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+The Project Gutenberg eBook, Why We Are At War (2nd Edition, revised), by
+Members of the Oxford Faculty of Modern History
+
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+
+
+
+Title: Why We Are At War (2nd Edition, revised)
+
+Author: Members of the Oxford Faculty of Modern History
+
+Release Date: January 23, 2004  [eBook #10809]
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: iso-8859-1
+
+
+***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK WHY WE ARE AT WAR (2ND EDITION,
+REVISED)***
+
+
+E-text prepared by Jonathan Ingram, David King, and the Project Gutenberg
+Online Distributed Proofreading Team
+
+
+
+WHY WE ARE AT WAR
+
+GREAT BRITAIN'S CASE
+
+With an Appendix of Original Documents including the Authorized English
+Translation of the White Book issued by the German Government
+
+Second Edition Revised (fourth impression)
+containing the Russian Orange Book
+
+BY
+
+MEMBERS OF THE OXFORD FACULTY OF MODERN HISTORY
+
+1914
+
+
+
+
+
+
+PREFACE
+
+
+We are not politicians, and we belong to different schools of political
+thought. We have written this book to set forth the causes of the
+present war, and the principles which we believe to be at stake. We have
+some experience in the handling of historic evidence, and we have
+endeavoured to treat this subject historically. Our fifth chapter, which
+to many readers will be the most interesting, is founded upon first-hand
+evidence--the documents contained in the British White Book
+(Parliamentary Paper, Cd. 7467; hereafter cited as _Correspondence
+respecting the European Crisis_), and the German White Book, which is an
+official apology, supplemented by documents. The German White Book, as
+being difficult of access, we have printed _in extenso_. It exists in
+two versions, a German and an English, both published for the German
+Government. We have reproduced the English version without correcting
+the solecisms of spelling and expression. From the English White Book we
+have reprinted, in the second appendix, a small selection of the more
+significant documents; many more are quoted in the body of our work.
+
+Our thanks are due to Sir H. Erle Richards, Chichele Professor of
+International Law and Diplomacy; and to Mr. W.G.S. Adams, Gladstone
+Professor of Political Theory and Institutions, for valuable suggestions
+and assistance.
+
+The sole responsibility for the book rests, however, with those who sign
+this Preface.
+
+Any profits arising from the sale of this work will be sent to the
+Belgian Relief Fund, as a mark of sympathy and respect for the Belgian
+nation, and especially for the University of Louvain.
+
+E. BARKER
+H. W. C. DAVIS
+C. R. L. FLETCHER
+ARTHUR HASSALL
+L. G. WICKHAM LEGG
+F. MORGAN
+
+
+
+
+Preface to Second Edition
+
+
+By the courtesy of His Excellency the Russian Ambassador we are now able
+to print in an appendix (No. VI) those documents contained in the
+Russian Orange Book which have not been already published in the German
+and the British White Books. In the light of the evidence afforded by
+the Russian Orange Book, we have modified one or two sentences in this
+edition.
+
+21 September, 1914.
+
+
+
+
+CONTENTS
+
+
+TABLE OF DATES
+
+CHAPTER I
+
+THE NEUTRALITY OF BELGIUM AND LUXEMBURG
+
+Belgian neutrality--The origin of Belgium--England and the smaller
+Powers--The Treaty of 1839--Belgium's independence and neutrality.--The
+neutrality of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg--Its origin--The Treaty of
+1867--The collective guarantee.--The strategic importance of
+Belgium--German plans long suspected.
+
+
+CHAPTER II
+
+THE GROWTH OF ALLIANCES AND THE RACE OF ARMAMENTS SINCE 1871
+
+Introduction--The Triple Alliance--Bismarck's dismissal--French colonial
+advance---Germany's demands for compensations--The Anglo-French
+agreement concerning Morocco--German objections--England and Russia--The
+Agadir incident--Anglo-French exchange of notes--Disputes in the
+Balkans--The 'Boulanger Law' of 1886--Count Caprivi's law of
+1893--Franco-Russian _entente_--German military preparations--France's
+response--Russia's reorganization--England's Army and Navy.
+
+Note. _Abstract of Anglo-French Agreement on Morocco_.
+
+
+CHAPTER III
+
+THE DEVELOPMENT OF RUSSIAN POLICY
+
+Estrangement of Russia and Germany--Austria and the Balkans--German
+penetration through the Balkans--Servia and Russia--Germany and the
+Slavs--Russia and England.
+
+
+CHAPTER IV
+
+CHRONOLOGICAL SKETCH OF THE CRISIS OF 1914
+
+Diary of the Events leading to the War.
+
+
+CHAPTER V
+
+NEGOTIATORS AND NEGOTIATIONS
+
+Dramatis personae. §1. _Germany's attitude to Russia and
+Austria_--Presentation of the Austrian Note to Servia--Germany shields
+Austria--Conduct of Germany considered--Sir Edward Grey proposes
+mediation, and then a Conference of Four Powers--Germany's objections to
+a 'Conference'--Direct conversations between the Powers--Austria invited
+to suspend military action--Mobilization; on whom does responsibility
+lie?--War inevitable. §2. _Germany's attitude to France_--Germany
+accuses France of military preparations--Germany invades France. §3.
+_The question of British neutrality_--Possibility of England being
+involved--Germany warned--German 'bid for British neutrality'--England's
+refusal--France agrees, and Germany refuses, to respect Belgian
+neutrality--Prince Lichnowsky and Sir Edward Grey--Neutrality of
+Luxemburg violated--Germany demands a free passage through Belgium--Sir
+Edward Grey protests--Belgium invaded--England's ultimatum--The Imperial
+Chancellor urges necessity of Germany's action. §4. _England and
+Servia_--Sir Edward Grey realizes Russia's interest in Servia--He is
+only concerned for the peace of Europe--He urges mediation--He proposes
+a Conference. §5. _Great Britain declines 'solidarity' with Russia and
+France_--Proposals by MM. Sazonof and Poincaré--England's refusal--Was
+it wise?--The Austrian _dossier_. §6. _Italy's comments on the
+situation_--Significance of Italy's position--Italy's endeavours to
+prevent war--Italy's declaration of neutrality.
+
+Note. Abstract of Austro-Hungarian note to Servia, and Servians reply.
+
+
+CHAPTER VI
+
+THE NEW GERMAN THEORY OF THE STATE
+
+The principles of _raison d'etat_ and the rule of law--Treitschke's
+teaching--The results of this philosophy--Contempt for public law--The
+glorification of war--The philosophy pagan--Its adoption by Prussian
+soldiers and Government--A plea for Prussia--England fights for law.
+
+
+EPILOGUE
+
+
+
+APPENDIXES
+
+I. THE GERMAN WHITE BOOK
+
+II. EXTRACTS FROM SIR EDWARD GREY'S CORRESPONDENCE RESPECTING THE
+EUROPEAN CRISIS
+
+III. EXTRACT FROM THE DISPATCH FROM HIS MAJESTY'S AMBASSADOR AT BERLIN
+RESPECTING THE RUPTURE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE GERMAN
+GOVERNMENT
+
+IV. THE CRIME OF SERAJEVO
+
+V. EXTRACT FROM THE DISPATCH FROM HIS MAJESTY'S AMBASSADOR AT VIENNA
+RESPECTING THE RUPTURE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN
+GOVERNMENT
+
+VI. EXTRACTS FROM THE RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK
+
+
+
+
+CHIEF DATES
+
+
+1648 Jan. The Treaty of Munster.
+     Oct. The Treaty of Westphalia.
+1713 April. The Treaty of Utrecht.
+1772 First Partition of Poland.
+1783 William of Nassau becomes Grand Duke of Luxemburg.
+1788 July. The Triple Alliance of England, Holland, and Prussia.
+1789 The French Revolution begins.
+1792 Nov. 6. Battle of Jemappes.  French Conquest of the Austrian
+     Netherlands and Liège.
+     Nov. 19. French decree offering 'freedom to all nations'.
+     Dec. 15. Compulsory freedom declared.
+1793 Jan. Second Partition of Poland.
+     Feb. 1. Declaration of War by France against England and Holland.
+1795 Third Partition of Poland.
+1801 Feb. 9. The Treaty of Luneville. France guarantees the
+     independence of Holland (then called 'Batavian Republic').
+1802 Mar. 27. The Treaty of Amiens.
+1803 Mar. 13. Napoleon's famous interview with Lord Whitworth.
+     May 12. Declaration of War by England against France.
+1814 Mar. 1. The Treaty of Chaumont.
+     May 30. The First Peace of Paris.
+     Sept. 29. Opening of the Congress of Vienna.
+1815 Mar-June. The Hundred Days.
+     May 31. Belgium and Luxemburg placed under the Prince of Orange as
+     King of the United Netherlands.
+     Nov. 20. The Second Peace of Paris.
+1830 Revolutions in France (July) and in Belgium (Aug.).
+1830-1878 Servia autonomous.
+1831 Nov. 15. Independence and Neutrality of Belgium guaranteed by
+     England, Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia.
+1839 April 19. Final recognition of the Independence and Neutrality of
+     Belgium by the above-named Powers.
+1867 May 11. European guarantee of the Neutrality of Luxemburg.
+     Declaration by Lord Stanley and Lord Clarendon.
+1870 Aug. 9. Independence and Neutrality of Belgium again guaranteed
+     by Germany and France.
+1871 May 10. The Treaty of Frankfort.
+1872 The _Dreikaiserbund_; Alliance of Russia, Germany, and
+     Austria.
+1875 Threatened attack on France by Germany prevented by
+     Russia and England.
+1878 The Treaty of Berlin.
+     Proclamation of Servian Independence under King Milan.
+1879 Secret Treaty between Germany and Austria.
+1883 Triple Alliance between Germany, Austria, and Italy.
+1885 Formation of United Bulgaria.
+     War between Bulgaria and Servia.
+1886 Peace between Bulgaria and Servia.
+1890 Fall of Bismarck. Cession of Heligoland to Germany.
+1891 Beginning of an understanding between Russia and France.
+1893 Caprivi's Army Act.
+1896 Germany begins to show aggressive tendencies in the field
+     of Colonial Expansion.
+     Treaty between England and France regarding their interests
+     in Indo-China.
+     Definite Alliance between Russia and France.
+1898 Reconquest of the Sudan.
+     Tsar's rescript for an International Peace Conference.
+1899 Anglo-French Agreement respecting Tripoli.
+     June. First Peace Conference at the Hague.
+     New German Army Act.
+1902 Anglo-Japanese Alliance.
+     The Peace of Vereeniging closes the South African War.
+1903 Revolution in Belgrade.
+1904 April. The Treaty of London between England and France
+     with regard to North Africa.
+1905 Mar. Visit of the German Emperor to Tangier.
+     June. Germany demands the dismissal of M. Delcassé.
+     Aug. The Treaty of Portsmouth between Russia and Japan.
+     Renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.
+     German Army Act.
+     Sept. France agrees to the holding of the Algeeiras
+     Conference.
+1907 Agreement between Russia and England concerning Persia,
+     Afghanistan, and Tibet.
+     June-Oct. Second Peace Conference at the Hague.
+1908 Young Turk Revolution in Constantinople.
+     Oct. Annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria.
+     German Navy Law.
+1909 Mar. Servia declares she will no longer protest against the
+     annexation of Bosnia by Austria.
+1909 Mr. Asquith's speech on necessity for increasing the Navy.
+1910 The Potsdam interview between the Tsar and the Kaiser.
+1911 European Crisis over the question of Morocco, followed by a
+     closer Anglo-French _entente_.
+     German Army Act.
+1912 Sensational German Army Bill.
+     War in the Balkans.
+     Nov. 26. German Navy construction estimates £11,416,700.
+     Dec. 29. Peace Conference of Balkan States with Turkey broken off.
+1913 Jan. 17. M. Poincaré elected French President.
+     Jan. 23. The Young Turkish Party overthrow the Government at
+     Constantinople.
+     May 26. Peace made between Turkey and the Balkan States.
+     May 28. The New German Army Bill passes the Budget Committee of
+     the Reichstag.
+     June 20. Universal military service in Belgium.
+     June 26. Conference between the French President, the French
+     Foreign Minister, and Sir Edward Grey.
+     June 30. Bulgaria is attacked by Servia and Greece.
+     New German Army Bill.
+     July. Roumania attacks Bulgaria.
+     The Turks re-occupy Adrianople.
+     New Russian Army Bill.
+     French Army Bill.
+     Aug. 6. The Treaty of Peace between Bulgaria, Servia, Greece, and
+     Roumania.
+     Sept. 22. The Treaty of Peace between Bulgaria and Turkey.
+     Oct. 20. Servia at Austria's demand abandons Albania.
+     Austrian War Fund increased.
+1914 Attacks by the German Press upon France and Russia.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 1
+
+
+THE NEUTRALITY OF BELGIUM AND LUXEMBURG
+
+I
+
+The kingdom of Belgium is a comparatively new creation, but the idea of
+a Belgian nation is older than the kingdom. Historically and
+geographically the kingdom has no doubt an artificial character; its
+boundaries have been determined by the Great Powers and cut across the
+ancient provinces of the Netherlands. And it must be added that its
+population is heterogeneous both in race and language. These facts,
+however, in no sense diminish the legal rights of Belgium as a nation.
+She is a sovereign state by the same charter as Italy or Greece; and for
+the convenience of Europe she has been solemnly declared a neutral
+state, endowed with special privileges but burdened with corresponding
+obligations. While those privileges were maintained--and they have been
+rigidly maintained for more than eighty years--the Belgian people
+punctually fulfilled their obligations; and, because they have declined
+to betray Europe by becoming the dependant of a powerful neighbour, or
+by participating in the violation of European public law, their country
+is a wilderness of smoking ruins.
+
+In the tremendous and all but crushing ordeal of August, 1914, Belgium
+has proved that she possesses other titles to existence and respect than
+those afforded by treaties, by the mutual jealousies of neighbours, or
+by the doctrines of international law. She has more than satisfied the
+tests which distinguish the true from the fictitious nationality. Those
+who have hitherto known Belgium only as a hive of manufacturing and
+mining industry, or as a land of historic memories and monuments, are
+now recognizing, with some shame for their past blindness, the moral and
+spiritual qualities which her people have developed under the aegis of a
+European guarantee. It is now beyond dispute that, if Belgium were
+obliterated from the map of Europe, the world would be the poorer and
+Europe put to shame. The proofs which Belgium has given of her
+nationality will never be forgotten while liberty has any value or
+patriotism any meaning among men. We cannot do less than echo the
+general sentiment of admiration for a constancy to national ideals which
+has left Belgium at the mercy of Huns less forgivable than those of
+Attila. But the case against her oppressor is not to be founded solely
+or mainly on her peculiar merits. In a special sense it rests upon the
+legal rights and duties with which she has been invested for the
+convenience of her neighbours and for the welfare of the European state
+system. It was in their interest, rather than her own, that the Great
+Powers made her a sovereign independent state. As such she is entitled,
+equally with England or with Germany, to immunity from unprovoked
+attack. But the Powers which made her a sovereign state, also, and for
+the same reasons of convenience, made her a neutral state. She was
+therefore debarred from consulting her own safety by making alliances
+upon what terms she would. She could not lawfully join either of the two
+armed camps into which Europe has fallen since the year 1907. And, if
+she had been as contemptible as she is actually the reverse, she would
+still be entitled to expect from England and from every other of her
+guarantors the utmost assistance it is in their power to give. In
+fighting for Belgium we fight for the law of nations; that is,
+ultimately, for the peace of all nations and for the right of the weaker
+to exist.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+The provinces which now constitute the kingdom of Belgium--with the
+exception of the bishopric of Liège, which was until 1795 an
+ecclesiastical principality--were known in the seventeenth century as
+the Spanish, in the eighteenth as the Austrian, Netherlands. They
+received the first of these names when they returned to the allegiance
+of Philip II, after a short participation in the revolt to which Holland
+owes her national existence. When the independence of Holland was
+finally recognized by Spain (1648), the Spanish Netherlands were
+subjected to the first of the artificial restrictions which Europe has
+seen fit to impose upon them. The Dutch monopoly of navigation in the
+Scheldt was admitted by the Treaty of Münster (1648), and Antwerp was
+thus precluded from developing into a rival of Amsterdam. In the age of
+Louis XIV the Spanish Netherlands were constantly attacked by France,
+who acquired at one time or another the chief towns of Artois and
+Hainault, including some which have lately come into prominence in the
+great war, such as Lille, Valenciennes, Cambray, and Maubeuge. The bulk,
+however, of the Spanish Netherlands passed at the Treaty of Utrecht to
+Austria, then the chief rival of France on the Continent. They passed
+with the reservation that certain fortresses on their southern border
+were to be garrisoned jointly by the Dutch and the Austrians as a
+barrier against French aggression. This arrangement was overthrown at
+the French Revolution. The French annexed the Austrian Netherlands and
+Liège in November, 1792; and immediately afterwards threw down a
+gauntlet to England by opening to all nations the navigation of the
+Scheldt. This, and the threatened French attack on Holland, her ally,
+drew England into conflict with the Revolution; for, first, Antwerp in
+French hands and as an open port would be a dangerous menace; and
+secondly, the French had announced a new and anarchic doctrine hostile
+to all standing treaties: 'Our reasons are that the river takes its rise
+in France and that a nation which has obtained its liberty cannot
+recognize a system of feudalism, much less adhere to it'.[1] The answer
+of William Pitt, which in effect declared war upon the Revolution,
+contains a memorable statement of the attitude towards public law which
+England held then, as she holds it to-day: 'With regard to the Scheldt
+France can have no right to annul existing stipulations, unless she also
+have the right to set aside equally the other treaties between all
+Powers of Europe and all the other rights of England and her allies....
+England will never consent that France shall arrogate the power of
+annulling at her pleasure and under the pretence of a pretended natural
+right, of which she makes herself the only judge, the political system
+of Europe, established by solemn treaties and guaranteed by the consent
+of all the Powers'.[2]
+
+This was not our attitude in the case of Belgium only. It was an
+attitude which we adopted with regard to all the minor Powers of Western
+Europe when they were threatened by Napoleon. On precisely the same
+grounds England defended in 1803 the independence of Holland, a
+commercial rival if an old political ally, and of Switzerland, where she
+had no immediate interests to protect. By the Treaty of Lunéville
+(February, 1801) France and Austria had mutually guaranteed the
+independence of the Batavian Republic and the right of the Dutch to
+adopt whatever form of government seemed good to them. In defiance of
+these stipulations Napoleon maintained a garrison in Holland, and forced
+upon her a new Constitution which had been prepared in Paris (November,
+1801). Identical stipulations had been made for the Helvetian Republic
+and had been similarly violated. Early in 1803 England demanded that the
+French should evacuate Holland and Switzerland: to which Napoleon
+replied that 'Switzerland and Holland are mere trifles'. His interview
+with the English Ambassador on March 13, 1803, has many points of
+resemblance with the now famous interview of August 4, 1914, between Sir
+Edward Goschen and Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg. The First Consul then, like
+the Imperial Chancellor to-day, was unable, or professed himself unable,
+to understand why Great Britain should insist upon the observance of
+treaties.
+
+To return to Belgium. It became apparent in the Napoleonic Wars that
+Belgium and Holland were individually too weak to protect themselves or
+the German people against an aggressive French Government. The allies
+therefore, in the year 1813, handed over to Holland the Austrian
+Netherlands and the bishopric of Liège in order 'to put Holland in a
+position to resist attack until the Powers could come to its aid'. This
+arrangement was ratified at the Treaty of Chaumont (1814). As there was
+no government or visible unity in the Belgian provinces after the
+retirement of the French, the union with Holland, originally suggested
+by Lord Castlereagh, seemed reasonable enough. It gave the Belgians the
+great privilege of freely navigating the Scheldt. It was confirmed at
+the Congress of Vienna, and the new kingdom of the United Netherlands
+was declared neutral by the common consent of the Powers.
+
+But the events of the years 1815-1830 proved conclusively that this
+union was unsatisfactory to the Belgian population. The Belgians
+complained that they were not allowed their just share of influence and
+representation in the legislature or executive. They resented the
+attempt to impose the Dutch language and Dutch Liberalism upon them.
+They rose in revolt, expelled the Dutch officials and garrisons, and
+drew up for themselves a monarchical and parliamentary constitution.
+Their aspirations aroused much sympathy both in England and in France.
+These two countries induced the other Great Powers (Austria, Prussia,
+Russia) to recognize the new kingdom as an independent neutral state.
+This recognition was embodied in the Treaty of the Twenty-Four Articles
+signed at London in October, 1831; and it was not too generous to the
+aspirations of Belgian nationality. Since the Belgians had been defeated
+in the field by Holland and had only been rescued by a French army, they
+were obliged to surrender their claims upon Maestricht, parts of
+Luxemburg, and parts of Limburg. Some time elapsed before this
+settlement was recognized by Holland. But at length this last guarantee
+was obtained; and the Treaty of London, 1839, finally established the
+international status of Belgium. Under this treaty both her independence
+and her neutrality were definitely guaranteed by England, France,
+Austria, Prussia, and Russia.
+
+We have recently been told by the Imperial Chancellor that the Treaty of
+1839 is nothing but 'a scrap of paper'. It is therefore desirable to
+point out that Bismarck made full use of it in 1870 to prevent England
+from supporting the cause of France. It was with this object that he
+published the proposal alleged to have been made to him by the French
+representative, Benedetti, in 1866, that Prussia should help France to
+acquire Belgium as a solace for Prussian annexations in Northern
+Germany. Then, as now, England insisted upon the Treaty of 1839. The
+result was that, on the instance of Lord Granville, Germany and France
+entered into an identic treaty with Great Britain (Aug. 1870) to the
+effect that, if either belligerent violated Belgian territory, Great
+Britain would co-operate with the other for the defence of it. The
+treaty was most strictly construed. After the battle of Sedan (Sept.
+1870) the German Government applied to Belgium for leave to transport
+the German wounded across Belgian territory. France protested that this
+would be a breach of neutrality and Belgium refused.
+
+Such is the history of the process by which Belgium has acquired her
+special status. As an independent state she is bound by the elementary
+principle of the law of nations, that a neutral state is bound to refuse
+to grant a right of passage to a belligerent. This is a well-established
+rule, and was formally affirmed by the Great Powers at the Hague Peace
+Conference of 1907. The fifth Article of the Convention [3] then drawn
+up respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in War
+on Land runs as follows:--
+
+  'A neutral power ought not to allow on its territory any of
+  the acts referred to in Articles 2 to 4'.
+
+Of the Articles thus specified the most important is No. 2:--
+
+  'Belligerents are forbidden to move across the territory of
+  a neutral power troops or convoys, either of munitions of war
+  or supplies'.
+
+By the Treaty of London the existence of Belgium is contingent upon her
+perpetual neutrality:--
+
+  'ARTICLE VII. Belgium within the limits specified in
+  Articles I, II, and IV shall form an independent and perpetually
+  neutral state. It shall be bound to observe such
+  neutrality towards all other states'.[4]
+
+It is unnecessary to elaborate further the point of law. That, it seems,
+has been admitted by the Imperial Chancellor before the German
+Reichstag. What is necessary to remember is that, in regard to Belgium,
+Germany has assumed the position which the Government of the French
+Revolution adopted towards the question of the Scheldt, and which
+Napoleon adopted towards the guaranteed neutrality of Switzerland and
+Holland. Now, as then, England has special interests at stake. The
+consequences of the oppression or the extinction of the smaller
+nationalities are bound to excite peculiar alarm in England. In
+particular she cannot forget how she would be menaced by the
+establishment of a militarist state in Belgium. But since in England's
+case the dangers and uncertainties of a state of things in which Might
+is treated as Right are particularly apparent, it is only to be expected
+that she should insist with special emphasis upon the sanctity of
+treaties, a sanctity which in the long run is as necessary to the
+strongest nation as to the weakest. If treaties count for nothing, no
+nation is secure so long as any imaginable combination of Powers can
+meet it in battle or diplomacy on equal terms; and the stronger nations
+must perforce fight one another to the death for the privilege of
+enslaving civilization. Whether the progress of such a competition would
+be a trifling evil, whether the success of any one among such
+competitors would conduce to the higher interests of humanity, impartial
+onlookers may debate if they please. England has answered both these
+questions with an unhesitating negative.
+
+
+II
+
+Under existing treaty law the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg stands for all
+practical purposes in the same legal position as its northern neighbour;
+and the ruler of Luxemburg has protested against the German invasion[5]
+of her territory no less emphatically than King Albert, though with less
+power of giving expression in action to her just resentment. If the
+defence of Belgium has appealed more forcibly to the ordinary
+Englishman, it is because he is more familiar with the past history of
+Belgium and sees more clearly in her case the ultimate issues that are
+involved in the German violation of her rights. As the following
+narrative will show, the neutrality of Luxemburg was guaranteed in the
+interests and at the instance of the Prussian state, as a protection
+against French aggression. The legal case could not be clearer, and it
+might perhaps be asked why the attack on Luxemburg, which preceded that
+on Belgium, was not treated by this country as a _casus belli_.
+England's attitude towards Luxemburg is that which she has consistently
+adopted towards those smaller states of Europe which lie outside the
+reach of naval power. It is an attitude which she has maintained in the
+case of Servia even more clearly than in that of Luxemburg. England
+holds herself bound to exert her influence in procuring for the smaller
+states of Europe equitable treatment from their more powerful
+neighbours. But the duty of insisting upon equitable treatment falls
+first upon those Powers whose situation enables them to support a
+protest by effective action. Just as Servia is the special concern of
+Russia, so Luxemburg must look to France in the first instance for
+protection against Germany, to Germany if she is assailed from the
+French side. In either case we should hold ourselves bound to exercise
+our influence, but not as principals. Any other course would be
+impossibly quixotic, and would only have the effect of destroying our
+power to help the states within our reach.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+The Grand Duchy of Luxemburg was a revival of an ancient state which had
+lost its existence during the French Revolution. Although it was placed
+under the rule of the King of the Netherlands, a descendant of its
+former sovereign, it was not incorporated in his kingdom, but retained
+its own identity and gave to its ruler the secondary title of Grand Duke
+of Luxemburg. The position it occupied after 1815 was in some ways
+anomalous; for lying as it did between the Meuse and the Rhine, and
+possessing in the town of Luxemburg a fortress whose natural strength
+some competent critics reckoned as second only to that of Gibraltar
+among the fortresses of Europe, it was considered to be an indispensable
+link in the chain of defences of Germany against French aggression. Not
+being able to trust the Dutch to hold this great fortress against the
+French, the Congress of Vienna laid down as a principle that all land
+between the Meuse and the Rhine must be held by Prussian troops on
+behalf of the newly formed Germanic Confederation. Thus Luxemburg was
+held by Prussian troops on behalf of this foreign confederation, and
+over this garrison the only right allowed to the Grand Duke, the
+sovereign of the country, was that of nominating the governor.
+
+This strange state of affairs was not modified by the Belgian Revolution
+of 1830; for though more than half the Grand Duchy threw in its lot with
+Belgium to form the modern province of Belgian Luxemburg, the Grand
+Duchy, confined to its modern limits, still contained the great fortress
+with its garrison of Prussian troops. It is not surprising that, under
+these circumstances, the Grand Duchy joined the Prussian _Zollverein_,
+and so drew nearer to Germany, in spite of the independent character of
+its inhabitants, who have strenuously resisted any attempt at absorption
+into Germany. France naturally continued to cast envious eyes upon the
+small state with the powerful citadel, but no opportunity presented
+itself for reopening the question until 1866.
+
+In that year Napoleon III had anticipated that the war between Prussia
+and Italy on one side and Austria and the small German states on the
+other would be long and exhausting, and would end in France imposing
+peace on the weary combatants with considerable territorial advantage to
+herself. His anticipation was entirely falsified; the war lasted only
+seven weeks and Prussia emerged victorious and immensely strengthened by
+the absorption of several German states and by the formation of the
+North German Confederation under her leadership. This, the first
+shattering blow which the French Emperor's diplomatic schemes had
+received, led him to demand compensation for the growth of Prussian
+power, and one of his proposals was the cession of Luxemburg to France.
+
+This suggestion had some legal plausibility quite apart from the
+question of the balance of power. For the Prussian garrison held
+Luxemburg in the name of the German Confederation, which had been
+destroyed by the war of 1866; and, the authority to which the garrison
+owed its existence being gone, it was only logical that the garrison
+should go too. After much demur Count Bismarck acknowledged the justice
+of the argument (April, 1867), but it did not by any means follow that
+the French should therefore take the place vacated by the Prussians. At
+the same time the fortress could not be left in the hands of a weak
+Power as a temptation for powerful and unscrupulous neighbours. The
+question of Luxemburg was therefore the subject discussed at a Congress
+held in London in the following May.
+
+Here the Prussians showed themselves extremely politic and reasonable.
+Realizing that, with the advance of artillery, the great rock-fortress
+no longer had the military value of earlier days, they not only raised
+no objections to the evacuation of Luxemburg by their troops, but in the
+Congress it was they who proposed that the territory of the Grand Duchy
+should be neutralized 'under the collective guarantee of the Powers'.[6]
+A treaty was therefore drawn up on May 11, 1867, of which the second
+article ran as follows:--
+
+    'The Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, within the Limits determined by the
+    Act annexed to the Treaties of the 19th April, 1839, under the
+    Guarantee of the Courts of Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia,
+    and Russia, shall henceforth form a perpetually Neutral State.
+
+    'It shall be bound to observe the same Neutrality towards all other
+    States.
+
+    'The High Contracting Parties engage to respect the principle of
+    Neutrality stipulated by the present Article.
+
+    'That principle is and remains placed under the sanction of the
+    collective Guarantee of the Powers signing as Parties to the present
+    Treaty, with the exception of Belgium, which is itself a Neutral
+    State'.[7]
+
+The third article provided for the demolition of the fortifications of
+Luxemburg and its conversion into an open town, the fourth for its
+evacuation by the Prussian garrison, and the fifth forbade the
+restoration of the fortifications.
+
+Such then was the treaty guaranteeing the neutrality of Luxemburg, which
+was proposed, it may be observed, by Prussia herself; but, until the
+treaty was broken by the very Power which had proposed the neutrality,
+only one incident need be noted in the history of the country, namely,
+the part it played in the war of 1870-1. On December 3, 1870, Count
+Bismarck issued from Versailles a circular to the Prussian Ambassadors,
+calling attention to the fact that both the French and the Luxemburgers
+had violated the neutrality of the Grand Duchy, mainly by giving
+facilities for French soldiers to return to France. Precautions were
+taken by the Prussian Government on the frontier to prevent such abuses
+occurring in the future, and as no violation of the neutrality of
+Luxemburg was committed by the Prussians, the neutral co-guarantors were
+satisfied with the Prussian attitude, and the subject dropped. At the
+end of the war, M. Thiers vainly attempted to obtain Luxemburg as
+compensation for the loss of Metz.
+
+In accordance with the Family Compact of 1783, the Grand Duchy passed on
+the death of the late King of Holland to Prince William of Nassau, on
+whose death the present Grand Duchess succeeded to her father's throne.
+
+There is one point in the Treaty of 1867 which calls for special
+comment. The neutrality of the Grand Duchy is 'placed under the
+collective guarantee of the Powers signing'. The phrase originally
+proposed by Count Bismarck was 'the formal and individual guarantee of
+the Powers,' and it was altered at the instance of the English Foreign
+Minister, Lord Stanley. The phrase actually adopted was suggested by the
+Russian diplomat, Baron Brunnow, and was accepted both by England and by
+Prussia. Lord Stanley's objection had been based upon the fear that
+England might incur an unlimited liability to assist Luxemburg
+single-handed if all other Powers failed to meet their obligations. In
+other words, Luxemburg might have been used as the infallible means of
+dragging us into every and any war which might arise between Germany and
+France. From that danger we were protected by Lord Stanley's objection;
+as the case stands the treaty gives us, in his own words, 'a right to
+make war, but would not necessarily impose the obligation,' should
+Luxemburg be attacked. To this doctrine a reference will be found in the
+British White Paper (No. 148), where Sir Edward Grey informs M. Cambon
+of 'the doctrine' concerning Luxemburg, 'laid down by Lord Derby and
+Lord Clarendon in 1867'. It may also be observed that two of the
+co-guarantors of the Treaty of 1867, namely Italy and Holland, have also
+not thought it necessary to make the violation of Luxemburg a _casus
+belli_.
+
+
+III
+
+It is evident to all who study closely the map of France that her
+eastern frontier falls into two sharply contrasted divisions, the
+north-eastern which reaches from the sea to the valley of the Sambre,
+and the south-eastern which extends from that river to, and along the
+Swiss boundary. The former is flat country, easy for military
+operations; the latter is mountainous, intersected with many deep
+valleys. After the loss of Alsace-Lorraine, the French set to work to
+rectify artificially the strategical weakness of their frontier; and in
+a chain of fortresses behind the Vosges Mountains they erected a rampart
+which has the reputation of being impregnable. This is the line Belfort,
+Épinal, Toul, Verdun. A German attack launched upon this line without
+violating neutral territory would have to be frontal, for on the north
+the line is covered by the neutral states of Belgium and Luxemburg,
+while on the south, although the gap between the Vosges and the Swiss
+frontier apparently gives a chance of out-flanking the French defences,
+the fortress of Belfort, which was never reduced even in the war of
+1870-1, was considered too formidable an obstacle against which to
+launch an invading army. A rapid advance on Paris was therefore deemed
+impossible if respect were to be paid to the neutrality of Belgium and
+Luxemburg, and it was for this purely military reason that Germany has
+to-day violated her promises to regard the neutrality of these states.
+This was frankly admitted by Herr von Jagow to Sir Edward Goschen: 'if
+they had gone by the more southern route they could not have hoped, in
+view of the paucity of roads and the strength of the fortresses, to have
+got through without formidable opposition entailing great loss of
+time'.[8]
+
+In the case of Belgium a very easy road was afforded into French
+territory up the Valley of the Meuse, past Liège and thence into France
+past Namur and through what is known as the Gap of Namur. A German army
+could debouch into France through this gap the more easily inasmuch as
+the French, relying on the neutrality of these two states, had not
+strongly fortified the frontier from the sea to Maubeuge. Moreover, as
+the country to the west of the Sambre was very easy country for
+manoeuvring and furnished with good roads and railways, it was reckoned
+that the formidable French lines to the south could be turned in this
+manner, and the German army could march upon Paris from the north-east.
+
+As to Luxemburg, plainly it could not in such a scheme remain neutral.
+It would lie between the two wings of the German army, and controlling
+as it did the roads to Brussels, Metz, and Aix-la-Chapelle, it could not
+be allowed to cause such inconvenience as to prevent easy communication
+between one portion of the German army and another.
+
+That such a plan was contemplated by the Germans has been for some years
+past a matter of common knowledge in England; and it has been also a
+matter of common opinion that the attempt to execute this plan would
+involve the active resistance of the British forces, to whom the duty
+was supposed to have been assigned of acting on the left flank of the
+French opposing the entry of the Germans from Belgian territory. The
+plea therefore that has been put forward that the British have now dealt
+the Germans 'a felon's blow' can only be put forward by persons who are
+either ignorant or heedless of what has been a matter of casual
+conversation all over England these last three years; and Sir Edward
+Grey himself was so convinced that the German Government knew what the
+consequences of a violation of Belgian neutrality would be that he
+informed Sir Francis Bertie on July 31st that the 'German Government do
+not expect our neutrality'.[9] There has been no secret about it
+whatever. It is incredible that the excitement and surprise of the
+Imperial Chancellor on the receipt of the ultimatum of August 4th should
+have been genuine, seeing that it involves miscalculation or
+misinformation entirely incompatible with what we know of the
+thoroughness of German methods. At the time of the Agadir crisis the
+military situation was the same, and the German War Office knew quite
+well what our part would then have been. Surprise at such action on our
+part in 1914 is little else than comedy, and can only have been
+expressed in order to throw the blame of German aggression on to the
+shoulders of Great Britain.
+
+This argument that Great Britain has taken the aggressive falls to the
+ground entirely when it is confronted with the hard facts of chronology.
+Far from attacking the Germans, we were so anxious to keep the peace
+that we were actually three days late in our mobilization to join the
+French on their left wing; and had it not been for the defence offered
+by Liège, our scruples would have gravely imperilled the common cause.
+For it was not until we were certain that Germany had committed what was
+tantamount to an act of war against us, by invading the neutral state of
+Belgium, that we delivered the ultimatum which led to the war.
+
+Notes:
+
+[Footnote 1: Cam. Mod. Hist. viii 301.]
+
+[Footnote 2: Ibid. 304.]
+
+[Footnote 3: Printed by A. Pearce Higgins, _The Hague Peace
+Conferences_, pp. 281-9.]
+
+[Footnote 4: The entire treaty will be found in Hertslet, _Map of Europe
+by Treaty_, vol. ii, pp. 979-98.]
+
+[Footnote 5: _Correspondence respecting the European Crisis_, (Cd.
+7467), No. 147. Minister of State, Luxemburg, to Sir E. Grey, Aug. 2.]
+
+[Footnote 6: Edward Hertslet, _The Map of Europe by Treaty_, vol. iii,
+p. 1806, no. 406. 'Proposal of _Prussia_ of Collective Guarantee by
+Powers of Neutrality of _Luxemburg_, London, 7th May, 1867.']
+
+[Footnote 7: Hertslet, _ut sup._, vol. iii, p. 1803. The High
+Contracting Powers were Great Britain, Austria, France, Belgium, Italy,
+the Netherlands, Prussia, and Russia.]
+
+[Footnote 8: _Dispatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin
+respecting the rupture of diplomatic relations with the German
+Government_ (Cd. 7445), Miscellaneous, no. 8, 1914.]
+
+[Footnote 9: _Correspondence respecting the European Crisis_, p. 62, no.
+116. July 31, 1914. See also _infra_ pp. 82 _et seqq_.]
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER II
+
+
+THE GROWTH OF ALLIANCES AND THE RACE OF ARMAMENTS SINCE 1871
+
+Even at the risk of being tedious it is essential that we should sketch
+in outline the events which have produced the present grouping of
+belligerent states, and the long-drawn-out preparations which have
+equipped them for conflict on this colossal scale. To understand why
+Austria-Hungary and Germany have thrown down the glove to France and
+Russia, why England has intervened not only as the protector of Belgium,
+but also as the friend of France, we must go back to the situation
+created by the Franco-German War. Starting from that point, we must
+notice in order the formation of the Triple Alliance between Germany,
+Austria-Hungary, and Italy, of the Dual Alliance between France and
+Russia, of the Anglo-French and the Anglo-Russian understandings. The
+Triple Alliance has been the grand cause of the present situation; not
+because such a grouping of the Central European Powers was
+objectionable, but because it has inspired over-confidence in the two
+leading allies; because they have traded upon the prestige of their
+league to press their claims East and West with an intolerable disregard
+for the law of nations. Above all it was the threatening attitude of
+Germany towards her Western neighbours that drove England forward step
+by step in a policy of precautions which, she hoped, would avert a
+European conflagration, and which her rivals have attempted to represent
+as stages in a Machiavellian design to ruin Germany's well-being. These
+precautions, so obviously necessary that they were continued and
+expanded by the most pacific Government which England has seen since Mr.
+Gladstone's retirement, have taken two forms: that of diplomatic
+understandings, and that of naval preparations. Whichever form they have
+taken, they have been adopted in response to definite provocations, and
+to threats which it was impossible to overlook. They have been strictly
+and jealously measured by the magnitude of the peril immediately in
+view. In her diplomacy England has given no blank cheques; in her
+armaments she has cut down expenditure to the minimum that, with
+reasonable good fortune, might enable her to defend this country and
+English sea-borne trade against any probable combination of hostile
+Powers.
+
+Let us consider (1) the development of the diplomatic situation since
+1870, (2) the so-called race of armaments since 1886.
+
+The Treaty of Frankfort (May 10, 1871), in which France submitted to the
+demands of the new-born German Empire, opened a fresh era of European
+diplomacy and international competition. The German Empire became at
+once, and has ever since remained, the predominant Power in Western
+Europe. The public opinion of this new Germany has been captured to no
+small extent by the views of such aggressive patriots as Treitschke, who
+openly avowed that 'the greatness and good of the world is to be found
+in the predominance there of German culture, of the German mind, in a
+word of the German character'. The school of Treitschke looked for the
+establishment of a German world-empire, and held that the essential
+preliminary to this scheme would be the overthrow of France and England.
+But until 1890, that is to say so long as Prince Bismarck remained
+Chancellor, no such ambitious programme was adopted by the German
+Government. Bismarck was content to strengthen the position of the
+Empire and to sow disunion among her actual or suspected enemies. In
+1872 he brought about a friendly understanding with Austria and Russia,
+the other two great Powers of Eastern Europe, the so-called
+_Dreikaiserbündnis_, which was designed to perpetuate the _status quo_.
+But the friendship with Russia quickly cooled; it received a sharp
+set-back in 1875, when the Tsar Alexander II came forward rather
+ostentatiously to save France from the alleged hostile designs of
+Germany; it was certainly not improved when Bismarck in his turn
+mediated between Russia and her opponents at the Congress of Berlin
+(1878). On the other hand, a common interest in the Eastern Question
+drew closer the bonds between Germany and Austria. The latter felt
+herself directly menaced by the Balkan policy of Russia; the former was
+not prepared to see her southern neighbour despoiled of territory. Hence
+in 1879 was initiated that closer union between Germany and Austria
+which has been so largely responsible for the present situation. The
+Treaty of 1879, which was kept secret until 1887, was purely defensive
+in its character; but the terms showed that Russia was the enemy whom
+both the contracting Powers chiefly feared. Neither was bound to active
+measures unless the other should be attacked by Russia, or any Power
+which had Russian support. In 1882 the alliance of the two great German
+Powers was joined by Italy--a surprising development which can only be
+explained on the ground of Italy's feeling that she could not hope for
+security at home, or for colonial expansion in the Mediterranean, so
+long as she remained in isolation. The Triple Alliance so constituted
+had a frail appearance, and it was hardly to be expected that Italy
+would receive strong support from partners in comparison with whose
+resources her own were insignificant. But the Triple Alliance has
+endured to the present day, the most permanent feature of the diplomatic
+system of the last thirty-two years. Whether the results have been
+commensurate with the sacrifices of sentiment and ambition which Italy
+has made, it is for Italy to judge. On the whole she has been a sleeping
+partner in the Alliance; its prestige has served almost exclusively for
+the promotion of Austrian and German aims; and one of its results has
+been to make Austria a formidable rival of Italy in the Adriatic.
+
+Meanwhile the remaining Great Powers of Europe had continued, as Prince
+Bismarck hoped, to pursue their separate paths, though England was on
+friendly terms with France and had, equally with Russia, laboured to
+avert a second Franco-German War in 1875. After 1882 the English
+occupation of Egypt constituted for some years a standing grievance in
+the eyes of France. The persistent advance of Russia in Asia had in like
+manner been a source of growing apprehension to England since 1868; and,
+for a long time after the Treaty of Berlin, English statesmen were on
+the watch to check the growth of Russian influence in the Balkans. But
+common interests of very different kinds were tending to unite these
+three Powers, not in any stable alliance, even for mutual defence, but
+in a string of compacts concluded for particular objects.
+
+One of these interests was connected with a feeling that the policy of
+the principal partners in the Triple Alliance, particularly that of
+Germany, had become incalculable and was only consistent in periodic
+outbursts of self-assertiveness, behind which could be discerned a
+steady determination to accumulate armaments which should be strong
+enough to intimidate any possible competitor. The growth of this feeling
+dates from the dismissal of Prince Bismarck by the present Kaiser.
+Bismarck had sedulously courted the friendship of Russia, even after
+1882. He entered in fact into a defensive agreement with Russia against
+Austria. While he increased the war strength of the army, he openly
+announced that Germany would always stand on the defensive; and he
+addressed a warning to the Reichstag against the 'offensive-defensive'
+policy which was even then in the air, though it was still far from its
+triumph:--
+
+    'If I were to say to you, "We are threatened by France and Russia;
+    it is better for us to fight at once; an offensive war is more
+    advantageous to us," and ask for a credit of a hundred millions, I
+    do not know whether you would grant it--I hope not.'[10]
+
+But Bismarck's retirement (1890) left the conduct of German policy in
+less cautious hands. The defensive alliance with Russia was allowed to
+lapse; friction between the two Powers increased, and as the result
+Germany found herself confronted with the Dual Alliance of France and
+Russia, which gradually developed, during the years 1891-6, from a
+friendly understanding into a formal contract for mutual defence. There
+is no doubt that this alliance afforded France a protection against that
+unprovoked attack upon her eastern frontier which she has never ceased
+to dread since 1875; and it has yet to be proved that she ever abused
+the new strength which this alliance gave her.
+
+It is only in the field of colonial expansion that she has shown
+aggressive tendencies since 1896; and even here the members of the
+Triple Alliance have never shown serious cause for a belief that France
+has invaded their lawful spheres of interest. Her advance in Morocco was
+permitted by Italy and Spain; her vast dominion in French West Africa
+has been recognized by treaties with Germany and England; in East Africa
+she has Madagascar, of which her possession has never been disputed by
+any European Power; her growing interests in Indo-China have impinged
+only upon an English sphere of interest and were peacefully defined by
+an Anglo-French Agreement of 1896. France has been the competitor, to
+some extent the successful competitor, of Germany in West Africa, where
+she partially envelops the Cameroons and Togoland. But the German
+Government has never ventured to state the French colonial methods as a
+_casus belli_. That the German people have viewed with jealousy the
+growth of French power in Africa is a notorious fact. Quite recently, on
+the eve of the present war, we were formally given to understand that
+Germany, in any war with France, might annex French colonies[11]; and it
+is easy to see how such an object would reconcile the divergent policies
+of the German military and naval experts.
+
+Up to the eve of the present war Great Britain has consistently refused
+to believe that Germany would be mad enough or dishonest enough to enter
+on a war of aggression for the dismemberment of colonial empires. German
+diplomacy in the past few weeks has rudely shattered this conviction.
+But up to the year 1914 the worst which was generally anticipated was
+that she would pursue in the future on a great scale the policy, which
+she has hitherto pursued on a small scale, of claiming so-called
+'compensations' when other Powers succeeded in developing their colonial
+spheres, and of invoking imaginary 'interests' as a reason why the
+efforts of explorers and diplomatists should not be allowed to yield to
+France their natural fruits of increased colonial trade. It is not our
+business to impugn or to defend the partition of Africa, or the methods
+by which it has been brought about. But it is vital to our subject that
+we should describe the methods by which Germany has endeavoured to
+intimidate France at various stages of the African question. The trouble
+arose out of a Moroccan Agreement between England and France, which was
+the first definite proof that these two Powers were drifting into
+relations closer than that of ordinary friendship.
+
+In 1904 England and France settled their old quarrel about Egypt. France
+recognized the English occupation of Egypt; England, on her side,
+promised not to impede the extension of French influence in Morocco. It
+was agreed that neither in Egypt nor in Morocco should there be a
+political revolution; and that in both countries the customs tariff
+should make no distinction between one nation and another. This compact
+was accompanied by a settlement of the old disputes about French fishing
+rights in Newfoundland, and of more recent difficulties concerning the
+frontiers between French and English possessions in West Africa.[12] The
+whole group formed a step in a general policy, on both sides, of healing
+local controversies which had little meaning except as instruments of
+diplomatic warfare. The agreement regarding Egypt and Morocco is
+distinguished from that concerning West Africa and Newfoundland in so
+far as it recognizes the possibility of objections on the part of other
+Powers. It promised mutual support in the case of such objections; but
+not the support of armed force, only that of diplomatic influence.
+
+At the moment of these agreements Count Bülow told the Reichstag that
+Germany had no objection, as her interests were in no way imperilled by
+them. Later, however, Germany chose to regard the Moroccan settlement as
+an injury or an insult or both. In the following year the Kaiser made a
+speech at Tangier (March, 1905) in which he asserted that he would
+uphold the important commercial and industrial interests of Germany in
+Morocco, and that he would never allow any other Power to step between
+him and the free sovereign of a free country. It was subsequently
+announced in the German Press that Germany had no objection to the
+Anglo-French Agreement in itself, but objected to not having been
+consulted before it was arranged. This complaint was met, on the part of
+France, by the retirement of M. Delcassé, her Minister of Foreign
+Affairs, and by her assent to an International Conference regarding
+Morocco. The Conference met at Algeciras, and German pretensions were
+satisfied by an international Agreement.[13] It is to be observed that
+in this Conference the original claims of Germany were opposed, not only
+by Russia, from whom she could hardly expect sympathy, but even by
+Italy, her own ally. When Germany had finally assented to the Agreement,
+her Chancellor, in flat contradiction with his previous utterance 'that
+German interests were in no way imperilled by it', announced that
+Germany had been compelled to intervene by her economic interests, by
+the prestige of German policy, and by the dignity of the German Empire.
+
+The plain fact was that Germany, soon after the conclusion of the
+Anglo-French agreements, had found herself suddenly delivered from her
+preoccupations on the side of Russia, and had seized the opportunity to
+assert herself in the West while Russia was involved in the most
+critical stage of her struggle with Japan. But this war came to an end
+before the Convention of Algeciras had begun; and Russia, even in the
+hour of defeat and internal revolutions, was still too formidable to be
+overridden, when she ranged herself beside her Western ally.
+
+Of the part which England played in the Moroccan dispute there are
+different versions. What is certain is that she gave France her
+diplomatic support. But the German Chancellor officially acknowledged,
+when all was over, that England's share in the Anglo-French Agreement
+had been perfectly correct, and that Germany bore England no ill-will
+for effecting a _rapprochement_ with France. Still there remained a
+strong impression, not only in England and France, that there had been
+on Germany's part a deliberate intention to test the strength of the
+Anglo-French understanding and, if possible, to show France that England
+was a broken reed.
+
+It is not surprising that under these circumstances England has taken,
+since 1906, the precaution of freeing herself from any embarrassments in
+which she had previously been involved with other Powers. In 1905 she
+had shown her goodwill to Russia by exercising her influence to moderate
+the terms of the settlement with Japan. This was a wise step, consonant
+alike with English treaty-obligations to Japan and with the interests of
+European civilization. It led naturally to an amicable agreement with
+Russia (1907) concerning Persia, Afghanistan, and Tibet, the three
+countries which touch the northern borders of our Indian Empire. It
+cannot be too strongly emphasized that this agreement was of a local
+character, exactly as was that with France; that our friendly
+understandings with France and with Russia were entirely separate; and
+that neither related to the prosecution of a common policy in Europe;
+unless indeed the name of a policy could be given to the precaution,
+which was from time to time adopted, of permitting consultations between
+the French and English military experts. It was understood that these
+consultations committed neither country to a policy of common
+action.[14] England was drifting from her old attitude of 'splendid
+isolation'; but she had as yet no desire to involve herself, even for
+defensive purposes, in such a formal and permanent alliance as that
+which had been contracted by Germany, Austria, and Italy.
+
+But her hand was forced by Germany in 1911. Again the question of
+Morocco was made to supply a pretext for attacking our friendship with
+France. The German occupation of Agadir had, and could have, only one
+meaning. It was 'fastening a quarrel on France on a question that was
+the subject of a special agreement between France and us'.[15] The
+attack failed in its object. War was averted by the prompt action of the
+British Government. Mr. Asquith[16] announced that Great Britain, in
+discussing the Moroccan question, would have regard to British
+interests, which might be more directly involved than had hitherto been
+the case, and also to our treaty obligations with France. Somewhat later
+Mr. Asquith announced that if the negotiations between France and
+Germany did not reach a satisfactory settlement, Great Britain would
+become an active party to the discussion.[17] The nature of British
+interests were appropriately defined by Mr. Lloyd George in a Guildhall
+speech as consisting in the peace of the world, the maintenance of
+national honour, and the security of international trade.[18] The last
+phrase was a significant reference to the fact that Agadir, though
+valueless for commercial purposes, might be invaluable to any Power
+which desired to molest the South Atlantic trade routes. No one doubted
+then, or doubts to-day, that England stood in 1911 on the brink of a war
+which she had done nothing to provoke.
+
+The situation was saved in 1911 by the solidarity of England and France.
+Two Powers, which in the past had been separated by a multitude of
+prejudices and conflicting ambitions, felt at last that both were
+exposed to a common danger of the most serious character. Hence a new
+phase in the Anglo-French _entente_, which was cemented, not by a
+treaty, but by the interchange of letters between the English Secretary
+for Foreign Affairs (Sir Edward Grey) and the French Ambassador in
+London (M. Paul Cambon). On November 22, 1912, Sir Edward Grey[19]
+reminded M. Cambon of a remark which the latter had made, 'that if
+either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a
+third Power, it might become essential to know whether it could in that
+event depend on the armed assistance of the other.' Sir Edward Grey
+continued:--'I agree that if either Government had grave reason to
+expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, or something that
+threatened the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the
+other whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression
+and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would be prepared
+to take in common. If these measures involved action, the plans of the
+General Staffs would at once be taken into consideration, and the
+Governments would then decide what effect should be given to them.'
+
+M. Cambon replied on the following day that he was authorized to accept
+the arrangement which Sir E. Grey had offered.[20]
+
+The agreement, it will be seen, was of an elastic nature. Neither party
+was bound to co-operate, even diplomatically, with the other. The
+undertaking was to discuss any threatening situation, and to take common
+measures if both agreed to the necessity; there was an admission that
+the agreement might result in the conduct of a joint defensive war upon
+a common plan. Such an understanding between two sovereign states could
+be resented only by a Power which designed to attack one of them without
+clear provocation.
+
+The date at which these notes were interchanged is certainly
+significant. In November, 1912, the Balkan Allies were advancing on
+Constantinople, and already the spoils of the Balkan War were in
+dispute. Servia incurred the hostility of Austria-Hungary by demanding
+Albania and Adriatic ports; and the Dual Monarchy announced that it
+could never accept this arrangement. Behind Servia Austrian statesmen
+suspected the influence of Russia; it was, they said, a scheme for
+bringing Russia down to a sea which Austria regarded as her own
+preserve. Austria mobilized her army, and a war could hardly have been
+avoided but for the mediation of Germany and England. If England had
+entertained the malignant designs with which she is credited in some
+German circles, nothing would have been easier for her than to fan the
+flames, and to bring Russia down upon the Triple Alliance. The notes
+show how different from this were the aims of Sir Edward Grey. He
+evidently foresaw that a war between Austria and Russia would result in
+a German attack upon France. Not content with giving France assurance of
+support, he laboured to remove the root of the evil. A congress to
+settle the Balkan disputes was held at London in December, 1912; and it
+persuaded Servia to accept a reasonable compromise, by which she
+obtained commercial access to the Adriatic, but no port. This for the
+moment pacified Austria and averted the world-war. To whom the solution
+was due we know from the lips of German statesmen. The German Chancellor
+subsequently (April 7, 1913) told the Reichstag:--
+
+    'A state of tension had for months existed between Austria-Hungary
+    and Russia which was only prevented from developing into war by the
+    moderation of the Powers.... Europe will feel grateful to the
+    English Minister of Foreign Affairs for the extraordinary ability
+    and spirit of conciliation with which he conducted the discussion of
+    the Ambassadors in London, and which constantly enabled him to
+    bridge over differences.'
+
+The Chancellor concluded by saying: 'We at any rate shall never stir up
+such a war'--a promise or a prophecy which has been singularly
+falsified.
+
+It is no easy matter to understand the line of conduct which Germany has
+adopted towards the great Slavonic Power on her flank. Since Bismarck
+left the helm, she has sometimes steered in the direction of
+subservience, and sometimes has displayed the most audacious insolence.
+Periodically, it is to be supposed, her rulers have felt that in the
+long run the momentum of a Russian attack would be irresistible; at
+other times, particularly after the Russo-Japanese War, they have
+treated Russia, as the Elizabethans treated Spain, as 'a colossus
+stuffed with clouts.' But rightly or wrongly they appear to have assumed
+that sooner or later there must come a general Armageddon, in which the
+central feature would be a duel of the Teuton with the Slav; and in
+German military circles there was undoubtedly a conviction that the epic
+conflict had best come sooner and not later. How long this idea has
+influenced German policy we do not pretend to say. But it has certainly
+contributed to her unenviable prominence in the 'race of armaments'
+which all thinking men have condemned as an insupportable, tax upon
+Western civilization, and which has aggravated all the evils that it was
+intended to avert.
+
+The beginning of the evil was perhaps due to France; but, if so, it was
+to a France which viewed with just alarm the enormous strides in
+population and wealth made by Germany since 1871. The 'Boulanger Law' of
+1886 raised the peace footing of the French army above 500,000 men, at a
+time when that of Germany was 427,000, and that of Russia 550,000.
+Bismarck replied by the comparatively moderate measure of adding 41,000
+to the German peace establishment for seven years; and it is significant
+of the difference between then and now that he only carried his Bill
+after a dissolution of one Reichstag and a forcible appeal to its
+successor.
+
+France must soon have repented of the indiscretion to which she had been
+tempted by a military adventurer. With a population comparatively small
+and rapidly approaching the stationary phase it was impossible that she
+could long maintain such a race. In 1893 Count Caprivi's law, carried
+like that of Bismarck after a stiff struggle with the Reichstag, raised
+the peace establishment to 479,000 men. Count Caprivi at the same time
+reduced the period of compulsory service from three years to two; but
+while this reform lightened the burden on the individual conscript, it
+meant a great increase in the number of those who passed through
+military training, and an enormous increase of the war strength. The
+Franco-Russian _entente_ of 1896 was a sign that France began to feel
+herself beaten in the race for supremacy and reduced to the defensive.
+In 1899 the German peace strength was raised to 495,000 for the next six
+years; in 1905 to 505,000. On the second of these occasions the German
+Government justified its policy by pointing out that the French war
+strength was still superior to that of Germany, and would become still
+stronger if France should change the period of service from three years
+to two. The German law was announced in 1904; it had the natural effect.
+The French Senate not only passed the new law early in 1905, but also
+swept away the changes which the Lower House had introduced to lighten
+the burden of annual training upon territorial reserves. France found
+her justification in the Moroccan episode of the previous year.
+
+This was not unreasonable; but since that date France has been heavily
+punished for a step which might be taken to indicate that _Revanche_ was
+still a feature of her foreign policy. Since 1886 her utmost efforts
+have only succeeded in raising her peace establishment to 545,000
+(including a body of 28,000 colonial troops stationed in France), and
+her total war strength to 4,000,000. In the same period the peace
+establishment of Germany was raised to over 800,000, and her total war
+strength of fully trained men to something like 5,400,000. It is obvious
+from these figures that a policy of isolation has long ceased to be
+possible to France; and that an alliance with Russia has been her only
+possible method of counterbalancing the numerical superiority of the
+German army, which is certainly not less well equipped or organized than
+that of France.
+
+This Russian alliance of France has been the only step in her
+continental policy which could be challenged as tending to overthrow the
+European balance. Undoubtedly it is France's prime offence in German
+eyes; and her colonial policy has only been attacked as a pretext for
+picking a quarrel and forcing on a decisive trial of strength before the
+growth of Russian resources should have made her ally impregnable.
+
+Let us now look at the German military preparations from a German point
+of view. The increases of the last twenty years in military expenditure
+and in fighting strength have been openly discussed in the Reichstag;
+and the debates have usually run on the same lines, because the
+Government up to 1912 pursued a consistent policy, framed for some years
+ahead and embodied in an Army Act. The underlying principle of these
+Army Acts (1893, 1899, 1905, 1911) was to maintain a fairly constant
+ratio between the peace strength and the population. But the war
+strength was disproportionately increased by the Caprivi Army Act of
+1893, which reduced the period of compulsory service from three years to
+two. The hardly-veiled intention of the German War Staff was to increase
+its war resources as rapidly as was consistent with the long-sufferance
+of those who served and those who paid the bill. It was taken as
+axiomatic that an increasing population ought to be protected by an
+increasing army. National defence was of course alleged as the prime
+consideration; and if these preparations were really required by growing
+danger on the two main frontiers of Germany, no German could do
+otherwise than approve the policy, no foreign Power could feel itself
+legitimately aggrieved.
+
+Unfortunately it has been a maxim of German policy in recent years that
+national independence means the power of taking the aggressive in any
+case where national interests or _amour-propre_ may prompt it. The
+increase of the German army, either in numbers or in technical
+efficiency, seems to be regularly followed by masterful strokes of
+diplomacy in which the 'mailed fist' is plainly shown to other
+continental Powers. Thus in 1909, at the close of a quinquennium of
+military re-equipment, which had raised her annual army budget from
+£27,000,000 to £41,000,000, Germany countenanced the Austrian annexation
+of Bosnia and the Herzegovina, and plainly told the authorities at St.
+Petersburg that any military action against Austria would bring Russia
+into a state of war with Germany. It was a startling step; _radix
+malorum_ we may call it, so far as the later development of the
+continental situation is concerned. Russia withdrew from the impending
+conflict in 1909, but it is improbable that she has ever forgiven the
+matter or the manner of the German ultimatum.
+
+In 1911 followed the episode of Agadir, which was clearly an attempt to
+'force a quarrel on France.' But in 1911 Germany realized that her
+military calculations had been insufficient, if she wished to continue
+these unamiable diplomatic manners. It was not a question of
+self-preservation; it was a question, as the German Chancellor told the
+Reichstag, of showing the world that 'Germany was firmly resolved not to
+be pushed aside.' Hence the sensational Army Bill of 1912, necessitated,
+as the Government told the Reichstag, by the events of 1911. The Russian
+peril could hardly be described as imminent. The Prussian Minister of
+War said publicly in 1911 that 'there was no Government which either
+desired or was seeking to bring about a war with Germany.' Russia had
+recently taken steps which, at Berlin, perhaps, were read as signs of
+weakness, but elsewhere were hailed as proofs of her desire for general
+peace. M. Isvolsky, the supposed champion of Balkan ideals, had retired
+from office; his successor, M. Sazonof, had accompanied the Czar to the
+Potsdam interview (1910); the outstanding disputes of Germany and Russia
+over their Persian interests had been settled by agreement in 1911.
+
+But the German Army Bill of 1912 was followed by Russia's intervention
+in the Balkans to secure for Servia at least commercial access to the
+Adriatic. This compromise, ostensibly promoted and belauded by German
+statesmanship, only increased the determination of the German Government
+to 'hold the ring' in the Balkans, to claim for Austria the right of
+settling her own differences with Servia as she would, and to deny
+Russia any interest in the matter. In 1913 came the supreme effort of
+the German General Staff: an Army Act for raising the peace strength by
+instalments until it reached 870,000, and for the eventual provision of
+a war strength of 5,400,000 men. This enormous increase was recommended
+'by the unanimous judgement of the military authorities' as being
+'necessary to secure the future of Germany.' The Chancellor warned the
+Reichstag that, although relations were friendly with Russia, they had
+to face the possibilities involved in the Pan-Slavist movement; while in
+Russia itself they had to reckon with a marvellous economic development
+and an unprecedented reorganization of the army. There was also a
+reference to the new law for a return to three years' service which
+France was introducing to improve the efficiency of her peace
+establishment. But it was obvious that Russia was the main
+preoccupation. Germany had forced the pace both in the aggrandizement of
+her military strength and in the methods of her diplomatic intercourse.
+Suddenly she found herself on the brink of an abyss. She had gone too
+far; she had provoked into the competition of armaments a Power as far
+superior to Germany in her reserves of men as Germany thought herself
+superior to France. It was not too late for Germany to pause. On her
+future behaviour towards other Powers it depended whether the Bill of
+1913 should be taken as an insurance against risks, or as a challenge to
+all possible opponents.
+
+The other Powers shaped their policy in accordance with Germany's
+example. In France, on March 4, the Supreme Council of War, having
+learned the outline of the German programme, decided to increase the
+effective fighting force by a return to the rule of three years'
+service. Before the German Bill had passed (June 30), the French Prime
+Minister announced (May 15) that he would of his own authority keep with
+the colours those who were completing their second year's service in the
+autumn. The French Army Bill, when finally passed (July 16), lowered the
+age limit for commencing service from twenty-one to twenty, and brought
+the new rule into force at once. A few weeks earlier (June 20) Belgium
+introduced universal military service in place of her former lenient
+system. In Russia a secret session of the Duma was held (July 8) to pass
+a new Army Budget, and the term of service was raised from three to
+three and a quarter years. Austria alone provided for no great increase
+in the numerical strength of her army; but budgeted (October 30) for
+extraordinary naval and military expenditure, to the extent of
+£28,000,000, to be incurred in the first six months of 1914. Thus on all
+sides the alarm was raised, and special preparations were put in hand,
+long before the crisis of 1914 actually arrived. It was Germany that had
+sounded the tocsin; and it is difficult to believe that some startling
+_coup_ was not even then being planned by the leaders of her military
+party.
+
+We have been told that, whatever the appearance of things might be, it
+was Russia who drove Germany to the extraordinary preparations of 1913;
+that Germany was arming simply in self-defence against a Slavonic
+Crusade. What are the facts? Economically Russia, as a state, is in a
+stronger position than the German Empire. In 1912 we were told that for
+the past five years the revenue of Russia had exceeded expenditure by an
+average sum of £20,000,000 per annum. The revenue of Russia in 1913 was
+over £324,000,000; she has budgeted for £78,000,000 of military
+expenditure in 1914, of which some £15,000,000 is emergency expenditure.
+The total revenue of the German Empire in 1913 was £184,000,000; she has
+budgeted for a military expenditure in 1914 of £60,000,000. To adopt the
+usual German tests of comparison, Russia has a population of 173
+millions to be defended on three land-frontiers, while Germany has a
+population of 65 millions to be defended on only two. The military
+efforts of Russia, therefore, have been made on a scale relatively
+smaller than those of Germany.
+
+We must, however, add some further considerations which have been urged
+by German military critics; the alleged facts we cannot test, but we
+state them for what they may be worth. The reorganization of the Russian
+army in recent years has resulted, so we are told, in the grouping of
+enormously increased forces upon the western frontier. The western
+fortresses also have been equipped on an unparalleled scale. New roads
+and railways have been constructed to accelerate the mobilization of the
+war strength; and, above all, strategic railways have been pushed
+towards the western frontier. Thus, it is argued, Russia has in effect
+gone behind the Potsdam Agreement of 1910, by which she withdrew her
+armies to a fixed distance behind the Russo-German frontier. We confess
+that, in all this, while there may have been cause for watchfulness on
+the part of Germany, we can see no valid cause for war, nothing that of
+necessity implies more than an intention, on the part of Russia, not to
+be brow-beaten in the future as she was in 1909 and 1912.
+
+These military developments did not escape English notice. They excited
+endless speculation about the great war of the future, and the part
+which this country might be asked to bear in it. Few, however, seriously
+supposed that we should commit ourselves to a share in the fighting upon
+land. The problem most usually discussed in this connexion was that of
+preparation to resist a sudden invasion from abroad. Was it possible to
+avoid compulsory service? Was the Territorial Force large enough and
+efficient enough to defend the country if the Expeditionary Force had
+gone abroad? Great Britain was infinitely better equipped for land
+warfare in August, 1914, than she had ever been in the nineteenth
+century. But her Expeditionary Force was a recent creation, and had been
+planned for the defence of India and the Colonies. In practice the
+country had clung to the 'Blue Water' policy, of trusting the national
+fortunes entirely to the Navy. The orthodox theory was that so long as
+the Navy was kept at the 'Two Power' standard, no considerable invasion
+of the British Isles was possible.
+
+But from 1898 the programmes of the German Navy Laws constituted a
+growing menace to the 'Two Power' standard, which had been laid down as
+our official principle in 1889, when France and Russia were our chief
+European rivals at sea. That France or Russia would combine with Germany
+to challenge our naval supremacy was improbable; but other states were
+beginning to build on a larger scale, and this multiplied the possible
+number of hostile combinations. That Germany should wish for a strong
+fleet was only natural. It was needed to defend her foreign trade, her
+colonial interests, and her own seaports. That Germany should lay down a
+definite programme for six years ahead, and that the programme should
+become more extensive at each revision, was no necessary proof of
+malice. But this country received a shock in 1900, when the programme of
+1898 was unexpectedly and drastically revised, so that the German Navy
+was practically doubled. England was at that moment involved in the
+South African War, and it was hard to see against whom the new fleet
+could be used, if not against England. This was pointed out from time to
+time by the Socialist opposition in the Reichstag. The orthodox official
+reply was that Germany must be so strong at sea that the strongest naval
+Power should not be able to challenge her with any confidence. But the
+feeling of the semi-official Navy League was known to be violently
+hostile to England; and it was obvious that the German navy owed its
+popularity to the alarmist propaganda of that league.
+
+It was impossible for English statesmen to avoid the suspicion that, on
+the sea as on land, the Germans meant by liberty the right to unlimited
+self-assertion. Common prudence dictated close attention to the German
+Navy Laws; especially as they proved capable of unexpected acceleration.
+The 'Two Power' standard, under the stress of German competition, became
+increasingly difficult to maintain, and English Liberals were inclined
+to denounce it as wasteful of money. But, when a Liberal Government
+tried the experiment of economizing on the Navy (1906-8), there was no
+corresponding reduction in the German programme. The German Naval Law of
+1906 raised the amount of the naval estimates by one-third; and German
+ministers blandly waved aside as impracticable a proposal for a mutual
+limitation of armaments.
+
+In 1909 this country discovered that in capital ships--which now began
+to be considered the decisive factor in naval warfare--Germany would
+actually be the superior by 1914 unless special measures were taken. The
+British Government was awakened to the new situation (it arose from the
+German Naval Law of 1908), and returned unwillingly to the path of
+increasing expenditure. The Prime Minister said that we regretted the
+race in naval expenditure and were not animated by anti-German feeling;
+but we could not afford to let our supremacy at sea be imperilled, since
+our national security depended on it (March 16, 1909). The 'Two Power'
+standard was dropped, and the Triple Alliance became the object of
+special attention at the Admiralty. The First Lord said on March 13,
+1911, that we should make our navy superior to any foreign navy and to
+any _probable_ combination which we might have to meet single-handed. In
+practice this meant a policy of developing, in the matter of
+Dreadnoughts, a superiority of sixty per cent, over the German navy;
+this, it was officially explained in 1912, had been for some years past
+the actual Admiralty standard of new construction (Mr. Winston
+Churchill, March 18, 1912).
+
+But even this programme had to be stiffened when the year 1912 saw a new
+German Navy Bill which involved an increased expenditure of £1,000,000
+annually for six years, and had the effect of putting nearly four-fifths
+of the German navy in a position of immediate readiness for war. Earlier
+in the year the British Government had announced that, if the German
+policy of construction were accelerated, we should add to our programme
+double the number which Germany put in hand; but if Germany relaxed her
+preparations we should make a fully proportionate reduction. The German
+Bill came as an answer to this declaration; and it was followed in this
+country by supplementary estimates on naval account, amounting to nearly
+a million pounds; and this was announced to be 'the first and smallest
+instalment of the extra expenditure entailed by the new German law.' The
+new British policy was maintained in 1913 and in 1914, though in 1913
+the First Lord of the Admiralty made a public offer of a 'naval
+holiday,' a suspension of new construction by mutual consent. The
+Imperial Chancellor responded only by suggesting that the proposal was
+entirely unofficial, by asking for concrete proposals, and by saying
+that the idea constituted a great progress; and his naval estimates in
+1913 were half a million higher than those of 1912.
+
+From these facts, viewed in their chronological order, it is clear that
+on sea as on land Germany has set the pace. Thirty years ago the German
+navy did not enter into England's naval calculations. For the last six
+years, if not for a longer period, it has been the one navy which our
+Admiralty felt the necessity of watching from year to year, and indeed
+from month to month. It is the first time for more than a hundred years
+that we have had to face the problem of 'a powerful homogeneous navy
+under one government and concentrated within easy distance of our
+shores.'
+
+On German principles we should long ago have adopted the
+'offensive-defensive.' We have been at least as seriously menaced by
+Germany at sea as Germany has been menaced by Russia upon land. But we
+can confidently say that in the period of rivalry our fleet has never
+been used as a threat, or turned to the purposes of an aggressive
+colonial policy. Rightly or wrongly, we have refused to make possible
+intentions a case for an ultimatum. We have held by the position that
+only a breach of public law would justify us in abandoning our efforts
+for the peace of Europe.
+
+NOTE
+
+_Abstract of Anglo-French Agreement on Morocco_.
+
+In April, 1904, England and France concluded an agreement for the
+delimitation of their interests on the Mediterranean littoral of North
+Africa. The agreement included five secret Articles which were not
+published until November, 1911. The purport of the Articles which were
+published at the time was as follows. By the first Article England
+stated that she had not the intention of changing the political state of
+Egypt; and France declared that she would not impede the action of
+England in Egypt by demanding that a term should be fixed for the
+British occupation or in any other way. By the second Article France
+declared that she had not the intention of changing the political state
+of Morocco; and England recognized that it appertained to France, as the
+Power conterminous with Morocco, to watch the tranquillity of this
+country and to assist it in all administrative, economic, financial, and
+military reforms which it required, France promised to respect the
+customary and treaty rights of England in Morocco; and by the third
+Article England made a corresponding promise to France in respect of
+Egypt. By the fourth Article the two Governments undertook to maintain
+'the principle of commercial liberty' in Egypt and Morocco, by not
+lending themselves in either country to inequality in the establishment
+of Customs-duties or of other taxes or of railway rates. The sixth and
+seventh Articles were inserted to ensure the free passage of the Suez
+Canal and of the Straits of Gibraltar. The eighth declared that both
+Governments took into friendly consideration the interests of Spain in
+Morocco, and that France would make some arrangements with the Spanish
+Monarchy. The ninth Article declared that each Government would lend its
+diplomatic support to the other in executing the clauses relative to
+Egypt and Morocco.[21] Of the secret Articles two (Nos. 3 and 4) related
+to Spain, defining the territory which she was to receive 'whenever the
+Sultan ceases to exercise authority over it,' and providing that the
+Anglo-French agreement would hold good even if Spain declined this
+arrangement. Article 1 stipulated that, if either Government found
+itself constrained, by the force of circumstances, to modify its policy
+in respect to Egypt or Morocco, nevertheless the fourth, sixth, and
+seventh Articles of the public declaration would remain intact; that is,
+each would under all circumstances maintain the principle of 'commercial
+liberty,' and would permit the free passage of the Suez Canal and the
+Straits of Gibraltar. In Article 2 England, while disclaiming any
+intention to alter the system of Capitulations or the judicial
+organization of Egypt, reserved the right to reform the Egyptian
+legislative system on the model of other civilized countries; and France
+agreed on condition that she should not be impeded from making similar
+reforms in Morocco. The fifth Article related to the Egyptian national
+debt.
+
+Notes:
+
+[Footnote 10: Quoted from Headlam's _Bismarck_, p. 444.]
+
+[Footnote 11: _Correspondence respecting the European Crisis_ (Cd.
+7467), No. 85. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 29, 1914. See
+_infra_, Appendix II.]
+
+[Footnote 12: For these agreements see _The Times_, April 12, 1904, and
+November 25, 1911. See note at end of this chapter.]
+
+[Footnote 13: White Paper, Morocco No. 1 (1906).]
+
+[Footnote 14: _Correspondence_, No. 105 (Enclosure 1). Sir E. Grey to M.
+Cambon, November 22, 1912. See Appendix II.]
+
+[Footnote 15: _Correspondence_, No. 87. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie,
+July 29, 1914.]
+
+[Footnote 16: _Times_, July 7, 1911.]
+
+[Footnote 17: _Times_, July 27, 1911.]
+
+[Footnote 18: _Times_, July 22, 1911.]
+
+[Footnote 19: _Correspondence_, p. 57 (Enclosure 1 in No. 105). See
+Appendix II.]
+
+[Footnote 20: _Ibid_. p. 57 (Enclosure 2 in No. 105).]
+
+[Footnote 21: _Times_, April 12, 1904.]
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER III
+
+
+THE DEVELOPMENT OF RUSSIAN POLICY
+
+Until the year 1890 Russia and Germany had been in close touch. Dynastic
+connexions united the two imperial houses; and the common policy of
+repression of Polish nationality--the fatal legacy of the days of
+Frederic the Great and Catharine II--united the two empires. National
+sentiment in Russia was, however, always anti-German; and as early as
+1885 Balkan affairs began to draw the Russian Government away from
+Germany. In 1890 Bismarck fell; and under William II German policy left
+the Russian connexion, and in close touch with Austria embarked on
+Balkan adventures which ran counter to Russian aims, while Russia on her
+side turned to new allies.
+
+The new direction of Russian policy, which has brought the aims of the
+Russian Government into close accord with the desires of national Slav
+sentiment, was determined by Balkan conditions. Bismarck had cherished
+no Balkan ambitions: he had been content to play the part of an 'honest
+broker' at the Congress of Berlin, and he had spoken of the Bulgarian
+affair of 1885 as 'not worth the bones of a Pomeranian grenadier.'
+William II apparently thought otherwise. At any rate Germany seems to
+have conducted, for many years past, a policy of establishing her
+influence, along with that of Austria, through South-Eastern Europe. And
+it is this policy which is the _fons et origo_ of the present struggle;
+for it is a policy which is not and cannot be tolerated by Russia, so
+long as Russia is true to her own Slav blood and to the traditions of
+centuries.
+
+After Austria had finally lost Italy, as she did in 1866, she turned for
+compensation to the Balkans. If Venetia was lost, it seemed some
+recompense when in 1878 Austria occupied Bosnia and the Herzegovina.
+Hence she could expand southwards--ultimately perhaps to Salonica.
+Servia, which might have objected, was a vassal kingdom, the protégé of
+Austria, under the dynasty of the Obrenovitch. As Austria might hope to
+follow the line to Salonica,[22] so Germany, before the end of the
+nineteenth century, seems to have conceived of a parallel line of
+penetration, which would carry her influence through Constantinople,
+through Konieh, to Bagdad. She has extended her political and economic
+influence among the small Slav states and in Turkey. In 1898 the King of
+Roumania (a Hohenzollern by descent) conceded direct communication
+through his territories between Berlin and Constantinople: in 1899 a
+German company obtained a concession for the Bagdad railway from Konieh
+to the head of the Persian Gulf. In a word, Germany began to stand in
+the way of the Russian traditions of ousting the Turk and ruling in
+Constantinople: she began to buttress the Turk, to train his army, to
+exploit his country, and to seek to oust Russia generally from
+South-Eastern Europe.
+
+In 1903 the progress of Austria and Germany received a check. A
+blood-stained revolution at Belgrade ousted the pro-Austrian
+Obrenovitch, and put in its place the rival family of the
+Karageorgevitch. Under the new dynasty Servia escaped from Austrian
+tutelage, and became an independent focus of Slav life in close touch
+with Russia. The change was illustrated in 1908, when Austria took
+advantage of the revolution in Turkey, led by the Young Turks, to annex
+formally the occupied territories of Bosnia and the Herzegovina. Servia,
+which had hoped to gain these territories, once a part of the old
+Servian kingdom, was mortally offended, and would have gone to war with
+Austria, if Russia, her champion under the new dynasty, could only have
+given her support. But Russia, still weak after the Japanese war, could
+not do so; Russia, on the contrary, had to suffer the humiliation of
+giving a pledge to the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg that she
+would not support Servia. That humiliation Russia has not forgotten. She
+has saved money, she has reorganized her army, she has done everything
+in her power to gain security for the future. And now that Austria has
+sought utterly to humiliate Servia on the unproved charge (unproved, in
+the sense that no legal proof was offered)[23] of complicity in the
+murder of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife, Russia has risked
+war rather than surrender her protection of a Slav kingdom. Slav
+sentiment imperatively demanded action in favour of Servia: no
+government could refuse to listen to the demand. The stake for Russia is
+not merely the integrity of Servia: it is her prestige among the Slav
+peoples, of which she is head; and behind all lies the question whether
+South-Eastern Europe shall be under Teutonic control, and lost to
+Russian influence.
+
+Germany has not only threatened Slav life in South-Eastern Europe: she
+has irritated Slav feeling on her own Eastern frontier. The vitality and
+the increase of the Slavs in Eastern Germany has excited deep German
+alarm. The German Government has therefore of late years pursued a
+policy of repression towards its own Slav subjects, the Poles,
+forbidding the use of the Polish language, and expropriating Polish
+landowners in order to plant a German garrison in the East. Teutonism is
+really alarmed at the superior birth-rate and physical vigour of the
+Slavs; but Russia has not loved Teutonic policy, and there has been an
+extensive boycott of German goods in Russian Poland. The promise made by
+the Tsar, since the beginning of the war, that he would re-create the
+old Poland, and give it autonomy, shows how far Russia has travelled
+from the days, not so far distant in point of time, when it was her
+policy to repress the Poles in conjunction with Germany; and it has made
+the breach between Germany and Russia final and irreparable.
+
+It is thus obvious that Germany is vitally opposed to the great Slav
+Empire in South-Eastern Europe and on her own eastern borders. But why,
+it may be asked, should Russian policy be linked with English? Is there
+any bond of union except the negative bond of common opposition to
+Germany? There is. For one thing England and Russia have sought to
+pursue a common cause--that of international arbitration and of
+disarmament. If neither has succeeded, it has been something of a bond
+between the two that both have attempted to succeed. But there are other
+and more vital factors. England, which in 1854-6 opposed and fought
+Russia for the sake of the integrity of Turkey, has no wish to fight
+Russia for the sake of a Germanized Turkey. On the contrary, the
+interest of England in maintaining independence in the South-East of
+Europe now coincides with that of Russia. Above all, the new
+constitutional Russia of the Duma is Anglophil.
+
+    'The political ideals both of Cadets and Octobrists were learnt
+    chiefly from England, the study of whose constitutional history had
+    aroused in Russia an enthusiasm hardly intelligible to a present-day
+    Englishman. All three Dumas ... were remarkably friendly to England,
+    and England supplied the staple of the precedents and parallels for
+    quotation.'[24]
+
+In a word, the beginnings of Russian constitutionalism not only
+coincided in time with the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907, but owed
+much to the inspiration of England.
+
+Notes:
+
+[Footnote 22: Count Aehrenthal, foreign minister of Austria (1906-1912),
+started the scheme of the Novi Bazar railway to connect the railways of
+Bosnia with the (then) Turkish line to Salonica. See also
+_Correspondence_, No. 19, Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey, July 25: 'There is
+reliable information that Austria intends to seize the Salonica
+railway.']
+
+[Footnote 23: For a summary of so-called proofs, see Appendix IV,
+_infra_.]
+
+[Footnote 24: _Camb. Mod. Hist_. xii. 379.]
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IV
+
+
+CHRONOLOGICAL SKETCH OF THE CRISIS
+
+The following sketch of events from June 28 to August 4, 1914, is merely
+intended as an introduction to the analytical and far more detailed
+account of the negotiations and declarations of those days which the
+reader will find below (Chap. V). Here we confine the narrative to a
+plain statement of the successive stages in the crisis, neither
+discussing the motives of the several Powers involved, nor
+distinguishing the fine shades of difference in the various proposals
+which were made by would-be mediators.
+
+The crisis of 1914 began with an unforeseen development in the old
+quarrel of Austria-Hungary and Russia over the Servian question. On June
+28 the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir-apparent of the Austro-Hungarian
+monarchy, and his wife, the Duchess of Hohenberg, paid a visit of
+ceremony to the town of Serajevo, in Bosnia, the administrative centre
+of the Austrian provinces of Bosnia and the Herzegovina. In entering the
+town, the Archduke and the Duchess narrowly escaped being killed by a
+bomb which was thrown at their carriage. Later in the day they were shot
+by assassins armed with Browning pistols. The crime was apparently
+planned by political conspirators who resented the Austrian annexation
+of Bosnia and the Herzegovina (_supra_, p. 54), and who desired that
+these provinces should be united to Servia.
+
+The Austrian Government, having instituted an inquiry, came to the
+conclusion that the bombs of the conspirators had been obtained from a
+Servian arsenal; that the crime had been planned in Belgrade, the
+Servian capital, with the help of a Servian staff-officer who provided
+the pistols; that the criminals and their weapons had been conveyed from
+Servia into Bosnia by officers of Servian frontier-posts and by Servian
+customs-officials. At the moment the Austrian Government published no
+proof of these conclusions,[25] but, on July 23, forwarded them to the
+Servian Government in a formal note containing certain demands which, it
+was intimated, must be satisfactorily answered by Servia within
+forty-eight hours.[26] This ultimatum included a form of apology to be
+published on a specified date by the Servian Government, and ten
+engagements which the Servian Government were to give the
+Austro-Hungarian Government. The extraordinary nature of some of these
+engagements is explained in the next chapter (pp. 103-7).
+
+On July 24 this note was communicated by Austria-Hungary to the other
+Powers of Europe,[27] and on July 25 it was published in a German paper,
+the _Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung_. It was therefore intended to be a
+public warning to Servia. On July 24 the German Government told the
+Powers that it approved the Austrian note, as being necessitated by the
+'Great-Servian' propaganda, which aimed at the incorporation in the
+Servian monarchy of the southern Slav provinces belonging to
+Austria-Hungary; that Austria, if she wished to remain a Great Power,
+could not avoid pressing the demands contained in the note, even, if
+necessary, by military measures; and that the question was one which
+concerned no Powers except Austria-Hungary and Servia.[28]
+
+Russia did not agree that the Austrian note was directed against Servia
+alone. On July 24 the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs told the
+British Ambassador at St. Petersburg that Austria's conduct was
+provocative and immoral; that some of her demands were impossible of
+acceptance; that Austria would never have taken such action unless
+Germany had first been consulted; that if Austria began military
+measures against Servia, Russia would probably mobilize. The Russian
+Minister hoped that England would proclaim its solidarity with France
+and Russia on the subject of the Austrian note; doubtless Servia could
+accept some of the Austrian demands.[29] To the Austro-Hungarian
+Government the Russian Minister sent a message, on the same day, July
+24, that the time-limit allowed to Servia for her reply was quite
+insufficient, if the Powers were to help in smoothing the situation; and
+he urged that Austria-Hungary should publish the proofs of the charges
+against Servia.[30] On July 25 Russia told England[31] that Servia would
+punish those proved to be guilty, but would not accept all the demands
+of Austria; that no independent state could do so. If Servia appealed to
+arbitration, as seemed possible, Russia was, she said, prepared to leave
+the arbitration in the hands of England, France, Germany, and Italy--the
+four Powers whom Sir Edward Grey had suggested as possible mediators.
+
+On the day on which Russia made this suggestion, July 25, the Servian
+Government replied to the Austrian note, conceding part of the Austrian
+demands, and announcing its readiness to accept, on the other points,
+the arbitration of the Hague Tribunal or of the Great Powers. The
+Austrian Government found the Servian note unsatisfactory, and
+criticized its details in an official memorandum.[32] The
+Austro-Hungarian Minister left Belgrade on July 25; on July 26 a part of
+the Austro-Hungarian army was mobilized; and on July 28 Austria-Hungary
+declared war on Servia.
+
+Sir Edward Grey had from the first declined to 'announce England's
+solidarity' with Russia and France on the Servian question. On and after
+July 26 he was taking active steps to bring about the mediation, between
+Austria-Hungary and Servia, of four Powers (Italy, Germany, France,
+England). To this mediation Russia had already agreed, July 25; and
+Italy and France were ready to co-operate with England.[33] Germany,
+however, made difficulties on the ground that anything like formal
+intervention would be impracticable, unless both Austria and Russia
+consented to it.[34] Russia had already (July 25) prepared the ukase
+ordering mobilization,[35] but had not yet issued it; on July 27 the
+Russian Foreign Minister announced his readiness to make the Servian
+question the subject of direct conversations with Vienna.[36] This offer
+was at first declined by the Austro-Hungarian Government, but
+subsequently accepted; and conversations were actually in progress
+between the representatives of the two Powers as late as August 1.[37]
+
+No doubt the hesitation of Austria was due to the fact that, on July 28,
+the Russian Government warned Germany of the mobilization of the
+southern military districts of Russia, to be publicly proclaimed on July
+29.[38] Austria replied to this intimation by offering assurances that
+she would respect the integrity and independence of Servia;[39] these
+assurances, considered inadequate by the Russian Government, seem to
+have been the subject of the last conversations between Russia and
+Austria-Hungary.
+
+Russia persisted that Germany was the real obstacle to a friendly
+settlement; and this conviction was not affected by the appeals for
+peace which the Kaiser telegraphed to the Tsar on July 28, July 29, and
+July 31.[40] On July 29 Germany told England that the Russian
+mobilization was alarming, and that France was also making military
+preparations;[41] at the same time Germany threatened to proclaim
+'imminent state of war' (_drohende Kriegsgefahr_) as a counter measure
+to the French preparations;[42] German military preparations, by July
+30, had in fact gone far beyond the preliminary stage which she thus
+indicated.[43] Germany had already warned England, France, and Russia
+that, if Russia mobilized, this would mean German mobilization against
+both France and Russia.[44] But on July 27, Russia had explained that
+her mobilization would in no sense be directed against Germany, and
+would only take place if Austrian forces crossed the Servian
+frontier.[45] On July 29, the day on which Russia actually mobilized the
+southern districts, Russia once more asked Germany to participate in the
+'quadruple conference' now proposed by England, for the purpose of
+mediating between Austria and Servia. This proposal was declined by the
+German Ambassador at St. Petersburg.[46] Germany in fact believed, or
+professed to believe, that the Russian mobilization, though not
+proclaimed, was already far advanced.[47]
+
+On July 30 Austria, although her conversations with Russia were still in
+progress, began the bombardment of Belgrade. The next day, July 31,
+Russia ordered general mobilization; on August 1 France and Germany each
+took the like step; Germany presented an ultimatum to Russia, demanding
+that Russian mobilization should cease, and another ultimatum to France
+asking what course she would take in the event of war between Germany
+and Russia.
+
+Before these decisive steps of July 30-August 1, and while Sir Edward
+Grey was still engaged in efforts of mediation, Germany made overtures
+to England, with the object of securing England's neutrality in the
+event of a war between Germany and France. On July 29 Germany offered,
+as the price of English neutrality, to give assurances that, if
+victorious, she would make no territorial acquisitions at the expense of
+France; but refused to give a similar assurance respecting French
+colonies, or to promise to respect Belgian neutrality.[48] These
+proposals were refused by England on July 30.[49] On August 1 the German
+Ambassador unofficially asked England to remain neutral on condition
+that Germany would not violate Belgian neutrality. Sir Edward Grey
+replied that England's hands were still free, and that he could not
+promise neutrality on that condition alone.[50]
+
+Meanwhile, on July 30, Sir Edward Grey was told by France that she would
+not remain neutral in a war between Germany and Russia.[51] On July 31
+the English Cabinet, being asked by France to declare definitely on her
+side, replied that England could give no pledge at present.[52] On the
+same day England asked France and Germany to engage to respect Belgian
+neutrality. France assented, Germany evaded giving a reply.[53] But, on
+August 2, German forces entered the neutral state of Luxemburg; and
+England promised to defend the French coasts and shipping if attacked by
+the German fleet in the Channel, or through the North Sea.[54] On August
+4 the King of the Belgians telegraphed to King George announcing that
+Germany had demanded passage for her troops through Belgian territory,
+and appealing to England for help.[55] On the same day, August 4,
+England sent an ultimatum to Germany asking for assurance, before
+midnight, that Germany would respect Belgian neutrality.[56] This demand
+was taken at Berlin as equivalent to a declaration of war by England
+against Germany.
+
+
+DIARY OF THE EVENTS LEADING TO THE WAR
+
+June 28. Assassination at Sarajevo of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand and
+the Duchess of Hohenberg.
+
+July 6. The Kaiser leaves Kiel for a cruise in Northern waters.
+
+July 9. Results of Austro-Hungarian investigation into the Servian crime
+laid before the Emperor.
+
+July 13, 14. Serious disclosures about condition of French army.
+
+July 13, 14, 15, 16. Heavy selling of Canadian Pacific Railway Shares,
+especially by Berlin operators.
+
+July 16. Count Tisza, the Hungarian Premier, speaking in the Hungarian
+Chamber, describes war as a sad _ultima ratio_, 'but every state and
+nation must be able and willing to make war if it wishes to exist as a
+state and a nation.'
+
+The _Times_ leading article 'Austria-Hungary and Servia' is commented on
+in Berlin as an 'English warning to Servia.'
+
+July 19. The King summons a conference to discuss the Home-Rule problem.
+
+July 21. The _Frankfurter Zeitung_ warns Austria-Hungary of the folly of
+its campaign against Servia.
+
+July 23. Thursday. Austria presents her Note to Servia giving her 48
+hours in which to accept.
+
+July 24. Friday. Russian Cabinet Council held. The Austro-Hungarian
+demands considered as an indirect challenge to Russia.--Strike at St.
+Petersburg.
+
+Failure of the conference on Home Rule.
+
+July 25. Saturday. Servian reply; considered unsatisfactory by
+Austria-Hungary, whose Minister and Legation-staff leave Belgrade.
+
+Russian Ambassador at Vienna instructed to request extension of
+time-limit allowed to Servia.
+
+Sir E. Grey suggests that the four other Powers should mediate at Vienna
+and St. Petersburg.--Serious riot in Dublin.
+
+July 26. Sunday. Sir E. Grey proposes that the French, Italian, and
+German Ambassadors should meet him in conference immediately for the
+purpose of discovering an issue which would prevent complications.
+
+Partial mobilization of Austro-Hungarian army ordered.
+
+Russian Foreign Minister warns German Ambassador that Russia cannot
+remain indifferent to the fate of Servia.
+
+Sir E. Goschen says the Kaiser is returning to-night.
+
+July 27. Monday. France and Italy accept proposal of a conference.
+German Secretary of State refuses the proposal of a 'conference.'
+
+Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs proposes direct conversation
+between Vienna and St. Petersburg.
+
+British Fleet kept assembled after manoeuvres.
+
+Sir E. Grey in the House of Commons makes a statement concerning the
+attitude of Great Britain.
+
+The _Times_ Berlin correspondent reports that the Kaiser returned this
+afternoon from Kiel to Potsdam.
+
+July 28. Tuesday. Austria-Hungary declares war on Servia.
+
+Russia says the key of the situation is to be found at Berlin.
+
+Austria declines any suggestion of negotiations on basis of the Servian
+reply.
+
+The Kaiser telegraphs to the Tsar.
+
+July 29. Wednesday. Russian mobilization in the four military districts
+of Odessa, Kiev, Moscow, and Kazan.
+
+Germany offers, in return for British neutrality, to promise territorial
+integrity of France, but will not extend the same assurance for French
+colonies.
+
+Sir E. Grey warns the German Ambassador that we should not necessarily
+stand aside, if all the efforts to maintain the peace failed.
+
+Austria at last realizes that Russia will not remain indifferent.
+
+The Tsar telegraphs to the Kaiser; the latter replies.
+
+July 30. Thursday. Bombardment of Belgrade by Austro-Hungarian forces.
+
+The Prime Minister speaks in the House of Commons on the gravity of the
+situation, and postpones discussion of the Home Rule Amending Bill.
+
+The Tsar telegraphs to the Kaiser.
+
+July 31. Friday. General Russian mobilization ordered.
+
+Sir E. Grey asks France and Germany whether they will respect neutrality
+of Belgium.
+
+France promises to respect Belgian neutrality; Germany is doubtful
+whether any answer will be returned to this request.
+
+Austria declares its readiness to discuss the substance of its ultimatum
+to Servia.
+
+Fresh telegrams pass between the Kaiser and the Tsar.
+
+Germany presents ultimatum to Russia demanding that her mobilization
+should cease within 12 hours.
+
+Germany presents an ultimatum to France asking her to define her
+attitude in case of a Russo-German war.
+
+English bankers confer with the Government about the financial
+situation.
+
+Aug. 1. Saturday. Sir E. Grey protests against detention of English
+ships at Hamburg.
+
+Orders issued for general mobilization of French army.
+
+Orders issued for general mobilization of German army.
+
+Aug. 2. Sunday. Germans invade Luxemburg.
+
+Sir E. Grey gives France an assurance that the English fleet will
+protect the North Coast of France against the German fleet.
+
+Germans enter French territory near Cirey.
+
+Aug. 3. Monday. Italy declares itself neutral, as the other members of
+the Triple Alliance are not engaged in a defensive war.
+
+Germany presents an ultimatum to Belgium.
+
+Sir E. Grey makes an important speech in the House of Commons.
+
+Aug. 4. Tuesday. Germans enter Belgian territory.
+
+Britain presents an ultimatum to Germany demanding an answer by
+midnight.
+
+The Prime Minister makes a speech in the House of Commons, practically
+announcing war against Germany and explaining the British position.
+
+Aug. 6. Austria-Hungary declares war on Russia.
+
+Aug. 11. The French Ambassador at Vienna demands his passport.
+
+Aug. 12. Great Britain declares war on Austria-Hungary.
+
+Notes:
+
+[Footnote 25: Extracts are printed in the German version of the German
+White Book (pp. 28-31) from an Austrian official publication of July 27.
+We print the extracts (the original not being accessible in this
+country) in Appendix IV.]
+
+[Footnote 26: Full text _infra_ in Appendix I (German White Book, pp.
+18-23); more correctly in _Correspondence respecting the European
+Crisis_, No. 4, Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff, July 24; but the
+differences between the two versions are immaterial for our present
+purpose.]
+
+[Footnote 27: See the communication to England in _Correspondence_, No.
+4.]
+
+[Footnote 28: _Correspondence_, No. 9, Note communicated by the German
+Ambassador, July 24.]
+
+[Footnote 29: _Correspondence_, No. 6, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey,
+July 24.]
+
+[Footnote 30: _Correspondence_, No. 13, Note communicated by Russian
+Ambassador, July 25.]
+
+[Footnote 31: _Correspondence_, No. 17, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey,
+July 25.]
+
+[Footnote 32: For text of Servian note see _infra_ Appendix I (German
+White Book, pp. 23-32). The Austrian comments also are given there.]
+
+[Footnote 33: _Correspondence_, No. 42, Sir F. Bertie to Sir E. Grey,
+July 27; _ibid_. No. 49, Sir E. Grey to Sir R. Rodd, July 27.]
+
+[Footnote 34: _Correspondence_, No. 43. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey,
+July 27.]
+
+[Footnote 35: German White Book, p. 46 (_infra_ in Appendix I). The Tsar
+to His Majesty, July 30.]
+
+[Footnote 36: _Correspondence_, No. 45. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey.]
+
+[Footnote 37: Austria declined conversations on July 28
+(_Correspondence_, No. 93); but for conversations of July 31 see
+_Correspondence_, No. III; of August I, see Appendix V.]
+
+[Footnote 38: _Correspondence_, No. 70 (I). M. Sazonof to Russian
+Ambassador at Berlin, July 28.]
+
+[Footnote 39: _Correspondence_, No. 72. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey,
+July 28.]
+
+[Footnote 40: German White Book, pp. 43, 45 (in Appendix I, _infra_).]
+
+[Footnote 41: _Correspondence_, No. 76. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey,
+July 29.]
+
+[Footnote 42: German White Book, p. 42, Exhibit 17 (_infra_, Appendix
+I).]
+
+[Footnote 43: _Correspondence_, No. 105 (Enclosure 3), July 30.]
+
+[Footnote 44: German White Book, p. 7; the date of the warning seems to
+be July 27.]
+
+[Footnote 45: German White Book, p. 40, Exhibit II.]
+
+[Footnote 46: _Ibid_. p. 9.]
+
+[Footnote 47: _Ibid_. p. 10.]
+
+[Footnote 48: _Correspondence_, No. 85. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey,
+July 29.]
+
+[Footnote 49: _Ibid_. No. 101. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, July 30.]
+
+[Footnote 50: _Correspondence_, No. 123. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen,
+Aug. 1.]
+
+[Footnote 51: _Ibid_. No. 105. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, July 30.]
+
+[Footnote 52: _Ibid_. No. 119. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, July 31.]
+
+[Footnote 53: _Ibid_. No. 114, 120, 122.]
+
+[Footnote 54: _Ibid_. No. 148. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, Aug. 2.]
+
+[Footnote 55: _Ibid_. No. 153. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, Aug. 4.]
+
+[Footnote 56: _Ibid_. No. 159. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, Aug. 4]
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER V
+
+
+NEGOTIATORS AND NEGOTIATIONS
+
+For purposes of reference the following list of _dramatis personae_ may
+be useful:--
+
+GREAT BRITAIN: King George V, _succ_. 1910.
+_Foreign Secretary_: Sir Edward Grey.
+_Ambassadors from France_: M. Paul Cambon.
+  _Russia_: Count Benckendorff.
+  _Germany_: Prince Lichnowsky.
+  _Austria_: Count Albert Mensdorff-Pouilly-Dietrichstein.
+  _Belgium_: Count A. de Lalaing (_Minister_).
+
+RUSSIA: Emperor Nicholas II, _succ_. 1894.
+_Foreign Secretary_: M. Sazonof.
+_Ambassadors from Great Britain_: Sir George Buchanan.
+  _France_: M. Paléologue.
+  _Germany_: Count Pourtalès.
+  _Austria_: Friedrich Count Szápáry.
+
+FRANCE: Raymond Poincaré, _President, elected_ 1913.
+_Premier_: M. Viviani.
+_Acting Foreign Secretary_: M. Doumergue.
+_Ambassadors from Great Britain_: Sir Francis Bertie.
+  _Russia_: M. Isvolsky.
+    M. Sevastopoulo (_Charge d'Affaires_).
+  _Germany_: Baron von Schoen.
+  _Austria_: Count Scézsen.
+
+GERMANY: Emperor William II, _succ_. 1888.
+_Imperial Chancellor_: Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg.
+_Foreign Secretary_: Herr von Jagow.
+_Ambassadors from Great Britain_: Sir Edward Goschen.
+    Sir Horace Rumbold (_Councillor_).
+  _Russia:_ M. Swerbeiev.
+    M. Bronewsky (_Charge d'Affaires_).
+  _France:_ M. Jules Cambon.
+  _Austria_: Count Ladislaus Szögyény-Marich.
+
+AUSTRIA-HUNGARY: Emperor Francis Joseph, _succ_. 1848.
+_Foreign Secretary_: Count Berchtold.
+_Ambassadors from Great Britain_: Sir Maurice de Bunsen.
+  _Russia_: M. Schebesco.
+    M. Kondachev (_Charge d'Affaires_).
+  _France_: M. Crozier.
+  _Germany_: Herr von Tschirscky-und-Bögendorff.
+
+ITALY: King Victor Emmanuel III, _succ_. 1900.
+_Foreign Secretary_: Marquis di San Giuliano.
+_Ambassador from Great Britain_: Sir Rennell Rodd.
+
+BELGIUM: King Albert, _succ_. 1909.
+_Minister of Great Britain_: Sir Francis Villiers.
+
+SERVIA: King Peter, _succ_. 1903.
+_Minister of Great Britain_: C.L. des Graz.
+  D.M. Crackanthorpe (_First Secretary_).
+_Russian Chargé d'Affaires_: M. Strandtmann.
+
+
+I
+
+_Germany's attitude to Austria and Russia_.
+
+From the very beginning of the conversations between the Powers on the
+assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand at Serajevo, and on the
+Austrian note to Servia, the German Government took up the attitude that
+it was a 'matter for settlement between Servia and Austria alone.'[57]
+Subsequently in their White Book they endeavoured to show that the
+Servian agitation was part of Russian propagandism.[58] In the
+negotiations, the cardinal point of their observations is that Russia is
+not to interfere in this matter, although M. Paul Cambon pointed out
+that 'Russia would be compelled by her public opinion to take action as
+soon as Austria attacked Servia'.[59]
+
+After the presentation of the Austrian note to Servia, Germany continued
+to maintain the position that the crisis could be localized, and to
+reject Sir Horace Rumbold's suggestion that 'in taking military action
+in Servia, Austria would dangerously excite public opinion in
+Russia'.[60]
+
+At Vienna Sir Maurice de Bunsen, the British Ambassador, was very
+frankly told by the German Ambassador that Germany was shielding Austria
+in the Servian business:--
+
+    'As for Germany, she knew very well what she was about in backing up
+    Austria-Hungary in this matter.... Servian concessions were all a
+    sham. Servia proved that she well knew that they were insufficient
+    to satisfy the legitimate demands of Austria-Hungary by the fact
+    that before making her offer she had ordered mobilization and
+    retirement of Government from Belgrade.'[61]
+
+M. Sazonof, the Russian Foreign Minister, seems to have divined this
+policy of Germany pretty soon:--
+
+    'My interviews with the German Ambassador confirm my impression that
+    Germany is, if anything, in favour of the uncompromising attitude
+    adopted by Austria. The Berlin Cabinet, who could have prevented the
+    whole of this crisis developing, appear to be exercising no
+    influence upon their ally.... There is no doubt that the key of the
+    situation is to be found at Berlin.'[62]
+
+When at the beginning of August the crisis had led to war, it is
+interesting to observe the opinions expressed by high and well-informed
+officials about German diplomacy. M. Sazonof summed up his opinion
+thus:--
+
+    'The policy of Austria had throughout been tortuous and immoral, and
+    she thought she could treat Russia with defiance, secure in the
+    support of her German ally. Similarly the policy of Germany had been
+    an equivocal and double-faced policy, and it mattered little whether
+    the German Government knew or did not know the terms of the Austrian
+    ultimatum; what mattered was that her intervention with the Austrian
+    Government had been postponed until the moment had passed when its
+    influence would have been felt. Germany was unfortunate in her
+    representatives in Vienna and St. Petersburg; the former was a
+    violent Russophobe who had urged Austria on, the latter had reported
+    to his Government that Russia would never go to war.'[63]
+
+And Sir Maurice de Bunsen on the same day wrote that he agreed with his
+Russian colleague that
+
+    'the German Ambassador at Vienna desired war from the first, and his
+    strong personal bias probably coloured his action here. The Russian
+    Ambassador is convinced that the German Government also desired war
+    from the first.'[64]
+
+Sir Maurice does not actually endorse this opinion concerning the
+attitude of the German Government, but there can be no doubt that this
+general attitude was most pernicious to the cause of European peace, and
+that if the German Government had desired war they could scarcely have
+acted more efficiently towards that end. No diplomatic pressure was put
+upon Vienna, which under the aegis of Berlin was allowed to go to any
+lengths against Servia. Over and over again the German diplomats were
+told that Russia was deeply interested in Servia, but they would not
+listen. As late as July 28th the German Chancellor himself refused 'to
+discuss the Servian note', adding that 'Austria's standpoint, and in
+this he agreed, was that her quarrel with Servia was a purely Austrian
+concern with which Russia had nothing to do'.[65] Next day the German
+Ambassador at Vienna was continuing 'to feign surprise that Servian
+affairs could be of such interest to Russia'.[66] But in their White
+Book, in order to blacken the character of Russia, the Germans remark
+that they 'were perfectly aware that a possible warlike attitude of
+Austria-Hungary against Servia might bring Russia into the field'.[67]
+Both stories cannot be true: the German Government have, not for the
+last time in the history of these negotiations, to choose between
+ineptitude and guilt; the ineptitude of not recognizing an obvious fact,
+and the guilt of deliberately allowing Austria to act in such a way that
+Russia was bound to come into the field.
+
+When Austria presented her ultimatum, Sir Edward Grey did all he could
+to obtain the good offices of Russia for a conciliatory reply by Servia,
+and to persuade the German Government to use influence with Austria so
+that she should take a friendly attitude to Servia. On the day of the
+presentation of the Austrian note he proposed to Prince Lichnowsky, the
+German Ambassador, the co-operation of the four Powers, Germany, France,
+Italy, and Great Britain, in favour of moderation at Vienna and St.
+Petersburg, and when the Austrians rejected the Servian reply he took
+the important step of proposing that the French, Italian, and German
+Ambassadors should meet him in conference immediately 'for the purpose
+of discovering an issue which would prevent complications'.[68] The
+proposal was accepted with alacrity by the French and Italian
+Governments. The German Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Herr von Jagow,
+on the other hand, was unable or unwilling to understand the proposal,
+and Sir Edward Goschen seems to have been unable to impress its real
+character upon the Government of Berlin. For Herr von Jagow, on receipt
+of the proposal, informed the British Ambassador, Sir Edward Goschen,
+that the conference suggested
+
+    'would practically amount to a court of arbitration and could not in
+    his opinion be called together except at the request of Austria and
+    Russia. He could not therefore fall in with it.'
+
+Sir Edward Goschen not unnaturally pointed out that
+
+    'the idea had nothing to do with arbitration, but meant that
+    representatives of the four nations not directly interested should
+    discuss and suggest means for avoiding a dangerous situation'.[69]
+
+Herr von Jagow spoke in the same sense to the French and Italian
+Ambassadors, who discussed the matter with their British colleague. Some
+doubt seems to have arisen in their minds as to the sincerity of the
+German Secretary of State's loudly expressed desire for peace; but,
+giving him the benefit of the doubt, they concluded that the objection
+must be to the 'form of the proposal'. 'Perhaps', added Sir Edward
+Goschen, 'he himself could be induced to suggest lines on which he would
+find it possible to work with us.'[70] The next day the same idea was
+pressed by Sir Edward Grey upon Prince Lichnowsky:--
+
+    'The whole idea of mediation or mediating influence was ready to be
+    put into operation by any method that Germany could suggest if mine
+    was not acceptable.'[71]
+
+But owing to German dilatoriness in this matter, events had by then gone
+so far that the very gravest questions had arisen for this country.
+
+With the refusal of the German Government to propose a form of mediation
+acceptable to themselves before graver events had occurred, the first
+period of the negotiation comes to an end. The responsibility of
+rejecting a conference, which, by staving off the evil day, might have
+preserved the peace of Europe, falls solely on the shoulders of Germany.
+The reasons advanced by Herr von Jagow were erroneous, and though Dr.
+von Bethmann-Hollweg, the Imperial Chancellor, was more conciliatory and
+sympathetic, it may be noted that the German White Book[72] continues to
+misrepresent Sir Edward Grey's proposal as a conference on the
+particular question of the Austro-Servian dispute, and not on the
+general situation of Europe.
+
+In the period that follows come spasmodic attempts at negotiation by
+direct conversations between the parties concerned, with no advantage,
+but rather with the growth of mutual suspicion. Down to August 1st both
+Sir Edward Grey and M. Sazonof were busy trying to find some formula
+which might be accepted as a basis for postponing hostilities between
+the Great Powers. And here it may be well to point out that Prince
+Lichnowsky seems to have been left in the dark by his chiefs. On July
+24th, the day after the Austrian note was presented, he was so little
+acquainted with the true state of affairs, that speaking privately he
+told Sir Edward Grey 'that a reply favourable on some points must be
+sent at once by Servia, so that an excuse against immediate action might
+be afforded to Austria'.[73] And in the matter of the conference, on the
+very day that Herr von Jagow was making his excuses against entering the
+proposed conference, Prince Lichnowsky informed Sir Edward Grey, that
+the German Government accepted in principle mediation between Austria
+and Russia by the four Powers, reserving, of course, their right as an
+ally to help Austria if attacked.[74] The mutual incompatibility of the
+two voices of Germany was pointed out from Rome, where the Marquis di
+San Giuliano, the Italian Foreign Minister, attempted a reconciliation
+between them, on information received from Berlin, that 'the difficulty
+was rather the "conference" than the principle'.[75] But we may ask
+whether Herr von Jagow's reply to Sir Edward Goschen does not really
+show that the whole principle of a conference was objected to, seeing
+that he said that such a 'conference was not practicable', and that 'it
+would be best to await the outcome of the exchange of views between the
+Austrian and Russian Governments'.[76] But, if it was not the principle
+that was objected to, but only the form, where are we? We can do nothing
+else but assume that the German Government objected to the terms
+employed by Sir Edward Grey, and that for the sake of a mere quibble
+they wasted time until other events made the catastrophe inevitable.
+Impartiality will have to judge whether such action was deliberate or
+not; whether in this case also it is crime or folly which has to be laid
+at the door of the German Government.
+
+The proposed conference having been rejected by Germany, an attempt was
+then made by several Powers to invite Austria to suspend military
+action. Although Count Mensdorff, the Austrian Ambassador in London, had
+made on July 25th a distinction between military preparations and
+military operations, and had urged that his Government had only the
+former then in view, it was reported two days later from Rome that there
+were great doubts 'whether Germany would be willing to invite Austria to
+suspend military action pending the conference'. Even if she had been
+willing to do so, it is very doubtful whether, in view of the Austrian
+declaration of war against Servia on July 28th, and the simultaneous
+Austrian decree for general mobilization, the position of Europe could
+have been improved, for on July 29th that declaration was followed by
+news of the Russian mobilization of the southern districts of Odessa,
+Kiev, Moscow, and Kazan.[77]
+
+Now the German Secretary of State had argued that 'if Russia mobilized
+against Germany, latter would have to follow suit'. On being asked what
+he meant by 'mobilizing against Germany', he said that
+
+    'if Russia mobilized in the South, Germany would not mobilize, but
+    if she mobilized in the north, Germany would have to do so too, and
+    Russian system of mobilization was so complicated that it might be
+    difficult exactly to locate her mobilization. Germany would
+    therefore have to be very careful not to be taken by surprise.'[78]
+
+This was on July 27th, and it cannot be said to have been unreasonable.
+But when on July 29th Russia mobilized the southern districts no grounds
+for German mobilization had yet been provided. No secret was made about
+this mobilization by the Russian Ambassador at Berlin,[79] but it is
+perhaps as well to point out here the remark made by Sir George
+Buchanan, the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, about the language
+used by his German colleague concerning the mobilization of the four
+southern districts: 'He accused the Russian Government of endangering
+the peace of Europe by their mobilization, and said, when I referred to
+all that had recently been done by Austria, that he could not discuss
+such matters.'[80] It would perhaps be rash to assume that the German
+Ambassador, Count Pourtalès, used such language to his home Government,
+for there is no evidence of it in the German White Book. What dispatches
+appear there from the German Embassy at St. Petersburg are refreshingly
+honest. The military attaché says, 'I deem it certain that mobilization
+has been ordered for Kiev and Odessa'. He adds: 'it is doubtful at
+Warsaw and Moscow, and improbable elsewhere'.[81]
+
+There was therefore, according to the evidence produced by the Germans
+themselves, no mobilization 'against Germany'. The only thing that looks
+at all like hostile action is contained in the news sent by the Imperial
+German Consul at Kovno on July 27th, that a 'state of war'
+(_Kriegszustand_) had been proclaimed in that district. But this is a
+very different thing from mobilization; it was almost bound to follow in
+the northern provinces of the Empire as the result of mobilization
+elsewhere. At any rate the Consul at Kovno announced it on July 27th
+before any Russian mobilization at all had taken place, and the fact
+that Germany did not instantly mobilize shows that at the end of July
+that Government did not consider _Kriegszustand_ in Kovno to be
+equivalent to 'mobilization against Germany'.
+
+Opinion in Berlin seems to have been that Russia would not make war.
+Perhaps there was no real fear that Russia would take an aggressive
+attitude, for many people believed that 'Russia neither wanted, nor was
+in a position to make war'.[82] This attitude of mind was known and
+deplored in Rome, where the Marquis di San Giuliano said 'there seemed
+to be a difficulty in making Germany believe that Russia was in
+earnest'.[83] Such an opinion seems to have been shared by Count
+Pourtalês, who on July 29 reported that the German Government were
+willing to guarantee that Servian integrity would be respected by
+Austria. This was held to be insufficient, as Servia might thus become
+an Austrian vassal, and there would be a revolution in Russia if she
+were to tolerate such a state of affairs. The next day the Russian
+Minister for Foreign Affairs told the British and French Ambassadors
+'that absolute proof was in the possession of the Russian Government
+that Germany was making military and naval preparations against
+Russia--more particularly in the direction of the Gulf of Finland'.[84]
+
+After this, is it difficult to see how German statesmen regarded the
+situation? Russia, in their eyes, was playing a game of bluff, and
+strong measures against her were in the interest of Germany. But, though
+under no illusion as to German preparations, M. Sazonof offered on July
+30 to stop all military preparations if Austria 'would eliminate from
+her ultimatum to Servia points which violate the principle of the
+sovereignty of Servia'.[85] 'Preparations for general mobilization will
+be proceeded with if this proposal is rejected by Austria,' wrote Sir
+George Buchanan.[86] The next day he reported to Sir Edward Grey that
+all attempts to obtain the consent of Austria to mediation had failed,
+and that she was moving troops against Russia as well as against
+Servia.[87]
+
+Face to face therefore with war against another Power, Russia ordered a
+general mobilization.[88] This was answered on the same day by a
+proclamation of _Kriegsgefahr_ at Berlin, 'as it can only be against
+Germany that Russian general mobilization is directed'.[89]
+
+Thus on Friday, July 31st, the situation had come to be this, that
+Russia, feeling herself threatened by the military preparations of
+Austria and Germany, decided to issue orders for a general
+mobilization.[90] Meanwhile Sir Edward Grey still clung to the hope that
+mediation with a view to safeguarding Austrian interests as against
+Servia might yet be accepted.[91] But his efforts were useless, for
+Germany had launched an ultimatum (July 31) to Russia, demanding
+demobilization. As Sir Edward Goschen pointed out, the demand was made
+'even more difficult for Russia to accept by asking them to demobilize
+in the south as well'.[92] The only explanation actually vouchsafed was
+that this had been asked to prevent Russia pleading that all her
+mobilization was only directed against Austria. Such a quibble, when
+such interests are at stake, seems to call for severe comment.
+
+War between the three empires seemed now inevitable, for though the
+Emperor of Russia and the German Emperor had exchanged telegrams each
+imploring the other to find a way out of the difficulty, and each saying
+that matters had gone so far that neither could grant the other's
+demands,[93] the officials at Berlin were now taking up the position
+that 'Russia's mobilization had spoilt everything'.[94] This attitude is
+as inexplicable as it proved disastrous. For it appears that on July 31
+Austria and Russia were ready to resume conversations. The Austrians,
+apparently alarmed at the prospect of a general war, were ready to
+discuss the substance of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia, and Russia
+announced that under certain conditions 'she would undertake to preserve
+her waiting attitude'.[95] Having issued her ultimatum to Russia,
+Germany naturally mobilized, but what kind of diplomacy is this in
+which, with the principals both ready to negotiate, a third party issues
+an ultimatum couched in such terms that a proud country can give but one
+answer?
+
+The sequence of events seems to be as follows. Austria mobilized against
+Servia. Russia, rightly or wrongly, took this as a threat to herself,
+and mobilized all her southern forces against Austria. Then Germany
+threatened to mobilize unless Russia ceased her military
+preparations--an inexcusable step, which increased Russia's
+apprehensions of a general war, and made a general Russian mobilization
+inevitable.[96] If Russia was the first to mobilize, she took this step
+in consequence of German threats. We repeat that in spite of the three
+empires taking this action, discussion was still possible between Russia
+and Austria,[97] and might have had good results. In fact, the situation
+was not irretrievable, if Germany had not rendered it so by issuing her
+ultimatum to Russia. Once again we may ask, was this crime or folly?
+
+
+II
+
+_Germany's attitude to France._
+
+We must now turn our eyes to the West of Europe, and observe the
+diplomacy of Germany with regard to France and Great Britain. On the
+27th of July we are told that the German Government received 'the first
+intimation concerning the preparatory measures taken by France: the 14th
+Corps discontinued the manoeuvres and returned to its garrison'.[98]
+Will it be believed that, except for the assertion 'of rapidly
+progressing preparations of France, both on water and on land',[99] this
+is the only shred of evidence that the Germans have produced to prove
+the aggressive intentions of France? And it may be worth while to point
+out that on July 29, when the German White Book says that Berlin heard
+of the 'rapidly progressing preparations of France', the French
+Ambassador at Berlin informed the Secretary of State that 'they had done
+nothing more than the German Government had done, namely, recalled the
+officers on leave'.[100]
+
+The very next day the French Government had 'reliable information that
+the German troops are concentrated round Thionville and Metz ready for
+war',[101] and before July 30th German patrols twice penetrated into
+French territory.[102] With great forbearance the French Government
+withdrew its troops ten kilometres from the frontier; and, although
+German reservists had been recalled from abroad 'by tens of thousands',
+the French Government had not called out a single reservist. Well might
+the French Minister for Foreign Affairs say 'Germany has done it'.[103]
+
+Having thus invaded France before July 30th, the German Government
+presented an ultimatum (July 31) demanding what were the French
+intentions, and on August 1st the French Government replied that it
+would consult its own interests.[104]
+
+
+III
+
+_The Question of British Neutrality_.
+
+Even then, nothing had happened to bring this country into the quarrel.
+If Germany were making war primarily on Russia, and France were only
+involved as the auxiliary of Russia, Germany would have acted rapidly
+against Russia, and would have stood on the defensive against France;
+and England would not have been dragged into war.[105] The question of
+British neutrality first appears in the British White Book on July 25th,
+when Sir Edward Grey, in a note to Sir George Buchanan, said: 'if war
+does take place, the development of other issues may draw us into it,
+and I am therefore anxious to prevent it'.[106] Two days later he wrote
+again:--
+
+    'I have been told by the Russian Ambassador that in German and
+    Austrian circles impression prevails that in any event we would
+    stand aside ... This impression ought, as I have pointed out, to be
+    dispelled by the orders we have given to the First Fleet ... not to
+    disperse for manoeuvre leave. But ... my reference to it must not be
+    taken to mean that anything more than diplomatic action was
+    promised.'[107]
+
+On the 29th the question of our neutrality was seriously discussed at
+both the Courts of St. James and Berlin independently. Sir Edward Grey,
+in an interview with Prince Lichnowsky, told him 'he did not wish the
+Ambassador to be misled ... into thinking we should stand aside'.
+Developing this, Sir Edward Grey solemnly warned the German Ambassador
+that
+
+    'there was no question of our intervening if Germany was not
+    involved, or even if France was not involved, but if the issue did
+    become such that we thought British interests required us to
+    intervene, we must intervene at once, and the decision would have to
+    be very rapid.... But ... I did not wish to be open to any reproach
+    from him that the friendly tone of all our conversations had misled
+    him or his Government into supposing that we should not take
+    action.'[108]
+
+Before the news of this had reached Berlin the Imperial Chancellor had
+made his notorious 'bid for British neutrality' on July 29:--
+
+    'He said it was clear, so far as he was able to judge the main
+    principle which governed British policy, that Great Britain would
+    never stand by and allow France to be crushed in any conflict there
+    might be. That, however, was not the object at which Germany aimed.
+    Provided that neutrality of Great Britain were certain, every
+    assurance would be given to the British Government that the Imperial
+    Government aimed at no territorial acquisitions at the expense of
+    France, should they prove victorious in any war that might ensue.
+
+    'I questioned his Excellency about the French colonies, and he said
+    he was unable to give a similar undertaking in that respect. As
+    regards Holland ... so long as Germany's adversaries respected the
+    integrity and neutrality of the Netherlands, Germany was ready to
+    give His Majesty's Government an assurance that she would do
+    likewise. It depended on the action of France what operations
+    Germany might be forced to enter upon in Belgium, but when the war
+    was over, Belgian integrity would be respected if she had not sided
+    against Germany.'[109]
+
+This request was at once repudiated (July 30) by the British
+Government:--
+
+    'His Majesty's Government cannot for one moment entertain the
+    Chancellor's proposal that they should bind themselves to neutrality
+    on such terms.
+
+    'What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while French
+    colonies are taken and France is beaten so long as Germany does not
+    take French territory as distinct from the colonies.
+
+    'From the material point of view the proposal is unacceptable, for
+    France, without further territory in Europe being taken from her,
+    could be so crushed as to lose her position as a Great Power and
+    become subordinate to German policy.
+
+    'Altogether apart from that, it would be a disgrace for us to make
+    this bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace from
+    which the good name of this country would never recover.
+
+    'The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain away whatever
+    obligation or interest we have as regards the neutrality of Belgium.
+    We could not entertain that bargain either.[110]
+
+He continued by saying that Great Britain must keep her hands absolutely
+free and hinted at some scheme for preventing anti-German aggression by
+the Powers of the Triple _Entente_:--
+
+    'If the peace of Europe can be preserved, and the present crisis
+    safely passed, my own endeavour will be to promote some arrangement
+    to which Germany could be a party, by which she could be assured
+    that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her or
+    her allies by France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or separately
+    ... The idea has hitherto been too Utopian to form the subject of
+    definite proposals, but if this crisis ... be safely passed, I am
+    hopeful that the relief and reaction which will follow will make
+    possible some more definite rapprochement between the Powers than
+    has been possible hitherto.'
+
+Thus two points were made clear: we were seriously concerned that France
+should not be crushed, and that the neutrality of Belgium should not be
+violated. It is interesting to note how this extremely serious warning
+was received by Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg:--'His Excellency was so taken
+up with the news of the Russian measures along the frontier ... that he
+received your communication without a comment.'[111]
+
+But the text of the reply was left with him, so that he could scarcely
+complain that no warning had been given to him.
+
+With the data at our disposal, it is not possible to make any deduction
+as to the effect which this warning had upon Berlin; but it may be
+remarked that at Rome that day, the Marquis di San Giuliano told Sir
+Rennell Rodd that he had
+
+    'good reason to believe that Germany was now disposed to give more
+    conciliatory advice to Austria, as she seemed convinced that we
+    should act with France and Russia, and was most anxious to avoid
+    issue with us.'[112]
+
+As this telegraphic dispatch was not received till the next day, it is
+not impossible that the Italian Minister gave this information to Sir
+Rennell Rodd late in the day, after having received news from Berlin
+sent under the impression made by Sir Edward Grey's warning.
+
+Such an impression, if it ever existed, must have been of short
+duration, for when the British Government demanded both of France and
+Germany whether they were 'prepared to engage to respect neutrality of
+Belgium so long as no other Power violates it',[113] the French gave an
+unequivocal promise the same day,[114] while the German answer is a
+striking contrast:--
+
+    'I have seen Secretary of State, who informs me that he must consult
+    the Emperor and the Chancellor before he can possibly answer. I
+    gathered from what he said that he thought any reply they might give
+    could not but disclose a certain amount of their plan of campaign in
+    the event of war ensuing, and he was therefore very doubtful whether
+    they would return any answer at all. His Excellency, nevertheless,
+    took note of your request.
+
+    'It appears from what he said that German Government considers that
+    certain hostile acts have already been committed in Belgium. As an
+    instance of this, he alleged that a consignment of corn for Germany
+    had been placed under an embargo already.'[115]
+
+It was now clear that a violation of Belgian neutrality was a
+contingency that would have to be faced, and Prince Lichnowsky was
+warned the next day that 'the neutrality of Belgium affected feeling in
+this country', and he was asked to obtain an assurance from the German
+Government similar to that given by France:--
+
+    'If there were a violation of the neutrality of Belgium by one
+    combatant, while the other respected it, it would be extremely
+    difficult to restrain public feeling in this country.'[116]
+
+The Ambassador then, on his own personal responsibility and without
+authority from his Government, tried to exact a promise that Great
+Britain would remain neutral 'if Germany gave a promise not to violate
+Belgian neutrality', but Sir Edward Grey was bound to refuse such an
+offer, seeing that it left out of account all question of an attack on
+France and her colonies, about which it had been stated already that
+there could be no bargaining. Even the guarantee of the integrity of
+France and her colonies was suggested, but again Sir Edward Grey was
+bound to refuse, for the reasons he gave to Sir Edward Goschen in
+rejecting what is now known as Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg's 'infamous
+proposal', namely, that France without actually losing territory might
+be so crushed as to lose her position as a Great Power, and become
+subordinate to German policy. And if there should be still any doubt
+about Sir Edward Grey's policy at this moment, we would refer to his
+statement in the House of Commons on August 27.[117] The important
+points are that the offers of August 1 were made on the sole
+responsibility of Prince Lichnowsky, and without authority from his
+Government; that the Cabinet on August 2 carefully discussed the
+conditions on which we might remain neutral, and that, on August 3, so
+far was the German Ambassador from guaranteeing the neutrality of
+Belgium that he actually had to ask Sir Edward Grey 'not to make the
+neutrality of Belgium one of our conditions'. Whatever Prince Lichnowsky
+may have said privately on August 1, the one fact certain is that two
+days later the German Government were making no concessions on that
+point; on the contrary they were asking us to withdraw from a position
+we had taken up on July 30, four days before.
+
+One more effort to preserve peace in Western Europe seems to have been
+made by Sir Edward Grey. On the telephone he asked Prince Lichnowsky
+whether, if France remained neutral, Germany would promise not to attack
+her. The impression seems to have prevailed in Berlin that this was an
+offer to guarantee French neutrality by the force of British arms, and
+the German Emperor in his telegram to the King gave evidence of the
+relief His Imperial Majesty felt at the prospect that the good relations
+between the two countries would be maintained. Unfortunately for such
+hopes, France had never been consulted in the matter, nor was there ever
+any idea of coercing France into neutrality, and even the original
+proposal had to be abandoned on consideration as unpractical.[118]
+
+Events now marched rapidly. While the Cabinet in London were still
+discussing whether a violation of Belgian neutrality would be an
+occasion for war, the news came of the violation of that of Luxemburg.
+Sir Edward Grey informed M. Cambon[119] that Lord Stanley and Lord
+Clarendon in 1867 had agreed to a 'collective guarantee' by which it was
+not intended that every Power was bound single-handed to fight any
+Government which violated Luxemburg. Although this gross disregard by
+the Germans of their solemn pledge did not entail the same consequences
+as the subsequent violation of Belgian neutrality, it is equally
+reprehensible from the point of view of international law, and the more
+cowardly in proportion as this state is weaker than Belgium. Against
+this intrusion Luxemburg protested, but, unlike Belgium, she did not
+appeal to the Powers.[120]
+
+Two days later, August 4th, the King of the Belgians appealed to the
+King for 'diplomatic intervention to safeguard the integrity of
+Belgium'.[121] The German Government had issued an ultimatum to the
+Belgian, asking for
+
+    'a free passage through Belgian territory, and promising to maintain
+    the independence and integrity of the kingdom and its possessions at
+    the conclusion of peace, threatening in case of refusal to treat
+    Belgium as an enemy. An answer was requested within twelve
+    hours'.[122]
+
+Sir Edward Grey instructed the British Ambassador to protest against
+this violation of a treaty to which Germany in common with ourselves was
+a party, and to ask an assurance that the demand made upon Belgium would
+not be proceeded with. At the same time the Belgian Government was told
+to resist German aggression by all the means in its power, as Great
+Britain was prepared to join France and Russia to maintain the
+independence and integrity of Belgium.[123] On receipt of the protest of
+Sir Edward Grey, it would seem that Herr von Jagow made one more
+desperate effort to bid for British neutrality: 'Germany will, under no
+pretence whatever, annex Belgian territory': to pass through Belgium was
+necessary because the 'German army could not be exposed to French attack
+across Belgium, which was planned according to absolutely unimpeachable
+information'. It was for Germany 'a question of life and death to
+prevent French advance'.[124] But matters had gone too far: that day
+(August 4) the Germans violated Belgian territory at Gemmenich, and
+thereupon the British demand to Germany to respect Belgian neutrality,
+issued earlier in the day, was converted into an ultimatum:--
+
+    'We hear that Germany has addressed note to Belgian Minister for
+    Foreign Affairs stating that German Government will be compelled to
+    carry out, if necessary by force of arms, the measures considered
+    indispensable.
+
+    'We are also informed that Belgian territory has been violated at
+    Gemmenich.
+
+    'In these circumstances, and in view of the fact that Germany
+    declined to give the same assurance respecting Belgium as France
+    gave last week in reply to our request made simultaneously at Berlin
+    and Paris, we must repeat that request, and ask that a satisfactory
+    reply to it and to my telegram of this morning be received here by
+    12 o'clock to-night. If not, you are instructed to ask for your
+    passports, and to say that His Majesty's Government feel bound to
+    take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium
+    and the observance of a treaty to which Germany is as much a party
+    as ourselves.'[125]
+
+The effect at Berlin was remarkable. Every sign was given of
+disappointment and resentment at such a step being taken, and the
+'harangue' of the Chancellor to Sir Edward Goschen, and his astonishment
+at the value laid by Great Britain upon the 'scrap of paper' of 1839
+would seem, when coupled with Herr von Jagow's desperate bid for
+neutrality at the last moment, to show that the German Government had
+counted on the neutrality of this country and had been deeply
+disappointed. If these outbursts and attempts at the eleventh hour to
+bargain for our neutrality were genuine efforts to keep the peace
+between Great Britain and Germany, it is our belief that their origin
+must be found in the highest authority in the German Empire, whom we
+believe, in spite of petty signs of spitefulness exhibited since the war
+broke out, to have been sincerely and honestly working in favour of
+European peace, against obstacles little dreamt of by our countrymen.
+But certain signs are not wanting that, in the lower ranks of the German
+hierarchy, war with this country had been decided on, and that Sir
+Edward Grey was not far wrong when he wrote to Sir Francis Bertie on
+July 31, 'I believe it to be quite untrue that our attitude has been a
+decisive factor in situation. German Government do not expect our
+neutrality.'[126] On what other grounds than that orders had been sent
+out from Berlin can the fact be explained that the German Customs
+authorities, three days before the declaration of war, began detaining
+British ships,[127] and compulsorily unloading cargoes of sugar from
+British vessels? In the former case, indeed, the ships were ordered to
+be released; in the latter case, of which the complaint was made
+twenty-four hours later, the reply to inquiries was the ominous
+statement that 'no information was to be had'.[128]
+
+This, however, is a digression from the main question. History will
+doubtless attribute the outbreak of war between ourselves and Germany to
+the development of the Belgian question, and, we are confident, will
+judge that had it not been for the gratuitous attack made on a neutral
+country by Germany, war with Great Britain would not have ensued on
+August 4, 1914. The excuses put forward by the German Government for
+this wanton outrage on international agreements are instructive. In
+conversation with Sir Edward Goschen, neither Herr von Jagow nor the
+Chancellor urged that the French had violated the neutrality; the
+argument is purely and simply that the route by way of the Vosges is
+difficult, time is everything, and it is a matter of life and death to
+Germany to crush France as quickly as possible, in order that she may be
+able to meet the Russians before they reach the German frontier. This
+excuse does not seem to have been very satisfactory even to those who
+put it forward, though it was indubitably the real reason; so vice paid
+homage to virtue, and Herr von Jagow urged to Prince Lichnowsky that he
+had 'absolutely unimpeachable information' that the German army was
+exposed to French attack across Belgium. On the other hand, the
+Chancellor, as late as August 4th, seems to have known nothing of any
+such action by France; at any rate he made no mention of it in his
+speech to the Reichstag:--
+
+    'We are now in a state of necessity, and necessity knows no law. Our
+    troops have occupied Luxemburg and perhaps are already on Belgian
+    soil. Gentlemen, that is contrary to the dictates of international
+    law. It is true that the French Government has declared at Brussels
+    that France is willing to respect the neutrality of Belgium, as long
+    as her opponent respects it. We knew, however, that France stood
+    ready for invasion. France could wait but we could not wait. A
+    French movement upon our flank upon the Lower Rhine might have been
+    disastrous. So we were compelled to override the just protest of the
+    Luxemburg and Belgian Governments. The wrong--I speak openly--that
+    we are committing we will endeavour to make good as soon as our
+    military goal has been reached. Anybody who is threatened as we are
+    threatened, and is fighting for his highest possessions, can only
+    have one thought--how he is to hack his way through.'[129]
+
+In this double-faced position of the German Government, we have an
+example either of unsurpassed wickedness or of insurpassable folly. The
+violation of Belgium must have been designed either in order to bring us
+into the quarrel, or on the supposition that, in spite of treaties and
+warnings, we should yet remain neutral. Yet the foolishness of such a
+calculation is as nothing to that which prompted the excuse that Germany
+had to violate Belgian neutrality because the French were going to do
+so, or had done so. In such a case undoubtedly the wisest course for
+Germany would have been to allow the French to earn the reward of their
+own folly and be attacked not only by Belgium but also by Great Britain,
+to whom not five days before they had solemnly promised to observe the
+neutrality, and whom such a gross violation of the French word must
+indubitably have kept neutral, if it did not throw her on to the side of
+Germany. In regard to Belgium the Germans have indeed put forward the
+plea that the French had already violated its neutrality before war was
+declared. This plea has been like a snowball. It began with the
+ineffective accusation that the French were at Givet, a town in French
+territory, and that this constituted an attack on Germany, though how
+the presence of the French in a town of their own could be called a
+violation of their neighbour's neutrality it is difficult to see. From
+that it has gradually grown into a more formidable story of the French
+supplying a garrison to Liège. There can be little doubt that all these
+attempts by Herr von Jagow to claim that the French violated Belgian
+neutrality are another illustration of Swift's dictum to the effect that
+'as universal a practice as lying is, and as easy a one as it seems', it
+is astonishing that it has been brought to so little perfection, 'even
+by those who are most celebrated in that faculty'.[130]
+
+
+IV
+
+_England and Servia_.
+
+We have seen what attitude was taken by Germany in the crisis which
+followed upon the Serajevo murders and more definitely upon the
+presentation of the Austrian note. It is equally important, and to
+English readers at least more interesting, to realize what attitude was
+taken by England. Sir Edward Grey throughout maintained the position,
+which he was so justly praised for adopting in 1912, that England had no
+direct interest in Balkan disputes, but that it was her bounden duty to
+prevent a European conflagration. He quickly saw, what Germany would not
+see, that Russia was so much interested in Servia, for both political
+and religious reasons, that any attempt by the Austro-Hungarian
+Government to coerce Servia, to interfere with her territorial integrity
+or independence as a sovereign state, would inevitably rouse Russia to
+military action. For Russia had greater interests in the security of
+Servia than Great Britain had in the security of Belgium. In each case
+the Great Power was bound by honour and self-interest alike to interfere
+to protect the smaller Power, but Russia was also bound to Servia by
+racial and religious bonds. This being so, Sir Edward Grey set himself,
+not as the German White Book says[131] to localize the conflict, but to
+prevent if possible a conflict between Austria-Hungary and Servia which
+would inevitably involve Russia and probably other European powers. He
+stated his policy with the greatest clearness in the House of Commons on
+July 27th, but he had already acted on the lines of the policy which he
+then explained. On July 24th he told Count Mensdorff that he would
+concern himself
+
+    'with the matter simply and solely from the point of view of the
+    peace of Europe. The merits of the dispute between Austria and
+    Servia were not the concern of His Majesty's Government[132].'
+
+In similar language, but more fully, on the same day he told the German
+Ambassador:--
+
+    'If the presentation of this ultimatum to Servia did not lead to
+    trouble between Austria and Russia, we need not concern ourselves
+    about it; but if Russia took the view of the Austrian ultimatum
+    which it seemed to me that any Power interested in Servia would
+    take, I should be quite powerless, in face of the terms of the
+    ultimatum, to exercise any moderating influence[133].'
+
+Sir Edward Grey at once urged that the four Powers, Germany, Italy,
+France, and Great Britain, should act together in the interests of peace
+at the courts of St. Petersburg and Vienna. And he went further and
+tried to induce Servia to 'express concern and regret' and to 'give
+Austria the fullest satisfaction', 'if it is proved that Servian
+officials, however subordinate, were accomplices in the murders at
+Serajevo[134].' Further than that no British Foreign Minister could go;
+Sir George Buchanan correctly explained the situation to M. Sazonof when
+he laid stress on the need of the sanction of British public
+opinion[135]. Sir Edward Grey re-echoed this when he wrote:--
+
+    'I do not consider that public opinion here would or ought to
+    sanction our going to war over a Servian quarrel. If, however, war
+    does take place, the development of other issues may draw us into
+    it, and I am therefore anxious to prevent it.'[136]
+
+However, matters were moving rapidly: the Servian reply[137] was
+presented on July 25; it was considered unsatisfactory by the
+Austro-Hungarian Government, and the Minister, with the Legation-staff,
+withdrew from Belgrade. Next day Sir Edward Grey proposed that a
+conference of Germany, Italy, France, and Great Britain should meet in
+London immediately 'for the purpose of discovering an issue which would
+prevent complications', and 'that all active military operations should
+be suspended pending results of conference'.[138] This proposal failed,
+as has been explained in earlier pages (pp. 71-3), and on July 28th
+Austria-Hungary declared war on Servia. Sir Edward Grey remained firm to
+his original attitude of non-intervention, and told M. Cambon that 'the
+dispute between Austria and Servia was not one in which we felt called
+to take a hand'.[139] And on the same day he declined to discuss with
+Count Mensdorff 'the merits of the question between Austria and
+Servia'.[140]
+
+No one can doubt that Sir Edward Grey's attitude was diplomatically
+correct and consistent. It was also inspired by a genuine desire for
+peace, and stands out in sharp contrast with the 'equivocal and
+double-faced' policy of Germany, and with the obstinacy of Austria in
+refusing to permit the Powers to mediate; for it was with truth that M.
+Sazonof remarked that
+
+    'a refusal to prolong the term of the ultimatum would render
+    nugatory the proposals made by the Austro-Hungarian Government to
+    the Powers, and would be in contradiction to the very basis of
+    international relations.'[141]
+
+
+V
+
+_Great Britain declines 'Solidarity' with Russia and France_.
+
+There is however another question which involves the whole foreign
+policy of Great Britain. Could Sir Edward Grey have prevented the war by
+boldly declaring at once that England would support Russia and France,
+if necessary by armed force? It was a policy urged on him from several
+quarters, and it is possible that such action might have been
+successful. It is to Sir Edward Grey's credit that he quietly but firmly
+refused to take so hazardous and unprecedented a step. Let us examine
+these proposals briefly. As early as July 24th M. Sazonof 'hoped that
+His Majesty's Government would not fail to proclaim their solidarity
+with Russia and France.[142]' The French Ambassador at St. Petersburg
+joined in the request, and M. Sazonof pointed out that
+
+    'we would sooner or later be dragged into war if it did break out;
+    we should have rendered war more likely if we did not from the
+    outset make common cause with his country and with France[143].'
+
+On July 30th the President of the French Republic expressed his
+conviction that
+
+    'peace between the Powers is in the hands of Great Britain. If His
+    Majesty's Government announced that England would come to the aid of
+    France in the event of a conflict between France and Germany, as a
+    result of the present differences between Austria and Servia, there
+    would be no war, for Germany would at once modify her
+    attitude[144].'
+
+Even more important was the opinion of the Italian Minister for Foreign
+Affairs, whose country was a member of the Triple Alliance:--
+
+    'As Germany was really anxious for good relations with ourselves, if
+    she believed that Great Britain would act with Russia and France, he
+    thought it would have a great effect.'[145]
+
+Such opinions must, and do, carry great weight, but Sir Edward Grey and
+the British Ambassadors were equally firm in withstanding them. Sir
+George Buchanan at once told M. Sazonof that he
+
+    'saw no reason to expect any declaration of solidarity from His
+    Majesty's Government that would entail an unconditional engagement
+    on their part to support Russia and France by force of arms'.[146]
+
+On July 27th he met the proposal more directly by pointing out that, so
+far from such a policy conducing to the maintenance of peace, it would
+merely offend the pride of the Germans and stiffen them in their present
+attitude.[147] Two days later Sir Edward Grey pointed out to M. Cambon
+that
+
+    'even if the question became one between Austria and Russia, we
+    should not feel called upon to take a hand in it. It would then be a
+    question of the supremacy of Teuton or Slav--a struggle for
+    supremacy in the Balkans; and our idea had always been to avoid
+    being drawn into a war over a Balkan question'.[148]
+
+That is one answer to the proposal, an answer based on history and on
+Britain's foreign policy in past years. Sir Edward Grey had another
+answer. It was to the effect that Germany could not, and ought to have
+known she could not, rely on our neutrality. For when the Russian
+Ambassador told him that an impression prevailed in German and Austrian
+circles that in any event England would stand aside, he pointed out that
+
+    'this impression ought to be dispelled by the orders we have given
+    to the First Fleet, which is concentrated, as it happens, at
+    Portland, not to disperse for manoeuvre leave'.[149]
+
+The situation continued to develop unfavourably for the cause of peace
+owing to the Austrian declaration of war on Servia, and the consequent
+mobilizations in Russia, Germany, and France. On July 31st Sir Edward
+Grey said:--
+
+    'I believe it to be quite untrue that our attitude has been a
+    decisive factor in situation. German Government do not expect our
+    neutrality.'[150]
+
+It is not quite clear that Sir Edward Grey's belief was justified.
+England's attitude may have been an important factor in the situation,
+but still in our opinion Sir Edward Grey was not only right in refusing
+to commit England to a new Continental policy, but could not, with due
+observance of constitutional usages, have taken any other course. Again,
+it is doubtful whether the German Government did or did not rely on our
+neutrality. The German Chancellor and the German Secretary for Foreign
+Affairs later affected great surprise at our action. Germany, however,
+as we have shown above (p. 82), had been plainly warned by Sir Edward
+Grey on July 29th[151] that she could not rely on our remaining neutral
+under all circumstances.
+
+Whether Sir Edward Grey was right or wrong in his estimate of Germany's
+prudence is a small matter; what is important is that his action was
+throughout perfectly straightforward and consistent. And unquestionably
+he had a very difficult part to play. The near East was like a blazing
+rick surrounded by farm buildings; Germany was, if not stirring up the
+conflagration, certainly not attempting to pour water on the flames,
+while Austria, possibly--and even probably[152] with Germany's
+knowledge, would allow no one to make the attempt.
+
+It would have aided the Austrian cause more effectively in Europe and
+elsewhere, if the Government had communicated[153] 'the _dossier_
+elucidating the Servian intrigues and the connexion between these
+intrigues and the murder of 28th June', which it said it held at the
+disposal of the British Government.[154] For even Count Mensdorff
+'admitted that, on paper, the Servian reply might seem to be
+satisfactory'.[155]
+
+To judge whether the Servian reply was satisfactory, it was, and is,
+necessary to examine the evidence on which the Austro-Hungarian
+Government based the accusations formulated in its note of July 23rd.
+But even assuming that the Austrian charges were true, as the German
+White Book says they are,[156] it is only a stronger reason for allowing
+the Powers to examine this evidence; and it does not explain the
+persistent refusal,[157] until July 31st,[158] to permit any
+negotiations on the basis of the Servian reply.
+
+Such being the situation, it is very difficult to see what more Sir
+Edward Grey could have done to prevent the outbreak of war between
+Austria-Hungary and Servia, which did inevitably, as he foresaw from the
+first, drag in other nations. He urged Servia to moderation and even to
+submission; he tried to induce the four Powers to mediate jointly at St.
+Petersburg and Vienna; he proposed a conference of the four Powers to
+prevent further complications; he did everything in his power to
+restrain Russia from immediate armed support of Servia; he declined to
+join Russia and France in eventual military action; and even up to the
+violation of the neutrality of Belgium he still strove to avert the
+horrors of war from Europe.
+
+
+VI
+
+_Italy's comments on the situation_.
+
+We have already shown (Chap. II) how Italy became a member of the Triple
+Alliance, and how, in spite of its apparent frailty and of the somewhat
+divergent aims of its members, that alliance has endured for thirty-two
+years. It remains to consider what policy Italy adopted in the critical
+situation created by the presentation of the Austro-Hungarian note to
+Servia, and to appreciate the significance of that policy. It is
+supremely significant that Italy, though a member of the Triple
+Alliance, was not consulted about the terms of the Austrian note to
+Servia; that she worked persistently side by side with England in
+endeavouring to prevent an outbreak of war, and, when that failed, to
+induce the states actually at war, or on the brink of war, to suspend
+all military operations in order to give diplomatic intervention an
+opportunity; and it is equally significant that, when the great war
+broke out, Italy remained neutral, in spite of the pressure from her
+allies and the tempting bait of a share of the spoil, which, it is said,
+is even now being offered to her.[159] This is but a bald description of
+Italy's policy, but it can be substantiated in detail from official
+documents. As early as July 25th the Italian Ambassador in a
+conversation with Sir Edward Grey 'made no secret of the fact that Italy
+was desirous to see war avoided',[160] and he cordially approved the
+idea of mediation by the four Powers. Two days later Italy again
+approved the proposed conference of four to be held immediately in
+London. The Italian Foreign Minister promised to recommend most strongly
+to the German Government the idea of asking Russia, Austria, and Servia
+to suspend military operations pending the result of the conference, and
+went even further in undertaking to ask what procedure Germany thought
+most likely to be successful at Vienna.[161] He thought it very doubtful
+whether Germany would consent to ask Austria to suspend military
+operations, but made a further suggestion that
+
+    'Servia may be induced to accept note in its entirety on the advice
+    of the four Powers invited to the conference, and this would enable
+    her to say that she had yielded to Europe and not to Austria-Hungary
+    alone'.[162]
+
+Next day the Marquis di San Giuliano called attention to a point in
+Servia's reply to Austria which might form a starting-point for
+mediation.[163] On July 29th he tried to get over Germany's objection to
+the idea of a 'Conference' by suggesting adherence to the idea of an
+exchange of views in London.[164] Next day he added to this the
+practical suggestion that
+
+    'Germany might invite Austria to state exactly the terms which she
+    would demand from Servia, and give a guarantee that she would
+    neither deprive her of independence, nor annex territory.... We
+    might, on the other hand, ascertain from Russia what she would
+    accept, and, once we knew the standpoints of these two countries,
+    discussions could be commenced at once.'[165]
+
+Moreover the Italian Ambassador at Vienna, in the hope of pacifying
+Russia, made the useful suggestion that Austria should
+
+    'convert into a binding engagement to Europe the declaration which
+    has been made at St. Petersburg to the effect that she desires
+    neither to destroy the independence of Servia, nor to acquire
+    Servian territory'.[166]
+
+All efforts to preserve peace proved futile; Germany delivered her
+ultimatum to France and to Russia. Then arose the question, what was
+Italy to do? The answer to this was given by the Italian Foreign
+Minister:--
+
+    'The war undertaken by Austria, and the consequences which might
+    result, had, in the words of the German Ambassador himself, an
+    aggressive object. Both were therefore in conflict with the purely
+    defensive character of the Triple Alliance; in such circumstances
+    Italy would remain neutral.'[167]
+
+The German White Book says 'Russia began the war on us'[168] and 'France
+opened hostilities'[169]; if these statements were true, Italy would
+have been obliged, if she were to remain faithful to her engagements, to
+take part in the war side by side with her colleagues of the Triple
+Alliance. Impartial readers can draw their own conclusions.
+
+
+NOTE
+
+_Austro-Hungarian note to Servia, and Servia's reply_.
+
+On July 23rd the Austro-Hungarian Government presented an ultimatum to
+Servia, demanding unconditional acceptance within 48 hours, an ultimatum
+which the _Temps_ next day described as 'unprecedented in its arrogance
+and in the extravagance of its demands'. Of it Sir Edward Grey said:--
+
+    'I had never before seen one State address to another independent
+    State a document of so formidable a character. Demand No. 5 would be
+    hardly consistent with the maintenance of Servia's independent
+    sovereignty, if it were to mean, as it seemed that it might, that
+    Austria-Hungary was to be invested with a right to appoint officials
+    who would have authority within the frontiers of Servia.'[170]
+
+It may be true, as the Austrian Ambassador explained,[171] that the
+Austro-Hungarian Government did not intend this step to be regarded as
+an ultimatum, but as a _démarche_ with a time-limit.
+
+In this extraordinary document[172] the Austro-Hungarian Government
+demanded:--
+
+A. That Servia should publish on the front page of its 'Official
+Gazette', and in the 'Official Bulletin' of the Army, and should
+communicate to the Army as the order of the day a declaration
+
+(1) condemning Serb propaganda against Austria-Hungary;
+
+(2) regretting that Servian officers and functionaries participated in
+the propaganda;
+
+(3) promising to proceed with the utmost rigour against persons who may
+be guilty of such machinations.
+
+B. That Servia should undertake
+
+(1) to suppress any publication inciting to hatred and contempt of
+Austria-Hungary;
+
+(2) to dissolve the society styled Narodna Odbrana and similar societies
+and to confiscate their means of propaganda;
+
+(3) to eliminate from public instruction in Servia all teachers and all
+methods of instruction responsible for fomenting opinion against
+Austria-Hungary;
+
+(4) to remove from the military service and from the administration all
+officers and functionaries guilty of such propaganda, whose names and
+deeds the Austro-Hungarian Government reserved to itself the right of
+communicating;
+
+(5) to accept the collaboration in Servia of representatives of
+Austria-Hungary in the suppression of the subversive anti-Austrian
+movement;
+
+(6) to take judicial proceedings against accessories to the Serajevo
+plot, with the co-operation of Austro-Hungarian delegates;
+
+(7) to proceed immediately to the arrest of Major Voija Tankositch and
+of Milan Ciganovitch, a Servian State employé, who have been compromised
+by the results of the inquiry at Serajevo;
+
+(8) to stop co-operation of Servian authorities in illicit traffic in
+arms and explosives, and to dismiss and punish those officials who
+helped the perpetrators of the Serajevo crime;
+
+(9) to explain the unjustifiable utterances of high Servian officials,
+at home and abroad, after the Serajevo crime.
+
+On July 25th the Servian reply[173] was presented to the
+Austro-Hungarian Government. Even to a reader with Austrian sympathies
+this reply seems to go a long way towards meeting the demands. The
+Servian Government agreed
+
+A. that Servia should, as demanded, publish a declaration
+
+(1) condemning all propaganda which may be directed against
+Austria-Hungary;
+
+(2) regretting that, according to the communication from the Imperial
+and Royal Government, Servian officers and officials participated in the
+propaganda;
+
+(3) promising to proceed with the utmost rigour against all persons who
+are guilty of such acts.
+
+B. That Servia would undertake
+
+(1) to introduce a provision into the press law providing for the most
+severe punishment of incitement to hatred and contempt of
+Austria-Hungary and to introduce an amendment to the Constitution
+providing for the confiscation of such publications;
+
+(2) to dissolve the Narodna Odbrana and similar societies;
+
+(3) to remove at once from their public educational establishments all
+that serves or could serve to foment propaganda, whenever the
+Austro-Hungarian Government furnish them with facts and proofs of this
+propaganda;
+
+(4) to remove from military service all such persons as the judicial
+inquiry may have proved to be guilty of acts directed against the
+territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary;
+
+(5) though they do not clearly grasp the meaning or the scope of the
+demand, to accept the collaboration of Austro-Hungarian officials so far
+as is consistent with the principle of international law, with criminal
+procedure and with good neighbourly relations;
+
+(6) to take judicial proceedings against accessories to the Serajevo
+plot; but they cannot admit the co-operation of Austro-Hungarian
+officials, as it would be a violation of the Constitution and of the law
+of criminal procedure;
+
+(7) On this they remark that Major Tankositch was arrested as soon as
+the note was presented, and that it has not been possible to arrest
+Ciganovitch, who is an Austro-Hungarian subject, but had been employed
+(on probation) by the directorate of railways;
+
+(8) to reinforce and extend the measures for preventing illicit traffic
+of arms and explosives across the frontier;
+
+(9) to give explanations of the remarks made by Servian officials, as
+soon as the Austro-Hungarian Government have communicated the passages
+and as soon as they have shown that the remarks were actually made by
+the said officials.
+
+The Austro-Hungarian Government regarded this reply as unsatisfactory
+and inadequate; they withdrew their Minister from Belgrade the same
+evening, and on July 28th declared war on Servia. Meanwhile they
+published a long official explanation[174] of the grounds on which the
+Servian reply was considered inadequate; in it they criticized and found
+unsatisfactory every single article of the reply, except that to demand
+No. 8. It is not worth while to analyze the whole of this; one sample
+may be sufficient. Sir Edward Grey commented on demand No. 5 and pointed
+out[175] that it
+
+    'would be hardly consistent with the maintenance of Servia's
+    independent sovereignty, if it were to mean, as it seemed that it
+    might, that Austria-Hungary was to be invested with a right to
+    appoint officials who would have authority within the frontiers of
+    Servia.'
+
+Obviously he was in doubt about the meaning and scope of this demand,
+and the next was equally vague. The Servian reply to these two demands
+was necessarily guarded: yet the Austro-Hungarian Government treated
+this as deliberate misrepresentation:--
+
+    'The international law, as well as the criminal law, has nothing to
+    do with this question; it is purely a matter of the nature of state
+    police which is to be solved by way of a special agreement. The
+    reserved attitude of Servia is therefore incomprehensible, and on
+    account of its vague general form it would lead to unbridgeable
+    difficulties.
+
+    ...
+
+    'If the Servian Government misunderstands us here, this is done
+    deliberately, for it must be familiar with the difference between
+    "enquête judiciaire" and simple police researches. As it desired to
+    escape from every control of the investigation which would yield, if
+    correctly carried out, highly undesirable results for it, and as it
+    possesses no means to refuse in a plausible manner the co-operation
+    of our officials (precedents for such police intervention exist in
+    great number), it tries to justify its refusal by showing up our
+    demands as impossible.'[176]
+
+It would have been fairer to Servia to assume that there had been a
+genuine misunderstanding, and that the explanation here given by Austria
+might prove satisfactory to Servia, as the Italian Minister for Foreign
+Affairs suggested.[177] The persistent refusal of Austria-Hungary to
+permit any discussion on the basis of the Servian reply goes far to
+justify Sir Maurice de Bunsen's impression
+
+    'that the Austro-Hungarian note was so drawn up as to make war
+    inevitable, that their Government are fully resolved to have war
+    with Servia, that they consider their position as a Great Power to
+    be at stake, and that until punishment has been administered to
+    Servia it is unlikely that they will listen to proposals of
+    mediation'.[178]
+
+Notes:
+
+[Footnote 57: _Correspondence respecting the European Crisis_, No. 2.
+Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 22, 1914.]
+
+[Footnote 58: German White Book, p. 4.]
+
+[Footnote 59: _Correspondence_, No. 10. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie,
+July 24.]
+
+[Footnote 60: _Correspondence_, No. 18. Sir H. Rumbold to Sir E. Grey,
+July 25.]
+
+[Footnote 61: Ibid. No. 32. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir E. Grey, July 26.
+See also German White Book, p. 5.]
+
+[Footnote 62: Ibid. No. 54. M. Sazonof to Count Benckendorff, July
+15/28, 1914 (communicated by Count Benckendorff, July 28).]
+
+[Footnote 63: _Correspondence_, No. 139. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey,
+August 1.]
+
+[Footnote 64: _Ibid_. No. 141. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir E. Grey, August
+1.]
+
+[Footnote 65: _Ibid_. No. 71. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 28.]
+
+[Footnote 66: _Correspondence_, No. 94. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir E. Grey,
+July 29.]
+
+[Footnote 67: German White Book, p. 4 (see _infra_ Appendix I).]
+
+[Footnote 68: _Ibid_. No. 36. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, Sir H.
+Rumbold, and Sir R. Rodd, July 26.]
+
+[Footnote 69: _Correspondence_, No. 43. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey,
+July 27.]
+
+[Footnote 70: _Ibid_. No. 60. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 28.]
+
+[Footnote 71: _Ibid_. No. 84. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, July 29.]
+
+[Footnote 72: p. 8 and Exhibit 12 (see _infra_ Appendix I).]
+
+[Footnote 73: _Correspondence_, No. 11. Sir E. Grey to Sir II. Rumbold,
+July 24.]
+
+[Footnote 74: _Correspondence_, No. 46. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen,
+July 27.]
+
+[Footnote 75: Ibid. No. 80. Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey, July 29.]
+
+[Footnote 76: Ibid. No. 43. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 27.]
+
+[Footnote 77: Although the German White Book attempts to make out that
+Russia mobilized on July 26th, it produces no evidence more satisfactory
+than the information of the German Imperial attaché in Russia, whose
+account of the Russian military preparations supports only in part the
+allegations made at Berlin. See German White Book, Exhibits 6 and 7;
+also _Correspondence_, No. 78, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 29.
+For the Austrian decree of general mobilization, see the Russian Orange
+Book No. 47 (_infra_ in Appendix VI).]
+
+[Footnote 78: _Correspondence_, No. 43. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey,
+July 27.]
+
+[Footnote 79: _Ibid_. No. 76. The same to the same, July 29.]
+
+[Footnote 80: _Correspondence_, No. 78. Sir George Buchanan to Sir E.
+Grey, July 29, 1914.]
+
+[Footnote 81: German White Book, p. 38, and Exhibit No. 7, July 26.]
+
+[Footnote 82: _Correspondence_, No. 71. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey,
+July 28. See also quotation in _Times_ of July 29, p. 8, col. 2, from
+the _Militär-Wochenblatt_: 'The fighting power of Russia is usually
+over-estimated, and numbers are far less decisive than _moral_, the
+higher command, armaments.... All military preparations for war, of
+whatever sort, have been taken with that attention to detail and that
+order which marks Germany. It can therefore be said, without
+exaggeration, that Germany can face the advent of grave events with
+complete calm, trusting to God and her own might.']
+
+[Footnote 83: _Correspondence_, No. 80. Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey, July
+29.]
+
+[Footnote 84: _Ibid_. No. 97. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 30.
+Cf. Russian Orange Book, Nos. 61, 62 (_infra_ in Appendix VI).]
+
+[Footnote 85: _Ibid_.]
+
+[Footnote 86: _Correspondence_, No. 97. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey,
+July 30.]
+
+[Footnote 87: _Ibid_. No. 113. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 31.]
+
+[Footnote 88: _Ibid_.]
+
+[Footnote 89: _Ibid_. No. 112. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 31.]
+
+[Footnote 90: _Ibid_. No. 113, _ut sup_. On August 1 _The Times_
+published a semi-official telegram from Berlin, dated Eydtkuhnen, July
+31, that 'the second and third Russian cavalry divisions are on the
+frontier between Wirballen, Augustof, and Allenstein'.]
+
+[Footnote 91: _Ibid_. No. 111. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, July 31.]
+
+[Footnote 92: _Ibid_. No. 121. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 31.]
+
+[Footnote 93: See German White Book, pp. 12 and 13, and Exhibits 20, 21,
+22, 23, 23a (see _infra_ Appendix I).]
+
+[Footnote 94: _Correspondence_, No. 121. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey,
+July 31.]
+
+[Footnote 95: _Ibid_. Nos. 131, 133, 135.]
+
+[Footnote 96: Russian Orange Book, No. 58 (_infra_ Appendix VI).]
+
+[Footnote 97: _Ibid_. No. 133. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, August 1,
+encloses a telegram of July 31, to the effect that 'The Austro-Hungarian
+Ambassador declared the readiness of his Government to discuss the
+substance of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia. M. Sazonof replied by
+expressing his satisfaction, and said it was desirable that the
+discussions should take place in London with the participation of the
+Great Powers.']
+
+[Footnote 98: German White Book, p. 8.]
+
+[Footnote 99: _Ibid_. p. 9, Exhibit No. 17.]
+
+[Footnote 100: _Correspondence_, No. 76. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey,
+July 29: 'His Excellency denied German Government had done this.
+Nevertheless it is true.']
+
+[Footnote 101: Ibid. No. 99. Sir F. Bertie to Sir E. Grey, July 30.]
+
+[Footnote 102: _Correspondence_. Enclosure 3 in No. 105. French Minister
+for Foreign Affairs to M. Cambon.]
+
+[Footnote 103: _Ibid_.]
+
+[Footnote 104: German White Book, p. 48 (see _infra_, Appendix I).]
+
+[Footnote 105: _Correspondence_, No. 138. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey,
+Aug. 1.]
+
+[Footnote 106: _Correspondence_, No. 24. Sir E. Grey to Sir G. Buchanan,
+July 25.]
+
+[Footnote 107: _Correspondence_, No. 47. Sir E. Grey to Sir G. Buchanan,
+July 27.]
+
+[Footnote 108: _Ibid_. No. 89. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, July 29.]
+
+[Footnote 109: _Correspondence_, No. 85. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey,
+July 29 (received July 29).]
+
+[Footnote 110: _Ibid_. No. 101. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, July 30.]
+
+[Footnote 111: _Correspondence_, No. 109. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey,
+July 31.]
+
+[Footnote 112: _Ibid_. No. 106. Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey, July 30.]
+
+[Footnote 113: _Correspondence_, No. 114. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie
+and Sir E. Goschen, July 31.]
+
+[Footnote 114: _Ibid_. No. 125. Sir F. Bertie to Sir E. Grey, July 31.]
+
+[Footnote 115: _Ibid_. No. 122. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 31.
+It may be observed that by the Hague Convention of 1907, Belgium was
+bound to impose this embargo after the ultimatum of Germany to Russia
+(Art. 2).]
+
+[Footnote 116: _Correspondence_, No. 123. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen,
+August 1.]
+
+[Footnote 117: _The Times_, August 28, 1914, p. 9, cols. 5 and 6.]
+
+[Footnote 118: See _The Times_, August 27, 1914. The Imperial Chancellor
+telegraphed to Prince Lichnowsky: 'Germany is ready to take up the
+English proposal if England guarantees with her forces the absolute
+neutrality of France in a Russo-German conflict.... We promise that the
+French frontier shall not be passed by our troops before 7 p.m. on
+Monday, August 3, if England's consent is given in the meantime.']
+
+[Footnote 119: _Correspondence_, No. 148. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie,
+August 2.]
+
+[Footnote 120: _Correspondence_, No. 147. Minister of State, Luxemburg,
+to Sir E. Grey, August 2.]
+
+[Footnote 121: _Ibid_. No. 153. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, August
+4.]
+
+[Footnote 122: _Ibid_.]
+
+[Footnote 123: _Ibid_. No. 155. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Villiers, August
+4.]
+
+[Footnote 124: _Correspondence_, No. 157. German Foreign Secretary to
+Prince Lichnowsky, August 4.]
+
+[Footnote 125: _Ibid_. No. 159. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, August
+4.]
+
+[Footnote 126: _Correspondence_, No. 116, July 31.]
+
+[Footnote 127: _Ibid_. Nos. 130, 143, 145.]
+
+[Footnote 128: _Ibid_. Nos. 149, 150, August 2 and 3.]
+
+[Footnote 129: _The Times_, August 11, p. 5, col. 1.]
+
+[Footnote 130: _Thoughts on Various Subjects, Moral and Diverting_
+(October, 1706).]
+
+[Footnote 131: p. 6.]
+
+[Footnote 132: _Correspondence_, No. 5. Sir E. Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen,
+July 24.]
+
+[Footnote 133: _Ibid_. No. 10. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, July 24.
+Cf. No. 24, Sir E. Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, July 25: 'The sudden,
+brusque, and peremptory character of the Austrian _démarche_ makes it
+almost inevitable that in a very short time both Russia and Austria will
+have mobilized against each other.']
+
+[Footnote 134: _Ibid_. No. 12. Sir E. Grey to Mr. Crackanthorpe, July
+24.]
+
+[Footnote 135: _Ibid_. No. 6. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 24:
+'I said ... direct British interests in Servia were _nil_, and a war on
+behalf of that country would never be sanctioned by British public
+opinion.']
+
+[Footnote 136: _Correspondence_, No. 24. Sir E. Grey to Sir G. Buchanan,
+July 25.]
+
+[Footnote 137: See note at the end of this chapter.]
+
+[Footnote 138: _Correspondence_, No. 36. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie,
+July 26.]
+
+[Footnote 139: _Ibid_. No. 87. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, July 29.]
+
+[Footnote 140: _Ibid_. No. 91. Sir E. Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, July
+29.]
+
+[Footnote 141: _Ibid_. No. 13. Note communicated to Sir E. Grey by the
+Russian Ambassador, July 25.]
+
+[Footnote 142: _Correspondence_, No. 6. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey,
+July 24.]
+
+[Footnote 143: _Ibid_.]
+
+[Footnote 144: _Ibid_. No. 99. Sir F. Bertie to Sir E. Grey, July 30.
+Cf. No. 119, Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, July 31.]
+
+[Footnote 145: _Correspondence_, No. 80. Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey,
+July 29.]
+
+[Footnote 146: _Ibid_. No. 6. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 24.]
+
+[Footnote 147: _Ibid_. No. 44. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 27:
+'Their (sc. the German) attitude would merely be stiffened by such a
+menace, and we could only induce her (sc. Germany) to use her influence
+at Vienna to avert war by approaching her in the capacity of a friend
+who was anxious to preserve peace.']
+
+[Footnote 148: _Ibid_. No. 87. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, July 29.]
+
+[Footnote 149: _Correspondence_, No. 47. Sir E. Grey to Sir G. Buchanan,
+July 27.]
+
+[Footnote 150: _Ibid_. No. 116. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, July 31.]
+
+[Footnote 151: _Ibid_. No. 89. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, July 29.]
+
+[Footnote 152: _Correspondence_, No. 95. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir E.
+Grey, July 30: 'Although I am not able to verify it, I have private
+information that the German Ambassador knew the text of the Austrian
+ultimatum to Servia before it was despatched, and telegraphed it to the
+German Emperor. I know from the German Ambassador himself that he
+endorses every line of it.']
+
+[Footnote 153: But see Appendix IV.]
+
+[Footnote 154: _Correspondence_, No. 4, p. 8.]
+
+[Footnote 155: _Ibid_. No. 48. Sir E. Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, July
+27.]
+
+[Footnote 156: pp. 3 to 5 and Exhibits 1 and 2 (see _infra_ Appendix
+I).]
+
+[Footnote 157: _Correspondence_, No. 61, Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir E.
+Grey, July 28; No. 78, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 29; No. 96,
+Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir E. Grey, July 30.]
+
+[Footnote 158: _Correspondence_, No. 110, Sir E. Grey to Sir G.
+Buchanan, July 31; No. 137, Sir E. Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, August 1.]
+
+[Footnote 159: _The Times_, September 3, p. 7. For Italy's ignorance of
+the contents of the Austrian note, see App. V.]
+
+[Footnote 160: _Correspondence_, No. 29. Sir E. Grey to Sir R. Rodd,
+July 25.]
+
+[Footnote 161: _Ibid_. No. 49. Sir E. Grey to Sir R. Rodd, July 27.]
+
+[Footnote 162: _Ibid_. No. 57. Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey, July 27. Cf.
+No. 78, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 29.]
+
+[Footnote 163: _Correspondence_, No. 64. Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey,
+July 28. Cf. _supra_, p. 99.]
+
+[Footnote 164: _Ibid_. No. 80. Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey, July 29. Cf.
+No. 92, Sir E. Grey to Sir R. Rodd, July 29.]
+
+[Footnote 165: _Ibid_. No. 106. Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey, July 30.]
+
+[Footnote 166: _Ibid_. No. 79. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir E. Grey, July
+29.]
+
+[Footnote 167: _Ibid_. No. 152. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, August 3.]
+
+[Footnote 168: p. 15 (see Appendix I _infra_).]
+
+[Footnote 169: p. 16 (_ibid._).]
+
+[Footnote 170: _Correspondence_, No. 5. Sir E. Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen,
+July 24. The text is also given in the German White Book (pp. 18-23),
+which will be found in Appendix I.]
+
+[Footnote 171: _Ibid_. No. 14. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, July 25.]
+
+[Footnote 172: _Ibid_. No. 4. Communicated by Count Mensdorff, July 24.]
+
+[Footnote 173: _Correspondence_, No. 39. Communicated by the Servian
+Minister, July 27. See also German White Book (pp. 23-32), _infra_ in
+Appendix I.]
+
+[Footnote 174: German White Book, pp. 24 _et sqq_.; see _infra_ Appendix
+I.]
+
+[Footnote 175: _Correspondence_, No. 5. Sir E. Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen,
+July 24.]
+
+[Footnote 176: German White Book, pp. 29 _et sqq_.; see _infra_ Appendix
+I.]
+
+[Footnote 177: _Correspondence_, No. 64. Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey,
+July 28.]
+
+[Footnote 178: _Ibid_. No. 41. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir E. Grey, July
+27.]
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VI
+
+
+THE NEW GERMAN THEORY OF THE STATE
+
+The war in which England is now engaged with Germany is fundamentally a
+war between two different principles--that of _raison d'état_, and that
+of the rule of law. The antagonism between these two principles appeared
+in our own internal history as far back as the seventeenth century, when
+the Stuarts championed the theory of state-necessity and the practice of
+a prerogative free to act outside and above the law in order to meet the
+demands of state-necessity, and when Parliament defended the rule of law
+and sought to include the Crown under that law. The same antagonism now
+appears externally in a struggle between two nations, one of which
+claims a prerogative to act outside and above the public law of Europe
+in order to secure the 'safety' of its own state, while the other stands
+for the rule of public law. The one regards international covenants to
+which it has pledged its own word as 'scraps of paper' when they stand
+in the way of _salus populi_; the other regards the maintenance of such
+covenants as a grave and inevitable obligation.
+
+Taught by Treitschke, whom they regard as their great national
+historian, and whose lectures on _Politik_ have become a gospel, the
+Germans of to-day assume as an ultimate end and a final standard what
+they regard as the national German state.[179] 'The state', says
+Treitschke, 'is the highest thing in the external society of man: above
+it there is nothing at all in the history of the world.' There is here
+no room for comity of nations; for a _societas totius humani generis_;
+for international law in any true sense. What really exists is the
+exclusive state--_der geschlossene Staat_--and in another sense than
+that of Fichte. This state is rigorously national: it excludes all
+foreign words from its vocabulary, and it would fain exclude all foreign
+articles from its shores in order to found a real 'national' economy
+such as List preached. Further, in the teaching of Treitschke this
+exclusive state is, 'as Machiavelli first clearly saw', essentially
+power: _der Staat ist Macht_. It may be defined as 'the public might for
+defence and offence'. As the highest duty of the individual is
+self-perfection, the highest duty of the state is self-preservation; and
+self-preservation means power. 'To care for its power is the highest
+moral duty of the state.' 'Of all political weaknesses that of
+feebleness is the most abominable and despicable: it is the sin against
+the Holy Spirit of Politics.' This may seem the mere worship of might,
+and it is in effect nothing else than the mere worship of might; but we
+should misrepresent Treitschke if we did not add that power is not
+conceived by him as mere or bare power. The power of the state is
+precious and ultimate because the state is a vehicle of culture: the
+armed sword of the German state is precious because that state is the
+_colporteur_ of German culture. And thus Treitschke holds that
+Machiavelli, the great apostle of might, is only wrong in so far as he
+failed to see that might must justify itself by having a content, that
+is to say, by being used to spread the highest moral culture. It is
+naturally assumed by German nationalists that this is German culture.
+
+Two results flow from this philosophy, one negative, the other positive.
+The negative result is the repudiation of any idea of the final
+character of international obligation; the other is the praise of the
+glory of war.
+
+_Salus populi suprema lex_; and to it all international 'law' so called
+must bend. The absolute sovereignty of the state is necessary for its
+absolute power; and that absolute sovereignty cannot be bound by _any_
+obligation, even of its own making. Every treaty or promise made by a
+state, Treitschke holds, is to be understood as limited by the proviso
+_rebus sic stantibus_. 'A state cannot bind its will for the future over
+against other states.' International treaties are no absolute
+limitation, but a voluntary self-limitation of the state, and only for
+such time as the state may find to be convenient. The state has no judge
+set over it, and any 'legal' obligation it may incur is in the last
+resort subject to its own decision--in other words, to its own
+repudiation.[180] That the end justifies the means (in other words, that
+the maintenance of the German Empire as it stands justifies the
+violation of an international obligation) 'has a certain truth'. 'It is
+ridiculous to advise a state which is in competition with other states
+to start by taking the catechism into its hands.' All these hints of his
+master were adopted and expanded by Bernhardi, the faithful disciple of
+Treitschke, whose Berlin lectures were attended in the last quarter of
+the nineteenth century by soldiers and officials as well as by students.
+There is no such thing, Bernhardi feels, as universal international law.
+'Each nation evolves its own conception of Right (_Recht_): none can say
+that one nation has a better conception than another.' 'No
+self-respecting nation would sacrifice its own conception of Right' to
+any international rule: 'by so doing it would renounce its own highest
+ideals.' The ardent nationalism which will reject foreign words and
+foreign wares will reject international law as something 'foreign'.
+Again, Bernhardi makes play with the proviso _rebus sic stantibus_; and
+this, curiously enough, he does in reference to Belgium. Things are
+altered in Belgium, and therefore the plighted word of Germany may no
+longer be binding. 'When Belgium was proclaimed neutral, no one
+contemplated that she would lay claim to a large and valuable region of
+Africa. It may well be asked whether the acquisition of such territory
+is not _ipso facto_ a breach of neutrality.'[181]
+
+But it is the glorification of war--war aggressive as well as war
+defensive--which is the most striking result of the doctrine of the
+all-sufficing, all-embracing national state. In the index to
+Treitschke's _Politik_, under the word War, one reads the following
+headings--'its sanctity'; 'to be conceived as an ordinance set by God';
+'is the most powerful maker of nations'; 'is politics _par excellence_'.
+Two functions, says Treitschke, the state exists to discharge; and these
+are to administer law, and to make war. Of the two war, since it is
+politics _par excellence_, would appear to be the greater. War cannot be
+thought or wished out of the world: it is the only medicine for a sick
+nation. When we are sunk in the selfish individualism of peace, war
+comes to make us realize that we are members one of another. 'Therein
+lies the majesty of war, that the petty individual altogether vanishes
+before the great thought of the state.' War alone makes us realize the
+social organism to which we belong: 'it is political idealism which
+demands war.' And again, 'what a perversion of morality it were, if one
+struck out of humanity heroism'(_Heldentum_)--as if _Heldentum_ could
+not exist in peace! 'But the living God will see to it that war shall
+always recur as a terrible medicine for humanity.'
+
+Thus the idealization of the state as power results in the idealization
+of war. As we have seen that the state must be 'power' in order to
+preserve itself at all, we now find that it must be a war-state to
+preserve itself from 'sickness'. If it does not fight, individualism
+will triumph over the social organism; heroism will perish out of the
+world. Hence Bernhardi writes: 'the maintenance of peace never can or
+may be the goal of a policy'. War, war--the 'strong medicine', the
+teacher of heroism, and, as Bernhardi adds to Treitschke, the inevitable
+biological law, the force that spreads the finest culture--war is the
+law of humanity. And this war is offensive as well as defensive--
+primarily, indeed, offensive. For the growing nation must preserve
+all its new members in its bosom: it must not let them slip away
+by emigration to foreign soils. It must therefore find for itself
+colonies; and since the world is already largely occupied, it must find
+them by conquest from other powers.[182] Treitschke already cried the
+watchwords--'Colonies!' 'Sea-power to gain colonies!' Treitschke already
+designated England as the object of German attack, and began to instil
+in Germany a hatred of England. England blocked the way to the growth of
+Germany from a European into a World-power; Germany, to preserve intact
+for German culture the surplus of the growing population, must be a
+World-power or perish. And besides, England was a 'sick' state--a sham,
+an hypocrisy.[183]
+
+The whole philosophy seems paganism, or rather barbarism, with a moral
+veneer. It seems barbarism, because it brings us back to the good old
+days when mere might was right. Bernhardi, speaking of the right of
+conquest of new territory inherent in a growing people, tells us that in
+such cases 'might is at once the supreme right, and the dispute as to
+what is right is decided by the arbitrament of war', which gives a
+'biologically just decision'! And he expresses wonder and surprise at
+those who think that 'the weak nation is to have the same right to live
+as the powerful and vigorous nation'. In a word, then, might is right.
+The doctrine has in itself a rude barbaric simplicity: what is utterly
+revolting in the neo-Germanic presentment is its moral veneer--the talk
+of war as the fruit of 'political idealism' and the expression of the
+'social organism': the talk of 'historical development' as invalidating
+supposed 'rights' like the neutrality of Belgium; above all, the talk of
+power as 'the vehicle of the highest culture'. Treitschke, a stern
+Protestant, seeks to reconcile the doctrine with Christianity; but the
+doctrine is all the same pagan. It is the worship of brute force
+disguised as _Heldentum_, and of vicious cunning disguised as political
+morality: it is a mixture of Nietzsche[184] and of Machiavelli. It is a
+doctrine of the omnipotence of the super-nation, which 'to maintain its
+state', as Machiavelli said, 'will go to work against faith and charity
+and humanity and religion', and which will stride ruthlessly to war when
+'the day' comes. And when it goes to war, all the veneer of culture
+goes. 'Have a care', Mommsen once said, 'lest in this state, which has
+been at once a power in arms and a power in intelligence, the
+intelligence should vanish, and nothing but the pure military state
+should remain.' Mommsen's warning has come true in August, 1914. By
+their fruits ye shall know them. The fruits of _Heldentum_ are Louvain
+smoking in ashes to the sky.
+
+It has seemed worth while to describe this philosophy of life, because
+it is not only the philosophy of a professor like Treitschke, but also
+that of a soldier like Bernhardi; and not only so, but it is the
+philosophy of the Prussian Government. Even the Imperial Chancellor
+himself used this doctrine (with some qualms, it is true) to justify
+Germany in 'hewing its way' through Belgium. Let us only remember, in
+justice to a great people, that it is not really the doctrine of
+Germany, but rather the doctrine of Prussia (though Treitschke will tell
+us that Germany is 'just merely an extended Prussia'). And let us
+remember, in extenuation of Prussia, that she has suffered from two
+things--geographical pressure springing from her mid-European situation,
+and an evil tradition of ruthless conquest perpetuated by her
+Hohenzollern rulers since the days of the Great Elector, and especially
+since Frederic the Great. Geographical pressure on all sides has made
+Prussia feel herself in a state of chronic strangulation; and a man who
+feels strangled will struggle ruthlessly for breath. To get breathing
+space, to secure frontiers which would ease an intolerable pressure,
+Frederic the Great could seize Silesia in time of peace in spite of his
+father's guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction, and could suggest the
+partition of Poland. Frontier pressure thus led to ruthless conquest
+irrespective of rights; and that tradition has sunk deep. It has been
+easier for England, an island state in the West exempt from pressure, to
+think in other terms: it has been possible for Russia, secure in the
+East, to think, and to think nobly (as the present Tsar has done), of
+international obligation. Nor is it an accident that sees England and
+Russia united in the common cause of Europe to-day--that sees both
+championing the cause of small nations, one in the East, the other in
+the West.[185]
+
+But in whatever way we may excuse Prussia we must fight Prussia; and we
+fight it in the noblest cause for which men can fight. That cause is the
+public law of Europe, as a sure shield and buckler of all nations, great
+and small, and especially the small. To the doctrine of the almightiness
+of the state--to the doctrine that all means are justified which are, or
+seem, necessary to its self-preservation, we oppose the doctrine of a
+European society, or at least a European comity of nations, within which
+all states stand; we oppose the doctrine of a public law of Europe, by
+which all states are bound to respect the covenants they have made. We
+will not and cannot tolerate the view that nations are 'in the state and
+posture of gladiators' in their relations one with another; we stand for
+the reign of law.
+
+Our cause, as one would expect from a people that has fought out its own
+internal struggles under the forms of law, is a legal cause. We are a
+people in whose blood the cause of law is the vital element. It is no
+new thing in our history that we should fight for that cause. When
+England and Revolutionary France went to war in 1793, the cause, on the
+side of England, was a legal cause. We fought for the public law of
+Europe, as it had stood since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. We did
+not fight in 1870, because neither France nor Germany had infringed the
+public law of Europe by attacking the neutrality of Belgium, but we were
+ready to fight if they did. A fine cartoon in _Punch_, of August, 1870,
+shows armed England encouraging Belgium, who stands ready with spear and
+shield, with the words--'Trust me! Let us hope that they won't trouble
+you, dear friend. But if they do----' To-day they have; and England has
+drawn her sword. How could she have done otherwise, with those
+traditions of law so deep in all Anglo-Saxon blood--traditions as real
+and as vital to Anglo-Saxon America as to Anglo-Saxon England;
+traditions which are the fundamental basis of Anglo-Saxon public life
+all the world over? America once fought and beat England, in
+long-forgotten days, on the ground of law. That very ground of law--that
+law-abidingness which is as deeply engrained in the men of Massachusetts
+to-day as it is in any Britisher--is a bond of sympathy between the two
+in this great struggle of the nations.
+
+To Germans our defence of public law may seem part of the moral
+hypocrisy of which in their view we are full. What we are doing, they
+feel, is to strike at Germany, our competitor for 'world-empire', with
+its dangerous navy, while Germany is engaged in a life and death
+struggle with France and Russia. We too, they feel, are Machiavellians;
+but we have put on what Machiavelli called 'the mantle of superstition',
+the pretence of morality and law, to cover our craft. It is true that we
+are fighting for our own interest. But what is our interest? We are
+fighting for Right, because Right is our supreme interest. The new
+German political theory enunciates that 'our interest is our right'. The
+old--the very old--English political theory is, 'The Right is our
+interest'. It is true that we have everything to gain by defending the
+cause of international law. Should that prevent us from defending that
+cause? What do we not lose of precious lives in the defence?
+
+This is the case of England. England stands for the idea of a public law
+of Europe, and for the small nations which it protects. She stands for
+her own preservation, which is menaced when public law is broken, and
+the 'ages' slow-bought gain' imperilled.
+
+(Treitschke's _Politik_, lectures delivered in Berlin during the years
+1875 to 1895, was published in two volumes in 1899. General Bernhardi's
+book, _Deutschland und der nächste Krieg_, was published in 1911, and
+has been translated into English under the title _Germany and the Next
+War_. See also J.A. Cramb, _England and Germany_, 1914.)
+
+Notes:
+
+[Footnote 179: The unity of the German state is in no small measure a
+matter of artificial Prussianization. Of this Prussianization Treitschke
+was the great advocate, though he was himself ultimately of Slavonic
+origin, and immediately of Saxon birth.]
+
+[Footnote 180: We are reminded of the famous sentence in _The
+Prince_:--_Dove non è giudizio da richiamare si guarda al fine_.]
+
+[Footnote 181: Bernhardi adds: 'The conception of permanent neutrality
+is entirely contrary to the essential nature of the state, which can
+only attain its highest moral aims in competition with other states.' It
+would seem to follow that by violating the neutrality of Belgium Germany
+is helping that country to attain its highest moral aims. The suggestion
+that Belgium is no longer a neutral Power was not adopted by the German
+Government before the war, nor by Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg in his speech
+to the Reichstag on the Belgian question (see _supra_, p. 91).]
+
+[Footnote 182: It was significant that Germany, while offering to
+England at the end of July a guarantee of the integrity of the soil of
+France, would not offer any guarantee of the integrity of French
+colonies (_supra_, p. 82).]
+
+[Footnote 183: Nothing has here been said, though much might be said, of
+the distortion of history and ethnology by German nationalism, or
+Pan-Germanism. It is well known that the Pan-Germans regard England as
+Teutonic, and destined to be gathered into the German fold. In these
+last few weeks we have been reproached as a people for being traitors to
+our 'Teutonic' blood. Better be traitors to blood than to plain duty;
+but as a matter of fact our mixed blood has many other strains than the
+Teutonic. On the aims of the Pan-Germanists readers may with profit
+consult a book by Paul Vergnet, _La France en danger_ (Oct. 1913).]
+
+[Footnote 184: In fairness to Nietzsche it should be said that in his
+later years he revolted against the Prussian military system.]
+
+[Footnote 185: German professors have recently reproached England for
+being allied with 'Muscovite barbarism'. Is Russia so barbarous, whose
+sovereign convened the first Peace Conference? Have not England and
+Russia striven together in peace (as they now strive together in war)
+for a great common cause? The German White Book, which seeks to fasten
+on Russia the blame of the present war, is oblivious of all that has
+happened in these matters since 1898. The reader may with advantage
+refer, on this subject, to a pamphlet by Professor Vinogradoff, _Russia:
+the Psychology of a Nation_ (Oxford, 1914).]
+
+
+
+
+EPILOGUE
+
+
+In conclusion something must be said of the process by which our
+understanding with France, still so elastic in 1912 and 1913, became the
+solid alliance which now, on sea and land alike, confronts the German
+forces. England gave France no positive engagements until the eleventh
+hour; it may be argued that England gave them far too late, and that the
+war might never have occurred if England had been less obstinately and
+judicially pacific. But the English case for the delay is clear. We
+hesitated to throw in our lot with France, because France would not
+stand neutral while Germany made war on Russia. We shrank from the
+incalculable entanglements which seemed to lie before us if we allied
+ourselves with a power which was so committed. Why, we were asking
+ourselves, should we fight the battles of Russia in the Balkans?
+
+We were perhaps too cautious in suspecting that France might contemplate
+this policy. She could not define beforehand the limits which she would
+observe in defending Russia's cause. But she knew, as we now know, that
+a war with Russia meant, to German statesmen, only a pretext for a new
+attack on France, even more deadly in intention than that of 1870.
+France could not do without the help of Russia. How then could she
+afford to forfeit Russia's friendship by declaring, at Germany's
+command, that she would do nothing to help Russia?
+
+This loyalty to the Dual Alliance left France during the last days
+before the war in a cruel dilemma. Russia, however well disposed, could
+not help her ally in the first weeks of a war; and for France these were
+the critical weeks, the weeks upon which her own fate must depend. She
+appealed urgently to England for support.
+
+But, even on July 31st, the English Cabinet replied that it could make
+no definite engagement. This answer, it is true, had been foreshadowed
+in earlier communications. Sir Edward Grey had made it abundantly clear
+that there could be no prospect of common action unless France were
+exposed to 'an unprovoked attack', and no certainty of such action even
+in that case. But France had staked everything upon the justice of her
+cause. She had felt that her pacific intentions were clear to all the
+world; and that England could not, with any self-respect, refuse
+assistance. The French mobilization had been delayed until July 31st, to
+convince the British Cabinet of French good faith; and the French fleet
+had been left in the Mediterranean to guard the interests of England no
+less than those of France. We can imagine how bitter was the
+disappointment with which France received the English answer of July
+31st.
+
+But we were loyal to our obligations as we understood them. If our
+answers to France were guarded, our answers to the German overtures of
+July 29th and August 1st show that we were fighting the battle of France
+with diplomatic weapons. On August 2nd we went still further, by
+undertaking to defend the French coasts and shipping, if the German
+fleet should come into the Channel or through the North Sea. To justify
+our position of reserve from July 31st to August 4th we may quote what
+Mr. Asquith said the other day (September 4th):--
+
+    'No one who has not been in that position can realize the strength,
+    the energy, and the persistence with which we laboured for peace. We
+    persevered by every expedient that diplomacy could suggest,
+    straining almost to breaking-point our most cherished friendships
+    and obligations.'
+
+Those efforts failed. We know to-day that mediation had never any
+prospects of success, because Germany had resolved that it should not
+succeed. Ought we to have known this from the first? It is easy to be
+wise after the event. But in England we have Cabinet government and we
+have Parliamentary government. Before an English minister can act, in a
+matter of national importance, no matter how positive his own
+convictions may be, he must convince his colleagues, and they must feel
+certain of convincing a democracy which is essentially pacific,
+cautious, slow to move. Nothing short of the German attack on Belgium
+would have convinced the ordinary Englishman that German statesmanship
+had degenerated into piracy. That proof was given us on August 4th; and
+on that day we sent our ultimatum to Berlin.
+
+To-day all England is convinced; and we are fighting back to back with
+the French for their national existence and our own. Our own, because
+England's existence depends not only on her sea-power, but upon the
+maintenance of European state-law. The military spirit which we have
+described above (Chap. VI) tramples upon the rights of nations because
+it sees a foe in every equal; because it regards the prosperity of a
+neighbour as a national misfortune; because it holds that national
+greatness is only to be realized in the act of destroying or absorbing
+other nationalities. To those who are not yet visibly assailed, and who
+possibly believe themselves secure, we can only give the warning: _Tua
+res agitur, paries cum proximus ardet_.
+
+Of the issue England is not afraid. The most unfavourable issue would
+find her still convinced that she has taken the only course compatible
+with honour and with public law. Military anarchism shall be destroyed
+if England, France, and Russia can destroy it. On this object England
+and France have staked their last ship and their last soldier. But, it
+may be asked, what state-system do we hope to establish, if and when we
+are successful in this great crusade?
+
+What England not only desires but needs, and needs imperatively, is,
+first, the restitution to Belgium of her former status and whatever else
+can be restored of all that she has sacrificed. This is the
+indispensable preliminary to any form of settlement. The next essential
+is an adequate guarantee to France that she shall never experience such
+another invasion as we have seen in August, 1914; without a France which
+is prosperous, secure, and independent, European civilization would be
+irreparably maimed and stunted. The third essential, as essential as the
+other two, is the conservation of those other nations which can only
+exist on sufferance so long as _Realpolitik_ is practised with impunity.
+
+To minor nationalities it should be clear that England is their friend,
+and cannot choose but stand their friend. Three times in her history she
+has made war upon a would-be despot of the Continent, treating the
+'Balance of Power' as a principle for which no sacrifice could be too
+great. In these struggles she assisted the small Powers, less from
+altruism than because their interest was her own. She supported Holland
+against Philip II of Spain and against Louis XIV; against Napoleon she
+supported not Holland only, but also Portugal and, to the best of her
+power, Switzerland and Piedmont.
+
+We do not argue--it would be absurd to argue--that England has always
+been free from reproach in her dealings with the smaller states. Holland
+may well remember the naval conflicts of the seventeenth century and the
+English Navigation Laws. But Holland should also remember that, in the
+seventeenth century, England was not yet a great Power; Holland and
+England fought as rivals and on equal terms, in a feud which subsequent
+alliances have healed, over a policy which England has long since
+renounced as mischievous and futile. On Denmark we inflicted a great
+wrong in 1807; it can only be extenuated by the fact, which Denmark
+knows now though she did not know it then, that Napoleon had conspired
+with Russia to seize the Danish fleet and use it against England.
+Denmark, indeed, has better cause to complain that we gave her no
+assistance in 1864. That mistake--for it was a mistake of weakness, not
+deliberate treachery--has brought its own nemesis. We are still paying
+for that particular mistake, and we are not likely to forget the lesson.
+The case of Schleswig-Holstein shows how the losses of such a state as
+Denmark may react on such a state as England.
+
+England cannot afford that her weaker neighbours should become less
+prosperous or less independent than they are. So far as the long arm of
+naval power reaches, England is bound to give them whatever help she
+can. From motives of self-preservation, if on no other ground, she could
+not tolerate their subordination to such a power as Germany aspires to
+found. Her quarrel is not with the German people, but with the political
+system for which the German Empire, in its present temper, stands. That
+system England is bound to resist, no matter by what power it is
+adopted.
+
+English sympathies and English traditions are here at one with English
+interests. England is proud to recollect how she befriended struggling
+nationalities in the nineteenth century. She did not support Greece and
+Italy for the sake of any help that they could give her. The goodwill of
+England to Holland, to Switzerland, to the Scandinavian states, is
+largely based upon their achievements in science and art and literature.
+They have proved that they can serve the higher interests of humanity.
+They have contributed to the growth of that common civilization which
+links together the small powers and the great with bonds more sacred and
+more durable than those of race, of government, of material interest. In
+this fraternity each nation has a duty to the rest. If we have harped on
+England's interest, it must not for a moment be supposed that we have
+forgotten England's duty. But England stands to-day in this fortunate
+position, that her duty and her interest combine to impel her in the
+same direction.
+
+
+
+
+APPENDIX I
+
+
+GERMANY'S REASONS
+
+FOR
+
+WAR WITH RUSSIA
+
+
+How Russia and her Ruler betrayed Germany's confidence and thereby made
+the European War.
+
+WITH THE ORIGINAL TELEGRAMS
+AND NOTES.
+
+Druck und Verlag: Liebheit & Thiesen, Berlin.
+
+Foreign Office,
+Berlin, August 1914.
+
+On June 28th the Austro-Hungarian successor to the throne, Arch-Duke
+Franz Ferdinand, and his wife, the Duchess of Hohenberg, were
+assassinated by a member of a band of servian conspirators. The
+investigation of the crime through the Austro-Hungarian authorities has
+yielded the fact that the conspiracy against the life of the Arch-Duke
+and successor to the throne was prepared and abetted in Belgrade with
+the cooperation of Servian officials, and executed with arms from the
+Servian State arsenal. This crime must have opened the eyes of the
+entire civilized world, not only in regard to the aims of the Servian
+policies directed against the conservation and integrity of the
+Austro-Hungarian monarchy, but also concerning the criminal means which
+the pan-Serb propaganda in Servia had no hesitation in employing for the
+achievement of these aims.
+
+The goal of these policies was the gradual revolutionizing and final
+separation of the south-easterly districts from the Austro-Hungarian
+monarchy and their union with Servia. This direction of Servias policy
+has not been altered in the least in spite of the repeated and solemn
+declarations of Servia in which it vouchsafed a change in these policies
+toward Austria-Hungary as well as the cultivation of good and neighborly
+relations.
+
+In this manner for the third time in the course of the last 6 years
+Servia has led Europe to the brink of a world-war.
+
+It could only do this because it believed itself supported in its
+intentions by Russia.
+
+Russia soon after the events brought about by the Turkish revolution of
+1908, endeavored to found a union of the Balcan states under Russian
+patronage and directed against the existence of Turkey. This union which
+succeeded in 1911 in driving out Turkey from a greater part of her
+European possessions, collapsed over the question of the distribution of
+spoils. The Russian policies were not dismayed over this failure.
+According to the idea of the Russian statesmen a new Balcan union under
+Russian patronage should be called into existence, headed no longer
+against Turkey, now dislodged from the Balcan, but against the existence
+of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. It was the idea that Servia should
+cede to Bulgaria those parts of Macedonia which it had received during
+the last Balcan war, in exchange for Bosnia and the Herzegovina which
+were to be taken from Austria. To oblige Bulgaria to fall in with this
+plan it was to be isolated, Roumania attached to Russia with the aid of
+French propaganda, and Servia promised Bosnia and the Herzegovina.
+
+Under these circumstances it was clear to Austria that it was not
+compatible with the dignity and the spirit of self-preservation of the
+monarchy to view idly any longer this agitation across the border. The
+Imperial and Royal Government appraised Germany of this conception and
+asked for our opinion. With all our heart we were able to agree with our
+allys estimate of the situation, and assure him that any action
+considered necessary to end the movement in Servia directed against the
+conservation of the monarchy would meet with our approval.
+
+We were perfectly aware that a possible warlike attitude of
+Austria-Hungary against Servia might bring Russia upon the field, and
+that it might therefore involve us in a war, in accordance with our duty
+as allies. We could not, however, in these vital interests of
+Austria-Hungary, which were at stake, advise our ally to take a yielding
+attitude not compatible with his dignity, nor deny him our assistance in
+these trying days. We could do this all the less as our own interests
+were menaced through the continued Serb agitation. If the Serbs
+continued with the aid of Russia and France to menace the existence of
+Austria-Hungary, the gradual collapse of Austria and the subjection of
+all the Slavs under one Russian sceptre would be the consequence, thus
+making untenable the position of the Teutonic race in Central Europe. A
+morally weakened Austria under the pressure of Russian pan-slavism would
+be no longer an ally on whom we could count and in whom we could have
+confidence, as we must be able to have, in view of the ever more
+menacing attitude of our easterly and westerly neighbors. We, therefore,
+permitted Austria a completely free hand in her action towards Servia
+but have not participated in her preparations.
+
+Austria chose the method of presenting to the Servian Government a note,
+in which the direct connection between the murder at Sarajevo and the
+pan-Serb movement, as not only countenanced but actively supported by
+the Servian Government, was explained, and in which a complete cessation
+of this agitation, as well as a punishment of the guilty, was requested.
+At the same time Austria-Hungary demanded as necessary guarantee for the
+accomplishment of her desire the participation of some Austrian
+officials in the preliminary examination on Servian territory and the
+final dissolution of the pan-Serb societies agitating against
+Austria-Hungary. The Imperial and Royal Government gave a period of 48
+hours for the unconditional acceptance of its demands.
+
+The Servian Government started the mobilization of its army one day
+after the transmission of the Austro-Hungarian note.
+
+As after the stipulated date the Servian Government rendered a reply
+which, though complying in some points with the conditions of
+Austria-Hungary, yet showed in all essentials the endeavor through
+procrastination and new negotiations to escape from the just demands of
+the monarchy, the latter discontinued her diplomatic relations with
+Servia without indulging in further negotiations or accepting further
+Servian assurances, whose value, to its loss, she had sufficiently
+experienced.
+
+From this moment Austria was in fact in a state of war with Servia,
+which it proclaimed officially on the 28th of July by declaring war.
+
+[Sidenote: see exhibits 1 & 2.]
+
+From the beginning of the conflict we assumed the position that there
+were here concerned the affairs of Austria alone, which it would have to
+settle with Servia. We therefore directed our efforts toward the
+localizing of the war, and toward convincing the other powers that
+Austria-Hungary had to appeal to arms in justifiable self-defence,
+forced upon her by the conditions. We emphatically took the position
+that no civilized country possessed the right to stay the arm of Austria
+in this struggle with barbarism and political crime, and to shield the
+Servians against their just punishment. In this sense we instructed our
+representatives with the foreign powers.
+
+[Sidenote: see exhibit 3.]
+
+Simultaneously the Austro-Hungarian Government communicated to the
+Russian Government that the step undertaken against Servia implied
+merely a defensive measure against the Serb agitation, but that
+Austria-Hungary must of necessity demand guarantees for a continued
+friendly behavior of Servia towards the monarchy. Austria-Hungary had no
+intention whatsoever to shift the balance of power in the Balcan.
+
+In answer to our declaration that the German Government desired, and
+aimed at, a localization of the conflict, both the French and the
+English Governments promised an action in the same direction. But these
+endeavors did not succeed in preventing the interposition of Russia in
+the Austro-Servian disagreement.
+
+[Sidenote: see exhibits 4 & 5.]
+
+The Russian Government submitted an official communiqué on July 24th,
+according to which Russia could not possibly remain indifferent in the
+Servio-Austrian conflict. The same was declared by the Russian Secretary
+of Foreign Affairs, M. Sasonow, to the German Ambassador, Count
+Pourtalès, in the afternoon of July 26th. The German Government declared
+again, through its Ambassador at St. Petersburg, that Austria-Hungary
+had no desire for conquest and only wished peace at her frontiers. After
+the official explanation by Austria-Hungary to Russia that it did not
+claim territorial gain in Servia, the decision concerning the peace of
+the world rested exclusively with St. Petersburg.
+
+[Sidenote: see exhibits 6, 7, 8, 9.]
+
+The same day the first news of Russian mobilization reached Berlin in
+the evening.
+
+[Sidenote: see exhibits 10, 10a, 10b.]
+
+The German Ambassadors at London, Paris, and St. Petersburg were
+instructed to energetically point out the danger of this Russian
+mobilization. The Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg was also
+directed to make the following declaration to the Russian Government:
+
+    "Preparatory military measures by Russia will force us to
+    counter-measures which must consist in mobilizing the army.
+
+    "But mobilization means war.
+
+    "As we know the obligations of France towards Russia, this
+    mobilization would be directed against both Russia and France. We
+    cannot assume that Russia desires to unchain such a European war.
+    Since Austria-Hungary will not touch the existence of the Servian
+    kingdom, we are of the opinion that Russia can afford to assume an
+    attitude of waiting. We can all the more support the desire of
+    Russia to protect the integrity of Servia as Austria-Hungary does
+    not intend to question the latter. It will be easy in the further
+    development of the affair to find a basis for an understanding."
+
+[Sidenote: see exhibit 11.]
+
+On July 27th the Russian Secretary of War, M. Ssuchomlinow, gave the
+German military attaché his word of honor that no order to mobilize had
+been issued, merely preparations were being made, but not a horse
+mustered, nor reserves called in. If Austria-Hungary crossed the Servian
+frontier, the military districts directed towards Austria, i.e. Kiev,
+Odessa, Moscow, Kazan, would be mobilized, under no circumstances those
+situated on the German frontier, i.e. St. Petersburg, Vilna, and Warsaw.
+Upon inquiry into the object of the mobilization against
+Austria-Hungary, the Russian Minister of War replied by shrugging his
+shoulders and referring to the diplomats. The military attaché then
+pointed to these mobilization measures against Austria-Hungary as
+extremely menacing also for Germany.
+
+In the succeeding days news concerning Russian mobilization came at a
+rapid rate. Among it was also news about preparations on the
+German-Russian frontier, as for instance the announcement of the state
+of war in Kovno, the departure of the Warsaw garrison, and the
+strengthening of the Alexandrovo garrison.
+
+On July 27th, the first information was received concerning preparatory
+measures taken by France: the 14th Corps discontinued the manoeuvres and
+returned to its garrison.
+
+In the meantime we had endeavored to localize the conflict by most
+emphatic steps.
+
+[Sidenote: see exhibit 12.]
+
+On July 26th, Sir Edward Grey had made the proposal to submit the
+differences between Austria-Hungary and Servia to a conference of the
+Ambassadors of Germany, France, and Italy under his chairmanship. We
+declared in regard to this proposal that we could not, however much we
+approved the idea, participate in such a conference, as we could not
+call Austria in her dispute with Servia before a European tribunal.
+
+France consented to the proposal of Sir Edward Grey, but it foundered
+upon Austria's declining it, as was to be expected.
+
+[Sidenote: see exhibit 13.]
+
+Faithful to our principle that mediation should not extend to the
+Austro-Servian conflict, which is to be considered as a purely
+Austro-Hungarian affair, but merely to the relations between
+Austria-Hungary and Russia, we continued our endeavors to bring about an
+understanding between these two powers.
+
+[Sidenote: see exhibits 15 & 16.]
+
+We further declared ourselves ready, after failure of the conference
+idea, to transmit a second proposal of Sir Edward Grey's to Vienna in
+which he suggested Austria-Hungary should decide that either the Servian
+reply was sufficient, or that it be used as a basis for further
+negotiations. The Austro-Hungarian Government remarked with full
+appreciation of our action that it had come too late, the hostilities
+having already been opened.
+
+In spite of this we continued our attempts to the utmost, and we advised
+Vienna to show every possible advance compatible with the dignity of the
+monarchy.
+
+Unfortunately, all these proposals were overtaken by the military
+preparations of Russia and France.
+
+[Sidenote: see exhibit 17.]
+
+On July 29th, the Russian Government made the official notification in
+Berlin that four army districts had been mobilized. At the same time
+further news was received concerning rapidly progressing military
+preparations of France, both on water and on land.
+
+On the same day the Imperial Ambassador in St. Petersburg had an
+interview with the Russian Foreign Secretary, in regard to which he
+reported by telegraph, as follows:
+
+    "The Secretary tried to persuade me that I should urge my Government
+    to participate in a quadruple conference to find means to induce
+    Austria-Hungary to give up those demands which touch upon the
+    sovereignty of Servia. I could merely promise to report the
+    conversation and took the position that, after Russia had decided
+    upon the baneful step of mobilization, every exchange of ideas
+    appeared now extremely difficult, if not impossible. Besides, Russia
+    now was demanding from us in regard to Austria-Hungary the same
+    which Austria-Hungary was being blamed for with regard to Servia,
+    i.e. an infraction of sovereignty. Austria-Hungary having promised
+    to consider the Russian interests by disclaiming any territorial
+    aspiration,--a great concession on the part of a state engaged in
+    war--should therefore be permitted to attend to its affair with
+    Servia alone. There would be time at the peace conference to return
+    to the matter of forbearance towards the sovereignty of Servia.
+
+    "I added very solemnly that at this moment the entire Austro-Servian
+    affair was eclipsed by the danger of a general European
+    conflagration, and I endeavored to present to the Secretary the
+    magnitude of this danger.
+
+    "It was impossible to dissuade Sasonow from the idea that Servia
+    could not now be deserted by Russia".
+
+On July 29th, the German Military Attache at St. Petersburg wired the
+following report on a conversation with the Chief of the General Staff
+of the Russian army:
+
+    "The Chief of the General Staff has asked me to call on him, and he
+    has told me that he has just come from His Majesty. He has been
+    requested by the Secretary of War to reiterate once more that
+    everything had remained as the Secretary had informed me two days
+    ago. He offered confirmation in writing and gave me his word of
+    honor in the most solemn manner that nowhere there had been a
+    mobilization, viz. calling in of a single man or horse up to the
+    present time, i.e. 3 o'clock in the afternoon. He could not assume a
+    guaranty for the future, but he could emphasize that in the fronts
+    directed towards our frontiers His Majesty desired no mobilization.
+
+    "As, however, I had received here many pieces of news concerning the
+    calling in of the reserves in different parts of the country also in
+    Warsaw and in Vilna, I told the general that his statements placed
+    me before a riddle. On his officers word of honor he replied that
+    such news was wrong, but that possibly here and there a false alarm
+    might have been given.
+
+    "I must consider this conversation as an attempt to mislead us as to
+    the extent of the measures hitherto taken in view of the abundant
+    and positive information about the calling in of reserves."
+
+In reply to various inquiries concerning reasons for its threatening
+attitude, the Russian Government repeatedly pointed out that
+Austria-Hungary had commenced no conversation in St. Petersburg. The
+Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in St. Petersburg was therefore instructed
+on July 29th, at our suggestion, to enter into such conversation with
+Sasonow. Count Szápáry was empowered to explain to the Russian minister
+the note to Servia though it had been overtaken by the state of war, and
+to accept any suggestion on the part of Russia as well as to discuss
+with Sasonow all questions touching directly upon the Austro-Russian
+relations.
+
+[Sidenote: see exhibit 19.]
+
+Shoulder to shoulder with England we labored incessantly and supported
+every proposal in Vienna from which we hoped to gain the possibility of
+a peaceable solution of the conflict. We even as late as the 30th of
+July forwarded the English proposal to Vienna, as basis for
+negotiations, that Austria-Hungary should dictate her conditions in
+Servia, i.e. after her march into Servia. We thought that Russia would
+accept this basis.
+
+During the interval from July 29th to July 31st there appeared renewed
+and cumulative news concerning Russian measures of mobilization.
+Accumulation of troops on the East Prussian frontier and the declaration
+of the state of war over all important parts of the Russian west
+frontier allowed no further doubt that the Russian mobilization was in
+full swing against us, while simultaneously all such measures were
+denied to our representative in St. Petersburg on word of honor.
+
+Nay, even before the reply from Vienna regarding the Anglo-German
+mediation whose tendencies and basis must have been known in St.
+Petersburg, could possibly have been received in Berlin, Russia ordered
+a general mobilization.
+
+[Sidenote: see exhibits 18, 20, 21, 22, 23.]
+
+During the same days, there took place between His Majesty the Kaiser,
+and Czar Nicolas an exchange of telegrams in which His Majesty called
+the attention of the Czar to the menacing character of the Russian
+mobilization during the continuance of his own mediating activities.
+
+On July 31st, the Czar directed the following telegram to His Majesty
+the Kaiser:
+
+    "I thank You cordially for Your mediation which permits the hope
+    that everything may yet end peaceably. It is technically impossible
+    to discontinue our military preparations which have been made
+    necessary by the Austrian mobilization. It is far from us to want
+    war. As long as the negotiations between Austria and Servia
+    continue, my troops will undertake no provocative action. I give You
+    my solemn word thereon. I confide with all my faith in the grace of
+    God, and I hope for the success of Your mediation in Vienna for the
+    welfare of our countries and the peace of Europe.
+
+    "Your cordially devoted
+
+    "Nicolas."
+
+This telegram of the Czar crossed with the following, sent by H.M. the
+Kaiser, also on July 31st, at 2 p.m.:
+
+    "Upon Your appeal to my friendship and Your request for my aid I
+    have engaged in mediation between Your Government and the Government
+    of Austria-Hungary. While this action was taking place, Your troops
+    were being mobilized against my ally Austria-Hungary, whereby, as I
+    have already communicated to You, my mediation has become almost
+    illusory. In spite of this, I have continued it, and now I receive
+    reliable news that serious preparations for war are going on on my
+    eastern frontier. The responsibility for the security of my country
+    forces me to measures of defence. I have gone to the extreme limit
+    of the possible in my efforts for the preservation of the peace of
+    the world. It is not I who bear the responsibility for the
+    misfortune which now threatens the entire civilized world. It rests
+    in Your hand to avert it. No one threatens the honor and peace of
+    Russia which might well have awaited the success of my mediation.
+    The friendship for You and Your country, bequeathed to me by my
+    grand-father on his deathbed, has always been sacred to me, and I
+    have stood faithfully by Russia while it was in serious affliction,
+    especially during its last war. The peace of Europe can still be
+    preserved by You if Russia decides to discontinue those military
+    preparations which menace Germany and Austria-Hungary."
+
+Before this telegram reached its destination, the mobilization of all
+the Russian forces, obviously directed against us and already ordered
+during the afternoon of the 31st of July, was in full swing.
+Notwithstanding, the telegram of the Czar was sent at 2 o'clock that
+same afternoon.
+
+[Sidenote: see exhibit 24.]
+
+After the Russian general mobilization became known in Berlin, the
+Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg was instructed on the afternoon of
+July 31st to explain to the Russian Government that Germany declared the
+state of war as counter-measure against the general mobilization of the
+Russian army and navy which must be followed by mobilization if Russia
+did not cease its military measures against Germany and Austria-Hungary
+within 12 hours, and notified Germany thereof.
+
+[Sidenote: see exhibit 25.]
+
+At the same time the Imperial Ambassador in Paris was instructed to
+demand from the French Government a declaration within 18 hours, whether
+it would remain neutral in a Russo-German war.
+
+The Russian Government destroyed through its mobilization, menacing the
+security of our country, the laborious action at mediation of the
+European cabinets. The Russian mobilization in regard to the seriousness
+of which the Russian Government was never allowed by us to entertain a
+doubt, in connection with its continued denial, shows clearly that
+Russia wanted war.
+
+The Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg delivered his note to M.
+Sasonow on July 31st at 12 o'clock midnight.
+
+The reply of the Russian Government has never reached us.
+
+Two hours after the expiration of the time limit the Czar telegraphed to
+H.M. the Kaiser, as follows:
+
+    "I have received Your telegram. I comprehend that You are forced to
+    mobilize, but I should like to have from You the same guaranty which
+    I have given You, viz., that these measures do not mean war, and
+    that we shall continue to negotiate for the welfare of our two
+    countries and the universal peace which is so dear to our hearts.
+    With the aid of God it must be possible to our long tried friendship
+    to prevent the shedding of blood. I expect with full confidence Your
+    urgent reply."
+
+To this H.M. the Kaiser replied:
+
+    "I thank You for Your telegram. I have shown yesterday to Your
+    Government the way through which alone war may yet be averted.
+    Although I asked for a reply by to-day noon, no telegram from my
+    Ambassador has reached me with the reply of Your Government. I
+    therefore have been forced to mobilize my army. An immediate, clear
+    and unmistakable reply of Your Government is the sole way to avoid
+    endless misery. Until I receive this reply I am unable, to my great
+    grief, to enter upon the subject of Your telegram. I must ask most
+    earnestly that You, without delay, order Your troops to commit,
+    under no circumstances, the slightest violation of our frontiers."
+
+As the time limit given to Russia had expired without the receipt of a
+reply to our inquiry, H.M. the Kaiser ordered the mobilization of the
+entire German Army and Navy on August 1st at 5 p.m.
+
+[Sidenote: see exhibit 25.]
+
+The German Ambassador at St. Petersburg was instructed that, in the
+event of the Russian Government not giving a satisfactory reply within
+the stipulated time, he should declare that we considered ourselves in a
+state of war after the refusal of our demands. However, before a
+confirmation of the execution of this order had been received, that is
+to say, already in the afternoon of August 1st, i.e., the same afternoon
+on which the telegram of the Czar, cited above, was sent, Russian troops
+crossed our frontier and marched into German territory.
+
+Thus Russia began the war against us.
+
+Meanwhile the Imperial Ambassador in Paris put our question to the
+French Cabinet on July 31st at 7 p.m.
+
+[Sidenote: see exhibit 27.]
+
+The French Prime Minister gave an equivocal and unsatisfactory reply on
+August 1st at 1. p.m. which gave no clear idea of the position of
+France, as he limited himself to the explanation that France would do
+that which her interests demanded. A few hours later, at 5 p.m., the
+mobilization of the entire French army and navy was ordered.
+
+On the morning of the next day France opened hostilities.
+
+
+THE ORIGINAL TELEGRAMS AND NOTES.
+
+
+THE NOTE OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY TO SERVIA.
+
+Presented July 23rd in Belgrade.
+
+"On March 31st, 1909, the Royal Servian Minister to the Court of Vienna
+made the following statement, by order of his Government:
+
+"Servia declares that she is not affected in her rights by the situation
+established in Bosnia, and that she will therefore adapt herself to the
+decisions which the powers are going to arrive at in reference to Art.
+25 of the Berlin Treaty. By following the councils of the powers, Servia
+binds herself to cease the attitude of protest and resistence which she
+has assumed since last October, relative to the annexation, and she
+binds herself further to change the direction of her present policies
+towards Austria-Hungary, and, in the future, to live with the latter in
+friendly and neighborly relations.
+
+"The history of the last years, and especially the painful events of
+June 28th, have demonstrated the existence of a subversive movement in
+Servia whose aim it is to separate certain territories from the
+Austro-Hungarian monarchy. This movement, which developed under the eyes
+of the Servian Government, has found expression subsequently beyond the
+territory of the kingdom, in acts of terrorism, a series of
+assassinations and murders.
+
+"Far from fulfilling the formal obligations contained in the declaration
+of March 31st, 1909, the Royal Servian Government has done nothing to
+suppress this movement. She suffered the criminal doings of the various
+societies and associations directed against the monarchy, the unbridled
+language of the press, the glorification of the originators of
+assassinations, the participation of officers and officials in
+subversive intrigues; she suffered the unwholesome propaganda in public
+education, and lastly permitted all manifestations which would mislead
+the Servian people into hatred of the monarchy and into contempt for its
+institutions.
+
+"This sufferance of which the Royal Servian Government made itself
+guilty, has lasted up to the moment in which the events of June 28th
+demonstrated to the entire world the ghastly consequences of such
+sufferance.
+
+"_It becomes plain from the evidence and confessions of the criminal
+authors of the outrage of June 28th, that the murder at Sarajevo was
+conceived in Belgrade, that the murderers received the arms and bombs
+with which they were equipped, from Servian officers and officials who
+belonged to the Narodna Odbrana, and that, lastly, the transportation of
+the criminals and their arms to Bosnia was arranged and carried out by
+leading Servian frontier officials._
+
+"The cited results of the investigation do not permit the Imperial and
+Royal Government to observe any longer the attitude of waiting, which it
+has assumed for years towards those agitations which have their centre
+in Belgrade, and which from there radiate into the territory of the
+monarchy. These results, on the contrary, impose upon the Imperial and
+Royal Government the duty to terminate intrigues which constitute a
+permanent menace for the peace of the monarchy.
+
+"In order to obtain this purpose, the Imperial and Royal Government is
+forced to demand official assurance from the Servian Government that it
+condemns the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary, i.e. the
+entirety of the machinations whose aim it is to separate parts from the
+monarchy which belong to it, and that she binds herself to suppress with
+all means this criminal and terrorizing propaganda.
+
+"In order to give to these obligations a solemn character, the Royal
+Servian Government will publish on the first page of its official organ
+of July 26th, 1914, the following declaration:
+
+"The Royal Servian Government condemns the propaganda directed against
+Austria-Hungary, i.e. the entirety of those machinations whose aim it is
+to separate from the Austro-Hungarian monarchy territories belonging
+thereto, and she regrets sincerely the ghastly consequences of these
+criminal actions.
+
+"The Royal Servian Government regrets that Servian officers and
+officials have participated in the propaganda, cited above, and have
+thus threatened the friendly and neighborly relations which the Royal
+Government was solemnly bound to cultivate by its declaration of March
+31st, 1909.
+
+"The Royal Government which disapproves and rejects every thought or
+every attempt at influencing the destinations of the inhabitants of any
+part of Austria-Hungary, considers it its duty to call most emphatically
+to the attention of its officers and officials, and of the entire
+population of the kingdom, that it will hence-forward proceed with the
+utmost severity against any persons guilty of similar actions, to
+prevent and suppress which it will make every effort."
+
+"This explanation is to be brought simultaneously to the cognizance of
+the Royal Army through an order of H.M. the King, and it is to be
+published in the official organ of the Army.
+
+"The Royal Servian Government binds itself, in addition, as follows:
+
+"1. to suppress any publication which fosters hatred of, and contempt
+for, the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and whose general tendency is
+directed against the latters territorial integrity;
+
+"2. to proceed at once with the dissolution of the society Narodna
+Odbrana, to confiscate their entire means of propaganda, and to proceed
+in the same manner against the other societies and associations in
+Servia which occupy themselves with the propaganda against
+Austria-Hungary. The Royal Government will take the necessary measures,
+so that the dissolved societies may not continue their activities under
+another name or in another form;
+
+"3. without delay to eliminate from the public instruction in Servia, so
+far as the corps of instructors, as well as the means of instruction are
+concerned, that which serves, or may serve, to foster the propaganda
+against Austria-Hungary;
+
+"4. to remove from military service and the administration in general all
+officers and officials who are guilty of propaganda against
+Austria-Hungary, and whose names, with a communication of the material
+which the Imperial and Royal Government possesses against them, the
+Imperial and Royal Government reserves the right to communicate to the
+Royal Government;
+
+"5. to consent that in Servia officials of the Imperial and Royal
+Government co-operate in the suppression of a movement directed against
+the territorial integrity of the monarchy;
+
+"6. to commence a judicial investigation against the participants of the
+conspiracy of June 28th, who are on Servian territory. Officials,
+delegated by the Imperial and Royal Government will participate in the
+examinations;
+
+"7. to proceed at once with all severity to arrest Major Voja Tankosic
+and a certain Milan Ciganowic, Servian State officials, who have been
+compromised through the result of the investigation;
+
+"8. to prevent through effective measures the participation of the
+Servian authorities in the smuggling of arms and explosives across the
+frontier and to dismiss those officials of Shabatz and Loznica, who
+assisted the originators of the crime of Sarajevo in crossing the
+frontier;
+
+"9. to give to the Imperial and Royal Government explanations in regard
+to the unjustifiable remarks of high Servian functionaries in Servia and
+abroad who have not hesitated, in spite of their official position, to
+express themselves in interviews in a hostile manner against
+Austria-Hungary after the outrage of June 28th;
+
+"10. The Imperial and Royal Government expects a reply from the Royal
+Government at the latest until Saturday 25th inst., at 6 p.m. A memoir
+concerning the results of the investigations at Sarajevo, so far as they
+concern points 7. and 8. is enclosed with this note."
+
+ENCLOSURE.
+
+The investigation carried on against Gabrilo Princip and accomplices in
+the Court of Sarajevo, on account of the assassination on June 28th has,
+so far, yielded the following results:
+
+1. The plan to murder Arch-Duke Franz Ferdinand during his stay in
+Sarajevo was conceived in Belgrade by Gabrilo Princip, Nedeljko,
+Gabrinowic, and a certain Milan Ciganowic and Trifko Grabez, with the
+aid of Major Voja Tankosic.
+
+2. The six bombs and four Browning pistols which were used by the
+criminals, were obtained by Milan Ciganowic and Major Tankosic, and
+presented to Princip Gabrinowic in Belgrade.
+
+3. The bombs are hand grenades, manufactured at the arsenal of the
+Servian Army in Kragujevac.
+
+4. To insure the success of the assassination, Milan Ciganowic
+instructed Princip Gabrinowic in the use of the grenades and gave
+instructions in shooting with Browning pistols to Princip Grabez in a
+forest near the target practice field of Topshider--(outside Belgrade).
+
+5. In order to enable the crossing of the frontier of Bosnia and
+Herzegovina by Princip Gabrinowic and Grabez, and the smuggling of their
+arms, a secret system of transportation was organized by Ciganowic. The
+entry of the criminals with their arms into Bosnia and Herzegovina was
+effected by the frontier captains of Shabatz (Rade Popowic) and of
+Loznica, as well as by the custom house official Rudivoy Grbic of
+Loznica with the aid of several other persons.
+
+
+THE SERVIAN ANSWER.
+
+Presented at Vienna, July 25th, 1914.
+(With Austria's commentaries in italics.)
+
+The Royal Government has received the communication of the Imperial and
+Royal Government of the 23rd inst. and is convinced that its reply will
+dissipate any misunderstanding which threatens to destroy the friendly
+and neighborly relations between the Austrian monarchy and the kingdom
+of Servia.
+
+The Royal Government is conscious that nowhere there have been renewed
+protests against the great neighborly monarchy like those which at one
+time were expressed in the Skuptschina, as well as in the declaration
+and actions of the responsible representatives of the state at that
+time, and which were terminated by the Servian declaration of March 31st
+1909; furthermore that since that time neither the different
+corporations of the kingdom, nor the officials have made an attempt to
+alter the political and judicial condition created in Bosnia and the
+Herzegovina. The Royal Government states that the I. and R. Government
+has made no protestation in this sense excepting in the case of a text
+book, in regard to which the I. and R. Government has received an
+entirely satisfactory explanation. Servia has given during the time of
+the Balcan crisis in numerous cases evidence of her pacific and moderate
+policy, and it is only owing to Servia and the sacrifices which she has
+brought in the interest of the peace of Europe that this peace has been
+preserved.
+
+_The Royal Servian Government limits itself to establishing that since
+the declaration of March 31st 1909, there has been no attempt on the
+part of the Servian Government to alter the position of Bosnia and the
+Herzegovina._
+
+_With this she deliberately shifts the foundation of our note, as we
+have not insisted that she and her officials have undertaken anything
+official in this direction. Our gravamen is that in spite of the
+obligation assumed in the cited note, she has omitted to suppress the
+movement directed against the territorial integrity of the monarchy._
+
+_Her obligation consisted in changing her attitude and the entire
+direction of her policies, and in entering into friendly and neighborly
+relations with the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and not only not to
+interfere with the possession of Bosnia._
+
+The Royal Government cannot be made responsible for expressions of a
+private character, as for instance newspaper articles and the peaceable
+work of societies, expressions which are of very common appearance in
+other countries, and which ordinarily are not under the control of the
+state. This, all the less, as the Royal Government has shown great
+courtesy in the solution of a whole series of questions which have
+arisen between Servia and Austria-Hungary, whereby it has succeeded to
+solve the greater number thereof, in favor of the progress of both
+countries.
+
+_The assertion of the Royal Servian Government that the expressions of
+the press and the activity of Servian associations possess a private
+character and thus escape governmental control, stands in full contrast
+with the institutions of modern states and even the most liberal of
+press and society laws, which nearly everywhere subject the press and
+the societies to a certain control of the state. This is also provided
+for by the Servian institutions. The rebuke against the Servian
+Government consists in the fact that it has totally omitted to supervise
+its press and its societies, in so far as it knew their direction to be
+hostile to the monarchy._
+
+The Royal Government was therefore painfully surprised by the assertions
+that citizens of Servia had participated in the preparations of the
+outrage in Sarajevo. The Government expected to be invited to cooperate
+in the investigation of the crime, and it was ready in order to prove
+its complete correctness, to proceed against all persons in regard to
+whom it would receive information.
+
+_This assertion is incorrect. The Servian Government was accurately
+informed about the suspicion resting upon quite definite personalities
+and not only in the position, but also obliged by its own laws to
+institute investigations spontaneously. The Servian Government has done
+nothing in this direction._
+
+According to the wishes of the I. and R. Government, the Royal
+Government is prepared to surrender to the court, without regard to
+position and rank, every Servian citizen, for whose participation in the
+crime of Sarajevo it should have received proof. It binds itself
+particularly on the first page of the official organ of the 26th of July
+to publish the following enunciation:
+
+"The Royal Servian Government condemns every propaganda which should be
+directed against Austria-Hungary, i. e. the entirety of such activities
+as aim towards the separation of certain territories from the
+Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and it regrets sincerely the lamentable
+consequences of these criminal machinations."
+
+_The Austrian demand reads_:
+
+"_The Royal Servian Government condemns the propaganda against
+Austria-Hungary_...."
+
+_The alteration of the declaration as demanded by us, which has been
+made by the Royal Servian Government, is meant to imply that a
+propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary does not exist, and that it
+is not aware of such. This formula is insincere, and the Servian
+Government reserves itself the supterfuge for later occasions that it
+had not disavowed by this declaration the existing propaganda, nor
+recognized the same as hostile to the monarchy, whence it could deduce
+further that it is not obliged to suppress in the future a propaganda
+similar to the present one_.
+
+The Royal Government regrets that according to a communication of the I.
+and R. Government certain Servian officers and functionaries have
+participated in the propaganda just referred to, and that these have
+therefore endangered the amicable relations for the observation of which
+the Royal Government had solemnly obliged itself through the declaration
+of March 31st, 1909.
+
+The Government ... identical with the demanded text.
+
+_The formula as demanded by Austria reads_:
+
+"_The Royal Government regrets that Servian officers and functionaries
+... have participated_...."
+
+_Also with this formula and the further addition "according to the
+declaration of the I. and R. Government", the Servian Government pursues
+the object, already indicated above, to preserve a free hand for the
+future_.
+
+The Royal Government binds itself further:
+
+1. During the next regular meeting of the Skuptschina to embody in the
+press laws a clause, to wit, that the incitement to hatred of, and
+contempt for, the monarchy is to be must severely punished, as well as
+every publication whose general tendency is directed against the
+territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary.
+
+It binds itself in view of the coming revision of the constitution to
+embody an amendment into Art. 22 of the constitutional law which permits
+the confiscation of such publications as is at present impossible
+according to the clear definition of Art. 22 of the constitution.
+
+_Austria had demanded_:
+
+_1. To suppress every publication which incites to hatred and contempt
+for the monarchy, and whose tendency is directed against the territorial
+integrity of the monarchy._
+
+_We wanted to bring about the obligation for Servia to take care that
+such attacks of the press would cease in the future._
+
+_Instead Servia offers to pass certain laws which are meant as means
+towards this end, viz.:_
+
+_a) A law according to which the expressions of the press hostile to the
+monarchy can be individually punished, a matter, which is immaterial to
+us, all the more so, as the individual prosecution of press intrigues is
+very rarely possible and as, with a lax enforcement of such laws, the
+few cases of this nature would not be punished. The proposition,
+therefore, does not meet our demand in any way, and it offers not the
+least guarantee for the desired success._
+
+_b) An amendment to Art. 22 of the constitution, which would permit
+confiscation, a proposal, which does not satisfy us, as the existence of
+such a law in Servia is of no use to us. For we want the obligation of
+the Government to enforce it and that has not been promised us._
+
+_These proposals are therefore entirely unsatisfactory and evasive as we
+are not told within what time these laws will be passed, and as in the
+event of the notpassing of these laws by the Skuptschina everything
+would remain as it is, excepting the event of a possible resignation of
+the Government._
+
+2. The Government possesses no proofs and the note of the I. and R.
+Government does not submit them that the society Narodna Odbrana and
+other similar societies have committed, up to the present, any criminal
+actions of this manner through anyone of their members. Notwithstanding
+this, the Royal Government will accept the demand of the I. and R.
+Government and dissolve the society Narodna Odbrana, as well as every
+society which should act against Austria-Hungary.
+
+_The propaganda of the Narodna Odbrana and affiliated societies hostile
+to the monarchy fills the entire public life of Servia; it is therefore
+an entirely inacceptable reserve if the Servian Government asserts that
+it knows nothing about it. Aside from this, our demand is not completely
+fulfilled, as we have asked besides:_
+
+"_To confiscate the means of propaganda of these societies to prevent
+the reformation of the dissolved societies under another name and in
+another form._"
+
+_In these two directions the Belgrade Cabinet is perfectly silent, so
+that through this semi-concession there is offered us no guarantee for
+putting an end to the agitation of the associations hostile to the
+Monarchy, especially the Narodna Odbrana._
+
+3. The Royal Servian Government binds itself without delay to eliminate
+from the public instruction in Servia anything which might further the
+propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary provided the I. and R.
+Government furnishes actual proofs.
+
+_Also in this case the Servian Government first demands proofs for a
+propaganda hostile to the Monarchy in the public instruction of Servia
+while it must know that the text books introduced in the Servian schools
+contain objectionable matter in this direction and that a large portion
+of the teachers are in the camp of the Narodna Odbrana and affiliated
+societies._
+
+_Furthermore, the Servian Government has not fulfilled a part of our
+demands, as we have requested, as it omitted in its text the addition
+desired by us: "as far as the body of instructors is concerned, as well
+as the means of instruction"--a sentence which shows clearly where the
+propaganda hostile to the Monarchy is to be found in the Servian
+schools_.
+
+4. The Royal Government is also ready to dismiss those officers and
+officials from the military and civil services in regard to whom it has
+been proved by judicial investigation that they have been guilty of
+actions against the territorial integrity of the monarchy; it expects
+that the I. and R. Government communicate to it for the purpose of
+starting the investigation the names of these officers and officials,
+and the facts with which they have been charged.
+
+_By promising the dismissal from the military and civil services of
+those officers and officials who are found guilty by judicial procedure,
+the Servian Government limits its assent to those cases, in which these
+persons have been charged with a crime according to the statutory code.
+As, however, we demand the removal of such officers and officials as
+indulge in a propaganda hostile to the Monarchy, which is generally not
+punishable in Servia, our demands have not been fulfilled in this
+point_.
+
+5. The Royal Government confesses that it is not clear about the sense
+and the scope of that demand of the I. and R. Government which concerns
+the obligation on the part of the Royal Servian Government to permit the
+cooperation of officials of the I. and R. Government on Servian
+territory, but it declares that it is willing to accept every
+cooperation which does not run counter to international law and criminal
+law, as well as to the friendly and neighborly relations.
+
+_The international law, as well as the criminal law, has nothing to do
+with this question; it is purely a matter of the nature of state police
+which is to be solved by way of a special agreement. The reserved
+attitude of Servia is therefore incomprehensible and on account of its
+vague general form it would lead to unbridgeable difficulties_.
+
+6. The Royal Government considers it its duty as a matter of course to
+begin an investigation against all those persons who have participated
+in the outrage of June 28th and who are in its territory. As far as the
+cooperation in this investigation of specially delegated officials of
+the I. and R. Government is concerned, this cannot be accepted, as this
+is a violation of the constitution and of criminal procedure. Yet in
+some cases the result of the investigation might be communicated to the
+Austro-Hungarian officials.
+
+_The Austrian demand was clear and unmistakable_:
+
+_1. To institute a criminal procedure against the participants in the
+outrage_.
+
+_2. Participation by I. and R. Government officials in the examinations
+("Recherche" in contrast with "enquête judiciaire")._
+
+_3. It did not occur to us to let I. and R. Government officials
+participate in the Servian court procedure; they were to cooperate only
+in the police researches which had to furnish and fix the material for
+the investigation._
+
+_If the Servian Government misunderstands us here, this is done
+deliberately, for it must be familiar with the difference between
+"enquête judiciaire" and simple police researches. As it desired to
+escape from every control of the investigation which would yield, if
+correctly carried out, highly undesirable results for it, and as it
+possesses no means to refuse in a plausible manner the cooperation of
+our officials (precedents for such police intervention exist in great
+number) it tries to justify its refusal by showing up our demands as
+impossible_.
+
+7. The Royal Government has ordered on the evening of the day on which
+the note was received the arrest of Major Voislar Tankosic. However, as
+far as Milan Ciganowic is concerned who is a citizen of the
+Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and who has been employed till June 28th with
+the Railroad Department, it has as yet been impossible to locate him,
+wherefor a warrant has been issued against him.
+
+The I. and R. Government is asked to make known, as soon as possible,
+for the purpose of conducting the investigation, the existing grounds
+for suspicion and the proofs of guilt, obtained in the investigation at
+Sarajevo.
+
+_This reply is disingenuous. According to our investigation, Ciganowic,
+by order of the police prefect in Belgrade, left three days after the
+outrage for Ribari, after it had become known that Ciganowic had
+participated in the outrage. In the first place, it is therefore
+incorrect that Ciganowic left the Servian service on June 28th. In the
+second place, we add that the prefect of police at Belgrade who had
+himself caused the departure of this Ciganowic and who knew his
+whereabout, declared in an interview that a man by the name of Milan
+Ciganowic did not exist in Belgrade_.
+
+8. The Servian Government will amplify and render more severe the
+existing measures against the suppression of smuggling of arms and
+explosives.
+
+It is a matter of course that it will proceed at once against, and
+punish severely, those officials of the frontier service on the line
+Shabatz-Loznica who violated their duty and who have permitted the
+perpetrators of the crime to cross the frontier.
+
+9. The Royal Government is ready to give explanations about the
+expressions which its officials in Servia and abroad have made in
+interviews after the outrage and which, according to the assertion of
+the I. and R. Government, were hostile to the Monarchy. As soon as the
+I. and R. Government points out in detail where those expressions were
+made and succeeds in proving that those expressions have actually been
+made by the functionaries concerned, the Royal Government itself will
+take care that the necessary evidences and proofs are collected
+therefor.
+
+_The Royal Servian Government must be aware of the interviews in
+question. If it demands of the I. and R. Government that it should
+furnish all kinds of detail about the said interviews and if it reserves
+for itself the right of a formal investigation, it shows that it is not
+its intention seriously to fulfill the demand._
+
+10. The Royal Government will notify the I. and R. Government, so far as
+this has not been already done by the present note, of the execution of
+the measures in question as soon as one of those measures has been
+ordered and put into execution.
+
+The Royal Servian Government believes it to be to the common interest
+not to rush the solution of this affair and it is therefore, in case the
+I. and R. Government should not consider itself satisfied with this
+answer, ready, as ever, to accept a peaceable solution, be it by
+referring the decision of this question to the International Court at
+the Hague or by leaving it to the decision of the Great Powers who have
+participated in the working out of the declaration given by the Servian
+Government on March 31st 1909.
+
+_The Servian Note, therefore, is entirely a play for time._
+
+
+EXHIBIT I.
+
+The Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassadors at Paris, London, and St.
+Petersburg, on Juli 23rd 1914.
+
+The publications of the Austro-Hungarian Government concerning the
+circumstances under which the Assassination of the Austrian successor to
+the throne and his consort took place, disclose clearly the aims which
+the pan-Serb propaganda has set itself and the means which it utilizes
+for their realization. Through the published facts the last doubt must
+disappear that the center of action of the efforts for the separation of
+the south slavic provinces from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and their
+union with the Servian Kingdom must be sought in Belgrade where it
+displays its activity with the connivance of members of the Government
+and of the Army.
+
+The Serb intrigues may be traced back through a series of years. In a
+specially marked manner the pan-Serb chauvinism showed itself during the
+Bosnian crisis. Only to the far-reaching self-restraint and moderation
+of the Austro-Hungarian Government and the energetic intercession of the
+powers is it to be ascribed that the provocations to which at that time
+Austria-Hungary was exposed on the part of Servia, did not lead to a
+conflict. The assurance of future well-behaviour which the Servian
+Government gave at that time, it has not kept. Under the very eyes, at
+least with the tacit sufferance of official Servia, the pan-Serb
+propaganda has meanwhile increased in scope and intensity; at its door
+is to be laid the latest crime the threads of which lead to Belgrade. It
+has become evident that it is compatible neither with the dignity nor
+with the self-preservation of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy to view any
+longer idly the doings across the border through which the safety and
+the integrity of the Monarchy are permanently threatened. With this
+state of affairs, the action as well as the demands of the
+Austro-Hungarian government can be viewed only as justifiable.
+Nevertheless, the attitude assumed by public opinion as well as by the
+government in Servia does not preclude the fear that the Servian
+government will decline to meet these demands and that it will allow
+itself to be carried away into a provocative attitude toward
+Austria-Hungary. Nothing would remain for the Austro-Hungarian
+government, unless it renounced definitely its position as a great
+power, but to press its demands with the Servian government and, if need
+be, enforce the same by appeal to military measures, in regard to which
+the choice of means must be left with it.
+
+I have the honor to request you to express yourself in the sense
+indicated above to (the present representative of M. Viviani) (Sir
+Edward Grey) (M. Sasonow) and therewith give special emphasis to the
+view that in this question there is concerned an affair which should be
+settled solely between Austria-Hungary and Servia, the limitation to
+which it must be the earnest endeavor of the powers to insure. We
+anxiously desire the localisation of the conflict because every
+intercession of another power on account of the various treaty-alliances
+would precipitate inconceivable consequences.
+
+I shall look forward with interest to a telegraphic report about the
+course of your interview.
+
+
+EXHIBIT 2.
+
+The Chancellor to the Governments of Germany.
+Confidential. Berlin, July 28, 1914.
+
+You will make the following report to the Government to which you are
+accredited:
+
+In view of the facts which the Austrian Government has published in its
+note to the Servian Government, the last doubt must disappear that the
+outrage to which the Austro-Hungarian successor to the throne has fallen
+a victim, was prepared in Servia, to say the least with the connivance
+of members of the Servian government and army. It is a product of the
+pan-Serb intrigues which for a series of years have become a source of
+permanent disturbance for the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and for the
+whole of Europe.
+
+The pan-Serb chauvinism appeared especially marked during the Bosnian
+crisis. Only to the far-reaching self-restraint and moderation of the
+Austro-Hungarian government and the energetic intercession of the powers
+is it to be ascribed that the provocations to which Austria-Hungary was
+exposed at that time, did not lead to a conflict. The assurance of
+future well-behaviour, which the Servian government gave at that time,
+it has not kept. Under the very eyes, at least with the tacit sufferance
+of official Servia, the pan-Serb propaganda has meanwhile continued to
+increase in scope and intensity. It would be compatible neither with its
+dignity nor with its right to self-preservation if the Austro-Hungarian
+government persisted to view idly any longer the intrigues beyond the
+frontier, through which the safety and the integrity of the monarchy are
+permanently threatened. With this state of affairs, the action as well
+as the demands of the Austro-Hungarian Government can be viewed only as
+justifiable.
+
+The reply of the Servian government to the demands which the
+Austro-Hungarian government put on the 23rd inst. through its
+representative in Belgrade, shows that the dominating factors in Servia
+are not inclined to cease their former policies and agitation. There
+will remain nothing else for the Austro-Hungarian government than to
+press its demands, if need be through military action, unless it
+renounces for good its position as a great power.
+
+Some Russian personalities deem it their right as a matter of course and
+a task of Russia's to actively become a party to Servia in the conflict
+between Austria-Hungary and Servia. For the European conflagration which
+would result from a similar step by Russia, the "Nowoje Wremja" believes
+itself justified in making Germany responsible in so far as it does not
+induce Austria-Hungary to yield.
+
+The Russian press thus turns conditions upside down. It is not
+Austria-Hungary which has called forth the conflict with Servia, but it
+is Servia which, through unscrupulous favor toward pan-Serb aspirations,
+even in parts of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, threatens the same in
+her existence and creates conditions, which eventually found expression
+in the wanton outrage at Sarajevo. If Russia believes that it must
+champion the cause of Servia in this matter, it certainly has the right
+to do so. However, it must realize that it makes the Serb activities its
+own, to undermine the conditions of existence of the Austro-Hungarian
+monarchy, and that thus it bears the sole responsibility if out of the
+Austro-Servian affair, which all other great powers desire to localize,
+there arises a European war. This responsibility of Russia's is evident
+and it weighs the more heavily as Count Berchtold has officially
+declared to Russia that Austria-Hungary has no intention to acquire
+Servian territory or to touch the existence of the Servian Kingdom, but
+only desires peace against the Servian intrigues threatening its
+existence.
+
+The attitude of the Imperial government in this question is clearly
+indicated. The agitation conducted by the pan-Slavs in Austria-Hungary
+has for its goal, with the destruction of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy,
+the scattering or weakening of the triple alliance with a complete
+isolation of the German Empire in consequence. Our own interest
+therefore calls us to the side of Austria-Hungary. The duty, if at all
+possible, to guard Europe against a universal war, points to the support
+by ourselves of those endeavors which aim at the localization of the
+conflict, faithful to the course of those policies which we have carried
+out successfully for forty-four years in the interest of the
+preservation of the peace of Europe.
+
+Should, however, against our hope, through the interference of Russia
+the fire be spread, we should have to support, faithful to our duty as
+allies, the neighbor-monarchy with all the power at our command. We
+shall take the sword only if forced to it, but then in the clear
+consciousness that we are not guilty of the calamity which war will
+bring upon the peoples of Europe.
+
+
+EXHIBIT 3.
+
+Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at Vienna to the Chancellor on July
+24th 1914.
+
+Count Berchtold has asked to-day for the Russian Chargé d'affaires in
+order to explain to him thoroughly and cordially Austria-Hungary's point
+of view toward Servia. After recapitulation of the historical
+development of the past few years, he emphasized that the Monarchy
+entertained no thought of conquest toward Servia. Austria-Hungary would
+not claim Servian territory. It insisted merely that this step was meant
+as a definite means of checking the Serb intrigues. Impelled by force of
+circumstance, Austria-Hungary must have a guaranty for continued
+amicable relations with Servia. It was far from him to intend to bring
+about a change in the balance of powers in the Balcan. The Charge
+d'affaires who had received no instructions from St. Petersburg, took
+the discussion of the Secretary "ad referendum" with the promise to
+submit it immediately to Sasonow.
+
+
+EXHIBIT 4.
+
+Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg to the Chancellor
+on July 24th 1914.
+
+I have just utilized the contents of Order 592 in a prolonged interview
+with Sasonow. The Secretary (Sasonow) indulged in unmeasured accusations
+toward Austria-Hungary and he was very much agitated. He declared most
+positively that Russia could not permit under any circumstances that the
+Servo-Austrian difficulty be settled alone between the parties
+concerned.
+
+
+EXHIBIT 5.
+
+The Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg to the Chancellor. Telegram of
+July 26th 1914.
+
+The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador had an extended interview with Sasonow
+this afternoon. Both parties had a satisfactory impression as they told
+me afterwards. The assurance of the Ambassador that Austria-Hungary had
+no idea of conquest but wished to obtain peace at last at her frontiers,
+greatly pacified the Secretary.
+
+
+EXHIBIT 6.
+
+Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to the Chancellor
+on July 25th 1914.
+
+Message to H.M. from General von Chelius (German honorary aide de camp
+to the Czar).
+
+The manoeuvres of the troops in the Krasnoe camp were suddenly
+interrupted and the regiments returned to their garrisons at once. The
+manoeuvres have been cancelled. The military pupils were raised to-day
+to the rank of officers instead of next fall. At headquarters there
+obtains great excitement over the procedure of Austria. I have the
+impression that complete preparations for mobilization against Austria
+are being made.
+
+
+EXHIBIT 7.
+
+Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to the Chancellor
+on July 26th 1914.
+
+The military attaché requests the following message to be sent to the
+general staff:
+
+I deem it certain that mobilisation has been ordered for Kiev and
+Odessa. It is doubtful at Warsaw and Moscow and improbable elsewhere.
+
+
+EXHIBIT 8.
+
+Telegram of the Imperial Consulate at Kovno to the Chancellor on July
+27th 1914.
+
+Kovno has been declared to be in a state of war.
+
+(Note that the official translator means _Kriegszustand_.)
+
+
+EXHIBIT 9.
+
+Telegram of the Imperial Minister at Berne to the Chancellor on July
+27th 1914.
+
+Have learned reliably that French XIVth corps has discontinued
+manoeuvres.
+
+
+EXHIBIT 10.
+
+Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at London. Urgent.
+July 26th 1914.
+
+Austria-Hungary has declared in St. Petersburg officially and solemnly
+that it has no desire for territorial gain in Servia; that it will not
+touch the existence of the Kingdom, but that it desires to establish
+peaceful conditions. According to news received here, the call for
+several classes of the reserves is expected immediately which is
+equivalent to mobilization.[186] If this news proves correct, we shall
+be forced to contermeasures very much against our own wishes. Our desire
+to localize the conflict and to preserve the peace of Europe remains
+unchanged. We ask to act in this sense at St. Petersburg with all
+possible emphasis.
+
+[Footnote 186: The German text inserts _auch gegen uns_, i.e. also
+against us.]
+
+
+EXHIBIT 10a.
+
+Telegram of the Imperial Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at Paris.
+July 26th 1914.
+
+After officially declaring to Russia that Austria-Hungary has no
+intention to acquire territorial gain and to touch the existence of the
+Kingdom, the decision whether there is to be a European war rests solely
+with Russia which has to bear the entire responsibility. We depend upon
+France with which we are at one in the desire for the preservation of
+the peace of Europe that it will exercise its influence at St.
+Petersburg in favour of peace.
+
+
+EXHIBIT 10b.
+
+Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg
+on July 26th, 1914.
+
+After Austria's solemn declaration of its territorial
+dis-interestedness, the responsibility for a possible disturbance of the
+peace of Europe through a Russian intervention rests solely upon Russia.
+We trust still that Russia will undertake no steps which will threaten
+seriously the peace of Europe.
+
+
+EXHIBIT 11.
+
+Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg to the Chancellor
+on July 27th, 1914.
+
+Military Attaché reports a conversation with the Secretary of War:
+
+Sasonow has requested the latter to enlighten me on the situation. The
+Secretary of War has given me his word of honor that no order to
+mobilize has as yet been issued. Though general preparations are being
+made, no reserves were called and no horses mustered. If Austria crossed
+the Servian frontier, such military districts as are directed toward
+Austria, viz., Kiev, Odessa, Moscow, Kazan, are to be mobilized. Under
+no circumstances those on the German frontier, Warsaw, Vilna, St.
+Petersburg. Peace with Germany was desired very much. Upon my inquiry
+into the object of mobilization against Austria he shrugged his
+shoulders and referred to the diplomats. I told the Secretary that we
+appreciated the friendly intentions, but considered mobilization even
+against Austria as very menacing.
+
+
+EXHIBIT 12.
+
+Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at London on July
+27th, 1914.
+
+We know as yet nothing of a suggestion of Sir Edward Grey's to hold a
+quadruple conference in London. It is impossible for us to place our
+ally in his dispute with Servia before a European tribunal. Our
+mediation must be limited to the danger of an Austro-Russian conflict.
+
+
+EXHIBIT 13.
+
+Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at London on July
+25th, 1914.
+
+The distinction made by Sir Edward Grey between an Austro-Servian and an
+Austro-Russian conflict is perfectly correct. We do not wish to
+interpose in the former any more than England, and as heretofore we take
+the position that this question must be localized by virtue of all
+powers refraining from intervention. It is therefore our hope that
+Russia will refrain from any action in view of her responsibility and
+the seriousness of the situation. We are prepared, in the event of an
+Austro-Russian controversy, quite apart from our known duties as allies,
+to intercede between Russia and Austria jointly with the other powers.
+
+
+EXHIBIT 14.
+
+Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg
+on July 28th, 1914.
+
+We continue in our endeavor to induce Vienna to elucidate in St.
+Petersburg the object and scope of the Austrian action in Servia in a
+manner both convincing and satisfactory to Russia. The declaration of
+war which has meanwhile ensued alters nothing in this matter.
+
+
+EXHIBIT 15.
+
+Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador in London on July
+27th, 1914.
+
+We have at once started the mediation proposal in Vienna in the sense as
+desired by Sir Edward Grey. We have communicated besides to Count
+Berchtold the desire of M. Sasonow for a direct parley with Vienna.
+
+
+EXHIBIT 16.
+
+Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at Vienna to the Chancellor on July
+28th, 1914.
+
+Count Berchtold requests me to express to Your Excellency his thanks for
+the communication of the English mediation proposal. He states, however,
+that after the opening of hostilities by Servia and the subsequent
+declaration of war, the step appears belated.
+
+
+EXHIBIT 17.
+
+Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at Paris on July
+29th, 1914.
+
+News received here regarding French preparations of war multiplies from
+hour to hour. I request that You call the attention of the French
+Government to this and accentuate that such measures would call forth
+counter-measures on our part. We should have to proclaim threatening
+state of war (drohende Kriegsgefahr), and while this would not mean a
+call for the reserves or mobilization, yet the tension would be
+aggravated. We continue to hope for the preservation of peace.
+
+
+EXHIBIT 18.
+
+Telegram of the Military Attache at St. Petersburg to H. M. the Kaiser
+on July 30th, 1914.
+
+Prince Troubetzki said to me yesterday, after causing Your Majesty's
+telegram to be delivered at once to Czar Nicolas: Thank God that a
+telegram of Your Emperor has come. He has just told me the telegram has
+made a deep impression upon the Czar but as the mobilization against
+Austria had already been ordered and Sasonow had convinced His Majesty
+that it was no longer possible to retreat, His Majesty was sorry he
+could not change it any more. I then told him that the guilt for the
+measureless consequences lay at the door of premature mobilization
+against Austria-Hungary which after all was involved merely in a local
+war with Servia, for Germany's answer was clear and the responsibility
+rested upon Russia which ignored Austria-Hungary's assurance that it had
+no intentions of territorial gain in Servia. Austria-Hungary mobilized
+against Servia and not against Russia and there was no ground for an
+immediate action on the part of Russia. I further added that in Germany
+one could not understand any more Russia's phrase that "she could not
+desert her brethren in Servia", after the horrible crime of Sarajevo. I
+told him finally he need not wonder if Germany's army were to be
+mobilized.
+
+
+EXHIBIT 19.
+
+Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at Rome on July
+31st, 1914.
+
+We have continued to negotiate between Russia and Austria-Hungary
+through a direct exchange of telegrams between His Majesty the Kaiser
+and His Majesty the Czar, as well as in conjunction with Sir Edward
+Grey. Through the mobilization of Russia all our efforts have been
+greatly handicapped if they have not become impossible. In spite of
+pacifying assurances Russia is taking such far-reaching measures against
+us that the situation is becoming continually more menacing.
+
+
+EXHIBIT 20.
+
+I. His Majesty to the Czar.
+
+July 28th, 10.45 p.m.
+
+I have heard with the greatest anxiety of the impression which is caused
+by the action of Austria-Hungary against Servia. The inscrupulous
+agitation which has been going on for years in Servia, has led to the
+revolting crime of which Archduke Franz Ferdinand has become a victim.
+The spirit which made the Servians murder their own King and his
+consort, still dominates that country. Doubtless You will agree with me
+that both of us, You as well as I, and all other sovereigns, have a
+common interest to insist that all those who are responsible for this
+horrible murder, shall suffer their deserved punishment.
+
+On the other hand I by no means overlook the difficulty encountered by
+You and Your Government to stem the tide of public opinion. In view of
+the cordial friendship which has joined us both for a long time with
+firm ties, I shall use my entire influence to induce Austria-Hungary to
+obtain a frank and satisfactory understanding with Russia. I hope
+confidently that You will support me in my efforts to overcome all
+difficulties which may yet arise.
+
+Your most sincere and devoted friend and cousin
+
+signed: Wilhelm.
+
+
+EXHIBIT 21.
+
+II. The Czar to His Majesty.
+
+Peterhof Palace, July 29th, 1 p.m.
+
+I am glad that You are back in Germany. In this serious moment I ask You
+earnestly to help me. An ignominious war has been declared against a
+weak country and in Russia the indignation which I fully share is
+tremendous. I fear that very soon I shall be unable to resist the
+pressure exercised upon me and that I shall be forced to take measures
+which will lead to war. To prevent a calamity as a European war would
+be, I urge You in the name of our old friendship to do all in Your power
+to restrain Your ally from going too far.
+
+signed: Nicolas.
+
+
+EXHIBIT 22.
+
+III. His Majesty to the Czar.
+
+July 29th, 6.30 p.m.
+
+I have received Your telegram and I share Your desire for the
+conservation of peace. However: I cannot--as I told You in my first
+telegram--consider the action of Austria-Hungary as an "ignominious
+war". Austria-Hungary knows from experience that the promises of Servia
+as long as they are merely on paper are entirely unreliable.
+
+According to my opinion the action of Austria-Hungary is to be
+considered as an attempt to receive full guaranty that the promises of
+Servia are effectively translated into deeds. In this opinion I am
+strengthened by the explanation of the Austrian cabinet that
+Austria-Hungary intended no territorial gain at the expense of Servia. I
+am therefore of opinion that it is perfectly possible for Russia to
+remain a spectator in the Austro-Servian war without drawing Europe into
+the most terrible war it has ever seen. I believe that a direct
+understanding is possible and desirable between Your Government and
+Vienna, an understanding which--as I have already telegraphed You--my
+Government endeavors to aid with all possible effort. Naturally military
+measures by Russia, which might be construed as a menace by
+Austria-Hungary, would accelerate a calamity which both of us desire to
+avoid and would undermine my position as mediator which--upon Your
+appeal to my friendship and aid--I willingly accepted.
+
+signed: Wilhelm.
+
+
+EXHIBIT 23.
+
+IV. His Majesty to the Czar.
+
+July 30th, 1 a.m.
+
+My Ambassador has instructions to direct the attention of Your
+Government to the dangers and serious consequences of a mobilization; I
+have told You the same in my last telegram. Austria-Hungary has
+mobilized only against Servia, and only a part of her army. If Russia,
+as seems to be the case according to Your advice and that of Your
+Government, mobilizes against Austria-Hungary, the part of the mediator
+with which You have entrusted me in such friendly manner and which I
+have accepted upon Your express desire, is threatened if not made
+impossible. The entire weight of decision now rests upon Your shoulders,
+You have to bear the responsibility for war or peace.
+
+signed: Wilhelm.
+
+
+EXHIBIT 23a.
+
+V. The Czar to His Majesty.
+
+Peterhof, July 30th, 1914, 1.20 p.m.
+
+I thank You from my heart for Your quick reply. I am sending to-night
+Tatisheft (Russian honorary aide to the Kaiser) with instructions. The
+military measures now taking form were decided upon five days ago, and
+for the reason of defence against the preparations of Austria. I hope
+with all my heart that these measures will not influence in any manner
+Your position as mediator which I appraise very highly. We need Your
+strong pressure upon Austria so that an understanding can be arrived at
+with us.
+
+Nicolas.
+
+
+EXHIBIT 24.
+
+Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg
+on July 31st, 1914. Urgent.
+
+In spite of negotiations still pending and although we have up to this
+hour made no preparations for mobilization, Russia has mobilized her
+entire army and navy, hence also against us. On account of these Russian
+measures we have been forced, for the safety of the country, to proclaim
+the threatening state of war, which does not yet imply mobilization.
+Mobilization, however, is bound to follow if Russia does not stop every
+measure of war against us and against Austria-Hungary within 12 hours
+and notifies us definitely to this effect. Please to communicate this at
+once to M. Sasonow and wire hour of communication.
+
+
+EXHIBIT 25.
+
+Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador in Paris on July
+31st, 1914. Urgent.
+
+Russia has ordered mobilization of her entire army and fleet, therefore
+also against us in spite of our still pending mediation. We have
+therefore declared the threatening state of war which is bound to be
+followed by mobilization unless Russia stops within 12 hours all
+measures of war against us and Austria. Mobilization inevitably implies
+war. Please ask French Government whether it intends to remain neutral
+in a Russo-German war. Reply must be made in 18 hours. Wire at once hour
+of inquiry. Utmost speed necessary.
+
+
+EXHIBIT 26.
+
+Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador in St. Petersburg
+on August 1st, 12.52 p.m. Urgent.
+
+If the Russian Government gives no satisfactory reply to our demand,
+Your Excellency will please transmit this afternoon 5 o'clock
+(mid-European time) the following statement:
+
+"Le Gouvernement Impérial s'est efforcé dès les débuts de la crise de la
+mener à une solution pacifique. Se rendant à un désir que lui en avail
+été exprimé par Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie, Sa Majesté l'Empereur
+d'Allemagne d'accord avec l'Angleterre était appliqué à accomplir un
+rôle médiateur auprès des Cabinets de Vienne et de St. Petersbourg,
+lorsque la Russie, sans en attendre le résultat, procéda à la
+mobilisation de la totalité de ses forces de terre et de mer.
+
+"A la suite de cette mesure menaçante motivée par aucun préparatif
+militaire de la part de l'Allemagne, l'Empire Allemand se trouva
+vis-à-vis d'un danger grave et imminent. Si le Gouvernement Impérial eût
+manqué de parer à ce péril il aurait compromis la securité et
+l'existence même de l'Allemagne. Par conséquent le Gouvernement Allemand
+se vit forcé de s'adresser au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté l'Empereur de
+toutes les Russies en sistant sur la cessation des dits actes
+militaires. La Russie ayant refusé de faire droit à cette demande et
+ayant manifesté par ce refus, que son action était dirigée contre
+l'Allemande, j'ai l'honneur d'ordre de mon Gouvernement de faire savoir
+à Votre Excellence ce qui suit:
+
+"Sa Majesté l'Empereur, mon auguste Souverain, an nom de l'Empire relève
+le défi et Se considère en état de guerre avec la Russie."
+
+Please wire urgent receipt and time of carrying out this instruction by
+Russian time.
+
+Please ask for Your passports and turn over protection and affairs to
+the American Embassy.
+
+
+EXHIBIT 27.
+
+Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador in Paris to the Chancellor on August
+1st 1.05 p. m.
+
+Upon my repeated definite inquiry whether France would remain neutral in
+the event of a Russo-German war, the Prime Minister declared that France
+would do that which her interests dictated.
+
+
+
+
+APPENDIX II
+
+
+EXTRACTS FROM
+
+SIR EDWARD GREY'S
+
+CORRESPONDENCE
+
+RESPECTING THE EUROPEAN
+
+CRISIS
+
+_For the complete Correspondence see White Paper Miscellaneous No. 6
+(1914) (Cd. 7467), presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of
+His Majesty, August 1914_
+
+
+No. 13.
+
+_Note communicated by Russian Ambassador, July 25._
+
+(Translation.)
+
+M. Sazionof telegraphs to the Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Vienna on the
+11th (24th) July, 1914:
+
+"The communication made by Austria-Hungary to the Powers the day after
+the presentation of the ultimatum at Belgrade leaves a period to the
+Powers which is quite insufficient to enable them to take any steps
+which might help to smooth away the difficulties that have arisen.
+
+"In order to prevent the consequences, equally incalculable and fatal to
+all the Powers, which may result from the course of action followed by
+the Austro-Hungarian Government, it seems to us to be above all
+essential that the period allowed for the Servian reply should be
+extended. Austria-Hungary, having declared her readiness to inform the
+Powers of the results of the enquiry upon which the Imperial and Royal
+Government base their accusations, should equally allow them sufficient
+time to study them.
+
+"In this case, if the Powers were convinced that certain of the Austrian
+demands were well founded, they would be in a position to offer advice
+to the Servian Government.
+
+"A refusal to prolong the term of the ultimatum would render nugatory
+the proposals made by the Austro-Hungarian Government to the Powers, and
+would be in contradiction to the very bases of international relations.
+
+"Prince Kudachef is instructed to communicate the above to the Cabinet
+at Vienna.
+
+"M. Sazonof hopes that His Britannic Majesty's Government will adhere to
+the point of view set forth above, and he trusts that Sir E. Grey will
+see his way to furnish similar instructions to the British Ambassador at
+Vienna."
+
+
+No. 17.
+
+_Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.--(Received July_ 25.)
+
+(Telegraphic.)      _St. Petersburgh, July_ 25, 1914.
+
+I Saw the Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning....
+
+The Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Servia was quite ready to do
+as you had suggested and to punish those proved to be guilty, but that
+no independent State could be expected to accept the political demands
+which had been put forward. The Minister for Foreign Affairs thought,
+from a conversation which he had with the Servian Minister yesterday,
+that, in the event of the Austrians attacking Servia, the Servian
+Government would abandon Belgrade, and withdraw their forces into the
+interior, while they would at the same time appeal to the Powers to help
+them. His Excellency was in favour of their making this appeal. He would
+like to see the question placed on an international footing, as the
+obligations taken by Servia in 1908, to which reference is made in the
+Austrian ultimatum, were given not to Austria, but to the Powers.
+
+If Servia should appeal to the Powers, Russia would be quite ready to
+stand aside and leave the question in the hands of England, France,
+Germany, and Italy. It was possible, in his opinion, that Servia might
+propose to submit the question to arbitration.
+
+On my expressing the earnest hope that Russia would not precipitate war
+by mobilising until you had had time to use your influence in favour of
+peace, his Excellency assured me that Russia had no aggressive
+intentions, and she would take no action until it was forced on her.
+Austria's action was in reality directed against Russia. She aimed at
+overthrowing the present _status quo_ in the Balkans, and establishing
+her own hegemony there. He did not believe that Germany really wanted
+war, but her attitude was decided by ours. If we took our stand firmly
+with France and Russia there would be no war. If we failed them now,
+rivers of blood would flow, and we would in the end be dragged into war.
+I said that England could play the role of mediator at Berlin and Vienna
+to better purpose as friend who, if her counsels of moderation were
+disregarded, might one day be converted into an ally, than if she were
+to declare herself Russia's ally at once. His Excellency said that
+unfortunately Germany was convinced that she could count upon our
+neutrality.
+
+I said all I could to impress prudence on the Minister for Foreign
+Affairs, and warned him that if Russia mobilised, Germany would not be
+content with mere mobilisation, or give Russia time to carry out hers,
+but would probably declare war at once. His Excellency replied that
+Russia could not allow Austria to crush Servia and become the
+predominant Power in the Balkans, and, if she feels secure of the
+support of France, she will face all the risks of war. He assured me
+once more that he did not wish to precipitate a conflict, but that
+unless Germany could restrain Austria I could regard the situation as
+desperate.
+
+
+No. 18.
+
+_Sir H. Rumbold to Sir Edward Grey.--(Received July 25.)_
+
+(Telegraphic.)         _Berlin, July 25, 1914._
+
+Your telegram of the 24th July acted on.
+
+Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs says that on receipt of a
+telegram at 10 this morning from German Ambassador at London, he
+immediately instructed German Ambassador at Vienna to pass on to
+Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs your suggestion for an extension
+of time limit, and to speak to his Excellency about it. Unfortunately it
+appeared from press that Count Berchtold is at Ischl, and Secretary of
+State thought that in these circumstances there would be delay and
+difficulty in getting time limit extended. Secretary of State said that
+he did not know what Austria-Hungary had ready on the spot, but he
+admitted quite freely that Austro-Hungarian Government wished to give
+the Servians a lesson, and that they meant to take military action. He
+also admitted that Servian Government could not swallow certain of the
+Austro-Hungarian demands.
+
+Secretary of State said that a reassuring feature of situation was that
+Count Berchtold had sent for Russian representative at Vienna and had
+told him that Austria-Hungary had no intention of seizing Servian
+territory. This step should, in his opinion, exercise a calming
+influence at St. Petersburgh. I asked whether it was not to be feared
+that, in taking military action against Servia, Austria would
+dangerously excite public opinion in Russia. He said he thought not. He
+remained of opinion that crisis could be localised. I said that
+telegrams from Russia in this morning's papers did not look very
+reassuring, but he maintained his optimistic view with regard to Russia.
+He said that he had given the Russian Government to understand that last
+thing Germany wanted was a general war, and he would do all in his power
+to prevent such a calamity. If the relations between Austria and Russia
+became threatening, he was quite ready to fall in with your suggestion
+as to the four Powers working in favour of moderation at Vienna and St.
+Petersburgh.
+
+Secretary of State confessed privately that he thought the note left
+much to be desired as a diplomatic document. He repeated very earnestly
+that, though he had been accused of knowing all about the contents of
+that note, he had in fact had no such knowledge.
+
+
+No. 41.
+
+_Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.--(Received July 27.)_
+
+(Telegraphic.)                      _Vienna, July_ 27, 1914.
+
+I have had conversations with all my colleagues representing the Great
+Powers. The impression left on my mind is that the Austro-Hungarian note
+was so drawn up as to make war inevitable; that the Austro-Hungarian
+Government are fully resolved to have war with Servia; that they
+consider their position as a Great Power to be at stake; and that until
+punishment has been administered to Servia it is unlikely that they will
+listen to proposals of mediation. This country has gone wild with joy at
+the prospect of war with Servia, and its postponement or prevention
+would undoubtedly be a great disappointment.
+
+I propose, subject to any special directions you desire to send me, to
+express to the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs the hope of His
+Majesty's Government that it may yet be possible to avoid war, and to
+ask his Excellency whether he cannot suggest a way out even now.
+
+
+No. 43.
+
+_Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.--(Received July 27.)_
+
+(Telegraphic.)                         _Berlin, July_ 27, 1914.
+
+Your telegram of 26th July.
+
+Secretary of State says that conference you suggest would practically
+amount to a court of arbitration and could not, in his opinion, be
+called together except at the request of Austria and Russia. He could
+not therefore fall in with your suggestion, desirous though he was to
+co-operate for the maintenance of peace. I said I was sure that your
+idea had nothing to do with arbitration, but meant that representatives
+of the four nations not directly interested should discuss and suggest
+means for avoiding a dangerous situation. He maintained, however, that
+such a conference as you proposed was not practicable. He added that
+news he had just received from St. Petersburgh showed that there was an
+intention on the part of M. de Sazonof to exchange views with Count
+Berchtold. He thought that this method of procedure might lead to a
+satisfactory result, and that it would be best, before doing anything
+else, to await outcome of the exchange of views between the Austrian and
+Russian Governments.
+
+In the course of a short conversation Secretary of State said that as
+yet Austria was only partially mobilising, but that if Russia mobilised
+against Germany latter would have to follow suit. I asked him what he
+meant by "mobilising against Germany." He said that if Russia only
+mobilised in south, Germany would not mobilise, but if she mobilised in
+north, Germany would have to do so too, and Russian system of
+mobilisation was so complicated that it might be difficult exactly to
+locate her mobilisation. Germany would therefore have to be very careful
+not to be taken by surprise.
+
+Finally, Secretary of State said that news from St. Petersburgh had
+caused him to take more hopeful view of the general situation.
+
+
+No. 56.
+
+_Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.--(Received July 28.)_
+
+(Telegraphic.)                      _Vienna, July_ 27, 1914.
+
+The Russian Ambassador had to-day a long and earnest conversation with
+Baron Macchio, the Under-secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. He told
+him that, having just come back from St. Petersburgh, he was well
+acquainted with the views of the Russian Government and the state of
+Russian public opinion. He could assure him that if actual war broke out
+with Servia it would be impossible to localise it, for Russia was not
+prepared to give way again, as she had done on previous occasions, and
+especially during the annexation crisis of 1909. He earnestly hoped that
+something would be done before Servia was actually invaded. Baron
+Macchio replied that this would now be difficult, as a skirmish had
+already taken place on the Danube, in which the Servians had been the
+aggressors. The Russian Ambassador said that he would do all he could to
+keep the Servians quiet pending any discussions that might yet take
+place, and he told me that he would advise his Government to induce the
+Servian Government to avoid any conflict as long as possible, and to
+fall back before an Austrian advance. Time so gained should suffice to
+enable a settlement to be reached. He had just heard of a satisfactory
+conversation which the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs had
+yesterday with the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh. The former
+had agreed that much of the Austro-Hungarian note to Servia had been
+perfectly reasonable, and in fact they had practically reached an
+understanding as to the guarantees which Servia might reasonably be
+asked to give to Austria-Hungary for her future good behaviour. The
+Russian Ambassador urged that the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh
+should be furnished with full powers to continue discussion with the
+Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who was very willing to advise
+Servia to yield all that could be fairly asked of her as an independent
+Power. Baron Macchio promised to submit this suggestion to the Minister
+for Foreign Affairs.
+
+
+No. 62.
+
+_Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.--(Received July 28.)_
+
+(Telegraphic.)                          _Vienna, July 28_, 1914.
+
+I spoke to Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day in the sense of your
+telegram of 27th July to Berlin. I avoided the word "mediation," but
+said that, as mentioned in your speech,[187] which he had just read to
+me, you had hopes that conversations in London between the four Powers
+less interested might yet lead to an arrangement which Austro-Hungarian
+Government would accept as satisfactory and as rendering actual
+hostilities unnecessary. I added that you had regarded Servian reply as
+having gone far to meet just demands of Austria-Hungary; that you
+thought it constituted a fair basis of discussion during which warlike
+operations might remain in abeyance, and that Austrian Ambassador in
+Berlin was speaking in this sense. Minister for Foreign Affairs said
+quietly, but firmly, that no discussion could be accepted on basis of
+Servian note; that war would be declared to-day, and that well-known
+pacific character of Emperor, as well as, he might add, his own, might
+be accepted as a guarantee that war was both just and inevitable. This
+was a matter that must be settled directly between the two parties
+immediately concerned. I said that you would hear with regret that
+hostilities could not now be arrested, as you feared that they might
+lead to complications threatening the peace of Europe.
+
+In taking leave of his Excellency, I begged him to believe that, if in
+the course of present grave crisis our point of view should sometimes
+differ from his, this would arise, not from want of sympathy with the
+many just complaints which Austria-Hungary had against Servia, but from
+the fact that, whereas Austria-Hungary put first her quarrel with
+Servia, you were anxious in the first instance for peace of Europe. I
+trusted this larger aspect of the question would appeal with equal force
+to his Excellency. He said he had it also in mind, but thought that
+Russia ought not to oppose operations like those impending, which did
+not aim at territorial aggrandisement and which could no longer be
+postponed.
+
+[Footnote 187: "Hansard," Vol. 65, No. 107, Columns 931, 932, 933.]
+
+
+No. 85.
+
+_Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.--(Received July 29.)_
+
+(Telegraphic.)                        _Berlin, July_ 29, 1914.
+
+I was asked to call upon the Chancellor to-night. His Excellency had
+just returned from Potsdam.
+
+He said that should Austria be attacked by Russia a European
+conflagration might, he feared, become inevitable, owing to Germany's
+obligations as Austria's ally, in spite of his continued efforts to
+maintain peace. He then proceeded to make the following strong bid for
+British neutrality. He said that it was clear, so far as he was able to
+judge the main principle which governed British policy, that Great
+Britain would never stand by and allow France to be crushed in any
+conflict there might be. That, however, was not the object at which
+Germany aimed. Provided that neutrality of Great Britain were certain,
+every assurance would be given to the British Government that the
+Imperial Government aimed at no territorial acquisitions at the expense
+of France should they prove victorious in any war that might ensue.
+
+I questioned his Excellency about the French colonies, and he said that
+he was unable to give a similar undertaking in that respect. As regards
+Holland, however, his Excellency said that, so long as Germany's
+adversaries respected the integrity and neutrality of the Netherlands,
+Germany was ready to give His Majesty's Government an assurance that she
+would do likewise. It depended upon the action of France what operations
+Germany might be forced to enter upon in Belgium, but when the war was
+over, Belgian integrity would be respected if she had not sided against
+Germany.
+
+His Excellency ended by saying that ever since he had been Chancellor
+the object of his policy had been, as you were aware, to bring about an
+understanding with England; he trusted that these assurances might form
+the basis of that understanding which he so much desired. He had in mind
+a general neutrality agreement between England and Germany, though it
+was of course at the present moment too early to discuss details, and an
+assurance of British neutrality in the conflict which present crisis
+might possibly produce, would enable him to look forward to realisation
+of his desire.
+
+In reply to his Excellency's enquiry how I thought his request would
+appeal to you, I said that I did not think it probable that at this
+stage of events you would care to bind yourself to any course of action
+and that I was of opinion that you would desire to retain full liberty.
+
+Our conversation upon this subject having come to an end, I communicated
+the contents of your telegram of to-day to his Excellency, who expressed
+his best thanks to you.
+
+
+No. 87.
+
+_Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie_.
+
+Sir,                            _Foreign Office, July_ 29, 1914.
+
+After telling M. Cambon to-day how grave the situation seemed to be, I
+told him that I meant to tell the German Ambassador to-day that he must
+not be misled by the friendly tone of our conversations into any sense
+of false security that we should stand aside if all the efforts to
+preserve the peace, which we were now making in common with Germany,
+failed. But I went on to say to M. Cambon that I thought it necessary to
+tell him also that public opinion here approached the present difficulty
+from a quite different point of view from that taken during the
+difficulty as to Morocco a few years ago. In the case of Morocco the
+dispute was one in which France was primarily interested, and in which
+it appeared that Germany, in an attempt to crush France, was fastening a
+quarrel on France on a question that was the subject of a special
+agreement between France and us. In the present case the dispute between
+Austria and Servia was not one in which we felt called to take a hand.
+Even if the question became one between Austria and Russia we should not
+feel called upon to take a hand in it. It would then be a question of
+the supremacy of Teuton or Slav--a struggle for supremacy in the
+Balkans; and our idea had always been to avoid being drawn into a war
+over a Balkan question. If Germany became involved and France became
+involved, we had not made up our minds what we should do; it was a case
+that we should have to consider. France would then have been drawn into
+a quarrel which was not hers, but in which, owing to her alliance, her
+honour and interest obliged her to engage. We were free from
+engagements, and we should have to decide what British interests
+required us to do. I thought it necessary to say that, because, as he
+knew, we were taking all precautions with regard to our fleet, and I was
+about to warn Prince Lichnowsky not to count on our standing aside, but
+it would not be fair that I should let M. Cambon be misled into
+supposing that this meant that we had decided what to do in a
+contingency that I still hoped might not arise.
+
+M. Cambon said that I had explained the situation very clearly. He
+understood it to be that in a Balkan quarrel, and in a struggle for
+supremacy between Teuton and Slav we should not feel called to
+intervene; should other issues be raised, and Germany and France become
+involved, so that the question became one of the hegemony of Europe, we
+should then decide what it was necessary for us to do. He seemed quite
+prepared for this announcement, and made no criticism upon it.
+
+He said French opinion was calm, but decided. He anticipated a demand
+from Germany that France would be neutral while Germany attacked Russia.
+This assurance France, of course, could not give; she was bound to help
+Russia if Russia was attacked.
+
+I am, &c.
+
+E. GREY.
+
+
+No. 89.
+
+_Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen_.
+
+Sir,                             _Foreign Office, July_ 29, 1914.
+
+After speaking to the German Ambassador this afternoon about the
+European situation, I said that I wished to say to him, in a quite
+private and friendly way, something that was on my mind. The situation
+was very grave. While it was restricted to the issues at present
+actually involved we had no thought of interfering in it. But if Germany
+became involved in it, and then France, the issue might be so great that
+it would involve all European interests; and I did not wish him to be
+misled by the friendly tone of our conversation--which I hoped would
+continue--into thinking that we should stand aside.
+
+He said that he quite understood this, but he asked whether I meant that
+we should, under certain circumstances, intervene?
+
+I replied that I did not wish to say that, or to use anything that was
+like a threat or an attempt to apply pressure by saying that, if things
+became worse, we should intervene. There would be no question of our
+intervening if Germany was not involved, or even if France was not
+involved. But we knew very well that, if the issue did become such that
+we thought British interests required us to intervene, we must intervene
+at once, and the decision would have to be very rapid, just as the
+decisions of other Powers had to be. I hoped that the friendly tone of
+our conversations would continue as at present, and that I should be
+able to keep as closely in touch with the German Government in working
+for peace. But if we failed in our efforts to keep the peace, and if the
+issue spread so that it involved practically every European interest, I
+did not wish to be open to any reproach from him that the friendly tone
+of all our conversations had misled him or his Government into supposing
+that we should not take action, and to the reproach that, if they had
+not been so misled, the course of things might have been different.
+
+The German Ambassador took no exception to what I had said; indeed, he
+told me that it accorded with what he had already given in Berlin as his
+view of the situation.
+
+I am, &c.
+
+E. GREY.
+
+
+No. 98.
+
+_Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.--(Received July 30.)_
+
+(Telegraphic.)                           _Berlin, July_ 30, 1914.
+
+Secretary of State informs me that immediately on receipt of Prince
+Lichnowsky's telegram recording his last conversation with you he asked
+Austro-Hungarian Government whether they would be willing to accept
+mediation on basis of occupation by Austrian troops of Belgrade or some
+other point and issue their conditions from there. He has up till now
+received no reply, but he fears Russian mobilisation against Austria
+will have increased difficulties, as Austria-Hungary, who has as yet
+only mobilised against Servia, will probably find it necessary also
+against Russia. Secretary of State says if you can succeed in getting
+Russia to agree to above basis for an arrangement and in persuading her
+in the meantime to take no steps which might be regarded as an act of
+aggression against Austria he still sees some chance that European peace
+may be preserved.
+
+He begged me to impress on you difficulty of Germany's position in view
+of Russian mobilisation and military measures which he hears are being
+taken in France. Beyond recall of officers on leave--a measure which had
+been officially taken after, and not before, visit of French Ambassador
+yesterday--Imperial Government had done nothing special in way of
+military preparations. Something, however, would have soon to be done,
+for it might be too late, and when they mobilised they would have to
+mobilise on three sides. He regretted this, as he knew France did not
+desire war, but it would be a military necessity.
+
+His Excellency added that telegram received from Prince Lichnowsky last
+night contains matter which he had heard with regret, but not exactly
+with surprise, and at all events he thoroughly appreciated frankness and
+loyalty with which you had spoken.
+
+He also told me that this telegram had only reached Berlin very late
+last night; had it been received earlier Chancellor would, of course,
+not have spoken to me in way he had done.
+
+
+No. 101.
+
+_Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen_.
+
+(Telegraphic.)                   _Foreign Office, July_ 30, 1914.
+
+Your telegram of 29th July.[188]
+
+His Majesty's Government cannot for a moment entertain the Chancellor's
+proposal that they should bind themselves to neutrality on such terms.
+
+What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while French colonies
+are taken and France is beaten so long as Germany does not take French
+territory as distinct from the colonies.
+
+From the material point of view such a proposal is unacceptable, for
+France, without further territory in Europe being taken from her, could
+be so crushed as to lose her position as a Great Power, and become
+subordinate to German policy.
+
+Altogether, apart from that, it would be a disgrace for us to make this
+bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace from which the
+good name of this country would never recover.
+
+The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain away whatever
+obligation or interest we have as regards the neutrality of Belgium. We
+could not entertain that bargain either.
+
+Having said so much, it is unnecessary to examine whether the prospect
+of a future general neutrality agreement between England and Germany
+offered positive advantages sufficient to compensate us for tying our
+hands now. We must preserve our full freedom to act as circumstances may
+seem to us to require in any such unfavourable and regrettable
+development of the present crisis as the Chancellor contemplates.
+
+You should speak to the Chancellor in the above sense, and add most
+earnestly that the one way of maintaining the good relations between
+England and Germany is that they should continue to work together to
+preserve the peace of Europe; if we succeed in this object, the mutual
+relations of Germany and England will, I believe, be _ipso facto_
+improved and strengthened. For that object His Majesty's Government will
+work in that way with all sincerity and good-will.
+
+And I will say this: If the peace of Europe can be preserved, and the
+present crisis safely passed, my own endeavour will be to promote some
+arrangement to which Germany could be a party, by which she could be
+assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against
+her or her allies by France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or
+separately. I have desired this and worked for it, as far as I could,
+through the last Balkan crisis, and, Germany having a corresponding
+object, our relations sensibly improved. The idea has hitherto been too
+Utopian to form the subject of definite proposals, but if this present
+crisis, so much more acute than any that Europe has gone through for
+generations, be safely passed, I am hopeful that the relief and reaction
+which will follow may make possible some more definite rapprochement
+between the Powers than has been possible hitherto.
+
+[Footnote 188: See No. 85.]
+
+
+Enclosure 1 in No. 105.
+
+_Sir Edward Grey to M. Cambon_.
+
+My dear Ambassador,          _Foreign Office, November 22_, 1912.
+
+From time to time in recent years the French and British naval and
+military experts have consulted together. It has always been understood
+that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of either
+Government to decide at any future time whether or not to assist the
+other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation between experts
+is not, and ought not to be regarded as, an engagement that commits
+either Government to action in a contingency that has not arisen and may
+never arise. The disposition, for instance, of the French and British
+fleets respectively at the present moment is not based upon an
+engagement to co-operate in war.
+
+You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government had grave
+reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, it might become
+essential to know whether it could in that event depend upon the armed
+assistance of the other.
+
+I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an
+unprovoked attack by a third Power, or something that threatened the
+general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether both
+Governments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve
+peace, and, if so, what measures they would be prepared to take in
+common. If these measures involved action, the plans of the General
+Staffs would at once be taken into consideration, and the Governments
+would then decide what effect should be given to them.
+
+Yours, &c.
+
+E. GREY.
+
+
+No. 119.
+
+_Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie_.
+
+Sir,                             _Foreign Office, July_ 31, 1914.
+
+M. Cambon referred to-day to a telegram that had been shown to Sir
+Arthur Nicolson this morning from the French Ambassador in Berlin,
+saying that it was the uncertainty with regard to whether we would
+intervene which was the encouraging element in Berlin, and that, it we
+would only declare definitely on the side of Russia and France, it would
+decide the German attitude in favour of peace.
+
+I said that it was quite wrong to suppose that we had left Germany under
+the impression that we would not intervene. I had refused overtures to
+promise that we should remain neutral. I had not only definitely
+declined to say that we would remain neutral, I had even gone so far
+this morning as to say to the German Ambassador that, if France and
+Germany became involved in war, we should be drawn into it. That, of
+course, was not the same thing as taking an engagement to France, and I
+told M. Cambon of it only to show that we had not left Germany under the
+impression that we would stand aside.
+
+M. Cambon then asked me for my reply to what he had said yesterday.
+
+I said that we had come to the conclusion, in the Cabinet to-day, that
+we could not give any pledge at the present time. Though we should have
+to put our policy before Parliament, we could not pledge Parliament in
+advance. Up to the present moment, we did not feel, and public opinion
+did not feel, that any treaties or obligations of this country were
+involved. Further developments might alter this situation and cause the
+Government and Parliament to take the view that intervention was
+justified. The preservation of the neutrality of Belgium might be, I
+would not say a decisive, but an important factor, in determining our
+attitude. Whether we proposed to Parliament to intervene or not to
+intervene in a war, Parliament would wish to know how we stood with
+regard to the neutrality of Belgium, and it might be that I should ask
+both France and Germany whether each was prepared to undertake an
+engagement that she would not be the first to violate the neutrality of
+Belgium.
+
+M. Cambon repeated his question whether we would help France if Germany
+made an attack on her.
+
+I said that I could only adhere to the answer that, as far as things had
+gone at present, we could not take any engagement.
+
+M. Cambon urged that Germany had from the beginning rejected proposals
+that might have made for peace. It could not be to England's interest
+that France should be crushed by Germany. We should then be in a very
+diminished position with regard to Germany. In 1870 we had made a great
+mistake in allowing an enormous increase of German strength, and we
+should now be repeating the mistake. He asked me whether I could not
+submit his question to the Cabinet again.
+
+I said that the Cabinet would certainly be summoned as soon as there was
+some new development, but at the present moment the only answer I could
+give was that we could not undertake any definite engagement.
+
+I am, &c.
+
+E. GREY.
+
+
+No. 122.
+
+_Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.--(Received August 1.)_
+
+(Telegraphic.)                          _Berlin, July_ 31, 1914.
+
+Neutrality of Belgium, referred to in your telegram of 31st July to Sir
+F. Bertie.
+
+I have seen Secretary of State, who informs me that he must consult the
+Emperor and the Chancellor before he could possibly answer. I gathered
+from what he said that he thought any reply they might give could not
+but disclose a certain amount of their plan of campaign in the event of
+war ensuing, and he was therefore very doubtful whether they would
+return any answer at all. His Excellency, nevertheless, took note of
+your request.
+
+It appears from what he said that German Government consider that
+certain hostile acts have already been committed by Belgium. As an
+instance of this, he alleged that a consignment of corn for Germany had
+been placed under an embargo already.
+
+I hope to see his Excellency to-morrow again to discuss the matter
+further, but the prospect of obtaining a definite answer seems to me
+remote.
+
+In speaking to me to-day the Chancellor made it clear that Germany would
+in any case desire to know the reply returned to you by the French
+Government.
+
+
+No. 123.
+
+_Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen_.
+
+Sir,                            _Foreign Office, August_ 1, 1914.
+
+I told the German Ambassador to-day that the reply[189] of the German
+Government with regard to the neutrality of Belgium was a matter of very
+great regret, because the neutrality of Belgium affected feeling in this
+country. If Germany could see her way to give the same assurance as that
+which had been given by France it would materially contribute to relieve
+anxiety and tension here. On the other hand, if there were a violation
+of the neutrality of Belgium by one combatant while the other respected
+it, it would be extremely difficult to restrain public feeling in this
+country. I said that we had been discussing this question at a Cabinet
+meeting, and as I was authorised to tell him this I gave him a
+memorandum of it.
+
+He asked me whether, if Germany gave a promise not to violate Belgian
+neutrality, we would engage to remain neutral.
+
+I replied that I could not say that; our hands were still free, and we
+were considering what our attitude should be. All I could say was that
+our attitude would be determined largely by public opinion here, and
+that the neutrality of Belgium would appeal very strongly to Public
+opinion here. I did not think that we could give a promise of neutrality
+on that condition alone.
+
+The Ambassador pressed me as to whether I could not formulate conditions
+on which we would remain neutral. He even suggested that the integrity
+of France and her colonies might be guaranteed.
+
+I said that I felt obliged to refuse definitely any promise to remain
+neutral on similar terms, and I could only say that we must keep our
+hands free.
+
+I am, &c.
+
+E. GREY.
+
+[Footnote 189: See No. 122.]
+
+
+No. 133.
+
+_Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen_.
+
+(Telegraphic.)                  _Foreign Office, August_ 1, 1914.
+
+M. De Etter came to-day to communicate the contents of a telegram from
+M. Sazonof, dated the 31st July, which are as follows:--
+
+"The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador declared the readiness of his
+Government to discuss the substance of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia.
+M. Sazonof replied by expressing his satisfaction, and said it was
+desirable that the discussions should take place in London with the
+participation of the Great Powers.
+
+"M. Sazonof hoped that the British Government would assume the direction
+of these discussions. The whole of Europe would be thankful to them. It
+would be very important that Austria should meanwhile put a stop
+provisionally to her military action on Servian territory."
+
+(The above has been communicated to the six Powers.)
+
+
+No. 134.
+
+_Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.--(Received August 1.)_
+
+(Telegraphic.)                           _Paris, August_ 1, 1914.
+
+President of the Republic has informed me that German Government were
+trying to saddle Russia with the responsibility; that it was only after
+a decree of general mobilisation had been issued in Austria that the
+Emperor of Russia ordered a general mobilisation; that, although the
+measures which the German Government have already taken are in effect a
+general mobilisation, they are not so designated; that a French general
+mobilisation will become necessary in self-defence, and that France is
+already forty-eight hours behind Germany as regards German military
+preparations; that the French troops have orders not to go nearer to the
+German frontier than a distance of 10 kilom. so as to avoid any grounds
+for accusations of provocation to Germany, whereas the German troops, on
+the other hand, are actually on the French frontier and have made
+incursions on it; that, notwithstanding mobilisations, the Emperor of
+Russia has expressed himself ready to continue his conversations with
+the German Ambassador with a view to preserving the peace; that French
+Government, whose wishes are markedly pacific, sincerely desire the
+preservation of peace and do not quite despair, even now, of its being
+possible to avoid war.
+
+
+No. 148.
+
+_Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie_.
+
+(Telegraphic.)                  _Foreign Office, August_ 2, 1914.
+
+After the Cabinet this morning I gave M. Cambon the following
+memorandum:--
+
+"I am authorised to give an assurance that, if the German fleet comes
+into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile
+operations against French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will
+give all the protection in its power.
+
+"This assurance is of course subject to the policy of His Majesty's
+Government receiving the support of Parliament, and must not be taken as
+binding His Majesty's Government to take any action until the above
+contingency of action by the German fleet takes place."
+
+I pointed out that we had very large questions and most difficult issues
+to consider, and that Government felt that they could not bind
+themselves to declare war upon Germany necessarily if war broke out
+between France and Germany to-morrow, but it was essential to the French
+Government, whose fleet had long been concentrated in the Mediterranean,
+to know how to make their dispositions with their north coast entirely
+undefended. We therefore thought it necessary to give them this
+assurance. It did not bind us to go to war with Germany unless the
+German fleet took the action indicated, but it did give a security to
+France that would enable her to settle the disposition of her own
+Mediterranean fleet.
+
+M. Cambon asked me about the violation of Luxemburg. I told him the
+doctrine on that point laid down by Lord Derby and Lord Clarendon in
+1867. He asked me what we should say about the violation of the
+neutrality of Belgium. I said that was a much more important matter; we
+were considering what statement we should make in Parliament
+to-morrow--in effect, whether we should declare violation of Belgian
+neutrality to be a _casus belli_. I told him what had been said to the
+German Ambassador on this point.
+
+
+No. 153.
+
+_Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen_.
+
+(Telegraphic.)                  _Foreign Office, August_ 4, 1914.
+
+The King of the Belgians has made an appeal to His Majesty the King for
+diplomatic intervention on behalf of Belgium in the following terms:--
+
+"Remembering the numerous proofs of your Majesty's friendship and that
+of your predecessor, and the friendly attitude of England in 1870 and
+the proof of friendship you have just given us again, I make a supreme
+appeal to the diplomatic intervention of your Majesty's Government to
+safeguard the integrity of Belgium."
+
+His Majesty's Government are also informed that the German Government
+has delivered to the Belgian Government a note proposing friendly
+neutrality entailing free passage through Belgian territory, and
+promising to maintain the independence and integrity of the kingdom and
+its possessions at the conclusion of peace, threatening in case of
+refusal to treat Belgium as an enemy. An answer was requested within
+twelve hours.
+
+We also understand that Belgium has categorically refused this as a
+flagrant violation of the law of nations.
+
+His Majesty's Government are bound to protest against this violation of
+a treaty to which Germany is a party in common with themselves, and must
+request an assurance that the demand made upon Belgium will not be
+proceeded with and that her neutrality will be respected by Germany. You
+should ask for an immediate reply.
+
+
+
+
+APPENDIX III
+
+
+Extract from the Dispatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin
+respecting the Rupture of Diplomatic Relations with the German
+Government.
+
+(Cd. 7445.)
+
+
+_Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey_.
+
+Sir,                                    _London, August_ 8, 1914.
+
+In accordance with the instructions contained in your telegram of the
+4th instant I called upon the Secretary of State that afternoon and
+enquired, in the name of His Majesty's Government, whether the Imperial
+Government would refrain from violating Belgian neutrality. Herr von
+Jagow at once replied that he was sorry to say that his answer must be
+"No," as, in consequence of the German troops having crossed the
+frontier that morning, Belgian neutrality had been already violated.
+Herr von Jagow again went into the reasons why the Imperial Government
+had been obliged to take this step, namely, that they had to advance
+into France by the quickest and easiest way, so as to be able to get
+well ahead with their operations and endeavour to strike some decisive
+blow as early as possible. It was a matter of life and death for them,
+as if they had gone by the more southern route they could not have
+hoped, in view of the paucity of roads and the strength of the
+fortresses, to have got through without formidable opposition entailing
+great loss of time. This loss of time would have meant time gained by
+the Russians for bringing up their troops to the German frontier.
+Rapidity of action was the great German asset, while that of Russia was
+an inexhaustible supply of troops. I pointed out to Herr von Jagow that
+this _fait accompli_ of the violation of the Belgian frontier rendered,
+as he would readily understand, the situation exceedingly grave, and I
+asked him whether there was not still time to draw back and avoid
+possible consequences, which both he and I would deplore. He replied
+that, for the reasons he had given me, it was now impossible for them to
+draw back.
+
+During the afternoon I received your further telegram of the same date,
+and, in compliance with the instructions therein contained, I again
+proceeded to the Imperial Foreign Office and informed the Secretary of
+State that unless the Imperial Government could give the assurance by 12
+o'clock that night that they would proceed no further with their
+violation of the Belgian frontier and stop their advance, I had been
+instructed to demand my passports and inform the Imperial Government
+that His Majesty's Government would have to take all steps in their
+power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty
+to which Germany was as much a party as themselves.
+
+Herr von Jagow replied that to his great regret he could give no other
+answer than that which he had given me earlier in the day, namely, that
+the safety of the Empire rendered it absolutely necessary that the
+Imperial troops should advance through Belgium. I gave his Excellency a
+written summary of your telegram and, pointing out that you had
+mentioned 12 o'clock as the time when His Majesty's Government would
+expect an answer, asked him whether, in view of the terrible
+consequences which would necessarily ensue, it were not possible even at
+the last moment that their answer should be reconsidered. He replied
+that if the time given were even twenty-four hours or more, his answer
+must be the same. I said that in that case I should have to demand my
+passports. This interview took place at about 7 o'clock. In a short
+conversation which ensued Herr von Jagow expressed his poignant regret
+at the crumbling of his entire policy and that of the Chancellor, which
+had been to make friends with Great Britain and then, through Great
+Britain, to get closer to France. I said that this sudden end to my work
+in Berlin was to me also a matter of deep regret and disappointment, but
+that he must understand that under the circumstances and in view of our
+engagements, His Majesty's Government could not possibly have acted
+otherwise than they had done.
+
+I then said that I should like to go and see the Chancellor, as it might
+be, perhaps, the last time I should have an opportunity of seeing him.
+He begged me to do so. I found the Chancellor very agitated. His
+Excellency at once began a harangue, which lasted for about 20 minutes.
+He said that the step taken by His Majesty's Government was terrible to
+a degree; just for a word--"neutrality," a word which in war time had so
+often been disregarded--just for a scrap of paper Great Britain was
+going to make war on a kindred nation who desired nothing better than to
+be friends with her. All his efforts in that direction had been rendered
+useless by this last terrible step, and the policy to which, as I knew,
+he had devoted himself since his accession to office had tumbled down
+like a house of cards. What we had done was unthinkable; it was like
+striking a man from behind while he was fighting for his life against
+two assailants. He held Great Britain responsible for all the terrible
+events that might happen. I protested strongly against that statement,
+and said that, in the same way as he and Herr von Jagow wished me to
+understand that for strategical reasons it was a matter of life and
+death to Germany to advance through Belgium and violate the latter's
+neutrality, so I would wish him to understand that it was, so to speak,
+a matter of "life and death" for the honour of Great Britain that she
+should keep her solemn engagement to do her utmost to defend Belgium's
+neutrality if attacked. That solemn compact simply had to be kept, or
+what confidence could anyone have in engagements given by Great Britain
+in the future? The Chancellor said, "But at what price will that compact
+have been kept. Has the British Government thought of that?" I hinted to
+his Excellency as plainly as I could that fear of consequences could
+hardly be regarded as an excuse for breaking solemn engagements, but his
+Excellency was so excited, so evidently overcome by the news of our
+action, and so little disposed to hear reason that I refrained from
+adding fuel to the flame by further argument. As I was leaving he said
+that the blow of Great Britain joining Germany's enemies was all the
+greater that almost up to the last moment he and his Government had been
+working with us and supporting our efforts to maintain peace between
+Austria and Russia. I said that this was part of the tragedy which saw
+the two nations fall apart just at the moment when the relations between
+them had been more friendly and cordial than they had been for years.
+Unfortunately, notwithstanding our efforts to maintain peace between
+Russia and Austria, the war had spread and had brought us face to face
+with a situation which, if we held to our engagements, we could not
+possibly avoid, and which unfortunately entailed our separation from our
+late fellow-workers. He would readily understand that no one regretted
+this more than I.
+
+After this somewhat painful interview I returned to the embassy and drew
+up a telegraphic report of what had passed. This telegram was handed in
+at the Central Telegraph Office a little before 9 P.M. It was accepted
+by that office, but apparently never despatched.[190]
+
+[Footnote 190: This telegram never reached the Foreign Office.]
+
+
+
+
+APPENDIX IV
+
+
+THE CRIME OF SERAJEVO
+
+SELECTIONS FROM THE AUSTRIAN _dossier_ OF THE CRIME
+
+The following document is contained in the German Version of the German
+White Book (pp. 28-31); and though it adds little to our knowledge of
+the Austrian case against Servia, it deserves to be reprinted, as it is
+omitted altogether in the official version in English of the German
+White Book. The authorship of the document is uncertain. It has the
+appearance of an extract from a German newspaper.
+
+Aus dem österreich-ungarischen Material.
+
+Wien, 27. Juli. Das in der österreichisch-ungarischen Zirkularnote an
+die auswärtigen Botschaften in Angelegenheit des serbischen Konflikts
+erwähnte Dossier wird heute veröffentlicht.
+
+In diesem Memoire wird darauf hingewiesen, dass die von Serbien
+ausgegangene Bewegung, die sich zum Ziele gesetzt hat, die südlichen
+Teile Oesterreich-Ungarns von der Monarchie loszureiszen, um sie mit
+Serbien zu einer staatlichen Einheit zu verbinden, weit zurückgreist.
+Diese in ihren Endzielen stets gleichbleibende und nur in ihren Mitteln
+und an Intensität wechselnde Propaganda erreichte zur Zeit der
+Unnerionskrise ihren Höhepunft und trat damals ossen mit ihren Tendenzen
+hervor. Während einerjeits die gesamte serbische Bresse zum Kampfe gegen
+die Monarchie ausrief, bildeten sich--von anderen Propagandamitteln
+abgesehen--Ussoziationen, die diese Kämpfe vorbereiteten, unter denen
+die Harodna Odbrana an Bedeutung hervorragte. Aus einem revolutionären
+Komitee hervorgegangen, fonstituierte sich diese vom Belgrader
+Auswärtigen Amte völlig abhängige Organisation unter Leitung von
+Staatsmännern und Offizieren, darunter dem General Tantovic und dem
+ehemaligen Minister Ivanovic. Auch Major Oja Jantovic und Milan
+Pribicevic gehören zu diesen Gründern. Dieser Berein hatte sich die
+Bildung und Ausrüstung von Freischaren für den bevorstehenden Krieg
+gegen die öfterreichisch-ungarische Monarchie zum Ziele gesetzt. In
+einer dem Memoire angefügten Anlage wird ein Auszug aus dem vom
+Zentralausschusse der Narodna Odbrana herausgegebenen Vereinsorgane
+gleichen Namens veröffentlicht, worin in mehreren Artikeln die Tätigfelt
+und Ziele dieses Vereins ausführlich dargelegt werden. Es heißt darin,
+daß zu der Hauptaufgabe der Narodna Odbrana die Verbindung mit ihren
+nahen und ferneren Brüdern jenseits der Grenze und unseren übrigen
+Freunden in der Welt gehören.
+
+_Oesterreich ist als erster und größter Feind bezeichnet_. Wie die
+Narodna Odbrana die Notwendigkeit des Kampfes mit Oesterreich predigt,
+predigt sie eine heilige Wahrheit unserer nationalen Lage. Das
+Schlußkapitel enthält einen Apell an die Regierung und das Volk
+Serbiens, sich mit allen Mitteln für den Kampf vorzubereiten, den die
+Annexion vorangezeigt hat.
+
+Das Memoire schildert nach einer Aussage eines von der Narodna Odbrana
+angeworbenen Komitatschis die damalige Tätigkeit der Narodna Odbrana,
+die eine von zwei Hauptleuten, darunter Jankovic, geleitete _Schule zur
+Ausbildung von Banden_ unterhielt, Schulen, welche von General Jankovic
+und von Hauptmann Milan Pribicevic regelmäßig inspiziert wurden. Weiter
+wurden die Komitatschis im  _Schießen und Bombenwerfen, im Minenlegen,
+Sprengen von Eisenbahnbrücken_ usw. unterrichtet. Nach der feierlichen
+Erklärung der Serbischen Regierung vom Jahre 1909 schien auch das Ende
+dieser Organisation gekommen zu sein. Diese Erwartungen haben sich aber
+nicht nur nicht erfüllt, sondern die Propaganda wurde durch die
+serbische Presse fortgesetzt. Das Memoire führt als Beispiel die Art und
+Weise an, wie das Attentat gegen den bosnischen Landeschef Varesanin
+publizistisch verwertet wurde, indem der Attentäter als serbischer
+Nationalheld gefeiert und seine Tat verherrlicht wurde. Diese Blätter
+wurden nicht nur in Serbien verbreitet, sondern auch auf
+wohlorganisierten Schleichwegen in die Monarchie hineingeschmuggelt.
+
+Unter der gleichen Leitung wie bei ihrer Gründung wurde die Narodna
+Odbrana neuerlich der zentralpunkt einer Agitation welcher der
+_Schützenbund mit 762 Vereinen, ein Sokolbund mit 3500 Mitgliedern, und
+verschiedene andere Vereine angehörten_.
+
+Im Kleide eines Kulturvereins auftretend, dem nur die geistige und die
+füörperliche Entwickelung der Bevölkerung Serbiens sowie deren
+materielle Kräftigung am Herzen liegt, enthullt die Narodna Oobrana ihr
+wahres reorganisiertes Programm in vorzitiertem Auszug aus ihrem
+Vereinsorgan, in welchem "die heilige Wahrheit" gepredigt wird, dass es
+eine unerlässliche Notwendigkeit ist, gegen Oesterreich, seinen ersten
+grössten Feind, diesen Ausrottungskampf mit Gewehr und Kanone zu führen,
+und das Volk mit allen Mitteln auf den Kampf vorzubereiten, zur
+Befreiung der unterworfenen Gebiete, in denen viele Millionen
+unterjochter Brüder schmachten. Die in dem Memoire zitierten Aufrufe und
+Reden ähnlichen Charakters beleuchten die vielseitige auswärtige
+Tätigkeit der Narodna Oobrana und ihrer affilierten Vereine, die in
+Vortragsreifen, in der Teilnahme an Festen von bosnischen Vereinen, bei
+denen offen Mitglieder für die erwähnte serbische Vereinigung geworben
+wurden, besteht. Gegenwärtig ist noch die Untersuchung darüber im Zuge,
+dass die Sokolvereine Serbiens analoge Vereinigungen der Monarchie
+bestimmten, sich mit ihnen in einem bisher geheim gehaltenen Verbande zu
+vereinigen. Durch Vertrauensmänner und Missionäre wurde die Aufwiegelung
+in die Kreise Erwachsener und der urteilslosen Jugend gebracht. So
+wurden von Milan Pribicewitsch ehmalige honvedoffiziere und ein
+Gendarmerieleutnant zum Verlassen des Heeresdienstes in der Monarchie
+unter bedenklichen Umständen verleitet. In den Schulen der
+Lehrerbildungsanstalten wurde eine weitgehende Agitation entwickelt. Der
+gewünschte Krieg gegen die Monarchie wurde militärisch auch insofern
+vorbereitet, als serbische Emissäre im Falle des Ausbruchs der
+Feindseligkeiten mit der Zerstörung von Transportmitteln usw., der
+Anfachung von Revolten und Paniken betraut wurden. Alles dies wird in
+einer besonderen Beilage belegt.
+
+Das Memoire schildert ferner den Zusammenhang zwischen dieser Tätigkeit
+der Narodna Oobrana und den affilierten Organisationen mit den
+Attentaten gegen den Königlichen Kommissär in Agram Cuvaj im Juli 1912,
+dem Attentat von Dojcic in Agram 1913 gegen Sterlecz und dem
+missglückten Attentat Schäfers am 20. Mai im Aramer Theater. Es
+verbreitet sich hierauf über den Zusammenhang des Attentats auf den
+Thronfolger und dessen Gemahlin, über die Art, wie sich die Jungen schon
+in der Schule an dem Gedanken der Narodna Dobrana vergifteten und wie
+sich die Attentäter mit Hilfe von Pribicewic und Dacic die Werkzeuge zu
+dem Attentat verschafften, wobei insbesondere die Rolle des Majors
+Tankofte dargelegt wird, der die Mordwassën lieferte, wie auch die Rolle
+eines gewissen Ciganovic, eines gewesenen Komitatschi und jetzigen
+Beamten der serbischen Eisenbahndirektion Belgrad, der schon 1909 als
+Zögling der Bandenschule der damaligen Narodna Odbrana austauchte.
+Ferner wird die Art dargelegt, wie Bomben und Waffen unbemerkt nach
+Bosnien eingeschmuggelt wurden, die keinen Zweifel darüber lässt, dass
+dies ein wohl voerberiteter und für die geheimnisvollen Zwecke der
+Narodna oft begangener Schleichweg war.
+
+Eine Beilage enthält einen Auszug aus den Akten des Kreisgerichts in
+Serajewo über die Untersuchung des Attentats gegen den Erzherzog Franz
+Ferdinand und dessen Gemahlin. Danach sind Princip, Cabrinovic, Grabez,
+Crupilovic und Papovic geständig, in Gemeinschaft mit dem flüchtigen
+Mehmedbasic ein Komplott zur Erwordung des Erzherzogs gebildet und ihm
+zu diesen Zweck aufgelauert zu haben. Cabrinovic ist geständig, die
+Bombe geworfen und Gabrilo Princip das Attentat mit der Browningpistole
+ausgeführt zu haben. Beide Täter gaben zu, bei der Verübung der Tat die
+Absicht des Mordes gehabt zu haben. Die weiteren Teile der Anlage
+enthalten weitere Angaben der Beschuldigten vor dem Untersuchungsrichter
+über Entstehung des Komplotts, Herkunft der Bomben, welche fabrikmässig
+hergestellt wurden, für millitärische Zwecke bestimmt waren und ihrer
+Originalpackung nach aus dem serbischen Waffenlager aus Kragujevac
+stammten. Endlich gibt die Beilage Auskunft über den Transport der drei
+Attentäter und der Waffen von Serbien nach Bosnien. Aus dem weiteren
+Zeugenprotokoll ergibt sich, dass ein Angehöriger der Monarchie einige
+Tage vor dem Attentat dem österreichisch-ungarischen Konsulat in Belgrad
+Meldung von der Vermutung erstatten wollte, dass ein Plan zur Verübung
+des Attentats gegen den Erzherzog während dessen Anwesenheit in Bosnien
+bestehe. Dieser Mann soll nun durch Belgrader Polizeiorgane, welche ihn
+unmittelbar vor Betreten des Konsulats aus nichtigen Gründen
+verhafteten, an der Erstattung der Meldung verhindert worden sein.
+Weiter gehe aus dem Zeugenprotokoll hervor, dass die betreffenden
+Polizeiorgane von dem geplanten Attentat Kenntnis gehabt hätten. Da
+diese Angaben noch nicht nachgeprüft sind, kann über deren
+Stichhaltigkeit vorläufig noch kein Urteil gefällt werden. In der
+Beilage zum Memoire heisst es: Vor dem Empfangssaal des serbischen
+Kriegsministeriums befinden sich an der Wand vier allegorische Bilder,
+von denen drei Darstellungen serbischer Kriegserfolge sind, während das
+vierte die Verwirklichung der monarchiefeindlichen Tendenzen Serbiens
+versinnbildlicht. Ueber einer Landschaft, die teils Gebirge (Bosnien),
+teils Ebene (Südungarn) darstellt, geht die Zora, die Morgenröte der
+serbischen Hoffnungen, auf. Im Vordergrunde steht eine bewaffnete
+Frauengestalt, auf deren Schilde die Namen aller "noch zu befreienden
+Provinzen": Bosnien, Herzegowina, Wojwodina, Gyrmien, Dalmatien usw.
+stehen.
+
+
+
+
+APPENDIX V
+
+
+Extract from the Dispatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna
+respecting the Rupture of Diplomatic Relations with the Austro-Hungarian
+Government.
+
+(Cd. 7596)
+
+_Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey_.
+
+             _London, September_ 1, 1914.
+
+Sir,
+
+The rapidity of the march of events during the days which led up to the
+outbreak of the European war made it difficult, at the time, to do more
+than record their progress by telegraph. I propose now to add a few
+comments.
+
+The delivery at Belgrade on the 23rd July of the Austrian note to Servia
+was preceded by a period of absolute silence at the Ballplatz. Except
+Herr von Tchinsky, who must have been aware of the tenour, if not of the
+actual words of the note, none of my colleagues were allowed to see
+through the veil. On the 22nd and 23rd July, M. Dumaine, French
+Ambassador, had long interviews with Baron Macchio, one of the
+Under-Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs, by whom he was left
+under the impression that the words of warning he had been instructed to
+speak to the Austro-Hungarian Government had not been unavailing, and
+that the note which was being drawn up would be found to contain nothing
+with which a self-respecting State need hesitate to comply. At the
+second of these interviews he was not even informed that the note was at
+that very moment being presented at Belgrade, or that it would be
+published in Vienna on the following morning. Count Forgach, the other
+Under-Secretary of State, had indeed been good enough to confide to me
+on the same day the true character of the note, and the fact of its
+presentation about the time we were speaking.
+
+So little had the Russian Ambassador been made aware of what was
+preparing that he actually left Vienna on a fortnight's leave of absence
+about the 20th July. He had only been absent a few days when events
+compelled him to return. It might have been supposed that Duc Avarna,
+Ambassador of the allied Italian Kingdom, which was bound to be so
+closely affected by fresh complications in the Balkans, would have been
+taken fully into the confidence of Count Berchtold during this critical
+time. In point of fact his Excellency was left completely in the dark.
+As for myself, no indication was given me by Count Berchtold of the
+impending storm, and it was from a private source that I received on the
+15th July the forecast of what was about to happen which I telegraphed
+to you the following day. It is true that during all this time the "Neue
+Freie Presse" and other leading Viennese newspapers were using language
+which pointed unmistakably to war with Servia. The official
+"Fremdenblatt", however, was more cautious, and till the note was
+published, the prevailing opinion among my colleagues was that Austria
+would shrink from courses calculated to involve her in grave European
+complications.
+
+On the 24th July the note was published in the newspapers. By common
+consent it was at once styled an ultimatum. Its integral acceptance by
+Servia was neither expected nor desired, and when, on the following
+afternoon, it was at first rumoured in Vienna that it had been
+unconditionally accepted, there was a moment of keen disappointment. The
+mistake was quickly corrected, and as soon as it was known later in the
+evening that the Servian reply had been rejected and that Baron Giesl
+had broken off relations at Belgrade, Vienna burst into a frenzy of
+delight, vast crowds parading the streets and singing patriotic songs
+till the small hours of the morning.
+
+The demonstrations were perfectly orderly, consisting for the most part
+of organised processions through the principal streets ending up at the
+Ministry of War. One or two attempts to make hostile manifestations
+against the Russian Embassy were frustrated by the strong guard of
+police which held the approaches to the principal embassies during those
+days. The demeanour of the people at Vienna, and, as I was informed, in
+many other principal cities of the Monarchy, showed plainly the
+popularity of the idea of war with Servia, and there can be no doubt
+that the small body of Austrian and Hungarian statesmen by whom this
+momentous step was adopted gauged rightly the sense, and it may even be
+said the determination, of the people, except presumably in portions of
+the provinces inhabited by the Slav races. There had been much
+disappointment in many quarters at the avoidance of war with Servia
+during the annexation crisis in 1908 and again in connection with the
+recent Balkan war. Count Berchtold's peace policy had met with little
+sympathy in the Delegation. Now the flood-gates were opened, and the
+entire people and press clamoured impatiently for immediate and condign
+punishment of the hated Servian race. The country certainly believed
+that it had before it only the alternative of subduing Servia or of
+submitting sooner or later to mutilation at her hands. But a peaceful
+solution should first have been attempted. Few seemed to reflect that
+the forcible intervention of a Great Power in the Balkans must
+inevitably call other Great Powers into the field. So just was the cause
+of Austria held to be, that it seemed to her people inconceivable that
+any country should place itself in her path, or that questions of mere
+policy or prestige should be regarded anywhere as superseding the
+necessity which had arisen to exact summary vengeance for the crime of
+Serajevo. The conviction had been expressed to me by the German
+Ambassador on the 24th July that Russia would stand aside. This feeling,
+which was also held at the Ballplatz, influenced no doubt the course of
+events, and it is deplorable that no effort should have been made to
+secure by means of diplomatic negotiations the acquiescence of Russia
+and Europe as a whole in some peaceful compromise of the Servian
+question by which Austrian fears of Servian aggression and intrigue
+might have been removed for the future. Instead of adopting this course
+the Austro-Hungarian Government resolved upon war. The inevitable
+consequence ensued. Russia replied to a partial Austrian mobilisation
+and declaration of war against Servia by a partial Russian mobilisation
+against Austria. Austria met this move by completing her own
+mobilisation, and Russia again responded with results which have passed
+into history. The fate of the proposals put forward by His Majesty's
+Government for the preservation of peace is recorded in the White Paper
+on the European Crisis[191]. On the 28th July I saw Count Berchtold and
+urged as strongly as I could that the scheme of mediation mentioned in
+your speech in the House of Commons on the previous day should be
+accepted as offering an honourable and peaceful settlement of the
+question at issue. His Excellency himself read to me a telegraphic
+report of the speech, but added that matters had gone too far; Austria
+was that day declaring war on Servia, and she could never accept the
+conference which you had suggested should take place between the less
+interested Powers on the basis of the Servian reply. This was a matter
+which must be settled directly between the two parties immediately
+concerned. I said His Majesty's Government would hear with regret that
+hostilities could not be arrested, as you feared they would lead to
+European complications. I disclaimed any British lack of sympathy with
+Austria in the matter of her legitimate grievances against Servia, and
+pointed out that, whereas Austria seemed to be making these the starting
+point of her policy, His Majesty's Government were bound to look at the
+question primarily from the point of view of the maintenance of the
+peace of Europe. In this way the two countries might easily drift apart.
+
+His Excellency said that he too was keeping the European aspect of the
+question in sight. He thought, however, that Russia would have no right
+to intervene after receiving his assurance that Austria sought no
+territorial aggrandisement. His Excellency remarked to me in the course
+of his conversation that, though he had been glad to co-operate towards
+bringing about the settlement which had resulted from the ambassadorial
+conferences in London during the Balkan crisis, he had never had much
+belief in the permanency of that settlement, which was necessarily of a
+highly artificial character, inasmuch as the interests which it sought
+to harmonise were in themselves profoundly divergent. His Excellency
+maintained a most friendly demeanour throughout the interview, but left
+no doubt in my mind as to the determination of the Austro-Hungarian
+Government to proceed with the invasion of Servia.
+
+The German Government claim to have persevered to the end in the
+endeavour to support at Vienna your successive proposals in the interest
+of peace. Herr von Tchirsky abstained from inviting my co-operation or
+that of the French and Russian Ambassadors in carrying out his
+instructions to that effect, and I had no means of knowing what response
+he was receiving from the Austro-Hungarian Government. I was, however,
+kept fully informed by M. Schebeko, the Russian Ambassador, of his own
+direct negotiations with Count Berchtold. M. Schebeko endeavoured on the
+28th July to persuade the Austro-Hungarian Government to furnish Count
+Szápáry with full powers to continue at St. Petersburgh the hopeful
+conversations which had there been taking place between the latter and
+M. Sazonof. Count Berchtold refused at the time, but two days later
+(30th July), though in the meantime Russia had partially mobilised
+against Austria, he received M. Schebeko again, in a perfectly friendly
+manner, and gave his consent to the continuance of the conversations at
+St. Petersburgh. From now onwards the tension between Russia and Germany
+was much greater than between Russia and Austria. As between the latter
+an arrangement seemed almost in sight, and on the 1st August I was
+informed by M. Schebeko that Count Szápáry had at last conceded the main
+point at issue by announcing to M. Sazonof that Austria would consent to
+submit to mediation the points in the note to Servia which seemed
+incompatible with the maintenance of Servian independence. M. Sazonof,
+M. Schebeko added, had accepted this proposal on condition that Austria
+would refrain from the actual invasion of Servia. Austria, in fact, had
+finally yielded, and that she herself had at this point good hopes of a
+peaceful issue is shown by the communication made to you on the 1st
+August by Count Mensdorff, to the effect that Austria had neither
+"banged the door" on compromise nor cut off the conversations.[192] M.
+Schebeko to the end was working hard for peace. He was holding the most
+conciliatory language to Count Berchtold, and he informed me that the
+latter, as well as Count Forgach, had responded in the same spirit.
+Certainly it was too much for Russia to expect that Austria would hold
+back her armies, but this matter could probably have been settled by
+negotiation, and M. Schebeko repeatedly told me he was prepared to
+accept any reasonable compromise.
+
+Unfortunately these conversations at St. Petersburgh and Vienna were cut
+short by the transfer of the dispute to the more dangerous ground of a
+direct conflict between Germany and Russia. Germany intervened on the
+31st July by means of her double ultimatums to St. Petersburgh and
+Paris. The ultimatums were of a kind to which only one answer is
+possible, and Germany declared war on Russia on the 1st August, and on
+France on the 3rd August. A few days' delay might in all probability
+have saved Europe from one of the greatest calamities in history.
+
+Russia still abstained from attacking Austria, and M. Schebeko had been
+instructed to remain at his post till war should actually be declared
+against her by the Austro-Hungarian Government. This only happened on
+the 6th August when Count Berchtold informed the foreign missions at
+Vienna that "the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh had been
+instructed to notify the Russian Government that, in view of the
+menacing attitude of Russia in the Austro-Servian conflict and the fact
+that Russia had commenced hostilities against Germany, Austria-Hungary
+considered herself also at war with Russia."
+
+M. Schebeko left quietly in a special train provided by the
+Austro-Hungarian Government on the 7th September. He had urgently
+requested to be conveyed to the Roumanian frontier, so that he might be
+able to proceed to his own country, but was taken instead to the Swiss
+frontier, and ten days later I found him at Berne.
+
+M. Dumaine, French Ambassador, stayed on till the 12th August. On the
+previous day he had been instructed to demand his passport on the ground
+that Austrian troops were being employed against France. This point was
+not fully cleared up when I left Vienna. On the 9th August, M. Dumaine
+had received from Count Berchtold the categorical declaration that no
+Austrian troops were being moved to Alsace. The next day this statement
+was supplemented by a further one, in writing, giving Count Berchtold's
+assurance that not only had no Austrian troops been moved actually to
+the French frontier, but that none were moving from Austria in a
+westerly direction into Germany in such a way that they might replace
+German troops employed at the front. These two statements were made by
+Count Berchtold in reply to precise questions put to him by M. Dumaine,
+under instructions from his Government. The French Ambassador's
+departure was not attended by any hostile demonstration, but his
+Excellency before leaving had been justly offended by a harangue made by
+the Chief Burgomaster of Vienna to the crowd assembled before the steps
+of the town hall, in which he assured the people that Paris was in the
+throes of a revolution, and that the President of the Republic had been
+assassinated.
+
+The British declaration of war on Germany was made known in Vienna by
+special editions of the newspapers about midday on the 5th August. An
+abstract of your speeches in the House of Commons, and also of the
+German Chancellor's speech in the Reichstag of the 4th April, appeared
+the same day, as well as the text of the German ultimatum to Belgium.
+Otherwise few details of the great events of these days transpired. The
+"Neue Freie Presse" was violently insulting towards England. The
+"Fremdenblatt" was not offensive, but little or nothing was said in the
+columns of any Vienna paper to explain that the violation of Belgian
+neutrality had left His Majesty's Government no alternative but to take
+part in the war.
+
+The declaration of Italian neutrality was bitterly felt in Vienna, but
+scarcely mentioned in the newspapers.
+
+On the 5th August I had the honour to receive your instruction of the
+previous day preparing me for the immediate outbreak of war with
+Germany, but adding that, Austria being understood to be not yet at that
+date at war with Russia and France, you did not desire me to ask for my
+passport or to make any particular communication to the Austro-Hungarian
+Government. You stated at the same time that His Majesty's Government of
+course expected Austria not to commit any act of war against us without
+the notice required by diplomatic usage.
+
+On Thursday morning, the 13th August, I had the honour to receive your
+telegram of the 12th, stating that you had been compelled to inform
+Count Mensdorff, at the request of the French Government, that a
+complete rupture had occurred between France and Austria, on the ground
+that Austria had declared war on Russia who was already fighting on the
+side of France, and that Austria had sent troops to the German frontier
+under conditions that were a direct menace to France. The rupture having
+been brought about with France in this way, I was to ask for my
+passport, and your telegram stated, in conclusion, that you had informed
+Count Mensdorff that a state of war would exist between the two
+countries from midnight of the 12th August.
+
+After seeing Mr. Penfield, the United States Ambassador, who accepted
+immediately in the most friendly spirit my request that his Excellency
+would take charge provisionally of British interests in Austria-Hungary
+during the unfortunate interruption of relations, I proceeded, with Mr.
+Theo Russell, Counsellor of His Majesty's Embassy, to the Ballplatz.
+Count Berchtold received me at midday. I delivered my message, for which
+his Excellency did not seem to be unprepared, although he told me that a
+long telegram from Count Mensdorff had just come in but had not yet been
+brought to him. His Excellency received my communication with the
+courtesy which never leaves him. He deplored the unhappy complications
+which were drawing such good friends as Austria and England into war. In
+point of fact, he added, Austria did not consider herself then at war
+with France, though diplomatic relations with that country had been
+broken off. I explained in a few words how circumstances had forced this
+unwelcome conflict upon us. We both avoided useless argument...
+
+[Footnote 191: "Miscellaneous, No. 6 (1914)."]
+
+[Footnote 192: See No. 137, "Miscellaneous, No. 6 (1914)."]
+
+
+
+
+APPENDIX VI
+
+
+EXTRACTS FROM
+
+THE RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK
+
+_Recueil de Documents Diplomatiques_:
+
+_Négociations ayant précédé la guerre_
+
+_10/23 Juillet--24 Juillet/6 Août 1914_
+
+PREFATORY NOTE TO APPENDIX VI
+
+This important collection of documents, which has only reached us since
+the publication of our first edition, confirms the conclusion, which we
+had deduced from other evidence in our fifth chapter (_supra_, pp.
+66-107), that Germany consistently placed obstacles in the way of any
+proposals for a peaceful settlement, and this in spite of the
+willingness of all the other Powers, including Austria-Hungary and
+Russia, to continue discussion of the Servian question. That the crisis
+took Russia by surprise seems evident from the fact that her ambassadors
+accredited to France, Berlin, and Vienna were not at their posts when
+friction began with Russia. (_Infra_, Nos. 4, 7, 8.)
+
+The Russian evidence shows that, on July 29, Germany threatened to
+mobilize if Russia did not desist from military preparations. This
+threat was viewed by M. Sazonof as an additional reason for taking all
+precautions; 'since we cannot accede to Germany's desire, the only
+course open to us is to accelerate our own preparations and to assume
+that war is probably inevitable.' (_Infra_, No. 58.) The reader will
+also notice the curious fact that on July 30 the decree mobilizing the
+German army and navy was published, only to be immediately withdrawn;
+and that the German Government explained that the publication had been
+premature and accidental. (_Infra_, Nos. 61, 62.) We know from the
+British White Book (_Correspondence_, No. 99, Sir F. Bertie to Sir E.
+Grey, July 30) that, on July 30, Germany showed signs of weakening in
+her attitude to Russia.
+
+It will be noted that war between Austria-Hungary and Russia was not
+officially declared until August 6, five days after Germany had declared
+war on Russia. (_Infra_, No. 79.)
+
+In Nos. 36 and 46 will be found some curious details of the methods
+employed by Austria-Hungary and Germany to delay the publication of the
+Servian reply to Austria-Hungary.
+
+MINISTÈRE DES AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES.
+
+
+RECUEIL
+
+DE DOCUMENTS DIPLOMATIQUES.
+
+
+
+Négociations ayant précédé la guerre.
+
+10/23 Juillet--24 Juillet/6 Août 1914.
+
+
+
+
+Petrograde,
+Imprimerie de l'Etat.
+1914.
+
+
+No. 1.
+
+Le Chargé d'affaires en Serbie au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
+
+(_Télégramme_).
+
+Belgrade, le 10/23 Juillet 1914.
+
+Le Ministre d'Autriche vient de transmettre, à 6 heures du soir, an
+Ministre des Finances Patchou, qui remplace Pachitch, une note
+ultimative de son Gouvernement fixant un délai de 48 heures pour
+l'acceptation des demandes y contenues. Giesl a ajouté verbalement que
+pour le cas où la note ne serait pas acceptée intégralement dans un
+délai de 48 heures, il avait l'ordre de quitter Belgrade avec le
+personnel de la Légation. Pachitch et les autres Ministres qui se
+trouvent en tournée électorale ont été rappelés et sont attendus à
+Belgrade demain Vendredi à 10 heures du matin. Patchou qui m'a
+communiqué le contenu de la note, sollicite l'aide de la Russie et
+déclare qu'aucun Gouvernement Serbe ne pourra accepter les demandes de
+l'Autriche.
+
+(Signé) Strandtman.
+
+
+No. 2.
+
+Le Chargé d'affaires en Serbie au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
+
+_(Télégramme)._
+
+Belgrade, le 10/23 Juillet 1914.
+
+Texte de la note qui a été transmise aujourd'hui par le Ministre
+d'Autriche-Hongrie an gouvernement Serbe:...
+
+(_For this note, see German White Book, pp. 18-22_ (supra _in Appendix
+I._))
+
+Un mémoire concernant les résultats de l'instruction de Sarajevo à
+l'égard des fonctionnaires mentionnés aux points 7 et 8 est annexé à
+cette note'.[193]
+
+(Signé) Strandtman.
+
+[Footnote 193: This memorandum is in the German White Book, pp. 22-3
+(_supra_, Appendix I), and not reproduced in the Russian Orange Book.]
+
+
+No. 3.
+
+Note Verbale transmise personnellement par l'Ambassadeur
+d'Autriche-Hongrie à St.-Pétersbourg au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères
+le 11/24 Juillet 1914 à 10 heures du matin.
+
+Le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal s'est trouvé dans la nécessité de
+remettre le Jeudi 10/23 du mois courant, par l'entremise du Ministre
+Impérial et Royal à Belgrade, la note suivante an Gouvernement Royal de
+Serbie:
+
+(Suit le texte de la note).
+
+Voir document No. 2.
+
+
+No. 4.
+
+Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères au Chargé d'affaires en
+Autriche-Hongrie.
+
+_(Télégramme)._
+
+St.-Pétersbourg, le 11/24 Juillet 1914.
+
+Veuillez transmettre au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères
+d'Autriche-Hongrie ce qui suit....
+
+(This communication is printed in the British White Book
+(_Correspondence_, No. 13); see p. 177 _supra_ for the text in English.)
+
+Communiqué à Londres, Rome, Paris, Belgrade.
+
+(Signé) Sazonow.
+
+
+No. 5.
+
+Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères aux Représentants de Sa Majesté
+l'Empereur en Angleterre, en Allemagne, en Italie et en France.
+
+_(Télégramme)._
+
+St.-Pétersbourg, le 11/24 Juillet 1914.
+
+Me réfère à mon télégramme à Koudachew d'aujourd'hui; nous espérons que
+le Gouvernement auprès duquel. Vous êtes accrédité partagera notre point
+de vue et prescrira d'urgence à son Représentant à Vienne de se
+prononcer dans le même sens.
+
+Communiqué à Belgrade.
+
+(Signé) Sazonow.
+
+
+No. 6.
+
+Télégramme de Son Altesse Royale le Prince Régent de Serbie à Sa Majesté
+l'Empereur.
+
+Belgrade, le 11/24 Juillet 1914.
+
+Le Gouvernement Austro-Hongrois a remis hier soir au Gouvernement serbe
+une note concernant l'attentat de Sarajevo. Consciente de ses devoirs
+internationaux, la Serbie dès les premiers jours de l'horrible crime a
+déclaré qu'elle le condamnait et qu'elle était prête à ouvrir une
+enquête sur son territoire si la complicité de certains de ses sujets
+était prouvée au cours du procès instruit par les autorités
+Austro-hongroises. Cependant les demandes contenues dans la note
+Austro-hongroise sont inutilement humiliantes pour la Serbie et
+incompatibles avec sa dignité comme Etat indépendant. Ainsi on nous
+demande sur un ton péremptoire une déclaration du gouvernement dans
+l'officiel et un ordre du souverain à l'armée, où nous réprimerions
+l'esprit hostile contre l'Autriche en nous faisant à nous mêmes des
+reproches d'une faiblesse criminelle envers nos menées perfides.--On
+nous impose ensuite l'admission des fonctionnaires austro-hongrois en
+Serbie pour participer avec les nôtres à l'instruction et pour
+surveiller l'exécution des autres conditions indiquées dans la note.
+Nous avons reçu un délai de 48 heures pour accepter le tout, faute de
+quoi la Légation d'Autriche-Hongrie quittera Belgrade. Nous sommes prêts
+à accepter les conditions austro-hongroises qui sont compatibles avec la
+situation d'un Etat indépendant, ainsi que celles dont l'acception nous
+sera conseillée par Votre Majesté; toutes les personnes dont la
+participation à l'attentat sera démontrée seront sévèrement punis par
+nous. Certaines parmi ces demandes ne pourraient être exécutées sans des
+changements de notre législation, ce qui exige du temps. On nous a donné
+un délai trop court. Nous pouvons être attaqués après l'expiration du
+délai par l'armée austro-hongroise qui se concentre sur notre frontière.
+Il nous est impossible de nous défendre et nous supplions Votre Majesté
+de nous donner Son aide le plus tôt possible. La bienveillance précieuse
+de Votre Majesté qui s'est manifestée tant de fois à notre égard nous
+fait espérer fermement que cette fois encore notre appel sera entendu
+par Son généreux coeur slave.
+
+En ces moments difficiles l'interprète les sentiments du peuple serbe
+qui supplie Votre Majesté de vouloir bien s'intéresser au sort du
+Royaume de Serbie.
+
+(Signé) Alexandre.
+
+
+No. 7.
+
+Le Chargé d'Affaires en Allemagne au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
+
+_(Télégramme)._
+
+Berlin, le 11/24 Juillet 1914.
+
+Tous les journaux du matin, même ceux, rares, qui reconnaissent
+l'impossibilité pour la Serbie d'accepter les conditions posées,
+accueillent avec une grande sympathie le ton énergique adopté par
+l'Autriche. L'officieux «Local-Anzeiger» est particulièrement agressif;
+il qualifie de superflus les recours éventuels de la Serbie à St.
+Pétersbourg, à Paris, à Athènes et à Bucarest, et termine en disant que
+le peuple allemand respirera librement quand il aura appris que la
+situation dans la péninsule Balcanique va enfin s'éclaircir.
+
+(Signé) Bronewsky.
+
+
+No. 8.
+
+Le Chargé d'Affaires en France an Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
+
+_(Télégramme)._ Paris, le 11/24 Juillet 1914.
+
+La copie de la note officiellement remise à Belgrade a été communiquée
+par l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche an Gouvernement Français. Plus tard
+l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a visité le Ministre et lui a lu une
+communication reproduisant les arguments autrichiens et indiquant qu'en
+cas de refus de la part de la Serbie, l'Autriche serait obligée de
+recourir à une pression et, en cas de besoin, à des mesures militaires;
+la communication se terminait par la remarque qu'à l'avis de l'Allemagne
+cette question devrait être résolue directement entre l'Autriche et la
+Serbie et qu'il était de l'intérêt des Puissances de circonscrire
+l'affaire en l'abandonnant aux Parties intéressées. Le Gérant du
+Département Politique, qui assistait à l'entretien, demanda à
+l'Ambassadeur s'il fallait considérer l'action autrichienne comme un
+ultimatum--en d'autres termes, si, dans le cas où la Serbie ne se
+soumettrait pas entièrement aux demandes autrichiennes, les hostilités
+étaient inévitables? L'ambassadeur évita une réponse directe en
+alléguant l'absence d'instructions.
+
+(Signé) Sevastopoulo.
+
+
+No. 9.
+
+Le Chargé d'Affaires en Serbie au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
+
+_(Télégramme)._ Belgrade, le 11/24 Juillet 1914.
+
+Pachitch est rentré à Belgrade. Il a l'intention de donner dans le délai
+fixé, c'est à dire demain Samedi à 6 heures du soir, une réponse à
+l'Autriche indiquant les points acceptables et inacceptables. On
+adressera aujourd'hui même aux Puissances la prière de défendre
+l'indépendance de la Serbie. Ensuite, ajouta Pachitch, si la guerre est
+inévitable--nous ferons la guerre.
+
+(Signé) Strandtman.
+
+
+No. 10.
+
+Communiqué du Gouvernement Impérial.
+
+St.-Pétersbourg, le 12/25 Juillet 1914.
+
+Les derniers événements et l'envoi par l'Autriche-Hongrie d'un ultimatum
+à la Serbie préoccupent le Gouvernement Impérial an plus haut degré. Le
+Gouvernement suit attentivement l'évolution du conflit serbo-autrichien
+qui ne peut pas laisser la Russie indifférente.
+
+
+No. 11.
+
+Le Chargé d'Affaires en Autriche-Hongrie au Ministre des Affaires
+Etrangères.
+
+_(Télégramme)._ Vienne, le 12/25 Juillet 1914.
+
+Le comte Berchtold se trouve à Ischl. Vu l'impossibilité d'y arriver à
+temps, je lui ai télégraphié notre proposition de prolonger le délai de
+l'ultimatum et l'ai répétée verbalement au Baron Macchio. Ce dernier m'a
+promis de la communiquer à temps au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères,
+mais a ajouté qu'il pouvait prédire avec assurance un refus catégorique.
+
+(Signé) Koudachew.
+
+
+No. 12.
+
+Le Chargé d'Affaires en Autriche-Hongrie an Ministre des Affaires
+Etrangères.
+
+_(Télégramme)._ Vienne, le 12/25 Juillet 1914.
+
+Suite à mon télégramme d'aujourd'hui. Viens de recevoir de Macchio la
+réponse négative du Gouvernement Austro-Hongrois à notre proposition de
+prolonger le délai de la note.
+
+(Signé) Koudachew.
+
+
+No. 13.
+
+Le Chargé d'Affaires en Serbie an Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
+
+_(Télégramme)._ Belgrade, le 12/25 Juillet 1914.
+
+Reçu avec retard le 14--27 Juillet 1914.
+
+Je transmets la réponse que le Président du Conseil des Ministres Serbe
+a remis an ministre Austro-Hongrois à Belgrade aujourd'hui avant
+l'expiration du délai de l'ultimatum....
+
+(The text of the reply will be found in the British White Book
+(_Correspondence_, No. 39) and also in the German White Book, pp. 23-32
+(supra, Appendix I.).)
+
+
+No. 14.
+
+Le Chargé d'affaires en Allemagne au Ministre des affaires Etrangères.
+
+_(Télégramme)._ Berlin, le 12/25 Juillet 1914.
+
+Ai reçu Votre télégramme du 11/24 Juillet. Ai communiqué son contenu an
+Ministre des Affaires Etrangères. Il me dit que le Gouvernement Anglais
+l'a également prié de conseiller à Vienne la prolongation du délai de
+l'ultimatum; il a communiqué cette démarche télégraphiquement à Vienne,
+il va en faire autant pour notre démarche, mais il craint qu'à la suite
+de l'absence de Berchtold parti pour Ischl, et vu le manque de temps,
+ses télégrammes ne restent sans résultats; il a, en outre, des doutes
+sur l'opportunité pour l'Autriche de céder an dernier moment et il se
+demande si cela ne pouvait pas augmenter l'assurance de la Serbie. J'ai
+répondu qu'une grande Puissance comme l'Autriche pourrait céder sans
+porter atteinte à son prestige et ai fait valoir tous les arguments
+conformes, cependant je n'ai pu obtenir des promesses plus précises.
+Même lorsque je laissais entendre qu'il fallait agir à Vienne pour
+éviter la possibilité de conséquences redoutables, le Ministre des
+Affaires Etrangères répondait chaque fois négativement.
+
+(Signé) Bronewsky.
+
+
+No. 15.
+
+Le Chargé d'affaires en France an Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
+
+(_Télégramme_). Paris, le 12/25 Juillet 1914.
+
+Ai reçu le télégramme du 11/24 Juillet concernant la prolongation du
+délai de l'ultimatum autrichien et ai fait la communication prescrite.
+Le Représentant de France à Vienne a été muni d'instructions conformes.
+
+(Signé) Sevastopoulo.
+
+
+No. 16.
+
+L'Ambassadeur en Angleterre an Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
+
+(_Télégramme_). Londres, le 12/25 Juillet 1914.
+
+Reçu télégramme du 11 Juillet. Grey a prescrit à l'Ambassadeur
+d'Angleterre à Vienne d'appuyer notre démarche concernant la
+prolongation du délai de l'ultimatum. Il m'a dit en même temps que
+l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche était venu le voir et avait expliqué qu'on ne
+devrait pas attribuer à la note autrichienne le caractère d'un
+ultimatum; il faudrait la considérer comme une démarche qui, en cas
+d'absence de réponse ou en cas de réponse insuffisante au terme fixé,
+aurait comme suite la rupture des relations diplomatiques et le départ
+immédiat de Belgrade du Ministre d'Autriche-Hongrie, sans entrainer
+cependant le commencement immédiat des hostilités.--Grey a ajouté qu'à
+la suite de cette explication il a indiqué à l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre
+à Vienne que dans le cas où il serait trop tard pour soulever la
+question de la prolongation du délai de l'ultimatum, celle de l'arrêt
+des hostilités pourrait peut-être servir de base à la discussion.
+
+(Signé) Benckendorff.
+
+
+No. 17.
+
+Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères à l'Ambassadeur à Londres.
+
+_(Télégramme)._ St.-Pétersbourg, le 12/25 Juillet 1914.
+
+Dans le cas d'une nouvelle aggravation de la situation, pouvant
+provoquer de la part des Grandes Puissances des actions conformes, nous
+comptons que l'Angleterre ne tardera pas de se ranger nettement du côté
+de la Russie et de la France, en vue de maintenir l'équilibre européen,
+en faveur duquel elle est intervenue constamment dans le passé et qui
+serait sans aucun doute compromis dans le cas du triomphe de l'Autriche.
+
+(Signé) Sazonow.
+
+
+No. 18.
+
+Note verbale remise par l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne au Ministre des
+Affaires Etrangères le 12/25 Juillet 1914.
+
+Il nous revient de source autoritative que la nouvelle répandue par
+quelques journaux d'après laquelle la démarche du Gouvernement
+d'Autriche-Hongrie à Belgrade aurait été faite à l'instigation de
+l'Allemagne est absolument fausse. Le Gouvernement Allemand n'a pas eu
+connaissance du texte de la note Autrichienne avant qu'elle ait été
+remise et n'a exercé aucune influence sur son contenu. C'est à tort
+qu'on attribue à l'Allemagne une attitude comminatoire.
+
+L'Allemagne appuie naturellement comme allié de l'Autriche les
+revendications à son avis légitimes du Cabinet de Vienne contre la
+Serbie.
+
+Avant tout elle désire comme elle l'a déjà déclaré dès le commencement
+du différend Austro-Serbe que ce conflit reste localisé.
+
+
+No. 19.
+
+Le Chargé d'affaires en France an Ministre des affaires Etrangères.
+
+_(Télégramme)_ Paris, le 12/25 Juillet 1914.
+
+Me réfère à mon télégramme du 11/24 Juillet.
+
+Aujourd'hui un journal du matin a publié, sous une forme pas entièrement
+exacte, les déclarations d'hier de l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne, en les
+faisant suivre de commentaires qui attribuent à cette démarche le
+caractère d'une menace. L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne, très impressionné par
+ces divulgations, a visité aujourd'hui le Gérant du Département
+Politique pour lui dire que ses paroles n'avaient nullement eu le
+caractère de menace qu'on leur attribue. Il a déclaré que l'Autriche
+avait présenté sa note à la Serbie sans entente précise avec Berlin,
+mais que cependant l'Allemagne approuvait le point de vue de l'Autriche
+et que certainement 'la flèche une fois partie' (ce sont là ses propres
+paroles), l'Allemagne ne pouvait se laisser guider que par ses devoirs
+d'alliée.
+
+(Signé) Sevastopoulo.
+
+
+No. 20.
+
+L'ambassadeur en Angleterre au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
+
+_(Télégramme)._ Londres, le 12/25 Juillet 1914.
+
+Grey m'a dit que l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne lui a déclaré que le
+Gouvernement Allemand n'avait pas été informé du texte de la note
+autrichienne, mais qu'il soutenait entièrement la démarche autrichienne.
+L'Ambassadeur a demandé en même temps si l'Angleterre pouvait consentir
+à agir à St. Pétersbourg dans un esprit de conciliation. Grey a répondu
+que cela était complètement impossible. Le Ministre a ajouté que tant
+que les complications n'existaient qu'entre l'Autriche et la Serbie, les
+intérêts Anglais n'étaient engagés qu'indirectement, mais qu'il devait
+prévoir que la mobilisation autrichienne aurait comme suite la
+mobilisation de la Russie et que dès ce moment on se trouverait en
+présence d'une situation à laquelle seraient intéressées toutes les
+Puissances. L'Angleterre se réservait pour ce cas une complète liberté
+d'action.
+
+(Signé) Benckendorff.
+
+
+No. 21.
+
+Le Chargé d'affaires en Serbie an Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
+
+_(Télégramme)._ Belgrade, le 12/25 Juillet 1914.
+
+Malgré le caractère extrêmement conciliant de la réponse serbe à
+l'ultimatum, le Ministre d'Autriche vient d'informer, à 6-1/2 du soir,
+le Gouvernement Serbe par note, que n'ayant pas reçu an délai fixé une
+réponse satisfaisante il quitte Belgrade avec tout le personnel de la
+Légation. La Scoupchtina est convoquée à Nich pour le 14/27 Juillet. Le
+Gouvernement Serbe et le Corps Diplomatique partent ce soir pour la même
+ville.
+
+(Signé) Strandtman.
+
+
+No. 22.
+
+L'Ambassadeur en Angleterre an Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
+
+_(Télégramme)._ Londres, le 12/25 Juillet 1914.
+
+Grey a dit à l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne qu'à son avis la mobilisation
+autrichienne devait entraîner la mobilisation de la Russie, qu'alors
+surgirait le danger aigu d'une guerre générale et qu'il ne voyait qu'un
+seul moyen pour une solution pacifique: qu'en présence des mobilisations
+autrichienne et russe, l'Allemagne, la France, l'Italie et l'Angleterre
+s'abstiennent d'une mobilisation immédiate et proposent tout d'abord
+leurs bons offices. Grey m'a dit que ce plan nécessitait avant tout
+l'agrément de l'Allemagne et l'engagement de cette Puissance de ne pas
+mobiliser. En conséquence il a adressé tout d'abord à Berlin une
+question à ce sujet.
+
+(Signé) Benckendorff.
+
+
+No. 23.
+
+Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères à l'Ambassadeur en Italie.
+
+_(Télégramme)._ St. Pétersbourg, le 13/26 Juillet 1914.
+
+L'Italie pourrait jouer un rôle de tout premier ordre en faveur du
+maintien de la paix, en exerçant l'influence nécessaire sur l'Autriche
+et en adoptant une attitude nettement défavorable au conflit, car ce
+dernier ne saurait être localisé. Il est désirable que vous exprimiez la
+conviction qu'il est impossible pour la Russie de ne pas venir en aide à
+la Serbie.
+
+(Signé) Sazonow.
+
+
+No. 24.
+
+Le Gérant du Consulat à Prague au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
+
+_(Télégramme)._ Prague, le 13/26 Juillet 1914.
+
+La mobilisation a été décrétée.
+
+(Signé) Kazansky.
+
+
+No. 25.
+
+Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères à l'Ambassadeur en Autriche-Hongrie.
+
+_(Télégramme)._ St. Pétersbourg, le 13/26 Juillet 1914.
+
+J'ai eu aujourd'hui un long entretien sur un ton amical avec
+l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie. Après avoir examiné avec lui les 10
+demandes adressées à la Serbie, j'ai fait observer qu'à part la forme
+peu habile sous laquelle elles sont présentées, quelques-unes parmi
+elles sont absolument inexécutables, même dans le cas où le gouvernement
+Serbe déclarerait les vouloir accepter. Ainsi, par exemple, les points 1
+et 2 ne pourraient être exécutés sans un remaniement des lois serbes sur
+la presse et sur les associations, pour lequel le consentement de la
+Scoupchtina pourrait être difficilement obtenu; quant à l'exécution des
+points 4 et 5, elle pourrait produire des conséquences fort dangereuses
+et même faire naître le danger d'actes de terrorisme dirigés contre les
+membres de la Maison Royale et contre Pachitch, ce qui ne saurait entrer
+dans les vues de l'Autriche. En ce qui regarde les autres points, il me
+semble, qu'avec certains changements dans les détails, il ne serait pas
+difficile de trouver un terrain d'entente si les accusations y contenues
+étaient confirmées par des preuves suffisantes.
+
+Dans l'intérêt de la conservation de la paix qui, aux dires de Szápáry,
+est précieuse à l'Autriche au même degré qu'à toutes les Puissances, il
+serait nécessaire de mettre au plus tôt possible une fin à la situation
+tendue du moment. Dans ce but il me semblerait très désirable que
+l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie fût autorisé d'entrer avec moi dans un
+échange de vues privé aux fins d'un remaniement en commun de quelques
+articles de la note autrichienne du 10/23 Juillet. Ce procédé
+permettrait peut-être de trouver une formule qui fût acceptable pour la
+Serbie, tout en donnant satisfaction à l'Autriche quant au fond de ses
+demandes. Veuillez avoir une explication prudente et amicale dans le
+sens de ce télégramme avec le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
+Communiqué aux Ambassadeurs en Allemagne, en France, en Angleterre et en
+Italie.
+
+(Signé) Sazonow.
+
+
+No. 26.
+
+Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères à l'Ambassadeur en Allemagne.
+
+_(Télégramme)._ St. Pétersbourg, le 13/26 Juillet.
+
+Veuillez communiquer le contenu de mon télégramme à Vienne d'aujourd'hui
+au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères Allemand et lui exprimer l'espoir,
+que de son côté il trouvera possible de conseiller à Vienne d'aller
+au-devant de notre proposition.
+
+(Signé) Sazonow.
+
+
+No. 27.
+
+Le Chargé d'Affaires en France au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
+
+_(Télégramme)._ Paris, le 13/26 Juillet 1914.
+
+Le Directeur du Département Politique m'informe, que lors de la
+communication qu'il a faite à l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche du contenu de la
+réponse serbe à l'ultimatum, l'Ambassadeur n'a pas caché son étonnement
+de ce qu'elle n'ait pas donné satisfaction à Giesl. L'attitude
+conciliante de la Serbie doit, selon l'avis du Directeur du Département
+Politique, produire la meilleure impression en Europe.
+
+(Signé) Sevastopoulo.
+
+
+No. 28.
+
+Le Chargé d'Affaires en France an Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
+
+(_Télégramme_). Paris, le 13/26 Juillet 1914.
+
+Aujourd'hui l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a de nouveau rendu visite au
+Gérant du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et lui a fait les
+déclarations suivantes:
+
+«L'Autriche a déclaré à la Russie qu'elle ne recherche pas des
+acquisitions territoriales et qu'elle ne menace pas l'intégrité de la
+Serbie. Son but unique est d'assurer sa propre tranquillité. Par
+conséquent il dépend de la Russie d'éviter la guerre. L'Allemagne se
+sent solidaire avec la France dans le désir ardent de conserver la paix
+et espère fermement que la France usera de son influence à Pétersbourg
+dans un sens modérateur». Le Ministre fit observer que l'Allemagne
+pourrait de son côté entreprendre des démarches analogues à Vienne,
+surtout en présence de l'esprit de conciliation dont a fait preuve la
+Serbie. L'Ambassadeur répondit que cela n'était pas possible, vu la
+résolution prise de ne pas s'immiscer dans le conflit austro-serbe.
+Alors le Ministre demanda, si les quatre Puissances--l'Angleterre,
+l'Allemagne, l'Italie et la France--ne pouvaient pas entreprendre des
+démarches à St. Pétersbourg et à Vienne, puisque l'affaire se réduisait
+en somme à un conflit entre la Russie et l'Autriche. L'Ambassadeur
+allégua l'absence d'instructions. Finalement le Ministre refusa
+d'adhérer à la proposition allemande.
+
+(Signé) Sevastopoulo.
+
+
+No. 29.
+
+Le Chargé d'Affaires en France au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
+
+(_Télégramme_). Paris, le 13/28 Juillet 1914.
+
+Le Directeur du Département Politique a déclaré qu'à son avis personnel,
+les démarches successives allemandes à Paris ont pour but d'intimider la
+France et d'amener son intervention à St. Pétersbourg.
+
+(Signé) Sevastopoulo.
+
+
+No. 30.
+
+Le Chargé d'Affaires en Allemagne au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
+
+(_Télégramme_). Berlin, le 13/26 Juillet 1914.
+
+Après la réception à Berlin de la nouvelle de la mobilisation de l'armée
+autrichienne contre la Serbie une grande foule, composée, aux dires des
+journaux, en partie d'éléments autrichiens, se livra à une série de
+bruyantes manifestations en faveur de l'Autriche. A une heure avancée de
+la soirée les manifestants se massèrent à plusieurs reprises devant le
+palais de l'Ambassade Impériale en poussant des cris hostiles à la
+Russie; la police était presque absente et ne prenait aucune mesure.
+
+(Signé) Bronewsky.
+
+
+No. 31.
+
+L'Ambassadeur en Angleterre au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
+
+_(Télégramme)_.
+
+Londres, le 14/27 Juillet 1914.
+
+Ai reçu votre télégramme du 13-26 Juillet. Prie me télégraphier si, à
+Votre avis, Vos pourparlers directs avec le cabinet de Vienne
+s'accordent avec le projet de Grey concernant la médiation des 4
+Gouvernements. Ayant appris de l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre à St.
+Pétersbourg que Vous étiez disposé à accepter cette combinaison, Grey a
+décidé de la transformer en une proposition officielle qu'il a faite
+hier soir à Berlin, à Paris et à Rome.
+
+(Signé) Benckendorff.
+
+
+No. 32.
+
+Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères aux Ambassadeurs en France et en
+Angleterre.
+
+_(Télégramme)_.
+
+St. Pétersbourg, le 14/27 Juillet 1914.
+
+(Printed in the British White Book (_Correspondence_, No. 53.).)
+
+
+No. 33.
+
+Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères aux Ambassadeurs en France, en
+Angleterre, en Allemagne, en Autriche-Hongrie et en Italie.
+
+_(Télégramme)_.
+
+St. Pétersbourg, le 14/27 Juillet 1914.
+
+Ai pris connaissance de la réponse transmise par le Gouvernement Serbe
+au Baron Giesl. Elle dépasse toutes nos prévisions par sa modération et
+son désir de donner la plus complète satisfaction à l'Autriche. Nous ne
+voyons pas quelles pourraient être encore les demandes de l'Autriche, à
+moins que le Cabinet de Vienne ne cherche un prétexte pour une guerre
+avec la Serbie.
+
+(Signé) Sazonow.
+
+
+No. 34.
+
+Le Chargé d'Affaires en France au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
+
+_(Télégramme)_.
+
+Paris, le 14/27 Juillet 1914.
+
+L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a conféré aujourd'hui de nouveau longuement
+sur la situation avec le Directeur du Département Politique.
+L'Ambassadeur a beaucoup insisté sur l'exclusion de toute possibilité
+d'une médiation ou d'une conférence.
+
+(Signé) Sevastopoulo.
+
+
+No. 35.
+
+L'Ambassadeur en France au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
+
+_(Télégramme)._ Paris, le 14/27 Juillet 1914.
+
+Ai conféré avec le Gérant du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, en
+présence de Berthelot, immédiatement après mon retour à Paris. Tous les
+deux m'out confirmé les détails concernant les démarches de
+l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne que Sevastopoulo Vous a communiqués dans ses
+télégrammes. Ce matin le Baron de Schoen a confirmé par écrit sa
+déclaration d'hier, savoir: 1) l'Autriche a déclaré à la Russie qu'elle
+ne recherche pas d'acquisitions et n'attente pas à l'intégrité de la
+Serbie. Son unique but est d'assurer sa propre tranquillité. 2) Par
+conséquent il dépend de la Russie d'éviter la guerre. 3) L'Allemagne et
+la France, complètement solidaires dans l'ardent désir de ne pas rompre
+la paix, doivent agir sur la Russie dans un sens modérateur. Le Baron de
+Schoen a spécialement souligné l'expression de la solidarité entre
+l'Allemagne et la France. D'après la conviction du Ministre de la
+Justice, les démarches susdites de l'Allemagne out pour but évident de
+désunir la Russie et la France, d'entraîner le Gouvernement Français
+dans la voie des représentations à St. Pétersbourg et de compromettre
+ainsi notre allié à nos yeux; enfin, en cas de guerre, d'en rejeter la
+responsabilité non sur l'Allemagne, qui emploie soi-disant tous ses
+efforts pour le maintien de la paix, mais sur la Russie et la France.
+
+(Signé) Iswolsky.
+
+
+No. 36.
+
+L'Ambassadeur en France au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
+
+_(Télégramme)._ Paris, le 14/27 Juillet 1914.
+
+Il ressort de vos télégrammes du 13/26 Juillet que vous ne connaissiez
+pas encore la réponse du Gouvernement Serbe. Le télégramme par lequel
+cette nouvelle m'a été communiquée de Belgrade a été également en route
+pendant 20 heures. Le télégramme du Ministre des Affaires Etrangères
+Français expédié avant-hier, au triple tarif, à onze heures du matin, et
+contenant l'ordre d'appuyer notre démarche, n'est parvenu à sa
+destination qu'à 6 heures. Il n'y a aucun doute que ce télégramme n'ait
+été retenu intentionnellement par le télégraphe autrichien.
+
+(Signé) Iswolsky.
+
+
+No. 37.
+
+L'Ambassadeur en France au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
+
+_(Télégramme)._ Paris, le 14/27 Juillet 1914.
+
+D'ordre de son Gouvernement, l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche a communiqué au
+Gérant du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères que la réponse de la Serbie
+a été jugée insuffisante à Vienne et que demain, mardi, l'Autriche
+procéderait à des 'actions énergiques' don't le but serait de forcer la
+Serbie de lui donner les garanties nécessaires. Le Ministre ayant
+demandé en quoi consisteraient ces actions, l'Ambassadeur répondit qu'il
+n'avait pas de renseignements exacts à ce sujet, mais qu'il pouvait
+s'agir d'un passage da la frontière serbe, d'un ultimatum et même d'une
+déclaration de guerre.
+
+(Signé) Iswolsky.
+
+
+No. 38.
+
+Le Chargé d'Affaires en Allemagne au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
+
+_(Télégramme)._ Berlin, le 14/27 Juillet 1914.
+
+J'ai prié le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères d'appuyer à Vienne votre
+proposition tendant à autoriser Szápáry d'élaborer, par la voie d'un
+échange de vues privé avec Vous, une rédaction des demandes
+austro-hongroises acceptable pour les deux parties. Jagow a répondu
+qu'il était an courant de cette proposition et qu'il partageait l'avis
+de Pourtalès que, puisque Szápáry avait commencé cette conversation, il
+pourrait aussi bien la continuer. Il télégraphiera dans ce sens à
+l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne à Vienne. Je l'ai prié de conseiller d'une
+façon plus pressante à Vienne de s'engager dans cette voie de
+conciliation; Jagow a répondu qu'il ne pouvait pas conseiller à
+l'Autriche de céder.
+
+(Signé) Bronewsky.
+
+
+No. 39.
+
+Le Chargé d'Affaires en Allemagne au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
+
+_(Télégramme)._ Berlin, le 14/27 Juillet 1914.
+
+Aujourd'hui, avant ma visite au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, ce
+dernier avait reçu celle de l'Ambassadeur de France qui avait tenté de
+lui faire accepter la proposition anglaise relative à une action en
+faveur de la paix, action qui serait exercée simultanément à
+St.-Pétersbourg et à Vienne par l'Angleterre, l'Allemagne, l'Italie et
+la France. Cambon a proposé que ces Puissances donnent à Vienne un
+conseil dans les termes suivants: «S'abstenir de tout acte qui pourrait
+aggraver la situation de l'heure actuelle». En adoptant cette formule
+voilée on éviterait de mentionner la nécessité de s'abstenir d'une
+invasion de la Serbie. Jagow a opposé à cette proposition un refus
+catégorique, et cela malgré les instances de l'Ambassadeur qui a fait
+valoir, comme un bon côte de la proposition, le groupement mixte des
+Puissances grâce auquel on évitait l'opposition de l'Alliance à
+l'Entente, ce dont s'était si souvent plaint Jagow lui-même.
+
+(Signé) Bronewsky.
+
+
+No. 40.
+
+Télégramme de Sa Majesté Impériale l'Empereur à Son Altesse Royale le
+Prince Alexandre de Serbie en date du 14/27 Juillet 1914.
+
+Votre Altesse Royale en s'adressant à Moi dans un moment
+particulièrement difficile ne s'est pas trompée sur les sentiments qui
+M'animent à Son égard et sur Ma sympathie cordiale pour le peuple serbe.
+
+Ma plus sérieuse attention est attirée par la situation actuelle et Mon
+Gouvernement s'applique de toutes ses forces à aplanir les présentes
+difficultés. Je ne doute point que Votre Altesse et le Gouvernement
+Royal ne veuillent faciliter cette tâche en ne négligeant rien pour
+arriver à une solution qui permette de prévenir les horreurs d'une
+nouvelle guerre tout en sauvegardant la dignité de la Serbie.
+
+Tant qu'il y a le moindre espoir d'éviter une effusion de sang, tous nos
+efforts doivent tendre vers ce but. Si, malgré Notre plus sincère désir,
+Nous ne réussissons pas, Votre Altesse peut être assurée qu'en aucun cas
+la Russie ne se désintéressera du sort de la Serbie.
+
+(Signé) Nicolas.
+
+
+No. 41.
+
+L'Ambassadeur en Autriche-Hongrie au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
+
+(_Télégramme_). Vienne, le 14/17 juillet 1914.[194]
+
+Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères est absent. Pendant un entretien
+prolongé, que j'ai eu aujourd'hui avec Macchio, j'ai, en termes tout à
+fait amicaux, attiré son attention sur l'impression défavorable qu'a
+produite en Russie la présentation par l'Autriche à la Serbie de
+demandes absolument inacceptables pour chaque état indépendant, bien que
+petit. J'ai ajouté que ce procédé, qui pourrait amener des complications
+les moins désirables, a provoqué en Russie une profonde surprise et une
+réprobation générale. Il faut supposer que l'Autriche, sous l'influence
+des assurances du Représentant Allemand à Vienne, lequel pendant toute
+cette crise a joué un rôle d'instigateur, a compté sur la probabilité de
+la localisation de son conflit avec la Serbie et sur la possibilité de
+porter à cette dernière impunément un coup grave. La déclaration du
+Gouvernement Impérial concernant l'impossibilité pour la Russie de
+rester indifférente en présence d'un tel procédé a provoqué ici une
+grande impression.
+
+(Signé) Schébéko.
+
+[Footnote 194: Evidently the date July 17 is a misprint for July 27.]
+
+
+No. 42.
+
+L'Ambassadeur en Angleterre au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
+
+(_Télégramme_). Londres, le 14/17 Juillet 1914.[195]
+
+Grey vient de répondre à l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne, qui était venu le
+questionner sur la possibilité d'une action à St.-Pétersbourg, que cette
+action devrait se produire à Vienne et que le cabinet de Berlin serait
+le mieux qualifié pour l'exercer. Grey a fait observer en même temps que
+la réponse serbe à la note autrichienne dépassait par sa modération et
+son esprit de conciliation tout ce à quoi on pouvait s'attendre. Grey a
+ajouté qu'il en concluait que la Russie avait conseillé à Belgrade de
+donner une réponse modérée et qu'il pensait que la réponse serbe pouvait
+servir de base à une solution pacifique et acceptable de la question.
+
+Dans ces conditions, a continué Grey, si l'Autriche malgré cette réponse
+commençait les hostilités, elle prouverait son intention d'anéantir la
+Serbie. La question placée sur ce terrain produirait une situation qui
+pourrait amener une guerre dans laquelle seraient impliquées toutes les
+Puissances.
+
+Grey a enfin déclaré que le Gouvernement Anglais était bien sincèrement
+disposé à collaborer avec le gouvernement Allemand tant qu'il s'agirait
+de la conservation de la paix; mais que pour le cas contraire
+l'Angleterre se réservait une pleine liberté d'action.
+
+(Signé) Benckendorff.
+
+[Footnote 195: Evidently the date July 17 is a misprint for July 27.]
+
+
+No. 43.
+
+Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères à l'Ambassadeur en Angleterre.
+
+(_Télégramme_). St.-Pétersbourg, le 15/28 Juillet 1914.
+
+(Printed in the British White Book (_Correspondence_, No. 54.).)
+
+
+No. 44.
+
+Le Consul général à Fiume au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
+
+_(Télégramme)._ Fiume, le 15/28 Juillet 1914.
+
+L'état de siège a été proclamé en Slavonie, en Croatie et à Fiume et en
+même temps les réservistes de toutes les catégories ont été mobilisés.
+
+(Signé) Salviati.
+
+
+No. 45.
+
+L'Ambassadeur en Autriche-Hongrie au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
+
+_(Télégramme)._ Vienne, le 15/28 Juillet 1914.
+
+(Printed in the British White Book (_Correspondence_, No. 93 (I)).)
+
+
+No. 46.
+
+Le Chargé d'affaires en Allemagne au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
+
+_(Télégramme)._ Berlin, le 15/28 Juillet 1914.
+
+Le Bureau Wolff n'a pas publié le texte de la note responsive serbe qui
+lui avait été communiqué. Jusqu'à ce moment cette note n'a paru in
+extenso dans aucun des journaux locaux, qui selon toute évidence ne
+veulent pas lui donner place dans leurs colonnes, se rendant compte de
+l'effet calmant que cette publication produirait sur les lecteurs
+allemands.
+
+(Signé) Bronewsky.
+
+
+No. 47.
+
+L'Ambassadeur en Autriche-Hongrie au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
+
+_(Télégramme)._ Vienne, le 15/28 Juillet, 1914.
+
+Le décret sur la mobilisation générale a été signé.
+
+(Signé) Schébéko.
+
+
+No. 48.
+
+Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères à l'Ambassadeur à Londres.[196]
+
+_(Télégramme)._ St.-Pétersbourg, le 15/28 Juillet, 1914.
+
+En présence des hostilités entre l'Autriche-Hongrie et la Serbie il est
+nécessaire que l'Angleterre entreprenne d'urgence une action médiatrice
+et que l'action militaire de l'Autriche contre la Serbie soit
+immédiatement suspendue. Autrement la médiation ne servira que de
+prétexte pour tirer en longueur la solution de la question et donnera
+entre temps à l'Autriche la possibilité d'écraser complètement la Serbie
+et d'occuper une situation dominante dans les Balcans.
+
+Communiqué à Paris, Berlin, Vienne et Rome.
+
+(Signé) Sazonow.
+
+[Footnote 196: An English (abbreviated) version of this telegram is
+given in the British White Book (_Correspondence_, No. 70 (2)).]
+
+
+No. 49.
+
+Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères au Chargé d'Affaires en Allemagne.
+
+_(Télégramme)._ St.-Pétersbourg, le 16/29 Juillet, 1914.
+
+(Printed in the British White Book (_Correspondence_, No. 93 (2)).)
+
+
+No. 50.
+
+Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères aux Ambassadeurs en Angleterre et en
+France.
+
+_(Télégramme)._ St.-Pétersbourg, le 16/29 Juillet 1914.
+
+(Printed in the British White Book (_Correspondence_, No. 93 (3)).)
+
+
+No. 51.
+
+Le Chargé d'Affaires en Allemagne au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
+
+_(Télégramme)._ Berlin, le 16/29 Juillet 1914.
+
+Sur ma question s'il avait une réponse de Vienne relativement à Votre
+proposition de pourparlers privés à St.-Pétersbourg, le Secrétaire
+d'Etat a répondu négativement.
+
+Il déclare qu'il lui est fort difficile d'agir sur Vienne, surtout
+ouvertement. Parlant à Cambon, il a même ajouté qu'en cas d'une pression
+trop évidente l'Autriche se hâterait de mettre l'Allemagne en présence
+d'un fait accompli.
+
+Le Secrétaire d'Etat dit qu'il a reçu aujourd'hui un télégramme de
+Pourtalès d'où il constate que plus que les premiers jours Vous êtes
+disposé à trouver un compromis acceptable pour tous. J'ai répliqué que
+probablement Vous avez été dès le commencement en faveur d'un compromis,
+bien entendu à la condition qu'il soit acceptable non seulement pour
+l'Autriche, mais également pour nous. Il m'a dit ensuite qu'il
+paraissait que nous avions commencé à mobiliser sur la frontière
+autrichienne et qu'il craignait que ceci rendrait plus difficile pour
+l'Autriche la possibilité de s'entendre avec nous, d'autant plus que
+l'Autriche ne mobilisait que contre la Serbie et ne faisait pas de
+préparatifs sur notre frontière. J'ai répondu que, d'après les
+renseignements dont je disposais, l'Autriche mobilisait également sur
+notre frontière et que par conséquent nous devions prendre des mesures
+analogues. J'ai ajouté que les mesures que nous avons peut-être prises
+de notre côté n'étaient nullement dirigées contre l'Allemagne.
+
+(Signé) Bronewsky.
+
+
+No. 52.
+
+Le Chargé d'affaires en Serbie au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
+
+_(Télégramme)._ Nich, le 16/29 Juillet 1914.
+
+Aujourd'hui le Ministre de Bulgarie, an nom de son Gouvernement, a
+déclaré à Pachiteh que la Bulgarie observerait la neutralité.
+
+(Signé) Strandtman.
+
+
+No. 53.
+
+L'Ambassadeur en France au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
+
+_(Télégramme)._ Paris, le 16/29 Juillet 1914.
+
+A l'occasion de l'arrivée du Président de la République Français le
+Ministre des Affaires Etrangères avait préparé un court exposé de la
+situation politique actuelle, à pen près dans les termes suivants:
+L'Autriche, craignant la décomposition intérieure, s'est emparée du
+prétexte de l'assassinat de l'Archiduc pour essayer d'obtenir des
+garanties qui pourront revêtir la forme de l'occupation des
+communications militaires serbes ou même du territoire serbe.
+L'Allemagne soutient l'Autriche. Le maintien de la paix dépend de la
+seule Russie, parce qu'il s'agit d'une affaire qui doit être «localisée»
+entre l'Autriche et la Serbie, c'est à dire de la punition de la
+politique précédente de la Serbie et des garanties pour l'avenir. De
+ceci l'Allemagne conclue qu'il faut exercer une action modératrice à
+Pétersbourg. Ce sophisme a été réfuté à Paris comme à Londres. A Paris,
+le Baron de Schoen a en vain tâché d'entraîner la France à une action
+solidaire avec l'Allemagne sur la Russie en faveur du maintien de la
+paix. Les mêmes tentatives out été faites à Londres. Dans les deux
+capitales il a été répondu que l'action devrait être exercée à Vienne,
+car les demandes excessives de l'Autriche, son refus de discuter les
+rares réserves de la Serbie, et la déclaration de guerre menacent de
+provoquer la guerre générale. La France et l'Angleterre ne peuvent
+exercer une action modératrice sur la Russie, laquelle jusqu'ici a fait
+preuve de la plus grande modération, surtout en conseillant à la Serbie
+d'accepter ce qui était possible de la note autrichienne. Aujourd'hui
+l'Allemagne paraît renoncer à l'idée d'une action sur la Russie seule et
+incline vers une action médiatrice à Pétersbourg et à Vienne, mais en
+même temps l'Allemagne comme l'Autriche tâchent de faire traîner
+l'affaire. L'Allemagne s'oppose à la Conférence sans indiquer aucune
+autre manière d'agir pratique. L'Autriche mène des pourparlers
+manifestement dilatoires à Pétersbourg. En même temps elle prend des
+mesures actives, et si ces mesures sont tolérées, ses prétentions
+augmenteront proportionnellement. Il est très désirable que la Russie
+prête tout son appui an projet de médiation que présentera Sir E. Grey.
+Dans le cas contraire l'Autriche, sous prétexte de «garantie», pourra,
+en fait, changer le status territorial de l'Europe orientale.
+
+(Signé) Iswolsky.
+
+
+No. 54.
+
+L'Ambassadeur en Angleterre au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
+
+_(Télégramme)._ Londres, le 10/29 Juillet 1914.
+
+Ai communiqué le contenu de Vos télégrammes du 15/28 Juillet à Grey. Il
+a déclaré aujourd'hui à l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne que les pourparlers
+directs entre la Russie et l'Autriche avaient échoué, et que les
+correspondants des journaux mandaient de St.-Pétersbourg que la Russie
+mobilisait contre l'Autriche à la suite de la mobilisation de cette
+dernière. Grey dit qu'en principe le Gouvernement Allemand s'est déclaré
+en faveur de la médiation, mais qu'il rencontre des difficultés quant à
+la forme. Grey a insisté pour que le Gouvernement Allemand indiquât la
+forme laquelle à l'avis de l'Allemagne pourrait permettre aux 4
+Puissances d'exercer leur médiation pour éviter la guerre; vu le
+consentement de la France, de l'Italie et de l'Angleterre la médiation
+pourrait avoir lieu seulement dans le cas où l'Allemagne consentirait à
+se ranger du côté de la paix.
+
+(Signé) Benckendorff.
+
+
+No. 55.
+
+L'Ambassadeur en France au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
+
+_(Télégramme)._ Paris, le 16/29 Juillet 1914.
+
+Viviani vient de me confirmer l'entière résolution du Gouvernement
+Français d'agir d'accord avec nous. Cette résolution est soutenue par
+les cercles les plus étendus et par les partis, y compris les
+radicaux-socialistes, qui viennent de lui présenter une déclaration
+exprimant la confiance absolue et les dispositions patriotiques du
+groupe. Dès son arrivée à Paris, Viviani a télégraphié d'urgence à
+Londres que vu la cessation des pourparlers directs entre Pétersbourg et
+Vienne il était nécessaire que le Cabinet de Londres renouvelât le plus
+tôt possible sous telle ou autre forme sa proposition concernant la
+médiation des Puissances. Avant moi Viviani a reçu aujourd'hui
+l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne qui lui a renouvelé l'assurance des tendances
+pacifiques de l'Allemagne. Viviani ayant fait observer que si
+l'Allemagne désirait la paix elle devrait se hâter d'adhérer à la
+proposition de médiation anglaise, le Baron Schoen a répondu que les
+mots «conférence» ou «arbitrage» effrayaient l'Autriche. Viviani a
+répliqué qu'il ne s'agissait pas de mots et qu'il serait facile de
+trouver une autre forme de médiation. D'après l'avis du Baron de Schoen,
+pour le succès des négociations entre les Puissances il serait
+nécessaire de savoir ce que l'Autriche compterait demander à la Serbie.
+Viviani a répondu que le Cabinet de Berlin pourrait bien facilement s'en
+enquérir auprès de l'Autriche, mais qu'en attendant la note responsive
+serbe pourrait servir de base à la discussion; il a ajouté que la France
+désirait sincèrement la paix, mais qu'elle était en même temps résolue
+d'agir en pleine harmonie avec ses alliés et amis, et que lui, le Baron
+de Schoen, avait pu se convaincre que cette résolution rencontrait la
+plus vive approbation du pays.
+
+(Signé) Iswolsky.
+
+
+No. 56.
+
+Télégramme de son Altesse Royale le Prince Alexandre de Serbie à sa
+Majesté l'Empereur.
+
+Profondément touché par le télégramme que Votre Majesté a bien voulu
+M'adresser hier, Je M'empresse de La remercier de tout mon coeur. Je
+prie Votre Majesté d'être persuadée que la cordiale sympathie, dont
+Votre Majesté est animée envers Mon pays, nous est particulièrement
+précieuse et remplit notre âme de l'espoir que l'avenir de la Serbie est
+assuré étant devenu l'objet de la Haute sollicitude de Votre Majesté.
+Ces moments pénibles ne peuvent que raffermir les liens de l'attachement
+profond qui unissent la Serbie à la sainte Russie slave, et les
+sentiments de reconnaissance éternelle pour l'aide et la protection de
+Votre Majesté seront conservés pieusement dans l'âme de tous les Serbes.
+
+(Signé) Alexandre,
+
+
+No. 57.
+
+Le Chargé d'Affaires en Serbie au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
+
+_(Télégramme)._ Nich, le 16/29 Juillet 1914.
+
+J'ai communiqué à Pachitch le texte du télégramme responsif de Sa
+Majesté l'Empereur an Prince Alexandre. Pachitch après l'avoir lu, se
+signa et dit: «Seigneur! Le Tzar est grand et clément»! Ensuite il
+m'embrassa, ne pouvant contenir l'émotion qui l'avait gagné. L'héritier
+est attendu à Nich dans la nuit.
+
+(Signé) Strandtman.
+
+
+No. 58.
+
+Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères à l'Ambassadeur en France.
+
+_(Télégramme)._ St. Pétersbourg, le 10/29 Juillet 1914.
+
+Aujourd'hui l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne m'a communiqué la résolution prise
+par son gouvernement de mobiliser, si la Russie ne cessait pas ses
+préparatifs militaires. Or, nous n'avons commencé ces derniers qu'à la
+suite de la mobilisation à laquelle avait déjà procédé l'Autriche et vu
+l'absence évidente chez cette dernière du désir d'accepter un mode
+quelconque d'une solution pacifique de son conflit avec la Serbie.
+
+Puisque nous ne pouvons pas accéder au désir de l'Allemagne, il ne nous
+reste que d'accélérer nos propres armements et de compter avec
+l'inévitabilité probable de la guerre.--Veuillez en avertir le
+Gouvernement Français et lui exprimer en même temps notre sincère
+reconnaissance pour la déclaration que l'Ambassadeur de France m'a faite
+en son nom en disant que nous pouvons compter entièrement sur l'appui de
+notre alliée de France. Dans les circonstances actuelles cette
+déclaration nous est particulièrement précieuse. Communiqué aux
+Ambassadeurs en Angleterre, Autriche-Hongrie, Italie, Allemagne.
+
+(Signé) Sazonow.
+
+
+No. 59.
+
+Le Chargé d'Affaires en Serbie au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
+
+_(Télégramme)._ Nich, le 17/30 Juillet 1914.
+
+Le Prince-Régent a publié hier un manifeste signé par tous les Ministres
+à l'occasion de la déclaration de la guerre par l'Autriche à la Serbie.
+Le manifeste se termine par les paroles suivantes: «Défendez de toutes
+vos forces vos foyers et la Serbie». Lors de l'ouverture solennelle de
+la Scouptchina, le Régent lut en son nom le discours du trône, an début
+duquel il indiqua que le lieu de la convocation démontrait l'importance
+des évènements actuels. Suit l'exposé des faits des derniers
+jours--l'ultimatum autrichien, la réponse serbe, les efforts du
+gouvernement Royal de faire tout ce qui était compatible avec la dignité
+de l'Etat pour éviter la guerre et enfin l'agression armée du voisin
+plus puissant contre la Serbie, aux côtés de laquelle se tient le
+Monténégro. En passant à l'examen de l'attitude des Puissances en
+présence du conflit, le Prince insista tout d'abord sur les sentiments
+dont est animée la Russie et sur la Toute Gracieuse Communication de sa
+Majesté l'Empereur disant que la Russie en aucun cas n'abandonnera la
+Serbie. A chaque mention du nom de Sa Majesté Impériale et de la Russie
+un «jivio» formidable et fébrile secouait la salle des séances. Les
+marques de sympathie de la part de la France et de l'Angleterre furent
+aussi relevées séparément et provoquèrent des «jivio» d'approbation de
+la part des députés. Le discours du trône se termine par la déclaration
+d'ouverture de la Scouptchina et par l'expression du voeu que toutes les
+mesures soient prises pour faciliter la tâche du Gouvernement.
+
+(Signé) Strandtman.
+
+
+No. 60.
+
+Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères aux Ambassadeurs en Allemagne, en
+Autriche-Hongrie, en France, en Angleterre, et en Italie.
+
+_(Télégramme)._ St. Pétersbourg, le 17/30 Juillet 1914.
+
+L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne qui vient de me quitter m'a demandé si nous ne
+pouvions pas nous contenter de la promesse que l'Autriche pourrait
+donner--de ne pas porter atteinte à l'intégrité du Royaume de Serbie--et
+indiquer à quelles conditions nous pourrions encore consentir à
+suspendre nos armements; je lui ai dicté, pour être transmise d'urgence
+à Berlin, la déclaration suivante: «Si l'Autriche, reconnaissant que la
+question austro-serbe a assumé le caractère d'une question européenne,
+se déclare prête à éliminer de son ultimatum les points qui portent
+atteinte aux droits souverains de la Serbie, la Russie s'engage à cesser
+ses préparatifs militaires.»
+
+Veuillez télégraphier d'urgence quelle sera l'attitude du Gouvernement
+Allemand en présence de cette nouvelle preuve de notre désir de faire le
+possible pour la solution pacifique de la question, car nous ne pouvons
+pas admettre que de semblables pourparlers ne servent qu'à faire gagner
+du temps à l'Allemagne et à l'Autriche pour leurs préparatifs
+militaires.
+
+(Signé) Sazonow.
+
+
+No. 61.
+
+L'Ambassadeur en Allemagne au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
+
+_(Télégramme)._ Berlin, le 17/30 Juillet 1914.
+
+J'apprends que le décret de mobilisation de l'armée et de la flotte
+allemandes vient d'être promulgué.
+
+(Signé) Swerbéew.
+
+
+No. 62.
+
+L'Ambassadeur en Allemagne au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
+
+_(Télégramme)._ Berlin, le 17/30 Juillet 1914.
+
+Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères vient de me téléphoner pour me
+communiquer que la nouvelle lancée tout à l'heure de la mobilisation de
+l'armée et de la flotte allemandes est fausse; que les feuillets des
+journaux étaient imprimés d'avance en prévision de toutes éventualités,
+et mis en vente à l'heure de l'après-midi, mais que maintenant ils sont
+confisqués,
+
+(Signé) Swerbéew.
+
+
+No. 63.
+
+L'Ambassadeur en Allemagne au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
+
+_(Télégramme)._ Berlin, le 17/30 Juillet 1914.
+
+Ai reçu Votre télégramme du 16-29 Juillet et ai transmis le texte de
+Votre proposition au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères que je viens de
+voir; il m'a dit qu'il avait reçu un télégramme identique de
+l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne à St.-Pétersbourg et m'a déclaré ensuite qu'il
+trouvait notre proposition inacceptable pour l'Autriche.
+
+(Signé) Swerbéew.
+
+
+No. 64.
+
+L'Ambassadeur en Angleterre au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
+
+_(Télégramme)._ Londres, le 17/30 Juillet 1914.
+
+Ai communiqué le contenu de Vos télégrammes du 16 et 17 Juillet à Grey
+lequel considère la situation comme très sérieuse, mais désire continuer
+les pourparlers. J'ai fait observer à Grey que depuis que Vous lui aviez
+fait la proposition d'accepter tout ce qu'il proposerait en faveur du
+maintien de la paix, pourvu que l'Autriche ne pût profiter de ces
+atermoiements pour écraser la Serbie, la situation dans laquelle Vous
+vous trouviez s'était apparemment modifiée. A cette époque nos rapports
+avec l'Allemagne n'étaient pas compromis. Après la déclaration de
+l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne à St.-Pétersbourg concernant la mobilisation
+allemande, ces rapports avaient changé et sa demande avait reçu de Votre
+part la seule réponse que pouvait donner une grande Puissance. Lorsque
+l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne était revenu auprès de Vous et s'était enquis
+de Vos conditions, Vous les aviez formulées dans des circonstances
+tout-à-fait spéciales. J'ai en même temps de nouveau insisté auprès de
+Grey sur la nécessité de prendre en considération la situation nouvelle
+créée par la faute de l'Allemagne à la suite de l'action de
+l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne. Grey a répondu qu'il le comprenait et qu'il
+tiendrait compte de ces arguments.
+
+(Signé) Benckendorff.
+
+
+No. 65.
+
+L'Ambassadeur en Angleterre au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
+
+_(Télégramme)._ Londres, le 17/30 Juillet 1914.
+
+L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a demandé à Grey pour quelle raison
+l'Angleterre prenait des mesures militaires sur terre et sur mer. Grey a
+répondu que ces mesures n'avaient pas un caractère agressif, mais que la
+situation était telle que chaque Puissance devait se préparer.
+
+(Signé) Benckendorff.
+
+
+No. 66.
+
+L'Ambassadeur en Autriche-Hongrie au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
+
+_(Télégramme)._ Vienne, le 18/31 Juillet 1914.
+
+Malgré la mobilisation générale je continue à échanger des vues avec le
+Comte Berchtold et ses collaborateurs. Tous insistent sur l'absence chez
+l'Autriche d'intentions agressives quelconques contre la Russie et de
+visées de conquête à l'égard de la Serbie, mais tous insistent également
+sur la nécessité pour l'Autriche de poursuivre jusqu'an bout l'action
+commencée et de donner à la Serbie une leçon sérieuse qui pourrait
+constituer une certaine garantie pour l'avenir.
+
+(Signé) Schébéko.
+
+
+No. 67.
+
+Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères aux Ambassadeurs en Allemagne,
+Autriche-Hongrie, en France, en Angleterre et en Italie.[197]
+
+_(Télégramme)._ St. Pétersbourg, le 18/31 Juillet 1914.
+
+Me réfère à mon télégramme du 17/30 Juillet. D'ordre de son
+gouvernement, l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre m'a transmis le désir du
+Cabinet de Londres d'introduire quelques modifications dans la formule
+que j'ai proposée hier à l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne. J'ai répondu que
+j'acceptais la proposition anglaise. Ci-dessous je vous transmets la
+formule modifiée en conséquence.
+
+'Si l'Autriche consent à arrêter la marche de ses armées sur le
+territoire Serbe et si, reconnaissant que le conflit austro-serbe à
+assumé le caractère d'une question d'intérêt européen, elle admet que
+les Grandes Puissances examinent la satisfaction que la Serbie pourrait
+accorder au gouvernement d'Autriche-Hongrie sans laisser porter atteinte
+à ses droits d'Etat souverain et à son indépendance,--la Russie s'engage
+à conserver son attitude expectante.'
+
+(Signé) Sazonow.
+
+[Footnote 197: The second paragraph is printed in the British White Book
+(_Correspondence_ No. 132).]
+
+
+No. 68.
+
+L'Ambassadeur en Allemagne au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
+
+_(Télégramme)._ Berlin, le 18/31 Juillet 1914.
+
+Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères vient de me dire que nos
+pourparlers, qui étaient déjà difficiles à la suite de la mobilisation
+contre l'Autriche, le deviennent encore davantage en présence des graves
+mesures militaires que nous prenons contre l'Allemagne; des nouvelles y
+relatives sont, d'après lui, reçues ici de tous les côtés et devront
+provoquer inévitablement des mesures analogues de la part de
+l'Allemagne. A cela j'ai répondu que, d'après des renseignements sûrs
+dont je disposais et qui étaient confirmés par tous nos compatriotes
+arrivant à Berlin, la prise contre nous des mesures susdites se
+poursuivait également en Allemagne avec grande activité. Malgré cela, le
+Ministre des Affaires Etrangères affirme qu'ici on n'a fait que rappeler
+les officiers de leurs congés et les troupes des champs de manoeuvres.
+
+(Signé) Swerbéew.
+
+
+No. 69.
+
+Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères à l'Ambassadeur en Angleterre.
+
+_(Télégramme)._ St.-Pétersbourg, le 18/31 Juillet 1914.
+
+J'ai prié l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre de transmettre à Grey l'expression
+de ma plus sincère reconnaissance pour le ton amical et ferme dont il a
+usé pendant les pourparlers avec l'Allemagne et l'Autriche, grâce à quoi
+l'espoir de trouver une issue pacifique de la situation actuelle n'est
+pas encore perdu.
+
+Je l'ai aussi prié de dire au Ministre Anglais que je pensais que ce
+n'était qu'à Londres que les pourparlers auraient encore quelques
+chances d'un succès quelconque, en facilitant à l'Autriche la nécessité
+d'un compromis.
+
+Communiqué à l'Ambassadeur en France.
+
+(Signé) Sazonow.
+
+
+No. 70.
+
+Télégramme secret aux Représentants de Sa Majesté l'Empereur à
+l'étranger.
+
+(_Télégramme_). Le 19 Juillet/1 Août 1914.
+
+A minuit l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne m'a déclaré, d'ordre de son
+Gouvernement, que si dans les 12 heures, c'est-à-dire à midi, Samedi,
+nous ne commencions pas la démobilisation, non seulement à l'égard de
+l'Allemagne, mais aussi à l'égard de l'Autriche, le Gouvernement
+Allemand serait forcé de donner l'ordre de mobilisation. A ma question
+si c'était la guerre, l'Ambassadeur a répondu par la négative, mais en
+ajoutant que nous étions fort près d'elle.
+
+(Signé) Sazonow.
+
+
+No. 71.
+
+L'Ambassadeur en Angleterre au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
+
+_(Télégramme)._ Londres, 19 Juillet/1 Août 1914.
+
+Grey m'a dit qu'il a télégraphié à Berlin qu'à son avis la dernière
+formule acceptée par le Gouvernement Russe constitue la base de
+négociations qui présente le plus de chances pour une solution pacifique
+du conflict. Il a exprimé en même temps l'espoir qu'aucune grande
+Puissance ne commencerait les hostilités avant l'examen de cette
+formule.
+
+(Signé) Benckendorff.
+
+
+No. 72.
+
+L'Ambassadeur eu Angleterre au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
+
+(_Télégramme_). Londres, le 19 Juillet/1 Août 1914.
+
+Le Gouvernement de la Grande-Bretagne a posé aux Gouvernements Français
+et Allemand la question s'ils respecteraient la neutralité de la
+Belgique.
+
+La France a répondu dans I'affirmative, tandis que le Gouvernement
+Allemand a déclaré ne pouvoir répondre à cette question catégoriquement.
+
+(Signé) Benckendorff.
+
+
+No. 73.
+
+L'Ambassadeur en France au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
+
+_(Télégramme)._ Paris, le 19 Juillet/1 Août 1914.
+
+L'Ambassadeur d'Autriche a visité hier Viviani et lui a déclare que
+l'Autriche non seulement n'avait pas le dessein de porter atteinte à
+l'intégrité territoriale de la Serbie, mais était prête à discuter avec
+les autres Puissances le fond de son conflit avec la Serbie. Le
+Gouvernement Français est très préoccupé par les préparatifs militaires
+extraordinaires de l'Allemagne sur la frontière française, car il est
+convaincu que sous le voile du «Kriegszustand» se produit une véritable
+mobilisation.
+
+(Signé) Iswolsky.
+
+
+No. 74.
+
+L'Ambassadeur en France au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
+
+_(Télégramme)._ Paris, le 19 Juillet/1 Août 1914.
+
+A la réception ici du télégramme de l'Ambassadeur de France à
+St.-Petersbourg contenant la communication que Vous a faite
+l'Ambassadeur Allemand concernant la résolution de l'Allemagne de
+décréter aujourd'hui la mobilisation générale, le Président de la
+République a signé le décret de mobilisation. Dans les rues on procède à
+l'affichage des listes d'appel des réservistes. L'Ambassadeur
+d'Allemagne vient de rendre visite à Viviani, mais ne lui a fait aucune
+nouvelle communication, en alléguant l'impossibilité de déchiffrer les
+télégrammes qu'il a reçus. Viviani l'a informé de la signature du décret
+de mobilisation en réponse à la mobilisation allemande et lui a fait
+part de son étonnement de ce que l'Allemagne eût pris une telle mesure à
+un moment où se poursuivait encore un échange de vues amical entre la
+Russie, l'Autriche et les Puissances; il a ajouté que la mobilisation ne
+préjugeait pas nécessairement la guerre et que l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne
+pourrait rester à Paris comme l'Ambassadeur de Russie est resté à Vienne
+et celui d'Autriche à St.-Pétersbourg.
+
+(Signé) Iswolsky.
+
+
+No. 75.
+
+L'Ambassadeur en France au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.
+
+_(Télégramme)._ Paris, le 19 Juillet/1 Août 1914.
+
+Je tiens du Président que pendant les dernières journées l'Ambassadeur
+d'Autriche a assuré avec force le Président du Conseil des Ministres et
+lui même, que l'Autriche nous aurait déclaré être prête à respecter non
+seulement l'intégrité territoriale de la Serbie, mais aussi ses droits
+souverains, mais que nous aurions intentionnellement fait le silence sur
+cette déclaration. J'ai opposé un démenti catégorique à cela.
+
+(Signé) Iswolsky.
+
+
+No. 76.
+
+Note remise par l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne à St.-Pétersbourg le 19
+Juillet 1914 à 7 h. 10 du soir.
+
+Le Gouvernement Impérial s'est efforcé dès les débuts de la crise de la
+mener à une solution pacifique. Se rendant à un désir qui lui en avait
+été exprimé par Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie, Sa Majesté l'Empereur
+d'Allemagne d'accord avec l'Angleterre s'était appliqué à accomplir un
+rôle médiateur auprès des Cabinets de Vienne et de St.-Pétersbourg,
+lorsque la Russie, sans en attendre le résultat, procéda à la
+mobilisation de la totalité de ses forces de terre et de mer. A la suite
+de cette mesure menaçante motivée par aucun présage militaire de la part
+de l'Allemagne, l'Empire Allemand s'est trouvé vis-à-vis d'un danger
+grave et imminent. Si le Gouvernement Impérial eût manqué de parer à ce
+péril, il aurait compromis la sécurité et l'existence même de
+l'Allemagne. Par conséquent le Gouvernement Allemand se vit forcé de
+s'adresser au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Toutes les
+Russies en insistant sur la cessation desdits actes militaires. La
+Russie ayant refusé de faire droit à (n'ayant pas cru devoir répondre
+à[198]) cette demande et ayant manifesté par ce refus (cette attitude
+[198]) que son action était dirigée contre I'Allemagne, j'ai l'honneur,
+d'ordre de mon Gouvernement, de faire savoir à Votre Excellence ce qui
+suit:
+
+Sa Majesté l'Empereur Mon Auguste Souverain au nom de l'Empire, relevant
+le défi se considère en état de guerre avec la Russie.
+
+St.-Pétersbourg, le 19 Juillet/1 Août 1914.
+
+(Signé) F. Pourtalès.
+
+[Footnote 198: Les mots placés entre parenthèses se trouvent dans
+l'original. Il faut supposer que deux variantes avaient été préparées
+d'avance et que par erreur elles out été insérées toutes les deux dans
+la note.]
+
+
+No. 77.
+
+Communiqué du Ministre des Affaires Etrangères concernant les événements
+des derniers jours.
+
+Le 20 Juillet/2 Août 1914.
+
+Un exposé défigurant les événements des derniers jours ayant paru dans
+la presse étrangère, le Ministère des Affaires Etrangères croit de son
+devoir de publier l'aperçu suivant des pourparlers diplomatiques pendant
+le temps susvisé.
+
+Le 10/23 Juillet a.c. le Ministre d'Autriche-Hongrie à Belgrade présenta
+an Ministre Président Serbe une note où le Gouvernement Serbe était
+accusé d'avoir favorisé le mouvement panserbe qui avait abouti à
+l'assassinat de l'héritier du trône austro-hongrois. En conséquence
+l'Autriche-Hongrie demandait au Gouvernement Serbe non seulement de
+condamner sous une forme solennelle la susdite propagande, mais aussi de
+prendre, sous le contrôle de l'Autriche-Hongrie, une série de mesures
+tendant à la découverte du complot, à la punition des sujets serbes y
+ayant participé et à la prévention dans l'avenir de tout attentat sur le
+sol du Royaume. Un délai de 48 heures fut fixé au Gouvernement Serbe
+pour la réponse à la susdite note.
+
+Le Gouvernement Impérial, auquel l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie à
+St.-Pétersbourg avait communiqué le texte de la note 17 heures après sa
+remise à Belgrade, ayant pris connaissance des demandes y contenues, dut
+s'apercevoir que quelques-unes parmi elles étaient inexécutables quant
+an fond, tandis que d'autres étaient présentées sous une forme
+incompatible avec la dignité d'un Etat indépendant. Trouvant
+inadmissibles la diminution de la dignité de la Serbie contenue dans ces
+demandes, ainsi que la tendance de l'Autriche-Hongrie d'assurer sa
+prépondérance dans les Balcans démontrée par ces mêmes exigences, le
+Gouvernement Russe fit observer dans la forme la plus amicale à
+l'Autriche-Hongrie qu'il serait désirable de soumettre à un nouvel
+examen les points contenus dans la note austro-hongroise. Le
+Gouvernement Austro-Hongrois ne crut possible de consentir à une
+discussion de la note. L'action modératrice des autres Puissances à
+Vienne ne fut non plus couronnée de succès.
+
+Malgré que la Serbie eût reprouvé le crime et se fût montrée prête à
+donner satisfaction à l'Autriche dans une mesure qui dépassa les
+prévisions non seulement de la Russie, mais aussi des autres Puissances,
+le Ministre d'Autriche-Hongrie à Belgrade jugea la réponse serbe
+insuffisante et quitta cette ville.
+
+Reconnaissant le caractère exagéré des demandes présentées par
+l'Autriche, la Russie avait déclaré encore auparavant qu'il lui serait
+impossible de rester indifférente, sans se refuser toutefois à employer
+tous ses efforts pour trouver une issue pacifique qui fût acceptable
+pour l'Autriche et ménageât son amour-propre de grande puissance. En
+même temps la Russie établit fermement qu'elle admettait une solution
+pacifique de la question seulement dans une mesure qui n'impliquerait
+pas la diminution de la dignité de la Serbie comme Etat indépendant.
+Malheureusement tous les efforts déployés par le Gouvernement Impérial
+dans cette direction restèrent sans effet. Le Gouvernement
+Austro-Hongrois, après s'être dérobé à toute intervention conciliatrice
+des Puissances dans son conflit avec la Serbie, procéda à la
+mobilisation, déclara officiellement la guerre à la Serbie, et le jour
+suivant Belgrade fut bombardée. Le manifeste qui a accompagné la
+déclaration de guerre accuse ouvertement la Serbie d'avoir préparé et
+exécuté le crime de Seraïewo. Une pareille accusation d'un crime de
+droit commun lancée contre tout un peuple et tout un État attira à la
+Serbie par son inanité évidente les larges sympathies des cercles de la
+société européenne.
+
+A la suite de cette manière d'agir du Gouvernement Austro-Hongrois,
+malgré la déclaration de la Russie qu'elle ne pourrait rester
+indifférente au sort de la Serbie, le Gouvernement Impérial jugea
+nécessaire d'ordonner la mobilisation des circonscriptions militaires de
+Kiew, d'Odessa, de Moscou et de Kazan. Une telle décision s'imposait
+parce que depuis la date de la remise de la note austro-hongroise au
+Gouvernement Serbe et les premières démarches de la Russie cinq jours
+s'étaient écoulés, et cependant le Cabinet de Vienne n'avait fait aucun
+pas pour aller au-devant de nos efforts pacifiques; au contraire, la
+mobilisation de la moitié de l'armée austro-hongroise avait été
+décrétée.
+
+Le Gouvernement Allemand fut mis au courant des mesures prises par la
+Russie; il lui fut en même temps expliqué qu'elles n'étaient que la
+conséquence des armements autrichiens et nullement dirigées contre
+l'Allemagne. En même temps, le Gouvernement Impérial déclara que la
+Russie était prête à continuer les pourparlers en vue d'une solution
+pacifique du conflit, soit par la voie de négociations directes avec le
+Cabinet de Vienne, soit en suivant la proposition de la Grande-Bretagne,
+par la voie d'une Conférence des quatre Grandes Puissances non
+intéressées directement, voire l'Angleterre, la France, l'Allemagne et
+l'Italie.
+
+Cependant cette tentative de la Russie échoua également.
+L'Autriche-Hongrie déclina un échange de vues ultérieur avec nous, et le
+Cabinet de Vienne se déroba à la participation à la Conférence des
+Puissances projetée.
+
+Néanmoins, la Russie ne discontinua pas ses efforts en faveur de la
+paix. Répondant à la question de l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne, à quelles
+conditions nous consentirions encore à suspendre nos armements, le
+Ministre des Affaires Etrangères déclara que ces conditions seraient la
+reconnaissance par l'Autriche-Hongrie que la question Austro-Serbe avait
+revêtu le caractère d'une question européenne, et la déclaration de
+cette même Puissance qu'elle consentait à ne pas insister sur des
+demandes incompatibles avec les droits souverains de la Serbie.
+
+La proposition de la Russie fut jugée par l'Allemagne inacceptable pour
+l'Autriche-Hongrie. Simultanément on reçut à St.-Pétersbourg la nouvelle
+de la proclamation de la mobilisation générale par l'Autriche-Hongrie.
+
+En même temps les hostilités continuaient sur le territoire Serbe et
+Belgrade fut bombardée derechef.
+
+L'insuccès de nos propositions pacifiques nous obligea d'élargir les
+mesures de précaution militaires.
+
+Le Cabinet de Berlin nous ayant adressé une question à ce sujet, il lui
+fut répondu que la Russie était forcée de commencer ses armements pour
+se prémunir contre toutes éventualités.
+
+Tout en prenant cette mesure de précaution, la Russie n'en discontinuait
+pas moins de rechercher de toutes ses forces une issue de cette
+situation et déclara être prête à accepter tout moyen de solution du
+conflit qui comporterait l'observation des conditions posées par nous.
+
+Malgré cette communication conciliante, le Gouvernement Allemand, le
+18/31 Juillet, adressa au Gouvernement Russe la demande d'avoir à
+suspendre ses mesures militaires à midi du 19 Juillet/ 1 Août, en
+menaçant, dans le cas contraire, de procéder à une mobilisation
+générale.
+
+Le lendemain, 19 Juillet/1 Août, l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne transmit au
+Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, an nom de son Gouvernement, la
+déclaration de guerre.
+
+
+No. 78.
+
+Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères aux Représentants de S. M.
+I'Empereur à l'étranger.
+
+(_Télégramme_). St.-Pétersbourg, le 20 Juillet/2 Août 1914.
+
+Il est absolument clair que l'Allemagne s'efforce dès à présent de
+rejeter sur nous la responsabilité de la rupture. Notre mobilisation a
+été provoquée par l'énorme responsabilité que nous aurions assumée, si
+nous n'avions pas pris toutes les mesures de précaution à un moment où
+l'Autriche, se bornant à des pourparlers d'un caractère dilatoire,
+bombardait Belgrade et procédait à une mobilisation générale.
+
+Sa Majesté l'Empereur s'était engagé vis-à-vis de l'Empereur d'Allemagne
+par sa parole à n'entreprendre aucun acte agressif tant que dureraient
+les pourparlers avec l'Autriche. Après une telle garantie et après
+toutes les preuves de l'amour de la Russie pour la paix, l'Allemagne ne
+pouvait ni avait le droit de douter de notre déclaration que nous
+accepterions avec joie toute issue pacifique compatible avec la dignité
+et l'indépendance de la Serbie. Une autre issue, tout en étant
+complètement incompatible avec notre propre dignité, aurait certainement
+ébranlé l'équilibre Européen assurant l'hégémonie de l'Allemagne. Ce
+caractère Européen, voire mondial, du conflit est infiniment plus
+important que le prétexte qui l'a créé. Par sa décision de nous déclarer
+la guerre à un moment où se poursuivaient les négociations entre les
+Puissances, l'Allemagne a assumé une lourde responsabilité.
+
+(Signé) Sazonow.
+
+
+No. 79.
+
+Note remise par l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie à St.-Pétersbourg au
+Ministre des Affaires Etrangères le 24 Juillet à 6 h. du soir.
+
+D'ordre de son Gouvernement le soussigné Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie
+a l'honneur de notifier à Son Excellence Monsieur le Ministre des
+Affaires Etrangères de Russie ce qui suit:
+
+«Vu l'attitude menaçante prise par la Russie dans le conflit entre la
+Monarchie Austro-Hongroise et la Serbie et en présence du fait qu'en
+suite de ce conflit la Russie, d'après une communication du Cabinet de
+Berlin, a cru devoir ouvrir les hostilités contre l'Allemagne et que
+celle-ci se trouve par conséquent en état de guerre avec ladite
+Puissance, l'Autriche-Hongrie se considère également en état de guerre
+avec la Russie à partir du présent moment.
+
+"(Signé) Szápáry. St.-Pétersbourg. 6 Août/24 Juillet 1914."
+
+
+
+***END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK WHY WE ARE AT WAR (2ND EDITION,
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+<h1>The Project Gutenberg eBook, Why We Are At War (2nd Edition, revised), by
+Members of the Oxford Faculty of Modern History</h1>
+<pre>
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at <a href = "https://www.gutenberg.org">www.gutenberg.org</a></pre>
+<p>Title: Why We Are At War (2nd Edition, revised)</p>
+<p>Author: Members of the Oxford Faculty of Modern History</p>
+<p>Release Date: January 23, 2004  [eBook #10809]</p>
+<p>Language: English</p>
+<p>Character set encoding: iso-8859-1</p>
+<p>***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK WHY WE ARE AT WAR (2ND EDITION, REVISED)***</p>
+<center><h3>E-text prepared by Jonathan Ingram, David King,<br />
+            and the Project Gutenberg Online Distributed Proofreading Team</h3></center>
+<hr class="full" />
+<h1>WHY WE ARE AT WAR: GREAT BRITAIN'S CASE</h1>
+<center><b>BY MEMBERS OF THE</b></center>
+<center>OXFORD FACULTY OF MODERN HISTORY</center>
+<p>With an Appendix of Original Documents including the Authorized
+English Translation of the White Book issued by the German
+Government</p>
+<p>Second Edition Revised (fourth impression) containing the
+Russian Orange Book</p>
+<p>1914</p>
+<a name="PRF" id="PRF"><!-- PRF --></a>
+<h2>PREFACE</h2>
+<p>We are not politicians, and we belong to different schools of
+political thought. We have written this book to set forth the
+causes of the present war, and the principles which we believe to
+be at stake. We have some experience in the handling of historic
+evidence, and we have endeavoured to treat this subject
+historically. Our fifth chapter, which to many readers will be the
+most interesting, is founded upon first-hand evidence&mdash;the
+documents contained in the British White Book (Parliamentary Paper,
+Cd. 7467; hereafter cited as <i>Correspondence respecting the
+European Crisis</i>), and the German White Book, which is an
+official apology, supplemented by documents. The German White Book,
+as being difficult of access, we have printed <i>in extenso</i>. It
+exists in two versions, a German and an English, both published for
+the German Government. We have reproduced the English version
+without correcting the solecisms of spelling and expression. From
+the English White Book we have reprinted, in the second appendix, a
+small selection of the more significant documents; many more are
+quoted in the body of our work.</p>
+<p>Our thanks are due to Sir H. Erle Richards, Chichele Professor
+of International Law and Diplomacy; and to Mr. W.G.S. Adams,
+Gladstone Professor of Political Theory and Institutions, for
+valuable suggestions and assistance.</p>
+<p>The sole responsibility for the book rests, however, with those
+who sign this Preface.</p>
+<p>Any profits arising from the sale of this work will be sent to
+the Belgian Relief Fund, as a mark of sympathy and respect for the
+Belgian nation, and especially for the University of Louvain.</p>
+<p>E. BARKER<br />
+H. W. C. DAVIS<br />
+C. R. L. FLETCHER<br />
+ARTHUR HASSALL<br />
+L. G. WICKHAM LEGG<br />
+F. MORGAN</p>
+<p><i>Preface to Second Edition</i>.</p>
+<p>By the courtesy of His Excellency the Russian Ambassador we are
+now able to print in an appendix (No. VI) those documents contained
+in the Russian Orange Book which have not been already published in
+the German and the British White Books. In the light of the
+evidence afforded by the Russian Orange Book, we have modified one
+or two sentences in this edition.</p>
+<p>21 <i>September</i>, 1914.</p>
+<hr />
+<a name="TOC" id="TOC"><!-- TOC --></a>
+<h2>CONTENTS</h2>
+<p><a href="#RULE4_1">TABLE OF DATES</a></p>
+<p><a href="#CH1">CHAPTER I</a></p>
+<p>THE NEUTRALITY OF BELGIUM AND LUXEMBURG</p>
+<p>Belgian neutrality&mdash;The origin of Belgium&mdash;England and
+the smaller Powers&mdash;The Treaty of 1839&mdash;Belgium's
+independence and neutrality.&mdash;The neutrality of the Grand
+Duchy of Luxemburg&mdash;Its origin&mdash;The Treaty of
+1867&mdash;The collective guarantee.&mdash;The strategic importance
+of Belgium&mdash;German plans long suspected.</p>
+<p><a href="#CH2">CHAPTER II</a></p>
+<p>THE GROWTH OF ALLIANCES AND THE RACE OF ARMAMENTS SINCE 1871</p>
+<p>Introduction&mdash;The Triple Alliance&mdash;Bismarck's
+dismissal&mdash;French colonial advance&mdash;-Germany's demands
+for compensations&mdash;The Anglo-French agreement concerning
+Morocco&mdash;German objections&mdash;England and Russia&mdash;The
+Agadir incident&mdash;Anglo-French exchange of notes&mdash;Disputes
+in the Balkans&mdash;The 'Boulanger Law' of 1886&mdash;Count
+Caprivi's law of 1893&mdash;Franco-Russian
+<i>entente</i>&mdash;German military preparations&mdash;France's
+response&mdash;Russia's reorganization&mdash;England's Army and
+Navy.</p>
+<p>Note. <i>Abstract of Anglo-French Agreement on Morocco</i>.</p>
+<p><a href="#CH3">CHAPTER III</a></p>
+<p>THE DEVELOPMENT OF RUSSIAN POLICY</p>
+<p>Estrangement of Russia and Germany&mdash;Austria and the
+Balkans&mdash;German penetration through the Balkans&mdash;Servia
+and Russia&mdash;Germany and the Slavs&mdash;Russia and
+England.</p>
+<p><a href="#CH4">CHAPTER IV</a></p>
+<p>CHRONOLOGICAL SKETCH OF THE CRISIS OF 1914</p>
+<p>Diary of the Events leading to the War.</p>
+<p><a href="#CH5">CHAPTER V</a></p>
+<p>NEGOTIATORS AND NEGOTIATIONS</p>
+<p>Dramatis personae. &sect;1. <i>Germany's attitude to Russia and
+Austria</i>&mdash;Presentation of the Austrian Note to
+Servia&mdash;Germany shields Austria&mdash;Conduct of Germany
+considered&mdash;Sir Edward Grey proposes mediation, and then a
+Conference of Four Powers&mdash;Germany's objections to a
+'Conference'&mdash;Direct conversations between the
+Powers&mdash;Austria invited to suspend military
+action&mdash;Mobilization; on whom does responsibility
+lie?&mdash;War inevitable. &sect;2. <i>Germany's attitude to
+France</i>&mdash;Germany accuses France of military
+preparations&mdash;Germany invades France. &sect;3. <i>The question
+of British neutrality</i>&mdash;Possibility of England being
+involved&mdash;Germany warned&mdash;German 'bid for British
+neutrality'&mdash;England's refusal&mdash;France agrees, and
+Germany refuses, to respect Belgian neutrality&mdash;Prince
+Lichnowsky and Sir Edward Grey&mdash;Neutrality of Luxemburg
+violated&mdash;Germany demands a free passage through
+Belgium&mdash;Sir Edward Grey protests&mdash;Belgium
+invaded&mdash;England's ultimatum&mdash;The Imperial Chancellor
+urges necessity of Germany's action. &sect;4. <i>England and
+Servia</i>&mdash;Sir Edward Grey realizes Russia's interest in
+Servia&mdash;He is only concerned for the peace of Europe&mdash;He
+urges mediation&mdash;He proposes a Conference. &sect;5. <i>Great
+Britain declines 'solidarity' with Russia and
+France</i>&mdash;Proposals by MM. Sazonof and
+Poincar&eacute;&mdash;England's refusal&mdash;Was it
+wise?&mdash;The Austrian <i>dossier</i>. &sect;6. <i>Italy's
+comments on the situation</i>&mdash;Significance of Italy's
+position&mdash;Italy's endeavours to prevent war&mdash;Italy's
+declaration of neutrality.</p>
+<p>Note. <i>Abstract of Austro-Hungarian note to Servia, and
+Servians reply</i>.</p>
+<p><a href="#CH6">CHAPTER VI</a></p>
+<p>THE NEW GERMAN THEORY OF THE STATE</p>
+<p>The principles of <i>raison d'etat</i> and the rule of
+law&mdash;Treitschke's teaching&mdash;The results of this
+philosophy&mdash;Contempt for public law&mdash;The glorification of
+war&mdash;The philosophy pagan&mdash;Its adoption by Prussian
+soldiers and Government&mdash;A plea for Prussia&mdash;England
+fights for law.</p>
+<p><a href="#EPI">EPILOGUE</a></p>
+<p>APPENDIXES</p>
+<p><a href="#RULE4_2">I. THE GERMAN WHITE BOOK</a></p>
+<p><a href="#RULE4_3">II. EXTRACTS FROM SIR EDWARD GREY'S
+CORRESPONDENCE RESPECTING THE EUROPEAN CRISIS</a></p>
+<p><a href="#RULE4_4">III. EXTRACT FROM THE DISPATCH FROM HIS
+MAJESTY'S AMBASSADOR AT BERLIN RESPECTING THE RUPTURE OF DIPLOMATIC
+RELATIONS WITH THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT</a></p>
+<p><a href="#RULE4_5">IV. THE CRIME OF SERAJEVO</a></p>
+<p><a href="#RULE4_6">V. EXTRACT FROM THE DISPATCH FROM HIS
+MAJESTY'S AMBASSADOR AT VIENNA RESPECTING THE RUPTURE OF DIPLOMATIC
+RELATIONS WITH THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN GOVERNMENT</a></p>
+<p><a href="#RULE4_7">VI. EXTRACTS FROM THE RUSSIAN ORANGE
+BOOK</a></p>
+<hr />
+<a name="RULE4_1" id="RULE4_1"><!-- RULE4 1 --></a>
+<h2>CHIEF DATES</h2>
+<pre>
+1648 Jan. The Treaty of Munster.
+     Oct. The Treaty of Westphalia.
+1713 April. The Treaty of Utrecht.
+1772 First Partition of Poland.
+1783 William of Nassau becomes Grand Duke of Luxemburg.
+1788 July. The Triple Alliance of England, Holland, and Prussia.
+1789 The French Revolution begins.
+1792 Nov. 6. Battle of Jemappes.  French Conquest of the Austrian
+     Netherlands and Li&egrave;ge.
+     Nov. 19. French decree offering 'freedom to all nations'.
+     Dec. 15. Compulsory freedom declared.
+1793 Jan. Second Partition of Poland.
+     Feb. 1. Declaration of War by France against England and Holland.
+1795 Third Partition of Poland.
+1801 Feb. 9. The Treaty of Luneville. France guarantees the
+     independence of Holland (then called 'Batavian Republic').
+1802 Mar. 27. The Treaty of Amiens.
+1803 Mar. 13. Napoleon's famous interview with Lord Whitworth.
+     May 12. Declaration of War by England against France.
+1814 Mar. 1. The Treaty of Chaumont.
+     May 30. The First Peace of Paris.
+     Sept. 29. Opening of the Congress of Vienna.
+1815 Mar-June. The Hundred Days.
+     May 31. Belgium and Luxemburg placed under the Prince of Orange as
+     King of the United Netherlands.
+     Nov. 20. The Second Peace of Paris.
+1830 Revolutions in France (July) and in Belgium (Aug.).
+1830-1878 Servia autonomous.
+1831 Nov. 15. Independence and Neutrality of Belgium guaranteed by
+     England, Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia.
+1839 April 19. Final recognition of the Independence and Neutrality of
+     Belgium by the above-named Powers.
+1867 May 11. European guarantee of the Neutrality of Luxemburg.
+     Declaration by Lord Stanley and Lord Clarendon.
+1870 Aug. 9. Independence and Neutrality of Belgium again guaranteed
+     by Germany and France.
+1871 May 10. The Treaty of Frankfort.
+1872 The <i>Dreikaiserbund</i>; Alliance of Russia, Germany, and
+     Austria.
+1875 Threatened attack on France by Germany prevented by
+     Russia and England.
+1878 The Treaty of Berlin.
+     Proclamation of Servian Independence under King Milan.
+1879 Secret Treaty between Germany and Austria.
+1883 Triple Alliance between Germany, Austria, and Italy.
+1885 Formation of United Bulgaria.
+     War between Bulgaria and Servia.
+1886 Peace between Bulgaria and Servia.
+1890 Fall of Bismarck. Cession of Heligoland to Germany.
+1891 Beginning of an understanding between Russia and France.
+1893 Caprivi's Army Act.
+1896 Germany begins to show aggressive tendencies in the field
+     of Colonial Expansion.
+     Treaty between England and France regarding their interests
+     in Indo-China.
+     Definite Alliance between Russia and France.
+1898 Reconquest of the Sudan.
+     Tsar's rescript for an International Peace Conference.
+1899 Anglo-French Agreement respecting Tripoli.
+     June. First Peace Conference at the Hague.
+     New German Army Act.
+1902 Anglo-Japanese Alliance.
+     The Peace of Vereeniging closes the South African War.
+1903 Revolution in Belgrade.
+1904 April. The Treaty of London between England and France
+     with regard to North Africa.
+1905 Mar. Visit of the German Emperor to Tangier.
+     June. Germany demands the dismissal of M. Delcass&eacute;.
+     Aug. The Treaty of Portsmouth between Russia and Japan.
+     Renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.
+     German Army Act.
+     Sept. France agrees to the holding of the Algeeiras
+     Conference.
+1907 Agreement between Russia and England concerning Persia,
+     Afghanistan, and Tibet.
+     June-Oct. Second Peace Conference at the Hague.
+1908 Young Turk Revolution in Constantinople.
+     Oct. Annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria.
+     German Navy Law.
+1909 Mar. Servia declares she will no longer protest against the
+     annexation of Bosnia by Austria.
+1909 Mr. Asquith's speech on necessity for increasing the Navy.
+1910 The Potsdam interview between the Tsar and the Kaiser.
+1911 European Crisis over the question of Morocco, followed by a
+     closer Anglo-French <i>entente</i>.
+     German Army Act.
+1912 Sensational German Army Bill.
+     War in the Balkans.
+     Nov. 26. German Navy construction estimates &pound;11,416,700.
+     Dec. 29. Peace Conference of Balkan States with Turkey broken off.
+1913 Jan. 17. M. Poincar&eacute; elected French President.
+     Jan. 23. The Young Turkish Party overthrow the Government at
+     Constantinople.
+     May 26. Peace made between Turkey and the Balkan States.
+     May 28. The New German Army Bill passes the Budget Committee of
+     the Reichstag.
+     June 20. Universal military service in Belgium.
+     June 26. Conference between the French President, the French
+     Foreign Minister, and Sir Edward Grey.
+     June 30. Bulgaria is attacked by Servia and Greece.
+     New German Army Bill.
+     July. Roumania attacks Bulgaria.
+     The Turks re-occupy Adrianople.
+     New Russian Army Bill.
+     French Army Bill.
+     Aug. 6. The Treaty of Peace between Bulgaria, Servia, Greece, and
+     Roumania.
+     Sept. 22. The Treaty of Peace between Bulgaria and Turkey.
+     Oct. 20. Servia at Austria's demand abandons Albania.
+     Austrian War Fund increased.
+1914 Attacks by the German Press upon France and Russia.
+</pre>
+<hr />
+<a name="CH1" id="CH1"><!-- CH1 --></a>
+<h2>CHAPTER I</h2>
+<center>THE NEUTRALITY OF BELGIUM AND LUXEMBURG</center>
+<h3>I</h3>
+<p>The kingdom of Belgium is a comparatively new creation, but the
+idea of a Belgian nation is older than the kingdom. Historically
+and geographically the kingdom has no doubt an artificial
+character; its boundaries have been determined by the Great Powers
+and cut across the ancient provinces of the Netherlands. And it
+must be added that its population is heterogeneous both in race and
+language. These facts, however, in no sense diminish the legal
+rights of Belgium as a nation. She is a sovereign state by the same
+charter as Italy or Greece; and for the convenience of Europe she
+has been solemnly declared a neutral state, endowed with special
+privileges but burdened with corresponding obligations. While those
+privileges were maintained&mdash;and they have been rigidly
+maintained for more than eighty years&mdash;the Belgian people
+punctually fulfilled their obligations; and, because they have
+declined to betray Europe by becoming the dependant of a powerful
+neighbour, or by participating in the violation of European public
+law, their country is a wilderness of smoking ruins.</p>
+<p>In the tremendous and all but crushing ordeal of August, 1914,
+Belgium has proved that she possesses other titles to existence and
+respect than those afforded by treaties, by the mutual jealousies
+of neighbours, or by the doctrines of international law. She has
+more than satisfied the tests which distinguish the true from the
+fictitious nationality. Those who have hitherto known Belgium only
+as a hive of manufacturing and mining industry, or as a land of
+historic memories and monuments, are now recognizing, with some
+shame for their past blindness, the moral and spiritual qualities
+which her people have developed under the aegis of a European
+guarantee. It is now beyond dispute that, if Belgium were
+obliterated from the map of Europe, the world would be the poorer
+and Europe put to shame. The proofs which Belgium has given of her
+nationality will never be forgotten while liberty has any value or
+patriotism any meaning among men. We cannot do less than echo the
+general sentiment of admiration for a constancy to national ideals
+which has left Belgium at the mercy of Huns less forgivable than
+those of Attila. But the case against her oppressor is not to be
+founded solely or mainly on her peculiar merits. In a special sense
+it rests upon the legal rights and duties with which she has been
+invested for the convenience of her neighbours and for the welfare
+of the European state system. It was in their interest, rather than
+her own, that the Great Powers made her a sovereign independent
+state. As such she is entitled, equally with England or with
+Germany, to immunity from unprovoked attack. But the Powers which
+made her a sovereign state, also, and for the same reasons of
+convenience, made her a neutral state. She was therefore debarred
+from consulting her own safety by making alliances upon what terms
+she would. She could not lawfully join either of the two armed
+camps into which Europe has fallen since the year 1907. And, if she
+had been as contemptible as she is actually the reverse, she would
+still be entitled to expect from England and from every other of
+her guarantors the utmost assistance it is in their power to give.
+In fighting for Belgium we fight for the law of nations; that is,
+ultimately, for the peace of all nations and for the right of the
+weaker to exist.</p>
+<hr />
+<p>The provinces which now constitute the kingdom of
+Belgium&mdash;with the exception of the bishopric of Li&egrave;ge,
+which was until 1795 an ecclesiastical principality&mdash;were
+known in the seventeenth century as the Spanish, in the eighteenth
+as the Austrian, Netherlands. They received the first of these
+names when they returned to the allegiance of Philip II, after a
+short participation in the revolt to which Holland owes her
+national existence. When the independence of Holland was finally
+recognized by Spain (1648), the Spanish Netherlands were subjected
+to the first of the artificial restrictions which Europe has seen
+fit to impose upon them. The Dutch monopoly of navigation in the
+Scheldt was admitted by the Treaty of M&uuml;nster (1648), and
+Antwerp was thus precluded from developing into a rival of
+Amsterdam. In the age of Louis XIV the Spanish Netherlands were
+constantly attacked by France, who acquired at one time or another
+the chief towns of Artois and Hainault, including some which have
+lately come into prominence in the great war, such as Lille,
+Valenciennes, Cambray, and Maubeuge. The bulk, however, of the
+Spanish Netherlands passed at the Treaty of Utrecht to Austria,
+then the chief rival of France on the Continent. They passed with
+the reservation that certain fortresses on their southern border
+were to be garrisoned jointly by the Dutch and the Austrians as a
+barrier against French aggression. This arrangement was overthrown
+at the French Revolution. The French annexed the Austrian
+Netherlands and Li&egrave;ge in November, 1792; and immediately
+afterwards threw down a gauntlet to England by opening to all
+nations the navigation of the Scheldt. This, and the threatened
+French attack on Holland, her ally, drew England into conflict with
+the Revolution; for, first, Antwerp in French hands and as an open
+port would be a dangerous menace; and secondly, the French had
+announced a new and anarchic doctrine hostile to all standing
+treaties: 'Our reasons are that the river takes its rise in France
+and that a nation which has obtained its liberty cannot recognize a
+system of feudalism, much less adhere to it'.[<a href=
+"#note-1">1</a>] The answer of William Pitt, which in effect
+declared war upon the Revolution, contains a memorable statement of
+the attitude towards public law which England held then, as she
+holds it to-day: 'With regard to the Scheldt France can have no
+right to annul existing stipulations, unless she also have the
+right to set aside equally the other treaties between all Powers of
+Europe and all the other rights of England and her allies....
+England will never consent that France shall arrogate the power of
+annulling at her pleasure and under the pretence of a pretended
+natural right, of which she makes herself the only judge, the
+political system of Europe, established by solemn treaties and
+guaranteed by the consent of all the Powers'.[<a href=
+"#note-2">2</a>]</p>
+<p>This was not our attitude in the case of Belgium only. It was an
+attitude which we adopted with regard to all the minor Powers of
+Western Europe when they were threatened by Napoleon. On precisely
+the same grounds England defended in 1803 the independence of
+Holland, a commercial rival if an old political ally, and of
+Switzerland, where she had no immediate interests to protect. By
+the Treaty of Lun&eacute;ville (February, 1801) France and Austria
+had mutually guaranteed the independence of the Batavian Republic
+and the right of the Dutch to adopt whatever form of government
+seemed good to them. In defiance of these stipulations Napoleon
+maintained a garrison in Holland, and forced upon her a new
+Constitution which had been prepared in Paris (November, 1801).
+Identical stipulations had been made for the Helvetian Republic and
+had been similarly violated. Early in 1803 England demanded that
+the French should evacuate Holland and Switzerland: to which
+Napoleon replied that 'Switzerland and Holland are mere trifles'.
+His interview with the English Ambassador on March 13, 1803, has
+many points of resemblance with the now famous interview of August
+4, 1914, between Sir Edward Goschen and Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg.
+The First Consul then, like the Imperial Chancellor to-day, was
+unable, or professed himself unable, to understand why Great
+Britain should insist upon the observance of treaties.</p>
+<p>To return to Belgium. It became apparent in the Napoleonic Wars
+that Belgium and Holland were individually too weak to protect
+themselves or the German people against an aggressive French
+Government. The allies therefore, in the year 1813, handed over to
+Holland the Austrian Netherlands and the bishopric of Li&egrave;ge
+in order 'to put Holland in a position to resist attack until the
+Powers could come to its aid'. This arrangement was ratified at the
+Treaty of Chaumont (1814). As there was no government or visible
+unity in the Belgian provinces after the retirement of the French,
+the union with Holland, originally suggested by Lord Castlereagh,
+seemed reasonable enough. It gave the Belgians the great privilege
+of freely navigating the Scheldt. It was confirmed at the Congress
+of Vienna, and the new kingdom of the United Netherlands was
+declared neutral by the common consent of the Powers.</p>
+<p>But the events of the years 1815-1830 proved conclusively that
+this union was unsatisfactory to the Belgian population. The
+Belgians complained that they were not allowed their just share of
+influence and representation in the legislature or executive. They
+resented the attempt to impose the Dutch language and Dutch
+Liberalism upon them. They rose in revolt, expelled the Dutch
+officials and garrisons, and drew up for themselves a monarchical
+and parliamentary constitution. Their aspirations aroused much
+sympathy both in England and in France. These two countries induced
+the other Great Powers (Austria, Prussia, Russia) to recognize the
+new kingdom as an independent neutral state. This recognition was
+embodied in the Treaty of the Twenty-Four Articles signed at London
+in October, 1831; and it was not too generous to the aspirations of
+Belgian nationality. Since the Belgians had been defeated in the
+field by Holland and had only been rescued by a French army, they
+were obliged to surrender their claims upon Maestricht, parts of
+Luxemburg, and parts of Limburg. Some time elapsed before this
+settlement was recognized by Holland. But at length this last
+guarantee was obtained; and the Treaty of London, 1839, finally
+established the international status of Belgium. Under this treaty
+both her independence and her neutrality were definitely guaranteed
+by England, France, Austria, Prussia, and Russia.</p>
+<p>We have recently been told by the Imperial Chancellor that the
+Treaty of 1839 is nothing but 'a scrap of paper'. It is therefore
+desirable to point out that Bismarck made full use of it in 1870 to
+prevent England from supporting the cause of France. It was with
+this object that he published the proposal alleged to have been
+made to him by the French representative, Benedetti, in 1866, that
+Prussia should help France to acquire Belgium as a solace for
+Prussian annexations in Northern Germany. Then, as now, England
+insisted upon the Treaty of 1839. The result was that, on the
+instance of Lord Granville, Germany and France entered into an
+identic treaty with Great Britain (Aug. 1870) to the effect that,
+if either belligerent violated Belgian territory, Great Britain
+would co-operate with the other for the defence of it. The treaty
+was most strictly construed. After the battle of Sedan (Sept. 1870)
+the German Government applied to Belgium for leave to transport the
+German wounded across Belgian territory. France protested that this
+would be a breach of neutrality and Belgium refused.</p>
+<p>Such is the history of the process by which Belgium has acquired
+her special status. As an independent state she is bound by the
+elementary principle of the law of nations, that a neutral state is
+bound to refuse to grant a right of passage to a belligerent. This
+is a well-established rule, and was formally affirmed by the Great
+Powers at the Hague Peace Conference of 1907. The fifth Article of
+the Convention [<a href="#note-3">3</a>] then drawn up respecting
+the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in War on Land
+runs as follows:&mdash;</p>
+<p class="blockquote">'A neutral power ought not to allow on its
+territory any of the acts referred to in Articles 2 to 4'.</p>
+<p>Of the Articles thus specified the most important is No.
+2:&mdash;</p>
+<p class="blockquote">'Belligerents are forbidden to move across
+the territory of a neutral power troops or convoys, either of
+munitions of war or supplies'.</p>
+<p>By the Treaty of London the existence of Belgium is contingent
+upon her perpetual neutrality:&mdash;</p>
+<p class="blockquote">'ARTICLE VII. Belgium within the limits
+specified in Articles I, II, and IV shall form an independent and
+perpetually neutral state. It shall be bound to observe such
+neutrality towards all other states'.[<a href="#note-4">4</a>]</p>
+<p>It is unnecessary to elaborate further the point of law. That,
+it seems, has been admitted by the Imperial Chancellor before the
+German Reichstag. What is necessary to remember is that, in regard
+to Belgium, Germany has assumed the position which the Government
+of the French Revolution adopted towards the question of the
+Scheldt, and which Napoleon adopted towards the guaranteed
+neutrality of Switzerland and Holland. Now, as then, England has
+special interests at stake. The consequences of the oppression or
+the extinction of the smaller nationalities are bound to excite
+peculiar alarm in England. In particular she cannot forget how she
+would be menaced by the establishment of a militarist state in
+Belgium. But since in England's case the dangers and uncertainties
+of a state of things in which Might is treated as Right are
+particularly apparent, it is only to be expected that she should
+insist with special emphasis upon the sanctity of treaties, a
+sanctity which in the long run is as necessary to the strongest
+nation as to the weakest. If treaties count for nothing, no nation
+is secure so long as any imaginable combination of Powers can meet
+it in battle or diplomacy on equal terms; and the stronger nations
+must perforce fight one another to the death for the privilege of
+enslaving civilization. Whether the progress of such a competition
+would be a trifling evil, whether the success of any one among such
+competitors would conduce to the higher interests of humanity,
+impartial onlookers may debate if they please. England has answered
+both these questions with an unhesitating negative.</p>
+<h3>II</h3>
+<p>Under existing treaty law the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg stands
+for all practical purposes in the same legal position as its
+northern neighbour; and the ruler of Luxemburg has protested
+against the German invasion[<a href="#note-5">5</a>] of her
+territory no less emphatically than King Albert, though with less
+power of giving expression in action to her just resentment. If the
+defence of Belgium has appealed more forcibly to the ordinary
+Englishman, it is because he is more familiar with the past history
+of Belgium and sees more clearly in her case the ultimate issues
+that are involved in the German violation of her rights. As the
+following narrative will show, the neutrality of Luxemburg was
+guaranteed in the interests and at the instance of the Prussian
+state, as a protection against French aggression. The legal case
+could not be clearer, and it might perhaps be asked why the attack
+on Luxemburg, which preceded that on Belgium, was not treated by
+this country as a <i>casus belli</i>. England's attitude towards
+Luxemburg is that which she has consistently adopted towards those
+smaller states of Europe which lie outside the reach of naval
+power. It is an attitude which she has maintained in the case of
+Servia even more clearly than in that of Luxemburg. England holds
+herself bound to exert her influence in procuring for the smaller
+states of Europe equitable treatment from their more powerful
+neighbours. But the duty of insisting upon equitable treatment
+falls first upon those Powers whose situation enables them to
+support a protest by effective action. Just as Servia is the
+special concern of Russia, so Luxemburg must look to France in the
+first instance for protection against Germany, to Germany if she is
+assailed from the French side. In either case we should hold
+ourselves bound to exercise our influence, but not as principals.
+Any other course would be impossibly quixotic, and would only have
+the effect of destroying our power to help the states within our
+reach.</p>
+<hr />
+<p>The Grand Duchy of Luxemburg was a revival of an ancient state
+which had lost its existence during the French Revolution. Although
+it was placed under the rule of the King of the Netherlands, a
+descendant of its former sovereign, it was not incorporated in his
+kingdom, but retained its own identity and gave to its ruler the
+secondary title of Grand Duke of Luxemburg. The position it
+occupied after 1815 was in some ways anomalous; for lying as it did
+between the Meuse and the Rhine, and possessing in the town of
+Luxemburg a fortress whose natural strength some competent critics
+reckoned as second only to that of Gibraltar among the fortresses
+of Europe, it was considered to be an indispensable link in the
+chain of defences of Germany against French aggression. Not being
+able to trust the Dutch to hold this great fortress against the
+French, the Congress of Vienna laid down as a principle that all
+land between the Meuse and the Rhine must be held by Prussian
+troops on behalf of the newly formed Germanic Confederation. Thus
+Luxemburg was held by Prussian troops on behalf of this foreign
+confederation, and over this garrison the only right allowed to the
+Grand Duke, the sovereign of the country, was that of nominating
+the governor.</p>
+<p>This strange state of affairs was not modified by the Belgian
+Revolution of 1830; for though more than half the Grand Duchy threw
+in its lot with Belgium to form the modern province of Belgian
+Luxemburg, the Grand Duchy, confined to its modern limits, still
+contained the great fortress with its garrison of Prussian troops.
+It is not surprising that, under these circumstances, the Grand
+Duchy joined the Prussian <i>Zollverein</i>, and so drew nearer to
+Germany, in spite of the independent character of its inhabitants,
+who have strenuously resisted any attempt at absorption into
+Germany. France naturally continued to cast envious eyes upon the
+small state with the powerful citadel, but no opportunity presented
+itself for reopening the question until 1866.</p>
+<p>In that year Napoleon III had anticipated that the war between
+Prussia and Italy on one side and Austria and the small German
+states on the other would be long and exhausting, and would end in
+France imposing peace on the weary combatants with considerable
+territorial advantage to herself. His anticipation was entirely
+falsified; the war lasted only seven weeks and Prussia emerged
+victorious and immensely strengthened by the absorption of several
+German states and by the formation of the North German
+Confederation under her leadership. This, the first shattering blow
+which the French Emperor's diplomatic schemes had received, led him
+to demand compensation for the growth of Prussian power, and one of
+his proposals was the cession of Luxemburg to France.</p>
+<p>This suggestion had some legal plausibility quite apart from the
+question of the balance of power. For the Prussian garrison held
+Luxemburg in the name of the German Confederation, which had been
+destroyed by the war of 1866; and, the authority to which the
+garrison owed its existence being gone, it was only logical that
+the garrison should go too. After much demur Count Bismarck
+acknowledged the justice of the argument (April, 1867), but it did
+not by any means follow that the French should therefore take the
+place vacated by the Prussians. At the same time the fortress could
+not be left in the hands of a weak Power as a temptation for
+powerful and unscrupulous neighbours. The question of Luxemburg was
+therefore the subject discussed at a Congress held in London in the
+following May.</p>
+<p>Here the Prussians showed themselves extremely politic and
+reasonable. Realizing that, with the advance of artillery, the
+great rock-fortress no longer had the military value of earlier
+days, they not only raised no objections to the evacuation of
+Luxemburg by their troops, but in the Congress it was they who
+proposed that the territory of the Grand Duchy should be
+neutralized 'under the collective guarantee of the
+Powers'.[<a href="#note-6">6</a>] A treaty was therefore drawn up
+on May 11, 1867, of which the second article ran as
+follows:&mdash;</p>
+<p class="blockquote">'The Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, within the
+Limits determined by the Act annexed to the Treaties of the 19th
+April, 1839, under the Guarantee of the Courts of Great Britain,
+Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia, shall henceforth form a
+perpetually Neutral State.</p>
+<p class="blockquote">'It shall be bound to observe the same
+Neutrality towards all other States.</p>
+<p class="blockquote">'The High Contracting Parties engage to
+respect the principle of Neutrality stipulated by the present
+Article.</p>
+<p class="blockquote">'That principle is and remains placed under
+the sanction of the collective Guarantee of the Powers signing as
+Parties to the present Treaty, with the exception of Belgium, which
+is itself a Neutral State'.[<a href="#note-7">7</a>]</p>
+<p>The third article provided for the demolition of the
+fortifications of Luxemburg and its conversion into an open town,
+the fourth for its evacuation by the Prussian garrison, and the
+fifth forbade the restoration of the fortifications.</p>
+<p>Such then was the treaty guaranteeing the neutrality of
+Luxemburg, which was proposed, it may be observed, by Prussia
+herself; but, until the treaty was broken by the very Power which
+had proposed the neutrality, only one incident need be noted in the
+history of the country, namely, the part it played in the war of
+1870-1. On December 3, 1870, Count Bismarck issued from Versailles
+a circular to the Prussian Ambassadors, calling attention to the
+fact that both the French and the Luxemburgers had violated the
+neutrality of the Grand Duchy, mainly by giving facilities for
+French soldiers to return to France. Precautions were taken by the
+Prussian Government on the frontier to prevent such abuses
+occurring in the future, and as no violation of the neutrality of
+Luxemburg was committed by the Prussians, the neutral co-guarantors
+were satisfied with the Prussian attitude, and the subject dropped.
+At the end of the war, M. Thiers vainly attempted to obtain
+Luxemburg as compensation for the loss of Metz.</p>
+<p>In accordance with the Family Compact of 1783, the Grand Duchy
+passed on the death of the late King of Holland to Prince William
+of Nassau, on whose death the present Grand Duchess succeeded to
+her father's throne.</p>
+<p>There is one point in the Treaty of 1867 which calls for special
+comment. The neutrality of the Grand Duchy is 'placed under the
+collective guarantee of the Powers signing'. The phrase originally
+proposed by Count Bismarck was 'the formal and individual guarantee
+of the Powers,' and it was altered at the instance of the English
+Foreign Minister, Lord Stanley. The phrase actually adopted was
+suggested by the Russian diplomat, Baron Brunnow, and was accepted
+both by England and by Prussia. Lord Stanley's objection had been
+based upon the fear that England might incur an unlimited liability
+to assist Luxemburg single-handed if all other Powers failed to
+meet their obligations. In other words, Luxemburg might have been
+used as the infallible means of dragging us into every and any war
+which might arise between Germany and France. From that danger we
+were protected by Lord Stanley's objection; as the case stands the
+treaty gives us, in his own words, 'a right to make war, but would
+not necessarily impose the obligation,' should Luxemburg be
+attacked. To this doctrine a reference will be found in the British
+White Paper (No. 148), where Sir Edward Grey informs M. Cambon of
+'the doctrine' concerning Luxemburg, 'laid down by Lord Derby and
+Lord Clarendon in 1867'. It may also be observed that two of the
+co-guarantors of the Treaty of 1867, namely Italy and Holland, have
+also not thought it necessary to make the violation of Luxemburg a
+<i>casus belli</i>.</p>
+<h3>III</h3>
+<p>It is evident to all who study closely the map of France that
+her eastern frontier falls into two sharply contrasted divisions,
+the north-eastern which reaches from the sea to the valley of the
+Sambre, and the south-eastern which extends from that river to, and
+along the Swiss boundary. The former is flat country, easy for
+military operations; the latter is mountainous, intersected with
+many deep valleys. After the loss of Alsace-Lorraine, the French
+set to work to rectify artificially the strategical weakness of
+their frontier; and in a chain of fortresses behind the Vosges
+Mountains they erected a rampart which has the reputation of being
+impregnable. This is the line Belfort, &Eacute;pinal, Toul, Verdun.
+A German attack launched upon this line without violating neutral
+territory would have to be frontal, for on the north the line is
+covered by the neutral states of Belgium and Luxemburg, while on
+the south, although the gap between the Vosges and the Swiss
+frontier apparently gives a chance of out-flanking the French
+defences, the fortress of Belfort, which was never reduced even in
+the war of 1870-1, was considered too formidable an obstacle
+against which to launch an invading army. A rapid advance on Paris
+was therefore deemed impossible if respect were to be paid to the
+neutrality of Belgium and Luxemburg, and it was for this purely
+military reason that Germany has to-day violated her promises to
+regard the neutrality of these states. This was frankly admitted by
+Herr von Jagow to Sir Edward Goschen: 'if they had gone by the more
+southern route they could not have hoped, in view of the paucity of
+roads and the strength of the fortresses, to have got through
+without formidable opposition entailing great loss of
+time'.[<a href="#note-8">8</a>]</p>
+<p>In the case of Belgium a very easy road was afforded into French
+territory up the Valley of the Meuse, past Li&egrave;ge and thence
+into France past Namur and through what is known as the Gap of
+Namur. A German army could debouch into France through this gap the
+more easily inasmuch as the French, relying on the neutrality of
+these two states, had not strongly fortified the frontier from the
+sea to Maubeuge. Moreover, as the country to the west of the Sambre
+was very easy country for manoeuvring and furnished with good roads
+and railways, it was reckoned that the formidable French lines to
+the south could be turned in this manner, and the German army could
+march upon Paris from the north-east.</p>
+<p>As to Luxemburg, plainly it could not in such a scheme remain
+neutral. It would lie between the two wings of the German army, and
+controlling as it did the roads to Brussels, Metz, and
+Aix-la-Chapelle, it could not be allowed to cause such
+inconvenience as to prevent easy communication between one portion
+of the German army and another.</p>
+<p>That such a plan was contemplated by the Germans has been for
+some years past a matter of common knowledge in England; and it has
+been also a matter of common opinion that the attempt to execute
+this plan would involve the active resistance of the British
+forces, to whom the duty was supposed to have been assigned of
+acting on the left flank of the French opposing the entry of the
+Germans from Belgian territory. The plea therefore that has been
+put forward that the British have now dealt the Germans 'a felon's
+blow' can only be put forward by persons who are either ignorant or
+heedless of what has been a matter of casual conversation all over
+England these last three years; and Sir Edward Grey himself was so
+convinced that the German Government knew what the consequences of
+a violation of Belgian neutrality would be that he informed Sir
+Francis Bertie on July 31st that the 'German Government do not
+expect our neutrality'.[<a href="#note-9">9</a>] There has been no
+secret about it whatever. It is incredible that the excitement and
+surprise of the Imperial Chancellor on the receipt of the ultimatum
+of August 4th should have been genuine, seeing that it involves
+miscalculation or misinformation entirely incompatible with what we
+know of the thoroughness of German methods. At the time of the
+Agadir crisis the military situation was the same, and the German
+War Office knew quite well what our part would then have been.
+Surprise at such action on our part in 1914 is little else than
+comedy, and can only have been expressed in order to throw the
+blame of German aggression on to the shoulders of Great
+Britain.</p>
+<p>This argument that Great Britain has taken the aggressive falls
+to the ground entirely when it is confronted with the hard facts of
+chronology. Far from attacking the Germans, we were so anxious to
+keep the peace that we were actually three days late in our
+mobilization to join the French on their left wing; and had it not
+been for the defence offered by Li&egrave;ge, our scruples would
+have gravely imperilled the common cause. For it was not until we
+were certain that Germany had committed what was tantamount to an
+act of war against us, by invading the neutral state of Belgium,
+that we delivered the ultimatum which led to the war.</p>
+<p>Notes:</p>
+<p><a name="note-1" id="note-1"><!-- Note Anchor 1 --></a>[Footnote
+1: Cam. Mod. Hist. viii 301.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-2" id="note-2"><!-- Note Anchor 2 --></a>[Footnote
+2: Ibid. 304.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-3" id="note-3"><!-- Note Anchor 3 --></a>[Footnote
+3: Printed by A. Pearce Higgins, <i>The Hague Peace
+Conferences</i>, pp. 281-9.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-4" id="note-4"><!-- Note Anchor 4 --></a>[Footnote
+4: The entire treaty will be found in Hertslet, <i>Map of Europe by
+Treaty</i>, vol. ii, pp. 979-98.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-5" id="note-5"><!-- Note Anchor 5 --></a>[Footnote
+5: <i>Correspondence respecting the European Crisis</i>, (Cd.
+7467), No. 147. Minister of State, Luxemburg, to Sir E. Grey, Aug.
+2.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-6" id="note-6"><!-- Note Anchor 6 --></a>[Footnote
+6: Edward Hertslet, <i>The Map of Europe by Treaty</i>, vol. iii,
+p. 1806, no. 406. 'Proposal of <i>Prussia</i> of Collective
+Guarantee by Powers of Neutrality of <i>Luxemburg</i>, London, 7th
+May, 1867.']</p>
+<p><a name="note-7" id="note-7"><!-- Note Anchor 7 --></a>[Footnote
+7: Hertslet, <i>ut sup.</i>, vol. iii, p. 1803. The High
+Contracting Powers were Great Britain, Austria, France, Belgium,
+Italy, the Netherlands, Prussia, and Russia.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-8" id="note-8"><!-- Note Anchor 8 --></a>[Footnote
+8: <i>Dispatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin respecting
+the rupture of diplomatic relations with the German Government</i>
+(Cd. 7445), Miscellaneous, no. 8, 1914.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-9" id="note-9"><!-- Note Anchor 9 --></a>[Footnote
+9: <i>Correspondence respecting the European Crisis</i>, p. 62, no.
+116. July 31, 1914. See also <i>infra</i> <a href="#ch5sec3">pp.
+82</a> <i>et seqq</i>.]</p>
+<hr />
+<a name="CH2" id="CH2"><!-- CH2 --></a>
+<h2>CHAPTER II</h2>
+<center>THE GROWTH OF ALLIANCES AND THE RACE OF ARMAMENTS SINCE
+1871</center>
+<p>Even at the risk of being tedious it is essential that we should
+sketch in outline the events which have produced the present
+grouping of belligerent states, and the long-drawn-out preparations
+which have equipped them for conflict on this colossal scale. To
+understand why Austria-Hungary and Germany have thrown down the
+glove to France and Russia, why England has intervened not only as
+the protector of Belgium, but also as the friend of France, we must
+go back to the situation created by the Franco-German War. Starting
+from that point, we must notice in order the formation of the
+Triple Alliance between Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy, of the
+Dual Alliance between France and Russia, of the Anglo-French and
+the Anglo-Russian understandings. The Triple Alliance has been the
+grand cause of the present situation; not because such a grouping
+of the Central European Powers was objectionable, but because it
+has inspired over-confidence in the two leading allies; because
+they have traded upon the prestige of their league to press their
+claims East and West with an intolerable disregard for the law of
+nations. Above all it was the threatening attitude of Germany
+towards her Western neighbours that drove England forward step by
+step in a policy of precautions which, she hoped, would avert a
+European conflagration, and which her rivals have attempted to
+represent as stages in a Machiavellian design to ruin Germany's
+well-being. These precautions, so obviously necessary that they
+were continued and expanded by the most pacific Government which
+England has seen since Mr. Gladstone's retirement, have taken two
+forms: that of diplomatic understandings, and that of naval
+preparations. Whichever form they have taken, they have been
+adopted in response to definite provocations, and to threats which
+it was impossible to overlook. They have been strictly and
+jealously measured by the magnitude of the peril immediately in
+view. In her diplomacy England has given no blank cheques; in her
+armaments she has cut down expenditure to the minimum that, with
+reasonable good fortune, might enable her to defend this country
+and English sea-borne trade against any probable combination of
+hostile Powers.</p>
+<p>Let us consider (1) the development of the diplomatic situation
+since 1870, (2) the so-called race of armaments since 1886.</p>
+<p>The Treaty of Frankfort (May 10, 1871), in which France
+submitted to the demands of the new-born German Empire, opened a
+fresh era of European diplomacy and international competition. The
+German Empire became at once, and has ever since remained, the
+predominant Power in Western Europe. The public opinion of this new
+Germany has been captured to no small extent by the views of such
+aggressive patriots as Treitschke, who openly avowed that 'the
+greatness and good of the world is to be found in the predominance
+there of German culture, of the German mind, in a word of the
+German character'. The school of Treitschke looked for the
+establishment of a German world-empire, and held that the essential
+preliminary to this scheme would be the overthrow of France and
+England. But until 1890, that is to say so long as Prince Bismarck
+remained Chancellor, no such ambitious programme was adopted by the
+German Government. Bismarck was content to strengthen the position
+of the Empire and to sow disunion among her actual or suspected
+enemies. In 1872 he brought about a friendly understanding with
+Austria and Russia, the other two great Powers of Eastern Europe,
+the so-called <i>Dreikaiserb&uuml;ndnis</i>, which was designed to
+perpetuate the <i>status quo</i>. But the friendship with Russia
+quickly cooled; it received a sharp set-back in 1875, when the Tsar
+Alexander II came forward rather ostentatiously to save France from
+the alleged hostile designs of Germany; it was certainly not
+improved when Bismarck in his turn mediated between Russia and her
+opponents at the Congress of Berlin (1878). On the other hand, a
+common interest in the Eastern Question drew closer the bonds
+between Germany and Austria. The latter felt herself directly
+menaced by the Balkan policy of Russia; the former was not prepared
+to see her southern neighbour despoiled of territory. Hence in 1879
+was initiated that closer union between Germany and Austria which
+has been so largely responsible for the present situation. The
+Treaty of 1879, which was kept secret until 1887, was purely
+defensive in its character; but the terms showed that Russia was
+the enemy whom both the contracting Powers chiefly feared. Neither
+was bound to active measures unless the other should be attacked by
+Russia, or any Power which had Russian support. In 1882 the
+alliance of the two great German Powers was joined by Italy&mdash;a
+surprising development which can only be explained on the ground of
+Italy's feeling that she could not hope for security at home, or
+for colonial expansion in the Mediterranean, so long as she
+remained in isolation. The Triple Alliance so constituted had a
+frail appearance, and it was hardly to be expected that Italy would
+receive strong support from partners in comparison with whose
+resources her own were insignificant. But the Triple Alliance has
+endured to the present day, the most permanent feature of the
+diplomatic system of the last thirty-two years. Whether the results
+have been commensurate with the sacrifices of sentiment and
+ambition which Italy has made, it is for Italy to judge. On the
+whole she has been a sleeping partner in the Alliance; its prestige
+has served almost exclusively for the promotion of Austrian and
+German aims; and one of its results has been to make Austria a
+formidable rival of Italy in the Adriatic.</p>
+<p>Meanwhile the remaining Great Powers of Europe had continued, as
+Prince Bismarck hoped, to pursue their separate paths, though
+England was on friendly terms with France and had, equally with
+Russia, laboured to avert a second Franco-German War in 1875. After
+1882 the English occupation of Egypt constituted for some years a
+standing grievance in the eyes of France. The persistent advance of
+Russia in Asia had in like manner been a source of growing
+apprehension to England since 1868; and, for a long time after the
+Treaty of Berlin, English statesmen were on the watch to check the
+growth of Russian influence in the Balkans. But common interests of
+very different kinds were tending to unite these three Powers, not
+in any stable alliance, even for mutual defence, but in a string of
+compacts concluded for particular objects.</p>
+<p>One of these interests was connected with a feeling that the
+policy of the principal partners in the Triple Alliance,
+particularly that of Germany, had become incalculable and was only
+consistent in periodic outbursts of self-assertiveness, behind
+which could be discerned a steady determination to accumulate
+armaments which should be strong enough to intimidate any possible
+competitor. The growth of this feeling dates from the dismissal of
+Prince Bismarck by the present Kaiser. Bismarck had sedulously
+courted the friendship of Russia, even after 1882. He entered in
+fact into a defensive agreement with Russia against Austria. While
+he increased the war strength of the army, he openly announced that
+Germany would always stand on the defensive; and he addressed a
+warning to the Reichstag against the 'offensive-defensive' policy
+which was even then in the air, though it was still far from its
+triumph:&mdash;</p>
+<p class="blockquote">'If I were to say to you, "We are threatened
+by France and Russia; it is better for us to fight at once; an
+offensive war is more advantageous to us," and ask for a credit of
+a hundred millions, I do not know whether you would grant
+it&mdash;I hope not.'[<a href="#note-10">10</a>]</p>
+<p>But Bismarck's retirement (1890) left the conduct of German
+policy in less cautious hands. The defensive alliance with Russia
+was allowed to lapse; friction between the two Powers increased,
+and as the result Germany found herself confronted with the Dual
+Alliance of France and Russia, which gradually developed, during
+the years 1891-6, from a friendly understanding into a formal
+contract for mutual defence. There is no doubt that this alliance
+afforded France a protection against that unprovoked attack upon
+her eastern frontier which she has never ceased to dread since
+1875; and it has yet to be proved that she ever abused the new
+strength which this alliance gave her.</p>
+<p>It is only in the field of colonial expansion that she has shown
+aggressive tendencies since 1896; and even here the members of the
+Triple Alliance have never shown serious cause for a belief that
+France has invaded their lawful spheres of interest. Her advance in
+Morocco was permitted by Italy and Spain; her vast dominion in
+French West Africa has been recognized by treaties with Germany and
+England; in East Africa she has Madagascar, of which her possession
+has never been disputed by any European Power; her growing
+interests in Indo-China have impinged only upon an English sphere
+of interest and were peacefully defined by an Anglo-French
+Agreement of 1896. France has been the competitor, to some extent
+the successful competitor, of Germany in West Africa, where she
+partially envelops the Cameroons and Togoland. But the German
+Government has never ventured to state the French colonial methods
+as a <i>casus belli</i>. That the German people have viewed with
+jealousy the growth of French power in Africa is a notorious fact.
+Quite recently, on the eve of the present war, we were formally
+given to understand that Germany, in any war with France, might
+annex French colonies[<a href="#note-11">11</a>]; and it is easy to
+see how such an object would reconcile the divergent policies of
+the German military and naval experts.</p>
+<p>Up to the eve of the present war Great Britain has consistently
+refused to believe that Germany would be mad enough or dishonest
+enough to enter on a war of aggression for the dismemberment of
+colonial empires. German diplomacy in the past few weeks has rudely
+shattered this conviction. But up to the year 1914 the worst which
+was generally anticipated was that she would pursue in the future
+on a great scale the policy, which she has hitherto pursued on a
+small scale, of claiming so-called 'compensations' when other
+Powers succeeded in developing their colonial spheres, and of
+invoking imaginary 'interests' as a reason why the efforts of
+explorers and diplomatists should not be allowed to yield to France
+their natural fruits of increased colonial trade. It is not our
+business to impugn or to defend the partition of Africa, or the
+methods by which it has been brought about. But it is vital to our
+subject that we should describe the methods by which Germany has
+endeavoured to intimidate France at various stages of the African
+question. The trouble arose out of a Moroccan Agreement between
+England and France, which was the first definite proof that these
+two Powers were drifting into relations closer than that of
+ordinary friendship.</p>
+<p>In 1904 England and France settled their old quarrel about
+Egypt. France recognized the English occupation of Egypt; England,
+on her side, promised not to impede the extension of French
+influence in Morocco. It was agreed that neither in Egypt nor in
+Morocco should there be a political revolution; and that in both
+countries the customs tariff should make no distinction between one
+nation and another. This compact was accompanied by a settlement of
+the old disputes about French fishing rights in Newfoundland, and
+of more recent difficulties concerning the frontiers between French
+and English possessions in West Africa.[<a href="#note-12">12</a>]
+The whole group formed a step in a general policy, on both sides,
+of healing local controversies which had little meaning except as
+instruments of diplomatic warfare. The agreement regarding Egypt
+and Morocco is distinguished from that concerning West Africa and
+Newfoundland in so far as it recognizes the possibility of
+objections on the part of other Powers. It promised mutual support
+in the case of such objections; but not the support of armed force,
+only that of diplomatic influence.</p>
+<p>At the moment of these agreements Count B&uuml;low told the
+Reichstag that Germany had no objection, as her interests were in
+no way imperilled by them. Later, however, Germany chose to regard
+the Moroccan settlement as an injury or an insult or both. In the
+following year the Kaiser made a speech at Tangier (March, 1905) in
+which he asserted that he would uphold the important commercial and
+industrial interests of Germany in Morocco, and that he would never
+allow any other Power to step between him and the free sovereign of
+a free country. It was subsequently announced in the German Press
+that Germany had no objection to the Anglo-French Agreement in
+itself, but objected to not having been consulted before it was
+arranged. This complaint was met, on the part of France, by the
+retirement of M. Delcass&eacute;, her Minister of Foreign Affairs,
+and by her assent to an International Conference regarding Morocco.
+The Conference met at Algeciras, and German pretensions were
+satisfied by an international Agreement.[<a href="#note-13">13</a>]
+It is to be observed that in this Conference the original claims of
+Germany were opposed, not only by Russia, from whom she could
+hardly expect sympathy, but even by Italy, her own ally. When
+Germany had finally assented to the Agreement, her Chancellor, in
+flat contradiction with his previous utterance 'that German
+interests were in no way imperilled by it', announced that Germany
+had been compelled to intervene by her economic interests, by the
+prestige of German policy, and by the dignity of the German
+Empire.</p>
+<p>The plain fact was that Germany, soon after the conclusion of
+the Anglo-French agreements, had found herself suddenly delivered
+from her preoccupations on the side of Russia, and had seized the
+opportunity to assert herself in the West while Russia was involved
+in the most critical stage of her struggle with Japan. But this war
+came to an end before the Convention of Algeciras had begun; and
+Russia, even in the hour of defeat and internal revolutions, was
+still too formidable to be overridden, when she ranged herself
+beside her Western ally.</p>
+<p>Of the part which England played in the Moroccan dispute there
+are different versions. What is certain is that she gave France her
+diplomatic support. But the German Chancellor officially
+acknowledged, when all was over, that England's share in the
+Anglo-French Agreement had been perfectly correct, and that Germany
+bore England no ill-will for effecting a <i>rapprochement</i> with
+France. Still there remained a strong impression, not only in
+England and France, that there had been on Germany's part a
+deliberate intention to test the strength of the Anglo-French
+understanding and, if possible, to show France that England was a
+broken reed.</p>
+<p>It is not surprising that under these circumstances England has
+taken, since 1906, the precaution of freeing herself from any
+embarrassments in which she had previously been involved with other
+Powers. In 1905 she had shown her goodwill to Russia by exercising
+her influence to moderate the terms of the settlement with Japan.
+This was a wise step, consonant alike with English
+treaty-obligations to Japan and with the interests of European
+civilization. It led naturally to an amicable agreement with Russia
+(1907) concerning Persia, Afghanistan, and Tibet, the three
+countries which touch the northern borders of our Indian Empire. It
+cannot be too strongly emphasized that this agreement was of a
+local character, exactly as was that with France; that our friendly
+understandings with France and with Russia were entirely separate;
+and that neither related to the prosecution of a common policy in
+Europe; unless indeed the name of a policy could be given to the
+precaution, which was from time to time adopted, of permitting
+consultations between the French and English military experts. It
+was understood that these consultations committed neither country
+to a policy of common action.[<a href="#note-14">14</a>] England
+was drifting from her old attitude of 'splendid isolation'; but she
+had as yet no desire to involve herself, even for defensive
+purposes, in such a formal and permanent alliance as that which had
+been contracted by Germany, Austria, and Italy.</p>
+<p>But her hand was forced by Germany in 1911. Again the question
+of Morocco was made to supply a pretext for attacking our
+friendship with France. The German occupation of Agadir had, and
+could have, only one meaning. It was 'fastening a quarrel on France
+on a question that was the subject of a special agreement between
+France and us'.[<a href="#note-15">15</a>] The attack failed in its
+object. War was averted by the prompt action of the British
+Government. Mr. Asquith[<a href="#note-16">16</a>] announced that
+Great Britain, in discussing the Moroccan question, would have
+regard to British interests, which might be more directly involved
+than had hitherto been the case, and also to our treaty obligations
+with France. Somewhat later Mr. Asquith announced that if the
+negotiations between France and Germany did not reach a
+satisfactory settlement, Great Britain would become an active party
+to the discussion.[<a href="#note-17">17</a>] The nature of British
+interests were appropriately defined by Mr. Lloyd George in a
+Guildhall speech as consisting in the peace of the world, the
+maintenance of national honour, and the security of international
+trade.[<a href="#note-18">18</a>] The last phrase was a significant
+reference to the fact that Agadir, though valueless for commercial
+purposes, might be invaluable to any Power which desired to molest
+the South Atlantic trade routes. No one doubted then, or doubts
+to-day, that England stood in 1911 on the brink of a war which she
+had done nothing to provoke.</p>
+<p>The situation was saved in 1911 by the solidarity of England and
+France. Two Powers, which in the past had been separated by a
+multitude of prejudices and conflicting ambitions, felt at last
+that both were exposed to a common danger of the most serious
+character. Hence a new phase in the Anglo-French <i>entente</i>,
+which was cemented, not by a treaty, but by the interchange of
+letters between the English Secretary for Foreign Affairs (Sir
+Edward Grey) and the French Ambassador in London (M. Paul Cambon).
+On November 22, 1912, Sir Edward Grey[<a href="#note-19">19</a>]
+reminded M. Cambon of a remark which the latter had made, 'that if
+either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack
+by a third Power, it might become essential to know whether it
+could in that event depend on the armed assistance of the other.'
+Sir Edward Grey continued:&mdash;'I agree that if either Government
+had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power,
+or something that threatened the general peace, it should
+immediately discuss with the other whether both Governments should
+act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, if
+so, what measures they would be prepared to take in common. If
+these measures involved action, the plans of the General Staffs
+would at once be taken into consideration, and the Governments
+would then decide what effect should be given to them.'</p>
+<p>M. Cambon replied on the following day that he was authorized to
+accept the arrangement which Sir E. Grey had offered.[<a href=
+"#note-20">20</a>]</p>
+<p>The agreement, it will be seen, was of an elastic nature.
+Neither party was bound to co-operate, even diplomatically, with
+the other. The undertaking was to discuss any threatening
+situation, and to take common measures if both agreed to the
+necessity; there was an admission that the agreement might result
+in the conduct of a joint defensive war upon a common plan. Such an
+understanding between two sovereign states could be resented only
+by a Power which designed to attack one of them without clear
+provocation.</p>
+<p>The date at which these notes were interchanged is certainly
+significant. In November, 1912, the Balkan Allies were advancing on
+Constantinople, and already the spoils of the Balkan War were in
+dispute. Servia incurred the hostility of Austria-Hungary by
+demanding Albania and Adriatic ports; and the Dual Monarchy
+announced that it could never accept this arrangement. Behind
+Servia Austrian statesmen suspected the influence of Russia; it
+was, they said, a scheme for bringing Russia down to a sea which
+Austria regarded as her own preserve. Austria mobilized her army,
+and a war could hardly have been avoided but for the mediation of
+Germany and England. If England had entertained the malignant
+designs with which she is credited in some German circles, nothing
+would have been easier for her than to fan the flames, and to bring
+Russia down upon the Triple Alliance. The notes show how different
+from this were the aims of Sir Edward Grey. He evidently foresaw
+that a war between Austria and Russia would result in a German
+attack upon France. Not content with giving France assurance of
+support, he laboured to remove the root of the evil. A congress to
+settle the Balkan disputes was held at London in December, 1912;
+and it persuaded Servia to accept a reasonable compromise, by which
+she obtained commercial access to the Adriatic, but no port. This
+for the moment pacified Austria and averted the world-war. To whom
+the solution was due we know from the lips of German statesmen. The
+German Chancellor subsequently (April 7, 1913) told the
+Reichstag:&mdash;</p>
+<p class="blockquote">'A state of tension had for months existed
+between Austria-Hungary and Russia which was only prevented from
+developing into war by the moderation of the Powers.... Europe will
+feel grateful to the English Minister of Foreign Affairs for the
+extraordinary ability and spirit of conciliation with which he
+conducted the discussion of the Ambassadors in London, and which
+constantly enabled him to bridge over differences.'</p>
+<p>The Chancellor concluded by saying: 'We at any rate shall never
+stir up such a war'&mdash;a promise or a prophecy which has been
+singularly falsified.</p>
+<p>It is no easy matter to understand the line of conduct which
+Germany has adopted towards the great Slavonic Power on her flank.
+Since Bismarck left the helm, she has sometimes steered in the
+direction of subservience, and sometimes has displayed the most
+audacious insolence. Periodically, it is to be supposed, her rulers
+have felt that in the long run the momentum of a Russian attack
+would be irresistible; at other times, particularly after the
+Russo-Japanese War, they have treated Russia, as the Elizabethans
+treated Spain, as 'a colossus stuffed with clouts.' But rightly or
+wrongly they appear to have assumed that sooner or later there must
+come a general Armageddon, in which the central feature would be a
+duel of the Teuton with the Slav; and in German military circles
+there was undoubtedly a conviction that the epic conflict had best
+come sooner and not later. How long this idea has influenced German
+policy we do not pretend to say. But it has certainly contributed
+to her unenviable prominence in the 'race of armaments' which all
+thinking men have condemned as an insupportable, tax upon Western
+civilization, and which has aggravated all the evils that it was
+intended to avert.</p>
+<p>The beginning of the evil was perhaps due to France; but, if so,
+it was to a France which viewed with just alarm the enormous
+strides in population and wealth made by Germany since 1871. The
+'Boulanger Law' of 1886 raised the peace footing of the French army
+above 500,000 men, at a time when that of Germany was 427,000, and
+that of Russia 550,000. Bismarck replied by the comparatively
+moderate measure of adding 41,000 to the German peace establishment
+for seven years; and it is significant of the difference between
+then and now that he only carried his Bill after a dissolution of
+one Reichstag and a forcible appeal to its successor.</p>
+<p>France must soon have repented of the indiscretion to which she
+had been tempted by a military adventurer. With a population
+comparatively small and rapidly approaching the stationary phase it
+was impossible that she could long maintain such a race. In 1893
+Count Caprivi's law, carried like that of Bismarck after a stiff
+struggle with the Reichstag, raised the peace establishment to
+479,000 men. Count Caprivi at the same time reduced the period of
+compulsory service from three years to two; but while this reform
+lightened the burden on the individual conscript, it meant a great
+increase in the number of those who passed through military
+training, and an enormous increase of the war strength. The
+Franco-Russian <i>entente</i> of 1896 was a sign that France began
+to feel herself beaten in the race for supremacy and reduced to the
+defensive. In 1899 the German peace strength was raised to 495,000
+for the next six years; in 1905 to 505,000. On the second of these
+occasions the German Government justified its policy by pointing
+out that the French war strength was still superior to that of
+Germany, and would become still stronger if France should change
+the period of service from three years to two. The German law was
+announced in 1904; it had the natural effect. The French Senate not
+only passed the new law early in 1905, but also swept away the
+changes which the Lower House had introduced to lighten the burden
+of annual training upon territorial reserves. France found her
+justification in the Moroccan episode of the previous year.</p>
+<p>This was not unreasonable; but since that date France has been
+heavily punished for a step which might be taken to indicate that
+<i>Revanche</i> was still a feature of her foreign policy. Since
+1886 her utmost efforts have only succeeded in raising her peace
+establishment to 545,000 (including a body of 28,000 colonial
+troops stationed in France), and her total war strength to
+4,000,000. In the same period the peace establishment of Germany
+was raised to over 800,000, and her total war strength of fully
+trained men to something like 5,400,000. It is obvious from these
+figures that a policy of isolation has long ceased to be possible
+to France; and that an alliance with Russia has been her only
+possible method of counterbalancing the numerical superiority of
+the German army, which is certainly not less well equipped or
+organized than that of France.</p>
+<p>This Russian alliance of France has been the only step in her
+continental policy which could be challenged as tending to
+overthrow the European balance. Undoubtedly it is France's prime
+offence in German eyes; and her colonial policy has only been
+attacked as a pretext for picking a quarrel and forcing on a
+decisive trial of strength before the growth of Russian resources
+should have made her ally impregnable.</p>
+<p>Let us now look at the German military preparations from a
+German point of view. The increases of the last twenty years in
+military expenditure and in fighting strength have been openly
+discussed in the Reichstag; and the debates have usually run on the
+same lines, because the Government up to 1912 pursued a consistent
+policy, framed for some years ahead and embodied in an Army Act.
+The underlying principle of these Army Acts (1893, 1899, 1905,
+1911) was to maintain a fairly constant ratio between the peace
+strength and the population. But the war strength was
+disproportionately increased by the Caprivi Army Act of 1893, which
+reduced the period of compulsory service from three years to two.
+The hardly-veiled intention of the German War Staff was to increase
+its war resources as rapidly as was consistent with the
+long-sufferance of those who served and those who paid the bill. It
+was taken as axiomatic that an increasing population ought to be
+protected by an increasing army. National defence was of course
+alleged as the prime consideration; and if these preparations were
+really required by growing danger on the two main frontiers of
+Germany, no German could do otherwise than approve the policy, no
+foreign Power could feel itself legitimately aggrieved.</p>
+<p>Unfortunately it has been a maxim of German policy in recent
+years that national independence means the power of taking the
+aggressive in any case where national interests or
+<i>amour-propre</i> may prompt it. The increase of the German army,
+either in numbers or in technical efficiency, seems to be regularly
+followed by masterful strokes of diplomacy in which the 'mailed
+fist' is plainly shown to other continental Powers. Thus in 1909,
+at the close of a quinquennium of military re-equipment, which had
+raised her annual army budget from &pound;27,000,000 to
+&pound;41,000,000, Germany countenanced the Austrian annexation of
+Bosnia and the Herzegovina, and plainly told the authorities at St.
+Petersburg that any military action against Austria would bring
+Russia into a state of war with Germany. It was a startling step;
+<i>radix malorum</i> we may call it, so far as the later
+development of the continental situation is concerned. Russia
+withdrew from the impending conflict in 1909, but it is improbable
+that she has ever forgiven the matter or the manner of the German
+ultimatum.</p>
+<p>In 1911 followed the episode of Agadir, which was clearly an
+attempt to 'force a quarrel on France.' But in 1911 Germany
+realized that her military calculations had been insufficient, if
+she wished to continue these unamiable diplomatic manners. It was
+not a question of self-preservation; it was a question, as the
+German Chancellor told the Reichstag, of showing the world that
+'Germany was firmly resolved not to be pushed aside.' Hence the
+sensational Army Bill of 1912, necessitated, as the Government told
+the Reichstag, by the events of 1911. The Russian peril could
+hardly be described as imminent. The Prussian Minister of War said
+publicly in 1911 that 'there was no Government which either desired
+or was seeking to bring about a war with Germany.' Russia had
+recently taken steps which, at Berlin, perhaps, were read as signs
+of weakness, but elsewhere were hailed as proofs of her desire for
+general peace. M. Isvolsky, the supposed champion of Balkan ideals,
+had retired from office; his successor, M. Sazonof, had accompanied
+the Czar to the Potsdam interview (1910); the outstanding disputes
+of Germany and Russia over their Persian interests had been settled
+by agreement in 1911.</p>
+<p>But the German Army Bill of 1912 was followed by Russia's
+intervention in the Balkans to secure for Servia at least
+commercial access to the Adriatic. This compromise, ostensibly
+promoted and belauded by German statesmanship, only increased the
+determination of the German Government to 'hold the ring' in the
+Balkans, to claim for Austria the right of settling her own
+differences with Servia as she would, and to deny Russia any
+interest in the matter. In 1913 came the supreme effort of the
+German General Staff: an Army Act for raising the peace strength by
+instalments until it reached 870,000, and for the eventual
+provision of a war strength of 5,400,000 men. This enormous
+increase was recommended 'by the unanimous judgement of the
+military authorities' as being 'necessary to secure the future of
+Germany.' The Chancellor warned the Reichstag that, although
+relations were friendly with Russia, they had to face the
+possibilities involved in the Pan-Slavist movement; while in Russia
+itself they had to reckon with a marvellous economic development
+and an unprecedented reorganization of the army. There was also a
+reference to the new law for a return to three years' service which
+France was introducing to improve the efficiency of her peace
+establishment. But it was obvious that Russia was the main
+preoccupation. Germany had forced the pace both in the
+aggrandizement of her military strength and in the methods of her
+diplomatic intercourse. Suddenly she found herself on the brink of
+an abyss. She had gone too far; she had provoked into the
+competition of armaments a Power as far superior to Germany in her
+reserves of men as Germany thought herself superior to France. It
+was not too late for Germany to pause. On her future behaviour
+towards other Powers it depended whether the Bill of 1913 should be
+taken as an insurance against risks, or as a challenge to all
+possible opponents.</p>
+<p>The other Powers shaped their policy in accordance with
+Germany's example. In France, on March 4, the Supreme Council of
+War, having learned the outline of the German programme, decided to
+increase the effective fighting force by a return to the rule of
+three years' service. Before the German Bill had passed (June 30),
+the French Prime Minister announced (May 15) that he would of his
+own authority keep with the colours those who were completing their
+second year's service in the autumn. The French Army Bill, when
+finally passed (July 16), lowered the age limit for commencing
+service from twenty-one to twenty, and brought the new rule into
+force at once. A few weeks earlier (June 20) Belgium introduced
+universal military service in place of her former lenient system.
+In Russia a secret session of the Duma was held (July 8) to pass a
+new Army Budget, and the term of service was raised from three to
+three and a quarter years. Austria alone provided for no great
+increase in the numerical strength of her army; but budgeted
+(October 30) for extraordinary naval and military expenditure, to
+the extent of &pound;28,000,000, to be incurred in the first six
+months of 1914. Thus on all sides the alarm was raised, and special
+preparations were put in hand, long before the crisis of 1914
+actually arrived. It was Germany that had sounded the tocsin; and
+it is difficult to believe that some startling <i>coup</i> was not
+even then being planned by the leaders of her military party.</p>
+<p>We have been told that, whatever the appearance of things might
+be, it was Russia who drove Germany to the extraordinary
+preparations of 1913; that Germany was arming simply in
+self-defence against a Slavonic Crusade. What are the facts?
+Economically Russia, as a state, is in a stronger position than the
+German Empire. In 1912 we were told that for the past five years
+the revenue of Russia had exceeded expenditure by an average sum of
+&pound;20,000,000 per annum. The revenue of Russia in 1913 was over
+&pound;324,000,000; she has budgeted for &pound;78,000,000 of
+military expenditure in 1914, of which some &pound;15,000,000 is
+emergency expenditure. The total revenue of the German Empire in
+1913 was &pound;184,000,000; she has budgeted for a military
+expenditure in 1914 of &pound;60,000,000. To adopt the usual German
+tests of comparison, Russia has a population of 173 millions to be
+defended on three land-frontiers, while Germany has a population of
+65 millions to be defended on only two. The military efforts of
+Russia, therefore, have been made on a scale relatively smaller
+than those of Germany.</p>
+<p>We must, however, add some further considerations which have
+been urged by German military critics; the alleged facts we cannot
+test, but we state them for what they may be worth. The
+reorganization of the Russian army in recent years has resulted, so
+we are told, in the grouping of enormously increased forces upon
+the western frontier. The western fortresses also have been
+equipped on an unparalleled scale. New roads and railways have been
+constructed to accelerate the mobilization of the war strength;
+and, above all, strategic railways have been pushed towards the
+western frontier. Thus, it is argued, Russia has in effect gone
+behind the Potsdam Agreement of 1910, by which she withdrew her
+armies to a fixed distance behind the Russo-German frontier. We
+confess that, in all this, while there may have been cause for
+watchfulness on the part of Germany, we can see no valid cause for
+war, nothing that of necessity implies more than an intention, on
+the part of Russia, not to be brow-beaten in the future as she was
+in 1909 and 1912.</p>
+<p>These military developments did not escape English notice. They
+excited endless speculation about the great war of the future, and
+the part which this country might be asked to bear in it. Few,
+however, seriously supposed that we should commit ourselves to a
+share in the fighting upon land. The problem most usually discussed
+in this connexion was that of preparation to resist a sudden
+invasion from abroad. Was it possible to avoid compulsory service?
+Was the Territorial Force large enough and efficient enough to
+defend the country if the Expeditionary Force had gone abroad?
+Great Britain was infinitely better equipped for land warfare in
+August, 1914, than she had ever been in the nineteenth century. But
+her Expeditionary Force was a recent creation, and had been planned
+for the defence of India and the Colonies. In practice the country
+had clung to the 'Blue Water' policy, of trusting the national
+fortunes entirely to the Navy. The orthodox theory was that so long
+as the Navy was kept at the 'Two Power' standard, no considerable
+invasion of the British Isles was possible.</p>
+<p>But from 1898 the programmes of the German Navy Laws constituted
+a growing menace to the 'Two Power' standard, which had been laid
+down as our official principle in 1889, when France and Russia were
+our chief European rivals at sea. That France or Russia would
+combine with Germany to challenge our naval supremacy was
+improbable; but other states were beginning to build on a larger
+scale, and this multiplied the possible number of hostile
+combinations. That Germany should wish for a strong fleet was only
+natural. It was needed to defend her foreign trade, her colonial
+interests, and her own seaports. That Germany should lay down a
+definite programme for six years ahead, and that the programme
+should become more extensive at each revision, was no necessary
+proof of malice. But this country received a shock in 1900, when
+the programme of 1898 was unexpectedly and drastically revised, so
+that the German Navy was practically doubled. England was at that
+moment involved in the South African War, and it was hard to see
+against whom the new fleet could be used, if not against England.
+This was pointed out from time to time by the Socialist opposition
+in the Reichstag. The orthodox official reply was that Germany must
+be so strong at sea that the strongest naval Power should not be
+able to challenge her with any confidence. But the feeling of the
+semi-official Navy League was known to be violently hostile to
+England; and it was obvious that the German navy owed its
+popularity to the alarmist propaganda of that league.</p>
+<p>It was impossible for English statesmen to avoid the suspicion
+that, on the sea as on land, the Germans meant by liberty the right
+to unlimited self-assertion. Common prudence dictated close
+attention to the German Navy Laws; especially as they proved
+capable of unexpected acceleration. The 'Two Power' standard, under
+the stress of German competition, became increasingly difficult to
+maintain, and English Liberals were inclined to denounce it as
+wasteful of money. But, when a Liberal Government tried the
+experiment of economizing on the Navy (1906-8), there was no
+corresponding reduction in the German programme. The German Naval
+Law of 1906 raised the amount of the naval estimates by one-third;
+and German ministers blandly waved aside as impracticable a
+proposal for a mutual limitation of armaments.</p>
+<p>In 1909 this country discovered that in capital
+ships&mdash;which now began to be considered the decisive factor in
+naval warfare&mdash;Germany would actually be the superior by 1914
+unless special measures were taken. The British Government was
+awakened to the new situation (it arose from the German Naval Law
+of 1908), and returned unwillingly to the path of increasing
+expenditure. The Prime Minister said that we regretted the race in
+naval expenditure and were not animated by anti-German feeling; but
+we could not afford to let our supremacy at sea be imperilled,
+since our national security depended on it (March 16, 1909). The
+'Two Power' standard was dropped, and the Triple Alliance became
+the object of special attention at the Admiralty. The First Lord
+said on March 13, 1911, that we should make our navy superior to
+any foreign navy and to any <i>probable</i> combination which we
+might have to meet single-handed. In practice this meant a policy
+of developing, in the matter of Dreadnoughts, a superiority of
+sixty per cent, over the German navy; this, it was officially
+explained in 1912, had been for some years past the actual
+Admiralty standard of new construction (Mr. Winston Churchill,
+March 18, 1912).</p>
+<p>But even this programme had to be stiffened when the year 1912
+saw a new German Navy Bill which involved an increased expenditure
+of &pound;1,000,000 annually for six years, and had the effect of
+putting nearly four-fifths of the German navy in a position of
+immediate readiness for war. Earlier in the year the British
+Government had announced that, if the German policy of construction
+were accelerated, we should add to our programme double the number
+which Germany put in hand; but if Germany relaxed her preparations
+we should make a fully proportionate reduction. The German Bill
+came as an answer to this declaration; and it was followed in this
+country by supplementary estimates on naval account, amounting to
+nearly a million pounds; and this was announced to be 'the first
+and smallest instalment of the extra expenditure entailed by the
+new German law.' The new British policy was maintained in 1913 and
+in 1914, though in 1913 the First Lord of the Admiralty made a
+public offer of a 'naval holiday,' a suspension of new construction
+by mutual consent. The Imperial Chancellor responded only by
+suggesting that the proposal was entirely unofficial, by asking for
+concrete proposals, and by saying that the idea constituted a great
+progress; and his naval estimates in 1913 were half a million
+higher than those of 1912.</p>
+<p>From these facts, viewed in their chronological order, it is
+clear that on sea as on land Germany has set the pace. Thirty years
+ago the German navy did not enter into England's naval
+calculations. For the last six years, if not for a longer period,
+it has been the one navy which our Admiralty felt the necessity of
+watching from year to year, and indeed from month to month. It is
+the first time for more than a hundred years that we have had to
+face the problem of 'a powerful homogeneous navy under one
+government and concentrated within easy distance of our
+shores.'</p>
+<p>On German principles we should long ago have adopted the
+'offensive-defensive.' We have been at least as seriously menaced
+by Germany at sea as Germany has been menaced by Russia upon land.
+But we can confidently say that in the period of rivalry our fleet
+has never been used as a threat, or turned to the purposes of an
+aggressive colonial policy. Rightly or wrongly, we have refused to
+make possible intentions a case for an ultimatum. We have held by
+the position that only a breach of public law would justify us in
+abandoning our efforts for the peace of Europe.</p>
+<hr />
+<a name="ch2note" id="ch2note"></a>
+<h3>NOTE</h3>
+<p><i>Abstract of Anglo-French Agreement on Morocco</i>.</p>
+<p>In April, 1904, England and France concluded an agreement for
+the delimitation of their interests on the Mediterranean littoral
+of North Africa. The agreement included five secret Articles which
+were not published until November, 1911. The purport of the
+Articles which were published at the time was as follows. By the
+first Article England stated that she had not the intention of
+changing the political state of Egypt; and France declared that she
+would not impede the action of England in Egypt by demanding that a
+term should be fixed for the British occupation or in any other
+way. By the second Article France declared that she had not the
+intention of changing the political state of Morocco; and England
+recognized that it appertained to France, as the Power conterminous
+with Morocco, to watch the tranquillity of this country and to
+assist it in all administrative, economic, financial, and military
+reforms which it required, France promised to respect the customary
+and treaty rights of England in Morocco; and by the third Article
+England made a corresponding promise to France in respect of Egypt.
+By the fourth Article the two Governments undertook to maintain
+'the principle of commercial liberty' in Egypt and Morocco, by not
+lending themselves in either country to inequality in the
+establishment of Customs-duties or of other taxes or of railway
+rates. The sixth and seventh Articles were inserted to ensure the
+free passage of the Suez Canal and of the Straits of Gibraltar. The
+eighth declared that both Governments took into friendly
+consideration the interests of Spain in Morocco, and that France
+would make some arrangements with the Spanish Monarchy. The ninth
+Article declared that each Government would lend its diplomatic
+support to the other in executing the clauses relative to Egypt and
+Morocco.[<a href="#note-21">21</a>] Of the secret Articles two
+(Nos. 3 and 4) related to Spain, defining the territory which she
+was to receive 'whenever the Sultan ceases to exercise authority
+over it,' and providing that the Anglo-French agreement would hold
+good even if Spain declined this arrangement. Article 1 stipulated
+that, if either Government found itself constrained, by the force
+of circumstances, to modify its policy in respect to Egypt or
+Morocco, nevertheless the fourth, sixth, and seventh Articles of
+the public declaration would remain intact; that is, each would
+under all circumstances maintain the principle of 'commercial
+liberty,' and would permit the free passage of the Suez Canal and
+the Straits of Gibraltar. In Article 2 England, while disclaiming
+any intention to alter the system of Capitulations or the judicial
+organization of Egypt, reserved the right to reform the Egyptian
+legislative system on the model of other civilized countries; and
+France agreed on condition that she should not be impeded from
+making similar reforms in Morocco. The fifth Article related to the
+Egyptian national debt.</p>
+<p>Notes:</p>
+<p><a name="note-10" id="note-10">
+<!-- Note Anchor 10 --></a>[Footnote 10: Quoted from Headlam's
+<i>Bismarck</i>, p. 444.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-11" id="note-11">
+<!-- Note Anchor 11 --></a>[Footnote 11: <i>Correspondence
+respecting the European Crisis</i> (Cd. 7467), No. 85. Sir E.
+Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 29, 1914. See <i>infra</i>, <a href=
+"#RULE4_3">Appendix II</a>.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-12" id="note-12">
+<!-- Note Anchor 12 --></a>[Footnote 12: For these agreements see
+<i>The Times</i>, April 12, 1904, and November 25, 1911. See
+<a href="#ch2note">note</a> at end of this chapter.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-13" id="note-13">
+<!-- Note Anchor 13 --></a>[Footnote 13: White Paper, Morocco No. 1
+(1906).]</p>
+<p><a name="note-14" id="note-14">
+<!-- Note Anchor 14 --></a>[Footnote 14: <i>Correspondence</i>, No.
+105 (Enclosure 1). Sir E. Grey to M. Cambon, November 22, 1912. See
+<a href="#RULE4_3">Appendix II</a>.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-15" id="note-15">
+<!-- Note Anchor 15 --></a>[Footnote 15: <i>Correspondence</i>, No.
+87. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, July 29, 1914.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-16" id="note-16">
+<!-- Note Anchor 16 --></a>[Footnote 16: <i>Times</i>, July 7,
+1911.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-17" id="note-17">
+<!-- Note Anchor 17 --></a>[Footnote 17: <i>Times</i>, July 27,
+1911.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-18" id="note-18">
+<!-- Note Anchor 18 --></a>[Footnote 18: <i>Times</i>, July 22,
+1911.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-19" id="note-19">
+<!-- Note Anchor 19 --></a>[Footnote 19: <i>Correspondence</i>, p.
+57 (Enclosure 1 in No. 105). See <a href="#RULE4_3">Appendix
+II</a>.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-20" id="note-20">
+<!-- Note Anchor 20 --></a>[Footnote 20: <i>Ibid</i>. p. 57
+(Enclosure 2 in No. 105).]</p>
+<p><a name="note-21" id="note-21">
+<!-- Note Anchor 21 --></a>[Footnote 21: <i>Times</i>, April 12,
+1904.]</p>
+<hr />
+<a name="CH3" id="CH3"><!-- CH3 --></a>
+<h2>CHAPTER III</h2>
+<center>THE DEVELOPMENT OF RUSSIAN POLICY</center>
+<p>Until the year 1890 Russia and Germany had been in close touch.
+Dynastic connexions united the two imperial houses; and the common
+policy of repression of Polish nationality&mdash;the fatal legacy
+of the days of Frederic the Great and Catharine II&mdash;united the
+two empires. National sentiment in Russia was, however, always
+anti-German; and as early as 1885 Balkan affairs began to draw the
+Russian Government away from Germany. In 1890 Bismarck fell; and
+under William II German policy left the Russian connexion, and in
+close touch with Austria embarked on Balkan adventures which ran
+counter to Russian aims, while Russia on her side turned to new
+allies.</p>
+<p>The new direction of Russian policy, which has brought the aims
+of the Russian Government into close accord with the desires of
+national Slav sentiment, was determined by Balkan conditions.
+Bismarck had cherished no Balkan ambitions: he had been content to
+play the part of an 'honest broker' at the Congress of Berlin, and
+he had spoken of the Bulgarian affair of 1885 as 'not worth the
+bones of a Pomeranian grenadier.' William II apparently thought
+otherwise. At any rate Germany seems to have conducted, for many
+years past, a policy of establishing her influence, along with that
+of Austria, through South-Eastern Europe. And it is this policy
+which is the <i>fons et origo</i> of the present struggle; for it
+is a policy which is not and cannot be tolerated by Russia, so long
+as Russia is true to her own Slav blood and to the traditions of
+centuries.</p>
+<a name="occupation" id="occupation"></a>
+<p>After Austria had finally lost Italy, as she did in 1866, she
+turned for compensation to the Balkans. If Venetia was lost, it
+seemed some recompense when in 1878 Austria occupied Bosnia and the
+Herzegovina. Hence she could expand southwards&mdash;ultimately
+perhaps to Salonica. Servia, which might have objected, was a
+vassal kingdom, the prot&eacute;g&eacute; of Austria, under the
+dynasty of the Obrenovitch. As Austria might hope to follow the
+line to Salonica,[<a href="#note-22">22</a>] so Germany, before the
+end of the nineteenth century, seems to have conceived of a
+parallel line of penetration, which would carry her influence
+through Constantinople, through Konieh, to Bagdad. She has extended
+her political and economic influence among the small Slav states
+and in Turkey. In 1898 the King of Roumania (a Hohenzollern by
+descent) conceded direct communication through his territories
+between Berlin and Constantinople: in 1899 a German company
+obtained a concession for the Bagdad railway from Konieh to the
+head of the Persian Gulf. In a word, Germany began to stand in the
+way of the Russian traditions of ousting the Turk and ruling in
+Constantinople: she began to buttress the Turk, to train his army,
+to exploit his country, and to seek to oust Russia generally from
+South-Eastern Europe.</p>
+<p>In 1903 the progress of Austria and Germany received a check. A
+blood-stained revolution at Belgrade ousted the pro-Austrian
+Obrenovitch, and put in its place the rival family of the
+Karageorgevitch. Under the new dynasty Servia escaped from Austrian
+tutelage, and became an independent focus of Slav life in close
+touch with Russia. The change was illustrated in 1908, when Austria
+took advantage of the revolution in Turkey, led by the Young Turks,
+to annex formally the occupied territories of Bosnia and the
+Herzegovina. Servia, which had hoped to gain these territories,
+once a part of the old Servian kingdom, was mortally offended, and
+would have gone to war with Austria, if Russia, her champion under
+the new dynasty, could only have given her support. But Russia,
+still weak after the Japanese war, could not do so; Russia, on the
+contrary, had to suffer the humiliation of giving a pledge to the
+Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg that she would not support
+Servia. That humiliation Russia has not forgotten. She has saved
+money, she has reorganized her army, she has done everything in her
+power to gain security for the future. And now that Austria has
+sought utterly to humiliate Servia on the unproved charge
+(unproved, in the sense that no legal proof was offered)[<a href=
+"#note-23">23</a>] of complicity in the murder of the Archduke
+Franz Ferdinand and his wife, Russia has risked war rather than
+surrender her protection of a Slav kingdom. Slav sentiment
+imperatively demanded action in favour of Servia: no government
+could refuse to listen to the demand. The stake for Russia is not
+merely the integrity of Servia: it is her prestige among the Slav
+peoples, of which she is head; and behind all lies the question
+whether South-Eastern Europe shall be under Teutonic control, and
+lost to Russian influence.</p>
+<p>Germany has not only threatened Slav life in South-Eastern
+Europe: she has irritated Slav feeling on her own Eastern frontier.
+The vitality and the increase of the Slavs in Eastern Germany has
+excited deep German alarm. The German Government has therefore of
+late years pursued a policy of repression towards its own Slav
+subjects, the Poles, forbidding the use of the Polish language, and
+expropriating Polish landowners in order to plant a German garrison
+in the East. Teutonism is really alarmed at the superior birth-rate
+and physical vigour of the Slavs; but Russia has not loved Teutonic
+policy, and there has been an extensive boycott of German goods in
+Russian Poland. The promise made by the Tsar, since the beginning
+of the war, that he would re-create the old Poland, and give it
+autonomy, shows how far Russia has travelled from the days, not so
+far distant in point of time, when it was her policy to repress the
+Poles in conjunction with Germany; and it has made the breach
+between Germany and Russia final and irreparable.</p>
+<p>It is thus obvious that Germany is vitally opposed to the great
+Slav Empire in South-Eastern Europe and on her own eastern borders.
+But why, it may be asked, should Russian policy be linked with
+English? Is there any bond of union except the negative bond of
+common opposition to Germany? There is. For one thing England and
+Russia have sought to pursue a common cause&mdash;that of
+international arbitration and of disarmament. If neither has
+succeeded, it has been something of a bond between the two that
+both have attempted to succeed. But there are other and more vital
+factors. England, which in 1854-6 opposed and fought Russia for the
+sake of the integrity of Turkey, has no wish to fight Russia for
+the sake of a Germanized Turkey. On the contrary, the interest of
+England in maintaining independence in the South-East of Europe now
+coincides with that of Russia. Above all, the new constitutional
+Russia of the Duma is Anglophil.</p>
+<p class="blockquote">'The political ideals both of Cadets and
+Octobrists were learnt chiefly from England, the study of whose
+constitutional history had aroused in Russia an enthusiasm hardly
+intelligible to a present-day Englishman. All three Dumas ... were
+remarkably friendly to England, and England supplied the staple of
+the precedents and parallels for quotation.'[<a href=
+"#note-24">24</a>]</p>
+<p>In a word, the beginnings of Russian constitutionalism not only
+coincided in time with the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907, but
+owed much to the inspiration of England.</p>
+<p>Notes:</p>
+<p><a name="note-22" id="note-22">
+<!-- Note Anchor 22 --></a>[Footnote 22: Count Aehrenthal, foreign
+minister of Austria (1906-1912), started the scheme of the Novi
+Bazar railway to connect the railways of Bosnia with the (then)
+Turkish line to Salonica. See also <i>Correspondence</i>, No. 19,
+Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey, July 25: 'There is reliable information
+that Austria intends to seize the Salonica railway.']</p>
+<p><a name="note-23" id="note-23">
+<!-- Note Anchor 23 --></a>[Footnote 23: For a summary of so-called
+proofs, see <a href="#RULE4_5">Appendix IV</a>, <i>infra</i>.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-24" id="note-24">
+<!-- Note Anchor 24 --></a>[Footnote 24: <i>Camb. Mod. Hist</i>.
+xii. 379.]</p>
+<hr />
+<a name="CH4" id="CH4"><!-- CH4 --></a>
+<h2>CHAPTER IV</h2>
+<center>CHRONOLOGICAL SKETCH OF THE CRISIS</center>
+<p>The following sketch of events from June 28 to August 4, 1914,
+is merely intended as an introduction to the analytical and far
+more detailed account of the negotiations and declarations of those
+days which the reader will find below (<a href="#CH5">Chap. V</a>).
+Here we confine the narrative to a plain statement of the
+successive stages in the crisis, neither discussing the motives of
+the several Powers involved, nor distinguishing the fine shades of
+difference in the various proposals which were made by would-be
+mediators.</p>
+<p>The crisis of 1914 began with an unforeseen development in the
+old quarrel of Austria-Hungary and Russia over the Servian
+question. On June 28 the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir-apparent of
+the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and his wife, the Duchess of
+Hohenberg, paid a visit of ceremony to the town of Serajevo, in
+Bosnia, the administrative centre of the Austrian provinces of
+Bosnia and the Herzegovina. In entering the town, the Archduke and
+the Duchess narrowly escaped being killed by a bomb which was
+thrown at their carriage. Later in the day they were shot by
+assassins armed with Browning pistols. The crime was apparently
+planned by political conspirators who resented the Austrian
+annexation of Bosnia and the Herzegovina (<i>supra</i>, <a href=
+"#occupation">p. 54</a>), and who desired that these provinces
+should be united to Servia.</p>
+<p>The Austrian Government, having instituted an inquiry, came to
+the conclusion that the bombs of the conspirators had been obtained
+from a Servian arsenal; that the crime had been planned in
+Belgrade, the Servian capital, with the help of a Servian
+staff-officer who provided the pistols; that the criminals and
+their weapons had been conveyed from Servia into Bosnia by officers
+of Servian frontier-posts and by Servian customs-officials. At the
+moment the Austrian Government published no proof of these
+conclusions,[<a href="#note-25">25</a>] but, on July 23, forwarded
+them to the Servian Government in a formal note containing certain
+demands which, it was intimated, must be satisfactorily answered by
+Servia within forty-eight hours.[<a href="#note-26">26</a>] This
+ultimatum included a form of apology to be published on a specified
+date by the Servian Government, and ten engagements which the
+Servian Government were to give the Austro-Hungarian Government.
+The extraordinary nature of some of these engagements is explained
+in the <a href="#CH5">next chapter</a> (pp. 103-7).</p>
+<p>On July 24 this note was communicated by Austria-Hungary to the
+other Powers of Europe,[<a href="#note-27">27</a>] and on July 25
+it was published in a German paper, the <i>Norddeutsche Allgemeine
+Zeitung</i>. It was therefore intended to be a public warning to
+Servia. On July 24 the German Government told the Powers that it
+approved the Austrian note, as being necessitated by the
+'Great-Servian' propaganda, which aimed at the incorporation in the
+Servian monarchy of the southern Slav provinces belonging to
+Austria-Hungary; that Austria, if she wished to remain a Great
+Power, could not avoid pressing the demands contained in the note,
+even, if necessary, by military measures; and that the question was
+one which concerned no Powers except Austria-Hungary and
+Servia.[<a href="#note-28">28</a>]</p>
+<p>Russia did not agree that the Austrian note was directed against
+Servia alone. On July 24 the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs
+told the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg that Austria's
+conduct was provocative and immoral; that some of her demands were
+impossible of acceptance; that Austria would never have taken such
+action unless Germany had first been consulted; that if Austria
+began military measures against Servia, Russia would probably
+mobilize. The Russian Minister hoped that England would proclaim
+its solidarity with France and Russia on the subject of the
+Austrian note; doubtless Servia could accept some of the Austrian
+demands.[<a href="#note-29">29</a>] To the Austro-Hungarian
+Government the Russian Minister sent a message, on the same day,
+July 24, that the time-limit allowed to Servia for her reply was
+quite insufficient, if the Powers were to help in smoothing the
+situation; and he urged that Austria-Hungary should publish the
+proofs of the charges against Servia.[<a href="#note-30">30</a>] On
+July 25 Russia told England[<a href="#note-31">31</a>] that Servia
+would punish those proved to be guilty, but would not accept all
+the demands of Austria; that no independent state could do so. If
+Servia appealed to arbitration, as seemed possible, Russia was, she
+said, prepared to leave the arbitration in the hands of England,
+France, Germany, and Italy&mdash;the four Powers whom Sir Edward
+Grey had suggested as possible mediators.</p>
+<p>On the day on which Russia made this suggestion, July 25, the
+Servian Government replied to the Austrian note, conceding part of
+the Austrian demands, and announcing its readiness to accept, on
+the other points, the arbitration of the Hague Tribunal or of the
+Great Powers. The Austrian Government found the Servian note
+unsatisfactory, and criticized its details in an official
+memorandum.[<a href="#note-32">32</a>] The Austro-Hungarian
+Minister left Belgrade on July 25; on July 26 a part of the
+Austro-Hungarian army was mobilized; and on July 28 Austria-Hungary
+declared war on Servia.</p>
+<p>Sir Edward Grey had from the first declined to 'announce
+England's solidarity' with Russia and France on the Servian
+question. On and after July 26 he was taking active steps to bring
+about the mediation, between Austria-Hungary and Servia, of four
+Powers (Italy, Germany, France, England). To this mediation Russia
+had already agreed, July 25; and Italy and France were ready to
+co-operate with England.[<a href="#note-33">33</a>] Germany,
+however, made difficulties on the ground that anything like formal
+intervention would be impracticable, unless both Austria and Russia
+consented to it.[<a href="#note-34">34</a>] Russia had already
+(July 25) prepared the ukase ordering mobilization,[<a href=
+"#note-35">35</a>] but had not yet issued it; on July 27 the
+Russian Foreign Minister announced his readiness to make the
+Servian question the subject of direct conversations with
+Vienna.[<a href="#note-36">36</a>] This offer was at first declined
+by the Austro-Hungarian Government, but subsequently accepted; and
+conversations were actually in progress between the representatives
+of the two Powers as late as August 1.[<a href=
+"#note-37">37</a>]</p>
+<p>No doubt the hesitation of Austria was due to the fact that, on
+July 28, the Russian Government warned Germany of the mobilization
+of the southern military districts of Russia, to be publicly
+proclaimed on July 29.[<a href="#note-38">38</a>] Austria replied
+to this intimation by offering assurances that she would respect
+the integrity and independence of Servia;[<a href=
+"#note-39">39</a>] these assurances, considered inadequate by the
+Russian Government, seem to have been the subject of the last
+conversations between Russia and Austria-Hungary.</p>
+<p>Russia persisted that Germany was the real obstacle to a
+friendly settlement; and this conviction was not affected by the
+appeals for peace which the Kaiser telegraphed to the Tsar on July
+28, July 29, and July 31.[<a href="#note-40">40</a>] On July 29
+Germany told England that the Russian mobilization was alarming,
+and that France was also making military preparations;[<a href=
+"#note-41">41</a>] at the same time Germany threatened to proclaim
+'imminent state of war' (<i>drohende Kriegsgefahr</i>) as a counter
+measure to the French preparations;[<a href="#note-42">42</a>]
+German military preparations, by July 30, had in fact gone far
+beyond the preliminary stage which she thus indicated.[<a href=
+"#note-43">43</a>] Germany had already warned England, France, and
+Russia that, if Russia mobilized, this would mean German
+mobilization against both France and Russia.[<a href=
+"#note-44">44</a>] But on July 27, Russia had explained that her
+mobilization would in no sense be directed against Germany, and
+would only take place if Austrian forces crossed the Servian
+frontier.[<a href="#note-45">45</a>] On July 29, the day on which
+Russia actually mobilized the southern districts, Russia once more
+asked Germany to participate in the 'quadruple conference' now
+proposed by England, for the purpose of mediating between Austria
+and Servia. This proposal was declined by the German Ambassador at
+St. Petersburg.[<a href="#note-46">46</a>] Germany in fact
+believed, or professed to believe, that the Russian mobilization,
+though not proclaimed, was already far advanced.[<a href=
+"#note-47">47</a>]</p>
+<p>On July 30 Austria, although her conversations with Russia were
+still in progress, began the bombardment of Belgrade. The next day,
+July 31, Russia ordered general mobilization; on August 1 France
+and Germany each took the like step; Germany presented an ultimatum
+to Russia, demanding that Russian mobilization should cease, and
+another ultimatum to France asking what course she would take in
+the event of war between Germany and Russia.</p>
+<p>Before these decisive steps of July 30-August 1, and while Sir
+Edward Grey was still engaged in efforts of mediation, Germany made
+overtures to England, with the object of securing England's
+neutrality in the event of a war between Germany and France. On
+July 29 Germany offered, as the price of English neutrality, to
+give assurances that, if victorious, she would make no territorial
+acquisitions at the expense of France; but refused to give a
+similar assurance respecting French colonies, or to promise to
+respect Belgian neutrality.[<a href="#note-48">48</a>] These
+proposals were refused by England on July 30.[<a href=
+"#note-49">49</a>] On August 1 the German Ambassador unofficially
+asked England to remain neutral on condition that Germany would not
+violate Belgian neutrality. Sir Edward Grey replied that England's
+hands were still free, and that he could not promise neutrality on
+that condition alone.[<a href="#note-50">50</a>]</p>
+<p>Meanwhile, on July 30, Sir Edward Grey was told by France that
+she would not remain neutral in a war between Germany and
+Russia.[<a href="#note-51">51</a>] On July 31 the English Cabinet,
+being asked by France to declare definitely on her side, replied
+that England could give no pledge at present.[<a href=
+"#note-52">52</a>] On the same day England asked France and Germany
+to engage to respect Belgian neutrality. France assented, Germany
+evaded giving a reply.[<a href="#note-53">53</a>] But, on August 2,
+German forces entered the neutral state of Luxemburg; and England
+promised to defend the French coasts and shipping if attacked by
+the German fleet in the Channel, or through the North Sea.[<a href=
+"#note-54">54</a>] On August 4 the King of the Belgians telegraphed
+to King George announcing that Germany had demanded passage for her
+troops through Belgian territory, and appealing to England for
+help.[<a href="#note-55">55</a>] On the same day, August 4, England
+sent an ultimatum to Germany asking for assurance, before midnight,
+that Germany would respect Belgian neutrality.[<a href=
+"#note-56">56</a>] This demand was taken at Berlin as equivalent to
+a declaration of war by England against Germany.</p>
+<center>DIARY OF THE EVENTS LEADING TO THE WAR</center>
+<p>June 28. Assassination at Sarajevo of the Archduke Franz
+Ferdinand and the Duchess of Hohenberg.</p>
+<p>July 6. The Kaiser leaves Kiel for a cruise in Northern
+waters.</p>
+<p>July 9. Results of Austro-Hungarian investigation into the
+Servian crime laid before the Emperor.</p>
+<p>July 13, 14. Serious disclosures about condition of French
+army.</p>
+<p>July 13, 14, 15, 16. Heavy selling of Canadian Pacific Railway
+Shares, especially by Berlin operators.</p>
+<p>July 16. Count Tisza, the Hungarian Premier, speaking in the
+Hungarian Chamber, describes war as a sad <i>ultima ratio</i>, 'but
+every state and nation must be able and willing to make war if it
+wishes to exist as a state and a nation.'</p>
+<p>The <i>Times</i> leading article 'Austria-Hungary and Servia' is
+commented on in Berlin as an 'English warning to Servia.'</p>
+<p>July 19. The King summons a conference to discuss the Home-Rule
+problem.</p>
+<p>July 21. The <i>Frankfurter Zeitung</i> warns Austria-Hungary of
+the folly of its campaign against Servia.</p>
+<p>July 23. Thursday. Austria presents her Note to Servia giving
+her 48 hours in which to accept.</p>
+<p>July 24. Friday. Russian Cabinet Council held. The
+Austro-Hungarian demands considered as an indirect challenge to
+Russia.&mdash;Strike at St. Petersburg.</p>
+<p>Failure of the conference on Home Rule.</p>
+<p>July 25. Saturday. Servian reply; considered unsatisfactory by
+Austria-Hungary, whose Minister and Legation-staff leave
+Belgrade.</p>
+<p>Russian Ambassador at Vienna instructed to request extension of
+time-limit allowed to Servia.</p>
+<p>Sir E. Grey suggests that the four other Powers should mediate
+at Vienna and St. Petersburg.&mdash;Serious riot in Dublin.</p>
+<p>July 26. Sunday. Sir E. Grey proposes that the French, Italian,
+and German Ambassadors should meet him in conference immediately
+for the purpose of discovering an issue which would prevent
+complications.</p>
+<p>Partial mobilization of Austro-Hungarian army ordered.</p>
+<p>Russian Foreign Minister warns German Ambassador that Russia
+cannot remain indifferent to the fate of Servia.</p>
+<p>Sir E. Goschen says the Kaiser is returning to-night.</p>
+<p>July 27. Monday. France and Italy accept proposal of a
+conference. German Secretary of State refuses the proposal of a
+'conference.'</p>
+<p>Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs proposes direct
+conversation between Vienna and St. Petersburg.</p>
+<p>British Fleet kept assembled after manoeuvres.</p>
+<p>Sir E. Grey in the House of Commons makes a statement concerning
+the attitude of Great Britain.</p>
+<p>The <i>Times</i> Berlin correspondent reports that the Kaiser
+returned this afternoon from Kiel to Potsdam.</p>
+<p>July 28. Tuesday. Austria-Hungary declares war on Servia.</p>
+<p>Russia says the key of the situation is to be found at
+Berlin.</p>
+<p>Austria declines any suggestion of negotiations on basis of the
+Servian reply.</p>
+<p>The Kaiser telegraphs to the Tsar.</p>
+<p>July 29. Wednesday. Russian mobilization in the four military
+districts of Odessa, Kiev, Moscow, and Kazan.</p>
+<p>Germany offers, in return for British neutrality, to promise
+territorial integrity of France, but will not extend the same
+assurance for French colonies.</p>
+<p>Sir E. Grey warns the German Ambassador that we should not
+necessarily stand aside, if all the efforts to maintain the peace
+failed.</p>
+<p>Austria at last realizes that Russia will not remain
+indifferent.</p>
+<p>The Tsar telegraphs to the Kaiser; the latter replies.</p>
+<p>July 30. Thursday. Bombardment of Belgrade by Austro-Hungarian
+forces.</p>
+<p>The Prime Minister speaks in the House of Commons on the gravity
+of the situation, and postpones discussion of the Home Rule
+Amending Bill.</p>
+<p>The Tsar telegraphs to the Kaiser.</p>
+<p>July 31. Friday. General Russian mobilization ordered.</p>
+<p>Sir E. Grey asks France and Germany whether they will respect
+neutrality of Belgium.</p>
+<p>France promises to respect Belgian neutrality; Germany is
+doubtful whether any answer will be returned to this request.</p>
+<p>Austria declares its readiness to discuss the substance of its
+ultimatum to Servia.</p>
+<p>Fresh telegrams pass between the Kaiser and the Tsar.</p>
+<p>Germany presents ultimatum to Russia demanding that her
+mobilization should cease within 12 hours.</p>
+<p>Germany presents an ultimatum to France asking her to define her
+attitude in case of a Russo-German war.</p>
+<p>English bankers confer with the Government about the financial
+situation.</p>
+<p>Aug. 1. Saturday. Sir E. Grey protests against detention of
+English ships at Hamburg.</p>
+<p>Orders issued for general mobilization of French army.</p>
+<p>Orders issued for general mobilization of German army.</p>
+<p>Aug. 2. Sunday. Germans invade Luxemburg.</p>
+<p>Sir E. Grey gives France an assurance that the English fleet
+will protect the North Coast of France against the German
+fleet.</p>
+<p>Germans enter French territory near Cirey.</p>
+<p>Aug. 3. Monday. Italy declares itself neutral, as the other
+members of the Triple Alliance are not engaged in a defensive
+war.</p>
+<p>Germany presents an ultimatum to Belgium.</p>
+<p>Sir E. Grey makes an important speech in the House of
+Commons.</p>
+<p>Aug. 4. Tuesday. Germans enter Belgian territory.</p>
+<p>Britain presents an ultimatum to Germany demanding an answer by
+midnight.</p>
+<p>The Prime Minister makes a speech in the House of Commons,
+practically announcing war against Germany and explaining the
+British position.</p>
+<p>Aug. 6. Austria-Hungary declares war on Russia.</p>
+<p>Aug. 11. The French Ambassador at Vienna demands his
+passport.</p>
+<p>Aug. 12. Great Britain declares war on Austria-Hungary.</p>
+<p>Notes:</p>
+<p><a name="note-25" id="note-25">
+<!-- Note Anchor 25 --></a>[Footnote 25: Extracts are printed in
+the German version of the German White Book (pp. 28-31) from an
+Austrian official publication of July 27. We print the extracts
+(the original not being accessible in this country) in <a href=
+"#RULE4_5">Appendix IV</a>.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-26" id="note-26">
+<!-- Note Anchor 26 --></a>[Footnote 26: Full text <i>infra</i> in
+Appendix I (German White Book, pp. 18-23); more correctly in
+<i>Correspondence respecting the European Crisis</i>, No. 4, Count
+Berchtold to Count Mensdorff, July 24; but the differences between
+the two versions are immaterial for our present purpose.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-27" id="note-27">
+<!-- Note Anchor 27 --></a>[Footnote 27: See the communication to
+England in <i>Correspondence</i>, No. 4.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-28" id="note-28">
+<!-- Note Anchor 28 --></a>[Footnote 28: <i>Correspondence</i>, No.
+9, Note communicated by the German Ambassador, July 24.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-29" id="note-29">
+<!-- Note Anchor 29 --></a>[Footnote 29: <i>Correspondence</i>, No.
+6, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 24.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-30" id="note-30">
+<!-- Note Anchor 30 --></a>[Footnote 30: <i>Correspondence</i>, No.
+13, Note communicated by Russian Ambassador, July 25.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-31" id="note-31">
+<!-- Note Anchor 31 --></a>[Footnote 31: <i>Correspondence</i>, No.
+17, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 25.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-32" id="note-32">
+<!-- Note Anchor 32 --></a>[Footnote 32: For text of Servian note
+see <i>infra</i> Appendix I (German White Book, pp. 23-32). The
+Austrian comments also are given there.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-33" id="note-33">
+<!-- Note Anchor 33 --></a>[Footnote 33: <i>Correspondence</i>, No.
+42, Sir F. Bertie to Sir E. Grey, July 27; <i>ibid</i>. No. 49, Sir
+E. Grey to Sir R. Rodd, July 27.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-34" id="note-34">
+<!-- Note Anchor 34 --></a>[Footnote 34: <i>Correspondence</i>, No.
+43. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 27.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-35" id="note-35">
+<!-- Note Anchor 35 --></a>[Footnote 35: German White Book, p. 46
+(<i>infra</i> in <a href="#RULE4_2">Appendix I</a>). The Tsar to
+His Majesty, July 30.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-36" id="note-36">
+<!-- Note Anchor 36 --></a>[Footnote 36: <i>Correspondence</i>, No.
+45. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-37" id="note-37">
+<!-- Note Anchor 37 --></a>[Footnote 37: Austria declined
+conversations on July 28 (<i>Correspondence</i>, No. 93); but for
+conversations of July 31 see <i>Correspondence</i>, No. III; of
+August I, see <a href="#RULE4_6">Appendix V</a>.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-38" id="note-38">
+<!-- Note Anchor 38 --></a>[Footnote 38: <i>Correspondence</i>, No.
+70 (I). M. Sazonof to Russian Ambassador at Berlin, July 28.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-39" id="note-39">
+<!-- Note Anchor 39 --></a>[Footnote 39: <i>Correspondence</i>, No.
+72. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 28.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-40" id="note-40">
+<!-- Note Anchor 40 --></a>[Footnote 40: German White Book, pp. 43,
+45 (in <a href="#RULE4_2">Appendix I</a>, <i>infra</i>).]</p>
+<p><a name="note-41" id="note-41">
+<!-- Note Anchor 41 --></a>[Footnote 41: <i>Correspondence</i>, No.
+76. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 29.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-42" id="note-42">
+<!-- Note Anchor 42 --></a>[Footnote 42: German White Book, p. 42,
+Exhibit 17 (<i>infra</i>, <a href="#RULE4_2">Appendix I</a>).]</p>
+<p><a name="note-43" id="note-43">
+<!-- Note Anchor 43 --></a>[Footnote 43: <i>Correspondence</i>, No.
+105 (Enclosure 3), July 30.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-44" id="note-44">
+<!-- Note Anchor 44 --></a>[Footnote 44: German White Book, p. 7;
+the date of the warning seems to be July 27.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-45" id="note-45">
+<!-- Note Anchor 45 --></a>[Footnote 45: German White Book, p. 40,
+Exhibit II.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-46" id="note-46">
+<!-- Note Anchor 46 --></a>[Footnote 46: <i>Ibid</i>. p. 9.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-47" id="note-47">
+<!-- Note Anchor 47 --></a>[Footnote 47: <i>Ibid</i>. p. 10.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-48" id="note-48">
+<!-- Note Anchor 48 --></a>[Footnote 48: <i>Correspondence</i>, No.
+85. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 29.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-49" id="note-49">
+<!-- Note Anchor 49 --></a>[Footnote 49: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 101. Sir
+E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, July 30.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-50" id="note-50">
+<!-- Note Anchor 50 --></a>[Footnote 50: <i>Correspondence</i>, No.
+123. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, Aug. 1.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-51" id="note-51">
+<!-- Note Anchor 51 --></a>[Footnote 51: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 105. Sir
+E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, July 30.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-52" id="note-52">
+<!-- Note Anchor 52 --></a>[Footnote 52: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 119. Sir
+E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, July 31.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-53" id="note-53">
+<!-- Note Anchor 53 --></a>[Footnote 53: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 114, 120,
+122.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-54" id="note-54">
+<!-- Note Anchor 54 --></a>[Footnote 54: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 148. Sir
+E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, Aug. 2.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-55" id="note-55">
+<!-- Note Anchor 55 --></a>[Footnote 55: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 153. Sir
+E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, Aug. 4.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-56" id="note-56">
+<!-- Note Anchor 56 --></a>[Footnote 56: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 159. Sir
+E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, Aug. 4]</p>
+<hr />
+<a name="CH5" id="CH5"><!-- CH5 --></a>
+<h2>CHAPTER V</h2>
+<center>NEGOTIATORS AND NEGOTIATIONS</center>
+<p>For purposes of reference the following list of <i>dramatis
+personae</i> may be useful:&mdash;</p>
+<p>GREAT BRITAIN: King George V, <i>succ</i>. 1910.<br />
+<i>Foreign Secretary</i>: Sir Edward Grey.<br />
+<i>Ambassadors from France</i>: M. Paul Cambon.<br />
+<i>Russia</i>: Count Benckendorff.<br />
+<i>Germany</i>: Prince Lichnowsky.<br />
+<i>Austria</i>: Count Albert Mensdorff-Pouilly-Dietrichstein.<br />
+<i>Belgium</i>: Count A. de Lalaing (<i>Minister</i>).</p>
+<p>RUSSIA: Emperor Nicholas II, <i>succ</i>. 1894.<br />
+<i>Foreign Secretary</i>: M. Sazonof.<br />
+<i>Ambassadors from Great Britain</i>: Sir George Buchanan.<br />
+<i>France</i>: M. Pal&eacute;ologue.<br />
+<i>Germany</i>: Count Pourtal&egrave;s.<br />
+<i>Austria</i>: Friedrich Count Sz&aacute;p&aacute;ry.</p>
+<p>FRANCE: Raymond Poincar&eacute;, <i>President, elected</i>
+1913.<br />
+<i>Premier</i>: M. Viviani.<br />
+<i>Acting Foreign Secretary</i>: M. Doumergue.<br />
+<i>Ambassadors from Great Britain</i>: Sir Francis Bertie.<br />
+<i>Russia</i>: M. Isvolsky.<br />
+M. Sevastopoulo (<i>Charge d'Affaires</i>).<br />
+<i>Germany</i>: Baron von Schoen.<br />
+<i>Austria</i>: Count Sc&eacute;zsen.</p>
+<p>GERMANY: Emperor William II, <i>succ</i>. 1888.<br />
+<i>Imperial Chancellor</i>: Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg.<br />
+<i>Foreign Secretary</i>: Herr von Jagow.<br />
+<i>Ambassadors from Great Britain</i>: Sir Edward Goschen.<br />
+Sir Horace Rumbold (<i>Councillor</i>).<br />
+<i>Russia:</i> M. Swerbeiev.<br />
+M. Bronewsky (<i>Charge d'Affaires</i>).<br />
+<i>France:</i> M. Jules Cambon.<br />
+<i>Austria</i>: Count Ladislaus Sz&ouml;gy&eacute;ny-Marich.</p>
+<p>AUSTRIA-HUNGARY: Emperor Francis Joseph, <i>succ</i>.
+1848.<br />
+<i>Foreign Secretary</i>: Count Berchtold.<br />
+<i>Ambassadors from Great Britain</i>: Sir Maurice de Bunsen.<br />
+<i>Russia</i>: M. Schebesco.<br />
+M. Kondachev (<i>Charge d'Affaires</i>).<br />
+<i>France</i>: M. Crozier.<br />
+<i>Germany</i>: Herr von Tschirscky-und-B&ouml;gendorff.</p>
+<p>ITALY: King Victor Emmanuel III, <i>succ</i>. 1900.<br />
+<i>Foreign Secretary</i>: Marquis di San Giuliano.<br />
+<i>Ambassador from Great Britain</i>: Sir Rennell Rodd.</p>
+<p>BELGIUM: King Albert, <i>succ</i>. 1909.<br />
+<i>Minister of Great Britain</i>: Sir Francis Villiers.</p>
+<p>SERVIA: King Peter, <i>succ</i>. 1903.<br />
+<i>Minister of Great Britain</i>: C.L. des Graz.<br />
+D.M. Crackanthorpe (<i>First Secretary</i>).<br />
+<i>Russian Charg&eacute; d'Affaires</i>: M. Strandtmann.</p>
+<h3>I</h3>
+<center><i>Germany's attitude to Austria and Russia</i>.</center>
+<p>From the very beginning of the conversations between the Powers
+on the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand at Serajevo,
+and on the Austrian note to Servia, the German Government took up
+the attitude that it was a 'matter for settlement between Servia
+and Austria alone.'[<a href="#note-57">57</a>] Subsequently in
+their White Book they endeavoured to show that the Servian
+agitation was part of Russian propagandism.[<a href=
+"#note-58">58</a>] In the negotiations, the cardinal point of their
+observations is that Russia is not to interfere in this matter,
+although M. Paul Cambon pointed out that 'Russia would be compelled
+by her public opinion to take action as soon as Austria attacked
+Servia'.[<a href="#note-59">59</a>]</p>
+<p>After the presentation of the Austrian note to Servia, Germany
+continued to maintain the position that the crisis could be
+localized, and to reject Sir Horace Rumbold's suggestion that 'in
+taking military action in Servia, Austria would dangerously excite
+public opinion in Russia'.[<a href="#note-60">60</a>]</p>
+<p>At Vienna Sir Maurice de Bunsen, the British Ambassador, was
+very frankly told by the German Ambassador that Germany was
+shielding Austria in the Servian business:&mdash;</p>
+<p class="blockquote">'As for Germany, she knew very well what she
+was about in backing up Austria-Hungary in this matter.... Servian
+concessions were all a sham. Servia proved that she well knew that
+they were insufficient to satisfy the legitimate demands of
+Austria-Hungary by the fact that before making her offer she had
+ordered mobilization and retirement of Government from
+Belgrade.'[<a href="#note-61">61</a>]</p>
+<p>M. Sazonof, the Russian Foreign Minister, seems to have divined
+this policy of Germany pretty soon:&mdash;</p>
+<p class="blockquote">'My interviews with the German Ambassador
+confirm my impression that Germany is, if anything, in favour of
+the uncompromising attitude adopted by Austria. The Berlin Cabinet,
+who could have prevented the whole of this crisis developing,
+appear to be exercising no influence upon their ally.... There is
+no doubt that the key of the situation is to be found at
+Berlin.'[<a href="#note-62">62</a>]</p>
+<p>When at the beginning of August the crisis had led to war, it is
+interesting to observe the opinions expressed by high and
+well-informed officials about German diplomacy. M. Sazonof summed
+up his opinion thus:&mdash;</p>
+<p class="blockquote">'The policy of Austria had throughout been
+tortuous and immoral, and she thought she could treat Russia with
+defiance, secure in the support of her German ally. Similarly the
+policy of Germany had been an equivocal and double-faced policy,
+and it mattered little whether the German Government knew or did
+not know the terms of the Austrian ultimatum; what mattered was
+that her intervention with the Austrian Government had been
+postponed until the moment had passed when its influence would have
+been felt. Germany was unfortunate in her representatives in Vienna
+and St. Petersburg; the former was a violent Russophobe who had
+urged Austria on, the latter had reported to his Government that
+Russia would never go to war.'[<a href="#note-63">63</a>]</p>
+<p>And Sir Maurice de Bunsen on the same day wrote that he agreed
+with his Russian colleague that</p>
+<p class="blockquote">'the German Ambassador at Vienna desired war
+from the first, and his strong personal bias probably coloured his
+action here. The Russian Ambassador is convinced that the German
+Government also desired war from the first.'[<a href=
+"#note-64">64</a>]</p>
+<p>Sir Maurice does not actually endorse this opinion concerning
+the attitude of the German Government, but there can be no doubt
+that this general attitude was most pernicious to the cause of
+European peace, and that if the German Government had desired war
+they could scarcely have acted more efficiently towards that end.
+No diplomatic pressure was put upon Vienna, which under the aegis
+of Berlin was allowed to go to any lengths against Servia. Over and
+over again the German diplomats were told that Russia was deeply
+interested in Servia, but they would not listen. As late as July
+28th the German Chancellor himself refused 'to discuss the Servian
+note', adding that 'Austria's standpoint, and in this he agreed,
+was that her quarrel with Servia was a purely Austrian concern with
+which Russia had nothing to do'.[<a href="#note-65">65</a>] Next
+day the German Ambassador at Vienna was continuing 'to feign
+surprise that Servian affairs could be of such interest to
+Russia'.[<a href="#note-66">66</a>] But in their White Book, in
+order to blacken the character of Russia, the Germans remark that
+they 'were perfectly aware that a possible warlike attitude of
+Austria-Hungary against Servia might bring Russia into the
+field'.[<a href="#note-67">67</a>] Both stories cannot be true: the
+German Government have, not for the last time in the history of
+these negotiations, to choose between ineptitude and guilt; the
+ineptitude of not recognizing an obvious fact, and the guilt of
+deliberately allowing Austria to act in such a way that Russia was
+bound to come into the field.</p>
+<a name="failedproposal" id="failedproposal"></a>
+<p>When Austria presented her ultimatum, Sir Edward Grey did all he
+could to obtain the good offices of Russia for a conciliatory reply
+by Servia, and to persuade the German Government to use influence
+with Austria so that she should take a friendly attitude to Servia.
+On the day of the presentation of the Austrian note he proposed to
+Prince Lichnowsky, the German Ambassador, the co-operation of the
+four Powers, Germany, France, Italy, and Great Britain, in favour
+of moderation at Vienna and St. Petersburg, and when the Austrians
+rejected the Servian reply he took the important step of proposing
+that the French, Italian, and German Ambassadors should meet him in
+conference immediately 'for the purpose of discovering an issue
+which would prevent complications'.[<a href="#note-68">68</a>] The
+proposal was accepted with alacrity by the French and Italian
+Governments. The German Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Herr von
+Jagow, on the other hand, was unable or unwilling to understand the
+proposal, and Sir Edward Goschen seems to have been unable to
+impress its real character upon the Government of Berlin. For Herr
+von Jagow, on receipt of the proposal, informed the British
+Ambassador, Sir Edward Goschen, that the conference suggested</p>
+<p class="blockquote">'would practically amount to a court of
+arbitration and could not in his opinion be called together except
+at the request of Austria and Russia. He could not therefore fall
+in with it.'</p>
+<p>Sir Edward Goschen not unnaturally pointed out that</p>
+<p class="blockquote">'the idea had nothing to do with arbitration,
+but meant that representatives of the four nations not directly
+interested should discuss and suggest means for avoiding a
+dangerous situation'.[<a href="#note-69">69</a>]</p>
+<p>Herr von Jagow spoke in the same sense to the French and Italian
+Ambassadors, who discussed the matter with their British colleague.
+Some doubt seems to have arisen in their minds as to the sincerity
+of the German Secretary of State's loudly expressed desire for
+peace; but, giving him the benefit of the doubt, they concluded
+that the objection must be to the 'form of the proposal'.
+'Perhaps', added Sir Edward Goschen, 'he himself could be induced
+to suggest lines on which he would find it possible to work with
+us.'[<a href="#note-70">70</a>] The next day the same idea was
+pressed by Sir Edward Grey upon Prince Lichnowsky:&mdash;</p>
+<p class="blockquote">'The whole idea of mediation or mediating
+influence was ready to be put into operation by any method that
+Germany could suggest if mine was not acceptable.'[<a href=
+"#note-71">71</a>]</p>
+<p>But owing to German dilatoriness in this matter, events had by
+then gone so far that the very gravest questions had arisen for
+this country.</p>
+<p>With the refusal of the German Government to propose a form of
+mediation acceptable to themselves before graver events had
+occurred, the first period of the negotiation comes to an end. The
+responsibility of rejecting a conference, which, by staving off the
+evil day, might have preserved the peace of Europe, falls solely on
+the shoulders of Germany. The reasons advanced by Herr von Jagow
+were erroneous, and though Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg, the Imperial
+Chancellor, was more conciliatory and sympathetic, it may be noted
+that the German White Book[<a href="#note-72">72</a>] continues to
+misrepresent Sir Edward Grey's proposal as a conference on the
+particular question of the Austro-Servian dispute, and not on the
+general situation of Europe.</p>
+<p>In the period that follows come spasmodic attempts at
+negotiation by direct conversations between the parties concerned,
+with no advantage, but rather with the growth of mutual suspicion.
+Down to August 1st both Sir Edward Grey and M. Sazonof were busy
+trying to find some formula which might be accepted as a basis for
+postponing hostilities between the Great Powers. And here it may be
+well to point out that Prince Lichnowsky seems to have been left in
+the dark by his chiefs. On July 24th, the day after the Austrian
+note was presented, he was so little acquainted with the true state
+of affairs, that speaking privately he told Sir Edward Grey 'that a
+reply favourable on some points must be sent at once by Servia, so
+that an excuse against immediate action might be afforded to
+Austria'.[<a href="#note-73">73</a>] And in the matter of the
+conference, on the very day that Herr von Jagow was making his
+excuses against entering the proposed conference, Prince Lichnowsky
+informed Sir Edward Grey, that the German Government accepted in
+principle mediation between Austria and Russia by the four Powers,
+reserving, of course, their right as an ally to help Austria if
+attacked.[<a href="#note-74">74</a>] The mutual incompatibility of
+the two voices of Germany was pointed out from Rome, where the
+Marquis di San Giuliano, the Italian Foreign Minister, attempted a
+reconciliation between them, on information received from Berlin,
+that 'the difficulty was rather the "conference" than the
+principle'.[<a href="#note-75">75</a>] But we may ask whether Herr
+von Jagow's reply to Sir Edward Goschen does not really show that
+the whole principle of a conference was objected to, seeing that he
+said that such a 'conference was not practicable', and that 'it
+would be best to await the outcome of the exchange of views between
+the Austrian and Russian Governments'.[<a href="#note-76">76</a>]
+But, if it was not the principle that was objected to, but only the
+form, where are we? We can do nothing else but assume that the
+German Government objected to the terms employed by Sir Edward
+Grey, and that for the sake of a mere quibble they wasted time
+until other events made the catastrophe inevitable. Impartiality
+will have to judge whether such action was deliberate or not;
+whether in this case also it is crime or folly which has to be laid
+at the door of the German Government.</p>
+<p>The proposed conference having been rejected by Germany, an
+attempt was then made by several Powers to invite Austria to
+suspend military action. Although Count Mensdorff, the Austrian
+Ambassador in London, had made on July 25th a distinction between
+military preparations and military operations, and had urged that
+his Government had only the former then in view, it was reported
+two days later from Rome that there were great doubts 'whether
+Germany would be willing to invite Austria to suspend military
+action pending the conference'. Even if she had been willing to do
+so, it is very doubtful whether, in view of the Austrian
+declaration of war against Servia on July 28th, and the
+simultaneous Austrian decree for general mobilization, the position
+of Europe could have been improved, for on July 29th that
+declaration was followed by news of the Russian mobilization of the
+southern districts of Odessa, Kiev, Moscow, and Kazan.[<a href=
+"#note-77">77</a>]</p>
+<p>Now the German Secretary of State had argued that 'if Russia
+mobilized against Germany, latter would have to follow suit'. On
+being asked what he meant by 'mobilizing against Germany', he said
+that</p>
+<p class="blockquote">'if Russia mobilized in the South, Germany
+would not mobilize, but if she mobilized in the north, Germany
+would have to do so too, and Russian system of mobilization was so
+complicated that it might be difficult exactly to locate her
+mobilization. Germany would therefore have to be very careful not
+to be taken by surprise.'[<a href="#note-78">78</a>]</p>
+<p>This was on July 27th, and it cannot be said to have been
+unreasonable. But when on July 29th Russia mobilized the southern
+districts no grounds for German mobilization had yet been provided.
+No secret was made about this mobilization by the Russian
+Ambassador at Berlin,[<a href="#note-79">79</a>] but it is perhaps
+as well to point out here the remark made by Sir George Buchanan,
+the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, about the language used
+by his German colleague concerning the mobilization of the four
+southern districts: 'He accused the Russian Government of
+endangering the peace of Europe by their mobilization, and said,
+when I referred to all that had recently been done by Austria, that
+he could not discuss such matters.'[<a href="#note-80">80</a>] It
+would perhaps be rash to assume that the German Ambassador, Count
+Pourtal&egrave;s, used such language to his home Government, for
+there is no evidence of it in the German White Book. What
+dispatches appear there from the German Embassy at St. Petersburg
+are refreshingly honest. The military attach&eacute; says, 'I deem
+it certain that mobilization has been ordered for Kiev and Odessa'.
+He adds: 'it is doubtful at Warsaw and Moscow, and improbable
+elsewhere'.[<a href="#note-81">81</a>]</p>
+<p>There was therefore, according to the evidence produced by the
+Germans themselves, no mobilization 'against Germany'. The only
+thing that looks at all like hostile action is contained in the
+news sent by the Imperial German Consul at Kovno on July 27th, that
+a 'state of war' (<i>Kriegszustand</i>) had been proclaimed in that
+district. But this is a very different thing from mobilization; it
+was almost bound to follow in the northern provinces of the Empire
+as the result of mobilization elsewhere. At any rate the Consul at
+Kovno announced it on July 27th before any Russian mobilization at
+all had taken place, and the fact that Germany did not instantly
+mobilize shows that at the end of July that Government did not
+consider <i>Kriegszustand</i> in Kovno to be equivalent to
+'mobilization against Germany'.</p>
+<p>Opinion in Berlin seems to have been that Russia would not make
+war. Perhaps there was no real fear that Russia would take an
+aggressive attitude, for many people believed that 'Russia neither
+wanted, nor was in a position to make war'.[<a href=
+"#note-82">82</a>] This attitude of mind was known and deplored in
+Rome, where the Marquis di San Giuliano said 'there seemed to be a
+difficulty in making Germany believe that Russia was in
+earnest'.[<a href="#note-83">83</a>] Such an opinion seems to have
+been shared by Count Pourtal&ecirc;s, who on July 29 reported that
+the German Government were willing to guarantee that Servian
+integrity would be respected by Austria. This was held to be
+insufficient, as Servia might thus become an Austrian vassal, and
+there would be a revolution in Russia if she were to tolerate such
+a state of affairs. The next day the Russian Minister for Foreign
+Affairs told the British and French Ambassadors 'that absolute
+proof was in the possession of the Russian Government that Germany
+was making military and naval preparations against
+Russia&mdash;more particularly in the direction of the Gulf of
+Finland'.[<a href="#note-84">84</a>]</p>
+<p>After this, is it difficult to see how German statesmen regarded
+the situation? Russia, in their eyes, was playing a game of bluff,
+and strong measures against her were in the interest of Germany.
+But, though under no illusion as to German preparations, M. Sazonof
+offered on July 30 to stop all military preparations if Austria
+'would eliminate from her ultimatum to Servia points which violate
+the principle of the sovereignty of Servia'.[<a href=
+"#note-85">85</a>] 'Preparations for general mobilization will be
+proceeded with if this proposal is rejected by Austria,' wrote Sir
+George Buchanan.[<a href="#note-86">86</a>] The next day he
+reported to Sir Edward Grey that all attempts to obtain the consent
+of Austria to mediation had failed, and that she was moving troops
+against Russia as well as against Servia.[<a href=
+"#note-87">87</a>]</p>
+<p>Face to face therefore with war against another Power, Russia
+ordered a general mobilization.[<a href="#note-88">88</a>] This was
+answered on the same day by a proclamation of <i>Kriegsgefahr</i>
+at Berlin, 'as it can only be against Germany that Russian general
+mobilization is directed'.[<a href="#note-89">89</a>]</p>
+<p>Thus on Friday, July 31st, the situation had come to be this,
+that Russia, feeling herself threatened by the military
+preparations of Austria and Germany, decided to issue orders for a
+general mobilization.[<a href="#note-90">90</a>] Meanwhile Sir
+Edward Grey still clung to the hope that mediation with a view to
+safeguarding Austrian interests as against Servia might yet be
+accepted.[<a href="#note-91">91</a>] But his efforts were useless,
+for Germany had launched an ultimatum (July 31) to Russia,
+demanding demobilization. As Sir Edward Goschen pointed out, the
+demand was made 'even more difficult for Russia to accept by asking
+them to demobilize in the south as well'.[<a href=
+"#note-92">92</a>] The only explanation actually vouchsafed was
+that this had been asked to prevent Russia pleading that all her
+mobilization was only directed against Austria. Such a quibble,
+when such interests are at stake, seems to call for severe
+comment.</p>
+<p>War between the three empires seemed now inevitable, for though
+the Emperor of Russia and the German Emperor had exchanged
+telegrams each imploring the other to find a way out of the
+difficulty, and each saying that matters had gone so far that
+neither could grant the other's demands,[<a href="#note-93">93</a>]
+the officials at Berlin were now taking up the position that
+'Russia's mobilization had spoilt everything'.[<a href=
+"#note-94">94</a>] This attitude is as inexplicable as it proved
+disastrous. For it appears that on July 31 Austria and Russia were
+ready to resume conversations. The Austrians, apparently alarmed at
+the prospect of a general war, were ready to discuss the substance
+of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia, and Russia announced that
+under certain conditions 'she would undertake to preserve her
+waiting attitude'.[<a href="#note-95">95</a>] Having issued her
+ultimatum to Russia, Germany naturally mobilized, but what kind of
+diplomacy is this in which, with the principals both ready to
+negotiate, a third party issues an ultimatum couched in such terms
+that a proud country can give but one answer?</p>
+<p>The sequence of events seems to be as follows. Austria mobilized
+against Servia. Russia, rightly or wrongly, took this as a threat
+to herself, and mobilized all her southern forces against Austria.
+Then Germany threatened to mobilize unless Russia ceased her
+military preparations&mdash;an inexcusable step, which increased
+Russia's apprehensions of a general war, and made a general Russian
+mobilization inevitable.[<a href="#note-96">96</a>] If Russia was
+the first to mobilize, she took this step in consequence of German
+threats. We repeat that in spite of the three empires taking this
+action, discussion was still possible between Russia and
+Austria,[<a href="#note-97">97</a>] and might have had good
+results. In fact, the situation was not irretrievable, if Germany
+had not rendered it so by issuing her ultimatum to Russia. Once
+again we may ask, was this crime or folly?</p>
+<h3>II</h3>
+<center><i>Germany's attitude to France.</i></center>
+<p>We must now turn our eyes to the West of Europe, and observe the
+diplomacy of Germany with regard to France and Great Britain. On
+the 27th of July we are told that the German Government received
+'the first intimation concerning the preparatory measures taken by
+France: the 14th Corps discontinued the manoeuvres and returned to
+its garrison'.[<a href="#note-98">98</a>] Will it be believed that,
+except for the assertion 'of rapidly progressing preparations of
+France, both on water and on land',[<a href="#note-99">99</a>] this
+is the only shred of evidence that the Germans have produced to
+prove the aggressive intentions of France? And it may be worth
+while to point out that on July 29, when the German White Book says
+that Berlin heard of the 'rapidly progressing preparations of
+France', the French Ambassador at Berlin informed the Secretary of
+State that 'they had done nothing more than the German Government
+had done, namely, recalled the officers on leave'.[<a href=
+"#note-100">100</a>]</p>
+<p>The very next day the French Government had 'reliable
+information that the German troops are concentrated round
+Thionville and Metz ready for war',[<a href="#note-101">101</a>]
+and before July 30th German patrols twice penetrated into French
+territory.[<a href="#note-102">102</a>] With great forbearance the
+French Government withdrew its troops ten kilometres from the
+frontier; and, although German reservists had been recalled from
+abroad 'by tens of thousands', the French Government had not called
+out a single reservist. Well might the French Minister for Foreign
+Affairs say 'Germany has done it'.[<a href="#note-103">103</a>]</p>
+<p>Having thus invaded France before July 30th, the German
+Government presented an ultimatum (July 31) demanding what were the
+French intentions, and on August 1st the French Government replied
+that it would consult its own interests.[<a href=
+"#note-104">104</a>]</p>
+<a name="ch5sec3" id="ch5sec3"></a>
+<h3>III</h3>
+<center><i>The Question of British Neutrality</i>.</center>
+<p>Even then, nothing had happened to bring this country into the
+quarrel. If Germany were making war primarily on Russia, and France
+were only involved as the auxiliary of Russia, Germany would have
+acted rapidly against Russia, and would have stood on the defensive
+against France; and England would not have been dragged into
+war.[<a href="#note-105">105</a>] The question of British
+neutrality first appears in the British White Book on July 25th,
+when Sir Edward Grey, in a note to Sir George Buchanan, said: 'if
+war does take place, the development of other issues may draw us
+into it, and I am therefore anxious to prevent it'.[<a href=
+"#note-106">106</a>] Two days later he wrote again:&mdash;</p>
+<p class="blockquote">'I have been told by the Russian Ambassador
+that in German and Austrian circles impression prevails that in any
+event we would stand aside ... This impression ought, as I have
+pointed out, to be dispelled by the orders we have given to the
+First Fleet ... not to disperse for manoeuvre leave. But ... my
+reference to it must not be taken to mean that anything more than
+diplomatic action was promised.'[<a href="#note-107">107</a>]</p>
+<p>On the 29th the question of our neutrality was seriously
+discussed at both the Courts of St. James and Berlin independently.
+Sir Edward Grey, in an interview with Prince Lichnowsky, told him
+'he did not wish the Ambassador to be misled ... into thinking we
+should stand aside'. Developing this, Sir Edward Grey solemnly
+warned the German Ambassador that</p>
+<p class="blockquote">'there was no question of our intervening if
+Germany was not involved, or even if France was not involved, but
+if the issue did become such that we thought British interests
+required us to intervene, we must intervene at once, and the
+decision would have to be very rapid.... But ... I did not wish to
+be open to any reproach from him that the friendly tone of all our
+conversations had misled him or his Government into supposing that
+we should not take action.'[<a href="#note-108">108</a>]</p>
+<p>Before the news of this had reached Berlin the Imperial
+Chancellor had made his notorious 'bid for British neutrality' on
+July 29:&mdash;</p>
+<p class="blockquote">'He said it was clear, so far as he was able
+to judge the main principle which governed British policy, that
+Great Britain would never stand by and allow France to be crushed
+in any conflict there might be. That, however, was not the object
+at which Germany aimed. Provided that neutrality of Great Britain
+were certain, every assurance would be given to the British
+Government that the Imperial Government aimed at no territorial
+acquisitions at the expense of France, should they prove victorious
+in any war that might ensue.</p>
+<p class="blockquote">'I questioned his Excellency about the French
+colonies, and he said he was unable to give a similar undertaking
+in that respect. As regards Holland ... so long as Germany's
+adversaries respected the integrity and neutrality of the
+Netherlands, Germany was ready to give His Majesty's Government an
+assurance that she would do likewise. It depended on the action of
+France what operations Germany might be forced to enter upon in
+Belgium, but when the war was over, Belgian integrity would be
+respected if she had not sided against Germany.'[<a href=
+"#note-109">109</a>]</p>
+<p>This request was at once repudiated (July 30) by the British
+Government:&mdash;</p>
+<p class="blockquote">'His Majesty's Government cannot for one
+moment entertain the Chancellor's proposal that they should bind
+themselves to neutrality on such terms.</p>
+<p class="blockquote">'What he asks us in effect is to engage to
+stand by while French colonies are taken and France is beaten so
+long as Germany does not take French territory as distinct from the
+colonies.</p>
+<p class="blockquote">'From the material point of view the proposal
+is unacceptable, for France, without further territory in Europe
+being taken from her, could be so crushed as to lose her position
+as a Great Power and become subordinate to German policy.</p>
+<p class="blockquote">'Altogether apart from that, it would be a
+disgrace for us to make this bargain with Germany at the expense of
+France, a disgrace from which the good name of this country would
+never recover.</p>
+<p class="blockquote">'The Chancellor also in effect asks us to
+bargain away whatever obligation or interest we have as regards the
+neutrality of Belgium. We could not entertain that bargain
+either.[<a href="#note-110">110</a>]</p>
+<p>He continued by saying that Great Britain must keep her hands
+absolutely free and hinted at some scheme for preventing
+anti-German aggression by the Powers of the Triple
+<i>Entente</i>:&mdash;</p>
+<p class="blockquote">'If the peace of Europe can be preserved, and
+the present crisis safely passed, my own endeavour will be to
+promote some arrangement to which Germany could be a party, by
+which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy
+would be pursued against her or her allies by France, Russia, and
+ourselves, jointly or separately ... The idea has hitherto been too
+Utopian to form the subject of definite proposals, but if this
+crisis ... be safely passed, I am hopeful that the relief and
+reaction which will follow will make possible some more definite
+rapprochement between the Powers than has been possible
+hitherto.'</p>
+<p>Thus two points were made clear: we were seriously concerned
+that France should not be crushed, and that the neutrality of
+Belgium should not be violated. It is interesting to note how this
+extremely serious warning was received by Dr. von
+Bethmann-Hollweg:&mdash;'His Excellency was so taken up with the
+news of the Russian measures along the frontier ... that he
+received your communication without a comment.'[<a href=
+"#note-111">111</a>]</p>
+<p>But the text of the reply was left with him, so that he could
+scarcely complain that no warning had been given to him.</p>
+<p>With the data at our disposal, it is not possible to make any
+deduction as to the effect which this warning had upon Berlin; but
+it may be remarked that at Rome that day, the Marquis di San
+Giuliano told Sir Rennell Rodd that he had</p>
+<p class="blockquote">'good reason to believe that Germany was now
+disposed to give more conciliatory advice to Austria, as she seemed
+convinced that we should act with France and Russia, and was most
+anxious to avoid issue with us.'[<a href="#note-112">112</a>]</p>
+<p>As this telegraphic dispatch was not received till the next day,
+it is not impossible that the Italian Minister gave this
+information to Sir Rennell Rodd late in the day, after having
+received news from Berlin sent under the impression made by Sir
+Edward Grey's warning.</p>
+<p>Such an impression, if it ever existed, must have been of short
+duration, for when the British Government demanded both of France
+and Germany whether they were 'prepared to engage to respect
+neutrality of Belgium so long as no other Power violates
+it',[<a href="#note-113">113</a>] the French gave an unequivocal
+promise the same day,[<a href="#note-114">114</a>] while the German
+answer is a striking contrast:&mdash;</p>
+<p class="blockquote">'I have seen Secretary of State, who informs
+me that he must consult the Emperor and the Chancellor before he
+can possibly answer. I gathered from what he said that he thought
+any reply they might give could not but disclose a certain amount
+of their plan of campaign in the event of war ensuing, and he was
+therefore very doubtful whether they would return any answer at
+all. His Excellency, nevertheless, took note of your request.</p>
+<p class="blockquote">'It appears from what he said that German
+Government considers that certain hostile acts have already been
+committed in Belgium. As an instance of this, he alleged that a
+consignment of corn for Germany had been placed under an embargo
+already.'[<a href="#note-115">115</a>]</p>
+<p>It was now clear that a violation of Belgian neutrality was a
+contingency that would have to be faced, and Prince Lichnowsky was
+warned the next day that 'the neutrality of Belgium affected
+feeling in this country', and he was asked to obtain an assurance
+from the German Government similar to that given by
+France:&mdash;</p>
+<p class="blockquote">'If there were a violation of the neutrality
+of Belgium by one combatant, while the other respected it, it would
+be extremely difficult to restrain public feeling in this
+country.'[<a href="#note-116">116</a>]</p>
+<p>The Ambassador then, on his own personal responsibility and
+without authority from his Government, tried to exact a promise
+that Great Britain would remain neutral 'if Germany gave a promise
+not to violate Belgian neutrality', but Sir Edward Grey was bound
+to refuse such an offer, seeing that it left out of account all
+question of an attack on France and her colonies, about which it
+had been stated already that there could be no bargaining. Even the
+guarantee of the integrity of France and her colonies was
+suggested, but again Sir Edward Grey was bound to refuse, for the
+reasons he gave to Sir Edward Goschen in rejecting what is now
+known as Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg's 'infamous proposal', namely,
+that France without actually losing territory might be so crushed
+as to lose her position as a Great Power, and become subordinate to
+German policy. And if there should be still any doubt about Sir
+Edward Grey's policy at this moment, we would refer to his
+statement in the House of Commons on August 27.[<a href=
+"#note-117">117</a>] The important points are that the offers of
+August 1 were made on the sole responsibility of Prince Lichnowsky,
+and without authority from his Government; that the Cabinet on
+August 2 carefully discussed the conditions on which we might
+remain neutral, and that, on August 3, so far was the German
+Ambassador from guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium that he
+actually had to ask Sir Edward Grey 'not to make the neutrality of
+Belgium one of our conditions'. Whatever Prince Lichnowsky may have
+said privately on August 1, the one fact certain is that two days
+later the German Government were making no concessions on that
+point; on the contrary they were asking us to withdraw from a
+position we had taken up on July 30, four days before.</p>
+<p>One more effort to preserve peace in Western Europe seems to
+have been made by Sir Edward Grey. On the telephone he asked Prince
+Lichnowsky whether, if France remained neutral, Germany would
+promise not to attack her. The impression seems to have prevailed
+in Berlin that this was an offer to guarantee French neutrality by
+the force of British arms, and the German Emperor in his telegram
+to the King gave evidence of the relief His Imperial Majesty felt
+at the prospect that the good relations between the two countries
+would be maintained. Unfortunately for such hopes, France had never
+been consulted in the matter, nor was there ever any idea of
+coercing France into neutrality, and even the original proposal had
+to be abandoned on consideration as unpractical.[<a href=
+"#note-118">118</a>]</p>
+<p>Events now marched rapidly. While the Cabinet in London were
+still discussing whether a violation of Belgian neutrality would be
+an occasion for war, the news came of the violation of that of
+Luxemburg. Sir Edward Grey informed M. Cambon[<a href=
+"#note-119">119</a>] that Lord Stanley and Lord Clarendon in 1867
+had agreed to a 'collective guarantee' by which it was not intended
+that every Power was bound single-handed to fight any Government
+which violated Luxemburg. Although this gross disregard by the
+Germans of their solemn pledge did not entail the same consequences
+as the subsequent violation of Belgian neutrality, it is equally
+reprehensible from the point of view of international law, and the
+more cowardly in proportion as this state is weaker than Belgium.
+Against this intrusion Luxemburg protested, but, unlike Belgium,
+she did not appeal to the Powers.[<a href="#note-120">120</a>]</p>
+<p>Two days later, August 4th, the King of the Belgians appealed to
+the King for 'diplomatic intervention to safeguard the integrity of
+Belgium'.[<a href="#note-121">121</a>] The German Government had
+issued an ultimatum to the Belgian, asking for</p>
+<p class="blockquote">'a free passage through Belgian territory,
+and promising to maintain the independence and integrity of the
+kingdom and its possessions at the conclusion of peace, threatening
+in case of refusal to treat Belgium as an enemy. An answer was
+requested within twelve hours'.[<a href="#note-122">122</a>]</p>
+<p>Sir Edward Grey instructed the British Ambassador to protest
+against this violation of a treaty to which Germany in common with
+ourselves was a party, and to ask an assurance that the demand made
+upon Belgium would not be proceeded with. At the same time the
+Belgian Government was told to resist German aggression by all the
+means in its power, as Great Britain was prepared to join France
+and Russia to maintain the independence and integrity of
+Belgium.[<a href="#note-123">123</a>] On receipt of the protest of
+Sir Edward Grey, it would seem that Herr von Jagow made one more
+desperate effort to bid for British neutrality: 'Germany will,
+under no pretence whatever, annex Belgian territory': to pass
+through Belgium was necessary because the 'German army could not be
+exposed to French attack across Belgium, which was planned
+according to absolutely unimpeachable information'. It was for
+Germany 'a question of life and death to prevent French
+advance'.[<a href="#note-124">124</a>] But matters had gone too
+far: that day (August 4) the Germans violated Belgian territory at
+Gemmenich, and thereupon the British demand to Germany to respect
+Belgian neutrality, issued earlier in the day, was converted into
+an ultimatum:&mdash;</p>
+<p class="blockquote">'We hear that Germany has addressed note to
+Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that German Government
+will be compelled to carry out, if necessary by force of arms, the
+measures considered indispensable.</p>
+<p class="blockquote">'We are also informed that Belgian territory
+has been violated at Gemmenich.</p>
+<p class="blockquote">'In these circumstances, and in view of the
+fact that Germany declined to give the same assurance respecting
+Belgium as France gave last week in reply to our request made
+simultaneously at Berlin and Paris, we must repeat that request,
+and ask that a satisfactory reply to it and to my telegram of this
+morning be received here by 12 o'clock to-night. If not, you are
+instructed to ask for your passports, and to say that His Majesty's
+Government feel bound to take all steps in their power to uphold
+the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty to which
+Germany is as much a party as ourselves.'[<a href=
+"#note-125">125</a>]</p>
+<p>The effect at Berlin was remarkable. Every sign was given of
+disappointment and resentment at such a step being taken, and the
+'harangue' of the Chancellor to Sir Edward Goschen, and his
+astonishment at the value laid by Great Britain upon the 'scrap of
+paper' of 1839 would seem, when coupled with Herr von Jagow's
+desperate bid for neutrality at the last moment, to show that the
+German Government had counted on the neutrality of this country and
+had been deeply disappointed. If these outbursts and attempts at
+the eleventh hour to bargain for our neutrality were genuine
+efforts to keep the peace between Great Britain and Germany, it is
+our belief that their origin must be found in the highest authority
+in the German Empire, whom we believe, in spite of petty signs of
+spitefulness exhibited since the war broke out, to have been
+sincerely and honestly working in favour of European peace, against
+obstacles little dreamt of by our countrymen. But certain signs are
+not wanting that, in the lower ranks of the German hierarchy, war
+with this country had been decided on, and that Sir Edward Grey was
+not far wrong when he wrote to Sir Francis Bertie on July 31, 'I
+believe it to be quite untrue that our attitude has been a decisive
+factor in situation. German Government do not expect our
+neutrality.'[<a href="#note-126">126</a>] On what other grounds
+than that orders had been sent out from Berlin can the fact be
+explained that the German Customs authorities, three days before
+the declaration of war, began detaining British ships,[<a href=
+"#note-127">127</a>] and compulsorily unloading cargoes of sugar
+from British vessels? In the former case, indeed, the ships were
+ordered to be released; in the latter case, of which the complaint
+was made twenty-four hours later, the reply to inquiries was the
+ominous statement that 'no information was to be had'.[<a href=
+"#note-128">128</a>]</p>
+<p>This, however, is a digression from the main question. History
+will doubtless attribute the outbreak of war between ourselves and
+Germany to the development of the Belgian question, and, we are
+confident, will judge that had it not been for the gratuitous
+attack made on a neutral country by Germany, war with Great Britain
+would not have ensued on August 4, 1914. The excuses put forward by
+the German Government for this wanton outrage on international
+agreements are instructive. In conversation with Sir Edward
+Goschen, neither Herr von Jagow nor the Chancellor urged that the
+French had violated the neutrality; the argument is purely and
+simply that the route by way of the Vosges is difficult, time is
+everything, and it is a matter of life and death to Germany to
+crush France as quickly as possible, in order that she may be able
+to meet the Russians before they reach the German frontier. This
+excuse does not seem to have been very satisfactory even to those
+who put it forward, though it was indubitably the real reason; so
+vice paid homage to virtue, and Herr von Jagow urged to Prince
+Lichnowsky that he had 'absolutely unimpeachable information' that
+the German army was exposed to French attack across Belgium. On the
+other hand, the Chancellor, as late as August 4th, seems to have
+known nothing of any such action by France; at any rate he made no
+mention of it in his speech to the Reichstag:&mdash;</p>
+<p class="blockquote">'We are now in a state of necessity, and
+necessity knows no law. Our troops have occupied Luxemburg and
+perhaps are already on Belgian soil. Gentlemen, that is contrary to
+the dictates of international law. It is true that the French
+Government has declared at Brussels that France is willing to
+respect the neutrality of Belgium, as long as her opponent respects
+it. We knew, however, that France stood ready for invasion. France
+could wait but we could not wait. A French movement upon our flank
+upon the Lower Rhine might have been disastrous. So we were
+compelled to override the just protest of the Luxemburg and Belgian
+Governments. The wrong&mdash;I speak openly&mdash;that we are
+committing we will endeavour to make good as soon as our military
+goal has been reached. Anybody who is threatened as we are
+threatened, and is fighting for his highest possessions, can only
+have one thought&mdash;how he is to hack his way through.'[<a href=
+"#note-129">129</a>]</p>
+<p>In this double-faced position of the German Government, we have
+an example either of unsurpassed wickedness or of insurpassable
+folly. The violation of Belgium must have been designed either in
+order to bring us into the quarrel, or on the supposition that, in
+spite of treaties and warnings, we should yet remain neutral. Yet
+the foolishness of such a calculation is as nothing to that which
+prompted the excuse that Germany had to violate Belgian neutrality
+because the French were going to do so, or had done so. In such a
+case undoubtedly the wisest course for Germany would have been to
+allow the French to earn the reward of their own folly and be
+attacked not only by Belgium but also by Great Britain, to whom not
+five days before they had solemnly promised to observe the
+neutrality, and whom such a gross violation of the French word must
+indubitably have kept neutral, if it did not throw her on to the
+side of Germany. In regard to Belgium the Germans have indeed put
+forward the plea that the French had already violated its
+neutrality before war was declared. This plea has been like a
+snowball. It began with the ineffective accusation that the French
+were at Givet, a town in French territory, and that this
+constituted an attack on Germany, though how the presence of the
+French in a town of their own could be called a violation of their
+neighbour's neutrality it is difficult to see. From that it has
+gradually grown into a more formidable story of the French
+supplying a garrison to Li&egrave;ge. There can be little doubt
+that all these attempts by Herr von Jagow to claim that the French
+violated Belgian neutrality are another illustration of Swift's
+dictum to the effect that 'as universal a practice as lying is, and
+as easy a one as it seems', it is astonishing that it has been
+brought to so little perfection, 'even by those who are most
+celebrated in that faculty'.[<a href="#note-130">130</a>]</p>
+<h3>IV</h3>
+<center><i>England and Servia</i>.</center>
+<p>We have seen what attitude was taken by Germany in the crisis
+which followed upon the Serajevo murders and more definitely upon
+the presentation of the Austrian note. It is equally important, and
+to English readers at least more interesting, to realize what
+attitude was taken by England. Sir Edward Grey throughout
+maintained the position, which he was so justly praised for
+adopting in 1912, that England had no direct interest in Balkan
+disputes, but that it was her bounden duty to prevent a European
+conflagration. He quickly saw, what Germany would not see, that
+Russia was so much interested in Servia, for both political and
+religious reasons, that any attempt by the Austro-Hungarian
+Government to coerce Servia, to interfere with her territorial
+integrity or independence as a sovereign state, would inevitably
+rouse Russia to military action. For Russia had greater interests
+in the security of Servia than Great Britain had in the security of
+Belgium. In each case the Great Power was bound by honour and
+self-interest alike to interfere to protect the smaller Power, but
+Russia was also bound to Servia by racial and religious bonds. This
+being so, Sir Edward Grey set himself, not as the German White Book
+says[<a href="#note-131">131</a>] to localize the conflict, but to
+prevent if possible a conflict between Austria-Hungary and Servia
+which would inevitably involve Russia and probably other European
+powers. He stated his policy with the greatest clearness in the
+House of Commons on July 27th, but he had already acted on the
+lines of the policy which he then explained. On July 24th he told
+Count Mensdorff that he would concern himself</p>
+<p class="blockquote">'with the matter simply and solely from the
+point of view of the peace of Europe. The merits of the dispute
+between Austria and Servia were not the concern of His Majesty's
+Government[<a href="#note-132">132</a>].'</p>
+<p>In similar language, but more fully, on the same day he told the
+German Ambassador:&mdash;</p>
+<p class="blockquote">'If the presentation of this ultimatum to
+Servia did not lead to trouble between Austria and Russia, we need
+not concern ourselves about it; but if Russia took the view of the
+Austrian ultimatum which it seemed to me that any Power interested
+in Servia would take, I should be quite powerless, in face of the
+terms of the ultimatum, to exercise any moderating
+influence[<a href="#note-133">133</a>].'</p>
+<p>Sir Edward Grey at once urged that the four Powers, Germany,
+Italy, France, and Great Britain, should act together in the
+interests of peace at the courts of St. Petersburg and Vienna. And
+he went further and tried to induce Servia to 'express concern and
+regret' and to 'give Austria the fullest satisfaction', 'if it is
+proved that Servian officials, however subordinate, were
+accomplices in the murders at Serajevo[<a href=
+"#note-134">134</a>].' Further than that no British Foreign
+Minister could go; Sir George Buchanan correctly explained the
+situation to M. Sazonof when he laid stress on the need of the
+sanction of British public opinion[<a href="#note-135">135</a>].
+Sir Edward Grey re-echoed this when he wrote:&mdash;</p>
+<p class="blockquote">'I do not consider that public opinion here
+would or ought to sanction our going to war over a Servian quarrel.
+If, however, war does take place, the development of other issues
+may draw us into it, and I am therefore anxious to prevent
+it.'[<a href="#note-136">136</a>]</p>
+<p>However, matters were moving rapidly: the Servian reply[<a href=
+"#note-137">137</a>] was presented on July 25; it was considered
+unsatisfactory by the Austro-Hungarian Government, and the
+Minister, with the Legation-staff, withdrew from Belgrade. Next day
+Sir Edward Grey proposed that a conference of Germany, Italy,
+France, and Great Britain should meet in London immediately 'for
+the purpose of discovering an issue which would prevent
+complications', and 'that all active military operations should be
+suspended pending results of conference'.[<a href=
+"#note-138">138</a>] This proposal failed, as has been explained in
+earlier pages (<a href="#failedproposal">pp. 71-3</a>), and on July
+28th Austria-Hungary declared war on Servia. Sir Edward Grey
+remained firm to his original attitude of non-intervention, and
+told M. Cambon that 'the dispute between Austria and Servia was not
+one in which we felt called to take a hand'.[<a href=
+"#note-139">139</a>] And on the same day he declined to discuss
+with Count Mensdorff 'the merits of the question between Austria
+and Servia'.[<a href="#note-140">140</a>]</p>
+<p>No one can doubt that Sir Edward Grey's attitude was
+diplomatically correct and consistent. It was also inspired by a
+genuine desire for peace, and stands out in sharp contrast with the
+'equivocal and double-faced' policy of Germany, and with the
+obstinacy of Austria in refusing to permit the Powers to mediate;
+for it was with truth that M. Sazonof remarked that</p>
+<p class="blockquote">'a refusal to prolong the term of the
+ultimatum would render nugatory the proposals made by the
+Austro-Hungarian Government to the Powers, and would be in
+contradiction to the very basis of international
+relations.'[<a href="#note-141">141</a>]</p>
+<h3>V</h3>
+<center><i>Great Britain declines 'Solidarity' with Russia and
+France</i>.</center>
+<p>There is however another question which involves the whole
+foreign policy of Great Britain. Could Sir Edward Grey have
+prevented the war by boldly declaring at once that England would
+support Russia and France, if necessary by armed force? It was a
+policy urged on him from several quarters, and it is possible that
+such action might have been successful. It is to Sir Edward Grey's
+credit that he quietly but firmly refused to take so hazardous and
+unprecedented a step. Let us examine these proposals briefly. As
+early as July 24th M. Sazonof 'hoped that His Majesty's Government
+would not fail to proclaim their solidarity with Russia and
+France.[<a href="#note-142">142</a>]' The French Ambassador at St.
+Petersburg joined in the request, and M. Sazonof pointed out
+that</p>
+<p class="blockquote">'we would sooner or later be dragged into war
+if it did break out; we should have rendered war more likely if we
+did not from the outset make common cause with his country and with
+France[<a href="#note-143">143</a>].'</p>
+<p>On July 30th the President of the French Republic expressed his
+conviction that</p>
+<p class="blockquote">'peace between the Powers is in the hands of
+Great Britain. If His Majesty's Government announced that England
+would come to the aid of France in the event of a conflict between
+France and Germany, as a result of the present differences between
+Austria and Servia, there would be no war, for Germany would at
+once modify her attitude[<a href="#note-144">144</a>].'</p>
+<p>Even more important was the opinion of the Italian Minister for
+Foreign Affairs, whose country was a member of the Triple
+Alliance:&mdash;</p>
+<p class="blockquote">'As Germany was really anxious for good
+relations with ourselves, if she believed that Great Britain would
+act with Russia and France, he thought it would have a great
+effect.'[<a href="#note-145">145</a>]</p>
+<p>Such opinions must, and do, carry great weight, but Sir Edward
+Grey and the British Ambassadors were equally firm in withstanding
+them. Sir George Buchanan at once told M. Sazonof that he</p>
+<p class="blockquote">'saw no reason to expect any declaration of
+solidarity from His Majesty's Government that would entail an
+unconditional engagement on their part to support Russia and France
+by force of arms'.[<a href="#note-146">146</a>]</p>
+<p>On July 27th he met the proposal more directly by pointing out
+that, so far from such a policy conducing to the maintenance of
+peace, it would merely offend the pride of the Germans and stiffen
+them in their present attitude.[<a href="#note-147">147</a>] Two
+days later Sir Edward Grey pointed out to M. Cambon that</p>
+<p class="blockquote">'even if the question became one between
+Austria and Russia, we should not feel called upon to take a hand
+in it. It would then be a question of the supremacy of Teuton or
+Slav&mdash;a struggle for supremacy in the Balkans; and our idea
+had always been to avoid being drawn into a war over a Balkan
+question'.[<a href="#note-148">148</a>]</p>
+<p>That is one answer to the proposal, an answer based on history
+and on Britain's foreign policy in past years. Sir Edward Grey had
+another answer. It was to the effect that Germany could not, and
+ought to have known she could not, rely on our neutrality. For when
+the Russian Ambassador told him that an impression prevailed in
+German and Austrian circles that in any event England would stand
+aside, he pointed out that</p>
+<p class="blockquote">'this impression ought to be dispelled by the
+orders we have given to the First Fleet, which is concentrated, as
+it happens, at Portland, not to disperse for manoeuvre
+leave'.[<a href="#note-149">149</a>]</p>
+<p>The situation continued to develop unfavourably for the cause of
+peace owing to the Austrian declaration of war on Servia, and the
+consequent mobilizations in Russia, Germany, and France. On July
+31st Sir Edward Grey said:&mdash;</p>
+<p class="blockquote">'I believe it to be quite untrue that our
+attitude has been a decisive factor in situation. German Government
+do not expect our neutrality.'[<a href="#note-150">150</a>]</p>
+<p>It is not quite clear that Sir Edward Grey's belief was
+justified. England's attitude may have been an important factor in
+the situation, but still in our opinion Sir Edward Grey was not
+only right in refusing to commit England to a new Continental
+policy, but could not, with due observance of constitutional
+usages, have taken any other course. Again, it is doubtful whether
+the German Government did or did not rely on our neutrality. The
+German Chancellor and the German Secretary for Foreign Affairs
+later affected great surprise at our action. Germany, however, as
+we have shown above (<a href="#ch5sec3">p. 82</a>), had been
+plainly warned by Sir Edward Grey on July 29th[<a href=
+"#note-151">151</a>] that she could not rely on our remaining
+neutral under all circumstances.</p>
+<p>Whether Sir Edward Grey was right or wrong in his estimate of
+Germany's prudence is a small matter; what is important is that his
+action was throughout perfectly straightforward and consistent. And
+unquestionably he had a very difficult part to play. The near East
+was like a blazing rick surrounded by farm buildings; Germany was,
+if not stirring up the conflagration, certainly not attempting to
+pour water on the flames, while Austria, possibly&mdash;and even
+probably[<a href="#note-152">152</a>] with Germany's knowledge,
+would allow no one to make the attempt.</p>
+<p>It would have aided the Austrian cause more effectively in
+Europe and elsewhere, if the Government had communicated[<a href=
+"#note-153">153</a>] 'the <i>dossier</i> elucidating the Servian
+intrigues and the connexion between these intrigues and the murder
+of 28th June', which it said it held at the disposal of the British
+Government.[<a href="#note-154">154</a>] For even Count Mensdorff
+'admitted that, on paper, the Servian reply might seem to be
+satisfactory'.[<a href="#note-155">155</a>]</p>
+<p>To judge whether the Servian reply was satisfactory, it was, and
+is, necessary to examine the evidence on which the Austro-Hungarian
+Government based the accusations formulated in its note of July
+23rd. But even assuming that the Austrian charges were true, as the
+German White Book says they are,[<a href="#note-156">156</a>] it is
+only a stronger reason for allowing the Powers to examine this
+evidence; and it does not explain the persistent refusal,[<a href=
+"#note-157">157</a>] until July 31st,[<a href="#note-158">158</a>]
+to permit any negotiations on the basis of the Servian reply.</p>
+<p>Such being the situation, it is very difficult to see what more
+Sir Edward Grey could have done to prevent the outbreak of war
+between Austria-Hungary and Servia, which did inevitably, as he
+foresaw from the first, drag in other nations. He urged Servia to
+moderation and even to submission; he tried to induce the four
+Powers to mediate jointly at St. Petersburg and Vienna; he proposed
+a conference of the four Powers to prevent further complications;
+he did everything in his power to restrain Russia from immediate
+armed support of Servia; he declined to join Russia and France in
+eventual military action; and even up to the violation of the
+neutrality of Belgium he still strove to avert the horrors of war
+from Europe.</p>
+<h3>VI</h3>
+<center><i>Italy's comments on the situation</i>.</center>
+<p>We have already shown (<a href="#CH2">Chap. II</a>) how Italy
+became a member of the Triple Alliance, and how, in spite of its
+apparent frailty and of the somewhat divergent aims of its members,
+that alliance has endured for thirty-two years. It remains to
+consider what policy Italy adopted in the critical situation
+created by the presentation of the Austro-Hungarian note to Servia,
+and to appreciate the significance of that policy. It is supremely
+significant that Italy, though a member of the Triple Alliance, was
+not consulted about the terms of the Austrian note to Servia; that
+she worked persistently side by side with England in endeavouring
+to prevent an outbreak of war, and, when that failed, to induce the
+states actually at war, or on the brink of war, to suspend all
+military operations in order to give diplomatic intervention an
+opportunity; and it is equally significant that, when the great war
+broke out, Italy remained neutral, in spite of the pressure from
+her allies and the tempting bait of a share of the spoil, which, it
+is said, is even now being offered to her.[<a href=
+"#note-159">159</a>] This is but a bald description of Italy's
+policy, but it can be substantiated in detail from official
+documents. As early as July 25th the Italian Ambassador in a
+conversation with Sir Edward Grey 'made no secret of the fact that
+Italy was desirous to see war avoided',[<a href=
+"#note-160">160</a>] and he cordially approved the idea of
+mediation by the four Powers. Two days later Italy again approved
+the proposed conference of four to be held immediately in London.
+The Italian Foreign Minister promised to recommend most strongly to
+the German Government the idea of asking Russia, Austria, and
+Servia to suspend military operations pending the result of the
+conference, and went even further in undertaking to ask what
+procedure Germany thought most likely to be successful at
+Vienna.[<a href="#note-161">161</a>] He thought it very doubtful
+whether Germany would consent to ask Austria to suspend military
+operations, but made a further suggestion that</p>
+<p class="blockquote">'Servia may be induced to accept note in its
+entirety on the advice of the four Powers invited to the
+conference, and this would enable her to say that she had yielded
+to Europe and not to Austria-Hungary alone'.[<a href=
+"#note-162">162</a>]</p>
+<p>Next day the Marquis di San Giuliano called attention to a point
+in Servia's reply to Austria which might form a starting-point for
+mediation.[<a href="#note-163">163</a>] On July 29th he tried to
+get over Germany's objection to the idea of a 'Conference' by
+suggesting adherence to the idea of an exchange of views in
+London.[<a href="#note-164">164</a>] Next day he added to this the
+practical suggestion that</p>
+<p class="blockquote">'Germany might invite Austria to state
+exactly the terms which she would demand from Servia, and give a
+guarantee that she would neither deprive her of independence, nor
+annex territory.... We might, on the other hand, ascertain from
+Russia what she would accept, and, once we knew the standpoints of
+these two countries, discussions could be commenced at
+once.'[<a href="#note-165">165</a>]</p>
+<p>Moreover the Italian Ambassador at Vienna, in the hope of
+pacifying Russia, made the useful suggestion that Austria
+should</p>
+<p class="blockquote">'convert into a binding engagement to Europe
+the declaration which has been made at St. Petersburg to the effect
+that she desires neither to destroy the independence of Servia, nor
+to acquire Servian territory'.[<a href="#note-166">166</a>]</p>
+<p>All efforts to preserve peace proved futile; Germany delivered
+her ultimatum to France and to Russia. Then arose the question,
+what was Italy to do? The answer to this was given by the Italian
+Foreign Minister:&mdash;</p>
+<p class="blockquote">'The war undertaken by Austria, and the
+consequences which might result, had, in the words of the German
+Ambassador himself, an aggressive object. Both were therefore in
+conflict with the purely defensive character of the Triple
+Alliance; in such circumstances Italy would remain
+neutral.'[<a href="#note-167">167</a>]</p>
+<p>The German White Book says 'Russia began the war on us'[<a href=
+"#note-168">168</a>] and 'France opened hostilities'[<a href=
+"#note-169">169</a>]; if these statements were true, Italy would
+have been obliged, if she were to remain faithful to her
+engagements, to take part in the war side by side with her
+colleagues of the Triple Alliance. Impartial readers can draw their
+own conclusions.</p>
+<hr />
+<a name="ch5note" id="ch5note"></a>
+<h3>NOTE</h3>
+<center><i>Austro-Hungarian note to Servia, and Servia's
+reply</i>.</center>
+<p>On July 23rd the Austro-Hungarian Government presented an
+ultimatum to Servia, demanding unconditional acceptance within 48
+hours, an ultimatum which the <i>Temps</i> next day described as
+'unprecedented in its arrogance and in the extravagance of its
+demands'. Of it Sir Edward Grey said:&mdash;</p>
+<p class="blockquote">'I had never before seen one State address to
+another independent State a document of so formidable a character.
+Demand No. 5 would be hardly consistent with the maintenance of
+Servia's independent sovereignty, if it were to mean, as it seemed
+that it might, that Austria-Hungary was to be invested with a right
+to appoint officials who would have authority within the frontiers
+of Servia.'[<a href="#note-170">170</a>]</p>
+<p>It may be true, as the Austrian Ambassador explained,[<a href=
+"#note-171">171</a>] that the Austro-Hungarian Government did not
+intend this step to be regarded as an ultimatum, but as a
+<i>d&eacute;marche</i> with a time-limit.</p>
+<p>In this extraordinary document[<a href="#note-172">172</a>] the
+Austro-Hungarian Government demanded:&mdash;</p>
+<p>A. That Servia should publish on the front page of its 'Official
+Gazette', and in the 'Official Bulletin' of the Army, and should
+communicate to the Army as the order of the day a declaration</p>
+<p>(1) condemning Serb propaganda against Austria-Hungary;</p>
+<p>(2) regretting that Servian officers and functionaries
+participated in the propaganda;</p>
+<p>(3) promising to proceed with the utmost rigour against persons
+who may be guilty of such machinations.</p>
+<p>B. That Servia should undertake</p>
+<p>(1) to suppress any publication inciting to hatred and contempt
+of Austria-Hungary;</p>
+<p>(2) to dissolve the society styled Narodna Odbrana and similar
+societies and to confiscate their means of propaganda;</p>
+<p>(3) to eliminate from public instruction in Servia all teachers
+and all methods of instruction responsible for fomenting opinion
+against Austria-Hungary;</p>
+<p>(4) to remove from the military service and from the
+administration all officers and functionaries guilty of such
+propaganda, whose names and deeds the Austro-Hungarian Government
+reserved to itself the right of communicating;</p>
+<p>(5) to accept the collaboration in Servia of representatives of
+Austria-Hungary in the suppression of the subversive anti-Austrian
+movement;</p>
+<p>(6) to take judicial proceedings against accessories to the
+Serajevo plot, with the co-operation of Austro-Hungarian
+delegates;</p>
+<p>(7) to proceed immediately to the arrest of Major Voija
+Tankositch and of Milan Ciganovitch, a Servian State
+employ&eacute;, who have been compromised by the results of the
+inquiry at Serajevo;</p>
+<p>(8) to stop co-operation of Servian authorities in illicit
+traffic in arms and explosives, and to dismiss and punish those
+officials who helped the perpetrators of the Serajevo crime;</p>
+<p>(9) to explain the unjustifiable utterances of high Servian
+officials, at home and abroad, after the Serajevo crime.</p>
+<p>On July 25th the Servian reply[<a href="#note-173">173</a>] was
+presented to the Austro-Hungarian Government. Even to a reader with
+Austrian sympathies this reply seems to go a long way towards
+meeting the demands. The Servian Government agreed</p>
+<p>A. that Servia should, as demanded, publish a declaration</p>
+<p>(1) condemning all propaganda which may be directed against
+Austria-Hungary;</p>
+<p>(2) regretting that, according to the communication from the
+Imperial and Royal Government, Servian officers and officials
+participated in the propaganda;</p>
+<p>(3) promising to proceed with the utmost rigour against all
+persons who are guilty of such acts.</p>
+<p>B. That Servia would undertake</p>
+<p>(1) to introduce a provision into the press law providing for
+the most severe punishment of incitement to hatred and contempt of
+Austria-Hungary and to introduce an amendment to the Constitution
+providing for the confiscation of such publications;</p>
+<p>(2) to dissolve the Narodna Odbrana and similar societies;</p>
+<p>(3) to remove at once from their public educational
+establishments all that serves or could serve to foment propaganda,
+whenever the Austro-Hungarian Government furnish them with facts
+and proofs of this propaganda;</p>
+<p>(4) to remove from military service all such persons as the
+judicial inquiry may have proved to be guilty of acts directed
+against the territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary;</p>
+<p>(5) though they do not clearly grasp the meaning or the scope of
+the demand, to accept the collaboration of Austro-Hungarian
+officials so far as is consistent with the principle of
+international law, with criminal procedure and with good
+neighbourly relations;</p>
+<p>(6) to take judicial proceedings against accessories to the
+Serajevo plot; but they cannot admit the co-operation of
+Austro-Hungarian officials, as it would be a violation of the
+Constitution and of the law of criminal procedure;</p>
+<p>(7) On this they remark that Major Tankositch was arrested as
+soon as the note was presented, and that it has not been possible
+to arrest Ciganovitch, who is an Austro-Hungarian subject, but had
+been employed (on probation) by the directorate of railways;</p>
+<p>(8) to reinforce and extend the measures for preventing illicit
+traffic of arms and explosives across the frontier;</p>
+<p>(9) to give explanations of the remarks made by Servian
+officials, as soon as the Austro-Hungarian Government have
+communicated the passages and as soon as they have shown that the
+remarks were actually made by the said officials.</p>
+<p>The Austro-Hungarian Government regarded this reply as
+unsatisfactory and inadequate; they withdrew their Minister from
+Belgrade the same evening, and on July 28th declared war on Servia.
+Meanwhile they published a long official explanation[<a href=
+"#note-174">174</a>] of the grounds on which the Servian reply was
+considered inadequate; in it they criticized and found
+unsatisfactory every single article of the reply, except that to
+demand No. 8. It is not worth while to analyze the whole of this;
+one sample may be sufficient. Sir Edward Grey commented on demand
+No. 5 and pointed out[<a href="#note-175">175</a>] that it</p>
+<p class="blockquote">'would be hardly consistent with the
+maintenance of Servia's independent sovereignty, if it were to
+mean, as it seemed that it might, that Austria-Hungary was to be
+invested with a right to appoint officials who would have authority
+within the frontiers of Servia.'</p>
+<p>Obviously he was in doubt about the meaning and scope of this
+demand, and the next was equally vague. The Servian reply to these
+two demands was necessarily guarded: yet the Austro-Hungarian
+Government treated this as deliberate misrepresentation:&mdash;</p>
+<p class="blockquote">'The international law, as well as the
+criminal law, has nothing to do with this question; it is purely a
+matter of the nature of state police which is to be solved by way
+of a special agreement. The reserved attitude of Servia is
+therefore incomprehensible, and on account of its vague general
+form it would lead to unbridgeable difficulties.</p>
+<p class="blockquote">...</p>
+<p class="blockquote">'If the Servian Government misunderstands us
+here, this is done deliberately, for it must be familiar with the
+difference between "enqu&ecirc;te judiciaire" and simple police
+researches. As it desired to escape from every control of the
+investigation which would yield, if correctly carried out, highly
+undesirable results for it, and as it possesses no means to refuse
+in a plausible manner the co-operation of our officials (precedents
+for such police intervention exist in great number), it tries to
+justify its refusal by showing up our demands as
+impossible.'[<a href="#note-176">176</a>]</p>
+<p>It would have been fairer to Servia to assume that there had
+been a genuine misunderstanding, and that the explanation here
+given by Austria might prove satisfactory to Servia, as the Italian
+Minister for Foreign Affairs suggested.[<a href=
+"#note-177">177</a>] The persistent refusal of Austria-Hungary to
+permit any discussion on the basis of the Servian reply goes far to
+justify Sir Maurice de Bunsen's impression</p>
+<p class="blockquote">'that the Austro-Hungarian note was so drawn
+up as to make war inevitable, that their Government are fully
+resolved to have war with Servia, that they consider their position
+as a Great Power to be at stake, and that until punishment has been
+administered to Servia it is unlikely that they will listen to
+proposals of mediation'.[<a href="#note-178">178</a>]</p>
+<p>Notes:</p>
+<p><a name="note-57" id="note-57">
+<!-- Note Anchor 57 --></a>[Footnote 57: <i>Correspondence
+respecting the European Crisis</i>, No. 2. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E.
+Grey, July 22, 1914.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-58" id="note-58">
+<!-- Note Anchor 58 --></a>[Footnote 58: German White Book, p.
+4.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-59" id="note-59">
+<!-- Note Anchor 59 --></a>[Footnote 59: <i>Correspondence</i>, No.
+10. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, July 24.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-60" id="note-60">
+<!-- Note Anchor 60 --></a>[Footnote 60: <i>Correspondence</i>, No.
+18. Sir H. Rumbold to Sir E. Grey, July 25.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-61" id="note-61">
+<!-- Note Anchor 61 --></a>[Footnote 61: Ibid. No. 32. Sir M. de
+Bunsen to Sir E. Grey, July 26. See also German White Book, p.
+5.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-62" id="note-62">
+<!-- Note Anchor 62 --></a>[Footnote 62: Ibid. No. 54. M. Sazonof
+to Count Benckendorff, July 15/28, 1914 (communicated by Count
+Benckendorff, July 28).]</p>
+<p><a name="note-63" id="note-63">
+<!-- Note Anchor 63 --></a>[Footnote 63: <i>Correspondence</i>, No.
+139. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, August 1.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-64" id="note-64">
+<!-- Note Anchor 64 --></a>[Footnote 64: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 141. Sir
+M. de Bunsen to Sir E. Grey, August 1.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-65" id="note-65">
+<!-- Note Anchor 65 --></a>[Footnote 65: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 71. Sir
+E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 28.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-66" id="note-66">
+<!-- Note Anchor 66 --></a>[Footnote 66: <i>Correspondence</i>, No.
+94. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir E. Grey, July 29.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-67" id="note-67">
+<!-- Note Anchor 67 --></a>[Footnote 67: German White Book, p. 4
+(see <i>infra</i> <a href="#RULE4_2">Appendix I</a>).]</p>
+<p><a name="note-68" id="note-68">
+<!-- Note Anchor 68 --></a>[Footnote 68: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 36. Sir
+E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, Sir H. Rumbold, and Sir R. Rodd, July
+26.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-69" id="note-69">
+<!-- Note Anchor 69 --></a>[Footnote 69: <i>Correspondence</i>, No.
+43. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 27.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-70" id="note-70">
+<!-- Note Anchor 70 --></a>[Footnote 70: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 60. Sir
+E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 28.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-71" id="note-71">
+<!-- Note Anchor 71 --></a>[Footnote 71: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 84. Sir
+E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, July 29.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-72" id="note-72">
+<!-- Note Anchor 72 --></a>[Footnote 72: p. 8 and Exhibit 12 (see
+<i>infra</i> <a href="#RULE4_2">Appendix I</a>).]</p>
+<p><a name="note-73" id="note-73">
+<!-- Note Anchor 73 --></a>[Footnote 73: <i>Correspondence</i>, No.
+11. Sir E. Grey to Sir II. Rumbold, July 24.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-74" id="note-74">
+<!-- Note Anchor 74 --></a>[Footnote 74: <i>Correspondence</i>, No.
+46. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, July 27.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-75" id="note-75">
+<!-- Note Anchor 75 --></a>[Footnote 75: Ibid. No. 80. Sir R. Rodd
+to Sir E. Grey, July 29.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-76" id="note-76">
+<!-- Note Anchor 76 --></a>[Footnote 76: Ibid. No. 43. Sir E.
+Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 27.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-77" id="note-77">
+<!-- Note Anchor 77 --></a>[Footnote 77: Although the German White
+Book attempts to make out that Russia mobilized on July 26th, it
+produces no evidence more satisfactory than the information of the
+German Imperial attach&eacute; in Russia, whose account of the
+Russian military preparations supports only in part the allegations
+made at Berlin. See German White Book, Exhibits 6 and 7; also
+<i>Correspondence</i>, No. 78, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July
+29. For the Austrian decree of general mobilization, see the
+Russian Orange Book No. 47 (<i>infra</i> in <a href=
+"#RULE4_7">Appendix VI</a>).]</p>
+<p><a name="note-78" id="note-78">
+<!-- Note Anchor 78 --></a>[Footnote 78: <i>Correspondence</i>, No.
+43. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 27.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-79" id="note-79">
+<!-- Note Anchor 79 --></a>[Footnote 79: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 76. The
+same to the same, July 29.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-80" id="note-80">
+<!-- Note Anchor 80 --></a>[Footnote 80: <i>Correspondence</i>, No.
+78. Sir George Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 29, 1914.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-81" id="note-81">
+<!-- Note Anchor 81 --></a>[Footnote 81: German White Book, p. 38,
+and Exhibit No. 7, July 26.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-82" id="note-82">
+<!-- Note Anchor 82 --></a>[Footnote 82: <i>Correspondence</i>, No.
+71. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 28. See also quotation in
+<i>Times</i> of July 29, p. 8, col. 2, from the
+<i>Milit&auml;r-Wochenblatt</i>: 'The fighting power of Russia is
+usually over-estimated, and numbers are far less decisive than
+<i>moral</i>, the higher command, armaments.... All military
+preparations for war, of whatever sort, have been taken with that
+attention to detail and that order which marks Germany. It can
+therefore be said, without exaggeration, that Germany can face the
+advent of grave events with complete calm, trusting to God and her
+own might.']</p>
+<p><a name="note-83" id="note-83">
+<!-- Note Anchor 83 --></a>[Footnote 83: <i>Correspondence</i>, No.
+80. Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey, July 29.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-84" id="note-84">
+<!-- Note Anchor 84 --></a>[Footnote 84: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 97. Sir
+G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 30. Cf. Russian Orange Book, Nos.
+61, 62 (<i>infra</i> in <a href="#RULE4_7">Appendix VI</a>).]</p>
+<p><a name="note-85" id="note-85">
+<!-- Note Anchor 85 --></a>[Footnote 85: <i>Ibid</i>.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-86" id="note-86">
+<!-- Note Anchor 86 --></a>[Footnote 86: <i>Correspondence</i>, No.
+97. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 30.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-87" id="note-87">
+<!-- Note Anchor 87 --></a>[Footnote 87: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 113. Sir
+G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 31.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-88" id="note-88">
+<!-- Note Anchor 88 --></a>[Footnote 88: <i>Ibid</i>.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-89" id="note-89">
+<!-- Note Anchor 89 --></a>[Footnote 89: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 112. Sir
+E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 31.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-90" id="note-90">
+<!-- Note Anchor 90 --></a>[Footnote 90: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 113,
+<i>ut sup</i>. On August 1 <i>The Times</i> published a
+semi-official telegram from Berlin, dated Eydtkuhnen, July 31, that
+'the second and third Russian cavalry divisions are on the frontier
+between Wirballen, Augustof, and Allenstein'.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-91" id="note-91">
+<!-- Note Anchor 91 --></a>[Footnote 91: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 111. Sir
+E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, July 31.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-92" id="note-92">
+<!-- Note Anchor 92 --></a>[Footnote 92: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 121. Sir
+E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 31.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-93" id="note-93">
+<!-- Note Anchor 93 --></a>[Footnote 93: See German White Book, pp.
+12 and 13, and Exhibits 20, 21, 22, 23, 23a (see <i>infra</i>
+<a href="#RULE4_2">Appendix I</a>).]</p>
+<p><a name="note-94" id="note-94">
+<!-- Note Anchor 94 --></a>[Footnote 94: <i>Correspondence</i>, No.
+121. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 31.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-95" id="note-95">
+<!-- Note Anchor 95 --></a>[Footnote 95: <i>Ibid</i>. Nos. 131,
+133, 135.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-96" id="note-96">
+<!-- Note Anchor 96 --></a>[Footnote 96: Russian Orange Book, No.
+58 (<i>infra</i> Appendix VI).]</p>
+<p><a name="note-97" id="note-97">
+<!-- Note Anchor 97 --></a>[Footnote 97: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 133. Sir
+E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, August 1, encloses a telegram of July
+31, to the effect that 'The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador declared
+the readiness of his Government to discuss the substance of the
+Austrian ultimatum to Servia. M. Sazonof replied by expressing his
+satisfaction, and said it was desirable that the discussions should
+take place in London with the participation of the Great
+Powers.']</p>
+<p><a name="note-98" id="note-98">
+<!-- Note Anchor 98 --></a>[Footnote 98: German White Book, p.
+8.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-99" id="note-99">
+<!-- Note Anchor 99 --></a>[Footnote 99: <i>Ibid</i>. p. 9, Exhibit
+No. 17.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-100" id="note-100">
+<!-- Note Anchor 100 --></a>[Footnote 100: <i>Correspondence</i>,
+No. 76. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 29: 'His Excellency
+denied German Government had done this. Nevertheless it is
+true.']</p>
+<p><a name="note-101" id="note-101">
+<!-- Note Anchor 101 --></a>[Footnote 101: Ibid. No. 99. Sir F.
+Bertie to Sir E. Grey, July 30.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-102" id="note-102">
+<!-- Note Anchor 102 --></a>[Footnote 102: <i>Correspondence</i>.
+Enclosure 3 in No. 105. French Minister for Foreign Affairs to M.
+Cambon.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-103" id="note-103">
+<!-- Note Anchor 103 --></a>[Footnote 103: <i>Ibid</i>.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-104" id="note-104">
+<!-- Note Anchor 104 --></a>[Footnote 104: German White Book, p. 48
+(see <i>infra</i>, <a href="#RULE4_2">Appendix I</a>).]</p>
+<p><a name="note-105" id="note-105">
+<!-- Note Anchor 105 --></a>[Footnote 105: <i>Correspondence</i>,
+No. 138. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, Aug. 1.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-106" id="note-106">
+<!-- Note Anchor 106 --></a>[Footnote 106: <i>Correspondence</i>,
+No. 24. Sir E. Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, July 25.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-107" id="note-107">
+<!-- Note Anchor 107 --></a>[Footnote 107: <i>Correspondence</i>,
+No. 47. Sir E. Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, July 27.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-108" id="note-108">
+<!-- Note Anchor 108 --></a>[Footnote 108: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 89. Sir
+E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, July 29.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-109" id="note-109">
+<!-- Note Anchor 109 --></a>[Footnote 109: <i>Correspondence</i>,
+No. 85. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 29 (received July
+29).]</p>
+<p><a name="note-110" id="note-110">
+<!-- Note Anchor 110 --></a>[Footnote 110: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 101.
+Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, July 30.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-111" id="note-111">
+<!-- Note Anchor 111 --></a>[Footnote 111: <i>Correspondence</i>,
+No. 109. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 31.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-112" id="note-112">
+<!-- Note Anchor 112 --></a>[Footnote 112: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 106.
+Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey, July 30.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-113" id="note-113">
+<!-- Note Anchor 113 --></a>[Footnote 113: <i>Correspondence</i>,
+No. 114. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie and Sir E. Goschen, July
+31.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-114" id="note-114">
+<!-- Note Anchor 114 --></a>[Footnote 114: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 125.
+Sir F. Bertie to Sir E. Grey, July 31.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-115" id="note-115">
+<!-- Note Anchor 115 --></a>[Footnote 115: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 122.
+Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 31. It may be observed that by
+the Hague Convention of 1907, Belgium was bound to impose this
+embargo after the ultimatum of Germany to Russia (Art. 2).]</p>
+<p><a name="note-116" id="note-116">
+<!-- Note Anchor 116 --></a>[Footnote 116: <i>Correspondence</i>,
+No. 123. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, August 1.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-117" id="note-117">
+<!-- Note Anchor 117 --></a>[Footnote 117: <i>The Times</i>, August
+28, 1914, p. 9, cols. 5 and 6.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-118" id="note-118">
+<!-- Note Anchor 118 --></a>[Footnote 118: See <i>The Times</i>,
+August 27, 1914. The Imperial Chancellor telegraphed to Prince
+Lichnowsky: 'Germany is ready to take up the English proposal if
+England guarantees with her forces the absolute neutrality of
+France in a Russo-German conflict.... We promise that the French
+frontier shall not be passed by our troops before 7 p.m. on Monday,
+August 3, if England's consent is given in the meantime.']</p>
+<p><a name="note-119" id="note-119">
+<!-- Note Anchor 119 --></a>[Footnote 119: <i>Correspondence</i>,
+No. 148. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, August 2.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-120" id="note-120">
+<!-- Note Anchor 120 --></a>[Footnote 120: <i>Correspondence</i>,
+No. 147. Minister of State, Luxemburg, to Sir E. Grey, August
+2.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-121" id="note-121">
+<!-- Note Anchor 121 --></a>[Footnote 121: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 153.
+Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, August 4.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-122" id="note-122">
+<!-- Note Anchor 122 --></a>[Footnote 122: <i>Ibid</i>.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-123" id="note-123">
+<!-- Note Anchor 123 --></a>[Footnote 123: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 155.
+Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Villiers, August 4.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-124" id="note-124">
+<!-- Note Anchor 124 --></a>[Footnote 124: <i>Correspondence</i>,
+No. 157. German Foreign Secretary to Prince Lichnowsky, August
+4.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-125" id="note-125">
+<!-- Note Anchor 125 --></a>[Footnote 125: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 159.
+Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, August 4.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-126" id="note-126">
+<!-- Note Anchor 126 --></a>[Footnote 126: <i>Correspondence</i>,
+No. 116, July 31.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-127" id="note-127">
+<!-- Note Anchor 127 --></a>[Footnote 127: <i>Ibid</i>. Nos. 130,
+143, 145.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-128" id="note-128">
+<!-- Note Anchor 128 --></a>[Footnote 128: <i>Ibid</i>. Nos. 149,
+150, August 2 and 3.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-129" id="note-129">
+<!-- Note Anchor 129 --></a>[Footnote 129: <i>The Times</i>, August
+11, p. 5, col. 1.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-130" id="note-130">
+<!-- Note Anchor 130 --></a>[Footnote 130: <i>Thoughts on Various
+Subjects, Moral and Diverting</i> (October, 1706).]</p>
+<p><a name="note-131" id="note-131">
+<!-- Note Anchor 131 --></a>[Footnote 131: p. 6.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-132" id="note-132">
+<!-- Note Anchor 132 --></a>[Footnote 132: <i>Correspondence</i>,
+No. 5. Sir E. Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, July 24.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-133" id="note-133">
+<!-- Note Anchor 133 --></a>[Footnote 133: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 10. Sir
+E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, July 24. Cf. No. 24, Sir E. Grey to Sir
+G. Buchanan, July 25: 'The sudden, brusque, and peremptory
+character of the Austrian <i>d&eacute;marche</i> makes it almost
+inevitable that in a very short time both Russia and Austria will
+have mobilized against each other.']</p>
+<p><a name="note-134" id="note-134">
+<!-- Note Anchor 134 --></a>[Footnote 134: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 12. Sir
+E. Grey to Mr. Crackanthorpe, July 24.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-135" id="note-135">
+<!-- Note Anchor 135 --></a>[Footnote 135: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 6. Sir
+G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 24: 'I said ... direct British
+interests in Servia were <i>nil</i>, and a war on behalf of that
+country would never be sanctioned by British public opinion.']</p>
+<p><a name="note-136" id="note-136">
+<!-- Note Anchor 136 --></a>[Footnote 136: <i>Correspondence</i>,
+No. 24. Sir E. Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, July 25.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-137" id="note-137">
+<!-- Note Anchor 137 --></a>[Footnote 137: See <a href=
+"#ch5note">note</a> at the end of this chapter.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-138" id="note-138">
+<!-- Note Anchor 138 --></a>[Footnote 138: <i>Correspondence</i>,
+No. 36. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, July 26.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-139" id="note-139">
+<!-- Note Anchor 139 --></a>[Footnote 139: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 87. Sir
+E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, July 29.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-140" id="note-140">
+<!-- Note Anchor 140 --></a>[Footnote 140: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 91. Sir
+E. Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, July 29.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-141" id="note-141">
+<!-- Note Anchor 141 --></a>[Footnote 141: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 13.
+Note communicated to Sir E. Grey by the Russian Ambassador, July
+25.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-142" id="note-142">
+<!-- Note Anchor 142 --></a>[Footnote 142: <i>Correspondence</i>,
+No. 6. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 24.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-143" id="note-143">
+<!-- Note Anchor 143 --></a>[Footnote 143: <i>Ibid</i>.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-144" id="note-144">
+<!-- Note Anchor 144 --></a>[Footnote 144: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 99. Sir
+F. Bertie to Sir E. Grey, July 30. Cf. No. 119, Sir E. Grey to Sir
+F. Bertie, July 31.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-145" id="note-145">
+<!-- Note Anchor 145 --></a>[Footnote 145: <i>Correspondence</i>,
+No. 80. Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey, July 29.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-146" id="note-146">
+<!-- Note Anchor 146 --></a>[Footnote 146: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 6. Sir
+G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 24.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-147" id="note-147">
+<!-- Note Anchor 147 --></a>[Footnote 147: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 44. Sir
+G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 27: 'Their (sc. the German)
+attitude would merely be stiffened by such a menace, and we could
+only induce her (sc. Germany) to use her influence at Vienna to
+avert war by approaching her in the capacity of a friend who was
+anxious to preserve peace.']</p>
+<p><a name="note-148" id="note-148">
+<!-- Note Anchor 148 --></a>[Footnote 148: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 87. Sir
+E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, July 29.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-149" id="note-149">
+<!-- Note Anchor 149 --></a>[Footnote 149: <i>Correspondence</i>,
+No. 47. Sir E. Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, July 27.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-150" id="note-150">
+<!-- Note Anchor 150 --></a>[Footnote 150: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 116.
+Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, July 31.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-151" id="note-151">
+<!-- Note Anchor 151 --></a>[Footnote 151: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 89. Sir
+E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, July 29.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-152" id="note-152">
+<!-- Note Anchor 152 --></a>[Footnote 152: <i>Correspondence</i>,
+No. 95. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir E. Grey, July 30: 'Although I am
+not able to verify it, I have private information that the German
+Ambassador knew the text of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia before
+it was despatched, and telegraphed it to the German Emperor. I know
+from the German Ambassador himself that he endorses every line of
+it.']</p>
+<p><a name="note-153" id="note-153">
+<!-- Note Anchor 153 --></a>[Footnote 153: But see <a href=
+"#RULE4_5">Appendix IV</a>.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-154" id="note-154">
+<!-- Note Anchor 154 --></a>[Footnote 154: <i>Correspondence</i>,
+No. 4, p. 8.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-155" id="note-155">
+<!-- Note Anchor 155 --></a>[Footnote 155: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 48. Sir
+E. Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, July 27.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-156" id="note-156">
+<!-- Note Anchor 156 --></a>[Footnote 156: pp. 3 to 5 and Exhibits
+1 and 2 (see <i>infra</i> <a href="#RULE4_2">Appendix I</a>).]</p>
+<p><a name="note-157" id="note-157">
+<!-- Note Anchor 157 --></a>[Footnote 157: <i>Correspondence</i>,
+No. 61, Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir E. Grey, July 28; No. 78, Sir G.
+Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 29; No. 96, Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir
+E. Grey, July 30.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-158" id="note-158">
+<!-- Note Anchor 158 --></a>[Footnote 158: <i>Correspondence</i>,
+No. 110, Sir E. Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, July 31; No. 137, Sir E.
+Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, August 1.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-159" id="note-159">
+<!-- Note Anchor 159 --></a>[Footnote 159: <i>The Times</i>,
+September 3, p. 7. For Italy's ignorance of the contents of the
+Austrian note, see <a href="#RULE4_6">App. V</a>.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-160" id="note-160">
+<!-- Note Anchor 160 --></a>[Footnote 160: <i>Correspondence</i>,
+No. 29. Sir E. Grey to Sir R. Rodd, July 25.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-161" id="note-161">
+<!-- Note Anchor 161 --></a>[Footnote 161: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 49. Sir
+E. Grey to Sir R. Rodd, July 27.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-162" id="note-162">
+<!-- Note Anchor 162 --></a>[Footnote 162: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 57. Sir
+R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey, July 27. Cf. No. 78, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir
+E. Grey, July 29.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-163" id="note-163">
+<!-- Note Anchor 163 --></a>[Footnote 163: <i>Correspondence</i>,
+No. 64. Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey, July 28. Cf. <i>supra</i>, p.
+99.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-164" id="note-164">
+<!-- Note Anchor 164 --></a>[Footnote 164: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 80. Sir
+R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey, July 29. Cf. No. 92, Sir E. Grey to Sir R.
+Rodd, July 29.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-165" id="note-165">
+<!-- Note Anchor 165 --></a>[Footnote 165: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 106.
+Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey, July 30.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-166" id="note-166">
+<!-- Note Anchor 166 --></a>[Footnote 166: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 79. Sir
+M. de Bunsen to Sir E. Grey, July 29.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-167" id="note-167">
+<!-- Note Anchor 167 --></a>[Footnote 167: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 152.
+Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, August 3.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-168" id="note-168">
+<!-- Note Anchor 168 --></a>[Footnote 168: p. 15 (see <a href=
+"#RULE4_2">Appendix I</a> <i>infra</i>).]</p>
+<p><a name="note-169" id="note-169">
+<!-- Note Anchor 169 --></a>[Footnote 169: p. 16
+(<i>ibid.</i>).]</p>
+<p><a name="note-170" id="note-170">
+<!-- Note Anchor 170 --></a>[Footnote 170: <i>Correspondence</i>,
+No. 5. Sir E. Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, July 24. The text is also
+given in the German White Book (pp. 18-23), which will be found in
+<a href="#RULE4_2">Appendix I</a>.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-171" id="note-171">
+<!-- Note Anchor 171 --></a>[Footnote 171: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 14. Sir
+E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, July 25.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-172" id="note-172">
+<!-- Note Anchor 172 --></a>[Footnote 172: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 4.
+Communicated by Count Mensdorff, July 24.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-173" id="note-173">
+<!-- Note Anchor 173 --></a>[Footnote 173: <i>Correspondence</i>,
+No. 39. Communicated by the Servian Minister, July 27. See also
+German White Book (pp. 23-32), <i>infra</i> in <a href=
+"#RULE4_2">Appendix I</a>.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-174" id="note-174">
+<!-- Note Anchor 174 --></a>[Footnote 174: German White Book, pp.
+24 <i>et sqq</i>.; see <i>infra</i> <a href="#RULE4_2">Appendix
+I</a>.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-175" id="note-175">
+<!-- Note Anchor 175 --></a>[Footnote 175: <i>Correspondence</i>,
+No. 5. Sir E. Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, July 24.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-176" id="note-176">
+<!-- Note Anchor 176 --></a>[Footnote 176: German White Book, pp.
+29 <i>et sqq</i>.; see <i>infra</i> <a href="#RULE4_2">Appendix
+I</a>.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-177" id="note-177">
+<!-- Note Anchor 177 --></a>[Footnote 177: <i>Correspondence</i>,
+No. 64. Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey, July 28.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-178" id="note-178">
+<!-- Note Anchor 178 --></a>[Footnote 178: <i>Ibid</i>. No. 41. Sir
+M. de Bunsen to Sir E. Grey, July 27.]</p>
+<hr />
+<a name="CH6" id="CH6"><!-- CH6 --></a>
+<h2>CHAPTER VI</h2>
+<center>THE NEW GERMAN THEORY OF THE STATE</center>
+<p>The war in which England is now engaged with Germany is
+fundamentally a war between two different principles&mdash;that of
+<i>raison d'&eacute;tat</i>, and that of the rule of law. The
+antagonism between these two principles appeared in our own
+internal history as far back as the seventeenth century, when the
+Stuarts championed the theory of state-necessity and the practice
+of a prerogative free to act outside and above the law in order to
+meet the demands of state-necessity, and when Parliament defended
+the rule of law and sought to include the Crown under that law. The
+same antagonism now appears externally in a struggle between two
+nations, one of which claims a prerogative to act outside and above
+the public law of Europe in order to secure the 'safety' of its own
+state, while the other stands for the rule of public law. The one
+regards international covenants to which it has pledged its own
+word as 'scraps of paper' when they stand in the way of <i>salus
+populi</i>; the other regards the maintenance of such covenants as
+a grave and inevitable obligation.</p>
+<p>Taught by Treitschke, whom they regard as their great national
+historian, and whose lectures on <i>Politik</i> have become a
+gospel, the Germans of to-day assume as an ultimate end and a final
+standard what they regard as the national German state.[<a href=
+"#note-179">179</a>] 'The state', says Treitschke, 'is the highest
+thing in the external society of man: above it there is nothing at
+all in the history of the world.' There is here no room for comity
+of nations; for a <i>societas totius humani generis</i>; for
+international law in any true sense. What really exists is the
+exclusive state&mdash;<i>der geschlossene Staat</i>&mdash;and in
+another sense than that of Fichte. This state is rigorously
+national: it excludes all foreign words from its vocabulary, and it
+would fain exclude all foreign articles from its shores in order to
+found a real 'national' economy such as List preached. Further, in
+the teaching of Treitschke this exclusive state is, 'as Machiavelli
+first clearly saw', essentially power: <i>der Staat ist Macht</i>.
+It may be defined as 'the public might for defence and offence'. As
+the highest duty of the individual is self-perfection, the highest
+duty of the state is self-preservation; and self-preservation means
+power. 'To care for its power is the highest moral duty of the
+state.' 'Of all political weaknesses that of feebleness is the most
+abominable and despicable: it is the sin against the Holy Spirit of
+Politics.' This may seem the mere worship of might, and it is in
+effect nothing else than the mere worship of might; but we should
+misrepresent Treitschke if we did not add that power is not
+conceived by him as mere or bare power. The power of the state is
+precious and ultimate because the state is a vehicle of culture:
+the armed sword of the German state is precious because that state
+is the <i>colporteur</i> of German culture. And thus Treitschke
+holds that Machiavelli, the great apostle of might, is only wrong
+in so far as he failed to see that might must justify itself by
+having a content, that is to say, by being used to spread the
+highest moral culture. It is naturally assumed by German
+nationalists that this is German culture.</p>
+<p>Two results flow from this philosophy, one negative, the other
+positive. The negative result is the repudiation of any idea of the
+final character of international obligation; the other is the
+praise of the glory of war.</p>
+<p><i>Salus populi suprema lex</i>; and to it all international
+'law' so called must bend. The absolute sovereignty of the state is
+necessary for its absolute power; and that absolute sovereignty
+cannot be bound by <i>any</i> obligation, even of its own making.
+Every treaty or promise made by a state, Treitschke holds, is to be
+understood as limited by the proviso <i>rebus sic stantibus</i>. 'A
+state cannot bind its will for the future over against other
+states.' International treaties are no absolute limitation, but a
+voluntary self-limitation of the state, and only for such time as
+the state may find to be convenient. The state has no judge set
+over it, and any 'legal' obligation it may incur is in the last
+resort subject to its own decision&mdash;in other words, to its own
+repudiation.[<a href="#note-180">180</a>] That the end justifies
+the means (in other words, that the maintenance of the German
+Empire as it stands justifies the violation of an international
+obligation) 'has a certain truth'. 'It is ridiculous to advise a
+state which is in competition with other states to start by taking
+the catechism into its hands.' All these hints of his master were
+adopted and expanded by Bernhardi, the faithful disciple of
+Treitschke, whose Berlin lectures were attended in the last quarter
+of the nineteenth century by soldiers and officials as well as by
+students. There is no such thing, Bernhardi feels, as universal
+international law. 'Each nation evolves its own conception of Right
+(<i>Recht</i>): none can say that one nation has a better
+conception than another.' 'No self-respecting nation would
+sacrifice its own conception of Right' to any international rule:
+'by so doing it would renounce its own highest ideals.' The ardent
+nationalism which will reject foreign words and foreign wares will
+reject international law as something 'foreign'. Again, Bernhardi
+makes play with the proviso <i>rebus sic stantibus</i>; and this,
+curiously enough, he does in reference to Belgium. Things are
+altered in Belgium, and therefore the plighted word of Germany may
+no longer be binding. 'When Belgium was proclaimed neutral, no one
+contemplated that she would lay claim to a large and valuable
+region of Africa. It may well be asked whether the acquisition of
+such territory is not <i>ipso facto</i> a breach of
+neutrality.'[<a href="#note-181">181</a>]</p>
+<p>But it is the glorification of war&mdash;war aggressive as well
+as war defensive&mdash;which is the most striking result of the
+doctrine of the all-sufficing, all-embracing national state. In the
+index to Treitschke's <i>Politik</i>, under the word War, one reads
+the following headings&mdash;'its sanctity'; 'to be conceived as an
+ordinance set by God'; 'is the most powerful maker of nations'; 'is
+politics <i>par excellence</i>'. Two functions, says Treitschke,
+the state exists to discharge; and these are to administer law, and
+to make war. Of the two war, since it is politics <i>par
+excellence</i>, would appear to be the greater. War cannot be
+thought or wished out of the world: it is the only medicine for a
+sick nation. When we are sunk in the selfish individualism of
+peace, war comes to make us realize that we are members one of
+another. 'Therein lies the majesty of war, that the petty
+individual altogether vanishes before the great thought of the
+state.' War alone makes us realize the social organism to which we
+belong: 'it is political idealism which demands war.' And again,
+'what a perversion of morality it were, if one struck out of
+humanity heroism'(<i>Heldentum</i>)&mdash;as if <i>Heldentum</i>
+could not exist in peace! 'But the living God will see to it that
+war shall always recur as a terrible medicine for humanity.'</p>
+<p>Thus the idealization of the state as power results in the
+idealization of war. As we have seen that the state must be 'power'
+in order to preserve itself at all, we now find that it must be a
+war-state to preserve itself from 'sickness'. If it does not fight,
+individualism will triumph over the social organism; heroism will
+perish out of the world. Hence Bernhardi writes: 'the maintenance
+of peace never can or may be the goal of a policy'. War,
+war&mdash;the 'strong medicine', the teacher of heroism, and, as
+Bernhardi adds to Treitschke, the inevitable biological law, the
+force that spreads the finest culture&mdash;war is the law of
+humanity. And this war is offensive as well as
+defensive&mdash;primarily, indeed, offensive. For the growing
+nation must preserve all its new members in its bosom: it must not
+let them slip away by emigration to foreign soils. It must
+therefore find for itself colonies; and since the world is already
+largely occupied, it must find them by conquest from other
+powers.[<a href="#note-182">182</a>] Treitschke already cried the
+watchwords&mdash;'Colonies!' 'Sea-power to gain colonies!'
+Treitschke already designated England as the object of German
+attack, and began to instil in Germany a hatred of England. England
+blocked the way to the growth of Germany from a European into a
+World-power; Germany, to preserve intact for German culture the
+surplus of the growing population, must be a World-power or perish.
+And besides, England was a 'sick' state&mdash;a sham, an
+hypocrisy.[<a href="#note-183">183</a>]</p>
+<p>The whole philosophy seems paganism, or rather barbarism, with a
+moral veneer. It seems barbarism, because it brings us back to the
+good old days when mere might was right. Bernhardi, speaking of the
+right of conquest of new territory inherent in a growing people,
+tells us that in such cases 'might is at once the supreme right,
+and the dispute as to what is right is decided by the arbitrament
+of war', which gives a 'biologically just decision'! And he
+expresses wonder and surprise at those who think that 'the weak
+nation is to have the same right to live as the powerful and
+vigorous nation'. In a word, then, might is right. The doctrine has
+in itself a rude barbaric simplicity: what is utterly revolting in
+the neo-Germanic presentment is its moral veneer&mdash;the talk of
+war as the fruit of 'political idealism' and the expression of the
+'social organism': the talk of 'historical development' as
+invalidating supposed 'rights' like the neutrality of Belgium;
+above all, the talk of power as 'the vehicle of the highest
+culture'. Treitschke, a stern Protestant, seeks to reconcile the
+doctrine with Christianity; but the doctrine is all the same pagan.
+It is the worship of brute force disguised as <i>Heldentum</i>, and
+of vicious cunning disguised as political morality: it is a mixture
+of Nietzsche[<a href="#note-184">184</a>] and of Machiavelli. It is
+a doctrine of the omnipotence of the super-nation, which 'to
+maintain its state', as Machiavelli said, 'will go to work against
+faith and charity and humanity and religion', and which will stride
+ruthlessly to war when 'the day' comes. And when it goes to war,
+all the veneer of culture goes. 'Have a care', Mommsen once said,
+'lest in this state, which has been at once a power in arms and a
+power in intelligence, the intelligence should vanish, and nothing
+but the pure military state should remain.' Mommsen's warning has
+come true in August, 1914. By their fruits ye shall know them. The
+fruits of <i>Heldentum</i> are Louvain smoking in ashes to the
+sky.</p>
+<p>It has seemed worth while to describe this philosophy of life,
+because it is not only the philosophy of a professor like
+Treitschke, but also that of a soldier like Bernhardi; and not only
+so, but it is the philosophy of the Prussian Government. Even the
+Imperial Chancellor himself used this doctrine (with some qualms,
+it is true) to justify Germany in 'hewing its way' through Belgium.
+Let us only remember, in justice to a great people, that it is not
+really the doctrine of Germany, but rather the doctrine of Prussia
+(though Treitschke will tell us that Germany is 'just merely an
+extended Prussia'). And let us remember, in extenuation of Prussia,
+that she has suffered from two things&mdash;geographical pressure
+springing from her mid-European situation, and an evil tradition of
+ruthless conquest perpetuated by her Hohenzollern rulers since the
+days of the Great Elector, and especially since Frederic the Great.
+Geographical pressure on all sides has made Prussia feel herself in
+a state of chronic strangulation; and a man who feels strangled
+will struggle ruthlessly for breath. To get breathing space, to
+secure frontiers which would ease an intolerable pressure, Frederic
+the Great could seize Silesia in time of peace in spite of his
+father's guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction, and could suggest the
+partition of Poland. Frontier pressure thus led to ruthless
+conquest irrespective of rights; and that tradition has sunk deep.
+It has been easier for England, an island state in the West exempt
+from pressure, to think in other terms: it has been possible for
+Russia, secure in the East, to think, and to think nobly (as the
+present Tsar has done), of international obligation. Nor is it an
+accident that sees England and Russia united in the common cause of
+Europe to-day&mdash;that sees both championing the cause of small
+nations, one in the East, the other in the West.[<a href=
+"#note-185">185</a>]</p>
+<p>But in whatever way we may excuse Prussia we must fight Prussia;
+and we fight it in the noblest cause for which men can fight. That
+cause is the public law of Europe, as a sure shield and buckler of
+all nations, great and small, and especially the small. To the
+doctrine of the almightiness of the state&mdash;to the doctrine
+that all means are justified which are, or seem, necessary to its
+self-preservation, we oppose the doctrine of a European society, or
+at least a European comity of nations, within which all states
+stand; we oppose the doctrine of a public law of Europe, by which
+all states are bound to respect the covenants they have made. We
+will not and cannot tolerate the view that nations are 'in the
+state and posture of gladiators' in their relations one with
+another; we stand for the reign of law.</p>
+<p>Our cause, as one would expect from a people that has fought out
+its own internal struggles under the forms of law, is a legal
+cause. We are a people in whose blood the cause of law is the vital
+element. It is no new thing in our history that we should fight for
+that cause. When England and Revolutionary France went to war in
+1793, the cause, on the side of England, was a legal cause. We
+fought for the public law of Europe, as it had stood since the
+Peace of Westphalia in 1648. We did not fight in 1870, because
+neither France nor Germany had infringed the public law of Europe
+by attacking the neutrality of Belgium, but we were ready to fight
+if they did. A fine cartoon in <i>Punch</i>, of August, 1870, shows
+armed England encouraging Belgium, who stands ready with spear and
+shield, with the words&mdash;'Trust me! Let us hope that they won't
+trouble you, dear friend. But if they do&mdash;&mdash;' To-day they
+have; and England has drawn her sword. How could she have done
+otherwise, with those traditions of law so deep in all Anglo-Saxon
+blood&mdash;traditions as real and as vital to Anglo-Saxon America
+as to Anglo-Saxon England; traditions which are the fundamental
+basis of Anglo-Saxon public life all the world over? America once
+fought and beat England, in long-forgotten days, on the ground of
+law. That very ground of law&mdash;that law-abidingness which is as
+deeply engrained in the men of Massachusetts to-day as it is in any
+Britisher&mdash;is a bond of sympathy between the two in this great
+struggle of the nations.</p>
+<p>To Germans our defence of public law may seem part of the moral
+hypocrisy of which in their view we are full. What we are doing,
+they feel, is to strike at Germany, our competitor for
+'world-empire', with its dangerous navy, while Germany is engaged
+in a life and death struggle with France and Russia. We too, they
+feel, are Machiavellians; but we have put on what Machiavelli
+called 'the mantle of superstition', the pretence of morality and
+law, to cover our craft. It is true that we are fighting for our
+own interest. But what is our interest? We are fighting for Right,
+because Right is our supreme interest. The new German political
+theory enunciates that 'our interest is our right'. The
+old&mdash;the very old&mdash;English political theory is, 'The
+Right is our interest'. It is true that we have everything to gain
+by defending the cause of international law. Should that prevent us
+from defending that cause? What do we not lose of precious lives in
+the defence?</p>
+<p>This is the case of England. England stands for the idea of a
+public law of Europe, and for the small nations which it protects.
+She stands for her own preservation, which is menaced when public
+law is broken, and the 'ages' slow-bought gain' imperilled.</p>
+<p>(Treitschke's <i>Politik</i>, lectures delivered in Berlin
+during the years 1875 to 1895, was published in two volumes in
+1899. General Bernhardi's book, <i>Deutschland und der n&auml;chste
+Krieg</i>, was published in 1911, and has been translated into
+English under the title <i>Germany and the Next War</i>. See also
+J.A. Cramb, <i>England and Germany</i>, 1914.)</p>
+<p>Notes:</p>
+<p><a name="note-179" id="note-179">
+<!-- Note Anchor 179 --></a>[Footnote 179: The unity of the German
+state is in no small measure a matter of artificial
+Prussianization. Of this Prussianization Treitschke was the great
+advocate, though he was himself ultimately of Slavonic origin, and
+immediately of Saxon birth.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-180" id="note-180">
+<!-- Note Anchor 180 --></a>[Footnote 180: We are reminded of the
+famous sentence in <i>The Prince</i>:&mdash;<i>Dove non &egrave;
+giudizio da richiamare si guarda al fine</i>.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-181" id="note-181">
+<!-- Note Anchor 181 --></a>[Footnote 181: Bernhardi adds: 'The
+conception of permanent neutrality is entirely contrary to the
+essential nature of the state, which can only attain its highest
+moral aims in competition with other states.' It would seem to
+follow that by violating the neutrality of Belgium Germany is
+helping that country to attain its highest moral aims. The
+suggestion that Belgium is no longer a neutral Power was not
+adopted by the German Government before the war, nor by Dr. von
+Bethmann-Hollweg in his speech to the Reichstag on the Belgian
+question (see <i>supra</i>, p. 91).]</p>
+<p><a name="note-182" id="note-182">
+<!-- Note Anchor 182 --></a>[Footnote 182: It was significant that
+Germany, while offering to England at the end of July a guarantee
+of the integrity of the soil of France, would not offer any
+guarantee of the integrity of French colonies (<i>supra</i>,
+<a href="#ch5sec3">p. 82</a>).]</p>
+<p><a name="note-183" id="note-183">
+<!-- Note Anchor 183 --></a>[Footnote 183: Nothing has here been
+said, though much might be said, of the distortion of history and
+ethnology by German nationalism, or Pan-Germanism. It is well known
+that the Pan-Germans regard England as Teutonic, and destined to be
+gathered into the German fold. In these last few weeks we have been
+reproached as a people for being traitors to our 'Teutonic' blood.
+Better be traitors to blood than to plain duty; but as a matter of
+fact our mixed blood has many other strains than the Teutonic. On
+the aims of the Pan-Germanists readers may with profit consult a
+book by Paul Vergnet, <i>La France en danger</i> (Oct. 1913).]</p>
+<p><a name="note-184" id="note-184">
+<!-- Note Anchor 184 --></a>[Footnote 184: In fairness to Nietzsche
+it should be said that in his later years he revolted against the
+Prussian military system.]</p>
+<p><a name="note-185" id="note-185">
+<!-- Note Anchor 185 --></a>[Footnote 185: German professors have
+recently reproached England for being allied with 'Muscovite
+barbarism'. Is Russia so barbarous, whose sovereign convened the
+first Peace Conference? Have not England and Russia striven
+together in peace (as they now strive together in war) for a great
+common cause? The German White Book, which seeks to fasten on
+Russia the blame of the present war, is oblivious of all that has
+happened in these matters since 1898. The reader may with advantage
+refer, on this subject, to a pamphlet by Professor Vinogradoff,
+<i>Russia: the Psychology of a Nation</i> (Oxford, 1914).]</p>
+<hr />
+<a name="EPI" id="EPI"><!-- EPI --></a>
+<h2>EPILOGUE</h2>
+<p>In conclusion something must be said of the process by which our
+understanding with France, still so elastic in 1912 and 1913,
+became the solid alliance which now, on sea and land alike,
+confronts the German forces. England gave France no positive
+engagements until the eleventh hour; it may be argued that England
+gave them far too late, and that the war might never have occurred
+if England had been less obstinately and judicially pacific. But
+the English case for the delay is clear. We hesitated to throw in
+our lot with France, because France would not stand neutral while
+Germany made war on Russia. We shrank from the incalculable
+entanglements which seemed to lie before us if we allied ourselves
+with a power which was so committed. Why, we were asking ourselves,
+should we fight the battles of Russia in the Balkans?</p>
+<p>We were perhaps too cautious in suspecting that France might
+contemplate this policy. She could not define beforehand the limits
+which she would observe in defending Russia's cause. But she knew,
+as we now know, that a war with Russia meant, to German statesmen,
+only a pretext for a new attack on France, even more deadly in
+intention than that of 1870. France could not do without the help
+of Russia. How then could she afford to forfeit Russia's friendship
+by declaring, at Germany's command, that she would do nothing to
+help Russia?</p>
+<p>This loyalty to the Dual Alliance left France during the last
+days before the war in a cruel dilemma. Russia, however well
+disposed, could not help her ally in the first weeks of a war; and
+for France these were the critical weeks, the weeks upon which her
+own fate must depend. She appealed urgently to England for
+support.</p>
+<p>But, even on July 31st, the English Cabinet replied that it
+could make no definite engagement. This answer, it is true, had
+been foreshadowed in earlier communications. Sir Edward Grey had
+made it abundantly clear that there could be no prospect of common
+action unless France were exposed to 'an unprovoked attack', and no
+certainty of such action even in that case. But France had staked
+everything upon the justice of her cause. She had felt that her
+pacific intentions were clear to all the world; and that England
+could not, with any self-respect, refuse assistance. The French
+mobilization had been delayed until July 31st, to convince the
+British Cabinet of French good faith; and the French fleet had been
+left in the Mediterranean to guard the interests of England no less
+than those of France. We can imagine how bitter was the
+disappointment with which France received the English answer of
+July 31st.</p>
+<p>But we were loyal to our obligations as we understood them. If
+our answers to France were guarded, our answers to the German
+overtures of July 29th and August 1st show that we were fighting
+the battle of France with diplomatic weapons. On August 2nd we went
+still further, by undertaking to defend the French coasts and
+shipping, if the German fleet should come into the Channel or
+through the North Sea. To justify our position of reserve from July
+31st to August 4th we may quote what Mr. Asquith said the other day
+(September 4th):&mdash;</p>
+<p class="blockquote">'No one who has not been in that position can
+realize the strength, the energy, and the persistence with which we
+laboured for peace. We persevered by every expedient that diplomacy
+could suggest, straining almost to breaking-point our most
+cherished friendships and obligations.'</p>
+<p>Those efforts failed. We know to-day that mediation had never
+any prospects of success, because Germany had resolved that it
+should not succeed. Ought we to have known this from the first? It
+is easy to be wise after the event. But in England we have Cabinet
+government and we have Parliamentary government. Before an English
+minister can act, in a matter of national importance, no matter how
+positive his own convictions may be, he must convince his
+colleagues, and they must feel certain of convincing a democracy
+which is essentially pacific, cautious, slow to move. Nothing short
+of the German attack on Belgium would have convinced the ordinary
+Englishman that German statesmanship had degenerated into piracy.
+That proof was given us on August 4th; and on that day we sent our
+ultimatum to Berlin.</p>
+<p>To-day all England is convinced; and we are fighting back to
+back with the French for their national existence and our own. Our
+own, because England's existence depends not only on her sea-power,
+but upon the maintenance of European state-law. The military spirit
+which we have described above (<a href="#CH6">Chap. VI</a>)
+tramples upon the rights of nations because it sees a foe in every
+equal; because it regards the prosperity of a neighbour as a
+national misfortune; because it holds that national greatness is
+only to be realized in the act of destroying or absorbing other
+nationalities. To those who are not yet visibly assailed, and who
+possibly believe themselves secure, we can only give the warning:
+<i>Tua res agitur, paries cum proximus ardet</i>.</p>
+<p>Of the issue England is not afraid. The most unfavourable issue
+would find her still convinced that she has taken the only course
+compatible with honour and with public law. Military anarchism
+shall be destroyed if England, France, and Russia can destroy it.
+On this object England and France have staked their last ship and
+their last soldier. But, it may be asked, what state-system do we
+hope to establish, if and when we are successful in this great
+crusade?</p>
+<p>What England not only desires but needs, and needs imperatively,
+is, first, the restitution to Belgium of her former status and
+whatever else can be restored of all that she has sacrificed. This
+is the indispensable preliminary to any form of settlement. The
+next essential is an adequate guarantee to France that she shall
+never experience such another invasion as we have seen in August,
+1914; without a France which is prosperous, secure, and
+independent, European civilization would be irreparably maimed and
+stunted. The third essential, as essential as the other two, is the
+conservation of those other nations which can only exist on
+sufferance so long as <i>Realpolitik</i> is practised with
+impunity.</p>
+<p>To minor nationalities it should be clear that England is their
+friend, and cannot choose but stand their friend. Three times in
+her history she has made war upon a would-be despot of the
+Continent, treating the 'Balance of Power' as a principle for which
+no sacrifice could be too great. In these struggles she assisted
+the small Powers, less from altruism than because their interest
+was her own. She supported Holland against Philip II of Spain and
+against Louis XIV; against Napoleon she supported not Holland only,
+but also Portugal and, to the best of her power, Switzerland and
+Piedmont.</p>
+<p>We do not argue&mdash;it would be absurd to argue&mdash;that
+England has always been free from reproach in her dealings with the
+smaller states. Holland may well remember the naval conflicts of
+the seventeenth century and the English Navigation Laws. But
+Holland should also remember that, in the seventeenth century,
+England was not yet a great Power; Holland and England fought as
+rivals and on equal terms, in a feud which subsequent alliances
+have healed, over a policy which England has long since renounced
+as mischievous and futile. On Denmark we inflicted a great wrong in
+1807; it can only be extenuated by the fact, which Denmark knows
+now though she did not know it then, that Napoleon had conspired
+with Russia to seize the Danish fleet and use it against England.
+Denmark, indeed, has better cause to complain that we gave her no
+assistance in 1864. That mistake&mdash;for it was a mistake of
+weakness, not deliberate treachery&mdash;has brought its own
+nemesis. We are still paying for that particular mistake, and we
+are not likely to forget the lesson. The case of Schleswig-Holstein
+shows how the losses of such a state as Denmark may react on such a
+state as England.</p>
+<p>England cannot afford that her weaker neighbours should become
+less prosperous or less independent than they are. So far as the
+long arm of naval power reaches, England is bound to give them
+whatever help she can. From motives of self-preservation, if on no
+other ground, she could not tolerate their subordination to such a
+power as Germany aspires to found. Her quarrel is not with the
+German people, but with the political system for which the German
+Empire, in its present temper, stands. That system England is bound
+to resist, no matter by what power it is adopted.</p>
+<p>English sympathies and English traditions are here at one with
+English interests. England is proud to recollect how she befriended
+struggling nationalities in the nineteenth century. She did not
+support Greece and Italy for the sake of any help that they could
+give her. The goodwill of England to Holland, to Switzerland, to
+the Scandinavian states, is largely based upon their achievements
+in science and art and literature. They have proved that they can
+serve the higher interests of humanity. They have contributed to
+the growth of that common civilization which links together the
+small powers and the great with bonds more sacred and more durable
+than those of race, of government, of material interest. In this
+fraternity each nation has a duty to the rest. If we have harped on
+England's interest, it must not for a moment be supposed that we
+have forgotten England's duty. But England stands to-day in this
+fortunate position, that her duty and her interest combine to impel
+her in the same direction.</p>
+<hr />
+<a name="RULE4_2" id="RULE4_2"><!-- RULE4 2 --></a>
+<h2>APPENDIX I</h2>
+<center>GERMANY'S REASONS FOR WAR WITH RUSSIA</center>
+<p>How Russia and her Ruler betrayed Germany's confidence and
+thereby made the European War.</p>
+<p>WITH THE ORIGINAL TELEGRAMS AND NOTES.</p>
+<p>Druck und Verlag: Liebheit &amp; Thiesen, Berlin.</p>
+<p>Foreign Office,<br />
+Berlin, August 1914.</p>
+<p>On June 28th the Austro-Hungarian successor to the throne,
+Arch-Duke Franz Ferdinand, and his wife, the Duchess of Hohenberg,
+were assassinated by a member of a band of servian conspirators.
+The investigation of the crime through the Austro-Hungarian
+authorities has yielded the fact that the conspiracy against the
+life of the Arch-Duke and successor to the throne was prepared and
+abetted in Belgrade with the cooperation of Servian officials, and
+executed with arms from the Servian State arsenal. This crime must
+have opened the eyes of the entire civilized world, not only in
+regard to the aims of the Servian policies directed against the
+conservation and integrity of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, but
+also concerning the criminal means which the pan-Serb propaganda in
+Servia had no hesitation in employing for the achievement of these
+aims.</p>
+<p>The goal of these policies was the gradual revolutionizing and
+final separation of the south-easterly districts from the
+Austro-Hungarian monarchy and their union with Servia. This
+direction of Servias policy has not been altered in the least in
+spite of the repeated and solemn declarations of Servia in which it
+vouchsafed a change in these policies toward Austria-Hungary as
+well as the cultivation of good and neighborly relations.</p>
+<p>In this manner for the third time in the course of the last 6
+years Servia has led Europe to the brink of a world-war.</p>
+<p>It could only do this because it believed itself supported in
+its intentions by Russia.</p>
+<p>Russia soon after the events brought about by the Turkish
+revolution of 1908, endeavored to found a union of the Balcan
+states under Russian patronage and directed against the existence
+of Turkey. This union which succeeded in 1911 in driving out Turkey
+from a greater part of her European possessions, collapsed over the
+question of the distribution of spoils. The Russian policies were
+not dismayed over this failure. According to the idea of the
+Russian statesmen a new Balcan union under Russian patronage should
+be called into existence, headed no longer against Turkey, now
+dislodged from the Balcan, but against the existence of the
+Austro-Hungarian monarchy. It was the idea that Servia should cede
+to Bulgaria those parts of Macedonia which it had received during
+the last Balcan war, in exchange for Bosnia and the Herzegovina
+which were to be taken from Austria. To oblige Bulgaria to fall in
+with this plan it was to be isolated, Roumania attached to Russia
+with the aid of French propaganda, and Servia promised Bosnia and
+the Herzegovina.</p>
+<p>Under these circumstances it was clear to Austria that it was
+not compatible with the dignity and the spirit of self-preservation
+of the monarchy to view idly any longer this agitation across the
+border. The Imperial and Royal Government appraised Germany of this
+conception and asked for our opinion. With all our heart we were
+able to agree with our allys estimate of the situation, and assure
+him that any action considered necessary to end the movement in
+Servia directed against the conservation of the monarchy would meet
+with our approval.</p>
+<p>We were perfectly aware that a possible warlike attitude of
+Austria-Hungary against Servia might bring Russia upon the field,
+and that it might therefore involve us in a war, in accordance with
+our duty as allies. We could not, however, in these vital interests
+of Austria-Hungary, which were at stake, advise our ally to take a
+yielding attitude not compatible with his dignity, nor deny him our
+assistance in these trying days. We could do this all the less as
+our own interests were menaced through the continued Serb
+agitation. If the Serbs continued with the aid of Russia and France
+to menace the existence of Austria-Hungary, the gradual collapse of
+Austria and the subjection of all the Slavs under one Russian
+sceptre would be the consequence, thus making untenable the
+position of the Teutonic race in Central Europe. A morally weakened
+Austria under the pressure of Russian pan-slavism would be no
+longer an ally on whom we could count and in whom we could have
+confidence, as we must be able to have, in view of the ever more
+menacing attitude of our easterly and westerly neighbors. We,
+therefore, permitted Austria a completely free hand in her action
+towards Servia but have not participated in her preparations.</p>
+<p>Austria chose the method of presenting to the Servian Government
+a note, in which the direct connection between the murder at
+Sarajevo and the pan-Serb movement, as not only countenanced but
+actively supported by the Servian Government, was explained, and in
+which a complete cessation of this agitation, as well as a
+punishment of the guilty, was requested. At the same time
+Austria-Hungary demanded as necessary guarantee for the
+accomplishment of her desire the participation of some Austrian
+officials in the preliminary examination on Servian territory and
+the final dissolution of the pan-Serb societies agitating against
+Austria-Hungary. The Imperial and Royal Government gave a period of
+48 hours for the unconditional acceptance of its demands.</p>
+<p>The Servian Government started the mobilization of its army one
+day after the transmission of the Austro-Hungarian note.</p>
+<p>As after the stipulated date the Servian Government rendered a
+reply which, though complying in some points with the conditions of
+Austria-Hungary, yet showed in all essentials the endeavor through
+procrastination and new negotiations to escape from the just
+demands of the monarchy, the latter discontinued her diplomatic
+relations with Servia without indulging in further negotiations or
+accepting further Servian assurances, whose value, to its loss, she
+had sufficiently experienced.</p>
+<p>From this moment Austria was in fact in a state of war with
+Servia, which it proclaimed officially on the 28th of July by
+declaring war.</p>
+<p>[Sidenote: see exhibits 1 &amp; 2.]</p>
+<p>From the beginning of the conflict we assumed the position that
+there were here concerned the affairs of Austria alone, which it
+would have to settle with Servia. We therefore directed our efforts
+toward the localizing of the war, and toward convincing the other
+powers that Austria-Hungary had to appeal to arms in justifiable
+self-defence, forced upon her by the conditions. We emphatically
+took the position that no civilized country possessed the right to
+stay the arm of Austria in this struggle with barbarism and
+political crime, and to shield the Servians against their just
+punishment. In this sense we instructed our representatives with
+the foreign powers.</p>
+<p>[Sidenote: see exhibit 3.]</p>
+<p>Simultaneously the Austro-Hungarian Government communicated to
+the Russian Government that the step undertaken against Servia
+implied merely a defensive measure against the Serb agitation, but
+that Austria-Hungary must of necessity demand guarantees for a
+continued friendly behavior of Servia towards the monarchy.
+Austria-Hungary had no intention whatsoever to shift the balance of
+power in the Balcan.</p>
+<p>In answer to our declaration that the German Government desired,
+and aimed at, a localization of the conflict, both the French and
+the English Governments promised an action in the same direction.
+But these endeavors did not succeed in preventing the interposition
+of Russia in the Austro-Servian disagreement.</p>
+<p>[Sidenote: see exhibits 4 &amp; 5.]</p>
+<p>The Russian Government submitted an official communiqu&eacute;
+on July 24th, according to which Russia could not possibly remain
+indifferent in the Servio-Austrian conflict. The same was declared
+by the Russian Secretary of Foreign Affairs, M. Sasonow, to the
+German Ambassador, Count Pourtal&egrave;s, in the afternoon of July
+26th. The German Government declared again, through its Ambassador
+at St. Petersburg, that Austria-Hungary had no desire for conquest
+and only wished peace at her frontiers. After the official
+explanation by Austria-Hungary to Russia that it did not claim
+territorial gain in Servia, the decision concerning the peace of
+the world rested exclusively with St. Petersburg.</p>
+<p>[Sidenote: see exhibits 6, 7, 8, 9.]</p>
+<p>The same day the first news of Russian mobilization reached
+Berlin in the evening.</p>
+<p>[Sidenote: see exhibits 10, 10a, 10b.]</p>
+<p>The German Ambassadors at London, Paris, and St. Petersburg were
+instructed to energetically point out the danger of this Russian
+mobilization. The Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg was also
+directed to make the following declaration to the Russian
+Government:</p>
+<p class="blockquote">"Preparatory military measures by Russia will
+force us to counter-measures which must consist in mobilizing the
+army.</p>
+<p class="blockquote">"But mobilization means war.</p>
+<p class="blockquote">"As we know the obligations of France towards
+Russia, this mobilization would be directed against both Russia and
+France. We cannot assume that Russia desires to unchain such a
+European war. Since Austria-Hungary will not touch the existence of
+the Servian kingdom, we are of the opinion that Russia can afford
+to assume an attitude of waiting. We can all the more support the
+desire of Russia to protect the integrity of Servia as
+Austria-Hungary does not intend to question the latter. It will be
+easy in the further development of the affair to find a basis for
+an understanding."</p>
+<p>[Sidenote: see exhibit 11.]</p>
+<p>On July 27th the Russian Secretary of War, M. Ssuchomlinow, gave
+the German military attach&eacute; his word of honor that no order
+to mobilize had been issued, merely preparations were being made,
+but not a horse mustered, nor reserves called in. If
+Austria-Hungary crossed the Servian frontier, the military
+districts directed towards Austria, i.e. Kiev, Odessa, Moscow,
+Kazan, would be mobilized, under no circumstances those situated on
+the German frontier, i.e. St. Petersburg, Vilna, and Warsaw. Upon
+inquiry into the object of the mobilization against
+Austria-Hungary, the Russian Minister of War replied by shrugging
+his shoulders and referring to the diplomats. The military
+attach&eacute; then pointed to these mobilization measures against
+Austria-Hungary as extremely menacing also for Germany.</p>
+<p>In the succeeding days news concerning Russian mobilization came
+at a rapid rate. Among it was also news about preparations on the
+German-Russian frontier, as for instance the announcement of the
+state of war in Kovno, the departure of the Warsaw garrison, and
+the strengthening of the Alexandrovo garrison.</p>
+<p>On July 27th, the first information was received concerning
+preparatory measures taken by France: the 14th Corps discontinued
+the manoeuvres and returned to its garrison.</p>
+<p>In the meantime we had endeavored to localize the conflict by
+most emphatic steps.</p>
+<p>[Sidenote: see exhibit 12.]</p>
+<p>On July 26th, Sir Edward Grey had made the proposal to submit
+the differences between Austria-Hungary and Servia to a conference
+of the Ambassadors of Germany, France, and Italy under his
+chairmanship. We declared in regard to this proposal that we could
+not, however much we approved the idea, participate in such a
+conference, as we could not call Austria in her dispute with Servia
+before a European tribunal.</p>
+<p>France consented to the proposal of Sir Edward Grey, but it
+foundered upon Austria's declining it, as was to be expected.</p>
+<p>[Sidenote: see exhibit 13.]</p>
+<p>Faithful to our principle that mediation should not extend to
+the Austro-Servian conflict, which is to be considered as a purely
+Austro-Hungarian affair, but merely to the relations between
+Austria-Hungary and Russia, we continued our endeavors to bring
+about an understanding between these two powers.</p>
+<p>[Sidenote: see exhibits 15 &amp; 16.]</p>
+<p>We further declared ourselves ready, after failure of the
+conference idea, to transmit a second proposal of Sir Edward Grey's
+to Vienna in which he suggested Austria-Hungary should decide that
+either the Servian reply was sufficient, or that it be used as a
+basis for further negotiations. The Austro-Hungarian Government
+remarked with full appreciation of our action that it had come too
+late, the hostilities having already been opened.</p>
+<p>In spite of this we continued our attempts to the utmost, and we
+advised Vienna to show every possible advance compatible with the
+dignity of the monarchy.</p>
+<p>Unfortunately, all these proposals were overtaken by the
+military preparations of Russia and France.</p>
+<p>[Sidenote: see exhibit 17.]</p>
+<p>On July 29th, the Russian Government made the official
+notification in Berlin that four army districts had been mobilized.
+At the same time further news was received concerning rapidly
+progressing military preparations of France, both on water and on
+land.</p>
+<p>On the same day the Imperial Ambassador in St. Petersburg had an
+interview with the Russian Foreign Secretary, in regard to which he
+reported by telegraph, as follows:</p>
+<p class="blockquote">"The Secretary tried to persuade me that I
+should urge my Government to participate in a quadruple conference
+to find means to induce Austria-Hungary to give up those demands
+which touch upon the sovereignty of Servia. I could merely promise
+to report the conversation and took the position that, after Russia
+had decided upon the baneful step of mobilization, every exchange
+of ideas appeared now extremely difficult, if not impossible.
+Besides, Russia now was demanding from us in regard to
+Austria-Hungary the same which Austria-Hungary was being blamed for
+with regard to Servia, i.e. an infraction of sovereignty.
+Austria-Hungary having promised to consider the Russian interests
+by disclaiming any territorial aspiration,&mdash;a great concession
+on the part of a state engaged in war&mdash;should therefore be
+permitted to attend to its affair with Servia alone. There would be
+time at the peace conference to return to the matter of forbearance
+towards the sovereignty of Servia.</p>
+<p class="blockquote">"I added very solemnly that at this moment
+the entire Austro-Servian affair was eclipsed by the danger of a
+general European conflagration, and I endeavored to present to the
+Secretary the magnitude of this danger.</p>
+<p class="blockquote">"It was impossible to dissuade Sasonow from
+the idea that Servia could not now be deserted by Russia".</p>
+<p>On July 29th, the German Military Attache at St. Petersburg
+wired the following report on a conversation with the Chief of the
+General Staff of the Russian army:</p>
+<p class="blockquote">"The Chief of the General Staff has asked me
+to call on him, and he has told me that he has just come from His
+Majesty. He has been requested by the Secretary of War to reiterate
+once more that everything had remained as the Secretary had
+informed me two days ago. He offered confirmation in writing and
+gave me his word of honor in the most solemn manner that nowhere
+there had been a mobilization, viz. calling in of a single man or
+horse up to the present time, i.e. 3 o'clock in the afternoon. He
+could not assume a guaranty for the future, but he could emphasize
+that in the fronts directed towards our frontiers His Majesty
+desired no mobilization.</p>
+<p class="blockquote">"As, however, I had received here many pieces
+of news concerning the calling in of the reserves in different
+parts of the country also in Warsaw and in Vilna, I told the
+general that his statements placed me before a riddle. On his
+officers word of honor he replied that such news was wrong, but
+that possibly here and there a false alarm might have been
+given.</p>
+<p class="blockquote">"I must consider this conversation as an
+attempt to mislead us as to the extent of the measures hitherto
+taken in view of the abundant and positive information about the
+calling in of reserves."</p>
+<p>In reply to various inquiries concerning reasons for its
+threatening attitude, the Russian Government repeatedly pointed out
+that Austria-Hungary had commenced no conversation in St.
+Petersburg. The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in St. Petersburg was
+therefore instructed on July 29th, at our suggestion, to enter into
+such conversation with Sasonow. Count Sz&aacute;p&aacute;ry was
+empowered to explain to the Russian minister the note to Servia
+though it had been overtaken by the state of war, and to accept any
+suggestion on the part of Russia as well as to discuss with Sasonow
+all questions touching directly upon the Austro-Russian
+relations.</p>
+<p>[Sidenote: see exhibit 19.]</p>
+<p>Shoulder to shoulder with England we labored incessantly and
+supported every proposal in Vienna from which we hoped to gain the
+possibility of a peaceable solution of the conflict. We even as
+late as the 30th of July forwarded the English proposal to Vienna,
+as basis for negotiations, that Austria-Hungary should dictate her
+conditions in Servia, i.e. after her march into Servia. We thought
+that Russia would accept this basis.</p>
+<p>During the interval from July 29th to July 31st there appeared
+renewed and cumulative news concerning Russian measures of
+mobilization. Accumulation of troops on the East Prussian frontier
+and the declaration of the state of war over all important parts of
+the Russian west frontier allowed no further doubt that the Russian
+mobilization was in full swing against us, while simultaneously all
+such measures were denied to our representative in St. Petersburg
+on word of honor.</p>
+<p>Nay, even before the reply from Vienna regarding the
+Anglo-German mediation whose tendencies and basis must have been
+known in St. Petersburg, could possibly have been received in
+Berlin, Russia ordered a general mobilization.</p>
+<p>[Sidenote: see exhibits 18, 20, 21, 22, 23.]</p>
+<p>During the same days, there took place between His Majesty the
+Kaiser, and Czar Nicolas an exchange of telegrams in which His
+Majesty called the attention of the Czar to the menacing character
+of the Russian mobilization during the continuance of his own
+mediating activities.</p>
+<p>On July 31st, the Czar directed the following telegram to His
+Majesty the Kaiser:</p>
+<p class="blockquote">"I thank You cordially for Your mediation
+which permits the hope that everything may yet end peaceably. It is
+technically impossible to discontinue our military preparations
+which have been made necessary by the Austrian mobilization. It is
+far from us to want war. As long as the negotiations between
+Austria and Servia continue, my troops will undertake no
+provocative action. I give You my solemn word thereon. I confide
+with all my faith in the grace of God, and I hope for the success
+of Your mediation in Vienna for the welfare of our countries and
+the peace of Europe.</p>
+<p class="blockquote">"Your cordially devoted</p>
+<p class="blockquote">"Nicolas."</p>
+<p>This telegram of the Czar crossed with the following, sent by
+H.M. the Kaiser, also on July 31st, at 2 p.m.:</p>
+<p class="blockquote">"Upon Your appeal to my friendship and Your
+request for my aid I have engaged in mediation between Your
+Government and the Government of Austria-Hungary. While this action
+was taking place, Your troops were being mobilized against my ally
+Austria-Hungary, whereby, as I have already communicated to You, my
+mediation has become almost illusory. In spite of this, I have
+continued it, and now I receive reliable news that serious
+preparations for war are going on on my eastern frontier. The
+responsibility for the security of my country forces me to measures
+of defence. I have gone to the extreme limit of the possible in my
+efforts for the preservation of the peace of the world. It is not I
+who bear the responsibility for the misfortune which now threatens
+the entire civilized world. It rests in Your hand to avert it. No
+one threatens the honor and peace of Russia which might well have
+awaited the success of my mediation. The friendship for You and
+Your country, bequeathed to me by my grand-father on his deathbed,
+has always been sacred to me, and I have stood faithfully by Russia
+while it was in serious affliction, especially during its last war.
+The peace of Europe can still be preserved by You if Russia decides
+to discontinue those military preparations which menace Germany and
+Austria-Hungary."</p>
+<p>Before this telegram reached its destination, the mobilization
+of all the Russian forces, obviously directed against us and
+already ordered during the afternoon of the 31st of July, was in
+full swing. Notwithstanding, the telegram of the Czar was sent at 2
+o'clock that same afternoon.</p>
+<p>[Sidenote: see exhibit 24.]</p>
+<p>After the Russian general mobilization became known in Berlin,
+the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg was instructed on the
+afternoon of July 31st to explain to the Russian Government that
+Germany declared the state of war as counter-measure against the
+general mobilization of the Russian army and navy which must be
+followed by mobilization if Russia did not cease its military
+measures against Germany and Austria-Hungary within 12 hours, and
+notified Germany thereof.</p>
+<p>[Sidenote: see exhibit 25.]</p>
+<p>At the same time the Imperial Ambassador in Paris was instructed
+to demand from the French Government a declaration within 18 hours,
+whether it would remain neutral in a Russo-German war.</p>
+<p>The Russian Government destroyed through its mobilization,
+menacing the security of our country, the laborious action at
+mediation of the European cabinets. The Russian mobilization in
+regard to the seriousness of which the Russian Government was never
+allowed by us to entertain a doubt, in connection with its
+continued denial, shows clearly that Russia wanted war.</p>
+<p>The Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg delivered his note to
+M. Sasonow on July 31st at 12 o'clock midnight.</p>
+<p>The reply of the Russian Government has never reached us.</p>
+<p>Two hours after the expiration of the time limit the Czar
+telegraphed to H.M. the Kaiser, as follows:</p>
+<p class="blockquote">"I have received Your telegram. I comprehend
+that You are forced to mobilize, but I should like to have from You
+the same guaranty which I have given You, viz., that these measures
+do not mean war, and that we shall continue to negotiate for the
+welfare of our two countries and the universal peace which is so
+dear to our hearts. With the aid of God it must be possible to our
+long tried friendship to prevent the shedding of blood. I expect
+with full confidence Your urgent reply."</p>
+<p>To this H.M. the Kaiser replied:</p>
+<p class="blockquote">"I thank You for Your telegram. I have shown
+yesterday to Your Government the way through which alone war may
+yet be averted. Although I asked for a reply by to-day noon, no
+telegram from my Ambassador has reached me with the reply of Your
+Government. I therefore have been forced to mobilize my army. An
+immediate, clear and unmistakable reply of Your Government is the
+sole way to avoid endless misery. Until I receive this reply I am
+unable, to my great grief, to enter upon the subject of Your
+telegram. I must ask most earnestly that You, without delay, order
+Your troops to commit, under no circumstances, the slightest
+violation of our frontiers."</p>
+<p>As the time limit given to Russia had expired without the
+receipt of a reply to our inquiry, H.M. the Kaiser ordered the
+mobilization of the entire German Army and Navy on August 1st at 5
+p.m.</p>
+<p>[Sidenote: see exhibit 25.]</p>
+<p>The German Ambassador at St. Petersburg was instructed that, in
+the event of the Russian Government not giving a satisfactory reply
+within the stipulated time, he should declare that we considered
+ourselves in a state of war after the refusal of our demands.
+However, before a confirmation of the execution of this order had
+been received, that is to say, already in the afternoon of August
+1st, i.e., the same afternoon on which the telegram of the Czar,
+cited above, was sent, Russian troops crossed our frontier and
+marched into German territory.</p>
+<p>Thus Russia began the war against us.</p>
+<p>Meanwhile the Imperial Ambassador in Paris put our question to
+the French Cabinet on July 31st at 7 p.m.</p>
+<p>[Sidenote: see exhibit 27.]</p>
+<p>The French Prime Minister gave an equivocal and unsatisfactory
+reply on August 1st at 1. p.m. which gave no clear idea of the
+position of France, as he limited himself to the explanation that
+France would do that which her interests demanded. A few hours
+later, at 5 p.m., the mobilization of the entire French army and
+navy was ordered.</p>
+<p>On the morning of the next day France opened hostilities.</p>
+<center>THE ORIGINAL TELEGRAMS AND NOTES.</center>
+<center>THE NOTE OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY TO SERVIA.</center>
+<p>Presented July 23rd in Belgrade.</p>
+<p>"On March 31st, 1909, the Royal Servian Minister to the Court of
+Vienna made the following statement, by order of his
+Government:</p>
+<p>"Servia declares that she is not affected in her rights by the
+situation established in Bosnia, and that she will therefore adapt
+herself to the decisions which the powers are going to arrive at in
+reference to Art. 25 of the Berlin Treaty. By following the
+councils of the powers, Servia binds herself to cease the attitude
+of protest and resistence which she has assumed since last October,
+relative to the annexation, and she binds herself further to change
+the direction of her present policies towards Austria-Hungary, and,
+in the future, to live with the latter in friendly and neighborly
+relations.</p>
+<p>"The history of the last years, and especially the painful
+events of June 28th, have demonstrated the existence of a
+subversive movement in Servia whose aim it is to separate certain
+territories from the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. This movement,
+which developed under the eyes of the Servian Government, has found
+expression subsequently beyond the territory of the kingdom, in
+acts of terrorism, a series of assassinations and murders.</p>
+<p>"Far from fulfilling the formal obligations contained in the
+declaration of March 31st, 1909, the Royal Servian Government has
+done nothing to suppress this movement. She suffered the criminal
+doings of the various societies and associations directed against
+the monarchy, the unbridled language of the press, the
+glorification of the originators of assassinations, the
+participation of officers and officials in subversive intrigues;
+she suffered the unwholesome propaganda in public education, and
+lastly permitted all manifestations which would mislead the Servian
+people into hatred of the monarchy and into contempt for its
+institutions.</p>
+<p>"This sufferance of which the Royal Servian Government made
+itself guilty, has lasted up to the moment in which the events of
+June 28th demonstrated to the entire world the ghastly consequences
+of such sufferance.</p>
+<p>"<i>It becomes plain from the evidence and confessions of the
+criminal authors of the outrage of June 28th, that the murder at
+Sarajevo was conceived in Belgrade, that the murderers received the
+arms and bombs with which they were equipped, from Servian officers
+and officials who belonged to the Narodna Odbrana, and that,
+lastly, the transportation of the criminals and their arms to
+Bosnia was arranged and carried out by leading Servian frontier
+officials.</i></p>
+<p>"The cited results of the investigation do not permit the
+Imperial and Royal Government to observe any longer the attitude of
+waiting, which it has assumed for years towards those agitations
+which have their centre in Belgrade, and which from there radiate
+into the territory of the monarchy. These results, on the contrary,
+impose upon the Imperial and Royal Government the duty to terminate
+intrigues which constitute a permanent menace for the peace of the
+monarchy.</p>
+<p>"In order to obtain this purpose, the Imperial and Royal
+Government is forced to demand official assurance from the Servian
+Government that it condemns the propaganda directed against
+Austria-Hungary, i.e. the entirety of the machinations whose aim it
+is to separate parts from the monarchy which belong to it, and that
+she binds herself to suppress with all means this criminal and
+terrorizing propaganda.</p>
+<p>"In order to give to these obligations a solemn character, the
+Royal Servian Government will publish on the first page of its
+official organ of July 26th, 1914, the following declaration:</p>
+<p>"The Royal Servian Government condemns the propaganda directed
+against Austria-Hungary, i.e. the entirety of those machinations
+whose aim it is to separate from the Austro-Hungarian monarchy
+territories belonging thereto, and she regrets sincerely the
+ghastly consequences of these criminal actions.</p>
+<p>"The Royal Servian Government regrets that Servian officers and
+officials have participated in the propaganda, cited above, and
+have thus threatened the friendly and neighborly relations which
+the Royal Government was solemnly bound to cultivate by its
+declaration of March 31st, 1909.</p>
+<p>"The Royal Government which disapproves and rejects every
+thought or every attempt at influencing the destinations of the
+inhabitants of any part of Austria-Hungary, considers it its duty
+to call most emphatically to the attention of its officers and
+officials, and of the entire population of the kingdom, that it
+will hence-forward proceed with the utmost severity against any
+persons guilty of similar actions, to prevent and suppress which it
+will make every effort."</p>
+<p>"This explanation is to be brought simultaneously to the
+cognizance of the Royal Army through an order of H.M. the King, and
+it is to be published in the official organ of the Army.</p>
+<p>"The Royal Servian Government binds itself, in addition, as
+follows:</p>
+<p>"1. to suppress any publication which fosters hatred of, and
+contempt for, the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and whose general
+tendency is directed against the latters territorial integrity;</p>
+<p>"2. to proceed at once with the dissolution of the society
+Narodna Odbrana, to confiscate their entire means of propaganda,
+and to proceed in the same manner against the other societies and
+associations in Servia which occupy themselves with the propaganda
+against Austria-Hungary. The Royal Government will take the
+necessary measures, so that the dissolved societies may not
+continue their activities under another name or in another
+form;</p>
+<p>"3. without delay to eliminate from the public instruction in
+Servia, so far as the corps of instructors, as well as the means of
+instruction are concerned, that which serves, or may serve, to
+foster the propaganda against Austria-Hungary;</p>
+<p>"4. to remove from military service and the administration in
+general all officers and officials who are guilty of propaganda
+against Austria-Hungary, and whose names, with a communication of
+the material which the Imperial and Royal Government possesses
+against them, the Imperial and Royal Government reserves the right
+to communicate to the Royal Government;</p>
+<p>"5. to consent that in Servia officials of the Imperial and
+Royal Government co-operate in the suppression of a movement
+directed against the territorial integrity of the monarchy;</p>
+<p>"6. to commence a judicial investigation against the
+participants of the conspiracy of June 28th, who are on Servian
+territory. Officials, delegated by the Imperial and Royal
+Government will participate in the examinations;</p>
+<p>"7. to proceed at once with all severity to arrest Major Voja
+Tankosic and a certain Milan Ciganowic, Servian State officials,
+who have been compromised through the result of the
+investigation;</p>
+<p>"8. to prevent through effective measures the participation of
+the Servian authorities in the smuggling of arms and explosives
+across the frontier and to dismiss those officials of Shabatz and
+Loznica, who assisted the originators of the crime of Sarajevo in
+crossing the frontier;</p>
+<p>"9. to give to the Imperial and Royal Government explanations in
+regard to the unjustifiable remarks of high Servian functionaries
+in Servia and abroad who have not hesitated, in spite of their
+official position, to express themselves in interviews in a hostile
+manner against Austria-Hungary after the outrage of June 28th;</p>
+<p>"10. The Imperial and Royal Government expects a reply from the
+Royal Government at the latest until Saturday 25th inst., at 6 p.m.
+A memoir concerning the results of the investigations at Sarajevo,
+so far as they concern points 7. and 8. is enclosed with this
+note."</p>
+<p>ENCLOSURE.</p>
+<p>The investigation carried on against Gabrilo Princip and
+accomplices in the Court of Sarajevo, on account of the
+assassination on June 28th has, so far, yielded the following
+results:</p>
+<p>1. The plan to murder Arch-Duke Franz Ferdinand during his stay
+in Sarajevo was conceived in Belgrade by Gabrilo Princip, Nedeljko,
+Gabrinowic, and a certain Milan Ciganowic and Trifko Grabez, with
+the aid of Major Voja Tankosic.</p>
+<p>2. The six bombs and four Browning pistols which were used by
+the criminals, were obtained by Milan Ciganowic and Major Tankosic,
+and presented to Princip Gabrinowic in Belgrade.</p>
+<p>3. The bombs are hand grenades, manufactured at the arsenal of
+the Servian Army in Kragujevac.</p>
+<p>4. To insure the success of the assassination, Milan Ciganowic
+instructed Princip Gabrinowic in the use of the grenades and gave
+instructions in shooting with Browning pistols to Princip Grabez in
+a forest near the target practice field of Topshider&mdash;(outside
+Belgrade).</p>
+<p>5. In order to enable the crossing of the frontier of Bosnia and
+Herzegovina by Princip Gabrinowic and Grabez, and the smuggling of
+their arms, a secret system of transportation was organized by
+Ciganowic. The entry of the criminals with their arms into Bosnia
+and Herzegovina was effected by the frontier captains of Shabatz
+(Rade Popowic) and of Loznica, as well as by the custom house
+official Rudivoy Grbic of Loznica with the aid of several other
+persons.</p>
+<center>THE SERVIAN ANSWER.</center>
+<p>Presented at Vienna, July 25th, 1914.<br />
+(With Austria's commentaries in italics.)</p>
+<p>The Royal Government has received the communication of the
+Imperial and Royal Government of the 23rd inst. and is convinced
+that its reply will dissipate any misunderstanding which threatens
+to destroy the friendly and neighborly relations between the
+Austrian monarchy and the kingdom of Servia.</p>
+<p>The Royal Government is conscious that nowhere there have been
+renewed protests against the great neighborly monarchy like those
+which at one time were expressed in the Skuptschina, as well as in
+the declaration and actions of the responsible representatives of
+the state at that time, and which were terminated by the Servian
+declaration of March 31st 1909; furthermore that since that time
+neither the different corporations of the kingdom, nor the
+officials have made an attempt to alter the political and judicial
+condition created in Bosnia and the Herzegovina. The Royal
+Government states that the I. and R. Government has made no
+protestation in this sense excepting in the case of a text book, in
+regard to which the I. and R. Government has received an entirely
+satisfactory explanation. Servia has given during the time of the
+Balcan crisis in numerous cases evidence of her pacific and
+moderate policy, and it is only owing to Servia and the sacrifices
+which she has brought in the interest of the peace of Europe that
+this peace has been preserved.</p>
+<p><i>The Royal Servian Government limits itself to establishing
+that since the declaration of March 31st 1909, there has been no
+attempt on the part of the Servian Government to alter the position
+of Bosnia and the Herzegovina.</i></p>
+<p><i>With this she deliberately shifts the foundation of our note,
+as we have not insisted that she and her officials have undertaken
+anything official in this direction. Our gravamen is that in spite
+of the obligation assumed in the cited note, she has omitted to
+suppress the movement directed against the territorial integrity of
+the monarchy.</i></p>
+<p><i>Her obligation consisted in changing her attitude and the
+entire direction of her policies, and in entering into friendly and
+neighborly relations with the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and not
+only not to interfere with the possession of Bosnia.</i></p>
+<p>The Royal Government cannot be made responsible for expressions
+of a private character, as for instance newspaper articles and the
+peaceable work of societies, expressions which are of very common
+appearance in other countries, and which ordinarily are not under
+the control of the state. This, all the less, as the Royal
+Government has shown great courtesy in the solution of a whole
+series of questions which have arisen between Servia and
+Austria-Hungary, whereby it has succeeded to solve the greater
+number thereof, in favor of the progress of both countries.</p>
+<p><i>The assertion of the Royal Servian Government that the
+expressions of the press and the activity of Servian associations
+possess a private character and thus escape governmental control,
+stands in full contrast with the institutions of modern states and
+even the most liberal of press and society laws, which nearly
+everywhere subject the press and the societies to a certain control
+of the state. This is also provided for by the Servian
+institutions. The rebuke against the Servian Government consists in
+the fact that it has totally omitted to supervise its press and its
+societies, in so far as it knew their direction to be hostile to
+the monarchy.</i></p>
+<p>The Royal Government was therefore painfully surprised by the
+assertions that citizens of Servia had participated in the
+preparations of the outrage in Sarajevo. The Government expected to
+be invited to cooperate in the investigation of the crime, and it
+was ready in order to prove its complete correctness, to proceed
+against all persons in regard to whom it would receive
+information.</p>
+<p><i>This assertion is incorrect. The Servian Government was
+accurately informed about the suspicion resting upon quite definite
+personalities and not only in the position, but also obliged by its
+own laws to institute investigations spontaneously. The Servian
+Government has done nothing in this direction.</i></p>
+<p>According to the wishes of the I. and R. Government, the Royal
+Government is prepared to surrender to the court, without regard to
+position and rank, every Servian citizen, for whose participation
+in the crime of Sarajevo it should have received proof. It binds
+itself particularly on the first page of the official organ of the
+26th of July to publish the following enunciation:</p>
+<p>"The Royal Servian Government condemns every propaganda which
+should be directed against Austria-Hungary, i. e. the entirety of
+such activities as aim towards the separation of certain
+territories from the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and it regrets
+sincerely the lamentable consequences of these criminal
+machinations."</p>
+<p><i>The Austrian demand reads</i>:</p>
+<p>"<i>The Royal Servian Government condemns the propaganda against
+Austria-Hungary</i>...."</p>
+<p><i>The alteration of the declaration as demanded by us, which
+has been made by the Royal Servian Government, is meant to imply
+that a propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary does not exist,
+and that it is not aware of such. This formula is insincere, and
+the Servian Government reserves itself the supterfuge for later
+occasions that it had not disavowed by this declaration the
+existing propaganda, nor recognized the same as hostile to the
+monarchy, whence it could deduce further that it is not obliged to
+suppress in the future a propaganda similar to the present
+one</i>.</p>
+<p>The Royal Government regrets that according to a communication
+of the I. and R. Government certain Servian officers and
+functionaries have participated in the propaganda just referred to,
+and that these have therefore endangered the amicable relations for
+the observation of which the Royal Government had solemnly obliged
+itself through the declaration of March 31st, 1909.</p>
+<p>The Government ... identical with the demanded text.</p>
+<p><i>The formula as demanded by Austria reads</i>:</p>
+<p>"<i>The Royal Government regrets that Servian officers and
+functionaries ... have participated</i>...."</p>
+<p><i>Also with this formula and the further addition "according to
+the declaration of the I. and R. Government", the Servian
+Government pursues the object, already indicated above, to preserve
+a free hand for the future</i>.</p>
+<p>The Royal Government binds itself further:</p>
+<p>1. During the next regular meeting of the Skuptschina to embody
+in the press laws a clause, to wit, that the incitement to hatred
+of, and contempt for, the monarchy is to be must severely punished,
+as well as every publication whose general tendency is directed
+against the territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary.</p>
+<p>It binds itself in view of the coming revision of the
+constitution to embody an amendment into Art. 22 of the
+constitutional law which permits the confiscation of such
+publications as is at present impossible according to the clear
+definition of Art. 22 of the constitution.</p>
+<p><i>Austria had demanded</i>:</p>
+<p><i>1. To suppress every publication which incites to hatred and
+contempt for the monarchy, and whose tendency is directed against
+the territorial integrity of the monarchy.</i></p>
+<p><i>We wanted to bring about the obligation for Servia to take
+care that such attacks of the press would cease in the
+future.</i></p>
+<p><i>Instead Servia offers to pass certain laws which are meant as
+means towards this end, viz.:</i></p>
+<p><i>a) A law according to which the expressions of the press
+hostile to the monarchy can be individually punished, a matter,
+which is immaterial to us, all the more so, as the individual
+prosecution of press intrigues is very rarely possible and as, with
+a lax enforcement of such laws, the few cases of this nature would
+not be punished. The proposition, therefore, does not meet our
+demand in any way, and it offers not the least guarantee for the
+desired success.</i></p>
+<p><i>b) An amendment to Art. 22 of the constitution, which would
+permit confiscation, a proposal, which does not satisfy us, as the
+existence of such a law in Servia is of no use to us. For we want
+the obligation of the Government to enforce it and that has not
+been promised us.</i></p>
+<p><i>These proposals are therefore entirely unsatisfactory and
+evasive as we are not told within what time these laws will be
+passed, and as in the event of the notpassing of these laws by the
+Skuptschina everything would remain as it is, excepting the event
+of a possible resignation of the Government.</i></p>
+<p>2. The Government possesses no proofs and the note of the I. and
+R. Government does not submit them that the society Narodna Odbrana
+and other similar societies have committed, up to the present, any
+criminal actions of this manner through anyone of their members.
+Notwithstanding this, the Royal Government will accept the demand
+of the I. and R. Government and dissolve the society Narodna
+Odbrana, as well as every society which should act against
+Austria-Hungary.</p>
+<p><i>The propaganda of the Narodna Odbrana and affiliated
+societies hostile to the monarchy fills the entire public life of
+Servia; it is therefore an entirely inacceptable reserve if the
+Servian Government asserts that it knows nothing about it. Aside
+from this, our demand is not completely fulfilled, as we have asked
+besides:</i></p>
+<p>"<i>To confiscate the means of propaganda of these societies to
+prevent the reformation of the dissolved societies under another
+name and in another form.</i>"</p>
+<p><i>In these two directions the Belgrade Cabinet is perfectly
+silent, so that through this semi-concession there is offered us no
+guarantee for putting an end to the agitation of the associations
+hostile to the Monarchy, especially the Narodna Odbrana.</i></p>
+<p>3. The Royal Servian Government binds itself without delay to
+eliminate from the public instruction in Servia anything which
+might further the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary
+provided the I. and R. Government furnishes actual proofs.</p>
+<p><i>Also in this case the Servian Government first demands proofs
+for a propaganda hostile to the Monarchy in the public instruction
+of Servia while it must know that the text books introduced in the
+Servian schools contain objectionable matter in this direction and
+that a large portion of the teachers are in the camp of the Narodna
+Odbrana and affiliated societies.</i></p>
+<p><i>Furthermore, the Servian Government has not fulfilled a part
+of our demands, as we have requested, as it omitted in its text the
+addition desired by us: "as far as the body of instructors is
+concerned, as well as the means of instruction"&mdash;a sentence
+which shows clearly where the propaganda hostile to the Monarchy is
+to be found in the Servian schools</i>.</p>
+<p>4. The Royal Government is also ready to dismiss those officers
+and officials from the military and civil services in regard to
+whom it has been proved by judicial investigation that they have
+been guilty of actions against the territorial integrity of the
+monarchy; it expects that the I. and R. Government communicate to
+it for the purpose of starting the investigation the names of these
+officers and officials, and the facts with which they have been
+charged.</p>
+<p><i>By promising the dismissal from the military and civil
+services of those officers and officials who are found guilty by
+judicial procedure, the Servian Government limits its assent to
+those cases, in which these persons have been charged with a crime
+according to the statutory code. As, however, we demand the removal
+of such officers and officials as indulge in a propaganda hostile
+to the Monarchy, which is generally not punishable in Servia, our
+demands have not been fulfilled in this point</i>.</p>
+<p>5. The Royal Government confesses that it is not clear about the
+sense and the scope of that demand of the I. and R. Government
+which concerns the obligation on the part of the Royal Servian
+Government to permit the cooperation of officials of the I. and R.
+Government on Servian territory, but it declares that it is willing
+to accept every cooperation which does not run counter to
+international law and criminal law, as well as to the friendly and
+neighborly relations.</p>
+<p><i>The international law, as well as the criminal law, has
+nothing to do with this question; it is purely a matter of the
+nature of state police which is to be solved by way of a special
+agreement. The reserved attitude of Servia is therefore
+incomprehensible and on account of its vague general form it would
+lead to unbridgeable difficulties</i>.</p>
+<p>6. The Royal Government considers it its duty as a matter of
+course to begin an investigation against all those persons who have
+participated in the outrage of June 28th and who are in its
+territory. As far as the cooperation in this investigation of
+specially delegated officials of the I. and R. Government is
+concerned, this cannot be accepted, as this is a violation of the
+constitution and of criminal procedure. Yet in some cases the
+result of the investigation might be communicated to the
+Austro-Hungarian officials.</p>
+<p><i>The Austrian demand was clear and unmistakable</i>:</p>
+<p><i>1. To institute a criminal procedure against the participants
+in the outrage</i>.</p>
+<p><i>2. Participation by I. and R. Government officials in the
+examinations ("Recherche" in contrast with "enqu&ecirc;te
+judiciaire").</i></p>
+<p><i>3. It did not occur to us to let I. and R. Government
+officials participate in the Servian court procedure; they were to
+cooperate only in the police researches which had to furnish and
+fix the material for the investigation.</i></p>
+<p><i>If the Servian Government misunderstands us here, this is
+done deliberately, for it must be familiar with the difference
+between "enqu&ecirc;te judiciaire" and simple police researches. As
+it desired to escape from every control of the investigation which
+would yield, if correctly carried out, highly undesirable results
+for it, and as it possesses no means to refuse in a plausible
+manner the cooperation of our officials (precedents for such police
+intervention exist in great number) it tries to justify its refusal
+by showing up our demands as impossible</i>.</p>
+<p>7. The Royal Government has ordered on the evening of the day on
+which the note was received the arrest of Major Voislar Tankosic.
+However, as far as Milan Ciganowic is concerned who is a citizen of
+the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and who has been employed till June
+28th with the Railroad Department, it has as yet been impossible to
+locate him, wherefor a warrant has been issued against him.</p>
+<p>The I. and R. Government is asked to make known, as soon as
+possible, for the purpose of conducting the investigation, the
+existing grounds for suspicion and the proofs of guilt, obtained in
+the investigation at Sarajevo.</p>
+<p><i>This reply is disingenuous. According to our investigation,
+Ciganowic, by order of the police prefect in Belgrade, left three
+days after the outrage for Ribari, after it had become known that
+Ciganowic had participated in the outrage. In the first place, it
+is therefore incorrect that Ciganowic left the Servian service on
+June 28th. In the second place, we add that the prefect of police
+at Belgrade who had himself caused the departure of this Ciganowic
+and who knew his whereabout, declared in an interview that a man by
+the name of Milan Ciganowic did not exist in Belgrade</i>.</p>
+<p>8. The Servian Government will amplify and render more severe
+the existing measures against the suppression of smuggling of arms
+and explosives.</p>
+<p>It is a matter of course that it will proceed at once against,
+and punish severely, those officials of the frontier service on the
+line Shabatz-Loznica who violated their duty and who have permitted
+the perpetrators of the crime to cross the frontier.</p>
+<p>9. The Royal Government is ready to give explanations about the
+expressions which its officials in Servia and abroad have made in
+interviews after the outrage and which, according to the assertion
+of the I. and R. Government, were hostile to the Monarchy. As soon
+as the I. and R. Government points out in detail where those
+expressions were made and succeeds in proving that those
+expressions have actually been made by the functionaries concerned,
+the Royal Government itself will take care that the necessary
+evidences and proofs are collected therefor.</p>
+<p><i>The Royal Servian Government must be aware of the interviews
+in question. If it demands of the I. and R. Government that it
+should furnish all kinds of detail about the said interviews and if
+it reserves for itself the right of a formal investigation, it
+shows that it is not its intention seriously to fulfill the
+demand.</i></p>
+<p>10. The Royal Government will notify the I. and R. Government,
+so far as this has not been already done by the present note, of
+the execution of the measures in question as soon as one of those
+measures has been ordered and put into execution.</p>
+<p>The Royal Servian Government believes it to be to the common
+interest not to rush the solution of this affair and it is
+therefore, in case the I. and R. Government should not consider
+itself satisfied with this answer, ready, as ever, to accept a
+peaceable solution, be it by referring the decision of this
+question to the International Court at the Hague or by leaving it
+to the decision of the Great Powers who have participated in the
+working out of the declaration given by the Servian Government on
+March 31st 1909.</p>
+<p><i>The Servian Note, therefore, is entirely a play for
+time.</i></p>
+<center>EXHIBIT I.</center>
+<p>The Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassadors at Paris, London, and
+St. Petersburg, on Juli 23rd 1914.</p>
+<p>The publications of the Austro-Hungarian Government concerning
+the circumstances under which the Assassination of the Austrian
+successor to the throne and his consort took place, disclose
+clearly the aims which the pan-Serb propaganda has set itself and
+the means which it utilizes for their realization. Through the
+published facts the last doubt must disappear that the center of
+action of the efforts for the separation of the south slavic
+provinces from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and their union with
+the Servian Kingdom must be sought in Belgrade where it displays
+its activity with the connivance of members of the Government and
+of the Army.</p>
+<p>The Serb intrigues may be traced back through a series of years.
+In a specially marked manner the pan-Serb chauvinism showed itself
+during the Bosnian crisis. Only to the far-reaching self-restraint
+and moderation of the Austro-Hungarian Government and the energetic
+intercession of the powers is it to be ascribed that the
+provocations to which at that time Austria-Hungary was exposed on
+the part of Servia, did not lead to a conflict. The assurance of
+future well-behaviour which the Servian Government gave at that
+time, it has not kept. Under the very eyes, at least with the tacit
+sufferance of official Servia, the pan-Serb propaganda has
+meanwhile increased in scope and intensity; at its door is to be
+laid the latest crime the threads of which lead to Belgrade. It has
+become evident that it is compatible neither with the dignity nor
+with the self-preservation of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy to view
+any longer idly the doings across the border through which the
+safety and the integrity of the Monarchy are permanently
+threatened. With this state of affairs, the action as well as the
+demands of the Austro-Hungarian government can be viewed only as
+justifiable. Nevertheless, the attitude assumed by public opinion
+as well as by the government in Servia does not preclude the fear
+that the Servian government will decline to meet these demands and
+that it will allow itself to be carried away into a provocative
+attitude toward Austria-Hungary. Nothing would remain for the
+Austro-Hungarian government, unless it renounced definitely its
+position as a great power, but to press its demands with the
+Servian government and, if need be, enforce the same by appeal to
+military measures, in regard to which the choice of means must be
+left with it.</p>
+<p>I have the honor to request you to express yourself in the sense
+indicated above to (the present representative of M. Viviani) (Sir
+Edward Grey) (M. Sasonow) and therewith give special emphasis to
+the view that in this question there is concerned an affair which
+should be settled solely between Austria-Hungary and Servia, the
+limitation to which it must be the earnest endeavor of the powers
+to insure. We anxiously desire the localisation of the conflict
+because every intercession of another power on account of the
+various treaty-alliances would precipitate inconceivable
+consequences.</p>
+<p>I shall look forward with interest to a telegraphic report about
+the course of your interview.</p>
+<center>EXHIBIT 2.</center>
+<p>The Chancellor to the Governments of Germany. Confidential.
+Berlin, July 28, 1914.</p>
+<p>You will make the following report to the Government to which
+you are accredited:</p>
+<p>In view of the facts which the Austrian Government has published
+in its note to the Servian Government, the last doubt must
+disappear that the outrage to which the Austro-Hungarian successor
+to the throne has fallen a victim, was prepared in Servia, to say
+the least with the connivance of members of the Servian government
+and army. It is a product of the pan-Serb intrigues which for a
+series of years have become a source of permanent disturbance for
+the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and for the whole of Europe.</p>
+<p>The pan-Serb chauvinism appeared especially marked during the
+Bosnian crisis. Only to the far-reaching self-restraint and
+moderation of the Austro-Hungarian government and the energetic
+intercession of the powers is it to be ascribed that the
+provocations to which Austria-Hungary was exposed at that time, did
+not lead to a conflict. The assurance of future well-behaviour,
+which the Servian government gave at that time, it has not kept.
+Under the very eyes, at least with the tacit sufferance of official
+Servia, the pan-Serb propaganda has meanwhile continued to increase
+in scope and intensity. It would be compatible neither with its
+dignity nor with its right to self-preservation if the
+Austro-Hungarian government persisted to view idly any longer the
+intrigues beyond the frontier, through which the safety and the
+integrity of the monarchy are permanently threatened. With this
+state of affairs, the action as well as the demands of the
+Austro-Hungarian Government can be viewed only as justifiable.</p>
+<p>The reply of the Servian government to the demands which the
+Austro-Hungarian government put on the 23rd inst. through its
+representative in Belgrade, shows that the dominating factors in
+Servia are not inclined to cease their former policies and
+agitation. There will remain nothing else for the Austro-Hungarian
+government than to press its demands, if need be through military
+action, unless it renounces for good its position as a great
+power.</p>
+<p>Some Russian personalities deem it their right as a matter of
+course and a task of Russia's to actively become a party to Servia
+in the conflict between Austria-Hungary and Servia. For the
+European conflagration which would result from a similar step by
+Russia, the "Nowoje Wremja" believes itself justified in making
+Germany responsible in so far as it does not induce Austria-Hungary
+to yield.</p>
+<p>The Russian press thus turns conditions upside down. It is not
+Austria-Hungary which has called forth the conflict with Servia,
+but it is Servia which, through unscrupulous favor toward pan-Serb
+aspirations, even in parts of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy,
+threatens the same in her existence and creates conditions, which
+eventually found expression in the wanton outrage at Sarajevo. If
+Russia believes that it must champion the cause of Servia in this
+matter, it certainly has the right to do so. However, it must
+realize that it makes the Serb activities its own, to undermine the
+conditions of existence of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and that
+thus it bears the sole responsibility if out of the Austro-Servian
+affair, which all other great powers desire to localize, there
+arises a European war. This responsibility of Russia's is evident
+and it weighs the more heavily as Count Berchtold has officially
+declared to Russia that Austria-Hungary has no intention to acquire
+Servian territory or to touch the existence of the Servian Kingdom,
+but only desires peace against the Servian intrigues threatening
+its existence.</p>
+<p>The attitude of the Imperial government in this question is
+clearly indicated. The agitation conducted by the pan-Slavs in
+Austria-Hungary has for its goal, with the destruction of the
+Austro-Hungarian monarchy, the scattering or weakening of the
+triple alliance with a complete isolation of the German Empire in
+consequence. Our own interest therefore calls us to the side of
+Austria-Hungary. The duty, if at all possible, to guard Europe
+against a universal war, points to the support by ourselves of
+those endeavors which aim at the localization of the conflict,
+faithful to the course of those policies which we have carried out
+successfully for forty-four years in the interest of the
+preservation of the peace of Europe.</p>
+<p>Should, however, against our hope, through the interference of
+Russia the fire be spread, we should have to support, faithful to
+our duty as allies, the neighbor-monarchy with all the power at our
+command. We shall take the sword only if forced to it, but then in
+the clear consciousness that we are not guilty of the calamity
+which war will bring upon the peoples of Europe.</p>
+<center>EXHIBIT 3.</center>
+<p>Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at Vienna to the Chancellor
+on July 24th 1914.</p>
+<p>Count Berchtold has asked to-day for the Russian Charg&eacute;
+d'affaires in order to explain to him thoroughly and cordially
+Austria-Hungary's point of view toward Servia. After recapitulation
+of the historical development of the past few years, he emphasized
+that the Monarchy entertained no thought of conquest toward Servia.
+Austria-Hungary would not claim Servian territory. It insisted
+merely that this step was meant as a definite means of checking the
+Serb intrigues. Impelled by force of circumstance, Austria-Hungary
+must have a guaranty for continued amicable relations with Servia.
+It was far from him to intend to bring about a change in the
+balance of powers in the Balcan. The Charge d'affaires who had
+received no instructions from St. Petersburg, took the discussion
+of the Secretary "ad referendum" with the promise to submit it
+immediately to Sasonow.</p>
+<center>EXHIBIT 4.</center>
+<p>Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg to the
+Chancellor on July 24th 1914.</p>
+<p>I have just utilized the contents of Order 592 in a prolonged
+interview with Sasonow. The Secretary (Sasonow) indulged in
+unmeasured accusations toward Austria-Hungary and he was very much
+agitated. He declared most positively that Russia could not permit
+under any circumstances that the Servo-Austrian difficulty be
+settled alone between the parties concerned.</p>
+<center>EXHIBIT 5.</center>
+<p>The Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg to the Chancellor.
+Telegram of July 26th 1914.</p>
+<p>The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador had an extended interview with
+Sasonow this afternoon. Both parties had a satisfactory impression
+as they told me afterwards. The assurance of the Ambassador that
+Austria-Hungary had no idea of conquest but wished to obtain peace
+at last at her frontiers, greatly pacified the Secretary.</p>
+<center>EXHIBIT 6.</center>
+<p>Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to the
+Chancellor on July 25th 1914.</p>
+<p>Message to H.M. from General von Chelius (German honorary aide
+de camp to the Czar).</p>
+<p>The manoeuvres of the troops in the Krasnoe camp were suddenly
+interrupted and the regiments returned to their garrisons at once.
+The manoeuvres have been cancelled. The military pupils were raised
+to-day to the rank of officers instead of next fall. At
+headquarters there obtains great excitement over the procedure of
+Austria. I have the impression that complete preparations for
+mobilization against Austria are being made.</p>
+<center>EXHIBIT 7.</center>
+<p>Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to the
+Chancellor on July 26th 1914.</p>
+<p>The military attach&eacute; requests the following message to be
+sent to the general staff:</p>
+<p>I deem it certain that mobilisation has been ordered for Kiev
+and Odessa. It is doubtful at Warsaw and Moscow and improbable
+elsewhere.</p>
+<center>EXHIBIT 8.</center>
+<p>Telegram of the Imperial Consulate at Kovno to the Chancellor on
+July 27th 1914.</p>
+<p>Kovno has been declared to be in a state of war.</p>
+<p>(Note that the official translator means
+<i>Kriegszustand</i>.)</p>
+<center>EXHIBIT 9.</center>
+<p>Telegram of the Imperial Minister at Berne to the Chancellor on
+July 27th 1914.</p>
+<p>Have learned reliably that French XIVth corps has discontinued
+manoeuvres.</p>
+<center>EXHIBIT 10.</center>
+<p>Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at London.
+Urgent. July 26th 1914.</p>
+<p>Austria-Hungary has declared in St. Petersburg officially and
+solemnly that it has no desire for territorial gain in Servia; that
+it will not touch the existence of the Kingdom, but that it desires
+to establish peaceful conditions. According to news received here,
+the call for several classes of the reserves is expected
+immediately which is equivalent to mobilization.[<a href=
+"#note-186">186</a>] If this news proves correct, we shall be
+forced to contermeasures very much against our own wishes. Our
+desire to localize the conflict and to preserve the peace of Europe
+remains unchanged. We ask to act in this sense at St. Petersburg
+with all possible emphasis.</p>
+<p><a name="note-186" id="note-186">
+<!-- Note Anchor 186 --></a>[Footnote 186: The German text inserts
+<i>auch gegen uns</i>, i.e. also against us.]</p>
+<p>EXHIBIT 10a.</p>
+<p>Telegram of the Imperial Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador
+at Paris. July 26th 1914.</p>
+<p>After officially declaring to Russia that Austria-Hungary has no
+intention to acquire territorial gain and to touch the existence of
+the Kingdom, the decision whether there is to be a European war
+rests solely with Russia which has to bear the entire
+responsibility. We depend upon France with which we are at one in
+the desire for the preservation of the peace of Europe that it will
+exercise its influence at St. Petersburg in favour of peace.</p>
+<p>EXHIBIT 10b.</p>
+<p>Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at St.
+Petersburg on July 26th, 1914.</p>
+<p>After Austria's solemn declaration of its territorial
+dis-interestedness, the responsibility for a possible disturbance
+of the peace of Europe through a Russian intervention rests solely
+upon Russia. We trust still that Russia will undertake no steps
+which will threaten seriously the peace of Europe.</p>
+<center>EXHIBIT 11.</center>
+<p>Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg to the
+Chancellor on July 27th, 1914.</p>
+<p>Military Attach&eacute; reports a conversation with the
+Secretary of War:</p>
+<p>Sasonow has requested the latter to enlighten me on the
+situation. The Secretary of War has given me his word of honor that
+no order to mobilize has as yet been issued. Though general
+preparations are being made, no reserves were called and no horses
+mustered. If Austria crossed the Servian frontier, such military
+districts as are directed toward Austria, viz., Kiev, Odessa,
+Moscow, Kazan, are to be mobilized. Under no circumstances those on
+the German frontier, Warsaw, Vilna, St. Petersburg. Peace with
+Germany was desired very much. Upon my inquiry into the object of
+mobilization against Austria he shrugged his shoulders and referred
+to the diplomats. I told the Secretary that we appreciated the
+friendly intentions, but considered mobilization even against
+Austria as very menacing.</p>
+<center>EXHIBIT 12.</center>
+<p>Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at London
+on July 27th, 1914.</p>
+<p>We know as yet nothing of a suggestion of Sir Edward Grey's to
+hold a quadruple conference in London. It is impossible for us to
+place our ally in his dispute with Servia before a European
+tribunal. Our mediation must be limited to the danger of an
+Austro-Russian conflict.</p>
+<center>EXHIBIT 13.</center>
+<p>Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at London
+on July 25th, 1914.</p>
+<p>The distinction made by Sir Edward Grey between an
+Austro-Servian and an Austro-Russian conflict is perfectly correct.
+We do not wish to interpose in the former any more than England,
+and as heretofore we take the position that this question must be
+localized by virtue of all powers refraining from intervention. It
+is therefore our hope that Russia will refrain from any action in
+view of her responsibility and the seriousness of the situation. We
+are prepared, in the event of an Austro-Russian controversy, quite
+apart from our known duties as allies, to intercede between Russia
+and Austria jointly with the other powers.</p>
+<center>EXHIBIT 14.</center>
+<p>Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at St.
+Petersburg on July 28th, 1914.</p>
+<p>We continue in our endeavor to induce Vienna to elucidate in St.
+Petersburg the object and scope of the Austrian action in Servia in
+a manner both convincing and satisfactory to Russia. The
+declaration of war which has meanwhile ensued alters nothing in
+this matter.</p>
+<center>EXHIBIT 15.</center>
+<p>Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador in London
+on July 27th, 1914.</p>
+<p>We have at once started the mediation proposal in Vienna in the
+sense as desired by Sir Edward Grey. We have communicated besides
+to Count Berchtold the desire of M. Sasonow for a direct parley
+with Vienna.</p>
+<center>EXHIBIT 16.</center>
+<p>Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at Vienna to the Chancellor
+on July 28th, 1914.</p>
+<p>Count Berchtold requests me to express to Your Excellency his
+thanks for the communication of the English mediation proposal. He
+states, however, that after the opening of hostilities by Servia
+and the subsequent declaration of war, the step appears
+belated.</p>
+<center>EXHIBIT 17.</center>
+<p>Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at Paris
+on July 29th, 1914.</p>
+<p>News received here regarding French preparations of war
+multiplies from hour to hour. I request that You call the attention
+of the French Government to this and accentuate that such measures
+would call forth counter-measures on our part. We should have to
+proclaim threatening state of war (drohende Kriegsgefahr), and
+while this would not mean a call for the reserves or mobilization,
+yet the tension would be aggravated. We continue to hope for the
+preservation of peace.</p>
+<center>EXHIBIT 18.</center>
+<p>Telegram of the Military Attache at St. Petersburg to H. M. the
+Kaiser on July 30th, 1914.</p>
+<p>Prince Troubetzki said to me yesterday, after causing Your
+Majesty's telegram to be delivered at once to Czar Nicolas: Thank
+God that a telegram of Your Emperor has come. He has just told me
+the telegram has made a deep impression upon the Czar but as the
+mobilization against Austria had already been ordered and Sasonow
+had convinced His Majesty that it was no longer possible to
+retreat, His Majesty was sorry he could not change it any more. I
+then told him that the guilt for the measureless consequences lay
+at the door of premature mobilization against Austria-Hungary which
+after all was involved merely in a local war with Servia, for
+Germany's answer was clear and the responsibility rested upon
+Russia which ignored Austria-Hungary's assurance that it had no
+intentions of territorial gain in Servia. Austria-Hungary mobilized
+against Servia and not against Russia and there was no ground for
+an immediate action on the part of Russia. I further added that in
+Germany one could not understand any more Russia's phrase that "she
+could not desert her brethren in Servia", after the horrible crime
+of Sarajevo. I told him finally he need not wonder if Germany's
+army were to be mobilized.</p>
+<center>EXHIBIT 19.</center>
+<p>Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at Rome on
+July 31st, 1914.</p>
+<p>We have continued to negotiate between Russia and
+Austria-Hungary through a direct exchange of telegrams between His
+Majesty the Kaiser and His Majesty the Czar, as well as in
+conjunction with Sir Edward Grey. Through the mobilization of
+Russia all our efforts have been greatly handicapped if they have
+not become impossible. In spite of pacifying assurances Russia is
+taking such far-reaching measures against us that the situation is
+becoming continually more menacing.</p>
+<center>EXHIBIT 20.</center>
+<p>I. His Majesty to the Czar.</p>
+<p>July 28th, 10.45 p.m.</p>
+<p>I have heard with the greatest anxiety of the impression which
+is caused by the action of Austria-Hungary against Servia. The
+inscrupulous agitation which has been going on for years in Servia,
+has led to the revolting crime of which Archduke Franz Ferdinand
+has become a victim. The spirit which made the Servians murder
+their own King and his consort, still dominates that country.
+Doubtless You will agree with me that both of us, You as well as I,
+and all other sovereigns, have a common interest to insist that all
+those who are responsible for this horrible murder, shall suffer
+their deserved punishment.</p>
+<p>On the other hand I by no means overlook the difficulty
+encountered by You and Your Government to stem the tide of public
+opinion. In view of the cordial friendship which has joined us both
+for a long time with firm ties, I shall use my entire influence to
+induce Austria-Hungary to obtain a frank and satisfactory
+understanding with Russia. I hope confidently that You will support
+me in my efforts to overcome all difficulties which may yet
+arise.</p>
+<p>Your most sincere and devoted friend and cousin</p>
+<p>signed: Wilhelm.</p>
+<center>EXHIBIT 21.</center>
+<p>II. The Czar to His Majesty.</p>
+<p>Peterhof Palace, July 29th, 1 p.m.</p>
+<p>I am glad that You are back in Germany. In this serious moment I
+ask You earnestly to help me. An ignominious war has been declared
+against a weak country and in Russia the indignation which I fully
+share is tremendous. I fear that very soon I shall be unable to
+resist the pressure exercised upon me and that I shall be forced to
+take measures which will lead to war. To prevent a calamity as a
+European war would be, I urge You in the name of our old friendship
+to do all in Your power to restrain Your ally from going too
+far.</p>
+<p>signed: Nicolas.</p>
+<center>EXHIBIT 22.</center>
+<p>III. His Majesty to the Czar.</p>
+<p>July 29th, 6.30 p.m.</p>
+<p>I have received Your telegram and I share Your desire for the
+conservation of peace. However: I cannot&mdash;as I told You in my
+first telegram&mdash;consider the action of Austria-Hungary as an
+"ignominious war". Austria-Hungary knows from experience that the
+promises of Servia as long as they are merely on paper are entirely
+unreliable.</p>
+<p>According to my opinion the action of Austria-Hungary is to be
+considered as an attempt to receive full guaranty that the promises
+of Servia are effectively translated into deeds. In this opinion I
+am strengthened by the explanation of the Austrian cabinet that
+Austria-Hungary intended no territorial gain at the expense of
+Servia. I am therefore of opinion that it is perfectly possible for
+Russia to remain a spectator in the Austro-Servian war without
+drawing Europe into the most terrible war it has ever seen. I
+believe that a direct understanding is possible and desirable
+between Your Government and Vienna, an understanding which&mdash;as
+I have already telegraphed You&mdash;my Government endeavors to aid
+with all possible effort. Naturally military measures by Russia,
+which might be construed as a menace by Austria-Hungary, would
+accelerate a calamity which both of us desire to avoid and would
+undermine my position as mediator which&mdash;upon Your appeal to
+my friendship and aid&mdash;I willingly accepted.</p>
+<p>signed: Wilhelm.</p>
+<center>EXHIBIT 23.</center>
+<p>IV. His Majesty to the Czar.</p>
+<p>July 30th, 1 a.m.</p>
+<p>My Ambassador has instructions to direct the attention of Your
+Government to the dangers and serious consequences of a
+mobilization; I have told You the same in my last telegram.
+Austria-Hungary has mobilized only against Servia, and only a part
+of her army. If Russia, as seems to be the case according to Your
+advice and that of Your Government, mobilizes against
+Austria-Hungary, the part of the mediator with which You have
+entrusted me in such friendly manner and which I have accepted upon
+Your express desire, is threatened if not made impossible. The
+entire weight of decision now rests upon Your shoulders, You have
+to bear the responsibility for war or peace.</p>
+<p>signed: Wilhelm.</p>
+<center>EXHIBIT 23a.</center>
+<p>V. The Czar to His Majesty.</p>
+<p>Peterhof, July 30th, 1914, 1.20 p.m.</p>
+<p>I thank You from my heart for Your quick reply. I am sending
+to-night Tatisheft (Russian honorary aide to the Kaiser) with
+instructions. The military measures now taking form were decided
+upon five days ago, and for the reason of defence against the
+preparations of Austria. I hope with all my heart that these
+measures will not influence in any manner Your position as mediator
+which I appraise very highly. We need Your strong pressure upon
+Austria so that an understanding can be arrived at with us.</p>
+<p>Nicolas.</p>
+<center>EXHIBIT 24.</center>
+<p>Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at St.
+Petersburg on July 31st, 1914. Urgent.</p>
+<p>In spite of negotiations still pending and although we have up
+to this hour made no preparations for mobilization, Russia has
+mobilized her entire army and navy, hence also against us. On
+account of these Russian measures we have been forced, for the
+safety of the country, to proclaim the threatening state of war,
+which does not yet imply mobilization. Mobilization, however, is
+bound to follow if Russia does not stop every measure of war
+against us and against Austria-Hungary within 12 hours and notifies
+us definitely to this effect. Please to communicate this at once to
+M. Sasonow and wire hour of communication.</p>
+<center>EXHIBIT 25.</center>
+<p>Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador in Paris
+on July 31st, 1914. Urgent.</p>
+<p>Russia has ordered mobilization of her entire army and fleet,
+therefore also against us in spite of our still pending mediation.
+We have therefore declared the threatening state of war which is
+bound to be followed by mobilization unless Russia stops within 12
+hours all measures of war against us and Austria. Mobilization
+inevitably implies war. Please ask French Government whether it
+intends to remain neutral in a Russo-German war. Reply must be made
+in 18 hours. Wire at once hour of inquiry. Utmost speed
+necessary.</p>
+<center>EXHIBIT 26.</center>
+<p>Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador in St.
+Petersburg on August 1st, 12.52 p.m. Urgent.</p>
+<p>If the Russian Government gives no satisfactory reply to our
+demand, Your Excellency will please transmit this afternoon 5
+o'clock (mid-European time) the following statement:</p>
+<p>"Le Gouvernement Imp&eacute;rial s'est efforc&eacute; d&egrave;s
+les d&eacute;buts de la crise de la mener &agrave; une solution
+pacifique. Se rendant &agrave; un d&eacute;sir que lui en avail
+&eacute;t&eacute; exprim&eacute; par Sa Majest&eacute; l'Empereur
+de Russie, Sa Majest&eacute; l'Empereur d'Allemagne d'accord avec
+l'Angleterre &eacute;tait appliqu&eacute; &agrave; accomplir un
+r&ocirc;le m&eacute;diateur aupr&egrave;s des Cabinets de Vienne et
+de St. Petersbourg, lorsque la Russie, sans en attendre le
+r&eacute;sultat, proc&eacute;da &agrave; la mobilisation de la
+totalit&eacute; de ses forces de terre et de mer.</p>
+<p>"A la suite de cette mesure mena&ccedil;ante motiv&eacute;e par
+aucun pr&eacute;paratif militaire de la part de l'Allemagne,
+l'Empire Allemand se trouva vis-&agrave;-vis d'un danger grave et
+imminent. Si le Gouvernement Imp&eacute;rial e&ucirc;t
+manqu&eacute; de parer &agrave; ce p&eacute;ril il aurait compromis
+la securit&eacute; et l'existence m&ecirc;me de l'Allemagne. Par
+cons&eacute;quent le Gouvernement Allemand se vit forc&eacute; de
+s'adresser au Gouvernement de Sa Majest&eacute; l'Empereur de
+toutes les Russies en sistant sur la cessation des dits actes
+militaires. La Russie ayant refus&eacute; de faire droit &agrave;
+cette demande et ayant manifest&eacute; par ce refus, que son
+action &eacute;tait dirig&eacute;e contre l'Allemande, j'ai
+l'honneur d'ordre de mon Gouvernement de faire savoir &agrave;
+Votre Excellence ce qui suit:</p>
+<p>"Sa Majest&eacute; l'Empereur, mon auguste Souverain, an nom de
+l'Empire rel&egrave;ve le d&eacute;fi et Se consid&egrave;re en
+&eacute;tat de guerre avec la Russie."</p>
+<p>Please wire urgent receipt and time of carrying out this
+instruction by Russian time.</p>
+<p>Please ask for Your passports and turn over protection and
+affairs to the American Embassy.</p>
+<center>EXHIBIT 27.</center>
+<p>Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador in Paris to the Chancellor
+on August 1st 1.05 p. m.</p>
+<p>Upon my repeated definite inquiry whether France would remain
+neutral in the event of a Russo-German war, the Prime Minister
+declared that France would do that which her interests
+dictated.</p>
+<hr />
+<a name="RULE4_3" id="RULE4_3"><!-- RULE4 3 --></a>
+<h2>APPENDIX II</h2>
+<center>EXTRACTS FROM SIR EDWARD GREY'S CORRESPONDENCE RESPECTING
+THE EUROPEAN CRISIS</center>
+<p><i>For the complete Correspondence see White Paper Miscellaneous
+No. 6 (1914) (Cd. 7467), presented to both Houses of Parliament by
+Command of His Majesty, August 1914</i></p>
+<p>No. 13.</p>
+<p><i>Note communicated by Russian Ambassador, July 25.</i></p>
+<p>(Translation.)</p>
+<p>M. Sazionof telegraphs to the Russian Charg&eacute; d'Affaires
+at Vienna on the 11th (24th) July, 1914:</p>
+<p>"The communication made by Austria-Hungary to the Powers the day
+after the presentation of the ultimatum at Belgrade leaves a period
+to the Powers which is quite insufficient to enable them to take
+any steps which might help to smooth away the difficulties that
+have arisen.</p>
+<p>"In order to prevent the consequences, equally incalculable and
+fatal to all the Powers, which may result from the course of action
+followed by the Austro-Hungarian Government, it seems to us to be
+above all essential that the period allowed for the Servian reply
+should be extended. Austria-Hungary, having declared her readiness
+to inform the Powers of the results of the enquiry upon which the
+Imperial and Royal Government base their accusations, should
+equally allow them sufficient time to study them.</p>
+<p>"In this case, if the Powers were convinced that certain of the
+Austrian demands were well founded, they would be in a position to
+offer advice to the Servian Government.</p>
+<p>"A refusal to prolong the term of the ultimatum would render
+nugatory the proposals made by the Austro-Hungarian Government to
+the Powers, and would be in contradiction to the very bases of
+international relations.</p>
+<p>"Prince Kudachef is instructed to communicate the above to the
+Cabinet at Vienna.</p>
+<p>"M. Sazonof hopes that His Britannic Majesty's Government will
+adhere to the point of view set forth above, and he trusts that Sir
+E. Grey will see his way to furnish similar instructions to the
+British Ambassador at Vienna."</p>
+<p>No. 17.</p>
+<p><i>Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.&mdash;(Received July</i>
+25.)</p>
+<p>(Telegraphic.) <i>St. Petersburgh, July</i> 25, 1914.</p>
+<p>I Saw the Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning....</p>
+<p>The Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Servia was quite
+ready to do as you had suggested and to punish those proved to be
+guilty, but that no independent State could be expected to accept
+the political demands which had been put forward. The Minister for
+Foreign Affairs thought, from a conversation which he had with the
+Servian Minister yesterday, that, in the event of the Austrians
+attacking Servia, the Servian Government would abandon Belgrade,
+and withdraw their forces into the interior, while they would at
+the same time appeal to the Powers to help them. His Excellency was
+in favour of their making this appeal. He would like to see the
+question placed on an international footing, as the obligations
+taken by Servia in 1908, to which reference is made in the Austrian
+ultimatum, were given not to Austria, but to the Powers.</p>
+<p>If Servia should appeal to the Powers, Russia would be quite
+ready to stand aside and leave the question in the hands of
+England, France, Germany, and Italy. It was possible, in his
+opinion, that Servia might propose to submit the question to
+arbitration.</p>
+<p>On my expressing the earnest hope that Russia would not
+precipitate war by mobilising until you had had time to use your
+influence in favour of peace, his Excellency assured me that Russia
+had no aggressive intentions, and she would take no action until it
+was forced on her. Austria's action was in reality directed against
+Russia. She aimed at overthrowing the present <i>status quo</i> in
+the Balkans, and establishing her own hegemony there. He did not
+believe that Germany really wanted war, but her attitude was
+decided by ours. If we took our stand firmly with France and Russia
+there would be no war. If we failed them now, rivers of blood would
+flow, and we would in the end be dragged into war. I said that
+England could play the role of mediator at Berlin and Vienna to
+better purpose as friend who, if her counsels of moderation were
+disregarded, might one day be converted into an ally, than if she
+were to declare herself Russia's ally at once. His Excellency said
+that unfortunately Germany was convinced that she could count upon
+our neutrality.</p>
+<p>I said all I could to impress prudence on the Minister for
+Foreign Affairs, and warned him that if Russia mobilised, Germany
+would not be content with mere mobilisation, or give Russia time to
+carry out hers, but would probably declare war at once. His
+Excellency replied that Russia could not allow Austria to crush
+Servia and become the predominant Power in the Balkans, and, if she
+feels secure of the support of France, she will face all the risks
+of war. He assured me once more that he did not wish to precipitate
+a conflict, but that unless Germany could restrain Austria I could
+regard the situation as desperate.</p>
+<p>No. 18.</p>
+<p><i>Sir H. Rumbold to Sir Edward Grey.&mdash;(Received July
+25.)</i></p>
+<p>(Telegraphic.) <i>Berlin, July 25, 1914.</i></p>
+<p>Your telegram of the 24th July acted on.</p>
+<p>Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs says that on receipt of a
+telegram at 10 this morning from German Ambassador at London, he
+immediately instructed German Ambassador at Vienna to pass on to
+Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs your suggestion for an
+extension of time limit, and to speak to his Excellency about it.
+Unfortunately it appeared from press that Count Berchtold is at
+Ischl, and Secretary of State thought that in these circumstances
+there would be delay and difficulty in getting time limit extended.
+Secretary of State said that he did not know what Austria-Hungary
+had ready on the spot, but he admitted quite freely that
+Austro-Hungarian Government wished to give the Servians a lesson,
+and that they meant to take military action. He also admitted that
+Servian Government could not swallow certain of the
+Austro-Hungarian demands.</p>
+<p>Secretary of State said that a reassuring feature of situation
+was that Count Berchtold had sent for Russian representative at
+Vienna and had told him that Austria-Hungary had no intention of
+seizing Servian territory. This step should, in his opinion,
+exercise a calming influence at St. Petersburgh. I asked whether it
+was not to be feared that, in taking military action against
+Servia, Austria would dangerously excite public opinion in Russia.
+He said he thought not. He remained of opinion that crisis could be
+localised. I said that telegrams from Russia in this morning's
+papers did not look very reassuring, but he maintained his
+optimistic view with regard to Russia. He said that he had given
+the Russian Government to understand that last thing Germany wanted
+was a general war, and he would do all in his power to prevent such
+a calamity. If the relations between Austria and Russia became
+threatening, he was quite ready to fall in with your suggestion as
+to the four Powers working in favour of moderation at Vienna and
+St. Petersburgh.</p>
+<p>Secretary of State confessed privately that he thought the note
+left much to be desired as a diplomatic document. He repeated very
+earnestly that, though he had been accused of knowing all about the
+contents of that note, he had in fact had no such knowledge.</p>
+<p>No. 41.</p>
+<p><i>Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.&mdash;(Received July
+27.)</i></p>
+<p>(Telegraphic.) <i>Vienna, July</i> 27, 1914.</p>
+<p>I have had conversations with all my colleagues representing the
+Great Powers. The impression left on my mind is that the
+Austro-Hungarian note was so drawn up as to make war inevitable;
+that the Austro-Hungarian Government are fully resolved to have war
+with Servia; that they consider their position as a Great Power to
+be at stake; and that until punishment has been administered to
+Servia it is unlikely that they will listen to proposals of
+mediation. This country has gone wild with joy at the prospect of
+war with Servia, and its postponement or prevention would
+undoubtedly be a great disappointment.</p>
+<p>I propose, subject to any special directions you desire to send
+me, to express to the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs the
+hope of His Majesty's Government that it may yet be possible to
+avoid war, and to ask his Excellency whether he cannot suggest a
+way out even now.</p>
+<p>No. 43.</p>
+<p><i>Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.&mdash;(Received July
+27.)</i></p>
+<p>(Telegraphic.) <i>Berlin, July</i> 27, 1914.</p>
+<p>Your telegram of 26th July.</p>
+<p>Secretary of State says that conference you suggest would
+practically amount to a court of arbitration and could not, in his
+opinion, be called together except at the request of Austria and
+Russia. He could not therefore fall in with your suggestion,
+desirous though he was to co-operate for the maintenance of peace.
+I said I was sure that your idea had nothing to do with
+arbitration, but meant that representatives of the four nations not
+directly interested should discuss and suggest means for avoiding a
+dangerous situation. He maintained, however, that such a conference
+as you proposed was not practicable. He added that news he had just
+received from St. Petersburgh showed that there was an intention on
+the part of M. de Sazonof to exchange views with Count Berchtold.
+He thought that this method of procedure might lead to a
+satisfactory result, and that it would be best, before doing
+anything else, to await outcome of the exchange of views between
+the Austrian and Russian Governments.</p>
+<p>In the course of a short conversation Secretary of State said
+that as yet Austria was only partially mobilising, but that if
+Russia mobilised against Germany latter would have to follow suit.
+I asked him what he meant by "mobilising against Germany." He said
+that if Russia only mobilised in south, Germany would not mobilise,
+but if she mobilised in north, Germany would have to do so too, and
+Russian system of mobilisation was so complicated that it might be
+difficult exactly to locate her mobilisation. Germany would
+therefore have to be very careful not to be taken by surprise.</p>
+<p>Finally, Secretary of State said that news from St. Petersburgh
+had caused him to take more hopeful view of the general
+situation.</p>
+<p>No. 56.</p>
+<p><i>Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.&mdash;(Received July
+28.)</i></p>
+<p>(Telegraphic.) <i>Vienna, July</i> 27, 1914.</p>
+<p>The Russian Ambassador had to-day a long and earnest
+conversation with Baron Macchio, the Under-secretary of State for
+Foreign Affairs. He told him that, having just come back from St.
+Petersburgh, he was well acquainted with the views of the Russian
+Government and the state of Russian public opinion. He could assure
+him that if actual war broke out with Servia it would be impossible
+to localise it, for Russia was not prepared to give way again, as
+she had done on previous occasions, and especially during the
+annexation crisis of 1909. He earnestly hoped that something would
+be done before Servia was actually invaded. Baron Macchio replied
+that this would now be difficult, as a skirmish had already taken
+place on the Danube, in which the Servians had been the aggressors.
+The Russian Ambassador said that he would do all he could to keep
+the Servians quiet pending any discussions that might yet take
+place, and he told me that he would advise his Government to induce
+the Servian Government to avoid any conflict as long as possible,
+and to fall back before an Austrian advance. Time so gained should
+suffice to enable a settlement to be reached. He had just heard of
+a satisfactory conversation which the Russian Minister for Foreign
+Affairs had yesterday with the Austrian Ambassador at St.
+Petersburgh. The former had agreed that much of the
+Austro-Hungarian note to Servia had been perfectly reasonable, and
+in fact they had practically reached an understanding as to the
+guarantees which Servia might reasonably be asked to give to
+Austria-Hungary for her future good behaviour. The Russian
+Ambassador urged that the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh
+should be furnished with full powers to continue discussion with
+the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who was very willing to
+advise Servia to yield all that could be fairly asked of her as an
+independent Power. Baron Macchio promised to submit this suggestion
+to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.</p>
+<p>No. 62.</p>
+<p><i>Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.&mdash;(Received July
+28.)</i></p>
+<p>(Telegraphic.) <i>Vienna, July 28</i>, 1914.</p>
+<p>I spoke to Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day in the sense of
+your telegram of 27th July to Berlin. I avoided the word
+"mediation," but said that, as mentioned in your speech,[<a href=
+"#note-187">187</a>] which he had just read to me, you had hopes
+that conversations in London between the four Powers less
+interested might yet lead to an arrangement which Austro-Hungarian
+Government would accept as satisfactory and as rendering actual
+hostilities unnecessary. I added that you had regarded Servian
+reply as having gone far to meet just demands of Austria-Hungary;
+that you thought it constituted a fair basis of discussion during
+which warlike operations might remain in abeyance, and that
+Austrian Ambassador in Berlin was speaking in this sense. Minister
+for Foreign Affairs said quietly, but firmly, that no discussion
+could be accepted on basis of Servian note; that war would be
+declared to-day, and that well-known pacific character of Emperor,
+as well as, he might add, his own, might be accepted as a guarantee
+that war was both just and inevitable. This was a matter that must
+be settled directly between the two parties immediately concerned.
+I said that you would hear with regret that hostilities could not
+now be arrested, as you feared that they might lead to
+complications threatening the peace of Europe.</p>
+<p>In taking leave of his Excellency, I begged him to believe that,
+if in the course of present grave crisis our point of view should
+sometimes differ from his, this would arise, not from want of
+sympathy with the many just complaints which Austria-Hungary had
+against Servia, but from the fact that, whereas Austria-Hungary put
+first her quarrel with Servia, you were anxious in the first
+instance for peace of Europe. I trusted this larger aspect of the
+question would appeal with equal force to his Excellency. He said
+he had it also in mind, but thought that Russia ought not to oppose
+operations like those impending, which did not aim at territorial
+aggrandisement and which could no longer be postponed.</p>
+<p><a name="note-187" id="note-187">
+<!-- Note Anchor 187 --></a>[Footnote 187: "Hansard," Vol. 65, No.
+107, Columns 931, 932, 933.]</p>
+<a name="numb-85" id="numb-85"></a>
+<p>No. 85.</p>
+<p><i>Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.&mdash;(Received July
+29.)</i></p>
+<p>(Telegraphic.) <i>Berlin, July</i> 29, 1914.</p>
+<p>I was asked to call upon the Chancellor to-night. His Excellency
+had just returned from Potsdam.</p>
+<p>He said that should Austria be attacked by Russia a European
+conflagration might, he feared, become inevitable, owing to
+Germany's obligations as Austria's ally, in spite of his continued
+efforts to maintain peace. He then proceeded to make the following
+strong bid for British neutrality. He said that it was clear, so
+far as he was able to judge the main principle which governed
+British policy, that Great Britain would never stand by and allow
+France to be crushed in any conflict there might be. That, however,
+was not the object at which Germany aimed. Provided that neutrality
+of Great Britain were certain, every assurance would be given to
+the British Government that the Imperial Government aimed at no
+territorial acquisitions at the expense of France should they prove
+victorious in any war that might ensue.</p>
+<p>I questioned his Excellency about the French colonies, and he
+said that he was unable to give a similar undertaking in that
+respect. As regards Holland, however, his Excellency said that, so
+long as Germany's adversaries respected the integrity and
+neutrality of the Netherlands, Germany was ready to give His
+Majesty's Government an assurance that she would do likewise. It
+depended upon the action of France what operations Germany might be
+forced to enter upon in Belgium, but when the war was over, Belgian
+integrity would be respected if she had not sided against
+Germany.</p>
+<p>His Excellency ended by saying that ever since he had been
+Chancellor the object of his policy had been, as you were aware, to
+bring about an understanding with England; he trusted that these
+assurances might form the basis of that understanding which he so
+much desired. He had in mind a general neutrality agreement between
+England and Germany, though it was of course at the present moment
+too early to discuss details, and an assurance of British
+neutrality in the conflict which present crisis might possibly
+produce, would enable him to look forward to realisation of his
+desire.</p>
+<p>In reply to his Excellency's enquiry how I thought his request
+would appeal to you, I said that I did not think it probable that
+at this stage of events you would care to bind yourself to any
+course of action and that I was of opinion that you would desire to
+retain full liberty.</p>
+<p>Our conversation upon this subject having come to an end, I
+communicated the contents of your telegram of to-day to his
+Excellency, who expressed his best thanks to you.</p>
+<p>No. 87.</p>
+<p><i>Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie</i>.</p>
+<p>Sir, <i>Foreign Office, July</i> 29, 1914.</p>
+<p>After telling M. Cambon to-day how grave the situation seemed to
+be, I told him that I meant to tell the German Ambassador to-day
+that he must not be misled by the friendly tone of our
+conversations into any sense of false security that we should stand
+aside if all the efforts to preserve the peace, which we were now
+making in common with Germany, failed. But I went on to say to M.
+Cambon that I thought it necessary to tell him also that public
+opinion here approached the present difficulty from a quite
+different point of view from that taken during the difficulty as to
+Morocco a few years ago. In the case of Morocco the dispute was one
+in which France was primarily interested, and in which it appeared
+that Germany, in an attempt to crush France, was fastening a
+quarrel on France on a question that was the subject of a special
+agreement between France and us. In the present case the dispute
+between Austria and Servia was not one in which we felt called to
+take a hand. Even if the question became one between Austria and
+Russia we should not feel called upon to take a hand in it. It
+would then be a question of the supremacy of Teuton or Slav&mdash;a
+struggle for supremacy in the Balkans; and our idea had always been
+to avoid being drawn into a war over a Balkan question. If Germany
+became involved and France became involved, we had not made up our
+minds what we should do; it was a case that we should have to
+consider. France would then have been drawn into a quarrel which
+was not hers, but in which, owing to her alliance, her honour and
+interest obliged her to engage. We were free from engagements, and
+we should have to decide what British interests required us to do.
+I thought it necessary to say that, because, as he knew, we were
+taking all precautions with regard to our fleet, and I was about to
+warn Prince Lichnowsky not to count on our standing aside, but it
+would not be fair that I should let M. Cambon be misled into
+supposing that this meant that we had decided what to do in a
+contingency that I still hoped might not arise.</p>
+<p>M. Cambon said that I had explained the situation very clearly.
+He understood it to be that in a Balkan quarrel, and in a struggle
+for supremacy between Teuton and Slav we should not feel called to
+intervene; should other issues be raised, and Germany and France
+become involved, so that the question became one of the hegemony of
+Europe, we should then decide what it was necessary for us to do.
+He seemed quite prepared for this announcement, and made no
+criticism upon it.</p>
+<p>He said French opinion was calm, but decided. He anticipated a
+demand from Germany that France would be neutral while Germany
+attacked Russia. This assurance France, of course, could not give;
+she was bound to help Russia if Russia was attacked.</p>
+<p>I am, &amp;c.</p>
+<p>E. GREY.</p>
+<p>No. 89.</p>
+<p><i>Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen</i>.</p>
+<p>Sir, <i>Foreign Office, July</i> 29, 1914.</p>
+<p>After speaking to the German Ambassador this afternoon about the
+European situation, I said that I wished to say to him, in a quite
+private and friendly way, something that was on my mind. The
+situation was very grave. While it was restricted to the issues at
+present actually involved we had no thought of interfering in it.
+But if Germany became involved in it, and then France, the issue
+might be so great that it would involve all European interests; and
+I did not wish him to be misled by the friendly tone of our
+conversation&mdash;which I hoped would continue&mdash;into thinking
+that we should stand aside.</p>
+<p>He said that he quite understood this, but he asked whether I
+meant that we should, under certain circumstances, intervene?</p>
+<p>I replied that I did not wish to say that, or to use anything
+that was like a threat or an attempt to apply pressure by saying
+that, if things became worse, we should intervene. There would be
+no question of our intervening if Germany was not involved, or even
+if France was not involved. But we knew very well that, if the
+issue did become such that we thought British interests required us
+to intervene, we must intervene at once, and the decision would
+have to be very rapid, just as the decisions of other Powers had to
+be. I hoped that the friendly tone of our conversations would
+continue as at present, and that I should be able to keep as
+closely in touch with the German Government in working for peace.
+But if we failed in our efforts to keep the peace, and if the issue
+spread so that it involved practically every European interest, I
+did not wish to be open to any reproach from him that the friendly
+tone of all our conversations had misled him or his Government into
+supposing that we should not take action, and to the reproach that,
+if they had not been so misled, the course of things might have
+been different.</p>
+<p>The German Ambassador took no exception to what I had said;
+indeed, he told me that it accorded with what he had already given
+in Berlin as his view of the situation.</p>
+<p>I am, &amp;c.</p>
+<p>E. GREY.</p>
+<p>No. 98.</p>
+<p><i>Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.&mdash;(Received July
+30.)</i></p>
+<p>(Telegraphic.) <i>Berlin, July</i> 30, 1914.</p>
+<p>Secretary of State informs me that immediately on receipt of
+Prince Lichnowsky's telegram recording his last conversation with
+you he asked Austro-Hungarian Government whether they would be
+willing to accept mediation on basis of occupation by Austrian
+troops of Belgrade or some other point and issue their conditions
+from there. He has up till now received no reply, but he fears
+Russian mobilisation against Austria will have increased
+difficulties, as Austria-Hungary, who has as yet only mobilised
+against Servia, will probably find it necessary also against
+Russia. Secretary of State says if you can succeed in getting
+Russia to agree to above basis for an arrangement and in persuading
+her in the meantime to take no steps which might be regarded as an
+act of aggression against Austria he still sees some chance that
+European peace may be preserved.</p>
+<p>He begged me to impress on you difficulty of Germany's position
+in view of Russian mobilisation and military measures which he
+hears are being taken in France. Beyond recall of officers on
+leave&mdash;a measure which had been officially taken after, and
+not before, visit of French Ambassador yesterday&mdash;Imperial
+Government had done nothing special in way of military
+preparations. Something, however, would have soon to be done, for
+it might be too late, and when they mobilised they would have to
+mobilise on three sides. He regretted this, as he knew France did
+not desire war, but it would be a military necessity.</p>
+<p>His Excellency added that telegram received from Prince
+Lichnowsky last night contains matter which he had heard with
+regret, but not exactly with surprise, and at all events he
+thoroughly appreciated frankness and loyalty with which you had
+spoken.</p>
+<p>He also told me that this telegram had only reached Berlin very
+late last night; had it been received earlier Chancellor would, of
+course, not have spoken to me in way he had done.</p>
+<p>No. 101.</p>
+<p><i>Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen</i>.</p>
+<p>(Telegraphic.) <i>Foreign Office, July</i> 30, 1914.</p>
+<p>Your telegram of 29th July.[<a href="#note-188">188</a>]</p>
+<p>His Majesty's Government cannot for a moment entertain the
+Chancellor's proposal that they should bind themselves to
+neutrality on such terms.</p>
+<p>What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while French
+colonies are taken and France is beaten so long as Germany does not
+take French territory as distinct from the colonies.</p>
+<p>From the material point of view such a proposal is unacceptable,
+for France, without further territory in Europe being taken from
+her, could be so crushed as to lose her position as a Great Power,
+and become subordinate to German policy.</p>
+<p>Altogether, apart from that, it would be a disgrace for us to
+make this bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace
+from which the good name of this country would never recover.</p>
+<p>The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain away whatever
+obligation or interest we have as regards the neutrality of
+Belgium. We could not entertain that bargain either.</p>
+<p>Having said so much, it is unnecessary to examine whether the
+prospect of a future general neutrality agreement between England
+and Germany offered positive advantages sufficient to compensate us
+for tying our hands now. We must preserve our full freedom to act
+as circumstances may seem to us to require in any such unfavourable
+and regrettable development of the present crisis as the Chancellor
+contemplates.</p>
+<p>You should speak to the Chancellor in the above sense, and add
+most earnestly that the one way of maintaining the good relations
+between England and Germany is that they should continue to work
+together to preserve the peace of Europe; if we succeed in this
+object, the mutual relations of Germany and England will, I
+believe, be <i>ipso facto</i> improved and strengthened. For that
+object His Majesty's Government will work in that way with all
+sincerity and good-will.</p>
+<p>And I will say this: If the peace of Europe can be preserved,
+and the present crisis safely passed, my own endeavour will be to
+promote some arrangement to which Germany could be a party, by
+which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy
+would be pursued against her or her allies by France, Russia, and
+ourselves, jointly or separately. I have desired this and worked
+for it, as far as I could, through the last Balkan crisis, and,
+Germany having a corresponding object, our relations sensibly
+improved. The idea has hitherto been too Utopian to form the
+subject of definite proposals, but if this present crisis, so much
+more acute than any that Europe has gone through for generations,
+be safely passed, I am hopeful that the relief and reaction which
+will follow may make possible some more definite rapprochement
+between the Powers than has been possible hitherto.</p>
+<p><a name="note-188" id="note-188">
+<!-- Note Anchor 188 --></a>[Footnote 188: See <a href=
+"#numb-85">No. 85</a>.]</p>
+<p>Enclosure 1 in No. 105.</p>
+<p><i>Sir Edward Grey to M. Cambon</i>.</p>
+<p>My dear Ambassador, <i>Foreign Office, November 22</i>,
+1912.</p>
+<p>From time to time in recent years the French and British naval
+and military experts have consulted together. It has always been
+understood that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of
+either Government to decide at any future time whether or not to
+assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation
+between experts is not, and ought not to be regarded as, an
+engagement that commits either Government to action in a
+contingency that has not arisen and may never arise. The
+disposition, for instance, of the French and British fleets
+respectively at the present moment is not based upon an engagement
+to co-operate in war.</p>
+<p>You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government had
+grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, it
+might become essential to know whether it could in that event
+depend upon the armed assistance of the other.</p>
+<p>I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an
+unprovoked attack by a third Power, or something that threatened
+the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other
+whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression
+and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would be
+prepared to take in common. If these measures involved action, the
+plans of the General Staffs would at once be taken into
+consideration, and the Governments would then decide what effect
+should be given to them.</p>
+<p>Yours, &amp;c.</p>
+<p>E. GREY.</p>
+<p>No. 119.</p>
+<p><i>Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie</i>.</p>
+<p>Sir, <i>Foreign Office, July</i> 31, 1914.</p>
+<p>M. Cambon referred to-day to a telegram that had been shown to
+Sir Arthur Nicolson this morning from the French Ambassador in
+Berlin, saying that it was the uncertainty with regard to whether
+we would intervene which was the encouraging element in Berlin, and
+that, it we would only declare definitely on the side of Russia and
+France, it would decide the German attitude in favour of peace.</p>
+<p>I said that it was quite wrong to suppose that we had left
+Germany under the impression that we would not intervene. I had
+refused overtures to promise that we should remain neutral. I had
+not only definitely declined to say that we would remain neutral, I
+had even gone so far this morning as to say to the German
+Ambassador that, if France and Germany became involved in war, we
+should be drawn into it. That, of course, was not the same thing as
+taking an engagement to France, and I told M. Cambon of it only to
+show that we had not left Germany under the impression that we
+would stand aside.</p>
+<p>M. Cambon then asked me for my reply to what he had said
+yesterday.</p>
+<p>I said that we had come to the conclusion, in the Cabinet
+to-day, that we could not give any pledge at the present time.
+Though we should have to put our policy before Parliament, we could
+not pledge Parliament in advance. Up to the present moment, we did
+not feel, and public opinion did not feel, that any treaties or
+obligations of this country were involved. Further developments
+might alter this situation and cause the Government and Parliament
+to take the view that intervention was justified. The preservation
+of the neutrality of Belgium might be, I would not say a decisive,
+but an important factor, in determining our attitude. Whether we
+proposed to Parliament to intervene or not to intervene in a war,
+Parliament would wish to know how we stood with regard to the
+neutrality of Belgium, and it might be that I should ask both
+France and Germany whether each was prepared to undertake an
+engagement that she would not be the first to violate the
+neutrality of Belgium.</p>
+<p>M. Cambon repeated his question whether we would help France if
+Germany made an attack on her.</p>
+<p>I said that I could only adhere to the answer that, as far as
+things had gone at present, we could not take any engagement.</p>
+<p>M. Cambon urged that Germany had from the beginning rejected
+proposals that might have made for peace. It could not be to
+England's interest that France should be crushed by Germany. We
+should then be in a very diminished position with regard to
+Germany. In 1870 we had made a great mistake in allowing an
+enormous increase of German strength, and we should now be
+repeating the mistake. He asked me whether I could not submit his
+question to the Cabinet again.</p>
+<p>I said that the Cabinet would certainly be summoned as soon as
+there was some new development, but at the present moment the only
+answer I could give was that we could not undertake any definite
+engagement.</p>
+<p>I am, &amp;c.</p>
+<p>E. GREY.</p>
+<a name="numb-122" id="numb-122"></a>
+<p>No. 122.</p>
+<p><i>Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.&mdash;(Received August
+1.)</i></p>
+<p>(Telegraphic.) <i>Berlin, July</i> 31, 1914.</p>
+<p>Neutrality of Belgium, referred to in your telegram of 31st July
+to Sir F. Bertie.</p>
+<p>I have seen Secretary of State, who informs me that he must
+consult the Emperor and the Chancellor before he could possibly
+answer. I gathered from what he said that he thought any reply they
+might give could not but disclose a certain amount of their plan of
+campaign in the event of war ensuing, and he was therefore very
+doubtful whether they would return any answer at all. His
+Excellency, nevertheless, took note of your request.</p>
+<p>It appears from what he said that German Government consider
+that certain hostile acts have already been committed by Belgium.
+As an instance of this, he alleged that a consignment of corn for
+Germany had been placed under an embargo already.</p>
+<p>I hope to see his Excellency to-morrow again to discuss the
+matter further, but the prospect of obtaining a definite answer
+seems to me remote.</p>
+<p>In speaking to me to-day the Chancellor made it clear that
+Germany would in any case desire to know the reply returned to you
+by the French Government.</p>
+<p>No. 123.</p>
+<p><i>Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen</i>.</p>
+<p>Sir, <i>Foreign Office, August</i> 1, 1914.</p>
+<p>I told the German Ambassador to-day that the reply[<a href=
+"#note-189">189</a>] of the German Government with regard to the
+neutrality of Belgium was a matter of very great regret, because
+the neutrality of Belgium affected feeling in this country. If
+Germany could see her way to give the same assurance as that which
+had been given by France it would materially contribute to relieve
+anxiety and tension here. On the other hand, if there were a
+violation of the neutrality of Belgium by one combatant while the
+other respected it, it would be extremely difficult to restrain
+public feeling in this country. I said that we had been discussing
+this question at a Cabinet meeting, and as I was authorised to tell
+him this I gave him a memorandum of it.</p>
+<p>He asked me whether, if Germany gave a promise not to violate
+Belgian neutrality, we would engage to remain neutral.</p>
+<p>I replied that I could not say that; our hands were still free,
+and we were considering what our attitude should be. All I could
+say was that our attitude would be determined largely by public
+opinion here, and that the neutrality of Belgium would appeal very
+strongly to Public opinion here. I did not think that we could give
+a promise of neutrality on that condition alone.</p>
+<p>The Ambassador pressed me as to whether I could not formulate
+conditions on which we would remain neutral. He even suggested that
+the integrity of France and her colonies might be guaranteed.</p>
+<p>I said that I felt obliged to refuse definitely any promise to
+remain neutral on similar terms, and I could only say that we must
+keep our hands free.</p>
+<p>I am, &amp;c.</p>
+<p>E. GREY.</p>
+<p><a name="note-189" id="note-189">
+<!-- Note Anchor 189 --></a>[Footnote 189: See <a href=
+"#numb-122">No. 122</a>.]</p>
+<p>No. 133.</p>
+<p><i>Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen</i>.</p>
+<p>(Telegraphic.) <i>Foreign Office, August</i> 1, 1914.</p>
+<p>M. De Etter came to-day to communicate the contents of a
+telegram from M. Sazonof, dated the 31st July, which are as
+follows:&mdash;</p>
+<p>"The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador declared the readiness of his
+Government to discuss the substance of the Austrian ultimatum to
+Servia. M. Sazonof replied by expressing his satisfaction, and said
+it was desirable that the discussions should take place in London
+with the participation of the Great Powers.</p>
+<p>"M. Sazonof hoped that the British Government would assume the
+direction of these discussions. The whole of Europe would be
+thankful to them. It would be very important that Austria should
+meanwhile put a stop provisionally to her military action on
+Servian territory."</p>
+<p>(The above has been communicated to the six Powers.)</p>
+<p>No. 134.</p>
+<p><i>Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.&mdash;(Received August
+1.)</i></p>
+<p>(Telegraphic.) <i>Paris, August</i> 1, 1914.</p>
+<p>President of the Republic has informed me that German Government
+were trying to saddle Russia with the responsibility; that it was
+only after a decree of general mobilisation had been issued in
+Austria that the Emperor of Russia ordered a general mobilisation;
+that, although the measures which the German Government have
+already taken are in effect a general mobilisation, they are not so
+designated; that a French general mobilisation will become
+necessary in self-defence, and that France is already forty-eight
+hours behind Germany as regards German military preparations; that
+the French troops have orders not to go nearer to the German
+frontier than a distance of 10 kilom. so as to avoid any grounds
+for accusations of provocation to Germany, whereas the German
+troops, on the other hand, are actually on the French frontier and
+have made incursions on it; that, notwithstanding mobilisations,
+the Emperor of Russia has expressed himself ready to continue his
+conversations with the German Ambassador with a view to preserving
+the peace; that French Government, whose wishes are markedly
+pacific, sincerely desire the preservation of peace and do not
+quite despair, even now, of its being possible to avoid war.</p>
+<p>No. 148.</p>
+<p><i>Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie</i>.</p>
+<p>(Telegraphic.) <i>Foreign Office, August</i> 2, 1914.</p>
+<p>After the Cabinet this morning I gave M. Cambon the following
+memorandum:&mdash;</p>
+<p>"I am authorised to give an assurance that, if the German fleet
+comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake
+hostile operations against French coasts or shipping, the British
+fleet will give all the protection in its power.</p>
+<p>"This assurance is of course subject to the policy of His
+Majesty's Government receiving the support of Parliament, and must
+not be taken as binding His Majesty's Government to take any action
+until the above contingency of action by the German fleet takes
+place."</p>
+<p>I pointed out that we had very large questions and most
+difficult issues to consider, and that Government felt that they
+could not bind themselves to declare war upon Germany necessarily
+if war broke out between France and Germany to-morrow, but it was
+essential to the French Government, whose fleet had long been
+concentrated in the Mediterranean, to know how to make their
+dispositions with their north coast entirely undefended. We
+therefore thought it necessary to give them this assurance. It did
+not bind us to go to war with Germany unless the German fleet took
+the action indicated, but it did give a security to France that
+would enable her to settle the disposition of her own Mediterranean
+fleet.</p>
+<p>M. Cambon asked me about the violation of Luxemburg. I told him
+the doctrine on that point laid down by Lord Derby and Lord
+Clarendon in 1867. He asked me what we should say about the
+violation of the neutrality of Belgium. I said that was a much more
+important matter; we were considering what statement we should make
+in Parliament to-morrow&mdash;in effect, whether we should declare
+violation of Belgian neutrality to be a <i>casus belli</i>. I told
+him what had been said to the German Ambassador on this point.</p>
+<p>No. 153.</p>
+<p><i>Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen</i>.</p>
+<p>(Telegraphic.) <i>Foreign Office, August</i> 4, 1914.</p>
+<p>The King of the Belgians has made an appeal to His Majesty the
+King for diplomatic intervention on behalf of Belgium in the
+following terms:&mdash;</p>
+<p>"Remembering the numerous proofs of your Majesty's friendship
+and that of your predecessor, and the friendly attitude of England
+in 1870 and the proof of friendship you have just given us again, I
+make a supreme appeal to the diplomatic intervention of your
+Majesty's Government to safeguard the integrity of Belgium."</p>
+<p>His Majesty's Government are also informed that the German
+Government has delivered to the Belgian Government a note proposing
+friendly neutrality entailing free passage through Belgian
+territory, and promising to maintain the independence and integrity
+of the kingdom and its possessions at the conclusion of peace,
+threatening in case of refusal to treat Belgium as an enemy. An
+answer was requested within twelve hours.</p>
+<p>We also understand that Belgium has categorically refused this
+as a flagrant violation of the law of nations.</p>
+<p>His Majesty's Government are bound to protest against this
+violation of a treaty to which Germany is a party in common with
+themselves, and must request an assurance that the demand made upon
+Belgium will not be proceeded with and that her neutrality will be
+respected by Germany. You should ask for an immediate reply.</p>
+<hr />
+<a name="RULE4_4" id="RULE4_4"><!-- RULE4 4 --></a>
+<h2>APPENDIX III</h2>
+<p>Extract from the Dispatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at
+Berlin respecting the Rupture of Diplomatic Relations with the
+German Government.</p>
+<p>(Cd. 7445.)</p>
+<p><i>Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey</i>.</p>
+<p>Sir, <i>London, August</i> 8, 1914.</p>
+<p>In accordance with the instructions contained in your telegram
+of the 4th instant I called upon the Secretary of State that
+afternoon and enquired, in the name of His Majesty's Government,
+whether the Imperial Government would refrain from violating
+Belgian neutrality. Herr von Jagow at once replied that he was
+sorry to say that his answer must be "No," as, in consequence of
+the German troops having crossed the frontier that morning, Belgian
+neutrality had been already violated. Herr von Jagow again went
+into the reasons why the Imperial Government had been obliged to
+take this step, namely, that they had to advance into France by the
+quickest and easiest way, so as to be able to get well ahead with
+their operations and endeavour to strike some decisive blow as
+early as possible. It was a matter of life and death for them, as
+if they had gone by the more southern route they could not have
+hoped, in view of the paucity of roads and the strength of the
+fortresses, to have got through without formidable opposition
+entailing great loss of time. This loss of time would have meant
+time gained by the Russians for bringing up their troops to the
+German frontier. Rapidity of action was the great German asset,
+while that of Russia was an inexhaustible supply of troops. I
+pointed out to Herr von Jagow that this <i>fait accompli</i> of the
+violation of the Belgian frontier rendered, as he would readily
+understand, the situation exceedingly grave, and I asked him
+whether there was not still time to draw back and avoid possible
+consequences, which both he and I would deplore. He replied that,
+for the reasons he had given me, it was now impossible for them to
+draw back.</p>
+<p>During the afternoon I received your further telegram of the
+same date, and, in compliance with the instructions therein
+contained, I again proceeded to the Imperial Foreign Office and
+informed the Secretary of State that unless the Imperial Government
+could give the assurance by 12 o'clock that night that they would
+proceed no further with their violation of the Belgian frontier and
+stop their advance, I had been instructed to demand my passports
+and inform the Imperial Government that His Majesty's Government
+would have to take all steps in their power to uphold the
+neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty to which
+Germany was as much a party as themselves.</p>
+<p>Herr von Jagow replied that to his great regret he could give no
+other answer than that which he had given me earlier in the day,
+namely, that the safety of the Empire rendered it absolutely
+necessary that the Imperial troops should advance through Belgium.
+I gave his Excellency a written summary of your telegram and,
+pointing out that you had mentioned 12 o'clock as the time when His
+Majesty's Government would expect an answer, asked him whether, in
+view of the terrible consequences which would necessarily ensue, it
+were not possible even at the last moment that their answer should
+be reconsidered. He replied that if the time given were even
+twenty-four hours or more, his answer must be the same. I said that
+in that case I should have to demand my passports. This interview
+took place at about 7 o'clock. In a short conversation which ensued
+Herr von Jagow expressed his poignant regret at the crumbling of
+his entire policy and that of the Chancellor, which had been to
+make friends with Great Britain and then, through Great Britain, to
+get closer to France. I said that this sudden end to my work in
+Berlin was to me also a matter of deep regret and disappointment,
+but that he must understand that under the circumstances and in
+view of our engagements, His Majesty's Government could not
+possibly have acted otherwise than they had done.</p>
+<p>I then said that I should like to go and see the Chancellor, as
+it might be, perhaps, the last time I should have an opportunity of
+seeing him. He begged me to do so. I found the Chancellor very
+agitated. His Excellency at once began a harangue, which lasted for
+about 20 minutes. He said that the step taken by His Majesty's
+Government was terrible to a degree; just for a
+word&mdash;"neutrality," a word which in war time had so often been
+disregarded&mdash;just for a scrap of paper Great Britain was going
+to make war on a kindred nation who desired nothing better than to
+be friends with her. All his efforts in that direction had been
+rendered useless by this last terrible step, and the policy to
+which, as I knew, he had devoted himself since his accession to
+office had tumbled down like a house of cards. What we had done was
+unthinkable; it was like striking a man from behind while he was
+fighting for his life against two assailants. He held Great Britain
+responsible for all the terrible events that might happen. I
+protested strongly against that statement, and said that, in the
+same way as he and Herr von Jagow wished me to understand that for
+strategical reasons it was a matter of life and death to Germany to
+advance through Belgium and violate the latter's neutrality, so I
+would wish him to understand that it was, so to speak, a matter of
+"life and death" for the honour of Great Britain that she should
+keep her solemn engagement to do her utmost to defend Belgium's
+neutrality if attacked. That solemn compact simply had to be kept,
+or what confidence could anyone have in engagements given by Great
+Britain in the future? The Chancellor said, "But at what price will
+that compact have been kept. Has the British Government thought of
+that?" I hinted to his Excellency as plainly as I could that fear
+of consequences could hardly be regarded as an excuse for breaking
+solemn engagements, but his Excellency was so excited, so evidently
+overcome by the news of our action, and so little disposed to hear
+reason that I refrained from adding fuel to the flame by further
+argument. As I was leaving he said that the blow of Great Britain
+joining Germany's enemies was all the greater that almost up to the
+last moment he and his Government had been working with us and
+supporting our efforts to maintain peace between Austria and
+Russia. I said that this was part of the tragedy which saw the two
+nations fall apart just at the moment when the relations between
+them had been more friendly and cordial than they had been for
+years. Unfortunately, notwithstanding our efforts to maintain peace
+between Russia and Austria, the war had spread and had brought us
+face to face with a situation which, if we held to our engagements,
+we could not possibly avoid, and which unfortunately entailed our
+separation from our late fellow-workers. He would readily
+understand that no one regretted this more than I.</p>
+<p>After this somewhat painful interview I returned to the embassy
+and drew up a telegraphic report of what had passed. This telegram
+was handed in at the Central Telegraph Office a little before 9
+P.M. It was accepted by that office, but apparently never
+despatched.[<a href="#note-190">190</a>]</p>
+<p><a name="note-190" id="note-190">
+<!-- Note Anchor 190 --></a>[Footnote 190: This telegram never
+reached the Foreign Office.]</p>
+<hr />
+<a name="RULE4_5" id="RULE4_5"><!-- RULE4 5 --></a>
+<h2>APPENDIX IV</h2>
+<center>THE CRIME OF SERAJEVO<br />
+SELECTIONS FROM THE AUSTRIAN <i>dossier</i> OF THE CRIME</center>
+<p>The following document is contained in the German Version of the
+German White Book (pp. 28-31); and though it adds little to our
+knowledge of the Austrian case against Servia, it deserves to be
+reprinted, as it is omitted altogether in the official version in
+English of the German White Book. The authorship of the document is
+uncertain. It has the appearance of an extract from a German
+newspaper.</p>
+<p>Aus dem &ouml;sterreich-ungarischen Material.</p>
+<p>Wien, 27. Juli. Das in der &ouml;sterreichisch-ungarischen
+Zirkularnote an die ausw&auml;rtigen Botschaften in Angelegenheit
+des serbischen Konflikts erw&auml;hnte Dossier wird heute
+ver&ouml;ffentlicht.</p>
+<p>In diesem Memoire wird darauf hingewiesen, dass die von Serbien
+ausgegangene Bewegung, die sich zum Ziele gesetzt hat, die
+s&uuml;dlichen Teile Oesterreich-Ungarns von der Monarchie
+loszureiszen, um sie mit Serbien zu einer staatlichen Einheit zu
+verbinden, weit zur&uuml;ckgreist. Diese in ihren Endzielen stets
+gleichbleibende und nur in ihren Mitteln und an Intensit&auml;t
+wechselnde Propaganda erreichte zur Zeit der Unnerionskrise ihren
+H&ouml;hepunft und trat damals ossen mit ihren Tendenzen hervor.
+W&auml;hrend einerjeits die gesamte serbische Bresse zum Kampfe
+gegen die Monarchie ausrief, bildeten sich&mdash;von anderen
+Propagandamitteln abgesehen&mdash;Ussoziationen, die diese
+K&auml;mpfe vorbereiteten, unter denen die Harodna Odbrana an
+Bedeutung hervorragte. Aus einem revolution&auml;ren Komitee
+hervorgegangen, fonstituierte sich diese vom Belgrader
+Ausw&auml;rtigen Amte v&ouml;llig abh&auml;ngige Organisation unter
+Leitung von Staatsm&auml;nnern und Offizieren, darunter dem General
+Tantovic und dem ehemaligen Minister Ivanovic. Auch Major Oja
+Jantovic und Milan Pribicevic geh&ouml;ren zu diesen Gr&uuml;ndern.
+Dieser Berein hatte sich die Bildung und Ausr&uuml;stung von
+Freischaren f&uuml;r den bevorstehenden Krieg gegen die
+&ouml;fterreichisch-ungarische Monarchie zum Ziele gesetzt. In
+einer dem Memoire angef&uuml;gten Anlage wird ein Auszug aus dem
+vom Zentralausschusse der Narodna Odbrana herausgegebenen
+Vereinsorgane gleichen Namens ver&ouml;ffentlicht, worin in
+mehreren Artikeln die T&auml;tigfelt und Ziele dieses Vereins
+ausf&uuml;hrlich dargelegt werden. Es hei&szlig;t darin, da&szlig;
+zu der Hauptaufgabe der Narodna Odbrana die Verbindung mit ihren
+nahen und ferneren Br&uuml;dern jenseits der Grenze und unseren
+&uuml;brigen Freunden in der Welt geh&ouml;ren.</p>
+<p><i>Oesterreich ist als erster und gr&ouml;&szlig;ter Feind
+bezeichnet</i>. Wie die Narodna Odbrana die Notwendigkeit des
+Kampfes mit Oesterreich predigt, predigt sie eine heilige Wahrheit
+unserer nationalen Lage. Das Schlu&szlig;kapitel enth&auml;lt einen
+Apell an die Regierung und das Volk Serbiens, sich mit allen
+Mitteln f&uuml;r den Kampf vorzubereiten, den die Annexion
+vorangezeigt hat.</p>
+<p>Das Memoire schildert nach einer Aussage eines von der Narodna
+Odbrana angeworbenen Komitatschis die damalige T&auml;tigkeit der
+Narodna Odbrana, die eine von zwei Hauptleuten, darunter Jankovic,
+geleitete <i>Schule zur Ausbildung von Banden</i> unterhielt,
+Schulen, welche von General Jankovic und von Hauptmann Milan
+Pribicevic regelm&auml;&szlig;ig inspiziert wurden. Weiter wurden
+die Komitatschis im <i>Schie&szlig;en und Bombenwerfen, im
+Minenlegen, Sprengen von Eisenbahnbr&uuml;cken</i> usw.
+unterrichtet. Nach der feierlichen Erkl&auml;rung der Serbischen
+Regierung vom Jahre 1909 schien auch das Ende dieser Organisation
+gekommen zu sein. Diese Erwartungen haben sich aber nicht nur nicht
+erf&uuml;llt, sondern die Propaganda wurde durch die serbische
+Presse fortgesetzt. Das Memoire f&uuml;hrt als Beispiel die Art und
+Weise an, wie das Attentat gegen den bosnischen Landeschef
+Varesanin publizistisch verwertet wurde, indem der Attent&auml;ter
+als serbischer Nationalheld gefeiert und seine Tat verherrlicht
+wurde. Diese Bl&auml;tter wurden nicht nur in Serbien verbreitet,
+sondern auch auf wohlorganisierten Schleichwegen in die Monarchie
+hineingeschmuggelt.</p>
+<p>Unter der gleichen Leitung wie bei ihrer Gr&uuml;ndung wurde die
+Narodna Odbrana neuerlich der zentralpunkt einer Agitation welcher
+der <i>Sch&uuml;tzenbund mit 762 Vereinen, ein Sokolbund mit 3500
+Mitgliedern, und verschiedene andere Vereine
+angeh&ouml;rten</i>.</p>
+<p>Im Kleide eines Kulturvereins auftretend, dem nur die geistige
+und die f&uuml;&ouml;rperliche Entwickelung der Bev&ouml;lkerung
+Serbiens sowie deren materielle Kr&auml;ftigung am Herzen liegt,
+enthullt die Narodna Oobrana ihr wahres reorganisiertes Programm in
+vorzitiertem Auszug aus ihrem Vereinsorgan, in welchem "die heilige
+Wahrheit" gepredigt wird, dass es eine unerl&auml;ssliche
+Notwendigkeit ist, gegen Oesterreich, seinen ersten gr&ouml;ssten
+Feind, diesen Ausrottungskampf mit Gewehr und Kanone zu
+f&uuml;hren, und das Volk mit allen Mitteln auf den Kampf
+vorzubereiten, zur Befreiung der unterworfenen Gebiete, in denen
+viele Millionen unterjochter Br&uuml;der schmachten. Die in dem
+Memoire zitierten Aufrufe und Reden &auml;hnlichen Charakters
+beleuchten die vielseitige ausw&auml;rtige T&auml;tigkeit der
+Narodna Oobrana und ihrer affilierten Vereine, die in
+Vortragsreifen, in der Teilnahme an Festen von bosnischen Vereinen,
+bei denen offen Mitglieder f&uuml;r die erw&auml;hnte serbische
+Vereinigung geworben wurden, besteht. Gegenw&auml;rtig ist noch die
+Untersuchung dar&uuml;ber im Zuge, dass die Sokolvereine Serbiens
+analoge Vereinigungen der Monarchie bestimmten, sich mit ihnen in
+einem bisher geheim gehaltenen Verbande zu vereinigen. Durch
+Vertrauensm&auml;nner und Mission&auml;re wurde die Aufwiegelung in
+die Kreise Erwachsener und der urteilslosen Jugend gebracht. So
+wurden von Milan Pribicewitsch ehmalige honvedoffiziere und ein
+Gendarmerieleutnant zum Verlassen des Heeresdienstes in der
+Monarchie unter bedenklichen Umst&auml;nden verleitet. In den
+Schulen der Lehrerbildungsanstalten wurde eine weitgehende
+Agitation entwickelt. Der gew&uuml;nschte Krieg gegen die Monarchie
+wurde milit&auml;risch auch insofern vorbereitet, als serbische
+Emiss&auml;re im Falle des Ausbruchs der Feindseligkeiten mit der
+Zerst&ouml;rung von Transportmitteln usw., der Anfachung von
+Revolten und Paniken betraut wurden. Alles dies wird in einer
+besonderen Beilage belegt.</p>
+<p>Das Memoire schildert ferner den Zusammenhang zwischen dieser
+T&auml;tigkeit der Narodna Oobrana und den affilierten
+Organisationen mit den Attentaten gegen den K&ouml;niglichen
+Kommiss&auml;r in Agram Cuvaj im Juli 1912, dem Attentat von Dojcic
+in Agram 1913 gegen Sterlecz und dem missgl&uuml;ckten Attentat
+Sch&auml;fers am 20. Mai im Aramer Theater. Es verbreitet sich
+hierauf &uuml;ber den Zusammenhang des Attentats auf den
+Thronfolger und dessen Gemahlin, &uuml;ber die Art, wie sich die
+Jungen schon in der Schule an dem Gedanken der Narodna Dobrana
+vergifteten und wie sich die Attent&auml;ter mit Hilfe von
+Pribicewic und Dacic die Werkzeuge zu dem Attentat verschafften,
+wobei insbesondere die Rolle des Majors Tankofte dargelegt wird,
+der die Mordwass&euml;n lieferte, wie auch die Rolle eines gewissen
+Ciganovic, eines gewesenen Komitatschi und jetzigen Beamten der
+serbischen Eisenbahndirektion Belgrad, der schon 1909 als
+Z&ouml;gling der Bandenschule der damaligen Narodna Odbrana
+austauchte. Ferner wird die Art dargelegt, wie Bomben und Waffen
+unbemerkt nach Bosnien eingeschmuggelt wurden, die keinen Zweifel
+dar&uuml;ber l&auml;sst, dass dies ein wohl voerberiteter und
+f&uuml;r die geheimnisvollen Zwecke der Narodna oft begangener
+Schleichweg war.</p>
+<p>Eine Beilage enth&auml;lt einen Auszug aus den Akten des
+Kreisgerichts in Serajewo &uuml;ber die Untersuchung des Attentats
+gegen den Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand und dessen Gemahlin. Danach
+sind Princip, Cabrinovic, Grabez, Crupilovic und Papovic
+gest&auml;ndig, in Gemeinschaft mit dem fl&uuml;chtigen Mehmedbasic
+ein Komplott zur Erwordung des Erzherzogs gebildet und ihm zu
+diesen Zweck aufgelauert zu haben. Cabrinovic ist gest&auml;ndig,
+die Bombe geworfen und Gabrilo Princip das Attentat mit der
+Browningpistole ausgef&uuml;hrt zu haben. Beide T&auml;ter gaben
+zu, bei der Ver&uuml;bung der Tat die Absicht des Mordes gehabt zu
+haben. Die weiteren Teile der Anlage enthalten weitere Angaben der
+Beschuldigten vor dem Untersuchungsrichter &uuml;ber Entstehung des
+Komplotts, Herkunft der Bomben, welche fabrikm&auml;ssig
+hergestellt wurden, f&uuml;r millit&auml;rische Zwecke bestimmt
+waren und ihrer Originalpackung nach aus dem serbischen Waffenlager
+aus Kragujevac stammten. Endlich gibt die Beilage Auskunft
+&uuml;ber den Transport der drei Attent&auml;ter und der Waffen von
+Serbien nach Bosnien. Aus dem weiteren Zeugenprotokoll ergibt sich,
+dass ein Angeh&ouml;riger der Monarchie einige Tage vor dem
+Attentat dem &ouml;sterreichisch-ungarischen Konsulat in Belgrad
+Meldung von der Vermutung erstatten wollte, dass ein Plan zur
+Ver&uuml;bung des Attentats gegen den Erzherzog w&auml;hrend dessen
+Anwesenheit in Bosnien bestehe. Dieser Mann soll nun durch
+Belgrader Polizeiorgane, welche ihn unmittelbar vor Betreten des
+Konsulats aus nichtigen Gr&uuml;nden verhafteten, an der Erstattung
+der Meldung verhindert worden sein. Weiter gehe aus dem
+Zeugenprotokoll hervor, dass die betreffenden Polizeiorgane von dem
+geplanten Attentat Kenntnis gehabt h&auml;tten. Da diese Angaben
+noch nicht nachgepr&uuml;ft sind, kann &uuml;ber deren
+Stichhaltigkeit vorl&auml;ufig noch kein Urteil gef&auml;llt
+werden. In der Beilage zum Memoire heisst es: Vor dem Empfangssaal
+des serbischen Kriegsministeriums befinden sich an der Wand vier
+allegorische Bilder, von denen drei Darstellungen serbischer
+Kriegserfolge sind, w&auml;hrend das vierte die Verwirklichung der
+monarchiefeindlichen Tendenzen Serbiens versinnbildlicht. Ueber
+einer Landschaft, die teils Gebirge (Bosnien), teils Ebene
+(S&uuml;dungarn) darstellt, geht die Zora, die Morgenr&ouml;te der
+serbischen Hoffnungen, auf. Im Vordergrunde steht eine bewaffnete
+Frauengestalt, auf deren Schilde die Namen aller "noch zu
+befreienden Provinzen": Bosnien, Herzegowina, Wojwodina, Gyrmien,
+Dalmatien usw. stehen.</p>
+<hr />
+<a name="RULE4_6" id="RULE4_6"><!-- RULE4 6 --></a>
+<h2>APPENDIX V</h2>
+<p>Extract from the Dispatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at
+Vienna respecting the Rupture of Diplomatic Relations with the
+Austro-Hungarian Government.</p>
+<p>(Cd. 7596)</p>
+<p><i>Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey</i>.</p>
+<p><i>London, September</i> 1, 1914.</p>
+<p>Sir,</p>
+<p>The rapidity of the march of events during the days which led up
+to the outbreak of the European war made it difficult, at the time,
+to do more than record their progress by telegraph. I propose now
+to add a few comments.</p>
+<p>The delivery at Belgrade on the 23rd July of the Austrian note
+to Servia was preceded by a period of absolute silence at the
+Ballplatz. Except Herr von Tchinsky, who must have been aware of
+the tenour, if not of the actual words of the note, none of my
+colleagues were allowed to see through the veil. On the 22nd and
+23rd July, M. Dumaine, French Ambassador, had long interviews with
+Baron Macchio, one of the Under-Secretaries of State for Foreign
+Affairs, by whom he was left under the impression that the words of
+warning he had been instructed to speak to the Austro-Hungarian
+Government had not been unavailing, and that the note which was
+being drawn up would be found to contain nothing with which a
+self-respecting State need hesitate to comply. At the second of
+these interviews he was not even informed that the note was at that
+very moment being presented at Belgrade, or that it would be
+published in Vienna on the following morning. Count Forgach, the
+other Under-Secretary of State, had indeed been good enough to
+confide to me on the same day the true character of the note, and
+the fact of its presentation about the time we were speaking.</p>
+<p>So little had the Russian Ambassador been made aware of what was
+preparing that he actually left Vienna on a fortnight's leave of
+absence about the 20th July. He had only been absent a few days
+when events compelled him to return. It might have been supposed
+that Duc Avarna, Ambassador of the allied Italian Kingdom, which
+was bound to be so closely affected by fresh complications in the
+Balkans, would have been taken fully into the confidence of Count
+Berchtold during this critical time. In point of fact his
+Excellency was left completely in the dark. As for myself, no
+indication was given me by Count Berchtold of the impending storm,
+and it was from a private source that I received on the 15th July
+the forecast of what was about to happen which I telegraphed to you
+the following day. It is true that during all this time the "Neue
+Freie Presse" and other leading Viennese newspapers were using
+language which pointed unmistakably to war with Servia. The
+official "Fremdenblatt", however, was more cautious, and till the
+note was published, the prevailing opinion among my colleagues was
+that Austria would shrink from courses calculated to involve her in
+grave European complications.</p>
+<p>On the 24th July the note was published in the newspapers. By
+common consent it was at once styled an ultimatum. Its integral
+acceptance by Servia was neither expected nor desired, and when, on
+the following afternoon, it was at first rumoured in Vienna that it
+had been unconditionally accepted, there was a moment of keen
+disappointment. The mistake was quickly corrected, and as soon as
+it was known later in the evening that the Servian reply had been
+rejected and that Baron Giesl had broken off relations at Belgrade,
+Vienna burst into a frenzy of delight, vast crowds parading the
+streets and singing patriotic songs till the small hours of the
+morning.</p>
+<p>The demonstrations were perfectly orderly, consisting for the
+most part of organised processions through the principal streets
+ending up at the Ministry of War. One or two attempts to make
+hostile manifestations against the Russian Embassy were frustrated
+by the strong guard of police which held the approaches to the
+principal embassies during those days. The demeanour of the people
+at Vienna, and, as I was informed, in many other principal cities
+of the Monarchy, showed plainly the popularity of the idea of war
+with Servia, and there can be no doubt that the small body of
+Austrian and Hungarian statesmen by whom this momentous step was
+adopted gauged rightly the sense, and it may even be said the
+determination, of the people, except presumably in portions of the
+provinces inhabited by the Slav races. There had been much
+disappointment in many quarters at the avoidance of war with Servia
+during the annexation crisis in 1908 and again in connection with
+the recent Balkan war. Count Berchtold's peace policy had met with
+little sympathy in the Delegation. Now the flood-gates were opened,
+and the entire people and press clamoured impatiently for immediate
+and condign punishment of the hated Servian race. The country
+certainly believed that it had before it only the alternative of
+subduing Servia or of submitting sooner or later to mutilation at
+her hands. But a peaceful solution should first have been
+attempted. Few seemed to reflect that the forcible intervention of
+a Great Power in the Balkans must inevitably call other Great
+Powers into the field. So just was the cause of Austria held to be,
+that it seemed to her people inconceivable that any country should
+place itself in her path, or that questions of mere policy or
+prestige should be regarded anywhere as superseding the necessity
+which had arisen to exact summary vengeance for the crime of
+Serajevo. The conviction had been expressed to me by the German
+Ambassador on the 24th July that Russia would stand aside. This
+feeling, which was also held at the Ballplatz, influenced no doubt
+the course of events, and it is deplorable that no effort should
+have been made to secure by means of diplomatic negotiations the
+acquiescence of Russia and Europe as a whole in some peaceful
+compromise of the Servian question by which Austrian fears of
+Servian aggression and intrigue might have been removed for the
+future. Instead of adopting this course the Austro-Hungarian
+Government resolved upon war. The inevitable consequence ensued.
+Russia replied to a partial Austrian mobilisation and declaration
+of war against Servia by a partial Russian mobilisation against
+Austria. Austria met this move by completing her own mobilisation,
+and Russia again responded with results which have passed into
+history. The fate of the proposals put forward by His Majesty's
+Government for the preservation of peace is recorded in the White
+Paper on the European Crisis[<a href="#note-191">191</a>]. On the
+28th July I saw Count Berchtold and urged as strongly as I could
+that the scheme of mediation mentioned in your speech in the House
+of Commons on the previous day should be accepted as offering an
+honourable and peaceful settlement of the question at issue. His
+Excellency himself read to me a telegraphic report of the speech,
+but added that matters had gone too far; Austria was that day
+declaring war on Servia, and she could never accept the conference
+which you had suggested should take place between the less
+interested Powers on the basis of the Servian reply. This was a
+matter which must be settled directly between the two parties
+immediately concerned. I said His Majesty's Government would hear
+with regret that hostilities could not be arrested, as you feared
+they would lead to European complications. I disclaimed any British
+lack of sympathy with Austria in the matter of her legitimate
+grievances against Servia, and pointed out that, whereas Austria
+seemed to be making these the starting point of her policy, His
+Majesty's Government were bound to look at the question primarily
+from the point of view of the maintenance of the peace of Europe.
+In this way the two countries might easily drift apart.</p>
+<p>His Excellency said that he too was keeping the European aspect
+of the question in sight. He thought, however, that Russia would
+have no right to intervene after receiving his assurance that
+Austria sought no territorial aggrandisement. His Excellency
+remarked to me in the course of his conversation that, though he
+had been glad to co-operate towards bringing about the settlement
+which had resulted from the ambassadorial conferences in London
+during the Balkan crisis, he had never had much belief in the
+permanency of that settlement, which was necessarily of a highly
+artificial character, inasmuch as the interests which it sought to
+harmonise were in themselves profoundly divergent. His Excellency
+maintained a most friendly demeanour throughout the interview, but
+left no doubt in my mind as to the determination of the
+Austro-Hungarian Government to proceed with the invasion of
+Servia.</p>
+<p>The German Government claim to have persevered to the end in the
+endeavour to support at Vienna your successive proposals in the
+interest of peace. Herr von Tchirsky abstained from inviting my
+co-operation or that of the French and Russian Ambassadors in
+carrying out his instructions to that effect, and I had no means of
+knowing what response he was receiving from the Austro-Hungarian
+Government. I was, however, kept fully informed by M. Schebeko, the
+Russian Ambassador, of his own direct negotiations with Count
+Berchtold. M. Schebeko endeavoured on the 28th July to persuade the
+Austro-Hungarian Government to furnish Count Sz&aacute;p&aacute;ry
+with full powers to continue at St. Petersburgh the hopeful
+conversations which had there been taking place between the latter
+and M. Sazonof. Count Berchtold refused at the time, but two days
+later (30th July), though in the meantime Russia had partially
+mobilised against Austria, he received M. Schebeko again, in a
+perfectly friendly manner, and gave his consent to the continuance
+of the conversations at St. Petersburgh. From now onwards the
+tension between Russia and Germany was much greater than between
+Russia and Austria. As between the latter an arrangement seemed
+almost in sight, and on the 1st August I was informed by M.
+Schebeko that Count Sz&aacute;p&aacute;ry had at last conceded the
+main point at issue by announcing to M. Sazonof that Austria would
+consent to submit to mediation the points in the note to Servia
+which seemed incompatible with the maintenance of Servian
+independence. M. Sazonof, M. Schebeko added, had accepted this
+proposal on condition that Austria would refrain from the actual
+invasion of Servia. Austria, in fact, had finally yielded, and that
+she herself had at this point good hopes of a peaceful issue is
+shown by the communication made to you on the 1st August by Count
+Mensdorff, to the effect that Austria had neither "banged the door"
+on compromise nor cut off the conversations.[<a href=
+"#note-192">192</a>] M. Schebeko to the end was working hard for
+peace. He was holding the most conciliatory language to Count
+Berchtold, and he informed me that the latter, as well as Count
+Forgach, had responded in the same spirit. Certainly it was too
+much for Russia to expect that Austria would hold back her armies,
+but this matter could probably have been settled by negotiation,
+and M. Schebeko repeatedly told me he was prepared to accept any
+reasonable compromise.</p>
+<p>Unfortunately these conversations at St. Petersburgh and Vienna
+were cut short by the transfer of the dispute to the more dangerous
+ground of a direct conflict between Germany and Russia. Germany
+intervened on the 31st July by means of her double ultimatums to
+St. Petersburgh and Paris. The ultimatums were of a kind to which
+only one answer is possible, and Germany declared war on Russia on
+the 1st August, and on France on the 3rd August. A few days' delay
+might in all probability have saved Europe from one of the greatest
+calamities in history.</p>
+<p>Russia still abstained from attacking Austria, and M. Schebeko
+had been instructed to remain at his post till war should actually
+be declared against her by the Austro-Hungarian Government. This
+only happened on the 6th August when Count Berchtold informed the
+foreign missions at Vienna that "the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at
+St. Petersburgh had been instructed to notify the Russian
+Government that, in view of the menacing attitude of Russia in the
+Austro-Servian conflict and the fact that Russia had commenced
+hostilities against Germany, Austria-Hungary considered herself
+also at war with Russia."</p>
+<p>M. Schebeko left quietly in a special train provided by the
+Austro-Hungarian Government on the 7th September. He had urgently
+requested to be conveyed to the Roumanian frontier, so that he
+might be able to proceed to his own country, but was taken instead
+to the Swiss frontier, and ten days later I found him at Berne.</p>
+<p>M. Dumaine, French Ambassador, stayed on till the 12th August.
+On the previous day he had been instructed to demand his passport
+on the ground that Austrian troops were being employed against
+France. This point was not fully cleared up when I left Vienna. On
+the 9th August, M. Dumaine had received from Count Berchtold the
+categorical declaration that no Austrian troops were being moved to
+Alsace. The next day this statement was supplemented by a further
+one, in writing, giving Count Berchtold's assurance that not only
+had no Austrian troops been moved actually to the French frontier,
+but that none were moving from Austria in a westerly direction into
+Germany in such a way that they might replace German troops
+employed at the front. These two statements were made by Count
+Berchtold in reply to precise questions put to him by M. Dumaine,
+under instructions from his Government. The French Ambassador's
+departure was not attended by any hostile demonstration, but his
+Excellency before leaving had been justly offended by a harangue
+made by the Chief Burgomaster of Vienna to the crowd assembled
+before the steps of the town hall, in which he assured the people
+that Paris was in the throes of a revolution, and that the
+President of the Republic had been assassinated.</p>
+<p>The British declaration of war on Germany was made known in
+Vienna by special editions of the newspapers about midday on the
+5th August. An abstract of your speeches in the House of Commons,
+and also of the German Chancellor's speech in the Reichstag of the
+4th April, appeared the same day, as well as the text of the German
+ultimatum to Belgium. Otherwise few details of the great events of
+these days transpired. The "Neue Freie Presse" was violently
+insulting towards England. The "Fremdenblatt" was not offensive,
+but little or nothing was said in the columns of any Vienna paper
+to explain that the violation of Belgian neutrality had left His
+Majesty's Government no alternative but to take part in the
+war.</p>
+<p>The declaration of Italian neutrality was bitterly felt in
+Vienna, but scarcely mentioned in the newspapers.</p>
+<p>On the 5th August I had the honour to receive your instruction
+of the previous day preparing me for the immediate outbreak of war
+with Germany, but adding that, Austria being understood to be not
+yet at that date at war with Russia and France, you did not desire
+me to ask for my passport or to make any particular communication
+to the Austro-Hungarian Government. You stated at the same time
+that His Majesty's Government of course expected Austria not to
+commit any act of war against us without the notice required by
+diplomatic usage.</p>
+<p>On Thursday morning, the 13th August, I had the honour to
+receive your telegram of the 12th, stating that you had been
+compelled to inform Count Mensdorff, at the request of the French
+Government, that a complete rupture had occurred between France and
+Austria, on the ground that Austria had declared war on Russia who
+was already fighting on the side of France, and that Austria had
+sent troops to the German frontier under conditions that were a
+direct menace to France. The rupture having been brought about with
+France in this way, I was to ask for my passport, and your telegram
+stated, in conclusion, that you had informed Count Mensdorff that a
+state of war would exist between the two countries from midnight of
+the 12th August.</p>
+<p>After seeing Mr. Penfield, the United States Ambassador, who
+accepted immediately in the most friendly spirit my request that
+his Excellency would take charge provisionally of British interests
+in Austria-Hungary during the unfortunate interruption of
+relations, I proceeded, with Mr. Theo Russell, Counsellor of His
+Majesty's Embassy, to the Ballplatz. Count Berchtold received me at
+midday. I delivered my message, for which his Excellency did not
+seem to be unprepared, although he told me that a long telegram
+from Count Mensdorff had just come in but had not yet been brought
+to him. His Excellency received my communication with the courtesy
+which never leaves him. He deplored the unhappy complications which
+were drawing such good friends as Austria and England into war. In
+point of fact, he added, Austria did not consider herself then at
+war with France, though diplomatic relations with that country had
+been broken off. I explained in a few words how circumstances had
+forced this unwelcome conflict upon us. We both avoided useless
+argument...</p>
+<p><a name="note-191" id="note-191">
+<!-- Note Anchor 191 --></a>[Footnote 191: "Miscellaneous, No. 6
+(1914)."]</p>
+<p><a name="note-192" id="note-192">
+<!-- Note Anchor 192 --></a>[Footnote 192: See No. 137,
+"Miscellaneous, No. 6 (1914)."]</p>
+<hr />
+<a name="RULE4_7" id="RULE4_7"><!-- RULE4 7 --></a>
+<h2>APPENDIX VI</h2>
+<center>EXTRACTS FROM THE RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK</center>
+<p><i>Recueil de Documents Diplomatiques</i>:</p>
+<p><i>N&eacute;gociations ayant pr&eacute;c&eacute;d&eacute; la
+guerre</i></p>
+<p><i>10/23 Juillet&mdash;24 Juillet/6 Ao&ucirc;t 1914</i></p>
+<p>PREFATORY NOTE TO APPENDIX VI</p>
+<p>This important collection of documents, which has only reached
+us since the publication of our first edition, confirms the
+conclusion, which we had deduced from other evidence in our fifth
+chapter (<i>supra</i>, <a href="#CH5">pp. 66-107</a>), that Germany
+consistently placed obstacles in the way of any proposals for a
+peaceful settlement, and this in spite of the willingness of all
+the other Powers, including Austria-Hungary and Russia, to continue
+discussion of the Servian question. That the crisis took Russia by
+surprise seems evident from the fact that her ambassadors
+accredited to France, Berlin, and Vienna were not at their posts
+when friction began with Russia. (<i>Infra</i>, Nos. 4, 7, 8.)</p>
+<p>The Russian evidence shows that, on July 29, Germany threatened
+to mobilize if Russia did not desist from military preparations.
+This threat was viewed by M. Sazonof as an additional reason for
+taking all precautions; 'since we cannot accede to Germany's
+desire, the only course open to us is to accelerate our own
+preparations and to assume that war is probably inevitable.'
+(<i>Infra</i>, No. 58.) The reader will also notice the curious
+fact that on July 30 the decree mobilizing the German army and navy
+was published, only to be immediately withdrawn; and that the
+German Government explained that the publication had been premature
+and accidental. (<i>Infra</i>, Nos. 61, 62.) We know from the
+British White Book (<i>Correspondence</i>, No. 99, Sir F. Bertie to
+Sir E. Grey, July 30) that, on July 30, Germany showed signs of
+weakening in her attitude to Russia.</p>
+<p>It will be noted that war between Austria-Hungary and Russia was
+not officially declared until August 6, five days after Germany had
+declared war on Russia. (<i>Infra</i>, No. 79.)</p>
+<p>In Nos. 36 and 46 will be found some curious details of the
+methods employed by Austria-Hungary and Germany to delay the
+publication of the Servian reply to Austria-Hungary.</p>
+<p>MINIST&Egrave;RE DES AFFAIRES &Eacute;TRANG&Egrave;RES.</p>
+<p>RECUEIL</p>
+<p>DE DOCUMENTS DIPLOMATIQUES.</p>
+<p>N&eacute;gociations ayant pr&eacute;c&eacute;d&eacute; la
+guerre.</p>
+<p>10/23 Juillet&mdash;24 Juillet/6 Ao&ucirc;t 1914.</p>
+<p>Petrograde, Imprimerie de l'Etat. 1914.</p>
+<p>No. 1.</p>
+<p>Le Charg&eacute; d'affaires en Serbie au Ministre des Affaires
+Etrang&egrave;res.</p>
+<p>(<i>T&eacute;l&eacute;gramme</i>).</p>
+<p>Belgrade, le 10/23 Juillet 1914.</p>
+<p>Le Ministre d'Autriche vient de transmettre, &agrave; 6 heures
+du soir, an Ministre des Finances Patchou, qui remplace Pachitch,
+une note ultimative de son Gouvernement fixant un d&eacute;lai de
+48 heures pour l'acceptation des demandes y contenues. Giesl a
+ajout&eacute; verbalement que pour le cas o&ugrave; la note ne
+serait pas accept&eacute;e int&eacute;gralement dans un
+d&eacute;lai de 48 heures, il avait l'ordre de quitter Belgrade
+avec le personnel de la L&eacute;gation. Pachitch et les autres
+Ministres qui se trouvent en tourn&eacute;e &eacute;lectorale ont
+&eacute;t&eacute; rappel&eacute;s et sont attendus &agrave;
+Belgrade demain Vendredi &agrave; 10 heures du matin. Patchou qui
+m'a communiqu&eacute; le contenu de la note, sollicite l'aide de la
+Russie et d&eacute;clare qu'aucun Gouvernement Serbe ne pourra
+accepter les demandes de l'Autriche.</p>
+<p>(Sign&eacute;) Strandtman.</p>
+<p>No. 2.</p>
+<p>Le Charg&eacute; d'affaires en Serbie au Ministre des Affaires
+Etrang&egrave;res.</p>
+<p><i>(T&eacute;l&eacute;gramme).</i></p>
+<p>Belgrade, le 10/23 Juillet 1914.</p>
+<p>Texte de la note qui a &eacute;t&eacute; transmise aujourd'hui
+par le Ministre d'Autriche-Hongrie an gouvernement Serbe:...</p>
+<p>(<i>For this note, see German White Book, pp. 18-22</i> (supra
+<i>in Appendix I.</i>))</p>
+<p>Un m&eacute;moire concernant les r&eacute;sultats de
+l'instruction de Sarajevo &agrave; l'&eacute;gard des
+fonctionnaires mentionn&eacute;s aux points 7 et 8 est
+annex&eacute; &agrave; cette note'.[<a href=
+"#note-193">193</a>]</p>
+<p>(Sign&eacute;) Strandtman.</p>
+<p><a name="note-193" id="note-193">
+<!-- Note Anchor 193 --></a>[Footnote 193: This memorandum is in
+the German White Book, pp. 22-3 (<i>supra</i>, <a href=
+"#RULE4_2">Appendix I</a>), and not reproduced in the Russian
+Orange Book.]</p>
+<p>No. 3.</p>
+<p>Note Verbale transmise personnellement par l'Ambassadeur
+d'Autriche-Hongrie &agrave; St.-P&eacute;tersbourg au Ministre des
+Affaires Etrang&egrave;res le 11/24 Juillet 1914 &agrave; 10 heures
+du matin.</p>
+<p>Le Gouvernement Imp&eacute;rial et Royal s'est trouv&eacute;
+dans la n&eacute;cessit&eacute; de remettre le Jeudi 10/23 du mois
+courant, par l'entremise du Ministre Imp&eacute;rial et Royal
+&agrave; Belgrade, la note suivante an Gouvernement Royal de
+Serbie:</p>
+<p>(Suit le texte de la note).</p>
+<p>Voir document No. 2.</p>
+<p>No. 4.</p>
+<p>Le Ministre des Affaires Etrang&egrave;res au Charg&eacute;
+d'affaires en Autriche-Hongrie.</p>
+<p><i>(T&eacute;l&eacute;gramme).</i></p>
+<p>St.-P&eacute;tersbourg, le 11/24 Juillet 1914.</p>
+<p>Veuillez transmettre au Ministre des Affaires Etrang&egrave;res
+d'Autriche-Hongrie ce qui suit....</p>
+<p>(This communication is printed in the British White Book
+(<i>Correspondence</i>, No. 13); see p. 177 <i>supra</i> for the
+text in English.)</p>
+<p>Communiqu&eacute; &agrave; Londres, Rome, Paris, Belgrade.</p>
+<p>(Sign&eacute;) Sazonow.</p>
+<p>No. 5.</p>
+<p>Le Ministre des Affaires Etrang&egrave;res aux
+Repr&eacute;sentants de Sa Majest&eacute; l'Empereur en Angleterre,
+en Allemagne, en Italie et en France.</p>
+<p><i>(T&eacute;l&eacute;gramme).</i></p>
+<p>St.-P&eacute;tersbourg, le 11/24 Juillet 1914.</p>
+<p>Me r&eacute;f&egrave;re &agrave; mon t&eacute;l&eacute;gramme
+&agrave; Koudachew d'aujourd'hui; nous esp&eacute;rons que le
+Gouvernement aupr&egrave;s duquel. Vous &ecirc;tes
+accr&eacute;dit&eacute; partagera notre point de vue et prescrira
+d'urgence &agrave; son Repr&eacute;sentant &agrave; Vienne de se
+prononcer dans le m&ecirc;me sens.</p>
+<p>Communiqu&eacute; &agrave; Belgrade.</p>
+<p>(Sign&eacute;) Sazonow.</p>
+<p>No. 6.</p>
+<p>T&eacute;l&eacute;gramme de Son Altesse Royale le Prince
+R&eacute;gent de Serbie &agrave; Sa Majest&eacute; l'Empereur.</p>
+<p>Belgrade, le 11/24 Juillet 1914.</p>
+<p>Le Gouvernement Austro-Hongrois a remis hier soir au
+Gouvernement serbe une note concernant l'attentat de Sarajevo.
+Consciente de ses devoirs internationaux, la Serbie d&egrave;s les
+premiers jours de l'horrible crime a d&eacute;clar&eacute; qu'elle
+le condamnait et qu'elle &eacute;tait pr&ecirc;te &agrave; ouvrir
+une enqu&ecirc;te sur son territoire si la complicit&eacute; de
+certains de ses sujets &eacute;tait prouv&eacute;e au cours du
+proc&egrave;s instruit par les autorit&eacute;s Austro-hongroises.
+Cependant les demandes contenues dans la note Austro-hongroise sont
+inutilement humiliantes pour la Serbie et incompatibles avec sa
+dignit&eacute; comme Etat ind&eacute;pendant. Ainsi on nous demande
+sur un ton p&eacute;remptoire une d&eacute;claration du
+gouvernement dans l'officiel et un ordre du souverain &agrave;
+l'arm&eacute;e, o&ugrave; nous r&eacute;primerions l'esprit hostile
+contre l'Autriche en nous faisant &agrave; nous m&ecirc;mes des
+reproches d'une faiblesse criminelle envers nos men&eacute;es
+perfides.&mdash;On nous impose ensuite l'admission des
+fonctionnaires austro-hongrois en Serbie pour participer avec les
+n&ocirc;tres &agrave; l'instruction et pour surveiller
+l'ex&eacute;cution des autres conditions indiqu&eacute;es dans la
+note. Nous avons re&ccedil;u un d&eacute;lai de 48 heures pour
+accepter le tout, faute de quoi la L&eacute;gation
+d'Autriche-Hongrie quittera Belgrade. Nous sommes pr&ecirc;ts
+&agrave; accepter les conditions austro-hongroises qui sont
+compatibles avec la situation d'un Etat ind&eacute;pendant, ainsi
+que celles dont l'acception nous sera conseill&eacute;e par Votre
+Majest&eacute;; toutes les personnes dont la participation &agrave;
+l'attentat sera d&eacute;montr&eacute;e seront
+s&eacute;v&egrave;rement punis par nous. Certaines parmi ces
+demandes ne pourraient &ecirc;tre ex&eacute;cut&eacute;es sans des
+changements de notre l&eacute;gislation, ce qui exige du temps. On
+nous a donn&eacute; un d&eacute;lai trop court. Nous pouvons
+&ecirc;tre attaqu&eacute;s apr&egrave;s l'expiration du
+d&eacute;lai par l'arm&eacute;e austro-hongroise qui se concentre
+sur notre fronti&egrave;re. Il nous est impossible de nous
+d&eacute;fendre et nous supplions Votre Majest&eacute; de nous
+donner Son aide le plus t&ocirc;t possible. La bienveillance
+pr&eacute;cieuse de Votre Majest&eacute; qui s'est
+manifest&eacute;e tant de fois &agrave; notre &eacute;gard nous
+fait esp&eacute;rer fermement que cette fois encore notre appel
+sera entendu par Son g&eacute;n&eacute;reux coeur slave.</p>
+<p>En ces moments difficiles l'interpr&egrave;te les sentiments du
+peuple serbe qui supplie Votre Majest&eacute; de vouloir bien
+s'int&eacute;resser au sort du Royaume de Serbie.</p>
+<p>(Sign&eacute;) Alexandre.</p>
+<p>No. 7.</p>
+<p>Le Charg&eacute; d'Affaires en Allemagne au Ministre des
+Affaires Etrang&egrave;res.</p>
+<p><i>(T&eacute;l&eacute;gramme).</i></p>
+<p>Berlin, le 11/24 Juillet 1914.</p>
+<p>Tous les journaux du matin, m&ecirc;me ceux, rares, qui
+reconnaissent l'impossibilit&eacute; pour la Serbie d'accepter les
+conditions pos&eacute;es, accueillent avec une grande sympathie le
+ton &eacute;nergique adopt&eacute; par l'Autriche. L'officieux
+&laquo;Local-Anzeiger&raquo; est particuli&egrave;rement agressif;
+il qualifie de superflus les recours &eacute;ventuels de la Serbie
+&agrave; St. P&eacute;tersbourg, &agrave; Paris, &agrave;
+Ath&egrave;nes et &agrave; Bucarest, et termine en disant que le
+peuple allemand respirera librement quand il aura appris que la
+situation dans la p&eacute;ninsule Balcanique va enfin
+s'&eacute;claircir.</p>
+<p>(Sign&eacute;) Bronewsky.</p>
+<p>No. 8.</p>
+<p>Le Charg&eacute; d'Affaires en France an Ministre des Affaires
+Etrang&egrave;res.</p>
+<p><i>(T&eacute;l&eacute;gramme).</i> Paris, le 11/24 Juillet
+1914.</p>
+<p>La copie de la note officiellement remise &agrave; Belgrade a
+&eacute;t&eacute; communiqu&eacute;e par l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche
+an Gouvernement Fran&ccedil;ais. Plus tard l'Ambassadeur
+d'Allemagne a visit&eacute; le Ministre et lui a lu une
+communication reproduisant les arguments autrichiens et indiquant
+qu'en cas de refus de la part de la Serbie, l'Autriche serait
+oblig&eacute;e de recourir &agrave; une pression et, en cas de
+besoin, &agrave; des mesures militaires; la communication se
+terminait par la remarque qu'&agrave; l'avis de l'Allemagne cette
+question devrait &ecirc;tre r&eacute;solue directement entre
+l'Autriche et la Serbie et qu'il &eacute;tait de
+l'int&eacute;r&ecirc;t des Puissances de circonscrire l'affaire en
+l'abandonnant aux Parties int&eacute;ress&eacute;es. Le
+G&eacute;rant du D&eacute;partement Politique, qui assistait
+&agrave; l'entretien, demanda &agrave; l'Ambassadeur s'il fallait
+consid&eacute;rer l'action autrichienne comme un ultimatum&mdash;en
+d'autres termes, si, dans le cas o&ugrave; la Serbie ne se
+soumettrait pas enti&egrave;rement aux demandes autrichiennes, les
+hostilit&eacute;s &eacute;taient in&eacute;vitables? L'ambassadeur
+&eacute;vita une r&eacute;ponse directe en all&eacute;guant
+l'absence d'instructions.</p>
+<p>(Sign&eacute;) Sevastopoulo.</p>
+<p>No. 9.</p>
+<p>Le Charg&eacute; d'Affaires en Serbie au Ministre des Affaires
+Etrang&egrave;res.</p>
+<p><i>(T&eacute;l&eacute;gramme).</i> Belgrade, le 11/24 Juillet
+1914.</p>
+<p>Pachitch est rentr&eacute; &agrave; Belgrade. Il a l'intention
+de donner dans le d&eacute;lai fix&eacute;, c'est &agrave; dire
+demain Samedi &agrave; 6 heures du soir, une r&eacute;ponse
+&agrave; l'Autriche indiquant les points acceptables et
+inacceptables. On adressera aujourd'hui m&ecirc;me aux Puissances
+la pri&egrave;re de d&eacute;fendre l'ind&eacute;pendance de la
+Serbie. Ensuite, ajouta Pachitch, si la guerre est
+in&eacute;vitable&mdash;nous ferons la guerre.</p>
+<p>(Sign&eacute;) Strandtman.</p>
+<p>No. 10.</p>
+<p>Communiqu&eacute; du Gouvernement Imp&eacute;rial.</p>
+<p>St.-P&eacute;tersbourg, le 12/25 Juillet 1914.</p>
+<p>Les derniers &eacute;v&eacute;nements et l'envoi par
+l'Autriche-Hongrie d'un ultimatum &agrave; la Serbie
+pr&eacute;occupent le Gouvernement Imp&eacute;rial an plus haut
+degr&eacute;. Le Gouvernement suit attentivement l'&eacute;volution
+du conflit serbo-autrichien qui ne peut pas laisser la Russie
+indiff&eacute;rente.</p>
+<p>No. 11.</p>
+<p>Le Charg&eacute; d'Affaires en Autriche-Hongrie au Ministre des
+Affaires Etrang&egrave;res.</p>
+<p><i>(T&eacute;l&eacute;gramme).</i> Vienne, le 12/25 Juillet
+1914.</p>
+<p>Le comte Berchtold se trouve &agrave; Ischl. Vu
+l'impossibilit&eacute; d'y arriver &agrave; temps, je lui ai
+t&eacute;l&eacute;graphi&eacute; notre proposition de prolonger le
+d&eacute;lai de l'ultimatum et l'ai r&eacute;p&eacute;t&eacute;e
+verbalement au Baron Macchio. Ce dernier m'a promis de la
+communiquer &agrave; temps au Ministre des Affaires
+Etrang&egrave;res, mais a ajout&eacute; qu'il pouvait
+pr&eacute;dire avec assurance un refus cat&eacute;gorique.</p>
+<p>(Sign&eacute;) Koudachew.</p>
+<p>No. 12.</p>
+<p>Le Charg&eacute; d'Affaires en Autriche-Hongrie an Ministre des
+Affaires Etrang&egrave;res.</p>
+<p><i>(T&eacute;l&eacute;gramme).</i> Vienne, le 12/25 Juillet
+1914.</p>
+<p>Suite &agrave; mon t&eacute;l&eacute;gramme d'aujourd'hui. Viens
+de recevoir de Macchio la r&eacute;ponse n&eacute;gative du
+Gouvernement Austro-Hongrois &agrave; notre proposition de
+prolonger le d&eacute;lai de la note.</p>
+<p>(Sign&eacute;) Koudachew.</p>
+<p>No. 13.</p>
+<p>Le Charg&eacute; d'Affaires en Serbie an Ministre des Affaires
+Etrang&egrave;res.</p>
+<p><i>(T&eacute;l&eacute;gramme).</i> Belgrade, le 12/25 Juillet
+1914.</p>
+<p>Re&ccedil;u avec retard le 14&mdash;27 Juillet 1914.</p>
+<p>Je transmets la r&eacute;ponse que le Pr&eacute;sident du
+Conseil des Ministres Serbe a remis an ministre Austro-Hongrois
+&agrave; Belgrade aujourd'hui avant l'expiration du d&eacute;lai de
+l'ultimatum....</p>
+<p>(The text of the reply will be found in the British White Book
+(<i>Correspondence</i>, No. 39) and also in the German White Book,
+pp. 23-32 (supra, Appendix I.).)</p>
+<p>No. 14.</p>
+<p>Le Charg&eacute; d'affaires en Allemagne au Ministre des
+affaires Etrang&egrave;res.</p>
+<p><i>(T&eacute;l&eacute;gramme).</i> Berlin, le 12/25 Juillet
+1914.</p>
+<p>Ai re&ccedil;u Votre t&eacute;l&eacute;gramme du 11/24 Juillet.
+Ai communiqu&eacute; son contenu an Ministre des Affaires
+Etrang&egrave;res. Il me dit que le Gouvernement Anglais l'a
+&eacute;galement pri&eacute; de conseiller &agrave; Vienne la
+prolongation du d&eacute;lai de l'ultimatum; il a communiqu&eacute;
+cette d&eacute;marche t&eacute;l&eacute;graphiquement &agrave;
+Vienne, il va en faire autant pour notre d&eacute;marche, mais il
+craint qu'&agrave; la suite de l'absence de Berchtold parti pour
+Ischl, et vu le manque de temps, ses t&eacute;l&eacute;grammes ne
+restent sans r&eacute;sultats; il a, en outre, des doutes sur
+l'opportunit&eacute; pour l'Autriche de c&eacute;der an dernier
+moment et il se demande si cela ne pouvait pas augmenter
+l'assurance de la Serbie. J'ai r&eacute;pondu qu'une grande
+Puissance comme l'Autriche pourrait c&eacute;der sans porter
+atteinte &agrave; son prestige et ai fait valoir tous les arguments
+conformes, cependant je n'ai pu obtenir des promesses plus
+pr&eacute;cises. M&ecirc;me lorsque je laissais entendre qu'il
+fallait agir &agrave; Vienne pour &eacute;viter la
+possibilit&eacute; de cons&eacute;quences redoutables, le Ministre
+des Affaires Etrang&egrave;res r&eacute;pondait chaque fois
+n&eacute;gativement.</p>
+<p>(Sign&eacute;) Bronewsky.</p>
+<p>No. 15.</p>
+<p>Le Charg&eacute; d'affaires en France an Ministre des Affaires
+Etrang&egrave;res.</p>
+<p>(<i>T&eacute;l&eacute;gramme</i>). Paris, le 12/25 Juillet
+1914.</p>
+<p>Ai re&ccedil;u le t&eacute;l&eacute;gramme du 11/24 Juillet
+concernant la prolongation du d&eacute;lai de l'ultimatum
+autrichien et ai fait la communication prescrite. Le
+Repr&eacute;sentant de France &agrave; Vienne a &eacute;t&eacute;
+muni d'instructions conformes.</p>
+<p>(Sign&eacute;) Sevastopoulo.</p>
+<p>No. 16.</p>
+<p>L'Ambassadeur en Angleterre an Ministre des Affaires
+Etrang&egrave;res.</p>
+<p>(<i>T&eacute;l&eacute;gramme</i>). Londres, le 12/25 Juillet
+1914.</p>
+<p>Re&ccedil;u t&eacute;l&eacute;gramme du 11 Juillet. Grey a
+prescrit &agrave; l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre &agrave; Vienne
+d'appuyer notre d&eacute;marche concernant la prolongation du
+d&eacute;lai de l'ultimatum. Il m'a dit en m&ecirc;me temps que
+l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche &eacute;tait venu le voir et avait
+expliqu&eacute; qu'on ne devrait pas attribuer &agrave; la note
+autrichienne le caract&egrave;re d'un ultimatum; il faudrait la
+consid&eacute;rer comme une d&eacute;marche qui, en cas d'absence
+de r&eacute;ponse ou en cas de r&eacute;ponse insuffisante au terme
+fix&eacute;, aurait comme suite la rupture des relations
+diplomatiques et le d&eacute;part imm&eacute;diat de Belgrade du
+Ministre d'Autriche-Hongrie, sans entrainer cependant le
+commencement imm&eacute;diat des hostilit&eacute;s.&mdash;Grey a
+ajout&eacute; qu'&agrave; la suite de cette explication il a
+indiqu&eacute; &agrave; l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre &agrave; Vienne
+que dans le cas o&ugrave; il serait trop tard pour soulever la
+question de la prolongation du d&eacute;lai de l'ultimatum, celle
+de l'arr&ecirc;t des hostilit&eacute;s pourrait peut-&ecirc;tre
+servir de base &agrave; la discussion.</p>
+<p>(Sign&eacute;) Benckendorff.</p>
+<p>No. 17.</p>
+<p>Le Ministre des Affaires Etrang&egrave;res &agrave;
+l'Ambassadeur &agrave; Londres.</p>
+<p><i>(T&eacute;l&eacute;gramme).</i> St.-P&eacute;tersbourg, le
+12/25 Juillet 1914.</p>
+<p>Dans le cas d'une nouvelle aggravation de la situation, pouvant
+provoquer de la part des Grandes Puissances des actions conformes,
+nous comptons que l'Angleterre ne tardera pas de se ranger
+nettement du c&ocirc;t&eacute; de la Russie et de la France, en vue
+de maintenir l'&eacute;quilibre europ&eacute;en, en faveur duquel
+elle est intervenue constamment dans le pass&eacute; et qui serait
+sans aucun doute compromis dans le cas du triomphe de
+l'Autriche.</p>
+<p>(Sign&eacute;) Sazonow.</p>
+<p>No. 18.</p>
+<p>Note verbale remise par l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne au Ministre
+des Affaires Etrang&egrave;res le 12/25 Juillet 1914.</p>
+<p>Il nous revient de source autoritative que la nouvelle
+r&eacute;pandue par quelques journaux d'apr&egrave;s laquelle la
+d&eacute;marche du Gouvernement d'Autriche-Hongrie &agrave;
+Belgrade aurait &eacute;t&eacute; faite &agrave; l'instigation de
+l'Allemagne est absolument fausse. Le Gouvernement Allemand n'a pas
+eu connaissance du texte de la note Autrichienne avant qu'elle ait
+&eacute;t&eacute; remise et n'a exerc&eacute; aucune influence sur
+son contenu. C'est &agrave; tort qu'on attribue &agrave;
+l'Allemagne une attitude comminatoire.</p>
+<p>L'Allemagne appuie naturellement comme alli&eacute; de
+l'Autriche les revendications &agrave; son avis l&eacute;gitimes du
+Cabinet de Vienne contre la Serbie.</p>
+<p>Avant tout elle d&eacute;sire comme elle l'a d&eacute;j&agrave;
+d&eacute;clar&eacute; d&egrave;s le commencement du
+diff&eacute;rend Austro-Serbe que ce conflit reste
+localis&eacute;.</p>
+<p>No. 19.</p>
+<p>Le Charg&eacute; d'affaires en France an Ministre des affaires
+Etrang&egrave;res.</p>
+<p><i>(T&eacute;l&eacute;gramme)</i> Paris, le 12/25 Juillet
+1914.</p>
+<p>Me r&eacute;f&egrave;re &agrave; mon t&eacute;l&eacute;gramme du
+11/24 Juillet.</p>
+<p>Aujourd'hui un journal du matin a publi&eacute;, sous une forme
+pas enti&egrave;rement exacte, les d&eacute;clarations d'hier de
+l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne, en les faisant suivre de commentaires
+qui attribuent &agrave; cette d&eacute;marche le caract&egrave;re
+d'une menace. L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne, tr&egrave;s
+impressionn&eacute; par ces divulgations, a visit&eacute;
+aujourd'hui le G&eacute;rant du D&eacute;partement Politique pour
+lui dire que ses paroles n'avaient nullement eu le caract&egrave;re
+de menace qu'on leur attribue. Il a d&eacute;clar&eacute; que
+l'Autriche avait pr&eacute;sent&eacute; sa note &agrave; la Serbie
+sans entente pr&eacute;cise avec Berlin, mais que cependant
+l'Allemagne approuvait le point de vue de l'Autriche et que
+certainement 'la fl&egrave;che une fois partie' (ce sont l&agrave;
+ses propres paroles), l'Allemagne ne pouvait se laisser guider que
+par ses devoirs d'alli&eacute;e.</p>
+<p>(Sign&eacute;) Sevastopoulo.</p>
+<p>No. 20.</p>
+<p>L'ambassadeur en Angleterre au Ministre des Affaires
+Etrang&egrave;res.</p>
+<p><i>(T&eacute;l&eacute;gramme).</i> Londres, le 12/25 Juillet
+1914.</p>
+<p>Grey m'a dit que l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne lui a
+d&eacute;clar&eacute; que le Gouvernement Allemand n'avait pas
+&eacute;t&eacute; inform&eacute; du texte de la note autrichienne,
+mais qu'il soutenait enti&egrave;rement la d&eacute;marche
+autrichienne. L'Ambassadeur a demand&eacute; en m&ecirc;me temps si
+l'Angleterre pouvait consentir &agrave; agir &agrave; St.
+P&eacute;tersbourg dans un esprit de conciliation. Grey a
+r&eacute;pondu que cela &eacute;tait compl&egrave;tement
+impossible. Le Ministre a ajout&eacute; que tant que les
+complications n'existaient qu'entre l'Autriche et la Serbie, les
+int&eacute;r&ecirc;ts Anglais n'&eacute;taient engag&eacute;s
+qu'indirectement, mais qu'il devait pr&eacute;voir que la
+mobilisation autrichienne aurait comme suite la mobilisation de la
+Russie et que d&egrave;s ce moment on se trouverait en
+pr&eacute;sence d'une situation &agrave; laquelle seraient
+int&eacute;ress&eacute;es toutes les Puissances. L'Angleterre se
+r&eacute;servait pour ce cas une compl&egrave;te libert&eacute;
+d'action.</p>
+<p>(Sign&eacute;) Benckendorff.</p>
+<p>No. 21.</p>
+<p>Le Charg&eacute; d'affaires en Serbie an Ministre des Affaires
+Etrang&egrave;res.</p>
+<p><i>(T&eacute;l&eacute;gramme).</i> Belgrade, le 12/25 Juillet
+1914.</p>
+<p>Malgr&eacute; le caract&egrave;re extr&ecirc;mement conciliant
+de la r&eacute;ponse serbe &agrave; l'ultimatum, le Ministre
+d'Autriche vient d'informer, &agrave; 6-1/2 du soir, le
+Gouvernement Serbe par note, que n'ayant pas re&ccedil;u an
+d&eacute;lai fix&eacute; une r&eacute;ponse satisfaisante il quitte
+Belgrade avec tout le personnel de la L&eacute;gation. La
+Scoupchtina est convoqu&eacute;e &agrave; Nich pour le 14/27
+Juillet. Le Gouvernement Serbe et le Corps Diplomatique partent ce
+soir pour la m&ecirc;me ville.</p>
+<p>(Sign&eacute;) Strandtman.</p>
+<p>No. 22.</p>
+<p>L'Ambassadeur en Angleterre an Ministre des Affaires
+Etrang&egrave;res.</p>
+<p><i>(T&eacute;l&eacute;gramme).</i> Londres, le 12/25 Juillet
+1914.</p>
+<p>Grey a dit &agrave; l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne qu'&agrave; son
+avis la mobilisation autrichienne devait entra&icirc;ner la
+mobilisation de la Russie, qu'alors surgirait le danger aigu d'une
+guerre g&eacute;n&eacute;rale et qu'il ne voyait qu'un seul moyen
+pour une solution pacifique: qu'en pr&eacute;sence des
+mobilisations autrichienne et russe, l'Allemagne, la France,
+l'Italie et l'Angleterre s'abstiennent d'une mobilisation
+imm&eacute;diate et proposent tout d'abord leurs bons offices. Grey
+m'a dit que ce plan n&eacute;cessitait avant tout l'agr&eacute;ment
+de l'Allemagne et l'engagement de cette Puissance de ne pas
+mobiliser. En cons&eacute;quence il a adress&eacute; tout d'abord
+&agrave; Berlin une question &agrave; ce sujet.</p>
+<p>(Sign&eacute;) Benckendorff.</p>
+<p>No. 23.</p>
+<p>Le Ministre des Affaires Etrang&egrave;res &agrave;
+l'Ambassadeur en Italie.</p>
+<p><i>(T&eacute;l&eacute;gramme).</i> St. P&eacute;tersbourg, le
+13/26 Juillet 1914.</p>
+<p>L'Italie pourrait jouer un r&ocirc;le de tout premier ordre en
+faveur du maintien de la paix, en exer&ccedil;ant l'influence
+n&eacute;cessaire sur l'Autriche et en adoptant une attitude
+nettement d&eacute;favorable au conflit, car ce dernier ne saurait
+&ecirc;tre localis&eacute;. Il est d&eacute;sirable que vous
+exprimiez la conviction qu'il est impossible pour la Russie de ne
+pas venir en aide &agrave; la Serbie.</p>
+<p>(Sign&eacute;) Sazonow.</p>
+<p>No. 24.</p>
+<p>Le G&eacute;rant du Consulat &agrave; Prague au Ministre des
+Affaires Etrang&egrave;res.</p>
+<p><i>(T&eacute;l&eacute;gramme).</i> Prague, le 13/26 Juillet
+1914.</p>
+<p>La mobilisation a &eacute;t&eacute;
+d&eacute;cr&eacute;t&eacute;e.</p>
+<p>(Sign&eacute;) Kazansky.</p>
+<p>No. 25.</p>
+<p>Le Ministre des Affaires Etrang&egrave;res &agrave;
+l'Ambassadeur en Autriche-Hongrie.</p>
+<p><i>(T&eacute;l&eacute;gramme).</i> St. P&eacute;tersbourg, le
+13/26 Juillet 1914.</p>
+<p>J'ai eu aujourd'hui un long entretien sur un ton amical avec
+l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie. Apr&egrave;s avoir examin&eacute;
+avec lui les 10 demandes adress&eacute;es &agrave; la Serbie, j'ai
+fait observer qu'&agrave; part la forme peu habile sous laquelle
+elles sont pr&eacute;sent&eacute;es, quelques-unes parmi elles sont
+absolument inex&eacute;cutables, m&ecirc;me dans le cas o&ugrave;
+le gouvernement Serbe d&eacute;clarerait les vouloir accepter.
+Ainsi, par exemple, les points 1 et 2 ne pourraient &ecirc;tre
+ex&eacute;cut&eacute;s sans un remaniement des lois serbes sur la
+presse et sur les associations, pour lequel le consentement de la
+Scoupchtina pourrait &ecirc;tre difficilement obtenu; quant
+&agrave; l'ex&eacute;cution des points 4 et 5, elle pourrait
+produire des cons&eacute;quences fort dangereuses et m&ecirc;me
+faire na&icirc;tre le danger d'actes de terrorisme dirig&eacute;s
+contre les membres de la Maison Royale et contre Pachitch, ce qui
+ne saurait entrer dans les vues de l'Autriche. En ce qui regarde
+les autres points, il me semble, qu'avec certains changements dans
+les d&eacute;tails, il ne serait pas difficile de trouver un
+terrain d'entente si les accusations y contenues &eacute;taient
+confirm&eacute;es par des preuves suffisantes.</p>
+<p>Dans l'int&eacute;r&ecirc;t de la conservation de la paix qui,
+aux dires de Sz&aacute;p&aacute;ry, est pr&eacute;cieuse &agrave;
+l'Autriche au m&ecirc;me degr&eacute; qu'&agrave; toutes les
+Puissances, il serait n&eacute;cessaire de mettre au plus t&ocirc;t
+possible une fin &agrave; la situation tendue du moment. Dans ce
+but il me semblerait tr&egrave;s d&eacute;sirable que l'Ambassadeur
+d'Autriche-Hongrie f&ucirc;t autoris&eacute; d'entrer avec moi dans
+un &eacute;change de vues priv&eacute; aux fins d'un remaniement en
+commun de quelques articles de la note autrichienne du 10/23
+Juillet. Ce proc&eacute;d&eacute; permettrait peut-&ecirc;tre de
+trouver une formule qui f&ucirc;t acceptable pour la Serbie, tout
+en donnant satisfaction &agrave; l'Autriche quant au fond de ses
+demandes. Veuillez avoir une explication prudente et amicale dans
+le sens de ce t&eacute;l&eacute;gramme avec le Ministre des
+Affaires Etrang&egrave;res. Communiqu&eacute; aux Ambassadeurs en
+Allemagne, en France, en Angleterre et en Italie.</p>
+<p>(Sign&eacute;) Sazonow.</p>
+<p>No. 26.</p>
+<p>Le Ministre des Affaires Etrang&egrave;res &agrave;
+l'Ambassadeur en Allemagne.</p>
+<p><i>(T&eacute;l&eacute;gramme).</i> St. P&eacute;tersbourg, le
+13/26 Juillet.</p>
+<p>Veuillez communiquer le contenu de mon t&eacute;l&eacute;gramme
+&agrave; Vienne d'aujourd'hui au Ministre des Affaires
+Etrang&egrave;res Allemand et lui exprimer l'espoir, que de son
+c&ocirc;t&eacute; il trouvera possible de conseiller &agrave;
+Vienne d'aller au-devant de notre proposition.</p>
+<p>(Sign&eacute;) Sazonow.</p>
+<p>No. 27.</p>
+<p>Le Charg&eacute; d'Affaires en France au Ministre des Affaires
+Etrang&egrave;res.</p>
+<p><i>(T&eacute;l&eacute;gramme).</i> Paris, le 13/26 Juillet
+1914.</p>
+<p>Le Directeur du D&eacute;partement Politique m'informe, que lors
+de la communication qu'il a faite &agrave; l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche
+du contenu de la r&eacute;ponse serbe &agrave; l'ultimatum,
+l'Ambassadeur n'a pas cach&eacute; son &eacute;tonnement de ce
+qu'elle n'ait pas donn&eacute; satisfaction &agrave; Giesl.
+L'attitude conciliante de la Serbie doit, selon l'avis du Directeur
+du D&eacute;partement Politique, produire la meilleure impression
+en Europe.</p>
+<p>(Sign&eacute;) Sevastopoulo.</p>
+<p>No. 28.</p>
+<p>Le Charg&eacute; d'Affaires en France an Ministre des Affaires
+Etrang&egrave;res.</p>
+<p>(<i>T&eacute;l&eacute;gramme</i>). Paris, le 13/26 Juillet
+1914.</p>
+<p>Aujourd'hui l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a de nouveau rendu visite
+au G&eacute;rant du Minist&egrave;re des Affaires Etrang&egrave;res
+et lui a fait les d&eacute;clarations suivantes:</p>
+<p>&laquo;L'Autriche a d&eacute;clar&eacute; &agrave; la Russie
+qu'elle ne recherche pas des acquisitions territoriales et qu'elle
+ne menace pas l'int&eacute;grit&eacute; de la Serbie. Son but
+unique est d'assurer sa propre tranquillit&eacute;. Par
+cons&eacute;quent il d&eacute;pend de la Russie d'&eacute;viter la
+guerre. L'Allemagne se sent solidaire avec la France dans le
+d&eacute;sir ardent de conserver la paix et esp&egrave;re fermement
+que la France usera de son influence &agrave; P&eacute;tersbourg
+dans un sens mod&eacute;rateur&raquo;. Le Ministre fit observer que
+l'Allemagne pourrait de son c&ocirc;t&eacute; entreprendre des
+d&eacute;marches analogues &agrave; Vienne, surtout en
+pr&eacute;sence de l'esprit de conciliation dont a fait preuve la
+Serbie. L'Ambassadeur r&eacute;pondit que cela n'&eacute;tait pas
+possible, vu la r&eacute;solution prise de ne pas s'immiscer dans
+le conflit austro-serbe. Alors le Ministre demanda, si les quatre
+Puissances&mdash;l'Angleterre, l'Allemagne, l'Italie et la
+France&mdash;ne pouvaient pas entreprendre des d&eacute;marches
+&agrave; St. P&eacute;tersbourg et &agrave; Vienne, puisque
+l'affaire se r&eacute;duisait en somme &agrave; un conflit entre la
+Russie et l'Autriche. L'Ambassadeur all&eacute;gua l'absence
+d'instructions. Finalement le Ministre refusa d'adh&eacute;rer
+&agrave; la proposition allemande.</p>
+<p>(Sign&eacute;) Sevastopoulo.</p>
+<p>No. 29.</p>
+<p>Le Charg&eacute; d'Affaires en France au Ministre des Affaires
+Etrang&egrave;res.</p>
+<p>(<i>T&eacute;l&eacute;gramme</i>). Paris, le 13/28 Juillet
+1914.</p>
+<p>Le Directeur du D&eacute;partement Politique a
+d&eacute;clar&eacute; qu'&agrave; son avis personnel, les
+d&eacute;marches successives allemandes &agrave; Paris ont pour but
+d'intimider la France et d'amener son intervention &agrave; St.
+P&eacute;tersbourg.</p>
+<p>(Sign&eacute;) Sevastopoulo.</p>
+<p>No. 30.</p>
+<p>Le Charg&eacute; d'Affaires en Allemagne au Ministre des
+Affaires Etrang&egrave;res.</p>
+<p>(<i>T&eacute;l&eacute;gramme</i>). Berlin, le 13/26 Juillet
+1914.</p>
+<p>Apr&egrave;s la r&eacute;ception &agrave; Berlin de la nouvelle
+de la mobilisation de l'arm&eacute;e autrichienne contre la Serbie
+une grande foule, compos&eacute;e, aux dires des journaux, en
+partie d'&eacute;l&eacute;ments autrichiens, se livra &agrave; une
+s&eacute;rie de bruyantes manifestations en faveur de l'Autriche. A
+une heure avanc&eacute;e de la soir&eacute;e les manifestants se
+mass&egrave;rent &agrave; plusieurs reprises devant le palais de
+l'Ambassade Imp&eacute;riale en poussant des cris hostiles &agrave;
+la Russie; la police &eacute;tait presque absente et ne prenait
+aucune mesure.</p>
+<p>(Sign&eacute;) Bronewsky.</p>
+<p>No. 31.</p>
+<p>L'Ambassadeur en Angleterre au Ministre des Affaires
+Etrang&egrave;res.</p>
+<p><i>(T&eacute;l&eacute;gramme)</i>.</p>
+<p>Londres, le 14/27 Juillet 1914.</p>
+<p>Ai re&ccedil;u votre t&eacute;l&eacute;gramme du 13-26 Juillet.
+Prie me t&eacute;l&eacute;graphier si, &agrave; Votre avis, Vos
+pourparlers directs avec le cabinet de Vienne s'accordent avec le
+projet de Grey concernant la m&eacute;diation des 4 Gouvernements.
+Ayant appris de l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre &agrave; St.
+P&eacute;tersbourg que Vous &eacute;tiez dispos&eacute; &agrave;
+accepter cette combinaison, Grey a d&eacute;cid&eacute; de la
+transformer en une proposition officielle qu'il a faite hier soir
+&agrave; Berlin, &agrave; Paris et &agrave; Rome.</p>
+<p>(Sign&eacute;) Benckendorff.</p>
+<p>No. 32.</p>
+<p>Le Ministre des Affaires Etrang&egrave;res aux Ambassadeurs en
+France et en Angleterre.</p>
+<p><i>(T&eacute;l&eacute;gramme)</i>.</p>
+<p>St. P&eacute;tersbourg, le 14/27 Juillet 1914.</p>
+<p>(Printed in the British White Book (<i>Correspondence</i>, No.
+53.).)</p>
+<p>No. 33.</p>
+<p>Le Ministre des Affaires Etrang&egrave;res aux Ambassadeurs en
+France, en Angleterre, en Allemagne, en Autriche-Hongrie et en
+Italie.</p>
+<p><i>(T&eacute;l&eacute;gramme)</i>.</p>
+<p>St. P&eacute;tersbourg, le 14/27 Juillet 1914.</p>
+<p>Ai pris connaissance de la r&eacute;ponse transmise par le
+Gouvernement Serbe au Baron Giesl. Elle d&eacute;passe toutes nos
+pr&eacute;visions par sa mod&eacute;ration et son d&eacute;sir de
+donner la plus compl&egrave;te satisfaction &agrave; l'Autriche.
+Nous ne voyons pas quelles pourraient &ecirc;tre encore les
+demandes de l'Autriche, &agrave; moins que le Cabinet de Vienne ne
+cherche un pr&eacute;texte pour une guerre avec la Serbie.</p>
+<p>(Sign&eacute;) Sazonow.</p>
+<p>No. 34.</p>
+<p>Le Charg&eacute; d'Affaires en France au Ministre des Affaires
+Etrang&egrave;res.</p>
+<p><i>(T&eacute;l&eacute;gramme)</i>.</p>
+<p>Paris, le 14/27 Juillet 1914.</p>
+<p>L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a conf&eacute;r&eacute; aujourd'hui de
+nouveau longuement sur la situation avec le Directeur du
+D&eacute;partement Politique. L'Ambassadeur a beaucoup
+insist&eacute; sur l'exclusion de toute possibilit&eacute; d'une
+m&eacute;diation ou d'une conf&eacute;rence.</p>
+<p>(Sign&eacute;) Sevastopoulo.</p>
+<p>No. 35.</p>
+<p>L'Ambassadeur en France au Ministre des Affaires
+Etrang&egrave;res.</p>
+<p><i>(T&eacute;l&eacute;gramme).</i> Paris, le 14/27 Juillet
+1914.</p>
+<p>Ai conf&eacute;r&eacute; avec le G&eacute;rant du
+Minist&egrave;re des Affaires Etrang&egrave;res, en pr&eacute;sence
+de Berthelot, imm&eacute;diatement apr&egrave;s mon retour &agrave;
+Paris. Tous les deux m'out confirm&eacute; les d&eacute;tails
+concernant les d&eacute;marches de l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne que
+Sevastopoulo Vous a communiqu&eacute;s dans ses
+t&eacute;l&eacute;grammes. Ce matin le Baron de Schoen a
+confirm&eacute; par &eacute;crit sa d&eacute;claration d'hier,
+savoir: 1) l'Autriche a d&eacute;clar&eacute; &agrave; la Russie
+qu'elle ne recherche pas d'acquisitions et n'attente pas &agrave;
+l'int&eacute;grit&eacute; de la Serbie. Son unique but est
+d'assurer sa propre tranquillit&eacute;. 2) Par cons&eacute;quent
+il d&eacute;pend de la Russie d'&eacute;viter la guerre. 3)
+L'Allemagne et la France, compl&egrave;tement solidaires dans
+l'ardent d&eacute;sir de ne pas rompre la paix, doivent agir sur la
+Russie dans un sens mod&eacute;rateur. Le Baron de Schoen a
+sp&eacute;cialement soulign&eacute; l'expression de la
+solidarit&eacute; entre l'Allemagne et la France. D'apr&egrave;s la
+conviction du Ministre de la Justice, les d&eacute;marches susdites
+de l'Allemagne out pour but &eacute;vident de d&eacute;sunir la
+Russie et la France, d'entra&icirc;ner le Gouvernement
+Fran&ccedil;ais dans la voie des repr&eacute;sentations &agrave;
+St. P&eacute;tersbourg et de compromettre ainsi notre alli&eacute;
+&agrave; nos yeux; enfin, en cas de guerre, d'en rejeter la
+responsabilit&eacute; non sur l'Allemagne, qui emploie soi-disant
+tous ses efforts pour le maintien de la paix, mais sur la Russie et
+la France.</p>
+<p>(Sign&eacute;) Iswolsky.</p>
+<p>No. 36.</p>
+<p>L'Ambassadeur en France au Ministre des Affaires
+Etrang&egrave;res.</p>
+<p><i>(T&eacute;l&eacute;gramme).</i> Paris, le 14/27 Juillet
+1914.</p>
+<p>Il ressort de vos t&eacute;l&eacute;grammes du 13/26 Juillet que
+vous ne connaissiez pas encore la r&eacute;ponse du Gouvernement
+Serbe. Le t&eacute;l&eacute;gramme par lequel cette nouvelle m'a
+&eacute;t&eacute; communiqu&eacute;e de Belgrade a
+&eacute;t&eacute; &eacute;galement en route pendant 20 heures. Le
+t&eacute;l&eacute;gramme du Ministre des Affaires Etrang&egrave;res
+Fran&ccedil;ais exp&eacute;di&eacute; avant-hier, au triple tarif,
+&agrave; onze heures du matin, et contenant l'ordre d'appuyer notre
+d&eacute;marche, n'est parvenu &agrave; sa destination qu'&agrave;
+6 heures. Il n'y a aucun doute que ce t&eacute;l&eacute;gramme
+n'ait &eacute;t&eacute; retenu intentionnellement par le
+t&eacute;l&eacute;graphe autrichien.</p>
+<p>(Sign&eacute;) Iswolsky.</p>
+<p>No. 37.</p>
+<p>L'Ambassadeur en France au Ministre des Affaires
+Etrang&egrave;res.</p>
+<p><i>(T&eacute;l&eacute;gramme).</i> Paris, le 14/27 Juillet
+1914.</p>
+<p>D'ordre de son Gouvernement, l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche a
+communiqu&eacute; au G&eacute;rant du Minist&egrave;re des Affaires
+Etrang&egrave;res que la r&eacute;ponse de la Serbie a
+&eacute;t&eacute; jug&eacute;e insuffisante &agrave; Vienne et que
+demain, mardi, l'Autriche proc&eacute;derait &agrave; des 'actions
+&eacute;nergiques' don't le but serait de forcer la Serbie de lui
+donner les garanties n&eacute;cessaires. Le Ministre ayant
+demand&eacute; en quoi consisteraient ces actions, l'Ambassadeur
+r&eacute;pondit qu'il n'avait pas de renseignements exacts &agrave;
+ce sujet, mais qu'il pouvait s'agir d'un passage da la
+fronti&egrave;re serbe, d'un ultimatum et m&ecirc;me d'une
+d&eacute;claration de guerre.</p>
+<p>(Sign&eacute;) Iswolsky.</p>
+<p>No. 38.</p>
+<p>Le Charg&eacute; d'Affaires en Allemagne au Ministre des
+Affaires Etrang&egrave;res.</p>
+<p><i>(T&eacute;l&eacute;gramme).</i> Berlin, le 14/27 Juillet
+1914.</p>
+<p>J'ai pri&eacute; le Ministre des Affaires Etrang&egrave;res
+d'appuyer &agrave; Vienne votre proposition tendant &agrave;
+autoriser Sz&aacute;p&aacute;ry d'&eacute;laborer, par la voie d'un
+&eacute;change de vues priv&eacute; avec Vous, une r&eacute;daction
+des demandes austro-hongroises acceptable pour les deux parties.
+Jagow a r&eacute;pondu qu'il &eacute;tait an courant de cette
+proposition et qu'il partageait l'avis de Pourtal&egrave;s que,
+puisque Sz&aacute;p&aacute;ry avait commenc&eacute; cette
+conversation, il pourrait aussi bien la continuer. Il
+t&eacute;l&eacute;graphiera dans ce sens &agrave; l'Ambassadeur
+d'Allemagne &agrave; Vienne. Je l'ai pri&eacute; de conseiller
+d'une fa&ccedil;on plus pressante &agrave; Vienne de s'engager dans
+cette voie de conciliation; Jagow a r&eacute;pondu qu'il ne pouvait
+pas conseiller &agrave; l'Autriche de c&eacute;der.</p>
+<p>(Sign&eacute;) Bronewsky.</p>
+<p>No. 39.</p>
+<p>Le Charg&eacute; d'Affaires en Allemagne au Ministre des
+Affaires Etrang&egrave;res.</p>
+<p><i>(T&eacute;l&eacute;gramme).</i> Berlin, le 14/27 Juillet
+1914.</p>
+<p>Aujourd'hui, avant ma visite au Ministre des Affaires
+Etrang&egrave;res, ce dernier avait re&ccedil;u celle de
+l'Ambassadeur de France qui avait tent&eacute; de lui faire
+accepter la proposition anglaise relative &agrave; une action en
+faveur de la paix, action qui serait exerc&eacute;e
+simultan&eacute;ment &agrave; St.-P&eacute;tersbourg et &agrave;
+Vienne par l'Angleterre, l'Allemagne, l'Italie et la France. Cambon
+a propos&eacute; que ces Puissances donnent &agrave; Vienne un
+conseil dans les termes suivants: &laquo;S'abstenir de tout acte
+qui pourrait aggraver la situation de l'heure actuelle&raquo;. En
+adoptant cette formule voil&eacute;e on &eacute;viterait de
+mentionner la n&eacute;cessit&eacute; de s'abstenir d'une invasion
+de la Serbie. Jagow a oppos&eacute; &agrave; cette proposition un
+refus cat&eacute;gorique, et cela malgr&eacute; les instances de
+l'Ambassadeur qui a fait valoir, comme un bon c&ocirc;te de la
+proposition, le groupement mixte des Puissances gr&acirc;ce auquel
+on &eacute;vitait l'opposition de l'Alliance &agrave; l'Entente, ce
+dont s'&eacute;tait si souvent plaint Jagow lui-m&ecirc;me.</p>
+<p>(Sign&eacute;) Bronewsky.</p>
+<p>No. 40.</p>
+<p>T&eacute;l&eacute;gramme de Sa Majest&eacute; Imp&eacute;riale
+l'Empereur &agrave; Son Altesse Royale le Prince Alexandre de
+Serbie en date du 14/27 Juillet 1914.</p>
+<p>Votre Altesse Royale en s'adressant &agrave; Moi dans un moment
+particuli&egrave;rement difficile ne s'est pas tromp&eacute;e sur
+les sentiments qui M'animent &agrave; Son &eacute;gard et sur Ma
+sympathie cordiale pour le peuple serbe.</p>
+<p>Ma plus s&eacute;rieuse attention est attir&eacute;e par la
+situation actuelle et Mon Gouvernement s'applique de toutes ses
+forces &agrave; aplanir les pr&eacute;sentes difficult&eacute;s. Je
+ne doute point que Votre Altesse et le Gouvernement Royal ne
+veuillent faciliter cette t&acirc;che en ne n&eacute;gligeant rien
+pour arriver &agrave; une solution qui permette de pr&eacute;venir
+les horreurs d'une nouvelle guerre tout en sauvegardant la
+dignit&eacute; de la Serbie.</p>
+<p>Tant qu'il y a le moindre espoir d'&eacute;viter une effusion de
+sang, tous nos efforts doivent tendre vers ce but. Si,
+malgr&eacute; Notre plus sinc&egrave;re d&eacute;sir, Nous ne
+r&eacute;ussissons pas, Votre Altesse peut &ecirc;tre
+assur&eacute;e qu'en aucun cas la Russie ne se
+d&eacute;sint&eacute;ressera du sort de la Serbie.</p>
+<p>(Sign&eacute;) Nicolas.</p>
+<p>No. 41.</p>
+<p>L'Ambassadeur en Autriche-Hongrie au Ministre des Affaires
+Etrang&egrave;res.</p>
+<p>(<i>T&eacute;l&eacute;gramme</i>). Vienne, le 14/17 juillet
+1914.[<a href="#note-194">194</a>]</p>
+<p>Le Ministre des Affaires Etrang&egrave;res est absent. Pendant
+un entretien prolong&eacute;, que j'ai eu aujourd'hui avec Macchio,
+j'ai, en termes tout &agrave; fait amicaux, attir&eacute; son
+attention sur l'impression d&eacute;favorable qu'a produite en
+Russie la pr&eacute;sentation par l'Autriche &agrave; la Serbie de
+demandes absolument inacceptables pour chaque &eacute;tat
+ind&eacute;pendant, bien que petit. J'ai ajout&eacute; que ce
+proc&eacute;d&eacute;, qui pourrait amener des complications les
+moins d&eacute;sirables, a provoqu&eacute; en Russie une profonde
+surprise et une r&eacute;probation g&eacute;n&eacute;rale. Il faut
+supposer que l'Autriche, sous l'influence des assurances du
+Repr&eacute;sentant Allemand &agrave; Vienne, lequel pendant toute
+cette crise a jou&eacute; un r&ocirc;le d'instigateur, a
+compt&eacute; sur la probabilit&eacute; de la localisation de son
+conflit avec la Serbie et sur la possibilit&eacute; de porter
+&agrave; cette derni&egrave;re impun&eacute;ment un coup grave. La
+d&eacute;claration du Gouvernement Imp&eacute;rial concernant
+l'impossibilit&eacute; pour la Russie de rester indiff&eacute;rente
+en pr&eacute;sence d'un tel proc&eacute;d&eacute; a provoqu&eacute;
+ici une grande impression.</p>
+<p>(Sign&eacute;) Sch&eacute;b&eacute;ko.</p>
+<p><a name="note-194" id="note-194">
+<!-- Note Anchor 194 --></a>[Footnote 194: Evidently the date July
+17 is a misprint for July 27.]</p>
+<p>No. 42.</p>
+<p>L'Ambassadeur en Angleterre au Ministre des Affaires
+Etrang&egrave;res.</p>
+<p>(<i>T&eacute;l&eacute;gramme</i>). Londres, le 14/17 Juillet
+1914.[<a href="#note-195">195</a>]</p>
+<p>Grey vient de r&eacute;pondre &agrave; l'Ambassadeur
+d'Allemagne, qui &eacute;tait venu le questionner sur la
+possibilit&eacute; d'une action &agrave; St.-P&eacute;tersbourg,
+que cette action devrait se produire &agrave; Vienne et que le
+cabinet de Berlin serait le mieux qualifi&eacute; pour l'exercer.
+Grey a fait observer en m&ecirc;me temps que la r&eacute;ponse
+serbe &agrave; la note autrichienne d&eacute;passait par sa
+mod&eacute;ration et son esprit de conciliation tout ce &agrave;
+quoi on pouvait s'attendre. Grey a ajout&eacute; qu'il en concluait
+que la Russie avait conseill&eacute; &agrave; Belgrade de donner
+une r&eacute;ponse mod&eacute;r&eacute;e et qu'il pensait que la
+r&eacute;ponse serbe pouvait servir de base &agrave; une solution
+pacifique et acceptable de la question.</p>
+<p>Dans ces conditions, a continu&eacute; Grey, si l'Autriche
+malgr&eacute; cette r&eacute;ponse commen&ccedil;ait les
+hostilit&eacute;s, elle prouverait son intention d'an&eacute;antir
+la Serbie. La question plac&eacute;e sur ce terrain produirait une
+situation qui pourrait amener une guerre dans laquelle seraient
+impliqu&eacute;es toutes les Puissances.</p>
+<p>Grey a enfin d&eacute;clar&eacute; que le Gouvernement Anglais
+&eacute;tait bien sinc&egrave;rement dispos&eacute; &agrave;
+collaborer avec le gouvernement Allemand tant qu'il s'agirait de la
+conservation de la paix; mais que pour le cas contraire
+l'Angleterre se r&eacute;servait une pleine libert&eacute;
+d'action.</p>
+<p>(Sign&eacute;) Benckendorff.</p>
+<p><a name="note-195" id="note-195">
+<!-- Note Anchor 195 --></a>[Footnote 195: Evidently the date July
+17 is a misprint for July 27.]</p>
+<p>No. 43.</p>
+<p>Le Ministre des Affaires Etrang&egrave;res &agrave;
+l'Ambassadeur en Angleterre.</p>
+<p>(<i>T&eacute;l&eacute;gramme</i>). St.-P&eacute;tersbourg, le
+15/28 Juillet 1914.</p>
+<p>(Printed in the British White Book (<i>Correspondence</i>, No.
+54.).)</p>
+<p>No. 44.</p>
+<p>Le Consul g&eacute;n&eacute;ral &agrave; Fiume au Ministre des
+Affaires Etrang&egrave;res.</p>
+<p><i>(T&eacute;l&eacute;gramme).</i> Fiume, le 15/28 Juillet
+1914.</p>
+<p>L'&eacute;tat de si&egrave;ge a &eacute;t&eacute;
+proclam&eacute; en Slavonie, en Croatie et &agrave; Fiume et en
+m&ecirc;me temps les r&eacute;servistes de toutes les
+cat&eacute;gories ont &eacute;t&eacute; mobilis&eacute;s.</p>
+<p>(Sign&eacute;) Salviati.</p>
+<p>No. 45.</p>
+<p>L'Ambassadeur en Autriche-Hongrie au Ministre des Affaires
+Etrang&egrave;res.</p>
+<p><i>(T&eacute;l&eacute;gramme).</i> Vienne, le 15/28 Juillet
+1914.</p>
+<p>(Printed in the British White Book (<i>Correspondence</i>, No.
+93 (I)).)</p>
+<p>No. 46.</p>
+<p>Le Charg&eacute; d'affaires en Allemagne au Ministre des
+Affaires Etrang&egrave;res.</p>
+<p><i>(T&eacute;l&eacute;gramme).</i> Berlin, le 15/28 Juillet
+1914.</p>
+<p>Le Bureau Wolff n'a pas publi&eacute; le texte de la note
+responsive serbe qui lui avait &eacute;t&eacute; communiqu&eacute;.
+Jusqu'&agrave; ce moment cette note n'a paru in extenso dans aucun
+des journaux locaux, qui selon toute &eacute;vidence ne veulent pas
+lui donner place dans leurs colonnes, se rendant compte de l'effet
+calmant que cette publication produirait sur les lecteurs
+allemands.</p>
+<p>(Sign&eacute;) Bronewsky.</p>
+<p>No. 47.</p>
+<p>L'Ambassadeur en Autriche-Hongrie au Ministre des Affaires
+Etrang&egrave;res.</p>
+<p><i>(T&eacute;l&eacute;gramme).</i> Vienne, le 15/28 Juillet,
+1914.</p>
+<p>Le d&eacute;cret sur la mobilisation g&eacute;n&eacute;rale a
+&eacute;t&eacute; sign&eacute;.</p>
+<p>(Sign&eacute;) Sch&eacute;b&eacute;ko.</p>
+<p>No. 48.</p>
+<p>Le Ministre des Affaires Etrang&egrave;res &agrave;
+l'Ambassadeur &agrave; Londres.[<a href="#note-196">196</a>]</p>
+<p><i>(T&eacute;l&eacute;gramme).</i> St.-P&eacute;tersbourg, le
+15/28 Juillet, 1914.</p>
+<p>En pr&eacute;sence des hostilit&eacute;s entre
+l'Autriche-Hongrie et la Serbie il est n&eacute;cessaire que
+l'Angleterre entreprenne d'urgence une action m&eacute;diatrice et
+que l'action militaire de l'Autriche contre la Serbie soit
+imm&eacute;diatement suspendue. Autrement la m&eacute;diation ne
+servira que de pr&eacute;texte pour tirer en longueur la solution
+de la question et donnera entre temps &agrave; l'Autriche la
+possibilit&eacute; d'&eacute;craser compl&egrave;tement la Serbie
+et d'occuper une situation dominante dans les Balcans.</p>
+<p>Communiqu&eacute; &agrave; Paris, Berlin, Vienne et Rome.</p>
+<p>(Sign&eacute;) Sazonow.</p>
+<p><a name="note-196" id="note-196">
+<!-- Note Anchor 196 --></a>[Footnote 196: An English (abbreviated)
+version of this telegram is given in the British White Book
+(<i>Correspondence</i>, No. 70 (2)).]</p>
+<p>No. 49.</p>
+<p>Le Ministre des Affaires Etrang&egrave;res au Charg&eacute;
+d'Affaires en Allemagne.</p>
+<p><i>(T&eacute;l&eacute;gramme).</i> St.-P&eacute;tersbourg, le
+16/29 Juillet, 1914.</p>
+<p>(Printed in the British White Book (<i>Correspondence</i>, No.
+93 (2)).)</p>
+<p>No. 50.</p>
+<p>Le Ministre des Affaires Etrang&egrave;res aux Ambassadeurs en
+Angleterre et en France.</p>
+<p><i>(T&eacute;l&eacute;gramme).</i> St.-P&eacute;tersbourg, le
+16/29 Juillet 1914.</p>
+<p>(Printed in the British White Book (<i>Correspondence</i>, No.
+93 (3)).)</p>
+<p>No. 51.</p>
+<p>Le Charg&eacute; d'Affaires en Allemagne au Ministre des
+Affaires Etrang&egrave;res.</p>
+<p><i>(T&eacute;l&eacute;gramme).</i> Berlin, le 16/29 Juillet
+1914.</p>
+<p>Sur ma question s'il avait une r&eacute;ponse de Vienne
+relativement &agrave; Votre proposition de pourparlers
+priv&eacute;s &agrave; St.-P&eacute;tersbourg, le Secr&eacute;taire
+d'Etat a r&eacute;pondu n&eacute;gativement.</p>
+<p>Il d&eacute;clare qu'il lui est fort difficile d'agir sur
+Vienne, surtout ouvertement. Parlant &agrave; Cambon, il a
+m&ecirc;me ajout&eacute; qu'en cas d'une pression trop
+&eacute;vidente l'Autriche se h&acirc;terait de mettre l'Allemagne
+en pr&eacute;sence d'un fait accompli.</p>
+<p>Le Secr&eacute;taire d'Etat dit qu'il a re&ccedil;u aujourd'hui
+un t&eacute;l&eacute;gramme de Pourtal&egrave;s d'o&ugrave; il
+constate que plus que les premiers jours Vous &ecirc;tes
+dispos&eacute; &agrave; trouver un compromis acceptable pour tous.
+J'ai r&eacute;pliqu&eacute; que probablement Vous avez
+&eacute;t&eacute; d&egrave;s le commencement en faveur d'un
+compromis, bien entendu &agrave; la condition qu'il soit acceptable
+non seulement pour l'Autriche, mais &eacute;galement pour nous. Il
+m'a dit ensuite qu'il paraissait que nous avions commenc&eacute;
+&agrave; mobiliser sur la fronti&egrave;re autrichienne et qu'il
+craignait que ceci rendrait plus difficile pour l'Autriche la
+possibilit&eacute; de s'entendre avec nous, d'autant plus que
+l'Autriche ne mobilisait que contre la Serbie et ne faisait pas de
+pr&eacute;paratifs sur notre fronti&egrave;re. J'ai r&eacute;pondu
+que, d'apr&egrave;s les renseignements dont je disposais,
+l'Autriche mobilisait &eacute;galement sur notre fronti&egrave;re
+et que par cons&eacute;quent nous devions prendre des mesures
+analogues. J'ai ajout&eacute; que les mesures que nous avons
+peut-&ecirc;tre prises de notre c&ocirc;t&eacute; n'&eacute;taient
+nullement dirig&eacute;es contre l'Allemagne.</p>
+<p>(Sign&eacute;) Bronewsky.</p>
+<p>No. 52.</p>
+<p>Le Charg&eacute; d'affaires en Serbie au Ministre des Affaires
+Etrang&egrave;res.</p>
+<p><i>(T&eacute;l&eacute;gramme).</i> Nich, le 16/29 Juillet
+1914.</p>
+<p>Aujourd'hui le Ministre de Bulgarie, an nom de son Gouvernement,
+a d&eacute;clar&eacute; &agrave; Pachiteh que la Bulgarie
+observerait la neutralit&eacute;.</p>
+<p>(Sign&eacute;) Strandtman.</p>
+<p>No. 53.</p>
+<p>L'Ambassadeur en France au Ministre des Affaires
+Etrang&egrave;res.</p>
+<p><i>(T&eacute;l&eacute;gramme).</i> Paris, le 16/29 Juillet
+1914.</p>
+<p>A l'occasion de l'arriv&eacute;e du Pr&eacute;sident de la
+R&eacute;publique Fran&ccedil;ais le Ministre des Affaires
+Etrang&egrave;res avait pr&eacute;par&eacute; un court
+expos&eacute; de la situation politique actuelle, &agrave; pen
+pr&egrave;s dans les termes suivants: L'Autriche, craignant la
+d&eacute;composition int&eacute;rieure, s'est empar&eacute;e du
+pr&eacute;texte de l'assassinat de l'Archiduc pour essayer
+d'obtenir des garanties qui pourront rev&ecirc;tir la forme de
+l'occupation des communications militaires serbes ou m&ecirc;me du
+territoire serbe. L'Allemagne soutient l'Autriche. Le maintien de
+la paix d&eacute;pend de la seule Russie, parce qu'il s'agit d'une
+affaire qui doit &ecirc;tre &laquo;localis&eacute;e&raquo; entre
+l'Autriche et la Serbie, c'est &agrave; dire de la punition de la
+politique pr&eacute;c&eacute;dente de la Serbie et des garanties
+pour l'avenir. De ceci l'Allemagne conclue qu'il faut exercer une
+action mod&eacute;ratrice &agrave; P&eacute;tersbourg. Ce sophisme
+a &eacute;t&eacute; r&eacute;fut&eacute; &agrave; Paris comme
+&agrave; Londres. A Paris, le Baron de Schoen a en vain
+t&acirc;ch&eacute; d'entra&icirc;ner la France &agrave; une action
+solidaire avec l'Allemagne sur la Russie en faveur du maintien de
+la paix. Les m&ecirc;mes tentatives out &eacute;t&eacute; faites
+&agrave; Londres. Dans les deux capitales il a &eacute;t&eacute;
+r&eacute;pondu que l'action devrait &ecirc;tre exerc&eacute;e
+&agrave; Vienne, car les demandes excessives de l'Autriche, son
+refus de discuter les rares r&eacute;serves de la Serbie, et la
+d&eacute;claration de guerre menacent de provoquer la guerre
+g&eacute;n&eacute;rale. La France et l'Angleterre ne peuvent
+exercer une action mod&eacute;ratrice sur la Russie, laquelle
+jusqu'ici a fait preuve de la plus grande mod&eacute;ration,
+surtout en conseillant &agrave; la Serbie d'accepter ce qui
+&eacute;tait possible de la note autrichienne. Aujourd'hui
+l'Allemagne para&icirc;t renoncer &agrave; l'id&eacute;e d'une
+action sur la Russie seule et incline vers une action
+m&eacute;diatrice &agrave; P&eacute;tersbourg et &agrave; Vienne,
+mais en m&ecirc;me temps l'Allemagne comme l'Autriche t&acirc;chent
+de faire tra&icirc;ner l'affaire. L'Allemagne s'oppose &agrave; la
+Conf&eacute;rence sans indiquer aucune autre mani&egrave;re d'agir
+pratique. L'Autriche m&egrave;ne des pourparlers manifestement
+dilatoires &agrave; P&eacute;tersbourg. En m&ecirc;me temps elle
+prend des mesures actives, et si ces mesures sont
+tol&eacute;r&eacute;es, ses pr&eacute;tentions augmenteront
+proportionnellement. Il est tr&egrave;s d&eacute;sirable que la
+Russie pr&ecirc;te tout son appui an projet de m&eacute;diation que
+pr&eacute;sentera Sir E. Grey. Dans le cas contraire l'Autriche,
+sous pr&eacute;texte de &laquo;garantie&raquo;, pourra, en fait,
+changer le status territorial de l'Europe orientale.</p>
+<p>(Sign&eacute;) Iswolsky.</p>
+<p>No. 54.</p>
+<p>L'Ambassadeur en Angleterre au Ministre des Affaires
+Etrang&egrave;res.</p>
+<p><i>(T&eacute;l&eacute;gramme).</i> Londres, le 10/29 Juillet
+1914.</p>
+<p>Ai communiqu&eacute; le contenu de Vos t&eacute;l&eacute;grammes
+du 15/28 Juillet &agrave; Grey. Il a d&eacute;clar&eacute;
+aujourd'hui &agrave; l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne que les pourparlers
+directs entre la Russie et l'Autriche avaient &eacute;chou&eacute;,
+et que les correspondants des journaux mandaient de
+St.-P&eacute;tersbourg que la Russie mobilisait contre l'Autriche
+&agrave; la suite de la mobilisation de cette derni&egrave;re. Grey
+dit qu'en principe le Gouvernement Allemand s'est
+d&eacute;clar&eacute; en faveur de la m&eacute;diation, mais qu'il
+rencontre des difficult&eacute;s quant &agrave; la forme. Grey a
+insist&eacute; pour que le Gouvernement Allemand indiqu&acirc;t la
+forme laquelle &agrave; l'avis de l'Allemagne pourrait permettre
+aux 4 Puissances d'exercer leur m&eacute;diation pour &eacute;viter
+la guerre; vu le consentement de la France, de l'Italie et de
+l'Angleterre la m&eacute;diation pourrait avoir lieu seulement dans
+le cas o&ugrave; l'Allemagne consentirait &agrave; se ranger du
+c&ocirc;t&eacute; de la paix.</p>
+<p>(Sign&eacute;) Benckendorff.</p>
+<p>No. 55.</p>
+<p>L'Ambassadeur en France au Ministre des Affaires
+Etrang&egrave;res.</p>
+<p><i>(T&eacute;l&eacute;gramme).</i> Paris, le 16/29 Juillet
+1914.</p>
+<p>Viviani vient de me confirmer l'enti&egrave;re r&eacute;solution
+du Gouvernement Fran&ccedil;ais d'agir d'accord avec nous. Cette
+r&eacute;solution est soutenue par les cercles les plus
+&eacute;tendus et par les partis, y compris les
+radicaux-socialistes, qui viennent de lui pr&eacute;senter une
+d&eacute;claration exprimant la confiance absolue et les
+dispositions patriotiques du groupe. D&egrave;s son arriv&eacute;e
+&agrave; Paris, Viviani a t&eacute;l&eacute;graphi&eacute;
+d'urgence &agrave; Londres que vu la cessation des pourparlers
+directs entre P&eacute;tersbourg et Vienne il &eacute;tait
+n&eacute;cessaire que le Cabinet de Londres renouvel&acirc;t le
+plus t&ocirc;t possible sous telle ou autre forme sa proposition
+concernant la m&eacute;diation des Puissances. Avant moi Viviani a
+re&ccedil;u aujourd'hui l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne qui lui a
+renouvel&eacute; l'assurance des tendances pacifiques de
+l'Allemagne. Viviani ayant fait observer que si l'Allemagne
+d&eacute;sirait la paix elle devrait se h&acirc;ter
+d'adh&eacute;rer &agrave; la proposition de m&eacute;diation
+anglaise, le Baron Schoen a r&eacute;pondu que les mots
+&laquo;conf&eacute;rence&raquo; ou &laquo;arbitrage&raquo;
+effrayaient l'Autriche. Viviani a r&eacute;pliqu&eacute; qu'il ne
+s'agissait pas de mots et qu'il serait facile de trouver une autre
+forme de m&eacute;diation. D'apr&egrave;s l'avis du Baron de
+Schoen, pour le succ&egrave;s des n&eacute;gociations entre les
+Puissances il serait n&eacute;cessaire de savoir ce que l'Autriche
+compterait demander &agrave; la Serbie. Viviani a r&eacute;pondu
+que le Cabinet de Berlin pourrait bien facilement s'en
+enqu&eacute;rir aupr&egrave;s de l'Autriche, mais qu'en attendant
+la note responsive serbe pourrait servir de base &agrave; la
+discussion; il a ajout&eacute; que la France d&eacute;sirait
+sinc&egrave;rement la paix, mais qu'elle &eacute;tait en m&ecirc;me
+temps r&eacute;solue d'agir en pleine harmonie avec ses
+alli&eacute;s et amis, et que lui, le Baron de Schoen, avait pu se
+convaincre que cette r&eacute;solution rencontrait la plus vive
+approbation du pays.</p>
+<p>(Sign&eacute;) Iswolsky.</p>
+<p>No. 56.</p>
+<p>T&eacute;l&eacute;gramme de son Altesse Royale le Prince
+Alexandre de Serbie &agrave; sa Majest&eacute; l'Empereur.</p>
+<p>Profond&eacute;ment touch&eacute; par le
+t&eacute;l&eacute;gramme que Votre Majest&eacute; a bien voulu
+M'adresser hier, Je M'empresse de La remercier de tout mon coeur.
+Je prie Votre Majest&eacute; d'&ecirc;tre persuad&eacute;e que la
+cordiale sympathie, dont Votre Majest&eacute; est anim&eacute;e
+envers Mon pays, nous est particuli&egrave;rement pr&eacute;cieuse
+et remplit notre &acirc;me de l'espoir que l'avenir de la Serbie
+est assur&eacute; &eacute;tant devenu l'objet de la Haute
+sollicitude de Votre Majest&eacute;. Ces moments p&eacute;nibles ne
+peuvent que raffermir les liens de l'attachement profond qui
+unissent la Serbie &agrave; la sainte Russie slave, et les
+sentiments de reconnaissance &eacute;ternelle pour l'aide et la
+protection de Votre Majest&eacute; seront conserv&eacute;s
+pieusement dans l'&acirc;me de tous les Serbes.</p>
+<p>(Sign&eacute;) Alexandre,</p>
+<p>No. 57.</p>
+<p>Le Charg&eacute; d'Affaires en Serbie au Ministre des Affaires
+Etrang&egrave;res.</p>
+<p><i>(T&eacute;l&eacute;gramme).</i> Nich, le 16/29 Juillet
+1914.</p>
+<p>J'ai communiqu&eacute; &agrave; Pachitch le texte du
+t&eacute;l&eacute;gramme responsif de Sa Majest&eacute; l'Empereur
+an Prince Alexandre. Pachitch apr&egrave;s l'avoir lu, se signa et
+dit: &laquo;Seigneur! Le Tzar est grand et cl&eacute;ment&raquo;!
+Ensuite il m'embrassa, ne pouvant contenir l'&eacute;motion qui
+l'avait gagn&eacute;. L'h&eacute;ritier est attendu &agrave; Nich
+dans la nuit.</p>
+<p>(Sign&eacute;) Strandtman.</p>
+<p>No. 58.</p>
+<p>Le Ministre des Affaires Etrang&egrave;res &agrave;
+l'Ambassadeur en France.</p>
+<p><i>(T&eacute;l&eacute;gramme).</i> St. P&eacute;tersbourg, le
+10/29 Juillet 1914.</p>
+<p>Aujourd'hui l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne m'a communiqu&eacute; la
+r&eacute;solution prise par son gouvernement de mobiliser, si la
+Russie ne cessait pas ses pr&eacute;paratifs militaires. Or, nous
+n'avons commenc&eacute; ces derniers qu'&agrave; la suite de la
+mobilisation &agrave; laquelle avait d&eacute;j&agrave;
+proc&eacute;d&eacute; l'Autriche et vu l'absence &eacute;vidente
+chez cette derni&egrave;re du d&eacute;sir d'accepter un mode
+quelconque d'une solution pacifique de son conflit avec la
+Serbie.</p>
+<p>Puisque nous ne pouvons pas acc&eacute;der au d&eacute;sir de
+l'Allemagne, il ne nous reste que d'acc&eacute;l&eacute;rer nos
+propres armements et de compter avec l'in&eacute;vitabilit&eacute;
+probable de la guerre.&mdash;Veuillez en avertir le Gouvernement
+Fran&ccedil;ais et lui exprimer en m&ecirc;me temps notre
+sinc&egrave;re reconnaissance pour la d&eacute;claration que
+l'Ambassadeur de France m'a faite en son nom en disant que nous
+pouvons compter enti&egrave;rement sur l'appui de notre
+alli&eacute;e de France. Dans les circonstances actuelles cette
+d&eacute;claration nous est particuli&egrave;rement
+pr&eacute;cieuse. Communiqu&eacute; aux Ambassadeurs en Angleterre,
+Autriche-Hongrie, Italie, Allemagne.</p>
+<p>(Sign&eacute;) Sazonow.</p>
+<p>No. 59.</p>
+<p>Le Charg&eacute; d'Affaires en Serbie au Ministre des Affaires
+Etrang&egrave;res.</p>
+<p><i>(T&eacute;l&eacute;gramme).</i> Nich, le 17/30 Juillet
+1914.</p>
+<p>Le Prince-R&eacute;gent a publi&eacute; hier un manifeste
+sign&eacute; par tous les Ministres &agrave; l'occasion de la
+d&eacute;claration de la guerre par l'Autriche &agrave; la Serbie.
+Le manifeste se termine par les paroles suivantes:
+&laquo;D&eacute;fendez de toutes vos forces vos foyers et la
+Serbie&raquo;. Lors de l'ouverture solennelle de la Scouptchina, le
+R&eacute;gent lut en son nom le discours du tr&ocirc;ne, an
+d&eacute;but duquel il indiqua que le lieu de la convocation
+d&eacute;montrait l'importance des &eacute;v&egrave;nements
+actuels. Suit l'expos&eacute; des faits des derniers
+jours&mdash;l'ultimatum autrichien, la r&eacute;ponse serbe, les
+efforts du gouvernement Royal de faire tout ce qui &eacute;tait
+compatible avec la dignit&eacute; de l'Etat pour &eacute;viter la
+guerre et enfin l'agression arm&eacute;e du voisin plus puissant
+contre la Serbie, aux c&ocirc;t&eacute;s de laquelle se tient le
+Mont&eacute;n&eacute;gro. En passant &agrave; l'examen de
+l'attitude des Puissances en pr&eacute;sence du conflit, le Prince
+insista tout d'abord sur les sentiments dont est anim&eacute;e la
+Russie et sur la Toute Gracieuse Communication de sa Majest&eacute;
+l'Empereur disant que la Russie en aucun cas n'abandonnera la
+Serbie. A chaque mention du nom de Sa Majest&eacute;
+Imp&eacute;riale et de la Russie un &laquo;jivio&raquo; formidable
+et f&eacute;brile secouait la salle des s&eacute;ances. Les marques
+de sympathie de la part de la France et de l'Angleterre furent
+aussi relev&eacute;es s&eacute;par&eacute;ment et
+provoqu&egrave;rent des &laquo;jivio&raquo; d'approbation de la
+part des d&eacute;put&eacute;s. Le discours du tr&ocirc;ne se
+termine par la d&eacute;claration d'ouverture de la Scouptchina et
+par l'expression du voeu que toutes les mesures soient prises pour
+faciliter la t&acirc;che du Gouvernement.</p>
+<p>(Sign&eacute;) Strandtman.</p>
+<p>No. 60.</p>
+<p>Le Ministre des Affaires Etrang&egrave;res aux Ambassadeurs en
+Allemagne, en Autriche-Hongrie, en France, en Angleterre, et en
+Italie.</p>
+<p><i>(T&eacute;l&eacute;gramme).</i> St. P&eacute;tersbourg, le
+17/30 Juillet 1914.</p>
+<p>L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne qui vient de me quitter m'a
+demand&eacute; si nous ne pouvions pas nous contenter de la
+promesse que l'Autriche pourrait donner&mdash;de ne pas porter
+atteinte &agrave; l'int&eacute;grit&eacute; du Royaume de
+Serbie&mdash;et indiquer &agrave; quelles conditions nous pourrions
+encore consentir &agrave; suspendre nos armements; je lui ai
+dict&eacute;, pour &ecirc;tre transmise d'urgence &agrave; Berlin,
+la d&eacute;claration suivante: &laquo;Si l'Autriche, reconnaissant
+que la question austro-serbe a assum&eacute; le caract&egrave;re
+d'une question europ&eacute;enne, se d&eacute;clare pr&ecirc;te
+&agrave; &eacute;liminer de son ultimatum les points qui portent
+atteinte aux droits souverains de la Serbie, la Russie s'engage
+&agrave; cesser ses pr&eacute;paratifs militaires.&raquo;</p>
+<p>Veuillez t&eacute;l&eacute;graphier d'urgence quelle sera
+l'attitude du Gouvernement Allemand en pr&eacute;sence de cette
+nouvelle preuve de notre d&eacute;sir de faire le possible pour la
+solution pacifique de la question, car nous ne pouvons pas admettre
+que de semblables pourparlers ne servent qu'&agrave; faire gagner
+du temps &agrave; l'Allemagne et &agrave; l'Autriche pour leurs
+pr&eacute;paratifs militaires.</p>
+<p>(Sign&eacute;) Sazonow.</p>
+<p>No. 61.</p>
+<p>L'Ambassadeur en Allemagne au Ministre des Affaires
+Etrang&egrave;res.</p>
+<p><i>(T&eacute;l&eacute;gramme).</i> Berlin, le 17/30 Juillet
+1914.</p>
+<p>J'apprends que le d&eacute;cret de mobilisation de
+l'arm&eacute;e et de la flotte allemandes vient d'&ecirc;tre
+promulgu&eacute;.</p>
+<p>(Sign&eacute;) Swerb&eacute;ew.</p>
+<p>No. 62.</p>
+<p>L'Ambassadeur en Allemagne au Ministre des Affaires
+Etrang&egrave;res.</p>
+<p><i>(T&eacute;l&eacute;gramme).</i> Berlin, le 17/30 Juillet
+1914.</p>
+<p>Le Ministre des Affaires Etrang&egrave;res vient de me
+t&eacute;l&eacute;phoner pour me communiquer que la nouvelle
+lanc&eacute;e tout &agrave; l'heure de la mobilisation de
+l'arm&eacute;e et de la flotte allemandes est fausse; que les
+feuillets des journaux &eacute;taient imprim&eacute;s d'avance en
+pr&eacute;vision de toutes &eacute;ventualit&eacute;s, et mis en
+vente &agrave; l'heure de l'apr&egrave;s-midi, mais que maintenant
+ils sont confisqu&eacute;s,</p>
+<p>(Sign&eacute;) Swerb&eacute;ew.</p>
+<p>No. 63.</p>
+<p>L'Ambassadeur en Allemagne au Ministre des Affaires
+Etrang&egrave;res.</p>
+<p><i>(T&eacute;l&eacute;gramme).</i> Berlin, le 17/30 Juillet
+1914.</p>
+<p>Ai re&ccedil;u Votre t&eacute;l&eacute;gramme du 16-29 Juillet
+et ai transmis le texte de Votre proposition au Ministre des
+Affaires Etrang&egrave;res que je viens de voir; il m'a dit qu'il
+avait re&ccedil;u un t&eacute;l&eacute;gramme identique de
+l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne &agrave; St.-P&eacute;tersbourg et m'a
+d&eacute;clar&eacute; ensuite qu'il trouvait notre proposition
+inacceptable pour l'Autriche.</p>
+<p>(Sign&eacute;) Swerb&eacute;ew.</p>
+<p>No. 64.</p>
+<p>L'Ambassadeur en Angleterre au Ministre des Affaires
+Etrang&egrave;res.</p>
+<p><i>(T&eacute;l&eacute;gramme).</i> Londres, le 17/30 Juillet
+1914.</p>
+<p>Ai communiqu&eacute; le contenu de Vos t&eacute;l&eacute;grammes
+du 16 et 17 Juillet &agrave; Grey lequel consid&egrave;re la
+situation comme tr&egrave;s s&eacute;rieuse, mais d&eacute;sire
+continuer les pourparlers. J'ai fait observer &agrave; Grey que
+depuis que Vous lui aviez fait la proposition d'accepter tout ce
+qu'il proposerait en faveur du maintien de la paix, pourvu que
+l'Autriche ne p&ucirc;t profiter de ces atermoiements pour
+&eacute;craser la Serbie, la situation dans laquelle Vous vous
+trouviez s'&eacute;tait apparemment modifi&eacute;e. A cette
+&eacute;poque nos rapports avec l'Allemagne n'&eacute;taient pas
+compromis. Apr&egrave;s la d&eacute;claration de l'Ambassadeur
+d'Allemagne &agrave; St.-P&eacute;tersbourg concernant la
+mobilisation allemande, ces rapports avaient chang&eacute; et sa
+demande avait re&ccedil;u de Votre part la seule r&eacute;ponse que
+pouvait donner une grande Puissance. Lorsque l'Ambassadeur
+d'Allemagne &eacute;tait revenu aupr&egrave;s de Vous et
+s'&eacute;tait enquis de Vos conditions, Vous les aviez
+formul&eacute;es dans des circonstances tout-&agrave;-fait
+sp&eacute;ciales. J'ai en m&ecirc;me temps de nouveau
+insist&eacute; aupr&egrave;s de Grey sur la n&eacute;cessit&eacute;
+de prendre en consid&eacute;ration la situation nouvelle
+cr&eacute;&eacute;e par la faute de l'Allemagne &agrave; la suite
+de l'action de l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne. Grey a r&eacute;pondu
+qu'il le comprenait et qu'il tiendrait compte de ces arguments.</p>
+<p>(Sign&eacute;) Benckendorff.</p>
+<p>No. 65.</p>
+<p>L'Ambassadeur en Angleterre au Ministre des Affaires
+Etrang&egrave;res.</p>
+<p><i>(T&eacute;l&eacute;gramme).</i> Londres, le 17/30 Juillet
+1914.</p>
+<p>L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a demand&eacute; &agrave; Grey pour
+quelle raison l'Angleterre prenait des mesures militaires sur terre
+et sur mer. Grey a r&eacute;pondu que ces mesures n'avaient pas un
+caract&egrave;re agressif, mais que la situation &eacute;tait telle
+que chaque Puissance devait se pr&eacute;parer.</p>
+<p>(Sign&eacute;) Benckendorff.</p>
+<p>No. 66.</p>
+<p>L'Ambassadeur en Autriche-Hongrie au Ministre des Affaires
+Etrang&egrave;res.</p>
+<p><i>(T&eacute;l&eacute;gramme).</i> Vienne, le 18/31 Juillet
+1914.</p>
+<p>Malgr&eacute; la mobilisation g&eacute;n&eacute;rale je continue
+&agrave; &eacute;changer des vues avec le Comte Berchtold et ses
+collaborateurs. Tous insistent sur l'absence chez l'Autriche
+d'intentions agressives quelconques contre la Russie et de
+vis&eacute;es de conqu&ecirc;te &agrave; l'&eacute;gard de la
+Serbie, mais tous insistent &eacute;galement sur la
+n&eacute;cessit&eacute; pour l'Autriche de poursuivre jusqu'an bout
+l'action commenc&eacute;e et de donner &agrave; la Serbie une
+le&ccedil;on s&eacute;rieuse qui pourrait constituer une certaine
+garantie pour l'avenir.</p>
+<p>(Sign&eacute;) Sch&eacute;b&eacute;ko.</p>
+<p>No. 67.</p>
+<p>Le Ministre des Affaires Etrang&egrave;res aux Ambassadeurs en
+Allemagne, Autriche-Hongrie, en France, en Angleterre et en
+Italie.[<a href="#note-197">197</a>]</p>
+<p><i>(T&eacute;l&eacute;gramme).</i> St. P&eacute;tersbourg, le
+18/31 Juillet 1914.</p>
+<p>Me r&eacute;f&egrave;re &agrave; mon t&eacute;l&eacute;gramme du
+17/30 Juillet. D'ordre de son gouvernement, l'Ambassadeur
+d'Angleterre m'a transmis le d&eacute;sir du Cabinet de Londres
+d'introduire quelques modifications dans la formule que j'ai
+propos&eacute;e hier &agrave; l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne. J'ai
+r&eacute;pondu que j'acceptais la proposition anglaise. Ci-dessous
+je vous transmets la formule modifi&eacute;e en
+cons&eacute;quence.</p>
+<p>'Si l'Autriche consent &agrave; arr&ecirc;ter la marche de ses
+arm&eacute;es sur le territoire Serbe et si, reconnaissant que le
+conflit austro-serbe &agrave; assum&eacute; le caract&egrave;re
+d'une question d'int&eacute;r&ecirc;t europ&eacute;en, elle admet
+que les Grandes Puissances examinent la satisfaction que la Serbie
+pourrait accorder au gouvernement d'Autriche-Hongrie sans laisser
+porter atteinte &agrave; ses droits d'Etat souverain et &agrave;
+son ind&eacute;pendance,&mdash;la Russie s'engage &agrave;
+conserver son attitude expectante.'</p>
+<p>(Sign&eacute;) Sazonow.</p>
+<p><a name="note-197" id="note-197">
+<!-- Note Anchor 197 --></a>[Footnote 197: The second paragraph is
+printed in the British White Book (<i>Correspondence</i> No.
+132).]</p>
+<p>No. 68.</p>
+<p>L'Ambassadeur en Allemagne au Ministre des Affaires
+Etrang&egrave;res.</p>
+<p><i>(T&eacute;l&eacute;gramme).</i> Berlin, le 18/31 Juillet
+1914.</p>
+<p>Le Ministre des Affaires Etrang&egrave;res vient de me dire que
+nos pourparlers, qui &eacute;taient d&eacute;j&agrave; difficiles
+&agrave; la suite de la mobilisation contre l'Autriche, le
+deviennent encore davantage en pr&eacute;sence des graves mesures
+militaires que nous prenons contre l'Allemagne; des nouvelles y
+relatives sont, d'apr&egrave;s lui, re&ccedil;ues ici de tous les
+c&ocirc;t&eacute;s et devront provoquer in&eacute;vitablement des
+mesures analogues de la part de l'Allemagne. A cela j'ai
+r&eacute;pondu que, d'apr&egrave;s des renseignements s&ucirc;rs
+dont je disposais et qui &eacute;taient confirm&eacute;s par tous
+nos compatriotes arrivant &agrave; Berlin, la prise contre nous des
+mesures susdites se poursuivait &eacute;galement en Allemagne avec
+grande activit&eacute;. Malgr&eacute; cela, le Ministre des
+Affaires Etrang&egrave;res affirme qu'ici on n'a fait que rappeler
+les officiers de leurs cong&eacute;s et les troupes des champs de
+manoeuvres.</p>
+<p>(Sign&eacute;) Swerb&eacute;ew.</p>
+<p>No. 69.</p>
+<p>Le Ministre des Affaires Etrang&egrave;res &agrave;
+l'Ambassadeur en Angleterre.</p>
+<p><i>(T&eacute;l&eacute;gramme).</i> St.-P&eacute;tersbourg, le
+18/31 Juillet 1914.</p>
+<p>J'ai pri&eacute; l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre de transmettre
+&agrave; Grey l'expression de ma plus sinc&egrave;re reconnaissance
+pour le ton amical et ferme dont il a us&eacute; pendant les
+pourparlers avec l'Allemagne et l'Autriche, gr&acirc;ce &agrave;
+quoi l'espoir de trouver une issue pacifique de la situation
+actuelle n'est pas encore perdu.</p>
+<p>Je l'ai aussi pri&eacute; de dire au Ministre Anglais que je
+pensais que ce n'&eacute;tait qu'&agrave; Londres que les
+pourparlers auraient encore quelques chances d'un succ&egrave;s
+quelconque, en facilitant &agrave; l'Autriche la
+n&eacute;cessit&eacute; d'un compromis.</p>
+<p>Communiqu&eacute; &agrave; l'Ambassadeur en France.</p>
+<p>(Sign&eacute;) Sazonow.</p>
+<p>No. 70.</p>
+<p>T&eacute;l&eacute;gramme secret aux Repr&eacute;sentants de Sa
+Majest&eacute; l'Empereur &agrave; l'&eacute;tranger.</p>
+<p>(<i>T&eacute;l&eacute;gramme</i>). Le 19 Juillet/1 Ao&ucirc;t
+1914.</p>
+<p>A minuit l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne m'a d&eacute;clar&eacute;,
+d'ordre de son Gouvernement, que si dans les 12 heures,
+c'est-&agrave;-dire &agrave; midi, Samedi, nous ne commencions pas
+la d&eacute;mobilisation, non seulement &agrave; l'&eacute;gard de
+l'Allemagne, mais aussi &agrave; l'&eacute;gard de l'Autriche, le
+Gouvernement Allemand serait forc&eacute; de donner l'ordre de
+mobilisation. A ma question si c'&eacute;tait la guerre,
+l'Ambassadeur a r&eacute;pondu par la n&eacute;gative, mais en
+ajoutant que nous &eacute;tions fort pr&egrave;s d'elle.</p>
+<p>(Sign&eacute;) Sazonow.</p>
+<p>No. 71.</p>
+<p>L'Ambassadeur en Angleterre au Ministre des Affaires
+Etrang&egrave;res.</p>
+<p><i>(T&eacute;l&eacute;gramme).</i> Londres, 19 Juillet/1
+Ao&ucirc;t 1914.</p>
+<p>Grey m'a dit qu'il a t&eacute;l&eacute;graphi&eacute; &agrave;
+Berlin qu'&agrave; son avis la derni&egrave;re formule
+accept&eacute;e par le Gouvernement Russe constitue la base de
+n&eacute;gociations qui pr&eacute;sente le plus de chances pour une
+solution pacifique du conflict. Il a exprim&eacute; en m&ecirc;me
+temps l'espoir qu'aucune grande Puissance ne commencerait les
+hostilit&eacute;s avant l'examen de cette formule.</p>
+<p>(Sign&eacute;) Benckendorff.</p>
+<p>No. 72.</p>
+<p>L'Ambassadeur eu Angleterre au Ministre des Affaires
+Etrang&egrave;res.</p>
+<p>(<i>T&eacute;l&eacute;gramme</i>). Londres, le 19 Juillet/1
+Ao&ucirc;t 1914.</p>
+<p>Le Gouvernement de la Grande-Bretagne a pos&eacute; aux
+Gouvernements Fran&ccedil;ais et Allemand la question s'ils
+respecteraient la neutralit&eacute; de la Belgique.</p>
+<p>La France a r&eacute;pondu dans I'affirmative, tandis que le
+Gouvernement Allemand a d&eacute;clar&eacute; ne pouvoir
+r&eacute;pondre &agrave; cette question cat&eacute;goriquement.</p>
+<p>(Sign&eacute;) Benckendorff.</p>
+<p>No. 73.</p>
+<p>L'Ambassadeur en France au Ministre des Affaires
+Etrang&egrave;res.</p>
+<p><i>(T&eacute;l&eacute;gramme).</i> Paris, le 19 Juillet/1
+Ao&ucirc;t 1914.</p>
+<p>L'Ambassadeur d'Autriche a visit&eacute; hier Viviani et lui a
+d&eacute;clare que l'Autriche non seulement n'avait pas le dessein
+de porter atteinte &agrave; l'int&eacute;grit&eacute; territoriale
+de la Serbie, mais &eacute;tait pr&ecirc;te &agrave; discuter avec
+les autres Puissances le fond de son conflit avec la Serbie. Le
+Gouvernement Fran&ccedil;ais est tr&egrave;s
+pr&eacute;occup&eacute; par les pr&eacute;paratifs militaires
+extraordinaires de l'Allemagne sur la fronti&egrave;re
+fran&ccedil;aise, car il est convaincu que sous le voile du
+&laquo;Kriegszustand&raquo; se produit une v&eacute;ritable
+mobilisation.</p>
+<p>(Sign&eacute;) Iswolsky.</p>
+<p>No. 74.</p>
+<p>L'Ambassadeur en France au Ministre des Affaires
+Etrang&egrave;res.</p>
+<p><i>(T&eacute;l&eacute;gramme).</i> Paris, le 19 Juillet/1
+Ao&ucirc;t 1914.</p>
+<p>A la r&eacute;ception ici du t&eacute;l&eacute;gramme de
+l'Ambassadeur de France &agrave; St.-Petersbourg contenant la
+communication que Vous a faite l'Ambassadeur Allemand concernant la
+r&eacute;solution de l'Allemagne de d&eacute;cr&eacute;ter
+aujourd'hui la mobilisation g&eacute;n&eacute;rale, le
+Pr&eacute;sident de la R&eacute;publique a sign&eacute; le
+d&eacute;cret de mobilisation. Dans les rues on proc&egrave;de
+&agrave; l'affichage des listes d'appel des r&eacute;servistes.
+L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne vient de rendre visite &agrave; Viviani,
+mais ne lui a fait aucune nouvelle communication, en
+all&eacute;guant l'impossibilit&eacute; de d&eacute;chiffrer les
+t&eacute;l&eacute;grammes qu'il a re&ccedil;us. Viviani l'a
+inform&eacute; de la signature du d&eacute;cret de mobilisation en
+r&eacute;ponse &agrave; la mobilisation allemande et lui a fait
+part de son &eacute;tonnement de ce que l'Allemagne e&ucirc;t pris
+une telle mesure &agrave; un moment o&ugrave; se poursuivait encore
+un &eacute;change de vues amical entre la Russie, l'Autriche et les
+Puissances; il a ajout&eacute; que la mobilisation ne
+pr&eacute;jugeait pas n&eacute;cessairement la guerre et que
+l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne pourrait rester &agrave; Paris comme
+l'Ambassadeur de Russie est rest&eacute; &agrave; Vienne et celui
+d'Autriche &agrave; St.-P&eacute;tersbourg.</p>
+<p>(Sign&eacute;) Iswolsky.</p>
+<p>No. 75.</p>
+<p>L'Ambassadeur en France au Ministre des Affaires
+Etrang&egrave;res.</p>
+<p><i>(T&eacute;l&eacute;gramme).</i> Paris, le 19 Juillet/1
+Ao&ucirc;t 1914.</p>
+<p>Je tiens du Pr&eacute;sident que pendant les derni&egrave;res
+journ&eacute;es l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche a assur&eacute; avec force
+le Pr&eacute;sident du Conseil des Ministres et lui m&ecirc;me, que
+l'Autriche nous aurait d&eacute;clar&eacute; &ecirc;tre pr&ecirc;te
+&agrave; respecter non seulement l'int&eacute;grit&eacute;
+territoriale de la Serbie, mais aussi ses droits souverains, mais
+que nous aurions intentionnellement fait le silence sur cette
+d&eacute;claration. J'ai oppos&eacute; un d&eacute;menti
+cat&eacute;gorique &agrave; cela.</p>
+<p>(Sign&eacute;) Iswolsky.</p>
+<p>No. 76.</p>
+<p>Note remise par l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne &agrave;
+St.-P&eacute;tersbourg le 19 Juillet 1914 &agrave; 7 h. 10 du
+soir.</p>
+<p>Le Gouvernement Imp&eacute;rial s'est efforc&eacute; d&egrave;s
+les d&eacute;buts de la crise de la mener &agrave; une solution
+pacifique. Se rendant &agrave; un d&eacute;sir qui lui en avait
+&eacute;t&eacute; exprim&eacute; par Sa Majest&eacute; l'Empereur
+de Russie, Sa Majest&eacute; l'Empereur d'Allemagne d'accord avec
+l'Angleterre s'&eacute;tait appliqu&eacute; &agrave; accomplir un
+r&ocirc;le m&eacute;diateur aupr&egrave;s des Cabinets de Vienne et
+de St.-P&eacute;tersbourg, lorsque la Russie, sans en attendre le
+r&eacute;sultat, proc&eacute;da &agrave; la mobilisation de la
+totalit&eacute; de ses forces de terre et de mer. A la suite de
+cette mesure mena&ccedil;ante motiv&eacute;e par aucun
+pr&eacute;sage militaire de la part de l'Allemagne, l'Empire
+Allemand s'est trouv&eacute; vis-&agrave;-vis d'un danger grave et
+imminent. Si le Gouvernement Imp&eacute;rial e&ucirc;t
+manqu&eacute; de parer &agrave; ce p&eacute;ril, il aurait
+compromis la s&eacute;curit&eacute; et l'existence m&ecirc;me de
+l'Allemagne. Par cons&eacute;quent le Gouvernement Allemand se vit
+forc&eacute; de s'adresser au Gouvernement de Sa Majest&eacute;
+l'Empereur de Toutes les Russies en insistant sur la cessation
+desdits actes militaires. La Russie ayant refus&eacute; de faire
+droit &agrave; (n'ayant pas cru devoir r&eacute;pondre
+&agrave;[<a href="#note-198">198</a>]) cette demande et ayant
+manifest&eacute; par ce refus (cette attitude [<a href=
+"#note-198">198</a>]) que son action &eacute;tait dirig&eacute;e
+contre I'Allemagne, j'ai l'honneur, d'ordre de mon Gouvernement, de
+faire savoir &agrave; Votre Excellence ce qui suit:</p>
+<p>Sa Majest&eacute; l'Empereur Mon Auguste Souverain au nom de
+l'Empire, relevant le d&eacute;fi se consid&egrave;re en
+&eacute;tat de guerre avec la Russie.</p>
+<p>St.-P&eacute;tersbourg, le 19 Juillet/1 Ao&ucirc;t 1914.</p>
+<p>(Sign&eacute;) F. Pourtal&egrave;s.</p>
+<p><a name="note-198" id="note-198">
+<!-- Note Anchor 198 --></a>[Footnote 198: Les mots plac&eacute;s
+entre parenth&egrave;ses se trouvent dans l'original. Il faut
+supposer que deux variantes avaient &eacute;t&eacute;
+pr&eacute;par&eacute;es d'avance et que par erreur elles out
+&eacute;t&eacute; ins&eacute;r&eacute;es toutes les deux dans la
+note.]</p>
+<p>No. 77.</p>
+<p>Communiqu&eacute; du Ministre des Affaires Etrang&egrave;res
+concernant les &eacute;v&eacute;nements des derniers jours.</p>
+<p>Le 20 Juillet/2 Ao&ucirc;t 1914.</p>
+<p>Un expos&eacute; d&eacute;figurant les &eacute;v&eacute;nements
+des derniers jours ayant paru dans la presse
+&eacute;trang&egrave;re, le Minist&egrave;re des Affaires
+Etrang&egrave;res croit de son devoir de publier l'aper&ccedil;u
+suivant des pourparlers diplomatiques pendant le temps
+susvis&eacute;.</p>
+<p>Le 10/23 Juillet a.c. le Ministre d'Autriche-Hongrie &agrave;
+Belgrade pr&eacute;senta an Ministre Pr&eacute;sident Serbe une
+note o&ugrave; le Gouvernement Serbe &eacute;tait accus&eacute;
+d'avoir favoris&eacute; le mouvement panserbe qui avait abouti
+&agrave; l'assassinat de l'h&eacute;ritier du tr&ocirc;ne
+austro-hongrois. En cons&eacute;quence l'Autriche-Hongrie demandait
+au Gouvernement Serbe non seulement de condamner sous une forme
+solennelle la susdite propagande, mais aussi de prendre, sous le
+contr&ocirc;le de l'Autriche-Hongrie, une s&eacute;rie de mesures
+tendant &agrave; la d&eacute;couverte du complot, &agrave; la
+punition des sujets serbes y ayant particip&eacute; et &agrave; la
+pr&eacute;vention dans l'avenir de tout attentat sur le sol du
+Royaume. Un d&eacute;lai de 48 heures fut fix&eacute; au
+Gouvernement Serbe pour la r&eacute;ponse &agrave; la susdite
+note.</p>
+<p>Le Gouvernement Imp&eacute;rial, auquel l'Ambassadeur
+d'Autriche-Hongrie &agrave; St.-P&eacute;tersbourg avait
+communiqu&eacute; le texte de la note 17 heures apr&egrave;s sa
+remise &agrave; Belgrade, ayant pris connaissance des demandes y
+contenues, dut s'apercevoir que quelques-unes parmi elles
+&eacute;taient inex&eacute;cutables quant an fond, tandis que
+d'autres &eacute;taient pr&eacute;sent&eacute;es sous une forme
+incompatible avec la dignit&eacute; d'un Etat ind&eacute;pendant.
+Trouvant inadmissibles la diminution de la dignit&eacute; de la
+Serbie contenue dans ces demandes, ainsi que la tendance de
+l'Autriche-Hongrie d'assurer sa pr&eacute;pond&eacute;rance dans
+les Balcans d&eacute;montr&eacute;e par ces m&ecirc;mes exigences,
+le Gouvernement Russe fit observer dans la forme la plus amicale
+&agrave; l'Autriche-Hongrie qu'il serait d&eacute;sirable de
+soumettre &agrave; un nouvel examen les points contenus dans la
+note austro-hongroise. Le Gouvernement Austro-Hongrois ne crut
+possible de consentir &agrave; une discussion de la note. L'action
+mod&eacute;ratrice des autres Puissances &agrave; Vienne ne fut non
+plus couronn&eacute;e de succ&egrave;s.</p>
+<p>Malgr&eacute; que la Serbie e&ucirc;t reprouv&eacute; le crime
+et se f&ucirc;t montr&eacute;e pr&ecirc;te &agrave; donner
+satisfaction &agrave; l'Autriche dans une mesure qui d&eacute;passa
+les pr&eacute;visions non seulement de la Russie, mais aussi des
+autres Puissances, le Ministre d'Autriche-Hongrie &agrave; Belgrade
+jugea la r&eacute;ponse serbe insuffisante et quitta cette
+ville.</p>
+<p>Reconnaissant le caract&egrave;re exag&eacute;r&eacute; des
+demandes pr&eacute;sent&eacute;es par l'Autriche, la Russie avait
+d&eacute;clar&eacute; encore auparavant qu'il lui serait impossible
+de rester indiff&eacute;rente, sans se refuser toutefois &agrave;
+employer tous ses efforts pour trouver une issue pacifique qui
+f&ucirc;t acceptable pour l'Autriche et m&eacute;nage&acirc;t son
+amour-propre de grande puissance. En m&ecirc;me temps la Russie
+&eacute;tablit fermement qu'elle admettait une solution pacifique
+de la question seulement dans une mesure qui n'impliquerait pas la
+diminution de la dignit&eacute; de la Serbie comme Etat
+ind&eacute;pendant. Malheureusement tous les efforts
+d&eacute;ploy&eacute;s par le Gouvernement Imp&eacute;rial dans
+cette direction rest&egrave;rent sans effet. Le Gouvernement
+Austro-Hongrois, apr&egrave;s s'&ecirc;tre d&eacute;rob&eacute;
+&agrave; toute intervention conciliatrice des Puissances dans son
+conflit avec la Serbie, proc&eacute;da &agrave; la mobilisation,
+d&eacute;clara officiellement la guerre &agrave; la Serbie, et le
+jour suivant Belgrade fut bombard&eacute;e. Le manifeste qui a
+accompagn&eacute; la d&eacute;claration de guerre accuse
+ouvertement la Serbie d'avoir pr&eacute;par&eacute; et
+ex&eacute;cut&eacute; le crime de Sera&iuml;ewo. Une pareille
+accusation d'un crime de droit commun lanc&eacute;e contre tout un
+peuple et tout un &Eacute;tat attira &agrave; la Serbie par son
+inanit&eacute; &eacute;vidente les larges sympathies des cercles de
+la soci&eacute;t&eacute; europ&eacute;enne.</p>
+<p>A la suite de cette mani&egrave;re d'agir du Gouvernement
+Austro-Hongrois, malgr&eacute; la d&eacute;claration de la Russie
+qu'elle ne pourrait rester indiff&eacute;rente au sort de la
+Serbie, le Gouvernement Imp&eacute;rial jugea n&eacute;cessaire
+d'ordonner la mobilisation des circonscriptions militaires de Kiew,
+d'Odessa, de Moscou et de Kazan. Une telle d&eacute;cision
+s'imposait parce que depuis la date de la remise de la note
+austro-hongroise au Gouvernement Serbe et les premi&egrave;res
+d&eacute;marches de la Russie cinq jours s'&eacute;taient
+&eacute;coul&eacute;s, et cependant le Cabinet de Vienne n'avait
+fait aucun pas pour aller au-devant de nos efforts pacifiques; au
+contraire, la mobilisation de la moiti&eacute; de l'arm&eacute;e
+austro-hongroise avait &eacute;t&eacute;
+d&eacute;cr&eacute;t&eacute;e.</p>
+<p>Le Gouvernement Allemand fut mis au courant des mesures prises
+par la Russie; il lui fut en m&ecirc;me temps expliqu&eacute;
+qu'elles n'&eacute;taient que la cons&eacute;quence des armements
+autrichiens et nullement dirig&eacute;es contre l'Allemagne. En
+m&ecirc;me temps, le Gouvernement Imp&eacute;rial d&eacute;clara
+que la Russie &eacute;tait pr&ecirc;te &agrave; continuer les
+pourparlers en vue d'une solution pacifique du conflit, soit par la
+voie de n&eacute;gociations directes avec le Cabinet de Vienne,
+soit en suivant la proposition de la Grande-Bretagne, par la voie
+d'une Conf&eacute;rence des quatre Grandes Puissances non
+int&eacute;ress&eacute;es directement, voire l'Angleterre, la
+France, l'Allemagne et l'Italie.</p>
+<p>Cependant cette tentative de la Russie &eacute;choua
+&eacute;galement. L'Autriche-Hongrie d&eacute;clina un
+&eacute;change de vues ult&eacute;rieur avec nous, et le Cabinet de
+Vienne se d&eacute;roba &agrave; la participation &agrave; la
+Conf&eacute;rence des Puissances projet&eacute;e.</p>
+<p>N&eacute;anmoins, la Russie ne discontinua pas ses efforts en
+faveur de la paix. R&eacute;pondant &agrave; la question de
+l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne, &agrave; quelles conditions nous
+consentirions encore &agrave; suspendre nos armements, le Ministre
+des Affaires Etrang&egrave;res d&eacute;clara que ces conditions
+seraient la reconnaissance par l'Autriche-Hongrie que la question
+Austro-Serbe avait rev&ecirc;tu le caract&egrave;re d'une question
+europ&eacute;enne, et la d&eacute;claration de cette m&ecirc;me
+Puissance qu'elle consentait &agrave; ne pas insister sur des
+demandes incompatibles avec les droits souverains de la Serbie.</p>
+<p>La proposition de la Russie fut jug&eacute;e par l'Allemagne
+inacceptable pour l'Autriche-Hongrie. Simultan&eacute;ment on
+re&ccedil;ut &agrave; St.-P&eacute;tersbourg la nouvelle de la
+proclamation de la mobilisation g&eacute;n&eacute;rale par
+l'Autriche-Hongrie.</p>
+<p>En m&ecirc;me temps les hostilit&eacute;s continuaient sur le
+territoire Serbe et Belgrade fut bombard&eacute;e derechef.</p>
+<p>L'insucc&egrave;s de nos propositions pacifiques nous obligea
+d'&eacute;largir les mesures de pr&eacute;caution militaires.</p>
+<p>Le Cabinet de Berlin nous ayant adress&eacute; une question
+&agrave; ce sujet, il lui fut r&eacute;pondu que la Russie
+&eacute;tait forc&eacute;e de commencer ses armements pour se
+pr&eacute;munir contre toutes &eacute;ventualit&eacute;s.</p>
+<p>Tout en prenant cette mesure de pr&eacute;caution, la Russie
+n'en discontinuait pas moins de rechercher de toutes ses forces une
+issue de cette situation et d&eacute;clara &ecirc;tre pr&ecirc;te
+&agrave; accepter tout moyen de solution du conflit qui
+comporterait l'observation des conditions pos&eacute;es par
+nous.</p>
+<p>Malgr&eacute; cette communication conciliante, le Gouvernement
+Allemand, le 18/31 Juillet, adressa au Gouvernement Russe la
+demande d'avoir &agrave; suspendre ses mesures militaires &agrave;
+midi du 19 Juillet/ 1 Ao&ucirc;t, en mena&ccedil;ant, dans le cas
+contraire, de proc&eacute;der &agrave; une mobilisation
+g&eacute;n&eacute;rale.</p>
+<p>Le lendemain, 19 Juillet/1 Ao&ucirc;t, l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne
+transmit au Ministre des Affaires Etrang&egrave;res, an nom de son
+Gouvernement, la d&eacute;claration de guerre.</p>
+<p>No. 78.</p>
+<p>Le Ministre des Affaires Etrang&egrave;res aux
+Repr&eacute;sentants de S. M. I'Empereur &agrave;
+l'&eacute;tranger.</p>
+<p>(<i>T&eacute;l&eacute;gramme</i>). St.-P&eacute;tersbourg, le 20
+Juillet/2 Ao&ucirc;t 1914.</p>
+<p>Il est absolument clair que l'Allemagne s'efforce d&egrave;s
+&agrave; pr&eacute;sent de rejeter sur nous la
+responsabilit&eacute; de la rupture. Notre mobilisation a
+&eacute;t&eacute; provoqu&eacute;e par l'&eacute;norme
+responsabilit&eacute; que nous aurions assum&eacute;e, si nous
+n'avions pas pris toutes les mesures de pr&eacute;caution &agrave;
+un moment o&ugrave; l'Autriche, se bornant &agrave; des pourparlers
+d'un caract&egrave;re dilatoire, bombardait Belgrade et
+proc&eacute;dait &agrave; une mobilisation
+g&eacute;n&eacute;rale.</p>
+<p>Sa Majest&eacute; l'Empereur s'&eacute;tait engag&eacute;
+vis-&agrave;-vis de l'Empereur d'Allemagne par sa parole &agrave;
+n'entreprendre aucun acte agressif tant que dureraient les
+pourparlers avec l'Autriche. Apr&egrave;s une telle garantie et
+apr&egrave;s toutes les preuves de l'amour de la Russie pour la
+paix, l'Allemagne ne pouvait ni avait le droit de douter de notre
+d&eacute;claration que nous accepterions avec joie toute issue
+pacifique compatible avec la dignit&eacute; et
+l'ind&eacute;pendance de la Serbie. Une autre issue, tout en
+&eacute;tant compl&egrave;tement incompatible avec notre propre
+dignit&eacute;, aurait certainement &eacute;branl&eacute;
+l'&eacute;quilibre Europ&eacute;en assurant
+l'h&eacute;g&eacute;monie de l'Allemagne. Ce caract&egrave;re
+Europ&eacute;en, voire mondial, du conflit est infiniment plus
+important que le pr&eacute;texte qui l'a cr&eacute;&eacute;. Par sa
+d&eacute;cision de nous d&eacute;clarer la guerre &agrave; un
+moment o&ugrave; se poursuivaient les n&eacute;gociations entre les
+Puissances, l'Allemagne a assum&eacute; une lourde
+responsabilit&eacute;.</p>
+<p>(Sign&eacute;) Sazonow.</p>
+<p>No. 79.</p>
+<p>Note remise par l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie &agrave;
+St.-P&eacute;tersbourg au Ministre des Affaires Etrang&egrave;res
+le 24 Juillet &agrave; 6 h. du soir.</p>
+<p>D'ordre de son Gouvernement le soussign&eacute; Ambassadeur
+d'Autriche-Hongrie a l'honneur de notifier &agrave; Son Excellence
+Monsieur le Ministre des Affaires Etrang&egrave;res de Russie ce
+qui suit:</p>
+<p>&laquo;Vu l'attitude mena&ccedil;ante prise par la Russie dans
+le conflit entre la Monarchie Austro-Hongroise et la Serbie et en
+pr&eacute;sence du fait qu'en suite de ce conflit la Russie,
+d'apr&egrave;s une communication du Cabinet de Berlin, a cru devoir
+ouvrir les hostilit&eacute;s contre l'Allemagne et que celle-ci se
+trouve par cons&eacute;quent en &eacute;tat de guerre avec ladite
+Puissance, l'Autriche-Hongrie se consid&egrave;re &eacute;galement
+en &eacute;tat de guerre avec la Russie &agrave; partir du
+pr&eacute;sent moment.</p>
+<p>(Sign&eacute;) Sz&aacute;p&aacute;ry. St.-P&eacute;tersbourg. 6
+Ao&ucirc;t/24 Juillet 1914.</p>
+<hr class="full" />
+<p>***END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK WHY WE ARE AT WAR (2ND EDITION, REVISED)***</p>
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+</pre>
+</body>
+</html>
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+The Project Gutenberg eBook, Why We Are At War (2nd Edition, revised), by
+Members of the Oxford Faculty of Modern History
+
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+
+
+
+Title: Why We Are At War (2nd Edition, revised)
+
+Author: Members of the Oxford Faculty of Modern History
+
+Release Date: January 23, 2004  [eBook #10809]
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: US-ASCII
+
+
+***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK WHY WE ARE AT WAR (2ND EDITION,
+REVISED)***
+
+
+E-text prepared by Jonathan Ingram, David King, and the Project Gutenberg
+Online Distributed Proofreading Team
+
+
+
+WHY WE ARE AT WAR
+
+GREAT BRITAIN'S CASE
+
+With an Appendix of Original Documents including the Authorized English
+Translation of the White Book issued by the German Government
+
+Second Edition Revised (fourth impression)
+containing the Russian Orange Book
+
+BY
+
+MEMBERS OF THE OXFORD FACULTY OF MODERN HISTORY
+
+1914
+
+
+
+
+
+
+PREFACE
+
+
+We are not politicians, and we belong to different schools of political
+thought. We have written this book to set forth the causes of the
+present war, and the principles which we believe to be at stake. We have
+some experience in the handling of historic evidence, and we have
+endeavoured to treat this subject historically. Our fifth chapter, which
+to many readers will be the most interesting, is founded upon first-hand
+evidence--the documents contained in the British White Book
+(Parliamentary Paper, Cd. 7467; hereafter cited as _Correspondence
+respecting the European Crisis_), and the German White Book, which is an
+official apology, supplemented by documents. The German White Book, as
+being difficult of access, we have printed _in extenso_. It exists in
+two versions, a German and an English, both published for the German
+Government. We have reproduced the English version without correcting
+the solecisms of spelling and expression. From the English White Book we
+have reprinted, in the second appendix, a small selection of the more
+significant documents; many more are quoted in the body of our work.
+
+Our thanks are due to Sir H. Erle Richards, Chichele Professor of
+International Law and Diplomacy; and to Mr. W.G.S. Adams, Gladstone
+Professor of Political Theory and Institutions, for valuable suggestions
+and assistance.
+
+The sole responsibility for the book rests, however, with those who sign
+this Preface.
+
+Any profits arising from the sale of this work will be sent to the
+Belgian Relief Fund, as a mark of sympathy and respect for the Belgian
+nation, and especially for the University of Louvain.
+
+E. BARKER
+H. W. C. DAVIS
+C. R. L. FLETCHER
+ARTHUR HASSALL
+L. G. WICKHAM LEGG
+F. MORGAN
+
+
+
+
+Preface to Second Edition
+
+
+By the courtesy of His Excellency the Russian Ambassador we are now able
+to print in an appendix (No. VI) those documents contained in the
+Russian Orange Book which have not been already published in the German
+and the British White Books. In the light of the evidence afforded by
+the Russian Orange Book, we have modified one or two sentences in this
+edition.
+
+21 September, 1914.
+
+
+
+
+CONTENTS
+
+
+TABLE OF DATES
+
+CHAPTER I
+
+THE NEUTRALITY OF BELGIUM AND LUXEMBURG
+
+Belgian neutrality--The origin of Belgium--England and the smaller
+Powers--The Treaty of 1839--Belgium's independence and neutrality.--The
+neutrality of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg--Its origin--The Treaty of
+1867--The collective guarantee.--The strategic importance of
+Belgium--German plans long suspected.
+
+
+CHAPTER II
+
+THE GROWTH OF ALLIANCES AND THE RACE OF ARMAMENTS SINCE 1871
+
+Introduction--The Triple Alliance--Bismarck's dismissal--French colonial
+advance---Germany's demands for compensations--The Anglo-French
+agreement concerning Morocco--German objections--England and Russia--The
+Agadir incident--Anglo-French exchange of notes--Disputes in the
+Balkans--The 'Boulanger Law' of 1886--Count Caprivi's law of
+1893--Franco-Russian _entente_--German military preparations--France's
+response--Russia's reorganization--England's Army and Navy.
+
+Note. _Abstract of Anglo-French Agreement on Morocco_.
+
+
+CHAPTER III
+
+THE DEVELOPMENT OF RUSSIAN POLICY
+
+Estrangement of Russia and Germany--Austria and the Balkans--German
+penetration through the Balkans--Servia and Russia--Germany and the
+Slavs--Russia and England.
+
+
+CHAPTER IV
+
+CHRONOLOGICAL SKETCH OF THE CRISIS OF 1914
+
+Diary of the Events leading to the War.
+
+
+CHAPTER V
+
+NEGOTIATORS AND NEGOTIATIONS
+
+Dramatis personae. Sec. _Germany's attitude to Russia and
+Austria_--Presentation of the Austrian Note to Servia--Germany shields
+Austria--Conduct of Germany considered--Sir Edward Grey proposes
+mediation, and then a Conference of Four Powers--Germany's objections to
+a 'Conference'--Direct conversations between the Powers--Austria invited
+to suspend military action--Mobilization; on whom does responsibility
+lie?--War inevitable. Sec 2. _Germany's attitude to France_--Germany
+accuses France of military preparations--Germany invades France. Sec 3.
+_The question of British neutrality_--Possibility of England being
+involved--Germany warned--German 'bid for British neutrality'--England's
+refusal--France agrees, and Germany refuses, to respect Belgian
+neutrality--Prince Lichnowsky and Sir Edward Grey--Neutrality of
+Luxemburg violated--Germany demands a free passage through Belgium--Sir
+Edward Grey protests--Belgium invaded--England's ultimatum--The Imperial
+Chancellor urges necessity of Germany's action. Sec 4. _England and
+Servia_--Sir Edward Grey realizes Russia's interest in Servia--He is
+only concerned for the peace of Europe--He urges mediation--He proposes
+a Conference. Sec 5. _Great Britain declines 'solidarity' with Russia and
+France_--Proposals by MM. Sazonof and Poincare--England's refusal--Was
+it wise?--The Austrian _dossier_. Sec 6. _Italy's comments on the
+situation_--Significance of Italy's position--Italy's endeavours to
+prevent war--Italy's declaration of neutrality.
+
+Note. Abstract of Austro-Hungarian note to Servia, and Servians reply.
+
+
+CHAPTER VI
+
+THE NEW GERMAN THEORY OF THE STATE
+
+The principles of _raison d'etat_ and the rule of law--Treitschke's
+teaching--The results of this philosophy--Contempt for public law--The
+glorification of war--The philosophy pagan--Its adoption by Prussian
+soldiers and Government--A plea for Prussia--England fights for law.
+
+
+EPILOGUE
+
+
+
+APPENDIXES
+
+I. THE GERMAN WHITE BOOK
+
+II. EXTRACTS FROM SIR EDWARD GREY'S CORRESPONDENCE RESPECTING THE
+EUROPEAN CRISIS
+
+III. EXTRACT FROM THE DISPATCH FROM HIS MAJESTY'S AMBASSADOR AT BERLIN
+RESPECTING THE RUPTURE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE GERMAN
+GOVERNMENT
+
+IV. THE CRIME OF SERAJEVO
+
+V. EXTRACT FROM THE DISPATCH FROM HIS MAJESTY'S AMBASSADOR AT VIENNA
+RESPECTING THE RUPTURE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN
+GOVERNMENT
+
+VI. EXTRACTS FROM THE RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK
+
+
+
+
+CHIEF DATES
+
+
+1648 Jan. The Treaty of Munster.
+     Oct. The Treaty of Westphalia.
+1713 April. The Treaty of Utrecht.
+1772 First Partition of Poland.
+1783 William of Nassau becomes Grand Duke of Luxemburg.
+1788 July. The Triple Alliance of England, Holland, and Prussia.
+1789 The French Revolution begins.
+1792 Nov. 6. Battle of Jemappes.  French Conquest of the Austrian
+     Netherlands and Liege.
+     Nov. 19. French decree offering 'freedom to all nations'.
+     Dec. 15. Compulsory freedom declared.
+1793 Jan. Second Partition of Poland.
+     Feb. 1. Declaration of War by France against England and Holland.
+1795 Third Partition of Poland.
+1801 Feb. 9. The Treaty of Luneville. France guarantees the
+     independence of Holland (then called 'Batavian Republic').
+1802 Mar. 27. The Treaty of Amiens.
+1803 Mar. 13. Napoleon's famous interview with Lord Whitworth.
+     May 12. Declaration of War by England against France.
+1814 Mar. 1. The Treaty of Chaumont.
+     May 30. The First Peace of Paris.
+     Sept. 29. Opening of the Congress of Vienna.
+1815 Mar-June. The Hundred Days.
+     May 31. Belgium and Luxemburg placed under the Prince of Orange as
+     King of the United Netherlands.
+     Nov. 20. The Second Peace of Paris.
+1830 Revolutions in France (July) and in Belgium (Aug.).
+1830-1878 Servia autonomous.
+1831 Nov. 15. Independence and Neutrality of Belgium guaranteed by
+     England, Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia.
+1839 April 19. Final recognition of the Independence and Neutrality of
+     Belgium by the above-named Powers.
+1867 May 11. European guarantee of the Neutrality of Luxemburg.
+     Declaration by Lord Stanley and Lord Clarendon.
+1870 Aug. 9. Independence and Neutrality of Belgium again guaranteed
+     by Germany and France.
+1871 May 10. The Treaty of Frankfort.
+1872 The _Dreikaiserbund_; Alliance of Russia, Germany, and
+     Austria.
+1875 Threatened attack on France by Germany prevented by
+     Russia and England.
+1878 The Treaty of Berlin.
+     Proclamation of Servian Independence under King Milan.
+1879 Secret Treaty between Germany and Austria.
+1883 Triple Alliance between Germany, Austria, and Italy.
+1885 Formation of United Bulgaria.
+     War between Bulgaria and Servia.
+1886 Peace between Bulgaria and Servia.
+1890 Fall of Bismarck. Cession of Heligoland to Germany.
+1891 Beginning of an understanding between Russia and France.
+1893 Caprivi's Army Act.
+1896 Germany begins to show aggressive tendencies in the field
+     of Colonial Expansion.
+     Treaty between England and France regarding their interests
+     in Indo-China.
+     Definite Alliance between Russia and France.
+1898 Reconquest of the Sudan.
+     Tsar's rescript for an International Peace Conference.
+1899 Anglo-French Agreement respecting Tripoli.
+     June. First Peace Conference at the Hague.
+     New German Army Act.
+1902 Anglo-Japanese Alliance.
+     The Peace of Vereeniging closes the South African War.
+1903 Revolution in Belgrade.
+1904 April. The Treaty of London between England and France
+     with regard to North Africa.
+1905 Mar. Visit of the German Emperor to Tangier.
+     June. Germany demands the dismissal of M. Delcasse.
+     Aug. The Treaty of Portsmouth between Russia and Japan.
+     Renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.
+     German Army Act.
+     Sept. France agrees to the holding of the Algeeiras
+     Conference.
+1907 Agreement between Russia and England concerning Persia,
+     Afghanistan, and Tibet.
+     June-Oct. Second Peace Conference at the Hague.
+1908 Young Turk Revolution in Constantinople.
+     Oct. Annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria.
+     German Navy Law.
+1909 Mar. Servia declares she will no longer protest against the
+     annexation of Bosnia by Austria.
+1909 Mr. Asquith's speech on necessity for increasing the Navy.
+1910 The Potsdam interview between the Tsar and the Kaiser.
+1911 European Crisis over the question of Morocco, followed by a
+     closer Anglo-French _entente_.
+     German Army Act.
+1912 Sensational German Army Bill.
+     War in the Balkans.
+     Nov. 26. German Navy construction estimates L11,416,700.
+     Dec. 29. Peace Conference of Balkan States with Turkey broken off.
+1913 Jan. 17. M. Poincare elected French President.
+     Jan. 23. The Young Turkish Party overthrow the Government at
+     Constantinople.
+     May 26. Peace made between Turkey and the Balkan States.
+     May 28. The New German Army Bill passes the Budget Committee of
+     the Reichstag.
+     June 20. Universal military service in Belgium.
+     June 26. Conference between the French President, the French
+     Foreign Minister, and Sir Edward Grey.
+     June 30. Bulgaria is attacked by Servia and Greece.
+     New German Army Bill.
+     July. Roumania attacks Bulgaria.
+     The Turks re-occupy Adrianople.
+     New Russian Army Bill.
+     French Army Bill.
+     Aug. 6. The Treaty of Peace between Bulgaria, Servia, Greece, and
+     Roumania.
+     Sept. 22. The Treaty of Peace between Bulgaria and Turkey.
+     Oct. 20. Servia at Austria's demand abandons Albania.
+     Austrian War Fund increased.
+1914 Attacks by the German Press upon France and Russia.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER 1
+
+
+THE NEUTRALITY OF BELGIUM AND LUXEMBURG
+
+I
+
+The kingdom of Belgium is a comparatively new creation, but the idea of
+a Belgian nation is older than the kingdom. Historically and
+geographically the kingdom has no doubt an artificial character; its
+boundaries have been determined by the Great Powers and cut across the
+ancient provinces of the Netherlands. And it must be added that its
+population is heterogeneous both in race and language. These facts,
+however, in no sense diminish the legal rights of Belgium as a nation.
+She is a sovereign state by the same charter as Italy or Greece; and for
+the convenience of Europe she has been solemnly declared a neutral
+state, endowed with special privileges but burdened with corresponding
+obligations. While those privileges were maintained--and they have been
+rigidly maintained for more than eighty years--the Belgian people
+punctually fulfilled their obligations; and, because they have declined
+to betray Europe by becoming the dependant of a powerful neighbour, or
+by participating in the violation of European public law, their country
+is a wilderness of smoking ruins.
+
+In the tremendous and all but crushing ordeal of August, 1914, Belgium
+has proved that she possesses other titles to existence and respect than
+those afforded by treaties, by the mutual jealousies of neighbours, or
+by the doctrines of international law. She has more than satisfied the
+tests which distinguish the true from the fictitious nationality. Those
+who have hitherto known Belgium only as a hive of manufacturing and
+mining industry, or as a land of historic memories and monuments, are
+now recognizing, with some shame for their past blindness, the moral and
+spiritual qualities which her people have developed under the aegis of a
+European guarantee. It is now beyond dispute that, if Belgium were
+obliterated from the map of Europe, the world would be the poorer and
+Europe put to shame. The proofs which Belgium has given of her
+nationality will never be forgotten while liberty has any value or
+patriotism any meaning among men. We cannot do less than echo the
+general sentiment of admiration for a constancy to national ideals which
+has left Belgium at the mercy of Huns less forgivable than those of
+Attila. But the case against her oppressor is not to be founded solely
+or mainly on her peculiar merits. In a special sense it rests upon the
+legal rights and duties with which she has been invested for the
+convenience of her neighbours and for the welfare of the European state
+system. It was in their interest, rather than her own, that the Great
+Powers made her a sovereign independent state. As such she is entitled,
+equally with England or with Germany, to immunity from unprovoked
+attack. But the Powers which made her a sovereign state, also, and for
+the same reasons of convenience, made her a neutral state. She was
+therefore debarred from consulting her own safety by making alliances
+upon what terms she would. She could not lawfully join either of the two
+armed camps into which Europe has fallen since the year 1907. And, if
+she had been as contemptible as she is actually the reverse, she would
+still be entitled to expect from England and from every other of her
+guarantors the utmost assistance it is in their power to give. In
+fighting for Belgium we fight for the law of nations; that is,
+ultimately, for the peace of all nations and for the right of the weaker
+to exist.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+The provinces which now constitute the kingdom of Belgium--with the
+exception of the bishopric of Liege, which was until 1795 an
+ecclesiastical principality--were known in the seventeenth century as
+the Spanish, in the eighteenth as the Austrian, Netherlands. They
+received the first of these names when they returned to the allegiance
+of Philip II, after a short participation in the revolt to which Holland
+owes her national existence. When the independence of Holland was
+finally recognized by Spain (1648), the Spanish Netherlands were
+subjected to the first of the artificial restrictions which Europe has
+seen fit to impose upon them. The Dutch monopoly of navigation in the
+Scheldt was admitted by the Treaty of Muenster (1648), and Antwerp was
+thus precluded from developing into a rival of Amsterdam. In the age of
+Louis XIV the Spanish Netherlands were constantly attacked by France,
+who acquired at one time or another the chief towns of Artois and
+Hainault, including some which have lately come into prominence in the
+great war, such as Lille, Valenciennes, Cambray, and Maubeuge. The bulk,
+however, of the Spanish Netherlands passed at the Treaty of Utrecht to
+Austria, then the chief rival of France on the Continent. They passed
+with the reservation that certain fortresses on their southern border
+were to be garrisoned jointly by the Dutch and the Austrians as a
+barrier against French aggression. This arrangement was overthrown at
+the French Revolution. The French annexed the Austrian Netherlands and
+Liege in November, 1792; and immediately afterwards threw down a
+gauntlet to England by opening to all nations the navigation of the
+Scheldt. This, and the threatened French attack on Holland, her ally,
+drew England into conflict with the Revolution; for, first, Antwerp in
+French hands and as an open port would be a dangerous menace; and
+secondly, the French had announced a new and anarchic doctrine hostile
+to all standing treaties: 'Our reasons are that the river takes its rise
+in France and that a nation which has obtained its liberty cannot
+recognize a system of feudalism, much less adhere to it'.[1] The answer
+of William Pitt, which in effect declared war upon the Revolution,
+contains a memorable statement of the attitude towards public law which
+England held then, as she holds it to-day: 'With regard to the Scheldt
+France can have no right to annul existing stipulations, unless she also
+have the right to set aside equally the other treaties between all
+Powers of Europe and all the other rights of England and her allies....
+England will never consent that France shall arrogate the power of
+annulling at her pleasure and under the pretence of a pretended natural
+right, of which she makes herself the only judge, the political system
+of Europe, established by solemn treaties and guaranteed by the consent
+of all the Powers'.[2]
+
+This was not our attitude in the case of Belgium only. It was an
+attitude which we adopted with regard to all the minor Powers of Western
+Europe when they were threatened by Napoleon. On precisely the same
+grounds England defended in 1803 the independence of Holland, a
+commercial rival if an old political ally, and of Switzerland, where she
+had no immediate interests to protect. By the Treaty of Luneville
+(February, 1801) France and Austria had mutually guaranteed the
+independence of the Batavian Republic and the right of the Dutch to
+adopt whatever form of government seemed good to them. In defiance of
+these stipulations Napoleon maintained a garrison in Holland, and forced
+upon her a new Constitution which had been prepared in Paris (November,
+1801). Identical stipulations had been made for the Helvetian Republic
+and had been similarly violated. Early in 1803 England demanded that the
+French should evacuate Holland and Switzerland: to which Napoleon
+replied that 'Switzerland and Holland are mere trifles'. His interview
+with the English Ambassador on March 13, 1803, has many points of
+resemblance with the now famous interview of August 4, 1914, between Sir
+Edward Goschen and Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg. The First Consul then, like
+the Imperial Chancellor to-day, was unable, or professed himself unable,
+to understand why Great Britain should insist upon the observance of
+treaties.
+
+To return to Belgium. It became apparent in the Napoleonic Wars that
+Belgium and Holland were individually too weak to protect themselves or
+the German people against an aggressive French Government. The allies
+therefore, in the year 1813, handed over to Holland the Austrian
+Netherlands and the bishopric of Liege in order 'to put Holland in a
+position to resist attack until the Powers could come to its aid'. This
+arrangement was ratified at the Treaty of Chaumont (1814). As there was
+no government or visible unity in the Belgian provinces after the
+retirement of the French, the union with Holland, originally suggested
+by Lord Castlereagh, seemed reasonable enough. It gave the Belgians the
+great privilege of freely navigating the Scheldt. It was confirmed at
+the Congress of Vienna, and the new kingdom of the United Netherlands
+was declared neutral by the common consent of the Powers.
+
+But the events of the years 1815-1830 proved conclusively that this
+union was unsatisfactory to the Belgian population. The Belgians
+complained that they were not allowed their just share of influence and
+representation in the legislature or executive. They resented the
+attempt to impose the Dutch language and Dutch Liberalism upon them.
+They rose in revolt, expelled the Dutch officials and garrisons, and
+drew up for themselves a monarchical and parliamentary constitution.
+Their aspirations aroused much sympathy both in England and in France.
+These two countries induced the other Great Powers (Austria, Prussia,
+Russia) to recognize the new kingdom as an independent neutral state.
+This recognition was embodied in the Treaty of the Twenty-Four Articles
+signed at London in October, 1831; and it was not too generous to the
+aspirations of Belgian nationality. Since the Belgians had been defeated
+in the field by Holland and had only been rescued by a French army, they
+were obliged to surrender their claims upon Maestricht, parts of
+Luxemburg, and parts of Limburg. Some time elapsed before this
+settlement was recognized by Holland. But at length this last guarantee
+was obtained; and the Treaty of London, 1839, finally established the
+international status of Belgium. Under this treaty both her independence
+and her neutrality were definitely guaranteed by England, France,
+Austria, Prussia, and Russia.
+
+We have recently been told by the Imperial Chancellor that the Treaty of
+1839 is nothing but 'a scrap of paper'. It is therefore desirable to
+point out that Bismarck made full use of it in 1870 to prevent England
+from supporting the cause of France. It was with this object that he
+published the proposal alleged to have been made to him by the French
+representative, Benedetti, in 1866, that Prussia should help France to
+acquire Belgium as a solace for Prussian annexations in Northern
+Germany. Then, as now, England insisted upon the Treaty of 1839. The
+result was that, on the instance of Lord Granville, Germany and France
+entered into an identic treaty with Great Britain (Aug. 1870) to the
+effect that, if either belligerent violated Belgian territory, Great
+Britain would co-operate with the other for the defence of it. The
+treaty was most strictly construed. After the battle of Sedan (Sept.
+1870) the German Government applied to Belgium for leave to transport
+the German wounded across Belgian territory. France protested that this
+would be a breach of neutrality and Belgium refused.
+
+Such is the history of the process by which Belgium has acquired her
+special status. As an independent state she is bound by the elementary
+principle of the law of nations, that a neutral state is bound to refuse
+to grant a right of passage to a belligerent. This is a well-established
+rule, and was formally affirmed by the Great Powers at the Hague Peace
+Conference of 1907. The fifth Article of the Convention [3] then drawn
+up respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in War
+on Land runs as follows:--
+
+  'A neutral power ought not to allow on its territory any of
+  the acts referred to in Articles 2 to 4'.
+
+Of the Articles thus specified the most important is No. 2:--
+
+  'Belligerents are forbidden to move across the territory of
+  a neutral power troops or convoys, either of munitions of war
+  or supplies'.
+
+By the Treaty of London the existence of Belgium is contingent upon her
+perpetual neutrality:--
+
+  'ARTICLE VII. Belgium within the limits specified in
+  Articles I, II, and IV shall form an independent and perpetually
+  neutral state. It shall be bound to observe such
+  neutrality towards all other states'.[4]
+
+It is unnecessary to elaborate further the point of law. That, it seems,
+has been admitted by the Imperial Chancellor before the German
+Reichstag. What is necessary to remember is that, in regard to Belgium,
+Germany has assumed the position which the Government of the French
+Revolution adopted towards the question of the Scheldt, and which
+Napoleon adopted towards the guaranteed neutrality of Switzerland and
+Holland. Now, as then, England has special interests at stake. The
+consequences of the oppression or the extinction of the smaller
+nationalities are bound to excite peculiar alarm in England. In
+particular she cannot forget how she would be menaced by the
+establishment of a militarist state in Belgium. But since in England's
+case the dangers and uncertainties of a state of things in which Might
+is treated as Right are particularly apparent, it is only to be expected
+that she should insist with special emphasis upon the sanctity of
+treaties, a sanctity which in the long run is as necessary to the
+strongest nation as to the weakest. If treaties count for nothing, no
+nation is secure so long as any imaginable combination of Powers can
+meet it in battle or diplomacy on equal terms; and the stronger nations
+must perforce fight one another to the death for the privilege of
+enslaving civilization. Whether the progress of such a competition would
+be a trifling evil, whether the success of any one among such
+competitors would conduce to the higher interests of humanity, impartial
+onlookers may debate if they please. England has answered both these
+questions with an unhesitating negative.
+
+
+II
+
+Under existing treaty law the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg stands for all
+practical purposes in the same legal position as its northern neighbour;
+and the ruler of Luxemburg has protested against the German invasion[5]
+of her territory no less emphatically than King Albert, though with less
+power of giving expression in action to her just resentment. If the
+defence of Belgium has appealed more forcibly to the ordinary
+Englishman, it is because he is more familiar with the past history of
+Belgium and sees more clearly in her case the ultimate issues that are
+involved in the German violation of her rights. As the following
+narrative will show, the neutrality of Luxemburg was guaranteed in the
+interests and at the instance of the Prussian state, as a protection
+against French aggression. The legal case could not be clearer, and it
+might perhaps be asked why the attack on Luxemburg, which preceded that
+on Belgium, was not treated by this country as a _casus belli_.
+England's attitude towards Luxemburg is that which she has consistently
+adopted towards those smaller states of Europe which lie outside the
+reach of naval power. It is an attitude which she has maintained in the
+case of Servia even more clearly than in that of Luxemburg. England
+holds herself bound to exert her influence in procuring for the smaller
+states of Europe equitable treatment from their more powerful
+neighbours. But the duty of insisting upon equitable treatment falls
+first upon those Powers whose situation enables them to support a
+protest by effective action. Just as Servia is the special concern of
+Russia, so Luxemburg must look to France in the first instance for
+protection against Germany, to Germany if she is assailed from the
+French side. In either case we should hold ourselves bound to exercise
+our influence, but not as principals. Any other course would be
+impossibly quixotic, and would only have the effect of destroying our
+power to help the states within our reach.
+
+       *       *       *       *       *
+
+The Grand Duchy of Luxemburg was a revival of an ancient state which had
+lost its existence during the French Revolution. Although it was placed
+under the rule of the King of the Netherlands, a descendant of its
+former sovereign, it was not incorporated in his kingdom, but retained
+its own identity and gave to its ruler the secondary title of Grand Duke
+of Luxemburg. The position it occupied after 1815 was in some ways
+anomalous; for lying as it did between the Meuse and the Rhine, and
+possessing in the town of Luxemburg a fortress whose natural strength
+some competent critics reckoned as second only to that of Gibraltar
+among the fortresses of Europe, it was considered to be an indispensable
+link in the chain of defences of Germany against French aggression. Not
+being able to trust the Dutch to hold this great fortress against the
+French, the Congress of Vienna laid down as a principle that all land
+between the Meuse and the Rhine must be held by Prussian troops on
+behalf of the newly formed Germanic Confederation. Thus Luxemburg was
+held by Prussian troops on behalf of this foreign confederation, and
+over this garrison the only right allowed to the Grand Duke, the
+sovereign of the country, was that of nominating the governor.
+
+This strange state of affairs was not modified by the Belgian Revolution
+of 1830; for though more than half the Grand Duchy threw in its lot with
+Belgium to form the modern province of Belgian Luxemburg, the Grand
+Duchy, confined to its modern limits, still contained the great fortress
+with its garrison of Prussian troops. It is not surprising that, under
+these circumstances, the Grand Duchy joined the Prussian _Zollverein_,
+and so drew nearer to Germany, in spite of the independent character of
+its inhabitants, who have strenuously resisted any attempt at absorption
+into Germany. France naturally continued to cast envious eyes upon the
+small state with the powerful citadel, but no opportunity presented
+itself for reopening the question until 1866.
+
+In that year Napoleon III had anticipated that the war between Prussia
+and Italy on one side and Austria and the small German states on the
+other would be long and exhausting, and would end in France imposing
+peace on the weary combatants with considerable territorial advantage to
+herself. His anticipation was entirely falsified; the war lasted only
+seven weeks and Prussia emerged victorious and immensely strengthened by
+the absorption of several German states and by the formation of the
+North German Confederation under her leadership. This, the first
+shattering blow which the French Emperor's diplomatic schemes had
+received, led him to demand compensation for the growth of Prussian
+power, and one of his proposals was the cession of Luxemburg to France.
+
+This suggestion had some legal plausibility quite apart from the
+question of the balance of power. For the Prussian garrison held
+Luxemburg in the name of the German Confederation, which had been
+destroyed by the war of 1866; and, the authority to which the garrison
+owed its existence being gone, it was only logical that the garrison
+should go too. After much demur Count Bismarck acknowledged the justice
+of the argument (April, 1867), but it did not by any means follow that
+the French should therefore take the place vacated by the Prussians. At
+the same time the fortress could not be left in the hands of a weak
+Power as a temptation for powerful and unscrupulous neighbours. The
+question of Luxemburg was therefore the subject discussed at a Congress
+held in London in the following May.
+
+Here the Prussians showed themselves extremely politic and reasonable.
+Realizing that, with the advance of artillery, the great rock-fortress
+no longer had the military value of earlier days, they not only raised
+no objections to the evacuation of Luxemburg by their troops, but in the
+Congress it was they who proposed that the territory of the Grand Duchy
+should be neutralized 'under the collective guarantee of the Powers'.[6]
+A treaty was therefore drawn up on May 11, 1867, of which the second
+article ran as follows:--
+
+    'The Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, within the Limits determined by the
+    Act annexed to the Treaties of the 19th April, 1839, under the
+    Guarantee of the Courts of Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia,
+    and Russia, shall henceforth form a perpetually Neutral State.
+
+    'It shall be bound to observe the same Neutrality towards all other
+    States.
+
+    'The High Contracting Parties engage to respect the principle of
+    Neutrality stipulated by the present Article.
+
+    'That principle is and remains placed under the sanction of the
+    collective Guarantee of the Powers signing as Parties to the present
+    Treaty, with the exception of Belgium, which is itself a Neutral
+    State'.[7]
+
+The third article provided for the demolition of the fortifications of
+Luxemburg and its conversion into an open town, the fourth for its
+evacuation by the Prussian garrison, and the fifth forbade the
+restoration of the fortifications.
+
+Such then was the treaty guaranteeing the neutrality of Luxemburg, which
+was proposed, it may be observed, by Prussia herself; but, until the
+treaty was broken by the very Power which had proposed the neutrality,
+only one incident need be noted in the history of the country, namely,
+the part it played in the war of 1870-1. On December 3, 1870, Count
+Bismarck issued from Versailles a circular to the Prussian Ambassadors,
+calling attention to the fact that both the French and the Luxemburgers
+had violated the neutrality of the Grand Duchy, mainly by giving
+facilities for French soldiers to return to France. Precautions were
+taken by the Prussian Government on the frontier to prevent such abuses
+occurring in the future, and as no violation of the neutrality of
+Luxemburg was committed by the Prussians, the neutral co-guarantors were
+satisfied with the Prussian attitude, and the subject dropped. At the
+end of the war, M. Thiers vainly attempted to obtain Luxemburg as
+compensation for the loss of Metz.
+
+In accordance with the Family Compact of 1783, the Grand Duchy passed on
+the death of the late King of Holland to Prince William of Nassau, on
+whose death the present Grand Duchess succeeded to her father's throne.
+
+There is one point in the Treaty of 1867 which calls for special
+comment. The neutrality of the Grand Duchy is 'placed under the
+collective guarantee of the Powers signing'. The phrase originally
+proposed by Count Bismarck was 'the formal and individual guarantee of
+the Powers,' and it was altered at the instance of the English Foreign
+Minister, Lord Stanley. The phrase actually adopted was suggested by the
+Russian diplomat, Baron Brunnow, and was accepted both by England and by
+Prussia. Lord Stanley's objection had been based upon the fear that
+England might incur an unlimited liability to assist Luxemburg
+single-handed if all other Powers failed to meet their obligations. In
+other words, Luxemburg might have been used as the infallible means of
+dragging us into every and any war which might arise between Germany and
+France. From that danger we were protected by Lord Stanley's objection;
+as the case stands the treaty gives us, in his own words, 'a right to
+make war, but would not necessarily impose the obligation,' should
+Luxemburg be attacked. To this doctrine a reference will be found in the
+British White Paper (No. 148), where Sir Edward Grey informs M. Cambon
+of 'the doctrine' concerning Luxemburg, 'laid down by Lord Derby and
+Lord Clarendon in 1867'. It may also be observed that two of the
+co-guarantors of the Treaty of 1867, namely Italy and Holland, have also
+not thought it necessary to make the violation of Luxemburg a _casus
+belli_.
+
+
+III
+
+It is evident to all who study closely the map of France that her
+eastern frontier falls into two sharply contrasted divisions, the
+north-eastern which reaches from the sea to the valley of the Sambre,
+and the south-eastern which extends from that river to, and along the
+Swiss boundary. The former is flat country, easy for military
+operations; the latter is mountainous, intersected with many deep
+valleys. After the loss of Alsace-Lorraine, the French set to work to
+rectify artificially the strategical weakness of their frontier; and in
+a chain of fortresses behind the Vosges Mountains they erected a rampart
+which has the reputation of being impregnable. This is the line Belfort,
+Epinal, Toul, Verdun. A German attack launched upon this line without
+violating neutral territory would have to be frontal, for on the north
+the line is covered by the neutral states of Belgium and Luxemburg,
+while on the south, although the gap between the Vosges and the Swiss
+frontier apparently gives a chance of out-flanking the French defences,
+the fortress of Belfort, which was never reduced even in the war of
+1870-1, was considered too formidable an obstacle against which to
+launch an invading army. A rapid advance on Paris was therefore deemed
+impossible if respect were to be paid to the neutrality of Belgium and
+Luxemburg, and it was for this purely military reason that Germany has
+to-day violated her promises to regard the neutrality of these states.
+This was frankly admitted by Herr von Jagow to Sir Edward Goschen: 'if
+they had gone by the more southern route they could not have hoped, in
+view of the paucity of roads and the strength of the fortresses, to have
+got through without formidable opposition entailing great loss of
+time'.[8]
+
+In the case of Belgium a very easy road was afforded into French
+territory up the Valley of the Meuse, past Liege and thence into France
+past Namur and through what is known as the Gap of Namur. A German army
+could debouch into France through this gap the more easily inasmuch as
+the French, relying on the neutrality of these two states, had not
+strongly fortified the frontier from the sea to Maubeuge. Moreover, as
+the country to the west of the Sambre was very easy country for
+manoeuvring and furnished with good roads and railways, it was reckoned
+that the formidable French lines to the south could be turned in this
+manner, and the German army could march upon Paris from the north-east.
+
+As to Luxemburg, plainly it could not in such a scheme remain neutral.
+It would lie between the two wings of the German army, and controlling
+as it did the roads to Brussels, Metz, and Aix-la-Chapelle, it could not
+be allowed to cause such inconvenience as to prevent easy communication
+between one portion of the German army and another.
+
+That such a plan was contemplated by the Germans has been for some years
+past a matter of common knowledge in England; and it has been also a
+matter of common opinion that the attempt to execute this plan would
+involve the active resistance of the British forces, to whom the duty
+was supposed to have been assigned of acting on the left flank of the
+French opposing the entry of the Germans from Belgian territory. The
+plea therefore that has been put forward that the British have now dealt
+the Germans 'a felon's blow' can only be put forward by persons who are
+either ignorant or heedless of what has been a matter of casual
+conversation all over England these last three years; and Sir Edward
+Grey himself was so convinced that the German Government knew what the
+consequences of a violation of Belgian neutrality would be that he
+informed Sir Francis Bertie on July 31st that the 'German Government do
+not expect our neutrality'.[9] There has been no secret about it
+whatever. It is incredible that the excitement and surprise of the
+Imperial Chancellor on the receipt of the ultimatum of August 4th should
+have been genuine, seeing that it involves miscalculation or
+misinformation entirely incompatible with what we know of the
+thoroughness of German methods. At the time of the Agadir crisis the
+military situation was the same, and the German War Office knew quite
+well what our part would then have been. Surprise at such action on our
+part in 1914 is little else than comedy, and can only have been
+expressed in order to throw the blame of German aggression on to the
+shoulders of Great Britain.
+
+This argument that Great Britain has taken the aggressive falls to the
+ground entirely when it is confronted with the hard facts of chronology.
+Far from attacking the Germans, we were so anxious to keep the peace
+that we were actually three days late in our mobilization to join the
+French on their left wing; and had it not been for the defence offered
+by Liege, our scruples would have gravely imperilled the common cause.
+For it was not until we were certain that Germany had committed what was
+tantamount to an act of war against us, by invading the neutral state of
+Belgium, that we delivered the ultimatum which led to the war.
+
+Notes:
+
+[Footnote 1: Cam. Mod. Hist. viii 301.]
+
+[Footnote 2: Ibid. 304.]
+
+[Footnote 3: Printed by A. Pearce Higgins, _The Hague Peace
+Conferences_, pp. 281-9.]
+
+[Footnote 4: The entire treaty will be found in Hertslet, _Map of Europe
+by Treaty_, vol. ii, pp. 979-98.]
+
+[Footnote 5: _Correspondence respecting the European Crisis_, (Cd.
+7467), No. 147. Minister of State, Luxemburg, to Sir E. Grey, Aug. 2.]
+
+[Footnote 6: Edward Hertslet, _The Map of Europe by Treaty_, vol. iii,
+p. 1806, no. 406. 'Proposal of _Prussia_ of Collective Guarantee by
+Powers of Neutrality of _Luxemburg_, London, 7th May, 1867.']
+
+[Footnote 7: Hertslet, _ut sup._, vol. iii, p. 1803. The High
+Contracting Powers were Great Britain, Austria, France, Belgium, Italy,
+the Netherlands, Prussia, and Russia.]
+
+[Footnote 8: _Dispatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin
+respecting the rupture of diplomatic relations with the German
+Government_ (Cd. 7445), Miscellaneous, no. 8, 1914.]
+
+[Footnote 9: _Correspondence respecting the European Crisis_, p. 62, no.
+116. July 31, 1914. See also _infra_ pp. 82 _et seqq_.]
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER II
+
+
+THE GROWTH OF ALLIANCES AND THE RACE OF ARMAMENTS SINCE 1871
+
+Even at the risk of being tedious it is essential that we should sketch
+in outline the events which have produced the present grouping of
+belligerent states, and the long-drawn-out preparations which have
+equipped them for conflict on this colossal scale. To understand why
+Austria-Hungary and Germany have thrown down the glove to France and
+Russia, why England has intervened not only as the protector of Belgium,
+but also as the friend of France, we must go back to the situation
+created by the Franco-German War. Starting from that point, we must
+notice in order the formation of the Triple Alliance between Germany,
+Austria-Hungary, and Italy, of the Dual Alliance between France and
+Russia, of the Anglo-French and the Anglo-Russian understandings. The
+Triple Alliance has been the grand cause of the present situation; not
+because such a grouping of the Central European Powers was
+objectionable, but because it has inspired over-confidence in the two
+leading allies; because they have traded upon the prestige of their
+league to press their claims East and West with an intolerable disregard
+for the law of nations. Above all it was the threatening attitude of
+Germany towards her Western neighbours that drove England forward step
+by step in a policy of precautions which, she hoped, would avert a
+European conflagration, and which her rivals have attempted to represent
+as stages in a Machiavellian design to ruin Germany's well-being. These
+precautions, so obviously necessary that they were continued and
+expanded by the most pacific Government which England has seen since Mr.
+Gladstone's retirement, have taken two forms: that of diplomatic
+understandings, and that of naval preparations. Whichever form they have
+taken, they have been adopted in response to definite provocations, and
+to threats which it was impossible to overlook. They have been strictly
+and jealously measured by the magnitude of the peril immediately in
+view. In her diplomacy England has given no blank cheques; in her
+armaments she has cut down expenditure to the minimum that, with
+reasonable good fortune, might enable her to defend this country and
+English sea-borne trade against any probable combination of hostile
+Powers.
+
+Let us consider (1) the development of the diplomatic situation since
+1870, (2) the so-called race of armaments since 1886.
+
+The Treaty of Frankfort (May 10, 1871), in which France submitted to the
+demands of the new-born German Empire, opened a fresh era of European
+diplomacy and international competition. The German Empire became at
+once, and has ever since remained, the predominant Power in Western
+Europe. The public opinion of this new Germany has been captured to no
+small extent by the views of such aggressive patriots as Treitschke, who
+openly avowed that 'the greatness and good of the world is to be found
+in the predominance there of German culture, of the German mind, in a
+word of the German character'. The school of Treitschke looked for the
+establishment of a German world-empire, and held that the essential
+preliminary to this scheme would be the overthrow of France and England.
+But until 1890, that is to say so long as Prince Bismarck remained
+Chancellor, no such ambitious programme was adopted by the German
+Government. Bismarck was content to strengthen the position of the
+Empire and to sow disunion among her actual or suspected enemies. In
+1872 he brought about a friendly understanding with Austria and Russia,
+the other two great Powers of Eastern Europe, the so-called
+_Dreikaiserbuendnis_, which was designed to perpetuate the _status quo_.
+But the friendship with Russia quickly cooled; it received a sharp
+set-back in 1875, when the Tsar Alexander II came forward rather
+ostentatiously to save France from the alleged hostile designs of
+Germany; it was certainly not improved when Bismarck in his turn
+mediated between Russia and her opponents at the Congress of Berlin
+(1878). On the other hand, a common interest in the Eastern Question
+drew closer the bonds between Germany and Austria. The latter felt
+herself directly menaced by the Balkan policy of Russia; the former was
+not prepared to see her southern neighbour despoiled of territory. Hence
+in 1879 was initiated that closer union between Germany and Austria
+which has been so largely responsible for the present situation. The
+Treaty of 1879, which was kept secret until 1887, was purely defensive
+in its character; but the terms showed that Russia was the enemy whom
+both the contracting Powers chiefly feared. Neither was bound to active
+measures unless the other should be attacked by Russia, or any Power
+which had Russian support. In 1882 the alliance of the two great German
+Powers was joined by Italy--a surprising development which can only be
+explained on the ground of Italy's feeling that she could not hope for
+security at home, or for colonial expansion in the Mediterranean, so
+long as she remained in isolation. The Triple Alliance so constituted
+had a frail appearance, and it was hardly to be expected that Italy
+would receive strong support from partners in comparison with whose
+resources her own were insignificant. But the Triple Alliance has
+endured to the present day, the most permanent feature of the diplomatic
+system of the last thirty-two years. Whether the results have been
+commensurate with the sacrifices of sentiment and ambition which Italy
+has made, it is for Italy to judge. On the whole she has been a sleeping
+partner in the Alliance; its prestige has served almost exclusively for
+the promotion of Austrian and German aims; and one of its results has
+been to make Austria a formidable rival of Italy in the Adriatic.
+
+Meanwhile the remaining Great Powers of Europe had continued, as Prince
+Bismarck hoped, to pursue their separate paths, though England was on
+friendly terms with France and had, equally with Russia, laboured to
+avert a second Franco-German War in 1875. After 1882 the English
+occupation of Egypt constituted for some years a standing grievance in
+the eyes of France. The persistent advance of Russia in Asia had in like
+manner been a source of growing apprehension to England since 1868; and,
+for a long time after the Treaty of Berlin, English statesmen were on
+the watch to check the growth of Russian influence in the Balkans. But
+common interests of very different kinds were tending to unite these
+three Powers, not in any stable alliance, even for mutual defence, but
+in a string of compacts concluded for particular objects.
+
+One of these interests was connected with a feeling that the policy of
+the principal partners in the Triple Alliance, particularly that of
+Germany, had become incalculable and was only consistent in periodic
+outbursts of self-assertiveness, behind which could be discerned a
+steady determination to accumulate armaments which should be strong
+enough to intimidate any possible competitor. The growth of this feeling
+dates from the dismissal of Prince Bismarck by the present Kaiser.
+Bismarck had sedulously courted the friendship of Russia, even after
+1882. He entered in fact into a defensive agreement with Russia against
+Austria. While he increased the war strength of the army, he openly
+announced that Germany would always stand on the defensive; and he
+addressed a warning to the Reichstag against the 'offensive-defensive'
+policy which was even then in the air, though it was still far from its
+triumph:--
+
+    'If I were to say to you, "We are threatened by France and Russia;
+    it is better for us to fight at once; an offensive war is more
+    advantageous to us," and ask for a credit of a hundred millions, I
+    do not know whether you would grant it--I hope not.'[10]
+
+But Bismarck's retirement (1890) left the conduct of German policy in
+less cautious hands. The defensive alliance with Russia was allowed to
+lapse; friction between the two Powers increased, and as the result
+Germany found herself confronted with the Dual Alliance of France and
+Russia, which gradually developed, during the years 1891-6, from a
+friendly understanding into a formal contract for mutual defence. There
+is no doubt that this alliance afforded France a protection against that
+unprovoked attack upon her eastern frontier which she has never ceased
+to dread since 1875; and it has yet to be proved that she ever abused
+the new strength which this alliance gave her.
+
+It is only in the field of colonial expansion that she has shown
+aggressive tendencies since 1896; and even here the members of the
+Triple Alliance have never shown serious cause for a belief that France
+has invaded their lawful spheres of interest. Her advance in Morocco was
+permitted by Italy and Spain; her vast dominion in French West Africa
+has been recognized by treaties with Germany and England; in East Africa
+she has Madagascar, of which her possession has never been disputed by
+any European Power; her growing interests in Indo-China have impinged
+only upon an English sphere of interest and were peacefully defined by
+an Anglo-French Agreement of 1896. France has been the competitor, to
+some extent the successful competitor, of Germany in West Africa, where
+she partially envelops the Cameroons and Togoland. But the German
+Government has never ventured to state the French colonial methods as a
+_casus belli_. That the German people have viewed with jealousy the
+growth of French power in Africa is a notorious fact. Quite recently, on
+the eve of the present war, we were formally given to understand that
+Germany, in any war with France, might annex French colonies[11]; and it
+is easy to see how such an object would reconcile the divergent policies
+of the German military and naval experts.
+
+Up to the eve of the present war Great Britain has consistently refused
+to believe that Germany would be mad enough or dishonest enough to enter
+on a war of aggression for the dismemberment of colonial empires. German
+diplomacy in the past few weeks has rudely shattered this conviction.
+But up to the year 1914 the worst which was generally anticipated was
+that she would pursue in the future on a great scale the policy, which
+she has hitherto pursued on a small scale, of claiming so-called
+'compensations' when other Powers succeeded in developing their colonial
+spheres, and of invoking imaginary 'interests' as a reason why the
+efforts of explorers and diplomatists should not be allowed to yield to
+France their natural fruits of increased colonial trade. It is not our
+business to impugn or to defend the partition of Africa, or the methods
+by which it has been brought about. But it is vital to our subject that
+we should describe the methods by which Germany has endeavoured to
+intimidate France at various stages of the African question. The trouble
+arose out of a Moroccan Agreement between England and France, which was
+the first definite proof that these two Powers were drifting into
+relations closer than that of ordinary friendship.
+
+In 1904 England and France settled their old quarrel about Egypt. France
+recognized the English occupation of Egypt; England, on her side,
+promised not to impede the extension of French influence in Morocco. It
+was agreed that neither in Egypt nor in Morocco should there be a
+political revolution; and that in both countries the customs tariff
+should make no distinction between one nation and another. This compact
+was accompanied by a settlement of the old disputes about French fishing
+rights in Newfoundland, and of more recent difficulties concerning the
+frontiers between French and English possessions in West Africa.[12] The
+whole group formed a step in a general policy, on both sides, of healing
+local controversies which had little meaning except as instruments of
+diplomatic warfare. The agreement regarding Egypt and Morocco is
+distinguished from that concerning West Africa and Newfoundland in so
+far as it recognizes the possibility of objections on the part of other
+Powers. It promised mutual support in the case of such objections; but
+not the support of armed force, only that of diplomatic influence.
+
+At the moment of these agreements Count Buelow told the Reichstag that
+Germany had no objection, as her interests were in no way imperilled by
+them. Later, however, Germany chose to regard the Moroccan settlement as
+an injury or an insult or both. In the following year the Kaiser made a
+speech at Tangier (March, 1905) in which he asserted that he would
+uphold the important commercial and industrial interests of Germany in
+Morocco, and that he would never allow any other Power to step between
+him and the free sovereign of a free country. It was subsequently
+announced in the German Press that Germany had no objection to the
+Anglo-French Agreement in itself, but objected to not having been
+consulted before it was arranged. This complaint was met, on the part of
+France, by the retirement of M. Delcasse, her Minister of Foreign
+Affairs, and by her assent to an International Conference regarding
+Morocco. The Conference met at Algeciras, and German pretensions were
+satisfied by an international Agreement.[13] It is to be observed that
+in this Conference the original claims of Germany were opposed, not only
+by Russia, from whom she could hardly expect sympathy, but even by
+Italy, her own ally. When Germany had finally assented to the Agreement,
+her Chancellor, in flat contradiction with his previous utterance 'that
+German interests were in no way imperilled by it', announced that
+Germany had been compelled to intervene by her economic interests, by
+the prestige of German policy, and by the dignity of the German Empire.
+
+The plain fact was that Germany, soon after the conclusion of the
+Anglo-French agreements, had found herself suddenly delivered from her
+preoccupations on the side of Russia, and had seized the opportunity to
+assert herself in the West while Russia was involved in the most
+critical stage of her struggle with Japan. But this war came to an end
+before the Convention of Algeciras had begun; and Russia, even in the
+hour of defeat and internal revolutions, was still too formidable to be
+overridden, when she ranged herself beside her Western ally.
+
+Of the part which England played in the Moroccan dispute there are
+different versions. What is certain is that she gave France her
+diplomatic support. But the German Chancellor officially acknowledged,
+when all was over, that England's share in the Anglo-French Agreement
+had been perfectly correct, and that Germany bore England no ill-will
+for effecting a _rapprochement_ with France. Still there remained a
+strong impression, not only in England and France, that there had been
+on Germany's part a deliberate intention to test the strength of the
+Anglo-French understanding and, if possible, to show France that England
+was a broken reed.
+
+It is not surprising that under these circumstances England has taken,
+since 1906, the precaution of freeing herself from any embarrassments in
+which she had previously been involved with other Powers. In 1905 she
+had shown her goodwill to Russia by exercising her influence to moderate
+the terms of the settlement with Japan. This was a wise step, consonant
+alike with English treaty-obligations to Japan and with the interests of
+European civilization. It led naturally to an amicable agreement with
+Russia (1907) concerning Persia, Afghanistan, and Tibet, the three
+countries which touch the northern borders of our Indian Empire. It
+cannot be too strongly emphasized that this agreement was of a local
+character, exactly as was that with France; that our friendly
+understandings with France and with Russia were entirely separate; and
+that neither related to the prosecution of a common policy in Europe;
+unless indeed the name of a policy could be given to the precaution,
+which was from time to time adopted, of permitting consultations between
+the French and English military experts. It was understood that these
+consultations committed neither country to a policy of common
+action.[14] England was drifting from her old attitude of 'splendid
+isolation'; but she had as yet no desire to involve herself, even for
+defensive purposes, in such a formal and permanent alliance as that
+which had been contracted by Germany, Austria, and Italy.
+
+But her hand was forced by Germany in 1911. Again the question of
+Morocco was made to supply a pretext for attacking our friendship with
+France. The German occupation of Agadir had, and could have, only one
+meaning. It was 'fastening a quarrel on France on a question that was
+the subject of a special agreement between France and us'.[15] The
+attack failed in its object. War was averted by the prompt action of the
+British Government. Mr. Asquith[16] announced that Great Britain, in
+discussing the Moroccan question, would have regard to British
+interests, which might be more directly involved than had hitherto been
+the case, and also to our treaty obligations with France. Somewhat later
+Mr. Asquith announced that if the negotiations between France and
+Germany did not reach a satisfactory settlement, Great Britain would
+become an active party to the discussion.[17] The nature of British
+interests were appropriately defined by Mr. Lloyd George in a Guildhall
+speech as consisting in the peace of the world, the maintenance of
+national honour, and the security of international trade.[18] The last
+phrase was a significant reference to the fact that Agadir, though
+valueless for commercial purposes, might be invaluable to any Power
+which desired to molest the South Atlantic trade routes. No one doubted
+then, or doubts to-day, that England stood in 1911 on the brink of a war
+which she had done nothing to provoke.
+
+The situation was saved in 1911 by the solidarity of England and France.
+Two Powers, which in the past had been separated by a multitude of
+prejudices and conflicting ambitions, felt at last that both were
+exposed to a common danger of the most serious character. Hence a new
+phase in the Anglo-French _entente_, which was cemented, not by a
+treaty, but by the interchange of letters between the English Secretary
+for Foreign Affairs (Sir Edward Grey) and the French Ambassador in
+London (M. Paul Cambon). On November 22, 1912, Sir Edward Grey[19]
+reminded M. Cambon of a remark which the latter had made, 'that if
+either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a
+third Power, it might become essential to know whether it could in that
+event depend on the armed assistance of the other.' Sir Edward Grey
+continued:--'I agree that if either Government had grave reason to
+expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, or something that
+threatened the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the
+other whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression
+and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would be prepared
+to take in common. If these measures involved action, the plans of the
+General Staffs would at once be taken into consideration, and the
+Governments would then decide what effect should be given to them.'
+
+M. Cambon replied on the following day that he was authorized to accept
+the arrangement which Sir E. Grey had offered.[20]
+
+The agreement, it will be seen, was of an elastic nature. Neither party
+was bound to co-operate, even diplomatically, with the other. The
+undertaking was to discuss any threatening situation, and to take common
+measures if both agreed to the necessity; there was an admission that
+the agreement might result in the conduct of a joint defensive war upon
+a common plan. Such an understanding between two sovereign states could
+be resented only by a Power which designed to attack one of them without
+clear provocation.
+
+The date at which these notes were interchanged is certainly
+significant. In November, 1912, the Balkan Allies were advancing on
+Constantinople, and already the spoils of the Balkan War were in
+dispute. Servia incurred the hostility of Austria-Hungary by demanding
+Albania and Adriatic ports; and the Dual Monarchy announced that it
+could never accept this arrangement. Behind Servia Austrian statesmen
+suspected the influence of Russia; it was, they said, a scheme for
+bringing Russia down to a sea which Austria regarded as her own
+preserve. Austria mobilized her army, and a war could hardly have been
+avoided but for the mediation of Germany and England. If England had
+entertained the malignant designs with which she is credited in some
+German circles, nothing would have been easier for her than to fan the
+flames, and to bring Russia down upon the Triple Alliance. The notes
+show how different from this were the aims of Sir Edward Grey. He
+evidently foresaw that a war between Austria and Russia would result in
+a German attack upon France. Not content with giving France assurance of
+support, he laboured to remove the root of the evil. A congress to
+settle the Balkan disputes was held at London in December, 1912; and it
+persuaded Servia to accept a reasonable compromise, by which she
+obtained commercial access to the Adriatic, but no port. This for the
+moment pacified Austria and averted the world-war. To whom the solution
+was due we know from the lips of German statesmen. The German Chancellor
+subsequently (April 7, 1913) told the Reichstag:--
+
+    'A state of tension had for months existed between Austria-Hungary
+    and Russia which was only prevented from developing into war by the
+    moderation of the Powers.... Europe will feel grateful to the
+    English Minister of Foreign Affairs for the extraordinary ability
+    and spirit of conciliation with which he conducted the discussion of
+    the Ambassadors in London, and which constantly enabled him to
+    bridge over differences.'
+
+The Chancellor concluded by saying: 'We at any rate shall never stir up
+such a war'--a promise or a prophecy which has been singularly
+falsified.
+
+It is no easy matter to understand the line of conduct which Germany has
+adopted towards the great Slavonic Power on her flank. Since Bismarck
+left the helm, she has sometimes steered in the direction of
+subservience, and sometimes has displayed the most audacious insolence.
+Periodically, it is to be supposed, her rulers have felt that in the
+long run the momentum of a Russian attack would be irresistible; at
+other times, particularly after the Russo-Japanese War, they have
+treated Russia, as the Elizabethans treated Spain, as 'a colossus
+stuffed with clouts.' But rightly or wrongly they appear to have assumed
+that sooner or later there must come a general Armageddon, in which the
+central feature would be a duel of the Teuton with the Slav; and in
+German military circles there was undoubtedly a conviction that the epic
+conflict had best come sooner and not later. How long this idea has
+influenced German policy we do not pretend to say. But it has certainly
+contributed to her unenviable prominence in the 'race of armaments'
+which all thinking men have condemned as an insupportable, tax upon
+Western civilization, and which has aggravated all the evils that it was
+intended to avert.
+
+The beginning of the evil was perhaps due to France; but, if so, it was
+to a France which viewed with just alarm the enormous strides in
+population and wealth made by Germany since 1871. The 'Boulanger Law' of
+1886 raised the peace footing of the French army above 500,000 men, at a
+time when that of Germany was 427,000, and that of Russia 550,000.
+Bismarck replied by the comparatively moderate measure of adding 41,000
+to the German peace establishment for seven years; and it is significant
+of the difference between then and now that he only carried his Bill
+after a dissolution of one Reichstag and a forcible appeal to its
+successor.
+
+France must soon have repented of the indiscretion to which she had been
+tempted by a military adventurer. With a population comparatively small
+and rapidly approaching the stationary phase it was impossible that she
+could long maintain such a race. In 1893 Count Caprivi's law, carried
+like that of Bismarck after a stiff struggle with the Reichstag, raised
+the peace establishment to 479,000 men. Count Caprivi at the same time
+reduced the period of compulsory service from three years to two; but
+while this reform lightened the burden on the individual conscript, it
+meant a great increase in the number of those who passed through
+military training, and an enormous increase of the war strength. The
+Franco-Russian _entente_ of 1896 was a sign that France began to feel
+herself beaten in the race for supremacy and reduced to the defensive.
+In 1899 the German peace strength was raised to 495,000 for the next six
+years; in 1905 to 505,000. On the second of these occasions the German
+Government justified its policy by pointing out that the French war
+strength was still superior to that of Germany, and would become still
+stronger if France should change the period of service from three years
+to two. The German law was announced in 1904; it had the natural effect.
+The French Senate not only passed the new law early in 1905, but also
+swept away the changes which the Lower House had introduced to lighten
+the burden of annual training upon territorial reserves. France found
+her justification in the Moroccan episode of the previous year.
+
+This was not unreasonable; but since that date France has been heavily
+punished for a step which might be taken to indicate that _Revanche_ was
+still a feature of her foreign policy. Since 1886 her utmost efforts
+have only succeeded in raising her peace establishment to 545,000
+(including a body of 28,000 colonial troops stationed in France), and
+her total war strength to 4,000,000. In the same period the peace
+establishment of Germany was raised to over 800,000, and her total war
+strength of fully trained men to something like 5,400,000. It is obvious
+from these figures that a policy of isolation has long ceased to be
+possible to France; and that an alliance with Russia has been her only
+possible method of counterbalancing the numerical superiority of the
+German army, which is certainly not less well equipped or organized than
+that of France.
+
+This Russian alliance of France has been the only step in her
+continental policy which could be challenged as tending to overthrow the
+European balance. Undoubtedly it is France's prime offence in German
+eyes; and her colonial policy has only been attacked as a pretext for
+picking a quarrel and forcing on a decisive trial of strength before the
+growth of Russian resources should have made her ally impregnable.
+
+Let us now look at the German military preparations from a German point
+of view. The increases of the last twenty years in military expenditure
+and in fighting strength have been openly discussed in the Reichstag;
+and the debates have usually run on the same lines, because the
+Government up to 1912 pursued a consistent policy, framed for some years
+ahead and embodied in an Army Act. The underlying principle of these
+Army Acts (1893, 1899, 1905, 1911) was to maintain a fairly constant
+ratio between the peace strength and the population. But the war
+strength was disproportionately increased by the Caprivi Army Act of
+1893, which reduced the period of compulsory service from three years to
+two. The hardly-veiled intention of the German War Staff was to increase
+its war resources as rapidly as was consistent with the long-sufferance
+of those who served and those who paid the bill. It was taken as
+axiomatic that an increasing population ought to be protected by an
+increasing army. National defence was of course alleged as the prime
+consideration; and if these preparations were really required by growing
+danger on the two main frontiers of Germany, no German could do
+otherwise than approve the policy, no foreign Power could feel itself
+legitimately aggrieved.
+
+Unfortunately it has been a maxim of German policy in recent years that
+national independence means the power of taking the aggressive in any
+case where national interests or _amour-propre_ may prompt it. The
+increase of the German army, either in numbers or in technical
+efficiency, seems to be regularly followed by masterful strokes of
+diplomacy in which the 'mailed fist' is plainly shown to other
+continental Powers. Thus in 1909, at the close of a quinquennium of
+military re-equipment, which had raised her annual army budget from
+L27,000,000 to L41,000,000, Germany countenanced the Austrian annexation
+of Bosnia and the Herzegovina, and plainly told the authorities at St.
+Petersburg that any military action against Austria would bring Russia
+into a state of war with Germany. It was a startling step; _radix
+malorum_ we may call it, so far as the later development of the
+continental situation is concerned. Russia withdrew from the impending
+conflict in 1909, but it is improbable that she has ever forgiven the
+matter or the manner of the German ultimatum.
+
+In 1911 followed the episode of Agadir, which was clearly an attempt to
+'force a quarrel on France.' But in 1911 Germany realized that her
+military calculations had been insufficient, if she wished to continue
+these unamiable diplomatic manners. It was not a question of
+self-preservation; it was a question, as the German Chancellor told the
+Reichstag, of showing the world that 'Germany was firmly resolved not to
+be pushed aside.' Hence the sensational Army Bill of 1912, necessitated,
+as the Government told the Reichstag, by the events of 1911. The Russian
+peril could hardly be described as imminent. The Prussian Minister of
+War said publicly in 1911 that 'there was no Government which either
+desired or was seeking to bring about a war with Germany.' Russia had
+recently taken steps which, at Berlin, perhaps, were read as signs of
+weakness, but elsewhere were hailed as proofs of her desire for general
+peace. M. Isvolsky, the supposed champion of Balkan ideals, had retired
+from office; his successor, M. Sazonof, had accompanied the Czar to the
+Potsdam interview (1910); the outstanding disputes of Germany and Russia
+over their Persian interests had been settled by agreement in 1911.
+
+But the German Army Bill of 1912 was followed by Russia's intervention
+in the Balkans to secure for Servia at least commercial access to the
+Adriatic. This compromise, ostensibly promoted and belauded by German
+statesmanship, only increased the determination of the German Government
+to 'hold the ring' in the Balkans, to claim for Austria the right of
+settling her own differences with Servia as she would, and to deny
+Russia any interest in the matter. In 1913 came the supreme effort of
+the German General Staff: an Army Act for raising the peace strength by
+instalments until it reached 870,000, and for the eventual provision of
+a war strength of 5,400,000 men. This enormous increase was recommended
+'by the unanimous judgement of the military authorities' as being
+'necessary to secure the future of Germany.' The Chancellor warned the
+Reichstag that, although relations were friendly with Russia, they had
+to face the possibilities involved in the Pan-Slavist movement; while in
+Russia itself they had to reckon with a marvellous economic development
+and an unprecedented reorganization of the army. There was also a
+reference to the new law for a return to three years' service which
+France was introducing to improve the efficiency of her peace
+establishment. But it was obvious that Russia was the main
+preoccupation. Germany had forced the pace both in the aggrandizement of
+her military strength and in the methods of her diplomatic intercourse.
+Suddenly she found herself on the brink of an abyss. She had gone too
+far; she had provoked into the competition of armaments a Power as far
+superior to Germany in her reserves of men as Germany thought herself
+superior to France. It was not too late for Germany to pause. On her
+future behaviour towards other Powers it depended whether the Bill of
+1913 should be taken as an insurance against risks, or as a challenge to
+all possible opponents.
+
+The other Powers shaped their policy in accordance with Germany's
+example. In France, on March 4, the Supreme Council of War, having
+learned the outline of the German programme, decided to increase the
+effective fighting force by a return to the rule of three years'
+service. Before the German Bill had passed (June 30), the French Prime
+Minister announced (May 15) that he would of his own authority keep with
+the colours those who were completing their second year's service in the
+autumn. The French Army Bill, when finally passed (July 16), lowered the
+age limit for commencing service from twenty-one to twenty, and brought
+the new rule into force at once. A few weeks earlier (June 20) Belgium
+introduced universal military service in place of her former lenient
+system. In Russia a secret session of the Duma was held (July 8) to pass
+a new Army Budget, and the term of service was raised from three to
+three and a quarter years. Austria alone provided for no great increase
+in the numerical strength of her army; but budgeted (October 30) for
+extraordinary naval and military expenditure, to the extent of
+L28,000,000, to be incurred in the first six months of 1914. Thus on all
+sides the alarm was raised, and special preparations were put in hand,
+long before the crisis of 1914 actually arrived. It was Germany that had
+sounded the tocsin; and it is difficult to believe that some startling
+_coup_ was not even then being planned by the leaders of her military
+party.
+
+We have been told that, whatever the appearance of things might be, it
+was Russia who drove Germany to the extraordinary preparations of 1913;
+that Germany was arming simply in self-defence against a Slavonic
+Crusade. What are the facts? Economically Russia, as a state, is in a
+stronger position than the German Empire. In 1912 we were told that for
+the past five years the revenue of Russia had exceeded expenditure by an
+average sum of L20,000,000 per annum. The revenue of Russia in 1913 was
+over L324,000,000; she has budgeted for L78,000,000 of military
+expenditure in 1914, of which some L15,000,000 is emergency expenditure.
+The total revenue of the German Empire in 1913 was L184,000,000; she has
+budgeted for a military expenditure in 1914 of L60,000,000. To adopt the
+usual German tests of comparison, Russia has a population of 173
+millions to be defended on three land-frontiers, while Germany has a
+population of 65 millions to be defended on only two. The military
+efforts of Russia, therefore, have been made on a scale relatively
+smaller than those of Germany.
+
+We must, however, add some further considerations which have been urged
+by German military critics; the alleged facts we cannot test, but we
+state them for what they may be worth. The reorganization of the Russian
+army in recent years has resulted, so we are told, in the grouping of
+enormously increased forces upon the western frontier. The western
+fortresses also have been equipped on an unparalleled scale. New roads
+and railways have been constructed to accelerate the mobilization of the
+war strength; and, above all, strategic railways have been pushed
+towards the western frontier. Thus, it is argued, Russia has in effect
+gone behind the Potsdam Agreement of 1910, by which she withdrew her
+armies to a fixed distance behind the Russo-German frontier. We confess
+that, in all this, while there may have been cause for watchfulness on
+the part of Germany, we can see no valid cause for war, nothing that of
+necessity implies more than an intention, on the part of Russia, not to
+be brow-beaten in the future as she was in 1909 and 1912.
+
+These military developments did not escape English notice. They excited
+endless speculation about the great war of the future, and the part
+which this country might be asked to bear in it. Few, however, seriously
+supposed that we should commit ourselves to a share in the fighting upon
+land. The problem most usually discussed in this connexion was that of
+preparation to resist a sudden invasion from abroad. Was it possible to
+avoid compulsory service? Was the Territorial Force large enough and
+efficient enough to defend the country if the Expeditionary Force had
+gone abroad? Great Britain was infinitely better equipped for land
+warfare in August, 1914, than she had ever been in the nineteenth
+century. But her Expeditionary Force was a recent creation, and had been
+planned for the defence of India and the Colonies. In practice the
+country had clung to the 'Blue Water' policy, of trusting the national
+fortunes entirely to the Navy. The orthodox theory was that so long as
+the Navy was kept at the 'Two Power' standard, no considerable invasion
+of the British Isles was possible.
+
+But from 1898 the programmes of the German Navy Laws constituted a
+growing menace to the 'Two Power' standard, which had been laid down as
+our official principle in 1889, when France and Russia were our chief
+European rivals at sea. That France or Russia would combine with Germany
+to challenge our naval supremacy was improbable; but other states were
+beginning to build on a larger scale, and this multiplied the possible
+number of hostile combinations. That Germany should wish for a strong
+fleet was only natural. It was needed to defend her foreign trade, her
+colonial interests, and her own seaports. That Germany should lay down a
+definite programme for six years ahead, and that the programme should
+become more extensive at each revision, was no necessary proof of
+malice. But this country received a shock in 1900, when the programme of
+1898 was unexpectedly and drastically revised, so that the German Navy
+was practically doubled. England was at that moment involved in the
+South African War, and it was hard to see against whom the new fleet
+could be used, if not against England. This was pointed out from time to
+time by the Socialist opposition in the Reichstag. The orthodox official
+reply was that Germany must be so strong at sea that the strongest naval
+Power should not be able to challenge her with any confidence. But the
+feeling of the semi-official Navy League was known to be violently
+hostile to England; and it was obvious that the German navy owed its
+popularity to the alarmist propaganda of that league.
+
+It was impossible for English statesmen to avoid the suspicion that, on
+the sea as on land, the Germans meant by liberty the right to unlimited
+self-assertion. Common prudence dictated close attention to the German
+Navy Laws; especially as they proved capable of unexpected acceleration.
+The 'Two Power' standard, under the stress of German competition, became
+increasingly difficult to maintain, and English Liberals were inclined
+to denounce it as wasteful of money. But, when a Liberal Government
+tried the experiment of economizing on the Navy (1906-8), there was no
+corresponding reduction in the German programme. The German Naval Law of
+1906 raised the amount of the naval estimates by one-third; and German
+ministers blandly waved aside as impracticable a proposal for a mutual
+limitation of armaments.
+
+In 1909 this country discovered that in capital ships--which now began
+to be considered the decisive factor in naval warfare--Germany would
+actually be the superior by 1914 unless special measures were taken. The
+British Government was awakened to the new situation (it arose from the
+German Naval Law of 1908), and returned unwillingly to the path of
+increasing expenditure. The Prime Minister said that we regretted the
+race in naval expenditure and were not animated by anti-German feeling;
+but we could not afford to let our supremacy at sea be imperilled, since
+our national security depended on it (March 16, 1909). The 'Two Power'
+standard was dropped, and the Triple Alliance became the object of
+special attention at the Admiralty. The First Lord said on March 13,
+1911, that we should make our navy superior to any foreign navy and to
+any _probable_ combination which we might have to meet single-handed. In
+practice this meant a policy of developing, in the matter of
+Dreadnoughts, a superiority of sixty per cent, over the German navy;
+this, it was officially explained in 1912, had been for some years past
+the actual Admiralty standard of new construction (Mr. Winston
+Churchill, March 18, 1912).
+
+But even this programme had to be stiffened when the year 1912 saw a new
+German Navy Bill which involved an increased expenditure of L1,000,000
+annually for six years, and had the effect of putting nearly four-fifths
+of the German navy in a position of immediate readiness for war. Earlier
+in the year the British Government had announced that, if the German
+policy of construction were accelerated, we should add to our programme
+double the number which Germany put in hand; but if Germany relaxed her
+preparations we should make a fully proportionate reduction. The German
+Bill came as an answer to this declaration; and it was followed in this
+country by supplementary estimates on naval account, amounting to nearly
+a million pounds; and this was announced to be 'the first and smallest
+instalment of the extra expenditure entailed by the new German law.' The
+new British policy was maintained in 1913 and in 1914, though in 1913
+the First Lord of the Admiralty made a public offer of a 'naval
+holiday,' a suspension of new construction by mutual consent. The
+Imperial Chancellor responded only by suggesting that the proposal was
+entirely unofficial, by asking for concrete proposals, and by saying
+that the idea constituted a great progress; and his naval estimates in
+1913 were half a million higher than those of 1912.
+
+From these facts, viewed in their chronological order, it is clear that
+on sea as on land Germany has set the pace. Thirty years ago the German
+navy did not enter into England's naval calculations. For the last six
+years, if not for a longer period, it has been the one navy which our
+Admiralty felt the necessity of watching from year to year, and indeed
+from month to month. It is the first time for more than a hundred years
+that we have had to face the problem of 'a powerful homogeneous navy
+under one government and concentrated within easy distance of our
+shores.'
+
+On German principles we should long ago have adopted the
+'offensive-defensive.' We have been at least as seriously menaced by
+Germany at sea as Germany has been menaced by Russia upon land. But we
+can confidently say that in the period of rivalry our fleet has never
+been used as a threat, or turned to the purposes of an aggressive
+colonial policy. Rightly or wrongly, we have refused to make possible
+intentions a case for an ultimatum. We have held by the position that
+only a breach of public law would justify us in abandoning our efforts
+for the peace of Europe.
+
+NOTE
+
+_Abstract of Anglo-French Agreement on Morocco_.
+
+In April, 1904, England and France concluded an agreement for the
+delimitation of their interests on the Mediterranean littoral of North
+Africa. The agreement included five secret Articles which were not
+published until November, 1911. The purport of the Articles which were
+published at the time was as follows. By the first Article England
+stated that she had not the intention of changing the political state of
+Egypt; and France declared that she would not impede the action of
+England in Egypt by demanding that a term should be fixed for the
+British occupation or in any other way. By the second Article France
+declared that she had not the intention of changing the political state
+of Morocco; and England recognized that it appertained to France, as the
+Power conterminous with Morocco, to watch the tranquillity of this
+country and to assist it in all administrative, economic, financial, and
+military reforms which it required, France promised to respect the
+customary and treaty rights of England in Morocco; and by the third
+Article England made a corresponding promise to France in respect of
+Egypt. By the fourth Article the two Governments undertook to maintain
+'the principle of commercial liberty' in Egypt and Morocco, by not
+lending themselves in either country to inequality in the establishment
+of Customs-duties or of other taxes or of railway rates. The sixth and
+seventh Articles were inserted to ensure the free passage of the Suez
+Canal and of the Straits of Gibraltar. The eighth declared that both
+Governments took into friendly consideration the interests of Spain in
+Morocco, and that France would make some arrangements with the Spanish
+Monarchy. The ninth Article declared that each Government would lend its
+diplomatic support to the other in executing the clauses relative to
+Egypt and Morocco.[21] Of the secret Articles two (Nos. 3 and 4) related
+to Spain, defining the territory which she was to receive 'whenever the
+Sultan ceases to exercise authority over it,' and providing that the
+Anglo-French agreement would hold good even if Spain declined this
+arrangement. Article 1 stipulated that, if either Government found
+itself constrained, by the force of circumstances, to modify its policy
+in respect to Egypt or Morocco, nevertheless the fourth, sixth, and
+seventh Articles of the public declaration would remain intact; that is,
+each would under all circumstances maintain the principle of 'commercial
+liberty,' and would permit the free passage of the Suez Canal and the
+Straits of Gibraltar. In Article 2 England, while disclaiming any
+intention to alter the system of Capitulations or the judicial
+organization of Egypt, reserved the right to reform the Egyptian
+legislative system on the model of other civilized countries; and France
+agreed on condition that she should not be impeded from making similar
+reforms in Morocco. The fifth Article related to the Egyptian national
+debt.
+
+Notes:
+
+[Footnote 10: Quoted from Headlam's _Bismarck_, p. 444.]
+
+[Footnote 11: _Correspondence respecting the European Crisis_ (Cd.
+7467), No. 85. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 29, 1914. See
+_infra_, Appendix II.]
+
+[Footnote 12: For these agreements see _The Times_, April 12, 1904, and
+November 25, 1911. See note at end of this chapter.]
+
+[Footnote 13: White Paper, Morocco No. 1 (1906).]
+
+[Footnote 14: _Correspondence_, No. 105 (Enclosure 1). Sir E. Grey to M.
+Cambon, November 22, 1912. See Appendix II.]
+
+[Footnote 15: _Correspondence_, No. 87. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie,
+July 29, 1914.]
+
+[Footnote 16: _Times_, July 7, 1911.]
+
+[Footnote 17: _Times_, July 27, 1911.]
+
+[Footnote 18: _Times_, July 22, 1911.]
+
+[Footnote 19: _Correspondence_, p. 57 (Enclosure 1 in No. 105). See
+Appendix II.]
+
+[Footnote 20: _Ibid_. p. 57 (Enclosure 2 in No. 105).]
+
+[Footnote 21: _Times_, April 12, 1904.]
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER III
+
+
+THE DEVELOPMENT OF RUSSIAN POLICY
+
+Until the year 1890 Russia and Germany had been in close touch. Dynastic
+connexions united the two imperial houses; and the common policy of
+repression of Polish nationality--the fatal legacy of the days of
+Frederic the Great and Catharine II--united the two empires. National
+sentiment in Russia was, however, always anti-German; and as early as
+1885 Balkan affairs began to draw the Russian Government away from
+Germany. In 1890 Bismarck fell; and under William II German policy left
+the Russian connexion, and in close touch with Austria embarked on
+Balkan adventures which ran counter to Russian aims, while Russia on her
+side turned to new allies.
+
+The new direction of Russian policy, which has brought the aims of the
+Russian Government into close accord with the desires of national Slav
+sentiment, was determined by Balkan conditions. Bismarck had cherished
+no Balkan ambitions: he had been content to play the part of an 'honest
+broker' at the Congress of Berlin, and he had spoken of the Bulgarian
+affair of 1885 as 'not worth the bones of a Pomeranian grenadier.'
+William II apparently thought otherwise. At any rate Germany seems to
+have conducted, for many years past, a policy of establishing her
+influence, along with that of Austria, through South-Eastern Europe. And
+it is this policy which is the _fons et origo_ of the present struggle;
+for it is a policy which is not and cannot be tolerated by Russia, so
+long as Russia is true to her own Slav blood and to the traditions of
+centuries.
+
+After Austria had finally lost Italy, as she did in 1866, she turned for
+compensation to the Balkans. If Venetia was lost, it seemed some
+recompense when in 1878 Austria occupied Bosnia and the Herzegovina.
+Hence she could expand southwards--ultimately perhaps to Salonica.
+Servia, which might have objected, was a vassal kingdom, the protege of
+Austria, under the dynasty of the Obrenovitch. As Austria might hope to
+follow the line to Salonica,[22] so Germany, before the end of the
+nineteenth century, seems to have conceived of a parallel line of
+penetration, which would carry her influence through Constantinople,
+through Konieh, to Bagdad. She has extended her political and economic
+influence among the small Slav states and in Turkey. In 1898 the King of
+Roumania (a Hohenzollern by descent) conceded direct communication
+through his territories between Berlin and Constantinople: in 1899 a
+German company obtained a concession for the Bagdad railway from Konieh
+to the head of the Persian Gulf. In a word, Germany began to stand in
+the way of the Russian traditions of ousting the Turk and ruling in
+Constantinople: she began to buttress the Turk, to train his army, to
+exploit his country, and to seek to oust Russia generally from
+South-Eastern Europe.
+
+In 1903 the progress of Austria and Germany received a check. A
+blood-stained revolution at Belgrade ousted the pro-Austrian
+Obrenovitch, and put in its place the rival family of the
+Karageorgevitch. Under the new dynasty Servia escaped from Austrian
+tutelage, and became an independent focus of Slav life in close touch
+with Russia. The change was illustrated in 1908, when Austria took
+advantage of the revolution in Turkey, led by the Young Turks, to annex
+formally the occupied territories of Bosnia and the Herzegovina. Servia,
+which had hoped to gain these territories, once a part of the old
+Servian kingdom, was mortally offended, and would have gone to war with
+Austria, if Russia, her champion under the new dynasty, could only have
+given her support. But Russia, still weak after the Japanese war, could
+not do so; Russia, on the contrary, had to suffer the humiliation of
+giving a pledge to the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg that she
+would not support Servia. That humiliation Russia has not forgotten. She
+has saved money, she has reorganized her army, she has done everything
+in her power to gain security for the future. And now that Austria has
+sought utterly to humiliate Servia on the unproved charge (unproved, in
+the sense that no legal proof was offered)[23] of complicity in the
+murder of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife, Russia has risked
+war rather than surrender her protection of a Slav kingdom. Slav
+sentiment imperatively demanded action in favour of Servia: no
+government could refuse to listen to the demand. The stake for Russia is
+not merely the integrity of Servia: it is her prestige among the Slav
+peoples, of which she is head; and behind all lies the question whether
+South-Eastern Europe shall be under Teutonic control, and lost to
+Russian influence.
+
+Germany has not only threatened Slav life in South-Eastern Europe: she
+has irritated Slav feeling on her own Eastern frontier. The vitality and
+the increase of the Slavs in Eastern Germany has excited deep German
+alarm. The German Government has therefore of late years pursued a
+policy of repression towards its own Slav subjects, the Poles,
+forbidding the use of the Polish language, and expropriating Polish
+landowners in order to plant a German garrison in the East. Teutonism is
+really alarmed at the superior birth-rate and physical vigour of the
+Slavs; but Russia has not loved Teutonic policy, and there has been an
+extensive boycott of German goods in Russian Poland. The promise made by
+the Tsar, since the beginning of the war, that he would re-create the
+old Poland, and give it autonomy, shows how far Russia has travelled
+from the days, not so far distant in point of time, when it was her
+policy to repress the Poles in conjunction with Germany; and it has made
+the breach between Germany and Russia final and irreparable.
+
+It is thus obvious that Germany is vitally opposed to the great Slav
+Empire in South-Eastern Europe and on her own eastern borders. But why,
+it may be asked, should Russian policy be linked with English? Is there
+any bond of union except the negative bond of common opposition to
+Germany? There is. For one thing England and Russia have sought to
+pursue a common cause--that of international arbitration and of
+disarmament. If neither has succeeded, it has been something of a bond
+between the two that both have attempted to succeed. But there are other
+and more vital factors. England, which in 1854-6 opposed and fought
+Russia for the sake of the integrity of Turkey, has no wish to fight
+Russia for the sake of a Germanized Turkey. On the contrary, the
+interest of England in maintaining independence in the South-East of
+Europe now coincides with that of Russia. Above all, the new
+constitutional Russia of the Duma is Anglophil.
+
+    'The political ideals both of Cadets and Octobrists were learnt
+    chiefly from England, the study of whose constitutional history had
+    aroused in Russia an enthusiasm hardly intelligible to a present-day
+    Englishman. All three Dumas ... were remarkably friendly to England,
+    and England supplied the staple of the precedents and parallels for
+    quotation.'[24]
+
+In a word, the beginnings of Russian constitutionalism not only
+coincided in time with the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907, but owed
+much to the inspiration of England.
+
+Notes:
+
+[Footnote 22: Count Aehrenthal, foreign minister of Austria (1906-1912),
+started the scheme of the Novi Bazar railway to connect the railways of
+Bosnia with the (then) Turkish line to Salonica. See also
+_Correspondence_, No. 19, Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey, July 25: 'There is
+reliable information that Austria intends to seize the Salonica
+railway.']
+
+[Footnote 23: For a summary of so-called proofs, see Appendix IV,
+_infra_.]
+
+[Footnote 24: _Camb. Mod. Hist_. xii. 379.]
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IV
+
+
+CHRONOLOGICAL SKETCH OF THE CRISIS
+
+The following sketch of events from June 28 to August 4, 1914, is merely
+intended as an introduction to the analytical and far more detailed
+account of the negotiations and declarations of those days which the
+reader will find below (Chap. V). Here we confine the narrative to a
+plain statement of the successive stages in the crisis, neither
+discussing the motives of the several Powers involved, nor
+distinguishing the fine shades of difference in the various proposals
+which were made by would-be mediators.
+
+The crisis of 1914 began with an unforeseen development in the old
+quarrel of Austria-Hungary and Russia over the Servian question. On June
+28 the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir-apparent of the Austro-Hungarian
+monarchy, and his wife, the Duchess of Hohenberg, paid a visit of
+ceremony to the town of Serajevo, in Bosnia, the administrative centre
+of the Austrian provinces of Bosnia and the Herzegovina. In entering the
+town, the Archduke and the Duchess narrowly escaped being killed by a
+bomb which was thrown at their carriage. Later in the day they were shot
+by assassins armed with Browning pistols. The crime was apparently
+planned by political conspirators who resented the Austrian annexation
+of Bosnia and the Herzegovina (_supra_, p. 54), and who desired that
+these provinces should be united to Servia.
+
+The Austrian Government, having instituted an inquiry, came to the
+conclusion that the bombs of the conspirators had been obtained from a
+Servian arsenal; that the crime had been planned in Belgrade, the
+Servian capital, with the help of a Servian staff-officer who provided
+the pistols; that the criminals and their weapons had been conveyed from
+Servia into Bosnia by officers of Servian frontier-posts and by Servian
+customs-officials. At the moment the Austrian Government published no
+proof of these conclusions,[25] but, on July 23, forwarded them to the
+Servian Government in a formal note containing certain demands which, it
+was intimated, must be satisfactorily answered by Servia within
+forty-eight hours.[26] This ultimatum included a form of apology to be
+published on a specified date by the Servian Government, and ten
+engagements which the Servian Government were to give the
+Austro-Hungarian Government. The extraordinary nature of some of these
+engagements is explained in the next chapter (pp. 103-7).
+
+On July 24 this note was communicated by Austria-Hungary to the other
+Powers of Europe,[27] and on July 25 it was published in a German paper,
+the _Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung_. It was therefore intended to be a
+public warning to Servia. On July 24 the German Government told the
+Powers that it approved the Austrian note, as being necessitated by the
+'Great-Servian' propaganda, which aimed at the incorporation in the
+Servian monarchy of the southern Slav provinces belonging to
+Austria-Hungary; that Austria, if she wished to remain a Great Power,
+could not avoid pressing the demands contained in the note, even, if
+necessary, by military measures; and that the question was one which
+concerned no Powers except Austria-Hungary and Servia.[28]
+
+Russia did not agree that the Austrian note was directed against Servia
+alone. On July 24 the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs told the
+British Ambassador at St. Petersburg that Austria's conduct was
+provocative and immoral; that some of her demands were impossible of
+acceptance; that Austria would never have taken such action unless
+Germany had first been consulted; that if Austria began military
+measures against Servia, Russia would probably mobilize. The Russian
+Minister hoped that England would proclaim its solidarity with France
+and Russia on the subject of the Austrian note; doubtless Servia could
+accept some of the Austrian demands.[29] To the Austro-Hungarian
+Government the Russian Minister sent a message, on the same day, July
+24, that the time-limit allowed to Servia for her reply was quite
+insufficient, if the Powers were to help in smoothing the situation; and
+he urged that Austria-Hungary should publish the proofs of the charges
+against Servia.[30] On July 25 Russia told England[31] that Servia would
+punish those proved to be guilty, but would not accept all the demands
+of Austria; that no independent state could do so. If Servia appealed to
+arbitration, as seemed possible, Russia was, she said, prepared to leave
+the arbitration in the hands of England, France, Germany, and Italy--the
+four Powers whom Sir Edward Grey had suggested as possible mediators.
+
+On the day on which Russia made this suggestion, July 25, the Servian
+Government replied to the Austrian note, conceding part of the Austrian
+demands, and announcing its readiness to accept, on the other points,
+the arbitration of the Hague Tribunal or of the Great Powers. The
+Austrian Government found the Servian note unsatisfactory, and
+criticized its details in an official memorandum.[32] The
+Austro-Hungarian Minister left Belgrade on July 25; on July 26 a part of
+the Austro-Hungarian army was mobilized; and on July 28 Austria-Hungary
+declared war on Servia.
+
+Sir Edward Grey had from the first declined to 'announce England's
+solidarity' with Russia and France on the Servian question. On and after
+July 26 he was taking active steps to bring about the mediation, between
+Austria-Hungary and Servia, of four Powers (Italy, Germany, France,
+England). To this mediation Russia had already agreed, July 25; and
+Italy and France were ready to co-operate with England.[33] Germany,
+however, made difficulties on the ground that anything like formal
+intervention would be impracticable, unless both Austria and Russia
+consented to it.[34] Russia had already (July 25) prepared the ukase
+ordering mobilization,[35] but had not yet issued it; on July 27 the
+Russian Foreign Minister announced his readiness to make the Servian
+question the subject of direct conversations with Vienna.[36] This offer
+was at first declined by the Austro-Hungarian Government, but
+subsequently accepted; and conversations were actually in progress
+between the representatives of the two Powers as late as August 1.[37]
+
+No doubt the hesitation of Austria was due to the fact that, on July 28,
+the Russian Government warned Germany of the mobilization of the
+southern military districts of Russia, to be publicly proclaimed on July
+29.[38] Austria replied to this intimation by offering assurances that
+she would respect the integrity and independence of Servia;[39] these
+assurances, considered inadequate by the Russian Government, seem to
+have been the subject of the last conversations between Russia and
+Austria-Hungary.
+
+Russia persisted that Germany was the real obstacle to a friendly
+settlement; and this conviction was not affected by the appeals for
+peace which the Kaiser telegraphed to the Tsar on July 28, July 29, and
+July 31.[40] On July 29 Germany told England that the Russian
+mobilization was alarming, and that France was also making military
+preparations;[41] at the same time Germany threatened to proclaim
+'imminent state of war' (_drohende Kriegsgefahr_) as a counter measure
+to the French preparations;[42] German military preparations, by July
+30, had in fact gone far beyond the preliminary stage which she thus
+indicated.[43] Germany had already warned England, France, and Russia
+that, if Russia mobilized, this would mean German mobilization against
+both France and Russia.[44] But on July 27, Russia had explained that
+her mobilization would in no sense be directed against Germany, and
+would only take place if Austrian forces crossed the Servian
+frontier.[45] On July 29, the day on which Russia actually mobilized the
+southern districts, Russia once more asked Germany to participate in the
+'quadruple conference' now proposed by England, for the purpose of
+mediating between Austria and Servia. This proposal was declined by the
+German Ambassador at St. Petersburg.[46] Germany in fact believed, or
+professed to believe, that the Russian mobilization, though not
+proclaimed, was already far advanced.[47]
+
+On July 30 Austria, although her conversations with Russia were still in
+progress, began the bombardment of Belgrade. The next day, July 31,
+Russia ordered general mobilization; on August 1 France and Germany each
+took the like step; Germany presented an ultimatum to Russia, demanding
+that Russian mobilization should cease, and another ultimatum to France
+asking what course she would take in the event of war between Germany
+and Russia.
+
+Before these decisive steps of July 30-August 1, and while Sir Edward
+Grey was still engaged in efforts of mediation, Germany made overtures
+to England, with the object of securing England's neutrality in the
+event of a war between Germany and France. On July 29 Germany offered,
+as the price of English neutrality, to give assurances that, if
+victorious, she would make no territorial acquisitions at the expense of
+France; but refused to give a similar assurance respecting French
+colonies, or to promise to respect Belgian neutrality.[48] These
+proposals were refused by England on July 30.[49] On August 1 the German
+Ambassador unofficially asked England to remain neutral on condition
+that Germany would not violate Belgian neutrality. Sir Edward Grey
+replied that England's hands were still free, and that he could not
+promise neutrality on that condition alone.[50]
+
+Meanwhile, on July 30, Sir Edward Grey was told by France that she would
+not remain neutral in a war between Germany and Russia.[51] On July 31
+the English Cabinet, being asked by France to declare definitely on her
+side, replied that England could give no pledge at present.[52] On the
+same day England asked France and Germany to engage to respect Belgian
+neutrality. France assented, Germany evaded giving a reply.[53] But, on
+August 2, German forces entered the neutral state of Luxemburg; and
+England promised to defend the French coasts and shipping if attacked by
+the German fleet in the Channel, or through the North Sea.[54] On August
+4 the King of the Belgians telegraphed to King George announcing that
+Germany had demanded passage for her troops through Belgian territory,
+and appealing to England for help.[55] On the same day, August 4,
+England sent an ultimatum to Germany asking for assurance, before
+midnight, that Germany would respect Belgian neutrality.[56] This demand
+was taken at Berlin as equivalent to a declaration of war by England
+against Germany.
+
+
+DIARY OF THE EVENTS LEADING TO THE WAR
+
+June 28. Assassination at Sarajevo of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand and
+the Duchess of Hohenberg.
+
+July 6. The Kaiser leaves Kiel for a cruise in Northern waters.
+
+July 9. Results of Austro-Hungarian investigation into the Servian crime
+laid before the Emperor.
+
+July 13, 14. Serious disclosures about condition of French army.
+
+July 13, 14, 15, 16. Heavy selling of Canadian Pacific Railway Shares,
+especially by Berlin operators.
+
+July 16. Count Tisza, the Hungarian Premier, speaking in the Hungarian
+Chamber, describes war as a sad _ultima ratio_, 'but every state and
+nation must be able and willing to make war if it wishes to exist as a
+state and a nation.'
+
+The _Times_ leading article 'Austria-Hungary and Servia' is commented on
+in Berlin as an 'English warning to Servia.'
+
+July 19. The King summons a conference to discuss the Home-Rule problem.
+
+July 21. The _Frankfurter Zeitung_ warns Austria-Hungary of the folly of
+its campaign against Servia.
+
+July 23. Thursday. Austria presents her Note to Servia giving her 48
+hours in which to accept.
+
+July 24. Friday. Russian Cabinet Council held. The Austro-Hungarian
+demands considered as an indirect challenge to Russia.--Strike at St.
+Petersburg.
+
+Failure of the conference on Home Rule.
+
+July 25. Saturday. Servian reply; considered unsatisfactory by
+Austria-Hungary, whose Minister and Legation-staff leave Belgrade.
+
+Russian Ambassador at Vienna instructed to request extension of
+time-limit allowed to Servia.
+
+Sir E. Grey suggests that the four other Powers should mediate at Vienna
+and St. Petersburg.--Serious riot in Dublin.
+
+July 26. Sunday. Sir E. Grey proposes that the French, Italian, and
+German Ambassadors should meet him in conference immediately for the
+purpose of discovering an issue which would prevent complications.
+
+Partial mobilization of Austro-Hungarian army ordered.
+
+Russian Foreign Minister warns German Ambassador that Russia cannot
+remain indifferent to the fate of Servia.
+
+Sir E. Goschen says the Kaiser is returning to-night.
+
+July 27. Monday. France and Italy accept proposal of a conference.
+German Secretary of State refuses the proposal of a 'conference.'
+
+Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs proposes direct conversation
+between Vienna and St. Petersburg.
+
+British Fleet kept assembled after manoeuvres.
+
+Sir E. Grey in the House of Commons makes a statement concerning the
+attitude of Great Britain.
+
+The _Times_ Berlin correspondent reports that the Kaiser returned this
+afternoon from Kiel to Potsdam.
+
+July 28. Tuesday. Austria-Hungary declares war on Servia.
+
+Russia says the key of the situation is to be found at Berlin.
+
+Austria declines any suggestion of negotiations on basis of the Servian
+reply.
+
+The Kaiser telegraphs to the Tsar.
+
+July 29. Wednesday. Russian mobilization in the four military districts
+of Odessa, Kiev, Moscow, and Kazan.
+
+Germany offers, in return for British neutrality, to promise territorial
+integrity of France, but will not extend the same assurance for French
+colonies.
+
+Sir E. Grey warns the German Ambassador that we should not necessarily
+stand aside, if all the efforts to maintain the peace failed.
+
+Austria at last realizes that Russia will not remain indifferent.
+
+The Tsar telegraphs to the Kaiser; the latter replies.
+
+July 30. Thursday. Bombardment of Belgrade by Austro-Hungarian forces.
+
+The Prime Minister speaks in the House of Commons on the gravity of the
+situation, and postpones discussion of the Home Rule Amending Bill.
+
+The Tsar telegraphs to the Kaiser.
+
+July 31. Friday. General Russian mobilization ordered.
+
+Sir E. Grey asks France and Germany whether they will respect neutrality
+of Belgium.
+
+France promises to respect Belgian neutrality; Germany is doubtful
+whether any answer will be returned to this request.
+
+Austria declares its readiness to discuss the substance of its ultimatum
+to Servia.
+
+Fresh telegrams pass between the Kaiser and the Tsar.
+
+Germany presents ultimatum to Russia demanding that her mobilization
+should cease within 12 hours.
+
+Germany presents an ultimatum to France asking her to define her
+attitude in case of a Russo-German war.
+
+English bankers confer with the Government about the financial
+situation.
+
+Aug. 1. Saturday. Sir E. Grey protests against detention of English
+ships at Hamburg.
+
+Orders issued for general mobilization of French army.
+
+Orders issued for general mobilization of German army.
+
+Aug. 2. Sunday. Germans invade Luxemburg.
+
+Sir E. Grey gives France an assurance that the English fleet will
+protect the North Coast of France against the German fleet.
+
+Germans enter French territory near Cirey.
+
+Aug. 3. Monday. Italy declares itself neutral, as the other members of
+the Triple Alliance are not engaged in a defensive war.
+
+Germany presents an ultimatum to Belgium.
+
+Sir E. Grey makes an important speech in the House of Commons.
+
+Aug. 4. Tuesday. Germans enter Belgian territory.
+
+Britain presents an ultimatum to Germany demanding an answer by
+midnight.
+
+The Prime Minister makes a speech in the House of Commons, practically
+announcing war against Germany and explaining the British position.
+
+Aug. 6. Austria-Hungary declares war on Russia.
+
+Aug. 11. The French Ambassador at Vienna demands his passport.
+
+Aug. 12. Great Britain declares war on Austria-Hungary.
+
+Notes:
+
+[Footnote 25: Extracts are printed in the German version of the German
+White Book (pp. 28-31) from an Austrian official publication of July 27.
+We print the extracts (the original not being accessible in this
+country) in Appendix IV.]
+
+[Footnote 26: Full text _infra_ in Appendix I (German White Book, pp.
+18-23); more correctly in _Correspondence respecting the European
+Crisis_, No. 4, Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff, July 24; but the
+differences between the two versions are immaterial for our present
+purpose.]
+
+[Footnote 27: See the communication to England in _Correspondence_, No.
+4.]
+
+[Footnote 28: _Correspondence_, No. 9, Note communicated by the German
+Ambassador, July 24.]
+
+[Footnote 29: _Correspondence_, No. 6, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey,
+July 24.]
+
+[Footnote 30: _Correspondence_, No. 13, Note communicated by Russian
+Ambassador, July 25.]
+
+[Footnote 31: _Correspondence_, No. 17, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey,
+July 25.]
+
+[Footnote 32: For text of Servian note see _infra_ Appendix I (German
+White Book, pp. 23-32). The Austrian comments also are given there.]
+
+[Footnote 33: _Correspondence_, No. 42, Sir F. Bertie to Sir E. Grey,
+July 27; _ibid_. No. 49, Sir E. Grey to Sir R. Rodd, July 27.]
+
+[Footnote 34: _Correspondence_, No. 43. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey,
+July 27.]
+
+[Footnote 35: German White Book, p. 46 (_infra_ in Appendix I). The Tsar
+to His Majesty, July 30.]
+
+[Footnote 36: _Correspondence_, No. 45. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey.]
+
+[Footnote 37: Austria declined conversations on July 28
+(_Correspondence_, No. 93); but for conversations of July 31 see
+_Correspondence_, No. III; of August I, see Appendix V.]
+
+[Footnote 38: _Correspondence_, No. 70 (I). M. Sazonof to Russian
+Ambassador at Berlin, July 28.]
+
+[Footnote 39: _Correspondence_, No. 72. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey,
+July 28.]
+
+[Footnote 40: German White Book, pp. 43, 45 (in Appendix I, _infra_).]
+
+[Footnote 41: _Correspondence_, No. 76. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey,
+July 29.]
+
+[Footnote 42: German White Book, p. 42, Exhibit 17 (_infra_, Appendix
+I).]
+
+[Footnote 43: _Correspondence_, No. 105 (Enclosure 3), July 30.]
+
+[Footnote 44: German White Book, p. 7; the date of the warning seems to
+be July 27.]
+
+[Footnote 45: German White Book, p. 40, Exhibit II.]
+
+[Footnote 46: _Ibid_. p. 9.]
+
+[Footnote 47: _Ibid_. p. 10.]
+
+[Footnote 48: _Correspondence_, No. 85. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey,
+July 29.]
+
+[Footnote 49: _Ibid_. No. 101. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, July 30.]
+
+[Footnote 50: _Correspondence_, No. 123. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen,
+Aug. 1.]
+
+[Footnote 51: _Ibid_. No. 105. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, July 30.]
+
+[Footnote 52: _Ibid_. No. 119. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, July 31.]
+
+[Footnote 53: _Ibid_. No. 114, 120, 122.]
+
+[Footnote 54: _Ibid_. No. 148. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, Aug. 2.]
+
+[Footnote 55: _Ibid_. No. 153. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, Aug. 4.]
+
+[Footnote 56: _Ibid_. No. 159. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, Aug. 4]
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER V
+
+
+NEGOTIATORS AND NEGOTIATIONS
+
+For purposes of reference the following list of _dramatis personae_ may
+be useful:--
+
+GREAT BRITAIN: King George V, _succ_. 1910.
+_Foreign Secretary_: Sir Edward Grey.
+_Ambassadors from France_: M. Paul Cambon.
+  _Russia_: Count Benckendorff.
+  _Germany_: Prince Lichnowsky.
+  _Austria_: Count Albert Mensdorff-Pouilly-Dietrichstein.
+  _Belgium_: Count A. de Lalaing (_Minister_).
+
+RUSSIA: Emperor Nicholas II, _succ_. 1894.
+_Foreign Secretary_: M. Sazonof.
+_Ambassadors from Great Britain_: Sir George Buchanan.
+  _France_: M. Paleologue.
+  _Germany_: Count Pourtales.
+  _Austria_: Friedrich Count Szapary.
+
+FRANCE: Raymond Poincare, _President, elected_ 1913.
+_Premier_: M. Viviani.
+_Acting Foreign Secretary_: M. Doumergue.
+_Ambassadors from Great Britain_: Sir Francis Bertie.
+  _Russia_: M. Isvolsky.
+    M. Sevastopoulo (_Charge d'Affaires_).
+  _Germany_: Baron von Schoen.
+  _Austria_: Count Scezsen.
+
+GERMANY: Emperor William II, _succ_. 1888.
+_Imperial Chancellor_: Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg.
+_Foreign Secretary_: Herr von Jagow.
+_Ambassadors from Great Britain_: Sir Edward Goschen.
+    Sir Horace Rumbold (_Councillor_).
+  _Russia:_ M. Swerbeiev.
+    M. Bronewsky (_Charge d'Affaires_).
+  _France:_ M. Jules Cambon.
+  _Austria_: Count Ladislaus Szoegyeny-Marich.
+
+AUSTRIA-HUNGARY: Emperor Francis Joseph, _succ_. 1848.
+_Foreign Secretary_: Count Berchtold.
+_Ambassadors from Great Britain_: Sir Maurice de Bunsen.
+  _Russia_: M. Schebesco.
+    M. Kondachev (_Charge d'Affaires_).
+  _France_: M. Crozier.
+  _Germany_: Herr von Tschirscky-und-Boegendorff.
+
+ITALY: King Victor Emmanuel III, _succ_. 1900.
+_Foreign Secretary_: Marquis di San Giuliano.
+_Ambassador from Great Britain_: Sir Rennell Rodd.
+
+BELGIUM: King Albert, _succ_. 1909.
+_Minister of Great Britain_: Sir Francis Villiers.
+
+SERVIA: King Peter, _succ_. 1903.
+_Minister of Great Britain_: C.L. des Graz.
+  D.M. Crackanthorpe (_First Secretary_).
+_Russian Charge d'Affaires_: M. Strandtmann.
+
+
+I
+
+_Germany's attitude to Austria and Russia_.
+
+From the very beginning of the conversations between the Powers on the
+assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand at Serajevo, and on the
+Austrian note to Servia, the German Government took up the attitude that
+it was a 'matter for settlement between Servia and Austria alone.'[57]
+Subsequently in their White Book they endeavoured to show that the
+Servian agitation was part of Russian propagandism.[58] In the
+negotiations, the cardinal point of their observations is that Russia is
+not to interfere in this matter, although M. Paul Cambon pointed out
+that 'Russia would be compelled by her public opinion to take action as
+soon as Austria attacked Servia'.[59]
+
+After the presentation of the Austrian note to Servia, Germany continued
+to maintain the position that the crisis could be localized, and to
+reject Sir Horace Rumbold's suggestion that 'in taking military action
+in Servia, Austria would dangerously excite public opinion in
+Russia'.[60]
+
+At Vienna Sir Maurice de Bunsen, the British Ambassador, was very
+frankly told by the German Ambassador that Germany was shielding Austria
+in the Servian business:--
+
+    'As for Germany, she knew very well what she was about in backing up
+    Austria-Hungary in this matter.... Servian concessions were all a
+    sham. Servia proved that she well knew that they were insufficient
+    to satisfy the legitimate demands of Austria-Hungary by the fact
+    that before making her offer she had ordered mobilization and
+    retirement of Government from Belgrade.'[61]
+
+M. Sazonof, the Russian Foreign Minister, seems to have divined this
+policy of Germany pretty soon:--
+
+    'My interviews with the German Ambassador confirm my impression that
+    Germany is, if anything, in favour of the uncompromising attitude
+    adopted by Austria. The Berlin Cabinet, who could have prevented the
+    whole of this crisis developing, appear to be exercising no
+    influence upon their ally.... There is no doubt that the key of the
+    situation is to be found at Berlin.'[62]
+
+When at the beginning of August the crisis had led to war, it is
+interesting to observe the opinions expressed by high and well-informed
+officials about German diplomacy. M. Sazonof summed up his opinion
+thus:--
+
+    'The policy of Austria had throughout been tortuous and immoral, and
+    she thought she could treat Russia with defiance, secure in the
+    support of her German ally. Similarly the policy of Germany had been
+    an equivocal and double-faced policy, and it mattered little whether
+    the German Government knew or did not know the terms of the Austrian
+    ultimatum; what mattered was that her intervention with the Austrian
+    Government had been postponed until the moment had passed when its
+    influence would have been felt. Germany was unfortunate in her
+    representatives in Vienna and St. Petersburg; the former was a
+    violent Russophobe who had urged Austria on, the latter had reported
+    to his Government that Russia would never go to war.'[63]
+
+And Sir Maurice de Bunsen on the same day wrote that he agreed with his
+Russian colleague that
+
+    'the German Ambassador at Vienna desired war from the first, and his
+    strong personal bias probably coloured his action here. The Russian
+    Ambassador is convinced that the German Government also desired war
+    from the first.'[64]
+
+Sir Maurice does not actually endorse this opinion concerning the
+attitude of the German Government, but there can be no doubt that this
+general attitude was most pernicious to the cause of European peace, and
+that if the German Government had desired war they could scarcely have
+acted more efficiently towards that end. No diplomatic pressure was put
+upon Vienna, which under the aegis of Berlin was allowed to go to any
+lengths against Servia. Over and over again the German diplomats were
+told that Russia was deeply interested in Servia, but they would not
+listen. As late as July 28th the German Chancellor himself refused 'to
+discuss the Servian note', adding that 'Austria's standpoint, and in
+this he agreed, was that her quarrel with Servia was a purely Austrian
+concern with which Russia had nothing to do'.[65] Next day the German
+Ambassador at Vienna was continuing 'to feign surprise that Servian
+affairs could be of such interest to Russia'.[66] But in their White
+Book, in order to blacken the character of Russia, the Germans remark
+that they 'were perfectly aware that a possible warlike attitude of
+Austria-Hungary against Servia might bring Russia into the field'.[67]
+Both stories cannot be true: the German Government have, not for the
+last time in the history of these negotiations, to choose between
+ineptitude and guilt; the ineptitude of not recognizing an obvious fact,
+and the guilt of deliberately allowing Austria to act in such a way that
+Russia was bound to come into the field.
+
+When Austria presented her ultimatum, Sir Edward Grey did all he could
+to obtain the good offices of Russia for a conciliatory reply by Servia,
+and to persuade the German Government to use influence with Austria so
+that she should take a friendly attitude to Servia. On the day of the
+presentation of the Austrian note he proposed to Prince Lichnowsky, the
+German Ambassador, the co-operation of the four Powers, Germany, France,
+Italy, and Great Britain, in favour of moderation at Vienna and St.
+Petersburg, and when the Austrians rejected the Servian reply he took
+the important step of proposing that the French, Italian, and German
+Ambassadors should meet him in conference immediately 'for the purpose
+of discovering an issue which would prevent complications'.[68] The
+proposal was accepted with alacrity by the French and Italian
+Governments. The German Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Herr von Jagow,
+on the other hand, was unable or unwilling to understand the proposal,
+and Sir Edward Goschen seems to have been unable to impress its real
+character upon the Government of Berlin. For Herr von Jagow, on receipt
+of the proposal, informed the British Ambassador, Sir Edward Goschen,
+that the conference suggested
+
+    'would practically amount to a court of arbitration and could not in
+    his opinion be called together except at the request of Austria and
+    Russia. He could not therefore fall in with it.'
+
+Sir Edward Goschen not unnaturally pointed out that
+
+    'the idea had nothing to do with arbitration, but meant that
+    representatives of the four nations not directly interested should
+    discuss and suggest means for avoiding a dangerous situation'.[69]
+
+Herr von Jagow spoke in the same sense to the French and Italian
+Ambassadors, who discussed the matter with their British colleague. Some
+doubt seems to have arisen in their minds as to the sincerity of the
+German Secretary of State's loudly expressed desire for peace; but,
+giving him the benefit of the doubt, they concluded that the objection
+must be to the 'form of the proposal'. 'Perhaps', added Sir Edward
+Goschen, 'he himself could be induced to suggest lines on which he would
+find it possible to work with us.'[70] The next day the same idea was
+pressed by Sir Edward Grey upon Prince Lichnowsky:--
+
+    'The whole idea of mediation or mediating influence was ready to be
+    put into operation by any method that Germany could suggest if mine
+    was not acceptable.'[71]
+
+But owing to German dilatoriness in this matter, events had by then gone
+so far that the very gravest questions had arisen for this country.
+
+With the refusal of the German Government to propose a form of mediation
+acceptable to themselves before graver events had occurred, the first
+period of the negotiation comes to an end. The responsibility of
+rejecting a conference, which, by staving off the evil day, might have
+preserved the peace of Europe, falls solely on the shoulders of Germany.
+The reasons advanced by Herr von Jagow were erroneous, and though Dr.
+von Bethmann-Hollweg, the Imperial Chancellor, was more conciliatory and
+sympathetic, it may be noted that the German White Book[72] continues to
+misrepresent Sir Edward Grey's proposal as a conference on the
+particular question of the Austro-Servian dispute, and not on the
+general situation of Europe.
+
+In the period that follows come spasmodic attempts at negotiation by
+direct conversations between the parties concerned, with no advantage,
+but rather with the growth of mutual suspicion. Down to August 1st both
+Sir Edward Grey and M. Sazonof were busy trying to find some formula
+which might be accepted as a basis for postponing hostilities between
+the Great Powers. And here it may be well to point out that Prince
+Lichnowsky seems to have been left in the dark by his chiefs. On July
+24th, the day after the Austrian note was presented, he was so little
+acquainted with the true state of affairs, that speaking privately he
+told Sir Edward Grey 'that a reply favourable on some points must be
+sent at once by Servia, so that an excuse against immediate action might
+be afforded to Austria'.[73] And in the matter of the conference, on the
+very day that Herr von Jagow was making his excuses against entering the
+proposed conference, Prince Lichnowsky informed Sir Edward Grey, that
+the German Government accepted in principle mediation between Austria
+and Russia by the four Powers, reserving, of course, their right as an
+ally to help Austria if attacked.[74] The mutual incompatibility of the
+two voices of Germany was pointed out from Rome, where the Marquis di
+San Giuliano, the Italian Foreign Minister, attempted a reconciliation
+between them, on information received from Berlin, that 'the difficulty
+was rather the "conference" than the principle'.[75] But we may ask
+whether Herr von Jagow's reply to Sir Edward Goschen does not really
+show that the whole principle of a conference was objected to, seeing
+that he said that such a 'conference was not practicable', and that 'it
+would be best to await the outcome of the exchange of views between the
+Austrian and Russian Governments'.[76] But, if it was not the principle
+that was objected to, but only the form, where are we? We can do nothing
+else but assume that the German Government objected to the terms
+employed by Sir Edward Grey, and that for the sake of a mere quibble
+they wasted time until other events made the catastrophe inevitable.
+Impartiality will have to judge whether such action was deliberate or
+not; whether in this case also it is crime or folly which has to be laid
+at the door of the German Government.
+
+The proposed conference having been rejected by Germany, an attempt was
+then made by several Powers to invite Austria to suspend military
+action. Although Count Mensdorff, the Austrian Ambassador in London, had
+made on July 25th a distinction between military preparations and
+military operations, and had urged that his Government had only the
+former then in view, it was reported two days later from Rome that there
+were great doubts 'whether Germany would be willing to invite Austria to
+suspend military action pending the conference'. Even if she had been
+willing to do so, it is very doubtful whether, in view of the Austrian
+declaration of war against Servia on July 28th, and the simultaneous
+Austrian decree for general mobilization, the position of Europe could
+have been improved, for on July 29th that declaration was followed by
+news of the Russian mobilization of the southern districts of Odessa,
+Kiev, Moscow, and Kazan.[77]
+
+Now the German Secretary of State had argued that 'if Russia mobilized
+against Germany, latter would have to follow suit'. On being asked what
+he meant by 'mobilizing against Germany', he said that
+
+    'if Russia mobilized in the South, Germany would not mobilize, but
+    if she mobilized in the north, Germany would have to do so too, and
+    Russian system of mobilization was so complicated that it might be
+    difficult exactly to locate her mobilization. Germany would
+    therefore have to be very careful not to be taken by surprise.'[78]
+
+This was on July 27th, and it cannot be said to have been unreasonable.
+But when on July 29th Russia mobilized the southern districts no grounds
+for German mobilization had yet been provided. No secret was made about
+this mobilization by the Russian Ambassador at Berlin,[79] but it is
+perhaps as well to point out here the remark made by Sir George
+Buchanan, the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, about the language
+used by his German colleague concerning the mobilization of the four
+southern districts: 'He accused the Russian Government of endangering
+the peace of Europe by their mobilization, and said, when I referred to
+all that had recently been done by Austria, that he could not discuss
+such matters.'[80] It would perhaps be rash to assume that the German
+Ambassador, Count Pourtales, used such language to his home Government,
+for there is no evidence of it in the German White Book. What dispatches
+appear there from the German Embassy at St. Petersburg are refreshingly
+honest. The military attache says, 'I deem it certain that mobilization
+has been ordered for Kiev and Odessa'. He adds: 'it is doubtful at
+Warsaw and Moscow, and improbable elsewhere'.[81]
+
+There was therefore, according to the evidence produced by the Germans
+themselves, no mobilization 'against Germany'. The only thing that looks
+at all like hostile action is contained in the news sent by the Imperial
+German Consul at Kovno on July 27th, that a 'state of war'
+(_Kriegszustand_) had been proclaimed in that district. But this is a
+very different thing from mobilization; it was almost bound to follow in
+the northern provinces of the Empire as the result of mobilization
+elsewhere. At any rate the Consul at Kovno announced it on July 27th
+before any Russian mobilization at all had taken place, and the fact
+that Germany did not instantly mobilize shows that at the end of July
+that Government did not consider _Kriegszustand_ in Kovno to be
+equivalent to 'mobilization against Germany'.
+
+Opinion in Berlin seems to have been that Russia would not make war.
+Perhaps there was no real fear that Russia would take an aggressive
+attitude, for many people believed that 'Russia neither wanted, nor was
+in a position to make war'.[82] This attitude of mind was known and
+deplored in Rome, where the Marquis di San Giuliano said 'there seemed
+to be a difficulty in making Germany believe that Russia was in
+earnest'.[83] Such an opinion seems to have been shared by Count
+Pourtales, who on July 29 reported that the German Government were
+willing to guarantee that Servian integrity would be respected by
+Austria. This was held to be insufficient, as Servia might thus become
+an Austrian vassal, and there would be a revolution in Russia if she
+were to tolerate such a state of affairs. The next day the Russian
+Minister for Foreign Affairs told the British and French Ambassadors
+'that absolute proof was in the possession of the Russian Government
+that Germany was making military and naval preparations against
+Russia--more particularly in the direction of the Gulf of Finland'.[84]
+
+After this, is it difficult to see how German statesmen regarded the
+situation? Russia, in their eyes, was playing a game of bluff, and
+strong measures against her were in the interest of Germany. But, though
+under no illusion as to German preparations, M. Sazonof offered on July
+30 to stop all military preparations if Austria 'would eliminate from
+her ultimatum to Servia points which violate the principle of the
+sovereignty of Servia'.[85] 'Preparations for general mobilization will
+be proceeded with if this proposal is rejected by Austria,' wrote Sir
+George Buchanan.[86] The next day he reported to Sir Edward Grey that
+all attempts to obtain the consent of Austria to mediation had failed,
+and that she was moving troops against Russia as well as against
+Servia.[87]
+
+Face to face therefore with war against another Power, Russia ordered a
+general mobilization.[88] This was answered on the same day by a
+proclamation of _Kriegsgefahr_ at Berlin, 'as it can only be against
+Germany that Russian general mobilization is directed'.[89]
+
+Thus on Friday, July 31st, the situation had come to be this, that
+Russia, feeling herself threatened by the military preparations of
+Austria and Germany, decided to issue orders for a general
+mobilization.[90] Meanwhile Sir Edward Grey still clung to the hope that
+mediation with a view to safeguarding Austrian interests as against
+Servia might yet be accepted.[91] But his efforts were useless, for
+Germany had launched an ultimatum (July 31) to Russia, demanding
+demobilization. As Sir Edward Goschen pointed out, the demand was made
+'even more difficult for Russia to accept by asking them to demobilize
+in the south as well'.[92] The only explanation actually vouchsafed was
+that this had been asked to prevent Russia pleading that all her
+mobilization was only directed against Austria. Such a quibble, when
+such interests are at stake, seems to call for severe comment.
+
+War between the three empires seemed now inevitable, for though the
+Emperor of Russia and the German Emperor had exchanged telegrams each
+imploring the other to find a way out of the difficulty, and each saying
+that matters had gone so far that neither could grant the other's
+demands,[93] the officials at Berlin were now taking up the position
+that 'Russia's mobilization had spoilt everything'.[94] This attitude is
+as inexplicable as it proved disastrous. For it appears that on July 31
+Austria and Russia were ready to resume conversations. The Austrians,
+apparently alarmed at the prospect of a general war, were ready to
+discuss the substance of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia, and Russia
+announced that under certain conditions 'she would undertake to preserve
+her waiting attitude'.[95] Having issued her ultimatum to Russia,
+Germany naturally mobilized, but what kind of diplomacy is this in
+which, with the principals both ready to negotiate, a third party issues
+an ultimatum couched in such terms that a proud country can give but one
+answer?
+
+The sequence of events seems to be as follows. Austria mobilized against
+Servia. Russia, rightly or wrongly, took this as a threat to herself,
+and mobilized all her southern forces against Austria. Then Germany
+threatened to mobilize unless Russia ceased her military
+preparations--an inexcusable step, which increased Russia's
+apprehensions of a general war, and made a general Russian mobilization
+inevitable.[96] If Russia was the first to mobilize, she took this step
+in consequence of German threats. We repeat that in spite of the three
+empires taking this action, discussion was still possible between Russia
+and Austria,[97] and might have had good results. In fact, the situation
+was not irretrievable, if Germany had not rendered it so by issuing her
+ultimatum to Russia. Once again we may ask, was this crime or folly?
+
+
+II
+
+_Germany's attitude to France._
+
+We must now turn our eyes to the West of Europe, and observe the
+diplomacy of Germany with regard to France and Great Britain. On the
+27th of July we are told that the German Government received 'the first
+intimation concerning the preparatory measures taken by France: the 14th
+Corps discontinued the manoeuvres and returned to its garrison'.[98]
+Will it be believed that, except for the assertion 'of rapidly
+progressing preparations of France, both on water and on land',[99] this
+is the only shred of evidence that the Germans have produced to prove
+the aggressive intentions of France? And it may be worth while to point
+out that on July 29, when the German White Book says that Berlin heard
+of the 'rapidly progressing preparations of France', the French
+Ambassador at Berlin informed the Secretary of State that 'they had done
+nothing more than the German Government had done, namely, recalled the
+officers on leave'.[100]
+
+The very next day the French Government had 'reliable information that
+the German troops are concentrated round Thionville and Metz ready for
+war',[101] and before July 30th German patrols twice penetrated into
+French territory.[102] With great forbearance the French Government
+withdrew its troops ten kilometres from the frontier; and, although
+German reservists had been recalled from abroad 'by tens of thousands',
+the French Government had not called out a single reservist. Well might
+the French Minister for Foreign Affairs say 'Germany has done it'.[103]
+
+Having thus invaded France before July 30th, the German Government
+presented an ultimatum (July 31) demanding what were the French
+intentions, and on August 1st the French Government replied that it
+would consult its own interests.[104]
+
+
+III
+
+_The Question of British Neutrality_.
+
+Even then, nothing had happened to bring this country into the quarrel.
+If Germany were making war primarily on Russia, and France were only
+involved as the auxiliary of Russia, Germany would have acted rapidly
+against Russia, and would have stood on the defensive against France;
+and England would not have been dragged into war.[105] The question of
+British neutrality first appears in the British White Book on July 25th,
+when Sir Edward Grey, in a note to Sir George Buchanan, said: 'if war
+does take place, the development of other issues may draw us into it,
+and I am therefore anxious to prevent it'.[106] Two days later he wrote
+again:--
+
+    'I have been told by the Russian Ambassador that in German and
+    Austrian circles impression prevails that in any event we would
+    stand aside ... This impression ought, as I have pointed out, to be
+    dispelled by the orders we have given to the First Fleet ... not to
+    disperse for manoeuvre leave. But ... my reference to it must not be
+    taken to mean that anything more than diplomatic action was
+    promised.'[107]
+
+On the 29th the question of our neutrality was seriously discussed at
+both the Courts of St. James and Berlin independently. Sir Edward Grey,
+in an interview with Prince Lichnowsky, told him 'he did not wish the
+Ambassador to be misled ... into thinking we should stand aside'.
+Developing this, Sir Edward Grey solemnly warned the German Ambassador
+that
+
+    'there was no question of our intervening if Germany was not
+    involved, or even if France was not involved, but if the issue did
+    become such that we thought British interests required us to
+    intervene, we must intervene at once, and the decision would have to
+    be very rapid.... But ... I did not wish to be open to any reproach
+    from him that the friendly tone of all our conversations had misled
+    him or his Government into supposing that we should not take
+    action.'[108]
+
+Before the news of this had reached Berlin the Imperial Chancellor had
+made his notorious 'bid for British neutrality' on July 29:--
+
+    'He said it was clear, so far as he was able to judge the main
+    principle which governed British policy, that Great Britain would
+    never stand by and allow France to be crushed in any conflict there
+    might be. That, however, was not the object at which Germany aimed.
+    Provided that neutrality of Great Britain were certain, every
+    assurance would be given to the British Government that the Imperial
+    Government aimed at no territorial acquisitions at the expense of
+    France, should they prove victorious in any war that might ensue.
+
+    'I questioned his Excellency about the French colonies, and he said
+    he was unable to give a similar undertaking in that respect. As
+    regards Holland ... so long as Germany's adversaries respected the
+    integrity and neutrality of the Netherlands, Germany was ready to
+    give His Majesty's Government an assurance that she would do
+    likewise. It depended on the action of France what operations
+    Germany might be forced to enter upon in Belgium, but when the war
+    was over, Belgian integrity would be respected if she had not sided
+    against Germany.'[109]
+
+This request was at once repudiated (July 30) by the British
+Government:--
+
+    'His Majesty's Government cannot for one moment entertain the
+    Chancellor's proposal that they should bind themselves to neutrality
+    on such terms.
+
+    'What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while French
+    colonies are taken and France is beaten so long as Germany does not
+    take French territory as distinct from the colonies.
+
+    'From the material point of view the proposal is unacceptable, for
+    France, without further territory in Europe being taken from her,
+    could be so crushed as to lose her position as a Great Power and
+    become subordinate to German policy.
+
+    'Altogether apart from that, it would be a disgrace for us to make
+    this bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace from
+    which the good name of this country would never recover.
+
+    'The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain away whatever
+    obligation or interest we have as regards the neutrality of Belgium.
+    We could not entertain that bargain either.[110]
+
+He continued by saying that Great Britain must keep her hands absolutely
+free and hinted at some scheme for preventing anti-German aggression by
+the Powers of the Triple _Entente_:--
+
+    'If the peace of Europe can be preserved, and the present crisis
+    safely passed, my own endeavour will be to promote some arrangement
+    to which Germany could be a party, by which she could be assured
+    that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her or
+    her allies by France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or separately
+    ... The idea has hitherto been too Utopian to form the subject of
+    definite proposals, but if this crisis ... be safely passed, I am
+    hopeful that the relief and reaction which will follow will make
+    possible some more definite rapprochement between the Powers than
+    has been possible hitherto.'
+
+Thus two points were made clear: we were seriously concerned that France
+should not be crushed, and that the neutrality of Belgium should not be
+violated. It is interesting to note how this extremely serious warning
+was received by Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg:--'His Excellency was so taken
+up with the news of the Russian measures along the frontier ... that he
+received your communication without a comment.'[111]
+
+But the text of the reply was left with him, so that he could scarcely
+complain that no warning had been given to him.
+
+With the data at our disposal, it is not possible to make any deduction
+as to the effect which this warning had upon Berlin; but it may be
+remarked that at Rome that day, the Marquis di San Giuliano told Sir
+Rennell Rodd that he had
+
+    'good reason to believe that Germany was now disposed to give more
+    conciliatory advice to Austria, as she seemed convinced that we
+    should act with France and Russia, and was most anxious to avoid
+    issue with us.'[112]
+
+As this telegraphic dispatch was not received till the next day, it is
+not impossible that the Italian Minister gave this information to Sir
+Rennell Rodd late in the day, after having received news from Berlin
+sent under the impression made by Sir Edward Grey's warning.
+
+Such an impression, if it ever existed, must have been of short
+duration, for when the British Government demanded both of France and
+Germany whether they were 'prepared to engage to respect neutrality of
+Belgium so long as no other Power violates it',[113] the French gave an
+unequivocal promise the same day,[114] while the German answer is a
+striking contrast:--
+
+    'I have seen Secretary of State, who informs me that he must consult
+    the Emperor and the Chancellor before he can possibly answer. I
+    gathered from what he said that he thought any reply they might give
+    could not but disclose a certain amount of their plan of campaign in
+    the event of war ensuing, and he was therefore very doubtful whether
+    they would return any answer at all. His Excellency, nevertheless,
+    took note of your request.
+
+    'It appears from what he said that German Government considers that
+    certain hostile acts have already been committed in Belgium. As an
+    instance of this, he alleged that a consignment of corn for Germany
+    had been placed under an embargo already.'[115]
+
+It was now clear that a violation of Belgian neutrality was a
+contingency that would have to be faced, and Prince Lichnowsky was
+warned the next day that 'the neutrality of Belgium affected feeling in
+this country', and he was asked to obtain an assurance from the German
+Government similar to that given by France:--
+
+    'If there were a violation of the neutrality of Belgium by one
+    combatant, while the other respected it, it would be extremely
+    difficult to restrain public feeling in this country.'[116]
+
+The Ambassador then, on his own personal responsibility and without
+authority from his Government, tried to exact a promise that Great
+Britain would remain neutral 'if Germany gave a promise not to violate
+Belgian neutrality', but Sir Edward Grey was bound to refuse such an
+offer, seeing that it left out of account all question of an attack on
+France and her colonies, about which it had been stated already that
+there could be no bargaining. Even the guarantee of the integrity of
+France and her colonies was suggested, but again Sir Edward Grey was
+bound to refuse, for the reasons he gave to Sir Edward Goschen in
+rejecting what is now known as Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg's 'infamous
+proposal', namely, that France without actually losing territory might
+be so crushed as to lose her position as a Great Power, and become
+subordinate to German policy. And if there should be still any doubt
+about Sir Edward Grey's policy at this moment, we would refer to his
+statement in the House of Commons on August 27.[117] The important
+points are that the offers of August 1 were made on the sole
+responsibility of Prince Lichnowsky, and without authority from his
+Government; that the Cabinet on August 2 carefully discussed the
+conditions on which we might remain neutral, and that, on August 3, so
+far was the German Ambassador from guaranteeing the neutrality of
+Belgium that he actually had to ask Sir Edward Grey 'not to make the
+neutrality of Belgium one of our conditions'. Whatever Prince Lichnowsky
+may have said privately on August 1, the one fact certain is that two
+days later the German Government were making no concessions on that
+point; on the contrary they were asking us to withdraw from a position
+we had taken up on July 30, four days before.
+
+One more effort to preserve peace in Western Europe seems to have been
+made by Sir Edward Grey. On the telephone he asked Prince Lichnowsky
+whether, if France remained neutral, Germany would promise not to attack
+her. The impression seems to have prevailed in Berlin that this was an
+offer to guarantee French neutrality by the force of British arms, and
+the German Emperor in his telegram to the King gave evidence of the
+relief His Imperial Majesty felt at the prospect that the good relations
+between the two countries would be maintained. Unfortunately for such
+hopes, France had never been consulted in the matter, nor was there ever
+any idea of coercing France into neutrality, and even the original
+proposal had to be abandoned on consideration as unpractical.[118]
+
+Events now marched rapidly. While the Cabinet in London were still
+discussing whether a violation of Belgian neutrality would be an
+occasion for war, the news came of the violation of that of Luxemburg.
+Sir Edward Grey informed M. Cambon[119] that Lord Stanley and Lord
+Clarendon in 1867 had agreed to a 'collective guarantee' by which it was
+not intended that every Power was bound single-handed to fight any
+Government which violated Luxemburg. Although this gross disregard by
+the Germans of their solemn pledge did not entail the same consequences
+as the subsequent violation of Belgian neutrality, it is equally
+reprehensible from the point of view of international law, and the more
+cowardly in proportion as this state is weaker than Belgium. Against
+this intrusion Luxemburg protested, but, unlike Belgium, she did not
+appeal to the Powers.[120]
+
+Two days later, August 4th, the King of the Belgians appealed to the
+King for 'diplomatic intervention to safeguard the integrity of
+Belgium'.[121] The German Government had issued an ultimatum to the
+Belgian, asking for
+
+    'a free passage through Belgian territory, and promising to maintain
+    the independence and integrity of the kingdom and its possessions at
+    the conclusion of peace, threatening in case of refusal to treat
+    Belgium as an enemy. An answer was requested within twelve
+    hours'.[122]
+
+Sir Edward Grey instructed the British Ambassador to protest against
+this violation of a treaty to which Germany in common with ourselves was
+a party, and to ask an assurance that the demand made upon Belgium would
+not be proceeded with. At the same time the Belgian Government was told
+to resist German aggression by all the means in its power, as Great
+Britain was prepared to join France and Russia to maintain the
+independence and integrity of Belgium.[123] On receipt of the protest of
+Sir Edward Grey, it would seem that Herr von Jagow made one more
+desperate effort to bid for British neutrality: 'Germany will, under no
+pretence whatever, annex Belgian territory': to pass through Belgium was
+necessary because the 'German army could not be exposed to French attack
+across Belgium, which was planned according to absolutely unimpeachable
+information'. It was for Germany 'a question of life and death to
+prevent French advance'.[124] But matters had gone too far: that day
+(August 4) the Germans violated Belgian territory at Gemmenich, and
+thereupon the British demand to Germany to respect Belgian neutrality,
+issued earlier in the day, was converted into an ultimatum:--
+
+    'We hear that Germany has addressed note to Belgian Minister for
+    Foreign Affairs stating that German Government will be compelled to
+    carry out, if necessary by force of arms, the measures considered
+    indispensable.
+
+    'We are also informed that Belgian territory has been violated at
+    Gemmenich.
+
+    'In these circumstances, and in view of the fact that Germany
+    declined to give the same assurance respecting Belgium as France
+    gave last week in reply to our request made simultaneously at Berlin
+    and Paris, we must repeat that request, and ask that a satisfactory
+    reply to it and to my telegram of this morning be received here by
+    12 o'clock to-night. If not, you are instructed to ask for your
+    passports, and to say that His Majesty's Government feel bound to
+    take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium
+    and the observance of a treaty to which Germany is as much a party
+    as ourselves.'[125]
+
+The effect at Berlin was remarkable. Every sign was given of
+disappointment and resentment at such a step being taken, and the
+'harangue' of the Chancellor to Sir Edward Goschen, and his astonishment
+at the value laid by Great Britain upon the 'scrap of paper' of 1839
+would seem, when coupled with Herr von Jagow's desperate bid for
+neutrality at the last moment, to show that the German Government had
+counted on the neutrality of this country and had been deeply
+disappointed. If these outbursts and attempts at the eleventh hour to
+bargain for our neutrality were genuine efforts to keep the peace
+between Great Britain and Germany, it is our belief that their origin
+must be found in the highest authority in the German Empire, whom we
+believe, in spite of petty signs of spitefulness exhibited since the war
+broke out, to have been sincerely and honestly working in favour of
+European peace, against obstacles little dreamt of by our countrymen.
+But certain signs are not wanting that, in the lower ranks of the German
+hierarchy, war with this country had been decided on, and that Sir
+Edward Grey was not far wrong when he wrote to Sir Francis Bertie on
+July 31, 'I believe it to be quite untrue that our attitude has been a
+decisive factor in situation. German Government do not expect our
+neutrality.'[126] On what other grounds than that orders had been sent
+out from Berlin can the fact be explained that the German Customs
+authorities, three days before the declaration of war, began detaining
+British ships,[127] and compulsorily unloading cargoes of sugar from
+British vessels? In the former case, indeed, the ships were ordered to
+be released; in the latter case, of which the complaint was made
+twenty-four hours later, the reply to inquiries was the ominous
+statement that 'no information was to be had'.[128]
+
+This, however, is a digression from the main question. History will
+doubtless attribute the outbreak of war between ourselves and Germany to
+the development of the Belgian question, and, we are confident, will
+judge that had it not been for the gratuitous attack made on a neutral
+country by Germany, war with Great Britain would not have ensued on
+August 4, 1914. The excuses put forward by the German Government for
+this wanton outrage on international agreements are instructive. In
+conversation with Sir Edward Goschen, neither Herr von Jagow nor the
+Chancellor urged that the French had violated the neutrality; the
+argument is purely and simply that the route by way of the Vosges is
+difficult, time is everything, and it is a matter of life and death to
+Germany to crush France as quickly as possible, in order that she may be
+able to meet the Russians before they reach the German frontier. This
+excuse does not seem to have been very satisfactory even to those who
+put it forward, though it was indubitably the real reason; so vice paid
+homage to virtue, and Herr von Jagow urged to Prince Lichnowsky that he
+had 'absolutely unimpeachable information' that the German army was
+exposed to French attack across Belgium. On the other hand, the
+Chancellor, as late as August 4th, seems to have known nothing of any
+such action by France; at any rate he made no mention of it in his
+speech to the Reichstag:--
+
+    'We are now in a state of necessity, and necessity knows no law. Our
+    troops have occupied Luxemburg and perhaps are already on Belgian
+    soil. Gentlemen, that is contrary to the dictates of international
+    law. It is true that the French Government has declared at Brussels
+    that France is willing to respect the neutrality of Belgium, as long
+    as her opponent respects it. We knew, however, that France stood
+    ready for invasion. France could wait but we could not wait. A
+    French movement upon our flank upon the Lower Rhine might have been
+    disastrous. So we were compelled to override the just protest of the
+    Luxemburg and Belgian Governments. The wrong--I speak openly--that
+    we are committing we will endeavour to make good as soon as our
+    military goal has been reached. Anybody who is threatened as we are
+    threatened, and is fighting for his highest possessions, can only
+    have one thought--how he is to hack his way through.'[129]
+
+In this double-faced position of the German Government, we have an
+example either of unsurpassed wickedness or of insurpassable folly. The
+violation of Belgium must have been designed either in order to bring us
+into the quarrel, or on the supposition that, in spite of treaties and
+warnings, we should yet remain neutral. Yet the foolishness of such a
+calculation is as nothing to that which prompted the excuse that Germany
+had to violate Belgian neutrality because the French were going to do
+so, or had done so. In such a case undoubtedly the wisest course for
+Germany would have been to allow the French to earn the reward of their
+own folly and be attacked not only by Belgium but also by Great Britain,
+to whom not five days before they had solemnly promised to observe the
+neutrality, and whom such a gross violation of the French word must
+indubitably have kept neutral, if it did not throw her on to the side of
+Germany. In regard to Belgium the Germans have indeed put forward the
+plea that the French had already violated its neutrality before war was
+declared. This plea has been like a snowball. It began with the
+ineffective accusation that the French were at Givet, a town in French
+territory, and that this constituted an attack on Germany, though how
+the presence of the French in a town of their own could be called a
+violation of their neighbour's neutrality it is difficult to see. From
+that it has gradually grown into a more formidable story of the French
+supplying a garrison to Liege. There can be little doubt that all these
+attempts by Herr von Jagow to claim that the French violated Belgian
+neutrality are another illustration of Swift's dictum to the effect that
+'as universal a practice as lying is, and as easy a one as it seems', it
+is astonishing that it has been brought to so little perfection, 'even
+by those who are most celebrated in that faculty'.[130]
+
+
+IV
+
+_England and Servia_.
+
+We have seen what attitude was taken by Germany in the crisis which
+followed upon the Serajevo murders and more definitely upon the
+presentation of the Austrian note. It is equally important, and to
+English readers at least more interesting, to realize what attitude was
+taken by England. Sir Edward Grey throughout maintained the position,
+which he was so justly praised for adopting in 1912, that England had no
+direct interest in Balkan disputes, but that it was her bounden duty to
+prevent a European conflagration. He quickly saw, what Germany would not
+see, that Russia was so much interested in Servia, for both political
+and religious reasons, that any attempt by the Austro-Hungarian
+Government to coerce Servia, to interfere with her territorial integrity
+or independence as a sovereign state, would inevitably rouse Russia to
+military action. For Russia had greater interests in the security of
+Servia than Great Britain had in the security of Belgium. In each case
+the Great Power was bound by honour and self-interest alike to interfere
+to protect the smaller Power, but Russia was also bound to Servia by
+racial and religious bonds. This being so, Sir Edward Grey set himself,
+not as the German White Book says[131] to localize the conflict, but to
+prevent if possible a conflict between Austria-Hungary and Servia which
+would inevitably involve Russia and probably other European powers. He
+stated his policy with the greatest clearness in the House of Commons on
+July 27th, but he had already acted on the lines of the policy which he
+then explained. On July 24th he told Count Mensdorff that he would
+concern himself
+
+    'with the matter simply and solely from the point of view of the
+    peace of Europe. The merits of the dispute between Austria and
+    Servia were not the concern of His Majesty's Government[132].'
+
+In similar language, but more fully, on the same day he told the German
+Ambassador:--
+
+    'If the presentation of this ultimatum to Servia did not lead to
+    trouble between Austria and Russia, we need not concern ourselves
+    about it; but if Russia took the view of the Austrian ultimatum
+    which it seemed to me that any Power interested in Servia would
+    take, I should be quite powerless, in face of the terms of the
+    ultimatum, to exercise any moderating influence[133].'
+
+Sir Edward Grey at once urged that the four Powers, Germany, Italy,
+France, and Great Britain, should act together in the interests of peace
+at the courts of St. Petersburg and Vienna. And he went further and
+tried to induce Servia to 'express concern and regret' and to 'give
+Austria the fullest satisfaction', 'if it is proved that Servian
+officials, however subordinate, were accomplices in the murders at
+Serajevo[134].' Further than that no British Foreign Minister could go;
+Sir George Buchanan correctly explained the situation to M. Sazonof when
+he laid stress on the need of the sanction of British public
+opinion[135]. Sir Edward Grey re-echoed this when he wrote:--
+
+    'I do not consider that public opinion here would or ought to
+    sanction our going to war over a Servian quarrel. If, however, war
+    does take place, the development of other issues may draw us into
+    it, and I am therefore anxious to prevent it.'[136]
+
+However, matters were moving rapidly: the Servian reply[137] was
+presented on July 25; it was considered unsatisfactory by the
+Austro-Hungarian Government, and the Minister, with the Legation-staff,
+withdrew from Belgrade. Next day Sir Edward Grey proposed that a
+conference of Germany, Italy, France, and Great Britain should meet in
+London immediately 'for the purpose of discovering an issue which would
+prevent complications', and 'that all active military operations should
+be suspended pending results of conference'.[138] This proposal failed,
+as has been explained in earlier pages (pp. 71-3), and on July 28th
+Austria-Hungary declared war on Servia. Sir Edward Grey remained firm to
+his original attitude of non-intervention, and told M. Cambon that 'the
+dispute between Austria and Servia was not one in which we felt called
+to take a hand'.[139] And on the same day he declined to discuss with
+Count Mensdorff 'the merits of the question between Austria and
+Servia'.[140]
+
+No one can doubt that Sir Edward Grey's attitude was diplomatically
+correct and consistent. It was also inspired by a genuine desire for
+peace, and stands out in sharp contrast with the 'equivocal and
+double-faced' policy of Germany, and with the obstinacy of Austria in
+refusing to permit the Powers to mediate; for it was with truth that M.
+Sazonof remarked that
+
+    'a refusal to prolong the term of the ultimatum would render
+    nugatory the proposals made by the Austro-Hungarian Government to
+    the Powers, and would be in contradiction to the very basis of
+    international relations.'[141]
+
+
+V
+
+_Great Britain declines 'Solidarity' with Russia and France_.
+
+There is however another question which involves the whole foreign
+policy of Great Britain. Could Sir Edward Grey have prevented the war by
+boldly declaring at once that England would support Russia and France,
+if necessary by armed force? It was a policy urged on him from several
+quarters, and it is possible that such action might have been
+successful. It is to Sir Edward Grey's credit that he quietly but firmly
+refused to take so hazardous and unprecedented a step. Let us examine
+these proposals briefly. As early as July 24th M. Sazonof 'hoped that
+His Majesty's Government would not fail to proclaim their solidarity
+with Russia and France.[142]' The French Ambassador at St. Petersburg
+joined in the request, and M. Sazonof pointed out that
+
+    'we would sooner or later be dragged into war if it did break out;
+    we should have rendered war more likely if we did not from the
+    outset make common cause with his country and with France[143].'
+
+On July 30th the President of the French Republic expressed his
+conviction that
+
+    'peace between the Powers is in the hands of Great Britain. If His
+    Majesty's Government announced that England would come to the aid of
+    France in the event of a conflict between France and Germany, as a
+    result of the present differences between Austria and Servia, there
+    would be no war, for Germany would at once modify her
+    attitude[144].'
+
+Even more important was the opinion of the Italian Minister for Foreign
+Affairs, whose country was a member of the Triple Alliance:--
+
+    'As Germany was really anxious for good relations with ourselves, if
+    she believed that Great Britain would act with Russia and France, he
+    thought it would have a great effect.'[145]
+
+Such opinions must, and do, carry great weight, but Sir Edward Grey and
+the British Ambassadors were equally firm in withstanding them. Sir
+George Buchanan at once told M. Sazonof that he
+
+    'saw no reason to expect any declaration of solidarity from His
+    Majesty's Government that would entail an unconditional engagement
+    on their part to support Russia and France by force of arms'.[146]
+
+On July 27th he met the proposal more directly by pointing out that, so
+far from such a policy conducing to the maintenance of peace, it would
+merely offend the pride of the Germans and stiffen them in their present
+attitude.[147] Two days later Sir Edward Grey pointed out to M. Cambon
+that
+
+    'even if the question became one between Austria and Russia, we
+    should not feel called upon to take a hand in it. It would then be a
+    question of the supremacy of Teuton or Slav--a struggle for
+    supremacy in the Balkans; and our idea had always been to avoid
+    being drawn into a war over a Balkan question'.[148]
+
+That is one answer to the proposal, an answer based on history and on
+Britain's foreign policy in past years. Sir Edward Grey had another
+answer. It was to the effect that Germany could not, and ought to have
+known she could not, rely on our neutrality. For when the Russian
+Ambassador told him that an impression prevailed in German and Austrian
+circles that in any event England would stand aside, he pointed out that
+
+    'this impression ought to be dispelled by the orders we have given
+    to the First Fleet, which is concentrated, as it happens, at
+    Portland, not to disperse for manoeuvre leave'.[149]
+
+The situation continued to develop unfavourably for the cause of peace
+owing to the Austrian declaration of war on Servia, and the consequent
+mobilizations in Russia, Germany, and France. On July 31st Sir Edward
+Grey said:--
+
+    'I believe it to be quite untrue that our attitude has been a
+    decisive factor in situation. German Government do not expect our
+    neutrality.'[150]
+
+It is not quite clear that Sir Edward Grey's belief was justified.
+England's attitude may have been an important factor in the situation,
+but still in our opinion Sir Edward Grey was not only right in refusing
+to commit England to a new Continental policy, but could not, with due
+observance of constitutional usages, have taken any other course. Again,
+it is doubtful whether the German Government did or did not rely on our
+neutrality. The German Chancellor and the German Secretary for Foreign
+Affairs later affected great surprise at our action. Germany, however,
+as we have shown above (p. 82), had been plainly warned by Sir Edward
+Grey on July 29th[151] that she could not rely on our remaining neutral
+under all circumstances.
+
+Whether Sir Edward Grey was right or wrong in his estimate of Germany's
+prudence is a small matter; what is important is that his action was
+throughout perfectly straightforward and consistent. And unquestionably
+he had a very difficult part to play. The near East was like a blazing
+rick surrounded by farm buildings; Germany was, if not stirring up the
+conflagration, certainly not attempting to pour water on the flames,
+while Austria, possibly--and even probably[152] with Germany's
+knowledge, would allow no one to make the attempt.
+
+It would have aided the Austrian cause more effectively in Europe and
+elsewhere, if the Government had communicated[153] 'the _dossier_
+elucidating the Servian intrigues and the connexion between these
+intrigues and the murder of 28th June', which it said it held at the
+disposal of the British Government.[154] For even Count Mensdorff
+'admitted that, on paper, the Servian reply might seem to be
+satisfactory'.[155]
+
+To judge whether the Servian reply was satisfactory, it was, and is,
+necessary to examine the evidence on which the Austro-Hungarian
+Government based the accusations formulated in its note of July 23rd.
+But even assuming that the Austrian charges were true, as the German
+White Book says they are,[156] it is only a stronger reason for allowing
+the Powers to examine this evidence; and it does not explain the
+persistent refusal,[157] until July 31st,[158] to permit any
+negotiations on the basis of the Servian reply.
+
+Such being the situation, it is very difficult to see what more Sir
+Edward Grey could have done to prevent the outbreak of war between
+Austria-Hungary and Servia, which did inevitably, as he foresaw from the
+first, drag in other nations. He urged Servia to moderation and even to
+submission; he tried to induce the four Powers to mediate jointly at St.
+Petersburg and Vienna; he proposed a conference of the four Powers to
+prevent further complications; he did everything in his power to
+restrain Russia from immediate armed support of Servia; he declined to
+join Russia and France in eventual military action; and even up to the
+violation of the neutrality of Belgium he still strove to avert the
+horrors of war from Europe.
+
+
+VI
+
+_Italy's comments on the situation_.
+
+We have already shown (Chap. II) how Italy became a member of the Triple
+Alliance, and how, in spite of its apparent frailty and of the somewhat
+divergent aims of its members, that alliance has endured for thirty-two
+years. It remains to consider what policy Italy adopted in the critical
+situation created by the presentation of the Austro-Hungarian note to
+Servia, and to appreciate the significance of that policy. It is
+supremely significant that Italy, though a member of the Triple
+Alliance, was not consulted about the terms of the Austrian note to
+Servia; that she worked persistently side by side with England in
+endeavouring to prevent an outbreak of war, and, when that failed, to
+induce the states actually at war, or on the brink of war, to suspend
+all military operations in order to give diplomatic intervention an
+opportunity; and it is equally significant that, when the great war
+broke out, Italy remained neutral, in spite of the pressure from her
+allies and the tempting bait of a share of the spoil, which, it is said,
+is even now being offered to her.[159] This is but a bald description of
+Italy's policy, but it can be substantiated in detail from official
+documents. As early as July 25th the Italian Ambassador in a
+conversation with Sir Edward Grey 'made no secret of the fact that Italy
+was desirous to see war avoided',[160] and he cordially approved the
+idea of mediation by the four Powers. Two days later Italy again
+approved the proposed conference of four to be held immediately in
+London. The Italian Foreign Minister promised to recommend most strongly
+to the German Government the idea of asking Russia, Austria, and Servia
+to suspend military operations pending the result of the conference, and
+went even further in undertaking to ask what procedure Germany thought
+most likely to be successful at Vienna.[161] He thought it very doubtful
+whether Germany would consent to ask Austria to suspend military
+operations, but made a further suggestion that
+
+    'Servia may be induced to accept note in its entirety on the advice
+    of the four Powers invited to the conference, and this would enable
+    her to say that she had yielded to Europe and not to Austria-Hungary
+    alone'.[162]
+
+Next day the Marquis di San Giuliano called attention to a point in
+Servia's reply to Austria which might form a starting-point for
+mediation.[163] On July 29th he tried to get over Germany's objection to
+the idea of a 'Conference' by suggesting adherence to the idea of an
+exchange of views in London.[164] Next day he added to this the
+practical suggestion that
+
+    'Germany might invite Austria to state exactly the terms which she
+    would demand from Servia, and give a guarantee that she would
+    neither deprive her of independence, nor annex territory.... We
+    might, on the other hand, ascertain from Russia what she would
+    accept, and, once we knew the standpoints of these two countries,
+    discussions could be commenced at once.'[165]
+
+Moreover the Italian Ambassador at Vienna, in the hope of pacifying
+Russia, made the useful suggestion that Austria should
+
+    'convert into a binding engagement to Europe the declaration which
+    has been made at St. Petersburg to the effect that she desires
+    neither to destroy the independence of Servia, nor to acquire
+    Servian territory'.[166]
+
+All efforts to preserve peace proved futile; Germany delivered her
+ultimatum to France and to Russia. Then arose the question, what was
+Italy to do? The answer to this was given by the Italian Foreign
+Minister:--
+
+    'The war undertaken by Austria, and the consequences which might
+    result, had, in the words of the German Ambassador himself, an
+    aggressive object. Both were therefore in conflict with the purely
+    defensive character of the Triple Alliance; in such circumstances
+    Italy would remain neutral.'[167]
+
+The German White Book says 'Russia began the war on us'[168] and 'France
+opened hostilities'[169]; if these statements were true, Italy would
+have been obliged, if she were to remain faithful to her engagements, to
+take part in the war side by side with her colleagues of the Triple
+Alliance. Impartial readers can draw their own conclusions.
+
+
+NOTE
+
+_Austro-Hungarian note to Servia, and Servia's reply_.
+
+On July 23rd the Austro-Hungarian Government presented an ultimatum to
+Servia, demanding unconditional acceptance within 48 hours, an ultimatum
+which the _Temps_ next day described as 'unprecedented in its arrogance
+and in the extravagance of its demands'. Of it Sir Edward Grey said:--
+
+    'I had never before seen one State address to another independent
+    State a document of so formidable a character. Demand No. 5 would be
+    hardly consistent with the maintenance of Servia's independent
+    sovereignty, if it were to mean, as it seemed that it might, that
+    Austria-Hungary was to be invested with a right to appoint officials
+    who would have authority within the frontiers of Servia.'[170]
+
+It may be true, as the Austrian Ambassador explained,[171] that the
+Austro-Hungarian Government did not intend this step to be regarded as
+an ultimatum, but as a _demarche_ with a time-limit.
+
+In this extraordinary document[172] the Austro-Hungarian Government
+demanded:--
+
+A. That Servia should publish on the front page of its 'Official
+Gazette', and in the 'Official Bulletin' of the Army, and should
+communicate to the Army as the order of the day a declaration
+
+(1) condemning Serb propaganda against Austria-Hungary;
+
+(2) regretting that Servian officers and functionaries participated in
+the propaganda;
+
+(3) promising to proceed with the utmost rigour against persons who may
+be guilty of such machinations.
+
+B. That Servia should undertake
+
+(1) to suppress any publication inciting to hatred and contempt of
+Austria-Hungary;
+
+(2) to dissolve the society styled Narodna Odbrana and similar societies
+and to confiscate their means of propaganda;
+
+(3) to eliminate from public instruction in Servia all teachers and all
+methods of instruction responsible for fomenting opinion against
+Austria-Hungary;
+
+(4) to remove from the military service and from the administration all
+officers and functionaries guilty of such propaganda, whose names and
+deeds the Austro-Hungarian Government reserved to itself the right of
+communicating;
+
+(5) to accept the collaboration in Servia of representatives of
+Austria-Hungary in the suppression of the subversive anti-Austrian
+movement;
+
+(6) to take judicial proceedings against accessories to the Serajevo
+plot, with the co-operation of Austro-Hungarian delegates;
+
+(7) to proceed immediately to the arrest of Major Voija Tankositch and
+of Milan Ciganovitch, a Servian State employe, who have been compromised
+by the results of the inquiry at Serajevo;
+
+(8) to stop co-operation of Servian authorities in illicit traffic in
+arms and explosives, and to dismiss and punish those officials who
+helped the perpetrators of the Serajevo crime;
+
+(9) to explain the unjustifiable utterances of high Servian officials,
+at home and abroad, after the Serajevo crime.
+
+On July 25th the Servian reply[173] was presented to the
+Austro-Hungarian Government. Even to a reader with Austrian sympathies
+this reply seems to go a long way towards meeting the demands. The
+Servian Government agreed
+
+A. that Servia should, as demanded, publish a declaration
+
+(1) condemning all propaganda which may be directed against
+Austria-Hungary;
+
+(2) regretting that, according to the communication from the Imperial
+and Royal Government, Servian officers and officials participated in the
+propaganda;
+
+(3) promising to proceed with the utmost rigour against all persons who
+are guilty of such acts.
+
+B. That Servia would undertake
+
+(1) to introduce a provision into the press law providing for the most
+severe punishment of incitement to hatred and contempt of
+Austria-Hungary and to introduce an amendment to the Constitution
+providing for the confiscation of such publications;
+
+(2) to dissolve the Narodna Odbrana and similar societies;
+
+(3) to remove at once from their public educational establishments all
+that serves or could serve to foment propaganda, whenever the
+Austro-Hungarian Government furnish them with facts and proofs of this
+propaganda;
+
+(4) to remove from military service all such persons as the judicial
+inquiry may have proved to be guilty of acts directed against the
+territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary;
+
+(5) though they do not clearly grasp the meaning or the scope of the
+demand, to accept the collaboration of Austro-Hungarian officials so far
+as is consistent with the principle of international law, with criminal
+procedure and with good neighbourly relations;
+
+(6) to take judicial proceedings against accessories to the Serajevo
+plot; but they cannot admit the co-operation of Austro-Hungarian
+officials, as it would be a violation of the Constitution and of the law
+of criminal procedure;
+
+(7) On this they remark that Major Tankositch was arrested as soon as
+the note was presented, and that it has not been possible to arrest
+Ciganovitch, who is an Austro-Hungarian subject, but had been employed
+(on probation) by the directorate of railways;
+
+(8) to reinforce and extend the measures for preventing illicit traffic
+of arms and explosives across the frontier;
+
+(9) to give explanations of the remarks made by Servian officials, as
+soon as the Austro-Hungarian Government have communicated the passages
+and as soon as they have shown that the remarks were actually made by
+the said officials.
+
+The Austro-Hungarian Government regarded this reply as unsatisfactory
+and inadequate; they withdrew their Minister from Belgrade the same
+evening, and on July 28th declared war on Servia. Meanwhile they
+published a long official explanation[174] of the grounds on which the
+Servian reply was considered inadequate; in it they criticized and found
+unsatisfactory every single article of the reply, except that to demand
+No. 8. It is not worth while to analyze the whole of this; one sample
+may be sufficient. Sir Edward Grey commented on demand No. 5 and pointed
+out[175] that it
+
+    'would be hardly consistent with the maintenance of Servia's
+    independent sovereignty, if it were to mean, as it seemed that it
+    might, that Austria-Hungary was to be invested with a right to
+    appoint officials who would have authority within the frontiers of
+    Servia.'
+
+Obviously he was in doubt about the meaning and scope of this demand,
+and the next was equally vague. The Servian reply to these two demands
+was necessarily guarded: yet the Austro-Hungarian Government treated
+this as deliberate misrepresentation:--
+
+    'The international law, as well as the criminal law, has nothing to
+    do with this question; it is purely a matter of the nature of state
+    police which is to be solved by way of a special agreement. The
+    reserved attitude of Servia is therefore incomprehensible, and on
+    account of its vague general form it would lead to unbridgeable
+    difficulties.
+
+    ...
+
+    'If the Servian Government misunderstands us here, this is done
+    deliberately, for it must be familiar with the difference between
+    "enquete judiciaire" and simple police researches. As it desired to
+    escape from every control of the investigation which would yield, if
+    correctly carried out, highly undesirable results for it, and as it
+    possesses no means to refuse in a plausible manner the co-operation
+    of our officials (precedents for such police intervention exist in
+    great number), it tries to justify its refusal by showing up our
+    demands as impossible.'[176]
+
+It would have been fairer to Servia to assume that there had been a
+genuine misunderstanding, and that the explanation here given by Austria
+might prove satisfactory to Servia, as the Italian Minister for Foreign
+Affairs suggested.[177] The persistent refusal of Austria-Hungary to
+permit any discussion on the basis of the Servian reply goes far to
+justify Sir Maurice de Bunsen's impression
+
+    'that the Austro-Hungarian note was so drawn up as to make war
+    inevitable, that their Government are fully resolved to have war
+    with Servia, that they consider their position as a Great Power to
+    be at stake, and that until punishment has been administered to
+    Servia it is unlikely that they will listen to proposals of
+    mediation'.[178]
+
+Notes:
+
+[Footnote 57: _Correspondence respecting the European Crisis_, No. 2.
+Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 22, 1914.]
+
+[Footnote 58: German White Book, p. 4.]
+
+[Footnote 59: _Correspondence_, No. 10. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie,
+July 24.]
+
+[Footnote 60: _Correspondence_, No. 18. Sir H. Rumbold to Sir E. Grey,
+July 25.]
+
+[Footnote 61: Ibid. No. 32. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir E. Grey, July 26.
+See also German White Book, p. 5.]
+
+[Footnote 62: Ibid. No. 54. M. Sazonof to Count Benckendorff, July
+15/28, 1914 (communicated by Count Benckendorff, July 28).]
+
+[Footnote 63: _Correspondence_, No. 139. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey,
+August 1.]
+
+[Footnote 64: _Ibid_. No. 141. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir E. Grey, August
+1.]
+
+[Footnote 65: _Ibid_. No. 71. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 28.]
+
+[Footnote 66: _Correspondence_, No. 94. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir E. Grey,
+July 29.]
+
+[Footnote 67: German White Book, p. 4 (see _infra_ Appendix I).]
+
+[Footnote 68: _Ibid_. No. 36. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, Sir H.
+Rumbold, and Sir R. Rodd, July 26.]
+
+[Footnote 69: _Correspondence_, No. 43. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey,
+July 27.]
+
+[Footnote 70: _Ibid_. No. 60. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 28.]
+
+[Footnote 71: _Ibid_. No. 84. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, July 29.]
+
+[Footnote 72: p. 8 and Exhibit 12 (see _infra_ Appendix I).]
+
+[Footnote 73: _Correspondence_, No. 11. Sir E. Grey to Sir II. Rumbold,
+July 24.]
+
+[Footnote 74: _Correspondence_, No. 46. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen,
+July 27.]
+
+[Footnote 75: Ibid. No. 80. Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey, July 29.]
+
+[Footnote 76: Ibid. No. 43. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 27.]
+
+[Footnote 77: Although the German White Book attempts to make out that
+Russia mobilized on July 26th, it produces no evidence more satisfactory
+than the information of the German Imperial attache in Russia, whose
+account of the Russian military preparations supports only in part the
+allegations made at Berlin. See German White Book, Exhibits 6 and 7;
+also _Correspondence_, No. 78, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 29.
+For the Austrian decree of general mobilization, see the Russian Orange
+Book No. 47 (_infra_ in Appendix VI).]
+
+[Footnote 78: _Correspondence_, No. 43. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey,
+July 27.]
+
+[Footnote 79: _Ibid_. No. 76. The same to the same, July 29.]
+
+[Footnote 80: _Correspondence_, No. 78. Sir George Buchanan to Sir E.
+Grey, July 29, 1914.]
+
+[Footnote 81: German White Book, p. 38, and Exhibit No. 7, July 26.]
+
+[Footnote 82: _Correspondence_, No. 71. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey,
+July 28. See also quotation in _Times_ of July 29, p. 8, col. 2, from
+the _Militaer-Wochenblatt_: 'The fighting power of Russia is usually
+over-estimated, and numbers are far less decisive than _moral_, the
+higher command, armaments.... All military preparations for war, of
+whatever sort, have been taken with that attention to detail and that
+order which marks Germany. It can therefore be said, without
+exaggeration, that Germany can face the advent of grave events with
+complete calm, trusting to God and her own might.']
+
+[Footnote 83: _Correspondence_, No. 80. Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey, July
+29.]
+
+[Footnote 84: _Ibid_. No. 97. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 30.
+Cf. Russian Orange Book, Nos. 61, 62 (_infra_ in Appendix VI).]
+
+[Footnote 85: _Ibid_.]
+
+[Footnote 86: _Correspondence_, No. 97. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey,
+July 30.]
+
+[Footnote 87: _Ibid_. No. 113. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 31.]
+
+[Footnote 88: _Ibid_.]
+
+[Footnote 89: _Ibid_. No. 112. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 31.]
+
+[Footnote 90: _Ibid_. No. 113, _ut sup_. On August 1 _The Times_
+published a semi-official telegram from Berlin, dated Eydtkuhnen, July
+31, that 'the second and third Russian cavalry divisions are on the
+frontier between Wirballen, Augustof, and Allenstein'.]
+
+[Footnote 91: _Ibid_. No. 111. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, July 31.]
+
+[Footnote 92: _Ibid_. No. 121. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 31.]
+
+[Footnote 93: See German White Book, pp. 12 and 13, and Exhibits 20, 21,
+22, 23, 23a (see _infra_ Appendix I).]
+
+[Footnote 94: _Correspondence_, No. 121. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey,
+July 31.]
+
+[Footnote 95: _Ibid_. Nos. 131, 133, 135.]
+
+[Footnote 96: Russian Orange Book, No. 58 (_infra_ Appendix VI).]
+
+[Footnote 97: _Ibid_. No. 133. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, August 1,
+encloses a telegram of July 31, to the effect that 'The Austro-Hungarian
+Ambassador declared the readiness of his Government to discuss the
+substance of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia. M. Sazonof replied by
+expressing his satisfaction, and said it was desirable that the
+discussions should take place in London with the participation of the
+Great Powers.']
+
+[Footnote 98: German White Book, p. 8.]
+
+[Footnote 99: _Ibid_. p. 9, Exhibit No. 17.]
+
+[Footnote 100: _Correspondence_, No. 76. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey,
+July 29: 'His Excellency denied German Government had done this.
+Nevertheless it is true.']
+
+[Footnote 101: Ibid. No. 99. Sir F. Bertie to Sir E. Grey, July 30.]
+
+[Footnote 102: _Correspondence_. Enclosure 3 in No. 105. French Minister
+for Foreign Affairs to M. Cambon.]
+
+[Footnote 103: _Ibid_.]
+
+[Footnote 104: German White Book, p. 48 (see _infra_, Appendix I).]
+
+[Footnote 105: _Correspondence_, No. 138. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey,
+Aug. 1.]
+
+[Footnote 106: _Correspondence_, No. 24. Sir E. Grey to Sir G. Buchanan,
+July 25.]
+
+[Footnote 107: _Correspondence_, No. 47. Sir E. Grey to Sir G. Buchanan,
+July 27.]
+
+[Footnote 108: _Ibid_. No. 89. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, July 29.]
+
+[Footnote 109: _Correspondence_, No. 85. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey,
+July 29 (received July 29).]
+
+[Footnote 110: _Ibid_. No. 101. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, July 30.]
+
+[Footnote 111: _Correspondence_, No. 109. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey,
+July 31.]
+
+[Footnote 112: _Ibid_. No. 106. Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey, July 30.]
+
+[Footnote 113: _Correspondence_, No. 114. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie
+and Sir E. Goschen, July 31.]
+
+[Footnote 114: _Ibid_. No. 125. Sir F. Bertie to Sir E. Grey, July 31.]
+
+[Footnote 115: _Ibid_. No. 122. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 31.
+It may be observed that by the Hague Convention of 1907, Belgium was
+bound to impose this embargo after the ultimatum of Germany to Russia
+(Art. 2).]
+
+[Footnote 116: _Correspondence_, No. 123. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen,
+August 1.]
+
+[Footnote 117: _The Times_, August 28, 1914, p. 9, cols. 5 and 6.]
+
+[Footnote 118: See _The Times_, August 27, 1914. The Imperial Chancellor
+telegraphed to Prince Lichnowsky: 'Germany is ready to take up the
+English proposal if England guarantees with her forces the absolute
+neutrality of France in a Russo-German conflict.... We promise that the
+French frontier shall not be passed by our troops before 7 p.m. on
+Monday, August 3, if England's consent is given in the meantime.']
+
+[Footnote 119: _Correspondence_, No. 148. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie,
+August 2.]
+
+[Footnote 120: _Correspondence_, No. 147. Minister of State, Luxemburg,
+to Sir E. Grey, August 2.]
+
+[Footnote 121: _Ibid_. No. 153. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, August
+4.]
+
+[Footnote 122: _Ibid_.]
+
+[Footnote 123: _Ibid_. No. 155. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Villiers, August
+4.]
+
+[Footnote 124: _Correspondence_, No. 157. German Foreign Secretary to
+Prince Lichnowsky, August 4.]
+
+[Footnote 125: _Ibid_. No. 159. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, August
+4.]
+
+[Footnote 126: _Correspondence_, No. 116, July 31.]
+
+[Footnote 127: _Ibid_. Nos. 130, 143, 145.]
+
+[Footnote 128: _Ibid_. Nos. 149, 150, August 2 and 3.]
+
+[Footnote 129: _The Times_, August 11, p. 5, col. 1.]
+
+[Footnote 130: _Thoughts on Various Subjects, Moral and Diverting_
+(October, 1706).]
+
+[Footnote 131: p. 6.]
+
+[Footnote 132: _Correspondence_, No. 5. Sir E. Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen,
+July 24.]
+
+[Footnote 133: _Ibid_. No. 10. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, July 24.
+Cf. No. 24, Sir E. Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, July 25: 'The sudden,
+brusque, and peremptory character of the Austrian _demarche_ makes it
+almost inevitable that in a very short time both Russia and Austria will
+have mobilized against each other.']
+
+[Footnote 134: _Ibid_. No. 12. Sir E. Grey to Mr. Crackanthorpe, July
+24.]
+
+[Footnote 135: _Ibid_. No. 6. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 24:
+'I said ... direct British interests in Servia were _nil_, and a war on
+behalf of that country would never be sanctioned by British public
+opinion.']
+
+[Footnote 136: _Correspondence_, No. 24. Sir E. Grey to Sir G. Buchanan,
+July 25.]
+
+[Footnote 137: See note at the end of this chapter.]
+
+[Footnote 138: _Correspondence_, No. 36. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie,
+July 26.]
+
+[Footnote 139: _Ibid_. No. 87. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, July 29.]
+
+[Footnote 140: _Ibid_. No. 91. Sir E. Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, July
+29.]
+
+[Footnote 141: _Ibid_. No. 13. Note communicated to Sir E. Grey by the
+Russian Ambassador, July 25.]
+
+[Footnote 142: _Correspondence_, No. 6. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey,
+July 24.]
+
+[Footnote 143: _Ibid_.]
+
+[Footnote 144: _Ibid_. No. 99. Sir F. Bertie to Sir E. Grey, July 30.
+Cf. No. 119, Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, July 31.]
+
+[Footnote 145: _Correspondence_, No. 80. Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey,
+July 29.]
+
+[Footnote 146: _Ibid_. No. 6. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 24.]
+
+[Footnote 147: _Ibid_. No. 44. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 27:
+'Their (sc. the German) attitude would merely be stiffened by such a
+menace, and we could only induce her (sc. Germany) to use her influence
+at Vienna to avert war by approaching her in the capacity of a friend
+who was anxious to preserve peace.']
+
+[Footnote 148: _Ibid_. No. 87. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, July 29.]
+
+[Footnote 149: _Correspondence_, No. 47. Sir E. Grey to Sir G. Buchanan,
+July 27.]
+
+[Footnote 150: _Ibid_. No. 116. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, July 31.]
+
+[Footnote 151: _Ibid_. No. 89. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, July 29.]
+
+[Footnote 152: _Correspondence_, No. 95. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir E.
+Grey, July 30: 'Although I am not able to verify it, I have private
+information that the German Ambassador knew the text of the Austrian
+ultimatum to Servia before it was despatched, and telegraphed it to the
+German Emperor. I know from the German Ambassador himself that he
+endorses every line of it.']
+
+[Footnote 153: But see Appendix IV.]
+
+[Footnote 154: _Correspondence_, No. 4, p. 8.]
+
+[Footnote 155: _Ibid_. No. 48. Sir E. Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, July
+27.]
+
+[Footnote 156: pp. 3 to 5 and Exhibits 1 and 2 (see _infra_ Appendix
+I).]
+
+[Footnote 157: _Correspondence_, No. 61, Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir E.
+Grey, July 28; No. 78, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 29; No. 96,
+Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir E. Grey, July 30.]
+
+[Footnote 158: _Correspondence_, No. 110, Sir E. Grey to Sir G.
+Buchanan, July 31; No. 137, Sir E. Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, August 1.]
+
+[Footnote 159: _The Times_, September 3, p. 7. For Italy's ignorance of
+the contents of the Austrian note, see App. V.]
+
+[Footnote 160: _Correspondence_, No. 29. Sir E. Grey to Sir R. Rodd,
+July 25.]
+
+[Footnote 161: _Ibid_. No. 49. Sir E. Grey to Sir R. Rodd, July 27.]
+
+[Footnote 162: _Ibid_. No. 57. Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey, July 27. Cf.
+No. 78, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, July 29.]
+
+[Footnote 163: _Correspondence_, No. 64. Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey,
+July 28. Cf. _supra_, p. 99.]
+
+[Footnote 164: _Ibid_. No. 80. Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey, July 29. Cf.
+No. 92, Sir E. Grey to Sir R. Rodd, July 29.]
+
+[Footnote 165: _Ibid_. No. 106. Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey, July 30.]
+
+[Footnote 166: _Ibid_. No. 79. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir E. Grey, July
+29.]
+
+[Footnote 167: _Ibid_. No. 152. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, August 3.]
+
+[Footnote 168: p. 15 (see Appendix I _infra_).]
+
+[Footnote 169: p. 16 (_ibid._).]
+
+[Footnote 170: _Correspondence_, No. 5. Sir E. Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen,
+July 24. The text is also given in the German White Book (pp. 18-23),
+which will be found in Appendix I.]
+
+[Footnote 171: _Ibid_. No. 14. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, July 25.]
+
+[Footnote 172: _Ibid_. No. 4. Communicated by Count Mensdorff, July 24.]
+
+[Footnote 173: _Correspondence_, No. 39. Communicated by the Servian
+Minister, July 27. See also German White Book (pp. 23-32), _infra_ in
+Appendix I.]
+
+[Footnote 174: German White Book, pp. 24 _et sqq_.; see _infra_ Appendix
+I.]
+
+[Footnote 175: _Correspondence_, No. 5. Sir E. Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen,
+July 24.]
+
+[Footnote 176: German White Book, pp. 29 _et sqq_.; see _infra_ Appendix
+I.]
+
+[Footnote 177: _Correspondence_, No. 64. Sir R. Rodd to Sir E. Grey,
+July 28.]
+
+[Footnote 178: _Ibid_. No. 41. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir E. Grey, July
+27.]
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VI
+
+
+THE NEW GERMAN THEORY OF THE STATE
+
+The war in which England is now engaged with Germany is fundamentally a
+war between two different principles--that of _raison d'etat_, and that
+of the rule of law. The antagonism between these two principles appeared
+in our own internal history as far back as the seventeenth century, when
+the Stuarts championed the theory of state-necessity and the practice of
+a prerogative free to act outside and above the law in order to meet the
+demands of state-necessity, and when Parliament defended the rule of law
+and sought to include the Crown under that law. The same antagonism now
+appears externally in a struggle between two nations, one of which
+claims a prerogative to act outside and above the public law of Europe
+in order to secure the 'safety' of its own state, while the other stands
+for the rule of public law. The one regards international covenants to
+which it has pledged its own word as 'scraps of paper' when they stand
+in the way of _salus populi_; the other regards the maintenance of such
+covenants as a grave and inevitable obligation.
+
+Taught by Treitschke, whom they regard as their great national
+historian, and whose lectures on _Politik_ have become a gospel, the
+Germans of to-day assume as an ultimate end and a final standard what
+they regard as the national German state.[179] 'The state', says
+Treitschke, 'is the highest thing in the external society of man: above
+it there is nothing at all in the history of the world.' There is here
+no room for comity of nations; for a _societas totius humani generis_;
+for international law in any true sense. What really exists is the
+exclusive state--_der geschlossene Staat_--and in another sense than
+that of Fichte. This state is rigorously national: it excludes all
+foreign words from its vocabulary, and it would fain exclude all foreign
+articles from its shores in order to found a real 'national' economy
+such as List preached. Further, in the teaching of Treitschke this
+exclusive state is, 'as Machiavelli first clearly saw', essentially
+power: _der Staat ist Macht_. It may be defined as 'the public might for
+defence and offence'. As the highest duty of the individual is
+self-perfection, the highest duty of the state is self-preservation; and
+self-preservation means power. 'To care for its power is the highest
+moral duty of the state.' 'Of all political weaknesses that of
+feebleness is the most abominable and despicable: it is the sin against
+the Holy Spirit of Politics.' This may seem the mere worship of might,
+and it is in effect nothing else than the mere worship of might; but we
+should misrepresent Treitschke if we did not add that power is not
+conceived by him as mere or bare power. The power of the state is
+precious and ultimate because the state is a vehicle of culture: the
+armed sword of the German state is precious because that state is the
+_colporteur_ of German culture. And thus Treitschke holds that
+Machiavelli, the great apostle of might, is only wrong in so far as he
+failed to see that might must justify itself by having a content, that
+is to say, by being used to spread the highest moral culture. It is
+naturally assumed by German nationalists that this is German culture.
+
+Two results flow from this philosophy, one negative, the other positive.
+The negative result is the repudiation of any idea of the final
+character of international obligation; the other is the praise of the
+glory of war.
+
+_Salus populi suprema lex_; and to it all international 'law' so called
+must bend. The absolute sovereignty of the state is necessary for its
+absolute power; and that absolute sovereignty cannot be bound by _any_
+obligation, even of its own making. Every treaty or promise made by a
+state, Treitschke holds, is to be understood as limited by the proviso
+_rebus sic stantibus_. 'A state cannot bind its will for the future over
+against other states.' International treaties are no absolute
+limitation, but a voluntary self-limitation of the state, and only for
+such time as the state may find to be convenient. The state has no judge
+set over it, and any 'legal' obligation it may incur is in the last
+resort subject to its own decision--in other words, to its own
+repudiation.[180] That the end justifies the means (in other words, that
+the maintenance of the German Empire as it stands justifies the
+violation of an international obligation) 'has a certain truth'. 'It is
+ridiculous to advise a state which is in competition with other states
+to start by taking the catechism into its hands.' All these hints of his
+master were adopted and expanded by Bernhardi, the faithful disciple of
+Treitschke, whose Berlin lectures were attended in the last quarter of
+the nineteenth century by soldiers and officials as well as by students.
+There is no such thing, Bernhardi feels, as universal international law.
+'Each nation evolves its own conception of Right (_Recht_): none can say
+that one nation has a better conception than another.' 'No
+self-respecting nation would sacrifice its own conception of Right' to
+any international rule: 'by so doing it would renounce its own highest
+ideals.' The ardent nationalism which will reject foreign words and
+foreign wares will reject international law as something 'foreign'.
+Again, Bernhardi makes play with the proviso _rebus sic stantibus_; and
+this, curiously enough, he does in reference to Belgium. Things are
+altered in Belgium, and therefore the plighted word of Germany may no
+longer be binding. 'When Belgium was proclaimed neutral, no one
+contemplated that she would lay claim to a large and valuable region of
+Africa. It may well be asked whether the acquisition of such territory
+is not _ipso facto_ a breach of neutrality.'[181]
+
+But it is the glorification of war--war aggressive as well as war
+defensive--which is the most striking result of the doctrine of the
+all-sufficing, all-embracing national state. In the index to
+Treitschke's _Politik_, under the word War, one reads the following
+headings--'its sanctity'; 'to be conceived as an ordinance set by God';
+'is the most powerful maker of nations'; 'is politics _par excellence_'.
+Two functions, says Treitschke, the state exists to discharge; and these
+are to administer law, and to make war. Of the two war, since it is
+politics _par excellence_, would appear to be the greater. War cannot be
+thought or wished out of the world: it is the only medicine for a sick
+nation. When we are sunk in the selfish individualism of peace, war
+comes to make us realize that we are members one of another. 'Therein
+lies the majesty of war, that the petty individual altogether vanishes
+before the great thought of the state.' War alone makes us realize the
+social organism to which we belong: 'it is political idealism which
+demands war.' And again, 'what a perversion of morality it were, if one
+struck out of humanity heroism'(_Heldentum_)--as if _Heldentum_ could
+not exist in peace! 'But the living God will see to it that war shall
+always recur as a terrible medicine for humanity.'
+
+Thus the idealization of the state as power results in the idealization
+of war. As we have seen that the state must be 'power' in order to
+preserve itself at all, we now find that it must be a war-state to
+preserve itself from 'sickness'. If it does not fight, individualism
+will triumph over the social organism; heroism will perish out of the
+world. Hence Bernhardi writes: 'the maintenance of peace never can or
+may be the goal of a policy'. War, war--the 'strong medicine', the
+teacher of heroism, and, as Bernhardi adds to Treitschke, the inevitable
+biological law, the force that spreads the finest culture--war is the
+law of humanity. And this war is offensive as well as defensive--
+primarily, indeed, offensive. For the growing nation must preserve
+all its new members in its bosom: it must not let them slip away
+by emigration to foreign soils. It must therefore find for itself
+colonies; and since the world is already largely occupied, it must find
+them by conquest from other powers.[182] Treitschke already cried the
+watchwords--'Colonies!' 'Sea-power to gain colonies!' Treitschke already
+designated England as the object of German attack, and began to instil
+in Germany a hatred of England. England blocked the way to the growth of
+Germany from a European into a World-power; Germany, to preserve intact
+for German culture the surplus of the growing population, must be a
+World-power or perish. And besides, England was a 'sick' state--a sham,
+an hypocrisy.[183]
+
+The whole philosophy seems paganism, or rather barbarism, with a moral
+veneer. It seems barbarism, because it brings us back to the good old
+days when mere might was right. Bernhardi, speaking of the right of
+conquest of new territory inherent in a growing people, tells us that in
+such cases 'might is at once the supreme right, and the dispute as to
+what is right is decided by the arbitrament of war', which gives a
+'biologically just decision'! And he expresses wonder and surprise at
+those who think that 'the weak nation is to have the same right to live
+as the powerful and vigorous nation'. In a word, then, might is right.
+The doctrine has in itself a rude barbaric simplicity: what is utterly
+revolting in the neo-Germanic presentment is its moral veneer--the talk
+of war as the fruit of 'political idealism' and the expression of the
+'social organism': the talk of 'historical development' as invalidating
+supposed 'rights' like the neutrality of Belgium; above all, the talk of
+power as 'the vehicle of the highest culture'. Treitschke, a stern
+Protestant, seeks to reconcile the doctrine with Christianity; but the
+doctrine is all the same pagan. It is the worship of brute force
+disguised as _Heldentum_, and of vicious cunning disguised as political
+morality: it is a mixture of Nietzsche[184] and of Machiavelli. It is a
+doctrine of the omnipotence of the super-nation, which 'to maintain its
+state', as Machiavelli said, 'will go to work against faith and charity
+and humanity and religion', and which will stride ruthlessly to war when
+'the day' comes. And when it goes to war, all the veneer of culture
+goes. 'Have a care', Mommsen once said, 'lest in this state, which has
+been at once a power in arms and a power in intelligence, the
+intelligence should vanish, and nothing but the pure military state
+should remain.' Mommsen's warning has come true in August, 1914. By
+their fruits ye shall know them. The fruits of _Heldentum_ are Louvain
+smoking in ashes to the sky.
+
+It has seemed worth while to describe this philosophy of life, because
+it is not only the philosophy of a professor like Treitschke, but also
+that of a soldier like Bernhardi; and not only so, but it is the
+philosophy of the Prussian Government. Even the Imperial Chancellor
+himself used this doctrine (with some qualms, it is true) to justify
+Germany in 'hewing its way' through Belgium. Let us only remember, in
+justice to a great people, that it is not really the doctrine of
+Germany, but rather the doctrine of Prussia (though Treitschke will tell
+us that Germany is 'just merely an extended Prussia'). And let us
+remember, in extenuation of Prussia, that she has suffered from two
+things--geographical pressure springing from her mid-European situation,
+and an evil tradition of ruthless conquest perpetuated by her
+Hohenzollern rulers since the days of the Great Elector, and especially
+since Frederic the Great. Geographical pressure on all sides has made
+Prussia feel herself in a state of chronic strangulation; and a man who
+feels strangled will struggle ruthlessly for breath. To get breathing
+space, to secure frontiers which would ease an intolerable pressure,
+Frederic the Great could seize Silesia in time of peace in spite of his
+father's guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction, and could suggest the
+partition of Poland. Frontier pressure thus led to ruthless conquest
+irrespective of rights; and that tradition has sunk deep. It has been
+easier for England, an island state in the West exempt from pressure, to
+think in other terms: it has been possible for Russia, secure in the
+East, to think, and to think nobly (as the present Tsar has done), of
+international obligation. Nor is it an accident that sees England and
+Russia united in the common cause of Europe to-day--that sees both
+championing the cause of small nations, one in the East, the other in
+the West.[185]
+
+But in whatever way we may excuse Prussia we must fight Prussia; and we
+fight it in the noblest cause for which men can fight. That cause is the
+public law of Europe, as a sure shield and buckler of all nations, great
+and small, and especially the small. To the doctrine of the almightiness
+of the state--to the doctrine that all means are justified which are, or
+seem, necessary to its self-preservation, we oppose the doctrine of a
+European society, or at least a European comity of nations, within which
+all states stand; we oppose the doctrine of a public law of Europe, by
+which all states are bound to respect the covenants they have made. We
+will not and cannot tolerate the view that nations are 'in the state and
+posture of gladiators' in their relations one with another; we stand for
+the reign of law.
+
+Our cause, as one would expect from a people that has fought out its own
+internal struggles under the forms of law, is a legal cause. We are a
+people in whose blood the cause of law is the vital element. It is no
+new thing in our history that we should fight for that cause. When
+England and Revolutionary France went to war in 1793, the cause, on the
+side of England, was a legal cause. We fought for the public law of
+Europe, as it had stood since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. We did
+not fight in 1870, because neither France nor Germany had infringed the
+public law of Europe by attacking the neutrality of Belgium, but we were
+ready to fight if they did. A fine cartoon in _Punch_, of August, 1870,
+shows armed England encouraging Belgium, who stands ready with spear and
+shield, with the words--'Trust me! Let us hope that they won't trouble
+you, dear friend. But if they do----' To-day they have; and England has
+drawn her sword. How could she have done otherwise, with those
+traditions of law so deep in all Anglo-Saxon blood--traditions as real
+and as vital to Anglo-Saxon America as to Anglo-Saxon England;
+traditions which are the fundamental basis of Anglo-Saxon public life
+all the world over? America once fought and beat England, in
+long-forgotten days, on the ground of law. That very ground of law--that
+law-abidingness which is as deeply engrained in the men of Massachusetts
+to-day as it is in any Britisher--is a bond of sympathy between the two
+in this great struggle of the nations.
+
+To Germans our defence of public law may seem part of the moral
+hypocrisy of which in their view we are full. What we are doing, they
+feel, is to strike at Germany, our competitor for 'world-empire', with
+its dangerous navy, while Germany is engaged in a life and death
+struggle with France and Russia. We too, they feel, are Machiavellians;
+but we have put on what Machiavelli called 'the mantle of superstition',
+the pretence of morality and law, to cover our craft. It is true that we
+are fighting for our own interest. But what is our interest? We are
+fighting for Right, because Right is our supreme interest. The new
+German political theory enunciates that 'our interest is our right'. The
+old--the very old--English political theory is, 'The Right is our
+interest'. It is true that we have everything to gain by defending the
+cause of international law. Should that prevent us from defending that
+cause? What do we not lose of precious lives in the defence?
+
+This is the case of England. England stands for the idea of a public law
+of Europe, and for the small nations which it protects. She stands for
+her own preservation, which is menaced when public law is broken, and
+the 'ages' slow-bought gain' imperilled.
+
+(Treitschke's _Politik_, lectures delivered in Berlin during the years
+1875 to 1895, was published in two volumes in 1899. General Bernhardi's
+book, _Deutschland und der naechste Krieg_, was published in 1911, and
+has been translated into English under the title _Germany and the Next
+War_. See also J.A. Cramb, _England and Germany_, 1914.)
+
+Notes:
+
+[Footnote 179: The unity of the German state is in no small measure a
+matter of artificial Prussianization. Of this Prussianization Treitschke
+was the great advocate, though he was himself ultimately of Slavonic
+origin, and immediately of Saxon birth.]
+
+[Footnote 180: We are reminded of the famous sentence in _The
+Prince_:--_Dove non e giudizio da richiamare si guarda al fine_.]
+
+[Footnote 181: Bernhardi adds: 'The conception of permanent neutrality
+is entirely contrary to the essential nature of the state, which can
+only attain its highest moral aims in competition with other states.' It
+would seem to follow that by violating the neutrality of Belgium Germany
+is helping that country to attain its highest moral aims. The suggestion
+that Belgium is no longer a neutral Power was not adopted by the German
+Government before the war, nor by Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg in his speech
+to the Reichstag on the Belgian question (see _supra_, p. 91).]
+
+[Footnote 182: It was significant that Germany, while offering to
+England at the end of July a guarantee of the integrity of the soil of
+France, would not offer any guarantee of the integrity of French
+colonies (_supra_, p. 82).]
+
+[Footnote 183: Nothing has here been said, though much might be said, of
+the distortion of history and ethnology by German nationalism, or
+Pan-Germanism. It is well known that the Pan-Germans regard England as
+Teutonic, and destined to be gathered into the German fold. In these
+last few weeks we have been reproached as a people for being traitors to
+our 'Teutonic' blood. Better be traitors to blood than to plain duty;
+but as a matter of fact our mixed blood has many other strains than the
+Teutonic. On the aims of the Pan-Germanists readers may with profit
+consult a book by Paul Vergnet, _La France en danger_ (Oct. 1913).]
+
+[Footnote 184: In fairness to Nietzsche it should be said that in his
+later years he revolted against the Prussian military system.]
+
+[Footnote 185: German professors have recently reproached England for
+being allied with 'Muscovite barbarism'. Is Russia so barbarous, whose
+sovereign convened the first Peace Conference? Have not England and
+Russia striven together in peace (as they now strive together in war)
+for a great common cause? The German White Book, which seeks to fasten
+on Russia the blame of the present war, is oblivious of all that has
+happened in these matters since 1898. The reader may with advantage
+refer, on this subject, to a pamphlet by Professor Vinogradoff, _Russia:
+the Psychology of a Nation_ (Oxford, 1914).]
+
+
+
+
+EPILOGUE
+
+
+In conclusion something must be said of the process by which our
+understanding with France, still so elastic in 1912 and 1913, became the
+solid alliance which now, on sea and land alike, confronts the German
+forces. England gave France no positive engagements until the eleventh
+hour; it may be argued that England gave them far too late, and that the
+war might never have occurred if England had been less obstinately and
+judicially pacific. But the English case for the delay is clear. We
+hesitated to throw in our lot with France, because France would not
+stand neutral while Germany made war on Russia. We shrank from the
+incalculable entanglements which seemed to lie before us if we allied
+ourselves with a power which was so committed. Why, we were asking
+ourselves, should we fight the battles of Russia in the Balkans?
+
+We were perhaps too cautious in suspecting that France might contemplate
+this policy. She could not define beforehand the limits which she would
+observe in defending Russia's cause. But she knew, as we now know, that
+a war with Russia meant, to German statesmen, only a pretext for a new
+attack on France, even more deadly in intention than that of 1870.
+France could not do without the help of Russia. How then could she
+afford to forfeit Russia's friendship by declaring, at Germany's
+command, that she would do nothing to help Russia?
+
+This loyalty to the Dual Alliance left France during the last days
+before the war in a cruel dilemma. Russia, however well disposed, could
+not help her ally in the first weeks of a war; and for France these were
+the critical weeks, the weeks upon which her own fate must depend. She
+appealed urgently to England for support.
+
+But, even on July 31st, the English Cabinet replied that it could make
+no definite engagement. This answer, it is true, had been foreshadowed
+in earlier communications. Sir Edward Grey had made it abundantly clear
+that there could be no prospect of common action unless France were
+exposed to 'an unprovoked attack', and no certainty of such action even
+in that case. But France had staked everything upon the justice of her
+cause. She had felt that her pacific intentions were clear to all the
+world; and that England could not, with any self-respect, refuse
+assistance. The French mobilization had been delayed until July 31st, to
+convince the British Cabinet of French good faith; and the French fleet
+had been left in the Mediterranean to guard the interests of England no
+less than those of France. We can imagine how bitter was the
+disappointment with which France received the English answer of July
+31st.
+
+But we were loyal to our obligations as we understood them. If our
+answers to France were guarded, our answers to the German overtures of
+July 29th and August 1st show that we were fighting the battle of France
+with diplomatic weapons. On August 2nd we went still further, by
+undertaking to defend the French coasts and shipping, if the German
+fleet should come into the Channel or through the North Sea. To justify
+our position of reserve from July 31st to August 4th we may quote what
+Mr. Asquith said the other day (September 4th):--
+
+    'No one who has not been in that position can realize the strength,
+    the energy, and the persistence with which we laboured for peace. We
+    persevered by every expedient that diplomacy could suggest,
+    straining almost to breaking-point our most cherished friendships
+    and obligations.'
+
+Those efforts failed. We know to-day that mediation had never any
+prospects of success, because Germany had resolved that it should not
+succeed. Ought we to have known this from the first? It is easy to be
+wise after the event. But in England we have Cabinet government and we
+have Parliamentary government. Before an English minister can act, in a
+matter of national importance, no matter how positive his own
+convictions may be, he must convince his colleagues, and they must feel
+certain of convincing a democracy which is essentially pacific,
+cautious, slow to move. Nothing short of the German attack on Belgium
+would have convinced the ordinary Englishman that German statesmanship
+had degenerated into piracy. That proof was given us on August 4th; and
+on that day we sent our ultimatum to Berlin.
+
+To-day all England is convinced; and we are fighting back to back with
+the French for their national existence and our own. Our own, because
+England's existence depends not only on her sea-power, but upon the
+maintenance of European state-law. The military spirit which we have
+described above (Chap. VI) tramples upon the rights of nations because
+it sees a foe in every equal; because it regards the prosperity of a
+neighbour as a national misfortune; because it holds that national
+greatness is only to be realized in the act of destroying or absorbing
+other nationalities. To those who are not yet visibly assailed, and who
+possibly believe themselves secure, we can only give the warning: _Tua
+res agitur, paries cum proximus ardet_.
+
+Of the issue England is not afraid. The most unfavourable issue would
+find her still convinced that she has taken the only course compatible
+with honour and with public law. Military anarchism shall be destroyed
+if England, France, and Russia can destroy it. On this object England
+and France have staked their last ship and their last soldier. But, it
+may be asked, what state-system do we hope to establish, if and when we
+are successful in this great crusade?
+
+What England not only desires but needs, and needs imperatively, is,
+first, the restitution to Belgium of her former status and whatever else
+can be restored of all that she has sacrificed. This is the
+indispensable preliminary to any form of settlement. The next essential
+is an adequate guarantee to France that she shall never experience such
+another invasion as we have seen in August, 1914; without a France which
+is prosperous, secure, and independent, European civilization would be
+irreparably maimed and stunted. The third essential, as essential as the
+other two, is the conservation of those other nations which can only
+exist on sufferance so long as _Realpolitik_ is practised with impunity.
+
+To minor nationalities it should be clear that England is their friend,
+and cannot choose but stand their friend. Three times in her history she
+has made war upon a would-be despot of the Continent, treating the
+'Balance of Power' as a principle for which no sacrifice could be too
+great. In these struggles she assisted the small Powers, less from
+altruism than because their interest was her own. She supported Holland
+against Philip II of Spain and against Louis XIV; against Napoleon she
+supported not Holland only, but also Portugal and, to the best of her
+power, Switzerland and Piedmont.
+
+We do not argue--it would be absurd to argue--that England has always
+been free from reproach in her dealings with the smaller states. Holland
+may well remember the naval conflicts of the seventeenth century and the
+English Navigation Laws. But Holland should also remember that, in the
+seventeenth century, England was not yet a great Power; Holland and
+England fought as rivals and on equal terms, in a feud which subsequent
+alliances have healed, over a policy which England has long since
+renounced as mischievous and futile. On Denmark we inflicted a great
+wrong in 1807; it can only be extenuated by the fact, which Denmark
+knows now though she did not know it then, that Napoleon had conspired
+with Russia to seize the Danish fleet and use it against England.
+Denmark, indeed, has better cause to complain that we gave her no
+assistance in 1864. That mistake--for it was a mistake of weakness, not
+deliberate treachery--has brought its own nemesis. We are still paying
+for that particular mistake, and we are not likely to forget the lesson.
+The case of Schleswig-Holstein shows how the losses of such a state as
+Denmark may react on such a state as England.
+
+England cannot afford that her weaker neighbours should become less
+prosperous or less independent than they are. So far as the long arm of
+naval power reaches, England is bound to give them whatever help she
+can. From motives of self-preservation, if on no other ground, she could
+not tolerate their subordination to such a power as Germany aspires to
+found. Her quarrel is not with the German people, but with the political
+system for which the German Empire, in its present temper, stands. That
+system England is bound to resist, no matter by what power it is
+adopted.
+
+English sympathies and English traditions are here at one with English
+interests. England is proud to recollect how she befriended struggling
+nationalities in the nineteenth century. She did not support Greece and
+Italy for the sake of any help that they could give her. The goodwill of
+England to Holland, to Switzerland, to the Scandinavian states, is
+largely based upon their achievements in science and art and literature.
+They have proved that they can serve the higher interests of humanity.
+They have contributed to the growth of that common civilization which
+links together the small powers and the great with bonds more sacred and
+more durable than those of race, of government, of material interest. In
+this fraternity each nation has a duty to the rest. If we have harped on
+England's interest, it must not for a moment be supposed that we have
+forgotten England's duty. But England stands to-day in this fortunate
+position, that her duty and her interest combine to impel her in the
+same direction.
+
+
+
+
+APPENDIX I
+
+
+GERMANY'S REASONS
+
+FOR
+
+WAR WITH RUSSIA
+
+
+How Russia and her Ruler betrayed Germany's confidence and thereby made
+the European War.
+
+WITH THE ORIGINAL TELEGRAMS
+AND NOTES.
+
+Druck und Verlag: Liebheit & Thiesen, Berlin.
+
+Foreign Office,
+Berlin, August 1914.
+
+On June 28th the Austro-Hungarian successor to the throne, Arch-Duke
+Franz Ferdinand, and his wife, the Duchess of Hohenberg, were
+assassinated by a member of a band of servian conspirators. The
+investigation of the crime through the Austro-Hungarian authorities has
+yielded the fact that the conspiracy against the life of the Arch-Duke
+and successor to the throne was prepared and abetted in Belgrade with
+the cooperation of Servian officials, and executed with arms from the
+Servian State arsenal. This crime must have opened the eyes of the
+entire civilized world, not only in regard to the aims of the Servian
+policies directed against the conservation and integrity of the
+Austro-Hungarian monarchy, but also concerning the criminal means which
+the pan-Serb propaganda in Servia had no hesitation in employing for the
+achievement of these aims.
+
+The goal of these policies was the gradual revolutionizing and final
+separation of the south-easterly districts from the Austro-Hungarian
+monarchy and their union with Servia. This direction of Servias policy
+has not been altered in the least in spite of the repeated and solemn
+declarations of Servia in which it vouchsafed a change in these policies
+toward Austria-Hungary as well as the cultivation of good and neighborly
+relations.
+
+In this manner for the third time in the course of the last 6 years
+Servia has led Europe to the brink of a world-war.
+
+It could only do this because it believed itself supported in its
+intentions by Russia.
+
+Russia soon after the events brought about by the Turkish revolution of
+1908, endeavored to found a union of the Balcan states under Russian
+patronage and directed against the existence of Turkey. This union which
+succeeded in 1911 in driving out Turkey from a greater part of her
+European possessions, collapsed over the question of the distribution of
+spoils. The Russian policies were not dismayed over this failure.
+According to the idea of the Russian statesmen a new Balcan union under
+Russian patronage should be called into existence, headed no longer
+against Turkey, now dislodged from the Balcan, but against the existence
+of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. It was the idea that Servia should
+cede to Bulgaria those parts of Macedonia which it had received during
+the last Balcan war, in exchange for Bosnia and the Herzegovina which
+were to be taken from Austria. To oblige Bulgaria to fall in with this
+plan it was to be isolated, Roumania attached to Russia with the aid of
+French propaganda, and Servia promised Bosnia and the Herzegovina.
+
+Under these circumstances it was clear to Austria that it was not
+compatible with the dignity and the spirit of self-preservation of the
+monarchy to view idly any longer this agitation across the border. The
+Imperial and Royal Government appraised Germany of this conception and
+asked for our opinion. With all our heart we were able to agree with our
+allys estimate of the situation, and assure him that any action
+considered necessary to end the movement in Servia directed against the
+conservation of the monarchy would meet with our approval.
+
+We were perfectly aware that a possible warlike attitude of
+Austria-Hungary against Servia might bring Russia upon the field, and
+that it might therefore involve us in a war, in accordance with our duty
+as allies. We could not, however, in these vital interests of
+Austria-Hungary, which were at stake, advise our ally to take a yielding
+attitude not compatible with his dignity, nor deny him our assistance in
+these trying days. We could do this all the less as our own interests
+were menaced through the continued Serb agitation. If the Serbs
+continued with the aid of Russia and France to menace the existence of
+Austria-Hungary, the gradual collapse of Austria and the subjection of
+all the Slavs under one Russian sceptre would be the consequence, thus
+making untenable the position of the Teutonic race in Central Europe. A
+morally weakened Austria under the pressure of Russian pan-slavism would
+be no longer an ally on whom we could count and in whom we could have
+confidence, as we must be able to have, in view of the ever more
+menacing attitude of our easterly and westerly neighbors. We, therefore,
+permitted Austria a completely free hand in her action towards Servia
+but have not participated in her preparations.
+
+Austria chose the method of presenting to the Servian Government a note,
+in which the direct connection between the murder at Sarajevo and the
+pan-Serb movement, as not only countenanced but actively supported by
+the Servian Government, was explained, and in which a complete cessation
+of this agitation, as well as a punishment of the guilty, was requested.
+At the same time Austria-Hungary demanded as necessary guarantee for the
+accomplishment of her desire the participation of some Austrian
+officials in the preliminary examination on Servian territory and the
+final dissolution of the pan-Serb societies agitating against
+Austria-Hungary. The Imperial and Royal Government gave a period of 48
+hours for the unconditional acceptance of its demands.
+
+The Servian Government started the mobilization of its army one day
+after the transmission of the Austro-Hungarian note.
+
+As after the stipulated date the Servian Government rendered a reply
+which, though complying in some points with the conditions of
+Austria-Hungary, yet showed in all essentials the endeavor through
+procrastination and new negotiations to escape from the just demands of
+the monarchy, the latter discontinued her diplomatic relations with
+Servia without indulging in further negotiations or accepting further
+Servian assurances, whose value, to its loss, she had sufficiently
+experienced.
+
+From this moment Austria was in fact in a state of war with Servia,
+which it proclaimed officially on the 28th of July by declaring war.
+
+[Sidenote: see exhibits 1 & 2.]
+
+From the beginning of the conflict we assumed the position that there
+were here concerned the affairs of Austria alone, which it would have to
+settle with Servia. We therefore directed our efforts toward the
+localizing of the war, and toward convincing the other powers that
+Austria-Hungary had to appeal to arms in justifiable self-defence,
+forced upon her by the conditions. We emphatically took the position
+that no civilized country possessed the right to stay the arm of Austria
+in this struggle with barbarism and political crime, and to shield the
+Servians against their just punishment. In this sense we instructed our
+representatives with the foreign powers.
+
+[Sidenote: see exhibit 3.]
+
+Simultaneously the Austro-Hungarian Government communicated to the
+Russian Government that the step undertaken against Servia implied
+merely a defensive measure against the Serb agitation, but that
+Austria-Hungary must of necessity demand guarantees for a continued
+friendly behavior of Servia towards the monarchy. Austria-Hungary had no
+intention whatsoever to shift the balance of power in the Balcan.
+
+In answer to our declaration that the German Government desired, and
+aimed at, a localization of the conflict, both the French and the
+English Governments promised an action in the same direction. But these
+endeavors did not succeed in preventing the interposition of Russia in
+the Austro-Servian disagreement.
+
+[Sidenote: see exhibits 4 & 5.]
+
+The Russian Government submitted an official communique on July 24th,
+according to which Russia could not possibly remain indifferent in the
+Servio-Austrian conflict. The same was declared by the Russian Secretary
+of Foreign Affairs, M. Sasonow, to the German Ambassador, Count
+Pourtales, in the afternoon of July 26th. The German Government declared
+again, through its Ambassador at St. Petersburg, that Austria-Hungary
+had no desire for conquest and only wished peace at her frontiers. After
+the official explanation by Austria-Hungary to Russia that it did not
+claim territorial gain in Servia, the decision concerning the peace of
+the world rested exclusively with St. Petersburg.
+
+[Sidenote: see exhibits 6, 7, 8, 9.]
+
+The same day the first news of Russian mobilization reached Berlin in
+the evening.
+
+[Sidenote: see exhibits 10, 10a, 10b.]
+
+The German Ambassadors at London, Paris, and St. Petersburg were
+instructed to energetically point out the danger of this Russian
+mobilization. The Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg was also
+directed to make the following declaration to the Russian Government:
+
+    "Preparatory military measures by Russia will force us to
+    counter-measures which must consist in mobilizing the army.
+
+    "But mobilization means war.
+
+    "As we know the obligations of France towards Russia, this
+    mobilization would be directed against both Russia and France. We
+    cannot assume that Russia desires to unchain such a European war.
+    Since Austria-Hungary will not touch the existence of the Servian
+    kingdom, we are of the opinion that Russia can afford to assume an
+    attitude of waiting. We can all the more support the desire of
+    Russia to protect the integrity of Servia as Austria-Hungary does
+    not intend to question the latter. It will be easy in the further
+    development of the affair to find a basis for an understanding."
+
+[Sidenote: see exhibit 11.]
+
+On July 27th the Russian Secretary of War, M. Ssuchomlinow, gave the
+German military attache his word of honor that no order to mobilize had
+been issued, merely preparations were being made, but not a horse
+mustered, nor reserves called in. If Austria-Hungary crossed the Servian
+frontier, the military districts directed towards Austria, i.e. Kiev,
+Odessa, Moscow, Kazan, would be mobilized, under no circumstances those
+situated on the German frontier, i.e. St. Petersburg, Vilna, and Warsaw.
+Upon inquiry into the object of the mobilization against
+Austria-Hungary, the Russian Minister of War replied by shrugging his
+shoulders and referring to the diplomats. The military attache then
+pointed to these mobilization measures against Austria-Hungary as
+extremely menacing also for Germany.
+
+In the succeeding days news concerning Russian mobilization came at a
+rapid rate. Among it was also news about preparations on the
+German-Russian frontier, as for instance the announcement of the state
+of war in Kovno, the departure of the Warsaw garrison, and the
+strengthening of the Alexandrovo garrison.
+
+On July 27th, the first information was received concerning preparatory
+measures taken by France: the 14th Corps discontinued the manoeuvres and
+returned to its garrison.
+
+In the meantime we had endeavored to localize the conflict by most
+emphatic steps.
+
+[Sidenote: see exhibit 12.]
+
+On July 26th, Sir Edward Grey had made the proposal to submit the
+differences between Austria-Hungary and Servia to a conference of the
+Ambassadors of Germany, France, and Italy under his chairmanship. We
+declared in regard to this proposal that we could not, however much we
+approved the idea, participate in such a conference, as we could not
+call Austria in her dispute with Servia before a European tribunal.
+
+France consented to the proposal of Sir Edward Grey, but it foundered
+upon Austria's declining it, as was to be expected.
+
+[Sidenote: see exhibit 13.]
+
+Faithful to our principle that mediation should not extend to the
+Austro-Servian conflict, which is to be considered as a purely
+Austro-Hungarian affair, but merely to the relations between
+Austria-Hungary and Russia, we continued our endeavors to bring about an
+understanding between these two powers.
+
+[Sidenote: see exhibits 15 & 16.]
+
+We further declared ourselves ready, after failure of the conference
+idea, to transmit a second proposal of Sir Edward Grey's to Vienna in
+which he suggested Austria-Hungary should decide that either the Servian
+reply was sufficient, or that it be used as a basis for further
+negotiations. The Austro-Hungarian Government remarked with full
+appreciation of our action that it had come too late, the hostilities
+having already been opened.
+
+In spite of this we continued our attempts to the utmost, and we advised
+Vienna to show every possible advance compatible with the dignity of the
+monarchy.
+
+Unfortunately, all these proposals were overtaken by the military
+preparations of Russia and France.
+
+[Sidenote: see exhibit 17.]
+
+On July 29th, the Russian Government made the official notification in
+Berlin that four army districts had been mobilized. At the same time
+further news was received concerning rapidly progressing military
+preparations of France, both on water and on land.
+
+On the same day the Imperial Ambassador in St. Petersburg had an
+interview with the Russian Foreign Secretary, in regard to which he
+reported by telegraph, as follows:
+
+    "The Secretary tried to persuade me that I should urge my Government
+    to participate in a quadruple conference to find means to induce
+    Austria-Hungary to give up those demands which touch upon the
+    sovereignty of Servia. I could merely promise to report the
+    conversation and took the position that, after Russia had decided
+    upon the baneful step of mobilization, every exchange of ideas
+    appeared now extremely difficult, if not impossible. Besides, Russia
+    now was demanding from us in regard to Austria-Hungary the same
+    which Austria-Hungary was being blamed for with regard to Servia,
+    i.e. an infraction of sovereignty. Austria-Hungary having promised
+    to consider the Russian interests by disclaiming any territorial
+    aspiration,--a great concession on the part of a state engaged in
+    war--should therefore be permitted to attend to its affair with
+    Servia alone. There would be time at the peace conference to return
+    to the matter of forbearance towards the sovereignty of Servia.
+
+    "I added very solemnly that at this moment the entire Austro-Servian
+    affair was eclipsed by the danger of a general European
+    conflagration, and I endeavored to present to the Secretary the
+    magnitude of this danger.
+
+    "It was impossible to dissuade Sasonow from the idea that Servia
+    could not now be deserted by Russia".
+
+On July 29th, the German Military Attache at St. Petersburg wired the
+following report on a conversation with the Chief of the General Staff
+of the Russian army:
+
+    "The Chief of the General Staff has asked me to call on him, and he
+    has told me that he has just come from His Majesty. He has been
+    requested by the Secretary of War to reiterate once more that
+    everything had remained as the Secretary had informed me two days
+    ago. He offered confirmation in writing and gave me his word of
+    honor in the most solemn manner that nowhere there had been a
+    mobilization, viz. calling in of a single man or horse up to the
+    present time, i.e. 3 o'clock in the afternoon. He could not assume a
+    guaranty for the future, but he could emphasize that in the fronts
+    directed towards our frontiers His Majesty desired no mobilization.
+
+    "As, however, I had received here many pieces of news concerning the
+    calling in of the reserves in different parts of the country also in
+    Warsaw and in Vilna, I told the general that his statements placed
+    me before a riddle. On his officers word of honor he replied that
+    such news was wrong, but that possibly here and there a false alarm
+    might have been given.
+
+    "I must consider this conversation as an attempt to mislead us as to
+    the extent of the measures hitherto taken in view of the abundant
+    and positive information about the calling in of reserves."
+
+In reply to various inquiries concerning reasons for its threatening
+attitude, the Russian Government repeatedly pointed out that
+Austria-Hungary had commenced no conversation in St. Petersburg. The
+Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in St. Petersburg was therefore instructed
+on July 29th, at our suggestion, to enter into such conversation with
+Sasonow. Count Szapary was empowered to explain to the Russian minister
+the note to Servia though it had been overtaken by the state of war, and
+to accept any suggestion on the part of Russia as well as to discuss
+with Sasonow all questions touching directly upon the Austro-Russian
+relations.
+
+[Sidenote: see exhibit 19.]
+
+Shoulder to shoulder with England we labored incessantly and supported
+every proposal in Vienna from which we hoped to gain the possibility of
+a peaceable solution of the conflict. We even as late as the 30th of
+July forwarded the English proposal to Vienna, as basis for
+negotiations, that Austria-Hungary should dictate her conditions in
+Servia, i.e. after her march into Servia. We thought that Russia would
+accept this basis.
+
+During the interval from July 29th to July 31st there appeared renewed
+and cumulative news concerning Russian measures of mobilization.
+Accumulation of troops on the East Prussian frontier and the declaration
+of the state of war over all important parts of the Russian west
+frontier allowed no further doubt that the Russian mobilization was in
+full swing against us, while simultaneously all such measures were
+denied to our representative in St. Petersburg on word of honor.
+
+Nay, even before the reply from Vienna regarding the Anglo-German
+mediation whose tendencies and basis must have been known in St.
+Petersburg, could possibly have been received in Berlin, Russia ordered
+a general mobilization.
+
+[Sidenote: see exhibits 18, 20, 21, 22, 23.]
+
+During the same days, there took place between His Majesty the Kaiser,
+and Czar Nicolas an exchange of telegrams in which His Majesty called
+the attention of the Czar to the menacing character of the Russian
+mobilization during the continuance of his own mediating activities.
+
+On July 31st, the Czar directed the following telegram to His Majesty
+the Kaiser:
+
+    "I thank You cordially for Your mediation which permits the hope
+    that everything may yet end peaceably. It is technically impossible
+    to discontinue our military preparations which have been made
+    necessary by the Austrian mobilization. It is far from us to want
+    war. As long as the negotiations between Austria and Servia
+    continue, my troops will undertake no provocative action. I give You
+    my solemn word thereon. I confide with all my faith in the grace of
+    God, and I hope for the success of Your mediation in Vienna for the
+    welfare of our countries and the peace of Europe.
+
+    "Your cordially devoted
+
+    "Nicolas."
+
+This telegram of the Czar crossed with the following, sent by H.M. the
+Kaiser, also on July 31st, at 2 p.m.:
+
+    "Upon Your appeal to my friendship and Your request for my aid I
+    have engaged in mediation between Your Government and the Government
+    of Austria-Hungary. While this action was taking place, Your troops
+    were being mobilized against my ally Austria-Hungary, whereby, as I
+    have already communicated to You, my mediation has become almost
+    illusory. In spite of this, I have continued it, and now I receive
+    reliable news that serious preparations for war are going on on my
+    eastern frontier. The responsibility for the security of my country
+    forces me to measures of defence. I have gone to the extreme limit
+    of the possible in my efforts for the preservation of the peace of
+    the world. It is not I who bear the responsibility for the
+    misfortune which now threatens the entire civilized world. It rests
+    in Your hand to avert it. No one threatens the honor and peace of
+    Russia which might well have awaited the success of my mediation.
+    The friendship for You and Your country, bequeathed to me by my
+    grand-father on his deathbed, has always been sacred to me, and I
+    have stood faithfully by Russia while it was in serious affliction,
+    especially during its last war. The peace of Europe can still be
+    preserved by You if Russia decides to discontinue those military
+    preparations which menace Germany and Austria-Hungary."
+
+Before this telegram reached its destination, the mobilization of all
+the Russian forces, obviously directed against us and already ordered
+during the afternoon of the 31st of July, was in full swing.
+Notwithstanding, the telegram of the Czar was sent at 2 o'clock that
+same afternoon.
+
+[Sidenote: see exhibit 24.]
+
+After the Russian general mobilization became known in Berlin, the
+Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg was instructed on the afternoon of
+July 31st to explain to the Russian Government that Germany declared the
+state of war as counter-measure against the general mobilization of the
+Russian army and navy which must be followed by mobilization if Russia
+did not cease its military measures against Germany and Austria-Hungary
+within 12 hours, and notified Germany thereof.
+
+[Sidenote: see exhibit 25.]
+
+At the same time the Imperial Ambassador in Paris was instructed to
+demand from the French Government a declaration within 18 hours, whether
+it would remain neutral in a Russo-German war.
+
+The Russian Government destroyed through its mobilization, menacing the
+security of our country, the laborious action at mediation of the
+European cabinets. The Russian mobilization in regard to the seriousness
+of which the Russian Government was never allowed by us to entertain a
+doubt, in connection with its continued denial, shows clearly that
+Russia wanted war.
+
+The Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg delivered his note to M.
+Sasonow on July 31st at 12 o'clock midnight.
+
+The reply of the Russian Government has never reached us.
+
+Two hours after the expiration of the time limit the Czar telegraphed to
+H.M. the Kaiser, as follows:
+
+    "I have received Your telegram. I comprehend that You are forced to
+    mobilize, but I should like to have from You the same guaranty which
+    I have given You, viz., that these measures do not mean war, and
+    that we shall continue to negotiate for the welfare of our two
+    countries and the universal peace which is so dear to our hearts.
+    With the aid of God it must be possible to our long tried friendship
+    to prevent the shedding of blood. I expect with full confidence Your
+    urgent reply."
+
+To this H.M. the Kaiser replied:
+
+    "I thank You for Your telegram. I have shown yesterday to Your
+    Government the way through which alone war may yet be averted.
+    Although I asked for a reply by to-day noon, no telegram from my
+    Ambassador has reached me with the reply of Your Government. I
+    therefore have been forced to mobilize my army. An immediate, clear
+    and unmistakable reply of Your Government is the sole way to avoid
+    endless misery. Until I receive this reply I am unable, to my great
+    grief, to enter upon the subject of Your telegram. I must ask most
+    earnestly that You, without delay, order Your troops to commit,
+    under no circumstances, the slightest violation of our frontiers."
+
+As the time limit given to Russia had expired without the receipt of a
+reply to our inquiry, H.M. the Kaiser ordered the mobilization of the
+entire German Army and Navy on August 1st at 5 p.m.
+
+[Sidenote: see exhibit 25.]
+
+The German Ambassador at St. Petersburg was instructed that, in the
+event of the Russian Government not giving a satisfactory reply within
+the stipulated time, he should declare that we considered ourselves in a
+state of war after the refusal of our demands. However, before a
+confirmation of the execution of this order had been received, that is
+to say, already in the afternoon of August 1st, i.e., the same afternoon
+on which the telegram of the Czar, cited above, was sent, Russian troops
+crossed our frontier and marched into German territory.
+
+Thus Russia began the war against us.
+
+Meanwhile the Imperial Ambassador in Paris put our question to the
+French Cabinet on July 31st at 7 p.m.
+
+[Sidenote: see exhibit 27.]
+
+The French Prime Minister gave an equivocal and unsatisfactory reply on
+August 1st at 1. p.m. which gave no clear idea of the position of
+France, as he limited himself to the explanation that France would do
+that which her interests demanded. A few hours later, at 5 p.m., the
+mobilization of the entire French army and navy was ordered.
+
+On the morning of the next day France opened hostilities.
+
+
+THE ORIGINAL TELEGRAMS AND NOTES.
+
+
+THE NOTE OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY TO SERVIA.
+
+Presented July 23rd in Belgrade.
+
+"On March 31st, 1909, the Royal Servian Minister to the Court of Vienna
+made the following statement, by order of his Government:
+
+"Servia declares that she is not affected in her rights by the situation
+established in Bosnia, and that she will therefore adapt herself to the
+decisions which the powers are going to arrive at in reference to Art.
+25 of the Berlin Treaty. By following the councils of the powers, Servia
+binds herself to cease the attitude of protest and resistence which she
+has assumed since last October, relative to the annexation, and she
+binds herself further to change the direction of her present policies
+towards Austria-Hungary, and, in the future, to live with the latter in
+friendly and neighborly relations.
+
+"The history of the last years, and especially the painful events of
+June 28th, have demonstrated the existence of a subversive movement in
+Servia whose aim it is to separate certain territories from the
+Austro-Hungarian monarchy. This movement, which developed under the eyes
+of the Servian Government, has found expression subsequently beyond the
+territory of the kingdom, in acts of terrorism, a series of
+assassinations and murders.
+
+"Far from fulfilling the formal obligations contained in the declaration
+of March 31st, 1909, the Royal Servian Government has done nothing to
+suppress this movement. She suffered the criminal doings of the various
+societies and associations directed against the monarchy, the unbridled
+language of the press, the glorification of the originators of
+assassinations, the participation of officers and officials in
+subversive intrigues; she suffered the unwholesome propaganda in public
+education, and lastly permitted all manifestations which would mislead
+the Servian people into hatred of the monarchy and into contempt for its
+institutions.
+
+"This sufferance of which the Royal Servian Government made itself
+guilty, has lasted up to the moment in which the events of June 28th
+demonstrated to the entire world the ghastly consequences of such
+sufferance.
+
+"_It becomes plain from the evidence and confessions of the criminal
+authors of the outrage of June 28th, that the murder at Sarajevo was
+conceived in Belgrade, that the murderers received the arms and bombs
+with which they were equipped, from Servian officers and officials who
+belonged to the Narodna Odbrana, and that, lastly, the transportation of
+the criminals and their arms to Bosnia was arranged and carried out by
+leading Servian frontier officials._
+
+"The cited results of the investigation do not permit the Imperial and
+Royal Government to observe any longer the attitude of waiting, which it
+has assumed for years towards those agitations which have their centre
+in Belgrade, and which from there radiate into the territory of the
+monarchy. These results, on the contrary, impose upon the Imperial and
+Royal Government the duty to terminate intrigues which constitute a
+permanent menace for the peace of the monarchy.
+
+"In order to obtain this purpose, the Imperial and Royal Government is
+forced to demand official assurance from the Servian Government that it
+condemns the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary, i.e. the
+entirety of the machinations whose aim it is to separate parts from the
+monarchy which belong to it, and that she binds herself to suppress with
+all means this criminal and terrorizing propaganda.
+
+"In order to give to these obligations a solemn character, the Royal
+Servian Government will publish on the first page of its official organ
+of July 26th, 1914, the following declaration:
+
+"The Royal Servian Government condemns the propaganda directed against
+Austria-Hungary, i.e. the entirety of those machinations whose aim it is
+to separate from the Austro-Hungarian monarchy territories belonging
+thereto, and she regrets sincerely the ghastly consequences of these
+criminal actions.
+
+"The Royal Servian Government regrets that Servian officers and
+officials have participated in the propaganda, cited above, and have
+thus threatened the friendly and neighborly relations which the Royal
+Government was solemnly bound to cultivate by its declaration of March
+31st, 1909.
+
+"The Royal Government which disapproves and rejects every thought or
+every attempt at influencing the destinations of the inhabitants of any
+part of Austria-Hungary, considers it its duty to call most emphatically
+to the attention of its officers and officials, and of the entire
+population of the kingdom, that it will hence-forward proceed with the
+utmost severity against any persons guilty of similar actions, to
+prevent and suppress which it will make every effort."
+
+"This explanation is to be brought simultaneously to the cognizance of
+the Royal Army through an order of H.M. the King, and it is to be
+published in the official organ of the Army.
+
+"The Royal Servian Government binds itself, in addition, as follows:
+
+"1. to suppress any publication which fosters hatred of, and contempt
+for, the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and whose general tendency is
+directed against the latters territorial integrity;
+
+"2. to proceed at once with the dissolution of the society Narodna
+Odbrana, to confiscate their entire means of propaganda, and to proceed
+in the same manner against the other societies and associations in
+Servia which occupy themselves with the propaganda against
+Austria-Hungary. The Royal Government will take the necessary measures,
+so that the dissolved societies may not continue their activities under
+another name or in another form;
+
+"3. without delay to eliminate from the public instruction in Servia, so
+far as the corps of instructors, as well as the means of instruction are
+concerned, that which serves, or may serve, to foster the propaganda
+against Austria-Hungary;
+
+"4. to remove from military service and the administration in general all
+officers and officials who are guilty of propaganda against
+Austria-Hungary, and whose names, with a communication of the material
+which the Imperial and Royal Government possesses against them, the
+Imperial and Royal Government reserves the right to communicate to the
+Royal Government;
+
+"5. to consent that in Servia officials of the Imperial and Royal
+Government co-operate in the suppression of a movement directed against
+the territorial integrity of the monarchy;
+
+"6. to commence a judicial investigation against the participants of the
+conspiracy of June 28th, who are on Servian territory. Officials,
+delegated by the Imperial and Royal Government will participate in the
+examinations;
+
+"7. to proceed at once with all severity to arrest Major Voja Tankosic
+and a certain Milan Ciganowic, Servian State officials, who have been
+compromised through the result of the investigation;
+
+"8. to prevent through effective measures the participation of the
+Servian authorities in the smuggling of arms and explosives across the
+frontier and to dismiss those officials of Shabatz and Loznica, who
+assisted the originators of the crime of Sarajevo in crossing the
+frontier;
+
+"9. to give to the Imperial and Royal Government explanations in regard
+to the unjustifiable remarks of high Servian functionaries in Servia and
+abroad who have not hesitated, in spite of their official position, to
+express themselves in interviews in a hostile manner against
+Austria-Hungary after the outrage of June 28th;
+
+"10. The Imperial and Royal Government expects a reply from the Royal
+Government at the latest until Saturday 25th inst., at 6 p.m. A memoir
+concerning the results of the investigations at Sarajevo, so far as they
+concern points 7. and 8. is enclosed with this note."
+
+ENCLOSURE.
+
+The investigation carried on against Gabrilo Princip and accomplices in
+the Court of Sarajevo, on account of the assassination on June 28th has,
+so far, yielded the following results:
+
+1. The plan to murder Arch-Duke Franz Ferdinand during his stay in
+Sarajevo was conceived in Belgrade by Gabrilo Princip, Nedeljko,
+Gabrinowic, and a certain Milan Ciganowic and Trifko Grabez, with the
+aid of Major Voja Tankosic.
+
+2. The six bombs and four Browning pistols which were used by the
+criminals, were obtained by Milan Ciganowic and Major Tankosic, and
+presented to Princip Gabrinowic in Belgrade.
+
+3. The bombs are hand grenades, manufactured at the arsenal of the
+Servian Army in Kragujevac.
+
+4. To insure the success of the assassination, Milan Ciganowic
+instructed Princip Gabrinowic in the use of the grenades and gave
+instructions in shooting with Browning pistols to Princip Grabez in a
+forest near the target practice field of Topshider--(outside Belgrade).
+
+5. In order to enable the crossing of the frontier of Bosnia and
+Herzegovina by Princip Gabrinowic and Grabez, and the smuggling of their
+arms, a secret system of transportation was organized by Ciganowic. The
+entry of the criminals with their arms into Bosnia and Herzegovina was
+effected by the frontier captains of Shabatz (Rade Popowic) and of
+Loznica, as well as by the custom house official Rudivoy Grbic of
+Loznica with the aid of several other persons.
+
+
+THE SERVIAN ANSWER.
+
+Presented at Vienna, July 25th, 1914.
+(With Austria's commentaries in italics.)
+
+The Royal Government has received the communication of the Imperial and
+Royal Government of the 23rd inst. and is convinced that its reply will
+dissipate any misunderstanding which threatens to destroy the friendly
+and neighborly relations between the Austrian monarchy and the kingdom
+of Servia.
+
+The Royal Government is conscious that nowhere there have been renewed
+protests against the great neighborly monarchy like those which at one
+time were expressed in the Skuptschina, as well as in the declaration
+and actions of the responsible representatives of the state at that
+time, and which were terminated by the Servian declaration of March 31st
+1909; furthermore that since that time neither the different
+corporations of the kingdom, nor the officials have made an attempt to
+alter the political and judicial condition created in Bosnia and the
+Herzegovina. The Royal Government states that the I. and R. Government
+has made no protestation in this sense excepting in the case of a text
+book, in regard to which the I. and R. Government has received an
+entirely satisfactory explanation. Servia has given during the time of
+the Balcan crisis in numerous cases evidence of her pacific and moderate
+policy, and it is only owing to Servia and the sacrifices which she has
+brought in the interest of the peace of Europe that this peace has been
+preserved.
+
+_The Royal Servian Government limits itself to establishing that since
+the declaration of March 31st 1909, there has been no attempt on the
+part of the Servian Government to alter the position of Bosnia and the
+Herzegovina._
+
+_With this she deliberately shifts the foundation of our note, as we
+have not insisted that she and her officials have undertaken anything
+official in this direction. Our gravamen is that in spite of the
+obligation assumed in the cited note, she has omitted to suppress the
+movement directed against the territorial integrity of the monarchy._
+
+_Her obligation consisted in changing her attitude and the entire
+direction of her policies, and in entering into friendly and neighborly
+relations with the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and not only not to
+interfere with the possession of Bosnia._
+
+The Royal Government cannot be made responsible for expressions of a
+private character, as for instance newspaper articles and the peaceable
+work of societies, expressions which are of very common appearance in
+other countries, and which ordinarily are not under the control of the
+state. This, all the less, as the Royal Government has shown great
+courtesy in the solution of a whole series of questions which have
+arisen between Servia and Austria-Hungary, whereby it has succeeded to
+solve the greater number thereof, in favor of the progress of both
+countries.
+
+_The assertion of the Royal Servian Government that the expressions of
+the press and the activity of Servian associations possess a private
+character and thus escape governmental control, stands in full contrast
+with the institutions of modern states and even the most liberal of
+press and society laws, which nearly everywhere subject the press and
+the societies to a certain control of the state. This is also provided
+for by the Servian institutions. The rebuke against the Servian
+Government consists in the fact that it has totally omitted to supervise
+its press and its societies, in so far as it knew their direction to be
+hostile to the monarchy._
+
+The Royal Government was therefore painfully surprised by the assertions
+that citizens of Servia had participated in the preparations of the
+outrage in Sarajevo. The Government expected to be invited to cooperate
+in the investigation of the crime, and it was ready in order to prove
+its complete correctness, to proceed against all persons in regard to
+whom it would receive information.
+
+_This assertion is incorrect. The Servian Government was accurately
+informed about the suspicion resting upon quite definite personalities
+and not only in the position, but also obliged by its own laws to
+institute investigations spontaneously. The Servian Government has done
+nothing in this direction._
+
+According to the wishes of the I. and R. Government, the Royal
+Government is prepared to surrender to the court, without regard to
+position and rank, every Servian citizen, for whose participation in the
+crime of Sarajevo it should have received proof. It binds itself
+particularly on the first page of the official organ of the 26th of July
+to publish the following enunciation:
+
+"The Royal Servian Government condemns every propaganda which should be
+directed against Austria-Hungary, i. e. the entirety of such activities
+as aim towards the separation of certain territories from the
+Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and it regrets sincerely the lamentable
+consequences of these criminal machinations."
+
+_The Austrian demand reads_:
+
+"_The Royal Servian Government condemns the propaganda against
+Austria-Hungary_...."
+
+_The alteration of the declaration as demanded by us, which has been
+made by the Royal Servian Government, is meant to imply that a
+propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary does not exist, and that it
+is not aware of such. This formula is insincere, and the Servian
+Government reserves itself the supterfuge for later occasions that it
+had not disavowed by this declaration the existing propaganda, nor
+recognized the same as hostile to the monarchy, whence it could deduce
+further that it is not obliged to suppress in the future a propaganda
+similar to the present one_.
+
+The Royal Government regrets that according to a communication of the I.
+and R. Government certain Servian officers and functionaries have
+participated in the propaganda just referred to, and that these have
+therefore endangered the amicable relations for the observation of which
+the Royal Government had solemnly obliged itself through the declaration
+of March 31st, 1909.
+
+The Government ... identical with the demanded text.
+
+_The formula as demanded by Austria reads_:
+
+"_The Royal Government regrets that Servian officers and functionaries
+... have participated_...."
+
+_Also with this formula and the further addition "according to the
+declaration of the I. and R. Government", the Servian Government pursues
+the object, already indicated above, to preserve a free hand for the
+future_.
+
+The Royal Government binds itself further:
+
+1. During the next regular meeting of the Skuptschina to embody in the
+press laws a clause, to wit, that the incitement to hatred of, and
+contempt for, the monarchy is to be must severely punished, as well as
+every publication whose general tendency is directed against the
+territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary.
+
+It binds itself in view of the coming revision of the constitution to
+embody an amendment into Art. 22 of the constitutional law which permits
+the confiscation of such publications as is at present impossible
+according to the clear definition of Art. 22 of the constitution.
+
+_Austria had demanded_:
+
+_1. To suppress every publication which incites to hatred and contempt
+for the monarchy, and whose tendency is directed against the territorial
+integrity of the monarchy._
+
+_We wanted to bring about the obligation for Servia to take care that
+such attacks of the press would cease in the future._
+
+_Instead Servia offers to pass certain laws which are meant as means
+towards this end, viz.:_
+
+_a) A law according to which the expressions of the press hostile to the
+monarchy can be individually punished, a matter, which is immaterial to
+us, all the more so, as the individual prosecution of press intrigues is
+very rarely possible and as, with a lax enforcement of such laws, the
+few cases of this nature would not be punished. The proposition,
+therefore, does not meet our demand in any way, and it offers not the
+least guarantee for the desired success._
+
+_b) An amendment to Art. 22 of the constitution, which would permit
+confiscation, a proposal, which does not satisfy us, as the existence of
+such a law in Servia is of no use to us. For we want the obligation of
+the Government to enforce it and that has not been promised us._
+
+_These proposals are therefore entirely unsatisfactory and evasive as we
+are not told within what time these laws will be passed, and as in the
+event of the notpassing of these laws by the Skuptschina everything
+would remain as it is, excepting the event of a possible resignation of
+the Government._
+
+2. The Government possesses no proofs and the note of the I. and R.
+Government does not submit them that the society Narodna Odbrana and
+other similar societies have committed, up to the present, any criminal
+actions of this manner through anyone of their members. Notwithstanding
+this, the Royal Government will accept the demand of the I. and R.
+Government and dissolve the society Narodna Odbrana, as well as every
+society which should act against Austria-Hungary.
+
+_The propaganda of the Narodna Odbrana and affiliated societies hostile
+to the monarchy fills the entire public life of Servia; it is therefore
+an entirely inacceptable reserve if the Servian Government asserts that
+it knows nothing about it. Aside from this, our demand is not completely
+fulfilled, as we have asked besides:_
+
+"_To confiscate the means of propaganda of these societies to prevent
+the reformation of the dissolved societies under another name and in
+another form._"
+
+_In these two directions the Belgrade Cabinet is perfectly silent, so
+that through this semi-concession there is offered us no guarantee for
+putting an end to the agitation of the associations hostile to the
+Monarchy, especially the Narodna Odbrana._
+
+3. The Royal Servian Government binds itself without delay to eliminate
+from the public instruction in Servia anything which might further the
+propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary provided the I. and R.
+Government furnishes actual proofs.
+
+_Also in this case the Servian Government first demands proofs for a
+propaganda hostile to the Monarchy in the public instruction of Servia
+while it must know that the text books introduced in the Servian schools
+contain objectionable matter in this direction and that a large portion
+of the teachers are in the camp of the Narodna Odbrana and affiliated
+societies._
+
+_Furthermore, the Servian Government has not fulfilled a part of our
+demands, as we have requested, as it omitted in its text the addition
+desired by us: "as far as the body of instructors is concerned, as well
+as the means of instruction"--a sentence which shows clearly where the
+propaganda hostile to the Monarchy is to be found in the Servian
+schools_.
+
+4. The Royal Government is also ready to dismiss those officers and
+officials from the military and civil services in regard to whom it has
+been proved by judicial investigation that they have been guilty of
+actions against the territorial integrity of the monarchy; it expects
+that the I. and R. Government communicate to it for the purpose of
+starting the investigation the names of these officers and officials,
+and the facts with which they have been charged.
+
+_By promising the dismissal from the military and civil services of
+those officers and officials who are found guilty by judicial procedure,
+the Servian Government limits its assent to those cases, in which these
+persons have been charged with a crime according to the statutory code.
+As, however, we demand the removal of such officers and officials as
+indulge in a propaganda hostile to the Monarchy, which is generally not
+punishable in Servia, our demands have not been fulfilled in this
+point_.
+
+5. The Royal Government confesses that it is not clear about the sense
+and the scope of that demand of the I. and R. Government which concerns
+the obligation on the part of the Royal Servian Government to permit the
+cooperation of officials of the I. and R. Government on Servian
+territory, but it declares that it is willing to accept every
+cooperation which does not run counter to international law and criminal
+law, as well as to the friendly and neighborly relations.
+
+_The international law, as well as the criminal law, has nothing to do
+with this question; it is purely a matter of the nature of state police
+which is to be solved by way of a special agreement. The reserved
+attitude of Servia is therefore incomprehensible and on account of its
+vague general form it would lead to unbridgeable difficulties_.
+
+6. The Royal Government considers it its duty as a matter of course to
+begin an investigation against all those persons who have participated
+in the outrage of June 28th and who are in its territory. As far as the
+cooperation in this investigation of specially delegated officials of
+the I. and R. Government is concerned, this cannot be accepted, as this
+is a violation of the constitution and of criminal procedure. Yet in
+some cases the result of the investigation might be communicated to the
+Austro-Hungarian officials.
+
+_The Austrian demand was clear and unmistakable_:
+
+_1. To institute a criminal procedure against the participants in the
+outrage_.
+
+_2. Participation by I. and R. Government officials in the examinations
+("Recherche" in contrast with "enquete judiciaire")._
+
+_3. It did not occur to us to let I. and R. Government officials
+participate in the Servian court procedure; they were to cooperate only
+in the police researches which had to furnish and fix the material for
+the investigation._
+
+_If the Servian Government misunderstands us here, this is done
+deliberately, for it must be familiar with the difference between
+"enquete judiciaire" and simple police researches. As it desired to
+escape from every control of the investigation which would yield, if
+correctly carried out, highly undesirable results for it, and as it
+possesses no means to refuse in a plausible manner the cooperation of
+our officials (precedents for such police intervention exist in great
+number) it tries to justify its refusal by showing up our demands as
+impossible_.
+
+7. The Royal Government has ordered on the evening of the day on which
+the note was received the arrest of Major Voislar Tankosic. However, as
+far as Milan Ciganowic is concerned who is a citizen of the
+Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and who has been employed till June 28th with
+the Railroad Department, it has as yet been impossible to locate him,
+wherefor a warrant has been issued against him.
+
+The I. and R. Government is asked to make known, as soon as possible,
+for the purpose of conducting the investigation, the existing grounds
+for suspicion and the proofs of guilt, obtained in the investigation at
+Sarajevo.
+
+_This reply is disingenuous. According to our investigation, Ciganowic,
+by order of the police prefect in Belgrade, left three days after the
+outrage for Ribari, after it had become known that Ciganowic had
+participated in the outrage. In the first place, it is therefore
+incorrect that Ciganowic left the Servian service on June 28th. In the
+second place, we add that the prefect of police at Belgrade who had
+himself caused the departure of this Ciganowic and who knew his
+whereabout, declared in an interview that a man by the name of Milan
+Ciganowic did not exist in Belgrade_.
+
+8. The Servian Government will amplify and render more severe the
+existing measures against the suppression of smuggling of arms and
+explosives.
+
+It is a matter of course that it will proceed at once against, and
+punish severely, those officials of the frontier service on the line
+Shabatz-Loznica who violated their duty and who have permitted the
+perpetrators of the crime to cross the frontier.
+
+9. The Royal Government is ready to give explanations about the
+expressions which its officials in Servia and abroad have made in
+interviews after the outrage and which, according to the assertion of
+the I. and R. Government, were hostile to the Monarchy. As soon as the
+I. and R. Government points out in detail where those expressions were
+made and succeeds in proving that those expressions have actually been
+made by the functionaries concerned, the Royal Government itself will
+take care that the necessary evidences and proofs are collected
+therefor.
+
+_The Royal Servian Government must be aware of the interviews in
+question. If it demands of the I. and R. Government that it should
+furnish all kinds of detail about the said interviews and if it reserves
+for itself the right of a formal investigation, it shows that it is not
+its intention seriously to fulfill the demand._
+
+10. The Royal Government will notify the I. and R. Government, so far as
+this has not been already done by the present note, of the execution of
+the measures in question as soon as one of those measures has been
+ordered and put into execution.
+
+The Royal Servian Government believes it to be to the common interest
+not to rush the solution of this affair and it is therefore, in case the
+I. and R. Government should not consider itself satisfied with this
+answer, ready, as ever, to accept a peaceable solution, be it by
+referring the decision of this question to the International Court at
+the Hague or by leaving it to the decision of the Great Powers who have
+participated in the working out of the declaration given by the Servian
+Government on March 31st 1909.
+
+_The Servian Note, therefore, is entirely a play for time._
+
+
+EXHIBIT I.
+
+The Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassadors at Paris, London, and St.
+Petersburg, on Juli 23rd 1914.
+
+The publications of the Austro-Hungarian Government concerning the
+circumstances under which the Assassination of the Austrian successor to
+the throne and his consort took place, disclose clearly the aims which
+the pan-Serb propaganda has set itself and the means which it utilizes
+for their realization. Through the published facts the last doubt must
+disappear that the center of action of the efforts for the separation of
+the south slavic provinces from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and their
+union with the Servian Kingdom must be sought in Belgrade where it
+displays its activity with the connivance of members of the Government
+and of the Army.
+
+The Serb intrigues may be traced back through a series of years. In a
+specially marked manner the pan-Serb chauvinism showed itself during the
+Bosnian crisis. Only to the far-reaching self-restraint and moderation
+of the Austro-Hungarian Government and the energetic intercession of the
+powers is it to be ascribed that the provocations to which at that time
+Austria-Hungary was exposed on the part of Servia, did not lead to a
+conflict. The assurance of future well-behaviour which the Servian
+Government gave at that time, it has not kept. Under the very eyes, at
+least with the tacit sufferance of official Servia, the pan-Serb
+propaganda has meanwhile increased in scope and intensity; at its door
+is to be laid the latest crime the threads of which lead to Belgrade. It
+has become evident that it is compatible neither with the dignity nor
+with the self-preservation of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy to view any
+longer idly the doings across the border through which the safety and
+the integrity of the Monarchy are permanently threatened. With this
+state of affairs, the action as well as the demands of the
+Austro-Hungarian government can be viewed only as justifiable.
+Nevertheless, the attitude assumed by public opinion as well as by the
+government in Servia does not preclude the fear that the Servian
+government will decline to meet these demands and that it will allow
+itself to be carried away into a provocative attitude toward
+Austria-Hungary. Nothing would remain for the Austro-Hungarian
+government, unless it renounced definitely its position as a great
+power, but to press its demands with the Servian government and, if need
+be, enforce the same by appeal to military measures, in regard to which
+the choice of means must be left with it.
+
+I have the honor to request you to express yourself in the sense
+indicated above to (the present representative of M. Viviani) (Sir
+Edward Grey) (M. Sasonow) and therewith give special emphasis to the
+view that in this question there is concerned an affair which should be
+settled solely between Austria-Hungary and Servia, the limitation to
+which it must be the earnest endeavor of the powers to insure. We
+anxiously desire the localisation of the conflict because every
+intercession of another power on account of the various treaty-alliances
+would precipitate inconceivable consequences.
+
+I shall look forward with interest to a telegraphic report about the
+course of your interview.
+
+
+EXHIBIT 2.
+
+The Chancellor to the Governments of Germany.
+Confidential. Berlin, July 28, 1914.
+
+You will make the following report to the Government to which you are
+accredited:
+
+In view of the facts which the Austrian Government has published in its
+note to the Servian Government, the last doubt must disappear that the
+outrage to which the Austro-Hungarian successor to the throne has fallen
+a victim, was prepared in Servia, to say the least with the connivance
+of members of the Servian government and army. It is a product of the
+pan-Serb intrigues which for a series of years have become a source of
+permanent disturbance for the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and for the
+whole of Europe.
+
+The pan-Serb chauvinism appeared especially marked during the Bosnian
+crisis. Only to the far-reaching self-restraint and moderation of the
+Austro-Hungarian government and the energetic intercession of the powers
+is it to be ascribed that the provocations to which Austria-Hungary was
+exposed at that time, did not lead to a conflict. The assurance of
+future well-behaviour, which the Servian government gave at that time,
+it has not kept. Under the very eyes, at least with the tacit sufferance
+of official Servia, the pan-Serb propaganda has meanwhile continued to
+increase in scope and intensity. It would be compatible neither with its
+dignity nor with its right to self-preservation if the Austro-Hungarian
+government persisted to view idly any longer the intrigues beyond the
+frontier, through which the safety and the integrity of the monarchy are
+permanently threatened. With this state of affairs, the action as well
+as the demands of the Austro-Hungarian Government can be viewed only as
+justifiable.
+
+The reply of the Servian government to the demands which the
+Austro-Hungarian government put on the 23rd inst. through its
+representative in Belgrade, shows that the dominating factors in Servia
+are not inclined to cease their former policies and agitation. There
+will remain nothing else for the Austro-Hungarian government than to
+press its demands, if need be through military action, unless it
+renounces for good its position as a great power.
+
+Some Russian personalities deem it their right as a matter of course and
+a task of Russia's to actively become a party to Servia in the conflict
+between Austria-Hungary and Servia. For the European conflagration which
+would result from a similar step by Russia, the "Nowoje Wremja" believes
+itself justified in making Germany responsible in so far as it does not
+induce Austria-Hungary to yield.
+
+The Russian press thus turns conditions upside down. It is not
+Austria-Hungary which has called forth the conflict with Servia, but it
+is Servia which, through unscrupulous favor toward pan-Serb aspirations,
+even in parts of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, threatens the same in
+her existence and creates conditions, which eventually found expression
+in the wanton outrage at Sarajevo. If Russia believes that it must
+champion the cause of Servia in this matter, it certainly has the right
+to do so. However, it must realize that it makes the Serb activities its
+own, to undermine the conditions of existence of the Austro-Hungarian
+monarchy, and that thus it bears the sole responsibility if out of the
+Austro-Servian affair, which all other great powers desire to localize,
+there arises a European war. This responsibility of Russia's is evident
+and it weighs the more heavily as Count Berchtold has officially
+declared to Russia that Austria-Hungary has no intention to acquire
+Servian territory or to touch the existence of the Servian Kingdom, but
+only desires peace against the Servian intrigues threatening its
+existence.
+
+The attitude of the Imperial government in this question is clearly
+indicated. The agitation conducted by the pan-Slavs in Austria-Hungary
+has for its goal, with the destruction of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy,
+the scattering or weakening of the triple alliance with a complete
+isolation of the German Empire in consequence. Our own interest
+therefore calls us to the side of Austria-Hungary. The duty, if at all
+possible, to guard Europe against a universal war, points to the support
+by ourselves of those endeavors which aim at the localization of the
+conflict, faithful to the course of those policies which we have carried
+out successfully for forty-four years in the interest of the
+preservation of the peace of Europe.
+
+Should, however, against our hope, through the interference of Russia
+the fire be spread, we should have to support, faithful to our duty as
+allies, the neighbor-monarchy with all the power at our command. We
+shall take the sword only if forced to it, but then in the clear
+consciousness that we are not guilty of the calamity which war will
+bring upon the peoples of Europe.
+
+
+EXHIBIT 3.
+
+Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at Vienna to the Chancellor on July
+24th 1914.
+
+Count Berchtold has asked to-day for the Russian Charge d'affaires in
+order to explain to him thoroughly and cordially Austria-Hungary's point
+of view toward Servia. After recapitulation of the historical
+development of the past few years, he emphasized that the Monarchy
+entertained no thought of conquest toward Servia. Austria-Hungary would
+not claim Servian territory. It insisted merely that this step was meant
+as a definite means of checking the Serb intrigues. Impelled by force of
+circumstance, Austria-Hungary must have a guaranty for continued
+amicable relations with Servia. It was far from him to intend to bring
+about a change in the balance of powers in the Balcan. The Charge
+d'affaires who had received no instructions from St. Petersburg, took
+the discussion of the Secretary "ad referendum" with the promise to
+submit it immediately to Sasonow.
+
+
+EXHIBIT 4.
+
+Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg to the Chancellor
+on July 24th 1914.
+
+I have just utilized the contents of Order 592 in a prolonged interview
+with Sasonow. The Secretary (Sasonow) indulged in unmeasured accusations
+toward Austria-Hungary and he was very much agitated. He declared most
+positively that Russia could not permit under any circumstances that the
+Servo-Austrian difficulty be settled alone between the parties
+concerned.
+
+
+EXHIBIT 5.
+
+The Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg to the Chancellor. Telegram of
+July 26th 1914.
+
+The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador had an extended interview with Sasonow
+this afternoon. Both parties had a satisfactory impression as they told
+me afterwards. The assurance of the Ambassador that Austria-Hungary had
+no idea of conquest but wished to obtain peace at last at her frontiers,
+greatly pacified the Secretary.
+
+
+EXHIBIT 6.
+
+Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to the Chancellor
+on July 25th 1914.
+
+Message to H.M. from General von Chelius (German honorary aide de camp
+to the Czar).
+
+The manoeuvres of the troops in the Krasnoe camp were suddenly
+interrupted and the regiments returned to their garrisons at once. The
+manoeuvres have been cancelled. The military pupils were raised to-day
+to the rank of officers instead of next fall. At headquarters there
+obtains great excitement over the procedure of Austria. I have the
+impression that complete preparations for mobilization against Austria
+are being made.
+
+
+EXHIBIT 7.
+
+Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to the Chancellor
+on July 26th 1914.
+
+The military attache requests the following message to be sent to the
+general staff:
+
+I deem it certain that mobilisation has been ordered for Kiev and
+Odessa. It is doubtful at Warsaw and Moscow and improbable elsewhere.
+
+
+EXHIBIT 8.
+
+Telegram of the Imperial Consulate at Kovno to the Chancellor on July
+27th 1914.
+
+Kovno has been declared to be in a state of war.
+
+(Note that the official translator means _Kriegszustand_.)
+
+
+EXHIBIT 9.
+
+Telegram of the Imperial Minister at Berne to the Chancellor on July
+27th 1914.
+
+Have learned reliably that French XIVth corps has discontinued
+manoeuvres.
+
+
+EXHIBIT 10.
+
+Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at London. Urgent.
+July 26th 1914.
+
+Austria-Hungary has declared in St. Petersburg officially and solemnly
+that it has no desire for territorial gain in Servia; that it will not
+touch the existence of the Kingdom, but that it desires to establish
+peaceful conditions. According to news received here, the call for
+several classes of the reserves is expected immediately which is
+equivalent to mobilization.[186] If this news proves correct, we shall
+be forced to contermeasures very much against our own wishes. Our desire
+to localize the conflict and to preserve the peace of Europe remains
+unchanged. We ask to act in this sense at St. Petersburg with all
+possible emphasis.
+
+[Footnote 186: The German text inserts _auch gegen uns_, i.e. also
+against us.]
+
+
+EXHIBIT 10a.
+
+Telegram of the Imperial Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at Paris.
+July 26th 1914.
+
+After officially declaring to Russia that Austria-Hungary has no
+intention to acquire territorial gain and to touch the existence of the
+Kingdom, the decision whether there is to be a European war rests solely
+with Russia which has to bear the entire responsibility. We depend upon
+France with which we are at one in the desire for the preservation of
+the peace of Europe that it will exercise its influence at St.
+Petersburg in favour of peace.
+
+
+EXHIBIT 10b.
+
+Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg
+on July 26th, 1914.
+
+After Austria's solemn declaration of its territorial
+dis-interestedness, the responsibility for a possible disturbance of the
+peace of Europe through a Russian intervention rests solely upon Russia.
+We trust still that Russia will undertake no steps which will threaten
+seriously the peace of Europe.
+
+
+EXHIBIT 11.
+
+Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg to the Chancellor
+on July 27th, 1914.
+
+Military Attache reports a conversation with the Secretary of War:
+
+Sasonow has requested the latter to enlighten me on the situation. The
+Secretary of War has given me his word of honor that no order to
+mobilize has as yet been issued. Though general preparations are being
+made, no reserves were called and no horses mustered. If Austria crossed
+the Servian frontier, such military districts as are directed toward
+Austria, viz., Kiev, Odessa, Moscow, Kazan, are to be mobilized. Under
+no circumstances those on the German frontier, Warsaw, Vilna, St.
+Petersburg. Peace with Germany was desired very much. Upon my inquiry
+into the object of mobilization against Austria he shrugged his
+shoulders and referred to the diplomats. I told the Secretary that we
+appreciated the friendly intentions, but considered mobilization even
+against Austria as very menacing.
+
+
+EXHIBIT 12.
+
+Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at London on July
+27th, 1914.
+
+We know as yet nothing of a suggestion of Sir Edward Grey's to hold a
+quadruple conference in London. It is impossible for us to place our
+ally in his dispute with Servia before a European tribunal. Our
+mediation must be limited to the danger of an Austro-Russian conflict.
+
+
+EXHIBIT 13.
+
+Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at London on July
+25th, 1914.
+
+The distinction made by Sir Edward Grey between an Austro-Servian and an
+Austro-Russian conflict is perfectly correct. We do not wish to
+interpose in the former any more than England, and as heretofore we take
+the position that this question must be localized by virtue of all
+powers refraining from intervention. It is therefore our hope that
+Russia will refrain from any action in view of her responsibility and
+the seriousness of the situation. We are prepared, in the event of an
+Austro-Russian controversy, quite apart from our known duties as allies,
+to intercede between Russia and Austria jointly with the other powers.
+
+
+EXHIBIT 14.
+
+Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg
+on July 28th, 1914.
+
+We continue in our endeavor to induce Vienna to elucidate in St.
+Petersburg the object and scope of the Austrian action in Servia in a
+manner both convincing and satisfactory to Russia. The declaration of
+war which has meanwhile ensued alters nothing in this matter.
+
+
+EXHIBIT 15.
+
+Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador in London on July
+27th, 1914.
+
+We have at once started the mediation proposal in Vienna in the sense as
+desired by Sir Edward Grey. We have communicated besides to Count
+Berchtold the desire of M. Sasonow for a direct parley with Vienna.
+
+
+EXHIBIT 16.
+
+Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at Vienna to the Chancellor on July
+28th, 1914.
+
+Count Berchtold requests me to express to Your Excellency his thanks for
+the communication of the English mediation proposal. He states, however,
+that after the opening of hostilities by Servia and the subsequent
+declaration of war, the step appears belated.
+
+
+EXHIBIT 17.
+
+Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at Paris on July
+29th, 1914.
+
+News received here regarding French preparations of war multiplies from
+hour to hour. I request that You call the attention of the French
+Government to this and accentuate that such measures would call forth
+counter-measures on our part. We should have to proclaim threatening
+state of war (drohende Kriegsgefahr), and while this would not mean a
+call for the reserves or mobilization, yet the tension would be
+aggravated. We continue to hope for the preservation of peace.
+
+
+EXHIBIT 18.
+
+Telegram of the Military Attache at St. Petersburg to H. M. the Kaiser
+on July 30th, 1914.
+
+Prince Troubetzki said to me yesterday, after causing Your Majesty's
+telegram to be delivered at once to Czar Nicolas: Thank God that a
+telegram of Your Emperor has come. He has just told me the telegram has
+made a deep impression upon the Czar but as the mobilization against
+Austria had already been ordered and Sasonow had convinced His Majesty
+that it was no longer possible to retreat, His Majesty was sorry he
+could not change it any more. I then told him that the guilt for the
+measureless consequences lay at the door of premature mobilization
+against Austria-Hungary which after all was involved merely in a local
+war with Servia, for Germany's answer was clear and the responsibility
+rested upon Russia which ignored Austria-Hungary's assurance that it had
+no intentions of territorial gain in Servia. Austria-Hungary mobilized
+against Servia and not against Russia and there was no ground for an
+immediate action on the part of Russia. I further added that in Germany
+one could not understand any more Russia's phrase that "she could not
+desert her brethren in Servia", after the horrible crime of Sarajevo. I
+told him finally he need not wonder if Germany's army were to be
+mobilized.
+
+
+EXHIBIT 19.
+
+Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at Rome on July
+31st, 1914.
+
+We have continued to negotiate between Russia and Austria-Hungary
+through a direct exchange of telegrams between His Majesty the Kaiser
+and His Majesty the Czar, as well as in conjunction with Sir Edward
+Grey. Through the mobilization of Russia all our efforts have been
+greatly handicapped if they have not become impossible. In spite of
+pacifying assurances Russia is taking such far-reaching measures against
+us that the situation is becoming continually more menacing.
+
+
+EXHIBIT 20.
+
+I. His Majesty to the Czar.
+
+July 28th, 10.45 p.m.
+
+I have heard with the greatest anxiety of the impression which is caused
+by the action of Austria-Hungary against Servia. The inscrupulous
+agitation which has been going on for years in Servia, has led to the
+revolting crime of which Archduke Franz Ferdinand has become a victim.
+The spirit which made the Servians murder their own King and his
+consort, still dominates that country. Doubtless You will agree with me
+that both of us, You as well as I, and all other sovereigns, have a
+common interest to insist that all those who are responsible for this
+horrible murder, shall suffer their deserved punishment.
+
+On the other hand I by no means overlook the difficulty encountered by
+You and Your Government to stem the tide of public opinion. In view of
+the cordial friendship which has joined us both for a long time with
+firm ties, I shall use my entire influence to induce Austria-Hungary to
+obtain a frank and satisfactory understanding with Russia. I hope
+confidently that You will support me in my efforts to overcome all
+difficulties which may yet arise.
+
+Your most sincere and devoted friend and cousin
+
+signed: Wilhelm.
+
+
+EXHIBIT 21.
+
+II. The Czar to His Majesty.
+
+Peterhof Palace, July 29th, 1 p.m.
+
+I am glad that You are back in Germany. In this serious moment I ask You
+earnestly to help me. An ignominious war has been declared against a
+weak country and in Russia the indignation which I fully share is
+tremendous. I fear that very soon I shall be unable to resist the
+pressure exercised upon me and that I shall be forced to take measures
+which will lead to war. To prevent a calamity as a European war would
+be, I urge You in the name of our old friendship to do all in Your power
+to restrain Your ally from going too far.
+
+signed: Nicolas.
+
+
+EXHIBIT 22.
+
+III. His Majesty to the Czar.
+
+July 29th, 6.30 p.m.
+
+I have received Your telegram and I share Your desire for the
+conservation of peace. However: I cannot--as I told You in my first
+telegram--consider the action of Austria-Hungary as an "ignominious
+war". Austria-Hungary knows from experience that the promises of Servia
+as long as they are merely on paper are entirely unreliable.
+
+According to my opinion the action of Austria-Hungary is to be
+considered as an attempt to receive full guaranty that the promises of
+Servia are effectively translated into deeds. In this opinion I am
+strengthened by the explanation of the Austrian cabinet that
+Austria-Hungary intended no territorial gain at the expense of Servia. I
+am therefore of opinion that it is perfectly possible for Russia to
+remain a spectator in the Austro-Servian war without drawing Europe into
+the most terrible war it has ever seen. I believe that a direct
+understanding is possible and desirable between Your Government and
+Vienna, an understanding which--as I have already telegraphed You--my
+Government endeavors to aid with all possible effort. Naturally military
+measures by Russia, which might be construed as a menace by
+Austria-Hungary, would accelerate a calamity which both of us desire to
+avoid and would undermine my position as mediator which--upon Your
+appeal to my friendship and aid--I willingly accepted.
+
+signed: Wilhelm.
+
+
+EXHIBIT 23.
+
+IV. His Majesty to the Czar.
+
+July 30th, 1 a.m.
+
+My Ambassador has instructions to direct the attention of Your
+Government to the dangers and serious consequences of a mobilization; I
+have told You the same in my last telegram. Austria-Hungary has
+mobilized only against Servia, and only a part of her army. If Russia,
+as seems to be the case according to Your advice and that of Your
+Government, mobilizes against Austria-Hungary, the part of the mediator
+with which You have entrusted me in such friendly manner and which I
+have accepted upon Your express desire, is threatened if not made
+impossible. The entire weight of decision now rests upon Your shoulders,
+You have to bear the responsibility for war or peace.
+
+signed: Wilhelm.
+
+
+EXHIBIT 23a.
+
+V. The Czar to His Majesty.
+
+Peterhof, July 30th, 1914, 1.20 p.m.
+
+I thank You from my heart for Your quick reply. I am sending to-night
+Tatisheft (Russian honorary aide to the Kaiser) with instructions. The
+military measures now taking form were decided upon five days ago, and
+for the reason of defence against the preparations of Austria. I hope
+with all my heart that these measures will not influence in any manner
+Your position as mediator which I appraise very highly. We need Your
+strong pressure upon Austria so that an understanding can be arrived at
+with us.
+
+Nicolas.
+
+
+EXHIBIT 24.
+
+Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg
+on July 31st, 1914. Urgent.
+
+In spite of negotiations still pending and although we have up to this
+hour made no preparations for mobilization, Russia has mobilized her
+entire army and navy, hence also against us. On account of these Russian
+measures we have been forced, for the safety of the country, to proclaim
+the threatening state of war, which does not yet imply mobilization.
+Mobilization, however, is bound to follow if Russia does not stop every
+measure of war against us and against Austria-Hungary within 12 hours
+and notifies us definitely to this effect. Please to communicate this at
+once to M. Sasonow and wire hour of communication.
+
+
+EXHIBIT 25.
+
+Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador in Paris on July
+31st, 1914. Urgent.
+
+Russia has ordered mobilization of her entire army and fleet, therefore
+also against us in spite of our still pending mediation. We have
+therefore declared the threatening state of war which is bound to be
+followed by mobilization unless Russia stops within 12 hours all
+measures of war against us and Austria. Mobilization inevitably implies
+war. Please ask French Government whether it intends to remain neutral
+in a Russo-German war. Reply must be made in 18 hours. Wire at once hour
+of inquiry. Utmost speed necessary.
+
+
+EXHIBIT 26.
+
+Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador in St. Petersburg
+on August 1st, 12.52 p.m. Urgent.
+
+If the Russian Government gives no satisfactory reply to our demand,
+Your Excellency will please transmit this afternoon 5 o'clock
+(mid-European time) the following statement:
+
+"Le Gouvernement Imperial s'est efforce des les debuts de la crise de la
+mener a une solution pacifique. Se rendant a un desir que lui en avail
+ete exprime par Sa Majeste l'Empereur de Russie, Sa Majeste l'Empereur
+d'Allemagne d'accord avec l'Angleterre etait applique a accomplir un
+role mediateur aupres des Cabinets de Vienne et de St. Petersbourg,
+lorsque la Russie, sans en attendre le resultat, proceda a la
+mobilisation de la totalite de ses forces de terre et de mer.
+
+"A la suite de cette mesure menacante motivee par aucun preparatif
+militaire de la part de l'Allemagne, l'Empire Allemand se trouva
+vis-a-vis d'un danger grave et imminent. Si le Gouvernement Imperial eut
+manque de parer a ce peril il aurait compromis la securite et
+l'existence meme de l'Allemagne. Par consequent le Gouvernement Allemand
+se vit force de s'adresser au Gouvernement de Sa Majeste l'Empereur de
+toutes les Russies en sistant sur la cessation des dits actes
+militaires. La Russie ayant refuse de faire droit a cette demande et
+ayant manifeste par ce refus, que son action etait dirigee contre
+l'Allemande, j'ai l'honneur d'ordre de mon Gouvernement de faire savoir
+a Votre Excellence ce qui suit:
+
+"Sa Majeste l'Empereur, mon auguste Souverain, an nom de l'Empire releve
+le defi et Se considere en etat de guerre avec la Russie."
+
+Please wire urgent receipt and time of carrying out this instruction by
+Russian time.
+
+Please ask for Your passports and turn over protection and affairs to
+the American Embassy.
+
+
+EXHIBIT 27.
+
+Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador in Paris to the Chancellor on August
+1st 1.05 p. m.
+
+Upon my repeated definite inquiry whether France would remain neutral in
+the event of a Russo-German war, the Prime Minister declared that France
+would do that which her interests dictated.
+
+
+
+
+APPENDIX II
+
+
+EXTRACTS FROM
+
+SIR EDWARD GREY'S
+
+CORRESPONDENCE
+
+RESPECTING THE EUROPEAN
+
+CRISIS
+
+_For the complete Correspondence see White Paper Miscellaneous No. 6
+(1914) (Cd. 7467), presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of
+His Majesty, August 1914_
+
+
+No. 13.
+
+_Note communicated by Russian Ambassador, July 25._
+
+(Translation.)
+
+M. Sazionof telegraphs to the Russian Charge d'Affaires at Vienna on the
+11th (24th) July, 1914:
+
+"The communication made by Austria-Hungary to the Powers the day after
+the presentation of the ultimatum at Belgrade leaves a period to the
+Powers which is quite insufficient to enable them to take any steps
+which might help to smooth away the difficulties that have arisen.
+
+"In order to prevent the consequences, equally incalculable and fatal to
+all the Powers, which may result from the course of action followed by
+the Austro-Hungarian Government, it seems to us to be above all
+essential that the period allowed for the Servian reply should be
+extended. Austria-Hungary, having declared her readiness to inform the
+Powers of the results of the enquiry upon which the Imperial and Royal
+Government base their accusations, should equally allow them sufficient
+time to study them.
+
+"In this case, if the Powers were convinced that certain of the Austrian
+demands were well founded, they would be in a position to offer advice
+to the Servian Government.
+
+"A refusal to prolong the term of the ultimatum would render nugatory
+the proposals made by the Austro-Hungarian Government to the Powers, and
+would be in contradiction to the very bases of international relations.
+
+"Prince Kudachef is instructed to communicate the above to the Cabinet
+at Vienna.
+
+"M. Sazonof hopes that His Britannic Majesty's Government will adhere to
+the point of view set forth above, and he trusts that Sir E. Grey will
+see his way to furnish similar instructions to the British Ambassador at
+Vienna."
+
+
+No. 17.
+
+_Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.--(Received July_ 25.)
+
+(Telegraphic.)      _St. Petersburgh, July_ 25, 1914.
+
+I Saw the Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning....
+
+The Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Servia was quite ready to do
+as you had suggested and to punish those proved to be guilty, but that
+no independent State could be expected to accept the political demands
+which had been put forward. The Minister for Foreign Affairs thought,
+from a conversation which he had with the Servian Minister yesterday,
+that, in the event of the Austrians attacking Servia, the Servian
+Government would abandon Belgrade, and withdraw their forces into the
+interior, while they would at the same time appeal to the Powers to help
+them. His Excellency was in favour of their making this appeal. He would
+like to see the question placed on an international footing, as the
+obligations taken by Servia in 1908, to which reference is made in the
+Austrian ultimatum, were given not to Austria, but to the Powers.
+
+If Servia should appeal to the Powers, Russia would be quite ready to
+stand aside and leave the question in the hands of England, France,
+Germany, and Italy. It was possible, in his opinion, that Servia might
+propose to submit the question to arbitration.
+
+On my expressing the earnest hope that Russia would not precipitate war
+by mobilising until you had had time to use your influence in favour of
+peace, his Excellency assured me that Russia had no aggressive
+intentions, and she would take no action until it was forced on her.
+Austria's action was in reality directed against Russia. She aimed at
+overthrowing the present _status quo_ in the Balkans, and establishing
+her own hegemony there. He did not believe that Germany really wanted
+war, but her attitude was decided by ours. If we took our stand firmly
+with France and Russia there would be no war. If we failed them now,
+rivers of blood would flow, and we would in the end be dragged into war.
+I said that England could play the role of mediator at Berlin and Vienna
+to better purpose as friend who, if her counsels of moderation were
+disregarded, might one day be converted into an ally, than if she were
+to declare herself Russia's ally at once. His Excellency said that
+unfortunately Germany was convinced that she could count upon our
+neutrality.
+
+I said all I could to impress prudence on the Minister for Foreign
+Affairs, and warned him that if Russia mobilised, Germany would not be
+content with mere mobilisation, or give Russia time to carry out hers,
+but would probably declare war at once. His Excellency replied that
+Russia could not allow Austria to crush Servia and become the
+predominant Power in the Balkans, and, if she feels secure of the
+support of France, she will face all the risks of war. He assured me
+once more that he did not wish to precipitate a conflict, but that
+unless Germany could restrain Austria I could regard the situation as
+desperate.
+
+
+No. 18.
+
+_Sir H. Rumbold to Sir Edward Grey.--(Received July 25.)_
+
+(Telegraphic.)         _Berlin, July 25, 1914._
+
+Your telegram of the 24th July acted on.
+
+Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs says that on receipt of a
+telegram at 10 this morning from German Ambassador at London, he
+immediately instructed German Ambassador at Vienna to pass on to
+Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs your suggestion for an extension
+of time limit, and to speak to his Excellency about it. Unfortunately it
+appeared from press that Count Berchtold is at Ischl, and Secretary of
+State thought that in these circumstances there would be delay and
+difficulty in getting time limit extended. Secretary of State said that
+he did not know what Austria-Hungary had ready on the spot, but he
+admitted quite freely that Austro-Hungarian Government wished to give
+the Servians a lesson, and that they meant to take military action. He
+also admitted that Servian Government could not swallow certain of the
+Austro-Hungarian demands.
+
+Secretary of State said that a reassuring feature of situation was that
+Count Berchtold had sent for Russian representative at Vienna and had
+told him that Austria-Hungary had no intention of seizing Servian
+territory. This step should, in his opinion, exercise a calming
+influence at St. Petersburgh. I asked whether it was not to be feared
+that, in taking military action against Servia, Austria would
+dangerously excite public opinion in Russia. He said he thought not. He
+remained of opinion that crisis could be localised. I said that
+telegrams from Russia in this morning's papers did not look very
+reassuring, but he maintained his optimistic view with regard to Russia.
+He said that he had given the Russian Government to understand that last
+thing Germany wanted was a general war, and he would do all in his power
+to prevent such a calamity. If the relations between Austria and Russia
+became threatening, he was quite ready to fall in with your suggestion
+as to the four Powers working in favour of moderation at Vienna and St.
+Petersburgh.
+
+Secretary of State confessed privately that he thought the note left
+much to be desired as a diplomatic document. He repeated very earnestly
+that, though he had been accused of knowing all about the contents of
+that note, he had in fact had no such knowledge.
+
+
+No. 41.
+
+_Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.--(Received July 27.)_
+
+(Telegraphic.)                      _Vienna, July_ 27, 1914.
+
+I have had conversations with all my colleagues representing the Great
+Powers. The impression left on my mind is that the Austro-Hungarian note
+was so drawn up as to make war inevitable; that the Austro-Hungarian
+Government are fully resolved to have war with Servia; that they
+consider their position as a Great Power to be at stake; and that until
+punishment has been administered to Servia it is unlikely that they will
+listen to proposals of mediation. This country has gone wild with joy at
+the prospect of war with Servia, and its postponement or prevention
+would undoubtedly be a great disappointment.
+
+I propose, subject to any special directions you desire to send me, to
+express to the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs the hope of His
+Majesty's Government that it may yet be possible to avoid war, and to
+ask his Excellency whether he cannot suggest a way out even now.
+
+
+No. 43.
+
+_Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.--(Received July 27.)_
+
+(Telegraphic.)                         _Berlin, July_ 27, 1914.
+
+Your telegram of 26th July.
+
+Secretary of State says that conference you suggest would practically
+amount to a court of arbitration and could not, in his opinion, be
+called together except at the request of Austria and Russia. He could
+not therefore fall in with your suggestion, desirous though he was to
+co-operate for the maintenance of peace. I said I was sure that your
+idea had nothing to do with arbitration, but meant that representatives
+of the four nations not directly interested should discuss and suggest
+means for avoiding a dangerous situation. He maintained, however, that
+such a conference as you proposed was not practicable. He added that
+news he had just received from St. Petersburgh showed that there was an
+intention on the part of M. de Sazonof to exchange views with Count
+Berchtold. He thought that this method of procedure might lead to a
+satisfactory result, and that it would be best, before doing anything
+else, to await outcome of the exchange of views between the Austrian and
+Russian Governments.
+
+In the course of a short conversation Secretary of State said that as
+yet Austria was only partially mobilising, but that if Russia mobilised
+against Germany latter would have to follow suit. I asked him what he
+meant by "mobilising against Germany." He said that if Russia only
+mobilised in south, Germany would not mobilise, but if she mobilised in
+north, Germany would have to do so too, and Russian system of
+mobilisation was so complicated that it might be difficult exactly to
+locate her mobilisation. Germany would therefore have to be very careful
+not to be taken by surprise.
+
+Finally, Secretary of State said that news from St. Petersburgh had
+caused him to take more hopeful view of the general situation.
+
+
+No. 56.
+
+_Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.--(Received July 28.)_
+
+(Telegraphic.)                      _Vienna, July_ 27, 1914.
+
+The Russian Ambassador had to-day a long and earnest conversation with
+Baron Macchio, the Under-secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. He told
+him that, having just come back from St. Petersburgh, he was well
+acquainted with the views of the Russian Government and the state of
+Russian public opinion. He could assure him that if actual war broke out
+with Servia it would be impossible to localise it, for Russia was not
+prepared to give way again, as she had done on previous occasions, and
+especially during the annexation crisis of 1909. He earnestly hoped that
+something would be done before Servia was actually invaded. Baron
+Macchio replied that this would now be difficult, as a skirmish had
+already taken place on the Danube, in which the Servians had been the
+aggressors. The Russian Ambassador said that he would do all he could to
+keep the Servians quiet pending any discussions that might yet take
+place, and he told me that he would advise his Government to induce the
+Servian Government to avoid any conflict as long as possible, and to
+fall back before an Austrian advance. Time so gained should suffice to
+enable a settlement to be reached. He had just heard of a satisfactory
+conversation which the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs had
+yesterday with the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh. The former
+had agreed that much of the Austro-Hungarian note to Servia had been
+perfectly reasonable, and in fact they had practically reached an
+understanding as to the guarantees which Servia might reasonably be
+asked to give to Austria-Hungary for her future good behaviour. The
+Russian Ambassador urged that the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh
+should be furnished with full powers to continue discussion with the
+Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who was very willing to advise
+Servia to yield all that could be fairly asked of her as an independent
+Power. Baron Macchio promised to submit this suggestion to the Minister
+for Foreign Affairs.
+
+
+No. 62.
+
+_Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.--(Received July 28.)_
+
+(Telegraphic.)                          _Vienna, July 28_, 1914.
+
+I spoke to Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day in the sense of your
+telegram of 27th July to Berlin. I avoided the word "mediation," but
+said that, as mentioned in your speech,[187] which he had just read to
+me, you had hopes that conversations in London between the four Powers
+less interested might yet lead to an arrangement which Austro-Hungarian
+Government would accept as satisfactory and as rendering actual
+hostilities unnecessary. I added that you had regarded Servian reply as
+having gone far to meet just demands of Austria-Hungary; that you
+thought it constituted a fair basis of discussion during which warlike
+operations might remain in abeyance, and that Austrian Ambassador in
+Berlin was speaking in this sense. Minister for Foreign Affairs said
+quietly, but firmly, that no discussion could be accepted on basis of
+Servian note; that war would be declared to-day, and that well-known
+pacific character of Emperor, as well as, he might add, his own, might
+be accepted as a guarantee that war was both just and inevitable. This
+was a matter that must be settled directly between the two parties
+immediately concerned. I said that you would hear with regret that
+hostilities could not now be arrested, as you feared that they might
+lead to complications threatening the peace of Europe.
+
+In taking leave of his Excellency, I begged him to believe that, if in
+the course of present grave crisis our point of view should sometimes
+differ from his, this would arise, not from want of sympathy with the
+many just complaints which Austria-Hungary had against Servia, but from
+the fact that, whereas Austria-Hungary put first her quarrel with
+Servia, you were anxious in the first instance for peace of Europe. I
+trusted this larger aspect of the question would appeal with equal force
+to his Excellency. He said he had it also in mind, but thought that
+Russia ought not to oppose operations like those impending, which did
+not aim at territorial aggrandisement and which could no longer be
+postponed.
+
+[Footnote 187: "Hansard," Vol. 65, No. 107, Columns 931, 932, 933.]
+
+
+No. 85.
+
+_Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.--(Received July 29.)_
+
+(Telegraphic.)                        _Berlin, July_ 29, 1914.
+
+I was asked to call upon the Chancellor to-night. His Excellency had
+just returned from Potsdam.
+
+He said that should Austria be attacked by Russia a European
+conflagration might, he feared, become inevitable, owing to Germany's
+obligations as Austria's ally, in spite of his continued efforts to
+maintain peace. He then proceeded to make the following strong bid for
+British neutrality. He said that it was clear, so far as he was able to
+judge the main principle which governed British policy, that Great
+Britain would never stand by and allow France to be crushed in any
+conflict there might be. That, however, was not the object at which
+Germany aimed. Provided that neutrality of Great Britain were certain,
+every assurance would be given to the British Government that the
+Imperial Government aimed at no territorial acquisitions at the expense
+of France should they prove victorious in any war that might ensue.
+
+I questioned his Excellency about the French colonies, and he said that
+he was unable to give a similar undertaking in that respect. As regards
+Holland, however, his Excellency said that, so long as Germany's
+adversaries respected the integrity and neutrality of the Netherlands,
+Germany was ready to give His Majesty's Government an assurance that she
+would do likewise. It depended upon the action of France what operations
+Germany might be forced to enter upon in Belgium, but when the war was
+over, Belgian integrity would be respected if she had not sided against
+Germany.
+
+His Excellency ended by saying that ever since he had been Chancellor
+the object of his policy had been, as you were aware, to bring about an
+understanding with England; he trusted that these assurances might form
+the basis of that understanding which he so much desired. He had in mind
+a general neutrality agreement between England and Germany, though it
+was of course at the present moment too early to discuss details, and an
+assurance of British neutrality in the conflict which present crisis
+might possibly produce, would enable him to look forward to realisation
+of his desire.
+
+In reply to his Excellency's enquiry how I thought his request would
+appeal to you, I said that I did not think it probable that at this
+stage of events you would care to bind yourself to any course of action
+and that I was of opinion that you would desire to retain full liberty.
+
+Our conversation upon this subject having come to an end, I communicated
+the contents of your telegram of to-day to his Excellency, who expressed
+his best thanks to you.
+
+
+No. 87.
+
+_Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie_.
+
+Sir,                            _Foreign Office, July_ 29, 1914.
+
+After telling M. Cambon to-day how grave the situation seemed to be, I
+told him that I meant to tell the German Ambassador to-day that he must
+not be misled by the friendly tone of our conversations into any sense
+of false security that we should stand aside if all the efforts to
+preserve the peace, which we were now making in common with Germany,
+failed. But I went on to say to M. Cambon that I thought it necessary to
+tell him also that public opinion here approached the present difficulty
+from a quite different point of view from that taken during the
+difficulty as to Morocco a few years ago. In the case of Morocco the
+dispute was one in which France was primarily interested, and in which
+it appeared that Germany, in an attempt to crush France, was fastening a
+quarrel on France on a question that was the subject of a special
+agreement between France and us. In the present case the dispute between
+Austria and Servia was not one in which we felt called to take a hand.
+Even if the question became one between Austria and Russia we should not
+feel called upon to take a hand in it. It would then be a question of
+the supremacy of Teuton or Slav--a struggle for supremacy in the
+Balkans; and our idea had always been to avoid being drawn into a war
+over a Balkan question. If Germany became involved and France became
+involved, we had not made up our minds what we should do; it was a case
+that we should have to consider. France would then have been drawn into
+a quarrel which was not hers, but in which, owing to her alliance, her
+honour and interest obliged her to engage. We were free from
+engagements, and we should have to decide what British interests
+required us to do. I thought it necessary to say that, because, as he
+knew, we were taking all precautions with regard to our fleet, and I was
+about to warn Prince Lichnowsky not to count on our standing aside, but
+it would not be fair that I should let M. Cambon be misled into
+supposing that this meant that we had decided what to do in a
+contingency that I still hoped might not arise.
+
+M. Cambon said that I had explained the situation very clearly. He
+understood it to be that in a Balkan quarrel, and in a struggle for
+supremacy between Teuton and Slav we should not feel called to
+intervene; should other issues be raised, and Germany and France become
+involved, so that the question became one of the hegemony of Europe, we
+should then decide what it was necessary for us to do. He seemed quite
+prepared for this announcement, and made no criticism upon it.
+
+He said French opinion was calm, but decided. He anticipated a demand
+from Germany that France would be neutral while Germany attacked Russia.
+This assurance France, of course, could not give; she was bound to help
+Russia if Russia was attacked.
+
+I am, &c.
+
+E. GREY.
+
+
+No. 89.
+
+_Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen_.
+
+Sir,                             _Foreign Office, July_ 29, 1914.
+
+After speaking to the German Ambassador this afternoon about the
+European situation, I said that I wished to say to him, in a quite
+private and friendly way, something that was on my mind. The situation
+was very grave. While it was restricted to the issues at present
+actually involved we had no thought of interfering in it. But if Germany
+became involved in it, and then France, the issue might be so great that
+it would involve all European interests; and I did not wish him to be
+misled by the friendly tone of our conversation--which I hoped would
+continue--into thinking that we should stand aside.
+
+He said that he quite understood this, but he asked whether I meant that
+we should, under certain circumstances, intervene?
+
+I replied that I did not wish to say that, or to use anything that was
+like a threat or an attempt to apply pressure by saying that, if things
+became worse, we should intervene. There would be no question of our
+intervening if Germany was not involved, or even if France was not
+involved. But we knew very well that, if the issue did become such that
+we thought British interests required us to intervene, we must intervene
+at once, and the decision would have to be very rapid, just as the
+decisions of other Powers had to be. I hoped that the friendly tone of
+our conversations would continue as at present, and that I should be
+able to keep as closely in touch with the German Government in working
+for peace. But if we failed in our efforts to keep the peace, and if the
+issue spread so that it involved practically every European interest, I
+did not wish to be open to any reproach from him that the friendly tone
+of all our conversations had misled him or his Government into supposing
+that we should not take action, and to the reproach that, if they had
+not been so misled, the course of things might have been different.
+
+The German Ambassador took no exception to what I had said; indeed, he
+told me that it accorded with what he had already given in Berlin as his
+view of the situation.
+
+I am, &c.
+
+E. GREY.
+
+
+No. 98.
+
+_Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.--(Received July 30.)_
+
+(Telegraphic.)                           _Berlin, July_ 30, 1914.
+
+Secretary of State informs me that immediately on receipt of Prince
+Lichnowsky's telegram recording his last conversation with you he asked
+Austro-Hungarian Government whether they would be willing to accept
+mediation on basis of occupation by Austrian troops of Belgrade or some
+other point and issue their conditions from there. He has up till now
+received no reply, but he fears Russian mobilisation against Austria
+will have increased difficulties, as Austria-Hungary, who has as yet
+only mobilised against Servia, will probably find it necessary also
+against Russia. Secretary of State says if you can succeed in getting
+Russia to agree to above basis for an arrangement and in persuading her
+in the meantime to take no steps which might be regarded as an act of
+aggression against Austria he still sees some chance that European peace
+may be preserved.
+
+He begged me to impress on you difficulty of Germany's position in view
+of Russian mobilisation and military measures which he hears are being
+taken in France. Beyond recall of officers on leave--a measure which had
+been officially taken after, and not before, visit of French Ambassador
+yesterday--Imperial Government had done nothing special in way of
+military preparations. Something, however, would have soon to be done,
+for it might be too late, and when they mobilised they would have to
+mobilise on three sides. He regretted this, as he knew France did not
+desire war, but it would be a military necessity.
+
+His Excellency added that telegram received from Prince Lichnowsky last
+night contains matter which he had heard with regret, but not exactly
+with surprise, and at all events he thoroughly appreciated frankness and
+loyalty with which you had spoken.
+
+He also told me that this telegram had only reached Berlin very late
+last night; had it been received earlier Chancellor would, of course,
+not have spoken to me in way he had done.
+
+
+No. 101.
+
+_Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen_.
+
+(Telegraphic.)                   _Foreign Office, July_ 30, 1914.
+
+Your telegram of 29th July.[188]
+
+His Majesty's Government cannot for a moment entertain the Chancellor's
+proposal that they should bind themselves to neutrality on such terms.
+
+What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while French colonies
+are taken and France is beaten so long as Germany does not take French
+territory as distinct from the colonies.
+
+From the material point of view such a proposal is unacceptable, for
+France, without further territory in Europe being taken from her, could
+be so crushed as to lose her position as a Great Power, and become
+subordinate to German policy.
+
+Altogether, apart from that, it would be a disgrace for us to make this
+bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace from which the
+good name of this country would never recover.
+
+The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain away whatever
+obligation or interest we have as regards the neutrality of Belgium. We
+could not entertain that bargain either.
+
+Having said so much, it is unnecessary to examine whether the prospect
+of a future general neutrality agreement between England and Germany
+offered positive advantages sufficient to compensate us for tying our
+hands now. We must preserve our full freedom to act as circumstances may
+seem to us to require in any such unfavourable and regrettable
+development of the present crisis as the Chancellor contemplates.
+
+You should speak to the Chancellor in the above sense, and add most
+earnestly that the one way of maintaining the good relations between
+England and Germany is that they should continue to work together to
+preserve the peace of Europe; if we succeed in this object, the mutual
+relations of Germany and England will, I believe, be _ipso facto_
+improved and strengthened. For that object His Majesty's Government will
+work in that way with all sincerity and good-will.
+
+And I will say this: If the peace of Europe can be preserved, and the
+present crisis safely passed, my own endeavour will be to promote some
+arrangement to which Germany could be a party, by which she could be
+assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against
+her or her allies by France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or
+separately. I have desired this and worked for it, as far as I could,
+through the last Balkan crisis, and, Germany having a corresponding
+object, our relations sensibly improved. The idea has hitherto been too
+Utopian to form the subject of definite proposals, but if this present
+crisis, so much more acute than any that Europe has gone through for
+generations, be safely passed, I am hopeful that the relief and reaction
+which will follow may make possible some more definite rapprochement
+between the Powers than has been possible hitherto.
+
+[Footnote 188: See No. 85.]
+
+
+Enclosure 1 in No. 105.
+
+_Sir Edward Grey to M. Cambon_.
+
+My dear Ambassador,          _Foreign Office, November 22_, 1912.
+
+From time to time in recent years the French and British naval and
+military experts have consulted together. It has always been understood
+that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of either
+Government to decide at any future time whether or not to assist the
+other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation between experts
+is not, and ought not to be regarded as, an engagement that commits
+either Government to action in a contingency that has not arisen and may
+never arise. The disposition, for instance, of the French and British
+fleets respectively at the present moment is not based upon an
+engagement to co-operate in war.
+
+You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government had grave
+reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, it might become
+essential to know whether it could in that event depend upon the armed
+assistance of the other.
+
+I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an
+unprovoked attack by a third Power, or something that threatened the
+general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether both
+Governments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve
+peace, and, if so, what measures they would be prepared to take in
+common. If these measures involved action, the plans of the General
+Staffs would at once be taken into consideration, and the Governments
+would then decide what effect should be given to them.
+
+Yours, &c.
+
+E. GREY.
+
+
+No. 119.
+
+_Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie_.
+
+Sir,                             _Foreign Office, July_ 31, 1914.
+
+M. Cambon referred to-day to a telegram that had been shown to Sir
+Arthur Nicolson this morning from the French Ambassador in Berlin,
+saying that it was the uncertainty with regard to whether we would
+intervene which was the encouraging element in Berlin, and that, it we
+would only declare definitely on the side of Russia and France, it would
+decide the German attitude in favour of peace.
+
+I said that it was quite wrong to suppose that we had left Germany under
+the impression that we would not intervene. I had refused overtures to
+promise that we should remain neutral. I had not only definitely
+declined to say that we would remain neutral, I had even gone so far
+this morning as to say to the German Ambassador that, if France and
+Germany became involved in war, we should be drawn into it. That, of
+course, was not the same thing as taking an engagement to France, and I
+told M. Cambon of it only to show that we had not left Germany under the
+impression that we would stand aside.
+
+M. Cambon then asked me for my reply to what he had said yesterday.
+
+I said that we had come to the conclusion, in the Cabinet to-day, that
+we could not give any pledge at the present time. Though we should have
+to put our policy before Parliament, we could not pledge Parliament in
+advance. Up to the present moment, we did not feel, and public opinion
+did not feel, that any treaties or obligations of this country were
+involved. Further developments might alter this situation and cause the
+Government and Parliament to take the view that intervention was
+justified. The preservation of the neutrality of Belgium might be, I
+would not say a decisive, but an important factor, in determining our
+attitude. Whether we proposed to Parliament to intervene or not to
+intervene in a war, Parliament would wish to know how we stood with
+regard to the neutrality of Belgium, and it might be that I should ask
+both France and Germany whether each was prepared to undertake an
+engagement that she would not be the first to violate the neutrality of
+Belgium.
+
+M. Cambon repeated his question whether we would help France if Germany
+made an attack on her.
+
+I said that I could only adhere to the answer that, as far as things had
+gone at present, we could not take any engagement.
+
+M. Cambon urged that Germany had from the beginning rejected proposals
+that might have made for peace. It could not be to England's interest
+that France should be crushed by Germany. We should then be in a very
+diminished position with regard to Germany. In 1870 we had made a great
+mistake in allowing an enormous increase of German strength, and we
+should now be repeating the mistake. He asked me whether I could not
+submit his question to the Cabinet again.
+
+I said that the Cabinet would certainly be summoned as soon as there was
+some new development, but at the present moment the only answer I could
+give was that we could not undertake any definite engagement.
+
+I am, &c.
+
+E. GREY.
+
+
+No. 122.
+
+_Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.--(Received August 1.)_
+
+(Telegraphic.)                          _Berlin, July_ 31, 1914.
+
+Neutrality of Belgium, referred to in your telegram of 31st July to Sir
+F. Bertie.
+
+I have seen Secretary of State, who informs me that he must consult the
+Emperor and the Chancellor before he could possibly answer. I gathered
+from what he said that he thought any reply they might give could not
+but disclose a certain amount of their plan of campaign in the event of
+war ensuing, and he was therefore very doubtful whether they would
+return any answer at all. His Excellency, nevertheless, took note of
+your request.
+
+It appears from what he said that German Government consider that
+certain hostile acts have already been committed by Belgium. As an
+instance of this, he alleged that a consignment of corn for Germany had
+been placed under an embargo already.
+
+I hope to see his Excellency to-morrow again to discuss the matter
+further, but the prospect of obtaining a definite answer seems to me
+remote.
+
+In speaking to me to-day the Chancellor made it clear that Germany would
+in any case desire to know the reply returned to you by the French
+Government.
+
+
+No. 123.
+
+_Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen_.
+
+Sir,                            _Foreign Office, August_ 1, 1914.
+
+I told the German Ambassador to-day that the reply[189] of the German
+Government with regard to the neutrality of Belgium was a matter of very
+great regret, because the neutrality of Belgium affected feeling in this
+country. If Germany could see her way to give the same assurance as that
+which had been given by France it would materially contribute to relieve
+anxiety and tension here. On the other hand, if there were a violation
+of the neutrality of Belgium by one combatant while the other respected
+it, it would be extremely difficult to restrain public feeling in this
+country. I said that we had been discussing this question at a Cabinet
+meeting, and as I was authorised to tell him this I gave him a
+memorandum of it.
+
+He asked me whether, if Germany gave a promise not to violate Belgian
+neutrality, we would engage to remain neutral.
+
+I replied that I could not say that; our hands were still free, and we
+were considering what our attitude should be. All I could say was that
+our attitude would be determined largely by public opinion here, and
+that the neutrality of Belgium would appeal very strongly to Public
+opinion here. I did not think that we could give a promise of neutrality
+on that condition alone.
+
+The Ambassador pressed me as to whether I could not formulate conditions
+on which we would remain neutral. He even suggested that the integrity
+of France and her colonies might be guaranteed.
+
+I said that I felt obliged to refuse definitely any promise to remain
+neutral on similar terms, and I could only say that we must keep our
+hands free.
+
+I am, &c.
+
+E. GREY.
+
+[Footnote 189: See No. 122.]
+
+
+No. 133.
+
+_Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen_.
+
+(Telegraphic.)                  _Foreign Office, August_ 1, 1914.
+
+M. De Etter came to-day to communicate the contents of a telegram from
+M. Sazonof, dated the 31st July, which are as follows:--
+
+"The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador declared the readiness of his
+Government to discuss the substance of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia.
+M. Sazonof replied by expressing his satisfaction, and said it was
+desirable that the discussions should take place in London with the
+participation of the Great Powers.
+
+"M. Sazonof hoped that the British Government would assume the direction
+of these discussions. The whole of Europe would be thankful to them. It
+would be very important that Austria should meanwhile put a stop
+provisionally to her military action on Servian territory."
+
+(The above has been communicated to the six Powers.)
+
+
+No. 134.
+
+_Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.--(Received August 1.)_
+
+(Telegraphic.)                           _Paris, August_ 1, 1914.
+
+President of the Republic has informed me that German Government were
+trying to saddle Russia with the responsibility; that it was only after
+a decree of general mobilisation had been issued in Austria that the
+Emperor of Russia ordered a general mobilisation; that, although the
+measures which the German Government have already taken are in effect a
+general mobilisation, they are not so designated; that a French general
+mobilisation will become necessary in self-defence, and that France is
+already forty-eight hours behind Germany as regards German military
+preparations; that the French troops have orders not to go nearer to the
+German frontier than a distance of 10 kilom. so as to avoid any grounds
+for accusations of provocation to Germany, whereas the German troops, on
+the other hand, are actually on the French frontier and have made
+incursions on it; that, notwithstanding mobilisations, the Emperor of
+Russia has expressed himself ready to continue his conversations with
+the German Ambassador with a view to preserving the peace; that French
+Government, whose wishes are markedly pacific, sincerely desire the
+preservation of peace and do not quite despair, even now, of its being
+possible to avoid war.
+
+
+No. 148.
+
+_Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie_.
+
+(Telegraphic.)                  _Foreign Office, August_ 2, 1914.
+
+After the Cabinet this morning I gave M. Cambon the following
+memorandum:--
+
+"I am authorised to give an assurance that, if the German fleet comes
+into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile
+operations against French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will
+give all the protection in its power.
+
+"This assurance is of course subject to the policy of His Majesty's
+Government receiving the support of Parliament, and must not be taken as
+binding His Majesty's Government to take any action until the above
+contingency of action by the German fleet takes place."
+
+I pointed out that we had very large questions and most difficult issues
+to consider, and that Government felt that they could not bind
+themselves to declare war upon Germany necessarily if war broke out
+between France and Germany to-morrow, but it was essential to the French
+Government, whose fleet had long been concentrated in the Mediterranean,
+to know how to make their dispositions with their north coast entirely
+undefended. We therefore thought it necessary to give them this
+assurance. It did not bind us to go to war with Germany unless the
+German fleet took the action indicated, but it did give a security to
+France that would enable her to settle the disposition of her own
+Mediterranean fleet.
+
+M. Cambon asked me about the violation of Luxemburg. I told him the
+doctrine on that point laid down by Lord Derby and Lord Clarendon in
+1867. He asked me what we should say about the violation of the
+neutrality of Belgium. I said that was a much more important matter; we
+were considering what statement we should make in Parliament
+to-morrow--in effect, whether we should declare violation of Belgian
+neutrality to be a _casus belli_. I told him what had been said to the
+German Ambassador on this point.
+
+
+No. 153.
+
+_Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen_.
+
+(Telegraphic.)                  _Foreign Office, August_ 4, 1914.
+
+The King of the Belgians has made an appeal to His Majesty the King for
+diplomatic intervention on behalf of Belgium in the following terms:--
+
+"Remembering the numerous proofs of your Majesty's friendship and that
+of your predecessor, and the friendly attitude of England in 1870 and
+the proof of friendship you have just given us again, I make a supreme
+appeal to the diplomatic intervention of your Majesty's Government to
+safeguard the integrity of Belgium."
+
+His Majesty's Government are also informed that the German Government
+has delivered to the Belgian Government a note proposing friendly
+neutrality entailing free passage through Belgian territory, and
+promising to maintain the independence and integrity of the kingdom and
+its possessions at the conclusion of peace, threatening in case of
+refusal to treat Belgium as an enemy. An answer was requested within
+twelve hours.
+
+We also understand that Belgium has categorically refused this as a
+flagrant violation of the law of nations.
+
+His Majesty's Government are bound to protest against this violation of
+a treaty to which Germany is a party in common with themselves, and must
+request an assurance that the demand made upon Belgium will not be
+proceeded with and that her neutrality will be respected by Germany. You
+should ask for an immediate reply.
+
+
+
+
+APPENDIX III
+
+
+Extract from the Dispatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin
+respecting the Rupture of Diplomatic Relations with the German
+Government.
+
+(Cd. 7445.)
+
+
+_Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey_.
+
+Sir,                                    _London, August_ 8, 1914.
+
+In accordance with the instructions contained in your telegram of the
+4th instant I called upon the Secretary of State that afternoon and
+enquired, in the name of His Majesty's Government, whether the Imperial
+Government would refrain from violating Belgian neutrality. Herr von
+Jagow at once replied that he was sorry to say that his answer must be
+"No," as, in consequence of the German troops having crossed the
+frontier that morning, Belgian neutrality had been already violated.
+Herr von Jagow again went into the reasons why the Imperial Government
+had been obliged to take this step, namely, that they had to advance
+into France by the quickest and easiest way, so as to be able to get
+well ahead with their operations and endeavour to strike some decisive
+blow as early as possible. It was a matter of life and death for them,
+as if they had gone by the more southern route they could not have
+hoped, in view of the paucity of roads and the strength of the
+fortresses, to have got through without formidable opposition entailing
+great loss of time. This loss of time would have meant time gained by
+the Russians for bringing up their troops to the German frontier.
+Rapidity of action was the great German asset, while that of Russia was
+an inexhaustible supply of troops. I pointed out to Herr von Jagow that
+this _fait accompli_ of the violation of the Belgian frontier rendered,
+as he would readily understand, the situation exceedingly grave, and I
+asked him whether there was not still time to draw back and avoid
+possible consequences, which both he and I would deplore. He replied
+that, for the reasons he had given me, it was now impossible for them to
+draw back.
+
+During the afternoon I received your further telegram of the same date,
+and, in compliance with the instructions therein contained, I again
+proceeded to the Imperial Foreign Office and informed the Secretary of
+State that unless the Imperial Government could give the assurance by 12
+o'clock that night that they would proceed no further with their
+violation of the Belgian frontier and stop their advance, I had been
+instructed to demand my passports and inform the Imperial Government
+that His Majesty's Government would have to take all steps in their
+power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty
+to which Germany was as much a party as themselves.
+
+Herr von Jagow replied that to his great regret he could give no other
+answer than that which he had given me earlier in the day, namely, that
+the safety of the Empire rendered it absolutely necessary that the
+Imperial troops should advance through Belgium. I gave his Excellency a
+written summary of your telegram and, pointing out that you had
+mentioned 12 o'clock as the time when His Majesty's Government would
+expect an answer, asked him whether, in view of the terrible
+consequences which would necessarily ensue, it were not possible even at
+the last moment that their answer should be reconsidered. He replied
+that if the time given were even twenty-four hours or more, his answer
+must be the same. I said that in that case I should have to demand my
+passports. This interview took place at about 7 o'clock. In a short
+conversation which ensued Herr von Jagow expressed his poignant regret
+at the crumbling of his entire policy and that of the Chancellor, which
+had been to make friends with Great Britain and then, through Great
+Britain, to get closer to France. I said that this sudden end to my work
+in Berlin was to me also a matter of deep regret and disappointment, but
+that he must understand that under the circumstances and in view of our
+engagements, His Majesty's Government could not possibly have acted
+otherwise than they had done.
+
+I then said that I should like to go and see the Chancellor, as it might
+be, perhaps, the last time I should have an opportunity of seeing him.
+He begged me to do so. I found the Chancellor very agitated. His
+Excellency at once began a harangue, which lasted for about 20 minutes.
+He said that the step taken by His Majesty's Government was terrible to
+a degree; just for a word--"neutrality," a word which in war time had so
+often been disregarded--just for a scrap of paper Great Britain was
+going to make war on a kindred nation who desired nothing better than to
+be friends with her. All his efforts in that direction had been rendered
+useless by this last terrible step, and the policy to which, as I knew,
+he had devoted himself since his accession to office had tumbled down
+like a house of cards. What we had done was unthinkable; it was like
+striking a man from behind while he was fighting for his life against
+two assailants. He held Great Britain responsible for all the terrible
+events that might happen. I protested strongly against that statement,
+and said that, in the same way as he and Herr von Jagow wished me to
+understand that for strategical reasons it was a matter of life and
+death to Germany to advance through Belgium and violate the latter's
+neutrality, so I would wish him to understand that it was, so to speak,
+a matter of "life and death" for the honour of Great Britain that she
+should keep her solemn engagement to do her utmost to defend Belgium's
+neutrality if attacked. That solemn compact simply had to be kept, or
+what confidence could anyone have in engagements given by Great Britain
+in the future? The Chancellor said, "But at what price will that compact
+have been kept. Has the British Government thought of that?" I hinted to
+his Excellency as plainly as I could that fear of consequences could
+hardly be regarded as an excuse for breaking solemn engagements, but his
+Excellency was so excited, so evidently overcome by the news of our
+action, and so little disposed to hear reason that I refrained from
+adding fuel to the flame by further argument. As I was leaving he said
+that the blow of Great Britain joining Germany's enemies was all the
+greater that almost up to the last moment he and his Government had been
+working with us and supporting our efforts to maintain peace between
+Austria and Russia. I said that this was part of the tragedy which saw
+the two nations fall apart just at the moment when the relations between
+them had been more friendly and cordial than they had been for years.
+Unfortunately, notwithstanding our efforts to maintain peace between
+Russia and Austria, the war had spread and had brought us face to face
+with a situation which, if we held to our engagements, we could not
+possibly avoid, and which unfortunately entailed our separation from our
+late fellow-workers. He would readily understand that no one regretted
+this more than I.
+
+After this somewhat painful interview I returned to the embassy and drew
+up a telegraphic report of what had passed. This telegram was handed in
+at the Central Telegraph Office a little before 9 P.M. It was accepted
+by that office, but apparently never despatched.[190]
+
+[Footnote 190: This telegram never reached the Foreign Office.]
+
+
+
+
+APPENDIX IV
+
+
+THE CRIME OF SERAJEVO
+
+SELECTIONS FROM THE AUSTRIAN _dossier_ OF THE CRIME
+
+The following document is contained in the German Version of the German
+White Book (pp. 28-31); and though it adds little to our knowledge of
+the Austrian case against Servia, it deserves to be reprinted, as it is
+omitted altogether in the official version in English of the German
+White Book. The authorship of the document is uncertain. It has the
+appearance of an extract from a German newspaper.
+
+Aus dem oesterreich-ungarischen Material.
+
+Wien, 27. Juli. Das in der oesterreichisch-ungarischen Zirkularnote an
+die auswaertigen Botschaften in Angelegenheit des serbischen Konflikts
+erwaehnte Dossier wird heute veroeffentlicht.
+
+In diesem Memoire wird darauf hingewiesen, dass die von Serbien
+ausgegangene Bewegung, die sich zum Ziele gesetzt hat, die suedlichen
+Teile Oesterreich-Ungarns von der Monarchie loszureiszen, um sie mit
+Serbien zu einer staatlichen Einheit zu verbinden, weit zurueckgreist.
+Diese in ihren Endzielen stets gleichbleibende und nur in ihren Mitteln
+und an Intensitaet wechselnde Propaganda erreichte zur Zeit der
+Unnerionskrise ihren Hoehepunft und trat damals ossen mit ihren Tendenzen
+hervor. Waehrend einerjeits die gesamte serbische Bresse zum Kampfe gegen
+die Monarchie ausrief, bildeten sich--von anderen Propagandamitteln
+abgesehen--Ussoziationen, die diese Kaempfe vorbereiteten, unter denen
+die Harodna Odbrana an Bedeutung hervorragte. Aus einem revolutionaeren
+Komitee hervorgegangen, fonstituierte sich diese vom Belgrader
+Auswaertigen Amte voellig abhaengige Organisation unter Leitung von
+Staatsmaennern und Offizieren, darunter dem General Tantovic und dem
+ehemaligen Minister Ivanovic. Auch Major Oja Jantovic und Milan
+Pribicevic gehoeren zu diesen Gruendern. Dieser Berein hatte sich die
+Bildung und Ausruestung von Freischaren fuer den bevorstehenden Krieg
+gegen die oefterreichisch-ungarische Monarchie zum Ziele gesetzt. In
+einer dem Memoire angefuegten Anlage wird ein Auszug aus dem vom
+Zentralausschusse der Narodna Odbrana herausgegebenen Vereinsorgane
+gleichen Namens veroeffentlicht, worin in mehreren Artikeln die Taetigfelt
+und Ziele dieses Vereins ausfuehrlich dargelegt werden. Es heisst darin,
+dass zu der Hauptaufgabe der Narodna Odbrana die Verbindung mit ihren
+nahen und ferneren Bruedern jenseits der Grenze und unseren uebrigen
+Freunden in der Welt gehoeren.
+
+_Oesterreich ist als erster und groesster Feind bezeichnet_. Wie die
+Narodna Odbrana die Notwendigkeit des Kampfes mit Oesterreich predigt,
+predigt sie eine heilige Wahrheit unserer nationalen Lage. Das
+Schlusskapitel enthaelt einen Apell an die Regierung und das Volk
+Serbiens, sich mit allen Mitteln fuer den Kampf vorzubereiten, den die
+Annexion vorangezeigt hat.
+
+Das Memoire schildert nach einer Aussage eines von der Narodna Odbrana
+angeworbenen Komitatschis die damalige Taetigkeit der Narodna Odbrana,
+die eine von zwei Hauptleuten, darunter Jankovic, geleitete _Schule zur
+Ausbildung von Banden_ unterhielt, Schulen, welche von General Jankovic
+und von Hauptmann Milan Pribicevic regelmaessig inspiziert wurden. Weiter
+wurden die Komitatschis im  _Schiessen und Bombenwerfen, im Minenlegen,
+Sprengen von Eisenbahnbruecken_ usw. unterrichtet. Nach der feierlichen
+Erklaerung der Serbischen Regierung vom Jahre 1909 schien auch das Ende
+dieser Organisation gekommen zu sein. Diese Erwartungen haben sich aber
+nicht nur nicht erfuellt, sondern die Propaganda wurde durch die
+serbische Presse fortgesetzt. Das Memoire fuehrt als Beispiel die Art und
+Weise an, wie das Attentat gegen den bosnischen Landeschef Varesanin
+publizistisch verwertet wurde, indem der Attentaeter als serbischer
+Nationalheld gefeiert und seine Tat verherrlicht wurde. Diese Blaetter
+wurden nicht nur in Serbien verbreitet, sondern auch auf
+wohlorganisierten Schleichwegen in die Monarchie hineingeschmuggelt.
+
+Unter der gleichen Leitung wie bei ihrer Gruendung wurde die Narodna
+Odbrana neuerlich der zentralpunkt einer Agitation welcher der
+_Schuetzenbund mit 762 Vereinen, ein Sokolbund mit 3500 Mitgliedern, und
+verschiedene andere Vereine angehoerten_.
+
+Im Kleide eines Kulturvereins auftretend, dem nur die geistige und die
+fueoerperliche Entwickelung der Bevoelkerung Serbiens sowie deren
+materielle Kraeftigung am Herzen liegt, enthullt die Narodna Oobrana ihr
+wahres reorganisiertes Programm in vorzitiertem Auszug aus ihrem
+Vereinsorgan, in welchem "die heilige Wahrheit" gepredigt wird, dass es
+eine unerlaessliche Notwendigkeit ist, gegen Oesterreich, seinen ersten
+groessten Feind, diesen Ausrottungskampf mit Gewehr und Kanone zu fuehren,
+und das Volk mit allen Mitteln auf den Kampf vorzubereiten, zur
+Befreiung der unterworfenen Gebiete, in denen viele Millionen
+unterjochter Brueder schmachten. Die in dem Memoire zitierten Aufrufe und
+Reden aehnlichen Charakters beleuchten die vielseitige auswaertige
+Taetigkeit der Narodna Oobrana und ihrer affilierten Vereine, die in
+Vortragsreifen, in der Teilnahme an Festen von bosnischen Vereinen, bei
+denen offen Mitglieder fuer die erwaehnte serbische Vereinigung geworben
+wurden, besteht. Gegenwaertig ist noch die Untersuchung darueber im Zuge,
+dass die Sokolvereine Serbiens analoge Vereinigungen der Monarchie
+bestimmten, sich mit ihnen in einem bisher geheim gehaltenen Verbande zu
+vereinigen. Durch Vertrauensmaenner und Missionaere wurde die Aufwiegelung
+in die Kreise Erwachsener und der urteilslosen Jugend gebracht. So
+wurden von Milan Pribicewitsch ehmalige honvedoffiziere und ein
+Gendarmerieleutnant zum Verlassen des Heeresdienstes in der Monarchie
+unter bedenklichen Umstaenden verleitet. In den Schulen der
+Lehrerbildungsanstalten wurde eine weitgehende Agitation entwickelt. Der
+gewuenschte Krieg gegen die Monarchie wurde militaerisch auch insofern
+vorbereitet, als serbische Emissaere im Falle des Ausbruchs der
+Feindseligkeiten mit der Zerstoerung von Transportmitteln usw., der
+Anfachung von Revolten und Paniken betraut wurden. Alles dies wird in
+einer besonderen Beilage belegt.
+
+Das Memoire schildert ferner den Zusammenhang zwischen dieser Taetigkeit
+der Narodna Oobrana und den affilierten Organisationen mit den
+Attentaten gegen den Koeniglichen Kommissaer in Agram Cuvaj im Juli 1912,
+dem Attentat von Dojcic in Agram 1913 gegen Sterlecz und dem
+missglueckten Attentat Schaefers am 20. Mai im Aramer Theater. Es
+verbreitet sich hierauf ueber den Zusammenhang des Attentats auf den
+Thronfolger und dessen Gemahlin, ueber die Art, wie sich die Jungen schon
+in der Schule an dem Gedanken der Narodna Dobrana vergifteten und wie
+sich die Attentaeter mit Hilfe von Pribicewic und Dacic die Werkzeuge zu
+dem Attentat verschafften, wobei insbesondere die Rolle des Majors
+Tankofte dargelegt wird, der die Mordwassen lieferte, wie auch die Rolle
+eines gewissen Ciganovic, eines gewesenen Komitatschi und jetzigen
+Beamten der serbischen Eisenbahndirektion Belgrad, der schon 1909 als
+Zoegling der Bandenschule der damaligen Narodna Odbrana austauchte.
+Ferner wird die Art dargelegt, wie Bomben und Waffen unbemerkt nach
+Bosnien eingeschmuggelt wurden, die keinen Zweifel darueber laesst, dass
+dies ein wohl voerberiteter und fuer die geheimnisvollen Zwecke der
+Narodna oft begangener Schleichweg war.
+
+Eine Beilage enthaelt einen Auszug aus den Akten des Kreisgerichts in
+Serajewo ueber die Untersuchung des Attentats gegen den Erzherzog Franz
+Ferdinand und dessen Gemahlin. Danach sind Princip, Cabrinovic, Grabez,
+Crupilovic und Papovic gestaendig, in Gemeinschaft mit dem fluechtigen
+Mehmedbasic ein Komplott zur Erwordung des Erzherzogs gebildet und ihm
+zu diesen Zweck aufgelauert zu haben. Cabrinovic ist gestaendig, die
+Bombe geworfen und Gabrilo Princip das Attentat mit der Browningpistole
+ausgefuehrt zu haben. Beide Taeter gaben zu, bei der Veruebung der Tat die
+Absicht des Mordes gehabt zu haben. Die weiteren Teile der Anlage
+enthalten weitere Angaben der Beschuldigten vor dem Untersuchungsrichter
+ueber Entstehung des Komplotts, Herkunft der Bomben, welche fabrikmaessig
+hergestellt wurden, fuer millitaerische Zwecke bestimmt waren und ihrer
+Originalpackung nach aus dem serbischen Waffenlager aus Kragujevac
+stammten. Endlich gibt die Beilage Auskunft ueber den Transport der drei
+Attentaeter und der Waffen von Serbien nach Bosnien. Aus dem weiteren
+Zeugenprotokoll ergibt sich, dass ein Angehoeriger der Monarchie einige
+Tage vor dem Attentat dem oesterreichisch-ungarischen Konsulat in Belgrad
+Meldung von der Vermutung erstatten wollte, dass ein Plan zur Veruebung
+des Attentats gegen den Erzherzog waehrend dessen Anwesenheit in Bosnien
+bestehe. Dieser Mann soll nun durch Belgrader Polizeiorgane, welche ihn
+unmittelbar vor Betreten des Konsulats aus nichtigen Gruenden
+verhafteten, an der Erstattung der Meldung verhindert worden sein.
+Weiter gehe aus dem Zeugenprotokoll hervor, dass die betreffenden
+Polizeiorgane von dem geplanten Attentat Kenntnis gehabt haetten. Da
+diese Angaben noch nicht nachgeprueft sind, kann ueber deren
+Stichhaltigkeit vorlaeufig noch kein Urteil gefaellt werden. In der
+Beilage zum Memoire heisst es: Vor dem Empfangssaal des serbischen
+Kriegsministeriums befinden sich an der Wand vier allegorische Bilder,
+von denen drei Darstellungen serbischer Kriegserfolge sind, waehrend das
+vierte die Verwirklichung der monarchiefeindlichen Tendenzen Serbiens
+versinnbildlicht. Ueber einer Landschaft, die teils Gebirge (Bosnien),
+teils Ebene (Suedungarn) darstellt, geht die Zora, die Morgenroete der
+serbischen Hoffnungen, auf. Im Vordergrunde steht eine bewaffnete
+Frauengestalt, auf deren Schilde die Namen aller "noch zu befreienden
+Provinzen": Bosnien, Herzegowina, Wojwodina, Gyrmien, Dalmatien usw.
+stehen.
+
+
+
+
+APPENDIX V
+
+
+Extract from the Dispatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna
+respecting the Rupture of Diplomatic Relations with the Austro-Hungarian
+Government.
+
+(Cd. 7596)
+
+_Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey_.
+
+             _London, September_ 1, 1914.
+
+Sir,
+
+The rapidity of the march of events during the days which led up to the
+outbreak of the European war made it difficult, at the time, to do more
+than record their progress by telegraph. I propose now to add a few
+comments.
+
+The delivery at Belgrade on the 23rd July of the Austrian note to Servia
+was preceded by a period of absolute silence at the Ballplatz. Except
+Herr von Tchinsky, who must have been aware of the tenour, if not of the
+actual words of the note, none of my colleagues were allowed to see
+through the veil. On the 22nd and 23rd July, M. Dumaine, French
+Ambassador, had long interviews with Baron Macchio, one of the
+Under-Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs, by whom he was left
+under the impression that the words of warning he had been instructed to
+speak to the Austro-Hungarian Government had not been unavailing, and
+that the note which was being drawn up would be found to contain nothing
+with which a self-respecting State need hesitate to comply. At the
+second of these interviews he was not even informed that the note was at
+that very moment being presented at Belgrade, or that it would be
+published in Vienna on the following morning. Count Forgach, the other
+Under-Secretary of State, had indeed been good enough to confide to me
+on the same day the true character of the note, and the fact of its
+presentation about the time we were speaking.
+
+So little had the Russian Ambassador been made aware of what was
+preparing that he actually left Vienna on a fortnight's leave of absence
+about the 20th July. He had only been absent a few days when events
+compelled him to return. It might have been supposed that Duc Avarna,
+Ambassador of the allied Italian Kingdom, which was bound to be so
+closely affected by fresh complications in the Balkans, would have been
+taken fully into the confidence of Count Berchtold during this critical
+time. In point of fact his Excellency was left completely in the dark.
+As for myself, no indication was given me by Count Berchtold of the
+impending storm, and it was from a private source that I received on the
+15th July the forecast of what was about to happen which I telegraphed
+to you the following day. It is true that during all this time the "Neue
+Freie Presse" and other leading Viennese newspapers were using language
+which pointed unmistakably to war with Servia. The official
+"Fremdenblatt", however, was more cautious, and till the note was
+published, the prevailing opinion among my colleagues was that Austria
+would shrink from courses calculated to involve her in grave European
+complications.
+
+On the 24th July the note was published in the newspapers. By common
+consent it was at once styled an ultimatum. Its integral acceptance by
+Servia was neither expected nor desired, and when, on the following
+afternoon, it was at first rumoured in Vienna that it had been
+unconditionally accepted, there was a moment of keen disappointment. The
+mistake was quickly corrected, and as soon as it was known later in the
+evening that the Servian reply had been rejected and that Baron Giesl
+had broken off relations at Belgrade, Vienna burst into a frenzy of
+delight, vast crowds parading the streets and singing patriotic songs
+till the small hours of the morning.
+
+The demonstrations were perfectly orderly, consisting for the most part
+of organised processions through the principal streets ending up at the
+Ministry of War. One or two attempts to make hostile manifestations
+against the Russian Embassy were frustrated by the strong guard of
+police which held the approaches to the principal embassies during those
+days. The demeanour of the people at Vienna, and, as I was informed, in
+many other principal cities of the Monarchy, showed plainly the
+popularity of the idea of war with Servia, and there can be no doubt
+that the small body of Austrian and Hungarian statesmen by whom this
+momentous step was adopted gauged rightly the sense, and it may even be
+said the determination, of the people, except presumably in portions of
+the provinces inhabited by the Slav races. There had been much
+disappointment in many quarters at the avoidance of war with Servia
+during the annexation crisis in 1908 and again in connection with the
+recent Balkan war. Count Berchtold's peace policy had met with little
+sympathy in the Delegation. Now the flood-gates were opened, and the
+entire people and press clamoured impatiently for immediate and condign
+punishment of the hated Servian race. The country certainly believed
+that it had before it only the alternative of subduing Servia or of
+submitting sooner or later to mutilation at her hands. But a peaceful
+solution should first have been attempted. Few seemed to reflect that
+the forcible intervention of a Great Power in the Balkans must
+inevitably call other Great Powers into the field. So just was the cause
+of Austria held to be, that it seemed to her people inconceivable that
+any country should place itself in her path, or that questions of mere
+policy or prestige should be regarded anywhere as superseding the
+necessity which had arisen to exact summary vengeance for the crime of
+Serajevo. The conviction had been expressed to me by the German
+Ambassador on the 24th July that Russia would stand aside. This feeling,
+which was also held at the Ballplatz, influenced no doubt the course of
+events, and it is deplorable that no effort should have been made to
+secure by means of diplomatic negotiations the acquiescence of Russia
+and Europe as a whole in some peaceful compromise of the Servian
+question by which Austrian fears of Servian aggression and intrigue
+might have been removed for the future. Instead of adopting this course
+the Austro-Hungarian Government resolved upon war. The inevitable
+consequence ensued. Russia replied to a partial Austrian mobilisation
+and declaration of war against Servia by a partial Russian mobilisation
+against Austria. Austria met this move by completing her own
+mobilisation, and Russia again responded with results which have passed
+into history. The fate of the proposals put forward by His Majesty's
+Government for the preservation of peace is recorded in the White Paper
+on the European Crisis[191]. On the 28th July I saw Count Berchtold and
+urged as strongly as I could that the scheme of mediation mentioned in
+your speech in the House of Commons on the previous day should be
+accepted as offering an honourable and peaceful settlement of the
+question at issue. His Excellency himself read to me a telegraphic
+report of the speech, but added that matters had gone too far; Austria
+was that day declaring war on Servia, and she could never accept the
+conference which you had suggested should take place between the less
+interested Powers on the basis of the Servian reply. This was a matter
+which must be settled directly between the two parties immediately
+concerned. I said His Majesty's Government would hear with regret that
+hostilities could not be arrested, as you feared they would lead to
+European complications. I disclaimed any British lack of sympathy with
+Austria in the matter of her legitimate grievances against Servia, and
+pointed out that, whereas Austria seemed to be making these the starting
+point of her policy, His Majesty's Government were bound to look at the
+question primarily from the point of view of the maintenance of the
+peace of Europe. In this way the two countries might easily drift apart.
+
+His Excellency said that he too was keeping the European aspect of the
+question in sight. He thought, however, that Russia would have no right
+to intervene after receiving his assurance that Austria sought no
+territorial aggrandisement. His Excellency remarked to me in the course
+of his conversation that, though he had been glad to co-operate towards
+bringing about the settlement which had resulted from the ambassadorial
+conferences in London during the Balkan crisis, he had never had much
+belief in the permanency of that settlement, which was necessarily of a
+highly artificial character, inasmuch as the interests which it sought
+to harmonise were in themselves profoundly divergent. His Excellency
+maintained a most friendly demeanour throughout the interview, but left
+no doubt in my mind as to the determination of the Austro-Hungarian
+Government to proceed with the invasion of Servia.
+
+The German Government claim to have persevered to the end in the
+endeavour to support at Vienna your successive proposals in the interest
+of peace. Herr von Tchirsky abstained from inviting my co-operation or
+that of the French and Russian Ambassadors in carrying out his
+instructions to that effect, and I had no means of knowing what response
+he was receiving from the Austro-Hungarian Government. I was, however,
+kept fully informed by M. Schebeko, the Russian Ambassador, of his own
+direct negotiations with Count Berchtold. M. Schebeko endeavoured on the
+28th July to persuade the Austro-Hungarian Government to furnish Count
+Szapary with full powers to continue at St. Petersburgh the hopeful
+conversations which had there been taking place between the latter and
+M. Sazonof. Count Berchtold refused at the time, but two days later
+(30th July), though in the meantime Russia had partially mobilised
+against Austria, he received M. Schebeko again, in a perfectly friendly
+manner, and gave his consent to the continuance of the conversations at
+St. Petersburgh. From now onwards the tension between Russia and Germany
+was much greater than between Russia and Austria. As between the latter
+an arrangement seemed almost in sight, and on the 1st August I was
+informed by M. Schebeko that Count Szapary had at last conceded the main
+point at issue by announcing to M. Sazonof that Austria would consent to
+submit to mediation the points in the note to Servia which seemed
+incompatible with the maintenance of Servian independence. M. Sazonof,
+M. Schebeko added, had accepted this proposal on condition that Austria
+would refrain from the actual invasion of Servia. Austria, in fact, had
+finally yielded, and that she herself had at this point good hopes of a
+peaceful issue is shown by the communication made to you on the 1st
+August by Count Mensdorff, to the effect that Austria had neither
+"banged the door" on compromise nor cut off the conversations.[192] M.
+Schebeko to the end was working hard for peace. He was holding the most
+conciliatory language to Count Berchtold, and he informed me that the
+latter, as well as Count Forgach, had responded in the same spirit.
+Certainly it was too much for Russia to expect that Austria would hold
+back her armies, but this matter could probably have been settled by
+negotiation, and M. Schebeko repeatedly told me he was prepared to
+accept any reasonable compromise.
+
+Unfortunately these conversations at St. Petersburgh and Vienna were cut
+short by the transfer of the dispute to the more dangerous ground of a
+direct conflict between Germany and Russia. Germany intervened on the
+31st July by means of her double ultimatums to St. Petersburgh and
+Paris. The ultimatums were of a kind to which only one answer is
+possible, and Germany declared war on Russia on the 1st August, and on
+France on the 3rd August. A few days' delay might in all probability
+have saved Europe from one of the greatest calamities in history.
+
+Russia still abstained from attacking Austria, and M. Schebeko had been
+instructed to remain at his post till war should actually be declared
+against her by the Austro-Hungarian Government. This only happened on
+the 6th August when Count Berchtold informed the foreign missions at
+Vienna that "the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh had been
+instructed to notify the Russian Government that, in view of the
+menacing attitude of Russia in the Austro-Servian conflict and the fact
+that Russia had commenced hostilities against Germany, Austria-Hungary
+considered herself also at war with Russia."
+
+M. Schebeko left quietly in a special train provided by the
+Austro-Hungarian Government on the 7th September. He had urgently
+requested to be conveyed to the Roumanian frontier, so that he might be
+able to proceed to his own country, but was taken instead to the Swiss
+frontier, and ten days later I found him at Berne.
+
+M. Dumaine, French Ambassador, stayed on till the 12th August. On the
+previous day he had been instructed to demand his passport on the ground
+that Austrian troops were being employed against France. This point was
+not fully cleared up when I left Vienna. On the 9th August, M. Dumaine
+had received from Count Berchtold the categorical declaration that no
+Austrian troops were being moved to Alsace. The next day this statement
+was supplemented by a further one, in writing, giving Count Berchtold's
+assurance that not only had no Austrian troops been moved actually to
+the French frontier, but that none were moving from Austria in a
+westerly direction into Germany in such a way that they might replace
+German troops employed at the front. These two statements were made by
+Count Berchtold in reply to precise questions put to him by M. Dumaine,
+under instructions from his Government. The French Ambassador's
+departure was not attended by any hostile demonstration, but his
+Excellency before leaving had been justly offended by a harangue made by
+the Chief Burgomaster of Vienna to the crowd assembled before the steps
+of the town hall, in which he assured the people that Paris was in the
+throes of a revolution, and that the President of the Republic had been
+assassinated.
+
+The British declaration of war on Germany was made known in Vienna by
+special editions of the newspapers about midday on the 5th August. An
+abstract of your speeches in the House of Commons, and also of the
+German Chancellor's speech in the Reichstag of the 4th April, appeared
+the same day, as well as the text of the German ultimatum to Belgium.
+Otherwise few details of the great events of these days transpired. The
+"Neue Freie Presse" was violently insulting towards England. The
+"Fremdenblatt" was not offensive, but little or nothing was said in the
+columns of any Vienna paper to explain that the violation of Belgian
+neutrality had left His Majesty's Government no alternative but to take
+part in the war.
+
+The declaration of Italian neutrality was bitterly felt in Vienna, but
+scarcely mentioned in the newspapers.
+
+On the 5th August I had the honour to receive your instruction of the
+previous day preparing me for the immediate outbreak of war with
+Germany, but adding that, Austria being understood to be not yet at that
+date at war with Russia and France, you did not desire me to ask for my
+passport or to make any particular communication to the Austro-Hungarian
+Government. You stated at the same time that His Majesty's Government of
+course expected Austria not to commit any act of war against us without
+the notice required by diplomatic usage.
+
+On Thursday morning, the 13th August, I had the honour to receive your
+telegram of the 12th, stating that you had been compelled to inform
+Count Mensdorff, at the request of the French Government, that a
+complete rupture had occurred between France and Austria, on the ground
+that Austria had declared war on Russia who was already fighting on the
+side of France, and that Austria had sent troops to the German frontier
+under conditions that were a direct menace to France. The rupture having
+been brought about with France in this way, I was to ask for my
+passport, and your telegram stated, in conclusion, that you had informed
+Count Mensdorff that a state of war would exist between the two
+countries from midnight of the 12th August.
+
+After seeing Mr. Penfield, the United States Ambassador, who accepted
+immediately in the most friendly spirit my request that his Excellency
+would take charge provisionally of British interests in Austria-Hungary
+during the unfortunate interruption of relations, I proceeded, with Mr.
+Theo Russell, Counsellor of His Majesty's Embassy, to the Ballplatz.
+Count Berchtold received me at midday. I delivered my message, for which
+his Excellency did not seem to be unprepared, although he told me that a
+long telegram from Count Mensdorff had just come in but had not yet been
+brought to him. His Excellency received my communication with the
+courtesy which never leaves him. He deplored the unhappy complications
+which were drawing such good friends as Austria and England into war. In
+point of fact, he added, Austria did not consider herself then at war
+with France, though diplomatic relations with that country had been
+broken off. I explained in a few words how circumstances had forced this
+unwelcome conflict upon us. We both avoided useless argument...
+
+[Footnote 191: "Miscellaneous, No. 6 (1914)."]
+
+[Footnote 192: See No. 137, "Miscellaneous, No. 6 (1914)."]
+
+
+
+
+APPENDIX VI
+
+
+EXTRACTS FROM
+
+THE RUSSIAN ORANGE BOOK
+
+_Recueil de Documents Diplomatiques_:
+
+_Negociations ayant precede la guerre_
+
+_10/23 Juillet--24 Juillet/6 Aout 1914_
+
+PREFATORY NOTE TO APPENDIX VI
+
+This important collection of documents, which has only reached us since
+the publication of our first edition, confirms the conclusion, which we
+had deduced from other evidence in our fifth chapter (_supra_, pp.
+66-107), that Germany consistently placed obstacles in the way of any
+proposals for a peaceful settlement, and this in spite of the
+willingness of all the other Powers, including Austria-Hungary and
+Russia, to continue discussion of the Servian question. That the crisis
+took Russia by surprise seems evident from the fact that her ambassadors
+accredited to France, Berlin, and Vienna were not at their posts when
+friction began with Russia. (_Infra_, Nos. 4, 7, 8.)
+
+The Russian evidence shows that, on July 29, Germany threatened to
+mobilize if Russia did not desist from military preparations. This
+threat was viewed by M. Sazonof as an additional reason for taking all
+precautions; 'since we cannot accede to Germany's desire, the only
+course open to us is to accelerate our own preparations and to assume
+that war is probably inevitable.' (_Infra_, No. 58.) The reader will
+also notice the curious fact that on July 30 the decree mobilizing the
+German army and navy was published, only to be immediately withdrawn;
+and that the German Government explained that the publication had been
+premature and accidental. (_Infra_, Nos. 61, 62.) We know from the
+British White Book (_Correspondence_, No. 99, Sir F. Bertie to Sir E.
+Grey, July 30) that, on July 30, Germany showed signs of weakening in
+her attitude to Russia.
+
+It will be noted that war between Austria-Hungary and Russia was not
+officially declared until August 6, five days after Germany had declared
+war on Russia. (_Infra_, No. 79.)
+
+In Nos. 36 and 46 will be found some curious details of the methods
+employed by Austria-Hungary and Germany to delay the publication of the
+Servian reply to Austria-Hungary.
+
+MINISTERE DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES.
+
+
+RECUEIL
+
+DE DOCUMENTS DIPLOMATIQUES.
+
+
+
+Negociations ayant precede la guerre.
+
+10/23 Juillet--24 Juillet/6 Aout 1914.
+
+
+
+
+Petrograde,
+Imprimerie de l'Etat.
+1914.
+
+
+No. 1.
+
+Le Charge d'affaires en Serbie au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres.
+
+(_Telegramme_).
+
+Belgrade, le 10/23 Juillet 1914.
+
+Le Ministre d'Autriche vient de transmettre, a 6 heures du soir, an
+Ministre des Finances Patchou, qui remplace Pachitch, une note
+ultimative de son Gouvernement fixant un delai de 48 heures pour
+l'acceptation des demandes y contenues. Giesl a ajoute verbalement que
+pour le cas ou la note ne serait pas acceptee integralement dans un
+delai de 48 heures, il avait l'ordre de quitter Belgrade avec le
+personnel de la Legation. Pachitch et les autres Ministres qui se
+trouvent en tournee electorale ont ete rappeles et sont attendus a
+Belgrade demain Vendredi a 10 heures du matin. Patchou qui m'a
+communique le contenu de la note, sollicite l'aide de la Russie et
+declare qu'aucun Gouvernement Serbe ne pourra accepter les demandes de
+l'Autriche.
+
+(Signe) Strandtman.
+
+
+No. 2.
+
+Le Charge d'affaires en Serbie au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres.
+
+_(Telegramme)._
+
+Belgrade, le 10/23 Juillet 1914.
+
+Texte de la note qui a ete transmise aujourd'hui par le Ministre
+d'Autriche-Hongrie an gouvernement Serbe:...
+
+(_For this note, see German White Book, pp. 18-22_ (supra _in Appendix
+I._))
+
+Un memoire concernant les resultats de l'instruction de Sarajevo a
+l'egard des fonctionnaires mentionnes aux points 7 et 8 est annexe a
+cette note'.[193]
+
+(Signe) Strandtman.
+
+[Footnote 193: This memorandum is in the German White Book, pp. 22-3
+(_supra_, Appendix I), and not reproduced in the Russian Orange Book.]
+
+
+No. 3.
+
+Note Verbale transmise personnellement par l'Ambassadeur
+d'Autriche-Hongrie a St.-Petersbourg au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres
+le 11/24 Juillet 1914 a 10 heures du matin.
+
+Le Gouvernement Imperial et Royal s'est trouve dans la necessite de
+remettre le Jeudi 10/23 du mois courant, par l'entremise du Ministre
+Imperial et Royal a Belgrade, la note suivante an Gouvernement Royal de
+Serbie:
+
+(Suit le texte de la note).
+
+Voir document No. 2.
+
+
+No. 4.
+
+Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres au Charge d'affaires en
+Autriche-Hongrie.
+
+_(Telegramme)._
+
+St.-Petersbourg, le 11/24 Juillet 1914.
+
+Veuillez transmettre au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres
+d'Autriche-Hongrie ce qui suit....
+
+(This communication is printed in the British White Book
+(_Correspondence_, No. 13); see p. 177 _supra_ for the text in English.)
+
+Communique a Londres, Rome, Paris, Belgrade.
+
+(Signe) Sazonow.
+
+
+No. 5.
+
+Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres aux Representants de Sa Majeste
+l'Empereur en Angleterre, en Allemagne, en Italie et en France.
+
+_(Telegramme)._
+
+St.-Petersbourg, le 11/24 Juillet 1914.
+
+Me refere a mon telegramme a Koudachew d'aujourd'hui; nous esperons que
+le Gouvernement aupres duquel. Vous etes accredite partagera notre point
+de vue et prescrira d'urgence a son Representant a Vienne de se
+prononcer dans le meme sens.
+
+Communique a Belgrade.
+
+(Signe) Sazonow.
+
+
+No. 6.
+
+Telegramme de Son Altesse Royale le Prince Regent de Serbie a Sa Majeste
+l'Empereur.
+
+Belgrade, le 11/24 Juillet 1914.
+
+Le Gouvernement Austro-Hongrois a remis hier soir au Gouvernement serbe
+une note concernant l'attentat de Sarajevo. Consciente de ses devoirs
+internationaux, la Serbie des les premiers jours de l'horrible crime a
+declare qu'elle le condamnait et qu'elle etait prete a ouvrir une
+enquete sur son territoire si la complicite de certains de ses sujets
+etait prouvee au cours du proces instruit par les autorites
+Austro-hongroises. Cependant les demandes contenues dans la note
+Austro-hongroise sont inutilement humiliantes pour la Serbie et
+incompatibles avec sa dignite comme Etat independant. Ainsi on nous
+demande sur un ton peremptoire une declaration du gouvernement dans
+l'officiel et un ordre du souverain a l'armee, ou nous reprimerions
+l'esprit hostile contre l'Autriche en nous faisant a nous memes des
+reproches d'une faiblesse criminelle envers nos menees perfides.--On
+nous impose ensuite l'admission des fonctionnaires austro-hongrois en
+Serbie pour participer avec les notres a l'instruction et pour
+surveiller l'execution des autres conditions indiquees dans la note.
+Nous avons recu un delai de 48 heures pour accepter le tout, faute de
+quoi la Legation d'Autriche-Hongrie quittera Belgrade. Nous sommes prets
+a accepter les conditions austro-hongroises qui sont compatibles avec la
+situation d'un Etat independant, ainsi que celles dont l'acception nous
+sera conseillee par Votre Majeste; toutes les personnes dont la
+participation a l'attentat sera demontree seront severement punis par
+nous. Certaines parmi ces demandes ne pourraient etre executees sans des
+changements de notre legislation, ce qui exige du temps. On nous a donne
+un delai trop court. Nous pouvons etre attaques apres l'expiration du
+delai par l'armee austro-hongroise qui se concentre sur notre frontiere.
+Il nous est impossible de nous defendre et nous supplions Votre Majeste
+de nous donner Son aide le plus tot possible. La bienveillance precieuse
+de Votre Majeste qui s'est manifestee tant de fois a notre egard nous
+fait esperer fermement que cette fois encore notre appel sera entendu
+par Son genereux coeur slave.
+
+En ces moments difficiles l'interprete les sentiments du peuple serbe
+qui supplie Votre Majeste de vouloir bien s'interesser au sort du
+Royaume de Serbie.
+
+(Signe) Alexandre.
+
+
+No. 7.
+
+Le Charge d'Affaires en Allemagne au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres.
+
+_(Telegramme)._
+
+Berlin, le 11/24 Juillet 1914.
+
+Tous les journaux du matin, meme ceux, rares, qui reconnaissent
+l'impossibilite pour la Serbie d'accepter les conditions posees,
+accueillent avec une grande sympathie le ton energique adopte par
+l'Autriche. L'officieux "Local-Anzeiger" est particulierement agressif;
+il qualifie de superflus les recours eventuels de la Serbie a St.
+Petersbourg, a Paris, a Athenes et a Bucarest, et termine en disant que
+le peuple allemand respirera librement quand il aura appris que la
+situation dans la peninsule Balcanique va enfin s'eclaircir.
+
+(Signe) Bronewsky.
+
+
+No. 8.
+
+Le Charge d'Affaires en France an Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres.
+
+_(Telegramme)._ Paris, le 11/24 Juillet 1914.
+
+La copie de la note officiellement remise a Belgrade a ete communiquee
+par l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche an Gouvernement Francais. Plus tard
+l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a visite le Ministre et lui a lu une
+communication reproduisant les arguments autrichiens et indiquant qu'en
+cas de refus de la part de la Serbie, l'Autriche serait obligee de
+recourir a une pression et, en cas de besoin, a des mesures militaires;
+la communication se terminait par la remarque qu'a l'avis de l'Allemagne
+cette question devrait etre resolue directement entre l'Autriche et la
+Serbie et qu'il etait de l'interet des Puissances de circonscrire
+l'affaire en l'abandonnant aux Parties interessees. Le Gerant du
+Departement Politique, qui assistait a l'entretien, demanda a
+l'Ambassadeur s'il fallait considerer l'action autrichienne comme un
+ultimatum--en d'autres termes, si, dans le cas ou la Serbie ne se
+soumettrait pas entierement aux demandes autrichiennes, les hostilites
+etaient inevitables? L'ambassadeur evita une reponse directe en
+alleguant l'absence d'instructions.
+
+(Signe) Sevastopoulo.
+
+
+No. 9.
+
+Le Charge d'Affaires en Serbie au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres.
+
+_(Telegramme)._ Belgrade, le 11/24 Juillet 1914.
+
+Pachitch est rentre a Belgrade. Il a l'intention de donner dans le delai
+fixe, c'est a dire demain Samedi a 6 heures du soir, une reponse a
+l'Autriche indiquant les points acceptables et inacceptables. On
+adressera aujourd'hui meme aux Puissances la priere de defendre
+l'independance de la Serbie. Ensuite, ajouta Pachitch, si la guerre est
+inevitable--nous ferons la guerre.
+
+(Signe) Strandtman.
+
+
+No. 10.
+
+Communique du Gouvernement Imperial.
+
+St.-Petersbourg, le 12/25 Juillet 1914.
+
+Les derniers evenements et l'envoi par l'Autriche-Hongrie d'un ultimatum
+a la Serbie preoccupent le Gouvernement Imperial an plus haut degre. Le
+Gouvernement suit attentivement l'evolution du conflit serbo-autrichien
+qui ne peut pas laisser la Russie indifferente.
+
+
+No. 11.
+
+Le Charge d'Affaires en Autriche-Hongrie au Ministre des Affaires
+Etrangeres.
+
+_(Telegramme)._ Vienne, le 12/25 Juillet 1914.
+
+Le comte Berchtold se trouve a Ischl. Vu l'impossibilite d'y arriver a
+temps, je lui ai telegraphie notre proposition de prolonger le delai de
+l'ultimatum et l'ai repetee verbalement au Baron Macchio. Ce dernier m'a
+promis de la communiquer a temps au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres,
+mais a ajoute qu'il pouvait predire avec assurance un refus categorique.
+
+(Signe) Koudachew.
+
+
+No. 12.
+
+Le Charge d'Affaires en Autriche-Hongrie an Ministre des Affaires
+Etrangeres.
+
+_(Telegramme)._ Vienne, le 12/25 Juillet 1914.
+
+Suite a mon telegramme d'aujourd'hui. Viens de recevoir de Macchio la
+reponse negative du Gouvernement Austro-Hongrois a notre proposition de
+prolonger le delai de la note.
+
+(Signe) Koudachew.
+
+
+No. 13.
+
+Le Charge d'Affaires en Serbie an Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres.
+
+_(Telegramme)._ Belgrade, le 12/25 Juillet 1914.
+
+Recu avec retard le 14--27 Juillet 1914.
+
+Je transmets la reponse que le President du Conseil des Ministres Serbe
+a remis an ministre Austro-Hongrois a Belgrade aujourd'hui avant
+l'expiration du delai de l'ultimatum....
+
+(The text of the reply will be found in the British White Book
+(_Correspondence_, No. 39) and also in the German White Book, pp. 23-32
+(supra, Appendix I.).)
+
+
+No. 14.
+
+Le Charge d'affaires en Allemagne au Ministre des affaires Etrangeres.
+
+_(Telegramme)._ Berlin, le 12/25 Juillet 1914.
+
+Ai recu Votre telegramme du 11/24 Juillet. Ai communique son contenu an
+Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. Il me dit que le Gouvernement Anglais
+l'a egalement prie de conseiller a Vienne la prolongation du delai de
+l'ultimatum; il a communique cette demarche telegraphiquement a Vienne,
+il va en faire autant pour notre demarche, mais il craint qu'a la suite
+de l'absence de Berchtold parti pour Ischl, et vu le manque de temps,
+ses telegrammes ne restent sans resultats; il a, en outre, des doutes
+sur l'opportunite pour l'Autriche de ceder an dernier moment et il se
+demande si cela ne pouvait pas augmenter l'assurance de la Serbie. J'ai
+repondu qu'une grande Puissance comme l'Autriche pourrait ceder sans
+porter atteinte a son prestige et ai fait valoir tous les arguments
+conformes, cependant je n'ai pu obtenir des promesses plus precises.
+Meme lorsque je laissais entendre qu'il fallait agir a Vienne pour
+eviter la possibilite de consequences redoutables, le Ministre des
+Affaires Etrangeres repondait chaque fois negativement.
+
+(Signe) Bronewsky.
+
+
+No. 15.
+
+Le Charge d'affaires en France an Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres.
+
+(_Telegramme_). Paris, le 12/25 Juillet 1914.
+
+Ai recu le telegramme du 11/24 Juillet concernant la prolongation du
+delai de l'ultimatum autrichien et ai fait la communication prescrite.
+Le Representant de France a Vienne a ete muni d'instructions conformes.
+
+(Signe) Sevastopoulo.
+
+
+No. 16.
+
+L'Ambassadeur en Angleterre an Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres.
+
+(_Telegramme_). Londres, le 12/25 Juillet 1914.
+
+Recu telegramme du 11 Juillet. Grey a prescrit a l'Ambassadeur
+d'Angleterre a Vienne d'appuyer notre demarche concernant la
+prolongation du delai de l'ultimatum. Il m'a dit en meme temps que
+l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche etait venu le voir et avait explique qu'on ne
+devrait pas attribuer a la note autrichienne le caractere d'un
+ultimatum; il faudrait la considerer comme une demarche qui, en cas
+d'absence de reponse ou en cas de reponse insuffisante au terme fixe,
+aurait comme suite la rupture des relations diplomatiques et le depart
+immediat de Belgrade du Ministre d'Autriche-Hongrie, sans entrainer
+cependant le commencement immediat des hostilites.--Grey a ajoute qu'a
+la suite de cette explication il a indique a l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre
+a Vienne que dans le cas ou il serait trop tard pour soulever la
+question de la prolongation du delai de l'ultimatum, celle de l'arret
+des hostilites pourrait peut-etre servir de base a la discussion.
+
+(Signe) Benckendorff.
+
+
+No. 17.
+
+Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres a l'Ambassadeur a Londres.
+
+_(Telegramme)._ St.-Petersbourg, le 12/25 Juillet 1914.
+
+Dans le cas d'une nouvelle aggravation de la situation, pouvant
+provoquer de la part des Grandes Puissances des actions conformes, nous
+comptons que l'Angleterre ne tardera pas de se ranger nettement du cote
+de la Russie et de la France, en vue de maintenir l'equilibre europeen,
+en faveur duquel elle est intervenue constamment dans le passe et qui
+serait sans aucun doute compromis dans le cas du triomphe de l'Autriche.
+
+(Signe) Sazonow.
+
+
+No. 18.
+
+Note verbale remise par l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne au Ministre des
+Affaires Etrangeres le 12/25 Juillet 1914.
+
+Il nous revient de source autoritative que la nouvelle repandue par
+quelques journaux d'apres laquelle la demarche du Gouvernement
+d'Autriche-Hongrie a Belgrade aurait ete faite a l'instigation de
+l'Allemagne est absolument fausse. Le Gouvernement Allemand n'a pas eu
+connaissance du texte de la note Autrichienne avant qu'elle ait ete
+remise et n'a exerce aucune influence sur son contenu. C'est a tort
+qu'on attribue a l'Allemagne une attitude comminatoire.
+
+L'Allemagne appuie naturellement comme allie de l'Autriche les
+revendications a son avis legitimes du Cabinet de Vienne contre la
+Serbie.
+
+Avant tout elle desire comme elle l'a deja declare des le commencement
+du differend Austro-Serbe que ce conflit reste localise.
+
+
+No. 19.
+
+Le Charge d'affaires en France an Ministre des affaires Etrangeres.
+
+_(Telegramme)_ Paris, le 12/25 Juillet 1914.
+
+Me refere a mon telegramme du 11/24 Juillet.
+
+Aujourd'hui un journal du matin a publie, sous une forme pas entierement
+exacte, les declarations d'hier de l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne, en les
+faisant suivre de commentaires qui attribuent a cette demarche le
+caractere d'une menace. L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne, tres impressionne par
+ces divulgations, a visite aujourd'hui le Gerant du Departement
+Politique pour lui dire que ses paroles n'avaient nullement eu le
+caractere de menace qu'on leur attribue. Il a declare que l'Autriche
+avait presente sa note a la Serbie sans entente precise avec Berlin,
+mais que cependant l'Allemagne approuvait le point de vue de l'Autriche
+et que certainement 'la fleche une fois partie' (ce sont la ses propres
+paroles), l'Allemagne ne pouvait se laisser guider que par ses devoirs
+d'alliee.
+
+(Signe) Sevastopoulo.
+
+
+No. 20.
+
+L'ambassadeur en Angleterre au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres.
+
+_(Telegramme)._ Londres, le 12/25 Juillet 1914.
+
+Grey m'a dit que l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne lui a declare que le
+Gouvernement Allemand n'avait pas ete informe du texte de la note
+autrichienne, mais qu'il soutenait entierement la demarche autrichienne.
+L'Ambassadeur a demande en meme temps si l'Angleterre pouvait consentir
+a agir a St. Petersbourg dans un esprit de conciliation. Grey a repondu
+que cela etait completement impossible. Le Ministre a ajoute que tant
+que les complications n'existaient qu'entre l'Autriche et la Serbie, les
+interets Anglais n'etaient engages qu'indirectement, mais qu'il devait
+prevoir que la mobilisation autrichienne aurait comme suite la
+mobilisation de la Russie et que des ce moment on se trouverait en
+presence d'une situation a laquelle seraient interessees toutes les
+Puissances. L'Angleterre se reservait pour ce cas une complete liberte
+d'action.
+
+(Signe) Benckendorff.
+
+
+No. 21.
+
+Le Charge d'affaires en Serbie an Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres.
+
+_(Telegramme)._ Belgrade, le 12/25 Juillet 1914.
+
+Malgre le caractere extremement conciliant de la reponse serbe a
+l'ultimatum, le Ministre d'Autriche vient d'informer, a 6-1/2 du soir,
+le Gouvernement Serbe par note, que n'ayant pas recu an delai fixe une
+reponse satisfaisante il quitte Belgrade avec tout le personnel de la
+Legation. La Scoupchtina est convoquee a Nich pour le 14/27 Juillet. Le
+Gouvernement Serbe et le Corps Diplomatique partent ce soir pour la meme
+ville.
+
+(Signe) Strandtman.
+
+
+No. 22.
+
+L'Ambassadeur en Angleterre an Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres.
+
+_(Telegramme)._ Londres, le 12/25 Juillet 1914.
+
+Grey a dit a l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne qu'a son avis la mobilisation
+autrichienne devait entrainer la mobilisation de la Russie, qu'alors
+surgirait le danger aigu d'une guerre generale et qu'il ne voyait qu'un
+seul moyen pour une solution pacifique: qu'en presence des mobilisations
+autrichienne et russe, l'Allemagne, la France, l'Italie et l'Angleterre
+s'abstiennent d'une mobilisation immediate et proposent tout d'abord
+leurs bons offices. Grey m'a dit que ce plan necessitait avant tout
+l'agrement de l'Allemagne et l'engagement de cette Puissance de ne pas
+mobiliser. En consequence il a adresse tout d'abord a Berlin une
+question a ce sujet.
+
+(Signe) Benckendorff.
+
+
+No. 23.
+
+Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres a l'Ambassadeur en Italie.
+
+_(Telegramme)._ St. Petersbourg, le 13/26 Juillet 1914.
+
+L'Italie pourrait jouer un role de tout premier ordre en faveur du
+maintien de la paix, en exercant l'influence necessaire sur l'Autriche
+et en adoptant une attitude nettement defavorable au conflit, car ce
+dernier ne saurait etre localise. Il est desirable que vous exprimiez la
+conviction qu'il est impossible pour la Russie de ne pas venir en aide a
+la Serbie.
+
+(Signe) Sazonow.
+
+
+No. 24.
+
+Le Gerant du Consulat a Prague au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres.
+
+_(Telegramme)._ Prague, le 13/26 Juillet 1914.
+
+La mobilisation a ete decretee.
+
+(Signe) Kazansky.
+
+
+No. 25.
+
+Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres a l'Ambassadeur en Autriche-Hongrie.
+
+_(Telegramme)._ St. Petersbourg, le 13/26 Juillet 1914.
+
+J'ai eu aujourd'hui un long entretien sur un ton amical avec
+l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie. Apres avoir examine avec lui les 10
+demandes adressees a la Serbie, j'ai fait observer qu'a part la forme
+peu habile sous laquelle elles sont presentees, quelques-unes parmi
+elles sont absolument inexecutables, meme dans le cas ou le gouvernement
+Serbe declarerait les vouloir accepter. Ainsi, par exemple, les points 1
+et 2 ne pourraient etre executes sans un remaniement des lois serbes sur
+la presse et sur les associations, pour lequel le consentement de la
+Scoupchtina pourrait etre difficilement obtenu; quant a l'execution des
+points 4 et 5, elle pourrait produire des consequences fort dangereuses
+et meme faire naitre le danger d'actes de terrorisme diriges contre les
+membres de la Maison Royale et contre Pachitch, ce qui ne saurait entrer
+dans les vues de l'Autriche. En ce qui regarde les autres points, il me
+semble, qu'avec certains changements dans les details, il ne serait pas
+difficile de trouver un terrain d'entente si les accusations y contenues
+etaient confirmees par des preuves suffisantes.
+
+Dans l'interet de la conservation de la paix qui, aux dires de Szapary,
+est precieuse a l'Autriche au meme degre qu'a toutes les Puissances, il
+serait necessaire de mettre au plus tot possible une fin a la situation
+tendue du moment. Dans ce but il me semblerait tres desirable que
+l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie fut autorise d'entrer avec moi dans un
+echange de vues prive aux fins d'un remaniement en commun de quelques
+articles de la note autrichienne du 10/23 Juillet. Ce procede
+permettrait peut-etre de trouver une formule qui fut acceptable pour la
+Serbie, tout en donnant satisfaction a l'Autriche quant au fond de ses
+demandes. Veuillez avoir une explication prudente et amicale dans le
+sens de ce telegramme avec le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres.
+Communique aux Ambassadeurs en Allemagne, en France, en Angleterre et en
+Italie.
+
+(Signe) Sazonow.
+
+
+No. 26.
+
+Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres a l'Ambassadeur en Allemagne.
+
+_(Telegramme)._ St. Petersbourg, le 13/26 Juillet.
+
+Veuillez communiquer le contenu de mon telegramme a Vienne d'aujourd'hui
+au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres Allemand et lui exprimer l'espoir,
+que de son cote il trouvera possible de conseiller a Vienne d'aller
+au-devant de notre proposition.
+
+(Signe) Sazonow.
+
+
+No. 27.
+
+Le Charge d'Affaires en France au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres.
+
+_(Telegramme)._ Paris, le 13/26 Juillet 1914.
+
+Le Directeur du Departement Politique m'informe, que lors de la
+communication qu'il a faite a l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche du contenu de la
+reponse serbe a l'ultimatum, l'Ambassadeur n'a pas cache son etonnement
+de ce qu'elle n'ait pas donne satisfaction a Giesl. L'attitude
+conciliante de la Serbie doit, selon l'avis du Directeur du Departement
+Politique, produire la meilleure impression en Europe.
+
+(Signe) Sevastopoulo.
+
+
+No. 28.
+
+Le Charge d'Affaires en France an Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres.
+
+(_Telegramme_). Paris, le 13/26 Juillet 1914.
+
+Aujourd'hui l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a de nouveau rendu visite au
+Gerant du Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres et lui a fait les
+declarations suivantes:
+
+"L'Autriche a declare a la Russie qu'elle ne recherche pas des
+acquisitions territoriales et qu'elle ne menace pas l'integrite de la
+Serbie. Son but unique est d'assurer sa propre tranquillite. Par
+consequent il depend de la Russie d'eviter la guerre. L'Allemagne se
+sent solidaire avec la France dans le desir ardent de conserver la paix
+et espere fermement que la France usera de son influence a Petersbourg
+dans un sens moderateur". Le Ministre fit observer que l'Allemagne
+pourrait de son cote entreprendre des demarches analogues a Vienne,
+surtout en presence de l'esprit de conciliation dont a fait preuve la
+Serbie. L'Ambassadeur repondit que cela n'etait pas possible, vu la
+resolution prise de ne pas s'immiscer dans le conflit austro-serbe.
+Alors le Ministre demanda, si les quatre Puissances--l'Angleterre,
+l'Allemagne, l'Italie et la France--ne pouvaient pas entreprendre des
+demarches a St. Petersbourg et a Vienne, puisque l'affaire se reduisait
+en somme a un conflit entre la Russie et l'Autriche. L'Ambassadeur
+allegua l'absence d'instructions. Finalement le Ministre refusa
+d'adherer a la proposition allemande.
+
+(Signe) Sevastopoulo.
+
+
+No. 29.
+
+Le Charge d'Affaires en France au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres.
+
+(_Telegramme_). Paris, le 13/28 Juillet 1914.
+
+Le Directeur du Departement Politique a declare qu'a son avis personnel,
+les demarches successives allemandes a Paris ont pour but d'intimider la
+France et d'amener son intervention a St. Petersbourg.
+
+(Signe) Sevastopoulo.
+
+
+No. 30.
+
+Le Charge d'Affaires en Allemagne au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres.
+
+(_Telegramme_). Berlin, le 13/26 Juillet 1914.
+
+Apres la reception a Berlin de la nouvelle de la mobilisation de l'armee
+autrichienne contre la Serbie une grande foule, composee, aux dires des
+journaux, en partie d'elements autrichiens, se livra a une serie de
+bruyantes manifestations en faveur de l'Autriche. A une heure avancee de
+la soiree les manifestants se masserent a plusieurs reprises devant le
+palais de l'Ambassade Imperiale en poussant des cris hostiles a la
+Russie; la police etait presque absente et ne prenait aucune mesure.
+
+(Signe) Bronewsky.
+
+
+No. 31.
+
+L'Ambassadeur en Angleterre au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres.
+
+_(Telegramme)_.
+
+Londres, le 14/27 Juillet 1914.
+
+Ai recu votre telegramme du 13-26 Juillet. Prie me telegraphier si, a
+Votre avis, Vos pourparlers directs avec le cabinet de Vienne
+s'accordent avec le projet de Grey concernant la mediation des 4
+Gouvernements. Ayant appris de l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre a St.
+Petersbourg que Vous etiez dispose a accepter cette combinaison, Grey a
+decide de la transformer en une proposition officielle qu'il a faite
+hier soir a Berlin, a Paris et a Rome.
+
+(Signe) Benckendorff.
+
+
+No. 32.
+
+Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres aux Ambassadeurs en France et en
+Angleterre.
+
+_(Telegramme)_.
+
+St. Petersbourg, le 14/27 Juillet 1914.
+
+(Printed in the British White Book (_Correspondence_, No. 53.).)
+
+
+No. 33.
+
+Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres aux Ambassadeurs en France, en
+Angleterre, en Allemagne, en Autriche-Hongrie et en Italie.
+
+_(Telegramme)_.
+
+St. Petersbourg, le 14/27 Juillet 1914.
+
+Ai pris connaissance de la reponse transmise par le Gouvernement Serbe
+au Baron Giesl. Elle depasse toutes nos previsions par sa moderation et
+son desir de donner la plus complete satisfaction a l'Autriche. Nous ne
+voyons pas quelles pourraient etre encore les demandes de l'Autriche, a
+moins que le Cabinet de Vienne ne cherche un pretexte pour une guerre
+avec la Serbie.
+
+(Signe) Sazonow.
+
+
+No. 34.
+
+Le Charge d'Affaires en France au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres.
+
+_(Telegramme)_.
+
+Paris, le 14/27 Juillet 1914.
+
+L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a confere aujourd'hui de nouveau longuement
+sur la situation avec le Directeur du Departement Politique.
+L'Ambassadeur a beaucoup insiste sur l'exclusion de toute possibilite
+d'une mediation ou d'une conference.
+
+(Signe) Sevastopoulo.
+
+
+No. 35.
+
+L'Ambassadeur en France au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres.
+
+_(Telegramme)._ Paris, le 14/27 Juillet 1914.
+
+Ai confere avec le Gerant du Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres, en
+presence de Berthelot, immediatement apres mon retour a Paris. Tous les
+deux m'out confirme les details concernant les demarches de
+l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne que Sevastopoulo Vous a communiques dans ses
+telegrammes. Ce matin le Baron de Schoen a confirme par ecrit sa
+declaration d'hier, savoir: 1) l'Autriche a declare a la Russie qu'elle
+ne recherche pas d'acquisitions et n'attente pas a l'integrite de la
+Serbie. Son unique but est d'assurer sa propre tranquillite. 2) Par
+consequent il depend de la Russie d'eviter la guerre. 3) L'Allemagne et
+la France, completement solidaires dans l'ardent desir de ne pas rompre
+la paix, doivent agir sur la Russie dans un sens moderateur. Le Baron de
+Schoen a specialement souligne l'expression de la solidarite entre
+l'Allemagne et la France. D'apres la conviction du Ministre de la
+Justice, les demarches susdites de l'Allemagne out pour but evident de
+desunir la Russie et la France, d'entrainer le Gouvernement Francais
+dans la voie des representations a St. Petersbourg et de compromettre
+ainsi notre allie a nos yeux; enfin, en cas de guerre, d'en rejeter la
+responsabilite non sur l'Allemagne, qui emploie soi-disant tous ses
+efforts pour le maintien de la paix, mais sur la Russie et la France.
+
+(Signe) Iswolsky.
+
+
+No. 36.
+
+L'Ambassadeur en France au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres.
+
+_(Telegramme)._ Paris, le 14/27 Juillet 1914.
+
+Il ressort de vos telegrammes du 13/26 Juillet que vous ne connaissiez
+pas encore la reponse du Gouvernement Serbe. Le telegramme par lequel
+cette nouvelle m'a ete communiquee de Belgrade a ete egalement en route
+pendant 20 heures. Le telegramme du Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres
+Francais expedie avant-hier, au triple tarif, a onze heures du matin, et
+contenant l'ordre d'appuyer notre demarche, n'est parvenu a sa
+destination qu'a 6 heures. Il n'y a aucun doute que ce telegramme n'ait
+ete retenu intentionnellement par le telegraphe autrichien.
+
+(Signe) Iswolsky.
+
+
+No. 37.
+
+L'Ambassadeur en France au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres.
+
+_(Telegramme)._ Paris, le 14/27 Juillet 1914.
+
+D'ordre de son Gouvernement, l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche a communique au
+Gerant du Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres que la reponse de la Serbie
+a ete jugee insuffisante a Vienne et que demain, mardi, l'Autriche
+procederait a des 'actions energiques' don't le but serait de forcer la
+Serbie de lui donner les garanties necessaires. Le Ministre ayant
+demande en quoi consisteraient ces actions, l'Ambassadeur repondit qu'il
+n'avait pas de renseignements exacts a ce sujet, mais qu'il pouvait
+s'agir d'un passage da la frontiere serbe, d'un ultimatum et meme d'une
+declaration de guerre.
+
+(Signe) Iswolsky.
+
+
+No. 38.
+
+Le Charge d'Affaires en Allemagne au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres.
+
+_(Telegramme)._ Berlin, le 14/27 Juillet 1914.
+
+J'ai prie le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres d'appuyer a Vienne votre
+proposition tendant a autoriser Szapary d'elaborer, par la voie d'un
+echange de vues prive avec Vous, une redaction des demandes
+austro-hongroises acceptable pour les deux parties. Jagow a repondu
+qu'il etait an courant de cette proposition et qu'il partageait l'avis
+de Pourtales que, puisque Szapary avait commence cette conversation, il
+pourrait aussi bien la continuer. Il telegraphiera dans ce sens a
+l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a Vienne. Je l'ai prie de conseiller d'une
+facon plus pressante a Vienne de s'engager dans cette voie de
+conciliation; Jagow a repondu qu'il ne pouvait pas conseiller a
+l'Autriche de ceder.
+
+(Signe) Bronewsky.
+
+
+No. 39.
+
+Le Charge d'Affaires en Allemagne au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres.
+
+_(Telegramme)._ Berlin, le 14/27 Juillet 1914.
+
+Aujourd'hui, avant ma visite au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres, ce
+dernier avait recu celle de l'Ambassadeur de France qui avait tente de
+lui faire accepter la proposition anglaise relative a une action en
+faveur de la paix, action qui serait exercee simultanement a
+St.-Petersbourg et a Vienne par l'Angleterre, l'Allemagne, l'Italie et
+la France. Cambon a propose que ces Puissances donnent a Vienne un
+conseil dans les termes suivants: "S'abstenir de tout acte qui pourrait
+aggraver la situation de l'heure actuelle". En adoptant cette formule
+voilee on eviterait de mentionner la necessite de s'abstenir d'une
+invasion de la Serbie. Jagow a oppose a cette proposition un refus
+categorique, et cela malgre les instances de l'Ambassadeur qui a fait
+valoir, comme un bon cote de la proposition, le groupement mixte des
+Puissances grace auquel on evitait l'opposition de l'Alliance a
+l'Entente, ce dont s'etait si souvent plaint Jagow lui-meme.
+
+(Signe) Bronewsky.
+
+
+No. 40.
+
+Telegramme de Sa Majeste Imperiale l'Empereur a Son Altesse Royale le
+Prince Alexandre de Serbie en date du 14/27 Juillet 1914.
+
+Votre Altesse Royale en s'adressant a Moi dans un moment
+particulierement difficile ne s'est pas trompee sur les sentiments qui
+M'animent a Son egard et sur Ma sympathie cordiale pour le peuple serbe.
+
+Ma plus serieuse attention est attiree par la situation actuelle et Mon
+Gouvernement s'applique de toutes ses forces a aplanir les presentes
+difficultes. Je ne doute point que Votre Altesse et le Gouvernement
+Royal ne veuillent faciliter cette tache en ne negligeant rien pour
+arriver a une solution qui permette de prevenir les horreurs d'une
+nouvelle guerre tout en sauvegardant la dignite de la Serbie.
+
+Tant qu'il y a le moindre espoir d'eviter une effusion de sang, tous nos
+efforts doivent tendre vers ce but. Si, malgre Notre plus sincere desir,
+Nous ne reussissons pas, Votre Altesse peut etre assuree qu'en aucun cas
+la Russie ne se desinteressera du sort de la Serbie.
+
+(Signe) Nicolas.
+
+
+No. 41.
+
+L'Ambassadeur en Autriche-Hongrie au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres.
+
+(_Telegramme_). Vienne, le 14/17 juillet 1914.[194]
+
+Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres est absent. Pendant un entretien
+prolonge, que j'ai eu aujourd'hui avec Macchio, j'ai, en termes tout a
+fait amicaux, attire son attention sur l'impression defavorable qu'a
+produite en Russie la presentation par l'Autriche a la Serbie de
+demandes absolument inacceptables pour chaque etat independant, bien que
+petit. J'ai ajoute que ce procede, qui pourrait amener des complications
+les moins desirables, a provoque en Russie une profonde surprise et une
+reprobation generale. Il faut supposer que l'Autriche, sous l'influence
+des assurances du Representant Allemand a Vienne, lequel pendant toute
+cette crise a joue un role d'instigateur, a compte sur la probabilite de
+la localisation de son conflit avec la Serbie et sur la possibilite de
+porter a cette derniere impunement un coup grave. La declaration du
+Gouvernement Imperial concernant l'impossibilite pour la Russie de
+rester indifferente en presence d'un tel procede a provoque ici une
+grande impression.
+
+(Signe) Schebeko.
+
+[Footnote 194: Evidently the date July 17 is a misprint for July 27.]
+
+
+No. 42.
+
+L'Ambassadeur en Angleterre au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres.
+
+(_Telegramme_). Londres, le 14/17 Juillet 1914.[195]
+
+Grey vient de repondre a l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne, qui etait venu le
+questionner sur la possibilite d'une action a St.-Petersbourg, que cette
+action devrait se produire a Vienne et que le cabinet de Berlin serait
+le mieux qualifie pour l'exercer. Grey a fait observer en meme temps que
+la reponse serbe a la note autrichienne depassait par sa moderation et
+son esprit de conciliation tout ce a quoi on pouvait s'attendre. Grey a
+ajoute qu'il en concluait que la Russie avait conseille a Belgrade de
+donner une reponse moderee et qu'il pensait que la reponse serbe pouvait
+servir de base a une solution pacifique et acceptable de la question.
+
+Dans ces conditions, a continue Grey, si l'Autriche malgre cette reponse
+commencait les hostilites, elle prouverait son intention d'aneantir la
+Serbie. La question placee sur ce terrain produirait une situation qui
+pourrait amener une guerre dans laquelle seraient impliquees toutes les
+Puissances.
+
+Grey a enfin declare que le Gouvernement Anglais etait bien sincerement
+dispose a collaborer avec le gouvernement Allemand tant qu'il s'agirait
+de la conservation de la paix; mais que pour le cas contraire
+l'Angleterre se reservait une pleine liberte d'action.
+
+(Signe) Benckendorff.
+
+[Footnote 195: Evidently the date July 17 is a misprint for July 27.]
+
+
+No. 43.
+
+Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres a l'Ambassadeur en Angleterre.
+
+(_Telegramme_). St.-Petersbourg, le 15/28 Juillet 1914.
+
+(Printed in the British White Book (_Correspondence_, No. 54.).)
+
+
+No. 44.
+
+Le Consul general a Fiume au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres.
+
+_(Telegramme)._ Fiume, le 15/28 Juillet 1914.
+
+L'etat de siege a ete proclame en Slavonie, en Croatie et a Fiume et en
+meme temps les reservistes de toutes les categories ont ete mobilises.
+
+(Signe) Salviati.
+
+
+No. 45.
+
+L'Ambassadeur en Autriche-Hongrie au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres.
+
+_(Telegramme)._ Vienne, le 15/28 Juillet 1914.
+
+(Printed in the British White Book (_Correspondence_, No. 93 (I)).)
+
+
+No. 46.
+
+Le Charge d'affaires en Allemagne au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres.
+
+_(Telegramme)._ Berlin, le 15/28 Juillet 1914.
+
+Le Bureau Wolff n'a pas publie le texte de la note responsive serbe qui
+lui avait ete communique. Jusqu'a ce moment cette note n'a paru in
+extenso dans aucun des journaux locaux, qui selon toute evidence ne
+veulent pas lui donner place dans leurs colonnes, se rendant compte de
+l'effet calmant que cette publication produirait sur les lecteurs
+allemands.
+
+(Signe) Bronewsky.
+
+
+No. 47.
+
+L'Ambassadeur en Autriche-Hongrie au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres.
+
+_(Telegramme)._ Vienne, le 15/28 Juillet, 1914.
+
+Le decret sur la mobilisation generale a ete signe.
+
+(Signe) Schebeko.
+
+
+No. 48.
+
+Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres a l'Ambassadeur a Londres.[196]
+
+_(Telegramme)._ St.-Petersbourg, le 15/28 Juillet, 1914.
+
+En presence des hostilites entre l'Autriche-Hongrie et la Serbie il est
+necessaire que l'Angleterre entreprenne d'urgence une action mediatrice
+et que l'action militaire de l'Autriche contre la Serbie soit
+immediatement suspendue. Autrement la mediation ne servira que de
+pretexte pour tirer en longueur la solution de la question et donnera
+entre temps a l'Autriche la possibilite d'ecraser completement la Serbie
+et d'occuper une situation dominante dans les Balcans.
+
+Communique a Paris, Berlin, Vienne et Rome.
+
+(Signe) Sazonow.
+
+[Footnote 196: An English (abbreviated) version of this telegram is
+given in the British White Book (_Correspondence_, No. 70 (2)).]
+
+
+No. 49.
+
+Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres au Charge d'Affaires en Allemagne.
+
+_(Telegramme)._ St.-Petersbourg, le 16/29 Juillet, 1914.
+
+(Printed in the British White Book (_Correspondence_, No. 93 (2)).)
+
+
+No. 50.
+
+Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres aux Ambassadeurs en Angleterre et en
+France.
+
+_(Telegramme)._ St.-Petersbourg, le 16/29 Juillet 1914.
+
+(Printed in the British White Book (_Correspondence_, No. 93 (3)).)
+
+
+No. 51.
+
+Le Charge d'Affaires en Allemagne au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres.
+
+_(Telegramme)._ Berlin, le 16/29 Juillet 1914.
+
+Sur ma question s'il avait une reponse de Vienne relativement a Votre
+proposition de pourparlers prives a St.-Petersbourg, le Secretaire
+d'Etat a repondu negativement.
+
+Il declare qu'il lui est fort difficile d'agir sur Vienne, surtout
+ouvertement. Parlant a Cambon, il a meme ajoute qu'en cas d'une pression
+trop evidente l'Autriche se haterait de mettre l'Allemagne en presence
+d'un fait accompli.
+
+Le Secretaire d'Etat dit qu'il a recu aujourd'hui un telegramme de
+Pourtales d'ou il constate que plus que les premiers jours Vous etes
+dispose a trouver un compromis acceptable pour tous. J'ai replique que
+probablement Vous avez ete des le commencement en faveur d'un compromis,
+bien entendu a la condition qu'il soit acceptable non seulement pour
+l'Autriche, mais egalement pour nous. Il m'a dit ensuite qu'il
+paraissait que nous avions commence a mobiliser sur la frontiere
+autrichienne et qu'il craignait que ceci rendrait plus difficile pour
+l'Autriche la possibilite de s'entendre avec nous, d'autant plus que
+l'Autriche ne mobilisait que contre la Serbie et ne faisait pas de
+preparatifs sur notre frontiere. J'ai repondu que, d'apres les
+renseignements dont je disposais, l'Autriche mobilisait egalement sur
+notre frontiere et que par consequent nous devions prendre des mesures
+analogues. J'ai ajoute que les mesures que nous avons peut-etre prises
+de notre cote n'etaient nullement dirigees contre l'Allemagne.
+
+(Signe) Bronewsky.
+
+
+No. 52.
+
+Le Charge d'affaires en Serbie au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres.
+
+_(Telegramme)._ Nich, le 16/29 Juillet 1914.
+
+Aujourd'hui le Ministre de Bulgarie, an nom de son Gouvernement, a
+declare a Pachiteh que la Bulgarie observerait la neutralite.
+
+(Signe) Strandtman.
+
+
+No. 53.
+
+L'Ambassadeur en France au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres.
+
+_(Telegramme)._ Paris, le 16/29 Juillet 1914.
+
+A l'occasion de l'arrivee du President de la Republique Francais le
+Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres avait prepare un court expose de la
+situation politique actuelle, a pen pres dans les termes suivants:
+L'Autriche, craignant la decomposition interieure, s'est emparee du
+pretexte de l'assassinat de l'Archiduc pour essayer d'obtenir des
+garanties qui pourront revetir la forme de l'occupation des
+communications militaires serbes ou meme du territoire serbe.
+L'Allemagne soutient l'Autriche. Le maintien de la paix depend de la
+seule Russie, parce qu'il s'agit d'une affaire qui doit etre "localisee"
+entre l'Autriche et la Serbie, c'est a dire de la punition de la
+politique precedente de la Serbie et des garanties pour l'avenir. De
+ceci l'Allemagne conclue qu'il faut exercer une action moderatrice a
+Petersbourg. Ce sophisme a ete refute a Paris comme a Londres. A Paris,
+le Baron de Schoen a en vain tache d'entrainer la France a une action
+solidaire avec l'Allemagne sur la Russie en faveur du maintien de la
+paix. Les memes tentatives out ete faites a Londres. Dans les deux
+capitales il a ete repondu que l'action devrait etre exercee a Vienne,
+car les demandes excessives de l'Autriche, son refus de discuter les
+rares reserves de la Serbie, et la declaration de guerre menacent de
+provoquer la guerre generale. La France et l'Angleterre ne peuvent
+exercer une action moderatrice sur la Russie, laquelle jusqu'ici a fait
+preuve de la plus grande moderation, surtout en conseillant a la Serbie
+d'accepter ce qui etait possible de la note autrichienne. Aujourd'hui
+l'Allemagne parait renoncer a l'idee d'une action sur la Russie seule et
+incline vers une action mediatrice a Petersbourg et a Vienne, mais en
+meme temps l'Allemagne comme l'Autriche tachent de faire trainer
+l'affaire. L'Allemagne s'oppose a la Conference sans indiquer aucune
+autre maniere d'agir pratique. L'Autriche mene des pourparlers
+manifestement dilatoires a Petersbourg. En meme temps elle prend des
+mesures actives, et si ces mesures sont tolerees, ses pretentions
+augmenteront proportionnellement. Il est tres desirable que la Russie
+prete tout son appui an projet de mediation que presentera Sir E. Grey.
+Dans le cas contraire l'Autriche, sous pretexte de "garantie", pourra,
+en fait, changer le status territorial de l'Europe orientale.
+
+(Signe) Iswolsky.
+
+
+No. 54.
+
+L'Ambassadeur en Angleterre au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres.
+
+_(Telegramme)._ Londres, le 10/29 Juillet 1914.
+
+Ai communique le contenu de Vos telegrammes du 15/28 Juillet a Grey. Il
+a declare aujourd'hui a l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne que les pourparlers
+directs entre la Russie et l'Autriche avaient echoue, et que les
+correspondants des journaux mandaient de St.-Petersbourg que la Russie
+mobilisait contre l'Autriche a la suite de la mobilisation de cette
+derniere. Grey dit qu'en principe le Gouvernement Allemand s'est declare
+en faveur de la mediation, mais qu'il rencontre des difficultes quant a
+la forme. Grey a insiste pour que le Gouvernement Allemand indiquat la
+forme laquelle a l'avis de l'Allemagne pourrait permettre aux 4
+Puissances d'exercer leur mediation pour eviter la guerre; vu le
+consentement de la France, de l'Italie et de l'Angleterre la mediation
+pourrait avoir lieu seulement dans le cas ou l'Allemagne consentirait a
+se ranger du cote de la paix.
+
+(Signe) Benckendorff.
+
+
+No. 55.
+
+L'Ambassadeur en France au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres.
+
+_(Telegramme)._ Paris, le 16/29 Juillet 1914.
+
+Viviani vient de me confirmer l'entiere resolution du Gouvernement
+Francais d'agir d'accord avec nous. Cette resolution est soutenue par
+les cercles les plus etendus et par les partis, y compris les
+radicaux-socialistes, qui viennent de lui presenter une declaration
+exprimant la confiance absolue et les dispositions patriotiques du
+groupe. Des son arrivee a Paris, Viviani a telegraphie d'urgence a
+Londres que vu la cessation des pourparlers directs entre Petersbourg et
+Vienne il etait necessaire que le Cabinet de Londres renouvelat le plus
+tot possible sous telle ou autre forme sa proposition concernant la
+mediation des Puissances. Avant moi Viviani a recu aujourd'hui
+l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne qui lui a renouvele l'assurance des tendances
+pacifiques de l'Allemagne. Viviani ayant fait observer que si
+l'Allemagne desirait la paix elle devrait se hater d'adherer a la
+proposition de mediation anglaise, le Baron Schoen a repondu que les
+mots "conference" ou "arbitrage" effrayaient l'Autriche. Viviani a
+replique qu'il ne s'agissait pas de mots et qu'il serait facile de
+trouver une autre forme de mediation. D'apres l'avis du Baron de Schoen,
+pour le succes des negociations entre les Puissances il serait
+necessaire de savoir ce que l'Autriche compterait demander a la Serbie.
+Viviani a repondu que le Cabinet de Berlin pourrait bien facilement s'en
+enquerir aupres de l'Autriche, mais qu'en attendant la note responsive
+serbe pourrait servir de base a la discussion; il a ajoute que la France
+desirait sincerement la paix, mais qu'elle etait en meme temps resolue
+d'agir en pleine harmonie avec ses allies et amis, et que lui, le Baron
+de Schoen, avait pu se convaincre que cette resolution rencontrait la
+plus vive approbation du pays.
+
+(Signe) Iswolsky.
+
+
+No. 56.
+
+Telegramme de son Altesse Royale le Prince Alexandre de Serbie a sa
+Majeste l'Empereur.
+
+Profondement touche par le telegramme que Votre Majeste a bien voulu
+M'adresser hier, Je M'empresse de La remercier de tout mon coeur. Je
+prie Votre Majeste d'etre persuadee que la cordiale sympathie, dont
+Votre Majeste est animee envers Mon pays, nous est particulierement
+precieuse et remplit notre ame de l'espoir que l'avenir de la Serbie est
+assure etant devenu l'objet de la Haute sollicitude de Votre Majeste.
+Ces moments penibles ne peuvent que raffermir les liens de l'attachement
+profond qui unissent la Serbie a la sainte Russie slave, et les
+sentiments de reconnaissance eternelle pour l'aide et la protection de
+Votre Majeste seront conserves pieusement dans l'ame de tous les Serbes.
+
+(Signe) Alexandre,
+
+
+No. 57.
+
+Le Charge d'Affaires en Serbie au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres.
+
+_(Telegramme)._ Nich, le 16/29 Juillet 1914.
+
+J'ai communique a Pachitch le texte du telegramme responsif de Sa
+Majeste l'Empereur an Prince Alexandre. Pachitch apres l'avoir lu, se
+signa et dit: "Seigneur! Le Tzar est grand et clement"! Ensuite il
+m'embrassa, ne pouvant contenir l'emotion qui l'avait gagne. L'heritier
+est attendu a Nich dans la nuit.
+
+(Signe) Strandtman.
+
+
+No. 58.
+
+Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres a l'Ambassadeur en France.
+
+_(Telegramme)._ St. Petersbourg, le 10/29 Juillet 1914.
+
+Aujourd'hui l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne m'a communique la resolution prise
+par son gouvernement de mobiliser, si la Russie ne cessait pas ses
+preparatifs militaires. Or, nous n'avons commence ces derniers qu'a la
+suite de la mobilisation a laquelle avait deja procede l'Autriche et vu
+l'absence evidente chez cette derniere du desir d'accepter un mode
+quelconque d'une solution pacifique de son conflit avec la Serbie.
+
+Puisque nous ne pouvons pas acceder au desir de l'Allemagne, il ne nous
+reste que d'accelerer nos propres armements et de compter avec
+l'inevitabilite probable de la guerre.--Veuillez en avertir le
+Gouvernement Francais et lui exprimer en meme temps notre sincere
+reconnaissance pour la declaration que l'Ambassadeur de France m'a faite
+en son nom en disant que nous pouvons compter entierement sur l'appui de
+notre alliee de France. Dans les circonstances actuelles cette
+declaration nous est particulierement precieuse. Communique aux
+Ambassadeurs en Angleterre, Autriche-Hongrie, Italie, Allemagne.
+
+(Signe) Sazonow.
+
+
+No. 59.
+
+Le Charge d'Affaires en Serbie au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres.
+
+_(Telegramme)._ Nich, le 17/30 Juillet 1914.
+
+Le Prince-Regent a publie hier un manifeste signe par tous les Ministres
+a l'occasion de la declaration de la guerre par l'Autriche a la Serbie.
+Le manifeste se termine par les paroles suivantes: "Defendez de toutes
+vos forces vos foyers et la Serbie". Lors de l'ouverture solennelle de
+la Scouptchina, le Regent lut en son nom le discours du trone, an debut
+duquel il indiqua que le lieu de la convocation demontrait l'importance
+des evenements actuels. Suit l'expose des faits des derniers
+jours--l'ultimatum autrichien, la reponse serbe, les efforts du
+gouvernement Royal de faire tout ce qui etait compatible avec la dignite
+de l'Etat pour eviter la guerre et enfin l'agression armee du voisin
+plus puissant contre la Serbie, aux cotes de laquelle se tient le
+Montenegro. En passant a l'examen de l'attitude des Puissances en
+presence du conflit, le Prince insista tout d'abord sur les sentiments
+dont est animee la Russie et sur la Toute Gracieuse Communication de sa
+Majeste l'Empereur disant que la Russie en aucun cas n'abandonnera la
+Serbie. A chaque mention du nom de Sa Majeste Imperiale et de la Russie
+un "jivio" formidable et febrile secouait la salle des seances. Les
+marques de sympathie de la part de la France et de l'Angleterre furent
+aussi relevees separement et provoquerent des "jivio" d'approbation de
+la part des deputes. Le discours du trone se termine par la declaration
+d'ouverture de la Scouptchina et par l'expression du voeu que toutes les
+mesures soient prises pour faciliter la tache du Gouvernement.
+
+(Signe) Strandtman.
+
+
+No. 60.
+
+Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres aux Ambassadeurs en Allemagne, en
+Autriche-Hongrie, en France, en Angleterre, et en Italie.
+
+_(Telegramme)._ St. Petersbourg, le 17/30 Juillet 1914.
+
+L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne qui vient de me quitter m'a demande si nous ne
+pouvions pas nous contenter de la promesse que l'Autriche pourrait
+donner--de ne pas porter atteinte a l'integrite du Royaume de Serbie--et
+indiquer a quelles conditions nous pourrions encore consentir a
+suspendre nos armements; je lui ai dicte, pour etre transmise d'urgence
+a Berlin, la declaration suivante: "Si l'Autriche, reconnaissant que la
+question austro-serbe a assume le caractere d'une question europeenne,
+se declare prete a eliminer de son ultimatum les points qui portent
+atteinte aux droits souverains de la Serbie, la Russie s'engage a cesser
+ses preparatifs militaires."
+
+Veuillez telegraphier d'urgence quelle sera l'attitude du Gouvernement
+Allemand en presence de cette nouvelle preuve de notre desir de faire le
+possible pour la solution pacifique de la question, car nous ne pouvons
+pas admettre que de semblables pourparlers ne servent qu'a faire gagner
+du temps a l'Allemagne et a l'Autriche pour leurs preparatifs
+militaires.
+
+(Signe) Sazonow.
+
+
+No. 61.
+
+L'Ambassadeur en Allemagne au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres.
+
+_(Telegramme)._ Berlin, le 17/30 Juillet 1914.
+
+J'apprends que le decret de mobilisation de l'armee et de la flotte
+allemandes vient d'etre promulgue.
+
+(Signe) Swerbeew.
+
+
+No. 62.
+
+L'Ambassadeur en Allemagne au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres.
+
+_(Telegramme)._ Berlin, le 17/30 Juillet 1914.
+
+Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres vient de me telephoner pour me
+communiquer que la nouvelle lancee tout a l'heure de la mobilisation de
+l'armee et de la flotte allemandes est fausse; que les feuillets des
+journaux etaient imprimes d'avance en prevision de toutes eventualites,
+et mis en vente a l'heure de l'apres-midi, mais que maintenant ils sont
+confisques,
+
+(Signe) Swerbeew.
+
+
+No. 63.
+
+L'Ambassadeur en Allemagne au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres.
+
+_(Telegramme)._ Berlin, le 17/30 Juillet 1914.
+
+Ai recu Votre telegramme du 16-29 Juillet et ai transmis le texte de
+Votre proposition au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres que je viens de
+voir; il m'a dit qu'il avait recu un telegramme identique de
+l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a St.-Petersbourg et m'a declare ensuite qu'il
+trouvait notre proposition inacceptable pour l'Autriche.
+
+(Signe) Swerbeew.
+
+
+No. 64.
+
+L'Ambassadeur en Angleterre au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres.
+
+_(Telegramme)._ Londres, le 17/30 Juillet 1914.
+
+Ai communique le contenu de Vos telegrammes du 16 et 17 Juillet a Grey
+lequel considere la situation comme tres serieuse, mais desire continuer
+les pourparlers. J'ai fait observer a Grey que depuis que Vous lui aviez
+fait la proposition d'accepter tout ce qu'il proposerait en faveur du
+maintien de la paix, pourvu que l'Autriche ne put profiter de ces
+atermoiements pour ecraser la Serbie, la situation dans laquelle Vous
+vous trouviez s'etait apparemment modifiee. A cette epoque nos rapports
+avec l'Allemagne n'etaient pas compromis. Apres la declaration de
+l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a St.-Petersbourg concernant la mobilisation
+allemande, ces rapports avaient change et sa demande avait recu de Votre
+part la seule reponse que pouvait donner une grande Puissance. Lorsque
+l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne etait revenu aupres de Vous et s'etait enquis
+de Vos conditions, Vous les aviez formulees dans des circonstances
+tout-a-fait speciales. J'ai en meme temps de nouveau insiste aupres de
+Grey sur la necessite de prendre en consideration la situation nouvelle
+creee par la faute de l'Allemagne a la suite de l'action de
+l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne. Grey a repondu qu'il le comprenait et qu'il
+tiendrait compte de ces arguments.
+
+(Signe) Benckendorff.
+
+
+No. 65.
+
+L'Ambassadeur en Angleterre au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres.
+
+_(Telegramme)._ Londres, le 17/30 Juillet 1914.
+
+L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a demande a Grey pour quelle raison
+l'Angleterre prenait des mesures militaires sur terre et sur mer. Grey a
+repondu que ces mesures n'avaient pas un caractere agressif, mais que la
+situation etait telle que chaque Puissance devait se preparer.
+
+(Signe) Benckendorff.
+
+
+No. 66.
+
+L'Ambassadeur en Autriche-Hongrie au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres.
+
+_(Telegramme)._ Vienne, le 18/31 Juillet 1914.
+
+Malgre la mobilisation generale je continue a echanger des vues avec le
+Comte Berchtold et ses collaborateurs. Tous insistent sur l'absence chez
+l'Autriche d'intentions agressives quelconques contre la Russie et de
+visees de conquete a l'egard de la Serbie, mais tous insistent egalement
+sur la necessite pour l'Autriche de poursuivre jusqu'an bout l'action
+commencee et de donner a la Serbie une lecon serieuse qui pourrait
+constituer une certaine garantie pour l'avenir.
+
+(Signe) Schebeko.
+
+
+No. 67.
+
+Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres aux Ambassadeurs en Allemagne,
+Autriche-Hongrie, en France, en Angleterre et en Italie.[197]
+
+_(Telegramme)._ St. Petersbourg, le 18/31 Juillet 1914.
+
+Me refere a mon telegramme du 17/30 Juillet. D'ordre de son
+gouvernement, l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre m'a transmis le desir du
+Cabinet de Londres d'introduire quelques modifications dans la formule
+que j'ai proposee hier a l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne. J'ai repondu que
+j'acceptais la proposition anglaise. Ci-dessous je vous transmets la
+formule modifiee en consequence.
+
+'Si l'Autriche consent a arreter la marche de ses armees sur le
+territoire Serbe et si, reconnaissant que le conflit austro-serbe a
+assume le caractere d'une question d'interet europeen, elle admet que
+les Grandes Puissances examinent la satisfaction que la Serbie pourrait
+accorder au gouvernement d'Autriche-Hongrie sans laisser porter atteinte
+a ses droits d'Etat souverain et a son independance,--la Russie s'engage
+a conserver son attitude expectante.'
+
+(Signe) Sazonow.
+
+[Footnote 197: The second paragraph is printed in the British White Book
+(_Correspondence_ No. 132).]
+
+
+No. 68.
+
+L'Ambassadeur en Allemagne au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres.
+
+_(Telegramme)._ Berlin, le 18/31 Juillet 1914.
+
+Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres vient de me dire que nos
+pourparlers, qui etaient deja difficiles a la suite de la mobilisation
+contre l'Autriche, le deviennent encore davantage en presence des graves
+mesures militaires que nous prenons contre l'Allemagne; des nouvelles y
+relatives sont, d'apres lui, recues ici de tous les cotes et devront
+provoquer inevitablement des mesures analogues de la part de
+l'Allemagne. A cela j'ai repondu que, d'apres des renseignements surs
+dont je disposais et qui etaient confirmes par tous nos compatriotes
+arrivant a Berlin, la prise contre nous des mesures susdites se
+poursuivait egalement en Allemagne avec grande activite. Malgre cela, le
+Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres affirme qu'ici on n'a fait que rappeler
+les officiers de leurs conges et les troupes des champs de manoeuvres.
+
+(Signe) Swerbeew.
+
+
+No. 69.
+
+Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres a l'Ambassadeur en Angleterre.
+
+_(Telegramme)._ St.-Petersbourg, le 18/31 Juillet 1914.
+
+J'ai prie l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre de transmettre a Grey l'expression
+de ma plus sincere reconnaissance pour le ton amical et ferme dont il a
+use pendant les pourparlers avec l'Allemagne et l'Autriche, grace a quoi
+l'espoir de trouver une issue pacifique de la situation actuelle n'est
+pas encore perdu.
+
+Je l'ai aussi prie de dire au Ministre Anglais que je pensais que ce
+n'etait qu'a Londres que les pourparlers auraient encore quelques
+chances d'un succes quelconque, en facilitant a l'Autriche la necessite
+d'un compromis.
+
+Communique a l'Ambassadeur en France.
+
+(Signe) Sazonow.
+
+
+No. 70.
+
+Telegramme secret aux Representants de Sa Majeste l'Empereur a
+l'etranger.
+
+(_Telegramme_). Le 19 Juillet/1 Aout 1914.
+
+A minuit l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne m'a declare, d'ordre de son
+Gouvernement, que si dans les 12 heures, c'est-a-dire a midi, Samedi,
+nous ne commencions pas la demobilisation, non seulement a l'egard de
+l'Allemagne, mais aussi a l'egard de l'Autriche, le Gouvernement
+Allemand serait force de donner l'ordre de mobilisation. A ma question
+si c'etait la guerre, l'Ambassadeur a repondu par la negative, mais en
+ajoutant que nous etions fort pres d'elle.
+
+(Signe) Sazonow.
+
+
+No. 71.
+
+L'Ambassadeur en Angleterre au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres.
+
+_(Telegramme)._ Londres, 19 Juillet/1 Aout 1914.
+
+Grey m'a dit qu'il a telegraphie a Berlin qu'a son avis la derniere
+formule acceptee par le Gouvernement Russe constitue la base de
+negociations qui presente le plus de chances pour une solution pacifique
+du conflict. Il a exprime en meme temps l'espoir qu'aucune grande
+Puissance ne commencerait les hostilites avant l'examen de cette
+formule.
+
+(Signe) Benckendorff.
+
+
+No. 72.
+
+L'Ambassadeur eu Angleterre au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres.
+
+(_Telegramme_). Londres, le 19 Juillet/1 Aout 1914.
+
+Le Gouvernement de la Grande-Bretagne a pose aux Gouvernements Francais
+et Allemand la question s'ils respecteraient la neutralite de la
+Belgique.
+
+La France a repondu dans I'affirmative, tandis que le Gouvernement
+Allemand a declare ne pouvoir repondre a cette question categoriquement.
+
+(Signe) Benckendorff.
+
+
+No. 73.
+
+L'Ambassadeur en France au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres.
+
+_(Telegramme)._ Paris, le 19 Juillet/1 Aout 1914.
+
+L'Ambassadeur d'Autriche a visite hier Viviani et lui a declare que
+l'Autriche non seulement n'avait pas le dessein de porter atteinte a
+l'integrite territoriale de la Serbie, mais etait prete a discuter avec
+les autres Puissances le fond de son conflit avec la Serbie. Le
+Gouvernement Francais est tres preoccupe par les preparatifs militaires
+extraordinaires de l'Allemagne sur la frontiere francaise, car il est
+convaincu que sous le voile du "Kriegszustand" se produit une veritable
+mobilisation.
+
+(Signe) Iswolsky.
+
+
+No. 74.
+
+L'Ambassadeur en France au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres.
+
+_(Telegramme)._ Paris, le 19 Juillet/1 Aout 1914.
+
+A la reception ici du telegramme de l'Ambassadeur de France a
+St.-Petersbourg contenant la communication que Vous a faite
+l'Ambassadeur Allemand concernant la resolution de l'Allemagne de
+decreter aujourd'hui la mobilisation generale, le President de la
+Republique a signe le decret de mobilisation. Dans les rues on procede a
+l'affichage des listes d'appel des reservistes. L'Ambassadeur
+d'Allemagne vient de rendre visite a Viviani, mais ne lui a fait aucune
+nouvelle communication, en alleguant l'impossibilite de dechiffrer les
+telegrammes qu'il a recus. Viviani l'a informe de la signature du decret
+de mobilisation en reponse a la mobilisation allemande et lui a fait
+part de son etonnement de ce que l'Allemagne eut pris une telle mesure a
+un moment ou se poursuivait encore un echange de vues amical entre la
+Russie, l'Autriche et les Puissances; il a ajoute que la mobilisation ne
+prejugeait pas necessairement la guerre et que l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne
+pourrait rester a Paris comme l'Ambassadeur de Russie est reste a Vienne
+et celui d'Autriche a St.-Petersbourg.
+
+(Signe) Iswolsky.
+
+
+No. 75.
+
+L'Ambassadeur en France au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres.
+
+_(Telegramme)._ Paris, le 19 Juillet/1 Aout 1914.
+
+Je tiens du President que pendant les dernieres journees l'Ambassadeur
+d'Autriche a assure avec force le President du Conseil des Ministres et
+lui meme, que l'Autriche nous aurait declare etre prete a respecter non
+seulement l'integrite territoriale de la Serbie, mais aussi ses droits
+souverains, mais que nous aurions intentionnellement fait le silence sur
+cette declaration. J'ai oppose un dementi categorique a cela.
+
+(Signe) Iswolsky.
+
+
+No. 76.
+
+Note remise par l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a St.-Petersbourg le 19
+Juillet 1914 a 7 h. 10 du soir.
+
+Le Gouvernement Imperial s'est efforce des les debuts de la crise de la
+mener a une solution pacifique. Se rendant a un desir qui lui en avait
+ete exprime par Sa Majeste l'Empereur de Russie, Sa Majeste l'Empereur
+d'Allemagne d'accord avec l'Angleterre s'etait applique a accomplir un
+role mediateur aupres des Cabinets de Vienne et de St.-Petersbourg,
+lorsque la Russie, sans en attendre le resultat, proceda a la
+mobilisation de la totalite de ses forces de terre et de mer. A la suite
+de cette mesure menacante motivee par aucun presage militaire de la part
+de l'Allemagne, l'Empire Allemand s'est trouve vis-a-vis d'un danger
+grave et imminent. Si le Gouvernement Imperial eut manque de parer a ce
+peril, il aurait compromis la securite et l'existence meme de
+l'Allemagne. Par consequent le Gouvernement Allemand se vit force de
+s'adresser au Gouvernement de Sa Majeste l'Empereur de Toutes les
+Russies en insistant sur la cessation desdits actes militaires. La
+Russie ayant refuse de faire droit a (n'ayant pas cru devoir repondre
+a[198]) cette demande et ayant manifeste par ce refus (cette attitude
+[198]) que son action etait dirigee contre I'Allemagne, j'ai l'honneur,
+d'ordre de mon Gouvernement, de faire savoir a Votre Excellence ce qui
+suit:
+
+Sa Majeste l'Empereur Mon Auguste Souverain au nom de l'Empire, relevant
+le defi se considere en etat de guerre avec la Russie.
+
+St.-Petersbourg, le 19 Juillet/1 Aout 1914.
+
+(Signe) F. Pourtales.
+
+[Footnote 198: Les mots places entre parentheses se trouvent dans
+l'original. Il faut supposer que deux variantes avaient ete preparees
+d'avance et que par erreur elles out ete inserees toutes les deux dans
+la note.]
+
+
+No. 77.
+
+Communique du Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres concernant les evenements
+des derniers jours.
+
+Le 20 Juillet/2 Aout 1914.
+
+Un expose defigurant les evenements des derniers jours ayant paru dans
+la presse etrangere, le Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres croit de son
+devoir de publier l'apercu suivant des pourparlers diplomatiques pendant
+le temps susvise.
+
+Le 10/23 Juillet a.c. le Ministre d'Autriche-Hongrie a Belgrade presenta
+an Ministre President Serbe une note ou le Gouvernement Serbe etait
+accuse d'avoir favorise le mouvement panserbe qui avait abouti a
+l'assassinat de l'heritier du trone austro-hongrois. En consequence
+l'Autriche-Hongrie demandait au Gouvernement Serbe non seulement de
+condamner sous une forme solennelle la susdite propagande, mais aussi de
+prendre, sous le controle de l'Autriche-Hongrie, une serie de mesures
+tendant a la decouverte du complot, a la punition des sujets serbes y
+ayant participe et a la prevention dans l'avenir de tout attentat sur le
+sol du Royaume. Un delai de 48 heures fut fixe au Gouvernement Serbe
+pour la reponse a la susdite note.
+
+Le Gouvernement Imperial, auquel l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie a
+St.-Petersbourg avait communique le texte de la note 17 heures apres sa
+remise a Belgrade, ayant pris connaissance des demandes y contenues, dut
+s'apercevoir que quelques-unes parmi elles etaient inexecutables quant
+an fond, tandis que d'autres etaient presentees sous une forme
+incompatible avec la dignite d'un Etat independant. Trouvant
+inadmissibles la diminution de la dignite de la Serbie contenue dans ces
+demandes, ainsi que la tendance de l'Autriche-Hongrie d'assurer sa
+preponderance dans les Balcans demontree par ces memes exigences, le
+Gouvernement Russe fit observer dans la forme la plus amicale a
+l'Autriche-Hongrie qu'il serait desirable de soumettre a un nouvel
+examen les points contenus dans la note austro-hongroise. Le
+Gouvernement Austro-Hongrois ne crut possible de consentir a une
+discussion de la note. L'action moderatrice des autres Puissances a
+Vienne ne fut non plus couronnee de succes.
+
+Malgre que la Serbie eut reprouve le crime et se fut montree prete a
+donner satisfaction a l'Autriche dans une mesure qui depassa les
+previsions non seulement de la Russie, mais aussi des autres Puissances,
+le Ministre d'Autriche-Hongrie a Belgrade jugea la reponse serbe
+insuffisante et quitta cette ville.
+
+Reconnaissant le caractere exagere des demandes presentees par
+l'Autriche, la Russie avait declare encore auparavant qu'il lui serait
+impossible de rester indifferente, sans se refuser toutefois a employer
+tous ses efforts pour trouver une issue pacifique qui fut acceptable
+pour l'Autriche et menageat son amour-propre de grande puissance. En
+meme temps la Russie etablit fermement qu'elle admettait une solution
+pacifique de la question seulement dans une mesure qui n'impliquerait
+pas la diminution de la dignite de la Serbie comme Etat independant.
+Malheureusement tous les efforts deployes par le Gouvernement Imperial
+dans cette direction resterent sans effet. Le Gouvernement
+Austro-Hongrois, apres s'etre derobe a toute intervention conciliatrice
+des Puissances dans son conflit avec la Serbie, proceda a la
+mobilisation, declara officiellement la guerre a la Serbie, et le jour
+suivant Belgrade fut bombardee. Le manifeste qui a accompagne la
+declaration de guerre accuse ouvertement la Serbie d'avoir prepare et
+execute le crime de Seraiewo. Une pareille accusation d'un crime de
+droit commun lancee contre tout un peuple et tout un Etat attira a la
+Serbie par son inanite evidente les larges sympathies des cercles de la
+societe europeenne.
+
+A la suite de cette maniere d'agir du Gouvernement Austro-Hongrois,
+malgre la declaration de la Russie qu'elle ne pourrait rester
+indifferente au sort de la Serbie, le Gouvernement Imperial jugea
+necessaire d'ordonner la mobilisation des circonscriptions militaires de
+Kiew, d'Odessa, de Moscou et de Kazan. Une telle decision s'imposait
+parce que depuis la date de la remise de la note austro-hongroise au
+Gouvernement Serbe et les premieres demarches de la Russie cinq jours
+s'etaient ecoules, et cependant le Cabinet de Vienne n'avait fait aucun
+pas pour aller au-devant de nos efforts pacifiques; au contraire, la
+mobilisation de la moitie de l'armee austro-hongroise avait ete
+decretee.
+
+Le Gouvernement Allemand fut mis au courant des mesures prises par la
+Russie; il lui fut en meme temps explique qu'elles n'etaient que la
+consequence des armements autrichiens et nullement dirigees contre
+l'Allemagne. En meme temps, le Gouvernement Imperial declara que la
+Russie etait prete a continuer les pourparlers en vue d'une solution
+pacifique du conflit, soit par la voie de negociations directes avec le
+Cabinet de Vienne, soit en suivant la proposition de la Grande-Bretagne,
+par la voie d'une Conference des quatre Grandes Puissances non
+interessees directement, voire l'Angleterre, la France, l'Allemagne et
+l'Italie.
+
+Cependant cette tentative de la Russie echoua egalement.
+L'Autriche-Hongrie declina un echange de vues ulterieur avec nous, et le
+Cabinet de Vienne se deroba a la participation a la Conference des
+Puissances projetee.
+
+Neanmoins, la Russie ne discontinua pas ses efforts en faveur de la
+paix. Repondant a la question de l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne, a quelles
+conditions nous consentirions encore a suspendre nos armements, le
+Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres declara que ces conditions seraient la
+reconnaissance par l'Autriche-Hongrie que la question Austro-Serbe avait
+revetu le caractere d'une question europeenne, et la declaration de
+cette meme Puissance qu'elle consentait a ne pas insister sur des
+demandes incompatibles avec les droits souverains de la Serbie.
+
+La proposition de la Russie fut jugee par l'Allemagne inacceptable pour
+l'Autriche-Hongrie. Simultanement on recut a St.-Petersbourg la nouvelle
+de la proclamation de la mobilisation generale par l'Autriche-Hongrie.
+
+En meme temps les hostilites continuaient sur le territoire Serbe et
+Belgrade fut bombardee derechef.
+
+L'insucces de nos propositions pacifiques nous obligea d'elargir les
+mesures de precaution militaires.
+
+Le Cabinet de Berlin nous ayant adresse une question a ce sujet, il lui
+fut repondu que la Russie etait forcee de commencer ses armements pour
+se premunir contre toutes eventualites.
+
+Tout en prenant cette mesure de precaution, la Russie n'en discontinuait
+pas moins de rechercher de toutes ses forces une issue de cette
+situation et declara etre prete a accepter tout moyen de solution du
+conflit qui comporterait l'observation des conditions posees par nous.
+
+Malgre cette communication conciliante, le Gouvernement Allemand, le
+18/31 Juillet, adressa au Gouvernement Russe la demande d'avoir a
+suspendre ses mesures militaires a midi du 19 Juillet/ 1 Aout, en
+menacant, dans le cas contraire, de proceder a une mobilisation
+generale.
+
+Le lendemain, 19 Juillet/1 Aout, l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne transmit au
+Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres, an nom de son Gouvernement, la
+declaration de guerre.
+
+
+No. 78.
+
+Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres aux Representants de S. M.
+I'Empereur a l'etranger.
+
+(_Telegramme_). St.-Petersbourg, le 20 Juillet/2 Aout 1914.
+
+Il est absolument clair que l'Allemagne s'efforce des a present de
+rejeter sur nous la responsabilite de la rupture. Notre mobilisation a
+ete provoquee par l'enorme responsabilite que nous aurions assumee, si
+nous n'avions pas pris toutes les mesures de precaution a un moment ou
+l'Autriche, se bornant a des pourparlers d'un caractere dilatoire,
+bombardait Belgrade et procedait a une mobilisation generale.
+
+Sa Majeste l'Empereur s'etait engage vis-a-vis de l'Empereur d'Allemagne
+par sa parole a n'entreprendre aucun acte agressif tant que dureraient
+les pourparlers avec l'Autriche. Apres une telle garantie et apres
+toutes les preuves de l'amour de la Russie pour la paix, l'Allemagne ne
+pouvait ni avait le droit de douter de notre declaration que nous
+accepterions avec joie toute issue pacifique compatible avec la dignite
+et l'independance de la Serbie. Une autre issue, tout en etant
+completement incompatible avec notre propre dignite, aurait certainement
+ebranle l'equilibre Europeen assurant l'hegemonie de l'Allemagne. Ce
+caractere Europeen, voire mondial, du conflit est infiniment plus
+important que le pretexte qui l'a cree. Par sa decision de nous declarer
+la guerre a un moment ou se poursuivaient les negociations entre les
+Puissances, l'Allemagne a assume une lourde responsabilite.
+
+(Signe) Sazonow.
+
+
+No. 79.
+
+Note remise par l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie a St.-Petersbourg au
+Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres le 24 Juillet a 6 h. du soir.
+
+D'ordre de son Gouvernement le soussigne Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie
+a l'honneur de notifier a Son Excellence Monsieur le Ministre des
+Affaires Etrangeres de Russie ce qui suit:
+
+"Vu l'attitude menacante prise par la Russie dans le conflit entre la
+Monarchie Austro-Hongroise et la Serbie et en presence du fait qu'en
+suite de ce conflit la Russie, d'apres une communication du Cabinet de
+Berlin, a cru devoir ouvrir les hostilites contre l'Allemagne et que
+celle-ci se trouve par consequent en etat de guerre avec ladite
+Puissance, l'Autriche-Hongrie se considere egalement en etat de guerre
+avec la Russie a partir du present moment.
+
+"(Signe) Szapary. St.-Petersbourg. 6 Aout/24 Juillet 1914."
+
+
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