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diff --git a/old/7prep10.txt b/old/7prep10.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..45e72a4 --- /dev/null +++ b/old/7prep10.txt @@ -0,0 +1,15613 @@ +Project Gutenberg's Proportional Representation, by John H. Humphreys + +Copyright laws are changing all over the world. Be sure to check the +copyright laws for your country before downloading or redistributing +this or any other Project Gutenberg eBook. + +This header should be the first thing seen when viewing this Project +Gutenberg file. Please do not remove it. Do not change or edit the +header without written permission. + +Please read the "legal small print," and other information about the +eBook and Project Gutenberg at the bottom of this file. Included is +important information about your specific rights and restrictions in +how the file may be used. You can also find out about how to make a +donation to Project Gutenberg, and how to get involved. + + +**Welcome To The World of Free Plain Vanilla Electronic Texts** + +**eBooks Readable By Both Humans and By Computers, Since 1971** + +*****These eBooks Were Prepared By Thousands of Volunteers!***** + + +Title: Proportional Representation + A Study in Methods of Election + +Author: John H. Humphreys + +Release Date: January, 2006 [EBook #9630] +[Yes, we are more than one year ahead of schedule] +[This file was first posted on October 11, 2003] + +Edition: 10 + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION *** + + + + +Produced by Jonathan Ingram, Debra Storr and PG Distributed Proofreaders + + + + +PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION + +A STUDY IN METHODS OF ELECTION + +BY + +JOHN H. HUMPHREYS + +HON. SECRETARY, PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION SOCIETY + +WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY + +THE RT. HON. LORD COURTNEY OF PENWITH + +_First Published in 1911_ + +TO THE MEMORY OF + +CATHERINE HELEN SPENCE + +OF ADELAIDE + +AN UNWEARIED WORKER IN THE CAUSE OF REAL REPRESENTATION + +INTRODUCTION + +BY LORD COURTNEY OF PENWITH + +I believe this book will generally be welcomed as opportune. +Proportional Representation has made very rapid, almost startling +advances in recent years. In one shape or another it has been adopted in +many countries in Northern Europe, and there is a prospect of a most +important extension of this adoption in the reform of the parliamentary +institutions of France. Among ourselves, every political writer and +speaker have got some inkling of the central principle of proportional +representation, and not a few feel, sometimes with reluctance, that it +has come to stay, that it will indeed be worked into our own system when +the inevitable moment arrives for taking up again the reform of the +House of Commons. They know and confess so much among themselves, but +they want to be familiarized with the best machinery for working +proportional representation, and they would not be sorry to have the +arguments for and against its principles once more clearly examined so +that they may be properly equipped for the reception of the coming +change. This little book of Mr. Humphreys is just what they desire. The +author has no doubt about his conclusions, but he goes fairly and with +quite sufficient fulness through the main branches of the controversy +over proportional representation, and he explains the working of an +election under the system we must now regard as the one most likely to +be adopted among us. His qualifications for his work are indeed rare, +and his authority in a corresponding measure high. A convinced adherent +of proportional representation, he stimulated the revival of the Society +established to promote it. He was the chief organizer of the enlarged +illustrative elections we have had at home. He has attended elections in +Belgium and again in Sweden, and when the time came for electing +Senators in the colonies of South Africa, and Municipal Councils in +Johannesburg and Pretoria, the local governments solicited his +assistance in conducting them, and put on record their obligations for +his help. The reader can have no better guide in argument, no more +experienced hand in the explanation of machinery, and if I add that Mr. +Humphreys has done his work with complete mastery of his subject and +with conspicuous clearness of exposition, I need say no more in +recommendation of his book. + +It may be objected that the Royal Commission which issued its Report +last spring, did not recommend the incorporation of proportional +representation into our electoral system. This is most true. One member +indeed (Lord Lochee) did not shrink from this conclusion, but his +colleagues were unable to report that a case had been made out for the +adoption "here and now" of proportional representation. Their hesitancy +and the reasons they advanced as justifying it must lead many to a +conclusion opposite to their own. They themselves are indeed emphatic in +pressing the limitation "here and now" as qualifying their verdict. They +wish it to be most distinctly understood that they have no irresistible +objection to proportional representation. They indeed openly confess +that conditions may arise among ourselves at some future time which +would appear to be not necessarily distant, when the balance of +expediency may turn in favour of its adoption. They suggest "that some +need may become felt which can only be satisfied by proportional +representation in some form or another," and I do not think I +misrepresent their attitude in believing that a very small change of +circumstances might suffice to precipitate a reversal of their present +conclusion. All who are familiar with the conduct of political +controversies must recognize the situation thus revealed. Again and +again have proposals of reform been made which the wise could not +recommend for acceptance "here and now." They are seen to be good for +other folk; they fit into the circumstances of other societies; they may +have worked well in climates different from our own; nay, among +ourselves they might be tried in some auxiliary fashion separated from +the great use for which they have been recommended, but we will wait for +the proper moment of their undisguised general acceptance. It is in this +way that political ideas have been propagated, and it would be a mistake +if we were hastily to condemn what are sure and trusty lines of +progress. When the Royal Commissioners, after all their hesitations +about the intrusion of proportional representation even in the thinnest +of wedges into the House of Commons, go on to say that "there would be +much to be said in its favour as a method for the constitution of an +elected Second Chamber," and again, though admitting that this was +beyond their reference, express a pretty transparent wish that it might +be tried in municipal elections, the friends of the principle may well +be content with the line which the tide of opinion has reached. The +concluding words of this branch of the Report are scarcely necessary for +their satisfaction: "We need only add, that should it be decided at any +time to introduce proportional representation here for political +elections the change would be facilitated if experience had been gained +in municipal elections alike by electors and officials." + +A few words may be permitted in reference to the line of defence +advanced by the Commissioners against the inroad of proportional +representation. Mr. Humphreys has dealt with this with sufficient +fullness in Chapters X and XI which deal with objections to proportional +representation; and I refer the reader to what he has written on the +general subject. My own comment on the position of the Commissioners +must be short. Briefly stated, their position is that proportional +representation "cannot be recommended in a political election where the +question which party is to govern the country plays a predominant part," +and, as elsewhere they put it, "a general election is in fact considered +by a large portion of the electorate of this country as practically a +referendum on the question which of two governments shall be returned to +power." The first remark to be made upon this wonderful barrier is that +a general election avowedly cannot be trusted as a true referendum. It +produces a balance of members in favour of one party, though even this +may fail to be realized at no distant future, but the balance of members +may be and has been under our present system in contradiction to the +balance of the electors; or in other words, a referendum would answer +the vital question which party is to govern, in the opposite sense to +the answer given by a general election. This is so frankly admitted in +the Report that it is difficult to understand how the Commissioners can +recommend adherence to a process which they have proved to be a +delusion. Even on the bare question of ascertaining what government the +nation desires to see installed at Westminster, the present method is +found wanting, whilst the reformed plan, by giving us a reproduction in +miniature of the divisions of national opinion, would in the balance of +judgment of the microcosm give us the balance of judgment in the nation. +If a referendum is really wanted, a general election with single-member +constituencies does not give us a secure result, and an election under +proportional representation would ensure it. A different question +obviously disturbs many minds, to wit, the stability of a government +resting on the support of a truly representative assembly. Here again it +may be asked whether our present machinery really satisfies conditions +of stable equilibrium. We know they are wanting, and with the +development of groups among us, they will be found still more wanting. +The groups which emerge under existing processes are uncertain in shape, +in size, and in their combinations, and governments resting upon them +are infirm even when they appear to be strong. It is only when the +groups in the legislature represent in faithful proportion bodies of +convinced adherents returning them as their representatives that such +groups become strong enough to restore parliamentary efficiency and to +combine in the maintenance of a stable administration. It may require a +little exercise of political imagination to realize how the transformed +House of Commons would work, and to many the demonstration will only +come through a new experience to which they will be driven through the +failure of the existing apparatus. Meanwhile it may be suggested to +doubters whether their anxiety respecting the possible working of a +reformed House of Commons is not at bottom a distrust of freedom. They +are afraid of a House of chartered liberties, whereas they would find +the best security for stable and ordered progress in the self-adjustment +of an assembly which would be a nation in miniature. + +COURTNEY OF PENWITH + + +AUTHOR'S NOTE + +Current constitutional and electoral problems cannot be solved in the +absence of a satisfactory method of choosing representatives. An attempt +has therefore been made in the present volume to contrast the practical +working of various methods of election; of majority systems as +exemplified in single-member constituencies and in multi-member +constituencies with the block vote; of majority systems modified by the +use of the second ballot or of the transferable vote; of the earlier +forms of minority representation; and, lastly, of modern systems of +proportional representation. + +Care has been taken to ensure accuracy in the descriptions of the +electoral systems in use. The memorandum on the use of the single vote +in Japan has been kindly supplied by Mr. Kametaro Hayashida, the Chief +Secretary of the Japanese House of Representatives; the description of +the Belgian system of proportional representation has been revised by +Count Goblet d'Alviella, Secretary of the Belgian Senate; the account of +the Swedish system by Major E. von Heidenstam, of Ronneby; that of the +Finland system by Dr. J.N. Reuter, of Helsingfors; whilst the chapter on +the second ballot and the transferable vote in single-member +constituencies is based upon information furnished by correspondents in +the countries in which these systems are in force. The statistical +analyses of elections in the United Kingdom were prepared by Mr. J. +Booke Corbett, of the Manchester Statistical Society, whose figures were +accepted by the Royal Commission on Electoral Systems as representing +"the truth as correctly as circumstances will permit." + +The author is greatly indebted to his colleagues of the Proportional +Representation Society, Mr. J. Fischer Williams and Mr. Alfred J. Gray, +for the cordial assistance rendered by them in the preparation of this +book. Acknowledgments are also due to the editors of the _Times_, the +_Contemporary Review_, and the _Albany Review_, for permission to make +use of contributions to these journals. + +J.H.H. + + + + +CONTENTS + + +CHAPTER I + +THE HOUSE OF COMMONS AS AN EXPRESSION OF THE NATIONAL WILL + +The spread of Representative Government--The House of Commons and +sovereign power--The demand for complete sovereignty--Complete +sovereignty demands complete representation--Strengthening the +foundations of the House of Commons--The rise of a new party--The new +political conditions and electoral reform. + + +CHAPTER II + +THE DIRECT RESULTS OF MAJORITY SYSTEMS + +The exaggeration of majorities--The disfranchisement of minorities--The +under-representation of majorities--A "game of dice"--The importance of +boundaries--The "gerrymander"--The modern gerrymander--The "block" +vote--The election of the London County Council--The election of +aldermen of the London County Council--The election of Representative +Peers of Scotland--The Australian Senate--London Borough +Councils--Provincial Municipal Councils--Summary. + + +CHAPTER III + +THE INDIRECT RESULTS OF MAJORITY SYSTEMS + +False impressions of public opinion--become the basis of legislative +action--Loss of prestige by the House of Commons--Unstable +representation--Weakened personnel--Degradation of party strife--The +"final rally"--Bribery and "nursing"--The organization of victory--Party +exclusiveness--Mechanical debates--Disfranchisement of minorities in +bi-racial countries--Defective representation in municipal +bodies--Wasteful municipal finance--No continuity in administration--The +root of the evil. + + +CHAPTER IV + +THE REPRESENTATION OF MINORITIES + +The Limited vote--The Cumulative vote--The Single vote--The need of +minority representation. + + +CHAPTER V + +THE SECOND BALLOT AND THE TRANSFERABLE VOTE IN SINGLE-MEMBER +CONSTITUENCIES + +Three-cornered contests--The second ballot--Experience in Germany, +Austria, Belgium, France--The bargainings at second ballots in +France--The "Kuh-Handel" in Germany--The position of a deputy elected at +a second ballot--The Alternative vote--The Alternative or Contingent vote +in Queensland, in West Australia--Mr. Deakin's failure to carry the +Alternative vote--Probable effect of the Alternative vote in +England--The Alternative vote not a solution of the problem of +three-cornered contests. + + +CHAPTER VI + +PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION + +The essential features of a sound electoral method--Constituencies +returning several members--Proportional representation of the +electors--Experience in Denmark, Switzerland, Belgium, German States, +France, Holland, Finland, Sweden, Australasia, South Africa, Canada, +Oregon, The United Kingdom--The success of proportional representation +in practice--An election by miners. + + +CHAPTER VII + +THE SINGLE TRANSFERABLE VOTE + +Its present application--An English movement--The system in brief--Large +constituencies--The single vote--The vote made transferable--How votes +are transferred--The quota--A simple case--The transfer of surplus +votes--The elimination of the lowest unelected candidate--The +result--Different methods of transferring surplus votes: The Hare +method--The Hare-Clark method--The Gregory method--The Gove or Dobbs +method--The Model election of 1908--The counting of votes: general +arrangements--The first count--The quota--The transfer of surplus +votes--The elimination of unsuccessful candidates--The fairness of the +result--Improved arrangements in the Transvaal elections--Criticisms of +the single transferable vote--Effect of late preferences--Elimination of +candidates at the bottom of the poll--Quota representation the basis of +the system. + + +CHAPTER VIII + +LIST SYSTEMS OF PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. + +The Belgian electoral system--The Franchise--Compulsory voting--Partial +renewal of Chamber--The presentation of lists--The act of voting--The +allotment of seats to parties--The selection of the successful +candidates--A Belgian election, Ghent, 1908: the poll--The counting of +the votes--The final process--Public opinion favourable to the +system--The relation of the Belgian to other list systems--The different +methods of apportioning seats to lists--Criticism of the d'Hondt +rule--The formation of Cartels--The different methods of selecting +successful candidates--Panachage--The single vote and _case de +tete_--The limited and cumulative vote--Special characteristics of +Swedish and Finnish systems. + + +CHAPTER IX + +A COMPARISON OF LIST SYSTEMS WITH THE SINGLE TRANSFERABLE VOTE + +The influence of previous conditions--Party the basis of representation +in a list system--The freedom of the elector within the +party--Comparative accuracy--Panachage--Applicability to non-political +elections--Bye-elections--Relative simplicity of scrutiny. + + +CHAPTER X + +PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION AND PARTY GOVERNMENT + +Proportional representation and the two-party system--Burke's view of +party and party discipline--Narrow basis fatal to a large +party--Proportional representation and party discipline--"Free +questions" in Japan--The formation of groups--The formation of an +executive--A check on partisan legislation--Unlike the referendum, +proportional representation will strengthen the House of +Commons--Proportional representation facilitates legislation desired by +the nation--Proportional representation in Standing Committees--Taking +off the Whips--New political conditions. + + +CHAPTER XI + +OBJECTIONS TO PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION + +The question of practicability--The elector's task--The returning +officer's task--Time required for counting the votes--Fads and sectional +interests--The representation of localities--The member and his +constituents--Objections of party agents--Alleged difficulties in the +organization of elections--Alleged increase of cost--The accuracy of +representation--Summary. + + +CHAPTER XII + +THE KEY TO ELECTORAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM + +Electoral problems awaiting solution--Simplification of the +franchise--Redistribution--Should be automatic--Secures neither one vote +one value nor true representation--The problem simplified by +proportional representation--The case of Ireland--Three-cornered +contests--Partial adoption of proportional representation not +desirable--Proportional representation and democratic principles +--Constitutional reform--Federal Home Rule--Imperial Federation +--Conclusion. + + +APPENDICES + +APPENDIX I + +THE JAPANESE ELECTORAL SYSTEM--THE SINGLE NON-TRANSFERABLE VOTE + +Failure of single-member system--Multi-member constituencies: Single +Vote adopted 1900--Equitable results--The new system and party +organization--The position of independents--Public opinion and the new +system. + +APPENDIX II + +THE SECOND BALLOT: A NOTE ON THE GERMAN GENERAL ELECTIONS OF 1903 AND +1907 + +The effect of unequal constituencies on representation--The effect of +second ballots--Second ballots and the swing of the pendulum--The second +ballot and the representation of minorities--Summary. + +APPENDIX III + +THE SWEDISH SYSTEM OF PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION + +The former constitution of the two Chambers--The struggle for electoral +reform--The Swedish law of 1909--The Swedish system of proportional +representation--The allotment of seats to parties--The selection of the +successful candidates--Free voters and double candidatures--An election +at Carlskrona--The poll--The allotment of seats to parties--The +selection of the successful candidates--The election of +suppliants--Comparison with Belgian system--The system and party +organization--The great improvement effected by the Swedish system. + +APPENDIX IV + +THE FINLAND SYSTEM OF PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION + +The influence of the Belgian system--Schedules and "compacts" in place +of lists--An election in Nyland--Returning officer's task--The allotment +of seats--Successful candidates in the Nyland election--Equitable +results--Elector's freedom of choice. + +APPENDIX V + +STATISTICS OF THE GENERAL ELECTIONS, 1885-1910 + +Explanatory notes--The representation of minorities. + +APPENDIX VI + +PREFERENTIAL VOTING: THE TRANSFER OF SUPERFLUOUS VOTES + +I. The element of chance involved: Its magnitude. II. Method of +eliminating the chance element--Example. + +APPENDIX VII + +THE SINGLE TRANSFERABLE VOTE: SCHEDULE TO MUNICIPAL REPRESENTATION BILL, +1910 + +APPENDIX VIII + +THE SINGLE TRANSFERABLE VOTE: SCHEDULE TO TASMANIAN ELECTORAL ACT, 1907 + +APPENDIX IX + +THE SINGLE TRANSFERABLE VOTE: REGULATIONS FOR THE ELECTION OF SENATORS +UNDER THE SOUTH AFRICA ACT, 1909 + +APPENDIX X LIST SYSTEM: BILL PRESENTED TO THE FRENCH CHAMBER OF +DEPUTIES, 1907 + +APPENDIX XI + +LIST SYSTEM: LAW ADOPTED BY THE CANTON OF BALE TOWN, 1905 + +INDEX + + + + +"The object of our deliberation is to promote the good purposes for +which elections have been instituted, and to prevent their +inconveniences." + +--BURKE + + + + +CHAPTER I + +THE HOUSE OF COMMONS AS AN EXPRESSION OF THE NATIONAL WILL + +"The virtue, the spirit, the essence of the House of Commons, consists +in its being the express image of the nation."--BURKE. + + +"It is necessary," said Burke, "to resort to the theory of government +whenever you propose any alteration in the frame of it, whether that +alteration means the revival of some former antiquated and forsaken +constitution or state, or the introduction of some new improvement in +the commonwealth." The following chapters are a plea for an improvement +in our electoral methods, and although the suggested improvement and the +arguments with which it is supported are not new, yet it is desirable, +in the spirit of Burke's declaration, to preface the plea with some +reference to the main feature of our constitution. + +_The spread of representative government_. + +The outstanding characteristic of the British Constitution, its +fundamental principle, is now, if not fully so in Burke's time, the +government of the nation by its chosen representatives. Indeed, so much +is this the case that, in spite of the continued presence of elements +which are far from representative in character, originating in that +distant past when commoners had little, if any, political influence, the +British Constitution and Representative Government are almost synonymous +terms, and the "mother of parliaments" has given birth to so long a +succession of constitutions of which the cardinal principle is +representative government--the association of the governed with the +government--that we cannot now think of our House of Commons save as the +most complete expression of this principle. Nor, despite the criticisms, +many of them fully deserved, which have been directed against the +working of parliamentary institutions, has the House of Commons ceased +to be taken in other lands as a model to be reproduced in general +outline. New parliaments continue to arise and in the most unexpected +quarters. China is insistently demanding the immediate realisation of +full representative government. Japan has not only assimilated western +learning, but has adopted western representative institutions, and in +copying our electoral machinery has added improvements of her own. +Russia has established a parliament which, although not at present +elected upon a democratic basis, must inevitably act as a powerful check +upon autocracy, and in the process will assuredly seek that increased +authority which comes from a more complete identification with the +people. The Reichstag has demanded the cessation of the personal rule of +the German Emperor, and will not be content until, in the nation's name, +it exercises a more complete control over the nation's affairs. +Parliamentary government was recently established at Constantinople amid +the plaudits of the whole civilized world, and although the new regime +has not fulfilled all the hopes formed of it, yet upon its continuance +depends the maintenance of the improvements already effected in Turkey. +Lord Morley signalized his tenure of office as Secretary of State for +India by reforms that make a great advance in the establishment of +representative institutions. Some of these experiments may be regarded +as premature, but in the case of civilized nations there would appear to +be no going back; for them there is no alternative to democracy, and if +representative institutions have not yielded so far all the results that +were expected of them, progress must be sought in an improvement of +these institutions rather than in a return to earlier conditions. The +only criticism, therefore, of the House of Commons that is of practical +value must deal with those defects which experience has disclosed, and +with those improvements in its organization and composition which are +essential if in the future it is to discharge efficiently and adequately +its primary function of giving effect to the national will. + +_The House of Commons and sovereign power._ + +"The essential property of representative government," says Professor +Dicey, "is to produce coincidence between the wishes of the Sovereign +and the wishes of the subject.... This, which is true in its measure of +all real representative government applies with special truth to the +English House of Commons." [1] This conception of the House of Commons as +the central and predominant factor in the constitution, exercising +sovereign power because it represents the nation which it governs, has +been notably strengthened during the last fifty years. A change having +far-reaching consequences took place in 1861, when the repeal of the +paper duties was effected by a clause in the annual Bill providing for +the necessary reimposition of annual duties, a proceeding which deprived +the Lords of the opportunity of defeating the new proposal other than by +rejecting the whole of the measure of which it formed a part. This +example has since been followed by both the great parties of the State. +Sir William Harcourt embodied extensive changes in the Death Duties in +the Finance Bill of 1894; Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, in 1899, included +proposals for altering the permanent provisions made for the reduction +of the National Debt; Mr. Lloyd George, following these precedents, +included in the Finance Bill of 1909 important new taxes which, prior to +1861, would have been submitted to both Houses in the form of separate +Bills. The House of Commons, however, has not yet attained the position +of full unqualified sovereignty, for, whilst the relations between the +King and the Commons have been harmonised by making the King's Ministry +dependent upon that House, the decisions of the House of Lords are not +yet subject to the same control. The Lords successfully rejected the +Education, Licensing, and Plural Voting Bills, all of which were passed +by the Commons by large majorities during the Parliament of 1906-1909. +Further, it refused its consent to the Finance Bill of 1909 until the +measure had been submitted to the judgment of the country, and by this +action compelled a dissolution of Parliament.[2] + +_The demand for complete sovereignty._ + +These assertions of authority on the part of the House of Lords called +forth from the Commons a fresh demand for complete sovereignty--a demand +based on the ground that the House of Commons expresses the will of the +people, and that the rejection by the hereditary House of measures +desired by the nation's representatives is directly opposed to the true +principles of representative government. In consequence of the rejection +of the Education and Plural Voting Bills of 1906, Sir Henry +Campbell-Bannerman, in June 1907, moved in the House of Commons the +following resolution: "That, in order to give effect to the will of the +people as expressed by their elected representatives, it is necessary +that the power of the other House to alter or reject Bills passed by +this House, should be so restricted by law as to secure that within the +limit of a single Parliament the final decision of the Commons shall +prevail." The first clause of this resolution advances the claim already +referred to--that the House of Commons is the representative and +authoritative expression of the national will--and in support of this +claim Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman quoted the declaration of Burke, that +"the virtue, the spirit, the essence of the House of Commons consists in +its being the express image of the nation." In the Parliament elected in +January 1910, further resolutions were carried by the Commons defining +more precisely the proposed limitation of the legislative power of the +Lords. It was resolved[3] that the House of Lords should be disabled by +law from rejecting or amending a money Bill, and that any Bill other +than a money Bill which had passed the House of Commons in three +successive sessions should become law without the consent of the +House of Lords. + +These resolutions were embodied in the Parliament Bill, but the measure +was not proceeded with owing to the death of King Edward, and a +conference between the leaders of the two chief parties met for the +purpose of finding a settlement of the controversy by consent. The +conference failed, and the Government at once took steps to appeal to +the country for a decision in support of its proposals. Meanwhile the +House of Lords, which had already placed on record its opinion that the +possession of a peerage should no longer confer the right to legislate, +carried resolutions outlining a scheme for a new Second Chamber, and +proposing that disputes between the two Houses should be decided by +joint sessions, or, in matters of great gravity, by means of a +Referendum. The result of the appeal to the country (Dec. 1910) was in +favour of the Government. The Parliament Bill was re-introduced, and +this measure, if passed, will mark an important step in the realisation +of the demand of the Commons for complete sovereignty. + +_Complete sovereignty demands complete representation._ + +The Parliament Bill does not, however, contemplate the establishment of +single-chamber Government, and it would appear that complete sovereignty +is only claimed whilst the House of Lords is based upon the hereditary +principle. For the preamble of the Bill declares that "it is intended +to substitute for the House of Lords as it at present exists a Second +Chamber constituted on a popular instead of hereditary basis," and that +"provision will require hereafter to be made by Parliament in a measure +effecting such substitution for limiting and defining the powers of the +new Second Chamber." But whatever constitutional changes may take place, +the national will must remain the final authority in legislation, and +the ultimate position of the House of Commons in the constitution and in +public esteem will depend upon the confidence with which it can be +regarded as giving expression to that will. It cannot claim to be the +sole authority for legislation without provoking searching inquiries +into the methods of election by which it is brought into being. At a +General Election the citizens are asked to choose representatives who +shall have full power to speak in their name on all questions which may +arise during the lifetime of a Parliament. But, although invariably +there are several important questions before the country awaiting +decision, the elector is usually restricted in his choice to two +candidates, and it is obvious that this limited choice affords him a +most inadequate opportunity of giving expression to his views upon the +questions placed before him. There can be no guarantee that the +decisions of representatives so chosen are always in agreement with the +wishes of those who elected them. Even in the General Election of +December 1910, when every effort was made to concentrate public +attention upon one problem--the relations between the two Houses of +Parliament--the elector in giving his vote had to consider the probable +effect of his choice upon many other questions of first-class +importance--the constitution of a new Second Chamber, Home Rule for +Ireland, the maintenance of Free Trade, the establishment of an Imperial +Preference, Electoral Reform, the reversal or modification of the +Osborne Judgment, Payment of Members, Invalidity Insurance; in respect +of all of which legislative proposals might possibly be submitted to the +new Parliament. Obviously before the House of Commons can be regarded +with complete confidence as the expression of the national will, the +elector must be given a wider and more effective choice in the selection +of a representative. + +It is, however, contended by many politicians that the main object of a +General Election is not the creation of a legislature which shall give +expression to the views of electors on public questions. "A General +Election," says the Report of the Royal Commission on Electoral +Systems,[4] "is in fact considered by a large portion of the electorate +as practically a referendum on the question which of two Governments +shall be returned to power." But were this interpretation of a General +Election accepted it would destroy the grounds on which it is claimed +that the decisions of the Commons in respect of legislation shall +prevail "within the limit of a single Parliament." Some means should be +available for controlling the Government in respect of its legislative +proposals, and the history of the Unionist administrations of 1895-1906, +during which the House of Lords failed to exercise any such control, +demonstrated the need of a check upon the action of a House of Commons +elected under present conditions. Mr. John M. Robertson, whose +democratic leanings are not open to the least suspicion, has commented +in this sense upon the lack of confidence in the representative +character of the House of Commons. "Let me remind you," said he, "that +the state of things in which the Progressive party can get in on a tidal +movement of political feeling with a majority of 200, causes deep +misgivings in the minds of many electors.... Those who desire an +effective limitation of the power of the House of Lords and its ultimate +abolition, are bound to offer to the great mass of prudent electors some +measure of electoral reform which will give greater stability to the +results of the polls, and will make the results at a General Election +more in keeping with the actual balance of opinion in the country." [5] +The preamble of the Parliament Bill itself implies that the decisions of +the House of Commons may not always be in accordance with the national +wishes. It foreshadows the creation of a new Second Chamber, and the +only purpose which this chamber can serve is to make good the +deficiencies of the First. + +The fact that our electoral methods are so faulty that their results +produce in the minds of many electors deep misgivings as to the +representative character of the House of Commons must materially +undermine the authority of that House. All who desire the final and +complete triumph of representative institutions--a triumph that depends +upon their success in meeting the demands made upon them--all who are +anxious that the House of Commons shall not only maintain, but increase, +the prestige that has hitherto been associated with it, must, in the +face of possible constitutional developments, endeavour to strengthen +its position by making it in fact, as it is in theory, fully +representative of the nation. For Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's +quotation from Burke is double-edged, and may be expressed thus: "the +virtue, the spirit, the essence of the House of Commons departs as soon +as it ceases to be the express image of the nation." Such a House cannot +furnish an adequate basis of support for a Government. For the +Government which issues from it will not command public confidence. The +debates in the House in 1905, before the resignation of Mr. Balfour, +bore testimony to the fact that the strength and power of a Government +which, according to the theory of our constitution, depends upon the +number of its supporters in the House of Commons, in reality rests upon +its reputation with the country. There was quoted more than once with +excellent effect this dictum of Sir William Anson: "Ministers are not +only the servants of the Crown, they represent the public opinion of the +United Kingdom. When they cease to impersonate public opinion they +become a mere group of personages who must stand or fall by the +prudence and success of their actions. They have to deal with disorders +at home or hostile manifestations abroad; they would have to meet these +with the knowledge that they had not the confidence or support of the +country; and their opponents at home and abroad would know this too." [6] +The strength and stability of a democratic Government thus depend upon +its capacity to interpret the will of the country, and the support which +the House of Commons can give is of value only to the extent to which +that House reflects national opinion. The Commons, if it is to maintain +unimpaired its predominant position in the constitution, must make good +its claim to be the representative expression of the national will. The +measures for which it makes itself responsible must have behind them +that irresistible authority, the approval of the electorate. If then our +electoral methods fail to yield a fully representative House, and if, in +consequence, the House cannot satisfactorily fulfil its double function +of affording an adequate basis of support to the Government which +springs from it, and of legislating in accordance with the nation's +wishes, the resultant dissatisfaction and instability must give rise to +a demand for their improvement. The House of Commons must re-establish +itself upon surer foundations. + +_Strengthening the foundations of the House of Commons._ + +Each change in the constitution of the House of Commons--and its +foundations have been strengthened on more than one occasion--has been +preceded by a recognition of its failure to meet in full the +requirements of a representative chamber. Large changes have again and +again been made in consequence of such recognition since the day when +Burke alleged that its virtue lay in its being "the express image of the +nation." At the close of the eighteenth century, when these words were +spoken, it could be alleged with apparent truth that 306 members were +virtually returned by the influence of 160 persons.[7] The +consciousness that such a House could not be the express image of the +nation produced the Reform Bill of 1832, and a further recognition that +a still larger number of the governed must be associated with the +Government, produced the further changes of 1867 and of 1884, embodied +in measures significantly called Acts for the Representation of the +People. These changes, by conferring the franchise upon an ever-widening +circle of citizens, have, from one point of view, rendered the House of +Commons more fully representative of the nation at large. But even +whilst the process of extending the franchise was still in operation, it +was recognized that such extensions were not in themselves sufficient to +create a House of Commons that could claim to be a true expression of +the national will. The test of a true system of representation, laid +down by Mill in _Representative Government_, has never been successfully +challenged. It still remains the last word upon the subject, and, until +the House of Commons satisfies that test with reasonable approximation, +it will always be open to the charge that it is not fully +representative, and that in consequence its decisions lack the necessary +authority. "In a really equal democracy," runs the oft-quoted phrase, +"any and every section would be represented, not disproportionately, but +proportionately. A majority of the electors would always have a majority +of the representatives; but a minority of electors would always have a +minority of the representatives. Man for man, they would be as fully +represented as the majority." [8] + +Mill's philosophy finds but little favour in many quarters of political +activity to-day, and the rejection of his philosophy has induced many to +regard his views on representative government as of little value. Even +so staunch an admirer as Lord Morley of Blackburn has underestimated the +importance of Mill's declaration, for, in a recent appreciation of the +philosopher[9] he declared that Mill "was less successful in dealing +with parliamentary machinery than in the infinitely more important task +of moulding and elevating popular character, motives, ideals, and steady +respect for truth, equity and common sense--things that matter a vast +deal more than machinery." Yet Lord Morley, in his attempt to make a +beginning with representative institutions in India, found that +questions of electoral machinery were of the first importance; that +they, indeed, constituted his chief difficulty; and he was compelled in +adjusting the respective claims of Hindus and Muhammadans to have +recourse to Mill's famous principle--the due representation of +minorities. Mill, as subsequent chapters will show, understood what Lord +Morley seems to have insufficiently recognized, that the development or +repression of growth in popular character, motives and ideals, nay, the +successful working of representative institutions themselves, depends in +a very considerable degree upon electoral machinery. Its importance +increases with every fresh assertion of democratic principles, and the +constitutional issues raised during the Parliaments of 1906, 1910, and +1911 must involve a revision of our electoral methods before a complete +solution is attained. The demand on the part of the House of Commons for +complete sovereignty must evoke a counter demand that that House shall +make itself fully representative. + +_The rise of a new party._ + +But the relations which should subsist between the two Houses of +Parliament, whether the upper House is reformed or not, is not the only +question which is giving rise to a closer examination of the foundations +of the House of Commons. To this external difficulty there must be added +the internal, and in the future a more pressing, problem created by the +rise of a new organized party within the House of Commons itself. The +successive extensions of the franchise have given birth to new political +forces which are not content to give expression to their views along the +old channels of the two historic parties, and the growth of the Labour +Party must accelerate the demand for a more satisfactory electoral +method. For a system which fails in many respects to meet the +requirements of two political parties cannot possibly do justice to the +claims of three parties to fair representation in the House of Commons. +It is true that some statesmen regard the rise of a new party with fear +and trembling; they imagine that it forebodes the bankruptcy of +democratic institutions, the success of which, in their judgment, is +necessarily bound up with the maintenance of the two-party system. The +two-party system must indeed be a plant of tender growth if it depends +for existence upon the maintenance of antiquated electoral methods. But +those politicians who deprecate any change on the ground that +single-member constituencies afford the only means by which the +two-party system can be preserved, have failed to explain why this +electoral system has not prevented the growth of Labour parties in +Australia and in England, or why numerous parties and single-member +constituencies go hand in hand both in France and Germany. Single-member +constituencies may distort and falsify the representation of parties, +but they cannot prevent the coming of a new party if that party is the +outcome, the expression, of a new political force. + +_The new political conditions and electoral reform._ + +Why should the rise of a new party cause so much uneasiness? Can +democracy make no use of that increased diffusion of political +intelligence from which springs these new political movements? Mr. +Asquith takes no such pessimistic view. He, least, realises that our +present system is not necessarily the final stage in the development of +representative government. He does not imagine that, whilst we welcome +progress in all things else, we must at all costs adhere to the +electoral methods which have done duty in the past. Speaking at St. +Andrews, 19 February 1906, he declared that: "It was infinitely to the +advantage of the House of Commons, if it was to be a real reflection and +mirror of the national mind, that there should be no strain of opinion +honestly entertained by any substantial body of the King's subjects +which should not find there representation and speech. No student of +political development could have supposed that we should always go along +in the same old groove, one party on one side and another party on the +other side, without the intermediate ground being occupied, as it was in +every other civilized country, by groups and factions having special +ideas and interests of their own. If real and genuine and intelligent +opinion was more split up than it used to be, and if we could not now +classify everybody by the same simple process, we must accept the new +conditions and adapt our machinery to them, our party organization, our +representative system, and the whole scheme and form of our government." +This is not a chance saying, standing by itself, for a fortnight later, +speaking at Morley, Mr. Asquith added: "Let them have a House of Commons +which fully reflected every strain of opinion; that was what made +democratic government in the long run not only safer and more free, but +more stable." Mr. Asquith's statements take cognizance of the fact that +a great divergence between the theoretical and actual composition of the +House of Commons must make for instability, and his pronouncement is an +emphatic reinforcement of the arguments contained in the earlier portion +of this chapter. + +On a more important occasion, when replying to an influential deputation +of members of Parliament and others,[10] Mr. Asquith, with all the +responsibility which attaches to the words of a Prime Minister, made +this further statement: "I have said in public before now, and am +therefore only repeating an opinion which I have never ceased to hold, +namely, that there can be no question in the mind of any one familiar +with the actual operation of our constitutional system that it permits, +and I might say that it facilitates--but it certainly permits--a +minority of voters, whether in the country at large or in particular +constituencies, to determine the representation--the relative +representation in the one case of the whole nation, and the actual +representation in the other case of the particular +constituency--sometimes in defiance of the opinions and wishes of the +majority of the electors. The moment you have stated that as a fact +which cannot be disputed, and it cannot be contradicted by any one, you +have pointed out a flaw of a most serious character, and some might say +of an almost fatal character, when your constitutional and Parliamentary +system appears at the bar of judgment upon the issue whether or not it +does from the democratic point of view really carry out the first +principles of representative government. I therefore agree that it is +impossible to defend the rough and ready method which has been hitherto +adopted as a proper or satisfactory explanation of the representative +principle. It is not merely, as more than one speaker has pointed out, +that under our existing system a minority in the country may return a +majority of the House of Commons, but what more frequently happens, and +what I am disposed to agree is equally injurious in its results, is that +you have almost always a great disproportion in the relative size of the +majority and minority in the House of Commons as compared with their +relative size in the constituencies. That is the normal condition of our +House of Commons. I have had experience of some of the inconveniences +which result." In speaking at Burnley in support of the Parliament Bill +during the electoral campaign of December 1910, Mr. Asquith again laid +stress upon the need of making the House of Commons fully +representative. "It is," he said, "an essential and integral feature of +our policy ... that we shall go forward with the task of making the +House of Commons not only the mouthpiece but the mirror of the +national mind." + +There can be no doubt that the question of electoral methods must now +occupy a prominent place in all discussions which centre around the +purpose, efficiency and authority of the House of Commons. John Bright, +in addressing the people of Birmingham, on the eve of an election, +exhorted them to "bear in mind that you are going to make a machine +more important than any that is made in the manufactories of Birmingham +... a stupendous machine whose power no man can measure." [11] Can we +afford in the manufacture of such a machine to be content with rough and +ready methods of election? Accuracy and precision are being demanded +with ever-increasing force in all other departments of human activity; +on what grounds then can we in the most delicate of all--that of +government--refuse to recognize their value? The necessity of ensuring +the predominance of the House of Commons in our constitutional system, +the problem created by the rise of the Labour Party, the increased +recognition of the need of reform, cannot but contribute to one result. +The House of Commons will make itself more fully representative by the +adoption of more trustworthy electoral methods, and in so doing will not +only increase its stability and efficiency, but will render its +constitutional position impregnable. + +The indispensable preliminaries to any such change are, in the first +place, an analysis of the results, both direct and indirect, of existing +methods and, in the second place, a careful comparison of the +improvements possible. The subsequent chapters will be devoted to both +these aspects of the problem, for in the elucidation of the system most +suited to British conditions, the experience of those countries which, +faced with the necessity for change, have already introduced new methods +into their electoral systems, will be found to be of the highest value. + + +[Footnote 1: _The Law of the Constitution_, p. 81.] + +[Footnote 2: Our constitution is an ever-changing one, and had the +country endorsed the action of the Lords in withholding its assent to +the Finance Bill of 1909, a great blow would have been dealt to the +authority of the House of Commons. The Fabian Society, in its Manifesto +to members, issued on the eve of the election of January 1910, put this +aspect of the case very forcibly: "It may justly be claimed by the +Socialists that they have steadily refused to be misled by idle talk +about what is and what is not constitutional, and have recognized that +the only real constitution is the sum of the powers that are effectively +exercised in the country. If the House of Lords boldly refuses supply +and compels a dissolution, and the country, at the election, supports +the Lords, that support will make the action of the Lords constitutional +in spite of all paper denunciations by the defeated party" (_Fabian +News_, January 1910). + +The verdict of the country, as interpreted by the present mode of +election, condemned the action of the Lords by a substantial majority. +Yet the figures in Chap. II. p. 19, show by how small a turnover of +votes that judgment might have been reversed.] + +[Footnote 3: 14 April 1910.] + +[Footnote 4: Cd. 5163, par. 126.] + +[Footnote 5: Manchester Reform Club, 2 February 1909.] + +[Footnote 6: _The Law and Custom of the Constitution,_ p. 372.] + +[Footnote 7: Ibid., p. 124.] + +[Footnote 8: _Representative Government_, Chap. VII.] + +[Footnote 9: _The Times_, Literary Supplement, 18 May 1906.] + +[Footnote 10: 10 November 1908.] + +[Footnote 11: Thomas Hare, _The Election of Representatives_, p. 18] + + + + +CHAPTER II + +THE DIRECT RESULTS OF MAJORITY SYSTEMS + + +"I therefore agree that it is impossible to defend the rough and ready +method which has been hitherto adopted as a proper or satisfactory +explanation of the representative principle. It is not merely, as more +than one speaker has pointed out, that under our existing system a +minority in the country may return a majority of the House of Commons, +but what more frequently happens, and what I am disposed to agree is +equally injurious in its results, is that you have almost always a great +disproportion in the relative size of the majority and minority in the +House of Commons as compared with their relative size in the +constituencies." + +--THE RIGHT HON. H.H. ASQUITH[1] + +"English writers," says Mr. Archibald E. Dobbs, in the _Irish Year +Book_, 1909, "often write as if election by a bare majority was the only +natural or possible mode of election, as if it was like day and night, +seedtime and harvest; something fixed and in the nature of things, and +not to be questioned or examined or improved." The unquestioning habit +of our minds goes even farther than Mr. Dobbs suggests. For, although +prior to the Redistribution Act of 1885, every great town in the United +Kingdom, with the exception of London, was a parliamentary unit, yet the +system of single-member constituencies made general by that Act is now +regarded by many as another essential and permanent feature of the +English parliamentary system. But if, as this chapter proposes to show, +existing electoral methods may result, and have resulted, in a complete +travesty of representation, if these methods fail in every respect to +fulfil the requirements of a satisfactory electoral system, then neither +single-member constituencies nor the majority method of election can be +permitted to stand permanently in the way of effective improvement. + +_The exaggeration of majorities._ + +Since the Redistribution Act of 1885, when the system of single-member +constituencies was made general, there have been eight General +Elections, and these are amply sufficient to illustrate the working of +this system. A complete analysis of these elections, prepared by Mr. J. +Rooke Corbett, M.A., of the Manchester Statistical Society, appears in +Appendix V.[2] It will be sufficient for present purposes if attention +is directed to some of the more obvious of their lessons. The General +Elections of 1895, 1900, and 1906, resulted in the return to the House +of Commons of a number of representatives of the victorious party far in +excess of that to which their polling strength entitled them, and this +result, repeated three times in succession, has given rise to a +widespread belief that this system necessarily and always yields to the +victors an exaggerated majority. There is, however, no clear conception +of the extent to which these exaggerated majorities diverge from the +truth, and an examination of the figures is therefore desirable. Here +are the totals for the General Elections of 1900 and 1906:[3]-- + + +GENERAL ELECTION, 1900 + +Parties. Votes Seats Seats in + Obtained. Obtained. proportion + to Votes. + +Unionists 2,548,736 402 343 +Home Rulers 2,391,319 268 327 + +Majorities 157,417 134 16 +GENERAL ELECTION, 1906 + +Parties. Votes Seats Seats in + Obtained. Obtained. proportion + to Votes. +Ministerialists 3,395,811 513 387 +Unionists 2,494,794 157 283 + +Majorities 901,017 356 104 + + +It will be seen that in the General Election of 1900 the Unionists +obtained a majority of 134, but that if parties had been represented in +proportion to their polling strength this majority would have been 16, +whilst the majority of 356 obtained at the General Election of 1906 by +the Ministerialists (in which term, for the purposes of comparison, all +members of the Liberal, Labour and Nationalist parties are included) +would, under similar conditions, have been a majority of 104 only. The +very important change in public opinion disclosed by the polls at the +second of these elections was not nearly sufficient to justify the +enormous displacement that took place in the relative party strengths +within the House of Commons. The extent of the possible displacement in +representation may be more fully realised from a consideration of the +figures for Great Britain, for the representation of Ireland, where +parliamentary conditions have become stereotyped, is but little affected +at any election. An increase in the Liberal vote from 2,073,116 to +3,093,978--an increase of 50 per cent.--resulted in a change in the +number of representatives from 186 to 428, an increase of 130 per cent., +whilst a decrease in the Conservative vote from 2,402,740 to +2,350,086--a decline of little more than 2 per cent.--resulted in a +reduction in representation from 381 to 139 members, a decline of 63 per +cent. The displacement was even more pronounced in London, where the +number of Liberal members rose from 8 to 40, and the number of +Conservative members fell from 52 to 20. The violence of these changes +was attributed to a similar change on the part of the electors, but it +was much more largely due to an electoral method that exaggerates any +changes in public opinion beyond all reason. + +If, however, the results--not of two but of the eight General Elections, +1885-1910--are considered it will be seen that the current belief, that +the single-member system invariably yields a large majority, rests on a +very precarious foundation. The General Election of 1892, for example, +gave to the Liberals (inclusive of the Nationalists) a majority of 44 +only. In England (which, excluding Wales and Monmouth, returns 461 +members) the Conservatives in 1895 and 1900 had majorities of 233 and +213; in 1906 the Liberals had a majority of 207; but in the elections of +January and December 1910, the Conservatives had on each occasion a +majority of 17 only. If Wales and Monmouth are included, it will be +found that in the 1910 elections the Liberal majorities were 13 and 11 +respectively. Single-member constituencies do not therefore guarantee +large majorities. It can with greater truth be said that they guarantee +wrong majorities, for, as the following table shows, there is no +constant relation between the size of the majority in votes and the size +of the majority in seats:-- + +General Election. Majority in Seats. Majority in Votes. + +1885 Liberal 158 Liberal 564,391 +1886 Conservative 104 Liberal 54,817 +1892 Liberal 44 Liberal 190,974 +1895 Conservative 150 Conservative 117,473 +1900 Conservative 134 Conservative 157,417 +1906 Liberal 356 Liberal 901,017 +1910 (Jan.) Liberal 124 Liberal 495,683 +1910 (Dec.) Liberal 126 Liberal 355,945 + +The majority of 44 seats which the Liberals obtained in 1892 represented +a majority of 190,974 votes, whereas a much smaller Conservative +majority at the polls, viz., 117,473, yielded in 1895 a majority in +seats of 150. The overwhelming victory of 1895 represented the very +slender majority of 117,473 votes in a total of 4,841,769, whilst at the +next election, 1900, when the Conservatives increased their majority at +the polls, their majority in the House of Commons was reduced. The +Liberal majority in votes in the election of December 1910 was smaller +than in that of the preceding January, but not the majority in seats. In +1886, the Conservatives obtained the large majority of 104 without +having any majority in votes, and, if England is taken alone, it will be +found that in January 1910 the Liberals had a majority of 29,877 in +votes, and that in December the Conservatives had a majority of 31,744, +whereas on each occasion the Conservatives obtained a majority of +17 seats. + +_The disfranchisement of minorities._ + +Politicians, to whom the one great saving merit of the single-member +system is that it yields an exaggerated majority to the victors, would, +if pressed, find it very difficult to defend the results referred to in +the preceding paragraphs, and would be even more at a loss if asked to +state to what extent they considered that national opinion should be +falsified. The most ardent defenders of the system would hardly deny the +right of the minority to some representation, and it is worthy of note +that one of the reasons advanced by Mr. Gladstone in support of his +decision to adopt it was that such a system tended to secure +representation for minorities.[4] Yet, as prophesied in the debates of +1885, the minorities in the South and West of Ireland have since that +date been permanently disfranchised; in the eight Parliaments, +1885-1911, they have been entirely without representation. This +continued injustice is in itself sufficient to show how baseless was Mr. +Gladstone's assumption that the system of single member constituencies +would secure representation for minorities. This example, however, does +not stand alone. In the General Election of 1906 the Unionists of Wales +contested 17 constituencies, and although at the polls they numbered +52,637, they failed to secure a member; their 91,620 Liberal opponents +secured the whole of the representation allotted to those +constituencies. In addition the Liberals obtained the thirteen seats +which the Unionists did not challenge. The minority throughout Wales, +numbering 36 per cent, of the electors, had no spokesman in the House of +Commons. This result shows how completely a system of single-member +constituencies fails to protect minorities, and an analysis of the votes +cast in Scotland in 1910, both in January and December, reveals the fact +that the Unionist minority only escaped by the narrowest of margins the +fate which befel the Welsh Unionists in 1906. The figures speak for +themselves:-- + +SCOTLAND (Boroughs and Counties, January 1910) + +Parties. Votes. Seats Seats in + Obtained. proportion + to Votes. +Liberal 352,334 59 38 +Labour and Socialist 35,997 2 4 +Unionist 255,589 9 28 + +Totals 643,920 70 70 + +Every Scottish Unionist member of Parliament represented on an average +28,400 voters, whilst a Liberal member represented less than 6000 +voters. The figures repay still further examination. One of the Unionist +seats--the Camlachie division of Glasgow--was only captured as the result +of a split in the Ministerialist ranks. The other eight seats were won +by majorities ranging from 41 to 874, amounting in the aggregate to +3156. If therefore in these constituencies some 1600 Unionist voters had +changed sides, the Unionist party, though numbering more than a quarter +of a million, or 40 per cent. of the electorate, might have failed to +secure any representation at all. With the single-member system more +than a quarter of a million of Scottish Unionists only obtained +representation as it were by accident. In the same election the Liberals +in the counties of Surrey, Sussex, and Kent, numbering 134,677, found +themselves without a representative.[5] + +_The underrepresentation of majorities._ + +The failure of existing electoral methods to provide representation for +minorities not only unduly emphasizes racial and other differences +between different parts of the same country, as in Ireland, but often +leads to a complete falsification of public opinion. The results in +Birmingham and Manchester in the election of 1906 may serve as a text. +As a result of that election these two towns were represented in +Parliament as being absolutely opposed to one another--a heightened +contrast which was a pure caricature of the difference disclosed by the +polls. Manchester (including Salford) returned nine Ministerialists; +they were elected by the votes of 51,721 citizens, whilst the votes of +their 33,907 political opponents counted for nothing. Manchester was +solid for Liberalism. Birmingham (with Aston Manor) was represented by +eight Unionist members elected by 51,658 citizens, but here again the +polls disclosed a dissentient minority of 22,938. The total number of +votes in Manchester was 85,628, and in Birmingham 74,596. Manchester +(with Salford) has one more member than Birmingham (with Aston Manor), +because of the larger population and electorate of the former area. The +Ministerialists of Manchester and Salford were equal in number to the +Unionists in Birmingham, and it is interesting to observe that the +former obtained additional representation because their opponents were +more numerous than were the opponents of the Unionists in Birmingham. + +The combined results of these two districts disclose the crowning +weakness of a system of single-member constituencies. Taken together the +Unionists numbered 85,565, the Ministerialists 74,659, and if the net +Unionist majority of 10,906 had been spread over the whole of the two +areas it would have yielded in each constituency the very respectable +majority of 640. If their voting power had been evenly diffused the +Unionists might have won the whole of the seventeen seats, whereas they +were, as a result of the election, in a minority of one. This possible +inversion of the true opinion of the electorate may perhaps be more +clearly understood from another example taken from the same +election,--the results of the polls in the county divisions of +Warwickshire. + +WARWICKSHIRE (ELECTION, 1906) + +Electoral Conservative Liberal Conservative Liberal +Division Votes. Votes. Majority. Majority. +Tamworth 7,561 4,842 2,719 -- +Nuneaton 5,849 7,677 -- 1,828 +Rugby 4,907 5,181 -- 274 +Stratford-on-Avon 4,173 4,321 -- 148 + ------------------------------------------- + 22,490 22,021 469 + +The Conservatives, who were in a majority of 469, obtained one-fourth of +the representation allotted to the county. Similar examples can be given +from nearly every election. Thus the figures for the five divisions of +Sheffield in the election of December 1910 were as follows:-- + +SHEFFIELD (ELECTION, DECEMBER 1910) + +Electoral Ministerial Unionist Ministerial Unionist +Division Votes. Votes. Majority. Majority. +Attercliffe 6,532 5,354 1,178 -- +Brightside 5,766 3,902 1,864 -- +Central 3,271 3,455 -- 184 +Eccleshall 5,849 6,039 -- 190 +Hallam 5,593 5,788 -- 195 + ------------------------------------------- + 27,011 24,538 2,473 + +It will be seen that the Ministerial majority in each of the +Attercliffe and Brightside divisions was larger than the aggregate of +the Unionist majorities in the other three divisions; yet the Unionists +obtained three seats out of five. + +In the same election the result of the contested seats in London +(including Croydon and West Ham) was as follows:-- + +Parties. Votes Obtained. Seats Obtained. +Unionist . . . . . . 268,127 29 +Ministerialist . . . . 243,722 31 + +The Unionists were in a majority of 24,405, but only obtained a minority +of the seats. Had their majority been uniformly distributed throughout +London there would have been an average majority for the Unionists of +400 in every constituency, and in that case the press would have said +that London was solidly Unionist. + +It may be contended that the foregoing are isolated cases, but +innumerable examples can be culled from electoral statistics showing how +a system of single-member constituencies may fail to secure for +majorities the influence and power which are rightly theirs. In the +General Election of 1895 the contested elections yielded the following +results:-- + +GENERAL ELECTION, 1895 (Contested Constituencies) + +Parties. Votes. Seats. +Unionists . . . . . . 1,785,372 282 +Home Rulers . . . . 1,823,809 202 + +These figures show that in a contest extending over no less than 484 +constituencies the Unionists, who were in a minority of 38,437, +obtained a majority of 80 seats. In this election, if an allowance is +made for uncontested constituencies, it will be found that the Unionists +were in a majority, but in the General Election of 1886 the figures for +the whole of the United Kingdom (including an allowance for uncontested +seats made on the same basis[6]) were as follows:-- + +GENERAL ELECTION, 1886 (All Constituencies) + +Parties. Votes Obtained. Seats Obtained. +Home Rulers . . . . 2,103,954 283 +Unionists . . . . . . 2,049,137 387 + +This election was regarded as a crushing defeat for Mr. Gladstone. He +found himself in the House of Commons in a minority of 104, but his +supporters in the country were in a majority. The results of the General +Election of 1874--although the system of single-member constituencies +had not then been made general--are equally instructive. The figures are +as follows:-- + +GENERAL ELECTION, 1874 + +Parties. Votes Seats Seats in + Obtained. Obtained. proportion + to Votes. +Conservative . . . . . . 1,222,000 356 300 +Liberal and Home Rulers . 1,436,000 296 352 + +From this it appears that in 1874, while the Liberals in the United +Kingdom, in the aggregate, had a majority of 214,000 votes, the +Conservatives had a majority of 60 in the members elected, whereas with +a rational system of representation the Liberals should have had a +majority of 52.[7] + +Such anomalous results are not confined to this country; they are but +examples of that inversion of national opinion which marks at all stages +the history of elections based on the majority system. Speaking of the +United States, Professor Commons says that "as a result of the district +system the national House of Representatives is scarcely a +representative body. In the fifty-first Congress, which enacted the +McKinley Tariff Law, the majority of the representatives were elected by +a minority of the voters." In the fifty-third Congress, elected in 1892, +the Democrats, with 47.2 per cent, of the vote, obtained 59.8 per cent, +of the representatives. + +The stupendous Republican victory of 1894 was equally unjustified; the +Republican majority of 134 should have been a minority of 7, as against +all other parties.[8] Similarly in New South Wales the supporters of Mr. +Reid's government, who secured a majority of the seats at the election +of 1898, were in a minority of 15,000. The figures of the New York +Aldermanic election of 1906 show an equally striking contrast between +the actual results of the election and the probable results under a +proportional system:-- + +_A "game of dice."_ + +Parties. Seats Seats in + Obtained. proportion + to Votes. +Republican 41 18 +Democrat 26 27 +Municipal Ownership +Candidates 6 25 +Socialist -- 2 + +It is unnecessary to proceed with the recital of the anomalous results +of existing electoral methods. It has been abundantly shown that a +General Election often issues in a gross exaggeration of prevailing +opinion; that such exaggeration may at one time involve a complete +suppression of the minority, whilst at another time a majority may fail +to obtain its fair share of representation. M. Poincare may well liken +an election to a game of dice (he speaks of _les coups de de du systeme +majoritaire_,) for no one who has followed the course of elections could +have failed to have observed how largely the final results have depended +upon chance. This, indeed, was the most striking characteristic of the +General Elections of 1910. In the January election there were 144 +constituencies in which the successful member was returned by a majority +of less than 500. Of these constituencies 69 seats were held by the +Ministerialists and 75 by the Unionists. The majorities were in some +cases as low as 8, 10, and 14. The aggregate of the majorities in the +Ministerialist constituencies amounted to 16,931, and had some 8500 +Liberals in these constituencies changed sides, the Ministerialist +majority of 124 might have been annihilated. On the other hand, the +Unionists held 75 seats by an aggregate majority of 17,389, and had +fortune favoured the Ministeralists in these constituencies their +majority would have been no less than 274. Such is the stability of the +foundation on which the House of Commons rests; such the method to which +we trust when it is necessary to consult the nation on grave +national issues. + +_The importance of boundaries_. + +All these anomalies can be traced to the same cause--that with a +single-member system the whole of the representation of a constituency +must necessarily be to the majority of the electors, whether that +majority be large or small. It directly follows that the results of +elections often depend not so much upon the actual strength of political +parties, as upon the manner in which that strength is distributed over +the country. If that strength is evenly distributed, then the minority +may be crushed in every constituency; if unevenly distributed any result +is possible. In the latter case the result may be considerably +influenced by the manner in which the constituencies are arranged. A +slight change in the line of the boundaries of a constituency might +easily make a difference of 50 votes, whilst "to carry the dividing line +from North to South, instead of from East to West, would, in many +localities, completely alter the character of the representation." [9] An +example will make this statement clear. Take a town with 13,000 Liberal +and 12,000 Conservative electors and divide it into five districts of +5000 electors each. If there is a section of the town in which the +Liberals largely preponderate--and it often happens that the strength of +one or other of the parties is concentrated in a particular area--the +net result of the election in five districts will depend upon the way in +which the boundary lines are drawn. The possible results of two +different distributions may be shown in an extreme form thus:-- + +Constituency Libs. Cons. +1st. 4,000 1,000 Lib. victory. +2nd. 2,400 2,600 Cons. " +3rd. 2,300 2,700 " " +4th. 2,200 2,800 " " +5th. 2,100 2,900 " " + ------ ------ + 13,000 12,000 + +Constituency Libs. Cons. +1st. 2,600 2,400 Lib. victory. +2st. 2,600 2,400 Lib. " +3st. 2,600 2,400 Lib. " +4th. 2,600 2,400 Lib. " +5th. 2,600 2,400 Lib. " + ------ ------ + 13,000 12,000 + +_The gerrymander_. + +With one set of boundaries the area in which the Liberals largely +preponderate might be enclosed in one constituency. The Liberals might +obtain a majority of 3000 in this constituency but lose the other four +seats. If, however, the boundary lines were so arranged that each +constituency included a portion of this excessively Liberal area, the +Liberals might obtain the whole of the five seats. In both cases the +result of the election would fail to give a true presentation of the +real opinions of the town. The influence of boundaries in determining +the results of an election has been clearly realized in the United +States for more than a century. Professor Commons states that whenever +the periodical rearrangement of constituencies takes place the +boundaries are "gerrymandered." "Every apportionment Act," says he, +"that has been passed in this or any other country has involved +inequality; and it would be absurd to ask a political party to pass such +an Act, and give the advantage of the inequality to the opposite party. +Consequently, every apportionment Act involves more or less of the +gerrymander. The gerrymander is simply such a thoughtful construction of +districts as will economize the votes of the party in power by giving it +small majorities in a large number of districts, and coop up the +opposing party with overwhelming majorities in a small number of +districts.... Many of the worst gerrymanders have been so well designed +that they come close within all constitutional requirements." [10] +Although the National Congress has stated that the district for +congressional elections must be a compact and contiguous territory, the +law is everywhere disregarded. + +The word "gerrymander" has found its way into English journalism. It was +used by Liberals in their criticism of Mr. Balfour's abortive +redistribution scheme of 1905, and has been equally used by Unionists in +1909 in their criticism of Mr. Harcourt's London Elections Bill. On +neither occasion was the word used in its original meaning, and, +although its history is to be found in most works on electoral methods, +the story may, perhaps, be repeated with advantage:-- + +"The term Gerrymander dates from the year 1811, when Elbridge Gerry was +Governor of Massachusetts, and the Democratic, or, as it was then +termed, the Republican party, obtained a temporary ascendency in the +State. In order to secure themselves in the possession of the +Government, the party in power passed the famous law of 11 February +1812, providing for a new division of the State into senatorial +districts, so contrived that in as many districts as possible the +Federalists should be outnumbered by their opponents. To effect this all +natural and customary lines were disregarded, and some parts of the +State, particularly the counties of Worcester and Essex, presented +similar examples of political geography. It is said that Gilbert Stuart, +seeing in the office of the _Columbian Centinel_ an outline of the Essex +outer district, nearly encircling the rest of the country, added with +his pencil a beak to Salisbury, and claws to Salem and Marblehead, +exclaiming, 'There, that will do for a salamander!' 'Salamander!' said +Mr. Russell, the editor: 'I call it a Gerrymander!' The mot obtained +vogue, and a rude cut of the figure published in the _Centinel_ and in +the _Salem Gazette_, with the natural history of the monster duly set +forth, served to fix the word in the political vocabulary of the +country. So efficient was the law that at the elections of 1812, 50,164 +Democratic voters elected twenty-nine senators against eleven elected by +51,766 Federalists; and Essex county, which, when voting as a single +district had sent five Federalists to the Senate, was now represented in +that body by three Democrats and two Federalists." [11] + +Mr. Balfour's scheme did not involve a political rearrangement of +boundaries, and the word "gerrymandering" was thus incorrectly employed +in relation to it, but so long as we retain a system of single-member +constituencies a Redistribution Bill will always invite suspicion +because of the possibilities of influencing the arrangement of +constituencies which such a measure affords. Instructions are usually +given to boundary commissioners to attach due consideration "to +community or diversity of interests, means of communication, physical +features, existing electoral boundaries, sparsity or density of +population;" [12] but although such instructions are at once reasonable +and just, they would not prevent, and indeed might be used to +facilitate, a gerrymander in the American sense of the term were such a +proceeding determined upon. It is quite conceivable that a mining +district in which one party had a very large majority might be +surrounded by an area in which the political conditions were more +balanced, but in which the opposite party had a small majority. If that +mining area was, in accordance with the wording of these instructions, +treated as one constituency because of its community of interests and +the surrounding area divided into three or more districts, the minority +would in all probability obtain a majority of seats. + +_ The modern gerrymander_ + +The new constituencies required by the South Africa Act of 1909 have +been arranged with the utmost care,[13] but had the delegates to the +South African National Convention adhered to their original proposal to +abandon single-member constituencies, they would have secured for South +Africa, among other invaluable benefits, complete security from the +gerrymander, any possibility of which begets suspicion and reacts in a +disastrous way upon political warfare. The gerrymander is nothing more +or less than a fraudulent practice. But the United States is not the +only country in which such practices take place. Their counter-part in +Canada was described by Sir John Macdonald as "hiving the grits," and +even in England, without any change of boundaries, practices have arisen +within the last few years which have had their birth in the same motives +that produced the American gerrymander. In boroughs which are divided +into more than one constituency there is a considerable number of voters +who have qualifications in more than one division. A man may vote in any +division in which he has a qualification, but in not more than one. He +may make his choice. In Edinburgh for many years, on both sides of +politics, there has been a constant transfer of voters from one register +to another in the hopes of strengthening the party's position in one or +other division. It was even alleged that the precise moment of a vacancy +in West Edinburgh (May 1909) was determined by the desire to ascertain +the strength of the Unionist party in that division, to discover how +many Unionist votes should be transferred for the purpose of improving +Unionist prospects or of defeating the designs of their opponents. This +allegation may be wholly unfounded, but the single-member system +encourages such a proceeding, and the statement at least indicates how +the voting power of a division may be manipulated. The mere possibility +of such an action arouses the suspicion that it has taken place. Similar +practices have, it is stated, been pursued in Bristol. Votes have been +transferred from one division, where one of the parties was in a +hopeless minority, for the purpose of strengthening its position in +other divisions. An examination of the figures of the election in +Birmingham in 1906 shows that in one division, Birmingham East, the +Unionists narrowly escaped defeat. They won by a majority of 585 only. +In the other divisions the Unionists won by very large majorities. Must +not the possibility of transferring surplus votes in strong +constituencies to strengthen the position in weak constituencies prove +an irresistible temptation to the agents responsible for the success of +the party? They are entitled to make use of all the advantages at their +disposal. In this way a new and more subtle form of the "gerrymander" +has arisen in England, and if we are to redeem English political warfare +from proceedings which approximate very closely to sharp practices, we +must so amend our electoral system as to give due weight to the votes +not only of the majority but of the minority as well. + +_The Block Vote_ + +The analysis of the results of majority systems would not be complete +without some reference to the use of the "block" vote in the London +County Council, the London Borough Council, and other elections. In the +London County Council elections each constituency returns two members, +and each elector can give one vote to each of two candidates. The +Metropolitan boroughs are divided into wards returning from three to +nine members, each elector giving one vote apiece to candidates up to +the number to be returned. [14] Both in the London County and London +Borough elections the majority, as in a single-member constituency, can +obtain the whole of the representation. All the defects which arise from +parliamentary elections again appear, and often in a more accentuated +form. The figures of the two London County elections, 1904, 1907, +disclose a catastrophic change in representation similar to that which +characterized the General Election of 1906:-- + +LONDON COUNTY COUNCIL ELECTION, 1904 + + Seats in +Parties. Votes. Seats proportion + Obtained. to Votes. + +Progressive and Labour 357,557 83 64 +Moderate 287,079 34 52 +Independent 12,940 1 2 + +Progressive majority over +Moderates 70,478 49 12 + + +LONDON COUNTY COUNCIL ELECTION, 1907 + Seats in +Parties. Votes. Seats proportion + Obtained. to Votes. + +Moderate 526,700 79 67 +Progressive and Labour 395,749 38 50 +Independent 6,189 1 1 + +Moderate majority over + Progressive and Labour 70,478 49 12 + +_The London County Council elections_. + +A swing of the pendulum which, measured in votes, would have transferred +a majority of twelve into a minority of seventeen, had the effect of +changing a majority of 49 into a minority of 41. This alternate +exaggeration of the prevailing tendencies in municipal politics gives +rise to a false impression of the real opinions of the elector. The +citizens of London are not so unstable as the composition of their +Council, but it is the more violent displacement which forms the basis +of comment in the press and of municipal action. These elections, too, +like the Parliamentary elections, showed with what ease the minority +throughout large areas may be deprived of representation. Six adjoining +suburban boroughs--Brixton, Norwood, Dulwich, Lewisham, Greenwich, +Woolwich--were, before the election of 1907, represented by twelve +Progressives. At that election they returned twelve Moderates; indeed on +that occasion the outer western and southern boroughs, in one continuous +line from Hampstead to Fulham, from Wandsworth to Woolwich, returned +Moderates and Moderates only. + +_The election of aldermen of the L.C.C._ + +The London County Council elections of 1910 gave the Municipal Reform +party a majority of two councillors over the Progressive and Labour +parties. The transfer of a single vote in Central Finsbury would have +been sufficient to have produced an exact balance. It was the duty of +the new Council to elect the aldermen, the block vote being used. The +majority of two was sufficient to enable the Municipal Reformers to +carry the election of every one of the ten candidates nominated by them, +thus depriving the minority of any voice in the election of aldermen. +The object for which aldermen were instituted was entirely set at +naught, and this the method of election alone made possible. The +privilege of selecting aldermen was used by the party in power, not for +the purpose of strengthening the Council by the addition of +representative men, but for the purpose of strengthening the party +position.[15] The privilege has been abused in a similar way by the +English provincial boroughs. In these boroughs, prior to the Election of +Aldermen Act, 1910, aldermen as well as councillors took part in the +election of aldermen. In some cases a party having once obtained a +predominant position has, by making full use of its power to elect +aldermen in sympathy with itself, succeeded in perpetuating its +predominance, although defeated at the polls. The minority of the +councillors, with the assistance of the non-retiring aldermen, has not +only elected further aldermen from members of the same party, but has +controlled the policy of the Council. The Act referred to merely +prevents aldermen in municipal councils from voting in the election of +other aldermen, but does not go to the root of the evil. An alteration +in the method of election is required. + +[Sidenote 1: _The election of Representative Peers of Scotland_.] + +A further example of the use of the block vote may be taken from the +election of Scottish Representative Peers. At the commencement of each +Parliament the Scottish Peers meet in Holyrood Palace for the purpose of +electing sixteen of their number to represent the peerage of Scotland in +the Parliament of the United Kingdom. The Unionist Peers are in a +majority, and the block vote enables them to choose sixteen Unionist +Peers. At the election of January 1910 Lord Torphichen, a Unionist Peer, +who had voted against his party on the Finance Bill of the previous +year, failed to secure re-election. Lord Torphichen was elected in the +following December, but the incident shows how complete is the power +conferred upon the majority by this method of election; not only +political opponents but dissenting members of the same party can be +excluded from representation. + +_The Australian Senate_. + +The block vote is used also in the election of members of the Australian +Senate. Each State elects six senators, half of whom retire every three +years. Each State is polled as a separate constituency, and each elector +has three votes. At the election of 1910 the Labour Party polled the +highest number of votes in each of the States, and thus succeeded in +returning eighteen senators, all other parties obtaining none. The +figures here given for the elections in Victoria and New South Wales +show that in Victoria the successful candidates were not even supported +by a majority of electors, and that in both States the excess of the +successful over their leading opponents was so small that a slight turn +over would have completely altered the result of the elections:-- + +ELECTION of AUSTRALIAN SENATORS, 1910 + +_Victoria._ + +Successful. Unsuccessful. + +Findley (Lab.)....217,673 Best (Fusionist) ....... 213,976 +Barker (Lab.).....216,199 Trenwith (Fusionist).... 211,058 +Blakey (Lab.).....215,117 M'Cay (Fusionist) ...... 195,477 + Goldstein (Independent) 53,583 + Ronald (Independent) ... 18,380 + + 648,889 692,474 + +_New South Wales._ + +Successful. Unsuccessful. + +A.M'Dougall(Lab.) ..., 249,212 J.P. Gray (Fusionist)... 220,569 +A. Gardiner (Lab.) ... 247,047 E. Pulsford (Fusionist). 214,889 +A. Rae (Lab.)..........239,307 J. C. Neild (Fusionist). 212,150 + J. Norton (Independ.)... 50,893 + R. Mackenzie (Independ.) 13,608 + J.O. Maroney (Independ.) 9,660 + T. Hoare (Independ.).... 8,432 + + 735,566 730,201 + +_London Borough Councils_ + +The London Borough Council elections yield results equally +unsatisfactory. The Report of the Select Committee of the House of Lords +which, in 1907, examined the Municipal Representation Bill introduced by +Lord Courtney of Penwith, sums up these results in the following +paragraphs:-- + +"If the different wards are similar in character, the majority, even if +little more than one-half, may secure all the seats. For instance, in +one borough the Progressives, with 19,430 votes, obtained all the 30 +seats, and the Municipal Reformers, though they polled 11,416 votes, did +not obtain even one; while, on the contrary, in four other boroughs the +Progressives did not secure any representation. "On the other hand, the +system does not in all cases secure power to the majority. If the wards +are dissimilar and the majority too much condensed in certain districts, +the minority may secure a majority of seats, as in the case of one +borough where 46,000 votes secured 30 seats, while 54,000 votes only +obtained 24. + +"The system leads to violent fluctuations. If the two great parties are +nearly evenly divided, it is obvious that a comparatively small change +may create a revolution in the representation. In Lewisham, at the 1903 +election, the Progressives had 34 seats and the Moderates only 6; in +1905, on the other hand, the Municipal Reformers obtained all the 42 +seats, and the Progressives failed to secure even one."[16] + +One example will suffice to illustrate the findings of this Committee. +Here are the results of two wards in the Borough of Battersea:-- + +BATTERSEA BOROUGH COUNCIL ELECTION, 1906 + +Ward Votes Obtained. + Municipal Reform Progressive + Candidates. Candidates. + +Shaftesbury 786 905 } +(six seats) 777 902 } + 769 899 }all + 753 895 }successful. + 753 891 } + 741 852 } + ----- ----- + Totals 4,579 5,344 + +St. John's 747 } 217 +(three seats) 691 }all 197 + 686 }successful. 191 + ----- ----- + Totals 2,124 605 + +Totals for both wards 6,703 5,949 + +These tables disclose some curious anomalies. Each elector in the +Shaftesbury ward has six votes--the ward being entitled to six +Councillors--whereas each elector in the St. John's ward, which is only +entitled to three Councillors, has but three votes. The additional +representation is allotted to the Shaftesbury ward because of its larger +electorate, but the only electors to reap any advantage from this fact +are the Progressives. The presence in the ward of a large number of +citizens who are Municipal Reformers has merely had the effect of +increasing the amount of representation obtained by their opponents. +Further, the number of Municipal Reformers in the Shaftesbury ward +exceeded the number of Municipal Reformers in the St. John's ward; in +the former they obtained no representation, in the latter they obtained +three seats. The two wards taken together showed a net majority in votes +of 754 for the Municipal Reformers who, however, only secured three +seats out of nine. Taking the Borough as a whole the Municipal Reformers +obtained 24 representatives with 53,910 votes, whereas the Progressives +obtained 30 representatives with 46,274 votes. + +_Provincial Municipal Councils_. + +Nor are the results of the Provincial Borough elections more +satisfactory. These boroughs are usually divided into wards returning +three or six members each. One-third of the councillors retire each +year, and each ward is called upon to elect one or two councillors, as +the case may be. The figures for the Municipal elections held in +November 1908, at Manchester, Bradford, and Leeds disclose a similar +discrepancy between the votes polled and the seats obtained. [_See +table below_.] + +BOROUGH COUNCIL ELECTIONS, 1908 + +Parties Votes Seats Seats in + Polled. Obtained. proportion + to Votes. + +_Manchester_. +Conservative 25,724 14 10 +Independent 11,107 3 4 +Liberal 14,474 7 6 +Labour and Socialist 15,963 2 6 + +_Bradford_. +Conservative 12,809 10 6 +Liberal 12,106 6 5 +Socialist-Labour 11,388 0 5 +Independent 1,709 1 1 + +_Leeds_. +Conservative 18,145 8 5 +Liberal 19,507 3 5 +Socialist-Labour 9,615 1 2 +Independent 3,046 1 1 + +_Summary.] + +The examples given in this chapter may be briefly summarised. The same +defects are disclosed in Parliamentary, County Council and Municipal +(both metropolitan and provincial) elections. These defects may be +classified under three heads: (1) often a gross exaggeration of the +strength of the victorious party; (2) sometimes a complete +disfranchisement of the minority; and (3) at other times a failure of a +majority of citizens to obtain their due share of representation. In +addition, running through all the results, there is an element of +instability due to the fact that a slight change in public opinion may +produce an altogether disproportionate effect, the violence of the swing +of the pendulum arising more from the electoral method than from the +fickleness of the electorate. These defects all spring from the same +root cause--that the representation of any constituency is awarded to +the majority of the electors in that constituency irrespective of the +size of the majority; that the votes of the minority count for nothing. +The result of a General Election is thus often dependent not upon the +relative strengths of political forces, but upon the chance way in which +those forces are distributed, and in a considerable measure may be +influenced by the way in which the boundaries of constituencies are +drawn. Such a system invites and encourages gerrymandering, both in its +original and modern forms, but this detestable practice can be made of +no avail and the results of elections rendered trustworthy if we so +reform present methods as to give due weight to the strength of each +political party irrespective of the way in which that strength may be +distributed. + + +[Footnote 1: Reply to Deputation, House of Commons, 10 November 1908.] + +[Footnote 2: Mr. Corbett's analyses were accepted by the Royal +Commission on Electoral Systems as "representing the truth as nearly as +circumstances will permit."--Report, p. 31.] + +[Footnote 3: There is a marked difference between the electoral +conditions of Great Britain and Ireland, but as the Government of the +day depends for support upon a majority of the representatives of all +parts of the kingdom, the figures here given are those for the +United Kingdom.] + +[Footnote 4: Mr. Gladstone, in introducing the Redistribution of Seats +Bill, 1 December 1884, said: "The recommendations of this system +(one-member districts) I think are these--that it is very economical, it +is very simple, and it goes a very long way towards that which many +gentlemen have much at heart, viz., what is roughly termed +representation of minorities."--Hansard, 3rd series, vol. 294, p. 379.] + +[Footnote 5: Other examples are given in Appendix V. The representation +of minorities varies very considerably in amount, and, as shown in the +Appendix, depends not upon their size but upon the way in which they are +distributed over the electoral area.] + +[Footnote 6: The basis of calculation, as explained by Mr. Rooke +Corbett, is as follows: "It seems to me reasonable to suppose that those +changes of public opinion which affected the contested constituencies +affected the uncontested constituencies also, and therefore, in +estimating the number of voters in an uncontested constituency, I have +assumed that the strength of each party varied from one election to +another in the same ratio as in the contested constituencies in the same +county."--P. R. Pamphlet, No. 14. _Recent Electoral Statistics_, p. 5.] + +[Footnote 7: These figures are taken from an article by Robert B. +Hayward in _The Nineteenth Century_, February 1884, p. 295.] + +[Footnote 8: _Proportional Representation_, by Professor Commons, p. 52 +_et seq_. For further examples in the United States the reader should +consult Chapter III. of Professor Commons' book.] + +[Footnote 9: _Preferential Voting_, by the Right Hon. J. Parker Smith. +p. 8.] + +[Footnote 10: _Proportional Representation_, p. 50.] + +[Footnote 11: _The Machinery of Politics_, W. R. Warn, 1872.] + +[Footnote 12: Such instructions are contained in Clause 40 of the South +African Act, signed by the South African National Convention at +Bloemfontein, 11 May 1909.] + +[Footnote 13: See Report of Delimitation Commission.] + +[Footnote 14: This electoral method is known by various names. In +Australia it is called the block vote, in the United States the general +ticket, on the Continent the _scrutin de liste_.] + +[Footnote 15: The action was defended on the ground that the Municipal +Reform party had obtained a majority of 39,653 votes at the polls.] + +[Footnote 16: _Report on Municipal Representation Bill (H.L.)_, 1907 +(132), p. vi.] + + + + +CHAPTER III + +THE INDIRECT RESULTS OF MAJORITY SYSTEMS + + +"Nous attachons un interet vital, presque aussi grand, a la forme dans +laquello on consulte la nation qu'au principe lui-meme du suffrage +universel."--GAMBETTA + +_False impressions of public opinion._ + +The first and immediate consequence arising from present electoral +methods is the growth of false impressions of the true tendencies of +public opinion, impressions that are still further distorted by the +exaggerations of the press. The winning of a seat is always a "brilliant +victory," and a "crushing defeat" for the other side. The German General +Election of 1907 affords an excellent illustration of these false +impressions. The Social Democrats lost nearly 50 per cent. of their +previous representation, and an outburst of delight arose in certain +journals over their "crushing defeat." But the Socialists' poll showed +an increase of a quarter of a million, and although their total poll had +not increased in quite the same proportion as that of other parties, the +figures showed that the Social Democrats were still by far the largest +party in Germany. The number of seats won were no true index to the +movements in political forces. Not only the press, however, but some of +the most careful writers on modern tendencies in politics are also +misled by these false impressions. The General Election of 1895, in +which there was a majority of 117,473 for the Unionists in a total of +4,841,769 votes, is a case in point. This election has often been chosen +as marking the commencement of a period of strong reaction in political +thought. Writers have been misled by the overwhelming majority in seats +obtained by the Unionists at that election. They have entirely ignored +the figures of the polls, and these, the only safe guide to the opinions +of the electors, show that the reaction was far less strong than is +usually supposed. + +_False impressions become the basis of legislative action._ + +False impressions of public opinion, however, lead to an indirect effect +of much greater importance. The false impression becomes the basis of +action, and an apparent triumph for reaction makes a "reactionary" +policy much more easy of achievement. Similarly an apparent triumph for +a "progressive" policy facilitates its adoption. For the House of +Commons is still the most powerful factor in determining our political +destinies, and hence these false results have a very material effect in +the shaping of history. If the opinion of the people had been truly +represented in the Parliaments elected in 1895 and 1900, is it not +almost a certainty that the legislation of those two Parliaments would +have been considerably modified? Or, to go further back to the election +of 1886, the result of which was universally interpreted as a crushing +defeat of Mr. Gladstone's proposals in favour of Home Rule, would not a +true result on that occasion have influenced subsequent developments? +Over-representation, which results in the temporary triumph of a party +and of partisan measures, involves the nation in a serious loss, for the +time and energy of a Parliament may be largely consumed in revising and +correcting, if not in reversing the partisan legislation of its +predecessor. Thus, a considerable portion of the time of the Parliament +of 1906-1909 was spent in attempting to reverse the policies embodied in +the Education and Licensing Acts of the preceding Parliament. + +_Loss of prestige by the House of Commons._ + +Apart, however, from speculation as to the effect of false electoral +methods on the development of public affairs, the serious divergences +between representation and polling strength, to which attention has been +directed in the previous chapter, must tend to the weakening of the +authority and prestige of the House of Commons. Should a Government, +misled by the composition of the "representative" House, make use of +its majority in that House for the passage of measures not really +desired by the country, and should the House of Lords, reformed or not, +guess rightly that the decisions of the Commons were contrary to the +popular will, then inevitably the position of the House of Lords would +be strengthened as compared with that of the Commons. "A House of +Commons which does not represent," said a leading Liberal journal, "may +stand for less in the country than the House of Lords, or the Crown, and +its influence will infallibly decline in proportion. One has only to +take up an old volume of Bagehot to confirm one's suspicions that the +imperfections of electoral machinery, combined with the changes in the +character of the electorate, are already threatening to undermine the +real sources of the nation's power."[1] Sir Frederick Pollock has +declared that our defective electoral system may "yield a House of +Commons so unrepresentative in character as to cease to command the +respect and obedience of citizens."[2] + +_Unstable representation._ + +False impressions of public opinion, unstable legislation based upon +such false impressions, the weakening of the foundations on which the +authority of the House of Commons rests, these are results which in +themselves constitute a sufficiently serious condemnation of present +methods. But those upheavals in representation, those violent swings of +the pendulum which have often been so pronounced a feature of elections, +give an instability to the composition of our supreme legislative +chamber that must still further undermine its authority. Many, indeed, +imagining that this dangerous instability is the reflection of an +equally unstable electorate, begin to question whether a popular +franchise is in any circumstances a satisfactory basis for government. +The violence of the change in representation is attributed to the +character of the electors instead of to the evil effects of a defective +electoral method. On the other hand, the large majorities which +accompany such changes are regarded by other politicians as blessings in +disguise--as being essential to the formation of a strong Government. +But a Government based on a false majority will, in the long-run, find +that this exaggeration of its support in the country is a source of +weakness rather than of strength. Like the image in Nebuchadnezzar's +dream, the feet of such a Government are part of clay. For the extreme +swing of the pendulum which brought the Government into power is usually +followed by an equally violent swing in the opposite direction. When the +high-water mark of success is attained at a General Election it becomes +practically impossible for the party in power to gain additional seats +at bye-elections, whilst an unbroken series of losses makes it difficult +to prevent a feeling arising that the ministry has lost the confidence +of the electors, although the actual change in public opinion may have +been of the slightest. The prestige of the Government is gone, and +prestige is as necessary to a Government as a majority. In brief, a +large majority strengthens a Government only in so far as that majority +corresponds to public opinion. + +_Weakened personnel_. + +Moreover, the extreme changes which take place at a General Election +often result in a considerable weakening of the personnel of the House +of Commons. In such a debacle as that which took place in 1906, there +was no process of selection by which the Unionists might have retained +the services in Parliament of their ablest members. Although there were +33,907 Unionists in Manchester and Salford, Mr. Balfour, the leader of +the party, experienced the mortification of being rejected by one of the +divisions. This failure was paralleled by the defeat of Sir William +Harcourt at Derby in 1895, whilst Mr. Gladstone, in contesting Greenwich +in 1874, only succeeded in obtaining the second place, the first seat +being won by a Conservative. A way is usually found by which party +leaders return without delay to the House of Commons, but there are +members of the highest distinction and capacity who, especially if these +qualities are associated with a spirit of independence, find, it +increasingly difficult to re-enter political life. Victory at the polls +depends not so much upon the services which a statesman, however +eminent, may have rendered to his country, as upon the ability of the +party to maintain its majority in the particular constituency for which +he stands. Indeed, in this matter a leader of opinion is placed at a +disadvantage as compared with an ordinary member of the party; his very +pre-eminence, his very activities bring him into conflict with certain +sections of the electorate which, insignificant in themselves, may yet +be sufficiently numerous to influence the result of an election. +Statesmen, moreover, have often lost their seats merely because they +have endeavoured to give electors of their very best. When Mr. John +Morley (now Lord Morley of Blackburn), during the election of 1906, +received a deputation of Socialists, he, with characteristic courage, +explained very frankly the ground on which he could not support their +principles.[3] A similar candour on his part in 1895 cost him his seat +at Newcastle. Can we wonder then that there arise complaints that our +statesmen are deficient both in courage and in ideas? Single-member +constituencies are, as Gambetta pointed out more than twenty years ago, +inimical to political thinking, and recent General Elections have +afforded numerous examples in support of this statement. The courageous +and forcible presentment of ideas has time after time been rewarded by +exclusion from the House of Commons. + +_Degradation of party strife._ + +There is a further and equally serious charge that can be laid against +the existing electoral system--it is in no small measure responsible for +that increasing degradation in the methods of warfare which has +characterised recent political and municipal contests. This debasement +of elections cannot fail to contribute to that undermining of the +authority of the House of Commons, upon which stress has already been +laid. Indeed, there is abundant evidence to show that in conjunction +with the imaginary instability of the electorate, the debasement of +elections is weakening the faith of many in representative institutions. +An efficient bureaucracy is now being advocated by a writer so +distinguished as Mr. Graham Wallas, as the best safeguard against the +excesses of an unstable and ignorant democracy. There is no need to +undervalue the importance of competent officials, but all experience has +shown the equal necessity of an adequate check upon the bureaucracy, +however efficient, and such check must be found in the strengthening of +representative bodies. Mr. Graham Wallas declares that "the empirical +art of politics consists largely in the creation of opinion by the +deliberate exploitation of subconscious non-rational inferences,"[4] and +cites in support of this statement the atrocious posters and mendacious +appeals of an emotional kind addressed to the electors in recent +contests. It does not appear from electoral statistics that so large a +proportion of voters are influenced by such appeals as Mr. Wallas +thinks; his conclusions, like those of others, are based upon the false +impressions arising from false results. It is, however, sufficient for +the purpose of the political organizer to know that a number of the +electors will succumb to such influences. The votes of this small +section of the electorate can turn the scale at an election, and so long +as we adhere to a system under which the whole of the representation +allotted to any given constituency is awarded to the party which can +secure a bare majority of votes, we must expect to see a progressive +degradation of electoral contests. The successful organizer of victory +has already learnt that he must not be too squeamish in the methods by +which the victory is obtained, and if "the exploitation of subconscious +non-rational inferences" is necessary to this end he will undoubtedly +exploit them to the best of his powers. + +_The final rally._ + +Mr. Wallas gives from his personal experience an admirable illustration +of the way in which elections are often lost and won. His vivid +description of the close of a poll in a County Council election in a +very poor district is in itself an emphatic condemnation of our +electoral system. "The voters," says he, "who came in were the results +of the 'final rally' of the canvassers on both sides. They entered the +room in rapid but irregular succession, as if they were jerked forward +by a hurried and inefficient machine. About half of them were women with +broken straw hats, pallid faces, and untidy hair. All were dazed and +bewildered, having been snatched away in carriages or motors from the +making of match-boxes, or button-holes, or cheap furniture, or from the +public-house, or, since it was Saturday evening, from bed. Most of them +seemed to be trying in the unfamiliar surroundings to be sure of the +name for which, as they had been reminded at the door, they were to +vote. A few were drunk, and one man, who was apparently a supporter of +my own, clung to my neck while he tried to tell me of some vaguely +tremendous fact which just eluded his power of speech. I was very +anxious to win, and inclined to think that I had won, but my chief +feeling was an intense conviction that this could not be accepted as +even a decently satisfactory method of creating a Government for a city +of five million inhabitants, and that nothing short of a conscious and +resolute facing of the whole problem of the formation of political +opinion would enable us to improve it." The political "boss" has no such +qualms; victory may turn upon the votes recorded at this final rally, +and every effort must be made to ensure that the party's poll exceeds +that of the enemy. Mr. Wallas does not propose any remedy; he merely +suggests that something must be done to abolish the more sordid details +of English electioneering. Why not go to the root of the evil and amend +the electoral system which places so great a premium upon the success of +such practices? It is indeed evident that this cannot be accepted as "a +decently satisfactory method of creating a Government." But we are not +compelled to continue the use of such a method. What possible +justification is there for making the representation of all the other +electors of a constituency depend upon the result of a final rally? + +_Bribery and "nursing"_ + +Evidence was tendered before the Worcester Election Commission[5] to the +effect that there were 500 voters in the city who were amenable to the +influence of a small bribe, and that the party which secured the votes +of these electors won the election. Again, is there no alternative to an +electoral system which makes the representation of a town depend upon +the action of the least worthy of its citizens? Direct bribery has been +rendered more difficult by the Corrupt Practices Act, but bribery in a +much more subtle form--"nursing" the constituency--would appear to be on +the increase. Mr. Ellis T. Powell, who has had a considerable +electioneering experience, gives an admirable statement[6] of the +expenses attending a successful candidature. "If the candidate's means," +says he, "permit of a favourable response to these invitations (appeals +for money), he is said to be engaged in 'nursing' the constituency in +which the gifts are distributed. A great proportion of these appeals +relate to funds which are for public, or quasi-public purposes, such as +those of hospitals; and there is no suggestion that any direct political +influence is exercised in consequence of donations or contributions made +to these institutions. But what is certain is that a section of the +electorate-diminishing, but still potent, section--is favourably +influenced by the fact that Mr. A. has given L100 to the funds of the +hospital, whereas Mr. B. has given L5, 5_s_., or nothing at all. +Candidates and their agents are perfectly well aware of this, and are +even known to delay the announcement of their contributions in order to +ascertain their respective amounts, and so to guard themselves against +giving less than others have done. Mr. A. is inclined to give L20, but +waits to see if Mr. B. gives L25, in which case he will raise his +intended L20 to L30. These tactics are adopted, not because either of +the candidates desires to be lavish or ostentatious in his gifts, and +still less from any vulgar desire for notoriety in itself. They are +simply an element, almost vital under existing conditions, of a +successful appeal to the electorate. They may be said to be of the +psychological rather than the political order, introducing into the +electoral arena forces which have no business to be there, and whose +activity is wholly vicious; but forces which nevertheless no politician +can ignore, unless he wishes to postpone his realisation of their exact +potency until the declaration of the poll places it before his, own eyes +in large and unmistakable characters.... The writer was once consulted +by a gentleman who, from motives which were truly laudable, desired to +represent a London constituency. The path was clear to his selection as +a candidate; the only question was that of expense. The writer, after +noting the number of electors, informed him of the maximum sum which he +might expend at a contest, but at the same time warned him that unless +he were prepared to spend from L1500 to L2000 a year from that time +until the General Election (of which there was no immediate prospect) he +might regard his ambition as a hopeless one. The constituency was one +where money _must_ be spent. The other candidate would spend it, and his +opponent must do at least as much, while his chance at the poll would be +increased if he did a little more. When his opponent gave 10s. to a +local cricket club, he could give no less. If he gave a guinea it might +make a difference in his poll. The advice was not given in regard to +electoral conditions as they ought to be, but as they are. The writer +gave it with regret, and felt that he was playing almost a cynical part +when he uttered the words. Yet it was in complete accord with the +necessities of the existing system." Some of the practices associated +with constituency-nursing can perhaps be reached by further legislation, +but, if so, bribery in all probability will only take a form still more +subtle. Again, why not strike at the root cause which makes these +practices so highly profitable? Why continue to make the representation +of all electors depend upon the votes of those who are influenced by the +attentions of a rich patron? + +_The organization of victory._ + +The cumulative effect of these demoralising elements in party warfare is +shown in the separation of the work of the party organizer from that of +the party leader--separation which is becoming more and more complete. +The work of covering hoardings with posters of a repulsive type, the +task of preparing election "literature," must be carried out by men of a +different character from those who are responsible for the public +direction of the party; and as party agents often obtain their +appointments because of their previous success in winning elections, the +mere force of competition is compelling agents, sometimes against their +own wishes, to resort to these questionable practices. The success of +the Municipal Reform campaign in the London County Council election of +1907 was followed by a demand from many Progressives that the tactics of +their opponents should be copied, that gramophone should be answered by +gramophone, poster by poster. It is, however, certain that the more +victory depends upon the work of the party organizer the more must his +power increase, and this fact explains the unique position of the +political "boss" in the United States, where ordinary electoral methods +have been carried to their logical conclusion.[7] The political "boss" +has become all-powerful because he has made himself the indispensable +factor in successful political organization. At the London County +Council elections in 1907, the leaders of the Municipal Reform Party +dissociated themselves from the more extreme accusations made against +the administration of the Progressives, but the conduct of the elections +was apparently outside their powers of control. It may never become +possible in England for a political organization such as "Tammany Hall" +to succeed in planting on the register of voters a large number of +fraudulent names, nor is it necessary yet for the press to issue a +notice such as that which appeared in the New York _Evening Post:_ +"There are a thousand 'colonizers' waiting to vote for the Tammany +ticket. Vote early, so that no one can vote ahead of you in your +name."[8] In New York the Citizens' Unions have at each election to +spend several weeks in succession in thwarting attempts at this offence +on a large scale, and though our more perfect organization of elections +renders such frauds impossible, still if we are to arrest the +Americanization of our electoral contests we must cease to allow the +results of a "final rally," the votes of the least worthy citizens, +assiduous "nursing," or suggestive posters to decide the representation +of a constituency. + +_Party exclusiveness._ + +The preceding criticism of recent developments in electoral warfare must +not be read as a condemnation of party organization as such. Party +organization there must be, and unquestionably the success of a party is +intimately bound up with the efficiency of its organization. But our +defective electoral system confers upon party organization a weapon +which is not an adjunct to efficiency in the true sense of the word, but +a weapon which has been and can be made a serious menace to the +political independence and sincerity both of electors and of Members of +Parliament. During the memorable three-cornered fight in Greenwich in +1906, Lord Hugh Cecil made this statement: "The opposition to me is not +to put a Tariff Reformer in, but to keep me out. ... We are face to face +with an innovation in English politics, and it is a question of how far +it is desirable to introduce methods which may be handled with a view to +creating a party mechanism so rigid, so powerful, and so capable of +being directed by a particular mind towards a single object, that it may +become a formidable engine for carrying out a dangerous proposal. We do +not want a system of political assassination under which any one who is +in the way may be put out of the way." To realize the dangerous weapon +which our present system places in the hands of party organizations, it +is not necessary to give complete assent to the statement of Lord Hugh +Cecil as to the character of the opposition brought against him. The +power undoubtedly exists. Prior to the election of January 1910, the +secret organization known as "confederates" was reported to have marked +down all Unionist candidates who would not accept a course of policy +approved of by this body. The action was defended on the ground that it +was essential to secure Tariff Reform immediately and at all costs, but +it nevertheless constituted a serious attack upon the representative +character of the House of Commons. By such methods that historic House +will be deprived of its rightful place in the constitution of this +country. Political power will no longer be centred in the House of +Commons; it will be vested in organizations outside Parliament, which +will only meet to carry out their bidding. At the General Election of +1906 the mere threat of a three-cornered fight was sufficient to induce +many Free Trade Unionists to retire from the contest; the purging was +completed at the election of January 1910, and it would seem that in the +future only those politicians who can with alacrity adopt the newest +fashions or change their party allegiance can hope to take a permanent +part in the political life of their country. Many of those who were so +eager for Tariff Reform at all costs--the "confederates" +themselves--would probably have protested most vigorously had the same +policy of excluding competent men from Parliament been adopted for the +attainment of political objects of which they did not approve, and the +comment of _The Times_ on this exclusive policy reflects the opinion of +those who value the representative character of the House of Commons +more highly than an immediate party triumph:-- + +"Parliament ought to represent the opinion of the country as a whole, +and each of the great parties ought to represent the diversities of +opinion which incline to one side or the other of a dividing line +which, however practically convenient, does not itself represent any +hard and immutable frontier. Now the variety and elasticity of +representation, which are the secret of the permanence of our +institutions, are directly injured by any attempt to narrow the basis of +a party. If such attempts were to succeed upon any considerable scale we +should have a couple of machine-made parties confronting one another in +Parliament, with no golden bridges between their irreconcilable +programmes. There is some danger at the present day of an approximation +to a state of things in every way to be deprecated, and it is surely not +for the Unionist party to promote any movement tending in that +direction."[9] + +This process of excluding valuable elements from our representative +chamber is equally at work within the Liberal party. At the General +Election of 1906 Sir William Butler, a Liberal of very high attainments, +was compelled to withdraw his candidature for East Leeds on the ground +that he could not fully support the Education policy of the Government. +Mr. Harold Cox, during the Parliament of 1906, criticised the work of +the Liberal Government from the point of view of a Liberal of the +Manchester school, and the Preston Liberal Council withdrew its support. +Nor does the Labour Party escape the same charge. Originally each member +was required to accept in writing the constitution of the party, and +this condition was rigorously enforced. In January 1911 it was decided +at the Party Conference held at Leicester to dispense with the written +pledge, but it would appear that a cast-iron conformity to party +decisions is still insisted upon. On 10 February 1911 the party moved an +amendment to the Address in favour of the Right to Work Bill, a measure +as to the practicability of which there is a difference of opinion +within the party. Mr. Johnson, the member for Nuneaton, voted against +the amendment, and commenting on the incident the _Labour Leader_ said: +"Is Mr. Johnson to be allowed to defy the Party's mandate? We invite +the Labour stalwarts of Nuneaton to give their earnest consideration to +this question. And there can be no doubt as to what the verdict +will be." + +_Mechanical debates._ + +These repeated attempts to make members of a party conform in all +respects to a specified pattern, this constant insistence that members +must give up the right of criticism and support on all occasions the +party to which they belong, must and does react on the composition of +the House of Commons. The duty of a Member of Parliament will tend more +and more to be restricted to registering his approval or disapproval of +the decisions of the Government, and, as the central organization of +each party is in close touch with the party whips, the free and +independent electors will be more and more confined, in the election of +their representatives, to a choice between the nominees of machine-made +parties. Moreover, in a House of Commons so composed discussion +necessarily loses its vitalizing character. The debates on Free Trade in +the House of Commons in 1905 towards the close of Mr. Balfour's +administration were very real and full of life, because argument could +and did affect the votes of members, but if the process continues of +excluding all elements save those of the machine-controlled, debates +will become more and more formal. They will lose their value. As Lord +Hugh Cecil has said[10]: "The present system unquestionably weakens the +House of Commons by denuding it of moderate politicians not entirely in +sympathy with either political party, and consequently rendering +obsolete all the arts of persuasion and deliberation, and reducing +parliamentary discussion to a struggle between obstruction on the one +side and closure on the other. The disproportion, moreover, between the +majority in the House and that in the country, which it is supposed to +represent, deprives the decisions of the House of much of their moral +authority. The rigid partisanship, and the essentially unrepresentative +character of the House of Commons as now constituted, leave it only the +credit which belongs to the instrument of a party, and deprive it of +that higher authority which should be the portion of the representatives +of the whole people. "Similarly Mr. Birrell, in speaking[11] of the +debate on the Women's Franchise Bill (12 July 1910), stated that he +rejoiced in the immunity on that occasion from the tyranny of Government +programmes and the obligation to all to think alike. "To think in +programmes," said he, "is Egyptian bondage, and works the sterilization +of the political intellect." And the nation suffers. + +_The disfranchisement of minorities in bi-racial countries_ + +The extreme partizan who believes that political action is possible only +through a well-controlled organization may be affected but little by the +preceding arguments, and is, moreover, nearly always inclined to +postpone the consideration of any reform which might possibly deprive +his party of the advantages which he imagines it may obtain at the next +General Election. Yet cases have occurred when parties have sacrificed +their own advantage to the higher interests of the nation as a whole, +and national interests demand a change in electoral methods. For the +disfranchisement of minorities often gives rise to serious difficulties. +The elections which took place in the Transvaal and Orange River +Colony,[12] after the grant of self-government in 1906, show how racial +divisions are unduly emphasized by such disfranchisement. Only +one--Barberton--of the twenty-six country constituencies of the +Transvaal returned a member who did not owe allegiance to Het Volk, +although the figures of the polls showed that the minority numbered more +than 25 per cent, of the electors. In Pretoria the Progressives gained +but one seat, and that as the chance result of a three-cornered contest. +The disfranchisement of minorities heightened the natural difference +which existed between Johannesburg and the rest of the Transvaal--a +difference which would have been still more pronounced had not Het Volk +succeeded in obtaining six and the Nationalists five out of the total +of thirty-four seats allotted to Johannesburg and the Rand. The first +elections in the Orange River Colony resulted in a similar exaggerated +contrast between Bloemfontein and the rest of the country. Five seats +were allotted to Bloemfontein, four of which were won by members of the +Constitutional party, whilst the fifth was only lost to them by the +extremely narrow majority of two. Before the election _The Friend_, the +organ of the Orangia Unie, stated that "if Bloemfontein ventures to vote +for the Constitutionalists it will be setting itself in opposition to +the whole country, and will be manifesting a spirit of distrust of the +country population for which it will have to suffer afterwards." On the +morrow of the election the same paper declared that "the election +results of Bloemfontein will be read with deep disappointment throughout +the colony, where the feeling will be that the capital has now shown +itself politically an alien city." But would Bloemfontein have "shown +itself politically an alien city" if the electoral method had been such +that the minorities, both in Bloemfontein and in the country districts, +had been able to secure representation in proportion to their strength? + +Had the Constitution of South Africa provided for the representation of +minorities in the House of Assembly, as proposed in the original draft +signed at Cape Town, the process of race unification, both in the +Transvaal and the Orange River Colony, would have been facilitated, and +the conflicting interests of the constituent States and of town and +country would not by their exaggerated expression in the United +Parliament have impeded the consolidation and unification of South +Africa. The problem presented by racial differences is not confined to +South Africa. The United Kingdom itself presents a conspicuous example +of a nation in which the process of unification is still far from +complete, and the process has been retarded, and is at the present time +being retarded, by the electoral method in force. Not only does Ireland +still continue to chafe against the Union, but the racial divisions +within Ireland itself are encouraged and fostered by the failure of our +representative system to do justice to minorities. The South and West of +Ireland is represented in the House of Commons by Nationalists, and +Nationalists alone, and, ranged in opposition to them, the North-East is +represented by a smaller but equally determined body of Unionists, while +those forces in Ireland which would endeavour, and in the past have +endeavoured, to bridge over the differences between the North and South +are entirely unrepresented. Had the minorities in the North and South of +Ireland been represented within the House, there would probably have +still remained a notable contrast between the two areas, but that +contrast would not have appeared in its present heightened form, and, in +addition, with a true electoral system there would have come from +Ireland representatives whose sole aim and purpose was to achieve its +unification. The picture which Ireland would have presented within the +House would have been of a different character to that presented to-day, +and the perennial Irish problem would have been infinitely less +difficult, because the forces which made for union would have had full +play. Even the unification of England and Wales may, in some respects, +be described as incomplete; but such differences as exist largely arise +from the electoral system which sometimes deprives the minority in Wales +of all representation in the House of Commons. When in 1906 the fortunes +of the Welsh Conservatives reached their lowest ebb, the latter numbered +36 per cent. of the voters, whilst in former elections the minority +sometimes exceeded 40 per cent. Had Welsh Conservatives, during the last +two decades, been adequately represented in the House of Commons, would +not our conception of Wales from the political point of view have been +considerably modified, would not the process of political unification +have been made more complete? + +The non-representation of minorities in Belgium accentuated the racial +religious and language differences between Flanders and Wallony. +Flanders was represented by Catholics only; the French-speaking +districts by Liberals and Socialists. With proportional representation +members of all three parties are returned in both areas, and this result +has brought in its train a great national advantage, the political +consolidation of Belgium. Another example of the disintegrating effects +of the disfranchisement of minorities is to be seen in the American +Civil War. A committee of the United States Senate unanimously reported +in 1869 that this war might have been averted had the minorities in the +North and South been duly represented in Congress. In the words of the +report the absence of minority representation "in the States of the +South when rebellion was plotted, and when open steps were taken to +break the Union was unfortunate, for it would have held the Union men of +those States together and have given them voice in the electoral +colleges.... Dispersed, unorganized, unrepresented, without due voice +and power, they could interpose no effectual resistance to secession and +to civil war." + +_Defective representation in municipal bodies_.] + +False impressions of public opinion, unstable legislation, the weakening +of the House of Commons, both in authority and in personnel, the +degradation of party warfare, the undue exaltation of party machinery, +the heightening of racial differences and of sectional interests, these +are the fruits of that rough and ready system of Parliamentary elections +with which hitherto we have been content. The electoral methods in force +both in County Council and in Municipal elections are based on the same +false principle, and in these spheres of corporate activity results +almost equally disastrous are produced. The London County Council +elections of 1907 presented most of the features which characterized the +Parliamentary elections of 1906. Such catastrophic changes in the +personnel of the County Council as took place in 1907 involves serious +consequences to London ratepayers. In this election two ex-chairmen of +the Council, the vice-chairman and several chairmen of committees, lost +their seats. These were men who had been chosen by their colleagues +because of their special fitness for their positions, and this wholesale +dismissal as a result of a temporary wave of public feeling may make it +more difficult to secure as candidates those who are prepared to devote +the necessary time to the study of London's problems, for it is +generally admitted that the position of a London County Councillor is no +sinecure. The effective discharge of his duties demands unremitting +attention to details. The new Council was remarkable for the number of +members who had yet to win their spurs in public work, and London was +the poorer for the loss of those able administrators whom thousands of +voters desired as their representatives. A true electoral system would +not only secure the adequate representation of all parties, but the +presence in the Council of the most competent exponents of +different policies. + +_Wasteful municipal finance._ + +Not only does the electoral system involve undue changes in the +personnel of the Council, but it leads to an extremely wasteful +expenditure of public money. Whether the London County Council was or +was not justified in establishing a steamboat service, nothing can be +more wasteful than that one Council should establish such a service at +great cost, and that its successor should immediately reverse that +policy. The steady development of a works department by one Council and +its abandonment by a succeeding Council similarly involves useless +expenditure. A fully representative Council would not display such +violent alterations of policy, and it is of the utmost importance that +the objects on which it is decided to spend public moneys should be the +deliberate and considered choice of a Council on which all interests are +fairly represented. + +_No continuity in administration_.] + +The Metropolitan Borough Council elections tell a similar tale. The +Lewisham Borough Council consisted in 1900 of 35 Moderates and 7 +Progressives; in 1903 of 34 Progressives and 8 Moderates and +Independents; in 1906 of 42 Moderates, no representatives of the +Progressive or Labour parties being elected. In three successive +elections there was a complete change in the composition of the Council. +Lewisham's experience is typical of that of several other London +boroughs. Many councillors of the widest experience in municipal affairs +lose their seats at the same time, and there is in consequence no +security of continuity in the administration of the business of the +Metropolitan boroughs. Dr. Gilbert Slater, in giving evidence before a +select committee of the House of Lords, said: "I found, of course, when +I came on to the Council without any previous municipal experience +except by observation, that I and other members equally inexperienced +had to take great responsibilities upon ourselves. For instance, I was +vice-chairman of the Finance Committee, and my Chairman also had had no +previous municipal experience; the Finance Committee was felt to be one +of the most important of the Committees of the Council, and the fact +that its Chairman and Vice-chairman were two new members itself was a +weakness."[13] Dr. Slater added that it took three years' hard work +before a councillor could really master the affairs of a London borough, +and that being so, is it surprising that it is becoming increasingly +difficult to secure the services of competent men for the work of our +local bodies? There undoubtedly are, on both aides, men of marked +ability and of whole-hearted devotion to public affairs, but if our +electoral system is such that, in the presence of an undiscriminating +swing of the pendulum, their ability and devotion count for nothing, +such men tend, albeit unwillingly, to withdraw from public life. The +influence of the permanent official increases; the authority of the +representative assembly declines. + +_The root of the evil._ + +In parliamentary, in county, and in borough council elections alike we +trace the evils of defective electoral methods. These evils constitute a +complete answer to Lord Morley's criticism of Mill, that the latter laid +undue stress upon the efficiency of electoral machinery. Erected on a +false basis, those democratic institutions, on which so many hopes have +been built and on which our future still depends, are found full of +shortcomings due not only to the imperfections of human nature but to +the ill-working of a defective electoral system. The evils arising from +the latter cause can at least be remedied, and in remedying them we may +make it possible for the electors to put more intelligence and +conscience into their votes. Since Mill was, as Lord Morley says, +concerned with the important task of moulding and elevating popular +character, he was rightly anxious that the electoral machinery should be +such as to give due weight to those who desired to take an intelligent +interest in the affairs of their country. + + +[Footnote 1: _The Manchester Guardian_, 12 February 1909.] + +[Footnote 2: Annual Meeting, Proportional Representation Society, 9 May +1906.] + +[Footnote 3: _The Times_, 8 January 1906.] + +[Footnote 4: _Human Nature in Politics_, pp. 241 _et seq_.] + +[Footnote 5: _The Times_, 22 August 1906.] + +[Footnote 6: _The Essentials of Self-Government,_ pp. 102 _et seq_.] + +[Footnote 7: It is a matter for congratulation that in so many States +there is now (1911) a movement of revolt against the domination of +the "boss."] + +[Footnote 8: _The Manchester Guardian_, 21 April 1908.] + +[Footnote 9: _The Times_, 22 January 1909.] + +[Footnote 10: Letter read at the annual meeting of the Proportional +Representation Society, 24 April 1907.] + +[Footnote 11: Eighty Club, 25 July 1910.] + +[Footnote 12: Before the Union.] + +[Footnote 13: _Report on Municipal Representation Bill (H. L.)_, 1907 +(132).] + + + + +CHAPTER IV + +THE REPRESENTATION OF MINORITIES + + +The one pervading evil of democracy is the tyranny of the majority that +succeeds by force or fraud in carrying elections. To break off that +point is to avert the danger. The common system of representation +perpetuates the danger. Unequal electorates afford no security to +majorities. Equal electorates give none to minorities. Thirty-five years +ago it was pointed out that the remedy is proportional representation. +It is profoundly democratic, for it increases the influence of thousands +who would otherwise have no voice in the Government; and it brings men +more near an equality by so contriving that no vote shall be wasted, and +that every voter shall contribute to bring into Parliament a member of +his own opinion."--LORD ACTON + +The disfranchisement of minorities, noted in the two previous chapters +as the outcome of our electoral methods, attracted considerable +attention during the latter half of the nineteenth century, and several +legislative proposals were carried with the specific object of remedying +the evil. Indeed every electoral reform bill, beginning with that of +1832, has been accompanied with a demand or a suggestion for an +improvement in methods of election in order to secure for the House of +Commons a fully representative character. For it was clearly realized +that without some such improvement neither an extension of the franchise +nor a redistribution of seats would necessarily make the House a mirror +of the nation. These attempts to secure representation for minorities +have, however, often been confounded with the movement in favour of +proportional representation--the just representation of all parties--and +this confusion of thought may be partly due to the eloquent plea for the +representation of minorities advanced by Mill in the chapter in +_Representative Government_ devoted to the advocacy of Hare's scheme of +proportional representation. This confusion showed itself in the speech +which the Marquis of Ripon contributed to the debate[1] on the second +reading of the Municipal Representation Bill, introduced by Lord +Courtney of Penwith in 1907, for the purpose of enabling municipalities +to adopt a system of proportional representation. "It was a remarkable +thing," Lord Ripon said, "that so far as the experiments had gone they +had not succeeded, and that, he thought, should make them cautious when +looking into proposals of this kind." The experiments to which Lord +Ripon referred were legislative proposals for the representation of +minorities, and it cannot be admitted that these experiments were +failures. They did secure the representation of minorities. The +machinery provided did not enable them to do more, and an analysis of +the results of these experiments will show to what extent they succeeded +in their object, and at the same time disclose in what respects these +experiments fell short of a true electoral method. + +_The Limited Vote_.] + +The first of these experiments was known as the Limited Vote--a method +of voting which involves the creation of constituencies returning +several members but limits the elector in the number of his votes; the +elector is only permitted to vote for a number of candidates which is +less than the number of members to be elected, whilst he may not give +more than one vote to any one candidate. The Limited Vote was first +proposed by Mr. Mackworth Praed in Committee on the Reform Bill of 1831, +and the proposal was renewed by him in the following year in the Bill +which became the great Reform Act of 1832. Up to that time the +constituencies of England returned two members apiece, with the +exception of the City of London, which returned four, and of five +boroughs each returning one member. The Reform Bill provided that a +third member should be added to the representation of each of seven +counties, and that certain other counties should be divided into two or +more constituencies, each returning two members. Mr. Praed proposed to +drop this subdivision of counties, although permitting the additional +members to be given, and proposed that in constituencies returning +three or four members an elector should not be allowed to vote for more +than two candidates. The arguments advanced by Mr. Praed are worth +quoting. "He was of opinion," said he, "that it was an error in the +original construction of the Representative Assembly of this country to +allow any person to have more than one vote, for, by the present system, +it was frequently the case that the same persons, constituting perhaps a +bare majority of the electors, returned both members.... In the present +case, if large counties were not divided each freeholder would have four +votes. He wished to restrict them to two, and he thought that this +object might be attained even without the division of counties by +allowing each freeholder to vote only for two members although four was +to be the number returned. Some measure should be taken to make the vote +and views of a large minority known in the legislature." + +This form of voting was proposed by Lord Aberdeen's Government in the +Parliamentary Representation Bill of 1854. In this Bill it was proposed +to give a third member to 38 counties and divisions of counties (in +addition to the seven counties which already possessed that privilege), +and also to eight boroughs. Lord John Russell, in introducing the +measure, made a powerful plea on behalf of the representation of +minorities in each of these constituencies, but the Crimean War rendered +further consideration of the Bill impossible. The system was, however, +applied to thirteen constituencies by the Representation of the People +Act of 1867. It was not provided for in the Bill as submitted by the +Government, nor was it supported by the leader of the Opposition. Its +introduction was due to the action of Lord Cairns, who, on 30 July 1867, +carried in the House of Lords, with the support of Lord Russell and Lord +Spencer, the following amendment:-- + +"At a contested election for any county or borough represented by three +members, no person shall vote for more than two candidates." A further +amendment applicable to the City of London, which returned four members, +was also carried. The system remained in force until the Redistribution +Act of 1885, when three-member constituencies were abolished. "There is +nothing," said Lord Cairns, in the course of a memorable speech, "so +irksome to those who form the minority of one of these large +constituencies as to find that from the mere force of numbers they are +virtually excluded from the exercise of any political power, that it is +in vain for them to attempt to take any part in public affairs, that the +election must always go in one direction, and that they have no +political power whatever." + +The following table will show that Lord Cairns' proposal secured the +object which he had in view--the representation of minorities:-- + + 1868. 1874. 1880. +Constituency. Actual Probable Actual Probable Actual Probable + results results results results results results + with without with without with without + Limited Limited Limited Limited Limited Limited + Vote. Vote. Vote. Vote. Vote. Vote. + L. C. L. C. L. C. L. C. L. C. L. C +Berkshire 1 2 0 3 1 2 0 3 1 2 0 3 +Birmingham 3 0 3 0 3 0 3 0 3 0 3 0 +Buckinghamshire 1 2 0 3 1 2 0 3 1 2 0 3 +Cambridgeshire 1 2 0 3 1 2 0 3 1 2 0 3 +Dorsetshire 1 2 0 3 1 2 0 3 1 2 0 3 +Glasgow 3 0 3 0 2 1 3 0 3 0 3 0 +Herefordshire 1 2 0 3 1 2 0 3 2 1 3 0 +Hertfordshire 2 1 3 0 1 2 0 3 1 2 0 3 +Leeds 2 1 3 0 1 2 3 0 2 1 3 0 +Liverpool 1 2 0 3 1 2 0 3 1 2 0 3 +London (City) 3 1 4 0 1 3 0 4 1 3 0 4 +Manchester 2 1 3 0 1 2 0 3 2 1 3 0 +Oxfordshire 1 2 0 3 1 2 3 0 1 2 0 3 + +Totals 22 18 19 21 16 24 9 31 20 20 15 25 + +The actual results show the relative strength of the two great political +parties in each constituency; the probable results are based on the +hypothesis that if each voter could have given one vote to each of three +candidates, each of the parties would have nominated three candidates, +and that as the electors would for the most part have voted on party +lines, the larger body would have secured all three seats. In Berkshire, +Buckinghamshire, Cambridgeshire, Dorsetshire, Hertfordshire, +Oxfordshire, Liverpool and London, the Liberal minorities each obtained +a representative, whilst the Conservative minorities in Herefordshire, +Leeds, and Manchester also obtained representatives. There were only two +constituencies--Birmingham and Glasgow--where the minority failed to +obtain representation, and this was due to the fact that the minorities +in these particular constituencies were comparatively small. + +A consideration in detail of the election in Birmingham in 1880 will +show why the minority sometimes failed to obtain representation, and +will, at the same time, direct attention to the defects of the system. +The figures of this election were as follows:-- + +H. Muntz (Liberal) 22,969 +John Bright (Liberal) 20,079 +Joseph Chamberlain (Liberal) 19,544 + + 62,592 + +Major F. Burnaby (Con.) 15,735 +Hon. A. C. G. Calthorpe (Con.) 14,208 + + 29,943 + +It will be seen that the Liberals obtained 62,592 votes and the +Conservatives 29,943 votes, and that the latter therefore numbered +slightly less than a third of the constituency. If the Liberal votes had +not been distributed as evenly as they were over their three candidates, +it might have resulted that the lowest candidate on the poll, Joseph +Chamberlain, would have received less votes than Major Burnaby, who was +the highest of the two Conservative candidates. In order to obtain the +full advantage of their numerical superiority it was necessary for the +Liberal organization to make an extensive canvass of their supporters, +to ascertain as accurately as possible their strength, and to issue +precise instructions to the voters in each district as to the manner in +which they should record their votes. The memorable cry associated with +these elections--"Vote as you are told and we'll carry you through +"--was fit accompaniment of these efforts of the Birmingham caucus.[2] +But had there been a mistake in the calculations of the Liberal +organization, had the polls disclosed a larger number of Conservatives, +disaster would have followed the nomination of three Liberal candidates. +If for example the votes had been as follows:-- + +Muintz Liberal)...... 21,000 +Bright (Liberal)..... 20,000 +Chamberlain (Liberal) 20,000 + + 61,000 + +Burnaby (Conservative). 22,000 +Calthorpe (Conservative). 21,000 + + 43,000 + +the Conservatives would have returned two members, and the Liberals, +although in a majority, would have returned only one. In brief, the +party organizers had to be quite sure that their supporters numbered +more than 60 per cent. of the electorate, and that these supporters +would vote faithfully as ordered before they could recommend the +nomination of three candidates. The attempt to obtain all three seats at +Leeds, in the General Election of 1874, failed, with the result that the +minority got the larger share of the representation. The poll on this +occasion was as follows:-- + +M. Carter (Liberal)..... 15,390 +E. Baines (Liberal) .... 11,850 +Dr. F. R. Lees (Liberal). 5,945 + + 33,185 + +W.St.J.Wheelhouse (Con.) 14,864 +R. Tenant (Con.) . . .....13,192 + + 28,056 + +In this election the total Liberal vote amounted to 33,185, and the +total Conservative vote amounted to 28,056, but the Conservatives +obtained two seats out of three. + +The practical working of the Limited Vote has therefore shown that the +representation of a minority in a three-member constituency was always +secured whenever that minority numbered not less than two-fifths of the +electors, and as, in the majority of constituencies, the minority +exceeded this proportion the minority was able to return one of the +members. The system, however, possesses no elasticity. No party can put +forward a complete list of candidates without incurring considerable +risk, and even if the party has an ascertained strength of more than +three-fifths complete victory is only possible if the members of the +party are willing to carry out implicitly the instructions of the party +organization. It should be noted, in connexion with this system of +voting, that the more limited the vote the greater is the opportunity +afforded to the minority to obtain representation. When in a four-member +constituency each elector has three votes the minority must number +three-sevenths before it can obtain a representative; if, however, each +elector is limited to two votes a smaller minority, namely, a minority +which exceeds one-third of the electors, can make sure of returning a +member.[3] + +_The Cumulative Vote_.] + +The Cumulative Vote, the second of the experiments referred to by Lord +Ripen, although by no means free from serious defects, has also secured +the object for which it was designed--the representation of minorities. +With this system the member has as many votes as there are members to be +elected, and is permitted to distribute them amongst candidates, or to +cumulate them among one or more candidates according to his own +discretion. It was warmly advocated for the first time under the name of +the Cumulative Vote by James Garth Marshall in an open letter entitled +"Minorities and Majorities: their Relative Rights," addressed by him in +1853 to Lord John Russell. But three years earlier, in 1850, it was +recommended[4] by the Committee of the Privy Council for Trade and +Plantations, and adopted by Earl Grey in the draft Constitution proposed +for the Cape of Good Hope. The Legislative Council of Cape Colony +continued to be elected under this system until the Council disappeared +under the new Constitution of United South Africa. The Cumulative Vote +secured the representation of minorities in the Legislative Council of +Cape Colony, and a striking testimony to its value, from this point of +view, was given by Lord Milner when speaking in the House of Lords on 31 +July 1906, on the announcement of the terms of the new Transvaal +Constitution:-- + +"I hope," said Lord Milner, "that when the time for making the Second +Chamber elective comes, this matter may be reconsidered, for it is +certainly very remarkable how much more fairly the system of +proportional representation works out in the Cape Colony than the +system, not of single members there, but of double-member +representation. Take only a single instance. In the Cape Colony, take +the bulk of the country districts; you have, roughly speaking, about two +Boers to every one white man who is not a Boer. On the system which +prevails for the Lower House the representation of these districts is +exclusively Boer, for one-third of the population is absolutely excluded +from any representation whatever. Under the system which prevails in the +election to the Upper House, as nearly as possible one-third of the +representatives of those districts are British. Inversely, in the case +of the Cape Peninsula, where there is an enormously preponderant British +population, but still a considerable Dutch population also, you get in +the Lower House no single Dutch representative, whereas in the Upper +House there are three representatives, one of whom represents the Dutch +section. You could not have a more curious illustration of the great +difference in fairness between the two principles as applied to the +practical conditions of South Africa. And I cannot help hoping that +between this time and the time when the Constitution of the projected +Upper House comes to be decided, there may be such a development of +opinion as will enable and justify the Government of that day adopting +the far sounder principle for the elections to the Upper Chamber. It +certainly has a great bearing upon that development of better feeling +between the two great races of South Africa whom we are all agreed in +desiring to see ultimately amalgamated and fused." + +The Cape Assembly was elected by constituencies returning one or more +members, and when more than one each voter could give a single vote to +as many candidates as there were members to be elected, with the +consequence that the majority in every constituency commanded the whole +of its representation. The Council was elected by larger areas with the +cumulative vote. Lord Milner in his speech refers to the cumulative vote +as proportional voting, but it cannot, strictly speaking, be so +described. Nevertheless his testimony clearly shows that the cumulative +vote secured the representation of minorities--the great need of which +has been recognized by all impartial students of South African political +conditions. + +Mr. Robert Lowe endeavoured to introduce this form of voting into the +Electoral Reform Bill of 1867, but failed, and the only practical +application of the system within the United Kingdom has been in +connexion with School Board elections. It was introduced into the +Education Act of 1870 on the motion of a private member, Lord Frederick +Cavendish, whose proposition, supported as it was by W.E. Forster, +Vice-President of the Council for Education, by W.H. Smith and by Henry +Fawcett, was carried without a division. Under this Act London was +divided into eleven electoral areas, returning from four to seven +members each; whilst the large towns, such as Manchester, Birmingham, +and others, each constituted an electoral area itself, electing a Board +of some fifteen members. The Education Act for Scotland which followed +in the same Parliament embodied the same principle in the-same manner. +The figures of any School Board election will show that the object aimed +at--the representation of minorities--was undoubtedly achieved. The last +election of the School Board for London, that of 1900, will serve for +purposes of illustration. The figures are as follows:-- + + Votes Obtained. Members Returned. +Constituency. Mode- Pro- Inde- Mode- Pro- Inde- + rate. gressive. pendent. rate. gressive. pendent. +City 4,572 2,183 3 1 +Chelsea 7,831 5,408 2,144 3 2 +Finsbury 7,573 7,239 837 3 3 1 +Greenwich 6,706 6,008 3,375 2 1 +Hackney 5,438 9,130 1,579 2 3 +Lambeth, E 4,370 9,913 1,313 1 3 +Lambeth, W. 8,709 14,156 54 2 4 +Marylebone 9,450 7,047 536 4 3 +Southwark 2,636 3,430 2,328 1 2 1 +Tower Hamlets 6,199 7,437 5,495 1 3 1 +Westminster 4,829 2,354 3 2 + +Totals 68,313 74,305 17,661 25 27 3 + +In each constituency the minority was enabled to obtain some +representation, and although in the majority of cases the representation +was still confined to the two main parties, yet it was possible for an +independent candidate, as in the Tower Hamlets, or a Roman Catholic +candidate, as in Southwark, to succeed in their respective candidatures. +The Cumulative Vote not only secured the representation of minorities, +but in so doing facilitated very considerably the working of the +Education Act. Mr. Patrick Cumin, at that time permanent secretary of +the Education Department, in giving evidence before a select committee +of the House of Commons, stated that "it would not have been possible to +carry the Act into effect, and certainly there would have been more +friction if the cumulative vote had not been in existence; for instance, +he did not believe that the bye-laws could possibly have been carried +into effect without co-operation." The Right Hon. W.E. Forster and Sir +Francis Sandford bore similar testimony, and the Royal Commission on the +Elementary Education Acts, in the Report issued in 1888, strongly +advised the retention of a system of minority representation. + +The Cumulative Vote was also adopted by the State of Illinois for the +elections to the State House of Representatives. Each constituency +returns three members, and the elector may cumulate or divide his votes, +giving one vote to each candidate, or one and a half votes to each of +two candidates, or three votes to one candidate. "As a result," says +Professor Commons, "both parties have representatives from every part of +the State instead of from the strongholds only, and there are no +hopeless minorities of the two main parties. Every citizen who has +business before the Legislature has some member of his own party to +transact that business." Constituencies returning three members are, +however, not sufficiently large to do justice to this method of voting. + +The Cumulative Vote, whilst securing representation to the minority, +does not necessarily secure the representation of majorities and +minorities in their true proportions. As with the Limited Vote, the +party organizations, if they desire to make use of their polling +strength to the fullest advantage, must make as accurate an estimate as +possible of the numbers of their supporters, and must issue explicit +directions as to the way in which votes should be recorded. To nominate +more candidates than the party can carry may end in disaster. In the +first School Board elections in Birmingham the Liberal organization +endeavoured to obtain the whole of the representation, and nominated +fifteen candidates. The party polled a majority of the votes, but as +these votes were distributed over too many candidates, the Liberals +succeeded in returning only a minority of representatives. It is not +easy to understand how the Birmingham National League came to imagine +that, with the Cumulative Vote, they would still be able to elect a +Board composed of members entirely of their own side, and Mr. Forster +banteringly suggested that the League should obtain the assistance of a +well-taught elementary schoolboy who would be able to show them that it +was impossible to get the return which they supposed they might obtain. +While there was little excuse for the mistake made by the Birmingham +National League, it must be remembered that with the Cumulative Vote it +is easy to fall into the opposite error of nominating too few +candidates. Every School Board election furnishes examples of an +excessive concentration of votes upon individual candidates. The Glasgow +School Board election of 1909 resulted as follows:-- + +Elected----James Barr 81,109 + Canon Dyer 58,711 + John Shaughnessy 54,310 + Charles Byrne 54,236 + Rev. James Brisby 51,357 + W. Rounsfell Brown 35,739 + R. S. Allan 24,017 + Rev. J. Fraser Grahame 23,806 + Dr. Henry Dyer 23,422 + Mrs. Mary Mason 22,929 + W. Martin Haddow 21,880 + Rev. Robert Pryde 21,692 + Miss K. V. Bannatyne 18,864 + Mrs. Agnes Hardie 18,794 + J. Leiper Gemmil 18,619 +Unelected--Rev. J. A. Robertson 18,534 + James Welsh 13,951 + Dr. Sloan 13,114 + S. M. Lipschitz 12,680 + Dr. Charles Workman 7,405 + James Laidlaw 4,869 + Patrick Gallagher 2,478 + ------- + 602,516 + +It will be seen that the candidate at the head of the list, Mr. Barr, +obtained over 81,000 votes, and the highest of the unsuccessful +candidates 18,534 votes. The total number of votes polled was 602,516, +and one-fifteenth of this number, viz. 40,167, would have been amply +sufficient to secure the return of any one candidate. The votes given to +Mr. Barr in excess of this number were wasted, and thus, although with +the cumulative vote minorities can secure representation, neither +majorities nor minorities secure with any degree of certainty +representation in their true proportions. + +_The Single Vote_.] + +Japan, keenly alive to the evils of a defective electoral system, +abandoned, after a short trial, the system adopted when the Japanese +Constitution was promulgated in 1889. The administrative areas (with +some exceptions) were then divided into single-member constituencies, +but it was soon found how unsatisfactorily this system works. It would +appear from a memorandum prepared by Mr. Kametaro Hayashida, Chief +Secretary of the Japanese House of Representatives--a memorandum which +is printed in full in Appendix I.--that in certain of the administrative +areas a minority of the voters often obtained a majority of the members +elected. It was almost impossible for political parties to obtain +representation in proportion to the strength of their supporters. In +1900 a new election law was adopted. The administrative areas, +irrespective of size, were made parliamentary constituencies returning a +number of members varying from one to twelve according to the population +of the area, but the voter in any area was permitted only one vote. He +can vote for one candidate and no more. Under this system minorities can +and do get a share of representation whenever the area returns two or +more members. A secondary advantage of considerable importance was +secured by making the administrative areas conterminous with the +parliamentary constituencies. Future redistributions of seats would +leave the boundaries of these areas untouched; they would merely +consist of a re-arrangement of the number of members to be returned by +each area. + +The new system secured not only the representation of minorities, but +also the representation of the chief parties in reasonable proportion to +their voting strength. Further, to men of independent mind and character +the new system offered a greater opportunity of maintaining their +position in the House of Representatives. As will be seen from Mr. +Hayashida's memorandum, both Mr. Ozaki, the Mayor of Tokio, and Mr. S. +Shimada, have never lost their seats in Parliament, although they have +stood as independent candidates. At the General Election of 1908 they +were returned for their native prefecture or town with a great number of +votes. These are results of no mean value which are certainly not +possible with our Parliamentary system of single-member constituencies, +or with the block vote as used in the London municipal elections. Yet, +in spite of the marked superiority of the Japanese system, it falls +short of a true system of representation; it lacks the elasticity and +adaptability which should characterize such a system. Like the limited +vote and the cumulative vote, the Japanese system of the single vote +demands exact calculations on the part of party organizations, which +otherwise may fail to secure for their party the maximum number of +representatives. The number of candidates nominated must depend upon a +careful estimate of probable support, and when the nominations have +taken place efforts must be made by the party organizations to allot +this support to their candidates in such a way that not one of them is +in danger of defeat. Moreover, as the nomination of too large a number +of candidates would, as with the limited vote, be disastrous, parties +have in some constituencies been unwilling to nominate more than the +number of candidates who were successful at the previous election. + +_The need of minority representation_.] + +It cannot be maintained then, as was suggested by Lord Ripon, that the +experiments made for the purpose of securing the representation of +minorities have failed. All the methods tried--the limited, the +cumulative, and the single vote--have without question accomplished +their purpose. They have done even more. The cumulative vote facilitated +the smooth working of the Elementary Education Act, the single vote has +secured for Japan a House of Representatives which reflects in +reasonable proportions the political forces of the country. The problem +for the future is not the abandonment of the principle of minority +representation, but the adoption of such improvements in voting +mechanism as will do justice to majorities and to minorities alike. For +the need of minority representation is becoming more and not less +urgent. A brief reference to the more important Parliamentary Bills of +recent years will show that the most difficult problems which our +administrators have had to face in the framing of those Bills have +centred round the problem of representation--and that problem will recur +with greater frequency in the future. Mr. Birrell, the Chief Secretary +for Ireland, considered it essential that some special provision for the +representation of minorities should be embodied in the Irish +Administrative Council Bill introduced into the House of Commons in May +1907. But the method proposed--that the Council should consist of +eighty-two elected members and twenty-four nominated members--was +essentially undemocratic. The nominated members, even if they were +representative of the minority, would never have had the same authority +or influence as they would have had as members duly elected by the votes +of the minority; and even if we admit the special difficulties attending +the representation of minorities in Ireland the solution proposed by Mr. +Birrell was in every sense of the term unsatisfactory, and obviously of +a temporary character. The first step towards the solution of Irish +problems will have been taken when due provision has been made by +popular election for the representation of minorities. + +Lord Morley of Blackburn, in preparing his great scheme of Indian +reforms, found himself face to face with the same problem--the +representation of minorities. He had, moreover, been advised by the +Indian Government that "in most provinces the Muhammadans are in favour +of election, and regard nomination as an inferior method of obtaining +admission to the Legislative Council."[5] Lord Morley, willingly or +unwillingly, was compelled to brush aside the English electoral methods +as inapplicable to India, and to provide for the representation on the +proposed Provincial Legislative Councils of Hindus and Muhammadans in +proportion to their strength. The method proposed was an arbitrary one, +and can be best described by quoting the terms of Lord Morley's +preliminary despatch. + +"Let it be supposed that the total population of the Province is twenty +millions, of whom fifteen millions are Hindus and five millions +Muhammadans, and the number of members to be elected twelve. Then since +the Hindus are to Muhammadans as three to one, nine Hindus should be +elected to three Muhammadans. In order to obtain these members, divide +the Province into three electoral areas, in each of which three Hindus +and one Muhammadan are to be returned. Then, in each of these areas, +constitute an electoral college, consisting of, let us say, a hundred +members. In order to preserve the proportion between the two religions, +seventy-five of these should be Hindus and twenty-five Muhammadans. This +electoral college should be obtained by calling upon the various +electorates ... to return to it such candidates as they desired, a +definite number being allotted to each electorate. Out of those offering +themselves and obtaining votes, the seventy-five Hindus who obtained the +majority of votes should be declared members of the College, and the +twenty-five Musalmans who obtained the majority should similarly be +declared elected. If the Musalmans returned did not provide twenty-five +members for the Electoral College, the deficiency would be made good by +nomination. Having thus obtained an Electoral College containing +seventy-five Hindus and twenty-five Musalmans, that body would be called +upon to elect three representatives for the Hindus and one for the +Muhammadans; each member of the College would have only one vote, and +could vote for only one candidate. In this way it is evident that it +would be in the power of each section of the population to return a +member in the proportion corresponding to its own proportion to the +total population."[6] + +Lord Morley proceeded to explain that "in this manner minorities would +be protected against exclusion by majorities, and all large and +important sections of the population would have the opportunity of +returning members in proportion to their ratio to the total population. +Their choice would in that event be exercised in the best possible way, +that, namely, of popular election, instead of requiring Government to +supply deficiencies by the dubious method of nomination." The system of +nomination, considered by Mr. Birrell as an adequate solution of this +problem in Ireland, was summarily rejected, and rightly so, by Lord +Morley as being inferior to popular election, inferior even to the +arbitrary method proposed by himself. The plan finally adopted by Lord +Morley was a modification of the proposal here outlined, and its +working, as the working of all arbitrary schemes must, has evoked +criticism on the ground that it does not hold the scales even as between +the two sections to be represented. + +The Select Committee appointed by the House of Lords "to consider the +suggestions made from time to time for increasing the efficiency of that +House," was compelled to propose a method of election by which the +Liberal minority might retain some representation in that House. In the +election of Representative Peers for Scotland the majority method of +election is followed, with the result that none but Unionists are +chosen. It was obvious that no proposal for the reform of the House of +Lords which embodied an electoral method so unjust could possibly be +entertained, and therefore this Select Committee, following in this all +previous proposals for the reform of the Upper House, reported that the +representation of the minority was essential. A new Second Chamber is +now advocated both by Liberals and Unionists. + +Again, Mr. Asquith's Government experienced a very distinct rebuff in +its attempt to abolish the cumulative vote in the elections of Scottish +School Boards without making any alternative provision for the +representation of minorities. The Government proposed to substitute the +block vote for the cumulative vote. The block vote would have enabled +the majority of the electors to have secured the whole of the +representation on the Board. The deletion of the Government's proposal +was proposed in the Scottish Grand Committee, but was defeated. A +further amendment by Mr. Phipson Beale in favour of the principle of +proportional representation was, in spite of the strong opposition of +the Secretary for Scotland, defeated only by twenty-two votes to +eighteen. The Government finally withdrew their proposal to abolish the +cumulative vote, and it has been made abundantly clear that, while the +cumulative vote is far from satisfactory, it can only be dispensed with +by the introduction of a better and more scientific way of securing the +representation of minorities. + +In framing the Port of London Bill, Mr. Lloyd George had to make some +provision for the representation of the various interests concerned, and +so far as possible, in due proportion. It was impossible to entrust the +control of the new Port to the largest interest only, and accordingly he +proposed that "in prescribing the manner in which votes are to be +recorded, the Board of Trade shall have regard to the desirability of +votes being so recorded, whether by allowing the voter to record a vote +for a number of candidates in order of preference or otherwise, as to +secure that so far as possible the several interests concerned shall be +adequately represented on the Port Authority."[7] The reports of the +Poor Law Commission also raise in an acute form the problem of minority +representation. If the far-reaching suggestions of these reports are to +become law, and especially if the powers of County and County Borough +Councils are to be still further increased, the constitution of these +bodies will have to be closely examined. Are minorities to be excluded +altogether from the new authorities; are they to secure representation +through the processes of co-option and nomination; or are they to obtain +a hearing by a system of election that will provide them with +representation in their own right? + +While these and other matters are bringing into greater prominence the +need of minority representation, a new problem--one with which the +Continent has long been familiar--has arisen in connexion with English +parliamentary elections. In an increasing number of contests three or +more candidates have taken the field, and the candidate obtaining the +highest number of votes has been elected although he may have received +less than half the votes recorded. A member so chosen obviously +represents only a minority of the electors in the constituency for which +he has been returned. Such results have come as a shock to those who +have hitherto accepted with composure the more glaring anomalies of our +electoral system, and so the growing frequency of three-cornered fights +will assist those other forces which are making for a complete +readjustment of our electoral methods. The new problem is, however, +quite distinct from that of minority representation, and is of +sufficient importance to warrant consideration in a separate chapter. + + +[Footnote 1: 30 April 1907.] + +[Footnote 2: "One ward voted for A and B, another for A and C, a third +for B and C, a fourth for A and B, &c. The voter who had left the +selection of the three candidates to the general committee was also to +renounce the privilege of selecting from them the two which he +preferred. 'Vote as you are told' was the pass word."--Ostrogorski, +_Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties_, vol. i. p. 162.] + +[Footnote 3: If in a four-member constituency the number of voters is +21,000 and the parties are in the ratio of 12,000 to 9000, the larger +party would, if each elector had three votes, have 36,000 votes in all +and the smaller party would have 27,000. No candidate of the smaller +party could obtain more than 9000 votes, whilst the 36,000 votes of the +larger party carefully divided among four candidates would also allow +each candidate to receive 9000 votes. If then the larger party had +slightly more than 12,000 supporters out of a total of 21,000, the +larger party would obtain all four seats, as each of its candidates +would, if the votes were carefully distributed, receive more than 9000 +votes each.] + +[Footnote 4: "If it is desired that the body should not be a +representation of a single interest and a single class of opinions, some +means must be adopted to guard against its falling entirely into the +hands of the dominant party. With this view we would recommend that, in +the election of the council, each elector should have as many votes as +there might be members to be chosen, and should be entitled to give all +these votes to a single candidate, or to distribute them among several. +By this arrangement a monopoly of power in the Legislative Council by +any one party, or any one district of the Colony, would be prevented, +since a minority of the electors, by giving all their votes to a single +candidate, would be enabled to secure his return."--Earl Grey, _The +Colonial Policy of the Administration of Lord John Russell_, vol. ii., +Appendix, p. 362.] + +[Footnote 5: _East India_ (Advisory and Legislative Councils, &c.) (Cd. +4426), p. 14.] + +[Footnote 6: _East India_ (Advisory and Legislative Councils, &c.) (Cd. +4426), p. 45.] + +[Footnote 7: Port of London Act, 1908, Schedule I., Part IV. (1).] + + + + +CHAPTER V + +THE SECOND BALLOT AND THE TRANSFERABLE VOTE IN SINGLE-MEMBER +CONSTITUENCIES + + +"Le depute, au lieu de representer la majorite des electeurs, devient +prisonnier de la minorite qui lui a donne l'appoint necessaire pour son +election." + +--YVES GUYOT + +" ... every fool knows that a man represents +Not the fellers that sent him, but them on the fence." + +--J. RUSSELL LOWELL + +_Three-cornered contests._ + +It was stated in the first chapter that the rise of the Labour Party as +a political force, with an organization wholly independent of those of +the older parties, would make a change in our voting system imperative. +Both prior and subsequent to the appointment of the Royal Commission on +Electoral Systems political organizations have shown themselves keenly +alive to the necessity of such a change. At the meeting of the General +Committee of the National Liberal Federation at Leicester, on 21 +February 1908, a resolution in favour of the early adoption of the +second ballot was carried unanimously. The Trades Union Congress, at its +meeting in September 1908, less eager to pronounce in favour of a reform +of such doubtful value, passed a resolution in favour of an +authoritative "inquiry into proportional representation, preference or +second ballots, so that the most effective means of securing the true +representation of the electors may be embodied in the new Reform Bill." +The spokesman of a deputation from the Manchester Liberal Federation, +which waited upon Mr. Winston Churchill on 22 May 1909, said: "The point +on which we wish to speak to you to-day is the reform of the present +system of voting, which we hold to be out of date, archaic, and in +great need of reform." Mr. Churchill's reply was a significant +reinforcement of Mr. Asquith's previous declaration, that "it was +impossible to defend the present rough and ready methods." "I think," +said Mr. Churchill, "the present system has clearly broken down. The +results produced are not fair to any party, nor to any section of the +community. In many cases they do not secure majority representation, nor +do they secure an intelligent representation of minorities. All they +secure is fluke representation, freak representation, capricious +representation." The figures of two bye-elections--those of the Jarrow +Division of Durham and the Attercliffe Division of Sheffield--will show +how completely Mr. Churchill's language is justified. The figures are as +follows:-- + +JARROW ELECTION, 4 July 1907 + +Curran (Labour) 4,698 +Rose-Innes (Conservative) 3,930 +Hughes (Liberal) 3,474 +O'Hanlon (Nationalist) 2,124 + ___ + 14,226 + +ATTERCLIFFE ELECTION, 4 May 1909 + +Pointer (Labour) . . . . 3,531 +King-Farrow (Unionist) . . . 3,380 +Lambert (Liberal) . . . . 3,175 +Wilson (Ind. Unionist) . . . 2,803 + ___ + 12,889 + +In the case of Jarrow the successful candidate obtained just less than +one-third of the votes polled, and in the case of Attercliffe the member +returned represented a little more than a quarter of the electors. The +representation which results from elections of this kind is without +doubt most capricious and uncertain in character. A House of Commons so +built up could have no claim to be representative of the nation, and its +composition would be so unstable as seriously to impair its efficiency. +Nor can we afford to regard such elections as being a mere temporary +feature of our parliamentary system. The General Election of 1906 showed +a notable increase in the number of three-cornered fights over previous +general elections, and the bye-elections during the four years +1906--1909 were marked by a still further increase. The Report submitted +by the Executive Committee of the Labour Party to the Portsmouth +Conference in January 1909 foreshadowed a very large addition to the +number of Labour candidates. Some thirty-eight candidates, in addition +to the then existing Labour members in Parliament, had been formally +approved by the Executive Committee of the Labour Party after due +election by the Labour organizations to which the candidates belonged, +and although constituencies were not found for all of these new +candidates, the number of three-cornered contests in the election of +Jan. 1910, in which Liberal, Unionist, Labour (or Socialist) took part, +was no less than forty-one, and this number would have been greater had +not several Liberal candidates withdrawn. Owing to the desire on the +part of the Liberal and Labour parties to avoid the risk of losing seats +there were in the elections of December 1910 fewer three-cornered +fights. But the Labour party, the permanence of which is no longer open +to question, will not be content to remain with its present share of +representation. It can however gain additional seats only at the expense +of the older parties, and although the Liberal party, as in the +Mid-Derby bye-election of May 1908, may sometimes yield seats to Labour +nominees, it is not to be expected that the Liberal organizations will +always be willing to give way. At the Mid-Glamorgan bye-election in May +1910 the local organization, against the advice of the chief Liberal +Whip, nominated a Liberal candidate, and succeeded in retaining the seat +although it had been "ear-marked" by the Labour Party. In Scotland, +where Liberalism is less complaisant than in England, no seat has been +surrendered to the Labour Party without a fight, and when a Labour +candidature was threatened in December 1910, in the Bridgeton division +of Glasgow, the Liberals retaliated by threatening to place a Liberal +candidate in the Blackfriars division where Mr. Barnes, the Labour +representative was again standing. These facts should dispel any +illusion, if such still exist, that the problem of three-cornered fights +is a transitory phenomenon which can safely be ignored. The political +organizations, with a true instinct, have realized the importance and +urgency of this problem, and increasing pressure will doubtless be +brought to bear upon the Government to introduce a system of second +ballots, or some other electoral method, that will give effect to what +Mr. Churchill has described as "the broad democratic principle, that a +majority of voters in any electoral unit, acting together, shall be able +to return their man." The advocates of the second ballot and cognate +methods of reform seek a solution of this one problem only. They desire +to maintain the essential characteristic of the present system--the +exclusive representation of the majority in each constituency--and make +no attempt to remedy any of the other evils associated with +single-member constituencies. But the question at once arises whether +the problem of three-cornered contests can be solved by attempts to +preserve the distinctive feature of the present system--the +representation of the majority only. A little reflection must convince +the reader that such a solution deals with the form of the problem +rather than with its essence. For the new problem arises from the fact +that three parties instead of two are now seeking representation in +Parliament, and no remedy can be regarded as effective which does not +provide for the realization of the legitimate aspirations of all three +parties. This the system of second ballots has completely failed to do; +indeed its results only reinforce the arguments of previous chapters, +that so long as we compel the electors of any one district, whatever +their divisions of opinion, to be all represented by one man, their real +representation will be impossible. An examination of the effects of the +second ballot in those countries in which the system has been tried +fully justifies these statements, and fortunately the body of +experience now available is so considerable that the conclusions to be +drawn therefrom have an authoritative character. + +_The second ballot._ + +The Reports furnished by His Majesty's representatives abroad show that +the second ballot, in one form or another, is, or has been, in force in +the majority of continental countries. The forms differ in detail, but +reference need only be made to the three chief types. In Germany the two +candidates highest at the first poll proceed to a second election. It +was this form of the second ballot that was introduced into New Zealand +in 1908. In France all candidates in the original election and even +fresh candidates may stand at the second election. At this second poll a +relative--not an absolute--majority of votes is sufficient to secure the +election of a candidate. As a rule only the two candidates highest at +the first election take part in the second ballot, and therefore in +practice the German and French methods closely approximate to one +another. The third type concerns the application of the second ballot to +the _scrutin de liste_ or block vote in multi-member constituencies. It +was formerly used in the Belgian parliamentary elections, and is still +employed in the election for the Belgian Provincial Councils. The +candidates who receive the support of an absolute majority of the +electors voting at the first ballot are at once declared elected; the +candidates next highest on the poll, but only so many as are equal to +double the number of vacancies remaining to be filled, take part in a +second ballot. + +The object of the second ballot--to ensure that every elected candidate +should finally have obtained the support of a majority of the electors +voting in the constituency for which he has been returned--has, +generally speaking, been achieved. But that does not solve the problem +of the representation of three parties; a general election based on such +a system yields results which are far from satisfactory. The party which +is unsuccessful in one constituency may suffer the same fate in the +majority of the constituencies, and this is the fatal flaw in all forms +of the second ballot. Moreover experience has shown, and it is evident +_a priori_, that with this system the representation of any section of +political opinion depends not upon the number of its supporters, but +very largely upon the attitude taken towards it by other parties. For, +at a second ballot, the result is determined by the action of those +smaller minorities which were at the bottom of the poll at the first +ballot. No party can be certain of securing representation unless in its +own strength it can obtain an absolute majority in at least some of the +constituencies. The largest party in the State, if its voting strength +is evenly distributed, may be at the mercy of hostile combinations at +the second ballots, unless it is so large as to command a majority of +votes throughout the country, and when three parties have entered the +political arena it rarely happens that any one of them is in this +favourable position. That being so, the new element of uncertainty +associated with the system of second ballots may yield results which are +further removed from the true representation of the whole electorate +than the results of the first ballots. + +_Experience in Germany._ + +Continental experience has shown that the coalitions at the second +ballots are of two types. One party may incur the hostility of all other +parties, and if so, the second ballots will tend uniformly to the +suppression of that party. The combination of parties whose aims and +purposes are to some degree allied may be regarded as legitimate, but +the cumulative effect of such combinations over a large area is most +unfair to the party adversely affected. No defence at all can be urged +in palliation of the evils of certain other coalitions also +characteristic of second ballots--the coalitions of extreme and opposed +parties which temporarily combine for the purpose of wrecking a third +party in the hope of snatching some advantage from the resulting +political situation. Sometimes such coalitions are merely the expression +of resentment by an advanced party at the action of a party somewhat +less advanced than itself. But, whatever the cause, the coalitions at +the second ballots do not result in the creation of a fully +representative legislative chamber; on the contrary, they tend to take +away all sincerity from the parliamentary system. Illustrations of the +first type of coalitions abound. The German general elections afford +numerous examples, but as a special note on the working of the second +ballots in Germany is to be found in Appendix II., it will suffice to +quote some of the results of the election of 1907. The Social Democrats +were engaged at the second ballots in ninety constituencies. At the +first ballots they were at the head of the poll in forty-four of these +constituencies, but at the second ballots they only succeeded in +retaining that position in eleven. In the forty-six constituencies in +which they were second at the poll they were only able to improve their +condition in three cases. These figures show how the German Social +Democrats suffered from hostile combinations. It was with the utmost +difficulty that they obtained representation in constituencies other +than those in which at the first elections they were in an absolute +majority. No wonder that one of the planks of the platform of the Social +Democratic party is proportional representation. + +_Austria._ + +The Social Democrats of Austria suffered in the General Election of 1907 +in the same way. Professor Kedlich,[1] in an article entitled "The +Working of Universal Suffrage in Austria," wrote as follows: "The +Christian Socialists have ninety-six seats in the new House, the Social +Democrats eighty-six ... The number of seats won by them weighs still +heavier in the balance when we reflect that in many second ballots the +majority of the opponents of social democracy joined their forces +against them. Not less instructive are the relative numbers of the votes +recorded for each of the parties. Over a million votes were given to the +Social Democrats as against 531,000 for the Christian Socialists." Such +results destroy the representative character of legislative bodies. The +same lesson on a smaller scale is to be gathered from the Italian +elections. Speaking of the General Election of 1904, the Rome +correspondent of _The Morning Post_ pointed out that, in not a few +constituencies, like the second division of Rome, a rally of Clericals +at the second ballots enabled the Conservative Monarchists to triumph +over the Socialists. + +_Belgium._ + +The combinations of allied parties against a third party, as in the +examples already given, may be defended, but the coalitions at second +ballots, as has been pointed out, are not always of this character. +Should parties, angered and embittered by being deprived of +representation, use their power at the second ballots to render a stable +Government impossible, then the results are disastrous. Such were the +conditions which obtained in Belgium before the abandonment of second +ballots. "The system," says Sir Arthur Hardinge, "answered well enough +so long as only two parties contested an election; but the moment the +Socialist Party formed a distinct third party, after the establishment +of universal suffrage in 1894, it began to act in a manner which +produced unsatisfactory results.... The overwhelming victory of the +Clerical party in 1894 was largely due to the fact that in every second +ballot between Catholics and Socialists the Liberals voted for the +former, whilst in every second ballot between Catholics and Liberals, +with the single exception of the Thuin Division, the Socialists +preferred the Catholics as the creators of universal suffrage and as, in +some respects, a more genuinely democratic party, to the Liberals, whom +the Labour leaders regarded with peculiar hatred as the apostles of free +competition and individualism. In 1896 the Socialists were in their turn +the victims, as the Liberals had been in 1894, of the working of the +system of second ballots. Liberal electors at these elections voted +everywhere at the second ballots for Clerical against Labour candidates, +with the result that the Clericals won every one of the eighteen seats +for Brussels, although the total number of Clerical electors in a total +electorate of 202,000 was only 89,000, as against 40,000 Liberals and +73,000 ultra-Radicals and Labour men. Two years later the Liberals swung +round to an alliance with the Socialists against the Clericals, and in +several constituencies, owing to the system of second ballots, the +Socialists, although actually in a minority, won all the seats with the +help of the Liberals, who on the first ballot had voted unsuccessfully +for Liberal as against both Catholic and Labour candidates. It was the +practical experience of conditions such as these which gradually +convinced all the Belgian parties that, given a three-cornered fight in +every, or nearly every, constituency, the only way of preventing a +minority from turning the scales and excluding from all representation +the views of nearly half the electorate was to adopt the system of +proportional representation."[2] + +Count Goblet d'Alviella furnishes an excellent example of the working of +the second ballots at Verviers in the General Election of 1898, the last +parliamentary election in Belgium, at which second ballots were used. In +the election for Senators the Socialists spoiled the chances of the +Liberals by voting for the Clericals, whilst, in the election for the +Chamber, the Liberals, not to be outdone, spoiled the chances of the +Socialists by also supporting the Clericals. The Clericals thus obtained +all the seats both in the Senate and in the Chamber with the assistance +of the Socialists and of the Liberals in turn. The absurdities of the +General Election of 1898 were so flagrant that on the day after the +election so determined an opponent of proportional representation as _La +Chronique_ exclaimed, "Can anything be more absurd than the working of +the second ballots in this country? ... What becomes of the moral force +of an election in which parties are obliged, if they wish to win, to +implore the support of electors who yesterday were their enemies? Such +support is never obtained without conditions, and these conditions are +either promises which it is not intended to keep or a surrender of +principles--in either case a proceeding utterly immoral."[3] + +_France_.] + +French elections also furnish examples of the use of the second ballots +for the purpose of fostering dissension between opponents. At the +General Election in 1906 it was stated that the Conservatives in the +South of France, despairing of obtaining representation themselves, +intended to support the Socialists at the second ballot in the hope of +obtaining an advantage by accentuating the difference between the +Socialists and the Radicals. M. Jaures indignantly denied that there was +any understanding between the Socialists and the Conservatives, and took +advantage of the accusation to write in _L'Humanite_ a powerful plea for +proportional representation. "This reform," he declared, "would make +such unnatural alliances impossible. Each party would be induced and, +indeed, it would be to each party's advantage to fight its own battle, +for every group would have an opportunity of obtaining its full share of +representation. There would no longer be any question of doubtful +manoeuvres, of confused issues; Socialism would have its advocates, +Radicalism its exponents, Conservatism its leaders, and there would be a +magnificent propaganda of principles which would inevitably result in +the political education of the electorate. Every movement would be +assured of representation in proportion to its real strength in the +country; every party, freed from the necessity of entering into +alliances which invariably beget suspicion, would be able to formulate +quite clearly its essential principles; governmental and administrative +corruption would be reduced to a minimum; the real wishes of the people +would find expression; and if parties still continued to dispute for +power, it would be to enable them to promote the more effectually the +measures for which they stood." In spite, however, of this eloquent +disclaimer on the part of M. Jaures, the Conservatives have at the +bye-elections continued their policy of supporting the Socialists. The +bye election of Charolles in December 1908 is a case in point. At the +first ballot the figures were as follows:-- + +M. Sarrien fils (Radical) 5,770 votes +M. Duoarouge (Socialist) 4,367 " +M. Magnien (Conservative) 3,968 " + +At the second ballot-- + +M. Ducarouge (Socialist) 6,841 " Elected +M. Sarrien fils (Radical) 5,339 " +M. Magnien (Conservative) 301 " + +It should be explained that the Conservative candidate, although his +name still appeared upon the ballot paper, retired before the second +election, and it is evident that the votes of many of his supporters +were given to the Socialist candidate. In the following April (1909) +several further instances occurred. At Uzes a vacancy was caused by the +death of a Radical Socialist member who, at the General Election of +1906, had beaten the Duc d'Uzes, a Reactionary, the Socialist candidate +on that occasion being at the bottom of the poll. In the bye-election +the Socialist was returned at the head of the poll, but so obvious was +the fact that the Socialist owed his victory to Conservative support, +that he was received in the Chamber by the Radicals with the cry of "M. +le duc d'Uzes." Uzes was typical of other elections and, as the Paris +correspondent of _The Morning Post_ remarked, "the successes of the +Unified Socialists in the recent series of bye-elections are in part to +be attributed to the votes of the Reactionaries, who voted for the +Unified candidates as being enemies of the Republic." This abuse of the +purpose of second ballots--an abuse engendered by the failure of the +minority to obtain direct representation--destroys the last semblance of +sincerity in the representation of a constituency, and must hasten the +abolition of the second ballots in France in the same way as +combinations of a similar nature rendered imperative the introduction of +a more rational system of election in Belgium. + +The foregoing facts are sufficient to show that a system of second +ballots does not necessarily result in the formation of a legislative +chamber fully representative of the electorate. In Germany the largest +party has had its representation ruthlessly cut down by the operation of +the second ballots. Indeed, were it not for the overwhelming +predominance of this party in certain areas it might not have obtained +any representation whatever. In Belgium the effect of the second ballots +was to deprive the middle party, the Liberals, of their fair share of +representation. In 1896, owing to the coalitions of Socialists and +Catholics at the polls, the Liberals had only eleven representatives in +the popular chamber. All their leaders had been driven from Parliament, +their electoral associations had become completely disorganized save in +some large towns, and in many constituencies they had ceased to take +part in elections. Yet the results of the very first elections (1900) +after the establishment of proportional representation, showed that the +Liberals were the second largest party in the State, and that it was a +party which still responded to the needs and still gave voice to the +views of large numbers of citizens. + +_The bargainings at the second ballots in France_.] + +The system of second ballots not only deprives large sections of the +electorate of representation, but the very coalitions which produce this +result bring parliamentary institutions into still further disrepute. +These coalitions are condemned in unequivocal terms by Continental +writers and statesmen of widely differing schools of thought. The +scathing language of M. Jaures has already been quoted, and we find his +views endorsed by politicians of the type of M. Deschanel, an +ex-President of the Chamber of Deputies, who declared that these +coalitions entirely falsify the character of the popular verdict. Again, +M. Yves Guyot, an ex-Minister, asserts that "the second ballots give +rise to detestable bargainings which obliterate all political sense in +the electors." M. Raymond Poincare, a Senator and a former Minister, +condemns the system of second ballots in equally forcible language. "It +will be of no use," he says, "to replace one kind of constituency by +another if we do not, at the same time, suppress the gamble of the +majority system and the jobbery of the second ballots." These +expressions of opinion on the part of individual French politicians +could be multiplied, but it will be sufficient to add to them the more +formal and official declaration of the Commission du Suffrage Universel, +a Parliamentary Committee appointed by the Chamber of Deputies. In the +Report issued by this Committee in 1907, it is declared that "the +abolition of the second ballots with the bargainings to which they give +rise will not be the least of the advantages of the new system +[proportional representation]." + +_The "Kuh-Handel" in Germany._ + +It would appear that the German second ballots are also characterized by +this same evil of bargaining. Karl Blind, writing in _The Nineteenth +Century_, March 1907, stated that "in this last election the oddest +combinations have taken place for the ballots in the various parts of +the Empire and within different States. There was no uniformity of +action as to coming to a compromise between Conservative and Liberal, or +Liberal and Social Democrat, or Centre and any other party, as against +some supposed common enemy who was to be ousted from his insufficient +majority by a subsequent alliance between otherwise discordant groups, +or who wanted to have his insufficient majority increased to an absolute +one by the addition of the vote of one of the defeated candidates whose +friends finally choose the 'lesser evil'.... + +"To some extent these necessary, but sometimes rather sordid, +transactions are made all the more difficult through the very existence +of separate States with 'Home Rule' legislatures of their own. Political +development has in them gone so far in a centrifugal sense that the +nation has been sadly split up and the public mind too much divided into +merely local concerns and issues.... + +"Irrespective of this baneful influence of a so-called 'Home Rule' state +of things on the life of the nation at large, I must confess that the +huckstering at the second ballots does not strike me as an ideal +institution. It generally goes, in Germany, under the name of +_Kuh-Handel_ (cow-bargain). It often brings out the worst symptoms of +intrigue and political immorality.... Those who dabble in the +_Kuh-Handel_ either lead their own contingent as allies into an enemy's +camp from spite against another adversary, or they induce their own men +to desist from voting at all at a second ballot, so as to give a chance +to another candidate, whom they really detest with all their heart, but +whom they wish to use as a means of spiting one still more +deeply hated." + +_The position of a deputy elected at a second ballot_.] + +The separate experiences, therefore, of France, Belgium, and Germany all +yield convincing and corroborative testimony to the demoralizing +influence on political life which results from the coalitions at the +second ballots. Insufficient attention, however, has been directed to +one aspect of this influence, its pernicious effect upon the inner +working of parliamentary institutions. The deputy who is elected as the +result of a coalition of forces at the second ballot finds himself in an +extremely difficult and unstable position. Instead of being the +representative of the majority of the electors he too often becomes, in +the apt phrase of M. Yves Guyot, "the prisoner of the minority," and, +whilst in Parliament, he is being continually reminded of the power of +that minority to make or unmake him at the next election. The persistent +pressure of that minority explains those contradictory votes in the +French Chamber which, to a foreigner, are often incomprehensible. The +deputy will usually act in accordance with the opinion of the group to +which he belongs and vote accordingly, but at a subsequent sitting he +will find it necessary to vote in such a way as will give satisfaction +to that minority whose support assured his success at the previous +election, and without whose support he cannot hope for re-election when +the time comes for a fresh appeal to the country. The pressure which +such a minority can exert must often be intolerable, and must, in any +case, render it impossible for any deputy either to do justice to +himself or to the legislative chamber to which he belongs.[3] + +_The alternative vote._ + +The shortcomings of the system of the second ballot are so pronounced +and are so generally recognized that there now exists but little, if +any, demand for its introduction into this country, and more attention +has therefore been given to the mechanism of the alternative vote as +affording a means of securing the object of the second ballot whilst +avoiding many of its inconveniences. Under this suggested plan the voter +is invited to mark his preferences against the names of the candidates +on the voting paper by putting the figure "1" against his first +favourite; the figure "2" against the man he next prefers, and so on +through as many names as he may choose to mark. At the end of the poll +the number of papers in which each candidate's name is marked "1" is +ascertained, and if one of them is found to have secured the first +preferences of an absolute majority of all the persons voting, he is +declared elected; but if no candidate has obtained such a majority the +papers of the candidate who has obtained the least number of first +preferences are examined and transferred one by one to the candidate +marked "2" upon them. In this transfer, the papers on which only one +preference had been marked would be ignored, the preferences, to use +the current phrase, being "exhausted." If, as the result of this +transfer, any candidate has secured the support of an absolute majority +of the number of effective preferences he is declared duly elected; but +if there is still no candidate with an absolute majority the process is +repeated by distributing the papers of the candidate who is left with +the lowest number of votes, and so on until some candidate has got an +absolute majority of effective preferences. + +The alternative vote undoubtedly possesses many and valuable advantages +as compared with the second ballot. In the first place, its introduction +into the English electoral system would keep English voters in touch +with Colonial rather than with Continental practice. Preferential +voting[4] has been in use in Queensland since 1892; it was adopted in +1907 by the West Australian Parliament, and was proposed in a Bill +submitted by Mr. Deakin to the Australian Commonwealth Parliament in +1906. Moreover, the alternative vote enables the election to be +completed in a single ballot; and the fortnight that is wasted between +the first and second ballots on the Continent would be saved. There has +also been claimed for this method of voting this further advantage, that +it would prepare the way (perhaps by rendering it inevitable) for the +more complete reform--proportional representation. + +The principle of the alternative vote is extremely simple. It is +embodied in two Bills which were introduced into the House of Commons in +1908 by Mr. John M. Robertson and by Mr. Dundas White; and also in a +modified form in a Bill introduced in 1907 by Mr. A.E. Dunn. Its purpose +and mechanism is set forth in the memorandum of Mr. Robertson's Bill as +follows:-- + +"The object is to ensure that in a parliamentary election effect shall +be given as far as possible to the wishes of the majority of electors +voting. Under the present system when there are more than two candidates +for one seat it is possible that the member elected may be chosen by a +minority of the voters. + +"The Bill proposes to allow electors to indicate on their ballot papers +to what candidate they would wish their votes to be transferred if the +candidate of their first choice is third or lower on the poll and no +candidate has an absolute majority. It thus seeks to accomplish by one +operation the effect of a second ballot." + +Mr. Robertson's Bill, as originally introduced in 1906, was applicable +to single-member constituencies only; but the amended form in which the +Bill was re-introduced provided for the use of the transferable vote in +double-member constituencies as well, but, in doing so, still maintained +the essential characteristic of the existing system of voting--that each +member returned should have obtained the support of a majority of the +electors voting. Mr. Dundas White, however, in applying the alternative +vote to double-member constituencies, made a departure from this +principle, and proposed to render it possible for a candidate to be +returned who had obtained the support of less than one-half but more +than one-third of the voters.[5] The effect of Mr. Robertson's Bill +would have been that it would still be possible in double-member +constituencies for the party finally victorious to secure both seats; +whilst with Mr. Dundas White's provisions the two largest parties would +in all probability have obtained one seat each.[6] + +The difference between the two measures is, however, of no great +consequence; the number of double-member constituencies is not very +large, and their number may be still further reduced in any future +scheme of redistribution of seats. It will, therefore, be sufficient to +consider what effect the alternative vote would have in single-member +areas. Let us take the Jarrow election, in which there were four +candidates, and apply to that election the possible working of the +alternative vote. The figures for the election may be repeated:-- + +Curran(Labour) . . . . 4,698 +Rose-limes (Unionist). . . 3,930 +Hughes (Liberal) . . . . 3,474 +O'Hanlon (Nationalist) . . 2,122 + +The electors would, with the alternative vote, have numbered the +candidates on the ballot papers in the order of their choice, and, as +none of the candidates had obtained an absolute majority, the votes of +the lowest candidate on the poll would be transferred to the second +preferences marked by his supporters. If, for purposes of illustration, +it is assumed that every one of the 2122 supporters of Mr. O'Hanlon had +indicated a second preference, that 1000 had chosen Mr. Curran, 1000 had +chosen Mr. Hughes, and 122 had chosen Mr. Rose-Innes, then the following +table will show the effect of the transfer:-- + +Candidate. First Count. Transfer of O'Hanlou's Votes. Result. + +Curran (Labour) 4,698 +1,000 5,698 +Rose-Innes (Unionist) 3,930 + 122 4,052 +Hughes (Liberal) 3,474 +1,000 4,474 +O'Hanlon (Nationalist) 2,122 -2,112 -- + + Total 14,224 -- 14,224 + +Only three candidates now remain for consideration, and their position +on the poll as the result of the transfer is as follows:-- + +Curran . . . . . . 5,698 +Hughes . . . . . . 4,474 +Rose-Innes . . . . . 4,052 + +As neither has as yet obtained a majority of the total votes polled, it +becomes necessary that the votes given for Mr. Rose-Innes, who is now +lowest on the poll, should be transferred in accordance with the next +preferences of his supporters. It is conceivable that the larger +proportion of these preferences would have been given for the Liberal +candidate, Mr. Hughes, rather than for Mr. Curran, and, if so, the final +result might easily have been the election of Mr. Hughes as member +for Jarrow. + +_The alternative or contingent vote in Queensland_.] + +Before considering the value of the transferable vote in single-member +constituencies as a means of securing a true expression of the national +will, it may perhaps be pointed out that the procedure prescribed by the +Queensland Act differs from that contained in the English Bills. The +regulations of the Queensland Act are as follows:-- + +"When one member only is to be returned at the election, if there is no +candidate who receives an absolute majority of votes, all the candidates +except those two who receive the greatest number of votes shall be +deemed defeated candidates. + +"When two members are to be returned, and there are more than four +candidates, if there is no candidate who receives an absolute majority +of votes, all the candidates except those four who receive the greatest +number of votes shall be deemed defeated candidates." + +It will be seen that the system here prescribed approximates to the +German form of the second ballot, according to which only the two +candidates highest on the poll may stand again. Were the Queensland form +of preferential voting applied to the Jarrow election, both Mr. Hughes +and Mr. O'Hanlon would be declared defeated candidates, and only the +further preferences recorded by their supporters would be taken into +account in determining the relative position of the two highest +candidates, Curran and Rose-Innes. The provisions of the West Australian +Act of 1907, and of Mr. Deakin's Bill of 1906, followed the more +elastic and undoubtedly superior method embodied in the English +proposals. + +Sir J.G. Ward, in introducing the Second Ballot Bill into the New +Zealand Parliament in 1908, defended the selection of this electoral +method on the ground that the system of preferential voting introduced +into Queensland had been a partial failure. He stated that the privilege +of marking preferences had not been extensively used, and quoted the +opinion of Mr. Kidston, a former Queensland Premier, that the marking of +preferences should be made compulsory. As explained in the course of the +New Zealand debates, part of the alleged failure of the Queensland +system was due to the unnecessarily cumbrous nature of the regulations. +The Queensland Electoral Acts still retain the old method of +voting--that of striking out from the ballot paper the names of such +candidates as the elector does not intend to vote for. The confusion +produced in the mind of the elector may readily be imagined when he is +instructed to strike out the names of candidates for whom he does not +intend to vote in the first instance, and then to mark such candidates +in the order of his choice. Moreover, the provisions, as detailed above, +for giving effect to preferences are so defective that only a proportion +of the preferences marked can be taken into account. Even so, +preferential voting in Queensland sometimes has a decisive influence +upon the result of the election, as the following example, taken from +the elections of 1908, will show:-- + +WOOLLOONGABBA ELECTION + +_First Count_. + + Votes. +1st Candidate . . . 1,605 +2nd " . . . 1,366 +3rd " . . . 788 + ----- + Total . . . 3,759 + +The votes recorded for the third candidate were then +distributed according to the preferences marked, which were as follows:-- + +1st Candidate . . . 15 +2nd ,, . . . 379 +No preferences . . . 394 + --- + 788 + +The result of the distribution brought the second candidate to the top +of the poll, the final figures being as follows:-- + +2nd Candidate . . . 1,745 +1st ,, . . . 1,620 + +_West Australia_ + +Where the more simple and straightforward instructions have been +adopted, as in West Australia, it has been found that a larger +percentage of the electors make use of the privilege of marking +preferences. Here are the figures for the constituency of Claremont in +the elections of 1908:-- + + +_First Count._ + +Foulkes . . . . 1,427 +Briggs . . . . 825 +Stuart . . . . 630 + ----- +Total . . . 2,888 + +When the votes recorded for the candidate lowest on the poll were +distributed it was found that nearly 75 per cent, of his papers were +marked with additional preferences. The numbers were as follows:-- + +Briggs . . . . . 297 +Foulkes . . . . 174 +No preferences . . . 165 + --- +Total . . . 636 + +The final figures were as follows:-- + +Foulkes . . . . 1,601 +Briggs . . . . 1,122 + +These figures doubtless show that even in West Australia, when the +transferable vote is applied to single-member constituencies, a +considerable number of the electors will not indicate a preference for +any candidate other than for that of their own party, but similar +abstentions occur at the second ballots in France, where it is found +that a considerable percentage of the electors usually refrain from +going to the poll on the second occasion. The Labour Party in Queensland +has sometimes issued instructions to its supporters to abstain from +marking preferences for the purpose of keeping the party solid and +absolutely separate from other parties. Such action necessarily +increases the percentage of abstentions. Nor can any remedy for action +of this kind be found in making the marking of preferences compulsory. +Even in Belgium, where "compulsory voting" is in force, the compulsion +only extends to an enforced attendance at the polling place. The act of +voting is not compulsory, for a blank unmarked ballot paper may be +dropped into the voting urn. The compulsory marking of preferences when +the elector has none may still further vitiate the results of elections +in a most undesirable way, whilst abstention from preference marking +merely deprives those abstaining of a privilege which they might +exercise if they chose. It is quite conceivable that an elector after +voting for the candidate of his choice may be indifferent to the fate of +the remaining candidates and, if so, an enforced expression of opinion +on his part would not be of any real value, and should not be counted in +determining the result of an election. + +_Mr. Deakin's failure to carry the alternative vote._ + +Does then the alternative, or contingent vote, as used in West +Australia, solve the problem of three-cornered fights--the problem of +three distinct parties seeking representation in Parliament? When a +single seat is being contested it is doubtless sufficient if the member +elected represents the average views of his constituents, but a General +Election based on such a system would yield results no more satisfactory +than those of the second ballots. Neither the second ballot nor the +contingent vote are acceptable after their true effects are understood, +a fact which explains the failure of Mr. Deakin's Government to carry +their Preferential Ballot Bill in 1906. Several of the seats held by the +Australian Labour Party--as in the elections of Jarrow, Colne Valley, +and Attercliffe--were won by a minority vote; the _Melbourne Age_ +published the following list of seven constituencies in Victoria where +Labour members represented only a minority of the voters:-- + + Non-Labour Labour +Constituencies. Votes. Votes + +Geelong . . . . 1,704 1,153 +Ballarat West . . . 2,038 1,034 +Jika Jika . . . . 1,366 1,183 +Williamstown . . . 1,931 1,494 +Bendigo West . . . 1,654 1,248 +Grenville . . . . 1,457 1,268 +Maryborough . . . 1,929 1,263 + + Totals . . . 12,079 8,643 + +Preferential voting would have placed these seats at the mercy of a +combination of the other parties, and, somewhat alarmed by the too eager +advocacy of the measure on the part of the _Age_, the Labour Party, +which had voted for the second reading of the Bill, procured its defeat +on the first division in committee. It is impossible to defend the +present system by which the Labour Party, which numbered two-fifths of +the voters in these seven constituencies, obtained all seven seats, but, +on the other hand, it cannot be alleged that a system of preferential +voting, which would have enabled the other parties to have deprived +these electors of all representation, was a satisfactory solution of the +difficulty. In neither case would justice be done to the claims of three +parties to representation. + +_Probable effect of the alternative vote in England._ + +A consideration of the possible results of the introduction into the +English electoral system of second ballots or the transferable vote in +single-member constituencies will show that neither reform will solve +the problem presented by the rise of a new party. It is obvious that the +Labour Party could by a combination of Conservative and Liberal voters +be deprived of representation in all constituencies save those in which +they had the support of an absolute majority of the electorate. Nor +would the conditions remain the same as they are to-day. In many +constituencies in which the Liberals have allowed a straight fight to +take place between Tariff Reform and Labour candidates, the Liberal +Party would intervene; and should combinations at the polls result in +the defeat of Labour candidates, what would be the effect upon the +temper and spirit of Labour voters who found themselves under an +"improved" voting system less able than before to secure representation +in Parliament? Would there not possibly arise a disposition on the part +of the disfranchised minority to pursue on the next occasion a wrecking +policy such as has distinguished the second ballots both in Belgium and +in France? Even apart from precipitate action which might arise as the +result of ill-feeling, the alternative vote would afford an opportunity +for a predetermined policy on the part of a minority to create +dissension between the opponents. The manipulation of the alternative +vote would be easily understood. An angry minority of electors could be +instructed beforehand to use it, as we know from experience they _have_ +used the second ballot on the Continent. Would politicians, following an +exclusive electoral policy, hesitate to avail themselves of the weapon +which the alternative vote would place in their hands for the purpose of +annihilating any section they especially disliked, in the same way as +the Liberal Party in Belgium was destroyed by Catholic and Socialist +combinations at the second ballots? We cannot escape the conclusion +which all experience yields, that both these electoral methods place +the representation of any party at the mercy of either temporary or +permanent coalitions of other parties. To an even greater degree than +under the existing regime, the result of a General Election would fail +to reflect public opinion. + +The advocates of the alternative vote assume, with but little +justification, that this method will be free from the bargainings that +have distinguished the second ballots on the Continent. The bargainings +naturally take place between the first and second ballots, because that +is the most suitable time for the striking of bargains, for the strength +of parties is definitely known. With the alternative vote such +transactions would take place before the election, upon the basis of the +probable position of parties as ascertained by the party agents. Even if +experience should show that the transferable vote did not lend itself so +easily as the second ballot to the perpetration of those bargains which +are detested by all Continental statesmen, yet it is probable that the +successful candidate would, like the deputy elected under the system of +second ballots, become "the prisoner of the minority." The figures of +the election would disclose to what extent the member returned had owed +his success to the smallest minority. This minority would be only too +conscious that it held the key of the situation, and the member would +doubtless be exposed to the same intolerable pressure as has been +brought to bear upon members of the French Chamber of Deputies. In any +case the position of the elected member would be most unsatisfactory. +Were a Labour member returned with the assistance of Tariff Reform +votes, would not the parliamentary relations between the various parties +become as embittered as when the Unified Socialist candidate at Uzes was +enabled by Reactionary votes to capture a Radical seat? What +recriminations would accompany the election of a Conservative candidate +whose victory was due to Labour votes given to him as an expression of +resentment at the action of Liberals in other constituencies? What would +be the relations between the Liberal and Labour parties if in a +constituency now represented by a Labour member, a Liberal candidate, +with the aid of Conservative votes, displaced him? These strained +relations would not only exist within the House of Commons itself, but +also and perhaps in a more pronounced form in the constituencies +themselves. Such conditions would not only invite the sarcasm of all +critics of democracy, they would produce the much more serious effect of +crippling the successful working of parliamentary institutions. + +_The alternative vote not a solution of the problem of +three-cornered contests_.] + +Neither second ballots nor preferential voting can solve the problem of +three parties seeking representation. They may preserve the outward form +of the distinguishing characteristic of the present system--that each +successful candidate should secure the support of the majority of the +electors voting--but this apparent conformity to the requirements of +majority representation is only secured at the cost of destroying the +sincerity of the parliamentary system and of rendering the composition +of the House of Commons still more unstable than it is to-day. In +England the competition of the three parties is most pronounced in the +industrial areas, and Mr. Winston Churchill, apparently recognizing the +futility of the alternative vote as a solution of the new difficulty, +had good grounds for his suggestion that electoral reformers should +concentrate their minds upon the proportional representation of the +great cities.[7] For proportional representation attacks the new problem +on entirely different lines. It provides for the realization of the +essentially democratic principle, that the various sections of +political' opinion are entitled to representation in proportion to their +respective strengths, and that such representation should be independent +of the action of other parties. Once this democratic principle is +admitted we are in view of the only effective solution of the problem of +three-cornered fights--a solution which not only solves this particular +difficulty, but meets those serious defects of our electoral system to +which attention has been directed in the two preceding chapters. "The +theory of Government by party," says Professor Nanson of Melbourne, "is +to find the popular mind by the issue of a number of contests between +the 'ins' and the 'outs.' But owing to the multiplicity of political +issues, this theory is now no more tenable than is the theory that every +question can be answered by a plain 'yes' or 'no.' ... We require a +system capable of finding the mind of the people on more than one issue. +With such a system all the difficulties caused at present by the +existence of three parties disappear. Instead of being a hindrance three +parties will be a help. For each will help to organize public opinion, +and so enable the mind of the public on important issues to be more +definitely and clearly ascertained." + + +[Footnote 1: _The Albany Review_, October 1907.] + +[Footnote 2: Reports on the Second Ballot at Elections in Foreign +Countries. Miscellaneous. No. 2. 1908. (Cd. 3875.)] + +[Footnote 2: _La Representation Proportionnelle en Belgique_, p. 7.] + +[Footnote 3: An illuminating passage occurs in M. Guyot's article on +"The French Senate and Chamber of Deputies," in _The Contemporary +Review_, February 1910:-- + +"A deputy is only elected for four years, and almost on the morrow he +becomes again a candidate. If he has been elected at the second ballot, +with a rallying of the minority of electors, who have only voted for him +as better than nothing, and who can desert him at the next elections, +his position is very uncertain. Universal suffrage results in many +constituencies in great instability, and it is threatening especially +for the men who having had power have been obliged to act, and in acting +have dispersed certain illusions which they had perhaps entertained when +candidates, and have thus given offence.... Though one be an ex-Minister +one is none the less a man. The greater number of men--not only +ex-Ministers but men who have any reputation in Parliament--have sought +to migrate from the Palais Bourbon to the Luxemburg. The result is that +the Chamber of Deputies has not ceased to suffer from a species of +inverse selection. No body could retain its vigour under such a system. +The most experienced men have left; the composition of the Chamber of +Deputies has grown steadily weaker and weaker."] + +[Footnote 4: In Australia the system is known as the contingent or +preferentinal vote. In recent years the phrase "alternative vote" has +been employed in England, and was adopted by the Royal Commission on +Electoral Systems as a means of distinguishing the use of the +transferable vote in single-member constituencies from its use in +multi-member constituencies for the purpose of securing proportional +representation.] + +[Footnote 5: The regulations as to counting the votes contained in the +Schedule to the Bill were based upon those in Lord Courtney's Municipal +Representation Bill (see Appendix VI.), the practical application of +which is described in Chapter VII.] + +[Footnote 6: Mr. Crawshay-Williams introduced a further Bill (based on +that of Mr. Robertson) in 1910. This Bill, in its final form, was made +applicable, in accordance with the recommendation of the Royal +Commissions on Electoral Systems, to single-member constituencies only.] + +[Footnote 7: Reply to deputation of Manchester Liberal Federation, 23 +May 1909.] + + + + +CHAPTER VI + +PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION + + +"Celui-ci tuera celui-la. Voila la formula du scrutin d'arrondissement. + +"Ceux-ci tueront ceux-la. Voila la formule du serutin de liste sans la +representation proportionnelle. + +"Ceux-ci et ceux-la auront leur juste part. Voila la formule du scrutin +de liste avec la representation proportionnelle."--J. JAURES + +It cannot be a matter for surprise that the methods of election adopted +in the early stages of representative institutions fail to respond to +the needs of the more complex political conditions of highly civilized +communities. The movement in favour of improved electoral methods is in +keeping with the advances made in all other human institutions. We no +longer travel by stage-coach nor read by rush-light. We cross the +Atlantic with a certainty and an ease unknown and undreamt of a little +while ago. Means of intercommunication, the press, the mail, the +telegraph, the telephone have developed marvellously in response to +modern requirements. This continuous adaptation is the law of existence +and, in view of modern political conditions we cannot permanently refuse +to adapt our electoral methods to the more perfect organization of a +progressive democracy. By cumulative pressure the evils set forth in the +preceding chapters can have but one result; they will compel English +statesmen, as they have compelled or are compelling Continental +statesmen, to devise an effective remedy; and although individual +politicians may resist and retard the advent of reformed methods, the +demand for better representative institutions will in the end overcome +all such resistance. + +_The essential features of a sound electoral method_.] + +What then are the requirements of a satisfactory electoral method? The +evils to be remedied must yield the clue. Our present system--exclusive +majority representation--has often, as we have seen, resulted in a gross +exaggeration of the majority, sometimes in the total suppression of the +minority; and, on other occasions, in the return of a majority of +representatives by a minority of the electors. These evils have happened +when only two parties have been seeking representation; when a third +party enters the political arena the system completely breaks down, and +all efforts to restore "majority" representation by a system of second +ballots have proved an absolute failure. The attempts made in the past +to secure the special representation of minorities, though most +successful in many respects, have been of an empirical character, and +have dealt with the problem in a very partial way. Yet it is not +difficult to find a solution for all these problems which is at the same +time satisfactory and effective. It is only necessary to return to the +first principles of democracy, to keep steadily in view the meaning of +that self-government which we desire to achieve through representative +institutions. Self-government can only be realized when every section of +the community through its own representatives can give expression to its +needs in the assembly which is representative of the nation and which +derives all its authority from the fact that it is so representative. +This assembly acts in the name of the nation; its decisions are said to +embody the national will. But if any considerable section of the nation +is deprived, from whatever cause, of representation in the House of +Commons, in what sense can it be said that its decisions give expression +to the national will? The new electoral conditions force us, willingly +or unwillingly, to the conclusion that no satisfactory solution can be +reached until effect is given to Mill's fundamental principle of +democracy--that the various sections of political opinion should be +represented in the legislative chamber in proportion to their strength. +Only in the fulfilment of that condition can we escape from the evils +of the existing system and at the same time do justice to the claims of +three organized parties to representation within the House of Commons. + +_Constituencies returning several members._ + +It is now no longer possible to accept Mill's declaration as +theoretically perfect and then to dismiss it as wholly impracticable. If +the political conditions are such that the proportionate representation +of parties is the only satisfactory solution of our electoral +difficulties, it becomes the duty of statesmen to find some way by which +practical effect can be given to Mill's formula. There was doubtless +some excuse for the cry of impracticability when, in launching in 1857 +his proposals for proportional representation, Thomas Hare suggested +that the whole kingdom should form a single constituency. This +suggestion raised a barrier of prejudice against all proposals for +proportional representation, which only to-day is being broken down, and +led to a refusal to consider seriously any attempt to secure an +amelioration of existing methods along more modest lines. Nevertheless, +it must be admitted that the first step in the direction of realizing +true representation must be the enlargement of our present electoral +areas. So long as single-member constituencies are retained elections +must necessarily take the form of a struggle for the whole of the +representation allotted to the constituency. There is but one prize--a +prize which is indivisible--and the proportional distribution of that +prize is impossible. For a system of proportional representation the +first requirement is the formation of constituencies returning several +members. These electoral areas need not be formed in an arbitrary +manner. Familiar divisions of the country, such as large towns, counties +or parts of counties, may be treated as single constituencies. Glasgow, +Manchester, Birmingham, Sheffield, Leeds would form constituencies in +themselves. Counties which are large enough to return at least five +members might also be treated as electoral areas, whilst the smallest +counties would be grouped and the larger counties, if necessary, +subdivided. + +_The proportional representation of the electors._ + +With such constituencies it would be possible to approximate to a true +representation of the electors. Birmingham, which may be taken for +purposes of illustration, returns seven members to the House of Commons, +one for each of its seven divisions. The Unionists being in a majority +in each of these seven divisions, are enabled to secure the whole of the +representation allotted to the city, although there is a large minority +of non-Unionists. If Birmingham were treated as a single constituency, +and if the electors were divided as follows: Unionists, 40,000; +Liberals, 20,000; Labour, 10,000, then it is obvious that any just +system of representation would enable the Unionists, Liberal and Labour +electors to obtain four, two, and one members respectively. Birmingham +would then be represented accurately and fairly within the House of +Commons; and if each large area was so represented we should, in this +way, be able to build up a House of Commons which would reflect in true +proportions the political opinions of the country. The undoubted +fairness of such a system of representation will appeal with even more +force if consideration is given to the grounds on which seven +representatives are now allotted to a town of the size of Birmingham. +Did Birmingham contain only 40,000 electors, all of whom were Unionists, +it would only be entitled to four representatives in Parliament. The +presence of a large number of electors who are not Unionists brings, +however, the total electorate to 70,000, and Birmingham is granted +representation on the basis of this total. Thus the additional +representation, granted because of the presence of a large minority of +non-Unionist electors, takes the form of additional Unionist members. +The minority under the present system is not only disfranchised but +penalised; the representation which is due to them is given to their +opponents. + +But it is not difficult to devise a scheme of proportional +representation which should ensure that the electors of Birmingham and +other large towns, and also of the various counties, should be truly +represented within the House of Commons. Of this fact the recent +history of electoral legislation on the Continent and in the Colonies +furnishes incontrovertible proofs. Proportional representation has been +embodied in the laws of several countries, and these laws work with +perfect smoothness. + +_Experience in Denmark._ + +The first application of the principle took place in Denmark so long ago +as 1855, two years before the publication of Mr. Hare's scheme, when M. +Andrae, a Danish Minister of great eminence and ability, introduced it +into the new Constitution promulgated in that year. The system of +proportional representation was retained through the constitutional +changes of 1863 and 1866, though, it should be added, the extent of its +application was limited to the election of members of the Upper House. +The citizens of each constituency, voting in two classes, choose by the +ordinary method of voting an equal number of representatives. These +representatives constitute an electoral college, the members of which +proceed to the election of representatives of the constituency according +to the method of proportional representation. This limited application +of proportional representation still remains in force, and in recent +years the principle has received further and increasing recognition. +Parliamentary committees and committees of the municipalities of +Copenhagen are chosen by a proportional method. The principle was +applied in 1903 to the elections of the Congregational councils, but its +most notable extension was effected in 1908, when the system was applied +to all municipal elections, the first elections taking place in +March 1909. + +_Switzerland_ + +It will be seen that even in Denmark there was a considerable lapse of +time between the limited application adopted in 1855 and its extension +to elections of a more popular kind in recent years; and outside +Denmark, although societies advocating the new principles were founded +in England, France, Belgium, and Switzerland, proportional +representation did not succeed in finding its way very readily to the +statute book. It was not until 1890 that the first step was taken which +has resulted in so rapid an extension of the system. The evils arising +from the majority method of election had become so acute in the Swiss +canton of Ticino[1] that proportional representation was adopted as a +means of pacification. The elections in March 1889 resulted in the +return of seventy-seven Conservative deputies by 12,783 votes, whilst +the Liberals, with 12,166 votes, were only able to obtain thirty-five +representatives. The Liberals alleged that this unfair result was due to +a gerrymandering of the constituencies, and demanded a revision of the +Constitution. The Conservative Government declining to take the +necessary steps for this purpose, a revolution broke out in Bellinzona, +in the course of which one of the members of the Government was killed +and his colleagues arrested and imprisoned. The Federal Council +intervened and sent its representative, Colonel Kuenzli, who recommended +the adoption of proportional representation. After some hesitancy the +party leaders agreed, and the Cantonal Council passed a law (5 December +1890), providing for the election by a system of proportional +representation of a Constituent Assembly for the purpose of revising the +Constitution. The suspicions of the Liberals were not, however, fully +allayed and, thinking that they were again being duped, they decided on +the eve of the election of the Assembly to abstain. This decision was +adhered to, and as a result the first assembly in Ticino elected under +the proportional system consisted of Conservatives only. The +Conservatives remained faithful to the agreement entered into with the +Liberals and voted the law of 9 February 1891, introducing proportional +representation into the cantonal constitution and applying it to the +elections for the Cantonal Council, Constituent Assemblies and +municipalities. The law was approved by popular vote in the following +March, and the system has since retained its place in the constitution +of the canton[2]. The immediate object in view--the pacification of the +canton--was completely attained and its success has led to its adoption +in other cantons. It is now in force in Neuchatel, Geneva, Solothurn, +Zug, Schwyz, Bale City, Lucerne and St. Gall, and also (for municipal +elections) in Berne, Fribourg, and Valais, whilst there is an active and +growing demand for its application to the Federal elections. The +progress of public opinion in this respect has been tested by means of +the Referendum in 1900 and 1910. On the first occasion 169,000 voters +supported the extension to Federal elections, and 247,000 opposed it. In +1910 the number of voters in favour of the proposal had increased by +70,000, while the opposition had increased by only 15,000, and the +adoption of proportional representation for Federal elections was +defeated by the narrow margin of 23,000 votes in a total poll of half a +million. At the same time twelve out of the twenty-two cantons approved +of the extension, and it is generally agreed that the ultimate triumph +of the proportional principle cannot long be delayed. + +The need for proportional representation was particularly felt in the +canton of Geneva, where religious differences often form the dividing +line between parties. The canton is divided into three constituencies; +one for the town of Geneva, one for that part of the canton on the right +bank, and one for that on the left bank of the Lake and of the Rhone. +With the _scrutin de liste_ (the former method of election) the minority +in each constituency was completely crushed. The Protestants of the +right bank were deprived of all representation; the Catholics of the +town obtained a few deputies as an act of grace on the part of the +majority. In 1872, when the affairs of the Catholic church were being +discussed, the Radicals and Independents succeeded in excluding from the +Council all who were most directly affected by the question of the day. +The proportional system was introduced in 1892, and as the election of +members of the Federal Council was still conducted according to the old +system the working of the two methods could be readily compared. "The +elections for the cantonal councils in November 1892," wrote M. Naville, +"were keenly fought, but calm; no recriminations followed, and political +life pursued a normal course.... On the other hand, the Federal +elections in October 1893 were riotous, blows being exchanged. Exclusive +majority representation artificially creates disturbances.... +Proportional representation introduces a pacifying element into all +political struggles." + +_Belgium._ + +The introduction of a complete scheme of proportional representation +into Belgium was also rendered necessary by the intolerable position +arising from the former methods of election. The rapid growth of the +Socialist Party with a distinct organization created a situation which, +as already explained, was in no way relieved by the system of second +ballots in force. Indeed, the coalitions at the second ballots not only +discredited the system but greatly embittered the relations between the +various parties. "In 1899," says Count Goblet d'Alviella, "Belgium was +on the eve of a revolution--a revolution which was only avoided by the +immediate and complete introduction of proportional representation into +parliamentary elections." This, however, was not the first trial of +proportional representation in Belgium, for Belgium, like Switzerland, +affords an example of the gradual but certain extension of the new +method of election. In 1894 proportional representation had been applied +partially and tentatively to the larger municipal councils, and although +this application was of a partial character it achieved a considerable +measure of success. M. Braun, the Burgomaster of Ghent, speaking in May +1899, described its results in the following terms:-- + +"During the four years that proportional representation has been applied +to the communal elections of Ghent, every one has been able to +appreciate the happy effects of the reform. Everybody recognizes that, +far from being endangered, the material prosperity of the city has +increased, and that the ameliorating and pacifying effects of the +altered electoral method have even exceeded the expectations and hopes +of its advocates." [3] + +The system of proportional representation adopted for the parliamentary +elections was much more complete, and so great has been its success that +there has arisen a strong demand for its introduction into the elections +for the provincial councils in which the old majority system, with +second ballots, is still used. The parliamentary elections in May 1908 +were followed by the provincial elections in the ensuing month, and thus +a favourable opportunity was presented of contrasting the working of the +two systems. The grossly unfair results of the provincial elections drew +forth from many journals most caustic criticism. _Le Peuple_ expressed +the hope that these provincial elections would be the last instance of +the use of the majority system in Belgium. "Is it not," it proceeded, +"absurd, stupid, detestable that the provincial councils are alone +excluded from the system of proportional representation? Once for all we +must have done with this jumble of confusion, dishonesty, and +corruption." The _Etoile Belge_ declared that "One thing is certain, the +provincial electoral system can no longer be maintained without exposing +us to the laughter of Europe. To apply one system of proportional +representation to the parliamentary elections, another to municipal +elections, and to maintain the majority system for the provincial +elections, is really too absurd. For once we agree with _Le Peuple_ and +join our hopes and wishes to theirs." That these comments were fully +justified a few examples will show. In the province of Limbourg the +forty-eight seats on the provincial council were all obtained by the +Catholics, whereas in the parliamentary elections of the previous month +the Liberals, owing to the proportional system, were able to obtain two +seats out of six. In the "Agglomeration Bruxelloise" no Catholic and +only five Socialists were elected, although the Liberals numbered but a +few more than a third of the voters. The provincial elections of former +years afford further illustration. In 1898 at Ghent the Liberals of the +first canton defeated the Socialists at the second ballots with the help +of the Catholics, in the second canton they defeated the Catholics with +the help of the Socialists, while in the third canton they were +themselves defeated by the Catholics, who were assisted by the +Socialists. In the same year at Brussels, where a second ballot took +place in each of the five cantons, the Liberal minority captured every +one of the forty-four seats. Sir Arthur Hardinge pointed out in his +Report on the working of the Second Ballots in Belgium, that it was the +failure of this electoral method that rendered a proportional system in +parliamentary elections an absolute necessity; its failure in the +provincial elections will result in its abolition from these also. No +more convincing evidence of the satisfactory working of the proportional +system can be given than this demand for its extension, the latest +example of which in Belgium is its application by a new law passed in +1909 to the election of the _Conseils de Prud'hommes._ + +_German States._ + +Whilst the adoption of proportional representation in Switzerland and in +Belgium was due to the pressure of particular circumstances, the marked +success of the new method has not only resulted in its extension in +those countries, it has also had a pronounced influence upon public +opinion in neighbouring countries. The kingdoms of Southern Germany are +following the example of the Swiss cantons. Wuertemberg, in the new +constitution adopted in 1906, decided that the seats set free by the +removal of the "privileged" members of the Lower House should be filled +by proportional representation. Legislative proposals have since been +discussed in Saxony, and in May 1910 a vigorous debate took place in the +Bavarian Parliament, in the course of which Dr. Mueller declared that the +advocates of the reform would not rest "until this unjust electoral +system, this bulwark of short-sighted injustice and ill-omened party +spirit, is set aside in the higher interests of justice and of civil and +religious freedom." The principle has received a recognition even more +general in character, for a ministerial decree issued in June 1901, +relative to the associated committees of employers and workmen, enabled +these bodies, if they so chose, to elect their members in accordance +with the principle of proportional representation. Some sixteen towns, +including Frankfort-On-Main, Munich, Carlsruhe, Fribourg, Mannheim, &c., +availed themselves of the privilege, and the results have been most +satisfactory. Much greater interest has been taken in the elections. In +Carlsruhe, for instance, the number of voters increased from 1103 in +1897 to 3546 in 1903. + +_France_ + +Similarly, the great success of the Belgian legislation gave birth to a +fresh and more powerful movement in France. Founded in 1901, under the +presidency of M. Yves Guyot, the _Ligue pour la Representation +Proportionnelle_ enlisted the support of deputies drawn from all +political parties. The Electoral Reform group within the Chamber of +Deputies during the Parliament 1906-10 consisted of over two hundred +members, and, under the auspices of this group large and enthusiastic +meetings were held in the great towns. The reform has the support of +many leading newspapers, and the authoritative reports of the French +Parliamentary Committee, _la Commission du Suffrage Universel_, contain +strong recommendations in favour of the adoption of proportional +representation. The first of these reports prepared in 1905 by M. Chas. +Benoist[4] contains an admirable statement of the case for the reform, +a plea which is powerfully reinforced in the report prepared two years +later by M. Etienne Flandin.[5] The Bill recommended in this latter +report was discussed in the French Chamber of Deputies in October 1909. +The first clause of the Bill read as follows: "The members of the +Chamber of Deputies shall be elected by the _scrutin de liste_ according +to the rules for proportional representation." The first portion of this +clause--the members of the Chamber of Deputies shall be elected by +_scrutin de liste_--was carried by 379 votes against 142, or a majority +of 237. The second portion--according to the rules for proportional +representation--was carried by 281 votes to 235, or a majority of 46. +The Prime Minister, M. Briand, urged by many of his Radical supporters, +who were unwilling to forego the advantages which they obtained from the +existing system, then made the question one of confidence in the +Government, and the whole clause, when put to the final vote, was +defeated by 291 votes to 225. A noteworthy feature of these divisions +was the size of the majority by which the system of single-member +constituencies was condemned. At the General Election in April 1910 no +fewer than 315 Deputies were returned pledged to the reform. M. Briand +at once introduced a Bill which, however, did not fully meet the demands +of the reformers, and the _Commission du Suffrage Universel_ made +important modifications in it with a view to securing more completely +the proportional representation of all political parties within the +country. On the fall of M. Briand in February 1911, the government of M. +Monis announced its intention of supporting the amended scheme. The +success of the movement, commenced in 1901 is now, after a decade of +active effort, no longer open to doubt. + +_Holland_ + +Holland, too, has felt the influence of the legislation of its +neighbour. A constitutional commission, appointed by the Dutch +Government, reported in favour of amending the fundamental law so as to +render possible the adoption of proportional representation. The +recommendations of this Commission were embodied by the Government in +Bills presented to the States General in 1907, and although the +proposals were subsequently withdrawn, the reform has the support of +many of the leading statesmen, and a favourable report is anticipated +from the new Commission to which the question of reform has +been referred. + +_Finland._ + +In the North of Europe an equally successful and, in some respects, an +independent movement in favour of true representation has taken place. +In an excellent little pamphlet, published at Helsingfors,[6] it is +stated that during those calamitous years between the _coup d'etat_ of +1899 and the restoration of the constitution in 1906, there arose in +Finland the conviction that only a democratic reform of its political +institutions would afford a sufficient guarantee for the maintenance of +its internal independence. The fruits of that conviction were seen in +the draft of the new constitution for the Diet prepared by a committee +appointed by the Finnish Government. Provision was made for the adoption +both of universal suffrage and proportional representation. The report +adds that the four Estates of the Diet, satisfied that proportional +representation would ensure the just representation of all parties, +willingly accepted the proposals for universal suffrage, and also agreed +that henceforth the Diet should consist of but one chamber. Finland thus +found herself, when the new constitution was granted, in the possession +of an electoral system as democratic as any in the world.[7] + +_Sweden._ + +In Sweden a long and arduous struggle took place over the reform of the +franchise. The Liberals and Socialists demanded that less weight should +be given to the possession of property. The Conservatives resisted the +demand. The adoption of proportional representation as a possible way +out was proposed in 1902, and from that date the fight assumed another +aspect. "The method of voting," wrote Major von Heidenstam, part author +of the proposals embodied in the new law, "took from the beginning a +very prominent place, strange to say the most prominent down to the last +few months before the chief battle. We who went in for proportional +representation had a very hard struggle for the first five years, but we +won at last." The victory was complete; proportional representation was +accepted for both Chambers of the Riksdag, for the committees selected +by these Chambers, for County Councils and for Town Councils. When the +final adoption of the reform Bills was voted in 1909 they were carried +by very large majorities; in the first Chamber only 19 out of 141, and +in the second Chamber only 53 out of 225, recorded an adverse vote.[8] + +_Australasia._ + +In this remarkable outburst in favour of proportional representation +English-speaking countries are taking their part. Inspired by the late +Catherine Helen Spence, an untiring advocate of the reform, the +Effective Voting League has carried on an active campaign in +Australasia. Legislative proposals for proportional representation have +been discussed in recent years by the Commonwealth Parliament, and also +by the Parliaments of Victoria, South Australia and West Australia. +Although these measures have not become law, the work of Miss Spence and +her colleagues has gained considerable support. Mr. Deakin has openly +acknowledged his approval, whilst the results of recent elections, and +more particularly that of the election in 1910 for the Commonwealth +Senate, have increased the demand for reform. Proportional +representation, too, is meeting with increasing sympathy in New Zealand +where the system of second ballots, adopted in 1908, has failed to give +satisfaction. In Tasmania the movement has made much greater headway. An +Act was passed in 1896 applying proportional representation to the urban +districts of Hobart and Launceston, but although this Act was an +acknowledged success so far as the representation of these two towns +were concerned, the differentiation between the voting methods applied +to the town and country districts gave rise to dissatisfaction, and the +measure was withdrawn in 1901. But when once the benefits of +proportional representation had been felt its re-introduction in a more +complete form was not long delayed. In 1907 a new Act was passed +applying equally to town or country. The State is now divided into five +electoral districts, and the six members allotted to each district are +elected by the proportional method. The first elections under the new +law took place in April 1909, and the result has met with +general approval. + +_South Africa._ + +In South Africa proportional representation has, with astonishing +rapidity, gained the adherence of its foremost public men, and although +the delegates to the South African National Convention abandoned the +proposal for the use of the proportional method in the elections to the +legislative Assembly of United South Africa, yet the adoption of this +principle for the election of members of the Senate and of the +committees of the Provincial Councils, as finally agreed to, marks an +advance which a few years ago would have been thought impossible. Nor is +this the only forward step taken in South Africa. The Transvaal +Municipal Commission recommended the adoption of proportional +representation in municipal elections, and the Government embodied this +recommendation in an Act passed in June 1909. The first elections under +this Act took place with complete success on 27 October 1909, in +Johannesburg and Pretoria, each of these towns being polled as a single +constituency. + +_Canada._ + +In Canada, although the movement has not taken so active a form as +elsewhere, the Government consented in March 1909, on the motion of Mr. +F.D. Monk, K.C., to the appointment of a committee of the House of +Commons for the purpose of investigating methods of proportional +representation. Further, the Trades and Labour Congress, the chief +organization of this kind in Canada, the Toronto District Labour +Council, and the Winnipeg District Trades Council, employ the +proportional method in the election of their committees. + +_Oregon._ + +In the fight for the more popular control of politics in the United +States proportional representation will apparently play no mean part. +The object of the People's Power League of Oregon is to free the +representative assemblies of the State from the domination of political +bosses, and an amendment to the constitution, providing for the adoption +of proportional representation was, on the initiative of this League, +submitted to the electorate in 1908 and carried with a large majority. +The Oregon Legislature, which met in January 1909, was bitterly opposed +to the change, and refused to pass the Representation Bill which was +required to give effect to the decision of the electorate. A new +proportional representation amendment, which was self-enactive, was +submitted to the popular vote in November 1910, in conjunction with +other proposed constitutional changes, but failed to meet with approval +owing to the unpopularity of the measures with which it was combined, +the most striking of which was a six-year term for the legislature. +There may be a long struggle for supremacy between the "machine" and the +reformers, but in that revival of interest which is being taken +throughout the United States in the conduct and working of +representative institutions it can be confidently predicted that the +reform of the existing methods of election will take a prominent place. + +_The United Kingdom._ + +In the United Kingdom the Proportional Representation Society, founded +in 1884, was revived in 1905, and since its revival has secured the +adherence of a considerable number of members of Parliament. The Royal +Commission on Electoral Systems, appointed in December 1908, was the +outcome of its activity and, although this Commission did not recommend +the immediate application of proportional representation to the House +of Commons, its Report marks a very considerable advance in the history +of the movement in this country.[9] The Commission reported that there +would be much to be said in favour of proportional representation as a +method for the constitution of an elective Second Chamber, and intimated +its approval of this method of election for municipalities. The views +taken by the Commission in respect of an elective Second Chamber and +municipalities have found expression elsewhere. The Select Committee on +the Reform of the House of Lords, presided over by Lord Rosebery, +recommended that the election of Lords of Parliament to represent the +hereditary Peerage should be by the cumulative vote or any other scheme +of proportionate election,[10] and since this Report was issued all +proposals for the introduction of an elected element into the House of +Lords have recognized the need for an adequate representation of +minorities.[11] The Municipal Representation Bill, introduced by Lord +Courtney of Penwith, was passed by the House of Lords in 1908 after +careful examination by a select Committee of that House, whilst a +motion, moved by Mr. Aneurin Williams, on 30 March 1910, in the House of +Commons, in favour of applying the system to municipal elections was +carried without opposition. + +_The success of proportional representation in practice._ + +The movement in favour of more accurate methods of election is becoming +world-wide in its scope, and the brief summary[12] already given of the +progress made in recent years furnishes in itself abundant proof of the +practicability of proportional representation. In every country in which +the new methods have been introduced fears were expressed that it would +be impossible for the average elector to fulfil the new duties required +of him, and that returning officers would collapse under the weight of +their new responsibilities. The same apprehension still exists in +England, and it may therefore be desirable to refer in greater detail to +the experience of those countries in which the new methods have been put +to the test of popular elections. Nowhere do we find that the new +systems of voting have presented any serious difficulty to the electors, +and although the task imposed upon the returning officers has been in +some cases unnecessarily severe, yet they have not only carried out +their new duties with credit, but have made the introduction of the new +system a brilliant success. After the first elections in Geneva, in +November 1892, the journal _Le Genevois_, which had fought desperately +against the introduction of the reform, stated that the counting of the +votes had been quickly and correctly carried out. "We readily +acknowledge," it added, "that in this matter we were greatly deceived." +"From the point of view of practicability," wrote the _Journal de +Geneve_, "the new system has been a brilliant success." _La Suisse_ +declared that the outstanding triumph of the day was proportional +voting. The first elections in the canton of Bale-town were equally +successful. "The elections," said the late Professor Hagenbach-Bischoff, +"took place on 26 June 1905; the polling places were open till 2 P.M., +the counting was finished at 7 P.M., so that the newspapers were able to +publish the results the same evening. Everything went off well, and the +journals have acknowledged the great success of proportional +representation." + +Six General Elections have taken place in Belgium since the law of 1899, +and now no one in the country speaks of the impracticability of +proportional representation. Count Goblet d'Alviella states that "all +the objections that were brought against the system before its +introduction have been set at naught. The proportional method instead of +complicating, as was foretold, both the voting and the counting, has +worked with greater ease than the old one. The electors understood at +once what they were to do, and the counters made fewer mistakes than +before." Wurtemberg furnishes another instance of the ease with which +the new system can be introduced. _Der Beobachter_, a leading journal of +Stuttgart, stated that: "The new electoral system, which only a short +time ago was unknown to the electors, worked without a hitch in the +whole country, just as it worked a few weeks ago in Stuttgart. The first +feeling is one of surprise. The number of votes was enormous; the +candidates were numerous, the ballot papers from the different districts +were in various forms, and yet the whole machine, from the district +officials to the employees of the Government office, who collected the +results, worked with promptitude and ease. The next feeling is one of +pleasure at the complete success of this first experiment in +proportional representation on a large scale in the German Empire." + +The success of the first elections in Finland, in which more than half +the voters exercised the franchise for the first time, was equally +complete. According to the account of a Finnish journalist[13]: "The +first election under the new system took place on 15 and 16 March 1907. +The total electorate amounts to some 1,300,000 people, or 47 per cent, +of the whole population. Of these about 887,000, or nearly 64 per cent., +polled. In the more thickly-populated electoral divisions the percentage +was much higher: thus, in the Nyland division, which comprises +Helsingfors, it was 74.2 per cent.; in several polling districts as many +as 95 and even 98 per cent, came to the polling station. The often-used +argument against proportional representation, that the system is too +involved to be understood by the average voter, was in Finland +completely refuted. The number of spoilt ballot papers in the whole +country probably is less than 1 per cent.; in the Nyland division, the +largest of all, returning twenty-three members, the ballot paper +contained ninety-five candidates, and yet only 0.59 per cent, were +spoilt." Small as this number is, the official returns for the +succeeding elections show a still smaller percentage. In November 1910 +the number of spoilt papers throughout the country amounted to .25 per +cent, of the whole. The first elections in Sweden were equally +successful. There was only one spoilt paper in the elections witnessed +by the author at Carlskrona in May 1910. + +Nor have English-speaking peoples shown themselves less able to adapt +themselves to new voting methods. An official report presented by the +chief returning officer of Tasmania to the Senate of the Australian +Commonwealth[14] contains convincing evidence as to the practicability +of the single transferable vote for the purpose of parliamentary +elections. The report deals with the election of members of the +Commonwealth Senate and House of Representatives in 1901 by means of the +single transferable vote. For this purpose the State of Tasmania was +treated as a single constituency. The percentage of spoilt papers due to +the new system of voting was 1.44 in the Senate elections and 1.80 in +the election of the House of Representatives, but the returning officer +adds that "this would have been much less had it not been that the old +defective system previously in force in Tasmania required the actual +scoring out of every rejected candidate instead of, as in most +countries, the marking of a cross or sign only against those candidates +who were selected. Had this better form of marking been in practice in +Tasmania previous to the introduction of the Hare system of voting, it +is probable that there would be very few invalid papers due to the Hare +system of marking with preference numbers." Professor Jethro Brown, in +describing these first elections, states that "the work of the +returning officer, whilst less simple than that of the elector, demands +no exceptional qualifications; he need display the industry of an +average clerk--scarcely more."[15] The more recent elections in +Tasmania, those of 1909, were carried out with equal ease. The +percentage of spoilt ballot papers due to all causes was 2.86, and this +percentage compared favourably with the number of spoilt papers in the +election of 1906, in which the majority system of voting was used.[16] + +The Transvaal municipal elections also afford excellent evidence of the +ease with which the new system of voting can be introduced. Most of the +electors made their first acquaintance with the system during the +electoral campaign. In Pretoria the number of spoilt papers due to all +causes amounted to 38 out of a total of 2852, or 1.33 per cent., while +the number of spoilt papers which could be attributed to the new system +was only 27, or less than 1 per cent. The percentage of spoilt papers at +Johannesburg was larger, but it must be remembered that the electorate +in this town is perhaps as cosmopolitan as any in the world. At some of +the public meetings addresses were given in English, Dutch, and Yiddish, +and the task of instructing the electors in their new duties was +considerably more difficult than in a more homogeneous constituency. +Nevertheless the number of spoilt papers due to all causes was only 367 +out of a total number of 12,155, or 3 per cent., whilst the number of +spoilt papers attributable to the new system was 285, or 2.35 per cent. +Moreover, the returning officer was very strict in his decisions as to +the validity of papers, so that the number of spoilt papers attributable +to the new system included all those in which voters had in any way +departed from the letter of the instructions. The press bore striking +testimony to the success of the elections. The _Transvaal Leader_ +declared that "the consensus of competent opinion is that the system is +a perfect success, considered as electoral machinery.... The municipal +elections have demonstrated that every section can secure that amount of +representation which it can justly claim." The _Rand Daily Mail_ +expressed the view that "...Both here, and in Pretoria, it may claim to +have proved a success. The ten councillors elected under it here may +fairly claim to be representative of every shade of public opinion.... +We should like to see it extended to all municipalities, and ultimately +to parliamentary elections." The _Johannesburg Star_ stated that "The +authors may fairly congratulate themselves that they have proved it +practicable in working and fair in results. The business of counting the +votes and allotting the preferences was sure to be a slow one at the +first time of asking, but there was no hesitation and no confusion. The +proceedings in the Wanderer's Hall went forward with the steady +certainty of clockwork.... The whole trial was a high one in a town like +this with a considerable element of illiterate voters; but taking it all +through we have no hesitation in saying that the working of the new +system was a conspicuous and unqualified success." + +_An election by miners_.] + +After such a mass of testimony as to the satisfactory working of +proportional methods in parliamentary elections, it is perhaps hardly +necessary to refer to the success of those model elections carried out +from time to time by the Proportional Representation Society in +England.[17] Yet it may be as well to recall the novel and entirely +successful experiment, organized in 1885, by Mr. Albert Grey, M.P. (now +Earl Grey, Governor-General of Canada). "Mr. Grey," according to the +account in _The Times_[18], "was returning officer, and was assisted in +the count by thirty miners--a body of utterly untrained men whose hands, +accustomed by daily usage to the contact of pickaxe and shovel, were new +and strange to the somewhat delicate task of fingering and separating +flimsy ballot papers. They had received no instructions before they were +assembled in the room as to the duties they would be required to +transact, and the expedition, good-humour, and correctness with which +they got through the several stages of the count justly earned for them +the admiration of those who had come from a distance, as well as the +compliment which Mr. Grey deservedly paid them at the conclusion of the +day's proceedings." On this occasion some 6645 papers were counted, the +number of spoilt votes being 44, considerably less than 1 per cent. The +election is of interest as the members of Northumberland Miners' +Association have ever since that date used the transferable vote in the +election of their agents. + +To demonstrate the practicability of proportional representation does +not, however, dispose of all of the objections which have been urged +against the system, but before dealing with these objections it will +perhaps be useful to outline those schemes which have emerged so +successfully from the test of popular elections. These methods, although +they vary in detail, range themselves under two heads--the single +transferable vote and the system of lists. The first of these +systems--the single transferable vote--bases representation upon +electors who may, if they so desire, group themselves into parties, +whereas the list systems base representation upon parties as such. And +as the single transferable vote, in basing representation upon electors +follows English traditions, we will begin with the consideration of +this system. + + +[Footnote 1: The story of the introduction of proportional +representation into the Canton of Ticino is told in full by Professor +Galland in _La Democratie Tessinoise et la Representation +Proportionnelle_ (Grenoble, 1909).] + +[Footnote 2: The application was extended in 1892, 1895, and 1898 to the +election of the Executive Council, of jurors and of Communal Councils. +In 1904, however, when the Liberals were in a majority, a change was +made in the election of the Executive Council. The proportional system, +which had given them only three seats out of five, was replaced (for the +election of Executive Councils) by the limited vote. Under the new +system, which is less favourable to the minority, the Liberals obtained +four out of five seats.] + +[Footnote 3: Goblet d'Alviella, _La Representation Proportionnelle en +Belgique_, p. 92.] + +[Footnote 4: No. 2376, _Chambre des Deputes, Huitieme Legislature_, +1905.] + +[Footnote 5: No. 883, _Chambre des Deputes, Neuvieme Legislature_, 1907. +(See App. X.)] + +[Footnote 6: _The Finnish Reform Bill of_ 1906. The new method of voting +is described in Appendix IV.] + +[Footnote 7: The Russian Duma has since passed a law (1910) by which the +powers the Finnish Diet have been considerably curtailed.] + +[Footnote 8: The Swedish system is described in Appendix III.] + +[Footnote 9: Report of Royal Commission on Electoral Systems, 1910 (Cd. +5163).] + +[Footnote 10: House of Lords Report, 1908 (234), par. 18.] + +[Footnote 11: In the article, "Two Chambers or One," in _The Quarterly +Review,_ July 1910, the writer recommends that elected members, if +introduced into the House of Lords, should be chosen in large +constituencies by a system of proportional representation. Professor +Ramsay Muir in _Peers and Bureaucrats_ advocates the formation of a new +Upper House, wholly elected under a proportional system.] + +[Footnote 12: This summary is necessarily incomplete; the list of +countries is continually lengthening. Uruguay has adopted a form of +minority representation (1910); Lisbon and Oporto, under the electoral +scheme of the new Portuguese government, will choose representatives by +a proportional system (1911); a new movement, under the leadership of +Prince Teano, has arisen in Italy.] + +[Footnote 13: _The Daily Chronicle_ 1 June 1907.] + +[Footnote 14: Reprinted in Report on Municipal Representation Bill, +House of Lords, 1907 (132), p. 125.] + +[Footnote 15: _The New Democracy_, p. 47.] + +[Footnote 16: The percentage in the Federal Senate election of 1906 was +4.48; in the election of the House of Representatives, 3.94. A full +report on the General Election of 30 April 1909 has been published by +the Tasmanian Government--Tasmania, 1909, No. 34.] + +[Footnote 17: See Chapter VII.] + +[Footnote 18: _The Times_, 26 January 1885.] + + + + +CHAPTER VII + +THE SINGLE TRANSFERABLE VOTE + + +"The law regulating the form of voting may be thus expressed. Every vote +shall be given on a document setting forth the name of the candidate for +whom it is given; and if the vote be intended, in the events provided +for by this Act, to be transferred to any other candidate, or +candidates, then the names of such other candidate, or candidates, must +be added in numerical order."--Thomas Hare, _The Election of +Representatives_ (Fourth edition, 1873) + +The single transferable vote was the distinguishing characteristic of +the scheme of electoral reform proposed by Hare in 1857, but it was +associated with the proposal to treat the whole kingdom as a single +constituency. The later advocates of this new method of voting have +recommended its application to constituencies of more moderate size, +such as counties and large towns, and in this form the system has found +a more ready acceptance and has been used with success in parliamentary +elections. + +_Its present application_.] + +The first application of the single transferable vote took place in +Denmark[1] in 1855, and it is still being used under the Constitution of +1867 in the election of members of the Danish Upper House. It is also +used, as provided by the South Africa Act of 1909, in the elections of +the Senate of the United Parliament and in the election of the Executive +Committees of the Provincial Councils. In each of these cases the +electorates are small, and the electors possess special qualifications. +The Danish Upper House is elected in two stages, the transferable vote +being used only in the final stage in which electors of the second +degree alone take part. In South Africa the members of the first Senate +were elected by members of the local parliaments of the several +Colonies,[2] and the Executive Committees of the Provincial Councils by +members of the Councils. The system has, however, been subjected to the +test of popular parliamentary elections in Tasmania and of municipal +elections in Pretoria and Johannesburg. + +Ever since the publication of Hare's scheme, proposals for proportional +representation have been associated in English-speaking countries with +the idea of a transferable vote. Hare's proposals were warmly endorsed +by John Stuart Mill first in _Representative Government_, and again in a +memorable speech delivered in the House of Commons on 30 May 1867, when +he moved an amendment to the Electoral Reform Bill.[3] Mill's amendment +was defeated, but he retained to the full his faith in the great value +and need of the improved method of voting, as the following passage from +his _Autobiography_ shows: "This great discovery," said he, "for it is +no less, in the political art, inspired me, as I believe it has inspired +all thoughtful persons who have adopted it, with new and more sanguine +hopes respecting the prospects of human Society, by freeing the form of +political institutions towards which the whole civilized world is +manifestly and irresistibly tending from the chief part of what seemed +to qualify and render doubtful its ultimate benefits. ... I can +understand that persons, otherwise intelligent, should, for want of +sufficient examination, be repelled from Mr. Hare's plan by what they +think the complex nature of its machinery. But any one who does not feel +the want which the scheme is intended to supply; any one who throws it +over as a mere theoretical subtlety or crochet, tending to no valuable +purpose and unworthy of the attention of practical men, may be +pronounced an incompetent statesman, unequal to the politics of the +future."[4] + +_An English movement_.] + +The English advocates of proportional representation who have succeeded +Mill have equally favoured the single transferable vote. This system was +embodied in the Bill introduced into the House of Commons in 1872 by Mr. +Walter Morrison, Mr. Auberon Herbert, Mr. Henry Fawcett, and Mr. Thomas +Hughes; it was advocated in the important debates which took place in +the House of Commons in 1878 and 1879; and the Proportional +Representation Society, founded in 1884 in view of the Electoral Reform +Bill of that year, created, under the leadership of Sir John Lubbock and +Mr. Leonard Courtney, a strong movement in its favour. Owing to the +agreement between the leaders of the Liberal and Conservative parties in +favour of single-member constituencies this movement had no immediate +result. Since its revival in 1905 the Proportional Representation +Society has continued to press the claims of the single transferable +vote, and with some success. The practicability of the system was +admitted by the Select Committee of the House of Lords appointed to +examine the Municipal Representation Bill introduced into that House by +Lord Courtney in 1907; the model elections organized by the Society in +1906, 1908, and 1910,[5] have to some extent familiarized the British +public with its details; it found, as already mentioned, a place in the +South African Constitution of 1909, whilst the Royal Commission on +Electoral Systems reported in 1910 that "of schemes for producing +proportional representation we think that the transferable vote would +have the best chance of ultimate acceptance." + +_The system in brief_.] + +What then is the single transferable vote, and how does it help to +secure a true representation of the electors? Its mechanism and +advantages will best be understood by a comparison with the existing +system. The city of Birmingham is at present divided into seven +single-member constituencies, with the result that the majority in each +of these constituencies secures a representative, while the minority in +each case is unrepresented. Suppose there were in Birmingham 40,000 +Unionist, 20,000 Liberal, and 10,000 Labour voters: it might easily +happen that the Unionists would be in a majority in each of the seven +divisions and, if so, the 40,000 Unionist electors would obtain the +seven seats and the remaining 30,000 voters none. The transferable vote, +as will presently appear, would enable these 70,000 citizens to group +themselves into seven sections of equal size, each returning one member, +so that there would be four Unionist groups returning four members, two +Liberal groups returning two members and one Labour group returning one +member; and this is the ideal representation of such a community. + +_Large constituencies_.] + +In order to achieve this result several changes in electoral mechanism +are required. In the first place, Birmingham, instead of being divided +into seven constituencies, must be polled as one constituency, otherwise +the necessary grouping could not take place. This change is not in +itself sufficient, because if Birmingham were polled as one constituency +electing seven members, and if each elector could give, as with the +"block" vote, one vote apiece to seven candidates, then the seven +nominees of the majority would all receive a higher number of votes than +the seven nominees of the minority. In the numerical case cited above, +each Unionist candidate would command 40,000 votes, each Liberal 20,000, +and each Labour candidate 10,000, and the largest party would win all +the seats. + +_The single vote_.] + +It is therefore necessary, however many may be the number of members to +be elected, to limit the voting power of each elector to one vote--hence +the name "the single vote." An obvious result of this limitation is that +if a group numbering 10,000 electors concentrates its support upon one +man, then the group is certain of returning that candidate, because not +more than six equally large groups can be formed out of the remaining +electors. With open voting the grouping of electors could be arranged +with comparative ease, for if more electors than were sufficient to +constitute his group desired to vote for a particular candidate, those +who arrived late at the poll could be asked to give their votes to +another candidate, and so help to build up another group of the +requisite size. Or, if a candidate was receiving so little support that +he had no chance of election, the small group that had gathered round +him could be disbanded and these electors, instead of having their votes +wasted, could make their selection from among the other candidates +available. In this way seven groups could be formed, each of which would +obtain a representative.[6] + +_The vote made transferable_.] + +As, however, the ballot is secret and the result of the voting is not +known until the close of the poll, some provision must be made to +facilitate the equal grouping of the electors upon which fair +representation depends. This will be made clear by an example. Were Mr. +Joseph Chamberlain one of the Unionist candidates for Birmingham, the +group of voters who would record their votes for him would probably +considerably exceed the number required for his election. His Unionist +colleagues might, in consequence, find themselves left without adequate +support, and the party might fail to secure its fair share of the +representation. In order to prevent a mischance of this kind the very +simple device has been adopted of making the vote transferable. By this +means the necessary accuracy in grouping is secured automatically. + +_How votes are transferred_.] + +The transferable vote enables the elector to instruct the returning +officer to whom his vote is to be transferred in the event of his first +favourite _either_ receiving more support than he requires _or_ +receiving so little as to have no chance of election. Continuing the +example already given, an elector who desired to vote for Mr. +Chamberlain would place on the ballot paper the figure 1 against his +name. If, in addition, he placed the figures 2, 3, &c. against the names +of other candidates in the order of his choice, these figures would +instruct the returning officer, in the event of Mr. Chamberlain +obtaining more votes than were necessary to secure his election, as to +whom the vote was to be transferred. The votes given to Mr. Chamberlain +in excess of the number required for his election would thus be rendered +effective. They would be used and not wasted. If, on the other hand, an +elector had recorded his vote for a candidate who, after all excess +votes had been transferred, was found to be at the bottom of the poll, +the returning officer would similarly give effect to the wishes of the +elector as recorded on the ballot paper by transferring the vote to the +elector's second choice. Again the vote would not be wasted, but would +be used in building up a group sufficiently large to merit +representation. + +The ideas which have led up to the single transferable vote are, +therefore, of a simple character. Constituencies returning several +members are formed. A representative is given to every group of +electors which attains to a definite proportion of the whole, the +proportion depending upon the number of members to be returned. If a +candidate receives more votes than are sufficient, _i.e._ if too large a +group is formed, the surplus votes are transferred. If, after all +surplus votes have been transferred, there still remain more candidates +than there are vacancies, the lowest candidate on the poll is eliminated +from the contest, _i.e._ the smallest group is disbanded. The transfer +of surplus votes and of votes recorded for the candidates lowest on the +poll are all carried out in accordance with the wishes of the electors +as indicated by them on the ballot paper at the time of the poll. The +proportionate representation of all the electors is secured; each party +obtains the number of members to which it is entitled. + +_The Quota._ + +A few questions will at once occur to the reader as to the application +of these simple rules. How is the number of votes required for success +to be determined? In what way are the surplus votes to be distributed? +What is the order in which the elimination of unsuccessful candidates +shall proceed? The number of votes necessary to secure the election of a +candidate is called the "quota." At first sight it would seem that this +number should be ascertained, as suggested in the preceding paragraphs, +by dividing the number of votes by the number of vacancies. But a +smaller proportion is sufficient. Thus, in a single-member constituency +a candidate has no need to poll all the votes; it is evident that if he +polls more than a half he must be elected. No other candidate can equal +him; the quota in this case is, therefore, one more than a half. So, in +a two-member constituency the quota is one more than a third, for not +more than two candidates can poll so much; in a three-member +constituency, one more than a fourth, and so on. In a seven-member +constituency, like that of Birmingham, the quota would be one more than +an eighth. In general terms the quota is ascertained by dividing the +votes polled by one more than the number of seats to be filled and +adding one to the result.[7] + +_A simple case._ + +The processes involved in distributing the votes are described at some +length in the account which appears further on in this chapter of the +model election organized by the Proportional Representation Society in +1908, but the method of transferring votes and deciding the result of an +election may be more easily understood from a simple case. Let us +imagine there are six candidates for three seats, of whom A, B, C belong +to one party and X, Y, Z to another. On the conclusion of the poll the +ballot papers would be sorted into heaps, or files, corresponding to the +names against which the figure I had been marked, and in this way the +number of votes recorded for each candidate would be ascertained. Let +us assume that the result of the sorting is as follows:-- + + A is marked 1 upon 1801 papers, and therefore has 1801 votes + B " 1 " 350 " " 350 " + C " 1 " 300 " " 300 " + X " 1 " 820 " " 820 " + Y " 1 " 500 " " 500 " + Z " 1 " 229 " " 229 " + ---- ---- +Total number of papers 4000 Total number of Votes 4000 + +As there are three seats the quota is one more than a fourth of the +total of the votes polled. The total in this case is 4000, and the quota +is therefore 1001. + +A, having obtained more than the necessary quota of votes, is declared +elected. + +_The transfer of surplus votes._ + +It will be seen that A has obtained nearly two quotas of votes, and his +supporters, in the absence of any provision for the use of his surplus +votes, would not obtain the full share of representation to which they +are entitled. The next step is therefore to transfer A's surplus votes +in accordance with the wishes of his supporters. These have indicated on +the ballot papers to whom they desire their vote to be transferred. The +different methods in which the transfer of votes can be carried out will +be described, but for the present it may be assumed that the result of +the operation was to transfer: + +648 of the 800 surplus votes to B (a member of the same party as A) +132 " 800 " C (also a member of A's party) + 20 " 800 " Z + +The votes transferred to the several candidates are added to those +already obtained by them as follows:-- + + Original Votes. Transferred Votes. Total. +B 350 + 648 = 998 +C 300 + 132 = 432 +X 820 nil = 820 +Y 500 nil = 500 +Z 229 + 20 = 249 + +_The elimination of the lowest unelected candidate_.] + +Had any candidate, as a result of the transfer of A's surplus votes, +been raised above the quota he would have been declared elected and his +surplus distributed in the manner just described. In this case no +candidate, as the result of the transfer, has obtained the quota, and +there are, therefore, no further surplus votes to distribute. There are, +however, two vacancies still remaining unfilled, and the next operation +is to distribute the voting papers of Z, who, being the lowest on the +poll, is clearly out of the running. Z's papers are sorted, as in the +previous process, according to the candidates who are marked by the +voters as their next preferences, and it may be supposed that the result +is as follows:-- + +B is marked as next preference on 20 papers +X " " 200 " +Y " " 29 " + +These papers are then added to the heaps of the respective candidates, +B, X, and Y, and, with these additions, the votes credited to each +candidate may be shown thus:-- + + Previous Transfer of + Total. Z's Votes. Total. +B 998 + 20 = 1018 +C 432 + nil. = 432 +X 820 + 200 = 1020 +Y 500 + 29 = 529 + +Since B and X, as a result of the distribution, each obtain a quota of +votes, they are declared elected, and all the vacant seats now being +filled, the election is at an end. + +_The result._ + +The candidates elected, A, B, and X, each represent a "quota" of voters. +Each considerable section of the constituency is thus able to choose a +representative, whilst the party to whom both A and B belong return two +members, these candidates taken together having secured the support of +two quotas of voters. The voters who failed to secure a representative, +namely the supporters of C and Y, number less than a quota. + +_Different methods of transferring surplus votes.--The Hare +Method_.] + +There are several methods by which surplus votes may be transferred. In +the case imagined the simplest way to distribute A's surplus votes is +to take the 800 papers last filed and to sort these papers according to +the second preferences indicated thereon. This method, which was +recommended by the advocates of proportional representation in the +movement of 1884-85, is based upon that contained in Mr. Hare's +proposals. It has, however, been objected that if some other 800 voting +papers are taken the result may be different, and that in this way an +element of chance is introduced. This objection is considered in detail +in Appendix VI., and it will be sufficient to state here that, when +large numbers of votes are dealt with and the papers are well mixed, +this element of chance is negligible. But small as it is it can be +eliminated by adopting more accurate methods of transferring the votes. + +_The Hare-Clark method_ + +One of these more accurate methods was embodied in the Tasmanian Act of +1896, and also in the Municipal Representation Bill approved by the +Select Committee of the House of Lords in 1907. It is known as the +Hare-Clark system, its inception being due to Mr. Justice Clark, of +Tasmania. With this method the surplus votes of any successful candidate +are transferred to the unelected candidates in such a way that each +unelected candidate marked as the voter's next preference on the +successful candidate's papers receives a proportionate share of the +surplus. Continuing with the illustration already given, the returning +officer, instead of taking from A's heap the 800 papers last filed, +takes the whole of A's heap and sorts all these papers according to the +next preferences. Assume that the result is as follows:-- + +B is marked 2 on..... .................. ..1296 papers +C " 2 on......... .............. .. 264 " +Z " 2 on............. .......... .. 40 " + +Total papers showing second preferences .. 1600 + +Papers on which no further preferences are shown ...201 + +Total of A's papers.................... ...1801 + +In this case there are 800 surplus votes, whilst there are in all 1600 +papers on which next preferences have been marked. It is therefore clear +that each of the candidates B, C, Z is entitled to receive one-half the +papers on which his name has been marked as the next preference. Each of +the three bundles of papers showing next preferences for B, C, Z are +divided into two portions. One portion is transferred to the next +preference, the other is retained for the purpose of constituting A's +quota, in which is included the papers on which A's name is +alone marked. + +The complete operation is shown below:-- + + Candidate indicated as Number Number of Number of + next Preference. of next Papers Transferred Papers + Preferences. to the next Retained for + Preference. A's Quota. + +B 1290 648 648 +C 264 132 132 +Z 40 20 20 + ---- --- --- +Total of next preferences 1600 800 800 + +Papers showing no +further preference 201 -- 201 + ---- --- ---- + +Totals 1801 800 1001 + +In this way each of the candidates B, C, and Z obtains in strict +proportion that share of A's surplus to which he is entitled, and, so +far as this operation is concerned, the element of chance is wholly +eliminated.[8] + +The papers selected for transfer, however, are those last filed in the +process of sorting, and should it become necessary to transfer these +papers a second time there would enter in this further distribution an +element of chance which, as explained in the Appendix already referred +to, is so trifling as to have no practical effect upon the result unless +the number of electors is small as compared with the number of members +to be elected. + +_The Gregory Method._ + +A third method, in which the element of chance is eliminated from every +transfer, has been embodied in the Tasmanian Act of 1907. Whenever it is +necessary to transfer surplus votes, the whole of the successful +candidate's papers on which preferences are marked are transferred, but +at a reduced value. In the example given the whole of A's papers on +which next preferences had been marked for B, C, and Z would be carried +forward to those candidates, but each paper would be transferred at the +value of one-half, the remaining portion of the value of each paper +having been used for the purpose of electing A. This method is known as +the fractional, or Gregory, method of transfer, having been first +suggested by Mr. J. B. Gregory of Melbourne, in 1880. The regulations +for the conduct of elections contained in the Tasmanian Act are given in +Appendix VIII. + +The committee which investigated the working of this system as applied +to the Tasmanian General Election of 1909, made a very valuable +comparison between the rules contained in the Municipal Representation +Bill[9] and the more exact rules of the Tasmanian Act. A fresh scrutiny, +based on the rules of the Municipal Representation Bill, was made of all +the ballot papers used in that election. It was found that in each +district the same candidates were excluded in the same order and the +same candidates returned as at the actual election. The same results +would, therefore, have been attained and much labour saved if the rules +of the Municipal Representation Bill had been used. This committee, +however, in view of the fact that the more exact method had already been +established in Tasmania, and that the ascertainment of the results only +involved an expenditure of a few hours more time, and that there were +no data available to show the frequency of close contests in which a +small change in the distribution of votes might possibly affect the +result, recommended that no change should be made in the law. Still it +would seem that the rules of the Municipal Representation Bill are +sufficiently exact for all practical purposes except where the number of +electors is small. The fractional transfer is of course the most perfect +from the mathematical point of view, but the Royal Commission on +Electoral Systems, after a careful examination of its working, report +that "we agree with the Proportional Representation Society in regarding +the additional labour involved as greater than it is worth."[10] + +Where the number of electors is small, however, it is not only desirable +to carry out the transfers with the exactness prescribed by the +Tasmanian rules, but in important elections, such as those of the +Senators in South Africa, it is desirable to introduce a further +modification. In transferring the votes in ordinary elections fractions +of votes are ignored, because such fractions do not affect the result. +Where, however, there are only a few electors such fractions may become +important, and, for this reason, the regulations (see Appendix IX.) +adopted by the South African Government for the election of Senators +provided that each ballot paper should be treated as of the value of +100, or, in other words, that fractions should be taken into account as +far as two places of decimals. The application of these regulations +presented no difficulty; the counting of the votes in each of the four +Colonies proceeded without the slightest hitch. + +_The Gove or Dobbs Method._ + +The methods of transfer hitherto described all enable the voter to +maintain complete power over the disposal his vote. It has, however, +been suggested that the candidate for whom the vote is recorded should +have the privilege of deciding to whom it should be transferred. The +suggestion was first made by Mr. Archibald E. Dobbs, who, in 1872, in a +pamphlet entitled _General Representation_, made the proposal that +before the date of the election each candidate should publish a schedule +of the names of any of the other candidates to whom he desired his vote +to be transferred. This method of transfer by schedule is usually known +as the "Gove" method, and was contained in the Bill submitted by Mr. W. +H. Gove to the Legislature of Massachusetts, in 1891. Section 7 of this +Bill reads as follows: "Votes shall be transferred according to the +request of the candidate for whom they were originally cast to a person +named in the list furnished by said candidate before the date of the +election." With this method the elector in recording his vote for any +one candidate would have no independent power of indicating to whom the +vote should be transferred, and Mr. Dobbs, in a later pamphlet[11] has +suggested that the elector should be given the option of accepting the +schedule of preferences published by the candidate, or of indicating his +own. Mr. Dobbs thus gets rid of the compulsory acceptance of a schedule +of preferences, a proposal to which most English-speaking electors would +have an instinctive dislike. But even to an optional schedule certain +objections remain. The system has lost in simplicity, and the order of +the candidates in the particular schedules would be determined in most +cases by the party organizations. + +The _transferability_ of votes is the connecting link between all these +systems; it is the essential feature upon which depends the +proportionate representation of the contending parties, and the mode of +transfer is properly regarded as a matter upon which different views may +be held. As regards the second and third systems of transfer outlined +above--which so far are the only ones which have been put into +practice--experience confirms the theoretical conclusions of +mathematicians that, save in the case of small electorates, both methods +yield the same result. The second method was that used by the +Proportional Representation Society for the purpose of its model +elections, and is now applied in the election of Municipal Councils in +Johannesburg and Pretoria. A description of the Model Election of 1908 +will serve to illustrate the various processes involved in the sorting +and counting of votes. + +_The model election of 1908._ + +In this election it was assumed that the voters in a constituency +returning five members were asked to make their choice among twelve +candidates. These candidates were all well-known political men, and were +chosen with an attempt at impartiality from the Liberal, the Unionist, +and the Independent Labour parties. As no Irish newspaper was publishing +the ballot paper, no Nationalist was included.[12] This ballot paper, a +copy of which appears on page 147, was sent, accompanied by a short +explanatory article, for publication to, and appeared in, the following +newspapers: _The Times, The Morning Post, The Spectator, The Nation, The +Daily News, The Financial News, The Manchester Guardian, The Yorkshire +Post, The Yorkshire Daily Observer, The Western Morning News, The +Western Daily Mercury, The Glasgow Herald, The Dundee Advertiser, The +Woolwich Pioneer_, and _The Labour Leader_. Readers of the newspapers +were asked to cut out the ballot paper, mark it and return it to Caxton +Hall by the first post on the morning of Tuesday, 1 December 1908. +Ballot papers were also circulated independently among members of the +Proportional Representation Society and their friends. About 18,000 +papers were returned by newspaper readers, and about 3700 by members of +the Society and their friends. In all a constituency of 21,690 electors +was formed, a number whose votes were enough, but not too many, for +counting in a single evening. + + +PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION ELECTION, 1908 + +BALLOT PAPER + +PLEASE VOTE + +In this Illustrative Election FIVE members are to be elected for a +single constituency, such as Leeds. The following TWELVE Candidates are +supposed to have been nominated. + +Order of + Preference. Names of Candidates + +........... ASQUITH, The Rt. Hon. H. H. + +........... BALFOUR, The Rt. Hon. A. J. + +........... BURT, The Rt. Hon. Thomas + +........... CECIL, Lord Hugh + +........... HENDERSON, Arthur + +........... JONES, Leif + +........... JOYNSON-HICKS, W. + +........... LLOYD GEORGE, The Rt. Hon. D. + +........... LONG, The Rt. Hon. Walter H. + +........... MACDONALD, J. Ramsay + +........... SHACKLETON, David + +........... SMITH, F.E. + + +INSTRUCTIONS TO VOTERS + +A. _Each Elector has one vote_, and one vote only. + +B. _The Elector votes_ + +(a) By placing the figure 1 opposite the name of the candidate _he likes +best_. + +He is also invited to place + +(b) The figure 2 opposite the name of his _second choice, + +(c) The figure 3 opposite the name of his _third choice_, and so on, +numbering as many candidates as he pleases in the order of his +preference. + +_N.B._--The vote will be spoilt if the figure 1 is placed opposite the +name of more than one candidate. + + * * * * * + +This Ballot Paper should be filled in and returned not later than +_Tuesday_, first post, 1 _December_ 1908, in open envelope (halfpenny +stamp), addressed to + +THE RT. HON. LORD AVEBURY, Caxton Hall, Westminster, S.W. + + +_The counting of the votes. General Arrangements_. + +The votes were counted at the Caxton Hall, Westminster, on the evening +of Thursday, 3 December. Unfortunately, it was not found possible for +all the newspapers to reproduce the ballot paper in its exact +dimensions, and the unevenness in the sizes of the papers, which would +not occur in a real election, caused some trouble to the counters. The +method on which the room was arranged may best be gathered from the plan +shown on next page. + +[Illustration: ILLUSTRATIVE ELECTION, DECEMBER 3RD, 1908 PLAN OF ROOM] + +In the centre of the room was the sorting table, where the votes were in +imagination discharged from the ballot boxes. At this table were +stationed a number of helpers, chiefly Post Office sorters, who through +Mr. G. H. Stuart, of the Postmen's Federation, and Mr. A. Jones, of the +Fawcett Association, had kindly volunteered their services. Here also +were a dozen sets of pigeon-holes, each set having twelve compartments, +and each compartment being labelled with the name of a candidate. As +soon as the count began, the sorters started sorting the ballot papers +according to the names marked 1, placing in each candidate's compartment +the papers in which his name was so marked, and setting aside spoilt or +doubtful papers. Printed instructions to the sorters had been +issued, thus:-- + +1. Sort the ballot papers according to the names marked 1. + +2. Place spoiled or doubtful papers on top of the case (right-hand +side). + +As the papers were sorted the two assistants supervising these processes +took them to the small tables (checking and counting tables) ranged on +either side of the sorting table. These tables were appropriated to the +various candidates, and when it was expected that a candidate would poll +a large number of votes--_e.g.,_ in the cases of Mr. Asquith and Mr. +Balfour--several tables were allotted to him. At each of these tables +sat two counters who acted in accordance with the following +instructions:-- + +1. Count the papers into bundles of fifty. + +2. See that the figure 1 appears against the name of the candidate whose +papers are being counted. + +3. Place mis-sorts at the side of the table. + +4. Count each bundle twice. + +5. Place on the top of each bundle a coloured slip bearing the +candidate's name (already printed). + +6. Note the final bundle with the number of papers therein contained. + +The counters thus checked the accuracy of the sorters' work, and +labelled the bundles of each candidate's votes with a card of a +distinctive colour bearing his name. These bundles of votes were then +taken to the returning officer's table, where there awaited them a row +of twelve deep, three-sided open boxes, each labelled with the name of a +candidate. The returning officer's assistants at this table made up the +bundles of 50 into parcels of 500, and ascertained the total number of +votes for each candidate, carefully keeping each candidate's papers in +his own allotted box. + +Lastly, the results as ascertained were shown on large blackboards. If +and whenever any doubt arose as to the validity of a vote, it was taken +to the returning officer by the supervisors and adjudicated upon by him. +The accuracy of the sorting may be judged by the fact that when the 9043 +votes attributed to Mr. Asquith on the first count were subsequently +analyzed, it was found that only one paper was wrongly placed to his +credit, a Liberal vote which should have gone first to Mr. Lloyd George. + +As to these arrangements, one suggestion may be made for the guidance of +future returning officers: it was found in practice that the work at the +returning officer's table was too heavy for the two assistants to keep +pace with the rapidity with which the votes were sorted and counted. Two +assistants are required for the purpose of keeping a record of the +various processes; two others for receiving and distributing the +ballot papers. + +_The first count._ + +The first duty of the returning officer, as already explained, was to +ascertain the total number of votes polled by each candidate, each +ballot paper being a vote for the candidate marked 1 thereon. This was +a simple task, which took about an hour and a quarter, and yielded the +following result:-- + +Asquith (Liberal) 9,042 +Balfour (Unionist) 4,478 +Lloyd George (Liberal) 2,751 +Macdonald (Labour) 2,124 +Henderson (Labour) 1,038 +Long (Unionist) 672 +Hugh Cecil (Unionist Free Trader) 460 +Shackleton (Labour) 398 +Burt (Liberal) 260 +Leif Jones (Liberal) 191 +Smith (Unionist) 164 +Joynson-Hicks (Unionist) 94 + ------ + Total 21,672 + +_The Quota._ + +It will be seen that, with this method of election, the general result, +showing the relative strength of the parties, can be quickly +ascertained, but, some time elapses before the definitive result, with +the names of all the successful candidates, can be published. The first +step necessary in determining which candidates were successful was to +ascertain the _quota_, and this, in accordance with the rule above +stated,[13] was found by dividing the total number of votes by six and +adding one to the result. The number was found to be 3613, and the table +given above shows that on the first count Mr. Asquith and Mr. Balfour +had each polled more than a quota of votes. Both these candidates were, +in accordance with the rules, declared elected, and, as some +misapprehension prevails on this point, it should be stated that the +order of seniority of members elected under this system would be +determined by the order in which they were declared elected. In this +case Mr. Asquith and Mr. Balfour would be the senior members in the +order named. + +_The transfer of surplus votes._ + +The peculiar feature of the single transferable vote now came into play. +Both Mr. Asquith and Mr. Balfour had polled more votes than were +sufficient to ensure their election, and in order that these excess +votes should not be wasted and a result produced such as that already +shown to be possible where the votes are not transferable, it was the +duty of the returning officer to transfer these surplus votes, and in +doing so to carry out strictly the wishes of the electors as indicated +on their ballot papers. + +The largest surplus, that of Mr. Asquith, was first dealt with, and the +transfer of votes, as already mentioned, was effected in accordance with +the provisions of Lord Courtney's Municipal Representation Bill. All the +votes recorded for Mr. Asquith were re-examined, all the ballot papers +contained in his box being taken to the central table and re-sorted +according to the next available preferences indicated by the electors. +For this purpose the names of the elected candidates were removed from +their former pigeon-holes, and one of the compartments vacated was +marked "exhausted" and used as a receptacle for those papers which +contained no available next preference. The instructions to +sorters were:-- + +1. Sort the ballot papers according to the highest available preference. + +2. When no further preference is indicated, place the ballot paper in +the compartment marked "exhausted." + +The term "next available preferences" needs definition. As a rule the +next preference was the candidate marked with the figure 2; but if any +supporter of Mr. Asquith had indicated Mr. Balfour (already elected) as +his second choice, then the elector's third choice became the "next +available preference." The papers for each next preference were made +into bundles of 50, but, instead of a coloured card with the name of the +candidate, a white "transfer" card was placed with each bundle. The +transfer card was marked with the name of the candidate whose papers +were being re-sorted and also with the name of the candidate who had +been indicated as the next available preference. The instructions +issued to the counters were as follows:-- + +_(a)_1. Check the sorting of the papers, _i.e.,_ see that the candidate +whose papers are being counted is the highest available preference. + +2. Place mis-sorts at the side of the table. + +_(b)_ 1. Count the papers into bundles of fifty. + +2. Count each bundle twice. + +3. Place on the top of each bundle a "transfer card" showing from and to +whom the votes are being transferred. + +4. Note each bundle with the number of papers therein contained. + +These bundles were placed in a second series of open boxes on the +returning officer's table, each box being labelled with the name of a +candidate and being smaller in size than the boxes containing the first +preferences. The number of next available preferences for each candidate +was then ascertained. It was, of course, not the duty of the returning +officer to transfer all the re-sorted papers; it was necessary to retain +a "quota" for Mr. Asquith; and an operation which requires some care now +took place. The papers contained in each of the second series of boxes +were divided into two portions, bearing in each case the same proportion +to one another. One portion was transferred to the candidate who had +been indicated as the next preference, and the other was placed in Mr. +Asquith's box, the portions reserved for him constituting his quota; the +actual papers transferred to each next preference were those last placed +in the box bearing his name. The details of this process are set forth +in the table overleaf. + + +PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION ELECTION, 1908 + +TRANSFER SHEET + +Distribution of the Rt. Hon. H. H. ASQUITH's surplus. + +Surplus Votes 5429 + +No. of Papers showing a next preference 9009 + + Surplus 5429 +Proportion to be transferred = ------------------------- = ---- + Total of next preferences 9009 + + Column Headings: + A. Names of Candidates indicated as next preference. + I. No. of papers on which Candidate is marked as next preference. + II. No. of Votes transferred to next preference. (Fractions ignored.) + III. No. of Votes retained for Mr. Asquith's Quota. + +A. I. II. III. + +Balfour, The Rt. Hon. A. J. -- -- -- +Burt, The Rt, Hon. Thomas 468 282 186 +Cecil, Lord Hugh 132 79 53 +Henderson, Arthur 261 157 104 +Jones, Leif 176 106 70 +Joynson-Hicks, W. 17 10 7 +Lloyd George, The Rt. Hon. D. 7,807 4,704 3,103 +Long, The Rt. Hon. Walter H. 46 27 19 +Madonald, J. Ramsay 51 30 21 +Shackleton, David 35 21 14 +Smith, F. B. 16 9 7 + ----- ----- ----- +Total of next preferences 9,009 5,425 3,584 + +Preferences exhausted . . 33 -- 33 + ----- ----- ----- +Total 9,042 5,425 3,617[14] + +This table needs, perhaps, a further word of explanation. The first +column shows the result of the re-sorting of Mr. Asquith's papers, Mr. +Burt having been indicated as the next preference on 468 papers, Lord +Hugh Cecil on 132 papers, and so on. The papers for each next preference +were, as already staked, divided into two portions, and the second and +third columns show the result of this division. The division is carried +out in a strictly proportional manner, according to the following +principle. If 5429 surplus votes are to be transferred from a total of +9009 unexhausted voting papers, what portion should be transferred from +468, from 132, and so on. The proper numbers, which are given in the +second column, are found by a simple rule of three process; each of the +numbers in the second column is obtained from the corresponding number +in the first column by multiplying by the fraction 5429/9009, that being +the fraction which represents the proportion of unexhausted papers to be +transferred. The figures in column III., which are the votes retained in +each case to make up Mr. Asquith's quota, are obtained by subtracting +the corresponding numbers in column II. from those in column I. Ten +separate calculations were thus necessary, and for this part of the +election it is desirable that the returning officer should have two +assistants who are accustomed to figures. These should check one +another's work. In Belgium the returning officer is assisted by two +"professional calculators." + +The ballot papers with the votes constituting Mr. Asquith's quota were +replaced in his original box and never touched again. The ballot papers +transferred were placed in each case on the top of the papers already +contained in the box of the candidate to whom the transfer was made. + +As the result of the transfer of Mr. Asquith's surplus it was found that +the total of Mr. Lloyd George's votes amounted to 7455, and as this +number exceeded the quota, Mr. Lloyd George was declared elected, he +being the third member chosen. Mr. Balfour's surplus was then +distributed in a similar manner. The number of votes transferred is +shown in the result sheet, pp. 160-61. As Mr. Lloyd George's total +exceeded the quota, it was also necessary to dispose of his surplus. In +the latter case only the papers transferred to Mr. Lloyd George, and not +his original votes, were re-examined, as his surplus consisted of votes +originally given to Mr. Asquith. + +The poll now stood:-- + +Asquith (Liberal) 3,613 \ +Balfour (Unionist) 3,613 > Elected +Lloyd George (Liberal) 3,613 / +Macdonald (Labour) 2,387 +Henderson (Labour) 2,032 +Burt (Liberal) 1,793 +L. Jones (Liberal) 1,396 +Long (Unionist) 1,282 +Cecil (Unionist Free Trade) 822 +Shackleton (Labour) 683 +Smith (Unionist) 258 +Joynson-Hicks (Unionist) 167 + +Votes lost through neglect of fractions 13 + +It will readily be seen that these transfers have been in accordance +with what might have been assumed to be the general political +preferences of the electors. The Liberal surplus votes from Mr. Asquith +naturally went on chiefly to Mr. Lloyd George, and the overflow from Mr. +Lloyd George, after filling up his quota, went on to Mr. Burt and Mr. +Leif Jones, whose positions were greatly improved in consequence, though +neither obtained the quota. At the same time a formidable addition of +834 votes was given to Mr. Henderson, the votes doubtless of Liberal +sympathisers with Labour; and Lord Hugh Cecil received 88 votes, +presumably from moderate Liberals who lay chief stress on Free Trade. On +the other hand, Mr. Balfour's smaller Unionist surplus was divided +mainly between Mr. Walter Long, who received 526 additional votes, and +Lord Hugh Cecil, who received 195. + +_The elimination of unsuccessful candidates_.] + +After the transfer of all surplus votes had been completed, the work of +the returning officer again became very simple. Three members only had +been elected, two more were required, and there remained in the running +nine candidates, none of whom obtained a quota of votes. Another process +now began, namely the elimination of candidates at the bottom of the +poll, beginning with the lowest and working upwards. The group of +electors who have recorded their votes for the candidate lowest on the +poll are evidently not sufficiently numerous to have a direct +representative of their own. The process of elimination allows these +electors to re-combine with other groups until they become part of a +body large enough to be so entitled. The supporters of the lowest +candidate are treated as being asked (and answering, if they care to do +so, by their next preferences) the question: "The candidate of your +first choice having no chance of election, to whom now of the candidates +still in the running do you prefer your vote to go?" By this process, +first the two candidates, Mr. Smith and Mr. Joynson-Hicks, who at this +stage were at the bottom of the poll and whose combined votes were less +than those of the third lowest candidate, were eliminated and their +votes transferred to the next preferences of their supporters. No one +was elected as a result of this operation, and accordingly the votes of +Mr. Shackleton and Lord Hugh Cecil, now lowest on the poll, were +transferred in the order named. + +These and all other eliminations were of the same character. _All_ the +papers of the eliminated candidates which showed an available next +preference were transferred, and no calculations such as were required +in the case of the transfer of surplus votes were needed. It will be +sufficient if the details of one process--the transfer of Mr. +Shackleton's votes--are given; for the details of all other similar +transfers the full table on pp. 160-61 should be consulted. The votes of +Mr. Shackleton were disposed of as follows:-- + +TRANSFER OF MR. SHACKLETON'S VOTES + +Names of Candidates Number of Papers +indicated as next for each next +preference. preference. + +Burt 89 +Cecil 18 +Henderson 233 +Jones 57 +Long 8 +Macdonald 252 + +Preferences +exhausted 45 + --- +Total 702 + +The transfers of the votes both of Mr. Shackleton and of Lord Hugh +Cecil were completed, but still no fresh candidate had the quota, and +Mr. Lief Jones's 1500 votes came next for distribution. These 1500 votes +might have been expected to go to Mr. Burt, the sole remaining unelected +Liberal, who had already 2025 votes, and make his election practically +secure. But here came a surprise; Mr. Leif Jones's supporters (who had, +of course, in most instances, come to him from Mr. Asquith and Mr. Lloyd +George) had in some cases marked no further preferences, so that their +votes were no longer transferable, and in many other cases had marked +Mr. Henderson or Mr. Macdonald as their next preference; thus at the +conclusion of this operation the result of the election was +still doubtful. + +Two places had still to be filled, and the poll stood:-- + +Asquith (Liberal) 3,613 \ +Balfour (Unionist) 3,613 > Elected +Lloyd George (Liberal) 3,613 / +Macdonald (Labour) 2,851 +Henderson (Labour) 2,829 +Burt (Liberal) 2,683 +Long (Unionist) 2,035 + +Mr. Long's votes had now to be distributed; the majority of his +supporters were Unionists who had not marked any preference for either +of the two remaining Labour candidates or for the remaining Liberal +candidate, and their votes consequently were not capable of being +transferred. But some 370 of Mr. Long's supporters had shown a +preference for Mr. Burt (presumably as being reckoned not so Socialistic +as his competitors) as against some 27 for Mr. Macdonald and 80 for Mr. +Henderson, so that the poll stood:-- + +Asquith (Liberal) 3,613 \ +Balfour (Unionist) 3,613 > Elected +Lloyd George (Liberal) 3,613 / +Burt (Liberal) 3,053 +Macdonald (Labour) 2,938 +Henderson (Labour) 2,910 + +Mr. Henderson, being at the bottom of the poll, was then eliminated, +but it was unnecessary to proceed with the transfer of his votes as, +after his elimination, there were only five candidates remaining, and +five was the number of members to be elected. The work of the returning +officer was at an end, the following candidates being elected:-- + +Asquith (Liberal) +Bafour (Unionist) +Lloyd George (Liberal) +Burt (Liberal) +Macdonald (Labour) + +The whole process of the election is shown by the returning officers' +full result sheet. + +_The fairness of the result._ + +The fairness of this method of voting is at once apparent. Each group of +electors as large as a quota secured a representative. The Liberals were +in a very large majority, and with the block system and probably with +the single-member system would have nominated five candidates and have +obtained all five seats. In this election the two smaller groups, the +Unionist and Labour parties, each returned one member. The voters did +not, in recording their preferences, restrict themselves to candidates +of one party, but nevertheless, it will be of interest to compare the +seats gained with the strength of parties as indicated by the first +preferences. The party vote disclosed in the first count was as +follows:-- + + Votes polled. +Liberal 12,244 +Unionist 6,868 +Labour 3,660 + ------ +Total 21,672 + +The quota was 3613, and these totals show that the + +Liberals obtained 3 quotas with 1405 votes over and gained 3 seats. +Unionists obtained 1 quota with 2265 votes over and gained 1 seat. +Labour obtained 1 quota less 53 votes and gained 1 seat. + +PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION ELECTION, 1908--RESULT SHEET + +No. of Votes,--21,672. + +No. of Seats--5. + +Quota = (21,672/6) + 1 = 3613 + +Col 1: First Count +Col 2: Transfer of surplus votes (Asquith's) +Col 3: Result +Col 4: Transfer of Surplus Votes (Bafour) +Col 5: Result +Col 6: Transfer of Surplus Votes (Lloyd George) +Col 7: Result + +Names of Candidates. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 + +Asquith, The Rt.Hon.H.H. 9,042-5,429 3,613 -- 3,613 -- 3,613 + +Balfour, The Rt.Hon.A.J. 4,478 -- 4,478-865 3,613 -- 3,613 + +Burl, The Rt. Hon. Thomas. 260 +282 542 +12 554+1,239 1,793 + +Cecil, Lord Hugh 400 +79 539+195 734 +88 822 + +Henderson, Arthur 1,038 +157 1,195 +3 1,198 +834 2,032 + +Jone, Leif 191 +157 297 +2 299+1,097 1,396 + +Joynson-Hicks, W. 94 +10 104 +52 156 +11 167 + +Lloyd George, The Rt.Hon.D. 2,751+4,704 7,455 -- 7,455-3,842 3,613 + +Long, The Rt.Hon. Walter H. 672 +27 699+520 1,225 +57 1,282 + +Macdonald, J. Ramsay 2,124 +30 2,154 +5 2,159 +228 2,387 + +Shackleton, David 398 +21 419 +2 421 +202 683 + +Smith, F.E. 184 +9 173 +65 238 +20 258 + +Votes lost through +neglect of fractions - +4 4 +3 7 +6 13 + +Preferences Exhausted - - - - -- -- -- + +Totals 21,072 - 21,672 -- 21,672 -- 21,672 + +Col 8: Transfer of votes (J Hicks and Smiths) +Col 9: Result +Col 10: Transfer of Votes Shackleston's) +Col 11: Result +Col 12: Transfer of Votes (cecil's) +Col 13: Result +Col 14: Transfer of Votes (L.Jones) +Col 15: Results +Col 16: Transfer of Votes (Long's) +Col 17: Final Result. + + 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. + +Asquith -- 3,613 -- 3,613 -- 3,613 -- 3,613 -- 3,613 E + +Balfour -- 3,013 -- 3,613 -- 3,613 -- 3,613 -- 3,613 E + +Burl. +21 1,814 +89 1,903+122 2,025 +658 2,683 +370 3,053 E + +Cecil +88 908 +18 923-926 -- -- -- -- -- + +Henderson +14 2,046+233 2,270 +49 2,328 +501 2,829 +81 2,910 + +Jone +12 1,408 +57 1,465 +35 1,500-1,500 -- -- -- + +Joynson-Hicks 167 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- + +Lloyd George -- 3,613 -- 3,613 -- 3,613 -- 3,613 -- 3,613 E + +Long +233 1,505 +8 1,513+490 2,003 +32 2,035-2,035 -- + +Macdonald +21 2,408+252 2,680 +48 2,708 +143 2,851 +87 2,938 E + +Shackleton +19 702-702 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- + +Smith -258 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- + +Votes lost -- 13 -- 13 -- 13 -- 13 -- 13 + +Exhausted +29 29 +45 74+182 256 +166 422+1,497 1,919 + +Totals -- 21,672 -- 21,672 -- 21,672 -- 21,672 --21,672 + +This result is as fair as is possible, and would have been equally +attained if, as would probably be the case in a real election, there had +been but little cross voting. The total results in the Tasmanian General +Election, 1909 (six-member constituencies) showed an exact proportion +between the votes polled and the seats gained by the respective +parties.[15] + +_Improved arrangements in the Transvaal elections._ + +The arrangements made at the model election were adopted by the Chief +Electoral Officer of Tasmania,[16] and were also adopted by the +returning officers of Pretoria and Johannesburg. Experience has shown +that some improvements in details can be made. Both at Pretoria and +Johannesburg less work was done at the returning officer's table. The +counters were placed more directly arrangements under the +superintendence of the returning officer's assistants, and the final +totals of each operation were ascertained at the counters' tables. When +the ballot boxes were brought in by the presiding officers of the +polling stations with a return of the votes they contained, the +returning officer handed them one by one to superintendents who took +them to that section of the counting force over which they had charge. +The counters ascertained the number of papers in each ballot box. The +superintendents reported the total number to the returning officer, and +if this number agreed with the presiding officer's return the ballot box +and contents were handed back to the returning officer. After the +contents of all the ballot boxes had been verified and the grand total +of votes ascertained, all the papers were emptied into one box and were +well mixed. The papers were then sorted at a central table, as in the +election already described; the superintendent took the papers to the +counters, each of whom ascertained the number of votes for that +candidate whose papers he had been deputed to count. The superintendents +brought a statement of the totals for each candidate to the returning +officer, and if the aggregate of these figures did not agree with the +number of ballot papers distributed to the sorters a fresh count was +ordered. The elections at Johannesburg and Pretoria demonstrated that +the requisite accuracy in counting could be easily attained. The +operations were characterized with remarkable precision. There was no +error in the counting of the votes at Pretoria during the whole of the +operations, and the same remark holds good of Johannesburg, save that +one ballot paper which had been accidentally torn was omitted to be +counted. The two pieces had been pinned together, and the paper, which +in consequence had been rendered shorter than the others, was +overlooked. The omission was quickly discovered, and no other error +took place during the whole of the proceedings. The various counting +processes check one another. Any errors occurring in the earlier +operations are thrown out in the course of the subsequent proceedings, +for the totals of the votes at the conclusion of each operation must +agree with the total shown at the commencement of the count. In another +feature the organization of the Transvaal elections might be copied. All +spoilt or doubtful papers were brought to the returning officer's table +by his assistants, and were not examined until the conclusion of the +first count. The whole of these papers were then gone through by the +returning officer, who decided the question of their validity in the +presence of the candidates or their representatives. The returning +officer also examined all papers which were treated as "exhausted," but +this work might have been deputed to the assistant returning +officer.[17] + +_Criticisms of the single transferable vote._ + +After reviewing the whole of the evidence submitted to them, the Royal +Commission on Electoral Systems reported that "of schemes for producing +proportional representation we think that the transferable vote will +have the best chance of ultimate acceptance," but the Report contains +some criticisms of its mechanism which demand consideration. These +criticisms are directed to two points: (1) the effect of later +preferences in deciding the result of an election; (2) the process of +eliminating candidates at the bottom of the poll. + +_Effect of late preferences._ + +The Royal Commission express the opinion that late preferences may have +an undue weight in deciding the result of an election. But the +Commissioners seem to have been unnecessarily alarmed in this matter. A +careful analysis of the preferences recorded in the Tasmanian elections +was made by a Committee appointed for the purpose by the Tasmanian +Government. This Committee ascertained that the comparative values of +the various preferences in determining the result of the election were +as follows:-- + +1st preference .739 +2nd .140 +3rd .051 +4th .029 +5th .014 +6th .008 +7th .009 +8th .008 +9th .003 + +In other words 73.9 per cent, first preferences became effective votes, +14.0 per cent, second preferences became effective votes, and so on. +These figures show the great superiority in value of the earlier +preferences, and this superiority was also seen in the Transvaal +elections. In Pretoria 68 per cent, of the first preferences were +directly effective in returning candidates, in Johannesburg 67.5 per +cent. Second preferences primarily come into play in favour of +candidates of similar complexion to the candidates first chosen, and +when, as is possible in the last resort, a vote is passed on in support +of a candidate of a different party, this is no more than the +Commissioners themselves approve and recommend for adoption in the case +of three or more candidates standing for a single seat. The difference +between the effect of the final transfers under a system of proportional +representation and of transfers under the system recommended by the +Commission is that in the first case they might determine the character +of one out of five or more members representing a constituency, in the +other they might affect the representation of each of the five or more +divisions into which the constituency would be divided. + +_The elimination of candidates from the bottom of the poll._ + +The second criticism concerns the elimination of candidates. It is +sometimes contended that it is unfair to eliminate the candidate at the +bottom of the poll, because had he remained longer in the contest he +might have received at the next stage a considerable amount of support. +Taking an extreme case, the candidate at the bottom of the poll may +have been so generally popular as to have been the second choice of the +majority of the electors. This is theoretically conceivable, but it does +not conform to the facts of elections. The principle of eliminating a +candidate at the bottom of the poll is not peculiar to the single +transferable vote. When a constituency returns but one member and there +are three candidates, and it is desired by means of the second ballot to +ensure the election of the candidate who commands the support of the +majority of the electors, the candidate lowest on the poll is eliminated +and a second ballot is held to decide between the claims of the +remaining two candidates. In such a case it is conceivable that the +candidate lowest on the poll may have been more acceptable to the +majority of the electors than the candidate finally selected. But the +system of the single transferable vote with constituencies returning +several members diminishes very considerably any such possibility. In +the first place, the candidate to be successful need only obtain a much +smaller proportion of the total number of votes than in a single-member +constituency. In the latter he must poll just over one-half before he is +safe from defeat; in a seven-member constituency if he polls one-eighth +he will escape this fate. The candidate who has a reasonable proportion +of support, therefore, stands less chance of being excluded. In the +second place no candidate is excluded until after the transfer of all +surplus votes has been completed. If, in a constituency returning +several members, a candidate, after the transfer of all surplus votes, +is still at the bottom of the poll, the facts would seem to indicate +that he was not even the second favourite of any considerable number of +electors. The preferences actually given in elections show how little +force this criticism possesses. The table below was prepared by the +Committee appointed by the Tasmanian Government. It shows the result of +an examination of all the votes cast in the district of Wilmot for the +election of five members of the Tasmanian House of Assembly in April +1909. The names of the candidates are given with the numbers of the +various preferences recorded for each candidate. The total number of +second preferences recorded for Waterworth, the first candidate to be +excluded, was 141. Similar tables for the other four districts show that +no injustice arose from the exclusion of the lowest candidate. The only +occasion on which the criticism has any force is when, in filling the +last seats, the conditions are analogous to those which obtain in a +three-cornered fight in a single-member constituency. Yet in the latter +case the Royal Commission did not hesitate to recommend the exclusion of +the lowest candidate. + +DISTRICT OF WILMOT: NUMBERS OF VARIOUS PREFERENCES + +Name. Preferences. + 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 +Best 935 690 596 609 615 550 23 2 7 5 +Dumbleton 518 537 603 632 819 650 24 4 3 5 +Field 930 699 692 619 555 585 21 9 4 5 +Hope 1,232 1,302 1,077 551 229 159 13 6 2 5 +Jensen 1,955 894 1,087 132 58 58 13 19 7 36 +Kean 599 1,521 1,370 118 53 50 11 28 38 15 +Lee 822 750 902 618 512 488 27 4 7 1 +Lyons 1,079 1,444 1,329 93 76 65 21 29 32 12 +Murray 572 885 972 848 625 395 14 6 7 1 +Waterworth 221 141 236 590 198 254 141 21 6 9 + ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- --- --- --- -- + 8,863 8,863 8,863 4,810 3,740 3,254 308 128 113 94 + +The elimination of candidates has been criticized from another point of +view. The Royal Commission, while careful not to endorse this criticism, +and referring to it with reluctance, "because doubts about the absolute +reliability of the mechanism of the system may arouse prejudices +disproportionate to the importance of the subject, which is very small +in comparison with the other considerations involved," review the +evidence which had been submitted to them as follows: "The element of +chance involved in the order of elimination is exceedingly difficult to +determine. It would appear that the element is perceptible in certain +contingencies, but the rarity or frequency with which these would occur +in actual practice is a matter of pure speculation, as it apparently +depends on the amount of cross-voting which voters permit themselves in +the use of their later preferences, a point only to be decided by +experience. 'Chance' in this connexion has not quite the same meaning as +when used in respect of the method of transfer. In the case of the +latter we were dealing with mathematical probabilities; the chance which +is said to be involved in the process of elimination consists in the +fact that the results of the election may vary according to the strength +of quite irrelevant factors. Thus, a case was put to us to show that +with certain dispositions on the part of the electors the representation +of a party might be so much at the mercy of the order of elimination +that while it would only obtain one seat with 19,000 votes of its own it +would obtain two with 18,000, because in the latter case the order of +elimination of two candidates would be reversed."[18] + +It is here suggested that the results may depend upon the amount of +cross-voting which voters would permit themselves in the use of their +later preferences. The whole paragraph abounds in obscurities, and the +word "cross-voting" is used in such a context as to make it quite +uncertain whether the Commission mean by it inter- or intra-party +voting, or both. It is somewhat difficult to make a definite answer to a +charge so indistinctly formulated. Cross-voting, in the ordinary sense, +may certainly affect the result. If the supporters of a Radical +candidate prefer to give their second preferences to a Labour candidate +rather than to a moderate Liberal, such cross-voting obviously may +determine whether the Labour candidate or the moderate Liberal will be +successful. There is no element of chance involved. The object of the +system is the true representation of the electors, and the returning +officer must give effect to their wishes. The numerical case cited by +the Commissioners can only occur when so-called supporters of the party +in question are so indifferent to its fate as to refrain from recording +any preferences for any members of the party other than their own +favoured candidate. Such voters can hardly be called "members of a +party" for the purpose of contrasting its strength with that of another +party.[19] Even such cases, supposing them at all probable in practice, +could be provided against, as has been suggested by Mr. Rooke Corbett of +the Manchester Statistical Society, by determining a new quota whenever +any votes have to be set aside as exhausted. But the elections in which +the system has been tried show how little these cases accord with the +facts. The large number of exhausted papers which occur in the model +election described in this chapter, which was organized through the +press, perhaps accounts for much of this criticism. In real elections +the percentage of exhausted papers is much less. Thus in Johannesburg, +where one rigidly organized party, another party more loosely organized, +and ten independent candidates took the field, the electors made good +use of their privilege of marking preferences. Some 11,788 votes were +polled. At the conclusion of the tenth transfer only 104 votes had been +treated as exhausted. In Pretoria, where there were 2814 votes, the +total number of exhausted votes at the end of the election was only 63. +This happened on the occasion of the first trial of the system in +Johannesburg and Pretoria, and further experience will lead to an even +fuller exercise of the privilege of marking preferences. There is no +case for a criticism based on such a hypothetical example as that hinted +at by the Commission. + +_Quota Representation on the basis of the system._ + +Mr. Ramsay Macdonald, in criticizing this method of voting, complains +that its advocates "assume, quite erroneously, that a second preference +should carry the same political value as a first preference." But it +would be obviously unfair to penalize an elector by depriving him of any +part of the value of his vote because he failed to secure his first +choice as his representative. In making this criticism Mr. Macdonald has +lost sight of the reason for which the vote is made transferable. Every +elector has but one vote, and unless this vote retains its full value +when transferred, the proportionate representation of the electors +cannot be achieved. Thus it is conceivable that in a constituency +returning several members Mr. Macdonald might poll two quotas of Labour +votes, and if his excess votes were not transferred to the second +preferences of his supporters at their full value, the representation of +the party would suffer. Each quota of electors is entitled to a member, +and the transferring of votes enables the electors to group themselves +into quotas of equal size. + +In a critical analysis of the regulations adopted in the Transvaal, Mr. +Howard Pim, President of the Statistical Society, South Africa, stated +that: "However defective these regulations may be, the system of +election introduced by this Act is a great advance upon any previously +in existence in this Colony, for by it a minority which can command a +number of votes equal to or exceeding a number equal to the quota can +elect its candidate. This advantage far outweighs any defects that exist +in the regulations, and I trust that this principle of the quota will +never be surrendered, even if the Second Schedule of the Act be +modified."[20] Representation by quota has always been recognized by +advocates of the single transferable vote as being the great reform +accomplished by the new method of voting. The Government Statistician of +Tasmania, Mr. R. M. Johnston, declared that "those who ignore this +keystone, or foundation of the Hare system, and restrict their attention +entirely to peddling or unimportant details--such as the element of +chance involved in quota-excess-transfer-votes--fail altogether to +comprehend the grandeur and perfection of the cardinal features of the +system, which secures just and equitable representation of all forces, +whether of majorities or minorities." In attempting to give effect to +this great principle it is unnecessary to impose more work upon the +returning officers than is absolutely essential for the purpose, and +such experience as is available shows that the rules contained in the +Municipal Representation Bill[21] accomplish this end. + + +[Footnote 1: Denmark was thus the first country to make use of a system +of proportional representation. An excellent account of its introduction +is given in _La Representation Proportionelle_, published in 1888 by the +French Society for the Study of Proportional Representation.] + +[Footnote 2: In addition to the eight members elected by each Parliament, +the Senate includes eight nominated members appointed by the Governor in +Council. In future elections, unless otherwise determined by the Union +Parliament, eight Senators for each province will be elected at a joint +session of the members of the Provincial Council and the members of the +Union House of Assembly elected for the province.] + +[Footnote 3: The first section of the amendment was as follows: "From and +after the passing of the present Bill, every local constituency shall, +subject to the provisions hereinafter contained, return one member for +every quota of its registered electors actually voting at that election, +such quota being a number equal to the quotient obtained by dividing by +658 the total number of votes polled throughout the kingdom at the same +election, and if such quotient be fractional, the integral number nest +less. Provided always, that where the number of votes given by the +constituency shall not be equal to such quota, the quota may be +completed by means of votes given by persons duly qualified as electors +in any part of the United Kingdom; and the candidate who shall have +obtained such quota may, notwithstanding, be returned as a member for +the said constituency if he shall have obtained a majority of the votes +given therein as hereinafter mentioned."] + +[Footnote 4: _Autobiography_, 1873, p. 259.] + +[Footnote 5: The election of 1910, which was held in Glasgow, was +organized by the Scottish Branch of the Society.] + +[Footnote 6: This mode of voting is simple and effective where the +electing body is small and where there is no need or desire to avoid +full publicity. It is in use in the municipality of Toronto for the +election of committees, and was proposed for use in the election of a +number of Lords of Parliament from the whole body of peers in a +memorandum submitted by Lord Courtney of Penwith to the Select Committee +on the Reform of the House of Lords. See Report of this Committee [(234) +[(234) 1908] ] + +[Footnote 7: This rule for ascertaining the quota was first suggested by +Mr. H.R. Droop in a paper read by him before the Statistical Society in +April 1881. Both Mr. Hare and M. Andrae proposed that the quota should +be ascertained by dividing the number of votes cast by the number of +members to be elected. Mr. Droop pointed out that such a quota might, +with constituencies returning from three to eight representatives each, +yield on some occasions an incorrect result. "Suppose, for instance," +says he, "that the election is a contest between two parties of which +one commands 360 votes and the other 340, and that each party runs four +candidates for seven seats; then M. Andrae's quota will be (360 + 340) / +7 = 700 / 7 = 100, while mine will be: 700 / 8 + 1 = 88. Consequently, +if the 360 voters should divide their first votes so as to give +originally to each of three candidates 100, or more, votes, say 110, +104, and 100, their fourth candidate will originally have only 46 votes, +and will obtain by transfer with M. Andrae's quota only 14 additional +votes, and thus he will not get altogether more than 60 votes, and +therefore if the 340 can by organization arrange to divide their first +votes so that each of their four candidates has originally more than 60 +votes (which would not be difficult, as an equal division would give +each of them 85 votes) they will carry the odd candidate. On the other +hand, with my quota, the fourth candidate will get by transfer (however +the votes may be originally distributed) 360 - (3 x 88) = 360 - 264 = 96 +votes, and it will be impossible for the 340 to place all their four +candidates ahead of those of the 360. Therefore, with my quota nothing +can be gained by dividing the votes equally, or lost by dividing them +unequally, while with M. Andrae's and Mr. Hare's quota there will always +be a possibility of gaining by this, and therefore it may be worth while +in an important election to organize and ascertain how many candidates +the party's votes can carry, and arrange for such votes being divided +equally between these candidates, the very thing which preferential +voting is intended to render unnecessary."] + +[Footnote 8: The proportion will not in practice be so simple as in this +example--one-half. In every case the proportion is that which the number +of next preferences marked for any one unelected candidate bears to the +total number of preferences marked for all unelected candidates. +_Cf._ p. 164.] + +[Footnote 9: _Vide_ Appendix VII.] + +[Footnote 10: Report of the Royal Commission on Electoral Systems (Cd. +5163), Par. 65.] + +[Footnote 11: _Real Representation for Great Britain and Ireland_, 1910, +p. 23.] + +[Footnote 12: In the model election held in Glasgow, 1910, the list +contained the name of a Nationalist candidate (see _Representation_, No. +19, November 1910).] + +[Footnote 13: See page 137.] + +[Footnote 14: This total slightly exceeds the quota, 3613, owing to the +neglect of fractions in the second column. The loss of votes due to +neglect of fractions will be found separately recorded in the result +sheet, p. 160-61. This loss of votes can be avoided by treating the +largest fractions as unity.] + +[Footnote 15: See page 257.] + +[Footnote 16: It was at first intended to adopt the arrangement of staff +and method of recording preferences used at the election of 1897. These +arrangements were after a test abandoned in favour of the much more +convenient method used at the Proportional Representation Society's +model election held December 1908.--_Report on the Tasmanian General +Election_, 1909, par. 8.] + +[Footnote 17: For full details of these elections, see Report presented +to both Houses of the Transvaal Parliament.--T.G. 5--'10.] + +[Footnote 18: _Report of Royal Commission on Electoral Systems_, par. +76.] + +[Footnote 19: A simple example will explain. Let it be assumed that P +and Q are members of party A, and poll 18,000 votes, that R and S and T +are members of party B, polling in all 19,000 votes, and that the +following table records the votes given and the details of the transfers +made in arriving at the final result:-- + + Quota = (37,000/4) + 1 = 9251 + + Transfer Transfer + 1st of R's of T's +Candidates. Count. Surplus. Result. Votes. Result. + + P 9,050 9,050 9,050 (Elected). +Party A. Q 8,950 8,950 8,950 (Elected). + + R 10,000 -749 9,251 9,251 (Elected). +Party B. S 6,000 +500 6,500 +2,400 8,900 + T 3,000 +249 3,249 -3,249 + +Exhausted +849 849 + ------ ------ ------ + 37,000 37,000 37,000 + + +The members of the two parties recorded their votes as follows:-- + + Party A. Party B. +P. 9,050 R. 10,000 +Q. 8,950 S. 6,000 + T. 3,000 + +The total number of votes polled is 37,000, and the quota, therefore, is +9251. Candidate R, having received more than a quota would be declared +elected, and his surplus of 749 votes carried forward. It may be assumed +that candidates S and T, who are of the same party, received 500 and 249 +as their shares of this surplus. The result of this transfer is shown in +the table. T, the lowest candidate on the poll, would then be +eliminated. Now, if the contingent of voters Supporting T are not fully +loyal to their party, and as many as 849 have recorded no preference +save for T, then 2400 would be available for transfer to S, whose total +would be only 8900. S would be eliminated, and the three candidates +elected would be P and Q of party A, and R of party B, although R and S +between them represented 18,151 voters. This case can be met by +providing that whenever votes are exhausted the quota should be counted +afresh. The votes in play, ignoring those exhausted, would be in all +36,151, the new quota would be 9038, while an additional number of +votes, viz. 213, would be available for transfer from R to S, with the +result that the position of these candidates would be as follows:-- + +R 9,038 +S 9,113 +P 9,050 +Q 8,950 + +Party B would obtain two seats, the party A only one seat.] + +[Footnote 20: Address delivered on 6 September 1909.] + +[Footnote 22: See Appendix VII.] + + + + +CHAPTER VIII + +LIST SYSTEMS OF PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION + + +"'One man, one vote; one party, one candidate'--thus runs the +cry."--COUNT GOBLET D'ALVIELLA + +List systems of proportional representation are based upon the block +vote or _scrutin de liste_--the method of election generally used on the +Continent of Europe and in the United States of America when several +members are to be elected for the same constituency. With the _scrutin +de liste_, lists of candidates are nominated by the various political +organizations or groups of electors; each elector has as many votes as +there are members to be elected, but he may not give more than one vote +to any one candidate. The party which can obtain the support of a +majority of the electors can carry its list to the exclusion of all +others; minorities are crushed even more completely than with the system +of single-member constituencies. But as constituencies returning several +members are an essential requirement of any scheme of proportional +representation, the _scrutin de liste_ facilitates the introduction of a +proportional system, for the only great change involved is the allotment +of seats to the respective lists in proportion to the totals of votes +obtained by each. But this change brings in its train a change in the +nature of the vote. It remains no longer a vote only for candidates as +individuals; it obtains a twofold significance, and becomes what is +termed the double simultaneous vote (_le double vote simultanee_). In +the first place it is a vote for the party list as such, and is used for +determining the proportion of seats to be allotted to the lists; and, in +the second place, it is a vote for a particular candidate or order of +candidates for the purpose of ascertaining which of the candidates +included in a list shall be declared successful. This double function of +the vote is characteristic of all list systems of proportional +representation. Other changes of a subsidiary character, which +experience has shown to be advisable, have been adopted in different +countries so that the various systems differ in detail in the methods +both by which seats are apportioned among the competing lists and by +which the successful candidates are chosen. + +_The Belgian electoral system_.] + +List systems are in operation for parliamentary purposes in Switzerland, +Belgium, Wuertemberg, Sweden, and Finland. The simplest of these is that +adopted by Belgium, and the description of a Belgian election may serve +as an introduction to the study of other systems. Through the courtesy +of M. Steyeart, the President of the Tribunal of First Instance and +Chief Electoral Officer for the constituency of Ghent-Eecloo, the author +was enabled to watch the elections in May 1908 in that constituency. +Proportional representation is, however, only one of the points in which +the Belgian and English electoral systems differ, and in order to obtain +a true estimate of the working of the Belgian law it is necessary to +distinguish between results which are due to the franchise +qualifications and those which are due to the system of proportional +representation. The effects arising from these two separate features of +the electoral system have sometimes been confused, and it is therefore +desirable to give a brief outline of the conditions which govern a +Belgian election. + +In the first place, Belgium has manhood suffrage modified by a system of +graduated voting. Secondly, each elector is compelled to vote or, at +least, to present himself at the polling place. Thirdly, both the +Chambers are elective, and, although provision exists for the +dissolution and the election of Parliament as a whole, only one-half of +each Chamber is, in the ordinary course, elected at a time, each +Senator being elected for a fixed period of eight years, and each +member of the House of Representatives for a period of four years. + +_The franchise._ + +The unique franchise system embodied in the Belgian constitution in 1893 +was adopted only after months had been spent in discussing the schemes +of rival parties. All attempts at compromise failed until attention was +seriously directed to the suggestions of M. Albert Nyssens, Professor of +the University of Louvain, contained in his pamphlet _Le Suffrage +Universel Tempere_. His proposals had the merit of recognizing the +validity of the arguments advanced by all the political parties. +Conservatives desired the introduction of a system based on occupation +coupled with the payment of taxes; many Liberals were anxious to secure +special recognition for electors of admitted capacity--in short, an +educational qualification; the Radicals inside and Socialists outside +Parliament demonstrated continually in favour of universal, direct and +equal suffrage. The claim for universal suffrage was recognized by +granting to every male Belgian who had attained the age of twenty-five +years the right to vote, but a counterpoise to so democratic a suffrage +was sought in the granting of additional votes to electors possessing +specified qualifications. A supplementary vote was awarded to every +married man who had attained the age of thirty-five years and paid five +francs in taxes on his dwelling. An additional vote was given to every +owner of land or house property of the value of two thousand francs, or +to the possessor of an income of a hundred francs derived from Belgian +public funds. Thus were met the demands of the Catholics for the +representation of property, whilst the Liberal advocacy of the claims of +the educated voter were met in a similar way. Two additional votes were +awarded to those who had obtained a diploma of higher education; to +those who filled, or had filled, a public position; or to those engaged +in a profession which implied the possession of a good education. The +highest number of votes awarded to any elector, for parliamentary +purposes, whatever qualifications he might possess, was three. + +_Compulsory voting_. + +The exercise of the franchise is regarded in Belgium as a duty which +each citizen owes to the State, and the obligatory vote is therefore +universally accepted without demur. The elector must attend at the +polling place, take his ballot paper and deposit it in the ballot box. +If he places the ballot paper in the urn without voting there are no +means of ascertaining the fact; but unless he forwards to the Electoral +Officer an explanation, in due form, of his absence from the polling +booth he is liable to prosecution. The percentage of abstentions is thus +very low, but, in addition to this result, the obligatory vote has had a +considerable indirect effect upon the character of electoral contests. +Voting has become an official matter. Formerly, as here, it rested with +the political organizations to persuade and exhort electors to vote; +now, each elector receives from the Returning Officer an official +command to attend at the polling place. + +_Partial renewal of chamber_. + +The third difference--the partial renewal of the Chambers--dates from +the constitution of 1831, and the reason for its adoption was the same +as that which underlies the partial renewal of English municipal +councils--the desire to ensure continuity in the composition and +proceedings of Parliament. There was some justification for this +practice under the old voting methods, for then the result of elections +largely depended, as is the case in England to-day, upon the chance +distribution of party strength. The composition of the Chamber of +Representatives was liable to violent oscillations and changes, and the +partial renewal of the Chambers moderated the violence of these changes. +But whilst the partial renewal may be defended on these grounds, it has +two distinct disadvantages. When only one-half of the Chamber is to be +elected (as in the renewal of only one-third of our municipal Councils) +a considerable diminution takes place in the amount of public interest +evoked by an election. There is, moreover, a further and even more +serious drawback that, when the election turns upon a question of vital +importance, such for instance as the annexation of the Congo, the +verdict of _only one-half_ the people is obtained. In 1908 elections +took place in four provinces only--East Flanders, Hainaut, Liege, and +Limbourg--and so, whilst the citizens of Ghent and Liege were expressing +their opinion upon the policy of the Government, the citizens of +Brussels were reduced to the position of spectators of a fight in which +doubtless many would have liked to have taken a part. The introduction +of proportional representation has rendered this particular feature of +the Belgian electoral system quite unnecessary. Electors are not so +fickle as an irrational method of voting made them appear to be. + +_The presentation of lists_. + +For the purpose of parliamentary elections each of the nine provinces of +Belgium is divided into large constituencies returning several members; +Brussels returns twenty-one members, Ghent eleven, but several of the +smaller constituencies return as few as three representatives. Fifteen +days before the date of the election lists of candidates which, before +presentation, must have received the support of at least one hundred +electors, are sent to the returning officer. After verification, each +list is given an official number and the lists are then published, no +official title other than the number being given to the lists. In the +copy of the ballot paper used at Ghent, shown on the opposite page, list +No. 1 was presented by the Catholics; No. 2 by the Liberals; No. 3 by +those Socialists who were dissatisfied with their party's list; No. 4 by +the small tradesmen; No. 5 by the official Socialists; whilst No. 6 +contains the name of a candidate standing as an independent. It will be +observed that each of the first five lists is divided into two parts +separated by the word "Suppleants." The candidates so described are not +taken into account in the actual election of representatives; they are, +however, voted for in the same way and at the same time as the other +candidates, and are called upon (in the order determined by the result +of the election) to fill any vacancy occasioned by the retirement or +death of a duly-elected representative belonging to the same list. This +arrangement obviates the necessity for bye-elections, and the relative +strength of parties remains the same from the time of one election to +the next. The order in which the names of the candidates appear upon the +lists is arranged by the organizations responsible for their +presentation. It should, however, be stated that this provision, about +which public opinion is much divided, is not an essential feature of a +proportional system. It was not a part of the original proposals of M. +Beernaert, and it certainly strengthens the hands of political +organizations, although, as will be shown subsequently, proportional +representation considerably modifies, if it does not altogether prevent, +abuse of the power conceded to political bodies. + + +[Illustration: List Ballot paper] + +_The act of voting._ + +The work of the elector is simplicity itself. He can select one list or +one candidate in a list but not more for each of the votes to which he +may be entitled. His choice can be recorded in four different ways. In +each case the act of voting consists in pencilling one or other of the +white spots contained in the black squares at the head of the lists or +against the names of individual candidates. In the first place, the +elector may vote by blackening the spot at the head of the list. The +significance of such a vote is that the elector votes for the list, and, +at the same time, approves of the order in which the candidates have +been arranged by the party organization. Naturally all the party +organizations and journals advise their supporters to vote in this way. + +Secondly, the elector may vote by blackening the white spot against the +name of one of the "effective" candidates on one of the lists. Such a +vote implies that the elector votes for the list on which the +candidate's name appears, but that, instead of approving of the order in +which the candidates have been arranged, he prefers the particular +candidate he has marked. The third and fourth methods are but variations +of the second. The elector can indicate a preference for one of the +supplementary candidates, or he can indicate preferences for an +effective and also for a supplementary candidate. In brief, the elector +votes for one of the lists, and either approves of the list as arranged +or indicates the change he desires. + +_The allotment of seats to parties._ + +The number of representatives awarded to each party is determined by the +method formulated by M. Victor d'Hondt, a professor of the University of +Ghent. Its working may best be shown by an illustration. Let it be +assumed that three lists have been presented; that they have obtained +8000, 7500, and 4500 votes respectively, and that there are five +vacancies to be filled. The total number of votes for each list is +divided successively by the numbers 1, 2, 3, and so on, and the +resulting numbers are arranged thus:-- + +List No. 1. List No. 2. List No. 3. + 8,000 7,500 4,500 + 4,000 3,750 2,250 + 2,666 2,500 1,500 + +The five highest numbers (five being the number of vacancies to be +filled) are then arranged in order of magnitude as follows:-- + + 8,000 + 7,500 + 4,500 + 4,000 + 3,750 + +The lowest of these numbers, 3750, is called the "common divisor"[1] or +the "electoral quotient," and forms the basis for the allotment of +seats. The number of votes obtained by each of the lists is divided by +the "common divisor" thus:-- + + 8,000 divided by 3,750 = 2 with a remainder of 500. 7,500 " 3,750 = +2 4,500 " 3,750 = 1 with a remainder of 750. + +The first list contains the "electoral quotient" twice, the second +twice, and the third once, and the five seats are allotted accordingly. +Each party obtains one representative for every quota of voters which it +can rally to its support, all fractions of "quotas" being disregarded. + +The method of determining the electoral quotient may appear at first +sight rather empirical, but the rule is merely the arithmetical +expression, in a form convenient for returning officers, of the +following train of reasoning. The three lists with 8000, 7500, and 4500 +supporters are competing for seats. The first seat has to be allotted; +to which list is it to go? Plainly to the list with 8000 supporters. +Then the second seat has to be disposed of; to which list is it to go? +If it is given to the first list, then the supporters of the first list +will have two members in all, or one member for each 4000 votes. This +would be unfair while 7500 supporters of the second list are +unrepresented, therefore the second seat is allotted to the list with +7500 supporters. Similar reasoning will give the third seat to the list +with 4500 supporters, the fourth to the list with 8000 supporters, which +now will rightly have one representative for each 4000, and the fifth to +the list with 7500. The question in each case is to what list must the +seat be allotted in such a way that no one group of unrepresented +electors is larger than a represented group. The separate allotment of +seats one by one in accordance with the foregoing reasoning may be +shown thus:-- + +8,000 (List No. 1) +7,500 ( " No. 2) +4,500 ( " No. 3) +4,000 ( " No. 1) +3,750 ( " No. 2) + +This result of course agrees with that obtained by the official process +of dividing the total of each list by the electoral quotient. + +_The selection of successful candidates._ + +The seats having been apportioned to the respective lists it becomes +necessary to ascertain which of the candidates on the respective lists +are to be declared elected. In this second process it will be seen now +great an advantage is obtained by the candidates at the top of each +list.[2] A11 the votes marked in the space at the top of a list, _i.e.,_ +list votes, form a pool from which the candidates of the list draw in +succession as many votes as are necessary to make their individual +total equal to the electoral quotient, the process continuing until the +pool is exhausted. In the example already given, assume that List No. 1 +consists of three candidates, A, B, and C, arranged in the order named, +and that the 8000 supporters of the list have given their votes as +follows:-- + +Votes at the head of the List 4,000 +Preferential votes for A 600 + " " B 500 + " " C 3,000 + ----- + Total 8,000 + +Candidate A, being the first in order on the list, has the first claim +on the votes recorded for the list. The electoral quotient is 3750, and +A's total 500 is raised to this number by the addition of 3250 votes +taken from those recorded for the list. This secures his election, and +there remain 750 list votes which are attributed to candidate B, this +candidate being the second in order on the list. B, however, also had +500 votes recorded against his name, and his total poll therefore +amounts to 1250. But candidate C has obtained 3000 votes, all recorded +for himself personally, and as this total exceeds B's total of 1250, C +would be declared elected. The two candidates chosen from List No. 1 +would, in this case, be A and C. The successful supplementary candidates +are ascertained in the same way. + +_A Belgian election. Ghent, 1908: the poll._ + +In a Belgian election the polling proceeds very smoothly and quietly. +This is largely due to the fact that the law for compulsory voting has +relieved the party organizations of the necessity of whipping up their +supporters to the poll. At the election of Ghent, which the author was +privileged to witness, the candidates for the Chamber of Representatives +were as given in the ballot paper on page 177. It will be seen that six +lists of candidates were presented, but in the election of Senators only +the three chief organizations took part. There were eleven members of +the House of Representatives and five Senators to be elected. + +The constituency was divided into 350 polling districts, the maximum +number of electors for a district being 500. To each district was +assigned a polling place in charge of a presiding officer, appointed by +the returning officer of the district; the presiding officer was +assisted by four citizens, each of whom was required to be in possession +of the maximum number of votes, and to be at least forty years of age. +In addition, the party organizations sent duly accredited witnesses to +watch against possible fraud, and to assure themselves of the absolute +regularity of the proceedings. The poll opened at 8 A.M. Each elector +had to present his official "summons" to vote, and received from the +presiding officer one, two, or three ballot papers according to the +number of votes to which he was entitled. The elector took the papers to +a private compartment, as in an English election, marked them, placed +them in the ballot box and received back his official letter, now +stamped--evidence, if need be, that he had carried out the obligation +imposed upon him by law. At 1 P.M. the poll was closed; the ballot boxes +were opened and the ballot papers counted in the presence of the +assessors and party witnesses for the purpose of ascertaining that all +papers in the possession of the presiding officer at the opening of the +poll had been duly accounted for. + +_The counting of the votes_.] + +In order to maintain as far as possible, not only the secrecy of the +individual vote, but the secrecy of the vote of any locality, the votes +of three polling places were counted together, the grouping of polling +places for this purpose having been previously determined by lot. Thus +the votes counted at the town hall (polling district No. 1) were those +recorded in the districts Nos. 1, 112, and 94. The proceedings were +directed by the presiding officer of the first polling place, assisted +by the presiding officers of the other two. The only other persons +present were witnesses representing the three chief parties. The +counting commenced soon after 3 P.M., and was completed, both for the +Senate and Chamber, by 7 P.M. The papers were sorted according to the +votes given for each list, subsidiary heaps being made for those +candidates who had received individual votes of preference. A separate +heap was made of spoiled and blank voting papers, but it was evident +from the very commencement of the proceedings that the method of voting +had presented no difficulty to the elector. Of the 1370 votes recorded +in this division for candidates for the Chamber there were but +twenty-six spoiled papers; of these thirteen were blank, indicating that +the voters, although attending the poll, did not wish to record any +opinion. The thirteen other papers showed in nearly every case some +confusion in the mind of the elector with the elections for the communal +councils, when the elector can give several votes of preference. The +official returns, after endorsement, were forwarded by post to the +returning officer, whose duty it was to prepare the returns for the +whole constituency. The figures for each district were given to the +press at the close of the count, and special editions of the journals, +containing the probable result of the election, were issued the +same evening. + +_The final process._ + +The compilation of the returns for the whole constituency took place on +the following day. The returning officer presided, and was assisted by +four assessors, a secretary and three witnesses, who attended on behalf +of the chief parties. In addition there were two professional +calculators, who were responsible for the accuracy of the arithmetical +processes. The proceedings, in brief, consisted in extracting the +details of the returns furnished by the 120 counting places. The final +sheet for each list showed not only the total number of votes obtained +by the party, but the number of votes of preference recorded for each +candidate. The votes for each list were as follows:-- + +List No.1. List No.2. List No.3. List No.4. List No.5. List No.6. +78,868 39,788 913 1,094 23,118 271 + +The process of allotting the seats to the respective parties then +commenced. The totals for each list were divided by the numbers 1, 2, +3, and so on, and arranged thus:-- + + List List List List List List + No. 1. No. 2. No. 3. No. 4. No. 5. No. 6 + 78,865 39,788 913 1,094 23,118 271 + 39,432 19,894 11,559 + 26,288 13,262 + 19,716 9,947 + 15,773 + 13,144 + 11,266 + +The eleven highest figures thus obtained were then arranged in order of +magnitude, and the seats allotted accordingly:-- + + 1st Seat 78,865 (List No. 1--Catholic) + 2nd " 39,783 ( " No. 2--Liberal) + 3rd " 39,432 ( " No. 1--Catholic) + 4th " 26,288 ( " No. 1--Catholic) + 5th " 23,118 ( " No. 5--Socialist) + 6th " 19,894 ( " No. 2--Liberal) + 7th " 19,716 ( " No. 1--Catholic) + 8th " 15,773 ( " No. 1--Catholic) + 9th " 13,262 ( " No. 2--Liberal) +10th " 13,144 ( " No. 1--Catholic) +11th " 11,559 ( " No. 5--Socialist) + +Thus the Catholics, Liberals, and Socialists obtained six, three, and +ten seats respectively. It will be noticed that the eleventh figure, +11,559, which is the "common divisor," or "electoral quotient," is +contained six times in the Catholic total, with a remainder of 9511; +three times in the Liberal total, with a remainder of 5000; and twice in +the Socialist total. + +The highest number of preferences recorded for any individual candidate +(although placards had been posted inviting votes of preference for M. +Buysse, the candidate fourth on the Liberal list, and for M. Cambier, +the candidate third on the Socialist list) were 1914 and 1635, much too +small to effect any change in the order of the candidates as arranged by +the associations. It remains to add that the task was accomplished with +perfect regularity and despatch; the figures were checked at each stage, +but as the number of votes polled in the double election (for the +Senate and for the Chamber) amounted to no less than 270,892, it is not +surprising that the compilation of the final figures was not completed +until midnight. + +_Public opinion favorable to the system._ + +This was the fifth parliamentary election[3] in which the system of +proportional representation has been put to the test; its +practicability, both from the point of view of the elector and of the +returning officer, is now no longer open to question. Interviews on the +effects of the system with Catholic leaders like M. Beernaert or M. Van +den Heuvel, with Liberals like Count Goblet d'Alviella, or M. Gustave +Abel, the editor of _La Flandre Liberale_, or with Socialists like M. +Anseele, revealed the fact that there is no party in Belgium which +desires to return to the former electoral system. The Liberals and +Socialists are hostile to plural voting, but their attitude to +proportional representation may be summed up in the desire to make the +system more perfect.[4] Constituencies returning three or four members +are not sufficiently large to do complete justice to a system of +proportional representation, and many, among whom must be included M. +Vandervelde, desire the grouping of these smaller constituencies into +larger ones. The general trend of public opinion is in complete +agreement with the views of party leaders, and found forcible expression +in the press comments on the elections in 1908 for the +provincial councils. + +_The relation of the Belgian to other list systems._ + +The Belgian list method, although simple in form, is based upon a very +careful examination of earlier list systems, and represents an attempt +to avoid the defects and inconveniences of those systems. As already +stated, the vote in a "list" system has two aspects. Indeed, in the +canton of Solothurn in Switzerland each elector is invited, first, to +record his vote for a list as a separate act, and secondly, to vote for +the particular candidate he prefers. + +In tracing the growth of the Belgian system it will be best to consider +these two aspects separately, and, in the first place, the vote in so +far as it affects the fortunes of the list. The object in view--the +allotment of the seats in proportion to the total number of votes +obtained by the respective lists--would seem quite simple of attainment, +and would be so were the totals obtained by each list such that it was +possible to divide the seats among them in exact proportion. Voters do +not, however, group themselves in exact proportion, and it becomes +necessary therefore to devise a rule of distribution that shall +approximate to the desired end as closely as possible. + +_The different methods of apportioning seats to lists._ + +The first rule--a very simple one--was adopted because, in the words of +Ernest Naville, "it seemed most intelligible to the general public." The +grand total of votes polled by the different lists was divided by the +total number of seats, and the distribution of seats was based upon the +quotient, or "quota" thus obtained. The total of each list was divided +by the quota for the purpose of ascertaining the number of seats to +which it was entitled. The answers, as will be seen from the following +example, usually contained fractions. Assume that seven seats are to be +distributed among three lists, A, B, C; that the grand total of votes is +7000, and that the respective lists have polled as follows:-- + +List A 2,850 votes + " B 2,650 " + " C 1,500 " + ----- +Total 7,000 + +The quotient in this case is 1000. The totals of the lists A, B, and C +contain the quotient twice, twice and once respectively, but in each +case with a remainder, and it is the remainder that constitutes the +difficulty. According to the earliest list schemes the remaining seats +were allotted to the lists having the largest remainders, and, in the +example given, lists A and B would each receive an additional seat. +Party organizers were not slow to perceive that it was advisable to +obtain as many of the largest remainders as they could, and considerable +dissatisfaction arose in Ticino from the action of the Conservatives, +who very skilfully divided their forces into two groups, thereby +obtaining additional seats. A simple example will explain. Assume that +three deputies are to be elected, that the grand total of votes is 3000, +and that the party votes are as follows:-- + +Party A 1,600 votes + " B 1,400 " + ----- +Total 3,000 + +The quota would be 1000 votes. Party A, having the larger remainder, +would obtain two seats, and party B only one seat; but if party B should +present two lists and arrange for the division of its voting force, the +following result might ensue:-- + +Party A 1,600 votes + " B1 700 " + " B2 700 " + ----- +Total 3,000 + +The quota would still be 1000 votes, but party A would only obtain one +seat, whereas party B would obtain two, because each of its two lists +would show a remainder larger than A's remainder. This possibility led +to a modification of the rule, and the seats remaining after the first +distribution were allotted to the largest parties. But this was also far +from satisfactory, as will be seen from the following example taken from +a Ticino election:[5]-- + +Conservatives 614 votes +Radicals 399 " + ----- +Total 1,013 + +The constituency to which the figures refer returned five members; the +quotient therefore was 202, and the Conservatives obtained three seats +on the first distribution, and the Radicals one. As, under the rule, +the remaining seat was allotted to the largest party, the Conservatives +obtained four seats out of the five when, obviously, the true proportion +was three to two. + +The rule subsequently devised aimed at reducing the importance of +remainders in the allotment of seats. The total of each list was divided +by the number of seats plus one. This method yielded a smaller quota +than the original rule and enabled more seats to be allotted at the +first distribution. The final improvement, however, took the form of +devising a rule which should so allot the seats to different parties +that after the first distribution there should be no seats remaining +unallotted. This is the great merit of the Belgian or d'Hondt rule, +which has already been fully described. + +_Criticism of d'Hondt Rule_. + +The d'Hondt rule certainly accomplishes its purpose; it furnishes a +measuring rod by which to measure off the number of seats won by each +list.[6] But the rule is not without its critics.[7] As in the earlier +Swiss methods objection was taken to the undue favouring of certain +remainders, so in Belgium objection is taken to the fact that remainders +are not taken into account at all. The Belgian rule works to the +advantage of the largest party, a fact that many may consider as a point +in its favour. + +A further simple example will explain how the larger parties gain. +Assume that eleven seats are being contested by three parties, whose +votes are as follows:-- + +Party A 6,000 votes + " B 4,800 " + " C 1,900 " + ------ +Total 12,700 + +Arrange these numbers in a line, and divide successively by 1, 2, 3, +and so on, thus:-- + +Party A. Party B. Party C. + 6,000 4,800 1,900 + 3,000 2,400 960 + 2,000 1,600 + 1,500 1,200 + 1,200 960 + 1,000 + +The eleventh highest number, which constitutes the measuring rod, will +be found to be 1000; the largest party obtains six seats, the second +party obtains four seats, with a remainder of 800 votes, and the third +only one seat, with a remainder of 900 votes. The two smaller parties +taken together poll 6700 votes but only obtain five seats, as compared +with the six seats obtained by the larger party with 6000 votes; the two +remainders of 800 and 900 votes, which together constitute more than a +quota, having no influence on the result of the election. Even if, in +the allotment of seats, the largest party has a remainder of votes not +utilized, yet this remainder necessarily bears a smaller proportion to +the total of the votes polled than is the case with a smaller party. +Thus the system works steadily in favour of the larger party. + +The question of remainders, or votes not utilized in the distribution of +seats, is of minor importance when the constituencies return a large +number of members. When, for example, as in the city of Brussels, there +are twenty-one members to be elected, the votes not utilized bear a +small proportion to those that have been taken into account in the +allotment of seats. In Belgium, however, there are several +constituencies returning as few as three members, and there is naturally +a demand that these constituencies should be united so that the method +of distribution should yield more accurate results. + +If the d'Hondt rule, like every other method of distribution, is open to +criticism from the point of view of theoretical perfection, it must be +admitted that in practice it yields excellent results. The election at +Ghent resulted in the return of six Catholics, three Liberals and two +Socialists; it would have been impossible to have allotted the seats +more fairly. Under the old non-proportional method the Catholics would +have obtained eleven representatives and the Liberals and Socialists +none. The immeasurable improvement effected by every true proportional +method is apt to be overlooked in the critical examination of the +working of these methods in those extreme cases which rarely occur +in practice. + +_The formation of "cartels."_ + +The steady working of the d'Hondt rule in favour of the larger parties +has, however, not escaped the attention of advocates of proportional +representation. The late Professor Hagenbach-Bischoff has formulated the +proposal that parties should be allowed to put forward combined lists, +and that in the first allotment of seats the totals of the combined +lists should be taken as the basis of distribution. The need of some +such provision may be shown by an example used in illustration of the +d'Hondt system, at a meeting held under the auspices of the French +Proportional Representation League.[8] A constituency with eleven +members was taken; four lists, A, B, C, and D, received 6498, 2502, +1499, and 501 votes respectively; the d'Hondt rule made 834 the +measuring rod, and gave A seven members, B three, C one, and D none. The +question was asked why provision was not made for the transfer of the +votes from list D to list C, so that if, for example, these lists were +put forward by Radical-Socialists and by Socialists respectively, the +parties might obtain the additional seat to which their combined totals +entitled them. It will be seen that lists C and D, with a total of 2000 +votes (more than twice 834), obtained but one representative, while list +A, with 6498 votes, obtained seven representatives.[9] + +Professor Hagenbach-Bischoffs proposal, which would meet this +difficulty, has not been embodied in the Belgian law, but "cartels" +(arrangements for the presentation of a common list) are formed between +the Liberals and Socialists so as to lessen their loss of representation +due to the working of the d'Hondt rule. The "cartels," however, do not +give satisfaction, as experience shows that many Liberals who would vote +for a Liberal list decline to vote for a "cartel" of Liberals and +Socialists; whilst, on the other hand, extreme Socialists decline to +support a Liberal-Socialist coalition. In the Finnish system, however, +provision is made for the combination of lists in accordance with +Professor Hagenbach-Bischoff's suggestion. Indeed, as the Finnish law +forbids any list to contain more than three names, some such provision +was necessary in order to allow each separate party to nominate a full +list of candidates. + +The experience of the Belgian "cartels" would seem to show that, even +where party organization and discipline are highly developed, many +electors resent the disposal of their votes by a bargain between the +organizations concerned. The single transferable vote, by allowing each +elector to indicate his second choice in the way in which he himself +prefers, would enable smaller parties to obtain their share of +representation without involving a preliminary compact between party +organizations. A list system seems to establish a rigid division between +parties, whilst there is no such corresponding rigid division in the +minds of many electors. The model elections conducted by the +Proportional Representation Society cannot perhaps be accepted as a +conclusive guide to the action of voters at a real election, yet the +number of Liberals who, in the last of these elections, gave an +effective preference to a representative of the Independent Labour +Party, in the person of Mr. Henderson, was very noteworthy. In the +Belgian system no such fluidity is possible; the Liberal electors would +be shut off from any relation with the supporters of Mr. Henderson, who +could figure only upon the Labour Party's list. + +_The different methods of selecting successful candidates_. + +It will be seen that the problem of allotting seats to lists has been +solved in several different ways. Similarly, different methods have +been tried for the purpose of selecting the successful candidates from +the respective lists. The instructions to voters vary accordingly. The +earlier schemes (and the practice obtains in several Swiss cantons +to-day) provided that each elector should have as many votes as there +were members to be elected, and that he might distribute (without the +privilege of cumulating) his votes over the whole of the candidates +nominated, selecting, if he desired, some names from one list, some from +another, and some from another. After the number of seats secured by +each list had been ascertained those candidates were declared elected +who, in the respective lists, had obtained the highest number of +individual votes. + +_Panachage_. + +The practice of voting for candidates belonging to different +lists--_panachage_, as it is called--has evoked considerable discussion, +and still gives rise to differences of opinion among the advocates of +proportional representation on the Continent. At first sight there would +appear to be nothing to discuss, and that there was no possible reason +why the elector should not be allowed to exercise his choice in the +freest manner. It has, however, been found that this privilege can be +used in an unfair way. When each elector has as many votes as there are +candidates, and is not permitted to cumulate his votes on any one, it +usually happens that the votes obtained by individual candidates in any +given list vary but little in number. When in some elections it was +realized that the party could only obtain a certain number of seats, but +that it had a few hundred votes to spare, some extreme partisans used +these votes for the purpose of voting for the least competent men of +their opponents' list, and their action sometimes resulted in the +election of those men in preference to the more competent men of the +party. The danger from this cause would appear to be exaggerated, but +although success has seldom attended the abuse of _panachage_, the fear +of a successful attempt has a disturbing influence. The later Swiss +laws allow electors to cumulate three votes, but not more, upon any one +candidate, so that the success of popular candidates is assured. + +_The single vote and the case de tete_. + +The Belgian parliamentary system suppresses _panachage_, and that in a +most effective way. In this system each elector has but one vote, and +therefore can only vote for one candidate. In addition, the Belgian +system confers upon the organization presenting a list the right to +arrange the order in which the candidates shall appear upon the list, +and, further, it provides that the voter may approve of this arrangement +by voting at the head of the list in the space provided for that purpose +and which is known as the _case de tete_. Party organizations naturally +advise their supporters to vote in this way. Public opinion is divided +on this feature of the Belgian system, but M. Van den Heuvel, formerly +Minister of Justice, who took a responsible part in the passing of the +law, and with whom the author discussed this provision, defended it most +vigorously, on the ground that the party as a whole had a right to +determine which of its members should be elected. In the absence of the +provision referred to it might happen that some candidate would be +elected in preference to one who was more generally approved of by the +party. This may be made clear by an example given by M. Van den Heuvel +himself. A, B, C and D are candidates. Suppose that the party is strong +enough to return three candidates, but no more, and that five-sixths of +the party are in favour of candidates A, B and C, whilst the minority, +one-sixth, are ardently in favour of candidate D. It will be necessary +that the majority of the party (the five-sixths) should cleverly divide +their votes equally between the candidates A, B and C in order to +prevent the possibility of candidate D being elected by a small minority +of the party. A little reflection will show that in the absence of any +such provision the popular candidate of the majority, say A, might +attract too large a proportion of the votes, thereby allowing D to pass +B or C. Each provision of the Belgian system has been most carefully +thought out, and, if it strengthens the hands of party organizations, it +does so in order to secure the representation of the party by the +candidates most generally approved. It may, however, be pointed out that +had the single transferable vote been used, the candidates A, B and C, +who, in M. Van den Heuvel's example, were supported by five-sixths of +the party, would have been sure of election; there would have been no +need to have conferred a special privilege upon the party organizations. + +_The limited and cumulative vote_. + +The French Proportional Representation League, which, impressed with the +simplicity of the Belgian system, desired to introduce it into France, +refrained from advocating the adoption of the _case de tete_, and +suggested that the order in which candidates should be declared elected +on each list should be determined by the votes of the electors. The +French League in its first proposal recommended that each elector +should, as in Belgium, have but one vote. It was soon realized that the +popular candidate of the party might attract a large majority of the +votes, and that, in consequence, candidates might be elected who were +the nominees of only a small section of the party. The League in its +second proposal recommended the use of the limited vote, each elector +having two votes when six deputies were to be elected, and three in +larger constituencies. The League, however, followed the Belgian +practice in confining the choice of the elector to candidates on one +list. This proposition was examined in 1905 by the _Commission du +Suffrage Universel_, which, in the Report, declared that it was +impossible to approve of such a limitation of the elector's freedom. +"Nous ne pouvons," runs the Report, "laisser si etroitment enchainer, +garrotter, ligotter l'electeur proclame souverain et qui doit en tout +cas etre libre." The Committee recommended the use of the limited vote +without the restriction recommended by the League. In a further Report, +issued in 1907, this Committee again emphasized the necessity of leaving +the elector quite free in the choice of candidates, and a new Bill, +drafted by the Committee, provided that each elector should have as many +votes as there were deputies to be elected, and that he should be +allowed to cumulate the whole, or several of his votes, upon any one +candidate. Where, however, the cumulative vote has been introduced into +recent Swiss laws, as in that of the Canton of Bale City, the elector is +not permitted to cumulate more than three votes upon any one candidate. +It will thus be seen that the single vote, the multiple vote without the +privilege of cumulating, the limited vote, and the cumulative vote, have +all been proposed or adopted as methods of determining which candidates +shall be declared elected. + +_Special characteristics of Swedish and Finnish systems_. + +This summary of the different methods used in solving the double problem +of a list system--the allotment of seats to parties and the selection of +successful candidates--is not fully complete.[10] Special features have +been incorporated in the Swedish and Finnish systems for the purpose of +securing as much freedom of action as possible to electors, and these +systems are described in Appendices Nos. III. and IV. The differences +between the various list systems are, however, not so great as those +between a list system and the single transferable vote, but the +consideration of these must be reserved for the next chapter. + + +[Footnote 1: The text of the Belgian law (Art. 263 of the Electoral +Code) runs as follows: "Le bureau principal divise successivement par 1, +2, 3, 4, 5, &c. le chiftre electoral de chacune des listes et range les +quotients dans l'ordre de leur importance jusqu'a concurrence d'un +nombre total de quotients egal a celui des membres a elire. Le dernier +quotient sert de diviseur electoral. + +"La repartition entre les listes s'opere en attribuant a chacune d'elles +autant de sieges que son chiffre electoral comprend de fois ce +diviseur."] + +[Footnote 2: The order in which the names appear is arranged by the +party presenting the lists.] + +[Footnote 3: A further election (the sixth) took place in 1910.] + +[Footnote 4: See _La Representation Proportionnelle integrale_, 1910. +Felix Goblet d'Alviella (fils).] + +[Footnote 5: _Rapport de la Commission du Suffrage Universel_, 1905, p. +45.] + +[Footnote 6: Professor Hagenbach-Bischoff, of Bale, formulated a +different rule which is finding favour in Swiss cantons. The quota which +will ensure the apportionment of all the seats among the lists without +remainder is ascertained by trial. In practice the same results are +obtained as with the d'Hondt rule. Full directions for applying the rule +are contained in Clause XIII. of the law adopted for the canton of Bale +Town.--Appendix IX.] + +[Footnote 7: For recent French criticism, see page 202.] + +[Footnote 8: At Lille, December 1906.] + +[Footnote 9: The new French Bill (_see_ Appendix X.) provides for the +presentation of combined lists (_apparentement_).] + +[Footnote 10: Cf. _La Repesentation Proportionelle en France et en +Belgique_, M. Georges Lachapelle (1911) and the new report of the +Commission du Suffrage Universel (No. 826, Chambre des Deputes, 1911). +M. Lachapelle recommends a new proposal, _le systeme du nombre unique_. +The electoral quotient for all constituencies would be fixed by law at, +say, 15,000 votes. The number of deputies chosen at each election would +be allowed to vary. Each list in each constituency would receive as many +seats as its total contained the quotient. The constituencies would be +grouped into divisions. The votes remaining over after the allotment of +seats in each constituency would be added together, and further seats +would then be allotted to the respective lists.] + + + + +CHAPTER IX + +A COMPARISON OF LIST SYSTEMS WITH THE SINGLE TRANSFERABLE VOTE + + +"Les partis sont une institution de la vie politiquo actuelle. Ils sont +une partie, non ecrite, de la Constitution."--P. G. LA CHESNAIS + +_Influence of previous conditions_.] + +List methods of proportional representation have been favoured on the +Continent, the transferable vote in English-speaking countries, and the +question naturally arises, whence this difference? It would appear from +the history of proportional representation that advocates of the reform +have always kept in mind local customs, and have adapted their proposals +to them. Thus a list system of proportional representation was adopted +in Switzerland because such a system was more easily grafted upon +previous electoral conditions. This is the explanation given by Ernest +Naville, who for more than forty years was the leading advocate of +electoral reform in Switzerland, in a letter[1] addressed to the late +Miss Spence of Adelaide, South Australia. "The Swiss Cantons," said he, +"have adopted the system of competing lists. I do not think the system +is the best, but, as it involved the least departure from customary +practices, it was the system for which acceptance could be more easily +obtained. My ideal is a system which leaves the electors face to face +with the candidates without the intervention of lists presented by +parties; that is to say, that the method of voting indicated at the end +of the pamphlet[2] forwarded by you has my preference. It is the system +which I, inspired by the works of Mr. Hare, first proposed in Geneva, +but, in order to obtain a practical result, account has to be taken of +the habits and prejudices of the public to which the appeal is made, and +the best must often be renounced in order to obtain what is possible in +certain given circumstances." In a further letter Professor Naville was +even more emphatic. "I consider," said he, "the Hare system preferable +to that of competing lists. I have always thought so. I have always said +so. But our Swiss people are so accustomed to the _scrutin de liste_, or +multiple vote, that we could not obtain from them the profound +modification which would have been necessary to pass to the +Hare-Spence system." + +_Partly the basis of representation in a list system._ + +The long familiarity of the Belgian electors with the _scrutin de liste_ +also paved the way for the adoption of the list system of proportional +representation, but there is an additional reason why list systems have +found favour on the Continent. Some continental writers consider that +parties as such are alone entitled to representation in Parliament, and +are not enamoured of any scheme which makes personal representation +possible. This view is also taken by Mr. J. Ramsay Macdonald, who, +speaking of the Belgian scheme, says that "it makes party grouping the +most important consideration in forming the legislative order, and is +therefore much truer to the facts of Government than any other +proportional representation scheme."[3] The Royal Commission on +Electoral Systems also seems to have accepted the continental theory, +that "in political elections it is the balance of parties which is of +primary importance." In England, however, representation has never +theoretically been based upon party. The limited vote, the cumulative +vote, the double vote in double-member constituencies, have all allowed +the elector complete freedom of action to follow party instructions, or +to act independently. The electoral method has not been chosen to suit +the convenience of party organizations; parties have had to adapt +themselves to the system of voting. The single transferable vote in +accordance with these traditions bases representation upon electors, and +preserves to them freedom to vote as they please. So much is this the +case that some critics consider it unsuitable for a system of +proportional representation, and although Mill evidently regarded the +Hare scheme not only as a system of personal representation, but as a +plan for securing the representation of majorities and minorities in due +proportion, the Royal Commission on Electoral Systems took the view that +the transferable vote "was not originally invented as a system of +proportional representation, but as a system of personal representation +to secure the return of men as men, not as party units." Again, +Professor Commons says that "the Hare system is advocated by those who, +in a too doctrinaire fashion, wish to abolish political parties."[4] But +in making this statement Professor Commons himself supplies the answer. +"They apparently do not realize," says he, "the impossibility of acting +in politics without large groups of individuals, nor do they perceive +that the Hare system itself, though apparently a system of personal +representation, would nevertheless result in party representation." The +more complete organization of parties is a direct consequence of the +more democratic franchise now existing. Political action in modern times +without organization is impossible. The Johannesburg municipal elections +in November 1909, despite the success of two independent candidates, +showed that the most effective way of conducting elections with the +transferable vote is that of organizations presenting lists of +candidates. Indeed, so great a part does organization take in the +political life of to-day that it is desirable, if possible, to have some +counteracting influence. The transferable vote supplies this by securing +for the elector the utmost measure of freedom of action. + +This freedom of action is greatly appreciated by electors. A voter, +asked after the Johannesburg elections to give his impressions of the +new method of voting, stated that "the new system had put him on his +mettle. He had never experienced so much pleasure in the act of voting; +he had had to use his intelligence in discriminating between the claims +of the various candidates." Voting with the single transferable vote +ceases to be a purely mechanical operation, the voter becomes conscious +of the fact that in voting he is selecting a representative. It is of +little value to ask electors to exercise their intelligence if on the +day of the poll they have no means of doing so. There was some complaint +in Sweden after the first proportional representation elections because +the new system compelled an elector, if he wished to use his vote with +effect, to act rigidly with his party. With the transferable vote party +action has sufficient play. Electors can freely combine and vote as +parties, and effective organization will reap its legitimate reward. But +the elector will not be constrained to act against his wishes. He will +play an effective part in the election. In view of the great freedom +conferred by the single transferable vote on electors, it is not +surprising that the Royal Commission on Electoral Systems reported that +the "Belgian system is foredoomed to rejection by English public +opinion," and Mr. J. R. Macdonald states that "the British mind would +not submit to this (the Belgian) simplest and most efficient form of +proportional representation." + +_The freedom of the elector within the party._ + +Even when representation is based, as in the list systems, upon parties +as such, it becomes necessary to determine the degree of liberty that +shall be allowed to the individual elector in the exercise of the +franchise. If a party has obtained five seats and the party has +nominated seven candidates, how are the five successful ones to be +selected, and what part is the elector to take in the selection? There +is considerable dissatisfaction in Belgium with that part of the system +which enables the party organizations to arrange the order in which the +names shall appear upon the ballot paper, although this order may have +been arrived at by a preliminary election among members of the party. In +the election of 1910 there was a considerable increase in the number of +voters who exercised their right of giving a vote of preference to +individual candidates. The extensive use of this right resulted at +Brussels in the alteration of the order of election as determined by the +party organizations, and Count Goblet d'Alviella points out that this +will demand the consideration of the political parties.[5] Some device +such as that of making the vote transferable within the list will be +required in order to ensure that the majority within the party shall +obtain its full share of the representation. As stated in the previous +chapter, the French Parliamentary Committee felt it necessary to provide +for the elector a greater freedom of action than is possible under the +Belgian system. In the report issued by this Committee in 1905 the use +of the limited vote was recommended; in the report of 1907 the +cumulative vote, which confers still greater freedom upon the elector, +was proposed. In the Swedish system electors not only have full power to +strike out, to add to or to vary the order in which candidates' names +appear upon the ballot papers issued by the party organizations, but +they have the opportunity of presenting a non-party list. The Finnish +electoral law was deliberately framed so as not to interfere with or to +check the liberty of the voter in making up the lists.[6] This law not +only allows the names of candidates to figure on more than one list, but +permits the voter to prepare a list of his own composed of any three of +the candidates who have been duly nominated. In a list system two +problems, the allotment of seats to parties and the selection of the +successful candidates, have to be solved and the solution must in each +case respect the personal freedom of the elector. With the single +transferable vote the same mechanism solves both problems; it gives to +each party its due proportion of seats, it determines in the most +satisfactory way which of the candidates nominated by a party shall be +declared elected, and it does not encroach in any way upon the elector's +freedom of action. There is one point in which the single transferable +vote differs essentially from the list systems. With the former the vote +never passes out of the control of the voter, and the returning officer +can only transfer the vote to some candidate whom the elector has named. +With the list systems adopted in Belgium, Switzerland, Sweden and +Finland, or with that recommended by the French Parliamentary Committee, +a vote given for any one candidate is also a vote for the party which +has nominated the candidate, and the vote may contribute to the success +of some candidate of this party whose election the voter did not desire +to advance. This fact explains the difficulties which have been +associated with the formation of cartels in Belgium. A cartel is an +agreement between two parties to present a common list, and if, as has +taken place in some of the Belgian constituencies, Socialists and +Liberals present a combined list, a Liberal by voting for one of the +Liberal candidates of the cartel may contribute to the success of one of +the Socialist candidates. The Socialist voter may, on the other hand, +contribute to the return of a Liberal candidate. For this reason some +Liberals and some Socialists refuse to support cartels. In Sweden it is +possible that the elector's vote may, if he make use of a party ticket, +contribute to the return of some candidate whom he may have struck off +the list. If two parties agree to place the same motto at the head of +their respective lists, which may be quite distinct, a member of one +party may help to elect an additional candidate of the other party. Yet +a list system affords no way by which votes can be transferred from one +party to an allied party save by a cartel; if transferred at all they +must be transferred _en bloc_ from one party to another party, and not +from one candidate to another candidate, in accordance with the +expressed wishes of the elector. Mr. J. R. Macdonald states that +"proportional representation seeks to prevent the intermingling of +opinion on the margins of parties and sections of parties which is +essential to ordered and organic social progress." The statement is in +no sense true of the single transferable vote which affords every +facility for the intermingling of opinion on the margins of parties and +sections of parties, whilst even in Belgium groups within a party have +always presented a common list. + +_Comparative accuracy._ + +Considerable discussion has taken place as to which of the list systems +yield the most accurate results. It is obvious that as electors do not +divide themselves into groups which are exactly one-fourth, one-fifth, +or one-sixth of the whole, the utmost that a system of proportional +representation can do in the allotment of seats is to approximate as +closely as possible to the proportions in which the electors are +divided. There is very little difference in the results obtained by the +various list systems and by the single transferable vote. The Belgian +(d'Hondt) rule slightly favours the larger party; this rule allots seats +to parties according to the number of times the party total contains the +common divisor, the votes remaining over being ignored. For this reason +other advocates of list systems prefer the simple rule-of-three or +_methode rationelle._[7] With this system the total number of votes +polled is divided by the number of seats. The totals gained by the +respective lists are then divided by the quotient thus obtained and the +seats allotted to the lists accordingly. If after the allotment of seats +to the different lists there remain some seats not allotted, these are +awarded to the lists with the largest numbers of votes not utilized. The +transferable vote in practice, if not in theory, also awards seats to +the various parties according to the number of times the party total +contains the quota. If there is a seat not allotted it does not +necessarily fall to the party having the largest number of votes not +utilized. All the votes not utilized are taken into consideration, and +the smaller remainders may, by combination, win the odd seat. For +example, suppose that in a six-member constituency five seats have been +allotted and three candidates remain in competition for the last seat +with votes as follows:-- + +Candidate A 4,000 + " B 3,000 + " C 2,000 + +Then if the supporters of candidate C prefer B to A and have indicated +this fact on the ballot papers, the votes given to C would be +transferred to B, who would be elected to fill the last seat. With the +d'Hondt rule remainders are ignored; with the "rational method" the +largest remainders are favoured; with the single transferable vote the +last seat is awarded to the majority of the electors not otherwise +represented. The transferable vote therefore gives a result at least as +accurate as any of the rules devised in connexion with the list systems. +But in the majority of cases all three rules will yield the same result. + +_Panachage._ + +In the previous chapter reference has been made to the possible abuse of +_panachage_. In order to prevent such practice the Belgian system +provides that the elector shall vote for a member on one list only. In +Switzerland the elector is permitted to vote for members of more than +one list, and any abuse of this privilege is prevented by allowing the +elector to cumulate as many as three votes upon any of his favourite +candidates. This provision assures the return of the favourite +candidates of each party. The problem hardly arises with the single +transferable vote; the favourites of each party will doubtless always +receive more votes than are sufficient to ensure their election. The +elector who desires to advance the interests of his own party as much as +possible must indicate his preferences among all the members of his own +party before recording any preference for a candidate of another. + +_Applicability to non-political elections._ + +The single transferable vote possesses another advantage over list +systems. It is not only applicable to political elections, but to all +elections in which it is desired that the elected body should be +representative in character, but in which party lists are undesirable. +The British Medical Association has decided to conduct all its elections +so far as possible by the transferable vote; Trades Unions have made use +of it in the election of their committees; it has been used in Australia +by the Labour party for the selection of parliamentary candidates by +members of the party before the date of election. Thus the single +transferable vote would produce a much to be desired uniformity in +method in different elections. + +_Bye-elections._ + +The list systems have an advantage over the transferable vote in the +simplicity of their solution of the problem of bye-elections. Under list +systems bye-elections are abolished. But the preliminary question, +whether it is desirable that they should be abolished, needs +consideration. The Report of the Royal Commission on Electoral Systems +says: "Neither the single transferable vote nor list systems provide for +a solution of the problem of bye-elections which is both fitted to +English ideas and practically satisfactory." The Report continues: +"Bye-elections are generally regarded as valuable, if rough, tests of +public approval or disapproval of the proceedings of the Government, and +useful indications of the trend of political feeling. A system, +therefore, which would abolish or seriously hamper them is bound to +excite opposition."[8] If bye-elections are desirable because of the +indications which they give of the trend of political feeling, then the +large constituencies which the proportional system demands would add to +their value. The opinion of a larger number of electors would +be obtained. + +Wherever the single transferable vote has been adopted bye-elections +have been retained. In Tasmania, whenever a vacancy occurs the whole +constituency is polled; the Transvaal Municipal Act allows single +vacancies to remain unfilled, but provides for bye-elections when two or +more seats become vacant. The Proportional Representation Society, in +view of the demand for the retention of bye-elections, suggests that +single vacancies should be immediately filled by a bye-election when +they occur in a three-membered constituency, but that in larger areas no +bye-election should be held until two seats are vacated. But is not the +importance of bye-elections overrated? In many respects they are the +least satisfactory feature of English elections, and it is noticeable +that the change of opinion registered in a bye-election has often not +been maintained when the same constituency is polled at a General +Election. A considerable proportion of bye-elections are consequent upon +the taking of office by members of Parliament, and it is generally +agreed that such bye-elections are not necessary. Further, the House of +Commons has already resolved that it is desirable to reduce the length +of parliaments to five years, which in practice would mean a working +life of four years. The shortening of parliaments would destroy what +little value bye-elections possess. + +With a system of proportional representation bye-elections may produce +results which are unfair to the minority. If, for example, at a General +Election a constituency returned four Conservatives, two Liberals, and +one Socialist, and the Socialist member died or retired during the +lifetime of the parliament, the largest party would at a bye-election be +able to gain another member at the expense of the smallest party in the +constituency. This possible injustice is avoided in the list systems by +the abolition of bye-elections. Supplementary members are chosen at the +time of the General Election, and these are called upon to fill +vacancies in the order of their election. The party character of +representation remains unchanged from one election to another. When the +cumulative vote was used for School Board elections casual vacancies +were filled by co-option, and the party in whose ranks the vacancy +occurred was usually allowed to nominate his successor by consent of the +whole Board. Doubtless were bye-elections abolished there would be a +similar willingness to act fairly towards the smaller parties, but if it +was felt desirable to bring the transferable vote into agreement with +the practice followed in the list systems the necessary arrangements +could be made. On the death or retirement of a member the quota of +ballot papers by which he was elected, kept meanwhile under official +seal, could be re-examined, and the candidate who had secured a majority +of the highest preferences recorded on the papers could be called upon +to fill the vacancy. + +_Relative simplicity of scrutiny._ + +Experience shows conclusively that proportional systems, even the most +complex, present no great difficulty to the voter, and therefore there +is little to choose between them. The work thrown upon the returning +officer varies considerably, but in every country the returning officers +have proved equal to their task. The author has been present at Belgian +elections and at Swedish elections; he has conducted model elections in +England, and has been present at elections in the Transvaal, and has +therefore had some opportunity of judging different systems from the +point of view of facility in the counting of votes. The conclusion +arrived at is that the different schemes may be arranged in the +following order:-- + +1. The single transferable vote when the surplus votes are taken from +the top of the successful candidate's heap; + +2. The Belgian list system with its single vote; + +3. The single transferable vote with the surplus votes distributed +proportionately to the next preferences, as prescribed in the Schedule +of Lord Courtney's Municipal Representation Bill. + +4. List systems in which more than one vote is recorded. With these, the +counting increases in difficulty with the complexity of the scheme. + +The reasons for this conclusion are briefly these: Whenever the ballot +paper (as in the Belgian system and with the single transferable vote) +represents but one vote only, the process of counting consists of +sorting papers according to the votes given, and then in counting the +heaps of papers so formed. Whenever there is more than one vote recorded +upon a ballot paper it becomes necessary to extract the particulars of +each paper upon recording sheets. This is the case in the London Borough +Council elections, when the _scrutin de liste_ in its simple form is +used, and when, as in the list system proposed by the committee of the +French Chamber, the elector may cumulate or distribute his votes as he +pleases, selecting candidates from any or all the lists, this process of +extracting the details of the ballot papers must involve considerable +labour. By comparison, the process of sorting and counting ballot papers +is extremely simple. The Belgian law makes provision for the employment +of two "professional calculators," who are responsible for the accuracy +of the arithmetical calculations, and if the more accurate form of the +single transferable vote is adopted, it will be desirable that the +returning officer should have two assistants whose special duty it +should be to verify the accuracy of each stage of the process. + +In any comparison between the two main systems of proportional +representation there is no need to understate the advantages of either. +The results which have followed from the adoption of list systems on the +continent have shown how immeasurably superior these are to ordinary +electoral methods. Even in the most rigid of these systems--the +Belgian--there is within each party considerable freedom of opinion in +respect of all political questions which do not spring directly from the +principles on which the party is based. It is claimed, however, for the +single transferable vote that it is more elastic than the most complex +of list systems, that it more freely adapts itself to new political +conditions, and that in small constituencies returning, say, five or +seven members, it yields better results. Moreover, this system, based as +it is upon the direct representation of the electors, has appealed with +greater force to English-speaking peoples; it has its advocates in South +Africa, Australia, New Zealand and Canada, as well as in England, and as +a common electoral method for the British Empire is a desideratum in +itself, the balance of advantage, at least for English-speaking peoples, +would appear to be with the single transferable vote. + + +[Footnote 1: October 1894.] + +[Footnote 2: An address given by Miss Spence at River House, Chelsea, +London.] + +[Footnote 3: _Socialism and Government_, vol. i. p. 146.] + +[Footnote 4: _Proportional Representation_, New Edition, p. 104.] + +[Footnote 5: "Il serait desirable que nos associations politiques se +prononcent plus explicitement sur sa legitimite, si l'on ne veut pas que +ce genre de propagande reste une duperie pour les candidats les plus +scrupuleux." --_Nos Partis Politiques au lendemain du 22 Mai 1910_, +p. 10.] + +[Footnote 6: _Cf_. pamphlet, _The Finnish Reform Bill_, Helsingfors, +1906.] + +[Footnote 7: Readers who desire to follow the discussion as to the +comparative merits of the d'Hondt rule and the _methode rationelle_, +should consult the following works:-- + +_Examen Critique des Divers Precedes de Repartition Proportionnelle en +Matiere Electorale_, par M. E. Macquart; _Revue Scientifique_, 28 +October 1905. + +_La Representation Proportionnelle et les Partis Politiques_, par M. +P.G. la Chesnais. + +_La Vraie Representation Proportionnelle_, par M. Gaston Moch.] + +[Footnote 8: Ibid., par. 83.] + + + + +CHAPTER X + +PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION AND PARTY GOVERNMENT + +"Parties form and re-form themselves; they come together, dissolve, and +again come together; but in this flux and reflux a stability reigns such +as we observe amid similar phenomena in the course of nature; and indeed +it is the course of nature, only working in the world of politics +instead of the world of physics."--LORD COURTNEY OF PENWITH + +"To think in programmes is Egyptian bondage, and works the sterilization +of the political intellect."--AUGUSTINE BIRRELL + +Hitherto the objection most often urged against proportional +representation has been that it is impracticable; the successful +working, however, of the single transferable vote in Tasmania, in the +elections of the South African Senate and in the Transvaal Municipal +elections, and of list systems in Belgium, Switzerland, Sweden, +Wuertemberg and Finland has furnished a complete answer to this +objection. Manhood suffrage obtains in Belgium, adult suffrage in +Tasmania and Finland, and if, in countries possessing a franchise so +democratic, proportional systems have proved successful, it is no longer +possible to declare that proportional representation is impracticable. +Indeed, the practicability of proportional representation is now +generally admitted, and its critics prefer to lay stress upon objections +of another character. They even complain, as does Professor Jenks, that +"the supporters of the movement appear to be concentrating all their +arguments on the feasibility of their project, quietly assuming that its +desirability is axiomatic."[1] It does seem axiomatic that it is +desirable that representative institutions should reflect the views of +those represented, but it is now alleged that the representative +principle is merely "a means of getting things done," that the chief +function of the House of Commons is to provide the country with a strong +Government, and that proportional representation would render these +things impossible "because there would be no permanent majority strong +enough to get its own way." + +_Proportional representation and the two-party system._ + +This fear of a weakened executive doubtless explains why many others who +admit the justice and practicability of proportional representation, +still hesitate to support a reform the effects of which may greatly +modify existing parliamentary conditions. "We have still," said _The +Westminster Gazette,_[2] "to be convinced that we shall do well to make +still more difficult the maintenance of the two-party system, and that +it seems to us would almost certainly be the effect of proportional +representation." Ten years ago some professed supporters of proportional +representation took up the extraordinary position of allowing it only in +respect of two great parties within a State,[3] and quoted in support of +their views the words of Professor Paul Reinsch in his work on _World +Politics:_ "It is still as true as when Burke wrote his famous defence +of party, in his _Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents_, +that, for the realization of political freedom, the organization of the +electorate into regular and permanent parties is necessary. +Parliamentary government has attained its highest success only in those +countries where political power is held alternately by two great +national parties." Is no allowance to be made for the fluidity of +progressive democracy? Is it imagined that active political thought can +be compelled to follow stereotyped channels? Too profound a respect for +a system designed to meet former conditions led the Royal Commission on +Electoral Methods to the conclusion that, "reviewing the whole of the +evidence, and duly considering the gravity of the change involved, we +are unable to report that a case has been made out before us for the +adoption of the transferable vote here and now for elections to the +House of Commons."[4] The Commission proceed "to emphasize the exact +nature and limitations of this conclusion," which ultimately amounts to +no more than a suggestion for the postponement of an inevitable +change.[5] But the fact remains that the Royal Commission accepted the +theory of government placed before it by those who desire to maintain +the existing party system and who are of opinion that that system can +only be maintained by single-member constituencies and the majority +method of election. "On the question," says the Commission, "whether the +representation of all parties in proportion to their voting strength is +in itself desirable, we may point out that it is not a fair argument +against the present system that it fails to produce such a result, +because it does not profess to do so. A General Election is, in fact, +considered by a large portion of the electorate of this country as +practically a referendum on the question which of two governments shall +be returned to power."[6] " ... The case of those who hold that the +transferable vote is not capable of application in this country rests +only to a very slight extent on its mechanical difficulties.... The most +potent arguments are a theory of representation on the one hand and a +theory of government on the other."[7] It is evident that the most +important objection which advocates of proportional representation have +to meet concerns its probable effect upon party organization and upon +party government, and it is therefore necessary to consider this +objection in detail. + +_Burke's view of party and party discipline._ + +In the first place, can Burke's definition of party be used in defence +of modern party organization and discipline? The character of these has +fundamentally changed since Burke's time. His conception of national +parties and also, perhaps, of the probable influence of a system of +proportional representation upon their formation may be gathered from +his own words. "Party," says Burke, "is a body of men united for +promoting by their joint endeavours the national interest upon some +particular principle in which they are all agreed. For my part I find it +impossible to conceive that any one believes in his own politics, or +thinks them to be of any weight, who refuses to adopt the means of +having them reduced into practice. It is the business of the speculative +philosopher to mark the proper ends of government. It is the business of +the politician, who is the philosopher in action, to find out proper +means towards those ends, and to employ them with effect. Therefore +every honourable connexion will avow it is their first purpose to pursue +every just method to put the men who hold their opinions into such a +condition as may enable them to carry their common plans into execution, +with all the power and authority of the state." No advocate of +proportional representation would in the least quarrel with Burke's +definition of party or deny that sustained effort and efficient +organization are absolutely essential if practical effect is to be given +to political principles. Burke, however, did not contemplate a party +system in which complete submission to the programme of the party was +considered an essential condition of membership. Burke's definition of +party must be read in conjunction with his own interpretation of the +term. "In order," says he, "to throw an odium on political connexion, +these politicians suppose it a necessary incident to it that you are +blindly to follow the opinions of your party, when in direct opposition +to your own clear ideas; a degree of servitude that no worthy man could +bear the thought of submitting to; and such as, I believe, no connexions +(except some court factions) ever could be so senselessly tyrannical as +to impose. Men thinking freely will, in particular instances, think +differently. But still as the greater part of the measures which arise +in the course of public business are related to, or depend on, some +great leading general principles in government, a man must be peculiarly +unfortunate in the choice of his political company, if he does not agree +with them at least nine times in ten. If he does not concur in these +general principles upon which the party is founded, and which +necessarily draw on a concurrence in their application, he ought from +the beginning to have chosen some other, more conformable to his +opinions."[8] Burke does not limit the number of parties to two, and if +his authority is to be invoked in support of the maintenance of the +two-party system, it can only be invoked in support of the maintenance +of two parties which are based on such leading general principles as +will cover the whole field of politics, and the organization of which is +such as to leave to members of the party a considerable measure of +freedom in respect of individual questions. "We may be confident," says +Lord Courtney of Penwith, "that the two main divisions will survive, the +one pressing forward and the other cautiously holding back,"[9] and in +so far as it corresponds to the two main tendencies in human thought the +two-party system will doubtless survive any change in voting method. But +with the spread of political intelligence it cannot possibly survive the +rigidity of modern discipline--a rigidity which Burke would have been +the first to repudiate--nor can it survive the modern tendency towards +the formation of parties for the purpose of carrying specific reforms. + +_Narrow basis fatal to a large party._ + +The complete transformation of the Conservative Party into a Tariff +Reform Party would considerably narrow its basis, and any narrowing of +the basis of one party must help to break down the two-party system. For +although Tariff Reform is a matter of great national interest, having +very far-reaching effects, it obviously does not cover the whole field +of politics. There is no fundamental and necessary relation between +Tariff Reform and Home Rule, the constitutional position of the House of +Lords, or the special problem of the place of religion in national +education. Nor does it necessarily or even naturally attract those +cautious intellects which are the typical supporters of Conservatism. +The strenuous efforts which have been made in recent years to exclude +from the Unionist Party all who are unwilling to accept the policy of +Tariff Reform have, it is true, been crowned with considerable success, +but there is a limit to the process of unification. Should the advocates +of this fiscal change, for example, have desired to make terms with the +Nationalist party for the purpose of carrying their policy, any attempt +to impose those terms upon all members of the party would have resulted +in a further and probably a more serious split. In such circumstances +parties necessarily give place to groups, and the fissiparous tendency +is most apparent where party discipline is most rigid. The solidarity of +the German Social Democratic Party will only be maintained by according +liberty of action in local matters to the South German Socialists.[10] +The formation of the French Unified Socialist Party was a work of +considerable difficulty, and its maintenance will only be possible if +its constituent parts can tolerate differences of opinion. The two +sections of the English Labour Party have been able to work together by +concentrating their efforts on reforms which are advocated by both, +whilst the troubles which have arisen within the smaller group, the +Independent Labour Party, have sprung from attempts to insist upon a +narrow interpretation of the term Independent. The narrower the basis on +which the parties are formed and the more rigid the discipline employed, +the more difficult will become the maintenance of the two-party system. +If, then, it is considered essential to the successful working of +parliamentary government that there should be but two parties, these +parties must be based on broad leading principles and must be so +organized as to allow for differences of opinion on minor matters. With +the increase in the number of questions of first-class importance it +will, however, be difficult to maintain even the semblance of the +two-party system, and in the absence of those more elastic political +conditions which a system of proportional representation provides, +absolutely impossible. + +_Proportional representation and party discipline._ + +The argument in the preceding paragraphs can be illustrated from the +effect of proportional systems on party organization in those countries +in which they are at present in force. In Belgium the prophecy was +repeatedly made that the new law would result in the splitting of +parties into petty factions, rendering parliamentary government +impossible. Its real effect has been, if anything, of the contrary +character. There are still but three Belgian parties--Catholic, Liberal, +and Socialist. Their principles have tended to become more clearly +defined, but within each party there has arisen a considerable freedom +of opinion in respect to all political questions which do not spring +directly from the principles on which the parties are based. This was +clearly shown in the discussion on the proposals for the annexation of +the Congo. At the conference of Liberals held before the General +Election of 1908 it was decided that the annexation of the Congo should +be treated as a _question libre_. M. Vandervelde, at the same time, +expressed opinions on this subject which were contrary to those held by +the majority of Socialists, whilst several Catholics, who disapproved of +the terms on which the Congo was offered to the nation, did not hesitate +to say so. None of these expressions of opinion involved ostracism from +the party, and, although party discipline is strict, there is but little +doubt that this freedom of movement in respect to non-party questions +will continue to grow. The annexation of the Congo was voted in due +course, but the original draft of the Treaty received important +modifications which were due largely to the action and criticism of the +more independent Conservatives. + +The question of free trade or protection does not, at the present time, +occupy a prominent place in Belgian politics, but should it do so, there +is no reason to assume that opinions either for or against free trade +would involve, as here, ostracism from any party. Such conditions admit +of a much more genuine discussion of public and of economic questions. +In England, with the system of single-member constituencies, Unionist +Free Traders have had the alternative placed before them of submitting +to the opinions of the majority of the party or of retiring from all +active participation in public life. In Belgium, on the other hand, +proportional representation has induced parties, while adhering to their +fundamental principles, to make their lists of candidates as inclusive +as possible. The list presented by the Catholics at Ghent in 1908 +contained not only a free trader and a protectionist, but +representatives of different classes of interests within the +constituency, of agriculture, of landed proprietors, of workmen and of +masters of industry. Stress was laid upon the comprehensive character of +their list in the election address issued by the Catholics, and each +party endeavoured to make its list representative of the forces within +the party. Special efforts indeed are taken to accomplish this end; in +the preparation of the Liberal list members of the organization took +part in the preliminary selection of candidates, the final choice being +determined by a formal election. In reporting that the Belgian system of +proportional representation "is not favourable to small independent +parties, or, what is of greater interest to many observers in this +country, to small sections or wings of large parties," the Royal +Commission on Electoral Systems misinterpreted the working of the +Belgian system. It is true that the Christian Democrats form the only +small party in Belgium which has obtained direct representation, but the +Belgian system has certainly given representation to the wings of large +parties. Count Goblet d'Alviella, who was examined by the Commission, +has kindly furnished some observations upon the Commission's statement. +"Whenever there is room," he writes, "that is, where the seats are +numerous enough, the leaders take the greatest care to choose +representatives of the principal shades of opinion within their party +lines. At Brussels in 1910 the Catholics placed on their list not only +M. Colfs, who upset their order of precedence in the previous election, +but also M. Theodor, who, for the last three times, +headed--unsuccessfully--a separate list of the so-called Independent +Party. The Liberal list at Brussels has been formed by the joint action +of Moderates (Ligue liberale) and Radicals (Association liberale), each +of these two organizations trying to give satisfaction to their own +subdivisions (Flemish and Walloon, rural and urban, &c.). At Antwerp the +Liberal list has been formed by five Liberal organizations, each one +choosing its own representative." The M. Colfs referred to in Count +Goblet d'Alviella's letter strongly opposed the military proposals of +the Belgian Government, but he was, nevertheless, placed by the party +organization on the official list. Thus, in Belgium wings of parties +undoubtedly obtain their legitimate influence, and this renders the +formation of independent small parties superfluous. The number of broad +general principles on which political parties can be based is strictly +limited, and this explains why neither the Belgian nor any other system +of proportional representation will produce innumerable parties. + +_"Free Questions" in Japan._ + +The electoral system in Japan, giving as it does great freedom for the +expression of political opinion, has resulted, as in Belgium, in the +separation of political questions into two types--party and free. +According to Mr. Kametaro Hayashida, the Secretary of the Japanese House +of Representatives, the measures before parliament are duly considered +at party meetings; after deliberation a decision is taken as to whether +the measure under discussion should be treated as a party question, or +whether freedom of action should be permitted to the individual members +of the party, and a communication, embodying the result of the party +meeting, is then sent to every member. Here then we get additional +evidence of the amelioration of party spirit, which follows the adoption +of a more elastic system of representation. Political debate must become +in such cases not only more real but infinitely more valuable. The +number of questions left to the discretion of the individual member is +by no means inconsiderable, as will be seen from the following figures +showing the attitude taken by the various parties towards public +questions in 1908:-- + +(1)--Laws + +Party . . . . . Constitutionalist Progressive Conservative Radical + +Party questions . 105 75 66 -- +Free questions. . 2 32 41 107 + +(2)--Petitions + +Party . . . . . Constitutionalist Progressive Conservative Radical + +Party questions . 63 167 68 -- +Free questions. . 119 15 114 182 + +"It should be noted," says Mr. Hayashida, "that the Radicals had no +party questions, but made all questions free. On the other hand, the +Constitutionalists, who supported the Government, made party questions +of practically all laws submitted. On the average, apart from the +Radicals, the three other parties treated 23 per cent. of the laws, and +37 per cent. of the petitions in the twenty-sixth session of the +Imperial Japanese Diet as free questions." + +_The formation of groups._ + +Such evidence as we possess does not then warrant the assumption that a +proportional system leads to an increase in the number of political +parties. It makes them more elastic. On the other hand, it has been +demonstrated beyond any doubt that a system of single-member +constituencies has completely failed to maintain the two-party system. +In England the Labour Party forms within the House of Commons a distinct +camp by itself, the Nationalist Party still more jealously guards its +independence, and at the election of January, 1910, a smaller group of +Independent Nationalists was formed. The rise of the Labour Party in +Australia was not prevented by a system of single-member constituencies. +In Germany and France single-member constituencies have not arrested the +development of groups with national, religious, or sectional programmes. +When, therefore, it is contended that proportional representation will +lead to the formation of groups, the obvious answer is that it is the +present system which is producing groups; and should the representation +obtained by these groups, as in France and Germany and in Australia, +give no clear indication of public opinion, then the instability which +has been a characteristic of French and for a time of Australian +parliamentary conditions may become characteristic of the House +of Commons. + +Nor do those advocates of proportional representation, who desire to +maintain the two-party system by artificial means, offer any machinery +adequate for the purpose. In an article written before the first +elections for the Commonwealth parliament, Mr. Deakin wrote as +follows:-- + +"By the very circumstances of the case the tariff issue cannot but +dominate the first election, and determine the fate of the first +ministry of the Commonwealth. There will be no time for second thoughts +or for suspension of judgment. The first choice of the people will be +final on this head. The first parliament must be either protectionist or +anti-protectionist, and its first great work an Australian tariff. That +is the clear-cut issue. The risk is that a proportion of the +representatives may be returned upon other grounds, as the electors as a +whole may not realise all that is at stake or make the necessary +sacrifices or opinion and preferences to express themselves emphatically +on this point." + +In commenting upon this declaration the supporters of so-called +two-party proportional representation[11] said: + +"The only way to avoid the risk indicated is to take this one definite +issue as the basis of proportional representation. Each State should be +divided on it, and should elect its proportional number of Free-trade +and Protectionist representatives." But how are all the electors to be +constrained into accepting the dictates of party leaders as to the lines +upon which elections shall be fought? The Labour Party in Australia +apparently considered the special principles for which they stood of +more importance than either Free Trade or Protection. The English Labour +Party would doubtless adopt the same point of view, whilst the +Nationalists regard the Tariff question as of little importance as +compared with Home Rule. "The rude and crude division," said Mr. +Asquith, "which used to correspond more or less accurately with the +facts of a representative assembly of two parties, had perhaps become +everywhere more or less a thing of the past."[12] There are no means +available for restoring the earlier conditions, and certainly the +existing electoral system of single-member constituencies affords no +guarantee that in the future any one party will obtain a permanent +majority strong enough to get its own way. The maintenance in form of +the two-party system during the parliament of 1906-10 was merely due to +the accident of the phenomenal election of 1906, when the Liberal Party +was returned in such numbers as to exceed the combined forces of all +other groups. At the General Election of January, 1910, five parties +entered the field, and as a result of this election no party obtained +an absolute majority. In the important parliamentary debates which arose +immediately after the election each of these groups took part, as such, +for the purpose of emphasizing their independence, and when, consequent +upon the death of King Edward, a conference on the constitutional +question was arranged between the leaders of the Conservative and +Liberal parties, Mr. Ramsay Macdonald, in commenting upon the +conference, made this statement: "He regretted that there was going to +be any conference at all, but if there was going to be one he, as a +member of the Labour Party, denied the right of the two front benches to +settle it. They no longer represented the House of Commons or the +opinion of the country. There were other benches."[13] Obviously, if +other benches are to be taken into consideration in the solution of +constitutional questions, it is a matter of importance to know the true +strength that lies behind those occupying them. The difference--an +extremely important difference--that a proportional system would produce +in the composition of the House of Commons is that the representation +obtained by these groups would give a much more accurate clue to public +opinion and, as in the long-run the strength of an executive depends +upon its capacity to interpret the will of the people, the position of +the executive would be rendered much more stable. This is the +justification of Mr. Asquith's statement: "Let them have a House of +Commons which fully reflected every strain of opinion; that was what +made democratic government in the long-run not only safer and more free, +but more stable." + +But does parliamentary government, as the Royal Commission on Electoral +Systems suggests, really depend for its working upon the maintenance of +a system of election which admittedly distorts the real wishes of the +people? This argument had been anticipated and effectively dealt with by +M. Ostrogorski in his _Democracy and Political Parties_. "There arises," +says he, "the old question of the Duke of Wellington, frightened by the +prospect of the abolition of the rotten boroughs: How will the King's +government be carried out? How will parliamentary government work? In +reality the catastrophe will not be more than that which so alarmed the +hero of Waterloo; now, as then, it will be nothing more nor less than +the destruction of something rotten."[14] The King's government has been +improved by the abolition of the rotten boroughs, and will be still +further improved if opinion within the House of Commons is brought into +more direct relation with opinion outside. The view taken by the +Commission was not shared by one of its members, Lord Lochee, who in a +note appended to the Report says: "I am not concerned to dispute that +the introduction of proportional representation might involve important +changes in parliamentary government. That, in my view, is not a question +for the Commission. I shall, therefore, only say that I do not believe +that the cause of good government is bound up with the maintenance of a +distorted representation, or that British statesmanship would be unable +to cope with the problems which a better system might bring in +its train." + +_The formation of an executive_. + +Changes will doubtless take place in the method of carrying on the +King's government, but they will take place very gradually, and will be +evolved out of present conditions. It would be essential, as now, that +the government should possess the confidence of the House of Commons and +of the country, and, in order to obtain this confidence it would not be +sufficient to secure a majority by means of bargainings between groups +which involved important sacrifices of principle. Even with such rigid +party discipline as now obtains it would be difficult and perhaps +impossible to effect an alliance between Unionist Tariff Reformers and +Nationalists for the purpose of carrying out a double policy of Tariff +Reform and Home Rule. It is certain that under a system of proportional +representation such an arrangement would be useless as a basis for a +stable executive, for with the lessened rigidity in discipline party +leaders would have no means of enforcing the terms of such bargains upon +their followers. The composition of the House itself would give a clear +indication of the main policies which would meet with the approval of +the House and also of the Government which would command its confidence. +It is perhaps unwise to attempt to map out in any detail the probable +course of events, but there are some who are unwilling to take this step +forward in the perfecting of democratic institutions without some clear +conception of the way in which a good government might be formed under +the new conditions. Professor Nanson of Melbourne has endeavoured to +satisfy this anxiety by attempting to forecast the probable effect which +a system of proportional representation would have upon the formation of +governments in Australia, showing how such a system would enable a +really stable executive to be formed. + +"To bring the matter vividly before us," says he, "consider the two +vital issues now before the Australian public. These are Protection and +the Labour platform. Every elector and every candidate at once falls +into one of four groups. For every one is either Protectionist or +anti-Protectionist, and every one is either Labour or non-Labour. Every +person is therefore either Protectionist and Labour, or Protectionist +and non-Labour, or anti-Protectionist and Labour, or anti-Protectionist +and non-Labour. Using the letters P, A, L, N to denote Protectionist, +Anti-protectionist, Labour, Non-labour, we have four groups which we may +denote by PL, PN, AL, AN. + +"It is clear that if we can find out the number of voters in each group +we can at once declare the verdict of the country for or against +Protection, and for or against the Labour platform. Suppose, for the +sake of argument, that the percentage of voters are: Non-labour +Protectionist, 32; Non-labour Anti-protectionist, 28; Labour +Protectionist, 24; Labour Anti-protectionist, 16; as shown in the +following table:-- + + P A +N .... 32 28 60 +L .... 24 16 40 + _ _ __ + 50 44 100 + +"Then it is clear that there is a majority of 60 per cent, to 40 per +cent, against the Labour platform, and a majority of 56 per cent, to 44 +per cent, in favour of protection. Under such circumstances the +distribution of members in a House of 75 would be as follows:-- + + P A +N .... 24 21 45 +L .... 18 12 30 + _ _ _ + 42 33 75 + +"In such a House there would be a majority of 45 to 30 against the +Labour platform, and a majority of 42 to 33 in favour of Protection. In +such a House the only possible Ministry would be a Non-labour +Protectionist. There would be a straight out Ministerial party of 24. +There would be a right Ministerial Labour Protectionist wing of 18 bound +to support the Ministry in its Protectionist policy. There would be a +left Ministerial Anti-protectionist Non-labour wing of 21 bound to +support the Ministry in its Non-labour policy. The straight out +Opposition would be 12. Such a House might well be left to elect a +Ministry. Every minister would, with a proper method of election, if +necessary, be a Non-labour Protectionist. For there would be an absolute +majority of the House against every Labour man and against every +Anti-protectionist. Every Minister would be heart and soul with the +Ministerial policy. There could then be no possibility of dirt eating or +of voting against one's convictions, as is alleged to be the case at +present."[15] The divisions between English political parties may not +be so clearly cut nor the composition of the Executive so homogeneous as +outlined in this forecast of Professor Nanson, but a proportional system +would certainly yield a true indication of the mind of the nation on at +least three, and probably more, of the important matters under +discussion in England--Tariff Reform, Home Rule, and the constitutional +position of the House of Lords. A clear expression of national opinion +on these issues would determine the policy which an executive resting +for authority upon the House of Commons would have to pursue, but, in +addition, the improved electoral methods would yield unmistakable +indications of the attitude of the nation towards those Labour and +Social questions which will more and more claim the attention of +Parliament. In brief, so far from proportional representation creating +conditions unfavourable to the formation of a strong executive, it will +furnish the only means by which in the future stable executives can be +formed. It will place within the hands of governments a new and more +delicate instrument with which to gauge public opinion, and it is on the +accurate interpretation of public opinion that the continued existence +of a government depends. + +_A check on partisan legislation._ + +But those who, with Professor Jenks, regard the representative principle +as being merely a means of getting things done, will perhaps want some +indication of the possibility, not only of forming an Executive under a +proportional regime but of carrying legislation. There are obviously two +aspects to this question. The power of initiating and of controlling +legislation is now so largely in the hands of the executive authority +that means are required not only of getting things done but of ensuring +that the privileged position possessed by the executive authority is not +abused. The present system enables a ministry in command of an +overwhelming but false majority to impose upon the nation legislation +with which the nation is not in accord. It is more than doubtful whether +the Education and Licensing measures carried by Mr. Balfour's +administration (1902-5) would have been acceptable to a House of Commons +which was truly representative, and as Mr. Balfour's government +dominated the House of Lords as completely as it controlled the House of +Commons, the only check which existed upon the action of the Ministry +was the fear of defeat when the time came for the inevitable appeal to +the country. Such a check has proved to be inadequate to prevent the +passage of partisan legislation, and the failure of the House of Commons +to protect the nation against legislation of an arbitrary nature has +given rise to the demand for checks of another character. + +_Unlike the referendum, proportional representation will +strengthen the House of Commons._ + +Thus, it is now urged that the nation should, by means of the +referendum, be afforded the opportunity of exercising that control over +the executive which the House of Commons has lost. "Formerly," says +Professor Dicey, "when the King was the real and effective sovereign of +the country, and was responsible for its government, it was right that +he should have a veto. The nation is now the sovereign, and what I +propose is to place a veto in the hands of the nation.[16] Now, although +proportional representation is not inconsistent with the referendum, yet +these two reforms endeavour to cure the defects of representative +institutions in different ways. The referendum, by transferring +responsibility and authority from the House of Commons to the nation, +will tend to diminish the importance of the representative chamber. +Proportional representation, on the other hand, aims at strengthening +the House by making it more fully representative, and in consequence +more competent to discharge its true functions. Moreover, there are some +practical objections to the referendum. There must always be +considerable difficulty in framing the form in which a legislative +proposal should be submitted to the country. To be permitted to say +'yes' or 'no' to a complicated measure is not sufficient. It would have +been extremely difficult for most of the electors to have stated, +without any qualification, whether they approved of Mr. Asquith's +Licensing Bill of 1908. This measure was far too comprehensive to submit +as a whole, and an unfavourable verdict would have given no clear +indication as to the nation's wishes, and would have been open to +serious misinterpretation. The new licensing duties and the new land +taxes contained in the Finance Bill of 1909 had nothing in common, and +it would have been necessary to have submitted a Bill of this nature in +sections. Further, every time a measure which had passed the House of +Commons was rejected by the nation, the prestige of the House would be +impaired, and the conclusion is unavoidable that, were the referendum +adopted, the House could only retain an authoritative position by +introducing a system of proportional representation so as to bring it as +closely as possible into agreement with the nation. It is, moreover, +generally agreed that Finance Bills should not be the subject of a +referendum, but in a modern state these are of as much importance as +other legislation. The work of legislation demands special +qualifications. When we select a doctor or a lawyer, or any other agent, +we wish him to do his special work. The elector desires to have an +effective choice in the selection of his representative in parliament, +but having chosen a legislator with whom he is in sympathy entrusts the +details of legislation to him. Proportional representation would give +the elector this effective choice, and by restoring to members of +Parliament a greater measure of freedom would enable the House of +Commons to resume its proper function of controlling legislation. The +need for the referendum would disappear. + +_Proportional Representation facilitates legislation desired +by the nation._ + +It may be said, however, that there is here no indication of the means +of getting things done, only of a check upon partisan action. But +proportional representation, in rendering more difficult the passing of +legislation conceived in a partisan spirit, will save the time and +energy of Parliament for legislation which is more in accordance with +the nation's will. The history of the numerous Education and Licensing +Bills which have been presented to Parliament during the two decades +1890-1910 furnish an excellent example of the way in which a rigid party +system results in the waste of parliamentary time. No wonder that the +legislative machine has broken down. Efforts are now being made to +increase the working capacity of the House of Commons, but if these are +to be permanently successful, there must be such an abatement of +partisan feeling as a system of proportional representation encourages. +The changes which have been introduced in recent years into the +procedure of the House of Commons are of a far-reaching character. +According to the rules adopted in 1907, all Bills, other than money +Bills and Bills for confirming Provisional Orders, are referred, after +the passing of the second reading, to Standing Committees of the House, +unless a resolution to the contrary is moved immediately and carried. +There is a growing opinion in favour of these committees, the value of +which is largely due to the greater sincerity in discussion which takes +place in them. When Mr. Asquith moved the resolution allocating the time +to be allowed for discussion on the Housing and Town Planning Bill, Lord +Robert Cecil expressed the opinion that the system of guillotining +debate was destructive of the legislative efficiency and the dignity of +the House of Commons.[17] "Personally he thought some remedy might +possibly be found in an extension of the Grand Committee system. He +began with a violent prejudice against them. He had now sat on several +of them, and he had come to the belief that, on the whole, they were by +far the best instrument they now possessed, inferior though it was to a +full and free discussion in the whole House for the consideration of +legislation. The most important characteristic of them was that only +those decided who heard the arguments. They did not have the disgusting +farce that went on in that Chamber of members trooping in from outside +who had not the slightest knowledge of the subject which had been +discussed, who had not taken the slightest interest in it, and who +merely asked the Whips at the door, 'Which side are we to-day?' and +voted 'Aye' or 'No' as they were told. The Prime Minister recognized +that the independence and dignity of the House were invaluable assets to +the country, and had shown on many occasions a genuine desire to +preserve the dignity of members of Parliament, and the self-respect of +the House." Mr. Asquith, in reply to this statement, also expressed his +opinion that by a larger and more elastic use of the system of +Committees it would be possible to avoid some of the evils arising from +the growing congestion of parliamentary business. "The Housing and Town +Planning Bill was," said he, "a very good illustration of the useful +purpose served by the Grand Committee. It was there for twenty-three +days; it was discussed under almost ideal conditions; the closure was +never moved from beginning to end; the Government Whips never sought to +exert their authority in any one of the divisions which took place; and +the discussion was conducted by men who were obliged to listen to the +arguments of those who were opposed to them. As regards Bills of this +character, it was perfectly certain that they got a much more accurate +discussion, and decisions were arrived at far less under the stress of +party prepossession than when a Bill was discussed in Committee of the +whole House." + +Thus it seems that a lessening of party discipline and a greater freedom +and sincerity in discussion result in an acceleration of the rate of +legislation, and as a proportional system favours these conditions it +would materially assist the process of getting things done. + +_Proportional Representation in Standing Committees._ + +But this important change in the procedure of the House of Commons--the +discussion of the details of legislation in Grand Committees instead of +committees of the whole House--furnishes from another point of view +cogent reasons for the adoption of a system of proportional +representation. In the composition of these committees strict care is +taken to allot representation to the various parties within the House in +proportion to their strength. Otherwise these committees would not +possess the confidence of the House. But if the composition of +committees on a proportionate basis is a condition of their success, +would not their work be even more successful if in the first instance +the strength of parties within the House corresponded to the number of +their supporters in the country? The House of Commons would enjoy the +confidence of the nation, and its standing committees would acquire +greater authority because they, in turn, would be fully representative. + +One of the most important of these committees is the Scottish Grand +Committee, to which all Scottish Bills are referred. All Scottish +members are appointed to this committee, but in order that its +composition should conform to the rule--that committees should reflect +the strength of parties within the House--it has been found necessary to +add thereto a number of English Conservatives who often, if not usually, +have not the special qualifications necessary for dealing with the +details of Scottish questions. If the purpose for which the Scottish +Grand Committees have been constituted is to be fulfilled, it will be +necessary that the different political forces within each part of the +Kingdom should be represented in the House proportionately and that the +membership of the committees should be confined to Scottish members. It +is quite possible, under the present electoral system, that there might +be an overwhelming Conservative majority in England and a large Liberal +majority in Scotland. In such conditions the Scottish Grand Committee +would fail to work. It would be necessary to add so large a number of +English Conservatives that the Committee would lose its distinctively +Scottish character. There is often very little difference between +Scottish representatives on Scottish questions. A good instance of this +was shown in the discussion on the report stage of the House Letting +Bill (1909). The measure was opposed by the English Conservative +members of the Committee, whilst the Scottish Conservatives voted for +it. If the Scottish Conservatives were fully represented in the House of +Commons they would obtain adequate representation on the Committee; a +large addition of English Conservatives would not be necessary, and an +agreement between the members of the Committee would often be much more +quickly reached. Not only so, but a system of proportional +representation would greatly strengthen the personnel of the Committee. +Both the Scottish Law Officers of Mr. Balfour's Administration were +defeated in the General Election of 1906, and in consequence the +Scottish Conservatives, in their deliberations in Committee, were +deprived of the expert advice which these officers could have afforded. +Obviously, Scottish legislation can be dealt with best in a Scottish +Grand Committee, but the successful working of this Committee requires +the true representation thereon of the different sections of political +opinion in Scotland, and, in addition, the presentation of those +opinions by their most capable exponents. + +Similarly, all members representing constituencies in Wales and Monmouth +are to be appointed to the Committee dealing with Bills relating +exclusively to that part of the country. Such Bills are not so numerous +as Bills relating to Scotland, but nevertheless it is most desirable +that in the discussion of a Welsh Bill minorities in Wales should be +represented not by members sitting for English constituencies, but by +representatives chosen by themselves who would be fully conversant with +Welsh conditions. In the absence of such representation there will +always remain the feeling that the minority has been unfairly treated, +and it is this sense of unfairness that so often calls forth opposition +of a partizan character, and such opposition is fatal to progress in +legislation. + +Perhaps the South African National Convention affords the most striking +example of the capacity of a fully representative body to achieve +results of a satisfactory character and with little delay. Had this +Convention been packed either in the Boer or the British interest the +great task of South African Union would never have been accomplished. +The scrupulous care with which the rights of the minorities were +respected is the secret of the wonderful rapidity with which the +enormous difficulties involved in the task were overcome. Not only were +minorities awarded full representation on this Convention, but every +facility was afforded them in the choice of their delegates. The sense +of justice and the spirit of reasonableness go always hand in hand, and +the spirit of reasonableness alone makes possible the smooth and +efficient working of the legislative machine. + +_Taking off the Whips._ + +Proportional representation will therefore not only facilitate the +formation of a stable executive in the new political conditions, but it +will be of very great value in creating the atmosphere in which +legislation can most easily be passed. Even with the present system of +false representation progress might often be more rapid if debate was +less partisan in character. The executive might easily refrain from +driving so hard the members of the party on which it rests for support. +All political questions are not of the same importance, and a step in +the direction of freer and less partizan conditions would be taken if +opportunities were more often given to members to vote in accordance +with their own judgment. The experiment of taking off the official Whips +more frequently might yield valuable results. Sir Courtenay Ilbert says, +however, that "open questions are not popular; they compel a member to +think for himself, which is always troublesome."[18] But the advantage +which would arise from the increase of the spirit of reasonableness +would far outweigh such disadvantages as might befall the less +politically minded members of the House. Far less importance too need be +attached to snap divisions, and, as Sir William Anson has suggested, it +should be generally understood that the results of such divisions need +not entail the resignation of a government. + +_New political conditions._ + +Must then the practical politician still reject proportional +representation? Sir Charles Dilke, in evidence before the Royal +Commission on Electoral Systems,[19] attached great importance to the +views of political leaders upon the party system, and doubtless +practical politicians are guided by their views. The recent utterances, +however, of two great party leaders show that the new political +conditions and their consequences are fully recognized and appreciated +by them. Mr. Balfour, in a speech before the Scottish Conservative +Club,[20] emphasized the importance of having every shade of opinion +represented in the House of Commons: "There is a section," he said, "an +important section of Socialist opinion in the country, and it is quite +right that they should find voice in the House of Commons if their +numbers in the country render that desirable. We cannot, we do not, lose +by having Socialist members in the House of Commons, if there are many +Socialists in the country. We do not lose, we gain by it." Does this +utterance of a great Conservative leader indicate any belief that the +two-party system is the final and unchangeable expression of national +feeling. Mr. Asquith has said that "the rude and crude divisions which +used to correspond more or less accurately with the fact of a +representative assembly of two parties only, the Whig and the Tory, the +Right and the Left, or by whatever other names they may have been +called, with strictly drawn lines of demarcation with no debatable or +intermediate territory, that perhaps has become everywhere, more or +less, a thing of the past." Such opinions so freely expressed must +prepare the way for the more serious consideration of proportional +representation by the practical politicians. It will in no sense involve +the abandonment of party organization, but it will render those +organizations, to use Mr. Asquith's words once more, "elastic, flexible, +always adapting itself to shifting conditions." Party organization of +such a character is undoubtedly a fundamental condition of the smooth +working of the parliamentary machine, but another condition equally +fundamental is that the strength of parties within the House should bear +a direct and true relation to the strength of parties in the country. +Both these requirements are supplied by a system of proportional +representation. + + +[Footnote 1: "Doubts of Proportional Representation," _The Albany +Review,_ November 1907.] + +[Footnote 2: 12 September 1908.] + +[Footnote 3: T. R. and H. P. C. Ashworth, _Proportional Representation +applied to Party Government_, 1901, p. 195.] + +[Footnote 4: _Report of Royal Commission on Electoral Systems_ (Cd. +5163) par. 133.] + +[Footnote 5: Ibid., par. 126.] + +[Footnote 6: Ibid., par. 134.] + +[Footnote 7: Ibid., par. 88.] + +[Footnote 8: Burke, _Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents_.] + +[Footnote 9: "The Regeneration of Parliaments," _Contemporary Review_, +June 1905.] + +[Footnote 10: The Baden Socialists voted for the estimates in the Baden +Diet, and shortly after at the German Socialist Congress, Magdeburg, 21 +September 1910, a motion was carried excluding from the party _ipso +facto_ any member who in future voted for the estimates. The South +German Socialists left the Congress House.--_Times_, 23 September 1910.] + +[Footnote 11: T.R. and H.P.C. Ashworth, _Proportional Representation +Applied to Party Government: A New Electoral System_, 1901, p. 210.] + +[Footnote 12: Address to members of the Russian Duma, House of Commons, +22 June 1909.] + +[Footnote 13: _The Times_, 13 June 1910.] + +[Footnote 14: M. Ostrogorski, _Democracy and the Organization of +Political Parties_. (Translation by F. Clarke, M.A.), vol. ii. p. 713.] + +[Footnote 15: The Australian _Review of Reviews_, January 1906.] + +[Footnote 16: _The Times_, 16 March 1909.] + +[Footnote 17: _The Times_, 16 June 1909.] + +[Footnote 18: Preface to _Parliamentary Procedure of the House of +Commons_, by Josef Redlich, p. xvii.] + +[Footnote 19: _Minutes of Evidence of the Royal Commission on Electoral +Systems_ (Cd. 5152), Q. 1492.] + +[Footnote 20: Glasgow, 22 October 1910.] + + + + +CHAPTER XI + +OBJECTIONS TO PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION + + +"The party agents and political men opposed to the very last the +introduction of a system of proportional representation."--COUNT GOBLET +D'ALVIELLA + +_The question of practicality._ + +Although the fear lest proportional representation should weaken the +party system is now the most serious obstacle in the way of its +acceptance by the practical politician, yet there are others who warmly +approve of the principle, who regard proportional representation as the +ideal, but still entertain some doubts as to its practicability, and +therefore shrink from a whole-hearted advocacy of the reform. Nor are +these doubts entirely removed by the conclusion arrived at by the Royal +Commission on Electoral Systems--that the three systems of proportional +representation examined by the Commission are quite feasible. The +sceptics need to be convinced that the intelligence of the ordinary +English elector and the capacity of the English returning officer are +equal to the requirements of the new system; its practicability has in +fact to be demonstrated afresh. It is granted that the more complete +adaptation of the machinery of elections to the true representation of +the electors must involve some departure from the simplicity of present +methods, and in order to gauge the value of the objection that the +change proposed is so great as to render its introduction impracticable, +it will be well to consider once more the character of the tasks which +the new system will throw upon the elector and the returning officer. + +_The elector's task._ In criticizing the mechanism of the +single transferable vote a Member of Parliament, at a public meeting in +his constituency, declared that the act of voting ought to be made so +simple as to be intelligible to a child of the second standard in a +public elementary school. The reply might very well be made that such +children are capable of indicating a choice amongst those things in +which they are interested. But this assertion raises the question +whether the method of voting for the purpose of selecting the members of +an assembly, to which the affairs of an empire, a nation or a city, are +to be entrusted, can only be regarded as practicable if it is adapted to +the capacity of the least intelligent of the electors. Must a nation +continue to suffer all the evils which arise from an imperfect electoral +system because some of its citizens may be so unintelligent as to be +unable to make use of an improved method? A secretary of the Liberal +Unionist Association has declared that in some constituencies hundreds +of electors are so ignorant as not to know the name of the Prime +Minister, and has even advanced this fact in order to show that it is +unnecessary to trouble about the true representation of the electors. +Even were this statement not exaggerated it would but furnish an +additional argument in favour of proportional representation. The votes +of such ignorant electors, not being given for political reasons, are +far too easily bought by that indirect corruption which takes the form +of subscriptions, charitable donations, gifts of coals and of blankets; +and yet, with the present system, these votes may decide the result of +an election and completely nullify the votes of intelligent citizens. + +With the single transferable vote all that an elector is asked to do is +to number candidates in the order of his preference. He need do no more +than place the figure 1 against the name of his first choice. It is +desirable that, he should proceed further, but abundant assistance, if +he needs it, will be forthcoming from the party organizations and the +press. But is there any considerable section of the English electorate +that cannot perform this new duty? When being examined before the Select +Committee of the House of Lords on the Municipal Representation Bill, +Mr. J. J. Stephenson, a member of the Executive Committee of the Labour +Party, was asked, "Do you think that the system of voting proposed in +the Bill would offer any difficulties to working men?" His reply was +emphatic. "No. I have had some experience of working men, and I have +never found them any slower in intelligence than any other part of the +community--there are few working men who could not tell in order of +merit the men they wanted to vote for. That is my personal experience +gained after some years of work." Apart from this expression of opinion, +we have this convincing testimony to the capacity of working men +electors that they have been among the first to put improved electoral +methods into practice. The Northumberland miners and Canadian Trades +Unions are familiar with the use of the single transferable vote in the +election of their officers; the Labour Party in Victoria has made use of +preferential voting in the selection of its parliamentary candidates. +Moreover, the daily work of artizans enables them readily and quickly to +grasp the fundamental idea of proportional representation--the +representation of parties in _proportion_ to their strength--and the +discussions on this question in Labour organizations have been at least +as keen as, if not keener than, those in other political associations. + +The doubts entertained as to the capacity of the electorate are not +shared by those who have been officially responsible for the conduct of +elections. Mr. S. R. Ginn, Clerk of the Peace for Cambridgeshire, in +giving evidence before the Royal Commission on Electoral Systems, +declared that "after one or two elections proportional representation +ought to work as easily as the ballot. When the county electors got the +extended franchise we had some difficulty with the ballot, but now it is +simple, and proportional representation would be much the same." +Speaking of the elaborate precautions taken in the organization of +elections he expressed the opinion that the voters were more to be +trusted than our machinery trusts them. It is difficult in the face of +such evidence to understand on what grounds the English electors should +be regarded as so greatly inferior to the electors of other countries +that they cannot be trusted to make proper use of an improved electoral +method. The charge of incapacity can only apply to the least intelligent +section of the electorate, and it is astonishing that those who are so +anxious to preserve the electoral privileges of the unintelligent voters +should be supremely indifferent to the representation of the abler +sections of the electorate. At present at every election the votes of +thousands of intelligent citizens count for nothing. The electors who +voted for Conservative candidates in Wales at the General Election in +1906 might have saved themselves the trouble. Their voting papers, +although not spoiled in the technical sense, had no value. Proportional +representation would have given a value to all these votes, and even if +its introduction should result in an increase in the number of spoiled +papers, this would be as nothing compared with the number of votes to +which, for the first time, a value would be given. The Australian +advocates of proportional representation aptly describe the reform as +"effective voting." The elector knows that his vote will count, and thus +every inducement is offered to him to take part in the choice of a +representative. The vote becomes a more valuable possession to the +elector under proportional representation than under the +single-member system. + +_The returning officer's task._ + +With regard to the duties of returning officers, which in England fall +upon the sheriffs of counties and the mayors of boroughs, it should be +remembered that in the performance of these duties they are invariably +assisted by an expert staff, and in judging of the difficulties which +would attend the introduction of a new system, the fact that this expert +staff would be available for the purpose of carrying out the details of +an election must be taken into consideration. There would probably be +no more difficulty in the introduction of a system of proportional +representation than was experienced in introducing the greater change +associated with the Ballot Act. On that occasion instructions as to +their new duties were issued to returning officers, and similar +instructions would no doubt be issued as to the practical organization +of elections under a system of proportional representation. In Belgium a +department of the Ministry of the Interior is set apart for the +administration of electoral affairs. Complete instructions are issued +from this department to the returning officers throughout the country, +and the supervision which the department exercises over the conduct of +elections doubtless contributes to the facility with which returning +officers have carried out their duties under the proportional system. + +The fears expressed lest returning officers should not be equal to the +duties which would fall upon them under the system of the single +transferable vote are not shared by the returning officers themselves. +Mr. H. R. Poole, Under Sheriff for Somerset, who has had thirty years' +experience in the conduct of elections, stated, in evidence before the +Royal Commission on Electoral Systems, that were Somersetshire treated +as a single constituency under the system of the single transferable +vote he would be able to make the necessary arrangements for the +counting of the votes with a staff of the same class of men as had +assisted him hitherto. Speaking on behalf of the Under Sheriffs' +Association, he added that "they saw no difficulty in carrying out any +new electoral law which might be passed, and that they would always be +glad to give their assistance and work as loyally as they could in +support of anything which might be done." The officials of urban +constituencies are not less competent. Perhaps the largest urban +constituency which would be formed under a system of proportional +representation would be that of Glasgow, and Mr. Alexander Walker, the +Assessor of that city, who for twenty-four years was intimately +associated with the organization of elections, has, after a careful +examination of the details of the single transferable vote, stated that +there are no practical difficulties in the way of applying the system to +a constituency of the size of Glasgow. + +The doubts as to the capacity of returning officers spring from an +inadequate acquaintance with the difficulties which they already +overcome in the conduct of elections. The duties which would devolve +upon these officers under the single transferable vote system are not +greater than have been undertaken and are undertaken in Great Britain +to-day in connexion with the use of the cumulative vote. The Scottish +School Boards are still elected under the latter system, and the +following particulars of the elections in Glasgow on 2 April 1909, +illustrate the admirable manner in which returning officers in this +country, as elsewhere, carry out the tasks assigned to them. The whole +city was polled as one constituency; fifteen members were to be elected, +and each elector had fifteen votes, which he could distribute or +cumulate as he pleased upon any of the twenty-one candidates nominated. +There were on the roll 157,194 electors, of whom 40,778 took part in the +election. The returning officer, in this case the Treasurer of the +Glasgow School Board, had therefore to deal with over 600,000 votes, but +he had to make provision for counting a much larger number of votes. Yet +he had no difficulty in accomplishing successfully and expeditiously +this gigantic task. He enlisted the services of over 250 clerks, and the +whole process of extracting the details of the ballot papers was +completed in the course of about five hours. Had the single transferable +vote been employed the number of votes to be dealt with would have been +40,778 only, and although the papers would have had to be counted more +than once, the task would not have been so large as that entailed by the +cumulative vote, nor would it have been necessary to have engaged so +large a staff. It is sometimes forgotten that returning officers take a +pride in the perfecting of their arrangements for counting the votes. In +introducing new methods into the counting of votes in the Glasgow +Municipal elections, Mr. Walker prepared and issued very complete +instructions to his staff, and took pains to see that the staff were +fully prepared for its work, and there is not the least doubt that the +town clerks and under-sheriffs would meet any changes in electoral +methods with the determination to carry out their part of the work as +successfully as possible. The first elections in Tasmania and the +Transvaal with the single transferable vote proceeded with perfect +smoothness, and this was due to the excellent preparations made by the +returning officers. + +_Time required for counting votes._ + +One of the minor objections urged against proportional representation is +that a considerable time must elapse between the close of the poll and +the declaration of the result. It will not be possible to announce the +figures on the day of the election. It is doubtless desirable that the +result of an election should be ascertained without unnecessary delay, +but it is far better to wait a day in order to obtain a true result than +to adhere to an electoral system which gives a false result, and on +which a government may have to be based for a period of five years. With +most proportional systems only one day's delay occurs. The Under Sheriff +of Somerset has estimated that it might take him two days before he +could complete the return for that county, as it would probably take +half the first day to verify the contents of the ballot boxes. On this +point the verdict of the Royal Commission on Electoral Systems is as +follows: "On the whole it is probably safe to say that in a constituency +where 60,000 or 70,000 votes are cast, such as would have to be +contemplated in this country, the results should be declared with +efficient arrangements in the course of the second day after the poll. +Where the constituency was compact, _e.g.,_ in the case of a large town +like Birmingham or Manchester, the count of first votes could be +finished on the night of the election, and the remaining operations of +elimination and transfer completed in a long day's work on the following +day; but a longer time would have to be allowed in the case of extensive +rural districts."[1] It has also been alleged that there may be a +greater number of petitions for the recounting of votes under the +transferable vote system. But neither Tasmanian nor South African +experience gives any ground for this statement, and as the Tasmanian +Agent-General has pointed out, there is as much difference between the +counting of votes under the improved system and under the existing rough +and ready method as there is between book-keeping by single and +book-keeping by double entry; the sorting of the votes is carefully +checked at each operation, and all errors in the counting of votes must +be rectified before any new stage in the process can be entered upon. + +_ Fads and sectional interests._ + +The objection that a proportional system is too complex for English +electors and returning officers thus completely breaks down. But it +remains to consider whether the other objections which have been raised +against proportional representation are of sufficient weight as to +render its introduction undesirable. It is repeatedly asserted that +proportional representation will encourage the undue representation of +faddists and of sectional interests. For example, Professor Edward Jenks +alleges that, "If we had such a vast constituency as Manchester, or +Liverpool, under the proportional system we should certainly have a +member for teetotalism, a member for vegetarianism and the like, and +each of these, in all probability, would be instructed rigidly to oppose +everything inconsistent with the special ideal of its constituents."[2] +Now under a system of proportional representation a candidate in any +constituency, were it Liverpool, Manchester or Glasgow, would have to +secure about 10,000 votes before he could be sure of being returned, and +it is incredible that in any of these constituencies so large a number +of voters would support candidatures such as those described by +Professor Jenks, or that political feeling is so weak that Liberal, +Conservative, and Labour candidates would be set aside in favour of +candidates standing for a single interest only. The character of the +objection shows that the true working of a system of proportional +representation is completely misunderstood, for a proportional system +reduces fads and sectional interests to their proper proportions; it is +the existing system of single-member constituencies which confers +excessive power upon insignificant sections of the whole. Were there +10,000 electors in Manchester who, as suggested, would regard +vegetarianism as of greater importance than any other political +question, and were these electors scattered throughout the city, then +there would be an average of more than 1500 such electors in each of the +existing divisions. A body of 1500 voters in a division of Manchester +prepared to place their particular fad above all other political +questions have now the power of determining the result of the election +in that division; the 10,000 electors similarly minded would have the +power of extracting a pledge in support of their proposals, and probably +an effective pledge from the successful candidate in each division. +Under a system of proportional representation they might possibly secure +a few seats, but under the present system they can affect the election +in every constituency. It is well known that a large number of members +of Parliament pledge themselves at election time to the support of +movements with which they are not fully in accord. Probably their seat +depended upon the answer which they gave to the leaders of some small +body of electors holding the balance in the constituency. + +Mr. Henry Vivian, M.P., thus refers to the pressure which small groups +of voters bring to bear upon parliamentary candidates: "One serious evil +which he hoped might be abolished by a change of system was the ragging +of constituencies by a comparatively small number of busybodies +interested in some particular fad. A large number of members of +Parliament really had to bend to some two or three hundred electors, +although there might be 20,000 in the whole constituency. He had the +misfortune to be elected by only a gross. It was strictly true that in +many cases a candidate was compelled to consent to support something +that he felt strongly against, merely because a certain percentage of +the electors insisted upon it. He was not suggesting that proportional +representation would entirely get rid of this evil, but he was satisfied +that proportional representation rested on a larger basis--that they +would have larger constituencies and a number of men from whom the +elector might make selection; and therefore there would be a possibility +of their lessening, if not altogether getting rid of, this most +intolerable evil. He was not at all sure that he would not at times +rather be out of political life than in it; it became so threatening +that he absolutely refused to reply to the letters at all, or to be +dictated to, in the way that these people attempted to do. He would +venture to say that with a system of proportional representation they +would be able to get rid of some at least, if not of most, of the +objectionable features of the present system."[3] The same feature of +our electoral system has been condemned in the strongest terms by Mr. +Balfour. "Everybody," said he, "who has watched the actual course of a +contested election in a constituency where parties were fairly evenly +balanced, knows perfectly well the monstrous power which is given to a +very small minority to exact a pledge from the candidate, not that he +should support this or that great policy, but that he should help their +small and particular interest. I know nothing which is more corrupting, +both to the electors or to the elected, than that process; and although +I have fully seen the difficulties which attach to what is commonly +known as minority representation, it surely is an extraordinary +criticism upon our existing system that, while a small handful of +interested people can turn an election one way or the other on their own +personal issue, huge minorities, like the minority of the Unionists in +Scotland, are utterly and grossly unrepresented. We give every privilege +to the little knot of people in the individual constituencies; we ignore +the great mass who under our existing system find no representation at +all comparable either to their numerical strength or to their public +spirit, or to any other quality which makes them useful, able and +independent citizens."[4] + +The organizations of different branches of the Civil Service have, in +furtherance of their interests, sought to bring pressure to bear upon +members of Parliament, and in consequence of this action it has been +suggested that civil servants should be disfranchised. In other words, +it is proposed to meet an evil encouraged by defective electoral methods +by inflicting a gross injustice upon a large body of citizens, the +majority of whom, like other citizens, consider political problems +purely from the point of view of national advantage. The true remedy for +the unfair pressure of small sections must be sought in such a change in +the method of election as will allow the country to appraise them at +their true value. Direct representation, by means of which sectional +interests can, if necessary, be defended or advanced within the House of +Commons, is far less injurious to the State than a system which allows +such interests to bring unfair pressure to bear upon a considerable +number of members of Parliament, or to enforce their demands upon the +nation by linking themselves to a national party. There is, however, but +little danger of any large number of members being returned in support +of single interests only. The results under systems of proportional +representation show that the members elected are returned upon political +grounds, and when any question has attained such importance as to +command the support of 10,000 votes in any constituency, doubtless that +question has become ripe for discussion in Parliament, and can no longer +fairly be described as a fad. + +It is, however, said that the direct representation of sectional +interests will enable these to exercise in Parliament the same pressure +that they at present exercise in the constituencies. This statement also +is based upon a misconception of the changed conditions which would +result from a system of proportional representation. A small body of +electors can at present exercise pressure in the constituency, because +the result of the election is in their hands. A small group of members +could only exercise the same influence in the House of Commons if the +large parties were willing to bid for their support and were, at the +same time, able to enforce upon their followers the observance of any +agreement entered into. The great difference in the new conditions of +party discipline will here come into play. Members of a party who have +been able to win elections in spite of the opposition of sectional +interests, would be able to withstand pressure in Parliament. They would +know that they could appeal with confidence to their supporters in the +constituency to endorse their action, and, indeed, they would much more +likely lose their seat if they acted contrary to the wishes of those who +had returned them. Any sacrifice of principle by a party for the sake of +conciliating a small faction would cause a loss of support greater than +the gain. When proportional representation is established such grouping +as may take place within the House of Commons will be based upon +political affinities. + +_The representation of localities._ + +Another objection which is often brought against proportional +representation is that it will destroy the intimate relation which +exists at present between a constituency and its representative in +Parliament. Here the arguments used are not only as a rule +self-destructive, but they are obviously in conflict with the suggestion +that proportional representation would give undue weight to sectional +interests. "Parliament," said Burke, "is a deliberate assembly of one +nation, with one interest, that of the whole; where not local purpose, +not local prejudices, ought to guide, but the general good, resulting +from the general reason of the whole. You choose a member indeed, but +when you have chosen him he is not a member of Bristol, but he is a +member of Parliament. If the local constituent should have interest, or +should form a hasty opinion, evidently opposite to the real good of the +rest of the community, the member for that place ought to be as far as +any other from any endeavour to give it effect."[5] Were the primary +duty of a member for any constituency to consider the special needs of +that constituency, local considerations would outweigh national +interests. + +Yet Burke's declaration is not intended to relieve the representative of +a constituency from the duty of attending to its administrative +necessities. "Only members of Parliament," said Mr. Gulland, M.P., +"appreciate how largely their time is taken up with local matters. They +have to approach the different Government Departments upon an endless +variety of topics." But Mr. Gulland proceeds: "These matters as a rule +have no reference to existing Parliamentary divisions, and in a city it +would be very much better if a man were member for the whole city rather +than for a division. And in the case of a county, including burghs, it +would be better that the general interests of the county should be +attended to by members representing the county as a whole than by a +member who is only the representative of the burgh."[6] It is also +possible that the interests of some division of the city or county might +be opposed to the interests of the city as a whole, and this is an +additional reason against the subdivision of such constituencies for the +purpose of parliamentary representation. An admirable illustration +occurs in a speech made in the Canadian House of Commons by Mr. F. D. +Monk, K.C. "In a very large constituency," said he, "say of the size of +the entire island of Montreal, it would be impossible to resort to the +promise of a great many small public works, which by the admission of +everybody are not at present advantageous, when we have such large +problems to solve in connexion, for instance, with the problem of +transportation. Nobody in a constituency such as I have just indicated +could advocate the construction of a small wharf or a small public +building, but would be obliged to consider the relation of such a large +territory as the island and city of Montreal to the all-important +question of transportation. He would be obliged to lay before the +electors, not promises of small and very often useless, though +comparatively costly improvements, but the necessity of carrying out +such a plan of transportation as was laid before the country and the +Government some years ago by a commission composed of very experienced +men, who after considerable labour had in my opinion solved that very +vital question in every part of the country."[7] If local representation +is necessary it would therefore appear to be most desirable that the +representatives should be able to speak in the name of the whole of the +town or of the county, as the case may be, and that is the kind of local +representation which a system of proportional representation provides. +The members for the larger area can and do take a wider view than the +member for the smaller electorate. + +But what kind of local representation does a system of single-member +constituencies provide? A large number of constituencies are represented +by members who have no connexion with the locality other than that of +being its spokesman in Parliament. Mr. Winston Churchill, defeated in a +division of Manchester, is elected member for Dundee, a Scottish +constituency. In what sense is the local representation of Dundee +preserved? What were the special qualifications possessed by Mr. +Churchill for giving utterance to the needs of a Scottish constituency? +Doubtless Mr. Churchill made every effort to become acquainted with the +local conditions of Dundee, and the necessity of doing so must have made +considerable demands upon his time and energy. Yet it is more than +doubtful whether Mr. Churchill can ever be an ideal representative from +the standpoint of locality of a constituency to whose local life he is a +stranger. Mr. Churchill's experience is in no sense singular. Mr. +Gladstone found it necessary to leave Greenwich for Midlothian; Lord +Morley to leave Newcastle for Forfarshire; Sir William Harcourt to leave +Derby for Monmouthshire; Mr. Balfour to leave Manchester for the City of +London, and, however honoured the new constituencies might be by the +distinction of their members, it cannot be said that the intimate +relation between the representative and the constituency was maintained. +Under proportional representation the representation of localities +becomes much more real. Excellent examples can be seen in the working of +the system in Belgium. Before the introduction of the new methods +leaders of political parties in Belgium were compelled, as in England, +to leave the towns with which they were identified and to seek election +for constituencies, in which, comparatively speaking, they were unknown. +Here the cause was not the subdivision of constituencies but the absence +of any provision for the representation of minorities. M. Anseele, the +leader of the Socialists in Ghent, and intimately acquainted with the +life of that city, had to seek entrance into the Chamber of Deputies as +one of the Socialist representatives of Liege. Similarly, M. +Vandervelde, whose activities had always been identified with Brussels, +had to proceed to Charleroi in order to secure election. But on the +introduction of the proportional system, M. Vandervelde returned to +Brussels and was immediately elected as one of the Socialist members of +the constituency, of whose special requirements he could, if need be, +speak with effect in Parliament. M. Anseele returned to Ghent and was +elected as one of the members for the city with which the whole of his +life had been associated. He was relieved from the double burden of +continuing his work in Ghent and of acting as the representative of a +constituency in another part of the country. It is abundantly clear, if +it is desired to maintain the local character of representation, that a +proportional system secures such representation in its most +efficient form. + +So flimsy and contradictory are some of the arguments brought against +proportional representation that it is not surprising that certain +critics, impressed by such facts as are recorded in the previous +paragraph, have alleged that the system will so favour the +representation of localities that no one but a local candidate will ever +have any chance of success. The conclusion is drawn that proportional +representation will militate against the return of eminent politicians, +and is, for this reason, undesirable. But the facts cited as to Belgium +bear no such interpretation. It is true that under all electoral systems +the local candidate has, other things being equal, an advantage, and +rightly so, over candidates who are not directly connected with the +constituency, but it is also true that under all systems local +candidates give way, if necessary, to distinguished statesmen. In +Belgium the Socialists of Liege and Charleroi willingly accepted as +their representatives M. Anseele and M. Vandervelde when these failed to +secure representation in their own towns. So welcome are eminent +politicians that there can be no ground for supposing that they will +suffer from a proportional system. Indeed, large constituencies +returning several members give to these a much surer foothold in +Parliament than they can possibly secure with single-member areas. The +distinguished candidate can appeal almost with certainty of success for +the "quota" of votes which is sufficient to secure his election. The +only change that will be made by the proportional system is that he will +be able to retain his seat in the constituency with which he is really +identified; he will no longer be compelled to wander from place to place +with every swing of the pendulum. + +_The member and his constituents._ + +There is perhaps one other aspect of the representation of localities +which deserves attention. The fictions are still maintained that a +member of Parliament represents and is intimately associated with all +his constituents. As regards the latter, it is obvious that only in a +very small constituency can a member become personally acquainted with +the electors. This might have been feasible in the days of the +restricted franchise prior to 1867, but in modern constituencies which, +on an average, contain some 11,000 voters it is impossible. Further, in +respect of representation, since votes, save those of ignorant and +corrupt electors, are given more and more on political grounds, an +elector can derive but little consolation from the fact that he is +"represented" in Parliament by the candidate whom he did his best to +defeat, nor does such an elector, should he take a considerable interest +in political work, care to approach the member in any cause; he prefers +to seek help of a member of his own party who is the representative of +another constituency. If a member of Parliament is elected to defend +Free Trade he cannot possibly represent the political convictions of +constituents who believe that Free Trade is disastrous to the country. +But under a proportional system Free Traders and Tariff Reformers would +each have their own representatives, and whilst all the members would be +able to speak for the constituency when its local interests were +concerned, the various parties within the constituency would find +expression given to their views when the question of Free Trade or of +Tariff Reform was under discussion. So far as modern conditions permit, +the relations between the member and his constituents would be of an +intimate character, and at least there would be that bond of sympathy +which springs from identity of purpose and of political faith. + +_Objections of party agents._ + +Count Goblet d'Alviella has stated that the most strenuous and +persistent opposition to the introduction of proportional representation +in Belgium came from party agents and from the political men, that is, +from the extreme partizans. It is perhaps only natural to expect that +party agents should object to a system which would introduce a +considerable change in the method of party organization and in the +conduct of elections, but a good many of their fears are based upon +misapprehensions. It is true that political organizations might not +control nominations as much as they do now, but the work of organizers +would perhaps be even in greater demand than now. Thus, in Belgium, +before the introduction of proportional representation, many +constituencies were uncontested, some not for twenty years, and the +political organizations of the minority in these constituencies fell +into decay, in many places being completely abandoned. Similarly in +England, it is often extremely difficult to maintain political +organizations in those constituencies in which the position of the +minority is hopeless. The new electoral methods have been followed in +Belgium with a great increase of political activity; no constituency is +now uncontested, and each of the parties maintains an active +organization in every district. + +The objections generally advanced by party agents are the increased +inconvenience and cost which would result from the enlargement of the +constituencies. It is alleged that it would be impossible for candidates +in country areas to make themselves known to the electors. But to what +extent does this objection hold good? Prior to 1885 many of the +constituencies were much larger than they are to-day. The county of +Northumberland, which is now divided into six divisions, was then +divided into two. With the more rapid means of communications and of +transit now available a candidate can cover a county constituency with +much more ease than was possible a generation ago. The decrease in the +size of constituencies since 1885 has not given any greater leisure to +the candidates during the period of his candidature. Every moment of his +time is filled up and, indeed, there is often an unnecessary expenditure +of time and energy upon public meetings, the number of which, owing to +an insane competition, has been multiplied to an absurd degree. +Candidates are now expected to address meetings at the breakfast hour, +meetings at the luncheon hour, and meetings in the evening; if +constituencies were enlarged the time of the candidate would doubtless +be carefully mapped out to meet the new conditions. Moreover, the +constituencies required by a system of proportional representation in +the United Kingdom would still be small compared with the constituencies +in the Colonies, and even though large electoral areas may have some +disadvantages the benefits to be gained from a true system of +representation completely outweigh them. + +_Alleged difficulties in the organization of elections._ + +Some valuable lessons were learned during the course of the Johannesburg +municipal elections in 1909, as to the organization of contests under +the system of the single transferable vote. There was no previous +experience to guide either the candidate or their agents. The methods +pursued differed according to the rigidity of the discipline existing +within the party. A committee representative of commercial and other +interests, presided over by the Hon. W. A. Martin, M.L.C., selected the +names of ten candidates--there were ten vacancies--and this committee +asked the citizens of Johannesburg to vote for the candidates whose +names figured upon this ticket--the "ticket of the ten good men," as it +was called. The committee did not attempt to instruct the electors as to +the order in which preferences should be expressed for these candidates. +The electors were asked to place them in such order as they pleased.[8] +The candidature of the ticket, as such, was in some respects also +loosely organized. The various candidates gave separate and special +attention to the districts with which they were most closely identified, +but they also appeared in twos and threes on the same platform at public +meetings. In every district the names of all ten candidates appeared +upon the posters, but special prominence was given to the name of some +one candidate--the candidate associated with the district. The final +appeal to the public, in the form of a specimen ballot paper, had all +the ten names printed in bold type. In this way the committee was +enabled to appeal to the town to support the ticket as a whole, whilst +the individual members of the ticket were free to solicit first +preferences in the districts and circles in which they were best known. +Such an arrangement shows how easily the difficulties of candidature +under the new system can be overcome. If the arrangements outlined above +were adopted by party organizers the difficulties of an electoral +campaign would be no greater than with a system of single-member +constituencies. Each candidate on the ticket would canvass a portion of +the constituency--which would be no larger than a single-member +area--whilst at convenient centres the members of the ticket would +appear upon a common platform. The campaign of the Labour Party was more +rigidly organized. The leaders nominated a ticket of three candidates, +but instead of leaving their supporters free, instructed them to vote +for the candidates on the ticket in a definite order, although this +order was varied in different wards. In the official instructions the +elector is asked to vote by placing the figure 1 opposite the name of +the candidate he likes best, and some risk is run by an organization +which advises its supporters to express their first preference for some +candidate who is not the party's true first choice. It is sufficient for +organizers to advise their supporters to record preferences for all the +candidates of the party, leaving the elector free to decide the order in +which those preferences should be given. + +_Alleged increase of cost._ + +These elections threw some light on another difficulty urged against +proportional representation by party agents, namely, the increased +expenditure involved. Considerable sums of money were certainly spent in +the prosecution of the candidature of the "ten good men," but these +elections proved conclusively that excessive expenditure had much less +influence in determining the result than in our parliamentary and +municipal elections. The total expenses of the three Labour candidates +in Johannesburg were returned at L18, 5s., and even if there is added +thereto the expenditure incurred by the Labour Representation Committee, +amounting to L34, 3s. 6d., the total sum cannot be said to be excessive. +Two of these three candidates were successful. The expenditure of the +successful Labour candidate in Pretoria was practically nil. Further, +the Mayor of Johannesburg, who, relying upon his record of past work, +personally took no action beyond the issue of a manifesto to the +electors, was returned at the head of the poll. + +Mr. Ramsay Macdonald also objects to proportional representation because +of the cost involved in contesting large areas.[9] Johannesburg, for the +purpose of its municipal election, was polled as one constituency, and +the evidence furnished by this election is, therefore, of considerable +value. Further, this evidence is confirmed by the experience of +Socialist parties in Belgium, in Finland and elsewhere, which apparently +find no difficulty in fighting large constituencies. The electoral +conditions in these countries doubtless differ from those in England, +but an analysis of the expenses incurred by Labour candidates at home +show that single-member constituencies and small expenditure do not go +together. The cost of these candidatures, even apart from returning +officers' expenses, usually exceeds L500, and sometimes L1000. Such sums +could be spent to much greater advantage in large areas in bringing all +the adherents of a party to the poll. + +It has already been shown that the practice of "nursing" a constituency +is one of the indirect results of the single-member system. Indeed, no +system gives so great an advantage to the candidate with a long purse; +he can more easily influence those non-political electors whose votes +may decide the issue. A consideration of the working of the new system +will show that the cost of elections will in all probability be greatly +diminished. At present in a city returning seven members a party must +find seven candidates each with his separate organization and separate +expenses; with proportional representation there will be but one +organization for all candidates of the same party, and as no party can +hope to monopolize the representation, it is unlikely that any will run +as many as seven candidates. A well-organized party will get its due +share of representation without subscribing to clubs and flower shows. +The illegitimate power of money will be weakened, and the total amount +spent considerably reduced. + +_The accuracy of representation._ + +A final criticism made against proportional systems of voting is that +they do not secure the exact representation of all the electors in a +country. Thus the Royal Commission on Electoral Systems, whilst +admitting that the new method would generally produce more accurate +results, mathematically at least, than the existing method, qualified +their statement by saying that their success "in producing in Parliament +the 'scale map of the country,' which they held up as the ideal, can be +only partial"; and in another paragraph the Report contains this +remarkable statement: "On the assumption, however, that proportional +representation is desirable, can any system yet invented be guaranteed +or reasonably expected to ensure it? In our opinion, only in a limited +and generally unascertainable degree." No responsible advocate of +proportional representation has contended that proportional systems, +save when the country is treated as one constituency, will result in a +mathematically accurate representation of opinion. But the close +approximation to accuracy obtained in the practical application of +proportional systems is so pronounced that the statement of the +Commission is wholly misleading. The following figures of the Belgian +election of 1910 will show to what extent accuracy is obtained by a +proportional system, even when, as in this case, the mechanism slightly +favours the larger party: + +BELGIAN ELECTION, 1910 + + Seats Seats in +Parties Votes. Actually Proportion + Obtained. to Votes. +Catholics . . . . . 676,939 49 47.0 +Liberals and Socialists . 561,052 36 37.5 +Christian Democrats . . 16,170 ---- 1.0 +Independents . . . . 20,428 ---- 1.5 + +In Finland, where another system of proportional representation is in +operation, the result of the election of 1909 was as follows:-- + +FINLAND ELECTION, 1909 + + Seats Seats in +Parties Votes. Actually Proportion + Obtained. to Votes. +Social Democrat . . . . 337,685 84 80 +Old Finn . . . . . . 199,920 48 47 +Young Finn . . . . . 122,770 28 29 +Swedish . . . . . . 104,191 25 25 +Agrarian . . . . . . 56,943 14 13 +Christian Labourers . . 23,259 1 6 + +The single transferable vote has yielded results which are remarkably +accurate. It has been used in Tasmania, with adult suffrage, in the +Transvaal, with the municipal franchise, and in the election of the +Senate for United South Africa, by members of Parliament. Each of the +five constituencies in Tasmania returned six members, and the total +result was as follows:-- + +TASMANIAN ELECTION, 1909 + + Seats Seats in +Parties Votes. Actually Proportion + Obtained. to Votes. +Labour . . . . . . 19,067 12 11.7 +Non-Labour . . . . . 29,893 18 18.3 + +These figures speak for themselves. In the municipal elections in the +Transvaal each of the parties obtained its fair share of representation. +In Johannesburg the elections were fought by a commercial ticket of ten +candidates, a Labour ticket of three candidates, and ten Independent +candidates; the number of valid votes was 11,788, and the quota--that +is, the proportion of votes which would ensure the election of a +representative--amounted to 1072. The ticket of "ten good men" polled in +all some 6185 votes, or 247 votes short of six quotas, and the ticket +succeeded in returning six members. This result was strictly fair, for +the deficiency in votes was made up by those supporters of independent +candidates who, having failed to return their first choice, had +indicated members of this ticket as their next choice. The three Labour +candidates polled in all 2126 votes, or 18 votes short of two full +quotas, and the Labour Party was successful in securing two +representatives. The remaining two seats fell to two Independent +candidates, each of whom had a considerable personal following. In the +third test, the election of South African Senators, each of the parties +obtained representation in proportion to their force in the Parliaments +of the respective colonies. The details of the voting have not been +published,[10] but the returning officers have all borne testimony to +the satisfactory working of the system and absolute fairness of +the results. + +In the light of these facts, what meaning can be attached to the +statement that proportional systems only secure proportional +representation in a limited and generally unascertainable degree? The +results of proportional systems are seen in a still more favourable +light if contrasted with the working of non-proportional methods. Thus +the Liberals of Surrey, Sussex, and Kent were without representation in +the Parliament of 1910. The Unionists of Wales were in the same plight +in the previous one. In the election of the Australian Senate (1910) the +Labour Party obtained eighteen seats, all other parties none. In the +same year, the Municipal Reformers elected all the aldermen of the +London County Council, the Progressives none. In the election of +Representative Peers of Scotland no Liberal peer is ever chosen. + +_Summary of objections._ + +The various objections which have been raised from time to time against +proportional representation have been almost wholly disproved. Before it +was put into operation it was said to be impracticable; wherever the new +methods have been introduced the proceedings have in every case passed +off without a hitch. Proportional representation, it was said, would +result in unstable governments; now complaint is made that it has been +difficult in Belgium under the new system to effect a change of +government, the majority of the electors apparently being content with +things as they are. It was alleged that faddists would obtain undue +representation; it is now complained, under some misapprehension, that +independent political thought will fail to secure an adequate hearing. +Objections of a minor character are also raised; that proportional +representation will increase the difficulties of electioneering; that it +will increase the cost of elections--a conclusion not in accordance with +the experience of countries in which it has been applied; or that it +will destroy the sporting element in politics, as if the pursuit of +politics by itself was lacking in interest. Yet all the time the demand +for electoral reform is increasing, and whilst the figures in the +foregoing paragraphs show to what extent proportional systems secure +accuracy in representation, it can also be shown that proportional +representation will facilitate the solution of those other electoral +reforms which are also demanded upon the ground that they will add to +the representative character of the House of Commons. + +[Footnote 1: _Report of the Royal Commission on Electoral Systems_ (Cd. +5163), par. 81.] + +[Footnote 2: _The Albany Review_, October 1907.] + +[Footnote 3: Annual Meeting of the Proportional Representation Society, +June 1910.--_Representation_, vol. iii. p. 79.] + +[Footnote 4: Scottish Conservative Club, Glasgow, 5 October 1910.] + +[Footnote 5: Speech to the Electors of Bristol, 3 November 1774.] + +[Footnote 6: Minutes of Evidence: _Royal Commission on Electoral +Systems_ (Cd. 5352), p. 118.] + +[Footnote 7: 15 March 1909.] + +[Footnote 8: The following is taken from a letter sent to the press by +the Chairman of the Committee: "I am aware that many people are opposed +to the principle of a ticket on the ground that it savours of +'dictation,' &c. &c. We are exceedingly anxious that every voter should +be in a position to exercise his privilege of choice to the fullest +extent.... It is not reasonable to expect him, without advice, to +express an order of preference in the case of men he does not know. This +is exactly one of the strongest justifications for a representative +committee to come forward as we do, to say: 'We have carefully inquired +as to the character, capacity, and ability of all the candidates, and +having taken everything into consideration we recommend you to vote for +the ten whose names are on our ticket, _placing them in such order of +preference as you please_.'"] + +[Footnote 9: Labour Party Conference, Leicester, February 1911.] + +[Footnote 10: Owing to the small numbers taking part in the election, +the publication of the details might possibly have furnished a clue to +the votes of individual members of Parliament. For this reason the +returning officers and the scrutineers were pledged to secrecy. The +fairness of the results were fully recognized by the press, as the +following extracts show: + +"The result has demonstrated the absolute fairness of the single +transferable vote."--_Bloemfontein Friend_. + +"The system proved in practice as simple and accurate as it was +scrupulously fair in character."--_Bloemfontein Post_.] + + + +CHAPTER XII + +THE KEY TO ELECTORAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM + +"De la maniere de regler le suffrage depend la ruine ou le salut des +Etats."--MONTESQUIEU + +_Electoral problems awaiting solution._ + +The Liberal, Conservative, and Labour parties are all agreed that a +large measure of electoral reform is long overdue, but hitherto the +various parties have contended only for such reforms as would strengthen +their own parliamentary position. Liberal and Labour politicians, +looking at the inequality in the voting power of electors, have demanded +a reform of the franchise; they urge that every man should have one vote +and no more. The Conservative party, looking at the inequalities in the +size of constituencies, have demanded a redistribution of seats on the +ground that all votes should be of equal value. Liberals, again, feeling +the difficulties which have attended the emergence of third-party +candidatures in the constituencies, ask for a reform in the method of +voting so as to ensure that the member elected for any constituency +shall represent a majority of the citizens. Apart from the question of +the enfranchisement of women, which involves considerations of a +different order, these are the three electoral problems with which +public opinion has been chiefly concerned. + +The efforts of parties to give effect to the reforms in which they have +been more particularly interested have so far ended in failure. In 1905 +Mr. Balfour introduced a Bill for the redistribution of seats, +unaccompanied by any reform of the franchise. The measure was met with +the cry of "gerrymander!" and its disappearance with the fall of the +Government was regretted by few. In 1907 the Liberal Government +attempted to deal with the franchise problem, apart from any scheme of +redistribution. It endeavoured in Mr. Harcourt's Plural Voting Bill, a +highly complex measure, to give effect to the principle of "one man, one +vote." This Bill was strongly opposed on the ground that the reform was +partial in character. If, said the opponents of the measure, it is +unfair that one elector should have twelve votes whilst another elector +has but one, it is equally unfair that the vote of an elector in one +constituency should be twelve times as valuable as the vote of an +elector in another constituency. The justice of the argument must be +admitted, and explains why the rejection of the Plural Voting Bill by +the House of Lords aroused comparatively little public feeling. Yet the +rejection of this Bill has focussed attention upon the deficiencies of +our franchise laws, and the eyes of all politicians are turning towards +that more comprehensive measure of electoral reform which cannot be +indefinitely postponed. Such a measure has been categorically promised +by Mr. Asquith on more than one occasion. So far back as 1908, soon +after his accession to the Premiership,[1] he made the following public +declaration: "I regard it as a duty, and indeed as a binding obligation +on the part of the Government, that before this Parliament comes to an +end they should submit a really effective scheme for the reform of our +electoral system." + +_The simplification of the franchise._ + +What are the lines on which a really effective scheme can be framed? The +fate of the partial measures already referred to is at least an +indication of the difficulties which will attend any attempt to carry an +incomplete scheme. It may be assumed that an effective scheme must deal +with the three problems named: franchise (including registration), +redistribution, and three-cornered contests. Each of these factors must +be dealt with as simply as a due recognition of the problem to be +solved will allow. The complexity of Mr. Harcourt's Plural Voting Bill +was due to the fact that we possess no less than twenty[2] different +franchises. But the remedy is easy. "If," said the late Sir Charles +Dilke, "they wanted to cheapen the cost, to remove the disgrace from +this country of having registration more full of fraud and error than +anywhere else, they could only do so by some simple franchise. All +registration reform was condemned to failure until they made up their +minds on a simple and easy basis for the franchise, sufficiently wide to +enable them to absorb all existing franchises." Such a simple franchise +is to be found in manhood suffrage, which would admit of the easy +transfer of electors' names from the register of one electoral division +to another. The chief objection to this solution, which arises from the +fear that the most numerous class in the country may monopolise +representation, may be met by linking the adoption of a simple franchise +with a system of election which shall give due representation to +minorities. + +_Redistribution._ + +Redistribution must be treated with like boldness, but before +considering the principle on which this reform must be based, it would +be well to give some indication of its urgency. Here are the figures of +four of the largest and four of the smallest English constituencies as +given in the Parliamentary Return of 1911:-- +*** +Constituency. Electors. Constituency. Electors. Romford (Essex) 55,951 +Durham. 2,698 Walthamstow (Essex) 42,029 +Bury St. Edmunds 2,878 Wandsworth 39,821 +Whitehaven 2,989 Harrow (Middlesex) 38,865 +St. George's, Tower Hamlets 3,252 + +_Should be automatic._ + +It will be observed that an elector in Durham has twenty times the +political power of an elector in the Romford Division of Essex. Nor are +these discrepancies confined to England. There are great divergencies +between the electorates of individual constituencies in Scotland and +Ireland, and any measure of redistribution which attempted to deal +effectively with these would necessarily have to be of a far-reaching +character. Even were it possible to effect a readjustment by the +creation of parliamentary areas containing an equal number of electors, +so rapid are the changes in the electorate that the scheme would be out +of date almost before it came into force. Mr. Ellis T. Powell has +published a valuable table entitled "the process of electoral +evolution,"[3] in which he has arranged the constituencies in the order +of their size as measured by the number of electors who were on the +registers in 1886, and again in 1906. The table shows how remarkable has +been the change in their relative importance. The rapidity of the change +is still further indicated by a comparison based upon the 1908 register. +Any one who has the curiosity to count the number of constituencies +which retained the same position on the list both in 1906 and 1908 will +find this to be the case in nineteen constituencies only out of a total +of 481. So great, indeed, has been the change since 1901, the date of +the last census, that no satisfactory scheme of redistribution could be +framed upon the population figures of that year. It would seem that the +only satisfactory principle upon which the problem can be solved is that +of an automatic redistribution of seats on the completion of every +census, but the difficulties associated with such a solution, if the +present system of single-member constituencies is retained, are so +overwhelming as to render it almost inadmissible. True, the South +African Constitution provides for the automatic redistribution of seats +after every quinquennial census,[4] and the Canadian Constitution +contains a similar provision, but the inconveniences attaching to a +rearrangement of boundaries are not so great in new countries as those +which obtain in an established country. Moreover, as time goes on, the +inconveniences associated with rapid changes in boundaries will be felt +more and more both in Canada and in South Africa. For local +authorities[5] rightly complain of the difficulties which arise from the +creation of different areas for different purposes and the consequent +overlapping of boundaries, and these difficulties would increase were +fresh parliamentary divisions created every ten years. The problem which +would be involved in the creation of new parliamentary divisions for +London is such as to render a satisfactory scheme almost impossible. +Apart, however, from these considerations, the difficulties of another +kind attendant upon the creation of new constituencies are so great that +it is quite easy to understand the unwillingness of the leaders of both +political parties to embark upon schemes of redistribution. The +influence of boundaries upon the political fortunes of parties is so +well known that any rearrangement, whether in the metropolis or in the +large towns, would probably be looked upon with very grave suspicion, +and the more so that in several towns party organizations have already +endeavoured to obtain the maximum of party advantage under existing +conditions. + +_Secures neither one vote, one value nor true representation._ Further, +it has been proved beyond question that a redistribution of seats will, +if single-member constituencies are retained, fail to accomplish the end +which its advocates have in view, namely, one vote one value. For +redistribution can only secure equality in the size of electoral +districts, and this is not the same as equality in the value of votes. +With equal electoral districts it would still be possible in two +adjoining constituencies for one member to be returned by a large +majority and the other by a small majority. In Wales it might still +happen that a Conservative vote would be valueless for the purpose of +obtaining representation. Equality in vote value is only secured when +the votes of electors of all parties are equally effective. This can +only happen when the representation of parties is brought into agreement +with their voting strength. + +The Royal Commission on Electoral Systems entered very carefully into +the probable effect of redistribution upon the representation of parties +within the House of Commons, and came to the conclusion that, so far "as +facts can be adduced to test it, the theory that the varying size of +constituencies accounts for the exaggeration of majorities falls to the +ground." This conclusion--and the Commission could hardly have come to +any other--is in agreement with the opinions expressed both by Mr. S. +Rosenbaum, of the Royal Statistical Society,[6] and by Mr. J. Rooke +Corbett, of the Manchester Statistical Society.[7] The following summary +of the results of Mr. Corbett's analyses of the eight General Elections +1885-1910 shows conclusively that redistribution would fail to remedy +the inequalities in representation arising from a system of +single-member constituencies: + +GENERAL ELECTIONS, 1885-1910 + + Majority Majority +Year of of seats under system Majority under +Election Party. actually of equal a proportional + gained. electorates. system. +1885 Liberal 158 178 86 Liberal +1886 Conservative 104 102 8 Liberal +1892 Liberal 44 46 34 Liberal +1895 Conservative 150 172 12 Conservative +1900 Conservative 134 150 16 Conservative +1906 Liberal 356 362 104 Liberal +1910(Jan.) Liberal 124 136 66 Liberal +1910(Dec.) Liberal 126 122 38 Liberal + +"It is sometimes said," states Mr. Corbett, "that if the single-member +constituencies were made equal in size these inequalities of +representation would disappear. It is difficult to understand how any +one with even the most elementary knowledge of the facts can support +such a proposition. An examination of the foregoing summary will show +that no readjustment of the electoral constituencies would do much to +remedy the enormous inequalities which occur at present. In fact strict +equalization of the constituencies would be as likely to make matters +worse as to make them better. Thus, in the year 1885 the Liberal +majority of 158, which under a proportional system would have been 86, +by a system of equal electorates would have been transformed into a +majority of 178; in the following year a Conservative majority of 104, +which, with a proportional system, would have been a Liberal majority of +8, would under a system of equal electorates have been transformed into +a Conservative majority of 102." Mr. Rosenbaum states: "I am firmly +persuaded that it is not possible for redistribution alone to effect +those particular reforms which the advocates of proportional +representation urge.... Proportional representation would secure in the +House of Commons a representation of each party in strict arithmetical +proportion to the number of its supporters in the country. +Redistribution can remove anomalies due to over-representation in one +part and under-representation in another part of the country. So far as +the over-representation in one area is accompanied by an excessive +proportion of members of one party, and the under-representation in +another area is accompanied by a deficiency of members of the opposite +party, redistribution might have some counterbalancing results. There +is, however, no real security that redistribution by itself might not +aggravate rather than mitigate this particular trouble." + +_The problem simplified by proportional representation._ + +It will have been observed that the difficulties of redistribution arise +from the system of single-member constituencies, and it is this which +also renders all schemes useless for the purpose of securing equality in +the value of votes. An effective and simple solution of all difficulties +is available. Abandon the system of single-member constituencies with +their ever-changing boundaries, and treat the natural divisions of the +country (its counties, large towns, &c.) as permanent constituencies +with representation varying with the rise or fall of their population. +This is the scheme of redistribution required by a system of +proportional representation, and its adoption would simplify the most +difficult of all the problems of electoral reform. It would make +possible that automatic redistribution of seats, which must be an +essential feature of any satisfactory scheme of redistribution, without +involving these alterations of boundaries which, in addition to their +other disadvantages and even dangers, interfere so seriously with +administrative efficiency. With such a system the areas for local or +parliamentary purposes might easily be brought into agreement. Already +"we have strong county patriotism fostered by tradition, by +ecclesiastical and judicial affairs, county council government, county +territorial organization, and even county cricket and football; to have, +therefore, county electoral areas would be at once popular and +intelligible to all; besides, it would be a reversion to an old +tradition ";[8] and if the large towns were made parliamentary +constituencies this also would be a reversion to the conditions which +existed before 1885. It would be infinitely easier to add +representatives to or take them away from such electoral areas than it +would be to redivide the boroughs and counties for the purpose of +creating new constituencies. + +Commenting on the work of the Delimitation Commission, to which was +entrusted the duty of creating the new constituencies for the South +African Assembly and Provincial Councils, the Secretary, in a letter to +the author, says: "The task set the Commission proved exceedingly +difficult. While it was, so to speak, imperative to give due +consideration to all the principles enjoined by the Act, the great +object naturally was the framing of constituencies both for the Union +Assembly and for the Provincial Councils which would be able to send +representatives who, in turn, would reflect the will of the various +sections of the people. The conditions enjoined by the Act made it very +difficult to produce schemes which could on all hands be considered +entirely satisfactory.... Good as the result is, there is no question +that had the first recommendation of the South African Convention in +favour of proportional representation been adopted, the work of the +Commission would not only have been much simplified, but the chances of +framing constituencies with representatives forming a true mirror of the +various sections of the people would have been increased by more than +fifty per cent.... If there had been any doubt in my mind my work on +this Commission has removed that doubt, and proved to me that the only +remedy for our various electoral ills is a system of proportional +representation." This considered testimony, from one who has been +immersed in the practical details of redistribution, is of great value, +but it can occasion no surprise, for proportional representation admits +of automatic redistribution of seats, provides for the permanence of +boundaries, renders gerrymandering impossible, and, above all, secures +equality in the value of votes. + +_The case of Ireland._ There is one special difficulty,[9] however, +which must be faced in the consideration of any scheme of redistribution +for the United Kingdom--the number of representatives to be allotted to +Ireland. The permanent over-representation of any one part of a kingdom +united for common purposes cannot easily be defended, but the South +African Constitution furnishes an example of a larger representation +being accorded temporarily to the smaller states for the purpose of +facilitating the union of all; whilst in South Africa, Australia, and +the United States the separate states or provinces have equal +representation, irrespective of size, in the Senate. If the continued +over-representation of Ireland would in any way facilitate the process +of the unification of the United Kingdom, that in itself would be a very +powerful and sufficient reason for maintaining the number of Irish +members at its present level. A system of proportional representation +might simplify the solution of this particular difficulty, for the +over-representation of Ireland would not have the same disturbing effect +upon the composition of the House of Commons if the different divisions +of political opinions within Ireland obtained their fair share of +representation. For proportional representation would produce a very +important modification of the electoral conditions within Ireland. +According to Mr. J. Rooke Corbett, the Irish Unionists who, at the +General Election of 1906, obtained 18 representatives, were entitled to +34. But that is not the only change that would take place. There would +result a softening of those racial divisions which are now the chief +characteristic of Irish representation. Moderate opinion would be +encouraged to take a more active part in elections and to seek +representation. Nor can it be said that the political conditions of +Ireland are such as to render proportional representation within Ireland +either impracticable or nugatory in its effect. Mr. Archibald E. Dobbs, +High Sheriff of county Antrim, has framed a scheme with special +reference to Irish conditions[10], and Lord MacDonnell, who was +intimately associated with the details of the Irish Council Bill of +1907, has said: "He made the subject the matter of as close a study as +he could at the time, and everything he read more fully satisfied him of +the great desirability of the system. He felt that it was more needed in +Ireland than in any other part of the British Empire, because, although +for the purpose of general politics the division into Nationalists and +Unionists could be defended, for the purpose he had in view--the +internal administration of Ireland--it was essential that all views, not +only the Nationalists and the Unionists, but the great political school +of thought under the name of the old Whigs should also be represented. +The results of his labours perhaps it would not be discreet for him to +disclose, but he was quite satisfied of the practicability in Ireland of +a scheme of proportional representation[11]." + +_Three-cornered contests._ + +But even if the Electoral Reform Bill provided for a simplification of +the franchise and a redistribution of seats, yet such a measure could +not be described as a complete and effective scheme of reform. The Bill +must provide a solution for the further problem arising from +three-cornered contests, which have greatly increased in number in +recent elections. On what principle is this difficulty to be solved? +Formerly there was a strong demand for the second ballot, but its +defects have been so constantly exposed that the remedy more generally +advocated is the one recommended by the Royal Commission on Electoral +Systems, viz., the adoption of the alternative vote (the transferable +vote in single-member constituencies). This proposal, however, ignores +the real difficulty, which is found in the fact that three parties, and +not two, are now seeking representation. Three-cornered contests have, +so far, affected adversely the fortunes of the Liberal Party; and the +alternative vote, whilst tending, at least temporarily, to redress the +situation, does so without providing any adequate guarantee for the +fair representation of other parties. Were this remedy adopted it may be +assumed that Liberal candidates would be nominated in those +constituencies which are now represented by members of the Labour Party, +and at least there would be a cessation of the process of withdrawing +Liberal candidates from other constituencies ear-marked by the Labour +Party. Were all these constituencies contested by the three parties it +might easily happen that the smallest party would obtain no +representation whatever. Conservative electors might record their second +choice for the Liberal candidate, and in this way secure in each case +the defeat of the Labour candidates. On the other hand, an alliance +between Labour and Conservatives might procure the defeat of the Liberal +candidates. The representation of any one party would depend upon the +action taken by members of other parties. + +As the probable effects of the alternative vote becomes more fully +understood its inadequacy as a remedy will be more clearly realized, and +this proposal, instead of facilitating, may hinder the passage of a +comprehensive measure of reform. On the contrary, the wider reform of +proportional representation, providing as it would for the just and fair +representation of three parties (and this is the problem for which a +solution has to be found), has far greater claims to the consideration +of practical politicians. It simplifies the problem of redistribution; +it is the way by which equality in the value of votes can be secured; it +provides for the fair representation of three parties, and, in +guaranteeing the adequate representation of minorities, facilitates the +adoption of a simple franchise. Proportional representation is, as it +were, the master key which unlocks the difficulties associated with a +comprehensive measure of electoral reform. Based on a broad simple +principle, the justice of which is apparent to all, it provides the +means by which each of the separate parts of such a measure can be most +easily and effectively dealt with. Indeed, it is difficult to conceive +on what other principle any permanent solution of the electoral problem +can be based, or by what other means the difficulties inherent in a +comprehensive measure of reform can be successfully overcome. + +_Partial adoption of proportional representation not desirable_ + +Some who recognize the great merits of proportional representation have +suggested its application to urban constituencies by way of experiment. +Thus, Mr. Winston Churchill has expressed the opinion that "the +proportional representation of great cities was a point upon which +electoral reformers ought to concentrate their minds."[12] A partial +application of the reform might be of value as further evidence of its +practicability, but there is no need for this further evidence. The full +benefits of the system cannot be expected from such experiments, and +although a partial measure is apparently working satisfactorily in +Wuertemberg, the history of the movement shows that such schemes usually +arouse fierce opposition. An attempt to introduce a partial scheme in +Belgium provoked a storm of indignation and had to be withdrawn, and the +amendment to the original draft of the South African Constitution, +carried in the Cape Parliament, limiting the proposed application of +proportional representation to the towns, resulted in its complete +abandonment for the elections for the House of Assembly. All partial +applications of proportional representation are apt to work unfairly. In +Belgium, the Catholics were stronger in the rural districts than in the +towns and the proportional representation of the towns alone would have +strengthened the political position of the Catholics. Similarly the +limitation of proportional representation to the towns in South Africa +would have strengthened the political position of the Dutch in those +constituencies without giving a corresponding advantage to the +minorities in the country areas. Were a partial application attempted in +Great Britain it would be necessary to overcome the initial difficulty +of selecting the constituencies to which the experiment should be +applied, and in the absence of an agreement between the parties, it +would be difficult, if not impossible, to escape the fatal charge of +partisan selection. + +_Proportional representation and democratic principles._ + +What hinders the adoption of a complete scheme of proportional +representation? Is it not primarily a lack of courage and of trust in +the principle of democracy? But does it need a greater courage, a +greater belief in the value of the democratic principle than the grant +of self-government to the Transvaal and to the Orange River Colony +within a few years of the Boer War? The courage and faith in the latter +case have been abundantly justified, and were statesmen actuated by a +similar courage and belief in democracy to propose a system of +proportional representation there would undoubtedly be a public response +which would astonish them; for reforms which are obviously based upon +justice are quickly and gladly accepted. Democracy cannot be carried to +its highest pitch of perfection if the electoral methods by which +representative institutions are brought into being are fundamentally +defective. "By proportional representation," said Mr. James Gibb, "if +electors were enabled to put more intelligence and conscience into their +votes, the nation would be the gainer. The character of the electorate +is of paramount importance, one outcome of it being the character of the +House of Commons. The electors have not yet had a fair chance of showing +what they can do in the making of a House of Commons. The question put +to them is in such a form that they can hardly give an intelligible +reply. The single-member system seems to imply a belief that the +elector's liberty of choice must be narrow. We have now arrived at a +point when another step is due in the evolution of the people's +liberties, when an individual elector should obtain a greater freedom of +choice and therefore a more intimate relation to national affairs.[13] +Further, the smooth working of democratic institutions requires that no +section of the electors should be permanently divorced from the +governing body. Such separation begets a feeling of hostility towards +the institutions of the country. Thus, Lord Dunraven has referred to +Ireland as a country in the government of which some of its best +citizens are not allowed to take part. Similarly, many British settlers +in the Orange Free State, although resident for several years, never had +any representative in the State Assembly. The natural feeling arose that +the government of the country was a matter which did not concern them, +and they never attended the meetings addressed by the member of the +Assembly for the district. It may be true that minorities must suffer, +but there is no reason why they should suffer needlessly. Here justice +and expediency go hand in hand. It is to the advantage of the country +that all should be associated with the representative body which speaks +in the name of the whole, whether that body be a town council, a county +council, or a House of Commons. + +_Constitutional reform._ + +As pointed out in the opening chapter, the question of electoral reform +is intimately associated with the constitutional problem which has +occupied Parliament since 1906. This problem contains two factors--the +relation between the two Houses of Parliament, and the constitution of +the House of Lords. The House of Commons claims greater power in +legislation on the ground that it is the expression of the national +will. This demand has called forth a movement for reforming the House of +Lords in order that it may fulfil more adequately its duties as a Second +Chamber. The Unionist leaders have proposed that the peers should +delegate their powers to a small number and that the House should be +strengthened by the introduction of nominated and elected elements. With +regard to the suggestion that a certain number of Lords of Parliament +should be nominated by the Crown, all evidence points to the fact that +such nominations invariably become party in character. No Government +can afford to ignore the claims of the party which supports it, or to +miss the opportunity of strengthening its position in one of the Houses +of Parliament. The Canadian Senate, which is a nominated body, fails to +give satisfaction, and there is a strong demand for its reform. At the +conclusion of Sir John Macdonald's long lease of power the Senate +consisted nearly wholly of Conservatives. Now that the Liberal +Government has been in office for a good many years, the Senate is +nearly wholly Liberal. Obviously, the introduction of a nominated +element will not provide a Second Chamber that will command public +confidence. + +The elected element might be chosen indirectly by the County Councils or +by the House of Commons, or the much bolder course of direct popular +election, advocated by Sir Edward Grey, might be adopted. Direct +election is distinctly preferable to indirect election by bodies created +for other purposes. The experience of the United States, France, Sweden, +and all other countries where the Upper House is elected by local +legislatures, provincial councils, or municipalities, show that +elections to the local authorities are fought on questions of national +politics. But whether indirect or direct election is determined upon, it +is already clear that the only possible method of election is that of +proportional representation. The Royal Commission on Electoral Systems +has reported that there is much to be said in favour of the transferable +vote as a method of election for a Second Chamber, and this verdict has +since been endorsed in numerous articles in the press. Thus a writer in +the _Quarterly Review_ says that: "If an elected element is thought to +be necessary for the popularity and effectiveness of a reformed Upper +House, then let a certain number of members be elected in large +constituencies by means of proportional representation."[14] Were the +minimum age qualifying for a vote in such elections raised to +twenty-five or more there would naturally be provided the conservative +tendency to which that House is intended to give expression, and were +peers eligible as candidates doubtless such peers as were interested in +politics would experience little difficulty in securing election.[15] + +The principle of election has been adopted for the Senates of Australia +and of South Africa. In the former the majority system with direct +election is used; in the latter, a proportional system with indirect +election. The difference in the results is most striking. In Australia +each of the States is polled as a separate constituency, each elector +having three votes. The result of the election of 1910 was as follows:-- + +AUSTRALIA: SENATE ELECTIONS, 1910 + +State. Votes Polled. Labour Non-Labour Seats Obtained. Votes. Votes. +Labour. Non-Labour. Victoria 648,889 692,474 3 -- New South Wales +736,666 735,566 3 -- Queensland 244,292 124,048 3 -- South Australia +171,858 148,626 3 -- Western Australia 128,452 109,565 3 -- Tasmania +92,033 75,115 3 -- --------- --------- -- -- 2,021,090 1,997,029[16] +18 -- + +It will be seen that the Labour Party polled 2,021,090 votes and +obtained 18 seats, whilst their opponents, with a poll of no less than +1,997,029 votes, obtained none. So effectively does the majority system +in the form of the block vote blot out minorities. The Hon. W. Pember +Reeves, in commenting upon these figures,[17] said that: "Such results +give rise to revolutions." + +In South Africa each State is represented by eight Senators chosen by +the local Parliaments by means of the single transferable vote. The +first elections gave the following result:-- + +SOUTH AFRICA: SENATE ELECTIONS, 1910 + +Seats Obtained. States. Dutch Parties[18] British Parties[18] + +Cape Colony South African 6 Progressive 2 Transvaal Het Volk and +Progressive and Nationalist 5 Labour 3 Natal Dutch 1 British 7 Orange +Free State Orangia Unie 6 Constitutionalist 2 -- -- Total 18 Total 14 + +In the one case minorities are completely suppressed; in the other the +minority in each State obtains representation. + +These two illustrations show that if the House of Lords is to be +strengthened by the infusion of an elected element chosen by large +constituencies, a true system of election must be adopted. This is the +conclusion arrived at by Professor Ramsay Muir[19] after a careful +examination of the different methods by which a Second Chamber can be +constituted. All suggestions as to the selection of peers by hereditary +peers, of peers qualified by service, by nomination, by indirect +election, by direct election on a limited franchise, are ruled out and +the direct election of a new Second Chamber by the single transferable +vote is advocated in order that the new House may contain those elements +which fail to secure representation with a system of single-member +constituencies. But if, by the adoption of direct popular election and +proportional representation, the Upper House were made more truly +representative than the Lower, then whatever resolutions were passed +defining the relations between the two Houses there is not much doubt +that power would tend to pass into the hands of the more representative +House. In commenting upon the Royal Commission's report _The Nation_[20] +said: "Perhaps the most pregnant sentence in this whole report is that +in which the Commission suggests that proportional representation might +be a suitable basis for an elective Senate. We have our liberty of +choice, and democracy may find its account in either alternative. We may +prefer to retain an imperfectly representative Lower House. But if we +place above it a really representative Senate the whole balance of the +Constitution might be altered, and the Senate become the more venerable, +the more democratic, and in the end, the more powerful Chamber. We may, +on the other hand, reform the House of Commons, and render any Senate +superfluous. In either event, proportional representation may become the +ultimate key to our constitutional problem." + +_Federal Home Rule._ + +The same question, the method of election, must enter into the +consideration of those larger schemes, Federal Home Rule and Imperial +Federation, which have been mooted in the discussion of the +constitutional relations between the two Houses of the Parliament of the +United Kingdom. A writer in _The Times_,[21] whose series of letters +attracted considerable attention, said that the "central idea of +Federalism appears to be that our present single Imperial Parliament, +which does, or makes an attempt at doing, all the complicated +work--first of the Empire, and second of the United Kingdom of Great +Britain and Ireland, and third of the various countries which together +make up the United Kingdom--is no longer adequate to the purpose. The +Federalists therefore propose that the Imperial Parliament, while +maintaining its supremacy absolutely intact, shall delegate a large part +of its functions to a number of subordinate national or provincial +Parliaments, who shall manage the domestic affairs of England, +Scotland, Ireland and Wales, or of such other territorial divisions as +may be agreed upon. These national or provincial Parliaments will be +entirely independent one of another, but all will acknowledge the full +and absolute sovereignty of the Imperial Parliament." Mr. Birrell stated +that "Federation beginning here at home, as it is called, is ripening +for a speedy decision. Such a Federation once established would be able +to find room for our Dominions overseas as and when they wished to come +in. We should have then a truly Imperial Parliament, at the door of +which any one of our Dominions could come in, and as it were hang up its +hat and coat in his Mother's House and take part in common Imperial +proceedings, and in the government of this great Empire."[22] These are +great changes, and without entering too deeply into details of how these +new bodies are to be brought into being, it is certain that one of the +conditions of their successful working is that they must be fully +representative. It is inconceivable that a national council can be set +up for Wales, or for Scotland, or for Ireland, without provision for the +adequate representation of minorities. Lord Morley, in instituting the +new Councils in India, was compelled to make provision for the +representation of Muhammedans. Mr. Birrell, in the Irish Council Bill of +1907, proposed that minorities should be represented by members +nominated by the Crown. It is impossible to reconcile this reactionary +proposal with democratic principles, and there can be no possible reason +for its adoption when there is a method of election available which +enables minorities to choose their own representatives. + +_Imperial federation._ + +Mr. Birrell's vision of an Imperial Parliament for the British Empire +raises once more the value of a true method of election. An Imperial +Parliament will not accomplish its purpose--the consolidation of the +Empire--if the basis of representation is such as to give undue emphasis +to the separate interests of the constituent States. Further, it would +seem desirable that the establishment of such a Parliament should be +preceded by the more complete unification of the various States, for in +no other Empire are there so many racial divisions, and it is from these +that the greatest of political difficulties spring--in Ireland the +division between north and south; in the United Kingdom between Ireland +and Great Britain; in South Africa between the Dutch and British; in +Canada between the French and British. The majority system of election +brings out these differences in their acutest form. In Canada in 1910 no +representative from the Province of Quebec attended the National +Conference of Canadian Conservatives; of the four Provinces forming the +South African Union it was in the Orange Free State, where in the local +Parliament the minority was almost wholly deprived of representation, +that racial differences gave rise to the keenest feeling. Proportional +representation has proved itself to have been of the greatest value in +bi-racial countries such as Belgium where the representation of +political parties no longer coincides with racial divisions. The +adoption of proportional representation in the United Kingdom, in +Canada, and for all elections in South Africa would complete the +consolidation of these various divisions of the Empire, and even where +racial difficulties do not exist, as in Australia and New Zealand, the +fair representation of all classes of citizens would free questions of +Imperial politics from the dangers of exaggerated party majorities. + +_Conclusion._ + +Whether it is a question of improving existing institutions, or the +creation of further representative bodies, the method of election is all +important. All other departments or human activity show continuous +improvement, and the substitution of scientific for rule-of-thumb +methods of election is an improvement long overdue. It may even be said +that the continued successful working of representative institutions +demand such an improvement. The accomplishment of other electoral +reforms can be more easily attained by the adoption of a system which +allows of the fair representation of all. The reform of the House of +Lords, whether by the delegation of the powers of existing peers to a +small number, or by the introduction of an elected element, or its +establishment on a completely democratic basis, necessitates the +adequate representation of minorities. Federal Home Rule is +impracticable unless due provision is made for minority representation. +But in the contemplation of newer legislative bodies it must not be +forgotten that it is of the utmost importance that the prestige of the +House of Commons--the mother of parliaments, and, as such, the glory of +English-speaking peoples--should be maintained at the highest level. Yet +its predominance in the Parliament of the United Kingdom can be +permanently secured only if it is made fully and completely +representative. The House of Commons must once more renew itself; it +must establish itself on sounder foundations. Its privileges and powers +have been won by the efforts of past generations. To the present +generation falls the opportunity of perfecting its organization and of +strengthening its foundations by making it in truth the expression of +the national will. + +[Footnote 1: Reply to Deputation of Liberal members at House of Commons, +20 May 1908.] + +[Footnote 2: "This number might be reduced to eleven, if minor +variations were grouped."--Sir Charles Dilke, National Liberal Club, 10 +May 1909.] + +[Footnote 3: _The Essentials of Self-Government,_ 1909, p. 62.] + +[Footnote 4: Section 41 of the South Africa Act, 1909, reads thus: "As +soon as may be after every quinquennial census the +Governor-General-in-Council shall appoint a commission consisting of +three Judges of the Supreme Court of South Africa to carry out any +redivision which may have become necessary as between the different +electoral divisions in each Province, and to provide for the allocation +of the number of members to which such Province may have become entitled +under the provisions of this Act."] + +[Footnote 5: The Town Clerk of Edinburgh, Dr. Hunter, urges a +rearrangement of the Parliamentary Divisions of the city, so as to +assimilate them to the municipal wards. "Confusion and unnecessary +expense are caused by the present arrangement.... The municipal area of +the city is represented in Parliament partly by the four city members, +partly by the member for Leith Burghs, and partly by the member for the +County of Midlothian. The distinction thus existing between the +Municipal and Parliamentary divisions of the city necessitates the +annual making up of separate rolls of voters for municipal and for +Parliamentary purposes respectively, involving heavy additional expense +(amounting to upwards of L1100 per annum), which would be avoided if the +areas for both purposes were assimilated." Assimilation is desirable +"not merely in order to save needless expense, but in the interests of +candidates and electors as well as of the electoral agencies. In the +dual arrangement at present existing the usual organizations for +electoral purposes of all kinds have to be duplicated. Not one of the +Parliamentary wards correspond with any of the municipal wards."--_The +Scotsman_, 9 August 1910.] + +[Footnote 6: "The General Election of January 1910, and the Bearing of +the Results on some Problems of Representation." Paper read before the +Royal Statistical Society, 19 April 1910. Mr. Rosenbaum, however, +rejects proportional representation on political grounds. These have +been considered in the two previous chapters.] + +[Footnote 7: "Electoral Statistics." Paper read before the Manchester +Statistical Society, 12 December 1906.] + +[Footnote 8: Joseph King, M.P., in evidence before the Royal Commission +on Electoral Systems, 1909.] + +[Footnote 9: This difficulty would disappear with the adoption of Home +Rule.] + +[Footnote 10: _Real Representation for Ireland_, 1908.] + +[Footnote 11: Report of Annual Meeting of the Proportional +Representation Society, 21 July 1909.--_Representation,_ vol. ii. +p. 154.] + +[Footnote 12: In reply to a deputation of the Manchester Liberal +Federation, 22 May 1909.] + +[Footnote 13: _Minutes of Evidence_, Royal Commission on Electoral +Systems, 1910 (Cd. 6352), p. 104.] + +[Footnote 14: _Cf._ "Two Chambers or One," _Quarterly Review_, July +1910.] + +[Footnote 15: The indirect election of the United States Senate gives so +little satisfaction that the House of Representatives on 14 April 1911 +approved of the proposed amendment to the Constitution providing for +popular election by 296 votes to 6.] + +[Footnote 16: Of these, the Fusionists polled 1,830,353 votes.] + +[Footnote 17: Address to the London School of Economics, 5 October +1910.] + +[Footnote 18: These broad distinctive titles are here given, although +the author recognizes that the Nationalist and Unionist parties in South +Africa are not exclusively Dutch or British.] + +[Footnote 19: _Peers and Bureaucrats_, by Ramsay Muir, Professor of +Modern History at Liverpool University.] + +[Footnote 20: 21 May 1910.] + +[Footnote 21: "Pacificus," _The Times_, 31 October 1910.] + +[Footnote 22: Address to the Eighty Club, 25 July 1910.] + + + +APPENDIX I + +THE JAPANESE ELECTORAL SYSTEM--THE SINGLE NON-TRANSFERABLE VOTE + +The following memorandum has been written by Mr. Kametaro Hayasbida, the +Chief Secretary of the Japanese House of Representatives, in reply to a +series of questions, the particulars of which are set out in the +memorandum. + +_Failure of single member system._ + +The Original Election Law of our country was promulgated in 1889, the +same year in which took place the promulgation of the Constitution. +Under this law the system of small electoral districts was +single-adopted, and each _Fu_ or _Ken_ (administrative district) was +divided into several electoral districts each of which constituted a +single-member constituency (with the exception of some large districts +which, impossible of further division, had two seats allotted with the +system of _scrutin de liste_). The system was, however, found in +practice to be very unsatisfactory, as it often happened that a minority +of the voters, instead of the majority, in certain _Fu_ or _Ken_ +obtained the majority of the members returned, and, on the other hand, a +party with a majority at the polls could not sometimes, as the result of +the grouping of the voters in the small electoral districts, secure any +representation at all. Under such circumstances it was utterly +impossible for each political party to obtain representation in +reasonable proportion to the strength of its voters; or, in other words, +the electors of the country at large had never succeeded in being +properly represented in their legislative body. As the inadequacy of the +system was thus apparently shown I formulated in 1891, by somewhat what +modifying Marshal's cumulative voting system, a system of large +electoral districts combined with that of the single vote, and urged for +a revision of the Election Law. + +_Multi-member constituencies. Single vote adopted 1900._ + +Since then several elections had taken place; and the defects of the +existing law were more strongly pronounced at each successive election. +It was, however, not until the year 1898 that the Government at last +introduced a Bill for a revision of the law with the view of adopting +the system I had the honour of formulating. After heated discussion in +three successive sessions, the Bill was passed in 1900 and sanctioned as +a law. This is our present Election Law. In the revised system the _Fu, +Ken_, and _Shi_ (the administrative districts) constitute at the same +time the electoral districts, and a voter in each district has but one +vote for one candidate, while several seats (according to the +population) are allotted to the district. + +The above is a brief historical sketch of our electoral system. I shall +now try to answer your questions in order. + +_Equitable results._ + +As to the first question whether our system secures the representation +of each party in reasonable proportion to its voting strength, I cannot +do better than answer it by pointing out a few instances in the General +Election which took place on the 15 May 1908. + +TABLE I + +THE CITY OF TOKYO (11 seats) + + Seats in Seats +Parties. Votes. Proportion Obtained. + to votes. +Seiyu-Kwai (Liberals) 6,579 2.71 2 +Konsei-honto (Progressives) 2,216 0.91 1 +Daido-ha (Conservatives) 2,879 1.18 2 +Yuko-Kwai (Radicals) 4,656 1.91 2 +Churitsu (Independent) 10,414 4.29 4 +------ ----- -- +Total 26,744 11.00 11 + +All parties except the Seiyu-kwai and Daido-ha succeeded in obtaining +their representatives in reasonable proportion to their respective +voting strength. The explanation given for the particular case of the +Seiyu-kwai is that the party, unable for some reason or other to limit +the number of candidates, had placed five candidates instead of three or +four, and caused its own defeat by splitting the votes. I take at +random, or rather in the order they come, a few more districts, and the +results obtained are as follows:-- + +TABLE II + +TOKYO-FU (5 seats) + +Parties. Number of Seats in Seats + Candidates. Votes. Proportion Obtained + to Votes. +Seiyu-kwai 5 12,794 4.02 4 +Kensei-honto - - - - +Daido-ha. 1 13,122 .98 1 +Churitsu - - - - + ------ ---- - +Total 6 15,916 5.00 5 + +TABLE III + +THE CITY OF KYOTO (3 seats) + +Parties. Number of Seats in Seats + Candidates. Votes. Proportion Obtained + to Votes. +Seiyu-kwai 1 1,284 0.45 - +Kensei-honto - - - - +Daido-ha - - - - +Yuko-Kwai - - - - +Churitsu 3 7,304 2.55 3 + - ----- ---- - +Total 4 8,588 3.00 3 + +TABLE IV + +KYOTO-FU (5 seats) + +Parties. Number of Seats in Seats + Candidates. Votes. Proportion Obtained. + to Votes. +Seiyu-kwai 5 18,928 4.01 4 +Kensei-honto -- -- -- -- +Daido-ha -- -- -- -- +Yuko-kwai -- -- -- -- +Churitsu 1 4,701 0.99 1 + -------------------------------------- +Total.... 6 23,629 5.00 5 + +TABLE V + +THE CITY OF OSAKA (6 seats) + +Parties. Number of Seats in Seats + Candidates. Votes. Proportion Obtained. + to Votes. +Seiyu-kwai 5 8,666 3.32 4 +Kensei-honto -- -- -- -- +Daido-ha -- -- -- -- +Yuko-kwai 1 2,612 1.00 1 +Churitsu 2 4,368 1.68 1 + --------------------------------------------- +Total.... 8 15,646 6.00 6 + +TABLE VI + +OSAKU-FU (6 seats) + +Parties. Number of Seats in Seats + Candidates. Votes. Proportion Obtained. + to Votes. +Seiyu-kwai 5 15,137 3.57 5 +Kensei-honto -- -- -- -- +Daido-ha 1 2,199 0.52 -- +Yuko-kwai 1 1,304 0.31 -- +Churitsu 3 6,786 1.60 1 + --------------------------------------------- +Total.... 10 25,426 6.00 6 + +Throughout all electoral districts similar results were obtained. The +Churitsu (_i.e._ those belonging to no party), considered as a group, +had not everywhere been as successful as the other parties, as observe +in Tables V. and VI. Each candidate of this group is quite independent +of the other, and has no political views or propaganda in common, nor +any organization whatever. Therefore, each case is totally different +from the other. Although all independent candidates or voters are in +these tables grouped as Churitsu, it is not proper to consider them in +the same category with the other parties. + +Now, judging from the results in the General Election, a few instances +of which are given above, I may say that our present system, if not +fully satisfactory, tolerably secures the representation of each +political party in approximate proportion to its voting capacity. + +_The new system and party organization._ + +As to the first part of your second question, whether, to obtain these +results, the system involves a great deal of calculation on the part of +political organizations as to the exact number of their supporters, I +should say that, as the same system and method of election are uniformly +adopted in the city, county, borough and village elections as well as in +the elections of the Prefectural Assembly, it is not a very difficult +task for all political parties to ascertain from the results of all +these elections their relative strength, and to estimate the number of +their supporters. + +As to the second part of the question, whether it is necessary to issue +precise instructions to the electors as to the candidates for whom they +should vote, my answer is this: as every political organization through +its branch in every _Fu_ and _Ken_ and the sub-branches in the cities, +counties, towns and villages, is always in close touch with its +constituents, and is constantly explaining its position and propaganda, +with the view not only to instruct them but also to extend the sphere of +its influence, it is not so difficult as it seems to decide the number +of candidates. When it is once decided efforts are made on the part of +the organization to distribute the votes among the candidates in such a +way that not one of them receives a defeat at the hands of the other +party. To attain this object the methods are not very complicated, for +every elector has but one vote for one candidate; and, moreover, the +stronger candidates, so long as their own position is secured, will +endeavour to distribute a portion of their votes among the weaker +candidates. This being the case, the member returned with the greatest +number of votes may not be the most popular candidate, but the party as +a whole is much more likely to succeed in getting representatives in +proportion to the strength of its voters. + +_The position of independents._ + +As to the third question, whether the system enables men of independent +mind and character to maintain their position in Parliament, I should +emphatically state that the revised system is much better than the old +in this respect. Under the old system even such a prominent man as Mr. +M. Matsuda (the Speaker of the House of Representatives some years ago, +and the Minister of Finance in the present Government) suffered several +defeats. But under the new system it has never happened that the leader +of a party has lost his seat at any election, as he may seek his +election at the safest district. To men of independent mind and +character the new system offers the greater opportunity to maintain +their position in the House, for in the election they may, in spite of +the opposition of parties, draw their votes from all parts within a +large electoral district. It may be said that the larger electoral +district we have, the greater opportunity we afford to independent +candidates. For instance, both Mr. Y. Ozaki, the Mayor of Tokyo, and Mr. +S. Shimada, by being independent candidates, have never lost their seat +in Parliament, and in the last General Election were returned for their +native prefecture or town with a great number of votes. + +This brings me to the end of my answers to your inquiries. In conclusion +I may say a few words about the public opinions in our country as to the +Election Laws. + +_Public opinion and the new system._ + +Despite the fact that the new system enables the elector of the country +to be more reasonably represented in the House, still there are some +ambitious politicians urging for their own selfish purpose to restore +the old system. But, as almost all prominent members in both Houses are +fully cognizant of the relative merits and demerits of the two systems, +there is not much chance of our returning to the old system. + +APPENDIX II + +THE SECOND BALLOT + +A Note on the German General Elections of 1903 and 1907. + +The German Reichstag, which consists of 397 members, is elected by a +system of single-member constituencies. Every member, however, must have +obtained a majority of the votes polled, either at a first or second +ballot, in the constituency for which he has been returned. The German +Official Returns furnish very complete details of the elections, +including the figures for the first and second ballots, and the +summaries at the end of the Returns disclose a very striking divergence +between the proportions of seats obtained and votes polled by the +various political parties. These discrepancies have attracted general +attention, and have usually been attributed to the great variation in +the size of German constituencies. As a matter of fact, the effect of +redistribution on the proportionality between seats and votes is not +nearly so large as is generally supposed. Apart from the consequences of +neglecting the votes of the minority or minorities in each constituency, +wherein lies the gravest defect of a single-member system, the second +ballot is a disturbing factor of considerable importance. So far from +diminishing the disproportion between seats and votes polled by the +various parties, the second ballot frequently increases that +disproportion. In order to appreciate the respective effects of unequal +constituencies and of the second ballots it is necessary to consider +these two factors separately. This will be facilitated by making a +comparison between the results which would have been obtained without +second ballots with the results actually obtained. The following +tables, which are based upon the official returns, give the votes polled +and the seats obtained by the five principal groups:-- + +GERMAN GENERAL ELECTION, 1903 + +Parties. Votes. Results without Results with + Second Ballot. Second Ballot. +Social Democrats 3,010,771 122 81 + (31.7%) (30.7%) (20.4%) +Centre Party 1,875,273 104 100 + (19.7%) (26.2%) (25.2%) +National Liberals 1,317,401 32 51 + (13.9%) ( 8.1%) (12.8%) +Conservatives 1,281,852 79 75 + (13.6%) (19.9%) (18.9%) +Radical Parties 872,653 11 36 + ( 9.2%) ( 2.8%) ( 9.1%) + +GERMAN GENERAL ELECTION, 1907 + +Parties. Votes. Results without Results with + Second Ballot. Second Ballot. +Social Democrats 3,259,029 73 43 + (28.9%) (18.4%) (10.8%) +Centre Party 2,179,743 101 105 + (19.3%) (26.4%) (26.4%) +National Liberals 1,630,681 47 54 + (14.5%) (11.8%) (13.6%) +Conservatives 1,632,072 91 84 + (13.6%) (22.9%) (21.2%) +Radical Parties 1,233,933 30 49 + (10.9%) ( 7.6%) (12.3%) + +_The effect of unequal constituencies on representation_. + +The Social Democrats were affected to a greater extent than any other +party by both the factors referred to. In 1903 the Socialists polled +31.7 per cent, of the votes, and, at the first ballots, were at the head +of the poll in 122, or 30.7 per cent, of the constituencies. In other +words, if the system of second ballots had not been in force, the Social +Democrats would have obtained very nearly their fair share of +representation. If, in addition, there had been a redistribution of +seats by which the sizes of constituencies had been equalized, the +Social Democrats would have obtained more than their share of +representation. The strength of the party lay in the large towns, and +if, for example, Berlin had the additional eight seats to which it was +entitled nearly all of them would have fallen to the Social Democrats. +Again the three divisions of the district of Hamburg returned Social +Democrats with overwhelming majorities. Were the representation allotted +to Hamburg doubled, as it should be, all six seats might possibly have +fallen to the Social Democrats.[1] An equalization of the size of +constituencies might have produced in 1903 the phenomenon which has +occurred so often in England. The largest party would have secured a +number of seats far in excess of that to which it was entitled by reason +of its strength. In 1907 the Socialists polled 28.9 of the votes, but +only succeeded in reaching the head of the poll at the first ballot in +73, or 18.4 per cent. of the constituencies. A redistribution of seats +would have added to their representation in the large towns, and the +first ballots would have yielded a result which would have corresponded +more fairly with their polling strength. + +_The effect of second ballots_. + +In both years the system of second ballots has had the effect of +reducing very considerably the representation of the Social Democrats. +In the year 1903 the Social Democrats won 56 constituencies by absolute +majorities, and were engaged in the second ballots in 118 +constituencies. In 66 of these constituencies they were at the head of +the poll, but succeeded in maintaining this position at the second +ballots in 24 only. In the remaining 52 constituencies they were second +on the poll, and at the second ballots they were able to win only _one_ +of these seats. In these 118 constituencies the Socialists polled +1,170,000 votes at the first ballots, whilst the other parties polled +1,920,000. As a result of the second ballots the Socialists obtained 25 +seats and the remaining parties obtained 93 seats. + +The figures of the year 1907 tell a similar tale. At the first ballots +the Social Democrats were at the head of the poll in 73 constituencies. +The second ballots reduced this number to 43. They were engaged in the +second ballots in 90 constituencies; they were at the head of the poll +in the first ballot in 44 of these constituencies, but kept this +position in 11 only; they were second on the poll in the remaining 46 +constituencies and won in 3 cases only. In these 90 constituencies the +Social Democrats polled at the first ballot 1,185,000 votes, whilst the +other parties taken together polled 1,888,000 votes; the Socialists +obtained 14 seats, the other parties obtained 76 seats. + +In both these elections the second ballots affected very adversely the +representation of the largest party. If this party, without the second +ballot and with a fair distribution of seats, might have obtained more +than its share of representation, then the second ballots would have +acted as a corrective, but not necessarily so. There is no reason why +the second ballots should not have added to the over-representation +already obtained. This will be seen from the figures of the elections in +the Kingdom of Saxony. This division of the German Empire is entitled to +23 representatives in the Reichstag. In 1903 the Socialists won 18 of +these seats with absolute majorities; they were engaged in the second +ballots in the remaining five constituencies; they won four (all those +in which they were at the head of the poll at the first ballots) and +only lost the one constituency in which they were second on the poll. +The Social Democrats, who at the first ballots polled 58.8 per cent, of +the votes, thus obtained 22 seats out of 23, and the second ballots in +this case only confirmed the overwhelming preponderance which the system +of single-member constituencies had conferred upon the larger party. + +_Second ballots and the swing of the pendulum_.] It would, +indeed, seem that a system of second ballots rather accentuates those +great changes in representation which are the normal characteristic of a +system of single-member constituencies. In the elections in Saxony in +1907 the Social Democrats were still by far the largest party, obtaining +48.5 per cent. of the votes. They succeeded in obtaining eight seats by +absolute majorities and were engaged at the second ballots in eight +other constituencies. They lost every one of these constituencies, +although at the first ballots they had been at the head of the poll in +five of them. The unfavourable swing of the pendulum reduced their +representation at the first ballots, and the second ballots merely +increased their misfortunes. + +Nor would redistribution have lessened the violence of these changes in +the constituencies in which second ballots were necessary. Thus, for +example, Frankfort-On-Main, with an electorate of 77,164, should return +two members instead of one. The constituency was won by the Socialists +in the second ballots of 1903, but was lost at the second ballots in +1907. In both years the Socialist candidate was at the head of the poll +at the first ballots. Similarly the constituency of Elberfeld-Barmen, +with an electorate of 67,241, won by an absolute majority in 1903, was +lost by the Socialists at the second ballots in 1907, although their +candidate had been at the head of the poll at the first ballot. If these +and other constituencies had received additional representatives, the +violence of the changes in the composition of the legislative body would +in all probability have been increased. + +_The second ballot and the representation of minorities_. + +A study of the statistics of the German General Elections shows that the +representation obtained by the various parties depends very largely upon +their supremacy in certain localities. In these districts the minorities +have been unrepresented for many years, the second ballots having in no +way saved them from practical disfranchisement. Thus the Centre Party is +in the ascendant in the Rhenish Provinces. In the district of Cologne, +Muenster, and Aix-la-Chapelle, the Centre Party monopolizes the +representation, returning in 1907 every one of the 15 members to which +the districts were entitled. In the adjoining districts of Dusseldorf, +Coblentz and Treves they returned 16 out of 24. In Bavaria, the +districts of Lower Bavaria, the Upper Palatinate, Lower Franconia and +Schwabia, which are entitled to 23 members, were represented wholly by +members of the Centre Party. Taking the kingdom of Bavaria as a whole, +the Centre Party obtained 34 seats out of 48, although they polled only +44.7 per cent of the votes at the first ballots. There is therefore +reproduced in Germany the conditions which obtain in certain parts of +the United Kingdom--the permanent supremacy of one party which +monopolizes, or nearly so, the representation of the district. + +_Summary_ + +The system of second ballots has therefore had a considerable influence +in creating that divergence between the votes polled and the seats +obtained which has characterized German elections. The representation of +any one party depends, to a very large degree, upon the attitude taken +towards it by other parties. The system in no way acts as a corrective +to the anomalies arising from single-member constituencies, and may even +accentuate the violent changes associated with them. Moreover, the +system does not provide representation for minorities, and therefore +does not ensure a fully representative character to popularly elected +legislative bodies. It may be mentioned that all the criticisms here +directed against the second ballot apply with nearly equal force to the +use of the alternative vote (_see_ p. 95), a thinly disguised form of +the same principle which appears to be meeting with some acceptance in +this country. + + +[Footnote 1: The minority would, of course, have had a better chance +with six divisions. Dr. Ed. Bernstein, to whom the author submitted this +memorandum, makes the following comment: "I am not so sure that the +equalization of the size of the constituencies would in 1903 have +secured to the Social Democratic party a number of seats far in excess +of its voting strength. But this is a subordinate consideration. The +possibility of an unproportional representation of parties, even if the +seats are equally distributed, is undeniably there, and this ought to +settle the question.] + + +APPENDIX III + +THE SWEDISH SYSTEM OF PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION + +The principle of proportional representation was first discussed in +Sweden in 1867. The new Danish Constitution of that year provided for +the use of the transferable vote (Andrae's scheme) in the election of +the Upper House, and Herr S. G. Troil proposed in the Swedish Parliament +that the three most important of its committees should be elected by +means of the same system. The motion was not carried, and a similar +motion, made by Professor H. L. Ryoen in 1878, was equally unsuccessful. +It was not until 1896 that the next step was taken, when the Government, +in view of the increasing demand for a more democratic franchise, +proposed a proportional system of election. Nothing came of this +proposal immediately, but from this date the agitation for an extension +of the franchise gave rise to the demand for the proportional method of +election in order to ensure the representation of minorities. + +_The former constitution of the two chambers_.] + +The story of the struggle for reform will best be understood if prefaced +by a statement of the franchise conditions previously existing in +Sweden. The Upper, or First, Chamber of the Riksdag, was elected by +members of the provincial councils and of the councils of the five +largest towns. The other towns sent members to their provincial +councils. The members of provincial councils were elected in two stages; +the primary electors chose electors of the second degree, who in turn +chose the councillors. The primary electors in the country[1] had ten +votes for every 100 kroner of rateable income, subject to a limit of +5000 votes. The electors of the second degree had only one vote in the +election of councillors, and councillors had only one vote in the +election of members of the First Chamber of the Riksdag. Owing to the +great advantage conferred upon primary electors possessed of large +incomes these electors largely controlled not only the composition of +the town and provincial councils, but also the composition of the Upper +Chamber. The election of members of the Lower Chamber of Parliament was +direct; every person of not less than 800 kroner income was entitled to +vote, but no one was entitled to more than one vote. + +_The struggle for electoral reform_. + +In 1899 M. Branting, the leader of the Socialist Party, proposed the +adoption of proportional representation, coupled with universal and +equal suffrage for the election of town councils. The main object of +this proposal was to place town councils on a more democratic basis, but +as the five largest councils elected representatives to the First +Chamber the proposal would have had some influence upon the composition +of that House. M. Branting's proposal was rejected, and when revived two +years later met a similar fate. In 1902 two Liberals (MM. Hedlund and +Carlsson) proposed that provincial councils should be elected by a +proportional method on the basis of manhood suffrage, whilst a similar +proposition was made in the same year in respect of the elections of the +Lower House of Parliament. Both these motions were rejected, but in +response to a demand from both Houses for an inquiry a Royal Commission +was appointed to consider the problem of electoral reform. The +Commission reported in the following year in favour of a list system of +proportional representation with official ballot papers, and the +Government proposed this system combined with manhood suffrage for the +election of members for the Lower Chamber. This proposal was accepted +in 1904 in the Upper Chamber, but rejected in the Lower Chamber by five +votes. Next year it was again discussed, accepted by the Upper Chamber +but rejected in the Lower by a majority of ten. A change of ministry +took place, and in 1906 M. Staaff, the Liberal Prime Minister, proposed +manhood suffrage with the "majority" system of election. But the +Moderate Party insisted upon a proportional system, and the proposals of +the Liberal ministry were rejected by the Upper Chamber. M. Alfred +Petersson, of Paboda, then proposed manhood suffrage with a proportional +system for the Lower Chamber, and a proportional system for the Upper +Chamber, which, however, was to be elected as before by the provincial +councils. This proposal was rejected by the Lower Chamber but accepted +by the Upper Chamber, and M, Staaff resigned. The Moderates, with M. +Lindman as Prime Minister, then introduced a Bill incorporating M. +Petersson's proposals with the addition of the direct election of +provincial councils and a less plutocratic franchise. This measure, +which was adopted by both Houses in 1907, was confirmed after a General +Election in 1909. + +_The Swedish law of 1909_. + +Under this law the proportional system is applied to elections for both +Houses of Parliament, all parliamentary committees, town councils and +provincial councils. For the Lower Chamber there is manhood suffrage. +The Upper Chamber is elected still by the provincial councils and by the +town councils of the five largest towns, but the elections of provincial +councils are now direct. But, in order to maintain as much continuity as +possible in the composition of the Upper Chamber, only one-sixth of the +House is renewed every year. The maximum number of votes in the +elections of both provincial and town councils is forty. The first +election under the new system took place in 1909, when the Stockholm +Town Council and several provincial councils were called upon to elect +their proportion of members of the Upper House. In March 1910 the first +elections to the Stockholm Town Council were held, and in the following +May there were elections under the new system for all the provincial +councils. In 1911 the first elections to the Lower House of Parliament +will take place. + +In Sweden, even under the new law, there are no official ballot papers +and no nominations of candidates. This arrangement is supposed to +preserve to the electors the fullest possible liberty in voting. In +practice the party organizations print ballot papers containing the +names of the candidates whom they support, and these printed forms are +accepted by the returning officers. Every elector, however, is at +liberty to strike out any of the names on these papers, to substitute +other names, to vary the order in which the names are printed, or to +prepare his own ballot paper.[2] + +_The Swedish system of proportional representation_.] + +The mechanism of the proportional system adopted has had regard to the +practice mentioned in the preceding paragraph. The first proposal, that +of M. Petersson, of Paboda, was only a crude approximation towards a +proportional system. His scheme, in brief, was (1) that the number of +votes recorded for each candidate should be ascertained; (2) that the +candidate with the highest number of votes should be declared elected; +(3) that a further count should then take place, the papers on which the +successful candidate's name appeared being treated as of the value of +one-half. The remaining candidates whose names appeared on these papers +would be credited with half a vote in respect of each such paper. The +non-elected candidates would then be arranged according to the number of +votes obtained, the highest being declared elected. As soon as any two +names on any ballot paper had been declared successful a fresh count +would take place, such papers being treated as of the value of +one-third. This process of reducing the value of the paper as soon as a +further candidate appearing thereon was elected was to be continued +until all the seats were allotted. The principle underlying this +distribution of seats is the same as that contained in the d'Hondt rule +of the Belgian system. A group of electors which was more than twice as +numerous as any other group would obtain two seats before any was +allotted to a smaller group. If the group was more than three times as +large as any other it would obtain three seats before the smaller group +received one, and so on. It was at once recognized that this scheme +would tell considerably in favour of well-organized parties--parties +whose supporters would accept the ballot papers printed for them without +question. An example will make this clear. If, taking an extreme case, +in an election for three members 8000 voters placed the names of two +candidates, P and Q, on each of their ballot papers, whilst a more +loosely organized group of 13,000 voters spread its support over four +candidates, T, S, V and W, different sections voting for these +candidates independently, the following result might take place:-- + + P Q . . 8,000 | T . . . 4,000 + | S . . . 3,500 + | V . . . 3,000 + | W . . . 2,500 + +Candidate P, being the first in order on the 8000 ballot papers of the +first group, would be declared elected, and Q, the remaining name on +these ballot papers, would be credited with 4000 votes--half the +original value of the papers. Q and T, having 4000 votes each, would +then be declared elected. Thus one group, with 8000 votes, would carry +two seats, and the other, with 13,000 votes, would only obtain one--a +result due to a lack of combination. + +_The allotment of seats to parties_. + +The plan finally adopted is based on M. Petersson's proposal, but +provides, as in the Belgian scheme, for the official recognition of +parties. Electors may write at the head of their ballot papers the name +or motto of a party. The papers bearing the same name or motto are then +grouped together, the numbers in each group ascertained, and the seats +available are allotted to these groups in accordance with the d'Hondt +rule, irrespective of the number of votes obtained by individual +candidates. Thus, in the example given, if electors of the second group +had all headed their ballot papers with the same party name or motto the +particular way in which they had distributed their votes among the +candidates would not have affected the number of seats obtained by the +group as a whole. The first group would have obtained one, and the +second two seats. + +_The selection of the successful candidates_. + +The position of the candidates on each list is determined in accordance +with the original proposal of M. Petersson. The candidate receiving the +highest number of votes is declared elected, the papers on which his +name appears are then marked down to the value of one-half, the relative +position of the remaining candidates ascertained afresh, and the highest +of these declared elected, and so on. This procedure, called the +reduction rule, is however subordinate to a further rule (the rule of +the order of preference), which is as follows. If more than one-half of +the supporters of a party list have placed the same candidate at the +head of their ballot papers, the first seat apportioned to the list is +allotted to this candidate; if more than two-thirds have placed the same +two candidates in the same order at the head of the ballot papers, these +two candidates have the first claim to the seats apportioned to the +party; if more than three-fourths have placed the same three candidates +in the same order at the head of the list, these are given the first, +second, and third seats, and so on. The selection of the successful +candidates is determined in accordance with this rule so far as +possible, but as soon as the application of the rule breaks down the +relative claims of the non-elected candidates on the list are determined +in accordance with the reduction rule. But if, say, three candidates +have been declared elected in accordance with the rule of the order of +preference, and it is necessary to choose others by the reduction rule, +the papers containing these three names are treated as of the value of +one-fourth in determining the relative position of the remaining +candidates of the group. + +_Free voters and double candidatures._ + +In order to complete the description of the Swedish system two +subsidiary features, which will seldom come into play in actual +elections, must be mentioned. Provision is made for those electors who +owe no party allegiance, and who therefore do not wish to place any +party name or motto at the head of their list. Such voters are called +"free voters," and the votes recorded for their candidates are +ascertained. These candidates are placed in a group by themselves, +called the free group, but the number of votes recorded for each +individual candidate in this group, and not the total number of votes +recorded for all the candidates, forms the basis of comparison with the +totals of the party lists in the allotment of seats. The second feature +provides for the improbable case of two groups of electors or parties +having placed the same candidate upon their list. In the event of such +candidate being so favourably placed in two lists as to be elected by +both parties, then, for the purpose of ascertaining the new value of the +papers on which his name appears, each list is debited with half a seat. +When, as already explained, one seat has been allotted to a list, the +list total is divided by two in accordance with the d'Hondt rule for the +purpose of the fresh comparison of totals; but if this candidate has +already been elected on another list the total would be divided by one +and a half instead of by two. A fresh total would be ascertained for +each of the lists containing the candidate's name. + +_An election at Carlskrona._ + +The author was permitted by the courtesy of the Burgomaster of +Carlskrona to watch the election of provincial councillors on 24 May +1910, to represent the city in the Bleking provincial council, and a +description of this election will show how the system works in practice. +Carlskrona is entitled to nine members. For the purpose of the election +the town was divided into two parts, but the polling place in each +division was at the town hall. The register was prepared fourteen days +before the election, and stated in addition to the name, address, and +occupation of the elector, the amount of his (or her) rateable income +and the number of votes to which he (or she) was entitled. The conduct +of the election was in the hands of the Burgomaster, assisted by the +magistrates of the town. As already explained, there were no official +ballot papers and no nominations of candidates. Each elector voted for +such candidates as he pleased, provided they possessed the necessary +qualifications--those of an ordinary elector. Three parties--the +Moderate, Liberal, and Labour--contested the election. Each party +printed ballot papers containing the names of the candidates adopted by +the party organization and with the name of the party at the head of the +ballot paper. The ballot paper issued by the Moderate party was in the +following form:-- + +_De Moderata_ + +_Borgmaestaren_--O. Holmdahl. +_Grosshandlaren_--N. P. Nordstroem. +_Lasarettslaekaren_--R. Lundmark. +_Disponenten_--H. Berggren. +_Kommendoeren_--G. Lagercrantz. +_Radmannen_--C. G. Ewerlof. +_Chefsintendenten_--I. Neuendorff. +_Kaptenen, friherre_--F. E. von Otter. +_Underofficeren af 2: dra graden_--O. W. Stroemberg. +_Folkskollaeraren_--H. E. Mattsson. +_Byggmaestaren_--K. J. A. Johansson. +_Handlanden_--Aug. Andren. + +_The Poll._ + +The ballot papers could be obtained at the committee rooms on, or prior +to, the day of election, and also on the day of election from party +agents at the doors of the polling stations. Each elector took his +ballot paper folded to the Burgomaster, or presiding magistrate, who +endorsed the back with the number of votes to which the elector was +entitled. The presiding magistrate was assisted by two others who +checked the accuracy of the proceedings. The poll opened at 10 A.M., +the proceedings were adjourned for lunch at 1 P.M., the poll was again +opened during the afternoon and closed about 8 P.M. The counting took +place next day when, as comparatively few electors took advantage of +their right to vary the order of the names as printed on the ballot +papers, the number of votes recorded for each candidate was easily +ascertained. Nor did the varying values of the ballot papers present any +great difficulty. A calculating machine made the necessary additions +both quickly and accurately. In this election only one paper was +spoiled,[3] and it was very obvious that the provision of printed ballot +papers by the party organizations made the act of voting a very simple +one. The votes recorded for the different parties were as follows:-- + + Moderate . . . . . 20,334 + Liberal . . . . . 8,732 + Labour . . . . . 3,617 + +_The allotment of seats to parties. + +There were nine seats to be distributed among the three parties. The +distribution was carried out in accordance the d'Hondt rule, but the +method of applying this rule differed from that employed in Belgium. In +Belgium the party totals would have been divided by the numerals 1, 2, +3, &c., and the quotients ranged in order of magnitude, the ninth in +order being termed the "electoral quotient." Each party would have +received as many seats as its total contained this quotient. The Swedish +method provides for the allotment of one seat at a time, and it does so +because of the possibility of the same candidate being elected by more +than one party. Save in the rare case mentioned, the arithmetical +operations, though differently presented, are identical with those of +the Belgian system. Thus, at Carlskrona the first seat was given to the +Moderates--that party having received the highest number of votes. +Before the next seat was allotted the value of the Moderate total was +reduced by one-half, and the new total was then compared with the +original totals of the other parties. The totals to be considered in +the allotment of the second seat were, therefore, as follows:-- + +Moderate. . . . . 10,167 +Liberal . . . . . 8,732 +Labour . . . . . 3,617 + +The Moderate party being still credited with the highest total received +the second seat, and their original total, 20,334, was then divided by +three in order to ascertain to whom the third seat should be allotted. +The totals at this stage were as follows:-- + +Moderate . . . . . 6,778 +Liberal . . . . . 8,732 +Labour . . . . . 3,617 + +The Liberal total being now the highest, this party received the third +seat, and in order to ascertain to whom the fourth seat should be given +the Liberal total was reduced in value by one-half, the totals of the +other parties remaining as at the previous allotment. The totals for +comparison were now:-- + +Moderate . . . . . 6,778 +Liberal . . . . . 4,366 +Labour . . . . . 3,617 + +The Moderate total was again the highest, and the party received the +fourth seat. The process of reducing the totals in succession according +to the foregoing rule was continued until all the nine seats were +allotted. In this election the Moderates obtained six seats, the +Liberals two, and Labour one. + +_The selection of the successful candidates._ + +The returning officer had then to determine which candidates on each +list should be declared successful. In the Carlskrona election this task +was extremely simple, for the large majority of the voters had accepted +the ballot papers provided for them by their parties. No less than +19,756 votes out of a total of 20,334 had been received for the Moderate +list as printed by the party organization. The totals for each +candidate were quickly ascertained. Moreover, it was possible to select +all the successful candidates by the rule of the order of preference. +More than six-sevenths of the Moderate votes having been recorded for +the list as printed, the first six names on the list were declared +elected. Of the Liberal votes, 8118 out of a total of 8732 were recorded +for the party list as printed, and as this number constituted more than +two-thirds of the total, the first two names on the list were declared +elected. With regard to the Labour party, 3580 out of a total of 3617 +votes had been recorded for the party list, and the first candidate on +the list was therefore declared elected. + +_The election of suppleants. + +In common with all continental systems, supplementary members +(suppleants) were chosen for the purpose of taking the place of an +elected member who might die or retire before the council had run its +course. The method adopted in Sweden is peculiar to itself. In Belgium +the same rules serve for the election of the suppleants as for the +election of members, and they are called upon to serve in the order in +which they stand at the declaration of the poll. In Sweden it is held +that each elected member must have a suppleant, or deputy, special to +himself. The method of selection may be illustrated from the Carlskrona +election. The candidate who was to be regarded as suppleant to +Burgomaster Holmdahl (the first on the Moderate list) was chosen as +follows: Holmdahl had received 20,334 votes, his name having appeared on +every ballot paper of the Moderate party; the votes recorded for the +unelected candidates on these papers were ascertained, the +result being:-- + + Neuendorfs . . . . . 20,334 + von Otter . . . . . 20,242 + Stroemberg . . . . . 19,913 + Mattsson . . . . . 20,119 + Johansson . . . . . 20,237 + Andren . . . . . . 20,170 + +Neuendorff being the candidate who had received the highest number of +votes on these papers, was declared elected as suppleant to Holmdahl. A +suppleant for Nordstroem, the second elected member, was then chosen from +among the remaining five non-elected members. Nordstroem's votes were +20,235, and the votes recorded for the non-elected members on the same +papers were:-- + +von Otter 20,143 +Stroemberg 19,913 +Mattsson 20,055 +Johansson 20,195 +Andren 20,071 + +Johansson, being highest with 20,195 votes, was declared suppleant to +Nordstroem. + +This method of choosing the suppleant seems to be unsatisfactory. The +party as such does not determine who shall be called upon to fill a +vacancy in its ranks; whether a non-elected member succeeds to a vacancy +as a suppleant depends very largely on accident. A good illustration +occurred in the selection of a suppleant from the Labour list. The +party's candidates were as follows:-- + +Kloo. +Karlsson. +Ostergren. +Olsson. +Ek. +Johansson. +Jensen. +Fagerberg. +Pettersson. + +The first candidate on the list had been declared elected, and +obviously, in the opinion of the party, the next favourite was Karlsson, +and had there been a second seat awarded to the list Karlsson would have +been declared elected. In determining, however, whether he should be +declared elected as a suppleant, his position on the list did not count, +and as the party list had been voted for without alteration by most of +the Labour voters, five of the non-elected candidates were credited with +the same number of votes. The choice of the suppleant was made by lot, +and fell in this case upon Johansson, the sixth name on the list. It +may be said that there is; considerable dissatisfaction with the method +of electing suppleant candidates, and the Stockholm _Dagblad_, in its +issue of the 29 May 1910, stated that the choice of suppleant, although +there might have been many thousand votes given to every candidate, +depended upon so small a difference in the totals received by each that +even one ballot paper might determine the result. This is a detail in +the system that can easily be remedied, and steps are already being +taken to bring the election of suppleants into agreement with the +election of ordinary members. + +_Comparison with Belgian system._ + +It will be of interest to compare the Swedish with the Belgian system. +It has been shown that the method of allotting seats to different groups +is identical in principle in both countries. This method, the d'Hondt +rule, favours the largest parties, and this explains why, in the smaller +Belgian constituencies, cartels or combinations of parties take place. +The Swedish system enables such combined action to take place with +greater facility. It enables two parties to make use of the same motto +without presenting a common list of candidates. No inter-party +negotiations are required, as in Belgium, with reference to the order in +which the names of candidates shall appear upon the list. In Sweden each +group can put forward its own list of candidates, and so long as the +electors make use of the same motto at the head of the ballot paper the +combination gains the additional representation which may fall to it as +a result of being treated as one party, whilst the share falling to each +section is determined by the number of votes recorded for their +respective candidates. + +The Swedish method of choosing the successful candidates from the +various lists differs materially from that used in Belgium. In Sweden +the d'Hondt rule is used not only for the allotment of seats to parties, +but also in the selection of the successful candidates. In Belgium the +use of the d'Hondt rule is restricted to the former purpose, and when +once the electoral quotient is ascertained the rule is discarded. The +difference in the two methods can be illustrated from the Stockholm +municipal election of 1910. In the fifth ward the ballot paper of the +Moderate party was as follows:-- + +Welin. +Norstrom. +Boalt. +Roberg. +Palmgren. +Bohman. +Ringholm. +Herlitz. +------------------ +Hafstrom. +Svensson. +von Rosen. +Freden. + +The line in the ballot paper divides the eight candidates for election +as members from those who were standing for election as suppleants only. +The votes recorded for the Moderate party numbered 118,483, of which +86,851 were given for the party ticket as printed. The number of votes +accepting the party order of the first three candidates was about +93,000. This latter number was more than three-fourths, but less than +four-fifths of the total, and therefore only the first three candidates +on the ballot paper could be declared elected in accordance with the +rule of the order of preference. The remaining four members had to be +chosen by the reduction rule; the votes recorded for the five +non-elected candidates were ascertained, the papers containing the names +of the three elected candidates being treated for this purpose as of the +value of one-fourth. + +Some of the supporters of the eighth and sixth candidates had struck out +the names of the fourth and other candidates. This manoeuvre had the +result of placing these two candidates in the order named at the head of +the poll at the fourth and fifth counts, and they were accordingly +elected. Other candidates had received exclusive support, and it should +be pointed out that it is the total amount of exclusive support +recorded for all candidates which determines how soon the application of +the rule of the order of preference breaks down. As soon as this takes +place the election of any one candidate may depend, as in the election +of the suppleants, upon the action of a comparatively small number of +voters. Thus, some supporters of the fifth candidate, a Miss Palmgren, +had struck out the names of all candidates save hers. Those papers which +contained her name alone were treated as of full value, and although the +votes of these supporters only numbered 1100, or less than 1 per cent. +of the whole, they were sufficient to turn the scale in her favour. As, +however, 86,851 votes out of a total of 118,453, had been recorded for +the list as printed, showing that this proportion of voters preferred +the fourth candidate to those that succeeded him, it would certainly +seem that the result was not fair to this candidate. In Belgium if seven +seats were won by a party which polled 118,453 votes, the electoral +quotient would not be more than one-seventh of this total, and the +election of the first candidate, instead of absorbing one-half the value +of the votes, would consume only one-seventh. The election of the first +two candidates would absorb two-sevenths instead of two-thirds, the +election of three candidates would consume three-sevenths instead of +three-fourths, and the election of four candidates would consume +four-sevenths instead of four-fifths. In the Stockholm election more +than five-sevenths of the voters had supported the party list as it was +printed, and according to the Belgian system the first five candidates +would have been declared elected. + +_The system and party organization_. + +The Swedish rule of selecting successful candidates is defended on the +ground that it confers great power upon the electors. These can if +necessary more effectively express their disapproval of the list put +forward by the party organization, and as it is thought that a large +number of voters too readily accept the party lead, a counterpoise is +considered desirable. Recent experience in Belgium, however, would tend +to show that a greater knowledge of their power has induced more and +more electors to make use of the opportunity which that system allows of +expressing individual preferences. If we regard a party as consisting of +two groups--those that follow the party lead, and those which, whilst +supporting the party, desire to assert their own preferences--then as +between these two groups the Belgian system is strictly fair. If a party +wins seven seats and four-sevenths of the party support the official +list, this group would obtain four out of the seven seats; but in +Sweden, as has been shown, at least four-fifths must support the +official list before the first four candidates can be sure of election. +The Swedish system discriminates in favour of the dissentients within a +party, and this discrimination may have unexpected effects on party +organization. The Belgian method has induced parties to welcome the +support of all sections, knowing that such sections will not obtain more +than their fair share of influence. In Sweden the tendency may be for +party organizers to regard the support of various sections with +suspicion, because, whilst these sections will obtain the full advantage +of the party vote, their independent action may result in the gain of +the section at the expense of the party as a whole. As a result of the +Stockholm election referred to, the opinion was expressed by party +organizers that it would be necessary to limit the number of candidates +on a list to the number which the party knew it could carry. This would +be an undesirable outcome of a rule designed to secure greater freedom +for the elector, for it would tend to make party discipline more strict +and parties exclusive rather than inclusive, as is the case in Belgium. +It should, however, be added that in the large majority of the +provincial council elections the selection of candidates was made in +accordance with the rule of the order of preference. It would, +therefore, seem that party organizers, as a rule, took care to present +lists of candidates acceptable to the party as a whole. + +_The great improvement effected by the Swedish system_. + +The new Swedish electoral system, like all proportional systems, +constitutes a striking advance upon the previous electoral conditions. +The extent of the improvement will, of course, be seen from a comparison +of some of its results with those of former years. For example, +Stockholm used to be represented in the Lower Chamber by twenty-two +members chosen by the "block" system, or _scrutin de liste_. The party +in the majority monopolized the representation, and the absurdity of the +system was well illustrated by an incident in the election of 1882, +which was preceded by a severe struggle between the advocates of free +trade and protection. At this election Stockholm returned twenty-two +free traders, but as one of the elected members had not paid his taxes, +all the voting papers containing his name were declared to be invalid. +In consequence the twenty-two free traders were unseated and the +twenty-two protectionist candidates were declared elected in their +place. An attempt was made to ameliorate the evils of this system by +dividing the town into five parliamentary districts, but, although so +divided, Stockholm in 1908 returned twenty-one members, all of whom were +either Liberals or Socialists, the large minority of Moderates being +unrepresented. When the proportional system was applied in March 1910 to +the election of the municipal council, each party obtained its fair +share of representation in each of the six wards of the city, and the +total result shows how large an improvement is effected by the +new method:-- + + Parties. Votes Seats Seats in + Obtained. Obtained. Proportion + to Votes. + Moderate 281,743 22 24 + Liberal 142,639 12 12 + Socialist 160,607 16 14 + ----------------------------------- + 584,989 50 50 + +In the election of the provincial council of Bleking the result was as +follows:-- + +Parties. Votes Seats Seats in + Obtained. Obtained. Proportion + to Votes. +------------------------ ----------------------- +Moderate 54,465 22 22.4 +Liberal 36,595 10 15.1 +Socialist 3,617 1 1.5 + ---------------------------------- + 94,677 39 39 + +The general fairness of these results is all the more remarkable, +because in Stockholm there was a very considerable variation in the +value of a vote in the different wards, whilst many of the +constituencies in the province of Bleking returned only a few members, +and these did not give full play to the proportional system. The figures +confirm the experience of all other countries, that a proportional +system, even when applied to comparatively small constituencies, yields +results which approximate very closely to the ideal aimed at, the true +representation of the electors. + + +[Footnote 1: The town councils were elected in one stage; each elector +had one vote for every 100 kroner income, subject to a limit of 100 +votes. The members of the town council, when electing members of the +provincial councils, had only one vote each.] + +[Footnote 2: A ballot paper is not declared invalid even if it contains +the names of more candidates than there are members to be elected +(except at the elections of parliamentary committees). The names in +excess are regarded as suppleant candidates (see _Election of +Suppleants_) to the number of two in the elections for the Riksdag and +the town councils, and to a number equal to the number of members at the +election for the provincial councils. Any additional names on a ballot +paper are regarded as non-existent.] + +[Footnote 3: This paper bore the signature of the elector.] + + +APPENDIX IV + +THE FINLAND SYSTEM OF PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION + +_The influence of the Belgian system._ + +The system of proportional representation introduced into Finland by the +electoral law of 1906, while it presents little or no difficulty to the +voter, is, in its method of counting the votes, perhaps the most +complicated of the systems at present in force. It has for its basis the +Belgian List system and the d'Hondt rule, but the variations which were +introduced with the object of safeguarding the rights of the electors +against the possible tyranny of party managers are so important that at +the first glance its resemblance to the parent system is not easily +recognized. The Belgian model is followed more closely in the method of +distributing the seats to the various parties than in the manner in +which the successful candidates are chosen from the party lists. In its +internal party arrangement the Finnish system shows boldness, +originality, and, it must be added, no little complexity of procedure. + +_Schedules and "compacts" in place of lists._ + +Finland is divided into sixteen electoral districts returning from six +to twenty-three members, with the one exception of Lapland, which is a +single-member constituency. In each constituency any group of not less +than fifty electors can put forward a schedule of not more than three +candidates, however many may be the total number of members to be +elected. Each of these schedules may be headed with the name of a party +or some political motto. The persons responsible for these schedules +may, and commonly do, combine them in groups known as "compacts," and +it is these compacts, and not the original schedules, which correspond +roughly to the party "lists" of the Belgian system, the only limit to +this power of combination being that the combined schedules must not +contain the names of more candidates than there are vacancies to be +filled. But as the names of the same candidates may, and constantly do, +occur in many different schedules within a single compact, a first +glance at a Finnish polling paper would seem to show in each combination +the names of more candidates than there are vacancies. The compact bears +the name of the political party to which it belongs. Combination into +compacts is, of course, optional, and a certain number of schedules are +put forward independently. A vacant corner is reserved on the ballot +paper where any elector who is not content with any of the schedules +submitted may make his own schedule. + +_An election in Nyland_. + +The system may be more fully understood from some details of the +election of 1907 in the Nyland division. In this division, the largest +in Finland, returning twenty-three members, no less than seventy-two +schedules were presented, or which all except five were combined into +compacts. The five remained isolated. Of the combined schedules +seventeen were included in the compact of the Swedish party, but the +individual candidates in these seventeen schedules numbered only +twenty-three, the legal limit, the same names being repeated in several +schedules. The old Finnish compact contained thirteen schedules, the +Young Finns seventeen, the Social Democrats eight, the "Christian" +compact seven, the "Free Christian" compact three, and the Radicals two. + +As already stated, the voter's task is not difficult. He, or she, simply +marks the schedule of his, or her, choice. The voter can also, if he +wishes, alter the order of the names in a schedule. The effect of doing +this will be apparent in a moment. That the task is simple is +conclusively shown by the fact that the percentage of spoilt votes was +in the Nyland division only 0.58 per cent. For the whole country the +percentage was only 0.93, and this with universal adult suffrage and a +poll of 899,347, or 70.7 per cent, of the electorate. + +_The returning officer's task_. + +The task of the returning officer is twofold. He has to ascertain (1) +the relative positions of candidates within each compact (or independent +schedule), and (2) their position relatively to the candidates of other +compacts in the final allotment of seats. He proceeds as follows. He +first counts the votes on each schedule, reckoning a full vote to the +first name, a half vote to the second, and a third of a vote to the +third (the effect of an alteration of the order of names in a schedule +by the voter is now apparent). Thus if schedule No. 1 (in the specimen +ballot paper on page 323), containing the names Schybergson, Neovius, +and Soderholm, receives the support of 6000 voters in all, of whom 3000 +have placed Schybergson as No. 1, 2000 as No. 2, and 1000 as No. 3, +Schybergson will have a total of 3000 + 2000/2 + 1000/3 = 4333. +Similarly, if Neovius obtains the support of 2000 as No. 1, 2000 as No. +2, and 2000 as No. 3, his total will be 2000 + 2000/2 + 2000/3 = 3666; +Soderholm, the third candidate, would receive 1000 votes as No. 1, 2000 +as No. 2, and 3000 as No. 3, and his total would be 1000 + 2000/2 + +3000/3 = 3000. But these individual totals of 4333, 3666, and 3000 are +used merely to determine the order of the candidates within the schedule +itself, and having performed that function, they are not taken further +into account. In the example given (as would usually be the case in +practice) the order within the schedule has not been disturbed, and the +candidates are credited, the first (Schybergson) with the full number of +the voters who supported the schedule--6000; the second (Neovius) with +one-half that number--3000; the third (Soderholm) with one-third of that +number--2000. These last figures are called "numbers of comparison," a +phrase intended to throw light upon their function. The same process is +gone through with all the other schedules in the same compact. The +returning officer then adds up all the numbers of comparison which each +candidate has obtained in all the schedules within the compact where his +name appears, and arranges candidates within the compact in the order of +these totals. Thus, in the actual election of 1907, in the Nyland +division, Schybergson headed the Swedish party compact with 9192 as the +total of his "numbers of comparison," Soderholm coming next with 6837. + +_The allotment of seats_. + +When the candidates in each compact have thus been arranged in order +(and the votes given in writing by independent voters have also been +counted), the returning officer proceeds to the second stage of his +duties--the determination of the position of candidates with reference +to their competitors in other compacts; and it is on this position that +the actual allotment of seats depends. For this purpose he primarily +takes into account, not the "numbers of comparison" of individual +candidates, but the total number of voters who have supported each +compact; he credits this total to the candidate who has the highest +"number of comparison" within the compact; credits the next candidate +with one-half this total, the third candidate with one-third, and so on, +finally arranging the whole of the candidates in order. Thus far this +stage of the process is identical in substance with the Belgian method, +though the appearance is different. For, obviously, if List (or compact) +A, of which the candidates are G, H, I, in that order receives 12,000 +votes, while List B, with candidates P, Q, R, receives 10,000, and List +C, with candidates X, Y, Z, receives 8000, it is all one whether the +returning officer applies the d'Hondt rule and assigns two seats to List +A (thus seating G and H), two seats to List B (thus seating P and Q), +and one seat to List C (thus seating X), or whether he tabulates the +result of the polling thus: + +G 12,000 \ +P 10,000 | +X 8,000 > Elected. +H 12,000/2 i.e. 6,000 | +Q 10,000/2 i.e. 5,000 / +Y 8,000/2 i.e. 4,000 Not elected, and so on. + +But at this point a characteristic feature of the Finnish system comes +into play. Candidates' names may occur in more than one compact, and may +be found in isolated schedules, or on the written papers of independent +voters as well. Consequently their final order cannot be determined by +this simple application of the Belgian method. The returning officer +must[1] add to the number of votes credited to a candidate of any one +compact such additional votes as he may have obtained either as a member +of another compact or from independent voters. Thus, in the Nyland +elections, Miss Sohlberg, whose name will be found at the head of +Schedule 48 within the Swedish compact, obtained the eleventh place +within that compact. The total number of voters supporting this compact +was 44,544, and Miss Sohlberg was therefore credited with an eleventh of +this total, or 4049 votes. But Miss Sohlberg's name also occurred in +Schedules 62 and 63 in the "Free Christian" compact and Schedule 21 in +the "Christian" compact, and as her share of the votes of these compacts +she received 153 and 325 respectively. She also received four votes in +writing. Thus her final total was 4049 + 153 + 325 + 4, or 4531 in all, +and it was this number which determined her position on the poll. + +_Successful candidates in the Nyland election._ This +explanation will perhaps be more comprehensible if the actual result of +the polling in the Nyland division, so far as the first 25 candidates +are concerned, is given in a tabular form:-- + +Final Names of Party. Number of Additional Final +Order Candidates. Votes resulting Votes. Total. +of from Place of +Poll. Candidates on + Compact. + 1 Schybergson Swedish 44,544 2.33 44,546.33 + 2 Haeninan Social Dem. 40,951 6.5 40,957.5 + 3 Soderholm Swedish 22,272 0.33 22,272.33 + 4 Sillanpaeae Social Dem. 20,475.5 8.83 20,484.33 + 5 Kaekikoski Old Finn 20,402 9.33 20,411.33 + 6 Oljemark Swedish 14,848 -- 14,848 + 7 Siren Social Dem. 16,650.33 2.33 16,652.66 + 8 Rosenquist (G.) Swedish 8,908.8 2,932.83[2] 11,841.63 + 9 Rosenquist (V.) Swedish 11,136 4.33 11,140.33 +10 Helle Social Dem. 10,237.75 3 10,240.75 +11 Palmen Old Finn 10,201 8.83 10,209.83 +12 Pertillae (E.) Social Dem. 8,190.2 4.67 8,194.87 +13 Ahlroos Swedish 7,424 1 7,425 +14 Pertillae (V.) Social Dem. 6,725.17 1.5 6,726.67 +15 Reima Old Finn 6,800.67 5.67 6,806.34 +16 Erkko Young Finn 6,521 6.32 6,527.32 +17 Ehrnrooth Swedish 6,363.43 75.83 6,439.26 +18 Laine (M.) Social Dem. 5,850.14 4 5,854.14 +19 Wasastjerna Swedish 5,568 -- 5,568 +20 Ingman Social Dem. 5,118.88 3.5 5,122.38 +21 Laine (O.) Old Finn 5,100.5 -- 5,100.5 +22 von Alfthan Swedish 4,949.33 -- 4,949.33 +23 Johansson Social Dem. 4,550.11 1.33 4,551.44 + (All the above were elected.) +24 Sohlberg Swedish 4,049.45 482.45[3] 4,531.9 +25 Gustaffsson Swedish 4,454.4 4.5 4,458.9 + &c. &c. + +_Equitable results._ + +It will to some extent be gathered from the foregoing table that the +total number of the supporters of the various compacts or parties in the +Nyland division and the number of seats won were as follows: + + Seats Seats in +Parties. Votes. Actually Proportion + Won. to Votes. +Swedish 44,544 9 8.7 +Social Democrat 40,951 9 8.0 +Old Finn 20,402 4 4.0 +Young Finn 6,521 1 1.3 +"Christian" compact 2,932 - .6 +"Free Christian" 458 - .1 +Radical 168 - - +Isolated schedules 1,356 - .3 + +Total 117,332 23 23.0 + +The result is thus in reasonable correspondence with the demands of a +strictly proportionate allotment of seats; this statement is also true +of the results for the whole of Finland, as the following table +will show:-- + + Seats Seats in +Parties. Votes. Actually Proportion + Won. to Votes. +Social Democrat 329,946 80 74.1 +Old Finn. 243,573 59 54.7 +Young Finn 121,604 26 27.3 +Swedish 112,267 24 25.2 +Agrarian 51,242 9 11.5 +Christian Labourer 13,790 2 3.1 +Minor groups 18,568 - 4.1 + +Total 890,990 200 200.0 + +An exactly mathematical distribution is, of course, not to be expected +from this, any more than from any other method which does not adopt the +system of treating a whole country as a single constituency. As to the +mechanism of the system it only remains to add that the process of +counting was found to be very lengthy. In the Nyland division, where the +results were ascertained sooner than in any other case, the elections +were held on 15 and 16 March, but the result was not announced until +the 2 April. To people accustomed to the greater rapidity of ordinary +electoral methods this will seem a serious drawback. Possibly improved +arrangements may shorten this long interval between the elections and +the announcement of the result. + +It would obviously be premature to attempt to estimate the political +effects of the Finnish system as compared with other systems of +proportional representation. + +_Elector's freedom of choice._ + +The Finnish system has been in operation since 1907, and the whole +political circumstances of Finland have undergone so many striking +changes, and so many new factors are at work that to disentangle +particular causes and effects is an impossibility. But plainly the +Finnish machinery gives a greater freedom to the elector than the +Belgian system. The Finnish system in fact encourages the electors to +arrange the candidates of a party in the order preferred by the electors +themselves, and not in the order dictated by the party managers. There +is no "party ticket" for which the elector can vote blindfold. He must +choose the schedule that he prefers; he can even rearrange that +schedule, or, if he chooses, can make one of his own. No doubt the +schedule itself is ready made for him, but it contains three names only, +and is not the equivalent of the Belgian "list." On the other hand, the +elector who chooses to vote for a schedule within a compact adds, +whether he likes it or not, to the total votes of the compact, and so +may help to return not the candidate of his choice, but the candidates +preferred by the majority of the party with which he is in sympathy. An +illustration of this fact may be taken from the Nyland poll. The old +Finnish party were alive to the possibilities of the situation, and +combined their lists with great skill so as to attract votes. They +placed their favourite candidates in nearly every schedule, but not at +the head of the schedule. At the head of the schedule they placed some +man of local popularity, usually a peasant proprietor, whose name was +not repeated in many, if any, other schedules. Thus the local favourite +attracted votes to the schedule, but in the race for the highest numbers +of comparison the candidates whose names appeared on few schedules were +left behind those whose names appeared on many schedules even in the +lower places. + +A portion of the official ballot paper showing the compact put forward +by the Swedish People's Party is printed on the opposite page. In one +corner of the ballot paper was a blank schedule in the following form. + +THE ELECTOR who does not approve of any of the preceding lists should +write here the names of his candidates in the order in which he wishes +them to be elected. + +CANDIDATES + +_Name_.................................................... + +_Profession or Occupation_................................ + +_Address_................................................. + + +_Name_.................................................... + +_Profession or Occupation_................................ + +_Address_................................................. + + +_Name_.................................................... + +_Profession or Occupation_................................ + +_Address_................................................. + + +FINLAND GENERAL ELECTION, 1907 + +Part of Ballot Paper--Nyland Division. + +The Voters' Compact of the Swedish People's Party. + +1 +HELSINGFORS. +Experienced Members of the Diet:-- +--Schybergson, E. K. +--Neovius, A. W. +--Soderholm, K. G. + +33 +EAST NYLAND-LOUISA. +Justice and Progress:-- +--Rosenquist, G. G. +--Stromberg, J. +--Ehrnrooth, L. + +34 +MID-NYLAND-NIOKBY. +The Welfare of the Rural Population;-- +--Topelius, G. L. +--Alfthau, K. von +--Rosenquist, B. T. + +35 +MID-NYLAND-ESBO. +The Welfare of the Rural Population:-- +--Wasastjerna, O. +--Schybergson, E. +--Soderholin, K. + +36 +WEST NYLAND-KYRK-SLATT. +The Welfare ol the Rural Population:-- +--Nordberg, G. +--Ehrnrooth, L. +--Oljemark, K. T. + +37 +WEST NYLANB-EKENAS. +The Welfare of the Rural Population. Law and Justice:-- +--Oljemark, K. T. +--Schybergson, E. +--Soderholm, K. + +38 +BORGA. +Knowledge and Experience:-- +--Runeberg, J. W. +--Bjorkenheim, G. +--Rosenquist, G. G. + +39 +HELSINGFORS. +Sound Development of the Community;-- +--Westermarck, Helena. +--Rosenquist, B. T. +--Bjorkenheim, G. + +40 +HELSINGFORS. +Law and Justice:-- +--Sorterholm, K. +--Alfthan, K. von +--Westermarck, Helena, + +41 +HELSINGFORS. +Legality and Progress:-- +--Westermarck, Helena. +--Neovius, A. +--Ehrnrooth, L. + +42 +HELLSINGFORS. +Swedish Culture:-- +--Rosenqnist, B. T. +--Gustafsson, F. prof. +--Soderholm, K. + +43 +HELSINGFORS. +Friends of Labour and of the People:-- +--Alfthan, K. von +--Gustafsson, F. prof. +--Gronroos, F. + +44 +HELSINGFORS. +Experience and Practical Knowledge:-- +--Runeberg, J. W. +--Schybergson, E. +--Neovius, A. + +45 +HELSINGFORS. +The Labourers' Welfare:-- +--Ahlroos, F. +--Holmberg, W. +--Ehrnrooth, L. + +46 +HELSINGFORS. +Commerce and Industry: +--Heimburger, W. F. +--Bjorkenheim, G. +--Schybergson, E. + +47 +THE SKERRIES OF NYLAND: +Navigation and Fisheries:-- +--Hjelt, Th. +--Renter, O. +--Alfthan, K. + +48 +THE PROVINCE OF NYLAND: +HELSINGFORS. +Temperance, Morality and Popular Education:-- +--Sohlberg, H. +--Ahlroos, F. +--Rosenquist, G. G. + + +[Footnote 1: This right of addition is subject to a limit. The +reinforcements must not raise a candidate's total above what he might +obtain if the votes given to all compacts or lists, where his name +occurs, were divided by the figure which indicates his order within the +compact from which he derives his principal strength.] + +[Footnote 2: This large reinforcement of votes came from the Christian +compact, where this candidate's name appeared as well as in the +Swedish compact.] + +[Footnote 3: See reference to Miss Sohlberg in preceding paragraph.] + + +APPENDIX V + +THE STATISTICS OF THE GENERAL ELECTIONS, 1885-1910 + + +The following tables are taken, with permission, from a paper read on 12 +December 1906, by Mr. J. Rooke Corbett, M.A., before the Manchester +Statistical Society, of which a second and revised edition was published +in April 1910 by the Proportional Representation Society. + +In these tables the totals for England, Wales, and Monmouth, Scotland +and Ireland are shown separately, and the figures for England have been +further subdivided according to the ten divisions into which the kingdom +is divided by the Registrar General for the purpose of his work. + +These ten subdivisions are as follows: + +Metropolitan-- + London. +South East-- + Surrey. + Kent. + Sussex. + Hampshire. + Berkshire. +South Midland-- + Middlesex. + Hertfordshire. + Buckinghamshire. + Oxfordshire. + Northamptonshire. + Huntingdonshire. + Bedfordshire. + Cambridgeshire. +East-- + Essex. + Suffolk. + Norfolk. +South-West-- + Wiltshire. + Dorsetshire. + Devonshire. + Cornwall. + Somersetshire. +West Midland-- + Gloucestershire. + Herefordshire. + Shropshire. + Staffordshire. + Worcestershire. + Warwickshire. +North Midland-- + Leicestershire. + Rutlandshire. + Lincolnshire. + Nottinghamshire. + Derbyshire. +North-West-- + Cheshire. + Lancashire. +Yorkshire-- + West Riding. + East Riding (with York). + North Riding. +Northern Division-- + Durham. + Northumberland. + Cumberland. + Westmorland. + +The first three columns, A, B and C, show the number of members allotted +to these several divisions, the number of registered electors, and the +number of members to which each division would be entitled if the 670 +members of which the House of Commons is composed were divided among the +several divisions in proportion to their electorates. + +In taking the electorate as the basis of a proportionate redistribution +of seats it is not intended to prejudge the question whether population +or electorate is the better standard. The electorate has been taken +because the figures are available for the very year in which the +election takes place, whereas the population is only enumerated once in +ten years. + +The columns D and E show in two groups the number of members elected for +these divisions, Liberal, Labour, and Irish members being gathered +together in one column, Conservatives alone occupying the other. + +It is one of the disadvantages of our present system of representation +that it makes it quite impossible to ascertain the relative strength of +the several parties into which the voters are divided. In the great +majority of contests there is a Liberal, Labour, or Irish Nationalist +candidate on one side, and a Unionist candidate on the other, and there +is practically no evidence as to how many of the supporters of either +candidate belong to each of the parties concerned. Any estimate of the +relative strength of the Liberal and Labour parties or of the Unionist +Free Traders, and Tariff Reformers must be largely a matter of +guesswork. All that is possible, therefore, is to divide the voters into +two groups, as has been done in these tables. + +The columns F and G show the total electorate of the constituencies held +respectively by the two groups of members shown in columns D and E. + +The figures in these two columns are of value in showing the probable +result of a scheme of redistribution. The South-Eastern counties may be +taken as an example. These are at present represented by 48 members. The +Liberals held three constituencies in January 1910 containing an +electorate of 31,221 (columns D and F); the Conservatives held 45 +constituencies containing an electorate of 604,887 (columns E and G). If +a redistribution of seats was made on the basis of equal electorates, +the South-Eastern counties would be entitled to 55 members (column C). +It may be assumed that in any rearrangement of constituencies the +parties would retain their predominance in the areas which they now +represent, and if so the result of a rearrangement of constituencies on +the basis of equal electorates would be that in January 1910 the +Conservatives would have obtained 52 seats and the Liberals 3 (column +K). Similarly in the General Election of 1906 the Liberals in Wales and +Monmouth held 34 seats, the Conservatives none. If the constituencies +had been rearranged, the Liberals would have held 35 seats, the +Conservatives none. The majorities throughout the United Kingdom which +would be obtained under a scheme of equal electorates are shown +in column K. + +The columns H and I show the number of electors who voted for the +candidates of the two groups; Liberal, Labour, and Irish Nationalist +voters in one group, Conservative voters in the other. + +In computing the figures in these columns an allowance has been made for +uncontested constituencies on the following basis. It has been supposed +that the changes of public opinion which affect the contested +constituencies affect uncontested constituencies also, and in estimating +the number of voters in an uncontested constituency it has therefore +been assumed that the strength of each party varies from one election to +another in the same ratio as in the contested constituencies in the +same county. + +The three columns J, K and L show respectively the actual majorities +obtained, the majorities which would have been obtained if the country +had been divided into single-member constituencies of equal size, and +the majorities under a system of proportional representation. + +The figures in the last two columns have been calculated with reference +to the totals in column C, which gives the number of members to which +each division would be entitled on a proportional basis. + +In order to ascertain the figures given in column K _(i.e._ the probable +results with equal single-member constituencies) it has been assumed, as +already explained, that the two groups would, after the redistribution +of seats, be predominant in the same areas as before the rearrangement. + +_The representation of minorities._ + +The tables give abundant evidence of the anomalies associated with our +electoral system. One of the most striking is the great difference in +the amount of representation secured by minorities in different parts of +the country. The amount of representation secured by a minority has not +depended upon its size, but upon the way in which it has been +distributed. The following table shows the amount of representation +obtained by important minorities in the General Election of +January 1910:-- + +THE REPRESENTATION OF MINORITIES, ELECTION JAN. 1910 + + Size of Seats Total Seats +Area. Minority. Obtained. for Whole Area +Ireland . . . . . . . 145,437 21 103 +Scotland . . . . . . . 265,770 11 72 +S. East: Counties. . . 220,995 3 48 +Wales and Monmouth . . 116,696 2 34 +Northern Counties . . 75,897 9 32 + +The figures show that in Ireland a minority of 145,437 obtained +twenty-one representatives, whilst a minority of 116,696 in Wales and +Monmouth obtained only two. The good fortune which befel the minority in +Ireland, not only in the elections of 1910 but in all the elections +since the Redistribution Bill of 1885, has been due to the fact that +this minority is concentrated in one corner of Ireland and can transform +itself into local majorities. The larger minority in Scotland, owing to +its distribution throughout the country, obtains much less +representation; the minorities in the south-eastern counties of England +and Wales are also distributed throughout these two areas and likewise +suffer. The minority of 75,879 in the northern counties being less +evenly diffused was more fortunate, and obtained nine representatives. +The figures for the election of December 1910 disclose similar +anomalies. + +GENERAL ELECTION, 1885 + +Col A: Members +Col B: Registered Electors +Col C: Proportionate Number of Members +Col D: Members - Liberal, Labour and Irish +Col E: Members - Conservatives +Col F: Electorate of Constituencies held by - Liberal, Labour, + and Irish Nationalists +Col G: Electorate of Constituencies held by - Conservative +Col H: Voters - Liberal, Labour, and Irish Nationalist +Col I: Voters - Conservative +Col J: Majority - Actual +Col K: Majority - With equal Single Member Constituencies +Col L: Majority - Under Proportional Representation. + + A B C DE FG HI J K L + Prop Memb Electorate Voters Majority + Memb Elect Memb Act Eq PR +Metropolis 60 489,396 57 LLI 22 165,345 162,228 + Con 38 324,051 188,067 16 19 3 +England +South-East 48 406,955 47 LLI 4 34,883 144,659 + Con 44 372,072 187,831 40 39 7 +S.Midland 38 312,477 36 LLI 14 123,665 124,717 + Con 24 188,811 129,544 10 8 +East 29 257,022 29 LLI 18 173,521 107,710 7 11 1 + Con 11 83,501 98,137 +South-West 40 314,603 36 LLI 27 229,612 144,273 14 16 4 + Con 13 84,991 117,442 +W.Midland 58 544,415 63 LLI 45 427,549 248,825 32 36 8 + Con 13 116,866 198,212 +N.Midland 34 328,844 38 LLI 26 255,836 55,503 18 22 4 + Con 8 73,008 120,933 +North-West 70 654,751 76 LLI 24 231,123 263,670 + Con 46 423,628 292,942 22 22 4 +Yorkshire 52 536,553 62 LLI 36 398,426 248,078 20 30 8 + Con 16 138,127 189,930 20 30 8 +North 32 305,015 35 LLI 25 262,287 144,803 18 25 5 + Con 7 42,728 96,708 +ENGLAND 461 4,150,031 480 LLI 241 2,302,248 1,740,466 21 52 16 + Con 220 1,847,783 1,619,746 +Wales and + Monmouth 34 286,145 33 LLI 30 263,199 149,782 26 27 11 + Con 4 22,946 79,006 +Scotland 72 576,828 67 LLI 58 485,116 289,032 44 45 15 + Con 14 91,712 181,706 + +Britain 567 5,013,004 580 LLI 329 3,050,563 2,179,230 91 124 42 + Con 238 1,962,441 1,880,458 +Ireland 103 777,954 90 LLI 85 624,760 404,892 67 54 44 + Con 18 153,194 139,273 + +Total 670 5,790,958 670 LLI 414 3,675,323 2,584,122 158 178 86 + Con 256 2,115,635 2,019,731 + +Majority 158 1,559,638 564,391 + +NOTE.--The figures in columns K and L are calculated with reference to +the totals in column C. Thus the figure L 54 for Ireland in column K of +the last section of the table indicates that under a system of equal +single-member constituencies Ireland's 90 members would be Liberal etc. +72, Unionist 18, a Liberal majority of 54, and the corresponding figure +L 44 in column L indicates that under proportional representation the 90 +members which Ireland would return would be Liberal etc. 67, and +Unionist 23. a Liberal majority of 44. + +GENERAL ELECTION, 1886 + +Col A: Members +Col B: Registered Electors +Col C: Proportionate Number of Members +Col D: Members - Liberal, Labour and Irish +Col E: Members - Conservatives +Col F: Electorate of Constituencies held by - Liberal, Labour, + and Irish Nationalists +Col G: Electorate of Constituencies held by - Conservative +Col H: Voters - Liberal, Labour, and Irish Nationalist +Col I: Voters - Conservative +Col J: Majority - Actual +Col K: Majority - With equal Single Member Constituencies +Col L: Majority - Under Proportional Representation. + + A B C DE FG HI J K L + Prop Memb Electorate Voters Majority + Memb Elect Memb Act Eq PR +Metropolis 60 489,396 57 LLI 11 87,974 125,457 + Con 49 401,422 185,072 38 37 11 +England-- +South-East 48 406,955 47 LLI 0 - 114,518 + Con 48 406,955 184,221 48 47 11 +S.Midland 38 312,477 36 LLI 9 73,292 94,213 + Con 29 239,185 128,339 20 20 6 +East 29 257,022 29 LLI 4 87,975 81,838 + Con 25 219,047 102,732 21 21 3 +South-West 40 314,603 36 LLI 7 63,063 96,753 + Con 33 251,540 129,056 26 22 6 +W.Midland 58 544,415 63 LLI 15 136,518 173,463 + Con 43 407,897 218,753 28 32 8 +N.Midland 34 328,844 38 LLI 14 147,138 125,078 + Con 20 181,706 126,547 6 4 +North-West 70 654,751 76 LLI 13 123,459 236,134 + Con 57 531,292 282,187 44 48 6 +Yorkshire 52 536,553 62 LLI 33 359,414 214,407 6 + Con 19 177,139 180,728 14 22 +North 32 305,015 35 LLI 23 247,275 123,901 5 + Con 9 57,740 96,404 14 21 +ENGLAND 461 4,150,031 480 LLI 129 1,276,108 1,385,762 + Con 332 2,873,923 1,634,039 203 188 42 + +Wales and +Monmouth 34 286,145 33 LLI 27 240,752 123,186 20 23 7 + Con 7 45,393 82,179 +Scotland 72 576,828 67 LLI 43 339,726 218,561 14 11 5 + Con 29 237,102 188,164 + +Subtotal 567 5,013,004 580 LLI 199 1,856,586 1,727,509 + Con 368 3,156,418 1,904,382 169 154 30 + +Ireland 103 777,954 90 LLI 84 616,735 376,445 + Con 19 161,219 144,755 65 52 38 + +Total 670 5,790,958 670 LLI 283 2,473,321 2,103,954 8 + Con 387 3,317,637 2,049,137 104 102 + +Majority 104 844,316 54,817 + +GENERAL ELECTION, 1892 + +Table headings: +Col A: Members +Col B: Registered Electors +Col C: Proportionate Number of Members +Col D: Members - Liberal, Labour and Irish +Col E: Members - Conservatives +Col F: Electorate of Constituencies held by - Liberal, Labour, + and Irish Nationalists +Col G: Electorate of Constituencies held by - Conservative +Col H: Voters - Liberal, Labour, and Irish Nationalist +Col I: Voters - Conservative +Col J: Majority - Actual +Col K: Majority - With equal Single Member Constituencies +Col L: Majority - Under Proportional Representation. + + A B C DE FG HI J K L + Prop Memb Electorate Voters Majority + Memb Elect Memb Act Eq PR +Metropolis 60 552,024 60 LLI 23 186,572 183,967 + Con 37 365,452 214,275 14 20 4 +England: +South-East 48 463,073 50 LLI 4 38,534 147,136 + Con 44 424,539 206,075 40 42 8 +S.Midland 38 340,650 38 LLI 15 139,228 120,844 + Con 23 210,422 147,347 8 8 4 +East 29 276,491 30 LLI 13 134,632 108,866 + Con 16 141,859 110,849 3 +South-West 40 325,769 35 LLI 15 136,061 125,392 + Con 25 189,708 136,449 10 5 1 +W. Midland 58 577,397 63 LLI 16 143,567 204,453 + Con 42 433,830 248,774 26 31 7 +N. Midland 34 347,482 38 LLI 22 232,970 145,587 10 14 2 + Con 12 114,512 130,380 +North-West 70 707,392 77 LLI 26 284,970 282,139 + Con 44 422,422 307,698 18 15 3 +Yorkshire 52 571,864 62 LLI 35 418,414 244,099 18 28 6 + Con 17 153,450 204,492 +North 32 328,189 36 LLI 25 264,483 143,172 18 22 4 + Con 7 63,706 115,626 +ENGLAND 461 4,499,331 489 LLI 194 1,979,431 1,705,655 + Con 267 2,519,900 1,821,985 73 57 15 + +Wales and +Monmouth 34 314,063 34 LLI 31 294,395 152,326 28 30 10 + Con 3 19,668 86,576 +Scotland 72 606,203 66 LLI 52 449,994 267,631 32 32 8 + Con 20 156,209 214,448 + +Subtotal 567 5,419,497 589 LLI 277 2,723,820 2,125,612 5 3 + Con 290 2,695,777 2,123,009 13 +Ireland 103 746,781 81 LLI 80 561,938 345,548 57 41 31 + Con 23 184,843 157,181 + +Total 670 6,168,388 670 LLI 357 3,285,758 2,471,164 44 46 34 + Con 313 2,880,620 2,280,190 +Majority 44 405,138 190,974 + +GENERAL ELECTION, 1895 + +Table headings: +Col A: Members +Col B: Registered Electors +Col C: Proportionate Number of Members +Col D: Members - Liberal, Labour and Irish +Col E: Members - Conservatives +Col F: Electorate of Constituencies held by - Liberal, Labour, + and Irish Nationalists +Col G: Electorate of Constituencies held by - Conservative +Col H: Voters - Liberal, Labour, and Irish Nationalist +Col I: Voters - Conservative +Col J: Majority - Actual +Col K: Majority - With equal Single Member Constituencies +Col L: Majority - Under Proportional Representation. + + A B C DE FG HI J K L + Prop Memb Electorate Voters Majority + Memb Elect Memb Act Eq PR +Metropolis 60 573,141 61 LLI 8 70,056 161,328 + Con 52 503,085 242,999 44 47 13 +England: +South-East 48 472,725 50 LLI 2 24,057 152,213 + Con 46 448,668 217,096 44 44 8 +S.Midland 38 358,501 38 LLI 3 30,569 116,143 + Con 35 327,932 164,052 32 32 6 +East 29 294,153 31 LLI 8 70,467 101,736 + Con 21 223,686 122,999 13 15 3 +South-West 40 330,670 35 LLI 10 76,141 124,852 + Con 30 254,529 144,435 20 19 3 +W.Midland 58 589,881 63 LLI 9 85,544 195,545 + Con 49 504,337 259,382 40 45 9 +N.Midland 34 351,792 37 LLI 16 186,167 143,142 1 + Con 18 165,625 149,436 2 1 +North-West 70 728,292 78 LLI 10 114,035 273,585 + Con 60 614,257 332,101 50 54 8 +Yorkshire 52 565,799 61 LLI 28 317,932 238,032 4 7 1 + Con 24 247,867 225,871 +North 32 339,289 36 LLI 20 222,202 145,085 8 12 2 + Con 12 117,087 124,697 + +ENGLAND 461 4,604,243 490 LLI 114 1,197,170 1,652,261 + Con 347 3,407,073 1,983,068 233 236 48 +Wales and +Monmouth 34 320,532 34 LLI 25 241,750 148,552 16 18 6 + Con 9 78,782 108,036 +Scotland 72 636,106 68 LLI 39 335,143 243,425 6 4 2 + Con 33 300,963 234,138 + +Subtotal 567 5,560,881 592 LLI 178 1,774,068 2,044,238 + Con 389 3,786,818 2,325,242 211 214 40 + +Ireland 103 727,562 78 LLI 82 549,467 317,910 61 42 28 + Con 21 178,095 154,379 + +Total 670 6,292,443 670 LLI 260 2,323,530 2,362,148 + Con 410 3,964,913 2,479,621 150 172 12 +Majority 150 1,641,383 117,473 + +GENERAL ELECTION, 1900 +Table headings: +Col A: Members +Col B: Registered Electors +Col C: Proportionate Number of Members +Col D: Members - Liberal, Labour and Irish +Col E: Members - Conservatives +Col F: Electorate of Constituencies held by - Liberal, Labour, + and Irish Nationalists +Col G: Electorate of Constituencies held by - Conservative +Col H: Voters - Liberal, Labour, and Irish Nationalist +Col I: Voters - Conservative +Col J: Majority - Actual +Col K: Majority - With equal Single Member Constituencies +Col L: Majority - Under Proportional Representation. + + A B C DE FG HI J K L + Prop Memb Electorate Voters Majority + Memb Elect Memb Act Eq PR +Metropolis 60 601,925 60 LLI 8 73,718 150,047 + Con 52 528,207 247,777 44 46 14 +England: +South-East 48 512,408 51 LLI 3 23,362 140,277 + Con 45 489,406 220,829 42 47 11 +S. Midland 38 388,361 39 LLI 6 63,375 120,012 + Con 32 324,986 164,148 26 27 7 +East 29 319,997 32 LLI 9 80,447 101,785 + Con 20 239,550 125,375 11 8 4 +South-West 40 337,449 33 LLI 14 122,410 127,086 + Con 26 215,039 142,269 12 9 1 +W. Midland 58 630,931 63 LLI 10 96,089 200,113 + Con 48 534,842 261,474 38 43 9 +N. Midland 34 378,996 38 LLI 18 211,280 149,794 2 4 0 + Con 16 167,716 153,294 +North-West 70 794,142 79 LLI 14 176,183 281,634 + Con 56 617,957 351,243 42 43 9 +Yorkshire 52 612,892 61 LLI 26 326,841 239,045 5 1 + Con 26 286,051 238,870 +North 32 367,007 36 LLI 16 197,102 147,017 2 2 + Con 16 169,905 135,459 +ENGLAND 461 4,944,108 492 LLI 124 1,370,807 1,657,814 + Con 337 3,573,301 2,040,508 213 212 52 + +Wales and +Monmouth 34 342,209 34 LLI 28 286,628 161,190 22 24 8 + Con 6 55,581 103,396 +Scotland 72 683,840 68 LLI 34 312,781 254,112 + Con 34 371,059 258,836 4 6 + +Britain 567 5,970,187 594 LLI 186 1,970,216 2,073,116 + Con 381 3,999,941 2,402,740 195 194 44 + +Ireland 103 765,258 76 LLI 82 598,469 318,203 61 44 28 + Con 21 166,757 145,906 + +Total 670 6,735,415 670 LLI 268 2,568,685 2,391,319 + Con 402 4,166,698 2,548,736 134 150 16 +Majority 134 1,598,013 157,417 + +GENERAL ELECTION, 1906 + +Table headings: +Col A: Members +Col B: Registered Electors +Col C: Proportionate Number of Members +Col D: Members - Liberal, Labour and Irish +Col E: Members - Conservatives +Col F: Electorate of Constituencies held by - Liberal, Labour, + and Irish Nationalists +Col G: Electorate of Constituencies held by - Conservative +Col H: Voters - Liberal, Labour, and Irish Nationalist +Col I: Voters - Conservative +Col J: Majority - Actual +Col K: Majority - With equal Single Member Constituencies +Col L: Majority - Under Proportional Representation. + + A B C DE FG HI J K L + Prop Memb Electorate Voters Majority + Memb Elect Memb Act Eq PR +Metropolis 60 626,011 57 LLI 40 385,762 251,937 + Con 20 240,249 225,725 20 13 3 +England +South East 48 583,000 54 LLI 22 273,398 245,046 + Con 26 309,602 241,097 4 4 +S.Midlands 38 441,803 40 LLI 27 328,386 193,594 16 20 2 + Con 11 113,417 172,159 +East 29 368,662 34 LLI 25 333,564 170,039 21 28 4 + Con 4 35,098 128,991 +South-West 40 371,300 34 LLI 34 321,822 176,478 28 24 4 + Con 6 49,478 144,342 +W.Midland 58 679,903 63 LLI 35 402,148 288,832 12 11 1 + Con 23 277,760 286,862 +N.Midland 34 420,677 39 LLI 28 358,852 205,066 22 27 5 + Con 6 61,825 151,924 +North-West 70 869,792 80 LLI 55 680,843 420,969 40 46 12 + Con 15 188,949 321,560 +Yorkshire 52 667,863 62 LLI 41 556,233 340,865 30 42 14 + Con 11 111,635 218,778 +North 32 409,843 38 LLI 27 345,353 215,748 22 26 10 + Con 5 64,490 123,003 +England 461 5,438,859 501 LLI 334 3,986,356 2,508,574 207 233 53 + Con 127 1,452,503 2,014,441 + +Wales and + Monmouth 34 387,585 35 LLI 34 387,585 217,462 34 35 13 + Con 0 -- 100,547 +Scotland 72 750,401 70 LLI 60 629,360 367,942 48 48 16 + Con 12 121,041 235,098 + +Britain 567 6,576,845 606 LLI 428 5,003,301 3,093,978 289 316 82 + Con 139 1,573,544 2,350,086 + +Ireland 103 693,417 64 LLI 85 545,748 301,833 67 36 22 + Con 18 147,669 144,708 + +TOTAL 670 7,270,262 670 LLI 513 5,549,049 3,395,811 356 352 104 + Con 157 1,721,213 2,494,794 +Majority 356 3,827,836 901,017 + +GENERAL ELECTION, JANUARY 1910 + +Table headings: +Col A: Members +Col B: Registered Electors +Col C: Proportionate Number of Members +Col D: Members - Liberal, Labour and Irish +Col E: Members - Conservatives +Col F: Electorate of Constituencies held by - Liberal, Labour, + and Irish Nationalists +Col G: Electorate of Constituencies held by - Conservative +Col H: Voters - Liberal, Labour, and Irish Nationalist +Col I: Voters - Conservative +Col J: Majority - Actual +Col K: Majority - With equal Single Member Constituencies +Col L: Majority - Under Proportional Representation. + + A B C DE FG HI J K L + Prop Memb Electorate Voters Majority + Memb Elect Memb Act Eq PR +Metropolis 60 658,795 57 LLI 26 246,838 254,154 + Con 34 411,957 298,821 8 15 5 +England: +South-East 48 636,108 55 LLI 3 31,221 220,995 + Con 45 604,887 334,022 42 49 11 +S. Midland 38 490,592 43 LLI 11 146,312 197,717 + Con 27 344,280 235,776 16 17 3 +East 29 400,062 35 LLI 15 236,234 173,465 1 7 1 + Con 14 163,828 170,027 +South-West 40 386,514 34 LLI 18 201,726 172,692 2 + Con 22 184,788 175,010 4 +W. Midland 58 713,761 62 LLI 17 227,430 284,629 + Con 41 486,331 334,874 24 22 6 +N. Midland 34 446,752 39 LLI 23 334,766 216,469 12 19 3 + Con 11 111,986 181,209 +North-West 70 928,640 81 LLI 47 636,497 449,324 24 35 7 + Con 23 292,143 382,796 +Yorkshire 52 701,856 61 LLI 89 564,418 365,185 26 37 11 + Con 13 137,438 248,507 +North 32 430,594 38 LLI 23 354,697 216,760 14 24 6 + Con 9 75,897 150,471 +ENGLAND 461 5,793,674 505 LLI 222 2,980.139 2,551,390 21 3 + Con 239 2,813,535 2,521,513 17 +Wales and +Monmouth 34 425,714 37 LLI 32 414,613 243,383 30 35 13 + Con 2 11,101 116,696 +Scotland 72 785,391 68 LLI 61 675,723 394,103 50 50 14 + Con 11 109,668 265,770 +Sub total 567 7,004,779 610 LLI 315 4,070,475 3,188,876 63 106 30 + Con 252 3,188,876 2,903,979 + +Ireland 103 688,284 60 LLI 82 518,154 356,223 61 30 26 + Con 21 170,130 145,437 + +Total 670 7,693,063 670 LLI 397 4,588,629 3,545,099 124 136 56 + Con 270 3,104,434 3,049,416 +Majority 124 1,484,195 495,683 + +GENERAL ELECTION, DECEMBER 1910 + +Table headings: +Col A: Members +Col B: Registered Electors +Col C: Proportionate Number of Members +Col D: Members - Liberal, Labour and Irish +Col E: Members - Conservatives +Col F: Electorate of Constituencies held by - Liberal, Labour, + and Irish Nationalists +Col G: Electorate of Constituencies held by - Conservative +Col H: Voters - Liberal, Labour, and Irish Nationalist +Col I: Voters - Conservative +Col J: Majority - Actual +Col K: Majority - With equal Single Member Constituencies +Col L: Majority - Under Proportional Representation. + + A B C DE FG HI J K L + Prop Memb Electorate Voters Majority + Memb Elect Memb Act Eq PR +Metropolis 60 658,795 57 LLI 29 279,492 223,151 + Con 31 379,303 264,281 2 9 5 +England-- +South-East 48 636,108 55 LLI 5 58,248 209,434 + Con 43 577,860 311,888 38 45 11 +S. Midland 38 490,592 43 LLI 14 170,762 190,120 + Con 24 319,830 219,876 10 13 3 +East 29 400,062 35 LLI 16 256,750 164,849 3 9 1 + Con 13 143,312 154,529 +South-West 40 386,514 34 LLI 14 159,494 164,698 + Con 26 227,020 168,992 12 6 0 +W. Midland 58 713,761 62 LLI 19 246,842 268,125 + Con 39 466,919 316,574 20 20 6 +N. Midland 34 446,752 39 LLI 21 298,037 202,351 8 13 3 + Con 13 148,715 173,545 +North-West 70 928,640 81 LLI 39 524,682 400,508 8 11 1 + Con 31 403,958 386,045 +Yorkshire 52 701,856 61 LLI 40 570,544 321,622 28 39 9 + Con 12 131,312 239,067 +North 32 430,594 38 LLI 25 375,574 200,583 18 28 6 + Con 7 55,020 142,388 +ENGLAND 461 5,793,674 505 LLI 222 2,940,425 2,345,441 7 + Con 239 2,853,249 2,377,185 17 5 +Wales and +Monmouth 34 425,714 37 LLI 31 388,507 210,525 28 31 9 + Con 3 37,207 121,013 +Scotland 72 785,391 68 LLI 61 678,395 372,313 50 50 10 + Con 11 106,996 277,183 + +Subtotal 567 7,004,779 610 LLI 314 4,007,327 2,928,279 61 88 14 + Con 253 2,997,452 2,775,381 + +Ireland 103 688,284 60 LLI 84 536,675 350,029 65 34 24 + Con 19 151,609 146,982 + +Total 670 7,693,063 670 LLI 398 4,544,002 3,278,308 126 122 38 + Con 272 3,149,061 2,922,363 +Majority 126 1,394,941 355,945 + + +APPENDIX VI + +PREFERENTIAL VOTING: THE TRANSFER OF SUPERFLUOUS VOTES + +(A Memorandum by the Rt. Hon. J. Parker Smith)[1] + +(1) _The Element of Chance Involved: Its Magnitude_ + +An objection, which occurs to every one who considers schemes of +Preferential Voting, is that an element of chance is introduced into the +result by the methods for the transfer of the superfluous votes of +successful candidates. Supposing one part of the supporters of A, a +successful candidate, have put down B as their second choice, and the +remainder C, and that a certain number of A's votes are superfluous, and +have to be transferred, how is it to be determined what number of AB +votes, as they may be called, and what number of AC votes shall be +transferred? If the question is settled by chance, as, by drawing the +necessary number at random from A's heap, by declaring that voting +papers shall be used in the order in which they were handed in at the +polling booths, or by laying down any other set of arbitrary rules to +determine the order in which they shall be counted, an element of +uncertainty is introduced by which there seems to be serious danger that +B and C will gain or lose unfairly. + +Those who are accustomed to dealing with statistics will be prepared to +find this danger less than might have been expected; but even they will +be surprised to find of how small importance the arbitrary element is +discovered, by actual calculation, to be. + +The difficulty can be made clear by a numerical instance. Take the case +of an election for several seats, where the necessary quota is 6000, and +where a favourite candidate, whom we will call A, has received the first +votes of 10,000 voters. Though all those voters have agreed in putting +the same candidate first, they are divided as to who may wish to be +returned next. Six thousand of them put B as their second choice, and +the other 4000 C. If the 6000 votes which A requires are drawn wholly +from the AB votes, the result of the transfer will be that C is credited +with 4000 votes and B with none. This would be clearly unfair, for, in +reality, B has received among A's voters much more support than C. To +use up the 4000 AC votes and only 2000 AB votes, and to transfer 4000 +votes to B and none to C would be equally unfair to C. The course which +is exactly fair to both B and C is that the votes which are transferred +should be divided between them in the same proportion as that in which +the opinions of the whole number of A's supporters is divided. That is +to say, strict justice will be done if every 1000 votes which are used +or transferred are made up of 600 AB votes and 400 AC votes. +Accordingly, A's quota of 6000 must be made up of 3600 AB votes and 2400 +AC votes, and the 4000 papers left to be transferred will consequently +consist of 2400 votes for B and 1600 votes for C. + +This principle avoids all uncertainty, and is indisputably fair. It +remains to consider how to carry it into effect. In most cases there +would, in reality, be many more classes of votes than in the instance +taken above. Even in such cases it is practicable, as will presently be +shown, to divide the votes proportionately by an actual process of +counting and separation. A certain amount of complication is, of course, +introduced, but the extra labour involved does not seem impossible. The +question whether this extra labour is necessary must be answered by +examining the magnitude of the evil which it is sought to remedy. + +If the votes are counted in a random order, it is clear there is a +probability that the order in which they are drawn will correspond to +the total numbers of each class in the ballot-box. It is reasonable to +expect that when there are 10,000 ballot papers in an urn the +composition of the first thousand drawn out will nearly be the same as +that of any other thousand, or of the whole 10,000. The amount of this +probability may be determined mathematically, and is very great. + +This fact was clearly seen by Mr. Andrae, the statesman by whom the +method of preferential voting was introduced into Denmark in 1855, and a +mathematician of undisputed eminence. In answer to an objection of the +kind now under discussion, he replied: "If this law of mine had already +been in operation over the whole of Europe (including Turkey), for a +period of 10,000 years, and if the elections in every part of Europe to +which the law was applied were to take place, not every one, or three, +or seven years, but every week in regular repetition, these elections +throughout Europe, at the rate of a general European election per week, +would still have to go on for more than a thousand times the period of +years already stated; that is to say, for more than a thousand times ten +thousand years, before the chances would be equal that the voting papers +should come out of the urn in the order required to form the basis of +this problem. Although, therefore, the supposed combination is, +mathematically speaking, only an enormous improbability, yet, +practically speaking, it is absolutely impossible."[2] + +To state the matter more exactly, and as the result of an independent +mathematical investigation, it appears that in the case we have stated, +if 4000 voting papers were drawn out of A's heap at random, instead of +the papers being carefully sorted and proportionately divided, the +probability is that neither B nor C would gain or lose more than 11 +votes. In other words, it is just even betting that the number of AB +votes in the 4000 drawn would lie between 2411 and 2389 (inclusive), and +consequently that the number of BC votes will lie between 1589 and 1611. +The odds are more than 3 to 1 neither B nor C would gain or lose more +than 20 votes, _i.e._ that the number of AB votes drawn will lie between +2420 and 2380; more than 10 to 1 that neither would gain or lose more +than 30 votes; just 50 to 1 that neither would gain or lose more than 40 +votes; and about 2000 to 1 that neither would gain or lose more than 60 +votes. If the number of classes were larger or the number of votes to be +drawn smaller, the effect would be much less. It will thus be seen +that it is only in the case of very closely contested elections that the +element of chance can affect the result. It will also be observed that +the _element of chance will not be of importance as between the +different parties,_ but only as _between different individual candidates +of the same party_, since in almost all cases the electors who are +agreed upon the candidate they most desire will also put for their +second choice candidates of the same party. + +In closely contested elections it must, of course, be admitted that as a +result of this method, chance might decide which of two candidates of +the same party should be elected. But in closely contested elections in +large constituencies so many elements of chance are always and +necessarily involved, that the introduction of a fresh one does not, in +reality, make the result more arbitrary. Putting aside all the slight +influences which at the last moment decide a score or two of +featherweight votes, and assuming that every voter is profoundly +convinced of the truth of his opinions, there remains the question of +boundaries. A slight change in the line of the boundaries of the +constituency might easily make a difference of fifty votes--a larger +difference than what we are concerned with. To carry the dividing lines +from North to South instead of from East to West, would, in many +localities, completely alter the character of the representation. + +These are, in reality, matters of chance, and more arbitrary in their +nature than the order in which voting papers are drawn from an urn. + +(2) _Method of Eliminating the Chance Element_ + +If, however, special precautions are still thought necessary, the +following method of counting the votes appears to reduce, as far as +practicable, the element of chance involved in the transfer of +superfluous votes:-- + +The whole set of voting papers of the constituency being mixed, the +papers, not yet unfolded, are drawn out one by one. Each is stamped, as +it is drawn, with a corresponding number, 1, 2, ... in order. It is then +unfolded, and sorted according to the names of the candidates marked +first and second upon it. Suppose there are six candidates, A, B, C, X, +Y, Z; the votes of any candidate, A, will be sorted into six heaps, +viz., A votes (_i.e._ votes where A only is voted for), AB, AC, AX, AY, +and AZ votes. If A is found to have received more votes than he +requires, the order in which the votes will be counted to him will be as +follows: Use first the A votes, then use up those heaps where the second +name also is that of a candidate who has received more than the +necessary minimum. If these heaps give A more than he requires, take the +same proportion out of each of such heaps, taking out of each heap the +last drawn votes first. If, however, these heaps are used up without +giving A as many votes as he requires, take an equal proportion of the +votes of each of the remaining heaps--taking out of each heap the last +drawn votes first. + +_Example_.--Take an election where 6000 is the necessary minimum, and +suppose A has 8650 votes, composed as follows: + +A 600 +AB 2,700 +AC 4,500 +AX 50 +AY 200 +AZ 600 + ----- + 8,650 + + +Using first the 600 A votes, we are left with 5400 to make up out of the +remaining heaps. + +1. Suppose B and C have received the quota. The 5400 can be taken from +their heaps exclusively, for in their two heaps are 7200 votes; the +proportion to be taken from each heap is therefore 5400 out of 7200, +which is three quarters. Thus we make up A's number thus:-- + + A votes 600 +Three-quarters of 2,700 AB " 2,025 +Three-quarters of 4,500 AC " 3,375 + ----- + 6,000 + +And transfer the remainder (the AB and AC votes transferred being those +stamped with the lowest numbers). + +2. Suppose B and X have received the quota. Their two heaps amount to +2750 votes. Using these up, there remain 2650 votes to be made up out of +the AC, AY, and AZ heaps. These three heaps together contain 5300 votes; +and the proportion to be taken from each heap is 2650 out of 5300, or +half. Thus A's number is made up as follows:-- + + A votes 600 + AB " 2,700 + AX " 50 +Half of 4,500 AC " 2,250 +Half of 200 AY " 100 +Half of 600 AZ " 300 + ----- + 6,000 + +And the remaining votes of each of the three last classes--being those +stamped with the lowest numbers--will be transferred. + +It will be observed that the element of chance is not wholly excluded, +since the question, which papers out of the AC heap are transferred, is +left to depend upon the order of drawing. To exclude chance wholly, +these would have to be sorted into heaps according to the third name +upon them, and an equal proportion taken from each heap. The figures in +the first half of this paper are sufficient to show that such trouble +would be wholly superfluous. + + +[Footnote 1: This Memorandum is published by permission of the Rt. Hon. +J. Parker Smith. Although written in 1884, the arguments still apply. +The method described in the second part of the paper has been adopted in +the Municipal Representation Bill (see Appendix VII.), but the method of +application differs in detail.] + +[Footnote 2: Quoted by Mr. (afterwards Earl) Lytton in his _Report on +the Election of Representatives for the Rigsraad_.--House of Commons +papers, 1864, vol. 61, p. 24 of No. 7.] + + +APPENDIX VII + +THE SINGLE TRANSFERABLE VOTE + +SCHEDULE TO MUNICIPAL REPRESENTATION BILL, 1910 + +THE FIRST SCHEDULE[1] + +RULES FOB THE TRANSFER OF VOTES AND FOR ASCERTAINING THE RESULT OF THE +POLL + +_Arrangement of ballot papers._ + +1. After the ballot papers have been mixed, in accordance with the rules +contained in the First Schedule to the Ballot Act, 1872, the returning +officer shall draw out all ballot papers which he does not reject as +invalid, and file in a separate parcel those on which the figure 1 is +set opposite the name of the same candidate. The returning officer shall +then count the number of papers in each parcel. + +_Ascertainment of quota._ + +2. The returning officer shall then add together the numbers of the +papers in all the parcels and divide the total by a number exceeding by +one the number of vacancies to be filled, and the result increased by +one, disregarding any fractional remainder, shall be the number of votes +sufficient to secure the return of a candidate, herein called +the "quota." + +_Candidates with quota elected._ + +3. Any candidate whose parcel contains a number of papers equal to or +greater than the quota shall be declared elected. + +_Transfer of surplus votes_.] 4.--(1) If the number of +candidates elected under the last rule shall not equal the number of +vacancies, the returning officer shall as far as possible transfer from +each elected candidate the votes (if any) in excess of the quota (herein +called surplus votes) to the candidates indicated on the ballot papers +as next in order of the voters' preference, excluding candidates already +declared elected. The votes of the candidate having the largest number +of votes shall first be dealt with, and the particular votes to be +transferred shall be determined in accordance with the following +regulations:-- + +(a) The returning officer shall arrange all the ballot papers in the +parcel of the elected candidate on which votes capable of transfer are +given by filing in a separate sub-parcel those on which a next +preference is indicated for some one continuing candidate. + +(b) The returning officer shall also make a separate sub-parcel of the +ballot papers in the parcel on which the votes given are not capable +of transfer. + +(c) The returning officer shall count the ballot papers in each +sub-parcel, and also the total of all the ballot papers containing votes +capable of transfer. + +(d) If the total number of votes capable of transfer is equal to or less +than the surplus votes, the returning officer shall transfer all the +votes capable of transfer. + +(e) If the total number of votes capable of transfer is greater than the +surplus votes, the returning officer shall transfer from each sub-parcel +of votes capable of transfer the number of votes which bears the same +proportion to the total of the sub-parcel as the number of surplus votes +bears to the total of all the votes capable of transfer. + +(f) The number of votes to be transferred from each sub-parcel under the +preceding regulation shall be ascertained by multiplying the total of +the sub-parcel by the number of surplus votes and dividing the result by +the total number of votes capable of transfer. Fractional remainders +shall be disregarded. + +(g) The particular votes transferred from each sub-parcel shall be those +last filed in the sub-parcel. + +(2) The transfer of surplus votes shall be effected by making new +sub-parcels of the ballot papers on which those votes are given, and +adding those sub-parcels to the parcels (if any) of the candidates to +whom the transfers are made, or, where any such candidate has as yet no +parcel, a new parcel shall be formed for him from the papers +transferred. + +(3) All ballot papers in a parcel of an elected candidate not +transferred under this rule shall be set aside as finally dealt with, +and the votes given thereon shall thenceforth not be taken into account. + +(4) If two or more parcels of elected candidates are equal in size, the +returning officer shall decide which parcel he will first deal with +under this rule. + +(5) A transfer of votes under this rule shall not be made unless the +surplus votes of the elected candidate, together with any other surplus +votes not transferred, exceed the difference between the totals of the +votes of the two continuing candidates lowest on the poll. + +(6) This rule shall take effect subject to the provisions for filling +the last vacancy herein-after contained, and if at any time it shall be +possible to fill the last vacancy under those provisions, no further +transfer under this rule shall be made. + +_Result of transfer._ + +5. After the transfer of the surplus votes of an elected candidate, any +candidate who shall, as a result of the transfer, obtain the quota of +votes, shall be declared elected. + +_Further transfer of surplus votes._ + +6.--(1) Unless and until the last vacancy shall have been filled under +the provisions herein-after contained, if, after the transfers directed +by Rule 4, there shall still remain a vacancy, and the votes of any +elected candidate to whom a transfer has been made are in excess of the +quota, the returning officer shall, as far as possible, take from the +sub-parcel last transferred to that candidate a number of votes equal +to the surplus. + +(2) The particular votes to be taken shall be determined in accordance +with the regulations given in Rule 4 hereof, in the same manner as if +the votes included in the sub-parcel last transferred had been the only +votes given to the candidate; the ballot papers so taken shall be added +in separate sub-parcels to the parcels of the continuing candidates (if +any) indicated thereon as next in order of the voters' preference, and +the votes given thereon shall be transferred to those candidates +accordingly. Where any such candidate has as yet no parcel, a new parcel +shall be formed for him from the papers transferred. + +(3) The remaining ballot papers in the parcel of the elected candidate +(including the ballot papers taken from the parcel under Sub-Rule (1) on +which the votes given are not capable of transfer) shall be set aside as +finally dealt with, and the votes given thereon shall thenceforth not be +taken into account. + +(4) After any transfer of votes under this rule, any candidate who +shall, as a result of the transfer, obtain the quota of votes shall be +declared elected. + +(5) The process directed by this rule shall be repeated until the last +vacancy is filled, or until no candidate has any surplus votes, +whichever shall first happen. + +(6) If two or more parcels shall be equal in size, regard shall be had +to the number of votes counted to each candidate under Rule 1, and the +parcel of the candidate highest on that count shall first be dealt with, +but if the numbers of votes on that count were equal, the returning +officer shall decide which parcel he will first deal with under +this rule. + +(7) A transfer of votes under this rule shall not be made unless the +surplus votes of the elected candidate, together with any other surplus +votes not transferred, exceed the difference between the totals of the +votes of the two continuing candidates lowest on the poll. + +_Distribution of votes of lowest candidate_. + +7.--(1) Unless and until the last vacancy shall have been filled under +the provisions herein-after contained, if, after the transfers under +the preceding rules, there shall still remain one or more vacancies, or, +if no candidate shall have been declared elected under Rule 3, the +returning officer shall exclude from the poll the candidate having the +lowest number of votes, and shall distribute the votes capable of +transfer on the ballot papers in his parcel among the continuing +candidates next in order of the voters' preference. Any ballot papers in +the parcel, on which votes not capable of transfer are given, shall be +set aside as finally dealt with, and the votes given thereon shall +thenceforth not be taken into account. + +(2) If in any case the total of the votes of the two or more candidates +lowest on the poll together with any surplus votes not transferred is +less than the votes of the next highest candidate, the returning officer +may in one operation exclude those candidates from the poll and +distribute their votes in accordance with the foregoing provisions. + +(3) After the distribution under this rule of votes capable of transfer, +any candidate who has received the quota shall be declared elected. + +(4) The surplus votes of any candidate elected under this rule who has +received more than the quota shall be distributed in the manner directed +by and subject to the conditions of the last preceding rule. + +_Further distributions_. + +8. The process directed by the last rule shall be repeated on the +successive exclusions one after another of the candidates with the +lowest numbers of votes until the last vacancy is filled either by the +election of a candidate with the quota or under the next following rule. + +_Filling the last vacancy_. + +9.--(1) When the number of continuing candidates is reduced to the +number of vacancies remaining unfilled, the continuing candidates shall +be declared elected. + +(2) When only one vacancy remains unfilled and the votes of some one +continuing candidate exceed the total of all the votes of the other +continuing candidates together with any surplus votes not transferred, +that candidate shall be declared elected. + +(3) When more than one vacancy remains unfilled and the votes of the +candidate, who, if all the vacancies were filled by the successive +elections of the continuing candidates with the largest numbers of +votes, would be the last to be elected, exceed the total of all the +votes of the continuing candidates with fewer votes than himself +together with any surplus votes not transferred, that candidate and all +the other continuing candidates who have not less votes than himself +shall be declared elected. + +(4) When only one vacancy remains unfilled and there are only two +continuing candidates, and those two candidates have each the same +number of votes and no surplus votes remain capable of transfer, one +candidate shall be declared excluded under the next following rule and +the other declared elected. + +_Provisions for exclusion of candidates in special cases._ + +10. If at any time when a candidate has to be excluded under these rules +two or more candidates have each the same number of votes, regard shall +be had to the number of votes counted to each candidate under Rule 1, +and the candidate lowest on that count shall be excluded, but, if the +numbers of votes on that count were equal, the returning officer shall +decide which candidate shall be excluded. + +_Public notice of transfers._ + +11. The returning officer shall record and give public notice of any +transfer of votes made under these rules and of the total number of +votes counted to each candidate after any such transfer in addition to +the particulars prescribed by Rule 45 to the First Schedule to the +Ballot Act, 1872. Such public notice may be in accordance with the form +given in the appendix to these rules. + +_Recounts._ + +12.--(1) Any candidate or his agent may at any time during the counting +of the votes, either before the commencement or after the completion of +the transfer of the votes (whether surplus or otherwise) of any +candidate, request the returning officer to recount the papers then +comprised in the parcels of all or any candidates (not being papers set +aside as finally dealt with) and the returning officer shall forthwith +recount the same accordingly. The returning officer may also at his +discretion recount votes either once or more often in any case in which +he is not satisfied as to the accuracy of any previous count. Provided +that nothing herein shall make it obligatory on the returning officer to +recount the same votes more than once. + +(2) If upon an election petition-- + +(i) any ballot papers counted by the returning officer are rejected as +invalid, + +or + +(ii) any ballot papers rejected by the returning officer are declared +valid, + +the court may direct the whole or any part of the ballot papers to be +recounted and the result of the election ascertained in accordance with +these rules. + +(3) Except as in this rule expressly provided, no recount shall be had +whether on an election petition or otherwise. + +_Determination of questions as to transfers. + +13.--(1) If any question shall arise in relation to any transfer, the +decision of the returning officer, whether expressed or implied by his +acts, shall be final unless an objection is made by any candidate or his +agent before the declaration of the poll, and in that event the decision +of the returning officer may be reversed upon an election petition. + +(2) If any decision of the returning officer is so reversed, the +transfer in question and all operations subsequent thereto shall be +void, and the court shall direct what transfer is to be made in place +thereof, and shall cause the subsequent operations to be carried out and +the result of the election to be ascertained in accordance with +these rules. + +_Definitions_. + +14. In these rules-- + +(1) The expression "votes capable of transfer" means votes given on +ballot papers on which a further preference is indicated for a +continuing candidate. Provided that a vote shall be deemed not capable +of transfer in any case in which-- + +(a) The names of two or more candidates (whether already excluded from +the poll or declared elected or not) are marked with the same figure and +are next in order of preference, or + +(b) The name of the candidate to whom the transfer is to be made or of +some candidate (whether continuing or not) higher in the order of the +voters' preference is marked + +(i) by a figure not following consecutively after some other figure on +the ballot paper, or + +(ii) by two or more figures. + +(2) The expression "continuing candidates" means candidates not already +declared elected or excluded from the poll. + + + +APPENDIX TO SCHEDULE + +EXAMPLE OF AN ELECTION CONDUCTED ON THE SYSTEM OF PROPORTIONAL +REPRESENTATION SET OUT ABOVE + +Let it be assumed that there are five members to be elected, and that +there are ten candidates. + +The valid papers are drawn from the general heap of ballot papers and +arranged in separate parcels under the names of the candidates marked +with the figure 1. (Rule 1.) + +Each separate parcel is counted (Rule 1) and the total of all the valid +votes is ascertained (Rule 2). It is found that the total of all the +valid votes is 6000. + +This total is divided by six (_i.e._ the number which exceeds by one the +number of vacancies to be filled), and 1001 (_i.e._ the quotient 1000 +increased by one) is the number of votes sufficient to elect a member, +and is called the "quota" (Rule 2). + +The result of the count may be supposed to be as follows:-- + +A 2,009 Elected +B 952 +C 939 +D 746 +E 493 +F 341 +G 157 +H 152 +I 118 +K 93 + ----- + 6,000 + +A's votes exceed the quota and he is declared elected (Rule 3). + +_First Transfer_. + +It now becomes necessary to transfer A's surplus votes (Rule 4 (1)). A +has in fact (2009 less 1001 or) 1008 surplus votes. All A's 2009 voting +papers are examined and arranged in separate sub-parcels according to +the second preferences indicated thereon (Rule 4 (1) (_a_)). A separate +sub-parcel is also formed of those papers on which no second preference +is shown, and which are therefore not capable of transfer. (Rule 4 (1) +(_b_).) The result is found to be as follows. (Rule 4 (1) (_c_).) + +A second preference is shown for G on 1,708 papers + " " " D " 257 " + " " " E " 11 " + " " " F " 28 " + ----- +Total of votes capable of transfer 2,004 " +No second preference is shown on 5 " + ----- +Total of A's votes 2,009 + +The total number of votes to be transferred is 1008, and it is necessary +that they should be taken from the several sub-parcels in the +proportions which the latter bear to all the votes capable of transfer; +that is, there must be transferred, _e.g.,_ to G a number of votes +bearing the same proportion to 1008, the total to be transferred, as +1708, the number of votes in G's sub-parcel, bears to 2004, the total of +votes capable of transfer. In other words the number of the ballot +papers on which each candidate is next preference must be multiplied by +a fraction of which the surplus is the numerator and the total of votes +capable of transfer the denominator, in order to ascertain the number of +votes to be transferred to the candidate in question. In making the +transfers fractions of votes are neglected (Rule 4 (1) ( +e) and (f)). + +The process is as follows:-- + +To G there are to be transferred 1,708 x 1,008 / 2,004 = 589 votes + + " D " " " 257 x 1,008 / 2,004 = 129 " + + " E " " " 11 x 1,008 / 2,004 = 5 " + +" F " " " 28 x 1,008 / 2,004 = 14 " + ------- + 1,007 + +859, 129, 5 and 14 votes are now transferred to G, D, E, and F +respectively, the particular voting papers taken being those last filed +in their sub-parcels, and therefore at the top of the sub-parcels. These +voting papers are added in separate sub-parcels to G, D, E, and E (Rule +4 (2)). + +Their totals then become-- + +G . . . . . 157 + 859 = 1,016 +D . . . . . 746 + 129 = 875 +E . . . . . 493 + 5 = 498 +F . . . . . 341 + 14 = 355 + +All the other voting papers in A's parcel (1002 in number) are set aside +as finally dealt with (Rule 4 (3)), the figure 1002 being the quota 1001 +with the addition of the one further vote of the surplus which, owing to +the disregard of fractions, is not transferred. G having obtained more +than the quota is now declared elected (Rule 5), and the poll stands as +follows:-- + +A 1,002 Elected +G 1,016 Elected +B 952 +C 939 +D 875 +E 498 +F 355 +H 152 +I 118 +K 93 + +_Second Transfer_ + +G has now more than the quota, and his surplus votes (1016 less 1001 or +15) would have to be transferred (Rule 6(1)) were it not for the +provisions of Rule 6(7). But under that rule, the process of +transferring a surplus is postponed in a case where the surplus is less +than the difference between the two lowest candidates on the poll, and +where, therefore, the transfer would produce no practical effect. In +this case the difference between I and K, the two lowest candidates, is +118 - 93, or 25, and therefore it is not necessary to transfer +G's surplus. + +The returning officer proceeds to distribute the votes of the candidates +with the smallest totals (Rules 7 and 8). + +K's parcel is therefore examined and is found to contain 89 papers on +which F is next preference, and 4 on which C is next preference. + +Therefore 89 votes are transferred to F and 4 to C. + +The poll now stands-- + +A 1,002 Elected +G 1,016 Elected +B 952 +C 943 +D 875 +E 498 +F 444 +H 152 +I 118 + +No further candidate has the quota. + +_Third Transfer_ + +The difference between I and H exceeds G's surplus, which therefore is +allowed to remain (Rule 6 (7)), and the votes of I as now lowest on the +poll have now to be distributed in the same manner as K's (Rule 8). But +as the combined votes of H and I, together with G's surplus (152 + 118 + +15 = 285), are less than 444, the total of F, the next highest +candidate, the returning officer avails himself of Rule 7 (2), and +distributes both H and I's votes at one operation. + +I's parcel is found to contain 107 papers on which D and 11 on which B +is next preference, and H's parcel is found to contain 108 papers on +which B is next preference, and 44 on which there is no available +preference marked. (In some cases, some or one of A, G, I, H, and K are +marked as next in order of preference on the papers examined, but as all +of them are already either elected or excluded they are left out of +account.) Therefore, 107 votes are transferred to D, and 119 (108 + 11) +to B, while 44 are set aside as finally dealt with (Rule 7 (1)). The +result is to give B the quota, and he is declared elected. + +The poll now stands-- + +A 1,002 Elected +G 1,016 Elected +B 1,071 Elected +D 982 +C 943 +E 498 +F 444 + +_Fourth Transfer_ + +B has now a surplus of 70 votes, and it is necessary to distribute this +(Rules 7 (4), 6, and 4) as it exceeds the difference between E and F, +which is 54 (Rule 6 (7)). + +For this purpose only the 119 votes last transferred are taken into +account (Rule 6 (2)). + +These are examined and arranged in sub-parcels, in the same manner as +A's votes were examined and arranged, with the following result: A next +preference is shown for E on 84 papers. No further preference is shown +on 35 papers. The total number of votes capable of transfer (84) is thus +greater than the surplus (70), but, as there is only one possible +transfer, the process is simple: 84 x 70/84 = 70; and so the 70 votes +last filed in E's sub-parcel are transferred to E. + +The poll now stands-- + +A 1,002 Elected +G 1,016 Elected +B 1,001 Elected +D 982 +C 943 +E 568 +F 444 + +_Fifth Transfer_ + +G's surplus is still not distributable (Rule 6(7)), but F is now lowest +on the poll and his votes have to be distributed (Rule 8). + +On examination it is found that of F's 444 papers, 353 show a next +preference for C, and the remainder, 91, contain no further preference. + +The 353 are transferred to C, who thus has more than the quota, and is +declared elected, and the 91 are set aside as finally dealt with (Rule +7(1)). + +The poll now stands-- + +A 1,002 Elected +G 1,016 Elected +B 1,001 Elected +C 1,296 Elected +D 982 +E 568 + +This terminates the election; for, even if all C's surplus votes (295) +and all G's surplus votes (15) were transferred to E, his poll would +only amount to 878. But D's votes (982) exceed this total, D is +therefore declared elected (Rule 9 (2)). + +The final result is that A, G, B, C, and D are elected. + + +Public Notice of the Result of the Poll and of the Transfer of Votes + +Number of valid votes ... 6,000 +Number of members to be elected ... 5 +Quota ... 1,001 + +[column names-- ] +N: Names of Candidates +V: Votes +TA: Transfer of A's surplus +RA: Result +TK: Transfer of K's Votes +RK: Result +THI: Transfer of H and I's Votes +RHI: Result +TB: Transfer of B's surplus +TB: Result +TF: Transfer of F's Votes +RF: Final Result + +N: V: TA: RA: TK: RK: THI: RHI: TB: TB: TF: RF: + +A 2,009 -1,007 1,002 -- 1,002 -- 1,002 -- 1,002 -- 1,002(E) +B 952 -- 952 -- 952 +119 1,071 -70 1,001 -- 1,001(E) +C 939 -- 939 + 4 943 -- 943 -- 943 +353 1,296(E) +D 746 +129 875 -- 875 +107 982 -- 982 -- 982(E) +E 493 + 5 498 -- 498 -- 498 +70 568 -- 568 +F 341 + 14 355 +89 444 -- 444 -- 444 -444 -- +G 157 +859 1,016 -- 1,016 -- 1,016 -- 1,016 -- 1,016(E) +H 152 -- 152 -- 152 -152 -- -- -- -- -- +I 118 -- 118 -- 118 -118 -- -- -- -- -- +K 93 -- 93 -93 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- + ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ +Effective votes + 6,000 -- 6,000 -- 6,000 -- 5,956 -- 5,956 -- 5,865 +Preferences exhausted + -- -- -- +44 44 -- 44 +91 135 +Total valid votes + 6,000 -- 6,000 6,000 -- 6,000 -- 6,000 -- 6,000 + +[Candidates A, B, C, D, and G are elected.] + + +[Footnote 1: The rules contained in this schedule were examined and +approved by the Select Committee of the House of Lords in 1907. They are +substantially identical with those embodied in the Transvaal Municipal +Act of 1909, and used in the municipal elections of Pretoria and +Johannesburg in 1909, as well as in the model elections conducted by the +Proportional Representation Society in 1906, 1908, and 1910.] + + +APPENDIX VIII + +THE SINGLE TRANSFERABLE VOTE + +SCHEDULE (4) OF TASMANIAN ELECTORAL ACT, 1907 + +In this Schedule, unless the contrary intention appears-- + +"Returning Officer" means the Returning Officer for the District: + +"Quota" means the number of votes sufficient to elect a candidate: + +"Surplus" means the number of votes which a candidate has obtained, at +any stage of the scrutiny, over and above the quota: + +"First choice recorded for a candidate" means a voting-paper on which +the number 1 is placed in the square opposite the name: + +"Second choice recorded for a candidate" means a voting paper on which +the number 2 is placed in the square opposite his name: + +"Transfer value" means that portion of a vote which is unused by-- + +(a) an elected candidate who has obtained a surplus, + +(b) a candidate excluded on account of his being lowest on the poll, and +which is therefore transferred to the candidate next in the order of the +voter's preference. The transfer value of all votes is either 1 or some +fraction of 1. + +METHOD OF COUNTING VOTES + +_First choice of each candidate to be counted_.] + +1. The number of first choices recorded for each candidate shall be +counted, and all informal voting papers shall be rejected. + +_To find the quota_. + +2. The aggregate number of such first choices shall be divided by one +more than the number of candidates required to be elected, and the +quotient increased by one, disregarding any remainder, shall be the +quota, and (except as hereinafter provided in Rule 10) no candidate +shall be elected until he obtains a number of votes equal to or greater +than the quota. + +_Candidates who have the quota to be declared elected._ + +3. Any candidate who has, upon the first choices being counted, a number +of such votes equal to or greater than the quota shall be +declared elected. + +_If first choices exactly equal to quota, voting papers to be +set aside_. + +4. Where the number of such votes obtained by any candidate is equal to +the quota, the whole of the voting papers on which a first choice is +recorded for such elected candidate shall be set aside as finally +dealt with. + +_If a surplus, surplus to be transferred._ + +5. Where the number of such votes obtained by any candidate is in excess +of the quota, the proportion of votes in excess of the quota shall be +transferred to the other candidates not yet declared elected, next in +the order of the voters' respective preferences, in the +following manner:-- + +_Voting papers reexamined and second choices counted._ + +(i) All the voting papers on which a first choice is recorded for the +elected candidate shall be re-examined, and the number of second +choices, or (in the case provided for in Rule 12) third or next +consecutive choices, recorded for each unelected candidate thereon shall +be counted: + +_Find the transfer value._ (ii) The surplus of the elected +candidate shall be divided by the total number of votes obtained by him +on the counting of the first choices, and the resulting fraction shall +be the transfer value: + +_Multiply second choices by transfer value._ + +(iii) The number of second or other choices, ascertained in paragraph i, +to be recorded second for each unelected candidate, shall be multiplied +by the transfer value: + +_Add result on._ + +(iv) The resulting number, disregarding any fractional remainder, shall +be credited to each unelected candidate, and added to the number of +votes obtained by him on the counting of the first choices. + +_If more than one surplus, largest to be first dealt with._ + +6.--(a) Where, on the counting of the first choices or on any transfer, +more than one candidate has a surplus, the largest surplus shall be +first dealt with. If then more than one candidate has a surplus, the +then largest surplus shall be dealt with, and so on: Provided that, if +one candidate has obtained a surplus at a count or transfer previous to +that at which another candidate obtains a surplus, the surplus of the +former shall be first dealt with. + +_If surpluses equal, last difference to decide._ + +(b) Where two or more surpluses are equal, the surplus of the candidate +who was the highest on the poll at the count or transfer at which they +last had an unequal number of votes shall be first dealt with; and if +they have had an equal number of votes at all preceding counts or +transfers, the returning officer shall decide which candidate's surplus +shall be first dealt with. + +_If transfer raises candidate up to or above quota, he is to +be declared elected._ + +7.--(a) Where the number of votes obtained by a candidate is raised up +to or above the quota by a transfer as aforesaid, he shall thereupon be +declared elected. And in such case, notwithstanding the fact that he may +have reached the quota, such transfer shall be completed, and all the +votes to which he is entitled there from shall be transferred to him, +but no votes of any other candidate shall be transferred to him. + +_If votes exactly equal quota, voting papers to be set +aside._ + +(b) Where the number of votes obtained by a candidate is raised up to, +but not above, the quota by a transfer as aforesaid, the whole of the +voting papers on which such votes are recorded shall be set aside as +finally dealt with. + +_If surplus created, surplus to be transferred._ + +(c) Where the number of votes obtained by a candidate is raised above +the quota by a transfer as aforesaid, his surplus shall be transferred +to the candidates next in the order of the voters' respective +preferences, in the following manner:-- + +_Voting paper of last transfer re-examined and third choices +counted._ + +(i) The voting papers on which are recorded the votes obtained by the +elected candidate in the last transfer shall be reexamined, and the +number of third, or (in the case provided for in Rule 12) next +consecutive choices recorded for each unelected candidate +thereon counted: + +_ Find the transfer value._ + +(ii) The surplus of the elected candidate shall be divided by the total +number of voting papers mentioned in paragraph i, and the resulting +fraction shall be the transfer value: + +_Multiply third choices by transfer value._ + +(iii) The number of second (or other) choices, ascertained in paragraph +i, to be recorded for each unelected candidate, shall be multiplied by +the last-mentioned transfer value: + +_Add result on._ + +(iv) The resulting number, disregarding any fractional remainder, shall +be credited to each unelected candidate, and added to the number of +votes previously obtained by him. + +_When all surpluses dealt with candidate lowest on poll to be +excluded, and his votes transferred._ 8.--(a) Where, after the first +choices have been counted and all surpluses (if any) have been +transferred as hereinbefore directed, no candidate, or less than the +number of candidates required to be elected, has or have obtained the +quota, the candidate who is lowest on the poll shall be excluded, and +all the votes obtained by him shall be transferred to the candidates +next in the order of the voters' respective preferences, in the same +manner as is directed in Rule 5. + +_First choices to be transferred first._ + +(b) The votes obtained by such excluded candidate as first choices shall +first be transferred, the transfer value of each vote in this case +being 1. + +_Then other votes in order._ + +(c) The other votes of such excluded candidate shall then be dealt with +in the order of the transfers in which, and at the transfer value at +which, he obtained them. + +_Each transfer deemed a separate transfer._ + +(d) Each of the transfers which takes place under the two previous +clauses of this rule shall be deemed for all purposes to be a +separate transfer. + +_If transfer raises candidate up to quota, he is to be +declared elected._ + +9.--(a) Where the number of votes obtained by a candidate is raised up +to or above the by any such transfer as aforesaid, he shall thereupon be +declared elected. And in such case, notwithstanding the fact that he may +have reached the quota, such transfer shall be completed, and all the +votes to which he is entitled therefrom shall be transferred to him, but +no other votes shall be transferred to him. + +_If votes exactly equal to quota, voting papers to be set +aside._ + +(b) Where the number of votes obtained by a candidate is raised up to, +but not above, the quota by any such transfer as aforesaid, the whole of +the voting papers on which such votes are recorded shall be set aside as +finally dealt with. + +_If surplus created, surplus to be transferred._ + +(c) Where the number of votes obtained by a candidate is raised above +the quota by any such transfer as aforesaid, his surplus shall be +transferred to the candidates next in the order of the voters' +respective preferences in the same manner as is directed in Rule 7, +Clause (c): Provided that such surplus shall not be dealt with until all +the votes of the excluded candidate have been transferred. + +_Surpluses to be dealt with before further exclusion._ + +(d) Where any surplus exists it shall be dealt with before any other +candidate is excluded. + +_Process of exclusion to be repeated until there remain +number of candidates required._ + +10. The same process of excluding the candidate lowest on the poll and +transferring to other candidates his votes shall be repeated until all +the candidates, except the number required to be elected, have been +excluded, and the unexcluded candidates, who have not already been so +declared, shall then be declared elected. + +_If lowest candidates equal last, difference to decide._ + +11. Where at any time it becomes necessary to exclude a candidate, and +two or more candidates have the same number of votes and are lowest on +the poll, then whichever of such candidates was lowest on the poll at +the last count or transfer at which they had an unequal number of votes +shall be first excluded, and if such candidates have had an equal number +of votes at all preceding counts or transfers, the returning officer +shall decide which candidate shall be first excluded. + +_If a candidate elected or excluded, his name not considered +on voting paper._ + +12. In determining what candidate is next in the order of the voter's +preference, any candidates who have been declared elected or who have +been excluded shall not be considered, and the order of the voter's +preference shall be determined as if the names of such candidates had +not been on the voting paper. + +_Exhausted votes._ + +13. Where on any transfer it is found that on any voting paper there is +no candidate opposite whose name a number is placed, other than those +who have been already either declared elected or excluded, such voting +paper shall be set aside as exhausted. + + +APPENDIX IX + +THE SINGLE TRANSFERABLE VOTE + +REGULATIONS FOR THE ELECTION OF SENATORS UNDER THE SOUTH AFRICA ACT, 1909 + +I. In these Regulations:-- + +(1) "_Continuing Candidates_" mean candidates not elected or not +excluded from the poll at any given time. + +(2) "_First Preference_" means the figure 1 set opposite the name of any +candidate; "second preference" similarly means the figure 2; "third +preference" the figure 3, and so on. + +(3) "_Unexhausted papers_" mean ballot papers on which a further +preference is recorded for a continuing candidate. + +(4) "_Exhausted papers_" mean ballot papers on which no further +preference is recorded for a continuing candidate, provided that a paper +shall also be deemed to be exhausted in any case in which-- + +(_a_) The names of two or more candidates, whether continuing or not, +are marked with the same figure and are next in order of preference, or + +(_b_) The name of the candidate next in order of preference, whether +continuing or not, is marked + +(i) By a figure not following consecutively after some other figure on +the ballot paper, or + +(ii) By two or more figures.[1] (5) "_Original Votes_" in regard to any +candidate mean the votes derived from ballot papers on which a first +preference is recorded for such candidate. + +(6) "_Transferred Votes_" in regard to any candidate mean votes, the +value or part of the value of which is credited to such candidate and +which are derived from ballot papers on which a second or subsequent +preference is recorded for such candidate. + +(7) "_Surplus_" means the number by which the value of the votes of any +candidate, original and transferred, exceeds the quota. + +II. (1) The Governor in Council shall by Proclamation fix a date on or +before which every candidate for election shall be nominated by two +members of the Legislature in writing addressed to the Clerk of the +Legislative Assembly. Such nomination shall contain the candidate's full +name and address, shall be signed by two members of the Legislature, and +shall be accepted in writing by the candidate. + +A nomination paper may include any number of names not exceeding eight, +but no member shall sign more than one nomination paper, and no +candidate shall sign a nomination paper on which his name appears. The +Clerk of the Legislative Assembly shall, after consultation with the +Assessors hereinafter referred to, reject all nominations not made in +accordance with these regulations. + +(2) Immediately after the date fixed for receiving nominations the Clerk +of the Legislative Assembly shall make a return to the Governor in +Council showing the names and addresses of the candidates who have been +duly nominated, together with the names of the members who have +nominated them. He shall at the same time certify that such nominations +have been duly made in accordance with these regulations, and forward to +the Governor-in-Council the certificate by the Assessors mentioned in +Regulation IV. (2). + +In case of disagreement between the Clerk of the Legislative Assembly +and the Assessors, the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly shall, at the +request of the Governor-in-Council, inspect the nomination papers, and +his decision on the point at issue shall be final. + +(3) If the number of nominations received is less than the number of +vacancies to be filled, the Governor-in-Council shall by Proclamation +call for further nominations to be made on or before a date to be fixed +therein. If the number of nominations received on the original date, or +such further date as may be fixed, is equal to the number of vacancies +to be filled, the Governor-in-Council shall by Proclamation declare the +candidates so nominated to be duly elected. + +(4) If the number of candidates nominated as aforesaid exceeds the +number of vacancies to be filled, the Governor-in-Council shall by +Proclamation summon a joint sitting of both Houses of the Legislature +for the purpose of electing candidates to fill the vacancies in the +manner prescribed in these regulations. Such sitting shall be continued +for a period to be fixed in the Proclamation, not being less than two +hours, and no member shall be allowed to vote except during the +continuation of such sitting. Provided, however, that if all the members +of the Legislature have voted before the expiration of the said period +of two hours, the Speaker may close the sitting. + +III. Each member of the Legislature present shall vote in person, and no +voting by proxy shall be permitted. + +IV. (1) The Clerk of the Legislative Assembly shall act as returning +officer and shall, subject to these rules, do all things necessary for +the conduct of the election. + +(2) Two Assessors, not being Members of Parliament, shall be nominated, +one by the President of the Legislative Council and one by the Speaker +of the Legislative Assembly, who shall assist and advise the returning +officer in his duties, both in respect, of the receiving of nominations +and the conduct of the election. Immediately after the date fixed for +the receipt of nominations the Assessors shall furnish the returning +officer, for transmission to the Governor-in-Council, with a certificate +stating whether or not they are satisfied that the nominations have been +received in accordance with these regulations. Further, if either of the +Assessors is for any reason dissatisfied with the conduct of the +election he shall report his opinion, with the reasons therefor, in +writing to the President of the Legislative Council and the Speaker of +the Legislative Assembly, who, after consultation, may if they consider +it necessary, order a recount to be made, and the returning officer +shall act accordingly. + +(3) Before entering on their duties the returning officer and the +assessors shall be required to make oath or affirmation before the +Speaker that they will faithfully and impartially discharge the duties +of their offices according to the rules laid down herein, or such other +rules as may be lawfully made. + +(4) The returning officer shall furnish the Governor-in-Council with the +names of the persons elected, and shall make to the President of the +Legislative Council and the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly a +complete return signed by himself showing the various steps of the +election, and the result of the election. He shall also transmit to the +Speaker of the Legislative Assembly a sealed packet containing the +nominations, the actual ballot papers and the counterfoils, which shall +be preserved for a period of at least twelve months. The +Governor-in-Council shall notify by Proclamation the names of the +persons duly elected. + +V. (1) The voting shall be by ballot. The returning officer shall +ascertain that the person desiring to vote is entitled to vote and shall +enter his name upon the counterfoil in the ballot paper book, and shall +then tear out the ballot paper corresponding to that counterfoil, and, +having stamped the ballot paper with a perforating stamp provided for +the purpose, shall hand it to the member. Every ballot paper shall +contain the names and addresses of all the candidates duly nominated +for election, printed in alphabetical order, in the form prescribed in +the annexure hereto. + +(2) When the member has received a ballot paper he shall take the paper +to a compartment and desk provided for the purpose and signify in manner +provided by the next succeeding section for whom he desires to vote. The +member shall then fold the ballot paper so that the perforated mark may +be visible, and having held up the ballot paper so that the returning +officer can recognize the perforated mark, shall drop the ballot paper +in the ballot box placed in front of the returning officer. + +(3) If a member inadvertently spoils a ballot paper he may return it to +the returning officer, who shall, if satisfied of such inadvertence, +give him another paper and retain the spoiled paper, and this spoiled +paper shall be immediately cancelled, and the fact of such cancellation +shall be noted upon the counterfoil. + +VI. Every member shall have one vote only. A member in giving his vote + +(_a_) Must place on his ballot paper the figure 1 in the square opposite +the name of the candidate, for whom he votes; + +(_b_) May in addition place on his ballot paper the figure 2, or the +figures 2 and 3, or 2, 3 and 4, and so on, in the squares opposite the +names of other candidates in the order of his preference. + +VII. A ballot paper shall be invalid + +(_a_) Upon which a member signs his name or writes any word, or makes +any mark by which it becomes recognizable; or + +(_b_) Which does not bear the perforated mark; or + +(_c_) On which the figure 1 is not marked; or + +(_d_) On which the figure 1 is set opposite the name of more than one +candidate; or + +(_e_) On which the figure 1 and some other figure is set opposite the +name of the same candidate; or + +(_f_) Which is unmarked or void for uncertainty. + +VIII. In carrying out these rules the returning officer shall + +(_a_) Disregard all fractions; + +(_b_) Ignore all preferences recorded for candidates already elected or +excluded from the poll. + +IX. The ballot papers shall be examined and the returning officer, after +rejecting any invalid ballot papers, shall divide the remaining papers +into parcels according to the first preferences recorded for each +candidate. He shall then count the number of papers in each parcel. + +X. For the purpose of facilitating the processes prescribed by these +regulations, each valid ballot paper shall be deemed to be of the value +of one hundred.[2] + +XI. The returning officer shall then add together the values of the +papers in all the parcels and divide the total by a number exceeding by +one the number of vacancies to be filled, and the result increased by +one shall be the number sufficient to secure the return of a candidate, +herein called the "quota." + +XII. If at any time under these regulations a number of candidates equal +to the number of persons to be elected has obtained the quota, such +candidates shall be treated as elected and no further steps shall +be taken. + +XIII. (1) Any candidate the value of whose parcel, on the first +preferences being counted, is equal to or greater than the quota, shall +be declared elected. + +(2) If the value of the papers in any such parcel is equal to the quota, +the papers shall be set aside as finally dealt with. + +(3) If the value of the papers in any such parcel is greater than the +quota, the surplus shall be transferred to the continuing candidates +indicated on the ballot papers as next in the order of the voters' +preference, in the manner prescribed in the following regulation. + +XIV. (1) If and whenever as the result of any operation prescribed by +these regulations a candidate has a surplus, that surplus shall be +transferred in accordance with the provisions of this regulation. + +(2) If more than one candidate has a surplus the largest surplus shall +be dealt with first and the others in order of magnitude; provided that +every surplus arising on the first count of votes shall be dealt with +before those arising on the second count, and so on. + +(3) Where two or more surpluses are equal the returning officer shall +decide according to the terms of regulation XIX., which shall first be +dealt with. + +(4) _(a)_ If the surplus of any candidate to be transferred arises from +original votes only, the returning officer shall examine all the papers +in the parcel belonging to the candidate whose surplus is to be +transferred, and divide the unexhausted papers into sub-parcels +according to the next preferences recorded thereon. He shall also make a +separate sub-parcel of the exhausted papers. + +(_b_) He shall ascertain the value of the papers in each sub-parcel and +of all the unexhausted papers. + +(_c_) If the value of the unexhausted papers is equal to or less than +the surplus, he shall transfer all the unexhausted papers at the value +at which they were received by the candidate whose surplus is being +transferred. + +(_d_) If the value of the unexhausted papers is greater than the +surplus, he shall transfer the sub-parcels of unexhausted papers, and +the value at which each paper shall be transferred shall be ascertained +by dividing the surplus by the total number of unexhausted papers. + +(5) If the surplus of any candidate to be transferred arises from +transferred as well as original votes, the returning officer shall +re-examine all the papers in the sub-parcel last transferred to the +candidate and divide the unexhausted papers into sub-parcels according +to the next preferences recorded thereon. He shall thereupon deal with +the sub-parcels in the same manner as is provided in the case of the +sub-parcels referred to in the last preceding subsection. + +(6) The papers transferred to each candidate shall be added in the form +of a sub-parcel to the papers already belonging to such candidate. + +(7) All papers in the parcel or sub-parcels of an elected candidate not +transferred under this regulation shall be set aside as finally +dealt with. + +XV. (1) If after all surpluses have been transferred, as hereinbefore +directed, less than the number of candidates required has been elected, +the returning officer shall exclude from the poll the candidate lowest +on the poll, and shall distribute his unexhausted papers among the +continuing candidates according to the next preferences recorded +thereon. Any exhausted papers shall be set aside as finally dealt with. + +(2) The papers containing original votes of an excluded candidate shall +first be transferred, the transfer value of each paper being +one hundred. + +(3) The papers containing transferred votes of an excluded candidate +shall then be transferred in the order of the transfers in which, and at +the value of which, he obtained them. + +(4) Each of such transfers shall be deemed to be a separate transfer. + +(5) The process directed by this regulation shall be repeated on the +successive exclusions one after another of the candidates lowest on the +poll, until the last vacancy is filled either by the election of a +candidate with the quota, or as hereinafter provided. + +XVI. If as the result of a transfer of papers under these regulations +the value of the votes obtained by a candidate is equal to or greater +than the quota, the transfer then proceeding shall be completed, but no +further papers shall be transferred to him. + +XVII. (1) If after the completion of any transfer under these +regulations the value of the votes of any candidate shall be equal to +or greater than the quota, he shall be declared elected. + +(2) If the value of the votes of any such candidate shall be equal to +the quota, the whole of the papers on which such votes are recorded +shall be set aside as finally dealt with. + +(3) If the value of the votes of any such candidate shall be greater +than the quota, his surplus shall thereupon be distributed in the manner +hereinbefore provided, before the exclusion of any other candidate. + +XVIII. (1) When the number of continuing candidates is reduced to the +number of vacancies remaining unfilled, the continuing candidates shall +be declared elected. + +(2) When only one vacancy remains unfilled and the value of the votes of +some one continuing candidate exceeds the total value of all the votes +of the other continuing candidates, together with any surplus not +transferred, that candidate shall be declared elected. + +(3) When only one vacancy remains unfilled and there are only two +continuing candidates, and those two candidates have each the same value +of votes and no surplus remains capable of transfer, one candidate shall +be declared excluded under the next succeeding regulation, and the other +declared elected. + +XIX. If when there is more than one surplus to distribute, two or more +surpluses are equal, or if at any time it become necessary to exclude a +candidate and two or more candidates have the same value of votes and +are lowest on the poll, regard shall be had to the original votes of +each candidate, and the candidate for whom fewest original votes are +recorded shall have his surplus first distributed or shall be first +excluded as the case may be. If the values of their original votes are +equal the returning officer shall decide by lot which candidate shall +have his surplus distributed or be excluded. + + +ANNEXURE A + +FORM OF FRONT OF BALLOT PAPER + +___________________________________ + | | +_Counterfoil_ | Order of | Names of Candidates. +_No._........ |Preference | + | | +_________________ |___________|________ + | | + | | JOHN BROWN + | | + | | Address............................ +_The counterfoil_ |___________|______________ +_must show_ | | +_the number_ | | JAMES THOMSON +_corresponding to_| | +_that on the back_| | Address............................ +_of the ballot_ |___________|______________ +_paper. _ | | + | | ALFRED JAMES + | | + | | Address............................ + |___________|_____________ + | | + | | HENRY JONES + | | + | | Address............................ + |___________|______________ + | | + | | ISAAC LEVY + | | + | | Address............................ + |___________|______________ + | | + | | PAUL MAYNARD + | | + | | Address............................ + |___________|_______________ + | | + | | JOHANNES OOSTHUIZEN + | | + | | Address............................ + |___________|______________ + | | + | | HERBERT PAIN + | | + | | Address............................ + |___________|_______________ + | | + | | GEORGE ROBINSON + | | + | | Address............................ + |___________|_______________ + | | + | | JACOBUS SMIT + | | + | | Address............................ + |___________|_______________ + | | + | | PETRUS VAN DER SPUY + | | + | | Address............................ + |___________|______________ + +_Instructions to Members_ + +[_Printed below the List of Candidates on the Ballot Paper shown on +opposite page_ + +A. Each member has one vote, and one vote only. + +B. The member votes-- + +(_a_) By placing the figure "1" opposite the name of the candidate he +likes best. + +He is also invited to place + +(_b_) The figure "2" opposite the name of his second choice. + +(_c_) The figure "3" opposite the name of his third choice, and so on, +numbering as many candidates as he pleases in order of his preference. +The number of preferences is not necessarily restricted to the number of +vacancies. + +_N.B._--The vote will be spoilt if the figure "1" is placed opposite the +name of more than one candidate. + +[A number is printed on the back of the ballot paper corresponding with +that on the counterfoil.] + + +ANNEXURE C + +ILLUSTRATIVE ELECTION + +_Example of an Election conducted on the system of the single +transferable vote in accordance with the preceding regulations_ + +_Reg. IX._ + +Assuming that there are eight members to be elected, sixteen candidates, +and eighty-four electors. + +The valid ballot papers are arranged in separate parcels according to +the first preference recorded for each candidate, and the papers in each +parcel counted. Let it be assumed that the result is as follows:-- + +A 3 J 4 +B 13 K 4 +C 4 L 3 +D 2 M 4 +E 19 N 4 +F 5 O 3 +G 5 P 2 +H 3 -- +I 6 84 + + +_Reg. X._ + +Each valid ballot paper is deemed to be of the value of one hundred, and +the values of the votes obtained by the respective candidates are as +shown in the first column of the result sheet. + +_Reg. XI._ + +The value of all the papers are added together and the total, 8400, is +divided by nine (_i.e._ the number which exceeds by one the number of +vacancies to be filled), and 934 (_i.e._ the quotient, 933, increased by +one) is the number sufficient to secure the return of a member, and is +called the quota. The operation may be shown thus:-- Quota = 8400/9 + 1 += 933 + 1 = 934. + +_Reg. XIII_. (1).] + +The candidates B and E, the values of whose votes exceed the quota, are +declared elected. + +_Reg. XIII_. (3). _Transfer of surplus_.] + +As the values of the papers in the parcels of B and E exceed the quota, +the surplus of each candidate must be transferred. B's surplus is 366 +(_i.e._ 1300 less 934), and E's surplus is 966 (_i.e._ 1900 less 934). + +_Reg. XIV_. (2).] + +The largest surplus, that of E, is dealt with first. + +_Reg. XIV_. (4)(_a_).] + +The surplus arises from original votes, and therefore the whole of E's +papers are divided into sub-parcels according to the next preferences +recorded thereon, a separate parcel of the exhausted papers being also +made. Let it be assumed that the result is as follows: + +G is marked as next available preference on 10 papers. +H " " 5 " +L " " 3 " + -- + Total of unexhausted papers 18 + No. of exhausted papers 1 + -- + Total of papers 19 + + +_Reg. XIV_. (4)(_b_).] + +The values of the papers in the sub-parcels are as follows:-- + +G 1,000 +H 500 +L 300 + ----- +Total value of unexhausted papers 1,800 +Value of exhausted papers 100 + ----- +Total value 1,900 + +_Reg. XIV_. (4)(_d_).] + +The value of the unexhausted papers is 1800, and is greater than the +surplus. This surplus is therefore transferred as follows:--All the +papers unexhausted are transferred, but at a reduced value, which is +ascertained by dividing the surplus by the number of unexhausted papers. +The reduced value of all the unexhausted papers, when added together, +with the addition of any value lost as the result of the neglect of +fractions, equals the surplus. In this case the new value of each paper +transferred is 966 (the surplus)/ 18 (the number of unexhausted papers) += 53, the residue of the value, 47, being required by E for the purpose +of constituting his quota. + +The values of the sub-parcels transferred are:-- + +G = 530 (_i.e._ 10 papers at the value of 53) +H = 265 (_i.e._ 5 " " ) +L = 159 (_i.e._ 3 " " ) + +These operations can be shown on a transfer sheet as follows: + +TRANSFER SHEET + +Value of surplus (E's) to be transferred 966 +No. of papers in E's parcel 19 +Value of each paper in parcel 100 +No. of unexhausted papers 18 +Value of unexhausted papers 1,800 + +New value of each paper transferred = + +Surplus 966 / No. of unexhausted papers 18 = 53 + +Names of Candidates marked as the No. of Papers Value of Sub-parcel + next available Preference. to be to be + Transferred Transferred + G 10 530 + H 5 265 + L 3 159 + + Totals 18 954 + +No. of exhausted papers 1 --- +Loss of value owing to neglect of fractions -- 12 + + Totals 19 966 + +The values of the sub-parcels are added to the values of the votes +already credited to the candidates G, H, L. This operation is shown on +the result sheet. + +As a result of this operation G's total is brought above the quota, and +he is declared elected. + +_Reg. XIV_. (2).] + +The next largest surplus, that of B, viz. 366, is then transferred, the +operations being similar to those described in the transfer of E's +surplus. Assume that there are no unexhausted papers. The new value is +therefore 366 / 13 or 28. The surplus is distributed according to next +preferences, as follows: + + A = (7 x 28) = 196 + C = (6 x 28) = 168 +Value lost owing to +neglect of fractions 2 + ---- + Total ... 366 + +_Reg XIV. (5)._ + +G's surplus has now to be transferred, only the sub-parcel last +transferred being re-examined. The details are as follows:-- + +Value of G's surplus 96 +No. of papers in sub-parcel 10 +Value of each paper therein 53 +No. of unexhausted papers 10 +Value of unexhausted papers 530 + +New value of each paper transferred = 96/10 = 9 + +The result of the distribution is shown on the result sheet, five papers +of the value of nine each being transferred to A, and five of the same +value to O. + +_Reg. XV. (1)._ + +There being no further surplus, the candidate lowest on the poll has now +to be excluded. D and P both have 200. + +_Reg. XIX._ + +The returning officer casts lots, and P is chosen to be excluded. + +_Reg. XV. (1)._ + +Being original votes the two papers are transferred at the value of 100 +each, as shown in the result sheet, 100 going to L and 100 to N. D, now +being lowest, is then excluded in the same way, 100 going to H and 100 +to J, all transfers being made to the next preference as marked by +the elector. + +O now being lowest with 345, is next excluded. + +_Reg. XV. (2)._ + +300 being the value of original votes, the three corresponding papers +are transferred at the value of 100 each to K. + +_Reg. XV. (3)._ + +45 being the value of transferred votes, the five corresponding papers +are transferred at the value of 9 each to N. + +M is then excluded; his papers represent original votes and are +transferred to F. J is then excluded; of the 500 credited to him, 400 +come from original and 100 from transferred papers, but the value of the +latter being 100, all five papers are transferred at that value, 300 +going to I and 200 to H. + +A is then excluded, the value of his votes being as follows:-- + + Original 300 + Transferred 196 + " 45 + +The 300 original go to L. + +The 196 transferred representing 7 papers of the value of 28 each, and +the 45 representing 5 papers of the value of 9 each, all go to N. + +C is then excluded, the value of his votes being as follows:-- + + Original 400 + Transferred 168 + +The original go 300 to K and 100 to I, and the transferred go 84 to L +and 84 to H. + +H, I, K, and L now exceed the quota, and are declared elected. Seven +seats are now filled. + +_Reg. XIX._ + +I and K now both have a surplus of 66, which surpluses have to be +transferred. I having had 600 from original votes, and K 400, K's +surplus is first distributed. + +_Reg. XIV. (5)._ + +The last sub-parcel of the value of 300 is dealt with, and the whole +surplus 66 goes to F, he being the next preference on all three papers. + +F then has the quota and is declared elected. The election is now +completed, the full details being shown on the accompanying +result sheet. + +RESULT SHEET + Number of Votes 84 Number of Members to Elect 8 + 8,400 + Value of Votes 8,400 Quota ----- + 1 = 934 + 9 + + Column headings: + 1: Names of Candidates + 2: Value of Votes at 1st Count. + 3: Distribution of E's Surplus. + 4: Result. + 5: Distribution of B's Surplus. + 6: Result. + 7: Distribution of G's Surplus. + 8: Result. + 9: Distribution of P's and D's Votes. + 10: Result. + 11: Distribution of O's and M's Votes. + 12: Result. + 13: Distribution of J's and A's Votes. + 14: Result. + 15: Distribution of C's Votes. + 16: Result. + 17: Distribution of K's Surplus. + 18: Result. (E: Elected, NE: Not elected) + +1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 +A 300 300+196=496+45=451 541 541-541 -- -- -- +B 1,300 1,300-366=934 934 934 934 934 934 934 E +C 400 400+168=568 568 568 568 568-568 -- -- +D 200 200 200 200-200 -- -- -- -- -- +E 1,900-966=934 934 934 934 934 934 934 934 E +F 500 500 500 500 500+400=900 900 900+66=966 E +G 500+530=1,030 1,030-96=934 934 934 934 934 934 E +H 300+265= 565 565 565+100=665 665+200=865 +84= 949 949 E +I 600 600 600 600 600 600+300=900+100=1,000 1,000 E +J 400 400 400 400+100=500 500-500 -- -- - +K 400 400 400 400 400+300=700 700+300=1,000-66=934 E +L 300+159= 459 459 459+100=559 -- 559+300=859 +84= 943 934 E +M 400 400 400 400 400 400-400 -- -- -- +N 400 400 400 400+100=500 +45=545+241=786 786 786NE +O 300 300 300+45=345 345-345 -- -- -- -- +P 200 200 200 200-200 -- -- -- -- -- +Value of exhausted papers + +Loss of value owing to neglect of fractions + +12 = 12 +2= 14 +6= 20 -- 20 - 20 -- 20 -- 20 -- 20 + +Totals + 8,400 8,400 8,400 8,400 8,400 8,400 8,400 8,400 8,400 + + +[Footnote 1: The fact that a voter has not marked every preference +correctly does not invalidate the whole of his preferences. His paper is +only treated as exhausted when the wrongly marked preference is reached. + +The following are examples:-- + + { A 1 { A 1 + { B 2 { B 2 + (1) { C 3 (2) { C 3 + { D 3 { D 5 + { E 4 { E 6 + { F - + +In case (1) the preferences for A and B would be valid. If the third +preference were reached the paper would be treated as exhausted, as it +would be impossible to say for which candidate the voter really intended +to give his third preference. In case (2) the preferences for A, B and C +would be valid, but not the later ones, whether D had been elected or +excluded or was still a continuing candidate. It is possible that the +voter meant to give a fourth preference for some other candidate, _e.g._ +F, but omitted to do so. It would not be possible to treat 5 as being +meant to be 4.] + +[Footnote 2: In small elections certain difficulties arise which are not +present in the case of large elections. + +(_a_) The quota becomes too large if calculated in the ordinary way. +Assume that 27 electors are to elect 8 candidates. Then the quota is +27/(8+1) + 1 = 4. But 8 x 4 = 32. + +There are not enough quotas to go round and difficulties would arise. +The addition of 1 in the case of so small a number makes the quota +disproportionately big. For this reason it is advisable to treat each +paper as of the value of one hundred. In the case of the Transvaal the +quota instead of being 84/(8+1) + 1 = 10 will be 8400/(8+1) + 1 = 934. + +(_b_) The disregard of fractions in the case of small numbers may mean +the waste of several votes. Take the following example:-- + +Seat to be filled, 8 +Electors 25 +Quota = 25/(8+1) + 1 = 3 + + First Count +A 10 +B 3 +C 3 +D +E 2 +F 1 +G 1 +H 1 +I 1 +J 1 + +A having 10 has a surplus of 7, which has to be distributed. According +to the usual rule A's 10 votes are examined and the surplus is +distributed in proportion to the next preferences. The preferences are +as follows:-- + +For B....... 5 + " C....... 2 + " F....... 1 + " G....... 1 + " H....... 1 + +Each of these numbers must be multiplied by 7/10, _i.e._ the surplus +over the number of unexhausted votes, and the following votes are +transferred:-- + +To B.......3-1/2 + " C.......1-2/5 + " F.......7/10 + " G.......7/10 + " H.......7/10 + +The fractions which are ignored amount to 3 votes, which are +consequently wasted. This difficulty is overcome by increasing the value +of the papers to one hundred, or in other words by working out the +results to two places of decimals. + +(c) In a small election at the several stages there may be two or more +candidates at the bottom with an equal number of votes. Resort has to be +had to lot to decide which is to be eliminated. If the papers are raised +to the value of one hundred this difficulty is much less likely to occur +after the first count.] + + +APPENDIX X + +LIST SYSTEM: BILL PRESENTED TO THE FRENCH CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES, 1907 + +The _Commission du Suffrage Universel_, a committee of the Chamber of +Deputies, made a careful comparison of the various Bills which had been +submitted to the Chamber for the purpose of securing the proportional +representation of the electors. The Commission in their report,[1] which +was issued in March 1907, recommended the adoption of the Bill, of which +a free translation is given below. + +The essential features of this measure, which has received the support +of the leading advocates of proportional representation, are: (1) The +allotment of seats to lists in accordance with the d'Hondt, or Belgian +rule (Art. 8); (2) the use of the cumulative vote in determining the +relative position of candidates (Art. 6). The elector is given as many +votes as there are members to be elected, which he may cumulate upon any +one or distribute among several candidates. The elector is not +restricted in his choice of candidates to any one list. + +_Text of the Bill_ + +(1) Members of the Chamber of Deputies shall be elected on the list +system (_scrutin de liste_) in accordance with the scheme of +proportional representation hereinafter stated. There shall be no +second ballot. + +(2) Each department shall elect one deputy for every 75,000 +inhabitants. A remainder of 25,000, or more, inhabitants shall be +reckoned as 75,000. + +(3) A department shall form a single constituency, provided that where a +department would elect more than ten deputies, it shall be divided into +two or more constituencies, as determined by law hereafter. + +(4) A "list" is constituted by a group of candidates who (after making +the declaration prescribed by Article 2 of the Law of 17 July 1889) +jointly appeal for the support of the electors. + +A list shall not include a larger number of names than there are +deputies to be elected in the constituency, but it may contain a smaller +number. An independent candidate shall be reckoned as a distinct list. + +(5) Each list shall be delivered at the prefecture at any time after the +commencement of the electoral period, and at the latest ten clear days +before polling day. It shall be registered and numbered at the +prefecture, and a receipt for it shall be given to each candidate. + +The name of a candidate shall not be registered unless he has signed the +list. A list with more candidates than there are deputies to be elected +shall not be accepted for registration. + +A candidate whose name appears on one list shall not be entered on +another unless he has notified the prefecture by writing under his hand, +duly attested, that he retires from the former list, in which case his +name shall be at once removed from the former list. + +Twenty-four hours before the opening of the poll the prefect shall cause +each registered list with the number thereto given to be posted on the +doors of the polling station. + +(6) An elector has as many votes as there are deputies to be elected in +his constituency. + +He may give all or any of his votes to the same candidate. + +The reports of the local returning officer at each polling station shall +state the number of votes obtained by each candidate. (7) A Central +Board (_Commission de recensement_) shall collect the reports of the +local returning officers, and ascertain the electoral total of each +list, and allot the seats among the lists in proportion thereto. + +The electoral total of a list is the sum of the votes given to the +candidates whose names appear thereon. + +(8) For the purpose of allotting the seats, each electoral total shall +be divided by the figures 1, 2, 3, 4, and so on up to the number of +vacancies, and as many of the resulting quotients as there are vacancies +shall be arranged in order of size, beginning with the largest. The +smallest of these quotients so arranged, corresponding to the last seat +to be filled, shall be used as the common divisor, and to every list +shall be allotted a number of deputies equal to the number of times +which its electoral total contains the common divisor. + +(9) Within each list the seats shall be assigned to the candidates who +have the largest numbers of votes; in case of an equality of votes, the +eldest candidate shall be elected. + +(10) If two or more lists have an equal right to a seat, it shall be +allotted as between the competing candidates to that one who has +received the greater number of votes, and if those votes are equal the +eldest candidate shall be elected. + +(11) The unelected candidates of each list with the greatest number of +votes shall be classed as first, second, and third substitutes +(suppleants), and so on. + +If any vacancy shall occur by death, resignation, or otherwise, the +substitutes shall be summoned in their classified order to fill the +places of the elected members of the list to which they are attached, +provided that at the time of summons they are in the enjoyment of their +political rights. + +(12) If more than six months before the end of a Parliament, the +representation of a constituency is diminished by one-fourth and there +is no substitute who can be declared elected, bye-elections to fill the +vacant seats shall be held in that constituency. (13) The present law +shall extend to Algeria. Nothing in this law shall affect the +representation of the Colonies. + +NOTE.--Since the introduction of this Bill several other proposals have +been considered by the _Commission du Suffrage Universel._ The draft +Bill proposed in the last report (March 1911) is not based so strictly +upon proportional principles as the measure given above. + +The points of difference may be summarised as follows:-- + +(_a_) The use of the cumulative vote is retained (Art. 6), but there is +a change in the method of allotting seats to various lists (Art. 8). The +new method of allotment is as follows: an "electoral quotient" is found +by dividing the number of voters by the number of vacancies, and as many +seats are allotted to each list as the number of voters supporting a +list contains this quotient. Since each voter has as many votes as there +are seats to be filled, the number of voters supporting a list is +determined arbitrarily by dividing the total number of votes cast for +the list by the number of vacancies. + +If there are any seats not allotted by this distribution they are +awarded to any list which obtains an absolute majority of the votes. +Should no party obtain an absolute majority, the remaining seats are +allotted to the various lists in accordance with the method described in +the succeeding Appendix. This method leads to the same distribution of +seats as the d'Hondt rule. + +(b) The Bill recognises an important new principle in permitting +_apparentement des listes_. Parties may unite for the purpose of +presenting lists in combination, and the lists so presented are treated +for the purpose of the allotment of seats as if they emanated from one +party. This is an elastic form of the Belgian "cartel," allowing parties +to act together without loss of individuality. The seats won by any such +cartel are allotted to the various lists composing the cartel in +accordance with the second of the methods described in the previous +paragraph. + + +[Footnote 1: _Chambre des Deputes, Neuvieme Legislature:_ 1907, No. 883. +See note as to further report, March 1911, at end of Bill.] + + +APPENDIX XI + +LIST SYSTEM: LAW ADOPTED BY THE CANTON OF BALE TOWN, 1905 + +The special features of the following law are as follows:-- + +(1) The partial use of the cumulative vote in determining the relative +position of candidates (sec. 9). + +(2) The allotment of seats to lists in accordance with the rule +formulated by Professor Hagenbach-Bischoff (sec. 13). + +The provisions for bye-elections are contained in sections 17 to 20. + +(1) The elector is supplied three days before the election with copies +of the various party lists; he is given as many votes as there are +members to be elected; he may strike out any names and insert others in +any of the lists supplied to him, or compose his own list; he may repeat +the name of the same candidate three times, but no more; but in no case +may the total number of names exceed the number of members to +be elected. + +(2) The Hagenbach-Bischoff rule, like the d'Hondt rule, aims at finding +an electoral quotient which will allow all the seats to be allotted to +the different parties without remainder. In the former rule this is +found by trial. The following example explains its mechanism:-- + +Suppose, in an election for sixteen seats, five lists have obtained +votes as follows:-- + +List. Votes. +A 5,537 +B 9,507 +C 3,885 +D 4,769 +E 377 + ------- +Total 24,075 + +The first quota is ascertained as prescribed in section 11. The number +of votes is divided by one more than the number of vacancies, and the +result is increased by one, thus:-- + +24075/(16+1) + 1 = 1417 + +It will be observed that this quota is identical with the Droop quota of +the single transferable vote system. The totals obtained by each list +are divided by this quota, as many representatives being allotted to +each list as the list contains the quota. Remainders are ignored. + +Lists. Votes. Quota. Representatives. + A 5,537 / 1,417 3 + B 9,507 / 1,417 6 + C 3,885 / 1,417 2 + D 4,769 / 1,417 3 + E 377 / 1,417 0 + -- + Total 14 + +Only fourteen out of sixteen seats have been allotted in this operation. +It is obvious that the quota is too large, and a smaller quota is +ascertained in the following way. The number of votes for each list is +divided by one more than the number of members already assigned to such +list, and the first seat still to be disposed of is allotted to that +list which has the largest quotient. The following table shows the +process:-- + + Lists. Votes. Quotient. Representatives. + A 5,537 / 4 1,384 4 + B 9,507 / 7 1,358 6 + C 3,885 / 3 1,295 2 + D 4,769 / 4 1,192 3 + E 377 / 1 377 0 + -- + Total 15 + +The largest quotient is 1384, and this figure, which is taken as the new +quota, allows of the allotment of fifteen seats. There still remains one +seat to be disposed of, and the process just described is again +repeated, as shown in the following table:-- + +Lists. Votes. Quotient. Representatives. + A 5,537 / 5 1,107 4 + B 9,507 / 7 1,358 7 + C 3,885 / 3 1,295 2 + D 4,769 / 4 1,192 3 + E 377 / 1 377 0 + -- + 16 + +On this occasion all sixteen seats are allotted, the final quota being +1358. + +The results obtained by the Hagenbach-Bischoff method are identical with +those obtained by the d'Hondt rule. The operations required in the +preceding example for the allotment of seats by the latter rule are as +follows:-- + +List totals +divided by A B C D E + 1 5,537 9,507 3,885 4,769 377 + 2 2,768 4,753 1,942 2,384 -- + 3 1,845 3,169 1,295 1,589 -- + 4 1,384 2,376 971 1,192 -- + 5 1,107 1,901 -- -- -- + 6 -- 1,684 -- -- -- + 7 -- 1,358 -- -- -- + +The sixteen highest quotients arranged in order of magnitude are:-- + +9,507 (List B) 2,376 (List B) +5,537 (List A) 1,942 (List C) +4,769 (List D) 1,901 (List B) +4,753 (List B) 1,845 (List A) +3,885 (List C) 1,589 (List D) +3,169 (List B) 1,584 (List B) +2,768 (List A) 1,384 (List A) +2,384 (List D) 1,358 (List B) + +The lowest of these sixteen figures, viz. 1358, is the electoral +quotient, and agrees with the final quota furnished by the +Hagenbach-Bischoff rule. _Law for Elections to the Grand Council, on +the principle of Proportional Representation, 26 January 1905_ + +1. Nomination papers for the various electoral districts must be handed +in to the police department not later than three weeks before the day +fixed for the re-election of the Grand Council. + +They may contain the names of one or more persons eligible for election, +provided that the total number of names in any nomination paper is not +greater than the number of members which the electoral district in +question is entitled to elect; any name may appear more than once, but +not more than three times. + +2. Nomination papers for town districts must be signed by at least ten +qualified electors; those for country districts by at least three. An +elector may sign one, and only one, nomination paper, on each occasion, +in each electoral district. + +When handing in the nomination paper the signatories thereto must +designate one of their number to attend to any necessary formalities +with the police department in connexion therewith. + +3. The police department shall at once communicate with the candidates +nominated, and call upon them to declare within two days whether they +accept the candidature or not. + +If the person nominated declines to stand for election his nomination +shall be cancelled. + +4. No candidate may appear on more than one nomination paper. If +therefore any candidate be nominated in different electoral districts, +or on several nomination papers in the same district, the police +department shall, in informing him of the nominations, call upon him to +declare, within two days, under which nomination he wishes to stand, and +on receipt of his declaration shall strike his name off the other +nomination papers. + +If the candidate makes no declaration within the time fixed, the police +department shall decide by lot under which nomination he shall stand. + +5. The police department shall inform the representatives of the +nominators of the cancellings due to the refusal of the nominees to +accept nomination, or to the latter having been nominated more than +once, and shall allow the former a period of two days in which to make +further nominations. To these further nominations the declaration in +writing of the person nominated, accepting the candidature, must +be attached. + +If this declaration is not attached, or if the proposed candidate +already appears on another nomination, the supplementary nomination +shall be rejected. + +6. The final (definitive) nomination papers thus obtained shall be +called lists, and no further alterations may be made in them. The lists +shall each be printed on a separate sheet with the names of the +candidates in the order in which they appear on the nomination papers. +The lists shall also be provided with a number (in rotation) for each +electoral district, and if the proposers have given them any titles +these shall likewise be printed. + +If more than one list have the same title the police department shall +require the representatives of the nominators to make some distinction +between them. If this is not done within two days, these lists shall be +distinguished by further special numbers (in rotation). + +The different lists shall be printed on paper of the same size and the +same colour. + +7. At least three days before the election these lists shall be +delivered to each elector in an envelope, which shall at the same time +serve as a voucher of the elector's right to vote. In addition to the +printed lists, each voter shall receive a blank list containing no +names, but as many numbered lines as there are members to be elected +(free lists). + +The voucher shall take the place of the present admittance card. + +8. Electors must present themselves in person at the polling booth and +deliver the voucher to the polling officers. + +The latter shall retain the voucher, and in return give the elector an +official stamp. + +9. Each elector shall have as many votes as there are members of the +Grand Council to be elected in his district, and shall for that purpose +choose _one_ of the lists supplied to him. If he makes use of a printed +list he may strike out any names and insert any others. Every vote is +valid where the name of an eligible candidate is clearly given, and the +only restrictions are that the same name may not appear more than three +times, and that the total number of names may not exceed the number of +members to be elected. + +The voter may make the alterations he desires in the printed list +selected by him, or fill in the free list either at the polling booth or +before reaching it. + +The voter shall affix the official stamp supplied to him to the list he +has selected, and place the latter in the ballot box. + +10. At the close of the poll the presiding officer shall open the ballot +box and compare the number of voting papers therein with the number of +vouchers received and the number of official stamps issued. + +Only the official voting papers with stamps attached shall be valid. + +11. The polling officers shall then examine the valid voting papers and +ascertain by entering the votes on counting sheets how many votes each +name has received. + +If a voting paper contain more names than there are Councillors to be +elected for the electoral district, then the votes in excess at the +bottom of the list shall not be counted. + +If a voting paper contain fewer names than there are Councillors to be +elected in the district, then the number of votes not used shall be +ascertained and shall be added (as list votes) to the list chosen by the +elector, provided the latter has made use of a printed list. + +The number of votes for each list shall then be ascertained by adding +together the list votes and the vote given for individual candidates +on the list. + +If eligible persons not standing on any list receive votes, each of +these names shall be treated as a separate list. + +12. If no nominations have been handed in, those persons shall be +elected who receive most votes. + +In the event of equality of votes, the returning officer shall at once +decide the matter by casting lots. + +13. If one or more lists have been nominated, the vacancies on the Grand +Council shall be divided among the several lists in proportion to the +number of votes each list has received. The procedure shall be as +follows:-- + +The total number of the valid votes shall be divided by the number of +vacancies increased by one. + +The quotient thus obtained increased by one (but disregarding fractions) +shall be called the quota. + +To each list there shall be allotted as many members as the number of +times the quota is contained in the votes it receives. If the total +number of members thus obtained is less than the number to be elected, +the votes for each list shall be divided by one more than the number of +members already assigned to such list, and the first seat still to be +disposed of shall be allotted to that list which has the +largest quotient. + +The same procedure shall be repeated as long as any seats remain to be +disposed of. + +If two or more lists have the same claim to the last seat to be disposed +of (equality of quotient), that list shall always take precedence in +which the candidate who would be selected under the provisions of Clause +14 has received the largest number of votes. In case of equality of +votes the returning officer (_Wahl-bureau_) shall immediately decide the +question by casting lots. + +14. From each list those candidates (to the number allotted to the list) +shall be selected who have received the largest number of votes. +Equality of votes is decided by lot, to be drawn immediately by the +returning officer. + +15. If to one or several lists are allotted more seats than there are +names contained, all their candidates shall in the first place stand +elected. The surplus seats shall be divided among the remaining lists by +continuance of the procedure prescribed in Clause 13. + +16. After ascertaining the result of the election, the electoral office +shall draw up a report stating the number of the voting vouchers +received, of the official stamps issued, and of the voting papers handed +in, the number of the votes received for each name and for each list, +arranged according to the lists, particulars of the allotment of seats +and the names of the elected members. + +Mention shall also be made of any irregularities which have occurred. + +These reports shall be signed by all the electoral officers, and shall +then be forwarded, together with the voting vouchers received, the +unused official stamps, the voting papers and the unissued papers, to +the Government Council. + +The result of the election shall be affixed conspicuously outside the +Chief Polling Booth. + +The Polling Officers shall notify each elected candidate of his election +in writing. + +17. An elected candidate who did not appear on any of the nominations +put in may refuse to accept his election within one week by giving +written notice to the Government Council. + +The Government Council shall then immediately order a bye-election. + +18. Those elected candidates whose election is rendered void owing to +their simultaneously having been elected as members of the Government +Council shall be immediately replaced by the Government Council by the +non-elected candidates on the same list who have received most votes. + +If there are none, the vacant seats on the Great Council shall +immediately be filled by supplementary elections, which shall also serve +to fill any seats, if any rendered vacant under Clause 17. + +19. Members retiring from the Great Council during their period of +office shall be replaced immediately by the Government Council by the +non-elected candidates on the same list who have received most votes. +If there are none, supplementary elections shall take place in the first +half of the next following month of May. + +20. The same regulations shall serve for supplementary elections as for +general elections. + +21. The provisions of this law shall come into operation for the first +time in the general election for the Grand Council which takes place in +the year 1905. + +The provisions of earlier laws and resolutions of the Grand Council +referring to elections to the Grand Council are hereby repealed, in so +far as they are contrary to this law. + + + + +INDEX + +(The letter _f_ after a number signifies 'and page following.' The +letter _n_ signifies "note.") + +Accuracy of proportional systems, +Acton, Lord, +Acts-- +Education (1867), +Port of London (1908), +Queensland Electoral (1905), +Redistribution (1885), +South Africa (1909), +Tasmanian Electoral (1896), +Tasmanian Electoral (1907), +Transvaal Municipal (1909), +Advantages of proportional representation, +Advantages of single transferable vote. +_See_ Single transferable vote +Aldermen, election of, +Allotment of seats to parties, +Alternative vote, +Andrae, M., +Anson, Sir William R., Bart., +Asquith, Rt. Hon. H. H., +Australia, +Austria, +Avebury, Rt. Hon. Lord, + +Bale, +Balfour, Rt. Hon. A. J., +Ballot papers, copies of, +Ballots, second, +Battersea Borough Council, +Bavaria, +Beale, Mr. W. Phipson, +Belgian, or d'Hondt system, +Belgium, +Bernstein, Dr. Ed., +Bills-- + Alternative Vote (1908, 1910), + Electoral Reform (1867), + Electoral Reform (1884), + Electoral Reform (France), + Irish Council (1907), + Municipal Representation + Parliamentary Representation (1854), + Plural Voting (1907), + Redistribution (1905), + Reform (1832), + Representation of the People (1867), +Birmingham, +Birrell, Rt. Hon. Augustine, +Blind, Karl, +Block vote, +Borough Councils, +Boundaries, importance of, +Bribery, +Bright, John, +Brown, Prof. Jethro, +Brussels, +Burke, Edmund, +Bye-elections, + +Cairns, Lord, +Campbell-Bannerman, Sir Henry, +Canada, +Cape Colony Legislative Council, +Carlskrona election, +Cartel, +_Case de tete_, +Cecil, Lord Hugh, +Cecil, Lord Robert, +Chance, effect of, +Churchill, Rt. Hon. Winston S., +Clark, Justice, +Commons, Prof. J. R., +_Commission du Suffrage Universel_, +Constituencies, size of, +Constitutional reform, +Corbett, Mr. J. Rooke, +Cost of elections, +Courtney of Penwith, Rt. Hon. Lord, +Criticisms of single transferable vote, +Cross voting, +Cumulative vote, + +d'Alviella, Count Goblet, +Deakin, Mr. Alfred, +Defects of majority systems, +Denmark, +d'Hondt system, +Dicey, Prof. A. V., +Dilke, Sir Charles, +Dobbs, Mr. Archibald E., +Droop, H. R., + +Edinburgh, +Education Act (1867), +"Effective voting," +Elections, General, + _See also_ Statistics +Elections, procedure at, +Elector, freedom of, +Elector's task, + _See also_ Voting +Electoral Reform Bill (1884), +Electoral Reform Bill (1867), +Electoral systems, Royal Commission on. + _See_ Royal Commission +Elimination of lowest candidate, +Executive under proportional representation, + +Faddists, +Fairness of proportional systems, +Federal Home Rule, +Finland, +France, +Franchise, +Freedom of elector, +French Electoral Reform Bill, + +Geneva, +Germany, +Gerrymander, +Ghent, +Gladstone, W. E., +Glasgow, +Gove method, +Gregory method, +Grey, Earl, +Group formation, +Group representation, +Gulland, Mr. J. W., +Guyot, M. Yves, + +Hagenbach-Bischoff, Prof., +Hare, Thomas, +Hare-Clark method, +Hayashida, Mr. Kametaro, +Holland, +Home Rule, +House of Commons, +House of Commons committees, +House of Lords, +House of Lords, Select Committee on its Reform, +House of Lords, Select Committee on Municipal Representation Bill, + +Illinois, +Imperial Parliament, +Independents, the fate of, +India, +Ireland, +Irish Council Bill (1907), +Italy, + +Japan, +Jarrow, +Jaures, M. Jean, +Jenks, Prof. E., +Johannesburg, + +Labour Councils, Canadian, +Labour Party, +Lachapelle, M. Georges, +Late preferences, effect of, +Leeds, +Limited vote, +List systems, +Localities, representation of, +Lochee of Gowrie, Rt. Hon. Lord, +London, +London Borough Councils, +London County Council, +Lubbock, Sir John (Lord Avebury), + + +Macdonald, Mr. J. Ramsay, +Majorities, exaggeration of. + _See also_ Statistics, +Majorities, small, +Majorities, under-representation of, +Majority systems, +Manchester, +Marshall, J. Garth, +Mill, John Stuart, +Milner, Lord, +Miners' Association, Northumberland, +Minorities, disfranchisement of, +Minorities, representation of, +Model elections, +Monk, Mr. F. D., 122, 247 +Morley of Blackburn, Rt. Hon. Lord, +Muir, Prof. Ramsay, +Municipal elections, +Municipal Representation Bill (1907), + +Nanson, Prof. E. J., +Naville, Ernest, +New Zealand, +Nomination of public bodies, +Northumberland Miners' Association, + +Objections to proportional representation, +Orange Free State, +Oregon, +Organisation of elections, + +_Panachage_, +Parliamentary Representation Bill (1854), +Party exclusiveness, +Party government, +Party organisation, +Peers, Scottish Representative, +Plural Voting Bill (1907), +Port of London Act (1908), +Powell, Mr. Ellis T., +Practicability of single transferable vote, +Praed, Mackworth, +Preferences, comparative efficiency of different, +Present systems, defects of, +Pretoria, Proportional Representation League (France), +Proportional Representation Society, +Provincial Councils, South Africa, + +Queensland Electoral Act (1906), +Quota, the, + +Redistribution, +Redistribution Act (1885), +Redistribution Bill (1905), +Referendum, +Reform Bill (1832), +Representation of the people (1867), +Result sheet, +Returning officer, duty of, +Robertson, Mr. John M., +Royal Commission on Electoral Systems, +Russell, Lord John, + +Saxony, +School Board elections, +Scotland, +Scottish Grand Committee, +_Scrutin de liste_, +Seats, allotment to parties, +Second ballot, +Selection of successful candidate in a list, +Senates-- + Australia, + Canada, + South Africa, + Sheffield, +Single transferable vote-- + Advantages, + _See also_ Advantages of proportional representation + Application, + Criticisms, + Mechanism, +Single vote, +Smith, Rt. Hon. J. Parker, +Social Democratic Party (Germany), +Solothurn, +South Africa, +South Africa Act (1909), +Spence, Catherine Helen, +Spoilt ballot papers, +Statistics of elections-- + America, + Australia, + Belgium, + Finland, + Germany, + Japan, + South Africa, + Sweden, + United Kingdom, +_Suppleants,_ +Surplus votes, transfer of, +Sweden, +Switzerland, +Systems, majority. + _See_ Present systems +Systems, proportional. + _See_ Bale, Belgium, Finland, France, Japan, Sweden, and + Single transferable vote + +Tasmania, +Tasmanian Electoral Act (1896), +Tasmanian Electoral Act (1907), +Three-cornered contests, +Ticino, +Toronto, +Trades Unions, +Transfer of surplus votes, +Transfer sheet, +Transvaal, +Transvaal Municipal Act (1909), +Two-party system, + +Ulster, +United States, + +Vandervelde, M., +Vivian, Mr. Henry, +Voting, modes of, + +Wales, +Wallas, Mr. Graham, +Warwickshire, +Whips in House of Commons, + _See also_ Party organisation +White, Mr. Dundas, +Williams, Mr. Aneurin, +Wuertemberg, + + + + + +End of Project Gutenberg's Proportional Representation, by John H. 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Do not change or edit the +header without written permission. + +Please read the "legal small print," and other information about the +eBook and Project Gutenberg at the bottom of this file. Included is +important information about your specific rights and restrictions in +how the file may be used. You can also find out about how to make a +donation to Project Gutenberg, and how to get involved. + + +**Welcome To The World of Free Plain Vanilla Electronic Texts** + +**eBooks Readable By Both Humans and By Computers, Since 1971** + +*****These eBooks Were Prepared By Thousands of Volunteers!***** + + +Title: Proportional Representation + A Study in Methods of Election + +Author: John H. Humphreys + +Release Date: January, 2006 [EBook #9630] +[Yes, we are more than one year ahead of schedule] +[This file was first posted on October 11, 2003] + +Edition: 10 + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 + +*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION *** + + + + +Produced by Jonathan Ingram, Debra Storr and PG Distributed Proofreaders + + + + +PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION + +A STUDY IN METHODS OF ELECTION + +BY + +JOHN H. HUMPHREYS + +HON. SECRETARY, PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION SOCIETY + +WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY + +THE RT. HON. LORD COURTNEY OF PENWITH + +_First Published in 1911_ + +TO THE MEMORY OF + +CATHERINE HELEN SPENCE + +OF ADELAIDE + +AN UNWEARIED WORKER IN THE CAUSE OF REAL REPRESENTATION + +INTRODUCTION + +BY LORD COURTNEY OF PENWITH + +I believe this book will generally be welcomed as opportune. +Proportional Representation has made very rapid, almost startling +advances in recent years. In one shape or another it has been adopted in +many countries in Northern Europe, and there is a prospect of a most +important extension of this adoption in the reform of the parliamentary +institutions of France. Among ourselves, every political writer and +speaker have got some inkling of the central principle of proportional +representation, and not a few feel, sometimes with reluctance, that it +has come to stay, that it will indeed be worked into our own system when +the inevitable moment arrives for taking up again the reform of the +House of Commons. They know and confess so much among themselves, but +they want to be familiarized with the best machinery for working +proportional representation, and they would not be sorry to have the +arguments for and against its principles once more clearly examined so +that they may be properly equipped for the reception of the coming +change. This little book of Mr. Humphreys is just what they desire. The +author has no doubt about his conclusions, but he goes fairly and with +quite sufficient fulness through the main branches of the controversy +over proportional representation, and he explains the working of an +election under the system we must now regard as the one most likely to +be adopted among us. His qualifications for his work are indeed rare, +and his authority in a corresponding measure high. A convinced adherent +of proportional representation, he stimulated the revival of the Society +established to promote it. He was the chief organizer of the enlarged +illustrative elections we have had at home. He has attended elections in +Belgium and again in Sweden, and when the time came for electing +Senators in the colonies of South Africa, and Municipal Councils in +Johannesburg and Pretoria, the local governments solicited his +assistance in conducting them, and put on record their obligations for +his help. The reader can have no better guide in argument, no more +experienced hand in the explanation of machinery, and if I add that Mr. +Humphreys has done his work with complete mastery of his subject and +with conspicuous clearness of exposition, I need say no more in +recommendation of his book. + +It may be objected that the Royal Commission which issued its Report +last spring, did not recommend the incorporation of proportional +representation into our electoral system. This is most true. One member +indeed (Lord Lochee) did not shrink from this conclusion, but his +colleagues were unable to report that a case had been made out for the +adoption "here and now" of proportional representation. Their hesitancy +and the reasons they advanced as justifying it must lead many to a +conclusion opposite to their own. They themselves are indeed emphatic in +pressing the limitation "here and now" as qualifying their verdict. They +wish it to be most distinctly understood that they have no irresistible +objection to proportional representation. They indeed openly confess +that conditions may arise among ourselves at some future time which +would appear to be not necessarily distant, when the balance of +expediency may turn in favour of its adoption. They suggest "that some +need may become felt which can only be satisfied by proportional +representation in some form or another," and I do not think I +misrepresent their attitude in believing that a very small change of +circumstances might suffice to precipitate a reversal of their present +conclusion. All who are familiar with the conduct of political +controversies must recognize the situation thus revealed. Again and +again have proposals of reform been made which the wise could not +recommend for acceptance "here and now." They are seen to be good for +other folk; they fit into the circumstances of other societies; they may +have worked well in climates different from our own; nay, among +ourselves they might be tried in some auxiliary fashion separated from +the great use for which they have been recommended, but we will wait for +the proper moment of their undisguised general acceptance. It is in this +way that political ideas have been propagated, and it would be a mistake +if we were hastily to condemn what are sure and trusty lines of +progress. When the Royal Commissioners, after all their hesitations +about the intrusion of proportional representation even in the thinnest +of wedges into the House of Commons, go on to say that "there would be +much to be said in its favour as a method for the constitution of an +elected Second Chamber," and again, though admitting that this was +beyond their reference, express a pretty transparent wish that it might +be tried in municipal elections, the friends of the principle may well +be content with the line which the tide of opinion has reached. The +concluding words of this branch of the Report are scarcely necessary for +their satisfaction: "We need only add, that should it be decided at any +time to introduce proportional representation here for political +elections the change would be facilitated if experience had been gained +in municipal elections alike by electors and officials." + +A few words may be permitted in reference to the line of defence +advanced by the Commissioners against the inroad of proportional +representation. Mr. Humphreys has dealt with this with sufficient +fullness in Chapters X and XI which deal with objections to proportional +representation; and I refer the reader to what he has written on the +general subject. My own comment on the position of the Commissioners +must be short. Briefly stated, their position is that proportional +representation "cannot be recommended in a political election where the +question which party is to govern the country plays a predominant part," +and, as elsewhere they put it, "a general election is in fact considered +by a large portion of the electorate of this country as practically a +referendum on the question which of two governments shall be returned to +power." The first remark to be made upon this wonderful barrier is that +a general election avowedly cannot be trusted as a true referendum. It +produces a balance of members in favour of one party, though even this +may fail to be realized at no distant future, but the balance of members +may be and has been under our present system in contradiction to the +balance of the electors; or in other words, a referendum would answer +the vital question which party is to govern, in the opposite sense to +the answer given by a general election. This is so frankly admitted in +the Report that it is difficult to understand how the Commissioners can +recommend adherence to a process which they have proved to be a +delusion. Even on the bare question of ascertaining what government the +nation desires to see installed at Westminster, the present method is +found wanting, whilst the reformed plan, by giving us a reproduction in +miniature of the divisions of national opinion, would in the balance of +judgment of the microcosm give us the balance of judgment in the nation. +If a referendum is really wanted, a general election with single-member +constituencies does not give us a secure result, and an election under +proportional representation would ensure it. A different question +obviously disturbs many minds, to wit, the stability of a government +resting on the support of a truly representative assembly. Here again it +may be asked whether our present machinery really satisfies conditions +of stable equilibrium. We know they are wanting, and with the +development of groups among us, they will be found still more wanting. +The groups which emerge under existing processes are uncertain in shape, +in size, and in their combinations, and governments resting upon them +are infirm even when they appear to be strong. It is only when the +groups in the legislature represent in faithful proportion bodies of +convinced adherents returning them as their representatives that such +groups become strong enough to restore parliamentary efficiency and to +combine in the maintenance of a stable administration. It may require a +little exercise of political imagination to realize how the transformed +House of Commons would work, and to many the demonstration will only +come through a new experience to which they will be driven through the +failure of the existing apparatus. Meanwhile it may be suggested to +doubters whether their anxiety respecting the possible working of a +reformed House of Commons is not at bottom a distrust of freedom. They +are afraid of a House of chartered liberties, whereas they would find +the best security for stable and ordered progress in the self-adjustment +of an assembly which would be a nation in miniature. + +COURTNEY OF PENWITH + + +AUTHOR'S NOTE + +Current constitutional and electoral problems cannot be solved in the +absence of a satisfactory method of choosing representatives. An attempt +has therefore been made in the present volume to contrast the practical +working of various methods of election; of majority systems as +exemplified in single-member constituencies and in multi-member +constituencies with the block vote; of majority systems modified by the +use of the second ballot or of the transferable vote; of the earlier +forms of minority representation; and, lastly, of modern systems of +proportional representation. + +Care has been taken to ensure accuracy in the descriptions of the +electoral systems in use. The memorandum on the use of the single vote +in Japan has been kindly supplied by Mr. Kametaro Hayashida, the Chief +Secretary of the Japanese House of Representatives; the description of +the Belgian system of proportional representation has been revised by +Count Goblet d'Alviella, Secretary of the Belgian Senate; the account of +the Swedish system by Major E. von Heidenstam, of Ronneby; that of the +Finland system by Dr. J.N. Reuter, of Helsingfors; whilst the chapter on +the second ballot and the transferable vote in single-member +constituencies is based upon information furnished by correspondents in +the countries in which these systems are in force. The statistical +analyses of elections in the United Kingdom were prepared by Mr. J. +Booke Corbett, of the Manchester Statistical Society, whose figures were +accepted by the Royal Commission on Electoral Systems as representing +"the truth as correctly as circumstances will permit." + +The author is greatly indebted to his colleagues of the Proportional +Representation Society, Mr. J. Fischer Williams and Mr. Alfred J. Gray, +for the cordial assistance rendered by them in the preparation of this +book. Acknowledgments are also due to the editors of the _Times_, the +_Contemporary Review_, and the _Albany Review_, for permission to make +use of contributions to these journals. + +J.H.H. + + + + +CONTENTS + + +CHAPTER I + +THE HOUSE OF COMMONS AS AN EXPRESSION OF THE NATIONAL WILL + +The spread of Representative Government--The House of Commons and +sovereign power--The demand for complete sovereignty--Complete +sovereignty demands complete representation--Strengthening the +foundations of the House of Commons--The rise of a new party--The new +political conditions and electoral reform. + + +CHAPTER II + +THE DIRECT RESULTS OF MAJORITY SYSTEMS + +The exaggeration of majorities--The disfranchisement of minorities--The +under-representation of majorities--A "game of dice"--The importance of +boundaries--The "gerrymander"--The modern gerrymander--The "block" +vote--The election of the London County Council--The election of +aldermen of the London County Council--The election of Representative +Peers of Scotland--The Australian Senate--London Borough +Councils--Provincial Municipal Councils--Summary. + + +CHAPTER III + +THE INDIRECT RESULTS OF MAJORITY SYSTEMS + +False impressions of public opinion--become the basis of legislative +action--Loss of prestige by the House of Commons--Unstable +representation--Weakened personnel--Degradation of party strife--The +"final rally"--Bribery and "nursing"--The organization of victory--Party +exclusiveness--Mechanical debates--Disfranchisement of minorities in +bi-racial countries--Defective representation in municipal +bodies--Wasteful municipal finance--No continuity in administration--The +root of the evil. + + +CHAPTER IV + +THE REPRESENTATION OF MINORITIES + +The Limited vote--The Cumulative vote--The Single vote--The need of +minority representation. + + +CHAPTER V + +THE SECOND BALLOT AND THE TRANSFERABLE VOTE IN SINGLE-MEMBER +CONSTITUENCIES + +Three-cornered contests--The second ballot--Experience in Germany, +Austria, Belgium, France--The bargainings at second ballots in +France--The "Kuh-Handel" in Germany--The position of a deputy elected at +a second ballot--The Alternative vote--The Alternative or Contingent vote +in Queensland, in West Australia--Mr. Deakin's failure to carry the +Alternative vote--Probable effect of the Alternative vote in +England--The Alternative vote not a solution of the problem of +three-cornered contests. + + +CHAPTER VI + +PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION + +The essential features of a sound electoral method--Constituencies +returning several members--Proportional representation of the +electors--Experience in Denmark, Switzerland, Belgium, German States, +France, Holland, Finland, Sweden, Australasia, South Africa, Canada, +Oregon, The United Kingdom--The success of proportional representation +in practice--An election by miners. + + +CHAPTER VII + +THE SINGLE TRANSFERABLE VOTE + +Its present application--An English movement--The system in brief--Large +constituencies--The single vote--The vote made transferable--How votes +are transferred--The quota--A simple case--The transfer of surplus +votes--The elimination of the lowest unelected candidate--The +result--Different methods of transferring surplus votes: The Hare +method--The Hare-Clark method--The Gregory method--The Gove or Dobbs +method--The Model election of 1908--The counting of votes: general +arrangements--The first count--The quota--The transfer of surplus +votes--The elimination of unsuccessful candidates--The fairness of the +result--Improved arrangements in the Transvaal elections--Criticisms of +the single transferable vote--Effect of late preferences--Elimination of +candidates at the bottom of the poll--Quota representation the basis of +the system. + + +CHAPTER VIII + +LIST SYSTEMS OF PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. + +The Belgian electoral system--The Franchise--Compulsory voting--Partial +renewal of Chamber--The presentation of lists--The act of voting--The +allotment of seats to parties--The selection of the successful +candidates--A Belgian election, Ghent, 1908: the poll--The counting of +the votes--The final process--Public opinion favourable to the +system--The relation of the Belgian to other list systems--The different +methods of apportioning seats to lists--Criticism of the d'Hondt +rule--The formation of Cartels--The different methods of selecting +successful candidates--Panachage--The single vote and _case de +tête_--The limited and cumulative vote--Special characteristics of +Swedish and Finnish systems. + + +CHAPTER IX + +A COMPARISON OF LIST SYSTEMS WITH THE SINGLE TRANSFERABLE VOTE + +The influence of previous conditions--Party the basis of representation +in a list system--The freedom of the elector within the +party--Comparative accuracy--Panachage--Applicability to non-political +elections--Bye-elections--Relative simplicity of scrutiny. + + +CHAPTER X + +PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION AND PARTY GOVERNMENT + +Proportional representation and the two-party system--Burke's view of +party and party discipline--Narrow basis fatal to a large +party--Proportional representation and party discipline--"Free +questions" in Japan--The formation of groups--The formation of an +executive--A check on partisan legislation--Unlike the referendum, +proportional representation will strengthen the House of +Commons--Proportional representation facilitates legislation desired by +the nation--Proportional representation in Standing Committees--Taking +off the Whips--New political conditions. + + +CHAPTER XI + +OBJECTIONS TO PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION + +The question of practicability--The elector's task--The returning +officer's task--Time required for counting the votes--Fads and sectional +interests--The representation of localities--The member and his +constituents--Objections of party agents--Alleged difficulties in the +organization of elections--Alleged increase of cost--The accuracy of +representation--Summary. + + +CHAPTER XII + +THE KEY TO ELECTORAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM + +Electoral problems awaiting solution--Simplification of the +franchise--Redistribution--Should be automatic--Secures neither one vote +one value nor true representation--The problem simplified by +proportional representation--The case of Ireland--Three-cornered +contests--Partial adoption of proportional representation not +desirable--Proportional representation and democratic principles +--Constitutional reform--Federal Home Rule--Imperial Federation +--Conclusion. + + +APPENDICES + +APPENDIX I + +THE JAPANESE ELECTORAL SYSTEM--THE SINGLE NON-TRANSFERABLE VOTE + +Failure of single-member system--Multi-member constituencies: Single +Vote adopted 1900--Equitable results--The new system and party +organization--The position of independents--Public opinion and the new +system. + +APPENDIX II + +THE SECOND BALLOT: A NOTE ON THE GERMAN GENERAL ELECTIONS OF 1903 AND +1907 + +The effect of unequal constituencies on representation--The effect of +second ballots--Second ballots and the swing of the pendulum--The second +ballot and the representation of minorities--Summary. + +APPENDIX III + +THE SWEDISH SYSTEM OF PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION + +The former constitution of the two Chambers--The struggle for electoral +reform--The Swedish law of 1909--The Swedish system of proportional +representation--The allotment of seats to parties--The selection of the +successful candidates--Free voters and double candidatures--An election +at Carlskrona--The poll--The allotment of seats to parties--The +selection of the successful candidates--The election of +suppliants--Comparison with Belgian system--The system and party +organization--The great improvement effected by the Swedish system. + +APPENDIX IV + +THE FINLAND SYSTEM OF PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION + +The influence of the Belgian system--Schedules and "compacts" in place +of lists--An election in Nyland--Returning officer's task--The allotment +of seats--Successful candidates in the Nyland election--Equitable +results--Elector's freedom of choice. + +APPENDIX V + +STATISTICS OF THE GENERAL ELECTIONS, 1885-1910 + +Explanatory notes--The representation of minorities. + +APPENDIX VI + +PREFERENTIAL VOTING: THE TRANSFER OF SUPERFLUOUS VOTES + +I. The element of chance involved: Its magnitude. II. Method of +eliminating the chance element--Example. + +APPENDIX VII + +THE SINGLE TRANSFERABLE VOTE: SCHEDULE TO MUNICIPAL REPRESENTATION BILL, +1910 + +APPENDIX VIII + +THE SINGLE TRANSFERABLE VOTE: SCHEDULE TO TASMANIAN ELECTORAL ACT, 1907 + +APPENDIX IX + +THE SINGLE TRANSFERABLE VOTE: REGULATIONS FOR THE ELECTION OF SENATORS +UNDER THE SOUTH AFRICA ACT, 1909 + +APPENDIX X LIST SYSTEM: BILL PRESENTED TO THE FRENCH CHAMBER OF +DEPUTIES, 1907 + +APPENDIX XI + +LIST SYSTEM: LAW ADOPTED BY THE CANTON OF BÂLE TOWN, 1905 + +INDEX + + + + +"The object of our deliberation is to promote the good purposes for +which elections have been instituted, and to prevent their +inconveniences." + +--BURKE + + + + +CHAPTER I + +THE HOUSE OF COMMONS AS AN EXPRESSION OF THE NATIONAL WILL + +"The virtue, the spirit, the essence of the House of Commons, consists +in its being the express image of the nation."--BURKE. + + +"It is necessary," said Burke, "to resort to the theory of government +whenever you propose any alteration in the frame of it, whether that +alteration means the revival of some former antiquated and forsaken +constitution or state, or the introduction of some new improvement in +the commonwealth." The following chapters are a plea for an improvement +in our electoral methods, and although the suggested improvement and the +arguments with which it is supported are not new, yet it is desirable, +in the spirit of Burke's declaration, to preface the plea with some +reference to the main feature of our constitution. + +_The spread of representative government_. + +The outstanding characteristic of the British Constitution, its +fundamental principle, is now, if not fully so in Burke's time, the +government of the nation by its chosen representatives. Indeed, so much +is this the case that, in spite of the continued presence of elements +which are far from representative in character, originating in that +distant past when commoners had little, if any, political influence, the +British Constitution and Representative Government are almost synonymous +terms, and the "mother of parliaments" has given birth to so long a +succession of constitutions of which the cardinal principle is +representative government--the association of the governed with the +government--that we cannot now think of our House of Commons save as the +most complete expression of this principle. Nor, despite the criticisms, +many of them fully deserved, which have been directed against the +working of parliamentary institutions, has the House of Commons ceased +to be taken in other lands as a model to be reproduced in general +outline. New parliaments continue to arise and in the most unexpected +quarters. China is insistently demanding the immediate realisation of +full representative government. Japan has not only assimilated western +learning, but has adopted western representative institutions, and in +copying our electoral machinery has added improvements of her own. +Russia has established a parliament which, although not at present +elected upon a democratic basis, must inevitably act as a powerful check +upon autocracy, and in the process will assuredly seek that increased +authority which comes from a more complete identification with the +people. The Reichstag has demanded the cessation of the personal rule of +the German Emperor, and will not be content until, in the nation's name, +it exercises a more complete control over the nation's affairs. +Parliamentary government was recently established at Constantinople amid +the plaudits of the whole civilized world, and although the new régime +has not fulfilled all the hopes formed of it, yet upon its continuance +depends the maintenance of the improvements already effected in Turkey. +Lord Morley signalized his tenure of office as Secretary of State for +India by reforms that make a great advance in the establishment of +representative institutions. Some of these experiments may be regarded +as premature, but in the case of civilized nations there would appear to +be no going back; for them there is no alternative to democracy, and if +representative institutions have not yielded so far all the results that +were expected of them, progress must be sought in an improvement of +these institutions rather than in a return to earlier conditions. The +only criticism, therefore, of the House of Commons that is of practical +value must deal with those defects which experience has disclosed, and +with those improvements in its organization and composition which are +essential if in the future it is to discharge efficiently and adequately +its primary function of giving effect to the national will. + +_The House of Commons and sovereign power._ + +"The essential property of representative government," says Professor +Dicey, "is to produce coincidence between the wishes of the Sovereign +and the wishes of the subject.... This, which is true in its measure of +all real representative government applies with special truth to the +English House of Commons." [1] This conception of the House of Commons as +the central and predominant factor in the constitution, exercising +sovereign power because it represents the nation which it governs, has +been notably strengthened during the last fifty years. A change having +far-reaching consequences took place in 1861, when the repeal of the +paper duties was effected by a clause in the annual Bill providing for +the necessary reimposition of annual duties, a proceeding which deprived +the Lords of the opportunity of defeating the new proposal other than by +rejecting the whole of the measure of which it formed a part. This +example has since been followed by both the great parties of the State. +Sir William Harcourt embodied extensive changes in the Death Duties in +the Finance Bill of 1894; Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, in 1899, included +proposals for altering the permanent provisions made for the reduction +of the National Debt; Mr. Lloyd George, following these precedents, +included in the Finance Bill of 1909 important new taxes which, prior to +1861, would have been submitted to both Houses in the form of separate +Bills. The House of Commons, however, has not yet attained the position +of full unqualified sovereignty, for, whilst the relations between the +King and the Commons have been harmonised by making the King's Ministry +dependent upon that House, the decisions of the House of Lords are not +yet subject to the same control. The Lords successfully rejected the +Education, Licensing, and Plural Voting Bills, all of which were passed +by the Commons by large majorities during the Parliament of 1906-1909. +Further, it refused its consent to the Finance Bill of 1909 until the +measure had been submitted to the judgment of the country, and by this +action compelled a dissolution of Parliament.[2] + +_The demand for complete sovereignty._ + +These assertions of authority on the part of the House of Lords called +forth from the Commons a fresh demand for complete sovereignty--a demand +based on the ground that the House of Commons expresses the will of the +people, and that the rejection by the hereditary House of measures +desired by the nation's representatives is directly opposed to the true +principles of representative government. In consequence of the rejection +of the Education and Plural Voting Bills of 1906, Sir Henry +Campbell-Bannerman, in June 1907, moved in the House of Commons the +following resolution: "That, in order to give effect to the will of the +people as expressed by their elected representatives, it is necessary +that the power of the other House to alter or reject Bills passed by +this House, should be so restricted by law as to secure that within the +limit of a single Parliament the final decision of the Commons shall +prevail." The first clause of this resolution advances the claim already +referred to--that the House of Commons is the representative and +authoritative expression of the national will--and in support of this +claim Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman quoted the declaration of Burke, that +"the virtue, the spirit, the essence of the House of Commons consists in +its being the express image of the nation." In the Parliament elected in +January 1910, further resolutions were carried by the Commons defining +more precisely the proposed limitation of the legislative power of the +Lords. It was resolved[3] that the House of Lords should be disabled by +law from rejecting or amending a money Bill, and that any Bill other +than a money Bill which had passed the House of Commons in three +successive sessions should become law without the consent of the +House of Lords. + +These resolutions were embodied in the Parliament Bill, but the measure +was not proceeded with owing to the death of King Edward, and a +conference between the leaders of the two chief parties met for the +purpose of finding a settlement of the controversy by consent. The +conference failed, and the Government at once took steps to appeal to +the country for a decision in support of its proposals. Meanwhile the +House of Lords, which had already placed on record its opinion that the +possession of a peerage should no longer confer the right to legislate, +carried resolutions outlining a scheme for a new Second Chamber, and +proposing that disputes between the two Houses should be decided by +joint sessions, or, in matters of great gravity, by means of a +Referendum. The result of the appeal to the country (Dec. 1910) was in +favour of the Government. The Parliament Bill was re-introduced, and +this measure, if passed, will mark an important step in the realisation +of the demand of the Commons for complete sovereignty. + +_Complete sovereignty demands complete representation._ + +The Parliament Bill does not, however, contemplate the establishment of +single-chamber Government, and it would appear that complete sovereignty +is only claimed whilst the House of Lords is based upon the hereditary +principle. For the preamble of the Bill declares that "it is intended +to substitute for the House of Lords as it at present exists a Second +Chamber constituted on a popular instead of hereditary basis," and that +"provision will require hereafter to be made by Parliament in a measure +effecting such substitution for limiting and defining the powers of the +new Second Chamber." But whatever constitutional changes may take place, +the national will must remain the final authority in legislation, and +the ultimate position of the House of Commons in the constitution and in +public esteem will depend upon the confidence with which it can be +regarded as giving expression to that will. It cannot claim to be the +sole authority for legislation without provoking searching inquiries +into the methods of election by which it is brought into being. At a +General Election the citizens are asked to choose representatives who +shall have full power to speak in their name on all questions which may +arise during the lifetime of a Parliament. But, although invariably +there are several important questions before the country awaiting +decision, the elector is usually restricted in his choice to two +candidates, and it is obvious that this limited choice affords him a +most inadequate opportunity of giving expression to his views upon the +questions placed before him. There can be no guarantee that the +decisions of representatives so chosen are always in agreement with the +wishes of those who elected them. Even in the General Election of +December 1910, when every effort was made to concentrate public +attention upon one problem--the relations between the two Houses of +Parliament--the elector in giving his vote had to consider the probable +effect of his choice upon many other questions of first-class +importance--the constitution of a new Second Chamber, Home Rule for +Ireland, the maintenance of Free Trade, the establishment of an Imperial +Preference, Electoral Reform, the reversal or modification of the +Osborne Judgment, Payment of Members, Invalidity Insurance; in respect +of all of which legislative proposals might possibly be submitted to the +new Parliament. Obviously before the House of Commons can be regarded +with complete confidence as the expression of the national will, the +elector must be given a wider and more effective choice in the selection +of a representative. + +It is, however, contended by many politicians that the main object of a +General Election is not the creation of a legislature which shall give +expression to the views of electors on public questions. "A General +Election," says the Report of the Royal Commission on Electoral +Systems,[4] "is in fact considered by a large portion of the electorate +as practically a referendum on the question which of two Governments +shall be returned to power." But were this interpretation of a General +Election accepted it would destroy the grounds on which it is claimed +that the decisions of the Commons in respect of legislation shall +prevail "within the limit of a single Parliament." Some means should be +available for controlling the Government in respect of its legislative +proposals, and the history of the Unionist administrations of 1895-1906, +during which the House of Lords failed to exercise any such control, +demonstrated the need of a check upon the action of a House of Commons +elected under present conditions. Mr. John M. Robertson, whose +democratic leanings are not open to the least suspicion, has commented +in this sense upon the lack of confidence in the representative +character of the House of Commons. "Let me remind you," said he, "that +the state of things in which the Progressive party can get in on a tidal +movement of political feeling with a majority of 200, causes deep +misgivings in the minds of many electors.... Those who desire an +effective limitation of the power of the House of Lords and its ultimate +abolition, are bound to offer to the great mass of prudent electors some +measure of electoral reform which will give greater stability to the +results of the polls, and will make the results at a General Election +more in keeping with the actual balance of opinion in the country." [5] +The preamble of the Parliament Bill itself implies that the decisions of +the House of Commons may not always be in accordance with the national +wishes. It foreshadows the creation of a new Second Chamber, and the +only purpose which this chamber can serve is to make good the +deficiencies of the First. + +The fact that our electoral methods are so faulty that their results +produce in the minds of many electors deep misgivings as to the +representative character of the House of Commons must materially +undermine the authority of that House. All who desire the final and +complete triumph of representative institutions--a triumph that depends +upon their success in meeting the demands made upon them--all who are +anxious that the House of Commons shall not only maintain, but increase, +the prestige that has hitherto been associated with it, must, in the +face of possible constitutional developments, endeavour to strengthen +its position by making it in fact, as it is in theory, fully +representative of the nation. For Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's +quotation from Burke is double-edged, and may be expressed thus: "the +virtue, the spirit, the essence of the House of Commons departs as soon +as it ceases to be the express image of the nation." Such a House cannot +furnish an adequate basis of support for a Government. For the +Government which issues from it will not command public confidence. The +debates in the House in 1905, before the resignation of Mr. Balfour, +bore testimony to the fact that the strength and power of a Government +which, according to the theory of our constitution, depends upon the +number of its supporters in the House of Commons, in reality rests upon +its reputation with the country. There was quoted more than once with +excellent effect this dictum of Sir William Anson: "Ministers are not +only the servants of the Crown, they represent the public opinion of the +United Kingdom. When they cease to impersonate public opinion they +become a mere group of personages who must stand or fall by the +prudence and success of their actions. They have to deal with disorders +at home or hostile manifestations abroad; they would have to meet these +with the knowledge that they had not the confidence or support of the +country; and their opponents at home and abroad would know this too." [6] +The strength and stability of a democratic Government thus depend upon +its capacity to interpret the will of the country, and the support which +the House of Commons can give is of value only to the extent to which +that House reflects national opinion. The Commons, if it is to maintain +unimpaired its predominant position in the constitution, must make good +its claim to be the representative expression of the national will. The +measures for which it makes itself responsible must have behind them +that irresistible authority, the approval of the electorate. If then our +electoral methods fail to yield a fully representative House, and if, in +consequence, the House cannot satisfactorily fulfil its double function +of affording an adequate basis of support to the Government which +springs from it, and of legislating in accordance with the nation's +wishes, the resultant dissatisfaction and instability must give rise to +a demand for their improvement. The House of Commons must re-establish +itself upon surer foundations. + +_Strengthening the foundations of the House of Commons._ + +Each change in the constitution of the House of Commons--and its +foundations have been strengthened on more than one occasion--has been +preceded by a recognition of its failure to meet in full the +requirements of a representative chamber. Large changes have again and +again been made in consequence of such recognition since the day when +Burke alleged that its virtue lay in its being "the express image of the +nation." At the close of the eighteenth century, when these words were +spoken, it could be alleged with apparent truth that 306 members were +virtually returned by the influence of 160 persons.[7] The +consciousness that such a House could not be the express image of the +nation produced the Reform Bill of 1832, and a further recognition that +a still larger number of the governed must be associated with the +Government, produced the further changes of 1867 and of 1884, embodied +in measures significantly called Acts for the Representation of the +People. These changes, by conferring the franchise upon an ever-widening +circle of citizens, have, from one point of view, rendered the House of +Commons more fully representative of the nation at large. But even +whilst the process of extending the franchise was still in operation, it +was recognized that such extensions were not in themselves sufficient to +create a House of Commons that could claim to be a true expression of +the national will. The test of a true system of representation, laid +down by Mill in _Representative Government_, has never been successfully +challenged. It still remains the last word upon the subject, and, until +the House of Commons satisfies that test with reasonable approximation, +it will always be open to the charge that it is not fully +representative, and that in consequence its decisions lack the necessary +authority. "In a really equal democracy," runs the oft-quoted phrase, +"any and every section would be represented, not disproportionately, but +proportionately. A majority of the electors would always have a majority +of the representatives; but a minority of electors would always have a +minority of the representatives. Man for man, they would be as fully +represented as the majority." [8] + +Mill's philosophy finds but little favour in many quarters of political +activity to-day, and the rejection of his philosophy has induced many to +regard his views on representative government as of little value. Even +so staunch an admirer as Lord Morley of Blackburn has underestimated the +importance of Mill's declaration, for, in a recent appreciation of the +philosopher[9] he declared that Mill "was less successful in dealing +with parliamentary machinery than in the infinitely more important task +of moulding and elevating popular character, motives, ideals, and steady +respect for truth, equity and common sense--things that matter a vast +deal more than machinery." Yet Lord Morley, in his attempt to make a +beginning with representative institutions in India, found that +questions of electoral machinery were of the first importance; that +they, indeed, constituted his chief difficulty; and he was compelled in +adjusting the respective claims of Hindus and Muhammadans to have +recourse to Mill's famous principle--the due representation of +minorities. Mill, as subsequent chapters will show, understood what Lord +Morley seems to have insufficiently recognized, that the development or +repression of growth in popular character, motives and ideals, nay, the +successful working of representative institutions themselves, depends in +a very considerable degree upon electoral machinery. Its importance +increases with every fresh assertion of democratic principles, and the +constitutional issues raised during the Parliaments of 1906, 1910, and +1911 must involve a revision of our electoral methods before a complete +solution is attained. The demand on the part of the House of Commons for +complete sovereignty must evoke a counter demand that that House shall +make itself fully representative. + +_The rise of a new party._ + +But the relations which should subsist between the two Houses of +Parliament, whether the upper House is reformed or not, is not the only +question which is giving rise to a closer examination of the foundations +of the House of Commons. To this external difficulty there must be added +the internal, and in the future a more pressing, problem created by the +rise of a new organized party within the House of Commons itself. The +successive extensions of the franchise have given birth to new political +forces which are not content to give expression to their views along the +old channels of the two historic parties, and the growth of the Labour +Party must accelerate the demand for a more satisfactory electoral +method. For a system which fails in many respects to meet the +requirements of two political parties cannot possibly do justice to the +claims of three parties to fair representation in the House of Commons. +It is true that some statesmen regard the rise of a new party with fear +and trembling; they imagine that it forebodes the bankruptcy of +democratic institutions, the success of which, in their judgment, is +necessarily bound up with the maintenance of the two-party system. The +two-party system must indeed be a plant of tender growth if it depends +for existence upon the maintenance of antiquated electoral methods. But +those politicians who deprecate any change on the ground that +single-member constituencies afford the only means by which the +two-party system can be preserved, have failed to explain why this +electoral system has not prevented the growth of Labour parties in +Australia and in England, or why numerous parties and single-member +constituencies go hand in hand both in France and Germany. Single-member +constituencies may distort and falsify the representation of parties, +but they cannot prevent the coming of a new party if that party is the +outcome, the expression, of a new political force. + +_The new political conditions and electoral reform._ + +Why should the rise of a new party cause so much uneasiness? Can +democracy make no use of that increased diffusion of political +intelligence from which springs these new political movements? Mr. +Asquith takes no such pessimistic view. He, least, realises that our +present system is not necessarily the final stage in the development of +representative government. He does not imagine that, whilst we welcome +progress in all things else, we must at all costs adhere to the +electoral methods which have done duty in the past. Speaking at St. +Andrews, 19 February 1906, he declared that: "It was infinitely to the +advantage of the House of Commons, if it was to be a real reflection and +mirror of the national mind, that there should be no strain of opinion +honestly entertained by any substantial body of the King's subjects +which should not find there representation and speech. No student of +political development could have supposed that we should always go along +in the same old groove, one party on one side and another party on the +other side, without the intermediate ground being occupied, as it was in +every other civilized country, by groups and factions having special +ideas and interests of their own. If real and genuine and intelligent +opinion was more split up than it used to be, and if we could not now +classify everybody by the same simple process, we must accept the new +conditions and adapt our machinery to them, our party organization, our +representative system, and the whole scheme and form of our government." +This is not a chance saying, standing by itself, for a fortnight later, +speaking at Morley, Mr. Asquith added: "Let them have a House of Commons +which fully reflected every strain of opinion; that was what made +democratic government in the long run not only safer and more free, but +more stable." Mr. Asquith's statements take cognizance of the fact that +a great divergence between the theoretical and actual composition of the +House of Commons must make for instability, and his pronouncement is an +emphatic reinforcement of the arguments contained in the earlier portion +of this chapter. + +On a more important occasion, when replying to an influential deputation +of members of Parliament and others,[10] Mr. Asquith, with all the +responsibility which attaches to the words of a Prime Minister, made +this further statement: "I have said in public before now, and am +therefore only repeating an opinion which I have never ceased to hold, +namely, that there can be no question in the mind of any one familiar +with the actual operation of our constitutional system that it permits, +and I might say that it facilitates--but it certainly permits--a +minority of voters, whether in the country at large or in particular +constituencies, to determine the representation--the relative +representation in the one case of the whole nation, and the actual +representation in the other case of the particular +constituency--sometimes in defiance of the opinions and wishes of the +majority of the electors. The moment you have stated that as a fact +which cannot be disputed, and it cannot be contradicted by any one, you +have pointed out a flaw of a most serious character, and some might say +of an almost fatal character, when your constitutional and Parliamentary +system appears at the bar of judgment upon the issue whether or not it +does from the democratic point of view really carry out the first +principles of representative government. I therefore agree that it is +impossible to defend the rough and ready method which has been hitherto +adopted as a proper or satisfactory explanation of the representative +principle. It is not merely, as more than one speaker has pointed out, +that under our existing system a minority in the country may return a +majority of the House of Commons, but what more frequently happens, and +what I am disposed to agree is equally injurious in its results, is that +you have almost always a great disproportion in the relative size of the +majority and minority in the House of Commons as compared with their +relative size in the constituencies. That is the normal condition of our +House of Commons. I have had experience of some of the inconveniences +which result." In speaking at Burnley in support of the Parliament Bill +during the electoral campaign of December 1910, Mr. Asquith again laid +stress upon the need of making the House of Commons fully +representative. "It is," he said, "an essential and integral feature of +our policy ... that we shall go forward with the task of making the +House of Commons not only the mouthpiece but the mirror of the +national mind." + +There can be no doubt that the question of electoral methods must now +occupy a prominent place in all discussions which centre around the +purpose, efficiency and authority of the House of Commons. John Bright, +in addressing the people of Birmingham, on the eve of an election, +exhorted them to "bear in mind that you are going to make a machine +more important than any that is made in the manufactories of Birmingham +... a stupendous machine whose power no man can measure." [11] Can we +afford in the manufacture of such a machine to be content with rough and +ready methods of election? Accuracy and precision are being demanded +with ever-increasing force in all other departments of human activity; +on what grounds then can we in the most delicate of all--that of +government--refuse to recognize their value? The necessity of ensuring +the predominance of the House of Commons in our constitutional system, +the problem created by the rise of the Labour Party, the increased +recognition of the need of reform, cannot but contribute to one result. +The House of Commons will make itself more fully representative by the +adoption of more trustworthy electoral methods, and in so doing will not +only increase its stability and efficiency, but will render its +constitutional position impregnable. + +The indispensable preliminaries to any such change are, in the first +place, an analysis of the results, both direct and indirect, of existing +methods and, in the second place, a careful comparison of the +improvements possible. The subsequent chapters will be devoted to both +these aspects of the problem, for in the elucidation of the system most +suited to British conditions, the experience of those countries which, +faced with the necessity for change, have already introduced new methods +into their electoral systems, will be found to be of the highest value. + + +[Footnote 1: _The Law of the Constitution_, p. 81.] + +[Footnote 2: Our constitution is an ever-changing one, and had the +country endorsed the action of the Lords in withholding its assent to +the Finance Bill of 1909, a great blow would have been dealt to the +authority of the House of Commons. The Fabian Society, in its Manifesto +to members, issued on the eve of the election of January 1910, put this +aspect of the case very forcibly: "It may justly be claimed by the +Socialists that they have steadily refused to be misled by idle talk +about what is and what is not constitutional, and have recognized that +the only real constitution is the sum of the powers that are effectively +exercised in the country. If the House of Lords boldly refuses supply +and compels a dissolution, and the country, at the election, supports +the Lords, that support will make the action of the Lords constitutional +in spite of all paper denunciations by the defeated party" (_Fabian +News_, January 1910). + +The verdict of the country, as interpreted by the present mode of +election, condemned the action of the Lords by a substantial majority. +Yet the figures in Chap. II. p. 19, show by how small a turnover of +votes that judgment might have been reversed.] + +[Footnote 3: 14 April 1910.] + +[Footnote 4: Cd. 5163, par. 126.] + +[Footnote 5: Manchester Reform Club, 2 February 1909.] + +[Footnote 6: _The Law and Custom of the Constitution,_ p. 372.] + +[Footnote 7: Ibid., p. 124.] + +[Footnote 8: _Representative Government_, Chap. VII.] + +[Footnote 9: _The Times_, Literary Supplement, 18 May 1906.] + +[Footnote 10: 10 November 1908.] + +[Footnote 11: Thomas Hare, _The Election of Representatives_, p. 18] + + + + +CHAPTER II + +THE DIRECT RESULTS OF MAJORITY SYSTEMS + + +"I therefore agree that it is impossible to defend the rough and ready +method which has been hitherto adopted as a proper or satisfactory +explanation of the representative principle. It is not merely, as more +than one speaker has pointed out, that under our existing system a +minority in the country may return a majority of the House of Commons, +but what more frequently happens, and what I am disposed to agree is +equally injurious in its results, is that you have almost always a great +disproportion in the relative size of the majority and minority in the +House of Commons as compared with their relative size in the +constituencies." + +--THE RIGHT HON. H.H. ASQUITH[1] + +"English writers," says Mr. Archibald E. Dobbs, in the _Irish Year +Book_, 1909, "often write as if election by a bare majority was the only +natural or possible mode of election, as if it was like day and night, +seedtime and harvest; something fixed and in the nature of things, and +not to be questioned or examined or improved." The unquestioning habit +of our minds goes even farther than Mr. Dobbs suggests. For, although +prior to the Redistribution Act of 1885, every great town in the United +Kingdom, with the exception of London, was a parliamentary unit, yet the +system of single-member constituencies made general by that Act is now +regarded by many as another essential and permanent feature of the +English parliamentary system. But if, as this chapter proposes to show, +existing electoral methods may result, and have resulted, in a complete +travesty of representation, if these methods fail in every respect to +fulfil the requirements of a satisfactory electoral system, then neither +single-member constituencies nor the majority method of election can be +permitted to stand permanently in the way of effective improvement. + +_The exaggeration of majorities._ + +Since the Redistribution Act of 1885, when the system of single-member +constituencies was made general, there have been eight General +Elections, and these are amply sufficient to illustrate the working of +this system. A complete analysis of these elections, prepared by Mr. J. +Rooke Corbett, M.A., of the Manchester Statistical Society, appears in +Appendix V.[2] It will be sufficient for present purposes if attention +is directed to some of the more obvious of their lessons. The General +Elections of 1895, 1900, and 1906, resulted in the return to the House +of Commons of a number of representatives of the victorious party far in +excess of that to which their polling strength entitled them, and this +result, repeated three times in succession, has given rise to a +widespread belief that this system necessarily and always yields to the +victors an exaggerated majority. There is, however, no clear conception +of the extent to which these exaggerated majorities diverge from the +truth, and an examination of the figures is therefore desirable. Here +are the totals for the General Elections of 1900 and 1906:[3]-- + + +GENERAL ELECTION, 1900 + +Parties. Votes Seats Seats in + Obtained. Obtained. proportion + to Votes. + +Unionists 2,548,736 402 343 +Home Rulers 2,391,319 268 327 + +Majorities 157,417 134 16 +GENERAL ELECTION, 1906 + +Parties. Votes Seats Seats in + Obtained. Obtained. proportion + to Votes. +Ministerialists 3,395,811 513 387 +Unionists 2,494,794 157 283 + +Majorities 901,017 356 104 + + +It will be seen that in the General Election of 1900 the Unionists +obtained a majority of 134, but that if parties had been represented in +proportion to their polling strength this majority would have been 16, +whilst the majority of 356 obtained at the General Election of 1906 by +the Ministerialists (in which term, for the purposes of comparison, all +members of the Liberal, Labour and Nationalist parties are included) +would, under similar conditions, have been a majority of 104 only. The +very important change in public opinion disclosed by the polls at the +second of these elections was not nearly sufficient to justify the +enormous displacement that took place in the relative party strengths +within the House of Commons. The extent of the possible displacement in +representation may be more fully realised from a consideration of the +figures for Great Britain, for the representation of Ireland, where +parliamentary conditions have become stereotyped, is but little affected +at any election. An increase in the Liberal vote from 2,073,116 to +3,093,978--an increase of 50 per cent.--resulted in a change in the +number of representatives from 186 to 428, an increase of 130 per cent., +whilst a decrease in the Conservative vote from 2,402,740 to +2,350,086--a decline of little more than 2 per cent.--resulted in a +reduction in representation from 381 to 139 members, a decline of 63 per +cent. The displacement was even more pronounced in London, where the +number of Liberal members rose from 8 to 40, and the number of +Conservative members fell from 52 to 20. The violence of these changes +was attributed to a similar change on the part of the electors, but it +was much more largely due to an electoral method that exaggerates any +changes in public opinion beyond all reason. + +If, however, the results--not of two but of the eight General Elections, +1885-1910--are considered it will be seen that the current belief, that +the single-member system invariably yields a large majority, rests on a +very precarious foundation. The General Election of 1892, for example, +gave to the Liberals (inclusive of the Nationalists) a majority of 44 +only. In England (which, excluding Wales and Monmouth, returns 461 +members) the Conservatives in 1895 and 1900 had majorities of 233 and +213; in 1906 the Liberals had a majority of 207; but in the elections of +January and December 1910, the Conservatives had on each occasion a +majority of 17 only. If Wales and Monmouth are included, it will be +found that in the 1910 elections the Liberal majorities were 13 and 11 +respectively. Single-member constituencies do not therefore guarantee +large majorities. It can with greater truth be said that they guarantee +wrong majorities, for, as the following table shows, there is no +constant relation between the size of the majority in votes and the size +of the majority in seats:-- + +General Election. Majority in Seats. Majority in Votes. + +1885 Liberal 158 Liberal 564,391 +1886 Conservative 104 Liberal 54,817 +1892 Liberal 44 Liberal 190,974 +1895 Conservative 150 Conservative 117,473 +1900 Conservative 134 Conservative 157,417 +1906 Liberal 356 Liberal 901,017 +1910 (Jan.) Liberal 124 Liberal 495,683 +1910 (Dec.) Liberal 126 Liberal 355,945 + +The majority of 44 seats which the Liberals obtained in 1892 represented +a majority of 190,974 votes, whereas a much smaller Conservative +majority at the polls, viz., 117,473, yielded in 1895 a majority in +seats of 150. The overwhelming victory of 1895 represented the very +slender majority of 117,473 votes in a total of 4,841,769, whilst at the +next election, 1900, when the Conservatives increased their majority at +the polls, their majority in the House of Commons was reduced. The +Liberal majority in votes in the election of December 1910 was smaller +than in that of the preceding January, but not the majority in seats. In +1886, the Conservatives obtained the large majority of 104 without +having any majority in votes, and, if England is taken alone, it will be +found that in January 1910 the Liberals had a majority of 29,877 in +votes, and that in December the Conservatives had a majority of 31,744, +whereas on each occasion the Conservatives obtained a majority of +17 seats. + +_The disfranchisement of minorities._ + +Politicians, to whom the one great saving merit of the single-member +system is that it yields an exaggerated majority to the victors, would, +if pressed, find it very difficult to defend the results referred to in +the preceding paragraphs, and would be even more at a loss if asked to +state to what extent they considered that national opinion should be +falsified. The most ardent defenders of the system would hardly deny the +right of the minority to some representation, and it is worthy of note +that one of the reasons advanced by Mr. Gladstone in support of his +decision to adopt it was that such a system tended to secure +representation for minorities.[4] Yet, as prophesied in the debates of +1885, the minorities in the South and West of Ireland have since that +date been permanently disfranchised; in the eight Parliaments, +1885-1911, they have been entirely without representation. This +continued injustice is in itself sufficient to show how baseless was Mr. +Gladstone's assumption that the system of single member constituencies +would secure representation for minorities. This example, however, does +not stand alone. In the General Election of 1906 the Unionists of Wales +contested 17 constituencies, and although at the polls they numbered +52,637, they failed to secure a member; their 91,620 Liberal opponents +secured the whole of the representation allotted to those +constituencies. In addition the Liberals obtained the thirteen seats +which the Unionists did not challenge. The minority throughout Wales, +numbering 36 per cent, of the electors, had no spokesman in the House of +Commons. This result shows how completely a system of single-member +constituencies fails to protect minorities, and an analysis of the votes +cast in Scotland in 1910, both in January and December, reveals the fact +that the Unionist minority only escaped by the narrowest of margins the +fate which befel the Welsh Unionists in 1906. The figures speak for +themselves:-- + +SCOTLAND (Boroughs and Counties, January 1910) + +Parties. Votes. Seats Seats in + Obtained. proportion + to Votes. +Liberal 352,334 59 38 +Labour and Socialist 35,997 2 4 +Unionist 255,589 9 28 + +Totals 643,920 70 70 + +Every Scottish Unionist member of Parliament represented on an average +28,400 voters, whilst a Liberal member represented less than 6000 +voters. The figures repay still further examination. One of the Unionist +seats--the Camlachie division of Glasgow--was only captured as the result +of a split in the Ministerialist ranks. The other eight seats were won +by majorities ranging from 41 to 874, amounting in the aggregate to +3156. If therefore in these constituencies some 1600 Unionist voters had +changed sides, the Unionist party, though numbering more than a quarter +of a million, or 40 per cent. of the electorate, might have failed to +secure any representation at all. With the single-member system more +than a quarter of a million of Scottish Unionists only obtained +representation as it were by accident. In the same election the Liberals +in the counties of Surrey, Sussex, and Kent, numbering 134,677, found +themselves without a representative.[5] + +_The underrepresentation of majorities._ + +The failure of existing electoral methods to provide representation for +minorities not only unduly emphasizes racial and other differences +between different parts of the same country, as in Ireland, but often +leads to a complete falsification of public opinion. The results in +Birmingham and Manchester in the election of 1906 may serve as a text. +As a result of that election these two towns were represented in +Parliament as being absolutely opposed to one another--a heightened +contrast which was a pure caricature of the difference disclosed by the +polls. Manchester (including Salford) returned nine Ministerialists; +they were elected by the votes of 51,721 citizens, whilst the votes of +their 33,907 political opponents counted for nothing. Manchester was +solid for Liberalism. Birmingham (with Aston Manor) was represented by +eight Unionist members elected by 51,658 citizens, but here again the +polls disclosed a dissentient minority of 22,938. The total number of +votes in Manchester was 85,628, and in Birmingham 74,596. Manchester +(with Salford) has one more member than Birmingham (with Aston Manor), +because of the larger population and electorate of the former area. The +Ministerialists of Manchester and Salford were equal in number to the +Unionists in Birmingham, and it is interesting to observe that the +former obtained additional representation because their opponents were +more numerous than were the opponents of the Unionists in Birmingham. + +The combined results of these two districts disclose the crowning +weakness of a system of single-member constituencies. Taken together the +Unionists numbered 85,565, the Ministerialists 74,659, and if the net +Unionist majority of 10,906 had been spread over the whole of the two +areas it would have yielded in each constituency the very respectable +majority of 640. If their voting power had been evenly diffused the +Unionists might have won the whole of the seventeen seats, whereas they +were, as a result of the election, in a minority of one. This possible +inversion of the true opinion of the electorate may perhaps be more +clearly understood from another example taken from the same +election,--the results of the polls in the county divisions of +Warwickshire. + +WARWICKSHIRE (ELECTION, 1906) + +Electoral Conservative Liberal Conservative Liberal +Division Votes. Votes. Majority. Majority. +Tamworth 7,561 4,842 2,719 -- +Nuneaton 5,849 7,677 -- 1,828 +Rugby 4,907 5,181 -- 274 +Stratford-on-Avon 4,173 4,321 -- 148 + ------------------------------------------- + 22,490 22,021 469 + +The Conservatives, who were in a majority of 469, obtained one-fourth of +the representation allotted to the county. Similar examples can be given +from nearly every election. Thus the figures for the five divisions of +Sheffield in the election of December 1910 were as follows:-- + +SHEFFIELD (ELECTION, DECEMBER 1910) + +Electoral Ministerial Unionist Ministerial Unionist +Division Votes. Votes. Majority. Majority. +Attercliffe 6,532 5,354 1,178 -- +Brightside 5,766 3,902 1,864 -- +Central 3,271 3,455 -- 184 +Eccleshall 5,849 6,039 -- 190 +Hallam 5,593 5,788 -- 195 + ------------------------------------------- + 27,011 24,538 2,473 + +It will be seen that the Ministerial majority in each of the +Attercliffe and Brightside divisions was larger than the aggregate of +the Unionist majorities in the other three divisions; yet the Unionists +obtained three seats out of five. + +In the same election the result of the contested seats in London +(including Croydon and West Ham) was as follows:-- + +Parties. Votes Obtained. Seats Obtained. +Unionist . . . . . . 268,127 29 +Ministerialist . . . . 243,722 31 + +The Unionists were in a majority of 24,405, but only obtained a minority +of the seats. Had their majority been uniformly distributed throughout +London there would have been an average majority for the Unionists of +400 in every constituency, and in that case the press would have said +that London was solidly Unionist. + +It may be contended that the foregoing are isolated cases, but +innumerable examples can be culled from electoral statistics showing how +a system of single-member constituencies may fail to secure for +majorities the influence and power which are rightly theirs. In the +General Election of 1895 the contested elections yielded the following +results:-- + +GENERAL ELECTION, 1895 (Contested Constituencies) + +Parties. Votes. Seats. +Unionists . . . . . . 1,785,372 282 +Home Rulers . . . . 1,823,809 202 + +These figures show that in a contest extending over no less than 484 +constituencies the Unionists, who were in a minority of 38,437, +obtained a majority of 80 seats. In this election, if an allowance is +made for uncontested constituencies, it will be found that the Unionists +were in a majority, but in the General Election of 1886 the figures for +the whole of the United Kingdom (including an allowance for uncontested +seats made on the same basis[6]) were as follows:-- + +GENERAL ELECTION, 1886 (All Constituencies) + +Parties. Votes Obtained. Seats Obtained. +Home Rulers . . . . 2,103,954 283 +Unionists . . . . . . 2,049,137 387 + +This election was regarded as a crushing defeat for Mr. Gladstone. He +found himself in the House of Commons in a minority of 104, but his +supporters in the country were in a majority. The results of the General +Election of 1874--although the system of single-member constituencies +had not then been made general--are equally instructive. The figures are +as follows:-- + +GENERAL ELECTION, 1874 + +Parties. Votes Seats Seats in + Obtained. Obtained. proportion + to Votes. +Conservative . . . . . . 1,222,000 356 300 +Liberal and Home Rulers . 1,436,000 296 352 + +From this it appears that in 1874, while the Liberals in the United +Kingdom, in the aggregate, had a majority of 214,000 votes, the +Conservatives had a majority of 60 in the members elected, whereas with +a rational system of representation the Liberals should have had a +majority of 52.[7] + +Such anomalous results are not confined to this country; they are but +examples of that inversion of national opinion which marks at all stages +the history of elections based on the majority system. Speaking of the +United States, Professor Commons says that "as a result of the district +system the national House of Representatives is scarcely a +representative body. In the fifty-first Congress, which enacted the +McKinley Tariff Law, the majority of the representatives were elected by +a minority of the voters." In the fifty-third Congress, elected in 1892, +the Democrats, with 47.2 per cent, of the vote, obtained 59.8 per cent, +of the representatives. + +The stupendous Republican victory of 1894 was equally unjustified; the +Republican majority of 134 should have been a minority of 7, as against +all other parties.[8] Similarly in New South Wales the supporters of Mr. +Reid's government, who secured a majority of the seats at the election +of 1898, were in a minority of 15,000. The figures of the New York +Aldermanic election of 1906 show an equally striking contrast between +the actual results of the election and the probable results under a +proportional system:-- + +_A "game of dice."_ + +Parties. Seats Seats in + Obtained. proportion + to Votes. +Republican 41 18 +Democrat 26 27 +Municipal Ownership +Candidates 6 25 +Socialist -- 2 + +It is unnecessary to proceed with the recital of the anomalous results +of existing electoral methods. It has been abundantly shown that a +General Election often issues in a gross exaggeration of prevailing +opinion; that such exaggeration may at one time involve a complete +suppression of the minority, whilst at another time a majority may fail +to obtain its fair share of representation. M. Poincaré may well liken +an election to a game of dice (he speaks of _les coups de dé du système +majoritaire_,) for no one who has followed the course of elections could +have failed to have observed how largely the final results have depended +upon chance. This, indeed, was the most striking characteristic of the +General Elections of 1910. In the January election there were 144 +constituencies in which the successful member was returned by a majority +of less than 500. Of these constituencies 69 seats were held by the +Ministerialists and 75 by the Unionists. The majorities were in some +cases as low as 8, 10, and 14. The aggregate of the majorities in the +Ministerialist constituencies amounted to 16,931, and had some 8500 +Liberals in these constituencies changed sides, the Ministerialist +majority of 124 might have been annihilated. On the other hand, the +Unionists held 75 seats by an aggregate majority of 17,389, and had +fortune favoured the Ministeralists in these constituencies their +majority would have been no less than 274. Such is the stability of the +foundation on which the House of Commons rests; such the method to which +we trust when it is necessary to consult the nation on grave +national issues. + +_The importance of boundaries_. + +All these anomalies can be traced to the same cause--that with a +single-member system the whole of the representation of a constituency +must necessarily be to the majority of the electors, whether that +majority be large or small. It directly follows that the results of +elections often depend not so much upon the actual strength of political +parties, as upon the manner in which that strength is distributed over +the country. If that strength is evenly distributed, then the minority +may be crushed in every constituency; if unevenly distributed any result +is possible. In the latter case the result may be considerably +influenced by the manner in which the constituencies are arranged. A +slight change in the line of the boundaries of a constituency might +easily make a difference of 50 votes, whilst "to carry the dividing line +from North to South, instead of from East to West, would, in many +localities, completely alter the character of the representation." [9] An +example will make this statement clear. Take a town with 13,000 Liberal +and 12,000 Conservative electors and divide it into five districts of +5000 electors each. If there is a section of the town in which the +Liberals largely preponderate--and it often happens that the strength of +one or other of the parties is concentrated in a particular area--the +net result of the election in five districts will depend upon the way in +which the boundary lines are drawn. The possible results of two +different distributions may be shown in an extreme form thus:-- + +Constituency Libs. Cons. +1st. 4,000 1,000 Lib. victory. +2nd. 2,400 2,600 Cons. " +3rd. 2,300 2,700 " " +4th. 2,200 2,800 " " +5th. 2,100 2,900 " " + ------ ------ + 13,000 12,000 + +Constituency Libs. Cons. +1st. 2,600 2,400 Lib. victory. +2st. 2,600 2,400 Lib. " +3st. 2,600 2,400 Lib. " +4th. 2,600 2,400 Lib. " +5th. 2,600 2,400 Lib. " + ------ ------ + 13,000 12,000 + +_The gerrymander_. + +With one set of boundaries the area in which the Liberals largely +preponderate might be enclosed in one constituency. The Liberals might +obtain a majority of 3000 in this constituency but lose the other four +seats. If, however, the boundary lines were so arranged that each +constituency included a portion of this excessively Liberal area, the +Liberals might obtain the whole of the five seats. In both cases the +result of the election would fail to give a true presentation of the +real opinions of the town. The influence of boundaries in determining +the results of an election has been clearly realized in the United +States for more than a century. Professor Commons states that whenever +the periodical rearrangement of constituencies takes place the +boundaries are "gerrymandered." "Every apportionment Act," says he, +"that has been passed in this or any other country has involved +inequality; and it would be absurd to ask a political party to pass such +an Act, and give the advantage of the inequality to the opposite party. +Consequently, every apportionment Act involves more or less of the +gerrymander. The gerrymander is simply such a thoughtful construction of +districts as will economize the votes of the party in power by giving it +small majorities in a large number of districts, and coop up the +opposing party with overwhelming majorities in a small number of +districts.... Many of the worst gerrymanders have been so well designed +that they come close within all constitutional requirements." [10] +Although the National Congress has stated that the district for +congressional elections must be a compact and contiguous territory, the +law is everywhere disregarded. + +The word "gerrymander" has found its way into English journalism. It was +used by Liberals in their criticism of Mr. Balfour's abortive +redistribution scheme of 1905, and has been equally used by Unionists in +1909 in their criticism of Mr. Harcourt's London Elections Bill. On +neither occasion was the word used in its original meaning, and, +although its history is to be found in most works on electoral methods, +the story may, perhaps, be repeated with advantage:-- + +"The term Gerrymander dates from the year 1811, when Elbridge Gerry was +Governor of Massachusetts, and the Democratic, or, as it was then +termed, the Republican party, obtained a temporary ascendency in the +State. In order to secure themselves in the possession of the +Government, the party in power passed the famous law of 11 February +1812, providing for a new division of the State into senatorial +districts, so contrived that in as many districts as possible the +Federalists should be outnumbered by their opponents. To effect this all +natural and customary lines were disregarded, and some parts of the +State, particularly the counties of Worcester and Essex, presented +similar examples of political geography. It is said that Gilbert Stuart, +seeing in the office of the _Columbian Centinel_ an outline of the Essex +outer district, nearly encircling the rest of the country, added with +his pencil a beak to Salisbury, and claws to Salem and Marblehead, +exclaiming, 'There, that will do for a salamander!' 'Salamander!' said +Mr. Russell, the editor: 'I call it a Gerrymander!' The mot obtained +vogue, and a rude cut of the figure published in the _Centinel_ and in +the _Salem Gazette_, with the natural history of the monster duly set +forth, served to fix the word in the political vocabulary of the +country. So efficient was the law that at the elections of 1812, 50,164 +Democratic voters elected twenty-nine senators against eleven elected by +51,766 Federalists; and Essex county, which, when voting as a single +district had sent five Federalists to the Senate, was now represented in +that body by three Democrats and two Federalists." [11] + +Mr. Balfour's scheme did not involve a political rearrangement of +boundaries, and the word "gerrymandering" was thus incorrectly employed +in relation to it, but so long as we retain a system of single-member +constituencies a Redistribution Bill will always invite suspicion +because of the possibilities of influencing the arrangement of +constituencies which such a measure affords. Instructions are usually +given to boundary commissioners to attach due consideration "to +community or diversity of interests, means of communication, physical +features, existing electoral boundaries, sparsity or density of +population;" [12] but although such instructions are at once reasonable +and just, they would not prevent, and indeed might be used to +facilitate, a gerrymander in the American sense of the term were such a +proceeding determined upon. It is quite conceivable that a mining +district in which one party had a very large majority might be +surrounded by an area in which the political conditions were more +balanced, but in which the opposite party had a small majority. If that +mining area was, in accordance with the wording of these instructions, +treated as one constituency because of its community of interests and +the surrounding area divided into three or more districts, the minority +would in all probability obtain a majority of seats. + +_ The modern gerrymander_ + +The new constituencies required by the South Africa Act of 1909 have +been arranged with the utmost care,[13] but had the delegates to the +South African National Convention adhered to their original proposal to +abandon single-member constituencies, they would have secured for South +Africa, among other invaluable benefits, complete security from the +gerrymander, any possibility of which begets suspicion and reacts in a +disastrous way upon political warfare. The gerrymander is nothing more +or less than a fraudulent practice. But the United States is not the +only country in which such practices take place. Their counter-part in +Canada was described by Sir John Macdonald as "hiving the grits," and +even in England, without any change of boundaries, practices have arisen +within the last few years which have had their birth in the same motives +that produced the American gerrymander. In boroughs which are divided +into more than one constituency there is a considerable number of voters +who have qualifications in more than one division. A man may vote in any +division in which he has a qualification, but in not more than one. He +may make his choice. In Edinburgh for many years, on both sides of +politics, there has been a constant transfer of voters from one register +to another in the hopes of strengthening the party's position in one or +other division. It was even alleged that the precise moment of a vacancy +in West Edinburgh (May 1909) was determined by the desire to ascertain +the strength of the Unionist party in that division, to discover how +many Unionist votes should be transferred for the purpose of improving +Unionist prospects or of defeating the designs of their opponents. This +allegation may be wholly unfounded, but the single-member system +encourages such a proceeding, and the statement at least indicates how +the voting power of a division may be manipulated. The mere possibility +of such an action arouses the suspicion that it has taken place. Similar +practices have, it is stated, been pursued in Bristol. Votes have been +transferred from one division, where one of the parties was in a +hopeless minority, for the purpose of strengthening its position in +other divisions. An examination of the figures of the election in +Birmingham in 1906 shows that in one division, Birmingham East, the +Unionists narrowly escaped defeat. They won by a majority of 585 only. +In the other divisions the Unionists won by very large majorities. Must +not the possibility of transferring surplus votes in strong +constituencies to strengthen the position in weak constituencies prove +an irresistible temptation to the agents responsible for the success of +the party? They are entitled to make use of all the advantages at their +disposal. In this way a new and more subtle form of the "gerrymander" +has arisen in England, and if we are to redeem English political warfare +from proceedings which approximate very closely to sharp practices, we +must so amend our electoral system as to give due weight to the votes +not only of the majority but of the minority as well. + +_The Block Vote_ + +The analysis of the results of majority systems would not be complete +without some reference to the use of the "block" vote in the London +County Council, the London Borough Council, and other elections. In the +London County Council elections each constituency returns two members, +and each elector can give one vote to each of two candidates. The +Metropolitan boroughs are divided into wards returning from three to +nine members, each elector giving one vote apiece to candidates up to +the number to be returned. [14] Both in the London County and London +Borough elections the majority, as in a single-member constituency, can +obtain the whole of the representation. All the defects which arise from +parliamentary elections again appear, and often in a more accentuated +form. The figures of the two London County elections, 1904, 1907, +disclose a catastrophic change in representation similar to that which +characterized the General Election of 1906:-- + +LONDON COUNTY COUNCIL ELECTION, 1904 + + Seats in +Parties. Votes. Seats proportion + Obtained. to Votes. + +Progressive and Labour 357,557 83 64 +Moderate 287,079 34 52 +Independent 12,940 1 2 + +Progressive majority over +Moderates 70,478 49 12 + + +LONDON COUNTY COUNCIL ELECTION, 1907 + Seats in +Parties. Votes. Seats proportion + Obtained. to Votes. + +Moderate 526,700 79 67 +Progressive and Labour 395,749 38 50 +Independent 6,189 1 1 + +Moderate majority over + Progressive and Labour 70,478 49 12 + +_The London County Council elections_. + +A swing of the pendulum which, measured in votes, would have transferred +a majority of twelve into a minority of seventeen, had the effect of +changing a majority of 49 into a minority of 41. This alternate +exaggeration of the prevailing tendencies in municipal politics gives +rise to a false impression of the real opinions of the elector. The +citizens of London are not so unstable as the composition of their +Council, but it is the more violent displacement which forms the basis +of comment in the press and of municipal action. These elections, too, +like the Parliamentary elections, showed with what ease the minority +throughout large areas may be deprived of representation. Six adjoining +suburban boroughs--Brixton, Norwood, Dulwich, Lewisham, Greenwich, +Woolwich--were, before the election of 1907, represented by twelve +Progressives. At that election they returned twelve Moderates; indeed on +that occasion the outer western and southern boroughs, in one continuous +line from Hampstead to Fulham, from Wandsworth to Woolwich, returned +Moderates and Moderates only. + +_The election of aldermen of the L.C.C._ + +The London County Council elections of 1910 gave the Municipal Reform +party a majority of two councillors over the Progressive and Labour +parties. The transfer of a single vote in Central Finsbury would have +been sufficient to have produced an exact balance. It was the duty of +the new Council to elect the aldermen, the block vote being used. The +majority of two was sufficient to enable the Municipal Reformers to +carry the election of every one of the ten candidates nominated by them, +thus depriving the minority of any voice in the election of aldermen. +The object for which aldermen were instituted was entirely set at +naught, and this the method of election alone made possible. The +privilege of selecting aldermen was used by the party in power, not for +the purpose of strengthening the Council by the addition of +representative men, but for the purpose of strengthening the party +position.[15] The privilege has been abused in a similar way by the +English provincial boroughs. In these boroughs, prior to the Election of +Aldermen Act, 1910, aldermen as well as councillors took part in the +election of aldermen. In some cases a party having once obtained a +predominant position has, by making full use of its power to elect +aldermen in sympathy with itself, succeeded in perpetuating its +predominance, although defeated at the polls. The minority of the +councillors, with the assistance of the non-retiring aldermen, has not +only elected further aldermen from members of the same party, but has +controlled the policy of the Council. The Act referred to merely +prevents aldermen in municipal councils from voting in the election of +other aldermen, but does not go to the root of the evil. An alteration +in the method of election is required. + +[Sidenote 1: _The election of Representative Peers of Scotland_.] + +A further example of the use of the block vote may be taken from the +election of Scottish Representative Peers. At the commencement of each +Parliament the Scottish Peers meet in Holyrood Palace for the purpose of +electing sixteen of their number to represent the peerage of Scotland in +the Parliament of the United Kingdom. The Unionist Peers are in a +majority, and the block vote enables them to choose sixteen Unionist +Peers. At the election of January 1910 Lord Torphichen, a Unionist Peer, +who had voted against his party on the Finance Bill of the previous +year, failed to secure re-election. Lord Torphichen was elected in the +following December, but the incident shows how complete is the power +conferred upon the majority by this method of election; not only +political opponents but dissenting members of the same party can be +excluded from representation. + +_The Australian Senate_. + +The block vote is used also in the election of members of the Australian +Senate. Each State elects six senators, half of whom retire every three +years. Each State is polled as a separate constituency, and each elector +has three votes. At the election of 1910 the Labour Party polled the +highest number of votes in each of the States, and thus succeeded in +returning eighteen senators, all other parties obtaining none. The +figures here given for the elections in Victoria and New South Wales +show that in Victoria the successful candidates were not even supported +by a majority of electors, and that in both States the excess of the +successful over their leading opponents was so small that a slight turn +over would have completely altered the result of the elections:-- + +ELECTION of AUSTRALIAN SENATORS, 1910 + +_Victoria._ + +Successful. Unsuccessful. + +Findley (Lab.)....217,673 Best (Fusionist) ....... 213,976 +Barker (Lab.).....216,199 Trenwith (Fusionist).... 211,058 +Blakey (Lab.).....215,117 M'Cay (Fusionist) ...... 195,477 + Goldstein (Independent) 53,583 + Ronald (Independent) ... 18,380 + + 648,889 692,474 + +_New South Wales._ + +Successful. Unsuccessful. + +A.M'Dougall(Lab.) ..., 249,212 J.P. Gray (Fusionist)... 220,569 +A. Gardiner (Lab.) ... 247,047 E. Pulsford (Fusionist). 214,889 +A. Rae (Lab.)..........239,307 J. C. Neild (Fusionist). 212,150 + J. Norton (Independ.)... 50,893 + R. Mackenzie (Independ.) 13,608 + J.O. Maroney (Independ.) 9,660 + T. Hoare (Independ.).... 8,432 + + 735,566 730,201 + +_London Borough Councils_ + +The London Borough Council elections yield results equally +unsatisfactory. The Report of the Select Committee of the House of Lords +which, in 1907, examined the Municipal Representation Bill introduced by +Lord Courtney of Penwith, sums up these results in the following +paragraphs:-- + +"If the different wards are similar in character, the majority, even if +little more than one-half, may secure all the seats. For instance, in +one borough the Progressives, with 19,430 votes, obtained all the 30 +seats, and the Municipal Reformers, though they polled 11,416 votes, did +not obtain even one; while, on the contrary, in four other boroughs the +Progressives did not secure any representation. "On the other hand, the +system does not in all cases secure power to the majority. If the wards +are dissimilar and the majority too much condensed in certain districts, +the minority may secure a majority of seats, as in the case of one +borough where 46,000 votes secured 30 seats, while 54,000 votes only +obtained 24. + +"The system leads to violent fluctuations. If the two great parties are +nearly evenly divided, it is obvious that a comparatively small change +may create a revolution in the representation. In Lewisham, at the 1903 +election, the Progressives had 34 seats and the Moderates only 6; in +1905, on the other hand, the Municipal Reformers obtained all the 42 +seats, and the Progressives failed to secure even one."[16] + +One example will suffice to illustrate the findings of this Committee. +Here are the results of two wards in the Borough of Battersea:-- + +BATTERSEA BOROUGH COUNCIL ELECTION, 1906 + +Ward Votes Obtained. + Municipal Reform Progressive + Candidates. Candidates. + +Shaftesbury 786 905 } +(six seats) 777 902 } + 769 899 }all + 753 895 }successful. + 753 891 } + 741 852 } + ----- ----- + Totals 4,579 5,344 + +St. John's 747 } 217 +(three seats) 691 }all 197 + 686 }successful. 191 + ----- ----- + Totals 2,124 605 + +Totals for both wards 6,703 5,949 + +These tables disclose some curious anomalies. Each elector in the +Shaftesbury ward has six votes--the ward being entitled to six +Councillors--whereas each elector in the St. John's ward, which is only +entitled to three Councillors, has but three votes. The additional +representation is allotted to the Shaftesbury ward because of its larger +electorate, but the only electors to reap any advantage from this fact +are the Progressives. The presence in the ward of a large number of +citizens who are Municipal Reformers has merely had the effect of +increasing the amount of representation obtained by their opponents. +Further, the number of Municipal Reformers in the Shaftesbury ward +exceeded the number of Municipal Reformers in the St. John's ward; in +the former they obtained no representation, in the latter they obtained +three seats. The two wards taken together showed a net majority in votes +of 754 for the Municipal Reformers who, however, only secured three +seats out of nine. Taking the Borough as a whole the Municipal Reformers +obtained 24 representatives with 53,910 votes, whereas the Progressives +obtained 30 representatives with 46,274 votes. + +_Provincial Municipal Councils_. + +Nor are the results of the Provincial Borough elections more +satisfactory. These boroughs are usually divided into wards returning +three or six members each. One-third of the councillors retire each +year, and each ward is called upon to elect one or two councillors, as +the case may be. The figures for the Municipal elections held in +November 1908, at Manchester, Bradford, and Leeds disclose a similar +discrepancy between the votes polled and the seats obtained. [_See +table below_.] + +BOROUGH COUNCIL ELECTIONS, 1908 + +Parties Votes Seats Seats in + Polled. Obtained. proportion + to Votes. + +_Manchester_. +Conservative 25,724 14 10 +Independent 11,107 3 4 +Liberal 14,474 7 6 +Labour and Socialist 15,963 2 6 + +_Bradford_. +Conservative 12,809 10 6 +Liberal 12,106 6 5 +Socialist-Labour 11,388 0 5 +Independent 1,709 1 1 + +_Leeds_. +Conservative 18,145 8 5 +Liberal 19,507 3 5 +Socialist-Labour 9,615 1 2 +Independent 3,046 1 1 + +_Summary.] + +The examples given in this chapter may be briefly summarised. The same +defects are disclosed in Parliamentary, County Council and Municipal +(both metropolitan and provincial) elections. These defects may be +classified under three heads: (1) often a gross exaggeration of the +strength of the victorious party; (2) sometimes a complete +disfranchisement of the minority; and (3) at other times a failure of a +majority of citizens to obtain their due share of representation. In +addition, running through all the results, there is an element of +instability due to the fact that a slight change in public opinion may +produce an altogether disproportionate effect, the violence of the swing +of the pendulum arising more from the electoral method than from the +fickleness of the electorate. These defects all spring from the same +root cause--that the representation of any constituency is awarded to +the majority of the electors in that constituency irrespective of the +size of the majority; that the votes of the minority count for nothing. +The result of a General Election is thus often dependent not upon the +relative strengths of political forces, but upon the chance way in which +those forces are distributed, and in a considerable measure may be +influenced by the way in which the boundaries of constituencies are +drawn. Such a system invites and encourages gerrymandering, both in its +original and modern forms, but this detestable practice can be made of +no avail and the results of elections rendered trustworthy if we so +reform present methods as to give due weight to the strength of each +political party irrespective of the way in which that strength may be +distributed. + + +[Footnote 1: Reply to Deputation, House of Commons, 10 November 1908.] + +[Footnote 2: Mr. Corbett's analyses were accepted by the Royal +Commission on Electoral Systems as "representing the truth as nearly as +circumstances will permit."--Report, p. 31.] + +[Footnote 3: There is a marked difference between the electoral +conditions of Great Britain and Ireland, but as the Government of the +day depends for support upon a majority of the representatives of all +parts of the kingdom, the figures here given are those for the +United Kingdom.] + +[Footnote 4: Mr. Gladstone, in introducing the Redistribution of Seats +Bill, 1 December 1884, said: "The recommendations of this system +(one-member districts) I think are these--that it is very economical, it +is very simple, and it goes a very long way towards that which many +gentlemen have much at heart, viz., what is roughly termed +representation of minorities."--Hansard, 3rd series, vol. 294, p. 379.] + +[Footnote 5: Other examples are given in Appendix V. The representation +of minorities varies very considerably in amount, and, as shown in the +Appendix, depends not upon their size but upon the way in which they are +distributed over the electoral area.] + +[Footnote 6: The basis of calculation, as explained by Mr. Rooke +Corbett, is as follows: "It seems to me reasonable to suppose that those +changes of public opinion which affected the contested constituencies +affected the uncontested constituencies also, and therefore, in +estimating the number of voters in an uncontested constituency, I have +assumed that the strength of each party varied from one election to +another in the same ratio as in the contested constituencies in the same +county."--P. R. Pamphlet, No. 14. _Recent Electoral Statistics_, p. 5.] + +[Footnote 7: These figures are taken from an article by Robert B. +Hayward in _The Nineteenth Century_, February 1884, p. 295.] + +[Footnote 8: _Proportional Representation_, by Professor Commons, p. 52 +_et seq_. For further examples in the United States the reader should +consult Chapter III. of Professor Commons' book.] + +[Footnote 9: _Preferential Voting_, by the Right Hon. J. Parker Smith. +p. 8.] + +[Footnote 10: _Proportional Representation_, p. 50.] + +[Footnote 11: _The Machinery of Politics_, W. R. Warn, 1872.] + +[Footnote 12: Such instructions are contained in Clause 40 of the South +African Act, signed by the South African National Convention at +Bloemfontein, 11 May 1909.] + +[Footnote 13: See Report of Delimitation Commission.] + +[Footnote 14: This electoral method is known by various names. In +Australia it is called the block vote, in the United States the general +ticket, on the Continent the _scrutin de liste_.] + +[Footnote 15: The action was defended on the ground that the Municipal +Reform party had obtained a majority of 39,653 votes at the polls.] + +[Footnote 16: _Report on Municipal Representation Bill (H.L.)_, 1907 +(132), p. vi.] + + + + +CHAPTER III + +THE INDIRECT RESULTS OF MAJORITY SYSTEMS + + +"Nous attachons un intêrét vital, presque aussi grand, à la forme dans +laquello on consulte la nation qu'au principe lui-mème du suffrage +universel."--GAMBETTA + +_False impressions of public opinion._ + +The first and immediate consequence arising from present electoral +methods is the growth of false impressions of the true tendencies of +public opinion, impressions that are still further distorted by the +exaggerations of the press. The winning of a seat is always a "brilliant +victory," and a "crushing defeat" for the other side. The German General +Election of 1907 affords an excellent illustration of these false +impressions. The Social Democrats lost nearly 50 per cent. of their +previous representation, and an outburst of delight arose in certain +journals over their "crushing defeat." But the Socialists' poll showed +an increase of a quarter of a million, and although their total poll had +not increased in quite the same proportion as that of other parties, the +figures showed that the Social Democrats were still by far the largest +party in Germany. The number of seats won were no true index to the +movements in political forces. Not only the press, however, but some of +the most careful writers on modern tendencies in politics are also +misled by these false impressions. The General Election of 1895, in +which there was a majority of 117,473 for the Unionists in a total of +4,841,769 votes, is a case in point. This election has often been chosen +as marking the commencement of a period of strong reaction in political +thought. Writers have been misled by the overwhelming majority in seats +obtained by the Unionists at that election. They have entirely ignored +the figures of the polls, and these, the only safe guide to the opinions +of the electors, show that the reaction was far less strong than is +usually supposed. + +_False impressions become the basis of legislative action._ + +False impressions of public opinion, however, lead to an indirect effect +of much greater importance. The false impression becomes the basis of +action, and an apparent triumph for reaction makes a "reactionary" +policy much more easy of achievement. Similarly an apparent triumph for +a "progressive" policy facilitates its adoption. For the House of +Commons is still the most powerful factor in determining our political +destinies, and hence these false results have a very material effect in +the shaping of history. If the opinion of the people had been truly +represented in the Parliaments elected in 1895 and 1900, is it not +almost a certainty that the legislation of those two Parliaments would +have been considerably modified? Or, to go further back to the election +of 1886, the result of which was universally interpreted as a crushing +defeat of Mr. Gladstone's proposals in favour of Home Rule, would not a +true result on that occasion have influenced subsequent developments? +Over-representation, which results in the temporary triumph of a party +and of partisan measures, involves the nation in a serious loss, for the +time and energy of a Parliament may be largely consumed in revising and +correcting, if not in reversing the partisan legislation of its +predecessor. Thus, a considerable portion of the time of the Parliament +of 1906-1909 was spent in attempting to reverse the policies embodied in +the Education and Licensing Acts of the preceding Parliament. + +_Loss of prestige by the House of Commons._ + +Apart, however, from speculation as to the effect of false electoral +methods on the development of public affairs, the serious divergences +between representation and polling strength, to which attention has been +directed in the previous chapter, must tend to the weakening of the +authority and prestige of the House of Commons. Should a Government, +misled by the composition of the "representative" House, make use of +its majority in that House for the passage of measures not really +desired by the country, and should the House of Lords, reformed or not, +guess rightly that the decisions of the Commons were contrary to the +popular will, then inevitably the position of the House of Lords would +be strengthened as compared with that of the Commons. "A House of +Commons which does not represent," said a leading Liberal journal, "may +stand for less in the country than the House of Lords, or the Crown, and +its influence will infallibly decline in proportion. One has only to +take up an old volume of Bagehot to confirm one's suspicions that the +imperfections of electoral machinery, combined with the changes in the +character of the electorate, are already threatening to undermine the +real sources of the nation's power."[1] Sir Frederick Pollock has +declared that our defective electoral system may "yield a House of +Commons so unrepresentative in character as to cease to command the +respect and obedience of citizens."[2] + +_Unstable representation._ + +False impressions of public opinion, unstable legislation based upon +such false impressions, the weakening of the foundations on which the +authority of the House of Commons rests, these are results which in +themselves constitute a sufficiently serious condemnation of present +methods. But those upheavals in representation, those violent swings of +the pendulum which have often been so pronounced a feature of elections, +give an instability to the composition of our supreme legislative +chamber that must still further undermine its authority. Many, indeed, +imagining that this dangerous instability is the reflection of an +equally unstable electorate, begin to question whether a popular +franchise is in any circumstances a satisfactory basis for government. +The violence of the change in representation is attributed to the +character of the electors instead of to the evil effects of a defective +electoral method. On the other hand, the large majorities which +accompany such changes are regarded by other politicians as blessings in +disguise--as being essential to the formation of a strong Government. +But a Government based on a false majority will, in the long-run, find +that this exaggeration of its support in the country is a source of +weakness rather than of strength. Like the image in Nebuchadnezzar's +dream, the feet of such a Government are part of clay. For the extreme +swing of the pendulum which brought the Government into power is usually +followed by an equally violent swing in the opposite direction. When the +high-water mark of success is attained at a General Election it becomes +practically impossible for the party in power to gain additional seats +at bye-elections, whilst an unbroken series of losses makes it difficult +to prevent a feeling arising that the ministry has lost the confidence +of the electors, although the actual change in public opinion may have +been of the slightest. The prestige of the Government is gone, and +prestige is as necessary to a Government as a majority. In brief, a +large majority strengthens a Government only in so far as that majority +corresponds to public opinion. + +_Weakened personnel_. + +Moreover, the extreme changes which take place at a General Election +often result in a considerable weakening of the personnel of the House +of Commons. In such a débâcle as that which took place in 1906, there +was no process of selection by which the Unionists might have retained +the services in Parliament of their ablest members. Although there were +33,907 Unionists in Manchester and Salford, Mr. Balfour, the leader of +the party, experienced the mortification of being rejected by one of the +divisions. This failure was paralleled by the defeat of Sir William +Harcourt at Derby in 1895, whilst Mr. Gladstone, in contesting Greenwich +in 1874, only succeeded in obtaining the second place, the first seat +being won by a Conservative. A way is usually found by which party +leaders return without delay to the House of Commons, but there are +members of the highest distinction and capacity who, especially if these +qualities are associated with a spirit of independence, find, it +increasingly difficult to re-enter political life. Victory at the polls +depends not so much upon the services which a statesman, however +eminent, may have rendered to his country, as upon the ability of the +party to maintain its majority in the particular constituency for which +he stands. Indeed, in this matter a leader of opinion is placed at a +disadvantage as compared with an ordinary member of the party; his very +pre-eminence, his very activities bring him into conflict with certain +sections of the electorate which, insignificant in themselves, may yet +be sufficiently numerous to influence the result of an election. +Statesmen, moreover, have often lost their seats merely because they +have endeavoured to give electors of their very best. When Mr. John +Morley (now Lord Morley of Blackburn), during the election of 1906, +received a deputation of Socialists, he, with characteristic courage, +explained very frankly the ground on which he could not support their +principles.[3] A similar candour on his part in 1895 cost him his seat +at Newcastle. Can we wonder then that there arise complaints that our +statesmen are deficient both in courage and in ideas? Single-member +constituencies are, as Gambetta pointed out more than twenty years ago, +inimical to political thinking, and recent General Elections have +afforded numerous examples in support of this statement. The courageous +and forcible presentment of ideas has time after time been rewarded by +exclusion from the House of Commons. + +_Degradation of party strife._ + +There is a further and equally serious charge that can be laid against +the existing electoral system--it is in no small measure responsible for +that increasing degradation in the methods of warfare which has +characterised recent political and municipal contests. This debasement +of elections cannot fail to contribute to that undermining of the +authority of the House of Commons, upon which stress has already been +laid. Indeed, there is abundant evidence to show that in conjunction +with the imaginary instability of the electorate, the debasement of +elections is weakening the faith of many in representative institutions. +An efficient bureaucracy is now being advocated by a writer so +distinguished as Mr. Graham Wallas, as the best safeguard against the +excesses of an unstable and ignorant democracy. There is no need to +undervalue the importance of competent officials, but all experience has +shown the equal necessity of an adequate check upon the bureaucracy, +however efficient, and such check must be found in the strengthening of +representative bodies. Mr. Graham Wallas declares that "the empirical +art of politics consists largely in the creation of opinion by the +deliberate exploitation of subconscious non-rational inferences,"[4] and +cites in support of this statement the atrocious posters and mendacious +appeals of an emotional kind addressed to the electors in recent +contests. It does not appear from electoral statistics that so large a +proportion of voters are influenced by such appeals as Mr. Wallas +thinks; his conclusions, like those of others, are based upon the false +impressions arising from false results. It is, however, sufficient for +the purpose of the political organizer to know that a number of the +electors will succumb to such influences. The votes of this small +section of the electorate can turn the scale at an election, and so long +as we adhere to a system under which the whole of the representation +allotted to any given constituency is awarded to the party which can +secure a bare majority of votes, we must expect to see a progressive +degradation of electoral contests. The successful organizer of victory +has already learnt that he must not be too squeamish in the methods by +which the victory is obtained, and if "the exploitation of subconscious +non-rational inferences" is necessary to this end he will undoubtedly +exploit them to the best of his powers. + +_The final rally._ + +Mr. Wallas gives from his personal experience an admirable illustration +of the way in which elections are often lost and won. His vivid +description of the close of a poll in a County Council election in a +very poor district is in itself an emphatic condemnation of our +electoral system. "The voters," says he, "who came in were the results +of the 'final rally' of the canvassers on both sides. They entered the +room in rapid but irregular succession, as if they were jerked forward +by a hurried and inefficient machine. About half of them were women with +broken straw hats, pallid faces, and untidy hair. All were dazed and +bewildered, having been snatched away in carriages or motors from the +making of match-boxes, or button-holes, or cheap furniture, or from the +public-house, or, since it was Saturday evening, from bed. Most of them +seemed to be trying in the unfamiliar surroundings to be sure of the +name for which, as they had been reminded at the door, they were to +vote. A few were drunk, and one man, who was apparently a supporter of +my own, clung to my neck while he tried to tell me of some vaguely +tremendous fact which just eluded his power of speech. I was very +anxious to win, and inclined to think that I had won, but my chief +feeling was an intense conviction that this could not be accepted as +even a decently satisfactory method of creating a Government for a city +of five million inhabitants, and that nothing short of a conscious and +resolute facing of the whole problem of the formation of political +opinion would enable us to improve it." The political "boss" has no such +qualms; victory may turn upon the votes recorded at this final rally, +and every effort must be made to ensure that the party's poll exceeds +that of the enemy. Mr. Wallas does not propose any remedy; he merely +suggests that something must be done to abolish the more sordid details +of English electioneering. Why not go to the root of the evil and amend +the electoral system which places so great a premium upon the success of +such practices? It is indeed evident that this cannot be accepted as "a +decently satisfactory method of creating a Government." But we are not +compelled to continue the use of such a method. What possible +justification is there for making the representation of all the other +electors of a constituency depend upon the result of a final rally? + +_Bribery and "nursing"_ + +Evidence was tendered before the Worcester Election Commission[5] to the +effect that there were 500 voters in the city who were amenable to the +influence of a small bribe, and that the party which secured the votes +of these electors won the election. Again, is there no alternative to an +electoral system which makes the representation of a town depend upon +the action of the least worthy of its citizens? Direct bribery has been +rendered more difficult by the Corrupt Practices Act, but bribery in a +much more subtle form--"nursing" the constituency--would appear to be on +the increase. Mr. Ellis T. Powell, who has had a considerable +electioneering experience, gives an admirable statement[6] of the +expenses attending a successful candidature. "If the candidate's means," +says he, "permit of a favourable response to these invitations (appeals +for money), he is said to be engaged in 'nursing' the constituency in +which the gifts are distributed. A great proportion of these appeals +relate to funds which are for public, or quasi-public purposes, such as +those of hospitals; and there is no suggestion that any direct political +influence is exercised in consequence of donations or contributions made +to these institutions. But what is certain is that a section of the +electorate-diminishing, but still potent, section--is favourably +influenced by the fact that Mr. A. has given £100 to the funds of the +hospital, whereas Mr. B. has given £5, 5_s_., or nothing at all. +Candidates and their agents are perfectly well aware of this, and are +even known to delay the announcement of their contributions in order to +ascertain their respective amounts, and so to guard themselves against +giving less than others have done. Mr. A. is inclined to give £20, but +waits to see if Mr. B. gives £25, in which case he will raise his +intended £20 to £30. These tactics are adopted, not because either of +the candidates desires to be lavish or ostentatious in his gifts, and +still less from any vulgar desire for notoriety in itself. They are +simply an element, almost vital under existing conditions, of a +successful appeal to the electorate. They may be said to be of the +psychological rather than the political order, introducing into the +electoral arena forces which have no business to be there, and whose +activity is wholly vicious; but forces which nevertheless no politician +can ignore, unless he wishes to postpone his realisation of their exact +potency until the declaration of the poll places it before his, own eyes +in large and unmistakable characters.... The writer was once consulted +by a gentleman who, from motives which were truly laudable, desired to +represent a London constituency. The path was clear to his selection as +a candidate; the only question was that of expense. The writer, after +noting the number of electors, informed him of the maximum sum which he +might expend at a contest, but at the same time warned him that unless +he were prepared to spend from £1500 to £2000 a year from that time +until the General Election (of which there was no immediate prospect) he +might regard his ambition as a hopeless one. The constituency was one +where money _must_ be spent. The other candidate would spend it, and his +opponent must do at least as much, while his chance at the poll would be +increased if he did a little more. When his opponent gave 10s. to a +local cricket club, he could give no less. If he gave a guinea it might +make a difference in his poll. The advice was not given in regard to +electoral conditions as they ought to be, but as they are. The writer +gave it with regret, and felt that he was playing almost a cynical part +when he uttered the words. Yet it was in complete accord with the +necessities of the existing system." Some of the practices associated +with constituency-nursing can perhaps be reached by further legislation, +but, if so, bribery in all probability will only take a form still more +subtle. Again, why not strike at the root cause which makes these +practices so highly profitable? Why continue to make the representation +of all electors depend upon the votes of those who are influenced by the +attentions of a rich patron? + +_The organization of victory._ + +The cumulative effect of these demoralising elements in party warfare is +shown in the separation of the work of the party organizer from that of +the party leader--separation which is becoming more and more complete. +The work of covering hoardings with posters of a repulsive type, the +task of preparing election "literature," must be carried out by men of a +different character from those who are responsible for the public +direction of the party; and as party agents often obtain their +appointments because of their previous success in winning elections, the +mere force of competition is compelling agents, sometimes against their +own wishes, to resort to these questionable practices. The success of +the Municipal Reform campaign in the London County Council election of +1907 was followed by a demand from many Progressives that the tactics of +their opponents should be copied, that gramophone should be answered by +gramophone, poster by poster. It is, however, certain that the more +victory depends upon the work of the party organizer the more must his +power increase, and this fact explains the unique position of the +political "boss" in the United States, where ordinary electoral methods +have been carried to their logical conclusion.[7] The political "boss" +has become all-powerful because he has made himself the indispensable +factor in successful political organization. At the London County +Council elections in 1907, the leaders of the Municipal Reform Party +dissociated themselves from the more extreme accusations made against +the administration of the Progressives, but the conduct of the elections +was apparently outside their powers of control. It may never become +possible in England for a political organization such as "Tammany Hall" +to succeed in planting on the register of voters a large number of +fraudulent names, nor is it necessary yet for the press to issue a +notice such as that which appeared in the New York _Evening Post:_ +"There are a thousand 'colonizers' waiting to vote for the Tammany +ticket. Vote early, so that no one can vote ahead of you in your +name."[8] In New York the Citizens' Unions have at each election to +spend several weeks in succession in thwarting attempts at this offence +on a large scale, and though our more perfect organization of elections +renders such frauds impossible, still if we are to arrest the +Americanization of our electoral contests we must cease to allow the +results of a "final rally," the votes of the least worthy citizens, +assiduous "nursing," or suggestive posters to decide the representation +of a constituency. + +_Party exclusiveness._ + +The preceding criticism of recent developments in electoral warfare must +not be read as a condemnation of party organization as such. Party +organization there must be, and unquestionably the success of a party is +intimately bound up with the efficiency of its organization. But our +defective electoral system confers upon party organization a weapon +which is not an adjunct to efficiency in the true sense of the word, but +a weapon which has been and can be made a serious menace to the +political independence and sincerity both of electors and of Members of +Parliament. During the memorable three-cornered fight in Greenwich in +1906, Lord Hugh Cecil made this statement: "The opposition to me is not +to put a Tariff Reformer in, but to keep me out. ... We are face to face +with an innovation in English politics, and it is a question of how far +it is desirable to introduce methods which may be handled with a view to +creating a party mechanism so rigid, so powerful, and so capable of +being directed by a particular mind towards a single object, that it may +become a formidable engine for carrying out a dangerous proposal. We do +not want a system of political assassination under which any one who is +in the way may be put out of the way." To realize the dangerous weapon +which our present system places in the hands of party organizations, it +is not necessary to give complete assent to the statement of Lord Hugh +Cecil as to the character of the opposition brought against him. The +power undoubtedly exists. Prior to the election of January 1910, the +secret organization known as "confederates" was reported to have marked +down all Unionist candidates who would not accept a course of policy +approved of by this body. The action was defended on the ground that it +was essential to secure Tariff Reform immediately and at all costs, but +it nevertheless constituted a serious attack upon the representative +character of the House of Commons. By such methods that historic House +will be deprived of its rightful place in the constitution of this +country. Political power will no longer be centred in the House of +Commons; it will be vested in organizations outside Parliament, which +will only meet to carry out their bidding. At the General Election of +1906 the mere threat of a three-cornered fight was sufficient to induce +many Free Trade Unionists to retire from the contest; the purging was +completed at the election of January 1910, and it would seem that in the +future only those politicians who can with alacrity adopt the newest +fashions or change their party allegiance can hope to take a permanent +part in the political life of their country. Many of those who were so +eager for Tariff Reform at all costs--the "confederates" +themselves--would probably have protested most vigorously had the same +policy of excluding competent men from Parliament been adopted for the +attainment of political objects of which they did not approve, and the +comment of _The Times_ on this exclusive policy reflects the opinion of +those who value the representative character of the House of Commons +more highly than an immediate party triumph:-- + +"Parliament ought to represent the opinion of the country as a whole, +and each of the great parties ought to represent the diversities of +opinion which incline to one side or the other of a dividing line +which, however practically convenient, does not itself represent any +hard and immutable frontier. Now the variety and elasticity of +representation, which are the secret of the permanence of our +institutions, are directly injured by any attempt to narrow the basis of +a party. If such attempts were to succeed upon any considerable scale we +should have a couple of machine-made parties confronting one another in +Parliament, with no golden bridges between their irreconcilable +programmes. There is some danger at the present day of an approximation +to a state of things in every way to be deprecated, and it is surely not +for the Unionist party to promote any movement tending in that +direction."[9] + +This process of excluding valuable elements from our representative +chamber is equally at work within the Liberal party. At the General +Election of 1906 Sir William Butler, a Liberal of very high attainments, +was compelled to withdraw his candidature for East Leeds on the ground +that he could not fully support the Education policy of the Government. +Mr. Harold Cox, during the Parliament of 1906, criticised the work of +the Liberal Government from the point of view of a Liberal of the +Manchester school, and the Preston Liberal Council withdrew its support. +Nor does the Labour Party escape the same charge. Originally each member +was required to accept in writing the constitution of the party, and +this condition was rigorously enforced. In January 1911 it was decided +at the Party Conference held at Leicester to dispense with the written +pledge, but it would appear that a cast-iron conformity to party +decisions is still insisted upon. On 10 February 1911 the party moved an +amendment to the Address in favour of the Right to Work Bill, a measure +as to the practicability of which there is a difference of opinion +within the party. Mr. Johnson, the member for Nuneaton, voted against +the amendment, and commenting on the incident the _Labour Leader_ said: +"Is Mr. Johnson to be allowed to defy the Party's mandate? We invite +the Labour stalwarts of Nuneaton to give their earnest consideration to +this question. And there can be no doubt as to what the verdict +will be." + +_Mechanical debates._ + +These repeated attempts to make members of a party conform in all +respects to a specified pattern, this constant insistence that members +must give up the right of criticism and support on all occasions the +party to which they belong, must and does react on the composition of +the House of Commons. The duty of a Member of Parliament will tend more +and more to be restricted to registering his approval or disapproval of +the decisions of the Government, and, as the central organization of +each party is in close touch with the party whips, the free and +independent electors will be more and more confined, in the election of +their representatives, to a choice between the nominees of machine-made +parties. Moreover, in a House of Commons so composed discussion +necessarily loses its vitalizing character. The debates on Free Trade in +the House of Commons in 1905 towards the close of Mr. Balfour's +administration were very real and full of life, because argument could +and did affect the votes of members, but if the process continues of +excluding all elements save those of the machine-controlled, debates +will become more and more formal. They will lose their value. As Lord +Hugh Cecil has said[10]: "The present system unquestionably weakens the +House of Commons by denuding it of moderate politicians not entirely in +sympathy with either political party, and consequently rendering +obsolete all the arts of persuasion and deliberation, and reducing +parliamentary discussion to a struggle between obstruction on the one +side and closure on the other. The disproportion, moreover, between the +majority in the House and that in the country, which it is supposed to +represent, deprives the decisions of the House of much of their moral +authority. The rigid partisanship, and the essentially unrepresentative +character of the House of Commons as now constituted, leave it only the +credit which belongs to the instrument of a party, and deprive it of +that higher authority which should be the portion of the representatives +of the whole people. "Similarly Mr. Birrell, in speaking[11] of the +debate on the Women's Franchise Bill (12 July 1910), stated that he +rejoiced in the immunity on that occasion from the tyranny of Government +programmes and the obligation to all to think alike. "To think in +programmes," said he, "is Egyptian bondage, and works the sterilization +of the political intellect." And the nation suffers. + +_The disfranchisement of minorities in bi-racial countries_ + +The extreme partizan who believes that political action is possible only +through a well-controlled organization may be affected but little by the +preceding arguments, and is, moreover, nearly always inclined to +postpone the consideration of any reform which might possibly deprive +his party of the advantages which he imagines it may obtain at the next +General Election. Yet cases have occurred when parties have sacrificed +their own advantage to the higher interests of the nation as a whole, +and national interests demand a change in electoral methods. For the +disfranchisement of minorities often gives rise to serious difficulties. +The elections which took place in the Transvaal and Orange River +Colony,[12] after the grant of self-government in 1906, show how racial +divisions are unduly emphasized by such disfranchisement. Only +one--Barberton--of the twenty-six country constituencies of the +Transvaal returned a member who did not owe allegiance to Het Volk, +although the figures of the polls showed that the minority numbered more +than 25 per cent, of the electors. In Pretoria the Progressives gained +but one seat, and that as the chance result of a three-cornered contest. +The disfranchisement of minorities heightened the natural difference +which existed between Johannesburg and the rest of the Transvaal--a +difference which would have been still more pronounced had not Het Volk +succeeded in obtaining six and the Nationalists five out of the total +of thirty-four seats allotted to Johannesburg and the Rand. The first +elections in the Orange River Colony resulted in a similar exaggerated +contrast between Bloemfontein and the rest of the country. Five seats +were allotted to Bloemfontein, four of which were won by members of the +Constitutional party, whilst the fifth was only lost to them by the +extremely narrow majority of two. Before the election _The Friend_, the +organ of the Orangia Unie, stated that "if Bloemfontein ventures to vote +for the Constitutionalists it will be setting itself in opposition to +the whole country, and will be manifesting a spirit of distrust of the +country population for which it will have to suffer afterwards." On the +morrow of the election the same paper declared that "the election +results of Bloemfontein will be read with deep disappointment throughout +the colony, where the feeling will be that the capital has now shown +itself politically an alien city." But would Bloemfontein have "shown +itself politically an alien city" if the electoral method had been such +that the minorities, both in Bloemfontein and in the country districts, +had been able to secure representation in proportion to their strength? + +Had the Constitution of South Africa provided for the representation of +minorities in the House of Assembly, as proposed in the original draft +signed at Cape Town, the process of race unification, both in the +Transvaal and the Orange River Colony, would have been facilitated, and +the conflicting interests of the constituent States and of town and +country would not by their exaggerated expression in the United +Parliament have impeded the consolidation and unification of South +Africa. The problem presented by racial differences is not confined to +South Africa. The United Kingdom itself presents a conspicuous example +of a nation in which the process of unification is still far from +complete, and the process has been retarded, and is at the present time +being retarded, by the electoral method in force. Not only does Ireland +still continue to chafe against the Union, but the racial divisions +within Ireland itself are encouraged and fostered by the failure of our +representative system to do justice to minorities. The South and West of +Ireland is represented in the House of Commons by Nationalists, and +Nationalists alone, and, ranged in opposition to them, the North-East is +represented by a smaller but equally determined body of Unionists, while +those forces in Ireland which would endeavour, and in the past have +endeavoured, to bridge over the differences between the North and South +are entirely unrepresented. Had the minorities in the North and South of +Ireland been represented within the House, there would probably have +still remained a notable contrast between the two areas, but that +contrast would not have appeared in its present heightened form, and, in +addition, with a true electoral system there would have come from +Ireland representatives whose sole aim and purpose was to achieve its +unification. The picture which Ireland would have presented within the +House would have been of a different character to that presented to-day, +and the perennial Irish problem would have been infinitely less +difficult, because the forces which made for union would have had full +play. Even the unification of England and Wales may, in some respects, +be described as incomplete; but such differences as exist largely arise +from the electoral system which sometimes deprives the minority in Wales +of all representation in the House of Commons. When in 1906 the fortunes +of the Welsh Conservatives reached their lowest ebb, the latter numbered +36 per cent. of the voters, whilst in former elections the minority +sometimes exceeded 40 per cent. Had Welsh Conservatives, during the last +two decades, been adequately represented in the House of Commons, would +not our conception of Wales from the political point of view have been +considerably modified, would not the process of political unification +have been made more complete? + +The non-representation of minorities in Belgium accentuated the racial +religious and language differences between Flanders and Wallony. +Flanders was represented by Catholics only; the French-speaking +districts by Liberals and Socialists. With proportional representation +members of all three parties are returned in both areas, and this result +has brought in its train a great national advantage, the political +consolidation of Belgium. Another example of the disintegrating effects +of the disfranchisement of minorities is to be seen in the American +Civil War. A committee of the United States Senate unanimously reported +in 1869 that this war might have been averted had the minorities in the +North and South been duly represented in Congress. In the words of the +report the absence of minority representation "in the States of the +South when rebellion was plotted, and when open steps were taken to +break the Union was unfortunate, for it would have held the Union men of +those States together and have given them voice in the electoral +colleges.... Dispersed, unorganized, unrepresented, without due voice +and power, they could interpose no effectual resistance to secession and +to civil war." + +_Defective representation in municipal bodies_.] + +False impressions of public opinion, unstable legislation, the weakening +of the House of Commons, both in authority and in personnel, the +degradation of party warfare, the undue exaltation of party machinery, +the heightening of racial differences and of sectional interests, these +are the fruits of that rough and ready system of Parliamentary elections +with which hitherto we have been content. The electoral methods in force +both in County Council and in Municipal elections are based on the same +false principle, and in these spheres of corporate activity results +almost equally disastrous are produced. The London County Council +elections of 1907 presented most of the features which characterized the +Parliamentary elections of 1906. Such catastrophic changes in the +personnel of the County Council as took place in 1907 involves serious +consequences to London ratepayers. In this election two ex-chairmen of +the Council, the vice-chairman and several chairmen of committees, lost +their seats. These were men who had been chosen by their colleagues +because of their special fitness for their positions, and this wholesale +dismissal as a result of a temporary wave of public feeling may make it +more difficult to secure as candidates those who are prepared to devote +the necessary time to the study of London's problems, for it is +generally admitted that the position of a London County Councillor is no +sinecure. The effective discharge of his duties demands unremitting +attention to details. The new Council was remarkable for the number of +members who had yet to win their spurs in public work, and London was +the poorer for the loss of those able administrators whom thousands of +voters desired as their representatives. A true electoral system would +not only secure the adequate representation of all parties, but the +presence in the Council of the most competent exponents of +different policies. + +_Wasteful municipal finance._ + +Not only does the electoral system involve undue changes in the +personnel of the Council, but it leads to an extremely wasteful +expenditure of public money. Whether the London County Council was or +was not justified in establishing a steamboat service, nothing can be +more wasteful than that one Council should establish such a service at +great cost, and that its successor should immediately reverse that +policy. The steady development of a works department by one Council and +its abandonment by a succeeding Council similarly involves useless +expenditure. A fully representative Council would not display such +violent alterations of policy, and it is of the utmost importance that +the objects on which it is decided to spend public moneys should be the +deliberate and considered choice of a Council on which all interests are +fairly represented. + +_No continuity in administration_.] + +The Metropolitan Borough Council elections tell a similar tale. The +Lewisham Borough Council consisted in 1900 of 35 Moderates and 7 +Progressives; in 1903 of 34 Progressives and 8 Moderates and +Independents; in 1906 of 42 Moderates, no representatives of the +Progressive or Labour parties being elected. In three successive +elections there was a complete change in the composition of the Council. +Lewisham's experience is typical of that of several other London +boroughs. Many councillors of the widest experience in municipal affairs +lose their seats at the same time, and there is in consequence no +security of continuity in the administration of the business of the +Metropolitan boroughs. Dr. Gilbert Slater, in giving evidence before a +select committee of the House of Lords, said: "I found, of course, when +I came on to the Council without any previous municipal experience +except by observation, that I and other members equally inexperienced +had to take great responsibilities upon ourselves. For instance, I was +vice-chairman of the Finance Committee, and my Chairman also had had no +previous municipal experience; the Finance Committee was felt to be one +of the most important of the Committees of the Council, and the fact +that its Chairman and Vice-chairman were two new members itself was a +weakness."[13] Dr. Slater added that it took three years' hard work +before a councillor could really master the affairs of a London borough, +and that being so, is it surprising that it is becoming increasingly +difficult to secure the services of competent men for the work of our +local bodies? There undoubtedly are, on both aides, men of marked +ability and of whole-hearted devotion to public affairs, but if our +electoral system is such that, in the presence of an undiscriminating +swing of the pendulum, their ability and devotion count for nothing, +such men tend, albeit unwillingly, to withdraw from public life. The +influence of the permanent official increases; the authority of the +representative assembly declines. + +_The root of the evil._ + +In parliamentary, in county, and in borough council elections alike we +trace the evils of defective electoral methods. These evils constitute a +complete answer to Lord Morley's criticism of Mill, that the latter laid +undue stress upon the efficiency of electoral machinery. Erected on a +false basis, those democratic institutions, on which so many hopes have +been built and on which our future still depends, are found full of +shortcomings due not only to the imperfections of human nature but to +the ill-working of a defective electoral system. The evils arising from +the latter cause can at least be remedied, and in remedying them we may +make it possible for the electors to put more intelligence and +conscience into their votes. Since Mill was, as Lord Morley says, +concerned with the important task of moulding and elevating popular +character, he was rightly anxious that the electoral machinery should be +such as to give due weight to those who desired to take an intelligent +interest in the affairs of their country. + + +[Footnote 1: _The Manchester Guardian_, 12 February 1909.] + +[Footnote 2: Annual Meeting, Proportional Representation Society, 9 May +1906.] + +[Footnote 3: _The Times_, 8 January 1906.] + +[Footnote 4: _Human Nature in Politics_, pp. 241 _et seq_.] + +[Footnote 5: _The Times_, 22 August 1906.] + +[Footnote 6: _The Essentials of Self-Government,_ pp. 102 _et seq_.] + +[Footnote 7: It is a matter for congratulation that in so many States +there is now (1911) a movement of revolt against the domination of +the "boss."] + +[Footnote 8: _The Manchester Guardian_, 21 April 1908.] + +[Footnote 9: _The Times_, 22 January 1909.] + +[Footnote 10: Letter read at the annual meeting of the Proportional +Representation Society, 24 April 1907.] + +[Footnote 11: Eighty Club, 25 July 1910.] + +[Footnote 12: Before the Union.] + +[Footnote 13: _Report on Municipal Representation Bill (H. L.)_, 1907 +(132).] + + + + +CHAPTER IV + +THE REPRESENTATION OF MINORITIES + + +The one pervading evil of democracy is the tyranny of the majority that +succeeds by force or fraud in carrying elections. To break off that +point is to avert the danger. The common system of representation +perpetuates the danger. Unequal electorates afford no security to +majorities. Equal electorates give none to minorities. Thirty-five years +ago it was pointed out that the remedy is proportional representation. +It is profoundly democratic, for it increases the influence of thousands +who would otherwise have no voice in the Government; and it brings men +more near an equality by so contriving that no vote shall be wasted, and +that every voter shall contribute to bring into Parliament a member of +his own opinion."--LORD ACTON + +The disfranchisement of minorities, noted in the two previous chapters +as the outcome of our electoral methods, attracted considerable +attention during the latter half of the nineteenth century, and several +legislative proposals were carried with the specific object of remedying +the evil. Indeed every electoral reform bill, beginning with that of +1832, has been accompanied with a demand or a suggestion for an +improvement in methods of election in order to secure for the House of +Commons a fully representative character. For it was clearly realized +that without some such improvement neither an extension of the franchise +nor a redistribution of seats would necessarily make the House a mirror +of the nation. These attempts to secure representation for minorities +have, however, often been confounded with the movement in favour of +proportional representation--the just representation of all parties--and +this confusion of thought may be partly due to the eloquent plea for the +representation of minorities advanced by Mill in the chapter in +_Representative Government_ devoted to the advocacy of Hare's scheme of +proportional representation. This confusion showed itself in the speech +which the Marquis of Ripon contributed to the debate[1] on the second +reading of the Municipal Representation Bill, introduced by Lord +Courtney of Penwith in 1907, for the purpose of enabling municipalities +to adopt a system of proportional representation. "It was a remarkable +thing," Lord Ripon said, "that so far as the experiments had gone they +had not succeeded, and that, he thought, should make them cautious when +looking into proposals of this kind." The experiments to which Lord +Ripon referred were legislative proposals for the representation of +minorities, and it cannot be admitted that these experiments were +failures. They did secure the representation of minorities. The +machinery provided did not enable them to do more, and an analysis of +the results of these experiments will show to what extent they succeeded +in their object, and at the same time disclose in what respects these +experiments fell short of a true electoral method. + +_The Limited Vote_.] + +The first of these experiments was known as the Limited Vote--a method +of voting which involves the creation of constituencies returning +several members but limits the elector in the number of his votes; the +elector is only permitted to vote for a number of candidates which is +less than the number of members to be elected, whilst he may not give +more than one vote to any one candidate. The Limited Vote was first +proposed by Mr. Mackworth Praed in Committee on the Reform Bill of 1831, +and the proposal was renewed by him in the following year in the Bill +which became the great Reform Act of 1832. Up to that time the +constituencies of England returned two members apiece, with the +exception of the City of London, which returned four, and of five +boroughs each returning one member. The Reform Bill provided that a +third member should be added to the representation of each of seven +counties, and that certain other counties should be divided into two or +more constituencies, each returning two members. Mr. Praed proposed to +drop this subdivision of counties, although permitting the additional +members to be given, and proposed that in constituencies returning +three or four members an elector should not be allowed to vote for more +than two candidates. The arguments advanced by Mr. Praed are worth +quoting. "He was of opinion," said he, "that it was an error in the +original construction of the Representative Assembly of this country to +allow any person to have more than one vote, for, by the present system, +it was frequently the case that the same persons, constituting perhaps a +bare majority of the electors, returned both members.... In the present +case, if large counties were not divided each freeholder would have four +votes. He wished to restrict them to two, and he thought that this +object might be attained even without the division of counties by +allowing each freeholder to vote only for two members although four was +to be the number returned. Some measure should be taken to make the vote +and views of a large minority known in the legislature." + +This form of voting was proposed by Lord Aberdeen's Government in the +Parliamentary Representation Bill of 1854. In this Bill it was proposed +to give a third member to 38 counties and divisions of counties (in +addition to the seven counties which already possessed that privilege), +and also to eight boroughs. Lord John Russell, in introducing the +measure, made a powerful plea on behalf of the representation of +minorities in each of these constituencies, but the Crimean War rendered +further consideration of the Bill impossible. The system was, however, +applied to thirteen constituencies by the Representation of the People +Act of 1867. It was not provided for in the Bill as submitted by the +Government, nor was it supported by the leader of the Opposition. Its +introduction was due to the action of Lord Cairns, who, on 30 July 1867, +carried in the House of Lords, with the support of Lord Russell and Lord +Spencer, the following amendment:-- + +"At a contested election for any county or borough represented by three +members, no person shall vote for more than two candidates." A further +amendment applicable to the City of London, which returned four members, +was also carried. The system remained in force until the Redistribution +Act of 1885, when three-member constituencies were abolished. "There is +nothing," said Lord Cairns, in the course of a memorable speech, "so +irksome to those who form the minority of one of these large +constituencies as to find that from the mere force of numbers they are +virtually excluded from the exercise of any political power, that it is +in vain for them to attempt to take any part in public affairs, that the +election must always go in one direction, and that they have no +political power whatever." + +The following table will show that Lord Cairns' proposal secured the +object which he had in view--the representation of minorities:-- + + 1868. 1874. 1880. +Constituency. Actual Probable Actual Probable Actual Probable + results results results results results results + with without with without with without + Limited Limited Limited Limited Limited Limited + Vote. Vote. Vote. Vote. Vote. Vote. + L. C. L. C. L. C. L. C. L. C. L. C +Berkshire 1 2 0 3 1 2 0 3 1 2 0 3 +Birmingham 3 0 3 0 3 0 3 0 3 0 3 0 +Buckinghamshire 1 2 0 3 1 2 0 3 1 2 0 3 +Cambridgeshire 1 2 0 3 1 2 0 3 1 2 0 3 +Dorsetshire 1 2 0 3 1 2 0 3 1 2 0 3 +Glasgow 3 0 3 0 2 1 3 0 3 0 3 0 +Herefordshire 1 2 0 3 1 2 0 3 2 1 3 0 +Hertfordshire 2 1 3 0 1 2 0 3 1 2 0 3 +Leeds 2 1 3 0 1 2 3 0 2 1 3 0 +Liverpool 1 2 0 3 1 2 0 3 1 2 0 3 +London (City) 3 1 4 0 1 3 0 4 1 3 0 4 +Manchester 2 1 3 0 1 2 0 3 2 1 3 0 +Oxfordshire 1 2 0 3 1 2 3 0 1 2 0 3 + +Totals 22 18 19 21 16 24 9 31 20 20 15 25 + +The actual results show the relative strength of the two great political +parties in each constituency; the probable results are based on the +hypothesis that if each voter could have given one vote to each of three +candidates, each of the parties would have nominated three candidates, +and that as the electors would for the most part have voted on party +lines, the larger body would have secured all three seats. In Berkshire, +Buckinghamshire, Cambridgeshire, Dorsetshire, Hertfordshire, +Oxfordshire, Liverpool and London, the Liberal minorities each obtained +a representative, whilst the Conservative minorities in Herefordshire, +Leeds, and Manchester also obtained representatives. There were only two +constituencies--Birmingham and Glasgow--where the minority failed to +obtain representation, and this was due to the fact that the minorities +in these particular constituencies were comparatively small. + +A consideration in detail of the election in Birmingham in 1880 will +show why the minority sometimes failed to obtain representation, and +will, at the same time, direct attention to the defects of the system. +The figures of this election were as follows:-- + +H. Muntz (Liberal) 22,969 +John Bright (Liberal) 20,079 +Joseph Chamberlain (Liberal) 19,544 + + 62,592 + +Major F. Burnaby (Con.) 15,735 +Hon. A. C. G. Calthorpe (Con.) 14,208 + + 29,943 + +It will be seen that the Liberals obtained 62,592 votes and the +Conservatives 29,943 votes, and that the latter therefore numbered +slightly less than a third of the constituency. If the Liberal votes had +not been distributed as evenly as they were over their three candidates, +it might have resulted that the lowest candidate on the poll, Joseph +Chamberlain, would have received less votes than Major Burnaby, who was +the highest of the two Conservative candidates. In order to obtain the +full advantage of their numerical superiority it was necessary for the +Liberal organization to make an extensive canvass of their supporters, +to ascertain as accurately as possible their strength, and to issue +precise instructions to the voters in each district as to the manner in +which they should record their votes. The memorable cry associated with +these elections--"Vote as you are told and we'll carry you through +"--was fit accompaniment of these efforts of the Birmingham caucus.[2] +But had there been a mistake in the calculations of the Liberal +organization, had the polls disclosed a larger number of Conservatives, +disaster would have followed the nomination of three Liberal candidates. +If for example the votes had been as follows:-- + +Muintz Liberal)...... 21,000 +Bright (Liberal)..... 20,000 +Chamberlain (Liberal) 20,000 + + 61,000 + +Burnaby (Conservative). 22,000 +Calthorpe (Conservative). 21,000 + + 43,000 + +the Conservatives would have returned two members, and the Liberals, +although in a majority, would have returned only one. In brief, the +party organizers had to be quite sure that their supporters numbered +more than 60 per cent. of the electorate, and that these supporters +would vote faithfully as ordered before they could recommend the +nomination of three candidates. The attempt to obtain all three seats at +Leeds, in the General Election of 1874, failed, with the result that the +minority got the larger share of the representation. The poll on this +occasion was as follows:-- + +M. Carter (Liberal)..... 15,390 +E. Baines (Liberal) .... 11,850 +Dr. F. R. Lees (Liberal). 5,945 + + 33,185 + +W.St.J.Wheelhouse (Con.) 14,864 +R. Tenant (Con.) . . .....13,192 + + 28,056 + +In this election the total Liberal vote amounted to 33,185, and the +total Conservative vote amounted to 28,056, but the Conservatives +obtained two seats out of three. + +The practical working of the Limited Vote has therefore shown that the +representation of a minority in a three-member constituency was always +secured whenever that minority numbered not less than two-fifths of the +electors, and as, in the majority of constituencies, the minority +exceeded this proportion the minority was able to return one of the +members. The system, however, possesses no elasticity. No party can put +forward a complete list of candidates without incurring considerable +risk, and even if the party has an ascertained strength of more than +three-fifths complete victory is only possible if the members of the +party are willing to carry out implicitly the instructions of the party +organization. It should be noted, in connexion with this system of +voting, that the more limited the vote the greater is the opportunity +afforded to the minority to obtain representation. When in a four-member +constituency each elector has three votes the minority must number +three-sevenths before it can obtain a representative; if, however, each +elector is limited to two votes a smaller minority, namely, a minority +which exceeds one-third of the electors, can make sure of returning a +member.[3] + +_The Cumulative Vote_.] + +The Cumulative Vote, the second of the experiments referred to by Lord +Ripen, although by no means free from serious defects, has also secured +the object for which it was designed--the representation of minorities. +With this system the member has as many votes as there are members to be +elected, and is permitted to distribute them amongst candidates, or to +cumulate them among one or more candidates according to his own +discretion. It was warmly advocated for the first time under the name of +the Cumulative Vote by James Garth Marshall in an open letter entitled +"Minorities and Majorities: their Relative Rights," addressed by him in +1853 to Lord John Russell. But three years earlier, in 1850, it was +recommended[4] by the Committee of the Privy Council for Trade and +Plantations, and adopted by Earl Grey in the draft Constitution proposed +for the Cape of Good Hope. The Legislative Council of Cape Colony +continued to be elected under this system until the Council disappeared +under the new Constitution of United South Africa. The Cumulative Vote +secured the representation of minorities in the Legislative Council of +Cape Colony, and a striking testimony to its value, from this point of +view, was given by Lord Milner when speaking in the House of Lords on 31 +July 1906, on the announcement of the terms of the new Transvaal +Constitution:-- + +"I hope," said Lord Milner, "that when the time for making the Second +Chamber elective comes, this matter may be reconsidered, for it is +certainly very remarkable how much more fairly the system of +proportional representation works out in the Cape Colony than the +system, not of single members there, but of double-member +representation. Take only a single instance. In the Cape Colony, take +the bulk of the country districts; you have, roughly speaking, about two +Boers to every one white man who is not a Boer. On the system which +prevails for the Lower House the representation of these districts is +exclusively Boer, for one-third of the population is absolutely excluded +from any representation whatever. Under the system which prevails in the +election to the Upper House, as nearly as possible one-third of the +representatives of those districts are British. Inversely, in the case +of the Cape Peninsula, where there is an enormously preponderant British +population, but still a considerable Dutch population also, you get in +the Lower House no single Dutch representative, whereas in the Upper +House there are three representatives, one of whom represents the Dutch +section. You could not have a more curious illustration of the great +difference in fairness between the two principles as applied to the +practical conditions of South Africa. And I cannot help hoping that +between this time and the time when the Constitution of the projected +Upper House comes to be decided, there may be such a development of +opinion as will enable and justify the Government of that day adopting +the far sounder principle for the elections to the Upper Chamber. It +certainly has a great bearing upon that development of better feeling +between the two great races of South Africa whom we are all agreed in +desiring to see ultimately amalgamated and fused." + +The Cape Assembly was elected by constituencies returning one or more +members, and when more than one each voter could give a single vote to +as many candidates as there were members to be elected, with the +consequence that the majority in every constituency commanded the whole +of its representation. The Council was elected by larger areas with the +cumulative vote. Lord Milner in his speech refers to the cumulative vote +as proportional voting, but it cannot, strictly speaking, be so +described. Nevertheless his testimony clearly shows that the cumulative +vote secured the representation of minorities--the great need of which +has been recognized by all impartial students of South African political +conditions. + +Mr. Robert Lowe endeavoured to introduce this form of voting into the +Electoral Reform Bill of 1867, but failed, and the only practical +application of the system within the United Kingdom has been in +connexion with School Board elections. It was introduced into the +Education Act of 1870 on the motion of a private member, Lord Frederick +Cavendish, whose proposition, supported as it was by W.E. Forster, +Vice-President of the Council for Education, by W.H. Smith and by Henry +Fawcett, was carried without a division. Under this Act London was +divided into eleven electoral areas, returning from four to seven +members each; whilst the large towns, such as Manchester, Birmingham, +and others, each constituted an electoral area itself, electing a Board +of some fifteen members. The Education Act for Scotland which followed +in the same Parliament embodied the same principle in the-same manner. +The figures of any School Board election will show that the object aimed +at--the representation of minorities--was undoubtedly achieved. The last +election of the School Board for London, that of 1900, will serve for +purposes of illustration. The figures are as follows:-- + + Votes Obtained. Members Returned. +Constituency. Mode- Pro- Inde- Mode- Pro- Inde- + rate. gressive. pendent. rate. gressive. pendent. +City 4,572 2,183 3 1 +Chelsea 7,831 5,408 2,144 3 2 +Finsbury 7,573 7,239 837 3 3 1 +Greenwich 6,706 6,008 3,375 2 1 +Hackney 5,438 9,130 1,579 2 3 +Lambeth, E 4,370 9,913 1,313 1 3 +Lambeth, W. 8,709 14,156 54 2 4 +Marylebone 9,450 7,047 536 4 3 +Southwark 2,636 3,430 2,328 1 2 1 +Tower Hamlets 6,199 7,437 5,495 1 3 1 +Westminster 4,829 2,354 3 2 + +Totals 68,313 74,305 17,661 25 27 3 + +In each constituency the minority was enabled to obtain some +representation, and although in the majority of cases the representation +was still confined to the two main parties, yet it was possible for an +independent candidate, as in the Tower Hamlets, or a Roman Catholic +candidate, as in Southwark, to succeed in their respective candidatures. +The Cumulative Vote not only secured the representation of minorities, +but in so doing facilitated very considerably the working of the +Education Act. Mr. Patrick Cumin, at that time permanent secretary of +the Education Department, in giving evidence before a select committee +of the House of Commons, stated that "it would not have been possible to +carry the Act into effect, and certainly there would have been more +friction if the cumulative vote had not been in existence; for instance, +he did not believe that the bye-laws could possibly have been carried +into effect without co-operation." The Right Hon. W.E. Forster and Sir +Francis Sandford bore similar testimony, and the Royal Commission on the +Elementary Education Acts, in the Report issued in 1888, strongly +advised the retention of a system of minority representation. + +The Cumulative Vote was also adopted by the State of Illinois for the +elections to the State House of Representatives. Each constituency +returns three members, and the elector may cumulate or divide his votes, +giving one vote to each candidate, or one and a half votes to each of +two candidates, or three votes to one candidate. "As a result," says +Professor Commons, "both parties have representatives from every part of +the State instead of from the strongholds only, and there are no +hopeless minorities of the two main parties. Every citizen who has +business before the Legislature has some member of his own party to +transact that business." Constituencies returning three members are, +however, not sufficiently large to do justice to this method of voting. + +The Cumulative Vote, whilst securing representation to the minority, +does not necessarily secure the representation of majorities and +minorities in their true proportions. As with the Limited Vote, the +party organizations, if they desire to make use of their polling +strength to the fullest advantage, must make as accurate an estimate as +possible of the numbers of their supporters, and must issue explicit +directions as to the way in which votes should be recorded. To nominate +more candidates than the party can carry may end in disaster. In the +first School Board elections in Birmingham the Liberal organization +endeavoured to obtain the whole of the representation, and nominated +fifteen candidates. The party polled a majority of the votes, but as +these votes were distributed over too many candidates, the Liberals +succeeded in returning only a minority of representatives. It is not +easy to understand how the Birmingham National League came to imagine +that, with the Cumulative Vote, they would still be able to elect a +Board composed of members entirely of their own side, and Mr. Forster +banteringly suggested that the League should obtain the assistance of a +well-taught elementary schoolboy who would be able to show them that it +was impossible to get the return which they supposed they might obtain. +While there was little excuse for the mistake made by the Birmingham +National League, it must be remembered that with the Cumulative Vote it +is easy to fall into the opposite error of nominating too few +candidates. Every School Board election furnishes examples of an +excessive concentration of votes upon individual candidates. The Glasgow +School Board election of 1909 resulted as follows:-- + +Elected----James Barr 81,109 + Canon Dyer 58,711 + John Shaughnessy 54,310 + Charles Byrne 54,236 + Rev. James Brisby 51,357 + W. Rounsfell Brown 35,739 + R. S. Allan 24,017 + Rev. J. Fraser Grahame 23,806 + Dr. Henry Dyer 23,422 + Mrs. Mary Mason 22,929 + W. Martin Haddow 21,880 + Rev. Robert Pryde 21,692 + Miss K. V. Bannatyne 18,864 + Mrs. Agnes Hardie 18,794 + J. Leiper Gemmil 18,619 +Unelected--Rev. J. A. Robertson 18,534 + James Welsh 13,951 + Dr. Sloan 13,114 + S. M. Lipschitz 12,680 + Dr. Charles Workman 7,405 + James Laidlaw 4,869 + Patrick Gallagher 2,478 + ------- + 602,516 + +It will be seen that the candidate at the head of the list, Mr. Barr, +obtained over 81,000 votes, and the highest of the unsuccessful +candidates 18,534 votes. The total number of votes polled was 602,516, +and one-fifteenth of this number, viz. 40,167, would have been amply +sufficient to secure the return of any one candidate. The votes given to +Mr. Barr in excess of this number were wasted, and thus, although with +the cumulative vote minorities can secure representation, neither +majorities nor minorities secure with any degree of certainty +representation in their true proportions. + +_The Single Vote_.] + +Japan, keenly alive to the evils of a defective electoral system, +abandoned, after a short trial, the system adopted when the Japanese +Constitution was promulgated in 1889. The administrative areas (with +some exceptions) were then divided into single-member constituencies, +but it was soon found how unsatisfactorily this system works. It would +appear from a memorandum prepared by Mr. Kametaro Hayashida, Chief +Secretary of the Japanese House of Representatives--a memorandum which +is printed in full in Appendix I.--that in certain of the administrative +areas a minority of the voters often obtained a majority of the members +elected. It was almost impossible for political parties to obtain +representation in proportion to the strength of their supporters. In +1900 a new election law was adopted. The administrative areas, +irrespective of size, were made parliamentary constituencies returning a +number of members varying from one to twelve according to the population +of the area, but the voter in any area was permitted only one vote. He +can vote for one candidate and no more. Under this system minorities can +and do get a share of representation whenever the area returns two or +more members. A secondary advantage of considerable importance was +secured by making the administrative areas conterminous with the +parliamentary constituencies. Future redistributions of seats would +leave the boundaries of these areas untouched; they would merely +consist of a re-arrangement of the number of members to be returned by +each area. + +The new system secured not only the representation of minorities, but +also the representation of the chief parties in reasonable proportion to +their voting strength. Further, to men of independent mind and character +the new system offered a greater opportunity of maintaining their +position in the House of Representatives. As will be seen from Mr. +Hayashida's memorandum, both Mr. Ozaki, the Mayor of Tokio, and Mr. S. +Shimada, have never lost their seats in Parliament, although they have +stood as independent candidates. At the General Election of 1908 they +were returned for their native prefecture or town with a great number of +votes. These are results of no mean value which are certainly not +possible with our Parliamentary system of single-member constituencies, +or with the block vote as used in the London municipal elections. Yet, +in spite of the marked superiority of the Japanese system, it falls +short of a true system of representation; it lacks the elasticity and +adaptability which should characterize such a system. Like the limited +vote and the cumulative vote, the Japanese system of the single vote +demands exact calculations on the part of party organizations, which +otherwise may fail to secure for their party the maximum number of +representatives. The number of candidates nominated must depend upon a +careful estimate of probable support, and when the nominations have +taken place efforts must be made by the party organizations to allot +this support to their candidates in such a way that not one of them is +in danger of defeat. Moreover, as the nomination of too large a number +of candidates would, as with the limited vote, be disastrous, parties +have in some constituencies been unwilling to nominate more than the +number of candidates who were successful at the previous election. + +_The need of minority representation_.] + +It cannot be maintained then, as was suggested by Lord Ripon, that the +experiments made for the purpose of securing the representation of +minorities have failed. All the methods tried--the limited, the +cumulative, and the single vote--have without question accomplished +their purpose. They have done even more. The cumulative vote facilitated +the smooth working of the Elementary Education Act, the single vote has +secured for Japan a House of Representatives which reflects in +reasonable proportions the political forces of the country. The problem +for the future is not the abandonment of the principle of minority +representation, but the adoption of such improvements in voting +mechanism as will do justice to majorities and to minorities alike. For +the need of minority representation is becoming more and not less +urgent. A brief reference to the more important Parliamentary Bills of +recent years will show that the most difficult problems which our +administrators have had to face in the framing of those Bills have +centred round the problem of representation--and that problem will recur +with greater frequency in the future. Mr. Birrell, the Chief Secretary +for Ireland, considered it essential that some special provision for the +representation of minorities should be embodied in the Irish +Administrative Council Bill introduced into the House of Commons in May +1907. But the method proposed--that the Council should consist of +eighty-two elected members and twenty-four nominated members--was +essentially undemocratic. The nominated members, even if they were +representative of the minority, would never have had the same authority +or influence as they would have had as members duly elected by the votes +of the minority; and even if we admit the special difficulties attending +the representation of minorities in Ireland the solution proposed by Mr. +Birrell was in every sense of the term unsatisfactory, and obviously of +a temporary character. The first step towards the solution of Irish +problems will have been taken when due provision has been made by +popular election for the representation of minorities. + +Lord Morley of Blackburn, in preparing his great scheme of Indian +reforms, found himself face to face with the same problem--the +representation of minorities. He had, moreover, been advised by the +Indian Government that "in most provinces the Muhammadans are in favour +of election, and regard nomination as an inferior method of obtaining +admission to the Legislative Council."[5] Lord Morley, willingly or +unwillingly, was compelled to brush aside the English electoral methods +as inapplicable to India, and to provide for the representation on the +proposed Provincial Legislative Councils of Hindus and Muhammadans in +proportion to their strength. The method proposed was an arbitrary one, +and can be best described by quoting the terms of Lord Morley's +preliminary despatch. + +"Let it be supposed that the total population of the Province is twenty +millions, of whom fifteen millions are Hindus and five millions +Muhammadans, and the number of members to be elected twelve. Then since +the Hindus are to Muhammadans as three to one, nine Hindus should be +elected to three Muhammadans. In order to obtain these members, divide +the Province into three electoral areas, in each of which three Hindus +and one Muhammadan are to be returned. Then, in each of these areas, +constitute an electoral college, consisting of, let us say, a hundred +members. In order to preserve the proportion between the two religions, +seventy-five of these should be Hindus and twenty-five Muhammadans. This +electoral college should be obtained by calling upon the various +electorates ... to return to it such candidates as they desired, a +definite number being allotted to each electorate. Out of those offering +themselves and obtaining votes, the seventy-five Hindus who obtained the +majority of votes should be declared members of the College, and the +twenty-five Musalmans who obtained the majority should similarly be +declared elected. If the Musalmans returned did not provide twenty-five +members for the Electoral College, the deficiency would be made good by +nomination. Having thus obtained an Electoral College containing +seventy-five Hindus and twenty-five Musalmans, that body would be called +upon to elect three representatives for the Hindus and one for the +Muhammadans; each member of the College would have only one vote, and +could vote for only one candidate. In this way it is evident that it +would be in the power of each section of the population to return a +member in the proportion corresponding to its own proportion to the +total population."[6] + +Lord Morley proceeded to explain that "in this manner minorities would +be protected against exclusion by majorities, and all large and +important sections of the population would have the opportunity of +returning members in proportion to their ratio to the total population. +Their choice would in that event be exercised in the best possible way, +that, namely, of popular election, instead of requiring Government to +supply deficiencies by the dubious method of nomination." The system of +nomination, considered by Mr. Birrell as an adequate solution of this +problem in Ireland, was summarily rejected, and rightly so, by Lord +Morley as being inferior to popular election, inferior even to the +arbitrary method proposed by himself. The plan finally adopted by Lord +Morley was a modification of the proposal here outlined, and its +working, as the working of all arbitrary schemes must, has evoked +criticism on the ground that it does not hold the scales even as between +the two sections to be represented. + +The Select Committee appointed by the House of Lords "to consider the +suggestions made from time to time for increasing the efficiency of that +House," was compelled to propose a method of election by which the +Liberal minority might retain some representation in that House. In the +election of Representative Peers for Scotland the majority method of +election is followed, with the result that none but Unionists are +chosen. It was obvious that no proposal for the reform of the House of +Lords which embodied an electoral method so unjust could possibly be +entertained, and therefore this Select Committee, following in this all +previous proposals for the reform of the Upper House, reported that the +representation of the minority was essential. A new Second Chamber is +now advocated both by Liberals and Unionists. + +Again, Mr. Asquith's Government experienced a very distinct rebuff in +its attempt to abolish the cumulative vote in the elections of Scottish +School Boards without making any alternative provision for the +representation of minorities. The Government proposed to substitute the +block vote for the cumulative vote. The block vote would have enabled +the majority of the electors to have secured the whole of the +representation on the Board. The deletion of the Government's proposal +was proposed in the Scottish Grand Committee, but was defeated. A +further amendment by Mr. Phipson Beale in favour of the principle of +proportional representation was, in spite of the strong opposition of +the Secretary for Scotland, defeated only by twenty-two votes to +eighteen. The Government finally withdrew their proposal to abolish the +cumulative vote, and it has been made abundantly clear that, while the +cumulative vote is far from satisfactory, it can only be dispensed with +by the introduction of a better and more scientific way of securing the +representation of minorities. + +In framing the Port of London Bill, Mr. Lloyd George had to make some +provision for the representation of the various interests concerned, and +so far as possible, in due proportion. It was impossible to entrust the +control of the new Port to the largest interest only, and accordingly he +proposed that "in prescribing the manner in which votes are to be +recorded, the Board of Trade shall have regard to the desirability of +votes being so recorded, whether by allowing the voter to record a vote +for a number of candidates in order of preference or otherwise, as to +secure that so far as possible the several interests concerned shall be +adequately represented on the Port Authority."[7] The reports of the +Poor Law Commission also raise in an acute form the problem of minority +representation. If the far-reaching suggestions of these reports are to +become law, and especially if the powers of County and County Borough +Councils are to be still further increased, the constitution of these +bodies will have to be closely examined. Are minorities to be excluded +altogether from the new authorities; are they to secure representation +through the processes of co-option and nomination; or are they to obtain +a hearing by a system of election that will provide them with +representation in their own right? + +While these and other matters are bringing into greater prominence the +need of minority representation, a new problem--one with which the +Continent has long been familiar--has arisen in connexion with English +parliamentary elections. In an increasing number of contests three or +more candidates have taken the field, and the candidate obtaining the +highest number of votes has been elected although he may have received +less than half the votes recorded. A member so chosen obviously +represents only a minority of the electors in the constituency for which +he has been returned. Such results have come as a shock to those who +have hitherto accepted with composure the more glaring anomalies of our +electoral system, and so the growing frequency of three-cornered fights +will assist those other forces which are making for a complete +readjustment of our electoral methods. The new problem is, however, +quite distinct from that of minority representation, and is of +sufficient importance to warrant consideration in a separate chapter. + + +[Footnote 1: 30 April 1907.] + +[Footnote 2: "One ward voted for A and B, another for A and C, a third +for B and C, a fourth for A and B, &c. The voter who had left the +selection of the three candidates to the general committee was also to +renounce the privilege of selecting from them the two which he +preferred. 'Vote as you are told' was the pass word."--Ostrogorski, +_Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties_, vol. i. p. 162.] + +[Footnote 3: If in a four-member constituency the number of voters is +21,000 and the parties are in the ratio of 12,000 to 9000, the larger +party would, if each elector had three votes, have 36,000 votes in all +and the smaller party would have 27,000. No candidate of the smaller +party could obtain more than 9000 votes, whilst the 36,000 votes of the +larger party carefully divided among four candidates would also allow +each candidate to receive 9000 votes. If then the larger party had +slightly more than 12,000 supporters out of a total of 21,000, the +larger party would obtain all four seats, as each of its candidates +would, if the votes were carefully distributed, receive more than 9000 +votes each.] + +[Footnote 4: "If it is desired that the body should not be a +representation of a single interest and a single class of opinions, some +means must be adopted to guard against its falling entirely into the +hands of the dominant party. With this view we would recommend that, in +the election of the council, each elector should have as many votes as +there might be members to be chosen, and should be entitled to give all +these votes to a single candidate, or to distribute them among several. +By this arrangement a monopoly of power in the Legislative Council by +any one party, or any one district of the Colony, would be prevented, +since a minority of the electors, by giving all their votes to a single +candidate, would be enabled to secure his return."--Earl Grey, _The +Colonial Policy of the Administration of Lord John Russell_, vol. ii., +Appendix, p. 362.] + +[Footnote 5: _East India_ (Advisory and Legislative Councils, &c.) (Cd. +4426), p. 14.] + +[Footnote 6: _East India_ (Advisory and Legislative Councils, &c.) (Cd. +4426), p. 45.] + +[Footnote 7: Port of London Act, 1908, Schedule I., Part IV. (1).] + + + + +CHAPTER V + +THE SECOND BALLOT AND THE TRANSFERABLE VOTE IN SINGLE-MEMBER +CONSTITUENCIES + + +"Le député, au lieu de représenter la majorité des électeurs, devient +prisonnier de la minorité qui lui a donné l'appoint nécessaire pour son +élection." + +--YVES GUYOT + +" ... every fool knows that a man represents +Not the fellers that sent him, but them on the fence." + +--J. RUSSELL LOWELL + +_Three-cornered contests._ + +It was stated in the first chapter that the rise of the Labour Party as +a political force, with an organization wholly independent of those of +the older parties, would make a change in our voting system imperative. +Both prior and subsequent to the appointment of the Royal Commission on +Electoral Systems political organizations have shown themselves keenly +alive to the necessity of such a change. At the meeting of the General +Committee of the National Liberal Federation at Leicester, on 21 +February 1908, a resolution in favour of the early adoption of the +second ballot was carried unanimously. The Trades Union Congress, at its +meeting in September 1908, less eager to pronounce in favour of a reform +of such doubtful value, passed a resolution in favour of an +authoritative "inquiry into proportional representation, preference or +second ballots, so that the most effective means of securing the true +representation of the electors may be embodied in the new Reform Bill." +The spokesman of a deputation from the Manchester Liberal Federation, +which waited upon Mr. Winston Churchill on 22 May 1909, said: "The point +on which we wish to speak to you to-day is the reform of the present +system of voting, which we hold to be out of date, archaic, and in +great need of reform." Mr. Churchill's reply was a significant +reinforcement of Mr. Asquith's previous declaration, that "it was +impossible to defend the present rough and ready methods." "I think," +said Mr. Churchill, "the present system has clearly broken down. The +results produced are not fair to any party, nor to any section of the +community. In many cases they do not secure majority representation, nor +do they secure an intelligent representation of minorities. All they +secure is fluke representation, freak representation, capricious +representation." The figures of two bye-elections--those of the Jarrow +Division of Durham and the Attercliffe Division of Sheffield--will show +how completely Mr. Churchill's language is justified. The figures are as +follows:-- + +JARROW ELECTION, 4 July 1907 + +Curran (Labour) 4,698 +Rose-Innes (Conservative) 3,930 +Hughes (Liberal) 3,474 +O'Hanlon (Nationalist) 2,124 + ___ + 14,226 + +ATTERCLIFFE ELECTION, 4 May 1909 + +Pointer (Labour) . . . . 3,531 +King-Farrow (Unionist) . . . 3,380 +Lambert (Liberal) . . . . 3,175 +Wilson (Ind. Unionist) . . . 2,803 + ___ + 12,889 + +In the case of Jarrow the successful candidate obtained just less than +one-third of the votes polled, and in the case of Attercliffe the member +returned represented a little more than a quarter of the electors. The +representation which results from elections of this kind is without +doubt most capricious and uncertain in character. A House of Commons so +built up could have no claim to be representative of the nation, and its +composition would be so unstable as seriously to impair its efficiency. +Nor can we afford to regard such elections as being a mere temporary +feature of our parliamentary system. The General Election of 1906 showed +a notable increase in the number of three-cornered fights over previous +general elections, and the bye-elections during the four years +1906--1909 were marked by a still further increase. The Report submitted +by the Executive Committee of the Labour Party to the Portsmouth +Conference in January 1909 foreshadowed a very large addition to the +number of Labour candidates. Some thirty-eight candidates, in addition +to the then existing Labour members in Parliament, had been formally +approved by the Executive Committee of the Labour Party after due +election by the Labour organizations to which the candidates belonged, +and although constituencies were not found for all of these new +candidates, the number of three-cornered contests in the election of +Jan. 1910, in which Liberal, Unionist, Labour (or Socialist) took part, +was no less than forty-one, and this number would have been greater had +not several Liberal candidates withdrawn. Owing to the desire on the +part of the Liberal and Labour parties to avoid the risk of losing seats +there were in the elections of December 1910 fewer three-cornered +fights. But the Labour party, the permanence of which is no longer open +to question, will not be content to remain with its present share of +representation. It can however gain additional seats only at the expense +of the older parties, and although the Liberal party, as in the +Mid-Derby bye-election of May 1908, may sometimes yield seats to Labour +nominees, it is not to be expected that the Liberal organizations will +always be willing to give way. At the Mid-Glamorgan bye-election in May +1910 the local organization, against the advice of the chief Liberal +Whip, nominated a Liberal candidate, and succeeded in retaining the seat +although it had been "ear-marked" by the Labour Party. In Scotland, +where Liberalism is less complaisant than in England, no seat has been +surrendered to the Labour Party without a fight, and when a Labour +candidature was threatened in December 1910, in the Bridgeton division +of Glasgow, the Liberals retaliated by threatening to place a Liberal +candidate in the Blackfriars division where Mr. Barnes, the Labour +representative was again standing. These facts should dispel any +illusion, if such still exist, that the problem of three-cornered fights +is a transitory phenomenon which can safely be ignored. The political +organizations, with a true instinct, have realized the importance and +urgency of this problem, and increasing pressure will doubtless be +brought to bear upon the Government to introduce a system of second +ballots, or some other electoral method, that will give effect to what +Mr. Churchill has described as "the broad democratic principle, that a +majority of voters in any electoral unit, acting together, shall be able +to return their man." The advocates of the second ballot and cognate +methods of reform seek a solution of this one problem only. They desire +to maintain the essential characteristic of the present system--the +exclusive representation of the majority in each constituency--and make +no attempt to remedy any of the other evils associated with +single-member constituencies. But the question at once arises whether +the problem of three-cornered contests can be solved by attempts to +preserve the distinctive feature of the present system--the +representation of the majority only. A little reflection must convince +the reader that such a solution deals with the form of the problem +rather than with its essence. For the new problem arises from the fact +that three parties instead of two are now seeking representation in +Parliament, and no remedy can be regarded as effective which does not +provide for the realization of the legitimate aspirations of all three +parties. This the system of second ballots has completely failed to do; +indeed its results only reinforce the arguments of previous chapters, +that so long as we compel the electors of any one district, whatever +their divisions of opinion, to be all represented by one man, their real +representation will be impossible. An examination of the effects of the +second ballot in those countries in which the system has been tried +fully justifies these statements, and fortunately the body of +experience now available is so considerable that the conclusions to be +drawn therefrom have an authoritative character. + +_The second ballot._ + +The Reports furnished by His Majesty's representatives abroad show that +the second ballot, in one form or another, is, or has been, in force in +the majority of continental countries. The forms differ in detail, but +reference need only be made to the three chief types. In Germany the two +candidates highest at the first poll proceed to a second election. It +was this form of the second ballot that was introduced into New Zealand +in 1908. In France all candidates in the original election and even +fresh candidates may stand at the second election. At this second poll a +relative--not an absolute--majority of votes is sufficient to secure the +election of a candidate. As a rule only the two candidates highest at +the first election take part in the second ballot, and therefore in +practice the German and French methods closely approximate to one +another. The third type concerns the application of the second ballot to +the _scrutin de liste_ or block vote in multi-member constituencies. It +was formerly used in the Belgian parliamentary elections, and is still +employed in the election for the Belgian Provincial Councils. The +candidates who receive the support of an absolute majority of the +electors voting at the first ballot are at once declared elected; the +candidates next highest on the poll, but only so many as are equal to +double the number of vacancies remaining to be filled, take part in a +second ballot. + +The object of the second ballot--to ensure that every elected candidate +should finally have obtained the support of a majority of the electors +voting in the constituency for which he has been returned--has, +generally speaking, been achieved. But that does not solve the problem +of the representation of three parties; a general election based on such +a system yields results which are far from satisfactory. The party which +is unsuccessful in one constituency may suffer the same fate in the +majority of the constituencies, and this is the fatal flaw in all forms +of the second ballot. Moreover experience has shown, and it is evident +_a priori_, that with this system the representation of any section of +political opinion depends not upon the number of its supporters, but +very largely upon the attitude taken towards it by other parties. For, +at a second ballot, the result is determined by the action of those +smaller minorities which were at the bottom of the poll at the first +ballot. No party can be certain of securing representation unless in its +own strength it can obtain an absolute majority in at least some of the +constituencies. The largest party in the State, if its voting strength +is evenly distributed, may be at the mercy of hostile combinations at +the second ballots, unless it is so large as to command a majority of +votes throughout the country, and when three parties have entered the +political arena it rarely happens that any one of them is in this +favourable position. That being so, the new element of uncertainty +associated with the system of second ballots may yield results which are +further removed from the true representation of the whole electorate +than the results of the first ballots. + +_Experience in Germany._ + +Continental experience has shown that the coalitions at the second +ballots are of two types. One party may incur the hostility of all other +parties, and if so, the second ballots will tend uniformly to the +suppression of that party. The combination of parties whose aims and +purposes are to some degree allied may be regarded as legitimate, but +the cumulative effect of such combinations over a large area is most +unfair to the party adversely affected. No defence at all can be urged +in palliation of the evils of certain other coalitions also +characteristic of second ballots--the coalitions of extreme and opposed +parties which temporarily combine for the purpose of wrecking a third +party in the hope of snatching some advantage from the resulting +political situation. Sometimes such coalitions are merely the expression +of resentment by an advanced party at the action of a party somewhat +less advanced than itself. But, whatever the cause, the coalitions at +the second ballots do not result in the creation of a fully +representative legislative chamber; on the contrary, they tend to take +away all sincerity from the parliamentary system. Illustrations of the +first type of coalitions abound. The German general elections afford +numerous examples, but as a special note on the working of the second +ballots in Germany is to be found in Appendix II., it will suffice to +quote some of the results of the election of 1907. The Social Democrats +were engaged at the second ballots in ninety constituencies. At the +first ballots they were at the head of the poll in forty-four of these +constituencies, but at the second ballots they only succeeded in +retaining that position in eleven. In the forty-six constituencies in +which they were second at the poll they were only able to improve their +condition in three cases. These figures show how the German Social +Democrats suffered from hostile combinations. It was with the utmost +difficulty that they obtained representation in constituencies other +than those in which at the first elections they were in an absolute +majority. No wonder that one of the planks of the platform of the Social +Democratic party is proportional representation. + +_Austria._ + +The Social Democrats of Austria suffered in the General Election of 1907 +in the same way. Professor Kedlich,[1] in an article entitled "The +Working of Universal Suffrage in Austria," wrote as follows: "The +Christian Socialists have ninety-six seats in the new House, the Social +Democrats eighty-six ... The number of seats won by them weighs still +heavier in the balance when we reflect that in many second ballots the +majority of the opponents of social democracy joined their forces +against them. Not less instructive are the relative numbers of the votes +recorded for each of the parties. Over a million votes were given to the +Social Democrats as against 531,000 for the Christian Socialists." Such +results destroy the representative character of legislative bodies. The +same lesson on a smaller scale is to be gathered from the Italian +elections. Speaking of the General Election of 1904, the Rome +correspondent of _The Morning Post_ pointed out that, in not a few +constituencies, like the second division of Rome, a rally of Clericals +at the second ballots enabled the Conservative Monarchists to triumph +over the Socialists. + +_Belgium._ + +The combinations of allied parties against a third party, as in the +examples already given, may be defended, but the coalitions at second +ballots, as has been pointed out, are not always of this character. +Should parties, angered and embittered by being deprived of +representation, use their power at the second ballots to render a stable +Government impossible, then the results are disastrous. Such were the +conditions which obtained in Belgium before the abandonment of second +ballots. "The system," says Sir Arthur Hardinge, "answered well enough +so long as only two parties contested an election; but the moment the +Socialist Party formed a distinct third party, after the establishment +of universal suffrage in 1894, it began to act in a manner which +produced unsatisfactory results.... The overwhelming victory of the +Clerical party in 1894 was largely due to the fact that in every second +ballot between Catholics and Socialists the Liberals voted for the +former, whilst in every second ballot between Catholics and Liberals, +with the single exception of the Thuin Division, the Socialists +preferred the Catholics as the creators of universal suffrage and as, in +some respects, a more genuinely democratic party, to the Liberals, whom +the Labour leaders regarded with peculiar hatred as the apostles of free +competition and individualism. In 1896 the Socialists were in their turn +the victims, as the Liberals had been in 1894, of the working of the +system of second ballots. Liberal electors at these elections voted +everywhere at the second ballots for Clerical against Labour candidates, +with the result that the Clericals won every one of the eighteen seats +for Brussels, although the total number of Clerical electors in a total +electorate of 202,000 was only 89,000, as against 40,000 Liberals and +73,000 ultra-Radicals and Labour men. Two years later the Liberals swung +round to an alliance with the Socialists against the Clericals, and in +several constituencies, owing to the system of second ballots, the +Socialists, although actually in a minority, won all the seats with the +help of the Liberals, who on the first ballot had voted unsuccessfully +for Liberal as against both Catholic and Labour candidates. It was the +practical experience of conditions such as these which gradually +convinced all the Belgian parties that, given a three-cornered fight in +every, or nearly every, constituency, the only way of preventing a +minority from turning the scales and excluding from all representation +the views of nearly half the electorate was to adopt the system of +proportional representation."[2] + +Count Goblet d'Alviella furnishes an excellent example of the working of +the second ballots at Verviers in the General Election of 1898, the last +parliamentary election in Belgium, at which second ballots were used. In +the election for Senators the Socialists spoiled the chances of the +Liberals by voting for the Clericals, whilst, in the election for the +Chamber, the Liberals, not to be outdone, spoiled the chances of the +Socialists by also supporting the Clericals. The Clericals thus obtained +all the seats both in the Senate and in the Chamber with the assistance +of the Socialists and of the Liberals in turn. The absurdities of the +General Election of 1898 were so flagrant that on the day after the +election so determined an opponent of proportional representation as _La +Chronique_ exclaimed, "Can anything be more absurd than the working of +the second ballots in this country? ... What becomes of the moral force +of an election in which parties are obliged, if they wish to win, to +implore the support of electors who yesterday were their enemies? Such +support is never obtained without conditions, and these conditions are +either promises which it is not intended to keep or a surrender of +principles--in either case a proceeding utterly immoral."[3] + +_France_.] + +French elections also furnish examples of the use of the second ballots +for the purpose of fostering dissension between opponents. At the +General Election in 1906 it was stated that the Conservatives in the +South of France, despairing of obtaining representation themselves, +intended to support the Socialists at the second ballot in the hope of +obtaining an advantage by accentuating the difference between the +Socialists and the Radicals. M. Jaurès indignantly denied that there was +any understanding between the Socialists and the Conservatives, and took +advantage of the accusation to write in _L'Humanité_ a powerful plea for +proportional representation. "This reform," he declared, "would make +such unnatural alliances impossible. Each party would be induced and, +indeed, it would be to each party's advantage to fight its own battle, +for every group would have an opportunity of obtaining its full share of +representation. There would no longer be any question of doubtful +manoeuvres, of confused issues; Socialism would have its advocates, +Radicalism its exponents, Conservatism its leaders, and there would be a +magnificent propaganda of principles which would inevitably result in +the political education of the electorate. Every movement would be +assured of representation in proportion to its real strength in the +country; every party, freed from the necessity of entering into +alliances which invariably beget suspicion, would be able to formulate +quite clearly its essential principles; governmental and administrative +corruption would be reduced to a minimum; the real wishes of the people +would find expression; and if parties still continued to dispute for +power, it would be to enable them to promote the more effectually the +measures for which they stood." In spite, however, of this eloquent +disclaimer on the part of M. Jaurès, the Conservatives have at the +bye-elections continued their policy of supporting the Socialists. The +bye election of Charolles in December 1908 is a case in point. At the +first ballot the figures were as follows:-- + +M. Sarrien fils (Radical) 5,770 votes +M. Duoarouge (Socialist) 4,367 " +M. Magnien (Conservative) 3,968 " + +At the second ballot-- + +M. Ducarouge (Socialist) 6,841 " Elected +M. Sarrien fils (Radical) 5,339 " +M. Magnien (Conservative) 301 " + +It should be explained that the Conservative candidate, although his +name still appeared upon the ballot paper, retired before the second +election, and it is evident that the votes of many of his supporters +were given to the Socialist candidate. In the following April (1909) +several further instances occurred. At Uzès a vacancy was caused by the +death of a Radical Socialist member who, at the General Election of +1906, had beaten the Duc d'Uzès, a Reactionary, the Socialist candidate +on that occasion being at the bottom of the poll. In the bye-election +the Socialist was returned at the head of the poll, but so obvious was +the fact that the Socialist owed his victory to Conservative support, +that he was received in the Chamber by the Radicals with the cry of "M. +le duc d'Uzès." Uzès was typical of other elections and, as the Paris +correspondent of _The Morning Post_ remarked, "the successes of the +Unified Socialists in the recent series of bye-elections are in part to +be attributed to the votes of the Reactionaries, who voted for the +Unified candidates as being enemies of the Republic." This abuse of the +purpose of second ballots--an abuse engendered by the failure of the +minority to obtain direct representation--destroys the last semblance of +sincerity in the representation of a constituency, and must hasten the +abolition of the second ballots in France in the same way as +combinations of a similar nature rendered imperative the introduction of +a more rational system of election in Belgium. + +The foregoing facts are sufficient to show that a system of second +ballots does not necessarily result in the formation of a legislative +chamber fully representative of the electorate. In Germany the largest +party has had its representation ruthlessly cut down by the operation of +the second ballots. Indeed, were it not for the overwhelming +predominance of this party in certain areas it might not have obtained +any representation whatever. In Belgium the effect of the second ballots +was to deprive the middle party, the Liberals, of their fair share of +representation. In 1896, owing to the coalitions of Socialists and +Catholics at the polls, the Liberals had only eleven representatives in +the popular chamber. All their leaders had been driven from Parliament, +their electoral associations had become completely disorganized save in +some large towns, and in many constituencies they had ceased to take +part in elections. Yet the results of the very first elections (1900) +after the establishment of proportional representation, showed that the +Liberals were the second largest party in the State, and that it was a +party which still responded to the needs and still gave voice to the +views of large numbers of citizens. + +_The bargainings at the second ballots in France_.] + +The system of second ballots not only deprives large sections of the +electorate of representation, but the very coalitions which produce this +result bring parliamentary institutions into still further disrepute. +These coalitions are condemned in unequivocal terms by Continental +writers and statesmen of widely differing schools of thought. The +scathing language of M. Jaures has already been quoted, and we find his +views endorsed by politicians of the type of M. Deschanel, an +ex-President of the Chamber of Deputies, who declared that these +coalitions entirely falsify the character of the popular verdict. Again, +M. Yves Guyot, an ex-Minister, asserts that "the second ballots give +rise to detestable bargainings which obliterate all political sense in +the electors." M. Raymond Poincare, a Senator and a former Minister, +condemns the system of second ballots in equally forcible language. "It +will be of no use," he says, "to replace one kind of constituency by +another if we do not, at the same time, suppress the gamble of the +majority system and the jobbery of the second ballots." These +expressions of opinion on the part of individual French politicians +could be multiplied, but it will be sufficient to add to them the more +formal and official declaration of the Commission du Suffrage Universel, +a Parliamentary Committee appointed by the Chamber of Deputies. In the +Report issued by this Committee in 1907, it is declared that "the +abolition of the second ballots with the bargainings to which they give +rise will not be the least of the advantages of the new system +[proportional representation]." + +_The "Kuh-Handel" in Germany._ + +It would appear that the German second ballots are also characterized by +this same evil of bargaining. Karl Blind, writing in _The Nineteenth +Century_, March 1907, stated that "in this last election the oddest +combinations have taken place for the ballots in the various parts of +the Empire and within different States. There was no uniformity of +action as to coming to a compromise between Conservative and Liberal, or +Liberal and Social Democrat, or Centre and any other party, as against +some supposed common enemy who was to be ousted from his insufficient +majority by a subsequent alliance between otherwise discordant groups, +or who wanted to have his insufficient majority increased to an absolute +one by the addition of the vote of one of the defeated candidates whose +friends finally choose the 'lesser evil'.... + +"To some extent these necessary, but sometimes rather sordid, +transactions are made all the more difficult through the very existence +of separate States with 'Home Rule' legislatures of their own. Political +development has in them gone so far in a centrifugal sense that the +nation has been sadly split up and the public mind too much divided into +merely local concerns and issues.... + +"Irrespective of this baneful influence of a so-called 'Home Rule' state +of things on the life of the nation at large, I must confess that the +huckstering at the second ballots does not strike me as an ideal +institution. It generally goes, in Germany, under the name of +_Kuh-Handel_ (cow-bargain). It often brings out the worst symptoms of +intrigue and political immorality.... Those who dabble in the +_Kuh-Handel_ either lead their own contingent as allies into an enemy's +camp from spite against another adversary, or they induce their own men +to desist from voting at all at a second ballot, so as to give a chance +to another candidate, whom they really detest with all their heart, but +whom they wish to use as a means of spiting one still more +deeply hated." + +_The position of a deputy elected at a second ballot_.] + +The separate experiences, therefore, of France, Belgium, and Germany all +yield convincing and corroborative testimony to the demoralizing +influence on political life which results from the coalitions at the +second ballots. Insufficient attention, however, has been directed to +one aspect of this influence, its pernicious effect upon the inner +working of parliamentary institutions. The deputy who is elected as the +result of a coalition of forces at the second ballot finds himself in an +extremely difficult and unstable position. Instead of being the +representative of the majority of the electors he too often becomes, in +the apt phrase of M. Yves Guyot, "the prisoner of the minority," and, +whilst in Parliament, he is being continually reminded of the power of +that minority to make or unmake him at the next election. The persistent +pressure of that minority explains those contradictory votes in the +French Chamber which, to a foreigner, are often incomprehensible. The +deputy will usually act in accordance with the opinion of the group to +which he belongs and vote accordingly, but at a subsequent sitting he +will find it necessary to vote in such a way as will give satisfaction +to that minority whose support assured his success at the previous +election, and without whose support he cannot hope for re-election when +the time comes for a fresh appeal to the country. The pressure which +such a minority can exert must often be intolerable, and must, in any +case, render it impossible for any deputy either to do justice to +himself or to the legislative chamber to which he belongs.[3] + +_The alternative vote._ + +The shortcomings of the system of the second ballot are so pronounced +and are so generally recognized that there now exists but little, if +any, demand for its introduction into this country, and more attention +has therefore been given to the mechanism of the alternative vote as +affording a means of securing the object of the second ballot whilst +avoiding many of its inconveniences. Under this suggested plan the voter +is invited to mark his preferences against the names of the candidates +on the voting paper by putting the figure "1" against his first +favourite; the figure "2" against the man he next prefers, and so on +through as many names as he may choose to mark. At the end of the poll +the number of papers in which each candidate's name is marked "1" is +ascertained, and if one of them is found to have secured the first +preferences of an absolute majority of all the persons voting, he is +declared elected; but if no candidate has obtained such a majority the +papers of the candidate who has obtained the least number of first +preferences are examined and transferred one by one to the candidate +marked "2" upon them. In this transfer, the papers on which only one +preference had been marked would be ignored, the preferences, to use +the current phrase, being "exhausted." If, as the result of this +transfer, any candidate has secured the support of an absolute majority +of the number of effective preferences he is declared duly elected; but +if there is still no candidate with an absolute majority the process is +repeated by distributing the papers of the candidate who is left with +the lowest number of votes, and so on until some candidate has got an +absolute majority of effective preferences. + +The alternative vote undoubtedly possesses many and valuable advantages +as compared with the second ballot. In the first place, its introduction +into the English electoral system would keep English voters in touch +with Colonial rather than with Continental practice. Preferential +voting[4] has been in use in Queensland since 1892; it was adopted in +1907 by the West Australian Parliament, and was proposed in a Bill +submitted by Mr. Deakin to the Australian Commonwealth Parliament in +1906. Moreover, the alternative vote enables the election to be +completed in a single ballot; and the fortnight that is wasted between +the first and second ballots on the Continent would be saved. There has +also been claimed for this method of voting this further advantage, that +it would prepare the way (perhaps by rendering it inevitable) for the +more complete reform--proportional representation. + +The principle of the alternative vote is extremely simple. It is +embodied in two Bills which were introduced into the House of Commons in +1908 by Mr. John M. Robertson and by Mr. Dundas White; and also in a +modified form in a Bill introduced in 1907 by Mr. A.E. Dunn. Its purpose +and mechanism is set forth in the memorandum of Mr. Robertson's Bill as +follows:-- + +"The object is to ensure that in a parliamentary election effect shall +be given as far as possible to the wishes of the majority of electors +voting. Under the present system when there are more than two candidates +for one seat it is possible that the member elected may be chosen by a +minority of the voters. + +"The Bill proposes to allow electors to indicate on their ballot papers +to what candidate they would wish their votes to be transferred if the +candidate of their first choice is third or lower on the poll and no +candidate has an absolute majority. It thus seeks to accomplish by one +operation the effect of a second ballot." + +Mr. Robertson's Bill, as originally introduced in 1906, was applicable +to single-member constituencies only; but the amended form in which the +Bill was re-introduced provided for the use of the transferable vote in +double-member constituencies as well, but, in doing so, still maintained +the essential characteristic of the existing system of voting--that each +member returned should have obtained the support of a majority of the +electors voting. Mr. Dundas White, however, in applying the alternative +vote to double-member constituencies, made a departure from this +principle, and proposed to render it possible for a candidate to be +returned who had obtained the support of less than one-half but more +than one-third of the voters.[5] The effect of Mr. Robertson's Bill +would have been that it would still be possible in double-member +constituencies for the party finally victorious to secure both seats; +whilst with Mr. Dundas White's provisions the two largest parties would +in all probability have obtained one seat each.[6] + +The difference between the two measures is, however, of no great +consequence; the number of double-member constituencies is not very +large, and their number may be still further reduced in any future +scheme of redistribution of seats. It will, therefore, be sufficient to +consider what effect the alternative vote would have in single-member +areas. Let us take the Jarrow election, in which there were four +candidates, and apply to that election the possible working of the +alternative vote. The figures for the election may be repeated:-- + +Curran(Labour) . . . . 4,698 +Rose-limes (Unionist). . . 3,930 +Hughes (Liberal) . . . . 3,474 +O'Hanlon (Nationalist) . . 2,122 + +The electors would, with the alternative vote, have numbered the +candidates on the ballot papers in the order of their choice, and, as +none of the candidates had obtained an absolute majority, the votes of +the lowest candidate on the poll would be transferred to the second +preferences marked by his supporters. If, for purposes of illustration, +it is assumed that every one of the 2122 supporters of Mr. O'Hanlon had +indicated a second preference, that 1000 had chosen Mr. Curran, 1000 had +chosen Mr. Hughes, and 122 had chosen Mr. Rose-Innes, then the following +table will show the effect of the transfer:-- + +Candidate. First Count. Transfer of O'Hanlou's Votes. Result. + +Curran (Labour) 4,698 +1,000 5,698 +Rose-Innes (Unionist) 3,930 + 122 4,052 +Hughes (Liberal) 3,474 +1,000 4,474 +O'Hanlon (Nationalist) 2,122 -2,112 -- + + Total 14,224 -- 14,224 + +Only three candidates now remain for consideration, and their position +on the poll as the result of the transfer is as follows:-- + +Curran . . . . . . 5,698 +Hughes . . . . . . 4,474 +Rose-Innes . . . . . 4,052 + +As neither has as yet obtained a majority of the total votes polled, it +becomes necessary that the votes given for Mr. Rose-Innes, who is now +lowest on the poll, should be transferred in accordance with the next +preferences of his supporters. It is conceivable that the larger +proportion of these preferences would have been given for the Liberal +candidate, Mr. Hughes, rather than for Mr. Curran, and, if so, the final +result might easily have been the election of Mr. Hughes as member +for Jarrow. + +_The alternative or contingent vote in Queensland_.] + +Before considering the value of the transferable vote in single-member +constituencies as a means of securing a true expression of the national +will, it may perhaps be pointed out that the procedure prescribed by the +Queensland Act differs from that contained in the English Bills. The +regulations of the Queensland Act are as follows:-- + +"When one member only is to be returned at the election, if there is no +candidate who receives an absolute majority of votes, all the candidates +except those two who receive the greatest number of votes shall be +deemed defeated candidates. + +"When two members are to be returned, and there are more than four +candidates, if there is no candidate who receives an absolute majority +of votes, all the candidates except those four who receive the greatest +number of votes shall be deemed defeated candidates." + +It will be seen that the system here prescribed approximates to the +German form of the second ballot, according to which only the two +candidates highest on the poll may stand again. Were the Queensland form +of preferential voting applied to the Jarrow election, both Mr. Hughes +and Mr. O'Hanlon would be declared defeated candidates, and only the +further preferences recorded by their supporters would be taken into +account in determining the relative position of the two highest +candidates, Curran and Rose-Innes. The provisions of the West Australian +Act of 1907, and of Mr. Deakin's Bill of 1906, followed the more +elastic and undoubtedly superior method embodied in the English +proposals. + +Sir J.G. Ward, in introducing the Second Ballot Bill into the New +Zealand Parliament in 1908, defended the selection of this electoral +method on the ground that the system of preferential voting introduced +into Queensland had been a partial failure. He stated that the privilege +of marking preferences had not been extensively used, and quoted the +opinion of Mr. Kidston, a former Queensland Premier, that the marking of +preferences should be made compulsory. As explained in the course of the +New Zealand debates, part of the alleged failure of the Queensland +system was due to the unnecessarily cumbrous nature of the regulations. +The Queensland Electoral Acts still retain the old method of +voting--that of striking out from the ballot paper the names of such +candidates as the elector does not intend to vote for. The confusion +produced in the mind of the elector may readily be imagined when he is +instructed to strike out the names of candidates for whom he does not +intend to vote in the first instance, and then to mark such candidates +in the order of his choice. Moreover, the provisions, as detailed above, +for giving effect to preferences are so defective that only a proportion +of the preferences marked can be taken into account. Even so, +preferential voting in Queensland sometimes has a decisive influence +upon the result of the election, as the following example, taken from +the elections of 1908, will show:-- + +WOOLLOONGABBA ELECTION + +_First Count_. + + Votes. +1st Candidate . . . 1,605 +2nd " . . . 1,366 +3rd " . . . 788 + ----- + Total . . . 3,759 + +The votes recorded for the third candidate were then +distributed according to the preferences marked, which were as follows:-- + +1st Candidate . . . 15 +2nd ,, . . . 379 +No preferences . . . 394 + --- + 788 + +The result of the distribution brought the second candidate to the top +of the poll, the final figures being as follows:-- + +2nd Candidate . . . 1,745 +1st ,, . . . 1,620 + +_West Australia_ + +Where the more simple and straightforward instructions have been +adopted, as in West Australia, it has been found that a larger +percentage of the electors make use of the privilege of marking +preferences. Here are the figures for the constituency of Claremont in +the elections of 1908:-- + + +_First Count._ + +Foulkes . . . . 1,427 +Briggs . . . . 825 +Stuart . . . . 630 + ----- +Total . . . 2,888 + +When the votes recorded for the candidate lowest on the poll were +distributed it was found that nearly 75 per cent, of his papers were +marked with additional preferences. The numbers were as follows:-- + +Briggs . . . . . 297 +Foulkes . . . . 174 +No preferences . . . 165 + --- +Total . . . 636 + +The final figures were as follows:-- + +Foulkes . . . . 1,601 +Briggs . . . . 1,122 + +These figures doubtless show that even in West Australia, when the +transferable vote is applied to single-member constituencies, a +considerable number of the electors will not indicate a preference for +any candidate other than for that of their own party, but similar +abstentions occur at the second ballots in France, where it is found +that a considerable percentage of the electors usually refrain from +going to the poll on the second occasion. The Labour Party in Queensland +has sometimes issued instructions to its supporters to abstain from +marking preferences for the purpose of keeping the party solid and +absolutely separate from other parties. Such action necessarily +increases the percentage of abstentions. Nor can any remedy for action +of this kind be found in making the marking of preferences compulsory. +Even in Belgium, where "compulsory voting" is in force, the compulsion +only extends to an enforced attendance at the polling place. The act of +voting is not compulsory, for a blank unmarked ballot paper may be +dropped into the voting urn. The compulsory marking of preferences when +the elector has none may still further vitiate the results of elections +in a most undesirable way, whilst abstention from preference marking +merely deprives those abstaining of a privilege which they might +exercise if they chose. It is quite conceivable that an elector after +voting for the candidate of his choice may be indifferent to the fate of +the remaining candidates and, if so, an enforced expression of opinion +on his part would not be of any real value, and should not be counted in +determining the result of an election. + +_Mr. Deakin's failure to carry the alternative vote._ + +Does then the alternative, or contingent vote, as used in West +Australia, solve the problem of three-cornered fights--the problem of +three distinct parties seeking representation in Parliament? When a +single seat is being contested it is doubtless sufficient if the member +elected represents the average views of his constituents, but a General +Election based on such a system would yield results no more satisfactory +than those of the second ballots. Neither the second ballot nor the +contingent vote are acceptable after their true effects are understood, +a fact which explains the failure of Mr. Deakin's Government to carry +their Preferential Ballot Bill in 1906. Several of the seats held by the +Australian Labour Party--as in the elections of Jarrow, Colne Valley, +and Attercliffe--were won by a minority vote; the _Melbourne Age_ +published the following list of seven constituencies in Victoria where +Labour members represented only a minority of the voters:-- + + Non-Labour Labour +Constituencies. Votes. Votes + +Geelong . . . . 1,704 1,153 +Ballarat West . . . 2,038 1,034 +Jika Jika . . . . 1,366 1,183 +Williamstown . . . 1,931 1,494 +Bendigo West . . . 1,654 1,248 +Grenville . . . . 1,457 1,268 +Maryborough . . . 1,929 1,263 + + Totals . . . 12,079 8,643 + +Preferential voting would have placed these seats at the mercy of a +combination of the other parties, and, somewhat alarmed by the too eager +advocacy of the measure on the part of the _Age_, the Labour Party, +which had voted for the second reading of the Bill, procured its defeat +on the first division in committee. It is impossible to defend the +present system by which the Labour Party, which numbered two-fifths of +the voters in these seven constituencies, obtained all seven seats, but, +on the other hand, it cannot be alleged that a system of preferential +voting, which would have enabled the other parties to have deprived +these electors of all representation, was a satisfactory solution of the +difficulty. In neither case would justice be done to the claims of three +parties to representation. + +_Probable effect of the alternative vote in England._ + +A consideration of the possible results of the introduction into the +English electoral system of second ballots or the transferable vote in +single-member constituencies will show that neither reform will solve +the problem presented by the rise of a new party. It is obvious that the +Labour Party could by a combination of Conservative and Liberal voters +be deprived of representation in all constituencies save those in which +they had the support of an absolute majority of the electorate. Nor +would the conditions remain the same as they are to-day. In many +constituencies in which the Liberals have allowed a straight fight to +take place between Tariff Reform and Labour candidates, the Liberal +Party would intervene; and should combinations at the polls result in +the defeat of Labour candidates, what would be the effect upon the +temper and spirit of Labour voters who found themselves under an +"improved" voting system less able than before to secure representation +in Parliament? Would there not possibly arise a disposition on the part +of the disfranchised minority to pursue on the next occasion a wrecking +policy such as has distinguished the second ballots both in Belgium and +in France? Even apart from precipitate action which might arise as the +result of ill-feeling, the alternative vote would afford an opportunity +for a predetermined policy on the part of a minority to create +dissension between the opponents. The manipulation of the alternative +vote would be easily understood. An angry minority of electors could be +instructed beforehand to use it, as we know from experience they _have_ +used the second ballot on the Continent. Would politicians, following an +exclusive electoral policy, hesitate to avail themselves of the weapon +which the alternative vote would place in their hands for the purpose of +annihilating any section they especially disliked, in the same way as +the Liberal Party in Belgium was destroyed by Catholic and Socialist +combinations at the second ballots? We cannot escape the conclusion +which all experience yields, that both these electoral methods place +the representation of any party at the mercy of either temporary or +permanent coalitions of other parties. To an even greater degree than +under the existing régime, the result of a General Election would fail +to reflect public opinion. + +The advocates of the alternative vote assume, with but little +justification, that this method will be free from the bargainings that +have distinguished the second ballots on the Continent. The bargainings +naturally take place between the first and second ballots, because that +is the most suitable time for the striking of bargains, for the strength +of parties is definitely known. With the alternative vote such +transactions would take place before the election, upon the basis of the +probable position of parties as ascertained by the party agents. Even if +experience should show that the transferable vote did not lend itself so +easily as the second ballot to the perpetration of those bargains which +are detested by all Continental statesmen, yet it is probable that the +successful candidate would, like the deputy elected under the system of +second ballots, become "the prisoner of the minority." The figures of +the election would disclose to what extent the member returned had owed +his success to the smallest minority. This minority would be only too +conscious that it held the key of the situation, and the member would +doubtless be exposed to the same intolerable pressure as has been +brought to bear upon members of the French Chamber of Deputies. In any +case the position of the elected member would be most unsatisfactory. +Were a Labour member returned with the assistance of Tariff Reform +votes, would not the parliamentary relations between the various parties +become as embittered as when the Unified Socialist candidate at Uzès was +enabled by Reactionary votes to capture a Radical seat? What +recriminations would accompany the election of a Conservative candidate +whose victory was due to Labour votes given to him as an expression of +resentment at the action of Liberals in other constituencies? What would +be the relations between the Liberal and Labour parties if in a +constituency now represented by a Labour member, a Liberal candidate, +with the aid of Conservative votes, displaced him? These strained +relations would not only exist within the House of Commons itself, but +also and perhaps in a more pronounced form in the constituencies +themselves. Such conditions would not only invite the sarcasm of all +critics of democracy, they would produce the much more serious effect of +crippling the successful working of parliamentary institutions. + +_The alternative vote not a solution of the problem of +three-cornered contests_.] + +Neither second ballots nor preferential voting can solve the problem of +three parties seeking representation. They may preserve the outward form +of the distinguishing characteristic of the present system--that each +successful candidate should secure the support of the majority of the +electors voting--but this apparent conformity to the requirements of +majority representation is only secured at the cost of destroying the +sincerity of the parliamentary system and of rendering the composition +of the House of Commons still more unstable than it is to-day. In +England the competition of the three parties is most pronounced in the +industrial areas, and Mr. Winston Churchill, apparently recognizing the +futility of the alternative vote as a solution of the new difficulty, +had good grounds for his suggestion that electoral reformers should +concentrate their minds upon the proportional representation of the +great cities.[7] For proportional representation attacks the new problem +on entirely different lines. It provides for the realization of the +essentially democratic principle, that the various sections of +political' opinion are entitled to representation in proportion to their +respective strengths, and that such representation should be independent +of the action of other parties. Once this democratic principle is +admitted we are in view of the only effective solution of the problem of +three-cornered fights--a solution which not only solves this particular +difficulty, but meets those serious defects of our electoral system to +which attention has been directed in the two preceding chapters. "The +theory of Government by party," says Professor Nanson of Melbourne, "is +to find the popular mind by the issue of a number of contests between +the 'ins' and the 'outs.' But owing to the multiplicity of political +issues, this theory is now no more tenable than is the theory that every +question can be answered by a plain 'yes' or 'no.' ... We require a +system capable of finding the mind of the people on more than one issue. +With such a system all the difficulties caused at present by the +existence of three parties disappear. Instead of being a hindrance three +parties will be a help. For each will help to organize public opinion, +and so enable the mind of the public on important issues to be more +definitely and clearly ascertained." + + +[Footnote 1: _The Albany Review_, October 1907.] + +[Footnote 2: Reports on the Second Ballot at Elections in Foreign +Countries. Miscellaneous. No. 2. 1908. (Cd. 3875.)] + +[Footnote 2: _La Representation Proportionnelle en Belgique_, p. 7.] + +[Footnote 3: An illuminating passage occurs in M. Guyot's article on +"The French Senate and Chamber of Deputies," in _The Contemporary +Review_, February 1910:-- + +"A deputy is only elected for four years, and almost on the morrow he +becomes again a candidate. If he has been elected at the second ballot, +with a rallying of the minority of electors, who have only voted for him +as better than nothing, and who can desert him at the next elections, +his position is very uncertain. Universal suffrage results in many +constituencies in great instability, and it is threatening especially +for the men who having had power have been obliged to act, and in acting +have dispersed certain illusions which they had perhaps entertained when +candidates, and have thus given offence.... Though one be an ex-Minister +one is none the less a man. The greater number of men--not only +ex-Ministers but men who have any reputation in Parliament--have sought +to migrate from the Palais Bourbon to the Luxemburg. The result is that +the Chamber of Deputies has not ceased to suffer from a species of +inverse selection. No body could retain its vigour under such a system. +The most experienced men have left; the composition of the Chamber of +Deputies has grown steadily weaker and weaker."] + +[Footnote 4: In Australia the system is known as the contingent or +preferentinal vote. In recent years the phrase "alternative vote" has +been employed in England, and was adopted by the Royal Commission on +Electoral Systems as a means of distinguishing the use of the +transferable vote in single-member constituencies from its use in +multi-member constituencies for the purpose of securing proportional +representation.] + +[Footnote 5: The regulations as to counting the votes contained in the +Schedule to the Bill were based upon those in Lord Courtney's Municipal +Representation Bill (see Appendix VI.), the practical application of +which is described in Chapter VII.] + +[Footnote 6: Mr. Crawshay-Williams introduced a further Bill (based on +that of Mr. Robertson) in 1910. This Bill, in its final form, was made +applicable, in accordance with the recommendation of the Royal +Commissions on Electoral Systems, to single-member constituencies only.] + +[Footnote 7: Reply to deputation of Manchester Liberal Federation, 23 +May 1909.] + + + + +CHAPTER VI + +PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION + + +"Celui-ci tuera celui-là. Voilà la formula du scrutin d'arrondissement. + +"Ceux-ci tueront ceux-là. Voilà la formule du serutin de liste sans la +representation proportionnelle. + +"Ceux-ci et ceux-là auront leur juste part. Voila la formule du scrutin +de liste avec la representation proportionnelle."--J. JAURES + +It cannot be a matter for surprise that the methods of election adopted +in the early stages of representative institutions fail to respond to +the needs of the more complex political conditions of highly civilized +communities. The movement in favour of improved electoral methods is in +keeping with the advances made in all other human institutions. We no +longer travel by stage-coach nor read by rush-light. We cross the +Atlantic with a certainty and an ease unknown and undreamt of a little +while ago. Means of intercommunication, the press, the mail, the +telegraph, the telephone have developed marvellously in response to +modern requirements. This continuous adaptation is the law of existence +and, in view of modern political conditions we cannot permanently refuse +to adapt our electoral methods to the more perfect organization of a +progressive democracy. By cumulative pressure the evils set forth in the +preceding chapters can have but one result; they will compel English +statesmen, as they have compelled or are compelling Continental +statesmen, to devise an effective remedy; and although individual +politicians may resist and retard the advent of reformed methods, the +demand for better representative institutions will in the end overcome +all such resistance. + +_The essential features of a sound electoral method_.] + +What then are the requirements of a satisfactory electoral method? The +evils to be remedied must yield the clue. Our present system--exclusive +majority representation--has often, as we have seen, resulted in a gross +exaggeration of the majority, sometimes in the total suppression of the +minority; and, on other occasions, in the return of a majority of +representatives by a minority of the electors. These evils have happened +when only two parties have been seeking representation; when a third +party enters the political arena the system completely breaks down, and +all efforts to restore "majority" representation by a system of second +ballots have proved an absolute failure. The attempts made in the past +to secure the special representation of minorities, though most +successful in many respects, have been of an empirical character, and +have dealt with the problem in a very partial way. Yet it is not +difficult to find a solution for all these problems which is at the same +time satisfactory and effective. It is only necessary to return to the +first principles of democracy, to keep steadily in view the meaning of +that self-government which we desire to achieve through representative +institutions. Self-government can only be realized when every section of +the community through its own representatives can give expression to its +needs in the assembly which is representative of the nation and which +derives all its authority from the fact that it is so representative. +This assembly acts in the name of the nation; its decisions are said to +embody the national will. But if any considerable section of the nation +is deprived, from whatever cause, of representation in the House of +Commons, in what sense can it be said that its decisions give expression +to the national will? The new electoral conditions force us, willingly +or unwillingly, to the conclusion that no satisfactory solution can be +reached until effect is given to Mill's fundamental principle of +democracy--that the various sections of political opinion should be +represented in the legislative chamber in proportion to their strength. +Only in the fulfilment of that condition can we escape from the evils +of the existing system and at the same time do justice to the claims of +three organized parties to representation within the House of Commons. + +_Constituencies returning several members._ + +It is now no longer possible to accept Mill's declaration as +theoretically perfect and then to dismiss it as wholly impracticable. If +the political conditions are such that the proportionate representation +of parties is the only satisfactory solution of our electoral +difficulties, it becomes the duty of statesmen to find some way by which +practical effect can be given to Mill's formula. There was doubtless +some excuse for the cry of impracticability when, in launching in 1857 +his proposals for proportional representation, Thomas Hare suggested +that the whole kingdom should form a single constituency. This +suggestion raised a barrier of prejudice against all proposals for +proportional representation, which only to-day is being broken down, and +led to a refusal to consider seriously any attempt to secure an +amelioration of existing methods along more modest lines. Nevertheless, +it must be admitted that the first step in the direction of realizing +true representation must be the enlargement of our present electoral +areas. So long as single-member constituencies are retained elections +must necessarily take the form of a struggle for the whole of the +representation allotted to the constituency. There is but one prize--a +prize which is indivisible--and the proportional distribution of that +prize is impossible. For a system of proportional representation the +first requirement is the formation of constituencies returning several +members. These electoral areas need not be formed in an arbitrary +manner. Familiar divisions of the country, such as large towns, counties +or parts of counties, may be treated as single constituencies. Glasgow, +Manchester, Birmingham, Sheffield, Leeds would form constituencies in +themselves. Counties which are large enough to return at least five +members might also be treated as electoral areas, whilst the smallest +counties would be grouped and the larger counties, if necessary, +subdivided. + +_The proportional representation of the electors._ + +With such constituencies it would be possible to approximate to a true +representation of the electors. Birmingham, which may be taken for +purposes of illustration, returns seven members to the House of Commons, +one for each of its seven divisions. The Unionists being in a majority +in each of these seven divisions, are enabled to secure the whole of the +representation allotted to the city, although there is a large minority +of non-Unionists. If Birmingham were treated as a single constituency, +and if the electors were divided as follows: Unionists, 40,000; +Liberals, 20,000; Labour, 10,000, then it is obvious that any just +system of representation would enable the Unionists, Liberal and Labour +electors to obtain four, two, and one members respectively. Birmingham +would then be represented accurately and fairly within the House of +Commons; and if each large area was so represented we should, in this +way, be able to build up a House of Commons which would reflect in true +proportions the political opinions of the country. The undoubted +fairness of such a system of representation will appeal with even more +force if consideration is given to the grounds on which seven +representatives are now allotted to a town of the size of Birmingham. +Did Birmingham contain only 40,000 electors, all of whom were Unionists, +it would only be entitled to four representatives in Parliament. The +presence of a large number of electors who are not Unionists brings, +however, the total electorate to 70,000, and Birmingham is granted +representation on the basis of this total. Thus the additional +representation, granted because of the presence of a large minority of +non-Unionist electors, takes the form of additional Unionist members. +The minority under the present system is not only disfranchised but +penalised; the representation which is due to them is given to their +opponents. + +But it is not difficult to devise a scheme of proportional +representation which should ensure that the electors of Birmingham and +other large towns, and also of the various counties, should be truly +represented within the House of Commons. Of this fact the recent +history of electoral legislation on the Continent and in the Colonies +furnishes incontrovertible proofs. Proportional representation has been +embodied in the laws of several countries, and these laws work with +perfect smoothness. + +_Experience in Denmark._ + +The first application of the principle took place in Denmark so long ago +as 1855, two years before the publication of Mr. Hare's scheme, when M. +Andrae, a Danish Minister of great eminence and ability, introduced it +into the new Constitution promulgated in that year. The system of +proportional representation was retained through the constitutional +changes of 1863 and 1866, though, it should be added, the extent of its +application was limited to the election of members of the Upper House. +The citizens of each constituency, voting in two classes, choose by the +ordinary method of voting an equal number of representatives. These +representatives constitute an electoral college, the members of which +proceed to the election of representatives of the constituency according +to the method of proportional representation. This limited application +of proportional representation still remains in force, and in recent +years the principle has received further and increasing recognition. +Parliamentary committees and committees of the municipalities of +Copenhagen are chosen by a proportional method. The principle was +applied in 1903 to the elections of the Congregational councils, but its +most notable extension was effected in 1908, when the system was applied +to all municipal elections, the first elections taking place in +March 1909. + +_Switzerland_ + +It will be seen that even in Denmark there was a considerable lapse of +time between the limited application adopted in 1855 and its extension +to elections of a more popular kind in recent years; and outside +Denmark, although societies advocating the new principles were founded +in England, France, Belgium, and Switzerland, proportional +representation did not succeed in finding its way very readily to the +statute book. It was not until 1890 that the first step was taken which +has resulted in so rapid an extension of the system. The evils arising +from the majority method of election had become so acute in the Swiss +canton of Ticino[1] that proportional representation was adopted as a +means of pacification. The elections in March 1889 resulted in the +return of seventy-seven Conservative deputies by 12,783 votes, whilst +the Liberals, with 12,166 votes, were only able to obtain thirty-five +representatives. The Liberals alleged that this unfair result was due to +a gerrymandering of the constituencies, and demanded a revision of the +Constitution. The Conservative Government declining to take the +necessary steps for this purpose, a revolution broke out in Bellinzona, +in the course of which one of the members of the Government was killed +and his colleagues arrested and imprisoned. The Federal Council +intervened and sent its representative, Colonel Künzli, who recommended +the adoption of proportional representation. After some hesitancy the +party leaders agreed, and the Cantonal Council passed a law (5 December +1890), providing for the election by a system of proportional +representation of a Constituent Assembly for the purpose of revising the +Constitution. The suspicions of the Liberals were not, however, fully +allayed and, thinking that they were again being duped, they decided on +the eve of the election of the Assembly to abstain. This decision was +adhered to, and as a result the first assembly in Ticino elected under +the proportional system consisted of Conservatives only. The +Conservatives remained faithful to the agreement entered into with the +Liberals and voted the law of 9 February 1891, introducing proportional +representation into the cantonal constitution and applying it to the +elections for the Cantonal Council, Constituent Assemblies and +municipalities. The law was approved by popular vote in the following +March, and the system has since retained its place in the constitution +of the canton[2]. The immediate object in view--the pacification of the +canton--was completely attained and its success has led to its adoption +in other cantons. It is now in force in Neuchâtel, Geneva, Solothurn, +Zug, Schwyz, Bâle City, Lucerne and St. Gall, and also (for municipal +elections) in Berne, Fribourg, and Valais, whilst there is an active and +growing demand for its application to the Federal elections. The +progress of public opinion in this respect has been tested by means of +the Referendum in 1900 and 1910. On the first occasion 169,000 voters +supported the extension to Federal elections, and 247,000 opposed it. In +1910 the number of voters in favour of the proposal had increased by +70,000, while the opposition had increased by only 15,000, and the +adoption of proportional representation for Federal elections was +defeated by the narrow margin of 23,000 votes in a total poll of half a +million. At the same time twelve out of the twenty-two cantons approved +of the extension, and it is generally agreed that the ultimate triumph +of the proportional principle cannot long be delayed. + +The need for proportional representation was particularly felt in the +canton of Geneva, where religious differences often form the dividing +line between parties. The canton is divided into three constituencies; +one for the town of Geneva, one for that part of the canton on the right +bank, and one for that on the left bank of the Lake and of the Rhone. +With the _scrutin de liste_ (the former method of election) the minority +in each constituency was completely crushed. The Protestants of the +right bank were deprived of all representation; the Catholics of the +town obtained a few deputies as an act of grace on the part of the +majority. In 1872, when the affairs of the Catholic church were being +discussed, the Radicals and Independents succeeded in excluding from the +Council all who were most directly affected by the question of the day. +The proportional system was introduced in 1892, and as the election of +members of the Federal Council was still conducted according to the old +system the working of the two methods could be readily compared. "The +elections for the cantonal councils in November 1892," wrote M. Naville, +"were keenly fought, but calm; no recriminations followed, and political +life pursued a normal course.... On the other hand, the Federal +elections in October 1893 were riotous, blows being exchanged. Exclusive +majority representation artificially creates disturbances.... +Proportional representation introduces a pacifying element into all +political struggles." + +_Belgium._ + +The introduction of a complete scheme of proportional representation +into Belgium was also rendered necessary by the intolerable position +arising from the former methods of election. The rapid growth of the +Socialist Party with a distinct organization created a situation which, +as already explained, was in no way relieved by the system of second +ballots in force. Indeed, the coalitions at the second ballots not only +discredited the system but greatly embittered the relations between the +various parties. "In 1899," says Count Goblet d'Alviella, "Belgium was +on the eve of a revolution--a revolution which was only avoided by the +immediate and complete introduction of proportional representation into +parliamentary elections." This, however, was not the first trial of +proportional representation in Belgium, for Belgium, like Switzerland, +affords an example of the gradual but certain extension of the new +method of election. In 1894 proportional representation had been applied +partially and tentatively to the larger municipal councils, and although +this application was of a partial character it achieved a considerable +measure of success. M. Braun, the Burgomaster of Ghent, speaking in May +1899, described its results in the following terms:-- + +"During the four years that proportional representation has been applied +to the communal elections of Ghent, every one has been able to +appreciate the happy effects of the reform. Everybody recognizes that, +far from being endangered, the material prosperity of the city has +increased, and that the ameliorating and pacifying effects of the +altered electoral method have even exceeded the expectations and hopes +of its advocates." [3] + +The system of proportional representation adopted for the parliamentary +elections was much more complete, and so great has been its success that +there has arisen a strong demand for its introduction into the elections +for the provincial councils in which the old majority system, with +second ballots, is still used. The parliamentary elections in May 1908 +were followed by the provincial elections in the ensuing month, and thus +a favourable opportunity was presented of contrasting the working of the +two systems. The grossly unfair results of the provincial elections drew +forth from many journals most caustic criticism. _Le Peuple_ expressed +the hope that these provincial elections would be the last instance of +the use of the majority system in Belgium. "Is it not," it proceeded, +"absurd, stupid, detestable that the provincial councils are alone +excluded from the system of proportional representation? Once for all we +must have done with this jumble of confusion, dishonesty, and +corruption." The _Etoile Belge_ declared that "One thing is certain, the +provincial electoral system can no longer be maintained without exposing +us to the laughter of Europe. To apply one system of proportional +representation to the parliamentary elections, another to municipal +elections, and to maintain the majority system for the provincial +elections, is really too absurd. For once we agree with _Le Peuple_ and +join our hopes and wishes to theirs." That these comments were fully +justified a few examples will show. In the province of Limbourg the +forty-eight seats on the provincial council were all obtained by the +Catholics, whereas in the parliamentary elections of the previous month +the Liberals, owing to the proportional system, were able to obtain two +seats out of six. In the "Agglomération Bruxelloise" no Catholic and +only five Socialists were elected, although the Liberals numbered but a +few more than a third of the voters. The provincial elections of former +years afford further illustration. In 1898 at Ghent the Liberals of the +first canton defeated the Socialists at the second ballots with the help +of the Catholics, in the second canton they defeated the Catholics with +the help of the Socialists, while in the third canton they were +themselves defeated by the Catholics, who were assisted by the +Socialists. In the same year at Brussels, where a second ballot took +place in each of the five cantons, the Liberal minority captured every +one of the forty-four seats. Sir Arthur Hardinge pointed out in his +Report on the working of the Second Ballots in Belgium, that it was the +failure of this electoral method that rendered a proportional system in +parliamentary elections an absolute necessity; its failure in the +provincial elections will result in its abolition from these also. No +more convincing evidence of the satisfactory working of the proportional +system can be given than this demand for its extension, the latest +example of which in Belgium is its application by a new law passed in +1909 to the election of the _Conseils de Prud'hommes._ + +_German States._ + +Whilst the adoption of proportional representation in Switzerland and in +Belgium was due to the pressure of particular circumstances, the marked +success of the new method has not only resulted in its extension in +those countries, it has also had a pronounced influence upon public +opinion in neighbouring countries. The kingdoms of Southern Germany are +following the example of the Swiss cantons. Würtemberg, in the new +constitution adopted in 1906, decided that the seats set free by the +removal of the "privileged" members of the Lower House should be filled +by proportional representation. Legislative proposals have since been +discussed in Saxony, and in May 1910 a vigorous debate took place in the +Bavarian Parliament, in the course of which Dr. Müller declared that the +advocates of the reform would not rest "until this unjust electoral +system, this bulwark of short-sighted injustice and ill-omened party +spirit, is set aside in the higher interests of justice and of civil and +religious freedom." The principle has received a recognition even more +general in character, for a ministerial decree issued in June 1901, +relative to the associated committees of employers and workmen, enabled +these bodies, if they so chose, to elect their members in accordance +with the principle of proportional representation. Some sixteen towns, +including Frankfort-On-Main, Munich, Carlsruhe, Fribourg, Mannheim, &c., +availed themselves of the privilege, and the results have been most +satisfactory. Much greater interest has been taken in the elections. In +Carlsruhe, for instance, the number of voters increased from 1103 in +1897 to 3546 in 1903. + +_France_ + +Similarly, the great success of the Belgian legislation gave birth to a +fresh and more powerful movement in France. Founded in 1901, under the +presidency of M. Yves Guyot, the _Ligue pour la Représentation +Proportionnelle_ enlisted the support of deputies drawn from all +political parties. The Electoral Reform group within the Chamber of +Deputies during the Parliament 1906-10 consisted of over two hundred +members, and, under the auspices of this group large and enthusiastic +meetings were held in the great towns. The reform has the support of +many leading newspapers, and the authoritative reports of the French +Parliamentary Committee, _la Commission du Suffrage Universel_, contain +strong recommendations in favour of the adoption of proportional +representation. The first of these reports prepared in 1905 by M. Chas. +Benoist[4] contains an admirable statement of the case for the reform, +a plea which is powerfully reinforced in the report prepared two years +later by M. Etienne Flandin.[5] The Bill recommended in this latter +report was discussed in the French Chamber of Deputies in October 1909. +The first clause of the Bill read as follows: "The members of the +Chamber of Deputies shall be elected by the _scrutin de liste_ according +to the rules for proportional representation." The first portion of this +clause--the members of the Chamber of Deputies shall be elected by +_scrutin de liste_--was carried by 379 votes against 142, or a majority +of 237. The second portion--according to the rules for proportional +representation--was carried by 281 votes to 235, or a majority of 46. +The Prime Minister, M. Briand, urged by many of his Radical supporters, +who were unwilling to forego the advantages which they obtained from the +existing system, then made the question one of confidence in the +Government, and the whole clause, when put to the final vote, was +defeated by 291 votes to 225. A noteworthy feature of these divisions +was the size of the majority by which the system of single-member +constituencies was condemned. At the General Election in April 1910 no +fewer than 315 Deputies were returned pledged to the reform. M. Briand +at once introduced a Bill which, however, did not fully meet the demands +of the reformers, and the _Commission du Suffrage Universel_ made +important modifications in it with a view to securing more completely +the proportional representation of all political parties within the +country. On the fall of M. Briand in February 1911, the government of M. +Monis announced its intention of supporting the amended scheme. The +success of the movement, commenced in 1901 is now, after a decade of +active effort, no longer open to doubt. + +_Holland_ + +Holland, too, has felt the influence of the legislation of its +neighbour. A constitutional commission, appointed by the Dutch +Government, reported in favour of amending the fundamental law so as to +render possible the adoption of proportional representation. The +recommendations of this Commission were embodied by the Government in +Bills presented to the States General in 1907, and although the +proposals were subsequently withdrawn, the reform has the support of +many of the leading statesmen, and a favourable report is anticipated +from the new Commission to which the question of reform has +been referred. + +_Finland._ + +In the North of Europe an equally successful and, in some respects, an +independent movement in favour of true representation has taken place. +In an excellent little pamphlet, published at Helsingfors,[6] it is +stated that during those calamitous years between the _coup d'état_ of +1899 and the restoration of the constitution in 1906, there arose in +Finland the conviction that only a democratic reform of its political +institutions would afford a sufficient guarantee for the maintenance of +its internal independence. The fruits of that conviction were seen in +the draft of the new constitution for the Diet prepared by a committee +appointed by the Finnish Government. Provision was made for the adoption +both of universal suffrage and proportional representation. The report +adds that the four Estates of the Diet, satisfied that proportional +representation would ensure the just representation of all parties, +willingly accepted the proposals for universal suffrage, and also agreed +that henceforth the Diet should consist of but one chamber. Finland thus +found herself, when the new constitution was granted, in the possession +of an electoral system as democratic as any in the world.[7] + +_Sweden._ + +In Sweden a long and arduous struggle took place over the reform of the +franchise. The Liberals and Socialists demanded that less weight should +be given to the possession of property. The Conservatives resisted the +demand. The adoption of proportional representation as a possible way +out was proposed in 1902, and from that date the fight assumed another +aspect. "The method of voting," wrote Major von Heidenstam, part author +of the proposals embodied in the new law, "took from the beginning a +very prominent place, strange to say the most prominent down to the last +few months before the chief battle. We who went in for proportional +representation had a very hard struggle for the first five years, but we +won at last." The victory was complete; proportional representation was +accepted for both Chambers of the Riksdag, for the committees selected +by these Chambers, for County Councils and for Town Councils. When the +final adoption of the reform Bills was voted in 1909 they were carried +by very large majorities; in the first Chamber only 19 out of 141, and +in the second Chamber only 53 out of 225, recorded an adverse vote.[8] + +_Australasia._ + +In this remarkable outburst in favour of proportional representation +English-speaking countries are taking their part. Inspired by the late +Catherine Helen Spence, an untiring advocate of the reform, the +Effective Voting League has carried on an active campaign in +Australasia. Legislative proposals for proportional representation have +been discussed in recent years by the Commonwealth Parliament, and also +by the Parliaments of Victoria, South Australia and West Australia. +Although these measures have not become law, the work of Miss Spence and +her colleagues has gained considerable support. Mr. Deakin has openly +acknowledged his approval, whilst the results of recent elections, and +more particularly that of the election in 1910 for the Commonwealth +Senate, have increased the demand for reform. Proportional +representation, too, is meeting with increasing sympathy in New Zealand +where the system of second ballots, adopted in 1908, has failed to give +satisfaction. In Tasmania the movement has made much greater headway. An +Act was passed in 1896 applying proportional representation to the urban +districts of Hobart and Launceston, but although this Act was an +acknowledged success so far as the representation of these two towns +were concerned, the differentiation between the voting methods applied +to the town and country districts gave rise to dissatisfaction, and the +measure was withdrawn in 1901. But when once the benefits of +proportional representation had been felt its re-introduction in a more +complete form was not long delayed. In 1907 a new Act was passed +applying equally to town or country. The State is now divided into five +electoral districts, and the six members allotted to each district are +elected by the proportional method. The first elections under the new +law took place in April 1909, and the result has met with +general approval. + +_South Africa._ + +In South Africa proportional representation has, with astonishing +rapidity, gained the adherence of its foremost public men, and although +the delegates to the South African National Convention abandoned the +proposal for the use of the proportional method in the elections to the +legislative Assembly of United South Africa, yet the adoption of this +principle for the election of members of the Senate and of the +committees of the Provincial Councils, as finally agreed to, marks an +advance which a few years ago would have been thought impossible. Nor is +this the only forward step taken in South Africa. The Transvaal +Municipal Commission recommended the adoption of proportional +representation in municipal elections, and the Government embodied this +recommendation in an Act passed in June 1909. The first elections under +this Act took place with complete success on 27 October 1909, in +Johannesburg and Pretoria, each of these towns being polled as a single +constituency. + +_Canada._ + +In Canada, although the movement has not taken so active a form as +elsewhere, the Government consented in March 1909, on the motion of Mr. +F.D. Monk, K.C., to the appointment of a committee of the House of +Commons for the purpose of investigating methods of proportional +representation. Further, the Trades and Labour Congress, the chief +organization of this kind in Canada, the Toronto District Labour +Council, and the Winnipeg District Trades Council, employ the +proportional method in the election of their committees. + +_Oregon._ + +In the fight for the more popular control of politics in the United +States proportional representation will apparently play no mean part. +The object of the People's Power League of Oregon is to free the +representative assemblies of the State from the domination of political +bosses, and an amendment to the constitution, providing for the adoption +of proportional representation was, on the initiative of this League, +submitted to the electorate in 1908 and carried with a large majority. +The Oregon Legislature, which met in January 1909, was bitterly opposed +to the change, and refused to pass the Representation Bill which was +required to give effect to the decision of the electorate. A new +proportional representation amendment, which was self-enactive, was +submitted to the popular vote in November 1910, in conjunction with +other proposed constitutional changes, but failed to meet with approval +owing to the unpopularity of the measures with which it was combined, +the most striking of which was a six-year term for the legislature. +There may be a long struggle for supremacy between the "machine" and the +reformers, but in that revival of interest which is being taken +throughout the United States in the conduct and working of +representative institutions it can be confidently predicted that the +reform of the existing methods of election will take a prominent place. + +_The United Kingdom._ + +In the United Kingdom the Proportional Representation Society, founded +in 1884, was revived in 1905, and since its revival has secured the +adherence of a considerable number of members of Parliament. The Royal +Commission on Electoral Systems, appointed in December 1908, was the +outcome of its activity and, although this Commission did not recommend +the immediate application of proportional representation to the House +of Commons, its Report marks a very considerable advance in the history +of the movement in this country.[9] The Commission reported that there +would be much to be said in favour of proportional representation as a +method for the constitution of an elective Second Chamber, and intimated +its approval of this method of election for municipalities. The views +taken by the Commission in respect of an elective Second Chamber and +municipalities have found expression elsewhere. The Select Committee on +the Reform of the House of Lords, presided over by Lord Rosebery, +recommended that the election of Lords of Parliament to represent the +hereditary Peerage should be by the cumulative vote or any other scheme +of proportionate election,[10] and since this Report was issued all +proposals for the introduction of an elected element into the House of +Lords have recognized the need for an adequate representation of +minorities.[11] The Municipal Representation Bill, introduced by Lord +Courtney of Penwith, was passed by the House of Lords in 1908 after +careful examination by a select Committee of that House, whilst a +motion, moved by Mr. Aneurin Williams, on 30 March 1910, in the House of +Commons, in favour of applying the system to municipal elections was +carried without opposition. + +_The success of proportional representation in practice._ + +The movement in favour of more accurate methods of election is becoming +world-wide in its scope, and the brief summary[12] already given of the +progress made in recent years furnishes in itself abundant proof of the +practicability of proportional representation. In every country in which +the new methods have been introduced fears were expressed that it would +be impossible for the average elector to fulfil the new duties required +of him, and that returning officers would collapse under the weight of +their new responsibilities. The same apprehension still exists in +England, and it may therefore be desirable to refer in greater detail to +the experience of those countries in which the new methods have been put +to the test of popular elections. Nowhere do we find that the new +systems of voting have presented any serious difficulty to the electors, +and although the task imposed upon the returning officers has been in +some cases unnecessarily severe, yet they have not only carried out +their new duties with credit, but have made the introduction of the new +system a brilliant success. After the first elections in Geneva, in +November 1892, the journal _Le Génevois_, which had fought desperately +against the introduction of the reform, stated that the counting of the +votes had been quickly and correctly carried out. "We readily +acknowledge," it added, "that in this matter we were greatly deceived." +"From the point of view of practicability," wrote the _Journal de +Genève_, "the new system has been a brilliant success." _La Suisse_ +declared that the outstanding triumph of the day was proportional +voting. The first elections in the canton of Bale-town were equally +successful. "The elections," said the late Professor Hagenbach-Bischoff, +"took place on 26 June 1905; the polling places were open till 2 P.M., +the counting was finished at 7 P.M., so that the newspapers were able to +publish the results the same evening. Everything went off well, and the +journals have acknowledged the great success of proportional +representation." + +Six General Elections have taken place in Belgium since the law of 1899, +and now no one in the country speaks of the impracticability of +proportional representation. Count Goblet d'Alviella states that "all +the objections that were brought against the system before its +introduction have been set at naught. The proportional method instead of +complicating, as was foretold, both the voting and the counting, has +worked with greater ease than the old one. The electors understood at +once what they were to do, and the counters made fewer mistakes than +before." Wurtemberg furnishes another instance of the ease with which +the new system can be introduced. _Der Beobachter_, a leading journal of +Stuttgart, stated that: "The new electoral system, which only a short +time ago was unknown to the electors, worked without a hitch in the +whole country, just as it worked a few weeks ago in Stuttgart. The first +feeling is one of surprise. The number of votes was enormous; the +candidates were numerous, the ballot papers from the different districts +were in various forms, and yet the whole machine, from the district +officials to the employees of the Government office, who collected the +results, worked with promptitude and ease. The next feeling is one of +pleasure at the complete success of this first experiment in +proportional representation on a large scale in the German Empire." + +The success of the first elections in Finland, in which more than half +the voters exercised the franchise for the first time, was equally +complete. According to the account of a Finnish journalist[13]: "The +first election under the new system took place on 15 and 16 March 1907. +The total electorate amounts to some 1,300,000 people, or 47 per cent, +of the whole population. Of these about 887,000, or nearly 64 per cent., +polled. In the more thickly-populated electoral divisions the percentage +was much higher: thus, in the Nyland division, which comprises +Helsingfors, it was 74.2 per cent.; in several polling districts as many +as 95 and even 98 per cent, came to the polling station. The often-used +argument against proportional representation, that the system is too +involved to be understood by the average voter, was in Finland +completely refuted. The number of spoilt ballot papers in the whole +country probably is less than 1 per cent.; in the Nyland division, the +largest of all, returning twenty-three members, the ballot paper +contained ninety-five candidates, and yet only 0.59 per cent, were +spoilt." Small as this number is, the official returns for the +succeeding elections show a still smaller percentage. In November 1910 +the number of spoilt papers throughout the country amounted to .25 per +cent, of the whole. The first elections in Sweden were equally +successful. There was only one spoilt paper in the elections witnessed +by the author at Carlskrona in May 1910. + +Nor have English-speaking peoples shown themselves less able to adapt +themselves to new voting methods. An official report presented by the +chief returning officer of Tasmania to the Senate of the Australian +Commonwealth[14] contains convincing evidence as to the practicability +of the single transferable vote for the purpose of parliamentary +elections. The report deals with the election of members of the +Commonwealth Senate and House of Representatives in 1901 by means of the +single transferable vote. For this purpose the State of Tasmania was +treated as a single constituency. The percentage of spoilt papers due to +the new system of voting was 1.44 in the Senate elections and 1.80 in +the election of the House of Representatives, but the returning officer +adds that "this would have been much less had it not been that the old +defective system previously in force in Tasmania required the actual +scoring out of every rejected candidate instead of, as in most +countries, the marking of a cross or sign only against those candidates +who were selected. Had this better form of marking been in practice in +Tasmania previous to the introduction of the Hare system of voting, it +is probable that there would be very few invalid papers due to the Hare +system of marking with preference numbers." Professor Jethro Brown, in +describing these first elections, states that "the work of the +returning officer, whilst less simple than that of the elector, demands +no exceptional qualifications; he need display the industry of an +average clerk--scarcely more."[15] The more recent elections in +Tasmania, those of 1909, were carried out with equal ease. The +percentage of spoilt ballot papers due to all causes was 2.86, and this +percentage compared favourably with the number of spoilt papers in the +election of 1906, in which the majority system of voting was used.[16] + +The Transvaal municipal elections also afford excellent evidence of the +ease with which the new system of voting can be introduced. Most of the +electors made their first acquaintance with the system during the +electoral campaign. In Pretoria the number of spoilt papers due to all +causes amounted to 38 out of a total of 2852, or 1.33 per cent., while +the number of spoilt papers which could be attributed to the new system +was only 27, or less than 1 per cent. The percentage of spoilt papers at +Johannesburg was larger, but it must be remembered that the electorate +in this town is perhaps as cosmopolitan as any in the world. At some of +the public meetings addresses were given in English, Dutch, and Yiddish, +and the task of instructing the electors in their new duties was +considerably more difficult than in a more homogeneous constituency. +Nevertheless the number of spoilt papers due to all causes was only 367 +out of a total number of 12,155, or 3 per cent., whilst the number of +spoilt papers attributable to the new system was 285, or 2.35 per cent. +Moreover, the returning officer was very strict in his decisions as to +the validity of papers, so that the number of spoilt papers attributable +to the new system included all those in which voters had in any way +departed from the letter of the instructions. The press bore striking +testimony to the success of the elections. The _Transvaal Leader_ +declared that "the consensus of competent opinion is that the system is +a perfect success, considered as electoral machinery.... The municipal +elections have demonstrated that every section can secure that amount of +representation which it can justly claim." The _Rand Daily Mail_ +expressed the view that "...Both here, and in Pretoria, it may claim to +have proved a success. The ten councillors elected under it here may +fairly claim to be representative of every shade of public opinion.... +We should like to see it extended to all municipalities, and ultimately +to parliamentary elections." The _Johannesburg Star_ stated that "The +authors may fairly congratulate themselves that they have proved it +practicable in working and fair in results. The business of counting the +votes and allotting the preferences was sure to be a slow one at the +first time of asking, but there was no hesitation and no confusion. The +proceedings in the Wanderer's Hall went forward with the steady +certainty of clockwork.... The whole trial was a high one in a town like +this with a considerable element of illiterate voters; but taking it all +through we have no hesitation in saying that the working of the new +system was a conspicuous and unqualified success." + +_An election by miners_.] + +After such a mass of testimony as to the satisfactory working of +proportional methods in parliamentary elections, it is perhaps hardly +necessary to refer to the success of those model elections carried out +from time to time by the Proportional Representation Society in +England.[17] Yet it may be as well to recall the novel and entirely +successful experiment, organized in 1885, by Mr. Albert Grey, M.P. (now +Earl Grey, Governor-General of Canada). "Mr. Grey," according to the +account in _The Times_[18], "was returning officer, and was assisted in +the count by thirty miners--a body of utterly untrained men whose hands, +accustomed by daily usage to the contact of pickaxe and shovel, were new +and strange to the somewhat delicate task of fingering and separating +flimsy ballot papers. They had received no instructions before they were +assembled in the room as to the duties they would be required to +transact, and the expedition, good-humour, and correctness with which +they got through the several stages of the count justly earned for them +the admiration of those who had come from a distance, as well as the +compliment which Mr. Grey deservedly paid them at the conclusion of the +day's proceedings." On this occasion some 6645 papers were counted, the +number of spoilt votes being 44, considerably less than 1 per cent. The +election is of interest as the members of Northumberland Miners' +Association have ever since that date used the transferable vote in the +election of their agents. + +To demonstrate the practicability of proportional representation does +not, however, dispose of all of the objections which have been urged +against the system, but before dealing with these objections it will +perhaps be useful to outline those schemes which have emerged so +successfully from the test of popular elections. These methods, although +they vary in detail, range themselves under two heads--the single +transferable vote and the system of lists. The first of these +systems--the single transferable vote--bases representation upon +electors who may, if they so desire, group themselves into parties, +whereas the list systems base representation upon parties as such. And +as the single transferable vote, in basing representation upon electors +follows English traditions, we will begin with the consideration of +this system. + + +[Footnote 1: The story of the introduction of proportional +representation into the Canton of Ticino is told in full by Professor +Galland in _La Démocratie Tessinoise et la Représentation +Proportionnelle_ (Grenoble, 1909).] + +[Footnote 2: The application was extended in 1892, 1895, and 1898 to the +election of the Executive Council, of jurors and of Communal Councils. +In 1904, however, when the Liberals were in a majority, a change was +made in the election of the Executive Council. The proportional system, +which had given them only three seats out of five, was replaced (for the +election of Executive Councils) by the limited vote. Under the new +system, which is less favourable to the minority, the Liberals obtained +four out of five seats.] + +[Footnote 3: Goblet d'Alviella, _La Représentation Proportionnelle en +Belgique_, p. 92.] + +[Footnote 4: No. 2376, _Chambre des Députés, Huitième Législature_, +1905.] + +[Footnote 5: No. 883, _Chambre des Deputes, Neuvième Legislature_, 1907. +(See App. X.)] + +[Footnote 6: _The Finnish Reform Bill of_ 1906. The new method of voting +is described in Appendix IV.] + +[Footnote 7: The Russian Duma has since passed a law (1910) by which the +powers the Finnish Diet have been considerably curtailed.] + +[Footnote 8: The Swedish system is described in Appendix III.] + +[Footnote 9: Report of Royal Commission on Electoral Systems, 1910 (Cd. +5163).] + +[Footnote 10: House of Lords Report, 1908 (234), par. 18.] + +[Footnote 11: In the article, "Two Chambers or One," in _The Quarterly +Review,_ July 1910, the writer recommends that elected members, if +introduced into the House of Lords, should be chosen in large +constituencies by a system of proportional representation. Professor +Ramsay Muir in _Peers and Bureaucrats_ advocates the formation of a new +Upper House, wholly elected under a proportional system.] + +[Footnote 12: This summary is necessarily incomplete; the list of +countries is continually lengthening. Uruguay has adopted a form of +minority representation (1910); Lisbon and Oporto, under the electoral +scheme of the new Portuguese government, will choose representatives by +a proportional system (1911); a new movement, under the leadership of +Prince Teano, has arisen in Italy.] + +[Footnote 13: _The Daily Chronicle_ 1 June 1907.] + +[Footnote 14: Reprinted in Report on Municipal Representation Bill, +House of Lords, 1907 (132), p. 125.] + +[Footnote 15: _The New Democracy_, p. 47.] + +[Footnote 16: The percentage in the Federal Senate election of 1906 was +4.48; in the election of the House of Representatives, 3.94. A full +report on the General Election of 30 April 1909 has been published by +the Tasmanian Government--Tasmania, 1909, No. 34.] + +[Footnote 17: See Chapter VII.] + +[Footnote 18: _The Times_, 26 January 1885.] + + + + +CHAPTER VII + +THE SINGLE TRANSFERABLE VOTE + + +"The law regulating the form of voting may be thus expressed. Every vote +shall be given on a document setting forth the name of the candidate for +whom it is given; and if the vote be intended, in the events provided +for by this Act, to be transferred to any other candidate, or +candidates, then the names of such other candidate, or candidates, must +be added in numerical order."--Thomas Hare, _The Election of +Representatives_ (Fourth edition, 1873) + +The single transferable vote was the distinguishing characteristic of +the scheme of electoral reform proposed by Hare in 1857, but it was +associated with the proposal to treat the whole kingdom as a single +constituency. The later advocates of this new method of voting have +recommended its application to constituencies of more moderate size, +such as counties and large towns, and in this form the system has found +a more ready acceptance and has been used with success in parliamentary +elections. + +_Its present application_.] + +The first application of the single transferable vote took place in +Denmark[1] in 1855, and it is still being used under the Constitution of +1867 in the election of members of the Danish Upper House. It is also +used, as provided by the South Africa Act of 1909, in the elections of +the Senate of the United Parliament and in the election of the Executive +Committees of the Provincial Councils. In each of these cases the +electorates are small, and the electors possess special qualifications. +The Danish Upper House is elected in two stages, the transferable vote +being used only in the final stage in which electors of the second +degree alone take part. In South Africa the members of the first Senate +were elected by members of the local parliaments of the several +Colonies,[2] and the Executive Committees of the Provincial Councils by +members of the Councils. The system has, however, been subjected to the +test of popular parliamentary elections in Tasmania and of municipal +elections in Pretoria and Johannesburg. + +Ever since the publication of Hare's scheme, proposals for proportional +representation have been associated in English-speaking countries with +the idea of a transferable vote. Hare's proposals were warmly endorsed +by John Stuart Mill first in _Representative Government_, and again in a +memorable speech delivered in the House of Commons on 30 May 1867, when +he moved an amendment to the Electoral Reform Bill.[3] Mill's amendment +was defeated, but he retained to the full his faith in the great value +and need of the improved method of voting, as the following passage from +his _Autobiography_ shows: "This great discovery," said he, "for it is +no less, in the political art, inspired me, as I believe it has inspired +all thoughtful persons who have adopted it, with new and more sanguine +hopes respecting the prospects of human Society, by freeing the form of +political institutions towards which the whole civilized world is +manifestly and irresistibly tending from the chief part of what seemed +to qualify and render doubtful its ultimate benefits. ... I can +understand that persons, otherwise intelligent, should, for want of +sufficient examination, be repelled from Mr. Hare's plan by what they +think the complex nature of its machinery. But any one who does not feel +the want which the scheme is intended to supply; any one who throws it +over as a mere theoretical subtlety or crochet, tending to no valuable +purpose and unworthy of the attention of practical men, may be +pronounced an incompetent statesman, unequal to the politics of the +future."[4] + +_An English movement_.] + +The English advocates of proportional representation who have succeeded +Mill have equally favoured the single transferable vote. This system was +embodied in the Bill introduced into the House of Commons in 1872 by Mr. +Walter Morrison, Mr. Auberon Herbert, Mr. Henry Fawcett, and Mr. Thomas +Hughes; it was advocated in the important debates which took place in +the House of Commons in 1878 and 1879; and the Proportional +Representation Society, founded in 1884 in view of the Electoral Reform +Bill of that year, created, under the leadership of Sir John Lubbock and +Mr. Leonard Courtney, a strong movement in its favour. Owing to the +agreement between the leaders of the Liberal and Conservative parties in +favour of single-member constituencies this movement had no immediate +result. Since its revival in 1905 the Proportional Representation +Society has continued to press the claims of the single transferable +vote, and with some success. The practicability of the system was +admitted by the Select Committee of the House of Lords appointed to +examine the Municipal Representation Bill introduced into that House by +Lord Courtney in 1907; the model elections organized by the Society in +1906, 1908, and 1910,[5] have to some extent familiarized the British +public with its details; it found, as already mentioned, a place in the +South African Constitution of 1909, whilst the Royal Commission on +Electoral Systems reported in 1910 that "of schemes for producing +proportional representation we think that the transferable vote would +have the best chance of ultimate acceptance." + +_The system in brief_.] + +What then is the single transferable vote, and how does it help to +secure a true representation of the electors? Its mechanism and +advantages will best be understood by a comparison with the existing +system. The city of Birmingham is at present divided into seven +single-member constituencies, with the result that the majority in each +of these constituencies secures a representative, while the minority in +each case is unrepresented. Suppose there were in Birmingham 40,000 +Unionist, 20,000 Liberal, and 10,000 Labour voters: it might easily +happen that the Unionists would be in a majority in each of the seven +divisions and, if so, the 40,000 Unionist electors would obtain the +seven seats and the remaining 30,000 voters none. The transferable vote, +as will presently appear, would enable these 70,000 citizens to group +themselves into seven sections of equal size, each returning one member, +so that there would be four Unionist groups returning four members, two +Liberal groups returning two members and one Labour group returning one +member; and this is the ideal representation of such a community. + +_Large constituencies_.] + +In order to achieve this result several changes in electoral mechanism +are required. In the first place, Birmingham, instead of being divided +into seven constituencies, must be polled as one constituency, otherwise +the necessary grouping could not take place. This change is not in +itself sufficient, because if Birmingham were polled as one constituency +electing seven members, and if each elector could give, as with the +"block" vote, one vote apiece to seven candidates, then the seven +nominees of the majority would all receive a higher number of votes than +the seven nominees of the minority. In the numerical case cited above, +each Unionist candidate would command 40,000 votes, each Liberal 20,000, +and each Labour candidate 10,000, and the largest party would win all +the seats. + +_The single vote_.] + +It is therefore necessary, however many may be the number of members to +be elected, to limit the voting power of each elector to one vote--hence +the name "the single vote." An obvious result of this limitation is that +if a group numbering 10,000 electors concentrates its support upon one +man, then the group is certain of returning that candidate, because not +more than six equally large groups can be formed out of the remaining +electors. With open voting the grouping of electors could be arranged +with comparative ease, for if more electors than were sufficient to +constitute his group desired to vote for a particular candidate, those +who arrived late at the poll could be asked to give their votes to +another candidate, and so help to build up another group of the +requisite size. Or, if a candidate was receiving so little support that +he had no chance of election, the small group that had gathered round +him could be disbanded and these electors, instead of having their votes +wasted, could make their selection from among the other candidates +available. In this way seven groups could be formed, each of which would +obtain a representative.[6] + +_The vote made transferable_.] + +As, however, the ballot is secret and the result of the voting is not +known until the close of the poll, some provision must be made to +facilitate the equal grouping of the electors upon which fair +representation depends. This will be made clear by an example. Were Mr. +Joseph Chamberlain one of the Unionist candidates for Birmingham, the +group of voters who would record their votes for him would probably +considerably exceed the number required for his election. His Unionist +colleagues might, in consequence, find themselves left without adequate +support, and the party might fail to secure its fair share of the +representation. In order to prevent a mischance of this kind the very +simple device has been adopted of making the vote transferable. By this +means the necessary accuracy in grouping is secured automatically. + +_How votes are transferred_.] + +The transferable vote enables the elector to instruct the returning +officer to whom his vote is to be transferred in the event of his first +favourite _either_ receiving more support than he requires _or_ +receiving so little as to have no chance of election. Continuing the +example already given, an elector who desired to vote for Mr. +Chamberlain would place on the ballot paper the figure 1 against his +name. If, in addition, he placed the figures 2, 3, &c. against the names +of other candidates in the order of his choice, these figures would +instruct the returning officer, in the event of Mr. Chamberlain +obtaining more votes than were necessary to secure his election, as to +whom the vote was to be transferred. The votes given to Mr. Chamberlain +in excess of the number required for his election would thus be rendered +effective. They would be used and not wasted. If, on the other hand, an +elector had recorded his vote for a candidate who, after all excess +votes had been transferred, was found to be at the bottom of the poll, +the returning officer would similarly give effect to the wishes of the +elector as recorded on the ballot paper by transferring the vote to the +elector's second choice. Again the vote would not be wasted, but would +be used in building up a group sufficiently large to merit +representation. + +The ideas which have led up to the single transferable vote are, +therefore, of a simple character. Constituencies returning several +members are formed. A representative is given to every group of +electors which attains to a definite proportion of the whole, the +proportion depending upon the number of members to be returned. If a +candidate receives more votes than are sufficient, _i.e._ if too large a +group is formed, the surplus votes are transferred. If, after all +surplus votes have been transferred, there still remain more candidates +than there are vacancies, the lowest candidate on the poll is eliminated +from the contest, _i.e._ the smallest group is disbanded. The transfer +of surplus votes and of votes recorded for the candidates lowest on the +poll are all carried out in accordance with the wishes of the electors +as indicated by them on the ballot paper at the time of the poll. The +proportionate representation of all the electors is secured; each party +obtains the number of members to which it is entitled. + +_The Quota._ + +A few questions will at once occur to the reader as to the application +of these simple rules. How is the number of votes required for success +to be determined? In what way are the surplus votes to be distributed? +What is the order in which the elimination of unsuccessful candidates +shall proceed? The number of votes necessary to secure the election of a +candidate is called the "quota." At first sight it would seem that this +number should be ascertained, as suggested in the preceding paragraphs, +by dividing the number of votes by the number of vacancies. But a +smaller proportion is sufficient. Thus, in a single-member constituency +a candidate has no need to poll all the votes; it is evident that if he +polls more than a half he must be elected. No other candidate can equal +him; the quota in this case is, therefore, one more than a half. So, in +a two-member constituency the quota is one more than a third, for not +more than two candidates can poll so much; in a three-member +constituency, one more than a fourth, and so on. In a seven-member +constituency, like that of Birmingham, the quota would be one more than +an eighth. In general terms the quota is ascertained by dividing the +votes polled by one more than the number of seats to be filled and +adding one to the result.[7] + +_A simple case._ + +The processes involved in distributing the votes are described at some +length in the account which appears further on in this chapter of the +model election organized by the Proportional Representation Society in +1908, but the method of transferring votes and deciding the result of an +election may be more easily understood from a simple case. Let us +imagine there are six candidates for three seats, of whom A, B, C belong +to one party and X, Y, Z to another. On the conclusion of the poll the +ballot papers would be sorted into heaps, or files, corresponding to the +names against which the figure I had been marked, and in this way the +number of votes recorded for each candidate would be ascertained. Let +us assume that the result of the sorting is as follows:-- + + A is marked 1 upon 1801 papers, and therefore has 1801 votes + B " 1 " 350 " " 350 " + C " 1 " 300 " " 300 " + X " 1 " 820 " " 820 " + Y " 1 " 500 " " 500 " + Z " 1 " 229 " " 229 " + ---- ---- +Total number of papers 4000 Total number of Votes 4000 + +As there are three seats the quota is one more than a fourth of the +total of the votes polled. The total in this case is 4000, and the quota +is therefore 1001. + +A, having obtained more than the necessary quota of votes, is declared +elected. + +_The transfer of surplus votes._ + +It will be seen that A has obtained nearly two quotas of votes, and his +supporters, in the absence of any provision for the use of his surplus +votes, would not obtain the full share of representation to which they +are entitled. The next step is therefore to transfer A's surplus votes +in accordance with the wishes of his supporters. These have indicated on +the ballot papers to whom they desire their vote to be transferred. The +different methods in which the transfer of votes can be carried out will +be described, but for the present it may be assumed that the result of +the operation was to transfer: + +648 of the 800 surplus votes to B (a member of the same party as A) +132 " 800 " C (also a member of A's party) + 20 " 800 " Z + +The votes transferred to the several candidates are added to those +already obtained by them as follows:-- + + Original Votes. Transferred Votes. Total. +B 350 + 648 = 998 +C 300 + 132 = 432 +X 820 nil = 820 +Y 500 nil = 500 +Z 229 + 20 = 249 + +_The elimination of the lowest unelected candidate_.] + +Had any candidate, as a result of the transfer of A's surplus votes, +been raised above the quota he would have been declared elected and his +surplus distributed in the manner just described. In this case no +candidate, as the result of the transfer, has obtained the quota, and +there are, therefore, no further surplus votes to distribute. There are, +however, two vacancies still remaining unfilled, and the next operation +is to distribute the voting papers of Z, who, being the lowest on the +poll, is clearly out of the running. Z's papers are sorted, as in the +previous process, according to the candidates who are marked by the +voters as their next preferences, and it may be supposed that the result +is as follows:-- + +B is marked as next preference on 20 papers +X " " 200 " +Y " " 29 " + +These papers are then added to the heaps of the respective candidates, +B, X, and Y, and, with these additions, the votes credited to each +candidate may be shown thus:-- + + Previous Transfer of + Total. Z's Votes. Total. +B 998 + 20 = 1018 +C 432 + nil. = 432 +X 820 + 200 = 1020 +Y 500 + 29 = 529 + +Since B and X, as a result of the distribution, each obtain a quota of +votes, they are declared elected, and all the vacant seats now being +filled, the election is at an end. + +_The result._ + +The candidates elected, A, B, and X, each represent a "quota" of voters. +Each considerable section of the constituency is thus able to choose a +representative, whilst the party to whom both A and B belong return two +members, these candidates taken together having secured the support of +two quotas of voters. The voters who failed to secure a representative, +namely the supporters of C and Y, number less than a quota. + +_Different methods of transferring surplus votes.--The Hare +Method_.] + +There are several methods by which surplus votes may be transferred. In +the case imagined the simplest way to distribute A's surplus votes is +to take the 800 papers last filed and to sort these papers according to +the second preferences indicated thereon. This method, which was +recommended by the advocates of proportional representation in the +movement of 1884-85, is based upon that contained in Mr. Hare's +proposals. It has, however, been objected that if some other 800 voting +papers are taken the result may be different, and that in this way an +element of chance is introduced. This objection is considered in detail +in Appendix VI., and it will be sufficient to state here that, when +large numbers of votes are dealt with and the papers are well mixed, +this element of chance is negligible. But small as it is it can be +eliminated by adopting more accurate methods of transferring the votes. + +_The Hare-Clark method_ + +One of these more accurate methods was embodied in the Tasmanian Act of +1896, and also in the Municipal Representation Bill approved by the +Select Committee of the House of Lords in 1907. It is known as the +Hare-Clark system, its inception being due to Mr. Justice Clark, of +Tasmania. With this method the surplus votes of any successful candidate +are transferred to the unelected candidates in such a way that each +unelected candidate marked as the voter's next preference on the +successful candidate's papers receives a proportionate share of the +surplus. Continuing with the illustration already given, the returning +officer, instead of taking from A's heap the 800 papers last filed, +takes the whole of A's heap and sorts all these papers according to the +next preferences. Assume that the result is as follows:-- + +B is marked 2 on..... .................. ..1296 papers +C " 2 on......... .............. .. 264 " +Z " 2 on............. .......... .. 40 " + +Total papers showing second preferences .. 1600 + +Papers on which no further preferences are shown ...201 + +Total of A's papers.................... ...1801 + +In this case there are 800 surplus votes, whilst there are in all 1600 +papers on which next preferences have been marked. It is therefore clear +that each of the candidates B, C, Z is entitled to receive one-half the +papers on which his name has been marked as the next preference. Each of +the three bundles of papers showing next preferences for B, C, Z are +divided into two portions. One portion is transferred to the next +preference, the other is retained for the purpose of constituting A's +quota, in which is included the papers on which A's name is +alone marked. + +The complete operation is shown below:-- + + Candidate indicated as Number Number of Number of + next Preference. of next Papers Transferred Papers + Preferences. to the next Retained for + Preference. A's Quota. + +B 1290 648 648 +C 264 132 132 +Z 40 20 20 + ---- --- --- +Total of next preferences 1600 800 800 + +Papers showing no +further preference 201 -- 201 + ---- --- ---- + +Totals 1801 800 1001 + +In this way each of the candidates B, C, and Z obtains in strict +proportion that share of A's surplus to which he is entitled, and, so +far as this operation is concerned, the element of chance is wholly +eliminated.[8] + +The papers selected for transfer, however, are those last filed in the +process of sorting, and should it become necessary to transfer these +papers a second time there would enter in this further distribution an +element of chance which, as explained in the Appendix already referred +to, is so trifling as to have no practical effect upon the result unless +the number of electors is small as compared with the number of members +to be elected. + +_The Gregory Method._ + +A third method, in which the element of chance is eliminated from every +transfer, has been embodied in the Tasmanian Act of 1907. Whenever it is +necessary to transfer surplus votes, the whole of the successful +candidate's papers on which preferences are marked are transferred, but +at a reduced value. In the example given the whole of A's papers on +which next preferences had been marked for B, C, and Z would be carried +forward to those candidates, but each paper would be transferred at the +value of one-half, the remaining portion of the value of each paper +having been used for the purpose of electing A. This method is known as +the fractional, or Gregory, method of transfer, having been first +suggested by Mr. J. B. Gregory of Melbourne, in 1880. The regulations +for the conduct of elections contained in the Tasmanian Act are given in +Appendix VIII. + +The committee which investigated the working of this system as applied +to the Tasmanian General Election of 1909, made a very valuable +comparison between the rules contained in the Municipal Representation +Bill[9] and the more exact rules of the Tasmanian Act. A fresh scrutiny, +based on the rules of the Municipal Representation Bill, was made of all +the ballot papers used in that election. It was found that in each +district the same candidates were excluded in the same order and the +same candidates returned as at the actual election. The same results +would, therefore, have been attained and much labour saved if the rules +of the Municipal Representation Bill had been used. This committee, +however, in view of the fact that the more exact method had already been +established in Tasmania, and that the ascertainment of the results only +involved an expenditure of a few hours more time, and that there were +no data available to show the frequency of close contests in which a +small change in the distribution of votes might possibly affect the +result, recommended that no change should be made in the law. Still it +would seem that the rules of the Municipal Representation Bill are +sufficiently exact for all practical purposes except where the number of +electors is small. The fractional transfer is of course the most perfect +from the mathematical point of view, but the Royal Commission on +Electoral Systems, after a careful examination of its working, report +that "we agree with the Proportional Representation Society in regarding +the additional labour involved as greater than it is worth."[10] + +Where the number of electors is small, however, it is not only desirable +to carry out the transfers with the exactness prescribed by the +Tasmanian rules, but in important elections, such as those of the +Senators in South Africa, it is desirable to introduce a further +modification. In transferring the votes in ordinary elections fractions +of votes are ignored, because such fractions do not affect the result. +Where, however, there are only a few electors such fractions may become +important, and, for this reason, the regulations (see Appendix IX.) +adopted by the South African Government for the election of Senators +provided that each ballot paper should be treated as of the value of +100, or, in other words, that fractions should be taken into account as +far as two places of decimals. The application of these regulations +presented no difficulty; the counting of the votes in each of the four +Colonies proceeded without the slightest hitch. + +_The Gove or Dobbs Method._ + +The methods of transfer hitherto described all enable the voter to +maintain complete power over the disposal his vote. It has, however, +been suggested that the candidate for whom the vote is recorded should +have the privilege of deciding to whom it should be transferred. The +suggestion was first made by Mr. Archibald E. Dobbs, who, in 1872, in a +pamphlet entitled _General Representation_, made the proposal that +before the date of the election each candidate should publish a schedule +of the names of any of the other candidates to whom he desired his vote +to be transferred. This method of transfer by schedule is usually known +as the "Gove" method, and was contained in the Bill submitted by Mr. W. +H. Gove to the Legislature of Massachusetts, in 1891. Section 7 of this +Bill reads as follows: "Votes shall be transferred according to the +request of the candidate for whom they were originally cast to a person +named in the list furnished by said candidate before the date of the +election." With this method the elector in recording his vote for any +one candidate would have no independent power of indicating to whom the +vote should be transferred, and Mr. Dobbs, in a later pamphlet[11] has +suggested that the elector should be given the option of accepting the +schedule of preferences published by the candidate, or of indicating his +own. Mr. Dobbs thus gets rid of the compulsory acceptance of a schedule +of preferences, a proposal to which most English-speaking electors would +have an instinctive dislike. But even to an optional schedule certain +objections remain. The system has lost in simplicity, and the order of +the candidates in the particular schedules would be determined in most +cases by the party organizations. + +The _transferability_ of votes is the connecting link between all these +systems; it is the essential feature upon which depends the +proportionate representation of the contending parties, and the mode of +transfer is properly regarded as a matter upon which different views may +be held. As regards the second and third systems of transfer outlined +above--which so far are the only ones which have been put into +practice--experience confirms the theoretical conclusions of +mathematicians that, save in the case of small electorates, both methods +yield the same result. The second method was that used by the +Proportional Representation Society for the purpose of its model +elections, and is now applied in the election of Municipal Councils in +Johannesburg and Pretoria. A description of the Model Election of 1908 +will serve to illustrate the various processes involved in the sorting +and counting of votes. + +_The model election of 1908._ + +In this election it was assumed that the voters in a constituency +returning five members were asked to make their choice among twelve +candidates. These candidates were all well-known political men, and were +chosen with an attempt at impartiality from the Liberal, the Unionist, +and the Independent Labour parties. As no Irish newspaper was publishing +the ballot paper, no Nationalist was included.[12] This ballot paper, a +copy of which appears on page 147, was sent, accompanied by a short +explanatory article, for publication to, and appeared in, the following +newspapers: _The Times, The Morning Post, The Spectator, The Nation, The +Daily News, The Financial News, The Manchester Guardian, The Yorkshire +Post, The Yorkshire Daily Observer, The Western Morning News, The +Western Daily Mercury, The Glasgow Herald, The Dundee Advertiser, The +Woolwich Pioneer_, and _The Labour Leader_. Readers of the newspapers +were asked to cut out the ballot paper, mark it and return it to Caxton +Hall by the first post on the morning of Tuesday, 1 December 1908. +Ballot papers were also circulated independently among members of the +Proportional Representation Society and their friends. About 18,000 +papers were returned by newspaper readers, and about 3700 by members of +the Society and their friends. In all a constituency of 21,690 electors +was formed, a number whose votes were enough, but not too many, for +counting in a single evening. + + +PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION ELECTION, 1908 + +BALLOT PAPER + +PLEASE VOTE + +In this Illustrative Election FIVE members are to be elected for a +single constituency, such as Leeds. The following TWELVE Candidates are +supposed to have been nominated. + +Order of + Preference. Names of Candidates + +........... ASQUITH, The Rt. Hon. H. H. + +........... BALFOUR, The Rt. Hon. A. J. + +........... BURT, The Rt. Hon. Thomas + +........... CECIL, Lord Hugh + +........... HENDERSON, Arthur + +........... JONES, Leif + +........... JOYNSON-HICKS, W. + +........... LLOYD GEORGE, The Rt. Hon. D. + +........... LONG, The Rt. Hon. Walter H. + +........... MACDONALD, J. Ramsay + +........... SHACKLETON, David + +........... SMITH, F.E. + + +INSTRUCTIONS TO VOTERS + +A. _Each Elector has one vote_, and one vote only. + +B. _The Elector votes_ + +(a) By placing the figure 1 opposite the name of the candidate _he likes +best_. + +He is also invited to place + +(b) The figure 2 opposite the name of his _second choice, + +(c) The figure 3 opposite the name of his _third choice_, and so on, +numbering as many candidates as he pleases in the order of his +preference. + +_N.B._--The vote will be spoilt if the figure 1 is placed opposite the +name of more than one candidate. + + * * * * * + +This Ballot Paper should be filled in and returned not later than +_Tuesday_, first post, 1 _December_ 1908, in open envelope (halfpenny +stamp), addressed to + +THE RT. HON. LORD AVEBURY, Caxton Hall, Westminster, S.W. + + +_The counting of the votes. General Arrangements_. + +The votes were counted at the Caxton Hall, Westminster, on the evening +of Thursday, 3 December. Unfortunately, it was not found possible for +all the newspapers to reproduce the ballot paper in its exact +dimensions, and the unevenness in the sizes of the papers, which would +not occur in a real election, caused some trouble to the counters. The +method on which the room was arranged may best be gathered from the plan +shown on next page. + +[Illustration: ILLUSTRATIVE ELECTION, DECEMBER 3RD, 1908 PLAN OF ROOM] + +In the centre of the room was the sorting table, where the votes were in +imagination discharged from the ballot boxes. At this table were +stationed a number of helpers, chiefly Post Office sorters, who through +Mr. G. H. Stuart, of the Postmen's Federation, and Mr. A. Jones, of the +Fawcett Association, had kindly volunteered their services. Here also +were a dozen sets of pigeon-holes, each set having twelve compartments, +and each compartment being labelled with the name of a candidate. As +soon as the count began, the sorters started sorting the ballot papers +according to the names marked 1, placing in each candidate's compartment +the papers in which his name was so marked, and setting aside spoilt or +doubtful papers. Printed instructions to the sorters had been +issued, thus:-- + +1. Sort the ballot papers according to the names marked 1. + +2. Place spoiled or doubtful papers on top of the case (right-hand +side). + +As the papers were sorted the two assistants supervising these processes +took them to the small tables (checking and counting tables) ranged on +either side of the sorting table. These tables were appropriated to the +various candidates, and when it was expected that a candidate would poll +a large number of votes--_e.g.,_ in the cases of Mr. Asquith and Mr. +Balfour--several tables were allotted to him. At each of these tables +sat two counters who acted in accordance with the following +instructions:-- + +1. Count the papers into bundles of fifty. + +2. See that the figure 1 appears against the name of the candidate whose +papers are being counted. + +3. Place mis-sorts at the side of the table. + +4. Count each bundle twice. + +5. Place on the top of each bundle a coloured slip bearing the +candidate's name (already printed). + +6. Note the final bundle with the number of papers therein contained. + +The counters thus checked the accuracy of the sorters' work, and +labelled the bundles of each candidate's votes with a card of a +distinctive colour bearing his name. These bundles of votes were then +taken to the returning officer's table, where there awaited them a row +of twelve deep, three-sided open boxes, each labelled with the name of a +candidate. The returning officer's assistants at this table made up the +bundles of 50 into parcels of 500, and ascertained the total number of +votes for each candidate, carefully keeping each candidate's papers in +his own allotted box. + +Lastly, the results as ascertained were shown on large blackboards. If +and whenever any doubt arose as to the validity of a vote, it was taken +to the returning officer by the supervisors and adjudicated upon by him. +The accuracy of the sorting may be judged by the fact that when the 9043 +votes attributed to Mr. Asquith on the first count were subsequently +analyzed, it was found that only one paper was wrongly placed to his +credit, a Liberal vote which should have gone first to Mr. Lloyd George. + +As to these arrangements, one suggestion may be made for the guidance of +future returning officers: it was found in practice that the work at the +returning officer's table was too heavy for the two assistants to keep +pace with the rapidity with which the votes were sorted and counted. Two +assistants are required for the purpose of keeping a record of the +various processes; two others for receiving and distributing the +ballot papers. + +_The first count._ + +The first duty of the returning officer, as already explained, was to +ascertain the total number of votes polled by each candidate, each +ballot paper being a vote for the candidate marked 1 thereon. This was +a simple task, which took about an hour and a quarter, and yielded the +following result:-- + +Asquith (Liberal) 9,042 +Balfour (Unionist) 4,478 +Lloyd George (Liberal) 2,751 +Macdonald (Labour) 2,124 +Henderson (Labour) 1,038 +Long (Unionist) 672 +Hugh Cecil (Unionist Free Trader) 460 +Shackleton (Labour) 398 +Burt (Liberal) 260 +Leif Jones (Liberal) 191 +Smith (Unionist) 164 +Joynson-Hicks (Unionist) 94 + ------ + Total 21,672 + +_The Quota._ + +It will be seen that, with this method of election, the general result, +showing the relative strength of the parties, can be quickly +ascertained, but, some time elapses before the definitive result, with +the names of all the successful candidates, can be published. The first +step necessary in determining which candidates were successful was to +ascertain the _quota_, and this, in accordance with the rule above +stated,[13] was found by dividing the total number of votes by six and +adding one to the result. The number was found to be 3613, and the table +given above shows that on the first count Mr. Asquith and Mr. Balfour +had each polled more than a quota of votes. Both these candidates were, +in accordance with the rules, declared elected, and, as some +misapprehension prevails on this point, it should be stated that the +order of seniority of members elected under this system would be +determined by the order in which they were declared elected. In this +case Mr. Asquith and Mr. Balfour would be the senior members in the +order named. + +_The transfer of surplus votes._ + +The peculiar feature of the single transferable vote now came into play. +Both Mr. Asquith and Mr. Balfour had polled more votes than were +sufficient to ensure their election, and in order that these excess +votes should not be wasted and a result produced such as that already +shown to be possible where the votes are not transferable, it was the +duty of the returning officer to transfer these surplus votes, and in +doing so to carry out strictly the wishes of the electors as indicated +on their ballot papers. + +The largest surplus, that of Mr. Asquith, was first dealt with, and the +transfer of votes, as already mentioned, was effected in accordance with +the provisions of Lord Courtney's Municipal Representation Bill. All the +votes recorded for Mr. Asquith were re-examined, all the ballot papers +contained in his box being taken to the central table and re-sorted +according to the next available preferences indicated by the electors. +For this purpose the names of the elected candidates were removed from +their former pigeon-holes, and one of the compartments vacated was +marked "exhausted" and used as a receptacle for those papers which +contained no available next preference. The instructions to +sorters were:-- + +1. Sort the ballot papers according to the highest available preference. + +2. When no further preference is indicated, place the ballot paper in +the compartment marked "exhausted." + +The term "next available preferences" needs definition. As a rule the +next preference was the candidate marked with the figure 2; but if any +supporter of Mr. Asquith had indicated Mr. Balfour (already elected) as +his second choice, then the elector's third choice became the "next +available preference." The papers for each next preference were made +into bundles of 50, but, instead of a coloured card with the name of the +candidate, a white "transfer" card was placed with each bundle. The +transfer card was marked with the name of the candidate whose papers +were being re-sorted and also with the name of the candidate who had +been indicated as the next available preference. The instructions +issued to the counters were as follows:-- + +_(a)_1. Check the sorting of the papers, _i.e.,_ see that the candidate +whose papers are being counted is the highest available preference. + +2. Place mis-sorts at the side of the table. + +_(b)_ 1. Count the papers into bundles of fifty. + +2. Count each bundle twice. + +3. Place on the top of each bundle a "transfer card" showing from and to +whom the votes are being transferred. + +4. Note each bundle with the number of papers therein contained. + +These bundles were placed in a second series of open boxes on the +returning officer's table, each box being labelled with the name of a +candidate and being smaller in size than the boxes containing the first +preferences. The number of next available preferences for each candidate +was then ascertained. It was, of course, not the duty of the returning +officer to transfer all the re-sorted papers; it was necessary to retain +a "quota" for Mr. Asquith; and an operation which requires some care now +took place. The papers contained in each of the second series of boxes +were divided into two portions, bearing in each case the same proportion +to one another. One portion was transferred to the candidate who had +been indicated as the next preference, and the other was placed in Mr. +Asquith's box, the portions reserved for him constituting his quota; the +actual papers transferred to each next preference were those last placed +in the box bearing his name. The details of this process are set forth +in the table overleaf. + + +PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION ELECTION, 1908 + +TRANSFER SHEET + +Distribution of the Rt. Hon. H. H. ASQUITH's surplus. + +Surplus Votes 5429 + +No. of Papers showing a next preference 9009 + + Surplus 5429 +Proportion to be transferred = ------------------------- = ---- + Total of next preferences 9009 + + Column Headings: + A. Names of Candidates indicated as next preference. + I. No. of papers on which Candidate is marked as next preference. + II. No. of Votes transferred to next preference. (Fractions ignored.) + III. No. of Votes retained for Mr. Asquith's Quota. + +A. I. II. III. + +Balfour, The Rt. Hon. A. J. -- -- -- +Burt, The Rt, Hon. Thomas 468 282 186 +Cecil, Lord Hugh 132 79 53 +Henderson, Arthur 261 157 104 +Jones, Leif 176 106 70 +Joynson-Hicks, W. 17 10 7 +Lloyd George, The Rt. Hon. D. 7,807 4,704 3,103 +Long, The Rt. Hon. Walter H. 46 27 19 +Madonald, J. Ramsay 51 30 21 +Shackleton, David 35 21 14 +Smith, F. B. 16 9 7 + ----- ----- ----- +Total of next preferences 9,009 5,425 3,584 + +Preferences exhausted . . 33 -- 33 + ----- ----- ----- +Total 9,042 5,425 3,617[14] + +This table needs, perhaps, a further word of explanation. The first +column shows the result of the re-sorting of Mr. Asquith's papers, Mr. +Burt having been indicated as the next preference on 468 papers, Lord +Hugh Cecil on 132 papers, and so on. The papers for each next preference +were, as already staked, divided into two portions, and the second and +third columns show the result of this division. The division is carried +out in a strictly proportional manner, according to the following +principle. If 5429 surplus votes are to be transferred from a total of +9009 unexhausted voting papers, what portion should be transferred from +468, from 132, and so on. The proper numbers, which are given in the +second column, are found by a simple rule of three process; each of the +numbers in the second column is obtained from the corresponding number +in the first column by multiplying by the fraction 5429/9009, that being +the fraction which represents the proportion of unexhausted papers to be +transferred. The figures in column III., which are the votes retained in +each case to make up Mr. Asquith's quota, are obtained by subtracting +the corresponding numbers in column II. from those in column I. Ten +separate calculations were thus necessary, and for this part of the +election it is desirable that the returning officer should have two +assistants who are accustomed to figures. These should check one +another's work. In Belgium the returning officer is assisted by two +"professional calculators." + +The ballot papers with the votes constituting Mr. Asquith's quota were +replaced in his original box and never touched again. The ballot papers +transferred were placed in each case on the top of the papers already +contained in the box of the candidate to whom the transfer was made. + +As the result of the transfer of Mr. Asquith's surplus it was found that +the total of Mr. Lloyd George's votes amounted to 7455, and as this +number exceeded the quota, Mr. Lloyd George was declared elected, he +being the third member chosen. Mr. Balfour's surplus was then +distributed in a similar manner. The number of votes transferred is +shown in the result sheet, pp. 160-61. As Mr. Lloyd George's total +exceeded the quota, it was also necessary to dispose of his surplus. In +the latter case only the papers transferred to Mr. Lloyd George, and not +his original votes, were re-examined, as his surplus consisted of votes +originally given to Mr. Asquith. + +The poll now stood:-- + +Asquith (Liberal) 3,613 \ +Balfour (Unionist) 3,613 > Elected +Lloyd George (Liberal) 3,613 / +Macdonald (Labour) 2,387 +Henderson (Labour) 2,032 +Burt (Liberal) 1,793 +L. Jones (Liberal) 1,396 +Long (Unionist) 1,282 +Cecil (Unionist Free Trade) 822 +Shackleton (Labour) 683 +Smith (Unionist) 258 +Joynson-Hicks (Unionist) 167 + +Votes lost through neglect of fractions 13 + +It will readily be seen that these transfers have been in accordance +with what might have been assumed to be the general political +preferences of the electors. The Liberal surplus votes from Mr. Asquith +naturally went on chiefly to Mr. Lloyd George, and the overflow from Mr. +Lloyd George, after filling up his quota, went on to Mr. Burt and Mr. +Leif Jones, whose positions were greatly improved in consequence, though +neither obtained the quota. At the same time a formidable addition of +834 votes was given to Mr. Henderson, the votes doubtless of Liberal +sympathisers with Labour; and Lord Hugh Cecil received 88 votes, +presumably from moderate Liberals who lay chief stress on Free Trade. On +the other hand, Mr. Balfour's smaller Unionist surplus was divided +mainly between Mr. Walter Long, who received 526 additional votes, and +Lord Hugh Cecil, who received 195. + +_The elimination of unsuccessful candidates_.] + +After the transfer of all surplus votes had been completed, the work of +the returning officer again became very simple. Three members only had +been elected, two more were required, and there remained in the running +nine candidates, none of whom obtained a quota of votes. Another process +now began, namely the elimination of candidates at the bottom of the +poll, beginning with the lowest and working upwards. The group of +electors who have recorded their votes for the candidate lowest on the +poll are evidently not sufficiently numerous to have a direct +representative of their own. The process of elimination allows these +electors to re-combine with other groups until they become part of a +body large enough to be so entitled. The supporters of the lowest +candidate are treated as being asked (and answering, if they care to do +so, by their next preferences) the question: "The candidate of your +first choice having no chance of election, to whom now of the candidates +still in the running do you prefer your vote to go?" By this process, +first the two candidates, Mr. Smith and Mr. Joynson-Hicks, who at this +stage were at the bottom of the poll and whose combined votes were less +than those of the third lowest candidate, were eliminated and their +votes transferred to the next preferences of their supporters. No one +was elected as a result of this operation, and accordingly the votes of +Mr. Shackleton and Lord Hugh Cecil, now lowest on the poll, were +transferred in the order named. + +These and all other eliminations were of the same character. _All_ the +papers of the eliminated candidates which showed an available next +preference were transferred, and no calculations such as were required +in the case of the transfer of surplus votes were needed. It will be +sufficient if the details of one process--the transfer of Mr. +Shackleton's votes--are given; for the details of all other similar +transfers the full table on pp. 160-61 should be consulted. The votes of +Mr. Shackleton were disposed of as follows:-- + +TRANSFER OF MR. SHACKLETON'S VOTES + +Names of Candidates Number of Papers +indicated as next for each next +preference. preference. + +Burt 89 +Cecil 18 +Henderson 233 +Jones 57 +Long 8 +Macdonald 252 + +Preferences +exhausted 45 + --- +Total 702 + +The transfers of the votes both of Mr. Shackleton and of Lord Hugh +Cecil were completed, but still no fresh candidate had the quota, and +Mr. Lief Jones's 1500 votes came next for distribution. These 1500 votes +might have been expected to go to Mr. Burt, the sole remaining unelected +Liberal, who had already 2025 votes, and make his election practically +secure. But here came a surprise; Mr. Leif Jones's supporters (who had, +of course, in most instances, come to him from Mr. Asquith and Mr. Lloyd +George) had in some cases marked no further preferences, so that their +votes were no longer transferable, and in many other cases had marked +Mr. Henderson or Mr. Macdonald as their next preference; thus at the +conclusion of this operation the result of the election was +still doubtful. + +Two places had still to be filled, and the poll stood:-- + +Asquith (Liberal) 3,613 \ +Balfour (Unionist) 3,613 > Elected +Lloyd George (Liberal) 3,613 / +Macdonald (Labour) 2,851 +Henderson (Labour) 2,829 +Burt (Liberal) 2,683 +Long (Unionist) 2,035 + +Mr. Long's votes had now to be distributed; the majority of his +supporters were Unionists who had not marked any preference for either +of the two remaining Labour candidates or for the remaining Liberal +candidate, and their votes consequently were not capable of being +transferred. But some 370 of Mr. Long's supporters had shown a +preference for Mr. Burt (presumably as being reckoned not so Socialistic +as his competitors) as against some 27 for Mr. Macdonald and 80 for Mr. +Henderson, so that the poll stood:-- + +Asquith (Liberal) 3,613 \ +Balfour (Unionist) 3,613 > Elected +Lloyd George (Liberal) 3,613 / +Burt (Liberal) 3,053 +Macdonald (Labour) 2,938 +Henderson (Labour) 2,910 + +Mr. Henderson, being at the bottom of the poll, was then eliminated, +but it was unnecessary to proceed with the transfer of his votes as, +after his elimination, there were only five candidates remaining, and +five was the number of members to be elected. The work of the returning +officer was at an end, the following candidates being elected:-- + +Asquith (Liberal) +Bafour (Unionist) +Lloyd George (Liberal) +Burt (Liberal) +Macdonald (Labour) + +The whole process of the election is shown by the returning officers' +full result sheet. + +_The fairness of the result._ + +The fairness of this method of voting is at once apparent. Each group of +electors as large as a quota secured a representative. The Liberals were +in a very large majority, and with the block system and probably with +the single-member system would have nominated five candidates and have +obtained all five seats. In this election the two smaller groups, the +Unionist and Labour parties, each returned one member. The voters did +not, in recording their preferences, restrict themselves to candidates +of one party, but nevertheless, it will be of interest to compare the +seats gained with the strength of parties as indicated by the first +preferences. The party vote disclosed in the first count was as +follows:-- + + Votes polled. +Liberal 12,244 +Unionist 6,868 +Labour 3,660 + ------ +Total 21,672 + +The quota was 3613, and these totals show that the + +Liberals obtained 3 quotas with 1405 votes over and gained 3 seats. +Unionists obtained 1 quota with 2265 votes over and gained 1 seat. +Labour obtained 1 quota less 53 votes and gained 1 seat. + +PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION ELECTION, 1908--RESULT SHEET + +No. of Votes,--21,672. + +No. of Seats--5. + +Quota = (21,672/6) + 1 = 3613 + +Col 1: First Count +Col 2: Transfer of surplus votes (Asquith's) +Col 3: Result +Col 4: Transfer of Surplus Votes (Bafour) +Col 5: Result +Col 6: Transfer of Surplus Votes (Lloyd George) +Col 7: Result + +Names of Candidates. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 + +Asquith, The Rt.Hon.H.H. 9,042-5,429 3,613 -- 3,613 -- 3,613 + +Balfour, The Rt.Hon.A.J. 4,478 -- 4,478-865 3,613 -- 3,613 + +Burl, The Rt. Hon. Thomas. 260 +282 542 +12 554+1,239 1,793 + +Cecil, Lord Hugh 400 +79 539+195 734 +88 822 + +Henderson, Arthur 1,038 +157 1,195 +3 1,198 +834 2,032 + +Jone, Leif 191 +157 297 +2 299+1,097 1,396 + +Joynson-Hicks, W. 94 +10 104 +52 156 +11 167 + +Lloyd George, The Rt.Hon.D. 2,751+4,704 7,455 -- 7,455-3,842 3,613 + +Long, The Rt.Hon. Walter H. 672 +27 699+520 1,225 +57 1,282 + +Macdonald, J. Ramsay 2,124 +30 2,154 +5 2,159 +228 2,387 + +Shackleton, David 398 +21 419 +2 421 +202 683 + +Smith, F.E. 184 +9 173 +65 238 +20 258 + +Votes lost through +neglect of fractions - +4 4 +3 7 +6 13 + +Preferences Exhausted - - - - -- -- -- + +Totals 21,072 - 21,672 -- 21,672 -- 21,672 + +Col 8: Transfer of votes (J Hicks and Smiths) +Col 9: Result +Col 10: Transfer of Votes Shackleston's) +Col 11: Result +Col 12: Transfer of Votes (cecil's) +Col 13: Result +Col 14: Transfer of Votes (L.Jones) +Col 15: Results +Col 16: Transfer of Votes (Long's) +Col 17: Final Result. + + 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. + +Asquith -- 3,613 -- 3,613 -- 3,613 -- 3,613 -- 3,613 E + +Balfour -- 3,013 -- 3,613 -- 3,613 -- 3,613 -- 3,613 E + +Burl. +21 1,814 +89 1,903+122 2,025 +658 2,683 +370 3,053 E + +Cecil +88 908 +18 923-926 -- -- -- -- -- + +Henderson +14 2,046+233 2,270 +49 2,328 +501 2,829 +81 2,910 + +Jone +12 1,408 +57 1,465 +35 1,500-1,500 -- -- -- + +Joynson-Hicks 167 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- + +Lloyd George -- 3,613 -- 3,613 -- 3,613 -- 3,613 -- 3,613 E + +Long +233 1,505 +8 1,513+490 2,003 +32 2,035-2,035 -- + +Macdonald +21 2,408+252 2,680 +48 2,708 +143 2,851 +87 2,938 E + +Shackleton +19 702-702 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- + +Smith -258 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- + +Votes lost -- 13 -- 13 -- 13 -- 13 -- 13 + +Exhausted +29 29 +45 74+182 256 +166 422+1,497 1,919 + +Totals -- 21,672 -- 21,672 -- 21,672 -- 21,672 --21,672 + +This result is as fair as is possible, and would have been equally +attained if, as would probably be the case in a real election, there had +been but little cross voting. The total results in the Tasmanian General +Election, 1909 (six-member constituencies) showed an exact proportion +between the votes polled and the seats gained by the respective +parties.[15] + +_Improved arrangements in the Transvaal elections._ + +The arrangements made at the model election were adopted by the Chief +Electoral Officer of Tasmania,[16] and were also adopted by the +returning officers of Pretoria and Johannesburg. Experience has shown +that some improvements in details can be made. Both at Pretoria and +Johannesburg less work was done at the returning officer's table. The +counters were placed more directly arrangements under the +superintendence of the returning officer's assistants, and the final +totals of each operation were ascertained at the counters' tables. When +the ballot boxes were brought in by the presiding officers of the +polling stations with a return of the votes they contained, the +returning officer handed them one by one to superintendents who took +them to that section of the counting force over which they had charge. +The counters ascertained the number of papers in each ballot box. The +superintendents reported the total number to the returning officer, and +if this number agreed with the presiding officer's return the ballot box +and contents were handed back to the returning officer. After the +contents of all the ballot boxes had been verified and the grand total +of votes ascertained, all the papers were emptied into one box and were +well mixed. The papers were then sorted at a central table, as in the +election already described; the superintendent took the papers to the +counters, each of whom ascertained the number of votes for that +candidate whose papers he had been deputed to count. The superintendents +brought a statement of the totals for each candidate to the returning +officer, and if the aggregate of these figures did not agree with the +number of ballot papers distributed to the sorters a fresh count was +ordered. The elections at Johannesburg and Pretoria demonstrated that +the requisite accuracy in counting could be easily attained. The +operations were characterized with remarkable precision. There was no +error in the counting of the votes at Pretoria during the whole of the +operations, and the same remark holds good of Johannesburg, save that +one ballot paper which had been accidentally torn was omitted to be +counted. The two pieces had been pinned together, and the paper, which +in consequence had been rendered shorter than the others, was +overlooked. The omission was quickly discovered, and no other error +took place during the whole of the proceedings. The various counting +processes check one another. Any errors occurring in the earlier +operations are thrown out in the course of the subsequent proceedings, +for the totals of the votes at the conclusion of each operation must +agree with the total shown at the commencement of the count. In another +feature the organization of the Transvaal elections might be copied. All +spoilt or doubtful papers were brought to the returning officer's table +by his assistants, and were not examined until the conclusion of the +first count. The whole of these papers were then gone through by the +returning officer, who decided the question of their validity in the +presence of the candidates or their representatives. The returning +officer also examined all papers which were treated as "exhausted," but +this work might have been deputed to the assistant returning +officer.[17] + +_Criticisms of the single transferable vote._ + +After reviewing the whole of the evidence submitted to them, the Royal +Commission on Electoral Systems reported that "of schemes for producing +proportional representation we think that the transferable vote will +have the best chance of ultimate acceptance," but the Report contains +some criticisms of its mechanism which demand consideration. These +criticisms are directed to two points: (1) the effect of later +preferences in deciding the result of an election; (2) the process of +eliminating candidates at the bottom of the poll. + +_Effect of late preferences._ + +The Royal Commission express the opinion that late preferences may have +an undue weight in deciding the result of an election. But the +Commissioners seem to have been unnecessarily alarmed in this matter. A +careful analysis of the preferences recorded in the Tasmanian elections +was made by a Committee appointed for the purpose by the Tasmanian +Government. This Committee ascertained that the comparative values of +the various preferences in determining the result of the election were +as follows:-- + +1st preference .739 +2nd .140 +3rd .051 +4th .029 +5th .014 +6th .008 +7th .009 +8th .008 +9th .003 + +In other words 73.9 per cent, first preferences became effective votes, +14.0 per cent, second preferences became effective votes, and so on. +These figures show the great superiority in value of the earlier +preferences, and this superiority was also seen in the Transvaal +elections. In Pretoria 68 per cent, of the first preferences were +directly effective in returning candidates, in Johannesburg 67.5 per +cent. Second preferences primarily come into play in favour of +candidates of similar complexion to the candidates first chosen, and +when, as is possible in the last resort, a vote is passed on in support +of a candidate of a different party, this is no more than the +Commissioners themselves approve and recommend for adoption in the case +of three or more candidates standing for a single seat. The difference +between the effect of the final transfers under a system of proportional +representation and of transfers under the system recommended by the +Commission is that in the first case they might determine the character +of one out of five or more members representing a constituency, in the +other they might affect the representation of each of the five or more +divisions into which the constituency would be divided. + +_The elimination of candidates from the bottom of the poll._ + +The second criticism concerns the elimination of candidates. It is +sometimes contended that it is unfair to eliminate the candidate at the +bottom of the poll, because had he remained longer in the contest he +might have received at the next stage a considerable amount of support. +Taking an extreme case, the candidate at the bottom of the poll may +have been so generally popular as to have been the second choice of the +majority of the electors. This is theoretically conceivable, but it does +not conform to the facts of elections. The principle of eliminating a +candidate at the bottom of the poll is not peculiar to the single +transferable vote. When a constituency returns but one member and there +are three candidates, and it is desired by means of the second ballot to +ensure the election of the candidate who commands the support of the +majority of the electors, the candidate lowest on the poll is eliminated +and a second ballot is held to decide between the claims of the +remaining two candidates. In such a case it is conceivable that the +candidate lowest on the poll may have been more acceptable to the +majority of the electors than the candidate finally selected. But the +system of the single transferable vote with constituencies returning +several members diminishes very considerably any such possibility. In +the first place, the candidate to be successful need only obtain a much +smaller proportion of the total number of votes than in a single-member +constituency. In the latter he must poll just over one-half before he is +safe from defeat; in a seven-member constituency if he polls one-eighth +he will escape this fate. The candidate who has a reasonable proportion +of support, therefore, stands less chance of being excluded. In the +second place no candidate is excluded until after the transfer of all +surplus votes has been completed. If, in a constituency returning +several members, a candidate, after the transfer of all surplus votes, +is still at the bottom of the poll, the facts would seem to indicate +that he was not even the second favourite of any considerable number of +electors. The preferences actually given in elections show how little +force this criticism possesses. The table below was prepared by the +Committee appointed by the Tasmanian Government. It shows the result of +an examination of all the votes cast in the district of Wilmot for the +election of five members of the Tasmanian House of Assembly in April +1909. The names of the candidates are given with the numbers of the +various preferences recorded for each candidate. The total number of +second preferences recorded for Waterworth, the first candidate to be +excluded, was 141. Similar tables for the other four districts show that +no injustice arose from the exclusion of the lowest candidate. The only +occasion on which the criticism has any force is when, in filling the +last seats, the conditions are analogous to those which obtain in a +three-cornered fight in a single-member constituency. Yet in the latter +case the Royal Commission did not hesitate to recommend the exclusion of +the lowest candidate. + +DISTRICT OF WILMOT: NUMBERS OF VARIOUS PREFERENCES + +Name. Preferences. + 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 +Best 935 690 596 609 615 550 23 2 7 5 +Dumbleton 518 537 603 632 819 650 24 4 3 5 +Field 930 699 692 619 555 585 21 9 4 5 +Hope 1,232 1,302 1,077 551 229 159 13 6 2 5 +Jensen 1,955 894 1,087 132 58 58 13 19 7 36 +Kean 599 1,521 1,370 118 53 50 11 28 38 15 +Lee 822 750 902 618 512 488 27 4 7 1 +Lyons 1,079 1,444 1,329 93 76 65 21 29 32 12 +Murray 572 885 972 848 625 395 14 6 7 1 +Waterworth 221 141 236 590 198 254 141 21 6 9 + ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- --- --- --- -- + 8,863 8,863 8,863 4,810 3,740 3,254 308 128 113 94 + +The elimination of candidates has been criticized from another point of +view. The Royal Commission, while careful not to endorse this criticism, +and referring to it with reluctance, "because doubts about the absolute +reliability of the mechanism of the system may arouse prejudices +disproportionate to the importance of the subject, which is very small +in comparison with the other considerations involved," review the +evidence which had been submitted to them as follows: "The element of +chance involved in the order of elimination is exceedingly difficult to +determine. It would appear that the element is perceptible in certain +contingencies, but the rarity or frequency with which these would occur +in actual practice is a matter of pure speculation, as it apparently +depends on the amount of cross-voting which voters permit themselves in +the use of their later preferences, a point only to be decided by +experience. 'Chance' in this connexion has not quite the same meaning as +when used in respect of the method of transfer. In the case of the +latter we were dealing with mathematical probabilities; the chance which +is said to be involved in the process of elimination consists in the +fact that the results of the election may vary according to the strength +of quite irrelevant factors. Thus, a case was put to us to show that +with certain dispositions on the part of the electors the representation +of a party might be so much at the mercy of the order of elimination +that while it would only obtain one seat with 19,000 votes of its own it +would obtain two with 18,000, because in the latter case the order of +elimination of two candidates would be reversed."[18] + +It is here suggested that the results may depend upon the amount of +cross-voting which voters would permit themselves in the use of their +later preferences. The whole paragraph abounds in obscurities, and the +word "cross-voting" is used in such a context as to make it quite +uncertain whether the Commission mean by it inter- or intra-party +voting, or both. It is somewhat difficult to make a definite answer to a +charge so indistinctly formulated. Cross-voting, in the ordinary sense, +may certainly affect the result. If the supporters of a Radical +candidate prefer to give their second preferences to a Labour candidate +rather than to a moderate Liberal, such cross-voting obviously may +determine whether the Labour candidate or the moderate Liberal will be +successful. There is no element of chance involved. The object of the +system is the true representation of the electors, and the returning +officer must give effect to their wishes. The numerical case cited by +the Commissioners can only occur when so-called supporters of the party +in question are so indifferent to its fate as to refrain from recording +any preferences for any members of the party other than their own +favoured candidate. Such voters can hardly be called "members of a +party" for the purpose of contrasting its strength with that of another +party.[19] Even such cases, supposing them at all probable in practice, +could be provided against, as has been suggested by Mr. Rooke Corbett of +the Manchester Statistical Society, by determining a new quota whenever +any votes have to be set aside as exhausted. But the elections in which +the system has been tried show how little these cases accord with the +facts. The large number of exhausted papers which occur in the model +election described in this chapter, which was organized through the +press, perhaps accounts for much of this criticism. In real elections +the percentage of exhausted papers is much less. Thus in Johannesburg, +where one rigidly organized party, another party more loosely organized, +and ten independent candidates took the field, the electors made good +use of their privilege of marking preferences. Some 11,788 votes were +polled. At the conclusion of the tenth transfer only 104 votes had been +treated as exhausted. In Pretoria, where there were 2814 votes, the +total number of exhausted votes at the end of the election was only 63. +This happened on the occasion of the first trial of the system in +Johannesburg and Pretoria, and further experience will lead to an even +fuller exercise of the privilege of marking preferences. There is no +case for a criticism based on such a hypothetical example as that hinted +at by the Commission. + +_Quota Representation on the basis of the system._ + +Mr. Ramsay Macdonald, in criticizing this method of voting, complains +that its advocates "assume, quite erroneously, that a second preference +should carry the same political value as a first preference." But it +would be obviously unfair to penalize an elector by depriving him of any +part of the value of his vote because he failed to secure his first +choice as his representative. In making this criticism Mr. Macdonald has +lost sight of the reason for which the vote is made transferable. Every +elector has but one vote, and unless this vote retains its full value +when transferred, the proportionate representation of the electors +cannot be achieved. Thus it is conceivable that in a constituency +returning several members Mr. Macdonald might poll two quotas of Labour +votes, and if his excess votes were not transferred to the second +preferences of his supporters at their full value, the representation of +the party would suffer. Each quota of electors is entitled to a member, +and the transferring of votes enables the electors to group themselves +into quotas of equal size. + +In a critical analysis of the regulations adopted in the Transvaal, Mr. +Howard Pim, President of the Statistical Society, South Africa, stated +that: "However defective these regulations may be, the system of +election introduced by this Act is a great advance upon any previously +in existence in this Colony, for by it a minority which can command a +number of votes equal to or exceeding a number equal to the quota can +elect its candidate. This advantage far outweighs any defects that exist +in the regulations, and I trust that this principle of the quota will +never be surrendered, even if the Second Schedule of the Act be +modified."[20] Representation by quota has always been recognized by +advocates of the single transferable vote as being the great reform +accomplished by the new method of voting. The Government Statistician of +Tasmania, Mr. R. M. Johnston, declared that "those who ignore this +keystone, or foundation of the Hare system, and restrict their attention +entirely to peddling or unimportant details--such as the element of +chance involved in quota-excess-transfer-votes--fail altogether to +comprehend the grandeur and perfection of the cardinal features of the +system, which secures just and equitable representation of all forces, +whether of majorities or minorities." In attempting to give effect to +this great principle it is unnecessary to impose more work upon the +returning officers than is absolutely essential for the purpose, and +such experience as is available shows that the rules contained in the +Municipal Representation Bill[21] accomplish this end. + + +[Footnote 1: Denmark was thus the first country to make use of a system +of proportional representation. An excellent account of its introduction +is given in _La Représentation Proportionelle_, published in 1888 by the +French Society for the Study of Proportional Representation.] + +[Footnote 2: In addition to the eight members elected by each Parliament, +the Senate includes eight nominated members appointed by the Governor in +Council. In future elections, unless otherwise determined by the Union +Parliament, eight Senators for each province will be elected at a joint +session of the members of the Provincial Council and the members of the +Union House of Assembly elected for the province.] + +[Footnote 3: The first section of the amendment was as follows: "From and +after the passing of the present Bill, every local constituency shall, +subject to the provisions hereinafter contained, return one member for +every quota of its registered electors actually voting at that election, +such quota being a number equal to the quotient obtained by dividing by +658 the total number of votes polled throughout the kingdom at the same +election, and if such quotient be fractional, the integral number nest +less. Provided always, that where the number of votes given by the +constituency shall not be equal to such quota, the quota may be +completed by means of votes given by persons duly qualified as electors +in any part of the United Kingdom; and the candidate who shall have +obtained such quota may, notwithstanding, be returned as a member for +the said constituency if he shall have obtained a majority of the votes +given therein as hereinafter mentioned."] + +[Footnote 4: _Autobiography_, 1873, p. 259.] + +[Footnote 5: The election of 1910, which was held in Glasgow, was +organized by the Scottish Branch of the Society.] + +[Footnote 6: This mode of voting is simple and effective where the +electing body is small and where there is no need or desire to avoid +full publicity. It is in use in the municipality of Toronto for the +election of committees, and was proposed for use in the election of a +number of Lords of Parliament from the whole body of peers in a +memorandum submitted by Lord Courtney of Penwith to the Select Committee +on the Reform of the House of Lords. See Report of this Committee [(234) +[(234) 1908] ] + +[Footnote 7: This rule for ascertaining the quota was first suggested by +Mr. H.R. Droop in a paper read by him before the Statistical Society in +April 1881. Both Mr. Hare and M. Andrae proposed that the quota should +be ascertained by dividing the number of votes cast by the number of +members to be elected. Mr. Droop pointed out that such a quota might, +with constituencies returning from three to eight representatives each, +yield on some occasions an incorrect result. "Suppose, for instance," +says he, "that the election is a contest between two parties of which +one commands 360 votes and the other 340, and that each party runs four +candidates for seven seats; then M. Andrae's quota will be (360 + 340) / +7 = 700 / 7 = 100, while mine will be: 700 / 8 + 1 = 88. Consequently, +if the 360 voters should divide their first votes so as to give +originally to each of three candidates 100, or more, votes, say 110, +104, and 100, their fourth candidate will originally have only 46 votes, +and will obtain by transfer with M. Andrae's quota only 14 additional +votes, and thus he will not get altogether more than 60 votes, and +therefore if the 340 can by organization arrange to divide their first +votes so that each of their four candidates has originally more than 60 +votes (which would not be difficult, as an equal division would give +each of them 85 votes) they will carry the odd candidate. On the other +hand, with my quota, the fourth candidate will get by transfer (however +the votes may be originally distributed) 360 - (3 x 88) = 360 - 264 = 96 +votes, and it will be impossible for the 340 to place all their four +candidates ahead of those of the 360. Therefore, with my quota nothing +can be gained by dividing the votes equally, or lost by dividing them +unequally, while with M. Andrae's and Mr. Hare's quota there will always +be a possibility of gaining by this, and therefore it may be worth while +in an important election to organize and ascertain how many candidates +the party's votes can carry, and arrange for such votes being divided +equally between these candidates, the very thing which preferential +voting is intended to render unnecessary."] + +[Footnote 8: The proportion will not in practice be so simple as in this +example--one-half. In every case the proportion is that which the number +of next preferences marked for any one unelected candidate bears to the +total number of preferences marked for all unelected candidates. +_Cf._ p. 164.] + +[Footnote 9: _Vide_ Appendix VII.] + +[Footnote 10: Report of the Royal Commission on Electoral Systems (Cd. +5163), Par. 65.] + +[Footnote 11: _Real Representation for Great Britain and Ireland_, 1910, +p. 23.] + +[Footnote 12: In the model election held in Glasgow, 1910, the list +contained the name of a Nationalist candidate (see _Representation_, No. +19, November 1910).] + +[Footnote 13: See page 137.] + +[Footnote 14: This total slightly exceeds the quota, 3613, owing to the +neglect of fractions in the second column. The loss of votes due to +neglect of fractions will be found separately recorded in the result +sheet, p. 160-61. This loss of votes can be avoided by treating the +largest fractions as unity.] + +[Footnote 15: See page 257.] + +[Footnote 16: It was at first intended to adopt the arrangement of staff +and method of recording preferences used at the election of 1897. These +arrangements were after a test abandoned in favour of the much more +convenient method used at the Proportional Representation Society's +model election held December 1908.--_Report on the Tasmanian General +Election_, 1909, par. 8.] + +[Footnote 17: For full details of these elections, see Report presented +to both Houses of the Transvaal Parliament.--T.G. 5--'10.] + +[Footnote 18: _Report of Royal Commission on Electoral Systems_, par. +76.] + +[Footnote 19: A simple example will explain. Let it be assumed that P +and Q are members of party A, and poll 18,000 votes, that R and S and T +are members of party B, polling in all 19,000 votes, and that the +following table records the votes given and the details of the transfers +made in arriving at the final result:-- + + Quota = (37,000/4) + 1 = 9251 + + Transfer Transfer + 1st of R's of T's +Candidates. Count. Surplus. Result. Votes. Result. + + P 9,050 9,050 9,050 (Elected). +Party A. Q 8,950 8,950 8,950 (Elected). + + R 10,000 -749 9,251 9,251 (Elected). +Party B. S 6,000 +500 6,500 +2,400 8,900 + T 3,000 +249 3,249 -3,249 + +Exhausted +849 849 + ------ ------ ------ + 37,000 37,000 37,000 + + +The members of the two parties recorded their votes as follows:-- + + Party A. Party B. +P. 9,050 R. 10,000 +Q. 8,950 S. 6,000 + T. 3,000 + +The total number of votes polled is 37,000, and the quota, therefore, is +9251. Candidate R, having received more than a quota would be declared +elected, and his surplus of 749 votes carried forward. It may be assumed +that candidates S and T, who are of the same party, received 500 and 249 +as their shares of this surplus. The result of this transfer is shown in +the table. T, the lowest candidate on the poll, would then be +eliminated. Now, if the contingent of voters Supporting T are not fully +loyal to their party, and as many as 849 have recorded no preference +save for T, then 2400 would be available for transfer to S, whose total +would be only 8900. S would be eliminated, and the three candidates +elected would be P and Q of party A, and R of party B, although R and S +between them represented 18,151 voters. This case can be met by +providing that whenever votes are exhausted the quota should be counted +afresh. The votes in play, ignoring those exhausted, would be in all +36,151, the new quota would be 9038, while an additional number of +votes, viz. 213, would be available for transfer from R to S, with the +result that the position of these candidates would be as follows:-- + +R 9,038 +S 9,113 +P 9,050 +Q 8,950 + +Party B would obtain two seats, the party A only one seat.] + +[Footnote 20: Address delivered on 6 September 1909.] + +[Footnote 22: See Appendix VII.] + + + + +CHAPTER VIII + +LIST SYSTEMS OF PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION + + +"'One man, one vote; one party, one candidate'--thus runs the +cry."--COUNT GOBLET D'ALVIELLA + +List systems of proportional representation are based upon the block +vote or _scrutin de liste_--the method of election generally used on the +Continent of Europe and in the United States of America when several +members are to be elected for the same constituency. With the _scrutin +de liste_, lists of candidates are nominated by the various political +organizations or groups of electors; each elector has as many votes as +there are members to be elected, but he may not give more than one vote +to any one candidate. The party which can obtain the support of a +majority of the electors can carry its list to the exclusion of all +others; minorities are crushed even more completely than with the system +of single-member constituencies. But as constituencies returning several +members are an essential requirement of any scheme of proportional +representation, the _scrutin de liste_ facilitates the introduction of a +proportional system, for the only great change involved is the allotment +of seats to the respective lists in proportion to the totals of votes +obtained by each. But this change brings in its train a change in the +nature of the vote. It remains no longer a vote only for candidates as +individuals; it obtains a twofold significance, and becomes what is +termed the double simultaneous vote (_le double vote simultanée_). In +the first place it is a vote for the party list as such, and is used for +determining the proportion of seats to be allotted to the lists; and, in +the second place, it is a vote for a particular candidate or order of +candidates for the purpose of ascertaining which of the candidates +included in a list shall be declared successful. This double function of +the vote is characteristic of all list systems of proportional +representation. Other changes of a subsidiary character, which +experience has shown to be advisable, have been adopted in different +countries so that the various systems differ in detail in the methods +both by which seats are apportioned among the competing lists and by +which the successful candidates are chosen. + +_The Belgian electoral system_.] + +List systems are in operation for parliamentary purposes in Switzerland, +Belgium, Würtemberg, Sweden, and Finland. The simplest of these is that +adopted by Belgium, and the description of a Belgian election may serve +as an introduction to the study of other systems. Through the courtesy +of M. Steyeart, the President of the Tribunal of First Instance and +Chief Electoral Officer for the constituency of Ghent-Eecloo, the author +was enabled to watch the elections in May 1908 in that constituency. +Proportional representation is, however, only one of the points in which +the Belgian and English electoral systems differ, and in order to obtain +a true estimate of the working of the Belgian law it is necessary to +distinguish between results which are due to the franchise +qualifications and those which are due to the system of proportional +representation. The effects arising from these two separate features of +the electoral system have sometimes been confused, and it is therefore +desirable to give a brief outline of the conditions which govern a +Belgian election. + +In the first place, Belgium has manhood suffrage modified by a system of +graduated voting. Secondly, each elector is compelled to vote or, at +least, to present himself at the polling place. Thirdly, both the +Chambers are elective, and, although provision exists for the +dissolution and the election of Parliament as a whole, only one-half of +each Chamber is, in the ordinary course, elected at a time, each +Senator being elected for a fixed period of eight years, and each +member of the House of Representatives for a period of four years. + +_The franchise._ + +The unique franchise system embodied in the Belgian constitution in 1893 +was adopted only after months had been spent in discussing the schemes +of rival parties. All attempts at compromise failed until attention was +seriously directed to the suggestions of M. Albert Nyssens, Professor of +the University of Louvain, contained in his pamphlet _Le Suffrage +Universel Tempéré_. His proposals had the merit of recognizing the +validity of the arguments advanced by all the political parties. +Conservatives desired the introduction of a system based on occupation +coupled with the payment of taxes; many Liberals were anxious to secure +special recognition for electors of admitted capacity--in short, an +educational qualification; the Radicals inside and Socialists outside +Parliament demonstrated continually in favour of universal, direct and +equal suffrage. The claim for universal suffrage was recognized by +granting to every male Belgian who had attained the age of twenty-five +years the right to vote, but a counterpoise to so democratic a suffrage +was sought in the granting of additional votes to electors possessing +specified qualifications. A supplementary vote was awarded to every +married man who had attained the age of thirty-five years and paid five +francs in taxes on his dwelling. An additional vote was given to every +owner of land or house property of the value of two thousand francs, or +to the possessor of an income of a hundred francs derived from Belgian +public funds. Thus were met the demands of the Catholics for the +representation of property, whilst the Liberal advocacy of the claims of +the educated voter were met in a similar way. Two additional votes were +awarded to those who had obtained a diploma of higher education; to +those who filled, or had filled, a public position; or to those engaged +in a profession which implied the possession of a good education. The +highest number of votes awarded to any elector, for parliamentary +purposes, whatever qualifications he might possess, was three. + +_Compulsory voting_. + +The exercise of the franchise is regarded in Belgium as a duty which +each citizen owes to the State, and the obligatory vote is therefore +universally accepted without demur. The elector must attend at the +polling place, take his ballot paper and deposit it in the ballot box. +If he places the ballot paper in the urn without voting there are no +means of ascertaining the fact; but unless he forwards to the Electoral +Officer an explanation, in due form, of his absence from the polling +booth he is liable to prosecution. The percentage of abstentions is thus +very low, but, in addition to this result, the obligatory vote has had a +considerable indirect effect upon the character of electoral contests. +Voting has become an official matter. Formerly, as here, it rested with +the political organizations to persuade and exhort electors to vote; +now, each elector receives from the Returning Officer an official +command to attend at the polling place. + +_Partial renewal of chamber_. + +The third difference--the partial renewal of the Chambers--dates from +the constitution of 1831, and the reason for its adoption was the same +as that which underlies the partial renewal of English municipal +councils--the desire to ensure continuity in the composition and +proceedings of Parliament. There was some justification for this +practice under the old voting methods, for then the result of elections +largely depended, as is the case in England to-day, upon the chance +distribution of party strength. The composition of the Chamber of +Representatives was liable to violent oscillations and changes, and the +partial renewal of the Chambers moderated the violence of these changes. +But whilst the partial renewal may be defended on these grounds, it has +two distinct disadvantages. When only one-half of the Chamber is to be +elected (as in the renewal of only one-third of our municipal Councils) +a considerable diminution takes place in the amount of public interest +evoked by an election. There is, moreover, a further and even more +serious drawback that, when the election turns upon a question of vital +importance, such for instance as the annexation of the Congo, the +verdict of _only one-half_ the people is obtained. In 1908 elections +took place in four provinces only--East Flanders, Hainaut, Liege, and +Limbourg--and so, whilst the citizens of Ghent and Liège were expressing +their opinion upon the policy of the Government, the citizens of +Brussels were reduced to the position of spectators of a fight in which +doubtless many would have liked to have taken a part. The introduction +of proportional representation has rendered this particular feature of +the Belgian electoral system quite unnecessary. Electors are not so +fickle as an irrational method of voting made them appear to be. + +_The presentation of lists_. + +For the purpose of parliamentary elections each of the nine provinces of +Belgium is divided into large constituencies returning several members; +Brussels returns twenty-one members, Ghent eleven, but several of the +smaller constituencies return as few as three representatives. Fifteen +days before the date of the election lists of candidates which, before +presentation, must have received the support of at least one hundred +electors, are sent to the returning officer. After verification, each +list is given an official number and the lists are then published, no +official title other than the number being given to the lists. In the +copy of the ballot paper used at Ghent, shown on the opposite page, list +No. 1 was presented by the Catholics; No. 2 by the Liberals; No. 3 by +those Socialists who were dissatisfied with their party's list; No. 4 by +the small tradesmen; No. 5 by the official Socialists; whilst No. 6 +contains the name of a candidate standing as an independent. It will be +observed that each of the first five lists is divided into two parts +separated by the word "Suppléants." The candidates so described are not +taken into account in the actual election of representatives; they are, +however, voted for in the same way and at the same time as the other +candidates, and are called upon (in the order determined by the result +of the election) to fill any vacancy occasioned by the retirement or +death of a duly-elected representative belonging to the same list. This +arrangement obviates the necessity for bye-elections, and the relative +strength of parties remains the same from the time of one election to +the next. The order in which the names of the candidates appear upon the +lists is arranged by the organizations responsible for their +presentation. It should, however, be stated that this provision, about +which public opinion is much divided, is not an essential feature of a +proportional system. It was not a part of the original proposals of M. +Beernaert, and it certainly strengthens the hands of political +organizations, although, as will be shown subsequently, proportional +representation considerably modifies, if it does not altogether prevent, +abuse of the power conceded to political bodies. + + +[Illustration: List Ballot paper] + +_The act of voting._ + +The work of the elector is simplicity itself. He can select one list or +one candidate in a list but not more for each of the votes to which he +may be entitled. His choice can be recorded in four different ways. In +each case the act of voting consists in pencilling one or other of the +white spots contained in the black squares at the head of the lists or +against the names of individual candidates. In the first place, the +elector may vote by blackening the spot at the head of the list. The +significance of such a vote is that the elector votes for the list, and, +at the same time, approves of the order in which the candidates have +been arranged by the party organization. Naturally all the party +organizations and journals advise their supporters to vote in this way. + +Secondly, the elector may vote by blackening the white spot against the +name of one of the "effective" candidates on one of the lists. Such a +vote implies that the elector votes for the list on which the +candidate's name appears, but that, instead of approving of the order in +which the candidates have been arranged, he prefers the particular +candidate he has marked. The third and fourth methods are but variations +of the second. The elector can indicate a preference for one of the +supplementary candidates, or he can indicate preferences for an +effective and also for a supplementary candidate. In brief, the elector +votes for one of the lists, and either approves of the list as arranged +or indicates the change he desires. + +_The allotment of seats to parties._ + +The number of representatives awarded to each party is determined by the +method formulated by M. Victor d'Hondt, a professor of the University of +Ghent. Its working may best be shown by an illustration. Let it be +assumed that three lists have been presented; that they have obtained +8000, 7500, and 4500 votes respectively, and that there are five +vacancies to be filled. The total number of votes for each list is +divided successively by the numbers 1, 2, 3, and so on, and the +resulting numbers are arranged thus:-- + +List No. 1. List No. 2. List No. 3. + 8,000 7,500 4,500 + 4,000 3,750 2,250 + 2,666 2,500 1,500 + +The five highest numbers (five being the number of vacancies to be +filled) are then arranged in order of magnitude as follows:-- + + 8,000 + 7,500 + 4,500 + 4,000 + 3,750 + +The lowest of these numbers, 3750, is called the "common divisor"[1] or +the "electoral quotient," and forms the basis for the allotment of +seats. The number of votes obtained by each of the lists is divided by +the "common divisor" thus:-- + + 8,000 divided by 3,750 = 2 with a remainder of 500. 7,500 " 3,750 = +2 4,500 " 3,750 = 1 with a remainder of 750. + +The first list contains the "electoral quotient" twice, the second +twice, and the third once, and the five seats are allotted accordingly. +Each party obtains one representative for every quota of voters which it +can rally to its support, all fractions of "quotas" being disregarded. + +The method of determining the electoral quotient may appear at first +sight rather empirical, but the rule is merely the arithmetical +expression, in a form convenient for returning officers, of the +following train of reasoning. The three lists with 8000, 7500, and 4500 +supporters are competing for seats. The first seat has to be allotted; +to which list is it to go? Plainly to the list with 8000 supporters. +Then the second seat has to be disposed of; to which list is it to go? +If it is given to the first list, then the supporters of the first list +will have two members in all, or one member for each 4000 votes. This +would be unfair while 7500 supporters of the second list are +unrepresented, therefore the second seat is allotted to the list with +7500 supporters. Similar reasoning will give the third seat to the list +with 4500 supporters, the fourth to the list with 8000 supporters, which +now will rightly have one representative for each 4000, and the fifth to +the list with 7500. The question in each case is to what list must the +seat be allotted in such a way that no one group of unrepresented +electors is larger than a represented group. The separate allotment of +seats one by one in accordance with the foregoing reasoning may be +shown thus:-- + +8,000 (List No. 1) +7,500 ( " No. 2) +4,500 ( " No. 3) +4,000 ( " No. 1) +3,750 ( " No. 2) + +This result of course agrees with that obtained by the official process +of dividing the total of each list by the electoral quotient. + +_The selection of successful candidates._ + +The seats having been apportioned to the respective lists it becomes +necessary to ascertain which of the candidates on the respective lists +are to be declared elected. In this second process it will be seen now +great an advantage is obtained by the candidates at the top of each +list.[2] A11 the votes marked in the space at the top of a list, _i.e.,_ +list votes, form a pool from which the candidates of the list draw in +succession as many votes as are necessary to make their individual +total equal to the electoral quotient, the process continuing until the +pool is exhausted. In the example already given, assume that List No. 1 +consists of three candidates, A, B, and C, arranged in the order named, +and that the 8000 supporters of the list have given their votes as +follows:-- + +Votes at the head of the List 4,000 +Preferential votes for A 600 + " " B 500 + " " C 3,000 + ----- + Total 8,000 + +Candidate A, being the first in order on the list, has the first claim +on the votes recorded for the list. The electoral quotient is 3750, and +A's total 500 is raised to this number by the addition of 3250 votes +taken from those recorded for the list. This secures his election, and +there remain 750 list votes which are attributed to candidate B, this +candidate being the second in order on the list. B, however, also had +500 votes recorded against his name, and his total poll therefore +amounts to 1250. But candidate C has obtained 3000 votes, all recorded +for himself personally, and as this total exceeds B's total of 1250, C +would be declared elected. The two candidates chosen from List No. 1 +would, in this case, be A and C. The successful supplementary candidates +are ascertained in the same way. + +_A Belgian election. Ghent, 1908: the poll._ + +In a Belgian election the polling proceeds very smoothly and quietly. +This is largely due to the fact that the law for compulsory voting has +relieved the party organizations of the necessity of whipping up their +supporters to the poll. At the election of Ghent, which the author was +privileged to witness, the candidates for the Chamber of Representatives +were as given in the ballot paper on page 177. It will be seen that six +lists of candidates were presented, but in the election of Senators only +the three chief organizations took part. There were eleven members of +the House of Representatives and five Senators to be elected. + +The constituency was divided into 350 polling districts, the maximum +number of electors for a district being 500. To each district was +assigned a polling place in charge of a presiding officer, appointed by +the returning officer of the district; the presiding officer was +assisted by four citizens, each of whom was required to be in possession +of the maximum number of votes, and to be at least forty years of age. +In addition, the party organizations sent duly accredited witnesses to +watch against possible fraud, and to assure themselves of the absolute +regularity of the proceedings. The poll opened at 8 A.M. Each elector +had to present his official "summons" to vote, and received from the +presiding officer one, two, or three ballot papers according to the +number of votes to which he was entitled. The elector took the papers to +a private compartment, as in an English election, marked them, placed +them in the ballot box and received back his official letter, now +stamped--evidence, if need be, that he had carried out the obligation +imposed upon him by law. At 1 P.M. the poll was closed; the ballot boxes +were opened and the ballot papers counted in the presence of the +assessors and party witnesses for the purpose of ascertaining that all +papers in the possession of the presiding officer at the opening of the +poll had been duly accounted for. + +_The counting of the votes_.] + +In order to maintain as far as possible, not only the secrecy of the +individual vote, but the secrecy of the vote of any locality, the votes +of three polling places were counted together, the grouping of polling +places for this purpose having been previously determined by lot. Thus +the votes counted at the town hall (polling district No. 1) were those +recorded in the districts Nos. 1, 112, and 94. The proceedings were +directed by the presiding officer of the first polling place, assisted +by the presiding officers of the other two. The only other persons +present were witnesses representing the three chief parties. The +counting commenced soon after 3 P.M., and was completed, both for the +Senate and Chamber, by 7 P.M. The papers were sorted according to the +votes given for each list, subsidiary heaps being made for those +candidates who had received individual votes of preference. A separate +heap was made of spoiled and blank voting papers, but it was evident +from the very commencement of the proceedings that the method of voting +had presented no difficulty to the elector. Of the 1370 votes recorded +in this division for candidates for the Chamber there were but +twenty-six spoiled papers; of these thirteen were blank, indicating that +the voters, although attending the poll, did not wish to record any +opinion. The thirteen other papers showed in nearly every case some +confusion in the mind of the elector with the elections for the communal +councils, when the elector can give several votes of preference. The +official returns, after endorsement, were forwarded by post to the +returning officer, whose duty it was to prepare the returns for the +whole constituency. The figures for each district were given to the +press at the close of the count, and special editions of the journals, +containing the probable result of the election, were issued the +same evening. + +_The final process._ + +The compilation of the returns for the whole constituency took place on +the following day. The returning officer presided, and was assisted by +four assessors, a secretary and three witnesses, who attended on behalf +of the chief parties. In addition there were two professional +calculators, who were responsible for the accuracy of the arithmetical +processes. The proceedings, in brief, consisted in extracting the +details of the returns furnished by the 120 counting places. The final +sheet for each list showed not only the total number of votes obtained +by the party, but the number of votes of preference recorded for each +candidate. The votes for each list were as follows:-- + +List No.1. List No.2. List No.3. List No.4. List No.5. List No.6. +78,868 39,788 913 1,094 23,118 271 + +The process of allotting the seats to the respective parties then +commenced. The totals for each list were divided by the numbers 1, 2, +3, and so on, and arranged thus:-- + + List List List List List List + No. 1. No. 2. No. 3. No. 4. No. 5. No. 6 + 78,865 39,788 913 1,094 23,118 271 + 39,432 19,894 11,559 + 26,288 13,262 + 19,716 9,947 + 15,773 + 13,144 + 11,266 + +The eleven highest figures thus obtained were then arranged in order of +magnitude, and the seats allotted accordingly:-- + + 1st Seat 78,865 (List No. 1--Catholic) + 2nd " 39,783 ( " No. 2--Liberal) + 3rd " 39,432 ( " No. 1--Catholic) + 4th " 26,288 ( " No. 1--Catholic) + 5th " 23,118 ( " No. 5--Socialist) + 6th " 19,894 ( " No. 2--Liberal) + 7th " 19,716 ( " No. 1--Catholic) + 8th " 15,773 ( " No. 1--Catholic) + 9th " 13,262 ( " No. 2--Liberal) +10th " 13,144 ( " No. 1--Catholic) +11th " 11,559 ( " No. 5--Socialist) + +Thus the Catholics, Liberals, and Socialists obtained six, three, and +ten seats respectively. It will be noticed that the eleventh figure, +11,559, which is the "common divisor," or "electoral quotient," is +contained six times in the Catholic total, with a remainder of 9511; +three times in the Liberal total, with a remainder of 5000; and twice in +the Socialist total. + +The highest number of preferences recorded for any individual candidate +(although placards had been posted inviting votes of preference for M. +Buysse, the candidate fourth on the Liberal list, and for M. Cambier, +the candidate third on the Socialist list) were 1914 and 1635, much too +small to effect any change in the order of the candidates as arranged by +the associations. It remains to add that the task was accomplished with +perfect regularity and despatch; the figures were checked at each stage, +but as the number of votes polled in the double election (for the +Senate and for the Chamber) amounted to no less than 270,892, it is not +surprising that the compilation of the final figures was not completed +until midnight. + +_Public opinion favorable to the system._ + +This was the fifth parliamentary election[3] in which the system of +proportional representation has been put to the test; its +practicability, both from the point of view of the elector and of the +returning officer, is now no longer open to question. Interviews on the +effects of the system with Catholic leaders like M. Beernaert or M. Van +den Heuvel, with Liberals like Count Goblet d'Alviella, or M. Gustave +Abel, the editor of _La Flandre Liberale_, or with Socialists like M. +Anseele, revealed the fact that there is no party in Belgium which +desires to return to the former electoral system. The Liberals and +Socialists are hostile to plural voting, but their attitude to +proportional representation may be summed up in the desire to make the +system more perfect.[4] Constituencies returning three or four members +are not sufficiently large to do complete justice to a system of +proportional representation, and many, among whom must be included M. +Vandervelde, desire the grouping of these smaller constituencies into +larger ones. The general trend of public opinion is in complete +agreement with the views of party leaders, and found forcible expression +in the press comments on the elections in 1908 for the +provincial councils. + +_The relation of the Belgian to other list systems._ + +The Belgian list method, although simple in form, is based upon a very +careful examination of earlier list systems, and represents an attempt +to avoid the defects and inconveniences of those systems. As already +stated, the vote in a "list" system has two aspects. Indeed, in the +canton of Solothurn in Switzerland each elector is invited, first, to +record his vote for a list as a separate act, and secondly, to vote for +the particular candidate he prefers. + +In tracing the growth of the Belgian system it will be best to consider +these two aspects separately, and, in the first place, the vote in so +far as it affects the fortunes of the list. The object in view--the +allotment of the seats in proportion to the total number of votes +obtained by the respective lists--would seem quite simple of attainment, +and would be so were the totals obtained by each list such that it was +possible to divide the seats among them in exact proportion. Voters do +not, however, group themselves in exact proportion, and it becomes +necessary therefore to devise a rule of distribution that shall +approximate to the desired end as closely as possible. + +_The different methods of apportioning seats to lists._ + +The first rule--a very simple one--was adopted because, in the words of +Ernest Naville, "it seemed most intelligible to the general public." The +grand total of votes polled by the different lists was divided by the +total number of seats, and the distribution of seats was based upon the +quotient, or "quota" thus obtained. The total of each list was divided +by the quota for the purpose of ascertaining the number of seats to +which it was entitled. The answers, as will be seen from the following +example, usually contained fractions. Assume that seven seats are to be +distributed among three lists, A, B, C; that the grand total of votes is +7000, and that the respective lists have polled as follows:-- + +List A 2,850 votes + " B 2,650 " + " C 1,500 " + ----- +Total 7,000 + +The quotient in this case is 1000. The totals of the lists A, B, and C +contain the quotient twice, twice and once respectively, but in each +case with a remainder, and it is the remainder that constitutes the +difficulty. According to the earliest list schemes the remaining seats +were allotted to the lists having the largest remainders, and, in the +example given, lists A and B would each receive an additional seat. +Party organizers were not slow to perceive that it was advisable to +obtain as many of the largest remainders as they could, and considerable +dissatisfaction arose in Ticino from the action of the Conservatives, +who very skilfully divided their forces into two groups, thereby +obtaining additional seats. A simple example will explain. Assume that +three deputies are to be elected, that the grand total of votes is 3000, +and that the party votes are as follows:-- + +Party A 1,600 votes + " B 1,400 " + ----- +Total 3,000 + +The quota would be 1000 votes. Party A, having the larger remainder, +would obtain two seats, and party B only one seat; but if party B should +present two lists and arrange for the division of its voting force, the +following result might ensue:-- + +Party A 1,600 votes + " B1 700 " + " B2 700 " + ----- +Total 3,000 + +The quota would still be 1000 votes, but party A would only obtain one +seat, whereas party B would obtain two, because each of its two lists +would show a remainder larger than A's remainder. This possibility led +to a modification of the rule, and the seats remaining after the first +distribution were allotted to the largest parties. But this was also far +from satisfactory, as will be seen from the following example taken from +a Ticino election:[5]-- + +Conservatives 614 votes +Radicals 399 " + ----- +Total 1,013 + +The constituency to which the figures refer returned five members; the +quotient therefore was 202, and the Conservatives obtained three seats +on the first distribution, and the Radicals one. As, under the rule, +the remaining seat was allotted to the largest party, the Conservatives +obtained four seats out of the five when, obviously, the true proportion +was three to two. + +The rule subsequently devised aimed at reducing the importance of +remainders in the allotment of seats. The total of each list was divided +by the number of seats plus one. This method yielded a smaller quota +than the original rule and enabled more seats to be allotted at the +first distribution. The final improvement, however, took the form of +devising a rule which should so allot the seats to different parties +that after the first distribution there should be no seats remaining +unallotted. This is the great merit of the Belgian or d'Hondt rule, +which has already been fully described. + +_Criticism of d'Hondt Rule_. + +The d'Hondt rule certainly accomplishes its purpose; it furnishes a +measuring rod by which to measure off the number of seats won by each +list.[6] But the rule is not without its critics.[7] As in the earlier +Swiss methods objection was taken to the undue favouring of certain +remainders, so in Belgium objection is taken to the fact that remainders +are not taken into account at all. The Belgian rule works to the +advantage of the largest party, a fact that many may consider as a point +in its favour. + +A further simple example will explain how the larger parties gain. +Assume that eleven seats are being contested by three parties, whose +votes are as follows:-- + +Party A 6,000 votes + " B 4,800 " + " C 1,900 " + ------ +Total 12,700 + +Arrange these numbers in a line, and divide successively by 1, 2, 3, +and so on, thus:-- + +Party A. Party B. Party C. + 6,000 4,800 1,900 + 3,000 2,400 960 + 2,000 1,600 + 1,500 1,200 + 1,200 960 + 1,000 + +The eleventh highest number, which constitutes the measuring rod, will +be found to be 1000; the largest party obtains six seats, the second +party obtains four seats, with a remainder of 800 votes, and the third +only one seat, with a remainder of 900 votes. The two smaller parties +taken together poll 6700 votes but only obtain five seats, as compared +with the six seats obtained by the larger party with 6000 votes; the two +remainders of 800 and 900 votes, which together constitute more than a +quota, having no influence on the result of the election. Even if, in +the allotment of seats, the largest party has a remainder of votes not +utilized, yet this remainder necessarily bears a smaller proportion to +the total of the votes polled than is the case with a smaller party. +Thus the system works steadily in favour of the larger party. + +The question of remainders, or votes not utilized in the distribution of +seats, is of minor importance when the constituencies return a large +number of members. When, for example, as in the city of Brussels, there +are twenty-one members to be elected, the votes not utilized bear a +small proportion to those that have been taken into account in the +allotment of seats. In Belgium, however, there are several +constituencies returning as few as three members, and there is naturally +a demand that these constituencies should be united so that the method +of distribution should yield more accurate results. + +If the d'Hondt rule, like every other method of distribution, is open to +criticism from the point of view of theoretical perfection, it must be +admitted that in practice it yields excellent results. The election at +Ghent resulted in the return of six Catholics, three Liberals and two +Socialists; it would have been impossible to have allotted the seats +more fairly. Under the old non-proportional method the Catholics would +have obtained eleven representatives and the Liberals and Socialists +none. The immeasurable improvement effected by every true proportional +method is apt to be overlooked in the critical examination of the +working of these methods in those extreme cases which rarely occur +in practice. + +_The formation of "cartels."_ + +The steady working of the d'Hondt rule in favour of the larger parties +has, however, not escaped the attention of advocates of proportional +representation. The late Professor Hagenbach-Bischoff has formulated the +proposal that parties should be allowed to put forward combined lists, +and that in the first allotment of seats the totals of the combined +lists should be taken as the basis of distribution. The need of some +such provision may be shown by an example used in illustration of the +d'Hondt system, at a meeting held under the auspices of the French +Proportional Representation League.[8] A constituency with eleven +members was taken; four lists, A, B, C, and D, received 6498, 2502, +1499, and 501 votes respectively; the d'Hondt rule made 834 the +measuring rod, and gave A seven members, B three, C one, and D none. The +question was asked why provision was not made for the transfer of the +votes from list D to list C, so that if, for example, these lists were +put forward by Radical-Socialists and by Socialists respectively, the +parties might obtain the additional seat to which their combined totals +entitled them. It will be seen that lists C and D, with a total of 2000 +votes (more than twice 834), obtained but one representative, while list +A, with 6498 votes, obtained seven representatives.[9] + +Professor Hagenbach-Bischoffs proposal, which would meet this +difficulty, has not been embodied in the Belgian law, but "cartels" +(arrangements for the presentation of a common list) are formed between +the Liberals and Socialists so as to lessen their loss of representation +due to the working of the d'Hondt rule. The "cartels," however, do not +give satisfaction, as experience shows that many Liberals who would vote +for a Liberal list decline to vote for a "cartel" of Liberals and +Socialists; whilst, on the other hand, extreme Socialists decline to +support a Liberal-Socialist coalition. In the Finnish system, however, +provision is made for the combination of lists in accordance with +Professor Hagenbach-Bischoff's suggestion. Indeed, as the Finnish law +forbids any list to contain more than three names, some such provision +was necessary in order to allow each separate party to nominate a full +list of candidates. + +The experience of the Belgian "cartels" would seem to show that, even +where party organization and discipline are highly developed, many +electors resent the disposal of their votes by a bargain between the +organizations concerned. The single transferable vote, by allowing each +elector to indicate his second choice in the way in which he himself +prefers, would enable smaller parties to obtain their share of +representation without involving a preliminary compact between party +organizations. A list system seems to establish a rigid division between +parties, whilst there is no such corresponding rigid division in the +minds of many electors. The model elections conducted by the +Proportional Representation Society cannot perhaps be accepted as a +conclusive guide to the action of voters at a real election, yet the +number of Liberals who, in the last of these elections, gave an +effective preference to a representative of the Independent Labour +Party, in the person of Mr. Henderson, was very noteworthy. In the +Belgian system no such fluidity is possible; the Liberal electors would +be shut off from any relation with the supporters of Mr. Henderson, who +could figure only upon the Labour Party's list. + +_The different methods of selecting successful candidates_. + +It will be seen that the problem of allotting seats to lists has been +solved in several different ways. Similarly, different methods have +been tried for the purpose of selecting the successful candidates from +the respective lists. The instructions to voters vary accordingly. The +earlier schemes (and the practice obtains in several Swiss cantons +to-day) provided that each elector should have as many votes as there +were members to be elected, and that he might distribute (without the +privilege of cumulating) his votes over the whole of the candidates +nominated, selecting, if he desired, some names from one list, some from +another, and some from another. After the number of seats secured by +each list had been ascertained those candidates were declared elected +who, in the respective lists, had obtained the highest number of +individual votes. + +_Panachage_. + +The practice of voting for candidates belonging to different +lists--_panachage_, as it is called--has evoked considerable discussion, +and still gives rise to differences of opinion among the advocates of +proportional representation on the Continent. At first sight there would +appear to be nothing to discuss, and that there was no possible reason +why the elector should not be allowed to exercise his choice in the +freest manner. It has, however, been found that this privilege can be +used in an unfair way. When each elector has as many votes as there are +candidates, and is not permitted to cumulate his votes on any one, it +usually happens that the votes obtained by individual candidates in any +given list vary but little in number. When in some elections it was +realized that the party could only obtain a certain number of seats, but +that it had a few hundred votes to spare, some extreme partisans used +these votes for the purpose of voting for the least competent men of +their opponents' list, and their action sometimes resulted in the +election of those men in preference to the more competent men of the +party. The danger from this cause would appear to be exaggerated, but +although success has seldom attended the abuse of _panachage_, the fear +of a successful attempt has a disturbing influence. The later Swiss +laws allow electors to cumulate three votes, but not more, upon any one +candidate, so that the success of popular candidates is assured. + +_The single vote and the case de tête_. + +The Belgian parliamentary system suppresses _panachage_, and that in a +most effective way. In this system each elector has but one vote, and +therefore can only vote for one candidate. In addition, the Belgian +system confers upon the organization presenting a list the right to +arrange the order in which the candidates shall appear upon the list, +and, further, it provides that the voter may approve of this arrangement +by voting at the head of the list in the space provided for that purpose +and which is known as the _case de tête_. Party organizations naturally +advise their supporters to vote in this way. Public opinion is divided +on this feature of the Belgian system, but M. Van den Heuvel, formerly +Minister of Justice, who took a responsible part in the passing of the +law, and with whom the author discussed this provision, defended it most +vigorously, on the ground that the party as a whole had a right to +determine which of its members should be elected. In the absence of the +provision referred to it might happen that some candidate would be +elected in preference to one who was more generally approved of by the +party. This may be made clear by an example given by M. Van den Heuvel +himself. A, B, C and D are candidates. Suppose that the party is strong +enough to return three candidates, but no more, and that five-sixths of +the party are in favour of candidates A, B and C, whilst the minority, +one-sixth, are ardently in favour of candidate D. It will be necessary +that the majority of the party (the five-sixths) should cleverly divide +their votes equally between the candidates A, B and C in order to +prevent the possibility of candidate D being elected by a small minority +of the party. A little reflection will show that in the absence of any +such provision the popular candidate of the majority, say A, might +attract too large a proportion of the votes, thereby allowing D to pass +B or C. Each provision of the Belgian system has been most carefully +thought out, and, if it strengthens the hands of party organizations, it +does so in order to secure the representation of the party by the +candidates most generally approved. It may, however, be pointed out that +had the single transferable vote been used, the candidates A, B and C, +who, in M. Van den Heuvel's example, were supported by five-sixths of +the party, would have been sure of election; there would have been no +need to have conferred a special privilege upon the party organizations. + +_The limited and cumulative vote_. + +The French Proportional Representation League, which, impressed with the +simplicity of the Belgian system, desired to introduce it into France, +refrained from advocating the adoption of the _case de tête_, and +suggested that the order in which candidates should be declared elected +on each list should be determined by the votes of the electors. The +French League in its first proposal recommended that each elector +should, as in Belgium, have but one vote. It was soon realized that the +popular candidate of the party might attract a large majority of the +votes, and that, in consequence, candidates might be elected who were +the nominees of only a small section of the party. The League in its +second proposal recommended the use of the limited vote, each elector +having two votes when six deputies were to be elected, and three in +larger constituencies. The League, however, followed the Belgian +practice in confining the choice of the elector to candidates on one +list. This proposition was examined in 1905 by the _Commission du +Suffrage Universel_, which, in the Report, declared that it was +impossible to approve of such a limitation of the elector's freedom. +"Nous ne pouvons," runs the Report, "laisser si étroitment enchainer, +garrotter, ligotter l'electeur proclamé souverain et qui doit en tout +cas être libre." The Committee recommended the use of the limited vote +without the restriction recommended by the League. In a further Report, +issued in 1907, this Committee again emphasized the necessity of leaving +the elector quite free in the choice of candidates, and a new Bill, +drafted by the Committee, provided that each elector should have as many +votes as there were deputies to be elected, and that he should be +allowed to cumulate the whole, or several of his votes, upon any one +candidate. Where, however, the cumulative vote has been introduced into +recent Swiss laws, as in that of the Canton of Bâle City, the elector is +not permitted to cumulate more than three votes upon any one candidate. +It will thus be seen that the single vote, the multiple vote without the +privilege of cumulating, the limited vote, and the cumulative vote, have +all been proposed or adopted as methods of determining which candidates +shall be declared elected. + +_Special characteristics of Swedish and Finnish systems_. + +This summary of the different methods used in solving the double problem +of a list system--the allotment of seats to parties and the selection of +successful candidates--is not fully complete.[10] Special features have +been incorporated in the Swedish and Finnish systems for the purpose of +securing as much freedom of action as possible to electors, and these +systems are described in Appendices Nos. III. and IV. The differences +between the various list systems are, however, not so great as those +between a list system and the single transferable vote, but the +consideration of these must be reserved for the next chapter. + + +[Footnote 1: The text of the Belgian law (Art. 263 of the Electoral +Code) runs as follows: "Le bureau principal divise successivement par 1, +2, 3, 4, 5, &c. le chiftre électoral de chacune des listes et range les +quotients dans l'ordre de leur importance jusqu'à concurrence d'un +nombre total de quotients égal à celui des membres à élire. Le dernier +quotient sert de diviseur électoral. + +"La répartition entre les listes s'opère en attribuant à chacune d'elles +autant de sièges que son chiffre électoral comprend de fois ce +diviseur."] + +[Footnote 2: The order in which the names appear is arranged by the +party presenting the lists.] + +[Footnote 3: A further election (the sixth) took place in 1910.] + +[Footnote 4: See _La Representation Proportionnelle intégrale_, 1910. +Felix Goblet d'Alviella (fils).] + +[Footnote 5: _Rapport de la Commission du Suffrage Universel_, 1905, p. +45.] + +[Footnote 6: Professor Hagenbach-Bischoff, of Bâle, formulated a +different rule which is finding favour in Swiss cantons. The quota which +will ensure the apportionment of all the seats among the lists without +remainder is ascertained by trial. In practice the same results are +obtained as with the d'Hondt rule. Full directions for applying the rule +are contained in Clause XIII. of the law adopted for the canton of Bale +Town.--Appendix IX.] + +[Footnote 7: For recent French criticism, see page 202.] + +[Footnote 8: At Lille, December 1906.] + +[Footnote 9: The new French Bill (_see_ Appendix X.) provides for the +presentation of combined lists (_apparentement_).] + +[Footnote 10: Cf. _La Repésentation Proportionelle en France et en +Belgique_, M. Georges Lachapelle (1911) and the new report of the +Commission du Suffrage Universel (No. 826, Chambre des Députés, 1911). +M. Lachapelle recommends a new proposal, _le système du nombre unique_. +The electoral quotient for all constituencies would be fixed by law at, +say, 15,000 votes. The number of deputies chosen at each election would +be allowed to vary. Each list in each constituency would receive as many +seats as its total contained the quotient. The constituencies would be +grouped into divisions. The votes remaining over after the allotment of +seats in each constituency would be added together, and further seats +would then be allotted to the respective lists.] + + + + +CHAPTER IX + +A COMPARISON OF LIST SYSTEMS WITH THE SINGLE TRANSFERABLE VOTE + + +"Les partis sont une institution de la vie politiquo actuelle. Ils sont +une partie, non écrite, de la Constitution."--P. G. LA CHESNAIS + +_Influence of previous conditions_.] + +List methods of proportional representation have been favoured on the +Continent, the transferable vote in English-speaking countries, and the +question naturally arises, whence this difference? It would appear from +the history of proportional representation that advocates of the reform +have always kept in mind local customs, and have adapted their proposals +to them. Thus a list system of proportional representation was adopted +in Switzerland because such a system was more easily grafted upon +previous electoral conditions. This is the explanation given by Ernest +Naville, who for more than forty years was the leading advocate of +electoral reform in Switzerland, in a letter[1] addressed to the late +Miss Spence of Adelaide, South Australia. "The Swiss Cantons," said he, +"have adopted the system of competing lists. I do not think the system +is the best, but, as it involved the least departure from customary +practices, it was the system for which acceptance could be more easily +obtained. My ideal is a system which leaves the electors face to face +with the candidates without the intervention of lists presented by +parties; that is to say, that the method of voting indicated at the end +of the pamphlet[2] forwarded by you has my preference. It is the system +which I, inspired by the works of Mr. Hare, first proposed in Geneva, +but, in order to obtain a practical result, account has to be taken of +the habits and prejudices of the public to which the appeal is made, and +the best must often be renounced in order to obtain what is possible in +certain given circumstances." In a further letter Professor Naville was +even more emphatic. "I consider," said he, "the Hare system preferable +to that of competing lists. I have always thought so. I have always said +so. But our Swiss people are so accustomed to the _scrutin de liste_, or +multiple vote, that we could not obtain from them the profound +modification which would have been necessary to pass to the +Hare-Spence system." + +_Partly the basis of representation in a list system._ + +The long familiarity of the Belgian electors with the _scrutin de liste_ +also paved the way for the adoption of the list system of proportional +representation, but there is an additional reason why list systems have +found favour on the Continent. Some continental writers consider that +parties as such are alone entitled to representation in Parliament, and +are not enamoured of any scheme which makes personal representation +possible. This view is also taken by Mr. J. Ramsay Macdonald, who, +speaking of the Belgian scheme, says that "it makes party grouping the +most important consideration in forming the legislative order, and is +therefore much truer to the facts of Government than any other +proportional representation scheme."[3] The Royal Commission on +Electoral Systems also seems to have accepted the continental theory, +that "in political elections it is the balance of parties which is of +primary importance." In England, however, representation has never +theoretically been based upon party. The limited vote, the cumulative +vote, the double vote in double-member constituencies, have all allowed +the elector complete freedom of action to follow party instructions, or +to act independently. The electoral method has not been chosen to suit +the convenience of party organizations; parties have had to adapt +themselves to the system of voting. The single transferable vote in +accordance with these traditions bases representation upon electors, and +preserves to them freedom to vote as they please. So much is this the +case that some critics consider it unsuitable for a system of +proportional representation, and although Mill evidently regarded the +Hare scheme not only as a system of personal representation, but as a +plan for securing the representation of majorities and minorities in due +proportion, the Royal Commission on Electoral Systems took the view that +the transferable vote "was not originally invented as a system of +proportional representation, but as a system of personal representation +to secure the return of men as men, not as party units." Again, +Professor Commons says that "the Hare system is advocated by those who, +in a too doctrinaire fashion, wish to abolish political parties."[4] But +in making this statement Professor Commons himself supplies the answer. +"They apparently do not realize," says he, "the impossibility of acting +in politics without large groups of individuals, nor do they perceive +that the Hare system itself, though apparently a system of personal +representation, would nevertheless result in party representation." The +more complete organization of parties is a direct consequence of the +more democratic franchise now existing. Political action in modern times +without organization is impossible. The Johannesburg municipal elections +in November 1909, despite the success of two independent candidates, +showed that the most effective way of conducting elections with the +transferable vote is that of organizations presenting lists of +candidates. Indeed, so great a part does organization take in the +political life of to-day that it is desirable, if possible, to have some +counteracting influence. The transferable vote supplies this by securing +for the elector the utmost measure of freedom of action. + +This freedom of action is greatly appreciated by electors. A voter, +asked after the Johannesburg elections to give his impressions of the +new method of voting, stated that "the new system had put him on his +mettle. He had never experienced so much pleasure in the act of voting; +he had had to use his intelligence in discriminating between the claims +of the various candidates." Voting with the single transferable vote +ceases to be a purely mechanical operation, the voter becomes conscious +of the fact that in voting he is selecting a representative. It is of +little value to ask electors to exercise their intelligence if on the +day of the poll they have no means of doing so. There was some complaint +in Sweden after the first proportional representation elections because +the new system compelled an elector, if he wished to use his vote with +effect, to act rigidly with his party. With the transferable vote party +action has sufficient play. Electors can freely combine and vote as +parties, and effective organization will reap its legitimate reward. But +the elector will not be constrained to act against his wishes. He will +play an effective part in the election. In view of the great freedom +conferred by the single transferable vote on electors, it is not +surprising that the Royal Commission on Electoral Systems reported that +the "Belgian system is foredoomed to rejection by English public +opinion," and Mr. J. R. Macdonald states that "the British mind would +not submit to this (the Belgian) simplest and most efficient form of +proportional representation." + +_The freedom of the elector within the party._ + +Even when representation is based, as in the list systems, upon parties +as such, it becomes necessary to determine the degree of liberty that +shall be allowed to the individual elector in the exercise of the +franchise. If a party has obtained five seats and the party has +nominated seven candidates, how are the five successful ones to be +selected, and what part is the elector to take in the selection? There +is considerable dissatisfaction in Belgium with that part of the system +which enables the party organizations to arrange the order in which the +names shall appear upon the ballot paper, although this order may have +been arrived at by a preliminary election among members of the party. In +the election of 1910 there was a considerable increase in the number of +voters who exercised their right of giving a vote of preference to +individual candidates. The extensive use of this right resulted at +Brussels in the alteration of the order of election as determined by the +party organizations, and Count Goblet d'Alviella points out that this +will demand the consideration of the political parties.[5] Some device +such as that of making the vote transferable within the list will be +required in order to ensure that the majority within the party shall +obtain its full share of the representation. As stated in the previous +chapter, the French Parliamentary Committee felt it necessary to provide +for the elector a greater freedom of action than is possible under the +Belgian system. In the report issued by this Committee in 1905 the use +of the limited vote was recommended; in the report of 1907 the +cumulative vote, which confers still greater freedom upon the elector, +was proposed. In the Swedish system electors not only have full power to +strike out, to add to or to vary the order in which candidates' names +appear upon the ballot papers issued by the party organizations, but +they have the opportunity of presenting a non-party list. The Finnish +electoral law was deliberately framed so as not to interfere with or to +check the liberty of the voter in making up the lists.[6] This law not +only allows the names of candidates to figure on more than one list, but +permits the voter to prepare a list of his own composed of any three of +the candidates who have been duly nominated. In a list system two +problems, the allotment of seats to parties and the selection of the +successful candidates, have to be solved and the solution must in each +case respect the personal freedom of the elector. With the single +transferable vote the same mechanism solves both problems; it gives to +each party its due proportion of seats, it determines in the most +satisfactory way which of the candidates nominated by a party shall be +declared elected, and it does not encroach in any way upon the elector's +freedom of action. There is one point in which the single transferable +vote differs essentially from the list systems. With the former the vote +never passes out of the control of the voter, and the returning officer +can only transfer the vote to some candidate whom the elector has named. +With the list systems adopted in Belgium, Switzerland, Sweden and +Finland, or with that recommended by the French Parliamentary Committee, +a vote given for any one candidate is also a vote for the party which +has nominated the candidate, and the vote may contribute to the success +of some candidate of this party whose election the voter did not desire +to advance. This fact explains the difficulties which have been +associated with the formation of cartels in Belgium. A cartel is an +agreement between two parties to present a common list, and if, as has +taken place in some of the Belgian constituencies, Socialists and +Liberals present a combined list, a Liberal by voting for one of the +Liberal candidates of the cartel may contribute to the success of one of +the Socialist candidates. The Socialist voter may, on the other hand, +contribute to the return of a Liberal candidate. For this reason some +Liberals and some Socialists refuse to support cartels. In Sweden it is +possible that the elector's vote may, if he make use of a party ticket, +contribute to the return of some candidate whom he may have struck off +the list. If two parties agree to place the same motto at the head of +their respective lists, which may be quite distinct, a member of one +party may help to elect an additional candidate of the other party. Yet +a list system affords no way by which votes can be transferred from one +party to an allied party save by a cartel; if transferred at all they +must be transferred _en bloc_ from one party to another party, and not +from one candidate to another candidate, in accordance with the +expressed wishes of the elector. Mr. J. R. Macdonald states that +"proportional representation seeks to prevent the intermingling of +opinion on the margins of parties and sections of parties which is +essential to ordered and organic social progress." The statement is in +no sense true of the single transferable vote which affords every +facility for the intermingling of opinion on the margins of parties and +sections of parties, whilst even in Belgium groups within a party have +always presented a common list. + +_Comparative accuracy._ + +Considerable discussion has taken place as to which of the list systems +yield the most accurate results. It is obvious that as electors do not +divide themselves into groups which are exactly one-fourth, one-fifth, +or one-sixth of the whole, the utmost that a system of proportional +representation can do in the allotment of seats is to approximate as +closely as possible to the proportions in which the electors are +divided. There is very little difference in the results obtained by the +various list systems and by the single transferable vote. The Belgian +(d'Hondt) rule slightly favours the larger party; this rule allots seats +to parties according to the number of times the party total contains the +common divisor, the votes remaining over being ignored. For this reason +other advocates of list systems prefer the simple rule-of-three or +_méthode rationelle._[7] With this system the total number of votes +polled is divided by the number of seats. The totals gained by the +respective lists are then divided by the quotient thus obtained and the +seats allotted to the lists accordingly. If after the allotment of seats +to the different lists there remain some seats not allotted, these are +awarded to the lists with the largest numbers of votes not utilized. The +transferable vote in practice, if not in theory, also awards seats to +the various parties according to the number of times the party total +contains the quota. If there is a seat not allotted it does not +necessarily fall to the party having the largest number of votes not +utilized. All the votes not utilized are taken into consideration, and +the smaller remainders may, by combination, win the odd seat. For +example, suppose that in a six-member constituency five seats have been +allotted and three candidates remain in competition for the last seat +with votes as follows:-- + +Candidate A 4,000 + " B 3,000 + " C 2,000 + +Then if the supporters of candidate C prefer B to A and have indicated +this fact on the ballot papers, the votes given to C would be +transferred to B, who would be elected to fill the last seat. With the +d'Hondt rule remainders are ignored; with the "rational method" the +largest remainders are favoured; with the single transferable vote the +last seat is awarded to the majority of the electors not otherwise +represented. The transferable vote therefore gives a result at least as +accurate as any of the rules devised in connexion with the list systems. +But in the majority of cases all three rules will yield the same result. + +_Panachage._ + +In the previous chapter reference has been made to the possible abuse of +_panachage_. In order to prevent such practice the Belgian system +provides that the elector shall vote for a member on one list only. In +Switzerland the elector is permitted to vote for members of more than +one list, and any abuse of this privilege is prevented by allowing the +elector to cumulate as many as three votes upon any of his favourite +candidates. This provision assures the return of the favourite +candidates of each party. The problem hardly arises with the single +transferable vote; the favourites of each party will doubtless always +receive more votes than are sufficient to ensure their election. The +elector who desires to advance the interests of his own party as much as +possible must indicate his preferences among all the members of his own +party before recording any preference for a candidate of another. + +_Applicability to non-political elections._ + +The single transferable vote possesses another advantage over list +systems. It is not only applicable to political elections, but to all +elections in which it is desired that the elected body should be +representative in character, but in which party lists are undesirable. +The British Medical Association has decided to conduct all its elections +so far as possible by the transferable vote; Trades Unions have made use +of it in the election of their committees; it has been used in Australia +by the Labour party for the selection of parliamentary candidates by +members of the party before the date of election. Thus the single +transferable vote would produce a much to be desired uniformity in +method in different elections. + +_Bye-elections._ + +The list systems have an advantage over the transferable vote in the +simplicity of their solution of the problem of bye-elections. Under list +systems bye-elections are abolished. But the preliminary question, +whether it is desirable that they should be abolished, needs +consideration. The Report of the Royal Commission on Electoral Systems +says: "Neither the single transferable vote nor list systems provide for +a solution of the problem of bye-elections which is both fitted to +English ideas and practically satisfactory." The Report continues: +"Bye-elections are generally regarded as valuable, if rough, tests of +public approval or disapproval of the proceedings of the Government, and +useful indications of the trend of political feeling. A system, +therefore, which would abolish or seriously hamper them is bound to +excite opposition."[8] If bye-elections are desirable because of the +indications which they give of the trend of political feeling, then the +large constituencies which the proportional system demands would add to +their value. The opinion of a larger number of electors would +be obtained. + +Wherever the single transferable vote has been adopted bye-elections +have been retained. In Tasmania, whenever a vacancy occurs the whole +constituency is polled; the Transvaal Municipal Act allows single +vacancies to remain unfilled, but provides for bye-elections when two or +more seats become vacant. The Proportional Representation Society, in +view of the demand for the retention of bye-elections, suggests that +single vacancies should be immediately filled by a bye-election when +they occur in a three-membered constituency, but that in larger areas no +bye-election should be held until two seats are vacated. But is not the +importance of bye-elections overrated? In many respects they are the +least satisfactory feature of English elections, and it is noticeable +that the change of opinion registered in a bye-election has often not +been maintained when the same constituency is polled at a General +Election. A considerable proportion of bye-elections are consequent upon +the taking of office by members of Parliament, and it is generally +agreed that such bye-elections are not necessary. Further, the House of +Commons has already resolved that it is desirable to reduce the length +of parliaments to five years, which in practice would mean a working +life of four years. The shortening of parliaments would destroy what +little value bye-elections possess. + +With a system of proportional representation bye-elections may produce +results which are unfair to the minority. If, for example, at a General +Election a constituency returned four Conservatives, two Liberals, and +one Socialist, and the Socialist member died or retired during the +lifetime of the parliament, the largest party would at a bye-election be +able to gain another member at the expense of the smallest party in the +constituency. This possible injustice is avoided in the list systems by +the abolition of bye-elections. Supplementary members are chosen at the +time of the General Election, and these are called upon to fill +vacancies in the order of their election. The party character of +representation remains unchanged from one election to another. When the +cumulative vote was used for School Board elections casual vacancies +were filled by co-option, and the party in whose ranks the vacancy +occurred was usually allowed to nominate his successor by consent of the +whole Board. Doubtless were bye-elections abolished there would be a +similar willingness to act fairly towards the smaller parties, but if it +was felt desirable to bring the transferable vote into agreement with +the practice followed in the list systems the necessary arrangements +could be made. On the death or retirement of a member the quota of +ballot papers by which he was elected, kept meanwhile under official +seal, could be re-examined, and the candidate who had secured a majority +of the highest preferences recorded on the papers could be called upon +to fill the vacancy. + +_Relative simplicity of scrutiny._ + +Experience shows conclusively that proportional systems, even the most +complex, present no great difficulty to the voter, and therefore there +is little to choose between them. The work thrown upon the returning +officer varies considerably, but in every country the returning officers +have proved equal to their task. The author has been present at Belgian +elections and at Swedish elections; he has conducted model elections in +England, and has been present at elections in the Transvaal, and has +therefore had some opportunity of judging different systems from the +point of view of facility in the counting of votes. The conclusion +arrived at is that the different schemes may be arranged in the +following order:-- + +1. The single transferable vote when the surplus votes are taken from +the top of the successful candidate's heap; + +2. The Belgian list system with its single vote; + +3. The single transferable vote with the surplus votes distributed +proportionately to the next preferences, as prescribed in the Schedule +of Lord Courtney's Municipal Representation Bill. + +4. List systems in which more than one vote is recorded. With these, the +counting increases in difficulty with the complexity of the scheme. + +The reasons for this conclusion are briefly these: Whenever the ballot +paper (as in the Belgian system and with the single transferable vote) +represents but one vote only, the process of counting consists of +sorting papers according to the votes given, and then in counting the +heaps of papers so formed. Whenever there is more than one vote recorded +upon a ballot paper it becomes necessary to extract the particulars of +each paper upon recording sheets. This is the case in the London Borough +Council elections, when the _scrutin de liste_ in its simple form is +used, and when, as in the list system proposed by the committee of the +French Chamber, the elector may cumulate or distribute his votes as he +pleases, selecting candidates from any or all the lists, this process of +extracting the details of the ballot papers must involve considerable +labour. By comparison, the process of sorting and counting ballot papers +is extremely simple. The Belgian law makes provision for the employment +of two "professional calculators," who are responsible for the accuracy +of the arithmetical calculations, and if the more accurate form of the +single transferable vote is adopted, it will be desirable that the +returning officer should have two assistants whose special duty it +should be to verify the accuracy of each stage of the process. + +In any comparison between the two main systems of proportional +representation there is no need to understate the advantages of either. +The results which have followed from the adoption of list systems on the +continent have shown how immeasurably superior these are to ordinary +electoral methods. Even in the most rigid of these systems--the +Belgian--there is within each party considerable freedom of opinion in +respect of all political questions which do not spring directly from the +principles on which the party is based. It is claimed, however, for the +single transferable vote that it is more elastic than the most complex +of list systems, that it more freely adapts itself to new political +conditions, and that in small constituencies returning, say, five or +seven members, it yields better results. Moreover, this system, based as +it is upon the direct representation of the electors, has appealed with +greater force to English-speaking peoples; it has its advocates in South +Africa, Australia, New Zealand and Canada, as well as in England, and as +a common electoral method for the British Empire is a desideratum in +itself, the balance of advantage, at least for English-speaking peoples, +would appear to be with the single transferable vote. + + +[Footnote 1: October 1894.] + +[Footnote 2: An address given by Miss Spence at River House, Chelsea, +London.] + +[Footnote 3: _Socialism and Government_, vol. i. p. 146.] + +[Footnote 4: _Proportional Representation_, New Edition, p. 104.] + +[Footnote 5: "Il serait désirable que nos associations politiques se +prononcent plus explicitement sur sa légitimité, si l'on ne veut pas que +ce genre de propagande reste une duperie pour les candidats les plus +scrupuleux." --_Nos Partis Politiques au lendemain du 22 Mai 1910_, +p. 10.] + +[Footnote 6: _Cf_. pamphlet, _The Finnish Reform Bill_, Helsingfors, +1906.] + +[Footnote 7: Readers who desire to follow the discussion as to the +comparative merits of the d'Hondt rule and the _méthode rationelle_, +should consult the following works:-- + +_Examen Critique des Divers Precédés de Répartition Proportionnelle en +Matière Electorale_, par M. E. Macquart; _Revue Scientifique_, 28 +October 1905. + +_La Représentation Proportionnelle et les Partis Politiques_, par M. +P.G. la Chesnais. + +_La Vraie Représentation Proportionnelle_, par M. Gaston Moch.] + +[Footnote 8: Ibid., par. 83.] + + + + +CHAPTER X + +PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION AND PARTY GOVERNMENT + +"Parties form and re-form themselves; they come together, dissolve, and +again come together; but in this flux and reflux a stability reigns such +as we observe amid similar phenomena in the course of nature; and indeed +it is the course of nature, only working in the world of politics +instead of the world of physics."--LORD COURTNEY OF PENWITH + +"To think in programmes is Egyptian bondage, and works the sterilization +of the political intellect."--AUGUSTINE BIRRELL + +Hitherto the objection most often urged against proportional +representation has been that it is impracticable; the successful +working, however, of the single transferable vote in Tasmania, in the +elections of the South African Senate and in the Transvaal Municipal +elections, and of list systems in Belgium, Switzerland, Sweden, +Würtemberg and Finland has furnished a complete answer to this +objection. Manhood suffrage obtains in Belgium, adult suffrage in +Tasmania and Finland, and if, in countries possessing a franchise so +democratic, proportional systems have proved successful, it is no longer +possible to declare that proportional representation is impracticable. +Indeed, the practicability of proportional representation is now +generally admitted, and its critics prefer to lay stress upon objections +of another character. They even complain, as does Professor Jenks, that +"the supporters of the movement appear to be concentrating all their +arguments on the feasibility of their project, quietly assuming that its +desirability is axiomatic."[1] It does seem axiomatic that it is +desirable that representative institutions should reflect the views of +those represented, but it is now alleged that the representative +principle is merely "a means of getting things done," that the chief +function of the House of Commons is to provide the country with a strong +Government, and that proportional representation would render these +things impossible "because there would be no permanent majority strong +enough to get its own way." + +_Proportional representation and the two-party system._ + +This fear of a weakened executive doubtless explains why many others who +admit the justice and practicability of proportional representation, +still hesitate to support a reform the effects of which may greatly +modify existing parliamentary conditions. "We have still," said _The +Westminster Gazette,_[2] "to be convinced that we shall do well to make +still more difficult the maintenance of the two-party system, and that +it seems to us would almost certainly be the effect of proportional +representation." Ten years ago some professed supporters of proportional +representation took up the extraordinary position of allowing it only in +respect of two great parties within a State,[3] and quoted in support of +their views the words of Professor Paul Reinsch in his work on _World +Politics:_ "It is still as true as when Burke wrote his famous defence +of party, in his _Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents_, +that, for the realization of political freedom, the organization of the +electorate into regular and permanent parties is necessary. +Parliamentary government has attained its highest success only in those +countries where political power is held alternately by two great +national parties." Is no allowance to be made for the fluidity of +progressive democracy? Is it imagined that active political thought can +be compelled to follow stereotyped channels? Too profound a respect for +a system designed to meet former conditions led the Royal Commission on +Electoral Methods to the conclusion that, "reviewing the whole of the +evidence, and duly considering the gravity of the change involved, we +are unable to report that a case has been made out before us for the +adoption of the transferable vote here and now for elections to the +House of Commons."[4] The Commission proceed "to emphasize the exact +nature and limitations of this conclusion," which ultimately amounts to +no more than a suggestion for the postponement of an inevitable +change.[5] But the fact remains that the Royal Commission accepted the +theory of government placed before it by those who desire to maintain +the existing party system and who are of opinion that that system can +only be maintained by single-member constituencies and the majority +method of election. "On the question," says the Commission, "whether the +representation of all parties in proportion to their voting strength is +in itself desirable, we may point out that it is not a fair argument +against the present system that it fails to produce such a result, +because it does not profess to do so. A General Election is, in fact, +considered by a large portion of the electorate of this country as +practically a referendum on the question which of two governments shall +be returned to power."[6] " ... The case of those who hold that the +transferable vote is not capable of application in this country rests +only to a very slight extent on its mechanical difficulties.... The most +potent arguments are a theory of representation on the one hand and a +theory of government on the other."[7] It is evident that the most +important objection which advocates of proportional representation have +to meet concerns its probable effect upon party organization and upon +party government, and it is therefore necessary to consider this +objection in detail. + +_Burke's view of party and party discipline._ + +In the first place, can Burke's definition of party be used in defence +of modern party organization and discipline? The character of these has +fundamentally changed since Burke's time. His conception of national +parties and also, perhaps, of the probable influence of a system of +proportional representation upon their formation may be gathered from +his own words. "Party," says Burke, "is a body of men united for +promoting by their joint endeavours the national interest upon some +particular principle in which they are all agreed. For my part I find it +impossible to conceive that any one believes in his own politics, or +thinks them to be of any weight, who refuses to adopt the means of +having them reduced into practice. It is the business of the speculative +philosopher to mark the proper ends of government. It is the business of +the politician, who is the philosopher in action, to find out proper +means towards those ends, and to employ them with effect. Therefore +every honourable connexion will avow it is their first purpose to pursue +every just method to put the men who hold their opinions into such a +condition as may enable them to carry their common plans into execution, +with all the power and authority of the state." No advocate of +proportional representation would in the least quarrel with Burke's +definition of party or deny that sustained effort and efficient +organization are absolutely essential if practical effect is to be given +to political principles. Burke, however, did not contemplate a party +system in which complete submission to the programme of the party was +considered an essential condition of membership. Burke's definition of +party must be read in conjunction with his own interpretation of the +term. "In order," says he, "to throw an odium on political connexion, +these politicians suppose it a necessary incident to it that you are +blindly to follow the opinions of your party, when in direct opposition +to your own clear ideas; a degree of servitude that no worthy man could +bear the thought of submitting to; and such as, I believe, no connexions +(except some court factions) ever could be so senselessly tyrannical as +to impose. Men thinking freely will, in particular instances, think +differently. But still as the greater part of the measures which arise +in the course of public business are related to, or depend on, some +great leading general principles in government, a man must be peculiarly +unfortunate in the choice of his political company, if he does not agree +with them at least nine times in ten. If he does not concur in these +general principles upon which the party is founded, and which +necessarily draw on a concurrence in their application, he ought from +the beginning to have chosen some other, more conformable to his +opinions."[8] Burke does not limit the number of parties to two, and if +his authority is to be invoked in support of the maintenance of the +two-party system, it can only be invoked in support of the maintenance +of two parties which are based on such leading general principles as +will cover the whole field of politics, and the organization of which is +such as to leave to members of the party a considerable measure of +freedom in respect of individual questions. "We may be confident," says +Lord Courtney of Penwith, "that the two main divisions will survive, the +one pressing forward and the other cautiously holding back,"[9] and in +so far as it corresponds to the two main tendencies in human thought the +two-party system will doubtless survive any change in voting method. But +with the spread of political intelligence it cannot possibly survive the +rigidity of modern discipline--a rigidity which Burke would have been +the first to repudiate--nor can it survive the modern tendency towards +the formation of parties for the purpose of carrying specific reforms. + +_Narrow basis fatal to a large party._ + +The complete transformation of the Conservative Party into a Tariff +Reform Party would considerably narrow its basis, and any narrowing of +the basis of one party must help to break down the two-party system. For +although Tariff Reform is a matter of great national interest, having +very far-reaching effects, it obviously does not cover the whole field +of politics. There is no fundamental and necessary relation between +Tariff Reform and Home Rule, the constitutional position of the House of +Lords, or the special problem of the place of religion in national +education. Nor does it necessarily or even naturally attract those +cautious intellects which are the typical supporters of Conservatism. +The strenuous efforts which have been made in recent years to exclude +from the Unionist Party all who are unwilling to accept the policy of +Tariff Reform have, it is true, been crowned with considerable success, +but there is a limit to the process of unification. Should the advocates +of this fiscal change, for example, have desired to make terms with the +Nationalist party for the purpose of carrying their policy, any attempt +to impose those terms upon all members of the party would have resulted +in a further and probably a more serious split. In such circumstances +parties necessarily give place to groups, and the fissiparous tendency +is most apparent where party discipline is most rigid. The solidarity of +the German Social Democratic Party will only be maintained by according +liberty of action in local matters to the South German Socialists.[10] +The formation of the French Unified Socialist Party was a work of +considerable difficulty, and its maintenance will only be possible if +its constituent parts can tolerate differences of opinion. The two +sections of the English Labour Party have been able to work together by +concentrating their efforts on reforms which are advocated by both, +whilst the troubles which have arisen within the smaller group, the +Independent Labour Party, have sprung from attempts to insist upon a +narrow interpretation of the term Independent. The narrower the basis on +which the parties are formed and the more rigid the discipline employed, +the more difficult will become the maintenance of the two-party system. +If, then, it is considered essential to the successful working of +parliamentary government that there should be but two parties, these +parties must be based on broad leading principles and must be so +organized as to allow for differences of opinion on minor matters. With +the increase in the number of questions of first-class importance it +will, however, be difficult to maintain even the semblance of the +two-party system, and in the absence of those more elastic political +conditions which a system of proportional representation provides, +absolutely impossible. + +_Proportional representation and party discipline._ + +The argument in the preceding paragraphs can be illustrated from the +effect of proportional systems on party organization in those countries +in which they are at present in force. In Belgium the prophecy was +repeatedly made that the new law would result in the splitting of +parties into petty factions, rendering parliamentary government +impossible. Its real effect has been, if anything, of the contrary +character. There are still but three Belgian parties--Catholic, Liberal, +and Socialist. Their principles have tended to become more clearly +defined, but within each party there has arisen a considerable freedom +of opinion in respect to all political questions which do not spring +directly from the principles on which the parties are based. This was +clearly shown in the discussion on the proposals for the annexation of +the Congo. At the conference of Liberals held before the General +Election of 1908 it was decided that the annexation of the Congo should +be treated as a _question libre_. M. Vandervelde, at the same time, +expressed opinions on this subject which were contrary to those held by +the majority of Socialists, whilst several Catholics, who disapproved of +the terms on which the Congo was offered to the nation, did not hesitate +to say so. None of these expressions of opinion involved ostracism from +the party, and, although party discipline is strict, there is but little +doubt that this freedom of movement in respect to non-party questions +will continue to grow. The annexation of the Congo was voted in due +course, but the original draft of the Treaty received important +modifications which were due largely to the action and criticism of the +more independent Conservatives. + +The question of free trade or protection does not, at the present time, +occupy a prominent place in Belgian politics, but should it do so, there +is no reason to assume that opinions either for or against free trade +would involve, as here, ostracism from any party. Such conditions admit +of a much more genuine discussion of public and of economic questions. +In England, with the system of single-member constituencies, Unionist +Free Traders have had the alternative placed before them of submitting +to the opinions of the majority of the party or of retiring from all +active participation in public life. In Belgium, on the other hand, +proportional representation has induced parties, while adhering to their +fundamental principles, to make their lists of candidates as inclusive +as possible. The list presented by the Catholics at Ghent in 1908 +contained not only a free trader and a protectionist, but +representatives of different classes of interests within the +constituency, of agriculture, of landed proprietors, of workmen and of +masters of industry. Stress was laid upon the comprehensive character of +their list in the election address issued by the Catholics, and each +party endeavoured to make its list representative of the forces within +the party. Special efforts indeed are taken to accomplish this end; in +the preparation of the Liberal list members of the organization took +part in the preliminary selection of candidates, the final choice being +determined by a formal election. In reporting that the Belgian system of +proportional representation "is not favourable to small independent +parties, or, what is of greater interest to many observers in this +country, to small sections or wings of large parties," the Royal +Commission on Electoral Systems misinterpreted the working of the +Belgian system. It is true that the Christian Democrats form the only +small party in Belgium which has obtained direct representation, but the +Belgian system has certainly given representation to the wings of large +parties. Count Goblet d'Alviella, who was examined by the Commission, +has kindly furnished some observations upon the Commission's statement. +"Whenever there is room," he writes, "that is, where the seats are +numerous enough, the leaders take the greatest care to choose +representatives of the principal shades of opinion within their party +lines. At Brussels in 1910 the Catholics placed on their list not only +M. Colfs, who upset their order of precedence in the previous election, +but also M. Theodor, who, for the last three times, +headed--unsuccessfully--a separate list of the so-called Independent +Party. The Liberal list at Brussels has been formed by the joint action +of Moderates (Ligue libérale) and Radicals (Association libérale), each +of these two organizations trying to give satisfaction to their own +subdivisions (Flemish and Walloon, rural and urban, &c.). At Antwerp the +Liberal list has been formed by five Liberal organizations, each one +choosing its own representative." The M. Colfs referred to in Count +Goblet d'Alviella's letter strongly opposed the military proposals of +the Belgian Government, but he was, nevertheless, placed by the party +organization on the official list. Thus, in Belgium wings of parties +undoubtedly obtain their legitimate influence, and this renders the +formation of independent small parties superfluous. The number of broad +general principles on which political parties can be based is strictly +limited, and this explains why neither the Belgian nor any other system +of proportional representation will produce innumerable parties. + +_"Free Questions" in Japan._ + +The electoral system in Japan, giving as it does great freedom for the +expression of political opinion, has resulted, as in Belgium, in the +separation of political questions into two types--party and free. +According to Mr. Kametaro Hayashida, the Secretary of the Japanese House +of Representatives, the measures before parliament are duly considered +at party meetings; after deliberation a decision is taken as to whether +the measure under discussion should be treated as a party question, or +whether freedom of action should be permitted to the individual members +of the party, and a communication, embodying the result of the party +meeting, is then sent to every member. Here then we get additional +evidence of the amelioration of party spirit, which follows the adoption +of a more elastic system of representation. Political debate must become +in such cases not only more real but infinitely more valuable. The +number of questions left to the discretion of the individual member is +by no means inconsiderable, as will be seen from the following figures +showing the attitude taken by the various parties towards public +questions in 1908:-- + +(1)--Laws + +Party . . . . . Constitutionalist Progressive Conservative Radical + +Party questions . 105 75 66 -- +Free questions. . 2 32 41 107 + +(2)--Petitions + +Party . . . . . Constitutionalist Progressive Conservative Radical + +Party questions . 63 167 68 -- +Free questions. . 119 15 114 182 + +"It should be noted," says Mr. Hayashida, "that the Radicals had no +party questions, but made all questions free. On the other hand, the +Constitutionalists, who supported the Government, made party questions +of practically all laws submitted. On the average, apart from the +Radicals, the three other parties treated 23 per cent. of the laws, and +37 per cent. of the petitions in the twenty-sixth session of the +Imperial Japanese Diet as free questions." + +_The formation of groups._ + +Such evidence as we possess does not then warrant the assumption that a +proportional system leads to an increase in the number of political +parties. It makes them more elastic. On the other hand, it has been +demonstrated beyond any doubt that a system of single-member +constituencies has completely failed to maintain the two-party system. +In England the Labour Party forms within the House of Commons a distinct +camp by itself, the Nationalist Party still more jealously guards its +independence, and at the election of January, 1910, a smaller group of +Independent Nationalists was formed. The rise of the Labour Party in +Australia was not prevented by a system of single-member constituencies. +In Germany and France single-member constituencies have not arrested the +development of groups with national, religious, or sectional programmes. +When, therefore, it is contended that proportional representation will +lead to the formation of groups, the obvious answer is that it is the +present system which is producing groups; and should the representation +obtained by these groups, as in France and Germany and in Australia, +give no clear indication of public opinion, then the instability which +has been a characteristic of French and for a time of Australian +parliamentary conditions may become characteristic of the House +of Commons. + +Nor do those advocates of proportional representation, who desire to +maintain the two-party system by artificial means, offer any machinery +adequate for the purpose. In an article written before the first +elections for the Commonwealth parliament, Mr. Deakin wrote as +follows:-- + +"By the very circumstances of the case the tariff issue cannot but +dominate the first election, and determine the fate of the first +ministry of the Commonwealth. There will be no time for second thoughts +or for suspension of judgment. The first choice of the people will be +final on this head. The first parliament must be either protectionist or +anti-protectionist, and its first great work an Australian tariff. That +is the clear-cut issue. The risk is that a proportion of the +representatives may be returned upon other grounds, as the electors as a +whole may not realise all that is at stake or make the necessary +sacrifices or opinion and preferences to express themselves emphatically +on this point." + +In commenting upon this declaration the supporters of so-called +two-party proportional representation[11] said: + +"The only way to avoid the risk indicated is to take this one definite +issue as the basis of proportional representation. Each State should be +divided on it, and should elect its proportional number of Free-trade +and Protectionist representatives." But how are all the electors to be +constrained into accepting the dictates of party leaders as to the lines +upon which elections shall be fought? The Labour Party in Australia +apparently considered the special principles for which they stood of +more importance than either Free Trade or Protection. The English Labour +Party would doubtless adopt the same point of view, whilst the +Nationalists regard the Tariff question as of little importance as +compared with Home Rule. "The rude and crude division," said Mr. +Asquith, "which used to correspond more or less accurately with the +facts of a representative assembly of two parties, had perhaps become +everywhere more or less a thing of the past."[12] There are no means +available for restoring the earlier conditions, and certainly the +existing electoral system of single-member constituencies affords no +guarantee that in the future any one party will obtain a permanent +majority strong enough to get its own way. The maintenance in form of +the two-party system during the parliament of 1906-10 was merely due to +the accident of the phenomenal election of 1906, when the Liberal Party +was returned in such numbers as to exceed the combined forces of all +other groups. At the General Election of January, 1910, five parties +entered the field, and as a result of this election no party obtained +an absolute majority. In the important parliamentary debates which arose +immediately after the election each of these groups took part, as such, +for the purpose of emphasizing their independence, and when, consequent +upon the death of King Edward, a conference on the constitutional +question was arranged between the leaders of the Conservative and +Liberal parties, Mr. Ramsay Macdonald, in commenting upon the +conference, made this statement: "He regretted that there was going to +be any conference at all, but if there was going to be one he, as a +member of the Labour Party, denied the right of the two front benches to +settle it. They no longer represented the House of Commons or the +opinion of the country. There were other benches."[13] Obviously, if +other benches are to be taken into consideration in the solution of +constitutional questions, it is a matter of importance to know the true +strength that lies behind those occupying them. The difference--an +extremely important difference--that a proportional system would produce +in the composition of the House of Commons is that the representation +obtained by these groups would give a much more accurate clue to public +opinion and, as in the long-run the strength of an executive depends +upon its capacity to interpret the will of the people, the position of +the executive would be rendered much more stable. This is the +justification of Mr. Asquith's statement: "Let them have a House of +Commons which fully reflected every strain of opinion; that was what +made democratic government in the long-run not only safer and more free, +but more stable." + +But does parliamentary government, as the Royal Commission on Electoral +Systems suggests, really depend for its working upon the maintenance of +a system of election which admittedly distorts the real wishes of the +people? This argument had been anticipated and effectively dealt with by +M. Ostrogorski in his _Democracy and Political Parties_. "There arises," +says he, "the old question of the Duke of Wellington, frightened by the +prospect of the abolition of the rotten boroughs: How will the King's +government be carried out? How will parliamentary government work? In +reality the catastrophe will not be more than that which so alarmed the +hero of Waterloo; now, as then, it will be nothing more nor less than +the destruction of something rotten."[14] The King's government has been +improved by the abolition of the rotten boroughs, and will be still +further improved if opinion within the House of Commons is brought into +more direct relation with opinion outside. The view taken by the +Commission was not shared by one of its members, Lord Lochee, who in a +note appended to the Report says: "I am not concerned to dispute that +the introduction of proportional representation might involve important +changes in parliamentary government. That, in my view, is not a question +for the Commission. I shall, therefore, only say that I do not believe +that the cause of good government is bound up with the maintenance of a +distorted representation, or that British statesmanship would be unable +to cope with the problems which a better system might bring in +its train." + +_The formation of an executive_. + +Changes will doubtless take place in the method of carrying on the +King's government, but they will take place very gradually, and will be +evolved out of present conditions. It would be essential, as now, that +the government should possess the confidence of the House of Commons and +of the country, and, in order to obtain this confidence it would not be +sufficient to secure a majority by means of bargainings between groups +which involved important sacrifices of principle. Even with such rigid +party discipline as now obtains it would be difficult and perhaps +impossible to effect an alliance between Unionist Tariff Reformers and +Nationalists for the purpose of carrying out a double policy of Tariff +Reform and Home Rule. It is certain that under a system of proportional +representation such an arrangement would be useless as a basis for a +stable executive, for with the lessened rigidity in discipline party +leaders would have no means of enforcing the terms of such bargains upon +their followers. The composition of the House itself would give a clear +indication of the main policies which would meet with the approval of +the House and also of the Government which would command its confidence. +It is perhaps unwise to attempt to map out in any detail the probable +course of events, but there are some who are unwilling to take this step +forward in the perfecting of democratic institutions without some clear +conception of the way in which a good government might be formed under +the new conditions. Professor Nanson of Melbourne has endeavoured to +satisfy this anxiety by attempting to forecast the probable effect which +a system of proportional representation would have upon the formation of +governments in Australia, showing how such a system would enable a +really stable executive to be formed. + +"To bring the matter vividly before us," says he, "consider the two +vital issues now before the Australian public. These are Protection and +the Labour platform. Every elector and every candidate at once falls +into one of four groups. For every one is either Protectionist or +anti-Protectionist, and every one is either Labour or non-Labour. Every +person is therefore either Protectionist and Labour, or Protectionist +and non-Labour, or anti-Protectionist and Labour, or anti-Protectionist +and non-Labour. Using the letters P, A, L, N to denote Protectionist, +Anti-protectionist, Labour, Non-labour, we have four groups which we may +denote by PL, PN, AL, AN. + +"It is clear that if we can find out the number of voters in each group +we can at once declare the verdict of the country for or against +Protection, and for or against the Labour platform. Suppose, for the +sake of argument, that the percentage of voters are: Non-labour +Protectionist, 32; Non-labour Anti-protectionist, 28; Labour +Protectionist, 24; Labour Anti-protectionist, 16; as shown in the +following table:-- + + P A +N .... 32 28 60 +L .... 24 16 40 + _ _ __ + 50 44 100 + +"Then it is clear that there is a majority of 60 per cent, to 40 per +cent, against the Labour platform, and a majority of 56 per cent, to 44 +per cent, in favour of protection. Under such circumstances the +distribution of members in a House of 75 would be as follows:-- + + P A +N .... 24 21 45 +L .... 18 12 30 + _ _ _ + 42 33 75 + +"In such a House there would be a majority of 45 to 30 against the +Labour platform, and a majority of 42 to 33 in favour of Protection. In +such a House the only possible Ministry would be a Non-labour +Protectionist. There would be a straight out Ministerial party of 24. +There would be a right Ministerial Labour Protectionist wing of 18 bound +to support the Ministry in its Protectionist policy. There would be a +left Ministerial Anti-protectionist Non-labour wing of 21 bound to +support the Ministry in its Non-labour policy. The straight out +Opposition would be 12. Such a House might well be left to elect a +Ministry. Every minister would, with a proper method of election, if +necessary, be a Non-labour Protectionist. For there would be an absolute +majority of the House against every Labour man and against every +Anti-protectionist. Every Minister would be heart and soul with the +Ministerial policy. There could then be no possibility of dirt eating or +of voting against one's convictions, as is alleged to be the case at +present."[15] The divisions between English political parties may not +be so clearly cut nor the composition of the Executive so homogeneous as +outlined in this forecast of Professor Nanson, but a proportional system +would certainly yield a true indication of the mind of the nation on at +least three, and probably more, of the important matters under +discussion in England--Tariff Reform, Home Rule, and the constitutional +position of the House of Lords. A clear expression of national opinion +on these issues would determine the policy which an executive resting +for authority upon the House of Commons would have to pursue, but, in +addition, the improved electoral methods would yield unmistakable +indications of the attitude of the nation towards those Labour and +Social questions which will more and more claim the attention of +Parliament. In brief, so far from proportional representation creating +conditions unfavourable to the formation of a strong executive, it will +furnish the only means by which in the future stable executives can be +formed. It will place within the hands of governments a new and more +delicate instrument with which to gauge public opinion, and it is on the +accurate interpretation of public opinion that the continued existence +of a government depends. + +_A check on partisan legislation._ + +But those who, with Professor Jenks, regard the representative principle +as being merely a means of getting things done, will perhaps want some +indication of the possibility, not only of forming an Executive under a +proportional regime but of carrying legislation. There are obviously two +aspects to this question. The power of initiating and of controlling +legislation is now so largely in the hands of the executive authority +that means are required not only of getting things done but of ensuring +that the privileged position possessed by the executive authority is not +abused. The present system enables a ministry in command of an +overwhelming but false majority to impose upon the nation legislation +with which the nation is not in accord. It is more than doubtful whether +the Education and Licensing measures carried by Mr. Balfour's +administration (1902-5) would have been acceptable to a House of Commons +which was truly representative, and as Mr. Balfour's government +dominated the House of Lords as completely as it controlled the House of +Commons, the only check which existed upon the action of the Ministry +was the fear of defeat when the time came for the inevitable appeal to +the country. Such a check has proved to be inadequate to prevent the +passage of partisan legislation, and the failure of the House of Commons +to protect the nation against legislation of an arbitrary nature has +given rise to the demand for checks of another character. + +_Unlike the referendum, proportional representation will +strengthen the House of Commons._ + +Thus, it is now urged that the nation should, by means of the +referendum, be afforded the opportunity of exercising that control over +the executive which the House of Commons has lost. "Formerly," says +Professor Dicey, "when the King was the real and effective sovereign of +the country, and was responsible for its government, it was right that +he should have a veto. The nation is now the sovereign, and what I +propose is to place a veto in the hands of the nation.[16] Now, although +proportional representation is not inconsistent with the referendum, yet +these two reforms endeavour to cure the defects of representative +institutions in different ways. The referendum, by transferring +responsibility and authority from the House of Commons to the nation, +will tend to diminish the importance of the representative chamber. +Proportional representation, on the other hand, aims at strengthening +the House by making it more fully representative, and in consequence +more competent to discharge its true functions. Moreover, there are some +practical objections to the referendum. There must always be +considerable difficulty in framing the form in which a legislative +proposal should be submitted to the country. To be permitted to say +'yes' or 'no' to a complicated measure is not sufficient. It would have +been extremely difficult for most of the electors to have stated, +without any qualification, whether they approved of Mr. Asquith's +Licensing Bill of 1908. This measure was far too comprehensive to submit +as a whole, and an unfavourable verdict would have given no clear +indication as to the nation's wishes, and would have been open to +serious misinterpretation. The new licensing duties and the new land +taxes contained in the Finance Bill of 1909 had nothing in common, and +it would have been necessary to have submitted a Bill of this nature in +sections. Further, every time a measure which had passed the House of +Commons was rejected by the nation, the prestige of the House would be +impaired, and the conclusion is unavoidable that, were the referendum +adopted, the House could only retain an authoritative position by +introducing a system of proportional representation so as to bring it as +closely as possible into agreement with the nation. It is, moreover, +generally agreed that Finance Bills should not be the subject of a +referendum, but in a modern state these are of as much importance as +other legislation. The work of legislation demands special +qualifications. When we select a doctor or a lawyer, or any other agent, +we wish him to do his special work. The elector desires to have an +effective choice in the selection of his representative in parliament, +but having chosen a legislator with whom he is in sympathy entrusts the +details of legislation to him. Proportional representation would give +the elector this effective choice, and by restoring to members of +Parliament a greater measure of freedom would enable the House of +Commons to resume its proper function of controlling legislation. The +need for the referendum would disappear. + +_Proportional Representation facilitates legislation desired +by the nation._ + +It may be said, however, that there is here no indication of the means +of getting things done, only of a check upon partisan action. But +proportional representation, in rendering more difficult the passing of +legislation conceived in a partisan spirit, will save the time and +energy of Parliament for legislation which is more in accordance with +the nation's will. The history of the numerous Education and Licensing +Bills which have been presented to Parliament during the two decades +1890-1910 furnish an excellent example of the way in which a rigid party +system results in the waste of parliamentary time. No wonder that the +legislative machine has broken down. Efforts are now being made to +increase the working capacity of the House of Commons, but if these are +to be permanently successful, there must be such an abatement of +partisan feeling as a system of proportional representation encourages. +The changes which have been introduced in recent years into the +procedure of the House of Commons are of a far-reaching character. +According to the rules adopted in 1907, all Bills, other than money +Bills and Bills for confirming Provisional Orders, are referred, after +the passing of the second reading, to Standing Committees of the House, +unless a resolution to the contrary is moved immediately and carried. +There is a growing opinion in favour of these committees, the value of +which is largely due to the greater sincerity in discussion which takes +place in them. When Mr. Asquith moved the resolution allocating the time +to be allowed for discussion on the Housing and Town Planning Bill, Lord +Robert Cecil expressed the opinion that the system of guillotining +debate was destructive of the legislative efficiency and the dignity of +the House of Commons.[17] "Personally he thought some remedy might +possibly be found in an extension of the Grand Committee system. He +began with a violent prejudice against them. He had now sat on several +of them, and he had come to the belief that, on the whole, they were by +far the best instrument they now possessed, inferior though it was to a +full and free discussion in the whole House for the consideration of +legislation. The most important characteristic of them was that only +those decided who heard the arguments. They did not have the disgusting +farce that went on in that Chamber of members trooping in from outside +who had not the slightest knowledge of the subject which had been +discussed, who had not taken the slightest interest in it, and who +merely asked the Whips at the door, 'Which side are we to-day?' and +voted 'Aye' or 'No' as they were told. The Prime Minister recognized +that the independence and dignity of the House were invaluable assets to +the country, and had shown on many occasions a genuine desire to +preserve the dignity of members of Parliament, and the self-respect of +the House." Mr. Asquith, in reply to this statement, also expressed his +opinion that by a larger and more elastic use of the system of +Committees it would be possible to avoid some of the evils arising from +the growing congestion of parliamentary business. "The Housing and Town +Planning Bill was," said he, "a very good illustration of the useful +purpose served by the Grand Committee. It was there for twenty-three +days; it was discussed under almost ideal conditions; the closure was +never moved from beginning to end; the Government Whips never sought to +exert their authority in any one of the divisions which took place; and +the discussion was conducted by men who were obliged to listen to the +arguments of those who were opposed to them. As regards Bills of this +character, it was perfectly certain that they got a much more accurate +discussion, and decisions were arrived at far less under the stress of +party prepossession than when a Bill was discussed in Committee of the +whole House." + +Thus it seems that a lessening of party discipline and a greater freedom +and sincerity in discussion result in an acceleration of the rate of +legislation, and as a proportional system favours these conditions it +would materially assist the process of getting things done. + +_Proportional Representation in Standing Committees._ + +But this important change in the procedure of the House of Commons--the +discussion of the details of legislation in Grand Committees instead of +committees of the whole House--furnishes from another point of view +cogent reasons for the adoption of a system of proportional +representation. In the composition of these committees strict care is +taken to allot representation to the various parties within the House in +proportion to their strength. Otherwise these committees would not +possess the confidence of the House. But if the composition of +committees on a proportionate basis is a condition of their success, +would not their work be even more successful if in the first instance +the strength of parties within the House corresponded to the number of +their supporters in the country? The House of Commons would enjoy the +confidence of the nation, and its standing committees would acquire +greater authority because they, in turn, would be fully representative. + +One of the most important of these committees is the Scottish Grand +Committee, to which all Scottish Bills are referred. All Scottish +members are appointed to this committee, but in order that its +composition should conform to the rule--that committees should reflect +the strength of parties within the House--it has been found necessary to +add thereto a number of English Conservatives who often, if not usually, +have not the special qualifications necessary for dealing with the +details of Scottish questions. If the purpose for which the Scottish +Grand Committees have been constituted is to be fulfilled, it will be +necessary that the different political forces within each part of the +Kingdom should be represented in the House proportionately and that the +membership of the committees should be confined to Scottish members. It +is quite possible, under the present electoral system, that there might +be an overwhelming Conservative majority in England and a large Liberal +majority in Scotland. In such conditions the Scottish Grand Committee +would fail to work. It would be necessary to add so large a number of +English Conservatives that the Committee would lose its distinctively +Scottish character. There is often very little difference between +Scottish representatives on Scottish questions. A good instance of this +was shown in the discussion on the report stage of the House Letting +Bill (1909). The measure was opposed by the English Conservative +members of the Committee, whilst the Scottish Conservatives voted for +it. If the Scottish Conservatives were fully represented in the House of +Commons they would obtain adequate representation on the Committee; a +large addition of English Conservatives would not be necessary, and an +agreement between the members of the Committee would often be much more +quickly reached. Not only so, but a system of proportional +representation would greatly strengthen the personnel of the Committee. +Both the Scottish Law Officers of Mr. Balfour's Administration were +defeated in the General Election of 1906, and in consequence the +Scottish Conservatives, in their deliberations in Committee, were +deprived of the expert advice which these officers could have afforded. +Obviously, Scottish legislation can be dealt with best in a Scottish +Grand Committee, but the successful working of this Committee requires +the true representation thereon of the different sections of political +opinion in Scotland, and, in addition, the presentation of those +opinions by their most capable exponents. + +Similarly, all members representing constituencies in Wales and Monmouth +are to be appointed to the Committee dealing with Bills relating +exclusively to that part of the country. Such Bills are not so numerous +as Bills relating to Scotland, but nevertheless it is most desirable +that in the discussion of a Welsh Bill minorities in Wales should be +represented not by members sitting for English constituencies, but by +representatives chosen by themselves who would be fully conversant with +Welsh conditions. In the absence of such representation there will +always remain the feeling that the minority has been unfairly treated, +and it is this sense of unfairness that so often calls forth opposition +of a partizan character, and such opposition is fatal to progress in +legislation. + +Perhaps the South African National Convention affords the most striking +example of the capacity of a fully representative body to achieve +results of a satisfactory character and with little delay. Had this +Convention been packed either in the Boer or the British interest the +great task of South African Union would never have been accomplished. +The scrupulous care with which the rights of the minorities were +respected is the secret of the wonderful rapidity with which the +enormous difficulties involved in the task were overcome. Not only were +minorities awarded full representation on this Convention, but every +facility was afforded them in the choice of their delegates. The sense +of justice and the spirit of reasonableness go always hand in hand, and +the spirit of reasonableness alone makes possible the smooth and +efficient working of the legislative machine. + +_Taking off the Whips._ + +Proportional representation will therefore not only facilitate the +formation of a stable executive in the new political conditions, but it +will be of very great value in creating the atmosphere in which +legislation can most easily be passed. Even with the present system of +false representation progress might often be more rapid if debate was +less partisan in character. The executive might easily refrain from +driving so hard the members of the party on which it rests for support. +All political questions are not of the same importance, and a step in +the direction of freer and less partizan conditions would be taken if +opportunities were more often given to members to vote in accordance +with their own judgment. The experiment of taking off the official Whips +more frequently might yield valuable results. Sir Courtenay Ilbert says, +however, that "open questions are not popular; they compel a member to +think for himself, which is always troublesome."[18] But the advantage +which would arise from the increase of the spirit of reasonableness +would far outweigh such disadvantages as might befall the less +politically minded members of the House. Far less importance too need be +attached to snap divisions, and, as Sir William Anson has suggested, it +should be generally understood that the results of such divisions need +not entail the resignation of a government. + +_New political conditions._ + +Must then the practical politician still reject proportional +representation? Sir Charles Dilke, in evidence before the Royal +Commission on Electoral Systems,[19] attached great importance to the +views of political leaders upon the party system, and doubtless +practical politicians are guided by their views. The recent utterances, +however, of two great party leaders show that the new political +conditions and their consequences are fully recognized and appreciated +by them. Mr. Balfour, in a speech before the Scottish Conservative +Club,[20] emphasized the importance of having every shade of opinion +represented in the House of Commons: "There is a section," he said, "an +important section of Socialist opinion in the country, and it is quite +right that they should find voice in the House of Commons if their +numbers in the country render that desirable. We cannot, we do not, lose +by having Socialist members in the House of Commons, if there are many +Socialists in the country. We do not lose, we gain by it." Does this +utterance of a great Conservative leader indicate any belief that the +two-party system is the final and unchangeable expression of national +feeling. Mr. Asquith has said that "the rude and crude divisions which +used to correspond more or less accurately with the fact of a +representative assembly of two parties only, the Whig and the Tory, the +Right and the Left, or by whatever other names they may have been +called, with strictly drawn lines of demarcation with no debatable or +intermediate territory, that perhaps has become everywhere, more or +less, a thing of the past." Such opinions so freely expressed must +prepare the way for the more serious consideration of proportional +representation by the practical politicians. It will in no sense involve +the abandonment of party organization, but it will render those +organizations, to use Mr. Asquith's words once more, "elastic, flexible, +always adapting itself to shifting conditions." Party organization of +such a character is undoubtedly a fundamental condition of the smooth +working of the parliamentary machine, but another condition equally +fundamental is that the strength of parties within the House should bear +a direct and true relation to the strength of parties in the country. +Both these requirements are supplied by a system of proportional +representation. + + +[Footnote 1: "Doubts of Proportional Representation," _The Albany +Review,_ November 1907.] + +[Footnote 2: 12 September 1908.] + +[Footnote 3: T. R. and H. P. C. Ashworth, _Proportional Representation +applied to Party Government_, 1901, p. 195.] + +[Footnote 4: _Report of Royal Commission on Electoral Systems_ (Cd. +5163) par. 133.] + +[Footnote 5: Ibid., par. 126.] + +[Footnote 6: Ibid., par. 134.] + +[Footnote 7: Ibid., par. 88.] + +[Footnote 8: Burke, _Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents_.] + +[Footnote 9: "The Regeneration of Parliaments," _Contemporary Review_, +June 1905.] + +[Footnote 10: The Baden Socialists voted for the estimates in the Baden +Diet, and shortly after at the German Socialist Congress, Magdeburg, 21 +September 1910, a motion was carried excluding from the party _ipso +facto_ any member who in future voted for the estimates. The South +German Socialists left the Congress House.--_Times_, 23 September 1910.] + +[Footnote 11: T.R. and H.P.C. Ashworth, _Proportional Representation +Applied to Party Government: A New Electoral System_, 1901, p. 210.] + +[Footnote 12: Address to members of the Russian Duma, House of Commons, +22 June 1909.] + +[Footnote 13: _The Times_, 13 June 1910.] + +[Footnote 14: M. Ostrogorski, _Democracy and the Organization of +Political Parties_. (Translation by F. Clarke, M.A.), vol. ii. p. 713.] + +[Footnote 15: The Australian _Review of Reviews_, January 1906.] + +[Footnote 16: _The Times_, 16 March 1909.] + +[Footnote 17: _The Times_, 16 June 1909.] + +[Footnote 18: Preface to _Parliamentary Procedure of the House of +Commons_, by Josef Redlich, p. xvii.] + +[Footnote 19: _Minutes of Evidence of the Royal Commission on Electoral +Systems_ (Cd. 5152), Q. 1492.] + +[Footnote 20: Glasgow, 22 October 1910.] + + + + +CHAPTER XI + +OBJECTIONS TO PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION + + +"The party agents and political men opposed to the very last the +introduction of a system of proportional representation."--COUNT GOBLET +D'ALVIELLA + +_The question of practicality._ + +Although the fear lest proportional representation should weaken the +party system is now the most serious obstacle in the way of its +acceptance by the practical politician, yet there are others who warmly +approve of the principle, who regard proportional representation as the +ideal, but still entertain some doubts as to its practicability, and +therefore shrink from a whole-hearted advocacy of the reform. Nor are +these doubts entirely removed by the conclusion arrived at by the Royal +Commission on Electoral Systems--that the three systems of proportional +representation examined by the Commission are quite feasible. The +sceptics need to be convinced that the intelligence of the ordinary +English elector and the capacity of the English returning officer are +equal to the requirements of the new system; its practicability has in +fact to be demonstrated afresh. It is granted that the more complete +adaptation of the machinery of elections to the true representation of +the electors must involve some departure from the simplicity of present +methods, and in order to gauge the value of the objection that the +change proposed is so great as to render its introduction impracticable, +it will be well to consider once more the character of the tasks which +the new system will throw upon the elector and the returning officer. + +_The elector's task._ In criticizing the mechanism of the +single transferable vote a Member of Parliament, at a public meeting in +his constituency, declared that the act of voting ought to be made so +simple as to be intelligible to a child of the second standard in a +public elementary school. The reply might very well be made that such +children are capable of indicating a choice amongst those things in +which they are interested. But this assertion raises the question +whether the method of voting for the purpose of selecting the members of +an assembly, to which the affairs of an empire, a nation or a city, are +to be entrusted, can only be regarded as practicable if it is adapted to +the capacity of the least intelligent of the electors. Must a nation +continue to suffer all the evils which arise from an imperfect electoral +system because some of its citizens may be so unintelligent as to be +unable to make use of an improved method? A secretary of the Liberal +Unionist Association has declared that in some constituencies hundreds +of electors are so ignorant as not to know the name of the Prime +Minister, and has even advanced this fact in order to show that it is +unnecessary to trouble about the true representation of the electors. +Even were this statement not exaggerated it would but furnish an +additional argument in favour of proportional representation. The votes +of such ignorant electors, not being given for political reasons, are +far too easily bought by that indirect corruption which takes the form +of subscriptions, charitable donations, gifts of coals and of blankets; +and yet, with the present system, these votes may decide the result of +an election and completely nullify the votes of intelligent citizens. + +With the single transferable vote all that an elector is asked to do is +to number candidates in the order of his preference. He need do no more +than place the figure 1 against the name of his first choice. It is +desirable that, he should proceed further, but abundant assistance, if +he needs it, will be forthcoming from the party organizations and the +press. But is there any considerable section of the English electorate +that cannot perform this new duty? When being examined before the Select +Committee of the House of Lords on the Municipal Representation Bill, +Mr. J. J. Stephenson, a member of the Executive Committee of the Labour +Party, was asked, "Do you think that the system of voting proposed in +the Bill would offer any difficulties to working men?" His reply was +emphatic. "No. I have had some experience of working men, and I have +never found them any slower in intelligence than any other part of the +community--there are few working men who could not tell in order of +merit the men they wanted to vote for. That is my personal experience +gained after some years of work." Apart from this expression of opinion, +we have this convincing testimony to the capacity of working men +electors that they have been among the first to put improved electoral +methods into practice. The Northumberland miners and Canadian Trades +Unions are familiar with the use of the single transferable vote in the +election of their officers; the Labour Party in Victoria has made use of +preferential voting in the selection of its parliamentary candidates. +Moreover, the daily work of artizans enables them readily and quickly to +grasp the fundamental idea of proportional representation--the +representation of parties in _proportion_ to their strength--and the +discussions on this question in Labour organizations have been at least +as keen as, if not keener than, those in other political associations. + +The doubts entertained as to the capacity of the electorate are not +shared by those who have been officially responsible for the conduct of +elections. Mr. S. R. Ginn, Clerk of the Peace for Cambridgeshire, in +giving evidence before the Royal Commission on Electoral Systems, +declared that "after one or two elections proportional representation +ought to work as easily as the ballot. When the county electors got the +extended franchise we had some difficulty with the ballot, but now it is +simple, and proportional representation would be much the same." +Speaking of the elaborate precautions taken in the organization of +elections he expressed the opinion that the voters were more to be +trusted than our machinery trusts them. It is difficult in the face of +such evidence to understand on what grounds the English electors should +be regarded as so greatly inferior to the electors of other countries +that they cannot be trusted to make proper use of an improved electoral +method. The charge of incapacity can only apply to the least intelligent +section of the electorate, and it is astonishing that those who are so +anxious to preserve the electoral privileges of the unintelligent voters +should be supremely indifferent to the representation of the abler +sections of the electorate. At present at every election the votes of +thousands of intelligent citizens count for nothing. The electors who +voted for Conservative candidates in Wales at the General Election in +1906 might have saved themselves the trouble. Their voting papers, +although not spoiled in the technical sense, had no value. Proportional +representation would have given a value to all these votes, and even if +its introduction should result in an increase in the number of spoiled +papers, this would be as nothing compared with the number of votes to +which, for the first time, a value would be given. The Australian +advocates of proportional representation aptly describe the reform as +"effective voting." The elector knows that his vote will count, and thus +every inducement is offered to him to take part in the choice of a +representative. The vote becomes a more valuable possession to the +elector under proportional representation than under the +single-member system. + +_The returning officer's task._ + +With regard to the duties of returning officers, which in England fall +upon the sheriffs of counties and the mayors of boroughs, it should be +remembered that in the performance of these duties they are invariably +assisted by an expert staff, and in judging of the difficulties which +would attend the introduction of a new system, the fact that this expert +staff would be available for the purpose of carrying out the details of +an election must be taken into consideration. There would probably be +no more difficulty in the introduction of a system of proportional +representation than was experienced in introducing the greater change +associated with the Ballot Act. On that occasion instructions as to +their new duties were issued to returning officers, and similar +instructions would no doubt be issued as to the practical organization +of elections under a system of proportional representation. In Belgium a +department of the Ministry of the Interior is set apart for the +administration of electoral affairs. Complete instructions are issued +from this department to the returning officers throughout the country, +and the supervision which the department exercises over the conduct of +elections doubtless contributes to the facility with which returning +officers have carried out their duties under the proportional system. + +The fears expressed lest returning officers should not be equal to the +duties which would fall upon them under the system of the single +transferable vote are not shared by the returning officers themselves. +Mr. H. R. Poole, Under Sheriff for Somerset, who has had thirty years' +experience in the conduct of elections, stated, in evidence before the +Royal Commission on Electoral Systems, that were Somersetshire treated +as a single constituency under the system of the single transferable +vote he would be able to make the necessary arrangements for the +counting of the votes with a staff of the same class of men as had +assisted him hitherto. Speaking on behalf of the Under Sheriffs' +Association, he added that "they saw no difficulty in carrying out any +new electoral law which might be passed, and that they would always be +glad to give their assistance and work as loyally as they could in +support of anything which might be done." The officials of urban +constituencies are not less competent. Perhaps the largest urban +constituency which would be formed under a system of proportional +representation would be that of Glasgow, and Mr. Alexander Walker, the +Assessor of that city, who for twenty-four years was intimately +associated with the organization of elections, has, after a careful +examination of the details of the single transferable vote, stated that +there are no practical difficulties in the way of applying the system to +a constituency of the size of Glasgow. + +The doubts as to the capacity of returning officers spring from an +inadequate acquaintance with the difficulties which they already +overcome in the conduct of elections. The duties which would devolve +upon these officers under the single transferable vote system are not +greater than have been undertaken and are undertaken in Great Britain +to-day in connexion with the use of the cumulative vote. The Scottish +School Boards are still elected under the latter system, and the +following particulars of the elections in Glasgow on 2 April 1909, +illustrate the admirable manner in which returning officers in this +country, as elsewhere, carry out the tasks assigned to them. The whole +city was polled as one constituency; fifteen members were to be elected, +and each elector had fifteen votes, which he could distribute or +cumulate as he pleased upon any of the twenty-one candidates nominated. +There were on the roll 157,194 electors, of whom 40,778 took part in the +election. The returning officer, in this case the Treasurer of the +Glasgow School Board, had therefore to deal with over 600,000 votes, but +he had to make provision for counting a much larger number of votes. Yet +he had no difficulty in accomplishing successfully and expeditiously +this gigantic task. He enlisted the services of over 250 clerks, and the +whole process of extracting the details of the ballot papers was +completed in the course of about five hours. Had the single transferable +vote been employed the number of votes to be dealt with would have been +40,778 only, and although the papers would have had to be counted more +than once, the task would not have been so large as that entailed by the +cumulative vote, nor would it have been necessary to have engaged so +large a staff. It is sometimes forgotten that returning officers take a +pride in the perfecting of their arrangements for counting the votes. In +introducing new methods into the counting of votes in the Glasgow +Municipal elections, Mr. Walker prepared and issued very complete +instructions to his staff, and took pains to see that the staff were +fully prepared for its work, and there is not the least doubt that the +town clerks and under-sheriffs would meet any changes in electoral +methods with the determination to carry out their part of the work as +successfully as possible. The first elections in Tasmania and the +Transvaal with the single transferable vote proceeded with perfect +smoothness, and this was due to the excellent preparations made by the +returning officers. + +_Time required for counting votes._ + +One of the minor objections urged against proportional representation is +that a considerable time must elapse between the close of the poll and +the declaration of the result. It will not be possible to announce the +figures on the day of the election. It is doubtless desirable that the +result of an election should be ascertained without unnecessary delay, +but it is far better to wait a day in order to obtain a true result than +to adhere to an electoral system which gives a false result, and on +which a government may have to be based for a period of five years. With +most proportional systems only one day's delay occurs. The Under Sheriff +of Somerset has estimated that it might take him two days before he +could complete the return for that county, as it would probably take +half the first day to verify the contents of the ballot boxes. On this +point the verdict of the Royal Commission on Electoral Systems is as +follows: "On the whole it is probably safe to say that in a constituency +where 60,000 or 70,000 votes are cast, such as would have to be +contemplated in this country, the results should be declared with +efficient arrangements in the course of the second day after the poll. +Where the constituency was compact, _e.g.,_ in the case of a large town +like Birmingham or Manchester, the count of first votes could be +finished on the night of the election, and the remaining operations of +elimination and transfer completed in a long day's work on the following +day; but a longer time would have to be allowed in the case of extensive +rural districts."[1] It has also been alleged that there may be a +greater number of petitions for the recounting of votes under the +transferable vote system. But neither Tasmanian nor South African +experience gives any ground for this statement, and as the Tasmanian +Agent-General has pointed out, there is as much difference between the +counting of votes under the improved system and under the existing rough +and ready method as there is between book-keeping by single and +book-keeping by double entry; the sorting of the votes is carefully +checked at each operation, and all errors in the counting of votes must +be rectified before any new stage in the process can be entered upon. + +_ Fads and sectional interests._ + +The objection that a proportional system is too complex for English +electors and returning officers thus completely breaks down. But it +remains to consider whether the other objections which have been raised +against proportional representation are of sufficient weight as to +render its introduction undesirable. It is repeatedly asserted that +proportional representation will encourage the undue representation of +faddists and of sectional interests. For example, Professor Edward Jenks +alleges that, "If we had such a vast constituency as Manchester, or +Liverpool, under the proportional system we should certainly have a +member for teetotalism, a member for vegetarianism and the like, and +each of these, in all probability, would be instructed rigidly to oppose +everything inconsistent with the special ideal of its constituents."[2] +Now under a system of proportional representation a candidate in any +constituency, were it Liverpool, Manchester or Glasgow, would have to +secure about 10,000 votes before he could be sure of being returned, and +it is incredible that in any of these constituencies so large a number +of voters would support candidatures such as those described by +Professor Jenks, or that political feeling is so weak that Liberal, +Conservative, and Labour candidates would be set aside in favour of +candidates standing for a single interest only. The character of the +objection shows that the true working of a system of proportional +representation is completely misunderstood, for a proportional system +reduces fads and sectional interests to their proper proportions; it is +the existing system of single-member constituencies which confers +excessive power upon insignificant sections of the whole. Were there +10,000 electors in Manchester who, as suggested, would regard +vegetarianism as of greater importance than any other political +question, and were these electors scattered throughout the city, then +there would be an average of more than 1500 such electors in each of the +existing divisions. A body of 1500 voters in a division of Manchester +prepared to place their particular fad above all other political +questions have now the power of determining the result of the election +in that division; the 10,000 electors similarly minded would have the +power of extracting a pledge in support of their proposals, and probably +an effective pledge from the successful candidate in each division. +Under a system of proportional representation they might possibly secure +a few seats, but under the present system they can affect the election +in every constituency. It is well known that a large number of members +of Parliament pledge themselves at election time to the support of +movements with which they are not fully in accord. Probably their seat +depended upon the answer which they gave to the leaders of some small +body of electors holding the balance in the constituency. + +Mr. Henry Vivian, M.P., thus refers to the pressure which small groups +of voters bring to bear upon parliamentary candidates: "One serious evil +which he hoped might be abolished by a change of system was the ragging +of constituencies by a comparatively small number of busybodies +interested in some particular fad. A large number of members of +Parliament really had to bend to some two or three hundred electors, +although there might be 20,000 in the whole constituency. He had the +misfortune to be elected by only a gross. It was strictly true that in +many cases a candidate was compelled to consent to support something +that he felt strongly against, merely because a certain percentage of +the electors insisted upon it. He was not suggesting that proportional +representation would entirely get rid of this evil, but he was satisfied +that proportional representation rested on a larger basis--that they +would have larger constituencies and a number of men from whom the +elector might make selection; and therefore there would be a possibility +of their lessening, if not altogether getting rid of, this most +intolerable evil. He was not at all sure that he would not at times +rather be out of political life than in it; it became so threatening +that he absolutely refused to reply to the letters at all, or to be +dictated to, in the way that these people attempted to do. He would +venture to say that with a system of proportional representation they +would be able to get rid of some at least, if not of most, of the +objectionable features of the present system."[3] The same feature of +our electoral system has been condemned in the strongest terms by Mr. +Balfour. "Everybody," said he, "who has watched the actual course of a +contested election in a constituency where parties were fairly evenly +balanced, knows perfectly well the monstrous power which is given to a +very small minority to exact a pledge from the candidate, not that he +should support this or that great policy, but that he should help their +small and particular interest. I know nothing which is more corrupting, +both to the electors or to the elected, than that process; and although +I have fully seen the difficulties which attach to what is commonly +known as minority representation, it surely is an extraordinary +criticism upon our existing system that, while a small handful of +interested people can turn an election one way or the other on their own +personal issue, huge minorities, like the minority of the Unionists in +Scotland, are utterly and grossly unrepresented. We give every privilege +to the little knot of people in the individual constituencies; we ignore +the great mass who under our existing system find no representation at +all comparable either to their numerical strength or to their public +spirit, or to any other quality which makes them useful, able and +independent citizens."[4] + +The organizations of different branches of the Civil Service have, in +furtherance of their interests, sought to bring pressure to bear upon +members of Parliament, and in consequence of this action it has been +suggested that civil servants should be disfranchised. In other words, +it is proposed to meet an evil encouraged by defective electoral methods +by inflicting a gross injustice upon a large body of citizens, the +majority of whom, like other citizens, consider political problems +purely from the point of view of national advantage. The true remedy for +the unfair pressure of small sections must be sought in such a change in +the method of election as will allow the country to appraise them at +their true value. Direct representation, by means of which sectional +interests can, if necessary, be defended or advanced within the House of +Commons, is far less injurious to the State than a system which allows +such interests to bring unfair pressure to bear upon a considerable +number of members of Parliament, or to enforce their demands upon the +nation by linking themselves to a national party. There is, however, but +little danger of any large number of members being returned in support +of single interests only. The results under systems of proportional +representation show that the members elected are returned upon political +grounds, and when any question has attained such importance as to +command the support of 10,000 votes in any constituency, doubtless that +question has become ripe for discussion in Parliament, and can no longer +fairly be described as a fad. + +It is, however, said that the direct representation of sectional +interests will enable these to exercise in Parliament the same pressure +that they at present exercise in the constituencies. This statement also +is based upon a misconception of the changed conditions which would +result from a system of proportional representation. A small body of +electors can at present exercise pressure in the constituency, because +the result of the election is in their hands. A small group of members +could only exercise the same influence in the House of Commons if the +large parties were willing to bid for their support and were, at the +same time, able to enforce upon their followers the observance of any +agreement entered into. The great difference in the new conditions of +party discipline will here come into play. Members of a party who have +been able to win elections in spite of the opposition of sectional +interests, would be able to withstand pressure in Parliament. They would +know that they could appeal with confidence to their supporters in the +constituency to endorse their action, and, indeed, they would much more +likely lose their seat if they acted contrary to the wishes of those who +had returned them. Any sacrifice of principle by a party for the sake of +conciliating a small faction would cause a loss of support greater than +the gain. When proportional representation is established such grouping +as may take place within the House of Commons will be based upon +political affinities. + +_The representation of localities._ + +Another objection which is often brought against proportional +representation is that it will destroy the intimate relation which +exists at present between a constituency and its representative in +Parliament. Here the arguments used are not only as a rule +self-destructive, but they are obviously in conflict with the suggestion +that proportional representation would give undue weight to sectional +interests. "Parliament," said Burke, "is a deliberate assembly of one +nation, with one interest, that of the whole; where not local purpose, +not local prejudices, ought to guide, but the general good, resulting +from the general reason of the whole. You choose a member indeed, but +when you have chosen him he is not a member of Bristol, but he is a +member of Parliament. If the local constituent should have interest, or +should form a hasty opinion, evidently opposite to the real good of the +rest of the community, the member for that place ought to be as far as +any other from any endeavour to give it effect."[5] Were the primary +duty of a member for any constituency to consider the special needs of +that constituency, local considerations would outweigh national +interests. + +Yet Burke's declaration is not intended to relieve the representative of +a constituency from the duty of attending to its administrative +necessities. "Only members of Parliament," said Mr. Gulland, M.P., +"appreciate how largely their time is taken up with local matters. They +have to approach the different Government Departments upon an endless +variety of topics." But Mr. Gulland proceeds: "These matters as a rule +have no reference to existing Parliamentary divisions, and in a city it +would be very much better if a man were member for the whole city rather +than for a division. And in the case of a county, including burghs, it +would be better that the general interests of the county should be +attended to by members representing the county as a whole than by a +member who is only the representative of the burgh."[6] It is also +possible that the interests of some division of the city or county might +be opposed to the interests of the city as a whole, and this is an +additional reason against the subdivision of such constituencies for the +purpose of parliamentary representation. An admirable illustration +occurs in a speech made in the Canadian House of Commons by Mr. F. D. +Monk, K.C. "In a very large constituency," said he, "say of the size of +the entire island of Montreal, it would be impossible to resort to the +promise of a great many small public works, which by the admission of +everybody are not at present advantageous, when we have such large +problems to solve in connexion, for instance, with the problem of +transportation. Nobody in a constituency such as I have just indicated +could advocate the construction of a small wharf or a small public +building, but would be obliged to consider the relation of such a large +territory as the island and city of Montreal to the all-important +question of transportation. He would be obliged to lay before the +electors, not promises of small and very often useless, though +comparatively costly improvements, but the necessity of carrying out +such a plan of transportation as was laid before the country and the +Government some years ago by a commission composed of very experienced +men, who after considerable labour had in my opinion solved that very +vital question in every part of the country."[7] If local representation +is necessary it would therefore appear to be most desirable that the +representatives should be able to speak in the name of the whole of the +town or of the county, as the case may be, and that is the kind of local +representation which a system of proportional representation provides. +The members for the larger area can and do take a wider view than the +member for the smaller electorate. + +But what kind of local representation does a system of single-member +constituencies provide? A large number of constituencies are represented +by members who have no connexion with the locality other than that of +being its spokesman in Parliament. Mr. Winston Churchill, defeated in a +division of Manchester, is elected member for Dundee, a Scottish +constituency. In what sense is the local representation of Dundee +preserved? What were the special qualifications possessed by Mr. +Churchill for giving utterance to the needs of a Scottish constituency? +Doubtless Mr. Churchill made every effort to become acquainted with the +local conditions of Dundee, and the necessity of doing so must have made +considerable demands upon his time and energy. Yet it is more than +doubtful whether Mr. Churchill can ever be an ideal representative from +the standpoint of locality of a constituency to whose local life he is a +stranger. Mr. Churchill's experience is in no sense singular. Mr. +Gladstone found it necessary to leave Greenwich for Midlothian; Lord +Morley to leave Newcastle for Forfarshire; Sir William Harcourt to leave +Derby for Monmouthshire; Mr. Balfour to leave Manchester for the City of +London, and, however honoured the new constituencies might be by the +distinction of their members, it cannot be said that the intimate +relation between the representative and the constituency was maintained. +Under proportional representation the representation of localities +becomes much more real. Excellent examples can be seen in the working of +the system in Belgium. Before the introduction of the new methods +leaders of political parties in Belgium were compelled, as in England, +to leave the towns with which they were identified and to seek election +for constituencies, in which, comparatively speaking, they were unknown. +Here the cause was not the subdivision of constituencies but the absence +of any provision for the representation of minorities. M. Anseele, the +leader of the Socialists in Ghent, and intimately acquainted with the +life of that city, had to seek entrance into the Chamber of Deputies as +one of the Socialist representatives of Liège. Similarly, M. +Vandervelde, whose activities had always been identified with Brussels, +had to proceed to Charleroi in order to secure election. But on the +introduction of the proportional system, M. Vandervelde returned to +Brussels and was immediately elected as one of the Socialist members of +the constituency, of whose special requirements he could, if need be, +speak with effect in Parliament. M. Anseele returned to Ghent and was +elected as one of the members for the city with which the whole of his +life had been associated. He was relieved from the double burden of +continuing his work in Ghent and of acting as the representative of a +constituency in another part of the country. It is abundantly clear, if +it is desired to maintain the local character of representation, that a +proportional system secures such representation in its most +efficient form. + +So flimsy and contradictory are some of the arguments brought against +proportional representation that it is not surprising that certain +critics, impressed by such facts as are recorded in the previous +paragraph, have alleged that the system will so favour the +representation of localities that no one but a local candidate will ever +have any chance of success. The conclusion is drawn that proportional +representation will militate against the return of eminent politicians, +and is, for this reason, undesirable. But the facts cited as to Belgium +bear no such interpretation. It is true that under all electoral systems +the local candidate has, other things being equal, an advantage, and +rightly so, over candidates who are not directly connected with the +constituency, but it is also true that under all systems local +candidates give way, if necessary, to distinguished statesmen. In +Belgium the Socialists of Liège and Charleroi willingly accepted as +their representatives M. Anseele and M. Vandervelde when these failed to +secure representation in their own towns. So welcome are eminent +politicians that there can be no ground for supposing that they will +suffer from a proportional system. Indeed, large constituencies +returning several members give to these a much surer foothold in +Parliament than they can possibly secure with single-member areas. The +distinguished candidate can appeal almost with certainty of success for +the "quota" of votes which is sufficient to secure his election. The +only change that will be made by the proportional system is that he will +be able to retain his seat in the constituency with which he is really +identified; he will no longer be compelled to wander from place to place +with every swing of the pendulum. + +_The member and his constituents._ + +There is perhaps one other aspect of the representation of localities +which deserves attention. The fictions are still maintained that a +member of Parliament represents and is intimately associated with all +his constituents. As regards the latter, it is obvious that only in a +very small constituency can a member become personally acquainted with +the electors. This might have been feasible in the days of the +restricted franchise prior to 1867, but in modern constituencies which, +on an average, contain some 11,000 voters it is impossible. Further, in +respect of representation, since votes, save those of ignorant and +corrupt electors, are given more and more on political grounds, an +elector can derive but little consolation from the fact that he is +"represented" in Parliament by the candidate whom he did his best to +defeat, nor does such an elector, should he take a considerable interest +in political work, care to approach the member in any cause; he prefers +to seek help of a member of his own party who is the representative of +another constituency. If a member of Parliament is elected to defend +Free Trade he cannot possibly represent the political convictions of +constituents who believe that Free Trade is disastrous to the country. +But under a proportional system Free Traders and Tariff Reformers would +each have their own representatives, and whilst all the members would be +able to speak for the constituency when its local interests were +concerned, the various parties within the constituency would find +expression given to their views when the question of Free Trade or of +Tariff Reform was under discussion. So far as modern conditions permit, +the relations between the member and his constituents would be of an +intimate character, and at least there would be that bond of sympathy +which springs from identity of purpose and of political faith. + +_Objections of party agents._ + +Count Goblet d'Alviella has stated that the most strenuous and +persistent opposition to the introduction of proportional representation +in Belgium came from party agents and from the political men, that is, +from the extreme partizans. It is perhaps only natural to expect that +party agents should object to a system which would introduce a +considerable change in the method of party organization and in the +conduct of elections, but a good many of their fears are based upon +misapprehensions. It is true that political organizations might not +control nominations as much as they do now, but the work of organizers +would perhaps be even in greater demand than now. Thus, in Belgium, +before the introduction of proportional representation, many +constituencies were uncontested, some not for twenty years, and the +political organizations of the minority in these constituencies fell +into decay, in many places being completely abandoned. Similarly in +England, it is often extremely difficult to maintain political +organizations in those constituencies in which the position of the +minority is hopeless. The new electoral methods have been followed in +Belgium with a great increase of political activity; no constituency is +now uncontested, and each of the parties maintains an active +organization in every district. + +The objections generally advanced by party agents are the increased +inconvenience and cost which would result from the enlargement of the +constituencies. It is alleged that it would be impossible for candidates +in country areas to make themselves known to the electors. But to what +extent does this objection hold good? Prior to 1885 many of the +constituencies were much larger than they are to-day. The county of +Northumberland, which is now divided into six divisions, was then +divided into two. With the more rapid means of communications and of +transit now available a candidate can cover a county constituency with +much more ease than was possible a generation ago. The decrease in the +size of constituencies since 1885 has not given any greater leisure to +the candidates during the period of his candidature. Every moment of his +time is filled up and, indeed, there is often an unnecessary expenditure +of time and energy upon public meetings, the number of which, owing to +an insane competition, has been multiplied to an absurd degree. +Candidates are now expected to address meetings at the breakfast hour, +meetings at the luncheon hour, and meetings in the evening; if +constituencies were enlarged the time of the candidate would doubtless +be carefully mapped out to meet the new conditions. Moreover, the +constituencies required by a system of proportional representation in +the United Kingdom would still be small compared with the constituencies +in the Colonies, and even though large electoral areas may have some +disadvantages the benefits to be gained from a true system of +representation completely outweigh them. + +_Alleged difficulties in the organization of elections._ + +Some valuable lessons were learned during the course of the Johannesburg +municipal elections in 1909, as to the organization of contests under +the system of the single transferable vote. There was no previous +experience to guide either the candidate or their agents. The methods +pursued differed according to the rigidity of the discipline existing +within the party. A committee representative of commercial and other +interests, presided over by the Hon. W. A. Martin, M.L.C., selected the +names of ten candidates--there were ten vacancies--and this committee +asked the citizens of Johannesburg to vote for the candidates whose +names figured upon this ticket--the "ticket of the ten good men," as it +was called. The committee did not attempt to instruct the electors as to +the order in which preferences should be expressed for these candidates. +The electors were asked to place them in such order as they pleased.[8] +The candidature of the ticket, as such, was in some respects also +loosely organized. The various candidates gave separate and special +attention to the districts with which they were most closely identified, +but they also appeared in twos and threes on the same platform at public +meetings. In every district the names of all ten candidates appeared +upon the posters, but special prominence was given to the name of some +one candidate--the candidate associated with the district. The final +appeal to the public, in the form of a specimen ballot paper, had all +the ten names printed in bold type. In this way the committee was +enabled to appeal to the town to support the ticket as a whole, whilst +the individual members of the ticket were free to solicit first +preferences in the districts and circles in which they were best known. +Such an arrangement shows how easily the difficulties of candidature +under the new system can be overcome. If the arrangements outlined above +were adopted by party organizers the difficulties of an electoral +campaign would be no greater than with a system of single-member +constituencies. Each candidate on the ticket would canvass a portion of +the constituency--which would be no larger than a single-member +area--whilst at convenient centres the members of the ticket would +appear upon a common platform. The campaign of the Labour Party was more +rigidly organized. The leaders nominated a ticket of three candidates, +but instead of leaving their supporters free, instructed them to vote +for the candidates on the ticket in a definite order, although this +order was varied in different wards. In the official instructions the +elector is asked to vote by placing the figure 1 opposite the name of +the candidate he likes best, and some risk is run by an organization +which advises its supporters to express their first preference for some +candidate who is not the party's true first choice. It is sufficient for +organizers to advise their supporters to record preferences for all the +candidates of the party, leaving the elector free to decide the order in +which those preferences should be given. + +_Alleged increase of cost._ + +These elections threw some light on another difficulty urged against +proportional representation by party agents, namely, the increased +expenditure involved. Considerable sums of money were certainly spent in +the prosecution of the candidature of the "ten good men," but these +elections proved conclusively that excessive expenditure had much less +influence in determining the result than in our parliamentary and +municipal elections. The total expenses of the three Labour candidates +in Johannesburg were returned at £18, 5s., and even if there is added +thereto the expenditure incurred by the Labour Representation Committee, +amounting to £34, 3s. 6d., the total sum cannot be said to be excessive. +Two of these three candidates were successful. The expenditure of the +successful Labour candidate in Pretoria was practically nil. Further, +the Mayor of Johannesburg, who, relying upon his record of past work, +personally took no action beyond the issue of a manifesto to the +electors, was returned at the head of the poll. + +Mr. Ramsay Macdonald also objects to proportional representation because +of the cost involved in contesting large areas.[9] Johannesburg, for the +purpose of its municipal election, was polled as one constituency, and +the evidence furnished by this election is, therefore, of considerable +value. Further, this evidence is confirmed by the experience of +Socialist parties in Belgium, in Finland and elsewhere, which apparently +find no difficulty in fighting large constituencies. The electoral +conditions in these countries doubtless differ from those in England, +but an analysis of the expenses incurred by Labour candidates at home +show that single-member constituencies and small expenditure do not go +together. The cost of these candidatures, even apart from returning +officers' expenses, usually exceeds £500, and sometimes £1000. Such sums +could be spent to much greater advantage in large areas in bringing all +the adherents of a party to the poll. + +It has already been shown that the practice of "nursing" a constituency +is one of the indirect results of the single-member system. Indeed, no +system gives so great an advantage to the candidate with a long purse; +he can more easily influence those non-political electors whose votes +may decide the issue. A consideration of the working of the new system +will show that the cost of elections will in all probability be greatly +diminished. At present in a city returning seven members a party must +find seven candidates each with his separate organization and separate +expenses; with proportional representation there will be but one +organization for all candidates of the same party, and as no party can +hope to monopolize the representation, it is unlikely that any will run +as many as seven candidates. A well-organized party will get its due +share of representation without subscribing to clubs and flower shows. +The illegitimate power of money will be weakened, and the total amount +spent considerably reduced. + +_The accuracy of representation._ + +A final criticism made against proportional systems of voting is that +they do not secure the exact representation of all the electors in a +country. Thus the Royal Commission on Electoral Systems, whilst +admitting that the new method would generally produce more accurate +results, mathematically at least, than the existing method, qualified +their statement by saying that their success "in producing in Parliament +the 'scale map of the country,' which they held up as the ideal, can be +only partial"; and in another paragraph the Report contains this +remarkable statement: "On the assumption, however, that proportional +representation is desirable, can any system yet invented be guaranteed +or reasonably expected to ensure it? In our opinion, only in a limited +and generally unascertainable degree." No responsible advocate of +proportional representation has contended that proportional systems, +save when the country is treated as one constituency, will result in a +mathematically accurate representation of opinion. But the close +approximation to accuracy obtained in the practical application of +proportional systems is so pronounced that the statement of the +Commission is wholly misleading. The following figures of the Belgian +election of 1910 will show to what extent accuracy is obtained by a +proportional system, even when, as in this case, the mechanism slightly +favours the larger party: + +BELGIAN ELECTION, 1910 + + Seats Seats in +Parties Votes. Actually Proportion + Obtained. to Votes. +Catholics . . . . . 676,939 49 47.0 +Liberals and Socialists . 561,052 36 37.5 +Christian Democrats . . 16,170 ---- 1.0 +Independents . . . . 20,428 ---- 1.5 + +In Finland, where another system of proportional representation is in +operation, the result of the election of 1909 was as follows:-- + +FINLAND ELECTION, 1909 + + Seats Seats in +Parties Votes. Actually Proportion + Obtained. to Votes. +Social Democrat . . . . 337,685 84 80 +Old Finn . . . . . . 199,920 48 47 +Young Finn . . . . . 122,770 28 29 +Swedish . . . . . . 104,191 25 25 +Agrarian . . . . . . 56,943 14 13 +Christian Labourers . . 23,259 1 6 + +The single transferable vote has yielded results which are remarkably +accurate. It has been used in Tasmania, with adult suffrage, in the +Transvaal, with the municipal franchise, and in the election of the +Senate for United South Africa, by members of Parliament. Each of the +five constituencies in Tasmania returned six members, and the total +result was as follows:-- + +TASMANIAN ELECTION, 1909 + + Seats Seats in +Parties Votes. Actually Proportion + Obtained. to Votes. +Labour . . . . . . 19,067 12 11.7 +Non-Labour . . . . . 29,893 18 18.3 + +These figures speak for themselves. In the municipal elections in the +Transvaal each of the parties obtained its fair share of representation. +In Johannesburg the elections were fought by a commercial ticket of ten +candidates, a Labour ticket of three candidates, and ten Independent +candidates; the number of valid votes was 11,788, and the quota--that +is, the proportion of votes which would ensure the election of a +representative--amounted to 1072. The ticket of "ten good men" polled in +all some 6185 votes, or 247 votes short of six quotas, and the ticket +succeeded in returning six members. This result was strictly fair, for +the deficiency in votes was made up by those supporters of independent +candidates who, having failed to return their first choice, had +indicated members of this ticket as their next choice. The three Labour +candidates polled in all 2126 votes, or 18 votes short of two full +quotas, and the Labour Party was successful in securing two +representatives. The remaining two seats fell to two Independent +candidates, each of whom had a considerable personal following. In the +third test, the election of South African Senators, each of the parties +obtained representation in proportion to their force in the Parliaments +of the respective colonies. The details of the voting have not been +published,[10] but the returning officers have all borne testimony to +the satisfactory working of the system and absolute fairness of +the results. + +In the light of these facts, what meaning can be attached to the +statement that proportional systems only secure proportional +representation in a limited and generally unascertainable degree? The +results of proportional systems are seen in a still more favourable +light if contrasted with the working of non-proportional methods. Thus +the Liberals of Surrey, Sussex, and Kent were without representation in +the Parliament of 1910. The Unionists of Wales were in the same plight +in the previous one. In the election of the Australian Senate (1910) the +Labour Party obtained eighteen seats, all other parties none. In the +same year, the Municipal Reformers elected all the aldermen of the +London County Council, the Progressives none. In the election of +Representative Peers of Scotland no Liberal peer is ever chosen. + +_Summary of objections._ + +The various objections which have been raised from time to time against +proportional representation have been almost wholly disproved. Before it +was put into operation it was said to be impracticable; wherever the new +methods have been introduced the proceedings have in every case passed +off without a hitch. Proportional representation, it was said, would +result in unstable governments; now complaint is made that it has been +difficult in Belgium under the new system to effect a change of +government, the majority of the electors apparently being content with +things as they are. It was alleged that faddists would obtain undue +representation; it is now complained, under some misapprehension, that +independent political thought will fail to secure an adequate hearing. +Objections of a minor character are also raised; that proportional +representation will increase the difficulties of electioneering; that it +will increase the cost of elections--a conclusion not in accordance with +the experience of countries in which it has been applied; or that it +will destroy the sporting element in politics, as if the pursuit of +politics by itself was lacking in interest. Yet all the time the demand +for electoral reform is increasing, and whilst the figures in the +foregoing paragraphs show to what extent proportional systems secure +accuracy in representation, it can also be shown that proportional +representation will facilitate the solution of those other electoral +reforms which are also demanded upon the ground that they will add to +the representative character of the House of Commons. + +[Footnote 1: _Report of the Royal Commission on Electoral Systems_ (Cd. +5163), par. 81.] + +[Footnote 2: _The Albany Review_, October 1907.] + +[Footnote 3: Annual Meeting of the Proportional Representation Society, +June 1910.--_Representation_, vol. iii. p. 79.] + +[Footnote 4: Scottish Conservative Club, Glasgow, 5 October 1910.] + +[Footnote 5: Speech to the Electors of Bristol, 3 November 1774.] + +[Footnote 6: Minutes of Evidence: _Royal Commission on Electoral +Systems_ (Cd. 5352), p. 118.] + +[Footnote 7: 15 March 1909.] + +[Footnote 8: The following is taken from a letter sent to the press by +the Chairman of the Committee: "I am aware that many people are opposed +to the principle of a ticket on the ground that it savours of +'dictation,' &c. &c. We are exceedingly anxious that every voter should +be in a position to exercise his privilege of choice to the fullest +extent.... It is not reasonable to expect him, without advice, to +express an order of preference in the case of men he does not know. This +is exactly one of the strongest justifications for a representative +committee to come forward as we do, to say: 'We have carefully inquired +as to the character, capacity, and ability of all the candidates, and +having taken everything into consideration we recommend you to vote for +the ten whose names are on our ticket, _placing them in such order of +preference as you please_.'"] + +[Footnote 9: Labour Party Conference, Leicester, February 1911.] + +[Footnote 10: Owing to the small numbers taking part in the election, +the publication of the details might possibly have furnished a clue to +the votes of individual members of Parliament. For this reason the +returning officers and the scrutineers were pledged to secrecy. The +fairness of the results were fully recognized by the press, as the +following extracts show: + +"The result has demonstrated the absolute fairness of the single +transferable vote."--_Bloemfontein Friend_. + +"The system proved in practice as simple and accurate as it was +scrupulously fair in character."--_Bloemfontein Post_.] + + + +CHAPTER XII + +THE KEY TO ELECTORAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM + +"De la manière de régler le suffrage dépend la ruine ou le salut des +Etats."--MONTESQUIEU + +_Electoral problems awaiting solution._ + +The Liberal, Conservative, and Labour parties are all agreed that a +large measure of electoral reform is long overdue, but hitherto the +various parties have contended only for such reforms as would strengthen +their own parliamentary position. Liberal and Labour politicians, +looking at the inequality in the voting power of electors, have demanded +a reform of the franchise; they urge that every man should have one vote +and no more. The Conservative party, looking at the inequalities in the +size of constituencies, have demanded a redistribution of seats on the +ground that all votes should be of equal value. Liberals, again, feeling +the difficulties which have attended the emergence of third-party +candidatures in the constituencies, ask for a reform in the method of +voting so as to ensure that the member elected for any constituency +shall represent a majority of the citizens. Apart from the question of +the enfranchisement of women, which involves considerations of a +different order, these are the three electoral problems with which +public opinion has been chiefly concerned. + +The efforts of parties to give effect to the reforms in which they have +been more particularly interested have so far ended in failure. In 1905 +Mr. Balfour introduced a Bill for the redistribution of seats, +unaccompanied by any reform of the franchise. The measure was met with +the cry of "gerrymander!" and its disappearance with the fall of the +Government was regretted by few. In 1907 the Liberal Government +attempted to deal with the franchise problem, apart from any scheme of +redistribution. It endeavoured in Mr. Harcourt's Plural Voting Bill, a +highly complex measure, to give effect to the principle of "one man, one +vote." This Bill was strongly opposed on the ground that the reform was +partial in character. If, said the opponents of the measure, it is +unfair that one elector should have twelve votes whilst another elector +has but one, it is equally unfair that the vote of an elector in one +constituency should be twelve times as valuable as the vote of an +elector in another constituency. The justice of the argument must be +admitted, and explains why the rejection of the Plural Voting Bill by +the House of Lords aroused comparatively little public feeling. Yet the +rejection of this Bill has focussed attention upon the deficiencies of +our franchise laws, and the eyes of all politicians are turning towards +that more comprehensive measure of electoral reform which cannot be +indefinitely postponed. Such a measure has been categorically promised +by Mr. Asquith on more than one occasion. So far back as 1908, soon +after his accession to the Premiership,[1] he made the following public +declaration: "I regard it as a duty, and indeed as a binding obligation +on the part of the Government, that before this Parliament comes to an +end they should submit a really effective scheme for the reform of our +electoral system." + +_The simplification of the franchise._ + +What are the lines on which a really effective scheme can be framed? The +fate of the partial measures already referred to is at least an +indication of the difficulties which will attend any attempt to carry an +incomplete scheme. It may be assumed that an effective scheme must deal +with the three problems named: franchise (including registration), +redistribution, and three-cornered contests. Each of these factors must +be dealt with as simply as a due recognition of the problem to be +solved will allow. The complexity of Mr. Harcourt's Plural Voting Bill +was due to the fact that we possess no less than twenty[2] different +franchises. But the remedy is easy. "If," said the late Sir Charles +Dilke, "they wanted to cheapen the cost, to remove the disgrace from +this country of having registration more full of fraud and error than +anywhere else, they could only do so by some simple franchise. All +registration reform was condemned to failure until they made up their +minds on a simple and easy basis for the franchise, sufficiently wide to +enable them to absorb all existing franchises." Such a simple franchise +is to be found in manhood suffrage, which would admit of the easy +transfer of electors' names from the register of one electoral division +to another. The chief objection to this solution, which arises from the +fear that the most numerous class in the country may monopolise +representation, may be met by linking the adoption of a simple franchise +with a system of election which shall give due representation to +minorities. + +_Redistribution._ + +Redistribution must be treated with like boldness, but before +considering the principle on which this reform must be based, it would +be well to give some indication of its urgency. Here are the figures of +four of the largest and four of the smallest English constituencies as +given in the Parliamentary Return of 1911:-- +*** +Constituency. Electors. Constituency. Electors. Romford (Essex) 55,951 +Durham. 2,698 Walthamstow (Essex) 42,029 +Bury St. Edmunds 2,878 Wandsworth 39,821 +Whitehaven 2,989 Harrow (Middlesex) 38,865 +St. George's, Tower Hamlets 3,252 + +_Should be automatic._ + +It will be observed that an elector in Durham has twenty times the +political power of an elector in the Romford Division of Essex. Nor are +these discrepancies confined to England. There are great divergencies +between the electorates of individual constituencies in Scotland and +Ireland, and any measure of redistribution which attempted to deal +effectively with these would necessarily have to be of a far-reaching +character. Even were it possible to effect a readjustment by the +creation of parliamentary areas containing an equal number of electors, +so rapid are the changes in the electorate that the scheme would be out +of date almost before it came into force. Mr. Ellis T. Powell has +published a valuable table entitled "the process of electoral +evolution,"[3] in which he has arranged the constituencies in the order +of their size as measured by the number of electors who were on the +registers in 1886, and again in 1906. The table shows how remarkable has +been the change in their relative importance. The rapidity of the change +is still further indicated by a comparison based upon the 1908 register. +Any one who has the curiosity to count the number of constituencies +which retained the same position on the list both in 1906 and 1908 will +find this to be the case in nineteen constituencies only out of a total +of 481. So great, indeed, has been the change since 1901, the date of +the last census, that no satisfactory scheme of redistribution could be +framed upon the population figures of that year. It would seem that the +only satisfactory principle upon which the problem can be solved is that +of an automatic redistribution of seats on the completion of every +census, but the difficulties associated with such a solution, if the +present system of single-member constituencies is retained, are so +overwhelming as to render it almost inadmissible. True, the South +African Constitution provides for the automatic redistribution of seats +after every quinquennial census,[4] and the Canadian Constitution +contains a similar provision, but the inconveniences attaching to a +rearrangement of boundaries are not so great in new countries as those +which obtain in an established country. Moreover, as time goes on, the +inconveniences associated with rapid changes in boundaries will be felt +more and more both in Canada and in South Africa. For local +authorities[5] rightly complain of the difficulties which arise from the +creation of different areas for different purposes and the consequent +overlapping of boundaries, and these difficulties would increase were +fresh parliamentary divisions created every ten years. The problem which +would be involved in the creation of new parliamentary divisions for +London is such as to render a satisfactory scheme almost impossible. +Apart, however, from these considerations, the difficulties of another +kind attendant upon the creation of new constituencies are so great that +it is quite easy to understand the unwillingness of the leaders of both +political parties to embark upon schemes of redistribution. The +influence of boundaries upon the political fortunes of parties is so +well known that any rearrangement, whether in the metropolis or in the +large towns, would probably be looked upon with very grave suspicion, +and the more so that in several towns party organizations have already +endeavoured to obtain the maximum of party advantage under existing +conditions. + +_Secures neither one vote, one value nor true representation._ Further, +it has been proved beyond question that a redistribution of seats will, +if single-member constituencies are retained, fail to accomplish the end +which its advocates have in view, namely, one vote one value. For +redistribution can only secure equality in the size of electoral +districts, and this is not the same as equality in the value of votes. +With equal electoral districts it would still be possible in two +adjoining constituencies for one member to be returned by a large +majority and the other by a small majority. In Wales it might still +happen that a Conservative vote would be valueless for the purpose of +obtaining representation. Equality in vote value is only secured when +the votes of electors of all parties are equally effective. This can +only happen when the representation of parties is brought into agreement +with their voting strength. + +The Royal Commission on Electoral Systems entered very carefully into +the probable effect of redistribution upon the representation of parties +within the House of Commons, and came to the conclusion that, so far "as +facts can be adduced to test it, the theory that the varying size of +constituencies accounts for the exaggeration of majorities falls to the +ground." This conclusion--and the Commission could hardly have come to +any other--is in agreement with the opinions expressed both by Mr. S. +Rosenbaum, of the Royal Statistical Society,[6] and by Mr. J. Rooke +Corbett, of the Manchester Statistical Society.[7] The following summary +of the results of Mr. Corbett's analyses of the eight General Elections +1885-1910 shows conclusively that redistribution would fail to remedy +the inequalities in representation arising from a system of +single-member constituencies: + +GENERAL ELECTIONS, 1885-1910 + + Majority Majority +Year of of seats under system Majority under +Election Party. actually of equal a proportional + gained. electorates. system. +1885 Liberal 158 178 86 Liberal +1886 Conservative 104 102 8 Liberal +1892 Liberal 44 46 34 Liberal +1895 Conservative 150 172 12 Conservative +1900 Conservative 134 150 16 Conservative +1906 Liberal 356 362 104 Liberal +1910(Jan.) Liberal 124 136 66 Liberal +1910(Dec.) Liberal 126 122 38 Liberal + +"It is sometimes said," states Mr. Corbett, "that if the single-member +constituencies were made equal in size these inequalities of +representation would disappear. It is difficult to understand how any +one with even the most elementary knowledge of the facts can support +such a proposition. An examination of the foregoing summary will show +that no readjustment of the electoral constituencies would do much to +remedy the enormous inequalities which occur at present. In fact strict +equalization of the constituencies would be as likely to make matters +worse as to make them better. Thus, in the year 1885 the Liberal +majority of 158, which under a proportional system would have been 86, +by a system of equal electorates would have been transformed into a +majority of 178; in the following year a Conservative majority of 104, +which, with a proportional system, would have been a Liberal majority of +8, would under a system of equal electorates have been transformed into +a Conservative majority of 102." Mr. Rosenbaum states: "I am firmly +persuaded that it is not possible for redistribution alone to effect +those particular reforms which the advocates of proportional +representation urge.... Proportional representation would secure in the +House of Commons a representation of each party in strict arithmetical +proportion to the number of its supporters in the country. +Redistribution can remove anomalies due to over-representation in one +part and under-representation in another part of the country. So far as +the over-representation in one area is accompanied by an excessive +proportion of members of one party, and the under-representation in +another area is accompanied by a deficiency of members of the opposite +party, redistribution might have some counterbalancing results. There +is, however, no real security that redistribution by itself might not +aggravate rather than mitigate this particular trouble." + +_The problem simplified by proportional representation._ + +It will have been observed that the difficulties of redistribution arise +from the system of single-member constituencies, and it is this which +also renders all schemes useless for the purpose of securing equality in +the value of votes. An effective and simple solution of all difficulties +is available. Abandon the system of single-member constituencies with +their ever-changing boundaries, and treat the natural divisions of the +country (its counties, large towns, &c.) as permanent constituencies +with representation varying with the rise or fall of their population. +This is the scheme of redistribution required by a system of +proportional representation, and its adoption would simplify the most +difficult of all the problems of electoral reform. It would make +possible that automatic redistribution of seats, which must be an +essential feature of any satisfactory scheme of redistribution, without +involving these alterations of boundaries which, in addition to their +other disadvantages and even dangers, interfere so seriously with +administrative efficiency. With such a system the areas for local or +parliamentary purposes might easily be brought into agreement. Already +"we have strong county patriotism fostered by tradition, by +ecclesiastical and judicial affairs, county council government, county +territorial organization, and even county cricket and football; to have, +therefore, county electoral areas would be at once popular and +intelligible to all; besides, it would be a reversion to an old +tradition ";[8] and if the large towns were made parliamentary +constituencies this also would be a reversion to the conditions which +existed before 1885. It would be infinitely easier to add +representatives to or take them away from such electoral areas than it +would be to redivide the boroughs and counties for the purpose of +creating new constituencies. + +Commenting on the work of the Delimitation Commission, to which was +entrusted the duty of creating the new constituencies for the South +African Assembly and Provincial Councils, the Secretary, in a letter to +the author, says: "The task set the Commission proved exceedingly +difficult. While it was, so to speak, imperative to give due +consideration to all the principles enjoined by the Act, the great +object naturally was the framing of constituencies both for the Union +Assembly and for the Provincial Councils which would be able to send +representatives who, in turn, would reflect the will of the various +sections of the people. The conditions enjoined by the Act made it very +difficult to produce schemes which could on all hands be considered +entirely satisfactory.... Good as the result is, there is no question +that had the first recommendation of the South African Convention in +favour of proportional representation been adopted, the work of the +Commission would not only have been much simplified, but the chances of +framing constituencies with representatives forming a true mirror of the +various sections of the people would have been increased by more than +fifty per cent.... If there had been any doubt in my mind my work on +this Commission has removed that doubt, and proved to me that the only +remedy for our various electoral ills is a system of proportional +representation." This considered testimony, from one who has been +immersed in the practical details of redistribution, is of great value, +but it can occasion no surprise, for proportional representation admits +of automatic redistribution of seats, provides for the permanence of +boundaries, renders gerrymandering impossible, and, above all, secures +equality in the value of votes. + +_The case of Ireland._ There is one special difficulty,[9] however, +which must be faced in the consideration of any scheme of redistribution +for the United Kingdom--the number of representatives to be allotted to +Ireland. The permanent over-representation of any one part of a kingdom +united for common purposes cannot easily be defended, but the South +African Constitution furnishes an example of a larger representation +being accorded temporarily to the smaller states for the purpose of +facilitating the union of all; whilst in South Africa, Australia, and +the United States the separate states or provinces have equal +representation, irrespective of size, in the Senate. If the continued +over-representation of Ireland would in any way facilitate the process +of the unification of the United Kingdom, that in itself would be a very +powerful and sufficient reason for maintaining the number of Irish +members at its present level. A system of proportional representation +might simplify the solution of this particular difficulty, for the +over-representation of Ireland would not have the same disturbing effect +upon the composition of the House of Commons if the different divisions +of political opinions within Ireland obtained their fair share of +representation. For proportional representation would produce a very +important modification of the electoral conditions within Ireland. +According to Mr. J. Rooke Corbett, the Irish Unionists who, at the +General Election of 1906, obtained 18 representatives, were entitled to +34. But that is not the only change that would take place. There would +result a softening of those racial divisions which are now the chief +characteristic of Irish representation. Moderate opinion would be +encouraged to take a more active part in elections and to seek +representation. Nor can it be said that the political conditions of +Ireland are such as to render proportional representation within Ireland +either impracticable or nugatory in its effect. Mr. Archibald E. Dobbs, +High Sheriff of county Antrim, has framed a scheme with special +reference to Irish conditions[10], and Lord MacDonnell, who was +intimately associated with the details of the Irish Council Bill of +1907, has said: "He made the subject the matter of as close a study as +he could at the time, and everything he read more fully satisfied him of +the great desirability of the system. He felt that it was more needed in +Ireland than in any other part of the British Empire, because, although +for the purpose of general politics the division into Nationalists and +Unionists could be defended, for the purpose he had in view--the +internal administration of Ireland--it was essential that all views, not +only the Nationalists and the Unionists, but the great political school +of thought under the name of the old Whigs should also be represented. +The results of his labours perhaps it would not be discreet for him to +disclose, but he was quite satisfied of the practicability in Ireland of +a scheme of proportional representation[11]." + +_Three-cornered contests._ + +But even if the Electoral Reform Bill provided for a simplification of +the franchise and a redistribution of seats, yet such a measure could +not be described as a complete and effective scheme of reform. The Bill +must provide a solution for the further problem arising from +three-cornered contests, which have greatly increased in number in +recent elections. On what principle is this difficulty to be solved? +Formerly there was a strong demand for the second ballot, but its +defects have been so constantly exposed that the remedy more generally +advocated is the one recommended by the Royal Commission on Electoral +Systems, viz., the adoption of the alternative vote (the transferable +vote in single-member constituencies). This proposal, however, ignores +the real difficulty, which is found in the fact that three parties, and +not two, are now seeking representation. Three-cornered contests have, +so far, affected adversely the fortunes of the Liberal Party; and the +alternative vote, whilst tending, at least temporarily, to redress the +situation, does so without providing any adequate guarantee for the +fair representation of other parties. Were this remedy adopted it may be +assumed that Liberal candidates would be nominated in those +constituencies which are now represented by members of the Labour Party, +and at least there would be a cessation of the process of withdrawing +Liberal candidates from other constituencies ear-marked by the Labour +Party. Were all these constituencies contested by the three parties it +might easily happen that the smallest party would obtain no +representation whatever. Conservative electors might record their second +choice for the Liberal candidate, and in this way secure in each case +the defeat of the Labour candidates. On the other hand, an alliance +between Labour and Conservatives might procure the defeat of the Liberal +candidates. The representation of any one party would depend upon the +action taken by members of other parties. + +As the probable effects of the alternative vote becomes more fully +understood its inadequacy as a remedy will be more clearly realized, and +this proposal, instead of facilitating, may hinder the passage of a +comprehensive measure of reform. On the contrary, the wider reform of +proportional representation, providing as it would for the just and fair +representation of three parties (and this is the problem for which a +solution has to be found), has far greater claims to the consideration +of practical politicians. It simplifies the problem of redistribution; +it is the way by which equality in the value of votes can be secured; it +provides for the fair representation of three parties, and, in +guaranteeing the adequate representation of minorities, facilitates the +adoption of a simple franchise. Proportional representation is, as it +were, the master key which unlocks the difficulties associated with a +comprehensive measure of electoral reform. Based on a broad simple +principle, the justice of which is apparent to all, it provides the +means by which each of the separate parts of such a measure can be most +easily and effectively dealt with. Indeed, it is difficult to conceive +on what other principle any permanent solution of the electoral problem +can be based, or by what other means the difficulties inherent in a +comprehensive measure of reform can be successfully overcome. + +_Partial adoption of proportional representation not desirable_ + +Some who recognize the great merits of proportional representation have +suggested its application to urban constituencies by way of experiment. +Thus, Mr. Winston Churchill has expressed the opinion that "the +proportional representation of great cities was a point upon which +electoral reformers ought to concentrate their minds."[12] A partial +application of the reform might be of value as further evidence of its +practicability, but there is no need for this further evidence. The full +benefits of the system cannot be expected from such experiments, and +although a partial measure is apparently working satisfactorily in +Würtemberg, the history of the movement shows that such schemes usually +arouse fierce opposition. An attempt to introduce a partial scheme in +Belgium provoked a storm of indignation and had to be withdrawn, and the +amendment to the original draft of the South African Constitution, +carried in the Cape Parliament, limiting the proposed application of +proportional representation to the towns, resulted in its complete +abandonment for the elections for the House of Assembly. All partial +applications of proportional representation are apt to work unfairly. In +Belgium, the Catholics were stronger in the rural districts than in the +towns and the proportional representation of the towns alone would have +strengthened the political position of the Catholics. Similarly the +limitation of proportional representation to the towns in South Africa +would have strengthened the political position of the Dutch in those +constituencies without giving a corresponding advantage to the +minorities in the country areas. Were a partial application attempted in +Great Britain it would be necessary to overcome the initial difficulty +of selecting the constituencies to which the experiment should be +applied, and in the absence of an agreement between the parties, it +would be difficult, if not impossible, to escape the fatal charge of +partisan selection. + +_Proportional representation and democratic principles._ + +What hinders the adoption of a complete scheme of proportional +representation? Is it not primarily a lack of courage and of trust in +the principle of democracy? But does it need a greater courage, a +greater belief in the value of the democratic principle than the grant +of self-government to the Transvaal and to the Orange River Colony +within a few years of the Boer War? The courage and faith in the latter +case have been abundantly justified, and were statesmen actuated by a +similar courage and belief in democracy to propose a system of +proportional representation there would undoubtedly be a public response +which would astonish them; for reforms which are obviously based upon +justice are quickly and gladly accepted. Democracy cannot be carried to +its highest pitch of perfection if the electoral methods by which +representative institutions are brought into being are fundamentally +defective. "By proportional representation," said Mr. James Gibb, "if +electors were enabled to put more intelligence and conscience into their +votes, the nation would be the gainer. The character of the electorate +is of paramount importance, one outcome of it being the character of the +House of Commons. The electors have not yet had a fair chance of showing +what they can do in the making of a House of Commons. The question put +to them is in such a form that they can hardly give an intelligible +reply. The single-member system seems to imply a belief that the +elector's liberty of choice must be narrow. We have now arrived at a +point when another step is due in the evolution of the people's +liberties, when an individual elector should obtain a greater freedom of +choice and therefore a more intimate relation to national affairs.[13] +Further, the smooth working of democratic institutions requires that no +section of the electors should be permanently divorced from the +governing body. Such separation begets a feeling of hostility towards +the institutions of the country. Thus, Lord Dunraven has referred to +Ireland as a country in the government of which some of its best +citizens are not allowed to take part. Similarly, many British settlers +in the Orange Free State, although resident for several years, never had +any representative in the State Assembly. The natural feeling arose that +the government of the country was a matter which did not concern them, +and they never attended the meetings addressed by the member of the +Assembly for the district. It may be true that minorities must suffer, +but there is no reason why they should suffer needlessly. Here justice +and expediency go hand in hand. It is to the advantage of the country +that all should be associated with the representative body which speaks +in the name of the whole, whether that body be a town council, a county +council, or a House of Commons. + +_Constitutional reform._ + +As pointed out in the opening chapter, the question of electoral reform +is intimately associated with the constitutional problem which has +occupied Parliament since 1906. This problem contains two factors--the +relation between the two Houses of Parliament, and the constitution of +the House of Lords. The House of Commons claims greater power in +legislation on the ground that it is the expression of the national +will. This demand has called forth a movement for reforming the House of +Lords in order that it may fulfil more adequately its duties as a Second +Chamber. The Unionist leaders have proposed that the peers should +delegate their powers to a small number and that the House should be +strengthened by the introduction of nominated and elected elements. With +regard to the suggestion that a certain number of Lords of Parliament +should be nominated by the Crown, all evidence points to the fact that +such nominations invariably become party in character. No Government +can afford to ignore the claims of the party which supports it, or to +miss the opportunity of strengthening its position in one of the Houses +of Parliament. The Canadian Senate, which is a nominated body, fails to +give satisfaction, and there is a strong demand for its reform. At the +conclusion of Sir John Macdonald's long lease of power the Senate +consisted nearly wholly of Conservatives. Now that the Liberal +Government has been in office for a good many years, the Senate is +nearly wholly Liberal. Obviously, the introduction of a nominated +element will not provide a Second Chamber that will command public +confidence. + +The elected element might be chosen indirectly by the County Councils or +by the House of Commons, or the much bolder course of direct popular +election, advocated by Sir Edward Grey, might be adopted. Direct +election is distinctly preferable to indirect election by bodies created +for other purposes. The experience of the United States, France, Sweden, +and all other countries where the Upper House is elected by local +legislatures, provincial councils, or municipalities, show that +elections to the local authorities are fought on questions of national +politics. But whether indirect or direct election is determined upon, it +is already clear that the only possible method of election is that of +proportional representation. The Royal Commission on Electoral Systems +has reported that there is much to be said in favour of the transferable +vote as a method of election for a Second Chamber, and this verdict has +since been endorsed in numerous articles in the press. Thus a writer in +the _Quarterly Review_ says that: "If an elected element is thought to +be necessary for the popularity and effectiveness of a reformed Upper +House, then let a certain number of members be elected in large +constituencies by means of proportional representation."[14] Were the +minimum age qualifying for a vote in such elections raised to +twenty-five or more there would naturally be provided the conservative +tendency to which that House is intended to give expression, and were +peers eligible as candidates doubtless such peers as were interested in +politics would experience little difficulty in securing election.[15] + +The principle of election has been adopted for the Senates of Australia +and of South Africa. In the former the majority system with direct +election is used; in the latter, a proportional system with indirect +election. The difference in the results is most striking. In Australia +each of the States is polled as a separate constituency, each elector +having three votes. The result of the election of 1910 was as follows:-- + +AUSTRALIA: SENATE ELECTIONS, 1910 + +State. Votes Polled. Labour Non-Labour Seats Obtained. Votes. Votes. +Labour. Non-Labour. Victoria 648,889 692,474 3 -- New South Wales +736,666 735,566 3 -- Queensland 244,292 124,048 3 -- South Australia +171,858 148,626 3 -- Western Australia 128,452 109,565 3 -- Tasmania +92,033 75,115 3 -- --------- --------- -- -- 2,021,090 1,997,029[16] +18 -- + +It will be seen that the Labour Party polled 2,021,090 votes and +obtained 18 seats, whilst their opponents, with a poll of no less than +1,997,029 votes, obtained none. So effectively does the majority system +in the form of the block vote blot out minorities. The Hon. W. Pember +Reeves, in commenting upon these figures,[17] said that: "Such results +give rise to revolutions." + +In South Africa each State is represented by eight Senators chosen by +the local Parliaments by means of the single transferable vote. The +first elections gave the following result:-- + +SOUTH AFRICA: SENATE ELECTIONS, 1910 + +Seats Obtained. States. Dutch Parties[18] British Parties[18] + +Cape Colony South African 6 Progressive 2 Transvaal Het Volk and +Progressive and Nationalist 5 Labour 3 Natal Dutch 1 British 7 Orange +Free State Orangia Unie 6 Constitutionalist 2 -- -- Total 18 Total 14 + +In the one case minorities are completely suppressed; in the other the +minority in each State obtains representation. + +These two illustrations show that if the House of Lords is to be +strengthened by the infusion of an elected element chosen by large +constituencies, a true system of election must be adopted. This is the +conclusion arrived at by Professor Ramsay Muir[19] after a careful +examination of the different methods by which a Second Chamber can be +constituted. All suggestions as to the selection of peers by hereditary +peers, of peers qualified by service, by nomination, by indirect +election, by direct election on a limited franchise, are ruled out and +the direct election of a new Second Chamber by the single transferable +vote is advocated in order that the new House may contain those elements +which fail to secure representation with a system of single-member +constituencies. But if, by the adoption of direct popular election and +proportional representation, the Upper House were made more truly +representative than the Lower, then whatever resolutions were passed +defining the relations between the two Houses there is not much doubt +that power would tend to pass into the hands of the more representative +House. In commenting upon the Royal Commission's report _The Nation_[20] +said: "Perhaps the most pregnant sentence in this whole report is that +in which the Commission suggests that proportional representation might +be a suitable basis for an elective Senate. We have our liberty of +choice, and democracy may find its account in either alternative. We may +prefer to retain an imperfectly representative Lower House. But if we +place above it a really representative Senate the whole balance of the +Constitution might be altered, and the Senate become the more venerable, +the more democratic, and in the end, the more powerful Chamber. We may, +on the other hand, reform the House of Commons, and render any Senate +superfluous. In either event, proportional representation may become the +ultimate key to our constitutional problem." + +_Federal Home Rule._ + +The same question, the method of election, must enter into the +consideration of those larger schemes, Federal Home Rule and Imperial +Federation, which have been mooted in the discussion of the +constitutional relations between the two Houses of the Parliament of the +United Kingdom. A writer in _The Times_,[21] whose series of letters +attracted considerable attention, said that the "central idea of +Federalism appears to be that our present single Imperial Parliament, +which does, or makes an attempt at doing, all the complicated +work--first of the Empire, and second of the United Kingdom of Great +Britain and Ireland, and third of the various countries which together +make up the United Kingdom--is no longer adequate to the purpose. The +Federalists therefore propose that the Imperial Parliament, while +maintaining its supremacy absolutely intact, shall delegate a large part +of its functions to a number of subordinate national or provincial +Parliaments, who shall manage the domestic affairs of England, +Scotland, Ireland and Wales, or of such other territorial divisions as +may be agreed upon. These national or provincial Parliaments will be +entirely independent one of another, but all will acknowledge the full +and absolute sovereignty of the Imperial Parliament." Mr. Birrell stated +that "Federation beginning here at home, as it is called, is ripening +for a speedy decision. Such a Federation once established would be able +to find room for our Dominions overseas as and when they wished to come +in. We should have then a truly Imperial Parliament, at the door of +which any one of our Dominions could come in, and as it were hang up its +hat and coat in his Mother's House and take part in common Imperial +proceedings, and in the government of this great Empire."[22] These are +great changes, and without entering too deeply into details of how these +new bodies are to be brought into being, it is certain that one of the +conditions of their successful working is that they must be fully +representative. It is inconceivable that a national council can be set +up for Wales, or for Scotland, or for Ireland, without provision for the +adequate representation of minorities. Lord Morley, in instituting the +new Councils in India, was compelled to make provision for the +representation of Muhammedans. Mr. Birrell, in the Irish Council Bill of +1907, proposed that minorities should be represented by members +nominated by the Crown. It is impossible to reconcile this reactionary +proposal with democratic principles, and there can be no possible reason +for its adoption when there is a method of election available which +enables minorities to choose their own representatives. + +_Imperial federation._ + +Mr. Birrell's vision of an Imperial Parliament for the British Empire +raises once more the value of a true method of election. An Imperial +Parliament will not accomplish its purpose--the consolidation of the +Empire--if the basis of representation is such as to give undue emphasis +to the separate interests of the constituent States. Further, it would +seem desirable that the establishment of such a Parliament should be +preceded by the more complete unification of the various States, for in +no other Empire are there so many racial divisions, and it is from these +that the greatest of political difficulties spring--in Ireland the +division between north and south; in the United Kingdom between Ireland +and Great Britain; in South Africa between the Dutch and British; in +Canada between the French and British. The majority system of election +brings out these differences in their acutest form. In Canada in 1910 no +representative from the Province of Quebec attended the National +Conference of Canadian Conservatives; of the four Provinces forming the +South African Union it was in the Orange Free State, where in the local +Parliament the minority was almost wholly deprived of representation, +that racial differences gave rise to the keenest feeling. Proportional +representation has proved itself to have been of the greatest value in +bi-racial countries such as Belgium where the representation of +political parties no longer coincides with racial divisions. The +adoption of proportional representation in the United Kingdom, in +Canada, and for all elections in South Africa would complete the +consolidation of these various divisions of the Empire, and even where +racial difficulties do not exist, as in Australia and New Zealand, the +fair representation of all classes of citizens would free questions of +Imperial politics from the dangers of exaggerated party majorities. + +_Conclusion._ + +Whether it is a question of improving existing institutions, or the +creation of further representative bodies, the method of election is all +important. All other departments or human activity show continuous +improvement, and the substitution of scientific for rule-of-thumb +methods of election is an improvement long overdue. It may even be said +that the continued successful working of representative institutions +demand such an improvement. The accomplishment of other electoral +reforms can be more easily attained by the adoption of a system which +allows of the fair representation of all. The reform of the House of +Lords, whether by the delegation of the powers of existing peers to a +small number, or by the introduction of an elected element, or its +establishment on a completely democratic basis, necessitates the +adequate representation of minorities. Federal Home Rule is +impracticable unless due provision is made for minority representation. +But in the contemplation of newer legislative bodies it must not be +forgotten that it is of the utmost importance that the prestige of the +House of Commons--the mother of parliaments, and, as such, the glory of +English-speaking peoples--should be maintained at the highest level. Yet +its predominance in the Parliament of the United Kingdom can be +permanently secured only if it is made fully and completely +representative. The House of Commons must once more renew itself; it +must establish itself on sounder foundations. Its privileges and powers +have been won by the efforts of past generations. To the present +generation falls the opportunity of perfecting its organization and of +strengthening its foundations by making it in truth the expression of +the national will. + +[Footnote 1: Reply to Deputation of Liberal members at House of Commons, +20 May 1908.] + +[Footnote 2: "This number might be reduced to eleven, if minor +variations were grouped."--Sir Charles Dilke, National Liberal Club, 10 +May 1909.] + +[Footnote 3: _The Essentials of Self-Government,_ 1909, p. 62.] + +[Footnote 4: Section 41 of the South Africa Act, 1909, reads thus: "As +soon as may be after every quinquennial census the +Governor-General-in-Council shall appoint a commission consisting of +three Judges of the Supreme Court of South Africa to carry out any +redivision which may have become necessary as between the different +electoral divisions in each Province, and to provide for the allocation +of the number of members to which such Province may have become entitled +under the provisions of this Act."] + +[Footnote 5: The Town Clerk of Edinburgh, Dr. Hunter, urges a +rearrangement of the Parliamentary Divisions of the city, so as to +assimilate them to the municipal wards. "Confusion and unnecessary +expense are caused by the present arrangement.... The municipal area of +the city is represented in Parliament partly by the four city members, +partly by the member for Leith Burghs, and partly by the member for the +County of Midlothian. The distinction thus existing between the +Municipal and Parliamentary divisions of the city necessitates the +annual making up of separate rolls of voters for municipal and for +Parliamentary purposes respectively, involving heavy additional expense +(amounting to upwards of £1100 per annum), which would be avoided if the +areas for both purposes were assimilated." Assimilation is desirable +"not merely in order to save needless expense, but in the interests of +candidates and electors as well as of the electoral agencies. In the +dual arrangement at present existing the usual organizations for +electoral purposes of all kinds have to be duplicated. Not one of the +Parliamentary wards correspond with any of the municipal wards."--_The +Scotsman_, 9 August 1910.] + +[Footnote 6: "The General Election of January 1910, and the Bearing of +the Results on some Problems of Representation." Paper read before the +Royal Statistical Society, 19 April 1910. Mr. Rosenbaum, however, +rejects proportional representation on political grounds. These have +been considered in the two previous chapters.] + +[Footnote 7: "Electoral Statistics." Paper read before the Manchester +Statistical Society, 12 December 1906.] + +[Footnote 8: Joseph King, M.P., in evidence before the Royal Commission +on Electoral Systems, 1909.] + +[Footnote 9: This difficulty would disappear with the adoption of Home +Rule.] + +[Footnote 10: _Real Representation for Ireland_, 1908.] + +[Footnote 11: Report of Annual Meeting of the Proportional +Representation Society, 21 July 1909.--_Representation,_ vol. ii. +p. 154.] + +[Footnote 12: In reply to a deputation of the Manchester Liberal +Federation, 22 May 1909.] + +[Footnote 13: _Minutes of Evidence_, Royal Commission on Electoral +Systems, 1910 (Cd. 6352), p. 104.] + +[Footnote 14: _Cf._ "Two Chambers or One," _Quarterly Review_, July +1910.] + +[Footnote 15: The indirect election of the United States Senate gives so +little satisfaction that the House of Representatives on 14 April 1911 +approved of the proposed amendment to the Constitution providing for +popular election by 296 votes to 6.] + +[Footnote 16: Of these, the Fusionists polled 1,830,353 votes.] + +[Footnote 17: Address to the London School of Economics, 5 October +1910.] + +[Footnote 18: These broad distinctive titles are here given, although +the author recognizes that the Nationalist and Unionist parties in South +Africa are not exclusively Dutch or British.] + +[Footnote 19: _Peers and Bureaucrats_, by Ramsay Muir, Professor of +Modern History at Liverpool University.] + +[Footnote 20: 21 May 1910.] + +[Footnote 21: "Pacificus," _The Times_, 31 October 1910.] + +[Footnote 22: Address to the Eighty Club, 25 July 1910.] + + + +APPENDIX I + +THE JAPANESE ELECTORAL SYSTEM--THE SINGLE NON-TRANSFERABLE VOTE + +The following memorandum has been written by Mr. Kametaro Hayasbida, the +Chief Secretary of the Japanese House of Representatives, in reply to a +series of questions, the particulars of which are set out in the +memorandum. + +_Failure of single member system._ + +The Original Election Law of our country was promulgated in 1889, the +same year in which took place the promulgation of the Constitution. +Under this law the system of small electoral districts was +single-adopted, and each _Fu_ or _Ken_ (administrative district) was +divided into several electoral districts each of which constituted a +single-member constituency (with the exception of some large districts +which, impossible of further division, had two seats allotted with the +system of _scrutin de liste_). The system was, however, found in +practice to be very unsatisfactory, as it often happened that a minority +of the voters, instead of the majority, in certain _Fu_ or _Ken_ +obtained the majority of the members returned, and, on the other hand, a +party with a majority at the polls could not sometimes, as the result of +the grouping of the voters in the small electoral districts, secure any +representation at all. Under such circumstances it was utterly +impossible for each political party to obtain representation in +reasonable proportion to the strength of its voters; or, in other words, +the electors of the country at large had never succeeded in being +properly represented in their legislative body. As the inadequacy of the +system was thus apparently shown I formulated in 1891, by somewhat what +modifying Marshal's cumulative voting system, a system of large +electoral districts combined with that of the single vote, and urged for +a revision of the Election Law. + +_Multi-member constituencies. Single vote adopted 1900._ + +Since then several elections had taken place; and the defects of the +existing law were more strongly pronounced at each successive election. +It was, however, not until the year 1898 that the Government at last +introduced a Bill for a revision of the law with the view of adopting +the system I had the honour of formulating. After heated discussion in +three successive sessions, the Bill was passed in 1900 and sanctioned as +a law. This is our present Election Law. In the revised system the _Fu, +Ken_, and _Shi_ (the administrative districts) constitute at the same +time the electoral districts, and a voter in each district has but one +vote for one candidate, while several seats (according to the +population) are allotted to the district. + +The above is a brief historical sketch of our electoral system. I shall +now try to answer your questions in order. + +_Equitable results._ + +As to the first question whether our system secures the representation +of each party in reasonable proportion to its voting strength, I cannot +do better than answer it by pointing out a few instances in the General +Election which took place on the 15 May 1908. + +TABLE I + +THE CITY OF TOKYO (11 seats) + + Seats in Seats +Parties. Votes. Proportion Obtained. + to votes. +Seiyu-Kwai (Liberals) 6,579 2.71 2 +Konsei-honto (Progressives) 2,216 0.91 1 +Daido-ha (Conservatives) 2,879 1.18 2 +Yuko-Kwai (Radicals) 4,656 1.91 2 +Churitsu (Independent) 10,414 4.29 4 +------ ----- -- +Total 26,744 11.00 11 + +All parties except the Seiyu-kwai and Daido-ha succeeded in obtaining +their representatives in reasonable proportion to their respective +voting strength. The explanation given for the particular case of the +Seiyu-kwai is that the party, unable for some reason or other to limit +the number of candidates, had placed five candidates instead of three or +four, and caused its own defeat by splitting the votes. I take at +random, or rather in the order they come, a few more districts, and the +results obtained are as follows:-- + +TABLE II + +TOKYO-FU (5 seats) + +Parties. Number of Seats in Seats + Candidates. Votes. Proportion Obtained + to Votes. +Seiyu-kwai 5 12,794 4.02 4 +Kensei-honto - - - - +Daido-ha. 1 13,122 .98 1 +Churitsu - - - - + ------ ---- - +Total 6 15,916 5.00 5 + +TABLE III + +THE CITY OF KYOTO (3 seats) + +Parties. Number of Seats in Seats + Candidates. Votes. Proportion Obtained + to Votes. +Seiyu-kwai 1 1,284 0.45 - +Kensei-honto - - - - +Daido-ha - - - - +Yuko-Kwai - - - - +Churitsu 3 7,304 2.55 3 + - ----- ---- - +Total 4 8,588 3.00 3 + +TABLE IV + +KYOTO-FU (5 seats) + +Parties. Number of Seats in Seats + Candidates. Votes. Proportion Obtained. + to Votes. +Seiyu-kwai 5 18,928 4.01 4 +Kensei-honto -- -- -- -- +Daido-ha -- -- -- -- +Yuko-kwai -- -- -- -- +Churitsu 1 4,701 0.99 1 + -------------------------------------- +Total.... 6 23,629 5.00 5 + +TABLE V + +THE CITY OF OSAKA (6 seats) + +Parties. Number of Seats in Seats + Candidates. Votes. Proportion Obtained. + to Votes. +Seiyu-kwai 5 8,666 3.32 4 +Kensei-honto -- -- -- -- +Daido-ha -- -- -- -- +Yuko-kwai 1 2,612 1.00 1 +Churitsu 2 4,368 1.68 1 + --------------------------------------------- +Total.... 8 15,646 6.00 6 + +TABLE VI + +OSAKU-FU (6 seats) + +Parties. Number of Seats in Seats + Candidates. Votes. Proportion Obtained. + to Votes. +Seiyu-kwai 5 15,137 3.57 5 +Kensei-honto -- -- -- -- +Daido-ha 1 2,199 0.52 -- +Yuko-kwai 1 1,304 0.31 -- +Churitsu 3 6,786 1.60 1 + --------------------------------------------- +Total.... 10 25,426 6.00 6 + +Throughout all electoral districts similar results were obtained. The +Churitsu (_i.e._ those belonging to no party), considered as a group, +had not everywhere been as successful as the other parties, as observe +in Tables V. and VI. Each candidate of this group is quite independent +of the other, and has no political views or propaganda in common, nor +any organization whatever. Therefore, each case is totally different +from the other. Although all independent candidates or voters are in +these tables grouped as Churitsu, it is not proper to consider them in +the same category with the other parties. + +Now, judging from the results in the General Election, a few instances +of which are given above, I may say that our present system, if not +fully satisfactory, tolerably secures the representation of each +political party in approximate proportion to its voting capacity. + +_The new system and party organization._ + +As to the first part of your second question, whether, to obtain these +results, the system involves a great deal of calculation on the part of +political organizations as to the exact number of their supporters, I +should say that, as the same system and method of election are uniformly +adopted in the city, county, borough and village elections as well as in +the elections of the Prefectural Assembly, it is not a very difficult +task for all political parties to ascertain from the results of all +these elections their relative strength, and to estimate the number of +their supporters. + +As to the second part of the question, whether it is necessary to issue +precise instructions to the electors as to the candidates for whom they +should vote, my answer is this: as every political organization through +its branch in every _Fu_ and _Ken_ and the sub-branches in the cities, +counties, towns and villages, is always in close touch with its +constituents, and is constantly explaining its position and propaganda, +with the view not only to instruct them but also to extend the sphere of +its influence, it is not so difficult as it seems to decide the number +of candidates. When it is once decided efforts are made on the part of +the organization to distribute the votes among the candidates in such a +way that not one of them receives a defeat at the hands of the other +party. To attain this object the methods are not very complicated, for +every elector has but one vote for one candidate; and, moreover, the +stronger candidates, so long as their own position is secured, will +endeavour to distribute a portion of their votes among the weaker +candidates. This being the case, the member returned with the greatest +number of votes may not be the most popular candidate, but the party as +a whole is much more likely to succeed in getting representatives in +proportion to the strength of its voters. + +_The position of independents._ + +As to the third question, whether the system enables men of independent +mind and character to maintain their position in Parliament, I should +emphatically state that the revised system is much better than the old +in this respect. Under the old system even such a prominent man as Mr. +M. Matsuda (the Speaker of the House of Representatives some years ago, +and the Minister of Finance in the present Government) suffered several +defeats. But under the new system it has never happened that the leader +of a party has lost his seat at any election, as he may seek his +election at the safest district. To men of independent mind and +character the new system offers the greater opportunity to maintain +their position in the House, for in the election they may, in spite of +the opposition of parties, draw their votes from all parts within a +large electoral district. It may be said that the larger electoral +district we have, the greater opportunity we afford to independent +candidates. For instance, both Mr. Y. Ozaki, the Mayor of Tokyo, and Mr. +S. Shimada, by being independent candidates, have never lost their seat +in Parliament, and in the last General Election were returned for their +native prefecture or town with a great number of votes. + +This brings me to the end of my answers to your inquiries. In conclusion +I may say a few words about the public opinions in our country as to the +Election Laws. + +_Public opinion and the new system._ + +Despite the fact that the new system enables the elector of the country +to be more reasonably represented in the House, still there are some +ambitious politicians urging for their own selfish purpose to restore +the old system. But, as almost all prominent members in both Houses are +fully cognizant of the relative merits and demerits of the two systems, +there is not much chance of our returning to the old system. + +APPENDIX II + +THE SECOND BALLOT + +A Note on the German General Elections of 1903 and 1907. + +The German Reichstag, which consists of 397 members, is elected by a +system of single-member constituencies. Every member, however, must have +obtained a majority of the votes polled, either at a first or second +ballot, in the constituency for which he has been returned. The German +Official Returns furnish very complete details of the elections, +including the figures for the first and second ballots, and the +summaries at the end of the Returns disclose a very striking divergence +between the proportions of seats obtained and votes polled by the +various political parties. These discrepancies have attracted general +attention, and have usually been attributed to the great variation in +the size of German constituencies. As a matter of fact, the effect of +redistribution on the proportionality between seats and votes is not +nearly so large as is generally supposed. Apart from the consequences of +neglecting the votes of the minority or minorities in each constituency, +wherein lies the gravest defect of a single-member system, the second +ballot is a disturbing factor of considerable importance. So far from +diminishing the disproportion between seats and votes polled by the +various parties, the second ballot frequently increases that +disproportion. In order to appreciate the respective effects of unequal +constituencies and of the second ballots it is necessary to consider +these two factors separately. This will be facilitated by making a +comparison between the results which would have been obtained without +second ballots with the results actually obtained. The following +tables, which are based upon the official returns, give the votes polled +and the seats obtained by the five principal groups:-- + +GERMAN GENERAL ELECTION, 1903 + +Parties. Votes. Results without Results with + Second Ballot. Second Ballot. +Social Democrats 3,010,771 122 81 + (31.7%) (30.7%) (20.4%) +Centre Party 1,875,273 104 100 + (19.7%) (26.2%) (25.2%) +National Liberals 1,317,401 32 51 + (13.9%) ( 8.1%) (12.8%) +Conservatives 1,281,852 79 75 + (13.6%) (19.9%) (18.9%) +Radical Parties 872,653 11 36 + ( 9.2%) ( 2.8%) ( 9.1%) + +GERMAN GENERAL ELECTION, 1907 + +Parties. Votes. Results without Results with + Second Ballot. Second Ballot. +Social Democrats 3,259,029 73 43 + (28.9%) (18.4%) (10.8%) +Centre Party 2,179,743 101 105 + (19.3%) (26.4%) (26.4%) +National Liberals 1,630,681 47 54 + (14.5%) (11.8%) (13.6%) +Conservatives 1,632,072 91 84 + (13.6%) (22.9%) (21.2%) +Radical Parties 1,233,933 30 49 + (10.9%) ( 7.6%) (12.3%) + +_The effect of unequal constituencies on representation_. + +The Social Democrats were affected to a greater extent than any other +party by both the factors referred to. In 1903 the Socialists polled +31.7 per cent, of the votes, and, at the first ballots, were at the head +of the poll in 122, or 30.7 per cent, of the constituencies. In other +words, if the system of second ballots had not been in force, the Social +Democrats would have obtained very nearly their fair share of +representation. If, in addition, there had been a redistribution of +seats by which the sizes of constituencies had been equalized, the +Social Democrats would have obtained more than their share of +representation. The strength of the party lay in the large towns, and +if, for example, Berlin had the additional eight seats to which it was +entitled nearly all of them would have fallen to the Social Democrats. +Again the three divisions of the district of Hamburg returned Social +Democrats with overwhelming majorities. Were the representation allotted +to Hamburg doubled, as it should be, all six seats might possibly have +fallen to the Social Democrats.[1] An equalization of the size of +constituencies might have produced in 1903 the phenomenon which has +occurred so often in England. The largest party would have secured a +number of seats far in excess of that to which it was entitled by reason +of its strength. In 1907 the Socialists polled 28.9 of the votes, but +only succeeded in reaching the head of the poll at the first ballot in +73, or 18.4 per cent. of the constituencies. A redistribution of seats +would have added to their representation in the large towns, and the +first ballots would have yielded a result which would have corresponded +more fairly with their polling strength. + +_The effect of second ballots_. + +In both years the system of second ballots has had the effect of +reducing very considerably the representation of the Social Democrats. +In the year 1903 the Social Democrats won 56 constituencies by absolute +majorities, and were engaged in the second ballots in 118 +constituencies. In 66 of these constituencies they were at the head of +the poll, but succeeded in maintaining this position at the second +ballots in 24 only. In the remaining 52 constituencies they were second +on the poll, and at the second ballots they were able to win only _one_ +of these seats. In these 118 constituencies the Socialists polled +1,170,000 votes at the first ballots, whilst the other parties polled +1,920,000. As a result of the second ballots the Socialists obtained 25 +seats and the remaining parties obtained 93 seats. + +The figures of the year 1907 tell a similar tale. At the first ballots +the Social Democrats were at the head of the poll in 73 constituencies. +The second ballots reduced this number to 43. They were engaged in the +second ballots in 90 constituencies; they were at the head of the poll +in the first ballot in 44 of these constituencies, but kept this +position in 11 only; they were second on the poll in the remaining 46 +constituencies and won in 3 cases only. In these 90 constituencies the +Social Democrats polled at the first ballot 1,185,000 votes, whilst the +other parties taken together polled 1,888,000 votes; the Socialists +obtained 14 seats, the other parties obtained 76 seats. + +In both these elections the second ballots affected very adversely the +representation of the largest party. If this party, without the second +ballot and with a fair distribution of seats, might have obtained more +than its share of representation, then the second ballots would have +acted as a corrective, but not necessarily so. There is no reason why +the second ballots should not have added to the over-representation +already obtained. This will be seen from the figures of the elections in +the Kingdom of Saxony. This division of the German Empire is entitled to +23 representatives in the Reichstag. In 1903 the Socialists won 18 of +these seats with absolute majorities; they were engaged in the second +ballots in the remaining five constituencies; they won four (all those +in which they were at the head of the poll at the first ballots) and +only lost the one constituency in which they were second on the poll. +The Social Democrats, who at the first ballots polled 58.8 per cent, of +the votes, thus obtained 22 seats out of 23, and the second ballots in +this case only confirmed the overwhelming preponderance which the system +of single-member constituencies had conferred upon the larger party. + +_Second ballots and the swing of the pendulum_.] It would, +indeed, seem that a system of second ballots rather accentuates those +great changes in representation which are the normal characteristic of a +system of single-member constituencies. In the elections in Saxony in +1907 the Social Democrats were still by far the largest party, obtaining +48.5 per cent. of the votes. They succeeded in obtaining eight seats by +absolute majorities and were engaged at the second ballots in eight +other constituencies. They lost every one of these constituencies, +although at the first ballots they had been at the head of the poll in +five of them. The unfavourable swing of the pendulum reduced their +representation at the first ballots, and the second ballots merely +increased their misfortunes. + +Nor would redistribution have lessened the violence of these changes in +the constituencies in which second ballots were necessary. Thus, for +example, Frankfort-On-Main, with an electorate of 77,164, should return +two members instead of one. The constituency was won by the Socialists +in the second ballots of 1903, but was lost at the second ballots in +1907. In both years the Socialist candidate was at the head of the poll +at the first ballots. Similarly the constituency of Elberfeld-Barmen, +with an electorate of 67,241, won by an absolute majority in 1903, was +lost by the Socialists at the second ballots in 1907, although their +candidate had been at the head of the poll at the first ballot. If these +and other constituencies had received additional representatives, the +violence of the changes in the composition of the legislative body would +in all probability have been increased. + +_The second ballot and the representation of minorities_. + +A study of the statistics of the German General Elections shows that the +representation obtained by the various parties depends very largely upon +their supremacy in certain localities. In these districts the minorities +have been unrepresented for many years, the second ballots having in no +way saved them from practical disfranchisement. Thus the Centre Party is +in the ascendant in the Rhenish Provinces. In the district of Cologne, +Münster, and Aix-la-Chapelle, the Centre Party monopolizes the +representation, returning in 1907 every one of the 15 members to which +the districts were entitled. In the adjoining districts of Dusseldorf, +Coblentz and Treves they returned 16 out of 24. In Bavaria, the +districts of Lower Bavaria, the Upper Palatinate, Lower Franconia and +Schwabia, which are entitled to 23 members, were represented wholly by +members of the Centre Party. Taking the kingdom of Bavaria as a whole, +the Centre Party obtained 34 seats out of 48, although they polled only +44.7 per cent of the votes at the first ballots. There is therefore +reproduced in Germany the conditions which obtain in certain parts of +the United Kingdom--the permanent supremacy of one party which +monopolizes, or nearly so, the representation of the district. + +_Summary_ + +The system of second ballots has therefore had a considerable influence +in creating that divergence between the votes polled and the seats +obtained which has characterized German elections. The representation of +any one party depends, to a very large degree, upon the attitude taken +towards it by other parties. The system in no way acts as a corrective +to the anomalies arising from single-member constituencies, and may even +accentuate the violent changes associated with them. Moreover, the +system does not provide representation for minorities, and therefore +does not ensure a fully representative character to popularly elected +legislative bodies. It may be mentioned that all the criticisms here +directed against the second ballot apply with nearly equal force to the +use of the alternative vote (_see_ p. 95), a thinly disguised form of +the same principle which appears to be meeting with some acceptance in +this country. + + +[Footnote 1: The minority would, of course, have had a better chance +with six divisions. Dr. Ed. Bernstein, to whom the author submitted this +memorandum, makes the following comment: "I am not so sure that the +equalization of the size of the constituencies would in 1903 have +secured to the Social Democratic party a number of seats far in excess +of its voting strength. But this is a subordinate consideration. The +possibility of an unproportional representation of parties, even if the +seats are equally distributed, is undeniably there, and this ought to +settle the question.] + + +APPENDIX III + +THE SWEDISH SYSTEM OF PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION + +The principle of proportional representation was first discussed in +Sweden in 1867. The new Danish Constitution of that year provided for +the use of the transferable vote (Andrae's scheme) in the election of +the Upper House, and Herr S. G. Troil proposed in the Swedish Parliament +that the three most important of its committees should be elected by +means of the same system. The motion was not carried, and a similar +motion, made by Professor H. L. Ryön in 1878, was equally unsuccessful. +It was not until 1896 that the next step was taken, when the Government, +in view of the increasing demand for a more democratic franchise, +proposed a proportional system of election. Nothing came of this +proposal immediately, but from this date the agitation for an extension +of the franchise gave rise to the demand for the proportional method of +election in order to ensure the representation of minorities. + +_The former constitution of the two chambers_.] + +The story of the struggle for reform will best be understood if prefaced +by a statement of the franchise conditions previously existing in +Sweden. The Upper, or First, Chamber of the Riksdag, was elected by +members of the provincial councils and of the councils of the five +largest towns. The other towns sent members to their provincial +councils. The members of provincial councils were elected in two stages; +the primary electors chose electors of the second degree, who in turn +chose the councillors. The primary electors in the country[1] had ten +votes for every 100 kroner of rateable income, subject to a limit of +5000 votes. The electors of the second degree had only one vote in the +election of councillors, and councillors had only one vote in the +election of members of the First Chamber of the Riksdag. Owing to the +great advantage conferred upon primary electors possessed of large +incomes these electors largely controlled not only the composition of +the town and provincial councils, but also the composition of the Upper +Chamber. The election of members of the Lower Chamber of Parliament was +direct; every person of not less than 800 kroner income was entitled to +vote, but no one was entitled to more than one vote. + +_The struggle for electoral reform_. + +In 1899 M. Branting, the leader of the Socialist Party, proposed the +adoption of proportional representation, coupled with universal and +equal suffrage for the election of town councils. The main object of +this proposal was to place town councils on a more democratic basis, but +as the five largest councils elected representatives to the First +Chamber the proposal would have had some influence upon the composition +of that House. M. Branting's proposal was rejected, and when revived two +years later met a similar fate. In 1902 two Liberals (MM. Hedlund and +Carlsson) proposed that provincial councils should be elected by a +proportional method on the basis of manhood suffrage, whilst a similar +proposition was made in the same year in respect of the elections of the +Lower House of Parliament. Both these motions were rejected, but in +response to a demand from both Houses for an inquiry a Royal Commission +was appointed to consider the problem of electoral reform. The +Commission reported in the following year in favour of a list system of +proportional representation with official ballot papers, and the +Government proposed this system combined with manhood suffrage for the +election of members for the Lower Chamber. This proposal was accepted +in 1904 in the Upper Chamber, but rejected in the Lower Chamber by five +votes. Next year it was again discussed, accepted by the Upper Chamber +but rejected in the Lower by a majority of ten. A change of ministry +took place, and in 1906 M. Staaff, the Liberal Prime Minister, proposed +manhood suffrage with the "majority" system of election. But the +Moderate Party insisted upon a proportional system, and the proposals of +the Liberal ministry were rejected by the Upper Chamber. M. Alfred +Petersson, of Paboda, then proposed manhood suffrage with a proportional +system for the Lower Chamber, and a proportional system for the Upper +Chamber, which, however, was to be elected as before by the provincial +councils. This proposal was rejected by the Lower Chamber but accepted +by the Upper Chamber, and M, Staaff resigned. The Moderates, with M. +Lindman as Prime Minister, then introduced a Bill incorporating M. +Petersson's proposals with the addition of the direct election of +provincial councils and a less plutocratic franchise. This measure, +which was adopted by both Houses in 1907, was confirmed after a General +Election in 1909. + +_The Swedish law of 1909_. + +Under this law the proportional system is applied to elections for both +Houses of Parliament, all parliamentary committees, town councils and +provincial councils. For the Lower Chamber there is manhood suffrage. +The Upper Chamber is elected still by the provincial councils and by the +town councils of the five largest towns, but the elections of provincial +councils are now direct. But, in order to maintain as much continuity as +possible in the composition of the Upper Chamber, only one-sixth of the +House is renewed every year. The maximum number of votes in the +elections of both provincial and town councils is forty. The first +election under the new system took place in 1909, when the Stockholm +Town Council and several provincial councils were called upon to elect +their proportion of members of the Upper House. In March 1910 the first +elections to the Stockholm Town Council were held, and in the following +May there were elections under the new system for all the provincial +councils. In 1911 the first elections to the Lower House of Parliament +will take place. + +In Sweden, even under the new law, there are no official ballot papers +and no nominations of candidates. This arrangement is supposed to +preserve to the electors the fullest possible liberty in voting. In +practice the party organizations print ballot papers containing the +names of the candidates whom they support, and these printed forms are +accepted by the returning officers. Every elector, however, is at +liberty to strike out any of the names on these papers, to substitute +other names, to vary the order in which the names are printed, or to +prepare his own ballot paper.[2] + +_The Swedish system of proportional representation_.] + +The mechanism of the proportional system adopted has had regard to the +practice mentioned in the preceding paragraph. The first proposal, that +of M. Petersson, of Paboda, was only a crude approximation towards a +proportional system. His scheme, in brief, was (1) that the number of +votes recorded for each candidate should be ascertained; (2) that the +candidate with the highest number of votes should be declared elected; +(3) that a further count should then take place, the papers on which the +successful candidate's name appeared being treated as of the value of +one-half. The remaining candidates whose names appeared on these papers +would be credited with half a vote in respect of each such paper. The +non-elected candidates would then be arranged according to the number of +votes obtained, the highest being declared elected. As soon as any two +names on any ballot paper had been declared successful a fresh count +would take place, such papers being treated as of the value of +one-third. This process of reducing the value of the paper as soon as a +further candidate appearing thereon was elected was to be continued +until all the seats were allotted. The principle underlying this +distribution of seats is the same as that contained in the d'Hondt rule +of the Belgian system. A group of electors which was more than twice as +numerous as any other group would obtain two seats before any was +allotted to a smaller group. If the group was more than three times as +large as any other it would obtain three seats before the smaller group +received one, and so on. It was at once recognized that this scheme +would tell considerably in favour of well-organized parties--parties +whose supporters would accept the ballot papers printed for them without +question. An example will make this clear. If, taking an extreme case, +in an election for three members 8000 voters placed the names of two +candidates, P and Q, on each of their ballot papers, whilst a more +loosely organized group of 13,000 voters spread its support over four +candidates, T, S, V and W, different sections voting for these +candidates independently, the following result might take place:-- + + P Q . . 8,000 | T . . . 4,000 + | S . . . 3,500 + | V . . . 3,000 + | W . . . 2,500 + +Candidate P, being the first in order on the 8000 ballot papers of the +first group, would be declared elected, and Q, the remaining name on +these ballot papers, would be credited with 4000 votes--half the +original value of the papers. Q and T, having 4000 votes each, would +then be declared elected. Thus one group, with 8000 votes, would carry +two seats, and the other, with 13,000 votes, would only obtain one--a +result due to a lack of combination. + +_The allotment of seats to parties_. + +The plan finally adopted is based on M. Petersson's proposal, but +provides, as in the Belgian scheme, for the official recognition of +parties. Electors may write at the head of their ballot papers the name +or motto of a party. The papers bearing the same name or motto are then +grouped together, the numbers in each group ascertained, and the seats +available are allotted to these groups in accordance with the d'Hondt +rule, irrespective of the number of votes obtained by individual +candidates. Thus, in the example given, if electors of the second group +had all headed their ballot papers with the same party name or motto the +particular way in which they had distributed their votes among the +candidates would not have affected the number of seats obtained by the +group as a whole. The first group would have obtained one, and the +second two seats. + +_The selection of the successful candidates_. + +The position of the candidates on each list is determined in accordance +with the original proposal of M. Petersson. The candidate receiving the +highest number of votes is declared elected, the papers on which his +name appears are then marked down to the value of one-half, the relative +position of the remaining candidates ascertained afresh, and the highest +of these declared elected, and so on. This procedure, called the +reduction rule, is however subordinate to a further rule (the rule of +the order of preference), which is as follows. If more than one-half of +the supporters of a party list have placed the same candidate at the +head of their ballot papers, the first seat apportioned to the list is +allotted to this candidate; if more than two-thirds have placed the same +two candidates in the same order at the head of the ballot papers, these +two candidates have the first claim to the seats apportioned to the +party; if more than three-fourths have placed the same three candidates +in the same order at the head of the list, these are given the first, +second, and third seats, and so on. The selection of the successful +candidates is determined in accordance with this rule so far as +possible, but as soon as the application of the rule breaks down the +relative claims of the non-elected candidates on the list are determined +in accordance with the reduction rule. But if, say, three candidates +have been declared elected in accordance with the rule of the order of +preference, and it is necessary to choose others by the reduction rule, +the papers containing these three names are treated as of the value of +one-fourth in determining the relative position of the remaining +candidates of the group. + +_Free voters and double candidatures._ + +In order to complete the description of the Swedish system two +subsidiary features, which will seldom come into play in actual +elections, must be mentioned. Provision is made for those electors who +owe no party allegiance, and who therefore do not wish to place any +party name or motto at the head of their list. Such voters are called +"free voters," and the votes recorded for their candidates are +ascertained. These candidates are placed in a group by themselves, +called the free group, but the number of votes recorded for each +individual candidate in this group, and not the total number of votes +recorded for all the candidates, forms the basis of comparison with the +totals of the party lists in the allotment of seats. The second feature +provides for the improbable case of two groups of electors or parties +having placed the same candidate upon their list. In the event of such +candidate being so favourably placed in two lists as to be elected by +both parties, then, for the purpose of ascertaining the new value of the +papers on which his name appears, each list is debited with half a seat. +When, as already explained, one seat has been allotted to a list, the +list total is divided by two in accordance with the d'Hondt rule for the +purpose of the fresh comparison of totals; but if this candidate has +already been elected on another list the total would be divided by one +and a half instead of by two. A fresh total would be ascertained for +each of the lists containing the candidate's name. + +_An election at Carlskrona._ + +The author was permitted by the courtesy of the Burgomaster of +Carlskrona to watch the election of provincial councillors on 24 May +1910, to represent the city in the Bleking provincial council, and a +description of this election will show how the system works in practice. +Carlskrona is entitled to nine members. For the purpose of the election +the town was divided into two parts, but the polling place in each +division was at the town hall. The register was prepared fourteen days +before the election, and stated in addition to the name, address, and +occupation of the elector, the amount of his (or her) rateable income +and the number of votes to which he (or she) was entitled. The conduct +of the election was in the hands of the Burgomaster, assisted by the +magistrates of the town. As already explained, there were no official +ballot papers and no nominations of candidates. Each elector voted for +such candidates as he pleased, provided they possessed the necessary +qualifications--those of an ordinary elector. Three parties--the +Moderate, Liberal, and Labour--contested the election. Each party +printed ballot papers containing the names of the candidates adopted by +the party organization and with the name of the party at the head of the +ballot paper. The ballot paper issued by the Moderate party was in the +following form:-- + +_De Moderata_ + +_Borgmästaren_--O. Holmdahl. +_Grosshandlaren_--N. P. Nordström. +_Lasarettsläkaren_--R. Lundmark. +_Disponenten_--H. Berggren. +_Kommendören_--G. Lagercrantz. +_Rådmannen_--C. G. Ewerlof. +_Chefsintendenten_--I. Neuendorff. +_Kaptenen, friherre_--F. E. von Otter. +_Underofficeren af 2: dra graden_--O. W. Strömberg. +_Folkskolläraren_--H. E. Mattsson. +_Byggmästaren_--K. J. A. Johansson. +_Handlanden_--Aug. Andrén. + +_The Poll._ + +The ballot papers could be obtained at the committee rooms on, or prior +to, the day of election, and also on the day of election from party +agents at the doors of the polling stations. Each elector took his +ballot paper folded to the Burgomaster, or presiding magistrate, who +endorsed the back with the number of votes to which the elector was +entitled. The presiding magistrate was assisted by two others who +checked the accuracy of the proceedings. The poll opened at 10 A.M., +the proceedings were adjourned for lunch at 1 P.M., the poll was again +opened during the afternoon and closed about 8 P.M. The counting took +place next day when, as comparatively few electors took advantage of +their right to vary the order of the names as printed on the ballot +papers, the number of votes recorded for each candidate was easily +ascertained. Nor did the varying values of the ballot papers present any +great difficulty. A calculating machine made the necessary additions +both quickly and accurately. In this election only one paper was +spoiled,[3] and it was very obvious that the provision of printed ballot +papers by the party organizations made the act of voting a very simple +one. The votes recorded for the different parties were as follows:-- + + Moderate . . . . . 20,334 + Liberal . . . . . 8,732 + Labour . . . . . 3,617 + +_The allotment of seats to parties. + +There were nine seats to be distributed among the three parties. The +distribution was carried out in accordance the d'Hondt rule, but the +method of applying this rule differed from that employed in Belgium. In +Belgium the party totals would have been divided by the numerals 1, 2, +3, &c., and the quotients ranged in order of magnitude, the ninth in +order being termed the "electoral quotient." Each party would have +received as many seats as its total contained this quotient. The Swedish +method provides for the allotment of one seat at a time, and it does so +because of the possibility of the same candidate being elected by more +than one party. Save in the rare case mentioned, the arithmetical +operations, though differently presented, are identical with those of +the Belgian system. Thus, at Carlskrona the first seat was given to the +Moderates--that party having received the highest number of votes. +Before the next seat was allotted the value of the Moderate total was +reduced by one-half, and the new total was then compared with the +original totals of the other parties. The totals to be considered in +the allotment of the second seat were, therefore, as follows:-- + +Moderate. . . . . 10,167 +Liberal . . . . . 8,732 +Labour . . . . . 3,617 + +The Moderate party being still credited with the highest total received +the second seat, and their original total, 20,334, was then divided by +three in order to ascertain to whom the third seat should be allotted. +The totals at this stage were as follows:-- + +Moderate . . . . . 6,778 +Liberal . . . . . 8,732 +Labour . . . . . 3,617 + +The Liberal total being now the highest, this party received the third +seat, and in order to ascertain to whom the fourth seat should be given +the Liberal total was reduced in value by one-half, the totals of the +other parties remaining as at the previous allotment. The totals for +comparison were now:-- + +Moderate . . . . . 6,778 +Liberal . . . . . 4,366 +Labour . . . . . 3,617 + +The Moderate total was again the highest, and the party received the +fourth seat. The process of reducing the totals in succession according +to the foregoing rule was continued until all the nine seats were +allotted. In this election the Moderates obtained six seats, the +Liberals two, and Labour one. + +_The selection of the successful candidates._ + +The returning officer had then to determine which candidates on each +list should be declared successful. In the Carlskrona election this task +was extremely simple, for the large majority of the voters had accepted +the ballot papers provided for them by their parties. No less than +19,756 votes out of a total of 20,334 had been received for the Moderate +list as printed by the party organization. The totals for each +candidate were quickly ascertained. Moreover, it was possible to select +all the successful candidates by the rule of the order of preference. +More than six-sevenths of the Moderate votes having been recorded for +the list as printed, the first six names on the list were declared +elected. Of the Liberal votes, 8118 out of a total of 8732 were recorded +for the party list as printed, and as this number constituted more than +two-thirds of the total, the first two names on the list were declared +elected. With regard to the Labour party, 3580 out of a total of 3617 +votes had been recorded for the party list, and the first candidate on +the list was therefore declared elected. + +_The election of suppléants. + +In common with all continental systems, supplementary members +(suppléants) were chosen for the purpose of taking the place of an +elected member who might die or retire before the council had run its +course. The method adopted in Sweden is peculiar to itself. In Belgium +the same rules serve for the election of the suppléants as for the +election of members, and they are called upon to serve in the order in +which they stand at the declaration of the poll. In Sweden it is held +that each elected member must have a suppléant, or deputy, special to +himself. The method of selection may be illustrated from the Carlskrona +election. The candidate who was to be regarded as suppléant to +Burgomaster Holmdahl (the first on the Moderate list) was chosen as +follows: Holmdahl had received 20,334 votes, his name having appeared on +every ballot paper of the Moderate party; the votes recorded for the +unelected candidates on these papers were ascertained, the +result being:-- + + Neuendorfs . . . . . 20,334 + von Otter . . . . . 20,242 + Strömberg . . . . . 19,913 + Mattsson . . . . . 20,119 + Johansson . . . . . 20,237 + Andrén . . . . . . 20,170 + +Neuendorff being the candidate who had received the highest number of +votes on these papers, was declared elected as suppléant to Holmdahl. A +suppléant for Nordström, the second elected member, was then chosen from +among the remaining five non-elected members. Nordström's votes were +20,235, and the votes recorded for the non-elected members on the same +papers were:-- + +von Otter 20,143 +Strömberg 19,913 +Mattsson 20,055 +Johansson 20,195 +Andrén 20,071 + +Johansson, being highest with 20,195 votes, was declared suppléant to +Nordström. + +This method of choosing the suppléant seems to be unsatisfactory. The +party as such does not determine who shall be called upon to fill a +vacancy in its ranks; whether a non-elected member succeeds to a vacancy +as a suppléant depends very largely on accident. A good illustration +occurred in the selection of a suppléant from the Labour list. The +party's candidates were as follows:-- + +Kloo. +Karlsson. +Ostergren. +Olsson. +Ek. +Johansson. +Jensen. +Fagerberg. +Pettersson. + +The first candidate on the list had been declared elected, and +obviously, in the opinion of the party, the next favourite was Karlsson, +and had there been a second seat awarded to the list Karlsson would have +been declared elected. In determining, however, whether he should be +declared elected as a suppléant, his position on the list did not count, +and as the party list had been voted for without alteration by most of +the Labour voters, five of the non-elected candidates were credited with +the same number of votes. The choice of the suppléant was made by lot, +and fell in this case upon Johansson, the sixth name on the list. It +may be said that there is; considerable dissatisfaction with the method +of electing suppléant candidates, and the Stockholm _Dagblad_, in its +issue of the 29 May 1910, stated that the choice of suppléant, although +there might have been many thousand votes given to every candidate, +depended upon so small a difference in the totals received by each that +even one ballot paper might determine the result. This is a detail in +the system that can easily be remedied, and steps are already being +taken to bring the election of suppléants into agreement with the +election of ordinary members. + +_Comparison with Belgian system._ + +It will be of interest to compare the Swedish with the Belgian system. +It has been shown that the method of allotting seats to different groups +is identical in principle in both countries. This method, the d'Hondt +rule, favours the largest parties, and this explains why, in the smaller +Belgian constituencies, cartels or combinations of parties take place. +The Swedish system enables such combined action to take place with +greater facility. It enables two parties to make use of the same motto +without presenting a common list of candidates. No inter-party +negotiations are required, as in Belgium, with reference to the order in +which the names of candidates shall appear upon the list. In Sweden each +group can put forward its own list of candidates, and so long as the +electors make use of the same motto at the head of the ballot paper the +combination gains the additional representation which may fall to it as +a result of being treated as one party, whilst the share falling to each +section is determined by the number of votes recorded for their +respective candidates. + +The Swedish method of choosing the successful candidates from the +various lists differs materially from that used in Belgium. In Sweden +the d'Hondt rule is used not only for the allotment of seats to parties, +but also in the selection of the successful candidates. In Belgium the +use of the d'Hondt rule is restricted to the former purpose, and when +once the electoral quotient is ascertained the rule is discarded. The +difference in the two methods can be illustrated from the Stockholm +municipal election of 1910. In the fifth ward the ballot paper of the +Moderate party was as follows:-- + +Welin. +Norstrom. +Boalt. +Roberg. +Palmgren. +Bohman. +Ringholm. +Herlitz. +------------------ +Hafstrom. +Svensson. +von Rosen. +Freden. + +The line in the ballot paper divides the eight candidates for election +as members from those who were standing for election as suppléants only. +The votes recorded for the Moderate party numbered 118,483, of which +86,851 were given for the party ticket as printed. The number of votes +accepting the party order of the first three candidates was about +93,000. This latter number was more than three-fourths, but less than +four-fifths of the total, and therefore only the first three candidates +on the ballot paper could be declared elected in accordance with the +rule of the order of preference. The remaining four members had to be +chosen by the reduction rule; the votes recorded for the five +non-elected candidates were ascertained, the papers containing the names +of the three elected candidates being treated for this purpose as of the +value of one-fourth. + +Some of the supporters of the eighth and sixth candidates had struck out +the names of the fourth and other candidates. This manoeuvre had the +result of placing these two candidates in the order named at the head of +the poll at the fourth and fifth counts, and they were accordingly +elected. Other candidates had received exclusive support, and it should +be pointed out that it is the total amount of exclusive support +recorded for all candidates which determines how soon the application of +the rule of the order of preference breaks down. As soon as this takes +place the election of any one candidate may depend, as in the election +of the suppléants, upon the action of a comparatively small number of +voters. Thus, some supporters of the fifth candidate, a Miss Palmgren, +had struck out the names of all candidates save hers. Those papers which +contained her name alone were treated as of full value, and although the +votes of these supporters only numbered 1100, or less than 1 per cent. +of the whole, they were sufficient to turn the scale in her favour. As, +however, 86,851 votes out of a total of 118,453, had been recorded for +the list as printed, showing that this proportion of voters preferred +the fourth candidate to those that succeeded him, it would certainly +seem that the result was not fair to this candidate. In Belgium if seven +seats were won by a party which polled 118,453 votes, the electoral +quotient would not be more than one-seventh of this total, and the +election of the first candidate, instead of absorbing one-half the value +of the votes, would consume only one-seventh. The election of the first +two candidates would absorb two-sevenths instead of two-thirds, the +election of three candidates would consume three-sevenths instead of +three-fourths, and the election of four candidates would consume +four-sevenths instead of four-fifths. In the Stockholm election more +than five-sevenths of the voters had supported the party list as it was +printed, and according to the Belgian system the first five candidates +would have been declared elected. + +_The system and party organization_. + +The Swedish rule of selecting successful candidates is defended on the +ground that it confers great power upon the electors. These can if +necessary more effectively express their disapproval of the list put +forward by the party organization, and as it is thought that a large +number of voters too readily accept the party lead, a counterpoise is +considered desirable. Recent experience in Belgium, however, would tend +to show that a greater knowledge of their power has induced more and +more electors to make use of the opportunity which that system allows of +expressing individual preferences. If we regard a party as consisting of +two groups--those that follow the party lead, and those which, whilst +supporting the party, desire to assert their own preferences--then as +between these two groups the Belgian system is strictly fair. If a party +wins seven seats and four-sevenths of the party support the official +list, this group would obtain four out of the seven seats; but in +Sweden, as has been shown, at least four-fifths must support the +official list before the first four candidates can be sure of election. +The Swedish system discriminates in favour of the dissentients within a +party, and this discrimination may have unexpected effects on party +organization. The Belgian method has induced parties to welcome the +support of all sections, knowing that such sections will not obtain more +than their fair share of influence. In Sweden the tendency may be for +party organizers to regard the support of various sections with +suspicion, because, whilst these sections will obtain the full advantage +of the party vote, their independent action may result in the gain of +the section at the expense of the party as a whole. As a result of the +Stockholm election referred to, the opinion was expressed by party +organizers that it would be necessary to limit the number of candidates +on a list to the number which the party knew it could carry. This would +be an undesirable outcome of a rule designed to secure greater freedom +for the elector, for it would tend to make party discipline more strict +and parties exclusive rather than inclusive, as is the case in Belgium. +It should, however, be added that in the large majority of the +provincial council elections the selection of candidates was made in +accordance with the rule of the order of preference. It would, +therefore, seem that party organizers, as a rule, took care to present +lists of candidates acceptable to the party as a whole. + +_The great improvement effected by the Swedish system_. + +The new Swedish electoral system, like all proportional systems, +constitutes a striking advance upon the previous electoral conditions. +The extent of the improvement will, of course, be seen from a comparison +of some of its results with those of former years. For example, +Stockholm used to be represented in the Lower Chamber by twenty-two +members chosen by the "block" system, or _scrutin de liste_. The party +in the majority monopolized the representation, and the absurdity of the +system was well illustrated by an incident in the election of 1882, +which was preceded by a severe struggle between the advocates of free +trade and protection. At this election Stockholm returned twenty-two +free traders, but as one of the elected members had not paid his taxes, +all the voting papers containing his name were declared to be invalid. +In consequence the twenty-two free traders were unseated and the +twenty-two protectionist candidates were declared elected in their +place. An attempt was made to ameliorate the evils of this system by +dividing the town into five parliamentary districts, but, although so +divided, Stockholm in 1908 returned twenty-one members, all of whom were +either Liberals or Socialists, the large minority of Moderates being +unrepresented. When the proportional system was applied in March 1910 to +the election of the municipal council, each party obtained its fair +share of representation in each of the six wards of the city, and the +total result shows how large an improvement is effected by the +new method:-- + + Parties. Votes Seats Seats in + Obtained. Obtained. Proportion + to Votes. + Moderate 281,743 22 24 + Liberal 142,639 12 12 + Socialist 160,607 16 14 + ----------------------------------- + 584,989 50 50 + +In the election of the provincial council of Bleking the result was as +follows:-- + +Parties. Votes Seats Seats in + Obtained. Obtained. Proportion + to Votes. +------------------------ ----------------------- +Moderate 54,465 22 22.4 +Liberal 36,595 10 15.1 +Socialist 3,617 1 1.5 + ---------------------------------- + 94,677 39 39 + +The general fairness of these results is all the more remarkable, +because in Stockholm there was a very considerable variation in the +value of a vote in the different wards, whilst many of the +constituencies in the province of Bleking returned only a few members, +and these did not give full play to the proportional system. The figures +confirm the experience of all other countries, that a proportional +system, even when applied to comparatively small constituencies, yields +results which approximate very closely to the ideal aimed at, the true +representation of the electors. + + +[Footnote 1: The town councils were elected in one stage; each elector +had one vote for every 100 kroner income, subject to a limit of 100 +votes. The members of the town council, when electing members of the +provincial councils, had only one vote each.] + +[Footnote 2: A ballot paper is not declared invalid even if it contains +the names of more candidates than there are members to be elected +(except at the elections of parliamentary committees). The names in +excess are regarded as suppléant candidates (see _Election of +Suppléants_) to the number of two in the elections for the Riksdag and +the town councils, and to a number equal to the number of members at the +election for the provincial councils. Any additional names on a ballot +paper are regarded as non-existent.] + +[Footnote 3: This paper bore the signature of the elector.] + + +APPENDIX IV + +THE FINLAND SYSTEM OF PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION + +_The influence of the Belgian system._ + +The system of proportional representation introduced into Finland by the +electoral law of 1906, while it presents little or no difficulty to the +voter, is, in its method of counting the votes, perhaps the most +complicated of the systems at present in force. It has for its basis the +Belgian List system and the d'Hondt rule, but the variations which were +introduced with the object of safeguarding the rights of the electors +against the possible tyranny of party managers are so important that at +the first glance its resemblance to the parent system is not easily +recognized. The Belgian model is followed more closely in the method of +distributing the seats to the various parties than in the manner in +which the successful candidates are chosen from the party lists. In its +internal party arrangement the Finnish system shows boldness, +originality, and, it must be added, no little complexity of procedure. + +_Schedules and "compacts" in place of lists._ + +Finland is divided into sixteen electoral districts returning from six +to twenty-three members, with the one exception of Lapland, which is a +single-member constituency. In each constituency any group of not less +than fifty electors can put forward a schedule of not more than three +candidates, however many may be the total number of members to be +elected. Each of these schedules may be headed with the name of a party +or some political motto. The persons responsible for these schedules +may, and commonly do, combine them in groups known as "compacts," and +it is these compacts, and not the original schedules, which correspond +roughly to the party "lists" of the Belgian system, the only limit to +this power of combination being that the combined schedules must not +contain the names of more candidates than there are vacancies to be +filled. But as the names of the same candidates may, and constantly do, +occur in many different schedules within a single compact, a first +glance at a Finnish polling paper would seem to show in each combination +the names of more candidates than there are vacancies. The compact bears +the name of the political party to which it belongs. Combination into +compacts is, of course, optional, and a certain number of schedules are +put forward independently. A vacant corner is reserved on the ballot +paper where any elector who is not content with any of the schedules +submitted may make his own schedule. + +_An election in Nyland_. + +The system may be more fully understood from some details of the +election of 1907 in the Nyland division. In this division, the largest +in Finland, returning twenty-three members, no less than seventy-two +schedules were presented, or which all except five were combined into +compacts. The five remained isolated. Of the combined schedules +seventeen were included in the compact of the Swedish party, but the +individual candidates in these seventeen schedules numbered only +twenty-three, the legal limit, the same names being repeated in several +schedules. The old Finnish compact contained thirteen schedules, the +Young Finns seventeen, the Social Democrats eight, the "Christian" +compact seven, the "Free Christian" compact three, and the Radicals two. + +As already stated, the voter's task is not difficult. He, or she, simply +marks the schedule of his, or her, choice. The voter can also, if he +wishes, alter the order of the names in a schedule. The effect of doing +this will be apparent in a moment. That the task is simple is +conclusively shown by the fact that the percentage of spoilt votes was +in the Nyland division only 0.58 per cent. For the whole country the +percentage was only 0.93, and this with universal adult suffrage and a +poll of 899,347, or 70.7 per cent, of the electorate. + +_The returning officer's task_. + +The task of the returning officer is twofold. He has to ascertain (1) +the relative positions of candidates within each compact (or independent +schedule), and (2) their position relatively to the candidates of other +compacts in the final allotment of seats. He proceeds as follows. He +first counts the votes on each schedule, reckoning a full vote to the +first name, a half vote to the second, and a third of a vote to the +third (the effect of an alteration of the order of names in a schedule +by the voter is now apparent). Thus if schedule No. 1 (in the specimen +ballot paper on page 323), containing the names Schybergson, Neovius, +and Soderholm, receives the support of 6000 voters in all, of whom 3000 +have placed Schybergson as No. 1, 2000 as No. 2, and 1000 as No. 3, +Schybergson will have a total of 3000 + 2000/2 + 1000/3 = 4333. +Similarly, if Neovius obtains the support of 2000 as No. 1, 2000 as No. +2, and 2000 as No. 3, his total will be 2000 + 2000/2 + 2000/3 = 3666; +Soderholm, the third candidate, would receive 1000 votes as No. 1, 2000 +as No. 2, and 3000 as No. 3, and his total would be 1000 + 2000/2 + +3000/3 = 3000. But these individual totals of 4333, 3666, and 3000 are +used merely to determine the order of the candidates within the schedule +itself, and having performed that function, they are not taken further +into account. In the example given (as would usually be the case in +practice) the order within the schedule has not been disturbed, and the +candidates are credited, the first (Schybergson) with the full number of +the voters who supported the schedule--6000; the second (Neovius) with +one-half that number--3000; the third (Soderholm) with one-third of that +number--2000. These last figures are called "numbers of comparison," a +phrase intended to throw light upon their function. The same process is +gone through with all the other schedules in the same compact. The +returning officer then adds up all the numbers of comparison which each +candidate has obtained in all the schedules within the compact where his +name appears, and arranges candidates within the compact in the order of +these totals. Thus, in the actual election of 1907, in the Nyland +division, Schybergson headed the Swedish party compact with 9192 as the +total of his "numbers of comparison," Soderholm coming next with 6837. + +_The allotment of seats_. + +When the candidates in each compact have thus been arranged in order +(and the votes given in writing by independent voters have also been +counted), the returning officer proceeds to the second stage of his +duties--the determination of the position of candidates with reference +to their competitors in other compacts; and it is on this position that +the actual allotment of seats depends. For this purpose he primarily +takes into account, not the "numbers of comparison" of individual +candidates, but the total number of voters who have supported each +compact; he credits this total to the candidate who has the highest +"number of comparison" within the compact; credits the next candidate +with one-half this total, the third candidate with one-third, and so on, +finally arranging the whole of the candidates in order. Thus far this +stage of the process is identical in substance with the Belgian method, +though the appearance is different. For, obviously, if List (or compact) +A, of which the candidates are G, H, I, in that order receives 12,000 +votes, while List B, with candidates P, Q, R, receives 10,000, and List +C, with candidates X, Y, Z, receives 8000, it is all one whether the +returning officer applies the d'Hondt rule and assigns two seats to List +A (thus seating G and H), two seats to List B (thus seating P and Q), +and one seat to List C (thus seating X), or whether he tabulates the +result of the polling thus: + +G 12,000 \ +P 10,000 | +X 8,000 > Elected. +H 12,000/2 i.e. 6,000 | +Q 10,000/2 i.e. 5,000 / +Y 8,000/2 i.e. 4,000 Not elected, and so on. + +But at this point a characteristic feature of the Finnish system comes +into play. Candidates' names may occur in more than one compact, and may +be found in isolated schedules, or on the written papers of independent +voters as well. Consequently their final order cannot be determined by +this simple application of the Belgian method. The returning officer +must[1] add to the number of votes credited to a candidate of any one +compact such additional votes as he may have obtained either as a member +of another compact or from independent voters. Thus, in the Nyland +elections, Miss Sohlberg, whose name will be found at the head of +Schedule 48 within the Swedish compact, obtained the eleventh place +within that compact. The total number of voters supporting this compact +was 44,544, and Miss Sohlberg was therefore credited with an eleventh of +this total, or 4049 votes. But Miss Sohlberg's name also occurred in +Schedules 62 and 63 in the "Free Christian" compact and Schedule 21 in +the "Christian" compact, and as her share of the votes of these compacts +she received 153 and 325 respectively. She also received four votes in +writing. Thus her final total was 4049 + 153 + 325 + 4, or 4531 in all, +and it was this number which determined her position on the poll. + +_Successful candidates in the Nyland election._ This +explanation will perhaps be more comprehensible if the actual result of +the polling in the Nyland division, so far as the first 25 candidates +are concerned, is given in a tabular form:-- + +Final Names of Party. Number of Additional Final +Order Candidates. Votes resulting Votes. Total. +of from Place of +Poll. Candidates on + Compact. + 1 Schybergson Swedish 44,544 2.33 44,546.33 + 2 Häninan Social Dem. 40,951 6.5 40,957.5 + 3 Soderholm Swedish 22,272 0.33 22,272.33 + 4 Sillanpää Social Dem. 20,475.5 8.83 20,484.33 + 5 Käkikoski Old Finn 20,402 9.33 20,411.33 + 6 Oljemark Swedish 14,848 -- 14,848 + 7 Sirén Social Dem. 16,650.33 2.33 16,652.66 + 8 Rosenquist (G.) Swedish 8,908.8 2,932.83[2] 11,841.63 + 9 Rosenquist (V.) Swedish 11,136 4.33 11,140.33 +10 Helle Social Dem. 10,237.75 3 10,240.75 +11 Palmén Old Finn 10,201 8.83 10,209.83 +12 Pertillä (E.) Social Dem. 8,190.2 4.67 8,194.87 +13 Ahlroos Swedish 7,424 1 7,425 +14 Pertillä (V.) Social Dem. 6,725.17 1.5 6,726.67 +15 Reima Old Finn 6,800.67 5.67 6,806.34 +16 Erkko Young Finn 6,521 6.32 6,527.32 +17 Ehrnrooth Swedish 6,363.43 75.83 6,439.26 +18 Laine (M.) Social Dem. 5,850.14 4 5,854.14 +19 Wasastjerna Swedish 5,568 -- 5,568 +20 Ingman Social Dem. 5,118.88 3.5 5,122.38 +21 Laine (O.) Old Finn 5,100.5 -- 5,100.5 +22 von Alfthan Swedish 4,949.33 -- 4,949.33 +23 Johansson Social Dem. 4,550.11 1.33 4,551.44 + (All the above were elected.) +24 Sohlberg Swedish 4,049.45 482.45[3] 4,531.9 +25 Gustaffsson Swedish 4,454.4 4.5 4,458.9 + &c. &c. + +_Equitable results._ + +It will to some extent be gathered from the foregoing table that the +total number of the supporters of the various compacts or parties in the +Nyland division and the number of seats won were as follows: + + Seats Seats in +Parties. Votes. Actually Proportion + Won. to Votes. +Swedish 44,544 9 8.7 +Social Democrat 40,951 9 8.0 +Old Finn 20,402 4 4.0 +Young Finn 6,521 1 1.3 +"Christian" compact 2,932 - .6 +"Free Christian" 458 - .1 +Radical 168 - - +Isolated schedules 1,356 - .3 + +Total 117,332 23 23.0 + +The result is thus in reasonable correspondence with the demands of a +strictly proportionate allotment of seats; this statement is also true +of the results for the whole of Finland, as the following table +will show:-- + + Seats Seats in +Parties. Votes. Actually Proportion + Won. to Votes. +Social Democrat 329,946 80 74.1 +Old Finn. 243,573 59 54.7 +Young Finn 121,604 26 27.3 +Swedish 112,267 24 25.2 +Agrarian 51,242 9 11.5 +Christian Labourer 13,790 2 3.1 +Minor groups 18,568 - 4.1 + +Total 890,990 200 200.0 + +An exactly mathematical distribution is, of course, not to be expected +from this, any more than from any other method which does not adopt the +system of treating a whole country as a single constituency. As to the +mechanism of the system it only remains to add that the process of +counting was found to be very lengthy. In the Nyland division, where the +results were ascertained sooner than in any other case, the elections +were held on 15 and 16 March, but the result was not announced until +the 2 April. To people accustomed to the greater rapidity of ordinary +electoral methods this will seem a serious drawback. Possibly improved +arrangements may shorten this long interval between the elections and +the announcement of the result. + +It would obviously be premature to attempt to estimate the political +effects of the Finnish system as compared with other systems of +proportional representation. + +_Elector's freedom of choice._ + +The Finnish system has been in operation since 1907, and the whole +political circumstances of Finland have undergone so many striking +changes, and so many new factors are at work that to disentangle +particular causes and effects is an impossibility. But plainly the +Finnish machinery gives a greater freedom to the elector than the +Belgian system. The Finnish system in fact encourages the electors to +arrange the candidates of a party in the order preferred by the electors +themselves, and not in the order dictated by the party managers. There +is no "party ticket" for which the elector can vote blindfold. He must +choose the schedule that he prefers; he can even rearrange that +schedule, or, if he chooses, can make one of his own. No doubt the +schedule itself is ready made for him, but it contains three names only, +and is not the equivalent of the Belgian "list." On the other hand, the +elector who chooses to vote for a schedule within a compact adds, +whether he likes it or not, to the total votes of the compact, and so +may help to return not the candidate of his choice, but the candidates +preferred by the majority of the party with which he is in sympathy. An +illustration of this fact may be taken from the Nyland poll. The old +Finnish party were alive to the possibilities of the situation, and +combined their lists with great skill so as to attract votes. They +placed their favourite candidates in nearly every schedule, but not at +the head of the schedule. At the head of the schedule they placed some +man of local popularity, usually a peasant proprietor, whose name was +not repeated in many, if any, other schedules. Thus the local favourite +attracted votes to the schedule, but in the race for the highest numbers +of comparison the candidates whose names appeared on few schedules were +left behind those whose names appeared on many schedules even in the +lower places. + +A portion of the official ballot paper showing the compact put forward +by the Swedish People's Party is printed on the opposite page. In one +corner of the ballot paper was a blank schedule in the following form. + +THE ELECTOR who does not approve of any of the preceding lists should +write here the names of his candidates in the order in which he wishes +them to be elected. + +CANDIDATES + +_Name_.................................................... + +_Profession or Occupation_................................ + +_Address_................................................. + + +_Name_.................................................... + +_Profession or Occupation_................................ + +_Address_................................................. + + +_Name_.................................................... + +_Profession or Occupation_................................ + +_Address_................................................. + + +FINLAND GENERAL ELECTION, 1907 + +Part of Ballot Paper--Nyland Division. + +The Voters' Compact of the Swedish People's Party. + +1 +HELSINGFORS. +Experienced Members of the Diet:-- +--Schybergson, E. K. +--Neovius, A. W. +--Soderholm, K. G. + +33 +EAST NYLAND-LOUISA. +Justice and Progress:-- +--Rosenquist, G. G. +--Stromberg, J. +--Ehrnrooth, L. + +34 +MID-NYLAND-NIOKBY. +The Welfare of the Rural Population;-- +--Topelius, G. L. +--Alfthau, K. von +--Rosenquist, B. T. + +35 +MID-NYLAND-ESBO. +The Welfare of the Rural Population:-- +--Wasastjerna, O. +--Schybergson, E. +--Soderholin, K. + +36 +WEST NYLAND-KYRK-SLATT. +The Welfare ol the Rural Population:-- +--Nordberg, G. +--Ehrnrooth, L. +--Oljemark, K. T. + +37 +WEST NYLANB-EKENAS. +The Welfare of the Rural Population. Law and Justice:-- +--Oljemark, K. T. +--Schybergson, E. +--Soderholm, K. + +38 +BORGA. +Knowledge and Experience:-- +--Runeberg, J. W. +--Bjorkenheim, G. +--Rosenquist, G. G. + +39 +HELSINGFORS. +Sound Development of the Community;-- +--Westermarck, Helena. +--Rosenquist, B. T. +--Bjorkenheim, G. + +40 +HELSINGFORS. +Law and Justice:-- +--Sorterholm, K. +--Alfthan, K. von +--Westermarck, Helena, + +41 +HELSINGFORS. +Legality and Progress:-- +--Westermarck, Helena. +--Neovius, A. +--Ehrnrooth, L. + +42 +HELLSINGFORS. +Swedish Culture:-- +--Rosenqnist, B. T. +--Gustafsson, F. prof. +--Soderholm, K. + +43 +HELSINGFORS. +Friends of Labour and of the People:-- +--Alfthan, K. von +--Gustafsson, F. prof. +--Gronroos, F. + +44 +HELSINGFORS. +Experience and Practical Knowledge:-- +--Runeberg, J. W. +--Schybergson, E. +--Neovius, A. + +45 +HELSINGFORS. +The Labourers' Welfare:-- +--Ahlroos, F. +--Holmberg, W. +--Ehrnrooth, L. + +46 +HELSINGFORS. +Commerce and Industry: +--Heimburger, W. F. +--Bjorkenheim, G. +--Schybergson, E. + +47 +THE SKERRIES OF NYLAND: +Navigation and Fisheries:-- +--Hjelt, Th. +--Renter, O. +--Alfthan, K. + +48 +THE PROVINCE OF NYLAND: +HELSINGFORS. +Temperance, Morality and Popular Education:-- +--Sohlberg, H. +--Ahlroos, F. +--Rosenquist, G. G. + + +[Footnote 1: This right of addition is subject to a limit. The +reinforcements must not raise a candidate's total above what he might +obtain if the votes given to all compacts or lists, where his name +occurs, were divided by the figure which indicates his order within the +compact from which he derives his principal strength.] + +[Footnote 2: This large reinforcement of votes came from the Christian +compact, where this candidate's name appeared as well as in the +Swedish compact.] + +[Footnote 3: See reference to Miss Sohlberg in preceding paragraph.] + + +APPENDIX V + +THE STATISTICS OF THE GENERAL ELECTIONS, 1885-1910 + + +The following tables are taken, with permission, from a paper read on 12 +December 1906, by Mr. J. Rooke Corbett, M.A., before the Manchester +Statistical Society, of which a second and revised edition was published +in April 1910 by the Proportional Representation Society. + +In these tables the totals for England, Wales, and Monmouth, Scotland +and Ireland are shown separately, and the figures for England have been +further subdivided according to the ten divisions into which the kingdom +is divided by the Registrar General for the purpose of his work. + +These ten subdivisions are as follows: + +Metropolitan-- + London. +South East-- + Surrey. + Kent. + Sussex. + Hampshire. + Berkshire. +South Midland-- + Middlesex. + Hertfordshire. + Buckinghamshire. + Oxfordshire. + Northamptonshire. + Huntingdonshire. + Bedfordshire. + Cambridgeshire. +East-- + Essex. + Suffolk. + Norfolk. +South-West-- + Wiltshire. + Dorsetshire. + Devonshire. + Cornwall. + Somersetshire. +West Midland-- + Gloucestershire. + Herefordshire. + Shropshire. + Staffordshire. + Worcestershire. + Warwickshire. +North Midland-- + Leicestershire. + Rutlandshire. + Lincolnshire. + Nottinghamshire. + Derbyshire. +North-West-- + Cheshire. + Lancashire. +Yorkshire-- + West Riding. + East Riding (with York). + North Riding. +Northern Division-- + Durham. + Northumberland. + Cumberland. + Westmorland. + +The first three columns, A, B and C, show the number of members allotted +to these several divisions, the number of registered electors, and the +number of members to which each division would be entitled if the 670 +members of which the House of Commons is composed were divided among the +several divisions in proportion to their electorates. + +In taking the electorate as the basis of a proportionate redistribution +of seats it is not intended to prejudge the question whether population +or electorate is the better standard. The electorate has been taken +because the figures are available for the very year in which the +election takes place, whereas the population is only enumerated once in +ten years. + +The columns D and E show in two groups the number of members elected for +these divisions, Liberal, Labour, and Irish members being gathered +together in one column, Conservatives alone occupying the other. + +It is one of the disadvantages of our present system of representation +that it makes it quite impossible to ascertain the relative strength of +the several parties into which the voters are divided. In the great +majority of contests there is a Liberal, Labour, or Irish Nationalist +candidate on one side, and a Unionist candidate on the other, and there +is practically no evidence as to how many of the supporters of either +candidate belong to each of the parties concerned. Any estimate of the +relative strength of the Liberal and Labour parties or of the Unionist +Free Traders, and Tariff Reformers must be largely a matter of +guesswork. All that is possible, therefore, is to divide the voters into +two groups, as has been done in these tables. + +The columns F and G show the total electorate of the constituencies held +respectively by the two groups of members shown in columns D and E. + +The figures in these two columns are of value in showing the probable +result of a scheme of redistribution. The South-Eastern counties may be +taken as an example. These are at present represented by 48 members. The +Liberals held three constituencies in January 1910 containing an +electorate of 31,221 (columns D and F); the Conservatives held 45 +constituencies containing an electorate of 604,887 (columns E and G). If +a redistribution of seats was made on the basis of equal electorates, +the South-Eastern counties would be entitled to 55 members (column C). +It may be assumed that in any rearrangement of constituencies the +parties would retain their predominance in the areas which they now +represent, and if so the result of a rearrangement of constituencies on +the basis of equal electorates would be that in January 1910 the +Conservatives would have obtained 52 seats and the Liberals 3 (column +K). Similarly in the General Election of 1906 the Liberals in Wales and +Monmouth held 34 seats, the Conservatives none. If the constituencies +had been rearranged, the Liberals would have held 35 seats, the +Conservatives none. The majorities throughout the United Kingdom which +would be obtained under a scheme of equal electorates are shown +in column K. + +The columns H and I show the number of electors who voted for the +candidates of the two groups; Liberal, Labour, and Irish Nationalist +voters in one group, Conservative voters in the other. + +In computing the figures in these columns an allowance has been made for +uncontested constituencies on the following basis. It has been supposed +that the changes of public opinion which affect the contested +constituencies affect uncontested constituencies also, and in estimating +the number of voters in an uncontested constituency it has therefore +been assumed that the strength of each party varies from one election to +another in the same ratio as in the contested constituencies in the +same county. + +The three columns J, K and L show respectively the actual majorities +obtained, the majorities which would have been obtained if the country +had been divided into single-member constituencies of equal size, and +the majorities under a system of proportional representation. + +The figures in the last two columns have been calculated with reference +to the totals in column C, which gives the number of members to which +each division would be entitled on a proportional basis. + +In order to ascertain the figures given in column K _(i.e._ the probable +results with equal single-member constituencies) it has been assumed, as +already explained, that the two groups would, after the redistribution +of seats, be predominant in the same areas as before the rearrangement. + +_The representation of minorities._ + +The tables give abundant evidence of the anomalies associated with our +electoral system. One of the most striking is the great difference in +the amount of representation secured by minorities in different parts of +the country. The amount of representation secured by a minority has not +depended upon its size, but upon the way in which it has been +distributed. The following table shows the amount of representation +obtained by important minorities in the General Election of +January 1910:-- + +THE REPRESENTATION OF MINORITIES, ELECTION JAN. 1910 + + Size of Seats Total Seats +Area. Minority. Obtained. for Whole Area +Ireland . . . . . . . 145,437 21 103 +Scotland . . . . . . . 265,770 11 72 +S. East: Counties. . . 220,995 3 48 +Wales and Monmouth . . 116,696 2 34 +Northern Counties . . 75,897 9 32 + +The figures show that in Ireland a minority of 145,437 obtained +twenty-one representatives, whilst a minority of 116,696 in Wales and +Monmouth obtained only two. The good fortune which befel the minority in +Ireland, not only in the elections of 1910 but in all the elections +since the Redistribution Bill of 1885, has been due to the fact that +this minority is concentrated in one corner of Ireland and can transform +itself into local majorities. The larger minority in Scotland, owing to +its distribution throughout the country, obtains much less +representation; the minorities in the south-eastern counties of England +and Wales are also distributed throughout these two areas and likewise +suffer. The minority of 75,879 in the northern counties being less +evenly diffused was more fortunate, and obtained nine representatives. +The figures for the election of December 1910 disclose similar +anomalies. + +GENERAL ELECTION, 1885 + +Col A: Members +Col B: Registered Electors +Col C: Proportionate Number of Members +Col D: Members - Liberal, Labour and Irish +Col E: Members - Conservatives +Col F: Electorate of Constituencies held by - Liberal, Labour, + and Irish Nationalists +Col G: Electorate of Constituencies held by - Conservative +Col H: Voters - Liberal, Labour, and Irish Nationalist +Col I: Voters - Conservative +Col J: Majority - Actual +Col K: Majority - With equal Single Member Constituencies +Col L: Majority - Under Proportional Representation. + + A B C DE FG HI J K L + Prop Memb Electorate Voters Majority + Memb Elect Memb Act Eq PR +Metropolis 60 489,396 57 LLI 22 165,345 162,228 + Con 38 324,051 188,067 16 19 3 +England +South-East 48 406,955 47 LLI 4 34,883 144,659 + Con 44 372,072 187,831 40 39 7 +S.Midland 38 312,477 36 LLI 14 123,665 124,717 + Con 24 188,811 129,544 10 8 +East 29 257,022 29 LLI 18 173,521 107,710 7 11 1 + Con 11 83,501 98,137 +South-West 40 314,603 36 LLI 27 229,612 144,273 14 16 4 + Con 13 84,991 117,442 +W.Midland 58 544,415 63 LLI 45 427,549 248,825 32 36 8 + Con 13 116,866 198,212 +N.Midland 34 328,844 38 LLI 26 255,836 55,503 18 22 4 + Con 8 73,008 120,933 +North-West 70 654,751 76 LLI 24 231,123 263,670 + Con 46 423,628 292,942 22 22 4 +Yorkshire 52 536,553 62 LLI 36 398,426 248,078 20 30 8 + Con 16 138,127 189,930 20 30 8 +North 32 305,015 35 LLI 25 262,287 144,803 18 25 5 + Con 7 42,728 96,708 +ENGLAND 461 4,150,031 480 LLI 241 2,302,248 1,740,466 21 52 16 + Con 220 1,847,783 1,619,746 +Wales and + Monmouth 34 286,145 33 LLI 30 263,199 149,782 26 27 11 + Con 4 22,946 79,006 +Scotland 72 576,828 67 LLI 58 485,116 289,032 44 45 15 + Con 14 91,712 181,706 + +Britain 567 5,013,004 580 LLI 329 3,050,563 2,179,230 91 124 42 + Con 238 1,962,441 1,880,458 +Ireland 103 777,954 90 LLI 85 624,760 404,892 67 54 44 + Con 18 153,194 139,273 + +Total 670 5,790,958 670 LLI 414 3,675,323 2,584,122 158 178 86 + Con 256 2,115,635 2,019,731 + +Majority 158 1,559,638 564,391 + +NOTE.--The figures in columns K and L are calculated with reference to +the totals in column C. Thus the figure L 54 for Ireland in column K of +the last section of the table indicates that under a system of equal +single-member constituencies Ireland's 90 members would be Liberal etc. +72, Unionist 18, a Liberal majority of 54, and the corresponding figure +L 44 in column L indicates that under proportional representation the 90 +members which Ireland would return would be Liberal etc. 67, and +Unionist 23. a Liberal majority of 44. + +GENERAL ELECTION, 1886 + +Col A: Members +Col B: Registered Electors +Col C: Proportionate Number of Members +Col D: Members - Liberal, Labour and Irish +Col E: Members - Conservatives +Col F: Electorate of Constituencies held by - Liberal, Labour, + and Irish Nationalists +Col G: Electorate of Constituencies held by - Conservative +Col H: Voters - Liberal, Labour, and Irish Nationalist +Col I: Voters - Conservative +Col J: Majority - Actual +Col K: Majority - With equal Single Member Constituencies +Col L: Majority - Under Proportional Representation. + + A B C DE FG HI J K L + Prop Memb Electorate Voters Majority + Memb Elect Memb Act Eq PR +Metropolis 60 489,396 57 LLI 11 87,974 125,457 + Con 49 401,422 185,072 38 37 11 +England-- +South-East 48 406,955 47 LLI 0 - 114,518 + Con 48 406,955 184,221 48 47 11 +S.Midland 38 312,477 36 LLI 9 73,292 94,213 + Con 29 239,185 128,339 20 20 6 +East 29 257,022 29 LLI 4 87,975 81,838 + Con 25 219,047 102,732 21 21 3 +South-West 40 314,603 36 LLI 7 63,063 96,753 + Con 33 251,540 129,056 26 22 6 +W.Midland 58 544,415 63 LLI 15 136,518 173,463 + Con 43 407,897 218,753 28 32 8 +N.Midland 34 328,844 38 LLI 14 147,138 125,078 + Con 20 181,706 126,547 6 4 +North-West 70 654,751 76 LLI 13 123,459 236,134 + Con 57 531,292 282,187 44 48 6 +Yorkshire 52 536,553 62 LLI 33 359,414 214,407 6 + Con 19 177,139 180,728 14 22 +North 32 305,015 35 LLI 23 247,275 123,901 5 + Con 9 57,740 96,404 14 21 +ENGLAND 461 4,150,031 480 LLI 129 1,276,108 1,385,762 + Con 332 2,873,923 1,634,039 203 188 42 + +Wales and +Monmouth 34 286,145 33 LLI 27 240,752 123,186 20 23 7 + Con 7 45,393 82,179 +Scotland 72 576,828 67 LLI 43 339,726 218,561 14 11 5 + Con 29 237,102 188,164 + +Subtotal 567 5,013,004 580 LLI 199 1,856,586 1,727,509 + Con 368 3,156,418 1,904,382 169 154 30 + +Ireland 103 777,954 90 LLI 84 616,735 376,445 + Con 19 161,219 144,755 65 52 38 + +Total 670 5,790,958 670 LLI 283 2,473,321 2,103,954 8 + Con 387 3,317,637 2,049,137 104 102 + +Majority 104 844,316 54,817 + +GENERAL ELECTION, 1892 + +Table headings: +Col A: Members +Col B: Registered Electors +Col C: Proportionate Number of Members +Col D: Members - Liberal, Labour and Irish +Col E: Members - Conservatives +Col F: Electorate of Constituencies held by - Liberal, Labour, + and Irish Nationalists +Col G: Electorate of Constituencies held by - Conservative +Col H: Voters - Liberal, Labour, and Irish Nationalist +Col I: Voters - Conservative +Col J: Majority - Actual +Col K: Majority - With equal Single Member Constituencies +Col L: Majority - Under Proportional Representation. + + A B C DE FG HI J K L + Prop Memb Electorate Voters Majority + Memb Elect Memb Act Eq PR +Metropolis 60 552,024 60 LLI 23 186,572 183,967 + Con 37 365,452 214,275 14 20 4 +England: +South-East 48 463,073 50 LLI 4 38,534 147,136 + Con 44 424,539 206,075 40 42 8 +S.Midland 38 340,650 38 LLI 15 139,228 120,844 + Con 23 210,422 147,347 8 8 4 +East 29 276,491 30 LLI 13 134,632 108,866 + Con 16 141,859 110,849 3 +South-West 40 325,769 35 LLI 15 136,061 125,392 + Con 25 189,708 136,449 10 5 1 +W. Midland 58 577,397 63 LLI 16 143,567 204,453 + Con 42 433,830 248,774 26 31 7 +N. Midland 34 347,482 38 LLI 22 232,970 145,587 10 14 2 + Con 12 114,512 130,380 +North-West 70 707,392 77 LLI 26 284,970 282,139 + Con 44 422,422 307,698 18 15 3 +Yorkshire 52 571,864 62 LLI 35 418,414 244,099 18 28 6 + Con 17 153,450 204,492 +North 32 328,189 36 LLI 25 264,483 143,172 18 22 4 + Con 7 63,706 115,626 +ENGLAND 461 4,499,331 489 LLI 194 1,979,431 1,705,655 + Con 267 2,519,900 1,821,985 73 57 15 + +Wales and +Monmouth 34 314,063 34 LLI 31 294,395 152,326 28 30 10 + Con 3 19,668 86,576 +Scotland 72 606,203 66 LLI 52 449,994 267,631 32 32 8 + Con 20 156,209 214,448 + +Subtotal 567 5,419,497 589 LLI 277 2,723,820 2,125,612 5 3 + Con 290 2,695,777 2,123,009 13 +Ireland 103 746,781 81 LLI 80 561,938 345,548 57 41 31 + Con 23 184,843 157,181 + +Total 670 6,168,388 670 LLI 357 3,285,758 2,471,164 44 46 34 + Con 313 2,880,620 2,280,190 +Majority 44 405,138 190,974 + +GENERAL ELECTION, 1895 + +Table headings: +Col A: Members +Col B: Registered Electors +Col C: Proportionate Number of Members +Col D: Members - Liberal, Labour and Irish +Col E: Members - Conservatives +Col F: Electorate of Constituencies held by - Liberal, Labour, + and Irish Nationalists +Col G: Electorate of Constituencies held by - Conservative +Col H: Voters - Liberal, Labour, and Irish Nationalist +Col I: Voters - Conservative +Col J: Majority - Actual +Col K: Majority - With equal Single Member Constituencies +Col L: Majority - Under Proportional Representation. + + A B C DE FG HI J K L + Prop Memb Electorate Voters Majority + Memb Elect Memb Act Eq PR +Metropolis 60 573,141 61 LLI 8 70,056 161,328 + Con 52 503,085 242,999 44 47 13 +England: +South-East 48 472,725 50 LLI 2 24,057 152,213 + Con 46 448,668 217,096 44 44 8 +S.Midland 38 358,501 38 LLI 3 30,569 116,143 + Con 35 327,932 164,052 32 32 6 +East 29 294,153 31 LLI 8 70,467 101,736 + Con 21 223,686 122,999 13 15 3 +South-West 40 330,670 35 LLI 10 76,141 124,852 + Con 30 254,529 144,435 20 19 3 +W.Midland 58 589,881 63 LLI 9 85,544 195,545 + Con 49 504,337 259,382 40 45 9 +N.Midland 34 351,792 37 LLI 16 186,167 143,142 1 + Con 18 165,625 149,436 2 1 +North-West 70 728,292 78 LLI 10 114,035 273,585 + Con 60 614,257 332,101 50 54 8 +Yorkshire 52 565,799 61 LLI 28 317,932 238,032 4 7 1 + Con 24 247,867 225,871 +North 32 339,289 36 LLI 20 222,202 145,085 8 12 2 + Con 12 117,087 124,697 + +ENGLAND 461 4,604,243 490 LLI 114 1,197,170 1,652,261 + Con 347 3,407,073 1,983,068 233 236 48 +Wales and +Monmouth 34 320,532 34 LLI 25 241,750 148,552 16 18 6 + Con 9 78,782 108,036 +Scotland 72 636,106 68 LLI 39 335,143 243,425 6 4 2 + Con 33 300,963 234,138 + +Subtotal 567 5,560,881 592 LLI 178 1,774,068 2,044,238 + Con 389 3,786,818 2,325,242 211 214 40 + +Ireland 103 727,562 78 LLI 82 549,467 317,910 61 42 28 + Con 21 178,095 154,379 + +Total 670 6,292,443 670 LLI 260 2,323,530 2,362,148 + Con 410 3,964,913 2,479,621 150 172 12 +Majority 150 1,641,383 117,473 + +GENERAL ELECTION, 1900 +Table headings: +Col A: Members +Col B: Registered Electors +Col C: Proportionate Number of Members +Col D: Members - Liberal, Labour and Irish +Col E: Members - Conservatives +Col F: Electorate of Constituencies held by - Liberal, Labour, + and Irish Nationalists +Col G: Electorate of Constituencies held by - Conservative +Col H: Voters - Liberal, Labour, and Irish Nationalist +Col I: Voters - Conservative +Col J: Majority - Actual +Col K: Majority - With equal Single Member Constituencies +Col L: Majority - Under Proportional Representation. + + A B C DE FG HI J K L + Prop Memb Electorate Voters Majority + Memb Elect Memb Act Eq PR +Metropolis 60 601,925 60 LLI 8 73,718 150,047 + Con 52 528,207 247,777 44 46 14 +England: +South-East 48 512,408 51 LLI 3 23,362 140,277 + Con 45 489,406 220,829 42 47 11 +S. Midland 38 388,361 39 LLI 6 63,375 120,012 + Con 32 324,986 164,148 26 27 7 +East 29 319,997 32 LLI 9 80,447 101,785 + Con 20 239,550 125,375 11 8 4 +South-West 40 337,449 33 LLI 14 122,410 127,086 + Con 26 215,039 142,269 12 9 1 +W. Midland 58 630,931 63 LLI 10 96,089 200,113 + Con 48 534,842 261,474 38 43 9 +N. Midland 34 378,996 38 LLI 18 211,280 149,794 2 4 0 + Con 16 167,716 153,294 +North-West 70 794,142 79 LLI 14 176,183 281,634 + Con 56 617,957 351,243 42 43 9 +Yorkshire 52 612,892 61 LLI 26 326,841 239,045 5 1 + Con 26 286,051 238,870 +North 32 367,007 36 LLI 16 197,102 147,017 2 2 + Con 16 169,905 135,459 +ENGLAND 461 4,944,108 492 LLI 124 1,370,807 1,657,814 + Con 337 3,573,301 2,040,508 213 212 52 + +Wales and +Monmouth 34 342,209 34 LLI 28 286,628 161,190 22 24 8 + Con 6 55,581 103,396 +Scotland 72 683,840 68 LLI 34 312,781 254,112 + Con 34 371,059 258,836 4 6 + +Britain 567 5,970,187 594 LLI 186 1,970,216 2,073,116 + Con 381 3,999,941 2,402,740 195 194 44 + +Ireland 103 765,258 76 LLI 82 598,469 318,203 61 44 28 + Con 21 166,757 145,906 + +Total 670 6,735,415 670 LLI 268 2,568,685 2,391,319 + Con 402 4,166,698 2,548,736 134 150 16 +Majority 134 1,598,013 157,417 + +GENERAL ELECTION, 1906 + +Table headings: +Col A: Members +Col B: Registered Electors +Col C: Proportionate Number of Members +Col D: Members - Liberal, Labour and Irish +Col E: Members - Conservatives +Col F: Electorate of Constituencies held by - Liberal, Labour, + and Irish Nationalists +Col G: Electorate of Constituencies held by - Conservative +Col H: Voters - Liberal, Labour, and Irish Nationalist +Col I: Voters - Conservative +Col J: Majority - Actual +Col K: Majority - With equal Single Member Constituencies +Col L: Majority - Under Proportional Representation. + + A B C DE FG HI J K L + Prop Memb Electorate Voters Majority + Memb Elect Memb Act Eq PR +Metropolis 60 626,011 57 LLI 40 385,762 251,937 + Con 20 240,249 225,725 20 13 3 +England +South East 48 583,000 54 LLI 22 273,398 245,046 + Con 26 309,602 241,097 4 4 +S.Midlands 38 441,803 40 LLI 27 328,386 193,594 16 20 2 + Con 11 113,417 172,159 +East 29 368,662 34 LLI 25 333,564 170,039 21 28 4 + Con 4 35,098 128,991 +South-West 40 371,300 34 LLI 34 321,822 176,478 28 24 4 + Con 6 49,478 144,342 +W.Midland 58 679,903 63 LLI 35 402,148 288,832 12 11 1 + Con 23 277,760 286,862 +N.Midland 34 420,677 39 LLI 28 358,852 205,066 22 27 5 + Con 6 61,825 151,924 +North-West 70 869,792 80 LLI 55 680,843 420,969 40 46 12 + Con 15 188,949 321,560 +Yorkshire 52 667,863 62 LLI 41 556,233 340,865 30 42 14 + Con 11 111,635 218,778 +North 32 409,843 38 LLI 27 345,353 215,748 22 26 10 + Con 5 64,490 123,003 +England 461 5,438,859 501 LLI 334 3,986,356 2,508,574 207 233 53 + Con 127 1,452,503 2,014,441 + +Wales and + Monmouth 34 387,585 35 LLI 34 387,585 217,462 34 35 13 + Con 0 -- 100,547 +Scotland 72 750,401 70 LLI 60 629,360 367,942 48 48 16 + Con 12 121,041 235,098 + +Britain 567 6,576,845 606 LLI 428 5,003,301 3,093,978 289 316 82 + Con 139 1,573,544 2,350,086 + +Ireland 103 693,417 64 LLI 85 545,748 301,833 67 36 22 + Con 18 147,669 144,708 + +TOTAL 670 7,270,262 670 LLI 513 5,549,049 3,395,811 356 352 104 + Con 157 1,721,213 2,494,794 +Majority 356 3,827,836 901,017 + +GENERAL ELECTION, JANUARY 1910 + +Table headings: +Col A: Members +Col B: Registered Electors +Col C: Proportionate Number of Members +Col D: Members - Liberal, Labour and Irish +Col E: Members - Conservatives +Col F: Electorate of Constituencies held by - Liberal, Labour, + and Irish Nationalists +Col G: Electorate of Constituencies held by - Conservative +Col H: Voters - Liberal, Labour, and Irish Nationalist +Col I: Voters - Conservative +Col J: Majority - Actual +Col K: Majority - With equal Single Member Constituencies +Col L: Majority - Under Proportional Representation. + + A B C DE FG HI J K L + Prop Memb Electorate Voters Majority + Memb Elect Memb Act Eq PR +Metropolis 60 658,795 57 LLI 26 246,838 254,154 + Con 34 411,957 298,821 8 15 5 +England: +South-East 48 636,108 55 LLI 3 31,221 220,995 + Con 45 604,887 334,022 42 49 11 +S. Midland 38 490,592 43 LLI 11 146,312 197,717 + Con 27 344,280 235,776 16 17 3 +East 29 400,062 35 LLI 15 236,234 173,465 1 7 1 + Con 14 163,828 170,027 +South-West 40 386,514 34 LLI 18 201,726 172,692 2 + Con 22 184,788 175,010 4 +W. Midland 58 713,761 62 LLI 17 227,430 284,629 + Con 41 486,331 334,874 24 22 6 +N. Midland 34 446,752 39 LLI 23 334,766 216,469 12 19 3 + Con 11 111,986 181,209 +North-West 70 928,640 81 LLI 47 636,497 449,324 24 35 7 + Con 23 292,143 382,796 +Yorkshire 52 701,856 61 LLI 89 564,418 365,185 26 37 11 + Con 13 137,438 248,507 +North 32 430,594 38 LLI 23 354,697 216,760 14 24 6 + Con 9 75,897 150,471 +ENGLAND 461 5,793,674 505 LLI 222 2,980.139 2,551,390 21 3 + Con 239 2,813,535 2,521,513 17 +Wales and +Monmouth 34 425,714 37 LLI 32 414,613 243,383 30 35 13 + Con 2 11,101 116,696 +Scotland 72 785,391 68 LLI 61 675,723 394,103 50 50 14 + Con 11 109,668 265,770 +Sub total 567 7,004,779 610 LLI 315 4,070,475 3,188,876 63 106 30 + Con 252 3,188,876 2,903,979 + +Ireland 103 688,284 60 LLI 82 518,154 356,223 61 30 26 + Con 21 170,130 145,437 + +Total 670 7,693,063 670 LLI 397 4,588,629 3,545,099 124 136 56 + Con 270 3,104,434 3,049,416 +Majority 124 1,484,195 495,683 + +GENERAL ELECTION, DECEMBER 1910 + +Table headings: +Col A: Members +Col B: Registered Electors +Col C: Proportionate Number of Members +Col D: Members - Liberal, Labour and Irish +Col E: Members - Conservatives +Col F: Electorate of Constituencies held by - Liberal, Labour, + and Irish Nationalists +Col G: Electorate of Constituencies held by - Conservative +Col H: Voters - Liberal, Labour, and Irish Nationalist +Col I: Voters - Conservative +Col J: Majority - Actual +Col K: Majority - With equal Single Member Constituencies +Col L: Majority - Under Proportional Representation. + + A B C DE FG HI J K L + Prop Memb Electorate Voters Majority + Memb Elect Memb Act Eq PR +Metropolis 60 658,795 57 LLI 29 279,492 223,151 + Con 31 379,303 264,281 2 9 5 +England-- +South-East 48 636,108 55 LLI 5 58,248 209,434 + Con 43 577,860 311,888 38 45 11 +S. Midland 38 490,592 43 LLI 14 170,762 190,120 + Con 24 319,830 219,876 10 13 3 +East 29 400,062 35 LLI 16 256,750 164,849 3 9 1 + Con 13 143,312 154,529 +South-West 40 386,514 34 LLI 14 159,494 164,698 + Con 26 227,020 168,992 12 6 0 +W. Midland 58 713,761 62 LLI 19 246,842 268,125 + Con 39 466,919 316,574 20 20 6 +N. Midland 34 446,752 39 LLI 21 298,037 202,351 8 13 3 + Con 13 148,715 173,545 +North-West 70 928,640 81 LLI 39 524,682 400,508 8 11 1 + Con 31 403,958 386,045 +Yorkshire 52 701,856 61 LLI 40 570,544 321,622 28 39 9 + Con 12 131,312 239,067 +North 32 430,594 38 LLI 25 375,574 200,583 18 28 6 + Con 7 55,020 142,388 +ENGLAND 461 5,793,674 505 LLI 222 2,940,425 2,345,441 7 + Con 239 2,853,249 2,377,185 17 5 +Wales and +Monmouth 34 425,714 37 LLI 31 388,507 210,525 28 31 9 + Con 3 37,207 121,013 +Scotland 72 785,391 68 LLI 61 678,395 372,313 50 50 10 + Con 11 106,996 277,183 + +Subtotal 567 7,004,779 610 LLI 314 4,007,327 2,928,279 61 88 14 + Con 253 2,997,452 2,775,381 + +Ireland 103 688,284 60 LLI 84 536,675 350,029 65 34 24 + Con 19 151,609 146,982 + +Total 670 7,693,063 670 LLI 398 4,544,002 3,278,308 126 122 38 + Con 272 3,149,061 2,922,363 +Majority 126 1,394,941 355,945 + + +APPENDIX VI + +PREFERENTIAL VOTING: THE TRANSFER OF SUPERFLUOUS VOTES + +(A Memorandum by the Rt. Hon. J. Parker Smith)[1] + +(1) _The Element of Chance Involved: Its Magnitude_ + +An objection, which occurs to every one who considers schemes of +Preferential Voting, is that an element of chance is introduced into the +result by the methods for the transfer of the superfluous votes of +successful candidates. Supposing one part of the supporters of A, a +successful candidate, have put down B as their second choice, and the +remainder C, and that a certain number of A's votes are superfluous, and +have to be transferred, how is it to be determined what number of AB +votes, as they may be called, and what number of AC votes shall be +transferred? If the question is settled by chance, as, by drawing the +necessary number at random from A's heap, by declaring that voting +papers shall be used in the order in which they were handed in at the +polling booths, or by laying down any other set of arbitrary rules to +determine the order in which they shall be counted, an element of +uncertainty is introduced by which there seems to be serious danger that +B and C will gain or lose unfairly. + +Those who are accustomed to dealing with statistics will be prepared to +find this danger less than might have been expected; but even they will +be surprised to find of how small importance the arbitrary element is +discovered, by actual calculation, to be. + +The difficulty can be made clear by a numerical instance. Take the case +of an election for several seats, where the necessary quota is 6000, and +where a favourite candidate, whom we will call A, has received the first +votes of 10,000 voters. Though all those voters have agreed in putting +the same candidate first, they are divided as to who may wish to be +returned next. Six thousand of them put B as their second choice, and +the other 4000 C. If the 6000 votes which A requires are drawn wholly +from the AB votes, the result of the transfer will be that C is credited +with 4000 votes and B with none. This would be clearly unfair, for, in +reality, B has received among A's voters much more support than C. To +use up the 4000 AC votes and only 2000 AB votes, and to transfer 4000 +votes to B and none to C would be equally unfair to C. The course which +is exactly fair to both B and C is that the votes which are transferred +should be divided between them in the same proportion as that in which +the opinions of the whole number of A's supporters is divided. That is +to say, strict justice will be done if every 1000 votes which are used +or transferred are made up of 600 AB votes and 400 AC votes. +Accordingly, A's quota of 6000 must be made up of 3600 AB votes and 2400 +AC votes, and the 4000 papers left to be transferred will consequently +consist of 2400 votes for B and 1600 votes for C. + +This principle avoids all uncertainty, and is indisputably fair. It +remains to consider how to carry it into effect. In most cases there +would, in reality, be many more classes of votes than in the instance +taken above. Even in such cases it is practicable, as will presently be +shown, to divide the votes proportionately by an actual process of +counting and separation. A certain amount of complication is, of course, +introduced, but the extra labour involved does not seem impossible. The +question whether this extra labour is necessary must be answered by +examining the magnitude of the evil which it is sought to remedy. + +If the votes are counted in a random order, it is clear there is a +probability that the order in which they are drawn will correspond to +the total numbers of each class in the ballot-box. It is reasonable to +expect that when there are 10,000 ballot papers in an urn the +composition of the first thousand drawn out will nearly be the same as +that of any other thousand, or of the whole 10,000. The amount of this +probability may be determined mathematically, and is very great. + +This fact was clearly seen by Mr. Andrae, the statesman by whom the +method of preferential voting was introduced into Denmark in 1855, and a +mathematician of undisputed eminence. In answer to an objection of the +kind now under discussion, he replied: "If this law of mine had already +been in operation over the whole of Europe (including Turkey), for a +period of 10,000 years, and if the elections in every part of Europe to +which the law was applied were to take place, not every one, or three, +or seven years, but every week in regular repetition, these elections +throughout Europe, at the rate of a general European election per week, +would still have to go on for more than a thousand times the period of +years already stated; that is to say, for more than a thousand times ten +thousand years, before the chances would be equal that the voting papers +should come out of the urn in the order required to form the basis of +this problem. Although, therefore, the supposed combination is, +mathematically speaking, only an enormous improbability, yet, +practically speaking, it is absolutely impossible."[2] + +To state the matter more exactly, and as the result of an independent +mathematical investigation, it appears that in the case we have stated, +if 4000 voting papers were drawn out of A's heap at random, instead of +the papers being carefully sorted and proportionately divided, the +probability is that neither B nor C would gain or lose more than 11 +votes. In other words, it is just even betting that the number of AB +votes in the 4000 drawn would lie between 2411 and 2389 (inclusive), and +consequently that the number of BC votes will lie between 1589 and 1611. +The odds are more than 3 to 1 neither B nor C would gain or lose more +than 20 votes, _i.e._ that the number of AB votes drawn will lie between +2420 and 2380; more than 10 to 1 that neither would gain or lose more +than 30 votes; just 50 to 1 that neither would gain or lose more than 40 +votes; and about 2000 to 1 that neither would gain or lose more than 60 +votes. If the number of classes were larger or the number of votes to be +drawn smaller, the effect would be much less. It will thus be seen +that it is only in the case of very closely contested elections that the +element of chance can affect the result. It will also be observed that +the _element of chance will not be of importance as between the +different parties,_ but only as _between different individual candidates +of the same party_, since in almost all cases the electors who are +agreed upon the candidate they most desire will also put for their +second choice candidates of the same party. + +In closely contested elections it must, of course, be admitted that as a +result of this method, chance might decide which of two candidates of +the same party should be elected. But in closely contested elections in +large constituencies so many elements of chance are always and +necessarily involved, that the introduction of a fresh one does not, in +reality, make the result more arbitrary. Putting aside all the slight +influences which at the last moment decide a score or two of +featherweight votes, and assuming that every voter is profoundly +convinced of the truth of his opinions, there remains the question of +boundaries. A slight change in the line of the boundaries of the +constituency might easily make a difference of fifty votes--a larger +difference than what we are concerned with. To carry the dividing lines +from North to South instead of from East to West, would, in many +localities, completely alter the character of the representation. + +These are, in reality, matters of chance, and more arbitrary in their +nature than the order in which voting papers are drawn from an urn. + +(2) _Method of Eliminating the Chance Element_ + +If, however, special precautions are still thought necessary, the +following method of counting the votes appears to reduce, as far as +practicable, the element of chance involved in the transfer of +superfluous votes:-- + +The whole set of voting papers of the constituency being mixed, the +papers, not yet unfolded, are drawn out one by one. Each is stamped, as +it is drawn, with a corresponding number, 1, 2, ... in order. It is then +unfolded, and sorted according to the names of the candidates marked +first and second upon it. Suppose there are six candidates, A, B, C, X, +Y, Z; the votes of any candidate, A, will be sorted into six heaps, +viz., A votes (_i.e._ votes where A only is voted for), AB, AC, AX, AY, +and AZ votes. If A is found to have received more votes than he +requires, the order in which the votes will be counted to him will be as +follows: Use first the A votes, then use up those heaps where the second +name also is that of a candidate who has received more than the +necessary minimum. If these heaps give A more than he requires, take the +same proportion out of each of such heaps, taking out of each heap the +last drawn votes first. If, however, these heaps are used up without +giving A as many votes as he requires, take an equal proportion of the +votes of each of the remaining heaps--taking out of each heap the last +drawn votes first. + +_Example_.--Take an election where 6000 is the necessary minimum, and +suppose A has 8650 votes, composed as follows: + +A 600 +AB 2,700 +AC 4,500 +AX 50 +AY 200 +AZ 600 + ----- + 8,650 + + +Using first the 600 A votes, we are left with 5400 to make up out of the +remaining heaps. + +1. Suppose B and C have received the quota. The 5400 can be taken from +their heaps exclusively, for in their two heaps are 7200 votes; the +proportion to be taken from each heap is therefore 5400 out of 7200, +which is three quarters. Thus we make up A's number thus:-- + + A votes 600 +Three-quarters of 2,700 AB " 2,025 +Three-quarters of 4,500 AC " 3,375 + ----- + 6,000 + +And transfer the remainder (the AB and AC votes transferred being those +stamped with the lowest numbers). + +2. Suppose B and X have received the quota. Their two heaps amount to +2750 votes. Using these up, there remain 2650 votes to be made up out of +the AC, AY, and AZ heaps. These three heaps together contain 5300 votes; +and the proportion to be taken from each heap is 2650 out of 5300, or +half. Thus A's number is made up as follows:-- + + A votes 600 + AB " 2,700 + AX " 50 +Half of 4,500 AC " 2,250 +Half of 200 AY " 100 +Half of 600 AZ " 300 + ----- + 6,000 + +And the remaining votes of each of the three last classes--being those +stamped with the lowest numbers--will be transferred. + +It will be observed that the element of chance is not wholly excluded, +since the question, which papers out of the AC heap are transferred, is +left to depend upon the order of drawing. To exclude chance wholly, +these would have to be sorted into heaps according to the third name +upon them, and an equal proportion taken from each heap. The figures in +the first half of this paper are sufficient to show that such trouble +would be wholly superfluous. + + +[Footnote 1: This Memorandum is published by permission of the Rt. Hon. +J. Parker Smith. Although written in 1884, the arguments still apply. +The method described in the second part of the paper has been adopted in +the Municipal Representation Bill (see Appendix VII.), but the method of +application differs in detail.] + +[Footnote 2: Quoted by Mr. (afterwards Earl) Lytton in his _Report on +the Election of Representatives for the Rigsraad_.--House of Commons +papers, 1864, vol. 61, p. 24 of No. 7.] + + +APPENDIX VII + +THE SINGLE TRANSFERABLE VOTE + +SCHEDULE TO MUNICIPAL REPRESENTATION BILL, 1910 + +THE FIRST SCHEDULE[1] + +RULES FOB THE TRANSFER OF VOTES AND FOR ASCERTAINING THE RESULT OF THE +POLL + +_Arrangement of ballot papers._ + +1. After the ballot papers have been mixed, in accordance with the rules +contained in the First Schedule to the Ballot Act, 1872, the returning +officer shall draw out all ballot papers which he does not reject as +invalid, and file in a separate parcel those on which the figure 1 is +set opposite the name of the same candidate. The returning officer shall +then count the number of papers in each parcel. + +_Ascertainment of quota._ + +2. The returning officer shall then add together the numbers of the +papers in all the parcels and divide the total by a number exceeding by +one the number of vacancies to be filled, and the result increased by +one, disregarding any fractional remainder, shall be the number of votes +sufficient to secure the return of a candidate, herein called +the "quota." + +_Candidates with quota elected._ + +3. Any candidate whose parcel contains a number of papers equal to or +greater than the quota shall be declared elected. + +_Transfer of surplus votes_.] 4.--(1) If the number of +candidates elected under the last rule shall not equal the number of +vacancies, the returning officer shall as far as possible transfer from +each elected candidate the votes (if any) in excess of the quota (herein +called surplus votes) to the candidates indicated on the ballot papers +as next in order of the voters' preference, excluding candidates already +declared elected. The votes of the candidate having the largest number +of votes shall first be dealt with, and the particular votes to be +transferred shall be determined in accordance with the following +regulations:-- + +(a) The returning officer shall arrange all the ballot papers in the +parcel of the elected candidate on which votes capable of transfer are +given by filing in a separate sub-parcel those on which a next +preference is indicated for some one continuing candidate. + +(b) The returning officer shall also make a separate sub-parcel of the +ballot papers in the parcel on which the votes given are not capable +of transfer. + +(c) The returning officer shall count the ballot papers in each +sub-parcel, and also the total of all the ballot papers containing votes +capable of transfer. + +(d) If the total number of votes capable of transfer is equal to or less +than the surplus votes, the returning officer shall transfer all the +votes capable of transfer. + +(e) If the total number of votes capable of transfer is greater than the +surplus votes, the returning officer shall transfer from each sub-parcel +of votes capable of transfer the number of votes which bears the same +proportion to the total of the sub-parcel as the number of surplus votes +bears to the total of all the votes capable of transfer. + +(f) The number of votes to be transferred from each sub-parcel under the +preceding regulation shall be ascertained by multiplying the total of +the sub-parcel by the number of surplus votes and dividing the result by +the total number of votes capable of transfer. Fractional remainders +shall be disregarded. + +(g) The particular votes transferred from each sub-parcel shall be those +last filed in the sub-parcel. + +(2) The transfer of surplus votes shall be effected by making new +sub-parcels of the ballot papers on which those votes are given, and +adding those sub-parcels to the parcels (if any) of the candidates to +whom the transfers are made, or, where any such candidate has as yet no +parcel, a new parcel shall be formed for him from the papers +transferred. + +(3) All ballot papers in a parcel of an elected candidate not +transferred under this rule shall be set aside as finally dealt with, +and the votes given thereon shall thenceforth not be taken into account. + +(4) If two or more parcels of elected candidates are equal in size, the +returning officer shall decide which parcel he will first deal with +under this rule. + +(5) A transfer of votes under this rule shall not be made unless the +surplus votes of the elected candidate, together with any other surplus +votes not transferred, exceed the difference between the totals of the +votes of the two continuing candidates lowest on the poll. + +(6) This rule shall take effect subject to the provisions for filling +the last vacancy herein-after contained, and if at any time it shall be +possible to fill the last vacancy under those provisions, no further +transfer under this rule shall be made. + +_Result of transfer._ + +5. After the transfer of the surplus votes of an elected candidate, any +candidate who shall, as a result of the transfer, obtain the quota of +votes, shall be declared elected. + +_Further transfer of surplus votes._ + +6.--(1) Unless and until the last vacancy shall have been filled under +the provisions herein-after contained, if, after the transfers directed +by Rule 4, there shall still remain a vacancy, and the votes of any +elected candidate to whom a transfer has been made are in excess of the +quota, the returning officer shall, as far as possible, take from the +sub-parcel last transferred to that candidate a number of votes equal +to the surplus. + +(2) The particular votes to be taken shall be determined in accordance +with the regulations given in Rule 4 hereof, in the same manner as if +the votes included in the sub-parcel last transferred had been the only +votes given to the candidate; the ballot papers so taken shall be added +in separate sub-parcels to the parcels of the continuing candidates (if +any) indicated thereon as next in order of the voters' preference, and +the votes given thereon shall be transferred to those candidates +accordingly. Where any such candidate has as yet no parcel, a new parcel +shall be formed for him from the papers transferred. + +(3) The remaining ballot papers in the parcel of the elected candidate +(including the ballot papers taken from the parcel under Sub-Rule (1) on +which the votes given are not capable of transfer) shall be set aside as +finally dealt with, and the votes given thereon shall thenceforth not be +taken into account. + +(4) After any transfer of votes under this rule, any candidate who +shall, as a result of the transfer, obtain the quota of votes shall be +declared elected. + +(5) The process directed by this rule shall be repeated until the last +vacancy is filled, or until no candidate has any surplus votes, +whichever shall first happen. + +(6) If two or more parcels shall be equal in size, regard shall be had +to the number of votes counted to each candidate under Rule 1, and the +parcel of the candidate highest on that count shall first be dealt with, +but if the numbers of votes on that count were equal, the returning +officer shall decide which parcel he will first deal with under +this rule. + +(7) A transfer of votes under this rule shall not be made unless the +surplus votes of the elected candidate, together with any other surplus +votes not transferred, exceed the difference between the totals of the +votes of the two continuing candidates lowest on the poll. + +_Distribution of votes of lowest candidate_. + +7.--(1) Unless and until the last vacancy shall have been filled under +the provisions herein-after contained, if, after the transfers under +the preceding rules, there shall still remain one or more vacancies, or, +if no candidate shall have been declared elected under Rule 3, the +returning officer shall exclude from the poll the candidate having the +lowest number of votes, and shall distribute the votes capable of +transfer on the ballot papers in his parcel among the continuing +candidates next in order of the voters' preference. Any ballot papers in +the parcel, on which votes not capable of transfer are given, shall be +set aside as finally dealt with, and the votes given thereon shall +thenceforth not be taken into account. + +(2) If in any case the total of the votes of the two or more candidates +lowest on the poll together with any surplus votes not transferred is +less than the votes of the next highest candidate, the returning officer +may in one operation exclude those candidates from the poll and +distribute their votes in accordance with the foregoing provisions. + +(3) After the distribution under this rule of votes capable of transfer, +any candidate who has received the quota shall be declared elected. + +(4) The surplus votes of any candidate elected under this rule who has +received more than the quota shall be distributed in the manner directed +by and subject to the conditions of the last preceding rule. + +_Further distributions_. + +8. The process directed by the last rule shall be repeated on the +successive exclusions one after another of the candidates with the +lowest numbers of votes until the last vacancy is filled either by the +election of a candidate with the quota or under the next following rule. + +_Filling the last vacancy_. + +9.--(1) When the number of continuing candidates is reduced to the +number of vacancies remaining unfilled, the continuing candidates shall +be declared elected. + +(2) When only one vacancy remains unfilled and the votes of some one +continuing candidate exceed the total of all the votes of the other +continuing candidates together with any surplus votes not transferred, +that candidate shall be declared elected. + +(3) When more than one vacancy remains unfilled and the votes of the +candidate, who, if all the vacancies were filled by the successive +elections of the continuing candidates with the largest numbers of +votes, would be the last to be elected, exceed the total of all the +votes of the continuing candidates with fewer votes than himself +together with any surplus votes not transferred, that candidate and all +the other continuing candidates who have not less votes than himself +shall be declared elected. + +(4) When only one vacancy remains unfilled and there are only two +continuing candidates, and those two candidates have each the same +number of votes and no surplus votes remain capable of transfer, one +candidate shall be declared excluded under the next following rule and +the other declared elected. + +_Provisions for exclusion of candidates in special cases._ + +10. If at any time when a candidate has to be excluded under these rules +two or more candidates have each the same number of votes, regard shall +be had to the number of votes counted to each candidate under Rule 1, +and the candidate lowest on that count shall be excluded, but, if the +numbers of votes on that count were equal, the returning officer shall +decide which candidate shall be excluded. + +_Public notice of transfers._ + +11. The returning officer shall record and give public notice of any +transfer of votes made under these rules and of the total number of +votes counted to each candidate after any such transfer in addition to +the particulars prescribed by Rule 45 to the First Schedule to the +Ballot Act, 1872. Such public notice may be in accordance with the form +given in the appendix to these rules. + +_Recounts._ + +12.--(1) Any candidate or his agent may at any time during the counting +of the votes, either before the commencement or after the completion of +the transfer of the votes (whether surplus or otherwise) of any +candidate, request the returning officer to recount the papers then +comprised in the parcels of all or any candidates (not being papers set +aside as finally dealt with) and the returning officer shall forthwith +recount the same accordingly. The returning officer may also at his +discretion recount votes either once or more often in any case in which +he is not satisfied as to the accuracy of any previous count. Provided +that nothing herein shall make it obligatory on the returning officer to +recount the same votes more than once. + +(2) If upon an election petition-- + +(i) any ballot papers counted by the returning officer are rejected as +invalid, + +or + +(ii) any ballot papers rejected by the returning officer are declared +valid, + +the court may direct the whole or any part of the ballot papers to be +recounted and the result of the election ascertained in accordance with +these rules. + +(3) Except as in this rule expressly provided, no recount shall be had +whether on an election petition or otherwise. + +_Determination of questions as to transfers. + +13.--(1) If any question shall arise in relation to any transfer, the +decision of the returning officer, whether expressed or implied by his +acts, shall be final unless an objection is made by any candidate or his +agent before the declaration of the poll, and in that event the decision +of the returning officer may be reversed upon an election petition. + +(2) If any decision of the returning officer is so reversed, the +transfer in question and all operations subsequent thereto shall be +void, and the court shall direct what transfer is to be made in place +thereof, and shall cause the subsequent operations to be carried out and +the result of the election to be ascertained in accordance with +these rules. + +_Definitions_. + +14. In these rules-- + +(1) The expression "votes capable of transfer" means votes given on +ballot papers on which a further preference is indicated for a +continuing candidate. Provided that a vote shall be deemed not capable +of transfer in any case in which-- + +(a) The names of two or more candidates (whether already excluded from +the poll or declared elected or not) are marked with the same figure and +are next in order of preference, or + +(b) The name of the candidate to whom the transfer is to be made or of +some candidate (whether continuing or not) higher in the order of the +voters' preference is marked + +(i) by a figure not following consecutively after some other figure on +the ballot paper, or + +(ii) by two or more figures. + +(2) The expression "continuing candidates" means candidates not already +declared elected or excluded from the poll. + + + +APPENDIX TO SCHEDULE + +EXAMPLE OF AN ELECTION CONDUCTED ON THE SYSTEM OF PROPORTIONAL +REPRESENTATION SET OUT ABOVE + +Let it be assumed that there are five members to be elected, and that +there are ten candidates. + +The valid papers are drawn from the general heap of ballot papers and +arranged in separate parcels under the names of the candidates marked +with the figure 1. (Rule 1.) + +Each separate parcel is counted (Rule 1) and the total of all the valid +votes is ascertained (Rule 2). It is found that the total of all the +valid votes is 6000. + +This total is divided by six (_i.e._ the number which exceeds by one the +number of vacancies to be filled), and 1001 (_i.e._ the quotient 1000 +increased by one) is the number of votes sufficient to elect a member, +and is called the "quota" (Rule 2). + +The result of the count may be supposed to be as follows:-- + +A 2,009 Elected +B 952 +C 939 +D 746 +E 493 +F 341 +G 157 +H 152 +I 118 +K 93 + ----- + 6,000 + +A's votes exceed the quota and he is declared elected (Rule 3). + +_First Transfer_. + +It now becomes necessary to transfer A's surplus votes (Rule 4 (1)). A +has in fact (2009 less 1001 or) 1008 surplus votes. All A's 2009 voting +papers are examined and arranged in separate sub-parcels according to +the second preferences indicated thereon (Rule 4 (1) (_a_)). A separate +sub-parcel is also formed of those papers on which no second preference +is shown, and which are therefore not capable of transfer. (Rule 4 (1) +(_b_).) The result is found to be as follows. (Rule 4 (1) (_c_).) + +A second preference is shown for G on 1,708 papers + " " " D " 257 " + " " " E " 11 " + " " " F " 28 " + ----- +Total of votes capable of transfer 2,004 " +No second preference is shown on 5 " + ----- +Total of A's votes 2,009 + +The total number of votes to be transferred is 1008, and it is necessary +that they should be taken from the several sub-parcels in the +proportions which the latter bear to all the votes capable of transfer; +that is, there must be transferred, _e.g.,_ to G a number of votes +bearing the same proportion to 1008, the total to be transferred, as +1708, the number of votes in G's sub-parcel, bears to 2004, the total of +votes capable of transfer. In other words the number of the ballot +papers on which each candidate is next preference must be multiplied by +a fraction of which the surplus is the numerator and the total of votes +capable of transfer the denominator, in order to ascertain the number of +votes to be transferred to the candidate in question. In making the +transfers fractions of votes are neglected (Rule 4 (1) ( +e) and (f)). + +The process is as follows:-- + +To G there are to be transferred 1,708 x 1,008 / 2,004 = 589 votes + + " D " " " 257 x 1,008 / 2,004 = 129 " + + " E " " " 11 x 1,008 / 2,004 = 5 " + +" F " " " 28 x 1,008 / 2,004 = 14 " + ------- + 1,007 + +859, 129, 5 and 14 votes are now transferred to G, D, E, and F +respectively, the particular voting papers taken being those last filed +in their sub-parcels, and therefore at the top of the sub-parcels. These +voting papers are added in separate sub-parcels to G, D, E, and E (Rule +4 (2)). + +Their totals then become-- + +G . . . . . 157 + 859 = 1,016 +D . . . . . 746 + 129 = 875 +E . . . . . 493 + 5 = 498 +F . . . . . 341 + 14 = 355 + +All the other voting papers in A's parcel (1002 in number) are set aside +as finally dealt with (Rule 4 (3)), the figure 1002 being the quota 1001 +with the addition of the one further vote of the surplus which, owing to +the disregard of fractions, is not transferred. G having obtained more +than the quota is now declared elected (Rule 5), and the poll stands as +follows:-- + +A 1,002 Elected +G 1,016 Elected +B 952 +C 939 +D 875 +E 498 +F 355 +H 152 +I 118 +K 93 + +_Second Transfer_ + +G has now more than the quota, and his surplus votes (1016 less 1001 or +15) would have to be transferred (Rule 6(1)) were it not for the +provisions of Rule 6(7). But under that rule, the process of +transferring a surplus is postponed in a case where the surplus is less +than the difference between the two lowest candidates on the poll, and +where, therefore, the transfer would produce no practical effect. In +this case the difference between I and K, the two lowest candidates, is +118 - 93, or 25, and therefore it is not necessary to transfer +G's surplus. + +The returning officer proceeds to distribute the votes of the candidates +with the smallest totals (Rules 7 and 8). + +K's parcel is therefore examined and is found to contain 89 papers on +which F is next preference, and 4 on which C is next preference. + +Therefore 89 votes are transferred to F and 4 to C. + +The poll now stands-- + +A 1,002 Elected +G 1,016 Elected +B 952 +C 943 +D 875 +E 498 +F 444 +H 152 +I 118 + +No further candidate has the quota. + +_Third Transfer_ + +The difference between I and H exceeds G's surplus, which therefore is +allowed to remain (Rule 6 (7)), and the votes of I as now lowest on the +poll have now to be distributed in the same manner as K's (Rule 8). But +as the combined votes of H and I, together with G's surplus (152 + 118 + +15 = 285), are less than 444, the total of F, the next highest +candidate, the returning officer avails himself of Rule 7 (2), and +distributes both H and I's votes at one operation. + +I's parcel is found to contain 107 papers on which D and 11 on which B +is next preference, and H's parcel is found to contain 108 papers on +which B is next preference, and 44 on which there is no available +preference marked. (In some cases, some or one of A, G, I, H, and K are +marked as next in order of preference on the papers examined, but as all +of them are already either elected or excluded they are left out of +account.) Therefore, 107 votes are transferred to D, and 119 (108 + 11) +to B, while 44 are set aside as finally dealt with (Rule 7 (1)). The +result is to give B the quota, and he is declared elected. + +The poll now stands-- + +A 1,002 Elected +G 1,016 Elected +B 1,071 Elected +D 982 +C 943 +E 498 +F 444 + +_Fourth Transfer_ + +B has now a surplus of 70 votes, and it is necessary to distribute this +(Rules 7 (4), 6, and 4) as it exceeds the difference between E and F, +which is 54 (Rule 6 (7)). + +For this purpose only the 119 votes last transferred are taken into +account (Rule 6 (2)). + +These are examined and arranged in sub-parcels, in the same manner as +A's votes were examined and arranged, with the following result: A next +preference is shown for E on 84 papers. No further preference is shown +on 35 papers. The total number of votes capable of transfer (84) is thus +greater than the surplus (70), but, as there is only one possible +transfer, the process is simple: 84 x 70/84 = 70; and so the 70 votes +last filed in E's sub-parcel are transferred to E. + +The poll now stands-- + +A 1,002 Elected +G 1,016 Elected +B 1,001 Elected +D 982 +C 943 +E 568 +F 444 + +_Fifth Transfer_ + +G's surplus is still not distributable (Rule 6(7)), but F is now lowest +on the poll and his votes have to be distributed (Rule 8). + +On examination it is found that of F's 444 papers, 353 show a next +preference for C, and the remainder, 91, contain no further preference. + +The 353 are transferred to C, who thus has more than the quota, and is +declared elected, and the 91 are set aside as finally dealt with (Rule +7(1)). + +The poll now stands-- + +A 1,002 Elected +G 1,016 Elected +B 1,001 Elected +C 1,296 Elected +D 982 +E 568 + +This terminates the election; for, even if all C's surplus votes (295) +and all G's surplus votes (15) were transferred to E, his poll would +only amount to 878. But D's votes (982) exceed this total, D is +therefore declared elected (Rule 9 (2)). + +The final result is that A, G, B, C, and D are elected. + + +Public Notice of the Result of the Poll and of the Transfer of Votes + +Number of valid votes ... 6,000 +Number of members to be elected ... 5 +Quota ... 1,001 + +[column names-- ] +N: Names of Candidates +V: Votes +TA: Transfer of A's surplus +RA: Result +TK: Transfer of K's Votes +RK: Result +THI: Transfer of H and I's Votes +RHI: Result +TB: Transfer of B's surplus +TB: Result +TF: Transfer of F's Votes +RF: Final Result + +N: V: TA: RA: TK: RK: THI: RHI: TB: TB: TF: RF: + +A 2,009 -1,007 1,002 -- 1,002 -- 1,002 -- 1,002 -- 1,002(E) +B 952 -- 952 -- 952 +119 1,071 -70 1,001 -- 1,001(E) +C 939 -- 939 + 4 943 -- 943 -- 943 +353 1,296(E) +D 746 +129 875 -- 875 +107 982 -- 982 -- 982(E) +E 493 + 5 498 -- 498 -- 498 +70 568 -- 568 +F 341 + 14 355 +89 444 -- 444 -- 444 -444 -- +G 157 +859 1,016 -- 1,016 -- 1,016 -- 1,016 -- 1,016(E) +H 152 -- 152 -- 152 -152 -- -- -- -- -- +I 118 -- 118 -- 118 -118 -- -- -- -- -- +K 93 -- 93 -93 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- + ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ +Effective votes + 6,000 -- 6,000 -- 6,000 -- 5,956 -- 5,956 -- 5,865 +Preferences exhausted + -- -- -- +44 44 -- 44 +91 135 +Total valid votes + 6,000 -- 6,000 6,000 -- 6,000 -- 6,000 -- 6,000 + +[Candidates A, B, C, D, and G are elected.] + + +[Footnote 1: The rules contained in this schedule were examined and +approved by the Select Committee of the House of Lords in 1907. They are +substantially identical with those embodied in the Transvaal Municipal +Act of 1909, and used in the municipal elections of Pretoria and +Johannesburg in 1909, as well as in the model elections conducted by the +Proportional Representation Society in 1906, 1908, and 1910.] + + +APPENDIX VIII + +THE SINGLE TRANSFERABLE VOTE + +SCHEDULE (4) OF TASMANIAN ELECTORAL ACT, 1907 + +In this Schedule, unless the contrary intention appears-- + +"Returning Officer" means the Returning Officer for the District: + +"Quota" means the number of votes sufficient to elect a candidate: + +"Surplus" means the number of votes which a candidate has obtained, at +any stage of the scrutiny, over and above the quota: + +"First choice recorded for a candidate" means a voting-paper on which +the number 1 is placed in the square opposite the name: + +"Second choice recorded for a candidate" means a voting paper on which +the number 2 is placed in the square opposite his name: + +"Transfer value" means that portion of a vote which is unused by-- + +(a) an elected candidate who has obtained a surplus, + +(b) a candidate excluded on account of his being lowest on the poll, and +which is therefore transferred to the candidate next in the order of the +voter's preference. The transfer value of all votes is either 1 or some +fraction of 1. + +METHOD OF COUNTING VOTES + +_First choice of each candidate to be counted_.] + +1. The number of first choices recorded for each candidate shall be +counted, and all informal voting papers shall be rejected. + +_To find the quota_. + +2. The aggregate number of such first choices shall be divided by one +more than the number of candidates required to be elected, and the +quotient increased by one, disregarding any remainder, shall be the +quota, and (except as hereinafter provided in Rule 10) no candidate +shall be elected until he obtains a number of votes equal to or greater +than the quota. + +_Candidates who have the quota to be declared elected._ + +3. Any candidate who has, upon the first choices being counted, a number +of such votes equal to or greater than the quota shall be +declared elected. + +_If first choices exactly equal to quota, voting papers to be +set aside_. + +4. Where the number of such votes obtained by any candidate is equal to +the quota, the whole of the voting papers on which a first choice is +recorded for such elected candidate shall be set aside as finally +dealt with. + +_If a surplus, surplus to be transferred._ + +5. Where the number of such votes obtained by any candidate is in excess +of the quota, the proportion of votes in excess of the quota shall be +transferred to the other candidates not yet declared elected, next in +the order of the voters' respective preferences, in the +following manner:-- + +_Voting papers reexamined and second choices counted._ + +(i) All the voting papers on which a first choice is recorded for the +elected candidate shall be re-examined, and the number of second +choices, or (in the case provided for in Rule 12) third or next +consecutive choices, recorded for each unelected candidate thereon shall +be counted: + +_Find the transfer value._ (ii) The surplus of the elected +candidate shall be divided by the total number of votes obtained by him +on the counting of the first choices, and the resulting fraction shall +be the transfer value: + +_Multiply second choices by transfer value._ + +(iii) The number of second or other choices, ascertained in paragraph i, +to be recorded second for each unelected candidate, shall be multiplied +by the transfer value: + +_Add result on._ + +(iv) The resulting number, disregarding any fractional remainder, shall +be credited to each unelected candidate, and added to the number of +votes obtained by him on the counting of the first choices. + +_If more than one surplus, largest to be first dealt with._ + +6.--(a) Where, on the counting of the first choices or on any transfer, +more than one candidate has a surplus, the largest surplus shall be +first dealt with. If then more than one candidate has a surplus, the +then largest surplus shall be dealt with, and so on: Provided that, if +one candidate has obtained a surplus at a count or transfer previous to +that at which another candidate obtains a surplus, the surplus of the +former shall be first dealt with. + +_If surpluses equal, last difference to decide._ + +(b) Where two or more surpluses are equal, the surplus of the candidate +who was the highest on the poll at the count or transfer at which they +last had an unequal number of votes shall be first dealt with; and if +they have had an equal number of votes at all preceding counts or +transfers, the returning officer shall decide which candidate's surplus +shall be first dealt with. + +_If transfer raises candidate up to or above quota, he is to +be declared elected._ + +7.--(a) Where the number of votes obtained by a candidate is raised up +to or above the quota by a transfer as aforesaid, he shall thereupon be +declared elected. And in such case, notwithstanding the fact that he may +have reached the quota, such transfer shall be completed, and all the +votes to which he is entitled there from shall be transferred to him, +but no votes of any other candidate shall be transferred to him. + +_If votes exactly equal quota, voting papers to be set +aside._ + +(b) Where the number of votes obtained by a candidate is raised up to, +but not above, the quota by a transfer as aforesaid, the whole of the +voting papers on which such votes are recorded shall be set aside as +finally dealt with. + +_If surplus created, surplus to be transferred._ + +(c) Where the number of votes obtained by a candidate is raised above +the quota by a transfer as aforesaid, his surplus shall be transferred +to the candidates next in the order of the voters' respective +preferences, in the following manner:-- + +_Voting paper of last transfer re-examined and third choices +counted._ + +(i) The voting papers on which are recorded the votes obtained by the +elected candidate in the last transfer shall be reexamined, and the +number of third, or (in the case provided for in Rule 12) next +consecutive choices recorded for each unelected candidate +thereon counted: + +_ Find the transfer value._ + +(ii) The surplus of the elected candidate shall be divided by the total +number of voting papers mentioned in paragraph i, and the resulting +fraction shall be the transfer value: + +_Multiply third choices by transfer value._ + +(iii) The number of second (or other) choices, ascertained in paragraph +i, to be recorded for each unelected candidate, shall be multiplied by +the last-mentioned transfer value: + +_Add result on._ + +(iv) The resulting number, disregarding any fractional remainder, shall +be credited to each unelected candidate, and added to the number of +votes previously obtained by him. + +_When all surpluses dealt with candidate lowest on poll to be +excluded, and his votes transferred._ 8.--(a) Where, after the first +choices have been counted and all surpluses (if any) have been +transferred as hereinbefore directed, no candidate, or less than the +number of candidates required to be elected, has or have obtained the +quota, the candidate who is lowest on the poll shall be excluded, and +all the votes obtained by him shall be transferred to the candidates +next in the order of the voters' respective preferences, in the same +manner as is directed in Rule 5. + +_First choices to be transferred first._ + +(b) The votes obtained by such excluded candidate as first choices shall +first be transferred, the transfer value of each vote in this case +being 1. + +_Then other votes in order._ + +(c) The other votes of such excluded candidate shall then be dealt with +in the order of the transfers in which, and at the transfer value at +which, he obtained them. + +_Each transfer deemed a separate transfer._ + +(d) Each of the transfers which takes place under the two previous +clauses of this rule shall be deemed for all purposes to be a +separate transfer. + +_If transfer raises candidate up to quota, he is to be +declared elected._ + +9.--(a) Where the number of votes obtained by a candidate is raised up +to or above the by any such transfer as aforesaid, he shall thereupon be +declared elected. And in such case, notwithstanding the fact that he may +have reached the quota, such transfer shall be completed, and all the +votes to which he is entitled therefrom shall be transferred to him, but +no other votes shall be transferred to him. + +_If votes exactly equal to quota, voting papers to be set +aside._ + +(b) Where the number of votes obtained by a candidate is raised up to, +but not above, the quota by any such transfer as aforesaid, the whole of +the voting papers on which such votes are recorded shall be set aside as +finally dealt with. + +_If surplus created, surplus to be transferred._ + +(c) Where the number of votes obtained by a candidate is raised above +the quota by any such transfer as aforesaid, his surplus shall be +transferred to the candidates next in the order of the voters' +respective preferences in the same manner as is directed in Rule 7, +Clause (c): Provided that such surplus shall not be dealt with until all +the votes of the excluded candidate have been transferred. + +_Surpluses to be dealt with before further exclusion._ + +(d) Where any surplus exists it shall be dealt with before any other +candidate is excluded. + +_Process of exclusion to be repeated until there remain +number of candidates required._ + +10. The same process of excluding the candidate lowest on the poll and +transferring to other candidates his votes shall be repeated until all +the candidates, except the number required to be elected, have been +excluded, and the unexcluded candidates, who have not already been so +declared, shall then be declared elected. + +_If lowest candidates equal last, difference to decide._ + +11. Where at any time it becomes necessary to exclude a candidate, and +two or more candidates have the same number of votes and are lowest on +the poll, then whichever of such candidates was lowest on the poll at +the last count or transfer at which they had an unequal number of votes +shall be first excluded, and if such candidates have had an equal number +of votes at all preceding counts or transfers, the returning officer +shall decide which candidate shall be first excluded. + +_If a candidate elected or excluded, his name not considered +on voting paper._ + +12. In determining what candidate is next in the order of the voter's +preference, any candidates who have been declared elected or who have +been excluded shall not be considered, and the order of the voter's +preference shall be determined as if the names of such candidates had +not been on the voting paper. + +_Exhausted votes._ + +13. Where on any transfer it is found that on any voting paper there is +no candidate opposite whose name a number is placed, other than those +who have been already either declared elected or excluded, such voting +paper shall be set aside as exhausted. + + +APPENDIX IX + +THE SINGLE TRANSFERABLE VOTE + +REGULATIONS FOR THE ELECTION OF SENATORS UNDER THE SOUTH AFRICA ACT, 1909 + +I. In these Regulations:-- + +(1) "_Continuing Candidates_" mean candidates not elected or not +excluded from the poll at any given time. + +(2) "_First Preference_" means the figure 1 set opposite the name of any +candidate; "second preference" similarly means the figure 2; "third +preference" the figure 3, and so on. + +(3) "_Unexhausted papers_" mean ballot papers on which a further +preference is recorded for a continuing candidate. + +(4) "_Exhausted papers_" mean ballot papers on which no further +preference is recorded for a continuing candidate, provided that a paper +shall also be deemed to be exhausted in any case in which-- + +(_a_) The names of two or more candidates, whether continuing or not, +are marked with the same figure and are next in order of preference, or + +(_b_) The name of the candidate next in order of preference, whether +continuing or not, is marked + +(i) By a figure not following consecutively after some other figure on +the ballot paper, or + +(ii) By two or more figures.[1] (5) "_Original Votes_" in regard to any +candidate mean the votes derived from ballot papers on which a first +preference is recorded for such candidate. + +(6) "_Transferred Votes_" in regard to any candidate mean votes, the +value or part of the value of which is credited to such candidate and +which are derived from ballot papers on which a second or subsequent +preference is recorded for such candidate. + +(7) "_Surplus_" means the number by which the value of the votes of any +candidate, original and transferred, exceeds the quota. + +II. (1) The Governor in Council shall by Proclamation fix a date on or +before which every candidate for election shall be nominated by two +members of the Legislature in writing addressed to the Clerk of the +Legislative Assembly. Such nomination shall contain the candidate's full +name and address, shall be signed by two members of the Legislature, and +shall be accepted in writing by the candidate. + +A nomination paper may include any number of names not exceeding eight, +but no member shall sign more than one nomination paper, and no +candidate shall sign a nomination paper on which his name appears. The +Clerk of the Legislative Assembly shall, after consultation with the +Assessors hereinafter referred to, reject all nominations not made in +accordance with these regulations. + +(2) Immediately after the date fixed for receiving nominations the Clerk +of the Legislative Assembly shall make a return to the Governor in +Council showing the names and addresses of the candidates who have been +duly nominated, together with the names of the members who have +nominated them. He shall at the same time certify that such nominations +have been duly made in accordance with these regulations, and forward to +the Governor-in-Council the certificate by the Assessors mentioned in +Regulation IV. (2). + +In case of disagreement between the Clerk of the Legislative Assembly +and the Assessors, the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly shall, at the +request of the Governor-in-Council, inspect the nomination papers, and +his decision on the point at issue shall be final. + +(3) If the number of nominations received is less than the number of +vacancies to be filled, the Governor-in-Council shall by Proclamation +call for further nominations to be made on or before a date to be fixed +therein. If the number of nominations received on the original date, or +such further date as may be fixed, is equal to the number of vacancies +to be filled, the Governor-in-Council shall by Proclamation declare the +candidates so nominated to be duly elected. + +(4) If the number of candidates nominated as aforesaid exceeds the +number of vacancies to be filled, the Governor-in-Council shall by +Proclamation summon a joint sitting of both Houses of the Legislature +for the purpose of electing candidates to fill the vacancies in the +manner prescribed in these regulations. Such sitting shall be continued +for a period to be fixed in the Proclamation, not being less than two +hours, and no member shall be allowed to vote except during the +continuation of such sitting. Provided, however, that if all the members +of the Legislature have voted before the expiration of the said period +of two hours, the Speaker may close the sitting. + +III. Each member of the Legislature present shall vote in person, and no +voting by proxy shall be permitted. + +IV. (1) The Clerk of the Legislative Assembly shall act as returning +officer and shall, subject to these rules, do all things necessary for +the conduct of the election. + +(2) Two Assessors, not being Members of Parliament, shall be nominated, +one by the President of the Legislative Council and one by the Speaker +of the Legislative Assembly, who shall assist and advise the returning +officer in his duties, both in respect, of the receiving of nominations +and the conduct of the election. Immediately after the date fixed for +the receipt of nominations the Assessors shall furnish the returning +officer, for transmission to the Governor-in-Council, with a certificate +stating whether or not they are satisfied that the nominations have been +received in accordance with these regulations. Further, if either of the +Assessors is for any reason dissatisfied with the conduct of the +election he shall report his opinion, with the reasons therefor, in +writing to the President of the Legislative Council and the Speaker of +the Legislative Assembly, who, after consultation, may if they consider +it necessary, order a recount to be made, and the returning officer +shall act accordingly. + +(3) Before entering on their duties the returning officer and the +assessors shall be required to make oath or affirmation before the +Speaker that they will faithfully and impartially discharge the duties +of their offices according to the rules laid down herein, or such other +rules as may be lawfully made. + +(4) The returning officer shall furnish the Governor-in-Council with the +names of the persons elected, and shall make to the President of the +Legislative Council and the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly a +complete return signed by himself showing the various steps of the +election, and the result of the election. He shall also transmit to the +Speaker of the Legislative Assembly a sealed packet containing the +nominations, the actual ballot papers and the counterfoils, which shall +be preserved for a period of at least twelve months. The +Governor-in-Council shall notify by Proclamation the names of the +persons duly elected. + +V. (1) The voting shall be by ballot. The returning officer shall +ascertain that the person desiring to vote is entitled to vote and shall +enter his name upon the counterfoil in the ballot paper book, and shall +then tear out the ballot paper corresponding to that counterfoil, and, +having stamped the ballot paper with a perforating stamp provided for +the purpose, shall hand it to the member. Every ballot paper shall +contain the names and addresses of all the candidates duly nominated +for election, printed in alphabetical order, in the form prescribed in +the annexure hereto. + +(2) When the member has received a ballot paper he shall take the paper +to a compartment and desk provided for the purpose and signify in manner +provided by the next succeeding section for whom he desires to vote. The +member shall then fold the ballot paper so that the perforated mark may +be visible, and having held up the ballot paper so that the returning +officer can recognize the perforated mark, shall drop the ballot paper +in the ballot box placed in front of the returning officer. + +(3) If a member inadvertently spoils a ballot paper he may return it to +the returning officer, who shall, if satisfied of such inadvertence, +give him another paper and retain the spoiled paper, and this spoiled +paper shall be immediately cancelled, and the fact of such cancellation +shall be noted upon the counterfoil. + +VI. Every member shall have one vote only. A member in giving his vote + +(_a_) Must place on his ballot paper the figure 1 in the square opposite +the name of the candidate, for whom he votes; + +(_b_) May in addition place on his ballot paper the figure 2, or the +figures 2 and 3, or 2, 3 and 4, and so on, in the squares opposite the +names of other candidates in the order of his preference. + +VII. A ballot paper shall be invalid + +(_a_) Upon which a member signs his name or writes any word, or makes +any mark by which it becomes recognizable; or + +(_b_) Which does not bear the perforated mark; or + +(_c_) On which the figure 1 is not marked; or + +(_d_) On which the figure 1 is set opposite the name of more than one +candidate; or + +(_e_) On which the figure 1 and some other figure is set opposite the +name of the same candidate; or + +(_f_) Which is unmarked or void for uncertainty. + +VIII. In carrying out these rules the returning officer shall + +(_a_) Disregard all fractions; + +(_b_) Ignore all preferences recorded for candidates already elected or +excluded from the poll. + +IX. The ballot papers shall be examined and the returning officer, after +rejecting any invalid ballot papers, shall divide the remaining papers +into parcels according to the first preferences recorded for each +candidate. He shall then count the number of papers in each parcel. + +X. For the purpose of facilitating the processes prescribed by these +regulations, each valid ballot paper shall be deemed to be of the value +of one hundred.[2] + +XI. The returning officer shall then add together the values of the +papers in all the parcels and divide the total by a number exceeding by +one the number of vacancies to be filled, and the result increased by +one shall be the number sufficient to secure the return of a candidate, +herein called the "quota." + +XII. If at any time under these regulations a number of candidates equal +to the number of persons to be elected has obtained the quota, such +candidates shall be treated as elected and no further steps shall +be taken. + +XIII. (1) Any candidate the value of whose parcel, on the first +preferences being counted, is equal to or greater than the quota, shall +be declared elected. + +(2) If the value of the papers in any such parcel is equal to the quota, +the papers shall be set aside as finally dealt with. + +(3) If the value of the papers in any such parcel is greater than the +quota, the surplus shall be transferred to the continuing candidates +indicated on the ballot papers as next in the order of the voters' +preference, in the manner prescribed in the following regulation. + +XIV. (1) If and whenever as the result of any operation prescribed by +these regulations a candidate has a surplus, that surplus shall be +transferred in accordance with the provisions of this regulation. + +(2) If more than one candidate has a surplus the largest surplus shall +be dealt with first and the others in order of magnitude; provided that +every surplus arising on the first count of votes shall be dealt with +before those arising on the second count, and so on. + +(3) Where two or more surpluses are equal the returning officer shall +decide according to the terms of regulation XIX., which shall first be +dealt with. + +(4) _(a)_ If the surplus of any candidate to be transferred arises from +original votes only, the returning officer shall examine all the papers +in the parcel belonging to the candidate whose surplus is to be +transferred, and divide the unexhausted papers into sub-parcels +according to the next preferences recorded thereon. He shall also make a +separate sub-parcel of the exhausted papers. + +(_b_) He shall ascertain the value of the papers in each sub-parcel and +of all the unexhausted papers. + +(_c_) If the value of the unexhausted papers is equal to or less than +the surplus, he shall transfer all the unexhausted papers at the value +at which they were received by the candidate whose surplus is being +transferred. + +(_d_) If the value of the unexhausted papers is greater than the +surplus, he shall transfer the sub-parcels of unexhausted papers, and +the value at which each paper shall be transferred shall be ascertained +by dividing the surplus by the total number of unexhausted papers. + +(5) If the surplus of any candidate to be transferred arises from +transferred as well as original votes, the returning officer shall +re-examine all the papers in the sub-parcel last transferred to the +candidate and divide the unexhausted papers into sub-parcels according +to the next preferences recorded thereon. He shall thereupon deal with +the sub-parcels in the same manner as is provided in the case of the +sub-parcels referred to in the last preceding subsection. + +(6) The papers transferred to each candidate shall be added in the form +of a sub-parcel to the papers already belonging to such candidate. + +(7) All papers in the parcel or sub-parcels of an elected candidate not +transferred under this regulation shall be set aside as finally +dealt with. + +XV. (1) If after all surpluses have been transferred, as hereinbefore +directed, less than the number of candidates required has been elected, +the returning officer shall exclude from the poll the candidate lowest +on the poll, and shall distribute his unexhausted papers among the +continuing candidates according to the next preferences recorded +thereon. Any exhausted papers shall be set aside as finally dealt with. + +(2) The papers containing original votes of an excluded candidate shall +first be transferred, the transfer value of each paper being +one hundred. + +(3) The papers containing transferred votes of an excluded candidate +shall then be transferred in the order of the transfers in which, and at +the value of which, he obtained them. + +(4) Each of such transfers shall be deemed to be a separate transfer. + +(5) The process directed by this regulation shall be repeated on the +successive exclusions one after another of the candidates lowest on the +poll, until the last vacancy is filled either by the election of a +candidate with the quota, or as hereinafter provided. + +XVI. If as the result of a transfer of papers under these regulations +the value of the votes obtained by a candidate is equal to or greater +than the quota, the transfer then proceeding shall be completed, but no +further papers shall be transferred to him. + +XVII. (1) If after the completion of any transfer under these +regulations the value of the votes of any candidate shall be equal to +or greater than the quota, he shall be declared elected. + +(2) If the value of the votes of any such candidate shall be equal to +the quota, the whole of the papers on which such votes are recorded +shall be set aside as finally dealt with. + +(3) If the value of the votes of any such candidate shall be greater +than the quota, his surplus shall thereupon be distributed in the manner +hereinbefore provided, before the exclusion of any other candidate. + +XVIII. (1) When the number of continuing candidates is reduced to the +number of vacancies remaining unfilled, the continuing candidates shall +be declared elected. + +(2) When only one vacancy remains unfilled and the value of the votes of +some one continuing candidate exceeds the total value of all the votes +of the other continuing candidates, together with any surplus not +transferred, that candidate shall be declared elected. + +(3) When only one vacancy remains unfilled and there are only two +continuing candidates, and those two candidates have each the same value +of votes and no surplus remains capable of transfer, one candidate shall +be declared excluded under the next succeeding regulation, and the other +declared elected. + +XIX. If when there is more than one surplus to distribute, two or more +surpluses are equal, or if at any time it become necessary to exclude a +candidate and two or more candidates have the same value of votes and +are lowest on the poll, regard shall be had to the original votes of +each candidate, and the candidate for whom fewest original votes are +recorded shall have his surplus first distributed or shall be first +excluded as the case may be. If the values of their original votes are +equal the returning officer shall decide by lot which candidate shall +have his surplus distributed or be excluded. + + +ANNEXURE A + +FORM OF FRONT OF BALLOT PAPER + +___________________________________ + | | +_Counterfoil_ | Order of | Names of Candidates. +_No._........ |Preference | + | | +_________________ |___________|________ + | | + | | JOHN BROWN + | | + | | Address............................ +_The counterfoil_ |___________|______________ +_must show_ | | +_the number_ | | JAMES THOMSON +_corresponding to_| | +_that on the back_| | Address............................ +_of the ballot_ |___________|______________ +_paper. _ | | + | | ALFRED JAMES + | | + | | Address............................ + |___________|_____________ + | | + | | HENRY JONES + | | + | | Address............................ + |___________|______________ + | | + | | ISAAC LEVY + | | + | | Address............................ + |___________|______________ + | | + | | PAUL MAYNARD + | | + | | Address............................ + |___________|_______________ + | | + | | JOHANNES OOSTHUIZEN + | | + | | Address............................ + |___________|______________ + | | + | | HERBERT PAIN + | | + | | Address............................ + |___________|_______________ + | | + | | GEORGE ROBINSON + | | + | | Address............................ + |___________|_______________ + | | + | | JACOBUS SMIT + | | + | | Address............................ + |___________|_______________ + | | + | | PETRUS VAN DER SPUY + | | + | | Address............................ + |___________|______________ + +_Instructions to Members_ + +[_Printed below the List of Candidates on the Ballot Paper shown on +opposite page_ + +A. Each member has one vote, and one vote only. + +B. The member votes-- + +(_a_) By placing the figure "1" opposite the name of the candidate he +likes best. + +He is also invited to place + +(_b_) The figure "2" opposite the name of his second choice. + +(_c_) The figure "3" opposite the name of his third choice, and so on, +numbering as many candidates as he pleases in order of his preference. +The number of preferences is not necessarily restricted to the number of +vacancies. + +_N.B._--The vote will be spoilt if the figure "1" is placed opposite the +name of more than one candidate. + +[A number is printed on the back of the ballot paper corresponding with +that on the counterfoil.] + + +ANNEXURE C + +ILLUSTRATIVE ELECTION + +_Example of an Election conducted on the system of the single +transferable vote in accordance with the preceding regulations_ + +_Reg. IX._ + +Assuming that there are eight members to be elected, sixteen candidates, +and eighty-four electors. + +The valid ballot papers are arranged in separate parcels according to +the first preference recorded for each candidate, and the papers in each +parcel counted. Let it be assumed that the result is as follows:-- + +A 3 J 4 +B 13 K 4 +C 4 L 3 +D 2 M 4 +E 19 N 4 +F 5 O 3 +G 5 P 2 +H 3 -- +I 6 84 + + +_Reg. X._ + +Each valid ballot paper is deemed to be of the value of one hundred, and +the values of the votes obtained by the respective candidates are as +shown in the first column of the result sheet. + +_Reg. XI._ + +The value of all the papers are added together and the total, 8400, is +divided by nine (_i.e._ the number which exceeds by one the number of +vacancies to be filled), and 934 (_i.e._ the quotient, 933, increased by +one) is the number sufficient to secure the return of a member, and is +called the quota. The operation may be shown thus:-- Quota = 8400/9 + 1 += 933 + 1 = 934. + +_Reg. XIII_. (1).] + +The candidates B and E, the values of whose votes exceed the quota, are +declared elected. + +_Reg. XIII_. (3). _Transfer of surplus_.] + +As the values of the papers in the parcels of B and E exceed the quota, +the surplus of each candidate must be transferred. B's surplus is 366 +(_i.e._ 1300 less 934), and E's surplus is 966 (_i.e._ 1900 less 934). + +_Reg. XIV_. (2).] + +The largest surplus, that of E, is dealt with first. + +_Reg. XIV_. (4)(_a_).] + +The surplus arises from original votes, and therefore the whole of E's +papers are divided into sub-parcels according to the next preferences +recorded thereon, a separate parcel of the exhausted papers being also +made. Let it be assumed that the result is as follows: + +G is marked as next available preference on 10 papers. +H " " 5 " +L " " 3 " + -- + Total of unexhausted papers 18 + No. of exhausted papers 1 + -- + Total of papers 19 + + +_Reg. XIV_. (4)(_b_).] + +The values of the papers in the sub-parcels are as follows:-- + +G 1,000 +H 500 +L 300 + ----- +Total value of unexhausted papers 1,800 +Value of exhausted papers 100 + ----- +Total value 1,900 + +_Reg. XIV_. (4)(_d_).] + +The value of the unexhausted papers is 1800, and is greater than the +surplus. This surplus is therefore transferred as follows:--All the +papers unexhausted are transferred, but at a reduced value, which is +ascertained by dividing the surplus by the number of unexhausted papers. +The reduced value of all the unexhausted papers, when added together, +with the addition of any value lost as the result of the neglect of +fractions, equals the surplus. In this case the new value of each paper +transferred is 966 (the surplus)/ 18 (the number of unexhausted papers) += 53, the residue of the value, 47, being required by E for the purpose +of constituting his quota. + +The values of the sub-parcels transferred are:-- + +G = 530 (_i.e._ 10 papers at the value of 53) +H = 265 (_i.e._ 5 " " ) +L = 159 (_i.e._ 3 " " ) + +These operations can be shown on a transfer sheet as follows: + +TRANSFER SHEET + +Value of surplus (E's) to be transferred 966 +No. of papers in E's parcel 19 +Value of each paper in parcel 100 +No. of unexhausted papers 18 +Value of unexhausted papers 1,800 + +New value of each paper transferred = + +Surplus 966 / No. of unexhausted papers 18 = 53 + +Names of Candidates marked as the No. of Papers Value of Sub-parcel + next available Preference. to be to be + Transferred Transferred + G 10 530 + H 5 265 + L 3 159 + + Totals 18 954 + +No. of exhausted papers 1 --- +Loss of value owing to neglect of fractions -- 12 + + Totals 19 966 + +The values of the sub-parcels are added to the values of the votes +already credited to the candidates G, H, L. This operation is shown on +the result sheet. + +As a result of this operation G's total is brought above the quota, and +he is declared elected. + +_Reg. XIV_. (2).] + +The next largest surplus, that of B, viz. 366, is then transferred, the +operations being similar to those described in the transfer of E's +surplus. Assume that there are no unexhausted papers. The new value is +therefore 366 / 13 or 28. The surplus is distributed according to next +preferences, as follows: + + A = (7 x 28) = 196 + C = (6 x 28) = 168 +Value lost owing to +neglect of fractions 2 + ---- + Total ... 366 + +_Reg XIV. (5)._ + +G's surplus has now to be transferred, only the sub-parcel last +transferred being re-examined. The details are as follows:-- + +Value of G's surplus 96 +No. of papers in sub-parcel 10 +Value of each paper therein 53 +No. of unexhausted papers 10 +Value of unexhausted papers 530 + +New value of each paper transferred = 96/10 = 9 + +The result of the distribution is shown on the result sheet, five papers +of the value of nine each being transferred to A, and five of the same +value to O. + +_Reg. XV. (1)._ + +There being no further surplus, the candidate lowest on the poll has now +to be excluded. D and P both have 200. + +_Reg. XIX._ + +The returning officer casts lots, and P is chosen to be excluded. + +_Reg. XV. (1)._ + +Being original votes the two papers are transferred at the value of 100 +each, as shown in the result sheet, 100 going to L and 100 to N. D, now +being lowest, is then excluded in the same way, 100 going to H and 100 +to J, all transfers being made to the next preference as marked by +the elector. + +O now being lowest with 345, is next excluded. + +_Reg. XV. (2)._ + +300 being the value of original votes, the three corresponding papers +are transferred at the value of 100 each to K. + +_Reg. XV. (3)._ + +45 being the value of transferred votes, the five corresponding papers +are transferred at the value of 9 each to N. + +M is then excluded; his papers represent original votes and are +transferred to F. J is then excluded; of the 500 credited to him, 400 +come from original and 100 from transferred papers, but the value of the +latter being 100, all five papers are transferred at that value, 300 +going to I and 200 to H. + +A is then excluded, the value of his votes being as follows:-- + + Original 300 + Transferred 196 + " 45 + +The 300 original go to L. + +The 196 transferred representing 7 papers of the value of 28 each, and +the 45 representing 5 papers of the value of 9 each, all go to N. + +C is then excluded, the value of his votes being as follows:-- + + Original 400 + Transferred 168 + +The original go 300 to K and 100 to I, and the transferred go 84 to L +and 84 to H. + +H, I, K, and L now exceed the quota, and are declared elected. Seven +seats are now filled. + +_Reg. XIX._ + +I and K now both have a surplus of 66, which surpluses have to be +transferred. I having had 600 from original votes, and K 400, K's +surplus is first distributed. + +_Reg. XIV. (5)._ + +The last sub-parcel of the value of 300 is dealt with, and the whole +surplus 66 goes to F, he being the next preference on all three papers. + +F then has the quota and is declared elected. The election is now +completed, the full details being shown on the accompanying +result sheet. + +RESULT SHEET + Number of Votes 84 Number of Members to Elect 8 + 8,400 + Value of Votes 8,400 Quota ----- + 1 = 934 + 9 + + Column headings: + 1: Names of Candidates + 2: Value of Votes at 1st Count. + 3: Distribution of E's Surplus. + 4: Result. + 5: Distribution of B's Surplus. + 6: Result. + 7: Distribution of G's Surplus. + 8: Result. + 9: Distribution of P's and D's Votes. + 10: Result. + 11: Distribution of O's and M's Votes. + 12: Result. + 13: Distribution of J's and A's Votes. + 14: Result. + 15: Distribution of C's Votes. + 16: Result. + 17: Distribution of K's Surplus. + 18: Result. (E: Elected, NE: Not elected) + +1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 +A 300 300+196=496+45=451 541 541-541 -- -- -- +B 1,300 1,300-366=934 934 934 934 934 934 934 E +C 400 400+168=568 568 568 568 568-568 -- -- +D 200 200 200 200-200 -- -- -- -- -- +E 1,900-966=934 934 934 934 934 934 934 934 E +F 500 500 500 500 500+400=900 900 900+66=966 E +G 500+530=1,030 1,030-96=934 934 934 934 934 934 E +H 300+265= 565 565 565+100=665 665+200=865 +84= 949 949 E +I 600 600 600 600 600 600+300=900+100=1,000 1,000 E +J 400 400 400 400+100=500 500-500 -- -- - +K 400 400 400 400 400+300=700 700+300=1,000-66=934 E +L 300+159= 459 459 459+100=559 -- 559+300=859 +84= 943 934 E +M 400 400 400 400 400 400-400 -- -- -- +N 400 400 400 400+100=500 +45=545+241=786 786 786NE +O 300 300 300+45=345 345-345 -- -- -- -- +P 200 200 200 200-200 -- -- -- -- -- +Value of exhausted papers + +Loss of value owing to neglect of fractions + +12 = 12 +2= 14 +6= 20 -- 20 - 20 -- 20 -- 20 -- 20 + +Totals + 8,400 8,400 8,400 8,400 8,400 8,400 8,400 8,400 8,400 + + +[Footnote 1: The fact that a voter has not marked every preference +correctly does not invalidate the whole of his preferences. His paper is +only treated as exhausted when the wrongly marked preference is reached. + +The following are examples:-- + + { A 1 { A 1 + { B 2 { B 2 + (1) { C 3 (2) { C 3 + { D 3 { D 5 + { E 4 { E 6 + { F - + +In case (1) the preferences for A and B would be valid. If the third +preference were reached the paper would be treated as exhausted, as it +would be impossible to say for which candidate the voter really intended +to give his third preference. In case (2) the preferences for A, B and C +would be valid, but not the later ones, whether D had been elected or +excluded or was still a continuing candidate. It is possible that the +voter meant to give a fourth preference for some other candidate, _e.g._ +F, but omitted to do so. It would not be possible to treat 5 as being +meant to be 4.] + +[Footnote 2: In small elections certain difficulties arise which are not +present in the case of large elections. + +(_a_) The quota becomes too large if calculated in the ordinary way. +Assume that 27 electors are to elect 8 candidates. Then the quota is +27/(8+1) + 1 = 4. But 8 x 4 = 32. + +There are not enough quotas to go round and difficulties would arise. +The addition of 1 in the case of so small a number makes the quota +disproportionately big. For this reason it is advisable to treat each +paper as of the value of one hundred. In the case of the Transvaal the +quota instead of being 84/(8+1) + 1 = 10 will be 8400/(8+1) + 1 = 934. + +(_b_) The disregard of fractions in the case of small numbers may mean +the waste of several votes. Take the following example:-- + +Seat to be filled, 8 +Electors 25 +Quota = 25/(8+1) + 1 = 3 + + First Count +A 10 +B 3 +C 3 +D +E 2 +F 1 +G 1 +H 1 +I 1 +J 1 + +A having 10 has a surplus of 7, which has to be distributed. According +to the usual rule A's 10 votes are examined and the surplus is +distributed in proportion to the next preferences. The preferences are +as follows:-- + +For B....... 5 + " C....... 2 + " F....... 1 + " G....... 1 + " H....... 1 + +Each of these numbers must be multiplied by 7/10, _i.e._ the surplus +over the number of unexhausted votes, and the following votes are +transferred:-- + +To B.......3-1/2 + " C.......1-2/5 + " F.......7/10 + " G.......7/10 + " H.......7/10 + +The fractions which are ignored amount to 3 votes, which are +consequently wasted. This difficulty is overcome by increasing the value +of the papers to one hundred, or in other words by working out the +results to two places of decimals. + +(c) In a small election at the several stages there may be two or more +candidates at the bottom with an equal number of votes. Resort has to be +had to lot to decide which is to be eliminated. If the papers are raised +to the value of one hundred this difficulty is much less likely to occur +after the first count.] + + +APPENDIX X + +LIST SYSTEM: BILL PRESENTED TO THE FRENCH CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES, 1907 + +The _Commission du Suffrage Universel_, a committee of the Chamber of +Deputies, made a careful comparison of the various Bills which had been +submitted to the Chamber for the purpose of securing the proportional +representation of the electors. The Commission in their report,[1] which +was issued in March 1907, recommended the adoption of the Bill, of which +a free translation is given below. + +The essential features of this measure, which has received the support +of the leading advocates of proportional representation, are: (1) The +allotment of seats to lists in accordance with the d'Hondt, or Belgian +rule (Art. 8); (2) the use of the cumulative vote in determining the +relative position of candidates (Art. 6). The elector is given as many +votes as there are members to be elected, which he may cumulate upon any +one or distribute among several candidates. The elector is not +restricted in his choice of candidates to any one list. + +_Text of the Bill_ + +(1) Members of the Chamber of Deputies shall be elected on the list +system (_scrutin de liste_) in accordance with the scheme of +proportional representation hereinafter stated. There shall be no +second ballot. + +(2) Each department shall elect one deputy for every 75,000 +inhabitants. A remainder of 25,000, or more, inhabitants shall be +reckoned as 75,000. + +(3) A department shall form a single constituency, provided that where a +department would elect more than ten deputies, it shall be divided into +two or more constituencies, as determined by law hereafter. + +(4) A "list" is constituted by a group of candidates who (after making +the declaration prescribed by Article 2 of the Law of 17 July 1889) +jointly appeal for the support of the electors. + +A list shall not include a larger number of names than there are +deputies to be elected in the constituency, but it may contain a smaller +number. An independent candidate shall be reckoned as a distinct list. + +(5) Each list shall be delivered at the prefecture at any time after the +commencement of the electoral period, and at the latest ten clear days +before polling day. It shall be registered and numbered at the +prefecture, and a receipt for it shall be given to each candidate. + +The name of a candidate shall not be registered unless he has signed the +list. A list with more candidates than there are deputies to be elected +shall not be accepted for registration. + +A candidate whose name appears on one list shall not be entered on +another unless he has notified the prefecture by writing under his hand, +duly attested, that he retires from the former list, in which case his +name shall be at once removed from the former list. + +Twenty-four hours before the opening of the poll the prefect shall cause +each registered list with the number thereto given to be posted on the +doors of the polling station. + +(6) An elector has as many votes as there are deputies to be elected in +his constituency. + +He may give all or any of his votes to the same candidate. + +The reports of the local returning officer at each polling station shall +state the number of votes obtained by each candidate. (7) A Central +Board (_Commission de recensement_) shall collect the reports of the +local returning officers, and ascertain the electoral total of each +list, and allot the seats among the lists in proportion thereto. + +The electoral total of a list is the sum of the votes given to the +candidates whose names appear thereon. + +(8) For the purpose of allotting the seats, each electoral total shall +be divided by the figures 1, 2, 3, 4, and so on up to the number of +vacancies, and as many of the resulting quotients as there are vacancies +shall be arranged in order of size, beginning with the largest. The +smallest of these quotients so arranged, corresponding to the last seat +to be filled, shall be used as the common divisor, and to every list +shall be allotted a number of deputies equal to the number of times +which its electoral total contains the common divisor. + +(9) Within each list the seats shall be assigned to the candidates who +have the largest numbers of votes; in case of an equality of votes, the +eldest candidate shall be elected. + +(10) If two or more lists have an equal right to a seat, it shall be +allotted as between the competing candidates to that one who has +received the greater number of votes, and if those votes are equal the +eldest candidate shall be elected. + +(11) The unelected candidates of each list with the greatest number of +votes shall be classed as first, second, and third substitutes +(suppléants), and so on. + +If any vacancy shall occur by death, resignation, or otherwise, the +substitutes shall be summoned in their classified order to fill the +places of the elected members of the list to which they are attached, +provided that at the time of summons they are in the enjoyment of their +political rights. + +(12) If more than six months before the end of a Parliament, the +representation of a constituency is diminished by one-fourth and there +is no substitute who can be declared elected, bye-elections to fill the +vacant seats shall be held in that constituency. (13) The present law +shall extend to Algeria. Nothing in this law shall affect the +representation of the Colonies. + +NOTE.--Since the introduction of this Bill several other proposals have +been considered by the _Commission du Suffrage Universel._ The draft +Bill proposed in the last report (March 1911) is not based so strictly +upon proportional principles as the measure given above. + +The points of difference may be summarised as follows:-- + +(_a_) The use of the cumulative vote is retained (Art. 6), but there is +a change in the method of allotting seats to various lists (Art. 8). The +new method of allotment is as follows: an "electoral quotient" is found +by dividing the number of voters by the number of vacancies, and as many +seats are allotted to each list as the number of voters supporting a +list contains this quotient. Since each voter has as many votes as there +are seats to be filled, the number of voters supporting a list is +determined arbitrarily by dividing the total number of votes cast for +the list by the number of vacancies. + +If there are any seats not allotted by this distribution they are +awarded to any list which obtains an absolute majority of the votes. +Should no party obtain an absolute majority, the remaining seats are +allotted to the various lists in accordance with the method described in +the succeeding Appendix. This method leads to the same distribution of +seats as the d'Hondt rule. + +(b) The Bill recognises an important new principle in permitting +_apparentement des listes_. Parties may unite for the purpose of +presenting lists in combination, and the lists so presented are treated +for the purpose of the allotment of seats as if they emanated from one +party. This is an elastic form of the Belgian "cartel," allowing parties +to act together without loss of individuality. The seats won by any such +cartel are allotted to the various lists composing the cartel in +accordance with the second of the methods described in the previous +paragraph. + + +[Footnote 1: _Chambre des Deputés, Neuvième Legislature:_ 1907, No. 883. +See note as to further report, March 1911, at end of Bill.] + + +APPENDIX XI + +LIST SYSTEM: LAW ADOPTED BY THE CANTON OF BÂLE TOWN, 1905 + +The special features of the following law are as follows:-- + +(1) The partial use of the cumulative vote in determining the relative +position of candidates (sec. 9). + +(2) The allotment of seats to lists in accordance with the rule +formulated by Professor Hagenbach-Bischoff (sec. 13). + +The provisions for bye-elections are contained in sections 17 to 20. + +(1) The elector is supplied three days before the election with copies +of the various party lists; he is given as many votes as there are +members to be elected; he may strike out any names and insert others in +any of the lists supplied to him, or compose his own list; he may repeat +the name of the same candidate three times, but no more; but in no case +may the total number of names exceed the number of members to +be elected. + +(2) The Hagenbach-Bischoff rule, like the d'Hondt rule, aims at finding +an electoral quotient which will allow all the seats to be allotted to +the different parties without remainder. In the former rule this is +found by trial. The following example explains its mechanism:-- + +Suppose, in an election for sixteen seats, five lists have obtained +votes as follows:-- + +List. Votes. +A 5,537 +B 9,507 +C 3,885 +D 4,769 +E 377 + ------- +Total 24,075 + +The first quota is ascertained as prescribed in section 11. The number +of votes is divided by one more than the number of vacancies, and the +result is increased by one, thus:-- + +24075/(16+1) + 1 = 1417 + +It will be observed that this quota is identical with the Droop quota of +the single transferable vote system. The totals obtained by each list +are divided by this quota, as many representatives being allotted to +each list as the list contains the quota. Remainders are ignored. + +Lists. Votes. Quota. Representatives. + A 5,537 ÷ 1,417 3 + B 9,507 ÷ 1,417 6 + C 3,885 ÷ 1,417 2 + D 4,769 ÷ 1,417 3 + E 377 ÷ 1,417 0 + -- + Total 14 + +Only fourteen out of sixteen seats have been allotted in this operation. +It is obvious that the quota is too large, and a smaller quota is +ascertained in the following way. The number of votes for each list is +divided by one more than the number of members already assigned to such +list, and the first seat still to be disposed of is allotted to that +list which has the largest quotient. The following table shows the +process:-- + + Lists. Votes. Quotient. Representatives. + A 5,537 ÷ 4 1,384 4 + B 9,507 ÷ 7 1,358 6 + C 3,885 ÷ 3 1,295 2 + D 4,769 ÷ 4 1,192 3 + E 377 ÷ 1 377 0 + -- + Total 15 + +The largest quotient is 1384, and this figure, which is taken as the new +quota, allows of the allotment of fifteen seats. There still remains one +seat to be disposed of, and the process just described is again +repeated, as shown in the following table:-- + +Lists. Votes. Quotient. Representatives. + A 5,537 ÷ 5 1,107 4 + B 9,507 ÷ 7 1,358 7 + C 3,885 ÷ 3 1,295 2 + D 4,769 ÷ 4 1,192 3 + E 377 ÷ 1 377 0 + -- + 16 + +On this occasion all sixteen seats are allotted, the final quota being +1358. + +The results obtained by the Hagenbach-Bischoff method are identical with +those obtained by the d'Hondt rule. The operations required in the +preceding example for the allotment of seats by the latter rule are as +follows:-- + +List totals +divided by A B C D E + 1 5,537 9,507 3,885 4,769 377 + 2 2,768 4,753 1,942 2,384 -- + 3 1,845 3,169 1,295 1,589 -- + 4 1,384 2,376 971 1,192 -- + 5 1,107 1,901 -- -- -- + 6 -- 1,684 -- -- -- + 7 -- 1,358 -- -- -- + +The sixteen highest quotients arranged in order of magnitude are:-- + +9,507 (List B) 2,376 (List B) +5,537 (List A) 1,942 (List C) +4,769 (List D) 1,901 (List B) +4,753 (List B) 1,845 (List A) +3,885 (List C) 1,589 (List D) +3,169 (List B) 1,584 (List B) +2,768 (List A) 1,384 (List A) +2,384 (List D) 1,358 (List B) + +The lowest of these sixteen figures, viz. 1358, is the electoral +quotient, and agrees with the final quota furnished by the +Hagenbach-Bischoff rule. _Law for Elections to the Grand Council, on +the principle of Proportional Representation, 26 January 1905_ + +1. Nomination papers for the various electoral districts must be handed +in to the police department not later than three weeks before the day +fixed for the re-election of the Grand Council. + +They may contain the names of one or more persons eligible for election, +provided that the total number of names in any nomination paper is not +greater than the number of members which the electoral district in +question is entitled to elect; any name may appear more than once, but +not more than three times. + +2. Nomination papers for town districts must be signed by at least ten +qualified electors; those for country districts by at least three. An +elector may sign one, and only one, nomination paper, on each occasion, +in each electoral district. + +When handing in the nomination paper the signatories thereto must +designate one of their number to attend to any necessary formalities +with the police department in connexion therewith. + +3. The police department shall at once communicate with the candidates +nominated, and call upon them to declare within two days whether they +accept the candidature or not. + +If the person nominated declines to stand for election his nomination +shall be cancelled. + +4. No candidate may appear on more than one nomination paper. If +therefore any candidate be nominated in different electoral districts, +or on several nomination papers in the same district, the police +department shall, in informing him of the nominations, call upon him to +declare, within two days, under which nomination he wishes to stand, and +on receipt of his declaration shall strike his name off the other +nomination papers. + +If the candidate makes no declaration within the time fixed, the police +department shall decide by lot under which nomination he shall stand. + +5. The police department shall inform the representatives of the +nominators of the cancellings due to the refusal of the nominees to +accept nomination, or to the latter having been nominated more than +once, and shall allow the former a period of two days in which to make +further nominations. To these further nominations the declaration in +writing of the person nominated, accepting the candidature, must +be attached. + +If this declaration is not attached, or if the proposed candidate +already appears on another nomination, the supplementary nomination +shall be rejected. + +6. The final (definitive) nomination papers thus obtained shall be +called lists, and no further alterations may be made in them. The lists +shall each be printed on a separate sheet with the names of the +candidates in the order in which they appear on the nomination papers. +The lists shall also be provided with a number (in rotation) for each +electoral district, and if the proposers have given them any titles +these shall likewise be printed. + +If more than one list have the same title the police department shall +require the representatives of the nominators to make some distinction +between them. If this is not done within two days, these lists shall be +distinguished by further special numbers (in rotation). + +The different lists shall be printed on paper of the same size and the +same colour. + +7. At least three days before the election these lists shall be +delivered to each elector in an envelope, which shall at the same time +serve as a voucher of the elector's right to vote. In addition to the +printed lists, each voter shall receive a blank list containing no +names, but as many numbered lines as there are members to be elected +(free lists). + +The voucher shall take the place of the present admittance card. + +8. Electors must present themselves in person at the polling booth and +deliver the voucher to the polling officers. + +The latter shall retain the voucher, and in return give the elector an +official stamp. + +9. Each elector shall have as many votes as there are members of the +Grand Council to be elected in his district, and shall for that purpose +choose _one_ of the lists supplied to him. If he makes use of a printed +list he may strike out any names and insert any others. Every vote is +valid where the name of an eligible candidate is clearly given, and the +only restrictions are that the same name may not appear more than three +times, and that the total number of names may not exceed the number of +members to be elected. + +The voter may make the alterations he desires in the printed list +selected by him, or fill in the free list either at the polling booth or +before reaching it. + +The voter shall affix the official stamp supplied to him to the list he +has selected, and place the latter in the ballot box. + +10. At the close of the poll the presiding officer shall open the ballot +box and compare the number of voting papers therein with the number of +vouchers received and the number of official stamps issued. + +Only the official voting papers with stamps attached shall be valid. + +11. The polling officers shall then examine the valid voting papers and +ascertain by entering the votes on counting sheets how many votes each +name has received. + +If a voting paper contain more names than there are Councillors to be +elected for the electoral district, then the votes in excess at the +bottom of the list shall not be counted. + +If a voting paper contain fewer names than there are Councillors to be +elected in the district, then the number of votes not used shall be +ascertained and shall be added (as list votes) to the list chosen by the +elector, provided the latter has made use of a printed list. + +The number of votes for each list shall then be ascertained by adding +together the list votes and the vote given for individual candidates +on the list. + +If eligible persons not standing on any list receive votes, each of +these names shall be treated as a separate list. + +12. If no nominations have been handed in, those persons shall be +elected who receive most votes. + +In the event of equality of votes, the returning officer shall at once +decide the matter by casting lots. + +13. If one or more lists have been nominated, the vacancies on the Grand +Council shall be divided among the several lists in proportion to the +number of votes each list has received. The procedure shall be as +follows:-- + +The total number of the valid votes shall be divided by the number of +vacancies increased by one. + +The quotient thus obtained increased by one (but disregarding fractions) +shall be called the quota. + +To each list there shall be allotted as many members as the number of +times the quota is contained in the votes it receives. If the total +number of members thus obtained is less than the number to be elected, +the votes for each list shall be divided by one more than the number of +members already assigned to such list, and the first seat still to be +disposed of shall be allotted to that list which has the +largest quotient. + +The same procedure shall be repeated as long as any seats remain to be +disposed of. + +If two or more lists have the same claim to the last seat to be disposed +of (equality of quotient), that list shall always take precedence in +which the candidate who would be selected under the provisions of Clause +14 has received the largest number of votes. In case of equality of +votes the returning officer (_Wahl-bureau_) shall immediately decide the +question by casting lots. + +14. From each list those candidates (to the number allotted to the list) +shall be selected who have received the largest number of votes. +Equality of votes is decided by lot, to be drawn immediately by the +returning officer. + +15. If to one or several lists are allotted more seats than there are +names contained, all their candidates shall in the first place stand +elected. The surplus seats shall be divided among the remaining lists by +continuance of the procedure prescribed in Clause 13. + +16. After ascertaining the result of the election, the electoral office +shall draw up a report stating the number of the voting vouchers +received, of the official stamps issued, and of the voting papers handed +in, the number of the votes received for each name and for each list, +arranged according to the lists, particulars of the allotment of seats +and the names of the elected members. + +Mention shall also be made of any irregularities which have occurred. + +These reports shall be signed by all the electoral officers, and shall +then be forwarded, together with the voting vouchers received, the +unused official stamps, the voting papers and the unissued papers, to +the Government Council. + +The result of the election shall be affixed conspicuously outside the +Chief Polling Booth. + +The Polling Officers shall notify each elected candidate of his election +in writing. + +17. An elected candidate who did not appear on any of the nominations +put in may refuse to accept his election within one week by giving +written notice to the Government Council. + +The Government Council shall then immediately order a bye-election. + +18. Those elected candidates whose election is rendered void owing to +their simultaneously having been elected as members of the Government +Council shall be immediately replaced by the Government Council by the +non-elected candidates on the same list who have received most votes. + +If there are none, the vacant seats on the Great Council shall +immediately be filled by supplementary elections, which shall also serve +to fill any seats, if any rendered vacant under Clause 17. + +19. Members retiring from the Great Council during their period of +office shall be replaced immediately by the Government Council by the +non-elected candidates on the same list who have received most votes. +If there are none, supplementary elections shall take place in the first +half of the next following month of May. + +20. The same regulations shall serve for supplementary elections as for +general elections. + +21. The provisions of this law shall come into operation for the first +time in the general election for the Grand Council which takes place in +the year 1905. + +The provisions of earlier laws and resolutions of the Grand Council +referring to elections to the Grand Council are hereby repealed, in so +far as they are contrary to this law. + + + + +INDEX + +(The letter _f_ after a number signifies 'and page following.' The +letter _n_ signifies "note.") + +Accuracy of proportional systems, +Acton, Lord, +Acts-- +Education (1867), +Port of London (1908), +Queensland Electoral (1905), +Redistribution (1885), +South Africa (1909), +Tasmanian Electoral (1896), +Tasmanian Electoral (1907), +Transvaal Municipal (1909), +Advantages of proportional representation, +Advantages of single transferable vote. +_See_ Single transferable vote +Aldermen, election of, +Allotment of seats to parties, +Alternative vote, +Andrae, M., +Anson, Sir William R., Bart., +Asquith, Rt. Hon. H. H., +Australia, +Austria, +Avebury, Rt. Hon. Lord, + +Bâle, +Balfour, Rt. Hon. A. J., +Ballot papers, copies of, +Ballots, second, +Battersea Borough Council, +Bavaria, +Beale, Mr. W. Phipson, +Belgian, or d'Hondt system, +Belgium, +Bernstein, Dr. Ed., +Bills-- + Alternative Vote (1908, 1910), + Electoral Reform (1867), + Electoral Reform (1884), + Electoral Reform (France), + Irish Council (1907), + Municipal Representation + Parliamentary Representation (1854), + Plural Voting (1907), + Redistribution (1905), + Reform (1832), + Representation of the People (1867), +Birmingham, +Birrell, Rt. Hon. Augustine, +Blind, Karl, +Block vote, +Borough Councils, +Boundaries, importance of, +Bribery, +Bright, John, +Brown, Prof. Jethro, +Brussels, +Burke, Edmund, +Bye-elections, + +Cairns, Lord, +Campbell-Bannerman, Sir Henry, +Canada, +Cape Colony Legislative Council, +Carlskrona election, +Cartel, +_Case de tête_, +Cecil, Lord Hugh, +Cecil, Lord Robert, +Chance, effect of, +Churchill, Rt. Hon. Winston S., +Clark, Justice, +Commons, Prof. J. R., +_Commission du Suffrage Universel_, +Constituencies, size of, +Constitutional reform, +Corbett, Mr. J. Rooke, +Cost of elections, +Courtney of Penwith, Rt. Hon. Lord, +Criticisms of single transferable vote, +Cross voting, +Cumulative vote, + +d'Alviella, Count Goblet, +Deakin, Mr. Alfred, +Defects of majority systems, +Denmark, +d'Hondt system, +Dicey, Prof. A. V., +Dilke, Sir Charles, +Dobbs, Mr. Archibald E., +Droop, H. R., + +Edinburgh, +Education Act (1867), +"Effective voting," +Elections, General, + _See also_ Statistics +Elections, procedure at, +Elector, freedom of, +Elector's task, + _See also_ Voting +Electoral Reform Bill (1884), +Electoral Reform Bill (1867), +Electoral systems, Royal Commission on. + _See_ Royal Commission +Elimination of lowest candidate, +Executive under proportional representation, + +Faddists, +Fairness of proportional systems, +Federal Home Rule, +Finland, +France, +Franchise, +Freedom of elector, +French Electoral Reform Bill, + +Geneva, +Germany, +Gerrymander, +Ghent, +Gladstone, W. E., +Glasgow, +Gove method, +Gregory method, +Grey, Earl, +Group formation, +Group representation, +Gulland, Mr. J. W., +Guyot, M. Yves, + +Hagenbach-Bischoff, Prof., +Hare, Thomas, +Hare-Clark method, +Hayashida, Mr. Kametaro, +Holland, +Home Rule, +House of Commons, +House of Commons committees, +House of Lords, +House of Lords, Select Committee on its Reform, +House of Lords, Select Committee on Municipal Representation Bill, + +Illinois, +Imperial Parliament, +Independents, the fate of, +India, +Ireland, +Irish Council Bill (1907), +Italy, + +Japan, +Jarrow, +Jaurès, M. Jean, +Jenks, Prof. E., +Johannesburg, + +Labour Councils, Canadian, +Labour Party, +Lachapelle, M. Georges, +Late preferences, effect of, +Leeds, +Limited vote, +List systems, +Localities, representation of, +Lochee of Gowrie, Rt. Hon. Lord, +London, +London Borough Councils, +London County Council, +Lubbock, Sir John (Lord Avebury), + + +Macdonald, Mr. J. Ramsay, +Majorities, exaggeration of. + _See also_ Statistics, +Majorities, small, +Majorities, under-representation of, +Majority systems, +Manchester, +Marshall, J. Garth, +Mill, John Stuart, +Milner, Lord, +Miners' Association, Northumberland, +Minorities, disfranchisement of, +Minorities, representation of, +Model elections, +Monk, Mr. F. D., 122, 247 +Morley of Blackburn, Rt. Hon. Lord, +Muir, Prof. Ramsay, +Municipal elections, +Municipal Representation Bill (1907), + +Nanson, Prof. E. J., +Naville, Ernest, +New Zealand, +Nomination of public bodies, +Northumberland Miners' Association, + +Objections to proportional representation, +Orange Free State, +Oregon, +Organisation of elections, + +_Panachage_, +Parliamentary Representation Bill (1854), +Party exclusiveness, +Party government, +Party organisation, +Peers, Scottish Representative, +Plural Voting Bill (1907), +Port of London Act (1908), +Powell, Mr. Ellis T., +Practicability of single transferable vote, +Praed, Mackworth, +Preferences, comparative efficiency of different, +Present systems, defects of, +Pretoria, Proportional Representation League (France), +Proportional Representation Society, +Provincial Councils, South Africa, + +Queensland Electoral Act (1906), +Quota, the, + +Redistribution, +Redistribution Act (1885), +Redistribution Bill (1905), +Referendum, +Reform Bill (1832), +Representation of the people (1867), +Result sheet, +Returning officer, duty of, +Robertson, Mr. John M., +Royal Commission on Electoral Systems, +Russell, Lord John, + +Saxony, +School Board elections, +Scotland, +Scottish Grand Committee, +_Scrutin de liste_, +Seats, allotment to parties, +Second ballot, +Selection of successful candidate in a list, +Senates-- + Australia, + Canada, + South Africa, + Sheffield, +Single transferable vote-- + Advantages, + _See also_ Advantages of proportional representation + Application, + Criticisms, + Mechanism, +Single vote, +Smith, Rt. Hon. J. Parker, +Social Democratic Party (Germany), +Solothurn, +South Africa, +South Africa Act (1909), +Spence, Catherine Helen, +Spoilt ballot papers, +Statistics of elections-- + America, + Australia, + Belgium, + Finland, + Germany, + Japan, + South Africa, + Sweden, + United Kingdom, +_Suppléants,_ +Surplus votes, transfer of, +Sweden, +Switzerland, +Systems, majority. + _See_ Present systems +Systems, proportional. + _See_ Bâle, Belgium, Finland, France, Japan, Sweden, and + Single transferable vote + +Tasmania, +Tasmanian Electoral Act (1896), +Tasmanian Electoral Act (1907), +Three-cornered contests, +Ticino, +Toronto, +Trades Unions, +Transfer of surplus votes, +Transfer sheet, +Transvaal, +Transvaal Municipal Act (1909), +Two-party system, + +Ulster, +United States, + +Vandervelde, M., +Vivian, Mr. Henry, +Voting, modes of, + +Wales, +Wallas, Mr. Graham, +Warwickshire, +Whips in House of Commons, + _See also_ Party organisation +White, Mr. Dundas, +Williams, Mr. Aneurin, +Würtemberg, + + + + + +End of Project Gutenberg's Proportional Representation, by John H. 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