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diff --git a/1016-0.txt b/1016-0.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e3574ce --- /dev/null +++ b/1016-0.txt @@ -0,0 +1,1774 @@ +*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 1016 *** + +On the Improvement of the Understanding + +(Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect) + + +by + +Baruch Spinoza + +[Benedict de Spinoza] + + +Translated by R. H. M. Elwes + + + + +TABLE OF CONTENTS: + + + 1 On the Improvement of the Understanding + 3 Of the ordinary objects of men's desires + 12 Of the true and final good + 17 Certain rules of life + 19 Of the four modes of perception + 25 Of the best mode of perception + 33 Of the instruments of the intellect, or true ideas + 43 Answers to objections + + +First part of method: + + 50 Distinction of true ideas from fictitious ideas + 64 And from false ideas + 77 Of doubt + 81 Of memory and forgetfulness + 86 Mental hindrances from words--and from the popular confusion + of ready imagination with distinct understanding. + + +Second part of method: + + 91 Its object, the acquisition of clear and distinct ideas + 94 Its means, good definitions + Conditions of definition + 107 How to define understanding + + +---------------------------------------------------------------------- + +[Notice to the Reader.] + +(This notice to the reader was written by the editors of the +Opera Postuma in 1677. Taken from Curley, Note 3, at end) + + +*This Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect etc., which we +give you here, kind reader, in its unfinished [that is, defective] +state, was written by the author many years ago now. He always +intended to finish it. But hindered by other occupations, and +finally snatched away by death, he was unable to bring it to the +desired conclusion. But since it contains many excellent and useful +things, which--we have no doubt--will be of great benefit to +anyone sincerely seeking the truth, we did not wish to deprive you +of them. And so that you would be aware of, and find less difficult +to excuse, the many things that are still obscure, rough, and +unpolished, we wished to warn you of them. Farewell.* + + + + + +[1] (1) After experience had taught me that all the usual +surroundings of social life are vain and futile; seeing that none +of the objects of my fears contained in themselves anything either +good or bad, except in so far as the mind is affected by them, +I finally resolved to inquire whether there might be some real +good having power to communicate itself, which would affect the +mind singly, to the exclusion of all else: whether, in fact, there +might be anything of which the discovery and attainment would +enable me to enjoy continuous, supreme, and unending happiness. + +[2] (1) I say "I finally resolved," for at first sight it seemed +unwise willingly to lose hold on what was sure for the sake of +something then uncertain. (2) I could see the benefits which are +acquired through fame and riches, and that I should be obliged to +abandon the quest of such objects, if I seriously devoted myself +to the search for something different and new. (3) I perceived +that if true happiness chanced to be placed in the former I should +necessarily miss it; while if, on the other hand, it were not so +placed, and I gave them my whole attention, I should equally fail. + +[3] (1) I therefore debated whether it would not be possible to +arrive at the new principle, or at any rate at a certainty +concerning its existence, without changing the conduct and usual +plan of my life; with this end in view I made many efforts, +in vain. (2) For the ordinary surroundings of life which are +esteemed by men (as their actions testify) to be the highest +good, may be classed under the three heads--Riches, Fame, and +the Pleasures of Sense: with these three the mind is so absorbed +that it has little power to reflect on any different good. + +[4] (1) By sensual pleasure the mind is enthralled to the extent +of quiescence, as if the supreme good were actually attained, so +that it is quite incapable of thinking of any other object; when +such pleasure has been gratified it is followed by extreme +melancholy, whereby the mind, though not enthralled, is disturbed +and dulled. (2) The pursuit of honors and riches is likewise very +absorbing, especially if such objects be sought simply for their +own sake, [a] inasmuch as they are then supposed to constitute the +highest good. + +[5] (1) In the case of fame the mind is still more absorbed, for fame +is conceived as always good for its own sake, and as the ultimate end +to which all actions are directed. (2) Further, the attainment of +riches and fame is not followed as in the case of sensual pleasures by +repentance, but, the more we acquire, the greater is our delight, and, +consequently, the more are we incited to increase both the one and the +other; on the other hand, if our hopes happen to be frustrated we are +plunged into the deepest sadness. (3) Fame has the further drawback +that it compels its votaries to order their lives according to the +opinions of their fellow-men, shunning what they usually shun, and +seeking what they usually seek. + +[6] (1) When I saw that all these ordinary objects of desire would +be obstacles in the way of a search for something different and new--nay, +that they were so opposed thereto, that either they or it would +have to be abandoned, I was forced to inquire which would prove the +most useful to me: for, as I say, I seemed to be willingly losing +hold on a sure good for the sake of something uncertain. (6:2) However, +after I had reflected on the matter, I came in the first place to the +conclusion that by abandoning the ordinary objects of pursuit, and +betaking myself to a new quest, I should be leaving a good, uncertain +by reason of its own nature, as may be gathered from what has been +said, for the sake of a good not uncertain in its nature (for I sought +for a fixed good), but only in the possibility of its attainment. + +[7] (1) Further reflection convinced me that if I could really get +to the root of the matter I should be leaving certain evils for a +certain good. (2) I thus perceived that I was in a state of great +peril, and I compelled myself to seek with all my strength for a +remedy, however uncertain it might be; as a sick man struggling with +a deadly disease, when he sees that death will surely be upon him +unless a remedy be found, is compelled to seek a remedy with all his +strength, inasmuch as his whole hope lies therein. (7:3) All the +objects pursued by the multitude not only bring no remedy that tends +to preserve our being, but even act as hindrances, causing the death +not seldom of those who possess them, [b] and always of those who +are possessed by them. + +[8] (1) There are many examples of men who have suffered persecution +even to death for the sake of their riches, and of men who in pursuit +of wealth have exposed themselves to so many dangers, that they have +paid away their life as a penalty for their folly. (2) Examples are +no less numerous of men, who have endured the utmost wretchedness for +the sake of gaining or preserving their reputation. (3) Lastly, +are innumerable cases of men, who have hastened their death through +over-indulgence in sensual pleasure. + +[9] (1) All these evils seem to have arisen from the fact, that +happiness or unhappiness is made wholly dependent on the quality of the +object which we love. (2) When a thing is not loved, no quarrels will +arise concerning it--no sadness will be felt if it perishes--no envy if +it is possessed by another--no fear, no hatred, in short no disturbances +of the mind. (3) All these arise from the love of what is perishable, +such as the objects already mentioned. + +[10] (1) But love towards a thing eternal and infinite feeds the +mind wholly with joy, and is itself unmingled with any sadness, +wherefore it is greatly to be desired and sought for with all our +strength. (2) Yet it was not at random that I used the words, +"If I could go to the root of the matter," for, though what I have +urged was perfectly clear to my mind, I could not forthwith lay +aside all love of riches, sensual enjoyment, and fame. + +[11] (1) One thing was evident, namely, that while my mind was +employed with these thoughts it turned away from its former objects +of desire, and seriously considered the search for a new principle; +this state of things was a great comfort to me, for I perceived +that the evils were not such as to resist all remedies. (11:2) Although +these intervals were at first rare, and of very short duration, yet +afterwards, as the true good became more and more discernible to me, +they became more frequent and more lasting; especially after I had +recognized that the acquisition of wealth, sensual pleasure, or fame, +is only a hindrance, so long as they are sought as ends not as means; +if they be sought as means, they will be under restraint, and, far +from being hindrances, will further not a little the end for which +they are sought, as I will show in due time. + +[12] (1) I will here only briefly state what I mean by true good, +and also what is the nature of the highest good. (2) In order that +this may be rightly understood, we must bear in mind that the terms +good and evil are only applied relatively, so that the same thing +may be called both good and bad according to the relations in view, +in the same way as it may be called perfect or imperfect. +(3) Nothing regarded in its own nature can be called perfect or +imperfect; especially when we are aware that all things which come +to pass, come to pass according to the eternal order and fixed +laws of nature. + +[13] (1) However, human weakness cannot attain to this order in its +own thoughts, but meanwhile man conceives a human character much more +stable than his own, and sees that there is no reason why he should +not himself acquire such a character. (2) Thus he is led to seek +for means which will bring him to this pitch of perfection, and +calls everything which will serve as such means a true good. +(13:3) The chief good is that he should arrive, together with other +individuals if possible, at the possession of the aforesaid +character. (4) What that character is we shall show in due time, +namely, that it is the knowledge of the union existing being +the mind and the whole of nature. [c] + +[14] (1) This, then, is the end for which I strive, to attain to +such a character myself, and to endeavor that many should attain to +it with me. (2) In other words, it is part of my happiness to lend +a helping hand, that many others may understand even as I do, so +that their understanding and desire may entirely agree with my own. +(3) In order to bring this about, it is necessary to understand as +much of nature as will enable us to attain to the aforesaid character, +and also to form a social order such as is most conducive to the +attainment of this character by the greatest number with the least +difficulty and danger. + +[15] (1) We must seek the assistance of Moral Philosophy [d] and +the Theory of Education; further, as health is no insignificant means +for attaining our end, we must also include the whole science of +Medicine, and, as many difficult things are by contrivance rendered +easy, and we can in this way gain much time and convenience, the +science of Mechanics must in no way be despised. + +[16] (1) But before all things, a means must be devised for +improving the understanding and purifying it, as far as may be at +the outset, so that it may apprehend things without error, and in +the best possible way. (2) Thus it is apparent to everyone that I +wish to direct all science to one end [e] and aim, so that we may +attain to the supreme human perfection which we have named; and, +therefore, whatsoever in the sciences does not serve to promote +our object will have to be rejected as useless. (3) To sum up the +matter in a word, all our actions and thoughts must be directed to +this one end. + +[17] (1) Yet, as it is necessary that while we are endeavoring to +attain our purpose, and bring the understanding into the right path +we should carry on our life, we are compelled first of all to lay +down certain rules of life as provisionally good, to wit the +following:-- + +I. (2) To speak in a manner intelligible to the multitude, and to + comply with every general custom that does not hinder the + attainment of our purpose. (3) For we can gain from the multitude + no small advantages, provided that we strive to accommodate + ourselves to its understanding as far as possible: moreover, + we shall in this way gain a friendly audience for the reception + of the truth. + +II. (17:4) To indulge ourselves with pleasures only in so far as they + are necessary for preserving health. + +III. (5) Lastly, to endeavor to obtain only sufficient money or other + commodities to enable us to preserve our life and health, and to + follow such general customs as are consistent with our purpose. + +[18] (1) Having laid down these preliminary rules, I will betake +myself to the first and most important task, namely, the amendment +of the understanding, and the rendering it capable of understanding +things in the manner necessary for attaining our end. (2) In order +to bring this about, the natural order demands that I should here +recapitulate all the modes of perception, which I have hitherto +employed for affirming or denying anything with certainty, so that +I may choose the best, and at the same time begin to know my own +powers and the nature which I wish to perfect. + +[19] (1) Reflection shows that all modes of perception or knowledge +may be reduced to four:-- + +I. (2) Perception arising from hearsay or from some sign which + everyone may name as he please. + +II. (3) Perception arising from mere experience--that is, form + experience not yet classified by the intellect, and only so called + because the given event has happened to take place, and we have no + contradictory fact to set against it, so that it therefore remains + unassailed in our minds. + +III. (19:4) Perception arising when the essence of one thing is inferred + from another thing, but not adequately; this comes when [f] from some + effect we gather its cause, or when it is inferred from some general + proposition that some property is always present. + +IV. (5) Lastly, there is the perception arising when a thing is + perceived solely through its essence, or through the knowledge + of its proximate cause. + +[20] (1) All these kinds of perception I will illustrate by examples. +(2) By hearsay I know the day of my birth, my parentage, and other +matters about which I have never felt any doubt. (3) By mere +experience I know that I shall die, for this I can affirm from +having seen that others like myself have died, though all did not +live for the same period, or die by the same disease. (4) I know +by mere experience that oil has the property of feeding fire, and +water of extinguishing it. (5) In the same way I know that a dog +is a barking animal, man a rational animal, and in fact nearly all +the practical knowledge of life. + +[21] (1) We deduce one thing from another as follows: when we +clearly perceive that we feel a certain body and no other, we +thence clearly infer that the mind is united [g] to the body, +and that their union is the cause of the given sensation; but +we cannot thence absolutely understand [h] the nature of the +sensation and the union. (2) Or, after I have become acquainted +with the nature of vision, and know that it has the property of +making one and the same thing appear smaller when far off than +when near, I can infer that the sun is larger than it appears, +and can draw other conclusions of the same kind. + +[22] (1) Lastly, a thing may be perceived solely through its essence; +when, from the fact of knowing something, I know what it is to know +that thing, or when, from knowing the essence of the mind, I know +that it is united to the body. (2) By the same kind of knowledge +we know that two and three make five, or that two lines each parallel +to a third, are parallel to one another, &c. (3) The things which I +have been able to know by this kind of knowledge are as yet very few. + +[23] (1) In order that the whole matter may be put in a clearer +light, I will make use of a single illustration as follows. +(2) Three numbers are given--it is required to find a fourth, +which shall be to the third as the second is to the first. +(23:3) Tradesmen will at once tell us that they know what is required +to find the fourth number, for they have not yet forgotten the rule +which was given to them arbitrarily without proof by their masters; +others construct a universal axiom from their experience with simple +numbers, where the fourth number is self-evident, as in the case of +2, 4, 3, 6; here it is evident that if the second number be +multiplied by the third, and the product divided by the first, +the quotient is 6; when they see that by this process the number +is produced which they knew beforehand to be the proportional, +they infer that the process always holds good for finding a fourth +number proportional. + +[24] (1) Mathematicians, however, know by the proof of the nineteenth +proposition of the seventh book of Euclid, what numbers are +proportionals, namely, from the nature and property of proportion +it follows that the product of the first and fourth will be equal +to the product of the second and third: still they do not see the +adequate proportionality of the given numbers, or, if they do see it, +they see it not by virtue of Euclid's proposition, but intuitively, +without going through any process. + +[25] (1) In order that from these modes of perception the best may +be selected, it is well that we should briefly enumerate the means +necessary for attaining our end. + +I. (2) To have an exact knowledge of our nature which we desire to + perfect, and to know as much as is needful of nature in general. + +II. To collect in this way the differences, the agreements, and the + oppositions of things. + +III. To learn thus exactly how far they can or cannot be modified. + +IV. To compare this result with the nature and power of man. + (4) We shall thus discern the highest degree of perfection + to which man is capable of attaining. + +[26] (1) We shall then be in a position to see which mode of +perception we ought to choose. (2) As to the first mode, it is +evident that from hearsay our knowledge must always be uncertain, +and, moreover, can give us no insight into the essence of a thing, +as is manifest in our illustration; now one can only arrive at +knowledge of a thing through knowledge of its essence, as will +hereafter appear. (3) We may, therefore clearly conclude that +the certainty arising from hearsay cannot be scientific in its +character. (4) For simple hearsay cannot affect anyone whose +understanding does not, so to speak, meet it half way. + +[27] (1) The second mode of perception [i] cannot be said to +give us the idea of the proportion of which we are in search. +(2) Moreover its results are very uncertain and indefinite, +for we shall never discover anything in natural phenomena by its +means, except accidental properties, which are never clearly +understood, unless the essence of the things in question be +known first. (3) Wherefore this mode also must be rejected. + +[28] (1) Of the third mode of perception we may say in a manner +that it gives us the idea of the thing sought, and that it +us to draw conclusions without risk of error; yet it is not by +itself sufficient to put us in possession of the perfection we +aim at. + +[29] (1) The fourth mode alone apprehends the adequate essence of +a thing without danger of error. (2) This mode, therefore, must be +the one which we chiefly employ. (3) How, then, should we avail +ourselves of it so as to gain the fourth kind of knowledge with +the least delay concerning things previously unknown? (4) I will +proceed to explain. + +[30] (1) Now that we know what kind of knowledge is necessary for +us, we must indicate the way and the method whereby we may gain +the said knowledge concerning the things needful to be known. +(2) In order to accomplish this, we must first take care not to +commit ourselves to a search, going back to infinity--that is, +in order to discover the best method of finding truth, there is +no need of another method to discover such method; nor of a third +method for discovering the second, and so on to infinity. (3) By +such proceedings, we should never arrive at the knowledge of the +truth, or, indeed, at any knowledge at all. (30:4) The matter stands +on the same footing as the making of material tools, which might +be argued about in a similar way. (5) For, in order to work iron, +a hammer is needed, and the hammer cannot be forthcoming unless +it has been made; but, in order to make it, there was need +of another hammer and other tools, and so on to infinity. +(6) We might thus vainly endeavor to prove that men have no +power of working iron. + +[31] (1) But as men at first made use of the instruments supplied +by nature to accomplish very easy pieces of workmanship, laboriously +and imperfectly, and then, when these were finished, wrought other +things more difficult with less labour and greater perfection; +and so gradually mounted from the simplest operations to the making +of tools, and from the making of tools to the making of more complex +tools, and fresh feats of workmanship, till they arrived at making, +complicated mechanisms which they now possess. (31:2) So, in like +manner, the intellect, by its native strength, [k], makes for itself +intellectual instruments, whereby it acquires strength for performing +other intellectual operations, [l], and from these operations +again fresh instruments, or the power of pushing its investigations +further, and thus gradually proceeds till it reaches the summit +of wisdom. + +[32] (1) That this is the path pursued by the understanding may be +readily seen, when we understand the nature of the method for +finding out the truth, and of the natural instruments so necessary +complex instruments, and for the progress of investigation. I thus +proceed with my demonstration. + +[33] (1) A true idea, [m], (for we possess a true idea) is something +different from its correlate (ideatum); thus a circle is different +from the idea of a circle. (2) The idea of a circle is not something +having a circumference and a center, as a circle has; nor is the idea +of a body that body itself. (3) Now, as it is something different +from its correlate, it is capable of being understood through itself; +in other words, the idea, in so far as its actual essence (essentia +formalis) is concerned, may be the subject of another subjective +essence (essentia objectiva). [33note1] (4) And, again, this second +subjective essence will, regarded in itself, be something real, +capable of being understood; and so on, indefinitely. + +[34] (1) For instance, the man Peter is something real; the true +idea of Peter is the reality of Peter represented subjectively, +and is in itself something real, and quite distinct from the +actual Peter. (2) Now, as this true idea of Peter is in itself +something real, and has its own individual existence, it will +also be capable of being understood--that is, of being the +subject of another idea, which will contain by representation +(objective) all that the idea of Peter contains actually +(formaliter). (3) And, again, this idea of the idea of Peter +has its own individuality, which may become the subject of yet +another idea; and so on, indefinitely. (4) This everyone may +make trial of for himself, by reflecting that he knows what +Peter is, and also knows that he knows, and further knows that +he knows that he knows, &c. (34:5) Hence it is plain that, in +order to understand the actual Peter, it is not necessary first +to understand the idea of Peter, and still less the idea of +the idea of Peter. (6) This is the same as saying that, in order +to know, there is no need to know that we know, much less to +know that we know that we know. (7) This is no more necessary +than to know the nature of a circle before knowing the nature of +a triangle. [n]. (8) But, with these ideas, the contrary is the +case: for, in order to know that I know, I must first know. + +[35] (1) Hence it is clear that certainty is nothing else than +the subjective essence of a thing: in other words, the mode in +which we perceive an actual reality is certainty. (2) Further, +it is also evident that, for the certitude of truth, no further +sign is necessary beyond the possession of a true idea: for, +as I have shown, it is not necessary to know that we know that +we know. (3) Hence, again, it is clear that no one can know +the nature of the highest certainty, unless he possesses an +adequate idea, or the subjective essence of a thing: +certainty is identical with such subjective essence. + +[36] (1) Thus, as the truth needs no sign--it being to possess +the subjective essence of things, or, in other words, the ideas +of them, in order that all doubts may be removed--it follows +that the true method does not consist in seeking for the signs +of truth after the acquisition of the idea, but that the true +method teaches us the order in which we should seek for truth +itself, [o] or the subjective essences of things, or ideas, +for all these expressions are synonymous. + +[37] (1) Again, method must necessarily be concerned with +reasoning or understanding--I mean, method is not identical +with reasoning in the search for causes, still less is it +the comprehension of the causes of things: it is the +discernment of a true idea, by distinguishing it from other +perceptions, and by investigating its nature, in order that +we may so train our mind that it may, by a given standard, +comprehend whatsoever is intelligible, by laying down +certain rules as aids, and by avoiding useless mental +exertion. + +[38] (1) Whence we may gather that method is nothing else +than reflective knowledge, or the idea of an idea; and that +as there can be no idea of an idea--unless an idea exists +previously,--there can be no method without a pre-existent +idea. (2) Therefore, that will be a good method which +shows us how the mind should be directed, according to the +standard of the given true idea. + +(38:3) Again, seeing that the ratio existing between two +ideas the same as the ratio between the actual realities +corresponding to those ideas, it follows that the reflective +knowledge which has for its object the most perfect being is +more excellent than reflective knowledge concerning other +objects--in other words, that method will be most perfect +which affords the standard of the given idea of the most +perfect being whereby we may direct our mind. + +[39] (1) We thus easily understand how, in proportion as it +acquires new ideas, the mind simultaneously acquires fresh +instruments for pursuing its inquiries further. (2) For we +may gather from what has been said, that a true idea must +necessarily first of all exist in us as a natural instrument; +and that when this idea is apprehended by the mind, it enables +us to understand the difference existing between itself and +all other perceptions. (3) In this, one part of the method +consists. + +(39:4) Now it is clear that the mind apprehends itself better +in proportion as it understands a greater number of natural +objects; it follows, therefore, that this portion of the method +will be more perfect in proportion as the mind attains to the +comprehension of a greater number of objects, and that it will +be absolutely perfect when the mind gains a knowledge of the +absolutely perfect being, or becomes conscious thereof. + +[40] (1) Again, the more things the mind knows, the better does +it understand its own strength and the order of nature; by +increased self-knowledge, it can direct itself more easily, and +lay down rules for its own guidance; and, by increased knowledge +of nature, it can more easily avoid what is useless. (2) And +this is the sum total of method, as we have already stated. + +[41] (1) We may add that the idea in the world of thought is in +the same case as its correlate in the world of reality. (2) If, +therefore, there be anything in nature which is without connection +with any other thing, and if we assign to it a subjective essence, +which would in every way correspond to the objective reality, +the subjective essence would have no connection, [p] with any +other ideas--in other words, we could not draw any conclusions +with regard to it. (41:3) On the other hand, those things which are +connected with others--as all things that exist in nature--will +be understood by the mind, and their subjective essences will +maintain the same mutual relations as their objective realities--that +is to say, we shall infer from these ideas other ideas, which +will in turn be connected with others, and thus our instruments +for proceeding with our investigation will increase. (4) This is +what we were endeavoring to prove. + +[42] (1) Further, from what has just been said--namely, that an +idea must, in all respects, correspond to its correlate in the +world of reality,--it is evident that, in order to reproduce in +every respect the faithful image of nature, our mind must deduce +all its ideas from the idea which represents the origin and source +of the whole of nature, so that it may itself become the source +of other ideas. + +[43] (1) It may, perhaps, provoke astonishment that, after having +said that the good method is that which teaches us to direct our +mind according to the standard of the given true idea, we should +prove our point by reasoning, which would seem to indicate that it +is not self-evident. (2) We may, therefore, be questioned as to +the validity of our reasoning. (3) If our reasoning be sound, we +must take as a starting-point a true idea. (4) Now, to be certain +that our starting-point is really a true idea, we need proof. +(5) This first course of reasoning must be supported by a second, +the second by a third, and so on to infinity. + +[44] (1) To this I make answer that, if by some happy chance anyone +had adopted this method in his investigations of nature--that is, +if he had acquired new ideas in the proper order, according to the +standard of the original true idea, he would never have doubted [q] +of the truth of his knowledge, inasmuch as truth, as we have shown, +makes itself manifest, and all things would flow, as it were, +spontaneously towards him. (44:2) But as this never, or rarely, +happens, I have been forced so to arrange my proceedings, that we +may acquire by reflection and forethought what we cannot acquire +by chance, and that it may at the same time appear that, for +proving the truth, and for valid reasoning, we need no other means +than the truth and valid reasoning themselves: for by valid +reasoning I have established valid reasoning, and, in like measure, +I seek still to establish it. + +[45] (1) Moreover, this is the order of thinking adopted by men +in their inward meditations. (2) The reasons for its rare employment +in investigations of nature are to be found in current misconceptions, +whereof we shall examine the causes hereafter in our philosophy. +(3) Moreover, it demands, as we shall show, a keen and accurate +discernment. (4) Lastly, it is hindered by the conditions of human +life, which are, as we have already pointed out, extremely changeable. +(5) There are also other obstacles, which we will not here inquire into. + + +[46] (1) If anyone asks why I have not at the starting-point set forth +all the truths of nature in their due order, inasmuch as truth is +self-evident, I reply by warning him not to reject as false any +paradoxes he may find here, but to take the trouble to reflect on +the chain of reasoning by which they are supported; he will then +be no longer in doubt that we have attained to the truth. +(2) This is why I have as above. + +[47] (1) If there yet remains some sceptic, who doubts of our +primary truth, and of all deductions we make, taking such truth +as our standard, he must either be arguing in bad faith, or we +must confess that there are men in complete mental blindness +either innate or due to misconceptions--that is, to some external +influence. (2) Such persons are not conscious of themselves. +(3) If they affirm or doubt anything, they know not that they +affirm or doubt: they say that they know nothing, and they say +that they are ignorant of the very fact of their knowing nothing. +(4) Even this they do not affirm absolutely, they are afraid of +confessing that they exist, so long as they know nothing; +in fact, they ought to remain dumb, for fear of haply supposing +which should smack of truth. + +[48] (1) Lastly, with such persons, one should not speak of +sciences: for, in what relates to life and conduct, they are +compelled by necessity to suppose that they exist, and seek +their own advantage, and often affirm and deny, even with an +oath. (2) If they deny, grant, or gainsay, they know not that +they deny, grant, or gainsay, so that they ought to be +regarded as automata, utterly devoid of intelligence. + +[49] (1) Let us now return to our proposition. (2) Up to the present, +we have, first, defined the end to which we desire to direct all our +thoughts; secondly, we have determined the mode of perception best +adapted to aid us in attaining our perfection; thirdly, we have +discovered the way which our mind should take, in order to make a good +beginning--namely, that it should use every true idea as a standard in +pursuing its inquiries according to fixed rules. (49:3) Now, in order +that it may thus proceed, our method must furnish us, first, with a +means of distinguishing a true idea from all other perceptions, and +enabling the mind to avoid the latter; secondly, with rules for +perceiving unknown things according to the standard of the true idea; +thirdly, with an order which enables us to avoid useless labor. +(49:4) When we became acquainted with this method, we saw that, +fourthly, it would be perfect when we had attained to the idea of the +absolutely perfect Being. (5) This is an observation which should be +made at the outset, in order that we may arrive at the knowledge of +such a being more quickly. + +[50] (1) Let us then make a beginning with the first part of the method, +which is, as we have said, to distinguish and separate the true idea +from other perceptions, and to keep the mind from confusing with true +ideas those which are false, fictitious, and doubtful. (2) I intend to +dwell on this point at length, partly to keep a distinction so necessary +before the reader's mind, and also because there are some who doubt of +true ideas, through not having attended to the distinction between a true +perception and all others. (3) Such persons are like men who, while they +are awake, doubt not that they are awake, but afterwards in a dream, as +often happens, thinking that they are surely awake, and then finding that +they were in error, become doubtful even of being awake. (4) This state +of mind arises through neglect of the distinction between sleeping and +waking. + +[51] (1) Meanwhile, I give warning that I shall not here give +essence of every perception, and explain it through its proximate +cause. (2) Such work lies in the province of philosophy. (3) I shall +confine myself to what concerns method--that is, to the character of +fictitious, false and doubtful perceptions, and the means of freeing +ourselves therefrom. (4) Let us then first inquire into the nature of +a fictitious idea. + +[52] (1) Every perception has for its object either a thing considered +as existing, or solely the essence of a thing. (2) Now "fiction" is +chiefly occupied with things considered as existing. (3) I will, +therefore, consider these first--I mean cases where only the existence +of an object is feigned, and the thing thus feigned is understood, or +assumed to be understood. (4) For instance, I feign that Peter, whom +I know to have gone home, is gone to see me, [r] or something of that +kind. (5) With what is such an idea concerned? (6) It is concerned +with things possible, and not with things necessary or impossible. + +[53] (1) I call a thing impossible when its existence would imply a +contradiction; necessary, when its non-existence would imply a +contradiction; possible, when neither its existence nor its +non-existence imply a contradiction, but when the necessity or +impossibility of its nature depends on causes unknown to us, while +we feign that it exists. (2) If the necessity or impossibility of +its existence depending on external causes were known to us, we +could not form any fictitious hypotheses about it; + +[54] (1) Whence it follows that if there be a God, or omniscient +Being, such an one cannot form fictitious hypotheses. (2) For, +as regards ourselves, when I know that I exist, [s] I cannot +hypothesize that I exist or do not exist, any more than I can +hypothesize an elephant that can go through the eye of a needle; +nor when I know the nature of God, can I hypothesize that He +or does not exist. [t] (54:3) The same thing must be said of the +Chimaera, whereof the nature implies a contradiction. (4) From +these considerations, it is plain, as I have already stated, that +fiction cannot be concerned with eternal truths. [u] + +[55] (1) But before proceeding further, I must remark, in passing, +that the difference between the essence of one thing and the essence +of another thing is the same as that which exists between the reality +or existence of one thing and the reality or existence of another; +therefore, if we wished to conceive the existence, for example, +of Adam, simply by means of existence in general, it would be the +same as if, in order to conceive his existence, we went back to the +nature of being, so as to define Adam as a being. (2) Thus, the more +existence is conceived generally, the more is it conceived confusedly +and the more easily can it be ascribed to a given object. +(55:3) Contrariwise, the more it is conceived particularly, the more +is it understood clearly, and the less liable is it to be ascribed, +through negligence of Nature's order, to anything save its proper +object. (4) This is worthy of remark. + +[56] (1) We now proceed to consider those cases which are commonly +called fictions, though we clearly understood that the thing is not +as we imagine it. (2) For instance, I know that the earth is round, +but nothing prevents my telling people that it is a hemisphere, +and that it is like a half apple carved in relief on a dish; or, +that the sun moves round the earth, and so on. (56:3) However, +examination will show us that there is nothing here inconsistent +with what has been said, provided we first admit that we may have +made mistakes, and be now conscious of them; and, further, that we +can hypothesize, or at least suppose, that others are under the +same mistake as ourselves, or can, like us, fall under it. (4) We can, +I repeat, thus hypothesize so long as we see no impossibility. +(56:5) Thus, when I tell anyone that the earth is not round, &c., +I merely recall the error which I perhaps made myself, or which I +might have fallen into, and afterwards I hypothesize that the person +to whom I tell it, is still, or may still fall under the same mistake. +(6) This I say, I can feign so long as I do not perceive any +impossibility or necessity; if I truly understood either one or the +other I should not be able to feign, and I should be reduced to saying +that I had made the attempt. + +[57] (1) It remains for us to consider hypotheses made in problems, +which sometimes involve impossibilities. (2) For instance, when we +say--let us assume that this burning candle is not burning, or, +let us assume that it burns in some imaginary space, or where there +are no physical objects. (3) Such assumptions are freely made, +though the last is clearly seen to be impossible. (4) But, though +this be so, there is no fiction in the case. (57:5) For, in the first +case, I have merely recalled to memory, [x] another candle not +burning, or conceived the candle before me as without a flame, and +then I understand as applying to the latter, leaving its flame out +of the question, all that I think of the former. (6) In the second +case, I have merely to abstract my thoughts from the objects +surrounding the candle, for the mind to devote itself to the +contemplation of the candle singly looked at in itself only; I can +then draw the conclusion that the candle contains in itself no +causes for its own destruction, so that if there were no physical +objects the candle, and even the flame, would remain unchangeable, +and so on. (7) Thus there is here no fiction, but, [y] true and +bare assertions. + +[58] (1) Let us now pass on to the fictions concerned with essences +only, or with some reality or existence simultaneously. (2) Of +these we must specially observe that in proportion as the mind's +understanding is smaller, and its experience multiplex, so will its +power of coining fictions be larger, whereas as its understanding +increases, its capacity for entertaining fictitious ideas becomes +less. (58:3) For instance, in the same way as we are unable, while +we are thinking, to feign that we are thinking or not thinking, so, +also, when we know the nature of body we cannot imagine an infinite +fly; or, when we know the nature of the soul, [z] we cannot imagine +it as square, though anything may be expressed verbally. (4) But, +as we said above, the less men know of nature the more easily can +they coin fictitious ideas, such as trees speaking, men instantly +changed into stones, or into fountains, ghosts appearing in mirrors, +something issuing from nothing, even gods changed into beasts and men +and infinite other absurdities of the same kind. + +[59] (1) Some persons think, perhaps, that fiction is limited by +fiction, and not by understanding; in other words, after I have +formed some fictitious idea, and have affirmed of my own free will +that it exists under a certain form in nature, I am thereby +precluded from thinking of it under any other form. (2) For +instance, when I have feigned (to repeat their argument) that the +nature of body is of a certain kind, and have of my own free will +desired to convince myself that it actually exists under this +form, I am no longer able to hypothesize that a fly, for example, +is infinite; so, when I have hypothesized the essence of the soul, +I am not able to think of it as square, &c. + +[60] (1) But these arguments demand further inquiry. (2) First, +their upholders must either grant or deny that we can understand +anything. If they grant it, then necessarily the same must be +said of understanding, as is said of fiction. (3) If they deny +it, let us, who know that we do know something, see what they +mean. (4) They assert that the soul can be conscious of, and +perceive in a variety of ways, not itself nor things which +exist, but only things which are neither in itself nor anywhere +else, in other words, that the soul can, by its unaided power, +create sensations or ideas unconnected with things. (5) In fact, +they regard the soul as a sort of god. (60:6) Further, they assert +that we or our soul have such freedom that we can constrain +ourselves, or our soul, or even our soul's freedom. (7) For, +after it has formed a fictitious idea, and has given its assent +thereto, it cannot think or feign it in any other manner, but is +constrained by the first fictitious idea to keep all its other +thoughts in harmony therewith. (8) Our opponents are thus driven +to admit, in support of their fiction, the absurdities which I +have just enumerated; and which are not worthy of rational +refutation. + +[61] (1) While leaving such persons in their error, we will take +care to derive from our argument with them a truth serviceable for +our purpose, namely, [61a] that the mind, in paying attention to +a thing hypothetical or false, so as to meditate upon it and +understand it, and derive the proper conclusions in due order +therefrom, will readily discover its falsity; and if the thing +hypothetical be in its nature true, and the mind pays attention +to it, so as to understand it, and deduce the truths which are +derivable from it, the mind will proceed with an uninterrupted +series of apt conclusions; in the same way as it would at once +discover (as we showed just now) the absurdity of a false +hypothesis, and of the conclusions drawn from it. + +[62] (1) We need, therefore, be in no fear of forming hypotheses, +so long as we have a clear and distinct perception of what is +involved. (2) For, if we were to assert, haply, that men are +suddenly turned into beasts, the statement would be extremely +general, so general that there would be no conception, that is, +no idea or connection of subject and predicate, in our mind. +(3) If there were such a conception we should at the same time +be aware of the means and the causes whereby the event took place. +(4) Moreover, we pay no attention to the nature of the subject +and the predicate. + +[63] (1) Now, if the first idea be not fictitious, and if all the +other ideas be deduced therefrom, our hurry to form fictitious ideas +will gradually subside. (2) Further, as a fictitious idea cannot be +clear and distinct, but is necessarily confused, and as all confusion +arises from the fact that the mind has only partial knowledge of a +thing either simple or complex, and does not distinguish between the +known and the unknown, and, again, that it directs its attention +promiscuously to all parts of an object at once without making +distinctions, it follows, first, that if the idea be of something +very simple, it must necessarily be clear and distinct. (3) For +a very simple object cannot be known in part, it must either be +known altogether or not at all. + +[64] (1) Secondly, it follows that if a complex object be divided by +thought into a number of simple component parts, and if each be +regarded separately, all confusion will disappear. (2) Thirdly, it +follows that fiction cannot be simple, but is made up of the blending +of several confused ideas of diverse objects or actions existent in +nature, or rather is composed of attention directed to all such ideas +at once, [64b] and unaccompanied by any mental assent. + +(64:3) Now a fiction that was simple would be clear and distinct, +and therefore true, also a fiction composed only of distinct ideas +would be clear and distinct, and therefore true. (4) For instance, +when we know the nature of the circle and the square, it is +impossible for us to blend together these two figures, and to +hypothesize a square circle, any more than a square soul, or things +of that kind. + +[65] (1) Let us shortly come to our conclusion, and again repeat +that we need have no fear of confusing with true ideas that which +is only a fiction. (2) As for the first sort of fiction of which +we have already spoken, when a thing is clearly conceived, we saw +that if the existence of a that thing is in itself an eternal truth +fiction can have no part in it; but if the existence of the +conceived be not an eternal truth, we have only to be careful +such existence be compared to the thing's essence, and to +consider the order of nature. (64:3) As for the second sort of +fiction, which we stated to be the result of simultaneously +directing the attention, without the assent of the intellect, +to different confused ideas representing different things and +actions existing in nature, we have seen that an absolutely +simple thing cannot be feigned, but must be understood, and that +a complex thing is in the same case if we regard separately the +simple parts whereof it is composed; we shall not even be able +to hypothesize any untrue action concerning such objects, for we +shall be obliged to consider at the same time the causes and manner +of such action. + +[66] (1) These matters being thus understood, let us pass on to +consider the false idea, observing the objects with which it is +concerned, and the means of guarding ourselves from falling into +false perceptions. (2) Neither of these tasks will present much +difficulty, after our inquiry concerning fictitious ideas. +(3) The false idea only differs from the fictitious idea in the +fact of implying a mental assent--that is, as we have already +remarked, while the representations are occurring, there are no +causes present to us, wherefrom, as in fiction, we can conclude +that such representations do not arise from external objects: +in fact, it is much the same as dreaming with our eyes open, +or while awake. (67:4) Thus, a false idea is concerned with, or +(to speak more correctly) is attributable to, the existence of +a thing whereof the essence is known, or the essence itself, in +the same way as a fictitious idea. + +[67] (1) If attributable to the existence of the thing, it is +corrected in the same way as a fictitious idea under similar +circumstances. (2) If attributable to the essence, it is +likewise corrected in the same way as a fictitious idea. +(67:3) For if the nature of the thing known implies necessary +existence, we cannot possible be in error with regard to its +existence; but if the nature of the thing be not an eternal +truth, like its essence, but contrariwise the necessity or +impossibility of its existence depends on external causes, +then we must follow the same course as we adopted in the +of fiction, for it is corrected in the same manner. + +[68] (1) As for false ideas concerned with essences, or even +with actions, such perceptions are necessarily always confused, +being compounded of different confused perceptions of things +existing in nature, as, for instance, when men are persuaded +that deities are present in woods, in statues, in brute beasts, +and the like; that there are bodies which, by their composition +alone, give rise to intellect; that corpses reason, walk about, +and speak; that God is deceived, and so on. (68:2) But ideas which +are clear and distinct can never be false: for ideas of things +clearly and distinctly conceived are either very simple +themselves, or are compounded from very simple ideas, that is, +are deduced therefrom. (3) The impossibility of a very simple +idea being false is evident to everyone who understands the nature +of truth or understanding and of falsehood. + +[69] (1) As regards that which constitutes the reality of truth, +it is certain that a true idea is distinguished from a false one, +not so much by its extrinsic object as by its intrinsic nature. +(2) If an architect conceives a building properly constructed, +though such a building may never have existed, and amy never exist, +nevertheless the idea is true; and the idea remains the same, +whether it be put into execution or not. (69:3) On the other hand, +if anyone asserts, for instance, that Peter exists, without +knowing whether Peter really exists or not, the assertion, as far +as its asserter is concerned, is false, or not true, even though +Peter actually does exist. (4) The assertion that Peter exists is +true only with regard to him who knows for certain that Peter does +exist. + +[70] (1) Whence it follows that there is in ideas something real, +whereby the true are distinguished from the false. (2) This reality +must be inquired into, if we are to find the best standard of truth +(we have said that we ought to determine our thoughts by the given +standard of a true idea, and that method is reflective knowledge), +and to know the properties of our understanding. (70:3) Neither must +we say that the difference between true and false arises from the +fact, that true knowledge consists in knowing things through their +primary causes, wherein it is totally different from false knowledge, +as I have just explained it: for thought is said to be true, if +it involves subjectively the essence of any principle which has no +cause, and is known through itself and in itself. + +[71] (1) Wherefore the reality (forma) of true thought must exist +in the thought itself, without reference to other thoughts; it does +not acknowledge the object as its cause, but must depend on the +actual power and nature of the understanding. (2) For, if we +suppose that the understanding has perceived some new entity which +has never existed, as some conceive the understanding of God before +He created thing (a perception which certainly could not arise +any object), and has legitimately deduced other thoughts from said +perception, all such thoughts would be true, without being +determined by any external object; they would depend solely on the +power and nature of the understanding. (71:3) Thus, that which +constitutes the reality of a true thought must be sought in the +thought itself, and deduced from the nature of the understanding. + +[72] (1) In order to pursue our investigation, let us confront +ourselves with some true idea, whose object we know for +certain to be dependent on our power of thinking, and to have +nothing corresponding to it in nature. (2) With an idea of this +kind before us, we shall, as appears from what has just been said, +be more easily able to carry on the research we have in view. +(72:3) For instance, in order to form the conception of a sphere, +I invent a cause at my pleasure--namely, a semicircle revolving +round its center, and thus producing a sphere. (4) This is +indisputably a true idea; and, although we know that no sphere in +nature has ever actually been so formed, the perception remains +true, and is the easiest manner of conceiving a sphere. +(72:5) We must observe that this perception asserts the rotation +of a semicircle--which assertion would be false, if it were not +associated with the conception of a sphere, or of a cause +determining a motion of the kind, or absolutely, if the assertion +were isolated. (6) The mind would then only tend to the +affirmation of the sole motion of a semicircle, which is not +contained in the conception of a semicircle, and does not arise +from the conception of any cause capable of producing such motion. + +(72:7) Thus falsity consists only in this, that something is +affirmed of a thing, which is not contained in the conception +we have formed of that thing, as motion or rest of a semicircle. +(8) Whence it follows that simple ideas cannot be other than +true--e.g., the simple idea of a semicircle, of motion, of rest, +of quantity, &c. + +(72:9) Whatsoever affirmation such ideas contain is equal to the +concept formed, and does not extend further. (10) Wherefore we +form as many simple ideas as we please, without any fear of error. + +[73] (1) It only remains for us to inquire by what power our mind +can form true ideas, and how far such power extends. (2) It is +certain that such power cannot extend itself infinitely. (3) For +when we affirm somewhat of a thing, which is not contained in the +concept we have formed of that thing, such an affirmation shows a +defect of our perception, or that we have formed fragmentary or +mutilated ideas. (4) Thus we have seen that the notion of a +semicircle is false when it is isolated in the mind, but true when +it is associated with the concept of a sphere, or of some cause +determining such a motion. (73:5) But if it be the nature of a +thinking being, as seems, prima facie, to be the case, to form true +or adequate thoughts, it is plain that inadequate ideas arise in us +only because we are parts of a thinking being, whose thoughts--some +in their entirety, others in fragments only--constitute our mind. + +[74] (1) But there is another point to be considered, which was not +worth raising in the case of fiction, but which give rise to complete +deception--namely, that certain things presented to the imagination +also exist in the understanding--in other words, are conceived +clearly and distinctly. (2) Hence, so long as we do not separate that +which is distinct from that which is confused, certainty, or the true +idea, becomes mixed with indistinct ideas. (3) For instance, certain +Stoics heard, perhaps, the term "soul," and also that the soul is +immortal, yet imagined it only confusedly; they imaged, also, and +understood that very subtle bodies penetrate all others, and are +penetrated by none. (74:4) By combining these ideas, and being at the +same time certain of the truth of the axiom, they forthwith became +convinced that the mind consists of very subtle bodies; that these +very subtle bodies cannot be divided &c. + +[75] (1) But we are freed from mistakes of this kind, so long as we +endeavor to examine all our perceptions by the standard of the given +true idea. (2) We must take care, as has been said, to separate such +perceptions from all those which arise from hearsay or unclassified +experience. (3) Moreover, such mistakes arise from things being +conceived too much in the abstract; for it is sufficiently self-evident +that what I conceive as in its true object I cannot apply to anything +else. (75:4) Lastly, they arise from a want of understanding of the +primary elements of nature as a whole; whence we proceed without due +order, and confound nature with abstract rules, which, although they +be true enough in their sphere, yet, when misapplied, confound +themselves, and pervert the order of nature. (5) However, if we +proceed with as little abstraction as possible, and begin from primary +elements--that is, from the source and origin of nature, as far back +as we can reach,--we need not fear any deceptions of this kind. + +[76] (1) As far as the knowledge of the origin of nature is concerned, +there is no danger of our confounding it with abstractions. (2) For +when a thing is conceived in the abstract, as are all universal +notions, the said universal notions are always more extensive in the +mind than the number of individuals forming their contents really +existing in nature. (3) Again, there are many things in nature, the +difference between which is so slight as to be hardly perceptible to +the understanding; so that it may readily happen that such things are +confounded together, if they be conceived abstractedly. (4) But since +the first principle of nature cannot (as we shall see hereafter) be +conceived abstractedly or universally, and cannot extend further in +the understanding than it does in reality, and has no likeness to +mutable things, no confusion need be feared in respect to the idea of +it, provided (as before shown) that we possess a standard of truth. +(5) This is, in fact, a being single and infinite [76z]; in other +words, it is the sum total of being, beyond which there is no being +found. [76a] + +[77] (1) Thus far we have treated of the false idea. We have now +to investigate the doubtful idea--that is, to inquire what can +cause us to doubt, and how doubt may be removed. (2) I speak of +real doubt existing in the mind, not of such doubt as we see +exemplified when a man says that he doubts, though his mind does +not really hesitate. (77:3) The cure of the latter does not fall +within the province of method, it belongs rather to inquiries +concerning obstinacy and its cure. + +[78] (1) Real doubt is never produced in the mind by the thing +doubted of. (2) In other words, if there were only one idea in +the mind, whether that idea were true or false, there would be no +doubt or certainty present, only a certain sensation. (3) For an +idea is in itself nothing else than a certain sensation. (4) But +doubt will arise through another idea, not clear and distinct +enough for us to be able to draw any certain conclusions with +regard to the matter under consideration; that is, the idea which +causes us to doubt is not clear and distinct. (5) To take an example. +(78:6) Supposing that a man has never reflected, taught by experience +or by any other means, that our senses sometimes deceive us, he will +never doubt whether the sun be greater or less than it appears. +(7) Thus rustics are generally astonished when they hear that the +sun is much larger than the earth. (8) But from reflection on the +deceitfulness of the senses [78a] doubt arises, and if, after +doubting, we acquire a true knowledge of the senses, and how things +at a distance are represented through their instrumentality, doubt +is again removed. + +[79] (1) Hence we cannot cast doubt on true ideas by the supposition +that there is a deceitful Deity, who leads us astray even in what is +most certain. (2) We can only hold such an hypothesis so long as we +have no clear and distinct idea--in other words, until we reflect +the knowledge which we have of the first principle of all things, and +find that which teaches us that God is not a deceiver, and until we +know this with the same certainty as we know from reflecting on the +are equal to two right angles. (3) But if we have a knowledge of God +equal to that which we have of a triangle, all doubt is removed. +(79:4) In the same way as we can arrive at the said knowledge of a +triangle, though not absolutely sure that there is not some +arch-deceiver leading us astray, so can we come to a like knowledge +of God under the like condition, and when we have attained to it, +it is sufficient, as I said before, to remove every doubt which we can +possess concerning clear and distinct ideas. + +[80] (1) Thus, if a man proceeded with our investigations in due +order, inquiring first into those things which should first be +inquired into, never passing over a link in the chain of association, +and with knowledge how to define his questions before seeking to +answer them, he will never have any ideas save such as are very +certain, or, in other words, clear and distinct; for doubt is only a +suspension of the spirit concerning some affirmation or negation +which it would pronounce upon unhesitatingly if it were not in +ignorance of something, without which the knowledge of the matter in +hand must needs be imperfect. (2) We may, therefore, conclude that +doubt always proceeds from want of due order in investigation. + +[81] (1) These are the points I promised to discuss in the first part +of my treatise on method. (2) However, in order not to omit anything +which can conduce to the knowledge of the understanding and its +faculties, I will add a few words on the subject of memory and +forgetfulness. + +(81:3) The point most worthy of attention is, that memory is +strengthened both with and without the aid of the understanding. +(4) For the more intelligible a thing is, the more easily is it +remembered, and the less intelligible it is, the more easily do we +forget it. (5) For instance, a number of unconnected words is much +more difficult to remember than the same number in the form of a +narration. + +[82] (1) The memory is also strengthened without the aid of the +understanding by means of the power wherewith the imagination or +the sense called common, is affected by some particular physical +object. (2) I say particular, for the imagination is only affected +by particular objects. (3) If we read, for instance, a single romantic +comedy, we shall remember it very well, so long as we do not read +many others of the same kind, for it will reign alone in the memory +(4) If, however, we read several others of the same kind, we shall +think of them altogether, and easily confuse one with another. +(82:5) I say also, physical. (6) For the imagination is only +affected by physical objects. (7) As, then, the memory is +strengthened both with and without the aid of the understanding, +we may conclude that it is different from the understanding, +and that in the latter considered in itself there is neither +memory nor forgetfulness. + +[83] (1) What, then, is memory? (2) It is nothing else than the +actual sensation of impressions on the brain, accompanied with the +thought of a definite duration, [83d] of the sensation. (3) This +is also shown by reminiscence. (4) For then we think of the +sensation, but without the notion of continuous duration; thus the +idea of that sensation is not the actual duration of the sensation +or actual memory. (83:5) Whether ideas are or are not subject to +corruption will be seen in philosophy. (6) If this seems too +absurd to anyone, it will be sufficient for our purpose, if he +reflect on the fact that a thing is more easily remembered in +proportion to its singularity, as appears from the example of +the comedy just cited. (83:7) Further, a thing is remembered more +easily in proportion to its intelligibility; therefore we cannot +help remember that which is extremely singular and sufficiently +intelligible. + + +[84] (1) Thus, then, we have distinguished between a true idea and +other perceptions, and shown that ideas fictitious, false, and the +rest, originate in the imagination--that is, in certain sensations +fortuitous (so to speak) and disconnected, arising not from the power +of the mind, but from external causes, according as the body, +sleeping or waking, receives various motions. + +(2) But one may take any view one likes of the imagination so long +as one acknowledges that it is different from the understanding, and +that the soul is passive with regard to it. (3) The view taken is +immaterial, if we know that the imagination is something indefinite, +with regard to which the soul is passive, and that we can by some +means or other free ourselves therefrom with the help of the +understanding. (4) Let no one then be astonished that before proving +the existence of body, and other necessary things, I speak of +imagination of body, and of its composition. (5) The view taken is, +I repeat, immaterial, so long as we know that imagination is something +indefinite, &c. + +[85] (1) As regards as a true idea, we have shown that it is simple +or compounded of simple ideas; that it shows how and why something +is or has been made; and that its subjective effects in the soul +correspond to the actual reality of its object. (2) This conclusion +is identical with the saying of the ancients, that true proceeds +from cause to effect; though the ancients, so far as I know, +never formed the conception put forward here that the soul acts +according to fixed laws, and is as it were an immaterial automaton. + +[86] (1) Hence, as far as is possible at the outset, we have +acquired a knowledge of our understanding, and such a standard of +a true idea that we need no longer fear confounding truth with +falsehood and fiction. (2) Neither shall we wonder why we +understand some things which in nowise fall within the scope of +the imagination, while other things are in the imagination but +wholly opposed to the understanding, or others, again, which +agree therewith. (3) We now know that the operations, whereby the +effects of imagination are produced, take place under other laws +quite different from the laws of the understanding, and that the +mind is entirely passive with regard to them. + +[87] (1) Whence we may also see how easily men may fall into grave +errors through not distinguishing accurately between the imagination +and the understanding; such as believing that extension must be +localized, that it must be finite, that its parts are really distinct +one from the other, that it is the primary and single foundation of +all things, that it occupies more space at one time than at another +and other similar doctrines, all entirely opposed to truth, as we +shall duly show. + +[88] (1) Again, since words are a part of the imagination--that is, +since we form many conceptions in accordance with confused +arrangements of words in the memory, dependent on particular bodily +conditions,--there is no doubt that words may, equally with the +imagination, be the cause of many and great errors, unless we +strictly on our guard. + +[89] (1) Moreover, words are formed according to popular fancy and +intelligence, and are, therefore, signs of things as existing in the +imagination, not as existing in the understanding. (2) This is +evident from the fact that to all such things as exist only in the +understanding, not in the imagination, negative names are often +given, such as incorporeal, infinite, &c. (3) So, also, many +conceptions really affirmative are expressed negatively, and vice +versa, such as uncreate, independent, infinite, immortal, &c., +inasmuch as their contraries are much more easily imagined, and, +therefore, occurred first to men, and usurped positive names. +(89:4) Many things we affirm and deny, because the nature of words +allows us to do so, though the nature of things does not. (5) While +we remain unaware of this fact, we may easily mistake falsehood for +truth. + +[90] (1) Let us also beware of another great cause of confusion, +which prevents the understanding from reflecting on itself. +(2) Sometimes, while making no distinction between the imagination +and the intellect, we think that what we more readily imagine is +clearer to us; and also we think that what we imagine we understand. +(3) Thus, we put first that which should be last: the true order of +progression is reversed, and no legitimate conclusion is drawn. + +[91] [91e] (1) Now, in order at length to pass on to the second +part of this method, I shall first set forth the object aimed at, +and next the means for its attainment. (2) The object aimed at +is the acquisition of clear and distinct ideas, such as are +produced by the pure intellect, and not by chance physical motions. +(3) In order that all ideas may be reduced to unity, we shall +endeavor so to associate and arrange them that our mind may, as far +as possible, reflect subjectively the reality of nature, both as +a whole and as parts. + +[92] (1) As for the first point, it is necessary (as we have said) +for our purpose that everything should be conceived, either solely +through its essence, or through its proximate cause. (2) If the +thing be self-existent, or, as is commonly said, the cause of +itself, it must be understood through its essence only; if it be +not self-existent, but requires a cause for its existence, it must +be understood through its proximate cause. (3) For, in reality, +the knowledge, [92f] of an effect is nothing else than the +acquisition of more perfect knowledge of its cause. + +[93] (1) Therefore, we may never, while we are concerned with +inquiries into actual things, draw any conclusion from +abstractions; we shall be extremely careful not to confound that +which is only in the understanding with that which is in the +thing itself. (2) The best basis for drawing a conclusion will +be either some particular affirmative essence, or a true and +legitimate definition. (93:3) For the understanding cannot descend +from universal axioms by themselves to particular things, since +axioms are of infinite extent, and do not determine the +understanding to contemplate one particular thing more than +another. + +[94] (1) Thus the true method of discovery is to form thoughts +from some given definition. (2) This process will be the +more fruitful and easy in proportion as the thing given be +better defined. (3) Wherefore, the cardinal point of all this +second part of method consists in the knowledge of the conditions +of good definition, and the means of finding them. (4) I will +first treat of the conditions of definition. + +[95] (1) A definition, if it is to be called perfect, must +explain the inmost essence of a thing, and must take care not +to substitute for this any of its properties. (2) In order +to illustrate my meaning, without taking an example which +would seem to show a desire to expose other people's errors, +I will choose the case of something abstract, the definition +of which is of little moment. (95:3) Such is a circle. (4) If +a circle be defined as a figure, such that all straight lines +drawn from the center to the circumference are equal, every +one can see that such a definition does not in the least +explain the essence of a circle, but solely one of its +properties. (5) Though, as I have said, this is of no +importance in the case of figures and other abstractions, +it is of great importance in the case of physical beings +and realities: for the properties of things are not understood +so long as their essences are unknown. (6) If the latter be +passed over, there is necessarily a perversion of the +succession of ideas which should reflect the succession of +nature, and we go far astray from our object. + +[96] In order to be free from this fault, the following rules +should be observed in definition:-- + +I. (1) If the thing in question be created, the definition + must (as we have said) comprehend the proximate cause. + (2) For instance, a circle should, according to this rule, + be defined as follows: the figure described by any line + whereof one end is fixed and the other free. (3) This + definition clearly comprehends the proximate cause. + +II. (4) A conception or definition of a thing should be such + that all the properties of that thing, in so far as it is + considered by itself, and not in conjunction with other + things, can be deduced from it, as may be seen in the + definition given of a circle: for from that it clearly follows + that all straight lines drawn from the center to the + circumference are equal. (5) That this is a necessary + characteristic of a definition is so clear to anyone, who + reflects on the matter, that there is no need to spend time + in proving it, or in showing that, owing to this second + condition, every definition should be affirmative. (6) I + speak of intellectual affirmation, giving little thought to + verbal affirmations which, owing to the poverty of language, + must sometimes, perhaps, be expressed negatively, though + the idea contained is affirmative. + +[97] The rules for the definition of an uncreated thing +are as follows:-- + +I. The exclusion of all idea of cause--that is, the thing + must not need explanation by Anything outside itself. + +II. When the definition of the thing has been given, there must + be no room for doubt as to whether the thing exists or not. + +III. It must contain, as far as the mind is concerned, no + substantives which could be put into an adjectival form; + in other words, the object defined must not be explained + through abstractions. + +IV. Lastly, though this is not absolutely necessary, it should + be possible to deduce from the definition all the properties + of the thing defined. + +All these rules become obvious to anyone giving strict +attention to the matter. + +[98] (1) I have also stated that the best basis for drawing a +conclusion is a particular affirmative essence. (2) The more +specialized the idea is, the more it is distinct, and therefore +clear. (3) Wherefore a knowledge of particular things should +be sought for as diligently as possible. + +[99] (1) As regards the order of our perceptions, and the manner +in which they should be arranged and united, it is necessary that, +as soon as is possible and rational, we should inquire whether +there be any being (and, if so, what being), that is the cause +of all things, so that its essence, represented in thought, may +be the cause of all our ideas, and then our mind will to the +utmost possible extent reflect nature. (2) For it will possess, +subjectively, nature's essence, order, and union. (3) Thus we +can see that it is before all things necessary for us to deduce +all our ideas from physical things--that is, from real entities, +proceeding, as far as may be, according to the series of causes, +from one real entity to another real entity, never passing to +universals and abstractions, either for the purpose of deducing +some real entity from them, or deducing them from some real +entity. (4) Either of these processes interrupts the true +progress of the understanding. + +[100] (1) But it must be observed that, by the series of causes +and real entities, I do not here mean the series of particular +and mutable things, but only the series of fixed and eternal +things. (2) It would be impossible for human infirmity to follow +up the series of particular mutable things, both on account +their multitude, surpassing all calculation, and on account of +the infinitely diverse circumstances surrounding one and the same +thing, any one of which may be the cause of its existence or +non-existence. (3) Indeed, their existence has no connection +with their essence, or (as we have said already) is not an +eternal truth. + +[101] (1) Neither is there any need that we should understand +their series, for the essences of particular mutable things are +not to be gathered from their series or order of existence, +which would furnish us with nothing beyond their extrinsic +denominations, their relations, or, at most, their circumstances, +all of which are very different from their inmost essence. +(101:2) This inmost essence must be sought solely from fixed and +eternal things, and from the laws, inscribed (so to speak) in +those things as in their true codes, according to which all +particular things take place and are arranged; nay, these mutable +particular things depend so intimately and essentially (so to +phrase it) upon the fixed things, that they cannot either be +conceived without them. + +[102] (1) But, though this be so, there seems to be no small +difficulty in arriving at the knowledge of these particular things, +for to conceive them all at once would far surpass the powers of +the human understanding. (2) The arrangement whereby one thing is +understood, before another, as we have stated, should not be sought +from their series of existence, nor from eternal things. (3) For +the latter are all by nature simultaneous. (4) Other aids are +therefore needed besides those employed for understanding eternal +things and their laws. (5) However, this is not the place to recount +such aids, nor is there any need to do so, until we have acquired a +sufficient knowledge of eternal things and their infallible laws, +and until the nature of our senses has become plain to us. + +[103] (1) Before betaking ourselves to seek knowledge of particular +things, it will be seasonable to speak of such aids, as all tend to +teach us the mode of employing our senses, and to make certain +experiments under fixed rules and arrangements which may suffice to +determine the object of our inquiry, so that we may therefrom infer +what laws of eternal things it has been produced under, and may gain +an insight into its inmost nature, as I will duly show. (2) Here, +to return to my purpose, I will only endeavor to set forth what seems +necessary for enabling us to attain to knowledge of eternal things, +and to define them under the conditions laid down above. + +[104] (1) With this end, we must bear in mind what has already been +stated, namely, that when the mind devotes itself to any thought, so +as to examine it, and to deduce therefrom in due order all the +legitimate conclusions possible, any falsehood which may lurk in the +thought will be detected; but if the thought be true, the mind will +readily proceed without interruption to deduce truths from it. +(104:2) This, I say, is necessary for our purpose, for our thoughts +may be brought to a close by the absence of a foundation. + +[105] (1) If, therefore, we wish to investigate the first thing of +all, it will be necessary to supply some foundation which may direct +our thoughts thither. (2) Further, since method is reflective +knowledge, the foundation which must direct our thoughts can be +nothing else than the knowledge of that which constitutes the reality +of truth, and the knowledge of the understanding, its properties, and +powers. (3) When this has been acquired we shall possess a foundation +wherefrom we can deduce our thoughts, and a path whereby the intellect, +according to its capacity, may attain the knowledge of eternal things, +allowance being made for the extent of the intellectual powers. + +[106] (1) If, as I stated in the first part, it belongs to the nature +of thought to form true ideas, we must here inquire what is meant by +the faculties and power of the understanding. (2) The chief part of +our method is to understand as well as possible the powers of the +intellect, and its nature; we are, therefore, compelled (by the +considerations advanced in the second part of the method) necessarily +to draw these conclusions from the definition itself of thought and +understanding. + +[107] (1) But, so far as we have not got any rules for finding +definitions, and, as we cannot set forth such rules without a +previous knowledge of nature, that is without a definition of the +understanding and its power, it follows either that the definition +of the understanding must be clear in itself, or that we can +understand nothing. (2) Nevertheless this definition is not +absolutely clear in itself; however, since its properties, like +all things that we possess through the understanding, cannot be +known clearly and distinctly, unless its nature be known previously, +understanding makes itself manifest, if we pay attention to its +properties, which we know clearly and distinctly. (3) Let us, +then, enumerate here the properties of the understanding, let us +examine them, and begin by discussing the instruments for research +which we find innate in us. See [31] + +[108] (1) The properties of the understanding which I have chiefly +remarked, and which I clearly understand, are the following:-- + +I. (2) It involves certainty--in other words, it knows that a thing + exists in reality as it is reflected subjectively. + +II. (108:3) That it perceives certain things, or forms some ideas + absolutely, some ideas from others. (4) Thus it forms the + idea of quantity absolutely, without reference to any other + thoughts; but ideas of motion it only forms after taking into + consideration the idea of quantity. + +III. (108:5) Those ideas which the understanding forms absolutely + express infinity; determinate ideas are derived from other + ideas. (6) Thus in the idea of quantity, perceived by means + of a cause, the quantity is determined, as when a body is + perceived to be formed by the motion of a plane, a plane by + the motion of a line, or, again, a line by the motion of a + point. (7) All these are perceptions which do not serve + towards understanding quantity, but only towards determining + it. (108:8) This is proved by the fact that we conceive them + as formed as it were by motion, yet this motion is not perceived + unless the quantity be perceived also; we can even prolong the + motion to form an infinite line, which we certainly could not do + unless we had an idea of infinite quantity. + +IV. (9) The understanding forms positive ideas before forming + negative ideas. + +V. (108:10) It perceives things not so much under the condition + of duration as under a certain form of eternity, and in an + infinite number; or rather in perceiving things it does not + consider either their number or duration, whereas, in imagining + them, it perceives them in a determinate number, duration, and + quantity. + +VI. (108:11) The ideas which we form as clear and distinct, seem + to follow from the sole necessity of our nature, that they + appear to depend absolutely on our sole power; with confused + ideas the contrary is the case. (12) They are often formed + against our will. + +VII. (108:13) The mind can determine in many ways the ideas of things, +which the understanding forms from other ideas: thus, for instance, +in order to define the plane of an ellipse, it supposes a point +adhering to a cord to be moved around two centers, or, again, it +conceives an infinity of points, always in the same fixed relation +to a given straight line, angle of the vertex of the cone, or in an +infinity of other ways. + +VIII. (108:14) The more ideas express perfection of any object, +the more perfect are they themselves; for we do not admire the +architect who has planned a chapel so much as the architect who +has planned a splendid temple. + +[109] (1) I do not stop to consider the rest of what is referred +to thought, such as love, joy, &c. (2) They are nothing to our +present purpose, and cannot even be conceived unless the +understanding be perceived previously. (3) When perception is +removed, all these go with it. + +[110] (1) False and fictitious ideas have nothing positive about +them (as we have abundantly shown), which causes them to be called +false or fictitious; they are only considered as such through the +defectiveness of knowledge. (2) Therefore, false and fictitious +ideas as such can teach us nothing concerning the essence of thought; +this must be sought from the positive properties just enumerated; +in other words, we must lay down some common basis from which these +properties necessarily follow, so that when this is given, the +properties are necessarily given also, and when it is removed, +they too vanish with it. + +The rest of the treatise is wanting. + +---------------------------------------------------------------------- + +Spinoza's Endnotes: Marks as per Curley, see Note 5 above. + +[a] (1) This might be explained more at large and more clearly: + I mean by distinguishing riches according as they are pursued for + their own sake, in or furtherance of fame, or sensual pleasure, + or the advancement of science and art. (2) But this subject is + reserved to its own place, for it is not here proper to + investigate the matter more accurately. + +[b] These considerations should be set forth more precisely. + +[c] These matters are explained more at length elsewhere. + +[d] N.B. I do no more here than enumerate the sciences necessary + for our purpose; I lay no stress on their order. + +[e] There is for the sciences but one end, to which they should + all be directed. + +[f] (1) In this case we do not understand anything of the cause + from the consideration of it in the effect. (2) This is + sufficiently evident from the fact that the cause is only + spoken of in very general terms, such as--there exists then + something; there exists then some power, &c.; or from the + that we only express it in a negative manner--it is not + or that, &c. (3) In the second case something is ascribed + to the cause because of the effect, as we shall show in an + example, but only a property, never an essence. + +[g] (1) From this example may be clearly seen what I have just + drawn attention to. (2) For through this union we understand + nothing beyond the sensation, the effect, to wit, from which + we inferred the cause of which we understand nothing. + +[h] (1) A conclusion of this sort, though it be certain, is yet + not to be relied on without great caution; for unless we are + exceedingly careful we shall forthwith fall into error. + (2) When things are conceived thus abstractedly, and not + through their true essence, they are apt to be confused by the + imagination. (3) For that which is in itself one, men imagine + to be multiplex. (4) To those things which are conceived + abstractedly, apart, and confusedly, terms are applied which are + apt to become wrested from their strict meaning, and bestowed on + things more familiar; whence it results that these latter are + imagined in the same way as the former to which the terms were + originally given. + +[i] I shall here treat a little more in detail of experience, + and shall examine the method adopted by the Empirics, + and by recent philosophers. + +[k] By native strength, I mean that not bestowed on us by external + causes, as I shall afterwards explain in my philosophy. + +[l] Here I term them operations: I shall explain their nature + in my philosophy. + +[m] I shall take care not only to demonstrate what I have just + advanced, but also that we have hitherto proceeded rightly, + and other things needful to be known. + +[33note1] (1) In modern language, "the idea may become the + subject of another presentation." (2) Objectivus generally + corresponds to the modern "subjective," formalis to the + modern "objective." [Trans.- Note 1] + +[n] (1) Observe that we are not here inquiring how the first + subjective essence is innate in us. (2) This belongs to an + investigation into nature, where all these matters are amply + explained, and it is shown that without ideas neither + affirmation, nor negation, nor volition are possible. + +[o] The nature of mental search is explained in my philosophy. + +[p] To be connected with other things is to be produced by them, + or to produce them. + +[q] In the same way as we have here no doubt of the truth of + our knowledge. + +[r] See below the note on hypotheses, whereof we have a clear + understanding; the fiction consists in saying that such + hypotheses exist in heavenly bodies. + +[s] (1) As a thing, when once it is understood, manifests itself, + we have need only of an example without further proof. + (2) In the same way the contrary has only to be presented to + our minds to be recognized as false, as will forthwith appear + when we come to discuss fiction concerning essences. + +[t] Observe, that although many assert that they doubt whether God + exists, they have nought but his name in their minds, or else + some fiction which they call God: this fiction is not in + harmony with God's real nature, as we will duly show. + +[u] (1) I shall presently show that no fiction can concern eternal + truths. By an eternal truth, I mean that which being positive + could never become negative. (2) Thus it is a primary and + eternal truth that God exists, but it is not an eternal truth + that Adam thinks. (3) That the Chimaera does not exist is an + eternal truth, that Adam does not think is not so. + +[x] (1) Afterwards, when we come to speak of fiction that is + concerned with essences, it will be evident that fiction never + creates or furnishes the mind with anything new; only such things + as are already in the brain or imagination are recalled to the + memory, when the attention is directed to them confusedly and all + at once. (2) For instance, we have remembrance of spoken words + and of a tree; when the mind directs itself to them confusedly, + it forms the notion of a tree speaking. (3) The same may be said + of existence, especially when it is conceived quite generally as + an entity; it is then readily applied to all things together in + the memory. (4) This is specially worthy of remark. + +[y] We must understand as much in the case of hypotheses put forward + to explain certain movements accompanying celestial phenomena; + but from these, when applied to the celestial motions, we any + draw conclusions as to the nature of the heavens, whereas this + last may be quite different, especially as many other causes are + conceivable which would account for such motions. + +[z] (1) It often happens that a man recalls to mind this word soul, + and forms at the same time some corporeal image: as the two + representations are simultaneous, he easily thinks that he + imagines and feigns a corporeal soul: thus confusing the name + with the thing itself. (2) I here beg that my readers will not + be in a hurry to refute this proposition; they will, I hope, + have no mind to do so, if they pay close attention to the + examples given and to what follows. + +[61a] (1) Though I seem to deduce this from experience, some + may deny its cogency because I have given no formal proof. + (2) I therefore append the following for those who may + desire it. (3) As there can be nothing in nature contrary + to nature's laws, since all things come to pass by fixed + laws, so that each thing must irrefragably produce its own + proper effect, it follows that the soul, as soon as it + possesses the true conception of a thing, proceeds to + reproduce in thought that thing's effects. (4) See below, + where I speak of the false idea. + +[64b] (1) Observe that fiction regarded in itself, only differs + from dreams in that in the latter we do not perceive the + external causes which we perceive through the senses while + awake. (2) It has hence been inferred that representations + occurring in sleep have no connection with objects external + to us. (3) We shall presently see that error is the dreaming + of a waking man: if it reaches a certain pitch it becomes delirium. + +[76z] These are not attributes of God displaying His essence, + as I will show in my philosophy. + +[76a] (1) This has been shown already. (2) For if such a being + did not exist it would never be produced; therefore the mind + would be able to understand more than nature could furnish; + and this has been shown above to be false. + +[78a] (1) That is, it is known that the senses sometimes deceive us. + (2) But it is only known confusedly, for it is not known how + they deceive us. + +[83d] (1) If the duration be indefinite, the recollection is + imperfect; this everyone seems to have learnt from nature. + (2) For we often ask, to strengthen our belief in something + we hear of, when and where it happened; though ideas + themselves have their own duration in the mind, yet, as we + are wont to determine duration by the aid of some measure + of motion which, again, takes place by aid of imagination, + we preserve no memory connected with pure intellect. + +[91e] The chief rule of this part is, as appears from the first + part, to review all the ideas coming to us through pure + intellect, so as to distinguish them from such as we imagine: + the distinction will be shown through the properties of each, + namely, of the imagination and of the understanding. + +[92f] Observe that it is thereby manifest that we cannot understand + anything of nature without at the same time increasing our + knowledge of the first cause, or God. + + + + + +End of "On the Improvement of the Understanding." + + + +Notes by Volunteer. + +1. Used, in part, with kind permission from: + http://www.physics.wisc.edu/~shalizi/Spinoza/TIE/ + +2. The text is that of the translation of the Tractatus de Intellectus + Emendatione by R. H. M. Elwes, as printed by Dover Publications + (NY):1955), ISBN 0-486-20250-X. This text is "an unabridged and + unaltered republication of the Bohn Library edition originally + published by George Bell and Sons in 1883." + +3. Paragraph Numbers, shown thus [1], are from Edwin Curley's + translation in his "The Collected Works of Spinoza", Volume 1, 1985, + Princeton University Press; ISBN 0-691-07222-1. + +4. Sentence Numbers, shown thus (1), have been added by volunteer. + +5. Spinoza's endnotes are shown thus [a]. The letter is taken from + Curley, see Note 3. + +6. Search strings are enclosed in square brackets; include brackets. + +7. HTML versions of "On the Improvement of the Understanding" are + published in the Books On-Line Web Pages; + ttp://www.cs.cmu.edu/books.html and they include: + http://www.physics.wisc.edu/~shalizi/Spinoza/TIE/ + http://www.erols.com/jyselman/teielwes.htm + + + + + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of On the Improvement of the Understanding, by +Baruch Spinoza [Benedict de Spinoza] + +*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 1016 *** |