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+The Project Gutenberg Etext of The Ethics, by Benedict de Spinoza
+This is Part 4
+#4 in our series by Spinoza
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+Translated by R. H. M. Elwes
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+The Ethics [Part 4]
+
+(Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata)
+
+by Benedict de Spinoza
+
+Translated by R. H. M. Elwes
+
+July, 1997  [Etext #971]
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+The Project Gutenberg Etext of The Ethics, by Benedict de Spinoza
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+
+Benedict de Spinoza, THE ETHICS
+(Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata)
+
+Translated by R. H. M. Elwes
+
+
+
+
+
+PART IV:  Of Human Bondage, or the Strength of the Emotions
+
+
+
+
+PREFACE
+
+Human infirmity in moderating and checking the emotions I name bondage: 
+for, when a man is a prey to his emotions, he is not his own master, but 
+lies at the mercy of fortune: so much so, that he is often compelled, 
+while seeing that which is better for him, to follow that which is worse. 
+Why this is so, and what is good or evil in the emotions, I propose to 
+show in this part of my treatise. But, before I begin, it would be well 
+to make a few prefatory observations on perfection and imperfection, 
+good and evil. 
+
+When a man has purposed to make a given thing, and has brought it 
+to perfection, his work will be pronounced perfect, not only by 
+himself, but by everyone who rightly knows, or thinks that he knows, 
+the intention and aim of its author. For instance, suppose anyone sees a 
+work (which I assume to be not yet completed), and knows that the aim 
+of the author of that work is to build a house, he will call the work 
+imperfect; he will, on the other hand, call it perfect, as soon as he 
+sees that it is carried through to the end, which its author had purposed 
+for it. But if a man sees a work, the like whereof he has never seen 
+before, and if he knows not the intention of the artificer, he plainly 
+cannot know, whether that work be perfect or imperfect. Such seems to 
+be the primary meaning of these terms.
+
+But, after men began to form general ideas, to think out types of 
+houses, buildings, towers, &c., and to prefer certain types to others, 
+it came about, that each man called perfect that which he saw agree 
+with the general idea he had formed of the thing in question, and called 
+imperfect that which he saw agree less with his own preconceived type, 
+even though it had evidently been completed in accordance with the idea 
+of its artificer.  This seems to be the only reason for calling natural 
+phenomena, which, indeed, are not made with human hands, perfect or 
+imperfect: for men are wont to form general ideas of things natural, no 
+less than of things artificial, and such ideas they hold as types, 
+believing that Nature (who they think does nothing without an object) 
+has them in view, and has set them as types before herself. Therefore, 
+when they behold something in Nature, which does not wholly conform to 
+the preconceived type which they have formed of the thing in question, 
+they say that Nature has fallen short or has blundered, and has left 
+her work incomplete. Thus we see that men are wont to style natural 
+phenomena perfect or imperfect rather from their own prejudices, than 
+from true knowledge of what they pronounce upon.
+
+Now we showed in the Appendix to Part I., that Nature does not work 
+with an end in view. For the eternal and infinite Being, which we call 
+God or Nature, acts by the same necessity as that whereby it exists. For 
+we have shown, that by the same necessity of its nature, whereby it 
+exists, it likewise works (I:xvi.). The reason or cause why God or Nature 
+exists, and the reason why he acts, are one and the same.  Therefore, 
+as he does not exist for the sake of an end, so neither does he act for 
+the sake of an end; of his existence and of his action there is neither 
+origin nor end. Wherefore, a cause which is called final is nothing else 
+but human desire, in so far as it is considered as the origin or cause 
+of anything. For example, when we say that to be inhabited is the final 
+cause of this or that house, we mean nothing more than that a man, 
+conceiving the conveniences of household life, had a desire to build a 
+house. Wherefore, the being inhabited, in so far as it is regarded as 
+a final cause, is nothing else but this particular desire, which is 
+really the efficient cause; it is regarded as the primary cause, 
+because men are generally ignorant of the causes of their desires. 
+They are, as I have often said already, conscious of their own actions 
+and appetites, but ignorant of the causes whereby they are determined 
+to any particular desire. Therefore, the common saying that Nature 
+sometimes falls short, or blunders, and produces things which are 
+imperfect, I set down among the glosses treated of in the Appendix to 
+Part 1.  Perfection and imperfection, then, are in reality merely modes 
+of thinking, or notions which we form from a comparison among one 
+another of individuals of the same species; hence I said above 
+(II:Def.vi.), that by reality and perfection I mean the same thing. 
+For we are wont to refer all the individual things in nature to one 
+genus, which is called the highest genus, namely, to the category of 
+Being, whereto absolutely all individuals in nature belong. Thus, in 
+so far as we refer the individuals in nature to this category, and 
+comparing them one with another, find that some possess more of being or 
+reality than others, we, to this extent, say that some are more perfect 
+than others. Again, in so far as we attribute to them anything implying 
+negation - as term, end, infirmity, etc., we, to this extent, call them 
+imperfect, because they do not affect our mind so much as the things 
+which we call perfect, not because they have any intrinsic deficiency, 
+or because Nature has blundered. For nothing lies within the scope of a 
+thing's nature, save that which follows from the necessity of the nature 
+of its efficient cause, and whatsoever follows from the necessity of the 
+nature of its efficient cause necessarily comes to pass.
+
+As for the terms good and bad, they indicate no positive quality in 
+things regarded in themselves, but are merely modes of thinking, or 
+notions which we form from the comparison of things one with another. 
+Thus one and the same thing can be at the same time good, bad, and 
+indifferent. For instance, music is good for him that is melancholy, 
+bad for him that mourns; for him that is deaf, it is neither good nor 
+bad.
+
+Nevertheless, though this be so, the terms should still be retained. 
+For, inasmuch as we desire to form an idea of man as a type of human 
+nature which we may hold in view, it will be useful for us to retain 
+the terms in question, in the sense I have indicated.
+
+In what follows, then, I shall mean by, "good" that, which we 
+certainly know to be a means of approaching more nearly to the type 
+of human nature, which we have set before ourselves; by "bad," that 
+which we certainly know to be a hindrance to us in approaching the 
+said type.  Again, we shall that men are more perfect, or more imperfect, 
+in proportion as they approach more or less nearly to the said type. 
+For it must be specially remarked that, when I say that a man passes 
+from a lesser to a greater perfection, or vice versa, I do not mean 
+that he is changed from one essence or reality to another; for instance, 
+a horse would be as completely destroyed by being changed into a man, 
+as by being changed into an insect. What I mean is, that we conceive the 
+thing's power of action, in so far as this is understood by its nature, 
+to be increased or diminished. Lastly, by perfection in general I shall, 
+as I have said, mean reality in other words, each thing's essence, in so 
+far as it exists, and operates in a particular manner, and without paying 
+any regard to its duration. For no given thing can be said to be more 
+perfect, because it has passed a longer time in existence. The duration 
+of things cannot be determined by their essence, for the essence of 
+things involves no fixed and definite period of existence; but everything, 
+whether it be more perfect or less perfect, will always be able to persist 
+in existence with the same force wherewith it began to exist; wherefore, in 
+this respect, all things are equal.
+
+
+
+DEFINITIONS.
+
+I. By good I mean that which we certainly know to be useful to us.
+
+II. By evil I mean that which we certainly know to be a hindrance 
+to us in the attainment of any good. (Concerning these terms see the 
+foregoing preface towards the end.)
+
+III. Particular things I call contingent in so far as, while regarding 
+their essence only, we find nothing therein, which necessarily asserts 
+their existence or excludes it.
+
+IV. Particular things I call possible in so far as, while regarding the 
+causes whereby they must be produced, we know not, whether such causes 
+be determined for producing them.
+
+(In I:xxxiii.note.i., I drew no distinction between possible and 
+contingent, because there was in that place no need to distinguish 
+them accurately.)
+
+V. By conflicting emotions I mean those which draw a man in different 
+directions, though they are of the same kind, such as luxury and 
+avarice, which are both species of love, and are contraries, not 
+by nature, but by accident.
+
+VI. What I mean by emotion felt towards a thing, future, present, and 
+past, I explained in III:xviii.,notes.i.,&ii., which see.
+
+(But I should here also remark, that we can only distinctly conceive 
+distance of space or time up to a certain definite limit; that is, all 
+objects distant from us more than two hundred feet, or whose distance 
+from the place where we are exceeds that which we can distinctly conceive, 
+seem to be an equal distance from us, and all in the same plane; so also 
+objects, whose time of existing is conceived as removed from the present 
+by a longer interval than we can distinctly conceive, seem to be all 
+equally distant from the present, and are set down, as it were, to the 
+same moment of time.)
+
+VII. By an end, for the sake of which we do something, I mean a desire.
+
+VIII. By virtue (virtus) and power I mean the same thing; that is 
+(III:vii.), virtue, in so far as it is referred to man, is a man's 
+nature or essence, in so far as it has the power of effecting what 
+can only be understood by the laws of that nature.
+
+
+
+AXIOM.
+
+There is no individual thing in nature, than which there is not 
+another more powerful and strong. Whatsoever thing be given, there is 
+something stronger whereby it can be destroyed.
+
+
+
+PROPOSITIONS.
+Prop. I. No positive quality possessed by a 
+false idea is removed by the presence of 
+what is true, in virtue of its being true.
+
+Proof.- Falsity consists solely in the privation of knowledge which 
+inadequate ideas involve (II:xxxv.), nor have they any positive 
+quality on account of which they are called false (II:xxxiii.);   contrariwise, in so far as they
+are referred to God, they are true 
+(II:xxxii.).  Wherefore, if the positive quality possessed by a false 
+idea were removed by the presence of what is true, in virtue of its 
+being true, a true idea would then be removed by itself, which 
+(IV:iii.) is absurd. Therefore, no positive quality possessed by a 
+false idea, &c. Q.E.D.
+
+Note.- This proposition is more clearly understood from II:xvi.Coroll.ii. 
+For imagination is an idea, which indicates rather the present disposition 
+of the human body than the nature of the external body; not indeed 
+distinctly, but confusedly; whence it comes to pass, that the mind is 
+said to err. For instance, when we look at the sun, we conceive that it 
+is distant from us about two hundred feet; in this judgment we err, so 
+long as we are in ignorance of its true distance; when its true distance 
+is known, the error is removed, but not the imagination; or, in other 
+words, the idea of the sun, which only explains tho nature of that 
+luminary, in so far as the body is affected thereby: wherefore, though 
+we know the real distance, we shall still nevertheless imagine the sun 
+to be near us. For, as we said in III:xxxv.note, we do not imagine the sun 
+to be so near us, because we are ignorant of its true distance, but because 
+the mind conceives the magnitude of the sun to the extent that the body is 
+affected thereby.  Thus, when the rays of the sun falling on the surface of 
+water are reflected into our eyes, we imagine the sun as if it were in the 
+water, though we are aware of its real position; and similarly other 
+imaginations, wherein the mind is deceived whether they indicate the 
+natural disposition of the body, or that its power of activity is 
+increased or diminished, are not contrary to the truth, and do not vanish 
+at its presence. It happens indeed that, when we mistakenly fear an evil, 
+the fear vanishes when we hear the true tidings; but the contrary also 
+happens, namely, that we fear an evil which will certainly come, and our 
+fear vanishes when we hear false tidings; thus imaginations do not vanish 
+at the presence of the truth, in virtue of its being true, but because 
+other imaginations, stronger than the first, supervene and exclude the 
+present existence of that which we imagined, as I have shown in II:.xvii.
+
+
+
+Prop. II. We are only passive, in so far as 
+we are apart of Nature, which cannot be 
+conceived by itself without other parts.
+
+Proof.- We are said to be passive, when something arises in us, whereof 
+we are only a partial cause (III:Def.ii.), that is (III:Def.i.), something 
+which cannot be deduced solely from the laws of our nature. We are passive 
+therefore in so far as we are a part of Nature, which cannot be conceived 
+by itself without other parts. Q.E.D.
+
+
+
+Prop. III. The force whereby a man persists 
+in existing is limited, and is infinitely 
+surpassed by the power of external causes.
+
+Proof.-This is evident from the axiom of this part. For, when man is 
+given, there is something else - say A - more powerful; when A is given, 
+there is something else - say B - more powerful than A, and so on to 
+infinity; thus the power of man is limited by the power of some other 
+thing, and is infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes. Q.E.D.
+
+
+
+Prop. IV. It is impossible, that man should 
+not be a part of Nature, or that he should 
+be capable of undergoing no changes, save 
+such as can be understood through his nature 
+only as their adequate cause.
+
+Proof.- The power, whereby each particular thing, and consequently man, 
+preserves his being, is the power of God or of Nature (I:xxiv.Coroll.); 
+not in so far as it is infinite, but in so far as it can be explained by 
+the actual human essence (III:vii.). Thus the power of man, in so far 
+as it is explained through his own actual essence, is a part of the 
+infinite power of God or Nature, in other words, of the essence thereof 
+(I:xxxiv.). This was our first point. Again, if it were possible, that man 
+should undergo no changes save such as can be understood solely through 
+the nature of man, it would follow that he would not be able to die, but 
+would always necessarily exist; this would be the necessary consequence 
+of a cause whose power was either finite or infinite; namely, either of 
+man's power only, inasmuch as he would be capable of removing from himself 
+all changes which could spring from external causes; or of the infinite 
+power of Nature, whereby all individual things would be so ordered, that 
+man should be incapable of undergoing any changes save such as tended 
+towards his own preservation. But the first alternative is absurd (by the 
+last Prop., the proof of which is universal, and can be applied to all 
+individual things). Therefore, if it be possible, that man should not be 
+capable of undergoing any changes, save such as can be explained solely 
+through his own nature, and consequently that he must always (as we have 
+shown) necessarily exist; such a result must follow from the infinite 
+power of God, and consequently (I:xvi.) from the necessity of the divine 
+nature, in so far as it is regarded as affected by the idea of any given 
+man, the whole order of nature as conceived under the attributes of 
+extension and thought must be deducible. It would therefore follow (I:xxi.) 
+that man is infinite, which (by the first part of this proof) is absurd.
+It is, therefore, impossible, that man should not undergo any changes save 
+those whereof he is the adequate cause. Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary.- Hence it follows, that man is necessarily always a prey to 
+his passions, that he follows and obeys the general order of nature, and 
+that he accommodates himself thereto, as much as the nature of things 
+demands.
+
+
+
+Prop. V. The power and increase of every 
+passion, and its persistence in existing 
+are not defined by the power, whereby we 
+ourselves endeavour to persist in existing, 
+but by the power of an external cause 
+compared with our own.
+
+Proof.- The essence of a passion cannot be explained through our 
+essence alone (III:Def.i.&.ii.), that is (III:vii.), the power of 
+a passion cannot be defined by the power, whereby we ourselves 
+endeavour to persist in existing, but (as is shown in II:xvi.) must 
+necessarily be defined by the power of an external cause compared 
+with our own. Q.E.D. 
+
+
+
+Prop. VI. The force of any passion or emotion 
+can overcome the rest of a man's activities or 
+power, so that the emotion becomes obstinately 
+fixed to him. 
+
+Proof.- The force and increase of any passion and its persistence in 
+existing are defined by the power of an external cause compared with 
+our own (by the foregoing Prop.); therefore (IV:iii.) it can overcome a 
+man's power, &e. Q.E.D.
+
+
+
+Prop. VII. An emotion can only be controlled 
+or destroyed by another emotion contrary 
+thereto, and with more power for controlling 
+emotion.
+
+Proof.- Emotion, in so far as it is referred to the mind, is an idea, 
+whereby the mind affirms of its body a greater or less force of existence 
+than before (cf. the general Definition of the Emotions at the end of 
+Part III.) When, therefore, the mind is assailed by any emotion, the 
+body is at the same time affected with a modification whereby its power 
+of activity is increased or diminished. Now this modification of the body 
+(IV:v.) receives from its cause the force for persistence in its being; 
+which force can only be checked or destroyed by a bodily cause (II:vi.), 
+in virtue of the body being affected with a modification contrary to 
+(III:v.) and stronger than itself (IV.Ax.); wherefore (II:xii.) the mind 
+is affected by the idea of a modification contrary to, and stronger than 
+the former modification, in other words, (by the general definition 
+of the emotions) the mind will be affected by an emotion contrary to and 
+stronger than the former emotion, which will exclude or destroy the 
+existence of the former emotion; thus an emotion cannot be destroyed nor 
+controlled except by a contrary and stronger emotion. Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary.- An emotion, in so far as it is referred to the mind, can 
+only be controlled or destroyed through an idea of a modification of 
+the body contrary to, and stronger than, that which we are undergoing. 
+For the emotion which we undergo can only be checked or destroyed by an 
+emotion contrary to, and stronger than, itself, in other words, (by the 
+general Definition of the Emotions) only by an idea of a modification 
+of the body contrary to, and stronger than, the modification which we 
+undergo.
+
+
+
+Prop. VIII. The knowledge of good and evil 
+is nothing else but the emotions of pleasure 
+or pain, in so far as we are conscious 
+thereof.
+
+Proof.- We call a thing good or evil, when it is of service or the 
+reverse in preserving our being (IV:Def.i.&.ii.), that is (III:vii.), 
+when it increases or diminishes, helps or hinders, our power of activity. 
+Thus, in so far as we perceive that a thing affects us with pleasure or 
+pain, we call it good or evil; wherefore the knowledge of good and evil 
+is nothing else but the idea of the pleasure or pain, which necessarily 
+follows from that pleasurable or painful emotion (II:xxii.). But this idea 
+is united to the emotion in the same way as mind is united to body 
+(II:xxi.); that is, there is no real distinction between this idea and 
+the emotion or idea of the modification of the body, save in conception 
+only. Therefore the knowledge of good and evil is nothing else but the 
+emotion, in so far as we are conscious thereof. Q.E.D.
+
+
+
+Prop. IX. An emotion, whereof we conceive 
+the cause to be with us at the present time, 
+is stronger than if we did not conceive the 
+cause to be with us.
+
+Proof.- Imagination or conception is the idea, by which the mind regards 
+a thing as present (II:xvii.note), but which indicates the disposition of 
+the mind rather than the nature of the external thing (II:xvi.Coroll.ii). 
+An emotion is therefore a conception, in so far as it indicates the 
+disposition of the body. But a conception (by II:xvii.) is stronger, 
+so long as we conceive nothing which excludes the present existence 
+of the external object; wherefore an emotion is also stronger or more 
+intense, when we conceive the cause to be with us at the present time, 
+than when we do not conceive the cause to be with us. Q.E.D.
+
+Note.- When I said above in III:xviii. that we are affected by the image 
+of what is past or future with the same emotion as if the thing conceived 
+were present, I expressly stated, that this is only true in so far as we 
+look solely to the image of the thing in question itself ; for the thing's 
+nature is unchanged, whether we have conceived it or not; I did not deny 
+that the image becomes weaker, when we regard as present to us other 
+things which exclude the present existence of the future object: I did 
+not expressly call attention to the fact, because I purposed to treat 
+of the strength of the emotions in this part of my work.
+
+Corollary.- The image of something past or future, that is, of a thing 
+which we regard as in relation to time past or time future, to the 
+exclusion of time present, is, when other conditions are equal, weaker 
+than the image of something present; consequently an emotion felt towards 
+what is past or future is less intense, other conditions being equal, 
+than an emotion felt towards something present.
+
+
+
+Prop. X. Towards something future, which we 
+conceive as close at hand, we are affected 
+more intensely, than if we conceive that 
+its time for existence is separated from 
+the present by a longer interval; so too 
+by the remembrance of what we conceive to 
+have not long passed away we are affected 
+more intensely, than if we conceive that 
+it has long passed away. 
+
+Proof.- In so far as we conceive a thing as close at hand, or not long 
+passed away, we conceive that which excludes the presence of the object 
+less, than if its period of future existence were more distant from the 
+present, or if it had long passed away (this is obvious) therefore (by the 
+foregoing Prop.) we are, so far, more intensely affected towards it. Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary.- From the remarks made in IV:Def.vi. of this part it follows 
+that, if objects are separated from the present by a longer period than 
+we can define in conception, though their dates of occurrence be widely 
+separated one from the other, they all affect us equally faintly.
+
+
+
+Prop. XI. An emotion towards that which 
+we conceive as necessary is, when other 
+conditions are equal, more intense than 
+an emotion towards that which impossible, 
+or contingent, or non-necessary.
+
+Proof.- In so far as we conceive a thing to be necessary, we, to that 
+extent, affirm its existence; on the other hand we deny a thing's 
+existence, in so far as we conceive it not to be necessary :xxxiii.note.i.); 
+wherefore (IV.ix.) an emotion towards that which is necessary is, other 
+conditions being equal, more intense than an emotion that which is 
+non-necessary. Q.E.D.
+
+
+
+Prop. XII. An emotion towards a thing, 
+which we know not to exist at the present 
+time, and which we conceive as possible, 
+is more intense, other conditions being 
+equal, than an emotion towards a thing 
+contingent.
+
+Proof.- In so far as we conceive a thing as contingent, we are affected 
+by the conception of some further thing, which would assert the existence 
+of the former (IV:Def.iii.); but, on the other hand, we (by hypothesis) 
+conceive certain things, which exclude its present existence. But, in 
+so far as we conceive a thing to be possible in the future, we there by 
+conceive things which assert its existence (IV:iv.), that is (III:xviii.), 
+things which promote hope or fear: wherefore an emotion towards something 
+possible is more vehement. Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary.- An emotion towards a thing, which we know not to exist in the 
+present, and which we conceive as contingent, is far fainter, than if we 
+conceive the thing to be present with us.
+
+Proof.- Emotion towards a thing, which we conceive to exist, is more 
+intense than it would be, if we conceived the thing as future V:ix.Coroll.), 
+and is much more vehement, than if the future time be conceived as far 
+distant from the present (IV:x.). Therefore an emotion towards a thing, 
+whose period of existence we conceive to be far distant from the present, 
+is far fainter, than if we conceive the thing as present; it is, 
+nevertheless, more intense, than if we conceived the thing as contingent, 
+wherefore an emotion towards a thing, which we regard as contingent, 
+will be far fainter, than if we conceived the thing to be present with us. 
+Q.E.D.
+
+
+
+Prop. XIII. Emotion towards a thing contingent, 
+which we know not to exist in the present, is, 
+other conditions being equal, fainter than an 
+emotion towards a thing past.
+
+Proof.- In so far as we conceive a thing as contingent, we are not 
+affected by the image of any other thing, which asserts the existence 
+of the said thing (IV:Def.iii.), but, on the other hand (by hypothesis), 
+we conceive certain things excluding its present existence. But, in so 
+far as we conceive it in relation to time past, we are assumed to 
+conceive something, which recalls the thing to memory, or excites the 
+image thereof (II:xviii.&Note), which is so far the same as regarding 
+it as present (II:xvii.Coroll.). Therefore (IV:ix.) an emotion towards a 
+thing contingent, which we know does not exist in the present, is fainter, 
+other conditions being equal, than an emotion towards a thing past. Q.E.D.
+
+
+
+Prop. XIV. A true knowledge of good and evil 
+cannot check any emotion by virtue of being true, 
+but only in so far as it is considered as an emotion.
+
+Proof.- An emotion is an idea, whereby the mind affirms of its body a 
+greater or less force of existing than before (by the general Definition 
+of the Emotions); therefore it has no positive quality, which can be 
+destroyed by the presence of what is true; consequently the knowledge 
+of good and evil cannot, by virtue oi being true, restrain any emotion.  
+But, in so far as such knowledge is an emotion (IV:viii.) if it have 
+more strength for restraining emotion, it will to that extent be able 
+to restrain the given emotion. Q.E.D.
+
+
+
+Prop. XV. Desire arising from the 
+knowledge of good and bad can be 
+quenched or checked by many of the 
+other desires arising from the 
+emotions whereby we are assailed.
+
+Proof.- From the true knowledge of good and evil, in so far as it is an 
+emotion, necessarily arises desire (Def. of the Emotions, i.), the strength 
+of which is proportioned to the strength of the emotion wherefrom it arises 
+(III:xxxvii.). But, inasmuch as this desire arises (by hypothesis) from the 
+fact of our truly understanding anything, it follows that it is also 
+present with us, in so far as we are active (III:i.), and must therefore 
+be understood through our essence only (III:Def.ii.); consequently 
+(III:vii.) its force and increase can be defined solely by human power. 
+Again, the desires arising from the emotions whereby we are assailed are 
+stronger, in proportion as the said emotions are more vehement; wherefore 
+their force and increase must be defined solely by the power of external 
+causes, which, when compared with our own power, indefinitely surpass it 
+(IV:iii.); hence the desires arising from like emotions may be more 
+vehement, than the desire which arises from a true knowledge of good and 
+evil, and may, consequently, control or quench it. Q.E.D.
+
+
+
+Prop. XVI. Desire arising from the knowledge 
+of good and evil, in so far as such knowledge 
+regards what is future, may be more easily 
+controlled or quenched, than the desire for 
+what is agreeable at the present moment.
+
+Proof.- Emotion towards a thing, which we conceive as future, is fainter 
+than emotion towards a thing that is present (IV:ix.Coroll.). But desire, 
+which arises from the true knowledge of good and evil, though it be 
+concerned with things which are good at the moment, can be quenched 
+or controlled by any headstrong desire (by the last Prop., the proof 
+whereof is of universal application). Wherefore desire arising from 
+such knowledge, when concerned with the future, can be more easily 
+controlled or quenched, &c. Q.E.D.
+
+
+
+Prop. XVII. Desire arising from the true 
+knowledge of good and evil, in so far as 
+such knowledge is concerned with what is 
+contingent, can be controlled far more 
+easily still, than desire for things 
+that are present.
+
+Proof.- This Prop. is proved in the same way as the last Prop. from 
+IV:xii.Coroll.
+
+Note.- I think I have now shown the reason, why men are moved by opinion 
+more readily than by true reason, why it is that the true knowledge of good 
+and evil stirs up conflicts in the soul, and often yields to every kind of 
+passion. This state of things gave rise to the exclamation of the poet: 
+(Ov. Met. vii.20, "Video meliora proboque, Deteriora sequor.")
+
+    The better path I gaze at and approve, 
+
+   The worse - I follow."
+Ecclesiastes seems to have had the same thought in his mind, when he says, 
+"He who increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow." I have not written the 
+above with the object of drawing the conclusion, that ignorance is more 
+excellent than knowledge, or that a wise man is on a par with a fool in 
+controlling his emotions, but because it is necessary to know the power 
+and the infirmity of our nature, before we can determine what reason can 
+do in restraining the emotions, and what is beyond her power. I have said, 
+that in the present part I shall merely treat of human infirmity. The 
+power of reason over the emotions I have settled to treat separately.
+
+
+
+Prop. XVIII. Desire arising from pleasure is, 
+other conditions being equal, stronger than 
+desire arising from pain.
+
+Proof.- Desire is the essence of a man (Def. of the Emotions, i.), 
+that is, the endeavour whereby a man endeavours to persist in his own 
+being. Wherefore desire arising from pleasure is, by the fact of 
+pleasure being felt, increased or helped; on the contrary, desire 
+arising from pain is, by the fact of pain being felt, diminished or 
+hindered; hence the force of desire arising from pleasure must be 
+defined by human power together with the power of an external cause, 
+whereas desire arising from pain must be defined by human power only. 
+Thus the former is the stronger of the two. Q.E.D.
+
+Note.- In these few remarks I have explained the causes of human infirmity 
+and inconstancy, and shown why men do not abide by the precepts of reason. 
+It now remains for me to show what course is marked out for us by reason, 
+which of the emotions are in harmony with the rules of human reason, and 
+which of them are contrary thereto.
+
+But, before I begin to prove my Propositions in detailed geometrical 
+fashion, it is advisable to sketch them briefly in advance, so that 
+everyone may more readily grasp my meaning.
+
+As reason makes no demands contrary to nature, it demands, that every 
+man should love himself, should seek that which is useful to him - I mean, 
+that which is really useful to him, should desire everything which really 
+brings man to greater perfection, and should, each for himself, endeavour 
+as far as he can to preserve his own being. This is as necessarily true, 
+as that a whole is greater than its part. (Cf. III:iv.)
+
+Again, as virtue is nothing else but action in accordance with the 
+laws of one's own nature (IV:Def.viii.), and as no one endeavours to 
+preserve his own being, except in accordance with the laws of his own 
+nature, it follows, first, that the foundation of virtue is the endeavour 
+to preserve one's own being, and that happiness consists in man's power 
+of preserving, his own being; secondly, that virtue is to be desired for 
+its own sake, and that there is nothing more excellent or more useful to 
+us, for the sake of which we should desire it; thirdly and lastly that 
+suicides are weak-minded, and are overcome by external causes repugnant to 
+their nature. Further, it follows from Postulate iv. Part.II., that we can 
+never arrive at doing without all external things for the preservation of 
+our being or living, so as to have no relations with things 
+which are outside ourselves. Again, if we consider our mind, we see that 
+our intellect would be more imperfect, if mind were alone, and could 
+understand nothing besides itself. There are, then, many things outside 
+ourselves, which are useful to us, and are, therefore, to be desired. 
+Of such none can be discerned more excellent, than those which are in 
+entire agreement with our nature. For if, for example, two individuals 
+of entirely the same nature are united, they form a combination twice 
+as powerful as either of them singly.
+
+Therefore, to man there is nothing more useful than man - nothing, 
+I repeat, more excellent for preserving their being can be wished for 
+by men, than that all should so in all points agree, that the minds and 
+bodies of all should form, as it were, one single mind and one single 
+body, and that all should, with one consent, as far as they are able, 
+endeavour to preserve their being, and all with one consent seek what is 
+useful to them all. Hence, men who are governed by reason - that is, who 
+seek what is useful to them in accordance with reason, desire for 
+themselves nothing, which they do not also desire for the rest of mankind, 
+and, consequently, are just, faithful, and honourable in their conduct.
+
+Such are the dictates of reason, which I purposed thus briefly to 
+indicate, before beginning to prove them in greater detail. I have taken 
+this course, in order, if possible, to gain the attention of those who 
+believe, that the principle that every man is bound to seek what is useful 
+for himself is the foundation of impiety, rather than of piety and virtue. 
+
+Therefore, after briefly showing that the contrary is the case, I go 
+on to prove it by, the same method, as that whereby I have hitherto 
+proceeded.
+
+
+
+Prop. XIX. Every man, by the laws of his 
+nature, necessarily desires or shrinks 
+from that which he deems to be good or bad.
+
+Proof.- The knowledge of good and evil is (IV:viii.) the emotion of 
+pleasure or pain, in so far as we are conscious thereof; therefore, 
+every man necessarily desires what he thinks good, and shrinks from 
+what he thinks bad. Now this appetite is nothing else but man's nature 
+or essence (Cf. the Definition of Appetite, III.ix.note, and Def. of 
+the Emotions, i.). Therefore, every man, solely by the laws of his 
+nature, desires the one, and shrinks from the other, &c. Q.E.D. 
+
+
+
+Prop. XX. The more every man endeavours, 
+and is able to seek what is useful to him - 
+in other words, to preserve his own being - 
+the more is he endowed with virtue; on the 
+contrary, in proportion as a man neglects 
+to seek what is useful to him, that is, to 
+preserve his own being, he is wanting in power.
+
+Proof.- Virtue is human power, which is defined solely by man's essence 
+(IV:Def.viii.), that is, which is defined solely by the endeavour made by 
+man to persist in his own being. Wherefore, the more a man endeavours, 
+and is able to preserve his own being, the more is he endowed with virtue, 
+and, consequently (III:iv.&,vi.), in so far as a man neglects to 
+preserve his own being, he is wanting in power. Q.E.D. 
+
+Note.- No one, therefore, neglects seeking his own good, or preserving his 
+own being, unless he be overcome by causes external and foreign to his 
+nature. No one, I say, from the necessity of his own nature, or otherwise 
+than under compulsion from external causes, shrinks from food, or kills 
+himself: which latter may be done in a variety of ways. A man, for 
+instance, kills himself under the compulsion of another man, who twists 
+round his right hand, wherewith he happened to have taken up a sword, and 
+forces him to turn the blade against his own heart; or, again, he may be 
+compelled, like Seneca, by a tyrant's command, to open his own veins - 
+that is, to escape a greater evil by incurring, a lesser; or, lastly, 
+latent external causes may so disorder his imagination, and so affect his 
+body, that it may assume a nature contrary to its former one, and whereof 
+the idea cannot exist in the mind (III:x.) But that a man, from the 
+necessity of his own nature, should endeavour to become non-existent, is 
+as impossible as that something should be made out of nothing, as everyone 
+will see for himself, after a little reflection.
+
+
+
+Prop. XXI. No one can desire to be blessed, 
+to act rightly, and to live rightly, without 
+at the same time wishing to be, act, and to 
+live - in other words, to actually exist.
+
+Proof.- The proof of this proposition, or rather the proposition itself, 
+is self-evident, and is also plain from the definition of desire. For the 
+desire of living, acting, &C., blessedly or rightly, is (Def. of the 
+Emotions, i.) the essence of man - that is (III:vii.), the endeavour 
+made by everyone to preserve his own being. Therefore, no one can 
+desire, &c. Q.E.D.
+
+
+
+Prop. XXII. No virtue can be conceived 
+as prior to this endeavour to preserve 
+one's own being.
+
+Proof.- The effort for self-preservation is the essence of a thing 
+(III:vii.); therefore, if any virtue could be conceived as prior 
+thereto, the essence of a thing would have to be conceived as 
+prior to itself, which is obviously absurd. Therefore no virtue, &c. 
+Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary.- The effort for self-preservation is the first and only 
+foundation of virtue. For prior to this principle nothing can be 
+conceived, and without it no virtue can be conceived.
+
+
+
+Prop. XXIII. Man, in so far as he is 
+determined to a particular action 
+because he has inadequate ideas, 
+cannot be absolutely said to act in 
+obedience to virtue; he can only be 
+so described, in so far as he is 
+determined for the action because 
+he understands.
+
+Proof.- In so far as a man is determined to an action through having 
+inadequate ideas, he is passive (III:i.), that is (III:Def.i., &iii.), 
+he does something, which cannot be perceived solely through his essence, 
+that is (by IV:Def.viii.), which does not follow from his virtue. But, 
+in so far as he is determined for an action because he understands, he 
+is active; that is, he does something, which is perceived through his 
+essence alone, or which adequately follows from his virtue. Q.E.D.
+
+
+
+Prop. XXIV. To act absolutely in obedience 
+to virtue is in us the same thing as to act, 
+to live, or to preserve one's being (these 
+three terms are identical in meaning) in 
+accordance with the dictates of reason on the 
+basis of seeking what is useful to one's self.
+
+Proof.- To act absolutely in obedience to virtue is nothing else but 
+to act according to the laws of one's own nature. But we only act, in 
+so far as we understand (III:iii.) : therefore to act in obedience to 
+virtue is in us nothing else but to act, to live, or to preserve one's 
+being in obedience to reason, and that on the basis of seeking what is 
+useful for us (IV:xxii.Coroll.). Q.E.D.
+
+
+
+Prop. XXV. No one wishes to preserve his 
+being for the sake of anything else.
+
+Proof.- The endeavour, wherewith everything endeavours to persist in its 
+being, is defined solely by the essence of the thing itself (III:vii.); 
+from this alone, and not from the essence of anything else, it necessarily 
+follows (III:vi.) that everyone endeavours to preserve his being. 
+Moreover, this proposition is plain from IV:xxii.Coroll., for if a man 
+should endeavour to preserve his being for the sake of anything else, the 
+last-named thing would obviously be the basis of virtue, which, by the 
+foregoing corollary, is absurd. Therefore no one, &c. Q.E.D.
+
+
+
+Prop. XXVI. Whatsoever we endeavour in 
+obedience to reason is nothing further 
+than to understand; neither does the mind, 
+in so far as it makes use of reason, judge 
+anything to be useful to it, save such 
+things as are conducive to understanding.
+
+Proof.- The effort for self-preservation is nothing else but the essence 
+of the thing in question (III:vii.), which, in so far as it exists such 
+as it is, is conceived to have force for continuing in existence (III:vi.) 
+and doing such things as necessarily follow from its given nature (see the 
+Def. of Appetite, II:ix.Note). But the essence of reason is nought else but 
+our mind, in so far as it clearly and distinctly understands (see the 
+definition in II:xl.Note:ii.) ; therefore (III:xl.) whatsoever we endeavour 
+in obedience to reason is nothing else but to understand. Again, since this 
+effort of the mind wherewith the mind endeavours, in so far as it reasons, 
+to preserve its own being is nothing else but understanding; this effort 
+at understanding is (IV:xxii.Coroll.) the first and single basis of virtue, 
+nor shall we endeavour to understand things for the sake of any ulterior 
+object (IV:xxv.); on the other hand, the mind, in so far as it reasons, 
+will not be able to conceive any good for itself, save such things as are 
+conducive to understanding.
+
+
+
+Prop. XXVII. We know nothing to be certainly 
+good or evil, save such things as really 
+conduce to understanding, or such as are 
+able to hinder us from understanding.
+
+Proof.- The mind, in so far as it reasons, desires nothing beyond 
+understanding, and judges nothing to be useful to itself, save such 
+things as conduce to understanding (by the foregoing Prop.). But the 
+mind (II:xli.&Note) cannot possess certainty concerning anything, 
+except in so far as it has adequate ideas, or (what by II:xl.Note, 
+is the same thing) in so far as it reasons. Therefore we know nothing 
+to be good or evil save such things as really conduce, &c. Q.E.D.
+
+
+
+Prop. XXVIII. The mind's highest good is 
+the knowledge of God, and the mind's 
+highest virtue is to know God.
+
+Proof.- The mind is not capable of understanding anything higher than God, 
+that is (I:Def.vi.), than a Being absolutely infinite, and without which 
+(I:xv.) nothing can either be or be conceived; therefore (IV:xxvi., 
+&xxvii.), the mind's highest utility or (IV:Def.i.) good is the knowledge
+of God. Again, the mind is active, only in so far as it understands, and 
+only to the same extent can it be said absolutely to act virtuously. The 
+mind's absolute virtue is therefore to understand. Now, as we have already 
+shown, the highest that the mind can understand is God; therefore the 
+highest virtue of the mind is to understand or to know God. Q.E.D.
+
+
+
+Prop. XXIX. No individual thing, which is 
+entirely different from our own nature, 
+can help or check our power of activity, and 
+absolutely nothing can do us good or harm, 
+unless it has something in common with our nature.
+
+Proof.- The power of every individual thing, and consequently the power of 
+man, whereby he exists and operates, can only be determined by an 
+individual thing (I:xxviii.), whose nature (II:vi.) must be understood 
+through the same nature as that, through which human nature is conceived. 
+Therefore our power of activity, however it be conceived, can be determined 
+and consequently helped or hindered by the power of any other individual 
+thing, which has something in common with us, but not by the power of 
+anything, of which the nature is entirely different from our own; and 
+since we call good or evil that which is the cause of pleasure or pain 
+(IV:viii.), that is (III:xi.Note), which increases or diminishes, helps 
+or hinders, our power of activity; therefore, that which is entirely, 
+different from our nature can neither be to us good nor bad. Q.E.D.
+
+
+
+Prop. XXX. A thing cannot be bad for us 
+through the quality which it has in common 
+with our nature, but it is bad for us in so 
+far as it is contrary to our nature. 
+
+Proof.- We call a thing bad when it is the cause of pain (IV:viii.), that 
+is (by the Def., which see in III:xi.Note), when it diminishes or checks 
+our power of action. Therefore, if anything were bad for us through that 
+quality which it has in common with our nature, it would be able 
+itself to diminish or check that which it has in common with our nature, 
+which (III:iv.) is absurd. Wherefore nothing can be bad for us through 
+that quality which it has in common with us, but, on the other hand, in 
+so far as it is bad for us, that is (as we have just shown), in so far as  
+it can diminish or check our power of action, it is contrary to our nature. 
+Q.E.D.
+
+
+
+Prop. XXXI. In so far as a thing is in harmony 
+with our nature, it is necessarily good.
+
+Proof.- In so far as a thing is in harmony with our nature, it cannot be 
+bad for it. It will therefore necessarily be either good or indifferent. 
+If it be assumed that it be neither good nor bad, nothing will follow from 
+its nature (IV:Def.i.), which tends to the preservation of our nature, 
+that is (by the hypothesis), which tends to the preservation of the thing 
+itself; but this (III:vi.) is absurd; therefore, in so far as a thing is 
+in harmony with our nature, it is necessarily good. Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary.- Hence it follows, that, in proportion as a thing is in harmony 
+with our nature, so is it more useful or better for us, and vice versa, in 
+proportion as a thing is more useful for us, so is it more in harmony with 
+our nature. For, in so far as it is not in harmony with our nature, it 
+will necessarily be different therefrom or contrary thereto. If different, 
+it can neither be good nor bad (IV:xxix.); if contrary, it will be contrary 
+to that which is in harmony with our nature, that is, contrary to what is 
+good - in short, bad. Nothing, therefore, can be good, except in so far as 
+it is in harmony with our nature; and hence a thing is useful, in proportion 
+as it is in harmony with our nature, and vice versa. Q.E.D.
+
+
+
+Prop. XXXII. In so far as men are a prey 
+to passion, they cannot, in that respect, 
+be said to be naturally in harmony.
+
+Proof. Things, which are said to be in harmony naturally, are understood to 
+agree in power (III:vii.), not in want of power or negation, and 
+consequently not in passion (III:iii.Note); wherefore men, in so far as 
+they are a prey to their passions, cannot be said to be naturally in 
+harmony. Q.E.D.
+
+Note.- This is also self-evident; for, if we say that white and black only 
+agree in the fact that neither is red, we absolutely affirm that the do not 
+agree in any respect. So, if we say that a man and a stone only agree in the 
+fact that both are finite - wanting in power, not existing by the necessity 
+of their own nature, or, lastly, indefinitely surpassed by the power of 
+external causes - we should certainly affirm that a man and a stone are in 
+no respect alike; therefore, things which agree only in negation, or in 
+qualities which neither possess, really agree in no respect.
+
+
+
+Prop. XXXIII. Men can differ in nature, 
+in so far as they are assailed by those 
+emotions, which are passions, or passive 
+states; and to this extent one and the 
+same man is variable and inconstant.
+
+Proof.- The nature or essence of the emotions cannot be explained solely 
+through our essence or nature (III:Def.i.&ii.), but it must be defined by 
+the power, that is (III:vii.), by the nature of external causes in 
+comparison with our own; hence it follows, that there are as many kinds of 
+each emotion as there are external objects whereby we are affected 
+(III:lvi.), and that men may be differently affected by one and the same 
+object (III:li), and to this extent differ in nature; lastly, that one and 
+the same man may be differently affected towards the same object, and may 
+therefore be variable and inconstant. Q.E.D.
+
+
+
+Prop. XXXIV. In so far as men are assailed 
+by emotions which are passions, they can be 
+contrary one to another.
+
+Proof.- A man, for instance Peter, can be the cause of Paul's feeling pain, 
+because he (Peter) possesses something similar to that which Paul hates 
+(III:xvi.), or because Peter has sole possession of a thing which Paul also 
+loves (III:xxxii.&Note), or for other causes (of which the chief are 
+enumerated in III:lv.Note) ; it may therefore happen that Paul should hate 
+Peter (Def. of Emotions: vii.), consequently it may easily happen also, that 
+Peter should hate Paul in return, and that each should endeavour to do the 
+other an injury, (III:xxxix.), that is (IV:xxx.), that they should be 
+contrary one to another. But the emotion of pain is always a passion 
+or passive state (III:lix.); hence men, in so far as they are assailed by 
+emotions which are passions, can be contrary one to another. Q.E.D.
+
+Note.- I said that Paul may hate Peter, because he conceives that Peter 
+possesses something which he (Paul) also loves; from this it seems, at first 
+sight, to follow, that these two men, through both loving the same thing, 
+and, consequently, through agreement of their respective natures, stand in 
+one another's way; if this were so, II:xxx. and II:xxxi. would be untrue. 
+But if we give the matter our unbiased attention, we shall see that the 
+discrepancy vanishes. For the two men are not in one another's way in 
+virtue of the agreement of their natures, that is, through both loving the 
+same thing, but in virtue of one differing from the other. For, in so far 
+as each loves the same thing, the love of each is fostered thereby 
+(III:xxxi.), that is (Def. of the Emotions: vi.) the pleasure of each is 
+fostered thereby. Wherefore it is far from being the case, that they are 
+at variance through both loving the same thing, and through the agreement 
+in their natures. The cause for their opposition lies, as I have said, 
+solely in the fact that they are assumed to differ. For we assume that 
+Peter has the idea of the loved object as already in his possession, while 
+Paul has the idea of the loved object as lost. Hence the one man will be 
+affected with pleasure, the other will be affected with pain, and thus they 
+will be at variance one with another. We can easily show in like manner, 
+that all other causes of hatred depend solely on differences, and not on 
+the agreement between men's natures.
+
+
+
+Prop. XXXV. In so far only as men live 
+in obedience to reason, do they always 
+necessarily agree in nature.
+
+Proof.- In so far as men are assailed by emotions that are passions, they 
+can be different in nature (IV:xxxiii.), and at variance one with another. 
+But men are only said to be active, in so far as they act in obedience to 
+reason (III:iii.); therefore, what so ever follows from human nature in so 
+far as it is defined by reason must (III:Def.ii.) be understood solely 
+through human nature as its proximate cause. But, since every man by the 
+laws of his nature desires that which he deems good, and endeavours to 
+remove that which he deems bad (IV:xix.); and further, since that which we, 
+in accordance with reason, deem good or bad, necessarily is good 
+or bad (II:xli.); it follows that men, in so far as they live in obedience 
+to reason, necessarily do only such things as are necessarily good for 
+human nature, and consequently for each individual man (IV:xxxi.Coroll.); 
+in other words, such things as are in harmony with each man's nature. 
+Therefore, men in so far as they live in obedience to reason, necessarily 
+live always in harmony one with another. Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary I - There is no individual thing in nature, which is 
+more useful to man, than a man who lives in obedience to reason. For that 
+thing is to man most useful, which is most in harmony with his nature 
+(IV:xxxi.Coroll.); that is, obviously, man. But man acts absolutely 
+according to the laws of his nature, when he lives in obedience to reason 
+(III:Def.ii.), and to this extent only is always necessarily in harmony 
+with the nature of another man (by the last Prop.); wherefore among 
+individual things nothing is more useful to man, than a man who lives in 
+obedience to reason. Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary II.- As every man seeks most that which is useful to him, so are 
+men most useful one to another. For the more a man seeks what is useful to 
+him and endeavours to preserve himself, the more is he endowed with virtue 
+(IV:xx.), or, what is the same thing (IV:Def.viii.), the more is he endowed 
+with power to act according to the laws of his own nature, that is to live 
+in obedience to reason. But men are most in natural harmony, when they live 
+in obedience to reason (by the last Prop.); therefore (by the foregoing 
+Coroll.) men will be most useful one to another, when each seeks most that 
+which is useful to him. Q.E.D.
+
+Note.- What we have just shown is attested by experience so conspicuously, 
+that it is in the mouth of nearly everyone: "Man is to man a God." Yet it 
+rarely happens that men live in obedience to reason, for things are so 
+ordered among them, that they are generally envious and troublesome one to 
+another. Nevertheless they are scarcely able to lead a solitary life, 
+so that the definition of man as a social animal has met with general 
+assent; in fact, men do derive from social life much more convenience than 
+injury. Let satirists then laugh their fill at human affairs, let 
+theologians rail, and let misanthropes praise to their utmost the life of 
+untutored rusticity, let them heap contempt on men and praises on beasts; 
+when all is said, they will find that men can provide for their wants much 
+more easily by mutual help, and that only by uniting their forces can they 
+escape from the dangers that on every side beset them: not to say how much 
+more excellent and worthy of our knowledge it is, to study the actions of 
+men than the actions of beasts. But I will treat of this more at 
+length elsewhere.
+
+
+
+Prop. XXXVI. The highest good of those 
+who follow virtue is common to all, 
+and therefore all can equally rejoice 
+therein.
+
+Proof.- To act virtuously is to act in obedience with reason (IV:xxiv.), 
+and whatsoever we endeavour to do in obedience to reason is to understand 
+(IV:xxvi.); therefore (IV:xxviii.) the highest good for those who follow 
+after virtue is to know God; that is (II:xlvii.&Note) a good which is 
+common to all and can be possessed. by all men equally, in so far as they 
+are of the same nature. Q.E.D.
+
+Note.- Someone may ask how it would be, if the highest good of those who 
+follow after virtue were not common to all? Would it not then follow, as 
+above (IV:xxxiv.), that men living in obedience to reason, that is 
+(IV:xxxv.), men in so far as they agree in nature, would be at variance 
+one with another? To such an inquiry, I make answer, that it follows not 
+accidentally but from the very nature of reason, that main's highest good 
+is common to all, inasmuch as it is deduced from the very essence of man, 
+in so far as defined by reason; and that a man could neither be, nor be 
+conceived without the power of taking pleasure in this highest good. For 
+it belongs to the essence of the human mind (II:xlvii.), to have an 
+adequate knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God.
+
+
+
+Prop. XXXVII. The good which every man, 
+who follows after virtue, desires for 
+himself he will also desire for other 
+men, and so much the more, in proportion 
+as he has a greater knowledge of God.
+
+Proof.- Men, in so far as they live in obedience to reason, are most 
+useful to their fellow men (IV:xxxv;Coroll.i.); therefore (IV:xix.), 
+we shall in obedience to reason necessarily endeavour to bring about that 
+men should live in obedience to reason. But the good which every man, in 
+so far as he is guided by reason, or, in other words, follows after virtue, 
+desires for himself, is to understand (IV:xxvi.); wherefore the good, which 
+each follower of virtue seeks for himself, he will desire also for others. 
+Again, desire, in so far as it is referred to the mind, is the very 
+essence of the mind (Def. of the Emotions, i.); now the essence of the 
+mind consists in knowledge (III:xi.), which involves the knowledge of God 
+(II:xlvii.), and without it (I:xv.), can neither be, nor be conceived; 
+therefore, in proportion as the mind's essence involves a greater knowledge 
+of God, so also will be greater the desire of the follower of virtue, that 
+other men should possess that which he seeks as good for himself. Q.E.D.
+
+Another Proof.- The good, which a man desires for himself and loves, he 
+will love more constantly, if he sees that others love it also (III:xxxi.); 
+he will therefore endeavour that others should love it also; and as the 
+good in question is common to all, and therefore all can rejoice therein, 
+he will endeavour, for the same reason, to bring about that all should 
+rejoice therein, and this he will do the more (III:xxxvii.), in proportion 
+as his own enjoyment of the good is greater.
+
+Note 1- He who, guided by emotion only, endeavours to cause others to love 
+what he loves himself, and to make the rest of the world live according to 
+his own fancy, acts solely by impulse, and is, therefore, hateful, 
+especially, to those who take delight in something different, and 
+accordingly study and, by similar impulse, endeavour, to make men live in 
+accordance with what pleases themselves. Again, as the highest good sought 
+by men under the guidance of emotion is often such, that it can only be 
+possessed by a single individual, it follows that those who love it are not 
+consistent in their intentions, but, while they delight to sing its praises, 
+fear to be believed. But he, who endeavours to lead men by reason, does not 
+act by impulse but courteously and kindly, and his intention is always 
+consistent. Again, whatsoever we desire and do, whereof we are the cause 
+in so far as we possess the idea of God, or know God, I set down to 
+Religion. The desire of well-doing, which is engendered by a life 
+according to reason, I call piety. Further, the desire, whereby a 
+man living according to reason is bound to associate others with 
+himself in friendship, I call honour (Honestas); by honourable I mean 
+that which is praised by men living according to reason, and by base 
+I mean that which is repugnant to the gaining of friendship. I have also 
+shown in addition what are the foundations of a state; and the difference 
+between true ,virtue and infirmity may be readily gathered from what I 
+have said; namely, that true virtue is nothing else but living in 
+accordance with reason; while infirmity is nothing else but man's 
+allowing himself to be led by things which are external to himself, 
+and to be by them determined to act in a manner demanded by the general 
+disposition of things rather than by his own nature considered solely 
+in itself.
+
+Such are the matters which I engaged to prove in IV:xviii., whereby it 
+is plain that the law against the slaughtering of animals is founded rather 
+on vain superstition and womanish pity than on sound reason. The rational 
+quest of what is useful to us further teaches us the necessity of 
+associating ourselves with our fellow men, but - not with beasts, or things, 
+whose nature is different from our own; we have the same rights in respect 
+to them as they have in respect to us. Nay, as everyone's right is defined 
+by his virtue, or power, men have far greater rights over beasts than 
+beasts have over men. Still I do not deny that beasts feel: what I deny is, 
+that we may not consult our own advantage and use them as we please, 
+treating them in the way which best suits us; for their nature is not like 
+ours, and their emotions are naturally different from human emotions 
+(III:Ivii.Note). It remains for me to explain what I mean by, just and 
+unjust, sin and merit. On these points see the following note.
+
+Note II.- In the Appendix to Part I. I undertook to explain praise and 
+blame, merit and sin, justice and injustice.
+
+Concerning praise and blame I have spoken in III:xxix.Note: the time 
+has now come to treat of the remaining terms. But I must first say a few 
+words concerning man in the state of nature and in society.
+
+Every man exists by sovereign natural right, and, consequently, by 
+sovereign natural right performs those actions which follow from the 
+necessity of his own nature; therefore by sovereign natural right every man 
+judges what is good and what is bad, takes care of his own advantage 
+according to his own disposition (IV:xix. and IV:xx.), avenges the wrongs 
+done to him (III:xl.Coroll. ii.), and endeavours to preserve that which he 
+loves and to destroy - that which he hates (III:xxviii.). Now, if men lived 
+under the guidance of reason, everyone would remain in possession of this 
+his right, without any injury being done to his neighbour V:xxxv.Coroll.i.). 
+But seeing that they are a prey to their emotions, which far surpass human 
+power or virtue (IV:vi.), they are often drawn in different directions, and 
+being at variance one with another (IV:xxxiii., xxxiv.), stand in need of 
+mutual help (IV:xxxv.Note). Wherefore, in order that men may live together 
+in harmony, and may aid one another, it is necessary that they should 
+forego their natural right, and, for the sake of security, refrain from 
+all actions which can injure their fellow-men. The way in which this end 
+can be obtained, so that men who are necessarily a prey to their emotions 
+(IV:iv.Coroll.), inconstant, and diverse, should be able to render each 
+other mutually secure, and feel mutual trust, is evident from IV:vii. and 
+III:xxxix. It is there shown, that an emotion can only be restrained by an 
+emotion stronger than, and contrary to itself, and that men avoid inflicting 
+injury through fear of incurring a greater injury themselves.
+
+On this law society can be established, so long as it keeps in its own 
+hand the right, possessed by everyone, of avenging injury, and pronouncing 
+on good and evil; and provided it also possesses the power to lay down a 
+general rule of conduct, and to pass laws sanctioned, not by reason, which 
+is powerless in restraining emotion, but by threats (IV:xvii.Note). Such a 
+society established with laws and the power of preserving itself is called 
+a State, while those who live under its protection are called citizens. We 
+may readily understand that there is in the state of nature nothing, which 
+by universal consent is pronounced good or bad; for in the state of nature 
+everyone thinks solely of his own advantage, and according to his 
+disposition, with reference only to his individual advantage, decides 
+what is good or bad, being bound by no law to anyone besides himself.
+
+In the state of nature, therefore, sin is inconceivable; it can only 
+exist in a state, where good and evil are pronounced on by common consent, 
+and where everyone is bound to obey the State authority. Sin, then, 
+is nothing else but disobedience, which is therefore punished by the right 
+of the State only. Obedience, on the other hand, is set down as merit, 
+inasmuch as a man is thought worthy of merit, if he takes delight in the 
+advantages which a State provides.
+
+Again, in the state of nature, no one is by common consent master of 
+anything, nor is there anything in nature, which can be said to belong to 
+one man rather than another: all things are common to all. Hence, in the 
+state of nature, we can conceive no wish to render to every man his own, 
+or to deprive a man of that which belongs to him; in other words, there is 
+nothing in the state of nature answering to justice and injustice. Such 
+ideas are only possible in a social state, when it is decreed by common 
+consent what belongs to one man and what to another.
+
+From all these considerations it is evident, that justice and 
+injustice, sin and merit, are extrinsic ideas, and not attributes which 
+display the nature of the mind. But I have said enough.
+
+
+
+Prop. XXXVIII. Whatsoever disposes the human 
+body, so as to render it capable of being 
+affected in an increased number of ways, or 
+of affecting external bodies in an increased 
+number of ways, is useful to man ; and is so, 
+in proportion as the body is thereby rendered 
+more capable of being affected or affecting 
+other bodies in an increased number of ways; 
+contrariwise, whatsoever renders the body less 
+capable in this respect is hurtful to man.
+
+Proof.- Whatsoever thus increases the capabilities of the body increases 
+also the mind's capability of perception (II:xiv.); therefore, whatsoever 
+thus disposes the body and thus renders it capable, is necessarily good or 
+useful (IV:xxvi., IV:xxvii.); and is so in proportion to the extent to 
+which it can render the body capable; contrariwise (II:xiv., IV:xxvi., 
+IV:xxvii.), it is hurtful, if it renders the body in this respect less 
+capable. Q.E.D.
+
+
+
+Prop. XXXIX. Whatsoever brings about 
+the preservation of the proportion of 
+motion and rest, which the parts of 
+the human body mutually possess, is 
+good; contrariwise, whatsoever causes 
+a change in such proportion is bad.
+
+Proof.- The human body needs many other bodies for its preservation 
+(II:Post.iv.). But that which constitutes the specific reality (forma) 
+of a human body is, that its parts communicate their several motions 
+one to another in a certain fixed proportion (Def. before Lemma iv. after 
+II:xiii.). Therefore, whatsoever brings about the preservation of the 
+proportion between motion and rest, which the parts of the human body 
+mutually possess, preserves the specific reality of the human body, and 
+consequently renders the human body capable of being affected in many ways 
+and of affecting external bodies in many ways; consequently it is good 
+(by the last Prop.). Again, whatsoever brings about a change in the 
+aforesaid proportion causes the human body to assume another specific 
+character, in other words (see Preface to this Part towards the end, 
+though the point is indeed self-evident), to be destroyed, and 
+consequently totally incapable of being affected in an increased 
+numbers of ways; therefore it is bad. Q.E.D.
+
+Note.- The extent to which such causes can injure or be of service to the 
+mind will be explained in the Fifth Part. But I would here remark that I 
+consider that a body undergoes death, when the proportion of motion and 
+rest which obtained mutually among its several parts is changed. For I do 
+not venture to deny that a human body, while keeping the circulation of 
+the blood and other properties, wherein the life of a body is thought to 
+consist, may none the less be changed into another nature totally different 
+from its own. There is no reason, which compels me to maintain that a body 
+does not die, unless it becomes a corpse; nay, experience would seem to 
+point to the opposite conclusion. It sometimes happens, that a man 
+undergoes such changes, that I should hardly call him the same. As I have 
+heard tell of a certain Spanish poet, who had been seized with sickness, 
+and though he recovered therefrom yet remained so oblivious of his past 
+life, that he would not believe the plays and tragedies he had 
+written to be his own: indeed, he might have been taken for a grown-up 
+child, if he had also forgotten his native tongue. If this instance seems 
+incredible, what shall we say of infants? A man of ripe age deems their 
+nature so unlike his own, that he can only be persuaded that he too has 
+been an infant by the analogy of other men. However, I prefer to leave such 
+questions undiscussed, lest I should give ground to the superstitious for 
+raising new issues.
+
+
+
+Prop. XL. Whatsoever conduces to man's 
+social life, or causes men to live 
+together in harmony, is useful, whereas 
+whatsoever brings discord into a State is bad.
+
+Proof.- For whatsoever causes men to live together in harmony also causes 
+them to live according to reason (IV:xxxv.), and is therefore (IV:xxvi. 
+and IV:xxvii.) good, and (for the same reason) whatsoever brings about 
+discord is bad. Q.E.D.
+
+
+
+Prop. XLI. Pleasure in itself is not 
+bad but good: contrariwise, pain in 
+itself is bad.
+
+Proof.- Pleasure (III:xi.&Note) is emotion, whereby the body's power of 
+activity is increased or helped; pain is emotion, whereby the body's power 
+of activity is diminished or checked; therefore (IV:xxxviii.) pleasure in 
+itself is good, &c. Q.E.D.
+
+
+
+Prop. XLII. Mirth cannot be excessive, 
+but is always good; contrariwise, 
+Melancholy is always bad.
+
+Proof.- Mirth (see its Def. in III:xi.Note) is pleasure. which, in so 
+far as it is referred to the body, consists in all parts of the body being 
+affected equally: that is (III:xi.), the body's power of activity is 
+increased or aided in such a manner, that the several parts maintain their 
+former proportion of motion and rest; therefore Mirth is always good 
+(IV. xxxix.), and cannot be excessive. But Melancholy (see its Def. in 
+the same note to III:xi.Note) is pain, which, in so far as it is referred 
+to the body, consists in the absolute decrease or hindrance of the body's 
+power of activity; therefore (IV:xxxviii.) it is always bad. Q.E.D.
+
+
+
+Prop. XLIII. Stimulation may be excessive 
+and bad; on the other hand, grief may be 
+good, in so far as stimulation or pleasure 
+is bad.
+
+Proof.- Localized pleasure or stimulation (titillatio) is pleasure, which, 
+in so far as it is referred to the body, consists in one or some of its 
+parts being affected more than the rest (see its Definition, III:xi.Note); 
+the power of this emotion may be sufficient to overcome other actions of 
+the body (IV:vi.), and may remain obstinately fixed therein, thus rendering 
+it incapable of being affected in a variety of other ways: therefore 
+(IV:xxxviii.) it may be bad. Again, grief, which is pain, cannot as such 
+be good (IV:xli.). But, as its force and increase is defined by the power 
+of an external cause compared with our own (IV:v.), we can conceive  
+infinite degrees and modes of strength in this emotion (IV:iii.); 
+we can, therefore, conceive it as capable of restraining stimulation, 
+and preventing its becoming excessive, and hindering the body's 
+capabilities; thus, to this extent, it will be good. Q.E.D.
+
+
+
+Prop. XLIV. Love and desire may be excessive.
+
+Proof.- Love is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of an external cause 
+(Def_of_Emotions:vi.); therefore stimulation, accompanied by the idea of 
+an external cause is love (III:xi.Note); hence love maybe excessive.  
+Again, the strength of desire varies in proportion to the emotion from 
+which it arises (III:xxxvii.). Now emotion may overcome all the rest of 
+men's actions (IV:vi.); so, therefore, can desire, which arises from the 
+same emotion, overcome all other desires, and become excessive, as we 
+showed in the last proposition concerning stimulation.
+
+Note.- Mirth, which I have stated to be good, can be conceived more easily 
+than it can be observed. For the emotions, whereby we are daily assailed, 
+are generally referred to some part of the body which is affected more than 
+the rest; hence the emotions are generally excessive, and so fix the mind 
+in the contemplation of one object, that it is unable to think of others; 
+and although men, as a rule, are a prey to many emotions - and very few 
+are found who are always assailed by one and the same - yet there are 
+cases, where one and the same emotion remains obstinately fixed. We 
+sometimes see men so absorbed in one object, that, although it be not 
+present, they think they have it before them; when this is the case with a 
+man who is not asleep, we say he is delirious or mad; nor are those persons 
+who are inflamed with love, and who dream all night and all day about 
+nothing but their mistress, or some woman, considered as less mad, for 
+they are made objects of ridicule. But when a miser thinks of nothing but 
+gain or money, or when an ambitious man thinks of nothing but glory, they 
+are not reckoned to be mad, because they are generally harmful, and are 
+thought worthy of being hated. But, in reality, Avarice, Ambition, Lust, 
+&c., are species of madness, though they may not be reckoned among diseases.
+
+
+
+Prop. XLV. Hatred can never be good.
+
+Proof.- When we hate a man, we endeavour to destroy him (III.xxxix.), 
+that is (IV:xxxvii.), we endeavour to do something that is bad. 
+Therefore, &c. Q.E.D.
+
+N.B. Here, and in what follows, I mean by hatred only hatred towards men.
+
+Corollary I.- Envy, derision, contempt, anger, revenge, and other emotions 
+attributable to hatred, or arising therefrom, are bad; this is evident from 
+III:xxxix. and IV:xxxvii.
+
+Corollary II.- Whatsoever we desire from motives of hatred is base, and in 
+a State unjust. This also is evident from III:xxxix., and from the 
+definitions of baseness and injustice in IV:xxxvii.Note.
+
+Note.- Between derision (which I have in Coroll. I. stated to be bad) and 
+laughter I recognize a great difference. For laughter, as also jocularity, 
+is merely pleasure; therefore, so long as it be not excessive, it is in 
+itself good (IV:xli.). Assuredly nothing forbids man to enjoy himself, 
+save grim and gloomy superstition. For why is it more lawful to satiate 
+one's hunger and thirst than to drive away one's melancholy? I reason, and 
+have convinced myself as follows: No deity, nor anyone else, save the 
+envious, takes pleasure in my infirmity and discomfort, nor sets down to my 
+virtue the tears, sobs, fear, and the like, which axe signs of infirmity of 
+spirit; on the contrary, the greater the pleasure wherewith we are affected, 
+the greater the perfection whereto we pass; in other words, the more must 
+we necessarily partake of the divine nature. Therefore, to make use of what 
+comes in our way, and to enjoy it as much as possible (not to the point of 
+satiety, for that would not be enjoyment) is the part of a wise man. I say 
+it is the part of a wise man to refresh and recreate himself with moderate 
+and pleasant food and drink, and also with perfumes, with the soft beauty 
+of growing plants, with dress, with music, with many sports, with theatres, 
+and the like, such as every man may make use of without injury to his 
+neighbour. For the human body is composed of very numerous parts, of 
+diverse nature, which continually stand in need of fresh and varied 
+nourishment, so that the whole body may be equally capable of performing 
+all the actions, which follow from the necessity of its own nature; and, 
+consequently, so that the mind may also be equally capable of - 
+understanding many things simultaneously. This way of life, then, agrees 
+best with our principles, and also with general practice; therefore, if 
+there be any question of another plan, the plan we have mentioned is the 
+best, and in every way to be commended. There is no need for me to set 
+forth the matter more clearly or in more detail.
+
+
+
+Prop. XLVI. He, who lives under the 
+guidance of reason, endeavours, as 
+far as possible, to render back love, 
+or kindness, for other men's hatred, 
+anger, contempt, &c., towards him.
+
+Proof.- All emotions of hatred are bad (IV:xlv.Coroll.i.); therefore he who 
+lives under the guidance of reason will endeavour, as far as possible, to 
+avoid being assailed by, such emotions (IV:xix.); consequently, he will 
+also endeavour to prevent others being so aspect (IV:xxxvii.). But hatred 
+is increased by being reciprocated, and can be quenched by love III:xliii.), 
+so that hatred may pass into love (III:xliv.); therefore he who lives under 
+the guidance of reason will endeavour to repay hatred with love, that is, 
+with kindness. Q.E.D.
+
+Note.- He who chooses to avenge wrongs with hatred is assuredly, wretched.  
+But he, who strives to conquer hatred with love, fights his battle in joy 
+and confidence; he withstands many as easily as one, and has very little 
+need of fortune's aid. Those whom he vanquishes yield joyfully, not through 
+failure, but through increase in their powers; all these consequences 
+follow so plainly from the mere definitions of love and understanding, 
+that I have no need to prove them in detail.
+
+
+
+Prop. XLVII. Emotions of hope and fear 
+cannot be in themselves good.
+
+Proof.- Emotions of hope and fear cannot exist without pain. For fear is 
+pain (Def. of the  Emotions:xiii.), and hope (Def. of the Emotions, 
+Explanation xii. and xiii.) cannot exist without fear; therefore (IV. xli.) 
+these emotions cannot be good in themselves, but only in so far as they 
+can restrain excessive pleasure (IV:xliii.). Q.E.D.
+
+Note.- We may add, that these emotions show defective knowledge and an 
+absence of power in the mind; for the same reason confidence, despair, joy, 
+and disappointment are signs of a want of mental power. For although 
+confidence and joy are pleasurable emotions, they, nevertheless imply a 
+preceding, pain, namely, hope and fear. Wherefore the more we endeavour to 
+be guided by reason, the less do we depend on hope; we endeavour to free 
+ourselves from fear, and, as far as we can, to dominate fortune, directing 
+our actions by the sure counsels of wisdom.
+
+
+
+Prop. XLVIII. The emotions of over-esteem 
+and disparagement are always bad.
+
+Proof.- These emotions (see Def. of the Emotions, xxi., xxii.) are 
+repugnant to reason; and are therefore (IV. xxvi., IV:xxvii.) bad. Q.E.D.
+
+
+
+Prop. XLIX. Over-esteem is apt to 
+render its object proud.
+
+Proof.- If we see that any one rates us too highly, for love's sake, 
+we are apt to become elated (III:xli.), or to be pleasurably affected 
+Def. of the Emotions:xxx.); the good which we hear of ourselves we readily 
+believe (III:xxv.); and therefore, for love's sake, rate ourselves too 
+highly; in other words, we are apt to become proud. Q.E.D.
+
+
+
+Prop. L. Pity, in a man who lives 
+under the guidance of reason, is in 
+itself bad and useless.
+
+Proof.- Pity (Def. of the Emotions:xviii.) is a pain, and therefore 
+(IV:xli.) is in itself bad. The good effect which follows, namely, our 
+endeavour to free the object of our pity from misery, is an action which 
+we desire to do solely at the dictation of reason (IV:xxxvii.); only at 
+the dictation of reason are we able to perform any action, which we know 
+for certain to be good (IV:xxvii.); thus, in a man who lives under the 
+guidance of reason, pity in itself is useless and bad. Q.E.D.
+
+Note.- He who rightly realizes, that all things follow from the necessity 
+of the divine nature, and come to pass in accordance with the eternal laws 
+and rules of nature, will not find anything worthy of hatred, derision, or 
+contempt, nor will he bestow pity on anything, but to the utmost extent of 
+human virtue he will endeavour to do well, as the saying is, and to rejoice. 
+We may add, that he, who is easily touched with compassion, and is moved by 
+another's sorrow or tears, often does something which he afterwards regrets; 
+partly because we can never be sure that an action caused by emotion is 
+good, partly because we are easily deceived by false tears. I am in this 
+place expressly speaking of a man living under the guidance of reason. He 
+who is moved to help others neither by reason nor by compassion, is 
+rightly styled inhuman, for (III: xxvii.) he seems unlike a man.
+
+
+
+Prop. LI. Approval is not repugnant 
+to reason, but can agree therewith 
+and arise therefrom.
+
+Proof.- Approval is love towards one who has done good to another (Def. of 
+the Emotions:xix.); therefore it may be referred to the mind, in so far as 
+the latter is active (III:lix.), that is (III:iii.), in so far as it - 
+understands; therefore, it is in agreement with reason, &c. Q.E.D.
+
+Another Proof.- He, who lives under the guidance of reason, desires for 
+others the good which he seeks for himself (IV:xxxvii.); wherefore from 
+seeing someone doing good to his fellow his own endeavour to do good is 
+aided; in other words, he will feel pleasure (III:xi.Note) accompanied by 
+the idea of the benefactor. Therefore he approves of him. Q.E.D.
+
+Note.- Indignation as we defined it (Def. of the Emotions:xx.) is 
+necessarily evil (IV:xlv.); we may, however, remark that, when the 
+sovereign power for the sake of preserving peace punishes a citizen 
+who has injured another, it should not be said to be indignant with the 
+criminal, for it is not incited by hatred to ruin him, it is led by a sense 
+of duty to punish him.
+
+
+
+Prop. LII. Self-approval may arise 
+from reason, and that which arises 
+from reason is the highest possible.
+
+Proof.- Self-approval is pleasure arising from a man's contemplation of 
+himself and his own power of action (Def. of the Emotions:xxv.). But a 
+man's true power of action - or virtue is reason herself (III:iii.), as 
+the said man clearly and distinctly contemplates her (II:xl., II:xliii.); 
+therefore self-approval arises from reason. Again, when a man is 
+contemplating himself, he only perceived clearly and distinctly or 
+adequately, such things as follow from his power of action (III:Def.ii.), 
+that is (III:iii.), from his power of understanding; therefore in such 
+contemplation alone does the highest possible self-approval arise. Q.E.D.
+
+Note.- Self-approval is in reality the highest object for which we can hope.  
+For (as we showed in IV:xxv.) no one endeavours to preserve his being for 
+the sake of any ulterior object, and, as this approval is more and more 
+fostered and strengthened by praise (III:liii.Coroll.), and on the 
+contrary (III:lv.Coroll.) is more and more disturbed by blame, fame 
+becomes the most powerful of incitements to action, and life under 
+disgrace is almost unendurable.
+
+
+
+Prop. LIII. Humility is not a virtue, 
+or does not arise from reason.
+
+Proof.- Humility is pain arising from a man's contemplation of his own 
+infirmities (Def. of the Emotions:xxvi.). But, in so far as a man knows 
+himself by true reason, he is assumed to understand his essence, that is, 
+his power (III:vii.). Wherefore, if a man in self-contemplation perceives 
+any infirmity in himself, it is not by virtue of his understanding himself, 
+but (III:lv.) by virtue of his power of activity being checked. But, if we 
+assume that a man perceives his own infirmity by virtue of understanding 
+something stronger than himself, by the knowledge of which he determines 
+his own power of activity, this is the same as saying that we conceive 
+that a man understands himself distinctly (IV:xxvi.), because (Land reads: 
+"Quod ipsius agendi potentia juvatur"- which I have translated above. He - 
+suggests as alternative readings to `quod', 'quo' (= whereby) and 'quodque' 
+(= and that).) his power of activity is aided. Wherefore humility, or the 
+pain which arises from a man's contemplation of his own infirmity, does 
+not arise from the contemplation or reason, and is not a virtue but a 
+passion. Q.E.D.
+
+
+
+Prop. LIV. Repentance is not a virtue, 
+or does not arise from reason ; but he 
+who repents of an action is doubly 
+wretched or infirm.
+
+Proof.- The first part of this proposition is proved like the foregoing 
+one. The second part is proved from the mere definition of the emotion in 
+question (Def. of the Emotions:xxvii.). For the man allows himself to be 
+overcome, first, by evil desires; secondly, by pain.
+
+Note.- As men seldom live under the guidance of reason, these two emotions, 
+namely, Humility and Repentance, as also Hope and Fear, bring more good 
+than harm; hence, as we must sin, we had better sin in that direction. 
+For, if all men who are a prey to emotion were all equally proud, they 
+would shrink from nothing, and would fear nothing; how then could they be 
+joined and linked together in bonds of union?  The crowd plays the tyrant, 
+when it is not in fear; hence we need not wonder that the prophets, who 
+consulted the good, not of a few, but of all, so strenuously commended 
+Humility, Repentance, and Reverence. Indeed those who are a prey to these 
+emotions may be led much more easily than others to live under the 
+guidance of reason, that is, to become free and to enjoy the life of the 
+blessed.
+
+
+
+Prop. LV. Extreme pride or dejection 
+indicates extreme ignorance of self.
+
+Proof.- This is evident from Def. of the Emotions:xxviii. and xxix.
+
+
+
+Prop. LVI. Extreme pride or dejection 
+indicates extreme infirmity of spirit.
+
+Proof.- The first foundation of virtue is self-preservation 
+(IV:xxii.Coroll.) under the guidance of reason (IV:xxiv.). He, therefore, 
+who is ignorant of himself, is ignorant of the foundation of all virtues, 
+and consequently of all virtues. Again, to act virtuously is merely to 
+act under the guidance of reason (IV:xxiv.): now he, that acts under the 
+guidance of reason, must necessarily know that he so acts (III:xliii.).  
+Therefore he who is in extreme ignorance of himself, and consequently of 
+all virtues, acts least in obedience to virtue; in other words 
+(IV:Def.viii.), is most infirm of spirit. Thus extreme pride or dejection 
+indicates extreme infirmity of spirit. Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary.- Hence it most clearly follows, that the proud and the 
+dejected specially fall a prey to the emotions.
+
+Note.- Yet dejection can be more easily corrected than pride; for the 
+latter being a pleasurable emotion, and the former a painful emotion, the 
+pleasurable is stronger than the painful (IV:xviii.).
+
+
+
+Prop. LVII. The proud man delights in the 
+company of flatterers and parasites, 
+but hates the company of the high-minded.
+
+Proof.- Pride is pleasure arising from a man's over estimation of himself 
+(Def. of the Emotions:xxviii. and vi.); this estimation the proud man will 
+endeavour to foster by all the means in his power (III:xiii.Note); he will 
+therefore delight in the company of flatterers and parasites (whose 
+character is too well known to need definition here), and will avoid the 
+company of high-minded men, who value him according to his deserts. Q.E.D.
+
+Note.- It would be too long a task to enumerate here all the evil results 
+of pride, inasmuch as the proud are a, prey to all the emotions, though to 
+none of them less than to love and pity. I cannot, however, pass over in 
+silence the fact, that a man may be called proud from his underestimation 
+of other people; and, therefore, pride in this sense may be defined as 
+pleasure arising from the false opinion, whereby a man may consider 
+himself superior to his fellows. The dejection, which is the opposite 
+quality to this sort of pride, may be defined as pain arising from the 
+false opinion, whereby a man may think himself inferior to his fellows. 
+Such being the ease, we can easily see that a proud man is necessarily 
+envious (III:xli.Note), and only takes pleasure in the company, who fool 
+his weak mind to the top of his bent, and make him insane instead of 
+merely foolish.
+
+Though dejection is the emotion contrary to pride, yet is the dejected 
+man very near akin to the proud man. For, inasmuch as his pain arises 
+from a comparison between his own infirmity and other men's power or 
+virtue, it will be removed, or, in other words, he will feel pleasure, if 
+his imagination be occupied in contemplating other men's faults; whence 
+arises the proverb, "The unhappy are comforted by finding fellow-sufferers." 
+Contrariwise, he will be the more pained in proportion as he thinks 
+himself inferior to others; hence none are so prone to envy as the 
+dejected, they are specially keen in observing men's actions, with a 
+view to fault-finding rather than correction, in order to reserve their 
+praises for dejection, and to glory therein, though all the time with a 
+dejected air. These effects follow as necessarily from the said emotion, 
+as it follows from the nature of a triangle, that the three angles are 
+equal to two right angles. I have already said that I call these and 
+similar emotions bad, solely in respect to what is useful to man. The 
+laws of nature have regard to nature's general order, whereof man is but 
+a part. I mention this, in passing, lest any should think that I have 
+wished to set forth the faults and irrational deeds of men rather than 
+the nature and properties of things. For, as I said in the preface to the 
+third Part, I regard human emotions and their properties as on the same 
+footing with other natural phenomena. Assuredly human emotions indicate 
+the power and ingenuity, of nature, if not of human nature, quite as fully, 
+as other things which we admire, and which we delight to contemplate. 
+But I pass on to note those qualities in the emotions, which bring 
+advantage to man, or inflict injury upon him.
+
+
+
+Prop. LVIII. Honour (gloria) is not repugnant 
+to reason, but may arise therefrom.
+
+Proof.-This is evident from Def. of the Emotions:xxx., and also from the 
+definition of an honourable man (IV:xxxvii.Note.i.).
+
+Note.- Empty honour, as it is styled, is self- approval, fostered only by 
+the good opinion of the populace; when this good opinion ceases there 
+ceases also the self-approval, in other words, the highest object of each 
+man's love (IV:lii.Note); consequently, he whose honour is rooted in 
+popular approval must, day by day, anxiously strive, act, and scheme in 
+order to retain his reputation. For the populace is variable and 
+inconstant, so that, if a reputation be not kept up, it quickly withers 
+away. Everyone wishes to catch popular applause for himself, and readily 
+represses the fame of others. The object of the strife being estimated as 
+the greatest of all goods, each combatant is seized with a fierce desire 
+to put down his rivals in every possible way, till he who at last comes 
+out victorious is more proud of having done harm to others than of having 
+done good to himself. This sort of honour, then, is really empty, being 
+nothing.
+
+The points to note concerning shame (pudor) may easily be inferred 
+from what was said on the subject of mercy and repentance. I will only 
+add that shame, like compassion, though not a virtue, is yet good, in so 
+far as it shows, that the feeler of shame is really imbued with the 
+desire to live honourably; in the same way as suffering is good, as 
+showing that the injured part is not mortified. Therefore, though a man 
+who feels shame is sorrowful, he is yet more perfect than he, who is 
+shameless, and has no desire to live honourably.
+
+Such are the points which I undertook to remark upon concerning the 
+emotions of pleasure and pain; as for the desires, they are good or bad 
+according as they spring from good or evil emotions. But all, in so far 
+as they are engendered in us by, emotions wherein the mind is passive, 
+are blind (as is evident from what was said in IV:xliv.Note), and would 
+be useless, if men could easily, be induced to live by the guidance of 
+reason only, as I will now briefly, show.
+
+
+
+Prop. LIX. To all the actions, whereto we 
+are determined by emotion wherein the mind 
+is passive; we can be determined without 
+emotion by reason.
+
+Proof.- To act rationally, is nothing else (III:iii. and III:Def.ii.) 
+but to perform those actions, which follow from the necessity, of our 
+nature {to persist} considered in itself alone. But pain is bad, in so 
+far as it diminishes or checks the power of action (IV:xli.); wherefore 
+we cannot by pain be determined to any action, which we should be unable 
+to perform under the guidance of reason. Again, pleasure is bad only 
+in so far as it hinders a man's capability for action (IV:xli., IV:xliii.); 
+therefore to this extent we could not be determined by, it to any action, 
+which we could not perform under the guidance of reason. Lastly, pleasure, 
+in so far as it is good, is in harmony with reason (for it consists in the 
+fact that a man's capability for action is increased or aided); nor is the 
+mind passive therein, except in so far as a man's power of action is not 
+increased to the extent of affording him an adequate conception of 
+himself and his actions (III:iii., &Note).
+
+Wherefore, if a man who is pleasurably affected be brought to such a 
+state of perfection, that he gains an adequate conception of himself and 
+his own actions, he will be equally, nay more, capable of those actions, 
+to which he is determined by emotion wherein the mind is passive. But all 
+emotions are attributable to pleasure, to pain, or to desire (Def. of the 
+Emotions:iv. explanation); and desire (Def. of the Emotions:i.) is nothing 
+else but the attempt to act; therefore, to all actions, &c. Q.E.D.
+
+Another Proof.- A given action is called bad, in so far as it arises 
+from one being affected by hatred or any evil emotion. But no action, 
+considered in itself alone, is either good or bad (as we pointed out in 
+the preface to Pt. IV.), one and the same action being sometimes good, 
+sometimes bad; wherefore to the action which is sometimes bad, or arises 
+from some evil emotion, we may be led by reason (IV:xix.). Q.E.D. 
+
+Note.- An example will put this point in a clearer light. The action of 
+striking, in so far as it is considered physically, and in so far as we 
+merely look to the fact that a man raises his arm, clenches his fist, and 
+moves his whole arm violently downwards, is a virtue or excellence which 
+is conceived as proper to the structure of the human body. If, then, a man, 
+moved by anger or hatred, is led to clench his fist or to move his arm, 
+this result takes place (as we showed in Pt.II.), because one and the 
+same action can be associated with various mental images of things; 
+therefore we may be determined to the performance of one and the same 
+action by confused ideas, or by clear and distinct ideas. Hence it is 
+evident that every desire which springs from emotion, wherein the mind is 
+passive, would become useless, if men could be guided by reason. Let us 
+now see why desire which arises from emotion, wherein the mind is passive, 
+is called by us blind.
+
+
+
+Prop. LX. Desire arising from a pleasure 
+or pain, that is not attributable, to 
+the whole body, but only to one or certain 
+parts thereof, is without utility in 
+respect to a man as a whole.
+
+Proof.- Let it be assumed, for instance, that A, a part of a body, is so 
+strengthened by some external cause, that it prevails over the remaining 
+parts (IV:vi.). This part will not endeavour to do away with its own 
+powers, in order that the other parts of the body may perform its office; 
+for this it would be necessary for it to have a force or power of doing 
+away with its own powers, which (III:vi.) is absurd. The said part, and, 
+consequently, the mind also, will endeavour to preserve its condition. 
+Wherefore desire arising from a pleasure of the kind aforesaid has no 
+utility in reference to a man as a whole. If it be assumed, on the other 
+hand, that the part, A, be checked so that the remaining parts prevail, 
+it may be proved in the same manner that desire arising from pain has no 
+utility in respect to a man as a whole. Q.E.D.
+
+Note.- As pleasure is generally (IV:xliv.Note) attributed to one part 
+of the body, we generally desire to preserve our being with out taking 
+into consideration our health as a whole: to which it may be added, that 
+the desires which have most hold over us (IV:ix.) take account of the 
+present and not of the future.
+
+
+
+Prop. LXI. Desire which springs from 
+reason cannot be excessive.
+
+Proof.- Desire (Def. of the Emotions:i.) considered absolutely is the 
+actual essence of man, in so far as it is conceived as in any way 
+determined to a particular activity by some given modification of itself. 
+Hence desire, which arises from reason, that is (III:iii.), which is 
+engendered in us in so far as we act, is the actual essence or nature of 
+man, in so far as it is conceived as determined to such activities as are 
+adequately conceived through man's essence only (III:Def.ii.). Now, if 
+such desire could be excessive, human nature considered in itself alone 
+would be able to exceed itself, or would be able to do more than it can, 
+a manifest contradiction. Therefore, such desire cannot be excessive. Q.E.D.
+
+
+
+Prop. LXII. In so far as the mind conceives 
+a thing under the dictates of reason, it is 
+affected equally, whether the idea be of a 
+thing future, past, or present.
+
+Proof.- Whatsoever the mind conceives under the guidance of reason, it 
+conceives under the form of eternity or necessity (II:xliv.Coroll.ii.), 
+and is therefore affected with the same certitude (II:xliii.&Note).  
+Wherefore, whether the thing be present, past, or future, the mind 
+conceives it under the same necessity and is affected with the same 
+certitude; and whether the idea be of something present, past, or future, 
+it will in all cases be equally true (II:xli.); that is, it will always 
+possess the same properties of an adequate idea (II:Def.iv.); therefore, in 
+so far as the mind conceives things under the dictates of reason, it is 
+affected in the same manner, whether the idea be of a thing future, past, 
+or present. Q.E.D.
+
+Note.- If we could possess an adequate knowledge of the duration of things, 
+and could determine by reason their periods of existence, we should 
+contemplate things future with the same emotion as things present; and 
+the mind would desire as though it were present the good which it 
+conceived as future; consequently it would necessarily neglect a lesser 
+good in the present for the sake of a greater good in the future, and 
+would in no wise desire that which is good in the present but a source of 
+evil in the future, as we shall presently show. However, we can have but 
+a very inadequate knowledge of the duration of things (II:xxxi.) and the 
+periods of their existence (II:xliv.Note) we can only determine by 
+imagination, which is not so powerfully affected by the future as by the 
+present. Hence such true knowledge of good and evil as we possess is 
+merely abstract or general, and the judgment which we pass on the order 
+of things and the connection of causes, with a view to determining what 
+is good or bad for us in the, present, is rather imaginary than real.  
+Therefore it is nothing wonderful, if the desire arising from such 
+knowledge of good and evil, in so far as it looks on into the future, be 
+more readily checked than the desire of things which are agreeable at the 
+present time. (Cf. IV:xvi.)
+
+
+
+Prop. LXIII. He who is led by fear, 
+and does good in order to escape evil, 
+is not led by reason.
+
+Proof.- All the emotions which are attributable to the mind as active, 
+or in other words to reason, are emotions of pleasure and desire (III:lix.); 
+therefore, he who is led by fear, and does good in order to escape evil, 
+is not led by reason.
+
+Note.- Superstitions persons, who know better how to rail at vice than 
+how to teach virtue, and who strive not to guide men by reason, but so 
+to restrain them that they would rather escape evil than love virtue, 
+have no other aim but to make others as wretched as themselves; wherefore 
+it is nothing wonderful, if they be generally troublesome and odious to 
+their fellow-men.
+
+Corollary.- Under desire which springs from reason, we seek good directly, 
+and shun evil indirectly.
+
+Proof.- Desire which springs from reason can only spring from a pleasurable 
+emotion, wherein the mind is not passive (III:lix.), in other words, from 
+a pleasure which cannot be excessive (IV:lxi.), and not from pain; 
+wherefore this desire springs from the knowledge of good, not of evil 
+(IV:viii.); hence under the guidance of reason we seek good directly and 
+only by implication shun evil. Q.E.D.
+
+Note.- This Corollary may be illustrated by the example of a sick and a 
+healthy man. The sick man through fear of death eats what he naturally 
+shrinks from, but the healthy man takes pleasure in his food, and thus 
+gets a better enjoyment out of life, than if he were in fear of death, 
+and desired directly to avoid it. So a judge, who condemns a criminal 
+to death, not from hatred or anger but from love of the public 
+well-being, is guided solely by reason.
+
+
+
+Prop. LXIV. The knowledge of evil is 
+an inadequate knowledge.
+
+Proof.- The knowledge of evil (IV:viii.) is pain, in so far as we are 
+conscious thereof. Now pain is the transition to a lesser perfection 
+(Def. of the Emotions:iii.) and therefore cannot be understood through 
+man's nature (III:vi.,& II:vii.); therefore it is a passive state 
+(III.Def.ii.) which (III:iii.) depends on inadequate ideas; consequently 
+the knowledge thereof (II:xxix.), namely, the knowledge of evil, is 
+inadequate. Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary.- Hence it follows that, if the human mind possessed only 
+adequate ideas, it would form no conception of evil.
+
+
+
+Prop. LXV. Under the guidance of reason we 
+should pursue the greater of two goods and 
+the lesser of two evils.
+
+Proof.- A good which prevents our enjoyment of a greater good is in 
+reality an evil; for we apply the terms good and bad to things, in so 
+far as we compare them one with another (see preface to this Part); 
+therefore, evil is in reality a lesser good; hence under the guidance of 
+reason we seek or pursue only the greater good and the lesser evil. Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary.- We may, under the guidance of reason, pursue the lesser evil 
+as though it were the greater good, and we may shun the lesser good, 
+which would be the cause of the greater evil. For the evil, which is 
+here called the lesser, is really good, and the lesser good is really 
+evil, wherefore we may seek the former and shun the latter. Q.E.D.
+
+
+
+Prop. LXVI. We may, under the guidance of 
+reason, seek a greater good in the future 
+in preference to a lesser good in the 
+present, and we may seek a lesser evil in 
+the present in preference to a greater evil 
+in the future. 
+"Maltim praesens minus prae majori futuro." (Van Vloten).  Bruder reads: "Malum praesens minus, quod
+causa est faturi alicujus mali." The last word of the latter is an obvious misprint, and is
+corrected by the Dutch translator into "majoris boni." (Pollock, p. 268, note.)
+
+Proof.- If the mind could have an adequate knowledge of things future, 
+it would be affected towards what is future in the same way as towards 
+what is present (IV:lxii.); wherefore, looking merely to reason, as in 
+this proposition we are assumed to do, there is no difference, whether 
+the greater good or evil be assumed as present, or assumed as future; 
+hence (IV:lxv.) we may seek a greater good in the future in preference 
+to a lesser good in the present, &c. Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary.- We may, under the guidance of reason, seek a lesser evil in 
+the present, because it is the cause of a greater good in the future, 
+and we may shun a lesser good in the present, because it is the cause 
+of a greater evil in the future. This Corollary is related to the 
+foregoing Proposition as the Corollary to IV:lxv. is related to the 
+said IV:lxv.
+
+Note.- If these statements be compared with what we have pointed out 
+concerning the strength of the emotions in this Part up to Prop. xviii., 
+we shall readily see the difference between a man, who is led solely by 
+emotion or opinion, and a man, who is led by reason. The former, whether  
+will or no, performs actions whereof he is utterly ignorant; the latter is 
+his own master and only performs such actions, as he knows are of primary 
+importance in life, and therefore chiefly, desires; wherefore I call the 
+former a slave, and the latter a free man, concerning whose disposition 
+and manner of life it will be well to make a few observations.
+
+
+
+Prop. LXVII. A free man thinks of death 
+least of all things; and his wisdom is 
+a meditation not of death but of life.
+
+Proof.- A free man is one who lives under the guidance of reason, who is 
+not led by fear (IV:lxiii.), but who directly desires that which is good 
+(IV:lxiii.Coroll.), in other words (IV:xxiv.), who strives to act, to live, 
+and to preserve his being on the basis of seeking his own true advantage; 
+wherefore such an one thinks of nothing less than of death, but his wisdom 
+is a meditation of life. Q.E.D
+
+
+
+Prop. LXVIII. If men were born free, 
+they would, so long as they remained free, 
+form no conception of good and evil.
+
+Proof.- I call free him who is led solely by reason; he, therefore, who 
+is born free, and who remains free, has only adequate ideas; therefore 
+(IV:lxiv.Coroll.) he has no conception of evil, or consequently (good 
+and evil being correlative) of good. Q.E.D.
+
+Note.- It is evident, from IV:iv., that the hypothesis of this Proposition 
+is false and inconceivable, except in so far as we look solely to the 
+nature of man, or rather to God; not in so far as the latter is infinite, 
+but only in so far as he is the cause of man's existence.
+
+This, and other matters which we have already proved, seem to have 
+been signifieded by Moses in the history of the first man. For in that 
+narrative no other power of God is conceived, save that whereby he 
+created man, that is the power wherewith he provided solely for man's 
+advantage; it is stated that God forbade man, being free, to eat of the 
+tree of the knowledge of good and evil, and that, as soon as man should 
+have eaten of it, he would straightway fear death rather than desire to 
+live. Further, it is written that when man had found a wife, who was in 
+entire harmony with his nature, he knew that there could be nothing in 
+nature which could be more useful to him; but that after he believed the 
+beasts to be like himself, he straightway began to imitate their emotions 
+(III:xxvii.), and to lose his freedom; this freedom was afterwards 
+recovered by the patriarchs, led by the spirit of Christ; that is, by the 
+idea of God, whereon alone it depends, that man may be free, and desire for 
+others the good which he desires for himself, as we have shown above 
+(IV:xxxii.).
+
+
+
+Prop. LXIX. The virtue of a free man is seen 
+to be as great, when it declines dangers, 
+as when it overcomes them.
+
+Proof.- Emotion can only be checked or removed by an emotion contrary to 
+itself, and possessing more power in restraining emotion (IV:vii.). But 
+blind daring and fear are emotions, which can be conceived as equally 
+great (IV:v. and IV:iii.): hence, no less virtue or firmness is required 
+in checking daring than in checking fear (III:lix.Note); in other words 
+(Def. of the Emotions:xl. and xli.), the free man shows as much virtue, 
+when he declines dangers, as when he strives to overcome them. Q.E.D.
+
+Corollary.- The free man is as courageous in timely retreat as in combat; 
+or, a free man shows equal courage or presence of mind, whether he elect 
+to give battle or to retreat.
+
+ Note.- What courage (animositas) is, and what I mean thereby, I explained 
+in III:lix.Note. By danger I mean everything, which can give rise to any 
+evil, such as pain, hatred, discord, &c.
+
+
+
+Prop. LXX. The free man, who lives among the 
+ignorant, strives, as far as he can, to avoid 
+receiving favours from them.
+
+Proof.- Everyone judges what is good according to his disposition 
+(III:xxxix.Note); wherefore an ignorant man, who has conferred a benefit 
+on another, puts his own estimate upon it, and, if it appears to be 
+estimated less highly by the receiver, will feel pain (III:xlii.). But 
+the free man only desires to join other men to him in friendship 
+(IV:xxxvii.), not repaying their benefits with others reckoned as of like 
+value, but guiding himself and others by the free decision of reason, 
+and doing only such things as he knows to be of primary importance.  
+Therefore the free man, lest be should become hateful to the ignorant, or 
+follow their desires rather than reason, will endeavour, as far as he can, 
+to avoid receiving their favours.
+
+Note.- I say, as far as he can. For though men be ignorant, yet are they 
+men, and in cases of necessity could afford us human aid, the most 
+excellent of all things: therefore it is often necessary to accept favours 
+from them, and consequently to repay such favours in kind; we must, 
+therefore, exercise caution in declining favours, lest we should have the 
+appearance of despising those who bestow them, or of being, from 
+avaricious motives, unwilling to requite them, and so give ground for 
+offence by the very fact of striving to avoid it. Thus, in declining 
+favours, we must look to the requirements of utility and courtesy.
+
+
+
+
+Prop. LXXI. Only free men are thoroughly 
+grateful one to another.
+
+Proof.- Only free men are thoroughly useful one to another, and 
+associated among themselves by the closest necessity of friendship 
+(IV:xxxv.,&Coroll.i.), only such men endeavour, with mutual zeal of 
+love, to confer benefits on each other (IV:xxxvii.), and, therefore, 
+only they are thoroughly grateful one to another. Q.E.D.
+
+Note.- The goodwill, which men who are led by blind desire have for one 
+another, is generally a bargaining or enticement, rather than pure goodwill. 
+Moreover, ingratitude is not an emotion. Yet it is base, inasmuch as 
+it generally shows, that a man is affected by excessive hatred, anger, 
+pride, avarice, &c. He who, by reason of his folly, knows not how to 
+return benefits, is not ungrateful, much less he who is not gained over
+by the gifts of a courtesan to serve her lust, or by a thief to conceal 
+his thefts, or by any similar persons. Contrariwise, such an one shows 
+a constant mind, inasmuch as he cannot by an gifts be corrupted, to his 
+own or the general hurt.
+
+
+
+Prop. LXXII. The free man never acts fraudulently, 
+but always in good faith.
+
+Proof.- If it be asked: What should a man's conduct be in a case where 
+he could by breaking faith free himself from the danger of present death? 
+Would not his plan of self-preservation completely persuade him to deceive? 
+This may be answered by pointing out that, if reason persuaded him to act 
+thus, it would persuade all men to act in a similar manner, in which case 
+reason would persuade men not to agree in good faith to unite their forces, 
+or to have laws in common, that is, not to. have any general laws, which is 
+absurd.
+
+
+
+Prop. LXXIII. The man, who is guided by reason, 
+is more free in a State, where he lives under 
+a general system of law, than in 
+solitude, where he is independent.
+
+Proof.- The man, who is guided by reason, does not obey through fear 
+(IV:Ixiii.): but, in so far as he endeavours to preserve his being 
+according to the dictates of reason, that is (IV:lxvi.Note), in so far 
+as he endeavours to live in freedom, he desires to order his life 
+according to the general good (IV:xxxvii.), and, consequently (as we 
+showed in IV:xxxvii.Note.ii.), to live according to the laws of his 
+country. Therefore the free man, in order to enjoy greater freedom, 
+desires to possess the general rights of citizenship. Q.E.D.
+
+Note.- These and similar observations, which we have made on man's true 
+freedom, may be referred to strength, that is, to courage and nobility 
+of character (III:lix.Note). I do not think it worth while to prove 
+separately all the properties of strength; much less need I show, that he 
+that is strong hates no man, is angry with no man, envies no man, is 
+indignant with no man, despises no man, and least of all things is proud. 
+These propositions, and all that relate to the true way of life and 
+religion, are easily proved from IV:xxxvii. and IV:xlvi.; namely, that 
+hatred should be overcome with love, and that every man should desire for 
+others the good which he seeks for himself. We may also repeat what 
+we drew attention to in the note to IV:I., and in other places; namely, 
+that the strong man has ever first in his thoughts, that all things 
+follow from the necessity of the divine nature; so that whatsoever he 
+deems to be hurtful and evil, and whatsoever, accordingly, seems to him 
+impious, horrible, unjust, and base, assumes that appearance owing to his 
+own disordered, fragmentary, and confused view of the universe. Wherefore 
+he strives before all things to conceive things as they really are, and 
+to remove the hindrances to true knowledge, such as are hatred, anger, 
+envy, derision, pride, and similar emotions, which I have mentioned above. 
+Thus he endeavours, as we said before, as far as in him lies, to do good, 
+and to go on his way rejoicing. How far human virtue is capable of 
+attaining to such a condition, and what its powers may be, I will prove 
+in the following Part.
+
+
+
+APPENDIX.
+What have said in this Part concerning the right way of life has not been 
+arranged, so as to admit of being seen at one view, but has been set forth 
+piece-meal, according as I thought each Proposition could most readily be 
+deduced from what preceded it. I propose, therefore, to rearrange my 
+remarks and to bring them under leading heads.
+
+I. All our endeavours or desires so follow from the necessity of our 
+nature, that they can be understood either through it alone, as their 
+proximate cause, or by virtue of our being a part of nature, which cannot 
+be adequately conceived through itself without other individuals.
+
+II. Desires, which follow from our nature in such a manner, that they can 
+be understood through it alone, are those which are referred to the mind, 
+in so far as the latter is conceived to consist of adequate ideas: the 
+remaining desires are only referred to the mind, in so far as it conceives 
+things inadequately, and their force and increase are generally defined 
+not by the power of man, but by the power of things external to us: 
+wherefore the former are rightly called actions, the latter passions, for 
+the former always indicate our power, the latter, on the other hand, show 
+our infirmity and fragmentary knowledge.
+
+III. Our actions, that is, those desires which are defined by man's power 
+or reason, are always good. The rest maybe either good or bad.
+
+IV. Thus in life it is before all things useful to perfect the 
+understanding or reason, as far as we can, and in this alone man's 
+highest happiness or blessedness consists, indeed blessedness is nothing 
+else but the contentment of spirit, which arises from the intuitive 
+knowledge of God: now, to perfect the understanding is nothing else 
+but to understand God, God's attributes, and the actions which follow 
+from the necessity of his nature. Wherefore of a man, who is led by reason, 
+the ultimate aim or highest desire, whereby he seeks to govern all his 
+fellows, is that whereby he is brought to the adequate conception of 
+himself and of all things within the scope of his intelligence.
+
+V. Therefore, without intelligence there is not rational life: and things 
+are only good, in so far as they aid man in his enjoyment of the 
+intellectual life, which is defined by intelligence. Contrariwise, 
+whatsoever things hinder man's perfecting of his reason, and capability 
+to enjoy the rational life, are alone called evil.
+
+VI. As all things whereof man is the efficient cause are necessarily good, 
+no evil can befall man except through external causes; namely, by virtue
+of man being a part of universal nature, whose laws human nature is 
+compelled to, obey, and to conform to in almost infinite ways.
+
+VII. It is impossible, that man should not be a part of nature, or that 
+he should not follow her general order; but if he be thrown among 
+individuals whose nature is in harmony with his own, his power of action 
+will thereby be aided and fostered, whereas, if he be thrown among such as 
+are but very little in harmony with his nature, he will hardly be able to 
+accommodate himself to them without undergoing a great change himself.
+
+VIII. Whatsoever in nature we deem to be evil, or to be capable of 
+injuring our faculty for existing and enjoying the rational life, we may 
+endeavour to remove in whatever way seems safest to us; on the other hand, 
+whatsoever we deem to be good or useful for preserving our being, and 
+enabling us to enjoy the rational life, we may appropriate to our use and 
+employ as we think best. Everyone without exception may, by sovereign 
+right of nature, do whatsoever he thinks will advance his own interest.
+
+IX. Nothing can be in more harmony with the nature of any given thing 
+than other individuals of the same species; therefore (cf. vii.) for man 
+in the preservation of his being and the enjoyment of the rational life 
+there is nothing more useful than his fellow-man who is led by reason. 
+Further, as we know not anything among individual things which is more 
+excellent than a man led by reason, no man can better display the power of 
+his skill and disposition, than in so training men, that they come at last 
+to live under the dominion of their own reason.
+
+X. In so far as men are influenced by envy or any kind of hatred, one 
+towards another, they are at variance, and are therefore to be feared in 
+proportion, as they are more powerful than their fellows.
+
+XI. Yet minds are not conquered by force, but by love and high-mindedness.
+
+XII. It is before all things useful to men to associate their ways of life, 
+to bind themselves together with such bonds as they think most fitted to 
+gather them all into unity, and generally to do whatsoever serves to 
+strengthen friendship.
+
+XIII. But for this there is need of skill and watchfulness. For men are 
+diverse (seeing that those who live under the guidance of reason are few), 
+yet are they generally envious and more prone to revenge than to sympathy. 
+No small force of character is therefore required to take everyone as he 
+is, and to restrain one's self from imitating the emotions of others. But 
+those who carp at mankind, and are more skilled in railing at vice than 
+in instilling virtue, and who break rather than strengthen men's 
+dispositions, are hurtful both to themselves and others. Thus many from 
+too great impatience of spirit, or from misguided religious zeal, have 
+preferred to live among brutes rather than among men; as boys or youths, 
+who cannot peaceably endure the chidings of their parents, will enlist as 
+soldiers and choose the hardships of war and the despotic discipline in 
+preference to the comforts of home and the admonitions of their father: 
+suffering any burden to be put upon them, so long as they may spite 
+their parents.
+
+XIV. Therefore, although men are generally governed in everything by their 
+own lusts, yet their association in common brings many more advantages 
+than drawbacks. Wherefore it is better to bear patiently the wrongs they 
+may do us, and to strive to promote whatsoever serves to bring about 
+harmony and friendship.
+
+XV. Those things, which beget harmony, are such as are attributable to 
+justice, equity, and honourable living. For men brook ill not only what is 
+unjust or iniquitous, but also what is reckoned disgraceful, or that a man 
+should slight the received customs of their society. For winning love those 
+qualities are especially necessary which have regard to religion and piety 
+(cf. IV:xxxvii.Notes.i., &.ii.; IV:xlvi.Note; and IV:lxxiii.Note).
+
+XVI. Further, harmony is often the result of fear: but such harmony is 
+insecure. Further, fear arises from infirmity of spirit and moreover 
+belongs not to the exercise of reason: the same is true of compassion, 
+though this latter seems to bear a certain resemblance to piety.
+
+XVII. Men are also gained over by liberality, especially such as have 
+not the means to buy what is necessary to sustain life. However, to give 
+aid to every poor man is far beyond the power and the advantage of any 
+private person. For the riches of any private person are wholly inadequate 
+to meet such a call. Again, an individual man's resources of character 
+are too limited for him to be able to make all men his friends. Hence 
+providing for the poor is a duty, which falls on the State as a whole, 
+and has regard only to the general advantage.
+
+XVIII. In accepting favours, and in returning gratitude our duty must be 
+wholly different (cf. IV:lxx.Note; IV:lxxi. Note). 
+
+XIX. Again, meretricious love, that is, the lust of generation arising 
+from bodily beauty, and generally every sort of love, which owns anything 
+save freedom of soul as its cause, readily passes into hate; unless indeed, 
+what is worse, it is a species of madness; and then it promotes discord 
+rather than harmony (cf. III:xxxi.Coroll.).
+
+XX. As concerning marriage, it is certain that this is in harmony with 
+reason, if the desire for physical union be not engendered solely by 
+bodily beauty, but also by the desire to beget children and to train them 
+up wisely; and moreover, if the love of both, to wit, of the man and of 
+the woman, is not caused by bodily beauty only, but also by freedom of soul.
+
+XXI. Furthermore, flattery begets harmony; but only by means of the vile 
+offence of slavishness or treachery. None are more readily taken with 
+flattery than the proud, who wish to be first, but are not.
+
+XXII. There is in abasement a spurious appearance of piety and 
+religion. Although abasement is the opposite to pride, yet is he that 
+abases himself most akin to the proud (IV:lvii.Note).
+
+XXIII. Shame also brings about harmony, but only in such matters as cannot 
+be hid. Further, as shame is a species of pain, it does not concern the 
+exercise of reason. 
+
+XXIV. The remaining emotions of pain towards men are directly opposed
+to justice, equity, honour, piety, and religion; and, although 
+indignation seems to bear a certain resemblance to equity, yet is life 
+but lawless, where every man may pass judgment on another's deeds, and 
+vindicate his own or other men's rights. 
+
+XXV. Correctness of conduct (modestia), that is, the desire of pleasing 
+men which is determined by reason, is attributable to piety (as we said 
+in IV:xxxvii.Note.i.). But, if it spring from emotion, it is ambition, 
+or the desire whereby, men, under the false cloak of piety, generally 
+stir up discords and seditions. For he who desires to aid his fellows. 
+either in word or in deed, so that they may together enjoy the highest 
+good, he, I say, will before all things strive to, win them over with 
+love: not to draw them into admiration, so that a system may be called 
+after his name, nor to give any cause for envy. Further, in his 
+conversation he will shrink from talking of men's faults, and will be 
+careful to speak but sparingly of human infirmity: but he will dwell at 
+length on human virtue or power, and the way whereby it may be perfected. 
+Thus will men be stirred not by fear, nor by aversion, but only by the 
+emotion of joy, to endeavour, so far as in them lies, to live in 
+obedience to reason.
+
+XXVI. Besides men, we know of no particular thing in nature in whose mind 
+we may rejoice, and whom we can associate with ourselves in friendship or 
+any sort of fellowship; therefore, whatsoever there be in nature besides 
+man, a regard for our advantage does not call on us to preserve, but to 
+preserve or destroy according to its various capabilities, and to adapt 
+to our use as best we may.
+
+XXVII. The advantage which we derive from things external to us, besides 
+the experience and knowledge which we acquire from observing them, and 
+from recombining their elements in different forms, is principally the 
+preservation of the body; from this point of view, those things are most 
+useful which can so feed and nourish the body, that all its parts may 
+rightly fulfil their functions. For, in proportion as the body is capable 
+of being affected in a greater variety of ways, and of affecting external 
+bodies in a great number of ways, so much the more is the mind capable of 
+thinking (IV:xxxviii., IV:xxxix.). But there seem to be very few things 
+of this kind in nature; wherefore for the due nourishment of the body we 
+must use many foods of diverse nature. For the human body is composed of 
+very many parts of different nature, which stand in continual need of 
+varied nourishment, so that the whole body may be equally capable of 
+doing everything that can follow from its own nature, and consequently 
+that the mind also may be equally capable of forming many perceptions.
+
+XXVIII. Now for providing these nourishments the strength of each 
+individual would hardly suffice, if men did not lend one another mutual 
+aid. But money has furnished us with a token for everything: hence it is 
+with the notion of money, that the mind of the multitude is chiefly 
+engrossed: nay, it can hardly conceive any kind of pleasure, which is not 
+accompanied with the idea of money as cause.
+
+XXIX. This result is the fault only of those, who seek money, not from 
+poverty or to supply their necessary, wants, but because they, have 
+learned the arts of gain, wherewith they bring themselves to great 
+splendour. Certainly they nourish their bodies, according to custom, but 
+scantily, believing that they lose as much of their wealth as they spend on 
+the preservation of their body. But they who know the true use of money, 
+and who fix the measure of wealth solely with regard to their actual needs, 
+live content with little.
+
+XXX. As, therefore, those things are good which assist the various parts 
+of the body, and enable them to perform their functions; and as pleasure 
+consists in an increase of, or aid to, man's power, in so far as he is 
+composed of mind and body; it follows that all those things which bring 
+pleasure are good. But seeing that things do not work with the object of 
+giving us pleasure, and that their power of action is not tempered to suit 
+our advantage, and, lastly, that pleasure is generally referred to one 
+part of the body more than to the other parts; therefore most emotions of 
+pleasure (unless reason and watchfulness be at hand), and consequently the 
+desires arising therefrom, may become excessive. Moreover we may add that 
+emotion leads us to pay most regard to what is agreeable in the present, 
+nor can we estimate what is future with emotions equally vivid. 
+(IV:xliv.Note, and IV:lx.Note.)
+
+XXXI. Superstition, on the other hand, seems to account as good all that 
+brings pain, and as bad all that brings pleasure. However, as we said 
+above (IV:xlv.Note), none but the envious take delight in my infirmity 
+and trouble. For the greater the pleasure whereby we are affected, the 
+greater is the perfection whereto we pass, and consequently the more do 
+we partake of the divine nature: no pleasure can ever be evil, which is 
+regulated by a true regard for our advantage. But contrariwise he, who is 
+led by fear and does good only to avoid evil, is not guided by reason.
+
+Ap.XXXII. (1) But human power is extremely limited, and is infinitely 
+surpassed by the power of external causes; we have not, therefore, an 
+absolute power of shaping to our use those things which are without us.  
+Nevertheless, we shall bear with an equal mind all that happens to us 
+in contravention to the claims of our own advantage, so long as we are 
+conscious, that we have done our duty, and that the power which we possess 
+is not sufficient to enable us to protect ourselves completely; 
+remembering that we are a part of universal nature, and that we 
+follow her order. If we have a clear and distinct understanding of 
+this, that part of our nature which is defined by intelligence, in other 
+words the better part of ourselves, will assuredly acquiesce in what 
+befalls us, and in such acquiescence will endeavour to persist. For, 
+in so far as we are intelligent beings, we cannot desire anything save 
+that which is necessary, nor yield absolute acquiescence to anything, 
+save to that which is true: wherefore, in so far as we have a right 
+understanding of these things, the endeavour of the better part of 
+ourselves is in harmony with the order of nature as a whole.
+
+
+
+
+
+End of Part IV
+Of The Project Gutenberg Etext of The Ethics, by Benedict de Spinoza
+
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