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+*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 10827 ***
+
+Discourses on the First Decade of Titus Livius
+
+by Niccolo Machiavelli
+
+CITIZEN AND SECRETARY OF FLORENCE
+
+TRANSLATED FROM THE ITALIAN BY
+
+NINIAN HILL THOMSON, M.A.
+
+
+LONDON KEGAN PAUL, TRENCH & CO., 1, PATERNOSTER SQUARE 1883
+
+
+TO PROFESSOR PASQUALE VILLARI.
+
+DEAR PROFESSOR VILLARI,
+
+
+Permit me to inscribe your name on a translation of Machiavelli’s
+Discourses which I had your encouragement to undertake, and in which I
+have done my best to preserve something of the flavour of the original.
+Yours faithfully,
+
+NINIAN HILL THOMSON.
+
+
+FLORENCE, May 17, 1883.
+
+BOOK I.
+
+PREFACE
+
+CHAPTER
+
+
+I. Of the beginnings of Cities in general, and in particular of that of
+Rome
+
+II. Of the various kinds of Government; and to which of them the Roman
+Commonwealth belonged
+
+III. Of the accidents which led in Rome to the creation of Tribunes of
+the People, whereby the Republic was made more perfect
+
+IV. That the dissensions between the Senate and Commons of Rome made
+Rome free and powerful
+
+V. Whether the guardianship of public freedom is safer in the hands of
+the Commons or of the Nobles; and whether those who seek to acquire
+power, or they who seek to maintain it, are the greater cause of
+commotions
+
+VI. Whether it was possible in Rome to contrive such a Government as
+would have composed the differences between the Commons and the Senate
+
+VII. That to preserve liberty in a State, there must exist the right to
+accuse
+
+VIII. That calumny is as hurtful in a Commonwealth as the power to
+accuse is useful
+
+IX. That to give new institutions to a Commonwealth, or to reconstruct
+old institutions on an entirely new basis, must be the work of one Man
+
+X. That in proportion as the founder of a Kingdom or Commonwealth
+merits praise, he who founds a Tyranny deserves blame
+
+XI. Of the Religion of the Romans
+
+XII. That it is of much moment to make account of Religion; and that
+Italy, through the Roman Church, being wanting therein, has been ruined
+
+XIII. Of the use the Romans made of Religion in giving institutions to
+their City; in carrying out their enterprises; and in quelling tumults
+
+XIV. That the Romans interpreted the auspices to meet the occasion; and
+made a prudent show of observing the rites of Religion even when forced
+to disregard them; and any who rashly slighted Religion they punished
+
+XV. How the Samnites, as a last resource in their broken fortunes, had
+recourse to Religion
+
+XVI. That a People accustomed to live under a Prince, if by any
+accident it become free, can hardly preserve that freedom
+
+XVII. That a corrupt People obtaining freedom can hardly preserve it
+
+XVIII. How a free Government existing in a corrupt City may be
+preserved, or not existing may be created
+
+XIX. After a strong Prince a weak Prince may maintain himself: but
+after one weak Prince no Kingdom can stand a second
+
+XX. That the consecutive reigns of two valiant Princes produce great
+results: and that well-ordered Commonwealths are assured of a
+succession of valiant Rulers by whom their power and growth are rapidly
+extended
+
+XXI. That it is a great reproach to a Prince or to a Commonwealth to be
+without a National Army
+
+XXII. What is to be noted in the combat of the three Roman Horatii and
+the three Alban Curiatii
+
+XXIII. That we should never hazard our whole fortunes, where we put not
+forth our entire strength; for which reason to guard a defile is often
+hurtful
+
+XXIV. That well-ordered States always provide rewards and punishments
+for their Citizens; and never set off deserts against misdeeds
+
+XXV. That he who would reform the institutions of a free State, must
+retain at least the semblance of old ways
+
+XXVI. That a new Prince in a city or province of which he has taken
+possession, ought to make everything new
+
+XXVII. That Men seldom know how to be wholly good or wholly bad
+
+XXVIII. Whence it came that the Romans were less ungrateful to their
+citizens than were the Athenians
+
+XXIX. Whether a People or a Prince is the more ungrateful
+
+XXX. How Princes and Commonwealths may avoid the vice of ingratitude;
+and how a Captain or Citizen may escape being undone by it
+
+XXXI. That the Roman Captains were never punished with extreme severity
+for misconduct; and where loss resulted to the Republic merely through
+their ignorance or want of judgment, were not punished at all
+
+XXXII. That a Prince or Commonwealth should not defer benefits until
+they are forced to yield them
+
+XXXIII. When a mischief has grown up in, or against a State, it is
+safer to temporize with it than to meet it with violence
+
+XXXIV. That the authority of the Dictator did good and not harm to the
+Roman Republic; and that it is, not those powers which are given by the
+free suffrages of the People, but those which ambitious Citizens usurp
+for themselves that are pernicious to a State
+
+XXXV. Why the creation of the Decemvirate in Rome, although brought
+about by the free and open suffrage of the Citizens, was hurtful to the
+liberties of that Republic
+
+XXXVI. That Citizens who have held the higher offices of a Commonwealth
+should not disdain the lower
+
+XXXVII. Of the mischief bred in Rome by the Agrarian Law: and how it is
+a great source of disorder in a Commonwealth to pass a law opposed to
+ancient usage with stringent retrospective effect
+
+XXXVIII. That weak Republics are irresolute and undecided; and that the
+course they may take depends more on Necessity than Choice
+
+XXXIX. That often the same accidents are seen to befall different
+Nations
+
+XL. Of the creation of the Decemvirate in Rome, and what therein is to
+be noted. Wherein among other matters it is shown how the same causes
+may lead to the safety or to the ruin of a Commonwealth
+
+XLI. That it is unwise to pass at a bound from leniency to severity, or
+to a haughty bearing from a humble
+
+XLII. How easily men become corrupted
+
+XLIII. That men fighting in their own cause make good and resolute
+Soldiers
+
+XLIV. That the Multitude is helpless without a head: and that we should
+not with the same breath threaten and ask leave
+
+XLV. That it is of evil example, especially in the maker of a law, not
+to observe the law when made: and that daily to renew acts of severity
+in a City is most hurtful to the Governor
+
+XLVI. That men climb from one step of ambition to another, seeking at
+first to escape injury, and then to injure others
+
+XLVII. That though men deceive themselves in generalities, in
+particulars they judge truly
+
+XLVIII. He who would not have an office bestowed on some worthless or
+wicked person, should contrive that it be solicited by one who is
+utterly worthless and wicked, or else by one who is in the highest
+degree noble and good
+
+XLIX. That if Cities which, like Rome, had their beginning in freedom,
+have had difficulty in framing such laws as would preserve their
+freedom, Cities which at the first have been in subjection will find
+this almost impossible
+
+L. That neither any Council nor any Magistrate should have power to
+bring the Government of a City to a stay
+
+LI. What a Prince or Republic does of necessity, should seem to be done
+by choice
+
+LII. That to check the arrogance of a Citizen who is growing too
+powerful in a State, there is no safer method, nor less open to
+objection, than to forestall him in those ways whereby he seeks to
+advance himself
+
+LIII. That the People, deceived by a false show of advantage, often
+desire what would be their ruin; and that large hopes and brave
+promises easily move them
+
+LIV. Of the boundless authority which a great man may use to restrain
+an excited Multitude
+
+LV. That the Government is easily carried on in a City wherein the body
+of the People is not corrupted: and that a Princedom is impossible
+where equality prevails, and a Republic where it does not
+
+LVI. That when great calamities are about to befall a City or Country,
+signs are seen to presage, and seers arise who foretell them
+
+LVII. That the People are strong collectively, but individually weak
+
+LVIII. That a People is wiser and more constant than a Prince
+
+LIX. To what Leagues or Alliances we may most trust, whether those we
+make with Commonwealths or those we make with Princes
+
+LX. That the Consulship and all the other Magistracies in Rome were
+given without respect to Age
+
+BOOK II.
+
+PREFACE
+
+
+I. Whether the Empire acquired by the Romans was more due to Valour or
+to Fortune
+
+II. With what Nations the Romans had to contend, and how stubborn these
+were in defending their Freedom
+
+III. That Rome became great by destroying the Cities which lay round
+about her, and by readily admitting Strangers to the rights of
+Citizenship
+
+IV. That Commonwealths have followed three methods for extending their
+power
+
+V. That changes in Sects and Tongues, and the happening of Floods and
+Pestilences, obliterate the memory of the past
+
+VI. Of the methods followed by the Romans in making War
+
+VII. Of the quantity of land assigned by the Romans to each colonist
+
+VIII. Why certain Nations leave their ancestral seats and overflow the
+Countries of others
+
+IX. Of the Causes which commonly give rise to wars between States
+
+X. That contrary to the vulgar opinion, Money is not the sinews of War
+
+XI. That it were unwise to ally yourself with a Prince who has
+reputation rather than strength
+
+XII. Whether when Invasion is imminent it is better to anticipate or to
+await it
+
+XIII. That Men rise from humble to high fortunes rather by Fraud than
+by Force
+
+XIV. That Men often err in thinking they can subdue Pride by Humility
+
+XV. That weak States are always dubious in their resolves; and that
+tardy resolves are always hurtful
+
+XVI. That the Soldiers of our days depart widely from the methods of
+ancient Warfare
+
+XVII. What importance the Armies of the present day should allow to
+Artillery; and whether the commonly received opinion concerning it be
+just
+
+XVIII. That the authority of the Romans and the example of ancient
+warfare should make us hold Foot Soldiers of more account than Horse
+
+XIX. That conquests made by ill governed States and such as follow not
+the valiant methods of the Romans, lend rather to their ruin than to
+their aggrandizement
+
+XX. Of the dangers incurred by Princes or Republics who resort to
+Auxiliary or Mercenary Arms
+
+XXI. That Capua was the first City to which the Romans sent a Prætor;
+nor there, until four hundred years after they began to make war
+
+XXII. That in matters of moment Men often judge amiss
+
+XXIII. That in chastising their Subjects when circumstances required it
+the Romans always avoided half measures
+
+XXIV. That, commonly, Fortresses do much more harm than good
+
+XXV. That he who attacks a City divided against itself, must not think
+to get possession of it through its divisions
+
+XXVI. That Taunts and Abuse breed hatred against him who uses them,
+without yielding him any advantage
+
+XXVII. That prudent Princes and Republics should be content to have
+obtained a victory; for, commonly, when they are not, their victory
+turns to defeat
+
+XXVIII. That to neglect the redress of Grievances, whether public or
+private, is dangerous for a Prince or Commonwealth
+
+XXIX. That Fortune obscures the minds of Men when she would not have
+them hinder her designs
+
+XXX. That really powerful Princes and Commonwealths do not buy
+Friendships with money, but with their valour and the fame of their
+prowess
+
+XXXI. Of the danger of trusting banished men
+
+XXXII. In how many ways the Romans gained possession of Towns
+
+XXXIII. That the Romans entrusted the Captains of their Armies with the
+fullest Powers
+
+BOOK III.
+
+
+I. For a Sect or Commonwealth to last long, it must often be brought
+back to its beginnings
+
+II. That on occasion it is wise to feign folly
+
+III. That to preserve a newly acquired freedom we must slay the Sons of
+Brutus
+
+IV. That an Usurper is never safe in his Princedom while those live
+whom he has deprived of it
+
+V. How an Hereditary King may come to lose his Kingdom
+
+VI. Of Conspiracies
+
+VII. Why it is that changes from Freedom to Servitude, and from
+Servitude to Freedom, are sometimes made without bloodshed, but at
+other times reek with blood
+
+VIII. That he who would effect changes in a Commonwealth, must give
+heed to its character and condition
+
+IX. That to enjoy constant good fortune we must change with the times
+
+X. That a Captain cannot escape battle when his Enemy forces it on him
+at all hazards
+
+XI. That one who has to contend with many, though he be weaker than
+they, will prevail if he can withstand their first onset
+
+XII. A prudent Captain will do what he can to make it necessary for his
+own Soldiers to fight, and to relieve his Enemy from that necessity
+
+XIII. Whether we may trust more to a valiant Captain with a weak Army,
+or to a valiant Army with a weak Captain
+
+XIV. Of the effect produced in Battle by strange and unexpected Sights
+or Sounds
+
+XV. That one and not many should head an Army; and why it is
+disadvantageous to have more leaders than one
+
+XVI. That in times of difficulty true Worth is sought after whereas in
+quiet times it is not the most deserving but those who are recommended
+by wealth or connection who are most in favour
+
+XVII. That we are not to offend a Man, and then send him to fill an
+important Office or Command
+
+XVIII. That it is the highest quality of a Captain to be able to
+forestall the designs of his adversary
+
+XIX. Whether indulgence or severity be more necessary for controlling a
+Multitude
+
+XX. How one humane act availed more with the men of Falerii than all
+the might of the Roman Arms
+
+XXI. How it happened that Hannibal pursuing a course contrary to that
+taken by Scipio, wrought the same results in Italy which the other
+achieved in Spain
+
+XXII. That the severity of Manlius Torquatus and the gentleness of
+Valerius Corvinus won for both the same Glory
+
+XXIII. Why Camillus was banished from Rome
+
+XXIV. That prolonged Commands brought Rome to Servitude
+
+XXV. Of the Poverty of Cincinnatus and of many other Roman Citizens
+
+XXVI. How women are a cause of the ruin of States
+
+XXVII. How a divided City may be reunited; and how it is a false
+opinion that to hold Cities in subjection they must be kept divided
+
+XXVIII. That a Republic must keep an eye on what its Citizens are
+about; since often the seeds of a Tyranny lie hidden under a semblance
+of generous deeds
+
+XXIX. That the faults of a People are due to its Prince
+
+XXX. That a Citizen who seeks by his personal influence to render
+signal service to his Country, must first stand clear of Envy. How a
+City should prepare for its defence on the approach of an Enemy
+
+XXXI That strong Republics and valiant Men preserve through every
+change the same spirit and bearing
+
+XXXII. Of the methods which some have used to make Peace impossible
+
+XXXIII. That to insure victory in battle, you must inspire your
+soldiers with confidence in one another and in you
+
+XXXIV. By what reports, rumours, or surmises the Citizens of a Republic
+are led to favour a fellow-citizen: and whether the Magistracies are
+bestowed with better judgment by a People or by a Prince
+
+XXXV. Of the danger incurred in being the first to recommend new
+measures; and that the more unusual the measures, the greater the
+danger
+
+XXXVI. Why it has been and still may be affirmed of the Gauls, that at
+the beginning of a fray they are more than Men, but afterwards less
+than Women
+
+XXXVII. Whether a general engagement should be preceded by skirmishes;
+and how, avoiding these, we may get knowledge of a new Enemy
+
+XXXVIII. Of the Qualities of a Captain in whom his Soldiers can confide
+
+XXXIX. That a Captain should have good knowledge of Places
+
+XL. That Fraud is fair in War
+
+XLI. That our Country is to be defended by Honour or by Dishonour, and
+in either way is well defended
+
+XLII. That Promises made on compulsion are not to be observed
+
+XLIII. That Men born in the same Province retain through all times
+nearly the same character
+
+XLIV. That where ordinary methods fail, Hardihood and Daring often
+succeed
+
+XLV. Whether in battle it is better to await and repel the enemy’s
+attack, or to anticipate it by an impetuous onset
+
+XLVI. How the Characteristics of Families come to be perpetuated
+
+XLVII. That love of his Country should lead a good Citizen to forget
+private wrongs
+
+XLVIII. That on finding an Enemy make what seems a grave blunder we
+should suspect some fraud to lurk behind
+
+XLIX. That a Commonwealth to preserve its Freedom has constant need of
+new Ordinances. Of the services in respect of which Quintius Fabius
+received the surname of Maximus
+
+
+NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI
+
+TO
+
+ZANOBI BUONDELMONTI AND COSIMO RUCELLAI
+
+HEALTH.
+
+
+I send you a gift, which if it answers ill the obligations I owe you,
+is at any rate the greatest which Niccolò Machiavelli has it in his
+power to offer. For in it I have expressed whatever I have learned, or
+have observed for myself during a long experience and constant study of
+human affairs. And since neither you nor any other can expect more at
+my hands, you cannot complain if I have not given you more.
+
+You may indeed lament the poverty of my wit, since what I have to say
+is but poorly said; and tax the weakness of my judgment, which on many
+points may have erred in its conclusions. But granting all this, I know
+not which of us is less beholden to the other: I to you, who have
+forced me to write what of myself I never should have written; or you
+to me, who have written what can give you no content.
+
+Take this, however, in the spirit in which all that comes from a friend
+should be taken, in respect whereof we always look more to the
+intention of the giver than to the quality of the gift. And, believe
+me, that in one thing only I find satisfaction, namely, in knowing that
+while in many matters I may have made mistakes, at least I have not
+been mistaken in choosing you before all others as the persons to whom
+I dedicate these Discourses; both because I seem to myself, in doing
+so, to have shown a little gratitude for kindness received, and at the
+same time to have departed from the hackneyed custom which leads many
+authors to inscribe their works to some Prince, and blinded by hopes of
+favour or reward, to praise him as possessed of every virtue; whereas
+with more reason they might reproach him as contaminated with every
+shameful vice.
+
+To avoid which error I have chosen, not those who are but those who
+from their infinite merits deserve to be Princes; not such persons as
+have it in their power to load me with honours, wealth, and preferment,
+but such as though they lack the power, have all the will to do so. For
+men, if they would judge justly, should esteem those who are, and not
+those whose means enable them to be generous; and in like manner those
+who know how to govern kingdoms, rather than those who possess the
+government without such knowledge. For Historians award higher praise
+to Hiero of Syracuse when in a private station than to Perseus the
+Macedonian when a King affirming that while the former lacked nothing
+that a Prince should have save the name, the latter had nothing of the
+King but the kingdom.
+
+Make the most, therefore, of this good or this evil, as you may esteem
+it, which you have brought upon yourselves; and should you persist in
+the mistake of thinking my opinions worthy your attention, I shall not
+fail to proceed with the rest of the History in the manner promised in
+my Preface. _Farewell_.
+
+
+
+
+DISCOURSES
+
+ON THE FIRST DECADE OF
+
+TITUS LIVIUS.
+
+
+
+
+BOOK I.
+
+
+PREFACE.
+
+
+Albeit the jealous temper of mankind, ever more disposed to censure
+than to praise the work of others, has constantly made the pursuit of
+new methods and systems no less perilous than the search after unknown
+lands and seas; nevertheless, prompted by that desire which nature has
+implanted in me, fearlessly to undertake whatsoever I think offers a
+common benefit to all, I enter on a path which, being hitherto
+untrodden by any, though it involve me in trouble and fatigue, may yet
+win me thanks from those who judge my efforts in a friendly spirit. And
+although my feeble discernment, my slender experience of current
+affairs, and imperfect knowledge of ancient events, render these
+efforts of mine defective and of no great utility, they may at least
+open the way to some other, who, with better parts and sounder
+reasoning and judgment, shall carry out my design; whereby, if I gain
+no credit, at all events I ought to incur no blame.
+
+When I see antiquity held in such reverence, that to omit other
+instances, the mere fragment of some ancient statue is often bought at
+a great price, in order that the purchaser may keep it by him to adorn
+his house, or to have it copied by those who take delight in this art;
+and how these, again, strive with all their skill to imitate it in
+their various works; and when, on the other hand, I find those noble
+labours which history shows to have been wrought on behalf of the
+monarchies and republics of old times, by kings, captains, citizens,
+lawgivers, and others who have toiled for the good of their country,
+rather admired than followed, nay, so absolutely renounced by every one
+that not a trace of that antique worth is now left among us, I cannot
+but at once marvel and grieve; at this inconsistency; and all the more
+because I perceive that, in civil disputes between citizens, and in the
+bodily disorders into which men fall, recourse is always had to the
+decisions and remedies, pronounced or prescribed by the ancients.
+
+For the civil law is no more than the opinions delivered by the ancient
+jurisconsults, which, being reduced to a system, teach the
+jurisconsults of our own times how to determine; while the healing art
+is simply the recorded experience of the old physicians, on which our
+modern physicians found their practice. And yet, in giving laws to a
+commonwealth, in maintaining States and governing kingdoms, in
+organizing armies and conducting wars, in dealing with subject nations,
+and in extending a State’s dominions, we find no prince, no republic,
+no captain, and no citizen who resorts to the example of the ancients.
+
+This I persuade myself is due, not so much to the feebleness to which
+the present methods of education have brought the world, or to the
+injury which a pervading apathy has wrought in many provinces and
+cities of Christendom, as to the want of a right intelligence of
+History, which renders men incapable in reading it to extract its true
+meaning or to relish its flavour. Whence it happens that by far the
+greater number of those who read History, take pleasure in following
+the variety of incidents which it presents, without a thought to
+imitate them; judging such imitation to be not only difficult but
+impossible; as though the heavens, the sun, the elements, and man
+himself were no longer the same as they formerly were as regards
+motion, order, and power.
+
+Desiring to rescue men from this error, I have thought fit to note down
+with respect to all those books of Titus Livius which have escaped the
+malignity of Time, whatever seems to me essential to a right
+understanding of ancient and modern affairs; so that any who shall read
+these remarks of mine, may reap from them that profit for the sake of
+which a knowledge of History is to be sought. And although the task be
+arduous, still, with the help of those at whose instance I assumed the
+burthen, I hope to carry it forward so far, that another shall have no
+long way to go to bring it to its destination.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER I.—_Of the Beginnings of Cities in general, and in particular
+of that of Rome._
+
+
+No one who reads how the city of Rome had its beginning, who were its
+founders, and what its ordinances and laws, will marvel that so much
+excellence was maintained in it through many ages, or that it grew
+afterwards to be so great an Empire.
+
+And, first, as touching its origin, I say, that all cities have been
+founded either by the people of the country in which they stand, or by
+strangers. Cities have their origins in the former of these two ways
+when the inhabitants of a country find that they cannot live securely
+if they live dispersed in many and small societies, each of them
+unable, whether from its situation or its slender numbers, to stand
+alone against the attacks of its enemies; on whose approach there is no
+time left to unite for defence without abandoning many strongholds, and
+thus becoming an easy prey to the invader. To escape which dangers,
+whether of their own motion or at the instance of some of greater
+authority among them, they restrict themselves to dwell together in
+certain places, which they think will be more convenient to live in and
+easier to defend.
+
+Among many cities taking their origin in this way were Athens and
+Venice; the former of which, for reasons like those just now mentioned,
+was built by a scattered population under the direction of Theseus. To
+escape the wars which, on the decay of the Roman Empire daily renewed
+in Italy by the arrival of fresh hordes of Barbarians, numerous
+refugees, sheltering in certain little islands in a corner of the
+Adriatic Sea, gave beginning to Venice; where, without any recognized
+leader to direct them, they agreed to live together under such laws as
+they thought best suited to maintain them. And by reason of the
+prolonged tranquility which their position secured, they being
+protected by the narrow sea and by the circumstance that the tribes who
+then harassed Italy had no ships wherewith to molest them, they were
+able from very small beginnings to attain to that greatness they now
+enjoy.
+
+In the second case, namely of a city being founded by strangers, the
+settlers are either wholly independent, or they are controlled by
+others, as where colonies are sent forth either by a prince or by a
+republic, to relieve their countries of an excessive population, or to
+defend newly acquired territories which it is sought to secure at small
+cost. Of this sort many cities were settled by the Romans, and in all
+parts of their dominions. It may also happen that such cities are
+founded by a prince merely to add to his renown, without any intention
+on his part to dwell there, as Alexandria was built by Alexander the
+Great. Cities like these, not having had their beginning in freedom,
+seldom make such progress as to rank among the chief towns of kingdoms.
+
+The city of Florence belongs to that class of towns which has not been
+independent from the first; for whether we ascribe its origin to the
+soldiers of Sylla, or, as some have conjectured, to the mountaineers of
+Fiesole (who, emboldened by the long peace which prevailed throughout
+the world during the reign of Octavianus, came down to occupy the plain
+on the banks of the Arno), in either case, it was founded under the
+auspices of Rome nor could, at first, make other progress than was
+permitted by the grace of the sovereign State.
+
+The origin of cities may be said to be independent when a people,
+either by themselves or under some prince, are constrained by famine,
+pestilence, or war to leave their native land and seek a new
+habitation. Settlers of this sort either establish themselves in cities
+which they find ready to their hand in the countries of which they take
+possession, as did Moses; or they build new ones, as did Æneas. It is
+in this last case that the merits of a founder and the good fortune of
+the city founded are best seen; and this good fortune will be more or
+less remarkable according to the greater or less capacity of him who
+gives the city its beginning.
+
+The capacity of a founder is known in two ways: by his choice of a
+site, or by the laws which he frames. And since men act either of
+necessity or from choice, and merit may seem greater where choice is
+more restricted, we have to consider whether it may not be well to
+choose a sterile district as the site of a new city, in order that the
+inhabitants, being constrained to industry, and less corrupted by ease,
+may live in closer union, finding less cause for division in the
+poverty of their land; as was the case in Ragusa, and in many other
+cities built in similar situations. Such a choice were certainly the
+wisest and the most advantageous, could men be content to enjoy what is
+their own without seeking to lord it over others. But since to be safe
+they must be strong, they are compelled avoid these barren districts,
+and to plant themselves in more fertile regions; where, the
+fruitfulness of the soil enabling them to increase and multiply, they
+may defend themselves against any who attack them, and overthrow any
+who would withstand their power.
+
+And as for that languor which the situation might breed, care must be
+had that hardships which the site does not enforce, shall be enforced
+by the laws; and that the example of those wise nations be imitated,
+who, inhabiting most fruitful and delightful countries, and such as
+were likely to rear a listless and effeminate race, unfit for all manly
+exercises, in order to obviate the mischief wrought by the amenity and
+relaxing influence of the soil and climate, subjected all who were to
+serve as soldiers to the severest training; whence it came that better
+soldiers were raised in these countries than in others by nature rugged
+and barren. Such, of old, was the kingdom of the Egyptians, which,
+though of all lands the most bountiful, yet, by the severe training
+which its laws enforced, produced most valiant soldiers, who, had their
+names not been lost in antiquity, might be thought to deserve more
+praise than Alexander the Great and many besides, whose memory is still
+fresh in men’s minds. And even in recent times, any one contemplating
+the kingdom of the Soldan, and the military order of the Mamelukes
+before they were destroyed by Selim the Grand Turk, must have seen how
+carefully they trained their soldiers in every kind of warlike
+exercise; showing thereby how much they dreaded that indolence to which
+their genial soil and climate might have disposed them, unless
+neutralized by strenuous laws. I say, then, that it is a prudent choice
+to found your city in a fertile region when the effects of that
+fertility are duly balanced by the restraint of the laws.
+
+When Alexander the Great thought to add to his renown by founding a
+city, Dinocrates the architect came and showed him how he might build
+it on Mount Athos, which not only offered a strong position, but could
+be handled that the city built there might present a semblance of the
+human form, which would be a thing strange and striking, and worthy of
+so great a monarch. But on Alexander asking how the inhabitants were to
+live, Dinocrates answered that he had not thought of that. Whereupon,
+Alexander laughed, and leaving Mount Athos as it stood, built
+Alexandria; where, the fruitfulness of the soil, and the vicinity of
+the Nile and the sea, might attract many to take up their abode.
+
+To him, therefore, who inquires into the origin of Rome, if he assign
+its beginning to Æneas, it will seem to be of those cities which were
+founded by strangers if to Romulus, then of those founded by the
+natives of the country. But in whichever class we place it, it will be
+seen to have had its beginning in freedom, and not in subjection to
+another State. It will be seen, too, as hereafter shall be noted, how
+strict was the discipline which the laws instituted by Romulus, Numa,
+and its other founders made compulsory upon it; so that neither its
+fertility, the proximity of the sea, the number of its victories, nor
+the extent of its dominion, could for many centuries corrupt it, but,
+on the contrary, maintained it replete with such virtues as were never
+matched in any other commonwealth.
+
+And because the things done by Rome, and which Titus Livius has
+celebrated, were effected at home or abroad by public or by private
+wisdom, I shall begin by treating, and noting the consequences of those
+things done at home in accordance with the public voice, which seem
+most to merit attention; and to this object the whole of this first
+Book or first Part of my Discourses, shall be directed.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER II.—Of the various kinds of Government; and to which of them
+the Roman Commonwealth belonged.
+
+
+I forego all discussion concerning those cities which at the outset
+have been dependent upon others, and shall speak only of those which
+from their earliest beginnings have stood entirely clear of all foreign
+control, being governed from the first as pleased themselves, whether
+as republics or as princedoms.
+
+These as they have had different origins, so likewise have had
+different laws and institutions. For to some at their very first
+commencement, or not long after, laws have been given by a single
+legislator, and all at one time; like those given by Lycurgus to the
+Spartans; while to others they have been given at different times, as
+need rose or accident determined; as in the case of Rome. That
+republic, indeed, may be called happy, whose lot has been to have a
+founder so prudent as to provide for it laws under which it can
+continue to live securely, without need to amend them; as we find
+Sparta preserving hers for eight hundred years, without deterioration
+and without any dangerous disturbance. On the other hand, some measure
+of unhappiness attaches to the State which, not having yielded itself
+once for all into the hands of a single wise legislator, is obliged to
+recast its institutions for itself; and of such States, by far the most
+unhappy is that which is furthest removed from a sound system of
+government, by which I mean that its institutions lie wholly outside
+the path which might lead it to a true and perfect end. For it is
+scarcely possible that a State in this position can ever, by any
+chance, set itself to rights, whereas another whose institutions are
+imperfect, if it have made a good beginning and such as admits of its
+amendment, may in the course of events arrive at perfection. It is
+certain, however, that such States can never be reformed without great
+risk; for, as a rule, men will accept no new law altering the
+institutions of their State, unless the necessity for such a change be
+demonstrated; and since this necessity cannot arise without danger, the
+State may easily be overthrown before the new order of things is
+established. In proof whereof we may instance the republic of Florence,
+which was reformed in the year 1502, in consequence of the affair of
+Arezzo, but was ruined in 1512, in consequence of the affair of Prato.
+
+Desiring, therefore, to discuss the nature of the government of Rome,
+and to ascertain the accidental circumstances which brought it to its
+perfection, I say, as has been said before by many who have written of
+Governments, that of these there are three forms, known by the names
+Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Democracy, and that those who give its
+institutions to a State have recourse to one or other of these three,
+according as it suits their purpose. Other, and, as many have thought,
+wiser teachers, will have it, that there are altogether six forms of
+government, three of them utterly bad, the other three good in
+themselves, but so readily corrupted that they too are apt to become
+hurtful. The good are the three above named; the bad, three others
+dependent upon these, and each so like that to which it is related,
+that it is easy to pass imperceptibly from the one to the other. For a
+Monarchy readily becomes a Tyranny, an Aristocracy an Oligarchy, while
+a Democracy tends to degenerate into Anarchy. So that if the founder of
+a State should establish any one of these three forms of Government, he
+establishes it for a short time only, since no precaution he may take
+can prevent it from sliding into its contrary, by reason of the close
+resemblance which, in this case, the virtue bears to the vice.
+
+These diversities in the form of Government spring up among men by
+chance. For in the beginning of the world, its inhabitants, being few
+in number, for a time lived scattered after the fashion of beasts; but
+afterwards, as they increased and multiplied, gathered themselves into
+societies, and, the better to protect themselves, began to seek who
+among them was the strongest and of the highest courage, to whom,
+making him their head, they tendered obedience. Next arose the
+knowledge of such things as are honourable and good, as opposed to
+those which are bad and shameful. For observing that when a man wronged
+his benefactor, hatred was universally felt for the one and sympathy
+for the other, and that the ungrateful were blamed, while those who
+showed gratitude were honoured, and reflecting that the wrongs they saw
+done to others might be done to themselves, to escape these they
+resorted to making laws and fixing punishments against any who should
+transgress them; and in this way grew the recognition of Justice.
+Whence it came that afterwards, in choosing their rulers, men no longer
+looked about for the strongest, but for him who was the most prudent
+and the most just.
+
+But, presently, when sovereignty grew to be hereditary and no longer
+elective, hereditary sovereigns began to degenerate from their
+ancestors, and, quitting worthy courses, took up the notion that
+princes had nothing to do but to surpass the rest of the world in
+sumptuous display and wantonness, and whatever else ministers to
+pleasure so that the prince coming to be hated, and therefore to feel
+fear, and passing from fear to infliction of injuries, a tyranny soon
+sprang up. Forthwith there began movements to overthrow the prince, and
+plots and conspiracies against him undertaken not by those who were
+weak, or afraid for themselves, but by such as being conspicuous for
+their birth, courage, wealth, and station, could not tolerate the
+shameful life of the tyrant. The multitude, following the lead of these
+powerful men, took up arms against the prince and, he being got rid of,
+obeyed these others as their liberators; who, on their part, holding in
+hatred the name of sole ruler, formed themselves into a government and
+at first, while the recollection of past tyranny was still fresh,
+observed the laws they themselves made, and postponing personal
+advantage to the common welfare, administered affairs both publicly and
+privately with the utmost diligence and zeal. But this government
+passing, afterwards, to their descendants who, never having been taught
+in the school of Adversity, knew nothing of the vicissitudes of
+Fortune, these not choosing to rest content with mere civil equality,
+but abandoning themselves to avarice, ambition, and lust, converted,
+without respect to civil rights what had been a government of the best
+into a government of the few; and so very soon met with the same fate
+as the tyrant.
+
+For the multitude loathing its rulers, lent itself to any who ventured,
+in whatever way, to attack them; when some one man speedily arose who
+with the aid of the people overthrew them. But the recollection of the
+tyrant and of the wrongs suffered at his hands being still fresh in the
+minds of the people, who therefore felt no desire to restore the
+monarchy, they had recourse to a popular government, which they
+established on such a footing that neither king nor nobles had any
+place in it. And because all governments inspire respect at the first,
+this government also lasted for a while, but not for long, and seldom
+after the generation which brought it into existence had died out. For,
+suddenly, liberty passed into license, wherein neither private worth
+nor public authority was respected, but, every one living as he liked,
+a thousand wrongs were done daily. Whereupon, whether driven by
+necessity, or on the suggestion of some wiser man among them and to
+escape anarchy, the people reverted to a monarchy, from which, step by
+step, in the manner and for the causes already assigned, they came
+round once more to license. For this is the circle revolving within
+which all States are and have been governed; although in the same State
+the same forms of Government rarely repeat themselves, because hardly
+any State can have such vitality as to pass through such a cycle more
+than once, and still together. For it may be expected that in some sea
+of disaster, when a State must always be wanting prudent counsels and
+in strength, it will become subject to some neighbouring and
+better-governed State; though assuming this not to happen, it might
+well pass for an indefinite period from one of these forms of
+government to another.
+
+I say, then, that all these six forms of government are pernicious—the
+three good kinds, from their brief duration the three bad, from their
+inherent badness. Wise legislators therefore, knowing these defects,
+and avoiding each of these forms in its simplicity, have made choice of
+a form which shares in the qualities of all the first three, and which
+they judge to be more stable and lasting than any of these separately.
+For where we have a monarchy, an aristocracy, and a democracy existing
+together in the same city, each of the three serves as a check upon the
+other.
+
+Among those who have earned special praise by devising a constitution
+of this nature, was Lycurgus, who so framed the laws of Sparta as to
+assign their proper functions to kings, nobles, and commons; and in
+this way established a government, which, to his great glory and to the
+peace and tranquility of his country, lasted for more than eight
+hundred years. The contrary, however, happened in the case of Solon;
+who by the turn he gave to the institutions of Athens, created there a
+purely democratic government, of such brief duration, that he himself
+lived to witness the beginning of the despotism of Pisistratus. And
+although, forty years later, the heirs of Pisistratus were driven out,
+and Athens recovered her freedom, nevertheless because she reverted to
+the same form government as had been established by Solon, she could
+maintain it for only a hundred years more; for though to preserve it,
+many ordinances were passed for repressing the ambition of the great
+and the turbulence of the people, against which Solon had not provided,
+still, since neither the monarchic nor the aristocratic element was
+given a place in her constitution, Athens, as compared with Sparta, had
+but a short life.
+
+But let us now turn to Rome, which city, although she had no Lycurgus
+to give her from the first such a constitution as would preserve her
+long in freedom, through a series of accidents, caused by the contests
+between the commons and the senate, obtained by chance what the
+foresight of her founders failed to provide. So that Fortune, if she
+bestowed not her first favours on Rome, bestowed her second; because,
+although the original institutions of this city were defective, still
+they lay not outside the true path which could bring them to
+perfection. For Romulus and the other kings made many and good laws,
+and such as were not incompatible with freedom; but because they sought
+to found a kingdom and not a commonwealth, when the city became free
+many things were found wanting which in the interest of liberty it was
+necessary to supply, since these kings had not supplied them. And
+although the kings of Rome lost their sovereignty, in the manner and
+for the causes mentioned above, nevertheless those who drove them out,
+by at once creating two consuls to take their place, preserved in Rome
+the regal authority while banishing from it the regal throne, so that
+as both senate and consuls were included in that republic, it in fact
+possessed two of the elements above enumerated, to wit, the monarchic
+and the aristocratic.
+
+It then only remained to assign its place to the popular element, and
+the Roman nobles growing insolent from causes which shall be noticed
+hereafter, the commons against them, when, not to lose the whole of
+their power, they were forced to concede a share to the people; while
+with the share which remained, the senate and consuls retained so much
+authority that they still held their own place in the republic. In this
+way the tribunes of the people came to be created, after whose creation
+the stability of the State was much augmented, since each the three
+forms of government had now its due influence allowed it. And such was
+the good fortune of Rome that although her government passed from the
+kings to the nobles, and from these to the people, by the steps and for
+the reasons noticed above, still the entire authority of the kingly
+element was not sacrificed to strengthen the authority of the nobles,
+nor were the nobles divested of their authority to bestow it on the
+commons; but three, blending together, made up a perfect State; which
+perfection, as shall be fully shown in the next two Chapters, was
+reached through the dissensions of the commons and the senate.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER III.—Of the Accidents which led in Rome to the creation of
+Tribunes of the People; whereby the Republic was made more perfect.
+
+
+They who lay the foundations of a State and furnish it with laws must,
+as is shown by all who have treated of civil government, and by
+examples of which history is full, assume that ‘all men are bad, and
+will always, when they have free field, give loose to their evil
+inclinations; and that if these for a while remain hidden, it is owing
+to some secret cause, which, from our having no contrary experience, we
+do not recognize at once, but which is afterwards revealed by Time, of
+whom we speak as the father of all truth.
+
+In Rome, after the expulsion of the Tarquins, it seemed as though the
+closest union prevailed between the senate and the commons, and that
+the nobles, laying aside their natural arrogance, had learned so to
+sympathize with the people as to have become supportable by all, even
+of the humblest rank. This dissimulation remained undetected, and its
+causes concealed, while the Tarquins lived; for the nobles dreading the
+Tarquins, and fearing that the people, if they used them ill, might
+take part against them, treated them with kindness. But no sooner were
+the Tarquins got rid of, and the nobles thus relieved of their fears,
+when they began to spit forth against the commons all the venom which
+before they had kept in their breasts, offending and insulting them in
+every way they could; confirming what I have observed already, that men
+never behave well unless compelled, and that whenever they are free to
+act as they please, and are under no restraint everything falls at once
+into confusion and disorder. Wherefore it has been said that as poverty
+and hunger are needed to make men industrious, so laws are needed to
+make them good. When we do well without laws, laws are not needed; but
+when good customs are absent, laws are at once required.
+
+On the extinction of the Tarquins, therefore, the dread of whom had
+kept the nobles in check, some new safeguard had to be contrived, which
+should effect the same result as had been effected by the Tarquins
+while they lived. Accordingly, after much uproar and confusion, and
+much danger of violence ensuing between the commons and the nobles, to
+insure the safety of the former, tribunes were created, and were
+invested with such station and authority as always afterwards enabled
+them to stand between the people and the senate, and to resist the
+insolence of the nobles.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IV.—That the Dissensions between the Senate and Commons of
+Rome, made Rome free and powerful.
+
+
+Touching those tumults which prevailed in Rome from the extinction of
+the Tarquins to the creation of the tribunes the discussion of which I
+have no wish to avoid, and as to certain other matters of a like
+nature, I desire to say something in opposition to the opinion of many
+who assert that Rome was a turbulent city, and had fallen into utter
+disorder, that had not her good fortune and military prowess made
+amends for other defects, she would have been inferior to every other
+republic.
+
+I cannot indeed deny that the good fortune and the armies of Rome were
+the causes of her empire; yet it certainly seems to me that those
+holding this opinion fail to perceive, that in a State where there are
+good soldiers there must be good order, and, generally speaking, good
+fortune. And looking to the other circumstances of this city, I affirm
+that those who condemn these dissensions between the nobles and the
+commons, condemn what was the prime cause of Rome becoming free; and
+give more heed to the tumult and uproar wherewith these dissensions
+were attended, than to the good results which followed from them; not
+reflecting that while in every republic there are two conflicting
+factions, that of the people and that of the nobles, it is in this
+conflict that all laws favourable to freedom have their origin, as may
+readily be seen to have been the case in Rome. For from the time of the
+Tarquins to that of the Gracchi, a period of over three hundred years,
+the tumults in Rome seldom gave occasion to punishment by exile, and
+very seldom to bloodshed. So that we cannot truly declare those tumults
+to have been disastrous, or that republic to have been disorderly,
+which during all that time, on account of her internal broils, banished
+no more than eight or ten of her citizens, put very few to death, and
+rarely inflicted money penalties. Nor can we reasonably pronounce that
+city ill-governed wherein we find so many instances of virtue; for
+virtuous actions have their origin in right training, right training in
+wise laws, and wise laws in these very tumults which many would
+thoughtlessly condemn. For he who looks well to the results of these
+tumults will find that they did not lead to banishments, nor to
+violence hurtful to the common good, but to laws and ordinances
+beneficial to the public liberty. And should any object that the
+behaviour of the Romans was extravagant and outrageous; that for the
+assembled people to be heard shouting against the senate, the senate
+against the people; for the whole commons to be seen rushing wildly
+through the streets, closing their shops, and quitting the town, were
+things which might well affright him even who only reads of them; it
+may be answered, that the inhabitants of all cities, more especially of
+cities which seek to make use of the people in matters of importance,
+have their own ways of giving expression to their wishes; among which
+the city of Rome had the custom, that when its people sought to have a
+law passed they followed one or another of those courses mentioned
+above, or else refused to be enrolled as soldiers when, to pacify them,
+something of their demands had to be conceded. But the demands of a
+free people are hurtful to freedom, since they originate either in
+being oppressed, or in the fear that they are about to be so. When this
+fear is groundless, it finds its remedy in public meetings, wherein
+some worthy person may come forward and show the people by argument
+that they are deceiving themselves. For though they be ignorant, the
+people are not therefore, as Cicero says, incapable of being taught the
+truth, but are readily convinced when it is told them by one in whose
+honesty they can trust.
+
+We should, therefore, be careful how we censure the government of Rome,
+and should reflect that all the great results effected by that
+republic, could not have come about without good cause. And if the
+popular tumults led the creation of the tribunes, they merit all
+praise; since these magistrates not only gave its due influence to the
+popular voice in the government, but also acted as the guardians of
+Roman freedom, as shall be clearly shown in the following Chapter.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER V.—_Whether the Guardianship of public Freedom is safer in the
+hands of the Commons or of the Nobles; and whether those who seek to
+acquire Power or they who seek to maintain it are the greater cause of
+Commotions._
+
+
+Of the provisions made by wise founders of republics, one of the most
+necessary is for the creation of a guardianship of liberty; for
+according as this is placed in good or bad hands, the freedom of the
+State will be more or less lasting. And because in every republic we
+find the two parties of nobles and commons, the question arises, to
+which of these two this guardianship can most safely be entrusted.
+Among the Lacedæmonians of old, as now with the Venetians, it was
+placed in the hands of the nobles, but with the Romans it was vested in
+the commons. We have, therefore, to determine which of these States
+made the wiser choice. If we look to reasons, something is to be said
+on both sides of the question; though were we to look to results, we
+should have to pronounce in favour of the nobles, inasmuch as the
+liberty of Sparta and Venice has had a longer life than that of Rome.
+
+As touching reasons, it may be pleaded for the Roman method, that they
+are most fit to have charge of a thing, who least desire to pervert it
+to their own ends. And, doubtless, if we examine the aims which the
+nobles and the commons respectively set before them, we shall find in
+the former a great desire to dominate, in the latter merely a desire
+not to be dominated over, and hence a greater attachment to freedom,
+since they have less to gain than the others by destroying it.
+Wherefore, when the commons are put forward as the defenders of
+liberty, they may be expected to take better care of it, and, as they
+have no desire to tamper with it themselves, to be less apt to suffer
+others to do so.
+
+On the other hand, he who defends the method followed by the Spartans
+and Venetians, may urge, that by confiding this guardianship to the
+nobles, two desirable ends are served: first, that from being allowed
+to retain in their own hands a weapon which makes them the stronger
+party in the State, the ambition of this class is more fully satisfied;
+and, second, that an authority is withdrawn from the unstable multitude
+which as used by them is likely to lead to endless disputes and
+tumults, and to drive the nobles into dangerous and desperate courses.
+In instance whereof might be cited the case of Rome itself, wherein the
+tribunes of the people being vested with this authority, not content to
+have one consul a plebeian, insisted on having both; and afterwards
+laid claim to the censorship, the prætorship and all the other
+magistracies in the city. Nor was this enough for them, but, carried
+away by the same factious spirit, they began after a time to pay court
+to such men as they thought able to attack the nobility, and so gave
+occasion to the rise of Marius and the overthrow of Rome.
+
+Wherefore one who weighs both sides of the question well, might
+hesitate which party he should choose as the guardian of public
+liberty, being uncertain which class is more mischievous in a
+commonwealth, that which would acquire what it has not, or that which
+would keep the authority which it has already. But, on the whole, on a
+careful balance of arguments we may sum up thus:—Either we have to deal
+with a republic eager like Rome to extend its power, or with one
+content merely to maintain itself; in the former case it is necessary
+to do in all things as Rome did; in the latter, for the reasons and in
+the manner to be shown in the following Chapter, we may imitate Venice
+and Sparta.
+
+But reverting to the question which class of citizens is more
+mischievous in a republic, those who seek to acquire or those who fear
+to lose what they have acquired already, I note that when Marcus
+Menenius and Marcus Fulvius, both of them men of plebeian birth, were
+made the one dictator, the other master of the knights, that they might
+inquire into certain plots against Rome contrived in Capua, they had at
+the same time authority given them by the people to investigate
+whether, in Rome itself, irregular and corrupt practices had been used
+to obtain the consulship and other honours of the city. The nobles
+suspecting that the powers thus conferred were to be turned against
+them, everywhere gave out that if honours had been sought by any by
+irregular and unworthy means, it was not by them, but by the plebeians,
+who, with neither birth nor merit to recommend them, had need to resort
+to corruption. And more particularly they accused the dictator himself.
+And so telling was the effect of these charges, that Menenius, after
+haranguing the people and complaining to them of the calumnies
+circulated against him, laid down his dictatorship, and submitted
+himself to whatever judgment might be passed upon him. When his cause
+came to be tried he was acquitted; but at the hearing it was much
+debated, whether he who would retain power or he who would acquire it,
+is the more dangerous citizen; the desires of both being likely to lead
+to the greatest disorders.
+
+Nevertheless, I believe that, as a rule, disorders are more commonly
+occasioned by those seeking to preserve power, because in them the fear
+of loss breeds the same passions as are felt by those seeking to
+acquire; since men never think they hold what they have securely,
+unless when they are gaining something new from others. It is also to
+be said that their position enables them to operate changes with less
+effort and greater efficacy. Further, it may be added, that their
+corrupt and insolent behaviour inflames the minds of those who have
+nothing, with the desire to have; either for the sake of punishing
+their adversaries by despoiling them, or to obtain for themselves a
+share of those riches and honours which they see the others abuse.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VI.—_Whether it was possible in Rome to contrive such a
+Government as would have composed the Differences between the Commons
+and the Senate._
+
+
+I have spoken above of the effects produced in Rome by the
+controversies between the commons and the senate. Now, as these lasted
+down to the time of the Gracchi, when they brought about the overthrow
+of freedom, some may think it matter for regret that Rome should not
+have achieved the great things she did, without being torn by such
+disputes. Wherefore, it seems to me worth while to consider whether the
+government of Rome could ever have been constituted in such a way as to
+prevent like controversies.
+
+In making this inquiry we must first look to those republics which have
+enjoyed freedom for a great while, undisturbed by any violent
+contentions or tumults, and see what their government was, and whether
+it would have been possible to introduce it into Rome. Of such
+republics we have an example in ancient times in Sparta, in modern
+times in Venice, of both which States I have already made mention.
+Sparta created for herself a government consisting of a king and a
+limited senate. Venice has made no distinction in the titles of her
+rulers, all qualified to take part in her government being classed
+under the one designation of “Gentlemen,” an arrangement due rather to
+chance than to the foresight of those who gave this State its
+constitution. For many persons, from causes already noticed, seeking
+shelter on these rocks on which Venice now stands, after they had so
+multiplied that if they were to continue to live together it became
+necessary for them to frame laws, established a form of government; and
+assembling often in their councils to consult for the interests of
+their city, when it seemed to them that their numbers were sufficient
+for political existence, they closed the entrance to civil rights
+against all who came afterwards to live there, not allowing them to
+take any part in the management of affairs. And when in course of time
+there came to be many citizens excluded from the government, to add to
+the importance of the governing body, they named these “Gentlemen”
+(_gentiluomini_), the others “Plebeians” (_popolani_). And this
+distinction could grow up and maintain itself without causing
+disturbance; for as at the time of its origin, whosoever then lived in
+Venice was made one of the governing body, none had reason to complain;
+while those who came to live there afterwards, finding the government
+in a completed form, had neither ground nor opportunity to object. No
+ground, because nothing was taken from them; and no opportunity,
+because those in authority kept them under control, and never employed
+them in affairs in which they could acquire importance. Besides which,
+they who came later to dwell in Venice were not so numerous as to
+destroy all proportion between the governors and the governed; the
+number of the “Gentlemen” being as great as, or greater than that of
+the “Plebeians.” For these reasons, therefore, it was possible for
+Venice to make her constitution what it is, and to maintain it without
+divisions.
+
+Sparta, again, being governed, as I have said, by a king and a limited
+senate, was able to maintain herself for the long period she did,
+because, from the country being thinly inhabited and further influx of
+population forbidden, and from the laws of Lycurgus (the observance
+whereof removed all ground of disturbance) being held in high esteem,
+the citizens were able to continue long in unity. For Lycurgus having
+by his laws established in Sparta great equality as to property, but
+less equality as to rank, there prevailed there an equal poverty; and
+the commons were less ambitious, because the offices of the State,
+which were held to their exclusion, were confined to a few; and because
+the nobles never by harsh treatment aroused in them any desire to usurp
+these offices. And this was due to the Spartan kings, who, being
+appointed to that dignity for life, and placed in the midst of this
+nobility, had no stronger support to their authority than in defending
+the people against injustice. Whence it resulted that as the people
+neither feared nor coveted the power which they did not possess, the
+conflicts which might have arisen between them and the nobles were
+escaped, together with the causes which would have led to them; and in
+this way they were able to live long united. But of this unity in
+Sparta there were two chief causes: one, the fewness of its
+inhabitants, which allowed of their being governed by a few; the other,
+that by denying foreigners admission into their country, the people had
+less occasion to become corrupted, and never so increased in numbers as
+to prove troublesome to their few rulers.
+
+Weighing all which circumstances, we see that to have kept Rome in the
+same tranquility wherein these republics were kept, one of two courses
+must have been followed by her legislators; for either, like the
+Venetians, they must have refrained from employing the commons in war,
+or else, like the Spartans, they must have closed their country to
+foreigners. Whereas, in both particulars, they did the opposite, arming
+the commons and increasing their number, and thus affording endless
+occasions for disorder. And had the Roman commonwealth grown to be more
+tranquil, this inconvenience would have resulted, that it must at the
+same time have grown weaker, since the road would have been closed to
+that greatness to which it came, for in removing the causes of her
+tumults, Rome must have interfered with the causes of her growth.
+
+And he who looks carefully into the matter will find, that in all human
+affairs, we cannot rid ourselves of one inconvenience without running
+into another. So that if you would have your people numerous and
+warlike, to the end that with their aid you may establish a great
+empire, you will have them of such a sort as you cannot afterwards
+control at your pleasure; while should you keep them few and unwarlike,
+to the end that you may govern them easily, you will be unable, should
+you extend your dominions, to preserve them, and will become so
+contemptible as to be the prey of any who attack you. For which reason
+in all our deliberations we ought to consider where we are likely to
+encounter least inconvenience, and accept that as the course to be
+preferred, since we shall never find any line of action entirely free
+from disadvantage.
+
+Rome might, therefore, following the example of Sparta, have created a
+king for life and a senate of limited numbers, but desiring to become a
+great empire, she could not, like Sparta, have restricted the number of
+her citizens. So that to have created a king for life and a limited
+senate had been of little service to her.
+
+Were any one, therefore, about to found a wholly new republic, he would
+have to consider whether he desired it to increase as Rome did in
+territory and dominion, or to continue within narrow limits. In the
+former case he would have to shape its constitution as nearly as
+possible on the pattern of the Roman, leaving room for dissensions and
+popular tumults, for without a great and warlike population no republic
+can ever increase, or increasing maintain itself. In the second case he
+might give his republic a constitution like that of Venice or Sparta;
+but since extension is the ruin of such republics, the legislator would
+have to provide in every possible way against the State which he had
+founded making any additions to its territories. For these, when
+superimposed upon a feeble republic, are sure to be fatal to it: as we
+see to have been the case with Sparta and Venice, the former of which,
+after subjugating nearly all Greece, on sustaining a trifling reverse,
+betrayed the insufficiency of her foundations, for when, after the
+revolt of Thebes under Pelopidas, other cities also rebelled, the
+Spartan kingdom was utterly overthrown. Venice in like manner, after
+gaining possession of a great portion of Italy (most of it not by her
+arms but by her wealth and subtlety), when her strength was put to the
+proof, lost all in one pitched battle.
+
+I can well believe, then, that to found a republic which shall long
+endure, the best plan may be to give it internal institutions like
+those of Sparta or Venice; placing it in a naturally strong situation,
+and so fortifying it that none can expect to get the better of it
+easily, yet, at the same time, not making it so great as to be
+formidable to its neighbours; since by taking these precautions, it
+might long enjoy its independence. For there are two causes which lead
+to wars being made against a republic; one, your desire to be its
+master, the other the fear lest it should master you; both of which
+dangers the precaution indicated will go far to remove. For if, as we
+are to assume, this republic be well prepared for defence, and
+consequently difficult of attack, it will seldom or never happen that
+any one will form the design to attack it, and while it keeps within
+its own boundaries, and is seen from experience not to be influenced by
+ambition, no one will be led, out of fear for himself, to make war upon
+it, more particularly when its laws and constitution forbid its
+extension. And were it possible to maintain things in this equilibrium,
+I veritably believe that herein would be found the true form of
+political life, and the true tranquility of a republic. But all human
+affairs being in movement, and incapable of remaining as they are, they
+must either rise or fall; and to many conclusions to which we are not
+led by reason, we are brought by necessity. So that when we have given
+institutions to a State on the footing that it is to maintain itself
+without enlargement, should necessity require its enlargement, its
+foundations will be cut from below it, and its downfall quickly ensue.
+On the other hand, were a republic so favoured by Heaven as to lie
+under no necessity of making war, the result of this ease would be to
+make it effeminate and divided which two evils together, and each by
+itself, would insure its ruin. And since it is impossible, as I
+believe, to bring about an equilibrium, or to adhere strictly to the
+mean path, we must, in arranging our republic, consider what is the
+more honourable course for it to take, and so contrive that even if
+necessity compel its enlargement, it may be able to keep what it gains.
+
+But returning to the point first raised, I believe it necessary for us
+to follow the method of the Romans and not that of the other republics,
+for I know of no middle way. We must, consequently, put up with those
+dissensions which arise between commons and senate, looking on them as
+evils which cannot be escaped if we would arrive at the greatness of
+Rome.
+
+In connection with the arguments here used to prove that the authority
+of the tribunes was essential in Rome to the guardianship of freedom,
+we may naturally go on to show what advantages result to a republic
+from the power of impeachment; which, together with others, was
+conferred upon the tribunes; a subject to be noticed in the following
+Chapter.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VII.—_That to preserve Liberty in a State there must exist the
+Right to accuse._
+
+
+To those set forward in a commonwealth as guardians of public freedom,
+no more useful or necessary authority can be given than the power to
+accuse, either before the people, or before some council or tribunal,
+those citizens who in any way have offended against the liberty of
+their country.
+
+A law of this kind has two effects most beneficial to a State: _first,_
+that the citizens from fear of being accused, do not engage in attempts
+hurtful to the State, or doing so, are put down at once and without
+respect of persons: and _next,_ that a vent is given for the escape of
+all those evil humours which, from whatever cause, gather in cities
+against particular citizens; for unless an outlet be duly provided for
+these by the laws, they flow into irregular channels and overwhelm the
+State. There is nothing, therefore, which contributes so much to the
+stability and permanence of a State, as to take care that the
+fermentation of these disturbing humours be supplied by operation of
+law with a recognized outlet. This might be shown by many examples, but
+by none so clearly as by that of Coriolanus related by Livius, where he
+tells us, that at a time when the Roman nobles were angry with the
+plebeians (thinking that the appointment of tribunes for their
+protection had made them too powerful), it happened that Rome was
+visited by a grievous famine, to meet which the senate sent to Sicily
+for corn. But Coriolanus, hating the commons, sought to persuade the
+senate that now was the time to punish them, and to deprive them of the
+authority which they had usurped to the prejudice of the nobles, by
+withholding the distribution of corn, and so suffering them to perish
+of hunger. Which advice of his coming to the ears of the people,
+kindled them to such fury against him, that they would have slain him
+as he left the Senate House, had not the tribunes cited him to appear
+and answer before them to a formal charge.
+
+In respect of this incident I repeat what I have just now said, how
+useful and necessary it is for republics to provide by their laws a
+channel by which the displeasure of the multitude against a single
+citizen may find a vent. For when none such is regularly provided,
+recourse will be had to irregular channels, and these will assuredly
+lead to much worse results. For when a citizen is borne down by the
+operation of the ordinary laws, even though he be wronged, little or no
+disturbance is occasioned to the state: the injury he suffers not being
+wrought by private violence, nor by foreign force, which are the causes
+of the overthrow of free institutions, but by public authority and in
+accordance with public ordinances, which, having definite limits set
+them, are not likely to pass beyond these so as to endanger the
+commonwealth. For proof of which I am content to rest on this old
+example of Coriolanus, since all may see what a disaster it would have
+been for Rome had he been violently put to death by the people. For, as
+between citizen and citizen, a wrong would have been done affording
+ground for fear, fear would have sought defence, defence have led to
+faction, faction to divisions in the State, and these to its ruin. But
+the matter being taken up by those whose office it was to deal with it,
+all the evils which must have followed had it been left in private
+hands were escaped.
+
+In Florence, on the other hand, and in our own days, we have seen what
+violent commotions follow when the people cannot show their displeasure
+against particular citizens in a form recognized by the laws, in the
+instance of Francesco Valori, at one time looked upon as the foremost
+citizen of our republic. But many thinking him ambitious, and likely
+from his high spirit and daring to overstep the limits of civil
+freedom, and there being no way to oppose him save by setting up an
+adverse faction, the result was, that, apprehending irregular attacks,
+he sought to gain partisans for his support; while his opponents, on
+their side, having no course open to them of which the laws approved,
+resorted to courses of which the laws did not approve, and, at last, to
+open violence. And as his influence had to be attacked by unlawful
+methods, these were attended by injury not to him only, but to many
+other noble citizens; whereas, could he have been met by constitutional
+restraints, his power might have been broken without injury to any save
+himself. I might also cite from our Florentine history the fall of
+Piero Soderini, which had no other cause than there not being in our
+republic any law under which powerful and ambitious citizens can be
+impeached. For to form a tribunal by which a powerful citizen is to be
+tried, eight judges only are not enough; the judges must be numerous,
+because a few will always do the will of a few. But had there been
+proper methods for obtaining redress, either the people would have
+impeached Piero if he was guilty, and thus have given vent to their
+displeasure without calling in the Spanish army; or if he was innocent,
+would not have ventured, through fear of being accused themselves, to
+have taken proceedings against him. So that in either case the bitter
+spirit which was the cause of all the disorder would have had an end.
+Wherefore, when we find one of the parties in a State calling in a
+foreign power, we may safely conclude that it is because the defective
+laws of that State provide no escape for those malignant humours which
+are natural to men; which can best be done by arranging for an
+impeachment before a sufficient number of judges, and by giving
+countenance to this procedure. This was so well contrived in Rome that
+in spite of the perpetual struggle maintained between the commons and
+the senate, neither the senate nor the commons, nor any single citizen,
+ever sought redress at the hands of a foreign power; for having a
+remedy at home, there was no need to seek one abroad.
+
+Although the examples above cited be proof sufficient of what I affirm,
+I desire to adduce one other, recorded by Titus Livius in his history,
+where he relates that a sister of Aruns having been violated by a
+Lucumo of Clusium, the chief of the Etruscan towns, Aruns being unable,
+from the interest of her ravisher, to avenge her, betook himself to the
+Gauls who ruled in the province we now name Lombardy, and besought them
+to come with an armed force to Clusium; showing them how with advantage
+to themselves they might avenge his wrongs. Now, had Aruns seen that he
+could have had redress through the laws of his country, he never would
+have resorted to these Barbarians for help.
+
+But as the right to accuse is beneficial in a republic, so calumny, on
+the other hand, is useless and hurtful, as in the following Chapter I
+shall proceed to show.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VIII.—_That Calumny is as hurtful in a Commonwealth as the
+power to accuse is useful._
+
+
+Such were the services rendered to Rome by Furius Camillus in rescuing
+her from the oppression of the Gauls, that no Roman, however high his
+degree or station, held it derogatory to yield place to him, save only
+Manlius Capitolinus, who could not brook such glory and distinction
+being given to another. For he thought that in saving the Capitol, he
+had himself done as much as Camillus to preserve Rome, and that in
+respect of his other warlike achievements he was no whit behind him. So
+that, bursting with jealousy, and unable to remain at rest by reason of
+the other’s renown, and seeing no way to sow discord among the Fathers,
+he set himself to spread abroad sinister reports among the commons;
+throwing out, among other charges, that the treasure collected to be
+given to the Gauls, but which, afterwards, was withheld, had been
+embezzled by certain citizens, and if recovered might be turned to
+public uses in relieving the people from taxes or from private debts.
+These assertions so prevailed with the commons that they began to hold
+meetings and to raise what tumults they liked throughout the city. But
+this displeasing the senate, and the matter appearing to them grave and
+dangerous, they appointed a dictator to inquire into it, and to
+restrain the attacks of Manlius. The dictator, forthwith, caused
+Manlius to be cited before him; and these two were thus brought face to
+face in the presence of the whole city, the dictator surrounded by the
+nobles, and Manlius by the commons. The latter, being desired to say
+with whom the treasure of which he had spoken was to be found, since
+the senate were as anxious to know this as the commons, made no direct
+reply, but answered evasively that it was needless to tell them what
+they already knew. Whereupon the dictator ordered him to prison.
+
+In this passage we are taught how hateful a thing is calumny in all
+free States, as, indeed, in every society, and how we must neglect no
+means which may serve to check it. And there can be no more effectual
+means for checking calumny than by affording ample facilities for
+impeachment, which is as useful in a commonwealth as the other is
+pernicious. And between them there is this difference, that calumny
+needs neither witness, nor circumstantial proof to establish it, so
+that any man may be calumniated by any other; but not impeached; since
+impeachment demands that there be substantive charges made, and
+trustworthy evidence to support them. Again, it is before the
+magistrates, the people, or the courts of justice that men are
+impeached; but in the streets and market places that they are
+calumniated. Calumny, therefore, is most rife in that State wherein
+impeachment is least practised, and the laws least favour it. For which
+reasons the legislator should so shape the laws of his State that it
+shall be possible therein to impeach any of its citizens without fear
+or favour; and, after duly providing for this, should visit
+calumniators with the sharpest punishments. Those punished will have no
+cause to complain, since it was in their power to have impeached openly
+where they have secretly calumniated. Where this is not seen to, grave
+disorders will always ensue. For calumnies sting without disabling; and
+those who are stung being more moved by hatred of their detractors than
+by fear of the things they say against them, seek revenge.
+
+This matter, as we have said, was well arranged for in Rome, but has
+always been badly regulated in our city of Florence. And as the Roman
+ordinances with regard to it were productive of much good, so the want
+of them in Florence has bred much mischief. For any one reading the
+history of our city may perceive, how many calumnies have at all times
+been aimed against those of its citizens who have taken a leading part
+in its affairs. Thus, of one it would be said that he had plundered the
+public treasury, of another, that he had failed in some enterprise
+because he had been bribed; of a third, that this or the other disaster
+had originated in his ambition. Hence hatred sprung up on every side,
+and hatred growing to division, these led to factions, and these again
+to ruin. But had there existed in Florence some procedure whereby
+citizens might have been impeached, and calumniators punished,
+numberless disorders which have taken there would have been prevented.
+For citizens who were impeached, whether condemned or acquitted, would
+have had no power to injure the State; and they would have been
+impeached far seldomer than they have been calumniated; for calumny, as
+I have said already, is an easier matter than impeachment.
+
+Some, indeed, have made use of calumny as a means for raising
+themselves to power, and have found their advantage in traducing
+eminent citizens who withstood their designs; for by taking the part of
+the people, and confirming them in their ill-opinion of these great
+men, they made them their friends. Of this, though I could give many
+instances, I shall content myself with one. At the siege of Lucca the
+Florentine army was commanded by Messer Giovanni Guicciardini, as its
+commissary, through whose bad generalship or ill-fortune the town was
+not taken. But whatever the cause of this failure, Messer Giovanni had
+the blame; and the rumour ran that he had been bribed by the people of
+Lucca. Which calumny being fostered by his enemies, brought Messer
+Giovanni to very verge of despair; and though to clear himself he would
+willingly have given himself up to the Captain of Justice he found he
+could not, there being no provision in the laws of the republic which
+allowed of his doing so. Hence arose the bitterest hostility between
+the friends of Messer Giovanni, who were mostly of the old nobility
+(_grandi_), and those who sought to reform the government of Florence;
+and from this and the like causes, the affair grew to such dimensions
+as to bring about the downfall of our republic.
+
+Manlius Capitolinus, then, was a calumniator, not an accuser; and in
+their treatment of him the Romans showed how calumniators should be
+dealt with; by which I mean, that they should be forced to become
+accusers; and if their accusation be proved true, should be rewarded,
+or at least not punished, but if proved false should be punished as
+Manlius was.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IX.—_That to give new Institutions to a Commonwealth, or to
+reconstruct old Institutions on an entirely new basis, must be the work
+of one Man_.
+
+
+It may perhaps be thought that I should not have got so far into the
+history of Rome, without some mention of those who gave that city its
+institutions, and saying something of these institutions themselves, so
+far as they relate to religion and war. As I have no wish to keep those
+who would know my views on these matters in suspense, I say at once,
+that to many it might seem of evil omen that the founder of a civil
+government like Romulus, should first have slain his brother, and
+afterwards have consented to the death of Titus Tatius the Sabine, whom
+he had chosen to be his colleague in the kingship; since his
+countrymen, if moved by ambition and lust of power to inflict like
+injuries on any who opposed their designs, might plead the example of
+their prince. This view would be a reasonable one were we to disregard
+the object which led Romulus to put those men to death. But we must
+take it as a rule to which there are very few if any exceptions, that
+no commonwealth or kingdom ever has salutary institutions given it from
+the first or has its institutions recast in an entirely new mould,
+unless by a single person. On the contrary, it must be from one man
+that it receives its institutions at first, and upon one man that all
+similar reconstruction must depend. For this reason the wise founder of
+a commonwealth who seeks to benefit not himself only, or the line of
+his descendants, but his State and country, must endeavour to acquire
+an absolute and undivided authority. And none who is wise will ever
+blame any action, however extraordinary and irregular, which serves to
+lay the foundation of a kingdom or to establish a republic. For
+although the act condemn the doer, the end may justify him; and when,
+as in the case of Romulus, the end is good, it will always excuse the
+means; since it is he who does violence with intent to injure, not he
+who does it with the design to secure tranquility, who merits blame.
+Such a person ought however to be so prudent and moderate as to avoid
+transmitting the absolute authority he acquires, as an inheritance to
+another; for as men are, by nature, more prone to evil than to good, a
+successor may turn to ambitious ends the power which his predecessor
+has used to promote worthy ends. Moreover, though it be one man that
+must give a State its institutions, once given they are not so likely
+to last long resting for support on the shoulders of one man only, as
+when entrusted to the care of many, and when it is the business of many
+to maintain them. For though the multitude be unfit to set a State in
+order, since they cannot, by reason of the divisions which prevail
+among them, agree wherein the true well-being of the State lies, yet
+when they have once been taught the truth, they never will consent to
+abandon it. And that Romulus, though he put his brother to death, is
+yet of those who are to be pardoned, since what he did was done for the
+common good and not from personal ambition, is shown by his at once
+creating a senate, with whom he took counsel, and in accordance with
+whose voice he determined. And whosoever shall well examine the
+authority which Romulus reserved to himself, will find that he reserved
+nothing beyond the command of the army when war was resolved on, and
+the right to assemble the senate. This is seen later, on Rome becoming
+free by the expulsion of the Tarquins, when the Romans altered none of
+their ancient institutions save in appointing two consuls for a year
+instead of a king for life; for this proves that all the original
+institutions of that city were more in conformity with a free and
+constitutional government, than with an absolute and despotic one.
+
+In support of what has been said above, I might cite innumerable
+instances, as of Moses, Lycurgus, Solon, and other founders of kingdoms
+and commonwealths, who, from the full powers given them, were enabled
+to shape their laws to the public advantage; but passing over these
+examples, as of common notoriety, I take one, not indeed so famous, but
+which merits the attention of all who desire to frame wise laws. Agis,
+King of Sparta, desiring to bring back his countrymen to those limits
+within which the laws of Lycurgus had held them, because he thought
+that, from having somewhat deviated from them, his city had lost much
+of its ancient virtue and, consequently much of its strength and power,
+was, at the very outset of his attempts, slain by the Spartan Ephori,
+as one who sought to make himself a tyrant. But Cleomenes coming after
+him in the kingdom, and, on reading the notes and writings which he
+found of Agis wherein his designs and intentions were explained, being
+stirred by the same desire, perceived that he could not confer this
+benefit on his country unless he obtained sole power. For he saw that
+the ambition of others made it impossible for him to do what was useful
+for many against the will of a few. Wherefore, finding fit occasion, he
+caused the Ephori and all others likely to throw obstacles in his way,
+to be put to death; after which, he completely renewed the laws of
+Lycurgus. And the result of his measures would have been to give fresh
+life to Sparta, and to gain for himself a renown not inferior to that
+of Lycurgus, had it not been for the power of the Macedonians and the
+weakness of the other Greek States. For while engaged with these
+reforms, he was attacked by the Macedonians, and being by himself no
+match for them, and having none to whom he could turn for help, he was
+overpowered; and his plans, though wise and praiseworthy, were never
+brought to perfection.
+
+All which circumstances considered, I conclude that he who gives new
+institutions to a State must stand alone; and that for the deaths of
+Remus and Tatius, Romulus is to be excused rather than blamed.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER X.—_That in proportion as the Founder of a Kingdom or
+Commonwealth merits Praise, he who founds a Tyranny deserves Blame._
+
+
+Of all who are praised they are praised the most, who are the authors
+and founders of religions. After whom come the founders of kingdoms and
+commonwealths. Next to these, they have the greatest name who as
+commanders of armies have added to their own dominions or those of
+their country. After these, again, are ranked men of letters, who being
+of various shades of merit are celebrated each in his degree. To all
+others, whose number is infinite, is ascribed that measure of praise to
+which his profession or occupation entitles him. And, conversely, all
+who contribute to the overthrow of religion, or to the ruin of kingdoms
+and commonwealths, all who are foes to letters and to the arts which
+confer honour and benefit on the human race (among whom I reckon the
+impious, the cruel, the ignorant, the indolent, the base and the
+worthless), are held in infamy and detestation.
+
+No one, whether he be wise or foolish, bad or good, if asked to choose
+between these two kinds of men, will ever be found to withhold praise
+from what deserves praise, or blame from what is to be blamed. And yet
+almost all, deceived by a false good and a false glory, allow
+themselves either ignorantly or wilfully to follow in the footsteps
+such as deserve blame rather than praise; and, have it in their power
+to establish, to their lasting renown, a commonwealth or kingdom, turn
+aside to create a tyranny without a thought how much they thereby lose
+in name, fame, security, tranquility, and peace of mind; and into how
+much infamy, scorn, danger, and disquiet they run. But were they to
+read history, and turn to profit the lessons of the past, it seems
+impossible that those living in a republic as private citizens, should
+not prefer, in their native city, to play the part of Scipio rather of
+Cæsar; or that those who by good fortune or merit have risen to be
+rulers, should not seek rather to resemble Agesilaus, Timoleon, and
+Dion, than to Nabis, Phalaris and Dionysius; since they would see how
+the latter are loaded with infamy, while the former have been extolled
+beyond bounds. They would see, too, how Timoleon and others like him,
+had as great authority in their country as Dionysius or Phalaris in
+theirs, while enjoying far greater security. Nor let any one finding
+Cæsar celebrated by a crowd of writers, be misled by his glory; for
+those who praise him have been corrupted by his good fortune, and
+overawed by the greatness of that empire which, being governed in his
+name, would not suffer any to speak their minds openly concerning him.
+But let him who desires to know how historians would have written of
+Cæsar had they been free to declare their thoughts mark what they say
+of Catiline, than whom Cæsar is more hateful, in proportion as he who
+does is more to be condemned than he who only desires to do evil. Let
+him see also what praises they lavish upon Brutus, because being
+unable, out of respect for his power, to reproach Cæsar, they magnify
+his enemy. And if he who has become prince in any State will but
+reflect, how, after Rome was made an empire, far greater praise was
+earned those emperors who lived within the laws, and worthily, than by
+those who lived in the contrary way, he will see that Titus, Nerva,
+Trajan, Hadrian, Antoninus and Marcus had no need of prætorian cohorts,
+or of countless legions to guard them, but were defended by their own
+good lives, the good-will of their subjects, and the attachment of the
+senate. In like manner he will perceive in the case of Caligula, Nero,
+Vitellius, and ever so many more of those evil emperors, that all the
+armies of the east and of the west were of no avail to protect them
+from the enemies whom their bad and depraved lives raised up against
+them. And were the history of these emperors rightly studied, it would
+be a sufficient lesson to any prince how to distinguish the paths which
+lead to honour and safety from those which end in shame and insecurity.
+For of the twenty-six emperors from Cæsar to Maximinus, sixteen came to
+a violent, ten only to a natural death; and though one or two of those
+who died by violence may have been good princes, as Galba or Pertinax,
+they met their fate in consequence of that corruption which their
+predecessors had left behind in the army. And if among those who died a
+natural death, there be found some bad emperors, like Severus, it is to
+be ascribed to their signal good fortune and to their great abilities,
+advantages seldom found united in the same man. From the study of this
+history we may also learn how a good government is to be established;
+for while all the emperors who succeeded to the throne by birth, except
+Titus, were bad, all were good who succeeded by adoption; as in the
+case of the five from Nerva to Marcus. But so soon as the empire fell
+once more to the heirs by birth, its ruin recommenced.
+
+Let a prince therefore look to that period which extends from Nerva to
+Marcus, and contrast it with that which went before and that which came
+after, and then let him say in which of them he would wish to have been
+born or to have reigned. For during these times in which good men
+governed, he will see the prince secure in the midst of happy subjects,
+and the whole world filled with peace and justice. He will find the
+senate maintaining its authority, the magistrates enjoying their
+honours, rich citizens their wealth, rank and merit held in respect,
+ease and content everywhere prevailing, rancour, licence, corruption
+and ambition everywhere quenched, and that golden age restored in which
+every one might hold and support what opinions he pleased. He will see,
+in short, the world triumphing, the sovereign honoured and revered, the
+people animated with love, and rejoicing in their security. But should
+he turn to examine the times of the other emperors, he will find them
+wasted by battles, torn by seditions, cruel alike in war and peace;
+many princes perishing by the sword; many wars foreign and domestic;
+Italy overwhelmed with unheard-of disasters; her towns destroyed and
+plundered; Rome burned; the Capitol razed to the ground by Roman
+citizens; the ancient temples desolated; the ceremonies of religion
+corrupted; the cities rank with adultery; the seas covered with exiles
+and the islands polluted with blood. He will see outrage follow
+outrage; rank, riches, honours, and, above all, virtue imputed as
+mortal crimes; informers rewarded; slaves bribed to betray their
+masters, freedmen their patrons, and those who were without enemies
+brought to destruction by their friends; and then he will know the true
+nature of the debt which Rome, Italy, and the world owe to Cæsar; and
+if he possess a spark of human feeling, will turn from the example of
+those evil times, and kindle with a consuming passion to imitate those
+which were good.
+
+And in truth the prince who seeks for worldly glory should desire to be
+the ruler of a corrupt city; not that, like Cæsar, he may destroy it,
+but that, like Romulus, he may restore it; since man cannot hope for,
+nor Heaven offer any better opportunity of fame. Were it indeed
+necessary in giving a constitution to a State to forfeit its
+sovereignty, the prince who, to retain his station, should withhold a
+constitution, might plead excuse; but for him who in giving a
+constitution can still retain his sovereignty, no excuse is to be made.
+
+Let those therefore to whom Heaven has afforded this opportunity,
+remember that two courses lie open to them; one which will render them
+secure while they live and glorious when they die; another which
+exposes them to continual difficulties in life, and condemns them to
+eternal infamy after death.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XI.—_Of the Religion of the Romans._
+
+
+Though Rome had Romulus for her first founder, and as a daughter owed
+him her being and nurture, nevertheless, when the institutions of
+Romulus were seen by Heaven to be insufficient for so great a State,
+the Roman senate were moved to choose Numa Pompilius as his successor,
+that he might look to all matters which Romulus had neglected. He
+finding the people fierce and turbulent, and desiring with the help of
+the peaceful arts to bring them to order and obedience, called in the
+aid of religion as essential to the maintenance of civil society, and
+gave it such a form, that for many ages God was nowhere so much feared
+as in that republic. The effect of this was to render easy any
+enterprise in which the senate or great men of Rome thought fit to
+engage. And whosoever pays heed to an infinity of actions performed,
+sometimes by the Roman people collectively, often by single citizens,
+will see, that esteeming the power of God beyond that of man, they
+dreaded far more to violate their oath than to transgress the laws; as
+is clearly shown by the examples of Scipio and of Manlius Torquatus.
+For after the defeat of the Romans by Hannibal at Cannæ, many citizens
+meeting together, resolved, in their terror and dismay, to abandon
+Italy and seek refuge in Sicily. But Scipio, getting word of this, went
+among them, and menacing them with his naked sword, made them swear
+never to abandon their country. Again, when Lucius Manlius was accused
+by the tribune Marcus Pomponius, before the day fixed for trial, Titus
+Manlius, afterwards named Torquatus, son to Lucius, went to seek this
+Marcus, and threatening him with death if he did not withdraw the
+charge against his father, compelled him to swear compliance; and he,
+through fear, having sworn, kept his oath. In the first of these two
+instances, therefore, citizens whom love of their country and its laws
+could not have retained in Italy, were kept there by the oath forced
+upon them; and in the second, the tribune Marcus, to keep his oath,
+laid aside the hatred he bore the father, and overlooked the injury
+done him by the son, and his own dishonour. And this from no other
+cause than the religion which Numa had impressed upon this city.
+
+And it will be plain to any one who carefully studies Roman History,
+how much religion helped in disciplining the army, in uniting the
+people, in keeping good men good, and putting bad men to shame; so that
+had it to be decided to which prince, Romulus or Numa, Rome owed the
+greater debt, I think the balance must turn in favour of Numa; for when
+religion is once established you may readily bring in arms; but where
+you have arms without religion it is not easy afterwards to bring in
+religion. We see, too, that while Romulus in order to create a senate,
+and to establish his other ordinances civil and military, needed no
+support from Divine authority, this was very necessary to Numa, who
+feigned to have intercourse with a Nymph by whose advice he was guided
+in counselling the people. And this, because desiring to introduce in
+Rome new and untried institutions, he feared that his own authority
+might not effect his end. Nor, indeed, has any attempt ever been made
+to introduce unusual laws among a people, without resorting to Divine
+authority, since without such sanction they never would have been
+accepted. For the wise recognize many things to be good which do not
+bear such reasons on the face of them as command their acceptance by
+others; wherefore, wise men who would obviate these difficulties, have
+recourse to Divine aid. Thus did Lycurgus, thus Solon, and thus have
+done many besides who have had the same end in view.
+
+The Romans, accordingly, admiring the prudence and virtues of Numa,
+assented to all the measures which he recommended. This, however, is to
+be said, that the circumstance of these times being deeply tinctured
+with religious feeling, and of the men with whom he had to deal being
+rude and ignorant, gave Numa better facility to carry out his plans, as
+enabling him to mould his subjects readily to any new impression. And,
+doubtless, he who should seek at the present day to form a new
+commonwealth, would find the task easier among a race of simple
+mountaineers, than among the dwellers in cities where society is
+corrupt; as the sculptor can more easily carve a fair statue from a
+rough block, than from the block which has been badly shaped out by
+another. But taking all this into account, I maintain that the religion
+introduced by Numa was one of the chief causes of the prosperity of
+Rome, since it gave rise to good ordinances, which in turn brought with
+them good fortune, and with good fortune, happy issues to whatsoever
+was undertaken.
+
+And as the observance of the ordinances of religion is the cause of the
+greatness of a State, so their neglect is the occasion of its decline;
+since a kingdom without the fear of God must either fall to pieces, or
+must be maintained by the fear of some prince who supplies that
+influence not supplied by religion. But since the lives of princes are
+short, the life of this prince, also, and with it his influence, must
+soon come to an end; whence it happens that a kingdom which rests
+wholly on the qualities of its prince, lasts for a brief time only;
+because these qualities, terminating with his life, are rarely renewed
+in his successor. For as Dante wisely says:—
+
+“Seldom through the boughs
+Doth human worth renew itself; for such
+The will of Him who gives it, that to Him
+We may ascribe it.”[1]
+
+
+ [1] Rade volta risurge per li rami
+L’umana probitate: e questo vuole
+Quei che la dà, perchè da lui si chiami.
+          _Purg_. vii. 121-123.]
+
+
+It follows, therefore, that the safety of a commonwealth or kingdom
+lies, not in its having a ruler who governs it prudently while he
+lives, but in having one who so orders things, that when he dies, the
+State may still maintain itself. And though it be easier to impose new
+institutions or a new faith on rude and simple men, it is not therefore
+impossible to persuade their adoption by men who are civilized, and who
+do not think themselves rude. The people of Florence do not esteem
+themselves rude or ignorant, and yet were persuaded by the Friar
+Girolamo Savonarola that he spoke with God. Whether in this he said
+truth or no, I take not on me to pronounce, since of so great a man we
+must speak with reverence; but this I do say, that very many believed
+him without having witnessed anything extraordinary to warrant their
+belief; his life, his doctrines, the matter whereof he treated, being
+sufficient to enlist their faith.
+
+Let no man, therefore, lose heart from thinking that he cannot do what
+others have done before him; for, as I said in my Preface, men are
+born, and live, and die, always in accordance with the same rules.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XII.—That it is of much moment to make account of Religion; and
+that Italy, through the Roman Church, being wanting therein, has been
+ruined.
+
+
+Princes and commonwealths that would save themselves from growing
+corrupted, should before all things keep uncorrupted the rites and
+ceremonies of religion, and always hold them in reverence; since we can
+have no surer sign of the decay of a province than to see Divine
+worship held therein in contempt. This is easily understood when it is
+seen on what foundation that religion rests in which a man is born. For
+every religion has its root in certain fundamental ordinances peculiar
+to itself.
+
+The religion of the Gentiles had its beginning in the responses of the
+oracles and in the prognostics of the augurs and soothsayers. All their
+other ceremonies and observances depended upon these; because men
+naturally believed that the God who could forecast their future weal or
+woe, could also bring them to pass. Wherefore the temples, the prayers,
+the sacrifices, and all the other rites of their worship, had their
+origin in this, that the oracles of Delos, of Dodona, and others
+celebrated in antiquity, held the world admiring and devout. But,
+afterwards, when these oracles began to shape their answers to suit the
+interests of powerful men, and their impostures to be seen through by
+the multitude, men grew incredulous and ready to overturn every sacred
+institution. For which reason, the rulers of kingdoms and commonwealths
+should maintain the foundations of the faith which they hold; since
+thus it will be easy for them to keep their country religious, and,
+consequently, virtuous and united. To which end they should countenance
+and further whatsoever tells in favour of religion, even should they
+think it untrue; and the wiser they are, and the better they are
+acquainted with natural causes, the more ought they to do so. It is
+from this course having been followed by the wise, that the miracles
+celebrated even in false religions, have come to be held in repute; for
+from whatever source they spring, discreet men will extol them, whose
+authority afterwards gives them currency everywhere.
+
+These miracles were common enough in Rome, and among others this was
+believed, that when the Roman soldiers were sacking the city of Veii,
+certain of them entered the temple of Juno and spoke to the statue of
+the goddess, saying, “_Wilt thou come with us to Rome?_” when to some
+it seemed that she inclined her head in assent, and to others that they
+heard her answer, “_Yea_.” For these men being filled with religious
+awe (which Titus Livius shows us by the circumstance that, in entering
+the temple, they entered devoutly, reverently, and without tumult),
+persuaded themselves they heard that answer to their question, which,
+perhaps, they had formed beforehand in their minds. But their faith and
+belief were wholly approved of and confirmed by Camillus and by the
+other chief men of the city.
+
+Had religion been maintained among the princes of Christendom on the
+footing on which it was established by its Founder, the Christian
+States and republics had been far more united and far more prosperous
+than they now are; nor can we have surer proof of its decay than in
+witnessing how those countries which are the nearest neighbours of the
+Roman Church, the head of our faith, have less devoutness than any
+others; so that any one who considers its earliest beginnings and
+observes how widely different is its present practice, might well
+believe its ruin or its chastisement to be close at hand.
+
+But since some are of opinion that the welfare of Italy depends upon
+the Church of Rome, I desire to put forward certain arguments which
+occur to me against that view, and shall adduce two very strong ones,
+which, to my mind, admit of no answer. The first is, that, through the
+ill example of the Roman Court, the country has lost all religious
+feeling and devoutness, a loss which draws after it infinite mischiefs
+and disorders; for as the presence of religion implies every
+excellence, so the contrary is involved in its absence. To the Church,
+therefore, and to the priests, we Italians owe this first debt, that
+through them we have become wicked and irreligious. And a still greater
+debt we owe them for what is the immediate cause of our ruin, namely,
+that by the Church our country is kept divided. For no country was ever
+united or prosperous which did not yield obedience to some one prince
+or commonwealth, as has been the case with France and Spain. And the
+Church is the sole cause why Italy stands on a different footing, and
+is subject to no one king or commonwealth. For though she holds here
+her seat, and exerts her temporal authority, she has never yet gained
+strength and courage to seize upon the entire country, or make herself
+supreme; yet never has been so weak that when in fear of losing her
+temporal dominion, she could not call in some foreign potentate to aid
+her against any Italian State by which she was overmatched. Of which we
+find many instances, both in early times, as when by the intervention
+of Charles the Great she drove the Lombards, who had made themselves
+masters of nearly the whole country, out of Italy; and also in recent
+times, as when, with the help of France, she first stripped the
+Venetians of their territories, and then, with the help of the Swiss,
+expelled the French.
+
+The Church, therefore, never being powerful enough herself to take
+possession of the entire country, while, at the same time, preventing
+any one else from doing so, has made it impossible to bring Italy under
+one head; and has been the cause of her always living subject to many
+princes or rulers, by whom she has been brought to such division and
+weakness as to have become a prey, not to Barbarian kings only, but to
+any who have thought fit to attack her. For this, I say, we Italians
+have none to thank but the Church. And were any man powerful enough to
+transplant the Court of Rome, with all the authority it now wields over
+the rest of Italy, into the territories of the Swiss (the only people
+who at this day, both as regards religion and military discipline, live
+like the ancients,) he would have clear proof of the truth of what I
+affirm, and would find that the corrupt manners of that Court had, in a
+little while, wrought greater mischief in these territories than any
+other disaster which could ever befall them.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XIII.—_Of the use the Romans made of Religion in giving
+Institutions to their City, in carrying out their Enterprises, and in
+quelling Tumults._
+
+
+Here it seems to me not out of place to cite instances of the Romans
+seeking assistance from religion in reforming their institutions and in
+carrying out their warlike designs. And although many such are related
+by Titus Livius, I content myself with mentioning the following only:
+The Romans having appointed tribunes with consular powers, all of them,
+save one, plebeians, it so chanced that in that very year they were
+visited by plague and famine, accompanied by many strange portents.
+Taking occasion from this, the nobles, at the next creation of
+tribunes, gave out that the gods were angry with Rome for lowering the
+majesty of her government, nor could be appeased but by the choice of
+tribunes being restored to a fair footing. Whereupon the people,
+smitten with religious awe, chose all the tribunes from the nobles.
+Again, at the siege of Veii, we find the Roman commanders making use of
+religion to keep the minds of their men well disposed towards that
+enterprise. For when, in the last year of the siege, the soldiers,
+disgusted with their protracted service, began to clamour to be led
+back to Rome, on the Alban lake suddenly rising to an uncommon height,
+it was found that the oracles at Delphi and elsewhere had foretold that
+Veii should fall that year in which the Alban lake overflowed. The hope
+of near victory thus excited in the minds of the soldiers, led them to
+put up with the weariness of the war, and to continue in arms; until,
+on Camillus being named dictator, Veii was taken after a ten years’
+siege. In these cases, therefore, we see religion, wisely used, assist
+in the reduction of this city, and in restoring the tribuneship to the
+nobles; neither of which ends could well have been effected without it.
+
+One other example bearing on the same subject I must not omit. Constant
+disturbances were occasioned in Rome by the tribune Terentillus, who,
+for reasons to be noticed in their place, sought to pass a certain law.
+The nobles, in their efforts to baffle him, had recourse to religion,
+which they sought to turn to account in two ways. For first they caused
+the Sibylline books to be searched, and a feigned answer returned, that
+in that year the city ran great risk of losing its freedom through
+civil discord; which fraud, although exposed by the tribunes,
+nevertheless aroused such alarm in the minds of the commons that they
+slackened in their support of their leaders. Their other contrivance
+was as follows: A certain Appius Herdonius, at the head of a band of
+slaves and outlaws, to the number of four thousand, having seized the
+Capitol by night, an alarm was spread that were the Equians and
+Volscians, those perpetual enemies of the Roman name, then to attack
+the city, they might succeed in taking it. And when, in spite of this,
+the tribunes stubbornly persisted in their efforts to pass the law,
+declaring the act of Herdonius to be a device of the nobles and no real
+danger. Publius Rubetius, a citizen of weight and authority, came forth
+from the Senate House, and in words partly friendly and partly
+menacing, showed them the peril in which the city stood, and that their
+demands were unseasonable; and spoke to such effect that the commons
+bound themselves by oath to stand by the consul; in fulfilment of which
+engagement they aided the consul, Publius Valerius, to carry the
+Capitol by assault. But Valerius being slain in the attack, Titus
+Quintius was at once appointed in his place, who, to leave the people
+no breathing time, nor suffer their thoughts to revert to the
+Terentillian law, ordered them to quit Rome and march against the
+Volscians; declaring them bound to follow him by virtue of the oath
+they had sworn not to desert the consul. And though the tribunes
+withstood him, contending that the oath had been sworn to the dead
+consul and not to Quintius, yet the people under the influence of
+religious awe, chose rather to obey the consul than believe the
+tribunes. And Titus Livius commends their behaviour when he says:
+“_That neglect of the gods which now prevails, had not then made its
+way nor was it then the practice for every man to interpret his oath,
+or the laws, to suit his private ends_.” The tribunes accordingly,
+fearing to lose their entire ascendency, consented to obey the consul,
+and to refrain for a year from moving in the matter of the Terentillian
+law; while the consuls, on their part, undertook that for a year the
+commons should not be called forth to war. And thus, with the help of
+religion, the senate were able to overcome a difficulty which they
+never could have overcome without it.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XIV.—_That the Romans interpreted the Auspices to meet the
+occasion; and made a prudent show of observing the Rites of Religion
+even when forced to disregard them; and any who rashly slighted
+Religion they punished._
+
+
+Auguries were not only, as we have shown above, a main foundation of
+the old religion of the Gentiles, but were also the cause of the
+prosperity of the Roman commonwealth. Accordingly, the Romans gave more
+heed to these than to any other of their observances; resorting to them
+in their consular comitia; in undertaking new enterprises; in calling
+out their armies; in going into battle; and, in short, in every
+business of importance, whether civil or military. Nor would they ever
+set forth on any warlike expedition, until they had satisfied their
+soldiers that the gods had promised them victory.
+
+Among other means of declaring the auguries, they had in their armies a
+class of soothsayers, named by them _pullarii_, whom, when they desired
+to give battle, they would ask to take the auspices, which they did by
+observing the behaviour of fowls. If the fowls pecked, the engagement
+was begun with a favourable omen. If they refused, battle was declined.
+Nevertheless, when it was plain on the face of it that a certain course
+had to be taken, they would take it at all hazards, even though the
+auspices were adverse; contriving, however, to manage matters so
+adroitly as not to appear to throw any slight on religion; as was done
+by the consul Papirius in the great battle he fought with the Samnites
+wherein that nation was finally broken and overthrown. For Papirius
+being encamped over against the Samnites, and perceiving that if he
+fought, victory was certain, and consequently being eager to engage,
+desired the omens to be taken. The fowls refused to peck; but the chief
+soothsayer observing the eagerness of the soldiers to fight and the
+confidence felt both by them and by their captain, not to deprive the
+army of such an opportunity of glory, reported to the consul that the
+auspices were favourable. Whereupon Papirius began to array his army
+for battle. But some among the soothsayers having divulged to certain
+of the soldiers that the fowls had not pecked, this was told to Spurius
+Papirius, the nephew of the consul, who reporting it to his uncle, the
+latter straightway bade him mind his own business, for that so far as
+he himself and the army were concerned, the auspices were fair; and if
+the soothsayer had lied, the consequences were on his head. And that
+the event might accord with the prognostics, he commanded his officers
+to place the soothsayers in front of the battle. It so chanced that as
+they advanced against the enemy, the chief soothsayer was killed by a
+spear thrown by a Roman soldier; which, the consul hearing of, said,
+“_All goes well, and as the Gods would have it, for by the death of
+this liar the army is purged of blame and absolved from whatever
+displeasure these may have conceived against it_.” And contriving, in
+this way to make his designs tally with the auspices, he joined battle,
+without the army knowing that the ordinances of religion had in any
+degree been disregarded.
+
+But an opposite course was taken by Appius Pulcher, in Sicily, in the
+first Carthaginian war. For desiring to join battle, he bade the
+soothsayers take the auspices, and on their announcing that the fowls
+refused to feed, he answered, “_Let us see, then, whether they will
+drink,_” and, so saying, caused them to be thrown into the sea. After
+which he fought and was defeated. For this he was condemned at Rome,
+while Papirius was honoured; not so much because the one had gained
+while the other had lost a battle, as because in their treatment of the
+auspices the one had behaved discreetly, the other with rashness. And,
+in truth, the sole object of this system of taking the auspices was to
+insure the army joining battle with that confidence of success which
+constantly leads to victory; a device followed not by the Romans only,
+but by foreign nations as well; of which I shall give an example in the
+following Chapter.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XV.—_How the Samnites, as a last resource in their broken
+Fortunes, had recourse to Religion._
+
+
+The Samnites, who before had met with many defeats at the hands of the
+Romans, were at last decisively routed by them in Etruria, where their
+armies were cut to pieces and their commanders slain. And because their
+allies also, such as the Etruscans, the Umbrians, and the Gauls, were
+likewise vanquished, they “_could now no longer_” as Livius tells us,
+“_either trust to their own strength or to foreign aid; yet, for all
+that, would not cease from hostilities, nor resign themselves to
+forfeit the liberty which they had unsuccessfully defended, preferring
+new defeats to an inglorious submission._” They resolved, therefore, to
+make a final effort; and as they knew that victory was only to be
+secured by inspiring their soldiers with a stubborn courage, to which
+end nothing could help so much as religion, at the instance of their
+high priest, Ovius Paccius, they revived an ancient sacrificial rite
+performed by them in the manner following. After offering solemn
+sacrifice they caused all the captains of their armies, standing
+between the slain victims and the smoking altars, to swear never to
+abandon the war. They then summoned the common soldiers, one by one,
+and before the same altars, and surrounded by a ring of many centurions
+with drawn swords, first bound them by oath never to reveal what they
+might see or hear; and then, after imprecating the Divine wrath, and
+reciting the most terrible incantations, made them vow and swear to the
+gods, as they would not have a curse light on their race and offspring,
+to follow wherever their captains led, never to turn back from battle,
+and to put any they saw turn back to death. Some who in their terror
+declined to swear, were forthwith slain by the centurions. The rest,
+warned by their cruel fate, complied. Assembling thereafter to the
+number of forty thousand, one-half of whom, to render their appearance
+of unusual splendour were clad in white, with plumes and crests over
+their helmets, they took up their ground in the neighbourhood of
+Aquilonia. But Papirius, being sent against them, bade his soldiers be
+of good cheer, telling them “_that feathers made no wounds, and that a
+Roman spear would pierce a painted shield;_” and to lessen the effect
+which the oath taken by the Samnites had upon the minds of the Romans,
+he said that such an oath must rather distract than strengthen those
+bound by it, since they had to fear, at once, their enemies, their
+comrades, and their Gods. In the battle which ensued, the Samnites were
+routed, any firmness lent them by religion or by the oath they had
+sworn, being balanced by the Roman valour, and the terror inspired by
+past defeats. Still we see that, in their own judgment, they had no
+other refuge to which to turn, nor other remedy for restoring their
+broken hopes; and this is strong testimony to the spirit which religion
+rightly used can arouse.
+
+Some of the incidents which I have now been considering may be thought
+to relate rather to the foreign than to the domestic affairs of Rome,
+which last alone form the proper subject of this Book; nevertheless
+since the matter connects itself with one of the most important
+institutions of the Roman republic, I have thought it convenient to
+notice it here, so as not to divide the subject and be obliged to
+return to it hereafter.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XVI.—_That a People accustomed to live under a Prince, if by
+any accident it become free, can hardly preserve that Freedom._
+
+
+Should a people accustomed to live under a prince by any accident
+become free, as did the Romans on the expulsion of the Tarquins, we
+know from numberless instances recorded in ancient history, how hard it
+will be for it to maintain that freedom. And this is no more than we
+might expect. For a people in such circumstances may be likened to the
+wild animal which, though destined by nature to roam at large in the
+woods, has been reared in the cage and in constant confinement and
+which, should it chance to be set free in the open country, being
+unused to find its own food, and unfamiliar with the coverts where it
+might lie concealed, falls a prey to the first who seeks to recapture
+it. Even thus it fares with the people which has been accustomed to be
+governed by others; since ignorant how to act by itself either for
+attack or defence, and neither knowing foreign princes nor being known
+of them, it is speedily brought back under the yoke, and often under a
+heavier yoke than that from which it has just freed its neck. These
+difficulties will be met with, even where the great body of the
+citizens has not become wholly corrupted; but where the corruption is
+complete, freedom, as shall presently be shown, is not merely fleeting
+but impossible. Wherefore my remarks are to be taken as applying to
+those States only wherein corruption has as yet made no great progress,
+and in which there is more that is sound than unsound.
+
+To the difficulties above noticed, another has to be added, which is,
+that a State in becoming free makes for itself bitter enemies but not
+warm friends. All become its bitter enemies who, drawing their support
+from the wealth of the tyrant, flourished under his government. For
+these men, when the causes which made them powerful are withdrawn, can
+no longer live contented, but are one and all impelled to attempt the
+restoration of the tyranny in hopes of regaining their former
+importance. On the other hand, as I have said, the State which becomes
+free does not gain for itself warm friends. For a free government
+bestows its honours and rewards in accordance with certain fixed rules,
+and on considerations of merit, without which none is honoured or
+rewarded. But when a man obtains only those honours or rewards which he
+seems to himself to deserve, he will never admit that he is under any
+obligation to those who bestow them. Moreover the common benefits that
+all derive from a free government, which consist in the power to enjoy
+what is our own, openly and undisturbed, in having to feel no anxiety
+for the honour of wife or child, nor any fear for personal safety, are
+hardly recognized by men while they still possess them, since none will
+ever confess obligation to him who merely refrains from injury. For
+these reasons, I repeat, a State which has recently become free, is
+likely to have bitter enemies and no warm friends.
+
+Now, to meet these difficulties and their attendant disorders, there is
+no more potent, effectual, wholesome, and necessary remedy than _to
+slay the sons of Brutus_. They, as the historian tells us, were along
+with other young Romans led to conspire against their country, simply
+because the unusual privileges which they had enjoyed under the kings,
+were withheld under the consuls; so that to them it seemed as though
+the freedom of the people implied their servitude. Any one, therefore,
+who undertakes to control a people, either as their prince or as the
+head of a commonwealth, and does not make sure work with all who are
+hostile to his new institutions, founds a government which cannot last
+long. Undoubtedly those princes are to be reckoned unhappy, who, to
+secure their position, are forced to advance by unusual and irregular
+paths, and with the people for their enemies. For while he who has to
+deal with a few adversaries only, can easily and without much or
+serious difficulty secure himself, he who has an entire people against
+him can never feel safe and the greater the severity he uses the weaker
+his authority becomes; so that his best course is to strive to make the
+people his friends.
+
+But since these views may seem to conflict with what I have said above,
+treating there of a republic and here of a prince, that I may not have
+to return to the subject again, I will in this place discuss it
+briefly. Speaking, then of those princes who have become the tyrants of
+their country, I say that the prince who seeks to gain over an
+unfriendly people should first of all examine what it is the people
+really desire, and he will always find that they desire two things:
+first, to be revenged upon those who are the cause of their servitude;
+and second, to regain their freedom. The first of these desires the
+prince can gratify wholly, the second in part. As regards the former,
+we have an instance exactly in point. Clearchus, tyrant of Heraclea,
+being in exile, it so happened that on a feud arising between the
+commons and the nobles of that city, the latter, perceiving they were
+weaker than their adversaries, began to look with favour on Clearchus,
+and conspiring with him, in opposition to the popular voice recalled
+him to Heraclea and deprived the people of their freedom. Clearchus
+finding himself thus placed between the arrogance of the nobles, whom
+he could in no way either satisfy or correct, and the fury of the
+people, who could not put up with the loss of their freedom, resolved
+to rid himself at a stroke from the harassment of the nobles and
+recommend himself to the people. Wherefore, watching his opportunity,
+he caused all the nobles to be put to death, and thus, to the extreme
+delight of the people, satisfied one of those desires by which they are
+possessed, namely, the desire for vengeance.
+
+As for the other desire of the people, namely, to recover their
+freedom, the prince, since he never can content them in this, should
+examine what the causes are which make them long to be free; and he
+will find a very few of them desiring freedom that they may obtain
+power, but all the rest, whose number is countless, only desiring it
+that they may live securely. For in all republics, whatever the form of
+their government, barely forty or fifty citizens have any place in the
+direction of affairs; who, from their number being so small, can easily
+be reckoned with, either by making away with them, or by allowing them
+such a share of honours as, looking to their position, may reasonably
+content them. All those others whose sole aim it is to live safely, are
+well contented where the prince enacts such laws and ordinances as
+provide for the general security, while they establish his own
+authority; and when he does this, and the people see that nothing
+induces him to violate these laws, they soon begin to live happily and
+without anxiety. Of this we have an example in the kingdom of France,
+which enjoys perfect security from this cause alone, that its kings are
+bound to compliance with an infinity of laws upon which the well-being
+of the whole people depends. And he who gave this State its
+constitution allowed its kings to do as they pleased as regards arms
+and money; but provided that as regards everything else they should not
+interfere save as the laws might direct. Those rulers, therefore, who
+omit to provide sufficiently for the safety of their government at the
+outset, must, like the Romans, do so on the first occasion which
+offers; and whoever lets the occasion slip, will repent too late of not
+having acted as he should. The Romans, however, being still uncorrupted
+at the time when they recovered their freedom, were able, after slaying
+the sons of Brutus and getting rid of the Tarquins, to maintain it with
+all those safeguards and remedies which we have elsewhere considered.
+But had they already become corrupted, no remedy could have been found,
+either in Rome or out of it, by which their freedom could have been
+secured; as I shall show in the following Chapter.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XVII.—_That a corrupt People obtaining Freedom can hardly
+preserve it._
+
+
+I believe that if her kings had not been expelled, Rome must very soon
+have become a weak and inconsiderable State. For seeing to what a pitch
+of corruption these kings had come, we may conjecture that if two or
+three more like reigns had followed, and the taint spread from the head
+to the members, so soon as the latter became infected, cure would have
+been hopeless. But from the head being removed while the trunk was
+still sound, it was not difficult for the Romans to return to a free
+and constitutional government.
+
+It may be assumed, however, as most certain, that a corrupted city
+living under a prince can never recover its freedom, even were the
+prince and all his line to be exterminated. For in such a city it must
+necessarily happen that one prince will be replaced by another, and
+that things will never settle down until a new lord be established;
+unless, indeed, the combined goodness and valour of some one citizen
+should maintain freedom, which, even then, will endure only for his
+lifetime; as happened twice in Syracuse, first under the rule of Dion,
+and again under that of Timoleon, whose virtues while they lived kept
+their city free, but on whose death it fell once more under a tyranny.
+
+But the strongest example that can be given is that of Rome, which on
+the expulsion of the Tarquins was able at once to seize on liberty and
+to maintain it; yet, on the deaths of Cæsar, Caligula, and Nero, and on
+the extinction of the Julian line, was not only unable to establish her
+freedom, but did not even venture a step in that direction. Results so
+opposite arising in one and the same city can only be accounted for by
+this, that in the time of the Tarquins the Roman people were not yet
+corrupted, but in these later times had become utterly corrupt. For on
+the first occasion, nothing more was needed to prepare and determine
+them to shake off their kings, than that they should be bound by oath
+to suffer no king ever again to reign in Rome; whereas, afterwards, the
+authority and austere virtue of Brutus, backed by all the legions of
+the East, could not rouse them to maintain their hold of that freedom,
+which he, following in the footsteps of the first Brutus, had won for
+them; and this because of the corruption wherewith the people had been
+infected by the Marian faction, whereof Cæsar becoming head, was able
+so to blind the multitude that it saw not the yoke under which it was
+about to lay its neck.
+
+Though this example of Rome be more complete than any other, I desire
+to instance likewise, to the same effect, certain peoples well known in
+our own days; and I maintain that no change, however grave or violent,
+could ever restore freedom to Naples or Milan, because in these States
+the entire body of the people has grown corrupted. And so we find that
+Milan, although desirous to return to a free form of government, on the
+death of Filippo Visconti, had neither the force nor the skill needed
+to preserve it.
+
+Most fortunate, therefore, was it for Rome that her kings grew corrupt
+soon, so as to be driven out before the taint of their corruption had
+reached the vitals of the city. For it was because these were sound
+that the endless commotions which took place in Rome, so far from being
+hurtful, were, from their object being good, beneficial to the
+commonwealth. From which we may draw this inference, that where the
+body of the people is still sound, tumults and other like disorders do
+little hurt, but that where it has become corrupted, laws, however well
+devised, are of no advantage, unless imposed by some one whose
+paramount authority causes them to be observed until the community be
+once more restored to a sound and healthy condition.
+
+Whether this has ever happened I know not, nor whether it ever can
+happen. For we see, as I have said a little way back, that a city which
+owing to its pervading corruption has once begun to decline, if it is
+to recover at all, must be saved not by the excellence of the people
+collectively, but of some one man then living among them, on whose
+death it at once relapses into its former plight; as happened with
+Thebes, in which the virtue of Epaminondas made it possible while he
+lived to preserve the form of a free Government, but which fell again
+on his death into its old disorders; the reason being that hardly any
+ruler lives so long as to have time to accustom to right methods a city
+which has long been accustomed to wrong. Wherefore, unless things be
+put on a sound footing by some one ruler who lives to a very advanced
+age, or by two virtuous rulers succeeding one another, the city upon
+their death at once falls back into ruin; or, if it be preserved, must
+be so by incurring great risks, and at the cost of much blood. For the
+corruption I speak of, is wholly incompatible with a free government,
+because it results from an inequality which pervades the State and can
+only be removed by employing unusual and very violent remedies, such as
+few are willing or know how to employ, as in another place I shall more
+fully explain.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XVIII.—_How a Free Government existing in a corrupt City may be
+preserved, or not existing may be created._
+
+
+I think it neither out of place, nor inconsistent with what has been
+said above, to consider whether a free government existing in a corrupt
+city can be maintained, or, not existing, can be introduced. And on
+this head I say that it is very difficult to bring about either of
+these results, and next to impossible to lay down rules as to how it
+may be done; because the measures to be taken must vary with the degree
+of corruption which prevails.
+
+Nevertheless, since it is well to reason things out, I will not pass
+this matter by, but will assume, in the first place, the case of a very
+corrupt city, and then take the case of one in which corruption has
+reached a still greater height; but where corruption is universal, no
+laws or institutions will ever have force to restrain it. Because as
+good customs stand in need of good laws for their support, so laws,
+that they may be respected, stand in need of good customs. Moreover,
+the laws and institutions established in a republic at its beginning,
+when men were good, are no longer suitable when they have become bad;
+but while the laws of a city are altered to suit its circumstances, its
+institutions rarely or never change; whence it results that the
+introduction of new laws is of no avail, because the institutions,
+remaining unchanged, corrupt them.
+
+And to make this plainer, I say that in Rome it was first of all the
+institutions of the State, and next the laws as enforced by the
+magistrates, which kept the citizens under control. The institutions of
+the State consisted in the authority of the people, the senate, the
+tribunes, and the consuls; in the methods of choosing and appointing
+magistrates; and in the arrangements for passing laws. These
+institutions changed little, if at all, with circumstances. But the
+laws by which the people were controlled, as for instance the law
+relating to adultery, the sumptuary laws, the law as to canvassing at
+elections, and many others, were altered as the citizens grew more and
+more corrupted. Hence, the institutions of the State remaining the same
+although from the corruption of the people no longer suitable,
+amendments in the laws could not keep men good, though they might have
+proved very useful if at the time when they were made the institutions
+had likewise been reformed.
+
+That its original institutions are no longer adapted to a city that has
+become corrupted, is plainly seen in two matters of great moment, I
+mean in the appointment of magistrates and in the passing of laws. For
+the Roman people conferred the consulship and other great offices of
+their State on none save those who sought them; which was a good
+institution at first, because then none sought these offices save those
+who thought themselves worthy of them, and to be rejected was held
+disgraceful; so that, to be deemed worthy, all were on their best
+behaviour. But in a corrupted city this institution grew to be most
+mischievous. For it was no longer those of greatest worth, but those
+who had most influence, who sought the magistracies; while all who were
+without influence, however deserving, refrained through fear. This
+untoward result was not reached all at once, but like other similar
+results, by gradual steps. For after subduing Africa and Asia, and
+reducing nearly the whole of Greece to submission, the Romans became
+perfectly assured of their freedom, and seemed to themselves no longer
+to have any enemy whom they had cause to fear. But this security and
+the weakness of their adversaries led them in conferring the
+consulship, no longer to look to merit, but only to favour, selecting
+for the office those who knew best how to pay court to them, not those
+who knew best how to vanquish their enemies. And afterwards, instead of
+selecting those who were best liked, they came to select those who had
+most influence; and in this way, from the imperfection of their
+institutions, good men came to be wholly excluded.
+
+Again, as to making laws, any of the tribunes and certain others of the
+magistrates were entitled to submit laws to the people; but before
+these were passed it was open to every citizen to speak either for or
+against them. This was a good system so long as the citizens were good,
+since it is always well that every man should be able to propose what
+he thinks may be of use to his country, and that all should be allowed
+to express their views with regard to his proposal; so that the people,
+having heard all, may resolve on what is best. But when the people grew
+depraved, this became a very mischievous institution; for then it was
+only the powerful who proposed laws, and these not in the interest of
+public freedom but of their own authority; and because, through fear,
+none durst speak against the laws they proposed, the people were either
+deceived or forced into voting their own destruction.
+
+In order, therefore, that Rome after she had become corrupted might
+still preserve her freedom, it was necessary that, as in the course of
+events she had made new laws, so likewise she should frame new
+institutions, since different institutions and ordinances are needed in
+a corrupt State from those which suit a State which is not corrupted;
+for where the matter is wholly dissimilar, the form cannot be similar.
+
+But since old institutions must either be reformed all at once, as soon
+as they are seen to be no longer expedient, or else gradually, as the
+imperfection of each is recognized, I say that each of these two
+courses is all but impossible. For to effect a gradual reform requires
+a sagacious man who can discern mischief while it is still remote and
+in the germ. But it may well happen that no such person is found in a
+city; or that, if found, he is unable to persuade others of what he is
+himself persuaded. For men used to live in one way are loath to leave
+it for another, especially when they are not brought face to face with
+the evil against which they should guard, and only have it indicated to
+them by conjecture. And as for a sudden reform of institutions which
+are seen by all to be no longer good, I say that defects which are
+easily discerned are not easily corrected, because for their correction
+it is not enough to use ordinary means, these being in themselves
+insufficient; but recourse must be had to extraordinary means, such as
+violence and arms; and, as a preliminary, you must become prince of the
+city, and be able to deal with it at your pleasure. But since the
+restoration of a State to new political life presupposes a good man,
+and to become prince of a city by violence presupposes a bad man, it
+can, consequently, very seldom happen that, although the end be good, a
+good man will be found ready to become a prince by evil ways, or that a
+bad man having become a prince will be disposed to act virtuously, or
+think of turning to good account his ill-acquired authority.
+
+From all these causes comes the difficulty, or rather the
+impossibility, which a corrupted city finds in maintaining an existing
+free government, or in establishing a new one. So that had we to
+establish or maintain a government in that city, it would be necessary
+to give it a monarchical, rather than a popular form, in order that men
+too arrogant to be restrained by the laws, might in some measure be
+kept in check by a power almost absolute; since to attempt to make them
+good otherwise would be a very cruel or a wholly futile endeavour.
+This, as I have said, was the method followed by Cleomenes; and if he,
+that he might stand alone, put to death the Ephori; and if Romulus,
+with a like object, put to death his brother and Titus Tatius the
+Sabine, and if both afterwards made good use of the authority they thus
+acquired, it is nevertheless to be remembered that it was because
+neither Cleomenes nor Romulus had to deal with so corrupt a people as
+that of which I am now speaking, that they were able to effect their
+ends and to give a fair colour to their acts.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XIX.—_After a strong Prince a weak Prince may maintain himself:
+but after one weak Prince no Kingdom can stand a second._
+
+
+When we contemplate the excellent qualities of Romulus, Numa, and
+Tullus, the first three kings of Rome, and note the methods which they
+followed, we recognize the extreme good fortune of that city in having
+her first king fierce and warlike, her second peaceful and religious,
+and her third, like the first, of a high spirit and more disposed to
+war than to peace. For it was essential for Rome that almost at the
+outset of her career, a ruler should be found to lay the foundations of
+her civil life; but, after that had been done, it was necessary that
+her rulers should return to the virtues of Romulus, since otherwise the
+city must have grown feeble, and become a prey to her neighbours.
+
+And here we may note that a prince who succeeds to another of superior
+valour, may reign on by virtue of his predecessor’s merits, and reap
+the fruits of his labours; but if he live to a great age, or if he be
+followed by another who is wanting in the qualities of the first, that
+then the kingdom must necessarily dwindle. Conversely, when two
+consecutive princes are of rare excellence, we commonly find them
+achieving results which win for them enduring renown. David, for
+example, not only surpassed in learning and judgment, but was so
+valiant in arms that, after conquering and subduing all his neighbours,
+he left to his young son Solomon a tranquil State, which the latter,
+though unskilled in the arts of war, could maintain by the arts of
+peace, and thus happily enjoy the inheritance of his father’s valour.
+But Solomon could not transmit this inheritance to his son Rehoboam,
+who neither resembling his grandfather in valour, nor his father in
+good fortune, with difficulty made good his right to a sixth part of
+the kingdom. In like manner Bajazet, sultan of the Turks, though a man
+of peace rather than of war, was able to enjoy the labours of Mahomet
+his father, who, like David, having subdued his neighbours, left his
+son a kingdom so safely established that it could easily be retained by
+him by peaceful arts. But had Selim, son to Bajazet, been like his
+father, and not like his grandfather, the Turkish monarchy must have
+been overthrown; as it is, he seems likely to outdo the fame of his
+grandsire.
+
+I affirm it to be proved by these examples, that after a valiant prince
+a feeble prince may maintain himself; but that no kingdom can stand
+when two feeble princes follow in succession, unless, as in the case of
+France, it be supported by its ancient ordinances. By feeble princes, I
+mean such as are not valiant in war. And, to put the matter shortly, it
+may be said, that the great valour of Romulus left Numa a period of
+many years within which to govern Rome by peaceful arts; that after
+Numa came Tullus, who renewed by his courage the fame of Romulus; and
+that he in turn was succeeded by Ancus, a prince so gifted by nature
+that he could equally avail himself of the methods of peace or war; who
+setting himself at first to pursue the former, when he found that his
+neighbours judged him to be effeminate, and therefore held him in
+slight esteem, understood that to preserve Rome he must resort to arms
+and resemble Romulus rather than Numa. From whose example every ruler
+of a State may learn that a prince like Numa will hold or lose his
+power according as fortune and circumstances befriend him; but that the
+prince who resembles Romulus, and like him is fortified with foresight
+and arms, will hold his State whatever befall, unless deprived of it by
+some stubborn and irresistible force. For we may reckon with certainty
+that if Rome had not had for her third king one who knew how to restore
+her credit by deeds of valour, she could not, or at any rate not
+without great difficulty, have afterwards held her ground, nor could
+ever have achieved the great exploits she did.
+
+And for these reasons Rome, while she lived under her kings, was in
+constant danger of destruction through a king who might be weak or bad.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XX.—_That the consecutive Reigns of two valiant Princes produce
+great results: and that well-ordered Commonwealths are assured of a
+Succession of valiant Rulers by whom their Power and Growth are rapidly
+extended_.
+
+
+When Rome had driven out her kings, she was freed from those dangers to
+which, as I have said, she was exposed by the possible succession of a
+weak or wicked prince. For the chief share in the government then
+devolved upon the consuls, who took their authority not by inheritance,
+nor yet by craft or by ambitious violence, but by the free suffrages of
+their fellow-citizens, and were always men of signal worth; by whose
+valour and good fortune Rome being constantly aided, was able to reach
+the height of her greatness in the same number of years as she had
+lived under her kings. And since we find that two successive reigns of
+valiant princes, as of Philip of Macedon and his son Alexander, suffice
+to conquer the world, this ought to be still easier for a commonwealth,
+which has it in its power to choose, not two excellent rulers only, but
+an endless number in succession. And in every well ordered commonwealth
+provision will be made for a succession of this sort.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XXI.—_That it is a great reproach to a Prince or to a
+Commonwealth to be without a national Army_.
+
+
+Those princes and republics of the present day who lack forces of their
+own, whether for attack or defence, should take shame to themselves,
+and should be convinced by the example of Tullus, that their deficiency
+does not arise from want of men fit for warlike enterprises, but from
+their own fault in not knowing how to make their subjects good
+soldiers. For after Rome had been at peace for forty years, Tullus,
+succeeding to the kingdom, found not a single Roman who had ever been
+in battle. Nevertheless when he made up his mind to enter on a war, it
+never occurred to him to have recourse to the Samnites, or the
+Etruscans, or to any other of the neighbouring nations accustomed to
+arms, but he resolved, like the prudent prince he was, to rely on his
+own countrymen. And such was his ability that, under his rule, the
+people very soon became admirable soldiers. For nothing is more true
+than that where a country, having men, lacks soldiers, it results from
+some fault in its ruler, and not from any defect in the situation or
+climate. Of this we have a very recent instance. Every one knows, how,
+only the other day, the King of England invaded the realm of France
+with an army raised wholly from among his own people, although from his
+country having been at peace for thirty years, he had neither men nor
+officers who had ever looked an enemy in the face. Nevertheless, he did
+not hesitate with such troops as he had, to attack a kingdom well
+provided with officers and excellent soldiers who had been constantly
+under arms in the Italian wars. And this was possible through the
+prudence of the English king and the wise ordinances of his kingdom,
+which never in time of peace relaxes its warlike discipline. So too, in
+old times, Pelopidas and Epaminondas the Thebans, after they had freed
+Thebes from her tyrants, and rescued her from thraldom to Sparta,
+finding themselves in a city used to servitude and surrounded by an
+effeminate people, scrupled not, so great was their courage, to furnish
+these with arms, and go forth with them to meet and to conquer the
+Spartan forces on the field. And he who relates this, observes, that
+these two captains very soon showed that warriors are not bred in
+Lacedæmon alone, but in every country where men are found, if only some
+one arise among them who knows how to direct them to arms; as we see
+Tullus knew how to direct the Romans. Nor could Virgil better express
+this opinion, or show by fitter words that he was convinced of its
+truth than, when he says:—
+
+“To arms shall Tullus rouse
+His sluggish warriors.”[2]
+
+
+ [2] Residesque movebit
+Tullus in arma viros. _Virg. Aen_. vi. 814.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XXII.—_What is to be noted in the combat of the three Roman
+Horatii and the three Alban Curiatii_.
+
+
+It was agreed between Tullus king of Rome, and Metius king of Alba,
+that the nation whose champions were victorious in combat should rule
+over the other. The three Alban Curiatii were slain; one of the Roman
+Horatii survived. Whereupon the Alban king with all his people became
+subject to the Romans. The surviving Horatius returning victorious to
+Rome, and meeting his sister, wife to one of the dead Curiatii,
+bewailing the death of her husband, slew her; and being tried for this
+crime, was, after much contention, liberated, rather on the entreaties
+of his father than for his own deserts.
+
+Herein three points are to be noted. _First_, that we should never
+peril our whole fortunes on the success of only a part of our forces.
+_Second_, that in a well-governed State, merit should never be allowed
+to balance crime. And _third_, that those are never wise covenants
+which we cannot or should not expect to be observed. Now, for a State
+to be enslaved is so terrible a calamity that it ought never to have
+been supposed possible that either of these kings or nations would rest
+content under a slavery resulting from the defeat of three only of
+their number. And so it appeared to Metius; for although on the victory
+of the Roman champions, he at once confessed himself vanquished, and
+promised obedience; nevertheless, in the very first expedition which he
+and Tullus undertook jointly against the people of Veii, we find him
+seeking to circumvent the Roman, as though perceiving too late the rash
+part he had played.
+
+This is enough to say of the third point which I noted as deserving
+attention. Of the other two I shall speak in the next two Chapters.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XXIII.—_That we should never hazard our whole Fortunes where we
+put not forth our entire Strength; for which reason to guard a Defile
+is often hurtful_.
+
+
+It was never judged a prudent course to peril your whole fortunes where
+you put not forth your whole strength; as may happen in more ways than
+one. One of these ways was that taken by Tullus and Metius, when each
+staked the existence of his country and the credit of his army on the
+valour and good fortune of three only of his soldiers, that being an
+utterly insignificant fraction of the force at his disposal. For
+neither of these kings reflected that all the labours of their
+predecessors in framing such institutions for their States, as might,
+with the aid of the citizens themselves, maintain them long in freedom,
+were rendered futile, when the power to ruin all was left in the hands
+of so small a number. No rasher step, therefore, could have been taken,
+than was taken by these kings.
+
+A like risk is almost always incurred by those who, on the approach of
+an enemy, resolve to defend some place of strength, or to guard the
+defiles by which their country is entered. For unless room be found in
+this place of strength for almost all your army, the attempt to hold it
+will almost always prove hurtful. If you can find room, it will be
+right to defend your strong places; but if these be difficult of
+access, and you cannot there keep your entire force together, the
+effort to defend is mischievous. I come to this conclusion from
+observing the example of those who, although their territories be
+enclosed by mountains and precipices, have not, on being attacked by
+powerful enemies, attempted to fight on the mountains or in the
+defiles, but have advanced beyond them to meet their foes; or, if
+unwilling to advance, have awaited attack behind their mountains, on
+level and not on broken ground. The reason of which is, as I have above
+explained, that many men cannot be assembled in these strong places for
+their defence; partly because a large number of men cannot long subsist
+there, and partly because such places being narrow and confined, afford
+room for a few only; so that no enemy can there be withstood, who comes
+in force to the attack; which he can easily do, his design being to
+pass on and not to make a stay; whereas he who stands on the defensive
+cannot do so in force, because, from not knowing when the enemy may
+enter the confined and sterile tracts of which I speak, he may have to
+lodge himself there for a long time. But should you lose some pass
+which you had reckoned on holding, and on the defence of which your
+country and army have relied, there commonly follows such panic among
+your people and among the troops which remain to you, that you are
+vanquished without opportunity given for any display of valour, and
+lose everything without bringing all your resources into play.
+
+Every one has heard with what difficulty Hannibal crossed the Alps
+which divide France from Lombardy, and afterwards those which separate
+Lombardy from Tuscany. Nevertheless the Romans awaited him, in the
+first instance on the banks of the Ticino, in the second on the plain
+of Arezzo, preferring to be defeated on ground which at least gave them
+a chance of victory, to leading their army into mountain fastnesses
+where it was likely to be destroyed by the mere difficulties of the
+ground. And any who read history with attention will find, that very
+few capable commanders have attempted to hold passes of this nature, as
+well for the reasons already given, as because to close them all were
+impossible. For mountains, like plains, are traversed not only by
+well-known and frequented roads, but also by many by-ways, which,
+though unknown to strangers, are familiar to the people of the country,
+under whose guidance you may always, and in spite of any opposition, be
+easily conducted to whatever point you please. Of this we have a recent
+instance in the events of the year 1515. For when Francis I. of France
+resolved on invading Italy in order to recover the province of
+Lombardy, those hostile to his attempt looked mainly to the Swiss, who
+it was hoped would stop him in passing through their mountains. But
+this hope was disappointed by the event. For leaving on one side two or
+three defiles which were guarded by the Swiss, the king advanced by
+another unknown pass, and was in Italy and upon his enemies before they
+knew. Whereupon they fled terror-stricken into Milan; while the whole
+population of Lombardy, finding themselves deceived in their
+expectation that the French would be detained in the mountains, went
+over to their side.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XXIV.—_That well-ordered States always provide Rewards and
+Punishments for their Citizens; and never set off Deserts against
+Misdeeds_.
+
+
+The valour of Horatius in vanquishing the Curiatii deserved the highest
+reward. But in slaying his sister he had been guilty of a heinous
+crime. And so displeasing to the Romans was an outrage of this nature,
+that although his services were so great and so recent, they brought
+him to trial for his life. To one looking at it carelessly, this might
+seem an instance of popular ingratitude, but he who considers the
+matter more closely, and examines with sounder judgment what the
+ordinances of a State should be, will rather blame the Roman people for
+acquitting Horatius than for putting him on his trial. And this because
+no well-ordered State ever strikes a balance between the services of
+its citizens and their misdeeds; but appointing rewards for good
+actions and punishment for bad, when it has rewarded a man for acting
+well, will afterwards, should he act ill, chastise him, without regard
+to his former deserts. When these ordinances are duly observed, a city
+will live long in freedom, but when they are neglected, it must soon
+come to ruin. For when a citizen has rendered some splendid service to
+his country, if to the distinction which his action in itself confers,
+were added an over-weening confidence that any crime he might
+thenceforth commit would pass unpunished, he would soon become so
+arrogant that no civil bonds could restrain him.
+
+Still, while we would have punishment terrible to wrongdoers, it is
+essential that good actions should be rewarded, as we see to have been
+the case in Rome. For even where a republic is poor, and has but little
+to give, it ought not to withhold that little; since a gift, however
+small, bestowed as a reward for services however great, will always be
+esteemed most honourable and precious by him who receives it. The story
+of Horatius Cocles and that of Mutius Scævola are well known: how the
+one withstood the enemy on the bridge while it was being cut down, and
+the other thrust his hand into the fire in punishment of the mistake
+made when he sought the life of Porsenna the Etruscan king. To each of
+these two, in requital of their splendid deeds, two ploughgates only of
+the public land were given. Another famous story is that of Manlius
+Capitolinus, to whom, for having saved the Capitol from the besieging
+Gauls, a small measure of meal was given by each of those who were shut
+up with him during the siege. Which recompense, in proportion to the
+wealth of the citizens of Rome at that time, was thought ample; so that
+afterwards, when Manlius, moved by jealousy and malice, sought to
+arouse sedition in Rome, and to gain over the people to his cause, they
+without regard to his past services threw him headlong from that
+Capitol in saving which he had formerly gained so great a renown.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XXV.—_That he who would reform the Institutions of a free
+State, must retain at least the semblance of old Ways._
+
+
+Whoever takes upon him to reform the government of a city, must, if his
+measures are to be well received and carried out with general approval,
+preserve at least the semblance of existing methods, so as not to
+appear to the people to have made any change in the old order of
+things; although, in truth, the new ordinances differ altogether from
+those which they replace. For when this is attended to, the mass of
+mankind accept what seems as what is; nay, are often touched more
+nearly by appearances than by realities.
+
+This tendency being recognized by the Romans at the very outset of
+their civil freedom, when they appointed two consuls in place of a
+single king, they would not permit the consuls to have more than twelve
+lictors, in order that the old number of the king’s attendants might
+not be exceeded. Again, there being solemnized every year in Rome a
+sacrificial rite which could only be performed by the king in person,
+that the people might not be led by the absence of the king to remark
+the want of any ancient observance, a priest was appointed for the due
+celebration of this rite, to whom was given the name of _Rex
+sacrificulus_, and who was placed under the orders of the chief priest.
+In this way the people were contented, and had no occasion from any
+defect in the solemnities to desire the return of their kings. Like
+precautions should be used by all who would put an end to the old
+government of a city and substitute new and free institutions. For
+since novelty disturbs men’s minds, we should seek in the changes we
+make to preserve as far as possible what is ancient, so that if the new
+magistrates differ from the old in number, in authority, or in the
+duration of their office, they shall at least retain the old names.
+
+This, I say, should be seen to by him who would establish a
+constitutional government, whether in the form of a commonwealth or of
+a kingdom. But he who would create an absolute government of the kind
+which political writers term a tyranny, must renew everything, as shall
+be explained in the following Chapter.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XXVI.—_A new Prince in a City or Province of which he has taken
+Possession, ought to make Everything new._
+
+
+Whosoever becomes prince of a city or State, more especially if his
+position be so insecure that he cannot resort to constitutional
+government either in the form of a republic or a monarchy, will find
+that the best way to preserve his princedom is to renew the whole
+institutions of that State; that is to say, to create new magistracies
+with new names, confer new powers, and employ new men, and like David
+when he became king, exalt the humble and depress the great, “_filling
+the hungry with good things, and sending the rich empty away_.”
+Moreover, he must pull down existing towns and rebuild them, removing
+their inhabitants from one place to another; and, in short, leave
+nothing in the country as he found it; so that there shall be neither
+rank, nor condition, nor honour, nor wealth which its possessor can
+refer to any but to him. And he must take example from Philip of
+Macedon, the father of Alexander, who by means such as these, from
+being a petty prince became monarch of all Greece; and of whom it was
+written that he shifted men from province to province as a shepherd
+moves his flocks from one pasture to another.
+
+These indeed are most cruel expedients, contrary not merely to every
+Christian, but to every civilized rule of conduct, and such as every
+man should shun, choosing rather to lead a private life than to be a
+king on terms so hurtful to mankind. But he who will not keep to the
+fair path of virtue, must to maintain himself enter this path of evil.
+Men, however, not knowing how to be wholly good or wholly bad, choose
+for themselves certain middle ways, which of all others are the most
+pernicious, as shall be shown by an instance in the following Chapter.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XXVII.—_That Men seldom know how to be wholly good or wholly
+bad_.
+
+
+When in the year 1505, Pope Julius II. went to Bologna to expel from
+that city the family of the Bentivogli, who had been princes there for
+over a hundred years, it was also in his mind, as a part of the general
+design he had planned against all those lords who had usurped Church
+lands, to remove Giovanpagolo Baglioni, tyrant of Perugia. And coming
+to Perugia with this intention and resolve, of which all men knew, he
+would not wait to enter the town with a force sufficient for his
+protection, but entered it unattended by troops, although Giovanpagolo
+was there with a great company of soldiers whom he had assembled for
+his defence. And thus, urged on by that impetuosity which stamped all
+his actions, accompanied only by his body-guard, he committed himself
+into the hands of his enemy, whom he forthwith carried away with him,
+leaving a governor behind to hold the town for the Church. All prudent
+men who were with the Pope remarked on his temerity, and on the
+pusillanimity of Giovanpagolo; nor could they conjecture why the latter
+had not, to his eternal glory, availed himself of this opportunity for
+crushing his enemy, and at the same time enriching himself with
+plunder, the Pope being attended by the whole College of Cardinals with
+all their luxurious equipage. For it could not be supposed that he was
+withheld by any promptings of goodness or scruples of conscience;
+because in the breast of a profligate living in incest with his sister,
+and who to obtain the princedom had put his nephews and kinsmen to
+death, no virtuous impulse could prevail. So that the only inference to
+be drawn was, that men know not how to be splendidly wicked or wholly
+good, and shrink in consequence from such crimes as are stamped with an
+inherent greatness or disclose a nobility of nature. For which reason
+Giovanpagolo, who thought nothing of incurring the guilt of incest, or
+of murdering his kinsmen, could not, or more truly durst not, avail
+himself of a fair occasion to do a deed which all would have admired;
+which would have won for him a deathless fame as the first to teach the
+prelates how little those who live and reign as they do are to be
+esteemed; and which would have displayed a greatness far transcending
+any infamy or danger that could attach to it.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XXVIII.—_Whence it came that the Romans were less ungrateful to
+their Citizens than were the Athenians_.
+
+
+In the histories of all republics we meet with instances of some sort
+of ingratitude to their great citizens, but fewer in the history of
+Rome than of Athens, or indeed of any other republic. Searching for the
+cause of this, I am persuaded that, so far as regards Rome and Athens,
+it was due to the Romans having had less occasion than the Athenians to
+look upon their fellow-citizens with suspicion. For, from the expulsion
+of her kings down to the times of Sylla and Marius, the liberty of Rome
+was never subverted by any one of her citizens; so that there never was
+in that city grave cause for distrusting any man, and in consequence
+making him the victim of inconsiderate injustice. The reverse was
+notoriously the case with Athens; for that city, having, at a time when
+she was most flourishing, been deprived of her freedom by Pisistratus
+under a false show of good-will, remembering, after she regained her
+liberty, her former bondage and all the wrongs she had endured, became
+the relentless chastiser, not of offences only on the part of her
+citizens, but even of the shadow of an offence. Hence the banishment
+and death of so many excellent men, and hence the law of ostracism, and
+all those other violent measures which from time to time during the
+history of that city were directed against her foremost citizens. For
+this is most true which is asserted by the writers on civil government,
+that a people which has recovered its freedom, bites more fiercely than
+one which has always preserved it.
+
+And any who shall weigh well what has been said, will not condemn
+Athens in this matter, nor commend Rome, but refer all to the necessity
+arising out of the different conditions prevailing in the two States.
+For careful reflection will show that had Rome been deprived of her
+freedom as Athens was, she would not have been a whit more tender to
+her citizens. This we may reasonably infer from remarking what, after
+the expulsion of the kings, befell Collatinus and Publius Valerius; the
+former of whom, though he had taken part in the liberation of Rome, was
+sent into exile for no other reason than that he bore the name of
+Tarquin; while the sole ground of suspicion against the latter, and
+what almost led to his banishment, was his having built a house upon
+the Cælian hill. Seeing how harsh and suspicious Rome was in these two
+instances, we may surmise that she would have shown the same
+ingratitude as Athens, had she, like Athens, been wronged by her
+citizens at an early stage of her growth, and before she had attained
+to the fulness of her strength.
+
+That I may not have to return to this question of ingratitude, I shall
+say all that remains to be said about it in my next Chapter.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XXIX.—_Whether a People or a Prince is the more ungrateful._
+
+
+In connection with what has been said above, it seems proper to
+consider whether more notable instances of ingratitude are supplied by
+princes or peoples. And, to go to the root of the matter, I affirm that
+this vice of ingratitude has its source either in avarice or in
+suspicion. For a prince or people when they have sent forth a captain
+on some important enterprise, by succeeding in which he earns a great
+name, are bound in return to reward him; and if moved by avarice and
+covetousness they fail to do so, or if, instead of rewarding, they
+wrong and disgrace him, they commit an error which is not only without
+excuse, but brings with it undying infamy. And, in fact, we find many
+princes who have sinned in this way, for the cause given by Cornelius
+Tacitus when he says, that “_men are readier to pay back injuries than
+benefits, since to requite a benefit is felt to be a burthen, to return
+an injury a gain_.”[3]
+
+ [3] Proclivius est injuriæ quam beneficio vicem exsolvere, quia gratia
+ oneri, ultio in quastu habetur. _Tacit. Hist._ iv. 2.
+
+
+When, however, reward is withheld, or, to speak more correctly, where
+offence is given, not from avarice but from suspicion, the prince or
+people may deserve some excuse; and we read of many instances of
+ingratitude proceeding from this cause. For the captain who by his
+valour has won new dominions for his prince, since while overcoming his
+enemies, he at the same time covers himself with glory and enriches his
+soldiers, must needs acquire such credit with his own followers, and
+with the enemy, and also with the subjects of his prince, as cannot be
+wholly agreeable to the master who sent him forth. And since men are by
+nature ambitious as well as jealous, and none loves to set a limit to
+his fortunes, the suspicion which at once lays hold of the prince when
+he sees his captain victorious, is sure to be inflamed by some arrogant
+act or word of the captain himself. So that the prince will be unable
+to think of anything but how to secure himself; and to this end will
+contrive how he may put his captain to death, or at any rate deprive
+him of the credit he has gained with the army and among the people;
+doing all he can to show that the victory was not won by his valour,
+but by good fortune, or by the cowardice of the enemy, or by the skill
+and prudence of those commanders who were with him at this or the other
+battle.
+
+After Vespasian, who was then in Judæa, had been proclaimed emperor by
+his army, Antonius Primus, who commanded another army in Illyria,
+adopted his cause, and marching into Italy against Vitellius who had
+been proclaimed emperor in Rome, courageously defeated two armies under
+that prince, and occupied Rome; so that Mutianus, who was sent thither
+by Vespasian, found everything done to his hand, and all difficulties
+surmounted by the valour of Antonius. But all the reward which Antonius
+had for his pains, was, that Mutianus forthwith deprived him of his
+command of the army, and by degrees diminished his authority in Rome
+till none was left him. Thereupon Antonius went to join Vespasian, who
+was still in Asia; by whom he was so coldly received and so little
+considered, that in despair he put himself to death. And of cases like
+this, history is full. Every man living at the present hour knows with
+what zeal and courage Gonsalvo of Cordova, while conducting the war in
+Naples against the French, conquered and subdued that kingdom for his
+master Ferdinand of Aragon; and how his services were requited by
+Ferdinand coming from Aragon to Naples, and first of all depriving him
+of the command of the army, afterwards of the fortresses, and finally
+carrying him back with him to Spain, where soon after he died in
+disgrace.
+
+This jealousy, then, is so natural to princes, that they cannot guard
+themselves against it, nor show gratitude to those who serving under
+their standard have gained great victories and made great conquests on
+their behalf. And if it be impossible for princes to free their minds
+from such suspicions, there is nothing strange or surprising that a
+people should be unable to do so. For as a city living under free
+institutions has two ends always before it, namely to acquire liberty
+and to preserve it, it must of necessity be led by its excessive
+passion for liberty to make mistakes in the pursuit of both these
+objects. Of the mistakes it commits in the effort to acquire liberty, I
+shall speak, hereafter, in the proper place. Of mistakes committed in
+the endeavour to preserve liberty are to be noted, the injuring those
+citizens who ought to be rewarded, and the suspecting those who should
+be trusted. Now, although in a State which has grown corrupt these
+errors occasion great evils, and commonly lead to a tyranny, as
+happened in Rome when Cæsar took by force what ingratitude had denied
+him, they are nevertheless the cause of much good in the republic which
+has not been corrupted, since they prolong the duration of its free
+institutions, and make men, through fear of punishment, better and less
+ambitious. Of all peoples possessed of great power, the Romans, for the
+reasons I have given, have undoubtedly been the least ungrateful, since
+we have no other instance of their ingratitude to cite, save that of
+Scipio. For both Coriolanus and Camillus were banished on account of
+the wrongs which they inflicted on the commons; and though the former
+was not forgiven because he constantly retained ill will against the
+people, the latter was not only recalled, but for the rest of his life
+honoured as a prince. But the ingratitude shown towards Scipio arose
+from the suspicion wherewith the citizens came to regard him, which
+they had not felt in the case of the others, and which was occasioned
+by the greatness of the enemy whom he had overthrown, the fame he had
+won by prevailing in so dangerous and protracted a war, the suddenness
+of his victories, and, finally, the favour which his youth, together
+with his prudence and his other memorable qualities had gained for him.
+These qualities were, in truth, so remarkable that the very
+magistrates, not to speak of others, stood in awe of his authority, a
+circumstance displeasing to prudent citizens, as before unheard of in
+Rome. In short, his whole bearing and character were so much out of the
+common, that even the elder Cato, so celebrated for his austere virtue,
+was the first to declare against him, saying that no city could be
+deemed free which contained a citizen who was feared by the
+magistrates. And since, in this instance, the Romans followed the
+opinion of Cato, they merit that excuse which, as I have said already,
+should be extended to the prince or people who are ungrateful through
+suspicion.
+
+In conclusion it is to be said that while this vice of ingratitude has
+its origin either in avarice or in suspicion, commonwealths are rarely
+led into it by avarice, and far seldomer than princes by suspicion,
+having, as shall presently be shown, far less reason than princes for
+suspecting.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XXX.—_How Princes and Commonwealths may avoid the vice of
+Ingratitude; and how a Captain or Citizen may escape being undone by
+it._
+
+
+That he may not be tormented by suspicion, nor show ungrateful, a
+prince should go himself on his wars as the Roman emperors did at
+first, as the Turk does now, and, in short, as all valiant princes have
+done and do. For when it is the prince himself who conquers, the glory
+and the gain are all his own; but when he is absent, since the glory is
+another’s, it will seem to the prince that he profits nothing by the
+gain, unless that glory be quenched which he knew not how to win for
+himself; and when he thus becomes ungrateful and unjust, doubtless his
+loss is greater than his gain. To the prince, therefore, who, either
+through indolence or from want of foresight, sends forth a captain to
+conduct his wars while he himself remains inactive at home, I have no
+advice to offer which he does not already know. But I would counsel the
+captain whom he sends, since I am sure that he can never escape the
+attacks of ingratitude, to follow one or other of two courses, and
+either quit his command at once after a victory, and place himself in
+the hands of his prince, while carefully abstaining from every
+vainglorious or ambitious act, so that the prince, being relieved from
+all suspicion, may be disposed to reward, or at any rate not to injure
+him; or else, should he think it inexpedient for him to act in this
+way, to take boldly the contrary course, and fearlessly to follow out
+all such measures as he thinks will secure for himself, and not for his
+prince, whatever he has gained; conciliating the good-will of his
+soldiers and fellow-citizens, forming new friendships with neighbouring
+potentates, placing his own adherents in fortified towns, corrupting
+the chief officers of his army and getting rid of those whom he fails
+to corrupt, and by all similar means endeavouring to punish his master
+for the ingratitude which he looks for at his hands. These are the only
+two courses open; but since, as I said before, men know not how to be
+wholly good or wholly bad, it will never happen that after a victory a
+captain will quit his army and conduct himself modestly, nor yet that
+he will venture to use those hardy methods which have in them some
+strain of greatness; and so, remaining undecided, he will be crushed
+while he still wavers and doubts.
+
+A commonwealth desiring to avoid the vice of ingratitude is, as
+compared with a prince, at this disadvantage, that while a prince can
+go himself on his expeditions, the commonwealth must send some one of
+its citizens. As a remedy, I would recommend that course being adopted
+which was followed by the Roman republic in order to be less ungrateful
+than others, having its origin in the nature of the Roman government.
+For the whole city, nobles and commons alike, taking part in her wars,
+there were always found in Rome at every stage of her history, so many
+valiant and successful soldiers, that by reason of their number, and
+from one acting as a check upon another, the nation had never ground to
+be jealous of any one man among them; while they, on their part, lived
+uprightly, and were careful to betray no sign of ambition, nor give the
+people the least cause to distrust them as ambitious; so that he
+obtained most glory from his dictatorship who was first to lay it down.
+Which conduct, as it excited no suspicion, could occasion no
+ingratitude.
+
+We see, then, that the commonwealth which would have no cause to be
+ungrateful, must act as Rome did; and that the citizen who would escape
+ingratitude, must observe those precautions which were observed by
+Roman citizens.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XXXI.—_That the Roman Captains were never punished with extreme
+severity for Misconduct; and where loss resulted to the Republic merely
+through their Ignorance or Want of Judgment, were not punished at all_.
+
+
+The Romans were not only, as has been said above, less ungrateful than
+other republics, but were also more lenient and more considerate than
+others in punishing the captains of their armies. For if these erred of
+set purpose, they chastised them with gentleness; while if they erred
+through ignorance, so far from punishing, they even honoured and
+rewarded them. And this conduct was well considered. For as they judged
+it of the utmost moment, that those in command of their armies should,
+in all they had to do, have their minds undisturbed and free from
+external anxieties, they would not add further difficulty and danger to
+a task in itself both dangerous and difficult, lest none should ever be
+found to act with valour. For supposing them to be sending forth an
+army against Philip of Macedon in Greece or against Hannibal in Italy,
+or against any other enemy at whose hands they had already sustained
+reverses, the captain in command of that expedition would be weighted
+with all the grave and important cares which attend such enterprises.
+But if to all these cares, had been added the example of Roman generals
+crucified or otherwise put to death for having lost battles, it would
+have been impossible for a commander surrounded by so many causes for
+anxiety to have acted with vigour and decision. For which reason, and
+because they thought that to such persons the mere ignominy of defeat
+was in itself punishment enough, they would not dishearten their
+generals by inflicting on them any heavier penalty.
+
+Of errors committed not through ignorance, the following is an
+instance. Sergius and Virginius were engaged in the siege of Veii, each
+being in command of a division of the army, and while Sergius was set
+to guard against the approach of the Etruscans, it fell to Virginius to
+watch the town. But Sergius being attacked by the Faliscans and other
+tribes, chose rather to be defeated and routed than ask aid from
+Virginius, who, on his part, awaiting the humiliation of his rival, was
+willing to see his country dishonoured and an army destroyed, sooner
+than go unasked to his relief. This was notable misconduct, and likely,
+unless both offenders were punished, to bring discredit on the Roman
+name. But whereas another republic would have punished these men with
+death, the Romans were content to inflict only a money fine: not
+because the offence did not in itself deserve severe handling, but
+because they were unwilling, for the reasons already given, to depart
+in this instance from their ancient practice.
+
+Of errors committed through ignorance we have no better example than in
+the case of Varro, through whose rashness the Romans were defeated by
+Hannibal at Cannæ, where the republic well-nigh lost its liberty. But
+because he had acted through ignorance and with no evil design, they
+not only refrained from punishing him, but even treated him with
+distinction; the whole senate going forth to meet him on his return to
+Rome, and as they could not thank him for having fought, thanking him
+for having come back, and for not having despaired of the fortunes his
+country.
+
+Again, when Papirius Cursor would have had Fabius put to death,
+because, contrary to his orders, he had fought with the Samnites, among
+the reasons pleaded by the father of Fabius against the persistency of
+the dictator, he urged that never on the occasion of the defeat of any
+of their captains had the Romans done what Papirius desired them to do
+on the occasion of a victory.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XXXII.—_That a Prince or Commonwealth should not delay
+conferring Benefits until they are themselves in difficulties._
+
+
+The Romans found it for their advantage to be generous to the commons
+at a season of danger, when Porsenna came to attack Rome and restore
+the Tarquins. For the senate, apprehending that the people might choose
+rather to take back their kings than to support a war, secured their
+adherence by relieving them of the duty on salt and of all their other
+burthens; saying that “_the poor did enough for the common welfare in
+rearing their offspring._” In return for which indulgence the commons
+were content to undergo war, siege, and famine. Let no one however,
+relying on this example, delay conciliating the people till danger has
+actually come; or, if he do, let him not hope to have the same good
+fortune as the Romans. For the mass of the people will consider that
+they have to thank not him, but his enemies, and that there is ground
+to fear that when the danger has passed away, he will take back what he
+gave under compulsion, and, therefore, that to him they lie under no
+obligation. And the reason why the course followed by the Romans
+succeeded, was that the State was still new and unsettled. Besides
+which, the people knew that laws had already been passed in their
+favour, as, for instance, the law allowing an appeal to the tribunes,
+and could therefore persuade themselves that the benefits granted them
+proceeded from the good-will entertained towards them by the senate,
+and were not due merely to the approach of an enemy. Moreover, the
+memory of their kings, by whom they had in many ways been wronged and
+ill-treated, was still fresh in their minds. But since like conditions
+seldom recur, it can only rarely happen that like remedies are useful.
+Wherefore, all, whether princes or republics, who hold the reins of
+government, ought to think beforehand of the adverse times which may
+await them, and of what help they may then stand in need; and ought so
+to live with their people as they would think right were they suffering
+under any calamity. And, whosoever, whether prince or republic, but
+prince more especially, behaves otherwise, and believes that after the
+event and when danger is upon him he will be able to win men over by
+benefits, deceives himself, and will not merely fail to maintain his
+place, but will even precipitate his downfall.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XXXIII.—_When a Mischief has grown up in, or against a State,
+it is safer to temporize with than to meet it with Violence_.
+
+
+As Rome grew in fame, power, and dominion, her neighbours, who at first
+had taken no heed to the injury which this new republic might do them,
+began too late to see their mistake, and desiring to remedy what should
+have been remedied before, combined against her to the number of forty
+nations. Whereupon the Romans, resorting to a method usual with them in
+seasons of peril, appointed a dictator; that is, gave power to one man
+to decide without advice, and carry out his resolves without appeal.
+Which expedient, as it then enabled them to overcome the dangers by
+which they were threatened, so always afterwards proved most
+serviceable, when, at any time during the growth of their power,
+difficulties arose to embarrass their republic.
+
+In connection with this league against Rome we have first to note, that
+when a mischief which springs up either in or against a republic, and
+whether occasioned by internal or external causes, has grown to such
+proportions that it begins to fill the whole community with alarm, it
+is a far safer course to temporize with it than to attempt to quell it
+by violence. For commonly those who make this attempt only add fuel to
+the flame, and hasten the impending ruin. Such disorders arise in a
+republic more often from internal causes than external, either through
+some citizen being suffered to acquire undue influence, or from the
+corruption of some institution of that republic, which had once been
+the life and sinew of its freedom; and from this corruption being
+allowed to gain such head that the attempt to check it is more
+dangerous than to let it be. And it is all the harder to recognize
+these disorders in their beginning, because it seems natural to men to
+look with favour on the beginnings of things. Favour of this sort, more
+than by anything else, is attracted by those actions which seem to have
+in them a quality of greatness, or which are performed by the young.
+For when in a republic some young man is seen to come forward endowed
+with rare excellence, the eyes of all the citizens are at once turned
+upon him, and all, without distinction, concur to do him honour; so
+that if he have one spark of ambition, the advantages which he has from
+nature, together with those he takes from this favourable disposition
+of men’s minds, raise him to such a pitch of power, that when the
+citizens at last see their mistake it is almost impossible for them to
+correct it; and when they do what they can to oppose his influence the
+only result is to extend it. Of this I might cite numerous examples,
+but shall content myself with one relating to our own city.
+
+Cosimo de’ Medici, to whom the house of the Medici in Florence owes the
+origin of its fortunes, acquired so great a name from the favour
+wherewith his own prudence and the blindness of others invested him,
+that coming to be held in awe by the government, his fellow-citizens
+deemed it dangerous to offend him, but still more dangerous to let him
+alone. Nicolò da Uzzano, his cotemporary, who was accounted well versed
+in all civil affairs, but who had made a first mistake in not
+discerning the dangers which might grow from the rising influence of
+Cosimo, would never while he lived, permit a second mistake to be made
+in attempting to crush him; judging that such an attempt would be the
+ruin of the State, as in truth it proved after his death. For some who
+survived him, disregarding his counsels, combined against Cosimo and
+banished him from Florence. And so it came about that the partisans of
+Cosimo, angry at the wrong done him, soon afterwards recalled him and
+made him prince of the republic, a dignity he never would have reached
+but for this open opposition. The very same thing happened in Rome in
+the case of Cæsar. For his services having gained him the good-will of
+Pompey and other citizens, their favour was presently turned to fear,
+as Cicero testifies where he says that “it was late that Pompey began
+to fear Cæsar.” This fear led men to think of remedies, and the
+remedies to which they resorted accelerated the destruction of the
+republic.
+
+I say, then, that since it is difficult to recognize these disorders in
+their beginning, because of the false impressions which things produce
+at the first, it is a wiser course when they become known, to temporize
+with them than to oppose them; for when you temporize, either they die
+out of themselves, or at any rate the injury they do is deferred. And
+the prince who would suppress such disorders or oppose himself to their
+force and onset, must always be on his guard, lest he help where he
+would hinder, retard when he would advance, and drown the plant he
+thinks to water. He must therefore study well the symptoms of the
+disease; and, if he believe himself equal to the cure, grapple with it
+fearlessly; if not, he must let it be, and not attempt to treat it in
+any way. For, otherwise, it will fare with him as it fared with those
+neighbours of Rome, for whom it would have been safer, after that city
+had grown to be so great, to have sought to soothe and restrain her by
+peaceful arts, than to provoke her by open war to contrive new means of
+attack and new methods of defence. For this league had no other effect
+than to make the Romans more united and resolute than before, and to
+bethink themselves of new expedients whereby their power was still more
+rapidly advanced; among which was the creation of a dictator; for this
+innovation not only enabled them to surmount the dangers which then
+threatened them, but was afterwards the means of escaping infinite
+calamities into which, without it, the republic must have fallen.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XXXIV.—_That the authority of the Dictator did good and not
+harm to the Roman Republic: and that it is not those Powers which are
+given by the free suffrages of the People, but those which ambitious
+Citizens usurp for themselves, that are pernicious to a State._
+
+
+Those citizens who first devised a dictatorship for Rome have been
+blamed by certain writers, as though this had been the cause of the
+tyranny afterwards established there. For these authors allege that the
+first tyrant of Rome governed it with the title of Dictator, and that,
+but for the existence of the office, Cæsar could never have cloaked his
+usurpation under a constitutional name. He who first took up this
+opinion had not well considered the matter, and his conclusion has been
+accepted without good ground. For it was not the name nor office of
+Dictator which brought Rome to servitude, but the influence which
+certain of her citizens were able to assume from the prolongation of
+their term of power; so that even had the name of Dictator been wanting
+in Rome, some other had been found to serve their ends, since power may
+readily give titles, but not titles power. We find, accordingly, that
+while the dictatorship was conferred in conformity with public
+ordinances, and not through personal influence, it was constantly
+beneficial to the city. For it is the magistracies created and the
+powers usurped in unconstitutional ways that hurt a republic, not those
+which conform to ordinary rule; so that in Rome, through the whole
+period of her history, we never find a dictator who acted otherwise
+than well for the republic. For which there were the plainest reasons.
+In the first place, to enable a citizen to work harm and to acquire
+undue authority, many circumstances must be present which never can be
+present in a State which is not corrupted. For such a citizen must be
+exceedingly rich, and must have many retainers and partisans, whom he
+cannot have where the laws are strictly observed, and who, if he had
+them, would occasion so much alarm, that the free suffrage of the
+people would seldom be in his favour. In the second place, the dictator
+was not created for life, but for a fixed term, and only to meet the
+emergency for which he was appointed. Power was indeed given him to
+determine by himself what measures the exigency demanded; to do what he
+had to do without consultation; and to punish without appeal. But he
+had no authority to do anything to the prejudice of the State, as it
+would have been to deprive the senate or the people of their
+privileges, to subvert the ancient institutions of the city, or
+introduce new. So that taking into account the brief time for which his
+office lasted, its limited authority, and the circumstance that the
+Roman people were still uncorrupted, it was impossible for him to
+overstep the just limits of his power so as to injure the city; and in
+fact we find that he was always useful to it.
+
+And, in truth, among the institutions of Rome, this of the dictatorship
+deserves our special admiration, and to be linked with the chief causes
+of her greatness; for without some such safeguard a city can hardly
+pass unharmed through extraordinary dangers. Because as the ordinary
+institutions of a commonwealth work but slowly, no council and no
+magistrate having authority to act in everything alone, but in most
+matters one standing in need of the other, and time being required to
+reconcile their differences, the remedies which they provide are most
+dangerous when they have to be applied in cases which do not brook
+delay. For which reason, every republic ought to have some resource of
+this nature provided by its constitution; as we find that the Republic
+of Venice, one of the best of those now existing, has in cases of
+urgent danger reserved authority to a few of her citizens, if agreed
+among themselves, to determine without further consultation what course
+is to be followed. When a republic is not provided with some safeguard
+such as this, either it must be ruined by observing constitutional
+forms, or else, to save it, these must be broken through. But in a
+republic nothing should be left to be effected by irregular methods,
+because, although for the time the irregularity may be useful, the
+example will nevertheless be pernicious, as giving rise to a practice
+of violating the laws for good ends, under colour of which they may
+afterwards be violated for ends which are not good. For which reason,
+that can never become a perfect republic wherein every contingency has
+not been foreseen and provided for by the laws, and the method of
+dealing with it defined. To sum up, therefore, I say that those
+republics which cannot in sudden emergencies resort either to a
+dictator or to some similar authority, will, when the danger is
+serious, always be undone.
+
+We may note, moreover, how prudently the Romans, in introducing this
+new office, contrived the conditions under which it was to be
+exercised. For perceiving that the appointment of a dictator involved
+something of humiliation for the consuls, who, from being the heads of
+the State, were reduced to render obedience like every one else, and
+anticipating that this might give offence, they determined that the
+power to appoint should rest with the consuls, thinking that when the
+occasion came when Rome should have need of this regal authority, they
+would have the consuls acting willingly and feeling the less aggrieved
+from the appointment being in their own hands. For those wounds or
+other injuries which a man inflicts upon himself by choice, and of his
+own free will, pain him far less than those inflicted by another.
+Nevertheless, in the later days of the republic the Romans were wont to
+entrust this power to a consul instead of to a dictator, using the
+formula, _Videat_ CONSUL _ne quid respublica detrimenti capiat_.
+
+But to return to the matter in hand, I say briefly, that when the
+neighbours of Rome sought to crush her, they led her to take measures
+not merely for her readier defence, but such as enabled her to attack
+them with a stronger force, with better skill, and with an undivided
+command.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XXXV—_Why the Creation of the Decemvirate in Rome, although
+brought about by the free and open Suffrage of the Citizens, was
+hurtful to the Liberties of that Republic_
+
+
+The fact of those ten citizens who were chosen by the Roman people to
+make laws for Rome, in time becoming her tyrants and depriving her of
+her freedom, may seem contrary to what I have said above, namely that
+it is the authority which is violently usurped, and not that conferred
+by the free suffrages of the people which is injurious to a republic.
+Here, however, we have to take into account both the mode in which, and
+the term for which authority is given. Where authority is unrestricted
+and is conferred for a long term, meaning by that for a year or more,
+it is always attended with danger, and its results will be good or bad
+according as the men are good or bad to whom it is committed. Now when
+we compare the authority of the Ten with that possessed by the
+dictator, we see that the power placed in the hands of the former was
+out of all proportion greater than that entrusted to the latter. For
+when a dictator was appointed there still remained the tribunes, the
+consuls, and the senate, all of them invested with authority of which
+the dictator could not deprive them. For even if he could have taken
+his consulship from one man, or his status as a senator from another,
+he could not abolish the senatorial rank nor pass new laws. So that the
+senate, the consuls, and the tribunes continuing to exist with
+undiminished authority were a check upon him and kept him in the right
+road. But on the creation of the Ten, the opposite of all this took
+place. For on their appointment, consuls and tribunes were swept away,
+and express powers were given to the new magistrates to make laws and
+do whatever else they thought fit, with the entire authority of the
+whole Roman people. So that finding themselves alone without consuls or
+tribunes to control them, and with no appeal against them to the
+people, and thus there being none to keep a watch upon them, and
+further being stimulated by the ambition of Appius, in the second year
+of their office they began to wax insolent.
+
+Let it be noted, therefore, that when it is said that authority given
+by the public vote is never hurtful to any commonwealth, it is assumed
+that the people will never be led to confer that authority without due
+limitations, or for other than a reasonable term. Should they, however
+either from being deceived or otherwise blinded, be induced to bestow
+authority imprudently, as the Romans bestowed it on the Ten, it will
+always fare with them as with the Romans. And this may readily be
+understood on reflecting what causes operated to keep the dictator
+good, what to make the Ten bad, and by observing how those republics
+which have been accounted well governed, have acted when conferring
+authority for an extended period, as the Spartans on their kings and
+the Venetians on their doges; for it will be seen that in both these
+instances the authority was controlled by checks which made it
+impossible for it to be abused. But where an uncontrolled authority is
+given, no security is afforded by the circumstance that the body of the
+people is not corrupted; for in the briefest possible time absolute
+authority will make a people corrupt, and obtain for itself friends and
+partisans. Nor will it be any hindrance to him in whom such authority
+is vested, that he is poor and without connections, for wealth and
+every other advantage will quickly follow, as shall be shown more fully
+when we discuss the appointment of the Ten.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XXXVI.—_That Citizens who have held the higher Offices of a
+Commonwealth should not disdain the lower_.
+
+
+Under the consuls M. Fabius and Cn. Manlius, the Romans had a memorable
+victory in a battle fought with the Veientines and the Etruscans, in
+which Q. Fabius, brother of the consul, who had himself been consul the
+year before, was slain. This event may lead us to remark how well the
+methods followed by the city of Rome were suited to increase her power,
+and how great a mistake is made by other republics in departing from
+them. For, eager as the Romans were in the pursuit of glory, they never
+esteemed it a dishonour to obey one whom before they had commanded, or
+to find themselves serving in the ranks of an army which once they had
+led. This usage, however, is opposed to the ideas, the rules, and the
+practice which prevail at the present day, as, for instance, in Venice,
+where the notion still obtains that a citizen who has filled a great
+office should be ashamed to accept a less; and where the State itself
+permits him to decline it. This course, assuming it to lend lustre to
+individual citizens, is plainly to the disadvantage of the community,
+which has reason to hope more from, and to trust more to, the citizen
+who descends from a high office to fill a lower, than him who rises
+from a low office to fill a high one; for in the latter no confidence
+can reasonably be placed, unless he be seen to have others about him of
+such credit and worth that it may be hoped their wise counsels and
+influence will correct his inexperience. But had the usage which
+prevails in Venice and in other modern commonwealths and kingdoms,
+prevailed in Rome whereby he who had once been consul was never
+afterwards to go with the army except as consul, numberless results
+must have followed detrimental to the free institutions of that city;
+as well from the mistakes which the inexperience of new men would have
+occasioned, as because from their ambition having a freer course, and
+from their having none near them in whose presence they might fear to
+do amiss, they would have grown less scrupulous; and in this way the
+public service must have suffered grave harm.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XXXVII.—_Of the Mischief bred in Rome by the Agrarian Law: and
+how it is a great source of disorder in a Commonwealth to pass a Law
+opposed to ancient Usage and with stringent retrospective Effect._
+
+
+It has been said by ancient writers that to be pinched by adversity or
+pampered by prosperity is the common lot of men, and that in whichever
+way they are acted upon the result is the same. For when no longer
+urged to war on one another by necessity, they are urged by ambition,
+which has such dominion in their hearts that it never leaves them to
+whatsoever heights they climb. For nature has so ordered it that while
+they desire everything, it is impossible for them to have everything,
+and thus their desires being always in excess of their capacity to
+gratify them, they remain constantly dissatisfied and discontented. And
+hence the vicissitudes in human affairs. For some seeking to enlarge
+their possessions, and some to keep what they have got, wars and
+enmities ensue, from which result the ruin of one country and the
+growth of another.
+
+I am led to these reflections from observing that the commons of Rome
+were not content to secure themselves against the nobles by the
+creation of tribunes, a measure to which they were driven by necessity,
+but after effecting this, forthwith entered upon an ambitious contest
+with the nobles, seeking to share with them what all men most esteem,
+namely, their honours and their wealth. Hence was bred that disorder
+from which sprang the feuds relating to the Agrarian Laws, and which
+led in the end to the downfall of the Roman republic. And although it
+should be the object of every well-governed commonwealth to make the
+State rich and keep individual citizens poor it must be allowed that in
+the matter of this law the city of Rome was to blame; whether for
+having passed it at first in such a shape as to require it to be
+continually recast; or for having postponed it so long that its
+retrospective effect was the occasion of tumult; or else, because,
+although rightly framed at first, it had come in its operation to be
+perverted. But in whatever way it happened, so it was, that this law
+was never spoken of in Rome without the whole city being convulsed.
+
+The law itself embraced two principal provisions. By one it was enacted
+that no citizen should possess more than a fixed number of acres of
+land; by the other that all lands taken from the enemy should be
+distributed among the whole people. A twofold blow was thus aimed at
+the nobles; since all who possessed more land than the law allowed, as
+most of the nobles did, fell to be deprived of it; while by dividing
+the lands of the enemy among the whole people, the road to wealth was
+closed. These two grounds of offence being given to a powerful class,
+to whom it appeared that by resisting the law they did a service to the
+State, the whole city, as I have said, was thrown into an uproar on the
+mere mention of its name. The nobles indeed sought to temporize, and to
+prevail by patience and address; sometimes calling out the army,
+sometimes opposing another tribune to the one who was promoting the
+law, and sometimes coming to a compromise by sending a colony into the
+lands which were to be divided; as was done in the case of the
+territory of Antium, whither, on a dispute concerning the law having
+arisen, settlers were sent from Rome, and the land made over to them.
+In speaking of which colony Titus Livius makes the notable remark, that
+hardly any one in Rome could be got to take part in it, so much readier
+were the commons to indulge in covetous schemes at home, than to
+realize them by leaving it.
+
+The ill humour engendered by this contest continued to prevail until
+the Romans began to carry their arms into the remoter parts of Italy
+and to countries beyond its shores; after which it seemed for a time to
+slumber—and this, because the lands held by the enemies of Rome, out of
+sight of her citizens and too remote to be conveniently cultivated,
+came to be less desired. Whereupon the Romans grew less eager to punish
+their enemies by dividing their lands, and were content, when they
+deprived any city of its territory, to send colonists to occupy it. For
+causes such as these, the measure remained in abeyance down to the time
+of the Gracchi; but being by them revived, finally overthrew the
+liberty of Rome. For as it found the power of its adversaries doubled,
+such a flame of hatred was kindled between commons and senate, that,
+regardless of all civil restraints, they resorted to arms and
+bloodshed. And as the public magistrates were powerless to provide a
+remedy, each of the two factions having no longer any hopes from them,
+resolved to do what it could for itself, and to set up a chief for its
+own protection. On reaching this stage of tumult and disorder, the
+commons lent their influence to Marius, making him four times consul;
+whose authority, lasting thus long, and with very brief intervals,
+became so firmly rooted that he was able to make himself consul other
+three times. Against this scourge, the nobles, lacking other defence,
+set themselves to favour Sylla, and placing him at the head of their
+faction, entered on the civil wars; wherein, after much blood had been
+spilt, and after many changes of fortune, they got the better of their
+adversaries. But afterwards, in the time of Cæsar and Pompey, the
+distemper broke out afresh; for Cæsar heading the Marian party, and
+Pompey, that of Sylla, and war ensuing, the victory remained with
+Cæsar, who was the first tyrant in Rome; after whose time that city was
+never again free. Such, therefore, was the beginning and such the end
+of the Agrarian Law.
+
+But since it has elsewhere been said that the struggle between the
+commons and senate of Rome preserved her liberties, as giving rise to
+laws favourable to freedom, it might seem that the consequences of the
+Agrarian Law are opposed to that view. I am not, however, led to alter
+my opinion on this account; for I maintain that the ambition of the
+great is so pernicious that unless controlled and counteracted in a
+variety of ways, it will always reduce a city to speedy ruin. So that
+if the controversy over the Agrarian Laws took three hundred years to
+bring Rome to slavery, she would in all likelihood have been brought to
+slavery in a far shorter time, had not the commons, by means of this
+law, and by other demands, constantly restrained the ambition of the
+nobles.
+
+We may also learn from this contest how much more men value wealth than
+honours; for in the matter of honours, the Roman nobles always gave way
+to the commons without any extraordinary resistance; but when it came
+to be a question of property, so stubborn were they in its defence,
+that the commons to effect their ends had to resort to those irregular
+methods which have been described above. Of which irregularities the
+prime movers were the Gracchi, whose motives are more to be commended
+than their measures; since to pass a law with stringent retrospective
+effect, in order to remove an abuse of long standing in a republic, is
+an unwise step, and one which, as I have already shown at length, can
+have no other result than to accelerate the mischief to which the abuse
+leads; whereas, if you temporize, either the abuse develops more
+slowly, or else, in course of time, and before it comes to a head, dies
+out of itself.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XXXVIII.—_That weak Republics are irresolute and undecided; and
+that the course they may take depends more on Necessity than Choice._
+
+
+A terrible pestilence breaking out in Rome seemed to the Equians and
+Volscians to offer a fit opportunity for crushing her. The two nations,
+therefore, assembling a great army, attacked the Latins and Hernicians
+and laid waste their country. Whereupon the Latins and Hernicians were
+forced to make their case known to the Romans, and to ask to be
+defended by them. The Romans, who were sorely afflicted by the
+pestilence, answered that they must look to their own defence, and with
+their own forces, since Rome was in no position to succour them.
+
+Here we recognize the prudence and magnanimity of the Roman senate, and
+how at all times, and in all changes of fortune, they assumed the
+responsibility of determining the course their country should take; and
+were not ashamed, when necessary, to decide on a course contrary to
+that which was usual with them, or which they had decided to follow on
+some other occasion. I say this because on other occasions this same
+senate had forbidden these nations to defend themselves; and a less
+prudent assembly might have thought it lowered their credit to withdraw
+that prohibition. But the Roman senate always took a sound view of
+things, and always accepted the least hurtful course as the best. So
+that, although it was distasteful to them not to be able to defend
+their subjects, and equally distasteful—both for the reasons given, and
+for others which may be understood—that their subjects should take up
+arms in their absence, nevertheless knowing that these must have
+recourse to arms in any case, since the enemy was upon them, they took
+an honourable course in deciding that what had to be done should be
+done with their leave, lest men driven to disobey by necessity should
+come afterwards to disobey from choice. And although this may seem the
+course which every republic ought reasonably to follow, nevertheless
+weak and badly-advised republics cannot make up their minds to follow
+it, not knowing how to do themselves honour in like extremities.
+
+After Duke Valentino had taken Faenza and forced Bologna to yield to
+his terms, desiring to return to Rome through Tuscany, he sent one of
+his people to Florence to ask leave for himself and his army to pass. A
+council was held in Florence to consider how this request should be
+dealt with, but no one was favourable to the leave asked for being
+granted. Wherein the Roman method was not followed. For as the Duke had
+a very strong force with him, while the Florentines were so bare of
+troops that they could not have prevented his passage, it would have
+been far more for their credit that he should seem to pass with their
+consent, than that he should pass in spite of them; because, while
+discredit had to be incurred either way, they would have incurred less
+by acceding to his demand.
+
+But of all courses the worst for a weak State is to be irresolute; for
+then whatever it does will seem to be done under compulsion, so that if
+by chance it should do anything well, this will be set down to
+necessity and not to prudence. Of this I shall cite two other instances
+happening in our own times, and in our own country. In the year 1500,
+King Louis of France, after recovering Milan, being desirous to restore
+Pisa to the Florentines, so as to obtain payment from them of the fifty
+thousand ducats which they had promised him on the restitution being
+completed, sent troops to Pisa under M. Beaumont, in whom, though a
+Frenchman, the Florentines put much trust. Beaumont accordingly took up
+his position with his forces between Cascina and Pisa, to be in
+readiness to attack the town. After he had been there for some days
+making arrangements for the assault, envoys came to him from Pisa
+offering to surrender their city to the French if a promise were given
+in the king’s name, not to hand it over to the Florentines until four
+months had run. This condition was absolutely rejected by the
+Florentines, and the siege being proceeded with, they were forced to
+retire with disgrace. Now the proposal of the Pisans was rejected by
+the Florentines for no other reason than that they distrusted the good
+faith of the King, into whose hands their weakness obliged them to
+commit themselves, and did not reflect how much more it was for their
+interest that, by obtaining entrance into Pisa, he should have it in
+his power to restore the town to them, or, failing to restore it,
+should at once disclose his designs, than that remaining outside he
+should put them off with promises for which they had to pay. It would
+therefore have been a far better course for the Florentines to have
+agreed to Beaumont taking possession on whatever terms.
+
+This was seen afterwards by experience in the year 1502, when, on the
+revolt of Arezzo, M. Imbalt was sent by the King of France with French
+troops to assist the Florentines. For when he got near Arezzo, and
+began to negotiate with the Aretines, who, like the Pisans, were
+willing to surrender their town on terms, the acceptance of these terms
+was strongly disapproved in Florence; which Imbalt learning, and
+thinking that the Florentines were acting with little sense, he took
+the entire settlement of conditions into his own hands, and, without
+consulting the Florentine commissioners, concluded an arrangement to
+his own satisfaction, in execution of which he entered Arezzo with his
+army. And he let the Florentines know that he thought them fools and
+ignorant of the ways of the world; since if they desired to have
+Arezzo, they could signify their wishes to the King, who would be much
+better able to give it them when he had his soldiers inside, than when
+he had them outside the town. Nevertheless, in Florence they never
+ceased to blame and abuse M. Imbalt, until at last they came to see
+that if Beaumont had acted in the same way, they would have got
+possession Of Pisa as well as of Arezzo.
+
+Applying what has been said to the matter in hand, we find that
+irresolute republics, unless upon compulsion, never follow wise
+courses; for wherever there is room for doubt, their weakness will not
+suffer them to come to any resolve; so that unless their doubts be
+overcome by some superior force which impels them forward, they remain
+always in suspense.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XXXIX.—_That often the same Accidents are seen to befall
+different Nations._
+
+
+Any one comparing the present with the past will soon perceive that in
+all cities and in all nations there prevail the same desires and
+passions as always have prevailed; for which reason it should be an
+easy matter for him who carefully examines past events, to foresee
+those which are about to happen in any republic, and to apply such
+remedies as the ancients have used in like cases; or finding none which
+have been used by them, to strike out new ones, such as they might have
+used in similar circumstances. But these lessons being neglected or not
+understood by readers, or, if understood by them, being unknown to
+rulers, it follows that the same disorders are common to all times.
+
+In the year 1494 the Republic of Florence, having lost a portion of its
+territories, including Pisa and other towns, was forced to make war
+against those who had taken possession of them, who being powerful, it
+followed that great sums were spent on these wars to little purpose.
+This large expenditure had to be met by heavy taxes which gave occasion
+to numberless complaints on the part of the people; and inasmuch as the
+war was conducted by a council of ten citizens, who were styled “the
+Ten of the War,” the multitude began to regard these with displeasure,
+as though they were the cause of the war and of the consequent
+expenditure; and at last persuaded themselves that if they got rid of
+this magistracy there would be an end to the war. Wherefore when the
+magistracy of “the Ten” should have been renewed, the people did not
+renew it, but, suffering it to lapse, entrusted their affairs to the
+“Signory.” This course was most pernicious, since not only did it fail
+to put an end to the war, as the people expected it would, but by
+setting aside men who had conducted it with prudence, led to such
+mishaps that not Pisa only, but Arezzo also, and many other towns
+besides were lost to Florence. Whereupon, the people recognizing their
+mistake, and that the evil was in the disease and not in the physician,
+reinstated the magistracy of the Ten.
+
+Similar dissatisfaction grew up in Rome against the consular authority.
+For the people seeing one war follow another, and that they were never
+allowed to rest, when they should have ascribed this to the ambition of
+neighbouring nations who desired their overthrow, ascribed it to the
+ambition of the nobles, who, as they believed, being unable to wreak
+their hatred against them within the city, where they were protected by
+the power of the tribunes, sought to lead them outside the city, where
+they were under the authority of the consuls, that they might crush
+them where they were without help. In which belief they thought it
+necessary either to get rid of the consuls altogether, or so to
+restrict their powers as to leave them no authority over the people,
+either in the city or out of it.
+
+The first who attempted to pass a law to this effect was the tribune
+Terentillus, who proposed that a committee of five should be named to
+consider and regulate the power of the consuls. This roused the anger
+of the nobles, to whom it seemed that the greatness of their authority
+was about to set for ever, and that no part would be left them in the
+administration of the republic. Such, however, was the obstinacy of the
+tribunes, that they succeeded in abolishing the consular title, nor
+were satisfied until, after other changes, it was resolved that, in
+room of consuls, tribunes should be appointed with consular powers; so
+much greater was their hatred of the name than of the thing. For a long
+time matters remained on this footing; till eventually, the commons,
+discovering their mistake, resumed the appointment of consuls in the
+same way as the Florentines reverted to “the Ten of the War.”
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XL.—_Of the creation of the Decemvirate in Rome, and what
+therein is to be noted. Wherein among other Matters is shown how the
+same Causes may lead to the Safety or to the Ruin of a Commonwealth._
+
+
+It being my desire to treat fully of those disorders which arose in
+Rome on the creation of the decemvirate, I think it not amiss first of
+all to relate what took place at the time of that creation, and then to
+discuss those circumstances attending it which seem most to deserve
+notice. These are numerous, and should be well considered, both by
+those who would maintain the liberties of a commonwealth and by those
+who would subvert them. For in the course of our inquiry it will be
+seen that many mistakes prejudicial to freedom were made by the senate
+and people, and that many were likewise made by Appius, the chief
+decemvir, prejudicial to that tyranny which it was his aim to establish
+in Rome.
+
+After much controversy and wrangling between the commons and the nobles
+as to the framing of new laws by which the freedom of Rome might be
+better secured, Spurius Posthumius and two other citizens were, by
+general consent, despatched to Athens to procure copies of the laws
+which Solon had drawn up for the Athenians, to the end that these might
+serve as a groundwork for the laws of Rome. On their return, the next
+step was to depute certain persons to examine these laws and to draft
+the new code. For which purpose a commission consisting of ten members,
+among whom was Appius Claudius, a crafty and ambitious citizen, was
+appointed for a year; and that the commissioners in framing their laws
+might act without fear or favour, all the other magistracies, and in
+particular the consulate and tribuneship, were suspended, and the
+appeal to the people discontinued; so that the decemvirs came to be
+absolute in Rome. Very soon the whole authority of the commissioners
+came to be centred in Appius, owing to the favour in which he was held
+by the commons. For although before he had been regarded as the cruel
+persecutor of the people, he now showed himself so conciliatory in his
+bearing that men wondered at the sudden change in his character and
+disposition.
+
+This set of commissioners, then, behaved discreetly, being attended by
+no more than twelve lictors, walking in front of that decemvir whom the
+rest put forward as their chief; and though vested with absolute
+authority, yet when a Roman citizen had to be tried for murder, they
+cited him before the people and caused him to be judged by them. Their
+laws they wrote upon ten tables, but before signing them they exposed
+them publicly, that every one might read and consider them, and if any
+defect were discovered in them, it might be corrected before they were
+finally passed. At this juncture Appius caused it to be notified
+throughout the city that were two other tables added to these ten, the
+laws would be complete; hoping that under this belief the people would
+consent to continue the decemvirate for another year. This consent the
+people willingly gave, partly to prevent the consuls being reinstated,
+and partly because they thought they could hold their ground without
+the aid of the tribunes, who, as has already been said, were the judges
+in criminal cases.
+
+On it being resolved to reappoint the decemvirate, all the nobles set
+to canvass for the office, Appius among the foremost; and such
+cordiality did he display towards the commons while seeking their
+votes, that the other candidates, “_unable to persuade themselves that
+so much affability on the part of so proud a man was wholly
+disinterested,_” began to suspect him; but fearing to oppose him
+openly, sought to circumvent him, by putting him forward, though the
+youngest of them all, to declare to the people the names of the
+proposed decemvirs; thinking that he would not venture to name himself,
+that being an unusual course in Rome, and held discreditable. “_But
+what they meant as a hindrance, he turned to account,_” by proposing,
+to the surprise and displeasure of the whole nobility, his own name
+first, and then nominating nine others on whose support he thought he
+could depend.
+
+The new appointments, which were to last for a year, having been made,
+Appius soon let both commons and nobles know the mistake they had
+committed, for throwing off the mask, he allowed his innate arrogance
+to appear, and speedily infected his colleagues with the same spirit;
+who, to overawe the people and the senate, instead of twelve lictors,
+appointed one hundred and twenty. For a time their measures were
+directed against high and low alike; but presently they began to
+intrigue with the senate, and to attack the commons; and if any of the
+latter, on being harshly used by one decemvir, ventured to appeal to
+another, he was worse handled on the appeal than in the first instance.
+The commons, on discovering their error, began in their despair to turn
+their eyes towards the nobles, “_and to look for a breeze of freedom
+from that very quarter whence fearing slavery they had brought the
+republic to its present straits._” To the nobles the sufferings of the
+commons were not displeasing, from the hope “_that disgusted with the
+existing state of affairs, they too might come to desire the
+restoration of the consuls._”
+
+When the year for which the decemvirs were appointed at last came to an
+end, the two additional tables of the law were ready, but had not yet
+been published. This was made a pretext by them for prolonging their
+magistracy, which they took measures to retain by force, gathering
+round them for this purpose a retinue of young noblemen, whom they
+enriched with the goods of those citizens whom they had condemned.
+“_Corrupted by which gifts, these youths came to prefer selfish licence
+to public freedom._”
+
+It happened that at this time the Sabines and Volscians began to stir
+up a war against Rome, and it was during the alarm thereby occasioned
+that the decemvirs were first made aware how weak was their position.
+For without the senate they could take no warlike measures, while by
+assembling the senate they seemed to put an end to their own authority.
+Nevertheless, being driven to it by necessity, they took this latter
+course. When the senate met, many of the senators, but particularly
+Valerius and Horatius, inveighed against the insolence of the
+decemvirs, whose power would forthwith have been cut short, had not the
+senate through jealousy of the commons declined to exercise their
+authority. For they thought that were the decemvirs to lay down office
+of their own free will, tribunes might not be reappointed. Wherefore
+they decided for war, and sent forth the armies under command of
+certain of the decemvirs. But Appius remaining behind to govern the
+city, it so fell out that he became enamoured of Virginia, and that
+when he sought to lay violent hands upon her, Virginius, her father, to
+save her from dishonour, slew her. Thereupon followed tumults in Rome,
+and mutiny among the soldiers, who, making common cause with the rest
+of the plebeians, betook themselves to the Sacred Hill, and there
+remained until the decemvirs laid down their office; when tribunes and
+consuls being once more appointed, Rome was restored to her ancient
+freedom.
+
+In these events we note, first of all, that the pernicious step of
+creating this tyranny in Rome was due to the same causes which commonly
+give rise to tyrannies in cities; namely, the excessive love of the
+people for liberty, and the passionate eagerness of the nobles to
+govern. For when they cannot agree to pass some measure favourable to
+freedom, one faction or the other sets itself to support some one man,
+and a tyranny at once springs up. Both parties in Rome consented to the
+creation of the decemvirs, and to their exercising unrestricted powers,
+from the desire which the one had to put an end to the consular name,
+and the other to abolish the authority of the tribunes. When, on the
+appointment of the decemvirate, it seemed to the commons that Appius
+had become favourable to their cause, and was ready to attack the
+nobles, they inclined to support him. But when a people is led to
+commit this error of lending its support to some one man, in order that
+he may attack those whom it holds in hatred, if he only be prudent he
+will inevitably become the tyrant of that city. For he will wait until,
+with the support of the people, he can deal a fatal blow to the nobles,
+and will never set himself to oppress the people until the nobles have
+been rooted out. But when that time comes, the people, although they
+recognize their servitude, will have none to whom they can turn for
+help.
+
+Had this method, which has been followed by all who have successfully
+established tyrannies in republics, been followed by Appius, his power
+would have been more stable and lasting; whereas, taking the directly
+opposite course, he could not have acted more unwisely than he did. For
+in his eagerness to grasp the tyranny, he made himself obnoxious to
+those who were in fact conferring it, and who could have maintained him
+in it; and he destroyed those who were his friends, while he sought
+friendship from those from whom he could not have it. For although it
+be the desire of the nobles to tyrannize, that section of them which
+finds itself outside the tyranny is always hostile to the tyrant, who
+can never succeed in gaining over the entire body of the nobles by
+reason of their greed and ambition; for no tyrant can ever have honours
+or wealth enough to satisfy them all.
+
+In abandoning the people, therefore, and siding with the nobles, Appius
+committed a manifest mistake, as well for the reasons above given, as
+because to hold a thing by force, he who uses force must needs be
+stronger than he against whom it is used. Whence it happens that those
+tyrants who have the mass of the people for their friends and the
+nobles for their enemies, are more secure than those who have the
+people for their enemies and the nobles for their friends; because in
+the former case their authority has the stronger support. For with such
+support a ruler can maintain himself by the internal strength of his
+State, as did Nabis, tyrant of Sparta, when attacked by the Romans and
+by the whole of Greece; for making sure work with the nobles, who were
+few in number, and having the people on his side, he was able with
+their assistance to defend himself; which he could not have done had
+they been against him. But in the case of a city, wherein the tyrant
+has few friends, its internal strength will not avail him for its
+defence, and he will have to seek aid from without in one of three
+shapes. For either he must hire foreign guards to defend his person; or
+he must arm the peasantry, so that they may play the part which ought
+to be played by the citizens; or he must league with powerful
+neighbours for his defence. He who follows these methods and observes
+them well, may contrive to save himself, though he has the people for
+his enemy. But Appius could not follow the plan of gaining over the
+peasantry, since in Rome they and the people were one. And what he
+might have done he knew not how to do, and so was ruined at the very
+outset.
+
+In creating the decemvirate, therefore, both the senate and the people
+made grave mistakes. For although, as already explained, when speaking
+of the dictatorship, it is those magistrates who make themselves, and
+not those made by the votes of the people, that are hurtful to freedom;
+nevertheless the people, in creating magistrates ought to take such
+precautions as will make it difficult for these to become bad. But the
+Romans when they ought to have set a check on the decemvirs in order to
+keep them good, dispensed with it, making them the sole magistrates of
+Rome, and setting aside all others; and this from the excessive desire
+of the senate to get rid of the tribunes, and of the commons to get rid
+of the consuls; by which objects both were so blinded as to fall into
+all the disorders which ensued. For, as King Ferrando was wont to say,
+men often behave like certain of the smaller birds, which are so intent
+on the prey to which nature incites them, that they discern not the
+eagle hovering overhead for their destruction.
+
+In this Discourse then the mistakes made by the Roman people in their
+efforts to preserve their freedom and the mistakes made by Appius in
+his endeavour to obtain the tyranny, have, as I proposed at the outset,
+been plainly shown.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XLI.—_That it is unwise to pass at a bound from leniency to
+severity, or to a haughty bearing from a humble._
+
+
+Among the crafty devices used by Appius to aid him in maintaining his
+authority, this, of suddenly passing from one character to the other
+extreme, was of no small prejudice to him. For his fraud in pretending
+to the commons to be well disposed towards them, was happily contrived;
+as were also the means he took to bring about the reappointment of the
+decemvirate. Most skilful, too, was his audacity in nominating himself
+contrary to the expectation of the nobles, and in proposing colleagues
+on whom he could depend to carry out his ends. But, as I have said
+already, it was not happily contrived that, after doing all this, he
+should suddenly turn round, and from being the friend, reveal himself
+the enemy of the people; haughty instead of humane; cruel instead of
+kindly; and make this change so rapidly as to leave himself no shadow
+of excuse, but compel all to recognize the doubleness of his nature.
+For he who has once seemed good, should he afterwards choose, for his
+own ends, to become bad, ought to change by slow degrees, and as
+opportunity serves; so that before his altered nature strip him of old
+favour, he may have gained for himself an equal share of new, and thus
+his influence suffer no diminution. For otherwise, being at once
+unmasked and friendless, he is undone:
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XLII.—_How easily Men become corrupted._
+
+
+In this matter of the decemvirate we may likewise note the ease
+wherewith men become corrupted, and how completely, although born good
+and well brought up, they change their nature. For we see how
+favourably disposed the youths whom Appius gathered round him became
+towards his tyranny, in return for the trifling benefits which they
+drew from it; and how Quintus Fabius, one of the second decemvirate and
+a most worthy man, blinded by a little ambition, and misled by the evil
+counsels of Appius, abandoning his fair fame, betook himself to most
+unworthy courses, and grew like his master.
+
+Careful consideration of this should make those who frame laws for
+commonwealths and kingdoms more alive to the necessity of placing
+restraints on men’s evil appetites, and depriving them of all hope of
+doing wrong with impunity.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XLIII.—_That Men fighting in their own Cause make good and
+resolute Soldiers._
+
+
+From what has been touched upon above, we are also led to remark how
+wide is the difference between an army which, having no ground for
+discontent, fights in its own cause, and one which, being discontented,
+fights to satisfy the ambition of others. For whereas the Romans were
+always victorious under the consuls, under the decemvirs they were
+always defeated. This helps us to understand why it is that mercenary
+troops are worthless; namely, that they have no incitement to keep them
+true to you beyond the pittance which you pay them, which neither is
+nor can be a sufficient motive for such fidelity and devotion as would
+make them willing to die in your behalf. But in those armies in which
+there exists not such an attachment towards him for whom they fight as
+makes them devoted to his cause, there never will be valour enough to
+withstand an enemy if only he be a little brave. And since such
+attachment and devotion cannot be looked for from any save your own
+subjects, you must, if you would preserve your dominions, or maintain
+your commonwealth or kingdom, arm the natives of your country; as we
+see to have been done by all those who have achieved great things in
+war.
+
+Under the decemvirs the ancient valour of the Roman soldiers had in no
+degree abated; yet, because they were no longer animated by the same
+good will, they did not exert themselves as they were wont. But so soon
+as the decemvirate came to an end, and the soldiers began once more to
+fight as free men, the old spirit was reawakened, and, as a
+consequence, their enterprises, according to former usage, were brought
+to a successful close.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XLIV.—_That the Multitude is helpless without a Head: and that
+we should not with the same breath threaten and ask leave._
+
+
+When Virginia died by her father’s hand, the commons of Rome withdrew
+under arms to the Sacred Hill. Whereupon the senate sent messengers to
+demand by what sanction they had deserted their commanders and
+assembled there in arms. And in such reverence was the authority of the
+senate held, that the commons, lacking leaders, durst make no reply.
+“Not,” says Titus Livius, “that they were at a loss what to answer, but
+because they had none to answer for them;” words which clearly show how
+helpless a thing is the multitude when without a head.
+
+This defect was perceived by Virginius, at whose instance twenty
+military tribunes were appointed by the commons to be their spokesmen
+with the senate, and to negotiate terms; who, having asked that
+Valerius and Horatius might be sent to them, to whom their wishes would
+be made known, these declined to go until the decemvirs had laid down
+their office. When this was done, and Valerius and Horatius came to the
+hill where the commons were assembled, the latter demanded that
+tribunes of the people should be appointed; that in future there should
+be an appeal to the people from the magistrates of whatever degree; and
+that all the decemvirs should be given up to them to be burned alive.
+Valerius and Horatius approved the first two demands, but rejected the
+last as inhuman; telling the commons that “they were rushing into that
+very cruelty which they themselves had condemned in others;” and
+counselling them to say nothing about the decemvirs, but to be
+satisfied to regain their own power and authority; since thus the way
+would be open to them for obtaining every redress.
+
+Here we see plainly how foolish and unwise it is to ask a thing and
+with the same breath to say, “I desire this that I may inflict an
+injury.” For we should never declare our intention beforehand, but
+watch for every opportunity to carry it out. So that it is enough to
+ask another for his weapons, without adding, “With these I purpose to
+destroy you;” for when once you have secured his weapons, you can use
+them afterwards as you please.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XLV.—_That it is of evil example, especially in the Maker of a
+Law, not to observe the Law when made: and that daily to renew acts of
+injustice in a City is most hurtful to the Governor._
+
+
+Terms having been adjusted, and the old order of things restored in
+Rome, Virginius cited Appius to defend himself before the people; and
+on his appearing attended by many of the nobles, ordered him to be led
+to prison. Whereupon Appius began to cry out and appeal to the people.
+But Virginius told him that he was unworthy to be allowed that appeal
+which he had himself done away with, or to have that people whom he had
+wronged for his protectors. Appius rejoined, that the people should not
+set at nought that right of appeal which they themselves had insisted
+on with so much zeal. Nevertheless, he was dragged to prison, and
+before the day of trial slew himself. Now, though the wicked life of
+Appius merited every punishment, still it was impolitic to violate the
+laws, more particularly a law which had only just been passed; for
+nothing, I think, is of worse example in a republic, than to make a law
+and not to keep it; and most of all, when he who breaks is he that made
+it.
+
+After the year 1494, the city of Florence reformed its government with
+the help of the Friar Girolamo Savonarola, whose writings declare his
+learning, his wisdom, and the excellence of his heart. Among other
+ordinances for the safety of the citizens, he caused a law to be
+passed, allowing an appeal to the people from the sentences pronounced
+by “the Eight” and by the “Signory” in trials for State offences; a law
+he had long contended for, and carried at last with great difficulty.
+It so happened that a very short time after it was passed, five
+citizens were condemned to death by the “Signory” for State offences,
+and that when they sought to appeal to the people they were not
+permitted to do so, and the law was violated. This, more than any other
+mischance, helped to lessen the credit of the Friar; since if his law
+of appeal was salutary, he should have caused it to be observed; if
+useless, he ought not to have promoted it. And his inconsistency was
+the more remarked, because in all the sermons which he preached after
+the law was broken, he never either blamed or excused the person who
+had broken it, as though unwilling to condemn, while unable to justify
+what suited his purposes. This, as betraying the ambitious and partial
+turn of his mind, took from his reputation and exposed him to much
+obloquy.
+
+Another thing which greatly hurts a government is to keep alive bitter
+feelings in men’s minds by often renewed attacks on individuals, as was
+done in Rome after the decemvirate was put an end to. For each of the
+decemvirs, and other citizens besides, were at different times accused
+and condemned, so that the greatest alarm was spread through the whole
+body of the nobles, who came to believe that these prosecutions would
+never cease until their entire order was exterminated. And this must
+have led to grave mischief had not Marcus Duilius the tribune provided
+against it, by an edict which forbade every one, for the period of a
+year, citing or accusing any Roman citizen, an ordinance which had the
+effect of reassuring the whole nobility. Here we see how hurtful it is
+for a prince or commonwealth to keep the minds of their subjects in
+constant alarm and suspense by continually renewed punishments and
+violence. And, in truth, no course can be more pernicious. For men who
+are in fear for their safety will seize on every opportunity for
+securing themselves against the dangers which surround them, and will
+grow at once more daring, and less scrupulous in resorting to new
+courses. For these reasons we should either altogether avoid inflicting
+injury, or should inflict every injury at a stroke, and then seek to
+reassure men’s minds and suffer them to settle down and rest.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XLVI.—_That Men climb from one step of Ambition to another,
+seeking at first to escape Injury and then to injure others._
+
+
+As the commons of Rome on recovering their freedom were restored to
+their former position—nay, to one still stronger since many new laws
+had been passed which confirmed and extended their authority,—it might
+reasonably have been hoped that Rome would for a time remain at rest.
+The event, however, showed the contrary, for from day to day there
+arose in that city new tumults and fresh dissensions. And since the
+causes which brought this about have been most judiciously set forth by
+Titus Livius, it seems to me much to the purpose to cite his own words
+when he says, that “whenever either the commons or the nobles were
+humble, the others grew haughty; so that if the commons kept within due
+bounds, the young nobles began to inflict injuries upon them, against
+which the tribunes, who were themselves made the objects of outrage,
+were little able to give redress; while the nobles on their part,
+although they could not close their eyes to the ill behaviour of their
+young men, were yet well pleased that if excesses were to be committed,
+they should be committed by their own faction, and not by the commons.
+Thus the desire to secure its own liberty prompted each faction to make
+itself strong enough to oppress the other. For this is the common
+course of things, that in seeking to escape cause for fear, men come to
+give others cause to be afraid by inflicting on them those wrongs from
+which they strive to relieve themselves; as though the choice lay
+between injuring and being injured.”
+
+Herein, among other things, we perceive in what ways commonwealths are
+overthrown, and how men climb from one ambition to another; and
+recognize the truth of those words which Sallust puts in the mouth of
+Cæsar, that “_all ill actions have their origin in fair
+beginnings._”[4] For, as I have said already, the ambitious citizen in
+a commonwealth seeks at the outset to secure himself against injury,
+not only at the hands of private persons, but also of the magistrates;
+to effect which he endeavours to gain himself friends. These he obtains
+by means honourable in appearance, either by supplying them with money
+or protecting them against the powerful. And because such conduct seems
+praiseworthy, every one is readily deceived by it, and consequently no
+remedy is applied. Pursuing these methods without hindrance, this man
+presently comes to be so powerful that private citizens begin to fear
+him, and the magistrates to treat him with respect. But when he has
+advanced thus far on the road to power without encountering opposition,
+he has reached a point at which it is most dangerous to cope with him;
+it being dangerous, as I have before explained, to contend with a
+disorder which has already made progress in a city. Nevertheless, when
+he has brought things to this pass, you must either endeavour to crush
+him, at the risk of immediate ruin, or else, unless death or some like
+accident interpose, you incur inevitable slavery by letting him alone.
+For when, as I have said, it has come to this that the citizens and
+even the magistrates fear to offend him and his friends, little further
+effort will afterwards be needed to enable him to proscribe and ruin
+whom he pleases.
+
+ [4] Quod omnia mala exempla ex bonis initiis orta sunt. (Sall. Cat.
+ 51.)
+
+
+A republic ought, therefore, to provide by its ordinances that none of
+its citizens shall, under colour of doing good, have it in their power
+to do evil, but shall be suffered to acquire such influence only as may
+aid and not injure freedom. How this may be done, shall presently be
+explained.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XLVII.—_That though Men deceive themselves in Generalities, in
+Particulars they judge truly._
+
+
+The commons of Rome having, as I have said, grown disgusted with the
+consular name, and desiring either that men of plebeian birth should be
+admitted to the office or its authority be restricted, the nobles, to
+prevent its degradation in either of these two ways, proposed a middle
+course, whereby four tribunes, who might either be plebeians or nobles,
+were to be created with consular authority. This compromise satisfied
+the commons, who thought they would thus get rid of the consulship, and
+secure the highest offices of the State for their own order. But here a
+circumstance happened worth noting. When the four tribunes came to be
+chosen, the people, who had it in their power to choose all from the
+commons, chose all from the nobles. With respect to which election
+Titus Livius observes, that “_the result showed that the people when
+declaring their honest judgment after controversy was over, were
+governed by a different spirit from that which had inspired them while
+contending for their liberties and for a share in public honours_.” The
+reason for this I believe to be, that men deceive themselves more
+readily in generals than in particulars. To the commons of Rome it
+seemed, in the abstract, that they had every right to be admitted to
+the consulship, since their party in the city was the more numerous,
+since they bore the greater share of danger in their wars, and since it
+was they who by their valour kept Rome free and made her powerful. And
+because it appeared to them, as I have said, that their desire was a
+reasonable one, they were resolved to satisfy it at all hazards. But
+when they had to form a particular judgment on the men of their own
+party, they recognized their defects, and decided that individually no
+one of them was deserving of what, collectively, they seemed entitled
+to; and being ashamed of them, turned to bestow their honours on those
+who deserved them. Of which decision Titus Livius, speaking with due
+admiration, says, “_Where shall we now find in any one man, that
+modesty, moderation, and magnanimity which were then common to the
+entire people?_”
+
+As confirming what I have said, I shall cite another noteworthy
+incident, which occurred in Capua after the rout of the Romans by
+Hannibal at Cannæ. For all Italy being convulsed by that defeat, Capua
+too was threatened with civil tumult, through the hatred which
+prevailed between her people and senate. But Pacuvius Calavius, who at
+this time filled the office of chief magistrate, perceiving the danger,
+took upon himself to reconcile the contending factions. With this
+object he assembled the Senate and pointed out to them the hatred in
+which they were held by the people, and the risk they ran of being put
+to death by them, and of the city, now that the Romans were in
+distress, being given up to Hannibal. But he added that, were they to
+consent to leave the matter with him, he thought he could contrive to
+reconcile them; in the meanwhile, however, he must shut them up in the
+palace, that, by putting it in the power of the people to punish them,
+he might secure their safety.
+
+The senate consenting to this proposal, he shut them up in the palace,
+and summoning the people to a public meeting, told them the time had at
+last come for them to trample on the insolence of the nobles, and
+requite the wrongs suffered at their hands; for he had them all safe
+under bolt and bar; but, as he supposed they did not wish the city to
+remain without rulers, it was fit, before putting the old senators to
+death, they should appoint others in their room. Wherefore he had
+thrown the names of all the old senators into a bag, and would now
+proceed to draw them out one by one, and as they were drawn would cause
+them to be put to death, so soon as a successor was found for each.
+When the first name he drew was declared, there arose a great uproar
+among the people, all crying out against the cruelty, pride, and
+arrogance of that senator whose name it was. But on Pacuvius desiring
+them to propose a substitute, the meeting was quieted, and after a
+brief pause one of the commons was nominated. No sooner, however, was
+his name mentioned than one began to whistle, another to laugh, some
+jeering at him in one way and some in another. And the same thing
+happening in every case, each and all of those nominated were judged
+unworthy of senatorial rank. Whereupon Pacuvius, profiting by the
+opportunity, said, “Since you are agreed that the city would be badly
+off without a senate, but are not agreed whom to appoint in the room of
+the old senators, it will, perhaps, be well for you to be reconciled to
+them; for the fear into which they have been thrown must have so
+subdued them, that you are sure to find in them that affability which
+hitherto you have looked for in vain.” This proposal being agreed to, a
+reconciliation followed between the two orders; the commons having seen
+their error so soon as they were obliged to come to particulars.
+
+A people therefore is apt to err in judging of things and their
+accidents in the abstract, but on becoming acquainted with particulars,
+speedily discovers its mistakes. In the year 1494, when her greatest
+citizens were banished from Florence, and no regular government any
+longer existed there, but a spirit of licence prevailed, and matters
+went continually from bad to worse, many Florentines perceiving the
+decay of their city, and discerning no other cause for it, blamed the
+ambition of this or the other powerful citizen, who, they thought, was
+fomenting these disorders with a view to establish a government to his
+own liking, and to rob them of their liberties. Those who thought thus,
+would hang about the arcades and public squares, maligning many
+citizens, and giving it to be understood that if ever they found
+themselves in the Signory, they would expose the designs of these
+citizens and have them punished. From time to time it happened that one
+or another of those who used this language rose to be of the chief
+magistracy, and so soon as he obtained this advancement, and saw things
+nearer, became aware whence the disorders I have spoken of really came,
+the dangers attending them, and the difficulty in dealing with them;
+and recognizing that they were the growth of the times, and not
+occasioned by particular men, suddenly altered his views and conduct; a
+nearer knowledge of facts freeing him from the false impressions he had
+been led into on a general view of affairs. But those who had heard him
+speak as a private citizen, when they saw him remain inactive after he
+was made a magistrate, believed that this arose not from his having
+obtained any better knowledge of things, but from his having been
+cajoled or corrupted by the great. And this happening with many men and
+often, it came to be a proverb among the people, that “_men had one
+mind in the market-place, another in the palace._”
+
+Reflecting on what has been said, we see how quickly men’s eyes may be
+opened, if knowing that they deceive themselves in generalities, we can
+find a way to make them pass to particulars; as Pacuvius did in the
+case of the Capuans, and the senate in the case of Rome. Nor do I
+believe that any prudent man need shrink from the judgment of the
+people in questions relating to particulars, as, for instance, in the
+distribution of honours and dignities. For in such matters only, the
+people are either never mistaken, or at any rate far seldomer than a
+small number of persons would be, were the distribution entrusted to
+them.
+
+It seems to me, however, not out of place to notice in the following
+Chapter, a method employed by the Roman senate to enlighten the people
+in making this distribution.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XLVIII.—_He who would not have an Office bestowed on some
+worthless or wicked Person, should contrive that it be solicited by one
+who is utterly worthless and wicked, or else by one who is in the
+highest degree noble and good._
+
+
+Whenever the senate saw a likelihood of the tribunes with consular
+powers being chosen exclusively from the commons, it took one or other
+of two ways,—either by causing the office to be solicited by the most
+distinguished among the citizens; or else, to confess the truth, by
+bribing some base and ignoble fellow to fasten himself on to those
+other plebeians of better quality who were seeking the office, and
+become a candidate conjointly with them. The latter device made the
+people ashamed to give, the former ashamed to refuse.
+
+This confirms what I said in my last Chapter, as to the people
+deceiving themselves in generalities but not in particulars.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XLIX.—_That if Cities which, like Rome, had their beginning in
+Freedom, have had difficulty in framing such Laws as would preserve
+their Freedom, Cities which at the first have been in Subjection will
+find this almost impossible._
+
+
+How hard it is in founding a commonwealth to provide it with all the
+laws needed to maintain its freedom, is well seen from the history of
+the Roman Republic. For although ordinances were given it first by
+Romulus, then by Numa, afterwards by Tullus Hostilius and Servius, and
+lastly by the Ten created for the express purpose, nevertheless, in the
+actual government of Rome new needs were continually developed, to meet
+which, new ordinances had constantly to be devised; as in the creation
+of the censors, who were one of the chief means by which Rome was kept
+free during the whole period of her constitutional government. For as
+the censors became the arbiters of morals in Rome, it was very much
+owing to them that the progress of the Romans towards corruption was
+retarded. And though, at the first creation of the office, a mistake
+was doubtless made in fixing its term at five years, this was corrected
+not long after by the wisdom of the dictator Mamercus, who passed a law
+reducing it to eighteen months; a change which the censors then in
+office took in such ill part, that they deprived Mamercus of his rank
+as a senator. This step was much blamed both by the commons and the
+Fathers; still, as our History does not record that Mamercus obtained
+any redress, we must infer either that the Historian has omitted
+something, or that on this head the laws of Rome were defective; since
+it is never well that the laws of a commonwealth should suffer a
+citizen to incur irremediable wrong because he promotes a measure
+favourable to freedom.
+
+But returning to the matter under consideration, we have, in connection
+with the creation of this new office, to note, that if those cities
+which, as was the case with Rome, have had their beginning in freedom,
+and have by themselves maintained that freedom, have experienced great
+difficulty in framing good laws for the preservation of their
+liberties, it is little to be wondered at that cities which at the
+first were dependent, should find it not difficult merely but
+impossible so to shape their ordinances as to enable them to live free
+and undisturbed. This difficulty we see to have arisen in the case of
+Florence, which, being subject at first to the power of Rome and
+subsequently to that of other rulers, remained long in servitude,
+taking no thought for herself; and even afterwards, when she could
+breathe more freely and began to frame her own laws, these, since they
+were blended with ancient ordinances which were bad, could not
+themselves be good; and thus for the two hundred years of which we have
+trustworthy record, our city has gone on patching her institutions,
+without ever possessing a government in respect of which she could
+truly be termed a commonwealth.
+
+The difficulties which have been felt in Florence are the same as have
+been felt in all cities which have had a like origin; and although,
+repeatedly, by the free and public votes of her citizens, ample
+authority has been given to a few of their number to reform her
+constitution, no alteration of general utility has ever been
+introduced, but only such as forwarded the interests of the party to
+which those commissioned to make changes belonged. This, instead of
+order, has occasioned the greatest disorder in our city.
+
+But to come to particulars, I say, that among other matters which have
+to be considered by the founder of a commonwealth, is the question into
+whose hands should be committed the power of life and death over its
+citizens’ This was well seen to in Rome, where, as a rule, there was a
+right of appeal to the people, but where, on any urgent case arising in
+which it might have been dangerous to delay the execution of a judicial
+sentence, recourse could be had to a dictator with powers to execute
+justice at once; a remedy, however, never resorted to save in cases of
+extremity. But Florence, and other cities having a like origin,
+committed this power into the hands of a foreigner, whom they styled
+Captain, and as he was open to be corrupted by powerful citizens this
+was a pernicious course. Altering this arrangement afterwards in
+consequence of changes in their government, they appointed eight
+citizens to discharge the office of Captain. But this, for a reason
+already mentioned, namely that a few will always be governed by the
+will of a few and these the most powerful, was a change from bad to
+worse.
+
+The city of Venice has guarded herself against a like danger. For in
+Venice ten citizens are appointed with power to punish any man without
+appeal; and because, although possessing the requisite authority, this
+number might not be sufficient to insure the punishment of the
+powerful, in addition to their council of Ten, they have also
+constituted a council of Forty, and have further provided that the
+council of the “_Pregai_,” which is their supreme council, shall have
+authority to chastise powerful offenders. So that, unless an accuser be
+wanting, a tribunal is never wanting in Venice to keep powerful
+citizens in check.
+
+But when we see how in Rome, with ordinances of her own imposing, and
+with so many and so wise legislators, fresh occasion arose from day to
+day for framing new laws favourable to freedom, it is not to be
+wondered at that, in other cities less happy in their beginnings,
+difficulties should have sprung up which no ordinances could remedy.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER L.—_That neither any Council nor any Magistrate should have
+power to bring the Government of a City to a stay._
+
+
+T.Q. CINCINNATUS and Cn. Julius Mento being consuls of Rome, and being
+at variance with one another, brought the whole business of the city to
+a stay; which the senate perceiving, were moved to create a dictator to
+do what, by reason of their differences, the consuls would not. But
+though opposed to one another in everything else, the consuls were of
+one mind in resisting the appointment of a dictator; so that the senate
+had no remedy left them but to seek the help of the tribunes, who,
+supported by their authority, forced the consuls to yield.
+
+Here we have to note, first, the usefulness of the tribunes’ authority
+in checking the ambitious designs, not only of the nobles against the
+commons, but also of one section of the nobles against another; and
+next, that in no city ought things ever to be so ordered that it rests
+with a few to decide on matters, which, if the ordinary business of the
+State is to proceed at all, must be carried out. Wherefore, if you
+grant authority to a council to distribute honours and offices, or to a
+magistrate to administer any branch of public business, you must either
+impose an obligation that the duty confided shall be performed, or
+ordain that, on failure to perform, another may and shall do what has
+to be done. Otherwise such an arrangement will be found defective and
+dangerous; as would have been the case in Rome, had it not been
+possible to oppose the authority of the tribunes to the obstinacy of
+the consuls.
+
+In the Venetian Republic, the great council distributes honours and
+offices. But more than once it has happened that the council, whether
+from ill-humour or from being badly advised, has declined to appoint
+successors either to the magistrates of the city or to those
+administering the government abroad. This gave rise to the greatest
+confusion and disorder; for, on a sudden, both the city itself and the
+subject provinces found themselves deprived of their lawful governors;
+nor could any redress be had until the majority of the council were
+pacified or undeceived. And this disorder must have brought the city to
+a bad end, had not provision been made against its recurrence by
+certain of the wiser citizens, who, finding a fit opportunity, passed a
+law that no magistracy, whether within or without the city, should ever
+be deemed to have been vacated until it was filled up by the
+appointment of a successor. In this way the council was deprived of its
+facilities for stopping public business to the danger of the State.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER LI.—_What a Prince or Republic does of Necessity, should seem
+to be done by Choice_.
+
+
+In all their actions, even in those which are matters of necessity
+rather than choice, prudent men will endeavour so to conduct themselves
+as to conciliate good-will. This species of prudence was well exercised
+by the Roman senate when they resolved to grant pay from the public
+purse to soldiers on active service, who, before, had served at their
+own charges. For perceiving that under the old system they could
+maintain no war of any duration, and, consequently, could not undertake
+a siege or lead an army to any distance from home, and finding it
+necessary to be able to do both, they decided on granting the pay I
+have spoken of. But this, which they could not help doing, they did in
+such a way as to earn the thanks of the people, by whom the concession
+was so well received that all Rome was intoxicated with delight. For it
+seemed to them a boon beyond any they could have ventured to hope for,
+or have dreamed of demanding. And although the tribunes sought to make
+light of the benefit, by showing the people that their burthens would
+be increased rather than diminished by it, since taxes would have to be
+imposed out of which the soldier’s stipend might be paid, they could
+not persuade them to regard the measure otherwise than with gratitude;
+which was further increased by the manner in which the senate
+distributed the taxes, imposing on the nobles all the heavier and
+greater, and those which had to be paid first.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER LII.—_That to check the arrogance of a Citizen who is growing
+too powerful in a State, there is no safer Method, or less open to
+objection, than to forestall him in those Ways whereby he seeks to
+advance himself_.
+
+
+It has been seen in the preceding chapter how much credit the nobles
+gained with the commons by a show of good-will towards them, not only
+in providing for their military pay, but also in adjusting taxation.
+Had the senate constantly adhered to methods like these, they would
+have put an end to all disturbances in Rome, and have deprived the
+tribunes of the credit they had with the people, and of the influence
+thence arising. For in truth, in a commonwealth, and especially in one
+which has become corrupted, there is no better, or easier, or less
+objectionable way of opposing the ambition of any citizen, than to
+anticipate him in those paths by which he is seen to be advancing to
+the ends he has in view. This plan, had it been followed by the enemies
+of Cosimo de’ Medici, would have proved a far more useful course for
+them than to banish him from Florence; since if those citizens who
+opposed him had adopted his methods for gaining over the people, they
+would have succeeded, without violence or tumult, in taking his most
+effective weapon from his hands.
+
+The influence acquired in Florence by Piero Soderini was entirely due
+to his skill in securing the affections of the people, since in this
+way he obtained among them a name for loving the liberties of the
+commonwealth. And truly, for those citizens who envied his greatness it
+would have been both easier and more honourable, and at the same time
+far less dangerous and hurtful to the State, to forestall him in those
+measures by which he was growing powerful, than to oppose him in such a
+manner that his overthrow must bring with it the ruin of the entire
+republic. For had they, as they might easily have done, deprived him of
+the weapons which made him formidable, they could then have withstood
+him in all the councils, and in all public deliberations, without
+either being suspected or feared. And should any rejoin that, if the
+citizens who hated Piero Soderini committed an error in not being
+beforehand with him in those ways whereby he came to have influence
+with the people, Piero himself erred in like manner, in not
+anticipating his enemies in those methods whereby they grew formidable
+to him; I answer that Piero is to be excused, both because it would
+have been difficult for him to have so acted, and because for him such
+a course would not have been honourable. For the paths wherein his
+danger lay were those which favoured the Medici, and it was by these
+that his enemies attacked him, and in the end overthrew him. But these
+paths Piero could not pursue without dishonour, since he could not, if
+he was to preserve his fair fame, have joined in destroying that
+liberty which he had been put forward to defend. Moreover, since
+favours to the Medicean party could not have been rendered secretly and
+once for all, they would have been most dangerous for Piero, who, had
+he shown himself friendly to the Medici, must have become suspected and
+hated by the people; in which case his enemies would have had still
+better opportunities than before for his destruction.
+
+Men ought therefore to look to the risks and dangers of any course
+which lies before them, nor engage in it when it is plain that the
+dangers outweigh the advantages, even though they be advised by others
+that it is the most expedient way to take. Should they act otherwise,
+it will fare with them as with Tullius, who, in seeking to diminish the
+power of Marcus Antonius, added to it. For Antonius, who had been
+declared an enemy by the senate, having got together a strong force,
+mostly made up of veterans who had shared the fortunes of Cæsar,
+Tullius counselled the senate to invest Octavianus with full authority,
+and to send him against Antonius with the consuls and the army;
+affirming, that so soon as those veterans who had served with Cæsar saw
+the face of him who was Cæsar’s nephew and had assumed his name, they
+would rally to his side and desert Antonius, who might easily be
+crushed when thus left bare of support.
+
+But the reverse of all this happened. For Antonius persuaded Octavianus
+to take part with him, and to throw over Tullius and the senate. And
+this brought about the ruin of the senate, a result which might easily
+have been foreseen. For remembering the influence of that great
+captain, who, after overthrowing all opponents, had seized on sovereign
+power in Rome, the senate should have turned a deaf ear to the
+persuasions of Tullius, nor ever have believed it possible that from
+Cæsar’s heir, or from soldiers who had followed Cæsar, they could look
+for anything that consisted with the name of Freedom.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER LIII.—_That the People, deceived by a false show of Advantage,
+often desire what would be their Ruin; and that large Hopes and brave
+Promises easily move them_.
+
+
+When Veii fell, the commons of Rome took up the notion that it would be
+to the advantage of their city were half their number to go and dwell
+there. For they argued that as Veii lay in a fertile country and was a
+well-built city, a moiety of the Roman people might in this way be
+enriched; while, by reason of its vicinity to Rome, the management of
+civil affairs would in no degree be affected. To the senate, however,
+and the wiser among the citizens, the scheme appeared so rash and
+mischievous that they publicly declared they would die sooner than
+consent to it. The controversy continuing, the commons grew so inflamed
+against the senate that violence and bloodshed must have ensued; had
+not the senate for their protection put forward certain old and
+esteemed citizens, respect for whom restrained the populace and put a
+stop to their violence.
+
+Two points are here to be noted. First, that a people deceived by a
+false show of advantage will often labour for its own destruction; and,
+unless convinced by some one whom it trusts, that the course on which
+it is bent is pernicious, and that some other is to be preferred, will
+bring infinite danger and injury upon the State. And should it so
+happen, as sometimes is the case, that from having been deceived
+before, either by men or by events, there is none in whom the people
+trust, their ruin is inevitable. As to which Dante, in his treatise “De
+Monarchia,” observes that the people will often raise the cry,
+“_Flourish our death and perish our life_.”[5] From which distrust it
+arises that often in republics the right course is not followed; as
+when Venice, as has been related, on being attacked by many enemies,
+could not, until her ruin was complete, resolve to make friends with
+any one of them by restoring those territories she had taken from them,
+on account of which war had been declared and a league of princes
+formed against her.
+
+ [5] “Viva la sua morte e muoia la sua vita.” The quotation does _not_
+ seem to be from the “De Monarchia.”
+
+
+In considering what courses it is easy, and what it is difficult to
+persuade a people to follow, this distinction may be drawn: Either what
+you would persuade them to, presents on the face of it a semblance of
+gain or loss, or it seems a spirited course or a base one. When any
+proposal submitted to the people holds out promise of advantage, or
+seems to them a spirited course to take, though loss lie hid behind,
+nay, though the ruin of their country be involved in it, they will
+always be easily led to adopt it; whereas it will always be difficult
+to persuade the adoption of such courses as wear the appearance of
+disgrace or loss, even though safety and advantage be bound up with
+them. The truth of what I say is confirmed by numberless examples both
+Roman and foreign, modern and ancient. Hence grew the ill opinion
+entertained in Rome of Fabius Maximus, who could never persuade the
+people that it behoved them to proceed warily in their conflict with
+Hannibal, and withstand his onset without fighting. For this the people
+thought a base course, not discerning the advantage resulting from it,
+which Fabius could by no argument make plain to them. And so blinded
+are men in favour of what seems a spirited course, that although the
+Romans had already committed the blunder of permitting Varro, master of
+the knights to Fabius, to join battle contrary to the latter’s desire,
+whereby the army must have been destroyed had not Fabius by his
+prudence saved it, this lesson was not enough; for afterwards they
+appointed this Varro to be consul, for no other reason than that he
+gave out, in the streets and market-places, that he would make an end
+of Hannibal as soon as leave was given him to do so. Whence came the
+battle and defeat of Cannæ, and well-nigh the destruction of Rome.
+
+Another example taken from Roman history may be cited to the same
+effect. After Hannibal had maintained himself for eight or ten years in
+Italy, during which time the whole country had been deluged with Roman
+blood, a certain Marcus Centenius Penula, a man of mean origin, but who
+had held some post in the army, came forward and proposed to the senate
+that were leave given him to raise a force of volunteers in any part of
+Italy he pleased, he would speedily deliver Hannibal into their hands,
+alive or dead. To the senate this man’s offer seemed a rash one; but
+reflecting that were they to refuse it, and were the people afterwards
+to hear that it had been made, tumults, ill will, and resentment
+against them would result, they granted the permission asked; choosing
+rather to risk the lives of all who might follow Penula, than to excite
+fresh discontent on the part of the people, to whom they knew that such
+a proposal would be welcome, and that it would be very hard to dissuade
+them from it. And so this adventurer, marching forth with an
+undisciplined and disorderly rabble to meet Hannibal, was, with all his
+followers, defeated and slain in the very first encounter.
+
+In Greece, likewise, and in the city of Athens, that most grave and
+prudent statesman, Nicias, could not convince the people that the
+proposal to go and attack Sicily was disadvantageous; and the
+expedition being resolved on, contrary to his advice and to the wishes
+of the wiser among the citizens, resulted in the overthrow of the
+Athenian power. Scipio, on being appointed consul, asked that the
+province of Africa might be awarded to him, promising that he would
+utterly efface Carthage; and when the senate, on the advice of Fabius,
+refused his request, he threatened to submit the matter to the people
+as very well knowing that to the people such proposals are always
+acceptable.
+
+I might cite other instances to the same effect from the history of our
+own city, as when Messer Ercole Bentivoglio and Antonio Giacomini,
+being in joint command of the Florentine armies, after defeating
+Bartolommeo d’Alviano at San Vincenzo, proceeded to invest Pisa. For
+this enterprise was resolved on by the people in consequence of the
+brave promises of Messer Ercole; and though many wise citizens
+disapproved of it, they could do nothing to prevent it, being carried
+away by the popular will, which took its rise in the assurances of
+their captain.
+
+I say, then, that there is no readier way to bring about the ruin of a
+republic, when the power is in the hands of the people, than to suggest
+daring courses for their adoption. For wherever the people have a
+voice, such proposals will always be well received, nor will those
+persons who are opposed to them be able to apply any remedy. And as
+this occasions the ruin of States, it likewise, and even more
+frequently, occasions the private ruin of those to whom the execution
+of these proposals is committed; because the people anticipating
+victory, do not when there comes defeat ascribe it to the short means
+or ill fortune of the commander, but to his cowardice and incapacity;
+and commonly either put him to death, or imprison or banish him; as was
+done in the case of numberless Carthaginian generals and of many
+Athenian, no successes they might previously have obtained availing
+them anything; for all past services are cancelled by a present loss.
+And so it happened with our Antonio Giacomini, who not succeeding as
+the people had expected, and as he had promised, in taking Pisa, fell
+into such discredit with the people, that notwithstanding his countless
+past services, his life was spared rather by the compassion of those in
+authority than through any movement of the citizens in his behalf.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER LIV.—_Of the boundless Authority which a great Man may use to
+restrain an excited Multitude_.
+
+
+The next noteworthy point in the passage referred to in the foregoing
+Chapter is, that nothing tends so much to restrain an excited multitude
+as the reverence felt for some grave person, clothed with authority,
+who stands forward to oppose them. For not without reason has Virgil
+said—
+
+“If then, by chance, some reverend chief appear,
+Known for his deeds and for his virtues dear,
+Silent they wait his words and bend a listening ear.”[6]
+
+
+ [6] Tum pietate gravem ac meritis si forte virum quem
+Conspexere, silent, arrectisque auribus adstant.
+          _Virg. Aen._, I. 154.
+
+
+He therefore who commands an army or governs a city wherein tumult
+shall have broken out, ought to assume the noblest and bravest bearing
+he can, and clothe himself with all the ensigns of his station, that he
+may make himself more revered. It is not many years since Florence was
+divided into two factions, the _Frateschi_ and _Arrabbiati_, as they
+were named, and these coming to open violence, the _Frateschi_, among
+whom was Pagolo Antonio Soderini, a citizen of great reputation in
+these days, were worsted. In the course of these disturbances the
+people coming with arms in their hands to plunder the house of
+Soderini, his brother Messer Francesco, then bishop of Volterra and now
+cardinal, who happened to be dwelling there, so soon as he heard the
+uproar and saw the crowd, putting on his best apparel and over it his
+episcopal robes, went forth to meet the armed multitude, and by his
+words and mien brought them to a stay; and for many days his behaviour
+was commended by the whole city. The inference from all which is, that
+there is no surer or more necessary restraint on the violence of an
+unruly multitude, than the presence of some one whose character and
+bearing command respect.
+
+But to return once more to the passage we are considering, we see how
+stubbornly the people clung to this scheme of transplanting themselves
+to Veii, thinking it for their advantage, and not discerning the
+mischief really involved in it; so that in addition to the many
+dissensions which it occasioned, actual violence must have followed,
+had not the senate with the aid of certain grave and reverend citizens
+repressed the popular fury.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER LV.—_That Government is easily carried on in a City wherein the
+body of the People is not corrupted: and that a Princedom is impossible
+where Equality prevails, and a Republic where it does not_.
+
+
+Though what we have to fear or hope from cities that have grown
+corrupted has already been discussed, still I think it not out of place
+to notice a resolution passed by the senate touching the vow which
+Camillus made to Apollo of a tenth of the spoil taken from the
+Veientines. For this spoil having fallen into the hands of the people,
+the senate, being unable by other means to get any account of it,
+passed an edict that every man should publicly offer one tenth part of
+what he had taken. And although this edict was not carried out, from
+the senate having afterwards followed a different course, whereby, to
+the content of the people, the claim of Apollo was otherwise satisfied,
+we nevertheless see from their having entertained such a proposal, how
+completely the senate trusted to the honesty of the people, when they
+assumed that no one would withhold any part of what the edict commanded
+him to give; on the other hand, we see that it never occurred to the
+people that they might evade the law by giving less than was due, their
+only thought being to free themselves from the law by openly
+manifesting their displeasure. This example, together with many others
+already noticed, shows how much virtue and how profound a feeling of
+religion prevailed among the Roman people, and how much good was to be
+expected from them. And, in truth, in the country where virtue like
+this does not exist, no good can be looked for, as we should look for
+it in vain in provinces which at the present day are seen to be
+corrupted; as Italy is beyond all others, though, in some degree,
+France and Spain are similarly tainted. In which last two countries, if
+we see not so many disorders spring up as we see daily springing up in
+Italy, this is not so much due to the superior virtue of their
+inhabitants (who, to say truth, fall far short of our countrymen), as
+to their being governed by a king who keeps them united, not merely by
+his personal qualities, but also by the laws and ordinances of the
+realm which are still maintained with vigour. In Germany, however, we
+do see signal excellence and a devout religious spirit prevail among
+the people, giving rise to the many free States which there maintain
+themselves, with such strict observance of their laws that none, either
+within or without their walls, dare encroach on them.
+
+That among this last-named people a great share of the ancient
+excellence does in truth still flourish, I shall show by an example
+similar to that which I have above related of the senate and people of
+Rome. It is customary with the German Free States when they have to
+expend any large sum of money on the public account, for their
+magistrates or councils having authority given them in that behalf, to
+impose a rate of one or two in the hundred on every man’s estate; which
+rate being fixed, every man, in conformity with the laws of the city,
+presents himself before the collectors of the impost, and having first
+made oath to pay the amount justly due, throws into a chest provided
+for the purpose what he conscientiously believes it fair for him to
+pay, of which payment none is witness save himself. From this fact it
+may be gathered what honesty and religion still prevail among this
+people. For we must assume that each pays his just share, since
+otherwise the impost would not yield the sum which, with reference to
+former imposts, it was estimated to yield; whereby the fraud would be
+detected, and thereupon some other method for raising money have to be
+resorted to.
+
+At the present time this virtue is the more to be admired, because it
+seems to have survived in this province only. That it has survived
+there may be ascribed to two circumstances: _first_, that the natives
+have little communication with their neighbours, neither visiting them
+in their countries nor being visited by them; being content to use such
+commodities, and subsist on such food, and to wear garments of such
+materials as their own land supplies; so that all occasion for
+intercourse, and every cause of corruption is removed. For living after
+this fashion, they have not learned the manners of the French, the
+Italians, or the Spaniards, which three nations together are the
+corruption of the world. The _second_ cause is, that these republics in
+which a free and pure government is maintained will not suffer any of
+their citizens either to be, or to live as gentlemen; but on the
+contrary, while preserving a strict equality among themselves, are
+bitterly hostile to all those gentlemen and lords who dwell in their
+neighbourhood; so that if by chance any of these fall into their hands,
+they put them to death, as the chief promoters of corruption and the
+origin of all disorders.
+
+But to make plain what I mean when I speak of _gentlemen_, I say that
+those are so to be styled who live in opulence and idleness on the
+revenues of their estates, without concerning themselves with the
+cultivation of these estates, or incurring any other fatigue for their
+support. Such persons are very mischievous in every republic or
+country. But even more mischievous are they who, besides the estates I
+have spoken of, are lords of strongholds and castles, and have vassals
+and retainers who render them obedience. Of these two classes of men
+the kingdom of Naples, the country round Rome, Romagna, and Lombardy
+are full; and hence it happens that in these provinces no commonwealth
+or free form of government has ever existed; because men of this sort
+are the sworn foes to all free institutions.
+
+And since to plant a commonwealth in provinces which are in this
+condition were impossible, if these are to be reformed at all, it can
+only be by some one man who is able there to establish a kingdom; the
+reason being that when the body of the people is grown so corrupted
+that the laws are powerless to control it, there must in addition to
+the laws be introduced a stronger force, to wit, the regal, which by
+its absolute and unrestricted authority may curb the excessive ambition
+and corruption of the great. This opinion may be supported by the
+example of Tuscany, in which within a narrow compass of territory there
+have long existed the three republics of Florence, Lucca, and Siena,
+while the other cities of that province, although to a certain extent
+dependent, still show by their spirit and by their institutions that
+they preserve, or at any rate desire to preserve, their freedom: and
+this because there are in Tuscany no lords possessed of strongholds,
+and few or no gentlemen, but so complete an equality prevails, that a
+prudent statesman, well acquainted with the history of the free States
+of antiquity, might easily introduce free institutions. Such, however,
+has been the unhappiness of this our country, that, up to the present
+hour, it has never produced any man with the power and knowledge which
+would have enabled him to act in this way.
+
+From what has been said, it follows, that he who would found a
+commonwealth in a country wherein there are many gentlemen, cannot do
+so unless he first gets rid of them; and that he who would found a
+monarchy or princedom in a country wherein great equality prevails,
+will never succeed, unless he raise above the level of that equality
+many persons of a restless and ambitious temperament, whom he must make
+gentlemen not in name merely but in reality, by conferring on them
+castles and lands, supplying them with riches, and providing them with
+retainers; that with these gentlemen around him, and with their help,
+he may maintain his power, while they through him may gratify their
+ambition; all others being constrained to endure a yoke, which force
+and force alone imposes on them. For when in this way there comes to be
+a proportion between him who uses force and him against whom it is
+used, each stands fixed in his own station.
+
+But to found a commonwealth in a country suited for a kingdom, or a
+kingdom in a country suited to be a commonwealth, requires so rare a
+combination of intelligence and power, that though many engage in the
+attempt, few are found to succeed. For the greatness of the undertaking
+quickly daunts them, and so obstructs their advance they break down at
+the very outset. The case of the Venetian Republic, wherein none save
+gentlemen are permitted to hold any public office, does, doubtless,
+seem opposed to this opinion of mine that where there are gentlemen it
+is impossible to found a commonwealth. But it may be answered that the
+case of Venice is not in truth an instance to the contrary; since the
+gentlemen of Venice are gentlemen rather in name than in reality,
+inasmuch as they draw no great revenues from lands, their wealth
+consisting chiefly in merchandise and chattels, and not one of them
+possessing a castle or enjoying any feudal authority. For in Venice
+this name of gentleman is a title of honour and dignity, and does not
+depend on any of those circumstances in respect of which the name is
+given in other States. But as in other States the different ranks and
+classes are divided under different names, so in Venice we have the
+division into gentlemen (_gentiluomini_) and plebeians (_popolani_), it
+being understood that the former hold, or have the right to hold all
+situations of honour, from which the latter are entirely excluded. And
+in Venice this occasions no disturbance, for reasons which I have
+already explained.
+
+Let a commonwealth, then, be constituted in the country where a great
+equality is found or has been made; and, conversely, let a princedom be
+constituted where great inequality prevails. Otherwise what is
+constituted will be discordant in itself, and without stability.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER LVI.—_That when great Calamities are about to befall a City or
+Country, Signs are seen to presage, and Seers arise who foretell them_.
+
+
+Whence it happens I know not, but it is seen from examples both ancient
+and recent, that no grave calamity has ever befallen any city or
+country which has not been foretold by vision, by augury, by portent,
+or by some other Heaven-sent sign. And not to travel too far afield for
+evidence of this, every one knows that long before the invasion of
+Italy by Charles VIII. of France, his coming was foretold by the friar
+Girolamo Savonarola; and how, throughout the whole of Tuscany, the
+rumour ran that over Arezzo horsemen had been seen fighting in the air.
+And who is there who has not heard that before the death of the elder
+Lorenzo de’ Medici, the highest pinnacle of the cathedral was rent by a
+thunderbolt, to the great injury of the building? Or who, again, but
+knows that shortly before Piero Soderini, whom the people of Florence
+had made gonfalonier for life, was deprived of his office and banished,
+the palace itself was struck by lightning?
+
+Other instances might be cited, which, not to be tedious, I shall omit,
+and mention only a circumstance which Titus Livius tells us preceded
+the invasion of the Gauls. For he relates how a certain plebeian named
+Marcus Ceditius reported to the senate that as he passed by night along
+the Via Nova, he heard a voice louder than mortal, bidding him warn the
+magistrates that the Gauls were on their way to Rome.
+
+The causes of such manifestations ought, I think, to be inquired into
+and explained by some one who has a knowledge, which I have not, of
+causes natural and supernatural. It may, however, be, as certain wise
+men say, that the air is filled with intelligent beings, to whom it is
+given to forecast future events; who, taking pity upon men, warn them
+beforehand by these signs to prepare for what awaits them. Be this as
+it may, certain it is that such warnings are given, and that always
+after them new and strange disasters befall nations.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER LVII.—_That the People are strong collectively, but
+individually weak_.
+
+
+After the ruin brought on their country by the invasion of the Gauls,
+many of the Romans went to dwell in Veii, in opposition to the edicts
+and commands of the senate, who, to correct this mischief, publicly
+ordained that within a time fixed, and under penalties stated, all
+should return to live in Rome. The persons against whom these
+proclamations were directed at first derided them; but, when the time
+came for them to be obeyed, all obeyed them. And Titus Livius observes
+that, “_although bold enough collectively, each separately, fearing to
+be punished, made his submission_.” And indeed the temper of the
+multitude in such cases, cannot be better described than in this
+passage. For often a people will be open-mouthed in condemning the
+decrees of their prince, but afterwards, when they have to look
+punishment in the face, putting no trust in one another, they hasten to
+comply. Wherefore, if you be in a position to keep the people
+well-disposed towards you when they already are so, or to prevent them
+injuring you in case they be ill-disposed, it is clearly of little
+moment whether the feelings with which they profess to regard you, be
+favourable or no. This applies to all unfriendliness on the part of a
+people, whencesoever it proceed, excepting only the resentment felt by
+them on being deprived either of liberty, or of a prince whom they love
+and who still survives. For the hostile temper produced by these two
+causes is more to be feared than any beside, and demands measures of
+extreme severity to correct it. The other untoward humours of the
+multitude, should there be no powerful chief to foster them, are easily
+dealt with; because, while on the one hand there is nothing more
+terrible than an uncontrolled and headless mob, on the other, there is
+nothing feebler. For though it be furnished with arms it is easily
+subdued, if you have some place of strength wherein to shelter from its
+first onset. For when its first fury has somewhat abated, and each man
+sees that he has to return to his own house, all begin to lose heart
+and to take thought how to insure their personal safety, whether by
+flight or by submission. For which reason a multitude stirred in this
+way, if it would avoid dangers such as I speak of, must at once appoint
+a head from among its own numbers, who may control it, keep it united,
+and provide for its defence; as did the commons of Rome when, after the
+death of Virginia, they quitted the city, and for their protection
+created twenty tribunes from among themselves. Unless this be done,
+what Titus Livius has observed in the passage cited, will always prove
+true, namely, that a multitude is strong while it holds together, but
+so soon as each of those who compose it begins to think of his own
+private danger, it becomes weak and contemptible.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER LVIII.—_That a People is wiser and more constant than a Prince_
+
+
+That “_nothing is more fickle and inconstant than the multitude_” is
+affirmed not by Titus Livius only, but by all other historians, in
+whose chronicles of human actions we often find the multitude
+condemning some citizen to death, and afterwards lamenting him and
+grieving greatly for his loss, as the Romans grieved and lamented for
+Manlius Capitolinus, whom they had themselves condemned to die. In
+relating which circumstance our author observes “_In a short time the
+people, having no longer cause to fear him, began to deplore his
+death_” And elsewhere, when speaking of what took place in Syracuse
+after the murder of Hieronymus, grandson of Hiero, he says, “_It is the
+nature of the multitude to be an abject slave, or a domineering
+master_”
+
+It may be that in attempting to defend a cause, which, as I have said,
+all writers are agreed to condemn, I take upon me a task so hard and
+difficult that I shall either have to relinquish it with shame or
+pursue it with opprobrium. Be that as it may, I neither do, nor ever
+shall judge it a fault, to support opinion by arguments, where it is
+not sought to impose them by violence or authority I maintain, then,
+that this infirmity with which historians tax the multitude, may with
+equal reason be charged against every individual man, but most of all
+against princes, since all who are not controlled by the laws, will
+commit the very same faults as are committed by an uncontrolled
+multitude. Proof whereof were easy, since of all the many princes
+existing, or who have existed, few indeed are or have been either wise
+or good.
+
+I speak of such princes as have had it in their power to break the
+reins by which they are controlled, among whom I do not reckon those
+kings who reigned in Egypt in the most remote antiquity when that
+country was governed in conformity with its laws; nor do I include
+those kings who reigned in Sparta, nor those who in our own times reign
+in France, which kingdom, more than any other whereof we have knowledge
+at the present day, is under the government of its laws. For kings who
+live, as these do, subject to constitutional restraint, are not to be
+counted when we have to consider each man’s proper nature, and to see
+whether he resembles the multitude. For to draw a comparison with such
+princes as these, we must take the case of a multitude controlled as
+they are, and regulated by the laws, when we shall find it to possess
+the same virtues which we see in them, and neither conducting itself as
+an abject slave nor as a domineering master.
+
+Such was the people of Rome, who, while the commonwealth continued
+uncorrupted, never either served abjectly nor domineered haughtily;
+but, on the contrary, by means of their magistrates and their
+ordinances, maintained their place, and when forced to put forth their
+strength against some powerful citizen, as in the case of Manlius, the
+decemvirs, and others who sought to oppress them, did so; but when it
+was necessary for the public welfare to yield obedience to the dictator
+or consuls, obeyed. And if the Roman people mourned the loss of the
+dead Manlius, it is no wonder; for they mourned his virtues, which had
+been of such a sort that their memory stirred the regret of all, and
+would have had power to produce the same feelings even in a prince; all
+writers being agreed that excellence is praised and admired even by its
+enemies. But if Manlius when he was so greatly mourned, could have
+risen once more from the dead, the Roman people would have pronounced
+the same sentence against him which they pronounced when they led him
+forth from the prison-house, and straightway condemned him to die. And
+in like manner we see that princes, accounted wise, have put men to
+death, and afterwards greatly lamented them, as Alexander mourned for
+Clitus and others of his friends, and Herod for Mariamne.
+
+But what our historian says of the multitude, he says not of a
+multitude which like the people of Rome is controlled by the laws, but
+of an uncontrolled multitude like the Syracusans, who were guilty of
+all these crimes which infuriated and ungoverned men commit, and which
+were equally committed by Alexander and Herod in the cases mentioned.
+Wherefore the nature of a multitude is no more to be blamed than the
+nature of princes, since both equally err when they can do so without
+regard to consequences. Of which many instances, besides those already
+given, might be cited from the history of the Roman emperors, and of
+other princes and tyrants, in whose lives we find such inconstancy and
+fickleness, as we might look in vain for in a people.
+
+I maintain, therefore, contrary to the common opinion which avers that
+a people when they have the management of affairs are changeable,
+fickle, and ungrateful, that these faults exist not in them otherwise
+than as they exist in individual princes; so that were any to accuse
+both princes and peoples, the charge might be true, but that to make
+exception in favour of princes is a mistake; for a people in command,
+if it be duly restrained, will have the same prudence and the same
+gratitude as a prince has, or even more, however wise he may be
+reckoned; and a prince on the other hand, if freed from the control of
+the laws, will be more ungrateful, fickle, and short-sighted than a
+people. And further, I say that any difference in their methods of
+acting results not from any difference in their nature, that being the
+same in both, or, if there be advantage on either side, the advantage
+resting with the people, but from their having more or less respect for
+the laws under which each lives. And whosoever attentively considers
+the history of the Roman people, may see that for four hundred years
+they never relaxed in their hatred of the regal name, and were
+constantly devoted to the glory and welfare of their country, and will
+find numberless proofs given by them of their consistency in both
+particulars. And should any allege against me the ingratitude they
+showed to Scipio, I reply by what has already been said at length on
+that head, where I proved that peoples are less ungrateful than
+princes. But as for prudence and stability of purpose, I affirm that a
+people is more prudent, more stable, and of better judgment than a
+prince. Nor is it without reason that the voice of the people has been
+likened to the voice of God; for we see that wide-spread beliefs fulfil
+themselves, and bring about marvellous results, so as to have the
+appearance of presaging by some occult quality either weal or woe.
+Again, as to the justice of their opinions on public affairs, seldom
+find that after hearing two speakers of equal ability urging them in
+opposite directions, they do not adopt the sounder view, or are unable
+to decide on the truth of what they hear. And if, as I have said, a
+people errs in adopting courses which appear to it bold and
+advantageous, princes will likewise err when their passions are
+touched, as is far oftener the case with them than with a people.
+
+We see, too, that in the choice of magistrates a people will choose far
+more honestly than a prince; so that while you shall never persuade a
+people that it is advantageous to confer dignities on the infamous and
+profligate, a prince may readily, and in a thousand ways, be drawn to
+do so. Again, it may be seen that a people, when once they have come to
+hold a thing in abhorrence, remain for many ages of the same mind;
+which we do not find happen with princes. For the truth of both of
+which assertions the Roman people are my sufficient witness, who, in
+the course of so many hundred years, and in so many elections of
+consuls and tribunes, never made four appointments of which they had
+reason to repent; and, as I have said, so detested the name of king,
+that no obligation they might be under to any citizen who affected that
+name, could shield him from the appointed penalty.
+
+Further, we find that those cities wherein the government is in the
+hands of the people, in a very short space of time, make marvellous
+progress, far exceeding that made by cities which have been always
+ruled by princes; as Rome grew after the expulsion of her kings, and
+Athens after she freed herself from Pisistratus; and this we can
+ascribe to no other cause than that the rule of a people is better than
+the rule of a prince.
+
+Nor would I have it thought that anything our historian may have
+affirmed in the passage cited, or elsewhere, controverts these my
+opinions. For if all the glories and all the defects both of peoples
+and of princes be carefully weighed, it will appear that both for
+goodness and for glory a people is to be preferred. And if princes
+surpass peoples in the work of legislation, in shaping civil
+institutions, in moulding statutes, and framing new ordinances, so far
+do the latter surpass the former in maintaining what has once been
+established, as to merit no less praise than they.
+
+And to state the sum of the whole matter shortly, I say that popular
+governments have endured for long periods in the same way as the
+governments of princes, and that both have need to be regulated by the
+laws; because the prince who can do what he pleases is a madman, and
+the people which can do as it pleases is never wise. If, then, we
+assume the case of a prince bound, and of a people chained down by the
+laws, greater virtue will appear in the people than in the prince;
+while if we assume the case of each of them freed from all control, it
+will be seen that the people commits fewer errors than the prince, and
+less serious errors, and such as admit of readier cure. For a turbulent
+and unruly people may be spoken to by a good man, and readily brought
+back to good ways; but none can speak to a wicked prince, nor any
+remedy be found against him but by the sword. And from this we may
+infer which of the two suffers from the worse disease; for if the
+disease of the people may be healed by words, while that of the prince
+must be dealt with by the sword, there is none but will judge that evil
+to be the greater which demands the more violent remedy.
+
+When a people is absolutely uncontrolled, it is not so much the follies
+which it commits or the evil which it actually does that excites alarm,
+as the mischief which may thence result, since in such disorders it
+becomes possible for a tyrant to spring up. But with a wicked prince
+the contrary is the case; for we dread present ill, and place our hopes
+in the future, persuading ourselves that the evil life of the prince
+may bring about our freedom. So that there is this distinction between
+the two, that with the one we fear what is, with the other what is
+likely to be. Again, the cruelties of a people are turned against him
+who it fears will encroach upon the common rights, but the cruelties of
+the prince against those who he fears may assert those rights.
+
+The prejudice which is entertained against the people arises from this,
+that any man may speak ill of them openly and fearlessly, even when the
+government is in their hands; whereas princes are always spoken of with
+a thousand reserves and a constant eye to consequences.
+
+But since the subject suggests it, it seems to me not out of place to
+consider what alliances we can most trust, whether those made with
+commonwealths or those made with princes.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER LIX.—_To what Leagues or Alliances we may most trust; whether
+those we make with Commonwealths or those we make with Princes_.
+
+
+Since leagues and alliances are every day entered into by one prince
+with another, or by one commonwealth with another, and as conventions
+and treaties are concluded in like manner between princes and
+commonwealths, it seems to me proper to inquire whether the faith of a
+commonwealth or that of a prince is the more stable and the safer to
+count on. All things considered, I am disposed to believe that in most
+cases they are alike, though in some they differ. Of one thing,
+however, I am convinced, namely, that engagements made under duress
+will never be observed either by prince or by commonwealth; and that if
+menaced with the loss of their territories, both the one and the other
+will break faith with you and treat you with ingratitude. Demetrius,
+who was named the “City-taker,” had conferred numberless benefits upon
+the Athenians; but when, afterwards, on being defeated by his enemies,
+he sought shelter in Athens, as being a friendly city and under
+obligations to him, it was refused him; a circumstance which grieved
+him far more than the loss of his soldiers and army had done. Pompey,
+in like manner, when routed by Cæsar in Thessaly, fled for refuge to
+Ptolemy in Egypt, who formerly had been restored by him to his kingdom;
+by whom he was put to death. In both these instances the same causes
+were at work, although the inhumanity and the wrong inflicted were less
+in the case of the commonwealth than of the prince. Still, wherever
+there is fear, the want of faith will be the same.
+
+And even if there be found a commonwealth or prince who, in order to
+keep faith, will submit to be ruined, this is seen to result from a
+like cause. For, as to the prince, it may easily happen that he is
+friend to a powerful sovereign, whom, though he be at the time without
+means to defend him, he may presently hope to see restored to his
+dominions; or it may be that having linked his fortunes with another’s,
+he despairs of finding either faith or friendship from the enemies of
+his ally, as was the case with those Neapolitan princes who espoused
+the interests of France. As to commonwealths, an instance similar to
+that of the princes last named, is that of Saguntum in Spain, which
+awaited ruin in adhering to the fortunes of Rome. A like course was
+also followed by Florence when, in the year 1512, she stood steadfastly
+by the cause of the French. And taking everything into account, I
+believe that in cases of urgency, we shall find a certain degree of
+stability sooner in commonwealths than in princes. For though
+commonwealths be like-minded with princes, and influenced by the same
+passions, the circumstance that their movements must be slower, makes
+it harder for them to resolve than it is for a prince, for which reason
+they will be less ready to break faith.
+
+And since leagues and alliances are broken for the sake of certain
+advantages, in this respect also, commonwealths observe their
+engagements far more faithfully than princes; for abundant examples
+might be cited of a very slight advantage having caused a prince to
+break faith, and of a very great advantage having failed to induce a
+commonwealth to do so. Of this we have an instance in the proposal made
+to the Athenians by Themistocles, when he told them at a public meeting
+that he had certain advice to offer which would prove of great
+advantage to their city, but the nature of which he could not disclose
+to them, lest it should become generally known, when the opportunity
+for acting upon it would be lost. Whereupon the Athenians named
+Aristides to receive his communication, and to act upon it as he
+thought fit. To him, accordingly, Themistocles showed how the navy of
+united Greece, for the safety of which the Athenians stood pledged, was
+so situated that they might either gain it over or destroy it, and thus
+make themselves absolute masters of the whole country. Aristides
+reporting to the Athenians that the course proposed by Themistocles was
+extremely advantageous but extremely dishonourable, the people utterly
+refused to entertain it. But Philip of Macedon would not have so acted,
+nor any of those other princes who have sought and found more profit in
+breaking faith than in any other way.
+
+As to engagements broken off on the pretext that they have not been
+observed by the other side, I say nothing, since that is a matter of
+everyday occurrence, and I am speaking here only of those engagements
+which are broken off on extraordinary grounds; but in this respect,
+likewise, I believe that commonwealths offend less than princes, and
+are therefore more to be trusted.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER LX.—_That the Consulship and all the other Magistracies in Rome
+were given without respect to Age_.
+
+
+It is seen in the course of the Roman history that, after the
+consulship was thrown open to the commons, the republic conceded this
+dignity to all its citizens, without distinction either of age or
+blood; nay, that in this matter respect for age was never made a ground
+for preference among the Romans, whose constant aim it was to discover
+excellence whether existing in old or young. To this we have the
+testimony of Valerius Corvinus, himself made consul in his
+twenty-fourth year, who, in addressing his soldiers, said of the
+consulship that it was “_the reward not of birth but of desert_.”
+
+Whether the course thus followed by the Romans was well judged or not,
+is a question on which much might be said. The concession as to blood,
+however, was made under necessity, and as I have observed on another
+occasion, the same necessity which obtained in Rome, will be found to
+obtain in every other city which desires to achieve the results which
+Rome achieved. For you cannot subject men to hardships unless you hold
+out rewards, nor can you without danger deprive them of those rewards
+whereof you have held out hopes. It was consequently necessary to
+extend, betimes, to the commons the hope of obtaining the consulship,
+on which hope they fed themselves for a while, without actually
+realizing it. But afterwards the hope alone was not enough, and it had
+to be satisfied. For while cities which do not employ men of plebeian
+birth in any of those undertakings wherein glory is to be gained, as we
+have seen was the case with Venice, may treat these men as they please,
+those other cities which desire to do as Rome did, cannot make this
+distinction. And if there is to be no distinction in respect of blood,
+nothing can be pleaded for a distinction in respect of age. On the
+contrary, that distinction must of necessity cease to be observed. For
+where a young man is appointed to a post which requires the prudence
+which are is supposed to bring, it must be, since the choice rests with
+the people, that he is thus advanced in consideration of some noble
+action which he has performed; but when a young man is of such
+excellence as to have made a name for himself by some signal
+achievement, it were much to the detriment of his city were it unable
+at once to make use of him, but had to wait until he had grown old, and
+had lost, with youth, that alacrity and vigour by which his country
+might have profited; as Rome profited by the services of Valerius
+Corvinus, of Scipio, of Pompey, and of many others who triumphed while
+yet very young.
+
+
+
+
+BOOK II.
+
+
+PREFACE.
+
+
+Men do always, but not always with reason, commend the past and condemn
+the present, and are so much the partisans of what has been, as not
+merely to cry up those times which are known to them only from the
+records left by historians, but also, when they grow old, to extol the
+days in which they remember their youth to have been spent. And
+although this preference of theirs be in most instances a mistaken one,
+I can see that there are many causes to account for it; chief of which
+I take to be that in respect of things long gone by we perceive not the
+whole truth, those circumstances that would detract from the credit of
+the past being for the most part hidden from us, while all that gives
+it lustre is magnified and embellished. For the generality of writers
+render this tribute to the good fortune of conquerors, that to make
+their achievements seem more splendid, they not merely exaggerate the
+great things they have done, but also lend such a colour to the actions
+of their enemies, that any one born afterwards, whether in the
+conquering or in the conquered country, has cause to marvel at these
+men and these times, and is constrained to praise and love them beyond
+all others.
+
+Again, men being moved to hatred either by fear or envy, these two most
+powerful causes of dislike are cancelled in respect of things which are
+past, because what is past can neither do us hurt, nor afford occasion
+for envy. The contrary, however, is the case with the things we see,
+and in which we take part; for in these, from our complete acquaintance
+with them, no part of them being hidden from us, we recognize, along
+with much that is good, much that displeases us, and so are forced to
+pronounce them far inferior to the old, although in truth they deserve
+far greater praise and admiration. I speak not, here, of what relates
+to the arts, which have such distinction inherent in them, that time
+can give or take from them but little of the glory which they merit of
+themselves. I speak of the lives and manners of men, touching which the
+grounds for judging are not so clear.
+
+I repeat, then, that it is true that this habit of blaming and praising
+obtains, but not always true that it is wrong applied. For sometimes it
+will happen that this judgment is just; because, as human affairs are
+in constant movement, it must be that they either rise or fall.
+Wherefore, we may see a city or province furnished with free
+institutions by some great and wise founder, flourish for a while
+through his merits, and advance steadily on the path of improvement.
+Any one born therein at that time would be in the wrong to praise the
+past more than the present, and his error would be occasioned by the
+causes already noticed. But any one born afterwards in that city or
+province when the time has come for it to fall away from its former
+felicity, would not be mistaken in praising the past.
+
+When I consider how this happens, I am persuaded that the world,
+remaining continually the same, has in it a constant quantity of good
+and evil; but that this good and this evil shift about from one country
+to another, as we know that in ancient times empire shifted from one
+nation to another, according as the manners of these nations changed,
+the world, as a whole, continuing as before, and the only difference
+being that, whereas at first Assyria was made the seat of its
+excellence, this was afterwards placed in Media, then in Persia, until
+at last it was transferred to Italy and Rome. And although after the
+Roman Empire, none has followed which has endured, or in which the
+world has centred its whole excellence, we nevertheless find that
+excellence diffused among many valiant nations, the kingdom of the
+Franks, for example, that of the Turks, that of the Soldan, and the
+States of Germany at the present day; and shared at an earlier time by
+that sect of the Saracens who performed so many great achievements and
+gained so wide a dominion, after destroying the Roman Empire in the
+East.
+
+In all these countries, therefore, after the decline of the Roman
+power, and among all these races, there existed, and in some part of
+them there yet exists, that excellence which alone is to be desired and
+justly to be praised. Wherefore, if any man being born in one of these
+countries should exalt past times over present, he might be mistaken;
+but any who, living at the present day in Italy or Greece, has not in
+Italy become an ultramontane or in Greece a Turk, has reason to
+complain of his own times, and to commend those others, in which there
+were many things which made them admirable; whereas, now, no regard
+being had to religion, to laws, or to arms, but all being tarnished
+with every sort of shame, there is nothing to redeem the age from the
+last extremity of wretchedness, ignominy, and disgrace. And the vices
+of our age are the more odious in that they are practised by those who
+sit on the judgment seat, govern the State, and demand public
+reverence.
+
+But, returning to the matter in hand, it may be said, that if the
+judgment of men be at fault in pronouncing whether the present age or
+the past is the better in respect of things whereof, by reason of their
+antiquity, they cannot have the same perfect knowledge which they have
+of their own times, it ought not to be at fault in old men when they
+compare the days of their youth with those of their maturity, both of
+which have been alike seen and known by them. This were indeed true, if
+men at all periods of their lives judged of things in the same way, and
+were constantly influenced by the same desires; but since they alter,
+the times, although they alter not, cannot but seem different to those
+who have other desires, other pleasures, and other ways of viewing
+things in their old age from those they had in their youth. For since,
+when they grow old, men lose in bodily strength but gain in wisdom and
+discernment, it must needs be that those things which in their youth
+seemed to them tolerable and good, should in their old age appear
+intolerable and evil. And whereas they should ascribe this to their
+judgment, they lay the blame upon the times.
+
+But, further, since the desires of men are insatiable, Nature prompting
+them to desire all things and Fortune permitting them to enjoy but few,
+there results a constant discontent in their minds, and a loathing of
+what they possess, prompting them to find fault with the present,
+praise the past, and long for the future, even though they be not moved
+thereto by any reasonable cause.
+
+I know not, therefore, whether I may not deserve to be reckoned in the
+number of those who thus deceive themselves, if, in these Discourses of
+mine, I render excessive praise to the ancient times of the Romans
+while I censure our own. And, indeed, were not the excellence which
+then prevailed and the corruption which prevails now clearer than the
+sun, I should proceed more guardedly in what I have to say, from fear
+lest in accusing others I should myself fall into this self-deception.
+But since the thing is so plain that every one sees it, I shall be bold
+to speak freely all I think, both of old times and of new, in order
+that the minds of the young who happen to read these my writings, may
+be led to shun modern examples, and be prepared to follow those set by
+antiquity whenever chance affords the opportunity. For it is the duty
+of every good man to teach others those wholesome lessons which the
+malice of Time or of Fortune has not permitted him to put in practice;
+to the end, that out of many who have the knowledge, some one better
+loved by Heaven may be found able to carry them out.
+
+Having spoken, then, in the foregoing Book of the various methods
+followed by the Romans in regulating the domestic affairs of their
+city, in this I shall speak of what was done by them to spread their
+Empire.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER I.—_Whether the Empire acquired by the Romans was more due to
+Valour or to Fortune_.
+
+
+Many authors, and among others that most grave historian Plutarch, have
+thought that in acquiring their empire the Romans were more beholden to
+their good fortune than to their valour; and besides other reasons
+which they give for this opinion, they affirm it to be proved by the
+admission of the Romans themselves, since their having erected more
+temples to Fortune than to any other deity, shows that it was to her
+that they ascribed their success. It would seem, too, that Titus Livius
+was of the same mind, since he very seldom puts a speech into the mouth
+of any Roman in which he discourses of valour, wherein he does not also
+make mention of Fortune. This, however, is an opinion with which I can
+in no way concur, and which, I take it, cannot be made good. For if no
+commonwealth has ever been found to grow like the Roman, it is because
+none was ever found so well fitted by its institutions to make that
+growth. For by the valour of her armies she spread her empire, while by
+her conduct of affairs, and by other methods peculiar to herself and
+devised by her first founder, she was able to keep what she acquired,
+as shall be fully shown in many of the following Discourses.
+
+The writers to whom I have referred assert that it was owing to their
+good fortune and not to their prudence that the Romans never had two
+great wars on their hands at once; as, for instance, that they waged no
+wars with the Latins until they had not merely overcome the Samnites,
+but undertook in their defence the war on which they then entered; nor
+ever fought with the Etruscans until they had subjugated the Latins,
+and had almost worn out the Samnites by frequent defeats; whereas, had
+any two of these powers, while yet fresh and unexhausted, united
+together, it may easily be believed that the ruin of the Roman Republic
+must have followed. But to whatsoever cause we ascribe it, it never so
+chanced that the Romans engaged in two great wars at the same time. On
+the contrary, it always seemed as though on the breaking out of one
+war, another was extinguished; or that on the termination of one,
+another broke out. And this we may plainly see from the order in which
+their wars succeeded one another.
+
+For, omitting those waged by them before their city was taken by the
+Gauls, we find that during their struggle with the Equians and the
+Volscians, and while these two nations continued strong, no others rose
+against them. On these being subdued, there broke out the war with the
+Samnites; and although before the close of that contest the Latin
+nations had begun to rebel against Rome, nevertheless, when their
+rebellion came to a head, the Samnites were in league with Rome, and
+helped her with their army to quell the presumption of the rebels; on
+whose defeat the war with Samnium was renewed.
+
+When the strength of Samnium had been drained by repeated reverses,
+there followed the war with the Etruscans; which ended, the Samnites
+were once more stirred to activity by the coming of Pyrrhus into Italy.
+When he, too, had been defeated, and sent back to Greece, Rome entered
+on her first war with the Carthaginians; which was no sooner over than
+all the Gallic nations on both sides of the Alps combined against the
+Romans, by whom, in the battle fought between Populonia and Pisa, where
+now stands the fortress of San Vincenzo, they were at last routed with
+tremendous slaughter.
+
+This war ended, for twenty years together the Romans were engaged in no
+contest of importance, their only adversaries being the Ligurians, and
+the remnant of the Gallic tribes who occupied Lombardy; and on this
+footing things continued down to the second Carthaginian war, which for
+sixteen years kept the whole of Italy in a blaze. This too being
+brought to a most glorious termination, there followed the Macedonian
+war, at the close of which succeeded the war with Antiochus and Asia.
+These subdued, there remained not in the whole world, king or people
+who either singly or together could withstand the power of Rome.
+
+But even before this last victory, any one observing the order of these
+wars, and the method in which they were conducted, must have recognized
+not only the good fortune of the Romans, but also their extraordinary
+valour and prudence. And were any one to search for the causes of this
+good fortune, he would have little difficulty in finding them, since
+nothing is more certain than that when a potentate has attained so
+great a reputation that every neighbouring prince or people is afraid
+to engage him single-handed, and stands in awe of him, none will ever
+venture to attack him, unless driven to do so by necessity; so that it
+will almost rest on his will to make war as he likes on any of his
+neighbours, while he studiously maintains peace with the rest; who, on
+their part, whether through fear of his power, or deceived by the
+methods he takes to dull their vigilance, are easily kept quiet.
+Distant powers, in the mean time, who have no intercourse with either,
+treat the matter as too remote to concern them in any way; and abiding
+in this error until the conflagration approaches their own doors, on
+its arrival have no resource for its extinction, save in their own
+strength, which, as their enemy has by that time become exceedingly
+powerful, no longer suffices.
+
+I forbear to relate how the Samnites stood looking on while the Romans
+were subjugating the Equians and the Volscians; and, to avoid being
+prolix, shall content myself with the single instance of the
+Carthaginians, who, at the time when the Romans were contending with
+the Samnites and Etruscans, were possessed of great power and held in
+high repute, being already masters of the whole of Africa together with
+Sicily and Sardinia, besides occupying territory in various parts of
+Spain. And because their empire was so great, and at such a distance
+from the Roman frontier, they were never led to think of attacking the
+Romans or of lending assistance to the Etruscans or Samnites. On the
+contrary, they behaved towards the Romans as men behave towards those
+whom they see prosper, rather taking their part and courting their
+friendship. Nor did they discover their mistake until the Romans, after
+subduing all the intervening nations, began to assail their power both
+in Spain and Sicily. What happened in the case of the Carthaginians,
+happened also in the case of the Gauls, of Philip of Macedon, and of
+Antiochus, each of whom, while Rome was engaged with another of them,
+believed that other would have the advantage, and that there would be
+time enough to provide for their own safety, whether by making peace or
+war. It seems to me, therefore, that the same good fortune which, in
+this respect, attended the Romans, might be shared by all princes
+acting as they did, and of a valour equal to theirs.
+
+As bearing on this point, it might have been proper for me to show what
+methods were followed by the Romans in entering the territories of
+other nations, had I not already spoken of this at length in my
+_Treatise on Princedoms_, wherein the whole subject is discussed. Here
+it is enough to say briefly, that in a new province they always sought
+for some friend who should be to them as a ladder whereby to climb, a
+door through which to pass, or an instrument wherewith to keep their
+hold. Thus we see them effect their entrance into Samnium through the
+Capuans, into Etruria through the Camertines, into Sicily through the
+Mamertines, into Spain through the Saguntans, into Africa through
+Massinissa, into Greece through the Etolians, into Asia through Eumenes
+and other princes, into Gaul through the Massilians and Eduans; and, in
+like manner, never without similar assistance in their efforts whether
+to acquire provinces or to keep them.
+
+The nations who carefully attend to this precaution will be seen to
+stand in less need of Fortune’s help than others who neglect it. But
+that all may clearly understand how much more the Romans were aided by
+valour than by Fortune in acquiring their empire, I shall in the
+following Chapter consider the character of those nations with whom
+they had to contend, and show how stubborn these were in defending
+their freedom.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER II.—_With what Nations the Romans had to contend, and how
+stubborn these were in defending their Freedom._
+
+
+In subduing the countries round about them, and certain of the more
+distant provinces, nothing gave the Romans so much trouble, as the love
+which in those days many nations bore to freedom, defending it with
+such obstinacy as could not have been overcome save by a surpassing
+valour. For we know by numberless instances, what perils these nations
+were ready to face in their efforts to maintain or recover their
+freedom, and what vengeance they took against those who deprived them
+of it. We know, too, from history, what hurt a people or city suffers
+from servitude. And though, at the present day, there is but one
+province which can be said to contain within it free cities, we find
+that formerly these abounded everywhere. For we learn that in the
+ancient times of which I speak, from the mountains which divide Tuscany
+from Lombardy down to the extreme point of Italy, there dwelt numerous
+free nations, such as the Etruscans, the Romans, and the Samnites,
+besides many others in other parts of the Peninsula. Nor do we ever
+read of there being any kings over them, except those who reigned in
+Rome, and Porsenna, king of Etruria. How the line of this last-named
+prince came to be extinguished, history does not inform us; but it is
+clear that at the time when the Romans went to besiege Veii, Etruria
+was free, and so greatly rejoiced in her freedom, and so detested the
+regal name, that when the Veientines, who for their defence had created
+a king in Veii, sought aid from the Etruscans against Rome, these,
+after much deliberation resolved to lend them no help while they
+continued to live under a king; judging it useless to defend a country
+given over to servitude by its inhabitants.
+
+It is easy to understand whence this love of liberty arises among
+nations, for we know by experience that States have never signally
+increased, either as to dominion or wealth, except where they have
+lived under a free government. And truly it is strange to think to what
+a pitch of greatness Athens came during the hundred years after she had
+freed herself from the despotism of Pisistratus; and far stranger to
+contemplate the marvellous growth which Rome made after freeing herself
+from her kings. The cause, however, is not far to seek, since it is the
+well-being, not of individuals, but of the community which makes a
+State great; and, without question, this universal well-being is
+nowhere secured save in a republic. For a republic will do whatsoever
+makes for its interest; and though its measures prove hurtful to this
+man or to that, there are so many whom they benefit, that these are
+able to carry them out, in spite of the resistance of the few whom they
+injure.
+
+But the contrary happens in the case of a prince; for, as a rule, what
+helps him hurts the State, and what helps the State hurts him; so that
+whenever a tyranny springs up in a city which has lived free, the least
+evil which can befall that city is to make no further progress, nor
+ever increase in power or wealth; but in most cases, if not in all, it
+will be its fate to go back. Or should there chance to arise in it some
+able tyrant who extends his dominions by his valour and skill in arms,
+the advantage which results is to himself only, and not to the State;
+since he can bestow no honours on those of the citizens over whom he
+tyrannizes who have shown themselves good and valiant, lest afterwards
+he should have cause to fear them. Nor can he make those cities which
+he acquires, subject or tributary to the city over which he rules;
+because to make this city powerful is not for his interest, which lies
+in keeping it so divided that each town and province may separately
+recognize him alone as its master. In this way he only, and not his
+country, is the gainer by his conquests. And if any one desire to have
+this view confirmed by numberless other proofs, let him look into
+Xenophon’s treatise _De Tirannide_.
+
+No wonder, then, that the nations of antiquity pursued tyrants with
+such relentless hatred, and so passionately loved freedom that its very
+name was dear to them, as was seen when Hieronymus, grandson of Hiero
+the Syracusan, was put to death in Syracuse. For when word of his death
+reached the army, which lay encamped not far off, at first it was
+greatly moved, and eager to take up arms against the murderers. But on
+hearing the cry of liberty shouted in the streets of Syracuse, quieted
+at once by the name, it laid aside its resentment against those who had
+slain the tyrant, and fell to consider how a free government might be
+provided for the city.
+
+Nor is it to be wondered at that the ancient nations took terrible
+vengeance on those who deprived them of their freedom; of which, though
+there be many instances, I mean only to cite one which happened in the
+city of Corcyra at the time of the Peloponnesian war. For Greece being
+divided into two factions, one of which sided with the Athenians, the
+other with the Spartans, it resulted that many of its cities were
+divided against themselves, some of the citizens seeking the friendship
+of Sparta and some of Athens. In the aforesaid city of Corcyra, the
+nobles getting the upper hand, deprived the commons of their freedom;
+these, however, recovering themselves with the help of the Athenians,
+laid hold of the entire body of the nobles, and cast them into a prison
+large enough to contain them all, whence they brought them forth by
+eight or ten at a time, pretending that they were to be sent to
+different places into banishment, whereas, in fact, they put them to
+death with many circumstances of cruelty. Those who were left, learning
+what was going on, resolved to do their utmost to escape this
+ignominious death, and arming themselves with what weapons they could
+find, defended the door of their prison against all who sought to
+enter; till the people, hearing the tumult and rushing in haste to the
+prison, dragged down the roof, and smothered the prisoners in the
+ruins. Many other horrible and atrocious cruelties likewise perpetrated
+in Greece, show it to be true that a lost freedom is avenged with more
+ferocity than a threatened freedom is defended.
+
+When I consider whence it happened that the nations of antiquity were
+so much more zealous in their love of liberty than those of the present
+day, I am led to believe that it arose from the same cause which makes
+the present generation of men less vigorous and daring than those of
+ancient times, namely the difference of the training of the present day
+from that of earlier ages; and this, again, arises from the different
+character of the religions then and now prevailing. For our religion,
+having revealed to us the truth and the true path, teaches us to make
+little account of worldly glory; whereas, the Gentiles, greatly
+esteeming it, and placing therein their highest good, displayed a
+greater fierceness in their actions.
+
+This we may gather from many of their customs, beginning with their
+sacrificial rites, which were of much magnificence as compared with the
+simplicity of our worship, though that be not without a certain dignity
+of its own, refined rather than splendid, and far removed from any
+tincture of ferocity or violence. In the religious ceremonies of the
+ancients neither pomp nor splendour were wanting; but to these was
+joined the ordinance of sacrifice, giving occasion to much bloodshed
+and cruelty. For in its celebration many beasts were slaughtered, and
+this being a cruel spectacle imparted a cruel temper to the
+worshippers. Moreover, under the old religions none obtained divine
+honours save those who were loaded with worldly glory, such as captains
+of armies and rulers of cities; whereas our religion glorifies men of a
+humble and contemplative, rather than of an active life. Accordingly,
+while the highest good of the old religions consisted in magnanimity,
+bodily strength, and all those other qualities which make men brave,
+our religion places it in humility, lowliness, and contempt for the
+things of this world; or if it ever calls upon us to be brave, it is
+that we should be brave to suffer rather than to do.
+
+This manner of life, therefore, seems to have made the world feebler,
+and to have given it over as a prey to wicked men to deal with as they
+please; since the mass of mankind, in the hope of being received into
+Paradise, think more how to bear injuries than how to avenge them. But
+should it seem that the world has grown effeminate and Heaven laid
+aside her arms, this assuredly results from the baseness of those who
+have interpreted our religion to accord with indolence and ease rather
+than with valour. For were we to remember that religion permits the
+exaltation and defence of our country, we would see it to be our duty
+to love and honour it, and would strive to be able and ready to defend
+it.
+
+This training, therefore, and these most false interpretations are the
+causes why, in the world of the present day, we find no longer the
+numerous commonwealths which were found of old; and in consequence,
+that we see not now among the nations that love of freedom which
+prevailed then; though, at the same time, I am persuaded that one cause
+of this change has been, that the Roman Empire by its arms and power
+put an end to all the free States and free institutions of antiquity.
+For although the power of Rome fell afterwards into decay, these States
+could never recover their strength or resume their former mode of
+government, save in a very few districts of the Empire.
+
+But, be this as it may, certain it is that in every country of the
+world, even the least considerable, the Romans found a league of
+well-armed republics, most resolute in the defence of their freedom,
+whom it is clear they never could have subdued had they not been
+endowed with the rarest and most astonishing valour. To cite a single
+instance, I shall take the case of the Samnites who, strange as it may
+now seem, were on the admission of Titus Livius himself, so powerful
+and so steadfast in arms, as to be able to withstand the Romans down to
+the consulship of Papirius Cursor, son to the first Papirius, a period
+of six and forty years, in spite of numerous defeats, the loss of many
+of their towns, and the great slaughter which overtook them everywhere
+throughout their country. And this is the more remarkable when we see
+that country, which once contained so many noble cities, and supported
+so great a population, now almost uninhabited; and reflect that it
+formerly enjoyed a government and possessed resources making its
+conquest impossible to less than Roman valour.
+
+There is no difficulty, therefore, in determining whence that ancient
+greatness and this modern decay have arisen, since they can be traced
+to the free life formerly prevailing and to the servitude which
+prevails now. For all countries and provinces which enjoy complete
+freedom, make, as I have said, most rapid progress. Because, from
+marriage being less restricted in these countries, and more sought
+after, we find there a greater population; every man being disposed to
+beget as many children as he thinks he can rear, when he has no anxiety
+lest they should be deprived of their patrimony, and knows not only
+that they are born to freedom and not to slavery, but that they may
+rise by their merit to be the first men of their country. In such
+States, accordingly, we see wealth multiply, both that which comes from
+agriculture and that which comes from manufactures. For all love to
+gather riches and to add to their possessions when their enjoyment of
+them is not likely to be disturbed. And hence it happens that the
+citizens of such States vie with one another in whatever tends to
+promote public or private well-being; in both of which, consequently,
+there is a wonderful growth.
+
+But the contrary of all this takes place in those countries which live
+in servitude, and the more oppressive their servitude, the more they
+fall short of the good which all desire. And the hardest of all hard
+servitudes is that wherein one commonwealth is subjected to another.
+First, because it is more lasting, and there is less hope to escape
+from it; and, second, because every commonwealth seeks to add to its
+own strength by weakening and enfeebling all beside. A prince who gets
+the better of you will not treat you after this fashion, unless he be a
+barbarian like those eastern despots who lay countries waste and
+destroy the labours of civilization; but if influenced by the ordinary
+promptings of humanity, will, as a rule, regard all his subject States
+with equal favour, and suffer them to pursue their usual employments,
+and retain almost all their ancient institutions, so that if they
+flourish not as free States might, they do not dwindle as States that
+are enslaved; by which I mean enslaved by a stranger, for of that other
+slavery to which they may be reduced by one of their own citizens, I
+have already spoken.
+
+Whoever, therefore, shall well consider what has been said above, will
+not be astonished at the power possessed by the Samnites while they
+were still free, nor at the weakness into which they fell when they
+were subjugated. Of which change in their fortunes Livius often reminds
+us, and particularly in connection with the war with Hannibal, where he
+relates that the Samnites, being ill-treated by a Roman legion
+quartered at Nola, sent legates to Hannibal to ask his aid; who in
+laying their case before him told him, that with their own soldiers and
+captains they had fought single handed against the Romans for a hundred
+years, and had more than once withstood two consuls and two consular
+armies; but had now fallen so low, that they were scarce able to defend
+themselves against one poor legion.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER III.—_That Rome became great by destroying the Cities which lay
+round about her, and by readily admitting strangers to the rights of
+Citizenship._
+
+
+“Crescit interea Roma Albæ ruinis”—_Meanwhile Rome grows on the ruins
+of Alba_. They who would have their city become a great empire, must
+endeavour by every means to fill it with inhabitants; for without a
+numerous population no city can ever succeed in growing powerful. This
+may be effected in two ways, by gentleness or by force. By gentleness,
+when you offer a safe and open path to all strangers who may wish to
+come and dwell in your city, so as to encourage them to come there of
+their own accord; by force, when after destroying neighbouring towns,
+you transplant their inhabitants to live in yours. Both of these
+methods were practised by Rome, and with such success, that in the time
+of her sixth king there dwelt within her walls eighty thousand citizens
+fit to bear arms. For the Romans loved to follow the methods of the
+skilful husbandman, who, to insure a plant growing big and yielding and
+maturing its fruit, cuts off the first shoots it sends out, that the
+strength remaining in the stem, it may in due season put forth new and
+more vigorous and more fruitful branches. And that this was a right and
+a necessary course for Rome to take for establishing and extending her
+empire, is proved by the example of Sparta and Athens, which, although
+exceedingly well-armed States, and regulated by excellent laws, never
+reached the same greatness as the Roman Republic; though the latter, to
+all appearance, was more turbulent and disorderly than they, and, so
+far as laws went, not so perfectly governed. For this we can offer no
+other explanation than that already given. For by augmenting the
+numbers of her citizens in both the ways named, Rome was soon able to
+place two hundred and eighty thousand men under arms; while neither
+Sparta nor Athens could ever muster more than twenty thousand; and
+this, not because the situation of these countries was less
+advantageous than that of Rome, but simply from the difference in the
+methods they followed.
+
+For Lycurgus, the founder of the Spartan Republic, thinking nothing so
+likely to relax his laws as an admixture of new citizens, did all he
+could to prevent intercourse with strangers; with which object, besides
+refusing these the right to marry, the right of citizenship, and all
+such other social rights as induce men to become members of a
+community, he ordained that in this republic of his the only money
+current should be of leather, so that none might be tempted to repair
+thither to trade or to carry on any art.
+
+Under such circumstances the number of the inhabitants of that State
+could never much increase. For as all our actions imitate nature, and
+it is neither natural nor possible that a puny stem should carry a
+great branch, so a small republic cannot assume control over cities or
+countries stronger than herself; or, doing so, will resemble the tree
+whose boughs being greater than its trunk, are supported with
+difficulty, and snapped by every gust of wind. As it proved with
+Sparta. For after she had spread her dominion over all the cities of
+Greece, no sooner did Thebes rebel than all the others rebelled
+likewise, and the trunk was left stripped of its boughs. But this could
+not have happened with Rome, whose stem was mighty enough to bear any
+branch with ease.
+
+It was, therefore, by adding to her population, and by, adopting
+certain other methods presently to be noticed, that Rome became so
+great and powerful. And this is well expressed by Titus Livius, in the
+words, “_Crescit interea Roma Albae ruinis_.”
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IV.—_That Commonwealths have followed three Methods for
+extending their Power_.
+
+
+Any one who has read ancient history with attention, must have observed
+that three methods have been used by republics for extending their
+power. One of these, followed by the old Etruscans, is to form a
+confederation of many States, wherein none has precedence over the rest
+in authority or rank, and each allows the others to share its
+acquisitions; as do the States of the Swiss League in our days, and as
+the Achaians and Etolians did in Greece in earlier times. And because
+the Etruscans were opposed to the Romans in many wars, that I may give
+a clearer notion of this method of theirs, I shall enlarge a little in
+my account of the Etruscan people.
+
+In Italy, before the Romans became supreme, the Etruscans were very
+powerful, both by sea and land; and although we have no separate
+history of their affairs, we have some slight records left us of them,
+and some indications of their greatness. We know, for instance, that
+they planted a colony, to which they gave the name of Hadria, on the
+coast of the upper sea; which colony became so renowned that it lent
+its name to the sea itself, which to this day by the Latins is called
+the Hadriatic. We know, too, that their arms were obeyed from the Tiber
+to the foot of the mountains which enclose the greater part of the
+Italian peninsula; although, two hundred years before Rome grew to any
+great strength, they had lost their supremacy in the province now known
+as Lombardy, of which the French had possessed themselves. For that
+people, whether driven by necessity, or attracted by the excellence of
+the fruits, and still more of the wine of Italy, came there under their
+chief, Bellovesus; and after defeating and expelling the inhabitants of
+the country, settled themselves therein, and there built many cities;
+calling the district Gallia, after the name they then bore: and this
+territory they retained until they were subdued by the Romans.
+
+These Etruscans, therefore, living with one another on a footing of
+complete equality, when they sought to extend their power, followed
+that first method of which I have just now spoken. Their State was made
+up of twelve cities, among which were Chiusi, Veii, Friuli, Arezzo,
+Volterra, and the like, and their government was conducted in the form
+of a league. They could not, however, extend their conquests beyond
+Italy; while even within the limits of Italy, much territory remained
+unoccupied by them for reasons presently to be noticed.
+
+The second method is to provide yourself with allies or companions,
+taking heed, however, to retain in your own hands the chief command,
+the seat of government, and the titular supremacy. This was the method
+followed by the Romans.
+
+The third method is to hold other States in direct subjection to you,
+and not merely associated with you as companions; and this was the plan
+pursued by the Spartans and Athenians.
+
+Of these three methods, the last is wholly useless, as was seen in the
+case of the two States named, which came to ruin from no other cause
+than that they had acquired a dominion greater than they could
+maintain. For to undertake to govern cities by force, especially such
+cities as have been used to live in freedom, is a difficult and arduous
+task, in which you never can succeed without an army and that a great
+one. But to have such an army you must needs have associates who will
+help to swell the numbers of your own citizens. And because Athens and
+Sparta neglected this precaution, whatever they did was done in vain;
+whereas Rome, which offers an instance of the second of the methods we
+are considering, by attending to this precaution reached a power that
+had no limit. And as she alone has lived in this way, so she alone has
+attained to this pitch of power. For joining with herself many States
+throughout Italy as her companions, who in most respects lived with her
+on a footing of equality, while, as has been noted, always reserving to
+herself the seat of empire and the titular command, it came about that
+these States, without being aware of it, by their own efforts, and with
+their own blood, wrought out their own enslavement.
+
+For when Rome began to send armies out of Italy, for the purpose of
+reducing foreign kingdoms to provinces, and of subjugating nations who,
+being used to live under kings, were not impatient of her yoke, and
+who, receiving Roman governors, and having been conquered by armies
+bearing the Roman name, recognized no masters save the Romans, those
+companions of Rome who dwelt in Italy suddenly found themselves
+surrounded by Roman subjects, and weighed down by the greatness of the
+Roman power; and when at last they came to perceive the mistake in
+which they had been living, it was too late to remedy it, so vast was
+the authority which Rome had then obtained over foreign countries, and
+so great the resources which she possessed within herself; having by
+this time grown to be the mightiest and best-armed of States. So that
+although these her companions sought to avenge their wrongs by
+conspiring against her, they were soon defeated in the attempt, and
+remained in a worse plight than before, since they too became subjects
+and no longer associates. This method, then, as I have said, was
+followed by the Romans alone; but no other plan can be pursued by a
+republic which desires to extend its power; experience having shown
+none other so safe and certain.
+
+The method which consists in forming leagues, of which I have spoken
+above as having been adopted by the Etruscans, the Achaians, and the
+Etolians of old, and in our own days by the Swiss, is the next best
+after that followed by the Romans, for as in this way there can be no
+great extension of power, two advantages result: first, that you do not
+readily involve yourself in war; and, second, that you can easily
+preserve any little acquisition which you may make. The reason why you
+cannot greatly extend your power is, that as your league is made up of
+separate States with distinct seats of government, it is difficult for
+these to consult and resolve in concert. The same causes make these
+States careless to enlarge their territories; because acquisitions
+which have to be shared among many communities are less thought of than
+those made by a single republic which looks to enjoy them all to
+itself. Again, since leagues govern through general councils, they must
+needs be slower in resolving than a nation dwelling within one
+frontier.
+
+Moreover, we find from experience that this method has certain fixed
+limits beyond which there is no instance of its ever having passed; by
+which I mean that some twelve or fourteen communities may league
+themselves together, but will never seek to pass beyond that limit: for
+after associating themselves in such numbers as seem to them to secure
+their safety against all besides, they desire no further extension of
+their power, partly because no necessity compels them to extend, and
+partly because, for the reasons already given, they would find no
+profit in extending. For were they to seek extension they would have to
+follow one of two courses: either continuing to admit new members to
+their league, whose number must lead to confusion; or else making
+subjects, a course which they will avoid since they will see difficulty
+in making them, and no great good in having them. Wherefore, when their
+number has so increased that their safety seems secured, they have
+recourse to two expedients: either receiving other States under their
+protection and engaging for their defence (in which way they obtain
+money from various quarters which they can easily distribute among
+themselves); or else hiring themselves out as soldiers to foreign
+States, and drawing pay from this or the other prince who employs them
+to carry out his enterprises; as we see done by the Swiss at the
+present day, and as we read was done in ancient times by certain of
+those nations whom we have named above. To which we have a witness in
+Titus Livius, who relates that when Philip of Macedon came to treat
+with Titus Quintius Flamininus, and while terms were being discussed in
+the presence of a certain Etolian captain, this man coming to words
+with Philip, the latter taunted him with greed and bad faith; telling
+him that the Etolians were not ashamed to draw pay from one side, and
+then send their men to serve on the other; so that often the banner of
+Etolia might be seen displayed in two hostile camps.
+
+We see, therefore, that the method of proceeding by leagues has always
+been of the same character, and has led always to the same results. We
+see, likewise, that the method which proceeds by reducing States to
+direct subjection has constantly proved a weak one, and produced
+insignificant gains; and that whenever these gains have passed a
+certain limit, ruin has ensued. And if the latter of these two methods
+be of little utility among armed States, among those that are unarmed,
+as is now the case with the republics of Italy, it is worse than
+useless. We may conclude, therefore, that the true method was that
+followed by the Romans; which is the more remarkable as we find none
+who adopted it before they did, and none who have followed it since. As
+for leagues, I know of no nations who have had recourse to them in
+recent times except the Swiss and the Suevians.
+
+But to bring my remarks on this head to an end, I affirm that all the
+various methods followed by the Romans in conducting their affairs,
+whether foreign or domestic, so far from being imitated in our day,
+have been held of no account, some pronouncing them to be mere fables,
+some thinking them impracticable, others out of place and unprofitable;
+and so, abiding in this ignorance, we rest a prey to all who have
+chosen to invade our country. But should it seem difficult to tread in
+the footsteps of the Romans, it ought not to appear so hard, especially
+for us Tuscans, to imitate the Tuscans of antiquity, who if, from the
+causes already assigned, they failed to establish an empire like that
+of Rome, succeeded in acquiring in Italy that degree of power which
+their method of acting allowed, and which they long preserved in
+security, with the greatest renown in arms and government, and the
+highest reputation for manners and religion. This power and this glory
+of theirs were first impaired by the Gauls, and afterwards extinguished
+by the Romans, and so utterly extinguished, that of the Etruscan
+Empire, so splendid two thousand years ago, we have at the present day
+barely a record. This it is which has led me to inquire whence this
+oblivion of things arises, a question of which I shall treat in the
+following Chapter.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER V.—_That changes in Sects and Tongues, and the happening of
+Floods and Pestilences, obliterate the Memory of the Past_.
+
+
+To those philosophers who will have it that the world has existed from
+all eternity, it were, I think, a good answer, that if what they say be
+true we ought to have record of a longer period than five thousand
+years; did it not appear that the memory of past times is blotted out
+by a variety of causes, some referable to men, and some to Heaven.
+
+Among the causes which have a human origin are the changes in sects and
+tongues; because when a new sect, that is to say a new religion, comes
+up, its first endeavour, in order to give itself reputation, is to
+efface the old; and should it so happen that the founders of the new
+religion speak another tongue, this may readily be effected. This we
+know from observing the methods which Christianity has followed in
+dealing with the religion of the Gentiles, for we find that it has
+abolished all the rites and ordinances of that worship, and obliterated
+every trace of the ancient belief. True, it has not succeeded in
+utterly blotting out our knowledge of things done by the famous men who
+held that belief; and this because the propagators of the new faith,
+retaining the Latin tongue, were constrained to use it in writing the
+new law; for could they have written this in a new tongue, we may
+infer, having regard to their other persecutions, that no record
+whatever would have survived to us of past events. For any one who
+reads of the methods followed by Saint Gregory and the other heads of
+the Christian religion, will perceive with what animosity they pursued
+all ancient memorials; burning the works of poets and historians;
+breaking images; and destroying whatsoever else afforded any trace of
+antiquity. So that if to this persecution a new language had been
+joined, it must soon have been found that everything was forgotten.
+
+We may believe, therefore, that what Christianity has sought to effect
+against the sect of the Gentiles, was actually effected by that sect
+against the religion which preceded theirs; and that, from the repeated
+changes of belief which have taken place in the course of five or six
+thousand years, the memory of what happened at a remote date has
+perished, or, if any trace of it remain, has come to be regarded as a
+fable to which no credit is due; like the Chronicle of Diodorus
+Siculus, which, professing to give an account of the events of forty or
+fifty thousand years, is held, and I believe justly, a lying tale.
+
+As for the causes of oblivion which we may refer to Heaven, they are
+those which make havoc of the human race, and reduce the population of
+certain parts of the world to a very small number. This happens by
+plague, famine, or flood, of which three the last is the most hurtful,
+as well because it is the most universal, as because those saved are
+generally rude and ignorant mountaineers, who possessing no knowledge
+of antiquity themselves, can impart none to those who come after them.
+Or if among the survivors there chance to be one possessed of such
+knowledge, to give himself consequence and credit, he will conceal and
+pervert it to suit his private ends, so that to his posterity there
+will remain only so much as he may have been pleased to communicate,
+and no more.
+
+That these floods, plagues, and famines do in fact happen, I see no
+reason to doubt, both because we find all histories full of them, and
+recognize their effect in this oblivion of the past, and also because
+it is reasonable that such things should happen. For as when much
+superfluous matter has gathered in simple bodies, nature makes repeated
+efforts to remove and purge it away, thereby promoting the health of
+these bodies, so likewise as regards that composite body the human
+race, when every province of the world so teems with inhabitants that
+they can neither subsist where they are nor remove elsewhere, every
+region being equally crowded and over-peopled, and when human craft and
+wickedness have reached their highest pitch, it must needs come about
+that the world will purge herself in one or another of these three
+ways, to the end that men, becoming few and contrite, may amend their
+lives and live with more convenience.
+
+Etruria, then, as has been said above, was at one time powerful,
+abounding in piety and valour, practising her own customs, and speaking
+her own tongue; but all this was effaced by the power of Rome, so that,
+as I have observed already, nothing is left of her but the memory of a
+name.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VI.—_Of the Methods followed by the Romans in making War_.
+
+
+Having treated of the methods followed by the Romans for increasing
+their power, we shall now go on to consider those which they used in
+making war; and in all they did we shall find how wisely they turned
+aside from the common path in order to render their progress to supreme
+greatness easy.
+
+Whosoever makes war, whether from policy or ambition, means to acquire
+and to hold what he acquires, and to carry on the war he has undertaken
+in such a manner that it shall enrich and not impoverish his native
+country and State. It is necessary, therefore, whether for acquiring or
+holding, to consider how cost may be avoided, and everything done most
+advantageously for the public welfare. But whoever would effect all
+this, must take the course and follow the methods of the Romans; which
+consisted, first of all, in making their wars, as the French say,
+_great and short_. For entering the field with strong armies, they
+brought to a speedy conclusion whatever wars they had with the Latins,
+the Samnites, or the Etruscans.
+
+And if we take note of all the wars in which they were engaged, from
+the foundation of their city down to the siege of Veii, all will be
+seen to have been quickly ended some in twenty, some in ten, and some
+in no more than six days. And this was their wont: So soon as war was
+declared they would go forth with their armies to meet the enemy and at
+once deliver battle. The enemy, on being routed, to save their country
+from pillage, very soon came to terms, when the Romans would take from
+them certain portions of their territory. These they either assigned to
+particular persons, or made the seat of a colony, which being settled
+on the confines of the conquered country served as a defence to the
+Roman frontier, to the advantage both of the colonists who had these
+lands given them, and of the Roman people whose borders were thus
+guarded at no expense to themselves. And no other system of defence
+could have been at once so safe, so strong, and so effectual. For while
+the enemy were not actually in the field, this guard was sufficient;
+and when they came out in force to overwhelm the colony, the Romans
+also went forth in strength and gave them battle; and getting the
+better of them, imposed harder terms than before, and so returned home.
+And in this way they came gradually to establish their name abroad, and
+to add to their power.
+
+These methods they continued to employ until they changed their system
+of warfare, which they did during the siege of Veii; when to enable
+them to carry on a prolonged war, they passed a law for the payment of
+their soldiers, whom, up to that time they had not paid, nor needed to
+pay, because till then their wars had been of brief duration.
+Nevertheless, while allowing pay to their soldiers that they might thus
+wage longer wars, and keep their armies longer in the field when
+employed on distant enterprises, they never departed from their old
+plan of bringing their campaigns to as speedy an end as place and
+circumstances allowed, nor ever ceased to plant colonies.
+
+Their custom of terminating their wars with despatch, besides being
+natural to the Romans, was strengthened by the ambition of their
+consuls, who, being appointed for twelve months only, six of which they
+had to spend in the city, were eager to bring their wars to an end as
+rapidly as they could, that they might enjoy the honours of a triumph.
+The usage of planting colonies was recommended by the great advantage
+and convenience which resulted from it. In dealing with the spoils of
+warfare their practice, no doubt, in a measure changed, so that in this
+respect they were not afterwards so liberal as they were at first;
+partly, because liberality did not seem so necessary when their
+soldiers were in receipt of pay; and, partly, because the spoils
+themselves being greater than before, they thought by their help so to
+enrich the public treasury as to be able to carry on their wars without
+taxing the city; and, in fact, by pursuing this course the public
+revenues were soon greatly augmented. The methods thus followed by the
+Romans in dividing plunder and in planting colonies had, accordingly,
+this result, that whereas other less prudent princes and republics are
+impoverished by war, Rome was enriched by it; nay, so far was the
+system carried, that no consul could hope for a triumph unless he
+brought back with him for the public treasury much gold and silver and
+spoils of every kind.
+
+By methods such as these, at one time bringing their wars to a rapid
+conclusion by invasion and actual defeat, at another wearing out an
+enemy by protracted hostilities, and again by concluding peace on
+advantageous terms, the Romans continually grew richer and more
+powerful.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VII.—_Of the Quantity of Land assigned by the Romans to each
+Colonist_.
+
+
+It would, I think, be difficult to fix with certainty how much land the
+Romans allotted to each colonist, for my belief is that they gave more
+or less according to the character of the country to which they sent
+them. We may, however, be sure that in every instance, and to whatever
+country they were sent, the quantity of land assigned was not very
+large: first, because, these colonists being sent to guard the newly
+acquired country, by giving little land it became possible to send more
+men; and second because, as the Romans lived frugally at home, it is
+unreasonable to suppose that they should wish their countrymen to be
+too well off abroad. And Titus Livius tells us that on the capture of
+Veii, the Romans sent thither a colony, allotting to each colonist
+three jugera and seven unciae of land, which, according to our
+measurement would be something under two acres.
+
+Besides the above reasons, the Romans may likely enough have thought
+that it was not so much the quantity of the land allotted as its
+careful cultivation that would make it suffice. It is very necessary,
+however, that every colony should have common pasturage where all may
+send their cattle to graze, as well as woods where they may cut fuel;
+for without such conveniences no colony can maintain itself.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VIII.—_Why certain Nations leave their ancestral Seats and
+overflow the Countries of others_.
+
+
+Having spoken above of the methods followed by the Romans in making
+war, and related how the Etruscans were attacked by the Gauls, it seems
+to me not foreign to these topics to explain that of wars there are two
+kinds. One kind of war has its origin in the ambition of princes or
+republics who seek to extend their dominions. Such were the wars waged
+by Alexander the Great, and by the Romans, and such are those which we
+see every day carried on by one potentate against another. Wars of this
+sort have their dangers, but do not utterly extirpate the inhabitants
+of a country; what the conqueror seeks being merely the submission of
+the conquered people, whom, generally speaking, he suffers to retain
+their laws, and always their houses and goods.
+
+The other species of war is when an entire people, with all the
+families of which it is made up, being driven out by famine or defeat,
+removes from its former seat, and goes in search of a new abode and a
+new country, not simply with the view to establish dominion over it,
+but to possess it as its own, and to expel or exterminate the former
+inhabitants. Of this most terrible and cruel species of warfare Sallust
+speaks at the end of his history of the war with Jugurtha, where in
+mentioning that after the defeat of Jugurtha the movement of the Gauls
+into Italy began to be noticed, he observes that “_in the wars of the
+Romans with other nations the struggle was for mastery; but that always
+in their wars with the Gauls the struggle on both sides was for life_.”
+For a prince or commonwealth, when attacking another State, will be
+content to rid themselves of those only who are at the head of affairs;
+but an entire people, set in motion in the manner described, must
+destroy all who oppose them, since their object is to subsist on that
+whereon those whom they invade have hitherto subsisted.
+
+The Romans had to pass through three of these desperate wars; the first
+being that in which their city was actually captured by those Gauls
+who, as already mentioned, had previously taken Lombardy from the
+Etruscans and made it their seat, and for whose invasion Titus Livius
+has assigned two causes. First, that they were attracted, as I have
+said before, by the fruitful soil and by the wine of Italy which they
+had not in Gaul; second, that their population having multiplied so
+greatly that they could no longer find wherewithal to live on at home,
+the princes of their land decided that certain of their number should
+go forth to seek a new abode; and so deciding, chose as leaders of
+those who were to go, two Gaulish chiefs, Bellovesus and Siccovesus;
+the former of whom came into Italy while the latter passed into Spain.
+From the immigration under Bellovesus resulted the occupation of
+Lombardy, and, subsequently, the first war of the Gauls with Rome. At a
+later date, and after the close of the first war with Carthage, came
+the second Gallic invasion, when more than two hundred thousand Gauls
+perished in battle between Piombino and Pisa. The third of these wars
+broke out on the descent into Italy of the Todi and Cimbri, who, after
+defeating several Roman armies, were themselves defeated by Marius.
+
+In these three most dangerous contests the arms of Rome prevailed; but
+no ordinary valour was needed for their success. For we see afterwards,
+when the spirit of the Romans had declined, and their armies had lost
+their former excellence, their supremacy was overthrown by men of the
+same race, that is to say by the Goths, the Vandals, and others like
+them, who spread themselves over the whole of the Western Empire.
+
+Nations such as these, quit, as I have said, their native land, when
+forced by famine, or by defeat in domestic wars, to seek a new
+habitation elsewhere. When those thus driven forth are in large
+numbers, they violently invade the territories of other nations,
+slaughtering the inhabitants, seizing on their possessions, founding
+new kingdoms, and giving new names to provinces; as was done by Moses,
+and by those tribes who overran the Roman Empire. For the new names
+which we find in Italy and elsewhere, have no other origin than in
+their having been given by these new occupants; as when the countries
+formerly known as Gallia Cisalpina and Gallia Transalpina took the
+names of Lombardy and France, from the Lombards and the Franks who
+settled themselves there. In the same way Sclavonia was formerly known
+as Illyria, Hungary as Pannonia, and England as Britain; while many
+other provinces which it would be tedious to enumerate, have similarly
+changed their designations; as when the name Judæa was given by Moses
+to that part of Syria of which he took possession.
+
+And since I have said above that nations such as those I have been
+describing, are often driven by wars from their ancestral homes, and
+forced to seek a new country elsewhere, I shall cite the instance of
+the Maurusians, a people who anciently dwelt in Syria, but hearing of
+the inroad of the Hebrews, and thinking themselves unable to resist
+them, chose rather to seek safety in flight than to perish with their
+country in a vain effort to defend it. For which reason, removing with
+their families, they went to Africa, where, after driving out the
+native inhabitants, they took up their abode; and although they could
+not defend their own country, were able to possess themselves of a
+country belonging to others. And Procopius, who writes the history of
+the war which Belisarius conducted against those Vandals who seized on
+Africa, relates, that on certain pillars standing in places where the
+Maurusians once dwelt, he had read inscriptions in these words: “_We
+Maurusians who fled before Joshua, the robber, the son of Nun_;”[7]
+giving us to know the cause of their quitting Syria. Be this as it may,
+nations thus driven forth by a supreme necessity, are, if they be in
+great number, in the highest degree dangerous, and cannot be
+successfully withstood except by a people who excel in arms.
+
+ [7] Nos Maurusii qui fugimus a facie Jesu latronis filii Navæ.
+ _Procop. Hist. Bell. Vand. II._
+
+
+When those constrained to abandon their homes are not in large numbers,
+they are not so dangerous as the nations of whom I have been speaking,
+since they cannot use the same violence, but must trust to their
+address to procure them a habitation; and, after procuring it, must
+live with their neighbours as friends and companions, as we find Æneas,
+Dido, the Massilians, and others like them to have lived; all of whom
+contrived to maintain themselves in the districts in which they
+settled, by securing the good will of the neighbouring nations.
+
+Almost all the great emigrations of nations have been and continue to
+be from the cold and barren region of Scythia, because from the
+population there being excessive, and the soil ill able to support
+them, they are forced to quit their home, many causes operating to
+drive them forth and none to keep them back. And if, for the last five
+hundred years, it has not happened that any of these nations has
+actually overrun another country, there are various reasons to account
+for it. First, the great clearance which that region made of its
+inhabitants during the decline of the Roman Empire, when more than
+thirty nations issued from it in succession; and next, the circumstance
+that the countries of Germany and Hungary, whence also these nations
+came, are now so much improved that men can live there in comfort, and
+consequently are not constrained to shift their habitations. Besides
+which, since these countries are occupied by a very warlike race, they
+serve as a sort of bulwark to keep back the neighbouring Scythians, who
+for this reason do not venture to attack them, nor attempt to force a
+passage. Nevertheless, movements on a great scale have oftentimes been
+begun by the Tartars, and been at once withstood by the Hungarians and
+Poles, whose frequent boast it is, that but for them, Italy and the
+Church would more than once have felt the weight of the Tartar arms.
+
+Of the nations of whom I have been speaking, I shall now say no more.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IX.—_Of the Causes which commonly give rise to Wars between
+States_.
+
+
+The occasion which led to war between the Romans and Samnites, who for
+long had been in league with one another, is of common occurrence in
+all powerful States, being either brought about by accident, or else
+purposely contrived by some one who would set war a-foot. As between
+the Romans and the Samnites, the occasion of war was accidental. For in
+making war upon the Sidicinians and afterwards on the Campanians, the
+Samnites had no thought of involving themselves with the Romans. But
+the Campanians being overpowered, and, contrary to the expectation of
+Romans and Samnites alike, resorting to Rome for aid, the Romans, on
+whose protection they threw themselves, were forced to succour them as
+dependants, and to accept a war which, it seemed to them, they could
+not with honour decline. For though they might have thought it
+unreasonable to be called on to defend the Campanians as friends
+against their own friends the Samnites, it seemed to them shameful not
+to defend them as subjects, or as a people who had placed themselves
+under their protection. For they reasoned that to decline their defence
+would close the gate against all others who at any future time might
+desire to submit themselves to their power. And, accordingly, since
+glory and empire, and not peace, were the ends which they always had in
+view, it became impossible for them to refuse this protectorship.
+
+A similar circumstance gave rise to the first war with the
+Carthaginians, namely the protectorate assumed by the Romans of the
+citizens of Messina in Sicily, and this likewise came about by chance.
+But the second war with Carthage was not the result of chance. For
+Hannibal the Carthaginian general attacked the Saguntans, who were the
+friends of Rome in Spain, not from any desire to injure them, but in
+order to set the arms of Rome in motion, and so gain an opportunity of
+engaging the Romans in a war, and passing on into Italy. This method of
+picking a quarrel is constantly resorted to by powerful States when
+they are bound by scruples of honour or like considerations. For if I
+desire to make war on a prince with whom I am under an ancient and
+binding treaty, I shall find some colour or pretext for attacking the
+friend of that prince, very well knowing that when I attack his friend,
+either the prince will resent it, when my scheme for engaging him in
+war will be realized; or that, should he not resent it, his weakness or
+baseness in not defending one who is under his protection will be made
+apparent; either of which alternatives will discredit him, and further
+my designs.
+
+We are to note, therefore, in connection with this submission of the
+Campanians, what has just now been said as to provoking another power
+to war; and also the remedy open to a State which, being unequal to its
+own defence, is prepared to go all lengths to ruin its assailant,—that
+remedy being to give itself up unreservedly to some one whom it selects
+for its defender; as the Campanians gave themselves up to the Romans,
+and as the Florentines gave themselves up to King Robert of Naples,
+who, after refusing to defend them as his friends against Castruccio of
+Lucca by whom they were hard pressed, defended them as his subjects.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER X.—_That contrary to the vulgar opinion, Money is not the
+Sinews of War_.
+
+
+Since any man may begin a war at his pleasure, but cannot at his
+pleasure bring it to a close, a prince before he engages in any warlike
+enterprise ought to measure his strength and govern himself
+accordingly. But he must be prudent enough not to deceive himself as to
+his strength, which he will always do, if he measure it by money, by
+advantage of position, or by the good-will of his subjects, while he is
+unprovided with an army of his own. These are things which may swell
+your strength but do not constitute it, being in themselves null and of
+no avail without an army on which you can depend.
+
+Without such an army no amount of money will meet your wants, the
+natural strength of your country will not protect you, and the fidelity
+and attachment of your subjects will not endure, since it is impossible
+that they should continue true to you when you cannot defend them.
+Lakes, and mountains, and the most inaccessible strongholds, where
+valiant defenders are wanting, become no better than the level plain;
+and money, so far from being a safeguard, is more likely to leave you a
+prey to your enemy; since nothing can be falser than the vulgar opinion
+which affirms it to be the sinews of war.
+
+This opinion is put forward by Quintus Curtius, where, in speaking of
+the war between Antipater the Macedonian and the King of Sparta, he
+relates that the latter, from want of money, was constrained to give
+battle and was defeated; whereas, could he have put off fighting for a
+few days the news of Alexander’s death would have reached Greece, and
+he might have had a victory without a battle. But lacking money, and
+fearing that on that account his soldiers might desert him, he was
+forced to hazard an engagement. It was for this reason that Quintus
+Curtius declared money to be the sinews of war, a maxim every day cited
+and acted upon by princes less wise than they should be. For building
+upon this, they think it enough for their defence to have laid up great
+treasures; not reflecting that were great treasures all that is needed
+for victory, Darius of old had conquered Alexander, the Greeks the
+Romans, and in our own times Charles of Burgundy the Swiss; while the
+pope and the Florentines together would have had little difficulty in
+defeating Francesco Maria, nephew of Pope Julius II., in the recent war
+of Urbino; and yet, in every one of these instances, the victory
+remained with him who held the sinews of war to consist, not in money,
+but in good soldiers.
+
+Croesus, king of Lydia, after showing Solon the Athenian much besides,
+at last displayed to him the boundless riches of his treasure-house,
+and asked him what he thought of his power. Whereupon Solon answered
+that he thought him no whit more powerful in respect of these
+treasures, for as war is made with iron and not with gold, another
+coming with more iron might carry off his gold. After the death of
+Alexander the Great a tribe of Gauls, passing through Greece on their
+way into Asia, sent envoys to the King of Macedonia to treat for terms
+of accord; when the king, to dismay them by a display of his resources,
+showed them great store of gold and silver. But these barbarians, when
+they saw all this wealth, in their greed to possess it, though before
+they had looked on peace as settled, broke off negotiations; and thus
+the king was ruined by those very treasures he had amassed for his
+defence. In like manner, not many years ago, the Venetians, with a full
+treasury, lost their whole dominions without deriving the least
+advantage from their wealth.
+
+I maintain, therefore, that it is not gold, as is vulgarly supposed,
+that is the sinews of war, but good soldiers; or while gold by itself
+will not gain you good soldiers, good soldiers may readily get you
+gold. Had the Romans chosen to make war with gold rather than with iron
+all the treasures of the earth would not have sufficed them having
+regard to the greatness of their enterprises and the difficulties they
+had to overcome in carrying them out. But making their wars with iron
+they never felt any want of gold; for those who stood in fear of them
+brought gold into their camp.
+
+And supposing it true that the Spartan king was forced by lack of money
+to risk the chances of a battle, it only fared with him in respect of
+money as it has often fared with others from other causes; since we see
+that where an army is in such straits for want of victual that it must
+either fight or perish by famine, it will always fight, as being the
+more honourable course and that on which fortune may in some way smile.
+So, too, it has often happened that a captain, seeing his enemy about
+to be reinforced, has been obliged either to trust to fortune and at
+once deliver battle, or else, waiting till the reinforcement is
+complete, to fight then, whether he will or no, and at whatever
+disadvantage. We find also, as in the case of Hasdrubal when beset, in
+the March of Ancona, at once by Claudius Nero and by the other Roman
+consul, that a captain, when he must either fight or fly, will always
+fight, since it will seem to him that by this course, however
+hazardous, he has at least a chance of victory, while by the other his
+ruin is certain.
+
+There are many circumstances, therefore, which may force a captain to
+give battle contrary to his intention, among which the want of money
+may sometimes be one. But this is no ground for pronouncing money to be
+the sinews of war, any more than those other things from the want of
+which men are reduced to the same necessity. Once more, therefore, I
+repeat that not gold but good soldiers constitute the sinews of war.
+Money, indeed, is most necessary in a secondary place; but this
+necessity good soldiers will always be able to supply, since it is as
+impossible that good soldiers should lack money, as that money by
+itself should secure good soldiers. And that what I say is true is
+shown by countless passages in history. When Pericles persuaded the
+Athenians to declare war against the whole Peloponnesus, assuring them
+that their dexterity, aided by their wealth, was sure to bring them off
+victorious, the Athenians, though for a while they prospered in this
+war, in the end were overpowered, the prudent counsels and good
+soldiers of Sparta proving more than a match for the dexterity and
+wealth of Athens. But, indeed, there can be no better witness to the
+truth of my contention than Titus Livius himself. For in that passage
+of his history wherein he discusses whether if Alexander the Great had
+invaded Italy, he would have succeeded in vanquishing the Romans, three
+things are noted by him as essential to success in war; to wit, many
+and good soldiers, prudent captains, and favourable fortune; and after
+examining whether the Romans or Alexander would have had the advantage
+in each of these three particulars, he arrives at his conclusion
+without any mention of money.
+
+The Campanians, therefore, when asked by the Sidicinians to arm in
+their behalf, must have measured their strength by wealth and not by
+soldiers; for after declaring in their favour and suffering two
+defeats, to save themselves they were obliged to become tributary to
+Rome.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XI.—_That it were unwise to ally yourself a Prince who has
+Reputation rather than Strength._
+
+
+To mark the mistake made by the Sidicinians in trusting to the
+protection of the Campanians, and by the Campanians in supposing
+themselves able to protect the Sidicinians, Titus Livius could not have
+expressed himself in apter words than by saying, that “_the Campanians
+rather lent their name to the Sidicinians than furnished any
+substantial aid towards their defence._”
+
+Here we have to note that alliances with princes who from dwelling at a
+distance have no facility, or who from their own embarrassments, or
+from other causes, have no ability to render aid, afford rather
+reputation than protection to those who put their trust in them. As was
+the case in our own times with the Florentines, when, in the year 1479,
+they were attacked by the Pope and the King of Naples. For being
+friends of the French king they drew from that friendship more
+reputation than help. The same would be the case with that prince who
+should engage in any enterprise in reliance on the Emperor Maximilian,
+his being one of those friendships which, in the words of our
+historian, _nomen magis quam praesidium adferunt_.
+
+On this occasion, therefore, the Campanians were misled by imagining
+themselves stronger than they really were. For often, from defect of
+judgment, men take upon them to defend others, when they have neither
+skill nor ability to defend themselves. Of which we have a further
+instance in the Tarentines, who, when the Roman and Samnite armies were
+already drawn up against one another for battle, sent messengers to the
+Roman consul to acquaint him that they desired peace between the two
+nations, and would themselves declare war against whichsoever of the
+two first began hostilities. The consul, laughing at their threats, in
+the presence of the messengers, ordered the signal for battle to sound,
+and bade his army advance to meet the enemy; showing the Tarentines by
+acts rather than words what answer he thought their message deserved.
+
+Having spoken in the present Chapter of unwise courses followed by
+princes for defending others, I shall speak in the next, of the methods
+they follow in defending themselves.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XII.—_Whether when Invasion is imminent it is better to
+anticipate or to await it._
+
+
+I have often heard it disputed by men well versed in military affairs,
+whether, when there are two princes of nearly equal strength, and the
+bolder of the two proclaims war upon the other, it is better for that
+other to await attack within his own frontier, or to march into the
+enemy’s country and fight him there; and I have heard reasons given in
+favour of each of these courses.
+
+They who maintain that an enemy should be attacked in his own country,
+cite the advice given by Croesus to Cyrus, when the latter had come to
+the frontiers of the Massagetæ to make war on that people. For word
+being sent by Tomyris their queen that Cyrus might, at his pleasure,
+either enter her dominions, where she would await him, or else allow
+her to come and meet him; and the matter being debated, Croesus,
+contrary to the opinion of other advisers, counselled Cyrus to go
+forward and meet the queen, urging that were he to defeat her at a
+distance from her kingdom, he might not be able to take it from her,
+since she would have time to repair her strength; whereas, were he to
+defeat her within her own dominions, he could follow her up on her
+flight, and, without giving her time to recover herself, deprive her of
+her State. They cite also the advice given by Hannibal to Antiochus,
+when the latter was meditating a war on the Romans. For Hannibal told
+him that the Romans could not be vanquished except in Italy, where an
+invader might turn to account the arms and resources of their friends,
+whereas any one making war upon them out of Italy, and leaving that
+country in their hands, would leave them an unfailing source whence to
+draw whatever reinforcement they might need; and finally, he told him,
+that the Romans might more easily be deprived of Rome than of their
+empire, and of Italy more easily than of any of their other provinces.
+They likewise instance Agathocles, who, being unequal to support a war
+at home, invaded the Carthaginians, by whom he was being attacked, and
+reduced them to sue for peace. They also cite Scipio, who to shift the
+war from Italy, carried it into Africa.
+
+Those who hold a contrary opinion contend that to have your enemy at a
+disadvantage you must get him away from his home, alleging the case of
+the Athenians, who while they carried on the war at their convenience
+in their own territory, retained their superiority; but when they
+quitted that territory, and went with their armies to Sicily, lost
+their freedom. They cite also the fable of the poets wherein it is
+figured that Antæus, king of Libya, being assailed by the Egyptian
+Hercules, could not be overcome while he awaited his adversary within
+the bounds of his own kingdom; but so soon as he was withdrawn from
+these by the craft of Hercules, lost his kingdom and his life. Whence
+the fable runs that Antæus, being son to the goddess Earth, when thrown
+to the ground drew fresh strength from the Earth, his mother; and that
+Hercules, perceiving this, held him up away from the Earth.
+
+Recent opinions are likewise cited as favouring this view. Every one
+knows how Ferrando, king of Naples, was in his day accounted a most
+wise prince; and how two years before his death there came a rumour
+that Charles VIII of France was meditating an attack upon him; and how,
+after making great preparations for his defence, he sickened; and being
+on the point of death, among other counsels left his son Alfonso this
+advice, that nothing in the world should tempt him to pass out of his
+own territory, but to await the enemy within his frontier, and with his
+forces unimpaired; a warning disregarded by Alfonso, who sent into
+Romagna an army, which he lost, and with it his whole dominions,
+without a battle.
+
+Other arguments on both sides of the question in addition to those
+already noticed, are as follows: He who attacks shows higher courage
+than he who stands on his defence, and this gives his army greater
+confidence. Moreover, by attacking your enemy you deprive him of many
+opportunities for using his resources, since he can receive no aid from
+subjects who have been stripped of their possessions; and when an enemy
+is at his gates, a prince must be careful how he levies money and
+imposes taxes; so that, as Hannibal said, the springs which enable a
+country to support a war come to be dried up. Again, the soldiers of an
+invader, finding themselves in a foreign land, are under a stronger
+necessity to fight, and necessity, as has often been said, is the
+parent of valour.
+
+On the other hand, it may be argued that there are many advantages to
+be gained by awaiting the attack of your enemy. For without putting
+yourself much about, you may harass him by intercepting his supplies,
+whether of victual or of whatsoever else an army stands in need: from
+your better knowledge of the country you can impede his movements; and
+because men muster more willingly to defend their homes than to go on
+distant expeditions, you can meet him with more numerous forces, if
+defeated you can more easily repair your strength, because the bulk of
+your army, finding shelter at hand, will be able to save itself, and
+your reserves will have no distance to come. In this way you can use
+your whole strength without risking your entire fortunes; whereas, in
+leaving your country, you risk your entire fortunes, without putting
+forth your whole strength. Nay, we find that to weaken an adversary
+still further, some have suffered him to make a march of several days
+into their country, and then to capture certain of their towns, that by
+leaving garrisons in these, he might reduce the numbers of his army,
+and so be attacked at greater disadvantage.
+
+But now to speak my own mind on the matter, I think we should make this
+distinction. Either you have your country strongly defended, as the
+Romans had and the Swiss have theirs, or, like the Carthaginians of old
+and the King of France and the Italians at the present day, you have it
+undefended. In the latter case you must keep the enemy at a distance
+from your country, for as your strength lies not in men but in money,
+whenever the supply of money is cut off you are undone, and nothing so
+soon cuts off this supply as a war of invasion. Of which we have
+example in the Carthaginians, who, while their country was free from
+invasion, were able by means of their great revenues to carry on war in
+Italy against the Romans, but when they were invaded could not defend
+themselves even against Agathocles. The Florentines, in like manner,
+could make no head against Castruccio, lord of Lucca, when he attacked
+them in their own country; and to obtain protection, were compelled to
+yield themselves up to King Robert of Naples. And yet, after
+Castruccio’s death, these same Florentines were bold enough to attack
+the Duke of Milan in his own country, and strong enough to strip him of
+his dominions. Such valour did they display in distant wars, such
+weakness in those that were near.
+
+But when a country is armed as Rome was and Switzerland now is, the
+closer you press it, the harder it is to subdue; because such States
+can assemble a stronger force to resist attack than for attacking
+others. Nor does the great authority of Hannibal move me in this
+instance, since resentment and his own advantage might lead him to
+speak as he spoke to Antiochus. For had the Romans suffered in Gaul,
+and within the same space of time, those three defeats at the hands of
+Hannibal which they suffered in Italy, it must have made an end of
+them; since they could not have turned the remnants of their armies to
+account as they did in Italy, not having the same opportunity for
+repairing their strength; nor could they have met their enemy with such
+numerous armies. For we never find them sending forth a force of more
+than fifty thousand men for the invasion of any province; whereas, in
+defending their own country against the inroad of the Gauls at the end
+of the first Carthaginian war, we hear of them bringing some eighteen
+hundred thousand men into the field; and their failure to vanquish the
+Gauls in Lombardy as they had vanquished those in Tuscany arose from
+their inability to lead a great force so far against a numerous enemy,
+or to encounter him with the same advantages. In Germany the Cimbrians
+routed a Roman army who had there no means to repair their disaster;
+but when they came into Italy, the Romans could collect their whole
+strength, and destroy them. Out of their native country, whence they
+can bring no more than thirty or forty thousand men, the Swiss may
+readily be defeated; but in their own country, where they can assemble
+a hundred thousand, they are well-nigh invincible.
+
+In conclusion, therefore, I repeat that the prince who has his people
+armed and trained for war, should always await a great and dangerous
+war at home, and never go forth to meet it. But that he whose subjects
+are unarmed, and whose country is not habituated to war, should always
+carry the war to as great a distance as he can from home. For in this
+way each will defend himself in the best manner his means admit.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XIII.—_That Men rise from humble to high Fortunes rather by
+Fraud than by Force._
+
+
+I hold it as most certain that men seldom if ever rise to great place
+from small beginnings without using fraud or force, unless, indeed,
+they be given, or take by inheritance the place to which some other has
+already come. Force, however, will never suffice by itself to effect
+this end, while fraud often will, as any one may plainly see who reads
+the lives of Philip of Macedon, Agathocles of Sicily, and many others
+like them, who from the lowest or, at any rate, from very low
+beginnings, rose either to sovereignty or to the highest command.
+
+This necessity for using deceit is taught by Xenophon in his life of
+Cyrus; for the very first expedition on which Cyrus is sent, against
+the King of Armenia, is seen to teem with fraud; and it is by fraud,
+and not by force, that he is represented as having acquired his
+kingdom; so that the only inference to be drawn from his conduct, as
+Xenophon describes it, is, that the prince who would accomplish great
+things must have learned how to deceive. Xenophon, moreover, represents
+his hero as deceiving his maternal grandsire Cyaxares, king of the
+Medians, in a variety of ways; giving it to be understood that without
+such deceit he could not have reached the greatness to which he came.
+Nor do I believe that any man born to humble fortunes can be shown to
+have attained great station, by sheer and open force, whereas this has
+often been effected by mere fraud, such as that used by Giovanni
+Galeazzo to deprive his uncle Bernabo of the State and government of
+Lombardy.
+
+The same arts which princes are constrained to use at the outset of
+their career, must also be used by commonwealths, until they have grown
+powerful enough to dispense with them and trust to strength alone. And
+because Rome at all times, whether from chance or choice, followed all
+such methods as are necessary to attain greatness, in this also she was
+not behindhand. And, to begin with, she could have used no greater
+fraud than was involved in her method above noticed, of making for
+herself companions; since under this name she made for herself
+subjects, for such the Latins and the other surrounding nations, in
+fact, became. For availing herself at first of their arms to subdue
+neighbouring countries and gain herself reputation as a State, her
+power was so much increased by these conquests that there was none whom
+she could not overcome. But the Latins never knew that they were
+enslaved until they saw the Samnites twice routed and forced to make
+terms. This success, while it added greatly to the fame of the Romans
+among princes at a distance, who were thereby made familiar with the
+Roman name though not with the Roman arms, bred at the same time
+jealousy and distrust among those who, like the Latins, both saw and
+felt these arms; and such were the effects of this jealousy and
+distrust, that not the Latins only but all the Roman colonies in
+Latium, along with the Campanians whom a little while before the Romans
+had defended leagued themselves together against the authority of Rome.
+This war was set on foot by the Latins in the manner in which, as I
+have already explained, most wars are begun, not by directly attacking
+the Romans, but by defending the Sidicinians against the Samnites who
+were making war upon them with the permission of the Romans. And that
+it was from their having found out the crafty policy of the Romans that
+the Latins were led to take this step, is plain from the words which
+Titus Livius puts in the mouth of Annius Setinus the Latin prætor, who,
+in addressing the Latin council, is made to say, “_For if even now we
+can put up with slavery under the disguise of an equal alliance, etc_”
+
+We see, therefore, that the Romans, from the time they first began to
+extend their power, were not unfamiliar with the art of deceiving, an
+art always necessary for those who would mount to great heights from
+low beginnings; and which is the less to be condemned when, as in the
+case of the Romans, it is skilfully concealed.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XIV.—_That Men often err in thinking they can subdue Pride by
+Humility._
+
+
+You shall often find that humility is not merely of no service to you,
+but is even hurtful, especially when used in dealing with insolent men,
+who, through envy or other like cause, have conceived hatred against
+you. Proof whereof is supplied by our historian where he explains the
+causes of this war between the Romans and the Latins. For on the
+Samnites complaining to the Romans that the Latins had attacked them,
+the Romans, desiring not to give the Latins ground of offence, would
+not forbid them proceeding with the war. But the endeavour to avoid
+giving offence to the Latins only served to increase their confidence,
+and led them the sooner to declare their hostility. Of which we have
+evidence in the language used by the same Latin Prætor, Annius Setinus,
+at the aforesaid council, when he said:—“_You have tried their patience
+by refusing them, soldiers. Who doubts but that they are offended?
+Still they have put up with the affront. They have heard that we are
+assembling an army against their allies the Samnites; and yet they have
+not stirred from their city. Whence this astonishing forbearance, but
+from their knowing our strength and their own weakness_?” Which words
+give us clearly to understand how much the patience of the Romans
+increased the arrogance of the Latins.
+
+A prince, therefore, should never stoop from his dignity, nor should he
+if he would have credit for any concession make it voluntarily, unless
+he be able or believe himself able to withhold it. For almost always
+when matters have come to such a pass that you cannot give way with
+credit it is better that a thing be taken from you by force than
+yielded through fear of force. For if you yield through fear and to
+escape war, the chances are that you do not escape it; since he to
+whom, out of manifest cowardice you make this concession, will not rest
+content, but will endeavour to wring further concessions from you, and
+making less account of you, will only be the more kindled against you.
+At the same time you will find your friends less zealous on your
+behalf, since to them you will appear either weak or cowardly. But if,
+so soon as the designs of your enemy are disclosed, you at once prepare
+to resist though your strength be inferior to his, he will begin to
+think more of you, other neighbouring princes will think more; and many
+will be willing to assist you, on seeing you take up arms, who, had you
+relinquished hope and abandoned yourself to despair, would never have
+stirred a finger to save you.
+
+The above is to be understood as applying where you have a single
+adversary only; but should you have several, it will always be a
+prudent course, even after war has been declared, to restore to some
+one of their number something you have of his, so as to regain his
+friendship and detach him from the others who have leagued themselves
+against you.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XV.—That weak States are always dubious in their Resolves; and
+that tardy Resolves are always hurtful.
+
+
+Touching this very matter, and with regard to these earliest beginnings
+of war between the Latins and the Romans, it may be noted, that in all
+our deliberations it behoves us to come quickly to a definite resolve,
+and not to remain always in dubiety and suspense. This is plainly seen
+in connection with the council convened by the Latins when they thought
+to separate themselves from the Romans. For the Romans suspecting the
+hostile humour wherewith the Latins were infected, in order to learn
+how things really stood, and see whether they could not win back the
+malcontents without recourse to arms, gave them to know that they must
+send eight of their citizens to Rome, as they had occasion to consult
+with them. On receiving which message the Latins, knowing that they had
+done many things contrary to the wishes of the Romans, called a council
+to determine who of their number should be sent, and to instruct them
+what they were to say. But Annius, their prætor, being present in the
+council when these matters were being discussed, told them “_that he
+thought it of far greater moment for them to consider what they were to
+do than what they were to say; for when their resolves were formed, it
+would be easy to clothe them in fit words_.” This, in truth, was sound
+advice and such as every prince and republic should lay to heart.
+Because, where there is doubt and uncertainty as to what we may decide
+on doing, we know not how to suit our words to our conduct; whereas,
+with our minds made up, and the course we are to follow fixed, it is an
+easy matter to find words to declare our resolves. I have noticed this
+point the more readily, because I have often found such uncertainty
+hinder the public business of our own republic, to its detriment and
+discredit. And in all matters of difficulty, wherein courage is needed
+for resolving, this uncertainty will always be met with, whenever those
+who have to deliberate and decide are weak.
+
+Not less mischievous than doubtful resolves are those which are late
+and tardy, especially when they have to be made in behalf of a friend.
+For from their lateness they help none, and hurt ourselves. Tardy
+resolves are due to want of spirit or want of strength, or to the
+perversity of those who have to determine, who being moved by a secret
+desire to overthrow the government, or to carry out some selfish
+purpose of their own, suffer no decision to be come to, but only thwart
+and hinder. Whereas, good citizens, even when they see the popular mind
+to be bent on dangerous courses, will never oppose the adoption of a
+fixed plan, more particularly in matters which do not brook delay.
+
+After Hieronymus, the Syracusan tyrant, was put to death, there being
+at that time a great war between the Romans and the Carthaginians, the
+citizens of Syracuse fell to disputing among themselves with which
+nation they should take part; and so fierce grew the controversy
+between the partisans of the two alliances, that no course could be
+agreed on, and they took part with neither; until Apollonides, one of
+the foremost of the Syracusan citizens, told them in a speech replete
+with wisdom, that neither those who inclined to hold by the Romans, nor
+those who chose rather to side with the Carthaginians, were deserving
+of blame; but that what was utterly to be condemned was doubt and delay
+in taking one side or other; for from such uncertainty he clearly
+foresaw the ruin of their republic; whereas, by taking a decided
+course, whatever it might be, some good might come. Now Titus Livius
+could not show more clearly than he does in this passage, the mischief
+which results from resting in suspense. He shows it, likewise, in the
+case of the Lavinians, of whom he relates, that being urged by the
+Latins to aid them against Rome, they were so long in making up their
+minds, that when the army which they at last sent to succour the Latins
+was issuing from their gates, word came that the Latins were defeated.
+Whereupon Millionius, their prætor, said, “_With the Romans this short
+march will cost us dear_.” But had the Lavinians resolved at once
+either to grant aid or to refuse it, taking a latter course they would
+not have given offence to the Romans, taking the former, and rendering
+timely help, they and the Latins together might have had a victory. But
+by delay they stood to lose in every way, as the event showed.
+
+This example, had it been remembered by the Florentines, might have
+saved them from all that loss and vexation which they underwent at the
+hands of the French, at the time King Louis XII. of France came into
+Italy against Lodovico, duke of Milan. For when Louis first proposed to
+pass through Tuscany he met with no objection from the Florentines,
+whose envoys at his court arranged with him that they should stand
+neutral, while the king, on his arrival in Italy, was to maintain their
+government and take them under his protection; a month’s time being
+allowed the republic to ratify these terms. But certain persons, who,
+in their folly, favoured the cause of Lodovico, delayed this
+ratification until the king was already on the eve of victory; when the
+Florentines suddenly becoming eager to ratify, the king would not
+accept their ratification, perceiving their consent to be given under
+constraint and not of their own good-will. This cost the city of
+Florence dear, and went near to lose her freedom, whereof she was
+afterwards deprived on another like occasion. And the course taken by
+the Florentines was the more to be blamed in that it was of no sort of
+service to Duke Lodovico, who, had he been victorious, would have shown
+the Florentines many more signs of his displeasure than did the king.
+
+Although the hurt which results to republics from weakness of this sort
+has already been discussed in another Chapter, nevertheless, since an
+opportunity offered for touching upon it again, I have willingly
+availed myself of it, because to me it seems a matter of which
+republics like ours should take special heed.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XVI.—_That the Soldiers of our days depart widely from the
+methods of ancient Warfare._
+
+
+In all their wars with other nations, the most momentous battle ever
+fought by the Romans, was that which they fought with the Latins when
+Torquatus and Decius were consuls. For it may well be believed that as
+by the loss of that battle the Latins became subject to the Romans, so
+the Romans had they not prevailed must have become subject to the
+Latins. And Titus Livius is of this opinion, since he represents the
+armies as exactly equal in every respect, in discipline and in valour,
+in numbers and in obstinacy, the only difference he draws being, that
+of the two armies the Romans had the more capable commanders. We find,
+however, two circumstances occurring in the conduct of this battle, the
+like of which never happened before, and seldom since, namely, that to
+give steadiness to the minds of their soldiers, and render them
+obedient to the word of command and resolute to fight, one of the
+consuls put himself, and the other his son, to death.
+
+The equality which Titus Livius declares to have prevailed in these two
+armies, arose from this, that having long served together they used the
+same language, discipline, and arms; that in disposing their men for
+battle they followed the same system; and that the divisions and
+officers of their armies bore the same names. It was necessary,
+therefore, that as they were of equal strength and valour, something
+extraordinary should take place to render the courage of the one army
+more stubborn and unflinching than that of the other, it being on this
+stubbornness, as I have already said, that victory depends. For while
+this temper is maintained in the minds of the combatants they will
+never turn their backs on their foe. And that it might endure longer in
+the minds of the Romans than of the Latins, partly chance, and partly
+the valour of the consuls caused it to fall out that Torquatus slew his
+son, and Decius died by his own hand.
+
+In pointing out this equality of strength, Titus Livius takes occasion
+to explain the whole system followed by the Romans in the ordering of
+their armies and in disposing them for battle; and as he has treated
+the subject at length, I need not go over the same ground, and shall
+touch only on what I judge in it most to deserve attention, but, being
+overlooked by all the captains of our times, has led to disorder in
+many armies and in many battles.
+
+From this passage of Titus Livius, then, we learn that the Roman army
+had three principal divisions, or battalions as we might now call them,
+of which they named the first _hastati_, the second _principes_, and
+the third _triarii_, to each of which cavalry were attached. In
+arraying an army for battle they set the _hastati_ in front. Directly
+behind them, in the second rank, they placed the _principes_; and in
+the third rank of the same column, the _triarii_. The cavalry of each
+of these three divisions they disposed to the right and left of the
+division to which it belonged; and to these companies of horse, from
+their form and position, they gave the name wings (_alæ_), from their
+appearing like the two wings of the main body of the army. The first
+division, the _hastati_, which was in front, they drew up in close
+order to enable it to withstand and repulse the enemy. The second
+division, the _principes_, since it was not to be engaged from the
+beginning, but was meant to succour the first in case that were driven
+in, was not formed in close order but kept in open file, so that it
+might receive the other into its ranks whenever it was broken and
+forced to retire. The third division, that, namely, of the _triarii_,
+had its ranks still more open than those of the second, so that, if
+occasion required, it might receive the first two divisions of the
+_hastati_ and _principes_. These divisions, therefore, being drawn up
+in this order, the engagement began, and if the _hastati_ were
+overpowered and driven back, they retired within the loose ranks of the
+_principes_, when both these divisions, being thus united into one,
+renewed the conflict. If these, again, were routed and forced back,
+they retreated within the open ranks of the _triarii_, and all three
+divisions, forming into one, once more renewed the fight, in which, if
+they were overpowered, since they had no further means of recruiting
+their strength, they lost the battle. And because whenever this last
+division, of the _triarii_, had to be employed, the army was in
+jeopardy, there arose the proverb, “_Res redacta est ad triarios_,”
+equivalent to our expression of _playing a last stake_.
+
+The captains of our day, as they have abandoned all the other customs
+of antiquity, and pay no heed to any part of the ancient discipline, so
+also have discarded this method of disposing their men, though it was
+one of no small utility. For to insure the defeat of a commander who so
+arranges his forces as to be able thrice during an engagement to renew
+his strength, Fortune must thrice declare against him, and he must be
+matched with an adversary able three times over to defeat him; whereas
+he whose sole chance of success lies in his surviving the first onset,
+as is the case with all the armies of Christendom at the present day,
+may easily be vanquished, since any slight mishap, and the least
+failure in the steadiness of his men, may deprive him of victory.
+
+And what takes from our armies the capacity to renew their strength is,
+that provision is now no longer made for one division being received
+into the ranks of another, which happens because at present an army is
+arranged for battle in one or other of two imperfect methods. For
+either its divisions are placed side by side, so as to form a line of
+great width but of no depth or solidity; or if, to strengthen it, it be
+drawn up in columns after the fashion of the Roman armies, should the
+front line be broken, no provision having been made for its being
+received by the second, it is thrown into complete disorder, and both
+divisions fall to pieces. For if the front line be driven back, it
+jostles the second, if the second line endeavour to advance, the first
+stands in its way: and thus, the first driving against the second, and
+the second against the third, such confusion follows that often the
+most trifling accident will cause the ruin of an entire army.
+
+At the battle of Ravenna, where M. de Foix, the French commander, was
+slain, although according to modern notions this was a well-fought
+field, both the French and the Spanish armies were drawn up in the
+first of the faulty methods above described; that is to say, each army
+advanced with the whole of its battalions side by side, so that each
+presented a single front much wider than deep; this being always the
+plan followed by modern armies when, as at Ravenna, the ground is open.
+For knowing the disorder they fall into on retreat, forming themselves
+in a single line, they endeavour, as I have said, as much as possible
+to escape confusion by extending their front. But where the ground
+confines them they fall at once into the disorder spoken of, without an
+effort to prevent it.
+
+Troops traversing an enemy’s country, whether to pillage or carry out
+any other operation of war, are liable to fall into the same disorder;
+and at S. Regolo in the Pisan territory, and at other places where the
+Florentines were beaten by the Pisans during the war which followed on
+the revolt of Pisa after the coming of Charles of France into Italy,
+our defeat was due to no other cause than the behaviour of our own
+cavalry, who being posted in front, and being repulsed by the enemy,
+fell back on the infantry and threw them into confusion, whereupon the
+whole army took to flight; and Messer Ciriaco del Borgo, the veteran
+leader of the Florentine foot, has often declared in my presence that
+he had never been routed by any cavalry save those who were fighting on
+his side. For which reason the Swiss, who are the greatest proficients
+in modern warfare, when serving with the French, make it their first
+care to place themselves on their flank, so that the cavalry of their
+friends, if repulsed, may not throw them into disorder.
+
+But although these matters seem easy to understand and not difficult to
+put in practice, none has yet been found among the commanders of our
+times, who attempted to imitate the ancients or to correct the moderns.
+For although these also have a tripartite division of their armies into
+van-guard, main-body, and rear-guard, the only use they make of it is
+in giving orders when their men are in quarters; whereas on active
+service it rarely happens that all divisions are not equally exposed to
+the same onset.
+
+And because many, to excuse their ignorance, will have it that the
+destructive fire of artillery forbids our employing at the present day
+many of the tactics used by the ancients, I will discuss this question
+in the following Chapter, and examine whether artillery does in fact
+prevent us from using the valiant methods of antiquity.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XVII.—_What importance the Armies of the present day should
+allow to Artillery; and whether the commonly received opinion
+concerning it be just._
+
+
+Looking to the number of pitched battles, or what are termed by the
+French _journées_, and by the Italians _fatti d’arme_, fought by the
+Romans at divers times, I am led further to examine the generally
+received opinion, that had artillery been in use in their day, the
+Romans would not have been allowed, or at least not with the same ease,
+to subjugate provinces and make other nations their tributaries, and
+could never have spread their power in the astonishing way they did.
+For it is said that by reason of these fire-arms men can no longer use
+or display their personal valour as they could of old; that there is
+greater difficulty now than there was in former times in joining
+battle; that the tactics followed then cannot be followed now; and that
+in time all warfare must resolve itself into a question of artillery.
+
+Judging it not out of place to inquire whether these opinions are
+sound, and how far artillery has added to or taken from the strength of
+armies, and whether its use lessens or increases the opportunities for
+a good captain to behave valiantly, I shall at once address myself to
+the first of the averments noticed above, namely, that the armies of
+the ancient Romans could not have made the conquests they did, had
+artillery then been in use.
+
+To this I answer by saying that, since war is made for purposes either
+of offence or defence, we have first to see in which of these two kinds
+of warfare artillery gives the greater advantage or inflicts the
+greater hurt. Now, though something might be said both ways, I
+nevertheless believe that artillery is beyond comparison more hurtful
+to him who stands on the defensive than to him who attacks. For he who
+defends himself must either do so in a town or in a fortified camp. If
+within a town, either the town will be a small one, as fortified towns
+commonly are, or it will be a great one. In the former case, he who is
+on the defensive is at once undone. For such is the shock of artillery
+that there is no wall so strong that in a few days it will not batter
+down, when, unless those within have ample room to withdraw behind
+covering works and trenches, they must be beaten; it being impossible
+for them to resist the assault of an enemy who forces an entrance
+through the breaches in their walls. Nor will any artillery a defender
+may have be of any service to him; since it is an established axiom
+that where men are able to advance in numbers and rapidly, artillery is
+powerless to check them.
+
+For this reason, in storming towns the furious assaults of the northern
+nations prove irresistible, whereas the attacks of our Italian troops,
+who do not rush on in force, but advance to the assault in small knots
+of skirmishers (_scaramouches_, as they are fitly named), may easily be
+withstood. Those who advance in such loose order, and with so little
+spirit, against a breach covered by artillery, advance to certain
+destruction, and as against them artillery is useful. But when the
+assailants swarm to the breach so massed together that one pushes on
+another, unless they be brought to a stand by ditches and earthworks,
+they penetrate everywhere, and no artillery has any effect to keep them
+back; and though some must fall, yet not so many as to prevent a
+victory.
+
+The frequent success of the northern nations in storming towns, and
+more particularly the recovery of Brescia by the French, is proof
+sufficient of the truth of what I say. For the town of Brescia rising
+against the French while the citadel still held out, the Venetians, to
+meet any attack which might be made from the citadel upon the town,
+ranged guns along the whole line of road which led from the one to the
+other, planting them in front, and in flank, and wherever else they
+could be brought to bear. Of all which M. de Foix making no account,
+dismounted with his men-at-arms from horseback, and, advancing with
+them on foot through the midst of the batteries, took the town; nor do
+we learn that he sustained any considerable loss from the enemy’s fire.
+So that, as I have said, he who has to defend himself in a small town,
+when his walls are battered down and he has no room to retire behind
+other works, and has only his artillery to trust to, is at once undone.
+
+But even where the town you defend is a great one, so that you have
+room to fall back behind new works, artillery is still, by a long way,
+more useful for the assailant than for the defender. For to enable your
+artillery to do any hurt to those without, you must raise yourself with
+it above the level of the ground, since, if you remain on the level,
+the enemy, by erecting any low mound or earth-work, can so secure
+himself that it will be impossible for you to touch him. But in raising
+yourself above the level of the ground, whether by extending yourself
+along the gallery of the walls, or otherwise, you are exposed to two
+disadvantages; for, first, you cannot there bring into position guns of
+the same size or range as he who is without can bring to bear against
+you, since it is impossible to work large guns in a confined space;
+and, secondly, although you should succeed in getting your guns into
+position, you cannot construct such strong and solid works for their
+protection as those can who are outside, and on level ground, and who
+have all the room and every other advantage which they could desire. It
+is consequently impossible for him who defends a town to maintain his
+guns in position at any considerable height, when those who are outside
+have much and powerful artillery; while, if he place it lower, it
+becomes, as has been explained, to a great extent useless. So that in
+the end the defence of the city has to be effected, as in ancient
+times, by hand to hand fighting, or else by means of the smaller kinds
+of fire-arms, from which if the defender derive some slight advantage,
+it is balanced by the injury he sustains from the great artillery of
+his enemy, whereby the walls of the city are battered down and almost
+buried in their ditches; so that when it comes once more to an
+encounter at close quarters, by reason of his walls being demolished
+and his ditches filled up, the defender is now at a far greater
+disadvantage than he was formerly. Wherefore I repeat that these arms
+are infinitely more useful for him who attacks a town than for him who
+defends it.
+
+As to the remaining method, which consists in your taking up your
+position in an entrenched camp, where you need not fight unless you
+please, and unless you have the advantage, I say that this method
+commonly affords you no greater facility for avoiding an engagement
+than the ancients had; nay, that sometimes, owing to the use of
+artillery, you are worse off than they were. For if the enemy fall
+suddenly upon you, and have some slight advantage (as may readily be
+the case from his being on higher ground, or from your works on his
+arrival being still incomplete so that you are not wholly sheltered by
+them), forthwith, and without your being able to prevent him, he
+dislodges you, and you are forced to quit your defences and deliver
+battle: as happened to the Spaniards at the battle of Ravenna. For
+having posted themselves between the river Ronco and an earthwork, from
+their not having carried this work high enough, and from the French
+having a slight advantage of ground, they were forced by the fire of
+the latter to quit their entrenchments come to an engagement.
+
+But assuming the ground you have chosen for your camp to be, as it
+always should, higher than that occupied by the enemy, and your works
+to be complete and sufficient, so that from your position and
+preparations the enemy dare not attack you, recourse will then be had
+to the very same methods as were resorted to in ancient times when an
+army was so posted that it could not be assailed; that is to say, your
+country will be wasted, cities friendly to you besieged or stormed, and
+your supplies intercepted; until you are forced, at last, of necessity
+to quit your camp and to fight a pitched battle, in which, as will
+presently appear, artillery will be of little service to you.
+
+If we consider, therefore, for what ends the Romans made wars, and that
+attack and not defence was the object of almost all their campaigns, it
+will be clear, if what I have said be true, that they would have had
+still greater advantage, and might have achieved their conquests with
+even greater ease, had artillery been in use in their times.
+
+And as to the second complaint, that by reason of artillery men can no
+longer display their valour as they could in ancient days, I admit it
+to be true that when they have to expose themselves a few at a time,
+men run more risks now than formerly; as when they have to scale a town
+or perform some similar exploit, in which they are not massed together
+but must advance singly and one behind another. It is true, also, that
+Captains and commanders of armies are subjected to a greater risk of
+being killed now than of old, since they an be reached everywhere by
+the enemy’s fire; and it is no protection to them to be with those of
+their men who are furthest from the enemy, or to be surrounded by the
+bravest of their guards. Still, we do not often find either of these
+two dangers occasioning extraordinary loss. For towns strongly
+fortified are not attacked by escalade, nor will the assailing army
+advance against them in weak numbers; but will endeavour, as in ancient
+times, to reduce them by regular siege. And even in the case of towns
+attacked by storm, the dangers are not so very much greater now than
+they were formerly; for in those old days also, the defenders of towns
+were not without warlike engines, which if less terrible in their
+operation, had, so far as killing goes, much the same effect. And as
+for the deaths of captains and leaders of companies, it may be said
+that during the last twenty-four years of war in Italy, we have had
+fewer instances of such deaths than might be found in a period of ten
+years of ancient warfare. For excepting the Count Lodovico della
+Mirandola, who fell at Ferrara, when the Venetians a few years ago
+attacked that city, and the Duke de Nemours, slain at Cirignuola, we
+have no instance of any commander being killed by artillery. For, at
+Ravenna, M. de Foix died by steel and not by shot. Wherefore I say that
+if men no longer perform deeds of individual prowess, it results not so
+much from the use of artillery, as from the faulty discipline and
+weakness of our armies, which being collectively without valour cannot
+display it in particular instances.
+
+As to the third assertion, that armies can no longer be brought to
+engage one another, and that war will soon come to be carried on wholly
+with artillery, I maintain that this allegation is utterly untrue, and
+will always be so held by those who are willing in handling their
+troops to follow the usages of ancient valour. For whosoever would have
+a good army must train it, either by real or by mimic warfare, to
+approach the enemy, to come within sword-thrust, and to grapple with
+him; and must rely more on foot soldiers than on horse, for reasons
+presently to be explained. But when you trust to your foot-soldiers,
+and to the methods already indicated, artillery becomes powerless to
+harm you. For foot-soldiers, in approaching an enemy, can with more
+ease escape the fire of his artillery than in ancient times they could
+have avoided a charge of elephants or of scythed chariots, or any other
+of those strange contrivances which had to be encountered by the
+Romans, and against which they always devised some remedy. And,
+certainly, as against artillery, their remedy would have been easier,
+by as much as the time during which artillery can do hurt is shorter
+than the time during which elephants and chariots could. For by these
+you were thrown into disorder after battle joined, whereas artillery
+harasses you only before you engage; a danger which infantry can easily
+escape, either by advancing so as to be covered by the inequalities of
+the ground, or by lying down while the firing continues; nay, we find
+from experience that even these precautions may be dispensed with,
+especially as against great artillery, which can hardly be levelled
+with such precision that its fire shall not either pass over your head
+from the range being too high, or fall short from its being too low.
+
+So soon, however, as the engagement is begun, it is perfectly clear
+that neither small nor great artillery can harm you any longer; since,
+if the enemy have his artillerymen in front, you take them; if in rear,
+they will injure him before they injure you; and if in flank, they can
+never fire so effectively as to prevent your closing, with the result
+already explained. Nor does this admit of much dispute, since we have
+proof of it in the case of the Swiss at Novara, in the year 1513, when,
+with neither guns nor cavalry, they advanced against the French army,
+who had fortified themselves with artillery behind entrenchments, and
+routed them without suffering the slightest check from their fire. In
+further explanation whereof it is to be noted, that to work artillery
+effectively it should be protected by walls, by ditches, or by
+earth-works; and that whenever, from being left without such protection
+it has to be defended by men, as happens in pitched battles and
+engagements in the open field, it is either taken or otherwise becomes
+useless. Nor can it be employed on the flank of an army, save in the
+manner in which the ancients made use of their warlike engines, which
+they moved out from their columns that they might be worked without
+inconvenience, but withdrew within them when driven back by cavalry or
+other troops. He who looks for any further advantage from artillery
+does not rightly understand its nature, and trusts to what is most
+likely to deceive him. For although the Turk, using artillery, has
+gained victories over the Soldan and the Sofi, the only advantage he
+has had from it has been the terror into which the horses of the enemy,
+unused to such sounds, are thrown by the roar of the guns.
+
+And now, to bring these remarks to a conclusion, I say briefly that,
+employed by an army wherein there is some strain of the ancient valour,
+artillery is useful; but employed otherwise, against a brave adversary,
+is utterly useless.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XVIII.—_That the authority of the Romans and the example of
+ancient Warfare should make us hold Foot Soldiers of more account than
+Horse._
+
+
+By many arguments and instances it can be clearly established that in
+their military enterprises the Romans set far more store on their
+infantry than on their cavalry, and trusted to the former to carry out
+all the chief objects which their armies were meant to effect. Among
+many other examples of this, we may notice the great battle which they
+fought with the Latins near the lake Regillus, where to steady their
+wavering ranks they made their horsemen dismount, and renewing the
+combat on foot obtained a victory. Here we see plainly that the Romans
+had more confidence in themselves when they fought on foot than when
+they fought on horseback. The same expedient was resorted to by them in
+many of their other battles, and always in their sorest need they found
+it their surest stay.
+
+Nor are we to condemn the practice in deference to the opinion of
+Hannibal, who, at the battle of Cannæ, on seeing the consuls make the
+horsemen dismount, said scoffingly, “_Better still had they delivered
+their knights to me in chains._” For though this saying came from the
+mouth of a most excellent soldier, still, if we are to regard
+authority, we ought rather to follow the authority of a commonwealth
+like Rome, and of the many great captains who served her, than that of
+Hannibal alone. But, apart from authority, there are manifest reasons
+to bear out what I say. For a man may go on foot into many places where
+a horse cannot go; men can be taught to keep rank, and if thrown into
+disorder to recover form; whereas, it is difficult to keep horses in
+line, and impossible if once they be thrown into disorder to reform
+them. Moreover we find that with horses as with men, some have little
+courage and some much; and that often a spirited horse is ridden by a
+faint-hearted rider, or a dull horse by a courageous rider, and that in
+whatever way such disparity is caused, confusion and disorder result.
+Again, infantry, when drawn up in column, can easily break and is not
+easily broken by cavalry. This is vouched, not only by many ancient and
+many modern instances, but also by the authority of those who lay down
+rules for the government of States, who show that at first wars were
+carried on by mounted soldiers, because the methods for arraying
+infantry were not yet understood, but that so soon as these were
+discovered, the superiority of foot over horse was at once recognized.
+In saying this, I would not have it supposed that horsemen are not of
+the greatest use in armies, whether for purposes of observation, for
+harrying and laying waste the enemy’s country, for pursuing a
+retreating foe or helping to repulse his cavalry. But the substance and
+sinew of an army, and that part of it which ought constantly to be most
+considered, should always be the infantry. And among sins of the
+Italian princes who have made their country the slave of foreigners,
+there is none worse than that they have held these arms in contempt,
+and turned their whole attention to mounted troops.
+
+This error is due to the craft of our captains and to the ignorance of
+our rulers. For the control of the armies of Italy for the last five
+and twenty years resting in the hands of men, who, as having no lands
+of their own, may be looked on as mere soldiers of fortune, these fell
+forthwith on contriving how they might maintain their credit by being
+supplied with the arms which the princes of the country were without.
+And as they had no subjects of their own of whom they could make use,
+and could not obtain constant employment and pay for a large number of
+foot-soldiers, and as a small number would have given them no
+importance, they had recourse to horsemen. For a _condottiere_ drawing
+pay for two or three hundred horsemen was maintained by them in the
+highest credit, and yet the cost was not too great to be met by the
+princes who employed him. And to effect their object with more ease,
+and increase their credit still further, these adventurers would allow
+no merit or favour to be due to foot-soldiers, but claimed all for
+their horsemen. And to such a length was this bad system carried, that
+in the very greatest army only the smallest sprinkling of infantry was
+to be found. This, together with many other ill practices which
+accompanied it, has so weakened the militia of Italy, that the country
+has easily been trampled upon by all the nations of the North.
+
+That it is a mistake to make more account of cavalry than of infantry,
+may be still more clearly seen from another example taken from Roman
+history. The Romans being engaged on the siege of Sora, a troop of
+horse a sally from the town to attack their camp; when the Roman master
+of the knights advancing with his own horsemen to give them battle, it
+so chanced that, at the very first onset, the leaders on both sides
+were slain. Both parties being thus left without commanders, and the
+combat, nevertheless, continuing, the Romans thinking thereby to have
+the advantage of their adversaries, alighted from horseback, obliging
+the enemy’s cavalry, in order to defend themselves, to do the like. The
+result was that the Romans had the victory. Now there could be no
+stronger instance than this to show the superiority of foot over horse.
+For while in other battles the Roman cavalry were made by their consuls
+to dismount in order to succour their infantry who were in distress and
+in need of such aid, on this occasion they dismounted, not to succour
+their infantry, nor to encounter an enemy contending on foot, but
+because they saw that though they could not prevail against the enemy
+fighting as horsemen against horsemen, on foot they readily might. And
+from this I conclude that foot-soldiers, if rightly handled, can hardly
+be beaten except by other soldiers fighting on foot.
+
+With very few cavalry, but with a considerable force of infantry, the
+Roman commanders, Crassus and Marcus Antonius, each for many days
+together overran the territories of the Parthians, although opposed by
+the countless horsemen of that nation. Crassus, indeed, with the
+greater part of his army, was left there dead, and Antonius only saved
+himself by his valour; but even in the extremities to which the Romans
+were then brought, see how greatly superior foot-soldiers are to horse.
+For though fighting in an open country, far from the sea-coast, and cut
+off from his supplies, Antonius proved himself a valiant soldier in the
+judgment even of the Parthians themselves, the whole strength of whose
+cavalry never ventured to attack the columns of his army. And though
+Crassus perished there, any one who reads attentively the account of
+his expedition must see that he was rather outwitted than defeated, and
+that even when his condition was desperate, the Parthians durst not
+close with him, but effected his destruction by hanging continually on
+the flanks of his army, and intercepting his supplies, while cajoling
+him with promises which they never kept.
+
+It might, I grant, be harder to demonstrate this great superiority of
+foot over horse, had we not very many modern examples affording the
+clearest proof of it. For instance, at the battle of Novara, of which
+we have already spoken, nine thousand Swiss foot were seen to attack
+ten thousand cavalry together with an equal number of infantry, and to
+defeat them; the cavalry being powerless to injure them, while of the
+infantry, who were mostly Gascons, and badly disciplined, they made no
+account. On another occasion we have seen twenty-six thousand Swiss
+march on Milan to attack Francis I. of France, who had with him twenty
+thousand men-at-arms, forty thousand foot, and a hundred pieces of
+artillery; and although they were not victorious as at Novara, they
+nevertheless fought valiantly for two days together, and, in the end,
+though beaten, were able to bring off half their number. With
+foot-soldiers only Marcus Attilius Regulus ventured to oppose himself,
+not to cavalry merely, but to elephants; and if the attempt failed it
+does not follow that he was not justified by the valour of his men in
+believing them equal to surmount this danger.
+
+I repeat, therefore, that to prevail against well-disciplined infantry,
+you must meet them with infantry disciplined still better, and that
+otherwise you advance to certain destruction. In the time of Filippo
+Visconti, Duke of Milan, some sixteen thousand Swiss made a descent on
+Lombardy, whereupon the Duke, who at that time had Il Carmagnola as his
+captain, sent him with six thousand men-at-arms and a slender following
+of foot-soldiers to meet them. Not knowing their manner of fighting,
+Carmagnola fell upon them with his horsemen, expecting to put them at
+once to rout; but finding them immovable, after losing many of his men
+he withdrew. But, being a most wise captain, and skilful in devising
+new remedies to meet unwonted dangers, after reinforcing his company he
+again advanced to the attack; and when about to engage made all his
+men-at-arms dismount, and placing them in front of his foot-soldiers,
+fell once more upon the Swiss, who could then no longer withstand him.
+For his men, being on foot and well armed, easily penetrated the Swiss
+ranks without hurt to themselves; and getting among them, had no
+difficulty in cutting them down, so that of the entire army of the
+Swiss those only escaped who were spared by his humanity.
+
+Of this difference in the efficiency of these two kinds of troops, many
+I believe are aware; but such is the unhappiness and perversity of the
+times in which we live, that neither ancient nor modern examples, nor
+even the consciousness of error, can move our present princes to amend
+their ways, or convince them that to restore credit to the arms of a
+State or province, it is necessary to revive this branch of their
+militia also, to keep it near them, to make much of it, and to give it
+life, that in return, it may give back life and reputation to them. But
+as they have departed from all those other methods already spoken of,
+so have they departed from this, and with this result, that to them the
+acquisition of territory is rather a loss than a gain, as presently
+shall be shown.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XIX.—_That Acquisitions made by ill-governed States and such as
+follow not the valiant methods of the Romans, tend rather to their Ruin
+than to their Aggrandizement_.
+
+
+To these false opinions, founded on the pernicious example first set by
+the present corrupt age, we owe it, that no man thinks of departing
+from the methods which are in use. It had been impossible, for
+instance, some thirty years ago, to persuade an Italian that ten
+thousand foot-soldiers could, on plain ground, attack ten thousand
+cavalry together with an equal number of infantry; and not merely
+attack, but defeat them; as we saw done by the Swiss at that battle of
+Novara, to which I have already referred so often. For although history
+abounds in similar examples, none would have believed them, or,
+believing them, would have said that nowadays men are so much better
+armed, that a squadron of cavalry could shatter a rock, to say nothing
+of a column of infantry. With such false pleas would they have belied
+their judgment, taking no account that with a very scanty force of
+foot-soldiers, Lucullus routed a hundred and fifty thousand of the
+cavalry of Tigranes, among whom were a body of horsemen very nearly
+resembling our own men-at-arms. Now, however, this error is
+demonstrated by the example of the northern nations.
+
+And since what history teaches as to the superiority of foot-soldiers
+is thus proved to be true, men ought likewise to believe that the other
+methods practised by the ancients are in like manner salutary and
+useful. And were this once accepted, both princes and commonwealths
+would make fewer blunders than they do, would be stronger to resist
+sudden attack, and would no longer place their sole hope of safety in
+flight; while those who take in hand to provide a State with new
+institutions would know better what direction to give them, whether in
+the way of extending or merely of preserving; and would see that to
+augment the numbers of their citizens, to assume other States as
+companions rather than reduce them to subjection, to send out colonies
+for the defence of acquired territories, to hold their spoils at the
+credit of the common stock, to overcome enemies by inroads and pitched
+battles rather than by sieges, to enrich the public purse, keep down
+private wealth, and zealously, to maintain all military exercises, are
+the true ways to aggrandize a State and to extend its empire. Or if
+these methods for adding to their power are not to their mind, let them
+remember that acquisitions made in any other way are the ruin of
+republics, and so set bounds to their ambition, wisely regulating the
+internal government of their country by suitable laws and ordinances,
+forbidding extension, and looking only to defence, and taking heed that
+their defences are in good order, as do those republics of Germany
+which live and for long have lived, in freedom.
+
+And yet, as I have said on another occasion, when speaking of the
+difference between the methods suitable for acquiring and those
+suitable for maintaining, it is impossible for a republic to remain
+long in the peaceful enjoyment of freedom within a restricted frontier.
+For should it forbear from molesting others, others are not likely to
+refrain from molesting it; whence must grow at once the desire and the
+necessity to make acquisitions; or should no enemies be found abroad,
+they will be found at home, for this seems to be incidental to all
+great States. And if the free States of Germany are, and have long been
+able to maintain themselves on their present footing, this arises from
+certain conditions peculiar to that country, and to be found nowhere
+else, without which these communities could not go on living as they
+do.
+
+The district of Germany of which I speak was formerly subject to the
+Roman Empire, in the same way as France and Spain; but on the decline
+of the Empire, and when its very name came to be limited to this one
+province, its more powerful cities taking advantage of the weakness and
+necessities of the Emperors, began to free themselves by buying from
+them their liberty, subject to the payment of a trifling yearly
+tribute; until, gradually, all the cities which held directly from the
+Emperor, and were not subject to any intermediate lord, had, in like
+manner, purchased their freedom. While this went on, it so happened
+that certain communities subject to the Duke of Austria, among which
+were Friburg, the people of Schweitz, and the like, rose in rebellion
+against him, and meeting at the outset with good success, by degrees
+acquired such accession of strength that so far from returning under
+the Austrian yoke, they are become formidable to all their neighbours
+These are the States which we now name Swiss.
+
+Germany is, consequently, divided between the Swiss, the communities
+which take the name of Free Towns, the Princes, and the Emperor; and
+the reason why, amid so many conflicting interests, wars do not break
+out, or breaking out are of short continuance, is the reverence in
+which all hold this symbol of the Imperial authority. For although the
+Emperor be without strength of his own, he has nevertheless such credit
+with all these others that he alone can keep them united, and,
+interposing as mediator, can speedily repress by his influence any
+dissensions among them.
+
+The greatest and most protracted wars which have taken place in this
+country have been those between the Swiss and the Duke of Austria; and
+although for many years past the Empire and the dukedom of Austria have
+been united in the same man, he has always failed to subdue the
+stubbornness of the Swiss, who are never to be brought to terms save by
+force. Nor has the rest of Germany lent the Emperor much assistance in
+his wars with the Swiss, the Free Towns being little disposed to attack
+others whose desire is to live as they themselves do, in freedom; while
+the Princes of the Empire either are so poor that they cannot, or from
+jealousy of the power of the Emperor will not, take part with him
+against them.
+
+These communities, therefore, abide contented within their narrow
+confines, because, having regard to the Imperial authority, they have
+no occasion to desire greater; and are at the same time obliged to live
+in unity within their walls, because an enemy is always at hand, and
+ready to take advantage of their divisions to effect an entrance. But
+were the circumstances of the country other than they are these
+communities would be forced to make attempts to extend their dominions,
+and be constrained to relinquish their present peaceful mode of life.
+And since the same conditions are not found elsewhere, other nations
+cannot adopt this way of living, but are compelled to extend their
+power either by means of leagues, or else by the methods used by the
+Romans; and any one who should act otherwise would find not safety but
+rather death and destruction. For since in a thousand ways, and from
+causes innumerable, conquests are surrounded with dangers, it may well
+happen that in adding to our dominions, we add nothing to our strength;
+but whosoever increases not his strength while he adds to his
+dominions, must needs be ruined. He who is impoverished by his wars,
+even should he come off victorious, can add nothing to his strength,
+since he spends more than he gains, as the Venetians and Florentines
+have done. For Venice has been far feebler since she acquired Lombardy,
+and Florence since she acquired Tuscany, than when the one was content
+to be mistress of the seas, and the other of the lands lying within six
+miles from her walls. And this from their eagerness to acquire without
+knowing what way to take. For which ignorance these States are the more
+to be blamed in proportion as there is less to excuse them; since they
+had seen what methods were used by the Romans, and could have followed
+in their footsteps; whereas the Romans, without any example set them,
+were able by their own prudence to shape a course for themselves.
+
+But even to well-governed States, their conquests may chance to
+occasion much harm; as when some city or province is acquired abounding
+in luxury and delights, by whose manners the conqueror becomes
+infected; as happened first to the Romans, and afterwards to Hannibal
+on taking possession of Capua. And had Capua been at such a distance
+from Rome that a ready remedy could not have been applied to the
+disorders of the soldiery, or had Rome herself been in any degree
+tainted with corruption, this acquisition had certainly proved her
+ruin. To which Titus Livius bears witness when he says, “_Most
+mischievous at this time to our military discipline was Capua; for
+ministering to all delights, she turned away the corrupted minds of our
+soldiers from the remembrance of their country_.” And, truly, cities
+and provinces like this, avenge themselves on their conquerors without
+blood or blow; since by infecting them with their own evil customs they
+prepare them for defeat at the hands of any assailant. Nor could the
+subject have been better handled than by Juvenal, where he says in his
+Satires, that into the hearts of the Romans, through their conquests in
+foreign lands, foreign manners found their way; and in place of
+frugality and other admirable virtues—
+
+“Came luxury more mortal than the sword,
+And settling down, avenged a vanquished world.”[8]
+
+
+ [8] Sævior armis
+Luxuria occubuit victumque ulciscitur orbem.
+          _Juv. Sat_. vi. 292.
+
+
+And if their conquests were like to be fatal to the Romans at a time
+when they were still animated by great virtue and prudence, how must it
+fare with those who follow methods altogether different from theirs,
+and who, to crown their other errors of which we have already said
+enough, resort to auxiliary and mercenary arms, bringing upon
+themselves those dangers whereof mention shall be made in the Chapter
+following.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XX.—_Of the Dangers incurred by Princes or Republics who resort
+to Auxiliary or Mercenary Arms_.
+
+
+Had I not already, in another treatise, enlarged on the inutility of
+mercenary and auxiliary, and on the usefulness of national arms, I
+should dwell on these matters in the present Discourse more at length
+than it is my design to do. For having given the subject very full
+consideration elsewhere, here I would be brief. Still when I find Titus
+Livius supplying a complete example of what we have to look for from
+auxiliaries, by whom I mean troops sent to our assistance by some other
+prince or ruler, paid by him and under officers by him appointed, it is
+not fit that I should pass it by in silence.
+
+It is related, then, by our historian, that the Romans, after defeating
+on two different occasions armies of the Samnites with forces sent by
+them to succour the Capuans, whom they thus relieved from the war which
+the Samnites Were waging against them, being desirious to return to
+Rome, left behind two legions to defend the Capuans, that the latter
+might not, from being altogether deprived of their protection, once
+more become a prey to the Samnites. But these two legions, rotting in
+idleness began to take such delight therein, that forgetful of their
+country and the reverence due to the senate, they resolved to seize by
+violence the city they had been left to guard by their valour. For to
+them it seemed that the citizens of Capua were unworthy to enjoy
+advantages which they knew not how to defend. The Romans, however,
+getting timely notice of this design, at once met and defeated it, in
+the manner to be more fully noticed when I come to treat of
+conspiracies.
+
+Once more then, I repeat, that of all the various kinds of troops,
+auxiliaries are the most pernicious, because the prince or republic
+resorting to them for aid has no authority over them, the only person
+who possesses such authority being he who sends them. For, as I have
+said, auxiliary troops are those sent to your assistance by some other
+potentate, under his own flag, under his own officers, and in his own
+pay, as were the legions sent by the Romans to Capua. Such troops, if
+victorious, will for the most part plunder him by whom, as well as him
+against whom, they are hired to fight; and this they do, sometimes at
+the instigation of the potentate who sends them, sometimes for
+ambitious ends of their own. It was not the purpose of the Romans to
+violate the league and treaty which they had made with Capua; but to
+their soldiers it seemed so easy a matter to master the Capuans, that
+they were readily led into this plot for depriving them of their town
+and territories. Many other examples might be given to the same effect,
+but it is enough to mention besides this instance, that of the people
+of Regium, who were deprived of their city and of their lives by
+another Roman legion sent for their protection.
+
+Princes and republics, therefore, should resort to any other expedient
+for the defence of their States sooner than call in hired auxiliaries,
+when they have to rest their entire hopes of safety on them; since any
+accord or terms, however hard, which you may make with your enemy, will
+be carefully studied and current events well considered, it will be
+seen that for one who has succeeded with such assistance, hundreds have
+been betrayed. Nor, in truth, can any better opportunity for usurping a
+city or province present itself to an ambitious prince or commonwealth,
+than to be asked to send an army for its defence. On the other hand, he
+who is so greedy of conquest as to summon such help, not for purposes
+of defence but in order to attack others, seeks to have what he can
+never hold and is most likely to be taken from him by the very person
+who helps him to gain it. Yet such is the perversity of men that, to
+gratify the desire of the moment, they shut their eyes to those ills
+which must speedily ensue and are no more moved by example in this
+matter than in all those others of which I have spoken; for were they
+moved by these examples they would see that the more disposed they are
+to deal generously with their neighbours, and the more averse they are
+to usurp authority over them, the readier will these be to throw
+themselves into their arms; as will at once appear from the case of the
+Capuans.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XXI.—_That Capua was the first City to which the Romans sent a
+Prætor; nor there, until four hundred years after they began to make
+War._
+
+
+The great difference between the methods followed by the ancient Romans
+in adding to their dominions, and those used for that purpose by the
+States of the present time, has now been sufficiently discussed. It has
+been seen, too how in dealing with the cities which they did not think
+fit to destroy, and even with those which had made their submission not
+as companions but as subjects, it was customary with the Romans to
+permit them to live on under their own laws, without imposing any
+outward sign of dependence, merely binding them to certain conditions,
+or complying with which they were maintained in their former dignity
+and importance. We know, further, that the same methods continued to be
+followed by the Romans until they passed beyond the confines of Italy,
+and began to reduce foreign kingdoms and States to provinces: as
+plainly appears in the fact that Capua was the first city to which they
+sent a prætor, and him from no motive of ambition, but at the request
+of the Capuans themselves who, living at variance with one another,
+thought it necessary to have a Roman citizen in their town who might
+restore unity and good order among them. Influenced by this example,
+and urged by the same need, the people of Antium were the next to ask
+that they too might have a prætor given them; touching which request
+and in connection with which new method of governing, Titus Livius
+observes, “_that not the arms only but also the laws of Rome now began
+to exert an influence;_” showing how much the course thus followed by
+the Romans promoted the growth of their authority.
+
+For those cities, more especially, which have been used to freedom or
+to be governed by their own citizens, rest far better satisfied with a
+government which they do not see, even though it involve something of
+oppression, than with one which standing constantly before their eyes,
+seems every day to reproach them with the disgrace of servitude. And to
+the prince there is another advantage in this method of government,
+namely, that as the judges and magistrates who administer the laws
+civil and criminal within these cities, are not under his control, no
+decision of theirs can throw responsibility or discredit upon him; so
+that he thus escapes many occasions of calumny and hatred. Of the truth
+whereof, besides the ancient instances which might be noted, we have a
+recent example here in Italy. For Genoa, as every one knows, has many
+times been occupied by the French king, who always, until lately, sent
+thither a French governor to rule in his name. Recently, however, not
+from choice but of necessity, he has permitted the town to be
+self-governed under a Genoese ruler; and any one who had to decide
+which of these two methods of governing gives the greater security to
+the king’s authority and the greater content to the people themselves,
+would assuredly have to pronounce in favour of the latter.
+
+Men, moreover, in proportion as they see you averse to usurp authority
+over them, grow the readier to surrender themselves into your hands;
+and fear you less on the score of their freedom, when they find you
+acting towards them with consideration and kindness. It was the display
+of these qualities that moved the Capuans to ask the Romans for a
+prætor; for had the Romans betrayed the least eagerness to send them
+one, they would at once have conceived jealousy and grown estranged.
+
+But why turn for examples to Capua and Rome, when we have them close at
+hand in Tuscany and Florence? Who is there but knows what a time it is
+since the city of Pistoja submitted of her own accord to the Florentine
+supremacy? Who, again, but knows the animosity which down to the
+present day exists between Florence and the cities of Pisa, Lucca, and
+Siena? This difference of feeling does not arise from the citizens of
+Pistoja valuing their freedom less than the citizens of these other
+towns or thinking themselves inferior to them, but from the Florentines
+having always acted towards the former as brothers, towards the latter
+as foes. This it was that led the Pistojans to come voluntarily under
+our authority while the others have done and do all in their power to
+escape it. For there seems no reason to doubt, that if Florence,
+instead of exasperating these neighbours of hers, had sought to win
+them over, either by entering into league with them or by lending them
+assistance, she would at this hour have been mistress of Tuscany. Not
+that I would be understood to maintain that recourse is never to be had
+to force and to arms, but that these are only to be used in the last
+resort, and when all other remedies are unavailing.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XXII.—_That in matters of moment Men often judge amiss._
+
+
+How falsely men often judge of things, they who are present at their
+deliberations have constant occasion to know. For in many matters,
+unless these deliberations be guided by men of great parts, the
+conclusions come to are certain to be wrong. And because in corrupt
+republics, and especially in quiet times, either through jealousy or
+from other like causes, men of great ability are often obliged to stand
+aloof, it follows that measures not good in themselves are by a common
+error judged to be good, or are promoted by those who seek public
+favour rather than the public advantage. Mistakes of this sort are
+found out afterwards in seasons of adversity, when recourse must be had
+to those persons who in peaceful times had been, as it were, forgotten,
+as shall hereafter in its proper place be more fully explained. Cases,
+moreover, arise in which those who have little experience of affairs
+are sure to be misled, from the matters with which they have to deal
+being attended by many deceptive appearances such as lead men to
+believe whatsoever they are minded to believe.
+
+These remarks I make with reference to the false hopes which the
+Latins, after being defeated by the Romans, were led to form on the
+persuasion of their prætor Numitius, and also with reference to what
+was believed by many a few years ago, when Francis, king of France,
+came to recover Milan from the Swiss. For Francis of Angoulême,
+succeeding on the death of Louis XII. to the throne of France, and
+desiring to recover for that realm the Duchy of Milan, on which, some
+years before, the Swiss had seized at the instance of Pope Julius,
+sought for allies in Italy to second him in his attempt; and besides
+the Venetians, who had already been gained over by King Louis,
+endeavoured to secure the aid of the Florentines and Pope Leo X.;
+thinking that were he to succeed in getting these others to take part
+with him, his enterprise would be easier. For the forces of the Spanish
+king were then in Lombardy, and the army of the Emperor at Verona.
+
+Pope Leo, however, did not fall in with the wishes of Francis, being,
+it is said, persuaded by his advisers that his best course was to stand
+neutral. For they urged that it was not for the advantage of the Church
+to have powerful strangers, whether French or Swiss, in Italy; but that
+to restore the country to its ancient freedom, it must be delivered
+from the yoke of both. And since to conquer both, whether singly or
+together, was impossible, it was to be desired that the one should
+overthrow the other, after which the Church with her friends might fall
+upon the victor. And it was averred that no better opportunity for
+carrying out this design could ever be found than then presented
+itself; for both the French and the Swiss were in the field; while the
+Pope had his troops in readiness to appear on the Lombard frontier and
+in the vicinity of the two armies, where, under colour of watching his
+own interests, he could easily keep them until the opposed hosts came
+to an engagement; when, as both armies were full of courage, their
+encounter might be expected to be a bloody one, and likely to leave the
+victor so weakened that it would be easy for the Pope to attack and
+defeat him; and so, to his own great glory, remain master of Lombardy
+and supreme throughout Italy.
+
+How baseless this expectation was, was seen from the event. For the
+Swiss being routed after a protracted combat, the troops of the Pope
+and Spain, so far from venturing to attack the conqueror, prepared for
+flight; nor would flight have saved them, had not the humanity or
+indifference of the king withheld him from pursuing his victory, and
+disposed him to make terms with the Church.
+
+The arguments put forward by the Pope’s advisers had a certain show of
+reason in their favour, which looked at from a distance seemed
+plausible enough; but were in reality wholly contrary to truth; since
+it rarely happens that the captain who wins a victory loses any great
+number of his men, his loss being in battle only, and not in flight.
+For in the heat of battle, while men stand face to face, but few fall,
+chiefly because such combats do not last long; and even when they do
+last, and many of the victorious army are slain, so splendid is the
+reputation which attends a victory, and so great the terror it
+inspires, as far to outweigh any loss the victor suffers by the
+slaughter of his soldiers; so that an enemy who, trusting to find him
+weakened, should then venture to attack him, would soon be taught his
+mistake, unless strong enough to give him battle at any time, before
+his victory as well as after. For in that case he might, as fortune and
+valour should determine, either win or lose; though, even then, the
+army which had first fought and won would have an advantage. And this
+we know for a truth from what befell the Latins in consequence of the
+mistake made by Numitius their prætor, and their blindness in believing
+him. For when they had already suffered defeat at the hands of the
+Romans, Numitius caused it to be proclaimed throughout the whole
+country of Latium, that now was the time to fall upon the enemy,
+exhausted by a struggle in which they were victorious only in name,
+while in reality suffering all those ills which attend defeat, and who
+might easily be crushed by any fresh force brought against them.
+Whereupon the Latins believed him, and getting together a new army,
+were forthwith routed with such loss as always awaits those who listen
+to like counsels.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XXIII.—_That in chastising their Subjects when circumstances
+required it the Romans always avoided half-measures._
+
+
+“Such _was now the state of affairs in Latium, that peace and war
+seemed alike intolerable_.” No worse calamity can befall a prince or
+commonwealth than to be reduced to such straits that they can neither
+accept peace nor support war; as is the case with those whom it would
+ruin to conclude peace on the terms offered, while war obliges them
+either to yield themselves a spoil to their allies, or remain a prey to
+their foes. To this grievous alternative are men led by evil counsels
+and unwise courses, and, as already said, from not rightly measuring
+their strength. For the commonwealth or prince who has rightly measured
+his strength, can hardly be brought so low as were the Latins, who made
+war with the Romans when they should have made terms, and made terms
+when they should have made war, and so mismanaged everything that the
+friendship and the enmity of Rome were alike fatal. Whence it came
+that, in the first place, they were defeated and broken by Manlius
+Torquatus, and afterwards utterly subdued by Camillus; who, when he had
+forced them to surrender at discretion to the Roman arms, and had
+placed garrisons in all their towns, and taken hostages from all,
+returned to Rome and reported to the senate that the whole of Latium
+now lay at their mercy.
+
+And because the sentence then passed by the senate is memorable, and
+worthy to be studied by princes that it may be imitated by them on like
+occasion, I shall cite the exact words which Livius puts into the mouth
+of Camillus, as confirming what I have already said touching the
+methods used by the Romans to extend their power, and as showing how in
+chastising their subjects they always avoided half-measures and took a
+decided course. For government consists in nothing else than in so
+controlling your subjects that it shall neither be in their power nor
+for their interest to harm you. And this is effected either by making
+such sure work with them as puts it out of their power to do you
+injury, or else by so loading them with benefits that it would be folly
+in them to seek to alter their condition. All which is implied first in
+the measures proposed by Camillus, and next in the resolutions passed
+on these proposals by the senate. The words of Camillus were as
+follows: “_The immortal gods have made you so entirely masters in the
+matter you are now considering, that_ _it lies with you to pronounce
+whether Latium shall or shall not longer exist. So far as the Latins
+are concerned, you can secure a lasting peace either by clemency or by
+severity. Would you deal harshly with those whom you have conquered and
+who have given themselves into your hands, you can blot out the whole
+Latin nation. Would you, after the fashion of our ancestors, increase
+the strength of Rome by admitting the vanquished to the rights of
+citizenship, here you have opportunity to do so, and with the greatest
+glory to yourselves. That, assuredly, is the strongest government which
+they rejoice in who obey it. Now, then, is your time, while the minds
+of all are bent on what is about to happen, to obtain an ascendency
+over them, either by punishment or by benefits._”
+
+Upon this motion the senate resolved, in accordance with the advice
+given by the consul, to take the case of each city separately, and
+either destroy utterly or else treat with tenderness all the more
+important of the Latin towns. To those cities they dealt with
+leniently, they granted exemptions and privileges, conferring upon them
+the rights of citizenship, and securing their welfare in every
+particular. The others they razed to the ground, and planting colonies
+in their room, either removed the inhabitants to Rome, or so scattered
+and dispersed them that neither by arms nor by counsels was it ever
+again in their power to inflict hurt. For, as I have said already, the
+Romans never, in matters of moment, resorted to half-measures. And the
+sentence which they then pronounced should be a pattern for all rulers,
+and ought to have been followed by the Florentines when, in the year
+1502, Arezzo and all the Val di Chiana rose in revolt. For had they
+followed it, they would have established their authority on a surer
+footing, and added much to the greatness of their city by securing for
+it those lands which are needed to supply it with the necessaries of
+life. But pursuing that half-hearted policy which is most mischievous
+in executing justice, some of the Aretines they outlawed, some they
+condemned to death, and all they deprived of their dignities and
+ancient importance in their town, while leaving the town itself
+untouched. And if in the councils then held any Florentine recommended
+that Arezzo should be dismantled, they who thought themselves wiser
+than their fellows objected, that to do so would be little to the
+honour of our republic, since it would look as though she lacked
+strength to hold it. Reasons like this are of a sort which seem sound,
+but are not really so; for, by the same rule, no parricide should be
+put to death, nor any other malefactor, however atrocious his crimes;
+because, forsooth, it would be discreditable to the ruler to appear
+unequal to the control of a single criminal. They who hold such
+opinions fail to see that when men individually, or entire cities
+collectively, offend against the State, the prince for his own safety,
+and as a warning to others, has no alternative but to make an end of
+them; and that true honour lies in being able and in knowing how to
+chastise such offenders, and not in incurring endless dangers in the
+effort to retain them. For the prince who does not chastise offenders
+in a way that puts it out of their power to offend again, is accounted
+unwise or worthless.
+
+How necessary it was for the Romans to execute Justice against the
+Latins, is further seen from the course took with the men of Privernum.
+And here the text of Livius suggests two points for our attention:
+first, as already noted, that a subjugated people is either to be
+caressed or crushed; and second, how much it is for our advantage to
+maintain a manly bearing, and to speak the truth fearlessly in the
+presence of the wise. For the senate being met to determine the fate of
+the citizens of Privernum, who after rebelling had been reduced to
+submission by the Roman arms, certain of these citizens were sent by
+their countrymen to plead for pardon. When these had come into the
+presence of the senate, one of them was asked by a senator, “_What
+punishment he thought his fellow citizens deserved?_” To which he of
+Privernum answered, “_Such punishment as they deserve who deem
+themselves worthy of freedom._” “_But,_” said the consul, “_should we
+remit your punishment, what sort of peace can we hope to have with
+you?_” To which the other replied, “_If granted on fair terms, a firm
+and lasting peace; if on unfair, a peace of brief duration._” Upon
+this, though many of the senators were displeased, the wiser among them
+declared “_that they had heard the voice of freedom and manhood, and
+would never believe that the man or people who so spoke ought to remain
+longer than was needful in a position which gave them cause for shame;
+since that was a safe peace which was accepted willingly; whereas good
+faith could not be looked for where it was sought to impose
+servitude._” So saying, they decided that the people of Privernum
+should be admitted to Roman citizenship, with all the rights and
+privileges thereto appertaining; declaring that “_men whose only
+thought was for freedom, were indeed worthy to be Romans._” So pleasing
+was this true and high answer to generous minds, while any other must
+have seemed at once false and shameful. And they who judge otherwise of
+men, and of those men, especially, who have been used to be free, or so
+to think themselves, are mistaken; and are led through their mistake to
+adopt courses unprofitable for themselves and affording no content to
+others. Whence, the frequent rebellions and the downfall of States.
+
+But, returning to our subject, I conclude, as well from this instance
+of Privernum, as from the measures followed with the Latins, that when
+we have to pass sentence upon powerful States accustomed to live in
+freedom, we must either destroy them utterly, or else treat them with
+much indulgence; and that any other course we may take with them will
+be unprofitable. But most carefully should we avoid, as of all courses
+the most pernicious, such half-measures as were followed by the
+Samnites when they had the Romans shut up in the Caudine Forks, and
+would not listen to the counsels of the old man who urged them either
+to send their captives away with every honourable attention, or else
+put them all to death; but adopted a middle course, and after disarming
+them and making them pass under the yoke, suffered them to depart at
+once disgraced and angered. And no long time after, they found to their
+sorrow that the old man’s warning was true, and that the course they
+had themselves chosen was calamitous; as shall, hereafter, in its place
+be shown.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XXIV.—_That, commonly, Fortresses do much more Harm than Good_
+
+
+To the wise men of our day it may seem an oversight on the part of the
+Romans, that, when they sought to protect themselves against the men of
+Latium and Privernum, it never occurred to them to build strongholds in
+their cities to be a curb upon them, and insure their fidelity,
+especially when we remember the Florentine saying which these same wise
+men often quote, to the effect that Pisa and other like cities must be
+held by fortresses Doubtless, had those old Romans been like-minded
+with our modern sages, they would not have neglected to build
+themselves fortresses, but because they far surpassed them in courage,
+sense, and vigour, they refrained. And while Rome retained her freedom,
+and adhered to her own wise ordinances and wholesome usages, she never
+built a single fortress with the view to hold any city or province,
+though, sometimes, she may have suffered those to stand which she found
+already built.
+
+Looking, therefore, to the course followed by the Romans in this
+particular, and to that adopted by our modern rulers, it seems proper
+to consider whether or not it is advisable to build fortresses, and
+whether they are more likely to help or to hurt him who builds them In
+the first place, then, we are to remember that fortresses are built
+either as a defence against foreign foes or against subjects In the
+former case, I pronounce them unnecessary, in the latter mischievous.
+And to state the reasons why in the latter case they are mischievous, I
+say that when princes or republics are afraid of their subjects and in
+fear lest they rebel, this must proceed from knowing that their
+subjects hate them, which hatred in its turn results from their own ill
+conduct, and that again from their thinking themselves able to rule
+their subjects by mere force, or from their governing with little
+prudence. Now one of the causes which lead them to suppose that they
+can rule by mere force, is this very circumstance of their people
+having these fortresses on their backs So that the conduct which breeds
+hatred is itself mainly occasioned by these princes or republics being
+possessed of fortresses, which, if this be true, are really far more
+hurtful than useful First, because, as has been said already, they
+render a ruler bolder and more violent in his bearing towards his
+subjects, and, next, because they do not in reality afford him that
+security which he believes them to give For all those methods of
+violence and coercion which may be used to keep a people under, resolve
+themselves into two; since either like the Romans you must always have
+it in your power to bring a strong army into the field, or else you
+must dissipate, destroy, and disunite the subject people, and so divide
+and scatter them that they can never again combine to injure you For
+should you merely strip them of their wealth, _spoliatis arma
+supersunt_, arms still remain to them, or if you deprive them of their
+weapons, _furor arma ministrat_, rage will supply them, if you put
+their chiefs to death and continue to maltreat the rest, heads will
+renew themselves like those Hydra; while, if you build fortresses,
+these may serve in time of peace to make you bolder in outraging your
+subjects, but in time of war they will prove wholly useless, since they
+will be attacked at once by foes both foreign and domestic, whom
+together it will be impossible for you to resist. And if ever
+fortresses were useless they are so at the present day, by reason of
+the invention of artillery, against the fury of which, as I have shown
+already, a petty fortress which affords no room for retreat behind
+fresh works, cannot be defended.
+
+But to go deeper into the matter, I say, either you are a prince
+seeking by means of these fortresses to hold the people of your city in
+check; or you are a prince, or it may be a republic, desirous to
+control some city which you have gained in war. To the prince I would
+say, that, for the reasons already given, nothing can be more
+unserviceable than a fortress as a restraint upon your subjects, since
+it only makes you the readier to oppress them, and less scrupulous how
+you do so; while it is this very oppression which moves them to destroy
+you, and so kindles their hatred, that the fortress, which is the cause
+of all the mischief, is powerless to protect you. A wise and good
+prince, therefore, that he may continue good, and give no occasion or
+encouragement to his descendants to become evil, will never build a
+fortress, to the end that neither he nor they may ever be led to trust
+to it rather than to the good-will of their subjects. And if Francesco
+Sforza, who was accounted a wise ruler, on becoming Duke of Milan
+erected a fortress in that city, I say that herein he was unwise, and
+that the event has shown the building of this fortress to have been
+hurtful and not helpful to his heirs. For thinking that by its aid they
+could behave as badly as they liked to their citizens and subjects, and
+yet be secure, they refrained from no sort of violence or oppression,
+until, becoming beyond measure odious, they lost their State as soon as
+an enemy attacked it. Nor was this fortress, which in peace had
+occasioned them much hurt, any defence or of any service them in war.
+For had they being without it, through thoughtlessness, treated their
+subjects inhumanely, they must soon have discovered and withdrawn from
+their danger; and might, thereafter, with no other help than that of
+attached subjects, have withstood the attacks of the French far more
+successfully than they could with their fortress, but with subjects
+whom they had estranged.
+
+And, in truth, fortresses are unserviceable in every way, since they
+may be lost either by the treachery of those to whom you commit their
+defence, or by the overwhelming strength of an assailant, or else by
+famine. And where you seek to recover a State which you have lost, and
+in which only the fortress remains to you, if that fortress is to be of
+any service or assistance to you, you must have an army wherewith to
+attack the enemy who has driven you out. But with such an army you
+might succeed in recovering your State as readily without a fortress as
+with one; nay, perhaps, even more readily, since your subjects, had you
+not used them ill, from the overweening confidence your fortress gave
+you, might then have felt better disposed towards you. And the event
+shows that in times of adversity this very fortress of Milan has been
+of no advantage whatever, either to the Sforzas or to the French; but,
+on the contrary, has brought ruin on both, because, trusting to it,
+they did not turn their thoughts to nobler methods for preserving that
+State. Guido Ubaldo, duke of Urbino and son to Duke Federigo, who in
+his day was a warrior of much renown, but who was driven from his
+dominions by Cesare Borgia, son to Pope Alexander VI., when afterwards,
+by a sudden stroke of good fortune, he was restored to the dukedom
+caused all the fortresses of the country to be dismantled, judging them
+to be hurtful. For as he was beloved by his subjects, so far as they
+were concerned he had no need for fortresses; while, as against foreign
+enemies, he saw he could not defend them, since this would have
+required an army kept constantly in the field. For which reasons he
+made them be razed to the ground.
+
+When Pope Julius II. had driven the Bentivogli from Bologna, after
+erecting a citadel in that town, he caused the people to be cruelly
+oppressed by his governor; whereupon, the people rebelled, and he
+forthwith lost the citadel; so that his citadel, and the oppressions to
+which it led, were of less service to him than different behaviour on
+his part had been. When Niccolo da Castello, the ancestor of the
+Vitelli, returned to his country out of exile, he straightway pulled
+down the two fortresses built there by Pope Sixtus IV., perceiving that
+it was not by fortresses, but by the good-will of the people, that he
+could be maintained in his government.
+
+But the most recent, and in all respects most noteworthy instance, and
+that which best demonstrates the futility of building, and the
+advantage of destroying fortresses, is what happened only the other day
+in Genoa. Every one knows how, in 1507, Genoa rose in rebellion against
+Louis XII. of France, who came in person and with all his forces to
+recover it; and after recovering it built there a citadel stronger than
+any before known, being, both from its position and from every other
+circumstance, most inaccessible to attack. For standing on the
+extremity of a hill, named by the Genoese Codefa, which juts out into
+the sea, it commanded the whole harbour and the greater part of the
+town. But, afterwards, in the year 1512, when the French were driven
+out of Italy, the Genoese, in spite of this citadel, again rebelled,
+and Ottaviano Fregoso assuming the government, after the greatest
+efforts, continued over a period of sixteen months, at last succeeded
+in reducing the citadel by famine. By all it was believed that he would
+retain it as a rock of refuge in case of any reverse of fortune, and by
+some he was advised to do so; but he, being a truly wise ruler, and
+knowing well that it is by the attachment of their subjects and not by
+the strength of their fortifications that princes are maintained in
+their governments, dismantled this citadel; and founding his authority,
+not upon material defences, but on his own valour and prudence, kept
+and still keeps it. And whereas, formerly, a force of a thousand
+foot-soldiers could effect a change in the government of Genoa, the
+enemies of Ottaviano have assailed him with ten thousand, without being
+able to harm him.
+
+Here, then, we see that, while to dismantle this fortress occasioned
+Ottaviano no loss, its construction gave the French king no sort of
+advantage. For when he could come into Italy with an army, he could
+recover Genoa, though he had no citadel there; but when he could not
+come with an army, it was not in his power to hold the city by means of
+the citadel. Moreover it was costly for the king to build, and shameful
+for him to lose this fortress; while for Ottaviano it was glorious to
+take, and advantageous to destroy it.
+
+Let us turn now to those republics which build fortresses not within
+their own territories, but in towns whereof they have taken possession.
+And if the above example of France and Genoa suffice not to show the
+futility of this course, that of Florence and Pisa ought, I think, to
+be conclusive. For in erecting fortresses to hold Pisa, the Florentines
+failed to perceive that a city which had always been openly hostile to
+them, which had lived in freedom, and which could cloak rebellion under
+the name of liberty, must, if it were to be retained at all, be
+retained by those methods which were used by the Romans, and either be
+made a companion or be destroyed. Of how little service these Pisan
+fortresses were, was seen on the coming of Charles VIII. of France into
+Italy, to whom, whether through the treachery of their defenders or
+from fear of worse evils, they were at once delivered up; whereas, had
+there been no fortresses in Pisa, the Florentines would not have looked
+to them as the means whereby the town was to be held; the king could
+not by their assistance have taken the town from the Florentines; and
+the methods whereby it had previously been preserved might, in all
+likelihood, have continued sufficient to preserve it; and, at any rate,
+had served that end no worse than the fortresses.
+
+These, then, are the conclusions to which I come, namely, that
+fortresses built to hold your own country under are hurtful, and that
+those built to retain acquired territories are useless; and I am
+content to rely on the example of the Romans, who in the towns they
+sought to hold by the strong hand, rather pulled down fortresses than
+built them. And if any, to controvert these views of mine, were to cite
+the case of Tarentum in ancient times, or of Brescia in recent, as
+towns which when they rebelled were recovered by means of their
+citadels; I answer, that for the recovery of Tarentum, Fabius Maximus
+was sent at the end of a year with an army strong enough to retake it
+even had there been no fortress there; and that although he availed
+himself of the fortress for the recovery of the town, he might, without
+it, have resorted to other means which would have brought about the
+same result. Nor do I see of what service a citadel can be said to be,
+when to recover the city you must employ a consular army under a Fabius
+Maximus. But that the Romans would, in any case, have recovered
+Tarentum, is plain from what happened at Capua, where there was no
+citadel, and which they retook, simply by the valour of their soldiers.
+
+Again, as regards Brescia, I say that the circumstances attending the
+revolt of that town were such as occur but seldom, namely, that the
+citadel remaining in your hands after the defection of the city, you
+should happen to have a great army nigh at hand, as the French had
+theirs on this occasion. For M. de Foix being in command of the king’s
+forces at Bologna, on hearing of the loss of Brescia, marched thither
+without an hour’s delay, and reaching Brescia in three days, retook the
+town with the help of the citadel. But here, again, we see that, to be
+of any service, the citadel of Brescia had to be succoured by a de
+Foix, and by that French army which in three days’ time marched to its
+relief. So that this instance cannot be considered conclusive as
+against others of a contrary tendency. For, in the course of recent
+wars, many fortresses have been taken and retaken, with the same
+variety of fortune with which open country has been acquired or lost;
+and this not only in Lombardy, but also in Romagna, in the kingdom of
+Naples, and in all parts of Italy.
+
+And, further, touching the erection of fortresses as a defence against
+foreign enemies, I say that such defences are not needed by the prince
+or people who possess a good army; while for those who do not possess a
+good army, they are useless. For good armies without fortresses are in
+themselves a sufficient defence: whereas, fortresses without good
+armies avail nothing. And this we see in the case of those nations
+which have been thought to excel both in their government and
+otherwise, as, for instance, the Romans and the Spartans. For while the
+Romans would build no fortresses, the Spartans not merely abstained
+from building them, but would not even suffer their cities to be
+enclosed with walls; desiring to be protected by their own valour only,
+and by no other defence. So that when a Spartan was asked by an
+Athenian what he thought of the walls of Athens, he answered “that they
+were fine walls if meant to hold women only.”
+
+If a prince who has a good army has likewise, on the sea-front of his
+dominions, some fortress strong enough to keep an enemy in check for a
+few days, until he gets his forces together, this, though not
+necessary, may sometimes be for his advantage. But for a prince who is
+without a strong army to have fortresses erected throughout his
+territories, or upon his frontier, is either useless or hurtful, since
+they may readily be lost and then turned against him; or, supposing
+them so strong that the enemy is unable to take them by assault, he may
+leave them behind, and so render them wholly unprofitable. For a brave
+army, unless stoutly met, enters an enemy’s country without regard to
+the towns or fortified places it leaves in its rear, as we read of
+happening in ancient times, and have seen done by Francesco Maria della
+Rovere, who no long while ago, when he marched against Urbino, made
+little of leaving ten hostile cities behind him.
+
+The prince, therefore, who can bring together a strong army can do
+without building fortresses, while he who has not a strong army ought
+not to build them, but should carefully strengthen the city wherein he
+dwells, and keep it well stored with supplies, and its inhabitants well
+affected, so that he may resist attack till an accord be agreed on, or
+he be relieved by foreign aid. All other expedients are costly in time
+of peace, and in war useless.
+
+Whoever carefully weighs all that has now been said will perceive, that
+the Romans, as they were most prudent in all their other methods, so
+also showed their wisdom in the measures they took with the men of
+Latium and Privernum, when, without ever thinking of fortresses, they
+sought security in bolder and more sagacious courses.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XXV.—_That he who attacks a City divided against itself, must
+not think to get possession of it through its Divisions._
+
+
+Violent dissensions breaking out in Rome between the commons and the
+nobles, it appeared to the Veientines and Etruscans that now was their
+time to deal a fatal blow to the Roman supremacy. Accordingly, they
+assembled an army and invaded the territories of Rome. The senate sent
+Caius Manlius and Marcus Fabius to meet them, whose forces encamping
+close by the Veientines, the latter ceased not to reproach and vilify
+the Roman name with every sort of taunt and abuse, and so incensed the
+Romans by their unmeasured insolence that, from being divided they
+became reconciled, and giving the enemy battle, broke and defeated
+them. Here, again, we see, what has already been noted, how prone men
+are to adopt wrong courses, and how often they miss their object when
+they think to secure it. The Veientines imagined that they could
+conquer the Romans by attacking them while they were at feud among
+themselves; but this very attack reunited the Romans and brought ruin
+on their assailants. For the causes of division in a commonwealth are,
+for the most part, ease and tranquillity, while the causes of union are
+fear and war. Wherefore, had the Veientines been wise, the more divided
+they saw Rome to be, the more should they have sought to avoid war with
+her, and endeavoured to gain an advantage over her by peaceful arts.
+And the best way to effect this in a divided city lies in gaining the
+confidence of both factions, and in mediating between them as arbiter
+so long as they do not come to blows; but when they resort to open
+violence, then to render some tardy aid to the weaker side, so as to
+plunge them deeper in hostilities, wherein both may exhaust their
+forces without being led by your putting forth an excess of strength to
+suspect you of a desire to ruin them and remain their master. Where
+this is well managed, it will almost always happen that you succeed in
+effecting the object you propose to yourself.
+
+The city of Pistoja, as I have said already in connection with another
+matter, was won over to the Florentine republic by no other artifice
+than this. For the town being split by factions, the Florentines, by
+now favouring one side and now the other, without incurring the
+suspicions of either, brought both to such extremities that, wearied
+out with their harassed life, they threw themselves at last of their
+own accord into the arms of Florence. The city of Siena, again, has
+never made any change in her government which has had the support of
+the Florentines, save when that support has been slight and
+insignificant; for whenever the interference of Florence has been
+marked and decided, it has had the effect of uniting all parties in
+support of things as they stood.
+
+One other instance I shall add to those already given. Oftener than
+once Filippo Visconti, duke of Milan, relying on their divisions, set
+wars on foot against the Florentines, and always without success; so
+that, in lamenting over these failures, he was wont to complain that
+the mad humours of the Florentines had cost him two millions of gold,
+without his having anything to show for it. The Veientines and
+Etruscans, therefore, as I have said already, were misled by false
+hopes, and in the end were routed by the Romans in a single pitched
+battle; and any who should look hereafter to prevail on like grounds
+and by similar means against a divided people, will always find
+themselves deceived.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XXVI.—_That Taunts and Abuse breed Hatred against him who uses
+them, without yielding him any Advantage._
+
+
+To abstain from threats and injurious language, is, methinks, one of
+the wisest precautions a man can use. For abuse and menace take nothing
+from the strength of an adversary; the latter only making him more
+cautious, while the former inflames his hatred against you, and leads
+him to consider more diligently how he may cause you hurt.
+
+This is seen from the example of the Veientines, of whom I spoke in the
+last Chapter, who, to the injury of war against the Romans, added those
+verbal injuries from which all prudent commanders should compel their
+soldiers to refrain. For these are injuries which stir and kindle your
+enemy to vengeance, and yet, as has been said, in no way disable him
+from doing you hurt; so that, in truth, they are weapons which wound
+those who use them. Of this we find a notable instance in Asia, in
+connection with the siege of Amida. For Gabade, the Persian general,
+after besieging this town for a great while, wearied out at last by its
+protracted defence, determined on withdrawing his army; and had
+actually begun to strike his camp, when the whole inhabitants of the
+place, elated by their success, came out upon the walls to taunt and
+upbraid their enemies with their cowardice and meanness of spirit, and
+to load them with every kind of abuse. Stung by these insults, Gabade,
+changing his resolution, renewed the siege with such fury that in a few
+days he stormed and sacked the town. And the very same thing befell the
+Veientines, who, not content, as we have seen, to make war on the
+Romans with arms, must needs assail them with foul reproaches,
+advancing to the palisade of their camp to revile them, and molesting
+them more with their tongues than with their swords, until the Roman
+soldiers, who at first were most unwilling to fight, forced the consuls
+to lead them to the attack. Whereupon, the Veientines, like those
+others of whom mention has just now been made, had to pay the penalty
+of their insolence.
+
+Wise captains of armies, therefore, and prudent governors of cities,
+should take all fit precautions to prevent such insults and reproaches
+from being used by their soldiers and subjects, either amongst
+themselves or against an enemy. For when directed against an enemy they
+lead to the mischiefs above noticed, while still worse consequences may
+follow from our not preventing them among ourselves by such measures as
+sensible rulers have always taken for that purpose.
+
+The legions who were left behind for the protection of Capua having, as
+shall in its place be told, conspired against the Capuans, their
+conspiracy led to a mutiny, which was presently suppressed by Valerius
+Corvinus; when, as one of the conditions on which the mutineers made
+their submission, it was declared that whosoever should thereafter
+upbraid any soldier of these legions with having taken part in this
+mutiny, should be visited with the severest punishment. So likewise,
+when Tiberius Gracchus was appointed, during the war with Hannibal, to
+command a body of slaves, whom the Romans in their straits for soldiers
+had furnished with arms, one of his first acts was to pass an order
+making it death for any to reproach his men with their servile origin.
+So mischievous a thing did the Romans esteem it to use insulting words
+to others, or to taunt them with their shame. Whether this be done in
+sport or earnest, nothing vexes men more, or rouses them to fiercer
+indignation; “_for the biting jest which flavours too much of truth,
+leaves always behind it a rankling memory._”[9]
+
+ [9] Nam facetiæ asperæ, quando nimium ex vero traxere, acrem sui
+ memoriam relinquunt. _Tacit. An._ xv. 68.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XXVII.—_That prudent Princes and Republics should be content to
+have obtained a Victory; for, commonly, when they are not,
+theft-Victory turns to Defeat._
+
+
+The use of dishonouring language towards an enemy is mostly caused by
+an insolent humour, bred by victory or the false hope of it, whereby
+men are oftentimes led not only to speak, but also to act amiss. For
+such false hopes, when they gain an entry into men’s minds, cause them
+to overrun their goal, and to miss opportunities for securing a certain
+good, on the chance of obtaining some thing better, but uncertain. And
+this, being a matter that deserves attention, because in deceiving
+themselves men often injure their country, I desire to illustrate it by
+particular instances, ancient and recent, since mere argument might not
+place it in so clear a light.
+
+After routing the Romans at Cannæ, Hannibal sent messengers to Carthage
+to announce his victory, and to ask support. A debate arising in the
+Carthaginian senate as to what was to be done, Hanno, an aged and wise
+citizen, advised that they should prudently take advantage of their
+victory to make peace with the Romans, while as conquerors they might
+have it on favourable terms, and not wait to make it after a defeat;
+since it should be their object to show the Romans that they were
+strong enough to fight them, but not to peril the victory they had won
+in the hope of winning a greater. This advice was not followed by the
+Carthaginian senate, but its wisdom was well seen later, when the
+opportunity to act upon it was gone.
+
+When the whole East had been overrun by Alexander of Macedon, the
+citizens of Tyre (then at the height of its renown, and very strong
+from being built, like Venice, in the sea), recognizing his greatness,
+sent ambassadors to him to say that they desired to be his good
+servants, and to yield him all obedience, yet could not consent to
+receive either him or his soldiers within their walls. Whereupon,
+Alexander, displeased that a single city should venture to close its
+gates against him to whom all the rest of the world had thrown theirs
+open, repulsed the Tyrians, and rejecting their overtures set to work
+to besiege their town. But as it stood on the water, and was well
+stored with victual and all other munitions needed for its defence,
+after four months had gone, Alexander, perceiving that he was wasting
+more time in an inglorious attempt to reduce this one city than had
+sufficed for most of his other conquests, resolved to offer terms to
+the Tyrians, and to make them those concessions which they themselves
+had asked. But they, puffed up by their success, not merely refused the
+terms offered, but put to death the envoy sent to propose them. Enraged
+by this, Alexander renewed the siege, and with such vigour, that he
+took and destroyed the city, and either slew or made slaves of its
+inhabitants.
+
+In the year 1512, a Spanish army entered the Florentine territory, with
+the object of restoring the Medici to Florence, and of levying a
+subsidy from the town; having been summoned thither by certain of the
+citizens, who had promised them that so soon as they appeared within
+the Florentine confines they would arm in their behalf. But when the
+Spaniards had come into the plain of the Arno, and none declared in
+their favour, being in sore need of supplies, they offered to make
+terms. This offer the people of Florence in their pride rejected, and
+so gave occasion for the sack of Prato and the overthrow of the
+Florentine Republic.
+
+A prince, therefore, who is attacked by an enemy much more powerful
+than himself, can make no greater mistake than to refuse to treat,
+especially when overtures are made to him; for however poor the terms
+offered may be, they are sure to contain some conditions advantageous
+for him who accepts them, and which he may construe as a partial
+success. For which reason it ought to have been enough for the citizens
+of Tyre that Alexander was brought to accept terms which he had at
+first rejected; and they should have esteemed it a sufficient triumph
+that, by their resistance in arms, they had forced so great a warrior
+to bow to their will. And, in like manner, it should have been a
+sufficient victory for the Florentines that the Spaniards had in part
+yielded to their wishes, and abated something of their own demands, the
+purport of which was to change the government of Florence, to sever her
+from her allegiance to France, and, further, to obtain money from her.
+For if of these three objects the Spaniards had succeeded in securing
+the last two, while the Florentines maintained the integrity of their
+government, a fair share of honour and contentment would have fallen to
+each. And while preserving their political existence, the Florentines
+should have made small account of the other two conditions; nor ought
+they, even with the possibility and almost certainty of greater
+advantages before them, to have left matters in any degree to the
+arbitration of Fortune, by pushing things to extremes, and incurring
+risks which no prudent man should incur, unless compelled by necessity.
+
+Hannibal, when recalled by the Carthaginians from Italy, where for
+sixteen years he had covered himself with glory, to the defence of his
+native country, found on his arrival that Hasdrubal and Syphax had been
+defeated, the kingdom of Numidia lost, and Carthage confined within the
+limits of her walls, and left without other resource save in him and
+his army. Perceiving, therefore, that this was the last stake his
+country had to play, and not choosing to hazard it until he had tried
+every other expedient, he felt no shame to sue for peace, judging that
+in peace rather than in war lay the best hope of safety for his
+country. But, when peace was refused him, no fear of defeat deterred
+him from battle, being resolved either to conquer, if conquer he might,
+or if he must fall, to fall gloriously. Now, if a commander so valiant
+as Hannibal, at the head of an unconquered army, was willing to sue for
+peace rather than appeal to battle when he saw that by defeat his
+country must be enslaved, what course ought to be followed by another
+commander, less valiant and with less experience than he? But men
+labour under this infirmity, that they know not where to set bounds to
+their hopes, and building on these without otherwise measuring their
+strength, rush headlong on destruction.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XXVIII.—_That to neglect the redress of Grievances, whether
+public or private, is dangerous for a Prince or Commonwealth_.
+
+
+Certain Gauls coming to attack Etruria, and more particularly Clusium
+its chief city, the citizens of Clusium sought aid from Rome; whereupon
+the Romans sent the three Fabii, as envoys to these Gauls, to notify to
+them, in the name of the Roman people, that they must refrain from
+making war on the Etruscans. From what befell the Romans in connection
+with this embassy, we see clearly how far men may be carried in
+resenting an affront. For these envoys arriving at the very moment when
+the Gauls and Etruscans were about to join battle, being readier at
+deeds than words, took part with the Etruscans and fought in their
+foremost ranks. Whence it came that the Gauls recognizing the Roman
+envoys, turned against the Romans all the hatred which before they had
+felt for the Etruscans; and grew still more incensed when on making
+complaint to the Roman senate, through their ambassador, of the wrong
+done them, and demanding that the Fabii should be given up to them in
+atonement for their offence, not merely were the offenders not given up
+or punished in any way, but, on the contrary, when the comitia met were
+created tribunes with consular powers. But when the Gauls found these
+men honoured who deserved to be chastised, they concluded that what had
+happened had been done by way of slight and insult to them, and,
+burning with fury and resentment, hastened forward to attack Rome,
+which they took with the exception of the Capitol.
+
+Now this disaster overtook the Romans entirely from their disregard of
+justice. For their envoys, who had violated the law of nations, and had
+therefore deserved punishment, they had on the contrary treated with
+honour. And this should make us reflect, how carefully all princes and
+commonwealths ought to refrain from committing like wrongs, not only
+against communities, but also against particular men. For if a man be
+deeply wronged, either by a private hand or by a public officer, and be
+not avenged to his satisfaction, if he live in a republic, he will seek
+to avenge himself, though in doing so he bring ruin on his country; or
+if he live under a prince, and be of a resolute and haughty spirit, he
+will never rest until he has wreaked his resentment against the prince,
+though he knows it may cost him dear. Whereof we have no finer or truer
+example than in the death of Philip of Macedon, the father of
+Alexander. For Pausanias, a handsome and high-born youth belonging to
+Philip’s court, having been most foully and cruelly dishonoured by
+Attalus, one of the foremost men of the royal household, repeatedly
+complained to Philip of the outrage; who for a while put him off with
+promises of vengeance, but in the end, so far from avenging him,
+promoted Attalus to be governor of the province of Greece. Whereupon,
+Pausanias, seeing his enemy honoured and not punished, turned all his
+resentment from him who had outraged, against him who had not avenged
+him, and on the morning of the day fixed for the marriage of Philip’s
+daughter to Alexander of Epirus, while Philip walked between the two
+Alexanders, his son and his son-in-law, towards the temple to celebrate
+the nuptials, he slew him.
+
+This instance nearly resembles that of the Roman envoys; and offers a
+warning to all rulers never to think so lightly of any man as to
+suppose, that when wrong upon wrong has been done him, he will not
+bethink himself of revenge, however great the danger he runs, or the
+punishment he thereby brings upon himself.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XXIX.—_That Fortune obscures the minds of Men when she would
+not have them hinder her Designs._
+
+
+If we note well the course of human affairs, we shall often find things
+come about and accidents befall, against which it seems to be the will
+of Heaven that men should not provide. And if this were the case even
+in Rome, so renowned for her valour, religion, and wise ordinances, we
+need not wonder if it be far more common in other cities and provinces
+wherein these safeguards are wanting.
+
+Having here a notable opportunity to show how Heaven influences men’s
+actions, Titus Livius turns it to account, and treats the subject at
+large and in pregnant words, where he says, that since it was Heaven’s
+will, for ends of its own, that the Romans should feel its power, it
+first of all caused these Fabii, who were sent as envoys to the Gauls,
+to act amiss, and then by their misconduct stirred up the Gauls to make
+war on Rome; and, lastly, so ordered matters that nothing worthy of
+their name was done by the Romans to withstand their attack. For it was
+fore-ordained by Heaven that Camillus, who alone could supply the
+remedy to so mighty an evil, should be banished to Ardea; and again,
+that the citizens, who had often created a dictator to meet attacks of
+the Volscians and other neighbouring hostile nations, should fail to do
+so when the Gauls were marching upon Rome. Moreover, the army which the
+Romans got together was but a weak one, since they used no signal
+effort to make it strong; nay, were so dilatory in arming that they
+were barely in time to meet the enemy at the river Allia, though no
+more than ten miles distant from Rome. Here, again, the Roman tribunes
+pitched their camp without observing any of the usual precautions,
+attending neither to the choice of ground, nor to surround themselves
+with trench or Palisade, nor to avail themselves of any other aid,
+human or Divine. In ordering their army for battle, moreover, disposed
+it in weak columns, and these far apart: so that neither men nor
+officers accomplished anything worthy of the Roman discipline. The
+battle was bloodless for the Romans fled before they were attacked;
+most of them retreating to Veii, the rest to Rome, where, without
+turning aside to visit their homes, they made straight for the Capitol.
+
+Meanwhile, the senate, so far from bethinking themselves how they might
+defend the city, did not even attend to closing the gates; and while
+some of them made their escape from Rome, others entered the Capitol
+along with those who sought shelter there. It was only in the defence
+of the Capitol that any method was observed, measures being taken to
+prevent it being crowded with useless numbers, and all the victual
+which could be got, being brought into it to enable it to stand a
+siege. Of the women, the children, and the men whose years unfitted
+them for service, the most part fled for refuge to the neighbouring
+towns, the rest remained in Rome a prey to the invaders; so that no one
+who had heard of the achievements of the Romans in past years, on being
+told of what took place on this occasion, could have believed that it
+was of the same people that things so contrary were related.
+
+Wherefore, Titus Livius, after setting forth all these disorders,
+concludes with the words, “_So far does Fortune darken men’s minds when
+she would not have her ascendency gainsaid._” Nor could any juster
+observation be made. And hence it is that those who experience the
+extremes whether of good or of evil fortune, are, commonly, little
+deserving either of praise or blame; since it is apparent that it is
+from Heaven having afforded them, or denied them opportunities for
+acting worthily, that they have been brought to their greatness or to
+their undoing. Fortune, doubtless, when she seeks to effect great ends,
+will often choose as her instrument a man of such sense and worth that
+he can recognize the opportunities which she holds out to him; and, in
+like manner, when she desires to bring about great calamities, will put
+forward such men as will of themselves contribute to that result. And
+all who stand in her way, she either removes by death, or deprives of
+the means of effecting good. And it is well seen in the passage we are
+considering, how Fortune, to aggrandize Rome, and raise her to the
+height she reached, judged it necessary, as shall be more fully shown
+in the following Book, to humble her; yet would not have her utterly
+undone. For which reason we find her causing Camillus to be banished,
+but not put to death; suffering Rome to be taken, but not the Capitol;
+and bringing it to pass that, while the Romans took no wise precaution
+for the defence of their city, they neglected none in defending their
+citadel. That Rome might be taken, Fortune caused the mass of the army,
+after the rout at the Allia, to direct its flight to Veii, thus
+withdrawing the means wherewith the city might have been defended; but
+while thus disposing matters, she at the same time prepared all the
+needful steps for its recovery, in bringing an almost entire Roman
+array to Veii, and Camillus to Ardea, so that a great force might be
+assembled for the rescue of their country, under a captain in no way
+compromised by previous reverses, but, on the contrary, in the
+enjoyment of an untarnished renown. I might cite many modern instances
+to confirm these opinions, but since enough has been said to convince
+any fair mind, I pass them over. But once more I repeat what, from all
+history, may be seen to be most true, that men may aid Fortune, but not
+withstand her; may interweave their threads with her web, but cannot
+break it But, for all that, they must never lose heart, since not
+knowing what their end is to be, and moving towards it by cross-roads
+and untravelled paths, they have always room for hope, and ought never
+to abandon it, whatsoever befalls, and into whatsoever straits they
+come.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XXX.—_That really powerful Princes and, Commonwealths do not
+buy Friendships with Money, but with their Valour and the Fame of their
+Prowess_.
+
+
+When besieged in the Capitol, the Romans although expecting succour
+from Veii and from Camillus, nevertheless, being straitened by famine,
+entered into an agreement to buy off the Gauls with gold But at the
+very moment when, in pursuance of this agreement, the gold was being
+weighed out, Camillus came up with his army. This, says our historian,
+was contrived by Fortune, “_that the Romans might not live thereafter
+as men ransomed for a price,_” and the matter is noteworthy, not only
+with reference to this particular occasion, but also as it bears on the
+methods generally followed by this republic. For we never find Rome
+seeking to acquire towns, or to purchase peace with money, but always
+confiding in her own warlike valour, which could not, I believe, be
+said of any other republic.
+
+Now, one of the tests whereby to gauge the strength of any State, is to
+observe on what terms it lives with its neighbours: for when it so
+carries itself that, to secure its friendship, its neighbours pay it
+tribute, this is a sure sign of its strength, but when its neighbours,
+though of less reputation, receive payments from it, this is a clear
+proof of its weakness In the course of the Roman history we read how
+the Massilians, the Eduans, the Rhodians, Hiero of Syracuse, the Kings
+Eumenes and Massinissa, all of them neighbours to the Roman frontiers,
+in order to secure the friendship of Rome, submitted to imposts and
+tribute whenever Rome had need of them, asking no return save her
+protection. But with a weak State we find the reverse of all this
+happening And, to begin with our own republic of Florence, we know that
+in times past, when she was at the height of her renown, there was
+never a lordling of Romagna who had not a subsidy from her, to say
+nothing of what she paid to the Perugians, to the Castellans, and to
+all her other neighbours But had our city been armed and strong, the
+direct contrary would have been the case, for, to obtain her
+protection, all would have poured money into her lap, not seeking to
+sell their friendship but to purchase hers.
+
+Nor are the Florentines the only people who have lived on this
+dishonourable footing The Venetians have done the same, nay, the King
+of France himself, for all his great dominions, lives tributary to the
+Swiss and to the King of England; and this because the French king and
+the others named, with a view to escape dangers rather imaginary than
+real, have disarmed their subjects; seeking to reap a present gain by
+wringing money from them, rather than follow a course which would
+secure their own safety and the lasting welfare of their country. Which
+ill-practices of theirs, though they quiet things for a time, must in
+the end exhaust their resources, and give rise in seasons of danger to
+incurable mischief and disorder. It would be tedious to count up how
+often in the course of their wars, the Florentines, the Venetians, and
+the kingdom of France have had to ransom themselves from their enemies,
+and to submit to an ignominy to which, once only, the Romans were very
+near being subjected. It would be tedious, too, to recite how many
+towns have been bought by the Florentines and by the Venetians, which,
+afterwards, have only been a trouble to them, from their not knowing
+how to defend with iron what they had won with gold. While the Romans
+continued free they adhered to this more generous and noble method, but
+when they came under the emperors, and these, again, began to
+deteriorate, and to love the shade rather than the sunshine, they also
+took to purchasing peace, now from the Parthians, now from the Germans,
+and at other times from other neighbouring nations. And this was the
+beginning of the decline of their great empire.
+
+Such are the evils that befall when you withhold arms from your
+subjects; and this course is attended by the still greater
+disadvantage, that the closer an enemy presses you the weaker he finds
+you. For any one who follows the evil methods of which I speak, must,
+in order to support troops whom he thinks can be trusted to keep off
+his enemies, be very exacting in his dealings with those of his
+subjects who dwell in the heart of his dominions; since, to widen the
+interval between himself and his enemies, he must subsidize those
+princes and peoples who adjoin his frontiers. States maintained on this
+footing may make a little resistance on their confines; but when these
+are passed by the enemy no further defence remains. Those who pursue
+such methods as these seem not to perceive that they are opposed to
+reason and common sense. For the heart and vital parts of the body, not
+the extremities, are those which we should keep guarded, since we may
+live on without the latter, but must die if the former be hurt. But the
+States of which I speak, leaving the heart undefended, defend only the
+hands and feet. The mischief which has thus been, and is at this day
+wrought in Florence is plain enough to see. For so soon as an enemy
+penetrates within her frontiers, and approaches her heart, all is over
+with her. And the same was witnessed a few years ago in the case of the
+Venetians, whose city, had it not been girdled by the sea, must then
+have found its end. In France, indeed, a like result has not been seen
+so often, she being so great a kingdom as to have few enemies mightier
+than herself. Nevertheless, when the English invaded France in the year
+1513, the whole kingdom tottered; and the King himself, as well as
+every one else, had to own that a single defeat might have cost him his
+dominions.
+
+But with the Romans the reverse of all this took place. For the nearer
+an enemy approached Rome, the more completely he found her armed for
+resistance; and accordingly we see that on the occasion of Hannibal’s
+invasion of Italy, the Romans, after three defeats, and after the
+slaughter of so many of their captains and soldiers, were still able,
+not merely to withstand the invader, but even, in the end, to come off
+victorious. This we may ascribe to the heart being well guarded, while
+the extremities were but little heeded. For the strength of Rome rested
+on the Roman people themselves, on the Latin league, on the confederate
+towns of Italy, and on her colonies, from all of which sources she drew
+so numerous an army, as enabled her to subdue the whole world and to
+keep it in subjection.
+
+The truth of what I say may be further seen from the question put by
+Hanno the Carthaginian to the messengers sent to Carthage by Hannibal
+after his victory at Cannæ. For when these were vaunting the
+achievements of Hannibal, they were asked by Hanno whether any one had
+come forward on behalf of the Romans to propose terms of peace, and
+whether any town of the Latin league or of the colonized districts had
+revolted from the Romans. And when to both inquiries the envoys
+answered, “No,” Hanno observed that the war was no nearer an end than
+on the day it was begun.
+
+We can understand, therefore, as well from what has now been said, as
+from what I have often said before, how great a difference there is
+between the methods followed by the republics of the present times, and
+those followed by the republics of antiquity; and why it is that we see
+every day astounding losses alternate with extraordinary gains. For
+where men are weak, Fortune shows herself strong; and because she
+changes, States and Governments change with her; and will continue to
+change, until some one arise, who, following reverently the example of
+the ancients, shall so control her, that she shall not have opportunity
+with every revolution of the sun to display anew the greatness of her
+power.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XXXI.—_Of the Danger of trusting banished Men._
+
+
+The danger of trusting those who are in exile from their own country,
+being one to which the rulers of States are often exposed, may, I
+think, be fitly considered in these Discourses; and I notice it the
+more willingly, because I am able to illustrate it by a memorable
+instance which Titus Livius, though with another purpose, relates in
+his history. When Alexander the Great passed with his army into Asia,
+his brother-in-law and uncle, Alexander of Epirus, came with another
+army into Italy, being invited thither by the banished Lucanians, who
+gave him to believe that, with their aid, he might get possession of
+the whole of that country. But when, confiding in the promises of these
+exiles, and fed by the hopes they held out to him, he came into Italy,
+they put him to death, their fellow-citizens having offered to restore
+them to their country upon this condition. It behoves us, therefore, to
+remember how empty are the promises, and how doubtful the faith, of men
+in banishment from their native land. For as to their faith, it may be
+assumed that whenever they can effect their return by other means than
+yours, notwithstanding any covenants they may have made with you, they
+will throw you over, and take part with their countrymen. And as for
+the empty promises and delusive hopes which they set before you, so
+extreme is their desire to return home that they naturally believe many
+things which are untrue, and designedly misrepresent many others; so
+that between their beliefs and what they say they believe, they fill
+you with false impressions, on which if you build, your labour is in
+vain, and you are led to engage in enterprises from which nothing but
+ruin can result.
+
+To this instance of Alexander I shall add only one other, that, namely,
+of Themistocles the Athenian, who, being proclaimed a traitor, fled
+into Asia to Darius, to whom he made such lavish promises if he would
+only attack Greece, that he induced him to undertake the enterprise.
+But afterwards, when he could not fulfil what he had promised, either
+from shame, or through fear of punishment, he poisoned himself. But, if
+such a mistake as this was made by a man like Themistocles, we may
+reckon that mistakes still greater will be made by those who, being of
+a feebler nature, suffer themselves to be more completely swayed by
+their feelings and wishes Wherefore, let a prince be careful how he
+embarks in any enterprise on the representations of an exile; for
+otherwise, he is likely either to be put to shame, or to incur the
+gravest calamities.
+
+Because towns are sometimes, though seldom, taken by craft, through
+secret practices had with their inhabitants, I think it not out of
+place to discuss the matter in the following Chapter, wherein I shall
+likewise show in how many ways the Romans were wont to make such
+acquisitions.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XXXII.—_In how many Ways the Romans gained Possession of
+Towns._
+
+
+Turning their thoughts wholly to arms, the Romans always conducted
+their military enterprises in the most advantageous way, both as to
+cost and every other circumstance of war. For which reason they avoided
+attempting towns by siege, judging the expense and inconvenience of
+this method of carrying on war greatly to outweigh any advantage to be
+gained by it. Accordingly, they thought it better and more for their
+interest to reduce towns in any other way than this; and in all those
+years during which they were constantly engaged in wars we find very
+few instances of their proceeding by siege.
+
+For the capture of towns, therefore, they trusted either to assault or
+to surrender. Assaults were effected either by open force, or by force
+and stratagem combined. When a town was assailed by open force, the
+walls were stormed without being breached, and the assailants were said
+“_aggredi urbem corona,_” because they encircled the city with their
+entire strength and kept up an attack on all sides. In this way they
+often succeeded in carrying towns, and even great towns, at a first
+onset, as when Scipio took new Carthage in Spain. But when they failed
+to carry a town by storm, they set themselves to breach the walls with
+battering rams and other warlike engines; or they dug mines so as to
+obtain an entrance within the walls, this being the method followed in
+taking Veii; or else, to be on a level with the defenders, they erected
+towers of timber or threw up mounds of earth against the outside of the
+walls so as to reach the top.
+
+Of these methods of attack, the first, wherein the city was entirely
+surrounded, exposed the defenders to more sudden perils and left them
+more doubtful remedies. For while it was necessary for them to have a
+sufficient force at all points, it might happen that the forces at
+their disposal were not numerous enough to be everywhere at once, or to
+relieve one another. Or if their numbers were sufficient, they might
+not all be equally resolute in standing their ground, and their failure
+at any one point involved a general defeat. Consequently, as I have
+said, this method of attack was often successful. But when it did not
+succeed at the first, it was rarely renewed, being a method dangerous
+to the attacking army, which having to secure itself along an extended
+line, was left everywhere too weak to resist a sally made from the
+town; nay, of itself, was apt to fall into confusion and disorder. This
+method of attack, therefore, could be attempted once only and by way of
+surprise.
+
+Against breaches in the walls the defence was, as at the present day,
+to throw up new works; while mines were met by counter-mines, in which
+the enemy were either withstood at the point of the sword, or baffled
+by some other warlike contrivance; as by filling casks with feathers,
+which, being set on fire and placed in the mine, choked out the
+assailants by their smoke and stench. Where towers were employed for
+the attack, the defenders sought to destroy them with fire; and where
+mounds of earth were thrown up against the walls, they would dig holes
+at the base of the wall against which the mound rested, and carry off
+the earth which the enemy were heaping up; which, being removed from
+within as fast as it was thrown up from without, the mound made no
+progress.
+
+None of these methods of attack can long be persisted in and the
+assailant, if unsuccessful, must either strike his camp and seek
+victory in some other direction, as Scipio did when he invaded Africa
+and, after failing in the attempt to storm Utica, withdrew from his
+attack on that town and turned his strength against the Carthaginian
+army in the field; or else recourse must be had to regular siege, as by
+the Romans at Veii, Capua, Carthage, Jerusalem, and divers other cities
+which they reduced in this way.
+
+The capture of towns by stratagem combined with force is effected, as
+by the Romans at Palæopolis, through a secret understanding with some
+within the walls. Many attempts of this sort have been made, both by
+the Romans and by others, but few successfully, because the least
+hindrance disarranges the plan of action, and because such hindrances
+are very likely to occur. For either the plot is discovered before it
+can be carried out, as it readily may, whether from treachery on the
+part of those to whom it has been communicated, or from the
+difficulties which attend its inception, the preliminary arrangements
+having to be made with the enemy and with persons with whom it is not
+permitted, save under some pretext or other, to hold intercourse; or if
+it be not discovered while it is being contrived, a thousand
+difficulties will still be met with in its execution. For if you arrive
+either before or after the appointed time, all is ruined. The faintest
+sound, as of the cackling of the geese in the Capitol, the least
+departure from some ordinary routine, the most trifling mistake or
+error, mars the whole enterprise. Add to which, the darkness of night
+lends further terror to the perils of such undertakings; while the
+great majority of those engaged in them, having no knowledge of the
+district or places into which they are brought, are bewildered and
+disconcerted by the least mishap, and put to flight by every imaginary
+danger. In secret nocturnal enterprises of this sort, no man was ever
+more successful than Aratus of Sicyon, although in any encounter by day
+there never was a more arrant coward. This we must suppose due rather
+to some special and occult quality inherent in the man, than to success
+being naturally to be looked for in the like attempts. Such
+enterprises, accordingly, are often planned, but few are put into
+execution, and fewer still with success.
+
+When cities are acquired by surrender, the surrender is either
+voluntary or under compulsion; voluntary, when the citizens appeal to
+you for protection against some threatened danger from without, as
+Capua submitted to the Romans; or where they are moved by a desire to
+be better governed, and are attracted by the good government which he
+to whom they surrender is seen exercising over others who have placed
+themselves in his hands; as was the case with the Rhodians, the
+Massilians, and others who for like causes gave themselves up to the
+Roman people. Compulsory surrenders take place, either as the result of
+a protracted siege, like those we have spoken of above; or from the
+country being continually wasted by incursions, forays, and similar
+severities, to escape which a city makes its submission.
+
+Of the methods which have been noticed, the Romans, in preference to
+all others, used this last; and for four hundred and fifty years made
+it their aim to wear out their neighbours by invasion and by defeat in
+the open field, while endeavouring, as I have elsewhere said, to
+establish their influence over them by treaties and conventions. It was
+to this method of warfare therefore that they always mainly trusted,
+because, after trying all others, they found none so free from
+inconvenience and disadvantage—the procedure by siege involving expense
+and delay, that by assault, difficulty and danger, and that by secret
+practice, uncertainty and doubt. They found, likewise, that while in
+subduing one obstinate city by siege many years might be wasted, a
+kingdom might be gained in a single day by the defeat of a hostile army
+in the field.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XXXIII.—_That the Romans intrusted the Captains of their Armies
+with the fullest Powers._
+
+
+In reading this History of Titus Livius with a view to profit by it, I
+think that all the methods of conduct followed by the Roman people and
+senate merit attention. And among other things fit to be considered, it
+should be noted, with how ample an authority they sent forth their
+consuls, their dictators, and the other captains of their armies, all
+of whom we find clothed with the fullest powers: no other prerogative
+being reserved to itself by the senate save that of declaring war and
+making peace, while everything else was left to the discretion and
+determination of the consul. For so soon as the people and senate had
+resolved on war, for instance on a war against the Latins, they threw
+all further responsibility upon the consul, who might fight or decline
+battle as he pleased, and attack this or the other city as he thought
+fit.
+
+That this was so, is seen in many instances, and especially from what
+happened during an expedition made against the Etruscans. For the
+consul Fabius having routed that people near Sutrium, and thinking to
+pass onward through the Ciminian forest into Etruria, so far from
+seeking the advice of the senate, gave them no hint whatever of his
+design, although for its execution the war had to be carried into a
+new, difficult, and dangerous country. We have further witness to the
+same effect, in the action taken in respect of this enterprise by the
+senate, who being informed of the victory obtained by Fabius, and
+apprehending that he might decide to pass onward through the aforesaid
+forest, and deeming it inexpedient that he should incur risk by
+attempting this invasion, sent two messengers to warn him not to enter
+Etruria. These messengers, however, did not come up with the consul
+until he had already made his way into that country and gained a second
+victory; when, instead of opposing his further advance, they returned
+to Rome to announce his good fortune and the glory which he had won.
+
+Whoever, therefore, shall well consider the character of the authority
+whereof I speak, will see that it was most wisely accorded; since had
+it been the wish of the senate that a consul, in conducting a war,
+should proceed step by step as they might direct him, this must have
+made him at once less cautious and more dilatory; because the credit of
+victory would not then have seemed to be wholly his own, but shared by
+the senate on whose advice he acted. Besides which, the senate must
+have taken upon itself the task of advising on matters which it could
+not possibly understand; for although it might contain among its
+members all who were most versed in military affairs, still, since
+these men were not on the spot, and were ignorant of many particulars
+which, if they were to give sound advice, it was necessary for them to
+know, they must in advising have made numberless mistakes. For these
+reasons they desired that the consul should act on his own
+responsibility, and that the honours of success should be wholly his;
+judging that the love of fame would act on him at once as a spur and as
+a curb, making him do whatever he had to do well.
+
+This matter I have the rather dwelt upon because I observe that our
+modern republics, such as the Venetian and the Florentine, view it in a
+different light; so that when their captains, commissaries, or
+_provedditori_ have a single gun to place in position, the authorities
+at home must be informed and consulted; a course deserving the same
+approval as is due to all those other methods of theirs, which, one
+with another, have brought Italy to her present condition.
+
+
+
+
+BOOK III.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER I.—_For a Sect or Commonwealth to last long, it must often be
+brought back to its Beginnings._
+
+
+Doubtless, all the things of this world have a limit set to their
+duration; yet those of them the bodies whereof have not been suffered
+to grow disordered, but have been so cared for that either no change at
+all has been wrought in them, or, if any, a change for the better and
+not for the worse, will run that course which Heaven has in a general
+way appointed them. And since I am now speaking of mixed bodies, for
+States and Sects are so to be regarded, I say that for them these are
+wholesome changes which bring them back to their first beginnings.
+
+Those States consequently stand surest and endure longest which, either
+by the operation of their institutions can renew themselves, or come to
+be renewed by accident apart from any design. Nothing, however, can be
+clearer than that unless thus renewed these bodies do not last. Now the
+way to renew them is, as I have said, to bring them back to their
+beginnings, since all beginnings of sects, commonwealths, or kingdoms
+must needs have in them a certain excellence, by virtue of which they
+gain their first reputation and make their first growth. But because in
+progress of time this excellence becomes corrupted, unless something be
+done to restore it to what it was at first, these bodies necessarily
+decay; for as the physicians tell us in speaking of the human body,
+“_Something or other is daily added which sooner or later will require
+treatment._”[10]
+
+ [10] “Quod quotidie aggregatur aliquid quod quandoque indiget
+ curatione.”
+
+
+As regards commonwealths, this return to the point of departure is
+brought about either by extrinsic accident or by intrinsic foresight.
+As to the first, we have seen how it was necessary that Rome should be
+taken by the Gauls, that being thus in a manner reborn, she might
+recover life and vigour, and resume the observances of religion and
+justice which she had suffered to grow rusted by neglect. This is well
+seen from those passages of Livius wherein he tells us that when the
+Roman army was ‘sent forth against the Gauls, and again when tribunes
+were created with consular authority, no religious rites whatever were
+celebrated, and wherein he further relates how the Romans not only
+failed to punish the three Fabii, who contrary to the law of nations
+had fought against the Gauls, but even clothed them with honour. For,
+from these instances, we may well infer that the rest of the wise
+ordinances instituted by Romulus, and the other prudent kings, had
+begun to be held of less account than they deserved, and less than was
+essential for the maintenance of good government.
+
+And therefore it was that Rome was visited by this calamity from
+without, to the end that all her ordinances might be reformed, and the
+people taught that it behoved them not only to maintain religion and
+justice, but also to esteem their worthy citizens, and to prize their
+virtues beyond any advantages of which they themselves might seem to
+have been deprived at their instance. And this, we find, was just the
+effect produced. For no sooner was the city retaken, than all the
+ordinances of the old religion were at once restored; the Fabii, who
+had fought in violation of the law of nations, were punished; and the
+worth and excellence of Camillus so fully recognized, that the senate
+and the whole people, laying all jealousies aside, once more committed
+to him the entire charge of public affairs.
+
+It is necessary then, as I have said already, that where men dwell
+together in a regulated society, they be often reminded of those
+ordinances in conformity with which they ought to live, either by
+something inherent in these, or else by some external accident. A
+reminder is given in the former of these two ways, either by the
+passing of some law whereby the members of the society are brought to
+an account; or else by some man of rare worth arising among them, whose
+virtuous life and example have the same effect as a law. In a
+Commonwealth, accordingly, this end is served either by the virtues of
+some one of its citizens, or by the operation of its institutions.
+
+The institutions whereby the Roman Commonwealth was led back to its
+starting point, were the tribuneship of the people and the censorship,
+together with all those laws which were passed to check the insolence
+and ambition of its citizens. Such institutions, however, require fresh
+life to be infused into them by the worth of some one man who
+fearlessly devotes himself to give them effect in opposition to the
+power of those who set them at defiance.
+
+Of the laws being thus reinforced in Rome, before its capture by the
+Gauls, we have notable examples in the deaths of the sons of Brutus, of
+the Decemvirs, and of Manlius Frumentarius; and after its capture, in
+the deaths of Manlius Capitolinus, and of the son of Manlius Torquatus
+in the prosecution of his master of the knights by Papirius Cursor, and
+in the impeachment of the Scipios. Such examples as these, being signal
+and extraordinary, had the effect, whenever they took place, of
+bringing men back to the true standard of right; but when they came to
+be of rarer occurrence, they left men more leisure to grow corrupted,
+and were attended by greater danger and disturbance. Wherefore, between
+one and another of these vindications of the laws, no more than ten
+years, at most, ought to intervene; because after that time men begin
+to change their manners and to disregard the laws; and if nothing occur
+to recall the idea of punishment, and unless fear resume its hold on
+their minds, so many offenders suddenly spring up together that it is
+impossible to punish them without danger. And to this purport it used
+to be said by those who ruled Florence from the year 1434 to 1494, that
+their government could hardly be maintained unless it was renewed every
+five years; by which they meant that it was necessary for them to
+arouse the same terror and alarm in men’s minds, as they inspired when
+they first assumed the government, and when all who offended against
+their authority were signally chastised. For when the recollection of
+such chastisement has died out, men are emboldened to engage in new
+designs, and to speak ill of their rulers; for which the only remedy is
+to restore things to what they were at first.
+
+A republic may, likewise, be brought back to its original form, without
+recourse to ordinances for enforcing justice, by the mere virtues of a
+single citizen, by reason that these virtues are of such influence and
+authority that good men love to imitate them, and bad men are ashamed
+to depart from them. Those to whom Rome owed most for services of this
+sort, were Horatius Cocles, Mutius Scævola, the two Decii, Atilius
+Regulus, and divers others, whose rare excellence and generous example
+wrought for their city almost the same results as might have been
+effected by ordinances and laws. And if to these instances of
+individual worth had been added, every ten years, some signal
+enforcement of justice, it would have been impossible for Rome ever to
+have grown corrupted. But when both of these incitements to virtuous
+behavior began to recur less frequently, corruption spread, and after
+the time of Atilius Regulus, no like example was again witnessed. For
+though the two Catos came later, so great an interval had elapsed
+before the elder Cato appeared, and again, so long a period intervened
+between him and the younger, and these two, moreover, stood so much
+alone, that it was impossible for them, by their influence, to work any
+important change; more especially for the younger, who found Rome so
+much corrupted that he could do nothing to improve his fellow-citizens.
+
+This is enough to say concerning commonwealths, but as regards sects,
+we see from the instance of our own religion that here too a like
+renewal is needed. For had not this religion of ours been brought back
+to its original condition by Saint Francis and Saint Dominick, it must
+soon have been utterly extinguished. They, however, by their voluntary
+poverty, and by their imitation of the life of Christ, rekindled in the
+minds of men the dying flame of faith; and by the efficacious rules
+which they established averted from our Church that ruin which the ill
+lives of its prelates and heads must otherwise have brought upon it.
+For living in poverty, and gaining great authority with the people by
+confessing them and preaching to them, they got them to believe that it
+is evil to speak ill even of what is evil; and that it is good to be
+obedient to rulers, who, if they do amiss, may be left to the judgment
+of God. By which teaching these rulers are encouraged to behave as
+badly as they can, having no fear of punishments which they neither see
+nor credit. Nevertheless, it is this renewal which has maintained, and
+still maintains, our religion.
+
+Kingdoms also stand in need of a like renewal, and to have their laws
+restored to their former force; and we see how, by attending to this,
+the kingdom of France has profited. For that kingdom, more than any
+other, lies under the control of its laws and ordinances, which are
+maintained by its parliaments, and more especially by the parliament of
+Paris, from which last they derive fresh vigour whenever they have to
+be enforced against any prince of the realm; for this assembly
+pronounces sentence even against the king himself. Heretofore this
+parliament has maintained its name as the fearless champion of the laws
+against the nobles of the land; but should it ever at any future time
+suffer wrongs to pass unpunished, and should offences multiply, either
+these will have to be corrected with great disturbance to the State, or
+the kingdom itself must fall to pieces.
+
+This, then, is our conclusion—that nothing is so necessary in any
+society, be it a religious sect, a kingdom, or a commonwealth, as to
+restore to it that reputation which it had at first, and to see that it
+is provided either with wholesome laws, or with good men whose actions
+may effect the same ends, without need to resort to external force. For
+although this last may sometimes, as in the case of Rome, afford an
+efficacious remedy, it is too hazardous a remedy to make us ever wish
+to employ it.
+
+And that all may understand how much the actions of particular citizens
+helped to make Rome great, and how many admirable results they wrought
+in that city, I shall now proceed to set them forth and examine them;
+with which survey this Third Book of mine, and last division of the
+First Decade of Titus Livius, shall be brought to a close. But,
+although great and notable actions were done by the Roman kings,
+nevertheless, since history has treated of these at much length, here I
+shall pass them over, and say no more about these princes, save as
+regards certain things done by them with an eye to their private
+interest. I shall begin, therefore, with Brutus, the father of Roman
+freedom.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER II.—_That on occasion it is wise to feign Folly._
+
+
+Never did any man by the most splendid achievements gain for himself so
+great a name for wisdom and prudence as is justly due to Junius Brutus
+for feigning to be a fool. And although Titus Livius mentions one cause
+only as having led him to assume this part, namely, that he might live
+more securely and look after his patrimony; yet on considering his
+behavior we may believe that in counterfeiting folly it was also his
+object to escape notice, and so find better convenience to overthrow
+the kings, and to free his country whenever an occasion offered. That
+this was in his mind is seen first of all from the interpretation he
+gave to the oracle of Apollo, when, to render the gods favourable to
+his designs, he pretended to stumble, and secretly kissed his mother
+earth; and, again, from this, that on the death of Lucretia, though her
+father, her husband, and others of her kinsmen were present, he was the
+first to draw the dagger from her wound, and bind the bystanders by
+oath never more to suffer king to reign in Rome.
+
+From his example all who are discontented with their prince are taught,
+first of all, to measure, and to weigh their strength, and if they find
+themselves strong enough to disclose their hostility and proclaim open
+war, then to take that course as at once the nobler and less dangerous;
+but, if too weak to make open war, then sedulously to court the favour
+of the prince, using to that end all such methods as they may judge
+needful, adapting themselves to his pleasures, and showing delight in
+whatever they see him delight in. Such an intimacy, in the first place,
+enables you to live securely, and permits you, without incurring any
+risk, to share the happy fortunes of the prince, while it affords you
+every facility for carrying out your plans. Some, no doubt, will tell
+you that you should not stand so near the prince as to be involved in
+his downfall; nor yet at such a distance that when he falls you shall
+be too far off to use the occasion for rising on his ruin. But although
+this mean course, could we only follow it, were certainly the best,
+yet, since I believe it to be impracticable, we must resort to the
+methods above indicated, and either keep altogether aloof, or else
+cleave closely to the prince. Whosoever does otherwise, if he be of
+great station, lives in constant peril; nor will it avail him to say,
+“I concern myself with nothing; I covet neither honours nor preferment;
+my sole wish is to live a quiet and peaceful life.” For such excuses,
+though they be listened to, are not accepted; nor can any man of great
+position, however much and sincerely he desire it, elect to live this
+life of tranquillity since his professions will not be believed; so
+that although he might be contented to be let alone, others will not
+suffer him to be so. Wherefore, like Brutus, men must feign folly; and
+to play the part effectively, and so as to please their prince, must
+say, do, see, and praise things contrary to their inclinations.
+
+But now, having spoken of the prudence shown by Brutus when he sought
+to recover the freedom of Rome, let us next speak of the severity which
+he used to maintain it.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER III.—_That to preserve a newly acquired Freedom we must slay
+the Sons of Brutus._
+
+
+The severity used by Brutus in preserving for Rome the freedom he had
+won for her, was not less necessary than useful. The spectacle of a
+father sitting on the judgment, and not merely sentencing his own sons
+to death, but being himself present at their execution, affords an
+example rare in history. But those who study the records of ancient
+times will understand, that after a change in the form of a government,
+whether it be from a commonwealth to a tyranny or from a tyranny to a
+commonwealth, those who are hostile to the new order of things must
+always be visited with signal punishment. So that he who sets up as a
+tyrant and slays not Brutus, and he who creates a free government and
+slays not the sons of Brutus, can never maintain himself long. But
+since I have elsewhere treated of this matter at large, I shall merely
+refer to what has there been said concerning it, and shall cite here
+one instance only, happening in our own days, and memorable in the
+history of our country.
+
+I speak of Piero Soderini, who thought by his patience and goodness to
+overcome the very same temper which prompted the sons of Brutus to
+revert to the old government, and who failed in the endeavour. For
+although his sagacity should have taught him the necessity, while
+chance and the ambition of those who attacked him furnished him with
+the opportunity of making an end of them, he never could resolve to
+strike the blow; and not merely believed himself able to subdue
+disaffection by patience and kindness, and to mitigate the enmity of
+particular men by the rewards he held out to them, but also persuaded
+himself, and often declared in the presence of his friends, that he
+could not confront opposition openly, nor crush his adversaries,
+without assuming extraordinary powers and passing laws destructive of
+civil equality; which measures, although not afterward used by him for
+tyrannical ends, would so alarm the community, that after his death
+they would never again consent to appoint a Gonfalonier for life, an
+office which he judged it essential both to maintain and strengthen.
+Now although these scruples of his were wise and good, we ought never
+out of regard for what is good, to suffer an evil to run its course,
+since it may well happen that the evil will prevail over the good. And
+Piero should have believed that as his acts and intentions were to be
+judged by results, he might, if he lived and if fortune befriended him,
+have made it clear to all, that what he did was done to preserve his
+country, and not from personal ambition; and he might have so contrived
+matters that no successor of his could ever turn to bad ends the means
+which he had used for good ends. But he was misled by a preconceived
+opinion, and failed to understand that ill-will is not to be vanquished
+by time nor propitiated by favours. And, so, from not knowing how to
+resemble Brutus, he lost power, and fame, and was driven an exile from
+his country.
+
+That it is as hard a matter to preserve a princedom as it is to
+preserve a commonwealth, will be shown in the Chapter following.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IV.—_That an Usurper is never safe in his Princedom while those
+live whom he has deprived of it._
+
+
+From what befell the elder Tarquin at the hands of the sons of Ancus,
+and Servius Tullius at the hands of Tarquin the Proud, we see what an
+arduous and perilous course it is to strip a king of his kingdom and
+yet suffer him to live on, hoping to conciliate him by benefits. We
+see, too, how the elder Tarquin was ruined by his belief that he held
+the kingdom by a just title, since it had been given him by the people
+and confirmed to him by the senate, never suspecting that the sons of
+Ancus would be so stirred by resentment that it would be impossible to
+content them with what contented all the rest of Rome. Servius Tullius
+again, was ruined through believing that he could conciliate the sons
+of Ancus by loading them with favours.
+
+By the fate of the first of these kings every prince may be warned that
+he can never live securely in his princedom so long as those from whom
+he has taken it survive; while the fate of the second should remind all
+rulers that old injuries are not to be healed by subsequent benefits,
+and least of all when the new benefit is less in degree than the injury
+suffered. And, truly, Servius was wanting in wisdom when he imagined
+that the sons of Tarquin would contentedly resign themselves to be the
+sons-in-law of one whom they thought should be their subject. For the
+desire to reign is so prevailing a passion, that it penetrates the
+minds not only of those who are rightful heirs, but also of those who
+are not; as happened with the wife of the younger Tarquin, who was
+daughter to Servius, but who, possessed by this madness, and setting at
+naught all filial duty, incited her husband to take her father’s
+kingdom, and with it his life; so much nobler did she esteem it to be a
+queen than the daughter of a king. But while the elder Tarquin and
+Servius Tullius lost the kingdom from not knowing how to secure
+themselves against those whom they had deprived of it, the younger
+Tarquin lost it from not observing the ordinances of the old kings, as
+shall be shown in the following Chapter.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER V.—_How an Hereditary King may come to lose his Kingdom._
+
+
+Tarquin the Proud, when he had put Servius Tullius to death, inasmuch
+as the latter left no heirs, took secure possession of the kingdom,
+having nothing to fear from any of those dangers which had stood in the
+way of his predecessors. And although the means whereby he made himself
+king were hateful and monstrous, nevertheless, had he adhered to the
+ancient ordinances of the earlier kings, he might have been endured,
+nor would he have aroused both senate and people to combine against him
+and deprive him of his government. It was not, therefore, because his
+son Sextus violated Lucretia that Tarquin was driven out, but because
+he himself had violated the laws of the kingdom, and governed as a
+tyrant, stripping the senate of all authority, and bringing everything
+under his own control. For all business which formerly had been
+transacted in public, and with the sanction of the senate, he caused to
+be transacted in his palace, on his own responsibility, and to the
+displeasure of every one else, and so very soon deprived Rome of
+whatever freedom she had enjoyed under her other kings.
+
+Nor was it enough for him to have the Fathers his enemies, but he must
+needs also kindle the commons against him, wearing them out with mere
+mechanic labours, very different from the enterprises in which they had
+been employed by his predecessors; so that when Rome overflowed with
+instances of his cruelty and pride, he had already disposed the minds
+of all the citizens to rebel whenever they found the opportunity.
+Wherefore, had not occasion offered in the violence done to Lucretia,
+some other had soon been found to bring about the same result. But had
+Tarquin lived like the other kings, when Sextus his son committed that
+outrage, Brutus and Collatinus would have had recourse to him to punish
+the offender, and not to the commons of Rome. And hence let princes
+learn that from the hour they first violate those laws, customs, and
+usages under which men have lived for a great while, they begin to
+weaken the foundations of their authority. And should they, after they
+have been stripped of that authority, ever grow wise enough to see how
+easily princedoms are preserved by those who are content to follow
+prudent counsels, the sense of their loss will grieve them far more,
+and condemn them to a worse punishment than any they suffer at the
+hands of others. For it is far easier to be loved by good men than by
+bad, and to obey the laws than to seek to control them.
+
+And to learn what means they must use to retain their authority, they
+have only to take example by the conduct of good princes, such as
+Timoleon of Corinth, Aratus of Sicyone, and the like, in whose lives
+they will find such security and content, both on the side of the ruler
+and the ruled, as ought to stir them with the desire to imitate them,
+which, for the reasons already given, it is easy for them to do. For
+men, when they are well governed, ask no more, nor look for further
+freedom; as was the case with the peoples governed by the two whom I
+have named, whom they constrained to continue their rulers while they
+lived, though both of them sought repeatedly to return to private life.
+
+But because, in this and the two preceding Chapters, I have noticed the
+ill-will which arose against the kings, the plots contrived by the sons
+of Brutus against their country, and those directed against the elder
+Tarquin and Servius Tullius, it seems to me not out of place to
+discourse of these matters more at length in the following Chapter, as
+deserving the attention both of princes and private citizens.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VI.—_Of Conspiracies._
+
+
+It were an omission not to say something on the subject of
+conspiracies, these being a source of much danger both to princes and
+to private men. For we see that many more princes have lost their lives
+and states through these than in open warfare; power to wage open war
+upon a prince being conceded to few, whereas power to conspire against
+him is denied to none. On the other hand, since conspiracies are
+attended at every stage by difficulties and dangers, no more hazardous
+or desperate undertakings can be engaged in by any private citizen;
+whence it comes that while many conspiracies are planned, few effect
+their object. Wherefore, to put princes on their guard against these
+dangers, and to make subjects more cautious how they take part in them,
+and rather learn to live content under whatever government fortune has
+assigned them, I shall treat of them at length, without omitting any
+noteworthy circumstance which may serve for the instruction of either.
+Though, indeed, this is a golden sentence Of Cornelius Tacitus, wherein
+he says that “_the past should have our reverence, the present our
+obedience, and that we should wish for good princes, but put up with
+any._”[11] For assuredly whosoever does otherwise is likely to bring
+ruin both on himself and on his country.
+
+ [11] _Tac. Hist._ iv. 8.
+
+
+But, to go deeper into the matter, we have first of all to examine
+against whom conspiracies are directed; and we shall find that men
+conspire either against their country or their prince; and it is of
+these two kinds of conspiracy that at present I desire to speak. For of
+conspiracies which have for their object the surrender of cities to
+enemies who are besieging them, and of all others contrived for like
+ends, I have already said enough.
+
+First, then, I shall treat of those conspiracies which are directed
+against a prince, and begin by inquiring into their causes, which are
+manifold, but of which one is more momentous than all the rest; I mean,
+the being hated by the whole community. For it may reasonably be
+assumed, that when a prince has drawn upon himself this universal
+hatred, he must also have given special offence to particular men,
+which they will be eager to avenge. And this eagerness will be
+augmented by the feeling of general ill-will which the prince is seen
+to have incurred. A prince ought, therefore, to avoid this load of
+public hatred. How he is to do so I need not stop here to explain,
+having discussed the matter already in another place; but if he can
+guard against this, offence given to particular men will expose him to
+but few attacks. One reason being, that there are few men who think so
+much of an injury done them as to run great risks to revenge it;
+another, that assuming them to have both the disposition and the
+courage to avenge themselves, they are restrained by the universal
+favour which they see entertained towards the prince.
+
+Injuries are either to a man’s life, to his property, or to his honour.
+As regards the first, they who threaten injuries to life incur more
+danger than they who actually inflict them; or rather, while great
+danger is incurred in threatening, none at all is incurred from
+inflicting such injuries. For the dead are past thinking of revenge;
+and those who survive, for the most part leave such thoughts to the
+dead. But he whose life is threatened, finding himself forced by
+necessity either to do or suffer, becomes a man most dangerous to the
+prince, as shall be fully explained hereafter.
+
+After menaces to life, injuries to property and honour stir men more
+than any others, and of these a Prince has most to beware. For he can
+never strip a man so bare of his possessions as not to leave him some
+weapon wherewith to redress his wrongs, nor ever so far dishonour him
+as to quell the stubborn spirit which prompts revenge. Of all
+dishonours those done to the women of a household are the worst; after
+which come such personal indignities as nerved the arm of Pausanias
+against Philip of Macedon, and of many another against other princes;
+and, in our own days, it was no other reason that moved Giulio Belanti
+to conspire against Pandolfo, lord of Siena, than that Pandolfo, who
+had given him his daughter to wife, afterwards took her from him, as
+presently shall be told. Chief among the causes which led the Pazzi to
+conspire against the Medici, was the law passed by the latter depriving
+them of the inheritance of Giovanni Bonromei.
+
+Another most powerful motive to conspire against a prince is the desire
+men feel to free their country from a usurper. This it was which
+impelled Brutus and Cassius to conspire against Cæsar, and countless
+others against such tyrants as Phalaris, Dionysius, and the like.
+Against this humour no tyrant can guard, except by laying down his
+tyranny; which as none will do, few escape an unhappy end. Whence the
+verses of Juvenal:—
+
+“Few tyrants die a peaceful death, and few
+The kings who visit Proserpine’s dread lord,
+Unscathed by wounds and blood.”[12]
+
+
+ [12] Ad generum Cereris sine caede et vulnere pauci
+Descendunt reges, et sicca morte tiranni.
+          _Juv. Sat._ x. 112.
+
+
+Great, as I have said already, are the dangers which men run in
+conspiring; for at all times they are in peril, whether in contriving,
+in executing, or after execution. And since in conspiracies either many
+are engaged, or one only (for although it cannot properly be said of
+_one_ man that he _conspires_, there may exist in him the fixed resolve
+to put the prince to death), it is only the solitary plotter who
+escapes the first of these three stages of danger. For he runs no risk
+before executing his design, since as he imparts it to none, there is
+none to bring it to the ear of the prince. A deliberate resolve like
+this may be conceived by a person in any rank of life, high or low,
+base or noble, and whether or no he be the familiar of his prince. For
+every one must, at some time or other, have leave to speak to the
+prince, and whoever has this leave has opportunity to accomplish his
+design. Pausanias, of whom we have made mention so often, slew Philip
+of Macedon as he walked between his son and his son-in-law to the
+temple, surrounded by a thousand armed guards. Pausanias indeed was
+noble, and known to the prince, but Ferdinand of Spain was stabbed in
+the neck by a poor and miserable Spaniard; and though the wound was not
+mortal, it sufficed to show that neither courage nor opportunity were
+wanting to the would-be-assassin. A Dervish, or Turkish priest, drew
+his scimitar on Bajazet, father of the Sultan now reigning, and if he
+did not wound him, it was from no lack either of daring or of
+opportunity. And I believe that there are many who in their minds
+desire the deed, no punishment or danger attending the mere wish,
+though there be but few who dare do it. For since few or none who
+venture, escape death, few are willing to go forward to certain
+destruction.
+
+But to pass from these solitary attempts to those in which several are
+engaged, I affirm it to be shown by history that all such plots have
+been contrived by men of great station, or by those who have been on
+terms of close intimacy with the prince, since no others, not being
+downright madmen, would ever think of conspiring. For men of humble
+rank, and such as are not the intimates of their prince, are neither
+fed by the hopes nor possessed of the opportunities essential for such
+attempts. Because, in the first place, men of low degree will never
+find any to keep faith with them, none being moved to join in their
+schemes by those expectations which encourage men to run great risks;
+wherefore, so soon as their design has been imparted to two or three,
+they are betrayed and ruined. Or, assuming them fortunate enough to
+have no traitor of their number, they will be so hampered in the
+execution of their plot by the want of easy access to the prince, that
+they are sure to perish in the mere attempt. For if even men of great
+position, who have ready access to the prince, succumb to the
+difficulties which I shall presently notice, those difficulties must be
+infinitely increased in the case of men who are without these
+advantages. And because when life and property are at stake men are not
+utterly reckless, on perceiving themselves to be weak they grow
+cautious, and though cursing the tyrant in their hearts, are content to
+endure him, and to wait until some one of higher station than they,
+comes forward to redress their wrongs. So that should we ever find
+these weaklings attempting anything, we may commend their courage
+rather than their prudence.
+
+We see, however, that the great majority of conspirators have been
+persons of position and the familiars of their prince, and that their
+plots have been as often the consequence of excessive indulgence as of
+excessive injury; as when Perennius conspired against Commodus,
+Plautianus against Severus, and Sejanus against Tiberius; all of whom
+had been raised by their masters to such wealth, honours, and
+dignities, that nothing seemed wanting to their authority save the
+imperial name. That they might not lack this also, they fell to
+conspiring against their prince; but in every instance their
+conspiracies had the end which their ingratitude deserved.
+
+The only instance in recent times of such attempts succeeding, is the
+conspiracy of Jacopo IV. d’Appiano against Messer Piero Gambacorti,
+lord of Pisa. For Jacopo, who had been bred and brought up by Piero,
+and loaded by him with honours, deprived him of his State. Similar to
+this, in our own days, was the conspiracy of Coppola against King
+Ferdinand of Aragon. For Coppola had reached such a pitch of power that
+he seemed to himself to have everything but sovereignty; in seeking to
+obtain which he lost his life; though if any plot entered into by a man
+of great position could be expected to succeed, this certainly might,
+being contrived, as we may say, by another king, and by one who had the
+amplest opportunities for its accomplishment. But that lust of power
+which blinds men to dangers darkened the minds of those to whom the
+execution of the scheme was committed; who, had they only known how to
+add prudence to their villainy, could hardly have missed their aim.
+
+The prince, therefore, who would guard himself against plots, ought
+more to fear those men to whom he has been too indulgent, than those to
+whom he has done great wrongs. For the latter lack opportunities which
+the former have in abundance; and the moving cause is equally strong in
+both, lust of power being at least as strong a passion as lust of
+revenge. Wherefore, a prince should entrust his friends with so much
+authority only as leaves a certain interval between his position and
+theirs; that between the two something be still left them to desire.
+Otherwise it will be strange if he do not fare like those princes who
+have been named above.
+
+But to return from this digression, I say, that having shown it to be
+necessary that conspirators should be men of great station, and such as
+have ready access to the prince, we have next to consider what have
+been the results of their plots, and to trace the causes which have
+made them succeed or fail. Now, as I have said already, we find that
+conspiracies are attended by danger at three stages: before during, and
+after their execution; for which reason very few of them have had a
+happy issue; it being next to impossible to surmount all these
+different dangers successfully. And to begin with those which are
+incurred beforehand, and which are graver than all the rest, I say that
+he must be both very prudent and very fortunate who, when contriving a
+conspiracy, does not suffer his secret to be discovered.
+
+Conspiracies are discovered either by disclosures made, or by
+conjecture. Disclosures are made through the treachery or folly of
+those to whom you communicate your design. Treachery is to be looked
+for, because you can impart your plans only to such persons as you
+believe ready to face death on your behalf, or to those who are
+discontented with the prince. Of men whom you can trust thus
+implicitly, one or two may be found; but when you have to open your
+designs to many, they cannot all be of this nature; and their goodwill
+towards you must be extreme if they are not daunted by the danger and
+by fear of punishment. Moreover men commonly deceive themselves in
+respect of the love which they imagine others bear them, nor can ever
+be sure of it until they have put it to the proof. But to make proof of
+it in a matter like this is very perilous; and even if you have proved
+it already, and found it true in some other dangerous trial, you cannot
+assume that there will be the same fidelity here, since this far
+transcends every other kind of danger. Again, if you gauge a man’s
+fidelity by his discontent with the prince, you may easily deceive
+yourself; for so soon as you have taken this discontented man into your
+confidence, you have supplied him with the means whereby he may become
+contented; so that either his hatred of the prince must be great
+indeed, or your influence over him extraordinary, if it keep him
+faithful. Hence it comes that so many conspiracies have been discovered
+and crushed in their earliest stage, and that when the secret is
+preserved among many accomplices for any length of time, it is looked
+on as a miracle; as in the case of the conspiracy of Piso against Nero,
+and, in our own days, in that of the Pazzi against Lorenzo and Giuliano
+de’ Medici; which last, though more than fifty persons were privy to
+it, was not discovered until it came to be carried out.
+
+Conspiracies are disclosed through the imprudence of a conspirator when
+he talks so indiscreetly that some servant, or other person not in the
+plot, overhears him; as happened with the sons of Brutus, who, when
+treating with the envoys of Tarquin, were overheard by a slave, who
+became their accuser; or else through your own weakness in imparting
+your secret to some woman or boy whom you love, or to some other such
+light person; as when Dymnus, who was one of those who conspired with
+Philotas against Alexander the Great, revealed the plot to Nicomachus,
+a youth whom he loved, who at once told Cebalinus, and Cebalinus the
+king.
+
+Of discoveries by conjecture we have an instance in the conspiracy of
+Piso against Nero; for Scaevinus, one of the conspirators, the day
+before he was to kill Nero, made his will, liberated all his slaves and
+gave them money, and bade Milichus, his freedman, sharpen his old rusty
+dagger, and have bandages ready for binding up wounds. From all which
+preparations Milichus conjecturing what work was in hand, accused
+Scaevinus before Nero; whereupon Scaevinus was arrested, and with him
+Natalis, another of the conspirators, who the day before had been seen
+to speak with him for a long time in private; and when the two differed
+in their account of what then passed between them, they were put to the
+torture and forced to confess the truth. In this way the conspiracy was
+brought to light, to the ruin of all concerned.
+
+Against these causes of the discovery of conspiracies it is impossible
+so to guard as that either through treachery, want of caution, or
+levity, the secret shall not be found out, whenever more than three or
+four persons are privy to it. And whenever more than one conspirator is
+arrested, the plot is certain to be detected, because no two persons
+can perfectly agree in a false account of what has passed between them.
+If only one be taken, should he be a man of resolute courage, he may
+refuse to implicate his comrades; but they on their part must have no
+less courage, to stay quiet where they are, and not betray themselves
+by flight; for if courage be absent anywhere, whether in him who is
+taken or in those still at large, the conspiracy is revealed. And what
+is related by Titus Livius as having happened in the conspiracy against
+Hieronymus, tyrant of Syracuse, is most extraordinary, namely, that on
+the capture of one of the conspirators, named Theodorus, he, with great
+fortitude, withheld the names of all his accomplices, and accused
+friends of the tyrant; while his companions, on their part, trusted so
+completely in his courage, that not one of them quitted Syracuse or
+showed any sign of fear.
+
+All these dangers, therefore, which attend the contrivance of a plot,
+must be passed through before you come to its execution; or if you
+would escape them, you must observe the following precautions: Your
+first and surest, nay, to say truth, your only safeguard, is to leave
+your accomplices no time to accuse you; for which reason you must
+impart the affair to them, only at the moment when you mean it to be
+carried out, and not before. Those who have followed this course have
+wholly escaped the preliminary dangers of conspiracies, and, generally
+speaking, the others also; indeed, I may say that they have all
+succeeded, and that it is open to every prudent man to act as they did.
+It will be enough to give two instances of plots effected in this way.
+Nelematus, unable to endure the tyranny of Aristotimus, despot of
+Epirus, assembling many of his friends and kinsmen in his house,
+exhorted them to free their country; and when some of them asked for
+time to consider and mature their plans, he bade his slaves close the
+doors, and told those assembled that unless they swore to go at once
+and do as he directed he would make them over to Aristotimus as
+prisoners. Alarmed by his threats, they bound themselves by a solemn
+oath, and going forth at once and without delay, successfully carried
+out his bidding. A certain Magus having fraudulently usurped the throne
+of Persia; Ortanes, a grandee of that realm, discovering the fraud,
+disclosed it to six others of the chief nobility, telling them that it
+behoved them to free the kingdom from the tyranny of this impostor. And
+when some among them asked for time, Darius, who was one of the six
+summoned by Ortanes, stood up and said, “Either we go at once to do
+this deed, or I go to the Magus to accuse you all.” Whereupon, all
+rising together, without time given to any to change his mind, they
+went forth and succeeded in effecting their end. Not unlike these
+instances was the plan taken by the Etolians to rid themselves of
+Nabis, the Spartan tyrant, to whom, under pretence of succouring him,
+they sent Alasamenes, their fellow-citizen, with two hundred foot
+soldiers and thirty horsemen. For they imparted their real design to
+Alasamenes only, charging the rest, under pain of exile, to obey him in
+whatever he commanded. Alasamenes repaired to Sparta, and never
+divulged his commission till the time came for executing it; and so
+succeeded in putting Nabis to death.
+
+It was, therefore, by the precautions they observed, that the persons
+of whom I have just now spoken escaped all those perils that attend the
+contrivance of conspiracies; and any following their example may expect
+the like good fortune. And that all may learn to do as they did I shall
+notice the case of Piso, of which mention has before been made. By
+reason of his rank, his reputation, and the intimate terms on which he
+lived with Nero, who trusted him without reserve, and would often come
+to his garden to sup with him, Piso was able to gain the friendship of
+many persons of spirit and courage, and well fitted in every way to
+take part in his plot against the emperor, which, under these
+circumstances, might easily have been carried out. For when Nero came
+to his garden, Piso could readily have communicated his design to those
+friends of his, and with suitable words have encouraged them to do
+what, in fact, they would not have had time to withdraw from, and was
+certain to succeed. And were we to examine all similar attempts, it
+would be seen that there are few which might not have been effected in
+the manner shown. But since most men are very ignorant of practical
+affairs, they commit the gravest blunders, especially in matters which
+lie, as this does, a little way out of the beaten track.
+
+Wherefore, the contriver of a plot ought never, if he can help it, to
+communicate his design until the moment when it is to be executed; or
+if he must communicate it, then to some one man only, with whom he has
+long been intimate, and whom he knows to be moved by the same feelings
+as himself. To find one such person is far easier than to find several,
+and, at the same time, involves less risk; for though this one man play
+you false, you are not left altogether without resource, as you are
+when your accomplices are numerous. For I have heard it shrewdly said
+that to one man you may impart anything, since, unless you have been
+led to commit yourself by writing, your denial will go as far as his
+assertion. Shun writing, therefore, as you would a rock, for there is
+nothing so damning as a letter under your own hand.
+
+Plautianus, desiring to procure the deaths of the Emperor Severus and
+his son Caracalla, intrusted the business to the tribune Saturninus,
+who, being more disposed to betray than obey Plautianus, but at the
+same time afraid that, if it came to laying a charge, Plautianus might
+be believed sooner than he, asked him for a written authority, that his
+commission might be credited. Blinded by ambition, Plautianus complied,
+and forthwith was accused by Saturninus and found guilty; whereas, but
+for that written warrant, together with other corroborating proofs, he
+must have escaped by his bold denial of the charge. Against the
+testimony of a single witness, you have thus some defence, unless
+convicted by your own handwriting, or by other circumstantial proof
+against which you must guard. A woman, named Epicharis, who had
+formerly been a mistress of Nero, was privy to Piso’s conspiracy, and
+thinking it might be useful to have the help of a certain captain of
+triremes whom Nero had among his body-guards, she acquainted him with
+the plot, but not with the names of the plotters. This fellow, turning
+traitor, and accusing Epicharis to Nero, so stoutly did she deny the
+charge, that Nero, confounded by her effrontery, let her go.
+
+In imparting a plot to a single person there are, therefore, two risks:
+one, that he may come forward of his own accord to accuse you; the
+other, that if arrested on suspicion, or on some proof of his guilt, he
+may, on being convicted, in the hope to escape punishment, betray you.
+But in neither of these dangers are you left without a defence; since
+you may meet the one by ascribing the charge to the malice of your
+accuser, and the other by alleging that the witness his been forced by
+torture to say what is untrue. The wisest course, however, is to impart
+your design to none, but to act like those who have been mentioned
+above; or if you impart it, then to one only: for although even in this
+course there be a certain degree of danger, it is far less than when
+many are admitted to your confidence.
+
+A case nearly resembling that just now noticed, is where an emergency,
+so urgent as to leave you no time to provide otherwise for your safety,
+constrains you to do to a prince what you see him minded to do to you.
+A necessity of this sort leads almost always to the end desired, as two
+instances may suffice to show. Among the closest friends and intimates
+of the Emperor Commodus, were two captains of the pretorian guards,
+Letus and Electus, while among the most favoured of his distresses was
+a certain Martia. But because these three often reproved him for his
+manner of living, as disgraceful to himself and to his station, he
+resolved to rid himself of them; and so wrote their names, along with
+those of certain others whom he meant should be put to death the next
+night, in a list which he placed under the pillow of his bed. But on
+his going to bathe, a boy, who was a favourite of his, while playing
+about his room and on his bed, found the list, and coming out of the
+chamber with it in his hand, was met by Martia, who took it from him,
+and on reading it and finding what it contained, sent for Letus and
+Electus. And all three recognizing the danger in which they stood,
+resolved to be beforehand with the tyrant, and losing no time, murdered
+him that very night.
+
+The Emperor Caracalla, being with his armies in Mesopotamia, had with
+him Macrinus, who was more of a statesman than a soldier, as his
+prefect. But because princes who are not themselves good are always
+afraid lest others treat them as they deserve, Caracalla wrote to his
+friend Maternianus in Rome to learn from the astrologers whether any
+man had ambitious designs upon the empire, and to send him word.
+Maternianus, accordingly, wrote back that such designs were entertained
+by Macrinus. But this letter, ere it reached the emperor, fell into the
+hands of Macrinus, who, seeing when he read it that he must either put
+Caracalla to death before further letters arrived from Rome, or else
+die himself, committed the business to a centurion, named Martialis,
+whom he trusted, and whose brother had been slain by Caracalla a few
+days before, who succeeded in killing the emperor.
+
+We see, therefore, that an urgency which leaves no room for delay has
+almost the same results as the method already noticed as followed by
+Nelematus of Epirus. We see, too, what I remarked almost at the outset
+of this Discourse, that the threats of princes expose them to greater
+danger than the wrongs they actually inflict, and lead to more active
+conspiracies: and, therefore, that a prince should be careful not to
+threaten; since men are either to be treated kindly or else got rid of,
+but never brought to such a pass that they have to choose between
+slaying and being slain.
+
+As to the dangers attending the execution of plots, these result either
+from some change made in the plan, or from a failure in courage on the
+part of him who is to carry it out; or else from some mistake he falls
+into through want of foresight, or from his not giving the affair its
+finishing stroke, as when some are left alive whom it was meant to put
+to death. Now, nothing causes so much disturbance and hindrance in
+human affairs, as to be forced, at a moment’s notice and without time
+allowed for reflection, to vary your plan of action and adopt a
+different one from that fixed on at the first. And if such changes
+cause confusion anywhere, it is in matters appertaining to war, and in
+enterprises of the kind we are now speaking of; for in such affairs as
+these, there is nothing so essential as that men be prepared to do the
+exact thing intrusted to them. But when men have for many days together
+turned their whole thoughts to doing a thing in a certain way and in a
+certain order, and the way and order are suddenly altered, it is
+impossible but that they should be disconcerted and the whole scheme
+ruined. For which reason, it is far better to do everything in
+accordance with the preconcerted plan, though it be seen to be attended
+with some disadvantages, than, in order to escape these, to involve
+yourself in an infinity of dangers. And this will happen when you
+depart from your original design without time given to form a new one.
+For when time is given you may manage as you please.
+
+The conspiracy of the Pazzi against Lorenzo and Giuliano de’ Medici is
+well known. The scheme agreed on was to give a banquet to the Cardinal
+S. Giorgio, at which the brothers should be put to death. To each of
+the conspirators a part was assigned: to one the murder, to another the
+seizure of the palace, while a third was to ride through the streets
+and call on the people to free themselves. But it so chanced that at a
+time when the Pazzi, the Medici, and the Cardinal were all assembled in
+the cathedral church of Florence to hear High Mass, it became known
+that Giuliano would not be present at the banquet; whereupon the
+conspirators, laying their heads together, resolved to do in church
+what they were to have done elsewhere. This, however, deranged the
+whole scheme. For Giovambattista of Montesecco, would have no hand in
+the murder if it was to be done in a church; and the whole distribution
+of parts had in consequence to be changed; when, as those to whom the
+new parts were assigned had no time allowed them to nerve their minds
+to their new tasks, they managed matters so badly that they were
+overpowered in their attempt.
+
+Courage fails a conspirator either from his own poorness of spirit, or
+from his being overcome by some feeling of reverence. For such majesty
+and awe attend the person of a prince, that it may well happen that he
+softens or dismays his executioners. When Caius Marius was taken by the
+people of Minturnum, the slave sent in to slay him, overawed by the
+bearing of the man, and by the memories which his name called up,
+became unnerved, and powerless to perform his office. And if this
+influence was exercised by one who was a prisoner, and in chains, and
+overwhelmed by adverse fortune, how much more must reverence be
+inspired by a prince who is free and uncontrolled, surrounded by his
+retinue and by all the pomp and splendour of his station; whose dignity
+confounds, and whose graciousness conciliates.
+
+Certain persons conspiring against Sitalces, king of Thrace, fixed a
+day for his murder, and assembled at the place appointed, whither the
+king had already come. Yet none of them raised a hand to harm him, and
+all departed without attempting anything against him or knowing why
+they refrained; each blaming the others. And more than once the same
+folly was repeated, until the plot getting wind, they were taken and
+punished for what they might have done, yet durst not do.
+
+Two brothers of Alfonso, Duke of Ferrara, conspired against him,
+employing as their tool a certain priest named Giennes, a singing-man
+in the service of the Duke. He, at their request, repeatedly brought
+the Duke into their company, so that they had full opportunity to make
+away with him. Yet neither of them ever ventured to strike the blow;
+till at last, their scheme being discovered, they paid the penalty of
+their combined cowardice and temerity. Such irresolution can only have
+arisen from their being overawed by the majesty of the prince, or
+touched by his graciousness.
+
+In the execution of conspiracies, therefore, errors and mishaps arise
+from a failure of prudence or courage to which all are subject, when,
+losing self-control, they are led in their bewilderment to do and say
+what they ought not. That men are thus confounded, and thrown off their
+balance, could not be better shown than in the words of Titus Livius,
+where he describes the behaviour of Alasamenes the Etolian, at the time
+when he resolved on the death of Nabis the Spartan, of whom I have
+spoken before. For when the time to act came, and he had disclosed to
+his followers what they had to do, Livius represents him as
+“_collecting his thoughts which had grown confused by dwelling on so
+desperate an enterprise_.” For it is impossible for any one, though of
+the most steadfast temper and used to the sight of death and to handle
+deadly weapons, not to be perturbed at such a moment. For which reason
+we should on such occasions choose for our tools those who have had
+experience in similar affairs, and trust no others though reputed of
+the truest courage. For in these grave undertakings, no one who is
+without such experience, however bold and resolute, is to be trusted.
+
+The confusion of which I speak may either cause you to drop your weapon
+from your hand, or to use words which will have the same results.
+Quintianus being commanded by Lucilla, sister of Commodus, to slay him,
+lay in wait for him at the entrance of the amphitheatre, and rushing
+upon him with a drawn dagger, cried out, “_The senate sends you this_;”
+which words caused him to be seized before his blow descended. In like
+manner Messer Antonio of Volterra, who as we have elsewhere seen was
+told off to kill Lorenzo de’ Medici, exclaimed as he approached him,
+“_Ah traitor!_” and this exclamation proved the salvation of Lorenzo
+and the ruin of that conspiracy.
+
+For the reasons now given, a conspiracy against a single ruler may
+readily break down in its execution; but a conspiracy against two
+rulers is not only difficult, but so hazardous that its success is
+almost hopeless. For to effect like actions, at the same time, in
+different places, is well-nigh impossible; nor can they be effected at
+different times, if you would not have one counteract another. So that
+if conspiracy against a single ruler be imprudent and dangerous, to
+conspire against two, is in the last degree fool-hardy and desperate.
+And were it not for the respect in which I hold the historian, I could
+not credit as possible what Herodian relates of Plautianus, namely,
+that he committed to the centurion Saturninus the task of slaying
+single-handed both Severus and Caracalla, they dwelling in different
+places; for the thing is so opposed to reason that on no other
+authority could I be induced to accept it as true.
+
+Certain young Athenians conspired against Diocles and Hippias, tyrants
+of Athens. Diocles they slew; but Hippias, making his escape, avenged
+him. Chion and Leonidas of Heraclea, disciples of Plato, conspired
+against the despots Clearchus and Satirus. Clearchus fell, but Satirus
+survived and avenged him. The Pazzi, of whom we have spoken so often,
+succeeded in murdering Giuliano only. From such conspiracies,
+therefore, as are directed against more heads than one, all should
+abstain; for no good is to be got from them, whether for ourselves, for
+our country, or for any one else. On the contrary, when those conspired
+against escape, they become harsher and more unsufferable than before,
+as, in the examples given, Florence, Athens, and Heraclea had cause to
+know. True it is that the conspiracy contrived by Pelopidas for the
+liberation of his country, had to encounter every conceivable
+hindrance, and yet had the happiest end. For Pelopidas had to deal, not
+with two tyrants only, but with ten; and so far from having their
+confidence, could not, being an outlaw, even approach them. And yet he
+succeeded in coming to Thebes, in putting the tyrants to death, and in
+freeing his country. But whatever he did was done with the aid of one
+of the counsellors of the tyrants, a certain Charon, through whom he
+had all facilities for executing his design. Let none, however, take
+this case as a pattern; for that it was in truth a desperate attempt,
+and its success a marvel, was and is the opinion of all historians, who
+speak of it as a thing altogether extraordinary and unexampled.
+
+The execution of a plot may be frustrated by some groundless alarm or
+unforeseen mischance occurring at the very moment when the scheme is to
+be carried out. On the morning on which Brutus and his confederates
+were to slay Cæsar, it so happened that Cæsar talked for a great while
+with Cneus Pompilius Lenas, one of the conspirators; which some of the
+others observing, were in terror that Pompilius was divulging the
+conspiracy to Cæsar; whose life they would therefore have attempted
+then and there, without waiting his arrival in the senate house, had
+they not been reassured by seeing that when the conference ended he
+showed no sign of unusual emotion. False alarms of this sort are to be
+taken into account and allowed for, all the more that they are easily
+raised. For he who has not a clear conscience is apt to assume that
+others are speaking of him. A word used with a wholly different
+purpose, may throw his mind off its balance and lead him to fancy that
+reference is intended to the matter he is engaged on, and cause him
+either to betray the conspiracy by flight, or to derange its execution
+by anticipating the time fixed. And the more there are privy to the
+conspiracy, the likelier is this to happen.
+
+As to the mischances which may befall, since these are unforeseen, they
+can only be instanced by examples which may make men more cautious.
+Giulio Belanti of Siena, of whom I have spoken before, from the hate he
+bore Pandolfo Petrucci, who had given him his daughter to wife and
+afterwards taken her from him, resolved to murder him, and thus chose
+his time. Almost every day Pandolfo went to visit a sick kinsman,
+passing the house of Giulio on the way, who, remarking this, took
+measures to have his accomplices ready in his house to kill Pandolfo as
+he passed. Wherefore, placing the rest armed within the doorway, one he
+stationed at a window to give the signal of Pandolfo’s approach. It so
+happened however, that as he came nigh the house, and after the
+look-out had given the signal, Pandolfo fell in with a friend who
+stopped him to converse; when some of those with him, going on in
+advance, saw and heard the gleam and clash of weapons, and so
+discovered the ambuscade; whereby Pandolfo was saved, while Giulio with
+his companions had to fly from Siena. This plot accordingly was marred,
+and Giulio’s schemes baulked, in consequence of a chance meeting.
+Against such accidents, since they are out of the common course of
+things, no provision can be made. Still it is very necessary to take
+into account all that may happen, and devise what remedies you can.
+
+It now only remains for us to consider those dangers which follow after
+the execution of a plot. These in fact resolve themselves into one,
+namely, that some should survive who will avenge the death of the
+murdered prince. The part of avenger is likely to be assumed by a son,
+a brother, or other kinsman of the deceased, who in the ordinary course
+of events might have looked to succeed to the princedom. And such
+persons are suffered to live, either from inadvertence, or from some of
+the causes noted already, as when Giovann’ Andrea of Lampognano, with
+the help of his companions, put to death the Duke of Milan. For the son
+and two brothers of the Duke, who survived him, were able to avenge his
+death. In cases like this, indeed, the conspirators may be held
+excused, since there is nothing they can do to help themselves. But
+when from carelessness and want of due caution some one is allowed to
+live whose death ought to have been secured, there is no excuse.
+Certain conspirators, after murdering the lord, Count Girolamo of
+Forli, made prisoners of his wife and of his children who were still
+very young. By thinking they could not be safe unless they got
+possession of the citadel, which the governor refused to surrender,
+they obtained a promise from Madonna Caterina, for so the Countess was
+named, that on their permitting her to enter the citadel she would
+cause it to be given up to them, her children in the mean time
+remaining with them as hostages. On which undertaking they suffered her
+to enter the citadel. But no sooner had she got inside than she fell to
+upbraid them from the walls with the murder of her husband, and to
+threaten them with every kind of vengeance; and to show them how little
+store she set upon her children, told them scoffingly that she knew how
+others could be got. In the end, the rebels having no leader to advise
+them, and perceiving too late the error into which they had been
+betrayed, had to pay the penalty of their rashness by perpetual
+banishment.
+
+But of all the dangers which may follow on the execution of a plot,
+none is so much or so justly to be feared as that the people should be
+well affected to the prince whom you have put to death. For against
+this danger conspirators have no resource which can ensure their
+safety. Of this we have example in the case of Cæsar, who as he had the
+love of the Roman people was by them avenged; for they it was who, by
+driving out the conspirators from Rome, were the cause that all of
+them, at different times and in different places, came to violent ends.
+
+Conspiracies against their country are less danger for those who take
+part in them than conspiracies against princes; since there is less
+risk beforehand, and though there be the same danger in their
+execution, there is none afterwards. Beforehand, the risks are few,
+because a citizen may use means for obtaining power without betraying
+his wishes or designs to any; and unless his course be arrested, his
+designs are likely enough to succeed; nay, though laws be passed to
+restrain him, he may strike out a new path. This is to be understood of
+a commonwealth which has to some degree become corrupted; for in one
+wherein there is no taint of corruption, there being no soil in which
+evil seed can grow, such designs will never suggest themselves to any
+citizen.
+
+In a commonwealth, therefore, a citizen may by many means and in many
+ways aspire to the princedom without risking destruction, both because
+republics are slower than princes are to take alarm, are less
+suspicious and consequently less cautious, and because they look with
+greater reverence upon their great citizens, who are in this way
+rendered bolder and more reckless in attacking them. Any one who has
+read Sallust’s account of the conspiracy of Catiline, must remember
+how, when that conspiracy was discovered, Catiline not only remained in
+Rome, but even made his appearance in the senatehouse, where he was
+suffered to address the senate in the most insulting terms,—so
+scrupulous was that city in protecting the liberty of all its citizens.
+Nay, even after he had left Rome and placed himself at the head of his
+army, Lentulus and his other accomplices would not have been
+imprisoned, had not letters been found upon them clearly establishing
+their guilt. Hanno, the foremost citizen of Carthage, aspiring to
+absolute power, on the occasion of the marriage of a daughter contrived
+a plot for administering poison to the whole senate and so making
+himself prince. The scheme being discovered, the senate took no steps
+against him beyond passing a law to limit the expense of banquets and
+marriage ceremonies. So great was the respect they paid to his quality.
+
+True, the _execution_ of a plot against your country is attended with
+greater difficulty and danger, since it seldom happens that, in
+conspiring against so many, your own resources are sufficient by
+themselves; for it is not every one who, like Cæsar, Agathocles, or
+Cleomenes, is at the head of an army, so as to be able at a stroke, and
+by open force to make himself master of his country. To such as these,
+doubtless, the path is safe and easy enough; but others who have not
+such an assembled force ready at their command, must effect their ends
+either by stratagem and fraud, or with the help of foreign troops. Of
+such stratagems and frauds we have an instance in the case of
+Pisistratus the Athenian, who after defeating the Megarians and thereby
+gaining the favour of his fellow-citizens, showed himself to them one
+morning covered with wounds and blood, declaring that he had been thus
+outraged through the jealousy of the nobles, and asking that he might
+have an armed guard assigned for his protection. With the authority
+which this lent him, he easily rose to such a pitch of power as to
+become tyrant of Athens. In like manner Pandolfo Petrucci, on his
+return with the other exiles to Siena, was appointed the command of the
+public guard, as a mere office of routine which others had declined.
+Very soon, however, this armed force gave him so much importance that
+he became the supreme ruler of the State. And many others have followed
+other plans and methods, and in the course of time, and without
+incurring danger, have achieved their aim.
+
+Conspirators against their country, whether trusting to their own
+forces or to foreign aid, have had more or less success in proportion
+as they have been favoured by Fortune. Catiline, of whom we spoke just
+now, was overthrown. Hanno, who has also been mentioned, failing to
+accomplish his object by poison, armed his partisans to the number of
+many thousands; but both he and they came to an ill end. On the other
+hand, certain citizens of Thebes conspiring to become its tyrants,
+summoned a Spartan army to their assistance, and usurped the absolute
+control of the city. In short, if we examine all the conspiracies which
+men have engaged in against their country, we shall find that few or
+none have been quelled in their inception, but that all have either
+succeeded, or have broken down in their execution. Once executed, they
+entail no further risks beyond those implied in the nature of a
+princedom. For the man who becomes a tyrant incurs all the natural and
+ordinary dangers in which a tyranny involves him, and has no remedies
+against them save those of which I have already spoken.
+
+This is all that occurs to me to say on the subject of conspiracies. If
+I have noticed those which have been carried out with the sword rather
+than those wherein poison has been the instrument, it is because,
+generally speaking, the method of proceeding is the same in both. It is
+true, nevertheless, that conspiracies which are to be carried out by
+poison are, by reason of their uncertainty, attended by greater danger.
+For since fewer opportunities offer for their execution, you must have
+an understanding with persons who can command opportunities. But it is
+dangerous to have to depend on others. Again, many causes may hinder a
+poisoned draught from proving mortal; as when the murderers of
+Commodus, on his vomiting the poison given him, had to strangle him.
+
+Princes, then, have no worse enemy than conspiracy, for when a
+conspiracy is formed against them, it either carries them off, or
+discredits them: since, if it succeeds, they die; while, if it be
+discovered, and the conspirators be put to death themselves, it will
+always be believed that the whole affair has been trumped up by the
+prince that he might glut his greed and cruelty with the goods and
+blood of those whom he has made away with. Let me not, however, forget
+to warn the prince or commonwealth against whom a conspiracy is
+directed, that on getting word of it, and before taking any steps to
+punish it, they endeavour, as far as they can, to ascertain its
+character, and after carefully weighing the strength of the
+conspirators with their own, on finding it preponderate, never suffer
+their knowledge of the plot to appear until they are ready with a force
+sufficient to crush it. For otherwise, to disclose their knowledge will
+only give the signal for their destruction. They must strive therefore
+to seem unconscious of what is going on; for conspirators who see
+themselves detected are driven forward by necessity and will stick at
+nothing. Of this precaution we have an example in Roman history, when
+the officers of the two legions, who, as has already been mentioned,
+were left behind to defend the Capuans from the Samnites, conspired
+together against the Capuans. For on rumours of this conspiracy
+reaching Rome, Rutilius the new consul was charged to see to it; who,
+not to excite the suspicions of the conspirators, publicly gave out
+that by order of the senate the Capuan legions were continued in their
+station. The conspirators believing this, and thinking they would have
+ample time to execute their plans, made no effort to hasten matters,
+but remained at their ease, until they found that the consul was moving
+one of the two legions to a distance from the other. This arousing
+their suspicion, led them to disclose their designs and endeavour to
+carry them out.
+
+Now, we could have no more instructive example than this in whatever
+way we look at it. For it shows how slow men are to move in those
+matters wherein time seems of little importance, and how active they
+become when necessity urges them. Nor can a prince or commonwealth
+desiring for their own ends to retard the execution of a conspiracy,
+use any more effectual means to do so, than by artfully holding out to
+the conspirators some special opportunity as likely soon to present
+itself; awaiting which, and believing they have time and to spare for
+what they have to do, they will afford that prince or commonwealth all
+the leisure needed to prepare for their punishment. Whosoever neglects
+these precautions hastens his own destruction, as happened with the
+Duke of Athens, and with Guglielmo de’ Pazzi. For the Duke, who had
+made himself tyrant of Florence, on learning that he was being
+conspired against, without further inquiry into the matter, caused one
+of the conspirators to be seized; whereupon the rest at once armed
+themselves and deprived him of his government. Guglielmo, again, being
+commissary in the Val di Chiana in the year 1501, and learning that a
+conspiracy was being hatched in Arezzo to take the town from the
+Florentines and give it over to the Vitelli, repaired thither with all
+haste; and without providing himself with the necessary forces or
+giving a thought to the strength of the conspirators, on the advice of
+the bishop, his son, had one of them arrested. Which becoming known to
+the others, they forthwith rushed to arms, and taking the town from the
+Florentines, made Guglielmo their prisoner. Where, however,
+conspiracies are weak, they may and should be put down without scruple
+or hesitation.
+
+Two methods, somewhat opposed to one another, which have occasionally
+been followed in dealing with conspiracies, are in no way to be
+commended. One of these was that adopted by the Duke of Athens, of whom
+I have just now spoken, who to have it thought that he confided in the
+goodwill of the Florentines, caused a certain man who gave information
+of a plot against him, to be put to death. The other was that followed
+by Dion the Syracusan, who, to sound the intentions of one whom he
+suspected, arranged with Calippus, whom he trusted, to pretend to get
+up a conspiracy against him. Neither of these tyrants reaped any
+advantage from the course he followed. For the one discouraged
+informers and gave heart to those who were disposed to conspire, the
+other prepared an easy road to his own death, or rather was prime mover
+in a conspiracy against himself. As the event showed. For Calippus
+having free leave to plot against Dion, plotted to such effect, that he
+deprived him at once of his State and life.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VII.—_Why it is that changes from Freedom to Servitude, and
+from Servitude to Freedom, are sometimes made without Bloodshed, but at
+other times reek with Blood_.
+
+
+Since we find from history that in the countless changes which have
+been made from freedom to servitude and from servitude to freedom,
+sometimes an infinite multitude have perished, while at others not a
+soul has suffered (as when Rome made her change from kings to consuls,
+on which occasion none was banished save Tarquin, and no harm was done
+to any other), it may perhaps be asked, how it happens that of these
+revolutions, some have been attended by bloodshed and others not.
+
+The answer I take to be this. The government which suffers change
+either has or has not had its beginning in violence. And since the
+government which has its beginning in violence must start by inflicting
+injuries on many, it must needs happen that on its downfall those who
+were injured will desire to avenge themselves; from which desire for
+vengeance the slaughter and death of many will result. But when a
+government originates with, and derives its authority from the whole
+community, there is no reason why the community, if it withdraw that
+authority, should seek to injure any except the prince from whom it
+withdraws it. Now the government of Rome was of this nature, and the
+expulsion of the Tarquins took place in this way. Of a like character
+was the government of the Medici in Florence, and, accordingly, upon
+their overthrow in the year 1494, no injury was done to any save
+themselves.
+
+In such cases, therefore, the changes I speak of do not occasion any
+very great danger. But the changes wrought by men who have wrongs to
+revenge, are always of a most dangerous kind, and such, to say the
+least, as may well cause dismay in the minds of those who read of them.
+But since history abounds with instances of such changes I need say no
+more about them.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VIII.—_That he who would effect Changes in a Commonwealth, must
+give heed to its Character and Condition_
+
+
+I have said before that a bad citizen cannot work grave mischief in a
+commonwealth which has not become corrupted. This opinion is not only
+supported by the arguments already advanced, but is further confirmed
+by the examples of Spurius Cassius and Manlius Capitolinus. For
+Spurius, being ambitious, and desiring to obtain extraordinary
+authority in Rome, and to win over the people by loading them with
+benefits (as, for instance, by selling them those lands which the
+Romans had taken from the Hernici,) his designs were seen through by
+the senate, and laid him under such suspicion, that when in haranguing
+the people he offered them the money realized by the sale of the grain
+brought from Sicily at the public expense, they would have none of it,
+believing that he offered it as the price of their freedom. Now, had
+the people been corrupted, they would not have refused this bribe, but
+would have opened rather than closed the way to the tyranny.
+
+The example of Manlius is still more striking. For in his case we see
+what excellent gifts both of mind and body, and what splendid services
+to his country were afterwards cancelled by that shameful eagerness to
+reign which we find bred in him by his jealousy of the honours paid
+Camillus. For so darkened did his mind become, that without reflecting
+what were the institutions to which Rome was accustomed, or testing the
+material he had to work on, when he would have seen that it was still
+unfit to be moulded to evil ends, he set himself to stir up tumults
+against the senate and against the laws of his country.
+
+And herein we recognize the excellence of this city of Rome, and of the
+materials whereof it was composed. For although the nobles were wont to
+stand up stoutly for one another, not one of them stirred to succour
+Manlius, and not one of his kinsfolk made any effort on his behalf, so
+that although it was customary, in the case of other accused persons,
+for their friends to put on black and sordid raiment, with all the
+other outward signs of grief, in order to excite pity for the accused,
+none was seen to do any of these things for Manlius. Even the tribunes
+of the people, though constantly ready to promote whatever courses
+seemed to favour the popular cause, and the more vehemently the more
+they seemed to make against the nobles, in this instance sided with the
+nobles to put down the common enemy. Nay the very people themselves,
+keenly alive to their own interests, and well disposed towards any
+attempt to damage the nobles, though they showed Manlius many proofs of
+their regard, nevertheless, when he was cited by the tribunes to appear
+before them and submit his cause for their decision, assumed the part
+of judges and not of defenders, and without scruple or hesitation
+sentenced him to die. Wherefore, I think, that there is no example in
+the whole Roman history which serves so well as this to demonstrate the
+virtues of all ranks in that republic. For not a man in the whole city
+bestirred himself to shield a citizen endowed with every great quality,
+and who, both publicly and privately, had done so much that deserved
+praise. But in all, the love of country outweighed every other thought,
+and all looked less to his past deserts than to the dangers which his
+present conduct threatened; from which to relieve themselves they put
+him to death. “_Such_,” says Livius, “_was the fate of a man worthy our
+admiration had he not been born in a free State_.”
+
+And here two points should be noted. The first, that glory is to be
+sought by different methods in a corrupt city, and in one which still
+preserves its freedom. The second, which hardly differs from the first,
+that in their actions, and especially in matters of moment, men must
+have regard to times and circumstances and adapt themselves thereto.
+For those persons who from an unwise choice, or from natural
+inclination, run counter to the times will for the most part live
+unhappily, and find all they undertake issue in failure; whereas those
+who accommodate themselves to the times are fortunate and successful.
+And from the passage cited we may plainly infer, that had Manlius lived
+in the days of Marius and Sylla, when the body of the State had become
+corrupted, so that he could have impressed it with the stamp of his
+ambition, he might have had the same success as they had, and as those
+others had who after them aspired to absolute power; and, conversely,
+that if Sylla and Marius had lived in the days of Manlius, they must
+have broken down at the very beginning of their attempts.
+
+For one man, by mischievous arts and measures, may easily prepare the
+ground for the universal corruption of a city; but no one man in his
+lifetime can carry that corruption so far, as himself to reap the
+harvest; or granting that one man’s life might be long enough for this
+purpose, it would be impossible for him, having regard to the ordinary
+habits of men, who grow impatient and cannot long forego the
+gratification of their desires, to wait until the corruption was
+complete. Moreover, men deceive themselves in respect of their own
+affairs, and most of all in respect of those on which they are most
+bent; so that either from impatience or from self-deception, they rush
+upon undertakings for which the time is not ripe, and so come to an ill
+end. Wherefore to obtain absolute authority in a commonwealth and to
+destroy its liberties, you must find the body of the State already
+corrupted, and corrupted by a gradual wasting continued from generation
+to generation; which, indeed, takes place necessarily, unless, as has
+been already explained, the State be often reinforced by good examples,
+or brought back to its first beginnings by wise laws.
+
+Manlius, therefore, would have been a rare and renowned man had he been
+born in a corrupt city; and from his example we see that citizens
+seeking to introduce changes in the form of their government, whether
+in favour of liberty or despotism, ought to consider what materials
+they have to deal with, and then judge of the difficulty of their task.
+For it is no less arduous and dangerous to attempt to free a people
+disposed to live in servitude, than to enslave a people who desire to
+live free.
+
+And because it has been said above, that in their actions men must take
+into account the character of the times in which they live, and guide
+themselves accordingly, I shall treat this point more fully in the
+following Chapter.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IX.—_That to enjoy constant good Fortune we must change with
+the Times._
+
+
+I have repeatedly noted that the good or bad fortune of men depends on
+whether their methods of acting accord with the character of the times.
+For we see that in what they do some men act impulsively, others warily
+and with caution. And because, from inability to preserve the just
+mean, they in both of these ways overstep the true limit, they commit
+mistakes in one direction or the other. He, however, will make fewest
+mistakes, and may expect to prosper most, who, while following the
+course to which nature inclines him, finds, as I have said, his method
+of acting in accordance with the times in which he lives.
+
+All know that in his command of the Roman armies, Fabius Maximus
+displayed a prudence and caution very different from the audacity and
+hardihood natural to his countrymen; and it was his good fortune that
+his methods suited with the times. For Hannibal coming into Italy in
+all the flush of youth and recent success, having already by two
+defeats stripped Rome of her best soldiers and filled her with dismay,
+nothing could have been more fortunate for that republic than to find a
+general able, by his deliberateness and caution, to keep the enemy at
+bay. Nor, on the other hand, could Fabius have fallen upon times better
+suited to the methods which he used, and by which he crowned himself
+with glory. That he acted in accordance with his natural bent, and not
+from a reasoned choice, we may gather from this, that when Scipio, to
+bring the war to an end, proposed to pass with his army into Africa,
+Fabius, unable to depart from his characteristic methods and habits,
+strenuously opposed him; so that had it rested with him, Hannibal might
+never have left Italy. For he perceived not that the times had changed,
+and that with them it was necessary to change the methods of
+prosecuting the war. Had Fabius, therefore, been King of Rome, he might
+well have caused the war to end unhappily, not knowing how to
+accommodate his methods to the change in the times. As it was, he lived
+in a commonwealth in which there were many citizens, and many different
+dispositions; and which as it produced a Fabius, excellent at a time
+when it was necessary to protract hostilities, so also, afterwards gave
+birth to a Scipio, at a time suited to bring them to a successful
+close.
+
+And hence it comes that a commonwealth endures longer, and has a more
+sustained good fortune than a princedom, because from the diversity in
+the characters of its citizens, it can adapt itself better than a
+prince can to the diversity of times. For, as I have said before, a man
+accustomed to follow one method, will never alter it; whence it must
+needs happen that when times change so as no longer to accord with his
+method, he will be ruined. Piero Soderini, of whom I have already
+spoken, was guided in all his actions by patience and gentleness, and
+he and his country prospered while the times were in harmony with these
+methods. But, afterwards, when a time came when it behoved him to have
+done with patience and gentleness, he knew not how to drop them, and
+was ruined together with his country. Pope Julius II., throughout the
+whole of his pontificate, was governed by impulse and passion, and
+because the times were in perfect accord, all his undertakings
+prospered. But had other times come requiring other qualities, he could
+not have escaped destruction, since he could not have changed his
+methods nor his habitual line of conduct.
+
+As to why such changes are impossible, two reasons may be given. One is
+that we cannot act in opposition to the bent of our nature. The other,
+that when a man has been very successful while following a particular
+method, he can never be convinced that it is for his advantage to try
+some other. And hence it results that a man’s fortunes vary, because
+times change and he does not change with them. So, too, with
+commonwealths, which, as we have already shown at length, are ruined
+from not altering their institutions to suit the times. And
+commonwealths are slower to change than princes are, changes costing
+them more effort; because occasions must be waited for which shall stir
+the whole community, and it is not enough that a single citizen alters
+his method of acting.
+
+But since I have made mention of Fabius Maximus who wore out Hannibal
+by keeping him at bay, I think it opportune to consider in the
+following Chapter whether a general who desires to engage his enemy at
+all risks, can be prevented by that enemy from doing so.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER X.—_That a Captain cannot escape Battle when his Enemy forces
+it on him at all risks._
+
+
+“_Cneius Sulpitius when appointed dictator against the Gauls, being
+unwilling to tempt Fortune by attacking an enemy whom delay and a
+disadvantageous position would every day render weaker, protracted the
+war._”
+
+When a mistake is made of a sort that all or most men are likely to
+fall into, I think it not amiss to mark it again and again with
+disapproval. Wherefore, although I have already shown repeatedly how in
+affairs of moment the actions of the moderns conform not to those of
+antiquity, still it seems to me not superfluous, in this place, to say
+the same thing once more. For if in any particular the moderns have
+deviated from the methods of the ancients, it is especially in their
+methods of warfare, wherein not one of those rules formerly so much
+esteemed is now attended to. And this because both princes and
+commonwealths have devolved the charge of such matters upon others,
+and, to escape danger, have kept aloof from all military service; so
+that although one or another of the princes of our times may
+occasionally be seen present in person with his army, we are not
+therefore to expect from him any further praiseworthy behaviour. For
+even where such personages take part in any warlike enterprise, they do
+so out of ostentation and from no nobler motive; though doubtless from
+sometimes seeing their soldiers face to face, and from retaining to
+themselves the title of command, they are likely to make fewer blunders
+than we find made by republics, and most of all by the republics of
+Italy, which though altogether dependent upon others, and themselves
+utterly ignorant of everything relating to warfare, do yet, that they
+may figure as the commanders of their armies, take upon them to direct
+their movements, and in doing so commit countless mistakes; some of
+which have been considered elsewhere but one is of such importance as
+to deserve notice here.
+
+When these sluggard princes or effeminate republics send forth any of
+their Captains, it seems to them that the wisest instruction they can
+give him is to charge him on no account to give battle, but, on the
+contrary, to do what he can to avoid fighting. Wherein they imagine
+themselves to imitate the prudence of Fabius Maximus, who by
+protracting the war with Hannibal, saved the Roman commonwealth; not
+perceiving that in most instances such advice to a captain is either
+useless or hurtful. For the truth of the matter is, that a captain who
+would keep the field, cannot decline battle when his adversary forces
+it on him at all hazards. So that the instruction to avoid battle is
+but tantamount to saying, “You shall engage when it pleases your enemy,
+and not when it suits yourself.” For if you would keep the field and
+yet avoid battle, the only safe course is to interpose a distance of at
+least fifty miles between you and your enemy, and afterwards to
+maintain so vigilant a look-out, that should he advance you will have
+time to make your retreat. Another method is to shut yourself up in
+some town. But both of these methods are extremely disadvantageous. For
+by following the former, you leave your country a prey to the enemy,
+and a valiant prince would far sooner risk the chances of battle than
+prolong a war in a manner so disastrous to his subjects; while by
+adopting the latter method, and shutting yourself up in a town with
+your army, there is manifest danger of your being besieged, and
+presently reduced by famine and forced to surrender. Wherefore it is
+most mischievous to seek to avoid battle in either of these two ways.
+
+To intrench yourself in a strong position, as Fabius was wont to do, is
+a good method when your army is so formidable that the enemy dare not
+advance to attack you in your intrenchments; yet it cannot truly be
+said that Fabius avoided battle, but rather that he sought to give
+battle where he could do so with advantage. For had Hannibal desired to
+fight, Fabius would have waited for him and fought him. But Hannibal
+never dared to engage him on his own ground. So that an engagement was
+avoided as much by Hannibal as by Fabius, since if either had been
+minded to fight at all hazards the other would have been constrained to
+take one of three courses, that is to say, one or other of the two just
+now mentioned, or else to retreat. The truth of this is confirmed by
+numberless examples, and more particularly by what happened in the war
+waged by the Romans against Philip of Macedon, the father of Perseus.
+For Philip being invaded by the Romans, resolved not to give them
+battle; and to avoid battle, sought at first to do as Fabius had done
+in Italy, posting himself on the summit of a hill, where he intrenched
+himself strongly, thinking that the Romans would not venture to attack
+him there. But they advancing and attacking him in his intrenchments,
+drove him from his position; when, unable to make further resistance,
+he fled with the greater part of his army, and was only saved from
+utter destruction by the difficulty of the ground, which made it
+impossible for the Romans to pursue him.
+
+Philip, therefore, who had no mind to fight, encamping too near the
+Romans, was forced to fly; and learning from this experience that to
+escape fighting it was not enough for him to intrench himself on a
+hill, yet not choosing to shut himself up in a walled town, he was
+constrained to take the other alternative of keeping at a distance of
+many miles from the Roman legions. Accordingly, when the Romans entered
+one province, he betook himself to another, and when they left a
+province he entered it. But perceiving that by protracting the war in
+this way, his condition grew constantly worse, while his subjects
+suffered grievously, now from his own troops, at another time from
+those of the enemy, he at last resolved to hazard battle, and so came
+to a regular engagement with the Romans.
+
+It is for your interest, therefore, not to fight, when you possess the
+same advantages as Fabius, or as Cneius Sulpitius had; in other words,
+when your army is so formidable in itself that the enemy dare not
+attack you in your intrenchments, and although he has got within your
+territory has yet gained no footing there, and suffers in consequence
+from the want of necessary supplies. In such circumstances delay is
+useful, for the reasons assigned by Titus Livius when speaking of
+Sulpitius. In no other circumstances, however, can an engagement be
+avoided without dishonour or danger. For to retire as Philip did, is
+nothing else than defeat; and the disgrace is greater in proportion as
+your valour has been less put to the proof. And if Philip was lucky
+enough to escape, another, not similarly favoured by the nature of the
+ground, might not have the same good fortune.
+
+That Hannibal was not a master in the arts of warfare there is none
+will venture to maintain. Wherefore, when he had to encounter Scipio in
+Africa, it may be assumed that had he seen any advantage in prolonging
+the war he would have done so; and, possibly, being a skilful captain
+and in command of a valiant army, he might have been able to do what
+Fabius did in Italy. But since he took not that course, we may infer
+that he was moved by sufficient reasons. For the captain who has got an
+army together, and perceives that from want of money or friends he
+cannot maintain it long, must be a mere madman if he do not at once,
+and before his army melts away, try the fortunes of battle; since he is
+certain to lose by delay, while by fighting he may chance to succeed.
+And there is this also to be kept in view, that we must strive, even if
+we be defeated, to gain glory; and that more glory is to be won in
+being beaten by force, than in a defeat from any other cause. And this
+we may suppose to have weighed with Hannibal. On the other hand,
+supposing Hannibal to have declined battle, Scipio, even if he had
+lacked courage to follow him up and attack him in his intrenched camp,
+would not have suffered thereby; for as he had defeated Syphax, and got
+possession of many of the African towns, he could have rested where he
+was in the same security and with the same convenience as if he had
+been in Italy. But this was not the case with Hannibal when he had to
+encounter Fabius, nor with the Gauls when they were opposed to
+Sulpitius.
+
+Least of all can he decline battle who invades with his army the
+country of another; for seeking to enter his enemy’s country, he must
+fight whenever the enemy comes forward to meet him; and is under still
+greater necessity to fight, if he undertake the siege of any town. As
+happened in our own day with Duke Charles of Burgundy, who, when
+beleaguering Morat, a town of the Swiss, was by them attacked and
+routed; or as happened with the French army encamped against Novara,
+which was in like manner defeated by the Swiss.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XI.—_That one who has to contend with many, though he be weaker
+than they, will prevail if he can withstand their first onset._
+
+
+The power exercised in Rome by the tribunes of the people was great,
+and, as I have repeatedly explained, was necessary, since otherwise
+there would have been no check on the ambition of the nobles, and the
+commonwealth must have grown corrupted far sooner than it did. But
+because, as I have said elsewhere, there is in everything a latent evil
+peculiar to it, giving rise to new mischances, it becomes necessary to
+provide against these by new ordinances. The authority of the tribunes,
+therefore, being insolently asserted so as to become formidable to the
+nobility and to the entire city, disorders dangerous to the liberty of
+the State must thence have resulted, had not a method been devised by
+Appius Claudius for controlling the ambition of the tribunes. This was,
+to secure that there should always be one of their number timid, or
+venal, or else a lover of the general good, who could be influenced to
+oppose the rest whenever these sought to pass any measure contrary to
+the wishes of the senate. This remedy was a great restraint on the
+excessive authority of the tribunes, and on many occasions proved
+serviceable to Rome.
+
+I am led by this circumstance to remark, that when many powerful
+persons are united against one, who, although no match for the others
+collectively, is also powerful, the chances are more in favour of this
+single and less I powerful person, than of the many who together are
+much stronger. For setting aside an infinity of accidents which can be
+turned to better account by one than by many, it will always happen
+that, by exercising a little dexterity, the one will be able to divide
+the many, and weaken the force which was strong while it was united. In
+proof whereof, I shall not refer to ancient examples, though many such
+might be cited, but content myself with certain modern instances taken
+from the events of our own times.
+
+In the year 1484, all Italy combined against the Venetians, who finding
+their position desperate, and being unable to keep their army any
+longer in the field, bribed Signer Lodovico, who then governed Milan,
+and so succeeded in effecting a settlement, whereby they not only
+recovered the towns they had lost, but also obtained for themselves a
+part of the territories of Ferrara; so that those were by peace the
+gainers, who in war had been the losers. Not many years ago the whole
+world was banded together against France; but before the war came to a
+close, Spain breaking with the confederates and entering into a
+separate treaty with France, the other members of the league also, were
+presently forced to make terms.
+
+Wherefore we may always assume when we see a war set on foot by many
+against one, that this one, if he have strength to withstand the first
+shock, and can temporize and wait his opportunity, is certain to
+prevail. But unless he can do this he runs a thousand dangers: as did
+the Venetians in the year 1508, who, could they have temporized with
+the French, and so got time to conciliate some of those who had
+combined against them, might have escaped the ruin which then overtook
+them. But not possessing such a strong army as would have enabled them
+to temporize with their enemies, and consequently not having the time
+needed for gaining any to their side, they were undone. Yet we know
+that the Pope, as soon as he had obtained what he wanted, made friends
+with them, and that Spain did the like; and that both the one and the
+other of these powers would gladly have saved the Lombard territory for
+themselves, nor would, if they could have helped it, have left it to
+France, so as to augment her influence in Italy.
+
+The Venetians, therefore, should have given up a part to save the rest;
+and had they done so at a time when the surrender would not have seemed
+to be made under compulsion, and before any step had been taken in the
+direction of war, it would have been a most prudent course; although
+discreditable and probably of little avail after war had been begun.
+But until the war broke out, few of the Venetian citizens recognized
+the danger, fewer still the remedy, and none ventured to prescribe it.
+
+But to return to the point whence we started, I say that the same
+safeguard for their country which the Roman senate found against the
+ambition of the tribunes in their number, is within the reach of the
+prince who is attacked by many adversaries, if he only know to use
+prudently those methods which promote division.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XII.—_A prudent Captain will do what he can to make it
+necessary for his own Soldiers to fight, and to relieve his Enemy from
+that necessity._
+
+
+Elsewhere I have noted how greatly men are governed in what they do by
+Necessity, and how much of their renown is due to her guidance, so that
+it has even been said by some philosophers, that the hands and tongues
+of men, the two noblest instruments of their fame, would never have
+worked to perfection, nor have brought their labours to that pitch of
+excellence we see them to have reached, had they not been impelled by
+this cause. The captains of antiquity, therefore, knowing the virtues
+of this necessity, and seeing the steadfast courage which it gave their
+soldiers in battle, spared no effort to bring their armies under its
+influence, while using all their address to loosen its hold upon their
+enemies. For which reason, they would often leave open to an adversary
+some way which they might have closed, and close against their own men
+some way they might have left open.
+
+Whosoever, therefore, would have a city defend itself stubbornly, or an
+army fight resolutely in the field, must before all things endeavour to
+impress the minds of those whom he commands with the belief that no
+other course is open to them. In like manner a prudent captain who
+undertakes the attack of a city, will measure the ease or difficulty of
+his enterprise, by knowing and considering the nature of the necessity
+which compels the inhabitants to defend it; and where he finds that
+necessity to be strong, he may infer that his task will be difficult,
+but if otherwise, that it will be easy.
+
+And hence it happens that cities are harder to be recovered after a
+revolt than to be taken for the first time. Because on a first attack,
+having no occasion to fear punishment, since they have given no ground
+of offence, they readily surrender; but when they have revolted, they
+know that they have given ground of offence, and, fearing punishment,
+are not so easily brought under. A like stubbornness grows from the
+natural hostility with which princes or republics who are neighbours
+regard one another; which again is caused by the desire to dominate
+over those who live near, or from jealousy of their power. This is more
+particularly the case with republics, as in Tuscany for example; for
+contention and rivalry have always made, and always will make it
+extremely hard for one republic to bring another into subjection. And
+for this reason any one who considers attentively who are the
+neighbours of Florence, and who of Venice, will not marvel so much as
+some have done, that Florence should have spent more than Venice on her
+wars and gained less; since this results entirely from the Venetians
+finding their neighbouring towns less obstinate in their resistance
+than the Florentines theirs. For all the towns in the neighbourhood of
+Venice have been used to live under princes and not in freedom; and
+those who are used to servitude commonly think little of changing
+masters, nay are often eager for the change. In this way Venice, though
+she has had more powerful neighbours than Florence, has been able, from
+finding their towns less stubborn, to subdue them more easily than the
+latter, surrounded exclusively by free cities, has had it in her power
+to do.
+
+But, to return to the matter in hand, the captain who attacks a town
+should use what care he can, not to drive the defenders to extremities,
+lest he render them stubborn; but when they fear punishment should
+promise them pardon, and when they fear for their freedom should assure
+them that he has no designs against the common welfare, but only
+against a few ambitious men in their city; for such assurances have
+often smoothed the way to the surrender of towns. And although pretexts
+of this sort are easily seen through, especially by the wise, the mass
+of the people are often beguiled by them, because desiring present
+tranquillity, they shut their eyes to the snares hidden behind these
+specious promises. By means such as these, therefore, cities
+innumerable have been brought into subjection, as recently was the case
+with Florence. The ruin of Crassus and his army was similarly caused:
+for although he himself saw through the empty promises of the
+Parthians, as meant only to blind the Roman soldiers to the necessity
+of defending themselves, yet he could not keep his men steadfast, they,
+as we clearly gather in reading the life of this captain, being
+deceived by the offers of peace held out to them by their enemies.
+
+On the other hand, when the Samnites, who, at the instance of a few
+ambitious men, and in violation of the terms of the truce made with
+them, had overrun and pillaged lands belonging to the allies of Rome,
+afterwards sent envoys to Rome to implore peace, offering to restore
+whatever they had taken, and to surrender the authors of these injuries
+and outrages as prisoners, and these offers were rejected by the
+Romans, and the envoys returned to Samnium bringing with them no hope
+of an adjustment, Claudius Pontius, who then commanded the army of the
+Samnites, showed them in a remarkable speech, that the Romans desired
+war at all hazards, and declared that, although for the sake of his
+country he wished for peace, necessity constrained him to prepare for
+war; telling them “_that was a just war which could not be escaped, and
+those arms sacred in which lay their only hopes._” And building on this
+necessity, he raised in the minds of his soldiers a confident
+expectation of success. That I may not have to revert to this matter
+again, it will be convenient to notice here those examples from Roman
+history which most merit attention. When Caius Manilius was in command
+of the legions encamped against Veii, a division of the Veientine army
+having got within the Roman intrenchments, Manilius ran forward with a
+company of his men to defend them, and, to prevent the escape of the
+Veientines, guarded all the approaches to the camp. The Veientines
+finding themselves thus shut in, began to fight with such fury that
+they slew Manilius, and would have destroyed all the rest of the Roman
+army, had not the prudence of one of the tribunes opened a way for the
+Veientines to retreat. Here we see that so long as necessity compelled,
+the Veientines fought most fiercely, but on finding a path opened for
+escape, preferred flight to combat. On another occasion when the
+Volscians and Equians passed with their armies across the Roman
+frontier, the consuls were sent out to oppose them, and an engagement
+ensued. It so happened that when the combat was at its height, the army
+of the Volscians, commanded by Vectius Mescius, suddenly found
+themselves shut in between their own camp, which a division of the
+Romans had occupied, and the body of the Roman army; when seeing that
+they must either perish or cut a way for themselves with their swords,
+Vectius said to them, “_Come on, my men, here is no wall or rampart to
+be scaled: we fight man with man; in valour we are their equals, and
+necessity, that last and mightiest weapon, gives us the advantage._”
+Here, then, necessity is spoken of by Titus Livius as _the last and
+mightiest weapon_.
+
+Camillus, the wisest and most prudent of all the Roman commanders, when
+he had got within the town of Veii with his army, to make its surrender
+easier and not to drive its inhabitants to desperation, called out to
+his men, so that the Veientines might hear, to spare all whom they
+found unarmed. Whereupon the defenders throwing away their weapons, the
+town was taken almost without bloodshed. And this device was afterwards
+followed by many other captains.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XIII.—_Whether we may trust more to a valiant Captain with a
+weak Army, or to a valiant Army with a weak Captain._
+
+
+Coriolanus being banished from Rome betook himself to the Volscians,
+and when he had got together an army wherewith to avenge himself on his
+countrymen, came back to Rome; yet, again withdrew, not constrained to
+retire by the might of the Roman arms, but out of reverence for his
+mother. From this incident, says Titus Livius, we may learn that the
+spread of the Roman power was due more to the valour of her captains
+than of her soldiers. For before this the Volscians had always been
+routed, and only grew successful when Coriolanus became their captain.
+
+But though Livius be of this opinion, there are many passages in his
+history to show that the Roman soldiers, even when left without
+leaders, often performed astonishing feats of valour, nay, sometimes
+maintained better discipline and fought with greater spirit after their
+consuls were slain than they had before. For example, the army under
+the Scipios in Spain, after its two leaders had fallen, was able by its
+valour not merely to secure its own safety, but to overcome the enemy
+and preserve the province for the Roman Republic. So that to state the
+case fairly, we find many instances in which the valour of the soldiers
+alone gained the day, as well as many in which success was wholly due
+to the excellence of the captain. From which it may be inferred that
+the one stands in need of the other.
+
+And here the question suggests itself: which is the more formidable, a
+good army badly led, or a good captain commanding an indifferent army;
+though, were we to adopt the opinion of Cæsar on this head, we ought
+lightly to esteem both. For when Cæsar went to Spain against Afranius
+and Petreius, who were there in command of a strong army, he made
+little account of them, saying, “_that he went to fight an army without
+a captain_,” indicating thereby the weakness of these generals. And,
+conversely, when he went to encounter Pompeius in Thessaly, he said,
+“_I go against a captain without an army_.”[13]
+
+ [13] Professus ante inter suos, ire se ad exercitum sine duce, et inde
+ reversurum ad ducem sine exercitu. (_Suet. in Vita J. Caes._)
+
+
+A further question may also be raised, whether it is easier for a good
+captain to make a good army, or for a good army to make a good captain.
+As to this it might be thought there was barely room for doubt, since
+it ought to be far easier for many who are good to find one who is good
+or teach him to become so, than for one who is good to find or make
+many good. Lucullus when sent against Mithridates was wholly without
+experience in war: but his brave army, which was provided with many
+excellent officers, speedily taught him to be a good captain. On the
+other hand, when the Romans, being badly off for soldiers, armed a
+number of slaves and gave them over to be drilled by Sempronius
+Gracchus, he in a short time made them into a serviceable army. So too,
+as I have already mentioned, Pelopidas and Epaminondas after rescuing
+Thebes, their native city, from Spartan thraldom, in a short time made
+such valiant soldiers of the Theban peasantry, as to be able with their
+aid not only to withstand, but even to defeat the Spartan armies. So
+that the question may seem to be equally balanced, excellence on one
+side generally finding excellence on the other.
+
+A good army, however, when left without a good leader, as the
+Macedonian army was on the death of Alexander, or as those veterans
+were who had fought in the civil wars, is apt to grow restless and
+turbulent. Wherefore I am convinced that it is better to trust to the
+captain who has time allowed him to discipline his men, and means
+wherewith to equip them, than to a tumultuary host with a chance leader
+of its own choosing. But twofold is the merit and twofold the glory of
+those captains who not only have had to subdue their enemies, but also
+before encountering them to organize and discipline their forces. This,
+however, is a task requiring qualities so seldom combined, that were
+many of those captains who now enjoy a great name with the world,
+called on to perform it, they would be much less thought of than they
+are.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XIV.—_Of the effect produced in Battle by strange and
+unexpected Sights or Sounds._
+
+
+That the disorder occasioned by strange and unexpected sights or sounds
+may have momentous consequences in combat, might be shown by many
+instances, but by none better than by what befell in the battle fought
+between the Romans and the Volscians, when Quintius, the Roman general,
+seeing one wing of his army begin to waver, shouted aloud to his men to
+stand firm, for the other wing was already victorious. Which words of
+his giving confidence to his own troops and striking the enemy with
+dismay won him the battle. But if a cry like this, produce great effect
+on a well disciplined army, far greater must be its effect on one which
+is ill disciplined and disorderly. For by such a wind the whole mass
+will be moved, as I shall show by a well-known instance happening in
+our own times.
+
+A few years ago the city of Perugia was split into the two factions of
+the Baglioni and the Oddi, the former holding the government, the
+latter being in exile. The Oddeschi, however, with the help of friends,
+having got together an armed force which they lodged in villages of
+their own near Perugia, obtained, by the favour of some of their party,
+an entrance into the city by night, and moving forward without
+discovery, came as far as the public square. And as all the streets of
+Perugia are barred with chains drawn across them at their corners, the
+Oddeschi had in front of them a man who carried an iron hammer
+wherewith to break the fastenings of the chains so that horsemen might
+pass. When the only chain remaining unbroken was that which closed the
+public square, the alarm having now been given, the hammerman was so
+impeded by the crowd pressing behind him that he could not raise his
+arm to strike freely. Whereupon, to get more room for his work, he
+called aloud to the others to stand back; and the word back passing
+from rank to rank those furthest off began to run, and, presently, the
+others also, with such precipitancy, that they fell into utter
+disorder. In this way, and from this trifling circumstance, the attempt
+of the Oddeschi came to nothing.
+
+Here we may note that discipline is needed in an army, not so much to
+enable it to fight according to a settled order, as that it may not be
+thrown into confusion by every insignificant accident. For a tumultuary
+host is useless in war, simply because every word, or cry, or sound,
+may throw it into a panic and cause it to fly. Wherefore it behoves a
+good captain to provide that certain fixed persons shall receive his
+orders and pass them on to the rest, and to accustom his soldiers to
+look to these persons, and to them only, to be informed what his orders
+are. For whenever this precaution is neglected the gravest mishaps are
+constantly seen to ensue.
+
+As regards strange and unexpected sights, every captain should
+endeavour while his army is actually engaged with the enemy, to effect
+some such feint or diversion as will encourage his own men and dismay
+his adversary since this of all things that can happen is the likeliest
+to ensure victory. In evidence whereof we may cite the example of
+Cneius Sulpitius, the Roman dictator, who, when about to give battle to
+the Gauls, after arming his sutlers and camp followers, mounted them on
+mules and other beasts of burden, furnished them with spears and
+banners to look like cavalry, and placing them behind a hill, ordered
+them on a given signal, when the fight was at the hottest, to appear
+and show themselves to the enemy. All which being carried out as he had
+arranged, threw the Gauls into such alarm, that they lost the battle.
+
+A good captain, therefore, has two things to see to: first, to contrive
+how by some sudden surprise he may throw his enemy into confusion; and
+next, to be prepared should the enemy use a like stratagem against him
+to discover and defeat it; as the stratagem of Semiramis was defeated
+by the King of India. For Semiramis seeing that this king had elephants
+in great numbers, to dismay him by showing that she, too, was well
+supplied, caused the skins of many oxen and buffaloes to be sewn
+together in the shape of elephants and placed upon camels and sent to
+the front. But the trick being detected by the king, turned out not
+only useless but hurtful to its contriver. In a battle which the
+Dictator Mamercus fought against the people of Fidenae, the latter, to
+strike terror into the minds of the Romans, contrived that while the
+combat raged a number of soldiers should issue from Fidenae bearing
+lances tipped with fire, thinking that the Romans, disturbed by so
+strange a sight, would be thrown into confusion.
+
+We are to note, however, with regard to such contrivances, that if they
+are to serve any useful end, they should _be_ formidable as well as
+_seem_ so; for when they menace a real danger, their weak points are
+not so soon discerned. When they have more of pretence than reality, it
+will be well either to dispense with them altogether, or resorting to
+them, to keep them, like the muleteers of Sulpitius, in the background,
+so that they be not too readily found out. For any weakness inherent in
+them is soon discovered if they be brought near, when, as happened with
+the elephants of Semiramis and the fiery spears of the men of Fidenae,
+they do harm rather than good. For although by this last-mentioned
+device the Romans at the first were somewhat disconcerted, so soon as
+the dictator came up and began to chide them, asking if they were not
+ashamed to fly like bees from smoke, and calling on them to turn on
+their enemy, and “_with her own flames efface that Fidenae whom their
+benefits could not conciliate_,” they took courage; so that the device
+proved of no service to its contrivers, who were vanquished in the
+battle.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XV.—_That one and not many should head an Army: and why it is
+harmful to have more Leaders than one._
+
+
+The men of Fidenae rising against the colonists whom the Romans had
+settled among them, and putting them to the sword, the Romans to avenge
+the insult appointed four tribunes with consular powers: one of whom
+they retained to see to the defence of Rome, while the other three were
+sent against the Fidenati and the Veientines. But these three falling
+out among themselves, and being divided in their counsels, returned
+from their mission with discredit though not with loss. Of which
+discredit they were themselves the cause. That they sustained no loss
+was due to the valour of their soldiers But the senate perceiving the
+source of the mischief, to the end that one man might put to rights
+what three had thrown into confusion, resorted to the appointment of a
+dictator.
+
+Here we see the disadvantage of having several leaders in one army or
+in a town which has to defend itself. And the case could not be put in
+clearer words than by Titus Livius, where he says, “_The three tribunes
+with consular authority gave proof how hurtful it is in war to have
+many leaders; for each forming a different opinion, and each abiding by
+his own, they threw opportunities in the way of their enemies._” And
+though this example suffice by itself to show the disadvantage in war
+of divided commands, to make the matter still plainer I shall cite two
+further instances, one ancient and one modern.
+
+In the year 1500, Louis XII. of France, after recovering Milan, sent
+troops to restore Pisa to the Florentines, Giovambattista Ridolfi and
+Luca d’Antonio Albizzi going with them as commissaries. Now, because
+Giovambattista had a great name, and was older than Luca, the latter
+left the whole management of everything to him; and although he did not
+show his jealousy of him by opposing him, he betrayed it by his
+silence, and by being so careless and indifferent about everything,
+that he gave no help in the business of the siege either by word or
+deed, just as though he had been a person of no account. But when, in
+consequence of an accident, Giovambattista had to return to Florence,
+all this was changed; for Luca, remaining in sole charge, behaved with
+the greatest courage, prudence, and zeal, all which qualities had been
+hidden while he held a joint command. Further to bear me out I shall
+again borrow the words of Titus Livius, who, in relating how when
+Quintius and Agrippa his colleague were sent by the Romans against the
+Equians, Agrippa contrived that the conduct of the war should rest with
+Quintius, observes, “_Most wholesome is it that in affairs of great
+moment, supreme authority be vested in one man._” Very different,
+however, is the course followed by the republics and princes of our own
+days, who, thinking to be better served, are used to appoint several
+captains or commissioners to fill one command; a practice giving rise
+to so much confusion, that were we seeking for the causes of the
+overthrow of the French and Italian armies in recent times, we should
+find this to be the most active of any.
+
+Rightly, therefore, may we conclude that in sending forth an army upon
+service, it is wiser to entrust it to one man of ordinary prudence,
+than to two of great parts but with a divided command.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XVI.—_That in Times of Difficulty true Worth is sought after;
+whereas in quiet Times it is not the most deserving, but those who are
+recommended by Wealth or Connection who are most in favour._
+
+
+It always has happened and always will, that the great and admirable
+men of a republic are neglected in peaceful times; because at such
+seasons many citizens are found, who, envying the reputation these men
+have justly earned, seek to be regarded not merely as their equals but
+as their superiors. Touching this there is a notable passage in
+Thucydides, the Greek historian, where he tells how the republic of
+Athens coming victorious out of the Peloponessian war, wherein she had
+bridled the pride of Sparta, and brought almost the whole of Greece
+under her authority, was encouraged by the greatness of her renown to
+propose to herself the conquest of Sicily. In Athens this scheme was
+much debated, Alcibiades and certain others who had the public welfare
+very little in their thoughts, but who hoped that the enterprise, were
+they placed in command, might minister to their fame, recommending that
+it should be undertaken. Nicias, on the other hand, one of the best
+esteemed of the Athenian citizens, was against it, and in addressing
+the people, gave it as the strongest reason for trusting his advice,
+that in advising them not to engage in this war, he urged what was not
+for his own advantage; for he knew that while Athens remained at peace
+numberless citizens were ready to take precedence of him: whereas, were
+war declared, he was certain that none would rank before him or even be
+looked upon as his equal.
+
+Here we see that in tranquil times republics are subject to the
+infirmity of lightly esteeming their worthiest citizens. And this
+offends these persons for two reasons: first, because they are not
+given the place they deserve; and second, because they see unworthy men
+and of abilities inferior to their own, as much or more considered than
+they. Injustice such as this has caused the ruin of many republics. For
+citizens who find themselves undeservedly slighted, and perceive the
+cause to be that the times are tranquil and not troubled, will strive
+to change the times by stirring up wars hurtful to the public welfare.
+When I look for remedies for this state of things, I find two: first,
+to keep the citizens poor, so that wealth without worth shall corrupt
+neither them nor others; second, to be so prepared for war as always to
+be ready to make war; for then there will always be a need for worthy
+citizens, as was the case in Rome in early times. For as Rome
+constantly kept her armies in the field, there was constant opportunity
+for men to display their valour, nor was it possible to deprive a
+deserving man of his post and give it to another who was not deserving.
+Or if ever this were done by inadvertency, or by way of experiment,
+there forthwith resulted such disorder and danger, that the city at
+once retraced its steps and reverted to the true path. But other
+republics which are not regulated on the same plan, and make war only
+when driven to it by necessity, cannot help committing this injustice,
+nay, will constantly run into it, when, if the great citizen who finds
+himself slighted be vindictive, and have some credit and following in
+the city, disorder will always ensue. And though Rome escaped this
+danger for a time, she too, as has elsewhere been said, having no
+longer, after she had conquered Carthage and Antiochus, any fear of
+war, came to think she might commit her armies to whom she would,
+making less account of the valour of her captains than of those other
+qualities which gain favour with the people. Accordingly we find Paulus
+Emilius rejected oftener than once when he sought the consulship; nor,
+in fact, obtaining it until the Macedonian war broke out, which, being
+judged a formidable business, was by the voice of the whole city
+committed to his management. After the year 1494 our city of Florence
+was involved in a series of wars, in conducting which none of our
+citizens had any success until chance threw the command into the hands
+of one who showed us how an army should be led. This was Antonio
+Giacomini, and so long as there were dangerous wars on foot, all
+rivalry on the part of other citizens was suspended; and whenever a
+captain or commissary had to be appointed he was unopposed. But when a
+war came to be undertaken, as to the issue of which no misgivings were
+felt, and which promised both honour and preferment, so numerous were
+the competitors for command, that three commissaries having to be
+chosen to conduct the siege of Pisa, Antonio was left out; and though
+it cannot with certainty be shown that any harm resulted to our
+republic from his not having been sent on this enterprise, we may
+reasonably conjecture that such was indeed the case. For as the people
+of Pisa were then without means either for subsistence or defence, it
+may be believed that had Antonio been there he would have reduced them
+to such extremities as would have forced them to surrender at
+discretion to the Florentines. But Pisa being besieged by captains who
+knew neither how to blockade nor how to storm it, held out so long,
+that the Florentines, who should have reduced it by force, were obliged
+to buy its submission. Neglect like this might well move Antonio to
+resentment; and he must needs have been both very patient and very
+forgiving if he felt no desire to revenge himself when he could, by the
+ruin of the city or by injuries to individual citizens. But a republic
+should beware not to rouse such feelings, as I shall show in the
+following Chapter.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XVII.—_That we are not to offend a Man, and then send him to
+fill an important Office or Command._
+
+
+A republic should think twice before appointing to an important command
+a citizen who has sustained notable wrong at the hands of his
+fellow-citizens. Claudius Nero, quitting the army with which he was
+opposing Hannibal, went with a part of his forces into the March of
+Ancona, designing to join the other consul there, and after joining him
+to attack Hasdrubal before he came up with his brother. Now Claudius
+had previously commanded against Hasdrubal in Spain, and after driving
+him with his army into such a position that it seemed he must either
+fight at a disadvantage or perish by famine, had been outwitted by his
+adversary, who, while diverting his attention with proposals of terms,
+contrived to slip through his hands and rob him of the opportunity for
+effecting his destruction. This becoming known in Rome brought Claudius
+into so much discredit both with the senate and people, that to his
+great mortification and displeasure, he was slightingly spoken of by
+the whole city. But being afterwards made consul and sent to oppose
+Hannibal, he took the course mentioned above, which was in itself so
+hazardous that all Rome was filled with doubt and anxiety until tidings
+came of Hasdrubal’s defeat. When subsequently asked why he had played
+so dangerous a game, wherein without urgent necessity he had staked the
+very existence of Rome, Claudius answered, he had done so because he
+knew that were he to succeed he would recover whatever credit he had
+lost in Spain; while if he failed, and his attempt had an untoward
+issue, he would be revenged on that city and On those citizens who had
+so ungratefully and indiscreetly wronged him.
+
+But if resentment for an offence like this so deeply moved a Roman
+citizen at a time when Rome was still uncorrupted, we should consider
+how it may act on the citizen of a State not constituted as Rome then
+was. And because there is no certain remedy we can apply to such
+disorders when they arise in republics, it follows that it is
+impossible to establish a republic which shall endure always; since in
+a thousand unforeseen ways ruin may overtake it.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XVIII.—_That it is the highest Quality of a Captain to be able
+to forestall the designs of his Adversary._
+
+
+It was a saying of Epaminondas the Theban that nothing was so useful
+and necessary for a commander as to be able to see through the
+intentions and designs of his adversary. And because it is hard to come
+at this knowledge directly, the more credit is due to him who reaches
+it by conjecture. Yet sometimes it is easier to fathom an enemy’s
+designs than to construe his actions; and not so much those actions
+which are done at a distance from us, as those done in our presence and
+under our very eyes. For instance, it has often happened that when a
+battle has lasted till nightfall, the winner has believed himself the
+loser, and the loser has believed himself the winner and that this
+mistake has led him who made it to follow a course hurtful to himself.
+It was from a mistake of this sort, that Brutus and Cassius lost the
+battle of Philippi. For though Brutus was victorious with his wing of
+the army Cassius, whose wing was beaten, believed the entire army to be
+defeated, and under this belief gave way to despair and slew himself.
+So too, in our own days, in the battle fought by Francis, king of
+France, with the Swiss at Santa Cecilia in Lombardy, when night fell,
+those of the Swiss who remained unbroken, not knowing that the rest had
+been routed and slain, thought they had the victory; and so believing
+would not retreat, but, remaining on the field, renewed the combat the
+following morning to their great disadvantage. Nor were they the only
+sufferers from their mistake, since the armies of the Pope and of Spain
+were also misled by it, and well-nigh brought to destruction. For on
+the false report of a victory they crossed the Po, and had they only
+advanced a little further must have been made prisoners by the
+victorious French.
+
+An instance is recorded of a like mistake having been made in the camps
+both of the Romans and of the Equians. For the Consul Sempronius being
+in command against the Equians, and giving the enemy battle, the
+engagement lasted with varying success till nightfall, when as both
+armies had suffered what was almost a defeat, neither returned to their
+camp, but each drew off to the neighboring hills where they thought
+they would be safer. The Romans separated into two divisions, one of
+which with the consul, the other with the centurion Tempanius by whose
+valour the army had that day been saved from utter rout. At daybreak
+the consul, without waiting for further tidings of the enemy, made
+straight for Rome; and the Equians, in like manner, withdrew to their
+own country. For as each supposed the other to be victorious, neither
+thought much of leaving their camp to be plundered by the enemy. It so
+chanced, however, that Tempanius, who was himself retreating with the
+second division of the Roman army, fell in with certain wounded
+Equians, from whom he learned that their commanders had fled,
+abandoning their camp; on hearing which, he at once returned to the
+Roman camp and secured it, and then, after sacking the camp of the
+Equians, went back victorious to Rome. His success, as we see, turned
+entirely on his being the first to be informed of the enemy’s
+condition. And here we are to note that it may often happen that both
+the one and the other of two opposed armies shall fall into the same
+disorder, and be reduced to the same straits; in which case, that which
+soonest detects the other’s distress is sure to come off best.
+
+I shall give an instance of this which occurred recently in our own
+country. In the year 1498, when the Florentines had a great army in the
+territory of Pisa and had closely invested the town, the Venetians, who
+had undertaken its protection, seeing no other way to save it, resolved
+to make a diversion in its favour by attacking the territories of the
+Florentines in another quarter. Wherefore, having assembled a strong
+force, they entered Tuscany by the Val di Lamona, and seizing on the
+village of Marradi, besieged the stronghold of Castiglione which stands
+on the height above it. Getting word of this, the Florentines sought to
+relieve Marradi, without weakening the army which lay round Pisa. They
+accordingly raised a new levy of foot-soldiers, and equipped a fresh
+squadron of horse, which they despatched to Marradi under the joint
+command of Jacopo IV. d’Appiano, lord of Piombino, and Count Rinuccio
+of Marciano. These troops taking up their position on the hill above
+Marradi, the Venetians withdrew from the investment of Castiglione and
+lodged themselves in the village. But when the two armies had
+confronted one another for several days, both began to suffer sorely
+from want of victuals and other necessaries, and neither of them daring
+to attack the other, or knowing to what extremities the other was
+reduced, both simultaneously resolved to strike their camps the
+following morning, and to retreat, the Venetians towards Berzighella
+and Faenza, the Florentines towards Casaglia and the Mugello. But at
+daybreak, when both armies had begun to remove their baggage, it so
+happened that an old woman, whose years and poverty permitted her to
+pass unnoticed, leaving the village of Marradi, came to the Florentine
+camp, where were certain of her kinsfolk whom she desired to visit.
+Learning from her that the Venetians were in retreat, the Florentine
+commanders took courage, and changing their plan, went in pursuit of
+the enemy as though they had dislodged them, sending word to Florence
+that they had repulsed the Venetians and gained a victory. But in truth
+this victory was wholly due to their having notice of the enemy’s
+movements before the latter had notice of theirs. For had that notice
+been given to the Venetians first, it would have wrought against us the
+same results as it actually wrought for us.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XIX.—_Whether Indulgence or Severity be more necessary for
+controlling a Multitude._
+
+
+The Roman Republic was distracted by the feuds of the nobles and
+commons. Nevertheless, on war breaking out, Quintius and Appius
+Claudius were sent forth in command of Roman armies. From his harshness
+and severity to his soldiers, Appius was so ill obeyed by them, that
+after sustaining what almost amounted to a defeat, he had to resign his
+command. Quintius, on the contrary, by kindly and humane treatment,
+kept his men obedient and returned victorious to Rome. From this it
+might seem that to govern a large body of men, it is better to be
+humane than haughty, and kindly rather than severe.
+
+And yet Cornelius Tacitus, with whom many other authors are agreed,
+pronounces a contrary opinion where he says, “_In governing a multitude
+it avails more to punish than to be compliant._”[14] If it be asked how
+these opposite views can be reconciled, I answer that you exercise
+authority either over men used to regard you as their equal, or over
+men who have always been subject to you. When those over whom you
+exercise authority are your equals, you cannot trust wholly to
+punishment or to that severity of which Tacitus speaks. And since in
+Rome itself the commons had equal weight with the nobles, none
+appointed their captain for a time only, could control them by using
+harshness and severity. Accordingly we find that those Roman captains
+who gained the love of their soldiers and were considerate of them,
+often achieved greater results than those who made themselves feared by
+them in an unusual degree, unless, like Manlius Torquatus, these last
+were endowed with consummate valour. But he who has to govern subjects
+such as those of whom Tacitus speaks, to prevent their growing insolent
+and trampling upon him by reason of his too great easiness, must resort
+to punishment rather than to compliance. Still, to escape hatred,
+punishment should be moderate in degree, for to make himself hated is
+never for the interest of any prince. And to escape hatred, a prince
+has chiefly to guard against tampering with the property of any of his
+subjects; for where nothing is to be gained by it, no prince will
+desire to shed blood, unless, as seldom happens, constrained to do so
+by necessity. But where advantage is to be gained thereby, blood will
+always flow, and neither the desire to shed it, nor causes for shedding
+it will ever be wanting, as I have fully shown when discussing this
+subject in another treatise.
+
+ [14] “In multitudine regenda plus poena quam obsequium valet.” But
+ compare Annals, III. 55, “Obsequium inde in principem et æmulandi amoi
+ validioi quam poena ex legibus et metus.”
+
+
+Quintius therefore was more deserving of praise than Appius.
+Nevertheless the opinion of Tacitus, duly restricted and not understood
+as applying to a case like that of Appius, merits approval. But since I
+have spoken of punishment and indulgence, it seems not out of place to
+show how a single act of humanity availed more than arms with the
+citizens of Falerii.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XX.—_How one humane act availed more with the men of Falerii,
+than all the might of the Roman Arms._
+
+
+When the besieging army of the Romans lay round Falerii, the master of
+a school wherein the best-born youths of the city were taught, thinking
+to curry favour with Camillus and the Romans, came forth from the town
+with these boys, on pretence of giving them exercise, and bringing them
+into the camp where Camillus was, presented them to him, saying, “_To
+ransom these that city would yield itself into your hands._” Camillus,
+however, not only rejected this offer, but causing the schoolmaster to
+be stripped and his hands tied behind him, gave each of the boys a
+scourge, and bade them lead the fellow back to the town scourging him
+as they went. When the citizens of Falerii heard of this, so much were
+they pleased with the humanity and integrity of Camillus, that they
+resolved to surrender their town to him without further defence.
+
+This authentic instance may lead us to believe that a humane and kindly
+action may sometimes touch men’s minds more nearly than a harsh and
+cruel one; and that those cities and provinces into which the
+instruments and engines of war, with every other violence to which men
+resort, have failed to force a way, may be thrown open to a single act
+of tenderness, mercy, chastity, or generosity. Whereof history supplies
+us with many examples besides the one which I have just now noticed.
+For we find that when the arms of Rome were powerless to drive Pyrrhus
+out of Italy, he was moved to depart by the generosity of Fabritius in
+disclosing to him the proposal which his slave had made the Romans to
+poison him. Again, we read how Scipio gained less reputation in Spain
+by the capture of New Carthage, than by his virtue in restoring a young
+and beautiful wife unviolated to her husband; the fame of which action
+won him the love of the whole province. We see, too, how much this
+generous temper is esteemed by a people in its great men; and how much
+it is praised by historians and by those who write the lives of
+princes, as well as by those who lay down rules of human conduct. Among
+whom Xenophon has taken great pains to show what honours, and
+victories, and how fair a fame accrued to Cyrus from his being kindly
+and gracious, without taint of pride, or cruelty, or luxury, or any
+other of those vices which cast a stain upon men’s lives.
+
+And yet when we note that Hannibal, by methods wholly opposite to
+these, achieved splendid victories and a great renown, I think I am
+bound to say something in my next Chapter as to how this happened.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XXI.—_How it happened that Hannibal pursuing a course contrary
+to that taken by Scipio, wrought the same results in Italy which the
+other achieved in Spain._
+
+
+Some, I suspect, may marvel to find a captain, taking a contrary
+course, nevertheless arrive at the same ends as those who have pursued
+the methods above spoken of; since it must seem as though success did
+not depend on the causes I have named; nay, that if glory and fame are
+to be won in other ways, these causes neither add to our strength nor
+advance our fortunes. Wherefore, to make my meaning plain, and not to
+part company with the men of whom I have been speaking, I say, that as,
+on the one hand, we see Scipio enter Spain, and by his humane and
+generous conduct at once secure the good-will of the province, and the
+admiration and reverence of its inhabitants, so on the other hand, we
+see Hannibal enter Italy, and by methods wholly opposite, to wit, by
+violence and rapine, by cruelty and treachery of every kind, effect in
+that country the very same results. For all the States of Italy
+revolted in his favour, and all the Italian nations ranged themselves
+on his side.
+
+When we seek to know why this was, several reasons present themselves,
+the first being that men so passionately love change, that, commonly
+speaking, those who are well off are as eager for it as those who are
+badly off: for as already has been said with truth, men are pampered by
+prosperity, soured by adversity. This love of change, therefore, makes
+them open the door to any one who puts himself at the head of new
+movements in their country, and if he be a foreigner they adopt his
+cause, if a fellow-countryman they gather round him and become his
+partisans and supporters; so that whatever methods he may there use, he
+will succeed in making great progress. Moreover, men being moved by two
+chief passions, love and fear, he who makes himself feared commands
+with no less authority than he who makes himself loved; nay, as a rule,
+is followed and obeyed more implicitly than the other. It matters
+little, however, which of these two ways a captain chooses to follow,
+provided he be of transcendent valour, and has thereby won for himself
+a great name For when, like Hannibal or Scipio, a man is very valiant,
+this quality will cloak any error he may commit in seeking either to be
+too much loved or too much feared. Yet from each of these two
+tendencies, grave mischiefs, and such as lead to the ruin of a prince,
+may arise. For he who would be greatly loved, if he swerve ever so
+little from the right road, becomes contemptible; while he who would be
+greatly feared, if he go a jot too far, incurs hatred. And since it is
+impossible, our nature not allowing it, to adhere to the exact mean, it
+is essential that any excess should be balanced by an exceeding valour,
+as it was in Hannibal and Scipio. And yet we find that even they, while
+they were exalted by the methods they followed, were also injured by
+them. How they were exalted has been shown. The injury which Scipio
+suffered was, that in Spain his soldiers, in concert with certain of
+his allies, rose against him, for no other reason than that they stood
+in no fear of him. For men are so restless, that if ever so small a
+door be opened to their ambition, they forthwith forget all the love
+they have borne their prince in return for his graciousness and
+goodness, as did these soldiers and allies of Scipio; when, to correct
+the mischief, he was forced to use something of a cruelty foreign to
+his nature.
+
+As to Hannibal, we cannot point to any particular instance wherein his
+cruelty or want of faith are seen to have been directly hurtful to him;
+but we may well believe that Naples and other towns which remained
+loyal to the Roman people, did so by reason of the dread which his
+character inspired. This, however, is abundantly clear, that his
+inhumanity made him more detested by the Romans than any other enemy
+they ever had; so that while to Pyrrhus, in Italy with his army, they
+gave up the traitor who offered to poison him, Hannibal, even when
+disarmed and a fugitive, they never forgave, until they had compassed
+his death.
+
+To Hannibal, therefore, from his being accounted impious, perfidious,
+and cruel, these disadvantages resulted; but, on the other hand, there
+accrued to him one great gain, noticed with admiration by all
+historians, namely, that in his army, although made up of men of every
+race and country, no dissensions ever broke out among the soldiers
+themselves, nor any mutiny against their leader. This we can only
+ascribe to the awe which his character inspired, which together with
+the great name his valour had won for him, had the effect of keeping
+his soldiers quiet and united. I repeat, therefore, that it is of
+little moment which method a captain may follow if he be endowed with
+such valour as will bear him out in the course which he adopts. For, as
+I have said, there are disadvantages incident to both methods unless
+corrected by extraordinary valour.
+
+And now, since I have spoken of Scipio and Hannibal, the former of whom
+by praiseworthy, the latter by odious qualities, effected the same
+results, I must not, I think, omit to notice the characters of two
+Roman citizens, who by different, yet both by honourable methods,
+obtained a like glory.
+
+
+
+
+Chapter XXII.—_That the severity of Manlius Torquatus and the
+gentleness of Valerius Corvinus won for both the same Glory._
+
+
+There lived in Rome, at the same time, two excellent captains, Manlius
+Torquatus and Valerius Corvinus, equal in their triumphs and in their
+renown, and in the valour which in obtaining these they had displayed
+against the enemy; but who in the conduct of their armies and treatment
+of their soldiers, followed very different methods. For Manlius, in his
+command, resorted to every kind of severity, never sparing his men
+fatigue, nor remitting punishment; while Valerius, on the contrary,
+treated them with all kindness and consideration, and was easy and
+familiar in his intercourse with them. So that while the one, to secure
+the obedience of his soldiers, put his own son to death, the other
+never dealt harshly with any man. Yet, for all this diversity in their
+modes of acting, each had the same success against the enemy, and each
+obtained the same advantages both for the republic and for himself. For
+no soldier of theirs ever flinched in battle, or rose in mutiny against
+them, or in any particular opposed their will; though the commands of
+Manlius were of such severity that any order of excessive rigour came
+to be spoken of as a _Manlian order_.
+
+Here, then, we have to consider first of all why Manlius was obliged to
+use such severity; next, why Valerius could behave so humanely;
+thirdly, how it was that these opposite methods had the same results;
+and lastly, which of the two methods it is better and more useful for
+us to follow. Now, if we well examine the character of Manlius from the
+moment when Titus Livius first begins to make mention of him, we shall
+find him to have been endowed with a rare vigour both of mind and body,
+dutiful in his behaviour to his father and to his country, and most
+reverent to his superiors. All which we see in his slaying the Gaul, in
+his defence of his father against the tribune, and in the words in
+which, before going forth to fight the Gaul, he addressed the consul,
+when he said, “_Although assured of victory, never will I without thy
+bidding engage an enemy._” But when such a man as this attains to
+command, he looks to find all others like himself; his dauntless spirit
+prompts him to engage in daring enterprises, and to insist on their
+being carried out. And this is certain, that where things hard to
+execute are ordered to be done, the order must be enforced with
+sternness, since, otherwise, it will be disobeyed.
+
+And here be it noted that if you would be obeyed you must know how to
+command, and that they alone have this knowledge who have measured
+their power to enforce, with the willingness of others to yield
+obedience; and who issue their orders when they find these conditions
+combining, but, otherwise, abstain. Wherefore, a wise man was wont to
+say that to hold a republic by force, there must be a proportion
+between him who uses the force and him against whom it is used; and
+that while this proportion obtains the force will operate; but that
+when he who suffers is stronger than he who uses the force, we may
+expect to see it brought to an end at any moment.
+
+But returning to the matter in hand, I say that to command things hard
+of execution, requires hardness in him who gives the command, and that
+a man of this temper and who issues such commands, cannot look to
+enforce them by gentleness. He who is not of such a temper must be
+careful not to impose tasks of extraordinary difficulty, but may use
+his natural gentleness in imposing such as are ordinary. For common
+punishments are not imputed to the prince, but to the laws and
+ordinances which he has to administer.
+
+We must believe, therefore, that Manlius was constrained to act with
+severity by the unusual character of the commands which his natural
+disposition prompted him to issue. Such commands are useful in a
+republic, as restoring its ordinances to their original efficacy and
+excellence. And were a republic, as I have before observed, fortunate
+enough to come frequently under the influence of men who, by their
+example, reinforce its laws, and not only retard its progress towards
+corruption, but bring it back to its first perfection, it might endure
+for ever.
+
+Manlius, therefore, was of those who by the severity of their commands
+maintained the military discipline of Rome; urged thereto, in the first
+place, by his natural temper, and next by the desire that whatever he
+was minded to command should be done. Valerius, on the other hand,
+could afford to act humanely, because for him it was enough if all were
+done which in a Roman army it was customary to do. And, since the
+customs of that army were good customs, they sufficed to gain him
+honour, while at the same time their maintenance cost him no effort,
+nor threw on him the burthen of punishing transgressors; as well
+because there were none who trangressed, as because had there been any,
+they would, as I have said, have imputed their punishment to the
+ordinary rules of discipline, and not to the severity of their
+commander. In this way Valerius had room to exercise that humane
+disposition which enabled him at once to gain influence over his
+soldiers and to content them. Hence it was that both these captains
+obtaining the same obedience, could, while following different methods,
+arrive at the same ends. Those, however, who seek to imitate them may
+chance to fall into the errors of which I have already spoken, in
+connection with Hannibal and Scipio, as breeding contempt or hatred,
+and which are only to be corrected by the presence of extraordinary
+valour, and not otherwise.
+
+It rests now to determine which of these two methods is the more to be
+commended. This, I take it, is matter of dispute, since both methods
+have their advocates. Those writers, however, who have laid down rules
+for the conduct of princes, describe a character approaching more
+nearly to that of Valerius than to that of Manlius; and Xenophon, whom
+I have already cited, while giving many instances of the humanity of
+Cyrus, conforms closely to what Livius tells us of Valerius. For
+Valerius being made consul against the Samnites, on the eve of battle
+spoke to his men with the same kindliness with which he always treated
+them; and Livius, after telling us what he said, remarks of him:
+“_Never was there a leader more familiar with his men; cheerfully
+sharing with the meanest among them every hardship and fatigue. Even in
+the military games, wherein those of the same rank were wont to make
+trial of their strength or swiftness, he would good-naturedly take a
+part, nor disdain any adversary who offered; meeting victory or defeat
+with an unruffled temper and an unchanged countenance. When called on
+to act, his bounty and generosity never fell short. When he had to
+speak, he was as mindful of the feelings of others as of his own
+dignity. And, what more than anything else secures the popular favour,
+he maintained when exercising his magistracies the same bearing he had
+worn in seeking them._”
+
+Of Manlius also, Titus Livius speaks in like honourable terms, pointing
+out that his severity in putting his son to death brought the Roman
+army to that pitch of discipline which enabled it to prevail against
+the Latins, nay, he goes so far in his praises that after describing
+the whole order of the battle, comparing the strength of both armies,
+and showing all the dangers the Romans ran, and the difficulties they
+had to surmount, he winds up by saying, that it was the valour of
+Manlius which alone gained for them this great victory, and that
+whichever side had Manlius for its leader must have won the day. So
+that weighing all that the historians tell us of these two captains, it
+might be difficult to decide between them.
+
+Nevertheless, not to leave the question entirely open, I say, that for
+a citizen living under a republic, I think the conduct of Manlius more
+deserving of praise and less dangerous in its consequences. For methods
+like his tend only to the public good and in no way subserve private
+ends. He who shows himself harsh and stern at all times and to all men
+alike, and is seen to care only for the common welfare, will never gain
+himself partisans, since this is not the way to win personal friends,
+to whom, as I said before, the name of partisans is given. For a
+republic, therefore, no line of conduct could be more useful or more to
+be desired than this, because in following it the public interest is
+not neglected, and no room is given to suspect personal ambition.
+
+But the contrary holds as to the methods followed by Valerius. For
+though the public service they render be the same, misgivings must
+needs arise that the personal good-will which, in the course of a
+prolonged command, a captain obtains from his soldiers, may lead to
+consequences fatal to the public liberty. And if this was not found to
+happen in the case of Valerius, it was because the minds of the Roman
+people were not yet corrupted, and because they had never remained for
+a long time and continuously under his command.
+
+Had we, however, like Xenophon, to consider what is most for the
+interest of a prince, we should have to give up Manlius and hold by
+Valerius; for, undoubtedly, a prince should strive to gain the love of
+his soldiers and subjects, as well as their obedience. The latter he
+can secure by discipline and by his reputation for valour. But for the
+former he will be indebted to his affability, kindliness, gentleness,
+and all those other like qualities which were possessed by Valerius,
+and which are described by Xenophon as existing in Cyrus. That a prince
+should be personally loved and have his army wholly devoted to him is
+consistent with the character of his government; but that this should
+happen to a person of private station does not consist with his
+position as a citizen who has to live in conformity with the laws and
+in subordination to the magistrates. We read in the early annals of the
+Venetian Republic, that once, on the return of the fleet, a dispute
+broke out between the sailors and the people, resulting in tumults and
+armed violence which neither the efforts of the public officers, the
+respect felt for particular citizens, nor the authority of the
+magistrates could quell. But on a certain gentleman, who the year
+before had been in command of these sailors, showing himself among
+them, straightway, from the love they bore him, they submitted to his
+authority and withdrew from the fray. Which deference on their part
+aroused such jealousy and suspicion in the minds of the Venetian
+senators that very soon after they got rid of this gentleman, either by
+death or exile.
+
+The sum of the matter, therefore, is, that the methods followed by
+Valerius are useful in a prince, but pernicious in a private citizen,
+both for his country and for himself, for his country, because such
+methods pave the way to a tyranny; for himself, because his
+fellow-citizens, growing suspicious of his conduct, are constrained to
+protect themselves to his hurt. And conversely, I maintain, that the
+methods of Manlius, while hurtful in a prince are useful in a citizen,
+and in the highest degree for his country; and, moreover, seldom give
+offence, unless the hatred caused by his severity be augmented by the
+jealousy which the fame of his other virtues inspires: a matter now to
+be considered in connection with the banishment of Camillas.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XXIII.—_Why Camillus was banished from Rome._
+
+
+It has been shown above how methods like those of Valerius are hurtful
+to the citizen who employs them and to his country, while methods like
+those of Manlius are advantageous for a man’s country, though sometimes
+they be hurtful to the man himself. This is well seen in the example of
+Camillus, whose bearing more nearly resembled that of Manlius than that
+of Valerius, so that Titus Livius, in speaking of him, says, “_His
+virtues were at once hated and admired by his soldiers._” What gained
+him their admiration was his care for their safety, his prudence, his
+magnanimity, and the good order he maintained in conducting and
+commanding them. What made him hated was his being more stern to punish
+than bountiful to reward; and Livius instances the following
+circumstances as giving rise to this hatred. First, his having applied
+the money got by the sale of the goods of the Veientines to public
+purposes, and not divided it along with the rest of the spoils. Second,
+his having, on the occasion of his triumph, caused his chariot to be
+drawn by four white horses, seeking in his pride, men said, to make
+himself the equal of the sun god. And, third, his having vowed to
+Apollo a tenth of the Veientine plunder, which, if he was to fulfil his
+vow, he had to recover from his soldiers, into whose hands it had
+already come.
+
+Herein we may well and readily discern what causes tend to make a
+prince hateful to his people; the chief whereof is the depriving them
+of some advantage. And this is a matter of much importance. For when a
+man is deprived of what is in itself useful, he never forgets it, and
+every trifling occasion recalls it to his mind; and because such
+occasions recur daily, he is every day reminded of his loss. Another
+error which we are here taught to guard against, is the appearing
+haughty and proud, than which nothing is more distasteful to a people,
+and most of all to a free people; for although such pride and
+haughtiness do them no hurt, they nevertheless hold in detestation any
+who display these qualities. Every show of pride, therefore, a prince
+should shun as he would a rock, since to invite hatred without
+resulting advantage were utterly rash and futile.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XXIV.—_That prolonged Commands brought Rome to Servitude_.
+
+
+If we well examine the course of Roman history, we shall find two
+causes leading to the break-up of that republic: one, the dissensions
+which arose in connection with the agrarian laws; the other, the
+prolongation of commands. For had these matters been rightly understood
+from the first, and due remedies applied, the freedom of Rome had been
+far more lasting, and, possibly, less disturbed. And although, as
+touching the prolongation of commands, we never find any tumult
+breaking out in Rome on that account, we do in fact discern how much
+harm was done to the city by the ascendency which certain of its
+citizens thereby gained. This mischief indeed would not have arisen, if
+other citizens whose period of office was extended had been as good and
+wise as Lucius Quintius, whose virtue affords a notable example. For
+terms of accord having been settled between the senate and commons of
+Rome, the latter, thinking their tribunes well able to withstand the
+ambition of the nobles, prolonged their authority for a year.
+Whereupon, the senate, not to be outdone by the commons, proposed, out
+of rivalry, to extend the consulship of Quintius. He, however, refused
+absolutely to lend himself to their designs, and insisted on their
+appointing new consuls, telling them that they should seek to discredit
+evil examples, not add to them by setting worse. Had this prudence and
+virtue of his been shared by all the citizens of Rome, the practice of
+prolonging the terms of civil offices would not have been suffered to
+establish itself, nor have led to the kindred practice of extending the
+term of military commands, which in progress of time effected the ruin
+of their republic.
+
+The first military commander whose term was extended, was Publius
+Philo; for when his consulship was about to expire, he being then
+engaged in the siege of Palæopolis, the senate, seeing he had the
+victory in his hands, would not displace him by a successor, but
+appointed him _Proconsul_, which office he was the first to hold. Now,
+although in thus acting the senate did what they thought best for the
+public good, nevertheless it was this act of theirs that in time
+brought Rome to slavery. For the further the Romans carried their arms,
+the more necessary it seemed to them to grant similar extensions of
+command, and the oftener they, in fact, did so. This gave rise to two
+disadvantages: first that a smaller number of men were trained to
+command; second, that by the long continuance of his command a captain
+gained so much influence and ascendency over his soldiers that in time
+they came to hold the senate of no account, and looked only to him.
+This it was, that enabled Sylla and Marius to find adherents ready to
+follow them even to the public detriment, and enabled Cæsar to
+overthrow the liberties of his country; whereas, had the Romans never
+prolonged the period of authority, whether civil or military, though
+they might have taken longer to build up their empire, they certainly
+had been later in incurring servitude.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XXV.—_Of the poverty of Cincinnatus and of many other Roman
+Citizens.
+
+
+Elsewhere I have shown that no ordinance is of such advantage to a
+commonwealth, as one which enforces poverty on its citizens. And
+although it does not appear what particular law it was that had this
+operation in Rome (especially since we know the agrarian law to have
+been stubbornly resisted), we find, as a fact, that four hundred years
+after the city was founded, great poverty still prevailed there; and
+may assume that nothing helped so much to produce this result as the
+knowledge that the path to honours and preferment was closed to none,
+and that merit was sought after wheresoever it was to be found; for
+this manner of conferring honours made riches the less courted. In
+proof whereof I shall cite one instance only.
+
+When the consul Minutius was beset in his camp by the Equians, the
+Roman people were filled with such alarm lest their army should be
+destroyed, that they appointed a dictator, always their last stay in
+seasons of peril. Their choice fell on Lucius Quintius Cincinnatus, who
+at the time was living on his small farm of little more than four
+acres, which he tilled with his own hand. The story is nobly told by
+Titus Livius where he says: “_This is worth listening to by those who
+contemn all things human as compared with riches, and think that glory
+and excellence can have no place unless accompanied by lavish wealth._”
+Cincinnatus, then, was ploughing in his little field, when there
+arrived from Rome the messengers sent by the senate to tell him he had
+been made dictator, and inform him of the dangers which threatened the
+Republic. Putting on his gown, he hastened to Rome, and getting
+together an army, marched to deliver Minutius. But when he had defeated
+and spoiled the enemy, and released Minutius, he would not suffer the
+army he had rescued to participate in the spoils, saying, “_I will not
+have you share in the plunder of those to whom you had so nearly fallen
+a prey._” Minutius he deprived of his consulship, and reduced to be a
+subaltern, in which rank he bade him remain till he had learned how to
+command. And before this he had made Lucius Tarquininus, although
+forced by his poverty to serve on foot, his master of the knights.
+
+Here, then, we see what honour was paid in Rome to poverty, and how
+four acres of land sufficed to support so good and great a man as
+Cincinnatus. We find the same Poverty still prevailing in the time of
+Marcus Regulus, who when serving with the army in Africa sought leave
+of senate to return home that he might look after his farm which his
+labourers had suffered to run to waste. Here again we learn two things
+worthy our attention: first, the poverty of these men and their
+contentment under it, and how their sole study was to gain renown from
+war, leaving all its advantages to the State. For had they thought of
+enriching themselves by war, it had given them little concern that
+their fields were running to waste Further, we have to remark the
+magnanimity of these citizens, who when placed at the head of armies
+surpassed all princes in the loftiness of their spirit, who cared
+neither for king nor for commonwealth, and whom nothing could daunt or
+dismay; but who, on returning to private life, became once more so
+humble, so frugal, so careful of their slender means, and so submissive
+to the magistrates and reverential to their superiors, that it might
+seem impossible for the human mind to undergo so violent a change.
+
+This poverty prevailed down to the days of Paulus Emilius, almost the
+last happy days for this republic wherein a citizen, while enriching
+Rome by his triumphs, himself remained poor. And yet so greatly was
+poverty still esteemed at this time, that when Paulus, in conferring
+rewards on those who had behaved well in the war, presented his own
+son-in-law with a silver cup, it was the first vessel of silver ever
+seen in his house.
+
+I might run on to a great length pointing out how much better are the
+fruits of poverty than those of riches, and how poverty has brought
+cities, provinces, and nations to honour, while riches have wrought
+their ruin, had not this subject been often treated by others.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XXVI.—_How Women are a cause of the ruin of States._
+
+
+A feud broke out in Ardea touching the marriage of an heiress, whose
+hand was sought at the same time by two suitors, the one of plebeian,
+the other of noble birth. For her father being dead, her guardian
+wished her to wed the plebeian, her mother the noble. And so hot grew
+the dispute that resort was had to arms, the whole nobility siding with
+their fellow-noble, and all the plebeians with the plebeian. The latter
+faction being worsted, left the town, and sent to the Volscians for
+help; whereupon, the nobles sought help from Rome. The Volscians were
+first in the field, and on their arrival encamped round Ardea. The
+Romans, coming up later, shut in the Volscians between themselves and
+the town, and, reducing them by famine, forced them to surrender at
+discretion. They then entered Ardea, and putting all the ringleaders in
+this dispute to the sword, composed the disorders of the city.
+
+In connection with this affair there are several points to be noted.
+And in the first place we see how women have been the occasion of many
+divisions and calamities in States, and have wrought great harm to
+rulers; as when, according to our historian, the violence done to
+Lucretia drove the Tarquins from their kingdom, and that done to
+Virginia broke the power of the decemvirs. And among the chief causes
+which Aristotle assigns for the downfall of tyrants are the wrongs done
+by them to their subjects in respect of their women, whether by
+adultery, rape, or other like injury to their honour, as has been
+sufficiently noticed in the Chapter wherein we treated “_of
+Conspiracies_”
+
+I say, then, that neither absolute princes nor the rulers of free
+States should underrate the importance of matter, but take heed to the
+disorders which it may breed and provide against them while remedies
+can still be used without discredit to themselves or to their
+governments And this should have been done by the rulers of Ardea who
+by suffering the rivalry between their citizens to come to a head,
+promoted their divisions, and when they sought to reunite them had to
+summon foreign help, than which nothing sooner leads to servitude.
+
+But now let us turn to another subject which merits attention, namely,
+the means whereby divided cities may be reunited; and of this I propose
+to speak in the following Chapter.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XXVII.—_How a divided City may be reunited, and how it is a
+false opinion that to hold Cities in subjection they must be kept
+divided._
+
+
+From the example of the Roman consuls who reconciled the citizens of
+Ardea, we are taught the method whereby the feuds of a divided city may
+be composed, namely, by putting the ringleaders of the disturbances to
+death; and that no other remedy should be used. Three courses, indeed,
+are open to you, since you may either put to death, as these consuls
+did, or banish, or bind the citizens to live at peace with one another,
+taking security for their good behaviour. Of which three ways the last
+is the most hurtful, the most uncertain, and the least effectual;
+because when much blood has been shed, or other like outrage done, it
+cannot be that a peace imposed on compulsion should endure between men
+who are every day brought face to face with one another; for since
+fresh cause of contention may at any moment result from their meeting,
+it will be impossible for them to refrain from mutual injury. Of this
+we could have no better instance than in the city of Pistoja.
+
+Fifteen years ago this city was divided between the Panciatichi and
+Cancellieri, as indeed it still continues, the only difference being
+that then they were in arms, whereas, now, they have laid them aside.
+After much controversy and wrangling, these factions would presently
+proceed to bloodshed, to pulling down houses, plundering property, and
+all the other violent courses usual in divided cities. The Florentines,
+with whom it lay to compose these feuds, strove for a long time to do
+so by using the third of the methods mentioned; but when this only led
+to increased tumult and disorder, losing patience, they decided to try
+the second method and get rid of the ringleaders of both factions by
+imprisoning some and banishing others. In this way a sort of settlement
+was arrived at, which continues in operation up to the present hour.
+There can be no question, however, that the first of the methods named
+would have been the surest. But because extreme measures have in them
+an element of greatness and nobility, a weak republic, so far from
+knowing how to use this first method, can with difficulty be brought to
+employ even the second. This, as I said at the beginning, is the kind
+of blunder made by the princes of our times when they have to decide on
+matters of moment, from their not considering how those men acted who
+in ancient days had to determine under like conditions. For the
+weakness of the present race of men (the result of their enfeebling
+education and their ignorance of affairs), makes them regard the
+methods followed by the ancients as partly inhuman and partly
+impracticable. Accordingly, they have their own newfangled ways of
+looking at things, wholly at variance with the true, as when the sages
+of our city, some time since, pronounced that _Pistoja was to be held
+by feuds and Pisa by fortresses_, not perceiving how useless each of
+these methods is in itself.
+
+Having spoken of fortresses already at some length, I shall not further
+refer to them here, but shall consider the futility of trying to hold
+subject cities by keeping them divided. In the first place, it is
+impossible for the ruling power, whether prince or republic, to be
+friends with both factions. For wherever there is division, it is human
+nature to take a side, and to favour one party more than another. But
+if one party in a subject city be unfriendly to you, the consequence
+will be that you will lose that city so soon as you are involved in
+war, since it is impossible for you to hold a city where you have
+enemies both within and without. Should the ruling power be a republic,
+there is nothing so likely to corrupt its citizens and sow dissension
+among them, as having to control a divided city. For as each faction in
+that city will seek support and endeavour to make friends in a variety
+of corrupt ways, two very serious evils will result: first, that the
+governed city will never be contented with its governors, since there
+can be no good government where you often change its form, adapting
+yourself to the humours now of one party and now of another; and next,
+that the factious spirit of the subject city is certain to infect your
+own republic. To which Biondo testifies, when, in speaking of the
+citizens of Florence and Pistoja, he says, “_In seeking to unite
+Pistoja the Florentines themselves fell out_.”[15]
+
+ [15] _Flav. Blondri Hist._, dec. ii. lib. 9. Basle ed. 1559, p. 337
+
+
+It is easy, therefore, to understand how much mischief attends on such
+divisions. In the year 1501, when we lost Arezzo, and when all the Val
+di Tevere and Val di Chiana were occupied by the Vitelli and by Duke
+Valentino, a certain M. de Lant was sent by the King of France to cause
+the whole of the lost towns to be restored to the Florentines; who
+finding in all these towns men who came to him claiming to be of the
+party of the _Marzocco_,[16] greatly blamed this distinction,
+observing, that if in France any of the king’s subjects were to say
+that he was of the king’s party, he would be punished; since the
+expression would imply that there was a party hostile to the king,
+whereas it was his majesty’s desire that all his subjects should be his
+friends and live united without any distinction of party. But all these
+mistaken methods and opinions originate in the weakness of rulers, who,
+seeing that they cannot hold their States by their own strength and
+valour, have recourse to like devices; which, if now and then in
+tranquil times they prove of some slight assistance to them, in times
+of danger are shown to be worthless.
+
+ [16] The heraldic Lion of Florence.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XXVIII.—_That a Republic must keep an eye on what its Citizens
+are about; since often the seeds of a Tyranny lie hidden under a
+semblance of generous deeds._
+
+
+The granaries of Rome not sufficing to meet a famine with which the
+city was visited, a certain Spurius Melius, a very wealthy citizen for
+these days, privately laid in a supply of corn wherewith to feed the
+people at his own expense; gaining thereby such general favour with the
+commons, that the senate, apprehending that his bounty might have
+dangerous consequences, in order to crush him before he grew too
+powerful, appointed a dictator to deal with him and caused him to be
+put to death.
+
+Here we have to note that actions which seem good in themselves and
+unlikely to occasion harm to any one, very often become hurtful, nay,
+unless corrected in time, most dangerous for a republic. And to treat
+the matter with greater fulness, I say, that while a republic can never
+maintain itself long, or manage its affairs to advantage, without
+citizens of good reputation, on the other hand the credit enjoyed by
+particular citizens often leads to the establishment of a tyranny. For
+which reasons, and that things may take a safe course, it should be so
+arranged that a citizen shall have credit only for such behaviour as
+benefits, and not for such as injures the State and its liberties. We
+must therefore examine by what ways credit is acquired. These, briefly,
+are two, public or secret. Public, when a citizen gains a great name by
+advising well or by acting still better for the common advantage. To
+credit of this sort we should open a wide door, holding out rewards
+both for good counsels and for good actions, so that he who renders
+such services may be at once honoured and satisfied. Reputation
+acquired honestly and openly by such means as these can never be
+dangerous. But credit acquired by secret practices, which is the other
+method spoken of, is most perilous and prejudicial. Of such secret
+practices may be instanced, acts of kindness done to this or the other
+citizen in lending him money, in assisting him to marry his daughters,
+in defending him against the magistrates, and in conferring such other
+private favours as gain men devoted adherents, and encourage them after
+they have obtained such support, to corrupt the institutions of the
+State and to violate its laws.
+
+A well-governed republic, therefore, ought, as I have said, to throw
+wide the door to all who seek public favour by open courses, and to
+close it against any who would ingratiate themselves by underhand
+means. And this we find was done in Rome. For the Roman republic, as a
+reward to any citizen who served it well, ordained triumphs and all the
+other honours which it had to bestow; while against those who sought to
+aggrandize themselves by secret intrigues, it ordained accusations and
+impeachment; and when, from the people being blinded by a false show of
+benevolence, these proved insufficient, it provided for a dictator, who
+with regal authority might bring to bounds any who had strayed beyond
+them, as instanced in the case of Spurius Melius. And if conduct like
+his be ever suffered to pass unchastised, it may well be the ruin of a
+republic, for men when they have such examples set them are not easily
+led back into the right path.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XXIX.—_That the Faults of a People are due to its Prince._
+
+
+Let no prince complain of the faults committed by a people under his
+control; since these must be ascribed either to his negligence, or to
+his being himself blemished by similar defects. And were any one to
+consider what peoples in our own times have been most given to robbery
+and other like offences, he would find that they have only copied their
+rulers, who have themselves been of a like nature. Romagna, before
+those lords who ruled it were driven out by Pope Alexander VI., was a
+nursery of all the worst crimes, the slightest occasion giving rise to
+wholesale rapine and murder. This resulted from the wickedness of these
+lords, and not, as they asserted, from the evil disposition of their
+subjects. For these princes being poor, yet choosing to live as though
+they were rich, were forced to resort to cruelties innumerable and
+practised in divers ways; and among other shameful devices contrived by
+them to extort money, they would pass laws prohibiting certain acts,
+and then be the first to give occasion for breaking them; nor would
+they chastise offenders until they saw many involved in the same
+offence; when they fell to punishing, not from any zeal for the laws
+which they had made, but out of greed to realize the penalty. Whence
+flowed many mischiefs, and more particularly this, that the people
+being impoverished, but not corrected, sought to make good their
+injuries at the expense of others weaker than themselves. And thus
+there sprang up all those evils spoken of above, whereof the prince is
+the true cause.
+
+The truth of what I say is confirmed by Titus Livius where he relates
+how the Roman envoys, who were conveying the spoils of the Veientines
+as an offering to Apollo, were seized and brought on shore by the
+corsairs of the Lipari islands in Sicily; when Timasitheus, the prince
+of these islands, on learning the nature of the offering, its
+destination, and by whom sent, though himself of Lipari, behaved as a
+Roman might, showing his people what sacrilege it would be to intercept
+such a gift, and speaking to such purpose that by general consent the
+envoys were suffered to proceed upon their voyage, taking all their
+possessions with them. With reference to which incident the historian
+observes: “_The multitude, who always take their colour from their
+ruler, were filled by Timasitheus with a religious awe._” And to like
+purport we find it said by Lorenzo de’ Medici:—
+
+“A prince’s acts his people imitate;
+For on their lord the eyes of all men wait.”[17]
+
+
+ [17] E quel che fa il signer, fanno poi molti;
+ Chè nel signer son tutti gli occhi volti.
+(_La Rappresentazione di San Giovanni e Paolo._)
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XXX.—_That a Citizen who seeks by his personal influence to
+render signal service to his Country, must first stand clear of Envy.
+How a City should prepare for its defence on the approach of an Enemy._
+
+
+When the Roman senate learned that all Etruria was assembled in arms to
+march against Rome, and that the Latins and Hernicians, who before had
+been the friends of the Romans, had ranged themselves with the
+Volscians the ancient enemies of the Roman name, they foresaw that a
+perilous contest awaited them. But because Camillus was at that time
+tribune with consular authority they thought all might be managed
+without the appointment of a dictator, provided the other tribunes, his
+colleagues would agree to his assuming the sole direction of affairs.
+This they willingly did; “_nor_,” says Titus Livius, “_did they account
+anything as taken from their own dignity which was added to his._”
+
+On receiving their promise of obedience, Camillus gave orders that
+three armies should be enrolled. Of the first, which was to be directed
+against the Etruscans, he himself assumed command. The command of the
+second, which he meant to remain near Rome and meet any movement of the
+Latins and Hernicians, he gave to Quintius Servilius. The third army,
+which he designed for the protection of the city, and the defence of
+the gates and Curia, he entrusted to Lucius Quintius. And he further
+directed, that Horatius, one of his colleagues, should furnish supplies
+of arms, and corn, and of all else needful in time of war. Finally he
+put forward his colleague Cornelius to preside in the senate and public
+council, that from day to day he might advise what should be done. For
+in those times these tribunes were ready either to command or obey as
+the welfare of their country might require.
+
+We may gather from this passage how a brave and prudent man should act,
+how much good he may effect, and how serviceable he may be to his
+country, when by the force of his character and worth he succeeds in
+extinguishing envy. For this often disables men from acting to the best
+advantage, not permitting them to obtain that authority which it is
+essential they should have in matters of importance. Now, envy may be
+extinguished in one or other of two ways: first, by the approach of
+some flagrant danger, whereby seeing themselves like to be overwhelmed,
+all forego their own private ambition and lend a willing obedience to
+him who counts on his valour to rescue them. As in the case of
+Camillas, who from having given many proofs of surpassing ability, and
+from having been three times dictator and always exercised the office
+for the public good and not for his private advantage, had brought men
+to fear nothing from his advancement; while his fame and reputation
+made it no shame for them to recognize him as their superior. Wisely,
+therefore, does Titus Livius use concerning him the words which I have
+cited.
+
+The other way in which envy may be extinguished, is by the death,
+whether by violence or in the ordinary course of nature, of those who
+have been your rivals in the pursuit of fame or power, and who seeing
+you better esteemed than themselves, could never acquiesce in your
+superiority or put up with it in patience. For when these men have been
+brought up in a corrupt city, where their training is little likely to
+improve them, nothing that can happen will induce them to withdraw
+their pretensions; nay, to have their own way and satisfy their
+perverse humour, they will be content to look on while their country is
+ruined. For envy such as this there is no cure save by the death of
+those of whom it has taken possession. And when fortune so befriends a
+great man that his rivals are removed from his path by a natural death,
+his glory is established without scandal or offence, since he is then
+able to display his great qualities unhindered. But when fortune is not
+thus propitious to him, he must contrive other means to rid himself of
+rivals, and must do so successfully before he can accomplish anything.
+Any one who reads with intelligence the lessons of Holy Writ, will
+remember how Moses, to give effect to his laws and ordinances, was
+constrained to put to death an endless number of those who out of mere
+envy withstood his designs. The necessity of this course was well
+understood by the Friar Girolamo Savonarola, and by the Gonfalonier
+Piero Soderini. But the former could not comply with it, because, as a
+friar, he himself lacked the needful authority; while those of his
+followers who might have exercised that authority, did not rightly
+comprehend his teaching. This, however, was no fault of his; for his
+sermons are full of invectives and attacks against “_the wise of this
+world_,” that being the name he gave to envious rivals and to all who
+opposed his reforms. As for Piero Soderini, he was possessed by the
+belief that in time and with favourable fortune he could allay envy by
+gentleness-and by benefits conferred on particular men; for as he was
+still in the prime of life, and in the fresh enjoyment of that
+good-will which his character and opinions had gained for him, he
+thought to get the better of all who out of jealousy opposed him,
+without giving occasion for tumult, violence, or disorder; not knowing
+how time stays not, worth suffices not, fortune shifts, and malice will
+not be won over by any benefit Wherefore, because they could not or
+knew not how to vanquish this envy, the two whom I have named came to
+their downfall.
+
+Another point to be noted in the passage we are considering, is the
+careful provision made by Camillus for the safety of Rome both within
+and without the city. And, truly, not without reason do wise
+historians, like our author, set forth certain events with much
+minuteness and detail, to the end that those who come after may learn
+how to protect themselves in like dangers. Further, we have to note
+that there is no more hazardous or less useful defence than one
+conducted without method or system. This is shown in Camillus causing a
+third army to be enrolled that it might be left in Rome for the
+protection of the city. Many persons, doubtless, both then and now,
+would esteem this precaution superfluous, thinking that as the Romans
+were a warlike people and constantly under arms, there could be no
+occasion for a special levy, and that it was time enough to arm when
+the need came. But Camillus, and any other equally prudent captain
+would be of the same mind, judged otherwise, not permitting the
+multitude to take up arms unless they were to be bound by the rules and
+discipline of military service. Let him, therefore, who is called on to
+defend a city, taking example by Camillus, before all things avoid
+placing arms in the hands of an undisciplined multitude, but first of
+all select and enroll those whom he proposes to arm, so that they may
+be wholly governed by him as to where they shall assemble and whither
+they shall march; and then let him direct those who are not enrolled,
+to abide every man in his own house for its defence. Whosoever observes
+this method in a city which is attacked, will be able to defend it with
+ease; but whosoever disregards it, and follows not the example of
+Camillus, shall never succeed.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XXXI.—_That strong Republics and valiant Men preserve through
+every change the same Spirit and Bearing._
+
+
+Among other high sayings which our historian ascribes to Camillus, as
+showing of what stuff a truly great man should be made, he puts in his
+mouth the words, “_My courage came not with my dictatorship nor went
+with my exile;_” for by these words we are taught that a great man is
+constantly the same through all vicissitudes of Fortune; so that
+although she change, now exalting, now depressing, he remains
+unchanged, and retains always a mind so unmoved, and in such complete
+accordance with his nature as declares to all that over him Fortune has
+no dominion.
+
+Very different is the behaviour of those weak-minded mortals who,
+puffed up and intoxicated with their success, ascribe all their
+felicity to virtues which they never knew, and thus grow hateful and
+insupportable to all around them. Whence also the changes in their
+fortunes. For whenever they have to look adversity in the face, they
+suddenly pass to the other extreme, becoming abject and base. And thus
+it happens that feeble-minded princes, when they fall into
+difficulties, think rather of flight than of defence, because, having
+made bad use of their prosperity, they are wholly unprepared to defend
+themselves.
+
+The same merits and defects which I say are found in individual men,
+are likewise found in republics, whereof we have example in the case of
+Rome and of Venice. For no reverse of fortune ever broke the spirit of
+the Roman people, nor did any success ever unduly elate them; as we see
+plainly after their defeat at Cannæ, and after the victory they had
+over Antiochus. For the defeat at Cannæ, although most momentous, being
+the third they had met with, no whit daunted them; so that they
+continued to send forth armies, refused to ransom prisoners as contrary
+to their custom, and despatched no envoy to Hannibal or to Carthage to
+sue for peace; but without ever looking back on past humiliations,
+thought always of war, though in such straits for soldiers that they
+had to arm their old men and slaves. Which facts being made known to
+Hanno the Carthaginian, he, as I have already related, warned the
+Carthaginian senate not to lay too much stress upon their victory.
+Here, therefore, we see that in times of adversity the Romans were
+neither cast down nor dismayed. On the other hand, no prosperity ever
+made them arrogant. Before fighting the battle wherein he was finally
+routed, Antiochus sent messengers to Scipio to treat for an accord;
+when Scipio offered peace on condition that he withdrew at once into
+Syria, leaving all his other dominions to be dealt with by the Romans
+as they thought fit. Antiochus refusing these terms, fought and was
+defeated, and again sent envoys to Scipio, enjoining them to accept
+whatever conditions the victor might be pleased to impose. But Scipio
+proposed no different terms from those he had offered before saying
+that “_the Romans, as they lost not heart on defeat, so waxed not
+insolent with success._”
+
+The contrary of all this is seen in the behaviour of the Venetians, who
+thinking their good fortune due to valour of which they were devoid, in
+their pride addressed the French king as “Son of St. Mark;” and making
+no account of the Church, and no longer restricting their ambition to
+the limits of Italy, came to dream of founding an empire like the
+Roman. But afterwards, when their good fortune deserted them, and they
+met at Vailà a half-defeat at the hands of the French king, they lost
+their whole dominions, not altogether from revolt, but mainly by a base
+and abject surrender to the Pope and the King of Spain. Nay, so low did
+they stoop as to send ambassadors to the Emperor offering to become his
+tributaries, and to write letters to the Pope, full of submission and
+servility, in order to move his compassion. To such abasement were they
+brought in four days’ time by what was in reality only a half-defeat.
+For on their flight after the battle of Vailà only about a half of
+their forces were engaged, and one of their two provedditori escaped to
+Verona with five and twenty thousand men, horse and foot. So that had
+there been a spark of valour in Venice, or any soundness in her
+military system, she might easily have renewed her armies, and again
+confronting fortune have stood prepared either to conquer, or, if she
+must fall, to fall more gloriously; and at any rate might have obtained
+for herself more honourable terms. But a pusillanimous spirit,
+occasioned by the defects of her ordinances in so far as they relate to
+war, caused her to lose at once her courage and her dominions. And so
+will it always happen with those who behave like the Venetians. For
+when men grow insolent in good fortune, and abject inn evil, the fault
+lies in themselves and in the character of their training, which, when
+slight and frivolous, assimilates them to itself; but when otherwise,
+makes them of another temper, and giving them better acquaintance with
+the world, causes them to be less disheartened by misfortunes and less
+elated by success.
+
+And while this is true of individual men, it holds good also of a
+concourse of men living together in one republic, who will arrive at
+that measure of perfection which the institutions of their State
+permit. And although I have already said on another occasion that a
+good militia is the foundation of all States, and where that is wanting
+there can neither be good laws, nor aught else that is good, it seems
+to me not superfluous to say the same again; because in reading this
+history of Titus Livius the necessity of such a foundation is made
+apparent in every page. It is likewise shown that no army can be good
+unless it be thoroughly trained and exercised, and that this can only
+be the case with an army raised from your own subjects. For as a State
+is not and cannot always be at war, you must have opportunity to train
+your army in times of peace; but this, having regard to the cost, you
+can only have in respect of your own subjects.
+
+When Camillus, as already related, went forth to meet the Etruscans,
+his soldiers on seeing the great army of their enemy, were filled with
+fear, thinking themselves too to withstand its onset. This untoward
+disposition being reported to Camillus, he showed himself to his men
+and by visiting their tents, and conversing with this and the other
+among them, was able to remove their misgivings; and, finally, without
+other word of command, he bade them “_each do his part as he had
+learned and been accustomed_.” Now, any one who well considers the
+methods followed by Camillus, and the words spoken by him to encourage
+his soldiers to face their enemy, will perceive that these words and
+methods could never have been used with an army which had not been
+trained and disciplined in time of peace as well as of war. For no
+captain can trust to untrained soldiers or look for good service at
+their hands; nay, though he were another Hannibal, with such troops his
+defeat were certain. For, as a captain cannot be present everywhere
+while a battle is being fought, unless he have taken all measures
+beforehand to render his men of the same temper as himself, and have
+made sure that they perfectly understand his orders and arrangements,
+he will inevitably be destroyed.
+
+When a city therefore is armed and trained as Rome was, and when its
+citizens have daily opportunity, both singly and together, to make
+trial of their valour and learn what fortune can effect, it will always
+happen, that at all times, and whether circumstances be adverse or
+favourable, they will remain of unaltered courage and preserve the same
+noble bearing. But when its citizens are unpractised in arms, and trust
+not to their own valour but wholly to the arbitration of Fortune, they
+will change their temper as she changes, and offer always the same
+example of behaviour as was given by the Venetians.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XXXII.—_Of the methods which some have used to make Peace
+impossible_.
+
+
+The towns of Cære and Velitræ, two of her own colonies, revolted from
+Rome in expectation of being protected by the Latins. But the Latins
+being routed and all hopes of help from that quarter at an end, many of
+the townsmen recommended that envoys should be sent to Rome to make
+their peace with the senate. This proposal, however, was defeated by
+those who had been the prime movers of the revolt, who, fearing that
+the whole punishment might fall on their heads, to put a stop to any
+talk of an adjustment, incited the multitude to take up arms and make a
+foray into the Roman territory.
+
+And, in truth, when it is desired that a prince or people should banish
+from their minds every thought of reconciliation, there is no surer or
+more effectual plan than to incite them to inflict grave wrong on him
+with whom you would not have them be reconciled; for, then, the fear of
+that punishment which they will seem to themselves to have deserved,
+will always keep them apart. At the close of the first war waged by the
+Romans against Carthage, the soldiers who had served under the
+Carthaginians in Sardinia and Sicily, upon peace being proclaimed,
+returned to Africa; where, being dissatisfied with their pay, they
+mutinied against the Carthaginians, and choosing two of their number,
+Mato and Spendio, to be their leaders, seized and sacked many towns
+subject to Carthage. The Carthaginians, being loath to use force until
+they had tried all other methods for bringing them to reason, sent
+Hasdrubal, their fellow-citizen, to mediate with them, thinking that
+from formerly having commanded them he might be able to exercise some
+influence over them. But on his arrival, Spendio and Mato, to
+extinguish any hope these mutineers might have had of making peace with
+Carthage, and so leave them no alternative but war, persuaded them that
+their best course was to put Hasdrubal, with all the other Carthaginian
+citizens whom they had taken prisoners, to death. Whereupon, they not
+only put them to death, but first subjected them to an infinity of
+tortures; crowning their wickedness by a proclamation to the effect
+that every Carthaginian who might thereafter fall into their hands
+should meet a like fate. This advice, therefore, and its consummation
+had the effect of rendering these mutineers relentless and inveterate
+in their hostility to the Carthaginians.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XXXIII.—_That to insure victory in battle you must inspire your
+Men with confidence in one another and in you._
+
+
+To insure an army being victorious in battle you must inspire it with
+the conviction that it is certain to prevail. The causes which give it
+this confidence are its being well armed and disciplined, and the
+soldiers knowing one another. These conditions are only to be found
+united in soldiers born and bred in the same country.
+
+It is likewise essential that the army should think so well of its
+captain as to trust implicitly to his prudence; which it will always do
+if it see him careful of its welfare, attentive to discipline, brave in
+battle, and otherwise supporting well and honourably the dignity of his
+position. These conditions he fulfils when, while punishing faults, he
+does not needlessly harass his men, keeps his word with them, shows
+them that the path to victory is easy, and conceals from them, or makes
+light of things which seen from a distance might appear to threaten
+danger. The observance of these precautions will give an army great
+confidence, and such confidence leads to victory.
+
+This confidence the Romans were wont to inspire in the minds of their
+soldiers by the aid of religion; and accordingly their consuls were
+appointed, their armies were enrolled, their soldiers marched forth,
+and their battles were begun, only when the auguries and auspices were
+favourable; and without attending to all these observances no prudent
+captain would ever engage in combat; knowing that unless his soldiers
+were first assured that the gods were on their side, he might readily
+suffer defeat. But if any consul or other leader ever joined battle
+contrary to the auspices, the Romans would punish him, as they did
+Claudius Pulcher.
+
+The truth of what I affirm is plainly seen from the whole course of the
+Roman history, but is more particularly established by the words which
+Livius puts into the mouth of Appius Claudius, who, when complaining to
+the people of the insolence of the tribunes, and taxing them with
+having caused the corruption of the auspices and other rites of
+religion, is made to say, “_And now they would strip even religion of
+its authority. For what matters it, they will tell you, that the fowls
+refuse to peck, or come slowly from the coop, or that a cock has
+crowed? These are small matters doubtless; but it was by not contemning
+such small matters as these, that our forefathers built up this great
+republic._” And, indeed, in these small matters lies a power which
+keeps men united and of good courage, which is of itself the chief
+condition of success.
+
+But the observances of religion must be accompanied by valour, for
+otherwise they can nothing avail. The men of Praneste, leading forth
+their army against the Romans, took up their position near the river
+Allia, on the very spot where the Romans had been routed by the Gauls,
+selecting this ground that it might inspire their own side with
+confidence, and dishearten their enemies with the unhappy memories
+which it recalled But although, for the reasons already noted, this was
+a course which promised success, the result nevertheless showed that
+true valour is not to be daunted by trifling disadvantages. And this
+the historian well expresses by the words he puts in the mouth of the
+dictator as spoken to his master of the knights “_See how these
+fellows, in encamping on the banks of the Allia, have chosen their
+ground in reliance upon fortune. Do you, therefore, relying on
+discipline and valour, fall upon then centre._” For true valour, tight
+discipline, and the feeling of security gained by repeated victories,
+are not to be counteracted by things of no real moment, dismayed by
+empty terrors, or quelled by a solitary mishap. As was well seen when
+the two Manlii, being consuls in command against the Volscians, rashly
+allowed a part of their army to go out foraging, and both those who
+went out and those who stayed behind found themselves attacked at the
+same moment For from this danger they were saved by the courage of the
+soldiers, and not by the foresight of the consuls. With regard to which
+occurrence Titus Livius observes, “_Even without a leader the steadfast
+valour of the soldiers was maintained._”
+
+Here I must not omit to notice the device practised by Fabius to give
+his army confidence, when he led it for the first time into Etruria.
+For judging such encouragement to be especially needed by his men,
+since they were entering an unknown country to encounter a new foe, he
+addressed them before they joined battle, and, after reciting many
+reasons for expecting a victory, told them, that “_he could have
+mentioned other favourable circumstances making victory certain, had it
+not been dangerous to disclose them._” And as this device was
+dexterously used it merits imitation.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XXXIV.—_By what reports, rumours, or surmises the Citizens of a
+Republic are led to favour a Fellow-citizen: and-whether the
+Magistracies are bestowed with better judgment by a People or by a
+Prince._
+
+
+I have elsewhere related how Titus Manlius, afterwards named Torquatus,
+rescued his father from the charge laid against him by Marcus
+Pomponius, tribune of the people. And though the means he took to
+effect this were somewhat violent and irregular, so pleasing to
+everyone were his filial piety and affection, that not only did he
+escape rebuke, but when military tribunes had to be appointed his name
+was second on the list of those chosen. To explain his good fortune, it
+will, I think, be useful to consider what are the methods followed by
+the citizens of a republic in estimating the character of those on whom
+they bestow honours, so as to see whether what I have already said on
+this head be true, namely, that a people is more discriminating in
+awarding honours than a prince.
+
+I say, then, that in conferring honours and offices, the people, when
+it has no knowledge of a man from his public career, follows the
+estimate given of him by the general voice, and by common report; or
+else is guided by some prepossession or preconceived opinion which it
+has adopted concerning him. Such impressions are formed either from
+consideration of a man’s descent (it being assumed, until the contrary
+appears, that where his ancestors have been great and distinguished
+citizens their descendant will resemble them), or else from regard to
+his manners and habits; and nothing can be more in his favour than that
+he frequents the company of the grave and virtuous, and such as are
+generally reputed wise. For as we can have no better clue to a man’s
+character than the company he keeps, he who frequents worthy company
+deservedly obtains a good name, since there can hardly fail to be some
+similarity between himself and his associates. Sometimes, however, the
+popular estimate of a man is founded on some remarkable and noteworthy
+action, though not of public moment, in which he has acquitted himself
+well. And of all the three causes which create a prepossession in a
+man’s favour, none is so effectual as this last. For the presumption
+that he will resemble his ancestors and kinsmen is so often misleading,
+that men are slow to trust and quick to discard it, unless confirmed by
+the personal worth of him of whom they are judging.
+
+The criterion of character afforded by a man’s manners and conversation
+is a safer guide than the presumption of inherited excellence, but is
+far inferior to that afforded by his actions; for until he has given
+actual proof of his worth, his credit is built on mere opinion, which
+may readily change. But this third mode of judging, which originates in
+and rests upon his actions, at once gives him a name which can only be
+destroyed by his afterwards doing many actions of a contrary nature.
+Those therefore who live in a republic should conform to this third
+criterion, and endeavour, as did many of the Roman youth, to make their
+start in life with some extraordinary achievement, either by promoting
+a law conducive to the general well-being, or by accusing some powerful
+citizen as a transgressor of the laws, or by performing some similar
+new and notable action which cannot fail to be much spoken of.
+
+Actions like this are necessary not only to lay a foundation for your
+fame, but also to maintain and extend it. To which end, they must
+continually be renewed, as we find done by Titus Manlius throughout the
+whole course of his life. For after winning his earliest renown by his
+bold and singular defence of his father, when some years had passed he
+fought his famous duel with the Gaul, from whom, when he had slain him,
+he took the twisted golden collar which gave him the name of Torquatus.
+Nor was this the last of his remarkable actions, for at a later period,
+when he was of ripe years, he caused his own son to be put to death,
+because he had fought without leave, although successfully. Which three
+actions gained for him at the time a greater name, and have made him
+more renowned through after ages than all his triumphs and victories,
+though of these he had as large a share as fell to the lot of any other
+Roman. The explanation of which is, that while in his victories Manlius
+had many who resembled him, in these particular actions he stood almost
+or entirely alone.
+
+So, too, with the elder Scipio, all whose victories together did not
+obtain for him so much reputation, as did his rescue, while he was yet
+young, of his father at the Ticino, and his undaunted bearing after the
+rout at Cannæ, when with his naked sword he constrained a number of the
+Roman youth to swear never to abandon their country, as some among them
+had before been minded to do. It was these two actions, therefore,
+which laid the foundation of his future fame and paved the way for his
+triumphs in Spain and Africa. And the fair esteem in which men held
+him, was still further heightened when in Spain he restored a daughter
+to her father, a wife to her husband.
+
+Nor is it only the citizen who seeks reputation as leading to civil
+honours, who must act in this way; the prince who would maintain his
+credit in his princedom must do likewise; since nothing helps so much
+to make a prince esteemed as to give signal proofs of his worth,
+whether by words or by deeds which tend to promote the public good, and
+show him to be so magnanimous, generous, and just, that he may well
+pass into a proverb among his subjects. But to return to the point
+whence I digressed, I say that if a people, when they first confer
+honours on a fellow-citizen, rest their judgment on any one of the
+three circumstances above-mentioned, they build on a reasonable
+foundation; but, when many instances of noble conduct have made a man
+favourably known, that the foundation is still better, since then there
+is hardly room for mistake. I speak merely of those honours which are
+bestowed on a man at the outset of his career, before he has come to be
+known by continued proof, or is found to have passed from one kind of
+conduct to another and dissimilar kind, and I maintain that in such
+cases, so far as erroneous judgments or corrupt motives are concerned,
+a people will always commit fewer mistakes than a prince.
+
+But since a people may happen to be deceived as regards the character,
+reputation, and actions of a man, thinking them better or greater than
+in truth they are, an error a prince is less likely to fall into from
+his being informed and warned by his advisers, in order that the people
+may not lack similar advice, wise founders of republics have provided,
+that when the highest dignities of the State, to which it would be
+dangerous to appoint incapable men, have to be filled up, and it
+appears that some incapable man is the object of the popular choice, it
+shall be lawful and accounted honourable for any citizen to declare in
+the public assemblies the defects of the favoured candidate, that the
+people, being made acquainted therewith, may be better able to judge of
+his fitness. That this was the practice in Rome we have proof in the
+speech made by Fabius Maximus to the people during the second Punic
+war, when in the appointment of consuls public favour leaned towards
+Titus Ottacilius. For Fabius judging him unequal to the duties of the
+consulship at such a crisis, spoke against him and pointed out his
+insufficiency, and so prevented his appointment, turning the popular
+favour towards another who deserved it more.
+
+In the choice of its magistrates, therefore, a people judges of those
+among whom it has to choose, in accordance with the surest indications
+it can get; and when it can be advised as princes are, makes fewer
+mistakes than they. But the citizen who would make a beginning by
+gaining the good-will of the people, must, to obtain it, perform, like
+Titus Manlius, some noteworthy action.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XXXV.—_Of the Danger incurred in being the first to recommend
+new Measures; and that the more unusual the Measures the greater the
+Danger_.
+
+
+How perilous a thing it is to put one’s self at the head of changes
+whereby many are affected, how difficult to guide and bring them to
+perfection, and when perfected to maintain them, were too wide and
+arduous a subject to be treated here. Wherefore I reserve it for a
+fitter occasion, and shall now speak only of those dangers which are
+incurred by the citizens of a republic or by the counsellors of a
+prince in being the first to promote some grave and important measure
+in such manner that the whole responsibility attending it rests with
+them. For as men judge of things by their results, any evil which
+ensues from such measures will be imputed to their author. And although
+if good ensue he will be applauded, nevertheless in matters of this
+kind, what a man may gain is as nothing to what he may lose.
+
+Selim, the present sultan, or Grand Turk as he is called, being in
+readiness, as some who come from his country relate, to set forth on an
+expedition against Egypt and Syria, was urged by one of his bashaws
+whom he had stationed on the confines of Persia, to make war upon the
+Sofi. In compliance with which advice he went on this new enterprise
+with a vast army. But coming to a great plain, wherein were many
+deserts and few streams, and encountering the same difficulties as in
+ancient times had proved the ruin of many Roman armies, he suffered so
+much from pestilence and famine, that, although victorious in battle,
+he lost a great part of his men. This so enraged him against the bashaw
+on whose advice he had acted, that he forthwith put him to death.
+
+In like manner, we read of many citizens who having strenuously
+promoted various measures were banished when these turned out badly.
+Certain citizens of Rome, for instance, were very active in forwarding
+a law allowing the appointment of a plebeian to be consul. This law
+passing, it so happened that the first plebeian consul who went forth
+with the armies was routed; and had it not been that the party in whose
+behalf the law was made was extremely powerful, its promoters would
+have fared badly. It is plain therefore that the counsellors whether of
+a republic or of a prince stand in this dilemma, that if they do not
+conscientiously advise whatsoever they think advantageous for their
+city or prince, they fail in their duty; if they do advise it, they
+risk their places and their lives; all men being subject to this
+infirmity of judging advice by the event.
+
+When I consider in what way this reproach or this danger may best be
+escaped, I find no other remedy to recommend than that in giving advice
+you proceed discreetly not identifying yourself in a special manner
+with the measure you would see carried out, but offering your opinion
+without heat, and supporting it temperately and modestly, so that if
+the prince or city follow it, they shall do so of their own good-will,
+and not seem to be dragged into it by your importunity. When you act
+thus, neither prince nor people can reasonably bear you a grudge in
+respect of the advice given by you, since that advice was not adopted
+contrary to the general opinion. For your danger lies in many having
+opposed you, who afterwards, should your advice prove hurtful, combine
+to ruin you. And although in taking this course you fall short of the
+glory which is earned by him who stands alone against many in urging
+some measure which succeeds, you have nevertheless two advantages to
+make up for it: first, that you escape danger; and second, that when
+you have temperately stated your views, and when, in consequence of
+opposition, your advice has not been taken, should other counsels
+prevail and mischief come of them, your credit will be vastly enhanced.
+And although credit gained at the cost of misfortune to your prince or
+city cannot be matter of rejoicing, still it is something to be taken
+into account.
+
+On this head, then, I know of no other advice to offer. For that you
+should be silent and express no opinion at all, were a course hurtful
+for your prince or city, and which would not absolve you from danger,
+since you would soon grow to be suspected, when it might fare with you
+as with the friend of Perseus the Macedonian king. For Perseus being
+defeated by Paulus Emilius, and making his escape with a few
+companions, it happened that one of them, in reviewing the past, began
+to point out to the king many mistakes which he had made and which had
+been his ruin. Whereupon Perseus turning upon him said, “_Traitor, hast
+thou waited till now when there is no remedy to tell me these things_?”
+and so saying, slew him with his own hand. Such was the penalty
+incurred by one who was silent when he should have spoken, and who
+spoke when he should have been silent; and who found no escape from
+danger in having refrained from giving advice. Wherefore, I believe,
+that the course which I have recommended should be observed and
+followed.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XXXVI.—_Why it has been and still may be affirmed of the Gauls,
+that at the beginning of a fray they are more than Men, but afterwards
+less than Women_.
+
+
+The bravery of the Gaul who on the banks of the Anio challenged any
+among the Romans to fight with him, and the combat that thereupon
+ensued between him and Titus Manlius, remind me of what Titus Livius
+oftener than once observes in his history, that “_at the beginning of a
+fray the Gauls are more than men, but ere it is ended show themselves
+less than women_.”
+
+Touching the cause of this, many are content to believe that such is
+their nature, which, indeed, I take to be true; but we are not,
+therefore, to assume that the natural temper which makes them brave at
+the outset, may not be so trained and regulated as to keep them brave
+to the end. And, to prove this, I say, that armies are of three kinds.
+In one of these you have discipline with bravery and valour as its
+consequence. Such was the Roman army, which is shown by all historians
+to have maintained excellent discipline as the result of constant
+military training. And because in a well-disciplined army none must do
+anything save by rule, we find that in the Roman army, from which as it
+conquered the world all others should take example, none either eat, or
+slept, or bought, or sold, or did anything else, whether in his
+military or in his private capacity, without orders from the consul.
+Those armies which do otherwise are not true armies, and if ever they
+have any success, it is owing to the fury and impetuosity of their
+onset and not to trained and steady valour. But of this impetuosity and
+fury, trained valour, when occasion requires, will make use; nor will
+any danger daunt it or cause it to lose heart, its courage being kept
+alive by its discipline, and its confidence fed by the hope of victory
+which never fails it while that discipline is maintained.
+
+But the contrary happens with armies of the second sort, those, namely,
+which have impetuosity without discipline, as was the case with the
+Gauls whose courage in a protracted conflict gradually wore away; so
+that unless they succeeded in their first attack, the impetuosity to
+which they trusted, having no support from disciplined valour, soon
+cooled; when, as they had nothing else to depend on, their efforts
+ceased. The Romans, on the other hand, being less disquieted in danger
+by reason of their perfect discipline, and never losing hope, fought
+steadily and stubbornly to the last, and with the same courage at the
+end as at the outset; nay, growing heated by the conflict, only became
+the fiercer the longer it was continued.
+
+In armies of the third sort both natural spirit and trained valour are
+wanting; and to this class belong the Italian armies of our own times,
+of which it may be affirmed that they are absolutely worthless, never
+obtaining a victory, save when, by some accident, the enemy they
+encounter takes to flight. But since we have daily proofs of this
+absence of valour, it were needless to set forth particular instances
+of it.
+
+That all, however, may know on the testimony of Titus Livius what
+methods a good army should take, and what are taken by a bad army, I
+shall cite the words he represents Papirius Cursor to have used when
+urging that Fabius, his master of the knights, should be punished for
+disobedience, and denouncing the consequences which would ensue were he
+absolved, saying:—“_Let neither God nor man be held in reverence; let
+the orders of captains and the Divine auspices be alike disregarded;
+let a vagrant soldiery range without leave through the country of
+friend or foe; reckless of their military oath, let them disband at
+their pleasure; let them forsake their deserted standards, and neither
+rally nor disperse at the word of command; let them fight when they
+choose, by day or by night, with or without advantage of ground, with
+or without the bidding of their leader, neither maintaining their ranks
+_nor observing the order of battle; and let our armies, from being a
+solemn and consecrated company, grow to resemble some dark and
+fortuitous gathering of cut-throats._” With this passage before us, it
+is easy to pronounce whether the armies of our times be “_a dark and
+fortuitous gathering_,” or “_a solemn and consecrated company_;” nay,
+how far they fall short of anything worthy to be called an army,
+possessing neither the impetuous but disciplined valour of the Romans,
+nor even the mere undisciplined impetuosity of the Gauls.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XXXVII.—_Whether a general engagement should be preceded by
+skirmishes; and how, avoiding these, we may get knowledge of a new
+Enemy._
+
+
+Besides all the other difficulties which hinder men from bringing
+anything to its utmost perfection, it appears, as I have already
+observed, that in close vicinity to every good is found also an evil,
+so apt to grow up along with it that it is hardly possible to have the
+one without accepting the other. This we see in all human affairs, and
+the result is, that unless fortune aid us to overcome this natural and
+common disadvantage, we never arrive at any excellence. I am reminded
+of this by the combat between Titus Manlius and the Gaul, concerning
+which Livius writes that it “_determined the issue of the entire war;
+since the Gauls, abandoning their camp, hastily withdrew to the country
+about Tivoli, whence they presently passed into Campania._”
+
+It may be said, therefore, on the one hand, that a prudent captain
+ought absolutely to refrain from all those operations which, while of
+trifling moment in themselves, may possibly produce an ill effect on
+his army. Now, to engage in a combat wherein you risk your whole
+fortunes without putting forth your entire strength, is, as I observed
+before, when condemning the defence of a country by guarding its
+defiles, an utterly foolhardy course. On the other hand, it is to be
+said that a prudent captain, when he has to meet a new and redoubtable
+adversary, ought, before coming to a general engagement, to accustom
+his men by skirmishes and passages of arms, to the quality of their
+enemy; that they may learn to know him, and how to deal with him, and
+so free themselves from the feeling of dread which his name and fame
+inspire.
+
+This for a captain is a matter of the very greatest importance, and one
+which it might be almost fatal for him to neglect, since to risk a
+pitched battle without first giving your soldiers such opportunities to
+know their enemy and shake off their fear of him, is to rush on certain
+destruction. When Valerius Corvinus was sent by the Romans with their
+armies against the Samnites, these being new adversaries with whom up
+to that time they had not measured their strength, Titus Livius tells
+us that before giving battle he made his men make trial of the enemy in
+several unimportant skirmishes, “_lest they should be dismayed by a new
+foe and a new method of warfare._” Nevertheless, there is very great
+danger that, if your soldiers get the worst in these encounters, their
+alarm and self-distrust may be increased, and a result follow contrary
+to that intended, namely, that you dispirit where you meant to
+reassure.
+
+This, therefore, is one of those cases in which the evil lies so nigh
+the good, and both are so mixed up together that you may readily lay
+hold of the one when you think to grasp the other. And with regard to
+this I say, that a good captain should do what he can that nothing
+happen which might discourage his men, nor is there anything so likely
+to discourage them as to begin with a defeat. For which reason
+skirmishes are, as a rule, to be avoided, and only to be allowed where
+you fight to great advantage and with a certainty of victory. In like
+manner, no attempt should be made to defend the passes leading into
+your country unless your whole army can co-operate; nor are any towns
+to be defended save those whose loss necessarily involves your ruin.
+And as to those towns which you do defend, you must so arrange, both in
+respect of the garrison within and the army without, that in the event
+of a siege your whole forces can be employed. All other towns you must
+leave undefended. For, provided your army be kept together, you do not,
+in losing what you voluntarily abandon, forfeit your military
+reputation, or sacrifice your hopes of final success. But when you lose
+what it was your purpose, and what all know it was your purpose to
+hold, you suffer a real loss and injury, and, like the Gauls on the
+defeat of their champion, you are ruined by a mishap of no moment in
+itself.
+
+Philip of Macedon, the father of Perseus, a great soldier in his day,
+and of a great name, on being invaded by the Romans, laid waste and
+relinquished much of his territory which he thought he could not
+defend; rightly judging it more hurtful to his reputation to lose
+territory after an attempt to defend it, than to abandon it to the
+enemy as something he cared little to retain. So, likewise, after the
+battle of Cannæ, when their affairs were at their worst, the Romans
+refused aid to many subject and protected States, charging them to
+defend themselves as best they could. And this is a better course than
+to undertake to defend and then to fail; for by refusing to defend, you
+lose only your friend; whereas in failing, you not only lose your
+friend, but weaken yourself.
+
+But to return to the matter in hand, I affirm, that even when a captain
+is constrained by inexperience of his enemy to make trial of him by
+means of skirmishes, he ought first to see that he has so much the
+advantage that he runs no risk of defeat; or else, and this is his
+better course, he must do as Marius did when sent against the
+Cimbrians, a very courageous people who were laying Italy waste, and by
+their fierceness and numbers, and from the fact of their having already
+routed a Roman army, spreading terror wherever they came. For before
+fighting a decisive battle, Marius judged it necessary to do something
+to lessen the dread in which these enemies were held by his army; and
+being a prudent commander, he, on several occasions, posted his men at
+points where the Cimbrians must pass, that seeing and growing familiar
+with their appearance, while themselves in safety and within the
+shelter of their intrenched camp, and finding them to be a mere
+disorderly rabble, encumbered with baggage, and either without weapons,
+or with none that were formidable, they might at last assume courage
+and grow eager to engage them in battle. The part thus prudently taken
+by Marius, should be carefully imitated by others who would escape the
+dangers above spoken of and not have to betake themselves like the
+Gauls to a disgraceful flight, on sustaining some trifling defeat.
+
+But since in this Discourse I have referred by name to Valerius
+Corvinus, in my next Chapter I shall cite his words to show what manner
+of man a captain ought to be.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XXXVIII.—_Of the Qualities of a Captain in whom his Soldiers
+can confide._
+
+
+Valerius Corvinus, as I have said already, was sent in command of an
+army against the Samnites, who were then new enemies to Rome.
+Wherefore, to reassure his soldiers and familiarize them with their
+adversaries, he made them engage with them in various unimportant
+passages of arms. But not thinking this enough, he resolved before
+delivering battle to address his men, and by reminding them of their
+valour and his own, to make it plain how little they should esteem such
+enemies. And from the words which Titus Livius puts in his mouth we may
+gather what manner of man the captain ought to be in whom an army will
+put its trust. For he makes him say:—“_Bear ye also this in mind under
+whose conduct and auspices you are about to fight, and whether he whom
+you are to obey be great only in exhorting, bold only in words, and all
+unpractised in arms; or whether he be one who himself knows how to use
+his spear, to march before the eagles, and play his part in the
+thickest of the fight. Soldiers! I would have you follow my deeds and
+not my words, and look to me for example rather than for commands; for
+with this right hand I have won for myself three consulships, and an
+unsurpassed renown._” Which words rightly understood give every one to
+know what he must do to merit a captain’s rank. And if any man obtain
+it by other means, he will soon discover that advancement due to chance
+or intrigue rather takes away than brings reputation, since it is men
+who give lustre to titles and not titles to men.
+
+From what has been said it will likewise be understood that if great
+captains when matched against an unfamiliar foe have had to resort to
+unusual methods for reassuring the minds even of veteran soldiers, much
+more will it be necessary for them to use all their address when in
+command of a raw and untried army which has never before looked an
+enemy in the face. For if an unfamiliar adversary inspire terror even
+in a veteran army, how much greater must be the terror which any army
+will inspire in the minds of untrained men. And yet we often find all
+these difficulties overcome by the supreme prudence of a great captain
+like the Roman Gracchus or the Theban Epaminondas, of whom I have
+before spoken, who with untried troops defeated the most practised
+veterans. And the method they are said to have followed was to train
+their men for some months in mimic warfare, so as to accustom them to
+discipline and obedience, after which they employed them with complete
+confidence on actual service.
+
+No man, therefore, of warlike genius, need despair of creating a good
+army if only he have the men; for the prince who has many subjects and
+yet lacks soldiers, has only to thank his own inertness and want of
+foresight, and must not complain of the cowardice of his people.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XXXIX.—_That a Captain should have good knowledge of Places._
+
+
+Among other qualifications essential in a good captain is a knowledge,
+both general and particular, of places and countries, for without such
+knowledge it is impossible for him to carry out any enterprise in the
+best way. And while practice is needed for perfection in every art, in
+this it is needed in the highest degree. Such practice, or particular
+knowledge as it may be termed, is sooner acquired in the chase than in
+any other exercise; and, accordingly, we find it said by ancient
+historians that those heroes who, in their day, ruled the world, were
+bred in the woods and trained to the chase; for this exercise not
+merely gives the knowledge I speak of, but teaches countless other
+lessons needful in war. And Xenophon in his life of Cyrus tells us,
+that Cyrus, on his expedition against the King of Armenia, when
+assigning to each of his followers the part he was to perform, reminded
+them that the enterprise on which they were engaged, differed little
+from one of those hunting expeditions on which they had gone so often
+in his company; likening those who were to lie in ambush in the
+mountains, to the men sent to spread the toils on the hill-tops; and
+those who were to overrun the plain, to the beaters whose business it
+is to start the game from its lair that it may be driven into the
+toils. Now, this is related to show how, in the opinion of Xenophon,
+the chase is a mimic representation of war, and therefore to be
+esteemed by the great as useful and honourable.
+
+Nor can that knowledge of countries which I have spoken of as necessary
+in a commander, be obtained in any convenient way except by the chase.
+For he who joins therein gains a special acquaintance with the
+character of the country in which it is followed; and he who has made
+himself specially familiar with one district, will afterwards readily
+understand the character of any strange country into which he comes.
+For all countries, and the districts of which they are made up, have a
+certain resemblance to one another, so that from a knowledge of one we
+can pass easily to the knowledge of another. He therefore who is
+without such practical acquaintance with some one country, can only
+with difficulty, and after a long time, obtain a knowledge of another,
+while he who possesses it can take in at a glance how this plain
+spreads, how that mountain slopes, whither that valley winds, and all
+other like particulars in respect of which he has already acquired a
+certain familiarity.
+
+The truth of what I affirm is shown by Titus Livius in the case of
+Publius Decius, who, being military tribune in the army which the
+consul Cornelius led against the Samnites, when the consul advanced
+into a defile where the Roman army were like to be shut in by the
+enemy, perceiving the great danger they ran, and noting, as Livius
+relates, a hill which rose by a steep ascent and overhung the enemy’s
+camp, and which, though hard of access for heavy-armed troops,
+presented little difficulty to troops lightly armed, turned to the
+consul and said:—“_Seest thou, Aulus Cornelius, yonder height over
+above the enemy, which they have been blind enough to neglect? There,
+were we manfully to seize it, might we find the citadel of our hopes
+and of our safety._” Whereupon, he was sent by the consul with three
+thousand men to secure the height, and so saved the Roman army. And as
+it was part of his plan to make his own escape and carry off his men
+safely under shelter of night, Livius represents him as saying to his
+soldiers:—“_Come with me, that, while daylight still serves, we may
+learn where the enemy have posted their guards, and by what exit we may
+issue hence._” Accordingly, putting on the cloak of a common soldier,
+lest the enemy should observe that an officer was making his rounds he
+surveyed their camp in all directions.
+
+Now any one who carefully studies the whole of this passage, must
+perceive how useful and necessary it is for a captain to know the
+nature of places, which knowledge had Decius not possessed he could not
+have decided that it would be for the advantage of the Roman army to
+occupy this hill; nor could he have judged from a distance whether the
+hill was accessible or no; and when he reached the summit and desired
+to return to the consul, since he was surrounded on all sides by the
+enemy, he never could have distinguished the path it was safe for him
+to take, from those guarded by the foe. For all which reasons it was
+absolutely essential that Decius should have that thorough knowledge
+which enabled him by gaining possession of this hill to save the Roman
+army, and to discover a path whereby, in the event of his being
+attacked, he and his followers might escape.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XL.—_That Fraud is fair in War._
+
+
+Although in all other affairs it be hateful to use fraud, in the
+operations of war it is praiseworthy and glorious; so that he who gets
+the better of his enemy by fraud, is as much extolled as he who
+prevails by force. This appears in the judgments passed by such as have
+written of the lives of great warriors, who praise Hannibal and those
+other captains who have been most noted for acting in this way. But
+since we may read of many instances of such frauds, I shall not cite
+them here. This, however, I desire to say, that I would not have it
+understood that any fraud is glorious which leads you to break your
+plighted word, or to depart from covenants to which you have agreed;
+for though to do so may sometimes gain you territory and power, it can
+never, as I have said elsewhere, gain you glory.
+
+The fraud, then, which I here speak of is that employed against an
+enemy who places no trust in you, and is wholly directed to military
+operations, such as the stratagem of Hannibal at the Lake of
+Thrasymene, when he feigned flight in order to draw the Roman consul
+and his army into an ambuscade; or when to escape from the hands of
+Fabius Maximus he fastened lights to the horns of his oxen. Similar to
+the above was the deceit practised by Pontius the Samnite commander to
+inveigle the Roman army into the Caudine Forks. For after he had drawn
+up his forces behind the hills, he sent out a number of his soldiers,
+disguised as herdsmen, to drive great herds of cattle across the plain;
+who being captured by the Romans, and interrogated as to where the
+Samnite army was, all of them, as they had been taught by Pontius,
+agreed in saying that it had gone to besiege Nocera: which being
+believed by the consuls, led them to advance within the Caudine Valley,
+where no sooner were they come than they were beset by the Samnites.
+And the victory thus won by a fraud would have been most glorious for
+Pontius had he but taken the advice of his father Herennius, who urged
+that the Romans should either be set at liberty unconditionally, or all
+be put to death; but that a mean course “_which neither gains friends
+nor gets rid of foes_” should be avoided. And this was sound advice,
+for, as has already been shown, in affairs of moment a mean course is
+always hurtful.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XLI.—_That our Country is to be defended by Honour or by
+Dishonour; and in either way is well defended._
+
+
+The consuls together with the whole Roman army fell, as I have related,
+into the hands of the Samnites, who imposed on them the most
+ignominious terms, insisting that they should be stripped of their
+arms, and pass under the yoke before they were allowed to return to
+Rome. The consuls being astounded by the harshness of these conditions
+and the whole army overwhelmed with dismay, Lucius Lentulus, the Roman
+lieutenant, stood forward and said, that in his opinion they ought to
+decline no course whereby their country might be saved; and that as the
+very existence of Rome depended on the preservation of her army, that
+army must be saved at any sacrifice, for whether the means be
+honourable or ignominious, all is well done that is done for the
+defence of our country. And he said that were her army preserved, Rome,
+in course of time, might wipe out the disgrace; but if her army were
+destroyed, however gloriously it might perish, Rome and her freedom
+would perish with it. In the event his counsel was followed.
+
+Now this incident deserves to be noted and pondered over by every
+citizen who is called on to advise his country; for when the entire
+safety of our country is at stake, no consideration of what is just or
+unjust, merciful or cruel, praiseworthy or shameful, must intervene. On
+the contrary, every other consideration being set aside, that course
+alone must be taken which preserves the existence of the country and
+maintains its liberty. And this course we find followed by the people
+of France, both in their words and in their actions, with the view of
+supporting the dignity of their king and the integrity of their
+kingdom; for there is no remark they listen to with more impatience
+than that this or the other course is disgraceful to the king. For
+their king, they say, can incur no disgrace by any resolve he may take,
+whether it turn out well or ill; and whether it succeed or fail, all
+maintain that he has acted as a king should.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XLII.—_That Promises made on Compulsion are not to be
+observed._
+
+
+When, after being subjected to this disgrace, the consuls returned to
+Rome with their disarmed legions, Spurius Posthumius, himself one of
+the consuls, was the first to contend in the senate that the terms made
+in the Caudine Valley were not to be observed. For he argued that the
+Roman people were not bound by them, though he himself doubtless was,
+together with all the others who had promised peace; wherefore, if the
+people desired to set themselves free from every engagement, he and all
+the rest who had given this promise must be made over as prisoners into
+the hands of the Samnites. And so steadfastly did he hold to this
+opinion, that the senate were content to adopt it, and sending him and
+the rest as prisoners back to Samnium, protested to the Samnites that
+the peace was not binding. And so kind was Fortune to Posthumius on
+this occasion, that the Samnites would not keep him as a prisoner, and
+that on his return to Rome, notwithstanding his defeat, he was held in
+higher honour by the Romans than the victorious Pontius by his
+countrymen.
+
+Here two points are to be noted; first, that glory may be won by any
+action; for although, commonly, it follow upon victory, it may also
+follow on defeat, if this defeat be seen to have happened through no
+fault of yours, or if, directly after, you perform some valiant action
+which cancels it. The other point to be noted is that there is no
+disgrace in not observing promises wrung from you by force; for
+promises thus extorted when they affect the public welfare will always
+be broken so soon as the pressure under which they were made is
+withdrawn, and that, too, without shame on the part of him who breaks
+them; of which we read many instances in history, and find them
+constantly occurring at the present day. Nay, as between princes, not
+only are such compulsory promises broken when the force which extorted
+them is removed, but all other promises as well, are in like manner
+disregarded when the causes which led to them no longer operate.
+
+Whether this is a thing to be commended or no, and whether such methods
+ought or ought not to be followed by princes, has already been
+considered by me in my “_Treatise of the Prince_” wherefore I say no
+more on that subject here.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XLIII.—_That Men born in the same Province retain through all
+Times nearly the same Character._
+
+
+The wise are wont to say, and not without reason or at random, that he
+who would forecast what is about to happen should look to what has
+been; since all human events, whether present or to come, have their
+exact counterpart in the past. And this, because these events are
+brought about by men, whose passions and dispositions remaining in all
+ages the same naturally give rise to the same effects; although,
+doubtless, the operation of these causes takes a higher form, now in
+one province, and now in another, according to the character of the
+training wherein the inhabitants of these provinces acquire their way
+of life.
+
+Another aid towards judging of the future by the past, is to observe
+how the same nation long retains the same customs, remaining constantly
+covetous or deceitful, or similarly stamped by some one vice or virtue.
+Any one reading the past history of our city of Florence, and noting
+what has recently befallen it, will find the French and German nations
+overflowing with avarice, pride, cruelty, and perfidy, all of which
+four vices have at divers times wrought much harm to our city. As an
+instance of their perfidy, every one knows how often payments of money
+were made to Charles VIII. of France, in return for which he engaged to
+restore the fortresses of Pisa, yet never did restore them, manifesting
+thereby his bad faith and grasping avarice. Or, to pass from these very
+recent events, all may have heard of what happened in the war in which
+the Florentines were involved with the Visconti, dukes of Milan, when
+Florence, being left without other resource, resolved to invite the
+emperor into Italy, that she might be assisted by his name and power in
+her struggle with Lombardy. The emperor promised to come with a strong
+army to take part against the Visconti and to protect Florence from
+them, on condition that the Florentines paid him a hundred thousand
+ducats on his setting out, and another hundred thousand on his arrival
+in Italy; to which terms the Florentines agreed. But although he then
+received payment of the first instalment and, afterwards, on reaching
+Verona, of the second, he turned back from the expedition without
+effecting anything, alleging as his excuse that he was stopped by
+certain persons who had failed to fulfil their engagements. But if
+Florence had not been urged by passion or overcome by necessity, or had
+she read of and understood the ancient usages of the barbarians, she
+would neither on this, nor on many other occasions, have been deceived
+by them, seeing that these nations have always been of the same
+character, and have always, in all circumstances, and with all men
+alike, used the same methods. For in ancient times we find them
+behaving after the same fashion to the Etruscans, who, when overpowered
+by the Romans, by whom they had been repeatedly routed and put to
+flight, perceiving that they could not stand without help, entered into
+a compact with the Gauls dwelling in the parts of Italy south of the
+Alps, to pay them a certain sum if they would unite with them in a
+campaign against the Romans. But the Gauls, after taking their money,
+refused to arm on their behalf, alleging that they had not been paid to
+make war on the enemies of the Etruscans, but only to refrain from
+pillaging their lands. And thus the people of Etruria, through the
+avarice and perfidy of the Gauls, were at once defrauded of their money
+and disappointed of the help which they had counted on obtaining.
+
+From which two instances of the Etruscans in ancient times and of the
+Florentines in recent, we may see that barbaric races have constantly
+followed the same methods, and may easily draw our conclusions as to
+how far princes should trust them.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XLIV.—_That where ordinary methods fail, Hardihood and Daring
+often succeed._
+
+
+When attacked by the Romans, the Samnites as they could not without
+help stand against them in the field, resolved to leave garrisons in
+the towns of Samnium, and to pass with their main army into Etruria,
+that country being then at truce with Rome, and thus ascertain whether
+their actual presence in arms might not move the Etruscans to renew
+hostilities against Rome, which they had refused to renew when invited
+through envoys. During the negotiations which, on this occasion, passed
+between the two nations, the Samnites in explaining the chief causes
+that led them to take up arms, used the memorable words—“_they had
+risen because peace is a heavier burthen for slaves than war for
+freemen_” In the end, partly by their persuasions, and partly by the
+presence of their army, they induced the Etruscans to join forces with
+them.
+
+Here we are to note that when a prince would obtain something from
+another, he ought, if the occasion allow, to leave him no time to
+deliberate, but should so contrive that the other may see the need of
+resolving at once; as he will, if he perceive that refusal or delay in
+complying with what is asked of him, will draw upon him a sudden and
+dangerous resentment.
+
+This method we have seen employed with good effect in our own times by
+Pope Julius II. in dealing with France, and by M. de Foix, the general
+of the French king, in dealing with the Marquis of Mantua. For Pope
+Julius desiring to expel the Bentivogli from Bologna, and thinking that
+for this purpose he needed the help of French troops, and to have the
+Venetians neutral, after sounding both and receiving from both
+hesitating and ambiguous answers, determined to make both fall in with
+his views, by giving them no time to oppose him; and so, setting forth
+from Rome with as strong a force as he could get together, he marched
+on Bologna, sending word to the Venetians that they must stand aloof,
+and to the King of France to send him troops. The result was that in
+the brief time allowed them, neither of the two powers could make up
+their mind to thwart him; and knowing that refusal or delay would be
+violently resented by the Pope, they yielded to his demands, the king
+sending him soldiers and the Venetians maintaining neutrality.
+
+M. de Foix, again, being with the king’s army in Bologna when word came
+that Brescia had risen, could not rest till he had recovered that town.
+But, to get there he had to choose between two routes, one long and
+circuitous leading through the territories of the king, the other short
+and direct. In taking the latter route, however, not only would he have
+to pass through the dominions of the Marquis of Mantua, but also to
+make his way into these through the lakes and marshes wherewith that
+country abounds, by following an embanked road, closed and guarded by
+the marquis with forts and other defensive works. Resolving,
+nevertheless, to take the shortest road at all hazards, he waited till
+his men were already on their march before signifying to the marquis
+that he desired leave to pass through his country, so that no time
+might be left him to deliberate. Taken aback by the unexpected demand,
+the marquis gave the leave sought, which he never would have given had
+De Foix acted with less impetuosity. For he was in league with the
+Venetians and with the Pope, and had a son in the hands of the latter;
+all which circumstances would have afforded him fair pretexts for
+refusal. But carried away by the suddenness and urgency of the demand,
+he yielded. And in like manner the Etruscans yielded to the instances
+of the Samnites, the presence of whose army decided them to renew
+hostilities which before they had declined to renew.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XLV.—_Whether in battle it is better to await and repel the
+Enemy’s attack, or to anticipate it by an impetuous onset._
+
+
+Decius and Fabius, the Roman consuls, were each of them in command of a
+separate army, one directed against the Samnites, the other against the
+Etruscans: and as both delivered battle, we have to pronounce, in
+respect of the two engagements, which commander followed the better
+method. Decius attacked his enemy at once with the utmost fury and with
+his whole strength. Fabius was content, at first, merely to maintain
+his ground; for judging that more was to be gained by a later attack,
+he reserved his forces for a final effort, when the ardour of the enemy
+had cooled and his energy spent itself. The event showed Fabius to be
+more successful in his tactics than Decius, who being exhausted by his
+first onset, and seeing his ranks begin to waver, to secure by death
+the glory he could no longer hope from victory, followed the example
+set him by his father, and sacrificed himself to save the Roman
+legions. Word whereof being brought to Fabius, he, to gain, while he
+yet lived, as much honour as the other had earned by his death, pushed
+forward all the troops he had reserved for his final effort, and so
+obtained an unexampled victory. Whence we see that of the two methods,
+that of Fabius was the safer and the more deserving our imitation.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XLVI.—_How the Characteristics of Families come to be
+perpetuated._
+
+
+Manners and institutions differing in different cities, seem here to
+produce a harder and there a softer race; and a like difference may
+also be discerned in the character of different families in the same
+city. And while this holds good of all cities, we have many instances
+of it in reading the history of Rome. For we find the Manlii always
+stern and stubborn; the Valerii kindly and courteous; the Claudii
+haughty and ambitious; and many families besides similarly
+distinguished from one another by their peculiar qualities.
+
+These qualities we cannot refer wholly to the _blood_, for that must
+change as a result of repeated intermarriages, but must ascribe rather
+to the different training and education given in different families.
+For much turns on whether a child of tender years hears a thing well or
+ill spoken of, since this must needs make an impression on him whereby
+his whole conduct in after life will be influenced. Were it otherwise
+we should not have found the whole family of the Claudii moved by the
+desires and stirred by the passions which Titus Livius notes in many of
+them, and more especially in one holding the office of censor, who,
+when his colleague laid down his magistracy, as the law prescribed, at
+the end of eighteen months, would not resign, maintaining that he was
+entitled to hold the office for five years in accordance with the
+original law by which the censorship was regulated. And although his
+refusal gave occasion to much controversy, and bred great tumult and
+disturbance, no means could be found to depose him from his office,
+which he persisted in retaining in opposition to the will of the entire
+commons and a majority of the senate. And any who shall read the speech
+made against him by Publius Sempronius, tribune of the people, will
+find therein all the Claudian insolence exposed, and will recognize the
+docility and good temper shown by the body of the citizens in
+respecting the laws and institutions of their country.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XLVII.—_That love of his Country should lead a good Citizen to
+forget private Wrongs._
+
+
+While commanding as consul against the Samnites, Manlius was wounded in
+a skirmish. His army being thereby endangered, the senate judged it
+expedient to send Papirius Cursor as dictator to supply his place. But
+as it was necessary that the dictator should be nominated by Fabius,
+the other consul, who was with the army in Etruria, and as a doubt was
+felt that he might refuse to nominate Papirius, who was his enemy, the
+senate sent two messengers to entreat him to lay aside private
+animosity, and make the nomination which the public interest required.
+Moved by love of his country Fabius did as he was asked, although by
+his silence, and by many other signs, he gave it to be known that
+compliance was distasteful. From his conduct at this juncture all who
+would be thought good citizens should take example.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XLVIII.—_That on finding an Enemy make what seems a grave
+blunder, we should suspect some fraud to lurk behind._
+
+
+The consul having gone to Rome to perform certain ceremonial rites, and
+Fulvius being left in charge of the Roman army in Etruria, the
+Etruscans, to see whether they could not circumvent the new commander,
+planting an ambush not far from the Roman camp, sent forward soldiers
+disguised as shepherds driving large flocks of sheep so as to pass in
+sight of the Roman army. These pretended shepherds coming close to the
+wall of his camp, Fulvius, marvelling at what appeared to him
+unaccountable audacity, hit upon a device whereby the artifice of the
+Etruscans was detected and their design defeated.
+
+Here it seems proper to note that the captain of an army ought not to
+build on what seems a manifest blunder on the part of an enemy; for as
+men are unlikely to act with conspicuous want of caution, it will
+commonly be found that this blunder is cover to a fraud. And yet, so
+blinded are men’s minds by their eagerness for victory, that they look
+only to what appears on the surface.
+
+After defeating the Romans on the Allia, the Gauls, hastening on to
+Rome, found the gates of the city left open and unguarded. But fearing
+some stratagem, and being unable to believe that the Romans could be so
+foolish and cowardly as to abandon their city, they waited during the
+whole of that day and the following night outside the gates, without
+daring to enter. In the year 1508, when the Florentines Avere engaged
+in besieging Pisa, Alfonso del Mutolo, a citizen of that town,
+happening to be taken prisoner, was released on his promise to procure
+the surrender to the Florentines of one of the gates of the city.
+Afterwards, on pretence of arranging for the execution of this
+surrender, he came repeatedly to confer with those whom the Florentine
+commissaries had deputed to treat with him, coming not secretly but
+openly, and accompanied by other citizens of Pisa, whom he caused to
+stand aside while he conversed with the Florentines. From all which
+circumstances his duplicity might have been suspected, since, had he
+meant to do as he had engaged, it was most unlikely that he should be
+negotiating so openly. But the desire to recover possession of Pisa so
+blinded the Florentines that they allowed themselves to be conducted
+under his guidance to the Lucca Gate, where, through his treachery, but
+to their own disgrace, they lost a large number of their men and
+officers.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XLIX.—_That a Commonwealth to preserve its Freedom has constant
+need of new Ordinances. Of the services in respect of which Quintius
+Fabius received the surname of Maximus._
+
+
+It must happen, as I have already said, in every great city, that
+disorders needing the care of the physician continually spring up; and
+the graver these disorders are, the greater will be the skill needed
+for their treatment. And if ever in any city, most assuredly in Rome,
+we see these disorders assume strange and unexpected shapes. As when it
+appeared that all the Roman wives had conspired to murder their
+husbands, many of them being found to have actually administered
+poison, and many others to have drugs in readiness for the purpose.
+
+Of like nature was the conspiracy of the Bacchanals, discovered at the
+time of the Macedonian war, wherein many thousands, both men and women,
+were implicated, and which, had it not been found out, or had the
+Romans not been accustomed to deal with large bodies of offenders, must
+have proved perilous for their city. And, indeed, if the greatness of
+the Roman Republic were not declared by countless other signs, as well
+as by the manner in which it caused its laws to be observed, it might
+be seen in the character of the punishments which it inflicted against
+wrong-doers. For in vindicating justice, it would not scruple or
+hesitate to put a whole legion to death, to depopulate an entire city,
+or send eight or ten thousand men at a time into banishment, subject to
+the most stringent conditions, which had to be observed, not by one of
+these exiles only, but by all. As in the case of those soldiers who
+fought unsuccessfully at Cannæ, who were banished to Sicily, subject to
+the condition that they should not harbour in towns, and should all eat
+standing.
+
+But the most formidable of all their punishments was that whereby one
+man out of every ten in an entire army was chosen by lot to be put to
+death. For correcting a great body of men no more effectual means could
+be devised; because, when a multitude have offended and the ringleaders
+are not known, all cannot be punished, their number being too great;
+while to punish some only, and leave the rest unpunished, were unjust
+to those punished and an encouragement to those passed over to offend
+again. But where you put to death a tenth chosen by lot, where all
+equally deserve death, he who is punished will blame his unlucky
+fortune, while he who escapes will be afraid that another time the lot
+may be his, and for that reason will be careful how he repeats his
+offence. The poisoners and the Bacchanals, therefore, were punished as
+their crimes deserved.
+
+Although disorders like these occasion mischievous results in a
+commonwealth, still they are not fatal, since almost always there is
+time to correct them. But no time is given in the case of disorders in
+the State itself, which unless they be treated by some wise citizen,
+will always bring a city to destruction. From the readiness wherewith
+the Romans conferred the right of citizenship on foreigners, there came
+to be so many new citizens in Rome, and possessed of so large a share
+of the suffrage, that the government itself began to alter, forsaking
+those courses which it was accustomed to follow, and growing estranged
+from the men to whom it had before looked for guidance. Which being
+observed by Quintius Fabius when censor, he caused all those new
+citizens to be classed in four _Tribes_, that being reduced within this
+narrow limit they might not have it in their power to corrupt the
+entire State. And this was a wisely contrived measure, for, without
+introducing any violent change, it supplied a convenient remedy, and
+one so acceptable to the republic as to gain for Fabius the
+well-deserved name of Maximus.
+
+THE END.
+
+*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 10827 ***