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+The Project Gutenberg Etext of The Ethics, by Benedict de Spinoza
+This is Part I
+#1 in our series by Spinoza
+
+Translated by R. H. M. Elwes
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+The Ethics [Part I]
+
+(Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata)
+
+by Benedict de Spinoza
+
+Translated by R. H. M. Elwes
+
+May, 1997  [Etext #919]
+
+
+The Project Gutenberg Etext of The Ethics, by Benedict de Spinoza
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+
+Benedict de Spinoza, THE ETHICS
+(Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata)
+
+Translated by R. H. M. Elwes
+
+
+
+
+PART I:  CONCERNING GOD.
+
+
+DEFINITIONS.
+
+I.  By that which is 'self-caused' I mean that of which the
+essence involves existence, or that of which the nature is only
+conceivable as existent.
+
+II.  A thing is called 'finite after its kind' when it can be
+limited by another thing of the same nature; for instance, a body
+is called finite because we always conceive another greater body.
+So, also, a thought is limited by another thought, but a body is
+not limited by thought, nor a thought by body.
+
+III.  By 'substance' I mean that which is in itself, and is
+conceived through itself:  in other words, that of which a
+conception can be formed independently of any other conception.
+
+IV.  By 'attribute' I mean that which the intellect perceives as
+constituting the essence of substance.
+
+V.  By 'mode' I mean the modifications ("affectiones") of
+substance, or that which exists in, and is conceived through,
+something other than itself.
+
+VI.  By 'God' I mean a being absolutely infinite--that is, a
+substance consisting in infinite attributes, of which each
+expresses eternal and infinite essentiality.
+
+>>>>>Explanation--I say absolutely infinite, not infinite after
+its kind:  for, of a thing infinite only after its kind, infinite
+attributes may be denied; but that which is absolutely infinite,
+contains in its essence whatever expresses reality, and involves
+no negation.
+
+VII.  That thing is called 'free,' which exists solely by the
+necessity of its own nature, and of which the action is
+determined by itself alone.  On the other hand, that thing is
+necessary, or rather constrained, which is determined by
+something external to itself to a fixed and definite method of
+existence or action.
+
+VIII.  By 'eternity' I mean existence itself, in so far as it is
+conceived necessarily to follow solely from the definition of
+that which is eternal.
+
+>>>>>Explanation--Existence of this kind is conceived as an
+eternal truth, like the essence of a thing and, therefore,
+cannot be explained by means of continuance or time, though
+continuance may be conceived without a beginning or end.
+
+ AXIOMS. I.  Everything which exists, exists either in itself or
+in something else.
+
+II.  That which cannot be conceived through anything else must be
+conceived through itself.
+
+III.  From a given definite cause an effect necessarily follows;
+and, on the other hand, if no definite cause be granted, it is
+impossible that an effect can follow.
+
+IV.  The knowledge of an effect depends on and involves the
+knowledge of a cause.
+
+V.  Things which have nothing in common cannot be understood, the
+one by means of the other; the conception of one does not involve
+the conception of the other.
+
+VI.  A true idea must correspond with its ideate or object.
+
+VII.  If a thing can be conceived as non-existing, its essence
+does not involve existence.
+
+ PROPOSITIONS. I.  Substance is by nature prior to its
+modifications.
+
+>>>>>Proof--This is clear from Deff. iii. and v.
+
+II.  Two substances, whose attributes are different, have
+nothing in common.
+
+>>>>>Proof--Also evident from Def. iii.  For each must exist in
+itself, and be conceived through itself; in other words, the
+conception of one does not imply the conception of the other.
+
+III.  Things which have nothing in common cannot be one the cause
+of the other.
+
+>>>>>Proof--If they have nothing in common, it follows that one
+cannot be apprehended  by means of the other (Ax. v.), and,
+therefore, one cannot be the cause of the other (Ax.  iv.).
+Q.E.D.
+
+IV.  Two or more distinct things are distinguished one from the
+other, either by the difference of the attributes of the
+substances, or by the difference of their modifications.
+
+>>>>>Proof--Everything which exists, exists either in itself or
+in something else (Ax. i.),-- that is (by Deff. iii. and v.),
+nothing is granted in addition to the understanding, except
+substance and its modifications.  Nothing is, therefore, given
+besides the understanding, by which several things may be
+distinguished one from the other, except the substances, or, in
+other words (see Ax. iv.), their attributes and modifications.
+Q.E.D.
+
+V.  There cannot exist in the universe two or more substances
+having the same nature or attribute.
+
+>>>>>Proof--If several distinct substances be granted, they must
+be distinguished one from the other, either by the difference of
+their attributes, or by the difference of their modifications
+(Prop. iv.).  If only by the difference of their attributes, it
+will be granted that there cannot be more than one with an
+identical attribute.  If by the difference of their
+modifications--as substance is naturally prior to its
+modifications (Prop. i.)--it follows that setting the
+modifications aside, and considering substance in itself, that is
+truly, (Deff. iii  and vi.), there cannot be conceived one
+substance different from another--that is (by Prop. iv.), there
+cannot be granted several substances, but one substance only.
+Q.E.D.
+
+VI.  One substance cannot be produced by another substance.
+
+>>>>>Proof--It is impossible that there should be in the universe
+two substances with an identical attribute, i.e. which have
+anything common to them both (Prop ii.), and,  therefore (Prop.
+iii.), one cannot be the cause of the other, neither can one be
+produced by the other.  Q.E.D.
+
+<<<<<VI.  Corollary--Hence it follows that a substance cannot be
+produced by anything external to itself.  For in the universe
+nothing is granted, save substances and their modifications (as
+appears from Ax. i. and Deff. iii. and v.).  Now (by the last
+Prop.) substance cannot be produced by another substance,
+therefore it cannot be produced by anything external to itself.
+Q.E.D.  This is shown still more readily by the absurdity of the
+contradictory.  For, if substance be produced by an external
+cause, the knowledge of it would depend on the knowledge of its
+cause (Ax. iv.), and (by Deff. iii.) it would itself not be
+substance.
+
+VII.  Existence belongs to the nature of substances.
+
+>>>>>Proof--Substance cannot be produced by anything external
+(Cor., Prop vi.), it must, therefore, be its own cause--that is,
+its essence necessarily involves existence, or existence belongs
+to its nature.
+
+VIII.  Every substance is necessarily infinite.
+
+>>>>>Proof--There can only be one substance with an identical
+attribute, and existence follows from its nature (Prop. vii.);
+its nature, therefore, involves existence, either as finite  or
+infinite.  It does not exist as finite, for (by Deff. ii.) it
+would then be limited by something else of the same kind, which
+would also necessarily exist (Prop. vii.); and there would be two
+substances with an identical attribute, which is absurd (Prop.
+v.).  It therefore exists as infinite.  Q.E.D.
+
+*****Note I.--As finite existence involves a partial negation,
+and infinite existence is the  absolute affirmation of the given
+nature, it follows (solely from Prop. vii.) that every substance
+is necessarily infinite.
+
+*****Note II.--No doubt it will be difficult for those who think
+about things loosely, and have not been accustomed to know them
+by their primary causes, to comprehend the  demonstration of
+Prop. vii.:  for such persons make no distinction between the
+modifications of substances and the substances themselves, and
+are ignorant of the manner in which things are produced; hence
+they may attribute to substances the beginning which they observe
+in natural objects.  Those who are ignorant of true causes make
+complete confusion--think that trees might talk just as well as
+men--that men might be formed from stones as well as from seed;
+and imagine that any form might be changed into any other. So,
+also, those who confuse the two natures, divine and human,
+readily attribute human  passions to the deity, especially so
+long as they do not know how passions originate in the mind.
+But, if people would consider the nature of substance, they would
+have no doubt about the truth of Prop. vii.  In fact, this
+proposition would be a universal axiom, and accounted a truism.
+For, by substance, would be understood that which is in itself,
+and is conceived through itself--that is, something of which the
+conception requires not the  conception of anything else; whereas
+modifications exist in something external to themselves, and a
+conception of them is formed by means of a conception of the
+things in  which they exist.  Therefore, we may have true ideas
+of non-existent modifications; for, although they may have no
+actual existence apart from the conceiving intellect, yet their
+essence is so involved in something external to themselves that
+they may through it be conceived.  Whereas the only truth
+substances can have, external to the intellect, must  consist in
+their existence, because they are conceived through themselves.
+Therefore, for a person to say that he has a clear and
+distinct--that is, a true--idea of a substance, but that he is
+not sure whether such substance exists, would be the same as if
+he said that he had a true idea, but was not sure whether or no
+it was false (a little consideration will make this plain); or if
+anyone affirmed that substance is created, it would be the same
+as saying that a false idea was true--in short, the height of
+absurdity.  It must, then, necessarily be admitted that the
+existence of substance as its essence is an eternal truth.  And
+we can hence conclude by another process of reasoning--that there
+is but one such substance.  I think that this may profitably be
+done at once; and, in order to proceed regularly with the
+demonstration, we must premise:--
+
++++++1.  The true definition of a thing neither involves nor
+expresses anything beyond the nature of the thing defined.  From
+this it follows that--
+
++++++2.  No definition implies or expresses a certain number of
+individuals, inasmuch as it expresses nothing beyond the nature
+of the thing defined.  For instance, the definition of a triangle
+expresses nothing beyond the actual nature of a triangle:  it
+does not imply any fixed number of triangles.
+
++++++3.  There is necessarily for each individual existent thing
+a cause why it should  exist.
+
++++++4.  This cause of existence must either be contained in the
+nature and definition of the thing defined, or must be postulated
+apart from such definition.
+
+It therefore follows that, if a given number of individual things
+exist in nature, there must be some cause for the existence of
+exactly that number, neither more nor less.  For example, if
+twenty men exist in the universe (for simplicity's sake, I will
+suppose them existing simultaneously, and to have had no
+predecessors), and we want to account for the existence of these
+twenty men, it will not be enough to show the cause of human
+existence in general; we must also show why there are exactly
+twenty men, neither more nor less:  for a cause must be assigned
+for the existence of each individual.  Now this cause cannot be
+contained in the actual nature of man, for the true definition of
+man does not involve any consideration of the number twenty.
+Consequently, the cause for the existence of these twenty men,
+and, consequently, of each of them, must necessarily be sought
+externally to each individual. Hence we may lay down the absolute
+rule, that everything which may consist of several individuals
+must have an external cause.  And, as it has been shown already
+that existence appertains to the nature of substance, existence
+must necessarily be included in its definition; and from its
+definition alone existence must be deducible.  But from its
+definition (as we have shown, Notes ii., iii.), we cannot infer
+the existence of several substances; therefore it follows that
+there is only one substance of the same nature.  Q.E.D.
+
+IX.  The more reality or being a thing has, the greater the
+number of its attributes (Def. iv.).
+
+X.  Each particular attribute of the one substance must be
+conceived through itself.
+
+>>>>>Proof--An attribute is that which the intellect perceives of
+substance, as  constituting its essence (Def. iv.), and,
+therefore, must be conceived through itself (Def. iii.).  Q.E.D.
+
+*****Note--It is thus evident that, though two attributes are, in
+fact, conceived as distinct--that is, one without the help of the
+other--yet we cannot, therefore, conclude  that they constitute
+two entities, or two different substances.  For it is the nature
+of substance that each of its attributes is conceived through
+itself, inasmuch as all the attributes it has have always existed
+simultaneously in it, and none could be produced by any other;
+but each expresses the reality or being of substance.  It is,
+then, far from an absurdity to ascribe several attributes to one
+substance:  for nothing in nature is more clear than that each
+and every entity must be conceived under some attribute, and that
+its  reality or being is in proportion to the number of its
+attributes expressing necessity or eternity and infinity.
+Consequently it is abundantly clear, that an absolutely infinite
+being must necessarily be defined as consisting in infinite
+attributes, each of which expresses a  certain eternal and
+infinite essence.
+
+If anyone now ask, by what sign shall he be able to distinguish
+different substances, let him read the following propositions,
+which show that there is but one substance in the universe, and
+that it is absolutely infinite, wherefore such a sign would be
+sought in vain.
+
+XI.  God, or substance, consisting of infinite attributes, of
+which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality,
+necessarily exists.
+
+>>>>>Proof--If this be denied, conceive, if possible, that God
+does not exist:  then his essence does not involve existence.
+But this (Prop. vii.) is absurd.  Therefore God necessarily
+exists.
+
+>>>>>Another proof--Of everything whatsoever a cause or reason
+must be assigned,  either for its existence, or for its
+non-existence--e.g. if a triangle exist, a reason or cause must
+be granted for its existence; if, on the contrary, it does not
+exist, a cause must also be granted, which prevents it from
+existing, or annuls its existence.  This reason or cause must
+either be contained in the nature of the thing in question, or be
+external to it.  For instance, the reason for the non-existence
+of a square circle is indicated in its nature, namely, because it
+would involve a contradiction.  On the other hand, the existence
+of substance follows also solely from its nature, inasmuch as its
+nature involves existence. (See Prop. vii.)
+
+ But the reason for the existence of a triangle or a circle does
+not follow from the nature of those figures, but from the order
+of universal nature in extension.  From the latter it must
+follow, either that a triangle necessarily exists, or that it is
+impossible that it should exist.  So much is self-evident.  It
+follows therefrom that a thing necessarily exists, if no cause or
+reason be granted which prevents its existence.
+
+If, then, no cause or reason can be given, which prevents the
+existence of God, or which destroys his existence, we must
+certainly conclude that he necessarily does exist.  If such a
+reason or cause should be given, it must either be drawn from the
+very nature of God, or be external to him--that is, drawn from
+another substance of another nature.  For if it were of the same
+nature, God, by that very fact, would be admitted to exist.  But
+substance of another nature could have nothing in common with God
+(by Prop. ii.), and therefore would be unable either to cause or
+to destroy his existence.
+
+As, then, a reason or cause which would annul the divine
+existence cannot be drawn from  anything external to the divine
+nature, such cause must perforce, if God does not exist, be drawn
+from God's own nature, which would involve a contradiction.  To
+make such an affirmation about a being absolutely infinite and
+supremely perfect is absurd; therefore, neither in the nature of
+God, nor externally to his nature, can a cause or reason be
+assigned which would annul his existence.  Therefore, God
+necessarily exists.  Q.E.D.
+
+>>>>>Another proof--The potentiality of non-existence is a
+negation of power, and contrariwise the potentiality of existence
+is a power, as is obvious.  If, then, that which necessarily
+exists is nothing but finite beings, such finite beings are more
+powerful than a being absolutely infinite, which is obviously
+absurd; therefore, either nothing exists, or else a being
+absolutely infinite necessarily exists also.  Now we exist either
+in ourselves, or in  something else which necessarily exists (see
+Ax. i. and Prop. vii.).  Therefore a being absolutely
+infinite--in other words, God (Def. vi.)--necessarily exists.
+Q.E.D.
+
+*****Note--In this last proof, I have purposely shown God's
+existence 'a posteriori,' so that the proof might be more easily
+followed, not because, from the same premises, God's existence
+does not follow 'a priori.'  For, as the potentiality of
+existence is a power, it follows that, in proportion as reality
+increases in the nature of a thing, so also will it increase its
+strength for existence.  Therefore a being absolutely infinite,
+such as God, has from himself an absolutely infinite power of
+existence, and hence he does absolutely exist. Perhaps there will
+be many who will be unable to see the force of this proof,
+inasmuch as they are accustomed only to consider those things
+which flow from external causes.  Of  such things, they see that
+those which quickly come to pass--that is, quickly come into
+existence--quickly also disappear; whereas they regard as more
+difficult of accomplishment --that is, not so easily brought into
+existence--those things which they conceive as more complicated.
+
+However, to do away with this misconception, I need not here show
+the measure of truth in the proverb, "What comes quickly, goes
+quickly," nor discuss whether, from the point of view of
+universal nature, all things are equally easy, or otherwise:  I
+need only remark that I am not here speaking of things, which
+come to pass through causes external to themselves, but only of
+substances which (by Prop. vi.) cannot be produced by any
+external cause.   Things which are produced by external causes,
+whether they consist of many parts or few, owe whatsoever
+perfection or reality they possess solely to the efficacy of
+their external  cause; wherefore the existence of substance must
+arise solely from its own nature, which is nothing else but its
+essence.  Thus, the perfection of a thing does not annul its
+existence,  but, on the contrary, asserts it.  Imperfection, on
+the other hand, does annul it; therefore we cannot be more
+certain of the existence of anything, than of the existence of a
+being absolutely infinite or perfect--that is, of God.  For
+inasmuch as his essence excludes all imperfection, and involves
+absolute perfection, all cause for doubt concerning his existence
+is done away, and the utmost certainty on the question is given.
+This, I think, will be evident to every moderately attentive
+reader.
+
+XII.  No attribute of substance can be conceived from which it
+would follow that substance can be divided.
+
+>>>>>Proof--The parts into which substance as thus conceived
+would be divided either  will retain the nature of substance, or
+they will not.  If the former, then (by Prop. viii.) each part
+will necessarily be infinite, and (by Prop vi.) self-caused, and
+(by Prop. v.) will perforce consist of a different attribute, so
+that, in that case, several substances could be formed out of one
+substance, which (by Prop. vi.) is absurd.  Moreover, the parts
+(by Prop. ii.) would have nothing in common with their whole, and
+the whole (by Def. iv. and Prop. X) could both exist and be
+conceived without its parts, which everyone will admit to be
+absurd.  If we adopt the second alternative--namely, that the
+parts will not retain the  nature of substance--then, if the
+whole substance were divided into equal parts, it would  lose the
+nature of substance, and would cease to exist, which (by Prop.
+vii.) is absurd.
+
+XIII.  Substance absolutely infinite is indivisible.
+
+>>>>>Proof--If it could be divided, the parts into which it was
+divided would either retain the nature of absolutely infinite
+substance, or they would not.  If the former, we should have
+several substances of the same nature, which (by Prop. v.) is
+absurd.  If the latter,  then (by Prop. vii.) substance
+absolutely infinite could cease to exist, which (by Prop. xi.) is
+also absurd.
+
+<<<<<Corollary--It follows that no substance, and consequently no
+extended substance, in so far as it is substance, is divisible.
+
+*****Note--The indivisibility of substance may be more easily
+understood as follows.  The nature of substance can only be
+conceived as infinite, and by a part of substance, nothing else
+can be understood than finite substance, which (by Prop. viii.)
+involves a manifest  contradiction.
+
+XIV.  Besides God no substance can be granted or conceived.
+
+>>>>>Proof--As God is a being absolutely infinite, of whom no
+attribute that expresses the essence of substance can be denied
+(by Def. vi.), and he necessarily exists (by Prop. xi.); if any
+substance besides God were granted, it would have to be explained
+by some attribute of God, and thus two substances with the same
+attribute would exist, which (by Prop. v.) is absurd; therefore,
+besides God no substance can be granted, or consequently be
+conceived. If it could be conceived, it would necessarily have to
+be conceived as existent; but this (by the first part of this
+proof) is absurd.  Therefore, besides God no substance can be
+granted or conceived.  Q.E.D.
+
+<<<<<Corollary I.--Clearly, therefore:  1.  God is one, that is
+(by Def. vi.) only one substance can be granted in the universe,
+and that substance is absolutely infinite, as we have already
+indicated (in the note to Prop. x.).
+
+<<<<<Corollary II.--It follows:  2.  That extension and thought
+are either attributes of God or (by Ax. i.) accidents
+("affectiones") of the attributes of God.
+
+XV.  Whatsoever is, is in God, and without God nothing can be, or
+be conceived.
+
+>>>>>Proof--Besides God, no substance is granted or can be
+conceived (by Prop. xiv.), that is (by Def. iii.) nothing which
+is in itself and is conceived through itself.  But modes (by Def.
+v.) can neither be, nor be conceived without substance;
+wherefore they can only be in the divine nature, and can only
+through it be conceived.  But substances and modes form the sum
+total of existence (by Ax. i.), therefore, without God nothing
+can be, or be conceived.  Q.E.D.
+
+*****Note--Some assert that God, like a man, consists of body and
+mind, and is  susceptible of passions.  How far such persons have
+strayed from the truth is sufficiently evident from what has been
+said.  But these I pass over.  For all who have in anywise
+reflected on the divine nature deny that God has a body.  Of this
+they find excellent proof in the fact that we understand by body
+a definite quantity, so long, so broad, so deep, bounded by a
+certain shape, and it is the height of absurdity to predicate
+such a thing of God, a being absolutely infinite.  But meanwhile
+by other reasons with which they try to prove their point, they
+show that they think corporeal or extended substance wholly apart
+from the divine nature, and say it was created by God.  Wherefrom
+the divine nature can have been created, they are wholly
+ignorant; thus they clearly show that they do not know  the
+meaning of their own words.  I myself have proved sufficiently
+clearly, at any rate in my own judgment (Cor. Prop. vi., and Note
+2, Prop. viii.), that no substance can be  produced or created by
+anything other than itself.  Further, I showed (in Prop. xiv.)
+that  besides God no substance can be granted or conceived.
+Hence we drew the conclusion that extended substance is one of
+the infinite attributes of God.  However, in order to explain
+more fully, I will refute the arguments of my adversaries, which
+all start from the following points:--
+
+Extended substance, in so far as it is substance, consists, as
+they think, in parts, wherefore they deny that it can be
+infinite, or consequently, that it can appertain to God.  This
+they illustrate with many examples, of which I will take one or
+two.  If extended substance, they say, is infinite, let it be
+conceived to be divided into two parts; each part will then be
+either finite or infinite.  If the former, then infinite
+substance is composed of two finite parts, which is absurd.  If
+the latter, then one infinite will be twice as large as another
+infinite, which is also absurd.
+
+Further, if an infinite line be measured out in foot lengths, it
+will consist of an infinite number of such parts; it would
+equally consist of an infinite number of parts, if each part
+measured only an inch:  therefore, one infinity would be twelve
+times as great as the other.
+
+Lastly, if from a single point there be conceived to be drawn two
+diverging lines which at  first are at a definite distance apart,
+but are produced to infinity, it is certain that the  distance
+between the two lines will be continually increased, until at
+length it changes from definite to indefinable.  As these
+absurdities follow, it is said, from considering quantity as
+infinite, the conclusion is drawn that extended substance must
+necessarily be finite, and, consequently, cannot appertain to the
+nature of God.
+
+The second argument is also drawn from God's supreme perfection.
+God, it is said,  inasmuch as he is a supremely perfect being,
+cannot be passive; but extended substance, insofar as it is
+divisible, is passive.  It follows, therefore, that extended
+substance does not appertain to the essence of God.
+
+Such are the arguments I find on the subject in writers, who by
+them try to prove that extended substance is unworthy of the
+divine nature, and cannot possibly appertain thereto.  However, I
+think an attentive reader will see that I have already answered
+their propositions; for all their arguments are founded on the
+hypothesis that extended substance is composed of parts, and such
+a hypothesis I have shown (Prop. xii., and Cor. Prop. xiii.) to
+be absurd.  Moreover, anyone who reflects will see that all these
+absurdities (if  absurdities they be, which I am not now
+discussing), from which it is sought to extract the conclusion
+that extended substance is finite, do not at all follow from the
+notion of an infinite quantity, but merely from the notion that
+an infinite quantity is measurable, and composed of finite parts:
+therefore, the only fair conclusion to be drawn is that infinite
+quantity is not measurable, and cannot be composed of finite
+parts.  This is exactly what we have already proved (in Prop.
+xii.).  Wherefore the weapon which they aimed at us has in
+reality recoiled upon themselves.  If, from this absurdity of
+theirs, they persist in drawing the conclusion that extended
+substance must be finite, they will in good sooth be acting like
+a man who asserts that circles have the properties of squares,
+and, finding himself thereby landed in absurdities, proceeds to
+deny that circles have any center, from which all lines drawn to
+the circumference are equal.  For, taking extended substance,
+which can only be conceived as infinite, one, and indivisible
+(Props. viii., v., xii.) they assert, in order to prove that it
+is finite, that it is composed of finite parts, and that it can
+be multiplied and divided.
+
+So, also, others, after asserting that a line is composed of
+points, can produce many arguments to prove that a line cannot be
+infinitely divided.  Assuredly it is not less absurd to assert
+that extended substance is made up of bodies or parts, than it
+would be to assert that a solid is made up of surfaces, a surface
+of lines, and a line of points.  This must be admitted by all who
+know clear reason to be infallible, and most of all by those who
+deny the possibility of a vacuum.  For if extended substance
+could be so divided that its parts were really separate, why
+should not one part admit of being destroyed, the others
+remaining joined together as before?  And why should all be so
+fitted into one another as to leave no vacuum?  Surely in the
+case of things, which are really distinct one from the other, one
+can exist without the other, and can remain in its original
+condition.  As, then, there does not exist a vacuum in nature (of
+which anon), but all parts are bound to come together to prevent
+it, it follows from this that the parts cannot really be
+distinguished, and that extended substance in so far as it is
+substance cannot be divided.
+
+If anyone asks me the further question, Why are we naturally so
+prone to divide quantity? I answer, that quantity is conceived by
+us in two ways; in the abstract and superficially, as we imagine
+it; or as substance, as we conceive it solely by the intellect.
+If, then, we regard quantity as it is represented in our
+imagination, which we often and more easily do, we shall find
+that it is finite, divisible, and compounded of parts; but if we
+regard it as it is represented in our intellect, and conceive it
+as substance, which it is very difficult to do, we shall then, as
+I have sufficiently proved, find that it is infinite, one, and
+indivisible.  This will be plain enough to all who make a
+distinction between the intellect and the  imagination,
+especially if it be remembered that matter is everywhere the
+same, that its parts are not distinguishable, except in so far as
+we conceive matter as diversely modified, whence its parts are
+distinguished, not really, but modally.  For instance, water, in
+so far as it is water, we conceive to be divided, and its parts
+to be separated one from the other; but not in so far as it is
+extended substance; from this point of view it is neither
+separated nor  divisible.  Further, water, in so far as it is
+water, is produced and corrupted; but, in so far as it is
+substance, it is neither produced nor corrupted.
+
+I think I have now answered the second argument; it is, in fact,
+founded on the same assumption as the first--namely, that matter,
+in so far as it is substance, is divisible, and composed of
+parts.  Even if it were so, I do not know why it should be
+considered unworthy of the divine nature, inasmuch as besides God
+(by Prop. xiv.) no substance can be granted, wherefrom it could
+receive its modifications.  All things, I repeat, are in God, and
+all things which come to pass, come to pass solely through the
+laws of the infinite nature of God, and follow (as I will shortly
+show) from the necessity of his essence.   Wherefore it can in
+nowise be said that God is passive in respect to anything other
+than himself, or that extended substance is unworthy of the
+divine nature, even if it be supposed divisible, so long as it is
+granted to be infinite and eternal.  But enough of this for the
+present.
+
+XVI.  From the necessity of the divine nature must follow an
+infinite number of things in  infinite ways--that is, all things
+which can fall within the sphere of infinite intellect.
+
+>>>>>Proof--This proposition will be clear to everyone, who
+remembers that from the given definition of any thing the
+intellect infers several properties, which really necessarily
+follow therefrom (that is, from the actual essence of the thing
+defined); and it infers more properties in proportion as the
+definition of the thing expresses more reality, that is, in
+proportion as the essence of the thing defined involves more
+reality.  Now, as the divine nature has absolutely infinite
+attributes (by Def. vi.), of which each expresses infinite
+essence after its kind, it follows that from the necessity of its
+nature an infinite number of things (that is, everything which
+can fall within the sphere of an infinite intellect) must
+necessarily follow.  Q.E.D.
+
+<<<<<Corollary I.--Hence it follows, that God is the efficient
+cause of all that can fall within the sphere of an infinite
+intellect.
+
+<<<<<Corollary II.--It also follows that God is a cause in
+himself, and not through an accident of his nature.
+
+<<<<<Corollary III.--It follows, thirdly, that God is the
+absolutely first cause.
+
+XVII.  God acts solely by the laws of his own nature, and is not
+constrained by anyone.
+
+>>>>>Proof--We have just shown (in Prop. xvi.), that solely from
+the necessity of the divine nature, or, what is the same thing,
+solely from the laws of his nature, an infinite  number of things
+absolutely follow in an infinite number of ways; and we proved
+(in Prop. xv.), that without God nothing can be nor be conceived;
+but that all things are in God. Wherefore nothing can exist
+outside himself, whereby he can be conditioned or constrained to
+act.  Wherefore God acts solely by the laws of his own nature,
+and is not constrained by anyone.  Q.E.D.
+
+<<<<<Corollary I--It follows:  1.  That there can be no cause
+which, either extrinsically or intrinsically, besides the
+perfection of his own nature, moves God to act.
+
+<<<<<Corollary II--It follows:  2.  That God is the sole free
+cause.  For God alone exists by the sole necessity of his nature
+(by Prop. xi. and Prop. xiv., Cor. i.), and acts by the sole
+necessity of his own nature, wherefore God is (by Def. vii.) the
+sole free cause.  Q.E.D.
+
+*****Note--Others think that God is a free cause, because he can,
+as they think, bring it about, that those things which we have
+said follow from his nature--that is, which are in his power,
+should not come to pass, or should not be produced by him.  But
+this is the same as if they said, that God could bring it about,
+that it should follow from the nature of a  triangle that its
+three interior angles should not be equal to two right angles; or
+that from a given cause no effect should follow, which is absurd.
+
+Moreover, I will show below, without the aid of this
+proposition, that neither intellect nor will appertain to God's
+nature.  I know that there are many who think that they can show,
+that supreme intellect and free will do appertain to God's
+nature; for they say they know of nothing more perfect, which
+they can attribute to God, than that which is the highest
+perfection in ourselves.  Further, although they conceive God as
+actually supremely intelligent, they yet do not believe that he
+can bring into existence everything which he actually
+understands, for they think that they would thus destroy God's
+power.  If, they contend, God had created everything which is in
+his intellect, he would not be able to create anything more, and
+this, they think, would clash with God's omnipotence; therefore,
+they prefer to asset that God is indifferent to all things, and
+that he creates nothing except that which he has decided, by some
+absolute exercise of will, to create.  However, I think I have
+shown sufficiently clearly (by Prop. xvi.) that from God's
+supreme power, or infinite nature, an infinite number of
+things--that is, all things have necessarily flowed forth in an
+infinite number of ways, or always flow from the same necessity;
+in the same way as from the nature of a triangle it follows from
+eternity and for eternity, that its three interior angles are
+equal to two right angles.  Wherefore the omnipotence of God has
+been displayed from all eternity, and will for all eternity
+remain in the same state of activity. This manner of treating the
+question attributes to God an omnipotence, in my opinion, far
+more perfect.  For, otherwise, we are compelled to confess that
+God understands an infinite number of creatable things, which he
+will never be able to create, for, if he created all that he
+understands, he would, according to this showing, exhaust his
+omnipotence, and render himself imperfect.  Wherefore, in order
+to establish that God is perfect, we should be reduced to
+establishing at the same time, that he cannot bring to pass
+everything over which his power extends; this seems to be a
+hypothesis most absurd, and most repugnant to God's omnipotence.
+
+Further (to say a word concerning the intellect and the will
+which we attribute to God), if intellect and will appertain to
+the eternal essence of God, we must take these words in some
+significance quite different from those they usually bear.  For
+intellect and will, which should constitute the essence of God,
+would perforce be as far apart as the poles from the human
+intellect and will, in fact, would have nothing in common with
+them but the name; there would be about as much correspondence
+between the two as there is between the Dog, the heavenly
+constellation, and a dog, an animal that barks.  This I will
+prove as follows.  If intellect belongs to the divine nature, it
+cannot be in nature, as ours is generally thought to be,
+posterior to, or simultaneous with the things understood,
+inasmuch as God is prior to all things by reason of his causality
+(Prop. xvi., Cor. i.).  On the  contrary, the truth and formal
+essence of things is as it is, because it exists by
+representation as such in the intellect of God.  Wherefore the
+intellect of God, in so far as it is conceived to constitute
+God's essence, is, in reality, the cause of things, both of their
+essence and of their existence.  This seems to have been
+recognized by those who have asserted, that God's intellect,
+God's will, and God's power, are one and the same.  As,
+therefore, God's intellect is the sole cause of things, namely,
+both of their essence and existence, it must necessarily differ
+from them in respect to its essence, and in respect to its
+existence.  For a cause differs from a thing it causes,
+precisely in the quality which the latter gains from the former.
+
+For example, a man is the cause of another man's existence, but
+not of his essence (for the latter is an eternal truth), and,
+therefore, the two men may be entirely similar in essence, but
+must be different in existence; and hence if the existence of one
+of them cease, the existence of the other will not necessarily
+cease also; but if the essence of one could be destroyed, and be
+made false, the essence of the other would be destroyed also.
+Wherefore, a thing which is the cause both of the essence and of
+the existence of a given effect, must differ from such effect
+both in respect to its essence, and also in respect to its
+existence.  Now the intellect of God is the cause both of the
+essence and the existence of our intellect; therefore, the
+intellect of God in so far as it is conceived to constitute the
+divine essence, differs from our intellect both in respect to
+essence and in respect to  existence, nor can it in anywise agree
+therewith save in name, as we said before.  The  reasoning would
+be identical in the case of the will, as anyone can easily see.
+
+XVIII.  God is the indwelling and not the transient cause of all
+things. >>>>>Proof--All things which are, are in God, and must be
+conceived through God (by Prop. xv.), therefore (by Prop. xvi.,
+Cor. i.) God is the cause of those things which are in him.
+This is our first point.  Further, besides God there can be no
+substance (by Prop. xiv.), that is nothing in itself external to
+God.  This is our second point.  God, therefore, is the
+indwelling and not the transient cause of all things.  Q.E.D.
+
+XIX.  God, and all the attributes of God, are eternal.
+>>>>>Proof--God (by Def. vi.) is substance, which (by Prop. xi.)
+necessarily exists, that is (by Prop. vii.) existence appertains
+to its nature, or (what is the same thing) follows from its
+definition; therefore, God is eternal (by Def. vii.).  Further,
+by the attributes of God we must understand that which (by Def.
+iv.) expresses the essence of the divine substance--in other
+words, that which appertains to substance:  that, I say, should
+be involved in the attributes of substance.  Now eternity
+appertains to the nature of substance (as I have already shown in
+Prop. vii.); therefore, eternity must appertain to each of the
+attributes, and thus all are eternal.  Q.E.D.
+
+*****Note--This proposition is also evident from the manner in
+which (in Prop. xi.) I  demonstrated the existence of God; it is
+evident, I repeat, from that proof, that the existence of God,
+like his essence, is an eternal truth.  Further (in Prop. xix. of
+my  "Principles of the Cartesian Philosophy"), I have proved the
+eternity of God, in another manner, which I need not here
+repeat.
+
+XX.  The existence of God and his essence are one and the same.
+
+>>>>>Proof--God (by the last Prop.) and all his attributes are
+eternal, that is (by Def. viii.) each of his attributes expresses
+existence.  Therefore the same attributes of God which explain
+his eternal essence, explain at the same time his eternal
+existence--in other words, that which constitutes God's essence
+constitutes at the same time his existence.  Wherefore God's
+existence and God's essence are one and the same.  Q.E.D.
+
+<<<<<Corollary I.--Hence it follows that God's existence, like
+his essence, is an eternal truth.
+
+<<<<<Corollary II.--Secondly, it follows that God, and all the
+attributes of God, are unchangeable.  For if they could be
+changed in respect to existence, they must also be able to be
+changed in respect to essence--that is, obviously, be changed
+from true to false, which is absurd.
+
+XXI.  All things which follow from the absolute nature of any
+attribute of God must always exist and be infinite, or, in other
+words, are eternal and infinite through the said attribute.
+
+>>>>>Proof--Conceive, if it be possible (supposing the
+proposition to be denied), that something in some attribute of
+God can follow from the absolute nature of the said  attribute,
+and that at the same time it is finite, and has a conditioned
+existence or duration; for instance, the idea of God expressed in
+the attribute thought.  Now thought, in so far as it is supposed
+to be an attribute of God, is necessarily (by Prop. xi.) in its
+nature infinite. But, in so far as it possesses the idea of God,
+it is supposed finite.  It cannot, however, be conceived as
+finite, unless it be limited by thought (by Def. ii.); but it is
+not limited by thought itself, in so far as it has constituted
+the idea of God (for so far it is supposed to be finite);
+therefore, it is limited by thought, in so far as it has not
+constituted the idea of God, which nevertheless (by Prop. xi.)
+must necessarily exist.
+
+We have now granted, therefore, thought not constituting the idea
+of God, and, accordingly, the idea of God does not naturally
+follow from its nature in so far as it is absolute thought (for
+it is conceived as constituting, and also as not constituting,
+the idea of God), which is against our hypothesis.  Wherefore, if
+the idea of God expressed in the attribute thought, or, indeed,
+anything else in any attribute of God (for we may take any
+example, as the proof is of universal application) follows from
+the necessity of the absolute nature of the said attribute, the
+said thing must necessarily be infinite, which was our first
+point.
+
+Furthermore, a thing which thus follows from the necessity of the
+nature of any attribute cannot have a limited duration.  For if
+it can, suppose a thing, which follows from the necessity of the
+nature of some attribute, to exist in some attribute of God, for
+instance, the idea of God expressed in the attribute thought, and
+let it be supposed at some time not to have existed, or to be
+about not to exist.
+
+Now thought being an attribute of God must necessarily exist
+unchanged (by Prop. xi., and Prop. xx., Cor. ii.); and beyond the
+limits of the duration of the idea of God (supposing the latter
+at some time not to have existed, or not to be going to exist)
+thought would perforce have existed without the idea of God,
+which is contrary to our hypothesis, for we supposed that,
+thought being given, the idea of God necessarily flowed
+therefrom.  Therefore the idea of God expressed in thought, or
+anything which necessarily follows from the absolute nature of
+some attribute of God, cannot have a limited duration, but
+through the said attribute is eternal, which is our second point.
+Bear in mind that the same proposition may be affirmed of
+anything, which in any attribute necessarily follows from God's
+absolute nature.
+
+XXII.  Whatsoever follows from any attribute of God, in so far as
+it is modified by a modification, which exists necessarily and as
+infinite, through the said attribute, must also exist necessarily
+and as infinite.
+
+>>>>>Proof--The proof of this proposition is similar to that of
+the preceding one.
+
+XXIII.  Every mode, which exists both necessarily and as
+infinite, must necessarily follow either from the absolute nature
+of some attribute of God, or from an attribute modified by a
+modification which exists necessarily, and as infinite.
+
+>>>>>Proof--A mode exists in something else, through which it
+must be conceived (Def. v.), that is (Prop. xv.), it exists
+solely in God, and solely through God can be conceived. If
+therefore a mode is conceived as necessarily existing and
+infinite, it must necessarily be inferred or perceived through
+some attribute of God, in so far as such attribute is conceived
+as expressing the infinity and necessity of existence, in other
+words (Def. viii.) eternity; that is, in so far as it is
+considered absolutely.  A mode, therefore, which necessarily
+exists as infinite, must follow from the absolute nature of some
+attribute of God, either immediately (Prop. xxi.) or through the
+means of some modification, which follows from the absolute
+nature of the said attribute; that is (by Prop. xxii.), which
+exists necessarily and as infinite.
+
+XXIV.  The essence of things produced by God does not involve
+existence.
+
+>>>>>Proof--This proposition is evident from Def. i.  For that of
+which the nature (considered in itself) involves existence is
+self-caused, and exists by the sole necessity of its own nature.
+
+<<<<<Corollary--Hence it follows that God is not only the cause
+of things coming into existence, but also of their continuing in
+existence, that is, in scholastic phraseology, God is cause of
+the being of things (essendi rerum).  For whether things exist,
+or do not exist,  whenever we contemplate their essence, we see
+that it involves neither existence nor duration; consequently, it
+cannot be the cause of either the one or the other.  God must be
+the sole cause, inasmuch as to him alone does existence
+appertain.  (Prop. xiv. Cor. i.) Q.E.D.
+
+XXV.  God is the efficient cause not only of the existence of
+things, but also of their essence.
+
+>>>>>Proof--If this be denied, then God is not the cause of the
+essence of things; and therefore the essence of things can (by
+Ax. iv.) be conceived without God.  This (by Prop. xv.) is
+absurd.  Therefore, God is the cause of the essence of things.
+Q.E.D.
+
+*****Note--This proposition follows more clearly from Prop. xvi.
+For it is evident thereby that, given the divine nature, the
+essence of things must be inferred from it, no less than their
+existence--in a word, God must be called the cause of all things,
+in the same sense as he is called the cause of himself.  This
+will be made still clearer by the following corollary.
+
+<<<<<Corollary--Individual things are nothing but modifications
+of the attributes of God, or modes by which the attributes of God
+are expressed in a fixed and definite manner.  The proof appears
+from Prop. xv. and Def. v.
+
+XXVI.  A thing which is conditioned to act in a particular
+manner, has necessarily been thus conditioned by God; and that
+which has not been conditioned by God cannot condition itself to
+act.
+
+>>>>>Proof--That by which things are said to be conditioned to
+act in a particular manner is necessarily something positive
+(this is obvious); therefore both of its essence and of its
+existence God by the necessity of his nature is the efficient
+cause (Props. xxv. and xvi.); this is our first point.  Our
+second point is plainly to be inferred therefrom.  For if a
+thing, which has not been conditioned by God, could condition
+itself, the first part of our proof would be false, and this, as
+we have shown is absurd.
+
+XXVII.  A thing, which has been conditioned by God to act in a
+particular way, cannot render itself unconditioned.
+
+>>>>>Proof--This proposition is evident from Ax. iii.
+
+XXVIII.  Every individual thing, or everything which is finite
+and has a conditioned existence, cannot exist or be conditioned
+to act, unless it be conditioned for existence and action by a
+cause other than itself, which also is finite, and has a
+conditioned existence; and likewise this cause cannot in its turn
+exist, or be conditioned to act, unless it be conditioned for
+existence and action by another cause, which also is finite, and
+has a conditioned existence, and so on to infinity.
+
+>>>>>Proof--Whatsoever is conditioned to exist and act, has been
+thus conditioned by God (by Prop. xxvi. and Prop. xxiv., Cor.)
+
+But that which is finite, and has a conditioned existence, cannot
+be produced by the absolute nature of any attribute of God; for
+whatsoever follows from the absolute nature of any attribute of
+God is infinite and eternal (by Prop. xxi.).  It must, therefore,
+follow from some attribute of God, in so far as the said
+attribute is considered as in some way modified; for substance
+and modes make up the sum total of existence (by Ax. i. and Def.
+iii., v.), while modes are merely modifications of the
+attributes of God.  But from God, or from any of his attributes,
+in so far as the latter is modified by a modification infinite
+and eternal, a conditioned thing cannot follow.  Wherefore it
+must follow from, or be conditioned for, existence and action by
+God or one of his attributes, in so far as the latter are
+modified by some modification which is finite, and has a
+conditioned existence.  This is our first point.  Again, this
+cause or this modification (for the reason by which we
+established the first part of this proof) must in its turn be
+conditioned by another cause, which also is finite, and has a
+conditioned existence, and, again, this last by another (for the
+same reason); and so on (for the same reason) to infinity.
+Q.E.D.
+
+*****Note--As certain things must be produced immediately by God,
+namely those things which necessarily follow from his absolute
+nature, through the means of these primary attributes, which,
+nevertheless, can neither exist nor be conceived without God, it
+follows: 1. That God is absolutely the proximate cause of those
+things immediately produced by him.  I say absolutely, not after
+his kind, as is usually stated.  For the effects of God cannot
+either exist or be conceived without a cause (Prop. xv. and Prop.
+xxiv. Cor.).  2. That God cannot properly be styled the remote
+cause of individual things, except for the sake of
+distinguishing these from what he immediately produces, or rather
+from what follows from his absolute nature.  For, by a remote
+cause, we understand a cause which is in no way conjoined to the
+effect.  But all things which are, are in God, and so depend on
+God, that without him they can neither be nor be conceived.
+
+XXIX.  Nothing in the universe is contingent, but all things are
+conditioned to exist and operate in a particular manner by the
+necessity of the divine nature.
+
+>>>>>Proof--Whatsoever is, is in God (Prop. xv.).  But God cannot
+be called a thing contingent.  For (by Prop. xi.) he exists
+necessarily, and not contingently.  Further, the modes of the
+divine nature follow therefrom necessarily, and not contingently
+(Prop. xvi.); and they thus follow, whether we consider the
+divine nature absolutely, or whether we consider it as in any way
+conditioned to act (Prop. xxvii.).  Further, God is not only the
+cause of these modes, in so far as they simply exist (by Prop.
+xxiv., Cor.), but also in so far as they are considered as
+conditioned for operating in a particular manner (Prop. xxvi.).
+If they be not conditioned by God (Prop. xxvi.), it is
+impossible, and not contingent, that they should condition
+themselves; contrariwise, if they be conditioned by God, it is
+impossible, and not contingent, that they should render
+themselves unconditioned. Wherefore all things are conditioned by
+the necessity of the divine nature, not only to exist, but also
+to exist and operate in a particular manner, and there is nothing
+that is contingent. Q.E.D.
+
+*****Note--Before going any further, I wish here to explain, what
+we should understand by nature viewed as active (natura
+naturans), and nature viewed as passive (natura naturata).  I say
+to explain, or rather call attention to it, for I think that,
+from what has been said, it is sufficiently clear, that by nature
+viewed as active we should understand that which is in itself,
+and is conceived through itself, or those attributes of
+substance, which express eternal and infinite essence, in other
+words (Prop. xiv., Cor. i., and Prop. xvii., Cor. ii.) God, in so
+far as he is considered as a free cause.
+
+By nature viewed as passive I understand all that which follows
+from the necessity of the nature of God, or of any of the
+attributes of God, that is, all the modes of the attributes of
+God, in so far as they are considered as things which are in God,
+and which without God cannot exist or be conceived.
+
+XXX.  Intellect, in function (actu) finite, or in function
+infinite, must comprehend the attributes of God and the
+modifications of God, and nothing else.
+
+>>>>>Proof--A true idea must agree with its object (Ax. vi.); in
+other words (obviously) that which is contained in the intellect
+in representation must necessarily be granted in nature.  But in
+nature (by Prop. xiv., Cor. i.) there is no substance save God,
+nor any modifications save those (Prop. xv.) which are in God,
+and cannot without God either be or be conceived.  Therefore the
+intellect, in function finite, or in function infinite, must
+comprehend the attributes of God and the modifications of God,
+and nothing else.  Q.E.D.
+
+XXXI.  The intellect in function, whether finite or infinite, as
+will, desire, love, &c., should be referred to passive nature and
+not to active nature.
+
+>>>>>Proof--By the intellect we do not (obviously) mean absolute
+thought, but only a certain mode of thinking, differing from
+other modes, such as love, desire, &c., and therefore (Def. v.)
+requiring to be conceived through absolute thought.  It must (by
+Prop. xv. and Def. vi.), through some attribute of God which
+expresses the eternal and infinite essence of thought, be so
+conceived, that without such attribute it could neither be nor be
+conceived.  It must therefore be referred to nature passive
+rather than to nature active, as must also the other modes of
+thinking.  Q.E.D.
+
+*****Note--I do not here, by speaking of intellect in function,
+admit that there is such a thing as intellect in potentiality:
+but, wishing to avoid all confusion, I desire to speak only of
+what is most clearly perceived by us, namely, of the very act of
+understanding, than which nothing is more clearly perceived.  For
+we cannot perceive anything without adding to our knowledge of
+the act of understanding.
+
+XXXII.  Will cannot be called a free cause, but only a necessary
+cause.
+
+>>>>>Proof--Will is only a particular mode of thinking, like
+intellect; therefore (by Prop. xxviii.) no volition can exist,
+nor be conditioned to act, unless it be conditioned by some cause
+other than itself, which cause is conditioned by a third cause,
+and so on to infinity. But if will be supposed infinite, it must
+also be conditioned to exist and act by God, not by virtue of his
+being substance absolutely infinite, but by virtue of his
+possessing an attribute which expresses the infinite and eternal
+essence of thought (by Prop. xxiii.).  Thus, however it be
+conceived, whether as finite or infinite, it requires a cause by
+which it should be conditioned to exist and act.  Thus (Def.
+vii.) it cannot be called a free cause, but only a necessary or
+constrained cause.  Q.E.D.
+
+<<<<<Corollary I--Hence it follows, first, that God does not act
+according to freedom of the will.
+
+<<<<<Corollary II--It follows, secondly, that will and intellect
+stand in the same relation to the nature of God as do motion, and
+rest, and absolutely all natural phenomena, which must be
+conditioned by God (Prop. xxix.) to exist and act in a particular
+manner.  For will, like the rest, stands in need of a cause, by
+which it is conditioned to exist and act in a particular manner.
+And although, when will or intellect be granted, an infinite
+number of results may follow, yet God cannot on that account be
+said to act from freedom of the will, any more than the infinite
+number of results from motion and rest would justify us in saying
+that motion and rest act by free will.  Wherefore will no more
+appertains to God than does anything else in nature, but stands
+in the same relation to him as motion, rest, and the like, which
+we have shown to follow from the necessity of the divine nature,
+and to be conditioned by it to exist and act in a particular
+manner.
+
+XXXIII.  Things could not have been brought into being by God in
+any manner or in any order different from that which has in fact
+obtained.
+
+>>>>>Proof--All things necessarily follow from the nature of God
+(Prop. xvi.), and by the  nature of God are conditioned to exist
+and act in a particular way (Prop. xxix).  If things,  therefore,
+could have been of a different nature, or have been conditioned
+to act in a  different way, so that the order of nature would
+have been different, God's nature would  also have been able to
+be different from what it now is; and therefore (by Prop.
+xi.)that  different nature also would have perforce existed, and
+consequently there would have been  able to be two or more Gods.
+This (by Prop. xiv., Cor. i.) is absurd.  Therefore, things
+could not have been brought into being by God in any other
+manner, &c.  Q.E.D.
+
+*****Note I--As I have thus shown, more clearly than the sun at
+noonday, that there is  nothing to justify us in calling things
+contingent, I wish to explain briefly what meaning we  shall
+attach to the word contingent; but I will first explain the words
+necessary and  impossible.
+
+A thing is called necessary either in respect to its essence or
+in respect to its cause; for the  existence of a thing
+necessarily follows, either from its essence and definition, or
+from a  given efficient cause.  For similar reasons a thing is
+said to be impossible; namely,  inasmuch as its essence or
+definition involves a contradiction, or because no external cause
+ is granted, which is conditioned to produce such an effect; but
+a thing can in no respect be  called contingent, save in relation
+to the imperfection of our knowledge.
+
+A thing of which we do not know whether the essence does or does
+not involve a  contradiction, or of which, knowing that it does
+not involve a contradiction, we are still in  doubt concerning
+the existence, because the order of causes escapes us,--such a
+thing, I  say, cannot appear to us either necessary or
+impossible.  Wherefore we call it contingent  or possible.
+
+*****Note II--It clearly follows from what we have said, that
+things have been brought  into being by God in the highest
+perfection, inasmuch as they have necessarily followed  from a
+most perfect nature.  Nor does this prove any imperfection in
+God, for it has  compelled us to affirm his perfection.  From its
+contrary proposition, we should clearly  gather (as I have just
+shown), that God is not supremely perfect, for if things had been
+brought into being in any other way, we should have to assign to
+God a nature different  from that, which we are bound to
+attribute to him from the consideration of an absolutely  perfect
+being.
+
+I do not doubt, that many will scout this idea as absurd, and
+will refuse to give their minds  up to contemplating it, simply
+because they are accustomed to assign to God a freedom  very
+different from that which we (Def. vii.) have deduced.  They
+assign to him, in short,  absolute free will.  However, I am also
+convinced that if such persons reflect on the matter,  and duly
+weigh in their minds our series of propositions, they will reject
+such freedom as  they now attribute to God, not only as nugatory,
+but also as a great impediment to  organized knowledge.  There is
+no need for me to repeat what I have said in the note to  Prop.
+xvii.  But, for the sake of my opponents, I will show further,
+that although it be  granted that will pertains to the essence of
+God, it nevertheless follows from his perfection,  that things
+could not have been by him created other than they are, or in a
+different order;  this is easily proved, if we reflect on what
+our opponents themselves concede, namely, that  it depends solely
+on the decree and will of God, that each thing is what it is.  If
+it were  otherwise, God would not be the cause of all things.
+Further, that all the decrees of God  have been ratified from all
+eternity by God himself.  If it were otherwise, God would be
+convicted of imperfection or change.  But in eternity there is no
+such thing as when,  before, or after; hence it follows solely
+from the perfection of God, that God never can  decree, or never
+would have decreed anything but what is; that God did not exist
+before  his decrees, and would not exist without them.  But, it
+is said, supposing that God had  made a different universe, or
+had ordained other decrees from all eternity concerning  nature
+and her order, we could not therefore conclude any imperfection
+in God.  But  persons who say this must admit that God can change
+his decrees.  For if God had  ordained any decrees concerning
+nature and her order, different from those which he has
+ordained--in other words, if he had willed and conceived
+something different concerning  nature--he would perforce have
+had a different intellect from that which he has, and also a
+different will.  But if it were allowable to assign to God a
+different intellect and a different  will, without any change in
+his essence or his perfection, what would there be to prevent
+him changing the decrees which he has made concerning created
+things, and nevertheless  remaining perfect?  For his intellect
+and will concerning things created and their order are  the same,
+in respect to his essence and perfection, however they be
+conceived.
+
+Further, all the philosophers whom I have read admit that God's
+intellect is entirely actual,  and not at all potential; as they
+also admit that God's intellect, and God's will, and God's
+essence are identical, it follows that, if God had had a
+different actual intellect and a  different will, his essence
+would also have been different; and thus, as I concluded at
+first,  if things had been brought into being by God in a
+different way from that which has  obtained, God's intellect and
+will, that is (as is admitted) his essence would perforce have
+been different, which is absurd.
+
+As these things could not have been brought into being by God in
+any but the actual way  and order which has obtained; and as the
+truth of this proposition follows from the  supreme perfection of
+God; we can have no sound reason for persuading ourselves to
+believe that God did not wish to create all the things which were
+in his intellect, and to  create them in the same perfection as
+he had understood them.
+
+But, it will be said, there is in things no perfection nor
+imperfection; that which is in them,  and which causes them to be
+called perfect or imperfect, good or bad, depends solely on  the
+will of God.  If God had so willed, he might have brought it
+about that what is now  perfection should be extreme
+imperfection, and vice versa.  What is such an assertion, but
+an open declaration that God, who necessarily understands that
+which he wishes, might  bring it about by his will, that he
+should understand things differently from the way in  which he
+does understand them?  This (as we have just shown) is the height
+of absurdity.  Wherefore, I may turn the argument against its
+employers, as follows:--All things depend  on the power of God.
+In order that things should be different from what they are,
+God's  will would necessarily have to be different.  But God's
+will cannot be different (as we have  just most clearly
+demonstrated) from God's perfection.  Therefore neither can
+things be  different.  I confess, that the theory which subjects
+all things to the will of an indifferent  deity, and asserts that
+they are all dependent on his fiat, is less far from the truth
+than the  theory of those, who maintain that God acts in all
+things with a view of promoting what is  good.  For these latter
+persons seem to set up something beyond God, which does not
+depend on God, but which God in acting looks to as an exemplar,
+or which he aims at as  a definite goal.  This is only another
+name for subjecting God to the dominion of destiny,  an utter
+absurdity in respect to God, whom we have shown to be the first
+and only free  cause of the essence of all things and also of
+their existence.  I need, therefore, spend no  time in refuting
+such wild theories.
+
+XXXIV.  God's power is identical with his essence.
+
+>>>>>Proof--From the sole necessity of the essence of God it
+follows that God is the  cause of himself (Prop. xi.) and of all
+things (Prop. xvi. and Cor.).  Wherefore the power  of God, by
+which he and all things are and act, is identical with his
+essence.  Q.E.D.
+
+XXXV.  Whatsoever we conceive to be in the power of God,
+necessarily exists.
+
+>>>>>Proof--Whatsoever is in God's power, must (by the last
+Prop.) be comprehended  in his essence in such a manner, that it
+necessarily follows therefrom, and therefore  necessarily exists.
+Q.E.D.
+
+XXXVI.  There is no cause from whose nature some effect does not
+follow.
+
+>>>>>Proof--Whatsoever exists expresses God's nature or essence
+in a given conditioned  manner (by Prop. xxv., Cor.); that is,
+(by Prop. xxxiv.), whatsoever exists, expresses in a  given
+conditioned manner God's power, which is the cause of all
+things, therefore an effect  must (by Prop. xvi.) necessarily
+follow.  Q.E.D.
+
+ APPENDIX:  In the foregoing I have explained the nature and
+properties of God.  I have shown that he  necessarily exists,
+that he is one:  that he is, and acts solely by the necessity of
+his own  nature; that he is the free cause of all things, and how
+he is so; that all things are in God,  and so depend on him, that
+without him they could neither exist nor be conceived; lastly,
+that all things are predetermined by God, not through his free
+will or absolute fiat, but from  the very nature of God or
+infinite power.  I have further, where occasion afforded, taken
+care to remove the prejudices, which might impede the
+comprehension of my  demonstrations.  Yet there still remain
+misconceptions not a few, which might and may  prove very grave
+hindrances to the understanding of the concatenation of things,
+as I have  explained it above.  I have therefore thought it worth
+while to bring these misconceptions  before the bar of reason.
+
+All such opinions spring from the notion commonly entertained,
+that all things in nature act  as men themselves act, namely,
+with an end in view.  It is accepted as certain, that God
+himself directs all things to a definite goal (for it is said
+that God made all things for man,  and man that he might worship
+him).  I will, therefore, consider this opinion, asking first,
+why it obtains general credence, and why all men are naturally so
+prone to adopt it?;   secondly, I will point out its falsity;
+and, lastly, I will show how it has given rise to  prejudices
+about good and bad, right and wrong, praise and blame, order and
+confusion,  beauty and ugliness, and the like.  However, this is
+not the place to deduce these  misconceptions from the nature of
+the human mind:  it will be sufficient here, if I assume  as a
+starting point, what ought to be universally admitted, namely,
+that all men are born  ignorant of the causes of things, that all
+have the desire to seek for what is useful to them,  and that
+they are conscious of such desire.  Herefrom it follows, first,
+that men think  themselves free inasmuch as they are conscious of
+their volitions and desires, and never  even dream, in their
+ignorance, of the causes which have disposed them so to wish and
+desire.  Secondly, that men do all things for an end, namely, for
+that which is useful to  them, and which they seek.  Thus it
+comes to pass that they only look for a knowledge of  the final
+causes of events, and when these are learned, they are content,
+as having no cause  for further doubt.  If they cannot learn such
+causes from external sources, they are  compelled to turn to
+considering themselves, and reflecting what end would have
+induced  them personally to bring about the given event, and thus
+they necessarily judge other  natures by their own.  Further, as
+they find in themselves and outside themselves many  means which
+assist them not a little in the search for what is useful, for
+instance, eyes for  seeing, teeth for chewing, herbs and animals
+for yielding food, the sun for giving light, the  sea for
+breeding fish, &c., they come to look on the whole of nature as a
+means for  obtaining such conveniences.  Now as they are aware,
+that they found these conveniences  and did not make them, they
+think they have cause for believing, that some other being has
+made them for their use.  As they look upon things as means, they
+cannot believe them to  be self-created; but, judging from the
+means which they are accustomed to prepare for  themselves, they
+are bound to believe in some ruler or rulers of the universe
+endowed with  human freedom, who have arranged and adapted
+everything for human use.  They are  bound to estimate the nature
+of such rulers (having no information on the subject) in
+accordance with their own nature, and therefore they assert that
+the gods ordained  everything for the use of man, in order to
+bind man to themselves and obtain from him the  highest honor.
+Hence also it follows, that everyone thought out for himself,
+according to  his abilities, a different way of worshipping God,
+so that God might love him more than his  fellows, and direct the
+whole course of nature for the satisfaction of his blind cupidity
+and  insatiable avarice.  Thus the prejudice developed into
+superstition, and took deep root in  the human mind; and for this
+reason everyone strove most zealously to understand and  explain
+the final causes of things; but in their endeavor to show that
+nature does nothing  in vain, i.e. nothing which is useless to
+man, they only seem to have demonstrated that  nature, the gods,
+and men are all mad together.  Consider, I pray you, the result:
+among  the many helps of nature they were bound to find some
+hindrances, such as storms,  earthquakes, diseases, &c.:  so they
+declared that such things happen, because the gods  are angry at
+some wrong done to them by men, or at some fault committed in
+their  worship.  Experience day by day protested and showed by
+infinite examples, that good  and evil fortunes fall to the lot
+of pious and impious alike; still they would not abandon  their
+inveterate prejudice, for it was more easy for them to class such
+contradictions among  other unknown things of whose use they were
+ignorant, and thus to retain their actual and  innate condition
+of ignorance, than to destroy the whole fabric of their reasoning
+and start  afresh.  They therefore laid down as an axiom, that
+God's judgments far transcend human  understanding.  Such a
+doctrine might well have sufficed to conceal the truth from the
+human race for all eternity, if mathematics had not furnished
+another standard of verity in  considering solely the essence and
+properties of figures without regard to their final causes.
+There are other reasons (which I need not mention here) besides
+mathematics, which might  have caused men's minds to be directed
+to these general prejudices, and have led them to  the knowledge
+of the truth.
+
+I have now sufficiently explained my first point.  There is no
+need to show at length, that  nature has no particular goal in
+view, and that final causes are mere human figments.  This,  I
+think, is already evident enough, both from the causes and
+foundations on which I have  shown such prejudice to be based,
+and also from Prop. xvi., and the Corollary of Prop.  xxxii.,
+and, in fact, all those propositions in which I have shown, that
+everything in nature  proceeds from a sort of necessity, and with
+the utmost perfection.  However, I will add a  few remarks in
+order to overthrow this doctrine of a final cause utterly.  That
+which is  really a cause it considers as an effect, and vice
+versa:  it makes that which is by nature  first to be last, and
+that which is highest and most perfect to be most imperfect.
+Passing  over the questions of cause and priority as
+self-evident, it is plain from Props. xxi., xxii.,  xxiii. that
+the effect is most perfect which is produced immediately by God;
+the effect  which requires for its production several
+intermediate causes is, in that respect, more  imperfect.  But if
+those things which were made immediately by God were made to
+enable  him to attain his end, then the things which come after,
+for the sake of which the first were  made, are necessarily the
+most excellent of all.
+
+Further, this doctrine does away with the perfection of God:
+for, if God acts for an object,  he necessarily desires something
+which he lacks.  Certainly, theologians and metaphysicians  draw
+a distinction between the object of want and the object of
+assimilation; still they  confess that God made all things for
+the sake of himself, not for the sake of creation.  They  are
+unable to point to anything prior to creation, except God
+himself, as an object for  which God should act, and are
+therefore driven to admit (as they clearly must), that God
+lacked those things for whose attainment he created means, and
+further that he desired  them.
+
+We must not omit to notice that the followers of this doctrine,
+anxious to display their  talent in assigning final causes, have
+imported a new method of argument in proof of their
+theory--namely, a reduction, not to the impossible, but to
+ignorance; thus showing that they  have no other method of
+exhibiting their doctrine.  For example, if a stone falls from a
+roof  onto someone's head, and kills him, they will demonstrate
+by their new method, that the  stone fell in order to kill the
+man; for, if it had not by God's will fallen with that object,
+how could so many circumstances (and there are often many
+concurrent circumstances)  have all happened together by chance?
+Perhaps you will answer that the event is due to  the facts that
+the wind was blowing, and the man was walking that way.  "But
+why," they  will insist, "was the wind blowing, and why was the
+man at that very time walking that  way?"  If you again answer,
+that the wind had then sprung up because the sea had begun  to be
+agitated the day before, the weather being previously calm, and
+that the man had  been invited by a friend, they will again
+insist:  "But why was the sea agitated, and why was  the man
+invited at that time?"  So they will pursue their questions from
+cause to cause, till  at last you take refuge in the will of
+God--in other words, the sanctuary of ignorance.  So,  again,
+when they survey the frame of the human body, they are amazed;
+and being  ignorant of the causes of so great a work of art,
+conclude that it has been fashioned, not  mechanically, but by
+divine and supernatural skill, and has been so put together that
+one  part shall not hurt another.
+
+Hence anyone who seeks for the true causes of miracles, and
+strives to understand natural  phenomena as an intelligent being,
+and not to gaze at them like a fool, is set down and  denounced
+as an impious heretic by those, whom the masses adore as the
+interpreters of  nature and the gods.  Such persons know that,
+with the removal of ignorance, the wonder  which forms their only
+available means for proving and preserving their authority would
+vanish also.  But I now quit this subject, and pass on to my
+third point.
+
+After men persuaded themselves, that everything which is created
+is created for their sake,  they were bound to consider as the
+chief quality in everything that which is most useful to
+themselves, and to account those things the best of all which
+have the most beneficial effect  on mankind.  Further, they were
+bound to form abstract notions for the explanation of the  nature
+of things, such as goodness, badness, order, confusion, warmth,
+cold, beauty,  deformity, and so on; and from the belief that
+they are free agents arose the further notions  of praise and
+blame, sin and merit.
+
+I will speak of these latter hereafter, when I treat of human
+nature; the former I will briefly  explain here.
+
+Everything which conduces to health and the worship of God they
+have called good,  everything which hinders these objects they
+have styled bad; and inasmuch as those who  do not understand the
+nature of things do not verify phenomena in any way, but merely
+imagine them after a fashion, and mistake their imagination for
+understanding, such  persons firmly believe that there is an
+order in things, being really ignorant both of things  and their
+own nature.  When phenomena are of such a kind, that the
+impression they make  on our senses requires little effort of
+imagination, and can consequently be easily  remembered, we say
+that they are well-ordered; if the contrary, that they are
+ill-ordered or  confused.  Further, as things which are easily
+imagined are more pleasing to us, men prefer  order to
+confusion--as though there were any order in nature, except in
+relation to our  imagination--and say that God has created all
+things in order; thus, without knowing it,  attributing
+imagination to God, unless, indeed, they would have it that God
+foresaw human  imagination, and arranged everything, so that it
+should be most easily imagined.  If this be  their theory, they
+would not, perhaps, be daunted by the fact that we find an
+infinite  number of phenomena, far surpassing our imagination,
+and very many others which  confound its weakness.  But enough
+has been said on this subject.  The other abstract  notions are
+nothing but modes of imagining, in which the imagination is
+differently  affected:  though they are considered by the
+ignorant as the chief attributes of things,  inasmuch as they
+believe that everything was created for the sake of themselves;
+and,  according as they are affected by it, style it good or bad,
+healthy or rotten or corrupt.  For  instance, if the motion which
+objects we see communicate to our nerves be conducive to  health,
+the objects causing it are styled beautiful; if a contrary motion
+be excited, they are  styled ugly.
+
+Things which are perceived through our sense of smell are styled
+fragrant or fetid; if  through our taste, sweet or bitter,
+full-flavored or insipid; if through our touch, hard or  soft,
+rough or smooth, &c.
+
+Whatsoever affects our ears is said to give rise to noise, sound,
+or harmony.  In this last  case, there are men lunatic enough to
+believe, that even God himself takes pleasure in  harmony; and
+philosophers are not lacking who have persuaded themselves, that
+the  motion of the heavenly bodies gives rise to harmony--all of
+which instances sufficiently  show that everyone judges of things
+according to the state of his brain, or rather mistakes  for
+things the forms of his imagination.  We need no longer wonder
+that there have arisen  all the controversies we have witnessed,
+and finally skepticism:  for, although human bodies  in many
+respects agree, yet in very many others they differ; so that what
+seems good to one  seems confused to another; what is pleasing to
+one displeases another, and so on.  I need  not further
+enumerate, because this is not the place to treat the subject at
+length, and also  because the fact is sufficiently well known.
+It is commonly said:  "So many men, so many  minds; everyone is
+wise in his own way; brains differ as completely as palates."
+All of  which proverbs show, that men judge of things according
+to their mental disposition, and  rather imagine than understand:
+for, if they understood phenomena, they would, as
+mathematicians attest, be convinced, if not attracted, by what I
+have urged.
+
+We have now perceived, that all the explanations commonly given
+of nature are mere  modes of imagining, and do not indicate the
+true nature of anything, but only the  constitution of the
+imagination; and, although they have names, as though they were
+entities, existing externally to the imagination, I call them
+entities imaginary rather than real;  and, therefore, all
+arguments against us drawn from such abstractions are easily
+rebutted.
+
+Many argue in this way.  If all things follow from a necessity of
+the absolutely perfect  nature of God, why are there so many
+imperfections in nature?  such, for instance, as  things corrupt
+to the point of putridity, loathsome deformity, confusion, evil,
+sin, &c.  But  these reasoners are, as I have said, easily
+confuted, for the perfection of things is to be  reckoned only
+from their own nature and power; things are not more or less
+perfect,  according as they are serviceable or repugnant to
+mankind.  To those who ask why God  did not so create all men,
+that they should be governed only by reason, I give no answer
+but this:  because matter was not lacking to him for the creation
+of every degree of  perfection from highest to lowest; or, more
+strictly, because the laws of his nature are so  vast, as to
+suffice for the production of everything conceivable by an
+infinite intelligence,  as I have shown in Prop. xvi.
+
+Such are the misconceptions I have undertaken to note; if there
+are any more of the same  sort, everyone may easily dissipate
+them for himself with the aid of a little reflection.
+
+
+
+
+
+END OF PART I
+of The Project Gutenberg Etext of The Ethics, by Benedict de Spinoza
+
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