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diff --git a/9662.txt b/9662.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..21b6ffe --- /dev/null +++ b/9662.txt @@ -0,0 +1,6553 @@ +The Project Gutenberg EBook of An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, by +David Hume and L. A. Selby-Bigge + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding + +Author: David Hume + L. A. Selby-Bigge + +Posting Date: November 15, 2011 [EBook #9662] +Release Date: January, 2006 +First Posted: October 14, 2003 + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING *** + + + + +Produced by Jonathan Ingram and Project Gutenberg +Distributed Proofreaders + + + + + + + + + + + +AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING. + +BY DAVID HUME + + + +Extracted from: +Enquiries Concerning the Human Understanding, and Concerning the +Principles of Morals, By David Hume. + +Reprinted from The Posthumous Edition of 1777, and Edited with +Introduction, Comparative Tables of Contents, and Analytical Index +by L.A. Selby-Bigge, M.A., Late Fellow of University College, Oxford. + +Second Edition, 1902 + + + + + + +CONTENTS + + + I. Of the different Species of Philosophy + II. Of the Origin of Ideas + III. Of the Association of Ideas + IV. Sceptical Doubts concerning the Operations of the Understanding + V. Sceptical Solution of these Doubts + VI. Of Probability + VII. Of the Idea of necessary Connexion + VIII. Of Liberty and Necessity + IX. Of the Reason of Animals + X. Of Miracles + XI. Of a particular Providence and of a future State + XII. Of the academical or sceptical Philosophy + + + + INDEX + + + + +SECTION I. + +OF THE DIFFERENT SPECIES OF PHILOSOPHY. + + +1. Moral philosophy, or the science of human nature, may be treated +after two different manners; each of which has its peculiar merit, and +may contribute to the entertainment, instruction, and reformation of +mankind. The one considers man chiefly as born for action; and as +influenced in his measures by taste and sentiment; pursuing one object, +and avoiding another, according to the value which these objects seem to +possess, and according to the light in which they present themselves. As +virtue, of all objects, is allowed to be the most valuable, this species +of philosophers paint her in the most amiable colours; borrowing all +helps from poetry and eloquence, and treating their subject in an easy +and obvious manner, and such as is best fitted to please the +imagination, and engage the affections. They select the most striking +observations and instances from common life; place opposite characters +in a proper contrast; and alluring us into the paths of virtue by the +views of glory and happiness, direct our steps in these paths by the +soundest precepts and most illustrious examples. They make us _feel_ the +difference between vice and virtue; they excite and regulate our +sentiments; and so they can but bend our hearts to the love of probity +and true honour, they think, that they have fully attained the end of +all their labours. + +2. The other species of philosophers consider man in the light of a +reasonable rather than an active being, and endeavour to form his +understanding more than cultivate his manners. They regard human nature +as a subject of speculation; and with a narrow scrutiny examine it, in +order to find those principles, which regulate our understanding, excite +our sentiments, and make us approve or blame any particular object, +action, or behaviour. They think it a reproach to all literature, that +philosophy should not yet have fixed, beyond controversy, the foundation +of morals, reasoning, and criticism; and should for ever talk of truth +and falsehood, vice and virtue, beauty and deformity, without being able +to determine the source of these distinctions. While they attempt this +arduous task, they are deterred by no difficulties; but proceeding from +particular instances to general principles, they still push on their +enquiries to principles more general, and rest not satisfied till they +arrive at those original principles, by which, in every science, all +human curiosity must be bounded. Though their speculations seem +abstract, and even unintelligible to common readers, they aim at the +approbation of the learned and the wise; and think themselves +sufficiently compensated for the labour of their whole lives, if they +can discover some hidden truths, which may contribute to the instruction +of posterity. + +3. It is certain that the easy and obvious philosophy will always, with +the generality of mankind, have the preference above the accurate and +abstruse; and by many will be recommended, not only as more agreeable, +but more useful than the other. It enters more into common life; moulds +the heart and affections; and, by touching those principles which +actuate men, reforms their conduct, and brings them nearer to that model +of perfection which it describes. On the contrary, the abstruse +philosophy, being founded on a turn of mind, which cannot enter into +business and action, vanishes when the philosopher leaves the shade, and +comes into open day; nor can its principles easily retain any influence +over our conduct and behaviour. The feelings of our heart, the agitation +of our passions, the vehemence of our affections, dissipate all its +conclusions, and reduce the profound philosopher to a mere plebeian. + +4. This also must be confessed, that the most durable, as well as +justest fame, has been acquired by the easy philosophy, and that +abstract reasoners seem hitherto to have enjoyed only a momentary +reputation, from the caprice or ignorance of their own age, but have not +been able to support their renown with more equitable posterity. It is +easy for a profound philosopher to commit a mistake in his subtile +reasonings; and one mistake is the necessary parent of another, while he +pushes on his consequences, and is not deterred from embracing any +conclusion, by its unusual appearance, or its contradiction to popular +opinion. But a philosopher, who purposes only to represent the common +sense of mankind in more beautiful and more engaging colours, if by +accident he falls into error, goes no farther; but renewing his appeal +to common sense, and the natural sentiments of the mind, returns into +the right path, and secures himself from any dangerous illusions. The +fame of Cicero flourishes at present; but that of Aristotle is utterly +decayed. La Bruyere passes the seas, and still maintains his reputation: +But the glory of Malebranche is confined to his own nation, and to his +own age. And Addison, perhaps, will be read with pleasure, when Locke +shall be entirely forgotten. + +The mere philosopher is a character, which is commonly but little +acceptable in the world, as being supposed to contribute nothing either +to the advantage or pleasure of society; while he lives remote from +communication with mankind, and is wrapped up in principles and notions +equally remote from their comprehension. On the other hand, the mere +ignorant is still more despised; nor is any thing deemed a surer sign of +an illiberal genius in an age and nation where the sciences flourish, +than to be entirely destitute of all relish for those noble +entertainments. The most perfect character is supposed to lie between +those extremes; retaining an equal ability and taste for books, company, +and business; preserving in conversation that discernment and delicacy +which arise from polite letters; and in business, that probity and +accuracy which are the natural result of a just philosophy. In order to +diffuse and cultivate so accomplished a character, nothing can be more +useful than compositions of the easy style and manner, which draw not +too much from life, require no deep application or retreat to be +comprehended, and send back the student among mankind full of noble +sentiments and wise precepts, applicable to every exigence of human +life. By means of such compositions, virtue becomes amiable, science +agreeable, company instructive, and retirement entertaining. + +Man is a reasonable being; and as such, receives from science his proper +food and nourishment: But so narrow are the bounds of human +understanding, that little satisfaction can be hoped for in this +particular, either from the extent of security or his acquisitions. Man +is a sociable, no less than a reasonable being: But neither can he +always enjoy company agreeable and amusing, or preserve the proper +relish for them. Man is also an active being; and from that disposition, +as well as from the various necessities of human life, must submit to +business and occupation: But the mind requires some relaxation, and +cannot always support its bent to care and industry. It seems, then, +that nature has pointed out a mixed kind of life as most suitable to the +human race, and secretly admonished them to allow none of these biasses +to _draw_ too much, so as to incapacitate them for other occupations and +entertainments. Indulge your passion for science, says she, but let your +science be human, and such as may have a direct reference to action and +society. Abstruse thought and profound researches I prohibit, and will +severely punish, by the pensive melancholy which they introduce, by the +endless uncertainty in which they involve you, and by the cold reception +which your pretended discoveries shall meet with, when communicated. Be +a philosopher; but, amidst all your philosophy, be still a man. + +5. Were the generality of mankind contented to prefer the easy +philosophy to the abstract and profound, without throwing any blame or +contempt on the latter, it might not be improper, perhaps, to comply +with this general opinion, and allow every man to enjoy, without +opposition, his own taste and sentiment. But as the matter is often +carried farther, even to the absolute rejecting of all profound +reasonings, or what is commonly called _metaphysics_, we shall now +proceed to consider what can reasonably be pleaded in their behalf. + +We may begin with observing, that one considerable advantage, which +results from the accurate and abstract philosophy, is, its subserviency +to the easy and humane; which, without the former, can never attain a +sufficient degree of exactness in its sentiments, precepts, or +reasonings. All polite letters are nothing but pictures of human life in +various attitudes and situations; and inspire us with different +sentiments, of praise or blame, admiration or ridicule, according to the +qualities of the object, which they set before us. An artist must be +better qualified to succeed in this undertaking, who, besides a delicate +taste and a quick apprehension, possesses an accurate knowledge of the +internal fabric, the operations of the understanding, the workings of +the passions, and the various species of sentiment which discriminate +vice and virtue. How painful soever this inward search or enquiry may +appear, it becomes, in some measure, requisite to those, who would +describe with success the obvious and outward appearances of life and +manners. The anatomist presents to the eye the most hideous and +disagreeable objects; but his science is useful to the painter in +delineating even a Venus or an Helen. While the latter employs all the +richest colours of his art, and gives his figures the most graceful and +engaging airs; he must still carry his attention to the inward structure +of the human body, the position of the muscles, the fabric of the bones, +and the use and figure of every part or organ. Accuracy is, in every +case, advantageous to beauty, and just reasoning to delicate sentiment. +In vain would we exalt the one by depreciating the other. + +Besides, we may observe, in every art or profession, even those which +most concern life or action, that a spirit of accuracy, however +acquired, carries all of them nearer their perfection, and renders them +more subservient to the interests of society. And though a philosopher +may live remote from business, the genius of philosophy, if carefully +cultivated by several, must gradually diffuse itself throughout the +whole society, and bestow a similar correctness on every art and +calling. The politician will acquire greater foresight and subtility, in +the subdividing and balancing of power; the lawyer more method and finer +principles in his reasonings; and the general more regularity in his +discipline, and more caution in his plans and operations. The stability +of modern governments above the ancient, and the accuracy of modern +philosophy, have improved, and probably will still improve, by similar +gradations. + +6. Were there no advantage to be reaped from these studies, beyond the +gratification of an innocent curiosity, yet ought not even this to be +despised; as being one accession to those few safe and harmless +pleasures, which are bestowed on human race. The sweetest and most +inoffensive path of life leads through the avenues of science and +learning; and whoever can either remove any obstructions in this way, or +open up any new prospect, ought so far to be esteemed a benefactor to +mankind. And though these researches may appear painful and fatiguing, +it is with some minds as with some bodies, which being endowed with +vigorous and florid health, require severe exercise, and reap a pleasure +from what, to the generality of mankind, may seem burdensome and +laborious. Obscurity, indeed, is painful to the mind as well as to the +eye; but to bring light from obscurity, by whatever labour, must needs +be delightful and rejoicing. + +But this obscurity in the profound and abstract philosophy, is objected +to, not only as painful and fatiguing, but as the inevitable source of +uncertainty and error. Here indeed lies the justest and most plausible +objection against a considerable part of metaphysics, that they are not +properly a science; but arise either from the fruitless efforts of human +vanity, which would penetrate into subjects utterly inaccessible to the +understanding, or from the craft of popular superstitions, which, being +unable to defend themselves on fair ground, raise these intangling +brambles to cover and protect their weakness. Chaced from the open +country, these robbers fly into the forest, and lie in wait to break in +upon every unguarded avenue of the mind, and overwhelm it with religious +fears and prejudices. The stoutest antagonist, if he remit his watch a +moment, is oppressed. And many, through cowardice and folly, open the +gates to the enemies, and willingly receive them with reverence and +submission, as their legal sovereigns. + +7. But is this a sufficient reason, why philosophers should desist from +such researches, and leave superstition still in possession of her +retreat? Is it not proper to draw an opposite conclusion, and perceive +the necessity of carrying the war into the most secret recesses of the +enemy? In vain do we hope, that men, from frequent disappointment, will +at last abandon such airy sciences, and discover the proper province of +human reason. For, besides, that many persons find too sensible an +interest in perpetually recalling such topics; besides this, I say, the +motive of blind despair can never reasonably have place in the sciences; +since, however unsuccessful former attempts may have proved, there is +still room to hope, that the industry, good fortune, or improved +sagacity of succeeding generations may reach discoveries unknown to +former ages. Each adventurous genius will still leap at the arduous +prize, and find himself stimulated, rather that discouraged, by the +failures of his predecessors; while he hopes that the glory of achieving +so hard an adventure is reserved for him alone. The only method of +freeing learning, at once, from these abstruse questions, is to enquire +seriously into the nature of human understanding, and show, from an +exact analysis of its powers and capacity, that it is by no means fitted +for such remote and abstruse subjects. We must submit to this fatigue, +in order to live at ease ever after: And must cultivate true metaphysics +with some care, in order to destroy the false and adulterate. Indolence, +which, to some persons, affords a safeguard against this deceitful +philosophy, is, with others, overbalanced by curiosity; and despair, +which, at some moments, prevails, may give place afterwards to sanguine +hopes and expectations. Accurate and just reasoning is the only catholic +remedy, fitted for all persons and all dispositions; and is alone able +to subvert that abstruse philosophy and metaphysical jargon, which, +being mixed up with popular superstition, renders it in a manner +impenetrable to careless reasoners, and gives it the air of science +and wisdom. + +8. Besides this advantage of rejecting, after deliberate enquiry, the +most uncertain and disagreeable part of learning, there are many +positive advantages, which result from an accurate scrutiny into the +powers and faculties of human nature. It is remarkable concerning the +operations of the mind, that, though most intimately present to us, yet, +whenever they become the object of reflexion, they seem involved in +obscurity; nor can the eye readily find those lines and boundaries, +which discriminate and distinguish them. The objects are too fine to +remain long in the same aspect or situation; and must be apprehended in +an instant, by a superior penetration, derived from nature, and improved +by habit and reflexion. It becomes, therefore, no inconsiderable part of +science barely to know the different operations of the mind, to separate +them from each other, to class them under their proper heads, and to +correct all that seeming disorder, in which they lie involved, when made +the object of reflexion and enquiry. This talk of ordering and +distinguishing, which has no merit, when performed with regard to +external bodies, the objects of our senses, rises in its value, when +directed towards the operations of the mind, in proportion to the +difficulty and labour, which we meet with in performing it. And if we +can go no farther than this mental geography, or delineation of the +distinct parts and powers of the mind, it is at least a satisfaction to +go so far; and the more obvious this science may appear (and it is by no +means obvious) the more contemptible still must the ignorance of it be +esteemed, in all pretenders to learning and philosophy. + +Nor can there remain any suspicion, that this science is uncertain and +chimerical; unless we should entertain such a scepticism as is entirely +subversive of all speculation, and even action. It cannot be doubted, +that the mind is endowed with several powers and faculties, that these +powers are distinct from each other, that what is really distinct to the +immediate perception may be distinguished by reflexion; and +consequently, that there is a truth and falsehood in all propositions on +this subject, and a truth and falsehood, which lie not beyond the +compass of human understanding. There are many obvious distinctions of +this kind, such as those between the will and understanding, the +imagination and passions, which fall within the comprehension of every +human creature; and the finer and more philosophical distinctions are no +less real and certain, though more difficult to be comprehended. Some +instances, especially late ones, of success in these enquiries, may give +us a juster notion of the certainty and solidity of this branch of +learning. And shall we esteem it worthy the labour of a philosopher to +give us a true system of the planets, and adjust the position and order +of those remote bodies; while we affect to overlook those, who, with so +much success, delineate the parts of the mind, in which we are so +intimately concerned? + +9. But may we not hope, that philosophy, if cultivated with care, and +encouraged by the attention of the public, may carry its researches +still farther, and discover, at least in some degree, the secret springs +and principles, by which the human mind is actuated in its operations? +Astronomers had long contented themselves with proving, from the +phaenomena, the true motions, order, and magnitude of the heavenly +bodies: Till a philosopher, at last, arose, who seems, from the happiest +reasoning, to have also determined the laws and forces, by which the +revolutions of the planets are governed and directed. The like has been +performed with regard to other parts of nature. And there is no reason +to despair of equal success in our enquiries concerning the mental +powers and economy, if prosecuted with equal capacity and caution. It is +probable, that one operation and principle of the mind depends on +another; which, again, may be resolved into one more general and +universal: And how far these researches may possibly be carried, it will +be difficult for us, before, or even after, a careful trial, exactly to +determine. This is certain, that attempts of this kind are every day +made even by those who philosophize the most negligently: And nothing +can be more requisite than to enter upon the enterprize with thorough +care and attention; that, if it lie within the compass of human +understanding, it may at last be happily achieved; if not, it may, +however, be rejected with some confidence and security. This last +conclusion, surely, is not desirable; nor ought it to be embraced too +rashly. For how much must we diminish from the beauty and value of this +species of philosophy, upon such a supposition? Moralists have hitherto +been accustomed, when they considered the vast multitude and diversity +of those actions that excite our approbation or dislike, to search for +some common principle, on which this variety of sentiments might depend. +And though they have sometimes carried the matter too far, by their +passion for some one general principle; it must, however, be confessed, +that they are excusable in expecting to find some general principles, +into which all the vices and virtues were justly to be resolved. The +like has been the endeavour of critics, logicians, and even politicians: +Nor have their attempts been wholly unsuccessful; though perhaps longer +time, greater accuracy, and more ardent application may bring these +sciences still nearer their perfection. To throw up at once all +pretensions of this kind may justly be deemed more rash, precipitate, +and dogmatical, than even the boldest and most affirmative philosophy, +that has ever attempted to impose its crude dictates and principles +on mankind. + +10. What though these reasonings concerning human nature seem abstract, +and of difficult comprehension? This affords no presumption of their +falsehood. On the contrary, it seems impossible, that what has hitherto +escaped so many wise and profound philosophers can be very obvious and +easy. And whatever pains these researches may cost us, we may think +ourselves sufficiently rewarded, not only in point of profit but of +pleasure, if, by that means, we can make any addition to our stock of +knowledge, in subjects of such unspeakable importance. + +But as, after all, the abstractedness of these speculations is no +recommendation, but rather a disadvantage to them, and as this +difficulty may perhaps be surmounted by care and art, and the avoiding +of all unnecessary detail, we have, in the following enquiry, attempted +to throw some light upon subjects, from which uncertainty has hitherto +deterred the wise, and obscurity the ignorant. Happy, if we can unite +the boundaries of the different species of philosophy, by reconciling +profound enquiry with clearness, and truth with novelty! And still more +happy, if, reasoning in this easy manner, we can undermine the +foundations of an abstruse philosophy, which seems to have hitherto +served only as a shelter to superstition, and a cover to absurdity +and error! + + + +SECTION II. + +OF THE ORIGIN OF IDEAS. + + +11. Every one will readily allow, that there is a considerable +difference between the perceptions of the mind, when a man feels the +pain of excessive heat, or the pleasure of moderate warmth, and when he +afterwards recalls to his memory this sensation, or anticipates it by +his imagination. These faculties may mimic or copy the perceptions of +the senses; but they never can entirely reach the force and vivacity of +the original sentiment. The utmost we say of them, even when they +operate with greatest vigour, is, that they represent their object in so +lively a manner, that we could _almost_ say we feel or see it: But, +except the mind be disordered by disease or madness, they never can +arrive at such a pitch of vivacity, as to render these perceptions +altogether undistinguishable. All the colours of poetry, however +splendid, can never paint natural objects in such a manner as to make +the description be taken for a real landskip. The most lively thought is +still inferior to the dullest sensation. + +We may observe a like distinction to run through all the other +perceptions of the mind. A man in a fit of anger, is actuated in a very +different manner from one who only thinks of that emotion. If you tell +me, that any person is in love, I easily understand your meaning, and +form a just conception of his situation; but never can mistake that +conception for the real disorders and agitations of the passion. When we +reflect on our past sentiments and affections, our thought is a faithful +mirror, and copies its objects truly; but the colours which it employs +are faint and dull, in comparison of those in which our original +perceptions were clothed. It requires no nice discernment or +metaphysical head to mark the distinction between them. + +12. Here therefore we may divide all the perceptions of the mind into +two classes or species, which are distinguished by their different +degrees of force and vivacity. The less forcible and lively are commonly +denominated _Thoughts_ or _Ideas_. The other species want a name in our +language, and in most others; I suppose, because it was not requisite +for any, but philosophical purposes, to rank them under a general term +or appellation. Let us, therefore, use a little freedom, and call them +_Impressions_; employing that word in a sense somewhat different from +the usual. By the term _impression_, then, I mean all our more lively +perceptions, when we hear, or see, or feel, or love, or hate, or desire, +or will. And impressions are distinguished from ideas, which are the +less lively perceptions, of which we are conscious, when we reflect on +any of those sensations or movements above mentioned. + +13. Nothing, at first view, may seem more unbounded than the thought of +man, which not only escapes all human power and authority, but is not +even restrained within the limits of nature and reality. To form +monsters, and join incongruous shapes and appearances, costs the +imagination no more trouble than to conceive the most natural and +familiar objects. And while the body is confined to one planet, along +which it creeps with pain and difficulty; the thought can in an instant +transport us into the most distant regions of the universe; or even +beyond the universe, into the unbounded chaos, where nature is supposed +to lie in total confusion. What never was seen, or heard of, may yet be +conceived; nor is any thing beyond the power of thought, except what +implies an absolute contradiction. + +But though our thought seems to possess this unbounded liberty, we shall +find, upon a nearer examination, that it is really confined within very +narrow limits, and that all this creative power of the mind amounts to +no more than the faculty of compounding, transposing, augmenting, or +diminishing the materials afforded us by the senses and experience. When +we think of a golden mountain, we only join two consistent ideas, +_gold_, and _mountain_, with which we were formerly acquainted. A +virtuous horse we can conceive; because, from our own feeling, we can +conceive virtue; and this we may unite to the figure and shape of a +horse, which is an animal familiar to us. In short, all the materials of +thinking are derived either from our outward or inward sentiment: the +mixture and composition of these belongs alone to the mind and will. Or, +to express myself in philosophical language, all our ideas or more +feeble perceptions are copies of our impressions or more lively ones. + +14. To prove this, the two following arguments will, I hope, be +sufficient. First, when we analyze our thoughts or ideas, however +compounded or sublime, we always find that they resolve themselves into +such simple ideas as were copied from a precedent feeling or sentiment. +Even those ideas, which, at first view, seem the most wide of this +origin, are found, upon a nearer scrutiny, to be derived from it. The +idea of God, as meaning an infinitely intelligent, wise, and good Being, +arises from reflecting on the operations of our own mind, and +augmenting, without limit, those qualities of goodness and wisdom. We +may prosecute this enquiry to what length we please; where we shall +always find, that every idea which we examine is copied from a similar +impression. Those who would assert that this position is not universally +true nor without exception, have only one, and that an easy method of +refuting it; by producing that idea, which, in their opinion, is not +derived from this source. It will then be incumbent on us, if we would +maintain our doctrine, to produce the impression, or lively perception, +which corresponds to it. + +15. Secondly. If it happen, from a defect of the organ, that a man is +not susceptible of any species of sensation, we always find that he is +as little susceptible of the correspondent ideas. A blind man can form +no notion of colours; a deaf man of sounds. Restore either of them that +sense in which he is deficient; by opening this new inlet for his +sensations, you also open an inlet for the ideas; and he finds no +difficulty in conceiving these objects. The case is the same, if the +object, proper for exciting any sensation, has never been applied to the +organ. A Laplander or Negro has no notion of the relish of wine. And +though there are few or no instances of a like deficiency in the mind, +where a person has never felt or is wholly incapable of a sentiment or +passion that belongs to his species; yet we find the same observation to +take place in a less degree. A man of mild manners can form no idea of +inveterate revenge or cruelty; nor can a selfish heart easily conceive +the heights of friendship and generosity. It is readily allowed, that +other beings may possess many senses of which we can have no conception; +because the ideas of them have never been introduced to us in the only +manner by which an idea can have access to the mind, to wit, by the +actual feeling and sensation. + +16. There is, however, one contradictory phenomenon, which may prove +that it is not absolutely impossible for ideas to arise, independent of +their correspondent impressions. I believe it will readily be allowed, +that the several distinct ideas of colour, which enter by the eye, or +those of sound, which are conveyed by the ear, are really different from +each other; though, at the same time, resembling. Now if this be true of +different colours, it must be no less so of the different shades of the +same colour; and each shade produces a distinct idea, independent of the +rest. For if this should be denied, it is possible, by the continual +gradation of shades, to run a colour insensibly into what is most remote +from it; and if you will not allow any of the means to be different, you +cannot, without absurdity, deny the extremes to be the same. Suppose, +therefore, a person to have enjoyed his sight for thirty years, and to +have become perfectly acquainted with colours of all kinds except one +particular shade of blue, for instance, which it never has been his +fortune to meet with. Let all the different shades of that colour, +except that single one, be placed before him, descending gradually from +the deepest to the lightest; it is plain that he will perceive a blank, +where that shade is wanting, and will be sensible that there is a +greater distance in that place between the contiguous colours than in +any other. Now I ask, whether it be possible for him, from his own +imagination, to supply this deficiency, and raise up to himself the idea +of that particular shade, though it had never been conveyed to him by +his senses? I believe there are few but will be of opinion that he can: +and this may serve as a proof that the simple ideas are not always, in +every instance, derived from the correspondent impressions; though this +instance is so singular, that it is scarcely worth our observing, and +does not merit that for it alone we should alter our general maxim. + +17. Here, therefore, is a proposition, which not only seems, in itself, +simple and intelligible; but, if a proper use were made of it, might +render every dispute equally intelligible, and banish all that jargon, +which has so long taken possession of metaphysical reasonings, and drawn +disgrace upon them. All ideas, especially abstract ones, are naturally +faint and obscure: the mind has but a slender hold of them: they are apt +to be confounded with other resembling ideas; and when we have often +employed any term, though without a distinct meaning, we are apt to +imagine it has a determinate idea annexed to it. On the contrary, all +impressions, that is, all sensations, either outward or inward, are +strong and vivid: the limits between them are more exactly determined: +nor is it easy to fall into any error or mistake with regard to them. +When we entertain, therefore, any suspicion that a philosophical term is +employed without any meaning or idea (as is but too frequent), we need +but enquire, _from what impression is that supposed idea derived_? And +if it be impossible to assign any, this will serve to confirm our +suspicion. By bringing ideas into so clear a light we may reasonably +hope to remove all dispute, which may arise, concerning their nature and +reality.[1] + + [1] It is probable that no more was meant by those, who denied + innate ideas, than that all ideas were copies of our + impressions; though it must be confessed, that the terms, which + they employed, were not chosen with such caution, nor so + exactly defined, as to prevent all mistakes about their + doctrine. For what is meant by _innate_? If innate be + equivalent to natural, then all the perceptions and ideas of + the mind must be allowed to be innate or natural, in whatever + sense we take the latter word, whether in opposition to what is + uncommon, artificial, or miraculous. If by innate be meant, + contemporary to our birth, the dispute seems to be frivolous; + nor is it worth while to enquire at what time thinking begins, + whether before, at, or after our birth. Again, the word _idea_, + seems to be commonly taken in a very loose sense, by LOCKE and + others; as standing for any of our perceptions, our sensations + and passions, as well as thoughts. Now in this sense, I should + desire to know, what can be meant by asserting, that self-love, + or resentment of injuries, or the passion between the sexes is + not innate? + + But admitting these terms, _impressions_ and _ideas_, in the + sense above explained, and understanding by _innate_, what is + original or copied from no precedent perception, then may we + assert that all our impressions are innate, and our ideas + not innate. + + To be ingenuous, I must own it to be my opinion, that LOCKE was + betrayed into this question by the schoolmen, who, making use + of undefined terms, draw out their disputes to a tedious + length, without ever touching the point in question. A like + ambiguity and circumlocution seem to run through that + philosopher's reasonings on this as well as most other + subjects. + + + +SECTION III. + +OF THE ASSOCIATION OF IDEAS. + + +18. It is evident that there is a principle of connexion between the +different thoughts or ideas of the mind, and that, in their appearance +to the memory or imagination, they introduce each other with a certain +degree of method and regularity. In our more serious thinking or +discourse this is so observable that any particular thought, which +breaks in upon the regular tract or chain of ideas, is immediately +remarked and rejected. And even in our wildest and most wandering +reveries, nay in our very dreams, we shall find, if we reflect, that the +imagination ran not altogether at adventures, but that there was still a +connexion upheld among the different ideas, which succeeded each other. +Were the loosest and freest conversation to be transcribed, there would +immediately be observed something which connected it in all its +transitions. Or where this is wanting, the person who broke the thread +of discourse might still inform you, that there had secretly revolved in +his mind a succession of thought, which had gradually led him from the +subject of conversation. Among different languages, even where we cannot +suspect the least connexion or communication, it is found, that the +words, expressive of ideas, the most compounded, do yet nearly +correspond to each other: a certain proof that the simple ideas, +comprehended in the compound ones, were bound together by some universal +principle, which had an equal influence on all mankind. + +19. Though it be too obvious to escape observation, that different ideas +are connected together; I do not find that any philosopher has attempted +to enumerate or class all the principles of association; a subject, +however, that seems worthy of curiosity. To me, there appear to be only +three principles of connexion among ideas, namely, _Resemblance_, +_Contiguity_ in time or place, and _Cause or Effect_. + +That these principles serve to connect ideas will not, I believe, be +much doubted. A picture naturally leads our thoughts to the original[2]: +the mention of one apartment in a building naturally introduces an +enquiry or discourse concerning the others[3]: and if we think of a +wound, we can scarcely forbear reflecting on the pain which follows +it[4]. But that this enumeration is complete, and that there are no +other principles of association except these, may be difficult to prove +to the satisfaction of the reader, or even to a man's own satisfaction. +All we can do, in such cases, is to run over several instances, and +examine carefully the principle which binds the different thoughts to +each other, never stopping till we render the principle as general as +possible[5]. The more instances we examine, and the more care we employ, +the more assurance shall we acquire, that the enumeration, which we form +from the whole, is complete and entire. + + [2] Resemblance. + + [3] Contiguity. + + [4] Cause and effect. + + [5] For instance, Contrast or Contrariety is also a connexion + among Ideas: but it may, perhaps, be considered as a mixture of + _Causation_ and _Resemblance_. Where two objects are contrary, + the one destroys the other; that is, the cause of its + annihilation, and the idea of the annihilation of an object, + implies the idea of its former existence. + + + +SECTION IV. + +SCEPTICAL DOUBTS CONCERNING THE OPERATIONS OF THE UNDERSTANDING. + + +PART I. + + +20. All the objects of human reason or enquiry may naturally be divided +into two kinds, to wit, _Relations of Ideas_, and _Matters of Fact_. Of +the first kind are the sciences of Geometry, Algebra, and Arithmetic; +and in short, every affirmation which is either intuitively or +demonstratively certain. _That the square of the hypothenuse is equal to +the square of the two sides_, is a proposition which expresses a +relation between these figures. _That three times five is equal to the +half of thirty_, expresses a relation between these numbers. +Propositions of this kind are discoverable by the mere operation of +thought, without dependence on what is anywhere existent in the +universe. Though there never were a circle or triangle in nature, the +truths demonstrated by Euclid would for ever retain their certainty +and evidence. + +21. Matters of fact, which are the second objects of human reason, are +not ascertained in the same manner; nor is our evidence of their truth, +however great, of a like nature with the foregoing. The contrary of +every matter of fact is still possible; because it can never imply a +contradiction, and is conceived by the mind with the same facility and +distinctness, as if ever so conformable to reality. _That the sun will +not rise to-morrow_ is no less intelligible a proposition, and implies +no more contradiction than the affirmation, _that it will rise_. We +should in vain, therefore, attempt to demonstrate its falsehood. Were it +demonstratively false, it would imply a contradiction, and could never +be distinctly conceived by the mind. + +It may, therefore, be a subject worthy of curiosity, to enquire what is +the nature of that evidence which assures us of any real existence and +matter of fact, beyond the present testimony of our senses, or the +records of our memory. This part of philosophy, it is observable, has +been little cultivated, either by the ancients or moderns; and therefore +our doubts and errors, in the prosecution of so important an enquiry, +may be the more excusable; while we march through such difficult paths +without any guide or direction. They may even prove useful, by exciting +curiosity, and destroying that implicit faith and security, which is the +bane of all reasoning and free enquiry. The discovery of defects in the +common philosophy, if any such there be, will not, I presume, be a +discouragement, but rather an incitement, as is usual, to attempt +something more full and satisfactory than has yet been proposed to +the public. + +22. All reasonings concerning matter of fact seem to be founded on the +relation of _Cause and Effect_. By means of that relation alone we can +go beyond the evidence of our memory and senses. If you were to ask a +man, why he believes any matter of fact, which is absent; for instance, +that his friend is in the country, or in France; he would give you a +reason; and this reason would be some other fact; as a letter received +from him, or the knowledge of his former resolutions and promises. A man +finding a watch or any other machine in a desert island, would conclude +that there had once been men in that island. All our reasonings +concerning fact are of the same nature. And here it is constantly +supposed that there is a connexion between the present fact and that +which is inferred from it. Were there nothing to bind them together, the +inference would be entirely precarious. The hearing of an articulate +voice and rational discourse in the dark assures us of the presence of +some person: Why? because these are the effects of the human make and +fabric, and closely connected with it. If we anatomize all the other +reasonings of this nature, we shall find that they are founded on the +relation of cause and effect, and that this relation is either near or +remote, direct or collateral. Heat and light are collateral effects of +fire, and the one effect may justly be inferred from the other. + +23. If we would satisfy ourselves, therefore, concerning the nature of +that evidence, which assures us of matters of fact, we must enquire how +we arrive at the knowledge of cause and effect. + +I shall venture to affirm, as a general proposition, which admits of no +exception, that the knowledge of this relation is not, in any instance, +attained by reasonings _a priori_; but arises entirely from experience, +when we find that any particular objects are constantly conjoined with +each other. Let an object be presented to a man of ever so strong +natural reason and abilities; if that object be entirely new to him, he +will not be able, by the most accurate examination of its sensible +qualities, to discover any of its causes or effects. Adam, though his +rational faculties be supposed, at the very first, entirely perfect, +could not have inferred from the fluidity and transparency of water that +it would suffocate him, or from the light and warmth of fire that it +would consume him. No object ever discovers, by the qualities which +appear to the senses, either the causes which produced it, or the +effects which will arise from it; nor can our reason, unassisted by +experience, ever draw any inference concerning real existence and +matter of fact. + +24. This proposition, _that causes and effects are discoverable, not by +reason but by experience_, will readily be admitted with regard to such +objects, as we remember to have once been altogether unknown to us; +since we must be conscious of the utter inability, which we then lay +under, of foretelling what would arise from them. Present two smooth +pieces of marble to a man who has no tincture of natural philosophy; he +will never discover that they will adhere together in such a manner as +to require great force to separate them in a direct line, while they +make so small a resistance to a lateral pressure. Such events, as bear +little analogy to the common course of nature, are also readily +confessed to be known only by experience; nor does any man imagine that +the explosion of gunpowder, or the attraction of a loadstone, could ever +be discovered by arguments _a priori_. In like manner, when an effect is +supposed to depend upon an intricate machinery or secret structure of +parts, we make no difficulty in attributing all our knowledge of it to +experience. Who will assert that he can give the ultimate reason, why +milk or bread is proper nourishment for a man, not for a lion or +a tiger? + +But the same truth may not appear, at first sight, to have the same +evidence with regard to events, which have become familiar to us from +our first appearance in the world, which bear a close analogy to the +whole course of nature, and which are supposed to depend on the simple +qualities of objects, without any secret structure of parts. We are apt +to imagine that we could discover these effects by the mere operation of +our reason, without experience. We fancy, that were we brought on a +sudden into this world, we could at first have inferred that one +Billiard-ball would communicate motion to another upon impulse; and that +we needed not to have waited for the event, in order to pronounce with +certainty concerning it. Such is the influence of custom, that, where it +is strongest, it not only covers our natural ignorance, but even +conceals itself, and seems not to take place, merely because it is found +in the highest degree. + +25. But to convince us that all the laws of nature, and all the +operations of bodies without exception, are known only by experience, +the following reflections may, perhaps, suffice. Were any object +presented to us, and were we required to pronounce concerning the +effect, which will result from it, without consulting past observation; +after what manner, I beseech you, must the mind proceed in this +operation? It must invent or imagine some event, which it ascribes to +the object as its effect; and it is plain that this invention must be +entirely arbitrary. The mind can never possibly find the effect in the +supposed cause, by the most accurate scrutiny and examination. For the +effect is totally different from the cause, and consequently can never +be discovered in it. Motion in the second Billiard-ball is a quite +distinct event from motion in the first; nor is there anything in the +one to suggest the smallest hint of the other. A stone or piece of metal +raised into the air, and left without any support, immediately falls: +but to consider the matter _a priori_, is there anything we discover in +this situation which can beget the idea of a downward, rather than an +upward, or any other motion, in the stone or metal? And as the first +imagination or invention of a particular effect, in all natural +operations, is arbitrary, where we consult not experience; so must we +also esteem the supposed tie or connexion between the cause and effect, +which binds them together, and renders it impossible that any other +effect could result from the operation of that cause. When I see, for +instance, a Billiard-ball moving in a straight line towards another; +even suppose motion in the second ball should by accident be suggested +to me, as the result of their contact or impulse; may I not conceive, +that a hundred different events might as well follow from that cause? +May not both these balls remain at absolute rest? May not the first ball +return in a straight line, or leap off from the second in any line or +direction? All these suppositions are consistent and conceivable. Why +then should we give the preference to one, which is no more consistent +or conceivable than the rest? All our reasonings _a priori_ will never +be able to show us any foundation for this preference. + +In a word, then, every effect is a distinct event from its cause. It +could not, therefore, be discovered in the cause, and the first +invention or conception of it, _a priori_, must be entirely arbitrary. +And even after it is suggested, the conjunction of it with the cause +must appear equally arbitrary; since there are always many other +effects, which, to reason, must seem fully as consistent and natural. In +vain, therefore, should we pretend to determine any single event, or +infer any cause or effect, without the assistance of observation and +experience. + +26. Hence we may discover the reason why no philosopher, who is rational +and modest, has ever pretended to assign the ultimate cause of any +natural operation, or to show distinctly the action of that power, which +produces any single effect in the universe. It is confessed, that the +utmost effort of human reason is to reduce the principles, productive of +natural phenomena, to a greater simplicity, and to resolve the many +particular effects into a few general causes, by means of reasonings +from analogy, experience, and observation. But as to the causes of these +general causes, we should in vain attempt their discovery; nor shall we +ever be able to satisfy ourselves, by any particular explication of +them. These ultimate springs and principles are totally shut up from +human curiosity and enquiry. Elasticity, gravity, cohesion of parts, +communication of motion by impulse; these are probably the ultimate +causes and principles which we shall ever discover in nature; and we may +esteem ourselves sufficiently happy, if, by accurate enquiry and +reasoning, we can trace up the particular phenomena to, or near to, +these general principles. The most perfect philosophy of the natural +kind only staves off our ignorance a little longer: as perhaps the most +perfect philosophy of the moral or metaphysical kind serves only to +discover larger portions of it. Thus the observation of human blindness +and weakness is the result of all philosophy, and meets us at every +turn, in spite of our endeavours to elude or avoid it. + +27. Nor is geometry, when taken into the assistance of natural +philosophy, ever able to remedy this defect, or lead us into the +knowledge of ultimate causes, by all that accuracy of reasoning for +which it is so justly celebrated. Every part of mixed mathematics +proceeds upon the supposition that certain laws are established by +nature in her operations; and abstract reasonings are employed, either +to assist experience in the discovery of these laws, or to determine +their influence in particular instances, where it depends upon any +precise degree of distance and quantity. Thus, it is a law of motion, +discovered by experience, that the moment or force of any body in motion +is in the compound ratio or proportion of its solid contents and its +velocity; and consequently, that a small force may remove the greatest +obstacle or raise the greatest weight, if, by any contrivance or +machinery, we can increase the velocity of that force, so as to make it +an overmatch for its antagonist. Geometry assists us in the application +of this law, by giving us the just dimensions of all the parts and +figures which can enter into any species of machine; but still the +discovery of the law itself is owing merely to experience, and all the +abstract reasonings in the world could never lead us one step towards +the knowledge of it. When we reason _a priori_, and consider merely any +object or cause, as it appears to the mind, independent of all +observation, it never could suggest to us the notion of any distinct +object, such as its effect; much less, show us the inseparable and +inviolable connexion between them. A man must be very sagacious who +could discover by reasoning that crystal is the effect of heat, and ice +of cold, without being previously acquainted with the operation of these +qualities. + + +PART II. + + +28. But we have not yet attained any tolerable satisfaction with regard +to the question first proposed. Each solution still gives rise to a new +question as difficult as the foregoing, and leads us on to farther +enquiries. When it is asked, _What is the nature of all our reasonings +concerning matter of fact?_ the proper answer seems to be, that they are +founded on the relation of cause and effect. When again it is asked, +_What is the foundation of all our reasonings and conclusions concerning +that relation?_ it may be replied in one word, Experience. But if we +still carry on our sifting humour, and ask, _What is the foundation of +all conclusions from experience?_ this implies a new question, which may +be of more difficult solution and explication. Philosophers, that give +themselves airs of superior wisdom and sufficiency, have a hard task +when they encounter persons of inquisitive dispositions, who push them +from every corner to which they retreat, and who are sure at last to +bring them to some dangerous dilemma. The best expedient to prevent this +confusion, is to be modest in our pretensions; and even to discover the +difficulty ourselves before it is objected to us. By this means, we may +make a kind of merit of our very ignorance. + +I shall content myself, in this section, with an easy task, and shall +pretend only to give a negative answer to the question here proposed. I +say then, that, even after we have experience of the operations of cause +and effect, our conclusions from that experience are _not_ founded on +reasoning, or any process of the understanding. This answer we must +endeavour both to explain and to defend. + +29. It must certainly be allowed, that nature has kept us at a great +distance from all her secrets, and has afforded us only the knowledge of +a few superficial qualities of objects; while she conceals from us those +powers and principles on which the influence of those objects entirely +depends. Our senses inform us of the colour, weight, and consistence of +bread; but neither sense nor reason can ever inform us of those +qualities which fit it for the nourishment and support of a human body. +Sight or feeling conveys an idea of the actual motion of bodies; but as +to that wonderful force or power, which would carry on a moving body for +ever in a continued change of place, and which bodies never lose but by +communicating it to others; of this we cannot form the most distant +conception. But notwithstanding this ignorance of natural powers[6] and +principles, we always presume, when we see like sensible qualities, that +they have like secret powers, and expect that effects, similar to those +which we have experienced, will follow from them. If a body of like +colour and consistence with that bread, which we have formerly eat, be +presented to us, we make no scruple of repeating the experiment, and +foresee, with certainty, like nourishment and support. Now this is a +process of the mind or thought, of which I would willingly know the +foundation. It is allowed on all hands that there is no known connexion +between the sensible qualities and the secret powers; and consequently, +that the mind is not led to form such a conclusion concerning their +constant and regular conjunction, by anything which it knows of their +nature. As to past _Experience_, it can be allowed to give _direct_ and +_certain_ information of those precise objects only, and that precise +period of time, which fell under its cognizance: but why this experience +should be extended to future times, and to other objects, which for +aught we know, may be only in appearance similar; this is the main +question on which I would insist. The bread, which I formerly eat, +nourished me; that is, a body of such sensible qualities was, at that +time, endued with such secret powers: but does it follow, that other +bread must also nourish me at another time, and that like sensible +qualities must always be attended with like secret powers? The +consequence seems nowise necessary. At least, it must be acknowledged +that there is here a consequence drawn by the mind; that there is a +certain step taken; a process of thought, and an inference, which wants +to be explained. These two propositions are far from being the same, _I +have found that such an object has always been attended with such an +effect_, and _I foresee, that other objects, which are, in appearance, +similar, will be attended with similar effects_. I shall allow, if you +please, that the one proposition may justly be inferred from the other: +I know, in fact, that it always is inferred. But if you insist that the +inference is made by a chain of reasoning, I desire you to produce that +reasoning. The connexion between these propositions is not intuitive. +There is required a medium, which may enable the mind to draw such an +inference, if indeed it be drawn by reasoning and argument. What that +medium is, I must confess, passes my comprehension; and it is incumbent +on those to produce it, who assert that it really exists, and is the +origin of all our conclusions concerning matter of fact. + + [6] The word, Power, is here used in a loose and popular sense. + The more accurate explication of it would give additional + evidence to this argument. See Sect. 7. + +30. This negative argument must certainly, in process of time, become +altogether convincing, if many penetrating and able philosophers shall +turn their enquiries this way and no one be ever able to discover any +connecting proposition or intermediate step, which supports the +understanding in this conclusion. But as the question is yet new, every +reader may not trust so far to his own penetration, as to conclude, +because an argument escapes his enquiry, that therefore it does not +really exist. For this reason it may be requisite to venture upon a more +difficult task; and enumerating all the branches of human knowledge, +endeavour to show that none of them can afford such an argument. + +All reasonings may be divided into two kinds, namely, demonstrative +reasoning, or that concerning relations of ideas, and moral reasoning, +or that concerning matter of fact and existence. That there are no +demonstrative arguments in the case seems evident; since it implies no +contradiction that the course of nature may change, and that an object, +seemingly like those which we have experienced, may be attended with +different or contrary effects. May I not clearly and distinctly conceive +that a body, falling from the clouds, and which, in all other respects, +resembles snow, has yet the taste of salt or feeling of fire? Is there +any more intelligible proposition than to affirm, that all the trees +will flourish in December and January, and decay in May and June? Now +whatever is intelligible, and can be distinctly conceived, implies no +contradiction, and can never be proved false by any demonstrative +argument or abstract reasoning _a priori_. + +If we be, therefore, engaged by arguments to put trust in past +experience, and make it the standard of our future judgement, these +arguments must be probable only, or such as regard matter of fact and +real existence, according to the division above mentioned. But that +there is no argument of this kind, must appear, if our explication of +that species of reasoning be admitted as solid and satisfactory. We have +said that all arguments concerning existence are founded on the relation +of cause and effect; that our knowledge of that relation is derived +entirely from experience; and that all our experimental conclusions +proceed upon the supposition that the future will be conformable to the +past. To endeavour, therefore, the proof of this last supposition by +probable arguments, or arguments regarding existence, must be evidently +going in a circle, and taking that for granted, which is the very point +in question. + +31. In reality, all arguments from experience are founded on the +similarity which we discover among natural objects, and by which we are +induced to expect effects similar to those which we have found to follow +from such objects. And though none but a fool or madman will ever +pretend to dispute the authority of experience, or to reject that great +guide of human life, it may surely be allowed a philosopher to have so +much curiosity at least as to examine the principle of human nature, +which gives this mighty authority to experience, and makes us draw +advantage from that similarity which nature has placed among different +objects. From causes which appear _similar_ we expect similar effects. +This is the sum of all our experimental conclusions. Now it seems +evident that, if this conclusion were formed by reason, it would be as +perfect at first, and upon one instance, as after ever so long a course +of experience. But the case is far otherwise. Nothing so like as eggs; +yet no one, on account of this appearing similarity, expects the same +taste and relish in all of them. It is only after a long course of +uniform experiments in any kind, that we attain a firm reliance and +security with regard to a particular event. Now where is that process of +reasoning which, from one instance, draws a conclusion, so different +from that which it infers from a hundred instances that are nowise +different from that single one? This question I propose as much for the +sake of information, as with an intention of raising difficulties. I +cannot find, I cannot imagine any such reasoning. But I keep my mind +still open to instruction, if any one will vouchsafe to bestow it on me. + +32. Should it be said that, from a number of uniform experiments, we +_infer_ a connexion between the sensible qualities and the secret +powers; this, I must confess, seems the same difficulty, couched in +different terms. The question still recurs, on what process of argument +this _inference_ is founded? Where is the medium, the interposing ideas, +which join propositions so very wide of each other? It is confessed that +the colour, consistence, and other sensible qualities of bread appear +not, of themselves, to have any connexion with the secret powers of +nourishment and support. For otherwise we could infer these secret +powers from the first appearance of these sensible qualities, without +the aid of experience; contrary to the sentiment of all philosophers, +and contrary to plain matter of fact. Here, then, is our natural state +of ignorance with regard to the powers and influence of all objects. How +is this remedied by experience? It only shows us a number of uniform +effects, resulting from certain objects, and teaches us that those +particular objects, at that particular time, were endowed with such +powers and forces. When a new object, endowed with similar sensible +qualities, is produced, we expect similar powers and forces, and look +for a like effect. From a body of like colour and consistence with bread +we expect like nourishment and support. But this surely is a step or +progress of the mind, which wants to be explained. When a man says, _I +have found, in all past instances, such sensible qualities conjoined +with such secret powers_: And when he says, _Similar sensible qualities +will always be conjoined with similar secret powers_, he is not guilty +of a tautology, nor are these propositions in any respect the same. You +say that the one proposition is an inference from the other. But you +must confess that the inference is not intuitive; neither is it +demonstrative: Of what nature is it, then? To say it is experimental, is +begging the question. For all inferences from experience suppose, as +their foundation, that the future will resemble the past, and that +similar powers will be conjoined with similar sensible qualities. If +there be any suspicion that the course of nature may change, and that +the past may be no rule for the future, all experience becomes useless, +and can give rise to no inference or conclusion. It is impossible, +therefore, that any arguments from experience can prove this resemblance +of the past to the future; since all these arguments are founded on the +supposition of that resemblance. Let the course of things be allowed +hitherto ever so regular; that alone, without some new argument or +inference, proves not that, for the future, it will continue so. In vain +do you pretend to have learned the nature of bodies from your past +experience. Their secret nature, and consequently all their effects and +influence, may change, without any change in their sensible qualities. +This happens sometimes, and with regard to some objects: Why may it not +happen always, and with regard to all objects? What logic, what process +of argument secures you against this supposition? My practice, you say, +refutes my doubts. But you mistake the purport of my question. As an +agent, I am quite satisfied in the point; but as a philosopher, who has +some share of curiosity, I will not say scepticism, I want to learn the +foundation of this inference. No reading, no enquiry has yet been able +to remove my difficulty, or give me satisfaction in a matter of such +importance. Can I do better than propose the difficulty to the public, +even though, perhaps, I have small hopes of obtaining a solution? We +shall at least, by this means, be sensible of our ignorance, if we do +not augment our knowledge. + +33. I must confess that a man is guilty of unpardonable arrogance who +concludes, because an argument has escaped his own investigation, that +therefore it does not really exist. I must also confess that, though all +the learned, for several ages, should have employed themselves in +fruitless search upon any subject, it may still, perhaps, be rash to +conclude positively that the subject must, therefore, pass all human +comprehension. Even though we examine all the sources of our knowledge, +and conclude them unfit for such a subject, there may still remain a +suspicion, that the enumeration is not complete, or the examination not +accurate. But with regard to the present subject, there are some +considerations which seem to remove all this accusation of arrogance or +suspicion of mistake. + +It is certain that the most ignorant and stupid peasants--nay infants, +nay even brute beasts--improve by experience, and learn the qualities of +natural objects, by observing the effects which result from them. When a +child has felt the sensation of pain from touching the flame of a +candle, he will be careful not to put his hand near any candle; but will +expect a similar effect from a cause which is similar in its sensible +qualities and appearance. If you assert, therefore, that the +understanding of the child is led into this conclusion by any process of +argument or ratiocination, I may justly require you to produce that +argument; nor have you any pretence to refuse so equitable a demand. You +cannot say that the argument is abstruse, and may possibly escape your +enquiry; since you confess that it is obvious to the capacity of a mere +infant. If you hesitate, therefore, a moment, or if, after reflection, +you produce any intricate or profound argument, you, in a manner, give +up the question, and confess that it is not reasoning which engages us +to suppose the past resembling the future, and to expect similar effects +from causes which are, to appearance, similar. This is the proposition +which I intended to enforce in the present section. If I be right, I +pretend not to have made any mighty discovery. And if I be wrong, I must +acknowledge myself to be indeed a very backward scholar; since I cannot +now discover an argument which, it seems, was perfectly familiar to me +long before I was out of my cradle. + + + +SECTION V. + +SCEPTICAL SOLUTION OF THESE DOUBTS. + + +PART I. + + +34. The passion for philosophy, like that for religion, seems liable to +this inconvenience, that, though it aims at the correction of our +manners, and extirpation of our vices, it may only serve, by imprudent +management, to foster a predominant inclination, and push the mind, with +more determined resolution, towards that side which already _draws_ too +much, by the bias and propensity of the natural temper. It is certain +that, while we aspire to the magnanimous firmness of the philosophic +sage, and endeavour to confine our pleasures altogether within our own +minds, we may, at last, render our philosophy like that of Epictetus, +and other _Stoics_, only a more refined system of selfishness, and +reason ourselves out of all virtue as well as social enjoyment. While we +study with attention the vanity of human life, and turn all our thoughts +towards the empty and transitory nature of riches and honours, we are, +perhaps, all the while flattering our natural indolence, which, hating +the bustle of the world, and drudgery of business, seeks a pretence of +reason to give itself a full and uncontrolled indulgence. There is, +however, one species of philosophy which seems little liable to this +inconvenience, and that because it strikes in with no disorderly passion +of the human mind, nor can mingle itself with any natural affection or +propensity; and that is the Academic or Sceptical philosophy. The +academics always talk of doubt and suspense of judgement, of danger in +hasty determinations, of confining to very narrow bounds the enquiries +of the understanding, and of renouncing all speculations which lie not +within the limits of common life and practice. Nothing, therefore, can +be more contrary than such a philosophy to the supine indolence of the +mind, its rash arrogance, its lofty pretensions, and its superstitious +credulity. Every passion is mortified by it, except the love of truth; +and that passion never is, nor can be, carried to too high a degree. It +is surprising, therefore, that this philosophy, which, in almost every +instance, must be harmless and innocent, should be the subject of so +much groundless reproach and obloquy. But, perhaps, the very +circumstance which renders it so innocent is what chiefly exposes it to +the public hatred and resentment. By flattering no irregular passion, it +gains few partizans: By opposing so many vices and follies, it raises to +itself abundance of enemies, who stigmatize it as libertine profane, and +irreligious. + +Nor need we fear that this philosophy, while it endeavours to limit our +enquiries to common life, should ever undermine the reasonings of common +life, and carry its doubts so far as to destroy all action, as well as +speculation. Nature will always maintain her rights, and prevail in the +end over any abstract reasoning whatsoever. Though we should conclude, +for instance, as in the foregoing section, that, in all reasonings from +experience, there is a step taken by the mind which is not supported by +any argument or process of the understanding; there is no danger that +these reasonings, on which almost all knowledge depends, will ever be +affected by such a discovery. If the mind be not engaged by argument to +make this step, it must be induced by some other principle of equal +weight and authority; and that principle will preserve its influence as +long as human nature remains the same. What that principle is may well +be worth the pains of enquiry. + +35. Suppose a person, though endowed with the strongest faculties of +reason and reflection, to be brought on a sudden into this world; he +would, indeed, immediately observe a continual succession of objects, +and one event following another; but he would not be able to discover +anything farther. He would not, at first, by any reasoning, be able to +reach the idea of cause and effect; since the particular powers, by +which all natural operations are performed, never appear to the senses; +nor is it reasonable to conclude, merely because one event, in one +instance, precedes another, that therefore the one is the cause, the +other the effect. Their conjunction may be arbitrary and casual. There +may be no reason to infer the existence of one from the appearance of +the other. And in a word, such a person, without more experience, could +never employ his conjecture or reasoning concerning any matter of fact, +or be assured of anything beyond what was immediately present to his +memory and senses. + +Suppose, again, that he has acquired more experience, and has lived so +long in the world as to have observed familiar objects or events to be +constantly conjoined together; what is the consequence of this +experience? He immediately infers the existence of one object from the +appearance of the other. Yet he has not, by all his experience, acquired +any idea or knowledge of the secret power by which the one object +produces the other; nor is it, by any process of reasoning, he is +engaged to draw this inference. But still he finds himself determined to +draw it: And though he should be convinced that his understanding has no +part in the operation, he would nevertheless continue in the same course +of thinking. There is some other principle which determines him to form +such a conclusion. + +36. This principle is Custom or Habit. For wherever the repetition of +any particular act or operation produces a propensity to renew the same +act or operation, without being impelled by any reasoning or process of +the understanding, we always say, that this propensity is the effect of +_Custom_. By employing that word, we pretend not to have given the +ultimate reason of such a propensity. We only point out a principle of +human nature, which is universally acknowledged, and which is well known +by its effects. Perhaps we can push our enquiries no farther, or pretend +to give the cause of this cause; but must rest contented with it as the +ultimate principle, which we can assign, of all our conclusions from +experience. It is sufficient satisfaction, that we can go so far, +without repining at the narrowness of our faculties because they will +carry us no farther. And it is certain we here advance a very +intelligible proposition at least, if not a true one, when we assert +that, after the constant conjunction of two objects--heat and flame, for +instance, weight and solidity--we are determined by custom alone to +expect the one from the appearance of the other. This hypothesis seems +even the only one which explains the difficulty, why we draw, from a +thousand instances, an inference which we are not able to draw from one +instance, that is, in no respect, different from them. Reason is +incapable of any such variation. The conclusions which it draws from +considering one circle are the same which it would form upon surveying +all the circles in the universe. But no man, having seen only one body +move after being impelled by another, could infer that every other body +will move after a like impulse. All inferences from experience, +therefore, are effects of custom, not of reasoning[7]. + + [7] Nothing is more useful than for writers, even, on _moral_, + _political_, or _physical_ subjects, to distinguish between + _reason_ and _experience_, and to suppose, that these species + of argumentation are entirely different from each other. The + former are taken for the mere result of our intellectual + faculties, which, by considering _a priori_ the nature of + things, and examining the effects, that must follow from their + operation, establish particular principles of science and + philosophy. The latter are supposed to be derived entirely from + sense and observation, by which we learn what has actually + resulted from the operation of particular objects, and are + thence able to infer, what will, for the future, result from + them. Thus, for instance, the limitations and restraints of + civil government, and a legal constitution, may be defended, + either from _reason_, which reflecting on the great frailty and + corruption of human nature, teaches, that no man can safely be + trusted with unlimited authority; or from _experience_ and + history, which inform us of the enormous abuses, that ambition, + in every age and country, has been found to make of so + imprudent a confidence. + + The same distinction between reason and experience is + maintained in all our deliberations concerning the conduct of + life; while the experienced statesman, general, physician, or + merchant is trusted and followed; and the unpractised novice, + with whatever natural talents endowed, neglected and despised. + Though it be allowed, that reason may form very plausible + conjectures with regard to the consequences of such a + particular conduct in such particular circumstances; it is + still supposed imperfect, without the assistance of experience, + which is alone able to give stability and certainty to the + maxims, derived from study and reflection. + + But notwithstanding that this distinction be thus universally + received, both in the active speculative scenes of life, I + shall not scruple to pronounce, that it is, at bottom, + erroneous, at least, superficial. + + If we examine those arguments, which, in any of the sciences + above mentioned, are supposed to be the mere effects of + reasoning and reflection, they will be found to terminate, at + last, in some general principle or conclusion, for which we can + assign no reason but observation and experience. The only + difference between them and those maxims, which are vulgarly + esteemed the result of pure experience, is, that the former + cannot be established without some process of thought, and some + reflection on what we have observed, in order to distinguish + its circumstances, and trace its consequences: Whereas in the + latter, the experienced event is exactly and fully familiar to + that which we infer as the result of any particular situation. + The history of a TIBERIUS or a NERO makes us dread a like + tyranny, were our monarchs freed from the restraints of laws + and senates: But the observation of any fraud or cruelty in + private life is sufficient, with the aid of a little thought, + to give us the same apprehension; while it serves as an + instance of the general corruption of human nature, and shows + us the danger which we must incur by reposing an entire + confidence in mankind. In both cases, it is experience which is + ultimately the foundation of our inference and conclusion. + + There is no man so young and unexperienced, as not to have + formed, from observation, many general and just maxims + concerning human affairs and the conduct of life; but it must + be confessed, that, when a man comes to put these in practice, + he will be extremely liable to error, till time and farther + experience both enlarge these maxims, and teach him their + proper use and application. In every situation or incident, + there are many particular and seemingly minute circumstances, + which the man of greatest talent is, at first, apt to overlook, + though on them the justness of his conclusions, and + consequently the prudence of his conduct, entirely depend. Not + to mention, that, to a young beginner, the general observations + and maxims occur not always on the proper occasions, nor can be + immediately applied with due calmness and distinction. The + truth is, an unexperienced reasoner could be no reasoner at + all, were he absolutely unexperienced; and when we assign that + character to any one, we mean it only in a comparative sense, + and suppose him possessed of experience, in a smaller and more + imperfect degree. + +Custom, then, is the great guide of human life. It is that principle +alone which renders our experience useful to us, and makes us expect, +for the future, a similar train of events with those which have appeared +in the past. + +Without the influence of custom, we should be entirely ignorant of every +matter of fact beyond what is immediately present to the memory and +senses. We should never know how to adjust means to ends, or to employ +our natural powers in the production of any effect. There would be an +end at once of all action, as well as of the chief part of speculation. + +37. But here it may be proper to remark, that though our conclusions +from experience carry us beyond our memory and senses, and assure us of +matters of fact which happened in the most distant places and most +remote ages, yet some fact must always be present to the senses or +memory, from which we may first proceed in drawing these conclusions. A +man, who should find in a desert country the remains of pompous +buildings, would conclude that the country had, in ancient times, been +cultivated by civilized inhabitants; but did nothing of this nature +occur to him, he could never form such an inference. We learn the events +of former ages from history; but then we must peruse the volumes in +which this instruction is contained, and thence carry up our inferences +from one testimony to another, till we arrive at the eyewitnesses and +spectators of these distant events. In a word, if we proceed not upon +some fact, present to the memory or senses, our reasonings would be +merely hypothetical; and however the particular links might be connected +with each other, the whole chain of inferences would have nothing to +support it, nor could we ever, by its means, arrive at the knowledge of +any real existence. If I ask why you believe any particular matter of +fact, which you relate, you must tell me some reason; and this reason +will be some other fact, connected with it. But as you cannot proceed +after this manner, _in infinitum_, you must at last terminate in some +fact, which is present to your memory or senses; or must allow that your +belief is entirely without foundation. + +38. What, then, is the conclusion of the whole matter? A simple one; +though, it must be confessed, pretty remote from the common theories of +philosophy. All belief of matter of fact or real existence is derived +merely from some object, present to the memory or senses, and a +customary conjunction between that and some other object. Or in other +words; having found, in many instances, that any two kinds of +objects--flame and heat, snow and cold--have always been conjoined +together; if flame or snow be presented anew to the senses, the mind is +carried by custom to expect heat or cold, and to _believe_ that such a +quality does exist, and will discover itself upon a nearer approach. +This belief is the necessary result of placing the mind in such +circumstances. It is an operation of the soul, when we are so situated, +as unavoidable as to feel the passion of love, when we receive benefits; +or hatred, when we meet with injuries. All these operations are a +species of natural instincts, which no reasoning or process of the +thought and understanding is able either to produce or to prevent. + +At this point, it would be very allowable for us to stop our +philosophical researches. In most questions we can never make a single +step farther; and in all questions we must terminate here at last, after +our most restless and curious enquiries. But still our curiosity will be +pardonable, perhaps commendable, if it carry us on to still farther +researches, and make us examine more accurately the nature of this +_belief_, and of the _customary conjunction_, whence it is derived. By +this means we may meet with some explications and analogies that will +give satisfaction; at least to such as love the abstract sciences, and +can be entertained with speculations, which, however accurate, may still +retain a degree of doubt and uncertainty. As to readers of a different +taste; the remaining part of this section is not calculated for them, +and the following enquiries may well be understood, though it be +neglected. + + +PART II. + + +39. Nothing is more free than the imagination of man; and though it +cannot exceed that original stock of ideas furnished by the internal and +external senses, it has unlimited power of mixing, compounding, +separating, and dividing these ideas, in all the varieties of fiction +and vision. It can feign a train of events, with all the appearance of +reality, ascribe to them a particular time and place, conceive them as +existent, and paint them out to itself with every circumstance, that +belongs to any historical fact, which it believes with the greatest +certainty. Wherein, therefore, consists the difference between such a +fiction and belief? It lies not merely in any peculiar idea, which is +annexed to such a conception as commands our assent, and which is +wanting to every known fiction. For as the mind has authority over all +its ideas, it could voluntarily annex this particular idea to any +fiction, and consequently be able to believe whatever it pleases; +contrary to what we find by daily experience. We can, in our conception, +join the head of a man to the body of a horse; but it is not in our +power to believe that such an animal has ever really existed. + +It follows, therefore, that the difference between _fiction_ and +_belief_ lies in some sentiment or feeling, which is annexed to the +latter, not to the former, and which depends not on the will, nor can be +commanded at pleasure. It must be excited by nature, like all other +sentiments; and must arise from the particular situation, in which the +mind is placed at any particular juncture. Whenever any object is +presented to the memory or senses, it immediately, by the force of +custom, carries the imagination to conceive that object, which is +usually conjoined to it; and this conception is attended with a feeling +or sentiment, different from the loose reveries of the fancy. In this +consists the whole nature of belief. For as there is no matter of fact +which we believe so firmly that we cannot conceive the contrary, there +would be no difference between the conception assented to and that which +is rejected, were it not for some sentiment which distinguishes the one +from the other. If I see a billiard-ball moving towards another, on a +smooth table, I can easily conceive it to stop upon contact. This +conception implies no contradiction; but still it feels very differently +from that conception by which I represent to myself the impulse and the +communication of motion from one ball to another. + +40. Were we to attempt a _definition_ of this sentiment, we should, +perhaps, find it a very difficult, if not an impossible task; in the +same manner as if we should endeavour to define the feeling of cold or +passion of anger, to a creature who never had any experience of these +sentiments. Belief is the true and proper name of this feeling; and no +one is ever at a loss to know the meaning of that term; because every +man is every moment conscious of the sentiment represented by it. It may +not, however, be improper to attempt a _description_ of this sentiment; +in hopes we may, by that means, arrive at some analogies, which may +afford a more perfect explication of it. I say, then, that belief is +nothing but a more vivid, lively, forcible, firm, steady conception of +an object, than what the imagination alone is ever able to attain. This +variety of terms, which may seem so unphilosophical, is intended only to +express that act of the mind, which renders realities, or what is taken +for such, more present to us than fictions, causes them to weigh more in +the thought, and gives them a superior influence on the passions and +imagination. Provided we agree about the thing, it is needless to +dispute about the terms. The imagination has the command over all its +ideas, and can join and mix and vary them, in all the ways possible. It +may conceive fictitious objects with all the circumstances of place and +time. It may set them, in a manner, before our eyes, in their true +colours, just as they might have existed. But as it is impossible that +this faculty of imagination can ever, of itself, reach belief, it is +evident that belief consists not in the peculiar nature or order of +ideas, but in the _manner_ of their conception, and in their _feeling_ +to the mind. I confess, that it is impossible perfectly to explain this +feeling or manner of conception. We may make use of words which express +something near it. But its true and proper name, as we observed before, +is _belief_; which is a term that every one sufficiently understands in +common life. And in philosophy, we can go no farther than assert, that +_belief_ is something felt by the mind, which distinguishes the ideas of +the judgement from the fictions of the imagination. It gives them more +weight and influence; makes them appear of greater importance; enforces +them in the mind; and renders them the governing principle of our +actions. I hear at present, for instance, a person's voice, with whom I +am acquainted; and the sound comes as from the next room. This +impression of my senses immediately conveys my thought to the person, +together with all the surrounding objects. I paint them out to myself as +existing at present, with the same qualities and relations, of which I +formerly knew them possessed. These ideas take faster hold of my mind +than ideas of an enchanted castle. They are very different to the +feeling, and have a much greater influence of every kind, either to give +pleasure or pain, joy or sorrow. + +Let us, then, take in the whole compass of this doctrine, and allow, +that the sentiment of belief is nothing but a conception more intense +and steady than what attends the mere fictions of the imagination, and +that this _manner_ of conception arises from a customary conjunction of +the object with something present to the memory or senses: I believe +that it will not be difficult, upon these suppositions, to find other +operations of the mind analogous to it, and to trace up these phenomena +to principles still more general. + +41. We have already observed that nature has established connexions +among particular ideas, and that no sooner one idea occurs to our +thoughts than it introduces its correlative, and carries our attention +towards it, by a gentle and insensible movement. These principles of +connexion or association we have reduced to three, namely, +_Resemblance_, _Contiguity_ and _Causation_; which are the only bonds +that unite our thoughts together, and beget that regular train of +reflection or discourse, which, in a greater or less degree, takes place +among all mankind. Now here arises a question, on which the solution of +the present difficulty will depend. Does it happen, in all these +relations, that, when one of the objects is presented to the senses or +memory, the mind is not only carried to the conception of the +correlative, but reaches a steadier and stronger conception of it than +what otherwise it would have been able to attain? This seems to be the +case with that belief which arises from the relation of cause and +effect. And if the case be the same with the other relations or +principles of associations, this may be established as a general law, +which takes place in all the operations of the mind. + +We may, therefore, observe, as the first experiment to our present +purpose, that, upon the appearance of the picture of an absent friend, +our idea of him is evidently enlivened by the _resemblance_, and that +every passion, which that idea occasions, whether of joy or sorrow, +acquires new force and vigour. In producing this effect, there concur +both a relation and a present impression. Where the picture bears him no +resemblance, at least was not intended for him, it never so much as +conveys our thought to him: And where it is absent, as well as the +person, though the mind may pass from the thought of the one to that of +the other, it feels its idea to be rather weakened than enlivened by +that transition. We take a pleasure in viewing the picture of a friend, +when it is set before us; but when it is removed, rather choose to +consider him directly than by reflection in an image, which is equally +distant and obscure. + +The ceremonies of the Roman Catholic religion may be considered as +instances of the same nature. The devotees of that superstition usually +plead in excuse for the mummeries, with which they are upbraided, that +they feel the good effect of those external motions, and postures, and +actions, in enlivening their devotion and quickening their fervour, +which otherwise would decay, if directed entirely to distant and +immaterial objects. We shadow out the objects of our faith, say they, in +sensible types and images, and render them more present to us by the +immediate presence of these types, than it is possible for us to do +merely by an intellectual view and contemplation. Sensible objects have +always a greater influence on the fancy than any other; and this +influence they readily convey to those ideas to which they are related, +and which they resemble. I shall only infer from these practices, and +this reasoning, that the effect of resemblance in enlivening the ideas +is very common; and as in every case a resemblance and a present +impression must concur, we are abundantly supplied with experiments to +prove the reality of the foregoing principle. + +42. We may add force to these experiments by others of a different kind, +in considering the effects of _contiguity_ as well as of _resemblance_. +It is certain that distance diminishes the force of every idea, and +that, upon our approach to any object; though it does not discover +itself to our senses; it operates upon the mind with an influence, which +imitates an immediate impression. The thinking on any object readily +transports the mind to what is contiguous; but it is only the actual +presence of an object, that transports it with a superior vivacity. When +I am a few miles from home, whatever relates to it touches me more +nearly than when I am two hundred leagues distant; though even at that +distance the reflecting on any thing in the neighbourhood of my friends +or family naturally produces an idea of them. But as in this latter +case, both the objects of the mind are ideas; notwithstanding there is +an easy transition between them; that transition alone is not able to +give a superior vivacity to any of the ideas, for want of some immediate +impression[8]. + + [8] 'Naturane nobis, inquit, datum dicam, an errore quodam, ut, + cum ea loca videamus, in quibus memoria dignos viros + acceperimus multum esse versatos, magis moveamur, quam siquando + eorum ipsorum aut facta audiamus aut scriptum aliquod legamus? + Velut ego nunc moveor. Venit enim mihi Plato in mentem, quera + accepimus primum hic disputare solitum: cuius etiam illi + hortuli propinqui non memoriam solum mihi afferunt, sed ipsum + videntur in conspectu meo hic ponere. Hic Speusippus, hic + Xenocrates, hic eius auditor Polemo; cuius ipsa illa sessio + fuit, quam videmus. Equidem etiam curiam nostram, Hostiliam + dico, non hanc novam, quae mihi minor esse videtur postquam est + maior, solebam intuens, Scipionem, Catonem, Laelium, nostrum + vero in primis avum cogitare. Tanta vis admonitionis est in + locis; ut non sine causa ex his memoriae deducta sit + disciplina.' + + _Cicero de Finibus_. Lib. v. + +43. No one can doubt but causation has the same influence as the other +two relations of resemblance and contiguity. Superstitious people are +fond of the reliques of saints and holy men, for the same reason, that +they seek after types or images, in order to enliven their devotion, and +give them a more intimate and strong conception of those exemplary +lives, which they desire to imitate. Now it is evident, that one of the +best reliques, which a devotee could procure, would be the handywork of +a saint; and if his cloaths and furniture are ever to be considered in +this light, it is because they were once at his disposal, and were moved +and affected by him; in which respect they are to be considered as +imperfect effects, and as connected with him by a shorter chain of +consequences than any of those, by which we learn the reality of his +existence. + +Suppose, that the son of a friend, who had been long dead or absent, +were presented to us; it is evident, that this object would instantly +revive its correlative idea, and recal to our thoughts all past +intimacies and familiarities, in more lively colours than they would +otherwise have appeared to us. This is another phaenomenon, which seems +to prove the principle above mentioned. + +44. We may observe, that, in these phaenomena, the belief of the +correlative object is always presupposed; without which the relation +could have no effect. The influence of the picture supposes, that we +_believe_ our friend to have once existed. Contiguity to home can never +excite our ideas of home, unless we _believe_ that it really exists. Now +I assert, that this belief, where it reaches beyond the memory or +senses, is of a similar nature, and arises from similar causes, with the +transition of thought and vivacity of conception here explained. When I +throw a piece of dry wood into a fire, my mind is immediately carried to +conceive, that it augments, not extinguishes the flame. This transition +of thought from the cause to the effect proceeds not from reason. It +derives its origin altogether from custom and experience. And as it +first begins from an object, present to the senses, it renders the idea +or conception of flame more strong and lively than any loose, floating +reverie of the imagination. That idea arises immediately. The thought +moves instantly towards it, and conveys to it all that force of +conception, which is derived from the impression present to the senses. +When a sword is levelled at my breast, does not the idea of wound and +pain strike me more strongly, than when a glass of wine is presented to +me, even though by accident this idea should occur after the appearance +of the latter object? But what is there in this whole matter to cause +such a strong conception, except only a present object and a customary +transition to the idea of another object, which we have been accustomed +to conjoin with the former? This is the whole operation of the mind, in +all our conclusions concerning matter of fact and existence; and it is a +satisfaction to find some analogies, by which it may be explained. The +transition from a present object does in all cases give strength and +solidity to the related idea. + +Here, then, is a kind of pre-established harmony between the course of +nature and the succession of our ideas; and though the powers and +forces, by which the former is governed, be wholly unknown to us; yet +our thoughts and conceptions have still, we find, gone on in the same +train with the other works of nature. Custom is that principle, by which +this correspondence has been effected; so necessary to the subsistence +of our species, and the regulation of our conduct, in every circumstance +and occurrence of human life. Had not the presence of an object, +instantly excited the idea of those objects, commonly conjoined with it, +all our knowledge must have been limited to the narrow sphere of our +memory and senses; and we should never have been able to adjust means to +ends, or employ our natural powers, either to the producing of good, or +avoiding of evil. Those, who delight in the discovery and contemplation +of _final causes_, have here ample subject to employ their wonder and +admiration. + +45. I shall add, for a further confirmation of the foregoing theory, +that, as this operation of the mind, by which we infer like effects from +like causes, and _vice versa_, is so essential to the subsistence of all +human creatures, it is not probable, that it could be trusted to the +fallacious deductions of our reason, which is slow in its operations; +appears not, in any degree, during the first years of infancy; and at +best is, in every age and period of human life, extremely liable to +error and mistake. It is more conformable to the ordinary wisdom of +nature to secure so necessary an act of the mind, by some instinct or +mechanical tendency, which may be infallible in its operations, may +discover itself at the first appearance of life and thought, and may be +independent of all the laboured deductions of the understanding. As +nature has taught us the use of our limbs, without giving us the +knowledge of the muscles and nerves, by which they are actuated; so has +she implanted in us an instinct, which carries forward the thought in a +correspondent course to that which she has established among external +objects; though we are ignorant of those powers and forces, on which +this regular course and succession of objects totally depends. + + + +SECTION VI. + +OF PROBABILITY[9]. + + [9] Mr. Locke divides all arguments into demonstrative and + probable. In this view, we must say, that it is only probable + all men must die, or that the sun will rise to-morrow. But to + conform our language more to common use, we ought to divide + arguments into _demonstrations_, _proofs_, and _probabilities_. + By proofs meaning such arguments from experience as leave no + room for doubt or opposition. + + +46. Though there be no such thing as _Chance_ in the world; our +ignorance of the real cause of any event has the same influence on the +understanding, and begets a like species of belief or opinion. + +There is certainly a probability, which arises from a superiority of +chances on any side; and according as this superiority encreases, and +surpasses the opposite chances, the probability receives a +proportionable encrease, and begets still a higher degree of belief or +assent to that side, in which we discover the superiority. If a dye were +marked with one figure or number of spots on four sides, and with +another figure or number of spots on the two remaining sides, it would +be more probable, that the former would turn up than the latter; though, +if it had a thousand sides marked in the same manner, and only one side +different, the probability would be much higher, and our belief or +expectation of the event more steady and secure. This process of the +thought or reasoning may seem trivial and obvious; but to those who +consider it more narrowly, it may, perhaps, afford matter for curious +speculation. + +It seems evident, that, when the mind looks forward to discover the +event, which may result from the throw of such a dye, it considers the +turning up of each particular side as alike probable; and this is the +very nature of chance, to render all the particular events, comprehended +in it, entirely equal. But finding a greater number of sides concur in +the one event than in the other, the mind is carried more frequently to +that event, and meets it oftener, in revolving the various possibilities +or chances, on which the ultimate result depends. This concurrence of +several views in one particular event begets immediately, by an +inexplicable contrivance of nature, the sentiment of belief, and gives +that event the advantage over its antagonist, which is supported by a +smaller number of views, and recurs less frequently to the mind. If we +allow, that belief is nothing but a firmer and stronger conception of an +object than what attends the mere fictions of the imagination, this +operation may, perhaps, in some measure, be accounted for. The +concurrence of these several views or glimpses imprints the idea more +strongly on the imagination; gives it superior force and vigour; renders +its influence on the passions and affections more sensible; and in a +word, begets that reliance or security, which constitutes the nature of +belief and opinion. + +47. The case is the same with the probability of causes, as with that of +chance. There are some causes, which are entirely uniform and constant +in producing a particular effect; and no instance has ever yet been +found of any failure or irregularity in their operation. Fire has always +burned, and water suffocated every human creature: The production of +motion by impulse and gravity is an universal law, which has hitherto +admitted of no exception. But there are other causes, which have been +found more irregular and uncertain; nor has rhubarb always proved a +purge, or opium a soporific to every one, who has taken these medicines. +It is true, when any cause fails of producing its usual effect, +philosophers ascribe not this to any irregularity in nature; but +suppose, that some secret causes, in the particular structure of parts, +have prevented the operation. Our reasonings, however, and conclusions +concerning the event are the same as if this principle had no place. +Being determined by custom to transfer the past to the future, in all +our inferences; where the past has been entirely regular and uniform, we +expect the event with the greatest assurance, and leave no room for any +contrary supposition. But where different effects have been found to +follow from causes, which are to _appearance_ exactly similar, all these +various effects must occur to the mind in transferring the past to the +future, and enter into our consideration, when we determine the +probability of the event. Though we give the preference to that which +has been found most usual, and believe that this effect will exist, we +must not overlook the other effects, but must assign to each of them a +particular weight and authority, in proportion as we have found it to be +more or less frequent. It is more probable, in almost every country of +Europe, that there will be frost sometime in January, than that the +weather will continue open throughout that whole month; though this +probability varies according to the different climates, and approaches +to a certainty in the more northern kingdoms. Here then it seems +evident, that, when we transfer the past to the future, in order to +determine the effect, which will result from any cause, we transfer all +the different events, in the same proportion as they have appeared in +the past, and conceive one to have existed a hundred times, for +instance, another ten times, and another once. As a great number of +views do here concur in one event, they fortify and confirm it to the +imagination, beget that sentiment which we call _belief,_ and give its +object the preference above the contrary event, which is not supported +by an equal number of experiments, and recurs not so frequently to the +thought in transferring the past to the future. Let any one try to +account for this operation of the mind upon any of the received systems +of philosophy, and he will be sensible of the difficulty. For my part, I +shall think it sufficient, if the present hints excite the curiosity of +philosophers, and make them sensible how defective all common theories +are in treating of such curious and such sublime subjects. + + + +SECTION VII. + +OF THE IDEA OF NECESSARY CONNEXION. + +PART I. + + +48. The great advantage of the mathematical sciences above the moral +consists in this, that the ideas of the former, being sensible, are +always clear and determinate, the smallest distinction between them is +immediately perceptible, and the same terms are still expressive of the +same ideas, without ambiguity or variation. An oval is never mistaken +for a circle, nor an hyperbola for an ellipsis. The isosceles and +scalenum are distinguished by boundaries more exact than vice and +virtue, right and wrong. If any term be defined in geometry, the mind +readily, of itself, substitutes, on all occasions, the definition for +the term defined: Or even when no definition is employed, the object +itself may be presented to the senses, and by that means be steadily and +clearly apprehended. But the finer sentiments of the mind, the +operations of the understanding, the various agitations of the passions, +though really in themselves distinct, easily escape us, when surveyed by +reflection; nor is it in our power to recal the original object, as +often as we have occasion to contemplate it. Ambiguity, by this means, +is gradually introduced into our reasonings: Similar objects are readily +taken to be the same: And the conclusion becomes at last very wide of +the premises. + +One may safely, however, affirm, that, if we consider these sciences in +a proper light, their advantages and disadvantages nearly compensate +each other, and reduce both of them to a state of equality. If the mind, +with greater facility, retains the ideas of geometry clear and +determinate, it must carry on a much longer and more intricate chain of +reasoning, and compare ideas much wider of each other, in order to reach +the abstruser truths of that science. And if moral ideas are apt, +without extreme care, to fall into obscurity and confusion, the +inferences are always much shorter in these disquisitions, and the +intermediate steps, which lead to the conclusion, much fewer than in the +sciences which treat of quantity and number. In reality, there is +scarcely a proposition in Euclid so simple, as not to consist of more +parts, than are to be found in any moral reasoning which runs not into +chimera and conceit. Where we trace the principles of the human mind +through a few steps, we may be very well satisfied with our progress; +considering how soon nature throws a bar to all our enquiries concerning +causes, and reduces us to an acknowledgment of our ignorance. The chief +obstacle, therefore, to our improvement in the moral or metaphysical +sciences is the obscurity of the ideas, and ambiguity of the terms. The +principal difficulty in the mathematics is the length of inferences and +compass of thought, requisite to the forming of any conclusion. And, +perhaps, our progress in natural philosophy is chiefly retarded by the +want of proper experiments and phaenomena, which are often discovered by +chance, and cannot always be found, when requisite, even by the most +diligent and prudent enquiry. As moral philosophy seems hitherto to have +received less improvement than either geometry or physics, we may +conclude, that, if there be any difference in this respect among these +sciences, the difficulties, which obstruct the progress of the former, +require superior care and capacity to be surmounted. + +49. There are no ideas, which occur in metaphysics, more obscure and +uncertain, than those of _power, force, energy_ or _necessary +connexion_, of which it is every moment necessary for us to treat in all +our disquisitions. We shall, therefore, endeavour, in this section, to +fix, if possible, the precise meaning of these terms, and thereby remove +some part of that obscurity, which is so much complained of in this +species of philosophy. + +It seems a proposition, which will not admit of much dispute, that all +our ideas are nothing but copies of our impressions, or, in other words, +that it is impossible for us to _think_ of any thing, which we have not +antecedently _felt_, either by our external or internal senses. I have +endeavoured[10] to explain and prove this proposition, and have expressed +my hopes, that, by a proper application of it, men may reach a greater +clearness and precision in philosophical reasonings, than what they have +hitherto been able to attain. Complex ideas may, perhaps, be well known +by definition, which is nothing but an enumeration of those parts or +simple ideas, that compose them. But when we have pushed up definitions +to the most simple ideas, and find still some ambiguity and obscurity; +what resource are we then possessed of? By what invention can we throw +light upon these ideas, and render them altogether precise and +determinate to our intellectual view? Produce the impressions or +original sentiments, from which the ideas are copied. These impressions +are all strong and sensible. They admit not of ambiguity. They are not +only placed in a full light themselves, but may throw light on their +correspondent ideas, which lie in obscurity. And by this means, we may, +perhaps, attain a new microscope or species of optics, by which, in the +moral sciences, the most minute, and most simple ideas may be so +enlarged as to fall readily under our apprehension, and be equally known +with the grossest and most sensible ideas, that can be the object of +our enquiry. + + [10] Section II. + +50. To be fully acquainted, therefore, with the idea of power or +necessary connexion, let us examine its impression; and in order to find +the impression with greater certainty, let us search for it in all the +sources, from which it may possibly be derived. + +When we look about us towards external objects, and consider the +operation of causes, we are never able, in a single instance, to +discover any power or necessary connexion; any quality, which binds the +effect to the cause, and renders the one an infallible consequence of +the other. We only find, that the one does actually, in fact, follow the +other. The impulse of one billiard-ball is attended with motion in the +second. This is the whole that appears to the _outward_ senses. The mind +feels no sentiment or _inward_ impression from this succession of +objects: Consequently, there is not, in any single, particular instance +of cause and effect, any thing which can suggest the idea of power or +necessary connexion. + +From the first appearance of an object, we never can conjecture what +effect will result from it. But were the power or energy of any cause +discoverable by the mind, we could foresee the effect, even without +experience; and might, at first, pronounce with certainty concerning it, +by mere dint of thought and reasoning. + +In reality, there is no part of matter, that does ever, by its sensible +qualities, discover any power or energy, or give us ground to imagine, +that it could produce any thing, or be followed by any other object, +which we could denominate its effect. Solidity, extension, motion; these +qualities are all complete in themselves, and never point out any other +event which may result from them. The scenes of the universe are +continually shifting, and one object follows another in an uninterrupted +succession; but the power of force, which actuates the whole machine, is +entirely concealed from us, and never discovers itself in any of the +sensible qualities of body. We know, that, in fact, heat is a constant +attendant of flame; but what is the connexion between them, we have no +room so much as to conjecture or imagine. It is impossible, therefore, +that the idea of power can be derived from the contemplation of bodies, +in single instances of their operation; because no bodies ever discover +any power, which can be the original of this idea.[11] + + [11] Mr. Locke, in his chapter of power, says that, finding + from experience, that there are several new productions in + nature, and concluding that there must somewhere be a power + capable of producing them, we arrive at last by this reasoning + at the idea of power. But no reasoning can ever give us a new, + original, simple idea; as this philosopher himself confesses. + This, therefore, can never be the origin of that idea. + +51. Since, therefore, external objects as they appear to the senses, +give us no idea of power or necessary connexion, by their operation in +particular instances, let us see, whether this idea be derived from +reflection on the operations of our own minds, and be copied from any +internal impression. It may be said, that we are every moment conscious +of internal power; while we feel, that, by the simple command of our +will, we can move the organs of our body, or direct the faculties of our +mind. An act of volition produces motion in our limbs, or raises a new +idea in our imagination. This influence of the will we know by +consciousness. Hence we acquire the idea of power or energy; and are +certain, that we ourselves and all other intelligent beings are +possessed of power. This idea, then, is an idea of reflection, since it +arises from reflecting on the operations of our own mind, and on the +command which is exercised by will, both over the organs of the body and +faculties of the soul. + +52. We shall proceed to examine this pretension; and first with regard +to the influence of volition over the organs of the body. This +influence, we may observe, is a fact, which, like all other natural +events, can be known only by experience, and can never be foreseen from +any apparent energy or power in the cause, which connects it with the +effect, and renders the one an infallible consequence of the other. The +motion of our body follows upon the command of our will. Of this we are +every moment conscious. But the means, by which this is effected; the +energy, by which the will performs so extraordinary an operation; of +this we are so far from being immediately conscious, that it must for +ever escape our most diligent enquiry. + +For _first_; is there any principle in all nature more mysterious than +the union of soul with body; by which a supposed spiritual substance +acquires such an influence over a material one, that the most refined +thought is able to actuate the grossest matter? Were we empowered, by a +secret wish, to remove mountains, or control the planets in their orbit; +this extensive authority would not be more extraordinary, nor more +beyond our comprehension. But if by consciousness we perceived any power +or energy in the will, we must know this power; we must know its +connexion with the effect; we must know the secret union of soul and +body, and the nature of both these substances; by which the one is able +to operate, in so many instances, upon the other. + +_Secondly_, We are not able to move all the organs of the body with a +like authority; though we cannot assign any reason besides experience, +for so remarkable a difference between one and the other. Why has the +will an influence over the tongue and fingers, not over the heart or +liver? This question would never embarrass us, were we conscious of a +power in the former case, not in the latter. We should then perceive, +independent of experience, why the authority of will over the organs of +the body is circumscribed within such particular limits. Being in that +case fully acquainted with the power or force, by which it operates, we +should also know, why its influence reaches precisely to such +boundaries, and no farther. + +A man, suddenly struck with palsy in the leg or arm, or who had newly +lost those members, frequently endeavours, at first to move them, and +employ them in their usual offices. Here he is as much conscious of +power to command such limbs, as a man in perfect health is conscious of +power to actuate any member which remains in its natural state and +condition. But consciousness never deceives. Consequently, neither in +the one case nor in the other, are we ever conscious of any power. We +learn the influence of our will from experience alone. And experience +only teaches us, how one event constantly follows another; without +instructing us in the secret connexion, which binds them together, and +renders them inseparable. + +_Thirdly,_ We learn from anatomy, that the immediate object of power in +voluntary motion, is not the member itself which is moved, but certain +muscles, and nerves, and animal spirits, and, perhaps, something still +more minute and more unknown, through which the motion is successively +propagated, ere it reach the member itself whose motion is the immediate +object of volition. Can there be a more certain proof, that the power, +by which this whole operation is performed, so far from being directly +and fully known by an inward sentiment or consciousness, is, to the last +degree mysterious and unintelligible? Here the mind wills a certain +event: Immediately another event, unknown to ourselves, and totally +different from the one intended, is produced: This event produces +another, equally unknown: Till at last, through a long succession, the +desired event is produced. But if the original power were felt, it must +be known: Were it known, its effect also must be known; since all power +is relative to its effect. And _vice versa,_ if the effect be not known, +the power cannot be known nor felt. How indeed can we be conscious of a +power to move our limbs, when we have no such power; but only that to +move certain animal spirits, which, though they produce at last the +motion of our limbs, yet operate in such a manner as is wholly beyond +our comprehension? + +We may, therefore, conclude from the whole, I hope, without any +temerity, though with assurance; that our idea of power is not copied +from any sentiment or consciousness of power within ourselves, when we +give rise to animal motion, or apply our limbs to their proper use and +office. That their motion follows the command of the will is a matter of +common experience, like other natural events: But the power or energy by +which this is effected, like that in other natural events, is unknown +and inconceivable.[12] + + [12] It may be pretended, that the resistance which we meet + with in bodies, obliging us frequently to exert our force, and + call up all our power, this gives us the idea of force and + power. It is this _nisus_, or strong endeavour, of which we are + conscious, that is the original impression from which this idea + is copied. But, first, we attribute power to a vast number of + objects, where we never can suppose this resistance or exertion + of force to take place; to the Supreme Being, who never meets + with any resistance; to the mind in its command over its ideas + and limbs, in common thinking and motion, where the effect + follows immediately upon the will, without any exertion or + summoning up of force; to inanimate matter, which is not + capable of this sentiment. _Secondly,_ This sentiment of an + endeavour to overcome resistance has no known connexion with + any event: What follows it, we know by experience; but could + not know it _a priori._ It must, however, be confessed, that + the animal _nisus,_ which we experience, though it can afford + no accurate precise idea of power, enters very much into that + vulgar, inaccurate idea, which is formed of it. + +53. Shall we then assert, that we are conscious of a power or energy in +our own minds, when, by an act or command of our will, we raise up a new +idea, fix the mind to the contemplation of it, turn it on all sides, and +at last dismiss it for some other idea, when we think that we have +surveyed it with sufficient accuracy? I believe the same arguments will +prove, that even this command of the will gives us no real idea of force +or energy. + +_First,_ It must be allowed, that, when we know a power, we know that +very circumstance in the cause, by which it is enabled to produce the +effect: For these are supposed to be synonimous. We must, therefore, +know both the cause and effect, and the relation between them. But do we +pretend to be acquainted with the nature of the human soul and the +nature of an idea, or the aptitude of the one to produce the other? This +is a real creation; a production of something out of nothing: Which +implies a power so great, that it may seem, at first sight, beyond the +reach of any being, less than infinite. At least it must be owned, that +such a power is not felt, nor known, nor even conceivable by the mind. +We only feel the event, namely, the existence of an idea, consequent to +a command of the will: But the manner, in which this operation is +performed, the power by which it is produced, is entirely beyond our +comprehension. + +_Secondly_, The command of the mind over itself is limited, as well as +its command over the body; and these limits are not known by reason, or +any acquaintance with the nature of cause and effect, but only by +experience and observation, as in all other natural events and in the +operation of external objects. Our authority over our sentiments and +passions is much weaker than that over our ideas; and even the latter +authority is circumscribed within very narrow boundaries. Will any one +pretend to assign the ultimate reason of these boundaries, or show why +the power is deficient in one case, not in another. + +_Thirdly_, This self-command is very different at different times. A man +in health possesses more of it than one languishing with sickness. We +are more master of our thoughts in the morning than in the evening: +Fasting, than after a full meal. Can we give any reason for these +variations, except experience? Where then is the power, of which we +pretend to be conscious? Is there not here, either in a spiritual or +material substance, or both, some secret mechanism or structure of +parts, upon which the effect depends, and which, being entirely unknown +to us, renders the power or energy of the will equally unknown and +incomprehensible? + +Volition is surely an act of the mind, with which we are sufficiently +acquainted. Reflect upon it. Consider it on all sides. Do you find +anything in it like this creative power, by which it raises from nothing +a new idea, and with a kind of _Fiat_, imitates the omnipotence of its +Maker, if I may be allowed so to speak, who called forth into existence +all the various scenes of nature? So far from being conscious of this +energy in the will, it requires as certain experience as that of which +we are possessed, to convince us that such extraordinary effects do ever +result from a simple act of volition. + +54. The generality of mankind never find any difficulty in accounting +for the more common and familiar operations of nature--such as the +descent of heavy bodies, the growth of plants, the generation of +animals, or the nourishment of bodies by food: But suppose that, in all +these cases, they perceive the very force or energy of the cause, by +which it is connected with its effect, and is for ever infallible in its +operation. They acquire, by long habit, such a turn of mind, that, upon +the appearance of the cause, they immediately expect with assurance its +usual attendant, and hardly conceive it possible that any other event +could result from it. It is only on the discovery of extraordinary +phaenomena, such as earthquakes, pestilence, and prodigies of any kind, +that they find themselves at a loss to assign a proper cause, and to +explain the manner in which the effect is produced by it. It is usual +for men, in such difficulties, to have recourse to some invisible +intelligent principle[13] as the immediate cause of that event which +surprises them, and which, they think, cannot be accounted for from the +common powers of nature. But philosophers, who carry their scrutiny a +little farther, immediately perceive that, even in the most familiar +events, the energy of the cause is as unintelligible as in the most +unusual, and that we only learn by experience the frequent _Conjunction_ +of objects, without being ever able to comprehend anything like +_Connexion_ between them. + + [13] [Greek: theos apo maechanaes.] + +55. Here, then, many philosophers think themselves obliged by reason to +have recourse, on all occasions, to the same principle, which the vulgar +never appeal to but in cases that appear miraculous and supernatural. +They acknowledge mind and intelligence to be, not only the ultimate and +original cause of all things, but the immediate and sole cause of every +event which appears in nature. They pretend that those objects which are +commonly denominated _causes,_ are in reality nothing but _occasions;_ +and that the true and direct principle of every effect is not any power +or force in nature, but a volition of the Supreme Being, who wills that +such particular objects should for ever be conjoined with each other. +Instead of saying that one billiard-ball moves another by a force which +it has derived from the author of nature, it is the Deity himself, they +say, who, by a particular volition, moves the second ball, being +determined to this operation by the impulse of the first ball, in +consequence of those general laws which he has laid down to himself in +the government of the universe. But philosophers advancing still in +their inquiries, discover that, as we are totally ignorant of the power +on which depends the mutual operation of bodies, we are no less ignorant +of that power on which depends the operation of mind on body, or of body +on mind; nor are we able, either from our senses or consciousness, to +assign the ultimate principle in one case more than in the other. The +same ignorance, therefore, reduces them to the same conclusion. They +assert that the Deity is the immediate cause of the union between soul +and body; and that they are not the organs of sense, which, being +agitated by external objects, produce sensations in the mind; but that +it is a particular volition of our omnipotent Maker, which excites such +a sensation, in consequence of such a motion in the organ. In like +manner, it is not any energy in the will that produces local motion in +our members: It is God himself, who is pleased to second our will, in +itself impotent, and to command that motion which we erroneously +attribute to our own power and efficacy. Nor do philosophers stop at +this conclusion. They sometimes extend the same inference to the mind +itself, in its internal operations. Our mental vision or conception of +ideas is nothing but a revelation made to us by our Maker. When we +voluntarily turn our thoughts to any object, and raise up its image in +the fancy, it is not the will which creates that idea: It is the +universal Creator, who discovers it to the mind, and renders it +present to us. + +56. Thus, according to these philosophers, every thing is full of God. +Not content with the principle, that nothing exists but by his will, +that nothing possesses any power but by his concession: They rob nature, +and all created beings, of every power, in order to render their +dependence on the Deity still more sensible and immediate. They consider +not that, by this theory, they diminish, instead of magnifying, the +grandeur of those attributes, which they affect so much to celebrate. It +argues surely more power in the Deity to delegate a certain degree of +power to inferior creatures than to produce every thing by his own +immediate volition. It argues more wisdom to contrive at first the +fabric of the world with such perfect foresight that, of itself, and by +its proper operation, it may serve all the purposes of providence, than +if the great Creator were obliged every moment to adjust its parts, and +animate by his breath all the wheels of that stupendous machine. + +But if we would have a more philosophical confutation of this theory, +perhaps the two following reflections may suffice. + +57. _First_, it seems to me that this theory of the universal energy and +operation of the Supreme Being is too bold ever to carry conviction with +it to a man, sufficiently apprized of the weakness of human reason, and +the narrow limits to which it is confined in all its operations. Though +the chain of arguments which conduct to it were ever so logical, there +must arise a strong suspicion, if not an absolute assurance, that it has +carried us quite beyond the reach of our faculties, when it leads to +conclusions so extraordinary, and so remote from common life and +experience. We are got into fairy land, long ere we have reached the +last steps of our theory; and _there_ we have no reason to trust our +common methods of argument, or to think that our usual analogies and +probabilities have any authority. Our line is too short to fathom such +immense abysses. And however we may flatter ourselves that we are +guided, in every step which we take, by a kind of verisimilitude and +experience, we may be assured that this fancied experience has no +authority when we thus apply it to subjects that lie entirely out of the +sphere of experience. But on this we shall have occasion to touch +afterwards.[14] + + [14] Section XII. + +_Secondly,_ I cannot perceive any force in the arguments on which this +theory is founded. We are ignorant, it is true, of the manner in which +bodies operate on each other: Their force or energy is entirely +incomprehensible: But are we not equally ignorant of the manner or force +by which a mind, even the supreme mind, operates either on itself or on +body? Whence, I beseech you, do we acquire any idea of it? We have no +sentiment or consciousness of this power in ourselves. We have no idea +of the Supreme Being but what we learn from reflection on our own +faculties. Were our ignorance, therefore, a good reason for rejecting +any thing, we should be led into that principle of denying all energy in +the Supreme Being as much as in the grossest matter. We surely +comprehend as little the operations of one as of the other. Is it more +difficult to conceive that motion may arise from impulse than that it +may arise from volition? All we know is our profound ignorance in +both cases[15]. + + [15] I need not examine at length the _vis inertiae_ which is + so much talked of in the new philosophy, and which is ascribed + to matter. We find by experience, that a body at rest or in + motion continues for ever in its present state, till put from + it by some new cause; and that a body impelled takes as much + motion from the impelling body as it acquires itself. These are + facts. When we call this a _vis inertiae_, we only mark these + facts, without pretending to have any idea of the inert power; + in the same manner as, when we talk of gravity, we mean certain + effects, without comprehending that active power. It was never + the meaning of Sir ISAAC NEWTON to rob second causes of all + force or energy; though some of his followers have endeavoured + to establish that theory upon his authority. On the contrary, + that great philosopher had recourse to an etherial active fluid + to explain his universal attraction; though he was so cautious + and modest as to allow, that it was a mere hypothesis, not to + be insisted on, without more experiments. I must confess, that + there is something in the fate of opinions a little + extraordinary. DES CARTES insinuated that doctrine of the + universal and sole efficacy of the Deity, without insisting on + it. MALEBRANCHE and other CARTESIANS made it the foundation of + all their philosophy. It had, however, no authority in England. + LOCKE, CLARKE, and CUDWORTH, never so much as take notice of + it, but suppose all along, that matter has a real, though + subordinate and derived power. By what means has it become so + prevalent among our modern metaphysicians? + + +PART II. + + +58. But to hasten to a conclusion of this argument, which is already +drawn out to too great a length: We have sought in vain for an idea of +power or necessary connexion in all the sources from which we could +suppose it to be derived. It appears that, in single instances of the +operation of bodies, we never can, by our utmost scrutiny, discover any +thing but one event following another, without being able to comprehend +any force or power by which the cause operates, or any connexion between +it and its supposed effect. The same difficulty occurs in contemplating +the operations of mind on body--where we observe the motion of the +latter to follow upon the volition of the former, but are not able to +observe or conceive the tie which binds together the motion and +volition, or the energy by which the mind produces this effect. The +authority of the will over its own faculties and ideas is not a whit +more comprehensible: So that, upon the whole, there appears not, +throughout all nature, any one instance of connexion which is +conceivable by us. All events seem entirely loose and separate. One +event follows another; but we never can observe any tie between them. +They seem _conjoined_, but never _connected_. And as we can have no idea +of any thing which never appeared to our outward sense or inward +sentiment, the necessary conclusion _seems_ to be that we have no idea +of connexion or power at all, and that these words are absolutely +without any meaning, when employed either in philosophical reasonings or +common life. + +59. But there still remains one method of avoiding this conclusion, and +one source which we have not yet examined. When any natural object or +event is presented, it is impossible for us, by any sagacity or +penetration, to discover, or even conjecture, without experience, what +event will result from it, or to carry our foresight beyond that object +which is immediately present to the memory and senses. Even after one +instance or experiment where we have observed a particular event to +follow upon another, we are not entitled to form a general rule, or +foretell what will happen in like cases; it being justly esteemed an +unpardonable temerity to judge of the whole course of nature from one +single experiment, however accurate or certain. But when one particular +species of event has always, in all instances, been conjoined with +another, we make no longer any scruple of foretelling one upon the +appearance of the other, and of employing that reasoning, which can +alone assure us of any matter of fact or existence. We then call the one +object, _Cause;_ the other, _Effect._ We suppose that there is some +connexion between them; some power in the one, by which it infallibly +produces the other, and operates with the greatest certainty and +strongest necessity. + +It appears, then, that this idea of a necessary connexion among events +arises from a number of similar instances which occur of the constant +conjunction of these events; nor can that idea ever be suggested by any +one of these instances, surveyed in all possible lights and positions. +But there is nothing in a number of instances, different from every +single instance, which is supposed to be exactly similar; except only, +that after a repetition of similar instances, the mind is carried by +habit, upon the appearance of one event, to expect its usual attendant, +and to believe that it will exist. This connexion, therefore, which we +_feel_ in the mind, this customary transition of the imagination from +one object to its usual attendant, is the sentiment or impression from +which we form the idea of power or necessary connexion. Nothing farther +is in the case. Contemplate the subject on all sides; you will never +find any other origin of that idea. This is the sole difference between +one instance, from which we can never receive the idea of connexion, and +a number of similar instances, by which it is suggested. The first time +a man saw the communication of motion by impulse, as by the shock of two +billiard balls, he could not pronounce that the one event was +_connected:_ but only that it was _conjoined_ with the other. After he +has observed several instances of this nature, he then pronounces them +to be _connected._ What alteration has happened to give rise to this new +idea of _connexion?_ Nothing but that he now _feels_ these events to be +connected in his imagination, and can readily foretell the existence of +one from the appearance of the other. When we say, therefore, that one +object is connected with another, we mean only that they have acquired a +connexion in our thought, and give rise to this inference, by which they +become proofs of each other's existence: A conclusion which is somewhat +extraordinary, but which seems founded on sufficient evidence. Nor will +its evidence be weakened by any general diffidence of the understanding, +or sceptical suspicion concerning every conclusion which is new and +extraordinary. No conclusions can be more agreeable to scepticism than +such as make discoveries concerning the weakness and narrow limits of +human reason and capacity. + +60. And what stronger instance can be produced of the surprising +ignorance and weakness of the understanding than the present? For +surely, if there be any relation among objects which it imports to us to +know perfectly, it is that of cause and effect. On this are founded all +our reasonings concerning matter of fact or existence. By means of it +alone we attain any assurance concerning objects which are removed from +the present testimony of our memory and senses. The only immediate +utility of all sciences, is to teach us, how to control and regulate +future events by their causes. Our thoughts and enquiries are, +therefore, every moment, employed about this relation: Yet so imperfect +are the ideas which we form concerning it, that it is impossible to give +any just definition of cause, except what is drawn from something +extraneous and foreign to it. Similar objects are always conjoined with +similar. Of this we have experience. Suitably to this experience, +therefore, we may define a cause to be _an object, followed by another, +and where all the objects similar to the first are followed by objects +similar to the second_. Or in other words _where, if the first object +had not been, the second never had existed_. The appearance of a cause +always conveys the mind, by a customary transition, to the idea of the +effect. Of this also we have experience. We may, therefore, suitably to +this experience, form another definition of cause, and call it, _an +object followed by another, and whose appearance always conveys the +thought to that other._ But though both these definitions be drawn from +circumstances foreign to the cause, we cannot remedy this inconvenience, +or attain any more perfect definition, which may point out that +circumstance in the cause, which gives it a connexion with its effect. +We have no idea of this connexion, nor even any distinct notion what it +is we desire to know, when we endeavour at a conception of it. We say, +for instance, that the vibration of this string is the cause of this +particular sound. But what do we mean by that affirmation? We either +mean _that this vibration is followed by this sound, and that all +similar vibrations have been followed by similar sounds:_ Or, _that this +vibration is followed by this sound, and that upon the appearance of one +the mind anticipates the senses, and forms immediately an idea of the +other._ We may consider the relation of cause and effect in either of +these two lights; but beyond these, we have no idea of it.[16] + + [16] According to these explications and definitions, the idea + of _power_ is relative as much as that of _cause;_ and both + have a reference to an effect, or some other event constantly + conjoined with the former. When we consider the _unknown_ + circumstance of an object, by which the degree or quantity of + its effect is fixed and determined, we call that its power: And + accordingly, it is allowed by all philosophers, that the effect + is the measure of the power. But if they had any idea of power, + as it is in itself, why could not they Measure it in itself? + The dispute whether the force of a body in motion be as its + velocity, or the square of its velocity; this dispute, I say, + need not be decided by comparing its effects in equal or + unequal times; but by a direct mensuration and comparison. + + As to the frequent use of the words, Force, Power, Energy, &c., + which every where occur in common conversation, as well as in + philosophy; that is no proof, that we are acquainted, in any + instance, with the connecting principle between cause and + effect, or can account ultimately for the production of one + thing to another. These words, as commonly used, have very + loose meanings annexed to them; and their ideas are very + uncertain and confused. No animal can put external bodies in + motion without the sentiment of a _nisus_ or endeavour; and + every animal has a sentiment or feeling from the stroke or blow + of an external object, that is in motion. These sensations, + which are merely animal, and from which we can _a priori_ draw + no inference, we are apt to transfer to inanimate objects, and + to suppose, that they have some such feelings, whenever they + transfer or receive motion. With regard to energies, which are + exerted, without our annexing to them any idea of communicated + motion, we consider only the constant experienced conjunction + of the events; and as we _feel_ a customary connexion between + the ideas, we transfer that feeling to the objects; as nothing + is more usual than to apply to external bodies every internal + sensation, which they occasion. + +61. To recapitulate, therefore, the reasonings of this section: Every +idea is copied from some preceding impression or sentiment; and where we +cannot find any impression, we may be certain that there is no idea. In +all single instances of the operation of bodies or minds, there is +nothing that produces any impression, nor consequently can suggest any +idea of power or necessary connexion. But when many uniform instances +appear, and the same object is always followed by the same event; we +then begin to entertain the notion of cause and connexion. We then +_feel_ a new sentiment or impression, to wit, a customary connexion in +the thought or imagination between one object and its usual attendant; +and this sentiment is the original of that idea which we seek for. For +as this idea arises from a number of similar instances, and not from any +single instance, it must arise from that circumstance, in which the +number of instances differ from every individual instance. But this +customary connexion or transition of the imagination is the only +circumstance in which they differ. In every other particular they are +alike. The first instance which we saw of motion communicated by the +shock of two billiard balls (to return to this obvious illustration) is +exactly similar to any instance that may, at present, occur to us; +except only, that we could not, at first, _infer_ one event from the +other; which we are enabled to do at present, after so long a course of +uniform experience. I know not whether the reader will readily apprehend +this reasoning. I am afraid that, should I multiply words about it, or +throw it into a greater variety of lights, it would only become more +obscure and intricate. In all abstract reasonings there is one point of +view which, if we can happily hit, we shall go farther towards +illustrating the subject than by all the eloquence and copious +expression in the world. This point of view we should endeavour to +reach, and reserve the flowers of rhetoric for subjects which are more +adapted to them. + + + +SECTION VIII. + +OF LIBERTY AND NECESSITY. + + +PART I. + + +62. It might reasonably be expected in questions which have been +canvassed and disputed with great eagerness, since the first origin of +science and philosophy, that the meaning of all the terms, at least, +should have been agreed upon among the disputants; and our enquiries, in +the course of two thousand years, been able to pass from words to the +true and real subject of the controversy. For how easy may it seem to +give exact definitions of the terms employed in reasoning, and make +these definitions, not the mere sound of words, the object of future +scrutiny and examination? But if we consider the matter more narrowly, +we shall be apt to draw a quite opposite conclusion. From this +circumstance alone, that a controversy has been long kept on foot, and +remains still undecided, we may presume that there is some ambiguity in +the expression, and that the disputants affix different ideas to the +terms employed in the controversy. For as the faculties of the mind are +supposed to be naturally alike in every individual; otherwise nothing +could be more fruitless than to reason or dispute together; it were +impossible, if men affix the same ideas to their terms, that they could +so long form different opinions of the same subject; especially when +they communicate their views, and each party turn themselves on all +sides, in search of arguments which may give them the victory over their +antagonists. It is true, if men attempt the discussion of questions +which lie entirely beyond the reach of human capacity, such as those +concerning the origin of worlds, or the economy of the intellectual +system or region of spirits, they may long beat the air in their +fruitless contests, and never arrive at any determinate conclusion. But +if the question regard any subject of common life and experience, +nothing, one would think, could preserve the dispute so long undecided +but some ambiguous expressions, which keep the antagonists still at a +distance, and hinder them from grappling with each other. + +63. This has been the case in the long disputed question concerning +liberty and necessity; and to so remarkable a degree that, if I be not +much mistaken, we shall find, that all mankind, both learned and +ignorant, have always been of the same opinion with regard to this +subject, and that a few intelligible definitions would immediately have +put an end to the whole controversy. I own that this dispute has been so +much canvassed on all hands, and has led philosophers into such a +labyrinth of obscure sophistry, that it is no wonder, if a sensible +reader indulge his ease so far as to turn a deaf ear to the proposal of +such a question, from which he can expect neither instruction or +entertainment. But the state of the argument here proposed may, perhaps, +serve to renew his attention; as it has more novelty, promises at least +some decision of the controversy, and will not much disturb his ease by +any intricate or obscure reasoning. + +I hope, therefore, to make it appear that all men have ever agreed in +the doctrine both of necessity and of liberty, according to any +reasonable sense, which can be put on these terms; and that the whole +controversy has hitherto turned merely upon words. We shall begin with +examining the doctrine of necessity. + +64. It is universally allowed that matter, in all its operations, is +actuated by a necessary force, and that every natural effect is so +precisely determined by the energy of its cause that no other effect, in +such particular circumstances, could possibly have resulted from it. The +degree and direction of every motion is, by the laws of nature, +prescribed with such exactness that a living creature may as soon arise +from the shock of two bodies as motion in any other degree or direction +than what is actually produced by it. Would we, therefore, form a just +and precise idea of _necessity_, we must consider whence that idea +arises when we apply it to the operation of bodies. + +It seems evident that, if all the scenes of nature were continually +shifted in such a manner that no two events bore any resemblance to each +other, but every object was entirely new, without any similitude to +whatever had been seen before, we should never, in that case, have +attained the least idea of necessity, or of a connexion among these +objects. We might say, upon such a supposition, that one object or event +has followed another; not that one was produced by the other. The +relation of cause and effect must be utterly unknown to mankind. +Inference and reasoning concerning the operations of nature would, from +that moment, be at an end; and the memory and senses remain the only +canals, by which the knowledge of any real existence could possibly have +access to the mind. Our idea, therefore, of necessity and causation +arises entirely from the uniformity observable in the operations of +nature, where similar objects are constantly conjoined together, and the +mind is determined by custom to infer the one from the appearance of the +other. These two circumstances form the whole of that necessity, which +we ascribe to matter. Beyond the constant _conjunction_ of similar +objects, and the consequent _inference_ from one to the other, we have +no notion of any necessity or connexion. + +If it appear, therefore, that all mankind have ever allowed, without any +doubt or hesitation, that these two circumstances take place in the +voluntary actions of men, and in the operations of mind; it must follow, +that all mankind have ever agreed in the doctrine of necessity, and that +they have hitherto disputed, merely for not understanding each other. + +65. As to the first circumstance, the constant and regular conjunction +of similar events, we may possibly satisfy ourselves by the following +considerations. It is universally acknowledged that there is a great +uniformity among the actions of men, in all nations and ages, and that +human nature remains still the same, in its principles and operations. +The same motives always produce the same actions. The same events follow +from the same causes. Ambition, avarice, self-love, vanity, friendship, +generosity, public spirit: these passions, mixed in various degrees, and +distributed through society, have been, from the beginning of the world, +and still are, the source of all the actions and enterprises, which have +ever been observed among mankind. Would you know the sentiments, +inclinations, and course of life of the Greeks and Romans? Study well +the temper and actions of the French and English: You cannot be much +mistaken in transferring to the former _most_ of the observations which +you have made with regard to the latter. Mankind are so much the same, +in all times and places, that history informs us of nothing new or +strange in this particular. Its chief use is only to discover the +constant and universal principles of human nature, by showing men in all +varieties of circumstances and situations, and furnishing us with +materials from which we may form our observations and become acquainted +with the regular springs of human action and behaviour. These records of +wars, intrigues, factions, and revolutions, are so many collections of +experiments, by which the politician or moral philosopher fixes the +principles of his science, in the same manner as the physician or +natural philosopher becomes acquainted with the nature of plants, +minerals, and other external objects, by the experiments which he forms +concerning them. Nor are the earth, water, and other elements, examined +by Aristotle, and Hippocrates, more like to those which at present lie +under our observation than the men described by Polybius and Tacitus are +to those who now govern the world. + +Should a traveller, returning from a far country, bring us an account of +men, wholly different from any with whom we were ever acquainted; men, +who were entirely divested of avarice, ambition, or revenge; who knew no +pleasure but friendship, generosity, and public spirit; we should +immediately, from these circumstances, detect the falsehood, and prove +him a liar, with the same certainty as if he had stuffed his narration +with stories of centaurs and dragons, miracles and prodigies. And if we +would explode any forgery in history, we cannot make use of a more +convincing argument, than to prove, that the actions ascribed to any +person are directly contrary to the course of nature, and that no human +motives, in such circumstances, could ever induce him to such a conduct. +The veracity of Quintus Curtius is as much to be suspected, when he +describes the supernatural courage of Alexander, by which he was hurried +on singly to attack multitudes, as when he describes his supernatural +force and activity, by which he was able to resist them. So readily and +universally do we acknowledge a uniformity in human motives and actions +as well as in the operations of body. + +Hence likewise the benefit of that experience, acquired by long life and +a variety of business and company, in order to instruct us in the +principles of human nature, and regulate our future conduct, as well as +speculation. By means of this guide, we mount up to the knowledge of +men's inclinations and motives, from their actions, expressions, and +even gestures; and again descend to the interpretation of their actions +from our knowledge of their motives and inclinations. The general +observations treasured up by a course of experience, give us the clue of +human nature, and teach us to unravel all its intricacies. Pretexts and +appearances no longer deceive us. Public declarations pass for the +specious colouring of a cause. And though virtue and honour be allowed +their proper weight and authority, that perfect disinterestedness, so +often pretended to, is never expected in multitudes and parties; seldom +in their leaders; and scarcely even in individuals of any rank or +station. But were there no uniformity in human actions, and were every +experiment which we could form of this kind irregular and anomalous, it +were impossible to collect any general observations concerning mankind; +and no experience, however accurately digested by reflection, would ever +serve to any purpose. Why is the aged husbandman more skilful in his +calling than the young beginner but because there is a certain +uniformity in the operation of the sun, rain, and earth towards the +production of vegetables; and experience teaches the old practitioner +the rules by which this operation is governed and directed. + +66. We must not, however, expect that this uniformity of human actions +should be carried to such a length as that all men, in the same +circumstances, will always act precisely in the same manner, without +making any allowance for the diversity of characters, prejudices, and +opinions. Such a uniformity in every particular, is found in no part of +nature. On the contrary, from observing the variety of conduct in +different men, we are enabled to form a greater variety of maxims, which +still suppose a degree of uniformity and regularity. + +Are the manners of men different in different ages and countries? We +learn thence the great force of custom and education, which mould the +human mind from its infancy and form it into a fixed and established +character. Is the behaviour and conduct of the one sex very unlike that +of the other? Is it thence we become acquainted with the different +characters which nature has impressed upon the sexes, and which she +preserves with constancy and regularity? Are the actions of the same +person much diversified in the different periods of his life, from +infancy to old age? This affords room for many general observations +concerning the gradual change of our sentiments and inclinations, and +the different maxims which prevail in the different ages of human +creatures. Even the characters, which are peculiar to each individual, +have a uniformity in their influence; otherwise our acquaintance with +the persons and our observation of their conduct could never teach us +their dispositions, or serve to direct our behaviour with regard +to them. + +67. I grant it possible to find some actions, which seem to have no +regular connexion with any known motives, and are exceptions to all the +measures of conduct which have ever been established for the government +of men. But if we would willingly know what judgement should be formed +of such irregular and extraordinary actions, we may consider the +sentiments commonly entertained with regard to those irregular events +which appear in the course of nature, and the operations of external +objects. All causes are not conjoined to their usual effects with like +uniformity. An artificer, who handles only dead matter, may be +disappointed of his aim, as well as the politician, who directs the +conduct of sensible and intelligent agents. + +The vulgar, who take things according to their first appearance, +attribute the uncertainty of events to such an uncertainty in the causes +as makes the latter often fail of their usual influence; though they +meet with no impediment in their operation. But philosophers, observing +that, almost in every part of nature, there is contained a vast variety +of springs and principles, which are hid, by reason of their minuteness +or remoteness, find, that it is at least possible the contrariety of +events may not proceed from any contingency in the cause, but from the +secret operation of contrary causes. This possibility is converted into +certainty by farther observation, when they remark that, upon an exact +scrutiny, a contrariety of effects always betrays a contrariety of +causes, and proceeds from their mutual opposition. A peasant can give no +better reason for the stopping of any clock or watch than to say that it +does not commonly go right: But an artist easily perceives that the same +force in the spring or pendulum has always the same influence on the +wheels; but fails of its usual effect, perhaps by reason of a grain of +dust, which puts a stop to the whole movement. From the observation of +several parallel instances, philosophers form a maxim that the connexion +between all causes and effects is equally necessary, and that its +seeming uncertainty in some instances proceeds from the secret +opposition of contrary causes. + +Thus, for instance, in the human body, when the usual symptoms of health +or sickness disappoint our expectation; when medicines operate not with +their wonted powers; when irregular events follow from any particular +cause; the philosopher and physician are not surprised at the matter, +nor are ever tempted to deny, in general, the necessity and uniformity +of those principles by which the animal economy is conducted. They know +that a human body is a mighty complicated machine: That many secret +powers lurk in it, which are altogether beyond our comprehension: That +to us it must often appear very uncertain in its operations: And that +therefore the irregular events, which outwardly discover themselves, can +be no proof that the laws of nature are not observed with the greatest +regularity in its internal operations and government. + +68. The philosopher, if he be consistent, must apply the same reasoning +to the actions and volitions of intelligent agents. The most irregular +and unexpected resolutions of men may frequently be accounted for by +those who know every particular circumstance of their character and +situation. A person of an obliging disposition gives a peevish answer: +But he has the toothache, or has not dined. A stupid fellow discovers an +uncommon alacrity in his carriage: But he has met with a sudden piece of +good fortune. Or even when an action, as sometimes happens, cannot be +particularly accounted for, either by the person himself or by others; +we know, in general, that the characters of men are, to a certain +degree, inconstant and irregular. This is, in a manner, the constant +character of human nature; though it be applicable, in a more particular +manner, to some persons who have no fixed rule for their conduct, but +proceed in a continued course of caprice and inconstancy. The internal +principles and motives may operate in a uniform manner, notwithstanding +these seeming irregularities; in the same manner as the winds, rain, +clouds, and other variations of the weather are supposed to be governed +by steady principles; though not easily discoverable by human sagacity +and enquiry. + +69. Thus it appears, not only that the conjunction between motives and +voluntary actions is as regular and uniform as that between the cause +and effect in any part of nature; but also that this regular conjunction +has been universally acknowledged among mankind, and has never been the +subject of dispute, either in philosophy or common life. Now, as it is +from past experience that we draw all inferences concerning the future, +and as we conclude that objects will always be conjoined together which +we find to have always been conjoined; it may seem superfluous to prove +that this experienced uniformity in human actions is a source whence we +draw _inferences_ concerning them. But in order to throw the argument +into a greater variety of lights we shall also insist, though briefly, +on this latter topic. + +The mutual dependence of men is so great in all societies that scarce +any human action is entirely complete in itself, or is performed without +some reference to the actions of others, which are requisite to make it +answer fully the intention of the agent. The poorest artificer, who +labours alone, expects at least the protection of the magistrate, to +ensure him the enjoyment of the fruits of his labour. He also expects +that, when he carries his goods to market, and offers them at a +reasonable price, he shall find purchasers, and shall be able, by the +money he acquires, to engage others to supply him with those commodities +which are requisite for his subsistence. In proportion as men extend +their dealings, and render their intercourse with others more +complicated, they always comprehend, in their schemes of life, a greater +variety of voluntary actions, which they expect, from the proper +motives, to co-operate with their own. In all these conclusions they +take their measures from past experience, in the same manner as in their +reasonings concerning external objects; and firmly believe that men, as +well as all the elements, are to continue, in their operations, the same +that they have ever found them. A manufacturer reckons upon the labour +of his servants for the execution of any work as much as upon the tools +which he employs, and would be equally surprised were his expectations +disappointed. In short, this experimental inference and reasoning +concerning the actions of others enters so much into human life that no +man, while awake, is ever a moment without employing it. Have we not +reason, therefore, to affirm that all mankind have always agreed in the +doctrine of necessity according to the foregoing definition and +explication of it? + +70. Nor have philosophers ever entertained a different opinion from the +people in this particular. For, not to mention that almost every action +of their life supposes that opinion, there are even few of the +speculative parts of learning to which it is not essential. What would +become of _history,_ had we not a dependence on the veracity of the +historian according to the experience which we have had of mankind? How +could _politics_ be a science, if laws and forms of goverment had not a +uniform influence upon society? Where would be the foundation of +_morals,_ if particular characters had no certain or determinate power +to produce particular sentiments, and if these sentiments had no +constant operation on actions? And with what pretence could we employ +our _criticism_ upon any poet or polite author, if we could not +pronounce the conduct and sentiments of his actors either natural or +unnatural to such characters, and in such circumstances? It seems almost +impossible, therefore, to engage either in science or action of any kind +without acknowledging the doctrine of necessity, and this _inference_ +from motive to voluntary actions, from characters to conduct. + +And indeed, when we consider how aptly _natural_ and _moral_ evidence +link together, and form only one chain of argument, we shall make no +scruple to allow that they are of the same nature, and derived from the +same principles. A prisoner who has neither money nor interest, +discovers the impossibility of his escape, as well when he considers the +obstinacy of the gaoler, as the walls and bars with which he is +surrounded; and, in all attempts for his freedom, chooses rather to work +upon the stone and iron of the one, than upon the inflexible nature of +the other. The same prisoner, when conducted to the scaffold, foresees +his death as certainly from the constancy and fidelity of his guards, as +from the operation of the axe or wheel. His mind runs along a certain +train of ideas: The refusal of the soldiers to consent to his escape; +the action of the executioner; the separation of the head and body; +bleeding, convulsive motions, and death. Here is a connected chain of +natural causes and voluntary actions; but the mind feels no difference +between them in passing from one link to another: Nor is less certain of +the future event than if it were connected with the objects present to +the memory or senses, by a train of causes, cemented together by what we +are pleased to call a _physical_ necessity. The same experienced union +has the same effect on the mind, whether the united objects be motives, +volition, and actions; or figure and motion. We may change the name of +things; but their nature and their operation on the understanding +never change. + +Were a man, whom I know to be honest and opulent, and with whom I live +in intimate friendship, to come into my house, where I am surrounded +with my servants, I rest assured that he is not to stab me before he +leaves it in order to rob me of my silver standish; and I no more +suspect this event than the falling of the house itself, which is new, +and solidly built and founded._--But he may have been seized with a +sudden and unknown frenzy.--_So may a sudden earthquake arise, and shake +and tumble my house about my ears. I shall therefore change the +suppositions. I shall say that I know with certainty that he is not to +put his hand into the fire and hold it there till it be consumed: And +this event, I think I can foretell with the same assurance, as that, if +he throw himself out at the window, and meet with no obstruction, he +will not remain a moment suspended in the air. No suspicion of an +unknown frenzy can give the least possibility to the former event, which +is so contrary to all the known principles of human nature. A man who at +noon leaves his purse full of gold on the pavement at Charing-Cross, may +as well expect that it will fly away like a feather, as that he will +find it untouched an hour after. Above one half of human reasonings +contain inferences of a similar nature, attended with more or less +degrees of certainty proportioned to our experience of the usual conduct +of mankind in such particular situations. + +71. I have frequently considered, what could possibly be the reason why +all mankind, though they have ever, without hesitation, acknowledged the +doctrine of necessity in their whole practice and reasoning, have yet +discovered such a reluctance to acknowledge it in words, and have rather +shown a propensity, in all ages, to profess the contrary opinion. The +matter, I think, may be accounted for after the following manner. If we +examine the operations of body, and the production of effects from their +causes, we shall find that all our faculties can never carry us farther +in our knowledge of this relation than barely to observe that particular +objects are _constantly conjoined_ together, and that the mind is +carried, by a _customary transition,_ from the appearance of one to the +belief of the other. But though this conclusion concerning human +ignorance be the result of the strictest scrutiny of this subject, men +still entertain a strong propensity to believe that they penetrate +farther into the powers of nature, and perceive something like a +necessary connexion between the cause and the effect. When again they +turn their reflections towards the operations of their own minds, and +_feel_ no such connexion of the motive and the action; they are thence +apt to suppose, that there is a difference between the effects which +result from material force, and those which arise from thought and +intelligence. But being once convinced that we know nothing farther of +causation of any kind than merely the _constant conjunction_ of objects, +and the consequent _inference_ of the mind from one to another, and +finding that these two circumstances are universally allowed to have +place in voluntary actions; we may be more easily led to own the same +necessity common to all causes. And though this reasoning may contradict +the systems of many philosophers, in ascribing necessity to the +determinations of the will, we shall find, upon reflection, that they +dissent from it in words only, not in their real sentiment. Necessity, +according to the sense in which it is here taken, has never yet been +rejected, nor can ever, I think, be rejected by any philosopher. It may +only, perhaps, be pretended that the mind can perceive, in the +operations of matter, some farther connexion between the cause and +effect; and connexion that has not place in voluntary actions of +intelligent beings. Now whether it be so or not, can only appear upon +examination; and it is incumbent on these philosophers to make good +their assertion, by defining or describing that necessity, and pointing +it out to us in the operations of material causes. + +72. It would seem, indeed, that men begin at the wrong end of this +question concerning liberty and necessity, when they enter upon it by +examining the faculties of the soul, the influence of the understanding, +and the operations of the will. Let them first discuss a more simple +question, namely, the operations of body and of brute unintelligent +matter; and try whether they can there form any idea of causation and +necessity, except that of a constant conjunction of objects, and +subsequent inference of the mind from one to another. If these +circumstances form, in reality, the whole of that necessity, which we +conceive in matter, and if these circumstances be also universally +acknowledged to take place in the operations of the mind, the dispute is +at an end; at least, must be owned to be thenceforth merely verbal. But +as long as we will rashly suppose, that we have some farther idea of +necessity and causation in the operations of external objects; at the +same time, that we can find nothing farther in the voluntary actions of +the mind; there is no possibility of bringing the question to any +determinate issue, while we proceed upon so erroneous a supposition. The +only method of undeceiving us is to mount up higher; to examine the +narrow extent of science when applied to material causes; and to +convince ourselves that all we know of them is the constant conjunction +and inference above mentioned. We may, perhaps, find that it is with +difficulty we are induced to fix such narrow limits to human +understanding: But we can afterwards find no difficulty when we come to +apply this doctrine to the actions of the will. For as it is evident +that these have a regular conjunction with motives and circumstances and +characters, and as we always draw inferences from one to the other, we +must be obliged to acknowledge in words that necessity, which we have +already avowed, in every deliberation of our lives, and in every step of +our conduct and behaviour.[17] + + [17] The prevalence of the doctrine of liberty may be accounted + for, from another cause, viz. a false sensation or seeming + experience which we have, or may have, of liberty or + indifference, in many of our actions. The necessity of any + action, whether of matter or of mind, is not, properly + speaking, a quality in the agent, but in any thinking or + intelligent being, who may consider the action; and it consists + chiefly in the determination of his thoughts to infer the + existence of that action from some preceding objects; as + liberty, when opposed to necessity, is nothing but the want of + that determination, and a certain looseness or indifference, + which we feel, in passing, or not passing, from the idea of one + object to that of any succeeding one. Now we may observe, + that, though, in _reflecting_ on human actions, we seldom feel + such a looseness, or indifference, but are commonly able to + infer them with considerable certainty from their motives, and + from the dispositions of the agent; yet it frequently happens, + that, in _performing_ the actions themselves, we are sensible + of something like it: And as all resembling objects are readily + taken for each other, this has been employed as a demonstrative + and even intuitive proof of human liberty. We feel, that our + actions are subject to our will, on most occasions; and imagine + we feel, that the will itself is subject to nothing, because, + when by a denial of it we are provoked to try, we feel, that it + moves easily every way, and produces an image of itself (or a + _Velleity,_ as it is called in the schools) even on that side, + on which it did not settle. This image, or faint motion, we + persuade ourselves, could, at that time, have been compleated + into the thing itself; because, should that be denied, we find, + upon a second trial, that, at present, it can. We consider not, + that the fantastical desire of shewing liberty, is here the + motive of our actions. And it seems certain, that, however we + may imagine we feel a liberty within ourselves, a spectator can + commonly infer our actions from our motives and character; and + even where he cannot, he concludes in general, that he might, + were he perfectly acquainted with every circumstance of our + situation and temper, and the most secret springs of our + complexion and disposition. Now this is the very essence of + necessity, according to the foregoing doctrine. + +73. But to proceed in this reconciling project with regard to the +question of liberty and necessity; the most contentious question of +metaphysics, the most contentious science; it will not require many +words to prove, that all mankind have ever agreed in the doctrine of +liberty as well as in that of necessity, and that the whole dispute, in +this respect also, has been hitherto merely verbal. For what is meant by +liberty, when applied to voluntary actions? We cannot surely mean that +actions have so little connexion with motives, inclinations, and +circumstances, that one does not follow with a certain degree of +uniformity from the other, and that one affords no inference by which we +can conclude the existence of the other. For these are plain and +acknowledged matters of fact. By liberty, then, we can only mean _a +power of acting or not acting, according to the determinations of the +will;_ that is, if we choose to remain at rest, we may; if we choose to +move, we also may. Now this hypothetical liberty is universally allowed +to belong to every one who is not a prisoner and in chains. Here, then, +is no subject of dispute. + +74. Whatever definition we may give of liberty, we should be careful to +observe two requisite circumstances; _first,_ that it be consistent with +plain matter of fact; _secondly,_ that it be consistent with itself. If +we observe these circumstances, and render our definition intelligible, +I am persuaded that all mankind will be found of one opinion with +regard to it. + +It is universally allowed that nothing exists without a cause of its +existence, and that chance, when strictly examined, is a mere negative +word, and means not any real power which has anywhere a being in nature. +But it is pretended that some causes are necessary, some not necessary. +Here then is the advantage of definitions. Let any one _define_ a cause, +without comprehending, as a part of the definition, a _necessary +connexion_ with its effect; and let him show distinctly the origin of +the idea, expressed by the definition; and I shall readily give up the +whole controversy. But if the foregoing explication of the matter be +received, this must be absolutely impracticable. Had not objects a +regular conjunction with each other, we should never have entertained +any notion of cause and effect; and this regular conjunction produces +that inference of the understanding, which is the only connexion, that +we can have any comprehension of. Whoever attempts a definition of +cause, exclusive of these circumstances, will be obliged either to +employ unintelligible terms or such as are synonymous to the term which +he endeavours to define.[18] And if the definition above mentioned be +admitted; liberty, when opposed to necessity, not to constraint, is the +same thing with chance; which is universally allowed to have no +existence. + + [18] Thus, if a cause be defined, _that which produces any + thing;_ it is easy to observe, that _producing_ is synonymous + to _causing._ In like manner, if a cause be defined, _that by + which any thing exists;_ this is liable to the same objection. + For what is meant by these words, _by which?_ Had it been said, + that a cause is _that_ after which _any thing constantly + exists;_ we should have understood the terms. For this is, + indeed, all we know of the matter. And this constancy forms the + very essence of necessity, nor have we any other idea of it. + + +PART II. + + +75. There is no method of reasoning more common, and yet none more +blameable, than, in philosophical disputes, to endeavour the refutation +of any hypothesis, by a pretence of its dangerous consequences to +religion and morality. When any opinion leads to absurdities, it is +certainly false; but it is not certain that an opinion is false, because +it is of dangerous consequence. Such topics, therefore, ought entirely +to be forborne; as serving nothing to the discovery of truth, but only +to make the person of an antagonist odious. This I observe in general, +without pretending to draw any advantage from it. I frankly submit to +an examination of this kind, and shall venture to affirm that the +doctrines, both of necessity and of liberty, as above explained, are not +only consistent with morality, but are absolutely essential to +its support. + +Necessity may be defined two ways, conformably to the two definitions of +_cause_, of which it makes an essential part. It consists either in the +constant conjunction of like objects, or in the inference of the +understanding from one object to another. Now necessity, in both these +senses, (which, indeed, are at bottom the same) has universally, though +tacitly, in the schools, in the pulpit, and in common life, been allowed +to belong to the will of man; and no one has ever pretended to deny that +we can draw inferences concerning human actions, and that those +inferences are founded on the experienced union of like actions, with +like motives, inclinations, and circumstances. The only particular in +which any one can differ, is, that either, perhaps, he will refuse to +give the name of necessity to this property of human actions: But as +long as the meaning is understood, I hope the word can do no harm: Or +that he will maintain it possible to discover something farther in the +operations of matter. But this, it must be acknowledged, can be of no +consequence to morality or religion, whatever it may be to natural +philosophy or metaphysics. We may here be mistaken in asserting that +there is no idea of any other necessity or connexion in the actions of +body: But surely we ascribe nothing to the actions of the mind, but what +everyone does, and must readily allow of. We change no circumstance in +the received orthodox system with regard to the will, but only in that +with regard to material objects and causes. Nothing, therefore, can be +more innocent, at least, than this doctrine. + +76. All laws being founded on rewards and punishments, it is supposed as +a fundamental principle, that these motives have a regular and uniform +influence on the mind, and both produce the good and prevent the evil +actions. We may give to this influence what name we please; but, as it +is usually conjoined with the action, it must be esteemed a _cause_, and +be looked upon as an instance of that necessity, which we would here +establish. + +The only proper object of hatred or vengeance is a person or creature, +endowed with thought and consciousness; and when any criminal or +injurious actions excite that passion, it is only by their relation to +the person, or connexion with him. Actions are, by their very nature, +temporary and perishing; and where they proceed not from some _cause_ in +the character and disposition of the person who performed them, they can +neither redound to his honour, if good; nor infamy, if evil. The actions +themselves may be blameable; they may be contrary to all the rules of +morality and religion: But the person is not answerable for them; and as +they proceeded from nothing in him that is durable and constant, and +leave nothing of that nature behind them, it is impossible he can, upon +their account, become the object of punishment or vengeance. According +to the principle, therefore, which denies necessity, and consequently +causes, a man is as pure and untainted, after having committed the most +horrid crime, as at the first moment of his birth, nor is his character +anywise concerned in his actions, since they are not derived from it, +and the wickedness of the one can never be used as a proof of the +depravity of the other. + +Men are not blamed for such actions as they perform ignorantly and +casually, whatever may be the consequences. Why? but because the +principles of these actions are only momentary, and terminate in them +alone. Men are less blamed for such actions as they perform hastily and +unpremeditately than for such as proceed from deliberation. For what +reason? but because a hasty temper, though a constant cause or +principle in the mind, operates only by intervals, and infects not the +whole character. Again, repentance wipes off every crime, if attended +with a reformation of life and manners. How is this to be accounted for? +but by asserting that actions render a person criminal merely as they +are proofs of criminal principles in the mind; and when, by an +alteration of these principles, they cease to be just proofs, they +likewise cease to be criminal. But, except upon the doctrine of +necessity, they never were just proofs, and consequently never +were criminal. + +77. It will be equally easy to prove, and from the same arguments, that +_liberty_, according to that definition above mentioned, in which all +men agree, is also essential to morality, and that no human actions, +where it is wanting, are susceptible of any moral qualities, or can be +the objects either of approbation or dislike. For as actions are objects +of our moral sentiment, so far only as they are indications of the +internal character, passions, and affections; it is impossible that they +can give rise either to praise or blame, where they proceed not from +these principles, but are derived altogether from external violence. + +78. I pretend not to have obviated or removed all objections to this +theory, with regard to necessity and liberty. I can foresee other +objections, derived from topics which have not here been treated of. It +may be said, for instance, that, if voluntary actions be subjected to +the same laws of necessity with the operations of matter, there is a +continued chain of necessary causes, pre-ordained and pre-determined, +reaching from the original cause of all to every single volition of +every human creature. No contingency anywhere in the universe; no +indifference; no liberty. While we act, we are, at the same time, acted +upon. The ultimate Author of all our volitions is the Creator of the +world, who first bestowed motion on this immense machine, and placed all +beings in that particular position, whence every subsequent event, by +an inevitable necessity, must result. Human actions, therefore, either +can have no moral turpitude at all, as proceeding from so good a cause; +or if they have any turpitude, they must involve our Creator in the same +guilt, while he is acknowledged to be their ultimate cause and author. +For as a man, who fired a mine, is answerable for all the consequences +whether the train he employed be long or short; so wherever a continued +chain of necessary causes is fixed, that Being, either finite or +infinite, who produces the first, is likewise the author of all the +rest, and must both bear the blame and acquire the praise which belong +to them. Our clear and unalterable ideas of morality establish this +rule, upon unquestionable reasons, when we examine the consequences of +any human action; and these reasons must still have greater force when +applied to the volitions and intentions of a Being infinitely wise and +powerful. Ignorance or impotence may be pleaded for so limited a +creature as man; but those imperfections have no place in our Creator. +He foresaw, he ordained, he intended all those actions of men, which we +so rashly pronounce criminal. And we must therefore conclude, either +that they are not criminal, or that the Deity, not man, is accountable +for them. But as either of these positions is absurd and impious, it +follows, that the doctrine from which they are deduced cannot possibly +be true, as being liable to all the same objections. An absurd +consequence, if necessary, proves the original doctrine to be absurd; in +the same manner as criminal actions render criminal the original cause, +if the connexion between them be necessary and evitable. + +This objection consists of two parts, which we shall examine separately; +_First_, that, if human actions can be traced up, by a necessary chain, +to the Deity, they can never be criminal; on account of the infinite +perfection of that Being from whom they are derived, and who can intend +nothing but what is altogether good and laudable. Or, _Secondly_, if +they be criminal, we must retract the attribute of perfection, which we +ascribe to the Deity, and must acknowledge him to be the ultimate author +of guilt and moral turpitude in all his creatures. + +79. The answer to the first objection seems obvious and convincing. +There are many philosophers who, after an exact scrutiny of all the +phenomena of nature, conclude, that the WHOLE, considered as one system, +is, in every period of its existence, ordered with perfect benevolence; +and that the utmost possible happiness will, in the end, result to all +created beings, without any mixture of positive or absolute ill or +misery. Every physical ill, say they, makes an essential part of this +benevolent system, and could not possibly be removed, even by the Deity +himself, considered as a wise agent, without giving entrance to greater +ill, or excluding greater good, which will result from it. From this +theory, some philosophers, and the ancient _Stoics_ among the rest, +derived a topic of consolation under all afflictions, while they taught +their pupils that those ills under which they laboured were, in reality, +goods to the universe; and that to an enlarged view, which could +comprehend the whole system of nature, every event became an object of +joy and exultation. But though this topic be specious and sublime, it +was soon found in practice weak and ineffectual. You would surely more +irritate than appease a man lying under the racking pains of the gout by +preaching up to him the rectitude of those general laws, which produced +the malignant humours in his body, and led them through the proper +canals, to the sinews and nerves, where they now excite such acute +torments. These enlarged views may, for a moment, please the imagination +of a speculative man, who is placed in ease and security; but neither +can they dwell with constancy on his mind, even though undisturbed by +the emotions of pain or passion; much less can they maintain their +ground when attacked by such powerful antagonists. The affections take a +narrower and more natural survey of their object; and by an economy, +more suitable to the infirmity of human minds, regard alone the beings +around us, and are actuated by such events as appear good or ill to the +private system. + +80. The case is the same with _moral_ as with _physical_ ill. It cannot +reasonably be supposed, that those remote considerations, which are +found of so little efficacy with regard to one, will have a more +powerful influence with regard to the other. The mind of man is so +formed by nature that, upon the appearance of certain characters, +dispositions, and actions, it immediately feels the sentiment of +approbation or blame; nor are there any emotions more essential to its +frame and constitution. The characters which engage our approbation are +chiefly such as contribute to the peace and security of human society; +as the characters which excite blame are chiefly such as tend to public +detriment and disturbance: Whence it may reasonably be presumed, that +the moral sentiments arise, either mediately or immediately, from a +reflection of these opposite interests. What though philosophical +meditations establish a different opinion or conjecture; that everything +is right with regard to the WHOLE, and that the qualities, which disturb +society, are, in the main, as beneficial, and are as suitable to the +primary intention of nature as those which more directly promote its +happiness and welfare? Are such remote and uncertain speculations able +to counterbalance the sentiments which arise from the natural and +immediate view of the objects? A man who is robbed of a considerable +sum; does he find his vexation for the loss anywise diminished by these +sublime reflections? Why then should his moral resentment against the +crime be supposed incompatible with them? Or why should not the +acknowledgment of a real distinction between vice and virtue be +reconcileable to all speculative systems of philosophy, as well as that +of a real distinction between personal beauty and deformity? Both these +distinctions are founded in the natural sentiments of the human mind: +And these sentiments are not to be controuled or altered by any +philosophical theory or speculation whatsoever. + +81. The _second_ objection admits not of so easy and satisfactory an +answer; nor is it possible to explain distinctly, how the Deity can be +the mediate cause of all the actions of men, without being the author of +sin and moral turpitude. These are mysteries, which mere natural and +unassisted reason is very unfit to handle; and whatever system she +embraces, she must find herself involved in inextricable difficulties, +and even contradictions, at every step which she takes with regard to +such subjects. To reconcile the indifference and contingency of human +actions with prescience; or to defend absolute decrees, and yet free the +Deity from being the author of sin, has been found hitherto to exceed +all the power of philosophy. Happy, if she be thence sensible of her +temerity, when she pries into these sublime mysteries; and leaving a +scene so full of obscurities and perplexities, return, with suitable +modesty, to her true and proper province, the examination of common +life; where she will find difficulties enough to employ her enquiries, +without launching into so boundless an ocean of doubt, uncertainty, and +contradiction! + + + +SECTION IX. + +OF THE REASON OF ANIMALS. + + +82. All our reasonings concerning matter of fact are founded on a +species of Analogy, which leads us to expect from any cause the same +events, which we have observed to result from similar causes. Where the +causes are entirely similar, the analogy is perfect, and the inference, +drawn from it, is regarded as certain and conclusive: nor does any man +ever entertain a doubt, where he sees a piece of iron, that it will have +weight and cohesion of parts; as in all other instances, which have ever +fallen under his observation. But where the objects have not so exact a +similarity, the analogy is less perfect, and the inference is less +conclusive; though still it has some force, in proportion to the degree +of similarity and resemblance. The anatomical observations, formed upon +one animal, are, by this species of reasoning, extended to all animals; +and it is certain, that when the circulation of the blood, for instance, +is clearly proved to have place in one creature, as a frog, or fish, it +forms a strong presumption, that the same principle has place in all. +These analogical observations may be carried farther, even to this +science, of which we are now treating; and any theory, by which we +explain the operations of the understanding, or the origin and connexion +of the passions in man, will acquire additional authority, if we find, +that the same theory is requisite to explain the same phenomena in all +other animals. We shall make trial of this, with regard to the +hypothesis, by which we have, in the foregoing discourse, endeavoured +to account for all experimental reasonings; and it is hoped, that this +new point of view will serve to confirm all our former observations. + +83. _First_, It seems evident, that animals as well as men learn many +things from experience, and infer, that the same events will always +follow from the same causes. By this principle they become acquainted +with the more obvious properties of external objects, and gradually, +from their birth, treasure up a knowledge of the nature of fire, water, +earth, stones, heights, depths, &c., and of the effects which result +from their operation. The ignorance and inexperience of the young are +here plainly distinguishable from the cunning and sagacity of the old, +who have learned, by long observation, to avoid what hurt them, and to +pursue what gave ease or pleasure. A horse, that has been accustomed to +the field, becomes acquainted with the proper height which he can leap, +and will never attempt what exceeds his force and ability. An old +greyhound will trust the more fatiguing part of the chace to the +younger, and will place himself so as to meet the hare in her doubles; +nor are the conjectures, which he forms on this occasion, founded in any +thing but his observation and experience. + +This is still more evident from the effects of discipline and education +on animals, who, by the proper application of rewards and punishments, +may be taught any course of action, and most contrary to their natural +instincts and propensities. Is it not experience, which renders a dog +apprehensive of pain, when you menace him, or lift up the whip to beat +him? Is it not even experience, which makes him answer to his name, and +infer, from such an arbitrary sound, that you mean him rather than any +of his fellows, and intend to call him, when you pronounce it in a +certain manner, and with a certain tone and accent? + +In all these cases, we may observe, that the animal infers some fact +beyond what immediately strikes his senses; and that this inference is +altogether founded on past experience, while the creature expects from +the present object the same consequences, which it has always found in +its observation to result from similar objects. + +84. _Secondly_, It is impossible, that this inference of the animal can +be founded on any process of argument or reasoning, by which he +concludes, that like events must follow like objects, and that the +course of nature will always be regular in its operations. For if there +be in reality any arguments of this nature, they surely lie too abstruse +for the observation of such imperfect understandings; since it may well +employ the utmost care and attention of a philosophic genius to discover +and observe them. Animals, therefore, are not guided in these inferences +by reasoning: Neither are children: Neither are the generality of +mankind, in their ordinary actions and conclusions: Neither are +philosophers themselves, who, in all the active parts of life, are, in +the main, the same with the vulgar, and are governed by the same maxims. +Nature must have provided some other principle, of more ready, and more +general use and application; nor can an operation of such immense +consequence in life, as that of inferring effects from causes, be +trusted to the uncertain process of reasoning and argumentation. Were +this doubtful with regard to men, it seems to admit of no question with +regard to the brute creation; and the conclusion being once firmly +established in the one, we have a strong presumption, from all the rules +of analogy, that it ought to be universally admitted, without any +exception or reserve. It is custom alone, which engages animals, from +every object, that strikes their senses, to infer its usual attendant, +and carries their imagination, from the appearance of the one, to +conceive the other, in that particular manner, which we denominate +_belief_. No other explication can be given of this operation, in all +the higher, as well as lower classes of sensitive beings, which fall +under our notice and observation [19]. + + [19] Since all reasonings concerning facts or causes is derived + merely from custom, it may be asked how it happens, that men so + much surpass animals in reasoning, and one man so much + surpasses another? Has not the same custom the same + influence on all? + + We shall here endeavour briefly to explain the great difference + in human understandings: After which the reason of the + difference between men and animals will easily be comprehended. + + 1. When we have lived any time, and have been accustomed to the + uniformity of nature, we acquire a general habit, by which we + always transfer the known to the unknown, and conceive the + latter to resemble the former. By means of this general + habitual principle, we regard even one experiment as the + foundation of reasoning, and expect a similar event with some + degree of certainty, where the experiment has been made + accurately, and free from all foreign circumstances. It is + therefore considered as a matter of great importance to observe + the consequences of things; and as one man may very much + surpass another in attention and memory and observation, this + will make a very great difference in their reasoning. + + 2. Where there is a complication of causes to produce any + effect, one mind may be much larger than another, and better + able to comprehend the whole system of objects, and to infer + justly their consequences. + + 3. One man is able to carry on a chain of consequences to a + greater length than another. + + 4. Few men can think long without running into a confusion of + ideas, and mistaking one for another; and there are various + degrees of this infirmity. + + 5. The circumstance, on which the effect depends, is frequently + involved in other circumstances, which are foreign and + extrinsic. The separation of it often requires great attention, + accuracy, and subtilty. + + 6. The forming of general maxims from particular observation is + a very nice operation; and nothing is more usual, from haste or + a narrowness of mind, which sees not on all sides, than to + commit mistakes in this particular. + + 7. When we reason from analogies, the man, who has the greater + experience or the greater promptitude of suggesting analogies, + will be the better reasoner. + + 8. Byasses from prejudice, education, passion, party, &c. hang + more upon one mind than another. + + 9. After we have acquired a confidence in human testimony, + books and conversation enlarge much more the sphere of one + man's experience and thought than those of another. + + It would be easy to discover many other circumstances that make + a difference in the understandings of men. + +85. But though animals learn many parts of their knowledge from +observation, there are also many parts of it, which they derive from the +original hand of nature; which much exceed the share of capacity they +possess on ordinary occasions; and in which they improve, little or +nothing, by the longest practice and experience. These we denominate +Instincts, and are so apt to admire as something very extraordinary, and +inexplicable by all the disquisitions of human understanding. But our +wonder will, perhaps, cease or diminish, when we consider, that the +experimental reasoning itself, which we possess in common with beasts, +and on which the whole conduct of life depends, is nothing but a species +of instinct or mechanical power, that acts in us unknown to ourselves; +and in its chief operations, is not directed by any such relations or +comparisons of ideas, as are the proper objects of our intellectual +faculties. Though the instinct be different, yet still it is an +instinct, which teaches a man to avoid the fire; as much as that, which +teaches a bird, with such exactness, the art of incubation, and the +whole economy and order of its nursery. + + + +SECTION X. + +OF MIRACLES. + + +PART I. + + +86. There is, in Dr. Tillotson's writings, an argument against the _real +presence_, which is as concise, and elegant, and strong as any argument +can possibly be supposed against a doctrine, so little worthy of a +serious refutation. It is acknowledged on all hands, says that learned +prelate, that the authority, either of the scripture or of tradition, is +founded merely in the testimony of the apostles, who were eye-witnesses +to those miracles of our Saviour, by which he proved his divine mission. +Our evidence, then, for the truth of the _Christian_ religion is less +than the evidence for the truth of our senses; because, even in the +first authors of our religion, it was no greater; and it is evident it +must diminish in passing from them to their disciples; nor can any one +rest such confidence in their testimony, as in the immediate object of +his senses. But a weaker evidence can never destroy a stronger; and +therefore, were the doctrine of the real presence ever so clearly +revealed in scripture, it were directly contrary to the rules of just +reasoning to give our assent to it. It contradicts sense, though both +the scripture and tradition, on which it is supposed to be built, carry +not such evidence with them as sense; when they are considered merely as +external evidences, and are not brought home to every one's breast, by +the immediate operation of the Holy Spirit. + +Nothing is so convenient as a decisive argument of this kind, which +must at least _silence_ the most arrogant bigotry and superstition, and +free us from their impertinent solicitations. I flatter myself, that I +have discovered an argument of a like nature, which, if just, will, with +the wise and learned, be an everlasting check to all kinds of +superstitious delusion, and consequently, will be useful as long as the +world endures. For so long, I presume, will the accounts of miracles and +prodigies be found in all history, sacred and profane. + +87. Though experience be our only guide in reasoning concerning matters +of fact; it must be acknowledged, that this guide is not altogether +infallible, but in some cases is apt to lead us into errors. One, who in +our climate, should expect better weather in any week of June than in +one of December, would reason justly, and conformably to experience; but +it is certain, that he may happen, in the event, to find himself +mistaken. However, we may observe, that, in such a case, he would have +no cause to complain of experience; because it commonly informs us +beforehand of the uncertainty, by that contrariety of events, which we +may learn from a diligent observation. All effects follow not with like +certainty from their supposed causes. Some events are found, in all +countries and all ages, to have been constantly conjoined together: +Others are found to have been more variable, and sometimes to disappoint +our expectations; so that, in our reasonings concerning matter of fact, +there are all imaginable degrees of assurance, from the highest +certainty to the lowest species of moral evidence. + +A wise man, therefore, proportions his belief to the evidence. In such +conclusions as are founded on an infallible experience, he expects the +event with the last degree of assurance, and regards his past experience +as a full _proof_ of the future existence of that event. In other +cases, he proceeds with more caution: He weighs the opposite +experiments: He considers which side is supported by the greater number +of experiments: to that side he inclines, with doubt and hesitation; and +when at last he fixes his judgement, the evidence exceeds not what we +properly call _probability_. All probability, then, supposes an +opposition of experiments and observations, where the one side is found +to overbalance the other, and to produce a degree of evidence, +proportioned to the superiority. A hundred instances or experiments on +one side, and fifty on another, afford a doubtful expectation of any +event; though a hundred uniform experiments, with only one that is +contradictory, reasonably beget a pretty strong degree of assurance. In +all cases, we must balance the opposite experiments, where they are +opposite, and deduct the smaller number from the greater, in order to +know the exact force of the superior evidence. + +88. To apply these principles to a particular instance; we may observe, +that there is no species of reasoning more common, more useful, and even +necessary to human life, than that which is derived from the testimony +of men, and the reports of eye-witnesses and spectators. This species of +reasoning, perhaps, one may deny to be founded on the relation of cause +and effect. I shall not dispute about a word. It will be sufficient to +observe that our assurance in any argument of this kind is derived from +no other principle than our observation of the veracity of human +testimony, and of the usual conformity of facts to the reports of +witnesses. It being a general maxim, that no objects have any +discoverable connexion together, and that all the inferences, which we +can draw from one to another, are founded merely on our experience of +their constant and regular conjunction; it is evident, that we ought not +to make an exception to this maxim in favour of human testimony, whose +connexion with any event seems, in itself, as little necessary as any +other. Were not the memory tenacious to a certain degree, had not men +commonly an inclination to truth and a principle of probity; were they +not sensible to shame, when detected in a falsehood: Were not these, I +say, discovered by experience to be qualities, inherent in human nature, +we should never repose the least confidence in human testimony. A man +delirious, or noted for falsehood and villany, has no manner of +authority with us. + +And as the evidence, derived from witnesses and human testimony, is +founded on past experience, so it varies with the experience, and is +regarded either as a _proof_ or a _probability_, according as the +conjunction between any particular kind of report and any kind of object +has been found to be constant or variable. There are a number of +circumstances to be taken into consideration in all judgements of this +kind; and the ultimate standard, by which we determine all disputes, +that may arise concerning them, is always derived from experience and +observation. Where this experience is not entirely uniform on any side, +it is attended with an unavoidable contrariety in our judgements, and +with the same opposition and mutual destruction of argument as in every +other kind of evidence. We frequently hesitate concerning the reports of +others. We balance the opposite circumstances, which cause any doubt or +uncertainty; and when we discover a superiority on any side, we incline +to it; but still with a diminution of assurance, in proportion to the +force of its antagonist. + +89. This contrariety of evidence, in the present case, may be derived +from several different causes; from the opposition of contrary +testimony; from the character or number of the witnesses; from the +manner of their delivering their testimony; or from the union of all +these circumstances. We entertain a suspicion concerning any matter of +fact, when the witnesses contradict each other; when they are but few, +or of a doubtful character; when they have an interest in what they +affirm; when they deliver their testimony with hesitation, or on the +contrary, with too violent asseverations. There are many other +particulars of the same kind, which may diminish or destroy the force of +any argument, derived from human testimony. + +Suppose, for instance, that the fact, which the testimony endeavours to +establish, partakes of the extraordinary and the marvellous; in that +case, the evidence, resulting from the testimony, admits of a +diminution, greater or less, in proportion as the fact is more or less +unusual. The reason why we place any credit in witnesses and historians, +is not derived from any _connexion_, which we perceive _a priori_, +between testimony and reality, but because we are accustomed to find a +conformity between them. But when the fact attested is such a one as has +seldom fallen under our observation, here is a contest of two opposite +experiences; of which the one destroys the other, as far as its force +goes, and the superior can only operate on the mind by the force, which +remains. The very same principle of experience, which gives us a certain +degree of assurance in the testimony of witnesses, gives us also, in +this case, another degree of assurance against the fact, which they +endeavour to establish; from which contradition there necessarily arises +a counterpoize, and mutual destruction of belief and authority. + +_I should not believe such a story were it told me by Cato_, was a +proverbial saying in Rome, even during the lifetime of that +philosophical patriot.[20] The incredibility of a fact, it was allowed, +might invalidate so great an authority. + + [20] Plutarch, in vita Catonis. + +The Indian prince, who refused to believe the first relations concerning +the effects of frost, reasoned justly; and it naturally required very +strong testimony to engage his assent to facts, that arose from a state +of nature, with which he was unacquainted, and which bore so little +analogy to those events, of which he had had constant and uniform +experience. Though they were not contrary to his experience, they were +not conformable to it.[21] + + [21] No Indian, it is evident, could have experience that water + did not freeze in cold climates. This is placing nature in a + situation quite unknown to him; and it is impossible for him to + tell _a priori _what will result from it. It is making a new + experiment, the consequence of which is always uncertain. One + may sometimes conjecture from analogy what will follow; but + still this is but conjecture. And it must be confessed, that, + in the present case of freezing, the event follows contrary to + the rules of analogy, and is such as a rational Indian would + not look for. The operations of cold upon water are not + gradual, according to the degrees of cold; but whenever it + comes to the freezing point, the water passes in a moment, from + the utmost liquidity to perfect hardness. Such an event, + therefore, may be denominated _extraordinary_, and requires a + pretty strong testimony, to render it credible to people in a + warm climate: But still it is not _miraculous_, nor contrary to + uniform experience of the course of nature in cases where all + the circumstances are the same. The inhabitants of Sumatra + have always seen water fluid in their own climate, and the + freezing of their rivers ought to be deemed a prodigy: But they + never saw water in Muscovy during the winter; and therefore + they cannot reasonably be positive what would there be the + consequence. + +90. But in order to encrease the probability against the testimony of +witnesses, let us suppose, that the fact, which they affirm, instead of +being only marvellous, is really miraculous; and suppose also, that the +testimony considered apart and in itself, amounts to an entire proof; in +that case, there is proof against proof, of which the strongest must +prevail, but still with a diminution of its force, in proportion to that +of its antagonist. + +A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and +unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a +miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument +from experience can possibly be imagined. Why is it more than probable, +that all men must die; that lead cannot, of itself, remain suspended in +the air; that fire consumes wood, and is extinguished by water; unless +it be, that these events are found agreeable to the laws of nature, and +there is required a violation of these laws, or in other words, a +miracle to prevent them? Nothing is esteemed a miracle, if it ever +happen in the common course of nature. It is no miracle that a man, +seemingly in good health, should die on a sudden: because such a kind of +death, though more unusual than any other, has yet been frequently +observed to happen. But it is a miracle, that a dead man should come to +life; because that has never been observed in any age or country. There +must, therefore, be a uniform experience against every miraculous event, +otherwise the event would not merit that appellation. And as a uniform +experience amounts to a proof, there is here a direct and full _proof_, +from the nature of the fact, against the existence of any miracle; nor +can such a proof be destroyed, or the miracle rendered credible, but by +an opposite proof, which is superior.[22] + + [22] Sometimes an event may not, _in itself_, seem to be + contrary to the laws of nature, and yet, if it were real, it + might, by reason of some circumstances, be denominated a + miracle; because, in _fact_, it is contrary to these laws. Thus + if a person, claiming a divine authority, should command a sick + person to be well, a healthful man to fall down dead, the + clouds to pour rain, the winds to blow, in short, should order + many natural events, which immediately follow upon his command; + these might justly be esteemed miracles, because they are + really, in this case, contrary to the laws of nature. For if + any suspicion remain, that the event and command concurred by + accident, there is no miracle and no transgression of the laws + of nature. If this suspicion be removed, there is evidently a + miracle, and a transgression of these laws; because nothing can + be more contrary to nature than that the voice or command of a + man should have such an influence. A miracle may be accurately + defined, _a transgression of a law of nature by a particular + volition of the Deity, or by the interposition of some + invisible agent_. A miracle may either be discoverable by men + or not. This alters not its nature and essence. The raising of + a house or ship into the air is a visible miracle. The raising + of a feather, when the wind wants ever so little of a force + requisite for that purpose, is as real a miracle, though not so + sensible with regard to us. + +91. The plain consequence is (and it is a general maxim worthy of our +attention), 'That no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, +unless the testimony be of such a kind, that its falsehood would be more +miraculous, than the fact, which it endeavours to establish; and even in +that case there is a mutual destruction of arguments, and the superior +only gives us an assurance suitable to that degree of force, which +remains, after deducting the inferior.' When anyone tells me, that he +saw a dead man restored to life, I immediately consider with myself, +whether it be more probable, that this person should either deceive or +be deceived, or that the fact, which he relates, should really have +happened. I weigh the one miracle against the other; and according to +the superiority, which I discover, I pronounce my decision, and always +reject the greater miracle. If the falsehood of his testimony would be +more miraculous, than the event which he relates; then, and not till +then, can he pretend to command my belief or opinion. + + +PART II. + + +92. In the foregoing reasoning we have supposed, that the testimony, +upon which a miracle is founded, may possibly amount to an entire proof, +and that the falsehood of that testimony would be a real prodigy: But it +is easy to shew, that we have been a great deal too liberal in our +concession, and that there never was a miraculous event established on +so full an evidence. + +For _first_, there is not to be found, in all history, any miracle +attested by a sufficient number of men, of such unquestioned good-sense, +education, and learning, as to secure us against all delusion in +themselves; of such undoubted integrity, as to place them beyond all +suspicion of any design to deceive others; of such credit and reputation +in the eyes of mankind, as to have a great deal to lose in case of their +being detected in any falsehood; and at the same time, attesting facts +performed in such a public manner and in so celebrated a part of the +world, as to render the detection unavoidable: All which circumstances +are requisite to give us a full assurance in the testimony of men. + +93. _Secondly_. We may observe in human nature a principle which, if +strictly examined, will be found to diminish extremely the assurance, +which we might, from human testimony, have, in any kind of prodigy. The +maxim, by which we commonly conduct ourselves in our reasonings, is, +that the objects, of which we have no experience, resembles those, of +which we have; that what we have found to be most usual is always most +probable; and that where there is an opposition of arguments, we ought +to give the preference to such as are founded on the greatest number of +past observations. But though, in proceeding by this rule, we readily +reject any fact which is unusual and incredible in an ordinary degree; +yet in advancing farther, the mind observes not always the same rule; +but when anything is affirmed utterly absurd and miraculous, it rather +the more readily admits of such a fact, upon account of that very +circumstance, which ought to destroy all its authority. The passion of +_surprise_ and _wonder_, arising from miracles, being an agreeable +emotion, gives a sensible tendency towards the belief of those events, +from which it is derived. And this goes so far, that even those who +cannot enjoy this pleasure immediately, nor can believe those miraculous +events, of which they are informed, yet love to partake of the +satisfaction at second-hand or by rebound, and place a pride and delight +in exciting the admiration of others. + +With what greediness are the miraculous accounts of travellers received, +their descriptions of sea and land monsters, their relations of +wonderful adventures, strange men, and uncouth manners? But if the +spirit of religion join itself to the love of wonder, there is an end of +common sense; and human testimony, in these circumstances, loses all +pretensions to authority. A religionist may be an enthusiast, and +imagine he sees what has no reality: he may know his narrative to be +false, and yet persevere in it, with the best intentions in the world, +for the sake of promoting so holy a cause: or even where this delusion +has not place, vanity, excited by so strong a temptation, operates on +him more powerfully than on the rest of mankind in any other +circumstances; and self-interest with equal force. His auditors may not +have, and commonly have not, sufficient judgement to canvass his +evidence: what judgement they have, they renounce by principle, in these +sublime and mysterious subjects: or if they were ever so willing to +employ it, passion and a heated imagination disturb the regularity of +its operations. Their credulity increases his impudence: and his +impudence overpowers their credulity. + +Eloquence, when at its highest pitch, leaves little room for reason or +reflection; but addressing itself entirely to the fancy or the +affections, captivates the willing hearers, and subdues their +understanding. Happily, this pitch it seldom attains. But what a Tully +or a Demosthenes could scarcely effect over a Roman or Athenian +audience, every _Capuchin_, every itinerant or stationary teacher can +perform over the generality of mankind, and in a higher degree, by +touching such gross and vulgar passions. + +The many instances of forged miracles, and prophecies, and supernatural +events, which, in all ages, have either been detected by contrary +evidence, or which detect themselves by their absurdity, prove +sufficiently the strong propensity of mankind to the extraordinary and +the marvellous, and ought reasonably to beget a suspicion against all +relations of this kind. This is our natural way of thinking, even with +regard to the most common and most credible events. For instance: There +is no kind of report which rises so easily, and spreads so quickly, +especially in country places and provincial towns, as those concerning +marriages; insomuch that two young persons of equal condition never see +each other twice, but the whole neighbourhood immediately join them +together. The pleasure of telling a piece of news so interesting, of +propagating it, and of being the first reporters of it, spreads the +intelligence. And this is so well known, that no man of sense gives +attention to these reports, till he find them confirmed by some greater +evidence. Do not the same passions, and others still stronger, incline +the generality of mankind to believe and report, with the greatest +vehemence and assurance, all religious miracles? + +94. _Thirdly_. It forms a strong presumption against all supernatural +and miraculous relations, that they are observed chiefly to abound among +ignorant and barbarous nations; or if a civilized people has ever given +admission to any of them, that people will be found to have received +them from ignorant and barbarous ancestors, who transmitted them with +that inviolable sanction and authority, which always attend received +opinions. When we peruse the first histories of all nations, we are apt +to imagine ourselves transported into some new world; where the whole +frame of nature is disjointed, and every element performs its operations +in a different manner, from what it does at present. Battles, +revolutions, pestilence, famine and death, are never the effect of those +natural causes, which we experience. Prodigies, omens, oracles, +judgements, quite obscure the few natural events, that are intermingled +with them. But as the former grow thinner every page, in proportion as +we advance nearer the enlightened ages, we soon learn, that there is +nothing mysterious or supernatural in the case, but that all proceeds +from the usual propensity of mankind towards the marvellous, and that, +though this inclination may at intervals receive a check from sense and +learning, it can never be thoroughly extirpated from human nature. + +_It is strange_, a judicious reader is apt to say, upon the perusal of +these wonderful historians, _that such prodigious_ _events never happen +in our days_. But it is nothing strange, I hope, that men should lie in +all ages. You must surely have seen instances enough of that frailty. +You have yourself heard many such marvellous relations started, which, +being treated with scorn by all the wise and judicious, have at last +been abandoned even by the vulgar. Be assured, that those renowned lies, +which have spread and flourished to such a monstrous height, arose from +like beginnings; but being sown in a more proper soil, shot up at last +into prodigies almost equal to those which they relate. + +It was a wise policy in that false prophet, Alexander, who though now +forgotten, was once so famous, to lay the first scene of his impostures +in Paphlagonia, where, as Lucian tells us, the people were extremely +ignorant and stupid, and ready to swallow even the grossest delusion. +People at a distance, who are weak enough to think the matter at all +worth enquiry, have no opportunity of receiving better information. The +stories come magnified to them by a hundred circumstances. Fools are +industrious in propagating the imposture; while the wise and learned are +contented, in general, to deride its absurdity, without informing +themselves of the particular facts, by which it may be distinctly +refuted. And thus the impostor above mentioned was enabled to proceed, +from his ignorant Paphlagonians, to the enlisting of votaries, even +among the Grecian philosophers, and men of the most eminent rank and +distinction in Rome: nay, could engage the attention of that sage +emperor Marcus Aurelius; so far as to make him trust the success of a +military expedition to his delusive prophecies. + +The advantages are so great, of starting an imposture among an ignorant +people, that, even though the delusion should be too gross to impose on +the generality of them (_which, though seldom, is sometimes the case_) +it has a much better chance for succeeding in remote countries, than if +the first scene had been laid in a city renowned for arts and +knowledge. The most ignorant and barbarous of these barbarians carry +the report abroad. None of their countrymen have a large correspondence, +or sufficient credit and authority to contradict and beat down the +delusion. Men's inclination to the marvellous has full opportunity to +display itself. And thus a story, which is universally exploded in the +place where it was first started, shall pass for certain at a thousand +miles distance. But had Alexander fixed his residence at Athens, the +philosophers of that renowned mart of learning had immediately spread, +throughout the whole Roman empire, their sense of the matter; which, +being supported by so great authority, and displayed by all the force of +reason and eloquence, had entirely opened the eyes of mankind. It is +true; Lucian, passing by chance through Paphlagonia, had an opportunity +of performing this good office. But, though much to be wished, it does +not always happen, that every Alexander meets with a Lucian, ready to +expose and detect his impostures. + +95. I may add as a _fourth_ reason, which diminishes the authority of +prodigies, that there is no testimony for any, even those which have not +been expressly detected, that is not opposed by an infinite number of +witnesses; so that not only the miracle destroys the credit of +testimony, but the testimony destroys itself. To make this the better +understood, let us consider, that, in matters of religion, whatever is +different is contrary; and that it is impossible the religions of +ancient Rome, of Turkey, of Siam, and of China should, all of them, be +established on any solid foundation. Every miracle, therefore, pretended +to have been wrought in any of these religions (and all of them abound +in miracles), as its direct scope is to establish the particular system +to which it is attributed; so has it the same force, though more +indirectly, to overthrow every other system. In destroying a rival +system, it likewise destroys the credit of those miracles, on which that +system was established; so that all the prodigies of different +religions are to be regarded as contrary facts, and the evidences of +these prodigies, whether weak or strong, as opposite to each other. +According to this method of reasoning, when we believe any miracle of +Mahomet or his successors, we have for our warrant the testimony of a +few barbarous Arabians: And on the other hand, we are to regard the +authority of Titus Livius, Plutarch, Tacitus, and, in short, of all the +authors and witnesses, Grecian, Chinese, and Roman Catholic, who have +related any miracle in their particular religion; I say, we are to +regard their testimony in the same light as if they had mentioned that +Mahometan miracle, and had in express terms contradicted it, with the +same certainty as they have for the miracle they relate. This argument +may appear over subtile and refined; but is not in reality different +from the reasoning of a judge, who supposes, that the credit of two +witnesses, maintaining a crime against any one, is destroyed by the +testimony of two others, who affirm him to have been two hundred leagues +distant, at the same instant when the crime is said to have been +committed. + +96. One of the best attested miracles in all profane history, is that +which Tacitus reports of Vespasian, who cured a blind man in Alexandria, +by means of his spittle, and a lame man by the mere touch of his foot; +in obedience to a vision of the god Serapis, who had enjoined them to +have recourse to the Emperor, for these miraculous cures. The story may +be seen in that fine historian[23]; where every circumstance seems to add +weight to the testimony, and might be displayed at large with all the +force of argument and eloquence, if any one were now concerned to +enforce the evidence of that exploded and idolatrous superstition. The +gravity, solidity, age, and probity of so great an emperor, who, through +the whole course of his life, conversed in a familiar manner with his +friends and courtiers, and never affected those extraordinary airs of +divinity assumed by Alexander and Demetrius. The historian, a +cotemporary writer, noted for candour and veracity, and withal, the +greatest and most penetrating genius, perhaps, of all antiquity; and so +free from any tendency to credulity, that he even lies under the +contrary imputation, of atheism and profaneness: The persons, from whose +authority he related the miracle, of established character for judgement +and veracity, as we may well presume; eye-witnesses of the fact, and +confirming their testimony, after the Flavian family was despoiled of +the empire, and could no longer give any reward, as the price of a lie. +_Utrumque, qui interfuere, nunc quoque memorant, postquam nullum +mendacio pretium_. To which if we add the public nature of the facts, as +related, it will appear, that no evidence can well be supposed stronger +for so gross and so palpable a falsehood. + + [23] Hist. lib. iv. cap. 81. Suetonius gives nearly the same + account _in vita_ Vesp. + +There is also a memorable story related by Cardinal de Retz, which may +well deserve our consideration. When that intriguing politician fled +into Spain, to avoid the persecution of his enemies, he passed through +Saragossa, the capital of Arragon, where he was shewn, in the cathedral, +a man, who had served seven years as a door-keeper, and was well known +to every body in town, that had ever paid his devotions at that church. +He had been seen, for so long a time, wanting a leg; but recovered that +limb by the rubbing of holy oil upon the stump; and the cardinal assures +us that he saw him with two legs. This miracle was vouched by all the +canons of the church; and the whole company in town were appealed to for +a confirmation of the fact; whom the cardinal found, by their zealous +devotion, to be thorough believers of the miracle. Here the relater was +also cotemporary to the supposed prodigy, of an incredulous and +libertine character, as well as of great genius; the miracle of so +_singular_ a nature as could scarcely admit of a counterfeit, and the +witnesses very numerous, and all of them, in a manner, spectators of the +fact, to which they gave their testimony. And what adds mightily to the +force of the evidence, and may double our surprise on this occasion, is, +that the cardinal himself, who relates the story, seems not to give any +credit to it, and consequently cannot be suspected of any concurrence in +the holy fraud. He considered justly, that it was not requisite, in +order to reject a fact of this nature, to be able accurately to disprove +the testimony, and to trace its falsehood, through all the circumstances +of knavery and credulity which produced it. He knew, that, as this was +commonly altogether impossible at any small distance of time and place; +so was it extremely difficult, even where one was immediately present, +by reason of the bigotry, ignorance, cunning, and roguery of a great +part of mankind. He therefore concluded, like a just reasoner, that such +an evidence carried falsehood upon the very face of it, and that a +miracle, supported by any human testimony, was more properly a subject +of derision than of argument. + +There surely never was a greater number of miracles ascribed to one +person, than those, which were lately said to have been wrought in +France upon the tomb of Abbe Paris, the famous Jansenist, with whose +sanctity the people were so long deluded. The curing of the sick, giving +hearing to the deaf, and sight to the blind, were every where talked of +as the usual effects of that holy sepulchre. But what is more +extraordinary; many of the miracles were immediately proved upon the +spot, before judges of unquestioned integrity, attested by witnesses of +credit and distinction, in a learned age, and on the most eminent +theatre that is now in the world. Nor is this all: a relation of them +was published and dispersed every where; nor were the _Jesuits_, though +a learned body, supported by the civil magistrate, and determined +enemies to those opinions, in whose favour the miracles were said to +have been wrought, ever able distinctly to refute or detect them[24]. +Where shall we find such a number of circumstances, agreeing to the +corroboration of one fact? And what have we to oppose to such a cloud of +witnesses, but the absolute impossibility or miraculous nature of the +events, which they relate? And this surely, in the eyes of all +reasonable people, will alone be regarded as a sufficient refutation. + + [24] This book was writ by Mons. Montgeron, counsellor or judge + of the parliament of Paris, a man of figure and character, who + was also a martyr to the cause, and is now said to be somewhere + in a dungeon on account of his book. + + There is another book in three volumes (called _Recueil des + Miracles de l'Abbe_ Paris) giving an account of many of these + miracles, and accompanied with prefatory discourses, which are + very well written. There runs, however, through the whole of + these a ridiculous comparison between the miracles of our + Saviour and those of the Abbe; wherein it is asserted, that the + evidence for the latter is equal to that for the former: As if + the testimony of men could ever be put in the balance with that + of God himself, who conducted the pen of the inspired writers. + If these writers, indeed, were to be considered merely as human + testimony, the French author is very moderate in his + comparison; since he might, with some appearance of reason, + pretend, that the Jansenist miracles much surpass the other in + evidence and authority. The following circumstances are drawn + from authentic papers, inserted in the above-mentioned book. + + Many of the miracles of Abbe Paris were proved immediately by + witnesses before the officiality or bishop's court at Paris, + under the eye of cardinal Noailles, whose character for + integrity and capacity was never contested even by his enemies. + + His successor in the archbishopric was an enemy to the + Jansenists, and for that reason promoted to the see by the + court. Yet 22 rectors or cures of Paris, with infinite + earnestness, press him to examine those miracles, which they + assert to be known to the whole world, and undisputably + certain: But he wisely forbore. + + The Molinist party had tried to discredit these miracles in one + instance, that of Mademoiselle le Franc. But, besides that + their proceedings were in many respects the most irregular in + the world, particularly in citing only a few of the Jansenist + witnesses, whom they tampered with: Besides this, I say, they + soon found themselves overwhelmed by a cloud of new witnesses, + one hundred and twenty in number, most of them persons of + credit and substance in Paris, who gave oath for the miracle. + This was accompanied with a solemn and earnest appeal to the + parliament. But the parliament were forbidden by authority to + meddle in the affair. It was at last observed, that where men + are heated by zeal and enthusiasm, there is no degree of human + testimony so strong as may not be procured for the greatest + absurdity: And those who will be so silly as to examine the + affair by that medium, and seek particular flaws in the + testimony, are almost sure to be confounded. It must be a + miserable imposture, indeed, that does not prevail in + that contest. + + All who have been in France about that time have heard of the + reputation of Mons. Heraut, the _lieutenant de Police_, whose + vigilance, penetration, activity, and extensive intelligence + have been much talked of. This magistrate, who by the nature of + his office is almost absolute, was vested with full powers, on + purpose to suppress or discredit these miracles; and he + frequently seized immediately, and examined the witnesses and + subjects of them: But never could reach any thing satisfactory + against them. + + In the case of Mademoiselle Thibaut he sent the famous De Sylva + to examine her; whose evidence is very curious. The physician + declares, that it was impossible she could have been so ill as + was proved by witnesses; because it was impossible she could, + in so short a time, have recovered so perfectly as he found + her. He reasoned, like a man of sense, from natural causes; but + the opposite party told him, that the whole was a miracle, and + that his evidence was the very best proof of it. + + The Molinists were in a sad dilemma. They durst not assert the + absolute insufficiency of human evidence, to prove a miracle. + They were obliged to say, that these miracles were wrought by + witchcraft and the devil. But they were told, that this was the + resource of the Jews of old. + + No Jansenist was ever embarrassed to account for the cessation + of the miracles, when the church-yard was shut up by the king's + edict. It was the touch of the tomb, which produced these + extraordinary effects; and when no one could approach the tomb, + no effects could be expected. God, indeed, could have thrown + down the walls in a moment; but he is master of his own graces + and works, and it belongs not to us to account for them. He did + not throw down the walls of every city like those of Jericho, + on the sounding of the rams horns, nor break up the prison of + every apostle, like that of St. Paul. + + No less a man, than the Due de Chatillon, a duke and peer of + France, of the highest rank and family, gives evidence of a + miraculous cure, performed upon a servant of his, who had lived + several years in his house with a visible and palpable + infirmity. I shall conclude with observing, that no clergy are + more celebrated for strictness of life and manners than the + secular clergy of France, particularly the rectors or cures of + Paris, who bear testimony to these impostures. The learning, + genius, and probity of the gentlemen, and the austerity of the + nuns of Port-Royal, have been much celebrated all over Europe. + Yet they all give evidence for a miracle, wrought on the niece + of the famous Pascal, whose sanctity of life, as well as + extraordinary capacity, is well known. The famous Racine gives + an account of this miracle in his famous history of Port-Royal, + and fortifies it with all the proofs, which a multitude of + nuns, priests, physicians, and men of the world, all of them of + undoubted credit, could bestow upon it. Several men of letters, + particularly the bishop of Tournay, thought this miracle so + certain, as to employ it in the refutation of atheists and + free-thinkers. The queen-regent of France, who was extremely + prejudiced against the Port-Royal, sent her own physician to + examine the miracle, who returned an absolute convert. In + short, the supernatural cure was so uncontestable, that it + saved, for a time, that famous monastery from the ruin with + which it was threatened by the Jesuits. Had it been a cheat, it + had certainly been detected by such sagacious and powerful + antagonists, and must have hastened the ruin of the contrivers. + Our divines, who can build up a formidable castle from such + despicable materials; what a prodigious fabric could they have + reared from these and many other circumstances, which I have + not mentioned! How often would the great names of Pascal, + Racine, Amaud, Nicole, have resounded in our ears? But if they + be wise, they had better adopt the miracle, as being more + worth, a thousand times, than all the rest of the collection. + Besides, it may serve very much to their purpose. For that + miracle was really performed by the touch of an authentic holy + prickle of the holy thorn, which composed the holy crown, + which, &c. + +97. Is the consequence just, because some human testimony has the utmost +force and authority in some cases, when it relates the battle of +Philippi or Pharsalia for instance; that therefore all kinds of +testimony must, in all cases, have equal force and authority? Suppose +that the Caesarean and Pompeian factions had, each of them, claimed the +victory in these battles, and that the historians of each party had +uniformly ascribed the advantage to their own side; how could mankind, +at this distance, have been able to determine between them? The +contrariety is equally strong between the miracles related by Herodotus +or Plutarch, and those delivered by Mariana, Bede, or any monkish +historian. + +The wise lend a very academic faith to every report which favours the +passion of the reporter; whether it magnifies his country, his family, +or himself, or in any other way strikes in with his natural inclinations +and propensities. But what greater temptation than to appear a +missionary, a prophet, an ambassador from heaven? Who would not +encounter many dangers and difficulties, in order to attain so sublime a +character? Or if, by the help of vanity and a heated imagination, a man +has first made a convert of himself, and entered seriously into the +delusion; who ever scruples to make use of pious frauds, in support of +so holy and meritorious a cause? + +The smallest spark may here kindle into the greatest flame; because the +materials are always prepared for it. The _avidum genus auricularum_[25], +the gazing populace, receive greedily, without examination, whatever +sooths superstition, and promotes wonder. + + [25] Lucret. + +How many stories of this nature have, in all ages, been detected and +exploded in their infancy? How many more have been celebrated for a +time, and have afterwards sunk into neglect and oblivion? Where such +reports, therefore, fly about, the solution of the phenomenon is +obvious; and we judge in conformity to regular experience and +observation, when we account for it by the known and natural principles +of credulity and delusion. And shall we, rather than have a recourse to +so natural a solution, allow of a miraculous violation of the most +established laws of nature? + +I need not mention the difficulty of detecting a falsehood in any +private or even public history, at the place, where it is said to +happen; much more when the scene is removed to ever so small a distance. +Even a court of judicature, with all the authority, accuracy, and +judgement, which they can employ, find themselves often at a loss to +distinguish between truth and falsehood in the most recent actions. But +the matter never comes to any issue, if trusted to the common method of +altercations and debate and flying rumours; especially when men's +passions have taken part on either side. + +In the infancy of new religions, the wise and learned commonly esteem +the matter too inconsiderable to deserve their attention or regard. And +when afterwards they would willingly detect the cheat, in order to +undeceive the deluded multitude, the season is now past, and the records +and witnesses, which might clear up the matter, have perished +beyond recovery. + +No means of detection remain, but those which must be drawn from the +very testimony itself of the reporters: and these, though always +sufficient with the judicious and knowing, are commonly too fine to fall +under the comprehension of the vulgar. + +98. Upon the whole, then, it appears, that no testimony for any kind of +miracle has ever amounted to a probability, much less to a proof; and +that, even supposing it amounted to a proof, it would be opposed by +another proof; derived from the very nature of the fact, which it would +endeavour to establish. It is experience only, which gives authority to +human testimony; and it is the same experience, which assures us of the +laws of nature. When, therefore, these two kinds of experience are +contrary, we have nothing to do but substract the one from the other, +and embrace an opinion, either on one side or the other, with that +assurance which arises from the remainder. But according to the +principle here explained, this substraction, with regard to all popular +religions, amounts to an entire annihilation; and therefore we may +establish it as a maxim, that no human testimony can have such force as +to prove a miracle, and make it a just foundation for any such system +of religion. + +99. I beg the limitations here made may be remarked, when I say, that a +miracle can never be proved, so as to be the foundation of a system of +religion. For I own, that otherwise, there may possibly be miracles, or +violations of the usual course of nature, of such a kind as to admit of +proof from human testimony; though, perhaps, it will be impossible to +find any such in all the records of history. Thus, suppose, all authors, +in all languages, agree, that, from the first of January 1600, there was +a total darkness over the whole earth for eight days: suppose that the +tradition of this extraordinary event is still strong and lively among +the people: that all travellers, who return from foreign countries, +bring us accounts of the same tradition, without the least variation or +contradiction: it is evident, that our present philosophers, instead of +doubting the fact, ought to receive it as certain, and ought to search +for the causes whence it might be derived. The decay, corruption, and +dissolution of nature, is an event rendered probable by so many +analogies, that any phenomenon, which seems to have a tendency towards +that catastrophe, comes within the reach of human testimony, if that +testimony be very extensive and uniform. + +But suppose, that all the historians who treat of England, should agree, +that, on the first of January 1600, Queen Elizabeth died; that both +before and after her death she was seen by her physicians and the whole +court, as is usual with persons of her rank; that her successor was +acknowledged and proclaimed by the parliament; and that, after being +interred a month, she again appeared, resumed the throne, and governed +England for three years: I must confess that I should be surprised at +the concurrence of so many odd circumstances, but should not have the +least inclination to believe so miraculous an event. I should not doubt +of her pretended death, and of those other public circumstances that +followed it: I should only assert it to have been pretended, and that it +neither was, nor possibly could be real. You would in vain object to me +the difficulty, and almost impossibility of deceiving the world in an +affair of such consequence; the wisdom and solid judgement of that +renowned queen; with the little or no advantage which she could reap +from so poor an artifice: All this might astonish me; but I would still +reply, that the knavery and folly of men are such common phenomena, that +I should rather believe the most extraordinary events to arise from +their concurrence, than admit of so signal a violation of the laws +of nature. + +But should this miracle be ascribed to any new system of religion; men, +in all ages, have been so much imposed on by ridiculous stories of that +kind, that this very circumstance would be a full proof of a cheat, and +sufficient, with all men of sense, not only to make them reject the +fact, but even reject it without farther examination. Though the Being +to whom the miracle is ascribed, be, in this case, Almighty, it does +not, upon that account, become a whit more probable; since it is +impossible for us to know the attributes or actions of such a Being, +otherwise than from the experience which we have of his productions, in +the usual course of nature. This still reduces us to past observation, +and obliges us to compare the instances of the violation of truth in the +testimony of men, with those of the violation of the laws of nature by +miracles, in order to judge which of them is most likely and probable. +As the violations of truth are more common in the testimony concerning +religious miracles, than in that concerning any other matter of fact; +this must diminish very much the authority of the former testimony, and +make us form a general resolution, never to lend any attention to it, +with whatever specious pretence it may be covered. + +Lord Bacon seems to have embraced the same principles of reasoning. 'We +ought,' says he, 'to make a collection or particular history of all +monsters and prodigious births or productions, and in a word of every +thing new, rare, and extraordinary in nature. But this must be done with +the most severe scrutiny, lest we depart from truth. Above all, every +relation must be considered as suspicious, which depends in any degree +upon religion, as the prodigies of Livy: And no less so, every thing +that is to be found in the writers of natural magic or alchimy, or such +authors, who seem, all of them, to have an unconquerable appetite for +falsehood and fable[26].' + + [26] Nov. Org. lib. ii. aph. 29. + +100. I am the better pleased with the method of reasoning here +delivered, as I think it may serve to confound those dangerous friends +or disguised enemies to the _Christian Religion_, who have undertaken to +defend it by the principles of human reason. Our most holy religion is +founded on _Faith_, not on reason; and it is a sure method of exposing +it to put it to such a trial as it is, by no means, fitted to endure. To +make this more evident, let us examine those miracles, related in +scripture; and not to lose ourselves in too wide a field, let us confine +ourselves to such as we find in the _Pentateuch_, which we shall +examine, according to the principles of these pretended Christians, not +as the word or testimony of God himself, but as the production of a mere +human writer and historian. Here then we are first to consider a book, +presented to us by a barbarous and ignorant people, written in an age +when they were still more barbarous, and in all probability long after +the facts which it relates, corroborated by no concurring testimony, and +resembling those fabulous accounts, which every nation gives of its +origin. Upon reading this book, we find it full of prodigies and +miracles. It gives an account of a state of the world and of human +nature entirely different from the present: Of our fall from that state: +Of the age of man, extended to near a thousand years: Of the destruction +of the world by a deluge: Of the arbitrary choice of one people, as the +favourites of heaven; and that people the countrymen of the author: Of +their deliverance from bondage by prodigies the most astonishing +imaginable: I desire any one to lay his hand upon his heart, and after a +serious consideration declare, whether he thinks that the falsehood of +such a book, supported by such a testimony, would be more extraordinary +and miraculous than all the miracles it relates; which is, however, +necessary to make it be received, according to the measures of +probability above established. + +101. What we have said of miracles may be applied, without any +variation, to prophecies; and indeed, all prophecies are real miracles, +and as such only, can be admitted as proofs of any revelation. If it did +not exceed the capacity of human nature to foretell future events, it +would be absurd to employ any prophecy as an argument for a divine +mission or authority from heaven. So that, upon the whole, we may +conclude, that the _Christian Religion_ not only was at first attended +with miracles, but even at this day cannot be believed by any reasonable +person without one. Mere reason is insufficient to convince us of its +veracity: And whoever is moved by _Faith_ to assent to it, is conscious +of a continued miracle in his own person, which subverts all the +principles of his understanding, and gives him a determination to +believe what is most contrary to custom and experience. + + + +SECTION XI. + +OF A PARTICULAR PROVIDENCE AND OF A FUTURE STATE. + + +102. I was lately engaged in conversation with a friend who loves +sceptical paradoxes; where, though he advanced many principles, of which +I can by no means approve, yet as they seem to be curious, and to bear +some relation to the chain of reasoning carried on throughout this +enquiry, I shall here copy them from my memory as accurately as I can, +in order to submit them to the judgement of the reader. + +Our conversation began with my admiring the singular good fortune of +philosophy, which, as it requires entire liberty above all other +privileges, and chiefly flourishes from the free opposition of +sentiments and argumentation, received its first birth in an age and +country of freedom and toleration, and was never cramped, even in its +most extravagant principles, by any creeds, concessions, or penal +statutes. For, except the banishment of Protagoras, and the death of +Socrates, which last event proceeded partly from other motives, there +are scarcely any instances to be met with, in ancient history, of this +bigotted jealousy, with which the present age is so much infested. +Epicurus lived at Athens to an advanced age, in peace and tranquillity: +Epicureans[27] were even admitted to receive the sacerdotal character, +and to officiate at the altar, in the most sacred rites of the +established religion: And the public encouragement[28] of pensions and +salaries was afforded equally, by the wisest of all the Roman +emperors[29], to the professors of every sect of philosophy. How +requisite such kind of treatment was to philosophy, in her early youth, +will easily be conceived, if we reflect, that, even at present, when she +may be supposed more hardy and robust, she bears with much difficulty +the inclemency of the seasons, and those harsh winds of calumny and +persecution, which blow upon her. + + [27] Luciani [Greek: symp. ae Lapithai]. + + [28] Luciani [Greek: eunouchos]. + + [29] Luciani and Dio. + +You admire, says my friend, as the singular good fortune of philosophy, +what seems to result from the natural course of things, and to be +unavoidable in every age and nation. This pertinacious bigotry, of which +you complain, as so fatal to philosophy, is really her offspring, who, +after allying with superstition, separates himself entirely from the +interest of his parent, and becomes her most inveterate enemy and +persecutor. Speculative dogmas of religion, the present occasions of +such furious dispute, could not possibly be conceived or admitted in the +early ages of the world; when mankind, being wholly illiterate, formed +an idea of religion more suitable to their weak apprehension, and +composed their sacred tenets of such tales chiefly as were the objects +of traditional belief, more than of argument or disputation. After the +first alarm, therefore, was over, which arose from the new paradoxes and +principles of the philosophers; these teachers seem ever after, during +the ages of antiquity, to have lived in great harmony with the +established superstition, and to have made a fair partition of mankind +between them; the former claiming all the learned and wise, the latter +possessing all the vulgar and illiterate. + +103. It seems then, say I, that you leave politics entirely out of the +question, and never suppose, that a wise magistrate can justly be +jealous of certain tenets of philosophy, such as those of Epicurus, +which, denying a divine existence, and consequently a providence and a +future state, seem to loosen, in a great measure, the ties of morality, +and may be supposed, for that reason, pernicious to the peace of +civil society. + +I know, replied he, that in fact these persecutions never, in any age, +proceeded from calm reason, or from experience of the pernicious +consequences of philosophy; but arose entirely from passion and +prejudice. But what if I should advance farther, and assert, that if +Epicurus had been accused before the people, by any of the _sycophants_ +or informers of those days, he could easily have defended his cause, and +proved his principles of philosophy to be as salutary as those of his +adversaries, who endeavoured, with such zeal, to expose him to the +public hatred and jealousy? + +I wish, said I, you would try your eloquence upon so extraordinary a +topic, and make a speech for Epicurus, which might satisfy, not the mob +of Athens, if you will allow that ancient and polite city to have +contained any mob, but the more philosophical part of his audience, such +as might be supposed capable of comprehending his arguments. + +The matter would not be difficult, upon such conditions, replied he: And +if you please, I shall suppose myself Epicurus for a moment, and make +you stand for the Athenian people, and shall deliver you such an +harangue as will fill all the urn with white beans, and leave not a +black one to gratify the malice of my adversaries. + +Very well: Pray proceed upon these suppositions. + +104. I come hither, O ye Athenians, to justify in your assembly what I +maintained in my school, and I find myself impeached by furious +antagonists, instead of reasoning with calm and dispassionate enquirers. +Your deliberations, which of right should be directed to questions of +public good, and the interest of the commonwealth, are diverted to the +disquisitions of speculative philosophy; and these magnificent, but +perhaps fruitless enquiries, take place of your more familiar but more +useful occupations. But so far as in me lies, I will prevent this abuse. +We shall not here dispute concerning the origin and government of +worlds. We shall only enquire how far such questions concern the public +interest. And if I can persuade you, that they are entirely indifferent +to the peace of society and security of government, I hope that you will +presently send us back to our schools, there to examine, at leisure, the +question the most sublime, but at the same time, the most speculative of +all philosophy. + +The religious philosophers, not satisfied with the tradition of your +forefathers, and doctrine of your priests (in which I willingly +acquiesce), indulge a rash curiosity, in trying how far they can +establish religion upon the principles of reason; and they thereby +excite, instead of satisfying, the doubts, which naturally arise from a +diligent and scrutinous enquiry. They paint, in the most magnificent +colours, the order, beauty, and wise arrangement of the universe; and +then ask, if such a glorious display of intelligence could proceed from +the fortuitous concourse of atoms, or if chance could produce what the +greatest genius can never sufficiently admire. I shall not examine the +justness of this argument. I shall allow it to be as solid as my +antagonists and accusers can desire. It is sufficient, if I can prove, +from this very reasoning, that the question is entirely speculative, and +that, when, in my philosophical disquisitions, I deny a providence and a +future state, I undermine not the foundations of society, but advance +principles, which they themselves, upon their own topics, if they argue +consistently, must allow to be solid and satisfactory. + +105. You then, who are my accusers, have acknowledged, that the chief or +sole argument for a divine existence (which I never questioned) is +derived from the order of nature; where there appear such marks of +intelligence and design, that you think it extravagant to assign for its +cause, either chance, or the blind and unguided force of matter. You +allow, that this is an argument drawn from effects to causes. From the +order of the work, you infer, that there must have been project and +forethought in the workman. If you cannot make out this point, you +allow, that your conclusion fails; and you pretend not to establish the +conclusion in a greater latitude than the phenomena of nature will +justify. These are your concessions. I desire you to mark the +consequences. + +When we infer any particular cause from an effect, we must proportion +the one to the other, and can never be allowed to ascribe to the cause +any qualities, but what are exactly sufficient to produce the effect. A +body of ten ounces raised in any scale may serve as a proof, that the +counterbalancing weight exceeds ten ounces; but can never afford a +reason that it exceeds a hundred. If the cause, assigned for any effect, +be not sufficient to produce it, we must either reject that cause, or +add to it such qualities as will give it a just proportion to the +effect. But if we ascribe to it farther qualities, or affirm it capable +of producing other effects, we can only indulge the licence of +conjecture, and arbitrarily suppose the existence of qualities and +energies, without reason or authority. + +The same rule holds, whether the cause assigned be brute unconscious +matter, or a rational intelligent being. If the cause be known only by +the effect, we never ought to ascribe to it any qualities, beyond what +are precisely requisite to produce the effect: Nor can we, by any rules +of just reasoning, return back from the cause, and infer other effects +from it, beyond those by which alone it is known to us. No one, merely +from the sight of one of Zeuxis's pictures, could know, that he was also +a statuary or architect, and was an artist no less skilful in stone and +marble than in colours. The talents and taste, displayed in the +particular work before us; these we may safely conclude the workman to +be possessed of. The cause must be proportioned to the effect; and if +we exactly and precisely proportion it, we shall never find in it any +qualities, that point farther, or afford an inference concerning any +other design or performance. Such qualities must be somewhat beyond what +is merely requisite for producing the effect, which we examine. + +106. Allowing, therefore, the gods to be the authors of the existence or +order of the universe; it follows, that they possess that precise degree +of power, intelligence, and benevolence, which appears in their +workmanship; but nothing farther can ever be proved, except we call in +the assistance of exaggeration and flattery to supply the defects of +argument and reasoning. So far as the traces of any attributes, at +present, appear, so far may we conclude these attributes to exist. The +supposition of farther attributes is mere hypothesis; much more the +supposition, that, in distant regions of space or periods of time, there +has been, or will be, a more magnificent display of these attributes, +and a scheme of administration more suitable to such imaginary virtues. +We can never be allowed to mount up from the universe, the effect, to +Jupiter, the cause; and then descend downwards, to infer any new effect +from that cause; as if the present effects alone were not entirely +worthy of the glorious attributes, which we ascribe to that deity. The +knowledge of the cause being derived solely from the effect, they must +be exactly adjusted to each other; and the one can never refer to +anything farther, or be the foundation of any new inference and +conclusion. + +You find certain phenomena in nature. You seek a cause or author. You +imagine that you have found him. You afterwards become so enamoured of +this offspring of your brain, that you imagine it impossible, but he +must produce something greater and more perfect than the present scene +of things, which is so full of ill and disorder. You forget, that this +superlative intelligence and benevolence are entirely imaginary, or, at +least, without any foundation in reason; and that you have no ground to +ascribe to him any qualities, but what you see he has actually exerted +and displayed in his productions. Let your gods, therefore, O +philosophers, be suited to the present appearances of nature: and +presume not to alter these appearances by arbitrary suppositions, in +order to suit them to the attributes, which you so fondly ascribe to +your deities. + +107. When priests and poets, supported by your authority, O Athenians, +talk of a golden or silver age, which preceded the present state of vice +and misery, I hear them with attention and with reverence. But when +philosophers, who pretend to neglect authority, and to cultivate reason, +hold the same discourse, I pay them not, I own, the same obsequious +submission and pious deference. I ask; who carried them into the +celestial regions, who admitted them into the councils of the gods, who +opened to them the book of fate, that they thus rashly affirm, that +their deities have executed, or will execute, any purpose beyond what +has actually appeared? If they tell me, that they have mounted on the +steps or by the gradual ascent of reason, and by drawing inferences from +effects to causes, I still insist, that they have aided the ascent of +reason by the wings of imagination; otherwise they could not thus change +their manner of inference, and argue from causes to effects; presuming, +that a more perfect production than the present world would be more +suitable to such perfect beings as the gods, and forgetting that they +have no reason to ascribe to these celestial beings any perfection or +any attribute, but what can be found in the present world. + +Hence all the fruitless industry to account for the ill appearances of +nature, and save the honour of the gods; while we must acknowledge the +reality of that evil and disorder, with which the world so much abounds. +The obstinate and intractable qualities of matter, we are told, or the +observance of general laws, or some such reason, is the sole cause, +which controlled the power and benevolence of Jupiter, and obliged him +to create mankind and every sensible creature so imperfect and so +unhappy. These attributes then, are, it seems, beforehand, taken for +granted, in their greatest latitude. And upon that supposition, I own +that such conjectures may, perhaps, be admitted as plausible solutions +of the ill phenomena. But still I ask; Why take these attributes for +granted, or why ascribe to the cause any qualities but what actually +appear in the effect? Why torture your brain to justify the course of +nature upon suppositions, which, for aught you know, may be entirely +imaginary, and of which there are to be found no traces in the course +of nature? + +The religious hypothesis, therefore, must be considered only as a +particular method of accounting for the visible phenomena of the +universe: but no just reasoner will ever presume to infer from it any +single fact, and alter or add to the phenomena, in any single +particular. If you think, that the appearances of things prove such +causes, it is allowable for you to draw an inference concerning the +existence of these causes. In such complicated and sublime subjects, +every one should be indulged in the liberty of conjecture and argument. +But here you ought to rest. If you come backward, and arguing from your +inferred causes, conclude, that any other fact has existed, or will +exist, in the course of nature, which may serve as a fuller display of +particular attributes; I must admonish you, that you have departed from +the method of reasoning, attached to the present subject, and have +certainly added something to the attributes of the cause, beyond what +appears in the effect; otherwise you could never, with tolerable sense +or propriety, add anything to the effect, in order to render it more +worthy of the cause. + +108. Where, then, is the odiousness of that doctrine, which I teach in +my school, or rather, which I examine in my gardens? Or what do you find +in this whole question, wherein the security of good morals, or the +peace and order of society, is in the least concerned? + +I deny a providence, you say, and supreme governor of the world, who +guides the course of events, and punishes the vicious with infamy and +disappointment, and rewards the virtuous with honour and success, in all +their undertakings. But surely, I deny not the course itself of events, +which lies open to every one's inquiry and examination. I acknowledge, +that, in the present order of things, virtue is attended with more peace +of mind than vice, and meets with a more favourable reception from the +world. I am sensible, that, according to the past experience of mankind, +friendship is the chief joy of human life, and moderation the only +source of tranquillity and happiness. I never balance between the +virtuous and the vicious course of life; but am sensible, that, to a +well-disposed mind, every advantage is on the side of the former. And +what can you say more, allowing all your suppositions and reasonings? +You tell me, indeed, that this disposition of things proceeds from +intelligence and design. But whatever it proceeds from, the disposition +itself, on which depends our happiness or misery, and consequently our +conduct and deportment in life is still the same. It is still open for +me, as well as you, to regulate my behaviour, by my experience of past +events. And if you affirm, that, while a divine providence is allowed, +and a supreme distributive justice in the universe, I ought to expect +some more particular reward of the good, and punishment of the bad, +beyond the ordinary course of events; I here find the same fallacy, +which I have before endeavoured to detect. You persist in imagining, +that, if we grant that divine existence, for which you so earnestly +contend, you may safely infer consequences from it, and add something +to the experienced order of nature, by arguing from the attributes which +you ascribe to your gods. You seem not to remember, that all your +reasonings on this subject can only be drawn from effects to causes; and +that every argument, deducted from causes to effects, must of necessity +be a gross sophism; since it is impossible for you to know anything of +the cause, but what you have antecedently, not inferred, but discovered +to the full, in the effect. + +109. But what must a philosopher think of those vain reasoners, who, +instead of regarding the present scene of things as the sole object of +their contemplation, so far reverse the whole course of nature, as to +render this life merely a passage to something farther; a porch, which +leads to a greater, and vastly different building; a prologue, which +serves only to introduce the piece, and give it more grace and +propriety? Whence, do you think, can such philosophers derive their idea +of the gods? From their own conceit and imagination surely. For if they +derived it from the present phenomena, it would never point to anything +farther, but must be exactly adjusted to them. That the divinity may +_possibly_ be endowed with attributes, which we have never seen exerted; +may be governed by principles of action, which we cannot discover to be +satisfied: all this will freely be allowed. But still this is mere +_possibility_ and hypothesis. We never can have reason to _infer_ any +attributes, or any principles of action in him, but so far as we know +them to have been exerted and satisfied. + +_Are there any marks of a distributive justice in the world?_ If you +answer in the affirmative, I conclude, that, since justice here exerts +itself, it is satisfied. If you reply in the negative, I conclude, that +you have then no reason to ascribe justice, in our sense of it, to the +gods. If you hold a medium between affirmation and negation, by saying, +that the justice of the gods, at present, exerts itself in part, but not +in its full extent; I answer, that you have no reason to give it any +particular extent, but only so far as you see it, _at present_, +exert itself. + +110. Thus I bring the dispute, O Athenians, to a short issue with my +antagonists. The course of nature lies open to my contemplation as well +as to theirs. The experienced train of events is the great standard, by +which we all regulate our conduct. Nothing else can be appealed to in +the field, or in the senate. Nothing else ought ever to be heard of in +the school, or in the closet. In vain would our limited understanding +break through those boundaries, which are too narrow for our fond +imagination. While we argue from the course of nature, and infer a +particular intelligent cause, which first bestowed, and still preserves +order in the universe, we embrace a principle, which is both uncertain +and useless. It is uncertain; because the subject lies entirely beyond +the reach of human experience. It is useless; because our knowledge of +this cause being derived entirely from the course of nature, we can +never, according to the rules of just reasoning, return back from the +cause with any new inference, or making additions to the common and +experienced course of nature, establish any new principles of conduct +and behaviour. + +111. I observe (said I, finding he had finished his harangue) that you +neglect not the artifice of the demagogues of old; and as you were +pleased to make me stand for the people, you insinuate yourself into my +favour by embracing those principles, to which, you know, I have always +expressed a particular attachment. But allowing you to make experience +(as indeed I think you ought) the only standard of our judgement +concerning this, and all other questions of fact; I doubt not but, from +the very same experience, to which you appeal, it may be possible to +refute this reasoning, which you have put into the mouth of Epicurus. +If you saw, for instance, a half-finished building, surrounded with +heaps of brick and stone and mortar, and all the instruments of masonry; +could you not _infer_ from the effect, that it was a work of design and +contrivance? And could you not return again, from this inferred cause, +to infer new additions to the effect, and conclude, that the building +would soon be finished, and receive all the further improvements, which +art could bestow upon it? If you saw upon the sea-shore the print of one +human foot, you would conclude, that a man had passed that way, and that +he had also left the traces of the other foot, though effaced by the +rolling of the sands or inundation of the waters. Why then do you refuse +to admit the same method of reasoning with regard to the order of +nature? Consider the world and the present life only as an imperfect +building, from which you can infer a superior intelligence; and arguing +from that superior intelligence, which can leave nothing imperfect; why +may you not infer a more finished scheme or plan, which will receive its +completion in some distant point of space or time? Are not these methods +of reasoning exactly similar? And under what pretence can you embrace +the one, while you reject the other? + +112. The infinite difference of the subjects, replied he, is a +sufficient foundation for this difference in my conclusions. In works of +_human_ art and contrivance, it is allowable to advance from the effect +to the cause, and returning back from the cause, to form new inferences +concerning the effect, and examine the alterations, which it has +probably undergone, or may still undergo. But what is the foundation of +this method of reasoning? Plainly this; that man is a being, whom we +know by experience, whose motives and designs we are acquainted with, +and whose projects and inclinations have a certain connexion and +coherence, according to the laws which nature has established for the +government of such a creature. When, therefore, we find, that any work +has proceeded from the skill and industry of man; as we are otherwise +acquainted with the nature of the animal, we can draw a hundred +inferences concerning what may be expected from him; and these +inferences will all be founded in experience and observation. But did we +know man only from the single work or production which we examine, it +were impossible for us to argue in this manner; because our knowledge of +all the qualities, which we ascribe to him, being in that case derived +from the production, it is impossible they could point to anything +farther, or be the foundation of any new inference. The print of a foot +in the sand can only prove, when considered alone, that there was some +figure adapted to it, by which it was produced: but the print of a human +foot proves likewise, from our other experience, that there was probably +another foot, which also left its impression, though effaced by time or +other accidents. Here we mount from the effect to the cause; and +descending again from the cause, infer alterations in the effect; but +this is not a continuation of the same simple chain of reasoning. We +comprehend in this case a hundred other experiences and observations, +concerning the _usual_ figure and members of that species of animal, +without which this method of argument must be considered as fallacious +and sophistical. + +113. The case is not the same with our reasonings from the works of +nature. The Deity is known to us only by his productions, and is a +single being in the universe, not comprehended under any species or +genus, from whose experienced attributes or qualities, we can, by +analogy, infer any attribute or quality in him. As the universe shews +wisdom and goodness, we infer wisdom and goodness. As it shews a +particular degree of these perfections, we infer a particular degree of +them, precisely adapted to the effect which we examine. But farther +attributes or farther degrees of the same attributes, we can never be +authorised to infer or suppose, by any rules of just reasoning. Now, +without some such licence of supposition, it is impossible for us to +argue from the cause, or infer any alteration in the effect, beyond what +has immediately fallen under our observation. Greater good produced by +this Being must still prove a greater degree of goodness: a more +impartial distribution of rewards and punishments must proceed from a +greater regard to justice and equity. Every supposed addition to the +works of nature makes an addition to the attributes of the Author of +nature; and consequently, being entirely unsupported by any reason or +argument, can never be admitted but as mere conjecture and +hypothesis[30]. + + [30] In general, it may, I think, be established as a maxim, + that where any cause is known only by its particular effects, + it must be impossible to infer any new effects from that cause; + since the qualities, which are requisite to produce these new + effects along with the former, must either be different, or + superior, or of more extensive operation, than those which + simply produced the effect, whence alone the cause is supposed + to be known to us. We can never, therefore, have any reason to + suppose the existence of these qualities. To say, that the new + effects proceed only from a continuation of the same energy, + which is already known from the first effects, will not remove + the difficulty. For even granting this to be the case (which + can seldom be supposed), the very continuation and exertion of + a like energy (for it is impossible it can be absolutely the + same), I say, this exertion of a like energy, in a different + period of space and time, is a very arbitrary supposition, and + what there cannot possibly be any traces of in the effects, + from which all our knowledge of the cause is originally + derived. Let the _inferred_ cause be exactly proportioned (as + it should be) to the known effect; and it is impossible that + it can possess any qualities, from which new or different + effects can be _inferred_. + +The great source of our mistake in this subject, and of the unbounded +licence of conjecture, which we indulge, is, that we tacitly consider +ourselves, as in the place of the Supreme Being, and conclude, that he +will, on every occasion, observe the same conduct, which we ourselves, +in his situation, would have embraced as reasonable and eligible. But, +besides that the ordinary course of nature may convince us, that almost +everything is regulated by principles and maxims very different from +ours; besides this, I say, it must evidently appear contrary to all +rules of analogy to reason, from the intentions and projects of men, to +those of a Being so different, and so much superior. In human nature, +there is a certain experienced coherence of designs and inclinations; so +that when, from any fact, we have discovered one intention of any man, +it may often be reasonable, from experience, to infer another, and draw +a long chain of conclusions concerning his past or future conduct. But +this method of reasoning can never have place with regard to a Being, so +remote and incomprehensible, who bears much less analogy to any other +being in the universe than the sun to a waxen taper, and who discovers +himself only by some faint traces or outlines, beyond which we have no +authority to ascribe to him any attribute or perfection. What we imagine +to be a superior perfection, may really be a defect. Or were it ever so +much a perfection, the ascribing of it to the Supreme Being, where it +appears not to have been really exerted, to the full, in his works, +savours more of flattery and panegyric, than of just reasoning and sound +philosophy. All the philosophy, therefore, in the world, and all the +religion, which is nothing but a species of philosophy, will never be +able to carry us beyond the usual course of experience, or give us +measures of conduct and behaviour different from those which are +furnished by reflections on common life. No new fact can ever be +inferred from the religious hypothesis; no event foreseen or foretold; +no reward or punishment expected or dreaded, beyond what is already +known by practice and observation. So that my apology for Epicurus will +still appear solid and satisfactory; nor have the political interests +of society any connexion with the philosophical disputes concerning +metaphysics and religion. + +114. There is still one circumstance, replied I, which you seem to have +overlooked. Though I should allow your premises, I must deny your +conclusion. You conclude, that religious doctrines and reasonings _can_ +have no influence on life, because they _ought_ to have no influence; +never considering, that men reason not in the same manner you do, but +draw many consequences from the belief of a divine Existence, and +suppose that the Deity will inflict punishments on vice, and bestow +rewards on virtue, beyond what appear in the ordinary course of nature. +Whether this reasoning of theirs be just or not, is no matter. Its +influence on their life and conduct must still be the same. And, those, +who attempt to disabuse them of such prejudices, may, for aught I know, +be good reasoners, but I cannot allow them to be good citizens and +politicians; since they free men from one restraint upon their passions, +and make the infringement of the laws of society, in one respect, more +easy and secure. + +After all, I may, perhaps, agree to your general conclusion in favour of +liberty, though upon different premises from those, on which you +endeavour to found it. I think, that the state ought to tolerate every +principle of philosophy; nor is there an instance, that any government +has suffered in its political interests by such indulgence. There is no +enthusiasm among philosophers; their doctrines are not very alluring to +the people; and no restraint can be put upon their reasonings, but what +must be of dangerous consequence to the sciences, and even to the state, +by paving the way for persecution and oppression in points, where the +generality of mankind are more deeply interested and concerned. + +115. But there occurs to me (continued I) with regard to your main +topic, a difficulty, which I shall just propose to you without insisting +on it; lest it lead into reasonings of too nice and delicate a nature. +In a word, I much doubt whether it be possible for a cause to be known +only by its effect (as you have all along supposed) or to be of so +singular and particular a nature as to have no parallel and no +similarity with any other cause or object, that has ever fallen under +our observation. It is only when two _species_ of objects are found to +be constantly conjoined, that we can infer the one from the other; and +were an effect presented, which was entirely singular, and could not be +comprehended under any known _species_, I do not see, that we could form +any conjecture or inference at all concerning its cause. If experience +and observation and analogy be, indeed, the only guides which we can +reasonably follow in inferences of this nature; both the effect and +cause must bear a similarity and resemblance to other effects and +causes, which we know, and which we have found, in many instances, to be +conjoined with each other. I leave it to your own reflection to pursue +the consequences of this principle. I shall just observe, that, as the +antagonists of Epicurus always suppose the universe, an effect quite +singular and unparalleled, to be the proof of a Deity, a cause no less +singular and unparalleled; your reasonings, upon that supposition, seem, +at least, to merit our attention. There is, I own, some difficulty, how +we can ever return from the cause to the effect, and, reasoning from our +ideas of the former, infer any alteration on the latter, or any +addition to it. + + + +SECTION XII. + +OF THE ACADEMICAL OR SCEPTICAL PHILOSOPHY. + + +PART I. + + +116. There is not a greater number of philosophical reasonings, +displayed upon any subject, than those, which prove the existence of a +Deity, and refute the fallacies of _Atheists_; and yet the most +religious philosophers still dispute whether any man can be so blinded +as to be a speculative atheist. How shall we reconcile these +contradictions? The knights-errant, who wandered about to clear the +world of dragons and giants, never entertained the least doubt with +regard to the existence of these monsters. + +The _Sceptic_ is another enemy of religion, who naturally provokes the +indignation of all divines and graver philosophers; though it is +certain, that no man ever met with any such absurd creature, or +conversed with a man, who had no opinion or principle concerning any +subject, either of action or speculation. This begets a very natural +question; What is meant by a sceptic? And how far it is possible to push +these philosophical principles of doubt and uncertainty? + +There is a species of scepticism, _antecedent_ to all study and +philosophy, which is much inculcated by Des Cartes and others, as a +sovereign preservative against error and precipitate judgement. It +recommends an universal doubt, not only of all our former opinions and +principles, but also of our very faculties; of whose veracity, say they, +we must assure ourselves, by a chain of reasoning, deduced from some +original principle, which cannot possibly be fallacious or deceitful. +But neither is there any such original principle, which has a +prerogative above others, that are self-evident and convincing: or if +there were, could we advance a step beyond it, but by the use of those +very faculties, of which we are supposed to be already diffident. The +Cartesian doubt, therefore, were it ever possible to be attained by any +human creature (as it plainly is not) would be entirely incurable; and +no reasoning could ever bring us to a state of assurance and conviction +upon any subject. + +It must, however, be confessed, that this species of scepticism, when +more moderate, may be understood in a very reasonable sense, and is a +necessary preparative to the study of philosophy, by preserving a proper +impartiality in our judgements, and weaning our mind from all those +prejudices, which we may have imbibed from education or rash opinion. To +begin with clear and self-evident principles, to advance by timorous and +sure steps, to review frequently our conclusions, and examine accurately +all their consequences; though by these means we shall make both a slow +and a short progress in our systems; are the only methods, by which we +can ever hope to reach truth, and attain a proper stability and +certainty in our determinations. + +117. There is another species of scepticism, _consequent_ to science and +enquiry, when men are supposed to have discovered, either the absolute +fallaciousness of their mental faculties, or their unfitness to reach +any fixed determination in all those curious subjects of speculation, +about which they are commonly employed. Even our very senses are brought +into dispute, by a certain species of philosophers; and the maxims of +common life are subjected to the same doubt as the most profound +principles or conclusions of metaphysics and theology. As these +paradoxical tenets (if they may be called tenets) are to be met with in +some philosophers, and the refutation of them in several, they naturally +excite our curiosity, and make us enquire into the arguments, on which +they may be founded. + +I need not insist upon the more trite topics, employed by the sceptics +in all ages, against the evidence of _sense_; such as those which are +derived from the imperfection and fallaciousness of our organs, on +numberless occasions; the crooked appearance of an oar in water; the +various aspects of objects, according to their different distances; the +double images which arise from the pressing one eye; with many other +appearances of a like nature. These sceptical topics, indeed, are only +sufficient to prove, that the senses alone are not implicitly to be +depended on; but that we must correct their evidence by reason, and by +considerations, derived from the nature of the medium, the distance of +the object, and the disposition of the organ, in order to render them, +within their sphere, the proper _criteria_ of truth and falsehood. There +are other more profound arguments against the senses, which admit not of +so easy a solution. + +118. It seems evident, that men are carried, by a natural instinct or +prepossession, to repose faith in their senses; and that, without any +reasoning, or even almost before the use of reason, we always suppose an +external universe, which depends not on our perception, but would exist, +though we and every sensible creature were absent or annihilated. Even +the animal creation are governed by a like opinion, and preserve this +belief of external objects, in all their thoughts, designs, and actions. + +It seems also evident, that, when men follow this blind and powerful +instinct of nature, they always suppose the very images, presented by +the senses, to be the external objects, and never entertain any +suspicion, that the one are nothing but representations of the other. +This very table, which we see white, and which we feel hard, is believed +to exist, independent of our perception, and to be something external +to our mind, which perceives it. Our presence bestows not being on it: +our absence does not annihilate it. It preserves its existence uniform +and entire, independent of the situation of intelligent beings, who +perceive or contemplate it. + +But this universal and primary opinion of all men is soon destroyed by +the slightest philosophy, which teaches us, that nothing can ever be +present to the mind but an image or perception, and that the senses are +only the inlets, through which these images are conveyed, without being +able to produce any immediate intercourse between the mind and the +object. The table, which we see, seems to diminish, as we remove farther +from it: but the real table, which exists independent of us, suffers no +alteration: it was, therefore, nothing but its image, which was present +to the mind. These are the obvious dictates of reason; and no man, who +reflects, ever doubted, that the existences, which we consider, when we +say, _this house_ and _that tree_, are nothing but perceptions in the +mind, and fleeting copies or representations of other existences, which +remain uniform and independent. + +119. So far, then, are we necessitated by reasoning to contradict or +depart from the primary instincts of nature, and to embrace a new system +with regard to the evidence of our senses. But here philosophy finds +herself extremely embarrassed, when she would justify this new system, +and obviate the cavils and objections of the sceptics. She can no longer +plead the infallible and irresistible instinct of nature: for that led +us to a quite different system, which is acknowledged fallible and even +erroneous. And to justify this pretended philosophical system, by a +chain of clear and convincing argument, or even any appearance of +argument, exceeds the power of all human capacity. + +By what argument can it be proved, that the perceptions of the mind +must be caused by external objects, entirely different from them, though +resembling them (if that be possible) and could not arise either from +the energy of the mind itself, or from the suggestion of some invisible +and unknown spirit, or from some other cause still more unknown to us? +It is acknowledged, that, in fact, many of these perceptions arise not +from anything external, as in dreams, madness, and other diseases. And +nothing can be more inexplicable than the manner, in which body should +so operate upon mind as ever to convey an image of itself to a +substance, supposed of so different, and even contrary a nature. + +It is a question of fact, whether the perceptions of the senses be +produced by external objects, resembling them: how shall this question +be determined? By experience surely; as all other questions of a like +nature. But here experience is, and must be entirely silent. The mind +has never anything present to it but the perceptions, and cannot +possibly reach any experience of their connexion with objects. The +supposition of such a connexion is, therefore, without any foundation in +reasoning. + +120. To have recourse to the veracity of the supreme Being, in order to +prove the veracity of our senses, is surely making a very unexpected +circuit. If his veracity were at all concerned in this matter, our +senses would be entirely infallible; because it is not possible that he +can ever deceive. Not to mention, that, if the external world be once +called in question, we shall be at a loss to find arguments, by which we +may prove the existence of that Being or any of his attributes. + +121. This is a topic, therefore, in which the profounder and more +philosophical sceptics will always triumph, when they endeavour to +introduce an universal doubt into all subjects of human knowledge and +enquiry. Do you follow the instincts and propensities of nature, may +they say, in assenting to the veracity of sense? But these lead you to +believe that the very perception or sensible image is the external +object. Do you disclaim this principle, in order to embrace a more +rational opinion, that the perceptions are only representations of +something external? You here depart from your natural propensities and +more obvious sentiments; and yet are not able to satisfy your reason, +which can never find any convincing argument from experience to prove, +that the perceptions are connected with any external objects. + +122. There is another sceptical topic of a like nature, derived from the +most profound philosophy; which might merit our attention, were it +requisite to dive so deep, in order to discover arguments and +reasonings, which can so little serve to any serious purpose. It is +universally allowed by modern enquirers, that all the sensible qualities +of objects, such as hard, soft, hot, cold, white, black, &c. are merely +secondary, and exist not in the objects themselves, but are perceptions +of the mind, without any external archetype or model, which they +represent. If this be allowed, with regard to secondary qualities, it +must also follow, with regard to the supposed primary qualities of +extension and solidity; nor can the latter be any more entitled to that +denomination than the former. The idea of extension is entirely acquired +from the senses of sight and feeling; and if all the qualities, +perceived by the senses, be in the mind, not in the object, the same +conclusion must reach the idea of extension, which is wholly dependent +on the sensible ideas or the ideas of secondary qualities. Nothing can +save us from this conclusion, but the asserting, that the ideas of those +primary qualities are attained by _Abstraction_, an opinion, which, if +we examine it accurately, we shall find to be unintelligible, and even +absurd. An extension, that is neither tangible nor visible, cannot +possibly be conceived: and a tangible or visible extension, which is +neither hard nor soft, black nor white, is equally beyond the reach of +human conception. Let any man try to conceive a triangle in general, +which is neither _Isosceles_ nor _Scalenum_, nor has any particular +length or proportion of sides; and he will soon perceive the absurdity +of all the scholastic notions with regard to abstraction and +general ideas.[31] + + [31] This argument is drawn from Dr. Berkeley; and indeed most + of the writings of that very ingenious author form the best + lessons of scepticism, which are to be found either among + the ancient or modern philosopher, Bayle not excepted. He + professes, however, in his title-page (and undoubtedly with + great truth) to have composed his book against the sceptics as + well as against the atheists and free-thinkers. But that all + his arguments, though otherwise intended, are, in reality, + merely sceptical, appears from this, _that they admit of no + answer and produce no conviction_. Their only effect is to + cause that momentary amazement and irresolution and confusion, + which is the result of scepticism. + +123. Thus the first philosophical objection to the evidence of sense or +to the opinion of external existence consists in this, that such an +opinion, if rested on natural instinct, is contrary to reason, and if +referred to reason, is contrary to natural instinct, and at the same +time carries no rational evidence with it, to convince an impartial +enquirer. The second objection goes farther, and represents this opinion +as contrary to reason: at least, if it be a principle of reason, that +all sensible qualities are in the mind, not in the object. Bereave +matter of all its intelligible qualities, both primary and secondary, +you in a manner annihilate it, and leave only a certain unknown, +inexplicable _something_, as the cause of our perceptions; a notion so +imperfect, that no sceptic will think it worth while to contend +against it. + + +PART II. + + +124. It may seem a very extravagant attempt of the sceptics to destroy +_reason_ by argument and ratiocination; yet is this the grand scope of +all their enquiries and disputes. They endeavour to find objections, +both to our abstract reasonings, and to those which regard matter of +fact and existence. + +The chief objection against all _abstract_ reasonings is derived from +the ideas of space and time; ideas, which, in common life and to a +careless view, are very clear and intelligible, but when they pass +through the scrutiny of the profound sciences (and they are the chief +object of these sciences) afford principles, which seem full of +absurdity and contradiction. No priestly _dogmas_, invented on purpose +to tame and subdue the rebellious reason of mankind, ever shocked common +sense more than the doctrine of the infinitive divisibility of +extension, with its consequences; as they are pompously displayed by all +geometricians and metaphysicians, with a kind of triumph and exultation. +A real quantity, infinitely less than any finite quantity, containing +quantities infinitely less than itself, and so on _in infinitum_; this +is an edifice so bold and prodigious, that it is too weighty for any +pretended demonstration to support, because it shocks the clearest and +most natural principles of human reason.[32] But what renders the matter +more extraordinary, is, that these seemingly absurd opinions are +supported by a chain of reasoning, the clearest and most natural; nor is +it possible for us to allow the premises without admitting the +consequences. Nothing can be more convincing and satisfactory than all +the conclusions concerning the properties of circles and triangles; and +yet, when these are once received, how can we deny, that the angle of +contact between a circle and its tangent is infinitely less than any +rectilineal angle, that as you may increase the diameter of the circle +_in infinitum_, this angle of contact becomes still less, even _in +infinitum_, and that the angle of contact between other curves and their +tangents may be infinitely less than those between any circle and its +tangent, and so on, _in infinitum_? The demonstration of these +principles seems as unexceptionable as that which proves the three +angles of a triangle to be equal to two right ones, though the latter +opinion be natural and easy, and the former big with contradiction and +absurdity. Reason here seems to be thrown into a kind of amazement and +suspence, which, without the suggestions of any sceptic, gives her a +diffidence of herself, and of the ground on which she treads. She sees a +full light, which illuminates certain places; but that light borders +upon the most profound darkness. And between these she is so dazzled and +confounded, that she scarcely can pronounce with certainty and assurance +concerning any one object. + + [32] Whatever disputes there may be about mathematical points, + we must allow that there are physical points; that is, parts + of extension, which cannot be divided or lessened, either by + the eye or imagination. These images, then, which are present + to the fancy or senses, are absolutely indivisible, and + consequently must be allowed by mathematicians to be infinitely + less than any real part of extension; and yet nothing appears + more certain to reason, than that an infinite number of them + composes an infinite extension. How much more an infinite + number of those infinitely small parts of extension, which are + still supposed infinitely divisible. + +125. The absurdity of these bold determinations of the abstract sciences +seems to become, if possible, still more palpable with regard to time +than extension. An infinite number of real parts of time, passing in +succession, and exhausted one after another, appears so evident a +contradiction, that no man, one should think, whose judgement is not +corrupted, instead of being improved, by the sciences, would ever be +able to admit of it. + +Yet still reason must remain restless, and unquiet, even with regard to +that scepticism, to which she is driven by these seeming absurdities and +contradictions. How any clear, distinct idea can contain circumstances, +contradictory to itself, or to any other clear, distinct idea, is +absolutely incomprehensible; and is, perhaps, as absurd as any +proposition, which can be formed. So that nothing can be more +sceptical, or more full of doubt and hesitation, than this scepticism +itself, which arises from some of the paradoxical conclusions of +geometry or the science of quantity.[33] + + [33] It seems to me not impossible to avoid these absurdities + and contradictions, if it be admitted, that there is no such + thing as abstract or general ideas, properly speaking; but that + all general ideas are, in reality, particular ones, attached to + a general term, which recalls, upon occasion, other particular + ones, that resemble, in certain circumstances, the idea, + present to the mind. Thus when the term Horse is pronounced, we + immediately figure to ourselves the idea of a black or a white + animal, of a particular size or figure: But as that term is + also usually applied to animals of other colours, figures and + sizes, these ideas, though not actually present to the imagination, + are easily recalled; and our reasoning and conclusion proceed + in the same way, as if they were actually present. If this be + admitted (as seems reasonable) it follows that all the ideas of + quantity, upon which mathematicians reason, are nothing but + particular, and such as are suggested by the senses and + imagination, and consequently, cannot be infinitely divisible. + It is sufficient to have dropped this hint at present, without + prosecuting it any farther. It certainly concerns all lovers + of science not to expose themselves to the ridicule and + contempt of the ignorant by their conclusions; and this seems + the readiest solution of these difficulties. + +126. The sceptical objections to _moral_ evidence, or to the reasonings +concerning matter of fact, are either _popular_ or _philosophical_. The +popular objections are derived from the natural weakness of human +understanding; the contradictory opinions, which have been entertained +in different ages and nations; the variations of our judgement in +sickness and health, youth and old age, prosperity and adversity; the +perpetual contradiction of each particular man's opinions and +sentiments; with many other topics of that kind. It is needless to +insist farther on this head. These objections are but weak. For as, in +common life, we reason every moment concerning fact and existence, and +cannot possibly subsist, without continually employing this species of +argument, any popular objections, derived from thence, must be +insufficient to destroy that evidence. The great subverter of +_Pyrrhonism_ or the excessive principles of scepticism is action, and +employment, and the occupations of common life. These principles may +flourish and triumph in the schools; where it is, indeed, difficult, if +not impossible, to refute them. But as soon as they leave the shade, and +by the presence of the real objects, which actuate our passions and +sentiments, are put in opposition to the more powerful principles of our +nature, they vanish like smoke, and leave the most determined sceptic in +the same condition as other mortals. + +127. The sceptic, therefore, had better keep within his proper sphere, +and display those _philosophical_ objections, which arise from more +profound researches. Here he seems to have ample matter of triumph; +while he justly insists, that all our evidence for any matter of fact, +which lies beyond the testimony of sense or memory, is derived entirely +from the relation of cause and effect; that we have no other idea of +this relation than that of two objects, which have been frequently +_conjoined_ together; that we have no argument to convince us, that +objects, which have, in our experience, been frequently conjoined, will +likewise, in other instances, be conjoined in the same manner; and that +nothing leads us to this inference but custom or a certain instinct of +our nature; which it is indeed difficult to resist, but which, like +other instincts, may be fallacious and deceitful. While the sceptic +insists upon these topics, he shows his force, or rather, indeed, his +own and our weakness; and seems, for the time at least, to destroy all +assurance and conviction. These arguments might be displayed at greater +length, if any durable good or benefit to society could ever be expected +to result from them. + +128. For here is the chief and most confounding objection to _excessive_ +scepticism, that no durable good can ever result from it; while it +remains in its full force and vigour. We need only ask such a sceptic, +_What his meaning is? And what he proposes by all these curious +researches?_ He is immediately at a loss, and knows not what to answer. +A Copernican or Ptolemaic, who supports each his different system of +astronomy, may hope to produce a conviction, which will remain constant +and durable, with his audience. A Stoic or Epicurean displays +principles, which may not be durable, but which have an effect on +conduct and behaviour. But a Pyrrhonian cannot expect, that his +philosophy will have any constant influence on the mind: or if it had, +that its influence would be beneficial to society. On the contrary, he +must acknowledge, if he will acknowledge anything, that all human life +must perish, were his principles universally and steadily to prevail. +All discourse, all action would immediately cease; and men remain in a +total lethargy, till the necessities of nature, unsatisfied, put an end +to their miserable existence. It is true; so fatal an event is very +little to be dreaded. Nature is always too strong for principle. And +though a Pyrrhonian may throw himself or others into a momentary +amazement and confusion by his profound reasonings; the first and most +trivial event in life will put to flight all his doubts and scruples, and +leave him the same, in every point of action and speculation, with the +philosophers of every other sect, or with those who never concerned +themselves in any philosophical researches. When he awakes from his +dream, he will be the first to join in the laugh against himself, and to +confess, that all his objections are mere amusement, and can have no +other tendency than to show the whimsical condition of mankind, who must +act and reason and believe; though they are not able, by their most +diligent enquiry, to satisfy themselves concerning the foundation of +these operations, or to remove the objections, which may be raised +against them. + + +PART III. + + +129. There is, indeed, a more _mitigated_ scepticism or _academical_ +philosophy, which may be both durable and useful, and which may, in +part, be the result of this Pyrrhonism, or _excessive_ scepticism, when +its undistinguished doubts are, in some measure, corrected by common +sense and reflection. The greater part of mankind are naturally apt to +be affirmative and dogmatical in their opinions; and while they see +objects only on one side, and have no idea of any counterpoising +argument, they throw themselves precipitately into the principles, to +which they are inclined; nor have they any indulgence for those who +entertain opposite sentiments. To hesitate or balance perplexes their +understanding, checks their passion, and suspends their action. They +are, therefore, impatient till they escape from a state, which to them +is so uneasy: and they think, that they could never remove themselves +far enough from it, by the violence of their affirmations and obstinacy +of their belief. But could such dogmatical reasoners become sensible of +the strange infirmities of human understanding, even in its most perfect +state, and when most accurate and cautious in its determinations; such a +reflection would naturally inspire them with more modesty and reserve, +and diminish their fond opinion of themselves, and their prejudice +against antagonists. The illiterate may reflect on the disposition of +the learned, who, amidst all the advantages of study and reflection, are +commonly still diffident in their determinations: and if any of the +learned be inclined, from their natural temper, to haughtiness and +obstinacy, a small tincture of Pyrrhonism might abate their pride, by +showing them, that the few advantages, which they may have attained over +their fellows, are but inconsiderable, if compared with the universal +perplexity and confusion, which is inherent in human nature. In +general, there is a degree of doubt, and caution, and modesty, which, +in all kinds of scrutiny and decision, ought for ever to accompany a +just reasoner. + +130. Another species of _mitigated_ scepticism which may be of advantage +to mankind, and which may be the natural result of the Pyrrhonian doubts +and scruples, is the limitation of our enquiries to such subjects as are +best adapted to the narrow capacity of human understanding. The +_imagination_ of man is naturally sublime, delighted with whatever is +remote and extraordinary, and running, without control, into the most +distant parts of space and time in order to avoid the objects, which +custom has rendered too familiar to it. A correct _Judgement_ observes a +contrary method, and avoiding all distant and high enquiries, confines +itself to common life, and to such subjects as fall under daily practice +and experience; leaving the more sublime topics to the embellishment of +poets and orators, or to the arts of priests and politicians. To bring +us to so salutary a determination, nothing can be more serviceable, than +to be once thoroughly convinced of the force of the Pyrrhonian doubt, +and of the impossibility, that anything, but the strong power of natural +instinct, could free us from it. Those who have a propensity to +philosophy, will still continue their researches; because they reflect, +that, besides the immediate pleasure, attending such an occupation, +philosophical decisions are nothing but the reflections of common life, +methodized and corrected. But they will never be tempted to go beyond +common life, so long as they consider the imperfection of those +faculties which they employ, their narrow reach, and their inaccurate +operations. While we cannot give a satisfactory reason, why we believe, +after a thousand experiments, that a stone will fall, or fire burn; can +we ever satisfy ourselves concerning any determination, which we may +form, with regard to the origin of worlds, and the situation of nature, +from, and to eternity? + +This narrow limitation, indeed, of our enquiries, is, in every respect, +so reasonable, that it suffices to make the slightest examination into +the natural powers of the human mind and to compare them with their +objects, in order to recommend it to us. We shall then find what are the +proper subjects of science and enquiry. + +131. It seems to me, that the only objects of the abstract science or of +demonstration are quantity and number, and that all attempts to extend +this more perfect species of knowledge beyond these bounds are mere +sophistry and illusion. As the component parts of quantity and number +are entirely similar, their relations become intricate and involved; and +nothing can be more curious, as well as useful, than to trace, by a +variety of mediums, their equality or inequality, through their +different appearances. But as all other ideas are clearly distinct and +different from each other, we can never advance farther, by our utmost +scrutiny, than to observe this diversity, and, by an obvious reflection, +pronounce one thing not to be another. Or if there be any difficulty in +these decisions, it proceeds entirely from the undeterminate meaning of +words, which is corrected by juster definitions. That _the square of the +hypothenuse is equal to the squares of the other two sides_, cannot be +known, let the terms be ever so exactly defined, without a train of +reasoning and enquiry. But to convince us of this proposition, _that +where there is no property, there can be no injustice_, it is only +necessary to define the terms, and explain injustice to be a violation +of property. This proposition is, indeed, nothing but a more imperfect +definition. It is the same case with all those pretended syllogistical +reasonings, which may be found in every other branch of learning, except +the sciences of quantity and number; and these may safely, I think, be +pronounced the only proper objects of knowledge and demonstration. + +132. All other enquiries of men regard only matter of fact and +existence; and these are evidently incapable of demonstration. Whatever +_is_ may _not be_. No negation of a fact can involve a contradiction. +The non-existence of any being, without exception, is as clear and +distinct an idea as its existence. The proposition, which affirms it not +to be, however false, is no less conceivable and intelligible, than that +which affirms it to be. The case is different with the sciences, +properly so called. Every proposition, which is not true, is there +confused and unintelligible. That the cube root of 64 is equal to the +half of 10, is a false proposition, and can never be distinctly +conceived. But that Caesar, or the angel Gabriel, or any being never +existed, may be a false proposition, but still is perfectly conceivable, +and implies no contradiction. + +The existence, therefore, of any being can only be proved by arguments +from its cause or its effect; and these arguments are founded entirely +on experience. If we reason _a priori_, anything may appear able to +produce anything. The falling of a pebble may, for aught we know, +extinguish the sun; or the wish of a man control the planets in their +orbits. It is only experience, which teaches us the nature and bounds of +cause and effect, and enables us to infer the existence of one object +from that of another[34]. Such is the foundation of moral reasoning, +which forms the greater part of human knowledge, and is the source of +all human action and behaviour. + + [34] That impious maxim of the ancient philosophy, _Ex nihilo, + nihil fit_, by which the creation of matter was excluded, + ceases to be a maxim, according to this philosophy. Not only the + will of the supreme Being may create matter; but, for aught we + know _a priori_, the will of any other being might create it, + or any other cause, that the most whimsical imagination + can assign. + +Moral reasonings are either concerning particular or general facts. All +deliberations in life regard the former; as also all disquisitions in +history, chronology, geography, and astronomy. + +The sciences, which treat of general facts, are politics, natural +philosophy, physic, chemistry, &c. where the qualities, causes and +effects of a whole species of objects are enquired into. + +Divinity or Theology, as it proves the existence of a Deity, and the +immortality of souls, is composed partly of reasonings concerning +particular, partly concerning general facts. It has a foundation in +_reason_, so far as it is supported by experience. But its best and most +solid foundation is _faith_ and divine revelation. + +Morals and criticism are not so properly objects of the understanding as +of taste and sentiment. Beauty, whether moral or natural, is felt, more +properly than perceived. Or if we reason concerning it, and endeavour to +fix its standard, we regard a new fact, to wit, the general tastes of +mankind, or some such fact, which may be the object of reasoning +and enquiry. + +When we run over libraries, persuaded of these principles, what havoc +must we make? If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or school +metaphysics, for instance; let us ask, _Does it contain any abstract +reasoning concerning quantity or number?_ No. _Does it contain any +experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence?_ No. +Commit it then to the flames: for it can contain nothing but sophistry +and illusion. + + + + +INDEX + + +Abstraction + not source of ideas of primary qualities, 122. + +Academic + philosophy, 34. + +Action + and philosophy, 1, 4, 34, 128; + +Addition + 4. + +Analogy + a species of, the foundation of all reasoning about matter of fact, + 82; + +Animals + the reason of, 83-85; + learn from experience and draw inferences, 83; + which can only be founded on custom, 84; + cause of difference between men and animals, 84 n. + +Antiquity + 62. + +Appearances + to senses must be corrected by reason, 117. + +A priori + 25, 36 n, 89 n, 132, 132 n. + +Aristotle + 4. + +Association + of ideas, three principles of, 18-19, 41-44 (v. _Cause_ C). + +Atheism + 116. + + +Bacon + 99. + +Belief + (v. _Cause_ C, 39-45); + and chance, 46. + +Berkeley + really a sceptic, 122 n. + +Bigotry + 102. + +Body + and soul, mystery of union of, 52; + volition and movements of, 52. + + Real existence of (v. _Scepticism_, B, 118-123). + + +Cause + first (v. _God_, _Necessity_, 78-81; _Providence_, + 102-115, 132 n). + a principle of association of ideas, 19, 43; + sole foundation of reasonings about matter of fact or real existence, + 22. + + A. _Knowledge of Causes arises from experience not from Reason_, + 23-33. + + Reasonings _a priori_ give no knowledge of cause and effect, + 23 f.; + impossible to see the effect in the cause since they are totally + different, 25; + natural philosophy never pretends to assign ultimate causes, but only + to reduce causes to a few general causes, e.g. gravity, 26; + geometry applies laws obtained by experience, 27. + + Conclusions from experience not based on any process of the + understanding, 28; + yet we infer in the future a similar connexion between known + qualities of things and their secret powers, to that which + we assumed in the past. On what is this inference based? 29; + demonstrative reasoning has no place here, and all experimental + reasoning assumes the resemblance of the future to the past, + and so cannot prove it without being circular, 30, 32; + if reasoning were the basis of this belief, there would be no need + for the multiplication of instances or of long experience, + 31; + yet conclusions about matter of fact are affected by experience even + in beasts and children, so that they cannot be founded on + abstruse reasoning, 33; + to explain our inferences from experience a principle is required of + equal weight and authority with reason, 34. + + B. _Custom enables us to infer existence of one object from the + appearance of another_, 35-38. + + Experience enables us to ascribe a more than arbitrary connexion to + objects, 35; + we are determined to this by custom or habit which is the great guide + of human life, 36; + but our inference must be based on some fact present to the senses + or memory, 37; + the customary conjunction between such an object and some other + object produces an operation of the soul which is as + unavoidable as love, 38; + animals also infer one event from another by custom, 82-84; + and in man as in animals experimental reasoning depends on a species + of instinct or mechanical power that acts in us unknown to + ourselves, 85. + + C. _Belief_, 39-45. + Belief differs from fiction or the loose reveries of the fancy by + some feeling annexed to it, 39; + belief cannot be defined, but may be described as a more lively, + forcible, firm, steady conception of an object than can be + attained by the imagination alone, 40; + it is produced by the principles of association, viz. resemblance, + 41; + contiguity, 42; + causation, 43; + by a kind of pre-established harmony between the course of nature + and our ideas, 44; + this operation of our minds necessary to our subsistence and so + entrusted by nature to instinct rather than to reasoning, 45. + + _Probability_, 46-7. + + Belief produced by a majority of chances by an inexplicable + contrivance of Nature, 46 (cf. 87-8); + probability of causes: the failure of a cause ascribed to a secret + counteracting cause, 47 (cf. 67); + it is universally allowed that chance when strictly examined is a + mere negative word, 74. + + D. _Power_, 49-57. + + Power, force, energy, necessary connexion must either be defined by + analysis or explained by production of the impression from + which they are copied, 49; + from the first appearance of an object we cannot foretell its effect: + we cannot see the power of a single body: we only see + sequence, 50. + + Is the idea of power derived from an internal impression and is it an + idea of reflection? 51; + it is not derived, as Locke said, from reasoning about power of + production in nature, 50 n; + nor from consciousness of influence of will over bodily organs, 52; + nor from effort to overcome resistance, 52 n (cf. 60 n); + nor from influence of will over mind, 53; + many philosophers appeal to an invisible intelligent principle, to a + volition of the supreme being, and regard causes as only + occasions and our mental conceptions as revelations, 54-5; + thus diminishing the grandeur of God, 56; + this theory too bold and beyond verification by our faculties, and + is no explanation, 57; + vis inertiae, 57 n. + + In single instances we only see sequence of loose events which are + conjoined and never connected, 58; + the idea of necessary connexion only arises from a number of similar + instances, and the only difference between such a number and + a single instance is that the former produces a habit of + expecting the usual attendant, 59, 61. + This customary transition is the impression from which we form the + idea of necessary connexion. + + E. _Reasoning from effect to cause and conversely_, 105-115 (v. + _Providence_). + + In arguing from effect to cause we must not infer more qualities in + the cause than are required to produce the effect, nor reason + backwards from an inferred cause to new effects, 105-8; + we can reason back from cause to new effects in the case of human + acts by analogy which rests on previous knowledge, 111-2; + when the effect is entirely singular and does not belong to any + species we cannot infer its cause at all, 115. + + F. _Definitions of Cause_, 60 (cf. 74 n). + +Ceremonies + 41. + +Chance + ignorance of causes, 46; + has no existence, 74 (v. _Cause_ B). + +Cicero + 4. + +Circle + in reasoning, 30. + +Clarke + 37 n. + +Colour + peculiarity of ideas of, 16. + +Contiguity + 19, 42. + +Contradiction + the test of demonstration, 132. + +Contrariety + 19 n. + +Contrary + of matter of fact always possible, 21, 132. + +Creation + 132 n. + +Criticism + 132. + +Cudworth + 57 n, 158 n. + +Custom + when strongest conceals itself, 24; + an ultimate principle of all conclusions from experience, 36, 127; + and belief, 39-45; + gives rise to inferences of animals, 84. + + +Definition + only applicable to complex ideas, 49; + need of, 131; + of cause, 60. + +Demonstrative + opp. intuitive, 20; + reasoning, 30; + confined to quantity and number, 131; + impossible to demonstrate a fact since no negation of a fact can + involve a contradiction, 132. + +Descartes + 57 n.; + his universal doubt antecedent to study if strictly taken is + incurable, since even from an indubitable first principle no + advance can be made except by the faculties which we doubt, + 116; + his appeal to the veracity of God is useless, 120 (v. _Scepticism_, + 116-132). + +Design + argument from, 105 f. (v. _Providence_). + +Divisibility + of mathematical and physical points, 124. + +Doubt + Cartesian, 116, 120 (v. _Scepticism_ A). + + +Epictetus + 34. + +Epicurean + philosophy, defence of, 102-15; + denial of providence and future state is harmless, 104 (v. + _Providence_). + +Euclid + truths in, do not depend on existence of circles or triangles, 20. + +Evidence + moral and natural, 70; + value of human, 82-9 (v. _Miracles_). + +Evil + doctrine of necessity either makes God the cause of evil or denies + existence of evil as regards the whole, 78-81. + +Existence + external and perception, 118-9 (v. _Scepticism_, B, 116-32). + +Ex nihilo nihil + 132 n. + +Experience + (v. _Cause_ A, 23-33); + opposition of reason and experience usual, but really erroneous and + superficial, 36 n. + + Infallible, may be regarded as proof, 87 (v. _Miracles_); + all the philosophy and religion in the world cannot carry us beyond + the usual course of experience, 113. + +Extension + 50; + a supposed primary quality, 122. + + +Faith + 101, 132. + +Fiction + and fact (v. _Cause_ C), 39 f. + +Future + inference to, from past, 29 (v. _Cause_ A). + + +General + ideas, do not really exist, but only particular ideas attached to a + general term, 125 n. + +Geography + mental, 8. + +Geometry + propositions of certain, as depending only on relations of ideas not + on existence of objects, 20; + gives no knowledge of ultimate causes: only applies laws discovered + by experience, 27. + +God + idea of, 14; + no idea of except what we learn from reflection on our own + faculties, 57; + theory that God is cause of all motion and thought, causes being + only occasions of his volition, 54-57; + by doctrine of necessity either there are no bad actions or God is + the cause of evil, 78-81. + + Veracity of, appealed to, 120. + + And creation of matter, 132 n. + + v. _Providence_, 102-115; _Scepticism_, 116-132. + +Golden + age, 107. + +Gravity + 26. + + +Habit + (v. _Custom_, _Cause_ B). + +History + use of, 65. + +Human + nature, inconstancy a constant character of, 68. + + +Ideas + A. _Origin of_, 11-17. + + Perceptions divided into impressions and ideas, 11-12; + the mind can only compound the materials derived from outward or + inward sentiment, 13 (cf. 53); + all ideas resolvable into simple ideas copied from precedent + feelings, 14; + deficiency in an organ of sensation produces deficiency in + corresponding idea, 15-16; + suspected ideas to be tested by asking for the impression from + which it is derived, 17 (cf. 49); + idea of reflection, 51; + general ideas, 135 n; + innate ideas, 19 n; + power of will over ideas, 53. + + B. _Association of_, 18-19. + + Ideas introduce each other with a certain degree of method and + regularity, 18; + only three principles of association, viz. Resemblance, Contiguity, + and Cause or Effect, 19; + contrariety, 19 n; + production of belief by these principles, 41-43. + + C. Correspondence of ideas and course of nature, 44; + relations of ideas one of two possible objects of enquiry, 20; + such relations discoverable by the mere operation of thought, 20, + 131; + no demonstration possible except in case of ideas of quantity or + number, 131. + +Imagination + 11, 39; + and belief, 40. + +Impressions + all our more lively perceptions, 12; + the test of ideas, 17, 49. + +Incest + peculiar turpitude of explained, 12. + +Inconceivability + of the negative, 132 (cf. 20). + +Inertia + 57 n. + +Inference + and similarity, 30, 115 (v. _Cause_). + +Infinite + divisibility, 124 f. + +Instances + multiplication of not required by reason, 31. + +Instinct + more trustworthy than reasoning, 45; + the basis of all experimental reasoning, 85; + the basis of realism, 118, 121. + +Intuitive + opp. mediate reasoning, 2. + + +La Bruyere + 4. + +Liberty + (v. _Necessity_, 62-97). + Definition of hypothetical liberty, 73. + Necessary to morality, 77. + +Locke + 4, 40 n, 50 n, 57 n. + His loose use of 'ideas,' 19 n; + betrayed into frivolous disputes about innate ideas by the + School-men, 19 n; + distinction of primary and secondary qualities, 122. + + +Malebranche + 4, 57 n.. + +Man + a reasonable and active being, 4. + +Marriage + rules of, based on and vary with utility, 118. + +Mathematics + ideas of, clear and determinate, hence their superiority to moral + and metaphysical sciences, 48; + their difficulty, 48. + + Mathematical and physical points, 124 n. + +Matter + necessity of, 64; + creation of, 132 n (v. _Scepticism_ A). + +Matter-of-fact + contrary of, always possible, 21; + arguments to new, based only on cause and effect, 22. + +Metaphysics + not a science, 5-6; + how inferior and superior to mathematics, 48. + +Mind + mental geography, 8; + secret springs and principles of, 9; + can only mix and compound materials given by inward and outward + sentiment, 13; + power of will over, 53. + +Miracles. + 86-101. + + Belief in human evidence diminishes according as the event witnessed + is unusual or extraordinary, 89; + difference between extraordinary and miraculous, 89 n; + if the evidence for a miracle amounted to proof we should have one + proof opposed by another proof, for the proof against a + miracle is as complete as possible; + an event is not miraculous unless there is a uniform experience, + that is a proof, against it, 90; + definition of miracle, 90 n; + hence no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle unless its + falsehood would be more miraculous than the event it + establishes, 91; + as a fact the evidence for a miracle has never amounted to proof, 92; + the passion for the wonderful in human nature, 93; + prevalence of miracles in savage and early periods and their + diminution with civilization, 94; + the evidence for miracles in matters of religion opposed by the + almost infinite number of witnesses for rival religions, 95; + value of human testimony diminished by temptation to pose as a + prophet or apostle, 97; + no testimony for a miracle has ever amounted to a probability, much + less to a proof, and if it did amount to a proof it would be + opposed by another perfect proof, 98; + so a miracle can never be proved so as to be the foundation of a + system of religion, 99; + a conclusion which confounds those who base the Christian religion + on reason, not on faith, 100; + the Christian religion cannot be believed without a miracle which + will subvert the principle of a man's understanding and give + him a determination to believe what is most contrary to + custom and experience, 101. + +Moral + evil (q.v.) 80. + +Moral science + 30; + inferior to mathematics, 48; + sceptical objections to, 126-7. + + Moral evidence easily combined with natural, 70. + +Motion + 50. + + +Nature + design in, 105 f. (v. _Providence_), + and the course of our ideas, 44. + + State of, a philosophical fiction, 151, 151 n. + +Necessary + connexion (v. _Cause_). + +Necessity + two definitions of, 75. + + A. _and Liberty_, 62-81; + the controversy is based on ambiguity, and all mankind have always + been of the same opinion on this subject, 63; + our idea of the necessity of matter arises solely from observed + uniformity and consequent inference, circumstances which are + allowed by all men to exist in respect of human action, 64; + history and knowledge of human nature assume such uniformity, 65, + which does not exclude variety due to education and progress, 66; + irregular actions to be explained by secret operation of contrary + causes, 67; + the inconstancy of human action, its constant character, as of winds + and weather, 68; + we all acknowledge and draw inferences from the regular conjunction + of motives and actions, 69; + history, politics, and morals show this, and the possibility of + combining moral and natural evidence shows that they have a + common origin, 70; + the reluctance to acknowledge the necessity of actions due to a + lingering belief that we can see real connexion behind mere + conjunction, 71; + we should begin with the examination not of the soul and will but of + brute matter, 72; + the prevalence of the liberty doctrine due to a false sensation of + liberty and a false experiment, 72 n; + though this question is the most contentious of all, mankind has + always agreed in the doctrine of liberty, if we mean by it + that hypothetical liberty which consists in a power of + acting or not acting according to the determinations of our + will, and which can be ascribed to every one who is not a + prisoner, 73; + liberty when opposed to necessity, and not merely to constraint, is + the same as chance, 74. + + B. _Both necessity and liberty are necessary to morality_, this + doctrine of necessity only alters our view of matter and so + is at least innocent, 75; + rewards and punishments imply the uniform influence of motives, and + connexion of character and action: if necessity be denied, + a man may commit any crime and be no worse for it, 76; + liberty also essential to morality, 77. + + Objection that doctrine of necessity and of a regular chain of + causes either makes God the cause of evil, or abolishes evil + in actions, 78; + Stoic answer, that the whole system is good, is specious but + ineffectual in practice, 79; + no speculative argument can counteract the impulse of our natural + sentiments to blame certain actions, 80; + how God can be the cause of all actions without being the author of + moral evil is a mystery with which philosophy cannot deal, + 81. + +Negative + inconceivability of, 132. + +Newton + 57 n. + +Nisus + 52 n, 60 n. + +Number + the object of demonstration, 131. + + +Occasional causes + theory of, 55. + + +Parallelism + between thought and course of nature, 44-5. + +Perception + and external objects, 119 f. (v. _Scepticism_, _Impression_, + _Idea_). + +Philosophy + moral, two branches of, abstruse and practical, 1-5; + gratifies innocent curiosity, 6; + metaphysics tries to deal with matters inaccessible to human + understanding, 6. + + True, must lay down limits of understanding, 7 (cf. 113); + a large part of, consists in mental geography, 8; + may hope to resolve principles of mind into still more general + principles, 9. + + Natural, only staves off our ignorance a little longer, as moral or + metaphysical philosophy serves only to discover larger + portions of it, 26; + academical, or sceptical, flatters no bias or passion except love of + truth, and so has few partisans, 34; + though it destroy speculation, cannot destroy action, for nature + steps in and asserts her rights, 34; + moral, inferior to mathematics in clearness of ideas, superior in + shortness of arguments, 48. + + Controversies in, due to ambiguity of terms, 62. + + Disputes in, not be settled by appeal to dangerous consequences of a + doctrine, 75. + + Speculative, entirely indifferent to the peace of society and + security of government, 104 (cf. 114). + + All the philosophy in the world, and all the religion in the world, + which is nothing but a species of philosophy, can never + carry us beyond the usual course of experience, 113. + + Happiness of, to have originated in an age and country of freedom + and toleration, 102. + +Points + physical, indivisible, 124 n. + +Power + 50 f, 60 n. (v. _Cause_ D). + +Probability + 46 f. (v. _Cause_, B). + +Probable + arguments, 38, 46 n. + +Production + 50 n. + +Promises + not the foundation of justice, 257. + +Proof + 46 n, 86-101 (v. _Miracles_, _Demonstrative_). + +Providence + 102-115 (v. _God_). + + The sole argument for a divine existence is from the marks of design + in nature; must not infer greater power in the cause than is + necessary to produce the observed effects, nor argue from + such an inferred cause to any new effects which have not + been observed, 105; + so must not infer in God more power, wisdom, and benevolence than + appears in nature, 106; + so it is unnecessary to try and save the honour of the Gods by + assuming the intractability of matter or the observance of + general laws, 107; + to argue from effects to unknown causes, and then from these causes + to unknown effects, is a gross sophism, 108. + + From imperfect exercise of justice in this world we cannot infer its + perfect exercise in a future world, 109; + we must regulate our conduct solely by the experienced train of + events, 110; + in case of human works of art we can infer the perfect from the + imperfect, but that is because we know man by experience and + also know other instances of his art, 111-112; + but in the case of God we only know him by his productions, and do + not know any class of beings to which he belongs, 113; + and the universe, his production, is entirely singular and does not + belong to a known species of things, 115. + +Punishment + requires doctrines of necessity and liberty, 76 (v. _Necessity_). + +Pyrrhonism + 126. + + +Qualities + primary and secondary, 122. + +Quantity + and number, the only objects of demonstration, the parts of them + being entirely similar, 131. + + +Real + presence, 86. + +Reality + and thought, 44. + +Realism + of the vulgar, 118. + +Reason + (a) opp. intuition, 29; + opp. experience, 28, 36 n. + + (b) Corrects sympathy and senses, 117. + No match for nature, 34. + + Fallacious, compared with instinct, 45. + + Of men and animals, 84 n. + + (c) attempts to destroy, by reasoning, 124; + objections to abstract reasoning, 124 f. (v. _Scepticism_). + + (d) _Reasoning_. + + Two kinds of, demonstrative and moral, 30, 46 n, 132; + moral, divided into general and particular, 132; + produces demonstrations, proofs, and probabilities, 46 n. + + Probable (v. _Cause_, 28-32). + +Relations + of ideas, discoverable by the mere operation of thought, + independently of the existence of any object, 20. + +Religion + a kind of philosophy, 113 (v. _Miracles, Providence_). + +Resemblance + 19, 41 (v. _Similarity_). + +Resistance + and idea of power, 53 n. + + +Scepticism + A. antecedent to study and philosophy, such as Descartes' universal + doubt of our faculties, would be incurable: in a more + moderate sense it is useful, 116 (cf. 129-30); + extravagant attempts of, to destroy reason by reasoning, 124. + + No such absurd creature as a man who has no opinion about anything + at all, 116; + admits of no answer and produces no conviction, 122 n. (cf. 34, 126, + 128). + + B. _As to the Senses_, 117-123. + + The ordinary criticisms of our senses only show that they have to be + corrected by Reason, 117; + more profound arguments show that the vulgar belief in external + objects is baseless, and that the objects we see are nothing + but perceptions which are fleeting copies of other + existences, 118; + even this philosophy is hard to justify; it appeals neither to + natural instinct, nor to experience, for experience tells + nothing of objects which perceptions resemble, 119; + the appeal to the _veracity of God_ is useless, 120; + and scepticism is here triumphant, 121. + + _The distinction between primary and secondary qualities_ is useless, + for the supposed primary qualities are only perceptions, 122; + and Berkeley's theory that ideas of primary qualities are obtained by + abstraction is impossible, 122, 122 n; + if matter is deprived of both primary and secondary qualities there + is nothing left except a mere something which is not worth + arguing about, 123. + + C. _As to Reason_, 124-130. + + Attempt to destroy Reason by reasoning extravagant, 124; + objection to _abstract reasoning_ because it asserts infinite + divisibility of extension which is shocking to common sense, + 124, + and infinite divisibility of time, 125; + yet the ideas attacked are so clear and distinct that scepticism + becomes sceptical about itself, 125. + + Popular objections to _moral reasoning_ about matter of fact, based + on weakness of understanding, variation of judgement, and + disagreement among men, confuted by action, 126; + philosophical objections, that we only experience conjunction and + that inference is based on custom, 127; + excessive scepticism refuted by its uselessness and put to flight by + the most trivial event in life, 128. + + Mitigated scepticism or academical philosophy useful as a corrective + and as producing caution and modesty, 129; + and as limiting understanding to proper objects, 130; + all reasoning which is not either abstract, about quantity and + number, or experimental, about matters of fact, is sophistry + and illusion, 132. + + D. In _Religion_ (v. _Miracles_, _Providence_). + +Sciences + 132 (v. _Reason_, (d); _Scepticism_, C). + +Secret + powers, 39; + counteracting causes, 47, 67. + +Senses + outward and inward sensation supplies all the materials of + thinking--must be corrected by reason, 117. + + Scepticism concerning, 117 (v. _Scepticism_, B). + +Similarity + basis of all arguments from experience, 31 (cf. 115). + +Solidity + 50; + a supposed primary quality, 122. + +Soul + and body, 52. + +Space + and time, 124 f. + +Species + an effect which belongs to no species does not admit of inference + to its cause, 115 (cf. 113). + +Stoics + 34, 79. + +Superstition + 6 (v. _Providence_). + + +Theology + science of, 132 (v. _God_, _Providence_). + +Tillotson + argument against real presence, 86. + +Time + and space, 124 f. + +Truth + 8, 17 (v. _Scepticism_). + + +Understanding + limits of human, 7; + operations of, to be classified, 8; + opp. experience, 28; + weakness of, 126 (v. _Reason_, _Scepticism_). + + +Voluntariness + as ground of distinction between virtues and talents, 130. + + +Whole + theory that everything is good as regards 'the whole,' 79, 80. + +Will + compounds materials given by senses, 13; + influence of over organs of body can never give us the idea of + power; for we are not conscious of any power in our will, + only of sequence of motions on will, 52; + so with power of will over our minds in raising up new ideas, 53. + + Of God, cannot be used to explain motion, 57. + + Freedom of (v. _Necessity_). + + + + + + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of An Enquiry Concerning Human +Understanding, by David Hume and L. 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