colony into the +lands which were to be divided; as was done in the case of the +territory of Antium, whither, on a dispute concerning the law having +arisen, settlers were sent from Rome, and the land made over to them. +In speaking of which colony Titus Livius makes the notable remark, that +hardly any one in Rome could be got to take part in it, so much readier +were the commons to indulge in covetous schemes at home, than to +realize them by leaving it. + +The ill humour engendered by this contest continued to prevail until +the Romans began to carry their arms into the remoter parts of Italy +and to countries beyond its shores; after which it seemed for a time to +slumber—and this, because the lands held by the enemies of Rome, out of +sight of her citizens and too remote to be conveniently cultivated, +came to be less desired. Whereupon the Romans grew less eager to punish +their enemies by dividing their lands, and were content, when they +deprived any city of its territory, to send colonists to occupy it. For +causes such as these, the measure remained in abeyance down to the time +of the Gracchi; but being by them revived, finally overthrew the +liberty of Rome. For as it found the power of its adversaries doubled, +such a flame of hatred was kindled between commons and senate, that, +regardless of all civil restraints, they resorted to arms and +bloodshed. And as the public magistrates were powerless to provide a +remedy, each of the two factions having no longer any hopes from them, +resolved to do what it could for itself, and to set up a chief for its +own protection. On reaching this stage of tumult and disorder, the +commons lent their influence to Marius, making him four times consul; +whose authority, lasting thus long, and with very brief intervals, +became so firmly rooted that he was able to make himself consul other +three times. Against this scourge, the nobles, lacking other defence, +set themselves to favour Sylla, and placing him at the head of their +faction, entered on the civil wars; wherein, after much blood had been +spilt, and after many changes of fortune, they got the better of their +adversaries. But afterwards, in the time of Cæsar and Pompey, the +distemper broke out afresh; for Cæsar heading the Marian party, and +Pompey, that of Sylla, and war ensuing, the victory remained with +Cæsar, who was the first tyrant in Rome; after whose time that city was +never again free. Such, therefore, was the beginning and such the end +of the Agrarian Law. + +But since it has elsewhere been said that the struggle between the +commons and senate of Rome preserved her liberties, as giving rise to +laws favourable to freedom, it might seem that the consequences of the +Agrarian Law are opposed to that view. I am not, however, led to alter +my opinion on this account; for I maintain that the ambition of the +great is so pernicious that unless controlled and counteracted in a +variety of ways, it will always reduce a city to speedy ruin. So that +if the controversy over the Agrarian Laws took three hundred years to +bring Rome to slavery, she would in all likelihood have been brought to +slavery in a far shorter time, had not the commons, by means of this +law, and by other demands, constantly restrained the ambition of the +nobles. + +We may also learn from this contest how much more men value wealth than +honours; for in the matter of honours, the Roman nobles always gave way +to the commons without any extraordinary resistance; but when it came +to be a question of property, so stubborn were they in its defence, +that the commons to effect their ends had to resort to those irregular +methods which have been described above. Of which irregularities the +prime movers were the Gracchi, whose motives are more to be commended +than their measures; since to pass a law with stringent retrospective +effect, in order to remove an abuse of long standing in a republic, is +an unwise step, and one which, as I have already shown at length, can +have no other result than to accelerate the mischief to which the abuse +leads; whereas, if you temporize, either the abuse develops more +slowly, or else, in course of time, and before it comes to a head, dies +out of itself. + + + + +CHAPTER XXXVIII.—_That weak Republics are irresolute and undecided; and +that the course they may take depends more on Necessity than Choice._ + + +A terrible pestilence breaking out in Rome seemed to the Equians and +Volscians to offer a fit opportunity for crushing her. The two nations, +therefore, assembling a great army, attacked the Latins and Hernicians +and laid waste their country. Whereupon the Latins and Hernicians were +forced to make their case known to the Romans, and to ask to be +defended by them. The Romans, who were sorely afflicted by the +pestilence, answered that they must look to their own defence, and with +their own forces, since Rome was in no position to succour them. + +Here we recognize the prudence and magnanimity of the Roman senate, and +how at all times, and in all changes of fortune, they assumed the +responsibility of determining the course their country should take; and +were not ashamed, when necessary, to decide on a course contrary to +that which was usual with them, or which they had decided to follow on +some other occasion. I say this because on other occasions this same +senate had forbidden these nations to defend themselves; and a less +prudent assembly might have thought it lowered their credit to withdraw +that prohibition. But the Roman senate always took a sound view of +things, and always accepted the least hurtful course as the best. So +that, although it was distasteful to them not to be able to defend +their subjects, and equally distasteful—both for the reasons given, and +for others which may be understood—that their subjects should take up +arms in their absence, nevertheless knowing that these must have +recourse to arms in any case, since the enemy was upon them, they took +an honourable course in deciding that what had to be done should be +done with their leave, lest men driven to disobey by necessity should +come afterwards to disobey from choice. And although this may seem the +course which every republic ought reasonably to follow, nevertheless +weak and badly-advised republics cannot make up their minds to follow +it, not knowing how to do themselves honour in like extremities. + +After Duke Valentino had taken Faenza and forced Bologna to yield to +his terms, desiring to return to Rome through Tuscany, he sent one of +his people to Florence to ask leave for himself and his army to pass. A +council was held in Florence to consider how this request should be +dealt with, but no one was favourable to the leave asked for being +granted. Wherein the Roman method was not followed. For as the Duke had +a very strong force with him, while the Florentines were so bare of +troops that they could not have prevented his passage, it would have +been far more for their credit that he should seem to pass with their +consent, than that he should pass in spite of them; because, while +discredit had to be incurred either way, they would have incurred less +by acceding to his demand. + +But of all courses the worst for a weak State is to be irresolute; for +then whatever it does will seem to be done under compulsion, so that if +by chance it should do anything well, this will be set down to +necessity and not to prudence. Of this I shall cite two other instances +happening in our own times, and in our own country. In the year 1500, +King Louis of France, after recovering Milan, being desirous to restore +Pisa to the Florentines, so as to obtain payment from them of the fifty +thousand ducats which they had promised him on the restitution being +completed, sent troops to Pisa under M. Beaumont, in whom, though a +Frenchman, the Florentines put much trust. Beaumont accordingly took up +his position with his forces between Cascina and Pisa, to be in +readiness to attack the town. After he had been there for some days +making arrangements for the assault, envoys came to him from Pisa +offering to surrender their city to the French if a promise were given +in the king’s name, not to hand it over to the Florentines until four +months had run. This condition was absolutely rejected by the +Florentines, and the siege being proceeded with, they were forced to +retire with disgrace. Now the proposal of the Pisans was rejected by +the Florentines for no other reason than that they distrusted the good +faith of the King, into whose hands their weakness obliged them to +commit themselves, and did not reflect how much more it was for their +interest that, by obtaining entrance into Pisa, he should have it in +his power to restore the town to them, or, failing to restore it, +should at once disclose his designs, than that remaining outside he +should put them off with promises for which they had to pay. It would +therefore have been a far better course for the Florentines to have +agreed to Beaumont taking possession on whatever terms. + +This was seen afterwards by experience in the year 1502, when, on the +revolt of Arezzo, M. Imbalt was sent by the King of France with French +troops to assist the Florentines. For when he got near Arezzo, and +began to negotiate with the Aretines, who, like the Pisans, were +willing to surrender their town on terms, the acceptance of these terms +was strongly disapproved in Florence; which Imbalt learning, and +thinking that the Florentines were acting with little sense, he took +the entire settlement of conditions into his own hands, and, without +consulting the Florentine commissioners, concluded an arrangement to +his own satisfaction, in execution of which he entered Arezzo with his +army. And he let the Florentines know that he thought them fools and +ignorant of the ways of the world; since if they desired to have +Arezzo, they could signify their wishes to the King, who would be much +better able to give it them when he had his soldiers inside, than when +he had them outside the town. Nevertheless, in Florence they never +ceased to blame and abuse M. Imbalt, until at last they came to see +that if Beaumont had acted in the same way, they would have got +possession Of Pisa as well as of Arezzo. + +Applying what has been said to the matter in hand, we find that +irresolute republics, unless upon compulsion, never follow wise +courses; for wherever there is room for doubt, their weakness will not +suffer them to come to any resolve; so that unless their doubts be +overcome by some superior force which impels them forward, they remain +always in suspense. + + + + +CHAPTER XXXIX.—_That often the same Accidents are seen to befall +different Nations._ + + +Any one comparing the present with the past will soon perceive that in +all cities and in all nations there prevail the same desires and +passions as always have prevailed; for which reason it should be an +easy matter for him who carefully examines past events, to foresee +those which are about to happen in any republic, and to apply such +remedies as the ancients have used in like cases; or finding none which +have been used by them, to strike out new ones, such as they might have +used in similar circumstances. But these lessons being neglected or not +understood by readers, or, if understood by them, being unknown to +rulers, it follows that the same disorders are common to all times. + +In the year 1494 the Republic of Florence, having lost a portion of its +territories, including Pisa and other towns, was forced to make war +against those who had taken possession of them, who being powerful, it +followed that great sums were spent on these wars to little purpose. +This large expenditure had to be met by heavy taxes which gave occasion +to numberless complaints on the part of the people; and inasmuch as the +war was conducted by a council of ten citizens, who were styled “the +Ten of the War,” the multitude began to regard these with displeasure, +as though they were the cause of the war and of the consequent +expenditure; and at last persuaded themselves that if they got rid of +this magistracy there would be an end to the war. Wherefore when the +magistracy of “the Ten” should have been renewed, the people did not +renew it, but, suffering it to lapse, entrusted their affairs to the +“Signory.” This course was most pernicious, since not only did it fail +to put an end to the war, as the people expected it would, but by +setting aside men who had conducted it with prudence, led to such +mishaps that not Pisa only, but Arezzo also, and many other towns +besides were lost to Florence. Whereupon, the people recognizing their +mistake, and that the evil was in the disease and not in the physician, +reinstated the magistracy of the Ten. + +Similar dissatisfaction grew up in Rome against the consular authority. +For the people seeing one war follow another, and that they were never +allowed to rest, when they should have ascribed this to the ambition of +neighbouring nations who desired their overthrow, ascribed it to the +ambition of the nobles, who, as they believed, being unable to wreak +their hatred against them within the city, where they were protected by +the power of the tribunes, sought to lead them outside the city, where +they were under the authority of the consuls, that they might crush +them where they were without help. In which belief they thought it +necessary either to get rid of the consuls altogether, or so to +restrict their powers as to leave them no authority over the people, +either in the city or out of it. + +The first who attempted to pass a law to this effect was the tribune +Terentillus, who proposed that a committee of five should be named to +consider and regulate the power of the consuls. This roused the anger +of the nobles, to whom it seemed that the greatness of their authority +was about to set for ever, and that no part would be left them in the +administration of the republic. Such, however, was the obstinacy of the +tribunes, that they succeeded in abolishing the consular title, nor +were satisfied until, after other changes, it was resolved that, in +room of consuls, tribunes should be appointed with consular powers; so +much greater was their hatred of the name than of the thing. For a long +time matters remained on this footing; till eventually, the commons, +discovering their mistake, resumed the appointment of consuls in the +same way as the Florentines reverted to “the Ten of the War.” + + + + +CHAPTER XL.—_Of the creation of the Decemvirate in Rome, and what +therein is to be noted. Wherein among other Matters is shown how the +same Causes may lead to the Safety or to the Ruin of a Commonwealth._ + + +It being my desire to treat fully of those disorders which arose in +Rome on the creation of the decemvirate, I think it not amiss first of +all to relate what took place at the time of that creation, and then to +discuss those circumstances attending it which seem most to deserve +notice. These are numerous, and should be well considered, both by +those who would maintain the liberties of a commonwealth and by those +who would subvert them. For in the course of our inquiry it will be +seen that many mistakes prejudicial to freedom were made by the senate +and people, and that many were likewise made by Appius, the chief +decemvir, prejudicial to that tyranny which it was his aim to establish +in Rome. + +After much controversy and wrangling between the commons and the nobles +as to the framing of new laws by which the freedom of Rome might be +better secured, Spurius Posthumius and two other citizens were, by +general consent, despatched to Athens to procure copies of the laws +which Solon had drawn up for the Athenians, to the end that these might +serve as a groundwork for the laws of Rome. On their return, the next +step was to depute certain persons to examine these laws and to draft +the new code. For which purpose a commission consisting of ten members, +among whom was Appius Claudius, a crafty and ambitious citizen, was +appointed for a year; and that the commissioners in framing their laws +might act without fear or favour, all the other magistracies, and in +particular the consulate and tribuneship, were suspended, and the +appeal to the people discontinued; so that the decemvirs came to be +absolute in Rome. Very soon the whole authority of the commissioners +came to be centred in Appius, owing to the favour in which he was held +by the commons. For although before he had been regarded as the cruel +persecutor of the people, he now showed himself so conciliatory in his +bearing that men wondered at the sudden change in his character and +disposition. + +This set of commissioners, then, behaved discreetly, being attended by +no more than twelve lictors, walking in front of that decemvir whom the +rest put forward as their chief; and though vested with absolute +authority, yet when a Roman citizen had to be tried for murder, they +cited him before the people and caused him to be judged by them. Their +laws they wrote upon ten tables, but before signing them they exposed +them publicly, that every one might read and consider them, and if any +defect were discovered in them, it might be corrected before they were +finally passed. At this juncture Appius caused it to be notified +throughout the city that were two other tables added to these ten, the +laws would be complete; hoping that under this belief the people would +consent to continue the decemvirate for another year. This consent the +people willingly gave, partly to prevent the consuls being reinstated, +and partly because they thought they could hold their ground without +the aid of the tribunes, who, as has already been said, were the judges +in criminal cases. + +On it being resolved to reappoint the decemvirate, all the nobles set +to canvass for the office, Appius among the foremost; and such +cordiality did he display towards the commons while seeking their +votes, that the other candidates, “_unable to persuade themselves that +so much affability on the part of so proud a man was wholly +disinterested,_” began to suspect him; but fearing to oppose him +openly, sought to circumvent him, by putting him forward, though the +youngest of them all, to declare to the people the names of the +proposed decemvirs; thinking that he would not venture to name himself, +that being an unusual course in Rome, and held discreditable. “_But +what they meant as a hindrance, he turned to account,_” by proposing, +to the surprise and displeasure of the whole nobility, his own name +first, and then nominating nine others on whose support he thought he +could depend. + +The new appointments, which were to last for a year, having been made, +Appius soon let both commons and nobles know the mistake they had +committed, for throwing off the mask, he allowed his innate arrogance +to appear, and speedily infected his colleagues with the same spirit; +who, to overawe the people and the senate, instead of twelve lictors, +appointed one hundred and twenty. For a time their measures were +directed against high and low alike; but presently they began to +intrigue with the senate, and to attack the commons; and if any of the +latter, on being harshly used by one decemvir, ventured to appeal to +another, he was worse handled on the appeal than in the first instance. +The commons, on discovering their error, began in their despair to turn +their eyes towards the nobles, “_and to look for a breeze of freedom +from that very quarter whence fearing slavery they had brought the +republic to its present straits._” To the nobles the sufferings of the +commons were not displeasing, from the hope “_that disgusted with the +existing state of affairs, they too might come to desire the +restoration of the consuls._” + +When the year for which the decemvirs were appointed at last came to an +end, the two additional tables of the law were ready, but had not yet +been published. This was made a pretext by them for prolonging their +magistracy, which they took measures to retain by force, gathering +round them for this purpose a retinue of young noblemen, whom they +enriched with the goods of those citizens whom they had condemned. +“_Corrupted by which gifts, these youths came to prefer selfish licence +to public freedom._” + +It happened that at this time the Sabines and Volscians began to stir +up a war against Rome, and it was during the alarm thereby occasioned +that the decemvirs were first made aware how weak was their position. +For without the senate they could take no warlike measures, while by +assembling the senate they seemed to put an end to their own authority. +Nevertheless, being driven to it by necessity, they took this latter +course. When the senate met, many of the senators, but particularly +Valerius and Horatius, inveighed against the insolence of the +decemvirs, whose power would forthwith have been cut short, had not the +senate through jealousy of the commons declined to exercise their +authority. For they thought that were the decemvirs to lay down office +of their own free will, tribunes might not be reappointed. Wherefore +they decided for war, and sent forth the armies under command of +certain of the decemvirs. But Appius remaining behind to govern the +city, it so fell out that he became enamoured of Virginia, and that +when he sought to lay violent hands upon her, Virginius, her father, to +save her from dishonour, slew her. Thereupon followed tumults in Rome, +and mutiny among the soldiers, who, making common cause with the rest +of the plebeians, betook themselves to the Sacred Hill, and there +remained until the decemvirs laid down their office; when tribunes and +consuls being once more appointed, Rome was restored to her ancient +freedom. + +In these events we note, first of all, that the pernicious step of +creating this tyranny in Rome was due to the same causes which commonly +give rise to tyrannies in cities; namely, the excessive love of the +people for liberty, and the passionate eagerness of the nobles to +govern. For when they cannot agree to pass some measure favourable to +freedom, one faction or the other sets itself to support some one man, +and a tyranny at once springs up. Both parties in Rome consented to the +creation of the decemvirs, and to their exercising unrestricted powers, +from the desire which the one had to put an end to the consular name, +and the other to abolish the authority of the tribunes. When, on the +appointment of the decemvirate, it seemed to the commons that Appius +had become favourable to their cause, and was ready to attack the +nobles, they inclined to support him. But when a people is led to +commit this error of lending its support to some one man, in order that +he may attack those whom it holds in hatred, if he only be prudent he +will inevitably become the tyrant of that city. For he will wait until, +with the support of the people, he can deal a fatal blow to the nobles, +and will never set himself to oppress the people until the nobles have +been rooted out. But when that time comes, the people, although they +recognize their servitude, will have none to whom they can turn for +help. + +Had this method, which has been followed by all who have successfully +established tyrannies in republics, been followed by Appius, his power +would have been more stable and lasting; whereas, taking the directly +opposite course, he could not have acted more unwisely than he did. For +in his eagerness to grasp the tyranny, he made himself obnoxious to +those who were in fact conferring it, and who could have maintained him +in it; and he destroyed those who were his friends, while he sought +friendship from those from whom he could not have it. For although it +be the desire of the nobles to tyrannize, that section of them which +finds itself outside the tyranny is always hostile to the tyrant, who +can never succeed in gaining over the entire body of the nobles by +reason of their greed and ambition; for no tyrant can ever have honours +or wealth enough to satisfy them all. + +In abandoning the people, therefore, and siding with the nobles, Appius +committed a manifest mistake, as well for the reasons above given, as +because to hold a thing by force, he who uses force must needs be +stronger than he against whom it is used. Whence it happens that those +tyrants who have the mass of the people for their friends and the +nobles for their enemies, are more secure than those who have the +people for their enemies and the nobles for their friends; because in +the former case their authority has the stronger support. For with such +support a ruler can maintain himself by the internal strength of his +State, as did Nabis, tyrant of Sparta, when attacked by the Romans and +by the whole of Greece; for making sure work with the nobles, who were +few in number, and having the people on his side, he was able with +their assistance to defend himself; which he could not have done had +they been against him. But in the case of a city, wherein the tyrant +has few friends, its internal strength will not avail him for its +defence, and he will have to seek aid from without in one of three +shapes. For either he must hire foreign guards to defend his person; or +he must arm the peasantry, so that they may play the part which ought +to be played by the citizens; or he must league with powerful +neighbours for his defence. He who follows these methods and observes +them well, may contrive to save himself, though he has the people for +his enemy. But Appius could not follow the plan of gaining over the +peasantry, since in Rome they and the people were one. And what he +might have done he knew not how to do, and so was ruined at the very +outset. + +In creating the decemvirate, therefore, both the senate and the people +made grave mistakes. For although, as already explained, when speaking +of the dictatorship, it is those magistrates who make themselves, and +not those made by the votes of the people, that are hurtful to freedom; +nevertheless the people, in creating magistrates ought to take such +precautions as will make it difficult for these to become bad. But the +Romans when they ought to have set a check on the decemvirs in order to +keep them good, dispensed with it, making them the sole magistrates of +Rome, and setting aside all others; and this from the excessive desire +of the senate to get rid of the tribunes, and of the commons to get rid +of the consuls; by which objects both were so blinded as to fall into +all the disorders which ensued. For, as King Ferrando was wont to say, +men often behave like certain of the smaller birds, which are so intent +on the prey to which nature incites them, that they discern not the +eagle hovering overhead for their destruction. + +In this Discourse then the mistakes made by the Roman people in their +efforts to preserve their freedom and the mistakes made by Appius in +his endeavour to obtain the tyranny, have, as I proposed at the outset, +been plainly shown. + + + + +CHAPTER XLI.—_That it is unwise to pass at a bound from leniency to +severity, or to a haughty bearing from a humble._ + + +Among the crafty devices used by Appius to aid him in maintaining his +authority, this, of suddenly passing from one character to the other +extreme, was of no small prejudice to him. For his fraud in pretending +to the commons to be well disposed towards them, was happily contrived; +as were also the means he took to bring about the reappointment of the +decemvirate. Most skilful, too, was his audacity in nominating himself +contrary to the expectation of the nobles, and in proposing colleagues +on whom he could depend to carry out his ends. But, as I have said +already, it was not happily contrived that, after doing all this, he +should suddenly turn round, and from being the friend, reveal himself +the enemy of the people; haughty instead of humane; cruel instead of +kindly; and make this change so rapidly as to leave himself no shadow +of excuse, but compel all to recognize the doubleness of his nature. +For he who has once seemed good, should he afterwards choose, for his +own ends, to become bad, ought to change by slow degrees, and as +opportunity serves; so that before his altered nature strip him of old +favour, he may have gained for himself an equal share of new, and thus +his influence suffer no diminution. For otherwise, being at once +unmasked and friendless, he is undone: + + + + +CHAPTER XLII.—_How easily Men become corrupted._ + + +In this matter of the decemvirate we may likewise note the ease +wherewith men become corrupted, and how completely, although born good +and well brought up, they change their nature. For we see how +favourably disposed the youths whom Appius gathered round him became +towards his tyranny, in return for the trifling benefits which they +drew from it; and how Quintus Fabius, one of the second decemvirate and +a most worthy man, blinded by a little ambition, and misled by the evil +counsels of Appius, abandoning his fair fame, betook himself to most +unworthy courses, and grew like his master. + +Careful consideration of this should make those who frame laws for +commonwealths and kingdoms more alive to the necessity of placing +restraints on men’s evil appetites, and depriving them of all hope of +doing wrong with impunity. + + + + +CHAPTER XLIII.—_That Men fighting in their own Cause make good and +resolute Soldiers._ + + +From what has been touched upon above, we are also led to remark how +wide is the difference between an army which, having no ground for +discontent, fights in its own cause, and one which, being discontented, +fights to satisfy the ambition of others. For whereas the Romans were +always victorious under the consuls, under the decemvirs they were +always defeated. This helps us to understand why it is that mercenary +troops are worthless; namely, that they have no incitement to keep them +true to you beyond the pittance which you pay them, which neither is +nor can be a sufficient motive for such fidelity and devotion as would +make them willing to die in your behalf. But in those armies in which +there exists not such an attachment towards him for whom they fight as +makes them devoted to his cause, there never will be valour enough to +withstand an enemy if only he be a little brave. And since such +attachment and devotion cannot be looked for from any save your own +subjects, you must, if you would preserve your dominions, or maintain +your commonwealth or kingdom, arm the natives of your country; as we +see to have been done by all those who have achieved great things in +war. + +Under the decemvirs the ancient valour of the Roman soldiers had in no +degree abated; yet, because they were no longer animated by the same +good will, they did not exert themselves as they were wont. But so soon +as the decemvirate came to an end, and the soldiers began once more to +fight as free men, the old spirit was reawakened, and, as a +consequence, their enterprises, according to former usage, were brought +to a successful close. + + + + +CHAPTER XLIV.—_That the Multitude is helpless without a Head: and that +we should not with the same breath threaten and ask leave._ + + +When Virginia died by her father’s hand, the commons of Rome withdrew +under arms to the Sacred Hill. Whereupon the senate sent messengers to +demand by what sanction they had deserted their commanders and +assembled there in arms. And in such reverence was the authority of the +senate held, that the commons, lacking leaders, durst make no reply. +“Not,” says Titus Livius, “that they were at a loss what to answer, but +because they had none to answer for them;” words which clearly show how +helpless a thing is the multitude when without a head. + +This defect was perceived by Virginius, at whose instance twenty +military tribunes were appointed by the commons to be their spokesmen +with the senate, and to negotiate terms; who, having asked that +Valerius and Horatius might be sent to them, to whom their wishes would +be made known, these declined to go until the decemvirs had laid down +their office. When this was done, and Valerius and Horatius came to the +hill where the commons were assembled, the latter demanded that +tribunes of the people should be appointed; that in future there should +be an appeal to the people from the magistrates of whatever degree; and +that all the decemvirs should be given up to them to be burned alive. +Valerius and Horatius approved the first two demands, but rejected the +last as inhuman; telling the commons that “they were rushing into that +very cruelty which they themselves had condemned in others;” and +counselling them to say nothing about the decemvirs, but to be +satisfied to regain their own power and authority; since thus the way +would be open to them for obtaining every redress. + +Here we see plainly how foolish and unwise it is to ask a thing and +with the same breath to say, “I desire this that I may inflict an +injury.” For we should never declare our intention beforehand, but +watch for every opportunity to carry it out. So that it is enough to +ask another for his weapons, without adding, “With these I purpose to +destroy you;” for when once you have secured his weapons, you can use +them afterwards as you please. + + + + +CHAPTER XLV.—_That it is of evil example, especially in the Maker of a +Law, not to observe the Law when made: and that daily to renew acts of +injustice in a City is most hurtful to the Governor._ + + +Terms having been adjusted, and the old order of things restored in +Rome, Virginius cited Appius to defend himself before the people; and +on his appearing attended by many of the nobles, ordered him to be led +to prison. Whereupon Appius began to cry out and appeal to the people. +But Virginius told him that he was unworthy to be allowed that appeal +which he had himself done away with, or to have that people whom he had +wronged for his protectors. Appius rejoined, that the people should not +set at nought that right of appeal which they themselves had insisted +on with so much zeal. Nevertheless, he was dragged to prison, and +before the day of trial slew himself. Now, though the wicked life of +Appius merited every punishment, still it was impolitic to violate the +laws, more particularly a law which had only just been passed; for +nothing, I think, is of worse example in a republic, than to make a law +and not to keep it; and most of all, when he who breaks is he that made +it. + +After the year 1494, the city of Florence reformed its government with +the help of the Friar Girolamo Savonarola, whose writings declare his +learning, his wisdom, and the excellence of his heart. Among other +ordinances for the safety of the citizens, he caused a law to be +passed, allowing an appeal to the people from the sentences pronounced +by “the Eight” and by the “Signory” in trials for State offences; a law +he had long contended for, and carried at last with great difficulty. +It so happened that a very short time after it was passed, five +citizens were condemned to death by the “Signory” for State offences, +and that when they sought to appeal to the people they were not +permitted to do so, and the law was violated. This, more than any other +mischance, helped to lessen the credit of the Friar; since if his law +of appeal was salutary, he should have caused it to be observed; if +useless, he ought not to have promoted it. And his inconsistency was +the more remarked, because in all the sermons which he preached after +the law was broken, he never either blamed or excused the person who +had broken it, as though unwilling to condemn, while unable to justify +what suited his purposes. This, as betraying the ambitious and partial +turn of his mind, took from his reputation and exposed him to much +obloquy. + +Another thing which greatly hurts a government is to keep alive bitter +feelings in men’s minds by often renewed attacks on individuals, as was +done in Rome after the decemvirate was put an end to. For each of the +decemvirs, and other citizens besides, were at different times accused +and condemned, so that the greatest alarm was spread through the whole +body of the nobles, who came to believe that these prosecutions would +never cease until their entire order was exterminated. And this must +have led to grave mischief had not Marcus Duilius the tribune provided +against it, by an edict which forbade every one, for the period of a +year, citing or accusing any Roman citizen, an ordinance which had the +effect of reassuring the whole nobility. Here we see how hurtful it is +for a prince or commonwealth to keep the minds of their subjects in +constant alarm and suspense by continually renewed punishments and +violence. And, in truth, no course can be more pernicious. For men who +are in fear for their safety will seize on every opportunity for +securing themselves against the dangers which surround them, and will +grow at once more daring, and less scrupulous in resorting to new +courses. For these reasons we should either altogether avoid inflicting +injury, or should inflict every injury at a stroke, and then seek to +reassure men’s minds and suffer them to settle down and rest. + + + + +CHAPTER XLVI.—_That Men climb from one step of Ambition to another, +seeking at first to escape Injury and then to injure others._ + + +As the commons of Rome on recovering their freedom were restored to +their former position—nay, to one still stronger since many new laws +had been passed which confirmed and extended their authority,—it might +reasonably have been hoped that Rome would for a time remain at rest. +The event, however, showed the contrary, for from day to day there +arose in that city new tumults and fresh dissensions. And since the +causes which brought this about have been most judiciously set forth by +Titus Livius, it seems to me much to the purpose to cite his own words +when he says, that “whenever either the commons or the nobles were +humble, the others grew haughty; so that if the commons kept within due +bounds, the young nobles began to inflict injuries upon them, against +which the tribunes, who were themselves made the objects of outrage, +were little able to give redress; while the nobles on their part, +although they could not close their eyes to the ill behaviour of their +young men, were yet well pleased that if excesses were to be committed, +they should be committed by their own faction, and not by the commons. +Thus the desire to secure its own liberty prompted each faction to make +itself strong enough to oppress the other. For this is the common +course of things, that in seeking to escape cause for fear, men come to +give others cause to be afraid by inflicting on them those wrongs from +which they strive to relieve themselves; as though the choice lay +between injuring and being injured.” + +Herein, among other things, we perceive in what ways commonwealths are +overthrown, and how men climb from one ambition to another; and +recognize the truth of those words which Sallust puts in the mouth of +Cæsar, that “_all ill actions have their origin in fair +beginnings._”[4] For, as I have said already, the ambitious citizen in +a commonwealth seeks at the outset to secure himself against injury, +not only at the hands of private persons, but also of the magistrates; +to effect which he endeavours to gain himself friends. These he obtains +by means honourable in appearance, either by supplying them with money +or protecting them against the powerful. And because such conduct seems +praiseworthy, every one is readily deceived by it, and consequently no +remedy is applied. Pursuing these methods without hindrance, this man +presently comes to be so powerful that private citizens begin to fear +him, and the magistrates to treat him with respect. But when he has +advanced thus far on the road to power without encountering opposition, +he has reached a point at which it is most dangerous to cope with him; +it being dangerous, as I have before explained, to contend with a +disorder which has already made progress in a city. Nevertheless, when +he has brought things to this pass, you must either endeavour to crush +him, at the risk of immediate ruin, or else, unless death or some like +accident interpose, you incur inevitable slavery by letting him alone. +For when, as I have said, it has come to this that the citizens and +even the magistrates fear to offend him and his friends, little further +effort will afterwards be needed to enable him to proscribe and ruin +whom he pleases. + + [4] Quod omnia mala exempla ex bonis initiis orta sunt. (Sall. Cat. + 51.) + + +A republic ought, therefore, to provide by its ordinances that none of +its citizens shall, under colour of doing good, have it in their power +to do evil, but shall be suffered to acquire such influence only as may +aid and not injure freedom. How this may be done, shall presently be +explained. + + + + +CHAPTER XLVII.—_That though Men deceive themselves in Generalities, in +Particulars they judge truly._ + + +The commons of Rome having, as I have said, grown disgusted with the +consular name, and desiring either that men of plebeian birth should be +admitted to the office or its authority be restricted, the nobles, to +prevent its degradation in either of these two ways, proposed a middle +course, whereby four tribunes, who might either be plebeians or nobles, +were to be created with consular authority. This compromise satisfied +the commons, who thought they would thus get rid of the consulship, and +secure the highest offices of the State for their own order. But here a +circumstance happened worth noting. When the four tribunes came to be +chosen, the people, who had it in their power to choose all from the +commons, chose all from the nobles. With respect to which election +Titus Livius observes, that “_the result showed that the people when +declaring their honest judgment after controversy was over, were +governed by a different spirit from that which had inspired them while +contending for their liberties and for a share in public honours_.” The +reason for this I believe to be, that men deceive themselves more +readily in generals than in particulars. To the commons of Rome it +seemed, in the abstract, that they had every right to be admitted to +the consulship, since their party in the city was the more numerous, +since they bore the greater share of danger in their wars, and since it +was they who by their valour kept Rome free and made her powerful. And +because it appeared to them, as I have said, that their desire was a +reasonable one, they were resolved to satisfy it at all hazards. But +when they had to form a particular judgment on the men of their own +party, they recognized their defects, and decided that individually no +one of them was deserving of what, collectively, they seemed entitled +to; and being ashamed of them, turned to bestow their honours on those +who deserved them. Of which decision Titus Livius, speaking with due +admiration, says, “_Where shall we now find in any one man, that +modesty, moderation, and magnanimity which were then common to the +entire people?_” + +As confirming what I have said, I shall cite another noteworthy +incident, which occurred in Capua after the rout of the Romans by +Hannibal at Cannæ. For all Italy being convulsed by that defeat, Capua +too was threatened with civil tumult, through the hatred which +prevailed between her people and senate. But Pacuvius Calavius, who at +this time filled the office of chief magistrate, perceiving the danger, +took upon himself to reconcile the contending factions. With this +object he assembled the Senate and pointed out to them the hatred in +which they were held by the people, and the risk they ran of being put +to death by them, and of the city, now that the Romans were in +distress, being given up to Hannibal. But he added that, were they to +consent to leave the matter with him, he thought he could contrive to +reconcile them; in the meanwhile, however, he must shut them up in the +palace, that, by putting it in the power of the people to punish them, +he might secure their safety. + +The senate consenting to this proposal, he shut them up in the palace, +and summoning the people to a public meeting, told them the time had at +last come for them to trample on the insolence of the nobles, and +requite the wrongs suffered at their hands; for he had them all safe +under bolt and bar; but, as he supposed they did not wish the city to +remain without rulers, it was fit, before putting the old senators to +death, they should appoint others in their room. Wherefore he had +thrown the names of all the old senators into a bag, and would now +proceed to draw them out one by one, and as they were drawn would cause +them to be put to death, so soon as a successor was found for each. +When the first name he drew was declared, there arose a great uproar +among the people, all crying out against the cruelty, pride, and +arrogance of that senator whose name it was. But on Pacuvius desiring +them to propose a substitute, the meeting was quieted, and after a +brief pause one of the commons was nominated. No sooner, however, was +his name mentioned than one began to whistle, another to laugh, some +jeering at him in one way and some in another. And the same thing +happening in every case, each and all of those nominated were judged +unworthy of senatorial rank. Whereupon Pacuvius, profiting by the +opportunity, said, “Since you are agreed that the city would be badly +off without a senate, but are not agreed whom to appoint in the room of +the old senators, it will, perhaps, be well for you to be reconciled to +them; for the fear into which they have been thrown must have so +subdued them, that you are sure to find in them that affability which +hitherto you have looked for in vain.” This proposal being agreed to, a +reconciliation followed between the two orders; the commons having seen +their error so soon as they were obliged to come to particulars. + +A people therefore is apt to err in judging of things and their +accidents in the abstract, but on becoming acquainted with particulars, +speedily discovers its mistakes. In the year 1494, when her greatest +citizens were banished from Florence, and no regular government any +longer existed there, but a spirit of licence prevailed, and matters +went continually from bad to worse, many Florentines perceiving the +decay of their city, and discerning no other cause for it, blamed the +ambition of this or the other powerful citizen, who, they thought, was +fomenting these disorders with a view to establish a government to his +own liking, and to rob them of their liberties. Those who thought thus, +would hang about the arcades and public squares, maligning many +citizens, and giving it to be understood that if ever they found +themselves in the Signory, they would expose the designs of these +citizens and have them punished. From time to time it happened that one +or another of those who used this language rose to be of the chief +magistracy, and so soon as he obtained this advancement, and saw things +nearer, became aware whence the disorders I have spoken of really came, +the dangers attending them, and the difficulty in dealing with them; +and recognizing that they were the growth of the times, and not +occasioned by particular men, suddenly altered his views and conduct; a +nearer knowledge of facts freeing him from the false impressions he had +been led into on a general view of affairs. But those who had heard him +speak as a private citizen, when they saw him remain inactive after he +was made a magistrate, believed that this arose not from his having +obtained any better knowledge of things, but from his having been +cajoled or corrupted by the great. And this happening with many men and +often, it came to be a proverb among the people, that “_men had one +mind in the market-place, another in the palace._” + +Reflecting on what has been said, we see how quickly men’s eyes may be +opened, if knowing that they deceive themselves in generalities, we can +find a way to make them pass to particulars; as Pacuvius did in the +case of the Capuans, and the senate in the case of Rome. Nor do I +believe that any prudent man need shrink from the judgment of the +people in questions relating to particulars, as, for instance, in the +distribution of honours and dignities. For in such matters only, the +people are either never mistaken, or at any rate far seldomer than a +small number of persons would be, were the distribution entrusted to +them. + +It seems to me, however, not out of place to notice in the following +Chapter, a method employed by the Roman senate to enlighten the people +in making this distribution. + + + + +CHAPTER XLVIII.—_He who would not have an Office bestowed on some +worthless or wicked Person, should contrive that it be solicited by one +who is utterly worthless and wicked, or else by one who is in the +highest degree noble and good._ + + +Whenever the senate saw a likelihood of the tribunes with consular +powers being chosen exclusively from the commons, it took one or other +of two ways,—either by causing the office to be solicited by the most +distinguished among the citizens; or else, to confess the truth, by +bribing some base and ignoble fellow to fasten himself on to those +other plebeians of better quality who were seeking the office, and +become a candidate conjointly with them. The latter device made the +people ashamed to give, the former ashamed to refuse. + +This confirms what I said in my last Chapter, as to the people +deceiving themselves in generalities but not in particulars. + + + + +CHAPTER XLIX.—_That if Cities which, like Rome, had their beginning in +Freedom, have had difficulty in framing such Laws as would preserve +their Freedom, Cities which at the first have been in Subjection will +find this almost impossible._ + + +How hard it is in founding a commonwealth to provide it with all the +laws needed to maintain its freedom, is well seen from the history of +the Roman Republic. For although ordinances were given it first by +Romulus, then by Numa, afterwards by Tullus Hostilius and Servius, and +lastly by the Ten created for the express purpose, nevertheless, in the +actual government of Rome new needs were continually developed, to meet +which, new ordinances had constantly to be devised; as in the creation +of the censors, who were one of the chief means by which Rome was kept +free during the whole period of her constitutional government. For as +the censors became the arbiters of morals in Rome, it was very much +owing to them that the progress of the Romans towards corruption was +retarded. And though, at the first creation of the office, a mistake +was doubtless made in fixing its term at five years, this was corrected +not long after by the wisdom of the dictator Mamercus, who passed a law +reducing it to eighteen months; a change which the censors then in +office took in such ill part, that they deprived Mamercus of his rank +as a senator. This step was much blamed both by the commons and the +Fathers; still, as our History does not record that Mamercus obtained +any redress, we must infer either that the Historian has omitted +something, or that on this head the laws of Rome were defective; since +it is never well that the laws of a commonwealth should suffer a +citizen to incur irremediable wrong because he promotes a measure +favourable to freedom. + +But returning to the matter under consideration, we have, in connection +with the creation of this new office, to note, that if those cities +which, as was the case with Rome, have had their beginning in freedom, +and have by themselves maintained that freedom, have experienced great +difficulty in framing good laws for the preservation of their +liberties, it is little to be wondered at that cities which at the +first were dependent, should find it not difficult merely but +impossible so to shape their ordinances as to enable them to live free +and undisturbed. This difficulty we see to have arisen in the case of +Florence, which, being subject at first to the power of Rome and +subsequently to that of other rulers, remained long in servitude, +taking no thought for herself; and even afterwards, when she could +breathe more freely and began to frame her own laws, these, since they +were blended with ancient ordinances which were bad, could not +themselves be good; and thus for the two hundred years of which we have +trustworthy record, our city has gone on patching her institutions, +without ever possessing a government in respect of which she could +truly be termed a commonwealth. + +The difficulties which have been felt in Florence are the same as have +been felt in all cities which have had a like origin; and although, +repeatedly, by the free and public votes of her citizens, ample +authority has been given to a few of their number to reform her +constitution, no alteration of general utility has ever been +introduced, but only such as forwarded the interests of the party to +which those commissioned to make changes belonged. This, instead of +order, has occasioned the greatest disorder in our city. + +But to come to particulars, I say, that among other matters which have +to be considered by the founder of a commonwealth, is the question into +whose hands should be committed the power of life and death over its +citizens’ This was well seen to in Rome, where, as a rule, there was a +right of appeal to the people, but where, on any urgent case arising in +which it might have been dangerous to delay the execution of a judicial +sentence, recourse could be had to a dictator with powers to execute +justice at once; a remedy, however, never resorted to save in cases of +extremity. But Florence, and other cities having a like origin, +committed this power into the hands of a foreigner, whom they styled +Captain, and as he was open to be corrupted by powerful citizens this +was a pernicious course. Altering this arrangement afterwards in +consequence of changes in their government, they appointed eight +citizens to discharge the office of Captain. But this, for a reason +already mentioned, namely that a few will always be governed by the +will of a few and these the most powerful, was a change from bad to +worse. + +The city of Venice has guarded herself against a like danger. For in +Venice ten citizens are appointed with power to punish any man without +appeal; and because, although possessing the requisite authority, this +number might not be sufficient to insure the punishment of the +powerful, in addition to their council of Ten, they have also +constituted a council of Forty, and have further provided that the +council of the “_Pregai_,” which is their supreme council, shall have +authority to chastise powerful offenders. So that, unless an accuser be +wanting, a tribunal is never wanting in Venice to keep powerful +citizens in check. + +But when we see how in Rome, with ordinances of her own imposing, and +with so many and so wise legislators, fresh occasion arose from day to +day for framing new laws favourable to freedom, it is not to be +wondered at that, in other cities less happy in their beginnings, +difficulties should have sprung up which no ordinances could remedy. + + + + +CHAPTER L.—_That neither any Council nor any Magistrate should have +power to bring the Government of a City to a stay._ + + +T.Q. CINCINNATUS and Cn. Julius Mento being consuls of Rome, and being +at variance with one another, brought the whole business of the city to +a stay; which the senate perceiving, were moved to create a dictator to +do what, by reason of their differences, the consuls would not. But +though opposed to one another in everything else, the consuls were of +one mind in resisting the appointment of a dictator; so that the senate +had no remedy left them but to seek the help of the tribunes, who, +supported by their authority, forced the consuls to yield. + +Here we have to note, first, the usefulness of the tribunes’ authority +in checking the ambitious designs, not only of the nobles against the +commons, but also of one section of the nobles against another; and +next, that in no city ought things ever to be so ordered that it rests +with a few to decide on matters, which, if the ordinary business of the +State is to proceed at all, must be carried out. Wherefore, if you +grant authority to a council to distribute honours and offices, or to a +magistrate to administer any branch of public business, you must either +impose an obligation that the duty confided shall be performed, or +ordain that, on failure to perform, another may and shall do what has +to be done. Otherwise such an arrangement will be found defective and +dangerous; as would have been the case in Rome, had it not been +possible to oppose the authority of the tribunes to the obstinacy of +the consuls. + +In the Venetian Republic, the great council distributes honours and +offices. But more than once it has happened that the council, whether +from ill-humour or from being badly advised, has declined to appoint +successors either to the magistrates of the city or to those +administering the government abroad. This gave rise to the greatest +confusion and disorder; for, on a sudden, both the city itself and the +subject provinces found themselves deprived of their lawful governors; +nor could any redress be had until the majority of the council were +pacified or undeceived. And this disorder must have brought the city to +a bad end, had not provision been made against its recurrence by +certain of the wiser citizens, who, finding a fit opportunity, passed a +law that no magistracy, whether within or without the city, should ever +be deemed to have been vacated until it was filled up by the +appointment of a successor. In this way the council was deprived of its +facilities for stopping public business to the danger of the State. + + + + +CHAPTER LI.—_What a Prince or Republic does of Necessity, should seem +to be done by Choice_. + + +In all their actions, even in those which are matters of necessity +rather than choice, prudent men will endeavour so to conduct themselves +as to conciliate good-will. This species of prudence was well exercised +by the Roman senate when they resolved to grant pay from the public +purse to soldiers on active service, who, before, had served at their +own charges. For perceiving that under the old system they could +maintain no war of any duration, and, consequently, could not undertake +a siege or lead an army to any distance from home, and finding it +necessary to be able to do both, they decided on granting the pay I +have spoken of. But this, which they could not help doing, they did in +such a way as to earn the thanks of the people, by whom the concession +was so well received that all Rome was intoxicated with delight. For it +seemed to them a boon beyond any they could have ventured to hope for, +or have dreamed of demanding. And although the tribunes sought to make +light of the benefit, by showing the people that their burthens would +be increased rather than diminished by it, since taxes would have to be +imposed out of which the soldier’s stipend might be paid, they could +not persuade them to regard the measure otherwise than with gratitude; +which was further increased by the manner in which the senate +distributed the taxes, imposing on the nobles all the heavier and +greater, and those which had to be paid first. + + + + +CHAPTER LII.—_That to check the arrogance of a Citizen who is growing +too powerful in a State, there is no safer Method, or less open to +objection, than to forestall him in those Ways whereby he seeks to +advance himself_. + + +It has been seen in the preceding chapter how much credit the nobles +gained with the commons by a show of good-will towards them, not only +in providing for their military pay, but also in adjusting taxation. +Had the senate constantly adhered to methods like these, they would +have put an end to all disturbances in Rome, and have deprived the +tribunes of the credit they had with the people, and of the influence +thence arising. For in truth, in a commonwealth, and especially in one +which has become corrupted, there is no better, or easier, or less +objectionable way of opposing the ambition of any citizen, than to +anticipate him in those paths by which he is seen to be advancing to +the ends he has in view. This plan, had it been followed by the enemies +of Cosimo de’ Medici, would have proved a far more useful course for +them than to banish him from Florence; since if those citizens who +opposed him had adopted his methods for gaining over the people, they +would have succeeded, without violence or tumult, in taking his most +effective weapon from his hands. + +The influence acquired in Florence by Piero Soderini was entirely due +to his skill in securing the affections of the people, since in this +way he obtained among them a name for loving the liberties of the +commonwealth. And truly, for those citizens who envied his greatness it +would have been both easier and more honourable, and at the same time +far less dangerous and hurtful to the State, to forestall him in those +measures by which he was growing powerful, than to oppose him in such a +manner that his overthrow must bring with it the ruin of the entire +republic. For had they, as they might easily have done, deprived him of +the weapons which made him formidable, they could then have withstood +him in all the councils, and in all public deliberations, without +either being suspected or feared. And should any rejoin that, if the +citizens who hated Piero Soderini committed an error in not being +beforehand with him in those ways whereby he came to have influence +with the people, Piero himself erred in like manner, in not +anticipating his enemies in those methods whereby they grew formidable +to him; I answer that Piero is to be excused, both because it would +have been difficult for him to have so acted, and because for him such +a course would not have been honourable. For the paths wherein his +danger lay were those which favoured the Medici, and it was by these +that his enemies attacked him, and in the end overthrew him. But these +paths Piero could not pursue without dishonour, since he could not, if +he was to preserve his fair fame, have joined in destroying that +liberty which he had been put forward to defend. Moreover, since +favours to the Medicean party could not have been rendered secretly and +once for all, they would have been most dangerous for Piero, who, had +he shown himself friendly to the Medici, must have become suspected and +hated by the people; in which case his enemies would have had still +better opportunities than before for his destruction. + +Men ought therefore to look to the risks and dangers of any course +which lies before them, nor engage in it when it is plain that the +dangers outweigh the advantages, even though they be advised by others +that it is the most expedient way to take. Should they act otherwise, +it will fare with them as with Tullius, who, in seeking to diminish the +power of Marcus Antonius, added to it. For Antonius, who had been +declared an enemy by the senate, having got together a strong force, +mostly made up of veterans who had shared the fortunes of Cæsar, +Tullius counselled the senate to invest Octavianus with full authority, +and to send him against Antonius with the consuls and the army; +affirming, that so soon as those veterans who had served with Cæsar saw +the face of him who was Cæsar’s nephew and had assumed his name, they +would rally to his side and desert Antonius, who might easily be +crushed when thus left bare of support. + +But the reverse of all this happened. For Antonius persuaded Octavianus +to take part with him, and to throw over Tullius and the senate. And +this brought about the ruin of the senate, a result which might easily +have been foreseen. For remembering the influence of that great +captain, who, after overthrowing all opponents, had seized on sovereign +power in Rome, the senate should have turned a deaf ear to the +persuasions of Tullius, nor ever have believed it possible that from +Cæsar’s heir, or from soldiers who had followed Cæsar, they could look +for anything that consisted with the name of Freedom. + + + + +CHAPTER LIII.—_That the People, deceived by a false show of Advantage, +often desire what would be their Ruin; and that large Hopes and brave +Promises easily move them_. + + +When Veii fell, the commons of Rome took up the notion that it would be +to the advantage of their city were half their number to go and dwell +there. For they argued that as Veii lay in a fertile country and was a +well-built city, a moiety of the Roman people might in this way be +enriched; while, by reason of its vicinity to Rome, the management of +civil affairs would in no degree be affected. To the senate, however, +and the wiser among the citizens, the scheme appeared so rash and +mischievous that they publicly declared they would die sooner than +consent to it. The controversy continuing, the commons grew so inflamed +against the senate that violence and bloodshed must have ensued; had +not the senate for their protection put forward certain old and +esteemed citizens, respect for whom restrained the populace and put a +stop to their violence. + +Two points are here to be noted. First, that a people deceived by a +false show of advantage will often labour for its own destruction; and, +unless convinced by some one whom it trusts, that the course on which +it is bent is pernicious, and that some other is to be preferred, will +bring infinite danger and injury upon the State. And should it so +happen, as sometimes is the case, that from having been deceived +before, either by men or by events, there is none in whom the people +trust, their ruin is inevitable. As to which Dante, in his treatise “De +Monarchia,” observes that the people will often raise the cry, +“_Flourish our death and perish our life_.”[5] From which distrust it +arises that often in republics the right course is not followed; as +when Venice, as has been related, on being attacked by many enemies, +could not, until her ruin was complete, resolve to make friends with +any one of them by restoring those territories she had taken from them, +on account of which war had been declared and a league of princes +formed against her. + + [5] “Viva la sua morte e muoia la sua vita.” The quotation does _not_ + seem to be from the “De Monarchia.” + + +In considering what courses it is easy, and what it is difficult to +persuade a people to follow, this distinction may be drawn: Either what +you would persuade them to, presents on the face of it a semblance of +gain or loss, or it seems a spirited course or a base one. When any +proposal submitted to the people holds out promise of advantage, or +seems to them a spirited course to take, though loss lie hid behind, +nay, though the ruin of their country be involved in it, they will +always be easily led to adopt it; whereas it will always be difficult +to persuade the adoption of such courses as wear the appearance of +disgrace or loss, even though safety and advantage be bound up with +them. The truth of what I say is confirmed by numberless examples both +Roman and foreign, modern and ancient. Hence grew the ill opinion +entertained in Rome of Fabius Maximus, who could never persuade the +people that it behoved them to proceed warily in their conflict with +Hannibal, and withstand his onset without fighting. For this the people +thought a base course, not discerning the advantage resulting from it, +which Fabius could by no argument make plain to them. And so blinded +are men in favour of what seems a spirited course, that although the +Romans had already committed the blunder of permitting Varro, master of +the knights to Fabius, to join battle contrary to the latter’s desire, +whereby the army must have been destroyed had not Fabius by his +prudence saved it, this lesson was not enough; for afterwards they +appointed this Varro to be consul, for no other reason than that he +gave out, in the streets and market-places, that he would make an end +of Hannibal as soon as leave was given him to do so. Whence came the +battle and defeat of Cannæ, and well-nigh the destruction of Rome. + +Another example taken from Roman history may be cited to the same +effect. After Hannibal had maintained himself for eight or ten years in +Italy, during which time the whole country had been deluged with Roman +blood, a certain Marcus Centenius Penula, a man of mean origin, but who +had held some post in the army, came forward and proposed to the senate +that were leave given him to raise a force of volunteers in any part of +Italy he pleased, he would speedily deliver Hannibal into their hands, +alive or dead. To the senate this man’s offer seemed a rash one; but +reflecting that were they to refuse it, and were the people afterwards +to hear that it had been made, tumults, ill will, and resentment +against them would result, they granted the permission asked; choosing +rather to risk the lives of all who might follow Penula, than to excite +fresh discontent on the part of the people, to whom they knew that such +a proposal would be welcome, and that it would be very hard to dissuade +them from it. And so this adventurer, marching forth with an +undisciplined and disorderly rabble to meet Hannibal, was, with all his +followers, defeated and slain in the very first encounter. + +In Greece, likewise, and in the city of Athens, that most grave and +prudent statesman, Nicias, could not convince the people that the +proposal to go and attack Sicily was disadvantageous; and the +expedition being resolved on, contrary to his advice and to the wishes +of the wiser among the citizens, resulted in the overthrow of the +Athenian power. Scipio, on being appointed consul, asked that the +province of Africa might be awarded to him, promising that he would +utterly efface Carthage; and when the senate, on the advice of Fabius, +refused his request, he threatened to submit the matter to the people +as very well knowing that to the people such proposals are always +acceptable. + +I might cite other instances to the same effect from the history of our +own city, as when Messer Ercole Bentivoglio and Antonio Giacomini, +being in joint command of the Florentine armies, after defeating +Bartolommeo d’Alviano at San Vincenzo, proceeded to invest Pisa. For +this enterprise was resolved on by the people in consequence of the +brave promises of Messer Ercole; and though many wise citizens +disapproved of it, they could do nothing to prevent it, being carried +away by the popular will, which took its rise in the assurances of +their captain. + +I say, then, that there is no readier way to bring about the ruin of a +republic, when the power is in the hands of the people, than to suggest +daring courses for their adoption. For wherever the people have a +voice, such proposals will always be well received, nor will those +persons who are opposed to them be able to apply any remedy. And as +this occasions the ruin of States, it likewise, and even more +frequently, occasions the private ruin of those to whom the execution +of these proposals is committed; because the people anticipating +victory, do not when there comes defeat ascribe it to the short means +or ill fortune of the commander, but to his cowardice and incapacity; +and commonly either put him to death, or imprison or banish him; as was +done in the case of numberless Carthaginian generals and of many +Athenian, no successes they might previously have obtained availing +them anything; for all past services are cancelled by a present loss. +And so it happened with our Antonio Giacomini, who not succeeding as +the people had expected, and as he had promised, in taking Pisa, fell +into such discredit with the people, that notwithstanding his countless +past services, his life was spared rather by the compassion of those in +authority than through any movement of the citizens in his behalf. + + + + +CHAPTER LIV.—_Of the boundless Authority which a great Man may use to +restrain an excited Multitude_. + + +The next noteworthy point in the passage referred to in the foregoing +Chapter is, that nothing tends so much to restrain an excited multitude +as the reverence felt for some grave person, clothed with authority, +who stands forward to oppose them. For not without reason has Virgil +said— + +“If then, by chance, some reverend chief appear, +Known for his deeds and for his virtues dear, +Silent they wait his words and bend a listening ear.”[6] + + + [6] Tum pietate gravem ac meritis si forte virum quem +Conspexere, silent, arrectisque auribus adstant. + _Virg. Aen._, I. 154. + + +He therefore who commands an army or governs a city wherein tumult +shall have broken out, ought to assume the noblest and bravest bearing +he can, and clothe himself with all the ensigns of his station, that he +may make himself more revered. It is not many years since Florence was +divided into two factions, the _Frateschi_ and _Arrabbiati_, as they +were named, and these coming to open violence, the _Frateschi_, among +whom was Pagolo Antonio Soderini, a citizen of great reputation in +these days, were worsted. In the course of these disturbances the +people coming with arms in their hands to plunder the house of +Soderini, his brother Messer Francesco, then bishop of Volterra and now +cardinal, who happened to be dwelling there, so soon as he heard the +uproar and saw the crowd, putting on his best apparel and over it his +episcopal robes, went forth to meet the armed multitude, and by his +words and mien brought them to a stay; and for many days his behaviour +was commended by the whole city. The inference from all which is, that +there is no surer or more necessary restraint on the violence of an +unruly multitude, than the presence of some one whose character and +bearing command respect. + +But to return once more to the passage we are considering, we see how +stubbornly the people clung to this scheme of transplanting themselves +to Veii, thinking it for their advantage, and not discerning the +mischief really involved in it; so that in addition to the many +dissensions which it occasioned, actual violence must have followed, +had not the senate with the aid of certain grave and reverend citizens +repressed the popular fury. + + + + +CHAPTER LV.—_That Government is easily carried on in a City wherein the +body of the People is not corrupted: and that a Princedom is impossible +where Equality prevails, and a Republic where it does not_. + + +Though what we have to fear or hope from cities that have grown +corrupted has already been discussed, still I think it not out of place +to notice a resolution passed by the senate touching the vow which +Camillus made to Apollo of a tenth of the spoil taken from the +Veientines. For this spoil having fallen into the hands of the people, +the senate, being unable by other means to get any account of it, +passed an edict that every man should publicly offer one tenth part of +what he had taken. And although this edict was not carried out, from +the senate having afterwards followed a different course, whereby, to +the content of the people, the claim of Apollo was otherwise satisfied, +we nevertheless see from their having entertained such a proposal, how +completely the senate trusted to the honesty of the people, when they +assumed that no one would withhold any part of what the edict commanded +him to give; on the other hand, we see that it never occurred to the +people that they might evade the law by giving less than was due, their +only thought being to free themselves from the law by openly +manifesting their displeasure. This example, together with many others +already noticed, shows how much virtue and how profound a feeling of +religion prevailed among the Roman people, and how much good was to be +expected from them. And, in truth, in the country where virtue like +this does not exist, no good can be looked for, as we should look for +it in vain in provinces which at the present day are seen to be +corrupted; as Italy is beyond all others, though, in some degree, +France and Spain are similarly tainted. In which last two countries, if +we see not so many disorders spring up as we see daily springing up in +Italy, this is not so much due to the superior virtue of their +inhabitants (who, to say truth, fall far short of our countrymen), as +to their being governed by a king who keeps them united, not merely by +his personal qualities, but also by the laws and ordinances of the +realm which are still maintained with vigour. In Germany, however, we +do see signal excellence and a devout religious spirit prevail among +the people, giving rise to the many free States which there maintain +themselves, with such strict observance of their laws that none, either +within or without their walls, dare encroach on them. + +That among this last-named people a great share of the ancient +excellence does in truth still flourish, I shall show by an example +similar to that which I have above related of the senate and people of +Rome. It is customary with the German Free States when they have to +expend any large sum of money on the public account, for their +magistrates or councils having authority given them in that behalf, to +impose a rate of one or two in the hundred on every man’s estate; which +rate being fixed, every man, in conformity with the laws of the city, +presents himself before the collectors of the impost, and having first +made oath to pay the amount justly due, throws into a chest provided +for the purpose what he conscientiously believes it fair for him to +pay, of which payment none is witness save himself. From this fact it +may be gathered what honesty and religion still prevail among this +people. For we must assume that each pays his just share, since +otherwise the impost would not yield the sum which, with reference to +former imposts, it was estimated to yield; whereby the fraud would be +detected, and thereupon some other method for raising money have to be +resorted to. + +At the present time this virtue is the more to be admired, because it +seems to have survived in this province only. That it has survived +there may be ascribed to two circumstances: _first_, that the natives +have little communication with their neighbours, neither visiting them +in their countries nor being visited by them; being content to use such +commodities, and subsist on such food, and to wear garments of such +materials as their own land supplies; so that all occasion for +intercourse, and every cause of corruption is removed. For living after +this fashion, they have not learned the manners of the French, the +Italians, or the Spaniards, which three nations together are the +corruption of the world. The _second_ cause is, that these republics in +which a free and pure government is maintained will not suffer any of +their citizens either to be, or to live as gentlemen; but on the +contrary, while preserving a strict equality among themselves, are +bitterly hostile to all those gentlemen and lords who dwell in their +neighbourhood; so that if by chance any of these fall into their hands, +they put them to death, as the chief promoters of corruption and the +origin of all disorders. + +But to make plain what I mean when I speak of _gentlemen_, I say that +those are so to be styled who live in opulence and idleness on the +revenues of their estates, without concerning themselves with the +cultivation of these estates, or incurring any other fatigue for their +support. Such persons are very mischievous in every republic or +country. But even more mischievous are they who, besides the estates I +have spoken of, are lords of strongholds and castles, and have vassals +and retainers who render them obedience. Of these two classes of men +the kingdom of Naples, the country round Rome, Romagna, and Lombardy +are full; and hence it happens that in these provinces no commonwealth +or free form of government has ever existed; because men of this sort +are the sworn foes to all free institutions. + +And since to plant a commonwealth in provinces which are in this +condition were impossible, if these are to be reformed at all, it can +only be by some one man who is able there to establish a kingdom; the +reason being that when the body of the people is grown so corrupted +that the laws are powerless to control it, there must in addition to +the laws be introduced a stronger force, to wit, the regal, which by +its absolute and unrestricted authority may curb the excessive ambition +and corruption of the great. This opinion may be supported by the +example of Tuscany, in which within a narrow compass of territory there +have long existed the three republics of Florence, Lucca, and Siena, +while the other cities of that province, although to a certain extent +dependent, still show by their spirit and by their institutions that +they preserve, or at any rate desire to preserve, their freedom: and +this because there are in Tuscany no lords possessed of strongholds, +and few or no gentlemen, but so complete an equality prevails, that a +prudent statesman, well acquainted with the history of the free States +of antiquity, might easily introduce free institutions. Such, however, +has been the unhappiness of this our country, that, up to the present +hour, it has never produced any man with the power and knowledge which +would have enabled him to act in this way. + +From what has been said, it follows, that he who would found a +commonwealth in a country wherein there are many gentlemen, cannot do +so unless he first gets rid of them; and that he who would found a +monarchy or princedom in a country wherein great equality prevails, +will never succeed, unless he raise above the level of that equality +many persons of a restless and ambitious temperament, whom he must make +gentlemen not in name merely but in reality, by conferring on them +castles and lands, supplying them with riches, and providing them with +retainers; that with these gentlemen around him, and with their help, +he may maintain his power, while they through him may gratify their +ambition; all others being constrained to endure a yoke, which force +and force alone imposes on them. For when in this way there comes to be +a proportion between him who uses force and him against whom it is +used, each stands fixed in his own station. + +But to found a commonwealth in a country suited for a kingdom, or a +kingdom in a country suited to be a commonwealth, requires so rare a +combination of intelligence and power, that though many engage in the +attempt, few are found to succeed. For the greatness of the undertaking +quickly daunts them, and so obstructs their advance they break down at +the very outset. The case of the Venetian Republic, wherein none save +gentlemen are permitted to hold any public office, does, doubtless, +seem opposed to this opinion of mine that where there are gentlemen it +is impossible to found a commonwealth. But it may be answered that the +case of Venice is not in truth an instance to the contrary; since the +gentlemen of Venice are gentlemen rather in name than in reality, +inasmuch as they draw no great revenues from lands, their wealth +consisting chiefly in merchandise and chattels, and not one of them +possessing a castle or enjoying any feudal authority. For in Venice +this name of gentleman is a title of honour and dignity, and does not +depend on any of those circumstances in respect of which the name is +given in other States. But as in other States the different ranks and +classes are divided under different names, so in Venice we have the +division into gentlemen (_gentiluomini_) and plebeians (_popolani_), it +being understood that the former hold, or have the right to hold all +situations of honour, from which the latter are entirely excluded. And +in Venice this occasions no disturbance, for reasons which I have +already explained. + +Let a commonwealth, then, be constituted in the country where a great +equality is found or has been made; and, conversely, let a princedom be +constituted where great inequality prevails. Otherwise what is +constituted will be discordant in itself, and without stability. + + + + +CHAPTER LVI.—_That when great Calamities are about to befall a City or +Country, Signs are seen to presage, and Seers arise who foretell them_. + + +Whence it happens I know not, but it is seen from examples both ancient +and recent, that no grave calamity has ever befallen any city or +country which has not been foretold by vision, by augury, by portent, +or by some other Heaven-sent sign. And not to travel too far afield for +evidence of this, every one knows that long before the invasion of +Italy by Charles VIII. of France, his coming was foretold by the friar +Girolamo Savonarola; and how, throughout the whole of Tuscany, the +rumour ran that over Arezzo horsemen had been seen fighting in the air. +And who is there who has not heard that before the death of the elder +Lorenzo de’ Medici, the highest pinnacle of the cathedral was rent by a +thunderbolt, to the great injury of the building? Or who, again, but +knows that shortly before Piero Soderini, whom the people of Florence +had made gonfalonier for life, was deprived of his office and banished, +the palace itself was struck by lightning? + +Other instances might be cited, which, not to be tedious, I shall omit, +and mention only a circumstance which Titus Livius tells us preceded +the invasion of the Gauls. For he relates how a certain plebeian named +Marcus Ceditius reported to the senate that as he passed by night along +the Via Nova, he heard a voice louder than mortal, bidding him warn the +magistrates that the Gauls were on their way to Rome. + +The causes of such manifestations ought, I think, to be inquired into +and explained by some one who has a knowledge, which I have not, of +causes natural and supernatural. It may, however, be, as certain wise +men say, that the air is filled with intelligent beings, to whom it is +given to forecast future events; who, taking pity upon men, warn them +beforehand by these signs to prepare for what awaits them. Be this as +it may, certain it is that such warnings are given, and that always +after them new and strange disasters befall nations. + + + + +CHAPTER LVII.—_That the People are strong collectively, but +individually weak_. + + +After the ruin brought on their country by the invasion of the Gauls, +many of the Romans went to dwell in Veii, in opposition to the edicts +and commands of the senate, who, to correct this mischief, publicly +ordained that within a time fixed, and under penalties stated, all +should return to live in Rome. The persons against whom these +proclamations were directed at first derided them; but, when the time +came for them to be obeyed, all obeyed them. And Titus Livius observes +that, “_although bold enough collectively, each separately, fearing to +be punished, made his submission_.” And indeed the temper of the +multitude in such cases, cannot be better described than in this +passage. For often a people will be open-mouthed in condemning the +decrees of their prince, but afterwards, when they have to look +punishment in the face, putting no trust in one another, they hasten to +comply. Wherefore, if you be in a position to keep the people +well-disposed towards you when they already are so, or to prevent them +injuring you in case they be ill-disposed, it is clearly of little +moment whether the feelings with which they profess to regard you, be +favourable or no. This applies to all unfriendliness on the part of a +people, whencesoever it proceed, excepting only the resentment felt by +them on being deprived either of liberty, or of a prince whom they love +and who still survives. For the hostile temper produced by these two +causes is more to be feared than any beside, and demands measures of +extreme severity to correct it. The other untoward humours of the +multitude, should there be no powerful chief to foster them, are easily +dealt with; because, while on the one hand there is nothing more +terrible than an uncontrolled and headless mob, on the other, there is +nothing feebler. For though it be furnished with arms it is easily +subdued, if you have some place of strength wherein to shelter from its +first onset. For when its first fury has somewhat abated, and each man +sees that he has to return to his own house, all begin to lose heart +and to take thought how to insure their personal safety, whether by +flight or by submission. For which reason a multitude stirred in this +way, if it would avoid dangers such as I speak of, must at once appoint +a head from among its own numbers, who may control it, keep it united, +and provide for its defence; as did the commons of Rome when, after the +death of Virginia, they quitted the city, and for their protection +created twenty tribunes from among themselves. Unless this be done, +what Titus Livius has observed in the passage cited, will always prove +true, namely, that a multitude is strong while it holds together, but +so soon as each of those who compose it begins to think of his own +private danger, it becomes weak and contemptible. + + + + +CHAPTER LVIII.—_That a People is wiser and more constant than a Prince_ + + +That “_nothing is more fickle and inconstant than the multitude_” is +affirmed not by Titus Livius only, but by all other historians, in +whose chronicles of human actions we often find the multitude +condemning some citizen to death, and afterwards lamenting him and +grieving greatly for his loss, as the Romans grieved and lamented for +Manlius Capitolinus, whom they had themselves condemned to die. In +relating which circumstance our author observes “_In a short time the +people, having no longer cause to fear him, began to deplore his +death_” And elsewhere, when speaking of what took place in Syracuse +after the murder of Hieronymus, grandson of Hiero, he says, “_It is the +nature of the multitude to be an abject slave, or a domineering +master_” + +It may be that in attempting to defend a cause, which, as I have said, +all writers are agreed to condemn, I take upon me a task so hard and +difficult that I shall either have to relinquish it with shame or +pursue it with opprobrium. Be that as it may, I neither do, nor ever +shall judge it a fault, to support opinion by arguments, where it is +not sought to impose them by violence or authority I maintain, then, +that this infirmity with which historians tax the multitude, may with +equal reason be charged against every individual man, but most of all +against princes, since all who are not controlled by the laws, will +commit the very same faults as are committed by an uncontrolled +multitude. Proof whereof were easy, since of all the many princes +existing, or who have existed, few indeed are or have been either wise +or good. + +I speak of such princes as have had it in their power to break the +reins by which they are controlled, among whom I do not reckon those +kings who reigned in Egypt in the most remote antiquity when that +country was governed in conformity with its laws; nor do I include +those kings who reigned in Sparta, nor those who in our own times reign +in France, which kingdom, more than any other whereof we have knowledge +at the present day, is under the government of its laws. For kings who +live, as these do, subject to constitutional restraint, are not to be +counted when we have to consider each man’s proper nature, and to see +whether he resembles the multitude. For to draw a comparison with such +princes as these, we must take the case of a multitude controlled as +they are, and regulated by the laws, when we shall find it to possess +the same virtues which we see in them, and neither conducting itself as +an abject slave nor as a domineering master. + +Such was the people of Rome, who, while the commonwealth continued +uncorrupted, never either served abjectly nor domineered haughtily; +but, on the contrary, by means of their magistrates and their +ordinances, maintained their place, and when forced to put forth their +strength against some powerful citizen, as in the case of Manlius, the +decemvirs, and others who sought to oppress them, did so; but when it +was necessary for the public welfare to yield obedience to the dictator +or consuls, obeyed. And if the Roman people mourned the loss of the +dead Manlius, it is no wonder; for they mourned his virtues, which had +been of such a sort that their memory stirred the regret of all, and +would have had power to produce the same feelings even in a prince; all +writers being agreed that excellence is praised and admired even by its +enemies. But if Manlius when he was so greatly mourned, could have +risen once more from the dead, the Roman people would have pronounced +the same sentence against him which they pronounced when they led him +forth from the prison-house, and straightway condemned him to die. And +in like manner we see that princes, accounted wise, have put men to +death, and afterwards greatly lamented them, as Alexander mourned for +Clitus and others of his friends, and Herod for Mariamne. + +But what our historian says of the multitude, he says not of a +multitude which like the people of Rome is controlled by the laws, but +of an uncontrolled multitude like the Syracusans, who were guilty of +all these crimes which infuriated and ungoverned men commit, and which +were equally committed by Alexander and Herod in the cases mentioned. +Wherefore the nature of a multitude is no more to be blamed than the +nature of princes, since both equally err when they can do so without +regard to consequences. Of which many instances, besides those already +given, might be cited from the history of the Roman emperors, and of +other princes and tyrants, in whose lives we find such inconstancy and +fickleness, as we might look in vain for in a people. + +I maintain, therefore, contrary to the common opinion which avers that +a people when they have the management of affairs are changeable, +fickle, and ungrateful, that these faults exist not in them otherwise +than as they exist in individual princes; so that were any to accuse +both princes and peoples, the charge might be true, but that to make +exception in favour of princes is a mistake; for a people in command, +if it be duly restrained, will have the same prudence and the same +gratitude as a prince has, or even more, however wise he may be +reckoned; and a prince on the other hand, if freed from the control of +the laws, will be more ungrateful, fickle, and short-sighted than a +people. And further, I say that any difference in their methods of +acting results not from any difference in their nature, that being the +same in both, or, if there be advantage on either side, the advantage +resting with the people, but from their having more or less respect for +the laws under which each lives. And whosoever attentively considers +the history of the Roman people, may see that for four hundred years +they never relaxed in their hatred of the regal name, and were +constantly devoted to the glory and welfare of their country, and will +find numberless proofs given by them of their consistency in both +particulars. And should any allege against me the ingratitude they +showed to Scipio, I reply by what has already been said at length on +that head, where I proved that peoples are less ungrateful than +princes. But as for prudence and stability of purpose, I affirm that a +people is more prudent, more stable, and of better judgment than a +prince. Nor is it without reason that the voice of the people has been +likened to the voice of God; for we see that wide-spread beliefs fulfil +themselves, and bring about marvellous results, so as to have the +appearance of presaging by some occult quality either weal or woe. +Again, as to the justice of their opinions on public affairs, seldom +find that after hearing two speakers of equal ability urging them in +opposite directions, they do not adopt the sounder view, or are unable +to decide on the truth of what they hear. And if, as I have said, a +people errs in adopting courses which appear to it bold and +advantageous, princes will likewise err when their passions are +touched, as is far oftener the case with them than with a people. + +We see, too, that in the choice of magistrates a people will choose far +more honestly than a prince; so that while you shall never persuade a +people that it is advantageous to confer dignities on the infamous and +profligate, a prince may readily, and in a thousand ways, be drawn to +do so. Again, it may be seen that a people, when once they have come to +hold a thing in abhorrence, remain for many ages of the same mind; +which we do not find happen with princes. For the truth of both of +which assertions the Roman people are my sufficient witness, who, in +the course of so many hundred years, and in so many elections of +consuls and tribunes, never made four appointments of which they had +reason to repent; and, as I have said, so detested the name of king, +that no obligation they might be under to any citizen who affected that +name, could shield him from the appointed penalty. + +Further, we find that those cities wherein the government is in the +hands of the people, in a very short space of time, make marvellous +progress, far exceeding that made by cities which have been always +ruled by princes; as Rome grew after the expulsion of her kings, and +Athens after she freed herself from Pisistratus; and this we can +ascribe to no other cause than that the rule of a people is better than +the rule of a prince. + +Nor would I have it thought that anything our historian may have +affirmed in the passage cited, or elsewhere, controverts these my +opinions. For if all the glories and all the defects both of peoples +and of princes be carefully weighed, it will appear that both for +goodness and for glory a people is to be preferred. And if princes +surpass peoples in the work of legislation, in shaping civil +institutions, in moulding statutes, and framing new ordinances, so far +do the latter surpass the former in maintaining what has once been +established, as to merit no less praise than they. + +And to state the sum of the whole matter shortly, I say that popular +governments have endured for long periods in the same way as the +governments of princes, and that both have need to be regulated by the +laws; because the prince who can do what he pleases is a madman, and +the people which can do as it pleases is never wise. If, then, we +assume the case of a prince bound, and of a people chained down by the +laws, greater virtue will appear in the people than in the prince; +while if we assume the case of each of them freed from all control, it +will be seen that the people commits fewer errors than the prince, and +less serious errors, and such as admit of readier cure. For a turbulent +and unruly people may be spoken to by a good man, and readily brought +back to good ways; but none can speak to a wicked prince, nor any +remedy be found against him but by the sword. And from this we may +infer which of the two suffers from the worse disease; for if the +disease of the people may be healed by words, while that of the prince +must be dealt with by the sword, there is none but will judge that evil +to be the greater which demands the more violent remedy. + +When a people is absolutely uncontrolled, it is not so much the follies +which it commits or the evil which it actually does that excites alarm, +as the mischief which may thence result, since in such disorders it +becomes possible for a tyrant to spring up. But with a wicked prince +the contrary is the case; for we dread present ill, and place our hopes +in the future, persuading ourselves that the evil life of the prince +may bring about our freedom. So that there is this distinction between +the two, that with the one we fear what is, with the other what is +likely to be. Again, the cruelties of a people are turned against him +who it fears will encroach upon the common rights, but the cruelties of +the prince against those who he fears may assert those rights. + +The prejudice which is entertained against the people arises from this, +that any man may speak ill of them openly and fearlessly, even when the +government is in their hands; whereas princes are always spoken of with +a thousand reserves and a constant eye to consequences. + +But since the subject suggests it, it seems to me not out of place to +consider what alliances we can most trust, whether those made with +commonwealths or those made with princes. + + + + +CHAPTER LIX.—_To what Leagues or Alliances we may most trust; whether +those we make with Commonwealths or those we make with Princes_. + + +Since leagues and alliances are every day entered into by one prince +with another, or by one commonwealth with another, and as conventions +and treaties are concluded in like manner between princes and +commonwealths, it seems to me proper to inquire whether the faith of a +commonwealth or that of a prince is the more stable and the safer to +count on. All things considered, I am disposed to believe that in most +cases they are alike, though in some they differ. Of one thing, +however, I am convinced, namely, that engagements made under duress +will never be observed either by prince or by commonwealth; and that if +menaced with the loss of their territories, both the one and the other +will break faith with you and treat you with ingratitude. Demetrius, +who was named the “City-taker,” had conferred numberless benefits upon +the Athenians; but when, afterwards, on being defeated by his enemies, +he sought shelter in Athens, as being a friendly city and under +obligations to him, it was refused him; a circumstance which grieved +him far more than the loss of his soldiers and army had done. Pompey, +in like manner, when routed by Cæsar in Thessaly, fled for refuge to +Ptolemy in Egypt, who formerly had been restored by him to his kingdom; +by whom he was put to death. In both these instances the same causes +were at work, although the inhumanity and the wrong inflicted were less +in the case of the commonwealth than of the prince. Still, wherever +there is fear, the want of faith will be the same. + +And even if there be found a commonwealth or prince who, in order to +keep faith, will submit to be ruined, this is seen to result from a +like cause. For, as to the prince, it may easily happen that he is +friend to a powerful sovereign, whom, though he be at the time without +means to defend him, he may presently hope to see restored to his +dominions; or it may be that having linked his fortunes with another’s, +he despairs of finding either faith or friendship from the enemies of +his ally, as was the case with those Neapolitan princes who espoused +the interests of France. As to commonwealths, an instance similar to +that of the princes last named, is that of Saguntum in Spain, which +awaited ruin in adhering to the fortunes of Rome. A like course was +also followed by Florence when, in the year 1512, she stood steadfastly +by the cause of the French. And taking everything into account, I +believe that in cases of urgency, we shall find a certain degree of +stability sooner in commonwealths than in princes. For though +commonwealths be like-minded with princes, and influenced by the same +passions, the circumstance that their movements must be slower, makes +it harder for them to resolve than it is for a prince, for which reason +they will be less ready to break faith. + +And since leagues and alliances are broken for the sake of certain +advantages, in this respect also, commonwealths observe their +engagements far more faithfully than princes; for abundant examples +might be cited of a very slight advantage having caused a prince to +break faith, and of a very great advantage having failed to induce a +commonwealth to do so. Of this we have an instance in the proposal made +to the Athenians by Themistocles, when he told them at a public meeting +that he had certain advice to offer which would prove of great +advantage to their city, but the nature of which he could not disclose +to them, lest it should become generally known, when the opportunity +for acting upon it would be lost. Whereupon the Athenians named +Aristides to receive his communication, and to act upon it as he +thought fit. To him, accordingly, Themistocles showed how the navy of +united Greece, for the safety of which the Athenians stood pledged, was +so situated that they might either gain it over or destroy it, and thus +make themselves absolute masters of the whole country. Aristides +reporting to the Athenians that the course proposed by Themistocles was +extremely advantageous but extremely dishonourable, the people utterly +refused to entertain it. But Philip of Macedon would not have so acted, +nor any of those other princes who have sought and found more profit in +breaking faith than in any other way. + +As to engagements broken off on the pretext that they have not been +observed by the other side, I say nothing, since that is a matter of +everyday occurrence, and I am speaking here only of those engagements +which are broken off on extraordinary grounds; but in this respect, +likewise, I believe that commonwealths offend less than princes, and +are therefore more to be trusted. + + + + +CHAPTER LX.—_That the Consulship and all the other Magistracies in Rome +were given without respect to Age_. + + +It is seen in the course of the Roman history that, after the +consulship was thrown open to the commons, the republic conceded this +dignity to all its citizens, without distinction either of age or +blood; nay, that in this matter respect for age was never made a ground +for preference among the Romans, whose constant aim it was to discover +excellence whether existing in old or young. To this we have the +testimony of Valerius Corvinus, himself made consul in his +twenty-fourth year, who, in addressing his soldiers, said of the +consulship that it was “_the reward not of birth but of desert_.” + +Whether the course thus followed by the Romans was well judged or not, +is a question on which much might be said. The concession as to blood, +however, was made under necessity, and as I have observed on another +occasion, the same necessity which obtained in Rome, will be found to +obtain in every other city which desires to achieve the results which +Rome achieved. For you cannot subject men to hardships unless you hold +out rewards, nor can you without danger deprive them of those rewards +whereof you have held out hopes. It was consequently necessary to +extend, betimes, to the commons the hope of obtaining the consulship, +on which hope they fed themselves for a while, without actually +realizing it. But afterwards the hope alone was not enough, and it had +to be satisfied. For while cities which do not employ men of plebeian +birth in any of those undertakings wherein glory is to be gained, as we +have seen was the case with Venice, may treat these men as they please, +those other cities which desire to do as Rome did, cannot make this +distinction. And if there is to be no distinction in respect of blood, +nothing can be pleaded for a distinction in respect of age. On the +contrary, that distinction must of necessity cease to be observed. For +where a young man is appointed to a post which requires the prudence +which are is supposed to bring, it must be, since the choice rests with +the people, that he is thus advanced in consideration of some noble +action which he has performed; but when a young man is of such +excellence as to have made a name for himself by some signal +achievement, it were much to the detriment of his city were it unable +at once to make use of him, but had to wait until he had grown old, and +had lost, with youth, that alacrity and vigour by which his country +might have profited; as Rome profited by the services of Valerius +Corvinus, of Scipio, of Pompey, and of many others who triumphed while +yet very young. + + + + +BOOK II. + + +PREFACE. + + +Men do always, but not always with reason, commend the past and condemn +the present, and are so much the partisans of what has been, as not +merely to cry up those times which are known to them only from the +records left by historians, but also, when they grow old, to extol the +days in which they remember their youth to have been spent. And +although this preference of theirs be in most instances a mistaken one, +I can see that there are many causes to account for it; chief of which +I take to be that in respect of things long gone by we perceive not the +whole truth, those circumstances that would detract from the credit of +the past being for the most part hidden from us, while all that gives +it lustre is magnified and embellished. For the generality of writers +render this tribute to the good fortune of conquerors, that to make +their achievements seem more splendid, they not merely exaggerate the +great things they have done, but also lend such a colour to the actions +of their enemies, that any one born afterwards, whether in the +conquering or in the conquered country, has cause to marvel at these +men and these times, and is constrained to praise and love them beyond +all others. + +Again, men being moved to hatred either by fear or envy, these two most +powerful causes of dislike are cancelled in respect of things which are +past, because what is past can neither do us hurt, nor afford occasion +for envy. The contrary, however, is the case with the things we see, +and in which we take part; for in these, from our complete acquaintance +with them, no part of them being hidden from us, we recognize, along +with much that is good, much that displeases us, and so are forced to +pronounce them far inferior to the old, although in truth they deserve +far greater praise and admiration. I speak not, here, of what relates +to the arts, which have such distinction inherent in them, that time +can give or take from them but little of the glory which they merit of +themselves. I speak of the lives and manners of men, touching which the +grounds for judging are not so clear. + +I repeat, then, that it is true that this habit of blaming and praising +obtains, but not always true that it is wrong applied. For sometimes it +will happen that this judgment is just; because, as human affairs are +in constant movement, it must be that they either rise or fall. +Wherefore, we may see a city or province furnished with free +institutions by some great and wise founder, flourish for a while +through his merits, and advance steadily on the path of improvement. +Any one born therein at that time would be in the wrong to praise the +past more than the present, and his error would be occasioned by the +causes already noticed. But any one born afterwards in that city or +province when the time has come for it to fall away from its former +felicity, would not be mistaken in praising the past. + +When I consider how this happens, I am persuaded that the world, +remaining continually the same, has in it a constant quantity of good +and evil; but that this good and this evil shift about from one country +to another, as we know that in ancient times empire shifted from one +nation to another, according as the manners of these nations changed, +the world, as a whole, continuing as before, and the only difference +being that, whereas at first Assyria was made the seat of its +excellence, this was afterwards placed in Media, then in Persia, until +at last it was transferred to Italy and Rome. And although after the +Roman Empire, none has followed which has endured, or in which the +world has centred its whole excellence, we nevertheless find that +excellence diffused among many valiant nations, the kingdom of the +Franks, for example, that of the Turks, that of the Soldan, and the +States of Germany at the present day; and shared at an earlier time by +that sect of the Saracens who performed so many great achievements and +gained so wide a dominion, after destroying the Roman Empire in the +East. + +In all these countries, therefore, after the decline of the Roman +power, and among all these races, there existed, and in some part of +them there yet exists, that excellence which alone is to be desired and +justly to be praised. Wherefore, if any man being born in one of these +countries should exalt past times over present, he might be mistaken; +but any who, living at the present day in Italy or Greece, has not in +Italy become an ultramontane or in Greece a Turk, has reason to +complain of his own times, and to commend those others, in which there +were many things which made them admirable; whereas, now, no regard +being had to religion, to laws, or to arms, but all being tarnished +with every sort of shame, there is nothing to redeem the age from the +last extremity of wretchedness, ignominy, and disgrace. And the vices +of our age are the more odious in that they are practised by those who +sit on the judgment seat, govern the State, and demand public +reverence. + +But, returning to the matter in hand, it may be said, that if the +judgment of men be at fault in pronouncing whether the present age or +the past is the better in respect of things whereof, by reason of their +antiquity, they cannot have the same perfect knowledge which they have +of their own times, it ought not to be at fault in old men when they +compare the days of their youth with those of their maturity, both of +which have been alike seen and known by them. This were indeed true, if +men at all periods of their lives judged of things in the same way, and +were constantly influenced by the same desires; but since they alter, +the times, although they alter not, cannot but seem different to those +who have other desires, other pleasures, and other ways of viewing +things in their old age from those they had in their youth. For since, +when they grow old, men lose in bodily strength but gain in wisdom and +discernment, it must needs be that those things which in their youth +seemed to them tolerable and good, should in their old age appear +intolerable and evil. And whereas they should ascribe this to their +judgment, they lay the blame upon the times. + +But, further, since the desires of men are insatiable, Nature prompting +them to desire all things and Fortune permitting them to enjoy but few, +there results a constant discontent in their minds, and a loathing of +what they possess, prompting them to find fault with the present, +praise the past, and long for the future, even though they be not moved +thereto by any reasonable cause. + +I know not, therefore, whether I may not deserve to be reckoned in the +number of those who thus deceive themselves, if, in these Discourses of +mine, I render excessive praise to the ancient times of the Romans +while I censure our own. And, indeed, were not the excellence which +then prevailed and the corruption which prevails now clearer than the +sun, I should proceed more guardedly in what I have to say, from fear +lest in accusing others I should myself fall into this self-deception. +But since the thing is so plain that every one sees it, I shall be bold +to speak freely all I think, both of old times and of new, in order +that the minds of the young who happen to read these my writings, may +be led to shun modern examples, and be prepared to follow those set by +antiquity whenever chance affords the opportunity. For it is the duty +of every good man to teach others those wholesome lessons which the +malice of Time or of Fortune has not permitted him to put in practice; +to the end, that out of many who have the knowledge, some one better +loved by Heaven may be found able to carry them out. + +Having spoken, then, in the foregoing Book of the various methods +followed by the Romans in regulating the domestic affairs of their +city, in this I shall speak of what was done by them to spread their +Empire. + + + + +CHAPTER I.—_Whether the Empire acquired by the Romans was more due to +Valour or to Fortune_. + + +Many authors, and among others that most grave historian Plutarch, have +thought that in acquiring their empire the Romans were more beholden to +their good fortune than to their valour; and besides other reasons +which they give for this opinion, they affirm it to be proved by the +admission of the Romans themselves, since their having erected more +temples to Fortune than to any other deity, shows that it was to her +that they ascribed their success. It would seem, too, that Titus Livius +was of the same mind, since he very seldom puts a speech into the mouth +of any Roman in which he discourses of valour, wherein he does not also +make mention of Fortune. This, however, is an opinion with which I can +in no way concur, and which, I take it, cannot be made good. For if no +commonwealth has ever been found to grow like the Roman, it is because +none was ever found so well fitted by its institutions to make that +growth. For by the valour of her armies she spread her empire, while by +her conduct of affairs, and by other methods peculiar to herself and +devised by her first founder, she was able to keep what she acquired, +as shall be fully shown in many of the following Discourses. + +The writers to whom I have referred assert that it was owing to their +good fortune and not to their prudence that the Romans never had two +great wars on their hands at once; as, for instance, that they waged no +wars with the Latins until they had not merely overcome the Samnites, +but undertook in their defence the war on which they then entered; nor +ever fought with the Etruscans until they had subjugated the Latins, +and had almost worn out the Samnites by frequent defeats; whereas, had +any two of these powers, while yet fresh and unexhausted, united +together, it may easily be believed that the ruin of the Roman Republic +must have followed. But to whatsoever cause we ascribe it, it never so +chanced that the Romans engaged in two great wars at the same time. On +the contrary, it always seemed as though on the breaking out of one +war, another was extinguished; or that on the termination of one, +another broke out. And this we may plainly see from the order in which +their wars succeeded one another. + +For, omitting those waged by them before their city was taken by the +Gauls, we find that during their struggle with the Equians and the +Volscians, and while these two nations continued strong, no others rose +against them. On these being subdued, there broke out the war with the +Samnites; and although before the close of that contest the Latin +nations had begun to rebel against Rome, nevertheless, when their +rebellion came to a head, the Samnites were in league with Rome, and +helped her with their army to quell the presumption of the rebels; on +whose defeat the war with Samnium was renewed. + +When the strength of Samnium had been drained by repeated reverses, +there followed the war with the Etruscans; which ended, the Samnites +were once more stirred to activity by the coming of Pyrrhus into Italy. +When he, too, had been defeated, and sent back to Greece, Rome entered +on her first war with the Carthaginians; which was no sooner over than +all the Gallic nations on both sides of the Alps combined against the +Romans, by whom, in the battle fought between Populonia and Pisa, where +now stands the fortress of San Vincenzo, they were at last routed with +tremendous slaughter. + +This war ended, for twenty years together the Romans were engaged in no +contest of importance, their only adversaries being the Ligurians, and +the remnant of the Gallic tribes who occupied Lombardy; and on this +footing things continued down to the second Carthaginian war, which for +sixteen years kept the whole of Italy in a blaze. This too being +brought to a most glorious termination, there followed the Macedonian +war, at the close of which succeeded the war with Antiochus and Asia. +These subdued, there remained not in the whole world, king or people +who either singly or together could withstand the power of Rome. + +But even before this last victory, any one observing the order of these +wars, and the method in which they were conducted, must have recognized +not only the good fortune of the Romans, but also their extraordinary +valour and prudence. And were any one to search for the causes of this +good fortune, he would have little difficulty in finding them, since +nothing is more certain than that when a potentate has attained so +great a reputation that every neighbouring prince or people is afraid +to engage him single-handed, and stands in awe of him, none will ever +venture to attack him, unless driven to do so by necessity; so that it +will almost rest on his will to make war as he likes on any of his +neighbours, while he studiously maintains peace with the rest; who, on +their part, whether through fear of his power, or deceived by the +methods he takes to dull their vigilance, are easily kept quiet. +Distant powers, in the mean time, who have no intercourse with either, +treat the matter as too remote to concern them in any way; and abiding +in this error until the conflagration approaches their own doors, on +its arrival have no resource for its extinction, save in their own +strength, which, as their enemy has by that time become exceedingly +powerful, no longer suffices. + +I forbear to relate how the Samnites stood looking on while the Romans +were subjugating the Equians and the Volscians; and, to avoid being +prolix, shall content myself with the single instance of the +Carthaginians, who, at the time when the Romans were contending with +the Samnites and Etruscans, were possessed of great power and held in +high repute, being already masters of the whole of Africa together with +Sicily and Sardinia, besides occupying territory in various parts of +Spain. And because their empire was so great, and at such a distance +from the Roman frontier, they were never led to think of attacking the +Romans or of lending assistance to the Etruscans or Samnites. On the +contrary, they behaved towards the Romans as men behave towards those +whom they see prosper, rather taking their part and courting their +friendship. Nor did they discover their mistake until the Romans, after +subduing all the intervening nations, began to assail their power both +in Spain and Sicily. What happened in the case of the Carthaginians, +happened also in the case of the Gauls, of Philip of Macedon, and of +Antiochus, each of whom, while Rome was engaged with another of them, +believed that other would have the advantage, and that there would be +time enough to provide for their own safety, whether by making peace or +war. It seems to me, therefore, that the same good fortune which, in +this respect, attended the Romans, might be shared by all princes +acting as they did, and of a valour equal to theirs. + +As bearing on this point, it might have been proper for me to show what +methods were followed by the Romans in entering the territories of +other nations, had I not already spoken of this at length in my +_Treatise on Princedoms_, wherein the whole subject is discussed. Here +it is enough to say briefly, that in a new province they always sought +for some friend who should be to them as a ladder whereby to climb, a +door through which to pass, or an instrument wherewith to keep their +hold. Thus we see them effect their entrance into Samnium through the +Capuans, into Etruria through the Camertines, into Sicily through the +Mamertines, into Spain through the Saguntans, into Africa through +Massinissa, into Greece through the Etolians, into Asia through Eumenes +and other princes, into Gaul through the Massilians and Eduans; and, in +like manner, never without similar assistance in their efforts whether +to acquire provinces or to keep them. + +The nations who carefully attend to this precaution will be seen to +stand in less need of Fortune’s help than others who neglect it. But +that all may clearly understand how much more the Romans were aided by +valour than by Fortune in acquiring their empire, I shall in the +following Chapter consider the character of those nations with whom +they had to contend, and show how stubborn these were in defending +their freedom. + + + + +CHAPTER II.—_With what Nations the Romans had to contend, and how +stubborn these were in defending their Freedom._ + + +In subduing the countries round about them, and certain of the more +distant provinces, nothing gave the Romans so much trouble, as the love +which in those days many nations bore to freedom, defending it with +such obstinacy as could not have been overcome save by a surpassing +valour. For we know by numberless instances, what perils these nations +were ready to face in their efforts to maintain or recover their +freedom, and what vengeance they took against those who deprived them +of it. We know, too, from history, what hurt a people or city suffers +from servitude. And though, at the present day, there is but one +province which can be said to contain within it free cities, we find +that formerly these abounded everywhere. For we learn that in the +ancient times of which I speak, from the mountains which divide Tuscany +from Lombardy down to the extreme point of Italy, there dwelt numerous +free nations, such as the Etruscans, the Romans, and the Samnites, +besides many others in other parts of the Peninsula. Nor do we ever +read of there being any kings over them, except those who reigned in +Rome, and Porsenna, king of Etruria. How the line of this last-named +prince came to be extinguished, history does not inform us; but it is +clear that at the time when the Romans went to besiege Veii, Etruria +was free, and so greatly rejoiced in her freedom, and so detested the +regal name, that when the Veientines, who for their defence had created +a king in Veii, sought aid from the Etruscans against Rome, these, +after much deliberation resolved to lend them no help while they +continued to live under a king; judging it useless to defend a country +given over to servitude by its inhabitants. + +It is easy to understand whence this love of liberty arises among +nations, for we know by experience that States have never signally +increased, either as to dominion or wealth, except where they have +lived under a free government. And truly it is strange to think to what +a pitch of greatness Athens came during the hundred years after she had +freed herself from the despotism of Pisistratus; and far stranger to +contemplate the marvellous growth which Rome made after freeing herself +from her kings. The cause, however, is not far to seek, since it is the +well-being, not of individuals, but of the community which makes a +State great; and, without question, this universal well-being is +nowhere secured save in a republic. For a republic will do whatsoever +makes for its interest; and though its measures prove hurtful to this +man or to that, there are so many whom they benefit, that these are +able to carry them out, in spite of the resistance of the few whom they +injure. + +But the contrary happens in the case of a prince; for, as a rule, what +helps him hurts the State, and what helps the State hurts him; so that +whenever a tyranny springs up in a city which has lived free, the least +evil which can befall that city is to make no further progress, nor +ever increase in power or wealth; but in most cases, if not in all, it +will be its fate to go back. Or should there chance to arise in it some +able tyrant who extends his dominions by his valour and skill in arms, +the advantage which results is to himself only, and not to the State; +since he can bestow no honours on those of the citizens over whom he +tyrannizes who have shown themselves good and valiant, lest afterwards +he should have cause to fear them. Nor can he make those cities which +he acquires, subject or tributary to the city over which he rules; +because to make this city powerful is not for his interest, which lies +in keeping it so divided that each town and province may separately +recognize him alone as its master. In this way he only, and not his +country, is the gainer by his conquests. And if any one desire to have +this view confirmed by numberless other proofs, let him look into +Xenophon’s treatise _De Tirannide_. + +No wonder, then, that the nations of antiquity pursued tyrants with +such relentless hatred, and so passionately loved freedom that its very +name was dear to them, as was seen when Hieronymus, grandson of Hiero +the Syracusan, was put to death in Syracuse. For when word of his death +reached the army, which lay encamped not far off, at first it was +greatly moved, and eager to take up arms against the murderers. But on +hearing the cry of liberty shouted in the streets of Syracuse, quieted +at once by the name, it laid aside its resentment against those who had +slain the tyrant, and fell to consider how a free government might be +provided for the city. + +Nor is it to be wondered at that the ancient nations took terrible +vengeance on those who deprived them of their freedom; of which, though +there be many instances, I mean only to cite one which happened in the +city of Corcyra at the time of the Peloponnesian war. For Greece being +divided into two factions, one of which sided with the Athenians, the +other with the Spartans, it resulted that many of its cities were +divided against themselves, some of the citizens seeking the friendship +of Sparta and some of Athens. In the aforesaid city of Corcyra, the +nobles getting the upper hand, deprived the commons of their freedom; +these, however, recovering themselves with the help of the Athenians, +laid hold of the entire body of the nobles, and cast them into a prison +large enough to contain them all, whence they brought them forth by +eight or ten at a time, pretending that they were to be sent to +different places into banishment, whereas, in fact, they put them to +death with many circumstances of cruelty. Those who were left, learning +what was going on, resolved to do their utmost to escape this +ignominious death, and arming themselves with what weapons they could +find, defended the door of their prison against all who sought to +enter; till the people, hearing the tumult and rushing in haste to the +prison, dragged down the roof, and smothered the prisoners in the +ruins. Many other horrible and atrocious cruelties likewise perpetrated +in Greece, show it to be true that a lost freedom is avenged with more +ferocity than a threatened freedom is defended. + +When I consider whence it happened that the nations of antiquity were +so much more zealous in their love of liberty than those of the present +day, I am led to believe that it arose from the same cause which makes +the present generation of men less vigorous and daring than those of +ancient times, namely the difference of the training of the present day +from that of earlier ages; and this, again, arises from the different +character of the religions then and now prevailing. For our religion, +having revealed to us the truth and the true path, teaches us to make +little account of worldly glory; whereas, the Gentiles, greatly +esteeming it, and placing therein their highest good, displayed a +greater fierceness in their actions. + +This we may gather from many of their customs, beginning with their +sacrificial rites, which were of much magnificence as compared with the +simplicity of our worship, though that be not without a certain dignity +of its own, refined rather than splendid, and far removed from any +tincture of ferocity or violence. In the religious ceremonies of the +ancients neither pomp nor splendour were wanting; but to these was +joined the ordinance of sacrifice, giving occasion to much bloodshed +and cruelty. For in its celebration many beasts were slaughtered, and +this being a cruel spectacle imparted a cruel temper to the +worshippers. Moreover, under the old religions none obtained divine +honours save those who were loaded with worldly glory, such as captains +of armies and rulers of cities; whereas our religion glorifies men of a +humble and contemplative, rather than of an active life. Accordingly, +while the highest good of the old religions consisted in magnanimity, +bodily strength, and all those other qualities which make men brave, +our religion places it in humility, lowliness, and contempt for the +things of this world; or if it ever calls upon us to be brave, it is +that we should be brave to suffer rather than to do. + +This manner of life, therefore, seems to have made the world feebler, +and to have given it over as a prey to wicked men to deal with as they +please; since the mass of mankind, in the hope of being received into +Paradise, think more how to bear injuries than how to avenge them. But +should it seem that the world has grown effeminate and Heaven laid +aside her arms, this assuredly results from the baseness of those who +have interpreted our religion to accord with indolence and ease rather +than with valour. For were we to remember that religion permits the +exaltation and defence of our country, we would see it to be our duty +to love and honour it, and would strive to be able and ready to defend +it. + +This training, therefore, and these most false interpretations are the +causes why, in the world of the present day, we find no longer the +numerous commonwealths which were found of old; and in consequence, +that we see not now among the nations that love of freedom which +prevailed then; though, at the same time, I am persuaded that one cause +of this change has been, that the Roman Empire by its arms and power +put an end to all the free States and free institutions of antiquity. +For although the power of Rome fell afterwards into decay, these States +could never recover their strength or resume their former mode of +government, save in a very few districts of the Empire. + +But, be this as it may, certain it is that in every country of the +world, even the least considerable, the Romans found a league of +well-armed republics, most resolute in the defence of their freedom, +whom it is clear they never could have subdued had they not been +endowed with the rarest and most astonishing valour. To cite a single +instance, I shall take the case of the Samnites who, strange as it may +now seem, were on the admission of Titus Livius himself, so powerful +and so steadfast in arms, as to be able to withstand the Romans down to +the consulship of Papirius Cursor, son to the first Papirius, a period +of six and forty years, in spite of numerous defeats, the loss of many +of their towns, and the great slaughter which overtook them everywhere +throughout their country. And this is the more remarkable when we see +that country, which once contained so many noble cities, and supported +so great a population, now almost uninhabited; and reflect that it +formerly enjoyed a government and possessed resources making its +conquest impossible to less than Roman valour. + +There is no difficulty, therefore, in determining whence that ancient +greatness and this modern decay have arisen, since they can be traced +to the free life formerly prevailing and to the servitude which +prevails now. For all countries and provinces which enjoy complete +freedom, make, as I have said, most rapid progress. Because, from +marriage being less restricted in these countries, and more sought +after, we find there a greater population; every man being disposed to +beget as many children as he thinks he can rear, when he has no anxiety +lest they should be deprived of their patrimony, and knows not only +that they are born to freedom and not to slavery, but that they may +rise by their merit to be the first men of their country. In such +States, accordingly, we see wealth multiply, both that which comes from +agriculture and that which comes from manufactures. For all love to +gather riches and to add to their possessions when their enjoyment of +them is not likely to be disturbed. And hence it happens that the +citizens of such States vie with one another in whatever tends to +promote public or private well-being; in both of which, consequently, +there is a wonderful growth. + +But the contrary of all this takes place in those countries which live +in servitude, and the more oppressive their servitude, the more they +fall short of the good which all desire. And the hardest of all hard +servitudes is that wherein one commonwealth is subjected to another. +First, because it is more lasting, and there is less hope to escape +from it; and, second, because every commonwealth seeks to add to its +own strength by weakening and enfeebling all beside. A prince who gets +the better of you will not treat you after this fashion, unless he be a +barbarian like those eastern despots who lay countries waste and +destroy the labours of civilization; but if influenced by the ordinary +promptings of humanity, will, as a rule, regard all his subject States +with equal favour, and suffer them to pursue their usual employments, +and retain almost all their ancient institutions, so that if they +flourish not as free States might, they do not dwindle as States that +are enslaved; by which I mean enslaved by a stranger, for of that other +slavery to which they may be reduced by one of their own citizens, I +have already spoken. + +Whoever, therefore, shall well consider what has been said above, will +not be astonished at the power possessed by the Samnites while they +were still free, nor at the weakness into which they fell when they +were subjugated. Of which change in their fortunes Livius often reminds +us, and particularly in connection with the war with Hannibal, where he +relates that the Samnites, being ill-treated by a Roman legion +quartered at Nola, sent legates to Hannibal to ask his aid; who in +laying their case before him told him, that with their own soldiers and +captains they had fought single handed against the Romans for a hundred +years, and had more than once withstood two consuls and two consular +armies; but had now fallen so low, that they were scarce able to defend +themselves against one poor legion. + + + + +CHAPTER III.—_That Rome became great by destroying the Cities which lay +round about her, and by readily admitting strangers to the rights of +Citizenship._ + + +“Crescit interea Roma Albæ ruinis”—_Meanwhile Rome grows on the ruins +of Alba_. They who would have their city become a great empire, must +endeavour by every means to fill it with inhabitants; for without a +numerous population no city can ever succeed in growing powerful. This +may be effected in two ways, by gentleness or by force. By gentleness, +when you offer a safe and open path to all strangers who may wish to +come and dwell in your city, so as to encourage them to come there of +their own accord; by force, when after destroying neighbouring towns, +you transplant their inhabitants to live in yours. Both of these +methods were practised by Rome, and with such success, that in the time +of her sixth king there dwelt within her walls eighty thousand citizens +fit to bear arms. For the Romans loved to follow the methods of the +skilful husbandman, who, to insure a plant growing big and yielding and +maturing its fruit, cuts off the first shoots it sends out, that the +strength remaining in the stem, it may in due season put forth new and +more vigorous and more fruitful branches. And that this was a right and +a necessary course for Rome to take for establishing and extending her +empire, is proved by the example of Sparta and Athens, which, although +exceedingly well-armed States, and regulated by excellent laws, never +reached the same greatness as the Roman Republic; though the latter, to +all appearance, was more turbulent and disorderly than they, and, so +far as laws went, not so perfectly governed. For this we can offer no +other explanation than that already given. For by augmenting the +numbers of her citizens in both the ways named, Rome was soon able to +place two hundred and eighty thousand men under arms; while neither +Sparta nor Athens could ever muster more than twenty thousand; and +this, not because the situation of these countries was less +advantageous than that of Rome, but simply from the difference in the +methods they followed. + +For Lycurgus, the founder of the Spartan Republic, thinking nothing so +likely to relax his laws as an admixture of new citizens, did all he +could to prevent intercourse with strangers; with which object, besides +refusing these the right to marry, the right of citizenship, and all +such other social rights as induce men to become members of a +community, he ordained that in this republic of his the only money +current should be of leather, so that none might be tempted to repair +thither to trade or to carry on any art. + +Under such circumstances the number of the inhabitants of that State +could never much increase. For as all our actions imitate nature, and +it is neither natural nor possible that a puny stem should carry a +great branch, so a small republic cannot assume control over cities or +countries stronger than herself; or, doing so, will resemble the tree +whose boughs being greater than its trunk, are supported with +difficulty, and snapped by every gust of wind. As it proved with +Sparta. For after she had spread her dominion over all the cities of +Greece, no sooner did Thebes rebel than all the others rebelled +likewise, and the trunk was left stripped of its boughs. But this could +not have happened with Rome, whose stem was mighty enough to bear any +branch with ease. + +It was, therefore, by adding to her population, and by, adopting +certain other methods presently to be noticed, that Rome became so +great and powerful. And this is well expressed by Titus Livius, in the +words, “_Crescit interea Roma Albae ruinis_.” + + + + +CHAPTER IV.—_That Commonwealths have followed three Methods for +extending their Power_. + + +Any one who has read ancient history with attention, must have observed +that three methods have been used by republics for extending their +power. One of these, followed by the old Etruscans, is to form a +confederation of many States, wherein none has precedence over the rest +in authority or rank, and each allows the others to share its +acquisitions; as do the States of the Swiss League in our days, and as +the Achaians and Etolians did in Greece in earlier times. And because +the Etruscans were opposed to the Romans in many wars, that I may give +a clearer notion of this method of theirs, I shall enlarge a little in +my account of the Etruscan people. + +In Italy, before the Romans became supreme, the Etruscans were very +powerful, both by sea and land; and although we have no separate +history of their affairs, we have some slight records left us of them, +and some indications of their greatness. We know, for instance, that +they planted a colony, to which they gave the name of Hadria, on the +coast of the upper sea; which colony became so renowned that it lent +its name to the sea itself, which to this day by the Latins is called +the Hadriatic. We know, too, that their arms were obeyed from the Tiber +to the foot of the mountains which enclose the greater part of the +Italian peninsula; although, two hundred years before Rome grew to any +great strength, they had lost their supremacy in the province now known +as Lombardy, of which the French had possessed themselves. For that +people, whether driven by necessity, or attracted by the excellence of +the fruits, and still more of the wine of Italy, came there under their +chief, Bellovesus; and after defeating and expelling the inhabitants of +the country, settled themselves therein, and there built many cities; +calling the district Gallia, after the name they then bore: and this +territory they retained until they were subdued by the Romans. + +These Etruscans, therefore, living with one another on a footing of +complete equality, when they sought to extend their power, followed +that first method of which I have just now spoken. Their State was made +up of twelve cities, among which were Chiusi, Veii, Friuli, Arezzo, +Volterra, and the like, and their government was conducted in the form +of a league. They could not, however, extend their conquests beyond +Italy; while even within the limits of Italy, much territory remained +unoccupied by them for reasons presently to be noticed. + +The second method is to provide yourself with allies or companions, +taking heed, however, to retain in your own hands the chief command, +the seat of government, and the titular supremacy. This was the method +followed by the Romans. + +The third method is to hold other States in direct subjection to you, +and not merely associated with you as companions; and this was the plan +pursued by the Spartans and Athenians. + +Of these three methods, the last is wholly useless, as was seen in the +case of the two States named, which came to ruin from no other cause +than that they had acquired a dominion greater than they could +maintain. For to undertake to govern cities by force, especially such +cities as have been used to live in freedom, is a difficult and arduous +task, in which you never can succeed without an army and that a great +one. But to have such an army you must needs have associates who will +help to swell the numbers of your own citizens. And because Athens and +Sparta neglected this precaution, whatever they did was done in vain; +whereas Rome, which offers an instance of the second of the methods we +are considering, by attending to this precaution reached a power that +had no limit. And as she alone has lived in this way, so she alone has +attained to this pitch of power. For joining with herself many States +throughout Italy as her companions, who in most respects lived with her +on a footing of equality, while, as has been noted, always reserving to +herself the seat of empire and the titular command, it came about that +these States, without being aware of it, by their own efforts, and with +their own blood, wrought out their own enslavement. + +For when Rome began to send armies out of Italy, for the purpose of +reducing foreign kingdoms to provinces, and of subjugating nations who, +being used to live under kings, were not impatient of her yoke, and +who, receiving Roman governors, and having been conquered by armies +bearing the Roman name, recognized no masters save the Romans, those +companions of Rome who dwelt in Italy suddenly found themselves +surrounded by Roman subjects, and weighed down by the greatness of the +Roman power; and when at last they came to perceive the mistake in +which they had been living, it was too late to remedy it, so vast was +the authority which Rome had then obtained over foreign countries, and +so great the resources which she possessed within herself; having by +this time grown to be the mightiest and best-armed of States. So that +although these her companions sought to avenge their wrongs by +conspiring against her, they were soon defeated in the attempt, and +remained in a worse plight than before, since they too became subjects +and no longer associates. This method, then, as I have said, was +followed by the Romans alone; but no other plan can be pursued by a +republic which desires to extend its power; experience having shown +none other so safe and certain. + +The method which consists in forming leagues, of which I have spoken +above as having been adopted by the Etruscans, the Achaians, and the +Etolians of old, and in our own days by the Swiss, is the next best +after that followed by the Romans, for as in this way there can be no +great extension of power, two advantages result: first, that you do not +readily involve yourself in war; and, second, that you can easily +preserve any little acquisition which you may make. The reason why you +cannot greatly extend your power is, that as your league is made up of +separate States with distinct seats of government, it is difficult for +these to consult and resolve in concert. The same causes make these +States careless to enlarge their territories; because acquisitions +which have to be shared among many communities are less thought of than +those made by a single republic which looks to enjoy them all to +itself. Again, since leagues govern through general councils, they must +needs be slower in resolving than a nation dwelling within one +frontier. + +Moreover, we find from experience that this method has certain fixed +limits beyond which there is no instance of its ever having passed; by +which I mean that some twelve or fourteen communities may league +themselves together, but will never seek to pass beyond that limit: for +after associating themselves in such numbers as seem to them to secure +their safety against all besides, they desire no further extension of +their power, partly because no necessity compels them to extend, and +partly because, for the reasons already given, they would find no +profit in extending. For were they to seek extension they would have to +follow one of two courses: either continuing to admit new members to +their league, whose number must lead to confusion; or else making +subjects, a course which they will avoid since they will see difficulty +in making them, and no great good in having them. Wherefore, when their +number has so increased that their safety seems secured, they have +recourse to two expedients: either receiving other States under their +protection and engaging for their defence (in which way they obtain +money from various quarters which they can easily distribute among +themselves); or else hiring themselves out as soldiers to foreign +States, and drawing pay from this or the other prince who employs them +to carry out his enterprises; as we see done by the Swiss at the +present day, and as we read was done in ancient times by certain of +those nations whom we have named above. To which we have a witness in +Titus Livius, who relates that when Philip of Macedon came to treat +with Titus Quintius Flamininus, and while terms were being discussed in +the presence of a certain Etolian captain, this man coming to words +with Philip, the latter taunted him with greed and bad faith; telling +him that the Etolians were not ashamed to draw pay from one side, and +then send their men to serve on the other; so that often the banner of +Etolia might be seen displayed in two hostile camps. + +We see, therefore, that the method of proceeding by leagues has always +been of the same character, and has led always to the same results. We +see, likewise, that the method which proceeds by reducing States to +direct subjection has constantly proved a weak one, and produced +insignificant gains; and that whenever these gains have passed a +certain limit, ruin has ensued. And if the latter of these two methods +be of little utility among armed States, among those that are unarmed, +as is now the case with the republics of Italy, it is worse than +useless. We may conclude, therefore, that the true method was that +followed by the Romans; which is the more remarkable as we find none +who adopted it before they did, and none who have followed it since. As +for leagues, I know of no nations who have had recourse to them in +recent times except the Swiss and the Suevians. + +But to bring my remarks on this head to an end, I affirm that all the +various methods followed by the Romans in conducting their affairs, +whether foreign or domestic, so far from being imitated in our day, +have been held of no account, some pronouncing them to be mere fables, +some thinking them impracticable, others out of place and unprofitable; +and so, abiding in this ignorance, we rest a prey to all who have +chosen to invade our country. But should it seem difficult to tread in +the footsteps of the Romans, it ought not to appear so hard, especially +for us Tuscans, to imitate the Tuscans of antiquity, who if, from the +causes already assigned, they failed to establish an empire like that +of Rome, succeeded in acquiring in Italy that degree of power which +their method of acting allowed, and which they long preserved in +security, with the greatest renown in arms and government, and the +highest reputation for manners and religion. This power and this glory +of theirs were first impaired by the Gauls, and afterwards extinguished +by the Romans, and so utterly extinguished, that of the Etruscan +Empire, so splendid two thousand years ago, we have at the present day +barely a record. This it is which has led me to inquire whence this +oblivion of things arises, a question of which I shall treat in the +following Chapter. + + + + +CHAPTER V.—_That changes in Sects and Tongues, and the happening of +Floods and Pestilences, obliterate the Memory of the Past_. + + +To those philosophers who will have it that the world has existed from +all eternity, it were, I think, a good answer, that if what they say be +true we ought to have record of a longer period than five thousand +years; did it not appear that the memory of past times is blotted out +by a variety of causes, some referable to men, and some to Heaven. + +Among the causes which have a human origin are the changes in sects and +tongues; because when a new sect, that is to say a new religion, comes +up, its first endeavour, in order to give itself reputation, is to +efface the old; and should it so happen that the founders of the new +religion speak another tongue, this may readily be effected. This we +know from observing the methods which Christianity has followed in +dealing with the religion of the Gentiles, for we find that it has +abolished all the rites and ordinances of that worship, and obliterated +every trace of the ancient belief. True, it has not succeeded in +utterly blotting out our knowledge of things done by the famous men who +held that belief; and this because the propagators of the new faith, +retaining the Latin tongue, were constrained to use it in writing the +new law; for could they have written this in a new tongue, we may +infer, having regard to their other persecutions, that no record +whatever would have survived to us of past events. For any one who +reads of the methods followed by Saint Gregory and the other heads of +the Christian religion, will perceive with what animosity they pursued +all ancient memorials; burning the works of poets and historians; +breaking images; and destroying whatsoever else afforded any trace of +antiquity. So that if to this persecution a new language had been +joined, it must soon have been found that everything was forgotten. + +We may believe, therefore, that what Christianity has sought to effect +against the sect of the Gentiles, was actually effected by that sect +against the religion which preceded theirs; and that, from the repeated +changes of belief which have taken place in the course of five or six +thousand years, the memory of what happened at a remote date has +perished, or, if any trace of it remain, has come to be regarded as a +fable to which no credit is due; like the Chronicle of Diodorus +Siculus, which, professing to give an account of the events of forty or +fifty thousand years, is held, and I believe justly, a lying tale. + +As for the causes of oblivion which we may refer to Heaven, they are +those which make havoc of the human race, and reduce the population of +certain parts of the world to a very small number. This happens by +plague, famine, or flood, of which three the last is the most hurtful, +as well because it is the most universal, as because those saved are +generally rude and ignorant mountaineers, who possessing no knowledge +of antiquity themselves, can impart none to those who come after them. +Or if among the survivors there chance to be one possessed of such +knowledge, to give himself consequence and credit, he will conceal and +pervert it to suit his private ends, so that to his posterity there +will remain only so much as he may have been pleased to communicate, +and no more. + +That these floods, plagues, and famines do in fact happen, I see no +reason to doubt, both because we find all histories full of them, and +recognize their effect in this oblivion of the past, and also because +it is reasonable that such things should happen. For as when much +superfluous matter has gathered in simple bodies, nature makes repeated +efforts to remove and purge it away, thereby promoting the health of +these bodies, so likewise as regards that composite body the human +race, when every province of the world so teems with inhabitants that +they can neither subsist where they are nor remove elsewhere, every +region being equally crowded and over-peopled, and when human craft and +wickedness have reached their highest pitch, it must needs come about +that the world will purge herself in one or another of these three +ways, to the end that men, becoming few and contrite, may amend their +lives and live with more convenience. + +Etruria, then, as has been said above, was at one time powerful, +abounding in piety and valour, practising her own customs, and speaking +her own tongue; but all this was effaced by the power of Rome, so that, +as I have observed already, nothing is left of her but the memory of a +name. + + + + +CHAPTER VI.—_Of the Methods followed by the Romans in making War_. + + +Having treated of the methods followed by the Romans for increasing +their power, we shall now go on to consider those which they used in +making war; and in all they did we shall find how wisely they turned +aside from the common path in order to render their progress to supreme +greatness easy. + +Whosoever makes war, whether from policy or ambition, means to acquire +and to hold what he acquires, and to carry on the war he has undertaken +in such a manner that it shall enrich and not impoverish his native +country and State. It is necessary, therefore, whether for acquiring or +holding, to consider how cost may be avoided, and everything done most +advantageously for the public welfare. But whoever would effect all +this, must take the course and follow the methods of the Romans; which +consisted, first of all, in making their wars, as the French say, +_great and short_. For entering the field with strong armies, they +brought to a speedy conclusion whatever wars they had with the Latins, +the Samnites, or the Etruscans. + +And if we take note of all the wars in which they were engaged, from +the foundation of their city down to the siege of Veii, all will be +seen to have been quickly ended some in twenty, some in ten, and some +in no more than six days. And this was their wont: So soon as war was +declared they would go forth with their armies to meet the enemy and at +once deliver battle. The enemy, on being routed, to save their country +from pillage, very soon came to terms, when the Romans would take from +them certain portions of their territory. These they either assigned to +particular persons, or made the seat of a colony, which being settled +on the confines of the conquered country served as a defence to the +Roman frontier, to the advantage both of the colonists who had these +lands given them, and of the Roman people whose borders were thus +guarded at no expense to themselves. And no other system of defence +could have been at once so safe, so strong, and so effectual. For while +the enemy were not actually in the field, this guard was sufficient; +and when they came out in force to overwhelm the colony, the Romans +also went forth in strength and gave them battle; and getting the +better of them, imposed harder terms than before, and so returned home. +And in this way they came gradually to establish their name abroad, and +to add to their power. + +These methods they continued to employ until they changed their system +of warfare, which they did during the siege of Veii; when to enable +them to carry on a prolonged war, they passed a law for the payment of +their soldiers, whom, up to that time they had not paid, nor needed to +pay, because till then their wars had been of brief duration. +Nevertheless, while allowing pay to their soldiers that they might thus +wage longer wars, and keep their armies longer in the field when +employed on distant enterprises, they never departed from their old +plan of bringing their campaigns to as speedy an end as place and +circumstances allowed, nor ever ceased to plant colonies. + +Their custom of terminating their wars with despatch, besides being +natural to the Romans, was strengthened by the ambition of their +consuls, who, being appointed for twelve months only, six of which they +had to spend in the city, were eager to bring their wars to an end as +rapidly as they could, that they might enjoy the honours of a triumph. +The usage of planting colonies was recommended by the great advantage +and convenience which resulted from it. In dealing with the spoils of +warfare their practice, no doubt, in a measure changed, so that in this +respect they were not afterwards so liberal as they were at first; +partly, because liberality did not seem so necessary when their +soldiers were in receipt of pay; and, partly, because the spoils +themselves being greater than before, they thought by their help so to +enrich the public treasury as to be able to carry on their wars without +taxing the city; and, in fact, by pursuing this course the public +revenues were soon greatly augmented. The methods thus followed by the +Romans in dividing plunder and in planting colonies had, accordingly, +this result, that whereas other less prudent princes and republics are +impoverished by war, Rome was enriched by it; nay, so far was the +system carried, that no consul could hope for a triumph unless he +brought back with him for the public treasury much gold and silver and +spoils of every kind. + +By methods such as these, at one time bringing their wars to a rapid +conclusion by invasion and actual defeat, at another wearing out an +enemy by protracted hostilities, and again by concluding peace on +advantageous terms, the Romans continually grew richer and more +powerful. + + + + +CHAPTER VII.—_Of the Quantity of Land assigned by the Romans to each +Colonist_. + + +It would, I think, be difficult to fix with certainty how much land the +Romans allotted to each colonist, for my belief is that they gave more +or less according to the character of the country to which they sent +them. We may, however, be sure that in every instance, and to whatever +country they were sent, the quantity of land assigned was not very +large: first, because, these colonists being sent to guard the newly +acquired country, by giving little land it became possible to send more +men; and second because, as the Romans lived frugally at home, it is +unreasonable to suppose that they should wish their countrymen to be +too well off abroad. And Titus Livius tells us that on the capture of +Veii, the Romans sent thither a colony, allotting to each colonist +three jugera and seven unciae of land, which, according to our +measurement would be something under two acres. + +Besides the above reasons, the Romans may likely enough have thought +that it was not so much the quantity of the land allotted as its +careful cultivation that would make it suffice. It is very necessary, +however, that every colony should have common pasturage where all may +send their cattle to graze, as well as woods where they may cut fuel; +for without such conveniences no colony can maintain itself. + + + + +CHAPTER VIII.—_Why certain Nations leave their ancestral Seats and +overflow the Countries of others_. + + +Having spoken above of the methods followed by the Romans in making +war, and related how the Etruscans were attacked by the Gauls, it seems +to me not foreign to these topics to explain that of wars there are two +kinds. One kind of war has its origin in the ambition of princes or +republics who seek to extend their dominions. Such were the wars waged +by Alexander the Great, and by the Romans, and such are those which we +see every day carried on by one potentate against another. Wars of this +sort have their dangers, but do not utterly extirpate the inhabitants +of a country; what the conqueror seeks being merely the submission of +the conquered people, whom, generally speaking, he suffers to retain +their laws, and always their houses and goods. + +The other species of war is when an entire people, with all the +families of which it is made up, being driven out by famine or defeat, +removes from its former seat, and goes in search of a new abode and a +new country, not simply with the view to establish dominion over it, +but to possess it as its own, and to expel or exterminate the former +inhabitants. Of this most terrible and cruel species of warfare Sallust +speaks at the end of his history of the war with Jugurtha, where in +mentioning that after the defeat of Jugurtha the movement of the Gauls +into Italy began to be noticed, he observes that “_in the wars of the +Romans with other nations the struggle was for mastery; but that always +in their wars with the Gauls the struggle on both sides was for life_.” +For a prince or commonwealth, when attacking another State, will be +content to rid themselves of those only who are at the head of affairs; +but an entire people, set in motion in the manner described, must +destroy all who oppose them, since their object is to subsist on that +whereon those whom they invade have hitherto subsisted. + +The Romans had to pass through three of these desperate wars; the first +being that in which their city was actually captured by those Gauls +who, as already mentioned, had previously taken Lombardy from the +Etruscans and made it their seat, and for whose invasion Titus Livius +has assigned two causes. First, that they were attracted, as I have +said before, by the fruitful soil and by the wine of Italy which they +had not in Gaul; second, that their population having multiplied so +greatly that they could no longer find wherewithal to live on at home, +the princes of their land decided that certain of their number should +go forth to seek a new abode; and so deciding, chose as leaders of +those who were to go, two Gaulish chiefs, Bellovesus and Siccovesus; +the former of whom came into Italy while the latter passed into Spain. +From the immigration under Bellovesus resulted the occupation of +Lombardy, and, subsequently, the first war of the Gauls with Rome. At a +later date, and after the close of the first war with Carthage, came +the second Gallic invasion, when more than two hundred thousand Gauls +perished in battle between Piombino and Pisa. The third of these wars +broke out on the descent into Italy of the Todi and Cimbri, who, after +defeating several Roman armies, were themselves defeated by Marius. + +In these three most dangerous contests the arms of Rome prevailed; but +no ordinary valour was needed for their success. For we see afterwards, +when the spirit of the Romans had declined, and their armies had lost +their former excellence, their supremacy was overthrown by men of the +same race, that is to say by the Goths, the Vandals, and others like +them, who spread themselves over the whole of the Western Empire. + +Nations such as these, quit, as I have said, their native land, when +forced by famine, or by defeat in domestic wars, to seek a new +habitation elsewhere. When those thus driven forth are in large +numbers, they violently invade the territories of other nations, +slaughtering the inhabitants, seizing on their possessions, founding +new kingdoms, and giving new names to provinces; as was done by Moses, +and by those tribes who overran the Roman Empire. For the new names +which we find in Italy and elsewhere, have no other origin than in +their having been given by these new occupants; as when the countries +formerly known as Gallia Cisalpina and Gallia Transalpina took the +names of Lombardy and France, from the Lombards and the Franks who +settled themselves there. In the same way Sclavonia was formerly known +as Illyria, Hungary as Pannonia, and England as Britain; while many +other provinces which it would be tedious to enumerate, have similarly +changed their designations; as when the name Judæa was given by Moses +to that part of Syria of which he took possession. + +And since I have said above that nations such as those I have been +describing, are often driven by wars from their ancestral homes, and +forced to seek a new country elsewhere, I shall cite the instance of +the Maurusians, a people who anciently dwelt in Syria, but hearing of +the inroad of the Hebrews, and thinking themselves unable to resist +them, chose rather to seek safety in flight than to perish with their +country in a vain effort to defend it. For which reason, removing with +their families, they went to Africa, where, after driving out the +native inhabitants, they took up their abode; and although they could +not defend their own country, were able to possess themselves of a +country belonging to others. And Procopius, who writes the history of +the war which Belisarius conducted against those Vandals who seized on +Africa, relates, that on certain pillars standing in places where the +Maurusians once dwelt, he had read inscriptions in these words: “_We +Maurusians who fled before Joshua, the robber, the son of Nun_;”[7] +giving us to know the cause of their quitting Syria. Be this as it may, +nations thus driven forth by a supreme necessity, are, if they be in +great number, in the highest degree dangerous, and cannot be +successfully withstood except by a people who excel in arms. + + [7] Nos Maurusii qui fugimus a facie Jesu latronis filii Navæ. + _Procop. Hist. Bell. Vand. II._ + + +When those constrained to abandon their homes are not in large numbers, +they are not so dangerous as the nations of whom I have been speaking, +since they cannot use the same violence, but must trust to their +address to procure them a habitation; and, after procuring it, must +live with their neighbours as friends and companions, as we find Æneas, +Dido, the Massilians, and others like them to have lived; all of whom +contrived to maintain themselves in the districts in which they +settled, by securing the good will of the neighbouring nations. + +Almost all the great emigrations of nations have been and continue to +be from the cold and barren region of Scythia, because from the +population there being excessive, and the soil ill able to support +them, they are forced to quit their home, many causes operating to +drive them forth and none to keep them back. And if, for the last five +hundred years, it has not happened that any of these nations has +actually overrun another country, there are various reasons to account +for it. First, the great clearance which that region made of its +inhabitants during the decline of the Roman Empire, when more than +thirty nations issued from it in succession; and next, the circumstance +that the countries of Germany and Hungary, whence also these nations +came, are now so much improved that men can live there in comfort, and +consequently are not constrained to shift their habitations. Besides +which, since these countries are occupied by a very warlike race, they +serve as a sort of bulwark to keep back the neighbouring Scythians, who +for this reason do not venture to attack them, nor attempt to force a +passage. Nevertheless, movements on a great scale have oftentimes been +begun by the Tartars, and been at once withstood by the Hungarians and +Poles, whose frequent boast it is, that but for them, Italy and the +Church would more than once have felt the weight of the Tartar arms. + +Of the nations of whom I have been speaking, I shall now say no more. + + + + +CHAPTER IX.—_Of the Causes which commonly give rise to Wars between +States_. + + +The occasion which led to war between the Romans and Samnites, who for +long had been in league with one another, is of common occurrence in +all powerful States, being either brought about by accident, or else +purposely contrived by some one who would set war a-foot. As between +the Romans and the Samnites, the occasion of war was accidental. For in +making war upon the Sidicinians and afterwards on the Campanians, the +Samnites had no thought of involving themselves with the Romans. But +the Campanians being overpowered, and, contrary to the expectation of +Romans and Samnites alike, resorting to Rome for aid, the Romans, on +whose protection they threw themselves, were forced to succour them as +dependants, and to accept a war which, it seemed to them, they could +not with honour decline. For though they might have thought it +unreasonable to be called on to defend the Campanians as friends +against their own friends the Samnites, it seemed to them shameful not +to defend them as subjects, or as a people who had placed themselves +under their protection. For they reasoned that to decline their defence +would close the gate against all others who at any future time might +desire to submit themselves to their power. And, accordingly, since +glory and empire, and not peace, were the ends which they always had in +view, it became impossible for them to refuse this protectorship. + +A similar circumstance gave rise to the first war with the +Carthaginians, namely the protectorate assumed by the Romans of the +citizens of Messina in Sicily, and this likewise came about by chance. +But the second war with Carthage was not the result of chance. For +Hannibal the Carthaginian general attacked the Saguntans, who were the +friends of Rome in Spain, not from any desire to injure them, but in +order to set the arms of Rome in motion, and so gain an opportunity of +engaging the Romans in a war, and passing on into Italy. This method of +picking a quarrel is constantly resorted to by powerful States when +they are bound by scruples of honour or like considerations. For if I +desire to make war on a prince with whom I am under an ancient and +binding treaty, I shall find some colour or pretext for attacking the +friend of that prince, very well knowing that when I attack his friend, +either the prince will resent it, when my scheme for engaging him in +war will be realized; or that, should he not resent it, his weakness or +baseness in not defending one who is under his protection will be made +apparent; either of which alternatives will discredit him, and further +my designs. + +We are to note, therefore, in connection with this submission of the +Campanians, what has just now been said as to provoking another power +to war; and also the remedy open to a State which, being unequal to its +own defence, is prepared to go all lengths to ruin its assailant,—that +remedy being to give itself up unreservedly to some one whom it selects +for its defender; as the Campanians gave themselves up to the Romans, +and as the Florentines gave themselves up to King Robert of Naples, +who, after refusing to defend them as his friends against Castruccio of +Lucca by whom they were hard pressed, defended them as his subjects. + + + + +CHAPTER X.—_That contrary to the vulgar opinion, Money is not the +Sinews of War_. + + +Since any man may begin a war at his pleasure, but cannot at his +pleasure bring it to a close, a prince before he engages in any warlike +enterprise ought to measure his strength and govern himself +accordingly. But he must be prudent enough not to deceive himself as to +his strength, which he will always do, if he measure it by money, by +advantage of position, or by the good-will of his subjects, while he is +unprovided with an army of his own. These are things which may swell +your strength but do not constitute it, being in themselves null and of +no avail without an army on which you can depend. + +Without such an army no amount of money will meet your wants, the +natural strength of your country will not protect you, and the fidelity +and attachment of your subjects will not endure, since it is impossible +that they should continue true to you when you cannot defend them. +Lakes, and mountains, and the most inaccessible strongholds, where +valiant defenders are wanting, become no better than the level plain; +and money, so far from being a safeguard, is more likely to leave you a +prey to your enemy; since nothing can be falser than the vulgar opinion +which affirms it to be the sinews of war. + +This opinion is put forward by Quintus Curtius, where, in speaking of +the war between Antipater the Macedonian and the King of Sparta, he +relates that the latter, from want of money, was constrained to give +battle and was defeated; whereas, could he have put off fighting for a +few days the news of Alexander’s death would have reached Greece, and +he might have had a victory without a battle. But lacking money, and +fearing that on that account his soldiers might desert him, he was +forced to hazard an engagement. It was for this reason that Quintus +Curtius declared money to be the sinews of war, a maxim every day cited +and acted upon by princes less wise than they should be. For building +upon this, they think it enough for their defence to have laid up great +treasures; not reflecting that were great treasures all that is needed +for victory, Darius of old had conquered Alexander, the Greeks the +Romans, and in our own times Charles of Burgundy the Swiss; while the +pope and the Florentines together would have had little difficulty in +defeating Francesco Maria, nephew of Pope Julius II., in the recent war +of Urbino; and yet, in every one of these instances, the victory +remained with him who held the sinews of war to consist, not in money, +but in good soldiers. + +Croesus, king of Lydia, after showing Solon the Athenian much besides, +at last displayed to him the boundless riches of his treasure-house, +and asked him what he thought of his power. Whereupon Solon answered +that he thought him no whit more powerful in respect of these +treasures, for as war is made with iron and not with gold, another +coming with more iron might carry off his gold. After the death of +Alexander the Great a tribe of Gauls, passing through Greece on their +way into Asia, sent envoys to the King of Macedonia to treat for terms +of accord; when the king, to dismay them by a display of his resources, +showed them great store of gold and silver. But these barbarians, when +they saw all this wealth, in their greed to possess it, though before +they had looked on peace as settled, broke off negotiations; and thus +the king was ruined by those very treasures he had amassed for his +defence. In like manner, not many years ago, the Venetians, with a full +treasury, lost their whole dominions without deriving the least +advantage from their wealth. + +I maintain, therefore, that it is not gold, as is vulgarly supposed, +that is the sinews of war, but good soldiers; or while gold by itself +will not gain you good soldiers, good soldiers may readily get you +gold. Had the Romans chosen to make war with gold rather than with iron +all the treasures of the earth would not have sufficed them having +regard to the greatness of their enterprises and the difficulties they +had to overcome in carrying them out. But making their wars with iron +they never felt any want of gold; for those who stood in fear of them +brought gold into their camp. + +And supposing it true that the Spartan king was forced by lack of money +to risk the chances of a battle, it only fared with him in respect of +money as it has often fared with others from other causes; since we see +that where an army is in such straits for want of victual that it must +either fight or perish by famine, it will always fight, as being the +more honourable course and that on which fortune may in some way smile. +So, too, it has often happened that a captain, seeing his enemy about +to be reinforced, has been obliged either to trust to fortune and at +once deliver battle, or else, waiting till the reinforcement is +complete, to fight then, whether he will or no, and at whatever +disadvantage. We find also, as in the case of Hasdrubal when beset, in +the March of Ancona, at once by Claudius Nero and by the other Roman +consul, that a captain, when he must either fight or fly, will always +fight, since it will seem to him that by this course, however +hazardous, he has at least a chance of victory, while by the other his +ruin is certain. + +There are many circumstances, therefore, which may force a captain to +give battle contrary to his intention, among which the want of money +may sometimes be one. But this is no ground for pronouncing money to be +the sinews of war, any more than those other things from the want of +which men are reduced to the same necessity. Once more, therefore, I +repeat that not gold but good soldiers constitute the sinews of war. +Money, indeed, is most necessary in a secondary place; but this +necessity good soldiers will always be able to supply, since it is as +impossible that good soldiers should lack money, as that money by +itself should secure good soldiers. And that what I say is true is +shown by countless passages in history. When Pericles persuaded the +Athenians to declare war against the whole Peloponnesus, assuring them +that their dexterity, aided by their wealth, was sure to bring them off +victorious, the Athenians, though for a while they prospered in this +war, in the end were overpowered, the prudent counsels and good +soldiers of Sparta proving more than a match for the dexterity and +wealth of Athens. But, indeed, there can be no better witness to the +truth of my contention than Titus Livius himself. For in that passage +of his history wherein he discusses whether if Alexander the Great had +invaded Italy, he would have succeeded in vanquishing the Romans, three +things are noted by him as essential to success in war; to wit, many +and good soldiers, prudent captains, and favourable fortune; and after +examining whether the Romans or Alexander would have had the advantage +in each of these three particulars, he arrives at his conclusion +without any mention of money. + +The Campanians, therefore, when asked by the Sidicinians to arm in +their behalf, must have measured their strength by wealth and not by +soldiers; for after declaring in their favour and suffering two +defeats, to save themselves they were obliged to become tributary to +Rome. + + + + +CHAPTER XI.—_That it were unwise to ally yourself a Prince who has +Reputation rather than Strength._ + + +To mark the mistake made by the Sidicinians in trusting to the +protection of the Campanians, and by the Campanians in supposing +themselves able to protect the Sidicinians, Titus Livius could not have +expressed himself in apter words than by saying, that “_the Campanians +rather lent their name to the Sidicinians than furnished any +substantial aid towards their defence._” + +Here we have to note that alliances with princes who from dwelling at a +distance have no facility, or who from their own embarrassments, or +from other causes, have no ability to render aid, afford rather +reputation than protection to those who put their trust in them. As was +the case in our own times with the Florentines, when, in the year 1479, +they were attacked by the Pope and the King of Naples. For being +friends of the French king they drew from that friendship more +reputation than help. The same would be the case with that prince who +should engage in any enterprise in reliance on the Emperor Maximilian, +his being one of those friendships which, in the words of our +historian, _nomen magis quam praesidium adferunt_. + +On this occasion, therefore, the Campanians were misled by imagining +themselves stronger than they really were. For often, from defect of +judgment, men take upon them to defend others, when they have neither +skill nor ability to defend themselves. Of which we have a further +instance in the Tarentines, who, when the Roman and Samnite armies were +already drawn up against one another for battle, sent messengers to the +Roman consul to acquaint him that they desired peace between the two +nations, and would themselves declare war against whichsoever of the +two first began hostilities. The consul, laughing at their threats, in +the presence of the messengers, ordered the signal for battle to sound, +and bade his army advance to meet the enemy; showing the Tarentines by +acts rather than words what answer he thought their message deserved. + +Having spoken in the present Chapter of unwise courses followed by +princes for defending others, I shall speak in the next, of the methods +they follow in defending themselves. + + + + +CHAPTER XII.—_Whether when Invasion is imminent it is better to +anticipate or to await it._ + + +I have often heard it disputed by men well versed in military affairs, +whether, when there are two princes of nearly equal strength, and the +bolder of the two proclaims war upon the other, it is better for that +other to await attack within his own frontier, or to march into the +enemy’s country and fight him there; and I have heard reasons given in +favour of each of these courses. + +They who maintain that an enemy should be attacked in his own country, +cite the advice given by Croesus to Cyrus, when the latter had come to +the frontiers of the Massagetæ to make war on that people. For word +being sent by Tomyris their queen that Cyrus might, at his pleasure, +either enter her dominions, where she would await him, or else allow +her to come and meet him; and the matter being debated, Croesus, +contrary to the opinion of other advisers, counselled Cyrus to go +forward and meet the queen, urging that were he to defeat her at a +distance from her kingdom, he might not be able to take it from her, +since she would have time to repair her strength; whereas, were he to +defeat her within her own dominions, he could follow her up on her +flight, and, without giving her time to recover herself, deprive her of +her State. They cite also the advice given by Hannibal to Antiochus, +when the latter was meditating a war on the Romans. For Hannibal told +him that the Romans could not be vanquished except in Italy, where an +invader might turn to account the arms and resources of their friends, +whereas any one making war upon them out of Italy, and leaving that +country in their hands, would leave them an unfailing source whence to +draw whatever reinforcement they might need; and finally, he told him, +that the Romans might more easily be deprived of Rome than of their +empire, and of Italy more easily than of any of their other provinces. +They likewise instance Agathocles, who, being unequal to support a war +at home, invaded the Carthaginians, by whom he was being attacked, and +reduced them to sue for peace. They also cite Scipio, who to shift the +war from Italy, carried it into Africa. + +Those who hold a contrary opinion contend that to have your enemy at a +disadvantage you must get him away from his home, alleging the case of +the Athenians, who while they carried on the war at their convenience +in their own territory, retained their superiority; but when they +quitted that territory, and went with their armies to Sicily, lost +their freedom. They cite also the fable of the poets wherein it is +figured that Antæus, king of Libya, being assailed by the Egyptian +Hercules, could not be overcome while he awaited his adversary within +the bounds of his own kingdom; but so soon as he was withdrawn from +these by the craft of Hercules, lost his kingdom and his life. Whence +the fable runs that Antæus, being son to the goddess Earth, when thrown +to the ground drew fresh strength from the Earth, his mother; and that +Hercules, perceiving this, held him up away from the Earth. + +Recent opinions are likewise cited as favouring this view. Every one +knows how Ferrando, king of Naples, was in his day accounted a most +wise prince; and how two years before his death there came a rumour +that Charles VIII of France was meditating an attack upon him; and how, +after making great preparations for his defence, he sickened; and being +on the point of death, among other counsels left his son Alfonso this +advice, that nothing in the world should tempt him to pass out of his +own territory, but to await the enemy within his frontier, and with his +forces unimpaired; a warning disregarded by Alfonso, who sent into +Romagna an army, which he lost, and with it his whole dominions, +without a battle. + +Other arguments on both sides of the question in addition to those +already noticed, are as follows: He who attacks shows higher courage +than he who stands on his defence, and this gives his army greater +confidence. Moreover, by attacking your enemy you deprive him of many +opportunities for using his resources, since he can receive no aid from +subjects who have been stripped of their possessions; and when an enemy +is at his gates, a prince must be careful how he levies money and +imposes taxes; so that, as Hannibal said, the springs which enable a +country to support a war come to be dried up. Again, the soldiers of an +invader, finding themselves in a foreign land, are under a stronger +necessity to fight, and necessity, as has often been said, is the +parent of valour. + +On the other hand, it may be argued that there are many advantages to +be gained by awaiting the attack of your enemy. For without putting +yourself much about, you may harass him by intercepting his supplies, +whether of victual or of whatsoever else an army stands in need: from +your better knowledge of the country you can impede his movements; and +because men muster more willingly to defend their homes than to go on +distant expeditions, you can meet him with more numerous forces, if +defeated you can more easily repair your strength, because the bulk of +your army, finding shelter at hand, will be able to save itself, and +your reserves will have no distance to come. In this way you can use +your whole strength without risking your entire fortunes; whereas, in +leaving your country, you risk your entire fortunes, without putting +forth your whole strength. Nay, we find that to weaken an adversary +still further, some have suffered him to make a march of several days +into their country, and then to capture certain of their towns, that by +leaving garrisons in these, he might reduce the numbers of his army, +and so be attacked at greater disadvantage. + +But now to speak my own mind on the matter, I think we should make this +distinction. Either you have your country strongly defended, as the +Romans had and the Swiss have theirs, or, like the Carthaginians of old +and the King of France and the Italians at the present day, you have it +undefended. In the latter case you must keep the enemy at a distance +from your country, for as your strength lies not in men but in money, +whenever the supply of money is cut off you are undone, and nothing so +soon cuts off this supply as a war of invasion. Of which we have +example in the Carthaginians, who, while their country was free from +invasion, were able by means of their great revenues to carry on war in +Italy against the Romans, but when they were invaded could not defend +themselves even against Agathocles. The Florentines, in like manner, +could make no head against Castruccio, lord of Lucca, when he attacked +them in their own country; and to obtain protection, were compelled to +yield themselves up to King Robert of Naples. And yet, after +Castruccio’s death, these same Florentines were bold enough to attack +the Duke of Milan in his own country, and strong enough to strip him of +his dominions. Such valour did they display in distant wars, such +weakness in those that were near. + +But when a country is armed as Rome was and Switzerland now is, the +closer you press it, the harder it is to subdue; because such States +can assemble a stronger force to resist attack than for attacking +others. Nor does the great authority of Hannibal move me in this +instance, since resentment and his own advantage might lead him to +speak as he spoke to Antiochus. For had the Romans suffered in Gaul, +and within the same space of time, those three defeats at the hands of +Hannibal which they suffered in Italy, it must have made an end of +them; since they could not have turned the remnants of their armies to +account as they did in Italy, not having the same opportunity for +repairing their strength; nor could they have met their enemy with such +numerous armies. For we never find them sending forth a force of more +than fifty thousand men for the invasion of any province; whereas, in +defending their own country against the inroad of the Gauls at the end +of the first Carthaginian war, we hear of them bringing some eighteen +hundred thousand men into the field; and their failure to vanquish the +Gauls in Lombardy as they had vanquished those in Tuscany arose from +their inability to lead a great force so far against a numerous enemy, +or to encounter him with the same advantages. In Germany the Cimbrians +routed a Roman army who had there no means to repair their disaster; +but when they came into Italy, the Romans could collect their whole +strength, and destroy them. Out of their native country, whence they +can bring no more than thirty or forty thousand men, the Swiss may +readily be defeated; but in their own country, where they can assemble +a hundred thousand, they are well-nigh invincible. + +In conclusion, therefore, I repeat that the prince who has his people +armed and trained for war, should always await a great and dangerous +war at home, and never go forth to meet it. But that he whose subjects +are unarmed, and whose country is not habituated to war, should always +carry the war to as great a distance as he can from home. For in this +way each will defend himself in the best manner his means admit. + + + + +CHAPTER XIII.—_That Men rise from humble to high Fortunes rather by +Fraud than by Force._ + + +I hold it as most certain that men seldom if ever rise to great place +from small beginnings without using fraud or force, unless, indeed, +they be given, or take by inheritance the place to which some other has +already come. Force, however, will never suffice by itself to effect +this end, while fraud often will, as any one may plainly see who reads +the lives of Philip of Macedon, Agathocles of Sicily, and many others +like them, who from the lowest or, at any rate, from very low +beginnings, rose either to sovereignty or to the highest command. + +This necessity for using deceit is taught by Xenophon in his life of +Cyrus; for the very first expedition on which Cyrus is sent, against +the King of Armenia, is seen to teem with fraud; and it is by fraud, +and not by force, that he is represented as having acquired his +kingdom; so that the only inference to be drawn from his conduct, as +Xenophon describes it, is, that the prince who would accomplish great +things must have learned how to deceive. Xenophon, moreover, represents +his hero as deceiving his maternal grandsire Cyaxares, king of the +Medians, in a variety of ways; giving it to be understood that without +such deceit he could not have reached the greatness to which he came. +Nor do I believe that any man born to humble fortunes can be shown to +have attained great station, by sheer and open force, whereas this has +often been effected by mere fraud, such as that used by Giovanni +Galeazzo to deprive his uncle Bernabo of the State and government of +Lombardy. + +The same arts which princes are constrained to use at the outset of +their career, must also be used by commonwealths, until they have grown +powerful enough to dispense with them and trust to strength alone. And +because Rome at all times, whether from chance or choice, followed all +such methods as are necessary to attain greatness, in this also she was +not behindhand. And, to begin with, she could have used no greater +fraud than was involved in her method above noticed, of making for +herself companions; since under this name she made for herself +subjects, for such the Latins and the other surrounding nations, in +fact, became. For availing herself at first of their arms to subdue +neighbouring countries and gain herself reputation as a State, her +power was so much increased by these conquests that there was none whom +she could not overcome. But the Latins never knew that they were +enslaved until they saw the Samnites twice routed and forced to make +terms. This success, while it added greatly to the fame of the Romans +among princes at a distance, who were thereby made familiar with the +Roman name though not with the Roman arms, bred at the same time +jealousy and distrust among those who, like the Latins, both saw and +felt these arms; and such were the effects of this jealousy and +distrust, that not the Latins only but all the Roman colonies in +Latium, along with the Campanians whom a little while before the Romans +had defended leagued themselves together against the authority of Rome. +This war was set on foot by the Latins in the manner in which, as I +have already explained, most wars are begun, not by directly attacking +the Romans, but by defending the Sidicinians against the Samnites who +were making war upon them with the permission of the Romans. And that +it was from their having found out the crafty policy of the Romans that +the Latins were led to take this step, is plain from the words which +Titus Livius puts in the mouth of Annius Setinus the Latin prætor, who, +in addressing the Latin council, is made to say, “_For if even now we +can put up with slavery under the disguise of an equal alliance, etc_” + +We see, therefore, that the Romans, from the time they first began to +extend their power, were not unfamiliar with the art of deceiving, an +art always necessary for those who would mount to great heights from +low beginnings; and which is the less to be condemned when, as in the +case of the Romans, it is skilfully concealed. + + + + +CHAPTER XIV.—_That Men often err in thinking they can subdue Pride by +Humility._ + + +You shall often find that humility is not merely of no service to you, +but is even hurtful, especially when used in dealing with insolent men, +who, through envy or other like cause, have conceived hatred against +you. Proof whereof is supplied by our historian where he explains the +causes of this war between the Romans and the Latins. For on the +Samnites complaining to the Romans that the Latins had attacked them, +the Romans, desiring not to give the Latins ground of offence, would +not forbid them proceeding with the war. But the endeavour to avoid +giving offence to the Latins only served to increase their confidence, +and led them the sooner to declare their hostility. Of which we have +evidence in the language used by the same Latin Prætor, Annius Setinus, +at the aforesaid council, when he said:—“_You have tried their patience +by refusing them, soldiers. Who doubts but that they are offended? +Still they have put up with the affront. They have heard that we are +assembling an army against their allies the Samnites; and yet they have +not stirred from their city. Whence this astonishing forbearance, but +from their knowing our strength and their own weakness_?” Which words +give us clearly to understand how much the patience of the Romans +increased the arrogance of the Latins. + +A prince, therefore, should never stoop from his dignity, nor should he +if he would have credit for any concession make it voluntarily, unless +he be able or believe himself able to withhold it. For almost always +when matters have come to such a pass that you cannot give way with +credit it is better that a thing be taken from you by force than +yielded through fear of force. For if you yield through fear and to +escape war, the chances are that you do not escape it; since he to +whom, out of manifest cowardice you make this concession, will not rest +content, but will endeavour to wring further concessions from you, and +making less account of you, will only be the more kindled against you. +At the same time you will find your friends less zealous on your +behalf, since to them you will appear either weak or cowardly. But if, +so soon as the designs of your enemy are disclosed, you at once prepare +to resist though your strength be inferior to his, he will begin to +think more of you, other neighbouring princes will think more; and many +will be willing to assist you, on seeing you take up arms, who, had you +relinquished hope and abandoned yourself to despair, would never have +stirred a finger to save you. + +The above is to be understood as applying where you have a single +adversary only; but should you have several, it will always be a +prudent course, even after war has been declared, to restore to some +one of their number something you have of his, so as to regain his +friendship and detach him from the others who have leagued themselves +against you. + + + + +CHAPTER XV.—That weak States are always dubious in their Resolves; and +that tardy Resolves are always hurtful. + + +Touching this very matter, and with regard to these earliest beginnings +of war between the Latins and the Romans, it may be noted, that in all +our deliberations it behoves us to come quickly to a definite resolve, +and not to remain always in dubiety and suspense. This is plainly seen +in connection with the council convened by the Latins when they thought +to separate themselves from the Romans. For the Romans suspecting the +hostile humour wherewith the Latins were infected, in order to learn +how things really stood, and see whether they could not win back the +malcontents without recourse to arms, gave them to know that they must +send eight of their citizens to Rome, as they had occasion to consult +with them. On receiving which message the Latins, knowing that they had +done many things contrary to the wishes of the Romans, called a council +to determine who of their number should be sent, and to instruct them +what they were to say. But Annius, their prætor, being present in the +council when these matters were being discussed, told them “_that he +thought it of far greater moment for them to consider what they were to +do than what they were to say; for when their resolves were formed, it +would be easy to clothe them in fit words_.” This, in truth, was sound +advice and such as every prince and republic should lay to heart. +Because, where there is doubt and uncertainty as to what we may decide +on doing, we know not how to suit our words to our conduct; whereas, +with our minds made up, and the course we are to follow fixed, it is an +easy matter to find words to declare our resolves. I have noticed this +point the more readily, because I have often found such uncertainty +hinder the public business of our own republic, to its detriment and +discredit. And in all matters of difficulty, wherein courage is needed +for resolving, this uncertainty will always be met with, whenever those +who have to deliberate and decide are weak. + +Not less mischievous than doubtful resolves are those which are late +and tardy, especially when they have to be made in behalf of a friend. +For from their lateness they help none, and hurt ourselves. Tardy +resolves are due to want of spirit or want of strength, or to the +perversity of those who have to determine, who being moved by a secret +desire to overthrow the government, or to carry out some selfish +purpose of their own, suffer no decision to be come to, but only thwart +and hinder. Whereas, good citizens, even when they see the popular mind +to be bent on dangerous courses, will never oppose the adoption of a +fixed plan, more particularly in matters which do not brook delay. + +After Hieronymus, the Syracusan tyrant, was put to death, there being +at that time a great war between the Romans and the Carthaginians, the +citizens of Syracuse fell to disputing among themselves with which +nation they should take part; and so fierce grew the controversy +between the partisans of the two alliances, that no course could be +agreed on, and they took part with neither; until Apollonides, one of +the foremost of the Syracusan citizens, told them in a speech replete +with wisdom, that neither those who inclined to hold by the Romans, nor +those who chose rather to side with the Carthaginians, were deserving +of blame; but that what was utterly to be condemned was doubt and delay +in taking one side or other; for from such uncertainty he clearly +foresaw the ruin of their republic; whereas, by taking a decided +course, whatever it might be, some good might come. Now Titus Livius +could not show more clearly than he does in this passage, the mischief +which results from resting in suspense. He shows it, likewise, in the +case of the Lavinians, of whom he relates, that being urged by the +Latins to aid them against Rome, they were so long in making up their +minds, that when the army which they at last sent to succour the Latins +was issuing from their gates, word came that the Latins were defeated. +Whereupon Millionius, their prætor, said, “_With the Romans this short +march will cost us dear_.” But had the Lavinians resolved at once +either to grant aid or to refuse it, taking a latter course they would +not have given offence to the Romans, taking the former, and rendering +timely help, they and the Latins together might have had a victory. But +by delay they stood to lose in every way, as the event showed. + +This example, had it been remembered by the Florentines, might have +saved them from all that loss and vexation which they underwent at the +hands of the French, at the time King Louis XII. of France came into +Italy against Lodovico, duke of Milan. For when Louis first proposed to +pass through Tuscany he met with no objection from the Florentines, +whose envoys at his court arranged with him that they should stand +neutral, while the king, on his arrival in Italy, was to maintain their +government and take them under his protection; a month’s time being +allowed the republic to ratify these terms. But certain persons, who, +in their folly, favoured the cause of Lodovico, delayed this +ratification until the king was already on the eve of victory; when the +Florentines suddenly becoming eager to ratify, the king would not +accept their ratification, perceiving their consent to be given under +constraint and not of their own good-will. This cost the city of +Florence dear, and went near to lose her freedom, whereof she was +afterwards deprived on another like occasion. And the course taken by +the Florentines was the more to be blamed in that it was of no sort of +service to Duke Lodovico, who, had he been victorious, would have shown +the Florentines many more signs of his displeasure than did the king. + +Although the hurt which results to republics from weakness of this sort +has already been discussed in another Chapter, nevertheless, since an +opportunity offered for touching upon it again, I have willingly +availed myself of it, because to me it seems a matter of which +republics like ours should take special heed. + + + + +CHAPTER XVI.—_That the Soldiers of our days depart widely from the +methods of ancient Warfare._ + + +In all their wars with other nations, the most momentous battle ever +fought by the Romans, was that which they fought with the Latins when +Torquatus and Decius were consuls. For it may well be believed that as +by the loss of that battle the Latins became subject to the Romans, so +the Romans had they not prevailed must have become subject to the +Latins. And Titus Livius is of this opinion, since he represents the +armies as exactly equal in every respect, in discipline and in valour, +in numbers and in obstinacy, the only difference he draws being, that +of the two armies the Romans had the more capable commanders. We find, +however, two circumstances occurring in the conduct of this battle, the +like of which never happened before, and seldom since, namely, that to +give steadiness to the minds of their soldiers, and render them +obedient to the word of command and resolute to fight, one of the +consuls put himself, and the other his son, to death. + +The equality which Titus Livius declares to have prevailed in these two +armies, arose from this, that having long served together they used the +same language, discipline, and arms; that in disposing their men for +battle they followed the same system; and that the divisions and +officers of their armies bore the same names. It was necessary, +therefore, that as they were of equal strength and valour, something +extraordinary should take place to render the courage of the one army +more stubborn and unflinching than that of the other, it being on this +stubbornness, as I have already said, that victory depends. For while +this temper is maintained in the minds of the combatants they will +never turn their backs on their foe. And that it might endure longer in +the minds of the Romans than of the Latins, partly chance, and partly +the valour of the consuls caused it to fall out that Torquatus slew his +son, and Decius died by his own hand. + +In pointing out this equality of strength, Titus Livius takes occasion +to explain the whole system followed by the Romans in the ordering of +their armies and in disposing them for battle; and as he has treated +the subject at length, I need not go over the same ground, and shall +touch only on what I judge in it most to deserve attention, but, being +overlooked by all the captains of our times, has led to disorder in +many armies and in many battles. + +From this passage of Titus Livius, then, we learn that the Roman army +had three principal divisions, or battalions as we might now call them, +of which they named the first _hastati_, the second _principes_, and +the third _triarii_, to each of which cavalry were attached. In +arraying an army for battle they set the _hastati_ in front. Directly +behind them, in the second rank, they placed the _principes_; and in +the third rank of the same column, the _triarii_. The cavalry of each +of these three divisions they disposed to the right and left of the +division to which it belonged; and to these companies of horse, from +their form and position, they gave the name wings (_alæ_), from their +appearing like the two wings of the main body of the army. The first +division, the _hastati_, which was in front, they drew up in close +order to enable it to withstand and repulse the enemy. The second +division, the _principes_, since it was not to be engaged from the +beginning, but was meant to succour the first in case that were driven +in, was not formed in close order but kept in open file, so that it +might receive the other into its ranks whenever it was broken and +forced to retire. The third division, that, namely, of the _triarii_, +had its ranks still more open than those of the second, so that, if +occasion required, it might receive the first two divisions of the +_hastati_ and _principes_. These divisions, therefore, being drawn up +in this order, the engagement began, and if the _hastati_ were +overpowered and driven back, they retired within the loose ranks of the +_principes_, when both these divisions, being thus united into one, +renewed the conflict. If these, again, were routed and forced back, +they retreated within the open ranks of the _triarii_, and all three +divisions, forming into one, once more renewed the fight, in which, if +they were overpowered, since they had no further means of recruiting +their strength, they lost the battle. And because whenever this last +division, of the _triarii_, had to be employed, the army was in +jeopardy, there arose the proverb, “_Res redacta est ad triarios_,” +equivalent to our expression of _playing a last stake_. + +The captains of our day, as they have abandoned all the other customs +of antiquity, and pay no heed to any part of the ancient discipline, so +also have discarded this method of disposing their men, though it was +one of no small utility. For to insure the defeat of a commander who so +arranges his forces as to be able thrice during an engagement to renew +his strength, Fortune must thrice declare against him, and he must be +matched with an adversary able three times over to defeat him; whereas +he whose sole chance of success lies in his surviving the first onset, +as is the case with all the armies of Christendom at the present day, +may easily be vanquished, since any slight mishap, and the least +failure in the steadiness of his men, may deprive him of victory. + +And what takes from our armies the capacity to renew their strength is, +that provision is now no longer made for one division being received +into the ranks of another, which happens because at present an army is +arranged for battle in one or other of two imperfect methods. For +either its divisions are placed side by side, so as to form a line of +great width but of no depth or solidity; or if, to strengthen it, it be +drawn up in columns after the fashion of the Roman armies, should the +front line be broken, no provision having been made for its being +received by the second, it is thrown into complete disorder, and both +divisions fall to pieces. For if the front line be driven back, it +jostles the second, if the second line endeavour to advance, the first +stands in its way: and thus, the first driving against the second, and +the second against the third, such confusion follows that often the +most trifling accident will cause the ruin of an entire army. + +At the battle of Ravenna, where M. de Foix, the French commander, was +slain, although according to modern notions this was a well-fought +field, both the French and the Spanish armies were drawn up in the +first of the faulty methods above described; that is to say, each army +advanced with the whole of its battalions side by side, so that each +presented a single front much wider than deep; this being always the +plan followed by modern armies when, as at Ravenna, the ground is open. +For knowing the disorder they fall into on retreat, forming themselves +in a single line, they endeavour, as I have said, as much as possible +to escape confusion by extending their front. But where the ground +confines them they fall at once into the disorder spoken of, without an +effort to prevent it. + +Troops traversing an enemy’s country, whether to pillage or carry out +any other operation of war, are liable to fall into the same disorder; +and at S. Regolo in the Pisan territory, and at other places where the +Florentines were beaten by the Pisans during the war which followed on +the revolt of Pisa after the coming of Charles of France into Italy, +our defeat was due to no other cause than the behaviour of our own +cavalry, who being posted in front, and being repulsed by the enemy, +fell back on the infantry and threw them into confusion, whereupon the +whole army took to flight; and Messer Ciriaco del Borgo, the veteran +leader of the Florentine foot, has often declared in my presence that +he had never been routed by any cavalry save those who were fighting on +his side. For which reason the Swiss, who are the greatest proficients +in modern warfare, when serving with the French, make it their first +care to place themselves on their flank, so that the cavalry of their +friends, if repulsed, may not throw them into disorder. + +But although these matters seem easy to understand and not difficult to +put in practice, none has yet been found among the commanders of our +times, who attempted to imitate the ancients or to correct the moderns. +For although these also have a tripartite division of their armies into +van-guard, main-body, and rear-guard, the only use they make of it is +in giving orders when their men are in quarters; whereas on active +service it rarely happens that all divisions are not equally exposed to +the same onset. + +And because many, to excuse their ignorance, will have it that the +destructive fire of artillery forbids our employing at the present day +many of the tactics used by the ancients, I will discuss this question +in the following Chapter, and examine whether artillery does in fact +prevent us from using the valiant methods of antiquity. + + + + +CHAPTER XVII.—_What importance the Armies of the present day should +allow to Artillery; and whether the commonly received opinion +concerning it be just._ + + +Looking to the number of pitched battles, or what are termed by the +French _journées_, and by the Italians _fatti d’arme_, fought by the +Romans at divers times, I am led further to examine the generally +received opinion, that had artillery been in use in their day, the +Romans would not have been allowed, or at least not with the same ease, +to subjugate provinces and make other nations their tributaries, and +could never have spread their power in the astonishing way they did. +For it is said that by reason of these fire-arms men can no longer use +or display their personal valour as they could of old; that there is +greater difficulty now than there was in former times in joining +battle; that the tactics followed then cannot be followed now; and that +in time all warfare must resolve itself into a question of artillery. + +Judging it not out of place to inquire whether these opinions are +sound, and how far artillery has added to or taken from the strength of +armies, and whether its use lessens or increases the opportunities for +a good captain to behave valiantly, I shall at once address myself to +the first of the averments noticed above, namely, that the armies of +the ancient Romans could not have made the conquests they did, had +artillery then been in use. + +To this I answer by saying that, since war is made for purposes either +of offence or defence, we have first to see in which of these two kinds +of warfare artillery gives the greater advantage or inflicts the +greater hurt. Now, though something might be said both ways, I +nevertheless believe that artillery is beyond comparison more hurtful +to him who stands on the defensive than to him who attacks. For he who +defends himself must either do so in a town or in a fortified camp. If +within a town, either the town will be a small one, as fortified towns +commonly are, or it will be a great one. In the former case, he who is +on the defensive is at once undone. For such is the shock of artillery +that there is no wall so strong that in a few days it will not batter +down, when, unless those within have ample room to withdraw behind +covering works and trenches, they must be beaten; it being impossible +for them to resist the assault of an enemy who forces an entrance +through the breaches in their walls. Nor will any artillery a defender +may have be of any service to him; since it is an established axiom +that where men are able to advance in numbers and rapidly, artillery is +powerless to check them. + +For this reason, in storming towns the furious assaults of the northern +nations prove irresistible, whereas the attacks of our Italian troops, +who do not rush on in force, but advance to the assault in small knots +of skirmishers (_scaramouches_, as they are fitly named), may easily be +withstood. Those who advance in such loose order, and with so little +spirit, against a breach covered by artillery, advance to certain +destruction, and as against them artillery is useful. But when the +assailants swarm to the breach so massed together that one pushes on +another, unless they be brought to a stand by ditches and earthworks, +they penetrate everywhere, and no artillery has any effect to keep them +back; and though some must fall, yet not so many as to prevent a +victory. + +The frequent success of the northern nations in storming towns, and +more particularly the recovery of Brescia by the French, is proof +sufficient of the truth of what I say. For the town of Brescia rising +against the French while the citadel still held out, the Venetians, to +meet any attack which might be made from the citadel upon the town, +ranged guns along the whole line of road which led from the one to the +other, planting them in front, and in flank, and wherever else they +could be brought to bear. Of all which M. de Foix making no account, +dismounted with his men-at-arms from horseback, and, advancing with +them on foot through the midst of the batteries, took the town; nor do +we learn that he sustained any considerable loss from the enemy’s fire. +So that, as I have said, he who has to defend himself in a small town, +when his walls are battered down and he has no room to retire behind +other works, and has only his artillery to trust to, is at once undone. + +But even where the town you defend is a great one, so that you have +room to fall back behind new works, artillery is still, by a long way, +more useful for the assailant than for the defender. For to enable your +artillery to do any hurt to those without, you must raise yourself with +it above the level of the ground, since, if you remain on the level, +the enemy, by erecting any low mound or earth-work, can so secure +himself that it will be impossible for you to touch him. But in raising +yourself above the level of the ground, whether by extending yourself +along the gallery of the walls, or otherwise, you are exposed to two +disadvantages; for, first, you cannot there bring into position guns of +the same size or range as he who is without can bring to bear against +you, since it is impossible to work large guns in a confined space; +and, secondly, although you should succeed in getting your guns into +position, you cannot construct such strong and solid works for their +protection as those can who are outside, and on level ground, and who +have all the room and every other advantage which they could desire. It +is consequently impossible for him who defends a town to maintain his +guns in position at any considerable height, when those who are outside +have much and powerful artillery; while, if he place it lower, it +becomes, as has been explained, to a great extent useless. So that in +the end the defence of the city has to be effected, as in ancient +times, by hand to hand fighting, or else by means of the smaller kinds +of fire-arms, from which if the defender derive some slight advantage, +it is balanced by the injury he sustains from the great artillery of +his enemy, whereby the walls of the city are battered down and almost +buried in their ditches; so that when it comes once more to an +encounter at close quarters, by reason of his walls being demolished +and his ditches filled up, the defender is now at a far greater +disadvantage than he was formerly. Wherefore I repeat that these arms +are infinitely more useful for him who attacks a town than for him who +defends it. + +As to the remaining method, which consists in your taking up your +position in an entrenched camp, where you need not fight unless you +please, and unless you have the advantage, I say that this method +commonly affords you no greater facility for avoiding an engagement +than the ancients had; nay, that sometimes, owing to the use of +artillery, you are worse off than they were. For if the enemy fall +suddenly upon you, and have some slight advantage (as may readily be +the case from his being on higher ground, or from your works on his +arrival being still incomplete so that you are not wholly sheltered by +them), forthwith, and without your being able to prevent him, he +dislodges you, and you are forced to quit your defences and deliver +battle: as happened to the Spaniards at the battle of Ravenna. For +having posted themselves between the river Ronco and an earthwork, from +their not having carried this work high enough, and from the French +having a slight advantage of ground, they were forced by the fire of +the latter to quit their entrenchments come to an engagement. + +But assuming the ground you have chosen for your camp to be, as it +always should, higher than that occupied by the enemy, and your works +to be complete and sufficient, so that from your position and +preparations the enemy dare not attack you, recourse will then be had +to the very same methods as were resorted to in ancient times when an +army was so posted that it could not be assailed; that is to say, your +country will be wasted, cities friendly to you besieged or stormed, and +your supplies intercepted; until you are forced, at last, of necessity +to quit your camp and to fight a pitched battle, in which, as will +presently appear, artillery will be of little service to you. + +If we consider, therefore, for what ends the Romans made wars, and that +attack and not defence was the object of almost all their campaigns, it +will be clear, if what I have said be true, that they would have had +still greater advantage, and might have achieved their conquests with +even greater ease, had artillery been in use in their times. + +And as to the second complaint, that by reason of artillery men can no +longer display their valour as they could in ancient days, I admit it +to be true that when they have to expose themselves a few at a time, +men run more risks now than formerly; as when they have to scale a town +or perform some similar exploit, in which they are not massed together +but must advance singly and one behind another. It is true, also, that +Captains and commanders of armies are subjected to a greater risk of +being killed now than of old, since they an be reached everywhere by +the enemy’s fire; and it is no protection to them to be with those of +their men who are furthest from the enemy, or to be surrounded by the +bravest of their guards. Still, we do not often find either of these +two dangers occasioning extraordinary loss. For towns strongly +fortified are not attacked by escalade, nor will the assailing army +advance against them in weak numbers; but will endeavour, as in ancient +times, to reduce them by regular siege. And even in the case of towns +attacked by storm, the dangers are not so very much greater now than +they were formerly; for in those old days also, the defenders of towns +were not without warlike engines, which if less terrible in their +operation, had, so far as killing goes, much the same effect. And as +for the deaths of captains and leaders of companies, it may be said +that during the last twenty-four years of war in Italy, we have had +fewer instances of such deaths than might be found in a period of ten +years of ancient warfare. For excepting the Count Lodovico della +Mirandola, who fell at Ferrara, when the Venetians a few years ago +attacked that city, and the Duke de Nemours, slain at Cirignuola, we +have no instance of any commander being killed by artillery. For, at +Ravenna, M. de Foix died by steel and not by shot. Wherefore I say that +if men no longer perform deeds of individual prowess, it results not so +much from the use of artillery, as from the faulty discipline and +weakness of our armies, which being collectively without valour cannot +display it in particular instances. + +As to the third assertion, that armies can no longer be brought to +engage one another, and that war will soon come to be carried on wholly +with artillery, I maintain that this allegation is utterly untrue, and +will always be so held by those who are willing in handling their +troops to follow the usages of ancient valour. For whosoever would have +a good army must train it, either by real or by mimic warfare, to +approach the enemy, to come within sword-thrust, and to grapple with +him; and must rely more on foot soldiers than on horse, for reasons +presently to be explained. But when you trust to your foot-soldiers, +and to the methods already indicated, artillery becomes powerless to +harm you. For foot-soldiers, in approaching an enemy, can with more +ease escape the fire of his artillery than in ancient times they could +have avoided a charge of elephants or of scythed chariots, or any other +of those strange contrivances which had to be encountered by the +Romans, and against which they always devised some remedy. And, +certainly, as against artillery, their remedy would have been easier, +by as much as the time during which artillery can do hurt is shorter +than the time during which elephants and chariots could. For by these +you were thrown into disorder after battle joined, whereas artillery +harasses you only before you engage; a danger which infantry can easily +escape, either by advancing so as to be covered by the inequalities of +the ground, or by lying down while the firing continues; nay, we find +from experience that even these precautions may be dispensed with, +especially as against great artillery, which can hardly be levelled +with such precision that its fire shall not either pass over your head +from the range being too high, or fall short from its being too low. + +So soon, however, as the engagement is begun, it is perfectly clear +that neither small nor great artillery can harm you any longer; since, +if the enemy have his artillerymen in front, you take them; if in rear, +they will injure him before they injure you; and if in flank, they can +never fire so effectively as to prevent your closing, with the result +already explained. Nor does this admit of much dispute, since we have +proof of it in the case of the Swiss at Novara, in the year 1513, when, +with neither guns nor cavalry, they advanced against the French army, +who had fortified themselves with artillery behind entrenchments, and +routed them without suffering the slightest check from their fire. In +further explanation whereof it is to be noted, that to work artillery +effectively it should be protected by walls, by ditches, or by +earth-works; and that whenever, from being left without such protection +it has to be defended by men, as happens in pitched battles and +engagements in the open field, it is either taken or otherwise becomes +useless. Nor can it be employed on the flank of an army, save in the +manner in which the ancients made use of their warlike engines, which +they moved out from their columns that they might be worked without +inconvenience, but withdrew within them when driven back by cavalry or +other troops. He who looks for any further advantage from artillery +does not rightly understand its nature, and trusts to what is most +likely to deceive him. For although the Turk, using artillery, has +gained victories over the Soldan and the Sofi, the only advantage he +has had from it has been the terror into which the horses of the enemy, +unused to such sounds, are thrown by the roar of the guns. + +And now, to bring these remarks to a conclusion, I say briefly that, +employed by an army wherein there is some strain of the ancient valour, +artillery is useful; but employed otherwise, against a brave adversary, +is utterly useless. + + + + +CHAPTER XVIII.—_That the authority of the Romans and the example of +ancient Warfare should make us hold Foot Soldiers of more account than +Horse._ + + +By many arguments and instances it can be clearly established that in +their military enterprises the Romans set far more store on their +infantry than on their cavalry, and trusted to the former to carry out +all the chief objects which their armies were meant to effect. Among +many other examples of this, we may notice the great battle which they +fought with the Latins near the lake Regillus, where to steady their +wavering ranks they made their horsemen dismount, and renewing the +combat on foot obtained a victory. Here we see plainly that the Romans +had more confidence in themselves when they fought on foot than when +they fought on horseback. The same expedient was resorted to by them in +many of their other battles, and always in their sorest need they found +it their surest stay. + +Nor are we to condemn the practice in deference to the opinion of +Hannibal, who, at the battle of Cannæ, on seeing the consuls make the +horsemen dismount, said scoffingly, “_Better still had they delivered +their knights to me in chains._” For though this saying came from the +mouth of a most excellent soldier, still, if we are to regard +authority, we ought rather to follow the authority of a commonwealth +like Rome, and of the many great captains who served her, than that of +Hannibal alone. But, apart from authority, there are manifest reasons +to bear out what I say. For a man may go on foot into many places where +a horse cannot go; men can be taught to keep rank, and if thrown into +disorder to recover form; whereas, it is difficult to keep horses in +line, and impossible if once they be thrown into disorder to reform +them. Moreover we find that with horses as with men, some have little +courage and some much; and that often a spirited horse is ridden by a +faint-hearted rider, or a dull horse by a courageous rider, and that in +whatever way such disparity is caused, confusion and disorder result. +Again, infantry, when drawn up in column, can easily break and is not +easily broken by cavalry. This is vouched, not only by many ancient and +many modern instances, but also by the authority of those who lay down +rules for the government of States, who show that at first wars were +carried on by mounted soldiers, because the methods for arraying +infantry were not yet understood, but that so soon as these were +discovered, the superiority of foot over horse was at once recognized. +In saying this, I would not have it supposed that horsemen are not of +the greatest use in armies, whether for purposes of observation, for +harrying and laying waste the enemy’s country, for pursuing a +retreating foe or helping to repulse his cavalry. But the substance and +sinew of an army, and that part of it which ought constantly to be most +considered, should always be the infantry. And among sins of the +Italian princes who have made their country the slave of foreigners, +there is none worse than that they have held these arms in contempt, +and turned their whole attention to mounted troops. + +This error is due to the craft of our captains and to the ignorance of +our rulers. For the control of the armies of Italy for the last five +and twenty years resting in the hands of men, who, as having no lands +of their own, may be looked on as mere soldiers of fortune, these fell +forthwith on contriving how they might maintain their credit by being +supplied with the arms which the princes of the country were without. +And as they had no subjects of their own of whom they could make use, +and could not obtain constant employment and pay for a large number of +foot-soldiers, and as a small number would have given them no +importance, they had recourse to horsemen. For a _condottiere_ drawing +pay for two or three hundred horsemen was maintained by them in the +highest credit, and yet the cost was not too great to be met by the +princes who employed him. And to effect their object with more ease, +and increase their credit still further, these adventurers would allow +no merit or favour to be due to foot-soldiers, but claimed all for +their horsemen. And to such a length was this bad system carried, that +in the very greatest army only the smallest sprinkling of infantry was +to be found. This, together with many other ill practices which +accompanied it, has so weakened the militia of Italy, that the country +has easily been trampled upon by all the nations of the North. + +That it is a mistake to make more account of cavalry than of infantry, +may be still more clearly seen from another example taken from Roman +history. The Romans being engaged on the siege of Sora, a troop of +horse a sally from the town to attack their camp; when the Roman master +of the knights advancing with his own horsemen to give them battle, it +so chanced that, at the very first onset, the leaders on both sides +were slain. Both parties being thus left without commanders, and the +combat, nevertheless, continuing, the Romans thinking thereby to have +the advantage of their adversaries, alighted from horseback, obliging +the enemy’s cavalry, in order to defend themselves, to do the like. The +result was that the Romans had the victory. Now there could be no +stronger instance than this to show the superiority of foot over horse. +For while in other battles the Roman cavalry were made by their consuls +to dismount in order to succour their infantry who were in distress and +in need of such aid, on this occasion they dismounted, not to succour +their infantry, nor to encounter an enemy contending on foot, but +because they saw that though they could not prevail against the enemy +fighting as horsemen against horsemen, on foot they readily might. And +from this I conclude that foot-soldiers, if rightly handled, can hardly +be beaten except by other soldiers fighting on foot. + +With very few cavalry, but with a considerable force of infantry, the +Roman commanders, Crassus and Marcus Antonius, each for many days +together overran the territories of the Parthians, although opposed by +the countless horsemen of that nation. Crassus, indeed, with the +greater part of his army, was left there dead, and Antonius only saved +himself by his valour; but even in the extremities to which the Romans +were then brought, see how greatly superior foot-soldiers are to horse. +For though fighting in an open country, far from the sea-coast, and cut +off from his supplies, Antonius proved himself a valiant soldier in the +judgment even of the Parthians themselves, the whole strength of whose +cavalry never ventured to attack the columns of his army. And though +Crassus perished there, any one who reads attentively the account of +his expedition must see that he was rather outwitted than defeated, and +that even when his condition was desperate, the Parthians durst not +close with him, but effected his destruction by hanging continually on +the flanks of his army, and intercepting his supplies, while cajoling +him with promises which they never kept. + +It might, I grant, be harder to demonstrate this great superiority of +foot over horse, had we not very many modern examples affording the +clearest proof of it. For instance, at the battle of Novara, of which +we have already spoken, nine thousand Swiss foot were seen to attack +ten thousand cavalry together with an equal number of infantry, and to +defeat them; the cavalry being powerless to injure them, while of the +infantry, who were mostly Gascons, and badly disciplined, they made no +account. On another occasion we have seen twenty-six thousand Swiss +march on Milan to attack Francis I. of France, who had with him twenty +thousand men-at-arms, forty thousand foot, and a hundred pieces of +artillery; and although they were not victorious as at Novara, they +nevertheless fought valiantly for two days together, and, in the end, +though beaten, were able to bring off half their number. With +foot-soldiers only Marcus Attilius Regulus ventured to oppose himself, +not to cavalry merely, but to elephants; and if the attempt failed it +does not follow that he was not justified by the valour of his men in +believing them equal to surmount this danger. + +I repeat, therefore, that to prevail against well-disciplined infantry, +you must meet them with infantry disciplined still better, and that +otherwise you advance to certain destruction. In the time of Filippo +Visconti, Duke of Milan, some sixteen thousand Swiss made a descent on +Lombardy, whereupon the Duke, who at that time had Il Carmagnola as his +captain, sent him with six thousand men-at-arms and a slender following +of foot-soldiers to meet them. Not knowing their manner of fighting, +Carmagnola fell upon them with his horsemen, expecting to put them at +once to rout; but finding them immovable, after losing many of his men +he withdrew. But, being a most wise captain, and skilful in devising +new remedies to meet unwonted dangers, after reinforcing his company he +again advanced to the attack; and when about to engage made all his +men-at-arms dismount, and placing them in front of his foot-soldiers, +fell once more upon the Swiss, who could then no longer withstand him. +For his men, being on foot and well armed, easily penetrated the Swiss +ranks without hurt to themselves; and getting among them, had no +difficulty in cutting them down, so that of the entire army of the +Swiss those only escaped who were spared by his humanity. + +Of this difference in the efficiency of these two kinds of troops, many +I believe are aware; but such is the unhappiness and perversity of the +times in which we live, that neither ancient nor modern examples, nor +even the consciousness of error, can move our present princes to amend +their ways, or convince them that to restore credit to the arms of a +State or province, it is necessary to revive this branch of their +militia also, to keep it near them, to make much of it, and to give it +life, that in return, it may give back life and reputation to them. But +as they have departed from all those other methods already spoken of, +so have they departed from this, and with this result, that to them the +acquisition of territory is rather a loss than a gain, as presently +shall be shown. + + + + +CHAPTER XIX.—_That Acquisitions made by ill-governed States and such as +follow not the valiant methods of the Romans, tend rather to their Ruin +than to their Aggrandizement_. + + +To these false opinions, founded on the pernicious example first set by +the present corrupt age, we owe it, that no man thinks of departing +from the methods which are in use. It had been impossible, for +instance, some thirty years ago, to persuade an Italian that ten +thousand foot-soldiers could, on plain ground, attack ten thousand +cavalry together with an equal number of infantry; and not merely +attack, but defeat them; as we saw done by the Swiss at that battle of +Novara, to which I have already referred so often. For although history +abounds in similar examples, none would have believed them, or, +believing them, would have said that nowadays men are so much better +armed, that a squadron of cavalry could shatter a rock, to say nothing +of a column of infantry. With such false pleas would they have belied +their judgment, taking no account that with a very scanty force of +foot-soldiers, Lucullus routed a hundred and fifty thousand of the +cavalry of Tigranes, among whom were a body of horsemen very nearly +resembling our own men-at-arms. Now, however, this error is +demonstrated by the example of the northern nations. + +And since what history teaches as to the superiority of foot-soldiers +is thus proved to be true, men ought likewise to believe that the other +methods practised by the ancients are in like manner salutary and +useful. And were this once accepted, both princes and commonwealths +would make fewer blunders than they do, would be stronger to resist +sudden attack, and would no longer place their sole hope of safety in +flight; while those who take in hand to provide a State with new +institutions would know better what direction to give them, whether in +the way of extending or merely of preserving; and would see that to +augment the numbers of their citizens, to assume other States as +companions rather than reduce them to subjection, to send out colonies +for the defence of acquired territories, to hold their spoils at the +credit of the common stock, to overcome enemies by inroads and pitched +battles rather than by sieges, to enrich the public purse, keep down +private wealth, and zealously, to maintain all military exercises, are +the true ways to aggrandize a State and to extend its empire. Or if +these methods for adding to their power are not to their mind, let them +remember that acquisitions made in any other way are the ruin of +republics, and so set bounds to their ambition, wisely regulating the +internal government of their country by suitable laws and ordinances, +forbidding extension, and looking only to defence, and taking heed that +their defences are in good order, as do those republics of Germany +which live and for long have lived, in freedom. + +And yet, as I have said on another occasion, when speaking of the +difference between the methods suitable for acquiring and those +suitable for maintaining, it is impossible for a republic to remain +long in the peaceful enjoyment of freedom within a restricted frontier. +For should it forbear from molesting others, others are not likely to +refrain from molesting it; whence must grow at once the desire and the +necessity to make acquisitions; or should no enemies be found abroad, +they will be found at home, for this seems to be incidental to all +great States. And if the free States of Germany are, and have long been +able to maintain themselves on their present footing, this arises from +certain conditions peculiar to that country, and to be found nowhere +else, without which these communities could not go on living as they +do. + +The district of Germany of which I speak was formerly subject to the +Roman Empire, in the same way as France and Spain; but on the decline +of the Empire, and when its very name came to be limited to this one +province, its more powerful cities taking advantage of the weakness and +necessities of the Emperors, began to free themselves by buying from +them their liberty, subject to the payment of a trifling yearly +tribute; until, gradually, all the cities which held directly from the +Emperor, and were not subject to any intermediate lord, had, in like +manner, purchased their freedom. While this went on, it so happened +that certain communities subject to the Duke of Austria, among which +were Friburg, the people of Schweitz, and the like, rose in rebellion +against him, and meeting at the outset with good success, by degrees +acquired such accession of strength that so far from returning under +the Austrian yoke, they are become formidable to all their neighbours +These are the States which we now name Swiss. + +Germany is, consequently, divided between the Swiss, the communities +which take the name of Free Towns, the Princes, and the Emperor; and +the reason why, amid so many conflicting interests, wars do not break +out, or breaking out are of short continuance, is the reverence in +which all hold this symbol of the Imperial authority. For although the +Emperor be without strength of his own, he has nevertheless such credit +with all these others that he alone can keep them united, and, +interposing as mediator, can speedily repress by his influence any +dissensions among them. + +The greatest and most protracted wars which have taken place in this +country have been those between the Swiss and the Duke of Austria; and +although for many years past the Empire and the dukedom of Austria have +been united in the same man, he has always failed to subdue the +stubbornness of the Swiss, who are never to be brought to terms save by +force. Nor has the rest of Germany lent the Emperor much assistance in +his wars with the Swiss, the Free Towns being little disposed to attack +others whose desire is to live as they themselves do, in freedom; while +the Princes of the Empire either are so poor that they cannot, or from +jealousy of the power of the Emperor will not, take part with him +against them. + +These communities, therefore, abide contented within their narrow +confines, because, having regard to the Imperial authority, they have +no occasion to desire greater; and are at the same time obliged to live +in unity within their walls, because an enemy is always at hand, and +ready to take advantage of their divisions to effect an entrance. But +were the circumstances of the country other than they are these +communities would be forced to make attempts to extend their dominions, +and be constrained to relinquish their present peaceful mode of life. +And since the same conditions are not found elsewhere, other nations +cannot adopt this way of living, but are compelled to extend their +power either by means of leagues, or else by the methods used by the +Romans; and any one who should act otherwise would find not safety but +rather death and destruction. For since in a thousand ways, and from +causes innumerable, conquests are surrounded with dangers, it may well +happen that in adding to our dominions, we add nothing to our strength; +but whosoever increases not his strength while he adds to his +dominions, must needs be ruined. He who is impoverished by his wars, +even should he come off victorious, can add nothing to his strength, +since he spends more than he gains, as the Venetians and Florentines +have done. For Venice has been far feebler since she acquired Lombardy, +and Florence since she acquired Tuscany, than when the one was content +to be mistress of the seas, and the other of the lands lying within six +miles from her walls. And this from their eagerness to acquire without +knowing what way to take. For which ignorance these States are the more +to be blamed in proportion as there is less to excuse them; since they +had seen what methods were used by the Romans, and could have followed +in their footsteps; whereas the Romans, without any example set them, +were able by their own prudence to shape a course for themselves. + +But even to well-governed States, their conquests may chance to +occasion much harm; as when some city or province is acquired abounding +in luxury and delights, by whose manners the conqueror becomes +infected; as happened first to the Romans, and afterwards to Hannibal +on taking possession of Capua. And had Capua been at such a distance +from Rome that a ready remedy could not have been applied to the +disorders of the soldiery, or had Rome herself been in any degree +tainted with corruption, this acquisition had certainly proved her +ruin. To which Titus Livius bears witness when he says, “_Most +mischievous at this time to our military discipline was Capua; for +ministering to all delights, she turned away the corrupted minds of our +soldiers from the remembrance of their country_.” And, truly, cities +and provinces like this, avenge themselves on their conquerors without +blood or blow; since by infecting them with their own evil customs they +prepare them for defeat at the hands of any assailant. Nor could the +subject have been better handled than by Juvenal, where he says in his +Satires, that into the hearts of the Romans, through their conquests in +foreign lands, foreign manners found their way; and in place of +frugality and other admirable virtues— + +“Came luxury more mortal than the sword, +And settling down, avenged a vanquished world.”[8] + + + [8] Sævior armis +Luxuria occubuit victumque ulciscitur orbem. + _Juv. Sat_. vi. 292. + + +And if their conquests were like to be fatal to the Romans at a time +when they were still animated by great virtue and prudence, how must it +fare with those who follow methods altogether different from theirs, +and who, to crown their other errors of which we have already said +enough, resort to auxiliary and mercenary arms, bringing upon +themselves those dangers whereof mention shall be made in the Chapter +following. + + + + +CHAPTER XX.—_Of the Dangers incurred by Princes or Republics who resort +to Auxiliary or Mercenary Arms_. + + +Had I not already, in another treatise, enlarged on the inutility of +mercenary and auxiliary, and on the usefulness of national arms, I +should dwell on these matters in the present Discourse more at length +than it is my design to do. For having given the subject very full +consideration elsewhere, here I would be brief. Still when I find Titus +Livius supplying a complete example of what we have to look for from +auxiliaries, by whom I mean troops sent to our assistance by some other +prince or ruler, paid by him and under officers by him appointed, it is +not fit that I should pass it by in silence. + +It is related, then, by our historian, that the Romans, after defeating +on two different occasions armies of the Samnites with forces sent by +them to succour the Capuans, whom they thus relieved from the war which +the Samnites Were waging against them, being desirious to return to +Rome, left behind two legions to defend the Capuans, that the latter +might not, from being altogether deprived of their protection, once +more become a prey to the Samnites. But these two legions, rotting in +idleness began to take such delight therein, that forgetful of their +country and the reverence due to the senate, they resolved to seize by +violence the city they had been left to guard by their valour. For to +them it seemed that the citizens of Capua were unworthy to enjoy +advantages which they knew not how to defend. The Romans, however, +getting timely notice of this design, at once met and defeated it, in +the manner to be more fully noticed when I come to treat of +conspiracies. + +Once more then, I repeat, that of all the various kinds of troops, +auxiliaries are the most pernicious, because the prince or republic +resorting to them for aid has no authority over them, the only person +who possesses such authority being he who sends them. For, as I have +said, auxiliary troops are those sent to your assistance by some other +potentate, under his own flag, under his own officers, and in his own +pay, as were the legions sent by the Romans to Capua. Such troops, if +victorious, will for the most part plunder him by whom, as well as him +against whom, they are hired to fight; and this they do, sometimes at +the instigation of the potentate who sends them, sometimes for +ambitious ends of their own. It was not the purpose of the Romans to +violate the league and treaty which they had made with Capua; but to +their soldiers it seemed so easy a matter to master the Capuans, that +they were readily led into this plot for depriving them of their town +and territories. Many other examples might be given to the same effect, +but it is enough to mention besides this instance, that of the people +of Regium, who were deprived of their city and of their lives by +another Roman legion sent for their protection. + +Princes and republics, therefore, should resort to any other expedient +for the defence of their States sooner than call in hired auxiliaries, +when they have to rest their entire hopes of safety on them; since any +accord or terms, however hard, which you may make with your enemy, will +be carefully studied and current events well considered, it will be +seen that for one who has succeeded with such assistance, hundreds have +been betrayed. Nor, in truth, can any better opportunity for usurping a +city or province present itself to an ambitious prince or commonwealth, +than to be asked to send an army for its defence. On the other hand, he +who is so greedy of conquest as to summon such help, not for purposes +of defence but in order to attack others, seeks to have what he can +never hold and is most likely to be taken from him by the very person +who helps him to gain it. Yet such is the perversity of men that, to +gratify the desire of the moment, they shut their eyes to those ills +which must speedily ensue and are no more moved by example in this +matter than in all those others of which I have spoken; for were they +moved by these examples they would see that the more disposed they are +to deal generously with their neighbours, and the more averse they are +to usurp authority over them, the readier will these be to throw +themselves into their arms; as will at once appear from the case of the +Capuans. + + + + +CHAPTER XXI.—_That Capua was the first City to which the Romans sent a +Prætor; nor there, until four hundred years after they began to make +War._ + + +The great difference between the methods followed by the ancient Romans +in adding to their dominions, and those used for that purpose by the +States of the present time, has now been sufficiently discussed. It has +been seen, too how in dealing with the cities which they did not think +fit to destroy, and even with those which had made their submission not +as companions but as subjects, it was customary with the Romans to +permit them to live on under their own laws, without imposing any +outward sign of dependence, merely binding them to certain conditions, +or complying with which they were maintained in their former dignity +and importance. We know, further, that the same methods continued to be +followed by the Romans until they passed beyond the confines of Italy, +and began to reduce foreign kingdoms and States to provinces: as +plainly appears in the fact that Capua was the first city to which they +sent a prætor, and him from no motive of ambition, but at the request +of the Capuans themselves who, living at variance with one another, +thought it necessary to have a Roman citizen in their town who might +restore unity and good order among them. Influenced by this example, +and urged by the same need, the people of Antium were the next to ask +that they too might have a prætor given them; touching which request +and in connection with which new method of governing, Titus Livius +observes, “_that not the arms only but also the laws of Rome now began +to exert an influence;_” showing how much the course thus followed by +the Romans promoted the growth of their authority. + +For those cities, more especially, which have been used to freedom or +to be governed by their own citizens, rest far better satisfied with a +government which they do not see, even though it involve something of +oppression, than with one which standing constantly before their eyes, +seems every day to reproach them with the disgrace of servitude. And to +the prince there is another advantage in this method of government, +namely, that as the judges and magistrates who administer the laws +civil and criminal within these cities, are not under his control, no +decision of theirs can throw responsibility or discredit upon him; so +that he thus escapes many occasions of calumny and hatred. Of the truth +whereof, besides the ancient instances which might be noted, we have a +recent example here in Italy. For Genoa, as every one knows, has many +times been occupied by the French king, who always, until lately, sent +thither a French governor to rule in his name. Recently, however, not +from choice but of necessity, he has permitted the town to be +self-governed under a Genoese ruler; and any one who had to decide +which of these two methods of governing gives the greater security to +the king’s authority and the greater content to the people themselves, +would assuredly have to pronounce in favour of the latter. + +Men, moreover, in proportion as they see you averse to usurp authority +over them, grow the readier to surrender themselves into your hands; +and fear you less on the score of their freedom, when they find you +acting towards them with consideration and kindness. It was the display +of these qualities that moved the Capuans to ask the Romans for a +prætor; for had the Romans betrayed the least eagerness to send them +one, they would at once have conceived jealousy and grown estranged. + +But why turn for examples to Capua and Rome, when we have them close at +hand in Tuscany and Florence? Who is there but knows what a time it is +since the city of Pistoja submitted of her own accord to the Florentine +supremacy? Who, again, but knows the animosity which down to the +present day exists between Florence and the cities of Pisa, Lucca, and +Siena? This difference of feeling does not arise from the citizens of +Pistoja valuing their freedom less than the citizens of these other +towns or thinking themselves inferior to them, but from the Florentines +having always acted towards the former as brothers, towards the latter +as foes. This it was that led the Pistojans to come voluntarily under +our authority while the others have done and do all in their power to +escape it. For there seems no reason to doubt, that if Florence, +instead of exasperating these neighbours of hers, had sought to win +them over, either by entering into league with them or by lending them +assistance, she would at this hour have been mistress of Tuscany. Not +that I would be understood to maintain that recourse is never to be had +to force and to arms, but that these are only to be used in the last +resort, and when all other remedies are unavailing. + + + + +CHAPTER XXII.—_That in matters of moment Men often judge amiss._ + + +How falsely men often judge of things, they who are present at their +deliberations have constant occasion to know. For in many matters, +unless these deliberations be guided by men of great parts, the +conclusions come to are certain to be wrong. And because in corrupt +republics, and especially in quiet times, either through jealousy or +from other like causes, men of great ability are often obliged to stand +aloof, it follows that measures not good in themselves are by a common +error judged to be good, or are promoted by those who seek public +favour rather than the public advantage. Mistakes of this sort are +found out afterwards in seasons of adversity, when recourse must be had +to those persons who in peaceful times had been, as it were, forgotten, +as shall hereafter in its proper place be more fully explained. Cases, +moreover, arise in which those who have little experience of affairs +are sure to be misled, from the matters with which they have to deal +being attended by many deceptive appearances such as lead men to +believe whatsoever they are minded to believe. + +These remarks I make with reference to the false hopes which the +Latins, after being defeated by the Romans, were led to form on the +persuasion of their prætor Numitius, and also with reference to what +was believed by many a few years ago, when Francis, king of France, +came to recover Milan from the Swiss. For Francis of Angoulême, +succeeding on the death of Louis XII. to the throne of France, and +desiring to recover for that realm the Duchy of Milan, on which, some +years before, the Swiss had seized at the instance of Pope Julius, +sought for allies in Italy to second him in his attempt; and besides +the Venetians, who had already been gained over by King Louis, +endeavoured to secure the aid of the Florentines and Pope Leo X.; +thinking that were he to succeed in getting these others to take part +with him, his enterprise would be easier. For the forces of the Spanish +king were then in Lombardy, and the army of the Emperor at Verona. + +Pope Leo, however, did not fall in with the wishes of Francis, being, +it is said, persuaded by his advisers that his best course was to stand +neutral. For they urged that it was not for the advantage of the Church +to have powerful strangers, whether French or Swiss, in Italy; but that +to restore the country to its ancient freedom, it must be delivered +from the yoke of both. And since to conquer both, whether singly or +together, was impossible, it was to be desired that the one should +overthrow the other, after which the Church with her friends might fall +upon the victor. And it was averred that no better opportunity for +carrying out this design could ever be found than then presented +itself; for both the French and the Swiss were in the field; while the +Pope had his troops in readiness to appear on the Lombard frontier and +in the vicinity of the two armies, where, under colour of watching his +own interests, he could easily keep them until the opposed hosts came +to an engagement; when, as both armies were full of courage, their +encounter might be expected to be a bloody one, and likely to leave the +victor so weakened that it would be easy for the Pope to attack and +defeat him; and so, to his own great glory, remain master of Lombardy +and supreme throughout Italy. + +How baseless this expectation was, was seen from the event. For the +Swiss being routed after a protracted combat, the troops of the Pope +and Spain, so far from venturing to attack the conqueror, prepared for +flight; nor would flight have saved them, had not the humanity or +indifference of the king withheld him from pursuing his victory, and +disposed him to make terms with the Church. + +The arguments put forward by the Pope’s advisers had a certain show of +reason in their favour, which looked at from a distance seemed +plausible enough; but were in reality wholly contrary to truth; since +it rarely happens that the captain who wins a victory loses any great +number of his men, his loss being in battle only, and not in flight. +For in the heat of battle, while men stand face to face, but few fall, +chiefly because such combats do not last long; and even when they do +last, and many of the victorious army are slain, so splendid is the +reputation which attends a victory, and so great the terror it +inspires, as far to outweigh any loss the victor suffers by the +slaughter of his soldiers; so that an enemy who, trusting to find him +weakened, should then venture to attack him, would soon be taught his +mistake, unless strong enough to give him battle at any time, before +his victory as well as after. For in that case he might, as fortune and +valour should determine, either win or lose; though, even then, the +army which had first fought and won would have an advantage. And this +we know for a truth from what befell the Latins in consequence of the +mistake made by Numitius their prætor, and their blindness in believing +him. For when they had already suffered defeat at the hands of the +Romans, Numitius caused it to be proclaimed throughout the whole +country of Latium, that now was the time to fall upon the enemy, +exhausted by a struggle in which they were victorious only in name, +while in reality suffering all those ills which attend defeat, and who +might easily be crushed by any fresh force brought against them. +Whereupon the Latins believed him, and getting together a new army, +were forthwith routed with such loss as always awaits those who listen +to like counsels. + + + + +CHAPTER XXIII.—_That in chastising their Subjects when circumstances +required it the Romans always avoided half-measures._ + + +“Such _was now the state of affairs in Latium, that peace and war +seemed alike intolerable_.” No worse calamity can befall a prince or +commonwealth than to be reduced to such straits that they can neither +accept peace nor support war; as is the case with those whom it would +ruin to conclude peace on the terms offered, while war obliges them +either to yield themselves a spoil to their allies, or remain a prey to +their foes. To this grievous alternative are men led by evil counsels +and unwise courses, and, as already said, from not rightly measuring +their strength. For the commonwealth or prince who has rightly measured +his strength, can hardly be brought so low as were the Latins, who made +war with the Romans when they should have made terms, and made terms +when they should have made war, and so mismanaged everything that the +friendship and the enmity of Rome were alike fatal. Whence it came +that, in the first place, they were defeated and broken by Manlius +Torquatus, and afterwards utterly subdued by Camillus; who, when he had +forced them to surrender at discretion to the Roman arms, and had +placed garrisons in all their towns, and taken hostages from all, +returned to Rome and reported to the senate that the whole of Latium +now lay at their mercy. + +And because the sentence then passed by the senate is memorable, and +worthy to be studied by princes that it may be imitated by them on like +occasion, I shall cite the exact words which Livius puts into the mouth +of Camillus, as confirming what I have already said touching the +methods used by the Romans to extend their power, and as showing how in +chastising their subjects they always avoided half-measures and took a +decided course. For government consists in nothing else than in so +controlling your subjects that it shall neither be in their power nor +for their interest to harm you. And this is effected either by making +such sure work with them as puts it out of their power to do you +injury, or else by so loading them with benefits that it would be folly +in them to seek to alter their condition. All which is implied first in +the measures proposed by Camillus, and next in the resolutions passed +on these proposals by the senate. The words of Camillus were as +follows: “_The immortal gods have made you so entirely masters in the +matter you are now considering, that_ _it lies with you to pronounce +whether Latium shall or shall not longer exist. So far as the Latins +are concerned, you can secure a lasting peace either by clemency or by +severity. Would you deal harshly with those whom you have conquered and +who have given themselves into your hands, you can blot out the whole +Latin nation. Would you, after the fashion of our ancestors, increase +the strength of Rome by admitting the vanquished to the rights of +citizenship, here you have opportunity to do so, and with the greatest +glory to yourselves. That, assuredly, is the strongest government which +they rejoice in who obey it. Now, then, is your time, while the minds +of all are bent on what is about to happen, to obtain an ascendency +over them, either by punishment or by benefits._” + +Upon this motion the senate resolved, in accordance with the advice +given by the consul, to take the case of each city separately, and +either destroy utterly or else treat with tenderness all the more +important of the Latin towns. To those cities they dealt with +leniently, they granted exemptions and privileges, conferring upon them +the rights of citizenship, and securing their welfare in every +particular. The others they razed to the ground, and planting colonies +in their room, either removed the inhabitants to Rome, or so scattered +and dispersed them that neither by arms nor by counsels was it ever +again in their power to inflict hurt. For, as I have said already, the +Romans never, in matters of moment, resorted to half-measures. And the +sentence which they then pronounced should be a pattern for all rulers, +and ought to have been followed by the Florentines when, in the year +1502, Arezzo and all the Val di Chiana rose in revolt. For had they +followed it, they would have established their authority on a surer +footing, and added much to the greatness of their city by securing for +it those lands which are needed to supply it with the necessaries of +life. But pursuing that half-hearted policy which is most mischievous +in executing justice, some of the Aretines they outlawed, some they +condemned to death, and all they deprived of their dignities and +ancient importance in their town, while leaving the town itself +untouched. And if in the councils then held any Florentine recommended +that Arezzo should be dismantled, they who thought themselves wiser +than their fellows objected, that to do so would be little to the +honour of our republic, since it would look as though she lacked +strength to hold it. Reasons like this are of a sort which seem sound, +but are not really so; for, by the same rule, no parricide should be +put to death, nor any other malefactor, however atrocious his crimes; +because, forsooth, it would be discreditable to the ruler to appear +unequal to the control of a single criminal. They who hold such +opinions fail to see that when men individually, or entire cities +collectively, offend against the State, the prince for his own safety, +and as a warning to others, has no alternative but to make an end of +them; and that true honour lies in being able and in knowing how to +chastise such offenders, and not in incurring endless dangers in the +effort to retain them. For the prince who does not chastise offenders +in a way that puts it out of their power to offend again, is accounted +unwise or worthless. + +How necessary it was for the Romans to execute Justice against the +Latins, is further seen from the course took with the men of Privernum. +And here the text of Livius suggests two points for our attention: +first, as already noted, that a subjugated people is either to be +caressed or crushed; and second, how much it is for our advantage to +maintain a manly bearing, and to speak the truth fearlessly in the +presence of the wise. For the senate being met to determine the fate of +the citizens of Privernum, who after rebelling had been reduced to +submission by the Roman arms, certain of these citizens were sent by +their countrymen to plead for pardon. When these had come into the +presence of the senate, one of them was asked by a senator, “_What +punishment he thought his fellow citizens deserved?_” To which he of +Privernum answered, “_Such punishment as they deserve who deem +themselves worthy of freedom._” “_But,_” said the consul, “_should we +remit your punishment, what sort of peace can we hope to have with +you?_” To which the other replied, “_If granted on fair terms, a firm +and lasting peace; if on unfair, a peace of brief duration._” Upon +this, though many of the senators were displeased, the wiser among them +declared “_that they had heard the voice of freedom and manhood, and +would never believe that the man or people who so spoke ought to remain +longer than was needful in a position which gave them cause for shame; +since that was a safe peace which was accepted willingly; whereas good +faith could not be looked for where it was sought to impose +servitude._” So saying, they decided that the people of Privernum +should be admitted to Roman citizenship, with all the rights and +privileges thereto appertaining; declaring that “_men whose only +thought was for freedom, were indeed worthy to be Romans._” So pleasing +was this true and high answer to generous minds, while any other must +have seemed at once false and shameful. And they who judge otherwise of +men, and of those men, especially, who have been used to be free, or so +to think themselves, are mistaken; and are led through their mistake to +adopt courses unprofitable for themselves and affording no content to +others. Whence, the frequent rebellions and the downfall of States. + +But, returning to our subject, I conclude, as well from this instance +of Privernum, as from the measures followed with the Latins, that when +we have to pass sentence upon powerful States accustomed to live in +freedom, we must either destroy them utterly, or else treat them with +much indulgence; and that any other course we may take with them will +be unprofitable. But most carefully should we avoid, as of all courses +the most pernicious, such half-measures as were followed by the +Samnites when they had the Romans shut up in the Caudine Forks, and +would not listen to the counsels of the old man who urged them either +to send their captives away with every honourable attention, or else +put them all to death; but adopted a middle course, and after disarming +them and making them pass under the yoke, suffered them to depart at +once disgraced and angered. And no long time after, they found to their +sorrow that the old man’s warning was true, and that the course they +had themselves chosen was calamitous; as shall, hereafter, in its place +be shown. + + + + +CHAPTER XXIV.—_That, commonly, Fortresses do much more Harm than Good_ + + +To the wise men of our day it may seem an oversight on the part of the +Romans, that, when they sought to protect themselves against the men of +Latium and Privernum, it never occurred to them to build strongholds in +their cities to be a curb upon them, and insure their fidelity, +especially when we remember the Florentine saying which these same wise +men often quote, to the effect that Pisa and other like cities must be +held by fortresses Doubtless, had those old Romans been like-minded +with our modern sages, they would not have neglected to build +themselves fortresses, but because they far surpassed them in courage, +sense, and vigour, they refrained. And while Rome retained her freedom, +and adhered to her own wise ordinances and wholesome usages, she never +built a single fortress with the view to hold any city or province, +though, sometimes, she may have suffered those to stand which she found +already built. + +Looking, therefore, to the course followed by the Romans in this +particular, and to that adopted by our modern rulers, it seems proper +to consider whether or not it is advisable to build fortresses, and +whether they are more likely to help or to hurt him who builds them In +the first place, then, we are to remember that fortresses are built +either as a defence against foreign foes or against subjects In the +former case, I pronounce them unnecessary, in the latter mischievous. +And to state the reasons why in the latter case they are mischievous, I +say that when princes or republics are afraid of their subjects and in +fear lest they rebel, this must proceed from knowing that their +subjects hate them, which hatred in its turn results from their own ill +conduct, and that again from their thinking themselves able to rule +their subjects by mere force, or from their governing with little +prudence. Now one of the causes which lead them to suppose that they +can rule by mere force, is this very circumstance of their people +having these fortresses on their backs So that the conduct which breeds +hatred is itself mainly occasioned by these princes or republics being +possessed of fortresses, which, if this be true, are really far more +hurtful than useful First, because, as has been said already, they +render a ruler bolder and more violent in his bearing towards his +subjects, and, next, because they do not in reality afford him that +security which he believes them to give For all those methods of +violence and coercion which may be used to keep a people under, resolve +themselves into two; since either like the Romans you must always have +it in your power to bring a strong army into the field, or else you +must dissipate, destroy, and disunite the subject people, and so divide +and scatter them that they can never again combine to injure you For +should you merely strip them of their wealth, _spoliatis arma +supersunt_, arms still remain to them, or if you deprive them of their +weapons, _furor arma ministrat_, rage will supply them, if you put +their chiefs to death and continue to maltreat the rest, heads will +renew themselves like those Hydra; while, if you build fortresses, +these may serve in time of peace to make you bolder in outraging your +subjects, but in time of war they will prove wholly useless, since they +will be attacked at once by foes both foreign and domestic, whom +together it will be impossible for you to resist. And if ever +fortresses were useless they are so at the present day, by reason of +the invention of artillery, against the fury of which, as I have shown +already, a petty fortress which affords no room for retreat behind +fresh works, cannot be defended. + +But to go deeper into the matter, I say, either you are a prince +seeking by means of these fortresses to hold the people of your city in +check; or you are a prince, or it may be a republic, desirous to +control some city which you have gained in war. To the prince I would +say, that, for the reasons already given, nothing can be more +unserviceable than a fortress as a restraint upon your subjects, since +it only makes you the readier to oppress them, and less scrupulous how +you do so; while it is this very oppression which moves them to destroy +you, and so kindles their hatred, that the fortress, which is the cause +of all the mischief, is powerless to protect you. A wise and good +prince, therefore, that he may continue good, and give no occasion or +encouragement to his descendants to become evil, will never build a +fortress, to the end that neither he nor they may ever be led to trust +to it rather than to the good-will of their subjects. And if Francesco +Sforza, who was accounted a wise ruler, on becoming Duke of Milan +erected a fortress in that city, I say that herein he was unwise, and +that the event has shown the building of this fortress to have been +hurtful and not helpful to his heirs. For thinking that by its aid they +could behave as badly as they liked to their citizens and subjects, and +yet be secure, they refrained from no sort of violence or oppression, +until, becoming beyond measure odious, they lost their State as soon as +an enemy attacked it. Nor was this fortress, which in peace had +occasioned them much hurt, any defence or of any service them in war. +For had they being without it, through thoughtlessness, treated their +subjects inhumanely, they must soon have discovered and withdrawn from +their danger; and might, thereafter, with no other help than that of +attached subjects, have withstood the attacks of the French far more +successfully than they could with their fortress, but with subjects +whom they had estranged. + +And, in truth, fortresses are unserviceable in every way, since they +may be lost either by the treachery of those to whom you commit their +defence, or by the overwhelming strength of an assailant, or else by +famine. And where you seek to recover a State which you have lost, and +in which only the fortress remains to you, if that fortress is to be of +any service or assistance to you, you must have an army wherewith to +attack the enemy who has driven you out. But with such an army you +might succeed in recovering your State as readily without a fortress as +with one; nay, perhaps, even more readily, since your subjects, had you +not used them ill, from the overweening confidence your fortress gave +you, might then have felt better disposed towards you. And the event +shows that in times of adversity this very fortress of Milan has been +of no advantage whatever, either to the Sforzas or to the French; but, +on the contrary, has brought ruin on both, because, trusting to it, +they did not turn their thoughts to nobler methods for preserving that +State. Guido Ubaldo, duke of Urbino and son to Duke Federigo, who in +his day was a warrior of much renown, but who was driven from his +dominions by Cesare Borgia, son to Pope Alexander VI., when afterwards, +by a sudden stroke of good fortune, he was restored to the dukedom +caused all the fortresses of the country to be dismantled, judging them +to be hurtful. For as he was beloved by his subjects, so far as they +were concerned he had no need for fortresses; while, as against foreign +enemies, he saw he could not defend them, since this would have +required an army kept constantly in the field. For which reasons he +made them be razed to the ground. + +When Pope Julius II. had driven the Bentivogli from Bologna, after +erecting a citadel in that town, he caused the people to be cruelly +oppressed by his governor; whereupon, the people rebelled, and he +forthwith lost the citadel; so that his citadel, and the oppressions to +which it led, were of less service to him than different behaviour on +his part had been. When Niccolo da Castello, the ancestor of the +Vitelli, returned to his country out of exile, he straightway pulled +down the two fortresses built there by Pope Sixtus IV., perceiving that +it was not by fortresses, but by the good-will of the people, that he +could be maintained in his government. + +But the most recent, and in all respects most noteworthy instance, and +that which best demonstrates the futility of building, and the +advantage of destroying fortresses, is what happened only the other day +in Genoa. Every one knows how, in 1507, Genoa rose in rebellion against +Louis XII. of France, who came in person and with all his forces to +recover it; and after recovering it built there a citadel stronger than +any before known, being, both from its position and from every other +circumstance, most inaccessible to attack. For standing on the +extremity of a hill, named by the Genoese Codefa, which juts out into +the sea, it commanded the whole harbour and the greater part of the +town. But, afterwards, in the year 1512, when the French were driven +out of Italy, the Genoese, in spite of this citadel, again rebelled, +and Ottaviano Fregoso assuming the government, after the greatest +efforts, continued over a period of sixteen months, at last succeeded +in reducing the citadel by famine. By all it was believed that he would +retain it as a rock of refuge in case of any reverse of fortune, and by +some he was advised to do so; but he, being a truly wise ruler, and +knowing well that it is by the attachment of their subjects and not by +the strength of their fortifications that princes are maintained in +their governments, dismantled this citadel; and founding his authority, +not upon material defences, but on his own valour and prudence, kept +and still keeps it. And whereas, formerly, a force of a thousand +foot-soldiers could effect a change in the government of Genoa, the +enemies of Ottaviano have assailed him with ten thousand, without being +able to harm him. + +Here, then, we see that, while to dismantle this fortress occasioned +Ottaviano no loss, its construction gave the French king no sort of +advantage. For when he could come into Italy with an army, he could +recover Genoa, though he had no citadel there; but when he could not +come with an army, it was not in his power to hold the city by means of +the citadel. Moreover it was costly for the king to build, and shameful +for him to lose this fortress; while for Ottaviano it was glorious to +take, and advantageous to destroy it. + +Let us turn now to those republics which build fortresses not within +their own territories, but in towns whereof they have taken possession. +And if the above example of France and Genoa suffice not to show the +futility of this course, that of Florence and Pisa ought, I think, to +be conclusive. For in erecting fortresses to hold Pisa, the Florentines +failed to perceive that a city which had always been openly hostile to +them, which had lived in freedom, and which could cloak rebellion under +the name of liberty, must, if it were to be retained at all, be +retained by those methods which were used by the Romans, and either be +made a companion or be destroyed. Of how little service these Pisan +fortresses were, was seen on the coming of Charles VIII. of France into +Italy, to whom, whether through the treachery of their defenders or +from fear of worse evils, they were at once delivered up; whereas, had +there been no fortresses in Pisa, the Florentines would not have looked +to them as the means whereby the town was to be held; the king could +not by their assistance have taken the town from the Florentines; and +the methods whereby it had previously been preserved might, in all +likelihood, have continued sufficient to preserve it; and, at any rate, +had served that end no worse than the fortresses. + +These, then, are the conclusions to which I come, namely, that +fortresses built to hold your own country under are hurtful, and that +those built to retain acquired territories are useless; and I am +content to rely on the example of the Romans, who in the towns they +sought to hold by the strong hand, rather pulled down fortresses than +built them. And if any, to controvert these views of mine, were to cite +the case of Tarentum in ancient times, or of Brescia in recent, as +towns which when they rebelled were recovered by means of their +citadels; I answer, that for the recovery of Tarentum, Fabius Maximus +was sent at the end of a year with an army strong enough to retake it +even had there been no fortress there; and that although he availed +himself of the fortress for the recovery of the town, he might, without +it, have resorted to other means which would have brought about the +same result. Nor do I see of what service a citadel can be said to be, +when to recover the city you must employ a consular army under a Fabius +Maximus. But that the Romans would, in any case, have recovered +Tarentum, is plain from what happened at Capua, where there was no +citadel, and which they retook, simply by the valour of their soldiers. + +Again, as regards Brescia, I say that the circumstances attending the +revolt of that town were such as occur but seldom, namely, that the +citadel remaining in your hands after the defection of the city, you +should happen to have a great army nigh at hand, as the French had +theirs on this occasion. For M. de Foix being in command of the king’s +forces at Bologna, on hearing of the loss of Brescia, marched thither +without an hour’s delay, and reaching Brescia in three days, retook the +town with the help of the citadel. But here, again, we see that, to be +of any service, the citadel of Brescia had to be succoured by a de +Foix, and by that French army which in three days’ time marched to its +relief. So that this instance cannot be considered conclusive as +against others of a contrary tendency. For, in the course of recent +wars, many fortresses have been taken and retaken, with the same +variety of fortune with which open country has been acquired or lost; +and this not only in Lombardy, but also in Romagna, in the kingdom of +Naples, and in all parts of Italy. + +And, further, touching the erection of fortresses as a defence against +foreign enemies, I say that such defences are not needed by the prince +or people who possess a good army; while for those who do not possess a +good army, they are useless. For good armies without fortresses are in +themselves a sufficient defence: whereas, fortresses without good +armies avail nothing. And this we see in the case of those nations +which have been thought to excel both in their government and +otherwise, as, for instance, the Romans and the Spartans. For while the +Romans would build no fortresses, the Spartans not merely abstained +from building them, but would not even suffer their cities to be +enclosed with walls; desiring to be protected by their own valour only, +and by no other defence. So that when a Spartan was asked by an +Athenian what he thought of the walls of Athens, he answered “that they +were fine walls if meant to hold women only.” + +If a prince who has a good army has likewise, on the sea-front of his +dominions, some fortress strong enough to keep an enemy in check for a +few days, until he gets his forces together, this, though not +necessary, may sometimes be for his advantage. But for a prince who is +without a strong army to have fortresses erected throughout his +territories, or upon his frontier, is either useless or hurtful, since +they may readily be lost and then turned against him; or, supposing +them so strong that the enemy is unable to take them by assault, he may +leave them behind, and so render them wholly unprofitable. For a brave +army, unless stoutly met, enters an enemy’s country without regard to +the towns or fortified places it leaves in its rear, as we read of +happening in ancient times, and have seen done by Francesco Maria della +Rovere, who no long while ago, when he marched against Urbino, made +little of leaving ten hostile cities behind him. + +The prince, therefore, who can bring together a strong army can do +without building fortresses, while he who has not a strong army ought +not to build them, but should carefully strengthen the city wherein he +dwells, and keep it well stored with supplies, and its inhabitants well +affected, so that he may resist attack till an accord be agreed on, or +he be relieved by foreign aid. All other expedients are costly in time +of peace, and in war useless. + +Whoever carefully weighs all that has now been said will perceive, that +the Romans, as they were most prudent in all their other methods, so +also showed their wisdom in the measures they took with the men of +Latium and Privernum, when, without ever thinking of fortresses, they +sought security in bolder and more sagacious courses. + + + + +CHAPTER XXV.—_That he who attacks a City divided against itself, must +not think to get possession of it through its Divisions._ + + +Violent dissensions breaking out in Rome between the commons and the +nobles, it appeared to the Veientines and Etruscans that now was their +time to deal a fatal blow to the Roman supremacy. Accordingly, they +assembled an army and invaded the territories of Rome. The senate sent +Caius Manlius and Marcus Fabius to meet them, whose forces encamping +close by the Veientines, the latter ceased not to reproach and vilify +the Roman name with every sort of taunt and abuse, and so incensed the +Romans by their unmeasured insolence that, from being divided they +became reconciled, and giving the enemy battle, broke and defeated +them. Here, again, we see, what has already been noted, how prone men +are to adopt wrong courses, and how often they miss their object when +they think to secure it. The Veientines imagined that they could +conquer the Romans by attacking them while they were at feud among +themselves; but this very attack reunited the Romans and brought ruin +on their assailants. For the causes of division in a commonwealth are, +for the most part, ease and tranquillity, while the causes of union are +fear and war. Wherefore, had the Veientines been wise, the more divided +they saw Rome to be, the more should they have sought to avoid war with +her, and endeavoured to gain an advantage over her by peaceful arts. +And the best way to effect this in a divided city lies in gaining the +confidence of both factions, and in mediating between them as arbiter +so long as they do not come to blows; but when they resort to open +violence, then to render some tardy aid to the weaker side, so as to +plunge them deeper in hostilities, wherein both may exhaust their +forces without being led by your putting forth an excess of strength to +suspect you of a desire to ruin them and remain their master. Where +this is well managed, it will almost always happen that you succeed in +effecting the object you propose to yourself. + +The city of Pistoja, as I have said already in connection with another +matter, was won over to the Florentine republic by no other artifice +than this. For the town being split by factions, the Florentines, by +now favouring one side and now the other, without incurring the +suspicions of either, brought both to such extremities that, wearied +out with their harassed life, they threw themselves at last of their +own accord into the arms of Florence. The city of Siena, again, has +never made any change in her government which has had the support of +the Florentines, save when that support has been slight and +insignificant; for whenever the interference of Florence has been +marked and decided, it has had the effect of uniting all parties in +support of things as they stood. + +One other instance I shall add to those already given. Oftener than +once Filippo Visconti, duke of Milan, relying on their divisions, set +wars on foot against the Florentines, and always without success; so +that, in lamenting over these failures, he was wont to complain that +the mad humours of the Florentines had cost him two millions of gold, +without his having anything to show for it. The Veientines and +Etruscans, therefore, as I have said already, were misled by false +hopes, and in the end were routed by the Romans in a single pitched +battle; and any who should look hereafter to prevail on like grounds +and by similar means against a divided people, will always find +themselves deceived. + + + + +CHAPTER XXVI.—_That Taunts and Abuse breed Hatred against him who uses +them, without yielding him any Advantage._ + + +To abstain from threats and injurious language, is, methinks, one of +the wisest precautions a man can use. For abuse and menace take nothing +from the strength of an adversary; the latter only making him more +cautious, while the former inflames his hatred against you, and leads +him to consider more diligently how he may cause you hurt. + +This is seen from the example of the Veientines, of whom I spoke in the +last Chapter, who, to the injury of war against the Romans, added those +verbal injuries from which all prudent commanders should compel their +soldiers to refrain. For these are injuries which stir and kindle your +enemy to vengeance, and yet, as has been said, in no way disable him +from doing you hurt; so that, in truth, they are weapons which wound +those who use them. Of this we find a notable instance in Asia, in +connection with the siege of Amida. For Gabade, the Persian general, +after besieging this town for a great while, wearied out at last by its +protracted defence, determined on withdrawing his army; and had +actually begun to strike his camp, when the whole inhabitants of the +place, elated by their success, came out upon the walls to taunt and +upbraid their enemies with their cowardice and meanness of spirit, and +to load them with every kind of abuse. Stung by these insults, Gabade, +changing his resolution, renewed the siege with such fury that in a few +days he stormed and sacked the town. And the very same thing befell the +Veientines, who, not content, as we have seen, to make war on the +Romans with arms, must needs assail them with foul reproaches, +advancing to the palisade of their camp to revile them, and molesting +them more with their tongues than with their swords, until the Roman +soldiers, who at first were most unwilling to fight, forced the consuls +to lead them to the attack. Whereupon, the Veientines, like those +others of whom mention has just now been made, had to pay the penalty +of their insolence. + +Wise captains of armies, therefore, and prudent governors of cities, +should take all fit precautions to prevent such insults and reproaches +from being used by their soldiers and subjects, either amongst +themselves or against an enemy. For when directed against an enemy they +lead to the mischiefs above noticed, while still worse consequences may +follow from our not preventing them among ourselves by such measures as +sensible rulers have always taken for that purpose. + +The legions who were left behind for the protection of Capua having, as +shall in its place be told, conspired against the Capuans, their +conspiracy led to a mutiny, which was presently suppressed by Valerius +Corvinus; when, as one of the conditions on which the mutineers made +their submission, it was declared that whosoever should thereafter +upbraid any soldier of these legions with having taken part in this +mutiny, should be visited with the severest punishment. So likewise, +when Tiberius Gracchus was appointed, during the war with Hannibal, to +command a body of slaves, whom the Romans in their straits for soldiers +had furnished with arms, one of his first acts was to pass an order +making it death for any to reproach his men with their servile origin. +So mischievous a thing did the Romans esteem it to use insulting words +to others, or to taunt them with their shame. Whether this be done in +sport or earnest, nothing vexes men more, or rouses them to fiercer +indignation; “_for the biting jest which flavours too much of truth, +leaves always behind it a rankling memory._”[9] + + [9] Nam facetiæ asperæ, quando nimium ex vero traxere, acrem sui + memoriam relinquunt. _Tacit. An._ xv. 68. + + + + +CHAPTER XXVII.—_That prudent Princes and Republics should be content to +have obtained a Victory; for, commonly, when they are not, +theft-Victory turns to Defeat._ + + +The use of dishonouring language towards an enemy is mostly caused by +an insolent humour, bred by victory or the false hope of it, whereby +men are oftentimes led not only to speak, but also to act amiss. For +such false hopes, when they gain an entry into men’s minds, cause them +to overrun their goal, and to miss opportunities for securing a certain +good, on the chance of obtaining some thing better, but uncertain. And +this, being a matter that deserves attention, because in deceiving +themselves men often injure their country, I desire to illustrate it by +particular instances, ancient and recent, since mere argument might not +place it in so clear a light. + +After routing the Romans at Cannæ, Hannibal sent messengers to Carthage +to announce his victory, and to ask support. A debate arising in the +Carthaginian senate as to what was to be done, Hanno, an aged and wise +citizen, advised that they should prudently take advantage of their +victory to make peace with the Romans, while as conquerors they might +have it on favourable terms, and not wait to make it after a defeat; +since it should be their object to show the Romans that they were +strong enough to fight them, but not to peril the victory they had won +in the hope of winning a greater. This advice was not followed by the +Carthaginian senate, but its wisdom was well seen later, when the +opportunity to act upon it was gone. + +When the whole East had been overrun by Alexander of Macedon, the +citizens of Tyre (then at the height of its renown, and very strong +from being built, like Venice, in the sea), recognizing his greatness, +sent ambassadors to him to say that they desired to be his good +servants, and to yield him all obedience, yet could not consent to +receive either him or his soldiers within their walls. Whereupon, +Alexander, displeased that a single city should venture to close its +gates against him to whom all the rest of the world had thrown theirs +open, repulsed the Tyrians, and rejecting their overtures set to work +to besiege their town. But as it stood on the water, and was well +stored with victual and all other munitions needed for its defence, +after four months had gone, Alexander, perceiving that he was wasting +more time in an inglorious attempt to reduce this one city than had +sufficed for most of his other conquests, resolved to offer terms to +the Tyrians, and to make them those concessions which they themselves +had asked. But they, puffed up by their success, not merely refused the +terms offered, but put to death the envoy sent to propose them. Enraged +by this, Alexander renewed the siege, and with such vigour, that he +took and destroyed the city, and either slew or made slaves of its +inhabitants. + +In the year 1512, a Spanish army entered the Florentine territory, with +the object of restoring the Medici to Florence, and of levying a +subsidy from the town; having been summoned thither by certain of the +citizens, who had promised them that so soon as they appeared within +the Florentine confines they would arm in their behalf. But when the +Spaniards had come into the plain of the Arno, and none declared in +their favour, being in sore need of supplies, they offered to make +terms. This offer the people of Florence in their pride rejected, and +so gave occasion for the sack of Prato and the overthrow of the +Florentine Republic. + +A prince, therefore, who is attacked by an enemy much more powerful +than himself, can make no greater mistake than to refuse to treat, +especially when overtures are made to him; for however poor the terms +offered may be, they are sure to contain some conditions advantageous +for him who accepts them, and which he may construe as a partial +success. For which reason it ought to have been enough for the citizens +of Tyre that Alexander was brought to accept terms which he had at +first rejected; and they should have esteemed it a sufficient triumph +that, by their resistance in arms, they had forced so great a warrior +to bow to their will. And, in like manner, it should have been a +sufficient victory for the Florentines that the Spaniards had in part +yielded to their wishes, and abated something of their own demands, the +purport of which was to change the government of Florence, to sever her +from her allegiance to France, and, further, to obtain money from her. +For if of these three objects the Spaniards had succeeded in securing +the last two, while the Florentines maintained the integrity of their +government, a fair share of honour and contentment would have fallen to +each. And while preserving their political existence, the Florentines +should have made small account of the other two conditions; nor ought +they, even with the possibility and almost certainty of greater +advantages before them, to have left matters in any degree to the +arbitration of Fortune, by pushing things to extremes, and incurring +risks which no prudent man should incur, unless compelled by necessity. + +Hannibal, when recalled by the Carthaginians from Italy, where for +sixteen years he had covered himself with glory, to the defence of his +native country, found on his arrival that Hasdrubal and Syphax had been +defeated, the kingdom of Numidia lost, and Carthage confined within the +limits of her walls, and left without other resource save in him and +his army. Perceiving, therefore, that this was the last stake his +country had to play, and not choosing to hazard it until he had tried +every other expedient, he felt no shame to sue for peace, judging that +in peace rather than in war lay the best hope of safety for his +country. But, when peace was refused him, no fear of defeat deterred +him from battle, being resolved either to conquer, if conquer he might, +or if he must fall, to fall gloriously. Now, if a commander so valiant +as Hannibal, at the head of an unconquered army, was willing to sue for +peace rather than appeal to battle when he saw that by defeat his +country must be enslaved, what course ought to be followed by another +commander, less valiant and with less experience than he? But men +labour under this infirmity, that they know not where to set bounds to +their hopes, and building on these without otherwise measuring their +strength, rush headlong on destruction. + + + + +CHAPTER XXVIII.—_That to neglect the redress of Grievances, whether +public or private, is dangerous for a Prince or Commonwealth_. + + +Certain Gauls coming to attack Etruria, and more particularly Clusium +its chief city, the citizens of Clusium sought aid from Rome; whereupon +the Romans sent the three Fabii, as envoys to these Gauls, to notify to +them, in the name of the Roman people, that they must refrain from +making war on the Etruscans. From what befell the Romans in connection +with this embassy, we see clearly how far men may be carried in +resenting an affront. For these envoys arriving at the very moment when +the Gauls and Etruscans were about to join battle, being readier at +deeds than words, took part with the Etruscans and fought in their +foremost ranks. Whence it came that the Gauls recognizing the Roman +envoys, turned against the Romans all the hatred which before they had +felt for the Etruscans; and grew still more incensed when on making +complaint to the Roman senate, through their ambassador, of the wrong +done them, and demanding that the Fabii should be given up to them in +atonement for their offence, not merely were the offenders not given up +or punished in any way, but, on the contrary, when the comitia met were +created tribunes with consular powers. But when the Gauls found these +men honoured who deserved to be chastised, they concluded that what had +happened had been done by way of slight and insult to them, and, +burning with fury and resentment, hastened forward to attack Rome, +which they took with the exception of the Capitol. + +Now this disaster overtook the Romans entirely from their disregard of +justice. For their envoys, who had violated the law of nations, and had +therefore deserved punishment, they had on the contrary treated with +honour. And this should make us reflect, how carefully all princes and +commonwealths ought to refrain from committing like wrongs, not only +against communities, but also against particular men. For if a man be +deeply wronged, either by a private hand or by a public officer, and be +not avenged to his satisfaction, if he live in a republic, he will seek +to avenge himself, though in doing so he bring ruin on his country; or +if he live under a prince, and be of a resolute and haughty spirit, he +will never rest until he has wreaked his resentment against the prince, +though he knows it may cost him dear. Whereof we have no finer or truer +example than in the death of Philip of Macedon, the father of +Alexander. For Pausanias, a handsome and high-born youth belonging to +Philip’s court, having been most foully and cruelly dishonoured by +Attalus, one of the foremost men of the royal household, repeatedly +complained to Philip of the outrage; who for a while put him off with +promises of vengeance, but in the end, so far from avenging him, +promoted Attalus to be governor of the province of Greece. Whereupon, +Pausanias, seeing his enemy honoured and not punished, turned all his +resentment from him who had outraged, against him who had not avenged +him, and on the morning of the day fixed for the marriage of Philip’s +daughter to Alexander of Epirus, while Philip walked between the two +Alexanders, his son and his son-in-law, towards the temple to celebrate +the nuptials, he slew him. + +This instance nearly resembles that of the Roman envoys; and offers a +warning to all rulers never to think so lightly of any man as to +suppose, that when wrong upon wrong has been done him, he will not +bethink himself of revenge, however great the danger he runs, or the +punishment he thereby brings upon himself. + + + + +CHAPTER XXIX.—_That Fortune obscures the minds of Men when she would +not have them hinder her Designs._ + + +If we note well the course of human affairs, we shall often find things +come about and accidents befall, against which it seems to be the will +of Heaven that men should not provide. And if this were the case even +in Rome, so renowned for her valour, religion, and wise ordinances, we +need not wonder if it be far more common in other cities and provinces +wherein these safeguards are wanting. + +Having here a notable opportunity to show how Heaven influences men’s +actions, Titus Livius turns it to account, and treats the subject at +large and in pregnant words, where he says, that since it was Heaven’s +will, for ends of its own, that the Romans should feel its power, it +first of all caused these Fabii, who were sent as envoys to the Gauls, +to act amiss, and then by their misconduct stirred up the Gauls to make +war on Rome; and, lastly, so ordered matters that nothing worthy of +their name was done by the Romans to withstand their attack. For it was +fore-ordained by Heaven that Camillus, who alone could supply the +remedy to so mighty an evil, should be banished to Ardea; and again, +that the citizens, who had often created a dictator to meet attacks of +the Volscians and other neighbouring hostile nations, should fail to do +so when the Gauls were marching upon Rome. Moreover, the army which the +Romans got together was but a weak one, since they used no signal +effort to make it strong; nay, were so dilatory in arming that they +were barely in time to meet the enemy at the river Allia, though no +more than ten miles distant from Rome. Here, again, the Roman tribunes +pitched their camp without observing any of the usual precautions, +attending neither to the choice of ground, nor to surround themselves +with trench or Palisade, nor to avail themselves of any other aid, +human or Divine. In ordering their army for battle, moreover, disposed +it in weak columns, and these far apart: so that neither men nor +officers accomplished anything worthy of the Roman discipline. The +battle was bloodless for the Romans fled before they were attacked; +most of them retreating to Veii, the rest to Rome, where, without +turning aside to visit their homes, they made straight for the Capitol. + +Meanwhile, the senate, so far from bethinking themselves how they might +defend the city, did not even attend to closing the gates; and while +some of them made their escape from Rome, others entered the Capitol +along with those who sought shelter there. It was only in the defence +of the Capitol that any method was observed, measures being taken to +prevent it being crowded with useless numbers, and all the victual +which could be got, being brought into it to enable it to stand a +siege. Of the women, the children, and the men whose years unfitted +them for service, the most part fled for refuge to the neighbouring +towns, the rest remained in Rome a prey to the invaders; so that no one +who had heard of the achievements of the Romans in past years, on being +told of what took place on this occasion, could have believed that it +was of the same people that things so contrary were related. + +Wherefore, Titus Livius, after setting forth all these disorders, +concludes with the words, “_So far does Fortune darken men’s minds when +she would not have her ascendency gainsaid._” Nor could any juster +observation be made. And hence it is that those who experience the +extremes whether of good or of evil fortune, are, commonly, little +deserving either of praise or blame; since it is apparent that it is +from Heaven having afforded them, or denied them opportunities for +acting worthily, that they have been brought to their greatness or to +their undoing. Fortune, doubtless, when she seeks to effect great ends, +will often choose as her instrument a man of such sense and worth that +he can recognize the opportunities which she holds out to him; and, in +like manner, when she desires to bring about great calamities, will put +forward such men as will of themselves contribute to that result. And +all who stand in her way, she either removes by death, or deprives of +the means of effecting good. And it is well seen in the passage we are +considering, how Fortune, to aggrandize Rome, and raise her to the +height she reached, judged it necessary, as shall be more fully shown +in the following Book, to humble her; yet would not have her utterly +undone. For which reason we find her causing Camillus to be banished, +but not put to death; suffering Rome to be taken, but not the Capitol; +and bringing it to pass that, while the Romans took no wise precaution +for the defence of their city, they neglected none in defending their +citadel. That Rome might be taken, Fortune caused the mass of the army, +after the rout at the Allia, to direct its flight to Veii, thus +withdrawing the means wherewith the city might have been defended; but +while thus disposing matters, she at the same time prepared all the +needful steps for its recovery, in bringing an almost entire Roman +array to Veii, and Camillus to Ardea, so that a great force might be +assembled for the rescue of their country, under a captain in no way +compromised by previous reverses, but, on the contrary, in the +enjoyment of an untarnished renown. I might cite many modern instances +to confirm these opinions, but since enough has been said to convince +any fair mind, I pass them over. But once more I repeat what, from all +history, may be seen to be most true, that men may aid Fortune, but not +withstand her; may interweave their threads with her web, but cannot +break it But, for all that, they must never lose heart, since not +knowing what their end is to be, and moving towards it by cross-roads +and untravelled paths, they have always room for hope, and ought never +to abandon it, whatsoever befalls, and into whatsoever straits they +come. + + + + +CHAPTER XXX.—_That really powerful Princes and, Commonwealths do not +buy Friendships with Money, but with their Valour and the Fame of their +Prowess_. + + +When besieged in the Capitol, the Romans although expecting succour +from Veii and from Camillus, nevertheless, being straitened by famine, +entered into an agreement to buy off the Gauls with gold But at the +very moment when, in pursuance of this agreement, the gold was being +weighed out, Camillus came up with his army. This, says our historian, +was contrived by Fortune, “_that the Romans might not live thereafter +as men ransomed for a price,_” and the matter is noteworthy, not only +with reference to this particular occasion, but also as it bears on the +methods generally followed by this republic. For we never find Rome +seeking to acquire towns, or to purchase peace with money, but always +confiding in her own warlike valour, which could not, I believe, be +said of any other republic. + +Now, one of the tests whereby to gauge the strength of any State, is to +observe on what terms it lives with its neighbours: for when it so +carries itself that, to secure its friendship, its neighbours pay it +tribute, this is a sure sign of its strength, but when its neighbours, +though of less reputation, receive payments from it, this is a clear +proof of its weakness In the course of the Roman history we read how +the Massilians, the Eduans, the Rhodians, Hiero of Syracuse, the Kings +Eumenes and Massinissa, all of them neighbours to the Roman frontiers, +in order to secure the friendship of Rome, submitted to imposts and +tribute whenever Rome had need of them, asking no return save her +protection. But with a weak State we find the reverse of all this +happening And, to begin with our own republic of Florence, we know that +in times past, when she was at the height of her renown, there was +never a lordling of Romagna who had not a subsidy from her, to say +nothing of what she paid to the Perugians, to the Castellans, and to +all her other neighbours But had our city been armed and strong, the +direct contrary would have been the case, for, to obtain her +protection, all would have poured money into her lap, not seeking to +sell their friendship but to purchase hers. + +Nor are the Florentines the only people who have lived on this +dishonourable footing The Venetians have done the same, nay, the King +of France himself, for all his great dominions, lives tributary to the +Swiss and to the King of England; and this because the French king and +the others named, with a view to escape dangers rather imaginary than +real, have disarmed their subjects; seeking to reap a present gain by +wringing money from them, rather than follow a course which would +secure their own safety and the lasting welfare of their country. Which +ill-practices of theirs, though they quiet things for a time, must in +the end exhaust their resources, and give rise in seasons of danger to +incurable mischief and disorder. It would be tedious to count up how +often in the course of their wars, the Florentines, the Venetians, and +the kingdom of France have had to ransom themselves from their enemies, +and to submit to an ignominy to which, once only, the Romans were very +near being subjected. It would be tedious, too, to recite how many +towns have been bought by the Florentines and by the Venetians, which, +afterwards, have only been a trouble to them, from their not knowing +how to defend with iron what they had won with gold. While the Romans +continued free they adhered to this more generous and noble method, but +when they came under the emperors, and these, again, began to +deteriorate, and to love the shade rather than the sunshine, they also +took to purchasing peace, now from the Parthians, now from the Germans, +and at other times from other neighbouring nations. And this was the +beginning of the decline of their great empire. + +Such are the evils that befall when you withhold arms from your +subjects; and this course is attended by the still greater +disadvantage, that the closer an enemy presses you the weaker he finds +you. For any one who follows the evil methods of which I speak, must, +in order to support troops whom he thinks can be trusted to keep off +his enemies, be very exacting in his dealings with those of his +subjects who dwell in the heart of his dominions; since, to widen the +interval between himself and his enemies, he must subsidize those +princes and peoples who adjoin his frontiers. States maintained on this +footing may make a little resistance on their confines; but when these +are passed by the enemy no further defence remains. Those who pursue +such methods as these seem not to perceive that they are opposed to +reason and common sense. For the heart and vital parts of the body, not +the extremities, are those which we should keep guarded, since we may +live on without the latter, but must die if the former be hurt. But the +States of which I speak, leaving the heart undefended, defend only the +hands and feet. The mischief which has thus been, and is at this day +wrought in Florence is plain enough to see. For so soon as an enemy +penetrates within her frontiers, and approaches her heart, all is over +with her. And the same was witnessed a few years ago in the case of the +Venetians, whose city, had it not been girdled by the sea, must then +have found its end. In France, indeed, a like result has not been seen +so often, she being so great a kingdom as to have few enemies mightier +than herself. Nevertheless, when the English invaded France in the year +1513, the whole kingdom tottered; and the King himself, as well as +every one else, had to own that a single defeat might have cost him his +dominions. + +But with the Romans the reverse of all this took place. For the nearer +an enemy approached Rome, the more completely he found her armed for +resistance; and accordingly we see that on the occasion of Hannibal’s +invasion of Italy, the Romans, after three defeats, and after the +slaughter of so many of their captains and soldiers, were still able, +not merely to withstand the invader, but even, in the end, to come off +victorious. This we may ascribe to the heart being well guarded, while +the extremities were but little heeded. For the strength of Rome rested +on the Roman people themselves, on the Latin league, on the confederate +towns of Italy, and on her colonies, from all of which sources she drew +so numerous an army, as enabled her to subdue the whole world and to +keep it in subjection. + +The truth of what I say may be further seen from the question put by +Hanno the Carthaginian to the messengers sent to Carthage by Hannibal +after his victory at Cannæ. For when these were vaunting the +achievements of Hannibal, they were asked by Hanno whether any one had +come forward on behalf of the Romans to propose terms of peace, and +whether any town of the Latin league or of the colonized districts had +revolted from the Romans. And when to both inquiries the envoys +answered, “No,” Hanno observed that the war was no nearer an end than +on the day it was begun. + +We can understand, therefore, as well from what has now been said, as +from what I have often said before, how great a difference there is +between the methods followed by the republics of the present times, and +those followed by the republics of antiquity; and why it is that we see +every day astounding losses alternate with extraordinary gains. For +where men are weak, Fortune shows herself strong; and because she +changes, States and Governments change with her; and will continue to +change, until some one arise, who, following reverently the example of +the ancients, shall so control her, that she shall not have opportunity +with every revolution of the sun to display anew the greatness of her +power. + + + + +CHAPTER XXXI.—_Of the Danger of trusting banished Men._ + + +The danger of trusting those who are in exile from their own country, +being one to which the rulers of States are often exposed, may, I +think, be fitly considered in these Discourses; and I notice it the +more willingly, because I am able to illustrate it by a memorable +instance which Titus Livius, though with another purpose, relates in +his history. When Alexander the Great passed with his army into Asia, +his brother-in-law and uncle, Alexander of Epirus, came with another +army into Italy, being invited thither by the banished Lucanians, who +gave him to believe that, with their aid, he might get possession of +the whole of that country. But when, confiding in the promises of these +exiles, and fed by the hopes they held out to him, he came into Italy, +they put him to death, their fellow-citizens having offered to restore +them to their country upon this condition. It behoves us, therefore, to +remember how empty are the promises, and how doubtful the faith, of men +in banishment from their native land. For as to their faith, it may be +assumed that whenever they can effect their return by other means than +yours, notwithstanding any covenants they may have made with you, they +will throw you over, and take part with their countrymen. And as for +the empty promises and delusive hopes which they set before you, so +extreme is their desire to return home that they naturally believe many +things which are untrue, and designedly misrepresent many others; so +that between their beliefs and what they say they believe, they fill +you with false impressions, on which if you build, your labour is in +vain, and you are led to engage in enterprises from which nothing but +ruin can result. + +To this instance of Alexander I shall add only one other, that, namely, +of Themistocles the Athenian, who, being proclaimed a traitor, fled +into Asia to Darius, to whom he made such lavish promises if he would +only attack Greece, that he induced him to undertake the enterprise. +But afterwards, when he could not fulfil what he had promised, either +from shame, or through fear of punishment, he poisoned himself. But, if +such a mistake as this was made by a man like Themistocles, we may +reckon that mistakes still greater will be made by those who, being of +a feebler nature, suffer themselves to be more completely swayed by +their feelings and wishes Wherefore, let a prince be careful how he +embarks in any enterprise on the representations of an exile; for +otherwise, he is likely either to be put to shame, or to incur the +gravest calamities. + +Because towns are sometimes, though seldom, taken by craft, through +secret practices had with their inhabitants, I think it not out of +place to discuss the matter in the following Chapter, wherein I shall +likewise show in how many ways the Romans were wont to make such +acquisitions. + + + + +CHAPTER XXXII.—_In how many Ways the Romans gained Possession of +Towns._ + + +Turning their thoughts wholly to arms, the Romans always conducted +their military enterprises in the most advantageous way, both as to +cost and every other circumstance of war. For which reason they avoided +attempting towns by siege, judging the expense and inconvenience of +this method of carrying on war greatly to outweigh any advantage to be +gained by it. Accordingly, they thought it better and more for their +interest to reduce towns in any other way than this; and in all those +years during which they were constantly engaged in wars we find very +few instances of their proceeding by siege. + +For the capture of towns, therefore, they trusted either to assault or +to surrender. Assaults were effected either by open force, or by force +and stratagem combined. When a town was assailed by open force, the +walls were stormed without being breached, and the assailants were said +“_aggredi urbem corona,_” because they encircled the city with their +entire strength and kept up an attack on all sides. In this way they +often succeeded in carrying towns, and even great towns, at a first +onset, as when Scipio took new Carthage in Spain. But when they failed +to carry a town by storm, they set themselves to breach the walls with +battering rams and other warlike engines; or they dug mines so as to +obtain an entrance within the walls, this being the method followed in +taking Veii; or else, to be on a level with the defenders, they erected +towers of timber or threw up mounds of earth against the outside of the +walls so as to reach the top. + +Of these methods of attack, the first, wherein the city was entirely +surrounded, exposed the defenders to more sudden perils and left them +more doubtful remedies. For while it was necessary for them to have a +sufficient force at all points, it might happen that the forces at +their disposal were not numerous enough to be everywhere at once, or to +relieve one another. Or if their numbers were sufficient, they might +not all be equally resolute in standing their ground, and their failure +at any one point involved a general defeat. Consequently, as I have +said, this method of attack was often successful. But when it did not +succeed at the first, it was rarely renewed, being a method dangerous +to the attacking army, which having to secure itself along an extended +line, was left everywhere too weak to resist a sally made from the +town; nay, of itself, was apt to fall into confusion and disorder. This +method of attack, therefore, could be attempted once only and by way of +surprise. + +Against breaches in the walls the defence was, as at the present day, +to throw up new works; while mines were met by counter-mines, in which +the enemy were either withstood at the point of the sword, or baffled +by some other warlike contrivance; as by filling casks with feathers, +which, being set on fire and placed in the mine, choked out the +assailants by their smoke and stench. Where towers were employed for +the attack, the defenders sought to destroy them with fire; and where +mounds of earth were thrown up against the walls, they would dig holes +at the base of the wall against which the mound rested, and carry off +the earth which the enemy were heaping up; which, being removed from +within as fast as it was thrown up from without, the mound made no +progress. + +None of these methods of attack can long be persisted in and the +assailant, if unsuccessful, must either strike his camp and seek +victory in some other direction, as Scipio did when he invaded Africa +and, after failing in the attempt to storm Utica, withdrew from his +attack on that town and turned his strength against the Carthaginian +army in the field; or else recourse must be had to regular siege, as by +the Romans at Veii, Capua, Carthage, Jerusalem, and divers other cities +which they reduced in this way. + +The capture of towns by stratagem combined with force is effected, as +by the Romans at Palæopolis, through a secret understanding with some +within the walls. Many attempts of this sort have been made, both by +the Romans and by others, but few successfully, because the least +hindrance disarranges the plan of action, and because such hindrances +are very likely to occur. For either the plot is discovered before it +can be carried out, as it readily may, whether from treachery on the +part of those to whom it has been communicated, or from the +difficulties which attend its inception, the preliminary arrangements +having to be made with the enemy and with persons with whom it is not +permitted, save under some pretext or other, to hold intercourse; or if +it be not discovered while it is being contrived, a thousand +difficulties will still be met with in its execution. For if you arrive +either before or after the appointed time, all is ruined. The faintest +sound, as of the cackling of the geese in the Capitol, the least +departure from some ordinary routine, the most trifling mistake or +error, mars the whole enterprise. Add to which, the darkness of night +lends further terror to the perils of such undertakings; while the +great majority of those engaged in them, having no knowledge of the +district or places into which they are brought, are bewildered and +disconcerted by the least mishap, and put to flight by every imaginary +danger. In secret nocturnal enterprises of this sort, no man was ever +more successful than Aratus of Sicyon, although in any encounter by day +there never was a more arrant coward. This we must suppose due rather +to some special and occult quality inherent in the man, than to success +being naturally to be looked for in the like attempts. Such +enterprises, accordingly, are often planned, but few are put into +execution, and fewer still with success. + +When cities are acquired by surrender, the surrender is either +voluntary or under compulsion; voluntary, when the citizens appeal to +you for protection against some threatened danger from without, as +Capua submitted to the Romans; or where they are moved by a desire to +be better governed, and are attracted by the good government which he +to whom they surrender is seen exercising over others who have placed +themselves in his hands; as was the case with the Rhodians, the +Massilians, and others who for like causes gave themselves up to the +Roman people. Compulsory surrenders take place, either as the result of +a protracted siege, like those we have spoken of above; or from the +country being continually wasted by incursions, forays, and similar +severities, to escape which a city makes its submission. + +Of the methods which have been noticed, the Romans, in preference to +all others, used this last; and for four hundred and fifty years made +it their aim to wear out their neighbours by invasion and by defeat in +the open field, while endeavouring, as I have elsewhere said, to +establish their influence over them by treaties and conventions. It was +to this method of warfare therefore that they always mainly trusted, +because, after trying all others, they found none so free from +inconvenience and disadvantage—the procedure by siege involving expense +and delay, that by assault, difficulty and danger, and that by secret +practice, uncertainty and doubt. They found, likewise, that while in +subduing one obstinate city by siege many years might be wasted, a +kingdom might be gained in a single day by the defeat of a hostile army +in the field. + + + + +CHAPTER XXXIII.—_That the Romans intrusted the Captains of their Armies +with the fullest Powers._ + + +In reading this History of Titus Livius with a view to profit by it, I +think that all the methods of conduct followed by the Roman people and +senate merit attention. And among other things fit to be considered, it +should be noted, with how ample an authority they sent forth their +consuls, their dictators, and the other captains of their armies, all +of whom we find clothed with the fullest powers: no other prerogative +being reserved to itself by the senate save that of declaring war and +making peace, while everything else was left to the discretion and +determination of the consul. For so soon as the people and senate had +resolved on war, for instance on a war against the Latins, they threw +all further responsibility upon the consul, who might fight or decline +battle as he pleased, and attack this or the other city as he thought +fit. + +That this was so, is seen in many instances, and especially from what +happened during an expedition made against the Etruscans. For the +consul Fabius having routed that people near Sutrium, and thinking to +pass onward through the Ciminian forest into Etruria, so far from +seeking the advice of the senate, gave them no hint whatever of his +design, although for its execution the war had to be carried into a +new, difficult, and dangerous country. We have further witness to the +same effect, in the action taken in respect of this enterprise by the +senate, who being informed of the victory obtained by Fabius, and +apprehending that he might decide to pass onward through the aforesaid +forest, and deeming it inexpedient that he should incur risk by +attempting this invasion, sent two messengers to warn him not to enter +Etruria. These messengers, however, did not come up with the consul +until he had already made his way into that country and gained a second +victory; when, instead of opposing his further advance, they returned +to Rome to announce his good fortune and the glory which he had won. + +Whoever, therefore, shall well consider the character of the authority +whereof I speak, will see that it was most wisely accorded; since had +it been the wish of the senate that a consul, in conducting a war, +should proceed step by step as they might direct him, this must have +made him at once less cautious and more dilatory; because the credit of +victory would not then have seemed to be wholly his own, but shared by +the senate on whose advice he acted. Besides which, the senate must +have taken upon itself the task of advising on matters which it could +not possibly understand; for although it might contain among its +members all who were most versed in military affairs, still, since +these men were not on the spot, and were ignorant of many particulars +which, if they were to give sound advice, it was necessary for them to +know, they must in advising have made numberless mistakes. For these +reasons they desired that the consul should act on his own +responsibility, and that the honours of success should be wholly his; +judging that the love of fame would act on him at once as a spur and as +a curb, making him do whatever he had to do well. + +This matter I have the rather dwelt upon because I observe that our +modern republics, such as the Venetian and the Florentine, view it in a +different light; so that when their captains, commissaries, or +_provedditori_ have a single gun to place in position, the authorities +at home must be informed and consulted; a course deserving the same +approval as is due to all those other methods of theirs, which, one +with another, have brought Italy to her present condition. + + + + +BOOK III. + + + + +CHAPTER I.—_For a Sect or Commonwealth to last long, it must often be +brought back to its Beginnings._ + + +Doubtless, all the things of this world have a limit set to their +duration; yet those of them the bodies whereof have not been suffered +to grow disordered, but have been so cared for that either no change at +all has been wrought in them, or, if any, a change for the better and +not for the worse, will run that course which Heaven has in a general +way appointed them. And since I am now speaking of mixed bodies, for +States and Sects are so to be regarded, I say that for them these are +wholesome changes which bring them back to their first beginnings. + +Those States consequently stand surest and endure longest which, either +by the operation of their institutions can renew themselves, or come to +be renewed by accident apart from any design. Nothing, however, can be +clearer than that unless thus renewed these bodies do not last. Now the +way to renew them is, as I have said, to bring them back to their +beginnings, since all beginnings of sects, commonwealths, or kingdoms +must needs have in them a certain excellence, by virtue of which they +gain their first reputation and make their first growth. But because in +progress of time this excellence becomes corrupted, unless something be +done to restore it to what it was at first, these bodies necessarily +decay; for as the physicians tell us in speaking of the human body, +“_Something or other is daily added which sooner or later will require +treatment._”[10] + + [10] “Quod quotidie aggregatur aliquid quod quandoque indiget + curatione.” + + +As regards commonwealths, this return to the point of departure is +brought about either by extrinsic accident or by intrinsic foresight. +As to the first, we have seen how it was necessary that Rome should be +taken by the Gauls, that being thus in a manner reborn, she might +recover life and vigour, and resume the observances of religion and +justice which she had suffered to grow rusted by neglect. This is well +seen from those passages of Livius wherein he tells us that when the +Roman army was ‘sent forth against the Gauls, and again when tribunes +were created with consular authority, no religious rites whatever were +celebrated, and wherein he further relates how the Romans not only +failed to punish the three Fabii, who contrary to the law of nations +had fought against the Gauls, but even clothed them with honour. For, +from these instances, we may well infer that the rest of the wise +ordinances instituted by Romulus, and the other prudent kings, had +begun to be held of less account than they deserved, and less than was +essential for the maintenance of good government. + +And therefore it was that Rome was visited by this calamity from +without, to the end that all her ordinances might be reformed, and the +people taught that it behoved them not only to maintain religion and +justice, but also to esteem their worthy citizens, and to prize their +virtues beyond any advantages of which they themselves might seem to +have been deprived at their instance. And this, we find, was just the +effect produced. For no sooner was the city retaken, than all the +ordinances of the old religion were at once restored; the Fabii, who +had fought in violation of the law of nations, were punished; and the +worth and excellence of Camillus so fully recognized, that the senate +and the whole people, laying all jealousies aside, once more committed +to him the entire charge of public affairs. + +It is necessary then, as I have said already, that where men dwell +together in a regulated society, they be often reminded of those +ordinances in conformity with which they ought to live, either by +something inherent in these, or else by some external accident. A +reminder is given in the former of these two ways, either by the +passing of some law whereby the members of the society are brought to +an account; or else by some man of rare worth arising among them, whose +virtuous life and example have the same effect as a law. In a +Commonwealth, accordingly, this end is served either by the virtues of +some one of its citizens, or by the operation of its institutions. + +The institutions whereby the Roman Commonwealth was led back to its +starting point, were the tribuneship of the people and the censorship, +together with all those laws which were passed to check the insolence +and ambition of its citizens. Such institutions, however, require fresh +life to be infused into them by the worth of some one man who +fearlessly devotes himself to give them effect in opposition to the +power of those who set them at defiance. + +Of the laws being thus reinforced in Rome, before its capture by the +Gauls, we have notable examples in the deaths of the sons of Brutus, of +the Decemvirs, and of Manlius Frumentarius; and after its capture, in +the deaths of Manlius Capitolinus, and of the son of Manlius Torquatus +in the prosecution of his master of the knights by Papirius Cursor, and +in the impeachment of the Scipios. Such examples as these, being signal +and extraordinary, had the effect, whenever they took place, of +bringing men back to the true standard of right; but when they came to +be of rarer occurrence, they left men more leisure to grow corrupted, +and were attended by greater danger and disturbance. Wherefore, between +one and another of these vindications of the laws, no more than ten +years, at most, ought to intervene; because after that time men begin +to change their manners and to disregard the laws; and if nothing occur +to recall the idea of punishment, and unless fear resume its hold on +their minds, so many offenders suddenly spring up together that it is +impossible to punish them without danger. And to this purport it used +to be said by those who ruled Florence from the year 1434 to 1494, that +their government could hardly be maintained unless it was renewed every +five years; by which they meant that it was necessary for them to +arouse the same terror and alarm in men’s minds, as they inspired when +they first assumed the government, and when all who offended against +their authority were signally chastised. For when the recollection of +such chastisement has died out, men are emboldened to engage in new +designs, and to speak ill of their rulers; for which the only remedy is +to restore things to what they were at first. + +A republic may, likewise, be brought back to its original form, without +recourse to ordinances for enforcing justice, by the mere virtues of a +single citizen, by reason that these virtues are of such influence and +authority that good men love to imitate them, and bad men are ashamed +to depart from them. Those to whom Rome owed most for services of this +sort, were Horatius Cocles, Mutius Scævola, the two Decii, Atilius +Regulus, and divers others, whose rare excellence and generous example +wrought for their city almost the same results as might have been +effected by ordinances and laws. And if to these instances of +individual worth had been added, every ten years, some signal +enforcement of justice, it would have been impossible for Rome ever to +have grown corrupted. But when both of these incitements to virtuous +behavior began to recur less frequently, corruption spread, and after +the time of Atilius Regulus, no like example was again witnessed. For +though the two Catos came later, so great an interval had elapsed +before the elder Cato appeared, and again, so long a period intervened +between him and the younger, and these two, moreover, stood so much +alone, that it was impossible for them, by their influence, to work any +important change; more especially for the younger, who found Rome so +much corrupted that he could do nothing to improve his fellow-citizens. + +This is enough to say concerning commonwealths, but as regards sects, +we see from the instance of our own religion that here too a like +renewal is needed. For had not this religion of ours been brought back +to its original condition by Saint Francis and Saint Dominick, it must +soon have been utterly extinguished. They, however, by their voluntary +poverty, and by their imitation of the life of Christ, rekindled in the +minds of men the dying flame of faith; and by the efficacious rules +which they established averted from our Church that ruin which the ill +lives of its prelates and heads must otherwise have brought upon it. +For living in poverty, and gaining great authority with the people by +confessing them and preaching to them, they got them to believe that it +is evil to speak ill even of what is evil; and that it is good to be +obedient to rulers, who, if they do amiss, may be left to the judgment +of God. By which teaching these rulers are encouraged to behave as +badly as they can, having no fear of punishments which they neither see +nor credit. Nevertheless, it is this renewal which has maintained, and +still maintains, our religion. + +Kingdoms also stand in need of a like renewal, and to have their laws +restored to their former force; and we see how, by attending to this, +the kingdom of France has profited. For that kingdom, more than any +other, lies under the control of its laws and ordinances, which are +maintained by its parliaments, and more especially by the parliament of +Paris, from which last they derive fresh vigour whenever they have to +be enforced against any prince of the realm; for this assembly +pronounces sentence even against the king himself. Heretofore this +parliament has maintained its name as the fearless champion of the laws +against the nobles of the land; but should it ever at any future time +suffer wrongs to pass unpunished, and should offences multiply, either +these will have to be corrected with great disturbance to the State, or +the kingdom itself must fall to pieces. + +This, then, is our conclusion—that nothing is so necessary in any +society, be it a religious sect, a kingdom, or a commonwealth, as to +restore to it that reputation which it had at first, and to see that it +is provided either with wholesome laws, or with good men whose actions +may effect the same ends, without need to resort to external force. For +although this last may sometimes, as in the case of Rome, afford an +efficacious remedy, it is too hazardous a remedy to make us ever wish +to employ it. + +And that all may understand how much the actions of particular citizens +helped to make Rome great, and how many admirable results they wrought +in that city, I shall now proceed to set them forth and examine them; +with which survey this Third Book of mine, and last division of the +First Decade of Titus Livius, shall be brought to a close. But, +although great and notable actions were done by the Roman kings, +nevertheless, since history has treated of these at much length, here I +shall pass them over, and say no more about these princes, save as +regards certain things done by them with an eye to their private +interest. I shall begin, therefore, with Brutus, the father of Roman +freedom. + + + + +CHAPTER II.—_That on occasion it is wise to feign Folly._ + + +Never did any man by the most splendid achievements gain for himself so +great a name for wisdom and prudence as is justly due to Junius Brutus +for feigning to be a fool. And although Titus Livius mentions one cause +only as having led him to assume this part, namely, that he might live +more securely and look after his patrimony; yet on considering his +behavior we may believe that in counterfeiting folly it was also his +object to escape notice, and so find better convenience to overthrow +the kings, and to free his country whenever an occasion offered. That +this was in his mind is seen first of all from the interpretation he +gave to the oracle of Apollo, when, to render the gods favourable to +his designs, he pretended to stumble, and secretly kissed his mother +earth; and, again, from this, that on the death of Lucretia, though her +father, her husband, and others of her kinsmen were present, he was the +first to draw the dagger from her wound, and bind the bystanders by +oath never more to suffer king to reign in Rome. + +From his example all who are discontented with their prince are taught, +first of all, to measure, and to weigh their strength, and if they find +themselves strong enough to disclose their hostility and proclaim open +war, then to take that course as at once the nobler and less dangerous; +but, if too weak to make open war, then sedulously to court the favour +of the prince, using to that end all such methods as they may judge +needful, adapting themselves to his pleasures, and showing delight in +whatever they see him delight in. Such an intimacy, in the first place, +enables you to live securely, and permits you, without incurring any +risk, to share the happy fortunes of the prince, while it affords you +every facility for carrying out your plans. Some, no doubt, will tell +you that you should not stand so near the prince as to be involved in +his downfall; nor yet at such a distance that when he falls you shall +be too far off to use the occasion for rising on his ruin. But although +this mean course, could we only follow it, were certainly the best, +yet, since I believe it to be impracticable, we must resort to the +methods above indicated, and either keep altogether aloof, or else +cleave closely to the prince. Whosoever does otherwise, if he be of +great station, lives in constant peril; nor will it avail him to say, +“I concern myself with nothing; I covet neither honours nor preferment; +my sole wish is to live a quiet and peaceful life.” For such excuses, +though they be listened to, are not accepted; nor can any man of great +position, however much and sincerely he desire it, elect to live this +life of tranquillity since his professions will not be believed; so +that although he might be contented to be let alone, others will not +suffer him to be so. Wherefore, like Brutus, men must feign folly; and +to play the part effectively, and so as to please their prince, must +say, do, see, and praise things contrary to their inclinations. + +But now, having spoken of the prudence shown by Brutus when he sought +to recover the freedom of Rome, let us next speak of the severity which +he used to maintain it. + + + + +CHAPTER III.—_That to preserve a newly acquired Freedom we must slay +the Sons of Brutus._ + + +The severity used by Brutus in preserving for Rome the freedom he had +won for her, was not less necessary than useful. The spectacle of a +father sitting on the judgment, and not merely sentencing his own sons +to death, but being himself present at their execution, affords an +example rare in history. But those who study the records of ancient +times will understand, that after a change in the form of a government, +whether it be from a commonwealth to a tyranny or from a tyranny to a +commonwealth, those who are hostile to the new order of things must +always be visited with signal punishment. So that he who sets up as a +tyrant and slays not Brutus, and he who creates a free government and +slays not the sons of Brutus, can never maintain himself long. But +since I have elsewhere treated of this matter at large, I shall merely +refer to what has there been said concerning it, and shall cite here +one instance only, happening in our own days, and memorable in the +history of our country. + +I speak of Piero Soderini, who thought by his patience and goodness to +overcome the very same temper which prompted the sons of Brutus to +revert to the old government, and who failed in the endeavour. For +although his sagacity should have taught him the necessity, while +chance and the ambition of those who attacked him furnished him with +the opportunity of making an end of them, he never could resolve to +strike the blow; and not merely believed himself able to subdue +disaffection by patience and kindness, and to mitigate the enmity of +particular men by the rewards he held out to them, but also persuaded +himself, and often declared in the presence of his friends, that he +could not confront opposition openly, nor crush his adversaries, +without assuming extraordinary powers and passing laws destructive of +civil equality; which measures, although not afterward used by him for +tyrannical ends, would so alarm the community, that after his death +they would never again consent to appoint a Gonfalonier for life, an +office which he judged it essential both to maintain and strengthen. +Now although these scruples of his were wise and good, we ought never +out of regard for what is good, to suffer an evil to run its course, +since it may well happen that the evil will prevail over the good. And +Piero should have believed that as his acts and intentions were to be +judged by results, he might, if he lived and if fortune befriended him, +have made it clear to all, that what he did was done to preserve his +country, and not from personal ambition; and he might have so contrived +matters that no successor of his could ever turn to bad ends the means +which he had used for good ends. But he was misled by a preconceived +opinion, and failed to understand that ill-will is not to be vanquished +by time nor propitiated by favours. And, so, from not knowing how to +resemble Brutus, he lost power, and fame, and was driven an exile from +his country. + +That it is as hard a matter to preserve a princedom as it is to +preserve a commonwealth, will be shown in the Chapter following. + + + + +CHAPTER IV.—_That an Usurper is never safe in his Princedom while those +live whom he has deprived of it._ + + +From what befell the elder Tarquin at the hands of the sons of Ancus, +and Servius Tullius at the hands of Tarquin the Proud, we see what an +arduous and perilous course it is to strip a king of his kingdom and +yet suffer him to live on, hoping to conciliate him by benefits. We +see, too, how the elder Tarquin was ruined by his belief that he held +the kingdom by a just title, since it had been given him by the people +and confirmed to him by the senate, never suspecting that the sons of +Ancus would be so stirred by resentment that it would be impossible to +content them with what contented all the rest of Rome. Servius Tullius +again, was ruined through believing that he could conciliate the sons +of Ancus by loading them with favours. + +By the fate of the first of these kings every prince may be warned that +he can never live securely in his princedom so long as those from whom +he has taken it survive; while the fate of the second should remind all +rulers that old injuries are not to be healed by subsequent benefits, +and least of all when the new benefit is less in degree than the injury +suffered. And, truly, Servius was wanting in wisdom when he imagined +that the sons of Tarquin would contentedly resign themselves to be the +sons-in-law of one whom they thought should be their subject. For the +desire to reign is so prevailing a passion, that it penetrates the +minds not only of those who are rightful heirs, but also of those who +are not; as happened with the wife of the younger Tarquin, who was +daughter to Servius, but who, possessed by this madness, and setting at +naught all filial duty, incited her husband to take her father’s +kingdom, and with it his life; so much nobler did she esteem it to be a +queen than the daughter of a king. But while the elder Tarquin and +Servius Tullius lost the kingdom from not knowing how to secure +themselves against those whom they had deprived of it, the younger +Tarquin lost it from not observing the ordinances of the old kings, as +shall be shown in the following Chapter. + + + + +CHAPTER V.—_How an Hereditary King may come to lose his Kingdom._ + + +Tarquin the Proud, when he had put Servius Tullius to death, inasmuch +as the latter left no heirs, took secure possession of the kingdom, +having nothing to fear from any of those dangers which had stood in the +way of his predecessors. And although the means whereby he made himself +king were hateful and monstrous, nevertheless, had he adhered to the +ancient ordinances of the earlier kings, he might have been endured, +nor would he have aroused both senate and people to combine against him +and deprive him of his government. It was not, therefore, because his +son Sextus violated Lucretia that Tarquin was driven out, but because +he himself had violated the laws of the kingdom, and governed as a +tyrant, stripping the senate of all authority, and bringing everything +under his own control. For all business which formerly had been +transacted in public, and with the sanction of the senate, he caused to +be transacted in his palace, on his own responsibility, and to the +displeasure of every one else, and so very soon deprived Rome of +whatever freedom she had enjoyed under her other kings. + +Nor was it enough for him to have the Fathers his enemies, but he must +needs also kindle the commons against him, wearing them out with mere +mechanic labours, very different from the enterprises in which they had +been employed by his predecessors; so that when Rome overflowed with +instances of his cruelty and pride, he had already disposed the minds +of all the citizens to rebel whenever they found the opportunity. +Wherefore, had not occasion offered in the violence done to Lucretia, +some other had soon been found to bring about the same result. But had +Tarquin lived like the other kings, when Sextus his son committed that +outrage, Brutus and Collatinus would have had recourse to him to punish +the offender, and not to the commons of Rome. And hence let princes +learn that from the hour they first violate those laws, customs, and +usages under which men have lived for a great while, they begin to +weaken the foundations of their authority. And should they, after they +have been stripped of that authority, ever grow wise enough to see how +easily princedoms are preserved by those who are content to follow +prudent counsels, the sense of their loss will grieve them far more, +and condemn them to a worse punishment than any they suffer at the +hands of others. For it is far easier to be loved by good men than by +bad, and to obey the laws than to seek to control them. + +And to learn what means they must use to retain their authority, they +have only to take example by the conduct of good princes, such as +Timoleon of Corinth, Aratus of Sicyone, and the like, in whose lives +they will find such security and content, both on the side of the ruler +and the ruled, as ought to stir them with the desire to imitate them, +which, for the reasons already given, it is easy for them to do. For +men, when they are well governed, ask no more, nor look for further +freedom; as was the case with the peoples governed by the two whom I +have named, whom they constrained to continue their rulers while they +lived, though both of them sought repeatedly to return to private life. + +But because, in this and the two preceding Chapters, I have noticed the +ill-will which arose against the kings, the plots contrived by the sons +of Brutus against their country, and those directed against the elder +Tarquin and Servius Tullius, it seems to me not out of place to +discourse of these matters more at length in the following Chapter, as +deserving the attention both of princes and private citizens. + + + + +CHAPTER VI.—_Of Conspiracies._ + + +It were an omission not to say something on the subject of +conspiracies, these being a source of much danger both to princes and +to private men. For we see that many more princes have lost their lives +and states through these than in open warfare; power to wage open war +upon a prince being conceded to few, whereas power to conspire against +him is denied to none. On the other hand, since conspiracies are +attended at every stage by difficulties and dangers, no more hazardous +or desperate undertakings can be engaged in by any private citizen; +whence it comes that while many conspiracies are planned, few effect +their object. Wherefore, to put princes on their guard against these +dangers, and to make subjects more cautious how they take part in them, +and rather learn to live content under whatever government fortune has +assigned them, I shall treat of them at length, without omitting any +noteworthy circumstance which may serve for the instruction of either. +Though, indeed, this is a golden sentence Of Cornelius Tacitus, wherein +he says that “_the past should have our reverence, the present our +obedience, and that we should wish for good princes, but put up with +any._”[11] For assuredly whosoever does otherwise is likely to bring +ruin both on himself and on his country. + + [11] _Tac. Hist._ iv. 8. + + +But, to go deeper into the matter, we have first of all to examine +against whom conspiracies are directed; and we shall find that men +conspire either against their country or their prince; and it is of +these two kinds of conspiracy that at present I desire to speak. For of +conspiracies which have for their object the surrender of cities to +enemies who are besieging them, and of all others contrived for like +ends, I have already said enough. + +First, then, I shall treat of those conspiracies which are directed +against a prince, and begin by inquiring into their causes, which are +manifold, but of which one is more momentous than all the rest; I mean, +the being hated by the whole community. For it may reasonably be +assumed, that when a prince has drawn upon himself this universal +hatred, he must also have given special offence to particular men, +which they will be eager to avenge. And this eagerness will be +augmented by the feeling of general ill-will which the prince is seen +to have incurred. A prince ought, therefore, to avoid this load of +public hatred. How he is to do so I need not stop here to explain, +having discussed the matter already in another place; but if he can +guard against this, offence given to particular men will expose him to +but few attacks. One reason being, that there are few men who think so +much of an injury done them as to run great risks to revenge it; +another, that assuming them to have both the disposition and the +courage to avenge themselves, they are restrained by the universal +favour which they see entertained towards the prince. + +Injuries are either to a man’s life, to his property, or to his honour. +As regards the first, they who threaten injuries to life incur more +danger than they who actually inflict them; or rather, while great +danger is incurred in threatening, none at all is incurred from +inflicting such injuries. For the dead are past thinking of revenge; +and those who survive, for the most part leave such thoughts to the +dead. But he whose life is threatened, finding himself forced by +necessity either to do or suffer, becomes a man most dangerous to the +prince, as shall be fully explained hereafter. + +After menaces to life, injuries to property and honour stir men more +than any others, and of these a Prince has most to beware. For he can +never strip a man so bare of his possessions as not to leave him some +weapon wherewith to redress his wrongs, nor ever so far dishonour him +as to quell the stubborn spirit which prompts revenge. Of all +dishonours those done to the women of a household are the worst; after +which come such personal indignities as nerved the arm of Pausanias +against Philip of Macedon, and of many another against other princes; +and, in our own days, it was no other reason that moved Giulio Belanti +to conspire against Pandolfo, lord of Siena, than that Pandolfo, who +had given him his daughter to wife, afterwards took her from him, as +presently shall be told. Chief among the causes which led the Pazzi to +conspire against the Medici, was the law passed by the latter depriving +them of the inheritance of Giovanni Bonromei. + +Another most powerful motive to conspire against a prince is the desire +men feel to free their country from a usurper. This it was which +impelled Brutus and Cassius to conspire against Cæsar, and countless +others against such tyrants as Phalaris, Dionysius, and the like. +Against this humour no tyrant can guard, except by laying down his +tyranny; which as none will do, few escape an unhappy end. Whence the +verses of Juvenal:— + +“Few tyrants die a peaceful death, and few +The kings who visit Proserpine’s dread lord, +Unscathed by wounds and blood.”[12] + + + [12] Ad generum Cereris sine caede et vulnere pauci +Descendunt reges, et sicca morte tiranni. + _Juv. Sat._ x. 112. + + +Great, as I have said already, are the dangers which men run in +conspiring; for at all times they are in peril, whether in contriving, +in executing, or after execution. And since in conspiracies either many +are engaged, or one only (for although it cannot properly be said of +_one_ man that he _conspires_, there may exist in him the fixed resolve +to put the prince to death), it is only the solitary plotter who +escapes the first of these three stages of danger. For he runs no risk +before executing his design, since as he imparts it to none, there is +none to bring it to the ear of the prince. A deliberate resolve like +this may be conceived by a person in any rank of life, high or low, +base or noble, and whether or no he be the familiar of his prince. For +every one must, at some time or other, have leave to speak to the +prince, and whoever has this leave has opportunity to accomplish his +design. Pausanias, of whom we have made mention so often, slew Philip +of Macedon as he walked between his son and his son-in-law to the +temple, surrounded by a thousand armed guards. Pausanias indeed was +noble, and known to the prince, but Ferdinand of Spain was stabbed in +the neck by a poor and miserable Spaniard; and though the wound was not +mortal, it sufficed to show that neither courage nor opportunity were +wanting to the would-be-assassin. A Dervish, or Turkish priest, drew +his scimitar on Bajazet, father of the Sultan now reigning, and if he +did not wound him, it was from no lack either of daring or of +opportunity. And I believe that there are many who in their minds +desire the deed, no punishment or danger attending the mere wish, +though there be but few who dare do it. For since few or none who +venture, escape death, few are willing to go forward to certain +destruction. + +But to pass from these solitary attempts to those in which several are +engaged, I affirm it to be shown by history that all such plots have +been contrived by men of great station, or by those who have been on +terms of close intimacy with the prince, since no others, not being +downright madmen, would ever think of conspiring. For men of humble +rank, and such as are not the intimates of their prince, are neither +fed by the hopes nor possessed of the opportunities essential for such +attempts. Because, in the first place, men of low degree will never +find any to keep faith with them, none being moved to join in their +schemes by those expectations which encourage men to run great risks; +wherefore, so soon as their design has been imparted to two or three, +they are betrayed and ruined. Or, assuming them fortunate enough to +have no traitor of their number, they will be so hampered in the +execution of their plot by the want of easy access to the prince, that +they are sure to perish in the mere attempt. For if even men of great +position, who have ready access to the prince, succumb to the +difficulties which I shall presently notice, those difficulties must be +infinitely increased in the case of men who are without these +advantages. And because when life and property are at stake men are not +utterly reckless, on perceiving themselves to be weak they grow +cautious, and though cursing the tyrant in their hearts, are content to +endure him, and to wait until some one of higher station than they, +comes forward to redress their wrongs. So that should we ever find +these weaklings attempting anything, we may commend their courage +rather than their prudence. + +We see, however, that the great majority of conspirators have been +persons of position and the familiars of their prince, and that their +plots have been as often the consequence of excessive indulgence as of +excessive injury; as when Perennius conspired against Commodus, +Plautianus against Severus, and Sejanus against Tiberius; all of whom +had been raised by their masters to such wealth, honours, and +dignities, that nothing seemed wanting to their authority save the +imperial name. That they might not lack this also, they fell to +conspiring against their prince; but in every instance their +conspiracies had the end which their ingratitude deserved. + +The only instance in recent times of such attempts succeeding, is the +conspiracy of Jacopo IV. d’Appiano against Messer Piero Gambacorti, +lord of Pisa. For Jacopo, who had been bred and brought up by Piero, +and loaded by him with honours, deprived him of his State. Similar to +this, in our own days, was the conspiracy of Coppola against King +Ferdinand of Aragon. For Coppola had reached such a pitch of power that +he seemed to himself to have everything but sovereignty; in seeking to +obtain which he lost his life; though if any plot entered into by a man +of great position could be expected to succeed, this certainly might, +being contrived, as we may say, by another king, and by one who had the +amplest opportunities for its accomplishment. But that lust of power +which blinds men to dangers darkened the minds of those to whom the +execution of the scheme was committed; who, had they only known how to +add prudence to their villainy, could hardly have missed their aim. + +The prince, therefore, who would guard himself against plots, ought +more to fear those men to whom he has been too indulgent, than those to +whom he has done great wrongs. For the latter lack opportunities which +the former have in abundance; and the moving cause is equally strong in +both, lust of power being at least as strong a passion as lust of +revenge. Wherefore, a prince should entrust his friends with so much +authority only as leaves a certain interval between his position and +theirs; that between the two something be still left them to desire. +Otherwise it will be strange if he do not fare like those princes who +have been named above. + +But to return from this digression, I say, that having shown it to be +necessary that conspirators should be men of great station, and such as +have ready access to the prince, we have next to consider what have +been the results of their plots, and to trace the causes which have +made them succeed or fail. Now, as I have said already, we find that +conspiracies are attended by danger at three stages: before during, and +after their execution; for which reason very few of them have had a +happy issue; it being next to impossible to surmount all these +different dangers successfully. And to begin with those which are +incurred beforehand, and which are graver than all the rest, I say that +he must be both very prudent and very fortunate who, when contriving a +conspiracy, does not suffer his secret to be discovered. + +Conspiracies are discovered either by disclosures made, or by +conjecture. Disclosures are made through the treachery or folly of +those to whom you communicate your design. Treachery is to be looked +for, because you can impart your plans only to such persons as you +believe ready to face death on your behalf, or to those who are +discontented with the prince. Of men whom you can trust thus +implicitly, one or two may be found; but when you have to open your +designs to many, they cannot all be of this nature; and their goodwill +towards you must be extreme if they are not daunted by the danger and +by fear of punishment. Moreover men commonly deceive themselves in +respect of the love which they imagine others bear them, nor can ever +be sure of it until they have put it to the proof. But to make proof of +it in a matter like this is very perilous; and even if you have proved +it already, and found it true in some other dangerous trial, you cannot +assume that there will be the same fidelity here, since this far +transcends every other kind of danger. Again, if you gauge a man’s +fidelity by his discontent with the prince, you may easily deceive +yourself; for so soon as you have taken this discontented man into your +confidence, you have supplied him with the means whereby he may become +contented; so that either his hatred of the prince must be great +indeed, or your influence over him extraordinary, if it keep him +faithful. Hence it comes that so many conspiracies have been discovered +and crushed in their earliest stage, and that when the secret is +preserved among many accomplices for any length of time, it is looked +on as a miracle; as in the case of the conspiracy of Piso against Nero, +and, in our own days, in that of the Pazzi against Lorenzo and Giuliano +de’ Medici; which last, though more than fifty persons were privy to +it, was not discovered until it came to be carried out. + +Conspiracies are disclosed through the imprudence of a conspirator when +he talks so indiscreetly that some servant, or other person not in the +plot, overhears him; as happened with the sons of Brutus, who, when +treating with the envoys of Tarquin, were overheard by a slave, who +became their accuser; or else through your own weakness in imparting +your secret to some woman or boy whom you love, or to some other such +light person; as when Dymnus, who was one of those who conspired with +Philotas against Alexander the Great, revealed the plot to Nicomachus, +a youth whom he loved, who at once told Cebalinus, and Cebalinus the +king. + +Of discoveries by conjecture we have an instance in the conspiracy of +Piso against Nero; for Scaevinus, one of the conspirators, the day +before he was to kill Nero, made his will, liberated all his slaves and +gave them money, and bade Milichus, his freedman, sharpen his old rusty +dagger, and have bandages ready for binding up wounds. From all which +preparations Milichus conjecturing what work was in hand, accused +Scaevinus before Nero; whereupon Scaevinus was arrested, and with him +Natalis, another of the conspirators, who the day before had been seen +to speak with him for a long time in private; and when the two differed +in their account of what then passed between them, they were put to the +torture and forced to confess the truth. In this way the conspiracy was +brought to light, to the ruin of all concerned. + +Against these causes of the discovery of conspiracies it is impossible +so to guard as that either through treachery, want of caution, or +levity, the secret shall not be found out, whenever more than three or +four persons are privy to it. And whenever more than one conspirator is +arrested, the plot is certain to be detected, because no two persons +can perfectly agree in a false account of what has passed between them. +If only one be taken, should he be a man of resolute courage, he may +refuse to implicate his comrades; but they on their part must have no +less courage, to stay quiet where they are, and not betray themselves +by flight; for if courage be absent anywhere, whether in him who is +taken or in those still at large, the conspiracy is revealed. And what +is related by Titus Livius as having happened in the conspiracy against +Hieronymus, tyrant of Syracuse, is most extraordinary, namely, that on +the capture of one of the conspirators, named Theodorus, he, with great +fortitude, withheld the names of all his accomplices, and accused +friends of the tyrant; while his companions, on their part, trusted so +completely in his courage, that not one of them quitted Syracuse or +showed any sign of fear. + +All these dangers, therefore, which attend the contrivance of a plot, +must be passed through before you come to its execution; or if you +would escape them, you must observe the following precautions: Your +first and surest, nay, to say truth, your only safeguard, is to leave +your accomplices no time to accuse you; for which reason you must +impart the affair to them, only at the moment when you mean it to be +carried out, and not before. Those who have followed this course have +wholly escaped the preliminary dangers of conspiracies, and, generally +speaking, the others also; indeed, I may say that they have all +succeeded, and that it is open to every prudent man to act as they did. +It will be enough to give two instances of plots effected in this way. +Nelematus, unable to endure the tyranny of Aristotimus, despot of +Epirus, assembling many of his friends and kinsmen in his house, +exhorted them to free their country; and when some of them asked for +time to consider and mature their plans, he bade his slaves close the +doors, and told those assembled that unless they swore to go at once +and do as he directed he would make them over to Aristotimus as +prisoners. Alarmed by his threats, they bound themselves by a solemn +oath, and going forth at once and without delay, successfully carried +out his bidding. A certain Magus having fraudulently usurped the throne +of Persia; Ortanes, a grandee of that realm, discovering the fraud, +disclosed it to six others of the chief nobility, telling them that it +behoved them to free the kingdom from the tyranny of this impostor. And +when some among them asked for time, Darius, who was one of the six +summoned by Ortanes, stood up and said, “Either we go at once to do +this deed, or I go to the Magus to accuse you all.” Whereupon, all +rising together, without time given to any to change his mind, they +went forth and succeeded in effecting their end. Not unlike these +instances was the plan taken by the Etolians to rid themselves of +Nabis, the Spartan tyrant, to whom, under pretence of succouring him, +they sent Alasamenes, their fellow-citizen, with two hundred foot +soldiers and thirty horsemen. For they imparted their real design to +Alasamenes only, charging the rest, under pain of exile, to obey him in +whatever he commanded. Alasamenes repaired to Sparta, and never +divulged his commission till the time came for executing it; and so +succeeded in putting Nabis to death. + +It was, therefore, by the precautions they observed, that the persons +of whom I have just now spoken escaped all those perils that attend the +contrivance of conspiracies; and any following their example may expect +the like good fortune. And that all may learn to do as they did I shall +notice the case of Piso, of which mention has before been made. By +reason of his rank, his reputation, and the intimate terms on which he +lived with Nero, who trusted him without reserve, and would often come +to his garden to sup with him, Piso was able to gain the friendship of +many persons of spirit and courage, and well fitted in every way to +take part in his plot against the emperor, which, under these +circumstances, might easily have been carried out. For when Nero came +to his garden, Piso could readily have communicated his design to those +friends of his, and with suitable words have encouraged them to do +what, in fact, they would not have had time to withdraw from, and was +certain to succeed. And were we to examine all similar attempts, it +would be seen that there are few which might not have been effected in +the manner shown. But since most men are very ignorant of practical +affairs, they commit the gravest blunders, especially in matters which +lie, as this does, a little way out of the beaten track. + +Wherefore, the contriver of a plot ought never, if he can help it, to +communicate his design until the moment when it is to be executed; or +if he must communicate it, then to some one man only, with whom he has +long been intimate, and whom he knows to be moved by the same feelings +as himself. To find one such person is far easier than to find several, +and, at the same time, involves less risk; for though this one man play +you false, you are not left altogether without resource, as you are +when your accomplices are numerous. For I have heard it shrewdly said +that to one man you may impart anything, since, unless you have been +led to commit yourself by writing, your denial will go as far as his +assertion. Shun writing, therefore, as you would a rock, for there is +nothing so damning as a letter under your own hand. + +Plautianus, desiring to procure the deaths of the Emperor Severus and +his son Caracalla, intrusted the business to the tribune Saturninus, +who, being more disposed to betray than obey Plautianus, but at the +same time afraid that, if it came to laying a charge, Plautianus might +be believed sooner than he, asked him for a written authority, that his +commission might be credited. Blinded by ambition, Plautianus complied, +and forthwith was accused by Saturninus and found guilty; whereas, but +for that written warrant, together with other corroborating proofs, he +must have escaped by his bold denial of the charge. Against the +testimony of a single witness, you have thus some defence, unless +convicted by your own handwriting, or by other circumstantial proof +against which you must guard. A woman, named Epicharis, who had +formerly been a mistress of Nero, was privy to Piso’s conspiracy, and +thinking it might be useful to have the help of a certain captain of +triremes whom Nero had among his body-guards, she acquainted him with +the plot, but not with the names of the plotters. This fellow, turning +traitor, and accusing Epicharis to Nero, so stoutly did she deny the +charge, that Nero, confounded by her effrontery, let her go. + +In imparting a plot to a single person there are, therefore, two risks: +one, that he may come forward of his own accord to accuse you; the +other, that if arrested on suspicion, or on some proof of his guilt, he +may, on being convicted, in the hope to escape punishment, betray you. +But in neither of these dangers are you left without a defence; since +you may meet the one by ascribing the charge to the malice of your +accuser, and the other by alleging that the witness his been forced by +torture to say what is untrue. The wisest course, however, is to impart +your design to none, but to act like those who have been mentioned +above; or if you impart it, then to one only: for although even in this +course there be a certain degree of danger, it is far less than when +many are admitted to your confidence. + +A case nearly resembling that just now noticed, is where an emergency, +so urgent as to leave you no time to provide otherwise for your safety, +constrains you to do to a prince what you see him minded to do to you. +A necessity of this sort leads almost always to the end desired, as two +instances may suffice to show. Among the closest friends and intimates +of the Emperor Commodus, were two captains of the pretorian guards, +Letus and Electus, while among the most favoured of his distresses was +a certain Martia. But because these three often reproved him for his +manner of living, as disgraceful to himself and to his station, he +resolved to rid himself of them; and so wrote their names, along with +those of certain others whom he meant should be put to death the next +night, in a list which he placed under the pillow of his bed. But on +his going to bathe, a boy, who was a favourite of his, while playing +about his room and on his bed, found the list, and coming out of the +chamber with it in his hand, was met by Martia, who took it from him, +and on reading it and finding what it contained, sent for Letus and +Electus. And all three recognizing the danger in which they stood, +resolved to be beforehand with the tyrant, and losing no time, murdered +him that very night. + +The Emperor Caracalla, being with his armies in Mesopotamia, had with +him Macrinus, who was more of a statesman than a soldier, as his +prefect. But because princes who are not themselves good are always +afraid lest others treat them as they deserve, Caracalla wrote to his +friend Maternianus in Rome to learn from the astrologers whether any +man had ambitious designs upon the empire, and to send him word. +Maternianus, accordingly, wrote back that such designs were entertained +by Macrinus. But this letter, ere it reached the emperor, fell into the +hands of Macrinus, who, seeing when he read it that he must either put +Caracalla to death before further letters arrived from Rome, or else +die himself, committed the business to a centurion, named Martialis, +whom he trusted, and whose brother had been slain by Caracalla a few +days before, who succeeded in killing the emperor. + +We see, therefore, that an urgency which leaves no room for delay has +almost the same results as the method already noticed as followed by +Nelematus of Epirus. We see, too, what I remarked almost at the outset +of this Discourse, that the threats of princes expose them to greater +danger than the wrongs they actually inflict, and lead to more active +conspiracies: and, therefore, that a prince should be careful not to +threaten; since men are either to be treated kindly or else got rid of, +but never brought to such a pass that they have to choose between +slaying and being slain. + +As to the dangers attending the execution of plots, these result either +from some change made in the plan, or from a failure in courage on the +part of him who is to carry it out; or else from some mistake he falls +into through want of foresight, or from his not giving the affair its +finishing stroke, as when some are left alive whom it was meant to put +to death. Now, nothing causes so much disturbance and hindrance in +human affairs, as to be forced, at a moment’s notice and without time +allowed for reflection, to vary your plan of action and adopt a +different one from that fixed on at the first. And if such changes +cause confusion anywhere, it is in matters appertaining to war, and in +enterprises of the kind we are now speaking of; for in such affairs as +these, there is nothing so essential as that men be prepared to do the +exact thing intrusted to them. But when men have for many days together +turned their whole thoughts to doing a thing in a certain way and in a +certain order, and the way and order are suddenly altered, it is +impossible but that they should be disconcerted and the whole scheme +ruined. For which reason, it is far better to do everything in +accordance with the preconcerted plan, though it be seen to be attended +with some disadvantages, than, in order to escape these, to involve +yourself in an infinity of dangers. And this will happen when you +depart from your original design without time given to form a new one. +For when time is given you may manage as you please. + +The conspiracy of the Pazzi against Lorenzo and Giuliano de’ Medici is +well known. The scheme agreed on was to give a banquet to the Cardinal +S. Giorgio, at which the brothers should be put to death. To each of +the conspirators a part was assigned: to one the murder, to another the +seizure of the palace, while a third was to ride through the streets +and call on the people to free themselves. But it so chanced that at a +time when the Pazzi, the Medici, and the Cardinal were all assembled in +the cathedral church of Florence to hear High Mass, it became known +that Giuliano would not be present at the banquet; whereupon the +conspirators, laying their heads together, resolved to do in church +what they were to have done elsewhere. This, however, deranged the +whole scheme. For Giovambattista of Montesecco, would have no hand in +the murder if it was to be done in a church; and the whole distribution +of parts had in consequence to be changed; when, as those to whom the +new parts were assigned had no time allowed them to nerve their minds +to their new tasks, they managed matters so badly that they were +overpowered in their attempt. + +Courage fails a conspirator either from his own poorness of spirit, or +from his being overcome by some feeling of reverence. For such majesty +and awe attend the person of a prince, that it may well happen that he +softens or dismays his executioners. When Caius Marius was taken by the +people of Minturnum, the slave sent in to slay him, overawed by the +bearing of the man, and by the memories which his name called up, +became unnerved, and powerless to perform his office. And if this +influence was exercised by one who was a prisoner, and in chains, and +overwhelmed by adverse fortune, how much more must reverence be +inspired by a prince who is free and uncontrolled, surrounded by his +retinue and by all the pomp and splendour of his station; whose dignity +confounds, and whose graciousness conciliates. + +Certain persons conspiring against Sitalces, king of Thrace, fixed a +day for his murder, and assembled at the place appointed, whither the +king had already come. Yet none of them raised a hand to harm him, and +all departed without attempting anything against him or knowing why +they refrained; each blaming the others. And more than once the same +folly was repeated, until the plot getting wind, they were taken and +punished for what they might have done, yet durst not do. + +Two brothers of Alfonso, Duke of Ferrara, conspired against him, +employing as their tool a certain priest named Giennes, a singing-man +in the service of the Duke. He, at their request, repeatedly brought +the Duke into their company, so that they had full opportunity to make +away with him. Yet neither of them ever ventured to strike the blow; +till at last, their scheme being discovered, they paid the penalty of +their combined cowardice and temerity. Such irresolution can only have +arisen from their being overawed by the majesty of the prince, or +touched by his graciousness. + +In the execution of conspiracies, therefore, errors and mishaps arise +from a failure of prudence or courage to which all are subject, when, +losing self-control, they are led in their bewilderment to do and say +what they ought not. That men are thus confounded, and thrown off their +balance, could not be better shown than in the words of Titus Livius, +where he describes the behaviour of Alasamenes the Etolian, at the time +when he resolved on the death of Nabis the Spartan, of whom I have +spoken before. For when the time to act came, and he had disclosed to +his followers what they had to do, Livius represents him as +“_collecting his thoughts which had grown confused by dwelling on so +desperate an enterprise_.” For it is impossible for any one, though of +the most steadfast temper and used to the sight of death and to handle +deadly weapons, not to be perturbed at such a moment. For which reason +we should on such occasions choose for our tools those who have had +experience in similar affairs, and trust no others though reputed of +the truest courage. For in these grave undertakings, no one who is +without such experience, however bold and resolute, is to be trusted. + +The confusion of which I speak may either cause you to drop your weapon +from your hand, or to use words which will have the same results. +Quintianus being commanded by Lucilla, sister of Commodus, to slay him, +lay in wait for him at the entrance of the amphitheatre, and rushing +upon him with a drawn dagger, cried out, “_The senate sends you this_;” +which words caused him to be seized before his blow descended. In like +manner Messer Antonio of Volterra, who as we have elsewhere seen was +told off to kill Lorenzo de’ Medici, exclaimed as he approached him, +“_Ah traitor!_” and this exclamation proved the salvation of Lorenzo +and the ruin of that conspiracy. + +For the reasons now given, a conspiracy against a single ruler may +readily break down in its execution; but a conspiracy against two +rulers is not only difficult, but so hazardous that its success is +almost hopeless. For to effect like actions, at the same time, in +different places, is well-nigh impossible; nor can they be effected at +different times, if you would not have one counteract another. So that +if conspiracy against a single ruler be imprudent and dangerous, to +conspire against two, is in the last degree fool-hardy and desperate. +And were it not for the respect in which I hold the historian, I could +not credit as possible what Herodian relates of Plautianus, namely, +that he committed to the centurion Saturninus the task of slaying +single-handed both Severus and Caracalla, they dwelling in different +places; for the thing is so opposed to reason that on no other +authority could I be induced to accept it as true. + +Certain young Athenians conspired against Diocles and Hippias, tyrants +of Athens. Diocles they slew; but Hippias, making his escape, avenged +him. Chion and Leonidas of Heraclea, disciples of Plato, conspired +against the despots Clearchus and Satirus. Clearchus fell, but Satirus +survived and avenged him. The Pazzi, of whom we have spoken so often, +succeeded in murdering Giuliano only. From such conspiracies, +therefore, as are directed against more heads than one, all should +abstain; for no good is to be got from them, whether for ourselves, for +our country, or for any one else. On the contrary, when those conspired +against escape, they become harsher and more unsufferable than before, +as, in the examples given, Florence, Athens, and Heraclea had cause to +know. True it is that the conspiracy contrived by Pelopidas for the +liberation of his country, had to encounter every conceivable +hindrance, and yet had the happiest end. For Pelopidas had to deal, not +with two tyrants only, but with ten; and so far from having their +confidence, could not, being an outlaw, even approach them. And yet he +succeeded in coming to Thebes, in putting the tyrants to death, and in +freeing his country. But whatever he did was done with the aid of one +of the counsellors of the tyrants, a certain Charon, through whom he +had all facilities for executing his design. Let none, however, take +this case as a pattern; for that it was in truth a desperate attempt, +and its success a marvel, was and is the opinion of all historians, who +speak of it as a thing altogether extraordinary and unexampled. + +The execution of a plot may be frustrated by some groundless alarm or +unforeseen mischance occurring at the very moment when the scheme is to +be carried out. On the morning on which Brutus and his confederates +were to slay Cæsar, it so happened that Cæsar talked for a great while +with Cneus Pompilius Lenas, one of the conspirators; which some of the +others observing, were in terror that Pompilius was divulging the +conspiracy to Cæsar; whose life they would therefore have attempted +then and there, without waiting his arrival in the senate house, had +they not been reassured by seeing that when the conference ended he +showed no sign of unusual emotion. False alarms of this sort are to be +taken into account and allowed for, all the more that they are easily +raised. For he who has not a clear conscience is apt to assume that +others are speaking of him. A word used with a wholly different +purpose, may throw his mind off its balance and lead him to fancy that +reference is intended to the matter he is engaged on, and cause him +either to betray the conspiracy by flight, or to derange its execution +by anticipating the time fixed. And the more there are privy to the +conspiracy, the likelier is this to happen. + +As to the mischances which may befall, since these are unforeseen, they +can only be instanced by examples which may make men more cautious. +Giulio Belanti of Siena, of whom I have spoken before, from the hate he +bore Pandolfo Petrucci, who had given him his daughter to wife and +afterwards taken her from him, resolved to murder him, and thus chose +his time. Almost every day Pandolfo went to visit a sick kinsman, +passing the house of Giulio on the way, who, remarking this, took +measures to have his accomplices ready in his house to kill Pandolfo as +he passed. Wherefore, placing the rest armed within the doorway, one he +stationed at a window to give the signal of Pandolfo’s approach. It so +happened however, that as he came nigh the house, and after the +look-out had given the signal, Pandolfo fell in with a friend who +stopped him to converse; when some of those with him, going on in +advance, saw and heard the gleam and clash of weapons, and so +discovered the ambuscade; whereby Pandolfo was saved, while Giulio with +his companions had to fly from Siena. This plot accordingly was marred, +and Giulio’s schemes baulked, in consequence of a chance meeting. +Against such accidents, since they are out of the common course of +things, no provision can be made. Still it is very necessary to take +into account all that may happen, and devise what remedies you can. + +It now only remains for us to consider those dangers which follow after +the execution of a plot. These in fact resolve themselves into one, +namely, that some should survive who will avenge the death of the +murdered prince. The part of avenger is likely to be assumed by a son, +a brother, or other kinsman of the deceased, who in the ordinary course +of events might have looked to succeed to the princedom. And such +persons are suffered to live, either from inadvertence, or from some of +the causes noted already, as when Giovann’ Andrea of Lampognano, with +the help of his companions, put to death the Duke of Milan. For the son +and two brothers of the Duke, who survived him, were able to avenge his +death. In cases like this, indeed, the conspirators may be held +excused, since there is nothing they can do to help themselves. But +when from carelessness and want of due caution some one is allowed to +live whose death ought to have been secured, there is no excuse. +Certain conspirators, after murdering the lord, Count Girolamo of +Forli, made prisoners of his wife and of his children who were still +very young. By thinking they could not be safe unless they got +possession of the citadel, which the governor refused to surrender, +they obtained a promise from Madonna Caterina, for so the Countess was +named, that on their permitting her to enter the citadel she would +cause it to be given up to them, her children in the mean time +remaining with them as hostages. On which undertaking they suffered her +to enter the citadel. But no sooner had she got inside than she fell to +upbraid them from the walls with the murder of her husband, and to +threaten them with every kind of vengeance; and to show them how little +store she set upon her children, told them scoffingly that she knew how +others could be got. In the end, the rebels having no leader to advise +them, and perceiving too late the error into which they had been +betrayed, had to pay the penalty of their rashness by perpetual +banishment. + +But of all the dangers which may follow on the execution of a plot, +none is so much or so justly to be feared as that the people should be +well affected to the prince whom you have put to death. For against +this danger conspirators have no resource which can ensure their +safety. Of this we have example in the case of Cæsar, who as he had the +love of the Roman people was by them avenged; for they it was who, by +driving out the conspirators from Rome, were the cause that all of +them, at different times and in different places, came to violent ends. + +Conspiracies against their country are less danger for those who take +part in them than conspiracies against princes; since there is less +risk beforehand, and though there be the same danger in their +execution, there is none afterwards. Beforehand, the risks are few, +because a citizen may use means for obtaining power without betraying +his wishes or designs to any; and unless his course be arrested, his +designs are likely enough to succeed; nay, though laws be passed to +restrain him, he may strike out a new path. This is to be understood of +a commonwealth which has to some degree become corrupted; for in one +wherein there is no taint of corruption, there being no soil in which +evil seed can grow, such designs will never suggest themselves to any +citizen. + +In a commonwealth, therefore, a citizen may by many means and in many +ways aspire to the princedom without risking destruction, both because +republics are slower than princes are to take alarm, are less +suspicious and consequently less cautious, and because they look with +greater reverence upon their great citizens, who are in this way +rendered bolder and more reckless in attacking them. Any one who has +read Sallust’s account of the conspiracy of Catiline, must remember +how, when that conspiracy was discovered, Catiline not only remained in +Rome, but even made his appearance in the senatehouse, where he was +suffered to address the senate in the most insulting terms,—so +scrupulous was that city in protecting the liberty of all its citizens. +Nay, even after he had left Rome and placed himself at the head of his +army, Lentulus and his other accomplices would not have been +imprisoned, had not letters been found upon them clearly establishing +their guilt. Hanno, the foremost citizen of Carthage, aspiring to +absolute power, on the occasion of the marriage of a daughter contrived +a plot for administering poison to the whole senate and so making +himself prince. The scheme being discovered, the senate took no steps +against him beyond passing a law to limit the expense of banquets and +marriage ceremonies. So great was the respect they paid to his quality. + +True, the _execution_ of a plot against your country is attended with +greater difficulty and danger, since it seldom happens that, in +conspiring against so many, your own resources are sufficient by +themselves; for it is not every one who, like Cæsar, Agathocles, or +Cleomenes, is at the head of an army, so as to be able at a stroke, and +by open force to make himself master of his country. To such as these, +doubtless, the path is safe and easy enough; but others who have not +such an assembled force ready at their command, must effect their ends +either by stratagem and fraud, or with the help of foreign troops. Of +such stratagems and frauds we have an instance in the case of +Pisistratus the Athenian, who after defeating the Megarians and thereby +gaining the favour of his fellow-citizens, showed himself to them one +morning covered with wounds and blood, declaring that he had been thus +outraged through the jealousy of the nobles, and asking that he might +have an armed guard assigned for his protection. With the authority +which this lent him, he easily rose to such a pitch of power as to +become tyrant of Athens. In like manner Pandolfo Petrucci, on his +return with the other exiles to Siena, was appointed the command of the +public guard, as a mere office of routine which others had declined. +Very soon, however, this armed force gave him so much importance that +he became the supreme ruler of the State. And many others have followed +other plans and methods, and in the course of time, and without +incurring danger, have achieved their aim. + +Conspirators against their country, whether trusting to their own +forces or to foreign aid, have had more or less success in proportion +as they have been favoured by Fortune. Catiline, of whom we spoke just +now, was overthrown. Hanno, who has also been mentioned, failing to +accomplish his object by poison, armed his partisans to the number of +many thousands; but both he and they came to an ill end. On the other +hand, certain citizens of Thebes conspiring to become its tyrants, +summoned a Spartan army to their assistance, and usurped the absolute +control of the city. In short, if we examine all the conspiracies which +men have engaged in against their country, we shall find that few or +none have been quelled in their inception, but that all have either +succeeded, or have broken down in their execution. Once executed, they +entail no further risks beyond those implied in the nature of a +princedom. For the man who becomes a tyrant incurs all the natural and +ordinary dangers in which a tyranny involves him, and has no remedies +against them save those of which I have already spoken. + +This is all that occurs to me to say on the subject of conspiracies. If +I have noticed those which have been carried out with the sword rather +than those wherein poison has been the instrument, it is because, +generally speaking, the method of proceeding is the same in both. It is +true, nevertheless, that conspiracies which are to be carried out by +poison are, by reason of their uncertainty, attended by greater danger. +For since fewer opportunities offer for their execution, you must have +an understanding with persons who can command opportunities. But it is +dangerous to have to depend on others. Again, many causes may hinder a +poisoned draught from proving mortal; as when the murderers of +Commodus, on his vomiting the poison given him, had to strangle him. + +Princes, then, have no worse enemy than conspiracy, for when a +conspiracy is formed against them, it either carries them off, or +discredits them: since, if it succeeds, they die; while, if it be +discovered, and the conspirators be put to death themselves, it will +always be believed that the whole affair has been trumped up by the +prince that he might glut his greed and cruelty with the goods and +blood of those whom he has made away with. Let me not, however, forget +to warn the prince or commonwealth against whom a conspiracy is +directed, that on getting word of it, and before taking any steps to +punish it, they endeavour, as far as they can, to ascertain its +character, and after carefully weighing the strength of the +conspirators with their own, on finding it preponderate, never suffer +their knowledge of the plot to appear until they are ready with a force +sufficient to crush it. For otherwise, to disclose their knowledge will +only give the signal for their destruction. They must strive therefore +to seem unconscious of what is going on; for conspirators who see +themselves detected are driven forward by necessity and will stick at +nothing. Of this precaution we have an example in Roman history, when +the officers of the two legions, who, as has already been mentioned, +were left behind to defend the Capuans from the Samnites, conspired +together against the Capuans. For on rumours of this conspiracy +reaching Rome, Rutilius the new consul was charged to see to it; who, +not to excite the suspicions of the conspirators, publicly gave out +that by order of the senate the Capuan legions were continued in their +station. The conspirators believing this, and thinking they would have +ample time to execute their plans, made no effort to hasten matters, +but remained at their ease, until they found that the consul was moving +one of the two legions to a distance from the other. This arousing +their suspicion, led them to disclose their designs and endeavour to +carry them out. + +Now, we could have no more instructive example than this in whatever +way we look at it. For it shows how slow men are to move in those +matters wherein time seems of little importance, and how active they +become when necessity urges them. Nor can a prince or commonwealth +desiring for their own ends to retard the execution of a conspiracy, +use any more effectual means to do so, than by artfully holding out to +the conspirators some special opportunity as likely soon to present +itself; awaiting which, and believing they have time and to spare for +what they have to do, they will afford that prince or commonwealth all +the leisure needed to prepare for their punishment. Whosoever neglects +these precautions hastens his own destruction, as happened with the +Duke of Athens, and with Guglielmo de’ Pazzi. For the Duke, who had +made himself tyrant of Florence, on learning that he was being +conspired against, without further inquiry into the matter, caused one +of the conspirators to be seized; whereupon the rest at once armed +themselves and deprived him of his government. Guglielmo, again, being +commissary in the Val di Chiana in the year 1501, and learning that a +conspiracy was being hatched in Arezzo to take the town from the +Florentines and give it over to the Vitelli, repaired thither with all +haste; and without providing himself with the necessary forces or +giving a thought to the strength of the conspirators, on the advice of +the bishop, his son, had one of them arrested. Which becoming known to +the others, they forthwith rushed to arms, and taking the town from the +Florentines, made Guglielmo their prisoner. Where, however, +conspiracies are weak, they may and should be put down without scruple +or hesitation. + +Two methods, somewhat opposed to one another, which have occasionally +been followed in dealing with conspiracies, are in no way to be +commended. One of these was that adopted by the Duke of Athens, of whom +I have just now spoken, who to have it thought that he confided in the +goodwill of the Florentines, caused a certain man who gave information +of a plot against him, to be put to death. The other was that followed +by Dion the Syracusan, who, to sound the intentions of one whom he +suspected, arranged with Calippus, whom he trusted, to pretend to get +up a conspiracy against him. Neither of these tyrants reaped any +advantage from the course he followed. For the one discouraged +informers and gave heart to those who were disposed to conspire, the +other prepared an easy road to his own death, or rather was prime mover +in a conspiracy against himself. As the event showed. For Calippus +having free leave to plot against Dion, plotted to such effect, that he +deprived him at once of his State and life. + + + + +CHAPTER VII.—_Why it is that changes from Freedom to Servitude, and +from Servitude to Freedom, are sometimes made without Bloodshed, but at +other times reek with Blood_. + + +Since we find from history that in the countless changes which have +been made from freedom to servitude and from servitude to freedom, +sometimes an infinite multitude have perished, while at others not a +soul has suffered (as when Rome made her change from kings to consuls, +on which occasion none was banished save Tarquin, and no harm was done +to any other), it may perhaps be asked, how it happens that of these +revolutions, some have been attended by bloodshed and others not. + +The answer I take to be this. The government which suffers change +either has or has not had its beginning in violence. And since the +government which has its beginning in violence must start by inflicting +injuries on many, it must needs happen that on its downfall those who +were injured will desire to avenge themselves; from which desire for +vengeance the slaughter and death of many will result. But when a +government originates with, and derives its authority from the whole +community, there is no reason why the community, if it withdraw that +authority, should seek to injure any except the prince from whom it +withdraws it. Now the government of Rome was of this nature, and the +expulsion of the Tarquins took place in this way. Of a like character +was the government of the Medici in Florence, and, accordingly, upon +their overthrow in the year 1494, no injury was done to any save +themselves. + +In such cases, therefore, the changes I speak of do not occasion any +very great danger. But the changes wrought by men who have wrongs to +revenge, are always of a most dangerous kind, and such, to say the +least, as may well cause dismay in the minds of those who read of them. +But since history abounds with instances of such changes I need say no +more about them. + + + + +CHAPTER VIII.—_That he who would effect Changes in a Commonwealth, must +give heed to its Character and Condition_ + + +I have said before that a bad citizen cannot work grave mischief in a +commonwealth which has not become corrupted. This opinion is not only +supported by the arguments already advanced, but is further confirmed +by the examples of Spurius Cassius and Manlius Capitolinus. For +Spurius, being ambitious, and desiring to obtain extraordinary +authority in Rome, and to win over the people by loading them with +benefits (as, for instance, by selling them those lands which the +Romans had taken from the Hernici,) his designs were seen through by +the senate, and laid him under such suspicion, that when in haranguing +the people he offered them the money realized by the sale of the grain +brought from Sicily at the public expense, they would have none of it, +believing that he offered it as the price of their freedom. Now, had +the people been corrupted, they would not have refused this bribe, but +would have opened rather than closed the way to the tyranny. + +The example of Manlius is still more striking. For in his case we see +what excellent gifts both of mind and body, and what splendid services +to his country were afterwards cancelled by that shameful eagerness to +reign which we find bred in him by his jealousy of the honours paid +Camillus. For so darkened did his mind become, that without reflecting +what were the institutions to which Rome was accustomed, or testing the +material he had to work on, when he would have seen that it was still +unfit to be moulded to evil ends, he set himself to stir up tumults +against the senate and against the laws of his country. + +And herein we recognize the excellence of this city of Rome, and of the +materials whereof it was composed. For although the nobles were wont to +stand up stoutly for one another, not one of them stirred to succour +Manlius, and not one of his kinsfolk made any effort on his behalf, so +that although it was customary, in the case of other accused persons, +for their friends to put on black and sordid raiment, with all the +other outward signs of grief, in order to excite pity for the accused, +none was seen to do any of these things for Manlius. Even the tribunes +of the people, though constantly ready to promote whatever courses +seemed to favour the popular cause, and the more vehemently the more +they seemed to make against the nobles, in this instance sided with the +nobles to put down the common enemy. Nay the very people themselves, +keenly alive to their own interests, and well disposed towards any +attempt to damage the nobles, though they showed Manlius many proofs of +their regard, nevertheless, when he was cited by the tribunes to appear +before them and submit his cause for their decision, assumed the part +of judges and not of defenders, and without scruple or hesitation +sentenced him to die. Wherefore, I think, that there is no example in +the whole Roman history which serves so well as this to demonstrate the +virtues of all ranks in that republic. For not a man in the whole city +bestirred himself to shield a citizen endowed with every great quality, +and who, both publicly and privately, had done so much that deserved +praise. But in all, the love of country outweighed every other thought, +and all looked less to his past deserts than to the dangers which his +present conduct threatened; from which to relieve themselves they put +him to death. “_Such_,” says Livius, “_was the fate of a man worthy our +admiration had he not been born in a free State_.” + +And here two points should be noted. The first, that glory is to be +sought by different methods in a corrupt city, and in one which still +preserves its freedom. The second, which hardly differs from the first, +that in their actions, and especially in matters of moment, men must +have regard to times and circumstances and adapt themselves thereto. +For those persons who from an unwise choice, or from natural +inclination, run counter to the times will for the most part live +unhappily, and find all they undertake issue in failure; whereas those +who accommodate themselves to the times are fortunate and successful. +And from the passage cited we may plainly infer, that had Manlius lived +in the days of Marius and Sylla, when the body of the State had become +corrupted, so that he could have impressed it with the stamp of his +ambition, he might have had the same success as they had, and as those +others had who after them aspired to absolute power; and, conversely, +that if Sylla and Marius had lived in the days of Manlius, they must +have broken down at the very beginning of their attempts. + +For one man, by mischievous arts and measures, may easily prepare the +ground for the universal corruption of a city; but no one man in his +lifetime can carry that corruption so far, as himself to reap the +harvest; or granting that one man’s life might be long enough for this +purpose, it would be impossible for him, having regard to the ordinary +habits of men, who grow impatient and cannot long forego the +gratification of their desires, to wait until the corruption was +complete. Moreover, men deceive themselves in respect of their own +affairs, and most of all in respect of those on which they are most +bent; so that either from impatience or from self-deception, they rush +upon undertakings for which the time is not ripe, and so come to an ill +end. Wherefore to obtain absolute authority in a commonwealth and to +destroy its liberties, you must find the body of the State already +corrupted, and corrupted by a gradual wasting continued from generation +to generation; which, indeed, takes place necessarily, unless, as has +been already explained, the State be often reinforced by good examples, +or brought back to its first beginnings by wise laws. + +Manlius, therefore, would have been a rare and renowned man had he been +born in a corrupt city; and from his example we see that citizens +seeking to introduce changes in the form of their government, whether +in favour of liberty or despotism, ought to consider what materials +they have to deal with, and then judge of the difficulty of their task. +For it is no less arduous and dangerous to attempt to free a people +disposed to live in servitude, than to enslave a people who desire to +live free. + +And because it has been said above, that in their actions men must take +into account the character of the times in which they live, and guide +themselves accordingly, I shall treat this point more fully in the +following Chapter. + + + + +CHAPTER IX.—_That to enjoy constant good Fortune we must change with +the Times._ + + +I have repeatedly noted that the good or bad fortune of men depends on +whether their methods of acting accord with the character of the times. +For we see that in what they do some men act impulsively, others warily +and with caution. And because, from inability to preserve the just +mean, they in both of these ways overstep the true limit, they commit +mistakes in one direction or the other. He, however, will make fewest +mistakes, and may expect to prosper most, who, while following the +course to which nature inclines him, finds, as I have said, his method +of acting in accordance with the times in which he lives. + +All know that in his command of the Roman armies, Fabius Maximus +displayed a prudence and caution very different from the audacity and +hardihood natural to his countrymen; and it was his good fortune that +his methods suited with the times. For Hannibal coming into Italy in +all the flush of youth and recent success, having already by two +defeats stripped Rome of her best soldiers and filled her with dismay, +nothing could have been more fortunate for that republic than to find a +general able, by his deliberateness and caution, to keep the enemy at +bay. Nor, on the other hand, could Fabius have fallen upon times better +suited to the methods which he used, and by which he crowned himself +with glory. That he acted in accordance with his natural bent, and not +from a reasoned choice, we may gather from this, that when Scipio, to +bring the war to an end, proposed to pass with his army into Africa, +Fabius, unable to depart from his characteristic methods and habits, +strenuously opposed him; so that had it rested with him, Hannibal might +never have left Italy. For he perceived not that the times had changed, +and that with them it was necessary to change the methods of +prosecuting the war. Had Fabius, therefore, been King of Rome, he might +well have caused the war to end unhappily, not knowing how to +accommodate his methods to the change in the times. As it was, he lived +in a commonwealth in which there were many citizens, and many different +dispositions; and which as it produced a Fabius, excellent at a time +when it was necessary to protract hostilities, so also, afterwards gave +birth to a Scipio, at a time suited to bring them to a successful +close. + +And hence it comes that a commonwealth endures longer, and has a more +sustained good fortune than a princedom, because from the diversity in +the characters of its citizens, it can adapt itself better than a +prince can to the diversity of times. For, as I have said before, a man +accustomed to follow one method, will never alter it; whence it must +needs happen that when times change so as no longer to accord with his +method, he will be ruined. Piero Soderini, of whom I have already +spoken, was guided in all his actions by patience and gentleness, and +he and his country prospered while the times were in harmony with these +methods. But, afterwards, when a time came when it behoved him to have +done with patience and gentleness, he knew not how to drop them, and +was ruined together with his country. Pope Julius II., throughout the +whole of his pontificate, was governed by impulse and passion, and +because the times were in perfect accord, all his undertakings +prospered. But had other times come requiring other qualities, he could +not have escaped destruction, since he could not have changed his +methods nor his habitual line of conduct. + +As to why such changes are impossible, two reasons may be given. One is +that we cannot act in opposition to the bent of our nature. The other, +that when a man has been very successful while following a particular +method, he can never be convinced that it is for his advantage to try +some other. And hence it results that a man’s fortunes vary, because +times change and he does not change with them. So, too, with +commonwealths, which, as we have already shown at length, are ruined +from not altering their institutions to suit the times. And +commonwealths are slower to change than princes are, changes costing +them more effort; because occasions must be waited for which shall stir +the whole community, and it is not enough that a single citizen alters +his method of acting. + +But since I have made mention of Fabius Maximus who wore out Hannibal +by keeping him at bay, I think it opportune to consider in the +following Chapter whether a general who desires to engage his enemy at +all risks, can be prevented by that enemy from doing so. + + + + +CHAPTER X.—_That a Captain cannot escape Battle when his Enemy forces +it on him at all risks._ + + +“_Cneius Sulpitius when appointed dictator against the Gauls, being +unwilling to tempt Fortune by attacking an enemy whom delay and a +disadvantageous position would every day render weaker, protracted the +war._” + +When a mistake is made of a sort that all or most men are likely to +fall into, I think it not amiss to mark it again and again with +disapproval. Wherefore, although I have already shown repeatedly how in +affairs of moment the actions of the moderns conform not to those of +antiquity, still it seems to me not superfluous, in this place, to say +the same thing once more. For if in any particular the moderns have +deviated from the methods of the ancients, it is especially in their +methods of warfare, wherein not one of those rules formerly so much +esteemed is now attended to. And this because both princes and +commonwealths have devolved the charge of such matters upon others, +and, to escape danger, have kept aloof from all military service; so +that although one or another of the princes of our times may +occasionally be seen present in person with his army, we are not +therefore to expect from him any further praiseworthy behaviour. For +even where such personages take part in any warlike enterprise, they do +so out of ostentation and from no nobler motive; though doubtless from +sometimes seeing their soldiers face to face, and from retaining to +themselves the title of command, they are likely to make fewer blunders +than we find made by republics, and most of all by the republics of +Italy, which though altogether dependent upon others, and themselves +utterly ignorant of everything relating to warfare, do yet, that they +may figure as the commanders of their armies, take upon them to direct +their movements, and in doing so commit countless mistakes; some of +which have been considered elsewhere but one is of such importance as +to deserve notice here. + +When these sluggard princes or effeminate republics send forth any of +their Captains, it seems to them that the wisest instruction they can +give him is to charge him on no account to give battle, but, on the +contrary, to do what he can to avoid fighting. Wherein they imagine +themselves to imitate the prudence of Fabius Maximus, who by +protracting the war with Hannibal, saved the Roman commonwealth; not +perceiving that in most instances such advice to a captain is either +useless or hurtful. For the truth of the matter is, that a captain who +would keep the field, cannot decline battle when his adversary forces +it on him at all hazards. So that the instruction to avoid battle is +but tantamount to saying, “You shall engage when it pleases your enemy, +and not when it suits yourself.” For if you would keep the field and +yet avoid battle, the only safe course is to interpose a distance of at +least fifty miles between you and your enemy, and afterwards to +maintain so vigilant a look-out, that should he advance you will have +time to make your retreat. Another method is to shut yourself up in +some town. But both of these methods are extremely disadvantageous. For +by following the former, you leave your country a prey to the enemy, +and a valiant prince would far sooner risk the chances of battle than +prolong a war in a manner so disastrous to his subjects; while by +adopting the latter method, and shutting yourself up in a town with +your army, there is manifest danger of your being besieged, and +presently reduced by famine and forced to surrender. Wherefore it is +most mischievous to seek to avoid battle in either of these two ways. + +To intrench yourself in a strong position, as Fabius was wont to do, is +a good method when your army is so formidable that the enemy dare not +advance to attack you in your intrenchments; yet it cannot truly be +said that Fabius avoided battle, but rather that he sought to give +battle where he could do so with advantage. For had Hannibal desired to +fight, Fabius would have waited for him and fought him. But Hannibal +never dared to engage him on his own ground. So that an engagement was +avoided as much by Hannibal as by Fabius, since if either had been +minded to fight at all hazards the other would have been constrained to +take one of three courses, that is to say, one or other of the two just +now mentioned, or else to retreat. The truth of this is confirmed by +numberless examples, and more particularly by what happened in the war +waged by the Romans against Philip of Macedon, the father of Perseus. +For Philip being invaded by the Romans, resolved not to give them +battle; and to avoid battle, sought at first to do as Fabius had done +in Italy, posting himself on the summit of a hill, where he intrenched +himself strongly, thinking that the Romans would not venture to attack +him there. But they advancing and attacking him in his intrenchments, +drove him from his position; when, unable to make further resistance, +he fled with the greater part of his army, and was only saved from +utter destruction by the difficulty of the ground, which made it +impossible for the Romans to pursue him. + +Philip, therefore, who had no mind to fight, encamping too near the +Romans, was forced to fly; and learning from this experience that to +escape fighting it was not enough for him to intrench himself on a +hill, yet not choosing to shut himself up in a walled town, he was +constrained to take the other alternative of keeping at a distance of +many miles from the Roman legions. Accordingly, when the Romans entered +one province, he betook himself to another, and when they left a +province he entered it. But perceiving that by protracting the war in +this way, his condition grew constantly worse, while his subjects +suffered grievously, now from his own troops, at another time from +those of the enemy, he at last resolved to hazard battle, and so came +to a regular engagement with the Romans. + +It is for your interest, therefore, not to fight, when you possess the +same advantages as Fabius, or as Cneius Sulpitius had; in other words, +when your army is so formidable in itself that the enemy dare not +attack you in your intrenchments, and although he has got within your +territory has yet gained no footing there, and suffers in consequence +from the want of necessary supplies. In such circumstances delay is +useful, for the reasons assigned by Titus Livius when speaking of +Sulpitius. In no other circumstances, however, can an engagement be +avoided without dishonour or danger. For to retire as Philip did, is +nothing else than defeat; and the disgrace is greater in proportion as +your valour has been less put to the proof. And if Philip was lucky +enough to escape, another, not similarly favoured by the nature of the +ground, might not have the same good fortune. + +That Hannibal was not a master in the arts of warfare there is none +will venture to maintain. Wherefore, when he had to encounter Scipio in +Africa, it may be assumed that had he seen any advantage in prolonging +the war he would have done so; and, possibly, being a skilful captain +and in command of a valiant army, he might have been able to do what +Fabius did in Italy. But since he took not that course, we may infer +that he was moved by sufficient reasons. For the captain who has got an +army together, and perceives that from want of money or friends he +cannot maintain it long, must be a mere madman if he do not at once, +and before his army melts away, try the fortunes of battle; since he is +certain to lose by delay, while by fighting he may chance to succeed. +And there is this also to be kept in view, that we must strive, even if +we be defeated, to gain glory; and that more glory is to be won in +being beaten by force, than in a defeat from any other cause. And this +we may suppose to have weighed with Hannibal. On the other hand, +supposing Hannibal to have declined battle, Scipio, even if he had +lacked courage to follow him up and attack him in his intrenched camp, +would not have suffered thereby; for as he had defeated Syphax, and got +possession of many of the African towns, he could have rested where he +was in the same security and with the same convenience as if he had +been in Italy. But this was not the case with Hannibal when he had to +encounter Fabius, nor with the Gauls when they were opposed to +Sulpitius. + +Least of all can he decline battle who invades with his army the +country of another; for seeking to enter his enemy’s country, he must +fight whenever the enemy comes forward to meet him; and is under still +greater necessity to fight, if he undertake the siege of any town. As +happened in our own day with Duke Charles of Burgundy, who, when +beleaguering Morat, a town of the Swiss, was by them attacked and +routed; or as happened with the French army encamped against Novara, +which was in like manner defeated by the Swiss. + + + + +CHAPTER XI.—_That one who has to contend with many, though he be weaker +than they, will prevail if he can withstand their first onset._ + + +The power exercised in Rome by the tribunes of the people was great, +and, as I have repeatedly explained, was necessary, since otherwise +there would have been no check on the ambition of the nobles, and the +commonwealth must have grown corrupted far sooner than it did. But +because, as I have said elsewhere, there is in everything a latent evil +peculiar to it, giving rise to new mischances, it becomes necessary to +provide against these by new ordinances. The authority of the tribunes, +therefore, being insolently asserted so as to become formidable to the +nobility and to the entire city, disorders dangerous to the liberty of +the State must thence have resulted, had not a method been devised by +Appius Claudius for controlling the ambition of the tribunes. This was, +to secure that there should always be one of their number timid, or +venal, or else a lover of the general good, who could be influenced to +oppose the rest whenever these sought to pass any measure contrary to +the wishes of the senate. This remedy was a great restraint on the +excessive authority of the tribunes, and on many occasions proved +serviceable to Rome. + +I am led by this circumstance to remark, that when many powerful +persons are united against one, who, although no match for the others +collectively, is also powerful, the chances are more in favour of this +single and less I powerful person, than of the many who together are +much stronger. For setting aside an infinity of accidents which can be +turned to better account by one than by many, it will always happen +that, by exercising a little dexterity, the one will be able to divide +the many, and weaken the force which was strong while it was united. In +proof whereof, I shall not refer to ancient examples, though many such +might be cited, but content myself with certain modern instances taken +from the events of our own times. + +In the year 1484, all Italy combined against the Venetians, who finding +their position desperate, and being unable to keep their army any +longer in the field, bribed Signer Lodovico, who then governed Milan, +and so succeeded in effecting a settlement, whereby they not only +recovered the towns they had lost, but also obtained for themselves a +part of the territories of Ferrara; so that those were by peace the +gainers, who in war had been the losers. Not many years ago the whole +world was banded together against France; but before the war came to a +close, Spain breaking with the confederates and entering into a +separate treaty with France, the other members of the league also, were +presently forced to make terms. + +Wherefore we may always assume when we see a war set on foot by many +against one, that this one, if he have strength to withstand the first +shock, and can temporize and wait his opportunity, is certain to +prevail. But unless he can do this he runs a thousand dangers: as did +the Venetians in the year 1508, who, could they have temporized with +the French, and so got time to conciliate some of those who had +combined against them, might have escaped the ruin which then overtook +them. But not possessing such a strong army as would have enabled them +to temporize with their enemies, and consequently not having the time +needed for gaining any to their side, they were undone. Yet we know +that the Pope, as soon as he had obtained what he wanted, made friends +with them, and that Spain did the like; and that both the one and the +other of these powers would gladly have saved the Lombard territory for +themselves, nor would, if they could have helped it, have left it to +France, so as to augment her influence in Italy. + +The Venetians, therefore, should have given up a part to save the rest; +and had they done so at a time when the surrender would not have seemed +to be made under compulsion, and before any step had been taken in the +direction of war, it would have been a most prudent course; although +discreditable and probably of little avail after war had been begun. +But until the war broke out, few of the Venetian citizens recognized +the danger, fewer still the remedy, and none ventured to prescribe it. + +But to return to the point whence we started, I say that the same +safeguard for their country which the Roman senate found against the +ambition of the tribunes in their number, is within the reach of the +prince who is attacked by many adversaries, if he only know to use +prudently those methods which promote division. + + + + +CHAPTER XII.—_A prudent Captain will do what he can to make it +necessary for his own Soldiers to fight, and to relieve his Enemy from +that necessity._ + + +Elsewhere I have noted how greatly men are governed in what they do by +Necessity, and how much of their renown is due to her guidance, so that +it has even been said by some philosophers, that the hands and tongues +of men, the two noblest instruments of their fame, would never have +worked to perfection, nor have brought their labours to that pitch of +excellence we see them to have reached, had they not been impelled by +this cause. The captains of antiquity, therefore, knowing the virtues +of this necessity, and seeing the steadfast courage which it gave their +soldiers in battle, spared no effort to bring their armies under its +influence, while using all their address to loosen its hold upon their +enemies. For which reason, they would often leave open to an adversary +some way which they might have closed, and close against their own men +some way they might have left open. + +Whosoever, therefore, would have a city defend itself stubbornly, or an +army fight resolutely in the field, must before all things endeavour to +impress the minds of those whom he commands with the belief that no +other course is open to them. In like manner a prudent captain who +undertakes the attack of a city, will measure the ease or difficulty of +his enterprise, by knowing and considering the nature of the necessity +which compels the inhabitants to defend it; and where he finds that +necessity to be strong, he may infer that his task will be difficult, +but if otherwise, that it will be easy. + +And hence it happens that cities are harder to be recovered after a +revolt than to be taken for the first time. Because on a first attack, +having no occasion to fear punishment, since they have given no ground +of offence, they readily surrender; but when they have revolted, they +know that they have given ground of offence, and, fearing punishment, +are not so easily brought under. A like stubbornness grows from the +natural hostility with which princes or republics who are neighbours +regard one another; which again is caused by the desire to dominate +over those who live near, or from jealousy of their power. This is more +particularly the case with republics, as in Tuscany for example; for +contention and rivalry have always made, and always will make it +extremely hard for one republic to bring another into subjection. And +for this reason any one who considers attentively who are the +neighbours of Florence, and who of Venice, will not marvel so much as +some have done, that Florence should have spent more than Venice on her +wars and gained less; since this results entirely from the Venetians +finding their neighbouring towns less obstinate in their resistance +than the Florentines theirs. For all the towns in the neighbourhood of +Venice have been used to live under princes and not in freedom; and +those who are used to servitude commonly think little of changing +masters, nay are often eager for the change. In this way Venice, though +she has had more powerful neighbours than Florence, has been able, from +finding their towns less stubborn, to subdue them more easily than the +latter, surrounded exclusively by free cities, has had it in her power +to do. + +But, to return to the matter in hand, the captain who attacks a town +should use what care he can, not to drive the defenders to extremities, +lest he render them stubborn; but when they fear punishment should +promise them pardon, and when they fear for their freedom should assure +them that he has no designs against the common welfare, but only +against a few ambitious men in their city; for such assurances have +often smoothed the way to the surrender of towns. And although pretexts +of this sort are easily seen through, especially by the wise, the mass +of the people are often beguiled by them, because desiring present +tranquillity, they shut their eyes to the snares hidden behind these +specious promises. By means such as these, therefore, cities +innumerable have been brought into subjection, as recently was the case +with Florence. The ruin of Crassus and his army was similarly caused: +for although he himself saw through the empty promises of the +Parthians, as meant only to blind the Roman soldiers to the necessity +of defending themselves, yet he could not keep his men steadfast, they, +as we clearly gather in reading the life of this captain, being +deceived by the offers of peace held out to them by their enemies. + +On the other hand, when the Samnites, who, at the instance of a few +ambitious men, and in violation of the terms of the truce made with +them, had overrun and pillaged lands belonging to the allies of Rome, +afterwards sent envoys to Rome to implore peace, offering to restore +whatever they had taken, and to surrender the authors of these injuries +and outrages as prisoners, and these offers were rejected by the +Romans, and the envoys returned to Samnium bringing with them no hope +of an adjustment, Claudius Pontius, who then commanded the army of the +Samnites, showed them in a remarkable speech, that the Romans desired +war at all hazards, and declared that, although for the sake of his +country he wished for peace, necessity constrained him to prepare for +war; telling them “_that was a just war which could not be escaped, and +those arms sacred in which lay their only hopes._” And building on this +necessity, he raised in the minds of his soldiers a confident +expectation of success. That I may not have to revert to this matter +again, it will be convenient to notice here those examples from Roman +history which most merit attention. When Caius Manilius was in command +of the legions encamped against Veii, a division of the Veientine army +having got within the Roman intrenchments, Manilius ran forward with a +company of his men to defend them, and, to prevent the escape of the +Veientines, guarded all the approaches to the camp. The Veientines +finding themselves thus shut in, began to fight with such fury that +they slew Manilius, and would have destroyed all the rest of the Roman +army, had not the prudence of one of the tribunes opened a way for the +Veientines to retreat. Here we see that so long as necessity compelled, +the Veientines fought most fiercely, but on finding a path opened for +escape, preferred flight to combat. On another occasion when the +Volscians and Equians passed with their armies across the Roman +frontier, the consuls were sent out to oppose them, and an engagement +ensued. It so happened that when the combat was at its height, the army +of the Volscians, commanded by Vectius Mescius, suddenly found +themselves shut in between their own camp, which a division of the +Romans had occupied, and the body of the Roman army; when seeing that +they must either perish or cut a way for themselves with their swords, +Vectius said to them, “_Come on, my men, here is no wall or rampart to +be scaled: we fight man with man; in valour we are their equals, and +necessity, that last and mightiest weapon, gives us the advantage._” +Here, then, necessity is spoken of by Titus Livius as _the last and +mightiest weapon_. + +Camillus, the wisest and most prudent of all the Roman commanders, when +he had got within the town of Veii with his army, to make its surrender +easier and not to drive its inhabitants to desperation, called out to +his men, so that the Veientines might hear, to spare all whom they +found unarmed. Whereupon the defenders throwing away their weapons, the +town was taken almost without bloodshed. And this device was afterwards +followed by many other captains. + + + + +CHAPTER XIII.—_Whether we may trust more to a valiant Captain with a +weak Army, or to a valiant Army with a weak Captain._ + + +Coriolanus being banished from Rome betook himself to the Volscians, +and when he had got together an army wherewith to avenge himself on his +countrymen, came back to Rome; yet, again withdrew, not constrained to +retire by the might of the Roman arms, but out of reverence for his +mother. From this incident, says Titus Livius, we may learn that the +spread of the Roman power was due more to the valour of her captains +than of her soldiers. For before this the Volscians had always been +routed, and only grew successful when Coriolanus became their captain. + +But though Livius be of this opinion, there are many passages in his +history to show that the Roman soldiers, even when left without +leaders, often performed astonishing feats of valour, nay, sometimes +maintained better discipline and fought with greater spirit after their +consuls were slain than they had before. For example, the army under +the Scipios in Spain, after its two leaders had fallen, was able by its +valour not merely to secure its own safety, but to overcome the enemy +and preserve the province for the Roman Republic. So that to state the +case fairly, we find many instances in which the valour of the soldiers +alone gained the day, as well as many in which success was wholly due +to the excellence of the captain. From which it may be inferred that +the one stands in need of the other. + +And here the question suggests itself: which is the more formidable, a +good army badly led, or a good captain commanding an indifferent army; +though, were we to adopt the opinion of Cæsar on this head, we ought +lightly to esteem both. For when Cæsar went to Spain against Afranius +and Petreius, who were there in command of a strong army, he made +little account of them, saying, “_that he went to fight an army without +a captain_,” indicating thereby the weakness of these generals. And, +conversely, when he went to encounter Pompeius in Thessaly, he said, +“_I go against a captain without an army_.”[13] + + [13] Professus ante inter suos, ire se ad exercitum sine duce, et inde + reversurum ad ducem sine exercitu. (_Suet. in Vita J. Caes._) + + +A further question may also be raised, whether it is easier for a good +captain to make a good army, or for a good army to make a good captain. +As to this it might be thought there was barely room for doubt, since +it ought to be far easier for many who are good to find one who is good +or teach him to become so, than for one who is good to find or make +many good. Lucullus when sent against Mithridates was wholly without +experience in war: but his brave army, which was provided with many +excellent officers, speedily taught him to be a good captain. On the +other hand, when the Romans, being badly off for soldiers, armed a +number of slaves and gave them over to be drilled by Sempronius +Gracchus, he in a short time made them into a serviceable army. So too, +as I have already mentioned, Pelopidas and Epaminondas after rescuing +Thebes, their native city, from Spartan thraldom, in a short time made +such valiant soldiers of the Theban peasantry, as to be able with their +aid not only to withstand, but even to defeat the Spartan armies. So +that the question may seem to be equally balanced, excellence on one +side generally finding excellence on the other. + +A good army, however, when left without a good leader, as the +Macedonian army was on the death of Alexander, or as those veterans +were who had fought in the civil wars, is apt to grow restless and +turbulent. Wherefore I am convinced that it is better to trust to the +captain who has time allowed him to discipline his men, and means +wherewith to equip them, than to a tumultuary host with a chance leader +of its own choosing. But twofold is the merit and twofold the glory of +those captains who not only have had to subdue their enemies, but also +before encountering them to organize and discipline their forces. This, +however, is a task requiring qualities so seldom combined, that were +many of those captains who now enjoy a great name with the world, +called on to perform it, they would be much less thought of than they +are. + + + + +CHAPTER XIV.—_Of the effect produced in Battle by strange and +unexpected Sights or Sounds._ + + +That the disorder occasioned by strange and unexpected sights or sounds +may have momentous consequences in combat, might be shown by many +instances, but by none better than by what befell in the battle fought +between the Romans and the Volscians, when Quintius, the Roman general, +seeing one wing of his army begin to waver, shouted aloud to his men to +stand firm, for the other wing was already victorious. Which words of +his giving confidence to his own troops and striking the enemy with +dismay won him the battle. But if a cry like this, produce great effect +on a well disciplined army, far greater must be its effect on one which +is ill disciplined and disorderly. For by such a wind the whole mass +will be moved, as I shall show by a well-known instance happening in +our own times. + +A few years ago the city of Perugia was split into the two factions of +the Baglioni and the Oddi, the former holding the government, the +latter being in exile. The Oddeschi, however, with the help of friends, +having got together an armed force which they lodged in villages of +their own near Perugia, obtained, by the favour of some of their party, +an entrance into the city by night, and moving forward without +discovery, came as far as the public square. And as all the streets of +Perugia are barred with chains drawn across them at their corners, the +Oddeschi had in front of them a man who carried an iron hammer +wherewith to break the fastenings of the chains so that horsemen might +pass. When the only chain remaining unbroken was that which closed the +public square, the alarm having now been given, the hammerman was so +impeded by the crowd pressing behind him that he could not raise his +arm to strike freely. Whereupon, to get more room for his work, he +called aloud to the others to stand back; and the word back passing +from rank to rank those furthest off began to run, and, presently, the +others also, with such precipitancy, that they fell into utter +disorder. In this way, and from this trifling circumstance, the attempt +of the Oddeschi came to nothing. + +Here we may note that discipline is needed in an army, not so much to +enable it to fight according to a settled order, as that it may not be +thrown into confusion by every insignificant accident. For a tumultuary +host is useless in war, simply because every word, or cry, or sound, +may throw it into a panic and cause it to fly. Wherefore it behoves a +good captain to provide that certain fixed persons shall receive his +orders and pass them on to the rest, and to accustom his soldiers to +look to these persons, and to them only, to be informed what his orders +are. For whenever this precaution is neglected the gravest mishaps are +constantly seen to ensue. + +As regards strange and unexpected sights, every captain should +endeavour while his army is actually engaged with the enemy, to effect +some such feint or diversion as will encourage his own men and dismay +his adversary since this of all things that can happen is the likeliest +to ensure victory. In evidence whereof we may cite the example of +Cneius Sulpitius, the Roman dictator, who, when about to give battle to +the Gauls, after arming his sutlers and camp followers, mounted them on +mules and other beasts of burden, furnished them with spears and +banners to look like cavalry, and placing them behind a hill, ordered +them on a given signal, when the fight was at the hottest, to appear +and show themselves to the enemy. All which being carried out as he had +arranged, threw the Gauls into such alarm, that they lost the battle. + +A good captain, therefore, has two things to see to: first, to contrive +how by some sudden surprise he may throw his enemy into confusion; and +next, to be prepared should the enemy use a like stratagem against him +to discover and defeat it; as the stratagem of Semiramis was defeated +by the King of India. For Semiramis seeing that this king had elephants +in great numbers, to dismay him by showing that she, too, was well +supplied, caused the skins of many oxen and buffaloes to be sewn +together in the shape of elephants and placed upon camels and sent to +the front. But the trick being detected by the king, turned out not +only useless but hurtful to its contriver. In a battle which the +Dictator Mamercus fought against the people of Fidenae, the latter, to +strike terror into the minds of the Romans, contrived that while the +combat raged a number of soldiers should issue from Fidenae bearing +lances tipped with fire, thinking that the Romans, disturbed by so +strange a sight, would be thrown into confusion. + +We are to note, however, with regard to such contrivances, that if they +are to serve any useful end, they should _be_ formidable as well as +_seem_ so; for when they menace a real danger, their weak points are +not so soon discerned. When they have more of pretence than reality, it +will be well either to dispense with them altogether, or resorting to +them, to keep them, like the muleteers of Sulpitius, in the background, +so that they be not too readily found out. For any weakness inherent in +them is soon discovered if they be brought near, when, as happened with +the elephants of Semiramis and the fiery spears of the men of Fidenae, +they do harm rather than good. For although by this last-mentioned +device the Romans at the first were somewhat disconcerted, so soon as +the dictator came up and began to chide them, asking if they were not +ashamed to fly like bees from smoke, and calling on them to turn on +their enemy, and “_with her own flames efface that Fidenae whom their +benefits could not conciliate_,” they took courage; so that the device +proved of no service to its contrivers, who were vanquished in the +battle. + + + + +CHAPTER XV.—_That one and not many should head an Army: and why it is +harmful to have more Leaders than one._ + + +The men of Fidenae rising against the colonists whom the Romans had +settled among them, and putting them to the sword, the Romans to avenge +the insult appointed four tribunes with consular powers: one of whom +they retained to see to the defence of Rome, while the other three were +sent against the Fidenati and the Veientines. But these three falling +out among themselves, and being divided in their counsels, returned +from their mission with discredit though not with loss. Of which +discredit they were themselves the cause. That they sustained no loss +was due to the valour of their soldiers But the senate perceiving the +source of the mischief, to the end that one man might put to rights +what three had thrown into confusion, resorted to the appointment of a +dictator. + +Here we see the disadvantage of having several leaders in one army or +in a town which has to defend itself. And the case could not be put in +clearer words than by Titus Livius, where he says, “_The three tribunes +with consular authority gave proof how hurtful it is in war to have +many leaders; for each forming a different opinion, and each abiding by +his own, they threw opportunities in the way of their enemies._” And +though this example suffice by itself to show the disadvantage in war +of divided commands, to make the matter still plainer I shall cite two +further instances, one ancient and one modern. + +In the year 1500, Louis XII. of France, after recovering Milan, sent +troops to restore Pisa to the Florentines, Giovambattista Ridolfi and +Luca d’Antonio Albizzi going with them as commissaries. Now, because +Giovambattista had a great name, and was older than Luca, the latter +left the whole management of everything to him; and although he did not +show his jealousy of him by opposing him, he betrayed it by his +silence, and by being so careless and indifferent about everything, +that he gave no help in the business of the siege either by word or +deed, just as though he had been a person of no account. But when, in +consequence of an accident, Giovambattista had to return to Florence, +all this was changed; for Luca, remaining in sole charge, behaved with +the greatest courage, prudence, and zeal, all which qualities had been +hidden while he held a joint command. Further to bear me out I shall +again borrow the words of Titus Livius, who, in relating how when +Quintius and Agrippa his colleague were sent by the Romans against the +Equians, Agrippa contrived that the conduct of the war should rest with +Quintius, observes, “_Most wholesome is it that in affairs of great +moment, supreme authority be vested in one man._” Very different, +however, is the course followed by the republics and princes of our own +days, who, thinking to be better served, are used to appoint several +captains or commissioners to fill one command; a practice giving rise +to so much confusion, that were we seeking for the causes of the +overthrow of the French and Italian armies in recent times, we should +find this to be the most active of any. + +Rightly, therefore, may we conclude that in sending forth an army upon +service, it is wiser to entrust it to one man of ordinary prudence, +than to two of great parts but with a divided command. + + + + +CHAPTER XVI.—_That in Times of Difficulty true Worth is sought after; +whereas in quiet Times it is not the most deserving, but those who are +recommended by Wealth or Connection who are most in favour._ + + +It always has happened and always will, that the great and admirable +men of a republic are neglected in peaceful times; because at such +seasons many citizens are found, who, envying the reputation these men +have justly earned, seek to be regarded not merely as their equals but +as their superiors. Touching this there is a notable passage in +Thucydides, the Greek historian, where he tells how the republic of +Athens coming victorious out of the Peloponessian war, wherein she had +bridled the pride of Sparta, and brought almost the whole of Greece +under her authority, was encouraged by the greatness of her renown to +propose to herself the conquest of Sicily. In Athens this scheme was +much debated, Alcibiades and certain others who had the public welfare +very little in their thoughts, but who hoped that the enterprise, were +they placed in command, might minister to their fame, recommending that +it should be undertaken. Nicias, on the other hand, one of the best +esteemed of the Athenian citizens, was against it, and in addressing +the people, gave it as the strongest reason for trusting his advice, +that in advising them not to engage in this war, he urged what was not +for his own advantage; for he knew that while Athens remained at peace +numberless citizens were ready to take precedence of him: whereas, were +war declared, he was certain that none would rank before him or even be +looked upon as his equal. + +Here we see that in tranquil times republics are subject to the +infirmity of lightly esteeming their worthiest citizens. And this +offends these persons for two reasons: first, because they are not +given the place they deserve; and second, because they see unworthy men +and of abilities inferior to their own, as much or more considered than +they. Injustice such as this has caused the ruin of many republics. For +citizens who find themselves undeservedly slighted, and perceive the +cause to be that the times are tranquil and not troubled, will strive +to change the times by stirring up wars hurtful to the public welfare. +When I look for remedies for this state of things, I find two: first, +to keep the citizens poor, so that wealth without worth shall corrupt +neither them nor others; second, to be so prepared for war as always to +be ready to make war; for then there will always be a need for worthy +citizens, as was the case in Rome in early times. For as Rome +constantly kept her armies in the field, there was constant opportunity +for men to display their valour, nor was it possible to deprive a +deserving man of his post and give it to another who was not deserving. +Or if ever this were done by inadvertency, or by way of experiment, +there forthwith resulted such disorder and danger, that the city at +once retraced its steps and reverted to the true path. But other +republics which are not regulated on the same plan, and make war only +when driven to it by necessity, cannot help committing this injustice, +nay, will constantly run into it, when, if the great citizen who finds +himself slighted be vindictive, and have some credit and following in +the city, disorder will always ensue. And though Rome escaped this +danger for a time, she too, as has elsewhere been said, having no +longer, after she had conquered Carthage and Antiochus, any fear of +war, came to think she might commit her armies to whom she would, +making less account of the valour of her captains than of those other +qualities which gain favour with the people. Accordingly we find Paulus +Emilius rejected oftener than once when he sought the consulship; nor, +in fact, obtaining it until the Macedonian war broke out, which, being +judged a formidable business, was by the voice of the whole city +committed to his management. After the year 1494 our city of Florence +was involved in a series of wars, in conducting which none of our +citizens had any success until chance threw the command into the hands +of one who showed us how an army should be led. This was Antonio +Giacomini, and so long as there were dangerous wars on foot, all +rivalry on the part of other citizens was suspended; and whenever a +captain or commissary had to be appointed he was unopposed. But when a +war came to be undertaken, as to the issue of which no misgivings were +felt, and which promised both honour and preferment, so numerous were +the competitors for command, that three commissaries having to be +chosen to conduct the siege of Pisa, Antonio was left out; and though +it cannot with certainty be shown that any harm resulted to our +republic from his not having been sent on this enterprise, we may +reasonably conjecture that such was indeed the case. For as the people +of Pisa were then without means either for subsistence or defence, it +may be believed that had Antonio been there he would have reduced them +to such extremities as would have forced them to surrender at +discretion to the Florentines. But Pisa being besieged by captains who +knew neither how to blockade nor how to storm it, held out so long, +that the Florentines, who should have reduced it by force, were obliged +to buy its submission. Neglect like this might well move Antonio to +resentment; and he must needs have been both very patient and very +forgiving if he felt no desire to revenge himself when he could, by the +ruin of the city or by injuries to individual citizens. But a republic +should beware not to rouse such feelings, as I shall show in the +following Chapter. + + + + +CHAPTER XVII.—_That we are not to offend a Man, and then send him to +fill an important Office or Command._ + + +A republic should think twice before appointing to an important command +a citizen who has sustained notable wrong at the hands of his +fellow-citizens. Claudius Nero, quitting the army with which he was +opposing Hannibal, went with a part of his forces into the March of +Ancona, designing to join the other consul there, and after joining him +to attack Hasdrubal before he came up with his brother. Now Claudius +had previously commanded against Hasdrubal in Spain, and after driving +him with his army into such a position that it seemed he must either +fight at a disadvantage or perish by famine, had been outwitted by his +adversary, who, while diverting his attention with proposals of terms, +contrived to slip through his hands and rob him of the opportunity for +effecting his destruction. This becoming known in Rome brought Claudius +into so much discredit both with the senate and people, that to his +great mortification and displeasure, he was slightingly spoken of by +the whole city. But being afterwards made consul and sent to oppose +Hannibal, he took the course mentioned above, which was in itself so +hazardous that all Rome was filled with doubt and anxiety until tidings +came of Hasdrubal’s defeat. When subsequently asked why he had played +so dangerous a game, wherein without urgent necessity he had staked the +very existence of Rome, Claudius answered, he had done so because he +knew that were he to succeed he would recover whatever credit he had +lost in Spain; while if he failed, and his attempt had an untoward +issue, he would be revenged on that city and On those citizens who had +so ungratefully and indiscreetly wronged him. + +But if resentment for an offence like this so deeply moved a Roman +citizen at a time when Rome was still uncorrupted, we should consider +how it may act on the citizen of a State not constituted as Rome then +was. And because there is no certain remedy we can apply to such +disorders when they arise in republics, it follows that it is +impossible to establish a republic which shall endure always; since in +a thousand unforeseen ways ruin may overtake it. + + + + +CHAPTER XVIII.—_That it is the highest Quality of a Captain to be able +to forestall the designs of his Adversary._ + + +It was a saying of Epaminondas the Theban that nothing was so useful +and necessary for a commander as to be able to see through the +intentions and designs of his adversary. And because it is hard to come +at this knowledge directly, the more credit is due to him who reaches +it by conjecture. Yet sometimes it is easier to fathom an enemy’s +designs than to construe his actions; and not so much those actions +which are done at a distance from us, as those done in our presence and +under our very eyes. For instance, it has often happened that when a +battle has lasted till nightfall, the winner has believed himself the +loser, and the loser has believed himself the winner and that this +mistake has led him who made it to follow a course hurtful to himself. +It was from a mistake of this sort, that Brutus and Cassius lost the +battle of Philippi. For though Brutus was victorious with his wing of +the army Cassius, whose wing was beaten, believed the entire army to be +defeated, and under this belief gave way to despair and slew himself. +So too, in our own days, in the battle fought by Francis, king of +France, with the Swiss at Santa Cecilia in Lombardy, when night fell, +those of the Swiss who remained unbroken, not knowing that the rest had +been routed and slain, thought they had the victory; and so believing +would not retreat, but, remaining on the field, renewed the combat the +following morning to their great disadvantage. Nor were they the only +sufferers from their mistake, since the armies of the Pope and of Spain +were also misled by it, and well-nigh brought to destruction. For on +the false report of a victory they crossed the Po, and had they only +advanced a little further must have been made prisoners by the +victorious French. + +An instance is recorded of a like mistake having been made in the camps +both of the Romans and of the Equians. For the Consul Sempronius being +in command against the Equians, and giving the enemy battle, the +engagement lasted with varying success till nightfall, when as both +armies had suffered what was almost a defeat, neither returned to their +camp, but each drew off to the neighboring hills where they thought +they would be safer. The Romans separated into two divisions, one of +which with the consul, the other with the centurion Tempanius by whose +valour the army had that day been saved from utter rout. At daybreak +the consul, without waiting for further tidings of the enemy, made +straight for Rome; and the Equians, in like manner, withdrew to their +own country. For as each supposed the other to be victorious, neither +thought much of leaving their camp to be plundered by the enemy. It so +chanced, however, that Tempanius, who was himself retreating with the +second division of the Roman army, fell in with certain wounded +Equians, from whom he learned that their commanders had fled, +abandoning their camp; on hearing which, he at once returned to the +Roman camp and secured it, and then, after sacking the camp of the +Equians, went back victorious to Rome. His success, as we see, turned +entirely on his being the first to be informed of the enemy’s +condition. And here we are to note that it may often happen that both +the one and the other of two opposed armies shall fall into the same +disorder, and be reduced to the same straits; in which case, that which +soonest detects the other’s distress is sure to come off best. + +I shall give an instance of this which occurred recently in our own +country. In the year 1498, when the Florentines had a great army in the +territory of Pisa and had closely invested the town, the Venetians, who +had undertaken its protection, seeing no other way to save it, resolved +to make a diversion in its favour by attacking the territories of the +Florentines in another quarter. Wherefore, having assembled a strong +force, they entered Tuscany by the Val di Lamona, and seizing on the +village of Marradi, besieged the stronghold of Castiglione which stands +on the height above it. Getting word of this, the Florentines sought to +relieve Marradi, without weakening the army which lay round Pisa. They +accordingly raised a new levy of foot-soldiers, and equipped a fresh +squadron of horse, which they despatched to Marradi under the joint +command of Jacopo IV. d’Appiano, lord of Piombino, and Count Rinuccio +of Marciano. These troops taking up their position on the hill above +Marradi, the Venetians withdrew from the investment of Castiglione and +lodged themselves in the village. But when the two armies had +confronted one another for several days, both began to suffer sorely +from want of victuals and other necessaries, and neither of them daring +to attack the other, or knowing to what extremities the other was +reduced, both simultaneously resolved to strike their camps the +following morning, and to retreat, the Venetians towards Berzighella +and Faenza, the Florentines towards Casaglia and the Mugello. But at +daybreak, when both armies had begun to remove their baggage, it so +happened that an old woman, whose years and poverty permitted her to +pass unnoticed, leaving the village of Marradi, came to the Florentine +camp, where were certain of her kinsfolk whom she desired to visit. +Learning from her that the Venetians were in retreat, the Florentine +commanders took courage, and changing their plan, went in pursuit of +the enemy as though they had dislodged them, sending word to Florence +that they had repulsed the Venetians and gained a victory. But in truth +this victory was wholly due to their having notice of the enemy’s +movements before the latter had notice of theirs. For had that notice +been given to the Venetians first, it would have wrought against us the +same results as it actually wrought for us. + + + + +CHAPTER XIX.—_Whether Indulgence or Severity be more necessary for +controlling a Multitude._ + + +The Roman Republic was distracted by the feuds of the nobles and +commons. Nevertheless, on war breaking out, Quintius and Appius +Claudius were sent forth in command of Roman armies. From his harshness +and severity to his soldiers, Appius was so ill obeyed by them, that +after sustaining what almost amounted to a defeat, he had to resign his +command. Quintius, on the contrary, by kindly and humane treatment, +kept his men obedient and returned victorious to Rome. From this it +might seem that to govern a large body of men, it is better to be +humane than haughty, and kindly rather than severe. + +And yet Cornelius Tacitus, with whom many other authors are agreed, +pronounces a contrary opinion where he says, “_In governing a multitude +it avails more to punish than to be compliant._”[14] If it be asked how +these opposite views can be reconciled, I answer that you exercise +authority either over men used to regard you as their equal, or over +men who have always been subject to you. When those over whom you +exercise authority are your equals, you cannot trust wholly to +punishment or to that severity of which Tacitus speaks. And since in +Rome itself the commons had equal weight with the nobles, none +appointed their captain for a time only, could control them by using +harshness and severity. Accordingly we find that those Roman captains +who gained the love of their soldiers and were considerate of them, +often achieved greater results than those who made themselves feared by +them in an unusual degree, unless, like Manlius Torquatus, these last +were endowed with consummate valour. But he who has to govern subjects +such as those of whom Tacitus speaks, to prevent their growing insolent +and trampling upon him by reason of his too great easiness, must resort +to punishment rather than to compliance. Still, to escape hatred, +punishment should be moderate in degree, for to make himself hated is +never for the interest of any prince. And to escape hatred, a prince +has chiefly to guard against tampering with the property of any of his +subjects; for where nothing is to be gained by it, no prince will +desire to shed blood, unless, as seldom happens, constrained to do so +by necessity. But where advantage is to be gained thereby, blood will +always flow, and neither the desire to shed it, nor causes for shedding +it will ever be wanting, as I have fully shown when discussing this +subject in another treatise. + + [14] “In multitudine regenda plus poena quam obsequium valet.” But + compare Annals, III. 55, “Obsequium inde in principem et æmulandi amoi + validioi quam poena ex legibus et metus.” + + +Quintius therefore was more deserving of praise than Appius. +Nevertheless the opinion of Tacitus, duly restricted and not understood +as applying to a case like that of Appius, merits approval. But since I +have spoken of punishment and indulgence, it seems not out of place to +show how a single act of humanity availed more than arms with the +citizens of Falerii. + + + + +CHAPTER XX.—_How one humane act availed more with the men of Falerii, +than all the might of the Roman Arms._ + + +When the besieging army of the Romans lay round Falerii, the master of +a school wherein the best-born youths of the city were taught, thinking +to curry favour with Camillus and the Romans, came forth from the town +with these boys, on pretence of giving them exercise, and bringing them +into the camp where Camillus was, presented them to him, saying, “_To +ransom these that city would yield itself into your hands._” Camillus, +however, not only rejected this offer, but causing the schoolmaster to +be stripped and his hands tied behind him, gave each of the boys a +scourge, and bade them lead the fellow back to the town scourging him +as they went. When the citizens of Falerii heard of this, so much were +they pleased with the humanity and integrity of Camillus, that they +resolved to surrender their town to him without further defence. + +This authentic instance may lead us to believe that a humane and kindly +action may sometimes touch men’s minds more nearly than a harsh and +cruel one; and that those cities and provinces into which the +instruments and engines of war, with every other violence to which men +resort, have failed to force a way, may be thrown open to a single act +of tenderness, mercy, chastity, or generosity. Whereof history supplies +us with many examples besides the one which I have just now noticed. +For we find that when the arms of Rome were powerless to drive Pyrrhus +out of Italy, he was moved to depart by the generosity of Fabritius in +disclosing to him the proposal which his slave had made the Romans to +poison him. Again, we read how Scipio gained less reputation in Spain +by the capture of New Carthage, than by his virtue in restoring a young +and beautiful wife unviolated to her husband; the fame of which action +won him the love of the whole province. We see, too, how much this +generous temper is esteemed by a people in its great men; and how much +it is praised by historians and by those who write the lives of +princes, as well as by those who lay down rules of human conduct. Among +whom Xenophon has taken great pains to show what honours, and +victories, and how fair a fame accrued to Cyrus from his being kindly +and gracious, without taint of pride, or cruelty, or luxury, or any +other of those vices which cast a stain upon men’s lives. + +And yet when we note that Hannibal, by methods wholly opposite to +these, achieved splendid victories and a great renown, I think I am +bound to say something in my next Chapter as to how this happened. + + + + +CHAPTER XXI.—_How it happened that Hannibal pursuing a course contrary +to that taken by Scipio, wrought the same results in Italy which the +other achieved in Spain._ + + +Some, I suspect, may marvel to find a captain, taking a contrary +course, nevertheless arrive at the same ends as those who have pursued +the methods above spoken of; since it must seem as though success did +not depend on the causes I have named; nay, that if glory and fame are +to be won in other ways, these causes neither add to our strength nor +advance our fortunes. Wherefore, to make my meaning plain, and not to +part company with the men of whom I have been speaking, I say, that as, +on the one hand, we see Scipio enter Spain, and by his humane and +generous conduct at once secure the good-will of the province, and the +admiration and reverence of its inhabitants, so on the other hand, we +see Hannibal enter Italy, and by methods wholly opposite, to wit, by +violence and rapine, by cruelty and treachery of every kind, effect in +that country the very same results. For all the States of Italy +revolted in his favour, and all the Italian nations ranged themselves +on his side. + +When we seek to know why this was, several reasons present themselves, +the first being that men so passionately love change, that, commonly +speaking, those who are well off are as eager for it as those who are +badly off: for as already has been said with truth, men are pampered by +prosperity, soured by adversity. This love of change, therefore, makes +them open the door to any one who puts himself at the head of new +movements in their country, and if he be a foreigner they adopt his +cause, if a fellow-countryman they gather round him and become his +partisans and supporters; so that whatever methods he may there use, he +will succeed in making great progress. Moreover, men being moved by two +chief passions, love and fear, he who makes himself feared commands +with no less authority than he who makes himself loved; nay, as a rule, +is followed and obeyed more implicitly than the other. It matters +little, however, which of these two ways a captain chooses to follow, +provided he be of transcendent valour, and has thereby won for himself +a great name For when, like Hannibal or Scipio, a man is very valiant, +this quality will cloak any error he may commit in seeking either to be +too much loved or too much feared. Yet from each of these two +tendencies, grave mischiefs, and such as lead to the ruin of a prince, +may arise. For he who would be greatly loved, if he swerve ever so +little from the right road, becomes contemptible; while he who would be +greatly feared, if he go a jot too far, incurs hatred. And since it is +impossible, our nature not allowing it, to adhere to the exact mean, it +is essential that any excess should be balanced by an exceeding valour, +as it was in Hannibal and Scipio. And yet we find that even they, while +they were exalted by the methods they followed, were also injured by +them. How they were exalted has been shown. The injury which Scipio +suffered was, that in Spain his soldiers, in concert with certain of +his allies, rose against him, for no other reason than that they stood +in no fear of him. For men are so restless, that if ever so small a +door be opened to their ambition, they forthwith forget all the love +they have borne their prince in return for his graciousness and +goodness, as did these soldiers and allies of Scipio; when, to correct +the mischief, he was forced to use something of a cruelty foreign to +his nature. + +As to Hannibal, we cannot point to any particular instance wherein his +cruelty or want of faith are seen to have been directly hurtful to him; +but we may well believe that Naples and other towns which remained +loyal to the Roman people, did so by reason of the dread which his +character inspired. This, however, is abundantly clear, that his +inhumanity made him more detested by the Romans than any other enemy +they ever had; so that while to Pyrrhus, in Italy with his army, they +gave up the traitor who offered to poison him, Hannibal, even when +disarmed and a fugitive, they never forgave, until they had compassed +his death. + +To Hannibal, therefore, from his being accounted impious, perfidious, +and cruel, these disadvantages resulted; but, on the other hand, there +accrued to him one great gain, noticed with admiration by all +historians, namely, that in his army, although made up of men of every +race and country, no dissensions ever broke out among the soldiers +themselves, nor any mutiny against their leader. This we can only +ascribe to the awe which his character inspired, which together with +the great name his valour had won for him, had the effect of keeping +his soldiers quiet and united. I repeat, therefore, that it is of +little moment which method a captain may follow if he be endowed with +such valour as will bear him out in the course which he adopts. For, as +I have said, there are disadvantages incident to both methods unless +corrected by extraordinary valour. + +And now, since I have spoken of Scipio and Hannibal, the former of whom +by praiseworthy, the latter by odious qualities, effected the same +results, I must not, I think, omit to notice the characters of two +Roman citizens, who by different, yet both by honourable methods, +obtained a like glory. + + + + +Chapter XXII.—_That the severity of Manlius Torquatus and the +gentleness of Valerius Corvinus won for both the same Glory._ + + +There lived in Rome, at the same time, two excellent captains, Manlius +Torquatus and Valerius Corvinus, equal in their triumphs and in their +renown, and in the valour which in obtaining these they had displayed +against the enemy; but who in the conduct of their armies and treatment +of their soldiers, followed very different methods. For Manlius, in his +command, resorted to every kind of severity, never sparing his men +fatigue, nor remitting punishment; while Valerius, on the contrary, +treated them with all kindness and consideration, and was easy and +familiar in his intercourse with them. So that while the one, to secure +the obedience of his soldiers, put his own son to death, the other +never dealt harshly with any man. Yet, for all this diversity in their +modes of acting, each had the same success against the enemy, and each +obtained the same advantages both for the republic and for himself. For +no soldier of theirs ever flinched in battle, or rose in mutiny against +them, or in any particular opposed their will; though the commands of +Manlius were of such severity that any order of excessive rigour came +to be spoken of as a _Manlian order_. + +Here, then, we have to consider first of all why Manlius was obliged to +use such severity; next, why Valerius could behave so humanely; +thirdly, how it was that these opposite methods had the same results; +and lastly, which of the two methods it is better and more useful for +us to follow. Now, if we well examine the character of Manlius from the +moment when Titus Livius first begins to make mention of him, we shall +find him to have been endowed with a rare vigour both of mind and body, +dutiful in his behaviour to his father and to his country, and most +reverent to his superiors. All which we see in his slaying the Gaul, in +his defence of his father against the tribune, and in the words in +which, before going forth to fight the Gaul, he addressed the consul, +when he said, “_Although assured of victory, never will I without thy +bidding engage an enemy._” But when such a man as this attains to +command, he looks to find all others like himself; his dauntless spirit +prompts him to engage in daring enterprises, and to insist on their +being carried out. And this is certain, that where things hard to +execute are ordered to be done, the order must be enforced with +sternness, since, otherwise, it will be disobeyed. + +And here be it noted that if you would be obeyed you must know how to +command, and that they alone have this knowledge who have measured +their power to enforce, with the willingness of others to yield +obedience; and who issue their orders when they find these conditions +combining, but, otherwise, abstain. Wherefore, a wise man was wont to +say that to hold a republic by force, there must be a proportion +between him who uses the force and him against whom it is used; and +that while this proportion obtains the force will operate; but that +when he who suffers is stronger than he who uses the force, we may +expect to see it brought to an end at any moment. + +But returning to the matter in hand, I say that to command things hard +of execution, requires hardness in him who gives the command, and that +a man of this temper and who issues such commands, cannot look to +enforce them by gentleness. He who is not of such a temper must be +careful not to impose tasks of extraordinary difficulty, but may use +his natural gentleness in imposing such as are ordinary. For common +punishments are not imputed to the prince, but to the laws and +ordinances which he has to administer. + +We must believe, therefore, that Manlius was constrained to act with +severity by the unusual character of the commands which his natural +disposition prompted him to issue. Such commands are useful in a +republic, as restoring its ordinances to their original efficacy and +excellence. And were a republic, as I have before observed, fortunate +enough to come frequently under the influence of men who, by their +example, reinforce its laws, and not only retard its progress towards +corruption, but bring it back to its first perfection, it might endure +for ever. + +Manlius, therefore, was of those who by the severity of their commands +maintained the military discipline of Rome; urged thereto, in the first +place, by his natural temper, and next by the desire that whatever he +was minded to command should be done. Valerius, on the other hand, +could afford to act humanely, because for him it was enough if all were +done which in a Roman army it was customary to do. And, since the +customs of that army were good customs, they sufficed to gain him +honour, while at the same time their maintenance cost him no effort, +nor threw on him the burthen of punishing transgressors; as well +because there were none who trangressed, as because had there been any, +they would, as I have said, have imputed their punishment to the +ordinary rules of discipline, and not to the severity of their +commander. In this way Valerius had room to exercise that humane +disposition which enabled him at once to gain influence over his +soldiers and to content them. Hence it was that both these captains +obtaining the same obedience, could, while following different methods, +arrive at the same ends. Those, however, who seek to imitate them may +chance to fall into the errors of which I have already spoken, in +connection with Hannibal and Scipio, as breeding contempt or hatred, +and which are only to be corrected by the presence of extraordinary +valour, and not otherwise. + +It rests now to determine which of these two methods is the more to be +commended. This, I take it, is matter of dispute, since both methods +have their advocates. Those writers, however, who have laid down rules +for the conduct of princes, describe a character approaching more +nearly to that of Valerius than to that of Manlius; and Xenophon, whom +I have already cited, while giving many instances of the humanity of +Cyrus, conforms closely to what Livius tells us of Valerius. For +Valerius being made consul against the Samnites, on the eve of battle +spoke to his men with the same kindliness with which he always treated +them; and Livius, after telling us what he said, remarks of him: +“_Never was there a leader more familiar with his men; cheerfully +sharing with the meanest among them every hardship and fatigue. Even in +the military games, wherein those of the same rank were wont to make +trial of their strength or swiftness, he would good-naturedly take a +part, nor disdain any adversary who offered; meeting victory or defeat +with an unruffled temper and an unchanged countenance. When called on +to act, his bounty and generosity never fell short. When he had to +speak, he was as mindful of the feelings of others as of his own +dignity. And, what more than anything else secures the popular favour, +he maintained when exercising his magistracies the same bearing he had +worn in seeking them._” + +Of Manlius also, Titus Livius speaks in like honourable terms, pointing +out that his severity in putting his son to death brought the Roman +army to that pitch of discipline which enabled it to prevail against +the Latins, nay, he goes so far in his praises that after describing +the whole order of the battle, comparing the strength of both armies, +and showing all the dangers the Romans ran, and the difficulties they +had to surmount, he winds up by saying, that it was the valour of +Manlius which alone gained for them this great victory, and that +whichever side had Manlius for its leader must have won the day. So +that weighing all that the historians tell us of these two captains, it +might be difficult to decide between them. + +Nevertheless, not to leave the question entirely open, I say, that for +a citizen living under a republic, I think the conduct of Manlius more +deserving of praise and less dangerous in its consequences. For methods +like his tend only to the public good and in no way subserve private +ends. He who shows himself harsh and stern at all times and to all men +alike, and is seen to care only for the common welfare, will never gain +himself partisans, since this is not the way to win personal friends, +to whom, as I said before, the name of partisans is given. For a +republic, therefore, no line of conduct could be more useful or more to +be desired than this, because in following it the public interest is +not neglected, and no room is given to suspect personal ambition. + +But the contrary holds as to the methods followed by Valerius. For +though the public service they render be the same, misgivings must +needs arise that the personal good-will which, in the course of a +prolonged command, a captain obtains from his soldiers, may lead to +consequences fatal to the public liberty. And if this was not found to +happen in the case of Valerius, it was because the minds of the Roman +people were not yet corrupted, and because they had never remained for +a long time and continuously under his command. + +Had we, however, like Xenophon, to consider what is most for the +interest of a prince, we should have to give up Manlius and hold by +Valerius; for, undoubtedly, a prince should strive to gain the love of +his soldiers and subjects, as well as their obedience. The latter he +can secure by discipline and by his reputation for valour. But for the +former he will be indebted to his affability, kindliness, gentleness, +and all those other like qualities which were possessed by Valerius, +and which are described by Xenophon as existing in Cyrus. That a prince +should be personally loved and have his army wholly devoted to him is +consistent with the character of his government; but that this should +happen to a person of private station does not consist with his +position as a citizen who has to live in conformity with the laws and +in subordination to the magistrates. We read in the early annals of the +Venetian Republic, that once, on the return of the fleet, a dispute +broke out between the sailors and the people, resulting in tumults and +armed violence which neither the efforts of the public officers, the +respect felt for particular citizens, nor the authority of the +magistrates could quell. But on a certain gentleman, who the year +before had been in command of these sailors, showing himself among +them, straightway, from the love they bore him, they submitted to his +authority and withdrew from the fray. Which deference on their part +aroused such jealousy and suspicion in the minds of the Venetian +senators that very soon after they got rid of this gentleman, either by +death or exile. + +The sum of the matter, therefore, is, that the methods followed by +Valerius are useful in a prince, but pernicious in a private citizen, +both for his country and for himself, for his country, because such +methods pave the way to a tyranny; for himself, because his +fellow-citizens, growing suspicious of his conduct, are constrained to +protect themselves to his hurt. And conversely, I maintain, that the +methods of Manlius, while hurtful in a prince are useful in a citizen, +and in the highest degree for his country; and, moreover, seldom give +offence, unless the hatred caused by his severity be augmented by the +jealousy which the fame of his other virtues inspires: a matter now to +be considered in connection with the banishment of Camillas. + + + + +CHAPTER XXIII.—_Why Camillus was banished from Rome._ + + +It has been shown above how methods like those of Valerius are hurtful +to the citizen who employs them and to his country, while methods like +those of Manlius are advantageous for a man’s country, though sometimes +they be hurtful to the man himself. This is well seen in the example of +Camillus, whose bearing more nearly resembled that of Manlius than that +of Valerius, so that Titus Livius, in speaking of him, says, “_His +virtues were at once hated and admired by his soldiers._” What gained +him their admiration was his care for their safety, his prudence, his +magnanimity, and the good order he maintained in conducting and +commanding them. What made him hated was his being more stern to punish +than bountiful to reward; and Livius instances the following +circumstances as giving rise to this hatred. First, his having applied +the money got by the sale of the goods of the Veientines to public +purposes, and not divided it along with the rest of the spoils. Second, +his having, on the occasion of his triumph, caused his chariot to be +drawn by four white horses, seeking in his pride, men said, to make +himself the equal of the sun god. And, third, his having vowed to +Apollo a tenth of the Veientine plunder, which, if he was to fulfil his +vow, he had to recover from his soldiers, into whose hands it had +already come. + +Herein we may well and readily discern what causes tend to make a +prince hateful to his people; the chief whereof is the depriving them +of some advantage. And this is a matter of much importance. For when a +man is deprived of what is in itself useful, he never forgets it, and +every trifling occasion recalls it to his mind; and because such +occasions recur daily, he is every day reminded of his loss. Another +error which we are here taught to guard against, is the appearing +haughty and proud, than which nothing is more distasteful to a people, +and most of all to a free people; for although such pride and +haughtiness do them no hurt, they nevertheless hold in detestation any +who display these qualities. Every show of pride, therefore, a prince +should shun as he would a rock, since to invite hatred without +resulting advantage were utterly rash and futile. + + + + +CHAPTER XXIV.—_That prolonged Commands brought Rome to Servitude_. + + +If we well examine the course of Roman history, we shall find two +causes leading to the break-up of that republic: one, the dissensions +which arose in connection with the agrarian laws; the other, the +prolongation of commands. For had these matters been rightly understood +from the first, and due remedies applied, the freedom of Rome had been +far more lasting, and, possibly, less disturbed. And although, as +touching the prolongation of commands, we never find any tumult +breaking out in Rome on that account, we do in fact discern how much +harm was done to the city by the ascendency which certain of its +citizens thereby gained. This mischief indeed would not have arisen, if +other citizens whose period of office was extended had been as good and +wise as Lucius Quintius, whose virtue affords a notable example. For +terms of accord having been settled between the senate and commons of +Rome, the latter, thinking their tribunes well able to withstand the +ambition of the nobles, prolonged their authority for a year. +Whereupon, the senate, not to be outdone by the commons, proposed, out +of rivalry, to extend the consulship of Quintius. He, however, refused +absolutely to lend himself to their designs, and insisted on their +appointing new consuls, telling them that they should seek to discredit +evil examples, not add to them by setting worse. Had this prudence and +virtue of his been shared by all the citizens of Rome, the practice of +prolonging the terms of civil offices would not have been suffered to +establish itself, nor have led to the kindred practice of extending the +term of military commands, which in progress of time effected the ruin +of their republic. + +The first military commander whose term was extended, was Publius +Philo; for when his consulship was about to expire, he being then +engaged in the siege of Palæopolis, the senate, seeing he had the +victory in his hands, would not displace him by a successor, but +appointed him _Proconsul_, which office he was the first to hold. Now, +although in thus acting the senate did what they thought best for the +public good, nevertheless it was this act of theirs that in time +brought Rome to slavery. For the further the Romans carried their arms, +the more necessary it seemed to them to grant similar extensions of +command, and the oftener they, in fact, did so. This gave rise to two +disadvantages: first that a smaller number of men were trained to +command; second, that by the long continuance of his command a captain +gained so much influence and ascendency over his soldiers that in time +they came to hold the senate of no account, and looked only to him. +This it was, that enabled Sylla and Marius to find adherents ready to +follow them even to the public detriment, and enabled Cæsar to +overthrow the liberties of his country; whereas, had the Romans never +prolonged the period of authority, whether civil or military, though +they might have taken longer to build up their empire, they certainly +had been later in incurring servitude. + + + + +CHAPTER XXV.—_Of the poverty of Cincinnatus and of many other Roman +Citizens. + + +Elsewhere I have shown that no ordinance is of such advantage to a +commonwealth, as one which enforces poverty on its citizens. And +although it does not appear what particular law it was that had this +operation in Rome (especially since we know the agrarian law to have +been stubbornly resisted), we find, as a fact, that four hundred years +after the city was founded, great poverty still prevailed there; and +may assume that nothing helped so much to produce this result as the +knowledge that the path to honours and preferment was closed to none, +and that merit was sought after wheresoever it was to be found; for +this manner of conferring honours made riches the less courted. In +proof whereof I shall cite one instance only. + +When the consul Minutius was beset in his camp by the Equians, the +Roman people were filled with such alarm lest their army should be +destroyed, that they appointed a dictator, always their last stay in +seasons of peril. Their choice fell on Lucius Quintius Cincinnatus, who +at the time was living on his small farm of little more than four +acres, which he tilled with his own hand. The story is nobly told by +Titus Livius where he says: “_This is worth listening to by those who +contemn all things human as compared with riches, and think that glory +and excellence can have no place unless accompanied by lavish wealth._” +Cincinnatus, then, was ploughing in his little field, when there +arrived from Rome the messengers sent by the senate to tell him he had +been made dictator, and inform him of the dangers which threatened the +Republic. Putting on his gown, he hastened to Rome, and getting +together an army, marched to deliver Minutius. But when he had defeated +and spoiled the enemy, and released Minutius, he would not suffer the +army he had rescued to participate in the spoils, saying, “_I will not +have you share in the plunder of those to whom you had so nearly fallen +a prey._” Minutius he deprived of his consulship, and reduced to be a +subaltern, in which rank he bade him remain till he had learned how to +command. And before this he had made Lucius Tarquininus, although +forced by his poverty to serve on foot, his master of the knights. + +Here, then, we see what honour was paid in Rome to poverty, and how +four acres of land sufficed to support so good and great a man as +Cincinnatus. We find the same Poverty still prevailing in the time of +Marcus Regulus, who when serving with the army in Africa sought leave +of senate to return home that he might look after his farm which his +labourers had suffered to run to waste. Here again we learn two things +worthy our attention: first, the poverty of these men and their +contentment under it, and how their sole study was to gain renown from +war, leaving all its advantages to the State. For had they thought of +enriching themselves by war, it had given them little concern that +their fields were running to waste Further, we have to remark the +magnanimity of these citizens, who when placed at the head of armies +surpassed all princes in the loftiness of their spirit, who cared +neither for king nor for commonwealth, and whom nothing could daunt or +dismay; but who, on returning to private life, became once more so +humble, so frugal, so careful of their slender means, and so submissive +to the magistrates and reverential to their superiors, that it might +seem impossible for the human mind to undergo so violent a change. + +This poverty prevailed down to the days of Paulus Emilius, almost the +last happy days for this republic wherein a citizen, while enriching +Rome by his triumphs, himself remained poor. And yet so greatly was +poverty still esteemed at this time, that when Paulus, in conferring +rewards on those who had behaved well in the war, presented his own +son-in-law with a silver cup, it was the first vessel of silver ever +seen in his house. + +I might run on to a great length pointing out how much better are the +fruits of poverty than those of riches, and how poverty has brought +cities, provinces, and nations to honour, while riches have wrought +their ruin, had not this subject been often treated by others. + + + + +CHAPTER XXVI.—_How Women are a cause of the ruin of States._ + + +A feud broke out in Ardea touching the marriage of an heiress, whose +hand was sought at the same time by two suitors, the one of plebeian, +the other of noble birth. For her father being dead, her guardian +wished her to wed the plebeian, her mother the noble. And so hot grew +the dispute that resort was had to arms, the whole nobility siding with +their fellow-noble, and all the plebeians with the plebeian. The latter +faction being worsted, left the town, and sent to the Volscians for +help; whereupon, the nobles sought help from Rome. The Volscians were +first in the field, and on their arrival encamped round Ardea. The +Romans, coming up later, shut in the Volscians between themselves and +the town, and, reducing them by famine, forced them to surrender at +discretion. They then entered Ardea, and putting all the ringleaders in +this dispute to the sword, composed the disorders of the city. + +In connection with this affair there are several points to be noted. +And in the first place we see how women have been the occasion of many +divisions and calamities in States, and have wrought great harm to +rulers; as when, according to our historian, the violence done to +Lucretia drove the Tarquins from their kingdom, and that done to +Virginia broke the power of the decemvirs. And among the chief causes +which Aristotle assigns for the downfall of tyrants are the wrongs done +by them to their subjects in respect of their women, whether by +adultery, rape, or other like injury to their honour, as has been +sufficiently noticed in the Chapter wherein we treated “_of +Conspiracies_” + +I say, then, that neither absolute princes nor the rulers of free +States should underrate the importance of matter, but take heed to the +disorders which it may breed and provide against them while remedies +can still be used without discredit to themselves or to their +governments And this should have been done by the rulers of Ardea who +by suffering the rivalry between their citizens to come to a head, +promoted their divisions, and when they sought to reunite them had to +summon foreign help, than which nothing sooner leads to servitude. + +But now let us turn to another subject which merits attention, namely, +the means whereby divided cities may be reunited; and of this I propose +to speak in the following Chapter. + + + + +CHAPTER XXVII.—_How a divided City may be reunited, and how it is a +false opinion that to hold Cities in subjection they must be kept +divided._ + + +From the example of the Roman consuls who reconciled the citizens of +Ardea, we are taught the method whereby the feuds of a divided city may +be composed, namely, by putting the ringleaders of the disturbances to +death; and that no other remedy should be used. Three courses, indeed, +are open to you, since you may either put to death, as these consuls +did, or banish, or bind the citizens to live at peace with one another, +taking security for their good behaviour. Of which three ways the last +is the most hurtful, the most uncertain, and the least effectual; +because when much blood has been shed, or other like outrage done, it +cannot be that a peace imposed on compulsion should endure between men +who are every day brought face to face with one another; for since +fresh cause of contention may at any moment result from their meeting, +it will be impossible for them to refrain from mutual injury. Of this +we could have no better instance than in the city of Pistoja. + +Fifteen years ago this city was divided between the Panciatichi and +Cancellieri, as indeed it still continues, the only difference being +that then they were in arms, whereas, now, they have laid them aside. +After much controversy and wrangling, these factions would presently +proceed to bloodshed, to pulling down houses, plundering property, and +all the other violent courses usual in divided cities. The Florentines, +with whom it lay to compose these feuds, strove for a long time to do +so by using the third of the methods mentioned; but when this only led +to increased tumult and disorder, losing patience, they decided to try +the second method and get rid of the ringleaders of both factions by +imprisoning some and banishing others. In this way a sort of settlement +was arrived at, which continues in operation up to the present hour. +There can be no question, however, that the first of the methods named +would have been the surest. But because extreme measures have in them +an element of greatness and nobility, a weak republic, so far from +knowing how to use this first method, can with difficulty be brought to +employ even the second. This, as I said at the beginning, is the kind +of blunder made by the princes of our times when they have to decide on +matters of moment, from their not considering how those men acted who +in ancient days had to determine under like conditions. For the +weakness of the present race of men (the result of their enfeebling +education and their ignorance of affairs), makes them regard the +methods followed by the ancients as partly inhuman and partly +impracticable. Accordingly, they have their own newfangled ways of +looking at things, wholly at variance with the true, as when the sages +of our city, some time since, pronounced that _Pistoja was to be held +by feuds and Pisa by fortresses_, not perceiving how useless each of +these methods is in itself. + +Having spoken of fortresses already at some length, I shall not further +refer to them here, but shall consider the futility of trying to hold +subject cities by keeping them divided. In the first place, it is +impossible for the ruling power, whether prince or republic, to be +friends with both factions. For wherever there is division, it is human +nature to take a side, and to favour one party more than another. But +if one party in a subject city be unfriendly to you, the consequence +will be that you will lose that city so soon as you are involved in +war, since it is impossible for you to hold a city where you have +enemies both within and without. Should the ruling power be a republic, +there is nothing so likely to corrupt its citizens and sow dissension +among them, as having to control a divided city. For as each faction in +that city will seek support and endeavour to make friends in a variety +of corrupt ways, two very serious evils will result: first, that the +governed city will never be contented with its governors, since there +can be no good government where you often change its form, adapting +yourself to the humours now of one party and now of another; and next, +that the factious spirit of the subject city is certain to infect your +own republic. To which Biondo testifies, when, in speaking of the +citizens of Florence and Pistoja, he says, “_In seeking to unite +Pistoja the Florentines themselves fell out_.”[15] + + [15] _Flav. Blondri Hist._, dec. ii. lib. 9. Basle ed. 1559, p. 337 + + +It is easy, therefore, to understand how much mischief attends on such +divisions. In the year 1501, when we lost Arezzo, and when all the Val +di Tevere and Val di Chiana were occupied by the Vitelli and by Duke +Valentino, a certain M. de Lant was sent by the King of France to cause +the whole of the lost towns to be restored to the Florentines; who +finding in all these towns men who came to him claiming to be of the +party of the _Marzocco_,[16] greatly blamed this distinction, +observing, that if in France any of the king’s subjects were to say +that he was of the king’s party, he would be punished; since the +expression would imply that there was a party hostile to the king, +whereas it was his majesty’s desire that all his subjects should be his +friends and live united without any distinction of party. But all these +mistaken methods and opinions originate in the weakness of rulers, who, +seeing that they cannot hold their States by their own strength and +valour, have recourse to like devices; which, if now and then in +tranquil times they prove of some slight assistance to them, in times +of danger are shown to be worthless. + + [16] The heraldic Lion of Florence. + + + + +CHAPTER XXVIII.—_That a Republic must keep an eye on what its Citizens +are about; since often the seeds of a Tyranny lie hidden under a +semblance of generous deeds._ + + +The granaries of Rome not sufficing to meet a famine with which the +city was visited, a certain Spurius Melius, a very wealthy citizen for +these days, privately laid in a supply of corn wherewith to feed the +people at his own expense; gaining thereby such general favour with the +commons, that the senate, apprehending that his bounty might have +dangerous consequences, in order to crush him before he grew too +powerful, appointed a dictator to deal with him and caused him to be +put to death. + +Here we have to note that actions which seem good in themselves and +unlikely to occasion harm to any one, very often become hurtful, nay, +unless corrected in time, most dangerous for a republic. And to treat +the matter with greater fulness, I say, that while a republic can never +maintain itself long, or manage its affairs to advantage, without +citizens of good reputation, on the other hand the credit enjoyed by +particular citizens often leads to the establishment of a tyranny. For +which reasons, and that things may take a safe course, it should be so +arranged that a citizen shall have credit only for such behaviour as +benefits, and not for such as injures the State and its liberties. We +must therefore examine by what ways credit is acquired. These, briefly, +are two, public or secret. Public, when a citizen gains a great name by +advising well or by acting still better for the common advantage. To +credit of this sort we should open a wide door, holding out rewards +both for good counsels and for good actions, so that he who renders +such services may be at once honoured and satisfied. Reputation +acquired honestly and openly by such means as these can never be +dangerous. But credit acquired by secret practices, which is the other +method spoken of, is most perilous and prejudicial. Of such secret +practices may be instanced, acts of kindness done to this or the other +citizen in lending him money, in assisting him to marry his daughters, +in defending him against the magistrates, and in conferring such other +private favours as gain men devoted adherents, and encourage them after +they have obtained such support, to corrupt the institutions of the +State and to violate its laws. + +A well-governed republic, therefore, ought, as I have said, to throw +wide the door to all who seek public favour by open courses, and to +close it against any who would ingratiate themselves by underhand +means. And this we find was done in Rome. For the Roman republic, as a +reward to any citizen who served it well, ordained triumphs and all the +other honours which it had to bestow; while against those who sought to +aggrandize themselves by secret intrigues, it ordained accusations and +impeachment; and when, from the people being blinded by a false show of +benevolence, these proved insufficient, it provided for a dictator, who +with regal authority might bring to bounds any who had strayed beyond +them, as instanced in the case of Spurius Melius. And if conduct like +his be ever suffered to pass unchastised, it may well be the ruin of a +republic, for men when they have such examples set them are not easily +led back into the right path. + + + + +CHAPTER XXIX.—_That the Faults of a People are due to its Prince._ + + +Let no prince complain of the faults committed by a people under his +control; since these must be ascribed either to his negligence, or to +his being himself blemished by similar defects. And were any one to +consider what peoples in our own times have been most given to robbery +and other like offences, he would find that they have only copied their +rulers, who have themselves been of a like nature. Romagna, before +those lords who ruled it were driven out by Pope Alexander VI., was a +nursery of all the worst crimes, the slightest occasion giving rise to +wholesale rapine and murder. This resulted from the wickedness of these +lords, and not, as they asserted, from the evil disposition of their +subjects. For these princes being poor, yet choosing to live as though +they were rich, were forced to resort to cruelties innumerable and +practised in divers ways; and among other shameful devices contrived by +them to extort money, they would pass laws prohibiting certain acts, +and then be the first to give occasion for breaking them; nor would +they chastise offenders until they saw many involved in the same +offence; when they fell to punishing, not from any zeal for the laws +which they had made, but out of greed to realize the penalty. Whence +flowed many mischiefs, and more particularly this, that the people +being impoverished, but not corrected, sought to make good their +injuries at the expense of others weaker than themselves. And thus +there sprang up all those evils spoken of above, whereof the prince is +the true cause. + +The truth of what I say is confirmed by Titus Livius where he relates +how the Roman envoys, who were conveying the spoils of the Veientines +as an offering to Apollo, were seized and brought on shore by the +corsairs of the Lipari islands in Sicily; when Timasitheus, the prince +of these islands, on learning the nature of the offering, its +destination, and by whom sent, though himself of Lipari, behaved as a +Roman might, showing his people what sacrilege it would be to intercept +such a gift, and speaking to such purpose that by general consent the +envoys were suffered to proceed upon their voyage, taking all their +possessions with them. With reference to which incident the historian +observes: “_The multitude, who always take their colour from their +ruler, were filled by Timasitheus with a religious awe._” And to like +purport we find it said by Lorenzo de’ Medici:— + +“A prince’s acts his people imitate; +For on their lord the eyes of all men wait.”[17] + + + [17] E quel che fa il signer, fanno poi molti; + Chè nel signer son tutti gli occhi volti. +(_La Rappresentazione di San Giovanni e Paolo._) + + + + +CHAPTER XXX.—_That a Citizen who seeks by his personal influence to +render signal service to his Country, must first stand clear of Envy. +How a City should prepare for its defence on the approach of an Enemy._ + + +When the Roman senate learned that all Etruria was assembled in arms to +march against Rome, and that the Latins and Hernicians, who before had +been the friends of the Romans, had ranged themselves with the +Volscians the ancient enemies of the Roman name, they foresaw that a +perilous contest awaited them. But because Camillus was at that time +tribune with consular authority they thought all might be managed +without the appointment of a dictator, provided the other tribunes, his +colleagues would agree to his assuming the sole direction of affairs. +This they willingly did; “_nor_,” says Titus Livius, “_did they account +anything as taken from their own dignity which was added to his._” + +On receiving their promise of obedience, Camillus gave orders that +three armies should be enrolled. Of the first, which was to be directed +against the Etruscans, he himself assumed command. The command of the +second, which he meant to remain near Rome and meet any movement of the +Latins and Hernicians, he gave to Quintius Servilius. The third army, +which he designed for the protection of the city, and the defence of +the gates and Curia, he entrusted to Lucius Quintius. And he further +directed, that Horatius, one of his colleagues, should furnish supplies +of arms, and corn, and of all else needful in time of war. Finally he +put forward his colleague Cornelius to preside in the senate and public +council, that from day to day he might advise what should be done. For +in those times these tribunes were ready either to command or obey as +the welfare of their country might require. + +We may gather from this passage how a brave and prudent man should act, +how much good he may effect, and how serviceable he may be to his +country, when by the force of his character and worth he succeeds in +extinguishing envy. For this often disables men from acting to the best +advantage, not permitting them to obtain that authority which it is +essential they should have in matters of importance. Now, envy may be +extinguished in one or other of two ways: first, by the approach of +some flagrant danger, whereby seeing themselves like to be overwhelmed, +all forego their own private ambition and lend a willing obedience to +him who counts on his valour to rescue them. As in the case of +Camillas, who from having given many proofs of surpassing ability, and +from having been three times dictator and always exercised the office +for the public good and not for his private advantage, had brought men +to fear nothing from his advancement; while his fame and reputation +made it no shame for them to recognize him as their superior. Wisely, +therefore, does Titus Livius use concerning him the words which I have +cited. + +The other way in which envy may be extinguished, is by the death, +whether by violence or in the ordinary course of nature, of those who +have been your rivals in the pursuit of fame or power, and who seeing +you better esteemed than themselves, could never acquiesce in your +superiority or put up with it in patience. For when these men have been +brought up in a corrupt city, where their training is little likely to +improve them, nothing that can happen will induce them to withdraw +their pretensions; nay, to have their own way and satisfy their +perverse humour, they will be content to look on while their country is +ruined. For envy such as this there is no cure save by the death of +those of whom it has taken possession. And when fortune so befriends a +great man that his rivals are removed from his path by a natural death, +his glory is established without scandal or offence, since he is then +able to display his great qualities unhindered. But when fortune is not +thus propitious to him, he must contrive other means to rid himself of +rivals, and must do so successfully before he can accomplish anything. +Any one who reads with intelligence the lessons of Holy Writ, will +remember how Moses, to give effect to his laws and ordinances, was +constrained to put to death an endless number of those who out of mere +envy withstood his designs. The necessity of this course was well +understood by the Friar Girolamo Savonarola, and by the Gonfalonier +Piero Soderini. But the former could not comply with it, because, as a +friar, he himself lacked the needful authority; while those of his +followers who might have exercised that authority, did not rightly +comprehend his teaching. This, however, was no fault of his; for his +sermons are full of invectives and attacks against “_the wise of this +world_,” that being the name he gave to envious rivals and to all who +opposed his reforms. As for Piero Soderini, he was possessed by the +belief that in time and with favourable fortune he could allay envy by +gentleness-and by benefits conferred on particular men; for as he was +still in the prime of life, and in the fresh enjoyment of that +good-will which his character and opinions had gained for him, he +thought to get the better of all who out of jealousy opposed him, +without giving occasion for tumult, violence, or disorder; not knowing +how time stays not, worth suffices not, fortune shifts, and malice will +not be won over by any benefit Wherefore, because they could not or +knew not how to vanquish this envy, the two whom I have named came to +their downfall. + +Another point to be noted in the passage we are considering, is the +careful provision made by Camillus for the safety of Rome both within +and without the city. And, truly, not without reason do wise +historians, like our author, set forth certain events with much +minuteness and detail, to the end that those who come after may learn +how to protect themselves in like dangers. Further, we have to note +that there is no more hazardous or less useful defence than one +conducted without method or system. This is shown in Camillus causing a +third army to be enrolled that it might be left in Rome for the +protection of the city. Many persons, doubtless, both then and now, +would esteem this precaution superfluous, thinking that as the Romans +were a warlike people and constantly under arms, there could be no +occasion for a special levy, and that it was time enough to arm when +the need came. But Camillus, and any other equally prudent captain +would be of the same mind, judged otherwise, not permitting the +multitude to take up arms unless they were to be bound by the rules and +discipline of military service. Let him, therefore, who is called on to +defend a city, taking example by Camillus, before all things avoid +placing arms in the hands of an undisciplined multitude, but first of +all select and enroll those whom he proposes to arm, so that they may +be wholly governed by him as to where they shall assemble and whither +they shall march; and then let him direct those who are not enrolled, +to abide every man in his own house for its defence. Whosoever observes +this method in a city which is attacked, will be able to defend it with +ease; but whosoever disregards it, and follows not the example of +Camillus, shall never succeed. + + + + +CHAPTER XXXI.—_That strong Republics and valiant Men preserve through +every change the same Spirit and Bearing._ + + +Among other high sayings which our historian ascribes to Camillus, as +showing of what stuff a truly great man should be made, he puts in his +mouth the words, “_My courage came not with my dictatorship nor went +with my exile;_” for by these words we are taught that a great man is +constantly the same through all vicissitudes of Fortune; so that +although she change, now exalting, now depressing, he remains +unchanged, and retains always a mind so unmoved, and in such complete +accordance with his nature as declares to all that over him Fortune has +no dominion. + +Very different is the behaviour of those weak-minded mortals who, +puffed up and intoxicated with their success, ascribe all their +felicity to virtues which they never knew, and thus grow hateful and +insupportable to all around them. Whence also the changes in their +fortunes. For whenever they have to look adversity in the face, they +suddenly pass to the other extreme, becoming abject and base. And thus +it happens that feeble-minded princes, when they fall into +difficulties, think rather of flight than of defence, because, having +made bad use of their prosperity, they are wholly unprepared to defend +themselves. + +The same merits and defects which I say are found in individual men, +are likewise found in republics, whereof we have example in the case of +Rome and of Venice. For no reverse of fortune ever broke the spirit of +the Roman people, nor did any success ever unduly elate them; as we see +plainly after their defeat at Cannæ, and after the victory they had +over Antiochus. For the defeat at Cannæ, although most momentous, being +the third they had met with, no whit daunted them; so that they +continued to send forth armies, refused to ransom prisoners as contrary +to their custom, and despatched no envoy to Hannibal or to Carthage to +sue for peace; but without ever looking back on past humiliations, +thought always of war, though in such straits for soldiers that they +had to arm their old men and slaves. Which facts being made known to +Hanno the Carthaginian, he, as I have already related, warned the +Carthaginian senate not to lay too much stress upon their victory. +Here, therefore, we see that in times of adversity the Romans were +neither cast down nor dismayed. On the other hand, no prosperity ever +made them arrogant. Before fighting the battle wherein he was finally +routed, Antiochus sent messengers to Scipio to treat for an accord; +when Scipio offered peace on condition that he withdrew at once into +Syria, leaving all his other dominions to be dealt with by the Romans +as they thought fit. Antiochus refusing these terms, fought and was +defeated, and again sent envoys to Scipio, enjoining them to accept +whatever conditions the victor might be pleased to impose. But Scipio +proposed no different terms from those he had offered before saying +that “_the Romans, as they lost not heart on defeat, so waxed not +insolent with success._” + +The contrary of all this is seen in the behaviour of the Venetians, who +thinking their good fortune due to valour of which they were devoid, in +their pride addressed the French king as “Son of St. Mark;” and making +no account of the Church, and no longer restricting their ambition to +the limits of Italy, came to dream of founding an empire like the +Roman. But afterwards, when their good fortune deserted them, and they +met at Vailà a half-defeat at the hands of the French king, they lost +their whole dominions, not altogether from revolt, but mainly by a base +and abject surrender to the Pope and the King of Spain. Nay, so low did +they stoop as to send ambassadors to the Emperor offering to become his +tributaries, and to write letters to the Pope, full of submission and +servility, in order to move his compassion. To such abasement were they +brought in four days’ time by what was in reality only a half-defeat. +For on their flight after the battle of Vailà only about a half of +their forces were engaged, and one of their two provedditori escaped to +Verona with five and twenty thousand men, horse and foot. So that had +there been a spark of valour in Venice, or any soundness in her +military system, she might easily have renewed her armies, and again +confronting fortune have stood prepared either to conquer, or, if she +must fall, to fall more gloriously; and at any rate might have obtained +for herself more honourable terms. But a pusillanimous spirit, +occasioned by the defects of her ordinances in so far as they relate to +war, caused her to lose at once her courage and her dominions. And so +will it always happen with those who behave like the Venetians. For +when men grow insolent in good fortune, and abject inn evil, the fault +lies in themselves and in the character of their training, which, when +slight and frivolous, assimilates them to itself; but when otherwise, +makes them of another temper, and giving them better acquaintance with +the world, causes them to be less disheartened by misfortunes and less +elated by success. + +And while this is true of individual men, it holds good also of a +concourse of men living together in one republic, who will arrive at +that measure of perfection which the institutions of their State +permit. And although I have already said on another occasion that a +good militia is the foundation of all States, and where that is wanting +there can neither be good laws, nor aught else that is good, it seems +to me not superfluous to say the same again; because in reading this +history of Titus Livius the necessity of such a foundation is made +apparent in every page. It is likewise shown that no army can be good +unless it be thoroughly trained and exercised, and that this can only +be the case with an army raised from your own subjects. For as a State +is not and cannot always be at war, you must have opportunity to train +your army in times of peace; but this, having regard to the cost, you +can only have in respect of your own subjects. + +When Camillus, as already related, went forth to meet the Etruscans, +his soldiers on seeing the great army of their enemy, were filled with +fear, thinking themselves too to withstand its onset. This untoward +disposition being reported to Camillus, he showed himself to his men +and by visiting their tents, and conversing with this and the other +among them, was able to remove their misgivings; and, finally, without +other word of command, he bade them “_each do his part as he had +learned and been accustomed_.” Now, any one who well considers the +methods followed by Camillus, and the words spoken by him to encourage +his soldiers to face their enemy, will perceive that these words and +methods could never have been used with an army which had not been +trained and disciplined in time of peace as well as of war. For no +captain can trust to untrained soldiers or look for good service at +their hands; nay, though he were another Hannibal, with such troops his +defeat were certain. For, as a captain cannot be present everywhere +while a battle is being fought, unless he have taken all measures +beforehand to render his men of the same temper as himself, and have +made sure that they perfectly understand his orders and arrangements, +he will inevitably be destroyed. + +When a city therefore is armed and trained as Rome was, and when its +citizens have daily opportunity, both singly and together, to make +trial of their valour and learn what fortune can effect, it will always +happen, that at all times, and whether circumstances be adverse or +favourable, they will remain of unaltered courage and preserve the same +noble bearing. But when its citizens are unpractised in arms, and trust +not to their own valour but wholly to the arbitration of Fortune, they +will change their temper as she changes, and offer always the same +example of behaviour as was given by the Venetians. + + + + +CHAPTER XXXII.—_Of the methods which some have used to make Peace +impossible_. + + +The towns of Cære and Velitræ, two of her own colonies, revolted from +Rome in expectation of being protected by the Latins. But the Latins +being routed and all hopes of help from that quarter at an end, many of +the townsmen recommended that envoys should be sent to Rome to make +their peace with the senate. This proposal, however, was defeated by +those who had been the prime movers of the revolt, who, fearing that +the whole punishment might fall on their heads, to put a stop to any +talk of an adjustment, incited the multitude to take up arms and make a +foray into the Roman territory. + +And, in truth, when it is desired that a prince or people should banish +from their minds every thought of reconciliation, there is no surer or +more effectual plan than to incite them to inflict grave wrong on him +with whom you would not have them be reconciled; for, then, the fear of +that punishment which they will seem to themselves to have deserved, +will always keep them apart. At the close of the first war waged by the +Romans against Carthage, the soldiers who had served under the +Carthaginians in Sardinia and Sicily, upon peace being proclaimed, +returned to Africa; where, being dissatisfied with their pay, they +mutinied against the Carthaginians, and choosing two of their number, +Mato and Spendio, to be their leaders, seized and sacked many towns +subject to Carthage. The Carthaginians, being loath to use force until +they had tried all other methods for bringing them to reason, sent +Hasdrubal, their fellow-citizen, to mediate with them, thinking that +from formerly having commanded them he might be able to exercise some +influence over them. But on his arrival, Spendio and Mato, to +extinguish any hope these mutineers might have had of making peace with +Carthage, and so leave them no alternative but war, persuaded them that +their best course was to put Hasdrubal, with all the other Carthaginian +citizens whom they had taken prisoners, to death. Whereupon, they not +only put them to death, but first subjected them to an infinity of +tortures; crowning their wickedness by a proclamation to the effect +that every Carthaginian who might thereafter fall into their hands +should meet a like fate. This advice, therefore, and its consummation +had the effect of rendering these mutineers relentless and inveterate +in their hostility to the Carthaginians. + + + + +CHAPTER XXXIII.—_That to insure victory in battle you must inspire your +Men with confidence in one another and in you._ + + +To insure an army being victorious in battle you must inspire it with +the conviction that it is certain to prevail. The causes which give it +this confidence are its being well armed and disciplined, and the +soldiers knowing one another. These conditions are only to be found +united in soldiers born and bred in the same country. + +It is likewise essential that the army should think so well of its +captain as to trust implicitly to his prudence; which it will always do +if it see him careful of its welfare, attentive to discipline, brave in +battle, and otherwise supporting well and honourably the dignity of his +position. These conditions he fulfils when, while punishing faults, he +does not needlessly harass his men, keeps his word with them, shows +them that the path to victory is easy, and conceals from them, or makes +light of things which seen from a distance might appear to threaten +danger. The observance of these precautions will give an army great +confidence, and such confidence leads to victory. + +This confidence the Romans were wont to inspire in the minds of their +soldiers by the aid of religion; and accordingly their consuls were +appointed, their armies were enrolled, their soldiers marched forth, +and their battles were begun, only when the auguries and auspices were +favourable; and without attending to all these observances no prudent +captain would ever engage in combat; knowing that unless his soldiers +were first assured that the gods were on their side, he might readily +suffer defeat. But if any consul or other leader ever joined battle +contrary to the auspices, the Romans would punish him, as they did +Claudius Pulcher. + +The truth of what I affirm is plainly seen from the whole course of the +Roman history, but is more particularly established by the words which +Livius puts into the mouth of Appius Claudius, who, when complaining to +the people of the insolence of the tribunes, and taxing them with +having caused the corruption of the auspices and other rites of +religion, is made to say, “_And now they would strip even religion of +its authority. For what matters it, they will tell you, that the fowls +refuse to peck, or come slowly from the coop, or that a cock has +crowed? These are small matters doubtless; but it was by not contemning +such small matters as these, that our forefathers built up this great +republic._” And, indeed, in these small matters lies a power which +keeps men united and of good courage, which is of itself the chief +condition of success. + +But the observances of religion must be accompanied by valour, for +otherwise they can nothing avail. The men of Praneste, leading forth +their army against the Romans, took up their position near the river +Allia, on the very spot where the Romans had been routed by the Gauls, +selecting this ground that it might inspire their own side with +confidence, and dishearten their enemies with the unhappy memories +which it recalled But although, for the reasons already noted, this was +a course which promised success, the result nevertheless showed that +true valour is not to be daunted by trifling disadvantages. And this +the historian well expresses by the words he puts in the mouth of the +dictator as spoken to his master of the knights “_See how these +fellows, in encamping on the banks of the Allia, have chosen their +ground in reliance upon fortune. Do you, therefore, relying on +discipline and valour, fall upon then centre._” For true valour, tight +discipline, and the feeling of security gained by repeated victories, +are not to be counteracted by things of no real moment, dismayed by +empty terrors, or quelled by a solitary mishap. As was well seen when +the two Manlii, being consuls in command against the Volscians, rashly +allowed a part of their army to go out foraging, and both those who +went out and those who stayed behind found themselves attacked at the +same moment For from this danger they were saved by the courage of the +soldiers, and not by the foresight of the consuls. With regard to which +occurrence Titus Livius observes, “_Even without a leader the steadfast +valour of the soldiers was maintained._” + +Here I must not omit to notice the device practised by Fabius to give +his army confidence, when he led it for the first time into Etruria. +For judging such encouragement to be especially needed by his men, +since they were entering an unknown country to encounter a new foe, he +addressed them before they joined battle, and, after reciting many +reasons for expecting a victory, told them, that “_he could have +mentioned other favourable circumstances making victory certain, had it +not been dangerous to disclose them._” And as this device was +dexterously used it merits imitation. + + + + +CHAPTER XXXIV.—_By what reports, rumours, or surmises the Citizens of a +Republic are led to favour a Fellow-citizen: and-whether the +Magistracies are bestowed with better judgment by a People or by a +Prince._ + + +I have elsewhere related how Titus Manlius, afterwards named Torquatus, +rescued his father from the charge laid against him by Marcus +Pomponius, tribune of the people. And though the means he took to +effect this were somewhat violent and irregular, so pleasing to +everyone were his filial piety and affection, that not only did he +escape rebuke, but when military tribunes had to be appointed his name +was second on the list of those chosen. To explain his good fortune, it +will, I think, be useful to consider what are the methods followed by +the citizens of a republic in estimating the character of those on whom +they bestow honours, so as to see whether what I have already said on +this head be true, namely, that a people is more discriminating in +awarding honours than a prince. + +I say, then, that in conferring honours and offices, the people, when +it has no knowledge of a man from his public career, follows the +estimate given of him by the general voice, and by common report; or +else is guided by some prepossession or preconceived opinion which it +has adopted concerning him. Such impressions are formed either from +consideration of a man’s descent (it being assumed, until the contrary +appears, that where his ancestors have been great and distinguished +citizens their descendant will resemble them), or else from regard to +his manners and habits; and nothing can be more in his favour than that +he frequents the company of the grave and virtuous, and such as are +generally reputed wise. For as we can have no better clue to a man’s +character than the company he keeps, he who frequents worthy company +deservedly obtains a good name, since there can hardly fail to be some +similarity between himself and his associates. Sometimes, however, the +popular estimate of a man is founded on some remarkable and noteworthy +action, though not of public moment, in which he has acquitted himself +well. And of all the three causes which create a prepossession in a +man’s favour, none is so effectual as this last. For the presumption +that he will resemble his ancestors and kinsmen is so often misleading, +that men are slow to trust and quick to discard it, unless confirmed by +the personal worth of him of whom they are judging. + +The criterion of character afforded by a man’s manners and conversation +is a safer guide than the presumption of inherited excellence, but is +far inferior to that afforded by his actions; for until he has given +actual proof of his worth, his credit is built on mere opinion, which +may readily change. But this third mode of judging, which originates in +and rests upon his actions, at once gives him a name which can only be +destroyed by his afterwards doing many actions of a contrary nature. +Those therefore who live in a republic should conform to this third +criterion, and endeavour, as did many of the Roman youth, to make their +start in life with some extraordinary achievement, either by promoting +a law conducive to the general well-being, or by accusing some powerful +citizen as a transgressor of the laws, or by performing some similar +new and notable action which cannot fail to be much spoken of. + +Actions like this are necessary not only to lay a foundation for your +fame, but also to maintain and extend it. To which end, they must +continually be renewed, as we find done by Titus Manlius throughout the +whole course of his life. For after winning his earliest renown by his +bold and singular defence of his father, when some years had passed he +fought his famous duel with the Gaul, from whom, when he had slain him, +he took the twisted golden collar which gave him the name of Torquatus. +Nor was this the last of his remarkable actions, for at a later period, +when he was of ripe years, he caused his own son to be put to death, +because he had fought without leave, although successfully. Which three +actions gained for him at the time a greater name, and have made him +more renowned through after ages than all his triumphs and victories, +though of these he had as large a share as fell to the lot of any other +Roman. The explanation of which is, that while in his victories Manlius +had many who resembled him, in these particular actions he stood almost +or entirely alone. + +So, too, with the elder Scipio, all whose victories together did not +obtain for him so much reputation, as did his rescue, while he was yet +young, of his father at the Ticino, and his undaunted bearing after the +rout at Cannæ, when with his naked sword he constrained a number of the +Roman youth to swear never to abandon their country, as some among them +had before been minded to do. It was these two actions, therefore, +which laid the foundation of his future fame and paved the way for his +triumphs in Spain and Africa. And the fair esteem in which men held +him, was still further heightened when in Spain he restored a daughter +to her father, a wife to her husband. + +Nor is it only the citizen who seeks reputation as leading to civil +honours, who must act in this way; the prince who would maintain his +credit in his princedom must do likewise; since nothing helps so much +to make a prince esteemed as to give signal proofs of his worth, +whether by words or by deeds which tend to promote the public good, and +show him to be so magnanimous, generous, and just, that he may well +pass into a proverb among his subjects. But to return to the point +whence I digressed, I say that if a people, when they first confer +honours on a fellow-citizen, rest their judgment on any one of the +three circumstances above-mentioned, they build on a reasonable +foundation; but, when many instances of noble conduct have made a man +favourably known, that the foundation is still better, since then there +is hardly room for mistake. I speak merely of those honours which are +bestowed on a man at the outset of his career, before he has come to be +known by continued proof, or is found to have passed from one kind of +conduct to another and dissimilar kind, and I maintain that in such +cases, so far as erroneous judgments or corrupt motives are concerned, +a people will always commit fewer mistakes than a prince. + +But since a people may happen to be deceived as regards the character, +reputation, and actions of a man, thinking them better or greater than +in truth they are, an error a prince is less likely to fall into from +his being informed and warned by his advisers, in order that the people +may not lack similar advice, wise founders of republics have provided, +that when the highest dignities of the State, to which it would be +dangerous to appoint incapable men, have to be filled up, and it +appears that some incapable man is the object of the popular choice, it +shall be lawful and accounted honourable for any citizen to declare in +the public assemblies the defects of the favoured candidate, that the +people, being made acquainted therewith, may be better able to judge of +his fitness. That this was the practice in Rome we have proof in the +speech made by Fabius Maximus to the people during the second Punic +war, when in the appointment of consuls public favour leaned towards +Titus Ottacilius. For Fabius judging him unequal to the duties of the +consulship at such a crisis, spoke against him and pointed out his +insufficiency, and so prevented his appointment, turning the popular +favour towards another who deserved it more. + +In the choice of its magistrates, therefore, a people judges of those +among whom it has to choose, in accordance with the surest indications +it can get; and when it can be advised as princes are, makes fewer +mistakes than they. But the citizen who would make a beginning by +gaining the good-will of the people, must, to obtain it, perform, like +Titus Manlius, some noteworthy action. + + + + +CHAPTER XXXV.—_Of the Danger incurred in being the first to recommend +new Measures; and that the more unusual the Measures the greater the +Danger_. + + +How perilous a thing it is to put one’s self at the head of changes +whereby many are affected, how difficult to guide and bring them to +perfection, and when perfected to maintain them, were too wide and +arduous a subject to be treated here. Wherefore I reserve it for a +fitter occasion, and shall now speak only of those dangers which are +incurred by the citizens of a republic or by the counsellors of a +prince in being the first to promote some grave and important measure +in such manner that the whole responsibility attending it rests with +them. For as men judge of things by their results, any evil which +ensues from such measures will be imputed to their author. And although +if good ensue he will be applauded, nevertheless in matters of this +kind, what a man may gain is as nothing to what he may lose. + +Selim, the present sultan, or Grand Turk as he is called, being in +readiness, as some who come from his country relate, to set forth on an +expedition against Egypt and Syria, was urged by one of his bashaws +whom he had stationed on the confines of Persia, to make war upon the +Sofi. In compliance with which advice he went on this new enterprise +with a vast army. But coming to a great plain, wherein were many +deserts and few streams, and encountering the same difficulties as in +ancient times had proved the ruin of many Roman armies, he suffered so +much from pestilence and famine, that, although victorious in battle, +he lost a great part of his men. This so enraged him against the bashaw +on whose advice he had acted, that he forthwith put him to death. + +In like manner, we read of many citizens who having strenuously +promoted various measures were banished when these turned out badly. +Certain citizens of Rome, for instance, were very active in forwarding +a law allowing the appointment of a plebeian to be consul. This law +passing, it so happened that the first plebeian consul who went forth +with the armies was routed; and had it not been that the party in whose +behalf the law was made was extremely powerful, its promoters would +have fared badly. It is plain therefore that the counsellors whether of +a republic or of a prince stand in this dilemma, that if they do not +conscientiously advise whatsoever they think advantageous for their +city or prince, they fail in their duty; if they do advise it, they +risk their places and their lives; all men being subject to this +infirmity of judging advice by the event. + +When I consider in what way this reproach or this danger may best be +escaped, I find no other remedy to recommend than that in giving advice +you proceed discreetly not identifying yourself in a special manner +with the measure you would see carried out, but offering your opinion +without heat, and supporting it temperately and modestly, so that if +the prince or city follow it, they shall do so of their own good-will, +and not seem to be dragged into it by your importunity. When you act +thus, neither prince nor people can reasonably bear you a grudge in +respect of the advice given by you, since that advice was not adopted +contrary to the general opinion. For your danger lies in many having +opposed you, who afterwards, should your advice prove hurtful, combine +to ruin you. And although in taking this course you fall short of the +glory which is earned by him who stands alone against many in urging +some measure which succeeds, you have nevertheless two advantages to +make up for it: first, that you escape danger; and second, that when +you have temperately stated your views, and when, in consequence of +opposition, your advice has not been taken, should other counsels +prevail and mischief come of them, your credit will be vastly enhanced. +And although credit gained at the cost of misfortune to your prince or +city cannot be matter of rejoicing, still it is something to be taken +into account. + +On this head, then, I know of no other advice to offer. For that you +should be silent and express no opinion at all, were a course hurtful +for your prince or city, and which would not absolve you from danger, +since you would soon grow to be suspected, when it might fare with you +as with the friend of Perseus the Macedonian king. For Perseus being +defeated by Paulus Emilius, and making his escape with a few +companions, it happened that one of them, in reviewing the past, began +to point out to the king many mistakes which he had made and which had +been his ruin. Whereupon Perseus turning upon him said, “_Traitor, hast +thou waited till now when there is no remedy to tell me these things_?” +and so saying, slew him with his own hand. Such was the penalty +incurred by one who was silent when he should have spoken, and who +spoke when he should have been silent; and who found no escape from +danger in having refrained from giving advice. Wherefore, I believe, +that the course which I have recommended should be observed and +followed. + + + + +CHAPTER XXXVI.—_Why it has been and still may be affirmed of the Gauls, +that at the beginning of a fray they are more than Men, but afterwards +less than Women_. + + +The bravery of the Gaul who on the banks of the Anio challenged any +among the Romans to fight with him, and the combat that thereupon +ensued between him and Titus Manlius, remind me of what Titus Livius +oftener than once observes in his history, that “_at the beginning of a +fray the Gauls are more than men, but ere it is ended show themselves +less than women_.” + +Touching the cause of this, many are content to believe that such is +their nature, which, indeed, I take to be true; but we are not, +therefore, to assume that the natural temper which makes them brave at +the outset, may not be so trained and regulated as to keep them brave +to the end. And, to prove this, I say, that armies are of three kinds. +In one of these you have discipline with bravery and valour as its +consequence. Such was the Roman army, which is shown by all historians +to have maintained excellent discipline as the result of constant +military training. And because in a well-disciplined army none must do +anything save by rule, we find that in the Roman army, from which as it +conquered the world all others should take example, none either eat, or +slept, or bought, or sold, or did anything else, whether in his +military or in his private capacity, without orders from the consul. +Those armies which do otherwise are not true armies, and if ever they +have any success, it is owing to the fury and impetuosity of their +onset and not to trained and steady valour. But of this impetuosity and +fury, trained valour, when occasion requires, will make use; nor will +any danger daunt it or cause it to lose heart, its courage being kept +alive by its discipline, and its confidence fed by the hope of victory +which never fails it while that discipline is maintained. + +But the contrary happens with armies of the second sort, those, namely, +which have impetuosity without discipline, as was the case with the +Gauls whose courage in a protracted conflict gradually wore away; so +that unless they succeeded in their first attack, the impetuosity to +which they trusted, having no support from disciplined valour, soon +cooled; when, as they had nothing else to depend on, their efforts +ceased. The Romans, on the other hand, being less disquieted in danger +by reason of their perfect discipline, and never losing hope, fought +steadily and stubbornly to the last, and with the same courage at the +end as at the outset; nay, growing heated by the conflict, only became +the fiercer the longer it was continued. + +In armies of the third sort both natural spirit and trained valour are +wanting; and to this class belong the Italian armies of our own times, +of which it may be affirmed that they are absolutely worthless, never +obtaining a victory, save when, by some accident, the enemy they +encounter takes to flight. But since we have daily proofs of this +absence of valour, it were needless to set forth particular instances +of it. + +That all, however, may know on the testimony of Titus Livius what +methods a good army should take, and what are taken by a bad army, I +shall cite the words he represents Papirius Cursor to have used when +urging that Fabius, his master of the knights, should be punished for +disobedience, and denouncing the consequences which would ensue were he +absolved, saying:—“_Let neither God nor man be held in reverence; let +the orders of captains and the Divine auspices be alike disregarded; +let a vagrant soldiery range without leave through the country of +friend or foe; reckless of their military oath, let them disband at +their pleasure; let them forsake their deserted standards, and neither +rally nor disperse at the word of command; let them fight when they +choose, by day or by night, with or without advantage of ground, with +or without the bidding of their leader, neither maintaining their ranks +_nor observing the order of battle; and let our armies, from being a +solemn and consecrated company, grow to resemble some dark and +fortuitous gathering of cut-throats._” With this passage before us, it +is easy to pronounce whether the armies of our times be “_a dark and +fortuitous gathering_,” or “_a solemn and consecrated company_;” nay, +how far they fall short of anything worthy to be called an army, +possessing neither the impetuous but disciplined valour of the Romans, +nor even the mere undisciplined impetuosity of the Gauls. + + + + +CHAPTER XXXVII.—_Whether a general engagement should be preceded by +skirmishes; and how, avoiding these, we may get knowledge of a new +Enemy._ + + +Besides all the other difficulties which hinder men from bringing +anything to its utmost perfection, it appears, as I have already +observed, that in close vicinity to every good is found also an evil, +so apt to grow up along with it that it is hardly possible to have the +one without accepting the other. This we see in all human affairs, and +the result is, that unless fortune aid us to overcome this natural and +common disadvantage, we never arrive at any excellence. I am reminded +of this by the combat between Titus Manlius and the Gaul, concerning +which Livius writes that it “_determined the issue of the entire war; +since the Gauls, abandoning their camp, hastily withdrew to the country +about Tivoli, whence they presently passed into Campania._” + +It may be said, therefore, on the one hand, that a prudent captain +ought absolutely to refrain from all those operations which, while of +trifling moment in themselves, may possibly produce an ill effect on +his army. Now, to engage in a combat wherein you risk your whole +fortunes without putting forth your entire strength, is, as I observed +before, when condemning the defence of a country by guarding its +defiles, an utterly foolhardy course. On the other hand, it is to be +said that a prudent captain, when he has to meet a new and redoubtable +adversary, ought, before coming to a general engagement, to accustom +his men by skirmishes and passages of arms, to the quality of their +enemy; that they may learn to know him, and how to deal with him, and +so free themselves from the feeling of dread which his name and fame +inspire. + +This for a captain is a matter of the very greatest importance, and one +which it might be almost fatal for him to neglect, since to risk a +pitched battle without first giving your soldiers such opportunities to +know their enemy and shake off their fear of him, is to rush on certain +destruction. When Valerius Corvinus was sent by the Romans with their +armies against the Samnites, these being new adversaries with whom up +to that time they had not measured their strength, Titus Livius tells +us that before giving battle he made his men make trial of the enemy in +several unimportant skirmishes, “_lest they should be dismayed by a new +foe and a new method of warfare._” Nevertheless, there is very great +danger that, if your soldiers get the worst in these encounters, their +alarm and self-distrust may be increased, and a result follow contrary +to that intended, namely, that you dispirit where you meant to +reassure. + +This, therefore, is one of those cases in which the evil lies so nigh +the good, and both are so mixed up together that you may readily lay +hold of the one when you think to grasp the other. And with regard to +this I say, that a good captain should do what he can that nothing +happen which might discourage his men, nor is there anything so likely +to discourage them as to begin with a defeat. For which reason +skirmishes are, as a rule, to be avoided, and only to be allowed where +you fight to great advantage and with a certainty of victory. In like +manner, no attempt should be made to defend the passes leading into +your country unless your whole army can co-operate; nor are any towns +to be defended save those whose loss necessarily involves your ruin. +And as to those towns which you do defend, you must so arrange, both in +respect of the garrison within and the army without, that in the event +of a siege your whole forces can be employed. All other towns you must +leave undefended. For, provided your army be kept together, you do not, +in losing what you voluntarily abandon, forfeit your military +reputation, or sacrifice your hopes of final success. But when you lose +what it was your purpose, and what all know it was your purpose to +hold, you suffer a real loss and injury, and, like the Gauls on the +defeat of their champion, you are ruined by a mishap of no moment in +itself. + +Philip of Macedon, the father of Perseus, a great soldier in his day, +and of a great name, on being invaded by the Romans, laid waste and +relinquished much of his territory which he thought he could not +defend; rightly judging it more hurtful to his reputation to lose +territory after an attempt to defend it, than to abandon it to the +enemy as something he cared little to retain. So, likewise, after the +battle of Cannæ, when their affairs were at their worst, the Romans +refused aid to many subject and protected States, charging them to +defend themselves as best they could. And this is a better course than +to undertake to defend and then to fail; for by refusing to defend, you +lose only your friend; whereas in failing, you not only lose your +friend, but weaken yourself. + +But to return to the matter in hand, I affirm, that even when a captain +is constrained by inexperience of his enemy to make trial of him by +means of skirmishes, he ought first to see that he has so much the +advantage that he runs no risk of defeat; or else, and this is his +better course, he must do as Marius did when sent against the +Cimbrians, a very courageous people who were laying Italy waste, and by +their fierceness and numbers, and from the fact of their having already +routed a Roman army, spreading terror wherever they came. For before +fighting a decisive battle, Marius judged it necessary to do something +to lessen the dread in which these enemies were held by his army; and +being a prudent commander, he, on several occasions, posted his men at +points where the Cimbrians must pass, that seeing and growing familiar +with their appearance, while themselves in safety and within the +shelter of their intrenched camp, and finding them to be a mere +disorderly rabble, encumbered with baggage, and either without weapons, +or with none that were formidable, they might at last assume courage +and grow eager to engage them in battle. The part thus prudently taken +by Marius, should be carefully imitated by others who would escape the +dangers above spoken of and not have to betake themselves like the +Gauls to a disgraceful flight, on sustaining some trifling defeat. + +But since in this Discourse I have referred by name to Valerius +Corvinus, in my next Chapter I shall cite his words to show what manner +of man a captain ought to be. + + + + +CHAPTER XXXVIII.—_Of the Qualities of a Captain in whom his Soldiers +can confide._ + + +Valerius Corvinus, as I have said already, was sent in command of an +army against the Samnites, who were then new enemies to Rome. +Wherefore, to reassure his soldiers and familiarize them with their +adversaries, he made them engage with them in various unimportant +passages of arms. But not thinking this enough, he resolved before +delivering battle to address his men, and by reminding them of their +valour and his own, to make it plain how little they should esteem such +enemies. And from the words which Titus Livius puts in his mouth we may +gather what manner of man the captain ought to be in whom an army will +put its trust. For he makes him say:—“_Bear ye also this in mind under +whose conduct and auspices you are about to fight, and whether he whom +you are to obey be great only in exhorting, bold only in words, and all +unpractised in arms; or whether he be one who himself knows how to use +his spear, to march before the eagles, and play his part in the +thickest of the fight. Soldiers! I would have you follow my deeds and +not my words, and look to me for example rather than for commands; for +with this right hand I have won for myself three consulships, and an +unsurpassed renown._” Which words rightly understood give every one to +know what he must do to merit a captain’s rank. And if any man obtain +it by other means, he will soon discover that advancement due to chance +or intrigue rather takes away than brings reputation, since it is men +who give lustre to titles and not titles to men. + +From what has been said it will likewise be understood that if great +captains when matched against an unfamiliar foe have had to resort to +unusual methods for reassuring the minds even of veteran soldiers, much +more will it be necessary for them to use all their address when in +command of a raw and untried army which has never before looked an +enemy in the face. For if an unfamiliar adversary inspire terror even +in a veteran army, how much greater must be the terror which any army +will inspire in the minds of untrained men. And yet we often find all +these difficulties overcome by the supreme prudence of a great captain +like the Roman Gracchus or the Theban Epaminondas, of whom I have +before spoken, who with untried troops defeated the most practised +veterans. And the method they are said to have followed was to train +their men for some months in mimic warfare, so as to accustom them to +discipline and obedience, after which they employed them with complete +confidence on actual service. + +No man, therefore, of warlike genius, need despair of creating a good +army if only he have the men; for the prince who has many subjects and +yet lacks soldiers, has only to thank his own inertness and want of +foresight, and must not complain of the cowardice of his people. + + + + +CHAPTER XXXIX.—_That a Captain should have good knowledge of Places._ + + +Among other qualifications essential in a good captain is a knowledge, +both general and particular, of places and countries, for without such +knowledge it is impossible for him to carry out any enterprise in the +best way. And while practice is needed for perfection in every art, in +this it is needed in the highest degree. Such practice, or particular +knowledge as it may be termed, is sooner acquired in the chase than in +any other exercise; and, accordingly, we find it said by ancient +historians that those heroes who, in their day, ruled the world, were +bred in the woods and trained to the chase; for this exercise not +merely gives the knowledge I speak of, but teaches countless other +lessons needful in war. And Xenophon in his life of Cyrus tells us, +that Cyrus, on his expedition against the King of Armenia, when +assigning to each of his followers the part he was to perform, reminded +them that the enterprise on which they were engaged, differed little +from one of those hunting expeditions on which they had gone so often +in his company; likening those who were to lie in ambush in the +mountains, to the men sent to spread the toils on the hill-tops; and +those who were to overrun the plain, to the beaters whose business it +is to start the game from its lair that it may be driven into the +toils. Now, this is related to show how, in the opinion of Xenophon, +the chase is a mimic representation of war, and therefore to be +esteemed by the great as useful and honourable. + +Nor can that knowledge of countries which I have spoken of as necessary +in a commander, be obtained in any convenient way except by the chase. +For he who joins therein gains a special acquaintance with the +character of the country in which it is followed; and he who has made +himself specially familiar with one district, will afterwards readily +understand the character of any strange country into which he comes. +For all countries, and the districts of which they are made up, have a +certain resemblance to one another, so that from a knowledge of one we +can pass easily to the knowledge of another. He therefore who is +without such practical acquaintance with some one country, can only +with difficulty, and after a long time, obtain a knowledge of another, +while he who possesses it can take in at a glance how this plain +spreads, how that mountain slopes, whither that valley winds, and all +other like particulars in respect of which he has already acquired a +certain familiarity. + +The truth of what I affirm is shown by Titus Livius in the case of +Publius Decius, who, being military tribune in the army which the +consul Cornelius led against the Samnites, when the consul advanced +into a defile where the Roman army were like to be shut in by the +enemy, perceiving the great danger they ran, and noting, as Livius +relates, a hill which rose by a steep ascent and overhung the enemy’s +camp, and which, though hard of access for heavy-armed troops, +presented little difficulty to troops lightly armed, turned to the +consul and said:—“_Seest thou, Aulus Cornelius, yonder height over +above the enemy, which they have been blind enough to neglect? There, +were we manfully to seize it, might we find the citadel of our hopes +and of our safety._” Whereupon, he was sent by the consul with three +thousand men to secure the height, and so saved the Roman army. And as +it was part of his plan to make his own escape and carry off his men +safely under shelter of night, Livius represents him as saying to his +soldiers:—“_Come with me, that, while daylight still serves, we may +learn where the enemy have posted their guards, and by what exit we may +issue hence._” Accordingly, putting on the cloak of a common soldier, +lest the enemy should observe that an officer was making his rounds he +surveyed their camp in all directions. + +Now any one who carefully studies the whole of this passage, must +perceive how useful and necessary it is for a captain to know the +nature of places, which knowledge had Decius not possessed he could not +have decided that it would be for the advantage of the Roman army to +occupy this hill; nor could he have judged from a distance whether the +hill was accessible or no; and when he reached the summit and desired +to return to the consul, since he was surrounded on all sides by the +enemy, he never could have distinguished the path it was safe for him +to take, from those guarded by the foe. For all which reasons it was +absolutely essential that Decius should have that thorough knowledge +which enabled him by gaining possession of this hill to save the Roman +army, and to discover a path whereby, in the event of his being +attacked, he and his followers might escape. + + + + +CHAPTER XL.—_That Fraud is fair in War._ + + +Although in all other affairs it be hateful to use fraud, in the +operations of war it is praiseworthy and glorious; so that he who gets +the better of his enemy by fraud, is as much extolled as he who +prevails by force. This appears in the judgments passed by such as have +written of the lives of great warriors, who praise Hannibal and those +other captains who have been most noted for acting in this way. But +since we may read of many instances of such frauds, I shall not cite +them here. This, however, I desire to say, that I would not have it +understood that any fraud is glorious which leads you to break your +plighted word, or to depart from covenants to which you have agreed; +for though to do so may sometimes gain you territory and power, it can +never, as I have said elsewhere, gain you glory. + +The fraud, then, which I here speak of is that employed against an +enemy who places no trust in you, and is wholly directed to military +operations, such as the stratagem of Hannibal at the Lake of +Thrasymene, when he feigned flight in order to draw the Roman consul +and his army into an ambuscade; or when to escape from the hands of +Fabius Maximus he fastened lights to the horns of his oxen. Similar to +the above was the deceit practised by Pontius the Samnite commander to +inveigle the Roman army into the Caudine Forks. For after he had drawn +up his forces behind the hills, he sent out a number of his soldiers, +disguised as herdsmen, to drive great herds of cattle across the plain; +who being captured by the Romans, and interrogated as to where the +Samnite army was, all of them, as they had been taught by Pontius, +agreed in saying that it had gone to besiege Nocera: which being +believed by the consuls, led them to advance within the Caudine Valley, +where no sooner were they come than they were beset by the Samnites. +And the victory thus won by a fraud would have been most glorious for +Pontius had he but taken the advice of his father Herennius, who urged +that the Romans should either be set at liberty unconditionally, or all +be put to death; but that a mean course “_which neither gains friends +nor gets rid of foes_” should be avoided. And this was sound advice, +for, as has already been shown, in affairs of moment a mean course is +always hurtful. + + + + +CHAPTER XLI.—_That our Country is to be defended by Honour or by +Dishonour; and in either way is well defended._ + + +The consuls together with the whole Roman army fell, as I have related, +into the hands of the Samnites, who imposed on them the most +ignominious terms, insisting that they should be stripped of their +arms, and pass under the yoke before they were allowed to return to +Rome. The consuls being astounded by the harshness of these conditions +and the whole army overwhelmed with dismay, Lucius Lentulus, the Roman +lieutenant, stood forward and said, that in his opinion they ought to +decline no course whereby their country might be saved; and that as the +very existence of Rome depended on the preservation of her army, that +army must be saved at any sacrifice, for whether the means be +honourable or ignominious, all is well done that is done for the +defence of our country. And he said that were her army preserved, Rome, +in course of time, might wipe out the disgrace; but if her army were +destroyed, however gloriously it might perish, Rome and her freedom +would perish with it. In the event his counsel was followed. + +Now this incident deserves to be noted and pondered over by every +citizen who is called on to advise his country; for when the entire +safety of our country is at stake, no consideration of what is just or +unjust, merciful or cruel, praiseworthy or shameful, must intervene. On +the contrary, every other consideration being set aside, that course +alone must be taken which preserves the existence of the country and +maintains its liberty. And this course we find followed by the people +of France, both in their words and in their actions, with the view of +supporting the dignity of their king and the integrity of their +kingdom; for there is no remark they listen to with more impatience +than that this or the other course is disgraceful to the king. For +their king, they say, can incur no disgrace by any resolve he may take, +whether it turn out well or ill; and whether it succeed or fail, all +maintain that he has acted as a king should. + + + + +CHAPTER XLII.—_That Promises made on Compulsion are not to be +observed._ + + +When, after being subjected to this disgrace, the consuls returned to +Rome with their disarmed legions, Spurius Posthumius, himself one of +the consuls, was the first to contend in the senate that the terms made +in the Caudine Valley were not to be observed. For he argued that the +Roman people were not bound by them, though he himself doubtless was, +together with all the others who had promised peace; wherefore, if the +people desired to set themselves free from every engagement, he and all +the rest who had given this promise must be made over as prisoners into +the hands of the Samnites. And so steadfastly did he hold to this +opinion, that the senate were content to adopt it, and sending him and +the rest as prisoners back to Samnium, protested to the Samnites that +the peace was not binding. And so kind was Fortune to Posthumius on +this occasion, that the Samnites would not keep him as a prisoner, and +that on his return to Rome, notwithstanding his defeat, he was held in +higher honour by the Romans than the victorious Pontius by his +countrymen. + +Here two points are to be noted; first, that glory may be won by any +action; for although, commonly, it follow upon victory, it may also +follow on defeat, if this defeat be seen to have happened through no +fault of yours, or if, directly after, you perform some valiant action +which cancels it. The other point to be noted is that there is no +disgrace in not observing promises wrung from you by force; for +promises thus extorted when they affect the public welfare will always +be broken so soon as the pressure under which they were made is +withdrawn, and that, too, without shame on the part of him who breaks +them; of which we read many instances in history, and find them +constantly occurring at the present day. Nay, as between princes, not +only are such compulsory promises broken when the force which extorted +them is removed, but all other promises as well, are in like manner +disregarded when the causes which led to them no longer operate. + +Whether this is a thing to be commended or no, and whether such methods +ought or ought not to be followed by princes, has already been +considered by me in my “_Treatise of the Prince_” wherefore I say no +more on that subject here. + + + + +CHAPTER XLIII.—_That Men born in the same Province retain through all +Times nearly the same Character._ + + +The wise are wont to say, and not without reason or at random, that he +who would forecast what is about to happen should look to what has +been; since all human events, whether present or to come, have their +exact counterpart in the past. And this, because these events are +brought about by men, whose passions and dispositions remaining in all +ages the same naturally give rise to the same effects; although, +doubtless, the operation of these causes takes a higher form, now in +one province, and now in another, according to the character of the +training wherein the inhabitants of these provinces acquire their way +of life. + +Another aid towards judging of the future by the past, is to observe +how the same nation long retains the same customs, remaining constantly +covetous or deceitful, or similarly stamped by some one vice or virtue. +Any one reading the past history of our city of Florence, and noting +what has recently befallen it, will find the French and German nations +overflowing with avarice, pride, cruelty, and perfidy, all of which +four vices have at divers times wrought much harm to our city. As an +instance of their perfidy, every one knows how often payments of money +were made to Charles VIII. of France, in return for which he engaged to +restore the fortresses of Pisa, yet never did restore them, manifesting +thereby his bad faith and grasping avarice. Or, to pass from these very +recent events, all may have heard of what happened in the war in which +the Florentines were involved with the Visconti, dukes of Milan, when +Florence, being left without other resource, resolved to invite the +emperor into Italy, that she might be assisted by his name and power in +her struggle with Lombardy. The emperor promised to come with a strong +army to take part against the Visconti and to protect Florence from +them, on condition that the Florentines paid him a hundred thousand +ducats on his setting out, and another hundred thousand on his arrival +in Italy; to which terms the Florentines agreed. But although he then +received payment of the first instalment and, afterwards, on reaching +Verona, of the second, he turned back from the expedition without +effecting anything, alleging as his excuse that he was stopped by +certain persons who had failed to fulfil their engagements. But if +Florence had not been urged by passion or overcome by necessity, or had +she read of and understood the ancient usages of the barbarians, she +would neither on this, nor on many other occasions, have been deceived +by them, seeing that these nations have always been of the same +character, and have always, in all circumstances, and with all men +alike, used the same methods. For in ancient times we find them +behaving after the same fashion to the Etruscans, who, when overpowered +by the Romans, by whom they had been repeatedly routed and put to +flight, perceiving that they could not stand without help, entered into +a compact with the Gauls dwelling in the parts of Italy south of the +Alps, to pay them a certain sum if they would unite with them in a +campaign against the Romans. But the Gauls, after taking their money, +refused to arm on their behalf, alleging that they had not been paid to +make war on the enemies of the Etruscans, but only to refrain from +pillaging their lands. And thus the people of Etruria, through the +avarice and perfidy of the Gauls, were at once defrauded of their money +and disappointed of the help which they had counted on obtaining. + +From which two instances of the Etruscans in ancient times and of the +Florentines in recent, we may see that barbaric races have constantly +followed the same methods, and may easily draw our conclusions as to +how far princes should trust them. + + + + +CHAPTER XLIV.—_That where ordinary methods fail, Hardihood and Daring +often succeed._ + + +When attacked by the Romans, the Samnites as they could not without +help stand against them in the field, resolved to leave garrisons in +the towns of Samnium, and to pass with their main army into Etruria, +that country being then at truce with Rome, and thus ascertain whether +their actual presence in arms might not move the Etruscans to renew +hostilities against Rome, which they had refused to renew when invited +through envoys. During the negotiations which, on this occasion, passed +between the two nations, the Samnites in explaining the chief causes +that led them to take up arms, used the memorable words—“_they had +risen because peace is a heavier burthen for slaves than war for +freemen_” In the end, partly by their persuasions, and partly by the +presence of their army, they induced the Etruscans to join forces with +them. + +Here we are to note that when a prince would obtain something from +another, he ought, if the occasion allow, to leave him no time to +deliberate, but should so contrive that the other may see the need of +resolving at once; as he will, if he perceive that refusal or delay in +complying with what is asked of him, will draw upon him a sudden and +dangerous resentment. + +This method we have seen employed with good effect in our own times by +Pope Julius II. in dealing with France, and by M. de Foix, the general +of the French king, in dealing with the Marquis of Mantua. For Pope +Julius desiring to expel the Bentivogli from Bologna, and thinking that +for this purpose he needed the help of French troops, and to have the +Venetians neutral, after sounding both and receiving from both +hesitating and ambiguous answers, determined to make both fall in with +his views, by giving them no time to oppose him; and so, setting forth +from Rome with as strong a force as he could get together, he marched +on Bologna, sending word to the Venetians that they must stand aloof, +and to the King of France to send him troops. The result was that in +the brief time allowed them, neither of the two powers could make up +their mind to thwart him; and knowing that refusal or delay would be +violently resented by the Pope, they yielded to his demands, the king +sending him soldiers and the Venetians maintaining neutrality. + +M. de Foix, again, being with the king’s army in Bologna when word came +that Brescia had risen, could not rest till he had recovered that town. +But, to get there he had to choose between two routes, one long and +circuitous leading through the territories of the king, the other short +and direct. In taking the latter route, however, not only would he have +to pass through the dominions of the Marquis of Mantua, but also to +make his way into these through the lakes and marshes wherewith that +country abounds, by following an embanked road, closed and guarded by +the marquis with forts and other defensive works. Resolving, +nevertheless, to take the shortest road at all hazards, he waited till +his men were already on their march before signifying to the marquis +that he desired leave to pass through his country, so that no time +might be left him to deliberate. Taken aback by the unexpected demand, +the marquis gave the leave sought, which he never would have given had +De Foix acted with less impetuosity. For he was in league with the +Venetians and with the Pope, and had a son in the hands of the latter; +all which circumstances would have afforded him fair pretexts for +refusal. But carried away by the suddenness and urgency of the demand, +he yielded. And in like manner the Etruscans yielded to the instances +of the Samnites, the presence of whose army decided them to renew +hostilities which before they had declined to renew. + + + + +CHAPTER XLV.—_Whether in battle it is better to await and repel the +Enemy’s attack, or to anticipate it by an impetuous onset._ + + +Decius and Fabius, the Roman consuls, were each of them in command of a +separate army, one directed against the Samnites, the other against the +Etruscans: and as both delivered battle, we have to pronounce, in +respect of the two engagements, which commander followed the better +method. Decius attacked his enemy at once with the utmost fury and with +his whole strength. Fabius was content, at first, merely to maintain +his ground; for judging that more was to be gained by a later attack, +he reserved his forces for a final effort, when the ardour of the enemy +had cooled and his energy spent itself. The event showed Fabius to be +more successful in his tactics than Decius, who being exhausted by his +first onset, and seeing his ranks begin to waver, to secure by death +the glory he could no longer hope from victory, followed the example +set him by his father, and sacrificed himself to save the Roman +legions. Word whereof being brought to Fabius, he, to gain, while he +yet lived, as much honour as the other had earned by his death, pushed +forward all the troops he had reserved for his final effort, and so +obtained an unexampled victory. Whence we see that of the two methods, +that of Fabius was the safer and the more deserving our imitation. + + + + +CHAPTER XLVI.—_How the Characteristics of Families come to be +perpetuated._ + + +Manners and institutions differing in different cities, seem here to +produce a harder and there a softer race; and a like difference may +also be discerned in the character of different families in the same +city. And while this holds good of all cities, we have many instances +of it in reading the history of Rome. For we find the Manlii always +stern and stubborn; the Valerii kindly and courteous; the Claudii +haughty and ambitious; and many families besides similarly +distinguished from one another by their peculiar qualities. + +These qualities we cannot refer wholly to the _blood_, for that must +change as a result of repeated intermarriages, but must ascribe rather +to the different training and education given in different families. +For much turns on whether a child of tender years hears a thing well or +ill spoken of, since this must needs make an impression on him whereby +his whole conduct in after life will be influenced. Were it otherwise +we should not have found the whole family of the Claudii moved by the +desires and stirred by the passions which Titus Livius notes in many of +them, and more especially in one holding the office of censor, who, +when his colleague laid down his magistracy, as the law prescribed, at +the end of eighteen months, would not resign, maintaining that he was +entitled to hold the office for five years in accordance with the +original law by which the censorship was regulated. And although his +refusal gave occasion to much controversy, and bred great tumult and +disturbance, no means could be found to depose him from his office, +which he persisted in retaining in opposition to the will of the entire +commons and a majority of the senate. And any who shall read the speech +made against him by Publius Sempronius, tribune of the people, will +find therein all the Claudian insolence exposed, and will recognize the +docility and good temper shown by the body of the citizens in +respecting the laws and institutions of their country. + + + + +CHAPTER XLVII.—_That love of his Country should lead a good Citizen to +forget private Wrongs._ + + +While commanding as consul against the Samnites, Manlius was wounded in +a skirmish. His army being thereby endangered, the senate judged it +expedient to send Papirius Cursor as dictator to supply his place. But +as it was necessary that the dictator should be nominated by Fabius, +the other consul, who was with the army in Etruria, and as a doubt was +felt that he might refuse to nominate Papirius, who was his enemy, the +senate sent two messengers to entreat him to lay aside private +animosity, and make the nomination which the public interest required. +Moved by love of his country Fabius did as he was asked, although by +his silence, and by many other signs, he gave it to be known that +compliance was distasteful. From his conduct at this juncture all who +would be thought good citizens should take example. + + + + +CHAPTER XLVIII.—_That on finding an Enemy make what seems a grave +blunder, we should suspect some fraud to lurk behind._ + + +The consul having gone to Rome to perform certain ceremonial rites, and +Fulvius being left in charge of the Roman army in Etruria, the +Etruscans, to see whether they could not circumvent the new commander, +planting an ambush not far from the Roman camp, sent forward soldiers +disguised as shepherds driving large flocks of sheep so as to pass in +sight of the Roman army. These pretended shepherds coming close to the +wall of his camp, Fulvius, marvelling at what appeared to him +unaccountable audacity, hit upon a device whereby the artifice of the +Etruscans was detected and their design defeated. + +Here it seems proper to note that the captain of an army ought not to +build on what seems a manifest blunder on the part of an enemy; for as +men are unlikely to act with conspicuous want of caution, it will +commonly be found that this blunder is cover to a fraud. And yet, so +blinded are men’s minds by their eagerness for victory, that they look +only to what appears on the surface. + +After defeating the Romans on the Allia, the Gauls, hastening on to +Rome, found the gates of the city left open and unguarded. But fearing +some stratagem, and being unable to believe that the Romans could be so +foolish and cowardly as to abandon their city, they waited during the +whole of that day and the following night outside the gates, without +daring to enter. In the year 1508, when the Florentines Avere engaged +in besieging Pisa, Alfonso del Mutolo, a citizen of that town, +happening to be taken prisoner, was released on his promise to procure +the surrender to the Florentines of one of the gates of the city. +Afterwards, on pretence of arranging for the execution of this +surrender, he came repeatedly to confer with those whom the Florentine +commissaries had deputed to treat with him, coming not secretly but +openly, and accompanied by other citizens of Pisa, whom he caused to +stand aside while he conversed with the Florentines. From all which +circumstances his duplicity might have been suspected, since, had he +meant to do as he had engaged, it was most unlikely that he should be +negotiating so openly. But the desire to recover possession of Pisa so +blinded the Florentines that they allowed themselves to be conducted +under his guidance to the Lucca Gate, where, through his treachery, but +to their own disgrace, they lost a large number of their men and +officers. + + + + +CHAPTER XLIX.—_That a Commonwealth to preserve its Freedom has constant +need of new Ordinances. Of the services in respect of which Quintius +Fabius received the surname of Maximus._ + + +It must happen, as I have already said, in every great city, that +disorders needing the care of the physician continually spring up; and +the graver these disorders are, the greater will be the skill needed +for their treatment. And if ever in any city, most assuredly in Rome, +we see these disorders assume strange and unexpected shapes. As when it +appeared that all the Roman wives had conspired to murder their +husbands, many of them being found to have actually administered +poison, and many others to have drugs in readiness for the purpose. + +Of like nature was the conspiracy of the Bacchanals, discovered at the +time of the Macedonian war, wherein many thousands, both men and women, +were implicated, and which, had it not been found out, or had the +Romans not been accustomed to deal with large bodies of offenders, must +have proved perilous for their city. And, indeed, if the greatness of +the Roman Republic were not declared by countless other signs, as well +as by the manner in which it caused its laws to be observed, it might +be seen in the character of the punishments which it inflicted against +wrong-doers. For in vindicating justice, it would not scruple or +hesitate to put a whole legion to death, to depopulate an entire city, +or send eight or ten thousand men at a time into banishment, subject to +the most stringent conditions, which had to be observed, not by one of +these exiles only, but by all. As in the case of those soldiers who +fought unsuccessfully at Cannæ, who were banished to Sicily, subject to +the condition that they should not harbour in towns, and should all eat +standing. + +But the most formidable of all their punishments was that whereby one +man out of every ten in an entire army was chosen by lot to be put to +death. For correcting a great body of men no more effectual means could +be devised; because, when a multitude have offended and the ringleaders +are not known, all cannot be punished, their number being too great; +while to punish some only, and leave the rest unpunished, were unjust +to those punished and an encouragement to those passed over to offend +again. But where you put to death a tenth chosen by lot, where all +equally deserve death, he who is punished will blame his unlucky +fortune, while he who escapes will be afraid that another time the lot +may be his, and for that reason will be careful how he repeats his +offence. The poisoners and the Bacchanals, therefore, were punished as +their crimes deserved. + +Although disorders like these occasion mischievous results in a +commonwealth, still they are not fatal, since almost always there is +time to correct them. But no time is given in the case of disorders in +the State itself, which unless they be treated by some wise citizen, +will always bring a city to destruction. From the readiness wherewith +the Romans conferred the right of citizenship on foreigners, there came +to be so many new citizens in Rome, and possessed of so large a share +of the suffrage, that the government itself began to alter, forsaking +those courses which it was accustomed to follow, and growing estranged +from the men to whom it had before looked for guidance. Which being +observed by Quintius Fabius when censor, he caused all those new +citizens to be classed in four _Tribes_, that being reduced within this +narrow limit they might not have it in their power to corrupt the +entire State. And this was a wisely contrived measure, for, without +introducing any violent change, it supplied a convenient remedy, and +one so acceptable to the republic as to gain for Fabius the +well-deserved name of Maximus. + +THE END. + +*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 10827 *** |