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+*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 1016 ***
+
+On the Improvement of the Understanding
+
+(Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect)
+
+
+by
+
+Baruch Spinoza
+
+[Benedict de Spinoza]
+
+
+Translated by R. H. M. Elwes
+
+
+
+
+TABLE OF CONTENTS:
+
+
+   1   On the Improvement of the Understanding
+   3   Of the ordinary objects of men's desires
+  12  Of the true and final good
+  17  Certain rules of life
+  19  Of the four modes of perception
+  25  Of the best mode of perception
+  33  Of the instruments of the intellect, or true ideas
+  43  Answers to objections
+
+
+First part of method:
+
+  50  Distinction of true ideas from fictitious ideas
+  64  And from false ideas
+  77  Of doubt
+  81  Of memory and forgetfulness
+  86  Mental hindrances from words--and from the popular confusion
+      of ready imagination with distinct understanding.
+
+
+Second part of method:
+
+  91  Its object, the acquisition of clear and distinct ideas
+  94  Its means, good definitions
+      Conditions of definition
+  107 How to define understanding
+
+
+----------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+[Notice to the Reader.]
+
+(This notice to the reader was written by the editors of the
+Opera Postuma in 1677.  Taken from Curley, Note 3, at end)
+
+
+*This Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect etc., which we
+give you here, kind reader, in its unfinished [that is, defective]
+state, was written by the author many years ago now. He always
+intended to finish it. But hindered by other occupations, and
+finally snatched away by death, he was unable to bring it to the
+desired conclusion. But since it contains many excellent and useful
+things, which--we have no doubt--will be of great benefit to
+anyone sincerely seeking the truth, we did not wish to deprive you
+of them. And so that you would be aware of, and find less difficult
+to excuse, the many things that are still obscure, rough, and
+unpolished, we wished to warn you of them. Farewell.*
+
+
+
+
+
+[1]  (1) After experience had taught me that all the usual
+surroundings of social life are vain and futile; seeing that none
+of the objects of my fears contained in themselves anything either
+good or bad, except in so far as the mind is affected by them,
+I finally resolved to inquire whether there might be some real
+good having power to communicate itself, which would affect the
+mind singly, to the exclusion of all else: whether, in fact, there
+might be anything of which the discovery and attainment would
+enable me to enjoy continuous, supreme, and unending happiness.
+
+[2]  (1) I say "I finally resolved," for at first sight it seemed
+unwise willingly to lose hold on what was sure for the sake of
+something then uncertain.  (2) I could see the benefits which are
+acquired through fame and riches, and that I should be obliged to
+abandon the quest of such objects, if I seriously devoted myself
+to the search for something different and new.  (3) I perceived
+that if true happiness chanced to be placed in the former I should
+necessarily miss it; while if, on the other hand, it were not so
+placed, and I gave them my whole attention, I should equally fail.
+
+[3]  (1) I therefore debated whether it would not be possible to
+arrive at the new principle, or at any rate at a certainty
+concerning its existence, without changing the conduct and usual
+plan of my life; with this end in view I made many efforts,
+in vain.  (2) For the ordinary surroundings of life which are
+esteemed by men (as their actions testify) to be the highest
+good, may be classed under the three heads--Riches, Fame, and
+the Pleasures of Sense: with these three the mind is so absorbed
+that it has little power to reflect on any different good.
+
+[4]  (1) By sensual pleasure the mind is enthralled to the extent
+of quiescence, as if the supreme good were actually attained, so
+that it is quite incapable of thinking of any other object; when
+such pleasure has been gratified it is followed by extreme
+melancholy, whereby the mind, though not enthralled, is disturbed
+and dulled.  (2) The pursuit of honors and riches is likewise very
+absorbing, especially if such objects be sought simply for their
+own sake, [a] inasmuch as they are then supposed to constitute the
+highest good.
+
+[5]  (1) In the case of fame the mind is still more absorbed, for fame
+is conceived as always good for its own sake, and as the ultimate end
+to which all actions are directed.  (2) Further, the attainment of
+riches and fame is not followed as in the case of sensual pleasures by
+repentance, but, the more we acquire, the greater is our delight, and,
+consequently, the more are we incited to increase both the one and the
+other; on the other hand, if our hopes happen to be frustrated we are
+plunged into the deepest sadness.  (3) Fame has the further drawback
+that it compels its votaries to order their lives according to the
+opinions of their fellow-men, shunning what they usually shun, and
+seeking what they usually seek.
+
+[6]  (1) When I saw that all these ordinary objects of desire would
+be obstacles in the way of a search for something different and new--nay,
+that they were so opposed thereto, that either they or it would
+have to be abandoned, I was forced to inquire which would prove the
+most useful to me: for, as I say, I seemed to be willingly losing
+hold on a sure good for the sake of something uncertain.  (6:2) However,
+after I had reflected on the matter, I came in the first place to the
+conclusion that by abandoning the ordinary objects of pursuit, and
+betaking myself to a new quest, I should be leaving a good, uncertain
+by reason of its own nature, as may be gathered from what has been
+said, for the sake of a good not uncertain in its nature (for I sought
+for a fixed good), but only in the possibility of its attainment.
+
+[7] (1) Further reflection convinced me that if I could really get
+to the root of the matter I should be leaving certain evils for a
+certain good.  (2) I thus perceived that I was in a state of great
+peril, and I compelled myself to seek with all my strength for a
+remedy, however uncertain it might be; as a sick man struggling with
+a deadly disease, when he sees that death will surely be upon him
+unless a remedy be found, is compelled to seek a remedy with all his
+strength, inasmuch as his whole hope lies therein.  (7:3) All the
+objects pursued by the multitude not only bring no remedy that tends
+to preserve our being, but even act as hindrances, causing the death
+not seldom of those who possess them, [b] and always of those who
+are possessed by them.
+
+[8]  (1) There are many examples of men who have suffered persecution
+even to death for the sake of their riches, and of men who in pursuit
+of wealth have exposed themselves to so many dangers, that they have
+paid away their life as a penalty for their folly.  (2) Examples are
+no less numerous of men, who have endured the utmost wretchedness for
+the sake of gaining or preserving their reputation.  (3) Lastly,
+are innumerable cases of men, who have hastened their death through
+over-indulgence in sensual pleasure.
+
+[9]  (1) All these evils seem to have arisen from the fact, that
+happiness or unhappiness is made wholly dependent on the quality of the
+object which we love.  (2) When a thing is not loved, no quarrels will
+arise concerning it--no sadness will be felt if it perishes--no envy if
+it is possessed by another--no fear, no hatred, in short no disturbances
+of the mind. (3) All these arise from the love of what is perishable,
+such as the objects already mentioned.
+
+[10]  (1) But love towards a thing eternal and infinite feeds the
+mind wholly with joy, and is itself unmingled with any sadness,
+wherefore it is greatly to be desired and sought for with all our
+strength.  (2) Yet it was not at random that I used the words,
+"If I could go to the root of the matter," for, though what I have
+urged was perfectly clear to my mind, I could not forthwith lay
+aside all love of riches, sensual enjoyment, and fame.
+
+[11]  (1) One thing was evident, namely, that while my mind was
+employed with these thoughts it turned away from its former objects
+of desire, and seriously considered the search for a new principle;
+this state of things was a great comfort to me, for I perceived
+that the evils were not such as to resist all remedies.  (11:2) Although
+these intervals were at first rare, and of very short duration, yet
+afterwards, as the true good became more and more discernible to me,
+they became more frequent and more lasting; especially after I had
+recognized that the acquisition of wealth, sensual pleasure, or fame,
+is only a hindrance, so long as they are sought as ends not as means;
+if they be sought as means, they will be under restraint, and, far
+from being hindrances, will further not a little the end for which
+they are sought, as I will show in due time.
+
+[12]  (1) I will here only briefly state what I mean by true good,
+and also what is the nature of the highest good. (2) In order that
+this may be rightly understood, we must bear in mind that the terms
+good and evil are only applied relatively, so that the same thing
+may be called both good and bad according to the relations in view,
+in the same way as it may be called perfect or imperfect.
+(3) Nothing regarded in its own nature can be called perfect or
+imperfect; especially when we are aware that all things which come
+to pass, come to pass according to the eternal order and fixed
+laws of nature.
+
+[13]  (1) However, human weakness cannot attain to this order in its
+own thoughts, but meanwhile man conceives a human character much more
+stable than his own, and sees that there is no reason why he should
+not himself acquire such a character.  (2) Thus he is led to seek
+for means which will bring him to this pitch of perfection, and
+calls everything which will serve as such means a true good.
+(13:3) The chief good is that he should arrive, together with other
+individuals if possible, at the possession of the aforesaid
+character.  (4) What that character is we shall show in due time,
+namely, that it is the knowledge of the union existing being
+the mind and the whole of nature. [c]
+
+[14]  (1) This, then, is the end for which I strive, to attain to
+such a character myself, and to endeavor that many should attain to
+it with me.  (2) In other words, it is part of my happiness to lend
+a helping hand, that many others may understand even as I do, so
+that their understanding and desire may entirely agree with my own.
+(3) In order to bring this about, it is necessary to understand as
+much of nature as will enable us to attain to the aforesaid character,
+and  also to form a social order such as is most conducive to the
+attainment of this character by the greatest number with the least
+difficulty and danger.
+
+[15]  (1) We must seek the assistance of Moral Philosophy [d] and
+the Theory of Education; further, as health is no insignificant means
+for attaining our end, we must also include the whole science of
+Medicine, and, as many difficult things are by contrivance rendered
+easy, and we can in this way gain much time and convenience, the
+science of Mechanics must in no way be despised.
+
+[16]  (1) But before all things, a means must be devised for
+improving the understanding and purifying it, as far as may be at
+the outset, so that it may apprehend things without error, and in
+the best possible way.  (2) Thus it is apparent to everyone that I
+wish to direct all science to one end [e] and aim, so that we may
+attain to the supreme human perfection which we have named; and,
+therefore, whatsoever in the sciences does not serve to promote
+our object will have to be rejected as useless.  (3) To sum up the
+matter in a word, all our actions and thoughts must be directed to
+this one end.
+
+[17]  (1) Yet, as it is necessary that while we are endeavoring to
+attain our purpose, and bring the understanding into the right path
+we should carry on our life, we are compelled first of all to lay
+down certain rules of life as provisionally good, to wit the
+following:--
+
+I.  (2) To speak in a manner intelligible to the multitude, and to
+    comply with every general custom that does not hinder the
+    attainment of our purpose.  (3) For we can gain from the multitude
+    no small advantages, provided that we strive to accommodate
+    ourselves to its understanding as far as possible: moreover,
+    we shall in this way gain a friendly audience for the reception
+    of the truth.
+
+II. (17:4) To indulge ourselves with pleasures only in so far as they
+    are necessary for preserving health.
+
+III. (5) Lastly, to endeavor to obtain only sufficient money or other
+    commodities to enable us to preserve our life and health, and to
+    follow such general customs as are consistent with our purpose.
+
+[18]  (1) Having laid down these preliminary rules, I will betake
+myself to the first and most important task, namely, the amendment
+of the understanding, and the rendering it capable of understanding
+things in the manner necessary for attaining our end.  (2) In order
+to bring this about, the natural order demands that I should here
+recapitulate all the modes of perception, which I have hitherto
+employed for affirming or denying anything with certainty, so that
+I may choose the best, and at the same time begin to know my own
+powers and the nature which I wish to perfect.
+
+[19] (1) Reflection shows that all modes of perception or knowledge
+may be reduced to four:--
+
+I. (2) Perception arising from hearsay or from some sign which
+   everyone may name as he please.
+
+II. (3) Perception arising from mere experience--that is, form
+   experience not yet classified by the intellect, and only so called
+   because the given event has happened to take place, and we have no
+   contradictory fact to set against it, so that it therefore remains
+   unassailed in our minds.
+
+III. (19:4) Perception arising when the essence of one thing is inferred
+   from another thing, but not adequately; this comes when [f] from some
+   effect we gather its cause, or when it is inferred from some general
+   proposition that some property is  always present.
+
+IV. (5) Lastly, there is the perception arising when a thing is
+   perceived solely through its essence, or through the knowledge
+   of its proximate cause.
+
+[20] (1) All these kinds of perception I will illustrate by examples.
+(2) By hearsay I know the day of my birth, my parentage, and other
+matters about which I have never felt any doubt.  (3) By mere
+experience I know that I shall die, for this I can affirm from
+having seen that others like myself have died, though all did not
+live for the same period, or die by the same disease.  (4) I know
+by mere experience that oil has the property of feeding fire, and
+water of extinguishing it.  (5) In the same way I know that a dog
+is a barking animal, man a rational animal, and in fact nearly all
+the practical knowledge of life.
+
+[21]  (1) We deduce one thing from another as follows: when we
+clearly perceive that we feel a certain body and no other, we
+thence clearly infer that the mind is united [g] to the body,
+and that their union is the cause of the given sensation; but
+we cannot thence absolutely understand [h] the nature of the
+sensation and the union.  (2) Or, after I have become acquainted
+with the nature of vision, and know that it has the property of
+making one and the same thing appear smaller when far off than
+when near, I can infer that the sun is larger than it appears,
+and can draw other conclusions of the same kind.
+
+[22]  (1) Lastly, a thing may be perceived solely through its essence;
+when, from the fact of knowing something, I know what it is to know
+that thing, or when, from knowing the essence of the mind, I know
+that it is united to the body.  (2) By the same kind of knowledge
+we know that two and three make five, or that two lines each parallel
+to a third, are parallel to one another, &c. (3) The things which I
+have been able to know by this kind of knowledge are as yet very few.
+
+[23]  (1) In order that the whole matter may be put in a clearer
+light, I will make use of a single illustration as follows.
+(2) Three numbers are given--it is required to find a fourth,
+which shall be to the third as the second is to the first.
+(23:3) Tradesmen will at once tell us that they know what is required
+to find the fourth number, for they have not yet forgotten the rule
+which was given to them arbitrarily without proof by their masters;
+others construct a universal axiom from their experience with simple
+numbers, where the fourth number is self-evident, as in the case of
+2, 4, 3, 6; here it is evident that if the second number be
+multiplied by the third, and the product divided by the first,
+the quotient is 6; when they see that by this process the number
+is produced which they knew beforehand to be the proportional,
+they infer that the process always holds good for finding a fourth
+number proportional.
+
+[24]  (1) Mathematicians, however, know by the proof of the nineteenth
+proposition of the seventh book of Euclid, what numbers are
+proportionals, namely, from the nature and property of proportion
+it follows that the product of the first and fourth will be equal
+to the product of the second and third: still they do not see the
+adequate proportionality of the given numbers, or, if they do see it,
+they see it not by virtue of Euclid's proposition, but intuitively,
+without going through any process.
+
+[25] (1) In order that from these modes of perception the best may
+be selected, it is well that we should briefly enumerate the means
+necessary for attaining our end.
+
+I.  (2) To have an exact knowledge of our nature which we desire to
+    perfect, and to know as much as is needful of nature in general.
+
+II. To collect in this way the differences, the agreements, and the
+    oppositions of things.
+
+III. To learn thus exactly how far they can or cannot be modified.
+
+IV. To compare this result with the nature and power of man.
+    (4) We shall thus discern the highest degree of perfection
+    to which man is capable of attaining.
+
+[26] (1) We shall then be in a position to see which mode of
+perception we ought to choose.  (2) As to the first mode, it is
+evident that from hearsay our knowledge must always be uncertain,
+and, moreover, can give us no insight into the essence of a thing,
+as is manifest in our illustration; now one can only arrive at
+knowledge of a thing through knowledge of its essence, as will
+hereafter appear.  (3) We may, therefore clearly conclude that
+the certainty arising from hearsay cannot be scientific in its
+character.  (4) For simple hearsay cannot affect anyone whose
+understanding does not, so to speak, meet it half way.
+
+[27]  (1) The second mode of perception [i] cannot be said to
+give us the idea of the proportion of which we are in search.
+(2) Moreover its results are very uncertain and indefinite,
+for we shall never discover anything in natural phenomena by its
+means, except accidental properties, which are never clearly
+understood, unless the essence of the things in question be
+known first.  (3) Wherefore this mode also must be rejected.
+
+[28] (1) Of the third mode of perception we may say in a manner
+that it gives us the idea of the thing sought, and that it
+us to draw conclusions without risk of error; yet it is not by
+itself sufficient to put us in possession of the perfection we
+aim at.
+
+[29] (1) The fourth mode alone apprehends the adequate essence of
+a thing without danger of error.  (2) This mode, therefore, must be
+the one which we chiefly employ.  (3) How, then, should we avail
+ourselves of it so as to gain the fourth kind of knowledge with
+the least delay concerning things previously unknown?  (4) I will
+proceed to explain.
+
+[30] (1) Now that we know what kind of knowledge is necessary for
+us, we must indicate the way and the method whereby we may gain
+the said knowledge concerning the things needful to be known.
+(2) In order to accomplish this, we must first take care not to
+commit ourselves to a search, going back to infinity--that is,
+in order to discover the best method of finding truth, there is
+no need of another method to discover such method; nor of a third
+method for discovering the second, and so on to infinity.  (3) By
+such proceedings, we should never arrive at the knowledge of the
+truth, or, indeed, at any knowledge at all.  (30:4) The matter stands
+on the same footing as the making of material tools, which might
+be argued about in a similar way.  (5) For, in order to work iron,
+a hammer is needed, and the hammer cannot be forthcoming unless
+it has been made; but, in order to make it, there was need
+of another hammer and other tools, and so on to infinity.
+(6) We might thus vainly endeavor to prove that men have no
+power of working iron.
+
+[31]  (1) But as men at first made use of the instruments supplied
+by nature to accomplish very easy pieces of workmanship, laboriously
+and imperfectly, and then, when these were finished, wrought other
+things more difficult with less labour and greater perfection;
+and so gradually mounted from the simplest operations to the making
+of tools, and from the making of tools to the making of more complex
+tools, and fresh feats of workmanship, till they arrived at making,
+complicated mechanisms which they now possess.  (31:2) So, in like
+manner, the intellect, by its native strength, [k], makes for itself
+intellectual instruments, whereby it acquires strength for performing
+other intellectual operations, [l], and from these operations
+again fresh instruments, or the power of pushing its investigations
+further, and thus gradually proceeds till it reaches the summit
+of wisdom.
+
+[32]  (1) That this is the path pursued by the understanding may be
+readily seen, when we understand the nature of the method for
+finding out the truth, and of the natural instruments so necessary
+complex instruments, and for the progress of investigation. I thus
+proceed with my demonstration.
+
+[33]  (1) A true idea, [m], (for we possess a true idea) is something
+different from its correlate (ideatum); thus a circle is different
+from the idea of a circle. (2) The idea of a circle is not something
+having a circumference and a center, as a circle has; nor is the idea
+of a body that body itself. (3) Now, as it is something different
+from its correlate, it is capable of being understood through itself;
+in other words, the idea, in so far as its actual essence (essentia
+formalis) is concerned, may be the subject of another subjective
+essence (essentia objectiva).  [33note1] (4) And, again, this second
+subjective essence will, regarded in itself, be something real,
+capable of being understood; and so on, indefinitely.
+
+[34] (1) For instance, the man Peter is something real; the true
+idea of Peter is the reality of Peter represented subjectively,
+and is in itself something real, and quite distinct from the
+actual Peter.  (2) Now, as this true idea of Peter is in itself
+something real, and has its own individual existence, it will
+also be capable of being understood--that is, of being the
+subject of another idea, which will contain by representation
+(objective) all that the idea of Peter contains actually
+(formaliter).  (3) And, again, this idea of the idea of Peter
+has its own individuality, which may become the subject of yet
+another idea; and so on, indefinitely.  (4) This everyone may
+make trial of for himself, by reflecting that he knows what
+Peter is, and also knows that he knows, and further knows that
+he knows that he knows, &c.  (34:5) Hence it is plain that, in
+order to understand the actual Peter, it is not necessary first
+to understand the idea of Peter, and still less the idea of
+the idea of Peter.  (6) This is the same as saying that, in order
+to know, there is no need to know that we know, much less to
+know that we know that we know.  (7) This is no more necessary
+than to know the nature of a circle before knowing the nature of
+a triangle. [n].  (8) But, with these ideas, the contrary is the
+case: for, in order to know that I know, I must first know.
+
+[35] (1) Hence it is clear that certainty is nothing else than
+the subjective essence of a thing: in other words, the mode in
+which we perceive an actual reality is certainty.  (2) Further,
+it is also evident that, for the certitude of truth, no further
+sign is necessary beyond the possession of a true idea: for,
+as I have shown, it is not necessary to know that we know that
+we know.  (3) Hence, again, it is clear that no one can know
+the nature of the highest certainty, unless he possesses an
+adequate idea, or the subjective essence of a thing:
+certainty is identical with such subjective essence.
+
+[36]  (1) Thus, as the truth needs no sign--it being to possess
+the subjective essence of things, or, in other words, the ideas
+of them, in order that all doubts may be removed--it follows
+that the true method does not consist in seeking for the signs
+of truth after the acquisition of the idea, but that the true
+method teaches us the order in which we should seek for truth
+itself, [o] or the subjective essences of things, or ideas,
+for all these expressions are synonymous.
+
+[37] (1) Again, method must necessarily be concerned with
+reasoning or understanding--I mean, method is not identical
+with reasoning in the search for causes, still less is it
+the comprehension of the causes of things: it is the
+discernment of a true idea, by distinguishing it from other
+perceptions, and by investigating its nature, in order that
+we may so train our mind that it may, by a given standard,
+comprehend whatsoever is intelligible, by laying down
+certain rules as aids, and by avoiding useless mental
+exertion.
+
+[38]  (1) Whence we may gather that method is nothing else
+than reflective knowledge, or the idea of an idea; and that
+as there can be no idea of an idea--unless an idea exists
+previously,--there can be no method without a pre-existent
+idea.  (2) Therefore, that will be a good method which
+shows us how the mind should be directed, according to the
+standard of the given true idea.
+
+(38:3) Again, seeing that the ratio existing between two
+ideas the same as the ratio between the actual realities
+corresponding to those ideas, it follows that the reflective
+knowledge which has for its object the most perfect being is
+more excellent than reflective knowledge concerning other
+objects--in other words, that method will be most perfect
+which affords the standard of the given idea of the most
+perfect being whereby we may direct our mind.
+
+[39] (1) We thus easily understand how, in proportion as it
+acquires new ideas, the mind simultaneously acquires fresh
+instruments for pursuing its inquiries further. (2) For we
+may gather from what has been said, that a true idea must
+necessarily first of all exist in us as a natural instrument;
+and that when this idea is apprehended by the mind, it enables
+us to understand the difference existing between itself and
+all other perceptions.  (3) In this, one part of the method
+consists.
+
+(39:4) Now it is clear that the mind apprehends itself better
+in proportion as it understands a greater number of natural
+objects; it follows, therefore, that this portion of the method
+will be more perfect in proportion as the mind attains to the
+comprehension of a greater number of objects, and that it will
+be absolutely perfect when the mind gains a knowledge of the
+absolutely perfect being, or becomes conscious thereof.
+
+[40]  (1) Again, the more things the mind knows, the better does
+it understand its own strength and the order of nature; by
+increased self-knowledge, it can direct itself more easily, and
+lay down rules for its own guidance; and, by increased knowledge
+of nature, it can more easily avoid what is useless.  (2) And
+this is the sum total of method, as we have already stated.
+
+[41]  (1) We may add that the idea in the world of thought is in
+the same case as its correlate in the world of reality.  (2) If,
+therefore, there be anything in nature which is without connection
+with any other thing, and if we assign to it a subjective essence,
+which would in every way correspond to the objective reality,
+the subjective essence would have no connection, [p] with any
+other ideas--in other words, we could not draw any conclusions
+with regard to it.  (41:3) On the other hand, those things which are
+connected with others--as all things that exist in nature--will
+be understood by the mind, and their subjective essences will
+maintain the same mutual relations as their objective realities--that
+is to say, we shall infer from these ideas other ideas, which
+will in turn be connected with others, and thus our instruments
+for proceeding with our investigation will increase.  (4) This is
+what we were endeavoring to prove.
+
+[42]  (1) Further, from what has just been said--namely, that an
+idea must, in all respects, correspond to its correlate in the
+world of reality,--it is evident that, in order to reproduce in
+every respect the faithful image of nature, our mind must deduce
+all its ideas from the idea which represents the origin and source
+of the whole of nature, so that it may itself become the source
+of other ideas.
+
+[43]  (1) It may, perhaps, provoke astonishment that, after having
+said that the good method is that which teaches us to direct our
+mind according to the standard of the given true idea, we should
+prove our point by reasoning, which would seem to indicate that it
+is not self-evident.  (2) We may, therefore, be questioned as to
+the validity of our reasoning.  (3) If our reasoning be sound, we
+must take as a starting-point a true idea.  (4) Now, to be certain
+that our starting-point is really a true idea, we need proof.
+(5) This first course of reasoning must be supported by a second,
+the second by a third, and so on to infinity.
+
+[44]  (1) To this I make answer that, if by some happy chance anyone
+had adopted this method in his investigations of nature--that is,
+if he had acquired new ideas in the proper order, according to the
+standard of the original true idea, he would never have doubted [q]
+of the truth of his knowledge, inasmuch as truth, as we have shown,
+makes itself manifest, and all things would flow, as it were,
+spontaneously towards him.  (44:2) But as this never, or rarely,
+happens, I have been forced so to arrange my proceedings, that we
+may acquire by reflection and forethought what we cannot acquire
+by chance, and that it may at the same time appear that, for
+proving the truth, and for valid reasoning, we need no other means
+than the truth and valid reasoning themselves: for by valid
+reasoning I have established valid reasoning, and, in like measure,
+I seek still to establish it.
+
+[45]  (1) Moreover, this is the order of thinking adopted by men
+in their inward meditations.  (2) The reasons for its rare employment
+in investigations of nature are to be found in current misconceptions,
+whereof we shall examine the causes hereafter in our philosophy.
+(3) Moreover, it demands, as we shall show, a keen and accurate
+discernment.  (4) Lastly, it is hindered by the conditions of human
+life, which are, as we have already pointed out, extremely changeable.
+(5) There are also other obstacles, which we will not here inquire into.
+
+
+[46]  (1) If anyone asks why I have not at the starting-point set forth
+all the truths of nature in their due order, inasmuch as truth is
+self-evident, I reply by warning him not to reject as false any
+paradoxes he may find here, but to take the trouble to reflect on
+the chain of reasoning by which they are supported; he will then
+be no longer in doubt that we have attained to the truth.
+(2) This is why I have as above.
+
+[47] (1) If there yet remains some sceptic, who doubts of our
+primary truth, and of all deductions we make, taking such truth
+as our standard, he must either be arguing in bad faith, or we
+must confess that there are men in complete mental blindness
+either innate or due to misconceptions--that is, to some external
+influence.  (2) Such persons are not conscious of themselves.
+(3) If they affirm or doubt anything, they know not that they
+affirm or doubt: they say that they know nothing, and they say
+that they are ignorant of the very fact of their knowing nothing.
+(4) Even this they do not affirm absolutely, they are afraid of
+confessing that they exist, so long as they know nothing;
+in fact, they ought to remain dumb, for fear of haply supposing
+which should smack of truth.
+
+[48]  (1) Lastly, with such persons, one should not speak of
+sciences: for, in what relates to life and conduct, they are
+compelled by necessity to suppose that they exist, and seek
+their own advantage, and often affirm and deny, even with an
+oath.  (2) If they deny, grant, or gainsay, they know not that
+they deny, grant, or gainsay, so that they ought to be
+regarded as automata, utterly devoid of intelligence.
+
+[49] (1) Let us now return to our proposition.  (2) Up to the present,
+we have, first, defined the end to which we desire to direct all our
+thoughts; secondly, we have determined the mode of perception best
+adapted to aid us in attaining our perfection; thirdly, we have
+discovered the way which our mind should take, in order to make a good
+beginning--namely, that it should use every true idea as a standard in
+pursuing its inquiries according to fixed rules.  (49:3) Now, in order
+that it may thus proceed, our method must furnish us, first, with a
+means of distinguishing a true idea from all other perceptions, and
+enabling the mind to avoid the latter; secondly, with rules for
+perceiving unknown things according to the standard of the true idea;
+thirdly, with an order which enables us to avoid useless labor.
+(49:4) When we became acquainted with this method, we saw that,
+fourthly, it would be perfect when we had attained to the idea of the
+absolutely perfect Being.  (5) This is an observation which should be
+made at the outset, in order that we may arrive at the knowledge of
+such a being more quickly.
+
+[50] (1) Let us then make a beginning with the first part of the method,
+which is, as we have said, to distinguish and separate the true idea
+from other perceptions, and to keep the mind from confusing with true
+ideas those which are false, fictitious, and doubtful.  (2) I intend to
+dwell on this point at length, partly to keep a distinction so necessary
+before the reader's mind, and also because there are some who doubt of
+true ideas, through not having attended to the distinction between a true
+perception and all others.  (3) Such persons are like men who, while they
+are awake, doubt not that they are awake, but afterwards in a dream, as
+often happens, thinking that they are surely awake, and then finding that
+they were in error, become doubtful even of being awake.  (4) This state
+of mind arises through neglect of the distinction between sleeping and
+waking.
+
+[51]  (1) Meanwhile, I give warning that I shall not here give
+essence of every perception, and explain it through its proximate
+cause.  (2) Such work lies in the province of philosophy.  (3) I shall
+confine myself to what concerns method--that is, to the character of
+fictitious, false and doubtful perceptions, and the means of freeing
+ourselves therefrom.  (4) Let us then first inquire into the nature of
+a fictitious idea.
+
+[52]  (1) Every perception has for its object either a thing considered
+as existing, or solely the essence of a thing.  (2) Now "fiction" is
+chiefly occupied with things considered as existing.  (3) I will,
+therefore, consider these first--I mean cases where only the existence
+of an object is feigned, and the thing thus feigned is understood, or
+assumed to be understood.  (4) For instance, I feign that Peter, whom
+I know to have gone home, is gone to see me, [r] or something of that
+kind.  (5) With what is such an idea concerned?  (6) It is concerned
+with things possible, and not with things necessary or impossible.
+
+[53] (1) I call a thing impossible when its existence would imply a
+contradiction; necessary, when its non-existence would imply a
+contradiction; possible, when neither its existence nor its
+non-existence imply a contradiction, but when the necessity or
+impossibility of its nature depends on causes unknown to us, while
+we feign that it exists.  (2) If the necessity or impossibility of
+its existence depending on external causes were known to us, we
+could not form any fictitious hypotheses about it;
+
+[54] (1) Whence it follows that if there be a God, or omniscient
+Being, such an one cannot form fictitious hypotheses.  (2) For,
+as regards ourselves, when I know that I exist, [s] I cannot
+hypothesize that I exist or do not exist, any more than I can
+hypothesize an elephant that can go through the eye of a needle;
+nor when I know the nature of God, can I hypothesize that He
+or does not exist. [t]  (54:3) The same thing must be said of the
+Chimaera, whereof the nature implies a contradiction.  (4) From
+these considerations, it is plain, as I have already stated, that
+fiction cannot be concerned with eternal truths. [u]
+
+[55]  (1) But before proceeding further, I must remark, in passing,
+that the difference between the essence of one thing and the essence
+of another thing is the same as that which exists between the reality
+or existence of one thing and the reality or existence of another;
+therefore, if we wished to conceive the existence, for example,
+of Adam, simply by means of existence in general, it would be the
+same as if, in order to conceive his existence, we went back to the
+nature of being, so as to define Adam as a being.  (2) Thus, the more
+existence is conceived generally, the more is it conceived confusedly
+and the more easily can it be ascribed to a given object.
+(55:3) Contrariwise, the more it is conceived particularly, the more
+is it understood clearly, and the less liable is it to be ascribed,
+through negligence of Nature's order, to anything save its proper
+object.  (4) This is worthy of remark.
+
+[56]  (1) We now proceed to consider those cases which are commonly
+called fictions, though we clearly understood that the thing is not
+as we imagine it.  (2) For instance, I know that the earth is round,
+but nothing prevents my telling people that it is a hemisphere,
+and that it is like a half apple carved in relief on a dish; or,
+that the sun moves round the earth, and so on.  (56:3) However,
+examination will show us that there is nothing here inconsistent
+with what has been said, provided we first admit that we may have
+made mistakes, and be now conscious of them; and, further, that we
+can hypothesize, or at least suppose, that others are under the
+same mistake as ourselves, or can, like us, fall under it.  (4) We can,
+I repeat, thus hypothesize so long as we see no impossibility.
+(56:5) Thus, when I tell anyone that the earth is not round, &c.,
+I merely recall the error which I perhaps made myself, or which I
+might have fallen into, and afterwards I hypothesize that the person
+to whom I tell it, is still, or may still fall under the same mistake.
+(6) This I say, I can feign so long as I do not perceive any
+impossibility or necessity; if I truly understood either one or the
+other I should not be able to feign, and I should be reduced to saying
+that I had made the attempt.
+
+[57]  (1) It remains for us to consider hypotheses made in problems,
+which sometimes involve impossibilities.  (2) For instance, when we
+say--let us assume that this burning candle is not burning, or,
+let us assume that it burns in some imaginary space, or where there
+are no physical objects.  (3) Such assumptions are freely made,
+though the last is clearly seen to be impossible.  (4) But, though
+this be so, there is no fiction in the case.  (57:5) For, in the first
+case, I have merely recalled to memory, [x] another candle not
+burning, or conceived the candle before me as without a flame, and
+then I understand as applying to the latter, leaving its flame out
+of the question, all that I think of the former.  (6) In the second
+case, I have merely to abstract my thoughts from the objects
+surrounding the candle, for the mind to devote itself to the
+contemplation of the candle singly looked at in itself only; I can
+then draw the conclusion that the candle contains in itself no
+causes for its own destruction, so that if there were no physical
+objects the candle, and even the flame, would remain unchangeable,
+and so on.  (7) Thus there is here no fiction, but, [y] true and
+bare assertions.
+
+[58] (1) Let us now pass on to the fictions concerned with essences
+only, or with some reality or existence simultaneously.  (2) Of
+these we must specially observe that in proportion as the mind's
+understanding is smaller, and its experience multiplex, so will its
+power of coining fictions be larger, whereas as its understanding
+increases, its capacity for entertaining fictitious ideas becomes
+less.  (58:3) For instance, in the same way as we are unable, while
+we are thinking, to feign that we are thinking or not thinking, so,
+also, when we know the nature of body we cannot imagine an infinite
+fly; or, when we know the nature of the soul, [z] we cannot imagine
+it as square, though anything may be expressed verbally.  (4) But,
+as we said above, the less men know of nature the more easily can
+they coin fictitious ideas, such as trees speaking, men instantly
+changed into stones, or into fountains, ghosts appearing in mirrors,
+something issuing from nothing, even gods changed into beasts and men
+and infinite other absurdities of the same kind.
+
+[59] (1) Some persons think, perhaps, that fiction is limited by
+fiction, and not by understanding; in other words, after I have
+formed some fictitious idea, and have affirmed of my own free will
+that it exists under a certain form in nature, I am thereby
+precluded from thinking of it under any other form.  (2) For
+instance, when I have feigned (to repeat their argument) that the
+nature of body is of a certain kind, and have of my own free will
+desired to convince myself that it actually exists under this
+form, I am no longer able to hypothesize that a fly, for example,
+is infinite; so, when I have hypothesized the essence of the soul,
+I am not able to think of it as square, &c.
+
+[60] (1) But these arguments demand further inquiry. (2) First,
+their upholders must either grant or deny that we can understand
+anything. If they grant it, then necessarily the same must be
+said of understanding, as is said of fiction. (3) If they deny
+it, let us, who know that we do know something, see what they
+mean.  (4) They assert that the soul can be conscious of, and
+perceive in a variety of ways, not itself nor things which
+exist, but only things which are neither in itself nor anywhere
+else, in other words, that the soul can, by its unaided power,
+create sensations or ideas unconnected with things.  (5) In fact,
+they regard the soul as a sort of god.  (60:6) Further, they assert
+that we or our soul have such freedom that we can constrain
+ourselves, or our soul, or even our soul's freedom.  (7) For,
+after it has formed a fictitious idea, and has given its assent
+thereto, it cannot think or feign it in any other manner, but is
+constrained by the first fictitious idea to keep all its other
+thoughts in harmony therewith.  (8) Our opponents are thus driven
+to admit, in support of their fiction, the absurdities which I
+have just enumerated; and which are not worthy of rational
+refutation.
+
+[61]  (1) While leaving such persons in their error, we will take
+care to derive from our argument with them a truth serviceable for
+our purpose, namely, [61a] that the mind, in paying attention to
+a thing hypothetical or false, so as to meditate upon it and
+understand it, and derive the proper conclusions in due order
+therefrom, will readily discover its falsity; and if the thing
+hypothetical be in its nature true, and the mind pays attention
+to it, so as to understand it, and deduce the truths which are
+derivable from it, the mind will proceed with an uninterrupted
+series of apt conclusions; in the same way as it would at once
+discover (as we showed just now) the absurdity of a false
+hypothesis, and of the conclusions drawn from it.
+
+[62]  (1) We need, therefore, be in no fear of forming hypotheses,
+so long as we have a clear and distinct perception of what is
+involved.  (2) For, if we were to assert, haply, that men are
+suddenly turned into beasts, the statement would be extremely
+general, so general that there would be no conception, that is,
+no idea or connection of subject and predicate, in our mind.
+(3) If there were such a conception we should at the same time
+be aware of the means and the causes whereby the event took place.
+(4) Moreover, we pay no attention to the nature of the subject
+and the predicate.
+
+[63]  (1) Now, if the first idea be not fictitious, and if all the
+other ideas be deduced therefrom, our hurry to form fictitious ideas
+will gradually subside.  (2) Further, as a fictitious idea cannot be
+clear and distinct, but is necessarily confused, and as all confusion
+arises from the fact that the mind has only partial knowledge of a
+thing either simple or complex, and does not distinguish between the
+known and the unknown, and, again, that it directs its attention
+promiscuously to all parts of an object at once without making
+distinctions, it follows, first, that if the idea be of something
+very simple, it must necessarily be clear and distinct.  (3) For
+a very simple object cannot be known in part, it must either be
+known altogether or not at all.
+
+[64]  (1) Secondly, it follows that if a complex object be divided by
+thought into a number of simple component parts, and if each be
+regarded separately, all confusion will disappear.  (2) Thirdly, it
+follows that fiction cannot be simple, but is made up of the blending
+of several confused ideas of diverse objects or actions existent in
+nature, or rather is composed of attention directed to all such ideas
+at once, [64b] and unaccompanied by any mental assent.
+
+(64:3) Now a fiction that was simple would be clear and distinct,
+and therefore true, also a fiction composed only of distinct ideas
+would be clear and distinct, and therefore true.  (4) For instance,
+when we know the nature of the circle and the square, it is
+impossible for us to blend together these two figures, and to
+hypothesize a square circle, any more than a square soul, or things
+of that kind.
+
+[65] (1) Let us shortly come to our conclusion, and again repeat
+that we need have no fear of confusing with true ideas that which
+is only a fiction.  (2) As for the first sort of fiction of which
+we have already spoken, when a thing is clearly conceived, we saw
+that if the existence of a that thing is in itself an eternal truth
+fiction can have no part in it; but if the existence of the
+conceived be not an eternal truth, we have only to be careful
+such existence be compared to the thing's essence, and to
+consider the order of nature. (64:3) As for the second sort of
+fiction, which we stated to be the result of simultaneously
+directing the attention, without the assent of the intellect,
+to different confused ideas representing different things and
+actions existing in nature, we have seen that an absolutely
+simple thing cannot be feigned, but must be understood, and that
+a complex thing is in the same case if we regard separately the
+simple parts whereof it is composed; we shall not even be able
+to hypothesize any untrue action concerning such objects, for we
+shall be obliged to consider at the same time the causes and manner
+of such action.
+
+[66]  (1) These matters being thus understood, let us pass on to
+consider the false idea, observing the objects with which it is
+concerned, and the means of guarding ourselves from falling into
+false perceptions.  (2) Neither of these tasks will present much
+difficulty, after our inquiry concerning fictitious ideas.
+(3) The false idea only differs from the fictitious idea in the
+fact of implying a mental assent--that is, as we have already
+remarked, while the representations are occurring, there are no
+causes present to us, wherefrom, as in fiction, we can conclude
+that such representations do not arise from external objects:
+in fact, it is much the same as dreaming with our eyes open,
+or while awake.  (67:4) Thus, a false idea is concerned with, or
+(to speak more correctly) is attributable to, the existence of
+a thing whereof the essence is known, or the essence itself, in
+the same way as a fictitious idea.
+
+[67]  (1) If attributable to the existence of the thing, it is
+corrected in the same way as a fictitious idea under similar
+circumstances.  (2) If attributable to the essence, it is
+likewise corrected in the same way as a fictitious idea.
+(67:3) For if the nature of the thing known implies necessary
+existence, we cannot possible be in error with regard to its
+existence; but if the nature of the thing be not an eternal
+truth, like its essence, but contrariwise the necessity or
+impossibility of its existence depends on external causes,
+then we must follow the same course as we adopted in the
+of fiction, for it is corrected in the same manner.
+
+[68]  (1) As for false ideas concerned with essences, or even
+with actions, such perceptions are necessarily always confused,
+being compounded of different confused perceptions of things
+existing in nature, as, for instance, when men are persuaded
+that deities are present in woods, in statues, in brute beasts,
+and the like; that there are bodies which, by their composition
+alone, give rise to intellect; that corpses reason, walk about,
+and speak; that God is deceived, and so on.  (68:2) But ideas which
+are clear and distinct can never be false: for ideas of things
+clearly and distinctly conceived are either very simple
+themselves, or are compounded from very simple ideas, that is,
+are deduced therefrom.  (3) The impossibility of a very simple
+idea being false is evident to everyone who understands the nature
+of truth or understanding and of falsehood.
+
+[69]  (1) As regards that which constitutes the reality of truth,
+it is certain that a true idea is distinguished from a false one,
+not so much by its extrinsic object as by its intrinsic nature.
+(2) If an architect conceives a building properly constructed,
+though such a building may never have existed, and amy never exist,
+nevertheless the idea is true; and the idea remains the same,
+whether it be put into execution or not.  (69:3) On the other hand,
+if anyone asserts, for instance, that Peter exists, without
+knowing whether Peter really exists or not, the assertion, as far
+as its asserter is concerned, is false, or not true, even though
+Peter actually does exist.  (4) The assertion that Peter exists is
+true only with regard to him who knows for certain that Peter does
+exist.
+
+[70]  (1) Whence it follows that there is in ideas something real,
+whereby the true are distinguished from the false.  (2) This reality
+must be inquired into, if we are to find the best standard of truth
+(we have said that we ought to determine our thoughts by the given
+standard of a true idea, and that method is reflective knowledge),
+and to know the properties of our understanding.  (70:3) Neither must
+we say that the difference between true and false arises from the
+fact, that true knowledge consists in knowing things through their
+primary causes, wherein it is totally different from false knowledge,
+as I have just explained it: for thought is said to be true, if
+it involves subjectively the essence of any principle which has no
+cause, and is known through itself and in itself.
+
+[71]  (1) Wherefore the reality (forma) of true thought must exist
+in the thought itself, without reference to other thoughts; it does
+not acknowledge the object as its cause, but must depend on the
+actual power and nature of the understanding.  (2) For, if we
+suppose that the understanding has perceived some new entity which
+has never existed, as some conceive the understanding of God before
+He created thing (a perception which certainly could not arise
+any object), and has legitimately deduced other thoughts from said
+perception, all such thoughts would be true, without being
+determined by any external object; they would depend solely on the
+power and nature of the understanding.  (71:3) Thus, that which
+constitutes the reality of a true thought must be sought in the
+thought itself, and deduced from the nature of the understanding.
+
+[72]  (1) In order to pursue our investigation, let us confront
+ourselves with some true idea, whose object we know for
+certain to be dependent on our power of thinking, and to have
+nothing corresponding to it in nature.  (2) With an idea of this
+kind before us, we shall, as appears from what has just been said,
+be more easily able to carry on the research we have in view.
+(72:3) For instance, in order to form the conception of a sphere,
+I invent a cause at my pleasure--namely, a semicircle revolving
+round its center, and thus producing a sphere.  (4) This is
+indisputably a true idea; and, although we know that no sphere in
+nature has ever actually been so formed, the perception remains
+true, and is the easiest manner of conceiving a sphere.
+(72:5) We must observe that this perception asserts the rotation
+of a semicircle--which assertion would be false, if it were not
+associated with the conception of a sphere, or of a cause
+determining a motion of the kind, or absolutely, if the assertion
+were isolated.  (6) The mind would then only tend to the
+affirmation of the sole motion of a semicircle, which is not
+contained in the conception of a semicircle, and does not arise
+from the conception of any cause capable of producing such motion.
+
+(72:7) Thus falsity consists only in this, that something is
+affirmed of a thing, which is not contained in the conception
+we have formed of that thing, as motion or rest of a semicircle.
+(8) Whence it follows that simple ideas cannot be other than
+true--e.g., the simple idea of a semicircle, of motion, of rest,
+of quantity, &c.
+
+(72:9) Whatsoever affirmation such ideas contain is equal to the
+concept formed, and does not extend further.  (10) Wherefore we
+form as many simple ideas as we please, without any fear of error.
+
+[73]  (1) It only remains for us to inquire by what power our mind
+can form true ideas, and how far such power extends.  (2) It is
+certain that such power cannot extend itself infinitely.  (3) For
+when we affirm somewhat of a thing, which is not contained in the
+concept we have formed of that thing, such an affirmation shows a
+defect of our perception, or that we have formed fragmentary or
+mutilated ideas.  (4) Thus we have seen that the notion of a
+semicircle is false when it is isolated in the mind, but true when
+it is associated with the concept of a sphere, or of some cause
+determining such a motion.  (73:5) But if it be the nature of a
+thinking being, as seems, prima facie, to be the case, to form true
+or adequate thoughts, it is plain that inadequate ideas arise in us
+only because we are parts of a thinking being, whose thoughts--some
+in their entirety, others in fragments only--constitute our mind.
+
+[74]  (1) But there is another point to be considered, which was not
+worth raising in the case of fiction, but which give rise to complete
+deception--namely, that certain things presented to the imagination
+also exist in the understanding--in other words, are conceived
+clearly and distinctly.  (2) Hence, so long as we do not separate that
+which is distinct from that which is confused, certainty, or the true
+idea, becomes mixed with indistinct ideas.  (3) For instance, certain
+Stoics heard, perhaps, the term "soul," and also that the soul is
+immortal, yet imagined it only confusedly; they imaged, also, and
+understood that very subtle bodies penetrate all others, and are
+penetrated by none.  (74:4) By combining these ideas, and being at the
+same time certain of the truth of the axiom, they forthwith became
+convinced that the mind consists of very subtle bodies; that these
+very subtle bodies cannot be divided &c.
+
+[75]  (1) But we are freed from mistakes of this kind, so long as we
+endeavor to examine all our perceptions by the standard of the given
+true idea.  (2) We must take care, as has been said, to separate such
+perceptions from all those which arise from hearsay or unclassified
+experience.  (3) Moreover, such mistakes arise from things being
+conceived too much in the abstract; for it is sufficiently self-evident
+that what I conceive as in its true object I cannot apply to anything
+else.  (75:4) Lastly, they arise from a want of understanding of the
+primary elements of nature as a whole; whence we proceed without due
+order, and confound nature with abstract rules, which, although they
+be true enough in their sphere, yet, when misapplied, confound
+themselves, and pervert the order of nature.  (5) However, if we
+proceed with as little abstraction as possible, and begin from primary
+elements--that is, from the source and origin of nature, as far back
+as we can reach,--we need not fear any deceptions of this kind.
+
+[76] (1) As far as the knowledge of the origin of nature is concerned,
+there is no danger of our confounding it with abstractions.  (2) For
+when a thing is conceived in the abstract, as are all universal
+notions, the said universal notions are always more extensive in the
+mind than the number of individuals forming their contents really
+existing in nature.  (3) Again, there are many things in nature, the
+difference between which is so slight as to be hardly perceptible to
+the understanding; so that it may readily happen that such things are
+confounded together, if they be conceived abstractedly.  (4) But since
+the first principle of nature cannot (as we shall see hereafter) be
+conceived abstractedly or universally, and cannot extend further in
+the understanding than it does in reality, and has no likeness to
+mutable things, no confusion need be feared in respect to the idea of
+it, provided (as before shown) that we possess a standard of truth.
+(5) This is, in fact, a being single and infinite [76z]; in other
+words, it is the sum total of being, beyond which there is no being
+found. [76a]
+
+[77]  (1) Thus far we have treated of the false idea. We have now
+to investigate the doubtful idea--that is, to inquire what can
+cause us to doubt, and how doubt may be removed.  (2) I speak of
+real doubt existing in the mind, not of such doubt as we see
+exemplified when a man says that he doubts, though his mind does
+not really hesitate.  (77:3) The cure of the latter does not fall
+within the province of method, it belongs rather to inquiries
+concerning obstinacy and its cure.
+
+[78]  (1) Real doubt is never produced in the mind by the thing
+doubted of.  (2) In other words, if there were only one idea in
+the mind, whether that idea were true or false, there would be no
+doubt or certainty present, only a certain sensation.  (3) For an
+idea is in itself nothing else than a certain sensation. (4) But
+doubt will arise through another idea, not clear and distinct
+enough for us to be able to draw any certain conclusions with
+regard to the matter under consideration; that is, the idea which
+causes us to doubt is not clear and distinct. (5) To take an example.
+(78:6) Supposing that a man has never reflected, taught by experience
+or by any other means, that our senses sometimes deceive us, he will
+never doubt whether the sun be greater or less than it appears.
+(7) Thus rustics are generally astonished when they hear that the
+sun is much larger than the earth. (8) But from reflection on the
+deceitfulness of the senses [78a] doubt arises, and if, after
+doubting, we acquire a true knowledge of the senses, and how things
+at a distance are represented through their instrumentality, doubt
+is again removed.
+
+[79]  (1) Hence we cannot cast doubt on true ideas by the supposition
+that there is a deceitful Deity, who leads us astray even in what is
+most certain.  (2) We can only hold such an hypothesis so long as we
+have no clear and distinct idea--in other words, until we reflect
+the knowledge which we have of the first principle of all things, and
+find that which teaches us that God is not a deceiver, and until we
+know this with the same certainty as we know from reflecting on the
+are equal to two right angles.  (3) But if we have a knowledge of God
+equal to that which we have of a triangle, all doubt is removed.
+(79:4) In the same way as we can arrive at the said knowledge of a
+triangle, though not absolutely sure that there is not some
+arch-deceiver leading us astray, so can we come to a like knowledge
+of God under the like condition, and when we have attained to it,
+it is sufficient, as I said before, to remove every doubt which we can
+possess concerning clear and distinct ideas.
+
+[80]  (1) Thus, if a man proceeded with our investigations in due
+order, inquiring first into those things which should first be
+inquired into, never passing over a link in the chain of association,
+and with knowledge how to define his questions before seeking to
+answer them, he will never have any ideas save such as are very
+certain, or, in other words, clear and distinct; for doubt is only a
+suspension of the spirit concerning some affirmation or negation
+which it would pronounce upon unhesitatingly if it were not in
+ignorance of something, without which the knowledge of the matter in
+hand must needs be imperfect.  (2) We may, therefore, conclude that
+doubt always proceeds from want of due order in investigation.
+
+[81]  (1) These are the points I promised to discuss in the first part
+of my treatise on method.  (2) However, in order not to omit anything
+which can conduce to the knowledge of the understanding and its
+faculties, I will add a few words on the subject of memory and
+forgetfulness.
+
+(81:3) The point most worthy of attention is, that memory is
+strengthened both with and without the aid of the understanding.
+(4) For the more intelligible a thing is, the more easily is it
+remembered, and the less intelligible it is, the more easily do we
+forget it.  (5) For instance, a number of unconnected words is much
+more difficult to remember than the same number in the form of a
+narration.
+
+[82]  (1) The memory is also strengthened without the aid of the
+understanding by means of the power wherewith the imagination or
+the sense called common, is affected by some particular physical
+object.  (2) I say particular, for the imagination is only affected
+by particular objects.  (3) If we read, for instance, a single romantic
+comedy, we shall remember it very well, so long as we do not read
+many others of the same kind, for it will reign alone in the memory
+(4) If, however, we read several others of the same kind, we shall
+think of them altogether, and easily confuse one with another.
+(82:5) I say also, physical.  (6) For the imagination is only
+affected by physical objects.  (7) As, then, the memory is
+strengthened both with and without the aid of the understanding,
+we may conclude that it is different from the understanding,
+and that in the latter considered in itself there is neither
+memory nor forgetfulness.
+
+[83] (1) What, then, is memory? (2) It is nothing else than the
+actual sensation of impressions on the brain, accompanied with the
+thought of a definite duration, [83d] of the sensation.  (3) This
+is also shown by reminiscence.  (4) For then we think of the
+sensation, but without the notion of continuous duration; thus the
+idea of that sensation is not the actual duration of the sensation
+or actual memory.  (83:5) Whether ideas are or are not subject to
+corruption will be seen in philosophy.  (6) If this seems too
+absurd to anyone, it will be sufficient for our purpose, if he
+reflect on the fact that a thing is more easily remembered in
+proportion to its singularity, as appears from the example of
+the comedy just cited.  (83:7) Further, a thing is remembered more
+easily in proportion to its intelligibility; therefore we cannot
+help remember that which is extremely singular and sufficiently
+intelligible.
+
+
+[84]  (1) Thus, then, we have distinguished between a true idea and
+other perceptions, and shown that ideas fictitious, false, and the
+rest, originate in the imagination--that is, in certain sensations
+fortuitous (so to speak) and disconnected, arising not from the power
+of the mind, but from external causes, according as the body,
+sleeping or waking, receives various motions.
+
+(2) But one may take any view one likes of the imagination so long
+as one acknowledges that it is different from the understanding, and
+that the soul is passive with regard to it.  (3) The view taken is
+immaterial, if we know that the imagination is something indefinite,
+with regard to which the soul is passive, and that we can by some
+means or other free ourselves therefrom with the help of the
+understanding.  (4) Let no one then be astonished that before proving
+the existence of body, and other necessary things, I speak of
+imagination of body, and of its composition.  (5) The view taken is,
+I repeat, immaterial, so long as we know that imagination is something
+indefinite, &c.
+
+[85] (1) As regards as a true idea, we have shown that it is simple
+or compounded of simple ideas; that it shows how and why something
+is or has been made; and that its subjective effects in the soul
+correspond to the actual reality of its object.  (2) This conclusion
+is identical with the saying of the ancients, that true proceeds
+from cause to effect; though the ancients, so far as I know,
+never formed the conception put forward here that the soul acts
+according to fixed laws, and is as it were an immaterial automaton.
+
+[86]  (1) Hence, as far as is possible at the outset, we have
+acquired a knowledge of our understanding, and such a standard of
+a true idea that we need no longer fear confounding truth with
+falsehood and fiction.  (2) Neither shall we wonder why we
+understand some things which in nowise fall within the scope of
+the imagination, while other things are in the imagination but
+wholly opposed to the understanding, or others, again, which
+agree therewith.  (3) We now know that the operations, whereby the
+effects of imagination are produced, take place under other laws
+quite different from the laws of the understanding, and that the
+mind is entirely passive with regard to them.
+
+[87]  (1) Whence we may also see how easily men may fall into grave
+errors through not distinguishing accurately between the imagination
+and the understanding; such as believing that extension must be
+localized, that it must be finite, that its parts are really distinct
+one from the other, that it is the primary and single foundation of
+all things, that it occupies more space at one time than at another
+and other similar doctrines, all entirely opposed to truth, as we
+shall duly show.
+
+[88] (1) Again, since words are a part of the imagination--that is,
+since we form many conceptions in accordance with confused
+arrangements of words in the memory, dependent on particular bodily
+conditions,--there is no doubt that words may, equally with the
+imagination, be the cause of many and great errors, unless we
+strictly on our guard.
+
+[89] (1) Moreover, words are formed according to popular fancy and
+intelligence, and are, therefore, signs of things as existing in the
+imagination, not as existing in the understanding.  (2) This is
+evident from the fact that to all such things as exist only in the
+understanding, not in the imagination, negative names are often
+given, such as incorporeal, infinite, &c.  (3) So, also, many
+conceptions really affirmative are expressed negatively, and vice
+versa, such as uncreate, independent, infinite, immortal, &c.,
+inasmuch as their contraries are much more easily imagined, and,
+therefore, occurred first to men, and usurped positive names.
+(89:4) Many things we affirm and deny, because the nature of words
+allows us to do so, though the nature of things does not.  (5) While
+we remain unaware of this fact, we may easily mistake falsehood for
+truth.
+
+[90] (1) Let us also beware of another great cause of confusion,
+which prevents the understanding from reflecting on itself.
+(2) Sometimes, while making no distinction between the imagination
+and the intellect, we think that what we more readily imagine is
+clearer to us; and also we think that what we imagine we understand.
+(3) Thus, we put first that which should be last: the true order of
+progression is reversed, and no legitimate conclusion is drawn.
+
+[91]  [91e] (1) Now, in order at length to pass on to the second
+part of this method, I shall first set forth the object aimed at,
+and next the means for its attainment.  (2) The object aimed at
+is the acquisition of clear and distinct ideas, such as are
+produced by the pure intellect, and not by chance physical motions.
+(3) In order that all ideas may be reduced to unity, we shall
+endeavor so to associate and arrange them that our mind may, as far
+as possible, reflect subjectively the reality of nature, both as
+a whole and as parts.
+
+[92] (1) As for the first point, it is necessary (as we have said)
+for our purpose that everything should be conceived, either solely
+through its essence, or through its proximate cause.  (2) If the
+thing be self-existent, or, as is commonly said, the cause of
+itself, it must be understood through its essence only; if it be
+not self-existent, but requires a cause for its existence, it must
+be understood through its proximate cause.  (3) For, in reality,
+the knowledge, [92f] of an effect is nothing else than the
+acquisition of more perfect knowledge of its cause.
+
+[93] (1) Therefore, we may never, while we are concerned with
+inquiries into actual things, draw any conclusion from
+abstractions; we shall be extremely careful not to confound that
+which is only in the understanding with that which is in the
+thing itself. (2) The best basis for drawing a conclusion will
+be either some particular affirmative essence, or a true and
+legitimate definition.  (93:3) For the understanding cannot descend
+from universal axioms by themselves to particular things, since
+axioms are of infinite extent, and do not determine the
+understanding to contemplate one particular thing more than
+another.
+
+[94] (1) Thus the true method of discovery is to form thoughts
+from some given definition.  (2) This process will be the
+more fruitful and easy in proportion as the thing given be
+better defined.  (3) Wherefore, the cardinal point of all this
+second part of method consists in the knowledge of the conditions
+of good definition, and the means of finding them.  (4) I will
+first treat of the conditions of definition.
+
+[95]  (1) A definition, if it is to be called perfect, must
+explain the inmost essence of a thing, and must take care not
+to substitute for this any of its properties.  (2) In order
+to illustrate my meaning, without taking an example which
+would seem to show a desire to expose other people's errors,
+I will choose the case of something abstract, the definition
+of which is of little moment.  (95:3) Such is a circle.  (4) If
+a circle be defined as a figure, such that all straight lines
+drawn from the center to the circumference are equal, every
+one can see that such a definition does not in the least
+explain the essence of a circle, but solely one of its
+properties.  (5) Though, as I have said, this is of no
+importance in the case of figures and other abstractions,
+it is of great importance in the case of physical beings
+and realities: for the properties of things are not understood
+so long as their essences are unknown. (6) If the latter be
+passed over, there is necessarily a perversion of the
+succession of ideas which should reflect the succession of
+nature, and we go far astray from our object.
+
+[96]  In order to be free from this fault, the following rules
+should be observed in definition:--
+
+I.  (1) If the thing in question be created, the definition
+   must (as we have said) comprehend the proximate cause.
+   (2) For instance, a circle should, according to this rule,
+   be defined as follows: the figure described by any line
+   whereof one end is fixed and the other free.  (3) This
+   definition clearly comprehends the proximate cause.
+
+II.  (4) A conception or definition of a thing should be such
+   that all the properties of that thing, in so far as it is
+   considered by itself, and not in conjunction with other
+   things, can be deduced from it, as may be seen in the
+   definition given of a circle: for from that it clearly follows
+   that all straight lines drawn from the center to the
+   circumference are equal.  (5) That this is a necessary
+   characteristic of a definition is so clear to anyone, who
+   reflects on the matter, that there is no need to spend time
+   in proving it, or in showing that, owing to this second
+   condition, every definition should be affirmative.  (6) I
+   speak of intellectual affirmation, giving little thought to
+   verbal affirmations which, owing to the poverty of language,
+   must sometimes, perhaps, be expressed negatively, though
+   the idea contained is affirmative.
+
+[97]  The rules for the definition of an uncreated thing
+are as follows:--
+
+I.  The exclusion of all idea of cause--that is, the thing
+   must not need explanation by Anything outside itself.
+
+II. When the definition of the thing has been given, there must
+   be no room for doubt as to whether the thing exists or not.
+
+III. It must contain, as far as the mind is concerned, no
+   substantives which could be put into an adjectival form;
+   in other words, the object defined must not be explained
+   through abstractions.
+
+IV. Lastly, though this is not absolutely necessary, it should
+   be possible to deduce from the definition all the properties
+   of the thing defined.
+
+All these rules become obvious to anyone giving strict
+attention to the matter.
+
+[98]  (1) I have also stated that the best basis for drawing a
+conclusion is a particular affirmative essence.  (2) The more
+specialized the idea is, the more it is distinct, and therefore
+clear.  (3) Wherefore a knowledge of particular things should
+be sought for as diligently as possible.
+
+[99]  (1) As regards the order of our perceptions, and the manner
+in which they should be arranged and united, it is necessary that,
+as soon as is possible and rational, we should inquire whether
+there be any being (and, if so, what being), that is the cause
+of all things, so that its essence, represented in thought, may
+be the cause of all our ideas, and then our mind will to the
+utmost possible extent reflect nature. (2) For it will possess,
+subjectively, nature's essence, order, and union.  (3) Thus we
+can see that it is before all things necessary for us to deduce
+all our ideas from physical things--that is, from real entities,
+proceeding, as far as may be, according to the series of causes,
+from one real entity to another real entity, never passing to
+universals and abstractions, either for the purpose of deducing
+some real entity from them, or deducing them from some real
+entity.  (4) Either of these processes interrupts the true
+progress of the understanding.
+
+[100]  (1) But it must be observed that, by the series of causes
+and real entities, I do not here mean the series of particular
+and mutable things, but only the series of fixed and eternal
+things. (2) It would be impossible for human infirmity to follow
+up the series of particular mutable things, both on account
+their multitude, surpassing all calculation, and on account of
+the infinitely diverse circumstances surrounding one and the same
+thing, any one of which may be the cause of its existence or
+non-existence.  (3) Indeed, their existence has no connection
+with their essence, or (as we have said already) is not an
+eternal truth.
+
+[101] (1) Neither is there any need that we should understand
+their series, for the essences of particular mutable things are
+not to be gathered from their series or order of existence,
+which would furnish us with nothing beyond their extrinsic
+denominations, their relations, or, at most, their circumstances,
+all of which are very different from their inmost essence.
+(101:2) This inmost essence must be sought solely from fixed and
+eternal things, and from the laws, inscribed (so to speak) in
+those things as in their true codes, according to which all
+particular things take place and are arranged; nay, these mutable
+particular things depend so intimately and essentially (so to
+phrase it) upon the fixed things, that they cannot either be
+conceived without them.
+
+[102]  (1) But, though this be so, there seems to be no small
+difficulty in arriving at the knowledge of these particular things,
+for to conceive them all at once would far surpass the powers of
+the human understanding.  (2) The arrangement whereby one thing is
+understood, before another, as we have stated, should not be sought
+from their series of existence, nor from eternal things.  (3) For
+the latter are all by nature simultaneous.  (4) Other aids are
+therefore needed besides those employed for understanding eternal
+things and their laws.  (5) However, this is not the place to recount
+such aids, nor is there any need to do so, until we have acquired a
+sufficient knowledge of eternal things and their infallible laws,
+and until the nature of our senses has become plain to us.
+
+[103]  (1) Before betaking ourselves to seek knowledge of particular
+things, it will be seasonable to speak of such aids, as all tend to
+teach us the mode of employing our senses, and to make certain
+experiments under fixed rules and arrangements which may suffice to
+determine the object of our inquiry, so that we may therefrom infer
+what laws of eternal things it has been produced under, and may gain
+an insight into its inmost nature, as I will duly show.  (2) Here,
+to return to my purpose, I will only endeavor to set forth what seems
+necessary for enabling us to attain to knowledge of eternal things,
+and to define them under the conditions laid down above.
+
+[104]  (1) With this end, we must bear in mind what has already been
+stated, namely, that when the mind devotes itself to any thought, so
+as to examine it, and to deduce therefrom in due order all the
+legitimate conclusions possible, any falsehood which may lurk in the
+thought will be detected; but if the thought be true, the mind will
+readily proceed without interruption to deduce truths from it.
+(104:2) This, I say, is necessary for our purpose, for our thoughts
+may be brought to a close by the absence of a foundation.
+
+[105]  (1) If, therefore, we wish to investigate the first thing of
+all, it will be necessary to supply some foundation which may direct
+our thoughts thither.  (2) Further, since method is reflective
+knowledge, the foundation which must direct our thoughts can be
+nothing else than the knowledge of that which constitutes the reality
+of truth, and the knowledge of the understanding, its properties, and
+powers.  (3) When this has been acquired we shall possess a foundation
+wherefrom we can deduce our thoughts, and a path whereby the intellect,
+according to its capacity, may attain the knowledge of eternal things,
+allowance being made for the extent of the intellectual powers.
+
+[106]  (1) If, as I stated in the first part, it belongs to the nature
+of thought to form true ideas, we must here inquire what is meant by
+the faculties and power of the understanding.  (2) The chief part of
+our method is to understand as well as possible the powers of the
+intellect, and its nature; we are, therefore, compelled (by the
+considerations advanced in the second part of the method) necessarily
+to draw these conclusions from the definition itself of thought and
+understanding.
+
+[107]  (1) But, so far as we have not got any rules for finding
+definitions, and, as we cannot set forth such rules without a
+previous knowledge of nature, that is without a definition of the
+understanding and its power, it follows either that the definition
+of the understanding must be clear in itself, or that we can
+understand nothing.  (2) Nevertheless this definition is not
+absolutely clear in itself; however, since its properties, like
+all things that we possess through the understanding, cannot be
+known clearly and distinctly, unless its nature be known previously,
+understanding makes itself manifest, if we pay attention to its
+properties, which we know clearly and distinctly.  (3) Let us,
+then, enumerate here the properties of the understanding, let us
+examine them, and begin by discussing the instruments for research
+which we find innate in us. See [31]
+
+[108]  (1) The properties of the understanding which I have chiefly
+remarked, and which I clearly understand, are the following:--
+
+I. (2) It involves certainty--in other words, it knows that a thing
+   exists in reality as it is reflected subjectively.
+
+II. (108:3) That it perceives certain things, or forms some ideas
+   absolutely, some ideas from others.  (4) Thus it forms the
+   idea of quantity absolutely, without reference to any other
+   thoughts; but ideas of motion it only forms after taking into
+   consideration the idea of quantity.
+
+III. (108:5) Those ideas which the understanding forms absolutely
+   express infinity; determinate ideas are derived from other
+   ideas.  (6) Thus in the idea of quantity, perceived by means
+   of a cause, the quantity is determined, as when a body is
+   perceived to be formed by the motion of a plane, a plane by
+   the motion of a line, or, again, a line by the motion of a
+   point.  (7) All these are perceptions which do not serve
+   towards understanding quantity, but only towards determining
+   it.  (108:8) This is proved by the fact that we conceive them
+   as formed as it were by motion, yet this motion is not perceived
+   unless the quantity be perceived also; we can even prolong the
+   motion to form an infinite line, which we certainly could not do
+   unless we had an idea of infinite quantity.
+
+IV. (9) The understanding forms positive ideas before forming
+   negative ideas.
+
+V. (108:10) It perceives things not so much under the condition
+   of duration as under a certain form of eternity, and in an
+   infinite number; or rather in perceiving things it does not
+   consider either their number or duration, whereas, in imagining
+   them, it perceives them in a determinate number, duration, and
+   quantity.
+
+VI. (108:11) The ideas which we form as clear and distinct, seem
+   to follow from the sole necessity of our nature, that they
+   appear to depend absolutely on our sole power; with confused
+   ideas the contrary is the case.  (12) They are often formed
+   against our will.
+
+VII. (108:13) The mind can determine in many ways the ideas of things,
+which the understanding forms from other ideas: thus, for instance,
+in order to define the plane of an ellipse, it supposes a point
+adhering to a cord to be moved around two centers, or, again, it
+conceives an infinity of points, always in the same fixed relation
+to a given straight line, angle of the vertex of the cone, or in an
+infinity of other ways.
+
+VIII. (108:14) The more ideas express perfection of any object,
+the more perfect are they themselves; for we do not admire the
+architect who has planned a chapel so much as the architect who
+has planned a splendid temple.
+
+[109] (1) I do not stop to consider the rest of what is referred
+to thought, such as love, joy, &c.  (2) They are nothing to our
+present purpose, and cannot even be conceived unless the
+understanding be perceived previously. (3) When perception is
+removed, all these go with it.
+
+[110] (1) False and fictitious ideas have nothing positive about
+them (as we have abundantly shown), which causes them to be called
+false or fictitious; they are only considered as such through the
+defectiveness of knowledge.  (2) Therefore, false and fictitious
+ideas as such can teach us nothing concerning the essence of thought;
+this must be sought from the positive properties just enumerated;
+in other words, we must lay down some common basis from which these
+properties necessarily follow, so that when this is given, the
+properties are necessarily given also, and when it is removed,
+they too vanish with it.
+
+The rest of the treatise is wanting.
+
+----------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+Spinoza's Endnotes: Marks as per Curley, see Note 5 above.
+
+[a] (1) This might be explained more at large and more clearly:
+    I mean by distinguishing riches according as they are pursued for
+    their own sake, in or furtherance of fame, or sensual pleasure,
+    or the advancement of science and art. (2) But this subject is
+    reserved to its own place, for it is not here proper to
+    investigate the matter more accurately.
+
+[b] These considerations should be set forth more precisely.
+
+[c] These matters are explained more at length elsewhere.
+
+[d] N.B. I do no more here than enumerate the sciences necessary
+    for our purpose; I lay no stress on their order.
+
+[e] There is for the sciences but one end, to which they should
+    all be directed.
+
+[f] (1) In this case we do not understand anything of the cause
+    from the consideration of it in the effect.  (2) This is
+    sufficiently evident from the fact that the cause is only
+    spoken of in very general terms, such as--there exists then
+    something; there exists then some power, &c.; or from the
+    that we only express it in a negative manner--it is not
+    or that, &c.  (3) In the second case something is ascribed
+    to the cause because of the effect, as we shall show in an
+    example, but only a property, never an essence.
+
+[g] (1) From this example may be clearly seen what I have just
+    drawn attention to.  (2) For through this union we understand
+    nothing beyond the sensation, the effect, to wit, from which
+    we inferred the cause of which we understand nothing.
+
+[h] (1) A conclusion of this sort, though it be certain, is yet
+    not to be relied on without great caution; for unless we are
+    exceedingly careful we shall forthwith fall into error.
+    (2) When things are conceived thus abstractedly, and not
+    through their true essence, they are apt to be confused by the
+    imagination.  (3) For that which is in itself one, men imagine
+    to be multiplex.  (4) To those things which are conceived
+    abstractedly, apart, and confusedly, terms are applied which are
+    apt to become wrested from their strict meaning, and bestowed on
+    things more familiar; whence it results that these latter are
+    imagined in the same way as the former to which the terms were
+    originally given.
+
+[i] I shall here treat a little more in detail of experience,
+    and shall examine the method adopted by the Empirics,
+    and by recent philosophers.
+
+[k] By native strength, I mean that not bestowed on us by external
+    causes, as I shall afterwards explain in my philosophy.
+
+[l] Here I term them operations: I shall explain their nature
+    in my philosophy.
+
+[m] I shall take care not only to demonstrate what I have just
+    advanced, but also that we have hitherto proceeded rightly,
+    and other things needful to be known.
+
+[33note1] (1) In modern language, "the idea may become the
+    subject of another presentation."  (2) Objectivus generally
+    corresponds to the modern "subjective," formalis to the
+    modern "objective." [Trans.- Note 1]
+
+[n] (1) Observe that we are not here inquiring how the first
+    subjective essence is innate in us.  (2) This belongs to an
+    investigation into nature, where all these matters are amply
+    explained, and it is shown that without ideas neither
+    affirmation, nor negation, nor volition are possible.
+
+[o] The nature of mental search is explained in my philosophy.
+
+[p] To be connected with other things is to be produced by them,
+    or to produce them.
+
+[q] In the same way as we have here no doubt of the truth of
+    our knowledge.
+
+[r] See below the note on hypotheses, whereof we have a clear
+    understanding; the fiction consists in saying that such
+    hypotheses exist in heavenly bodies.
+
+[s] (1) As a thing, when once it is understood, manifests itself,
+    we have need only of an example without further proof.
+    (2) In the same way the contrary has only to be presented to
+    our minds to be recognized as false, as will forthwith appear
+    when we come to discuss fiction concerning essences.
+
+[t] Observe, that although many assert that they doubt whether God
+    exists, they have nought but his name in their minds, or else
+    some fiction which they call God: this fiction is not in
+    harmony with God's real nature, as we will duly show.
+
+[u] (1) I shall presently show that no fiction can concern eternal
+    truths. By an eternal truth, I mean that which being positive
+    could never become negative.  (2) Thus it is a primary and
+    eternal truth that God exists, but it is not an eternal truth
+    that Adam thinks.  (3) That the Chimaera does not exist is an
+    eternal truth, that Adam does not think is not so.
+
+[x] (1) Afterwards, when we come to speak of fiction that is
+    concerned with essences, it will be evident that fiction never
+    creates or furnishes the mind with anything new; only such things
+    as are already in the brain or imagination are recalled to the
+    memory, when the attention is directed to them confusedly and all
+    at once.  (2) For instance, we have remembrance of spoken words
+    and of a tree; when the mind directs itself to them confusedly,
+    it forms the notion of a tree speaking.  (3) The same may be said
+    of existence, especially when it is conceived quite generally as
+    an entity; it is then readily applied to all things together in
+    the memory.  (4) This is specially worthy of remark.
+
+[y] We must understand as much in the case of hypotheses put forward
+    to explain certain movements accompanying celestial phenomena;
+    but from these, when applied to the celestial motions, we any
+    draw conclusions as to the nature of the heavens, whereas this
+    last may be quite different, especially as many other causes are
+    conceivable which would account for such motions.
+
+[z] (1) It often happens that a man recalls to mind this word soul,
+    and forms at the same time some corporeal image: as the two
+    representations are simultaneous, he easily thinks that he
+    imagines and feigns a corporeal soul: thus confusing the name
+    with the thing itself.  (2) I here beg that my readers will not
+    be in a hurry to refute this proposition; they will, I hope,
+    have no mind to do so, if they pay close attention to the
+    examples given and to what follows.
+
+[61a] (1) Though I seem to deduce this from experience, some
+    may deny its cogency because I have given no formal proof.
+    (2) I therefore append the following for those who may
+    desire it.  (3) As there can be nothing in nature contrary
+    to nature's laws, since all things come to pass by fixed
+    laws, so that each thing must irrefragably produce its own
+    proper effect, it follows that the soul, as soon as it
+    possesses the true conception of a thing, proceeds to
+    reproduce in thought that thing's effects.  (4) See below,
+    where I speak of the false idea.
+
+[64b] (1) Observe that fiction regarded in itself, only differs
+    from dreams in that in the latter we do not perceive the
+    external causes which we perceive through the senses while
+    awake.  (2) It has hence been inferred that representations
+    occurring in sleep have no connection with objects external
+    to us.  (3) We shall presently see that error is the dreaming
+    of a waking man: if it reaches a certain pitch it becomes delirium.
+
+[76z] These are not attributes of God displaying His essence,
+    as I will show in my philosophy.
+
+[76a] (1) This has been shown already.  (2) For if such a being
+    did not exist it would never be produced; therefore the mind
+    would be able to understand more than nature could furnish;
+    and this has been shown above to be false.
+
+[78a] (1) That is, it is known that the senses sometimes deceive us.
+    (2) But it is only known confusedly, for it is not known how
+    they deceive us.
+
+[83d] (1) If the duration be indefinite, the recollection is
+    imperfect; this everyone seems to have learnt from nature.
+    (2) For we often ask, to strengthen our belief in something
+    we hear of, when and where it happened; though ideas
+    themselves have their own duration in the mind, yet, as we
+    are wont to determine duration by the aid of some measure
+    of motion which, again, takes place by aid of imagination,
+    we preserve no memory connected with pure intellect.
+
+[91e] The chief rule of this part is, as appears from the first
+    part, to review all the ideas coming to us through pure
+    intellect, so as to distinguish them from such as we imagine:
+    the distinction will be shown through the properties of each,
+    namely, of the imagination and of the understanding.
+
+[92f] Observe that it is thereby manifest that we cannot understand
+    anything of nature without at the same time increasing our
+    knowledge of the first cause, or God.
+
+
+
+
+
+End of "On the Improvement of the Understanding."
+
+
+
+Notes by Volunteer.
+
+1. Used, in part, with kind permission from:
+   http://www.physics.wisc.edu/~shalizi/Spinoza/TIE/
+
+2. The text is that of the translation of the Tractatus de Intellectus
+   Emendatione by R. H. M. Elwes, as printed by Dover Publications
+   (NY):1955), ISBN 0-486-20250-X.  This text is "an unabridged and
+   unaltered republication of the Bohn Library edition originally
+   published by George Bell and Sons in 1883."
+
+3. Paragraph Numbers, shown thus [1], are from Edwin Curley's
+   translation in his "The Collected Works of Spinoza", Volume 1, 1985,
+   Princeton University Press; ISBN 0-691-07222-1.
+
+4. Sentence Numbers, shown thus (1), have been added by volunteer.
+
+5. Spinoza's endnotes are shown thus [a]. The letter is taken from
+   Curley, see Note 3.
+
+6. Search strings are enclosed in square brackets; include brackets.
+
+7. HTML versions of "On the Improvement of the Understanding" are
+   published in the Books On-Line Web Pages;
+   ttp://www.cs.cmu.edu/books.html and they include:
+       http://www.physics.wisc.edu/~shalizi/Spinoza/TIE/
+       http://www.erols.com/jyselman/teielwes.htm
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of On the Improvement of the Understanding, by
+Baruch Spinoza  [Benedict de Spinoza]
+
+*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 1016 ***