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diff --git a/old/10809.txt b/old/10809.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a1ce2bf --- /dev/null +++ b/old/10809.txt @@ -0,0 +1,9490 @@ +The Project Gutenberg eBook, Why We Are At War (2nd Edition, revised), by +Members of the Oxford Faculty of Modern History + + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + + + + +Title: Why We Are At War (2nd Edition, revised) + +Author: Members of the Oxford Faculty of Modern History + +Release Date: January 23, 2004 [eBook #10809] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: US-ASCII + + +***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK WHY WE ARE AT WAR (2ND EDITION, +REVISED)*** + + +E-text prepared by Jonathan Ingram, David King, and the Project Gutenberg +Online Distributed Proofreading Team + + + +WHY WE ARE AT WAR + +GREAT BRITAIN'S CASE + +With an Appendix of Original Documents including the Authorized English +Translation of the White Book issued by the German Government + +Second Edition Revised (fourth impression) +containing the Russian Orange Book + +BY + +MEMBERS OF THE OXFORD FACULTY OF MODERN HISTORY + +1914 + + + + + + +PREFACE + + +We are not politicians, and we belong to different schools of political +thought. We have written this book to set forth the causes of the +present war, and the principles which we believe to be at stake. We have +some experience in the handling of historic evidence, and we have +endeavoured to treat this subject historically. Our fifth chapter, which +to many readers will be the most interesting, is founded upon first-hand +evidence--the documents contained in the British White Book +(Parliamentary Paper, Cd. 7467; hereafter cited as _Correspondence +respecting the European Crisis_), and the German White Book, which is an +official apology, supplemented by documents. The German White Book, as +being difficult of access, we have printed _in extenso_. It exists in +two versions, a German and an English, both published for the German +Government. We have reproduced the English version without correcting +the solecisms of spelling and expression. From the English White Book we +have reprinted, in the second appendix, a small selection of the more +significant documents; many more are quoted in the body of our work. + +Our thanks are due to Sir H. Erle Richards, Chichele Professor of +International Law and Diplomacy; and to Mr. W.G.S. Adams, Gladstone +Professor of Political Theory and Institutions, for valuable suggestions +and assistance. + +The sole responsibility for the book rests, however, with those who sign +this Preface. + +Any profits arising from the sale of this work will be sent to the +Belgian Relief Fund, as a mark of sympathy and respect for the Belgian +nation, and especially for the University of Louvain. + +E. BARKER +H. W. C. DAVIS +C. R. L. FLETCHER +ARTHUR HASSALL +L. G. WICKHAM LEGG +F. MORGAN + + + + +Preface to Second Edition + + +By the courtesy of His Excellency the Russian Ambassador we are now able +to print in an appendix (No. VI) those documents contained in the +Russian Orange Book which have not been already published in the German +and the British White Books. In the light of the evidence afforded by +the Russian Orange Book, we have modified one or two sentences in this +edition. + +21 September, 1914. + + + + +CONTENTS + + +TABLE OF DATES + +CHAPTER I + +THE NEUTRALITY OF BELGIUM AND LUXEMBURG + +Belgian neutrality--The origin of Belgium--England and the smaller +Powers--The Treaty of 1839--Belgium's independence and neutrality.--The +neutrality of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg--Its origin--The Treaty of +1867--The collective guarantee.--The strategic importance of +Belgium--German plans long suspected. + + +CHAPTER II + +THE GROWTH OF ALLIANCES AND THE RACE OF ARMAMENTS SINCE 1871 + +Introduction--The Triple Alliance--Bismarck's dismissal--French colonial +advance---Germany's demands for compensations--The Anglo-French +agreement concerning Morocco--German objections--England and Russia--The +Agadir incident--Anglo-French exchange of notes--Disputes in the +Balkans--The 'Boulanger Law' of 1886--Count Caprivi's law of +1893--Franco-Russian _entente_--German military preparations--France's +response--Russia's reorganization--England's Army and Navy. + +Note. _Abstract of Anglo-French Agreement on Morocco_. + + +CHAPTER III + +THE DEVELOPMENT OF RUSSIAN POLICY + +Estrangement of Russia and Germany--Austria and the Balkans--German +penetration through the Balkans--Servia and Russia--Germany and the +Slavs--Russia and England. + + +CHAPTER IV + +CHRONOLOGICAL SKETCH OF THE CRISIS OF 1914 + +Diary of the Events leading to the War. + + +CHAPTER V + +NEGOTIATORS AND NEGOTIATIONS + +Dramatis personae. Sec. _Germany's attitude to Russia and +Austria_--Presentation of the Austrian Note to Servia--Germany shields +Austria--Conduct of Germany considered--Sir Edward Grey proposes +mediation, and then a Conference of Four Powers--Germany's objections to +a 'Conference'--Direct conversations between the Powers--Austria invited +to suspend military action--Mobilization; on whom does responsibility +lie?--War inevitable. Sec 2. _Germany's attitude to France_--Germany +accuses France of military preparations--Germany invades France. Sec 3. +_The question of British neutrality_--Possibility of England being +involved--Germany warned--German 'bid for British neutrality'--England's +refusal--France agrees, and Germany refuses, to respect Belgian +neutrality--Prince Lichnowsky and Sir Edward Grey--Neutrality of +Luxemburg violated--Germany demands a free passage through Belgium--Sir +Edward Grey protests--Belgium invaded--England's ultimatum--The Imperial +Chancellor urges necessity of Germany's action. Sec 4. _England and +Servia_--Sir Edward Grey realizes Russia's interest in Servia--He is +only concerned for the peace of Europe--He urges mediation--He proposes +a Conference. Sec 5. _Great Britain declines 'solidarity' with Russia and +France_--Proposals by MM. Sazonof and Poincare--England's refusal--Was +it wise?--The Austrian _dossier_. Sec 6. _Italy's comments on the +situation_--Significance of Italy's position--Italy's endeavours to +prevent war--Italy's declaration of neutrality. + +Note. Abstract of Austro-Hungarian note to Servia, and Servians reply. + + +CHAPTER VI + +THE NEW GERMAN THEORY OF THE STATE + +The principles of _raison d'etat_ and the rule of law--Treitschke's +teaching--The results of this philosophy--Contempt for public law--The +glorification of war--The philosophy pagan--Its adoption by Prussian +soldiers and Government--A plea for Prussia--England fights for law. + + +EPILOGUE + + + +APPENDIXES + +I. THE GERMAN WHITE BOOK + +II. EXTRACTS FROM SIR EDWARD GREY'S CORRESPONDENCE RESPECTING THE +EUROPEAN CRISIS + +III. EXTRACT FROM THE DISPATCH FROM HIS MAJESTY'S AMBASSADOR AT BERLIN +RESPECTING THE RUPTURE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE GERMAN +GOVERNMENT + +IV. THE CRIME OF SERAJEVO + +V. EXTRACT FROM THE DISPATCH FROM HIS MAJESTY'S AMBASSADOR AT VIENNA +RESPECTING THE RUPTURE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN +GOVERNMENT + +VI. EXTRACTS FROM THE RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK + + + + +CHIEF DATES + + +1648 Jan. The Treaty of Munster. + Oct. The Treaty of Westphalia. +1713 April. The Treaty of Utrecht. +1772 First Partition of Poland. +1783 William of Nassau becomes Grand Duke of Luxemburg. +1788 July. The Triple Alliance of England, Holland, and Prussia. +1789 The French Revolution begins. +1792 Nov. 6. Battle of Jemappes. French Conquest of the Austrian + Netherlands and Liege. + Nov. 19. French decree offering 'freedom to all nations'. + Dec. 15. Compulsory freedom declared. +1793 Jan. Second Partition of Poland. + Feb. 1. Declaration of War by France against England and Holland. +1795 Third Partition of Poland. +1801 Feb. 9. The Treaty of Luneville. France guarantees the + independence of Holland (then called 'Batavian Republic'). +1802 Mar. 27. The Treaty of Amiens. +1803 Mar. 13. Napoleon's famous interview with Lord Whitworth. + May 12. Declaration of War by England against France. +1814 Mar. 1. The Treaty of Chaumont. + May 30. The First Peace of Paris. + Sept. 29. Opening of the Congress of Vienna. +1815 Mar-June. The Hundred Days. + May 31. Belgium and Luxemburg placed under the Prince of Orange as + King of the United Netherlands. + Nov. 20. The Second Peace of Paris. +1830 Revolutions in France (July) and in Belgium (Aug.). +1830-1878 Servia autonomous. +1831 Nov. 15. Independence and Neutrality of Belgium guaranteed by + England, Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia. +1839 April 19. Final recognition of the Independence and Neutrality of + Belgium by the above-named Powers. +1867 May 11. European guarantee of the Neutrality of Luxemburg. + Declaration by Lord Stanley and Lord Clarendon. +1870 Aug. 9. Independence and Neutrality of Belgium again guaranteed + by Germany and France. +1871 May 10. The Treaty of Frankfort. +1872 The _Dreikaiserbund_; Alliance of Russia, Germany, and + Austria. +1875 Threatened attack on France by Germany prevented by + Russia and England. +1878 The Treaty of Berlin. + Proclamation of Servian Independence under King Milan. +1879 Secret Treaty between Germany and Austria. +1883 Triple Alliance between Germany, Austria, and Italy. +1885 Formation of United Bulgaria. + War between Bulgaria and Servia. +1886 Peace between Bulgaria and Servia. +1890 Fall of Bismarck. Cession of Heligoland to Germany. +1891 Beginning of an understanding between Russia and France. +1893 Caprivi's Army Act. +1896 Germany begins to show aggressive tendencies in the field + of Colonial Expansion. + Treaty between England and France regarding their interests + in Indo-China. + Definite Alliance between Russia and France. +1898 Reconquest of the Sudan. + Tsar's rescript for an International Peace Conference. +1899 Anglo-French Agreement respecting Tripoli. + June. First Peace Conference at the Hague. + New German Army Act. +1902 Anglo-Japanese Alliance. + The Peace of Vereeniging closes the South African War. +1903 Revolution in Belgrade. +1904 April. The Treaty of London between England and France + with regard to North Africa. +1905 Mar. Visit of the German Emperor to Tangier. + June. Germany demands the dismissal of M. Delcasse. + Aug. The Treaty of Portsmouth between Russia and Japan. + Renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. + German Army Act. + Sept. France agrees to the holding of the Algeeiras + Conference. +1907 Agreement between Russia and England concerning Persia, + Afghanistan, and Tibet. + June-Oct. Second Peace Conference at the Hague. +1908 Young Turk Revolution in Constantinople. + Oct. Annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria. + German Navy Law. +1909 Mar. Servia declares she will no longer protest against the + annexation of Bosnia by Austria. +1909 Mr. Asquith's speech on necessity for increasing the Navy. +1910 The Potsdam interview between the Tsar and the Kaiser. +1911 European Crisis over the question of Morocco, followed by a + closer Anglo-French _entente_. + German Army Act. +1912 Sensational German Army Bill. + War in the Balkans. + Nov. 26. German Navy construction estimates L11,416,700. + Dec. 29. Peace Conference of Balkan States with Turkey broken off. +1913 Jan. 17. M. Poincare elected French President. + Jan. 23. The Young Turkish Party overthrow the Government at + Constantinople. + May 26. Peace made between Turkey and the Balkan States. + May 28. The New German Army Bill passes the Budget Committee of + the Reichstag. + June 20. Universal military service in Belgium. + June 26. Conference between the French President, the French + Foreign Minister, and Sir Edward Grey. + June 30. Bulgaria is attacked by Servia and Greece. + New German Army Bill. + July. Roumania attacks Bulgaria. + The Turks re-occupy Adrianople. + New Russian Army Bill. + French Army Bill. + Aug. 6. The Treaty of Peace between Bulgaria, Servia, Greece, and + Roumania. + Sept. 22. The Treaty of Peace between Bulgaria and Turkey. + Oct. 20. Servia at Austria's demand abandons Albania. + Austrian War Fund increased. +1914 Attacks by the German Press upon France and Russia. + + + + +CHAPTER 1 + + +THE NEUTRALITY OF BELGIUM AND LUXEMBURG + +I + +The kingdom of Belgium is a comparatively new creation, but the idea of +a Belgian nation is older than the kingdom. Historically and +geographically the kingdom has no doubt an artificial character; its +boundaries have been determined by the Great Powers and cut across the +ancient provinces of the Netherlands. And it must be added that its +population is heterogeneous both in race and language. These facts, +however, in no sense diminish the legal rights of Belgium as a nation. +She is a sovereign state by the same charter as Italy or Greece; and for +the convenience of Europe she has been solemnly declared a neutral +state, endowed with special privileges but burdened with corresponding +obligations. While those privileges were maintained--and they have been +rigidly maintained for more than eighty years--the Belgian people +punctually fulfilled their obligations; and, because they have declined +to betray Europe by becoming the dependant of a powerful neighbour, or +by participating in the violation of European public law, their country +is a wilderness of smoking ruins. + +In the tremendous and all but crushing ordeal of August, 1914, Belgium +has proved that she possesses other titles to existence and respect than +those afforded by treaties, by the mutual jealousies of neighbours, or +by the doctrines of international law. She has more than satisfied the +tests which distinguish the true from the fictitious nationality. Those +who have hitherto known Belgium only as a hive of manufacturing and +mining industry, or as a land of historic memories and monuments, are +now recognizing, with some shame for their past blindness, the moral and +spiritual qualities which her people have developed under the aegis of a +European guarantee. It is now beyond dispute that, if Belgium were +obliterated from the map of Europe, the world would be the poorer and +Europe put to shame. The proofs which Belgium has given of her +nationality will never be forgotten while liberty has any value or +patriotism any meaning among men. We cannot do less than echo the +general sentiment of admiration for a constancy to national ideals which +has left Belgium at the mercy of Huns less forgivable than those of +Attila. But the case against her oppressor is not to be founded solely +or mainly on her peculiar merits. In a special sense it rests upon the +legal rights and duties with which she has been invested for the +convenience of her neighbours and for the welfare of the European state +system. It was in their interest, rather than her own, that the Great +Powers made her a sovereign independent state. As such she is entitled, +equally with England or with Germany, to immunity from unprovoked +attack. But the Powers which made her a sovereign state, also, and for +the same reasons of convenience, made her a neutral state. She was +therefore debarred from consulting her own safety by making alliances +upon what terms she would. She could not lawfully join either of the two +armed camps into which Europe has fallen since the year 1907. And, if +she had been as contemptible as she is actually the reverse, she would +still be entitled to expect from England and from every other of her +guarantors the utmost assistance it is in their power to give. In +fighting for Belgium we fight for the law of nations; that is, +ultimately, for the peace of all nations and for the right of the weaker +to exist. + + * * * * * + +The provinces which now constitute the kingdom of Belgium--with the +exception of the bishopric of Liege, which was until 1795 an +ecclesiastical principality--were known in the seventeenth century as +the Spanish, in the eighteenth as the Austrian, Netherlands. They +received the first of these names when they returned to the allegiance +of Philip II, after a short participation in the revolt to which Holland +owes her national existence. When the independence of Holland was +finally recognized by Spain (1648), the Spanish Netherlands were +subjected to the first of the artificial restrictions which Europe has +seen fit to impose upon them. The Dutch monopoly of navigation in the +Scheldt was admitted by the Treaty of Muenster (1648), and Antwerp was +thus precluded from developing into a rival of Amsterdam. In the age of +Louis XIV the Spanish Netherlands were constantly attacked by France, +who acquired at one time or another the chief towns of Artois and +Hainault, including some which have lately come into prominence in the +great war, such as Lille, Valenciennes, Cambray, and Maubeuge. The bulk, +however, of the Spanish Netherlands passed at the Treaty of Utrecht to +Austria, then the chief rival of France on the Continent. They passed +with the reservation that certain fortresses on their southern border +were to be garrisoned jointly by the Dutch and the Austrians as a +barrier against French aggression. This arrangement was overthrown at +the French Revolution. The French annexed the Austrian Netherlands and +Liege in November, 1792; and immediately afterwards threw down a +gauntlet to England by opening to all nations the navigation of the +Scheldt. This, and the threatened French attack on Holland, her ally, +drew England into conflict with the Revolution; for, first, Antwerp in +French hands and as an open port would be a dangerous menace; and +secondly, the French had announced a new and anarchic doctrine hostile +to all standing treaties: 'Our reasons are that the river takes its rise +in France and that a nation which has obtained its liberty cannot +recognize a system of feudalism, much less adhere to it'.[1] The answer +of William Pitt, which in effect declared war upon the Revolution, +contains a memorable statement of the attitude towards public law which +England held then, as she holds it to-day: 'With regard to the Scheldt +France can have no right to annul existing stipulations, unless she also +have the right to set aside equally the other treaties between all +Powers of Europe and all the other rights of England and her allies.... +England will never consent that France shall arrogate the power of +annulling at her pleasure and under the pretence of a pretended natural +right, of which she makes herself the only judge, the political system +of Europe, established by solemn treaties and guaranteed by the consent +of all the Powers'.[2] + +This was not our attitude in the case of Belgium only. It was an +attitude which we adopted with regard to all the minor Powers of Western +Europe when they were threatened by Napoleon. On precisely the same +grounds England defended in 1803 the independence of Holland, a +commercial rival if an old political ally, and of Switzerland, where she +had no immediate interests to protect. By the Treaty of Luneville +(February, 1801) France and Austria had mutually guaranteed the +independence of the Batavian Republic and the right of the Dutch to +adopt whatever form of government seemed good to them. In defiance of +these stipulations Napoleon maintained a garrison in Holland, and forced +upon her a new Constitution which had been prepared in Paris (November, +1801). Identical stipulations had been made for the Helvetian Republic +and had been similarly violated. Early in 1803 England demanded that the +French should evacuate Holland and Switzerland: to which Napoleon +replied that 'Switzerland and Holland are mere trifles'. His interview +with the English Ambassador on March 13, 1803, has many points of +resemblance with the now famous interview of August 4, 1914, between Sir +Edward Goschen and Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg. The First Consul then, like +the Imperial Chancellor to-day, was unable, or professed himself unable, +to understand why Great Britain should insist upon the observance of +treaties. + +To return to Belgium. It became apparent in the Napoleonic Wars that +Belgium and Holland were individually too weak to protect themselves or +the German people against an aggressive French Government. The allies +therefore, in the year 1813, handed over to Holland the Austrian +Netherlands and the bishopric of Liege in order 'to put Holland in a +position to resist attack until the Powers could come to its aid'. This +arrangement was ratified at the Treaty of Chaumont (1814). As there was +no government or visible unity in the Belgian provinces after the +retirement of the French, the union with Holland, originally suggested +by Lord Castlereagh, seemed reasonable enough. It gave the Belgians the +great privilege of freely navigating the Scheldt. It was confirmed at +the Congress of Vienna, and the new kingdom of the United Netherlands +was declared neutral by the common consent of the Powers. + +But the events of the years 1815-1830 proved conclusively that this +union was unsatisfactory to the Belgian population. The Belgians +complained that they were not allowed their just share of influence and +representation in the legislature or executive. They resented the +attempt to impose the Dutch language and Dutch Liberalism upon them. +They rose in revolt, expelled the Dutch officials and garrisons, and +drew up for themselves a monarchical and parliamentary constitution. +Their aspirations aroused much sympathy both in England and in France. +These two countries induced the other Great Powers (Austria, Prussia, +Russia) to recognize the new kingdom as an independent neutral state. +This recognition was embodied in the Treaty of the Twenty-Four Articles +signed at London in October, 1831; and it was not too generous to the +aspirations of Belgian nationality. Since the Belgians had been defeated +in the field by Holland and had only been rescued by a French army, they +were obliged to surrender their claims upon Maestricht, parts of +Luxemburg, and parts of Limburg. Some time elapsed before this +settlement was recognized by Holland. But at length this last guarantee +was obtained; and the Treaty of London, 1839, finally established the +international status of Belgium. Under this treaty both her independence +and her neutrality were definitely guaranteed by England, France, +Austria, Prussia, and Russia. + +We have recently been told by the Imperial Chancellor that the Treaty of +1839 is nothing but 'a scrap of paper'. It is therefore desirable to +point out that Bismarck made full use of it in 1870 to prevent England +from supporting the cause of France. It was with this object that he +published the proposal alleged to have been made to him by the French +representative, Benedetti, in 1866, that Prussia should help France to +acquire Belgium as a solace for Prussian annexations in Northern +Germany. Then, as now, England insisted upon the Treaty of 1839. The +result was that, on the instance of Lord Granville, Germany and France +entered into an identic treaty with Great Britain (Aug. 1870) to the +effect that, if either belligerent violated Belgian territory, Great +Britain would co-operate with the other for the defence of it. The +treaty was most strictly construed. After the battle of Sedan (Sept. +1870) the German Government applied to Belgium for leave to transport +the German wounded across Belgian territory. France protested that this +would be a breach of neutrality and Belgium refused. + +Such is the history of the process by which Belgium has acquired her +special status. As an independent state she is bound by the elementary +principle of the law of nations, that a neutral state is bound to refuse +to grant a right of passage to a belligerent. This is a well-established +rule, and was formally affirmed by the Great Powers at the Hague Peace +Conference of 1907. The fifth Article of the Convention [3] then drawn +up respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in War +on Land runs as follows:-- + + 'A neutral power ought not to allow on its territory any of + the acts referred to in Articles 2 to 4'. + +Of the Articles thus specified the most important is No. 2:-- + + 'Belligerents are forbidden to move across the territory of + a neutral power troops or convoys, either of munitions of war + or supplies'. + +By the Treaty of London the existence of Belgium is contingent upon her +perpetual neutrality:-- + + 'ARTICLE VII. Belgium within the limits specified in + Articles I, II, and IV shall form an independent and perpetually + neutral state. It shall be bound to observe such + neutrality towards all other states'.[4] + +It is unnecessary to elaborate further the point of law. That, it seems, +has been admitted by the Imperial Chancellor before the German +Reichstag. What is necessary to remember is that, in regard to Belgium, +Germany has assumed the position which the Government of the French +Revolution adopted towards the question of the Scheldt, and which +Napoleon adopted towards the guaranteed neutrality of Switzerland and +Holland. Now, as then, England has special interests at stake. The +consequences of the oppression or the extinction of the smaller +nationalities are bound to excite peculiar alarm in England. In +particular she cannot forget how she would be menaced by the +establishment of a militarist state in Belgium. But since in England's +case the dangers and uncertainties of a state of things in which Might +is treated as Right are particularly apparent, it is only to be expected +that she should insist with special emphasis upon the sanctity of +treaties, a sanctity which in the long run is as necessary to the +strongest nation as to the weakest. If treaties count for nothing, no +nation is secure so long as any imaginable combination of Powers can +meet it in battle or diplomacy on equal terms; and the stronger nations +must perforce fight one another to the death for the privilege of +enslaving civilization. Whether the progress of such a competition would +be a trifling evil, whether the success of any one among such +competitors would conduce to the higher interests of humanity, impartial +onlookers may debate if they please. England has answered both these +questions with an unhesitating negative. + + +II + +Under existing treaty law the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg stands for all +practical purposes in the same legal position as its northern neighbour; +and the ruler of Luxemburg has protested against the German invasion[5] +of her territory no less emphatically than King Albert, though with less +power of giving expression in action to her just resentment. If the +defence of Belgium has appealed more forcibly to the ordinary +Englishman, it is because he is more familiar with the past history of +Belgium and sees more clearly in her case the ultimate issues that are +involved in the German violation of her rights. As the following +narrative will show, the neutrality of Luxemburg was guaranteed in the +interests and at the instance of the Prussian state, as a protection +against French aggression. The legal case could not be clearer, and it +might perhaps be asked why the attack on Luxemburg, which preceded that +on Belgium, was not treated by this country as a _casus belli_. +England's attitude towards Luxemburg is that which she has consistently +adopted towards those smaller states of Europe which lie outside the +reach of naval power. It is an attitude which she has maintained in the +case of Servia even more clearly than in that of Luxemburg. England +holds herself bound to exert her influence in procuring for the smaller +states of Europe equitable treatment from their more powerful +neighbours. But the duty of insisting upon equitable treatment falls +first upon those Powers whose situation enables them to support a +protest by effective action. Just as Servia is the special concern of +Russia, so Luxemburg must look to France in the first instance for +protection against Germany, to Germany if she is assailed from the +French side. In either case we should hold ourselves bound to exercise +our influence, but not as principals. Any other course would be +impossibly quixotic, and would only have the effect of destroying our +power to help the states within our reach. + + * * * * * + +The Grand Duchy of Luxemburg was a revival of an ancient state which had +lost its existence during the French Revolution. Although it was placed +under the rule of the King of the Netherlands, a descendant of its +former sovereign, it was not incorporated in his kingdom, but retained +its own identity and gave to its ruler the secondary title of Grand Duke +of Luxemburg. The position it occupied after 1815 was in some ways +anomalous; for lying as it did between the Meuse and the Rhine, and +possessing in the town of Luxemburg a fortress whose natural strength +some competent critics reckoned as second only to that of Gibraltar +among the fortresses of Europe, it was considered to be an indispensable +link in the chain of defences of Germany against French aggression. Not +being able to trust the Dutch to hold this great fortress against the +French, the Congress of Vienna laid down as a principle that all land +between the Meuse and the Rhine must be held by Prussian troops on +behalf of the newly formed Germanic Confederation. Thus Luxemburg was +held by Prussian troops on behalf of this foreign confederation, and +over this garrison the only right allowed to the Grand Duke, the +sovereign of the country, was that of nominating the governor. + +This strange state of affairs was not modified by the Belgian Revolution +of 1830; for though more than half the Grand Duchy threw in its lot with +Belgium to form the modern province of Belgian Luxemburg, the Grand +Duchy, confined to its modern limits, still contained the great fortress +with its garrison of Prussian troops. It is not surprising that, under +these circumstances, the Grand Duchy joined the Prussian _Zollverein_, +and so drew nearer to Germany, in spite of the independent character of +its inhabitants, who have strenuously resisted any attempt at absorption +into Germany. France naturally continued to cast envious eyes upon the +small state with the powerful citadel, but no opportunity presented +itself for reopening the question until 1866. + +In that year Napoleon III had anticipated that the war between Prussia +and Italy on one side and Austria and the small German states on the +other would be long and exhausting, and would end in France imposing +peace on the weary combatants with considerable territorial advantage to +herself. His anticipation was entirely falsified; the war lasted only +seven weeks and Prussia emerged victorious and immensely strengthened by +the absorption of several German states and by the formation of the +North German Confederation under her leadership. This, the first +shattering blow which the French Emperor's diplomatic schemes had +received, led him to demand compensation for the growth of Prussian +power, and one of his proposals was the cession of Luxemburg to France. + +This suggestion had some legal plausibility quite apart from the +question of the balance of power. For the Prussian garrison held +Luxemburg in the name of the German Confederation, which had been +destroyed by the war of 1866; and, the authority to which the garrison +owed its existence being gone, it was only logical that the garrison +should go too. After much demur Count Bismarck acknowledged the justice +of the argument (April, 1867), but it did not by any means follow that +the French should therefore take the place vacated by the Prussians. At +the same time the fortress could not be left in the hands of a weak +Power as a temptation for powerful and unscrupulous neighbours. The +question of Luxemburg was therefore the subject discussed at a Congress +held in London in the following May. + +Here the Prussians showed themselves extremely politic and reasonable. +Realizing that, with the advance of artillery, the great rock-fortress +no longer had the military value of earlier days, they not only raised +no objections to the evacuation of Luxemburg by their troops, but in the +Congress it was they who proposed that the territory of the Grand Duchy +should be neutralized 'under the collective guarantee of the Powers'.[6] +A treaty was therefore drawn up on May 11, 1867, of which the second +article ran as follows:-- + + 'The Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, within the Limits determined by the + Act annexed to the Treaties of the 19th April, 1839, under the + Guarantee of the Courts of Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia, + and Russia, shall henceforth form a perpetually Neutral State. + + 'It shall be bound to observe the same Neutrality towards all other + States. + + 'The High Contracting Parties engage to respect the principle of + Neutrality stipulated by the present Article. + + 'That principle is and remains placed under the sanction of the + collective Guarantee of the Powers signing as Parties to the present + Treaty, with the exception of Belgium, which is itself a Neutral + State'.[7] + +The third article provided for the demolition of the fortifications of +Luxemburg and its conversion into an open town, the fourth for its +evacuation by the Prussian garrison, and the fifth forbade the +restoration of the fortifications. + +Such then was the treaty guaranteeing the neutrality of Luxemburg, which +was proposed, it may be observed, by Prussia herself; but, until the +treaty was broken by the very Power which had proposed the neutrality, +only one incident need be noted in the history of the country, namely, +the part it played in the war of 1870-1. On December 3, 1870, Count +Bismarck issued from Versailles a circular to the Prussian Ambassadors, +calling attention to the fact that both the French and the Luxemburgers +had violated the neutrality of the Grand Duchy, mainly by giving +facilities for French soldiers to return to France. Precautions were +taken by the Prussian Government on the frontier to prevent such abuses +occurring in the future, and as no violation of the neutrality of +Luxemburg was committed by the Prussians, the neutral co-guarantors were +satisfied with the Prussian attitude, and the subject dropped. At the +end of the war, M. Thiers vainly attempted to obtain Luxemburg as +compensation for the loss of Metz. + +In accordance with the Family Compact of 1783, the Grand Duchy passed on +the death of the late King of Holland to Prince William of Nassau, on +whose death the present Grand Duchess succeeded to her father's throne. + +There is one point in the Treaty of 1867 which calls for special +comment. The neutrality of the Grand Duchy is 'placed under the +collective guarantee of the Powers signing'. The phrase originally +proposed by Count Bismarck was 'the formal and individual guarantee of +the Powers,' and it was altered at the instance of the English Foreign +Minister, Lord Stanley. The phrase actually adopted was suggested by the +Russian diplomat, Baron Brunnow, and was accepted both by England and by +Prussia. Lord Stanley's objection had been based upon the fear that +England might incur an unlimited liability to assist Luxemburg +single-handed if all other Powers failed to meet their obligations. In +other words, Luxemburg might have been used as the infallible means of +dragging us into every and any war which might arise between Germany and +France. From that danger we were protected by Lord Stanley's objection; +as the case stands the treaty gives us, in his own words, 'a right to +make war, but would not necessarily impose the obligation,' should +Luxemburg be attacked. To this doctrine a reference will be found in the +British White Paper (No. 148), where Sir Edward Grey informs M. Cambon +of 'the doctrine' concerning Luxemburg, 'laid down by Lord Derby and +Lord Clarendon in 1867'. It may also be observed that two of the +co-guarantors of the Treaty of 1867, namely Italy and Holland, have also +not thought it necessary to make the violation of Luxemburg a _casus +belli_. + + +III + +It is evident to all who study closely the map of France that her +eastern frontier falls into two sharply contrasted divisions, the +north-eastern which reaches from the sea to the valley of the Sambre, +and the south-eastern which extends from that river to, and along the +Swiss boundary. The former is flat country, easy for military +operations; the latter is mountainous, intersected with many deep +valleys. After the loss of Alsace-Lorraine, the French set to work to +rectify artificially the strategical weakness of their frontier; and in +a chain of fortresses behind the Vosges Mountains they erected a rampart +which has the reputation of being impregnable. This is the line Belfort, +Epinal, Toul, Verdun. A German attack launched upon this line without +violating neutral territory would have to be frontal, for on the north +the line is covered by the neutral states of Belgium and Luxemburg, +while on the south, although the gap between the Vosges and the Swiss +frontier apparently gives a chance of out-flanking the French defences, +the fortress of Belfort, which was never reduced even in the war of +1870-1, was considered too formidable an obstacle against which to +launch an invading army. A rapid advance on Paris was therefore deemed +impossible if respect were to be paid to the neutrality of Belgium and +Luxemburg, and it was for this purely military reason that Germany has +to-day violated her promises to regard the neutrality of these states. +This was frankly admitted by Herr von Jagow to Sir Edward Goschen: 'if +they had gone by the more southern route they could not have hoped, in +view of the paucity of roads and the strength of the fortresses, to have +got through without formidable opposition entailing great loss of +time'.[8] + +In the case of Belgium a very easy road was afforded into French +territory up the Valley of the Meuse, past Liege and thence into France +past Namur and through what is known as the Gap of Namur. A German army +could debouch into France through this gap the more easily inasmuch as +the French, relying on the neutrality of these two states, had not +strongly fortified the frontier from the sea to Maubeuge. Moreover, as +the country to the west of the Sambre was very easy country for +manoeuvring and furnished with good roads and railways, it was reckoned +that the formidable French lines to the south could be turned in this +manner, and the German army could march upon Paris from the north-east. + +As to Luxemburg, plainly it could not in such a scheme remain neutral. +It would lie between the two wings of the German army, and controlling +as it did the roads to Brussels, Metz, and Aix-la-Chapelle, it could not +be allowed to cause such inconvenience as to prevent easy communication +between one portion of the German army and another. + +That such a plan was contemplated by the Germans has been for some years +past a matter of common knowledge in England; and it has been also a +matter of common opinion that the attempt to execute this plan would +involve the active resistance of the British forces, to whom the duty +was supposed to have been assigned of acting on the left flank of the +French opposing the entry of the Germans from Belgian territory. The +plea therefore that has been put forward that the British have now dealt +the Germans 'a felon's blow' can only be put forward by persons who are +either ignorant or heedless of what has been a matter of casual +conversation all over England these last three years; and Sir Edward +Grey himself was so convinced that the German Government knew what the +consequences of a violation of Belgian neutrality would be that he +informed Sir Francis Bertie on July 31st that the 'German Government do +not expect our neutrality'.[9] There has been no secret about it +whatever. It is incredible that the excitement and surprise of the +Imperial Chancellor on the receipt of the ultimatum of August 4th should +have been genuine, seeing that it involves miscalculation or +misinformation entirely incompatible with what we know of the +thoroughness of German methods. At the time of the Agadir crisis the +military situation was the same, and the German War Office knew quite +well what our part would then have been. Surprise at such action on our +part in 1914 is little else than comedy, and can only have been +expressed in order to throw the blame of German aggression on to the +shoulders of Great Britain. + +This argument that Great Britain has taken the aggressive falls to the +ground entirely when it is confronted with the hard facts of chronology. +Far from attacking the Germans, we were so anxious to keep the peace +that we were actually three days late in our mobilization to join the +French on their left wing; and had it not been for the defence offered +by Liege, our scruples would have gravely imperilled the common cause. +For it was not until we were certain that Germany had committed what was +tantamount to an act of war against us, by invading the neutral state of +Belgium, that we delivered the ultimatum which led to the war. + +Notes: + +[Footnote 1: Cam. Mod. Hist. viii 301.] + +[Footnote 2: Ibid. 304.] + +[Footnote 3: Printed by A. Pearce Higgins, _The Hague Peace +Conferences_, pp. 281-9.] + +[Footnote 4: The entire treaty will be found in Hertslet, _Map of Europe +by Treaty_, vol. ii, pp. 979-98.] + +[Footnote 5: _Correspondence respecting the European Crisis_, (Cd. +7467), No. 147. Minister of State, Luxemburg, to Sir E. Grey, Aug. 2.] + +[Footnote 6: Edward Hertslet, _The Map of Europe by Treaty_, vol. iii, +p. 1806, no. 406. 'Proposal of _Prussia_ of Collective Guarantee by +Powers of Neutrality of _Luxemburg_, London, 7th May, 1867.'] + +[Footnote 7: Hertslet, _ut sup._, vol. iii, p. 1803. The High +Contracting Powers were Great Britain, Austria, France, Belgium, Italy, +the Netherlands, Prussia, and Russia.] + +[Footnote 8: _Dispatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin +respecting the rupture of diplomatic relations with the German +Government_ (Cd. 7445), Miscellaneous, no. 8, 1914.] + +[Footnote 9: _Correspondence respecting the European Crisis_, p. 62, no. +116. July 31, 1914. See also _infra_ pp. 82 _et seqq_.] + + + + +CHAPTER II + + +THE GROWTH OF ALLIANCES AND THE RACE OF ARMAMENTS SINCE 1871 + +Even at the risk of being tedious it is essential that we should sketch +in outline the events which have produced the present grouping of +belligerent states, and the long-drawn-out preparations which have +equipped them for conflict on this colossal scale. To understand why +Austria-Hungary and Germany have thrown down the glove to France and +Russia, why England has intervened not only as the protector of Belgium, +but also as the friend of France, we must go back to the situation +created by the Franco-German War. Starting from that point, we must +notice in order the formation of the Triple Alliance between Germany, +Austria-Hungary, and Italy, of the Dual Alliance between France and +Russia, of the Anglo-French and the Anglo-Russian understandings. The +Triple Alliance has been the grand cause of the present situation; not +because such a grouping of the Central European Powers was +objectionable, but because it has inspired over-confidence in the two +leading allies; because they have traded upon the prestige of their +league to press their claims East and West with an intolerable disregard +for the law of nations. Above all it was the threatening attitude of +Germany towards her Western neighbours that drove England forward step +by step in a policy of precautions which, she hoped, would avert a +European conflagration, and which her rivals have attempted to represent +as stages in a Machiavellian design to ruin Germany's well-being. These +precautions, so obviously necessary that they were continued and +expanded by the most pacific Government which England has seen since Mr. +Gladstone's retirement, have taken two forms: that of diplomatic +understandings, and that of naval preparations. Whichever form they have +taken, they have been adopted in response to definite provocations, and +to threats which it was impossible to overlook. They have been strictly +and jealously measured by the magnitude of the peril immediately in +view. In her diplomacy England has given no blank cheques; in her +armaments she has cut down expenditure to the minimum that, with +reasonable good fortune, might enable her to defend this country and +English sea-borne trade against any probable combination of hostile +Powers. + +Let us consider (1) the development of the diplomatic situation since +1870, (2) the so-called race of armaments since 1886. + +The Treaty of Frankfort (May 10, 1871), in which France submitted to the +demands of the new-born German Empire, opened a fresh era of European +diplomacy and international competition. The German Empire became at +once, and has ever since remained, the predominant Power in Western +Europe. The public opinion of this new Germany has been captured to no +small extent by the views of such aggressive patriots as Treitschke, who +openly avowed that 'the greatness and good of the world is to be found +in the predominance there of German culture, of the German mind, in a +word of the German character'. The school of Treitschke looked for the +establishment of a German world-empire, and held that the essential +preliminary to this scheme would be the overthrow of France and England. +But until 1890, that is to say so long as Prince Bismarck remained +Chancellor, no such ambitious programme was adopted by the German +Government. Bismarck was content to strengthen the position of the +Empire and to sow disunion among her actual or suspected enemies. In +1872 he brought about a friendly understanding with Austria and Russia, +the other two great Powers of Eastern Europe, the so-called +_Dreikaiserbuendnis_, which was designed to perpetuate the _status quo_. +But the friendship with Russia quickly cooled; it received a sharp +set-back in 1875, when the Tsar Alexander II came forward rather +ostentatiously to save France from the alleged hostile designs of +Germany; it was certainly not improved when Bismarck in his turn +mediated between Russia and her opponents at the Congress of Berlin +(1878). On the other hand, a common interest in the Eastern Question +drew closer the bonds between Germany and Austria. The latter felt +herself directly menaced by the Balkan policy of Russia; the former was +not prepared to see her southern neighbour despoiled of territory. Hence +in 1879 was initiated that closer union between Germany and Austria +which has been so largely responsible for the present situation. The +Treaty of 1879, which was kept secret until 1887, was purely defensive +in its character; but the terms showed that Russia was the enemy whom +both the contracting Powers chiefly feared. Neither was bound to active +measures unless the other should be attacked by Russia, or any Power +which had Russian support. In 1882 the alliance of the two great German +Powers was joined by Italy--a surprising development which can only be +explained on the ground of Italy's feeling that she could not hope for +security at home, or for colonial expansion in the Mediterranean, so +long as she remained in isolation. The Triple Alliance so constituted +had a frail appearance, and it was hardly to be expected that Italy +would receive strong support from partners in comparison with whose +resources her own were insignificant. But the Triple Alliance has +endured to the present day, the most permanent feature of the diplomatic +system of the last thirty-two years. Whether the results have been +commensurate with the sacrifices of sentiment and ambition which Italy +has made, it is for Italy to judge. On the whole she has been a sleeping +partner in the Alliance; its prestige has served almost exclusively for +the promotion of Austrian and German aims; and one of its results has +been to make Austria a formidable rival of Italy in the Adriatic. + +Meanwhile the remaining Great Powers of Europe had continued, as Prince +Bismarck hoped, to pursue their separate paths, though England was on +friendly terms with France and had, equally with Russia, laboured to +avert a second Franco-German War in 1875. After 1882 the English +occupation of Egypt constituted for some years a standing grievance in +the eyes of France. The persistent advance of Russia in Asia had in like +manner been a source of growing apprehension to England since 1868; and, +for a long time after the Treaty of Berlin, English statesmen were on +the watch to check the growth of Russian influence in the Balkans. But +common interests of very different kinds were tending to unite these +three Powers, not in any stable alliance, even for mutual defence, but +in a string of compacts concluded for particular objects. + +One of these interests was connected with a feeling that the policy of +the principal partners in the Triple Alliance, particularly that of +Germany, had become incalculable and was only consistent in periodic +outbursts of self-assertiveness, behind which could be discerned a +steady determination to accumulate armaments which should be strong +enough to intimidate any possible competitor. The growth of this feeling +dates from the dismissal of Prince Bismarck by the present Kaiser. +Bismarck had sedulously courted the friendship of Russia, even after +1882. He entered in fact into a defensive agreement with Russia against +Austria. While he increased the war strength of the army, he openly +announced that Germany would always stand on the defensive; and he +addressed a warning to the Reichstag against the 'offensive-defensive' +policy which was even then in the air, though it was still far from its +triumph:-- + + 'If I were to say to you, "We are threatened by France and Russia; + it is better for us to fight at once; an offensive war is more + advantageous to us," and ask for a credit of a hundred millions, I + do not know whether you would grant it--I hope not.'[10] + +But Bismarck's retirement (1890) left the conduct of German policy in +less cautious hands. The defensive alliance with Russia was allowed to +lapse; friction between the two Powers increased, and as the result +Germany found herself confronted with the Dual Alliance of France and +Russia, which gradually developed, during the years 1891-6, from a +friendly understanding into a formal contract for mutual defence. There +is no doubt that this alliance afforded France a protection against that +unprovoked attack upon her eastern frontier which she has never ceased +to dread since 1875; and it has yet to be proved that she ever abused +the new strength which this alliance gave her. + +It is only in the field of colonial expansion that she has shown +aggressive tendencies since 1896; and even here the members of the +Triple Alliance have never shown serious cause for a belief that France +has invaded their lawful spheres of interest. Her advance in Morocco was +permitted by Italy and Spain; her vast dominion in French West Africa +has been recognized by treaties with Germany and England; in East Africa +she has Madagascar, of which her possession has never been disputed by +any European Power; her growing interests in Indo-China have impinged +only upon an English sphere of interest and were peacefully defined by +an Anglo-French Agreement of 1896. France has been the competitor, to +some extent the successful competitor, of Germany in West Africa, where +she partially envelops the Cameroons and Togoland. But the German +Government has never ventured to state the French colonial methods as a +_casus belli_. That the German people have viewed with jealousy the +growth of French power in Africa is a notorious fact. Quite recently, on +the eve of the present war, we were formally given to understand that +Germany, in any war with France, might annex French colonies[11]; and it +is easy to see how such an object would reconcile the divergent policies +of the German military and naval experts. + +Up to the eve of the present war Great Britain has consistently refused +to believe that Germany would be mad enough or dishonest enough to enter +on a war of aggression for the dismemberment of colonial empires. German +diplomacy in the past few weeks has rudely shattered this conviction. +But up to the year 1914 the worst which was generally anticipated was +that she would pursue in the future on a great scale the policy, which +she has hitherto pursued on a small scale, of claiming so-called +'compensations' when other Powers succeeded in developing their colonial +spheres, and of invoking imaginary 'interests' as a reason why the +efforts of explorers and diplomatists should not be allowed to yield to +France their natural fruits of increased colonial trade. It is not our +business to impugn or to defend the partition of Africa, or the methods +by which it has been brought about. But it is vital to our subject that +we should describe the methods by which Germany has endeavoured to +intimidate France at various stages of the African question. The trouble +arose out of a Moroccan Agreement between England and France, which was +the first definite proof that these two Powers were drifting into +relations closer than that of ordinary friendship. + +In 1904 England and France settled their old quarrel about Egypt. France +recognized the English occupation of Egypt; England, on her side, +promised not to impede the extension of French influence in Morocco. It +was agreed that neither in Egypt nor in Morocco should there be a +political revolution; and that in both countries the customs tariff +should make no distinction between one nation and another. This compact +was accompanied by a settlement of the old disputes about French fishing +rights in Newfoundland, and of more recent difficulties concerning the +frontiers between French and English possessions in West Africa.[12] The +whole group formed a step in a general policy, on both sides, of healing +local controversies which had little meaning except as instruments of +diplomatic warfare. The agreement regarding Egypt and Morocco is +distinguished from that concerning West Africa and Newfoundland in so +far as it recognizes the possibility of objections on the part of other +Powers. It promised mutual support in the case of such objections; but +not the support of armed force, only that of diplomatic influence. + +At the moment of these agreements Count Buelow told the Reichstag that +Germany had no objection, as her interests were in no way imperilled by +them. Later, however, Germany chose to regard the Moroccan settlement as +an injury or an insult or both. In the following year the Kaiser made a +speech at Tangier (March, 1905) in which he asserted that he would +uphold the important commercial and industrial interests of Germany in +Morocco, and that he would never allow any other Power to step between +him and the free sovereign of a free country. It was subsequently +announced in the German Press that Germany had no objection to the +Anglo-French Agreement in itself, but objected to not having been +consulted before it was arranged. This complaint was met, on the part of +France, by the retirement of M. Delcasse, her Minister of Foreign +Affairs, and by her assent to an International Conference regarding +Morocco. The Conference met at Algeciras, and German pretensions were +satisfied by an international Agreement.[13] It is to be observed that +in this Conference the original claims of Germany were opposed, not only +by Russia, from whom she could hardly expect sympathy, but even by +Italy, her own ally. When Germany had finally assented to the Agreement, +her Chancellor, in flat contradiction with his previous utterance 'that +German interests were in no way imperilled by it', announced that +Germany had been compelled to intervene by her economic interests, by +the prestige of German policy, and by the dignity of the German Empire. + +The plain fact was that Germany, soon after the conclusion of the +Anglo-French agreements, had found herself suddenly delivered from her +preoccupations on the side of Russia, and had seized the opportunity to +assert herself in the West while Russia was involved in the most +critical stage of her struggle with Japan. But this war came to an end +before the Convention of Algeciras had begun; and Russia, even in the +hour of defeat and internal revolutions, was still too formidable to be +overridden, when she ranged herself beside her Western ally. + +Of the part which England played in the Moroccan dispute there are +different versions. What is certain is that she gave France her +diplomatic support. But the German Chancellor officially acknowledged, +when all was over, that England's share in the Anglo-French Agreement +had been perfectly correct, and that Germany bore England no ill-will +for effecting a _rapprochement_ with France. Still there remained a +strong impression, not only in England and France, that there had been +on Germany's part a deliberate intention to test the strength of the +Anglo-French understanding and, if possible, to show France that England +was a broken reed. + +It is not surprising that under these circumstances England has taken, +since 1906, the precaution of freeing herself from any embarrassments in +which she had previously been involved with other Powers. In 1905 she +had shown her goodwill to Russia by exercising her influence to moderate +the terms of the settlement with Japan. This was a wise step, consonant +alike with English treaty-obligations to Japan and with the interests of +European civilization. It led naturally to an amicable agreement with +Russia (1907) concerning Persia, Afghanistan, and Tibet, the three +countries which touch the northern borders of our Indian Empire. It +cannot be too strongly emphasized that this agreement was of a local +character, exactly as was that with France; that our friendly +understandings with France and with Russia were entirely separate; and +that neither related to the prosecution of a common policy in Europe; +unless indeed the name of a policy could be given to the precaution, +which was from time to time adopted, of permitting consultations between +the French and English military experts. It was understood that these +consultations committed neither country to a policy of common +action.[14] England was drifting from her old attitude of 'splendid +isolation'; but she had as yet no desire to involve herself, even for +defensive purposes, in such a formal and permanent alliance as that +which had been contracted by Germany, Austria, and Italy. + +But her hand was forced by Germany in 1911. Again the question of +Morocco was made to supply a pretext for attacking our friendship with +France. The German occupation of Agadir had, and could have, only one +meaning. It was 'fastening a quarrel on France on a question that was +the subject of a special agreement between France and us'.[15] The +attack failed in its object. War was averted by the prompt action of the +British Government. Mr. Asquith[16] announced that Great Britain, in +discussing the Moroccan question, would have regard to British +interests, which might be more directly involved than had hitherto been +the case, and also to our treaty obligations with France. Somewhat later +Mr. Asquith announced that if the negotiations between France and +Germany did not reach a satisfactory settlement, Great Britain would +become an active party to the discussion.[17] The nature of British +interests were appropriately defined by Mr. Lloyd George in a Guildhall +speech as consisting in the peace of the world, the maintenance of +national honour, and the security of international trade.[18] The last +phrase was a significant reference to the fact that Agadir, though +valueless for commercial purposes, might be invaluable to any Power +which desired to molest the South Atlantic trade routes. No one doubted +then, or doubts to-day, that England stood in 1911 on the brink of a war +which she had done nothing to provoke. + +The situation was saved in 1911 by the solidarity of England and France. +Two Powers, which in the past had been separated by a multitude of +prejudices and conflicting ambitions, felt at last that both were +exposed to a common danger of the most serious character. Hence a new +phase in the Anglo-French _entente_, which was cemented, not by a +treaty, but by the interchange of letters between the English Secretary +for Foreign Affairs (Sir Edward Grey) and the French Ambassador in +London (M. Paul Cambon). On November 22, 1912, Sir Edward Grey[19] +reminded M. Cambon of a remark which the latter had made, 'that if +either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a +third Power, it might become essential to know whether it could in that +event depend on the armed assistance of the other.' Sir Edward Grey +continued:--'I agree that if either Government had grave reason to +expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, or something that +threatened the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the +other whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression +and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would be prepared +to take in common. If these measures involved action, the plans of the +General Staffs would at once be taken into consideration, and the +Governments would then decide what effect should be given to them.' + +M. Cambon replied on the following day that he was authorized to accept +the arrangement which Sir E. Grey had offered.[20] + +The agreement, it will be seen, was of an elastic nature. Neither party +was bound to co-operate, even diplomatically, with the other. The +undertaking was to discuss any threatening situation, and to take common +measures if both agreed to the necessity; there was an admission that +the agreement might result in the conduct of a joint defensive war upon +a common plan. Such an understanding between two sovereign states could +be resented only by a Power which designed to attack one of them without +clear provocation. + +The date at which these notes were interchanged is certainly +significant. In November, 1912, the Balkan Allies were advancing on +Constantinople, and already the spoils of the Balkan War were in +dispute. Servia incurred the hostility of Austria-Hungary by demanding +Albania and Adriatic ports; and the Dual Monarchy announced that it +could never accept this arrangement. Behind Servia Austrian statesmen +suspected the influence of Russia; it was, they said, a scheme for +bringing Russia down to a sea which Austria regarded as her own +preserve. Austria mobilized her army, and a war could hardly have been +avoided but for the mediation of Germany and England. If England had +entertained the malignant designs with which she is credited in some +German circles, nothing would have been easier for her than to fan the +flames, and to bring Russia down upon the Triple Alliance. The notes +show how different from this were the aims of Sir Edward Grey. He +evidently foresaw that a war between Austria and Russia would result in +a German attack upon France. Not content with giving France assurance of +support, he laboured to remove the root of the evil. A congress to +settle the Balkan disputes was held at London in December, 1912; and it +persuaded Servia to accept a reasonable compromise, by which she +obtained commercial access to the Adriatic, but no port. This for the +moment pacified Austria and averted the world-war. To whom the solution +was due we know from the lips of German statesmen. The German Chancellor +subsequently (April 7, 1913) told the Reichstag:-- + + 'A state of tension had for months existed between Austria-Hungary + and Russia which was only prevented from developing into war by the + moderation of the Powers.... Europe will feel grateful to the + English Minister of Foreign Affairs for the extraordinary ability + and spirit of conciliation with which he conducted the discussion of + the Ambassadors in London, and which constantly enabled him to + bridge over differences.' + +The Chancellor concluded by saying: 'We at any rate shall never stir up +such a war'--a promise or a prophecy which has been singularly +falsified. + +It is no easy matter to understand the line of conduct which Germany has +adopted towards the great Slavonic Power on her flank. Since Bismarck +left the helm, she has sometimes steered in the direction of +subservience, and sometimes has displayed the most audacious insolence. +Periodically, it is to be supposed, her rulers have felt that in the +long run the momentum of a Russian attack would be irresistible; at +other times, particularly after the Russo-Japanese War, they have +treated Russia, as the Elizabethans treated Spain, as 'a colossus +stuffed with clouts.' But rightly or wrongly they appear to have assumed +that sooner or later there must come a general Armageddon, in which the +central feature would be a duel of the Teuton with the Slav; and in +German military circles there was undoubtedly a conviction that the epic +conflict had best come sooner and not later. How long this idea has +influenced German policy we do not pretend to say. But it has certainly +contributed to her unenviable prominence in the 'race of armaments' +which all thinking men have condemned as an insupportable, tax upon +Western civilization, and which has aggravated all the evils that it was +intended to avert. + +The beginning of the evil was perhaps due to France; but, if so, it was +to a France which viewed with just alarm the enormous strides in +population and wealth made by Germany since 1871. The 'Boulanger Law' of +1886 raised the peace footing of the French army above 500,000 men, at a +time when that of Germany was 427,000, and that of Russia 550,000. +Bismarck replied by the comparatively moderate measure of adding 41,000 +to the German peace establishment for seven years; and it is significant +of the difference between then and now that he only carried his Bill +after a dissolution of one Reichstag and a forcible appeal to its +successor. + +France must soon have repented of the indiscretion to which she had been +tempted by a military adventurer. With a population comparatively small +and rapidly approaching the stationary phase it was impossible that she +could long maintain such a race. In 1893 Count Caprivi's law, carried +like that of Bismarck after a stiff struggle with the Reichstag, raised +the peace establishment to 479,000 men. Count Caprivi at the same time +reduced the period of compulsory service from three years to two; but +while this reform lightened the burden on the individual conscript, it +meant a great increase in the number of those who passed through +military training, and an enormous increase of the war strength. The +Franco-Russian _entente_ of 1896 was a sign that France began to feel +herself beaten in the race for supremacy and reduced to the defensive. +In 1899 the German peace strength was raised to 495,000 for the next six +years; in 1905 to 505,000. On the second of these occasions the German +Government justified its policy by pointing out that the French war +strength was still superior to that of Germany, and would become still +stronger if France should change the period of service from three years +to two. The German law was announced in 1904; it had the natural effect. +The French Senate not only passed the new law early in 1905, but also +swept away the changes which the Lower House had introduced to lighten +the burden of annual training upon territorial reserves. France found +her justification in the Moroccan episode of the previous year. + +This was not unreasonable; but since that date France has been heavily +punished for a step which might be taken to indicate that _Revanche_ was +still a feature of her foreign policy. Since 1886 her utmost efforts +have only succeeded in raising her peace establishment to 545,000 +(including a body of 28,000 colonial troops stationed in France), and +her total war strength to 4,000,000. In the same period the peace +establishment of Germany was raised to over 800,000, and her total war +strength of fully trained men to something like 5,400,000. It is obvious +from these figures that a policy of isolation has long ceased to be +possible to France; and that an alliance with Russia has been her only +possible method of counterbalancing the numerical superiority of the +German army, which is certainly not less well equipped or organized than +that of France. + +This Russian alliance of France has been the only step in her +continental policy which could be challenged as tending to overthrow the +European balance. Undoubtedly it is France's prime offence in German +eyes; and her colonial policy has only been attacked as a pretext for +picking a quarrel and forcing on a decisive trial of strength before the +growth of Russian resources should have made her ally impregnable. + +Let us now look at the German military preparations from a German point +of view. The increases of the last twenty years in military expenditure +and in fighting strength have been openly discussed in the Reichstag; +and the debates have usually run on the same lines, because the +Government up to 1912 pursued a consistent policy, framed for some years +ahead and embodied in an Army Act. The underlying principle of these +Army Acts (1893, 1899, 1905, 1911) was to maintain a fairly constant +ratio between the peace strength and the population. But the war +strength was disproportionately increased by the Caprivi Army Act of +1893, which reduced the period of compulsory service from three years to +two. The hardly-veiled intention of the German War Staff was to increase +its war resources as rapidly as was consistent with the long-sufferance +of those who served and those who paid the bill. It was taken as +axiomatic that an increasing population ought to be protected by an +increasing army. National defence was of course alleged as the prime +consideration; and if these preparations were really required by growing +danger on the two main frontiers of Germany, no German could do +otherwise than approve the policy, no foreign Power could feel itself +legitimately aggrieved. + +Unfortunately it has been a maxim of German policy in recent years that +national independence means the power of taking the aggressive in any +case where national interests or _amour-propre_ may prompt it. The +increase of the German army, either in numbers or in technical +efficiency, seems to be regularly followed by masterful strokes of +diplomacy in which the 'mailed fist' is plainly shown to other +continental Powers. Thus in 1909, at the close of a quinquennium of +military re-equipment, which had raised her annual army budget from +L27,000,000 to L41,000,000, Germany countenanced the Austrian annexation +of Bosnia and the Herzegovina, and plainly told the authorities at St. +Petersburg that any military action against Austria would bring Russia +into a state of war with Germany. It was a startling step; _radix +malorum_ we may call it, so far as the later development of the +continental situation is concerned. Russia withdrew from the impending +conflict in 1909, but it is improbable that she has ever forgiven the +matter or the manner of the German ultimatum. + +In 1911 followed the episode of Agadir, which was clearly an attempt to +'force a quarrel on France.' But in 1911 Germany realized that her +military calculations had been insufficient, if she wished to continue +these unamiable diplomatic manners. It was not a question of +self-preservation; it was a question, as the German Chancellor told the +Reichstag, of showing the world that 'Germany was firmly resolved not to +be pushed aside.' Hence the sensational Army Bill of 1912, necessitated, +as the Government told the Reichstag, by the events of 1911. The Russian +peril could hardly be described as imminent. The Prussian Minister of +War said publicly in 1911 that 'there was no Government which either +desired or was seeking to bring about a war with Germany.' Russia had +recently taken steps which, at Berlin, perhaps, were read as signs of +weakness, but elsewhere were hailed as proofs of her desire for general +peace. M. Isvolsky, the supposed champion of Balkan ideals, had retired +from office; his successor, M. Sazonof, had accompanied the Czar to the +Potsdam interview (1910); the outstanding disputes of Germany and Russia +over their Persian interests had been settled by agreement in 1911. + +But the German Army Bill of 1912 was followed by Russia's intervention +in the Balkans to secure for Servia at least commercial access to the +Adriatic. This compromise, ostensibly promoted and belauded by German +statesmanship, only increased the determination of the German Government +to 'hold the ring' in the Balkans, to claim for Austria the right of +settling her own differences with Servia as she would, and to deny +Russia any interest in the matter. In 1913 came the supreme effort of +the German General Staff: an Army Act for raising the peace strength by +instalments until it reached 870,000, and for the eventual provision of +a war strength of 5,400,000 men. This enormous increase was recommended +'by the unanimous judgement of the military authorities' as being +'necessary to secure the future of Germany.' The Chancellor warned the +Reichstag that, although relations were friendly with Russia, they had +to face the possibilities involved in the Pan-Slavist movement; while in +Russia itself they had to reckon with a marvellous economic development +and an unprecedented reorganization of the army. There was also a +reference to the new law for a return to three years' service which +France was introducing to improve the efficiency of her peace +establishment. But it was obvious that Russia was the main +preoccupation. Germany had forced the pace both in the aggrandizement of +her military strength and in the methods of her diplomatic intercourse. +Suddenly she found herself on the brink of an abyss. She had gone too +far; she had provoked into the competition of armaments a Power as far +superior to Germany in her reserves of men as Germany thought herself +superior to France. It was not too late for Germany to pause. On her +future behaviour towards other Powers it depended whether the Bill of +1913 should be taken as an insurance against risks, or as a challenge to +all possible opponents. + +The other Powers shaped their policy in accordance with Germany's +example. In France, on March 4, the Supreme Council of War, having +learned the outline of the German programme, decided to increase the +effective fighting force by a return to the rule of three years' +service. Before the German Bill had passed (June 30), the French Prime +Minister announced (May 15) that he would of his own authority keep with +the colours those who were completing their second year's service in the +autumn. The French Army Bill, when finally passed (July 16), lowered the +age limit for commencing service from twenty-one to twenty, and brought +the new rule into force at once. A few weeks earlier (June 20) Belgium +introduced universal military service in place of her former lenient +system. In Russia a secret session of the Duma was held (July 8) to pass +a new Army Budget, and the term of service was raised from three to +three and a quarter years. Austria alone provided for no great increase +in the numerical strength of her army; but budgeted (October 30) for +extraordinary naval and military expenditure, to the extent of +L28,000,000, to be incurred in the first six months of 1914. Thus on all +sides the alarm was raised, and special preparations were put in hand, +long before the crisis of 1914 actually arrived. It was Germany that had +sounded the tocsin; and it is difficult to believe that some startling +_coup_ was not even then being planned by the leaders of her military +party. + +We have been told that, whatever the appearance of things might be, it +was Russia who drove Germany to the extraordinary preparations of 1913; +that Germany was arming simply in self-defence against a Slavonic +Crusade. What are the facts? Economically Russia, as a state, is in a +stronger position than the German Empire. In 1912 we were told that for +the past five years the revenue of Russia had exceeded expenditure by an +average sum of L20,000,000 per annum. The revenue of Russia in 1913 was +over L324,000,000; she has budgeted for L78,000,000 of military +expenditure in 1914, of which some L15,000,000 is emergency expenditure. +The total revenue of the German Empire in 1913 was L184,000,000; she has +budgeted for a military expenditure in 1914 of L60,000,000. To adopt the +usual German tests of comparison, Russia has a population of 173 +millions to be defended on three land-frontiers, while Germany has a +population of 65 millions to be defended on only two. The military +efforts of Russia, therefore, have been made on a scale relatively +smaller than those of Germany. + +We must, however, add some further considerations which have been urged +by German military critics; the alleged facts we cannot test, but we +state them for what they may be worth. The reorganization of the Russian +army in recent years has resulted, so we are told, in the grouping of +enormously increased forces upon the western frontier. The western +fortresses also have been equipped on an unparalleled scale. New roads +and railways have been constructed to accelerate the mobilization of the +war strength; and, above all, strategic railways have been pushed +towards the western frontier. Thus, it is argued, Russia has in effect +gone behind the Potsdam Agreement of 1910, by which she withdrew her +armies to a fixed distance behind the Russo-German frontier. We confess +that, in all this, while there may have been cause for watchfulness on +the part of Germany, we can see no valid cause for war, nothing that of +necessity implies more than an intention, on the part of Russia, not to +be brow-beaten in the future as she was in 1909 and 1912. + +These military developments did not escape English notice. They excited +endless speculation about the great war of the future, and the part +which this country might be asked to bear in it. Few, however, seriously +supposed that we should commit ourselves to a share in the fighting upon +land. The problem most usually discussed in this connexion was that of +preparation to resist a sudden invasion from abroad. Was it possible to +avoid compulsory service? Was the Territorial Force large enough and +efficient enough to defend the country if the Expeditionary Force had +gone abroad? Great Britain was infinitely better equipped for land +warfare in August, 1914, than she had ever been in the nineteenth +century. But her Expeditionary Force was a recent creation, and had been +planned for the defence of India and the Colonies. In practice the +country had clung to the 'Blue Water' policy, of trusting the national +fortunes entirely to the Navy. The orthodox theory was that so long as +the Navy was kept at the 'Two Power' standard, no considerable invasion +of the British Isles was possible. + +But from 1898 the programmes of the German Navy Laws constituted a +growing menace to the 'Two Power' standard, which had been laid down as +our official principle in 1889, when France and Russia were our chief +European rivals at sea. That France or Russia would combine with Germany +to challenge our naval supremacy was improbable; but other states were +beginning to build on a larger scale, and this multiplied the possible +number of hostile combinations. That Germany should wish for a strong +fleet was only natural. It was needed to defend her foreign trade, her +colonial interests, and her own seaports. That Germany should lay down a +definite programme for six years ahead, and that the programme should +become more extensive at each revision, was no necessary proof of +malice. But this country received a shock in 1900, when the programme of +1898 was unexpectedly and drastically revised, so that the German Navy +was practically doubled. England was at that moment involved in the +South African War, and it was hard to see against whom the new fleet +could be used, if not against England. This was pointed out from time to +time by the Socialist opposition in the Reichstag. The orthodox official +reply was that Germany must be so strong at sea that the strongest naval +Power should not be able to challenge her with any confidence. But the +feeling of the semi-official Navy League was known to be violently +hostile to England; and it was obvious that the German navy owed its +popularity to the alarmist propaganda of that league. + +It was impossible for English statesmen to avoid the suspicion that, on +the sea as on land, the Germans meant by liberty the right to unlimited +self-assertion. Common prudence dictated close attention to the German +Navy Laws; especially as they proved capable of unexpected acceleration. +The 'Two Power' standard, under the stress of German competition, became +increasingly difficult to maintain, and English Liberals were inclined +to denounce it as wasteful of money. But, when a Liberal Government +tried the experiment of economizing on the Navy (1906-8), there was no +corresponding reduction in the German programme. The German Naval Law of +1906 raised the amount of the naval estimates by one-third; and German +ministers blandly waved aside as impracticable a proposal for a mutual +limitation of armaments. + +In 1909 this country discovered that in capital ships--which now began +to be considered the decisive factor in naval warfare--Germany would +actually be the superior by 1914 unless special measures were taken. The +British Government was awakened to the new situation (it arose from the +German Naval Law of 1908), and returned unwillingly to the path of +increasing expenditure. The Prime Minister said that we regretted the +race in naval expenditure and were not animated by anti-German feeling; +but we could not afford to let our supremacy at sea be imperilled, since +our national security depended on it (March 16, 1909). The 'Two Power' +standard was dropped, and the Triple Alliance became the object of +special attention at the Admiralty. The First Lord said on March 13, +1911, that we should make our navy superior to any foreign navy and to +any _probable_ combination which we might have to meet single-handed. In +practice this meant a policy of developing, in the matter of +Dreadnoughts, a superiority of sixty per cent, over the German navy; +this, it was officially explained in 1912, had been for some years past +the actual Admiralty standard of new construction (Mr. Winston +Churchill, March 18, 1912). + +But even this programme had to be stiffened when the year 1912 saw a new +German Navy Bill which involved an increased expenditure of L1,000,000 +annually for six years, and had the effect of putting nearly four-fifths +of the German navy in a position of immediate readiness for war. Earlier +in the year the British Government had announced that, if the German +policy of construction were accelerated, we should add to our programme +double the number which Germany put in hand; but if Germany relaxed her +preparations we should make a fully proportionate reduction. The German +Bill came as an answer to this declaration; and it was followed in this +country by supplementary estimates on naval account, amounting to nearly +a million pounds; and this was announced to be 'the first and smallest +instalment of the extra expenditure entailed by the new German law.' The +new British policy was maintained in 1913 and in 1914, though in 1913 +the First Lord of the Admiralty made a public offer of a 'naval +holiday,' a suspension of new construction by mutual consent. The +Imperial Chancellor responded only by suggesting that the proposal was +entirely unofficial, by asking for concrete proposals, and by saying +that the idea constituted a great progress; and his naval estimates in +1913 were half a million higher than those of 1912. + +From these facts, viewed in their chronological order, it is clear that +on sea as on land Germany has set the pace. Thirty years ago the German +navy did not enter into England's naval calculations. For the last six +years, if not for a longer period, it has been the one navy which our +Admiralty felt the necessity of watching from year to year, and indeed +from month to month. It is the first time for more than a hundred years +that we have had to face the problem of 'a powerful homogeneous navy +under one government and concentrated within easy distance of our +shores.' + +On German principles we should long ago have adopted the +'offensive-defensive.' We have been at least as seriously menaced by +Germany at sea as Germany has been menaced by Russia upon land. But we +can confidently say that in the period of rivalry our fleet has never +been used as a threat, or turned to the purposes of an aggressive +colonial policy. Rightly or wrongly, we have refused to make possible +intentions a case for an ultimatum. We have held by the position that +only a breach of public law would justify us in abandoning our efforts +for the peace of Europe. + +NOTE + +_Abstract of Anglo-French Agreement on Morocco_. + +In April, 1904, England and France concluded an agreement for the +delimitation of their interests on the Mediterranean littoral of North +Africa. The agreement included five secret Articles which were not +published until November, 1911. The purport of the Articles which were +published at the time was as follows. By the first Article England +stated that she had not the intention of changing the political state of +Egypt; and France declared that she would not impede the action of +England in Egypt by demanding that a term should be fixed for the +British occupation or in any other way. By the second Article France +declared that she had not the intention of changing the political state +of Morocco; and England recognized that it appertained to France, as the +Power conterminous with Morocco, to watch the tranquillity of this +country and to assist it in all administrative, economic, financial, and +military reforms which it required, France promised to respect the +customary and treaty rights of England in Morocco; and by the third +Article England made a corresponding promise to France in respect of +Egypt. By the fourth Article the two Governments undertook to maintain +'the principle of commercial liberty' in Egypt and Morocco, by not +lending themselves in either country to inequality in the establishment +of Customs-duties or of other taxes or of railway rates. The sixth and +seventh Articles were inserted to ensure the free passage of the Suez +Canal and of the Straits of Gibraltar. The eighth declared that both +Governments took into friendly consideration the interests of Spain in +Morocco, and that France would make some arrangements with the Spanish +Monarchy. The ninth Article declared that each Government would lend its +diplomatic support to the other in executing the clauses relative to +Egypt and Morocco.[21] Of the secret Articles two (Nos. 3 and 4) related +to Spain, defining the territory which she was to receive 'whenever the +Sultan ceases to exercise authority over it,' and providing that the +Anglo-French agreement would hold good even if Spain declined this +arrangement. Article 1 stipulated that, if either Government found +itself constrained, by the force of circumstances, to modify its policy +in respect to Egypt or Morocco, nevertheless the fourth, sixth, and +seventh Articles of the public declaration would remain intact; that is, +each would under all circumstances maintain the principle of 'commercial +liberty,' and would permit the free passage of the Suez Canal and the +Straits of Gibraltar. In Article 2 England, while disclaiming any +intention to alter the system of Capitulations or the judicial +organization of Egypt, reserved the right to reform the Egyptian +legislative system on the model of other civilized countries; and France +agreed on condition that she should not be impeded from making similar +reforms in Morocco. The fifth Article related to the Egyptian national +debt. + +Notes: + +[Footnote 10: Quoted from Headlam's _Bismarck_, p. 444.] + +[Footnote 11: _Correspondence respecting the European Crisis_ (Cd. +7467), No. 85. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 29, 1914. See +_infra_, Appendix II.] + +[Footnote 12: For these agreements see _The Times_, April 12, 1904, and +November 25, 1911. See note at end of this chapter.] + +[Footnote 13: White Paper, Morocco No. 1 (1906).] + +[Footnote 14: _Correspondence_, No. 105 (Enclosure 1). Sir E. Grey to M. +Cambon, November 22, 1912. See Appendix II.] + +[Footnote 15: _Correspondence_, No. 87. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, +July 29, 1914.] + +[Footnote 16: _Times_, July 7, 1911.] + +[Footnote 17: _Times_, July 27, 1911.] + +[Footnote 18: _Times_, July 22, 1911.] + +[Footnote 19: _Correspondence_, p. 57 (Enclosure 1 in No. 105). See +Appendix II.] + +[Footnote 20: _Ibid_. p. 57 (Enclosure 2 in No. 105).] + +[Footnote 21: _Times_, April 12, 1904.] + + + + +CHAPTER III + + +THE DEVELOPMENT OF RUSSIAN POLICY + +Until the year 1890 Russia and Germany had been in close touch. Dynastic +connexions united the two imperial houses; and the common policy of +repression of Polish nationality--the fatal legacy of the days of +Frederic the Great and Catharine II--united the two empires. National +sentiment in Russia was, however, always anti-German; and as early as +1885 Balkan affairs began to draw the Russian Government away from +Germany. In 1890 Bismarck fell; and under William II German policy left +the Russian connexion, and in close touch with Austria embarked on +Balkan adventures which ran counter to Russian aims, while Russia on her +side turned to new allies. + +The new direction of Russian policy, which has brought the aims of the +Russian Government into close accord with the desires of national Slav +sentiment, was determined by Balkan conditions. Bismarck had cherished +no Balkan ambitions: he had been content to play the part of an 'honest +broker' at the Congress of Berlin, and he had spoken of the Bulgarian +affair of 1885 as 'not worth the bones of a Pomeranian grenadier.' +William II apparently thought otherwise. At any rate Germany seems to +have conducted, for many years past, a policy of establishing her +influence, along with that of Austria, through South-Eastern Europe. And +it is this policy which is the _fons et origo_ of the present struggle; +for it is a policy which is not and cannot be tolerated by Russia, so +long as Russia is true to her own Slav blood and to the traditions of +centuries. + +After Austria had finally lost Italy, as she did in 1866, she turned for +compensation to the Balkans. If Venetia was lost, it seemed some +recompense when in 1878 Austria occupied Bosnia and the Herzegovina. +Hence she could expand southwards--ultimately perhaps to Salonica. +Servia, which might have objected, was a vassal kingdom, the protege of +Austria, under the dynasty of the Obrenovitch. As Austria might hope to +follow the line to Salonica,[22] so Germany, before the end of the +nineteenth century, seems to have conceived of a parallel line of +penetration, which would carry her influence through Constantinople, +through Konieh, to Bagdad. She has extended her political and economic +influence among the small Slav states and in Turkey. In 1898 the King of +Roumania (a Hohenzollern by descent) conceded direct communication +through his territories between Berlin and Constantinople: in 1899 a +German company obtained a concession for the Bagdad railway from Konieh +to the head of the Persian Gulf. In a word, Germany began to stand in +the way of the Russian traditions of ousting the Turk and ruling in +Constantinople: she began to buttress the Turk, to train his army, to +exploit his country, and to seek to oust Russia generally from +South-Eastern Europe. + +In 1903 the progress of Austria and Germany received a check. A +blood-stained revolution at Belgrade ousted the pro-Austrian +Obrenovitch, and put in its place the rival family of the +Karageorgevitch. Under the new dynasty Servia escaped from Austrian +tutelage, and became an independent focus of Slav life in close touch +with Russia. The change was illustrated in 1908, when Austria took +advantage of the revolution in Turkey, led by the Young Turks, to annex +formally the occupied territories of Bosnia and the Herzegovina. Servia, +which had hoped to gain these territories, once a part of the old +Servian kingdom, was mortally offended, and would have gone to war with +Austria, if Russia, her champion under the new dynasty, could only have +given her support. But Russia, still weak after the Japanese war, could +not do so; Russia, on the contrary, had to suffer the humiliation of +giving a pledge to the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg that she +would not support Servia. That humiliation Russia has not forgotten. She +has saved money, she has reorganized her army, she has done everything +in her power to gain security for the future. And now that Austria has +sought utterly to humiliate Servia on the unproved charge (unproved, in +the sense that no legal proof was offered)[23] of complicity in the +murder of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife, Russia has risked +war rather than surrender her protection of a Slav kingdom. Slav +sentiment imperatively demanded action in favour of Servia: no +government could refuse to listen to the demand. The stake for Russia is +not merely the integrity of Servia: it is her prestige among the Slav +peoples, of which she is head; and behind all lies the question whether +South-Eastern Europe shall be under Teutonic control, and lost to +Russian influence. + +Germany has not only threatened Slav life in South-Eastern Europe: she +has irritated Slav feeling on her own Eastern frontier. The vitality and +the increase of the Slavs in Eastern Germany has excited deep German +alarm. The German Government has therefore of late years pursued a +policy of repression towards its own Slav subjects, the Poles, +forbidding the use of the Polish language, and expropriating Polish +landowners in order to plant a German garrison in the East. Teutonism is +really alarmed at the superior birth-rate and physical vigour of the +Slavs; but Russia has not loved Teutonic policy, and there has been an +extensive boycott of German goods in Russian Poland. The promise made by +the Tsar, since the beginning of the war, that he would re-create the +old Poland, and give it autonomy, shows how far Russia has travelled +from the days, not so far distant in point of time, when it was her +policy to repress the Poles in conjunction with Germany; and it has made +the breach between Germany and Russia final and irreparable. + +It is thus obvious that Germany is vitally opposed to the great Slav +Empire in South-Eastern Europe and on her own eastern borders. But why, +it may be asked, should Russian policy be linked with English? Is there +any bond of union except the negative bond of common opposition to +Germany? There is. For one thing England and Russia have sought to +pursue a common cause--that of international arbitration and of +disarmament. If neither has succeeded, it has been something of a bond +between the two that both have attempted to succeed. But there are other +and more vital factors. England, which in 1854-6 opposed and fought +Russia for the sake of the integrity of Turkey, has no wish to fight +Russia for the sake of a Germanized Turkey. On the contrary, the +interest of England in maintaining independence in the South-East of +Europe now coincides with that of Russia. Above all, the new +constitutional Russia of the Duma is Anglophil. + + 'The political ideals both of Cadets and Octobrists were learnt + chiefly from England, the study of whose constitutional history had + aroused in Russia an enthusiasm hardly intelligible to a present-day + Englishman. All three Dumas ... were remarkably friendly to England, + and England supplied the staple of the precedents and parallels for + quotation.'[24] + +In a word, the beginnings of Russian constitutionalism not only +coincided in time with the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907, but owed +much to the inspiration of England. + +Notes: + +[Footnote 22: Count Aehrenthal, foreign minister of Austria (1906-1912), +started the scheme of the Novi Bazar railway to connect the railways of +Bosnia with the (then) Turkish line to Salonica. See also +_Correspondence_, No. 19, Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey, July 25: 'There is +reliable information that Austria intends to seize the Salonica +railway.'] + +[Footnote 23: For a summary of so-called proofs, see Appendix IV, +_infra_.] + +[Footnote 24: _Camb. Mod. Hist_. xii. 379.] + + + + +CHAPTER IV + + +CHRONOLOGICAL SKETCH OF THE CRISIS + +The following sketch of events from June 28 to August 4, 1914, is merely +intended as an introduction to the analytical and far more detailed +account of the negotiations and declarations of those days which the +reader will find below (Chap. V). Here we confine the narrative to a +plain statement of the successive stages in the crisis, neither +discussing the motives of the several Powers involved, nor +distinguishing the fine shades of difference in the various proposals +which were made by would-be mediators. + +The crisis of 1914 began with an unforeseen development in the old +quarrel of Austria-Hungary and Russia over the Servian question. On June +28 the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir-apparent of the Austro-Hungarian +monarchy, and his wife, the Duchess of Hohenberg, paid a visit of +ceremony to the town of Serajevo, in Bosnia, the administrative centre +of the Austrian provinces of Bosnia and the Herzegovina. In entering the +town, the Archduke and the Duchess narrowly escaped being killed by a +bomb which was thrown at their carriage. Later in the day they were shot +by assassins armed with Browning pistols. The crime was apparently +planned by political conspirators who resented the Austrian annexation +of Bosnia and the Herzegovina (_supra_, p. 54), and who desired that +these provinces should be united to Servia. + +The Austrian Government, having instituted an inquiry, came to the +conclusion that the bombs of the conspirators had been obtained from a +Servian arsenal; that the crime had been planned in Belgrade, the +Servian capital, with the help of a Servian staff-officer who provided +the pistols; that the criminals and their weapons had been conveyed from +Servia into Bosnia by officers of Servian frontier-posts and by Servian +customs-officials. At the moment the Austrian Government published no +proof of these conclusions,[25] but, on July 23, forwarded them to the +Servian Government in a formal note containing certain demands which, it +was intimated, must be satisfactorily answered by Servia within +forty-eight hours.[26] This ultimatum included a form of apology to be +published on a specified date by the Servian Government, and ten +engagements which the Servian Government were to give the +Austro-Hungarian Government. The extraordinary nature of some of these +engagements is explained in the next chapter (pp. 103-7). + +On July 24 this note was communicated by Austria-Hungary to the other +Powers of Europe,[27] and on July 25 it was published in a German paper, +the _Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung_. It was therefore intended to be a +public warning to Servia. On July 24 the German Government told the +Powers that it approved the Austrian note, as being necessitated by the +'Great-Servian' propaganda, which aimed at the incorporation in the +Servian monarchy of the southern Slav provinces belonging to +Austria-Hungary; that Austria, if she wished to remain a Great Power, +could not avoid pressing the demands contained in the note, even, if +necessary, by military measures; and that the question was one which +concerned no Powers except Austria-Hungary and Servia.[28] + +Russia did not agree that the Austrian note was directed against Servia +alone. On July 24 the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs told the +British Ambassador at St. Petersburg that Austria's conduct was +provocative and immoral; that some of her demands were impossible of +acceptance; that Austria would never have taken such action unless +Germany had first been consulted; that if Austria began military +measures against Servia, Russia would probably mobilize. The Russian +Minister hoped that England would proclaim its solidarity with France +and Russia on the subject of the Austrian note; doubtless Servia could +accept some of the Austrian demands.[29] To the Austro-Hungarian +Government the Russian Minister sent a message, on the same day, July +24, that the time-limit allowed to Servia for her reply was quite +insufficient, if the Powers were to help in smoothing the situation; and +he urged that Austria-Hungary should publish the proofs of the charges +against Servia.[30] On July 25 Russia told England[31] that Servia would +punish those proved to be guilty, but would not accept all the demands +of Austria; that no independent state could do so. If Servia appealed to +arbitration, as seemed possible, Russia was, she said, prepared to leave +the arbitration in the hands of England, France, Germany, and Italy--the +four Powers whom Sir Edward Grey had suggested as possible mediators. + +On the day on which Russia made this suggestion, July 25, the Servian +Government replied to the Austrian note, conceding part of the Austrian +demands, and announcing its readiness to accept, on the other points, +the arbitration of the Hague Tribunal or of the Great Powers. The +Austrian Government found the Servian note unsatisfactory, and +criticized its details in an official memorandum.[32] The +Austro-Hungarian Minister left Belgrade on July 25; on July 26 a part of +the Austro-Hungarian army was mobilized; and on July 28 Austria-Hungary +declared war on Servia. + +Sir Edward Grey had from the first declined to 'announce England's +solidarity' with Russia and France on the Servian question. On and after +July 26 he was taking active steps to bring about the mediation, between +Austria-Hungary and Servia, of four Powers (Italy, Germany, France, +England). To this mediation Russia had already agreed, July 25; and +Italy and France were ready to co-operate with England.[33] Germany, +however, made difficulties on the ground that anything like formal +intervention would be impracticable, unless both Austria and Russia +consented to it.[34] Russia had already (July 25) prepared the ukase +ordering mobilization,[35] but had not yet issued it; on July 27 the +Russian Foreign Minister announced his readiness to make the Servian +question the subject of direct conversations with Vienna.[36] This offer +was at first declined by the Austro-Hungarian Government, but +subsequently accepted; and conversations were actually in progress +between the representatives of the two Powers as late as August 1.[37] + +No doubt the hesitation of Austria was due to the fact that, on July 28, +the Russian Government warned Germany of the mobilization of the +southern military districts of Russia, to be publicly proclaimed on July +29.[38] Austria replied to this intimation by offering assurances that +she would respect the integrity and independence of Servia;[39] these +assurances, considered inadequate by the Russian Government, seem to +have been the subject of the last conversations between Russia and +Austria-Hungary. + +Russia persisted that Germany was the real obstacle to a friendly +settlement; and this conviction was not affected by the appeals for +peace which the Kaiser telegraphed to the Tsar on July 28, July 29, and +July 31.[40] On July 29 Germany told England that the Russian +mobilization was alarming, and that France was also making military +preparations;[41] at the same time Germany threatened to proclaim +'imminent state of war' (_drohende Kriegsgefahr_) as a counter measure +to the French preparations;[42] German military preparations, by July +30, had in fact gone far beyond the preliminary stage which she thus +indicated.[43] Germany had already warned England, France, and Russia +that, if Russia mobilized, this would mean German mobilization against +both France and Russia.[44] But on July 27, Russia had explained that +her mobilization would in no sense be directed against Germany, and +would only take place if Austrian forces crossed the Servian +frontier.[45] On July 29, the day on which Russia actually mobilized the +southern districts, Russia once more asked Germany to participate in the +'quadruple conference' now proposed by England, for the purpose of +mediating between Austria and Servia. This proposal was declined by the +German Ambassador at St. Petersburg.[46] Germany in fact believed, or +professed to believe, that the Russian mobilization, though not +proclaimed, was already far advanced.[47] + +On July 30 Austria, although her conversations with Russia were still in +progress, began the bombardment of Belgrade. The next day, July 31, +Russia ordered general mobilization; on August 1 France and Germany each +took the like step; Germany presented an ultimatum to Russia, demanding +that Russian mobilization should cease, and another ultimatum to France +asking what course she would take in the event of war between Germany +and Russia. + +Before these decisive steps of July 30-August 1, and while Sir Edward +Grey was still engaged in efforts of mediation, Germany made overtures +to England, with the object of securing England's neutrality in the +event of a war between Germany and France. On July 29 Germany offered, +as the price of English neutrality, to give assurances that, if +victorious, she would make no territorial acquisitions at the expense of +France; but refused to give a similar assurance respecting French +colonies, or to promise to respect Belgian neutrality.[48] These +proposals were refused by England on July 30.[49] On August 1 the German +Ambassador unofficially asked England to remain neutral on condition +that Germany would not violate Belgian neutrality. Sir Edward Grey +replied that England's hands were still free, and that he could not +promise neutrality on that condition alone.[50] + +Meanwhile, on July 30, Sir Edward Grey was told by France that she would +not remain neutral in a war between Germany and Russia.[51] On July 31 +the English Cabinet, being asked by France to declare definitely on her +side, replied that England could give no pledge at present.[52] On the +same day England asked France and Germany to engage to respect Belgian +neutrality. France assented, Germany evaded giving a reply.[53] But, on +August 2, German forces entered the neutral state of Luxemburg; and +England promised to defend the French coasts and shipping if attacked by +the German fleet in the Channel, or through the North Sea.[54] On August +4 the King of the Belgians telegraphed to King George announcing that +Germany had demanded passage for her troops through Belgian territory, +and appealing to England for help.[55] On the same day, August 4, +England sent an ultimatum to Germany asking for assurance, before +midnight, that Germany would respect Belgian neutrality.[56] This demand +was taken at Berlin as equivalent to a declaration of war by England +against Germany. + + +DIARY OF THE EVENTS LEADING TO THE WAR + +June 28. Assassination at Sarajevo of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand and +the Duchess of Hohenberg. + +July 6. The Kaiser leaves Kiel for a cruise in Northern waters. + +July 9. Results of Austro-Hungarian investigation into the Servian crime +laid before the Emperor. + +July 13, 14. Serious disclosures about condition of French army. + +July 13, 14, 15, 16. Heavy selling of Canadian Pacific Railway Shares, +especially by Berlin operators. + +July 16. Count Tisza, the Hungarian Premier, speaking in the Hungarian +Chamber, describes war as a sad _ultima ratio_, 'but every state and +nation must be able and willing to make war if it wishes to exist as a +state and a nation.' + +The _Times_ leading article 'Austria-Hungary and Servia' is commented on +in Berlin as an 'English warning to Servia.' + +July 19. The King summons a conference to discuss the Home-Rule problem. + +July 21. The _Frankfurter Zeitung_ warns Austria-Hungary of the folly of +its campaign against Servia. + +July 23. Thursday. Austria presents her Note to Servia giving her 48 +hours in which to accept. + +July 24. Friday. Russian Cabinet Council held. The Austro-Hungarian +demands considered as an indirect challenge to Russia.--Strike at St. +Petersburg. + +Failure of the conference on Home Rule. + +July 25. Saturday. Servian reply; considered unsatisfactory by +Austria-Hungary, whose Minister and Legation-staff leave Belgrade. + +Russian Ambassador at Vienna instructed to request extension of +time-limit allowed to Servia. + +Sir E. Grey suggests that the four other Powers should mediate at Vienna +and St. Petersburg.--Serious riot in Dublin. + +July 26. Sunday. Sir E. Grey proposes that the French, Italian, and +German Ambassadors should meet him in conference immediately for the +purpose of discovering an issue which would prevent complications. + +Partial mobilization of Austro-Hungarian army ordered. + +Russian Foreign Minister warns German Ambassador that Russia cannot +remain indifferent to the fate of Servia. + +Sir E. Goschen says the Kaiser is returning to-night. + +July 27. Monday. France and Italy accept proposal of a conference. +German Secretary of State refuses the proposal of a 'conference.' + +Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs proposes direct conversation +between Vienna and St. Petersburg. + +British Fleet kept assembled after manoeuvres. + +Sir E. Grey in the House of Commons makes a statement concerning the +attitude of Great Britain. + +The _Times_ Berlin correspondent reports that the Kaiser returned this +afternoon from Kiel to Potsdam. + +July 28. Tuesday. Austria-Hungary declares war on Servia. + +Russia says the key of the situation is to be found at Berlin. + +Austria declines any suggestion of negotiations on basis of the Servian +reply. + +The Kaiser telegraphs to the Tsar. + +July 29. Wednesday. Russian mobilization in the four military districts +of Odessa, Kiev, Moscow, and Kazan. + +Germany offers, in return for British neutrality, to promise territorial +integrity of France, but will not extend the same assurance for French +colonies. + +Sir E. Grey warns the German Ambassador that we should not necessarily +stand aside, if all the efforts to maintain the peace failed. + +Austria at last realizes that Russia will not remain indifferent. + +The Tsar telegraphs to the Kaiser; the latter replies. + +July 30. Thursday. Bombardment of Belgrade by Austro-Hungarian forces. + +The Prime Minister speaks in the House of Commons on the gravity of the +situation, and postpones discussion of the Home Rule Amending Bill. + +The Tsar telegraphs to the Kaiser. + +July 31. Friday. General Russian mobilization ordered. + +Sir E. Grey asks France and Germany whether they will respect neutrality +of Belgium. + +France promises to respect Belgian neutrality; Germany is doubtful +whether any answer will be returned to this request. + +Austria declares its readiness to discuss the substance of its ultimatum +to Servia. + +Fresh telegrams pass between the Kaiser and the Tsar. + +Germany presents ultimatum to Russia demanding that her mobilization +should cease within 12 hours. + +Germany presents an ultimatum to France asking her to define her +attitude in case of a Russo-German war. + +English bankers confer with the Government about the financial +situation. + +Aug. 1. Saturday. Sir E. Grey protests against detention of English +ships at Hamburg. + +Orders issued for general mobilization of French army. + +Orders issued for general mobilization of German army. + +Aug. 2. Sunday. Germans invade Luxemburg. + +Sir E. Grey gives France an assurance that the English fleet will +protect the North Coast of France against the German fleet. + +Germans enter French territory near Cirey. + +Aug. 3. Monday. Italy declares itself neutral, as the other members of +the Triple Alliance are not engaged in a defensive war. + +Germany presents an ultimatum to Belgium. + +Sir E. Grey makes an important speech in the House of Commons. + +Aug. 4. Tuesday. Germans enter Belgian territory. + +Britain presents an ultimatum to Germany demanding an answer by +midnight. + +The Prime Minister makes a speech in the House of Commons, practically +announcing war against Germany and explaining the British position. + +Aug. 6. Austria-Hungary declares war on Russia. + +Aug. 11. The French Ambassador at Vienna demands his passport. + +Aug. 12. Great Britain declares war on Austria-Hungary. + +Notes: + +[Footnote 25: Extracts are printed in the German version of the German +White Book (pp. 28-31) from an Austrian official publication of July 27. +We print the extracts (the original not being accessible in this +country) in Appendix IV.] + +[Footnote 26: Full text _infra_ in Appendix I (German White Book, pp. +18-23); more correctly in _Correspondence respecting the European +Crisis_, No. 4, Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff, July 24; but the +differences between the two versions are immaterial for our present +purpose.] + +[Footnote 27: See the communication to England in _Correspondence_, No. +4.] + +[Footnote 28: _Correspondence_, No. 9, Note communicated by the German +Ambassador, July 24.] + +[Footnote 29: _Correspondence_, No. 6, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, +July 24.] + +[Footnote 30: _Correspondence_, No. 13, Note communicated by Russian +Ambassador, July 25.] + +[Footnote 31: _Correspondence_, No. 17, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, +July 25.] + +[Footnote 32: For text of Servian note see _infra_ Appendix I (German +White Book, pp. 23-32). The Austrian comments also are given there.] + +[Footnote 33: _Correspondence_, No. 42, Sir F. Bertie to Sir E. Grey, +July 27; _ibid_. No. 49, Sir E. Grey to Sir R. Rodd, July 27.] + +[Footnote 34: _Correspondence_, No. 43. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, +July 27.] + +[Footnote 35: German White Book, p. 46 (_infra_ in Appendix I). The Tsar +to His Majesty, July 30.] + +[Footnote 36: _Correspondence_, No. 45. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey.] + +[Footnote 37: Austria declined conversations on July 28 +(_Correspondence_, No. 93); but for conversations of July 31 see +_Correspondence_, No. III; of August I, see Appendix V.] + +[Footnote 38: _Correspondence_, No. 70 (I). M. Sazonof to Russian +Ambassador at Berlin, July 28.] + +[Footnote 39: _Correspondence_, No. 72. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, +July 28.] + +[Footnote 40: German White Book, pp. 43, 45 (in Appendix I, _infra_).] + +[Footnote 41: _Correspondence_, No. 76. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, +July 29.] + +[Footnote 42: German White Book, p. 42, Exhibit 17 (_infra_, Appendix +I).] + +[Footnote 43: _Correspondence_, No. 105 (Enclosure 3), July 30.] + +[Footnote 44: German White Book, p. 7; the date of the warning seems to +be July 27.] + +[Footnote 45: German White Book, p. 40, Exhibit II.] + +[Footnote 46: _Ibid_. p. 9.] + +[Footnote 47: _Ibid_. p. 10.] + +[Footnote 48: _Correspondence_, No. 85. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, +July 29.] + +[Footnote 49: _Ibid_. No. 101. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, July 30.] + +[Footnote 50: _Correspondence_, No. 123. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, +Aug. 1.] + +[Footnote 51: _Ibid_. No. 105. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, July 30.] + +[Footnote 52: _Ibid_. No. 119. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, July 31.] + +[Footnote 53: _Ibid_. No. 114, 120, 122.] + +[Footnote 54: _Ibid_. No. 148. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, Aug. 2.] + +[Footnote 55: _Ibid_. No. 153. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, Aug. 4.] + +[Footnote 56: _Ibid_. No. 159. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, Aug. 4] + + + + +CHAPTER V + + +NEGOTIATORS AND NEGOTIATIONS + +For purposes of reference the following list of _dramatis personae_ may +be useful:-- + +GREAT BRITAIN: King George V, _succ_. 1910. +_Foreign Secretary_: Sir Edward Grey. +_Ambassadors from France_: M. Paul Cambon. + _Russia_: Count Benckendorff. + _Germany_: Prince Lichnowsky. + _Austria_: Count Albert Mensdorff-Pouilly-Dietrichstein. + _Belgium_: Count A. de Lalaing (_Minister_). + +RUSSIA: Emperor Nicholas II, _succ_. 1894. +_Foreign Secretary_: M. Sazonof. +_Ambassadors from Great Britain_: Sir George Buchanan. + _France_: M. Paleologue. + _Germany_: Count Pourtales. + _Austria_: Friedrich Count Szapary. + +FRANCE: Raymond Poincare, _President, elected_ 1913. +_Premier_: M. Viviani. +_Acting Foreign Secretary_: M. Doumergue. +_Ambassadors from Great Britain_: Sir Francis Bertie. + _Russia_: M. Isvolsky. + M. Sevastopoulo (_Charge d'Affaires_). + _Germany_: Baron von Schoen. + _Austria_: Count Scezsen. + +GERMANY: Emperor William II, _succ_. 1888. +_Imperial Chancellor_: Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg. +_Foreign Secretary_: Herr von Jagow. +_Ambassadors from Great Britain_: Sir Edward Goschen. + Sir Horace Rumbold (_Councillor_). + _Russia:_ M. Swerbeiev. + M. Bronewsky (_Charge d'Affaires_). + _France:_ M. Jules Cambon. + _Austria_: Count Ladislaus Szoegyeny-Marich. + +AUSTRIA-HUNGARY: Emperor Francis Joseph, _succ_. 1848. +_Foreign Secretary_: Count Berchtold. +_Ambassadors from Great Britain_: Sir Maurice de Bunsen. + _Russia_: M. Schebesco. + M. Kondachev (_Charge d'Affaires_). + _France_: M. Crozier. + _Germany_: Herr von Tschirscky-und-Boegendorff. + +ITALY: King Victor Emmanuel III, _succ_. 1900. +_Foreign Secretary_: Marquis di San Giuliano. +_Ambassador from Great Britain_: Sir Rennell Rodd. + +BELGIUM: King Albert, _succ_. 1909. +_Minister of Great Britain_: Sir Francis Villiers. + +SERVIA: King Peter, _succ_. 1903. +_Minister of Great Britain_: C.L. des Graz. + D.M. Crackanthorpe (_First Secretary_). +_Russian Charge d'Affaires_: M. Strandtmann. + + +I + +_Germany's attitude to Austria and Russia_. + +From the very beginning of the conversations between the Powers on the +assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand at Serajevo, and on the +Austrian note to Servia, the German Government took up the attitude that +it was a 'matter for settlement between Servia and Austria alone.'[57] +Subsequently in their White Book they endeavoured to show that the +Servian agitation was part of Russian propagandism.[58] In the +negotiations, the cardinal point of their observations is that Russia is +not to interfere in this matter, although M. Paul Cambon pointed out +that 'Russia would be compelled by her public opinion to take action as +soon as Austria attacked Servia'.[59] + +After the presentation of the Austrian note to Servia, Germany continued +to maintain the position that the crisis could be localized, and to +reject Sir Horace Rumbold's suggestion that 'in taking military action +in Servia, Austria would dangerously excite public opinion in +Russia'.[60] + +At Vienna Sir Maurice de Bunsen, the British Ambassador, was very +frankly told by the German Ambassador that Germany was shielding Austria +in the Servian business:-- + + 'As for Germany, she knew very well what she was about in backing up + Austria-Hungary in this matter.... Servian concessions were all a + sham. Servia proved that she well knew that they were insufficient + to satisfy the legitimate demands of Austria-Hungary by the fact + that before making her offer she had ordered mobilization and + retirement of Government from Belgrade.'[61] + +M. Sazonof, the Russian Foreign Minister, seems to have divined this +policy of Germany pretty soon:-- + + 'My interviews with the German Ambassador confirm my impression that + Germany is, if anything, in favour of the uncompromising attitude + adopted by Austria. The Berlin Cabinet, who could have prevented the + whole of this crisis developing, appear to be exercising no + influence upon their ally.... There is no doubt that the key of the + situation is to be found at Berlin.'[62] + +When at the beginning of August the crisis had led to war, it is +interesting to observe the opinions expressed by high and well-informed +officials about German diplomacy. M. Sazonof summed up his opinion +thus:-- + + 'The policy of Austria had throughout been tortuous and immoral, and + she thought she could treat Russia with defiance, secure in the + support of her German ally. Similarly the policy of Germany had been + an equivocal and double-faced policy, and it mattered little whether + the German Government knew or did not know the terms of the Austrian + ultimatum; what mattered was that her intervention with the Austrian + Government had been postponed until the moment had passed when its + influence would have been felt. Germany was unfortunate in her + representatives in Vienna and St. Petersburg; the former was a + violent Russophobe who had urged Austria on, the latter had reported + to his Government that Russia would never go to war.'[63] + +And Sir Maurice de Bunsen on the same day wrote that he agreed with his +Russian colleague that + + 'the German Ambassador at Vienna desired war from the first, and his + strong personal bias probably coloured his action here. The Russian + Ambassador is convinced that the German Government also desired war + from the first.'[64] + +Sir Maurice does not actually endorse this opinion concerning the +attitude of the German Government, but there can be no doubt that this +general attitude was most pernicious to the cause of European peace, and +that if the German Government had desired war they could scarcely have +acted more efficiently towards that end. No diplomatic pressure was put +upon Vienna, which under the aegis of Berlin was allowed to go to any +lengths against Servia. Over and over again the German diplomats were +told that Russia was deeply interested in Servia, but they would not +listen. As late as July 28th the German Chancellor himself refused 'to +discuss the Servian note', adding that 'Austria's standpoint, and in +this he agreed, was that her quarrel with Servia was a purely Austrian +concern with which Russia had nothing to do'.[65] Next day the German +Ambassador at Vienna was continuing 'to feign surprise that Servian +affairs could be of such interest to Russia'.[66] But in their White +Book, in order to blacken the character of Russia, the Germans remark +that they 'were perfectly aware that a possible warlike attitude of +Austria-Hungary against Servia might bring Russia into the field'.[67] +Both stories cannot be true: the German Government have, not for the +last time in the history of these negotiations, to choose between +ineptitude and guilt; the ineptitude of not recognizing an obvious fact, +and the guilt of deliberately allowing Austria to act in such a way that +Russia was bound to come into the field. + +When Austria presented her ultimatum, Sir Edward Grey did all he could +to obtain the good offices of Russia for a conciliatory reply by Servia, +and to persuade the German Government to use influence with Austria so +that she should take a friendly attitude to Servia. On the day of the +presentation of the Austrian note he proposed to Prince Lichnowsky, the +German Ambassador, the co-operation of the four Powers, Germany, France, +Italy, and Great Britain, in favour of moderation at Vienna and St. +Petersburg, and when the Austrians rejected the Servian reply he took +the important step of proposing that the French, Italian, and German +Ambassadors should meet him in conference immediately 'for the purpose +of discovering an issue which would prevent complications'.[68] The +proposal was accepted with alacrity by the French and Italian +Governments. The German Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Herr von Jagow, +on the other hand, was unable or unwilling to understand the proposal, +and Sir Edward Goschen seems to have been unable to impress its real +character upon the Government of Berlin. For Herr von Jagow, on receipt +of the proposal, informed the British Ambassador, Sir Edward Goschen, +that the conference suggested + + 'would practically amount to a court of arbitration and could not in + his opinion be called together except at the request of Austria and + Russia. He could not therefore fall in with it.' + +Sir Edward Goschen not unnaturally pointed out that + + 'the idea had nothing to do with arbitration, but meant that + representatives of the four nations not directly interested should + discuss and suggest means for avoiding a dangerous situation'.[69] + +Herr von Jagow spoke in the same sense to the French and Italian +Ambassadors, who discussed the matter with their British colleague. Some +doubt seems to have arisen in their minds as to the sincerity of the +German Secretary of State's loudly expressed desire for peace; but, +giving him the benefit of the doubt, they concluded that the objection +must be to the 'form of the proposal'. 'Perhaps', added Sir Edward +Goschen, 'he himself could be induced to suggest lines on which he would +find it possible to work with us.'[70] The next day the same idea was +pressed by Sir Edward Grey upon Prince Lichnowsky:-- + + 'The whole idea of mediation or mediating influence was ready to be + put into operation by any method that Germany could suggest if mine + was not acceptable.'[71] + +But owing to German dilatoriness in this matter, events had by then gone +so far that the very gravest questions had arisen for this country. + +With the refusal of the German Government to propose a form of mediation +acceptable to themselves before graver events had occurred, the first +period of the negotiation comes to an end. The responsibility of +rejecting a conference, which, by staving off the evil day, might have +preserved the peace of Europe, falls solely on the shoulders of Germany. +The reasons advanced by Herr von Jagow were erroneous, and though Dr. +von Bethmann-Hollweg, the Imperial Chancellor, was more conciliatory and +sympathetic, it may be noted that the German White Book[72] continues to +misrepresent Sir Edward Grey's proposal as a conference on the +particular question of the Austro-Servian dispute, and not on the +general situation of Europe. + +In the period that follows come spasmodic attempts at negotiation by +direct conversations between the parties concerned, with no advantage, +but rather with the growth of mutual suspicion. Down to August 1st both +Sir Edward Grey and M. Sazonof were busy trying to find some formula +which might be accepted as a basis for postponing hostilities between +the Great Powers. And here it may be well to point out that Prince +Lichnowsky seems to have been left in the dark by his chiefs. On July +24th, the day after the Austrian note was presented, he was so little +acquainted with the true state of affairs, that speaking privately he +told Sir Edward Grey 'that a reply favourable on some points must be +sent at once by Servia, so that an excuse against immediate action might +be afforded to Austria'.[73] And in the matter of the conference, on the +very day that Herr von Jagow was making his excuses against entering the +proposed conference, Prince Lichnowsky informed Sir Edward Grey, that +the German Government accepted in principle mediation between Austria +and Russia by the four Powers, reserving, of course, their right as an +ally to help Austria if attacked.[74] The mutual incompatibility of the +two voices of Germany was pointed out from Rome, where the Marquis di +San Giuliano, the Italian Foreign Minister, attempted a reconciliation +between them, on information received from Berlin, that 'the difficulty +was rather the "conference" than the principle'.[75] But we may ask +whether Herr von Jagow's reply to Sir Edward Goschen does not really +show that the whole principle of a conference was objected to, seeing +that he said that such a 'conference was not practicable', and that 'it +would be best to await the outcome of the exchange of views between the +Austrian and Russian Governments'.[76] But, if it was not the principle +that was objected to, but only the form, where are we? We can do nothing +else but assume that the German Government objected to the terms +employed by Sir Edward Grey, and that for the sake of a mere quibble +they wasted time until other events made the catastrophe inevitable. +Impartiality will have to judge whether such action was deliberate or +not; whether in this case also it is crime or folly which has to be laid +at the door of the German Government. + +The proposed conference having been rejected by Germany, an attempt was +then made by several Powers to invite Austria to suspend military +action. Although Count Mensdorff, the Austrian Ambassador in London, had +made on July 25th a distinction between military preparations and +military operations, and had urged that his Government had only the +former then in view, it was reported two days later from Rome that there +were great doubts 'whether Germany would be willing to invite Austria to +suspend military action pending the conference'. Even if she had been +willing to do so, it is very doubtful whether, in view of the Austrian +declaration of war against Servia on July 28th, and the simultaneous +Austrian decree for general mobilization, the position of Europe could +have been improved, for on July 29th that declaration was followed by +news of the Russian mobilization of the southern districts of Odessa, +Kiev, Moscow, and Kazan.[77] + +Now the German Secretary of State had argued that 'if Russia mobilized +against Germany, latter would have to follow suit'. On being asked what +he meant by 'mobilizing against Germany', he said that + + 'if Russia mobilized in the South, Germany would not mobilize, but + if she mobilized in the north, Germany would have to do so too, and + Russian system of mobilization was so complicated that it might be + difficult exactly to locate her mobilization. Germany would + therefore have to be very careful not to be taken by surprise.'[78] + +This was on July 27th, and it cannot be said to have been unreasonable. +But when on July 29th Russia mobilized the southern districts no grounds +for German mobilization had yet been provided. No secret was made about +this mobilization by the Russian Ambassador at Berlin,[79] but it is +perhaps as well to point out here the remark made by Sir George +Buchanan, the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, about the language +used by his German colleague concerning the mobilization of the four +southern districts: 'He accused the Russian Government of endangering +the peace of Europe by their mobilization, and said, when I referred to +all that had recently been done by Austria, that he could not discuss +such matters.'[80] It would perhaps be rash to assume that the German +Ambassador, Count Pourtales, used such language to his home Government, +for there is no evidence of it in the German White Book. What dispatches +appear there from the German Embassy at St. Petersburg are refreshingly +honest. The military attache says, 'I deem it certain that mobilization +has been ordered for Kiev and Odessa'. He adds: 'it is doubtful at +Warsaw and Moscow, and improbable elsewhere'.[81] + +There was therefore, according to the evidence produced by the Germans +themselves, no mobilization 'against Germany'. The only thing that looks +at all like hostile action is contained in the news sent by the Imperial +German Consul at Kovno on July 27th, that a 'state of war' +(_Kriegszustand_) had been proclaimed in that district. But this is a +very different thing from mobilization; it was almost bound to follow in +the northern provinces of the Empire as the result of mobilization +elsewhere. At any rate the Consul at Kovno announced it on July 27th +before any Russian mobilization at all had taken place, and the fact +that Germany did not instantly mobilize shows that at the end of July +that Government did not consider _Kriegszustand_ in Kovno to be +equivalent to 'mobilization against Germany'. + +Opinion in Berlin seems to have been that Russia would not make war. +Perhaps there was no real fear that Russia would take an aggressive +attitude, for many people believed that 'Russia neither wanted, nor was +in a position to make war'.[82] This attitude of mind was known and +deplored in Rome, where the Marquis di San Giuliano said 'there seemed +to be a difficulty in making Germany believe that Russia was in +earnest'.[83] Such an opinion seems to have been shared by Count +Pourtales, who on July 29 reported that the German Government were +willing to guarantee that Servian integrity would be respected by +Austria. This was held to be insufficient, as Servia might thus become +an Austrian vassal, and there would be a revolution in Russia if she +were to tolerate such a state of affairs. The next day the Russian +Minister for Foreign Affairs told the British and French Ambassadors +'that absolute proof was in the possession of the Russian Government +that Germany was making military and naval preparations against +Russia--more particularly in the direction of the Gulf of Finland'.[84] + +After this, is it difficult to see how German statesmen regarded the +situation? Russia, in their eyes, was playing a game of bluff, and +strong measures against her were in the interest of Germany. But, though +under no illusion as to German preparations, M. Sazonof offered on July +30 to stop all military preparations if Austria 'would eliminate from +her ultimatum to Servia points which violate the principle of the +sovereignty of Servia'.[85] 'Preparations for general mobilization will +be proceeded with if this proposal is rejected by Austria,' wrote Sir +George Buchanan.[86] The next day he reported to Sir Edward Grey that +all attempts to obtain the consent of Austria to mediation had failed, +and that she was moving troops against Russia as well as against +Servia.[87] + +Face to face therefore with war against another Power, Russia ordered a +general mobilization.[88] This was answered on the same day by a +proclamation of _Kriegsgefahr_ at Berlin, 'as it can only be against +Germany that Russian general mobilization is directed'.[89] + +Thus on Friday, July 31st, the situation had come to be this, that +Russia, feeling herself threatened by the military preparations of +Austria and Germany, decided to issue orders for a general +mobilization.[90] Meanwhile Sir Edward Grey still clung to the hope that +mediation with a view to safeguarding Austrian interests as against +Servia might yet be accepted.[91] But his efforts were useless, for +Germany had launched an ultimatum (July 31) to Russia, demanding +demobilization. As Sir Edward Goschen pointed out, the demand was made +'even more difficult for Russia to accept by asking them to demobilize +in the south as well'.[92] The only explanation actually vouchsafed was +that this had been asked to prevent Russia pleading that all her +mobilization was only directed against Austria. Such a quibble, when +such interests are at stake, seems to call for severe comment. + +War between the three empires seemed now inevitable, for though the +Emperor of Russia and the German Emperor had exchanged telegrams each +imploring the other to find a way out of the difficulty, and each saying +that matters had gone so far that neither could grant the other's +demands,[93] the officials at Berlin were now taking up the position +that 'Russia's mobilization had spoilt everything'.[94] This attitude is +as inexplicable as it proved disastrous. For it appears that on July 31 +Austria and Russia were ready to resume conversations. The Austrians, +apparently alarmed at the prospect of a general war, were ready to +discuss the substance of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia, and Russia +announced that under certain conditions 'she would undertake to preserve +her waiting attitude'.[95] Having issued her ultimatum to Russia, +Germany naturally mobilized, but what kind of diplomacy is this in +which, with the principals both ready to negotiate, a third party issues +an ultimatum couched in such terms that a proud country can give but one +answer? + +The sequence of events seems to be as follows. Austria mobilized against +Servia. Russia, rightly or wrongly, took this as a threat to herself, +and mobilized all her southern forces against Austria. Then Germany +threatened to mobilize unless Russia ceased her military +preparations--an inexcusable step, which increased Russia's +apprehensions of a general war, and made a general Russian mobilization +inevitable.[96] If Russia was the first to mobilize, she took this step +in consequence of German threats. We repeat that in spite of the three +empires taking this action, discussion was still possible between Russia +and Austria,[97] and might have had good results. In fact, the situation +was not irretrievable, if Germany had not rendered it so by issuing her +ultimatum to Russia. Once again we may ask, was this crime or folly? + + +II + +_Germany's attitude to France._ + +We must now turn our eyes to the West of Europe, and observe the +diplomacy of Germany with regard to France and Great Britain. On the +27th of July we are told that the German Government received 'the first +intimation concerning the preparatory measures taken by France: the 14th +Corps discontinued the manoeuvres and returned to its garrison'.[98] +Will it be believed that, except for the assertion 'of rapidly +progressing preparations of France, both on water and on land',[99] this +is the only shred of evidence that the Germans have produced to prove +the aggressive intentions of France? And it may be worth while to point +out that on July 29, when the German White Book says that Berlin heard +of the 'rapidly progressing preparations of France', the French +Ambassador at Berlin informed the Secretary of State that 'they had done +nothing more than the German Government had done, namely, recalled the +officers on leave'.[100] + +The very next day the French Government had 'reliable information that +the German troops are concentrated round Thionville and Metz ready for +war',[101] and before July 30th German patrols twice penetrated into +French territory.[102] With great forbearance the French Government +withdrew its troops ten kilometres from the frontier; and, although +German reservists had been recalled from abroad 'by tens of thousands', +the French Government had not called out a single reservist. Well might +the French Minister for Foreign Affairs say 'Germany has done it'.[103] + +Having thus invaded France before July 30th, the German Government +presented an ultimatum (July 31) demanding what were the French +intentions, and on August 1st the French Government replied that it +would consult its own interests.[104] + + +III + +_The Question of British Neutrality_. + +Even then, nothing had happened to bring this country into the quarrel. +If Germany were making war primarily on Russia, and France were only +involved as the auxiliary of Russia, Germany would have acted rapidly +against Russia, and would have stood on the defensive against France; +and England would not have been dragged into war.[105] The question of +British neutrality first appears in the British White Book on July 25th, +when Sir Edward Grey, in a note to Sir George Buchanan, said: 'if war +does take place, the development of other issues may draw us into it, +and I am therefore anxious to prevent it'.[106] Two days later he wrote +again:-- + + 'I have been told by the Russian Ambassador that in German and + Austrian circles impression prevails that in any event we would + stand aside ... This impression ought, as I have pointed out, to be + dispelled by the orders we have given to the First Fleet ... not to + disperse for manoeuvre leave. But ... my reference to it must not be + taken to mean that anything more than diplomatic action was + promised.'[107] + +On the 29th the question of our neutrality was seriously discussed at +both the Courts of St. James and Berlin independently. Sir Edward Grey, +in an interview with Prince Lichnowsky, told him 'he did not wish the +Ambassador to be misled ... into thinking we should stand aside'. +Developing this, Sir Edward Grey solemnly warned the German Ambassador +that + + 'there was no question of our intervening if Germany was not + involved, or even if France was not involved, but if the issue did + become such that we thought British interests required us to + intervene, we must intervene at once, and the decision would have to + be very rapid.... But ... I did not wish to be open to any reproach + from him that the friendly tone of all our conversations had misled + him or his Government into supposing that we should not take + action.'[108] + +Before the news of this had reached Berlin the Imperial Chancellor had +made his notorious 'bid for British neutrality' on July 29:-- + + 'He said it was clear, so far as he was able to judge the main + principle which governed British policy, that Great Britain would + never stand by and allow France to be crushed in any conflict there + might be. That, however, was not the object at which Germany aimed. + Provided that neutrality of Great Britain were certain, every + assurance would be given to the British Government that the Imperial + Government aimed at no territorial acquisitions at the expense of + France, should they prove victorious in any war that might ensue. + + 'I questioned his Excellency about the French colonies, and he said + he was unable to give a similar undertaking in that respect. As + regards Holland ... so long as Germany's adversaries respected the + integrity and neutrality of the Netherlands, Germany was ready to + give His Majesty's Government an assurance that she would do + likewise. It depended on the action of France what operations + Germany might be forced to enter upon in Belgium, but when the war + was over, Belgian integrity would be respected if she had not sided + against Germany.'[109] + +This request was at once repudiated (July 30) by the British +Government:-- + + 'His Majesty's Government cannot for one moment entertain the + Chancellor's proposal that they should bind themselves to neutrality + on such terms. + + 'What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while French + colonies are taken and France is beaten so long as Germany does not + take French territory as distinct from the colonies. + + 'From the material point of view the proposal is unacceptable, for + France, without further territory in Europe being taken from her, + could be so crushed as to lose her position as a Great Power and + become subordinate to German policy. + + 'Altogether apart from that, it would be a disgrace for us to make + this bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace from + which the good name of this country would never recover. + + 'The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain away whatever + obligation or interest we have as regards the neutrality of Belgium. + We could not entertain that bargain either.[110] + +He continued by saying that Great Britain must keep her hands absolutely +free and hinted at some scheme for preventing anti-German aggression by +the Powers of the Triple _Entente_:-- + + 'If the peace of Europe can be preserved, and the present crisis + safely passed, my own endeavour will be to promote some arrangement + to which Germany could be a party, by which she could be assured + that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her or + her allies by France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or separately + ... The idea has hitherto been too Utopian to form the subject of + definite proposals, but if this crisis ... be safely passed, I am + hopeful that the relief and reaction which will follow will make + possible some more definite rapprochement between the Powers than + has been possible hitherto.' + +Thus two points were made clear: we were seriously concerned that France +should not be crushed, and that the neutrality of Belgium should not be +violated. It is interesting to note how this extremely serious warning +was received by Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg:--'His Excellency was so taken +up with the news of the Russian measures along the frontier ... that he +received your communication without a comment.'[111] + +But the text of the reply was left with him, so that he could scarcely +complain that no warning had been given to him. + +With the data at our disposal, it is not possible to make any deduction +as to the effect which this warning had upon Berlin; but it may be +remarked that at Rome that day, the Marquis di San Giuliano told Sir +Rennell Rodd that he had + + 'good reason to believe that Germany was now disposed to give more + conciliatory advice to Austria, as she seemed convinced that we + should act with France and Russia, and was most anxious to avoid + issue with us.'[112] + +As this telegraphic dispatch was not received till the next day, it is +not impossible that the Italian Minister gave this information to Sir +Rennell Rodd late in the day, after having received news from Berlin +sent under the impression made by Sir Edward Grey's warning. + +Such an impression, if it ever existed, must have been of short +duration, for when the British Government demanded both of France and +Germany whether they were 'prepared to engage to respect neutrality of +Belgium so long as no other Power violates it',[113] the French gave an +unequivocal promise the same day,[114] while the German answer is a +striking contrast:-- + + 'I have seen Secretary of State, who informs me that he must consult + the Emperor and the Chancellor before he can possibly answer. I + gathered from what he said that he thought any reply they might give + could not but disclose a certain amount of their plan of campaign in + the event of war ensuing, and he was therefore very doubtful whether + they would return any answer at all. His Excellency, nevertheless, + took note of your request. + + 'It appears from what he said that German Government considers that + certain hostile acts have already been committed in Belgium. As an + instance of this, he alleged that a consignment of corn for Germany + had been placed under an embargo already.'[115] + +It was now clear that a violation of Belgian neutrality was a +contingency that would have to be faced, and Prince Lichnowsky was +warned the next day that 'the neutrality of Belgium affected feeling in +this country', and he was asked to obtain an assurance from the German +Government similar to that given by France:-- + + 'If there were a violation of the neutrality of Belgium by one + combatant, while the other respected it, it would be extremely + difficult to restrain public feeling in this country.'[116] + +The Ambassador then, on his own personal responsibility and without +authority from his Government, tried to exact a promise that Great +Britain would remain neutral 'if Germany gave a promise not to violate +Belgian neutrality', but Sir Edward Grey was bound to refuse such an +offer, seeing that it left out of account all question of an attack on +France and her colonies, about which it had been stated already that +there could be no bargaining. Even the guarantee of the integrity of +France and her colonies was suggested, but again Sir Edward Grey was +bound to refuse, for the reasons he gave to Sir Edward Goschen in +rejecting what is now known as Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg's 'infamous +proposal', namely, that France without actually losing territory might +be so crushed as to lose her position as a Great Power, and become +subordinate to German policy. And if there should be still any doubt +about Sir Edward Grey's policy at this moment, we would refer to his +statement in the House of Commons on August 27.[117] The important +points are that the offers of August 1 were made on the sole +responsibility of Prince Lichnowsky, and without authority from his +Government; that the Cabinet on August 2 carefully discussed the +conditions on which we might remain neutral, and that, on August 3, so +far was the German Ambassador from guaranteeing the neutrality of +Belgium that he actually had to ask Sir Edward Grey 'not to make the +neutrality of Belgium one of our conditions'. Whatever Prince Lichnowsky +may have said privately on August 1, the one fact certain is that two +days later the German Government were making no concessions on that +point; on the contrary they were asking us to withdraw from a position +we had taken up on July 30, four days before. + +One more effort to preserve peace in Western Europe seems to have been +made by Sir Edward Grey. On the telephone he asked Prince Lichnowsky +whether, if France remained neutral, Germany would promise not to attack +her. The impression seems to have prevailed in Berlin that this was an +offer to guarantee French neutrality by the force of British arms, and +the German Emperor in his telegram to the King gave evidence of the +relief His Imperial Majesty felt at the prospect that the good relations +between the two countries would be maintained. Unfortunately for such +hopes, France had never been consulted in the matter, nor was there ever +any idea of coercing France into neutrality, and even the original +proposal had to be abandoned on consideration as unpractical.[118] + +Events now marched rapidly. While the Cabinet in London were still +discussing whether a violation of Belgian neutrality would be an +occasion for war, the news came of the violation of that of Luxemburg. +Sir Edward Grey informed M. Cambon[119] that Lord Stanley and Lord +Clarendon in 1867 had agreed to a 'collective guarantee' by which it was +not intended that every Power was bound single-handed to fight any +Government which violated Luxemburg. Although this gross disregard by +the Germans of their solemn pledge did not entail the same consequences +as the subsequent violation of Belgian neutrality, it is equally +reprehensible from the point of view of international law, and the more +cowardly in proportion as this state is weaker than Belgium. Against +this intrusion Luxemburg protested, but, unlike Belgium, she did not +appeal to the Powers.[120] + +Two days later, August 4th, the King of the Belgians appealed to the +King for 'diplomatic intervention to safeguard the integrity of +Belgium'.[121] The German Government had issued an ultimatum to the +Belgian, asking for + + 'a free passage through Belgian territory, and promising to maintain + the independence and integrity of the kingdom and its possessions at + the conclusion of peace, threatening in case of refusal to treat + Belgium as an enemy. An answer was requested within twelve + hours'.[122] + +Sir Edward Grey instructed the British Ambassador to protest against +this violation of a treaty to which Germany in common with ourselves was +a party, and to ask an assurance that the demand made upon Belgium would +not be proceeded with. At the same time the Belgian Government was told +to resist German aggression by all the means in its power, as Great +Britain was prepared to join France and Russia to maintain the +independence and integrity of Belgium.[123] On receipt of the protest of +Sir Edward Grey, it would seem that Herr von Jagow made one more +desperate effort to bid for British neutrality: 'Germany will, under no +pretence whatever, annex Belgian territory': to pass through Belgium was +necessary because the 'German army could not be exposed to French attack +across Belgium, which was planned according to absolutely unimpeachable +information'. It was for Germany 'a question of life and death to +prevent French advance'.[124] But matters had gone too far: that day +(August 4) the Germans violated Belgian territory at Gemmenich, and +thereupon the British demand to Germany to respect Belgian neutrality, +issued earlier in the day, was converted into an ultimatum:-- + + 'We hear that Germany has addressed note to Belgian Minister for + Foreign Affairs stating that German Government will be compelled to + carry out, if necessary by force of arms, the measures considered + indispensable. + + 'We are also informed that Belgian territory has been violated at + Gemmenich. + + 'In these circumstances, and in view of the fact that Germany + declined to give the same assurance respecting Belgium as France + gave last week in reply to our request made simultaneously at Berlin + and Paris, we must repeat that request, and ask that a satisfactory + reply to it and to my telegram of this morning be received here by + 12 o'clock to-night. If not, you are instructed to ask for your + passports, and to say that His Majesty's Government feel bound to + take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium + and the observance of a treaty to which Germany is as much a party + as ourselves.'[125] + +The effect at Berlin was remarkable. Every sign was given of +disappointment and resentment at such a step being taken, and the +'harangue' of the Chancellor to Sir Edward Goschen, and his astonishment +at the value laid by Great Britain upon the 'scrap of paper' of 1839 +would seem, when coupled with Herr von Jagow's desperate bid for +neutrality at the last moment, to show that the German Government had +counted on the neutrality of this country and had been deeply +disappointed. If these outbursts and attempts at the eleventh hour to +bargain for our neutrality were genuine efforts to keep the peace +between Great Britain and Germany, it is our belief that their origin +must be found in the highest authority in the German Empire, whom we +believe, in spite of petty signs of spitefulness exhibited since the war +broke out, to have been sincerely and honestly working in favour of +European peace, against obstacles little dreamt of by our countrymen. +But certain signs are not wanting that, in the lower ranks of the German +hierarchy, war with this country had been decided on, and that Sir +Edward Grey was not far wrong when he wrote to Sir Francis Bertie on +July 31, 'I believe it to be quite untrue that our attitude has been a +decisive factor in situation. German Government do not expect our +neutrality.'[126] On what other grounds than that orders had been sent +out from Berlin can the fact be explained that the German Customs +authorities, three days before the declaration of war, began detaining +British ships,[127] and compulsorily unloading cargoes of sugar from +British vessels? In the former case, indeed, the ships were ordered to +be released; in the latter case, of which the complaint was made +twenty-four hours later, the reply to inquiries was the ominous +statement that 'no information was to be had'.[128] + +This, however, is a digression from the main question. History will +doubtless attribute the outbreak of war between ourselves and Germany to +the development of the Belgian question, and, we are confident, will +judge that had it not been for the gratuitous attack made on a neutral +country by Germany, war with Great Britain would not have ensued on +August 4, 1914. The excuses put forward by the German Government for +this wanton outrage on international agreements are instructive. In +conversation with Sir Edward Goschen, neither Herr von Jagow nor the +Chancellor urged that the French had violated the neutrality; the +argument is purely and simply that the route by way of the Vosges is +difficult, time is everything, and it is a matter of life and death to +Germany to crush France as quickly as possible, in order that she may be +able to meet the Russians before they reach the German frontier. This +excuse does not seem to have been very satisfactory even to those who +put it forward, though it was indubitably the real reason; so vice paid +homage to virtue, and Herr von Jagow urged to Prince Lichnowsky that he +had 'absolutely unimpeachable information' that the German army was +exposed to French attack across Belgium. On the other hand, the +Chancellor, as late as August 4th, seems to have known nothing of any +such action by France; at any rate he made no mention of it in his +speech to the Reichstag:-- + + 'We are now in a state of necessity, and necessity knows no law. Our + troops have occupied Luxemburg and perhaps are already on Belgian + soil. Gentlemen, that is contrary to the dictates of international + law. It is true that the French Government has declared at Brussels + that France is willing to respect the neutrality of Belgium, as long + as her opponent respects it. We knew, however, that France stood + ready for invasion. France could wait but we could not wait. A + French movement upon our flank upon the Lower Rhine might have been + disastrous. So we were compelled to override the just protest of the + Luxemburg and Belgian Governments. The wrong--I speak openly--that + we are committing we will endeavour to make good as soon as our + military goal has been reached. Anybody who is threatened as we are + threatened, and is fighting for his highest possessions, can only + have one thought--how he is to hack his way through.'[129] + +In this double-faced position of the German Government, we have an +example either of unsurpassed wickedness or of insurpassable folly. The +violation of Belgium must have been designed either in order to bring us +into the quarrel, or on the supposition that, in spite of treaties and +warnings, we should yet remain neutral. Yet the foolishness of such a +calculation is as nothing to that which prompted the excuse that Germany +had to violate Belgian neutrality because the French were going to do +so, or had done so. In such a case undoubtedly the wisest course for +Germany would have been to allow the French to earn the reward of their +own folly and be attacked not only by Belgium but also by Great Britain, +to whom not five days before they had solemnly promised to observe the +neutrality, and whom such a gross violation of the French word must +indubitably have kept neutral, if it did not throw her on to the side of +Germany. In regard to Belgium the Germans have indeed put forward the +plea that the French had already violated its neutrality before war was +declared. This plea has been like a snowball. It began with the +ineffective accusation that the French were at Givet, a town in French +territory, and that this constituted an attack on Germany, though how +the presence of the French in a town of their own could be called a +violation of their neighbour's neutrality it is difficult to see. From +that it has gradually grown into a more formidable story of the French +supplying a garrison to Liege. There can be little doubt that all these +attempts by Herr von Jagow to claim that the French violated Belgian +neutrality are another illustration of Swift's dictum to the effect that +'as universal a practice as lying is, and as easy a one as it seems', it +is astonishing that it has been brought to so little perfection, 'even +by those who are most celebrated in that faculty'.[130] + + +IV + +_England and Servia_. + +We have seen what attitude was taken by Germany in the crisis which +followed upon the Serajevo murders and more definitely upon the +presentation of the Austrian note. It is equally important, and to +English readers at least more interesting, to realize what attitude was +taken by England. Sir Edward Grey throughout maintained the position, +which he was so justly praised for adopting in 1912, that England had no +direct interest in Balkan disputes, but that it was her bounden duty to +prevent a European conflagration. He quickly saw, what Germany would not +see, that Russia was so much interested in Servia, for both political +and religious reasons, that any attempt by the Austro-Hungarian +Government to coerce Servia, to interfere with her territorial integrity +or independence as a sovereign state, would inevitably rouse Russia to +military action. For Russia had greater interests in the security of +Servia than Great Britain had in the security of Belgium. In each case +the Great Power was bound by honour and self-interest alike to interfere +to protect the smaller Power, but Russia was also bound to Servia by +racial and religious bonds. This being so, Sir Edward Grey set himself, +not as the German White Book says[131] to localize the conflict, but to +prevent if possible a conflict between Austria-Hungary and Servia which +would inevitably involve Russia and probably other European powers. He +stated his policy with the greatest clearness in the House of Commons on +July 27th, but he had already acted on the lines of the policy which he +then explained. On July 24th he told Count Mensdorff that he would +concern himself + + 'with the matter simply and solely from the point of view of the + peace of Europe. The merits of the dispute between Austria and + Servia were not the concern of His Majesty's Government[132].' + +In similar language, but more fully, on the same day he told the German +Ambassador:-- + + 'If the presentation of this ultimatum to Servia did not lead to + trouble between Austria and Russia, we need not concern ourselves + about it; but if Russia took the view of the Austrian ultimatum + which it seemed to me that any Power interested in Servia would + take, I should be quite powerless, in face of the terms of the + ultimatum, to exercise any moderating influence[133].' + +Sir Edward Grey at once urged that the four Powers, Germany, Italy, +France, and Great Britain, should act together in the interests of peace +at the courts of St. Petersburg and Vienna. And he went further and +tried to induce Servia to 'express concern and regret' and to 'give +Austria the fullest satisfaction', 'if it is proved that Servian +officials, however subordinate, were accomplices in the murders at +Serajevo[134].' Further than that no British Foreign Minister could go; +Sir George Buchanan correctly explained the situation to M. Sazonof when +he laid stress on the need of the sanction of British public +opinion[135]. Sir Edward Grey re-echoed this when he wrote:-- + + 'I do not consider that public opinion here would or ought to + sanction our going to war over a Servian quarrel. If, however, war + does take place, the development of other issues may draw us into + it, and I am therefore anxious to prevent it.'[136] + +However, matters were moving rapidly: the Servian reply[137] was +presented on July 25; it was considered unsatisfactory by the +Austro-Hungarian Government, and the Minister, with the Legation-staff, +withdrew from Belgrade. Next day Sir Edward Grey proposed that a +conference of Germany, Italy, France, and Great Britain should meet in +London immediately 'for the purpose of discovering an issue which would +prevent complications', and 'that all active military operations should +be suspended pending results of conference'.[138] This proposal failed, +as has been explained in earlier pages (pp. 71-3), and on July 28th +Austria-Hungary declared war on Servia. Sir Edward Grey remained firm to +his original attitude of non-intervention, and told M. Cambon that 'the +dispute between Austria and Servia was not one in which we felt called +to take a hand'.[139] And on the same day he declined to discuss with +Count Mensdorff 'the merits of the question between Austria and +Servia'.[140] + +No one can doubt that Sir Edward Grey's attitude was diplomatically +correct and consistent. It was also inspired by a genuine desire for +peace, and stands out in sharp contrast with the 'equivocal and +double-faced' policy of Germany, and with the obstinacy of Austria in +refusing to permit the Powers to mediate; for it was with truth that M. +Sazonof remarked that + + 'a refusal to prolong the term of the ultimatum would render + nugatory the proposals made by the Austro-Hungarian Government to + the Powers, and would be in contradiction to the very basis of + international relations.'[141] + + +V + +_Great Britain declines 'Solidarity' with Russia and France_. + +There is however another question which involves the whole foreign +policy of Great Britain. Could Sir Edward Grey have prevented the war by +boldly declaring at once that England would support Russia and France, +if necessary by armed force? It was a policy urged on him from several +quarters, and it is possible that such action might have been +successful. It is to Sir Edward Grey's credit that he quietly but firmly +refused to take so hazardous and unprecedented a step. Let us examine +these proposals briefly. As early as July 24th M. Sazonof 'hoped that +His Majesty's Government would not fail to proclaim their solidarity +with Russia and France.[142]' The French Ambassador at St. Petersburg +joined in the request, and M. Sazonof pointed out that + + 'we would sooner or later be dragged into war if it did break out; + we should have rendered war more likely if we did not from the + outset make common cause with his country and with France[143].' + +On July 30th the President of the French Republic expressed his +conviction that + + 'peace between the Powers is in the hands of Great Britain. If His + Majesty's Government announced that England would come to the aid of + France in the event of a conflict between France and Germany, as a + result of the present differences between Austria and Servia, there + would be no war, for Germany would at once modify her + attitude[144].' + +Even more important was the opinion of the Italian Minister for Foreign +Affairs, whose country was a member of the Triple Alliance:-- + + 'As Germany was really anxious for good relations with ourselves, if + she believed that Great Britain would act with Russia and France, he + thought it would have a great effect.'[145] + +Such opinions must, and do, carry great weight, but Sir Edward Grey and +the British Ambassadors were equally firm in withstanding them. Sir +George Buchanan at once told M. Sazonof that he + + 'saw no reason to expect any declaration of solidarity from His + Majesty's Government that would entail an unconditional engagement + on their part to support Russia and France by force of arms'.[146] + +On July 27th he met the proposal more directly by pointing out that, so +far from such a policy conducing to the maintenance of peace, it would +merely offend the pride of the Germans and stiffen them in their present +attitude.[147] Two days later Sir Edward Grey pointed out to M. Cambon +that + + 'even if the question became one between Austria and Russia, we + should not feel called upon to take a hand in it. It would then be a + question of the supremacy of Teuton or Slav--a struggle for + supremacy in the Balkans; and our idea had always been to avoid + being drawn into a war over a Balkan question'.[148] + +That is one answer to the proposal, an answer based on history and on +Britain's foreign policy in past years. Sir Edward Grey had another +answer. It was to the effect that Germany could not, and ought to have +known she could not, rely on our neutrality. For when the Russian +Ambassador told him that an impression prevailed in German and Austrian +circles that in any event England would stand aside, he pointed out that + + 'this impression ought to be dispelled by the orders we have given + to the First Fleet, which is concentrated, as it happens, at + Portland, not to disperse for manoeuvre leave'.[149] + +The situation continued to develop unfavourably for the cause of peace +owing to the Austrian declaration of war on Servia, and the consequent +mobilizations in Russia, Germany, and France. On July 31st Sir Edward +Grey said:-- + + 'I believe it to be quite untrue that our attitude has been a + decisive factor in situation. German Government do not expect our + neutrality.'[150] + +It is not quite clear that Sir Edward Grey's belief was justified. +England's attitude may have been an important factor in the situation, +but still in our opinion Sir Edward Grey was not only right in refusing +to commit England to a new Continental policy, but could not, with due +observance of constitutional usages, have taken any other course. Again, +it is doubtful whether the German Government did or did not rely on our +neutrality. The German Chancellor and the German Secretary for Foreign +Affairs later affected great surprise at our action. Germany, however, +as we have shown above (p. 82), had been plainly warned by Sir Edward +Grey on July 29th[151] that she could not rely on our remaining neutral +under all circumstances. + +Whether Sir Edward Grey was right or wrong in his estimate of Germany's +prudence is a small matter; what is important is that his action was +throughout perfectly straightforward and consistent. And unquestionably +he had a very difficult part to play. The near East was like a blazing +rick surrounded by farm buildings; Germany was, if not stirring up the +conflagration, certainly not attempting to pour water on the flames, +while Austria, possibly--and even probably[152] with Germany's +knowledge, would allow no one to make the attempt. + +It would have aided the Austrian cause more effectively in Europe and +elsewhere, if the Government had communicated[153] 'the _dossier_ +elucidating the Servian intrigues and the connexion between these +intrigues and the murder of 28th June', which it said it held at the +disposal of the British Government.[154] For even Count Mensdorff +'admitted that, on paper, the Servian reply might seem to be +satisfactory'.[155] + +To judge whether the Servian reply was satisfactory, it was, and is, +necessary to examine the evidence on which the Austro-Hungarian +Government based the accusations formulated in its note of July 23rd. +But even assuming that the Austrian charges were true, as the German +White Book says they are,[156] it is only a stronger reason for allowing +the Powers to examine this evidence; and it does not explain the +persistent refusal,[157] until July 31st,[158] to permit any +negotiations on the basis of the Servian reply. + +Such being the situation, it is very difficult to see what more Sir +Edward Grey could have done to prevent the outbreak of war between +Austria-Hungary and Servia, which did inevitably, as he foresaw from the +first, drag in other nations. He urged Servia to moderation and even to +submission; he tried to induce the four Powers to mediate jointly at St. +Petersburg and Vienna; he proposed a conference of the four Powers to +prevent further complications; he did everything in his power to +restrain Russia from immediate armed support of Servia; he declined to +join Russia and France in eventual military action; and even up to the +violation of the neutrality of Belgium he still strove to avert the +horrors of war from Europe. + + +VI + +_Italy's comments on the situation_. + +We have already shown (Chap. II) how Italy became a member of the Triple +Alliance, and how, in spite of its apparent frailty and of the somewhat +divergent aims of its members, that alliance has endured for thirty-two +years. It remains to consider what policy Italy adopted in the critical +situation created by the presentation of the Austro-Hungarian note to +Servia, and to appreciate the significance of that policy. It is +supremely significant that Italy, though a member of the Triple +Alliance, was not consulted about the terms of the Austrian note to +Servia; that she worked persistently side by side with England in +endeavouring to prevent an outbreak of war, and, when that failed, to +induce the states actually at war, or on the brink of war, to suspend +all military operations in order to give diplomatic intervention an +opportunity; and it is equally significant that, when the great war +broke out, Italy remained neutral, in spite of the pressure from her +allies and the tempting bait of a share of the spoil, which, it is said, +is even now being offered to her.[159] This is but a bald description of +Italy's policy, but it can be substantiated in detail from official +documents. As early as July 25th the Italian Ambassador in a +conversation with Sir Edward Grey 'made no secret of the fact that Italy +was desirous to see war avoided',[160] and he cordially approved the +idea of mediation by the four Powers. Two days later Italy again +approved the proposed conference of four to be held immediately in +London. The Italian Foreign Minister promised to recommend most strongly +to the German Government the idea of asking Russia, Austria, and Servia +to suspend military operations pending the result of the conference, and +went even further in undertaking to ask what procedure Germany thought +most likely to be successful at Vienna.[161] He thought it very doubtful +whether Germany would consent to ask Austria to suspend military +operations, but made a further suggestion that + + 'Servia may be induced to accept note in its entirety on the advice + of the four Powers invited to the conference, and this would enable + her to say that she had yielded to Europe and not to Austria-Hungary + alone'.[162] + +Next day the Marquis di San Giuliano called attention to a point in +Servia's reply to Austria which might form a starting-point for +mediation.[163] On July 29th he tried to get over Germany's objection to +the idea of a 'Conference' by suggesting adherence to the idea of an +exchange of views in London.[164] Next day he added to this the +practical suggestion that + + 'Germany might invite Austria to state exactly the terms which she + would demand from Servia, and give a guarantee that she would + neither deprive her of independence, nor annex territory.... We + might, on the other hand, ascertain from Russia what she would + accept, and, once we knew the standpoints of these two countries, + discussions could be commenced at once.'[165] + +Moreover the Italian Ambassador at Vienna, in the hope of pacifying +Russia, made the useful suggestion that Austria should + + 'convert into a binding engagement to Europe the declaration which + has been made at St. Petersburg to the effect that she desires + neither to destroy the independence of Servia, nor to acquire + Servian territory'.[166] + +All efforts to preserve peace proved futile; Germany delivered her +ultimatum to France and to Russia. Then arose the question, what was +Italy to do? The answer to this was given by the Italian Foreign +Minister:-- + + 'The war undertaken by Austria, and the consequences which might + result, had, in the words of the German Ambassador himself, an + aggressive object. Both were therefore in conflict with the purely + defensive character of the Triple Alliance; in such circumstances + Italy would remain neutral.'[167] + +The German White Book says 'Russia began the war on us'[168] and 'France +opened hostilities'[169]; if these statements were true, Italy would +have been obliged, if she were to remain faithful to her engagements, to +take part in the war side by side with her colleagues of the Triple +Alliance. Impartial readers can draw their own conclusions. + + +NOTE + +_Austro-Hungarian note to Servia, and Servia's reply_. + +On July 23rd the Austro-Hungarian Government presented an ultimatum to +Servia, demanding unconditional acceptance within 48 hours, an ultimatum +which the _Temps_ next day described as 'unprecedented in its arrogance +and in the extravagance of its demands'. Of it Sir Edward Grey said:-- + + 'I had never before seen one State address to another independent + State a document of so formidable a character. Demand No. 5 would be + hardly consistent with the maintenance of Servia's independent + sovereignty, if it were to mean, as it seemed that it might, that + Austria-Hungary was to be invested with a right to appoint officials + who would have authority within the frontiers of Servia.'[170] + +It may be true, as the Austrian Ambassador explained,[171] that the +Austro-Hungarian Government did not intend this step to be regarded as +an ultimatum, but as a _demarche_ with a time-limit. + +In this extraordinary document[172] the Austro-Hungarian Government +demanded:-- + +A. That Servia should publish on the front page of its 'Official +Gazette', and in the 'Official Bulletin' of the Army, and should +communicate to the Army as the order of the day a declaration + +(1) condemning Serb propaganda against Austria-Hungary; + +(2) regretting that Servian officers and functionaries participated in +the propaganda; + +(3) promising to proceed with the utmost rigour against persons who may +be guilty of such machinations. + +B. That Servia should undertake + +(1) to suppress any publication inciting to hatred and contempt of +Austria-Hungary; + +(2) to dissolve the society styled Narodna Odbrana and similar societies +and to confiscate their means of propaganda; + +(3) to eliminate from public instruction in Servia all teachers and all +methods of instruction responsible for fomenting opinion against +Austria-Hungary; + +(4) to remove from the military service and from the administration all +officers and functionaries guilty of such propaganda, whose names and +deeds the Austro-Hungarian Government reserved to itself the right of +communicating; + +(5) to accept the collaboration in Servia of representatives of +Austria-Hungary in the suppression of the subversive anti-Austrian +movement; + +(6) to take judicial proceedings against accessories to the Serajevo +plot, with the co-operation of Austro-Hungarian delegates; + +(7) to proceed immediately to the arrest of Major Voija Tankositch and +of Milan Ciganovitch, a Servian State employe, who have been compromised +by the results of the inquiry at Serajevo; + +(8) to stop co-operation of Servian authorities in illicit traffic in +arms and explosives, and to dismiss and punish those officials who +helped the perpetrators of the Serajevo crime; + +(9) to explain the unjustifiable utterances of high Servian officials, +at home and abroad, after the Serajevo crime. + +On July 25th the Servian reply[173] was presented to the +Austro-Hungarian Government. Even to a reader with Austrian sympathies +this reply seems to go a long way towards meeting the demands. The +Servian Government agreed + +A. that Servia should, as demanded, publish a declaration + +(1) condemning all propaganda which may be directed against +Austria-Hungary; + +(2) regretting that, according to the communication from the Imperial +and Royal Government, Servian officers and officials participated in the +propaganda; + +(3) promising to proceed with the utmost rigour against all persons who +are guilty of such acts. + +B. That Servia would undertake + +(1) to introduce a provision into the press law providing for the most +severe punishment of incitement to hatred and contempt of +Austria-Hungary and to introduce an amendment to the Constitution +providing for the confiscation of such publications; + +(2) to dissolve the Narodna Odbrana and similar societies; + +(3) to remove at once from their public educational establishments all +that serves or could serve to foment propaganda, whenever the +Austro-Hungarian Government furnish them with facts and proofs of this +propaganda; + +(4) to remove from military service all such persons as the judicial +inquiry may have proved to be guilty of acts directed against the +territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary; + +(5) though they do not clearly grasp the meaning or the scope of the +demand, to accept the collaboration of Austro-Hungarian officials so far +as is consistent with the principle of international law, with criminal +procedure and with good neighbourly relations; + +(6) to take judicial proceedings against accessories to the Serajevo +plot; but they cannot admit the co-operation of Austro-Hungarian +officials, as it would be a violation of the Constitution and of the law +of criminal procedure; + +(7) On this they remark that Major Tankositch was arrested as soon as +the note was presented, and that it has not been possible to arrest +Ciganovitch, who is an Austro-Hungarian subject, but had been employed +(on probation) by the directorate of railways; + +(8) to reinforce and extend the measures for preventing illicit traffic +of arms and explosives across the frontier; + +(9) to give explanations of the remarks made by Servian officials, as +soon as the Austro-Hungarian Government have communicated the passages +and as soon as they have shown that the remarks were actually made by +the said officials. + +The Austro-Hungarian Government regarded this reply as unsatisfactory +and inadequate; they withdrew their Minister from Belgrade the same +evening, and on July 28th declared war on Servia. Meanwhile they +published a long official explanation[174] of the grounds on which the +Servian reply was considered inadequate; in it they criticized and found +unsatisfactory every single article of the reply, except that to demand +No. 8. It is not worth while to analyze the whole of this; one sample +may be sufficient. Sir Edward Grey commented on demand No. 5 and pointed +out[175] that it + + 'would be hardly consistent with the maintenance of Servia's + independent sovereignty, if it were to mean, as it seemed that it + might, that Austria-Hungary was to be invested with a right to + appoint officials who would have authority within the frontiers of + Servia.' + +Obviously he was in doubt about the meaning and scope of this demand, +and the next was equally vague. The Servian reply to these two demands +was necessarily guarded: yet the Austro-Hungarian Government treated +this as deliberate misrepresentation:-- + + 'The international law, as well as the criminal law, has nothing to + do with this question; it is purely a matter of the nature of state + police which is to be solved by way of a special agreement. The + reserved attitude of Servia is therefore incomprehensible, and on + account of its vague general form it would lead to unbridgeable + difficulties. + + ... + + 'If the Servian Government misunderstands us here, this is done + deliberately, for it must be familiar with the difference between + "enquete judiciaire" and simple police researches. As it desired to + escape from every control of the investigation which would yield, if + correctly carried out, highly undesirable results for it, and as it + possesses no means to refuse in a plausible manner the co-operation + of our officials (precedents for such police intervention exist in + great number), it tries to justify its refusal by showing up our + demands as impossible.'[176] + +It would have been fairer to Servia to assume that there had been a +genuine misunderstanding, and that the explanation here given by Austria +might prove satisfactory to Servia, as the Italian Minister for Foreign +Affairs suggested.[177] The persistent refusal of Austria-Hungary to +permit any discussion on the basis of the Servian reply goes far to +justify Sir Maurice de Bunsen's impression + + 'that the Austro-Hungarian note was so drawn up as to make war + inevitable, that their Government are fully resolved to have war + with Servia, that they consider their position as a Great Power to + be at stake, and that until punishment has been administered to + Servia it is unlikely that they will listen to proposals of + mediation'.[178] + +Notes: + +[Footnote 57: _Correspondence respecting the European Crisis_, No. 2. +Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 22, 1914.] + +[Footnote 58: German White Book, p. 4.] + +[Footnote 59: _Correspondence_, No. 10. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, +July 24.] + +[Footnote 60: _Correspondence_, No. 18. Sir H. Rumbold to Sir E. Grey, +July 25.] + +[Footnote 61: Ibid. No. 32. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir E. Grey, July 26. +See also German White Book, p. 5.] + +[Footnote 62: Ibid. No. 54. M. Sazonof to Count Benckendorff, July +15/28, 1914 (communicated by Count Benckendorff, July 28).] + +[Footnote 63: _Correspondence_, No. 139. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, +August 1.] + +[Footnote 64: _Ibid_. No. 141. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir E. Grey, August +1.] + +[Footnote 65: _Ibid_. No. 71. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 28.] + +[Footnote 66: _Correspondence_, No. 94. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir E. Grey, +July 29.] + +[Footnote 67: German White Book, p. 4 (see _infra_ Appendix I).] + +[Footnote 68: _Ibid_. No. 36. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, Sir H. +Rumbold, and Sir R. Rodd, July 26.] + +[Footnote 69: _Correspondence_, No. 43. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, +July 27.] + +[Footnote 70: _Ibid_. No. 60. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 28.] + +[Footnote 71: _Ibid_. No. 84. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, July 29.] + +[Footnote 72: p. 8 and Exhibit 12 (see _infra_ Appendix I).] + +[Footnote 73: _Correspondence_, No. 11. Sir E. Grey to Sir II. Rumbold, +July 24.] + +[Footnote 74: _Correspondence_, No. 46. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, +July 27.] + +[Footnote 75: Ibid. No. 80. Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey, July 29.] + +[Footnote 76: Ibid. No. 43. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 27.] + +[Footnote 77: Although the German White Book attempts to make out that +Russia mobilized on July 26th, it produces no evidence more satisfactory +than the information of the German Imperial attache in Russia, whose +account of the Russian military preparations supports only in part the +allegations made at Berlin. See German White Book, Exhibits 6 and 7; +also _Correspondence_, No. 78, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 29. +For the Austrian decree of general mobilization, see the Russian Orange +Book No. 47 (_infra_ in Appendix VI).] + +[Footnote 78: _Correspondence_, No. 43. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, +July 27.] + +[Footnote 79: _Ibid_. No. 76. The same to the same, July 29.] + +[Footnote 80: _Correspondence_, No. 78. Sir George Buchanan to Sir E. +Grey, July 29, 1914.] + +[Footnote 81: German White Book, p. 38, and Exhibit No. 7, July 26.] + +[Footnote 82: _Correspondence_, No. 71. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, +July 28. See also quotation in _Times_ of July 29, p. 8, col. 2, from +the _Militaer-Wochenblatt_: 'The fighting power of Russia is usually +over-estimated, and numbers are far less decisive than _moral_, the +higher command, armaments.... All military preparations for war, of +whatever sort, have been taken with that attention to detail and that +order which marks Germany. It can therefore be said, without +exaggeration, that Germany can face the advent of grave events with +complete calm, trusting to God and her own might.'] + +[Footnote 83: _Correspondence_, No. 80. Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey, July +29.] + +[Footnote 84: _Ibid_. No. 97. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 30. +Cf. Russian Orange Book, Nos. 61, 62 (_infra_ in Appendix VI).] + +[Footnote 85: _Ibid_.] + +[Footnote 86: _Correspondence_, No. 97. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, +July 30.] + +[Footnote 87: _Ibid_. No. 113. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 31.] + +[Footnote 88: _Ibid_.] + +[Footnote 89: _Ibid_. No. 112. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 31.] + +[Footnote 90: _Ibid_. No. 113, _ut sup_. On August 1 _The Times_ +published a semi-official telegram from Berlin, dated Eydtkuhnen, July +31, that 'the second and third Russian cavalry divisions are on the +frontier between Wirballen, Augustof, and Allenstein'.] + +[Footnote 91: _Ibid_. No. 111. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, July 31.] + +[Footnote 92: _Ibid_. No. 121. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 31.] + +[Footnote 93: See German White Book, pp. 12 and 13, and Exhibits 20, 21, +22, 23, 23a (see _infra_ Appendix I).] + +[Footnote 94: _Correspondence_, No. 121. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, +July 31.] + +[Footnote 95: _Ibid_. Nos. 131, 133, 135.] + +[Footnote 96: Russian Orange Book, No. 58 (_infra_ Appendix VI).] + +[Footnote 97: _Ibid_. No. 133. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, August 1, +encloses a telegram of July 31, to the effect that 'The Austro-Hungarian +Ambassador declared the readiness of his Government to discuss the +substance of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia. M. Sazonof replied by +expressing his satisfaction, and said it was desirable that the +discussions should take place in London with the participation of the +Great Powers.'] + +[Footnote 98: German White Book, p. 8.] + +[Footnote 99: _Ibid_. p. 9, Exhibit No. 17.] + +[Footnote 100: _Correspondence_, No. 76. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, +July 29: 'His Excellency denied German Government had done this. +Nevertheless it is true.'] + +[Footnote 101: Ibid. No. 99. Sir F. Bertie to Sir E. Grey, July 30.] + +[Footnote 102: _Correspondence_. Enclosure 3 in No. 105. French Minister +for Foreign Affairs to M. Cambon.] + +[Footnote 103: _Ibid_.] + +[Footnote 104: German White Book, p. 48 (see _infra_, Appendix I).] + +[Footnote 105: _Correspondence_, No. 138. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, +Aug. 1.] + +[Footnote 106: _Correspondence_, No. 24. Sir E. Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, +July 25.] + +[Footnote 107: _Correspondence_, No. 47. Sir E. Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, +July 27.] + +[Footnote 108: _Ibid_. No. 89. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, July 29.] + +[Footnote 109: _Correspondence_, No. 85. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, +July 29 (received July 29).] + +[Footnote 110: _Ibid_. No. 101. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, July 30.] + +[Footnote 111: _Correspondence_, No. 109. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, +July 31.] + +[Footnote 112: _Ibid_. No. 106. Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey, July 30.] + +[Footnote 113: _Correspondence_, No. 114. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie +and Sir E. Goschen, July 31.] + +[Footnote 114: _Ibid_. No. 125. Sir F. Bertie to Sir E. Grey, July 31.] + +[Footnote 115: _Ibid_. No. 122. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 31. +It may be observed that by the Hague Convention of 1907, Belgium was +bound to impose this embargo after the ultimatum of Germany to Russia +(Art. 2).] + +[Footnote 116: _Correspondence_, No. 123. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, +August 1.] + +[Footnote 117: _The Times_, August 28, 1914, p. 9, cols. 5 and 6.] + +[Footnote 118: See _The Times_, August 27, 1914. The Imperial Chancellor +telegraphed to Prince Lichnowsky: 'Germany is ready to take up the +English proposal if England guarantees with her forces the absolute +neutrality of France in a Russo-German conflict.... We promise that the +French frontier shall not be passed by our troops before 7 p.m. on +Monday, August 3, if England's consent is given in the meantime.'] + +[Footnote 119: _Correspondence_, No. 148. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, +August 2.] + +[Footnote 120: _Correspondence_, No. 147. Minister of State, Luxemburg, +to Sir E. Grey, August 2.] + +[Footnote 121: _Ibid_. No. 153. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, August +4.] + +[Footnote 122: _Ibid_.] + +[Footnote 123: _Ibid_. No. 155. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Villiers, August +4.] + +[Footnote 124: _Correspondence_, No. 157. German Foreign Secretary to +Prince Lichnowsky, August 4.] + +[Footnote 125: _Ibid_. No. 159. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, August +4.] + +[Footnote 126: _Correspondence_, No. 116, July 31.] + +[Footnote 127: _Ibid_. Nos. 130, 143, 145.] + +[Footnote 128: _Ibid_. Nos. 149, 150, August 2 and 3.] + +[Footnote 129: _The Times_, August 11, p. 5, col. 1.] + +[Footnote 130: _Thoughts on Various Subjects, Moral and Diverting_ +(October, 1706).] + +[Footnote 131: p. 6.] + +[Footnote 132: _Correspondence_, No. 5. Sir E. Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, +July 24.] + +[Footnote 133: _Ibid_. No. 10. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, July 24. +Cf. No. 24, Sir E. Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, July 25: 'The sudden, +brusque, and peremptory character of the Austrian _demarche_ makes it +almost inevitable that in a very short time both Russia and Austria will +have mobilized against each other.'] + +[Footnote 134: _Ibid_. No. 12. Sir E. Grey to Mr. Crackanthorpe, July +24.] + +[Footnote 135: _Ibid_. No. 6. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 24: +'I said ... direct British interests in Servia were _nil_, and a war on +behalf of that country would never be sanctioned by British public +opinion.'] + +[Footnote 136: _Correspondence_, No. 24. Sir E. Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, +July 25.] + +[Footnote 137: See note at the end of this chapter.] + +[Footnote 138: _Correspondence_, No. 36. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, +July 26.] + +[Footnote 139: _Ibid_. No. 87. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, July 29.] + +[Footnote 140: _Ibid_. No. 91. Sir E. Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, July +29.] + +[Footnote 141: _Ibid_. No. 13. Note communicated to Sir E. Grey by the +Russian Ambassador, July 25.] + +[Footnote 142: _Correspondence_, No. 6. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, +July 24.] + +[Footnote 143: _Ibid_.] + +[Footnote 144: _Ibid_. No. 99. Sir F. Bertie to Sir E. Grey, July 30. +Cf. No. 119, Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, July 31.] + +[Footnote 145: _Correspondence_, No. 80. Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey, +July 29.] + +[Footnote 146: _Ibid_. No. 6. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 24.] + +[Footnote 147: _Ibid_. No. 44. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 27: +'Their (sc. the German) attitude would merely be stiffened by such a +menace, and we could only induce her (sc. Germany) to use her influence +at Vienna to avert war by approaching her in the capacity of a friend +who was anxious to preserve peace.'] + +[Footnote 148: _Ibid_. No. 87. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, July 29.] + +[Footnote 149: _Correspondence_, No. 47. Sir E. Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, +July 27.] + +[Footnote 150: _Ibid_. No. 116. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, July 31.] + +[Footnote 151: _Ibid_. No. 89. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, July 29.] + +[Footnote 152: _Correspondence_, No. 95. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir E. +Grey, July 30: 'Although I am not able to verify it, I have private +information that the German Ambassador knew the text of the Austrian +ultimatum to Servia before it was despatched, and telegraphed it to the +German Emperor. I know from the German Ambassador himself that he +endorses every line of it.'] + +[Footnote 153: But see Appendix IV.] + +[Footnote 154: _Correspondence_, No. 4, p. 8.] + +[Footnote 155: _Ibid_. No. 48. Sir E. Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, July +27.] + +[Footnote 156: pp. 3 to 5 and Exhibits 1 and 2 (see _infra_ Appendix +I).] + +[Footnote 157: _Correspondence_, No. 61, Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir E. +Grey, July 28; No. 78, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 29; No. 96, +Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir E. Grey, July 30.] + +[Footnote 158: _Correspondence_, No. 110, Sir E. Grey to Sir G. +Buchanan, July 31; No. 137, Sir E. Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, August 1.] + +[Footnote 159: _The Times_, September 3, p. 7. For Italy's ignorance of +the contents of the Austrian note, see App. V.] + +[Footnote 160: _Correspondence_, No. 29. Sir E. Grey to Sir R. Rodd, +July 25.] + +[Footnote 161: _Ibid_. No. 49. Sir E. Grey to Sir R. Rodd, July 27.] + +[Footnote 162: _Ibid_. No. 57. Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey, July 27. Cf. +No. 78, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 29.] + +[Footnote 163: _Correspondence_, No. 64. Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey, +July 28. Cf. _supra_, p. 99.] + +[Footnote 164: _Ibid_. No. 80. Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey, July 29. Cf. +No. 92, Sir E. Grey to Sir R. Rodd, July 29.] + +[Footnote 165: _Ibid_. No. 106. Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey, July 30.] + +[Footnote 166: _Ibid_. No. 79. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir E. Grey, July +29.] + +[Footnote 167: _Ibid_. No. 152. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, August 3.] + +[Footnote 168: p. 15 (see Appendix I _infra_).] + +[Footnote 169: p. 16 (_ibid._).] + +[Footnote 170: _Correspondence_, No. 5. Sir E. Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, +July 24. The text is also given in the German White Book (pp. 18-23), +which will be found in Appendix I.] + +[Footnote 171: _Ibid_. No. 14. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, July 25.] + +[Footnote 172: _Ibid_. No. 4. Communicated by Count Mensdorff, July 24.] + +[Footnote 173: _Correspondence_, No. 39. Communicated by the Servian +Minister, July 27. See also German White Book (pp. 23-32), _infra_ in +Appendix I.] + +[Footnote 174: German White Book, pp. 24 _et sqq_.; see _infra_ Appendix +I.] + +[Footnote 175: _Correspondence_, No. 5. Sir E. Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, +July 24.] + +[Footnote 176: German White Book, pp. 29 _et sqq_.; see _infra_ Appendix +I.] + +[Footnote 177: _Correspondence_, No. 64. Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey, +July 28.] + +[Footnote 178: _Ibid_. No. 41. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir E. Grey, July +27.] + + + + +CHAPTER VI + + +THE NEW GERMAN THEORY OF THE STATE + +The war in which England is now engaged with Germany is fundamentally a +war between two different principles--that of _raison d'etat_, and that +of the rule of law. The antagonism between these two principles appeared +in our own internal history as far back as the seventeenth century, when +the Stuarts championed the theory of state-necessity and the practice of +a prerogative free to act outside and above the law in order to meet the +demands of state-necessity, and when Parliament defended the rule of law +and sought to include the Crown under that law. The same antagonism now +appears externally in a struggle between two nations, one of which +claims a prerogative to act outside and above the public law of Europe +in order to secure the 'safety' of its own state, while the other stands +for the rule of public law. The one regards international covenants to +which it has pledged its own word as 'scraps of paper' when they stand +in the way of _salus populi_; the other regards the maintenance of such +covenants as a grave and inevitable obligation. + +Taught by Treitschke, whom they regard as their great national +historian, and whose lectures on _Politik_ have become a gospel, the +Germans of to-day assume as an ultimate end and a final standard what +they regard as the national German state.[179] 'The state', says +Treitschke, 'is the highest thing in the external society of man: above +it there is nothing at all in the history of the world.' There is here +no room for comity of nations; for a _societas totius humani generis_; +for international law in any true sense. What really exists is the +exclusive state--_der geschlossene Staat_--and in another sense than +that of Fichte. This state is rigorously national: it excludes all +foreign words from its vocabulary, and it would fain exclude all foreign +articles from its shores in order to found a real 'national' economy +such as List preached. Further, in the teaching of Treitschke this +exclusive state is, 'as Machiavelli first clearly saw', essentially +power: _der Staat ist Macht_. It may be defined as 'the public might for +defence and offence'. As the highest duty of the individual is +self-perfection, the highest duty of the state is self-preservation; and +self-preservation means power. 'To care for its power is the highest +moral duty of the state.' 'Of all political weaknesses that of +feebleness is the most abominable and despicable: it is the sin against +the Holy Spirit of Politics.' This may seem the mere worship of might, +and it is in effect nothing else than the mere worship of might; but we +should misrepresent Treitschke if we did not add that power is not +conceived by him as mere or bare power. The power of the state is +precious and ultimate because the state is a vehicle of culture: the +armed sword of the German state is precious because that state is the +_colporteur_ of German culture. And thus Treitschke holds that +Machiavelli, the great apostle of might, is only wrong in so far as he +failed to see that might must justify itself by having a content, that +is to say, by being used to spread the highest moral culture. It is +naturally assumed by German nationalists that this is German culture. + +Two results flow from this philosophy, one negative, the other positive. +The negative result is the repudiation of any idea of the final +character of international obligation; the other is the praise of the +glory of war. + +_Salus populi suprema lex_; and to it all international 'law' so called +must bend. The absolute sovereignty of the state is necessary for its +absolute power; and that absolute sovereignty cannot be bound by _any_ +obligation, even of its own making. Every treaty or promise made by a +state, Treitschke holds, is to be understood as limited by the proviso +_rebus sic stantibus_. 'A state cannot bind its will for the future over +against other states.' International treaties are no absolute +limitation, but a voluntary self-limitation of the state, and only for +such time as the state may find to be convenient. The state has no judge +set over it, and any 'legal' obligation it may incur is in the last +resort subject to its own decision--in other words, to its own +repudiation.[180] That the end justifies the means (in other words, that +the maintenance of the German Empire as it stands justifies the +violation of an international obligation) 'has a certain truth'. 'It is +ridiculous to advise a state which is in competition with other states +to start by taking the catechism into its hands.' All these hints of his +master were adopted and expanded by Bernhardi, the faithful disciple of +Treitschke, whose Berlin lectures were attended in the last quarter of +the nineteenth century by soldiers and officials as well as by students. +There is no such thing, Bernhardi feels, as universal international law. +'Each nation evolves its own conception of Right (_Recht_): none can say +that one nation has a better conception than another.' 'No +self-respecting nation would sacrifice its own conception of Right' to +any international rule: 'by so doing it would renounce its own highest +ideals.' The ardent nationalism which will reject foreign words and +foreign wares will reject international law as something 'foreign'. +Again, Bernhardi makes play with the proviso _rebus sic stantibus_; and +this, curiously enough, he does in reference to Belgium. Things are +altered in Belgium, and therefore the plighted word of Germany may no +longer be binding. 'When Belgium was proclaimed neutral, no one +contemplated that she would lay claim to a large and valuable region of +Africa. It may well be asked whether the acquisition of such territory +is not _ipso facto_ a breach of neutrality.'[181] + +But it is the glorification of war--war aggressive as well as war +defensive--which is the most striking result of the doctrine of the +all-sufficing, all-embracing national state. In the index to +Treitschke's _Politik_, under the word War, one reads the following +headings--'its sanctity'; 'to be conceived as an ordinance set by God'; +'is the most powerful maker of nations'; 'is politics _par excellence_'. +Two functions, says Treitschke, the state exists to discharge; and these +are to administer law, and to make war. Of the two war, since it is +politics _par excellence_, would appear to be the greater. War cannot be +thought or wished out of the world: it is the only medicine for a sick +nation. When we are sunk in the selfish individualism of peace, war +comes to make us realize that we are members one of another. 'Therein +lies the majesty of war, that the petty individual altogether vanishes +before the great thought of the state.' War alone makes us realize the +social organism to which we belong: 'it is political idealism which +demands war.' And again, 'what a perversion of morality it were, if one +struck out of humanity heroism'(_Heldentum_)--as if _Heldentum_ could +not exist in peace! 'But the living God will see to it that war shall +always recur as a terrible medicine for humanity.' + +Thus the idealization of the state as power results in the idealization +of war. As we have seen that the state must be 'power' in order to +preserve itself at all, we now find that it must be a war-state to +preserve itself from 'sickness'. If it does not fight, individualism +will triumph over the social organism; heroism will perish out of the +world. Hence Bernhardi writes: 'the maintenance of peace never can or +may be the goal of a policy'. War, war--the 'strong medicine', the +teacher of heroism, and, as Bernhardi adds to Treitschke, the inevitable +biological law, the force that spreads the finest culture--war is the +law of humanity. And this war is offensive as well as defensive-- +primarily, indeed, offensive. For the growing nation must preserve +all its new members in its bosom: it must not let them slip away +by emigration to foreign soils. It must therefore find for itself +colonies; and since the world is already largely occupied, it must find +them by conquest from other powers.[182] Treitschke already cried the +watchwords--'Colonies!' 'Sea-power to gain colonies!' Treitschke already +designated England as the object of German attack, and began to instil +in Germany a hatred of England. England blocked the way to the growth of +Germany from a European into a World-power; Germany, to preserve intact +for German culture the surplus of the growing population, must be a +World-power or perish. And besides, England was a 'sick' state--a sham, +an hypocrisy.[183] + +The whole philosophy seems paganism, or rather barbarism, with a moral +veneer. It seems barbarism, because it brings us back to the good old +days when mere might was right. Bernhardi, speaking of the right of +conquest of new territory inherent in a growing people, tells us that in +such cases 'might is at once the supreme right, and the dispute as to +what is right is decided by the arbitrament of war', which gives a +'biologically just decision'! And he expresses wonder and surprise at +those who think that 'the weak nation is to have the same right to live +as the powerful and vigorous nation'. In a word, then, might is right. +The doctrine has in itself a rude barbaric simplicity: what is utterly +revolting in the neo-Germanic presentment is its moral veneer--the talk +of war as the fruit of 'political idealism' and the expression of the +'social organism': the talk of 'historical development' as invalidating +supposed 'rights' like the neutrality of Belgium; above all, the talk of +power as 'the vehicle of the highest culture'. Treitschke, a stern +Protestant, seeks to reconcile the doctrine with Christianity; but the +doctrine is all the same pagan. It is the worship of brute force +disguised as _Heldentum_, and of vicious cunning disguised as political +morality: it is a mixture of Nietzsche[184] and of Machiavelli. It is a +doctrine of the omnipotence of the super-nation, which 'to maintain its +state', as Machiavelli said, 'will go to work against faith and charity +and humanity and religion', and which will stride ruthlessly to war when +'the day' comes. And when it goes to war, all the veneer of culture +goes. 'Have a care', Mommsen once said, 'lest in this state, which has +been at once a power in arms and a power in intelligence, the +intelligence should vanish, and nothing but the pure military state +should remain.' Mommsen's warning has come true in August, 1914. By +their fruits ye shall know them. The fruits of _Heldentum_ are Louvain +smoking in ashes to the sky. + +It has seemed worth while to describe this philosophy of life, because +it is not only the philosophy of a professor like Treitschke, but also +that of a soldier like Bernhardi; and not only so, but it is the +philosophy of the Prussian Government. Even the Imperial Chancellor +himself used this doctrine (with some qualms, it is true) to justify +Germany in 'hewing its way' through Belgium. Let us only remember, in +justice to a great people, that it is not really the doctrine of +Germany, but rather the doctrine of Prussia (though Treitschke will tell +us that Germany is 'just merely an extended Prussia'). And let us +remember, in extenuation of Prussia, that she has suffered from two +things--geographical pressure springing from her mid-European situation, +and an evil tradition of ruthless conquest perpetuated by her +Hohenzollern rulers since the days of the Great Elector, and especially +since Frederic the Great. Geographical pressure on all sides has made +Prussia feel herself in a state of chronic strangulation; and a man who +feels strangled will struggle ruthlessly for breath. To get breathing +space, to secure frontiers which would ease an intolerable pressure, +Frederic the Great could seize Silesia in time of peace in spite of his +father's guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction, and could suggest the +partition of Poland. Frontier pressure thus led to ruthless conquest +irrespective of rights; and that tradition has sunk deep. It has been +easier for England, an island state in the West exempt from pressure, to +think in other terms: it has been possible for Russia, secure in the +East, to think, and to think nobly (as the present Tsar has done), of +international obligation. Nor is it an accident that sees England and +Russia united in the common cause of Europe to-day--that sees both +championing the cause of small nations, one in the East, the other in +the West.[185] + +But in whatever way we may excuse Prussia we must fight Prussia; and we +fight it in the noblest cause for which men can fight. That cause is the +public law of Europe, as a sure shield and buckler of all nations, great +and small, and especially the small. To the doctrine of the almightiness +of the state--to the doctrine that all means are justified which are, or +seem, necessary to its self-preservation, we oppose the doctrine of a +European society, or at least a European comity of nations, within which +all states stand; we oppose the doctrine of a public law of Europe, by +which all states are bound to respect the covenants they have made. We +will not and cannot tolerate the view that nations are 'in the state and +posture of gladiators' in their relations one with another; we stand for +the reign of law. + +Our cause, as one would expect from a people that has fought out its own +internal struggles under the forms of law, is a legal cause. We are a +people in whose blood the cause of law is the vital element. It is no +new thing in our history that we should fight for that cause. When +England and Revolutionary France went to war in 1793, the cause, on the +side of England, was a legal cause. We fought for the public law of +Europe, as it had stood since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. We did +not fight in 1870, because neither France nor Germany had infringed the +public law of Europe by attacking the neutrality of Belgium, but we were +ready to fight if they did. A fine cartoon in _Punch_, of August, 1870, +shows armed England encouraging Belgium, who stands ready with spear and +shield, with the words--'Trust me! Let us hope that they won't trouble +you, dear friend. But if they do----' To-day they have; and England has +drawn her sword. How could she have done otherwise, with those +traditions of law so deep in all Anglo-Saxon blood--traditions as real +and as vital to Anglo-Saxon America as to Anglo-Saxon England; +traditions which are the fundamental basis of Anglo-Saxon public life +all the world over? America once fought and beat England, in +long-forgotten days, on the ground of law. That very ground of law--that +law-abidingness which is as deeply engrained in the men of Massachusetts +to-day as it is in any Britisher--is a bond of sympathy between the two +in this great struggle of the nations. + +To Germans our defence of public law may seem part of the moral +hypocrisy of which in their view we are full. What we are doing, they +feel, is to strike at Germany, our competitor for 'world-empire', with +its dangerous navy, while Germany is engaged in a life and death +struggle with France and Russia. We too, they feel, are Machiavellians; +but we have put on what Machiavelli called 'the mantle of superstition', +the pretence of morality and law, to cover our craft. It is true that we +are fighting for our own interest. But what is our interest? We are +fighting for Right, because Right is our supreme interest. The new +German political theory enunciates that 'our interest is our right'. The +old--the very old--English political theory is, 'The Right is our +interest'. It is true that we have everything to gain by defending the +cause of international law. Should that prevent us from defending that +cause? What do we not lose of precious lives in the defence? + +This is the case of England. England stands for the idea of a public law +of Europe, and for the small nations which it protects. She stands for +her own preservation, which is menaced when public law is broken, and +the 'ages' slow-bought gain' imperilled. + +(Treitschke's _Politik_, lectures delivered in Berlin during the years +1875 to 1895, was published in two volumes in 1899. General Bernhardi's +book, _Deutschland und der naechste Krieg_, was published in 1911, and +has been translated into English under the title _Germany and the Next +War_. See also J.A. Cramb, _England and Germany_, 1914.) + +Notes: + +[Footnote 179: The unity of the German state is in no small measure a +matter of artificial Prussianization. Of this Prussianization Treitschke +was the great advocate, though he was himself ultimately of Slavonic +origin, and immediately of Saxon birth.] + +[Footnote 180: We are reminded of the famous sentence in _The +Prince_:--_Dove non e giudizio da richiamare si guarda al fine_.] + +[Footnote 181: Bernhardi adds: 'The conception of permanent neutrality +is entirely contrary to the essential nature of the state, which can +only attain its highest moral aims in competition with other states.' It +would seem to follow that by violating the neutrality of Belgium Germany +is helping that country to attain its highest moral aims. The suggestion +that Belgium is no longer a neutral Power was not adopted by the German +Government before the war, nor by Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg in his speech +to the Reichstag on the Belgian question (see _supra_, p. 91).] + +[Footnote 182: It was significant that Germany, while offering to +England at the end of July a guarantee of the integrity of the soil of +France, would not offer any guarantee of the integrity of French +colonies (_supra_, p. 82).] + +[Footnote 183: Nothing has here been said, though much might be said, of +the distortion of history and ethnology by German nationalism, or +Pan-Germanism. It is well known that the Pan-Germans regard England as +Teutonic, and destined to be gathered into the German fold. In these +last few weeks we have been reproached as a people for being traitors to +our 'Teutonic' blood. Better be traitors to blood than to plain duty; +but as a matter of fact our mixed blood has many other strains than the +Teutonic. On the aims of the Pan-Germanists readers may with profit +consult a book by Paul Vergnet, _La France en danger_ (Oct. 1913).] + +[Footnote 184: In fairness to Nietzsche it should be said that in his +later years he revolted against the Prussian military system.] + +[Footnote 185: German professors have recently reproached England for +being allied with 'Muscovite barbarism'. Is Russia so barbarous, whose +sovereign convened the first Peace Conference? Have not England and +Russia striven together in peace (as they now strive together in war) +for a great common cause? The German White Book, which seeks to fasten +on Russia the blame of the present war, is oblivious of all that has +happened in these matters since 1898. The reader may with advantage +refer, on this subject, to a pamphlet by Professor Vinogradoff, _Russia: +the Psychology of a Nation_ (Oxford, 1914).] + + + + +EPILOGUE + + +In conclusion something must be said of the process by which our +understanding with France, still so elastic in 1912 and 1913, became the +solid alliance which now, on sea and land alike, confronts the German +forces. England gave France no positive engagements until the eleventh +hour; it may be argued that England gave them far too late, and that the +war might never have occurred if England had been less obstinately and +judicially pacific. But the English case for the delay is clear. We +hesitated to throw in our lot with France, because France would not +stand neutral while Germany made war on Russia. We shrank from the +incalculable entanglements which seemed to lie before us if we allied +ourselves with a power which was so committed. Why, we were asking +ourselves, should we fight the battles of Russia in the Balkans? + +We were perhaps too cautious in suspecting that France might contemplate +this policy. She could not define beforehand the limits which she would +observe in defending Russia's cause. But she knew, as we now know, that +a war with Russia meant, to German statesmen, only a pretext for a new +attack on France, even more deadly in intention than that of 1870. +France could not do without the help of Russia. How then could she +afford to forfeit Russia's friendship by declaring, at Germany's +command, that she would do nothing to help Russia? + +This loyalty to the Dual Alliance left France during the last days +before the war in a cruel dilemma. Russia, however well disposed, could +not help her ally in the first weeks of a war; and for France these were +the critical weeks, the weeks upon which her own fate must depend. She +appealed urgently to England for support. + +But, even on July 31st, the English Cabinet replied that it could make +no definite engagement. This answer, it is true, had been foreshadowed +in earlier communications. Sir Edward Grey had made it abundantly clear +that there could be no prospect of common action unless France were +exposed to 'an unprovoked attack', and no certainty of such action even +in that case. But France had staked everything upon the justice of her +cause. She had felt that her pacific intentions were clear to all the +world; and that England could not, with any self-respect, refuse +assistance. The French mobilization had been delayed until July 31st, to +convince the British Cabinet of French good faith; and the French fleet +had been left in the Mediterranean to guard the interests of England no +less than those of France. We can imagine how bitter was the +disappointment with which France received the English answer of July +31st. + +But we were loyal to our obligations as we understood them. If our +answers to France were guarded, our answers to the German overtures of +July 29th and August 1st show that we were fighting the battle of France +with diplomatic weapons. On August 2nd we went still further, by +undertaking to defend the French coasts and shipping, if the German +fleet should come into the Channel or through the North Sea. To justify +our position of reserve from July 31st to August 4th we may quote what +Mr. Asquith said the other day (September 4th):-- + + 'No one who has not been in that position can realize the strength, + the energy, and the persistence with which we laboured for peace. We + persevered by every expedient that diplomacy could suggest, + straining almost to breaking-point our most cherished friendships + and obligations.' + +Those efforts failed. We know to-day that mediation had never any +prospects of success, because Germany had resolved that it should not +succeed. Ought we to have known this from the first? It is easy to be +wise after the event. But in England we have Cabinet government and we +have Parliamentary government. Before an English minister can act, in a +matter of national importance, no matter how positive his own +convictions may be, he must convince his colleagues, and they must feel +certain of convincing a democracy which is essentially pacific, +cautious, slow to move. Nothing short of the German attack on Belgium +would have convinced the ordinary Englishman that German statesmanship +had degenerated into piracy. That proof was given us on August 4th; and +on that day we sent our ultimatum to Berlin. + +To-day all England is convinced; and we are fighting back to back with +the French for their national existence and our own. Our own, because +England's existence depends not only on her sea-power, but upon the +maintenance of European state-law. The military spirit which we have +described above (Chap. VI) tramples upon the rights of nations because +it sees a foe in every equal; because it regards the prosperity of a +neighbour as a national misfortune; because it holds that national +greatness is only to be realized in the act of destroying or absorbing +other nationalities. To those who are not yet visibly assailed, and who +possibly believe themselves secure, we can only give the warning: _Tua +res agitur, paries cum proximus ardet_. + +Of the issue England is not afraid. The most unfavourable issue would +find her still convinced that she has taken the only course compatible +with honour and with public law. Military anarchism shall be destroyed +if England, France, and Russia can destroy it. On this object England +and France have staked their last ship and their last soldier. But, it +may be asked, what state-system do we hope to establish, if and when we +are successful in this great crusade? + +What England not only desires but needs, and needs imperatively, is, +first, the restitution to Belgium of her former status and whatever else +can be restored of all that she has sacrificed. This is the +indispensable preliminary to any form of settlement. The next essential +is an adequate guarantee to France that she shall never experience such +another invasion as we have seen in August, 1914; without a France which +is prosperous, secure, and independent, European civilization would be +irreparably maimed and stunted. The third essential, as essential as the +other two, is the conservation of those other nations which can only +exist on sufferance so long as _Realpolitik_ is practised with impunity. + +To minor nationalities it should be clear that England is their friend, +and cannot choose but stand their friend. Three times in her history she +has made war upon a would-be despot of the Continent, treating the +'Balance of Power' as a principle for which no sacrifice could be too +great. In these struggles she assisted the small Powers, less from +altruism than because their interest was her own. She supported Holland +against Philip II of Spain and against Louis XIV; against Napoleon she +supported not Holland only, but also Portugal and, to the best of her +power, Switzerland and Piedmont. + +We do not argue--it would be absurd to argue--that England has always +been free from reproach in her dealings with the smaller states. Holland +may well remember the naval conflicts of the seventeenth century and the +English Navigation Laws. But Holland should also remember that, in the +seventeenth century, England was not yet a great Power; Holland and +England fought as rivals and on equal terms, in a feud which subsequent +alliances have healed, over a policy which England has long since +renounced as mischievous and futile. On Denmark we inflicted a great +wrong in 1807; it can only be extenuated by the fact, which Denmark +knows now though she did not know it then, that Napoleon had conspired +with Russia to seize the Danish fleet and use it against England. +Denmark, indeed, has better cause to complain that we gave her no +assistance in 1864. That mistake--for it was a mistake of weakness, not +deliberate treachery--has brought its own nemesis. We are still paying +for that particular mistake, and we are not likely to forget the lesson. +The case of Schleswig-Holstein shows how the losses of such a state as +Denmark may react on such a state as England. + +England cannot afford that her weaker neighbours should become less +prosperous or less independent than they are. So far as the long arm of +naval power reaches, England is bound to give them whatever help she +can. From motives of self-preservation, if on no other ground, she could +not tolerate their subordination to such a power as Germany aspires to +found. Her quarrel is not with the German people, but with the political +system for which the German Empire, in its present temper, stands. That +system England is bound to resist, no matter by what power it is +adopted. + +English sympathies and English traditions are here at one with English +interests. England is proud to recollect how she befriended struggling +nationalities in the nineteenth century. She did not support Greece and +Italy for the sake of any help that they could give her. The goodwill of +England to Holland, to Switzerland, to the Scandinavian states, is +largely based upon their achievements in science and art and literature. +They have proved that they can serve the higher interests of humanity. +They have contributed to the growth of that common civilization which +links together the small powers and the great with bonds more sacred and +more durable than those of race, of government, of material interest. In +this fraternity each nation has a duty to the rest. If we have harped on +England's interest, it must not for a moment be supposed that we have +forgotten England's duty. But England stands to-day in this fortunate +position, that her duty and her interest combine to impel her in the +same direction. + + + + +APPENDIX I + + +GERMANY'S REASONS + +FOR + +WAR WITH RUSSIA + + +How Russia and her Ruler betrayed Germany's confidence and thereby made +the European War. + +WITH THE ORIGINAL TELEGRAMS +AND NOTES. + +Druck und Verlag: Liebheit & Thiesen, Berlin. + +Foreign Office, +Berlin, August 1914. + +On June 28th the Austro-Hungarian successor to the throne, Arch-Duke +Franz Ferdinand, and his wife, the Duchess of Hohenberg, were +assassinated by a member of a band of servian conspirators. The +investigation of the crime through the Austro-Hungarian authorities has +yielded the fact that the conspiracy against the life of the Arch-Duke +and successor to the throne was prepared and abetted in Belgrade with +the cooperation of Servian officials, and executed with arms from the +Servian State arsenal. This crime must have opened the eyes of the +entire civilized world, not only in regard to the aims of the Servian +policies directed against the conservation and integrity of the +Austro-Hungarian monarchy, but also concerning the criminal means which +the pan-Serb propaganda in Servia had no hesitation in employing for the +achievement of these aims. + +The goal of these policies was the gradual revolutionizing and final +separation of the south-easterly districts from the Austro-Hungarian +monarchy and their union with Servia. This direction of Servias policy +has not been altered in the least in spite of the repeated and solemn +declarations of Servia in which it vouchsafed a change in these policies +toward Austria-Hungary as well as the cultivation of good and neighborly +relations. + +In this manner for the third time in the course of the last 6 years +Servia has led Europe to the brink of a world-war. + +It could only do this because it believed itself supported in its +intentions by Russia. + +Russia soon after the events brought about by the Turkish revolution of +1908, endeavored to found a union of the Balcan states under Russian +patronage and directed against the existence of Turkey. This union which +succeeded in 1911 in driving out Turkey from a greater part of her +European possessions, collapsed over the question of the distribution of +spoils. The Russian policies were not dismayed over this failure. +According to the idea of the Russian statesmen a new Balcan union under +Russian patronage should be called into existence, headed no longer +against Turkey, now dislodged from the Balcan, but against the existence +of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. It was the idea that Servia should +cede to Bulgaria those parts of Macedonia which it had received during +the last Balcan war, in exchange for Bosnia and the Herzegovina which +were to be taken from Austria. To oblige Bulgaria to fall in with this +plan it was to be isolated, Roumania attached to Russia with the aid of +French propaganda, and Servia promised Bosnia and the Herzegovina. + +Under these circumstances it was clear to Austria that it was not +compatible with the dignity and the spirit of self-preservation of the +monarchy to view idly any longer this agitation across the border. The +Imperial and Royal Government appraised Germany of this conception and +asked for our opinion. With all our heart we were able to agree with our +allys estimate of the situation, and assure him that any action +considered necessary to end the movement in Servia directed against the +conservation of the monarchy would meet with our approval. + +We were perfectly aware that a possible warlike attitude of +Austria-Hungary against Servia might bring Russia upon the field, and +that it might therefore involve us in a war, in accordance with our duty +as allies. We could not, however, in these vital interests of +Austria-Hungary, which were at stake, advise our ally to take a yielding +attitude not compatible with his dignity, nor deny him our assistance in +these trying days. We could do this all the less as our own interests +were menaced through the continued Serb agitation. If the Serbs +continued with the aid of Russia and France to menace the existence of +Austria-Hungary, the gradual collapse of Austria and the subjection of +all the Slavs under one Russian sceptre would be the consequence, thus +making untenable the position of the Teutonic race in Central Europe. A +morally weakened Austria under the pressure of Russian pan-slavism would +be no longer an ally on whom we could count and in whom we could have +confidence, as we must be able to have, in view of the ever more +menacing attitude of our easterly and westerly neighbors. We, therefore, +permitted Austria a completely free hand in her action towards Servia +but have not participated in her preparations. + +Austria chose the method of presenting to the Servian Government a note, +in which the direct connection between the murder at Sarajevo and the +pan-Serb movement, as not only countenanced but actively supported by +the Servian Government, was explained, and in which a complete cessation +of this agitation, as well as a punishment of the guilty, was requested. +At the same time Austria-Hungary demanded as necessary guarantee for the +accomplishment of her desire the participation of some Austrian +officials in the preliminary examination on Servian territory and the +final dissolution of the pan-Serb societies agitating against +Austria-Hungary. The Imperial and Royal Government gave a period of 48 +hours for the unconditional acceptance of its demands. + +The Servian Government started the mobilization of its army one day +after the transmission of the Austro-Hungarian note. + +As after the stipulated date the Servian Government rendered a reply +which, though complying in some points with the conditions of +Austria-Hungary, yet showed in all essentials the endeavor through +procrastination and new negotiations to escape from the just demands of +the monarchy, the latter discontinued her diplomatic relations with +Servia without indulging in further negotiations or accepting further +Servian assurances, whose value, to its loss, she had sufficiently +experienced. + +From this moment Austria was in fact in a state of war with Servia, +which it proclaimed officially on the 28th of July by declaring war. + +[Sidenote: see exhibits 1 & 2.] + +From the beginning of the conflict we assumed the position that there +were here concerned the affairs of Austria alone, which it would have to +settle with Servia. We therefore directed our efforts toward the +localizing of the war, and toward convincing the other powers that +Austria-Hungary had to appeal to arms in justifiable self-defence, +forced upon her by the conditions. We emphatically took the position +that no civilized country possessed the right to stay the arm of Austria +in this struggle with barbarism and political crime, and to shield the +Servians against their just punishment. In this sense we instructed our +representatives with the foreign powers. + +[Sidenote: see exhibit 3.] + +Simultaneously the Austro-Hungarian Government communicated to the +Russian Government that the step undertaken against Servia implied +merely a defensive measure against the Serb agitation, but that +Austria-Hungary must of necessity demand guarantees for a continued +friendly behavior of Servia towards the monarchy. Austria-Hungary had no +intention whatsoever to shift the balance of power in the Balcan. + +In answer to our declaration that the German Government desired, and +aimed at, a localization of the conflict, both the French and the +English Governments promised an action in the same direction. But these +endeavors did not succeed in preventing the interposition of Russia in +the Austro-Servian disagreement. + +[Sidenote: see exhibits 4 & 5.] + +The Russian Government submitted an official communique on July 24th, +according to which Russia could not possibly remain indifferent in the +Servio-Austrian conflict. The same was declared by the Russian Secretary +of Foreign Affairs, M. Sasonow, to the German Ambassador, Count +Pourtales, in the afternoon of July 26th. The German Government declared +again, through its Ambassador at St. Petersburg, that Austria-Hungary +had no desire for conquest and only wished peace at her frontiers. After +the official explanation by Austria-Hungary to Russia that it did not +claim territorial gain in Servia, the decision concerning the peace of +the world rested exclusively with St. Petersburg. + +[Sidenote: see exhibits 6, 7, 8, 9.] + +The same day the first news of Russian mobilization reached Berlin in +the evening. + +[Sidenote: see exhibits 10, 10a, 10b.] + +The German Ambassadors at London, Paris, and St. Petersburg were +instructed to energetically point out the danger of this Russian +mobilization. The Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg was also +directed to make the following declaration to the Russian Government: + + "Preparatory military measures by Russia will force us to + counter-measures which must consist in mobilizing the army. + + "But mobilization means war. + + "As we know the obligations of France towards Russia, this + mobilization would be directed against both Russia and France. We + cannot assume that Russia desires to unchain such a European war. + Since Austria-Hungary will not touch the existence of the Servian + kingdom, we are of the opinion that Russia can afford to assume an + attitude of waiting. We can all the more support the desire of + Russia to protect the integrity of Servia as Austria-Hungary does + not intend to question the latter. It will be easy in the further + development of the affair to find a basis for an understanding." + +[Sidenote: see exhibit 11.] + +On July 27th the Russian Secretary of War, M. Ssuchomlinow, gave the +German military attache his word of honor that no order to mobilize had +been issued, merely preparations were being made, but not a horse +mustered, nor reserves called in. If Austria-Hungary crossed the Servian +frontier, the military districts directed towards Austria, i.e. Kiev, +Odessa, Moscow, Kazan, would be mobilized, under no circumstances those +situated on the German frontier, i.e. St. Petersburg, Vilna, and Warsaw. +Upon inquiry into the object of the mobilization against +Austria-Hungary, the Russian Minister of War replied by shrugging his +shoulders and referring to the diplomats. The military attache then +pointed to these mobilization measures against Austria-Hungary as +extremely menacing also for Germany. + +In the succeeding days news concerning Russian mobilization came at a +rapid rate. Among it was also news about preparations on the +German-Russian frontier, as for instance the announcement of the state +of war in Kovno, the departure of the Warsaw garrison, and the +strengthening of the Alexandrovo garrison. + +On July 27th, the first information was received concerning preparatory +measures taken by France: the 14th Corps discontinued the manoeuvres and +returned to its garrison. + +In the meantime we had endeavored to localize the conflict by most +emphatic steps. + +[Sidenote: see exhibit 12.] + +On July 26th, Sir Edward Grey had made the proposal to submit the +differences between Austria-Hungary and Servia to a conference of the +Ambassadors of Germany, France, and Italy under his chairmanship. We +declared in regard to this proposal that we could not, however much we +approved the idea, participate in such a conference, as we could not +call Austria in her dispute with Servia before a European tribunal. + +France consented to the proposal of Sir Edward Grey, but it foundered +upon Austria's declining it, as was to be expected. + +[Sidenote: see exhibit 13.] + +Faithful to our principle that mediation should not extend to the +Austro-Servian conflict, which is to be considered as a purely +Austro-Hungarian affair, but merely to the relations between +Austria-Hungary and Russia, we continued our endeavors to bring about an +understanding between these two powers. + +[Sidenote: see exhibits 15 & 16.] + +We further declared ourselves ready, after failure of the conference +idea, to transmit a second proposal of Sir Edward Grey's to Vienna in +which he suggested Austria-Hungary should decide that either the Servian +reply was sufficient, or that it be used as a basis for further +negotiations. The Austro-Hungarian Government remarked with full +appreciation of our action that it had come too late, the hostilities +having already been opened. + +In spite of this we continued our attempts to the utmost, and we advised +Vienna to show every possible advance compatible with the dignity of the +monarchy. + +Unfortunately, all these proposals were overtaken by the military +preparations of Russia and France. + +[Sidenote: see exhibit 17.] + +On July 29th, the Russian Government made the official notification in +Berlin that four army districts had been mobilized. At the same time +further news was received concerning rapidly progressing military +preparations of France, both on water and on land. + +On the same day the Imperial Ambassador in St. Petersburg had an +interview with the Russian Foreign Secretary, in regard to which he +reported by telegraph, as follows: + + "The Secretary tried to persuade me that I should urge my Government + to participate in a quadruple conference to find means to induce + Austria-Hungary to give up those demands which touch upon the + sovereignty of Servia. I could merely promise to report the + conversation and took the position that, after Russia had decided + upon the baneful step of mobilization, every exchange of ideas + appeared now extremely difficult, if not impossible. Besides, Russia + now was demanding from us in regard to Austria-Hungary the same + which Austria-Hungary was being blamed for with regard to Servia, + i.e. an infraction of sovereignty. Austria-Hungary having promised + to consider the Russian interests by disclaiming any territorial + aspiration,--a great concession on the part of a state engaged in + war--should therefore be permitted to attend to its affair with + Servia alone. There would be time at the peace conference to return + to the matter of forbearance towards the sovereignty of Servia. + + "I added very solemnly that at this moment the entire Austro-Servian + affair was eclipsed by the danger of a general European + conflagration, and I endeavored to present to the Secretary the + magnitude of this danger. + + "It was impossible to dissuade Sasonow from the idea that Servia + could not now be deserted by Russia". + +On July 29th, the German Military Attache at St. Petersburg wired the +following report on a conversation with the Chief of the General Staff +of the Russian army: + + "The Chief of the General Staff has asked me to call on him, and he + has told me that he has just come from His Majesty. He has been + requested by the Secretary of War to reiterate once more that + everything had remained as the Secretary had informed me two days + ago. He offered confirmation in writing and gave me his word of + honor in the most solemn manner that nowhere there had been a + mobilization, viz. calling in of a single man or horse up to the + present time, i.e. 3 o'clock in the afternoon. He could not assume a + guaranty for the future, but he could emphasize that in the fronts + directed towards our frontiers His Majesty desired no mobilization. + + "As, however, I had received here many pieces of news concerning the + calling in of the reserves in different parts of the country also in + Warsaw and in Vilna, I told the general that his statements placed + me before a riddle. On his officers word of honor he replied that + such news was wrong, but that possibly here and there a false alarm + might have been given. + + "I must consider this conversation as an attempt to mislead us as to + the extent of the measures hitherto taken in view of the abundant + and positive information about the calling in of reserves." + +In reply to various inquiries concerning reasons for its threatening +attitude, the Russian Government repeatedly pointed out that +Austria-Hungary had commenced no conversation in St. Petersburg. The +Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in St. Petersburg was therefore instructed +on July 29th, at our suggestion, to enter into such conversation with +Sasonow. Count Szapary was empowered to explain to the Russian minister +the note to Servia though it had been overtaken by the state of war, and +to accept any suggestion on the part of Russia as well as to discuss +with Sasonow all questions touching directly upon the Austro-Russian +relations. + +[Sidenote: see exhibit 19.] + +Shoulder to shoulder with England we labored incessantly and supported +every proposal in Vienna from which we hoped to gain the possibility of +a peaceable solution of the conflict. We even as late as the 30th of +July forwarded the English proposal to Vienna, as basis for +negotiations, that Austria-Hungary should dictate her conditions in +Servia, i.e. after her march into Servia. We thought that Russia would +accept this basis. + +During the interval from July 29th to July 31st there appeared renewed +and cumulative news concerning Russian measures of mobilization. +Accumulation of troops on the East Prussian frontier and the declaration +of the state of war over all important parts of the Russian west +frontier allowed no further doubt that the Russian mobilization was in +full swing against us, while simultaneously all such measures were +denied to our representative in St. Petersburg on word of honor. + +Nay, even before the reply from Vienna regarding the Anglo-German +mediation whose tendencies and basis must have been known in St. +Petersburg, could possibly have been received in Berlin, Russia ordered +a general mobilization. + +[Sidenote: see exhibits 18, 20, 21, 22, 23.] + +During the same days, there took place between His Majesty the Kaiser, +and Czar Nicolas an exchange of telegrams in which His Majesty called +the attention of the Czar to the menacing character of the Russian +mobilization during the continuance of his own mediating activities. + +On July 31st, the Czar directed the following telegram to His Majesty +the Kaiser: + + "I thank You cordially for Your mediation which permits the hope + that everything may yet end peaceably. It is technically impossible + to discontinue our military preparations which have been made + necessary by the Austrian mobilization. It is far from us to want + war. As long as the negotiations between Austria and Servia + continue, my troops will undertake no provocative action. I give You + my solemn word thereon. I confide with all my faith in the grace of + God, and I hope for the success of Your mediation in Vienna for the + welfare of our countries and the peace of Europe. + + "Your cordially devoted + + "Nicolas." + +This telegram of the Czar crossed with the following, sent by H.M. the +Kaiser, also on July 31st, at 2 p.m.: + + "Upon Your appeal to my friendship and Your request for my aid I + have engaged in mediation between Your Government and the Government + of Austria-Hungary. While this action was taking place, Your troops + were being mobilized against my ally Austria-Hungary, whereby, as I + have already communicated to You, my mediation has become almost + illusory. In spite of this, I have continued it, and now I receive + reliable news that serious preparations for war are going on on my + eastern frontier. The responsibility for the security of my country + forces me to measures of defence. I have gone to the extreme limit + of the possible in my efforts for the preservation of the peace of + the world. It is not I who bear the responsibility for the + misfortune which now threatens the entire civilized world. It rests + in Your hand to avert it. No one threatens the honor and peace of + Russia which might well have awaited the success of my mediation. + The friendship for You and Your country, bequeathed to me by my + grand-father on his deathbed, has always been sacred to me, and I + have stood faithfully by Russia while it was in serious affliction, + especially during its last war. The peace of Europe can still be + preserved by You if Russia decides to discontinue those military + preparations which menace Germany and Austria-Hungary." + +Before this telegram reached its destination, the mobilization of all +the Russian forces, obviously directed against us and already ordered +during the afternoon of the 31st of July, was in full swing. +Notwithstanding, the telegram of the Czar was sent at 2 o'clock that +same afternoon. + +[Sidenote: see exhibit 24.] + +After the Russian general mobilization became known in Berlin, the +Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg was instructed on the afternoon of +July 31st to explain to the Russian Government that Germany declared the +state of war as counter-measure against the general mobilization of the +Russian army and navy which must be followed by mobilization if Russia +did not cease its military measures against Germany and Austria-Hungary +within 12 hours, and notified Germany thereof. + +[Sidenote: see exhibit 25.] + +At the same time the Imperial Ambassador in Paris was instructed to +demand from the French Government a declaration within 18 hours, whether +it would remain neutral in a Russo-German war. + +The Russian Government destroyed through its mobilization, menacing the +security of our country, the laborious action at mediation of the +European cabinets. The Russian mobilization in regard to the seriousness +of which the Russian Government was never allowed by us to entertain a +doubt, in connection with its continued denial, shows clearly that +Russia wanted war. + +The Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg delivered his note to M. +Sasonow on July 31st at 12 o'clock midnight. + +The reply of the Russian Government has never reached us. + +Two hours after the expiration of the time limit the Czar telegraphed to +H.M. the Kaiser, as follows: + + "I have received Your telegram. I comprehend that You are forced to + mobilize, but I should like to have from You the same guaranty which + I have given You, viz., that these measures do not mean war, and + that we shall continue to negotiate for the welfare of our two + countries and the universal peace which is so dear to our hearts. + With the aid of God it must be possible to our long tried friendship + to prevent the shedding of blood. I expect with full confidence Your + urgent reply." + +To this H.M. the Kaiser replied: + + "I thank You for Your telegram. I have shown yesterday to Your + Government the way through which alone war may yet be averted. + Although I asked for a reply by to-day noon, no telegram from my + Ambassador has reached me with the reply of Your Government. I + therefore have been forced to mobilize my army. An immediate, clear + and unmistakable reply of Your Government is the sole way to avoid + endless misery. Until I receive this reply I am unable, to my great + grief, to enter upon the subject of Your telegram. I must ask most + earnestly that You, without delay, order Your troops to commit, + under no circumstances, the slightest violation of our frontiers." + +As the time limit given to Russia had expired without the receipt of a +reply to our inquiry, H.M. the Kaiser ordered the mobilization of the +entire German Army and Navy on August 1st at 5 p.m. + +[Sidenote: see exhibit 25.] + +The German Ambassador at St. Petersburg was instructed that, in the +event of the Russian Government not giving a satisfactory reply within +the stipulated time, he should declare that we considered ourselves in a +state of war after the refusal of our demands. However, before a +confirmation of the execution of this order had been received, that is +to say, already in the afternoon of August 1st, i.e., the same afternoon +on which the telegram of the Czar, cited above, was sent, Russian troops +crossed our frontier and marched into German territory. + +Thus Russia began the war against us. + +Meanwhile the Imperial Ambassador in Paris put our question to the +French Cabinet on July 31st at 7 p.m. + +[Sidenote: see exhibit 27.] + +The French Prime Minister gave an equivocal and unsatisfactory reply on +August 1st at 1. p.m. which gave no clear idea of the position of +France, as he limited himself to the explanation that France would do +that which her interests demanded. A few hours later, at 5 p.m., the +mobilization of the entire French army and navy was ordered. + +On the morning of the next day France opened hostilities. + + +THE ORIGINAL TELEGRAMS AND NOTES. + + +THE NOTE OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY TO SERVIA. + +Presented July 23rd in Belgrade. + +"On March 31st, 1909, the Royal Servian Minister to the Court of Vienna +made the following statement, by order of his Government: + +"Servia declares that she is not affected in her rights by the situation +established in Bosnia, and that she will therefore adapt herself to the +decisions which the powers are going to arrive at in reference to Art. +25 of the Berlin Treaty. By following the councils of the powers, Servia +binds herself to cease the attitude of protest and resistence which she +has assumed since last October, relative to the annexation, and she +binds herself further to change the direction of her present policies +towards Austria-Hungary, and, in the future, to live with the latter in +friendly and neighborly relations. + +"The history of the last years, and especially the painful events of +June 28th, have demonstrated the existence of a subversive movement in +Servia whose aim it is to separate certain territories from the +Austro-Hungarian monarchy. This movement, which developed under the eyes +of the Servian Government, has found expression subsequently beyond the +territory of the kingdom, in acts of terrorism, a series of +assassinations and murders. + +"Far from fulfilling the formal obligations contained in the declaration +of March 31st, 1909, the Royal Servian Government has done nothing to +suppress this movement. She suffered the criminal doings of the various +societies and associations directed against the monarchy, the unbridled +language of the press, the glorification of the originators of +assassinations, the participation of officers and officials in +subversive intrigues; she suffered the unwholesome propaganda in public +education, and lastly permitted all manifestations which would mislead +the Servian people into hatred of the monarchy and into contempt for its +institutions. + +"This sufferance of which the Royal Servian Government made itself +guilty, has lasted up to the moment in which the events of June 28th +demonstrated to the entire world the ghastly consequences of such +sufferance. + +"_It becomes plain from the evidence and confessions of the criminal +authors of the outrage of June 28th, that the murder at Sarajevo was +conceived in Belgrade, that the murderers received the arms and bombs +with which they were equipped, from Servian officers and officials who +belonged to the Narodna Odbrana, and that, lastly, the transportation of +the criminals and their arms to Bosnia was arranged and carried out by +leading Servian frontier officials._ + +"The cited results of the investigation do not permit the Imperial and +Royal Government to observe any longer the attitude of waiting, which it +has assumed for years towards those agitations which have their centre +in Belgrade, and which from there radiate into the territory of the +monarchy. These results, on the contrary, impose upon the Imperial and +Royal Government the duty to terminate intrigues which constitute a +permanent menace for the peace of the monarchy. + +"In order to obtain this purpose, the Imperial and Royal Government is +forced to demand official assurance from the Servian Government that it +condemns the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary, i.e. the +entirety of the machinations whose aim it is to separate parts from the +monarchy which belong to it, and that she binds herself to suppress with +all means this criminal and terrorizing propaganda. + +"In order to give to these obligations a solemn character, the Royal +Servian Government will publish on the first page of its official organ +of July 26th, 1914, the following declaration: + +"The Royal Servian Government condemns the propaganda directed against +Austria-Hungary, i.e. the entirety of those machinations whose aim it is +to separate from the Austro-Hungarian monarchy territories belonging +thereto, and she regrets sincerely the ghastly consequences of these +criminal actions. + +"The Royal Servian Government regrets that Servian officers and +officials have participated in the propaganda, cited above, and have +thus threatened the friendly and neighborly relations which the Royal +Government was solemnly bound to cultivate by its declaration of March +31st, 1909. + +"The Royal Government which disapproves and rejects every thought or +every attempt at influencing the destinations of the inhabitants of any +part of Austria-Hungary, considers it its duty to call most emphatically +to the attention of its officers and officials, and of the entire +population of the kingdom, that it will hence-forward proceed with the +utmost severity against any persons guilty of similar actions, to +prevent and suppress which it will make every effort." + +"This explanation is to be brought simultaneously to the cognizance of +the Royal Army through an order of H.M. the King, and it is to be +published in the official organ of the Army. + +"The Royal Servian Government binds itself, in addition, as follows: + +"1. to suppress any publication which fosters hatred of, and contempt +for, the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and whose general tendency is +directed against the latters territorial integrity; + +"2. to proceed at once with the dissolution of the society Narodna +Odbrana, to confiscate their entire means of propaganda, and to proceed +in the same manner against the other societies and associations in +Servia which occupy themselves with the propaganda against +Austria-Hungary. The Royal Government will take the necessary measures, +so that the dissolved societies may not continue their activities under +another name or in another form; + +"3. without delay to eliminate from the public instruction in Servia, so +far as the corps of instructors, as well as the means of instruction are +concerned, that which serves, or may serve, to foster the propaganda +against Austria-Hungary; + +"4. to remove from military service and the administration in general all +officers and officials who are guilty of propaganda against +Austria-Hungary, and whose names, with a communication of the material +which the Imperial and Royal Government possesses against them, the +Imperial and Royal Government reserves the right to communicate to the +Royal Government; + +"5. to consent that in Servia officials of the Imperial and Royal +Government co-operate in the suppression of a movement directed against +the territorial integrity of the monarchy; + +"6. to commence a judicial investigation against the participants of the +conspiracy of June 28th, who are on Servian territory. Officials, +delegated by the Imperial and Royal Government will participate in the +examinations; + +"7. to proceed at once with all severity to arrest Major Voja Tankosic +and a certain Milan Ciganowic, Servian State officials, who have been +compromised through the result of the investigation; + +"8. to prevent through effective measures the participation of the +Servian authorities in the smuggling of arms and explosives across the +frontier and to dismiss those officials of Shabatz and Loznica, who +assisted the originators of the crime of Sarajevo in crossing the +frontier; + +"9. to give to the Imperial and Royal Government explanations in regard +to the unjustifiable remarks of high Servian functionaries in Servia and +abroad who have not hesitated, in spite of their official position, to +express themselves in interviews in a hostile manner against +Austria-Hungary after the outrage of June 28th; + +"10. The Imperial and Royal Government expects a reply from the Royal +Government at the latest until Saturday 25th inst., at 6 p.m. A memoir +concerning the results of the investigations at Sarajevo, so far as they +concern points 7. and 8. is enclosed with this note." + +ENCLOSURE. + +The investigation carried on against Gabrilo Princip and accomplices in +the Court of Sarajevo, on account of the assassination on June 28th has, +so far, yielded the following results: + +1. The plan to murder Arch-Duke Franz Ferdinand during his stay in +Sarajevo was conceived in Belgrade by Gabrilo Princip, Nedeljko, +Gabrinowic, and a certain Milan Ciganowic and Trifko Grabez, with the +aid of Major Voja Tankosic. + +2. The six bombs and four Browning pistols which were used by the +criminals, were obtained by Milan Ciganowic and Major Tankosic, and +presented to Princip Gabrinowic in Belgrade. + +3. The bombs are hand grenades, manufactured at the arsenal of the +Servian Army in Kragujevac. + +4. To insure the success of the assassination, Milan Ciganowic +instructed Princip Gabrinowic in the use of the grenades and gave +instructions in shooting with Browning pistols to Princip Grabez in a +forest near the target practice field of Topshider--(outside Belgrade). + +5. In order to enable the crossing of the frontier of Bosnia and +Herzegovina by Princip Gabrinowic and Grabez, and the smuggling of their +arms, a secret system of transportation was organized by Ciganowic. The +entry of the criminals with their arms into Bosnia and Herzegovina was +effected by the frontier captains of Shabatz (Rade Popowic) and of +Loznica, as well as by the custom house official Rudivoy Grbic of +Loznica with the aid of several other persons. + + +THE SERVIAN ANSWER. + +Presented at Vienna, July 25th, 1914. +(With Austria's commentaries in italics.) + +The Royal Government has received the communication of the Imperial and +Royal Government of the 23rd inst. and is convinced that its reply will +dissipate any misunderstanding which threatens to destroy the friendly +and neighborly relations between the Austrian monarchy and the kingdom +of Servia. + +The Royal Government is conscious that nowhere there have been renewed +protests against the great neighborly monarchy like those which at one +time were expressed in the Skuptschina, as well as in the declaration +and actions of the responsible representatives of the state at that +time, and which were terminated by the Servian declaration of March 31st +1909; furthermore that since that time neither the different +corporations of the kingdom, nor the officials have made an attempt to +alter the political and judicial condition created in Bosnia and the +Herzegovina. The Royal Government states that the I. and R. Government +has made no protestation in this sense excepting in the case of a text +book, in regard to which the I. and R. Government has received an +entirely satisfactory explanation. Servia has given during the time of +the Balcan crisis in numerous cases evidence of her pacific and moderate +policy, and it is only owing to Servia and the sacrifices which she has +brought in the interest of the peace of Europe that this peace has been +preserved. + +_The Royal Servian Government limits itself to establishing that since +the declaration of March 31st 1909, there has been no attempt on the +part of the Servian Government to alter the position of Bosnia and the +Herzegovina._ + +_With this she deliberately shifts the foundation of our note, as we +have not insisted that she and her officials have undertaken anything +official in this direction. Our gravamen is that in spite of the +obligation assumed in the cited note, she has omitted to suppress the +movement directed against the territorial integrity of the monarchy._ + +_Her obligation consisted in changing her attitude and the entire +direction of her policies, and in entering into friendly and neighborly +relations with the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and not only not to +interfere with the possession of Bosnia._ + +The Royal Government cannot be made responsible for expressions of a +private character, as for instance newspaper articles and the peaceable +work of societies, expressions which are of very common appearance in +other countries, and which ordinarily are not under the control of the +state. This, all the less, as the Royal Government has shown great +courtesy in the solution of a whole series of questions which have +arisen between Servia and Austria-Hungary, whereby it has succeeded to +solve the greater number thereof, in favor of the progress of both +countries. + +_The assertion of the Royal Servian Government that the expressions of +the press and the activity of Servian associations possess a private +character and thus escape governmental control, stands in full contrast +with the institutions of modern states and even the most liberal of +press and society laws, which nearly everywhere subject the press and +the societies to a certain control of the state. This is also provided +for by the Servian institutions. The rebuke against the Servian +Government consists in the fact that it has totally omitted to supervise +its press and its societies, in so far as it knew their direction to be +hostile to the monarchy._ + +The Royal Government was therefore painfully surprised by the assertions +that citizens of Servia had participated in the preparations of the +outrage in Sarajevo. The Government expected to be invited to cooperate +in the investigation of the crime, and it was ready in order to prove +its complete correctness, to proceed against all persons in regard to +whom it would receive information. + +_This assertion is incorrect. The Servian Government was accurately +informed about the suspicion resting upon quite definite personalities +and not only in the position, but also obliged by its own laws to +institute investigations spontaneously. The Servian Government has done +nothing in this direction._ + +According to the wishes of the I. and R. Government, the Royal +Government is prepared to surrender to the court, without regard to +position and rank, every Servian citizen, for whose participation in the +crime of Sarajevo it should have received proof. It binds itself +particularly on the first page of the official organ of the 26th of July +to publish the following enunciation: + +"The Royal Servian Government condemns every propaganda which should be +directed against Austria-Hungary, i. e. the entirety of such activities +as aim towards the separation of certain territories from the +Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and it regrets sincerely the lamentable +consequences of these criminal machinations." + +_The Austrian demand reads_: + +"_The Royal Servian Government condemns the propaganda against +Austria-Hungary_...." + +_The alteration of the declaration as demanded by us, which has been +made by the Royal Servian Government, is meant to imply that a +propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary does not exist, and that it +is not aware of such. This formula is insincere, and the Servian +Government reserves itself the supterfuge for later occasions that it +had not disavowed by this declaration the existing propaganda, nor +recognized the same as hostile to the monarchy, whence it could deduce +further that it is not obliged to suppress in the future a propaganda +similar to the present one_. + +The Royal Government regrets that according to a communication of the I. +and R. Government certain Servian officers and functionaries have +participated in the propaganda just referred to, and that these have +therefore endangered the amicable relations for the observation of which +the Royal Government had solemnly obliged itself through the declaration +of March 31st, 1909. + +The Government ... identical with the demanded text. + +_The formula as demanded by Austria reads_: + +"_The Royal Government regrets that Servian officers and functionaries +... have participated_...." + +_Also with this formula and the further addition "according to the +declaration of the I. and R. Government", the Servian Government pursues +the object, already indicated above, to preserve a free hand for the +future_. + +The Royal Government binds itself further: + +1. During the next regular meeting of the Skuptschina to embody in the +press laws a clause, to wit, that the incitement to hatred of, and +contempt for, the monarchy is to be must severely punished, as well as +every publication whose general tendency is directed against the +territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary. + +It binds itself in view of the coming revision of the constitution to +embody an amendment into Art. 22 of the constitutional law which permits +the confiscation of such publications as is at present impossible +according to the clear definition of Art. 22 of the constitution. + +_Austria had demanded_: + +_1. To suppress every publication which incites to hatred and contempt +for the monarchy, and whose tendency is directed against the territorial +integrity of the monarchy._ + +_We wanted to bring about the obligation for Servia to take care that +such attacks of the press would cease in the future._ + +_Instead Servia offers to pass certain laws which are meant as means +towards this end, viz.:_ + +_a) A law according to which the expressions of the press hostile to the +monarchy can be individually punished, a matter, which is immaterial to +us, all the more so, as the individual prosecution of press intrigues is +very rarely possible and as, with a lax enforcement of such laws, the +few cases of this nature would not be punished. The proposition, +therefore, does not meet our demand in any way, and it offers not the +least guarantee for the desired success._ + +_b) An amendment to Art. 22 of the constitution, which would permit +confiscation, a proposal, which does not satisfy us, as the existence of +such a law in Servia is of no use to us. For we want the obligation of +the Government to enforce it and that has not been promised us._ + +_These proposals are therefore entirely unsatisfactory and evasive as we +are not told within what time these laws will be passed, and as in the +event of the notpassing of these laws by the Skuptschina everything +would remain as it is, excepting the event of a possible resignation of +the Government._ + +2. The Government possesses no proofs and the note of the I. and R. +Government does not submit them that the society Narodna Odbrana and +other similar societies have committed, up to the present, any criminal +actions of this manner through anyone of their members. Notwithstanding +this, the Royal Government will accept the demand of the I. and R. +Government and dissolve the society Narodna Odbrana, as well as every +society which should act against Austria-Hungary. + +_The propaganda of the Narodna Odbrana and affiliated societies hostile +to the monarchy fills the entire public life of Servia; it is therefore +an entirely inacceptable reserve if the Servian Government asserts that +it knows nothing about it. Aside from this, our demand is not completely +fulfilled, as we have asked besides:_ + +"_To confiscate the means of propaganda of these societies to prevent +the reformation of the dissolved societies under another name and in +another form._" + +_In these two directions the Belgrade Cabinet is perfectly silent, so +that through this semi-concession there is offered us no guarantee for +putting an end to the agitation of the associations hostile to the +Monarchy, especially the Narodna Odbrana._ + +3. The Royal Servian Government binds itself without delay to eliminate +from the public instruction in Servia anything which might further the +propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary provided the I. and R. +Government furnishes actual proofs. + +_Also in this case the Servian Government first demands proofs for a +propaganda hostile to the Monarchy in the public instruction of Servia +while it must know that the text books introduced in the Servian schools +contain objectionable matter in this direction and that a large portion +of the teachers are in the camp of the Narodna Odbrana and affiliated +societies._ + +_Furthermore, the Servian Government has not fulfilled a part of our +demands, as we have requested, as it omitted in its text the addition +desired by us: "as far as the body of instructors is concerned, as well +as the means of instruction"--a sentence which shows clearly where the +propaganda hostile to the Monarchy is to be found in the Servian +schools_. + +4. The Royal Government is also ready to dismiss those officers and +officials from the military and civil services in regard to whom it has +been proved by judicial investigation that they have been guilty of +actions against the territorial integrity of the monarchy; it expects +that the I. and R. Government communicate to it for the purpose of +starting the investigation the names of these officers and officials, +and the facts with which they have been charged. + +_By promising the dismissal from the military and civil services of +those officers and officials who are found guilty by judicial procedure, +the Servian Government limits its assent to those cases, in which these +persons have been charged with a crime according to the statutory code. +As, however, we demand the removal of such officers and officials as +indulge in a propaganda hostile to the Monarchy, which is generally not +punishable in Servia, our demands have not been fulfilled in this +point_. + +5. The Royal Government confesses that it is not clear about the sense +and the scope of that demand of the I. and R. Government which concerns +the obligation on the part of the Royal Servian Government to permit the +cooperation of officials of the I. and R. Government on Servian +territory, but it declares that it is willing to accept every +cooperation which does not run counter to international law and criminal +law, as well as to the friendly and neighborly relations. + +_The international law, as well as the criminal law, has nothing to do +with this question; it is purely a matter of the nature of state police +which is to be solved by way of a special agreement. The reserved +attitude of Servia is therefore incomprehensible and on account of its +vague general form it would lead to unbridgeable difficulties_. + +6. The Royal Government considers it its duty as a matter of course to +begin an investigation against all those persons who have participated +in the outrage of June 28th and who are in its territory. As far as the +cooperation in this investigation of specially delegated officials of +the I. and R. Government is concerned, this cannot be accepted, as this +is a violation of the constitution and of criminal procedure. Yet in +some cases the result of the investigation might be communicated to the +Austro-Hungarian officials. + +_The Austrian demand was clear and unmistakable_: + +_1. To institute a criminal procedure against the participants in the +outrage_. + +_2. Participation by I. and R. Government officials in the examinations +("Recherche" in contrast with "enquete judiciaire")._ + +_3. It did not occur to us to let I. and R. Government officials +participate in the Servian court procedure; they were to cooperate only +in the police researches which had to furnish and fix the material for +the investigation._ + +_If the Servian Government misunderstands us here, this is done +deliberately, for it must be familiar with the difference between +"enquete judiciaire" and simple police researches. As it desired to +escape from every control of the investigation which would yield, if +correctly carried out, highly undesirable results for it, and as it +possesses no means to refuse in a plausible manner the cooperation of +our officials (precedents for such police intervention exist in great +number) it tries to justify its refusal by showing up our demands as +impossible_. + +7. The Royal Government has ordered on the evening of the day on which +the note was received the arrest of Major Voislar Tankosic. However, as +far as Milan Ciganowic is concerned who is a citizen of the +Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and who has been employed till June 28th with +the Railroad Department, it has as yet been impossible to locate him, +wherefor a warrant has been issued against him. + +The I. and R. Government is asked to make known, as soon as possible, +for the purpose of conducting the investigation, the existing grounds +for suspicion and the proofs of guilt, obtained in the investigation at +Sarajevo. + +_This reply is disingenuous. According to our investigation, Ciganowic, +by order of the police prefect in Belgrade, left three days after the +outrage for Ribari, after it had become known that Ciganowic had +participated in the outrage. In the first place, it is therefore +incorrect that Ciganowic left the Servian service on June 28th. In the +second place, we add that the prefect of police at Belgrade who had +himself caused the departure of this Ciganowic and who knew his +whereabout, declared in an interview that a man by the name of Milan +Ciganowic did not exist in Belgrade_. + +8. The Servian Government will amplify and render more severe the +existing measures against the suppression of smuggling of arms and +explosives. + +It is a matter of course that it will proceed at once against, and +punish severely, those officials of the frontier service on the line +Shabatz-Loznica who violated their duty and who have permitted the +perpetrators of the crime to cross the frontier. + +9. The Royal Government is ready to give explanations about the +expressions which its officials in Servia and abroad have made in +interviews after the outrage and which, according to the assertion of +the I. and R. Government, were hostile to the Monarchy. As soon as the +I. and R. Government points out in detail where those expressions were +made and succeeds in proving that those expressions have actually been +made by the functionaries concerned, the Royal Government itself will +take care that the necessary evidences and proofs are collected +therefor. + +_The Royal Servian Government must be aware of the interviews in +question. If it demands of the I. and R. Government that it should +furnish all kinds of detail about the said interviews and if it reserves +for itself the right of a formal investigation, it shows that it is not +its intention seriously to fulfill the demand._ + +10. The Royal Government will notify the I. and R. Government, so far as +this has not been already done by the present note, of the execution of +the measures in question as soon as one of those measures has been +ordered and put into execution. + +The Royal Servian Government believes it to be to the common interest +not to rush the solution of this affair and it is therefore, in case the +I. and R. Government should not consider itself satisfied with this +answer, ready, as ever, to accept a peaceable solution, be it by +referring the decision of this question to the International Court at +the Hague or by leaving it to the decision of the Great Powers who have +participated in the working out of the declaration given by the Servian +Government on March 31st 1909. + +_The Servian Note, therefore, is entirely a play for time._ + + +EXHIBIT I. + +The Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassadors at Paris, London, and St. +Petersburg, on Juli 23rd 1914. + +The publications of the Austro-Hungarian Government concerning the +circumstances under which the Assassination of the Austrian successor to +the throne and his consort took place, disclose clearly the aims which +the pan-Serb propaganda has set itself and the means which it utilizes +for their realization. Through the published facts the last doubt must +disappear that the center of action of the efforts for the separation of +the south slavic provinces from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and their +union with the Servian Kingdom must be sought in Belgrade where it +displays its activity with the connivance of members of the Government +and of the Army. + +The Serb intrigues may be traced back through a series of years. In a +specially marked manner the pan-Serb chauvinism showed itself during the +Bosnian crisis. Only to the far-reaching self-restraint and moderation +of the Austro-Hungarian Government and the energetic intercession of the +powers is it to be ascribed that the provocations to which at that time +Austria-Hungary was exposed on the part of Servia, did not lead to a +conflict. The assurance of future well-behaviour which the Servian +Government gave at that time, it has not kept. Under the very eyes, at +least with the tacit sufferance of official Servia, the pan-Serb +propaganda has meanwhile increased in scope and intensity; at its door +is to be laid the latest crime the threads of which lead to Belgrade. It +has become evident that it is compatible neither with the dignity nor +with the self-preservation of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy to view any +longer idly the doings across the border through which the safety and +the integrity of the Monarchy are permanently threatened. With this +state of affairs, the action as well as the demands of the +Austro-Hungarian government can be viewed only as justifiable. +Nevertheless, the attitude assumed by public opinion as well as by the +government in Servia does not preclude the fear that the Servian +government will decline to meet these demands and that it will allow +itself to be carried away into a provocative attitude toward +Austria-Hungary. Nothing would remain for the Austro-Hungarian +government, unless it renounced definitely its position as a great +power, but to press its demands with the Servian government and, if need +be, enforce the same by appeal to military measures, in regard to which +the choice of means must be left with it. + +I have the honor to request you to express yourself in the sense +indicated above to (the present representative of M. Viviani) (Sir +Edward Grey) (M. Sasonow) and therewith give special emphasis to the +view that in this question there is concerned an affair which should be +settled solely between Austria-Hungary and Servia, the limitation to +which it must be the earnest endeavor of the powers to insure. We +anxiously desire the localisation of the conflict because every +intercession of another power on account of the various treaty-alliances +would precipitate inconceivable consequences. + +I shall look forward with interest to a telegraphic report about the +course of your interview. + + +EXHIBIT 2. + +The Chancellor to the Governments of Germany. +Confidential. Berlin, July 28, 1914. + +You will make the following report to the Government to which you are +accredited: + +In view of the facts which the Austrian Government has published in its +note to the Servian Government, the last doubt must disappear that the +outrage to which the Austro-Hungarian successor to the throne has fallen +a victim, was prepared in Servia, to say the least with the connivance +of members of the Servian government and army. It is a product of the +pan-Serb intrigues which for a series of years have become a source of +permanent disturbance for the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and for the +whole of Europe. + +The pan-Serb chauvinism appeared especially marked during the Bosnian +crisis. Only to the far-reaching self-restraint and moderation of the +Austro-Hungarian government and the energetic intercession of the powers +is it to be ascribed that the provocations to which Austria-Hungary was +exposed at that time, did not lead to a conflict. The assurance of +future well-behaviour, which the Servian government gave at that time, +it has not kept. Under the very eyes, at least with the tacit sufferance +of official Servia, the pan-Serb propaganda has meanwhile continued to +increase in scope and intensity. It would be compatible neither with its +dignity nor with its right to self-preservation if the Austro-Hungarian +government persisted to view idly any longer the intrigues beyond the +frontier, through which the safety and the integrity of the monarchy are +permanently threatened. With this state of affairs, the action as well +as the demands of the Austro-Hungarian Government can be viewed only as +justifiable. + +The reply of the Servian government to the demands which the +Austro-Hungarian government put on the 23rd inst. through its +representative in Belgrade, shows that the dominating factors in Servia +are not inclined to cease their former policies and agitation. There +will remain nothing else for the Austro-Hungarian government than to +press its demands, if need be through military action, unless it +renounces for good its position as a great power. + +Some Russian personalities deem it their right as a matter of course and +a task of Russia's to actively become a party to Servia in the conflict +between Austria-Hungary and Servia. For the European conflagration which +would result from a similar step by Russia, the "Nowoje Wremja" believes +itself justified in making Germany responsible in so far as it does not +induce Austria-Hungary to yield. + +The Russian press thus turns conditions upside down. It is not +Austria-Hungary which has called forth the conflict with Servia, but it +is Servia which, through unscrupulous favor toward pan-Serb aspirations, +even in parts of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, threatens the same in +her existence and creates conditions, which eventually found expression +in the wanton outrage at Sarajevo. If Russia believes that it must +champion the cause of Servia in this matter, it certainly has the right +to do so. However, it must realize that it makes the Serb activities its +own, to undermine the conditions of existence of the Austro-Hungarian +monarchy, and that thus it bears the sole responsibility if out of the +Austro-Servian affair, which all other great powers desire to localize, +there arises a European war. This responsibility of Russia's is evident +and it weighs the more heavily as Count Berchtold has officially +declared to Russia that Austria-Hungary has no intention to acquire +Servian territory or to touch the existence of the Servian Kingdom, but +only desires peace against the Servian intrigues threatening its +existence. + +The attitude of the Imperial government in this question is clearly +indicated. The agitation conducted by the pan-Slavs in Austria-Hungary +has for its goal, with the destruction of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, +the scattering or weakening of the triple alliance with a complete +isolation of the German Empire in consequence. Our own interest +therefore calls us to the side of Austria-Hungary. The duty, if at all +possible, to guard Europe against a universal war, points to the support +by ourselves of those endeavors which aim at the localization of the +conflict, faithful to the course of those policies which we have carried +out successfully for forty-four years in the interest of the +preservation of the peace of Europe. + +Should, however, against our hope, through the interference of Russia +the fire be spread, we should have to support, faithful to our duty as +allies, the neighbor-monarchy with all the power at our command. We +shall take the sword only if forced to it, but then in the clear +consciousness that we are not guilty of the calamity which war will +bring upon the peoples of Europe. + + +EXHIBIT 3. + +Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at Vienna to the Chancellor on July +24th 1914. + +Count Berchtold has asked to-day for the Russian Charge d'affaires in +order to explain to him thoroughly and cordially Austria-Hungary's point +of view toward Servia. After recapitulation of the historical +development of the past few years, he emphasized that the Monarchy +entertained no thought of conquest toward Servia. Austria-Hungary would +not claim Servian territory. It insisted merely that this step was meant +as a definite means of checking the Serb intrigues. Impelled by force of +circumstance, Austria-Hungary must have a guaranty for continued +amicable relations with Servia. It was far from him to intend to bring +about a change in the balance of powers in the Balcan. The Charge +d'affaires who had received no instructions from St. Petersburg, took +the discussion of the Secretary "ad referendum" with the promise to +submit it immediately to Sasonow. + + +EXHIBIT 4. + +Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg to the Chancellor +on July 24th 1914. + +I have just utilized the contents of Order 592 in a prolonged interview +with Sasonow. The Secretary (Sasonow) indulged in unmeasured accusations +toward Austria-Hungary and he was very much agitated. He declared most +positively that Russia could not permit under any circumstances that the +Servo-Austrian difficulty be settled alone between the parties +concerned. + + +EXHIBIT 5. + +The Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg to the Chancellor. Telegram of +July 26th 1914. + +The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador had an extended interview with Sasonow +this afternoon. Both parties had a satisfactory impression as they told +me afterwards. The assurance of the Ambassador that Austria-Hungary had +no idea of conquest but wished to obtain peace at last at her frontiers, +greatly pacified the Secretary. + + +EXHIBIT 6. + +Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to the Chancellor +on July 25th 1914. + +Message to H.M. from General von Chelius (German honorary aide de camp +to the Czar). + +The manoeuvres of the troops in the Krasnoe camp were suddenly +interrupted and the regiments returned to their garrisons at once. The +manoeuvres have been cancelled. The military pupils were raised to-day +to the rank of officers instead of next fall. At headquarters there +obtains great excitement over the procedure of Austria. I have the +impression that complete preparations for mobilization against Austria +are being made. + + +EXHIBIT 7. + +Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to the Chancellor +on July 26th 1914. + +The military attache requests the following message to be sent to the +general staff: + +I deem it certain that mobilisation has been ordered for Kiev and +Odessa. It is doubtful at Warsaw and Moscow and improbable elsewhere. + + +EXHIBIT 8. + +Telegram of the Imperial Consulate at Kovno to the Chancellor on July +27th 1914. + +Kovno has been declared to be in a state of war. + +(Note that the official translator means _Kriegszustand_.) + + +EXHIBIT 9. + +Telegram of the Imperial Minister at Berne to the Chancellor on July +27th 1914. + +Have learned reliably that French XIVth corps has discontinued +manoeuvres. + + +EXHIBIT 10. + +Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at London. Urgent. +July 26th 1914. + +Austria-Hungary has declared in St. Petersburg officially and solemnly +that it has no desire for territorial gain in Servia; that it will not +touch the existence of the Kingdom, but that it desires to establish +peaceful conditions. According to news received here, the call for +several classes of the reserves is expected immediately which is +equivalent to mobilization.[186] If this news proves correct, we shall +be forced to contermeasures very much against our own wishes. Our desire +to localize the conflict and to preserve the peace of Europe remains +unchanged. We ask to act in this sense at St. Petersburg with all +possible emphasis. + +[Footnote 186: The German text inserts _auch gegen uns_, i.e. also +against us.] + + +EXHIBIT 10a. + +Telegram of the Imperial Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at Paris. +July 26th 1914. + +After officially declaring to Russia that Austria-Hungary has no +intention to acquire territorial gain and to touch the existence of the +Kingdom, the decision whether there is to be a European war rests solely +with Russia which has to bear the entire responsibility. We depend upon +France with which we are at one in the desire for the preservation of +the peace of Europe that it will exercise its influence at St. +Petersburg in favour of peace. + + +EXHIBIT 10b. + +Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg +on July 26th, 1914. + +After Austria's solemn declaration of its territorial +dis-interestedness, the responsibility for a possible disturbance of the +peace of Europe through a Russian intervention rests solely upon Russia. +We trust still that Russia will undertake no steps which will threaten +seriously the peace of Europe. + + +EXHIBIT 11. + +Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg to the Chancellor +on July 27th, 1914. + +Military Attache reports a conversation with the Secretary of War: + +Sasonow has requested the latter to enlighten me on the situation. The +Secretary of War has given me his word of honor that no order to +mobilize has as yet been issued. Though general preparations are being +made, no reserves were called and no horses mustered. If Austria crossed +the Servian frontier, such military districts as are directed toward +Austria, viz., Kiev, Odessa, Moscow, Kazan, are to be mobilized. Under +no circumstances those on the German frontier, Warsaw, Vilna, St. +Petersburg. Peace with Germany was desired very much. Upon my inquiry +into the object of mobilization against Austria he shrugged his +shoulders and referred to the diplomats. I told the Secretary that we +appreciated the friendly intentions, but considered mobilization even +against Austria as very menacing. + + +EXHIBIT 12. + +Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at London on July +27th, 1914. + +We know as yet nothing of a suggestion of Sir Edward Grey's to hold a +quadruple conference in London. It is impossible for us to place our +ally in his dispute with Servia before a European tribunal. Our +mediation must be limited to the danger of an Austro-Russian conflict. + + +EXHIBIT 13. + +Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at London on July +25th, 1914. + +The distinction made by Sir Edward Grey between an Austro-Servian and an +Austro-Russian conflict is perfectly correct. We do not wish to +interpose in the former any more than England, and as heretofore we take +the position that this question must be localized by virtue of all +powers refraining from intervention. It is therefore our hope that +Russia will refrain from any action in view of her responsibility and +the seriousness of the situation. We are prepared, in the event of an +Austro-Russian controversy, quite apart from our known duties as allies, +to intercede between Russia and Austria jointly with the other powers. + + +EXHIBIT 14. + +Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg +on July 28th, 1914. + +We continue in our endeavor to induce Vienna to elucidate in St. +Petersburg the object and scope of the Austrian action in Servia in a +manner both convincing and satisfactory to Russia. The declaration of +war which has meanwhile ensued alters nothing in this matter. + + +EXHIBIT 15. + +Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador in London on July +27th, 1914. + +We have at once started the mediation proposal in Vienna in the sense as +desired by Sir Edward Grey. We have communicated besides to Count +Berchtold the desire of M. Sasonow for a direct parley with Vienna. + + +EXHIBIT 16. + +Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at Vienna to the Chancellor on July +28th, 1914. + +Count Berchtold requests me to express to Your Excellency his thanks for +the communication of the English mediation proposal. He states, however, +that after the opening of hostilities by Servia and the subsequent +declaration of war, the step appears belated. + + +EXHIBIT 17. + +Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at Paris on July +29th, 1914. + +News received here regarding French preparations of war multiplies from +hour to hour. I request that You call the attention of the French +Government to this and accentuate that such measures would call forth +counter-measures on our part. We should have to proclaim threatening +state of war (drohende Kriegsgefahr), and while this would not mean a +call for the reserves or mobilization, yet the tension would be +aggravated. We continue to hope for the preservation of peace. + + +EXHIBIT 18. + +Telegram of the Military Attache at St. Petersburg to H. M. the Kaiser +on July 30th, 1914. + +Prince Troubetzki said to me yesterday, after causing Your Majesty's +telegram to be delivered at once to Czar Nicolas: Thank God that a +telegram of Your Emperor has come. He has just told me the telegram has +made a deep impression upon the Czar but as the mobilization against +Austria had already been ordered and Sasonow had convinced His Majesty +that it was no longer possible to retreat, His Majesty was sorry he +could not change it any more. I then told him that the guilt for the +measureless consequences lay at the door of premature mobilization +against Austria-Hungary which after all was involved merely in a local +war with Servia, for Germany's answer was clear and the responsibility +rested upon Russia which ignored Austria-Hungary's assurance that it had +no intentions of territorial gain in Servia. Austria-Hungary mobilized +against Servia and not against Russia and there was no ground for an +immediate action on the part of Russia. I further added that in Germany +one could not understand any more Russia's phrase that "she could not +desert her brethren in Servia", after the horrible crime of Sarajevo. I +told him finally he need not wonder if Germany's army were to be +mobilized. + + +EXHIBIT 19. + +Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at Rome on July +31st, 1914. + +We have continued to negotiate between Russia and Austria-Hungary +through a direct exchange of telegrams between His Majesty the Kaiser +and His Majesty the Czar, as well as in conjunction with Sir Edward +Grey. Through the mobilization of Russia all our efforts have been +greatly handicapped if they have not become impossible. In spite of +pacifying assurances Russia is taking such far-reaching measures against +us that the situation is becoming continually more menacing. + + +EXHIBIT 20. + +I. His Majesty to the Czar. + +July 28th, 10.45 p.m. + +I have heard with the greatest anxiety of the impression which is caused +by the action of Austria-Hungary against Servia. The inscrupulous +agitation which has been going on for years in Servia, has led to the +revolting crime of which Archduke Franz Ferdinand has become a victim. +The spirit which made the Servians murder their own King and his +consort, still dominates that country. Doubtless You will agree with me +that both of us, You as well as I, and all other sovereigns, have a +common interest to insist that all those who are responsible for this +horrible murder, shall suffer their deserved punishment. + +On the other hand I by no means overlook the difficulty encountered by +You and Your Government to stem the tide of public opinion. In view of +the cordial friendship which has joined us both for a long time with +firm ties, I shall use my entire influence to induce Austria-Hungary to +obtain a frank and satisfactory understanding with Russia. I hope +confidently that You will support me in my efforts to overcome all +difficulties which may yet arise. + +Your most sincere and devoted friend and cousin + +signed: Wilhelm. + + +EXHIBIT 21. + +II. The Czar to His Majesty. + +Peterhof Palace, July 29th, 1 p.m. + +I am glad that You are back in Germany. In this serious moment I ask You +earnestly to help me. An ignominious war has been declared against a +weak country and in Russia the indignation which I fully share is +tremendous. I fear that very soon I shall be unable to resist the +pressure exercised upon me and that I shall be forced to take measures +which will lead to war. To prevent a calamity as a European war would +be, I urge You in the name of our old friendship to do all in Your power +to restrain Your ally from going too far. + +signed: Nicolas. + + +EXHIBIT 22. + +III. His Majesty to the Czar. + +July 29th, 6.30 p.m. + +I have received Your telegram and I share Your desire for the +conservation of peace. However: I cannot--as I told You in my first +telegram--consider the action of Austria-Hungary as an "ignominious +war". Austria-Hungary knows from experience that the promises of Servia +as long as they are merely on paper are entirely unreliable. + +According to my opinion the action of Austria-Hungary is to be +considered as an attempt to receive full guaranty that the promises of +Servia are effectively translated into deeds. In this opinion I am +strengthened by the explanation of the Austrian cabinet that +Austria-Hungary intended no territorial gain at the expense of Servia. I +am therefore of opinion that it is perfectly possible for Russia to +remain a spectator in the Austro-Servian war without drawing Europe into +the most terrible war it has ever seen. I believe that a direct +understanding is possible and desirable between Your Government and +Vienna, an understanding which--as I have already telegraphed You--my +Government endeavors to aid with all possible effort. Naturally military +measures by Russia, which might be construed as a menace by +Austria-Hungary, would accelerate a calamity which both of us desire to +avoid and would undermine my position as mediator which--upon Your +appeal to my friendship and aid--I willingly accepted. + +signed: Wilhelm. + + +EXHIBIT 23. + +IV. His Majesty to the Czar. + +July 30th, 1 a.m. + +My Ambassador has instructions to direct the attention of Your +Government to the dangers and serious consequences of a mobilization; I +have told You the same in my last telegram. Austria-Hungary has +mobilized only against Servia, and only a part of her army. If Russia, +as seems to be the case according to Your advice and that of Your +Government, mobilizes against Austria-Hungary, the part of the mediator +with which You have entrusted me in such friendly manner and which I +have accepted upon Your express desire, is threatened if not made +impossible. The entire weight of decision now rests upon Your shoulders, +You have to bear the responsibility for war or peace. + +signed: Wilhelm. + + +EXHIBIT 23a. + +V. The Czar to His Majesty. + +Peterhof, July 30th, 1914, 1.20 p.m. + +I thank You from my heart for Your quick reply. I am sending to-night +Tatisheft (Russian honorary aide to the Kaiser) with instructions. The +military measures now taking form were decided upon five days ago, and +for the reason of defence against the preparations of Austria. I hope +with all my heart that these measures will not influence in any manner +Your position as mediator which I appraise very highly. We need Your +strong pressure upon Austria so that an understanding can be arrived at +with us. + +Nicolas. + + +EXHIBIT 24. + +Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg +on July 31st, 1914. Urgent. + +In spite of negotiations still pending and although we have up to this +hour made no preparations for mobilization, Russia has mobilized her +entire army and navy, hence also against us. On account of these Russian +measures we have been forced, for the safety of the country, to proclaim +the threatening state of war, which does not yet imply mobilization. +Mobilization, however, is bound to follow if Russia does not stop every +measure of war against us and against Austria-Hungary within 12 hours +and notifies us definitely to this effect. Please to communicate this at +once to M. Sasonow and wire hour of communication. + + +EXHIBIT 25. + +Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador in Paris on July +31st, 1914. Urgent. + +Russia has ordered mobilization of her entire army and fleet, therefore +also against us in spite of our still pending mediation. We have +therefore declared the threatening state of war which is bound to be +followed by mobilization unless Russia stops within 12 hours all +measures of war against us and Austria. Mobilization inevitably implies +war. Please ask French Government whether it intends to remain neutral +in a Russo-German war. Reply must be made in 18 hours. Wire at once hour +of inquiry. Utmost speed necessary. + + +EXHIBIT 26. + +Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador in St. Petersburg +on August 1st, 12.52 p.m. Urgent. + +If the Russian Government gives no satisfactory reply to our demand, +Your Excellency will please transmit this afternoon 5 o'clock +(mid-European time) the following statement: + +"Le Gouvernement Imperial s'est efforce des les debuts de la crise de la +mener a une solution pacifique. Se rendant a un desir que lui en avail +ete exprime par Sa Majeste l'Empereur de Russie, Sa Majeste l'Empereur +d'Allemagne d'accord avec l'Angleterre etait applique a accomplir un +role mediateur aupres des Cabinets de Vienne et de St. Petersbourg, +lorsque la Russie, sans en attendre le resultat, proceda a la +mobilisation de la totalite de ses forces de terre et de mer. + +"A la suite de cette mesure menacante motivee par aucun preparatif +militaire de la part de l'Allemagne, l'Empire Allemand se trouva +vis-a-vis d'un danger grave et imminent. Si le Gouvernement Imperial eut +manque de parer a ce peril il aurait compromis la securite et +l'existence meme de l'Allemagne. Par consequent le Gouvernement Allemand +se vit force de s'adresser au Gouvernement de Sa Majeste l'Empereur de +toutes les Russies en sistant sur la cessation des dits actes +militaires. La Russie ayant refuse de faire droit a cette demande et +ayant manifeste par ce refus, que son action etait dirigee contre +l'Allemande, j'ai l'honneur d'ordre de mon Gouvernement de faire savoir +a Votre Excellence ce qui suit: + +"Sa Majeste l'Empereur, mon auguste Souverain, an nom de l'Empire releve +le defi et Se considere en etat de guerre avec la Russie." + +Please wire urgent receipt and time of carrying out this instruction by +Russian time. + +Please ask for Your passports and turn over protection and affairs to +the American Embassy. + + +EXHIBIT 27. + +Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador in Paris to the Chancellor on August +1st 1.05 p. m. + +Upon my repeated definite inquiry whether France would remain neutral in +the event of a Russo-German war, the Prime Minister declared that France +would do that which her interests dictated. + + + + +APPENDIX II + + +EXTRACTS FROM + +SIR EDWARD GREY'S + +CORRESPONDENCE + +RESPECTING THE EUROPEAN + +CRISIS + +_For the complete Correspondence see White Paper Miscellaneous No. 6 +(1914) (Cd. 7467), presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of +His Majesty, August 1914_ + + +No. 13. + +_Note communicated by Russian Ambassador, July 25._ + +(Translation.) + +M. Sazionof telegraphs to the Russian Charge d'Affaires at Vienna on the +11th (24th) July, 1914: + +"The communication made by Austria-Hungary to the Powers the day after +the presentation of the ultimatum at Belgrade leaves a period to the +Powers which is quite insufficient to enable them to take any steps +which might help to smooth away the difficulties that have arisen. + +"In order to prevent the consequences, equally incalculable and fatal to +all the Powers, which may result from the course of action followed by +the Austro-Hungarian Government, it seems to us to be above all +essential that the period allowed for the Servian reply should be +extended. Austria-Hungary, having declared her readiness to inform the +Powers of the results of the enquiry upon which the Imperial and Royal +Government base their accusations, should equally allow them sufficient +time to study them. + +"In this case, if the Powers were convinced that certain of the Austrian +demands were well founded, they would be in a position to offer advice +to the Servian Government. + +"A refusal to prolong the term of the ultimatum would render nugatory +the proposals made by the Austro-Hungarian Government to the Powers, and +would be in contradiction to the very bases of international relations. + +"Prince Kudachef is instructed to communicate the above to the Cabinet +at Vienna. + +"M. Sazonof hopes that His Britannic Majesty's Government will adhere to +the point of view set forth above, and he trusts that Sir E. Grey will +see his way to furnish similar instructions to the British Ambassador at +Vienna." + + +No. 17. + +_Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.--(Received July_ 25.) + +(Telegraphic.) _St. Petersburgh, July_ 25, 1914. + +I Saw the Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning.... + +The Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Servia was quite ready to do +as you had suggested and to punish those proved to be guilty, but that +no independent State could be expected to accept the political demands +which had been put forward. The Minister for Foreign Affairs thought, +from a conversation which he had with the Servian Minister yesterday, +that, in the event of the Austrians attacking Servia, the Servian +Government would abandon Belgrade, and withdraw their forces into the +interior, while they would at the same time appeal to the Powers to help +them. His Excellency was in favour of their making this appeal. He would +like to see the question placed on an international footing, as the +obligations taken by Servia in 1908, to which reference is made in the +Austrian ultimatum, were given not to Austria, but to the Powers. + +If Servia should appeal to the Powers, Russia would be quite ready to +stand aside and leave the question in the hands of England, France, +Germany, and Italy. It was possible, in his opinion, that Servia might +propose to submit the question to arbitration. + +On my expressing the earnest hope that Russia would not precipitate war +by mobilising until you had had time to use your influence in favour of +peace, his Excellency assured me that Russia had no aggressive +intentions, and she would take no action until it was forced on her. +Austria's action was in reality directed against Russia. She aimed at +overthrowing the present _status quo_ in the Balkans, and establishing +her own hegemony there. He did not believe that Germany really wanted +war, but her attitude was decided by ours. If we took our stand firmly +with France and Russia there would be no war. If we failed them now, +rivers of blood would flow, and we would in the end be dragged into war. +I said that England could play the role of mediator at Berlin and Vienna +to better purpose as friend who, if her counsels of moderation were +disregarded, might one day be converted into an ally, than if she were +to declare herself Russia's ally at once. His Excellency said that +unfortunately Germany was convinced that she could count upon our +neutrality. + +I said all I could to impress prudence on the Minister for Foreign +Affairs, and warned him that if Russia mobilised, Germany would not be +content with mere mobilisation, or give Russia time to carry out hers, +but would probably declare war at once. His Excellency replied that +Russia could not allow Austria to crush Servia and become the +predominant Power in the Balkans, and, if she feels secure of the +support of France, she will face all the risks of war. He assured me +once more that he did not wish to precipitate a conflict, but that +unless Germany could restrain Austria I could regard the situation as +desperate. + + +No. 18. + +_Sir H. Rumbold to Sir Edward Grey.--(Received July 25.)_ + +(Telegraphic.) _Berlin, July 25, 1914._ + +Your telegram of the 24th July acted on. + +Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs says that on receipt of a +telegram at 10 this morning from German Ambassador at London, he +immediately instructed German Ambassador at Vienna to pass on to +Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs your suggestion for an extension +of time limit, and to speak to his Excellency about it. Unfortunately it +appeared from press that Count Berchtold is at Ischl, and Secretary of +State thought that in these circumstances there would be delay and +difficulty in getting time limit extended. Secretary of State said that +he did not know what Austria-Hungary had ready on the spot, but he +admitted quite freely that Austro-Hungarian Government wished to give +the Servians a lesson, and that they meant to take military action. He +also admitted that Servian Government could not swallow certain of the +Austro-Hungarian demands. + +Secretary of State said that a reassuring feature of situation was that +Count Berchtold had sent for Russian representative at Vienna and had +told him that Austria-Hungary had no intention of seizing Servian +territory. This step should, in his opinion, exercise a calming +influence at St. Petersburgh. I asked whether it was not to be feared +that, in taking military action against Servia, Austria would +dangerously excite public opinion in Russia. He said he thought not. He +remained of opinion that crisis could be localised. I said that +telegrams from Russia in this morning's papers did not look very +reassuring, but he maintained his optimistic view with regard to Russia. +He said that he had given the Russian Government to understand that last +thing Germany wanted was a general war, and he would do all in his power +to prevent such a calamity. If the relations between Austria and Russia +became threatening, he was quite ready to fall in with your suggestion +as to the four Powers working in favour of moderation at Vienna and St. +Petersburgh. + +Secretary of State confessed privately that he thought the note left +much to be desired as a diplomatic document. He repeated very earnestly +that, though he had been accused of knowing all about the contents of +that note, he had in fact had no such knowledge. + + +No. 41. + +_Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.--(Received July 27.)_ + +(Telegraphic.) _Vienna, July_ 27, 1914. + +I have had conversations with all my colleagues representing the Great +Powers. The impression left on my mind is that the Austro-Hungarian note +was so drawn up as to make war inevitable; that the Austro-Hungarian +Government are fully resolved to have war with Servia; that they +consider their position as a Great Power to be at stake; and that until +punishment has been administered to Servia it is unlikely that they will +listen to proposals of mediation. This country has gone wild with joy at +the prospect of war with Servia, and its postponement or prevention +would undoubtedly be a great disappointment. + +I propose, subject to any special directions you desire to send me, to +express to the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs the hope of His +Majesty's Government that it may yet be possible to avoid war, and to +ask his Excellency whether he cannot suggest a way out even now. + + +No. 43. + +_Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.--(Received July 27.)_ + +(Telegraphic.) _Berlin, July_ 27, 1914. + +Your telegram of 26th July. + +Secretary of State says that conference you suggest would practically +amount to a court of arbitration and could not, in his opinion, be +called together except at the request of Austria and Russia. He could +not therefore fall in with your suggestion, desirous though he was to +co-operate for the maintenance of peace. I said I was sure that your +idea had nothing to do with arbitration, but meant that representatives +of the four nations not directly interested should discuss and suggest +means for avoiding a dangerous situation. He maintained, however, that +such a conference as you proposed was not practicable. He added that +news he had just received from St. Petersburgh showed that there was an +intention on the part of M. de Sazonof to exchange views with Count +Berchtold. He thought that this method of procedure might lead to a +satisfactory result, and that it would be best, before doing anything +else, to await outcome of the exchange of views between the Austrian and +Russian Governments. + +In the course of a short conversation Secretary of State said that as +yet Austria was only partially mobilising, but that if Russia mobilised +against Germany latter would have to follow suit. I asked him what he +meant by "mobilising against Germany." He said that if Russia only +mobilised in south, Germany would not mobilise, but if she mobilised in +north, Germany would have to do so too, and Russian system of +mobilisation was so complicated that it might be difficult exactly to +locate her mobilisation. Germany would therefore have to be very careful +not to be taken by surprise. + +Finally, Secretary of State said that news from St. Petersburgh had +caused him to take more hopeful view of the general situation. + + +No. 56. + +_Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.--(Received July 28.)_ + +(Telegraphic.) _Vienna, July_ 27, 1914. + +The Russian Ambassador had to-day a long and earnest conversation with +Baron Macchio, the Under-secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. He told +him that, having just come back from St. Petersburgh, he was well +acquainted with the views of the Russian Government and the state of +Russian public opinion. He could assure him that if actual war broke out +with Servia it would be impossible to localise it, for Russia was not +prepared to give way again, as she had done on previous occasions, and +especially during the annexation crisis of 1909. He earnestly hoped that +something would be done before Servia was actually invaded. Baron +Macchio replied that this would now be difficult, as a skirmish had +already taken place on the Danube, in which the Servians had been the +aggressors. The Russian Ambassador said that he would do all he could to +keep the Servians quiet pending any discussions that might yet take +place, and he told me that he would advise his Government to induce the +Servian Government to avoid any conflict as long as possible, and to +fall back before an Austrian advance. Time so gained should suffice to +enable a settlement to be reached. He had just heard of a satisfactory +conversation which the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs had +yesterday with the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh. The former +had agreed that much of the Austro-Hungarian note to Servia had been +perfectly reasonable, and in fact they had practically reached an +understanding as to the guarantees which Servia might reasonably be +asked to give to Austria-Hungary for her future good behaviour. The +Russian Ambassador urged that the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh +should be furnished with full powers to continue discussion with the +Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who was very willing to advise +Servia to yield all that could be fairly asked of her as an independent +Power. Baron Macchio promised to submit this suggestion to the Minister +for Foreign Affairs. + + +No. 62. + +_Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.--(Received July 28.)_ + +(Telegraphic.) _Vienna, July 28_, 1914. + +I spoke to Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day in the sense of your +telegram of 27th July to Berlin. I avoided the word "mediation," but +said that, as mentioned in your speech,[187] which he had just read to +me, you had hopes that conversations in London between the four Powers +less interested might yet lead to an arrangement which Austro-Hungarian +Government would accept as satisfactory and as rendering actual +hostilities unnecessary. I added that you had regarded Servian reply as +having gone far to meet just demands of Austria-Hungary; that you +thought it constituted a fair basis of discussion during which warlike +operations might remain in abeyance, and that Austrian Ambassador in +Berlin was speaking in this sense. Minister for Foreign Affairs said +quietly, but firmly, that no discussion could be accepted on basis of +Servian note; that war would be declared to-day, and that well-known +pacific character of Emperor, as well as, he might add, his own, might +be accepted as a guarantee that war was both just and inevitable. This +was a matter that must be settled directly between the two parties +immediately concerned. I said that you would hear with regret that +hostilities could not now be arrested, as you feared that they might +lead to complications threatening the peace of Europe. + +In taking leave of his Excellency, I begged him to believe that, if in +the course of present grave crisis our point of view should sometimes +differ from his, this would arise, not from want of sympathy with the +many just complaints which Austria-Hungary had against Servia, but from +the fact that, whereas Austria-Hungary put first her quarrel with +Servia, you were anxious in the first instance for peace of Europe. I +trusted this larger aspect of the question would appeal with equal force +to his Excellency. He said he had it also in mind, but thought that +Russia ought not to oppose operations like those impending, which did +not aim at territorial aggrandisement and which could no longer be +postponed. + +[Footnote 187: "Hansard," Vol. 65, No. 107, Columns 931, 932, 933.] + + +No. 85. + +_Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.--(Received July 29.)_ + +(Telegraphic.) _Berlin, July_ 29, 1914. + +I was asked to call upon the Chancellor to-night. His Excellency had +just returned from Potsdam. + +He said that should Austria be attacked by Russia a European +conflagration might, he feared, become inevitable, owing to Germany's +obligations as Austria's ally, in spite of his continued efforts to +maintain peace. He then proceeded to make the following strong bid for +British neutrality. He said that it was clear, so far as he was able to +judge the main principle which governed British policy, that Great +Britain would never stand by and allow France to be crushed in any +conflict there might be. That, however, was not the object at which +Germany aimed. Provided that neutrality of Great Britain were certain, +every assurance would be given to the British Government that the +Imperial Government aimed at no territorial acquisitions at the expense +of France should they prove victorious in any war that might ensue. + +I questioned his Excellency about the French colonies, and he said that +he was unable to give a similar undertaking in that respect. As regards +Holland, however, his Excellency said that, so long as Germany's +adversaries respected the integrity and neutrality of the Netherlands, +Germany was ready to give His Majesty's Government an assurance that she +would do likewise. It depended upon the action of France what operations +Germany might be forced to enter upon in Belgium, but when the war was +over, Belgian integrity would be respected if she had not sided against +Germany. + +His Excellency ended by saying that ever since he had been Chancellor +the object of his policy had been, as you were aware, to bring about an +understanding with England; he trusted that these assurances might form +the basis of that understanding which he so much desired. He had in mind +a general neutrality agreement between England and Germany, though it +was of course at the present moment too early to discuss details, and an +assurance of British neutrality in the conflict which present crisis +might possibly produce, would enable him to look forward to realisation +of his desire. + +In reply to his Excellency's enquiry how I thought his request would +appeal to you, I said that I did not think it probable that at this +stage of events you would care to bind yourself to any course of action +and that I was of opinion that you would desire to retain full liberty. + +Our conversation upon this subject having come to an end, I communicated +the contents of your telegram of to-day to his Excellency, who expressed +his best thanks to you. + + +No. 87. + +_Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie_. + +Sir, _Foreign Office, July_ 29, 1914. + +After telling M. Cambon to-day how grave the situation seemed to be, I +told him that I meant to tell the German Ambassador to-day that he must +not be misled by the friendly tone of our conversations into any sense +of false security that we should stand aside if all the efforts to +preserve the peace, which we were now making in common with Germany, +failed. But I went on to say to M. Cambon that I thought it necessary to +tell him also that public opinion here approached the present difficulty +from a quite different point of view from that taken during the +difficulty as to Morocco a few years ago. In the case of Morocco the +dispute was one in which France was primarily interested, and in which +it appeared that Germany, in an attempt to crush France, was fastening a +quarrel on France on a question that was the subject of a special +agreement between France and us. In the present case the dispute between +Austria and Servia was not one in which we felt called to take a hand. +Even if the question became one between Austria and Russia we should not +feel called upon to take a hand in it. It would then be a question of +the supremacy of Teuton or Slav--a struggle for supremacy in the +Balkans; and our idea had always been to avoid being drawn into a war +over a Balkan question. If Germany became involved and France became +involved, we had not made up our minds what we should do; it was a case +that we should have to consider. France would then have been drawn into +a quarrel which was not hers, but in which, owing to her alliance, her +honour and interest obliged her to engage. We were free from +engagements, and we should have to decide what British interests +required us to do. I thought it necessary to say that, because, as he +knew, we were taking all precautions with regard to our fleet, and I was +about to warn Prince Lichnowsky not to count on our standing aside, but +it would not be fair that I should let M. Cambon be misled into +supposing that this meant that we had decided what to do in a +contingency that I still hoped might not arise. + +M. Cambon said that I had explained the situation very clearly. He +understood it to be that in a Balkan quarrel, and in a struggle for +supremacy between Teuton and Slav we should not feel called to +intervene; should other issues be raised, and Germany and France become +involved, so that the question became one of the hegemony of Europe, we +should then decide what it was necessary for us to do. He seemed quite +prepared for this announcement, and made no criticism upon it. + +He said French opinion was calm, but decided. He anticipated a demand +from Germany that France would be neutral while Germany attacked Russia. +This assurance France, of course, could not give; she was bound to help +Russia if Russia was attacked. + +I am, &c. + +E. GREY. + + +No. 89. + +_Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen_. + +Sir, _Foreign Office, July_ 29, 1914. + +After speaking to the German Ambassador this afternoon about the +European situation, I said that I wished to say to him, in a quite +private and friendly way, something that was on my mind. The situation +was very grave. While it was restricted to the issues at present +actually involved we had no thought of interfering in it. But if Germany +became involved in it, and then France, the issue might be so great that +it would involve all European interests; and I did not wish him to be +misled by the friendly tone of our conversation--which I hoped would +continue--into thinking that we should stand aside. + +He said that he quite understood this, but he asked whether I meant that +we should, under certain circumstances, intervene? + +I replied that I did not wish to say that, or to use anything that was +like a threat or an attempt to apply pressure by saying that, if things +became worse, we should intervene. There would be no question of our +intervening if Germany was not involved, or even if France was not +involved. But we knew very well that, if the issue did become such that +we thought British interests required us to intervene, we must intervene +at once, and the decision would have to be very rapid, just as the +decisions of other Powers had to be. I hoped that the friendly tone of +our conversations would continue as at present, and that I should be +able to keep as closely in touch with the German Government in working +for peace. But if we failed in our efforts to keep the peace, and if the +issue spread so that it involved practically every European interest, I +did not wish to be open to any reproach from him that the friendly tone +of all our conversations had misled him or his Government into supposing +that we should not take action, and to the reproach that, if they had +not been so misled, the course of things might have been different. + +The German Ambassador took no exception to what I had said; indeed, he +told me that it accorded with what he had already given in Berlin as his +view of the situation. + +I am, &c. + +E. GREY. + + +No. 98. + +_Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.--(Received July 30.)_ + +(Telegraphic.) _Berlin, July_ 30, 1914. + +Secretary of State informs me that immediately on receipt of Prince +Lichnowsky's telegram recording his last conversation with you he asked +Austro-Hungarian Government whether they would be willing to accept +mediation on basis of occupation by Austrian troops of Belgrade or some +other point and issue their conditions from there. He has up till now +received no reply, but he fears Russian mobilisation against Austria +will have increased difficulties, as Austria-Hungary, who has as yet +only mobilised against Servia, will probably find it necessary also +against Russia. Secretary of State says if you can succeed in getting +Russia to agree to above basis for an arrangement and in persuading her +in the meantime to take no steps which might be regarded as an act of +aggression against Austria he still sees some chance that European peace +may be preserved. + +He begged me to impress on you difficulty of Germany's position in view +of Russian mobilisation and military measures which he hears are being +taken in France. Beyond recall of officers on leave--a measure which had +been officially taken after, and not before, visit of French Ambassador +yesterday--Imperial Government had done nothing special in way of +military preparations. Something, however, would have soon to be done, +for it might be too late, and when they mobilised they would have to +mobilise on three sides. He regretted this, as he knew France did not +desire war, but it would be a military necessity. + +His Excellency added that telegram received from Prince Lichnowsky last +night contains matter which he had heard with regret, but not exactly +with surprise, and at all events he thoroughly appreciated frankness and +loyalty with which you had spoken. + +He also told me that this telegram had only reached Berlin very late +last night; had it been received earlier Chancellor would, of course, +not have spoken to me in way he had done. + + +No. 101. + +_Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen_. + +(Telegraphic.) _Foreign Office, July_ 30, 1914. + +Your telegram of 29th July.[188] + +His Majesty's Government cannot for a moment entertain the Chancellor's +proposal that they should bind themselves to neutrality on such terms. + +What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while French colonies +are taken and France is beaten so long as Germany does not take French +territory as distinct from the colonies. + +From the material point of view such a proposal is unacceptable, for +France, without further territory in Europe being taken from her, could +be so crushed as to lose her position as a Great Power, and become +subordinate to German policy. + +Altogether, apart from that, it would be a disgrace for us to make this +bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace from which the +good name of this country would never recover. + +The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain away whatever +obligation or interest we have as regards the neutrality of Belgium. We +could not entertain that bargain either. + +Having said so much, it is unnecessary to examine whether the prospect +of a future general neutrality agreement between England and Germany +offered positive advantages sufficient to compensate us for tying our +hands now. We must preserve our full freedom to act as circumstances may +seem to us to require in any such unfavourable and regrettable +development of the present crisis as the Chancellor contemplates. + +You should speak to the Chancellor in the above sense, and add most +earnestly that the one way of maintaining the good relations between +England and Germany is that they should continue to work together to +preserve the peace of Europe; if we succeed in this object, the mutual +relations of Germany and England will, I believe, be _ipso facto_ +improved and strengthened. For that object His Majesty's Government will +work in that way with all sincerity and good-will. + +And I will say this: If the peace of Europe can be preserved, and the +present crisis safely passed, my own endeavour will be to promote some +arrangement to which Germany could be a party, by which she could be +assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against +her or her allies by France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or +separately. I have desired this and worked for it, as far as I could, +through the last Balkan crisis, and, Germany having a corresponding +object, our relations sensibly improved. The idea has hitherto been too +Utopian to form the subject of definite proposals, but if this present +crisis, so much more acute than any that Europe has gone through for +generations, be safely passed, I am hopeful that the relief and reaction +which will follow may make possible some more definite rapprochement +between the Powers than has been possible hitherto. + +[Footnote 188: See No. 85.] + + +Enclosure 1 in No. 105. + +_Sir Edward Grey to M. Cambon_. + +My dear Ambassador, _Foreign Office, November 22_, 1912. + +From time to time in recent years the French and British naval and +military experts have consulted together. It has always been understood +that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of either +Government to decide at any future time whether or not to assist the +other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation between experts +is not, and ought not to be regarded as, an engagement that commits +either Government to action in a contingency that has not arisen and may +never arise. The disposition, for instance, of the French and British +fleets respectively at the present moment is not based upon an +engagement to co-operate in war. + +You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government had grave +reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, it might become +essential to know whether it could in that event depend upon the armed +assistance of the other. + +I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an +unprovoked attack by a third Power, or something that threatened the +general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether both +Governments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve +peace, and, if so, what measures they would be prepared to take in +common. If these measures involved action, the plans of the General +Staffs would at once be taken into consideration, and the Governments +would then decide what effect should be given to them. + +Yours, &c. + +E. GREY. + + +No. 119. + +_Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie_. + +Sir, _Foreign Office, July_ 31, 1914. + +M. Cambon referred to-day to a telegram that had been shown to Sir +Arthur Nicolson this morning from the French Ambassador in Berlin, +saying that it was the uncertainty with regard to whether we would +intervene which was the encouraging element in Berlin, and that, it we +would only declare definitely on the side of Russia and France, it would +decide the German attitude in favour of peace. + +I said that it was quite wrong to suppose that we had left Germany under +the impression that we would not intervene. I had refused overtures to +promise that we should remain neutral. I had not only definitely +declined to say that we would remain neutral, I had even gone so far +this morning as to say to the German Ambassador that, if France and +Germany became involved in war, we should be drawn into it. That, of +course, was not the same thing as taking an engagement to France, and I +told M. Cambon of it only to show that we had not left Germany under the +impression that we would stand aside. + +M. Cambon then asked me for my reply to what he had said yesterday. + +I said that we had come to the conclusion, in the Cabinet to-day, that +we could not give any pledge at the present time. Though we should have +to put our policy before Parliament, we could not pledge Parliament in +advance. Up to the present moment, we did not feel, and public opinion +did not feel, that any treaties or obligations of this country were +involved. Further developments might alter this situation and cause the +Government and Parliament to take the view that intervention was +justified. The preservation of the neutrality of Belgium might be, I +would not say a decisive, but an important factor, in determining our +attitude. Whether we proposed to Parliament to intervene or not to +intervene in a war, Parliament would wish to know how we stood with +regard to the neutrality of Belgium, and it might be that I should ask +both France and Germany whether each was prepared to undertake an +engagement that she would not be the first to violate the neutrality of +Belgium. + +M. Cambon repeated his question whether we would help France if Germany +made an attack on her. + +I said that I could only adhere to the answer that, as far as things had +gone at present, we could not take any engagement. + +M. Cambon urged that Germany had from the beginning rejected proposals +that might have made for peace. It could not be to England's interest +that France should be crushed by Germany. We should then be in a very +diminished position with regard to Germany. In 1870 we had made a great +mistake in allowing an enormous increase of German strength, and we +should now be repeating the mistake. He asked me whether I could not +submit his question to the Cabinet again. + +I said that the Cabinet would certainly be summoned as soon as there was +some new development, but at the present moment the only answer I could +give was that we could not undertake any definite engagement. + +I am, &c. + +E. GREY. + + +No. 122. + +_Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.--(Received August 1.)_ + +(Telegraphic.) _Berlin, July_ 31, 1914. + +Neutrality of Belgium, referred to in your telegram of 31st July to Sir +F. Bertie. + +I have seen Secretary of State, who informs me that he must consult the +Emperor and the Chancellor before he could possibly answer. I gathered +from what he said that he thought any reply they might give could not +but disclose a certain amount of their plan of campaign in the event of +war ensuing, and he was therefore very doubtful whether they would +return any answer at all. His Excellency, nevertheless, took note of +your request. + +It appears from what he said that German Government consider that +certain hostile acts have already been committed by Belgium. As an +instance of this, he alleged that a consignment of corn for Germany had +been placed under an embargo already. + +I hope to see his Excellency to-morrow again to discuss the matter +further, but the prospect of obtaining a definite answer seems to me +remote. + +In speaking to me to-day the Chancellor made it clear that Germany would +in any case desire to know the reply returned to you by the French +Government. + + +No. 123. + +_Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen_. + +Sir, _Foreign Office, August_ 1, 1914. + +I told the German Ambassador to-day that the reply[189] of the German +Government with regard to the neutrality of Belgium was a matter of very +great regret, because the neutrality of Belgium affected feeling in this +country. If Germany could see her way to give the same assurance as that +which had been given by France it would materially contribute to relieve +anxiety and tension here. On the other hand, if there were a violation +of the neutrality of Belgium by one combatant while the other respected +it, it would be extremely difficult to restrain public feeling in this +country. I said that we had been discussing this question at a Cabinet +meeting, and as I was authorised to tell him this I gave him a +memorandum of it. + +He asked me whether, if Germany gave a promise not to violate Belgian +neutrality, we would engage to remain neutral. + +I replied that I could not say that; our hands were still free, and we +were considering what our attitude should be. All I could say was that +our attitude would be determined largely by public opinion here, and +that the neutrality of Belgium would appeal very strongly to Public +opinion here. I did not think that we could give a promise of neutrality +on that condition alone. + +The Ambassador pressed me as to whether I could not formulate conditions +on which we would remain neutral. He even suggested that the integrity +of France and her colonies might be guaranteed. + +I said that I felt obliged to refuse definitely any promise to remain +neutral on similar terms, and I could only say that we must keep our +hands free. + +I am, &c. + +E. GREY. + +[Footnote 189: See No. 122.] + + +No. 133. + +_Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen_. + +(Telegraphic.) _Foreign Office, August_ 1, 1914. + +M. De Etter came to-day to communicate the contents of a telegram from +M. Sazonof, dated the 31st July, which are as follows:-- + +"The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador declared the readiness of his +Government to discuss the substance of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia. +M. Sazonof replied by expressing his satisfaction, and said it was +desirable that the discussions should take place in London with the +participation of the Great Powers. + +"M. Sazonof hoped that the British Government would assume the direction +of these discussions. The whole of Europe would be thankful to them. It +would be very important that Austria should meanwhile put a stop +provisionally to her military action on Servian territory." + +(The above has been communicated to the six Powers.) + + +No. 134. + +_Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.--(Received August 1.)_ + +(Telegraphic.) _Paris, August_ 1, 1914. + +President of the Republic has informed me that German Government were +trying to saddle Russia with the responsibility; that it was only after +a decree of general mobilisation had been issued in Austria that the +Emperor of Russia ordered a general mobilisation; that, although the +measures which the German Government have already taken are in effect a +general mobilisation, they are not so designated; that a French general +mobilisation will become necessary in self-defence, and that France is +already forty-eight hours behind Germany as regards German military +preparations; that the French troops have orders not to go nearer to the +German frontier than a distance of 10 kilom. so as to avoid any grounds +for accusations of provocation to Germany, whereas the German troops, on +the other hand, are actually on the French frontier and have made +incursions on it; that, notwithstanding mobilisations, the Emperor of +Russia has expressed himself ready to continue his conversations with +the German Ambassador with a view to preserving the peace; that French +Government, whose wishes are markedly pacific, sincerely desire the +preservation of peace and do not quite despair, even now, of its being +possible to avoid war. + + +No. 148. + +_Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie_. + +(Telegraphic.) _Foreign Office, August_ 2, 1914. + +After the Cabinet this morning I gave M. Cambon the following +memorandum:-- + +"I am authorised to give an assurance that, if the German fleet comes +into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile +operations against French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will +give all the protection in its power. + +"This assurance is of course subject to the policy of His Majesty's +Government receiving the support of Parliament, and must not be taken as +binding His Majesty's Government to take any action until the above +contingency of action by the German fleet takes place." + +I pointed out that we had very large questions and most difficult issues +to consider, and that Government felt that they could not bind +themselves to declare war upon Germany necessarily if war broke out +between France and Germany to-morrow, but it was essential to the French +Government, whose fleet had long been concentrated in the Mediterranean, +to know how to make their dispositions with their north coast entirely +undefended. We therefore thought it necessary to give them this +assurance. It did not bind us to go to war with Germany unless the +German fleet took the action indicated, but it did give a security to +France that would enable her to settle the disposition of her own +Mediterranean fleet. + +M. Cambon asked me about the violation of Luxemburg. I told him the +doctrine on that point laid down by Lord Derby and Lord Clarendon in +1867. He asked me what we should say about the violation of the +neutrality of Belgium. I said that was a much more important matter; we +were considering what statement we should make in Parliament +to-morrow--in effect, whether we should declare violation of Belgian +neutrality to be a _casus belli_. I told him what had been said to the +German Ambassador on this point. + + +No. 153. + +_Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen_. + +(Telegraphic.) _Foreign Office, August_ 4, 1914. + +The King of the Belgians has made an appeal to His Majesty the King for +diplomatic intervention on behalf of Belgium in the following terms:-- + +"Remembering the numerous proofs of your Majesty's friendship and that +of your predecessor, and the friendly attitude of England in 1870 and +the proof of friendship you have just given us again, I make a supreme +appeal to the diplomatic intervention of your Majesty's Government to +safeguard the integrity of Belgium." + +His Majesty's Government are also informed that the German Government +has delivered to the Belgian Government a note proposing friendly +neutrality entailing free passage through Belgian territory, and +promising to maintain the independence and integrity of the kingdom and +its possessions at the conclusion of peace, threatening in case of +refusal to treat Belgium as an enemy. An answer was requested within +twelve hours. + +We also understand that Belgium has categorically refused this as a +flagrant violation of the law of nations. + +His Majesty's Government are bound to protest against this violation of +a treaty to which Germany is a party in common with themselves, and must +request an assurance that the demand made upon Belgium will not be +proceeded with and that her neutrality will be respected by Germany. You +should ask for an immediate reply. + + + + +APPENDIX III + + +Extract from the Dispatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin +respecting the Rupture of Diplomatic Relations with the German +Government. + +(Cd. 7445.) + + +_Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey_. + +Sir, _London, August_ 8, 1914. + +In accordance with the instructions contained in your telegram of the +4th instant I called upon the Secretary of State that afternoon and +enquired, in the name of His Majesty's Government, whether the Imperial +Government would refrain from violating Belgian neutrality. Herr von +Jagow at once replied that he was sorry to say that his answer must be +"No," as, in consequence of the German troops having crossed the +frontier that morning, Belgian neutrality had been already violated. +Herr von Jagow again went into the reasons why the Imperial Government +had been obliged to take this step, namely, that they had to advance +into France by the quickest and easiest way, so as to be able to get +well ahead with their operations and endeavour to strike some decisive +blow as early as possible. It was a matter of life and death for them, +as if they had gone by the more southern route they could not have +hoped, in view of the paucity of roads and the strength of the +fortresses, to have got through without formidable opposition entailing +great loss of time. This loss of time would have meant time gained by +the Russians for bringing up their troops to the German frontier. +Rapidity of action was the great German asset, while that of Russia was +an inexhaustible supply of troops. I pointed out to Herr von Jagow that +this _fait accompli_ of the violation of the Belgian frontier rendered, +as he would readily understand, the situation exceedingly grave, and I +asked him whether there was not still time to draw back and avoid +possible consequences, which both he and I would deplore. He replied +that, for the reasons he had given me, it was now impossible for them to +draw back. + +During the afternoon I received your further telegram of the same date, +and, in compliance with the instructions therein contained, I again +proceeded to the Imperial Foreign Office and informed the Secretary of +State that unless the Imperial Government could give the assurance by 12 +o'clock that night that they would proceed no further with their +violation of the Belgian frontier and stop their advance, I had been +instructed to demand my passports and inform the Imperial Government +that His Majesty's Government would have to take all steps in their +power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty +to which Germany was as much a party as themselves. + +Herr von Jagow replied that to his great regret he could give no other +answer than that which he had given me earlier in the day, namely, that +the safety of the Empire rendered it absolutely necessary that the +Imperial troops should advance through Belgium. I gave his Excellency a +written summary of your telegram and, pointing out that you had +mentioned 12 o'clock as the time when His Majesty's Government would +expect an answer, asked him whether, in view of the terrible +consequences which would necessarily ensue, it were not possible even at +the last moment that their answer should be reconsidered. He replied +that if the time given were even twenty-four hours or more, his answer +must be the same. I said that in that case I should have to demand my +passports. This interview took place at about 7 o'clock. In a short +conversation which ensued Herr von Jagow expressed his poignant regret +at the crumbling of his entire policy and that of the Chancellor, which +had been to make friends with Great Britain and then, through Great +Britain, to get closer to France. I said that this sudden end to my work +in Berlin was to me also a matter of deep regret and disappointment, but +that he must understand that under the circumstances and in view of our +engagements, His Majesty's Government could not possibly have acted +otherwise than they had done. + +I then said that I should like to go and see the Chancellor, as it might +be, perhaps, the last time I should have an opportunity of seeing him. +He begged me to do so. I found the Chancellor very agitated. His +Excellency at once began a harangue, which lasted for about 20 minutes. +He said that the step taken by His Majesty's Government was terrible to +a degree; just for a word--"neutrality," a word which in war time had so +often been disregarded--just for a scrap of paper Great Britain was +going to make war on a kindred nation who desired nothing better than to +be friends with her. All his efforts in that direction had been rendered +useless by this last terrible step, and the policy to which, as I knew, +he had devoted himself since his accession to office had tumbled down +like a house of cards. What we had done was unthinkable; it was like +striking a man from behind while he was fighting for his life against +two assailants. He held Great Britain responsible for all the terrible +events that might happen. I protested strongly against that statement, +and said that, in the same way as he and Herr von Jagow wished me to +understand that for strategical reasons it was a matter of life and +death to Germany to advance through Belgium and violate the latter's +neutrality, so I would wish him to understand that it was, so to speak, +a matter of "life and death" for the honour of Great Britain that she +should keep her solemn engagement to do her utmost to defend Belgium's +neutrality if attacked. That solemn compact simply had to be kept, or +what confidence could anyone have in engagements given by Great Britain +in the future? The Chancellor said, "But at what price will that compact +have been kept. Has the British Government thought of that?" I hinted to +his Excellency as plainly as I could that fear of consequences could +hardly be regarded as an excuse for breaking solemn engagements, but his +Excellency was so excited, so evidently overcome by the news of our +action, and so little disposed to hear reason that I refrained from +adding fuel to the flame by further argument. As I was leaving he said +that the blow of Great Britain joining Germany's enemies was all the +greater that almost up to the last moment he and his Government had been +working with us and supporting our efforts to maintain peace between +Austria and Russia. I said that this was part of the tragedy which saw +the two nations fall apart just at the moment when the relations between +them had been more friendly and cordial than they had been for years. +Unfortunately, notwithstanding our efforts to maintain peace between +Russia and Austria, the war had spread and had brought us face to face +with a situation which, if we held to our engagements, we could not +possibly avoid, and which unfortunately entailed our separation from our +late fellow-workers. He would readily understand that no one regretted +this more than I. + +After this somewhat painful interview I returned to the embassy and drew +up a telegraphic report of what had passed. This telegram was handed in +at the Central Telegraph Office a little before 9 P.M. It was accepted +by that office, but apparently never despatched.[190] + +[Footnote 190: This telegram never reached the Foreign Office.] + + + + +APPENDIX IV + + +THE CRIME OF SERAJEVO + +SELECTIONS FROM THE AUSTRIAN _dossier_ OF THE CRIME + +The following document is contained in the German Version of the German +White Book (pp. 28-31); and though it adds little to our knowledge of +the Austrian case against Servia, it deserves to be reprinted, as it is +omitted altogether in the official version in English of the German +White Book. The authorship of the document is uncertain. It has the +appearance of an extract from a German newspaper. + +Aus dem oesterreich-ungarischen Material. + +Wien, 27. Juli. Das in der oesterreichisch-ungarischen Zirkularnote an +die auswaertigen Botschaften in Angelegenheit des serbischen Konflikts +erwaehnte Dossier wird heute veroeffentlicht. + +In diesem Memoire wird darauf hingewiesen, dass die von Serbien +ausgegangene Bewegung, die sich zum Ziele gesetzt hat, die suedlichen +Teile Oesterreich-Ungarns von der Monarchie loszureiszen, um sie mit +Serbien zu einer staatlichen Einheit zu verbinden, weit zurueckgreist. +Diese in ihren Endzielen stets gleichbleibende und nur in ihren Mitteln +und an Intensitaet wechselnde Propaganda erreichte zur Zeit der +Unnerionskrise ihren Hoehepunft und trat damals ossen mit ihren Tendenzen +hervor. Waehrend einerjeits die gesamte serbische Bresse zum Kampfe gegen +die Monarchie ausrief, bildeten sich--von anderen Propagandamitteln +abgesehen--Ussoziationen, die diese Kaempfe vorbereiteten, unter denen +die Harodna Odbrana an Bedeutung hervorragte. Aus einem revolutionaeren +Komitee hervorgegangen, fonstituierte sich diese vom Belgrader +Auswaertigen Amte voellig abhaengige Organisation unter Leitung von +Staatsmaennern und Offizieren, darunter dem General Tantovic und dem +ehemaligen Minister Ivanovic. Auch Major Oja Jantovic und Milan +Pribicevic gehoeren zu diesen Gruendern. Dieser Berein hatte sich die +Bildung und Ausruestung von Freischaren fuer den bevorstehenden Krieg +gegen die oefterreichisch-ungarische Monarchie zum Ziele gesetzt. In +einer dem Memoire angefuegten Anlage wird ein Auszug aus dem vom +Zentralausschusse der Narodna Odbrana herausgegebenen Vereinsorgane +gleichen Namens veroeffentlicht, worin in mehreren Artikeln die Taetigfelt +und Ziele dieses Vereins ausfuehrlich dargelegt werden. Es heisst darin, +dass zu der Hauptaufgabe der Narodna Odbrana die Verbindung mit ihren +nahen und ferneren Bruedern jenseits der Grenze und unseren uebrigen +Freunden in der Welt gehoeren. + +_Oesterreich ist als erster und groesster Feind bezeichnet_. Wie die +Narodna Odbrana die Notwendigkeit des Kampfes mit Oesterreich predigt, +predigt sie eine heilige Wahrheit unserer nationalen Lage. Das +Schlusskapitel enthaelt einen Apell an die Regierung und das Volk +Serbiens, sich mit allen Mitteln fuer den Kampf vorzubereiten, den die +Annexion vorangezeigt hat. + +Das Memoire schildert nach einer Aussage eines von der Narodna Odbrana +angeworbenen Komitatschis die damalige Taetigkeit der Narodna Odbrana, +die eine von zwei Hauptleuten, darunter Jankovic, geleitete _Schule zur +Ausbildung von Banden_ unterhielt, Schulen, welche von General Jankovic +und von Hauptmann Milan Pribicevic regelmaessig inspiziert wurden. Weiter +wurden die Komitatschis im _Schiessen und Bombenwerfen, im Minenlegen, +Sprengen von Eisenbahnbruecken_ usw. unterrichtet. Nach der feierlichen +Erklaerung der Serbischen Regierung vom Jahre 1909 schien auch das Ende +dieser Organisation gekommen zu sein. Diese Erwartungen haben sich aber +nicht nur nicht erfuellt, sondern die Propaganda wurde durch die +serbische Presse fortgesetzt. Das Memoire fuehrt als Beispiel die Art und +Weise an, wie das Attentat gegen den bosnischen Landeschef Varesanin +publizistisch verwertet wurde, indem der Attentaeter als serbischer +Nationalheld gefeiert und seine Tat verherrlicht wurde. Diese Blaetter +wurden nicht nur in Serbien verbreitet, sondern auch auf +wohlorganisierten Schleichwegen in die Monarchie hineingeschmuggelt. + +Unter der gleichen Leitung wie bei ihrer Gruendung wurde die Narodna +Odbrana neuerlich der zentralpunkt einer Agitation welcher der +_Schuetzenbund mit 762 Vereinen, ein Sokolbund mit 3500 Mitgliedern, und +verschiedene andere Vereine angehoerten_. + +Im Kleide eines Kulturvereins auftretend, dem nur die geistige und die +fueoerperliche Entwickelung der Bevoelkerung Serbiens sowie deren +materielle Kraeftigung am Herzen liegt, enthullt die Narodna Oobrana ihr +wahres reorganisiertes Programm in vorzitiertem Auszug aus ihrem +Vereinsorgan, in welchem "die heilige Wahrheit" gepredigt wird, dass es +eine unerlaessliche Notwendigkeit ist, gegen Oesterreich, seinen ersten +groessten Feind, diesen Ausrottungskampf mit Gewehr und Kanone zu fuehren, +und das Volk mit allen Mitteln auf den Kampf vorzubereiten, zur +Befreiung der unterworfenen Gebiete, in denen viele Millionen +unterjochter Brueder schmachten. Die in dem Memoire zitierten Aufrufe und +Reden aehnlichen Charakters beleuchten die vielseitige auswaertige +Taetigkeit der Narodna Oobrana und ihrer affilierten Vereine, die in +Vortragsreifen, in der Teilnahme an Festen von bosnischen Vereinen, bei +denen offen Mitglieder fuer die erwaehnte serbische Vereinigung geworben +wurden, besteht. Gegenwaertig ist noch die Untersuchung darueber im Zuge, +dass die Sokolvereine Serbiens analoge Vereinigungen der Monarchie +bestimmten, sich mit ihnen in einem bisher geheim gehaltenen Verbande zu +vereinigen. Durch Vertrauensmaenner und Missionaere wurde die Aufwiegelung +in die Kreise Erwachsener und der urteilslosen Jugend gebracht. So +wurden von Milan Pribicewitsch ehmalige honvedoffiziere und ein +Gendarmerieleutnant zum Verlassen des Heeresdienstes in der Monarchie +unter bedenklichen Umstaenden verleitet. In den Schulen der +Lehrerbildungsanstalten wurde eine weitgehende Agitation entwickelt. Der +gewuenschte Krieg gegen die Monarchie wurde militaerisch auch insofern +vorbereitet, als serbische Emissaere im Falle des Ausbruchs der +Feindseligkeiten mit der Zerstoerung von Transportmitteln usw., der +Anfachung von Revolten und Paniken betraut wurden. Alles dies wird in +einer besonderen Beilage belegt. + +Das Memoire schildert ferner den Zusammenhang zwischen dieser Taetigkeit +der Narodna Oobrana und den affilierten Organisationen mit den +Attentaten gegen den Koeniglichen Kommissaer in Agram Cuvaj im Juli 1912, +dem Attentat von Dojcic in Agram 1913 gegen Sterlecz und dem +missglueckten Attentat Schaefers am 20. Mai im Aramer Theater. Es +verbreitet sich hierauf ueber den Zusammenhang des Attentats auf den +Thronfolger und dessen Gemahlin, ueber die Art, wie sich die Jungen schon +in der Schule an dem Gedanken der Narodna Dobrana vergifteten und wie +sich die Attentaeter mit Hilfe von Pribicewic und Dacic die Werkzeuge zu +dem Attentat verschafften, wobei insbesondere die Rolle des Majors +Tankofte dargelegt wird, der die Mordwassen lieferte, wie auch die Rolle +eines gewissen Ciganovic, eines gewesenen Komitatschi und jetzigen +Beamten der serbischen Eisenbahndirektion Belgrad, der schon 1909 als +Zoegling der Bandenschule der damaligen Narodna Odbrana austauchte. +Ferner wird die Art dargelegt, wie Bomben und Waffen unbemerkt nach +Bosnien eingeschmuggelt wurden, die keinen Zweifel darueber laesst, dass +dies ein wohl voerberiteter und fuer die geheimnisvollen Zwecke der +Narodna oft begangener Schleichweg war. + +Eine Beilage enthaelt einen Auszug aus den Akten des Kreisgerichts in +Serajewo ueber die Untersuchung des Attentats gegen den Erzherzog Franz +Ferdinand und dessen Gemahlin. Danach sind Princip, Cabrinovic, Grabez, +Crupilovic und Papovic gestaendig, in Gemeinschaft mit dem fluechtigen +Mehmedbasic ein Komplott zur Erwordung des Erzherzogs gebildet und ihm +zu diesen Zweck aufgelauert zu haben. Cabrinovic ist gestaendig, die +Bombe geworfen und Gabrilo Princip das Attentat mit der Browningpistole +ausgefuehrt zu haben. Beide Taeter gaben zu, bei der Veruebung der Tat die +Absicht des Mordes gehabt zu haben. Die weiteren Teile der Anlage +enthalten weitere Angaben der Beschuldigten vor dem Untersuchungsrichter +ueber Entstehung des Komplotts, Herkunft der Bomben, welche fabrikmaessig +hergestellt wurden, fuer millitaerische Zwecke bestimmt waren und ihrer +Originalpackung nach aus dem serbischen Waffenlager aus Kragujevac +stammten. Endlich gibt die Beilage Auskunft ueber den Transport der drei +Attentaeter und der Waffen von Serbien nach Bosnien. Aus dem weiteren +Zeugenprotokoll ergibt sich, dass ein Angehoeriger der Monarchie einige +Tage vor dem Attentat dem oesterreichisch-ungarischen Konsulat in Belgrad +Meldung von der Vermutung erstatten wollte, dass ein Plan zur Veruebung +des Attentats gegen den Erzherzog waehrend dessen Anwesenheit in Bosnien +bestehe. Dieser Mann soll nun durch Belgrader Polizeiorgane, welche ihn +unmittelbar vor Betreten des Konsulats aus nichtigen Gruenden +verhafteten, an der Erstattung der Meldung verhindert worden sein. +Weiter gehe aus dem Zeugenprotokoll hervor, dass die betreffenden +Polizeiorgane von dem geplanten Attentat Kenntnis gehabt haetten. Da +diese Angaben noch nicht nachgeprueft sind, kann ueber deren +Stichhaltigkeit vorlaeufig noch kein Urteil gefaellt werden. In der +Beilage zum Memoire heisst es: Vor dem Empfangssaal des serbischen +Kriegsministeriums befinden sich an der Wand vier allegorische Bilder, +von denen drei Darstellungen serbischer Kriegserfolge sind, waehrend das +vierte die Verwirklichung der monarchiefeindlichen Tendenzen Serbiens +versinnbildlicht. Ueber einer Landschaft, die teils Gebirge (Bosnien), +teils Ebene (Suedungarn) darstellt, geht die Zora, die Morgenroete der +serbischen Hoffnungen, auf. Im Vordergrunde steht eine bewaffnete +Frauengestalt, auf deren Schilde die Namen aller "noch zu befreienden +Provinzen": Bosnien, Herzegowina, Wojwodina, Gyrmien, Dalmatien usw. +stehen. + + + + +APPENDIX V + + +Extract from the Dispatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna +respecting the Rupture of Diplomatic Relations with the Austro-Hungarian +Government. + +(Cd. 7596) + +_Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey_. + + _London, September_ 1, 1914. + +Sir, + +The rapidity of the march of events during the days which led up to the +outbreak of the European war made it difficult, at the time, to do more +than record their progress by telegraph. I propose now to add a few +comments. + +The delivery at Belgrade on the 23rd July of the Austrian note to Servia +was preceded by a period of absolute silence at the Ballplatz. Except +Herr von Tchinsky, who must have been aware of the tenour, if not of the +actual words of the note, none of my colleagues were allowed to see +through the veil. On the 22nd and 23rd July, M. Dumaine, French +Ambassador, had long interviews with Baron Macchio, one of the +Under-Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs, by whom he was left +under the impression that the words of warning he had been instructed to +speak to the Austro-Hungarian Government had not been unavailing, and +that the note which was being drawn up would be found to contain nothing +with which a self-respecting State need hesitate to comply. At the +second of these interviews he was not even informed that the note was at +that very moment being presented at Belgrade, or that it would be +published in Vienna on the following morning. Count Forgach, the other +Under-Secretary of State, had indeed been good enough to confide to me +on the same day the true character of the note, and the fact of its +presentation about the time we were speaking. + +So little had the Russian Ambassador been made aware of what was +preparing that he actually left Vienna on a fortnight's leave of absence +about the 20th July. He had only been absent a few days when events +compelled him to return. It might have been supposed that Duc Avarna, +Ambassador of the allied Italian Kingdom, which was bound to be so +closely affected by fresh complications in the Balkans, would have been +taken fully into the confidence of Count Berchtold during this critical +time. In point of fact his Excellency was left completely in the dark. +As for myself, no indication was given me by Count Berchtold of the +impending storm, and it was from a private source that I received on the +15th July the forecast of what was about to happen which I telegraphed +to you the following day. It is true that during all this time the "Neue +Freie Presse" and other leading Viennese newspapers were using language +which pointed unmistakably to war with Servia. The official +"Fremdenblatt", however, was more cautious, and till the note was +published, the prevailing opinion among my colleagues was that Austria +would shrink from courses calculated to involve her in grave European +complications. + +On the 24th July the note was published in the newspapers. By common +consent it was at once styled an ultimatum. Its integral acceptance by +Servia was neither expected nor desired, and when, on the following +afternoon, it was at first rumoured in Vienna that it had been +unconditionally accepted, there was a moment of keen disappointment. The +mistake was quickly corrected, and as soon as it was known later in the +evening that the Servian reply had been rejected and that Baron Giesl +had broken off relations at Belgrade, Vienna burst into a frenzy of +delight, vast crowds parading the streets and singing patriotic songs +till the small hours of the morning. + +The demonstrations were perfectly orderly, consisting for the most part +of organised processions through the principal streets ending up at the +Ministry of War. One or two attempts to make hostile manifestations +against the Russian Embassy were frustrated by the strong guard of +police which held the approaches to the principal embassies during those +days. The demeanour of the people at Vienna, and, as I was informed, in +many other principal cities of the Monarchy, showed plainly the +popularity of the idea of war with Servia, and there can be no doubt +that the small body of Austrian and Hungarian statesmen by whom this +momentous step was adopted gauged rightly the sense, and it may even be +said the determination, of the people, except presumably in portions of +the provinces inhabited by the Slav races. There had been much +disappointment in many quarters at the avoidance of war with Servia +during the annexation crisis in 1908 and again in connection with the +recent Balkan war. Count Berchtold's peace policy had met with little +sympathy in the Delegation. Now the flood-gates were opened, and the +entire people and press clamoured impatiently for immediate and condign +punishment of the hated Servian race. The country certainly believed +that it had before it only the alternative of subduing Servia or of +submitting sooner or later to mutilation at her hands. But a peaceful +solution should first have been attempted. Few seemed to reflect that +the forcible intervention of a Great Power in the Balkans must +inevitably call other Great Powers into the field. So just was the cause +of Austria held to be, that it seemed to her people inconceivable that +any country should place itself in her path, or that questions of mere +policy or prestige should be regarded anywhere as superseding the +necessity which had arisen to exact summary vengeance for the crime of +Serajevo. The conviction had been expressed to me by the German +Ambassador on the 24th July that Russia would stand aside. This feeling, +which was also held at the Ballplatz, influenced no doubt the course of +events, and it is deplorable that no effort should have been made to +secure by means of diplomatic negotiations the acquiescence of Russia +and Europe as a whole in some peaceful compromise of the Servian +question by which Austrian fears of Servian aggression and intrigue +might have been removed for the future. Instead of adopting this course +the Austro-Hungarian Government resolved upon war. The inevitable +consequence ensued. Russia replied to a partial Austrian mobilisation +and declaration of war against Servia by a partial Russian mobilisation +against Austria. Austria met this move by completing her own +mobilisation, and Russia again responded with results which have passed +into history. The fate of the proposals put forward by His Majesty's +Government for the preservation of peace is recorded in the White Paper +on the European Crisis[191]. On the 28th July I saw Count Berchtold and +urged as strongly as I could that the scheme of mediation mentioned in +your speech in the House of Commons on the previous day should be +accepted as offering an honourable and peaceful settlement of the +question at issue. His Excellency himself read to me a telegraphic +report of the speech, but added that matters had gone too far; Austria +was that day declaring war on Servia, and she could never accept the +conference which you had suggested should take place between the less +interested Powers on the basis of the Servian reply. This was a matter +which must be settled directly between the two parties immediately +concerned. I said His Majesty's Government would hear with regret that +hostilities could not be arrested, as you feared they would lead to +European complications. I disclaimed any British lack of sympathy with +Austria in the matter of her legitimate grievances against Servia, and +pointed out that, whereas Austria seemed to be making these the starting +point of her policy, His Majesty's Government were bound to look at the +question primarily from the point of view of the maintenance of the +peace of Europe. In this way the two countries might easily drift apart. + +His Excellency said that he too was keeping the European aspect of the +question in sight. He thought, however, that Russia would have no right +to intervene after receiving his assurance that Austria sought no +territorial aggrandisement. His Excellency remarked to me in the course +of his conversation that, though he had been glad to co-operate towards +bringing about the settlement which had resulted from the ambassadorial +conferences in London during the Balkan crisis, he had never had much +belief in the permanency of that settlement, which was necessarily of a +highly artificial character, inasmuch as the interests which it sought +to harmonise were in themselves profoundly divergent. His Excellency +maintained a most friendly demeanour throughout the interview, but left +no doubt in my mind as to the determination of the Austro-Hungarian +Government to proceed with the invasion of Servia. + +The German Government claim to have persevered to the end in the +endeavour to support at Vienna your successive proposals in the interest +of peace. Herr von Tchirsky abstained from inviting my co-operation or +that of the French and Russian Ambassadors in carrying out his +instructions to that effect, and I had no means of knowing what response +he was receiving from the Austro-Hungarian Government. I was, however, +kept fully informed by M. Schebeko, the Russian Ambassador, of his own +direct negotiations with Count Berchtold. M. Schebeko endeavoured on the +28th July to persuade the Austro-Hungarian Government to furnish Count +Szapary with full powers to continue at St. Petersburgh the hopeful +conversations which had there been taking place between the latter and +M. Sazonof. Count Berchtold refused at the time, but two days later +(30th July), though in the meantime Russia had partially mobilised +against Austria, he received M. Schebeko again, in a perfectly friendly +manner, and gave his consent to the continuance of the conversations at +St. Petersburgh. From now onwards the tension between Russia and Germany +was much greater than between Russia and Austria. As between the latter +an arrangement seemed almost in sight, and on the 1st August I was +informed by M. Schebeko that Count Szapary had at last conceded the main +point at issue by announcing to M. Sazonof that Austria would consent to +submit to mediation the points in the note to Servia which seemed +incompatible with the maintenance of Servian independence. M. Sazonof, +M. Schebeko added, had accepted this proposal on condition that Austria +would refrain from the actual invasion of Servia. Austria, in fact, had +finally yielded, and that she herself had at this point good hopes of a +peaceful issue is shown by the communication made to you on the 1st +August by Count Mensdorff, to the effect that Austria had neither +"banged the door" on compromise nor cut off the conversations.[192] M. +Schebeko to the end was working hard for peace. He was holding the most +conciliatory language to Count Berchtold, and he informed me that the +latter, as well as Count Forgach, had responded in the same spirit. +Certainly it was too much for Russia to expect that Austria would hold +back her armies, but this matter could probably have been settled by +negotiation, and M. Schebeko repeatedly told me he was prepared to +accept any reasonable compromise. + +Unfortunately these conversations at St. Petersburgh and Vienna were cut +short by the transfer of the dispute to the more dangerous ground of a +direct conflict between Germany and Russia. Germany intervened on the +31st July by means of her double ultimatums to St. Petersburgh and +Paris. The ultimatums were of a kind to which only one answer is +possible, and Germany declared war on Russia on the 1st August, and on +France on the 3rd August. A few days' delay might in all probability +have saved Europe from one of the greatest calamities in history. + +Russia still abstained from attacking Austria, and M. Schebeko had been +instructed to remain at his post till war should actually be declared +against her by the Austro-Hungarian Government. This only happened on +the 6th August when Count Berchtold informed the foreign missions at +Vienna that "the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh had been +instructed to notify the Russian Government that, in view of the +menacing attitude of Russia in the Austro-Servian conflict and the fact +that Russia had commenced hostilities against Germany, Austria-Hungary +considered herself also at war with Russia." + +M. Schebeko left quietly in a special train provided by the +Austro-Hungarian Government on the 7th September. He had urgently +requested to be conveyed to the Roumanian frontier, so that he might be +able to proceed to his own country, but was taken instead to the Swiss +frontier, and ten days later I found him at Berne. + +M. Dumaine, French Ambassador, stayed on till the 12th August. On the +previous day he had been instructed to demand his passport on the ground +that Austrian troops were being employed against France. This point was +not fully cleared up when I left Vienna. On the 9th August, M. Dumaine +had received from Count Berchtold the categorical declaration that no +Austrian troops were being moved to Alsace. The next day this statement +was supplemented by a further one, in writing, giving Count Berchtold's +assurance that not only had no Austrian troops been moved actually to +the French frontier, but that none were moving from Austria in a +westerly direction into Germany in such a way that they might replace +German troops employed at the front. These two statements were made by +Count Berchtold in reply to precise questions put to him by M. Dumaine, +under instructions from his Government. The French Ambassador's +departure was not attended by any hostile demonstration, but his +Excellency before leaving had been justly offended by a harangue made by +the Chief Burgomaster of Vienna to the crowd assembled before the steps +of the town hall, in which he assured the people that Paris was in the +throes of a revolution, and that the President of the Republic had been +assassinated. + +The British declaration of war on Germany was made known in Vienna by +special editions of the newspapers about midday on the 5th August. An +abstract of your speeches in the House of Commons, and also of the +German Chancellor's speech in the Reichstag of the 4th April, appeared +the same day, as well as the text of the German ultimatum to Belgium. +Otherwise few details of the great events of these days transpired. The +"Neue Freie Presse" was violently insulting towards England. The +"Fremdenblatt" was not offensive, but little or nothing was said in the +columns of any Vienna paper to explain that the violation of Belgian +neutrality had left His Majesty's Government no alternative but to take +part in the war. + +The declaration of Italian neutrality was bitterly felt in Vienna, but +scarcely mentioned in the newspapers. + +On the 5th August I had the honour to receive your instruction of the +previous day preparing me for the immediate outbreak of war with +Germany, but adding that, Austria being understood to be not yet at that +date at war with Russia and France, you did not desire me to ask for my +passport or to make any particular communication to the Austro-Hungarian +Government. You stated at the same time that His Majesty's Government of +course expected Austria not to commit any act of war against us without +the notice required by diplomatic usage. + +On Thursday morning, the 13th August, I had the honour to receive your +telegram of the 12th, stating that you had been compelled to inform +Count Mensdorff, at the request of the French Government, that a +complete rupture had occurred between France and Austria, on the ground +that Austria had declared war on Russia who was already fighting on the +side of France, and that Austria had sent troops to the German frontier +under conditions that were a direct menace to France. The rupture having +been brought about with France in this way, I was to ask for my +passport, and your telegram stated, in conclusion, that you had informed +Count Mensdorff that a state of war would exist between the two +countries from midnight of the 12th August. + +After seeing Mr. Penfield, the United States Ambassador, who accepted +immediately in the most friendly spirit my request that his Excellency +would take charge provisionally of British interests in Austria-Hungary +during the unfortunate interruption of relations, I proceeded, with Mr. +Theo Russell, Counsellor of His Majesty's Embassy, to the Ballplatz. +Count Berchtold received me at midday. I delivered my message, for which +his Excellency did not seem to be unprepared, although he told me that a +long telegram from Count Mensdorff had just come in but had not yet been +brought to him. His Excellency received my communication with the +courtesy which never leaves him. He deplored the unhappy complications +which were drawing such good friends as Austria and England into war. In +point of fact, he added, Austria did not consider herself then at war +with France, though diplomatic relations with that country had been +broken off. I explained in a few words how circumstances had forced this +unwelcome conflict upon us. We both avoided useless argument... + +[Footnote 191: "Miscellaneous, No. 6 (1914)."] + +[Footnote 192: See No. 137, "Miscellaneous, No. 6 (1914)."] + + + + +APPENDIX VI + + +EXTRACTS FROM + +THE RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK + +_Recueil de Documents Diplomatiques_: + +_Negociations ayant precede la guerre_ + +_10/23 Juillet--24 Juillet/6 Aout 1914_ + +PREFATORY NOTE TO APPENDIX VI + +This important collection of documents, which has only reached us since +the publication of our first edition, confirms the conclusion, which we +had deduced from other evidence in our fifth chapter (_supra_, pp. +66-107), that Germany consistently placed obstacles in the way of any +proposals for a peaceful settlement, and this in spite of the +willingness of all the other Powers, including Austria-Hungary and +Russia, to continue discussion of the Servian question. That the crisis +took Russia by surprise seems evident from the fact that her ambassadors +accredited to France, Berlin, and Vienna were not at their posts when +friction began with Russia. (_Infra_, Nos. 4, 7, 8.) + +The Russian evidence shows that, on July 29, Germany threatened to +mobilize if Russia did not desist from military preparations. This +threat was viewed by M. Sazonof as an additional reason for taking all +precautions; 'since we cannot accede to Germany's desire, the only +course open to us is to accelerate our own preparations and to assume +that war is probably inevitable.' (_Infra_, No. 58.) The reader will +also notice the curious fact that on July 30 the decree mobilizing the +German army and navy was published, only to be immediately withdrawn; +and that the German Government explained that the publication had been +premature and accidental. (_Infra_, Nos. 61, 62.) We know from the +British White Book (_Correspondence_, No. 99, Sir F. Bertie to Sir E. +Grey, July 30) that, on July 30, Germany showed signs of weakening in +her attitude to Russia. + +It will be noted that war between Austria-Hungary and Russia was not +officially declared until August 6, five days after Germany had declared +war on Russia. (_Infra_, No. 79.) + +In Nos. 36 and 46 will be found some curious details of the methods +employed by Austria-Hungary and Germany to delay the publication of the +Servian reply to Austria-Hungary. + +MINISTERE DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES. + + +RECUEIL + +DE DOCUMENTS DIPLOMATIQUES. + + + +Negociations ayant precede la guerre. + +10/23 Juillet--24 Juillet/6 Aout 1914. + + + + +Petrograde, +Imprimerie de l'Etat. +1914. + + +No. 1. + +Le Charge d'affaires en Serbie au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. + +(_Telegramme_). + +Belgrade, le 10/23 Juillet 1914. + +Le Ministre d'Autriche vient de transmettre, a 6 heures du soir, an +Ministre des Finances Patchou, qui remplace Pachitch, une note +ultimative de son Gouvernement fixant un delai de 48 heures pour +l'acceptation des demandes y contenues. Giesl a ajoute verbalement que +pour le cas ou la note ne serait pas acceptee integralement dans un +delai de 48 heures, il avait l'ordre de quitter Belgrade avec le +personnel de la Legation. Pachitch et les autres Ministres qui se +trouvent en tournee electorale ont ete rappeles et sont attendus a +Belgrade demain Vendredi a 10 heures du matin. Patchou qui m'a +communique le contenu de la note, sollicite l'aide de la Russie et +declare qu'aucun Gouvernement Serbe ne pourra accepter les demandes de +l'Autriche. + +(Signe) Strandtman. + + +No. 2. + +Le Charge d'affaires en Serbie au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. + +_(Telegramme)._ + +Belgrade, le 10/23 Juillet 1914. + +Texte de la note qui a ete transmise aujourd'hui par le Ministre +d'Autriche-Hongrie an gouvernement Serbe:... + +(_For this note, see German White Book, pp. 18-22_ (supra _in Appendix +I._)) + +Un memoire concernant les resultats de l'instruction de Sarajevo a +l'egard des fonctionnaires mentionnes aux points 7 et 8 est annexe a +cette note'.[193] + +(Signe) Strandtman. + +[Footnote 193: This memorandum is in the German White Book, pp. 22-3 +(_supra_, Appendix I), and not reproduced in the Russian Orange Book.] + + +No. 3. + +Note Verbale transmise personnellement par l'Ambassadeur +d'Autriche-Hongrie a St.-Petersbourg au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres +le 11/24 Juillet 1914 a 10 heures du matin. + +Le Gouvernement Imperial et Royal s'est trouve dans la necessite de +remettre le Jeudi 10/23 du mois courant, par l'entremise du Ministre +Imperial et Royal a Belgrade, la note suivante an Gouvernement Royal de +Serbie: + +(Suit le texte de la note). + +Voir document No. 2. + + +No. 4. + +Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres au Charge d'affaires en +Autriche-Hongrie. + +_(Telegramme)._ + +St.-Petersbourg, le 11/24 Juillet 1914. + +Veuillez transmettre au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres +d'Autriche-Hongrie ce qui suit.... + +(This communication is printed in the British White Book +(_Correspondence_, No. 13); see p. 177 _supra_ for the text in English.) + +Communique a Londres, Rome, Paris, Belgrade. + +(Signe) Sazonow. + + +No. 5. + +Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres aux Representants de Sa Majeste +l'Empereur en Angleterre, en Allemagne, en Italie et en France. + +_(Telegramme)._ + +St.-Petersbourg, le 11/24 Juillet 1914. + +Me refere a mon telegramme a Koudachew d'aujourd'hui; nous esperons que +le Gouvernement aupres duquel. Vous etes accredite partagera notre point +de vue et prescrira d'urgence a son Representant a Vienne de se +prononcer dans le meme sens. + +Communique a Belgrade. + +(Signe) Sazonow. + + +No. 6. + +Telegramme de Son Altesse Royale le Prince Regent de Serbie a Sa Majeste +l'Empereur. + +Belgrade, le 11/24 Juillet 1914. + +Le Gouvernement Austro-Hongrois a remis hier soir au Gouvernement serbe +une note concernant l'attentat de Sarajevo. Consciente de ses devoirs +internationaux, la Serbie des les premiers jours de l'horrible crime a +declare qu'elle le condamnait et qu'elle etait prete a ouvrir une +enquete sur son territoire si la complicite de certains de ses sujets +etait prouvee au cours du proces instruit par les autorites +Austro-hongroises. Cependant les demandes contenues dans la note +Austro-hongroise sont inutilement humiliantes pour la Serbie et +incompatibles avec sa dignite comme Etat independant. Ainsi on nous +demande sur un ton peremptoire une declaration du gouvernement dans +l'officiel et un ordre du souverain a l'armee, ou nous reprimerions +l'esprit hostile contre l'Autriche en nous faisant a nous memes des +reproches d'une faiblesse criminelle envers nos menees perfides.--On +nous impose ensuite l'admission des fonctionnaires austro-hongrois en +Serbie pour participer avec les notres a l'instruction et pour +surveiller l'execution des autres conditions indiquees dans la note. +Nous avons recu un delai de 48 heures pour accepter le tout, faute de +quoi la Legation d'Autriche-Hongrie quittera Belgrade. Nous sommes prets +a accepter les conditions austro-hongroises qui sont compatibles avec la +situation d'un Etat independant, ainsi que celles dont l'acception nous +sera conseillee par Votre Majeste; toutes les personnes dont la +participation a l'attentat sera demontree seront severement punis par +nous. Certaines parmi ces demandes ne pourraient etre executees sans des +changements de notre legislation, ce qui exige du temps. On nous a donne +un delai trop court. Nous pouvons etre attaques apres l'expiration du +delai par l'armee austro-hongroise qui se concentre sur notre frontiere. +Il nous est impossible de nous defendre et nous supplions Votre Majeste +de nous donner Son aide le plus tot possible. La bienveillance precieuse +de Votre Majeste qui s'est manifestee tant de fois a notre egard nous +fait esperer fermement que cette fois encore notre appel sera entendu +par Son genereux coeur slave. + +En ces moments difficiles l'interprete les sentiments du peuple serbe +qui supplie Votre Majeste de vouloir bien s'interesser au sort du +Royaume de Serbie. + +(Signe) Alexandre. + + +No. 7. + +Le Charge d'Affaires en Allemagne au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. + +_(Telegramme)._ + +Berlin, le 11/24 Juillet 1914. + +Tous les journaux du matin, meme ceux, rares, qui reconnaissent +l'impossibilite pour la Serbie d'accepter les conditions posees, +accueillent avec une grande sympathie le ton energique adopte par +l'Autriche. L'officieux "Local-Anzeiger" est particulierement agressif; +il qualifie de superflus les recours eventuels de la Serbie a St. +Petersbourg, a Paris, a Athenes et a Bucarest, et termine en disant que +le peuple allemand respirera librement quand il aura appris que la +situation dans la peninsule Balcanique va enfin s'eclaircir. + +(Signe) Bronewsky. + + +No. 8. + +Le Charge d'Affaires en France an Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. + +_(Telegramme)._ Paris, le 11/24 Juillet 1914. + +La copie de la note officiellement remise a Belgrade a ete communiquee +par l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche an Gouvernement Francais. Plus tard +l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a visite le Ministre et lui a lu une +communication reproduisant les arguments autrichiens et indiquant qu'en +cas de refus de la part de la Serbie, l'Autriche serait obligee de +recourir a une pression et, en cas de besoin, a des mesures militaires; +la communication se terminait par la remarque qu'a l'avis de l'Allemagne +cette question devrait etre resolue directement entre l'Autriche et la +Serbie et qu'il etait de l'interet des Puissances de circonscrire +l'affaire en l'abandonnant aux Parties interessees. Le Gerant du +Departement Politique, qui assistait a l'entretien, demanda a +l'Ambassadeur s'il fallait considerer l'action autrichienne comme un +ultimatum--en d'autres termes, si, dans le cas ou la Serbie ne se +soumettrait pas entierement aux demandes autrichiennes, les hostilites +etaient inevitables? L'ambassadeur evita une reponse directe en +alleguant l'absence d'instructions. + +(Signe) Sevastopoulo. + + +No. 9. + +Le Charge d'Affaires en Serbie au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. + +_(Telegramme)._ Belgrade, le 11/24 Juillet 1914. + +Pachitch est rentre a Belgrade. Il a l'intention de donner dans le delai +fixe, c'est a dire demain Samedi a 6 heures du soir, une reponse a +l'Autriche indiquant les points acceptables et inacceptables. On +adressera aujourd'hui meme aux Puissances la priere de defendre +l'independance de la Serbie. Ensuite, ajouta Pachitch, si la guerre est +inevitable--nous ferons la guerre. + +(Signe) Strandtman. + + +No. 10. + +Communique du Gouvernement Imperial. + +St.-Petersbourg, le 12/25 Juillet 1914. + +Les derniers evenements et l'envoi par l'Autriche-Hongrie d'un ultimatum +a la Serbie preoccupent le Gouvernement Imperial an plus haut degre. Le +Gouvernement suit attentivement l'evolution du conflit serbo-autrichien +qui ne peut pas laisser la Russie indifferente. + + +No. 11. + +Le Charge d'Affaires en Autriche-Hongrie au Ministre des Affaires +Etrangeres. + +_(Telegramme)._ Vienne, le 12/25 Juillet 1914. + +Le comte Berchtold se trouve a Ischl. Vu l'impossibilite d'y arriver a +temps, je lui ai telegraphie notre proposition de prolonger le delai de +l'ultimatum et l'ai repetee verbalement au Baron Macchio. Ce dernier m'a +promis de la communiquer a temps au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres, +mais a ajoute qu'il pouvait predire avec assurance un refus categorique. + +(Signe) Koudachew. + + +No. 12. + +Le Charge d'Affaires en Autriche-Hongrie an Ministre des Affaires +Etrangeres. + +_(Telegramme)._ Vienne, le 12/25 Juillet 1914. + +Suite a mon telegramme d'aujourd'hui. Viens de recevoir de Macchio la +reponse negative du Gouvernement Austro-Hongrois a notre proposition de +prolonger le delai de la note. + +(Signe) Koudachew. + + +No. 13. + +Le Charge d'Affaires en Serbie an Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. + +_(Telegramme)._ Belgrade, le 12/25 Juillet 1914. + +Recu avec retard le 14--27 Juillet 1914. + +Je transmets la reponse que le President du Conseil des Ministres Serbe +a remis an ministre Austro-Hongrois a Belgrade aujourd'hui avant +l'expiration du delai de l'ultimatum.... + +(The text of the reply will be found in the British White Book +(_Correspondence_, No. 39) and also in the German White Book, pp. 23-32 +(supra, Appendix I.).) + + +No. 14. + +Le Charge d'affaires en Allemagne au Ministre des affaires Etrangeres. + +_(Telegramme)._ Berlin, le 12/25 Juillet 1914. + +Ai recu Votre telegramme du 11/24 Juillet. Ai communique son contenu an +Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. Il me dit que le Gouvernement Anglais +l'a egalement prie de conseiller a Vienne la prolongation du delai de +l'ultimatum; il a communique cette demarche telegraphiquement a Vienne, +il va en faire autant pour notre demarche, mais il craint qu'a la suite +de l'absence de Berchtold parti pour Ischl, et vu le manque de temps, +ses telegrammes ne restent sans resultats; il a, en outre, des doutes +sur l'opportunite pour l'Autriche de ceder an dernier moment et il se +demande si cela ne pouvait pas augmenter l'assurance de la Serbie. J'ai +repondu qu'une grande Puissance comme l'Autriche pourrait ceder sans +porter atteinte a son prestige et ai fait valoir tous les arguments +conformes, cependant je n'ai pu obtenir des promesses plus precises. +Meme lorsque je laissais entendre qu'il fallait agir a Vienne pour +eviter la possibilite de consequences redoutables, le Ministre des +Affaires Etrangeres repondait chaque fois negativement. + +(Signe) Bronewsky. + + +No. 15. + +Le Charge d'affaires en France an Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. + +(_Telegramme_). Paris, le 12/25 Juillet 1914. + +Ai recu le telegramme du 11/24 Juillet concernant la prolongation du +delai de l'ultimatum autrichien et ai fait la communication prescrite. +Le Representant de France a Vienne a ete muni d'instructions conformes. + +(Signe) Sevastopoulo. + + +No. 16. + +L'Ambassadeur en Angleterre an Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. + +(_Telegramme_). Londres, le 12/25 Juillet 1914. + +Recu telegramme du 11 Juillet. Grey a prescrit a l'Ambassadeur +d'Angleterre a Vienne d'appuyer notre demarche concernant la +prolongation du delai de l'ultimatum. Il m'a dit en meme temps que +l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche etait venu le voir et avait explique qu'on ne +devrait pas attribuer a la note autrichienne le caractere d'un +ultimatum; il faudrait la considerer comme une demarche qui, en cas +d'absence de reponse ou en cas de reponse insuffisante au terme fixe, +aurait comme suite la rupture des relations diplomatiques et le depart +immediat de Belgrade du Ministre d'Autriche-Hongrie, sans entrainer +cependant le commencement immediat des hostilites.--Grey a ajoute qu'a +la suite de cette explication il a indique a l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre +a Vienne que dans le cas ou il serait trop tard pour soulever la +question de la prolongation du delai de l'ultimatum, celle de l'arret +des hostilites pourrait peut-etre servir de base a la discussion. + +(Signe) Benckendorff. + + +No. 17. + +Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres a l'Ambassadeur a Londres. + +_(Telegramme)._ St.-Petersbourg, le 12/25 Juillet 1914. + +Dans le cas d'une nouvelle aggravation de la situation, pouvant +provoquer de la part des Grandes Puissances des actions conformes, nous +comptons que l'Angleterre ne tardera pas de se ranger nettement du cote +de la Russie et de la France, en vue de maintenir l'equilibre europeen, +en faveur duquel elle est intervenue constamment dans le passe et qui +serait sans aucun doute compromis dans le cas du triomphe de l'Autriche. + +(Signe) Sazonow. + + +No. 18. + +Note verbale remise par l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne au Ministre des +Affaires Etrangeres le 12/25 Juillet 1914. + +Il nous revient de source autoritative que la nouvelle repandue par +quelques journaux d'apres laquelle la demarche du Gouvernement +d'Autriche-Hongrie a Belgrade aurait ete faite a l'instigation de +l'Allemagne est absolument fausse. Le Gouvernement Allemand n'a pas eu +connaissance du texte de la note Autrichienne avant qu'elle ait ete +remise et n'a exerce aucune influence sur son contenu. C'est a tort +qu'on attribue a l'Allemagne une attitude comminatoire. + +L'Allemagne appuie naturellement comme allie de l'Autriche les +revendications a son avis legitimes du Cabinet de Vienne contre la +Serbie. + +Avant tout elle desire comme elle l'a deja declare des le commencement +du differend Austro-Serbe que ce conflit reste localise. + + +No. 19. + +Le Charge d'affaires en France an Ministre des affaires Etrangeres. + +_(Telegramme)_ Paris, le 12/25 Juillet 1914. + +Me refere a mon telegramme du 11/24 Juillet. + +Aujourd'hui un journal du matin a publie, sous une forme pas entierement +exacte, les declarations d'hier de l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne, en les +faisant suivre de commentaires qui attribuent a cette demarche le +caractere d'une menace. L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne, tres impressionne par +ces divulgations, a visite aujourd'hui le Gerant du Departement +Politique pour lui dire que ses paroles n'avaient nullement eu le +caractere de menace qu'on leur attribue. Il a declare que l'Autriche +avait presente sa note a la Serbie sans entente precise avec Berlin, +mais que cependant l'Allemagne approuvait le point de vue de l'Autriche +et que certainement 'la fleche une fois partie' (ce sont la ses propres +paroles), l'Allemagne ne pouvait se laisser guider que par ses devoirs +d'alliee. + +(Signe) Sevastopoulo. + + +No. 20. + +L'ambassadeur en Angleterre au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. + +_(Telegramme)._ Londres, le 12/25 Juillet 1914. + +Grey m'a dit que l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne lui a declare que le +Gouvernement Allemand n'avait pas ete informe du texte de la note +autrichienne, mais qu'il soutenait entierement la demarche autrichienne. +L'Ambassadeur a demande en meme temps si l'Angleterre pouvait consentir +a agir a St. Petersbourg dans un esprit de conciliation. Grey a repondu +que cela etait completement impossible. Le Ministre a ajoute que tant +que les complications n'existaient qu'entre l'Autriche et la Serbie, les +interets Anglais n'etaient engages qu'indirectement, mais qu'il devait +prevoir que la mobilisation autrichienne aurait comme suite la +mobilisation de la Russie et que des ce moment on se trouverait en +presence d'une situation a laquelle seraient interessees toutes les +Puissances. L'Angleterre se reservait pour ce cas une complete liberte +d'action. + +(Signe) Benckendorff. + + +No. 21. + +Le Charge d'affaires en Serbie an Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. + +_(Telegramme)._ Belgrade, le 12/25 Juillet 1914. + +Malgre le caractere extremement conciliant de la reponse serbe a +l'ultimatum, le Ministre d'Autriche vient d'informer, a 6-1/2 du soir, +le Gouvernement Serbe par note, que n'ayant pas recu an delai fixe une +reponse satisfaisante il quitte Belgrade avec tout le personnel de la +Legation. La Scoupchtina est convoquee a Nich pour le 14/27 Juillet. Le +Gouvernement Serbe et le Corps Diplomatique partent ce soir pour la meme +ville. + +(Signe) Strandtman. + + +No. 22. + +L'Ambassadeur en Angleterre an Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. + +_(Telegramme)._ Londres, le 12/25 Juillet 1914. + +Grey a dit a l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne qu'a son avis la mobilisation +autrichienne devait entrainer la mobilisation de la Russie, qu'alors +surgirait le danger aigu d'une guerre generale et qu'il ne voyait qu'un +seul moyen pour une solution pacifique: qu'en presence des mobilisations +autrichienne et russe, l'Allemagne, la France, l'Italie et l'Angleterre +s'abstiennent d'une mobilisation immediate et proposent tout d'abord +leurs bons offices. Grey m'a dit que ce plan necessitait avant tout +l'agrement de l'Allemagne et l'engagement de cette Puissance de ne pas +mobiliser. En consequence il a adresse tout d'abord a Berlin une +question a ce sujet. + +(Signe) Benckendorff. + + +No. 23. + +Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres a l'Ambassadeur en Italie. + +_(Telegramme)._ St. Petersbourg, le 13/26 Juillet 1914. + +L'Italie pourrait jouer un role de tout premier ordre en faveur du +maintien de la paix, en exercant l'influence necessaire sur l'Autriche +et en adoptant une attitude nettement defavorable au conflit, car ce +dernier ne saurait etre localise. Il est desirable que vous exprimiez la +conviction qu'il est impossible pour la Russie de ne pas venir en aide a +la Serbie. + +(Signe) Sazonow. + + +No. 24. + +Le Gerant du Consulat a Prague au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. + +_(Telegramme)._ Prague, le 13/26 Juillet 1914. + +La mobilisation a ete decretee. + +(Signe) Kazansky. + + +No. 25. + +Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres a l'Ambassadeur en Autriche-Hongrie. + +_(Telegramme)._ St. Petersbourg, le 13/26 Juillet 1914. + +J'ai eu aujourd'hui un long entretien sur un ton amical avec +l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie. Apres avoir examine avec lui les 10 +demandes adressees a la Serbie, j'ai fait observer qu'a part la forme +peu habile sous laquelle elles sont presentees, quelques-unes parmi +elles sont absolument inexecutables, meme dans le cas ou le gouvernement +Serbe declarerait les vouloir accepter. Ainsi, par exemple, les points 1 +et 2 ne pourraient etre executes sans un remaniement des lois serbes sur +la presse et sur les associations, pour lequel le consentement de la +Scoupchtina pourrait etre difficilement obtenu; quant a l'execution des +points 4 et 5, elle pourrait produire des consequences fort dangereuses +et meme faire naitre le danger d'actes de terrorisme diriges contre les +membres de la Maison Royale et contre Pachitch, ce qui ne saurait entrer +dans les vues de l'Autriche. En ce qui regarde les autres points, il me +semble, qu'avec certains changements dans les details, il ne serait pas +difficile de trouver un terrain d'entente si les accusations y contenues +etaient confirmees par des preuves suffisantes. + +Dans l'interet de la conservation de la paix qui, aux dires de Szapary, +est precieuse a l'Autriche au meme degre qu'a toutes les Puissances, il +serait necessaire de mettre au plus tot possible une fin a la situation +tendue du moment. Dans ce but il me semblerait tres desirable que +l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie fut autorise d'entrer avec moi dans un +echange de vues prive aux fins d'un remaniement en commun de quelques +articles de la note autrichienne du 10/23 Juillet. Ce procede +permettrait peut-etre de trouver une formule qui fut acceptable pour la +Serbie, tout en donnant satisfaction a l'Autriche quant au fond de ses +demandes. Veuillez avoir une explication prudente et amicale dans le +sens de ce telegramme avec le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. +Communique aux Ambassadeurs en Allemagne, en France, en Angleterre et en +Italie. + +(Signe) Sazonow. + + +No. 26. + +Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres a l'Ambassadeur en Allemagne. + +_(Telegramme)._ St. Petersbourg, le 13/26 Juillet. + +Veuillez communiquer le contenu de mon telegramme a Vienne d'aujourd'hui +au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres Allemand et lui exprimer l'espoir, +que de son cote il trouvera possible de conseiller a Vienne d'aller +au-devant de notre proposition. + +(Signe) Sazonow. + + +No. 27. + +Le Charge d'Affaires en France au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. + +_(Telegramme)._ Paris, le 13/26 Juillet 1914. + +Le Directeur du Departement Politique m'informe, que lors de la +communication qu'il a faite a l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche du contenu de la +reponse serbe a l'ultimatum, l'Ambassadeur n'a pas cache son etonnement +de ce qu'elle n'ait pas donne satisfaction a Giesl. L'attitude +conciliante de la Serbie doit, selon l'avis du Directeur du Departement +Politique, produire la meilleure impression en Europe. + +(Signe) Sevastopoulo. + + +No. 28. + +Le Charge d'Affaires en France an Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. + +(_Telegramme_). Paris, le 13/26 Juillet 1914. + +Aujourd'hui l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a de nouveau rendu visite au +Gerant du Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres et lui a fait les +declarations suivantes: + +"L'Autriche a declare a la Russie qu'elle ne recherche pas des +acquisitions territoriales et qu'elle ne menace pas l'integrite de la +Serbie. Son but unique est d'assurer sa propre tranquillite. Par +consequent il depend de la Russie d'eviter la guerre. L'Allemagne se +sent solidaire avec la France dans le desir ardent de conserver la paix +et espere fermement que la France usera de son influence a Petersbourg +dans un sens moderateur". Le Ministre fit observer que l'Allemagne +pourrait de son cote entreprendre des demarches analogues a Vienne, +surtout en presence de l'esprit de conciliation dont a fait preuve la +Serbie. L'Ambassadeur repondit que cela n'etait pas possible, vu la +resolution prise de ne pas s'immiscer dans le conflit austro-serbe. +Alors le Ministre demanda, si les quatre Puissances--l'Angleterre, +l'Allemagne, l'Italie et la France--ne pouvaient pas entreprendre des +demarches a St. Petersbourg et a Vienne, puisque l'affaire se reduisait +en somme a un conflit entre la Russie et l'Autriche. L'Ambassadeur +allegua l'absence d'instructions. Finalement le Ministre refusa +d'adherer a la proposition allemande. + +(Signe) Sevastopoulo. + + +No. 29. + +Le Charge d'Affaires en France au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. + +(_Telegramme_). Paris, le 13/28 Juillet 1914. + +Le Directeur du Departement Politique a declare qu'a son avis personnel, +les demarches successives allemandes a Paris ont pour but d'intimider la +France et d'amener son intervention a St. Petersbourg. + +(Signe) Sevastopoulo. + + +No. 30. + +Le Charge d'Affaires en Allemagne au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. + +(_Telegramme_). Berlin, le 13/26 Juillet 1914. + +Apres la reception a Berlin de la nouvelle de la mobilisation de l'armee +autrichienne contre la Serbie une grande foule, composee, aux dires des +journaux, en partie d'elements autrichiens, se livra a une serie de +bruyantes manifestations en faveur de l'Autriche. A une heure avancee de +la soiree les manifestants se masserent a plusieurs reprises devant le +palais de l'Ambassade Imperiale en poussant des cris hostiles a la +Russie; la police etait presque absente et ne prenait aucune mesure. + +(Signe) Bronewsky. + + +No. 31. + +L'Ambassadeur en Angleterre au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. + +_(Telegramme)_. + +Londres, le 14/27 Juillet 1914. + +Ai recu votre telegramme du 13-26 Juillet. Prie me telegraphier si, a +Votre avis, Vos pourparlers directs avec le cabinet de Vienne +s'accordent avec le projet de Grey concernant la mediation des 4 +Gouvernements. Ayant appris de l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre a St. +Petersbourg que Vous etiez dispose a accepter cette combinaison, Grey a +decide de la transformer en une proposition officielle qu'il a faite +hier soir a Berlin, a Paris et a Rome. + +(Signe) Benckendorff. + + +No. 32. + +Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres aux Ambassadeurs en France et en +Angleterre. + +_(Telegramme)_. + +St. Petersbourg, le 14/27 Juillet 1914. + +(Printed in the British White Book (_Correspondence_, No. 53.).) + + +No. 33. + +Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres aux Ambassadeurs en France, en +Angleterre, en Allemagne, en Autriche-Hongrie et en Italie. + +_(Telegramme)_. + +St. Petersbourg, le 14/27 Juillet 1914. + +Ai pris connaissance de la reponse transmise par le Gouvernement Serbe +au Baron Giesl. Elle depasse toutes nos previsions par sa moderation et +son desir de donner la plus complete satisfaction a l'Autriche. Nous ne +voyons pas quelles pourraient etre encore les demandes de l'Autriche, a +moins que le Cabinet de Vienne ne cherche un pretexte pour une guerre +avec la Serbie. + +(Signe) Sazonow. + + +No. 34. + +Le Charge d'Affaires en France au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. + +_(Telegramme)_. + +Paris, le 14/27 Juillet 1914. + +L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a confere aujourd'hui de nouveau longuement +sur la situation avec le Directeur du Departement Politique. +L'Ambassadeur a beaucoup insiste sur l'exclusion de toute possibilite +d'une mediation ou d'une conference. + +(Signe) Sevastopoulo. + + +No. 35. + +L'Ambassadeur en France au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. + +_(Telegramme)._ Paris, le 14/27 Juillet 1914. + +Ai confere avec le Gerant du Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres, en +presence de Berthelot, immediatement apres mon retour a Paris. Tous les +deux m'out confirme les details concernant les demarches de +l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne que Sevastopoulo Vous a communiques dans ses +telegrammes. Ce matin le Baron de Schoen a confirme par ecrit sa +declaration d'hier, savoir: 1) l'Autriche a declare a la Russie qu'elle +ne recherche pas d'acquisitions et n'attente pas a l'integrite de la +Serbie. Son unique but est d'assurer sa propre tranquillite. 2) Par +consequent il depend de la Russie d'eviter la guerre. 3) L'Allemagne et +la France, completement solidaires dans l'ardent desir de ne pas rompre +la paix, doivent agir sur la Russie dans un sens moderateur. Le Baron de +Schoen a specialement souligne l'expression de la solidarite entre +l'Allemagne et la France. D'apres la conviction du Ministre de la +Justice, les demarches susdites de l'Allemagne out pour but evident de +desunir la Russie et la France, d'entrainer le Gouvernement Francais +dans la voie des representations a St. Petersbourg et de compromettre +ainsi notre allie a nos yeux; enfin, en cas de guerre, d'en rejeter la +responsabilite non sur l'Allemagne, qui emploie soi-disant tous ses +efforts pour le maintien de la paix, mais sur la Russie et la France. + +(Signe) Iswolsky. + + +No. 36. + +L'Ambassadeur en France au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. + +_(Telegramme)._ Paris, le 14/27 Juillet 1914. + +Il ressort de vos telegrammes du 13/26 Juillet que vous ne connaissiez +pas encore la reponse du Gouvernement Serbe. Le telegramme par lequel +cette nouvelle m'a ete communiquee de Belgrade a ete egalement en route +pendant 20 heures. Le telegramme du Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres +Francais expedie avant-hier, au triple tarif, a onze heures du matin, et +contenant l'ordre d'appuyer notre demarche, n'est parvenu a sa +destination qu'a 6 heures. Il n'y a aucun doute que ce telegramme n'ait +ete retenu intentionnellement par le telegraphe autrichien. + +(Signe) Iswolsky. + + +No. 37. + +L'Ambassadeur en France au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. + +_(Telegramme)._ Paris, le 14/27 Juillet 1914. + +D'ordre de son Gouvernement, l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche a communique au +Gerant du Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres que la reponse de la Serbie +a ete jugee insuffisante a Vienne et que demain, mardi, l'Autriche +procederait a des 'actions energiques' don't le but serait de forcer la +Serbie de lui donner les garanties necessaires. Le Ministre ayant +demande en quoi consisteraient ces actions, l'Ambassadeur repondit qu'il +n'avait pas de renseignements exacts a ce sujet, mais qu'il pouvait +s'agir d'un passage da la frontiere serbe, d'un ultimatum et meme d'une +declaration de guerre. + +(Signe) Iswolsky. + + +No. 38. + +Le Charge d'Affaires en Allemagne au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. + +_(Telegramme)._ Berlin, le 14/27 Juillet 1914. + +J'ai prie le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres d'appuyer a Vienne votre +proposition tendant a autoriser Szapary d'elaborer, par la voie d'un +echange de vues prive avec Vous, une redaction des demandes +austro-hongroises acceptable pour les deux parties. Jagow a repondu +qu'il etait an courant de cette proposition et qu'il partageait l'avis +de Pourtales que, puisque Szapary avait commence cette conversation, il +pourrait aussi bien la continuer. Il telegraphiera dans ce sens a +l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a Vienne. Je l'ai prie de conseiller d'une +facon plus pressante a Vienne de s'engager dans cette voie de +conciliation; Jagow a repondu qu'il ne pouvait pas conseiller a +l'Autriche de ceder. + +(Signe) Bronewsky. + + +No. 39. + +Le Charge d'Affaires en Allemagne au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. + +_(Telegramme)._ Berlin, le 14/27 Juillet 1914. + +Aujourd'hui, avant ma visite au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres, ce +dernier avait recu celle de l'Ambassadeur de France qui avait tente de +lui faire accepter la proposition anglaise relative a une action en +faveur de la paix, action qui serait exercee simultanement a +St.-Petersbourg et a Vienne par l'Angleterre, l'Allemagne, l'Italie et +la France. Cambon a propose que ces Puissances donnent a Vienne un +conseil dans les termes suivants: "S'abstenir de tout acte qui pourrait +aggraver la situation de l'heure actuelle". En adoptant cette formule +voilee on eviterait de mentionner la necessite de s'abstenir d'une +invasion de la Serbie. Jagow a oppose a cette proposition un refus +categorique, et cela malgre les instances de l'Ambassadeur qui a fait +valoir, comme un bon cote de la proposition, le groupement mixte des +Puissances grace auquel on evitait l'opposition de l'Alliance a +l'Entente, ce dont s'etait si souvent plaint Jagow lui-meme. + +(Signe) Bronewsky. + + +No. 40. + +Telegramme de Sa Majeste Imperiale l'Empereur a Son Altesse Royale le +Prince Alexandre de Serbie en date du 14/27 Juillet 1914. + +Votre Altesse Royale en s'adressant a Moi dans un moment +particulierement difficile ne s'est pas trompee sur les sentiments qui +M'animent a Son egard et sur Ma sympathie cordiale pour le peuple serbe. + +Ma plus serieuse attention est attiree par la situation actuelle et Mon +Gouvernement s'applique de toutes ses forces a aplanir les presentes +difficultes. Je ne doute point que Votre Altesse et le Gouvernement +Royal ne veuillent faciliter cette tache en ne negligeant rien pour +arriver a une solution qui permette de prevenir les horreurs d'une +nouvelle guerre tout en sauvegardant la dignite de la Serbie. + +Tant qu'il y a le moindre espoir d'eviter une effusion de sang, tous nos +efforts doivent tendre vers ce but. Si, malgre Notre plus sincere desir, +Nous ne reussissons pas, Votre Altesse peut etre assuree qu'en aucun cas +la Russie ne se desinteressera du sort de la Serbie. + +(Signe) Nicolas. + + +No. 41. + +L'Ambassadeur en Autriche-Hongrie au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. + +(_Telegramme_). Vienne, le 14/17 juillet 1914.[194] + +Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres est absent. Pendant un entretien +prolonge, que j'ai eu aujourd'hui avec Macchio, j'ai, en termes tout a +fait amicaux, attire son attention sur l'impression defavorable qu'a +produite en Russie la presentation par l'Autriche a la Serbie de +demandes absolument inacceptables pour chaque etat independant, bien que +petit. J'ai ajoute que ce procede, qui pourrait amener des complications +les moins desirables, a provoque en Russie une profonde surprise et une +reprobation generale. Il faut supposer que l'Autriche, sous l'influence +des assurances du Representant Allemand a Vienne, lequel pendant toute +cette crise a joue un role d'instigateur, a compte sur la probabilite de +la localisation de son conflit avec la Serbie et sur la possibilite de +porter a cette derniere impunement un coup grave. La declaration du +Gouvernement Imperial concernant l'impossibilite pour la Russie de +rester indifferente en presence d'un tel procede a provoque ici une +grande impression. + +(Signe) Schebeko. + +[Footnote 194: Evidently the date July 17 is a misprint for July 27.] + + +No. 42. + +L'Ambassadeur en Angleterre au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. + +(_Telegramme_). Londres, le 14/17 Juillet 1914.[195] + +Grey vient de repondre a l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne, qui etait venu le +questionner sur la possibilite d'une action a St.-Petersbourg, que cette +action devrait se produire a Vienne et que le cabinet de Berlin serait +le mieux qualifie pour l'exercer. Grey a fait observer en meme temps que +la reponse serbe a la note autrichienne depassait par sa moderation et +son esprit de conciliation tout ce a quoi on pouvait s'attendre. Grey a +ajoute qu'il en concluait que la Russie avait conseille a Belgrade de +donner une reponse moderee et qu'il pensait que la reponse serbe pouvait +servir de base a une solution pacifique et acceptable de la question. + +Dans ces conditions, a continue Grey, si l'Autriche malgre cette reponse +commencait les hostilites, elle prouverait son intention d'aneantir la +Serbie. La question placee sur ce terrain produirait une situation qui +pourrait amener une guerre dans laquelle seraient impliquees toutes les +Puissances. + +Grey a enfin declare que le Gouvernement Anglais etait bien sincerement +dispose a collaborer avec le gouvernement Allemand tant qu'il s'agirait +de la conservation de la paix; mais que pour le cas contraire +l'Angleterre se reservait une pleine liberte d'action. + +(Signe) Benckendorff. + +[Footnote 195: Evidently the date July 17 is a misprint for July 27.] + + +No. 43. + +Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres a l'Ambassadeur en Angleterre. + +(_Telegramme_). St.-Petersbourg, le 15/28 Juillet 1914. + +(Printed in the British White Book (_Correspondence_, No. 54.).) + + +No. 44. + +Le Consul general a Fiume au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. + +_(Telegramme)._ Fiume, le 15/28 Juillet 1914. + +L'etat de siege a ete proclame en Slavonie, en Croatie et a Fiume et en +meme temps les reservistes de toutes les categories ont ete mobilises. + +(Signe) Salviati. + + +No. 45. + +L'Ambassadeur en Autriche-Hongrie au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. + +_(Telegramme)._ Vienne, le 15/28 Juillet 1914. + +(Printed in the British White Book (_Correspondence_, No. 93 (I)).) + + +No. 46. + +Le Charge d'affaires en Allemagne au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. + +_(Telegramme)._ Berlin, le 15/28 Juillet 1914. + +Le Bureau Wolff n'a pas publie le texte de la note responsive serbe qui +lui avait ete communique. Jusqu'a ce moment cette note n'a paru in +extenso dans aucun des journaux locaux, qui selon toute evidence ne +veulent pas lui donner place dans leurs colonnes, se rendant compte de +l'effet calmant que cette publication produirait sur les lecteurs +allemands. + +(Signe) Bronewsky. + + +No. 47. + +L'Ambassadeur en Autriche-Hongrie au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. + +_(Telegramme)._ Vienne, le 15/28 Juillet, 1914. + +Le decret sur la mobilisation generale a ete signe. + +(Signe) Schebeko. + + +No. 48. + +Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres a l'Ambassadeur a Londres.[196] + +_(Telegramme)._ St.-Petersbourg, le 15/28 Juillet, 1914. + +En presence des hostilites entre l'Autriche-Hongrie et la Serbie il est +necessaire que l'Angleterre entreprenne d'urgence une action mediatrice +et que l'action militaire de l'Autriche contre la Serbie soit +immediatement suspendue. Autrement la mediation ne servira que de +pretexte pour tirer en longueur la solution de la question et donnera +entre temps a l'Autriche la possibilite d'ecraser completement la Serbie +et d'occuper une situation dominante dans les Balcans. + +Communique a Paris, Berlin, Vienne et Rome. + +(Signe) Sazonow. + +[Footnote 196: An English (abbreviated) version of this telegram is +given in the British White Book (_Correspondence_, No. 70 (2)).] + + +No. 49. + +Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres au Charge d'Affaires en Allemagne. + +_(Telegramme)._ St.-Petersbourg, le 16/29 Juillet, 1914. + +(Printed in the British White Book (_Correspondence_, No. 93 (2)).) + + +No. 50. + +Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres aux Ambassadeurs en Angleterre et en +France. + +_(Telegramme)._ St.-Petersbourg, le 16/29 Juillet 1914. + +(Printed in the British White Book (_Correspondence_, No. 93 (3)).) + + +No. 51. + +Le Charge d'Affaires en Allemagne au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. + +_(Telegramme)._ Berlin, le 16/29 Juillet 1914. + +Sur ma question s'il avait une reponse de Vienne relativement a Votre +proposition de pourparlers prives a St.-Petersbourg, le Secretaire +d'Etat a repondu negativement. + +Il declare qu'il lui est fort difficile d'agir sur Vienne, surtout +ouvertement. Parlant a Cambon, il a meme ajoute qu'en cas d'une pression +trop evidente l'Autriche se haterait de mettre l'Allemagne en presence +d'un fait accompli. + +Le Secretaire d'Etat dit qu'il a recu aujourd'hui un telegramme de +Pourtales d'ou il constate que plus que les premiers jours Vous etes +dispose a trouver un compromis acceptable pour tous. J'ai replique que +probablement Vous avez ete des le commencement en faveur d'un compromis, +bien entendu a la condition qu'il soit acceptable non seulement pour +l'Autriche, mais egalement pour nous. Il m'a dit ensuite qu'il +paraissait que nous avions commence a mobiliser sur la frontiere +autrichienne et qu'il craignait que ceci rendrait plus difficile pour +l'Autriche la possibilite de s'entendre avec nous, d'autant plus que +l'Autriche ne mobilisait que contre la Serbie et ne faisait pas de +preparatifs sur notre frontiere. J'ai repondu que, d'apres les +renseignements dont je disposais, l'Autriche mobilisait egalement sur +notre frontiere et que par consequent nous devions prendre des mesures +analogues. J'ai ajoute que les mesures que nous avons peut-etre prises +de notre cote n'etaient nullement dirigees contre l'Allemagne. + +(Signe) Bronewsky. + + +No. 52. + +Le Charge d'affaires en Serbie au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. + +_(Telegramme)._ Nich, le 16/29 Juillet 1914. + +Aujourd'hui le Ministre de Bulgarie, an nom de son Gouvernement, a +declare a Pachiteh que la Bulgarie observerait la neutralite. + +(Signe) Strandtman. + + +No. 53. + +L'Ambassadeur en France au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. + +_(Telegramme)._ Paris, le 16/29 Juillet 1914. + +A l'occasion de l'arrivee du President de la Republique Francais le +Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres avait prepare un court expose de la +situation politique actuelle, a pen pres dans les termes suivants: +L'Autriche, craignant la decomposition interieure, s'est emparee du +pretexte de l'assassinat de l'Archiduc pour essayer d'obtenir des +garanties qui pourront revetir la forme de l'occupation des +communications militaires serbes ou meme du territoire serbe. +L'Allemagne soutient l'Autriche. Le maintien de la paix depend de la +seule Russie, parce qu'il s'agit d'une affaire qui doit etre "localisee" +entre l'Autriche et la Serbie, c'est a dire de la punition de la +politique precedente de la Serbie et des garanties pour l'avenir. De +ceci l'Allemagne conclue qu'il faut exercer une action moderatrice a +Petersbourg. Ce sophisme a ete refute a Paris comme a Londres. A Paris, +le Baron de Schoen a en vain tache d'entrainer la France a une action +solidaire avec l'Allemagne sur la Russie en faveur du maintien de la +paix. Les memes tentatives out ete faites a Londres. Dans les deux +capitales il a ete repondu que l'action devrait etre exercee a Vienne, +car les demandes excessives de l'Autriche, son refus de discuter les +rares reserves de la Serbie, et la declaration de guerre menacent de +provoquer la guerre generale. La France et l'Angleterre ne peuvent +exercer une action moderatrice sur la Russie, laquelle jusqu'ici a fait +preuve de la plus grande moderation, surtout en conseillant a la Serbie +d'accepter ce qui etait possible de la note autrichienne. Aujourd'hui +l'Allemagne parait renoncer a l'idee d'une action sur la Russie seule et +incline vers une action mediatrice a Petersbourg et a Vienne, mais en +meme temps l'Allemagne comme l'Autriche tachent de faire trainer +l'affaire. L'Allemagne s'oppose a la Conference sans indiquer aucune +autre maniere d'agir pratique. L'Autriche mene des pourparlers +manifestement dilatoires a Petersbourg. En meme temps elle prend des +mesures actives, et si ces mesures sont tolerees, ses pretentions +augmenteront proportionnellement. Il est tres desirable que la Russie +prete tout son appui an projet de mediation que presentera Sir E. Grey. +Dans le cas contraire l'Autriche, sous pretexte de "garantie", pourra, +en fait, changer le status territorial de l'Europe orientale. + +(Signe) Iswolsky. + + +No. 54. + +L'Ambassadeur en Angleterre au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. + +_(Telegramme)._ Londres, le 10/29 Juillet 1914. + +Ai communique le contenu de Vos telegrammes du 15/28 Juillet a Grey. Il +a declare aujourd'hui a l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne que les pourparlers +directs entre la Russie et l'Autriche avaient echoue, et que les +correspondants des journaux mandaient de St.-Petersbourg que la Russie +mobilisait contre l'Autriche a la suite de la mobilisation de cette +derniere. Grey dit qu'en principe le Gouvernement Allemand s'est declare +en faveur de la mediation, mais qu'il rencontre des difficultes quant a +la forme. Grey a insiste pour que le Gouvernement Allemand indiquat la +forme laquelle a l'avis de l'Allemagne pourrait permettre aux 4 +Puissances d'exercer leur mediation pour eviter la guerre; vu le +consentement de la France, de l'Italie et de l'Angleterre la mediation +pourrait avoir lieu seulement dans le cas ou l'Allemagne consentirait a +se ranger du cote de la paix. + +(Signe) Benckendorff. + + +No. 55. + +L'Ambassadeur en France au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. + +_(Telegramme)._ Paris, le 16/29 Juillet 1914. + +Viviani vient de me confirmer l'entiere resolution du Gouvernement +Francais d'agir d'accord avec nous. Cette resolution est soutenue par +les cercles les plus etendus et par les partis, y compris les +radicaux-socialistes, qui viennent de lui presenter une declaration +exprimant la confiance absolue et les dispositions patriotiques du +groupe. Des son arrivee a Paris, Viviani a telegraphie d'urgence a +Londres que vu la cessation des pourparlers directs entre Petersbourg et +Vienne il etait necessaire que le Cabinet de Londres renouvelat le plus +tot possible sous telle ou autre forme sa proposition concernant la +mediation des Puissances. Avant moi Viviani a recu aujourd'hui +l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne qui lui a renouvele l'assurance des tendances +pacifiques de l'Allemagne. Viviani ayant fait observer que si +l'Allemagne desirait la paix elle devrait se hater d'adherer a la +proposition de mediation anglaise, le Baron Schoen a repondu que les +mots "conference" ou "arbitrage" effrayaient l'Autriche. Viviani a +replique qu'il ne s'agissait pas de mots et qu'il serait facile de +trouver une autre forme de mediation. D'apres l'avis du Baron de Schoen, +pour le succes des negociations entre les Puissances il serait +necessaire de savoir ce que l'Autriche compterait demander a la Serbie. +Viviani a repondu que le Cabinet de Berlin pourrait bien facilement s'en +enquerir aupres de l'Autriche, mais qu'en attendant la note responsive +serbe pourrait servir de base a la discussion; il a ajoute que la France +desirait sincerement la paix, mais qu'elle etait en meme temps resolue +d'agir en pleine harmonie avec ses allies et amis, et que lui, le Baron +de Schoen, avait pu se convaincre que cette resolution rencontrait la +plus vive approbation du pays. + +(Signe) Iswolsky. + + +No. 56. + +Telegramme de son Altesse Royale le Prince Alexandre de Serbie a sa +Majeste l'Empereur. + +Profondement touche par le telegramme que Votre Majeste a bien voulu +M'adresser hier, Je M'empresse de La remercier de tout mon coeur. Je +prie Votre Majeste d'etre persuadee que la cordiale sympathie, dont +Votre Majeste est animee envers Mon pays, nous est particulierement +precieuse et remplit notre ame de l'espoir que l'avenir de la Serbie est +assure etant devenu l'objet de la Haute sollicitude de Votre Majeste. +Ces moments penibles ne peuvent que raffermir les liens de l'attachement +profond qui unissent la Serbie a la sainte Russie slave, et les +sentiments de reconnaissance eternelle pour l'aide et la protection de +Votre Majeste seront conserves pieusement dans l'ame de tous les Serbes. + +(Signe) Alexandre, + + +No. 57. + +Le Charge d'Affaires en Serbie au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. + +_(Telegramme)._ Nich, le 16/29 Juillet 1914. + +J'ai communique a Pachitch le texte du telegramme responsif de Sa +Majeste l'Empereur an Prince Alexandre. Pachitch apres l'avoir lu, se +signa et dit: "Seigneur! Le Tzar est grand et clement"! Ensuite il +m'embrassa, ne pouvant contenir l'emotion qui l'avait gagne. L'heritier +est attendu a Nich dans la nuit. + +(Signe) Strandtman. + + +No. 58. + +Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres a l'Ambassadeur en France. + +_(Telegramme)._ St. Petersbourg, le 10/29 Juillet 1914. + +Aujourd'hui l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne m'a communique la resolution prise +par son gouvernement de mobiliser, si la Russie ne cessait pas ses +preparatifs militaires. Or, nous n'avons commence ces derniers qu'a la +suite de la mobilisation a laquelle avait deja procede l'Autriche et vu +l'absence evidente chez cette derniere du desir d'accepter un mode +quelconque d'une solution pacifique de son conflit avec la Serbie. + +Puisque nous ne pouvons pas acceder au desir de l'Allemagne, il ne nous +reste que d'accelerer nos propres armements et de compter avec +l'inevitabilite probable de la guerre.--Veuillez en avertir le +Gouvernement Francais et lui exprimer en meme temps notre sincere +reconnaissance pour la declaration que l'Ambassadeur de France m'a faite +en son nom en disant que nous pouvons compter entierement sur l'appui de +notre alliee de France. Dans les circonstances actuelles cette +declaration nous est particulierement precieuse. Communique aux +Ambassadeurs en Angleterre, Autriche-Hongrie, Italie, Allemagne. + +(Signe) Sazonow. + + +No. 59. + +Le Charge d'Affaires en Serbie au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. + +_(Telegramme)._ Nich, le 17/30 Juillet 1914. + +Le Prince-Regent a publie hier un manifeste signe par tous les Ministres +a l'occasion de la declaration de la guerre par l'Autriche a la Serbie. +Le manifeste se termine par les paroles suivantes: "Defendez de toutes +vos forces vos foyers et la Serbie". Lors de l'ouverture solennelle de +la Scouptchina, le Regent lut en son nom le discours du trone, an debut +duquel il indiqua que le lieu de la convocation demontrait l'importance +des evenements actuels. Suit l'expose des faits des derniers +jours--l'ultimatum autrichien, la reponse serbe, les efforts du +gouvernement Royal de faire tout ce qui etait compatible avec la dignite +de l'Etat pour eviter la guerre et enfin l'agression armee du voisin +plus puissant contre la Serbie, aux cotes de laquelle se tient le +Montenegro. En passant a l'examen de l'attitude des Puissances en +presence du conflit, le Prince insista tout d'abord sur les sentiments +dont est animee la Russie et sur la Toute Gracieuse Communication de sa +Majeste l'Empereur disant que la Russie en aucun cas n'abandonnera la +Serbie. A chaque mention du nom de Sa Majeste Imperiale et de la Russie +un "jivio" formidable et febrile secouait la salle des seances. Les +marques de sympathie de la part de la France et de l'Angleterre furent +aussi relevees separement et provoquerent des "jivio" d'approbation de +la part des deputes. Le discours du trone se termine par la declaration +d'ouverture de la Scouptchina et par l'expression du voeu que toutes les +mesures soient prises pour faciliter la tache du Gouvernement. + +(Signe) Strandtman. + + +No. 60. + +Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres aux Ambassadeurs en Allemagne, en +Autriche-Hongrie, en France, en Angleterre, et en Italie. + +_(Telegramme)._ St. Petersbourg, le 17/30 Juillet 1914. + +L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne qui vient de me quitter m'a demande si nous ne +pouvions pas nous contenter de la promesse que l'Autriche pourrait +donner--de ne pas porter atteinte a l'integrite du Royaume de Serbie--et +indiquer a quelles conditions nous pourrions encore consentir a +suspendre nos armements; je lui ai dicte, pour etre transmise d'urgence +a Berlin, la declaration suivante: "Si l'Autriche, reconnaissant que la +question austro-serbe a assume le caractere d'une question europeenne, +se declare prete a eliminer de son ultimatum les points qui portent +atteinte aux droits souverains de la Serbie, la Russie s'engage a cesser +ses preparatifs militaires." + +Veuillez telegraphier d'urgence quelle sera l'attitude du Gouvernement +Allemand en presence de cette nouvelle preuve de notre desir de faire le +possible pour la solution pacifique de la question, car nous ne pouvons +pas admettre que de semblables pourparlers ne servent qu'a faire gagner +du temps a l'Allemagne et a l'Autriche pour leurs preparatifs +militaires. + +(Signe) Sazonow. + + +No. 61. + +L'Ambassadeur en Allemagne au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. + +_(Telegramme)._ Berlin, le 17/30 Juillet 1914. + +J'apprends que le decret de mobilisation de l'armee et de la flotte +allemandes vient d'etre promulgue. + +(Signe) Swerbeew. + + +No. 62. + +L'Ambassadeur en Allemagne au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. + +_(Telegramme)._ Berlin, le 17/30 Juillet 1914. + +Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres vient de me telephoner pour me +communiquer que la nouvelle lancee tout a l'heure de la mobilisation de +l'armee et de la flotte allemandes est fausse; que les feuillets des +journaux etaient imprimes d'avance en prevision de toutes eventualites, +et mis en vente a l'heure de l'apres-midi, mais que maintenant ils sont +confisques, + +(Signe) Swerbeew. + + +No. 63. + +L'Ambassadeur en Allemagne au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. + +_(Telegramme)._ Berlin, le 17/30 Juillet 1914. + +Ai recu Votre telegramme du 16-29 Juillet et ai transmis le texte de +Votre proposition au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres que je viens de +voir; il m'a dit qu'il avait recu un telegramme identique de +l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a St.-Petersbourg et m'a declare ensuite qu'il +trouvait notre proposition inacceptable pour l'Autriche. + +(Signe) Swerbeew. + + +No. 64. + +L'Ambassadeur en Angleterre au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. + +_(Telegramme)._ Londres, le 17/30 Juillet 1914. + +Ai communique le contenu de Vos telegrammes du 16 et 17 Juillet a Grey +lequel considere la situation comme tres serieuse, mais desire continuer +les pourparlers. J'ai fait observer a Grey que depuis que Vous lui aviez +fait la proposition d'accepter tout ce qu'il proposerait en faveur du +maintien de la paix, pourvu que l'Autriche ne put profiter de ces +atermoiements pour ecraser la Serbie, la situation dans laquelle Vous +vous trouviez s'etait apparemment modifiee. A cette epoque nos rapports +avec l'Allemagne n'etaient pas compromis. Apres la declaration de +l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a St.-Petersbourg concernant la mobilisation +allemande, ces rapports avaient change et sa demande avait recu de Votre +part la seule reponse que pouvait donner une grande Puissance. Lorsque +l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne etait revenu aupres de Vous et s'etait enquis +de Vos conditions, Vous les aviez formulees dans des circonstances +tout-a-fait speciales. J'ai en meme temps de nouveau insiste aupres de +Grey sur la necessite de prendre en consideration la situation nouvelle +creee par la faute de l'Allemagne a la suite de l'action de +l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne. Grey a repondu qu'il le comprenait et qu'il +tiendrait compte de ces arguments. + +(Signe) Benckendorff. + + +No. 65. + +L'Ambassadeur en Angleterre au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. + +_(Telegramme)._ Londres, le 17/30 Juillet 1914. + +L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a demande a Grey pour quelle raison +l'Angleterre prenait des mesures militaires sur terre et sur mer. Grey a +repondu que ces mesures n'avaient pas un caractere agressif, mais que la +situation etait telle que chaque Puissance devait se preparer. + +(Signe) Benckendorff. + + +No. 66. + +L'Ambassadeur en Autriche-Hongrie au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. + +_(Telegramme)._ Vienne, le 18/31 Juillet 1914. + +Malgre la mobilisation generale je continue a echanger des vues avec le +Comte Berchtold et ses collaborateurs. Tous insistent sur l'absence chez +l'Autriche d'intentions agressives quelconques contre la Russie et de +visees de conquete a l'egard de la Serbie, mais tous insistent egalement +sur la necessite pour l'Autriche de poursuivre jusqu'an bout l'action +commencee et de donner a la Serbie une lecon serieuse qui pourrait +constituer une certaine garantie pour l'avenir. + +(Signe) Schebeko. + + +No. 67. + +Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres aux Ambassadeurs en Allemagne, +Autriche-Hongrie, en France, en Angleterre et en Italie.[197] + +_(Telegramme)._ St. Petersbourg, le 18/31 Juillet 1914. + +Me refere a mon telegramme du 17/30 Juillet. D'ordre de son +gouvernement, l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre m'a transmis le desir du +Cabinet de Londres d'introduire quelques modifications dans la formule +que j'ai proposee hier a l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne. J'ai repondu que +j'acceptais la proposition anglaise. Ci-dessous je vous transmets la +formule modifiee en consequence. + +'Si l'Autriche consent a arreter la marche de ses armees sur le +territoire Serbe et si, reconnaissant que le conflit austro-serbe a +assume le caractere d'une question d'interet europeen, elle admet que +les Grandes Puissances examinent la satisfaction que la Serbie pourrait +accorder au gouvernement d'Autriche-Hongrie sans laisser porter atteinte +a ses droits d'Etat souverain et a son independance,--la Russie s'engage +a conserver son attitude expectante.' + +(Signe) Sazonow. + +[Footnote 197: The second paragraph is printed in the British White Book +(_Correspondence_ No. 132).] + + +No. 68. + +L'Ambassadeur en Allemagne au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. + +_(Telegramme)._ Berlin, le 18/31 Juillet 1914. + +Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres vient de me dire que nos +pourparlers, qui etaient deja difficiles a la suite de la mobilisation +contre l'Autriche, le deviennent encore davantage en presence des graves +mesures militaires que nous prenons contre l'Allemagne; des nouvelles y +relatives sont, d'apres lui, recues ici de tous les cotes et devront +provoquer inevitablement des mesures analogues de la part de +l'Allemagne. A cela j'ai repondu que, d'apres des renseignements surs +dont je disposais et qui etaient confirmes par tous nos compatriotes +arrivant a Berlin, la prise contre nous des mesures susdites se +poursuivait egalement en Allemagne avec grande activite. Malgre cela, le +Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres affirme qu'ici on n'a fait que rappeler +les officiers de leurs conges et les troupes des champs de manoeuvres. + +(Signe) Swerbeew. + + +No. 69. + +Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres a l'Ambassadeur en Angleterre. + +_(Telegramme)._ St.-Petersbourg, le 18/31 Juillet 1914. + +J'ai prie l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre de transmettre a Grey l'expression +de ma plus sincere reconnaissance pour le ton amical et ferme dont il a +use pendant les pourparlers avec l'Allemagne et l'Autriche, grace a quoi +l'espoir de trouver une issue pacifique de la situation actuelle n'est +pas encore perdu. + +Je l'ai aussi prie de dire au Ministre Anglais que je pensais que ce +n'etait qu'a Londres que les pourparlers auraient encore quelques +chances d'un succes quelconque, en facilitant a l'Autriche la necessite +d'un compromis. + +Communique a l'Ambassadeur en France. + +(Signe) Sazonow. + + +No. 70. + +Telegramme secret aux Representants de Sa Majeste l'Empereur a +l'etranger. + +(_Telegramme_). Le 19 Juillet/1 Aout 1914. + +A minuit l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne m'a declare, d'ordre de son +Gouvernement, que si dans les 12 heures, c'est-a-dire a midi, Samedi, +nous ne commencions pas la demobilisation, non seulement a l'egard de +l'Allemagne, mais aussi a l'egard de l'Autriche, le Gouvernement +Allemand serait force de donner l'ordre de mobilisation. A ma question +si c'etait la guerre, l'Ambassadeur a repondu par la negative, mais en +ajoutant que nous etions fort pres d'elle. + +(Signe) Sazonow. + + +No. 71. + +L'Ambassadeur en Angleterre au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. + +_(Telegramme)._ Londres, 19 Juillet/1 Aout 1914. + +Grey m'a dit qu'il a telegraphie a Berlin qu'a son avis la derniere +formule acceptee par le Gouvernement Russe constitue la base de +negociations qui presente le plus de chances pour une solution pacifique +du conflict. Il a exprime en meme temps l'espoir qu'aucune grande +Puissance ne commencerait les hostilites avant l'examen de cette +formule. + +(Signe) Benckendorff. + + +No. 72. + +L'Ambassadeur eu Angleterre au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. + +(_Telegramme_). Londres, le 19 Juillet/1 Aout 1914. + +Le Gouvernement de la Grande-Bretagne a pose aux Gouvernements Francais +et Allemand la question s'ils respecteraient la neutralite de la +Belgique. + +La France a repondu dans I'affirmative, tandis que le Gouvernement +Allemand a declare ne pouvoir repondre a cette question categoriquement. + +(Signe) Benckendorff. + + +No. 73. + +L'Ambassadeur en France au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. + +_(Telegramme)._ Paris, le 19 Juillet/1 Aout 1914. + +L'Ambassadeur d'Autriche a visite hier Viviani et lui a declare que +l'Autriche non seulement n'avait pas le dessein de porter atteinte a +l'integrite territoriale de la Serbie, mais etait prete a discuter avec +les autres Puissances le fond de son conflit avec la Serbie. Le +Gouvernement Francais est tres preoccupe par les preparatifs militaires +extraordinaires de l'Allemagne sur la frontiere francaise, car il est +convaincu que sous le voile du "Kriegszustand" se produit une veritable +mobilisation. + +(Signe) Iswolsky. + + +No. 74. + +L'Ambassadeur en France au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. + +_(Telegramme)._ Paris, le 19 Juillet/1 Aout 1914. + +A la reception ici du telegramme de l'Ambassadeur de France a +St.-Petersbourg contenant la communication que Vous a faite +l'Ambassadeur Allemand concernant la resolution de l'Allemagne de +decreter aujourd'hui la mobilisation generale, le President de la +Republique a signe le decret de mobilisation. Dans les rues on procede a +l'affichage des listes d'appel des reservistes. L'Ambassadeur +d'Allemagne vient de rendre visite a Viviani, mais ne lui a fait aucune +nouvelle communication, en alleguant l'impossibilite de dechiffrer les +telegrammes qu'il a recus. Viviani l'a informe de la signature du decret +de mobilisation en reponse a la mobilisation allemande et lui a fait +part de son etonnement de ce que l'Allemagne eut pris une telle mesure a +un moment ou se poursuivait encore un echange de vues amical entre la +Russie, l'Autriche et les Puissances; il a ajoute que la mobilisation ne +prejugeait pas necessairement la guerre et que l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne +pourrait rester a Paris comme l'Ambassadeur de Russie est reste a Vienne +et celui d'Autriche a St.-Petersbourg. + +(Signe) Iswolsky. + + +No. 75. + +L'Ambassadeur en France au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. + +_(Telegramme)._ Paris, le 19 Juillet/1 Aout 1914. + +Je tiens du President que pendant les dernieres journees l'Ambassadeur +d'Autriche a assure avec force le President du Conseil des Ministres et +lui meme, que l'Autriche nous aurait declare etre prete a respecter non +seulement l'integrite territoriale de la Serbie, mais aussi ses droits +souverains, mais que nous aurions intentionnellement fait le silence sur +cette declaration. J'ai oppose un dementi categorique a cela. + +(Signe) Iswolsky. + + +No. 76. + +Note remise par l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a St.-Petersbourg le 19 +Juillet 1914 a 7 h. 10 du soir. + +Le Gouvernement Imperial s'est efforce des les debuts de la crise de la +mener a une solution pacifique. Se rendant a un desir qui lui en avait +ete exprime par Sa Majeste l'Empereur de Russie, Sa Majeste l'Empereur +d'Allemagne d'accord avec l'Angleterre s'etait applique a accomplir un +role mediateur aupres des Cabinets de Vienne et de St.-Petersbourg, +lorsque la Russie, sans en attendre le resultat, proceda a la +mobilisation de la totalite de ses forces de terre et de mer. A la suite +de cette mesure menacante motivee par aucun presage militaire de la part +de l'Allemagne, l'Empire Allemand s'est trouve vis-a-vis d'un danger +grave et imminent. Si le Gouvernement Imperial eut manque de parer a ce +peril, il aurait compromis la securite et l'existence meme de +l'Allemagne. Par consequent le Gouvernement Allemand se vit force de +s'adresser au Gouvernement de Sa Majeste l'Empereur de Toutes les +Russies en insistant sur la cessation desdits actes militaires. La +Russie ayant refuse de faire droit a (n'ayant pas cru devoir repondre +a[198]) cette demande et ayant manifeste par ce refus (cette attitude +[198]) que son action etait dirigee contre I'Allemagne, j'ai l'honneur, +d'ordre de mon Gouvernement, de faire savoir a Votre Excellence ce qui +suit: + +Sa Majeste l'Empereur Mon Auguste Souverain au nom de l'Empire, relevant +le defi se considere en etat de guerre avec la Russie. + +St.-Petersbourg, le 19 Juillet/1 Aout 1914. + +(Signe) F. Pourtales. + +[Footnote 198: Les mots places entre parentheses se trouvent dans +l'original. Il faut supposer que deux variantes avaient ete preparees +d'avance et que par erreur elles out ete inserees toutes les deux dans +la note.] + + +No. 77. + +Communique du Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres concernant les evenements +des derniers jours. + +Le 20 Juillet/2 Aout 1914. + +Un expose defigurant les evenements des derniers jours ayant paru dans +la presse etrangere, le Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres croit de son +devoir de publier l'apercu suivant des pourparlers diplomatiques pendant +le temps susvise. + +Le 10/23 Juillet a.c. le Ministre d'Autriche-Hongrie a Belgrade presenta +an Ministre President Serbe une note ou le Gouvernement Serbe etait +accuse d'avoir favorise le mouvement panserbe qui avait abouti a +l'assassinat de l'heritier du trone austro-hongrois. En consequence +l'Autriche-Hongrie demandait au Gouvernement Serbe non seulement de +condamner sous une forme solennelle la susdite propagande, mais aussi de +prendre, sous le controle de l'Autriche-Hongrie, une serie de mesures +tendant a la decouverte du complot, a la punition des sujets serbes y +ayant participe et a la prevention dans l'avenir de tout attentat sur le +sol du Royaume. Un delai de 48 heures fut fixe au Gouvernement Serbe +pour la reponse a la susdite note. + +Le Gouvernement Imperial, auquel l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie a +St.-Petersbourg avait communique le texte de la note 17 heures apres sa +remise a Belgrade, ayant pris connaissance des demandes y contenues, dut +s'apercevoir que quelques-unes parmi elles etaient inexecutables quant +an fond, tandis que d'autres etaient presentees sous une forme +incompatible avec la dignite d'un Etat independant. Trouvant +inadmissibles la diminution de la dignite de la Serbie contenue dans ces +demandes, ainsi que la tendance de l'Autriche-Hongrie d'assurer sa +preponderance dans les Balcans demontree par ces memes exigences, le +Gouvernement Russe fit observer dans la forme la plus amicale a +l'Autriche-Hongrie qu'il serait desirable de soumettre a un nouvel +examen les points contenus dans la note austro-hongroise. Le +Gouvernement Austro-Hongrois ne crut possible de consentir a une +discussion de la note. L'action moderatrice des autres Puissances a +Vienne ne fut non plus couronnee de succes. + +Malgre que la Serbie eut reprouve le crime et se fut montree prete a +donner satisfaction a l'Autriche dans une mesure qui depassa les +previsions non seulement de la Russie, mais aussi des autres Puissances, +le Ministre d'Autriche-Hongrie a Belgrade jugea la reponse serbe +insuffisante et quitta cette ville. + +Reconnaissant le caractere exagere des demandes presentees par +l'Autriche, la Russie avait declare encore auparavant qu'il lui serait +impossible de rester indifferente, sans se refuser toutefois a employer +tous ses efforts pour trouver une issue pacifique qui fut acceptable +pour l'Autriche et menageat son amour-propre de grande puissance. En +meme temps la Russie etablit fermement qu'elle admettait une solution +pacifique de la question seulement dans une mesure qui n'impliquerait +pas la diminution de la dignite de la Serbie comme Etat independant. +Malheureusement tous les efforts deployes par le Gouvernement Imperial +dans cette direction resterent sans effet. Le Gouvernement +Austro-Hongrois, apres s'etre derobe a toute intervention conciliatrice +des Puissances dans son conflit avec la Serbie, proceda a la +mobilisation, declara officiellement la guerre a la Serbie, et le jour +suivant Belgrade fut bombardee. Le manifeste qui a accompagne la +declaration de guerre accuse ouvertement la Serbie d'avoir prepare et +execute le crime de Seraiewo. Une pareille accusation d'un crime de +droit commun lancee contre tout un peuple et tout un Etat attira a la +Serbie par son inanite evidente les larges sympathies des cercles de la +societe europeenne. + +A la suite de cette maniere d'agir du Gouvernement Austro-Hongrois, +malgre la declaration de la Russie qu'elle ne pourrait rester +indifferente au sort de la Serbie, le Gouvernement Imperial jugea +necessaire d'ordonner la mobilisation des circonscriptions militaires de +Kiew, d'Odessa, de Moscou et de Kazan. Une telle decision s'imposait +parce que depuis la date de la remise de la note austro-hongroise au +Gouvernement Serbe et les premieres demarches de la Russie cinq jours +s'etaient ecoules, et cependant le Cabinet de Vienne n'avait fait aucun +pas pour aller au-devant de nos efforts pacifiques; au contraire, la +mobilisation de la moitie de l'armee austro-hongroise avait ete +decretee. + +Le Gouvernement Allemand fut mis au courant des mesures prises par la +Russie; il lui fut en meme temps explique qu'elles n'etaient que la +consequence des armements autrichiens et nullement dirigees contre +l'Allemagne. En meme temps, le Gouvernement Imperial declara que la +Russie etait prete a continuer les pourparlers en vue d'une solution +pacifique du conflit, soit par la voie de negociations directes avec le +Cabinet de Vienne, soit en suivant la proposition de la Grande-Bretagne, +par la voie d'une Conference des quatre Grandes Puissances non +interessees directement, voire l'Angleterre, la France, l'Allemagne et +l'Italie. + +Cependant cette tentative de la Russie echoua egalement. +L'Autriche-Hongrie declina un echange de vues ulterieur avec nous, et le +Cabinet de Vienne se deroba a la participation a la Conference des +Puissances projetee. + +Neanmoins, la Russie ne discontinua pas ses efforts en faveur de la +paix. Repondant a la question de l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne, a quelles +conditions nous consentirions encore a suspendre nos armements, le +Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres declara que ces conditions seraient la +reconnaissance par l'Autriche-Hongrie que la question Austro-Serbe avait +revetu le caractere d'une question europeenne, et la declaration de +cette meme Puissance qu'elle consentait a ne pas insister sur des +demandes incompatibles avec les droits souverains de la Serbie. + +La proposition de la Russie fut jugee par l'Allemagne inacceptable pour +l'Autriche-Hongrie. Simultanement on recut a St.-Petersbourg la nouvelle +de la proclamation de la mobilisation generale par l'Autriche-Hongrie. + +En meme temps les hostilites continuaient sur le territoire Serbe et +Belgrade fut bombardee derechef. + +L'insucces de nos propositions pacifiques nous obligea d'elargir les +mesures de precaution militaires. + +Le Cabinet de Berlin nous ayant adresse une question a ce sujet, il lui +fut repondu que la Russie etait forcee de commencer ses armements pour +se premunir contre toutes eventualites. + +Tout en prenant cette mesure de precaution, la Russie n'en discontinuait +pas moins de rechercher de toutes ses forces une issue de cette +situation et declara etre prete a accepter tout moyen de solution du +conflit qui comporterait l'observation des conditions posees par nous. + +Malgre cette communication conciliante, le Gouvernement Allemand, le +18/31 Juillet, adressa au Gouvernement Russe la demande d'avoir a +suspendre ses mesures militaires a midi du 19 Juillet/ 1 Aout, en +menacant, dans le cas contraire, de proceder a une mobilisation +generale. + +Le lendemain, 19 Juillet/1 Aout, l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne transmit au +Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres, an nom de son Gouvernement, la +declaration de guerre. + + +No. 78. + +Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres aux Representants de S. M. +I'Empereur a l'etranger. + +(_Telegramme_). St.-Petersbourg, le 20 Juillet/2 Aout 1914. + +Il est absolument clair que l'Allemagne s'efforce des a present de +rejeter sur nous la responsabilite de la rupture. Notre mobilisation a +ete provoquee par l'enorme responsabilite que nous aurions assumee, si +nous n'avions pas pris toutes les mesures de precaution a un moment ou +l'Autriche, se bornant a des pourparlers d'un caractere dilatoire, +bombardait Belgrade et procedait a une mobilisation generale. + +Sa Majeste l'Empereur s'etait engage vis-a-vis de l'Empereur d'Allemagne +par sa parole a n'entreprendre aucun acte agressif tant que dureraient +les pourparlers avec l'Autriche. Apres une telle garantie et apres +toutes les preuves de l'amour de la Russie pour la paix, l'Allemagne ne +pouvait ni avait le droit de douter de notre declaration que nous +accepterions avec joie toute issue pacifique compatible avec la dignite +et l'independance de la Serbie. Une autre issue, tout en etant +completement incompatible avec notre propre dignite, aurait certainement +ebranle l'equilibre Europeen assurant l'hegemonie de l'Allemagne. Ce +caractere Europeen, voire mondial, du conflit est infiniment plus +important que le pretexte qui l'a cree. Par sa decision de nous declarer +la guerre a un moment ou se poursuivaient les negociations entre les +Puissances, l'Allemagne a assume une lourde responsabilite. + +(Signe) Sazonow. + + +No. 79. + +Note remise par l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie a St.-Petersbourg au +Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres le 24 Juillet a 6 h. du soir. + +D'ordre de son Gouvernement le soussigne Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie +a l'honneur de notifier a Son Excellence Monsieur le Ministre des +Affaires Etrangeres de Russie ce qui suit: + +"Vu l'attitude menacante prise par la Russie dans le conflit entre la +Monarchie Austro-Hongroise et la Serbie et en presence du fait qu'en +suite de ce conflit la Russie, d'apres une communication du Cabinet de +Berlin, a cru devoir ouvrir les hostilites contre l'Allemagne et que +celle-ci se trouve par consequent en etat de guerre avec ladite +Puissance, l'Autriche-Hongrie se considere egalement en etat de guerre +avec la Russie a partir du present moment. + +"(Signe) Szapary. St.-Petersbourg. 6 Aout/24 Juillet 1914." + + + +***END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK WHY WE ARE AT WAR (2ND EDITION, +REVISED)*** + + +******* This file should be named 10809.txt or 10809.zip ******* + + +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: +https://www.gutenberg.org/1/0/8/0/10809 + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. Special rules, +set forth in the General Terms of Use part of this license, apply to +copying and distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works to +protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm concept and trademark. 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