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diff --git a/8910-8.txt b/8910-8.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..272205d --- /dev/null +++ b/8910-8.txt @@ -0,0 +1,13098 @@ +The Project Gutenberg EBook of The System of Nature, Volume 2, by +Paul Henri Thiery (Baron D'Holbach) + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: The System of Nature, Volume 2 + +Author: Paul Henri Thiery (Baron D'Holbach) + +Commentator: Samuel Wilkinson + +Translator: Samuel Wilkinson + + +Release Date: September, 2005 [EBook #8910] +This file was first posted on August 23, 2003 +Last Updated: June 8, 2013 + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE SYSTEM OF NATURE, VOLUME 2 *** + + + + +Produced by Freethought Archives and Distributed Proofreaders + + + + + + + +THE SYSTEM OF NATURE; + +or, + +_THE LAWS_ of the MORAL AND PHYSICAL WORLD. + + + +TRANSLATED FROM THE ORIGINAL FRENCH OF M. DE MIRABAUD + + + +VOL. II. + + + + + +PRODUCTION NOTES: First published in French in 1770 under the pseudonym +of Mirabaud. This e-book based on a facsimile reprint of an English +translation originally published 1820-21. This e-text covers the second +of the original two volumes. + + + + + +CONTENTS + + + PART II. Of the Divinity.--Proofs of his existence.-- + Of his attributes.--Of his influence over the happiness of man. + + +CHAP. I. The origin of man's ideas upon the Divinity. + +CHAP. II. Of mythology.--Of theology + +CHAP. III. Of the confused and contradictory ideas of theology. + +CHAP. IV. Examination of the proofs of the existence of the Divinity, as +given by Clarke. + +CHAP. V. Examination of the proofs offered by Descartes, Malebranche, +Newton, &c. + +CHAP. VI. Of Pantheism; or of the natural ideas of the Divinity. + +CHAP. VII. Of Theism--Of the System of Optimism--Of Final Causes + +CHAP. VIII. Examination of the Advantages which result from Man's +Notions on the Divinity;--of their Influence upon Morals;--upon +Politics;--upon Science;--upon the Happiness of Nations, and that of +individuals. + +CHAP. IX. Theological Notions cannot be the Basis of +Morality.--Comparison between Theological Ethics and Natural +Morality--Theology prejudicial to the Human Mind. + +CHAP. X. Man can form no Conclusion from the Ideas which are offered him +of the Divinity.--Of their want of just Inference.--Of the Inutility of +his Conduct. + +CHAP. XI Defence of the Sentiments contained in this Work.--Of +Impiety.--Do there exist Atheists? + +CHAP. XII. Is what is termed Atheism, compatible with Morality? + +CHAP. XIII. Of the motives which lead to what is falsely called +Atheism.--Can this System be dangerous?--Can it be embraced by the +Illiterate? + +CHAP. XIV. A summary of the Code of Nature. + + +A Brief Sketch of the Life and Writings of M. de Mirabaud + + + + + +MIRABAUD'S SYSTEM OF NATURE + +Translated from the Original BY SAMUEL WILKINSON + + + + + + PART II. + + ON THE DIVINITY:--PROOFS OF HIS EXISTENCE:--OF HIS ATTRIBUTES: + OF HIS INFLUENCE OVER THE HAPPINESS OF MAN. + + + +CHAP. I. + +_The Origin of Man's Ideas upon the Divinity._ + + +If man possessed the courage, if he had the requisite industry to recur +to the source of those opinions which are most deeply engraven on his +brain; if he rendered to himself a faithful account of the reasons which +make him hold these opinions as sacred; if he coolly examined the basis +of his hopes, the foundation of his fears, he would find that it very +frequently happens, those objects, or those ideas which move him most +powerfully, either have no real existence, or are words devoid of +meaning, which terror has conjured up to explain some sudden disaster; +that they are often phantoms engendered by a disordered imagination, +modified by ignorance; the effect of an ardent mind distracted by +contending passions, which prevent him from either reasoning justly, or +consulting experience in his judgment; that this mind often labours with +a precipitancy that throws his intellectual faculties into confusion; +that bewilders his ideas; that consequently he gives a substance and a +form to chimeras, to airy nothings, which he afterwards idolizes from +sloth, reverences from prejudice. + +A sensible being placed in a nature where every part is in motion, has +various feelings, in consequence of either the agreeable or disagreeable +effects which he is obliged to experience from this continued action and +re-action; in consequence he either finds himself happy or miserable; +according to the quality of the sensations excited in him, he will love +or fear, seek after or fly from, the real or supposed causes of such +marked effects operated on his machine. But if he is ignorant of nature, +if he is destitute of experience, he will frequently deceive himself as +to these causes; for want of either capability or inclination to recur +back to them, he will neither have a true knowledge of their energy, nor +a clear idea of their mode of acting: thus until reiterated experience +shall have formed his ideas, until the mirror of truth shall have shewn +him the judgment he ought to make, he will be involved in trouble, a +prey to incertitude, a victim to credulity. + +Man is a being who brings with him nothing into the world save an +aptitude to feeling in a manner more or less lively according to his +individual organization: he has no innate knowledge of any of the causes +that act upon him: by degrees his faculty of feeling discovers to him +their various qualities; he learns to judge of them; time familiarizes +him with their properties; he attaches ideas to them, according to +the manner in which they have affected him; these ideas are correct or +otherwise, in a ratio to the soundness of his organic structure: +his judgment is faulty or not, as these organs are either well or +ill-constituted; in proportion as they are competent to afford him sure +and reiterated experience. + +The first moments of man are marked by his wants; that is to say, the +first impulse he receives is to conserve his existence; this he would +not be able to maintain without the concurrence of many analogous +causes: these wants in a sensible being, manifest themselves by a +general languor, a sinking, a confusion in his machine, which gives him +the consciousness of a painful sensation: this derangement subsists, is +even augmented, until the cause suitable to remove it re-establishes +the harmony so necessary to the existence of the human frame. Want, +therefore, is the first evil man experiences; nevertheless it is +requisite to the maintenance of his existence. Was it not for this +derangement of his body, which obliges him to furnish its remedy, he +would not be warned of the necessity of preserving the existence he has +received. Without wants man would be an insensible machine, similar to +a vegetable; like that he would be incapable of preserving himself; +he would not be competent to using the means required to conserve his +being. To his wants are to be ascribed his passions; his desires; +the exercise of his corporeal functions; the play of his intellectual +faculties: they are his wants that oblige him to think; that determine +his will, that induce him to act; it is to satisfy them or rather to +put an end to the painful sensations excited by their presence, that +according to his capacity, to the natural sensibility of his soul, +to the energies which are peculiar to himself, he gives play to his +faculties, exerts the activity of his bodily strength, or displays the +extensive powers of his mind. His wants being perpetual, he is obliged +to labour without relaxation, to procure objects competent to satisfy +them. In a word, it is owing to his multiplied wants that man's energy +is kept in a state of continual activity: as soon as he ceases to +have wants, he falls into inaction--becomes listless--declines into +apathy--sinks into a languor that is incommodious to his feelings or +prejudicial to his existence: this lethargic state of weariness lasts +until new wants, by giving him fresh activity, rouse his dormant +faculties--throw off his stupor--re-animate his vigour, and destroy the +sluggishness to which he had become a prey. + +From hence it will be obvious that evil is necessary to man; without it +he would neither be in a condition to know that which injures him; to +avoid its presence; or to seek his own welfare: without this stimulus, +he would differ in nothing from insensible, unorganized beings: if those +evanescent evils which he calls _wants_, did not oblige him to call +forth his faculties, to set his energies in motion, to cull experience, +to compare objects, to discriminate them, to separate those which have +the capabilities to injure him, from those which possess the means +to benefit him, he would be insensible to happiness--inadequate to +enjoyment. In short, _without evil man would be ignorant of good_; he +would be continually exposed to perish like the leaf on a tree. He would +resemble an infant, who, destitute of experience, runs the risque of +meeting his destruction at every step he takes, unguarded by his nurse. +What the nurse is to the child, experience is to the adult; when either +are wanting, these children of different lustres generally go astray: +frequently encounter disaster. Without evil he would be unable to judge +of any thing; he would have no preference; his will would be without +volition, he would be destitute of passions; desire would find no place +in his heart; he would not revolt at the most disgusting objects; he +would not strive to put them away; he would neither have stimuli +to love, nor motives to fear any thing; he would be an insensible +automaton; he would no longer be a man. + +If no evil had existed in this world, man would never have dreamt of +those numerous divinities, to whom he has rendered such various modes +of worship. If nature had permitted him easily to satisfy all his +regenerating wants, if she had given him none but agreeable sensations, +his days would have uninterruptedly rolled on in one perpetual +uniformity; he would never have discovered his own nakedness; he would +never have had motives to search after the unknown causes of things--to +meditate in pain. Therefore man, always contented, would only have +occupied himself with satisfying his wants; with enjoying the present, +with feeling the influence of objects, that would unceasingly warn him +of his existence in a mode that he must necessarily approve; nothing +would alarm his heart; every thing would be analogous to his existence: +he would neither know fear, experience distrust, nor have inquietude +for the future: these feelings can only be the consequence of some +troublesome sensation, which must have anteriorly affected him, or which +by disturbing the harmony of his machine, has interrupted the course of +his happiness; which has shewn him he is naked. + +Independent of those wants which in man renew themselves every instant; +which he frequently finds it impossible to satisfy; every individual +experiences a multiplicity of evils--he suffers from the inclemency +of the seasons--he pines in penury--he is infected with plague--he +is scourged by war--he is the victim of famine--he is afflicted with +disease--he is the sport of a thousand accidents, &c. This is the reason +why all men are fearful; why the whole human race are diffident. The +knowledge he has of pain alarms him upon all unknown causes, that is to +say, upon all those of which he has not yet experienced the effect; this +experience made with precipitation, or if it be preferred, by instinct, +places him on his guard against all those objects from the operation of +which he is ignorant what consequences may result to himself. + +His inquietude is in proportion; his fears keep pace with the extent of +the disorder which these objects produce in him; they are measured by +their rarity, that is to say, by the inexperience he has of them; by the +natural sensibility of the soul; and by the ardour of his imagination. +The wore ignorant man is, the less experience he has, the more he is +susceptible of fear; solitude, the obscurity of a forest, silence, and +the darkness of night, desolate ruins, the roaring of the wind, sudden, +confused noises, are objects of terror to all who are unaccustomed to +these things. The uninformed man is a child whom every thing astonishes; +who trembles at every thing he encounters: his alarms disappear, his +fears diminish, his mind becomes calm, in proportion as experience +familiarizes him, more or less, with natural effects; his fears cease +entirely, as soon as he understands, or believes he understands, the +causes that act; or when he knows how to avoid their effects. But if he +cannot penetrate the causes which disturb him, if he cannot discover the +agents by whom he suffers, if he cannot find to what account to place +the confusion he experiences, his inquietude augments; his fears +redouble; his imagination leads him astray; it exaggerates his evil; +paints in a disorderly manner these unknown objects of his terror; +magnifies their powers; then making an analogy between them and those +terrific objects, with whom he is already acquainted, he suggests +to himself the means he usually takes to mitigate their anger; to +conciliate their kindness; he employs similar measures to soften the +anger, to disarm the power, to avert the effects of the concealed cause +which gives birth to his inquietudes, which fills him with anxiety, +which alarms his fears. It is thus his weakness, aided by ignorance, +renders him superstitious. + +There are very few men, even in our own day, who have sufficiently +studied nature, who are fully apprised of physical causes, or with the +effects they must necessarily produce. This ignorance, without doubt, +was much greater in the more remote ages of the world, when the human +mind, yet in its infancy, had not collected that experience, taken that +expansion, made those strides towards improvement, which distinguishes +the present from the past. Savages dispersed, erratic, thinly scattered +up and down, knew the course of nature either very imperfectly or not +at all; society alone perfects human knowledge: it requires not only +multiplied but combined efforts to unravel the secrets of nature. This +granted, all natural causes were mysteries to our wandering ancestors; +the entire of nature was an enigma to them; all its phenomena was +marvellous, every event inspired terror to beings who were destitute +of experience; almost every thing, they saw must have appeared to them +strange, unusual, contrary to their idea of the order of things. + +It cannot then furnish matter for surprise, if we behold men in the +present day trembling at the sight of those objects which have formerly +filled their fathers with dismay. _Eclipse, comets, meteors_, were, in +ancient days, subjects of alarm to all the people of the earth: these +effects, so natural in the eyes of the sound philosopher, who has by +degrees fathomed their true causes, have yet the right, possess the +power, to alarm the most numerous, to excite the fears of the least +instructed part of modern nations. The people of the present day, as +well as their ignorant ancestors, find something marvellous, believe +there is a supernatural agency in all those objects to which their eyes +are unaccustomed; they consider all those unknown causes as wonderful, +that act with a force of which their mind has no idea it is possible +the known agents are capable. The ignorant see wonders _prodigies, +miracles_, in all those striking effects of which they are unable to +render themselves a satisfactory account; all the causes which produce +them they think _supernatural_; this, however, really implies nothing +more than that they are not familiar to them, or that they have not +hitherto witnessed natural agents, whose energy was equal to the +production of effects so rare, so astonishing, as those with which their +sight has been appalled. + +Besides the ordinary phenomena to which nations were witnesses without +being competent to unravel the causes, they have in times very remote +from ours, experienced calamities, whether general or local, which +filled them with the most cruel inquietude; which plunged them into an +abyss of consternation. The traditions of all people, the annals of all +nations, recal, even at this day, melancholy events, physical disasters, +dreadful catastrophes, which had the effect of spreading universal +terror among our forefathers, But when history should be silent on these +stupendous revolutions, would not our own reflection on what passes +under our eyes be sufficient to convince us, that all parts of our globe +have been, and following the course of things, will necessarily be +again violently agitated, overturned, changed, overflowed, in a state of +conflagration? Vast continents have been inundated, seas breaking their +limits have usurped the dominion of the earth; at length retiring, +these waters have left striking, proofs of their presence, by the marine +vestiges of shells, skeletons of sea fish, &c. which the attentive +observer meets with at every step, in the bowels of those fertile +countries we now inhabit--subterraneous fires have opened to themselves +the most frightful volcanoes, whose craters frequently issue destruction +on every side. In short, the elements unloosed, have at various times, +disputed among themselves the empire of our globe; this exhibits +evidence of the fact, by those vast heaps of wreck, those stupendous +ruins spread over its surface. What, then, must have been the fears of +mankind, who in those countries believed he beheld the entire of nature +armed against his peace, menacing with destruction his very abode? What +must have been the inquietude of a people taken thus unprovided, who +fancied they saw nature cruelly labouring to their annihilation? Who +beheld a world ready to be dashed into atoms; who witnessed the earth +suddenly rent asunder; whose yawning chasm was the grave of large +cities, whole provinces, entire nations? What ideas must mortals, thus +overwhelmed with terror, form to themselves of the irresistible cause +that could produce such extended effects? Without doubt they did not +attribute these wide spreading calamities to nature; neither did they +conceive they were mere physical causes; they could not suspect she was +the author, the accomplice of the confusion she herself experienced; +they did not see that these tremendous revolutions, these overpowering +disorders, were the necessary result of her immutable laws; that they +contributed to the general order by which she subsists; that, in point +of fact, there was nothing more surprising in the inundation of large +portions of the earth, in the swallowing up an entire nation, in a +volcanic conflagration spreading destruction over whole provinces, than +there is in a stone falling to the earth, or the death of a fly; that +each equally has its spring in the necessity of things. + +It was under these astounding circumstances, that nations, bathed in +the most bitter tears, perplexed with the most frightful visions, +electrified with terror, not believing there existed on this mundane +ball, causes sufficiently powerful to operate the gigantic phenomena +that filled their minds with dismay, carried their streaming eyes +towards heaven, where their tremulous fears led them to suppose these +unknown agents, whose unprovoked enmity destroyed, their earthly +felicity, could alone reside. + +It was in the lap of ignorance, in the season of alarm, in the bosom of +calamity, that mankind ever formed his first notions of the _Divinity_. +From hence it is obvious that his ideas on this subject are to be +suspected, that his notions are in a great measure false, that they are +always afflicting. Indeed, upon whatever part of our sphere we cast +our eyes, whether it be upon the frozen climates of the north, upon the +parching regions of the south, or under the more temperate zones, we +every where behold the people when assailed by misfortunes, have either +made to themselves national gods, or else have adopted those which have +been given them by their conquerors; before these beings, either +of their own creation or adoption, they have tremblingly prostrated +themselves in the hour of calamity, soliciting relief; have ignorantly +attributed to blocks of stone, or to men like themselves, those natural +effects which were above their comprehension; the inhabitants of many +nations, not contented with the national gods, made each to himself +one or more gods, which he supposed presided exclusively over his own +household, from whom he supposed he derived his own peculiar happiness, +to whom he attributed all his domestic misfortunes. The idea of these +powerful agents, these supposed distributors of good and evil, was +always associated with that of terror; their name was never pronounced +without recalling to man's wind either his own particular calamities or +those of his fathers. In many places man trembles at this day, because +his progenitors have trembled for thousands of years past. The thought +of his gods always awakened in man the most afflicting ideas. If he +recurred to the source of his actual fears, to the commencement of those +melancholy impressions that stamp themselves in his mind when their +name is announced, he would find it in the conflagrations, in the +revolutions, in those extended disasters, that have at various times +destroyed large portions of the human race; that overwhelmed with dismay +those miserable beings who escaped the destruction of the earth; these +in transmitting to posterity, the tradition of such afflicting events, +have also transmitted to him their fears; have delivered down to their +successors, those gloomy ideas which their bewildered imaginations, +coupled with their barbarous ignorance of natural causes, had formed to +them of the anger of their irritated gods, to which their alarm falsely +attributed these sweeping disasters. + +If the gods of nations had their birth in the bosom of alarm, it was +again in that of despair that each individual formed the unknown power +that he made exclusively for himself. Ignorant of physical causes, +unpractised in their mode of action, unaccustomed to their effects, +whenever he experienced any serious misfortune, whenever he was +afflicted with any grievous sensation, he was at a loss how to account +for it; he therefore attributed it to his household gods, to whom he +made an immediate supplication for assistance, or rather for forbearance +of further affliction: this disposition in man has been finely +pourtrayed by Aesop in his fable of "the Waggoner and Hercules." The +motion which in despight of himself was excited in his machine, his +diseases, his troubles, his passions, his inquietude, the painful +alterations his frame underwent, without his being able to fathom the +true causes; at length death, of which the aspect in so formidable to a +being strongly attached to existence, were effects he looked upon either +as supernatural, or else he conceived they were repugnant to his actual +nature; he attributed them to some mighty cause, which maugre all his +efforts, disposed of him at each, moment. Thus palsied with alarm, +benumbed with terror, he pensively meditated upon his sorrows; agitated +with fear, he sought for means to avert the calamities that threatened +him with destruction; his imagination, thus rendered desperate by +his endurance of evils which he found inevitable, formed to him +those phantoms which he called gods; before whom he trembled from a +consciousness of his own weakness; thus disposed, he endeavoured by +prostration, by sacrifices, by prayers, to disarm the anger of these +imaginary beings to which his trepidation had given birth; whom he +ignorantly imagined to be the cause of his misery, whom his fancy +painted to him as endowed with the power of alleviating his sufferings: +it was thus in the extremity of his grief, in the exacerbation of his +mind, weighed down with misfortune, that unhappy man fashioned +those chimeras which filled him with the most gloomy ideas, which he +transmitted to his posterity, as the surest means of avoiding the evils +to which he had been himself subjected. + +Man never judges of those objects of which he is ignorant, but through +the medium of those which come within his knowledge: thus man, taking +himself for the model, ascribed will, intelligence, design, projects, +passions; in a word, qualities analogous to his own, to all those +unknown causes of which he experienced the action. As soon as a visible +or supposed cause affects him in an agreeable manner, or in a mode +favourable to his existence, he concludes it to be good, to be well +intentioned towards him: on the contrary, he judges all those to be bad +in their nature, evilly disposed, to have the intention of injuring him, +which cause him any painful sensations. He attributes views, plans, +a system of conduct like his own, to every thing which to his limited +ideas appears of itself to produce connected effects; to act with +regularity; to constantly operate in the same manner; that uniformly +produces the same sensations in his own person. According to these +notions, which he always borrows from himself, from his own peculiar +mode of action, he either loves or fears those objects which have +affected him; he in consequence approaches them with confidence or +timidity; seeks after them or flies from them in proportion as the +feelings they have excited are either pleasant or painful. Having +travelled thus far, he presently addresses them; he invokes their aid; +prays to them for succour; conjures them to cease his afflictions; +to forbear tormenting him; as he finds himself sensible to presents, +pleased with submission, he tries to win them to his interests by +humiliation, by sacrifices; he exercises towards them the hospitality +he himself loves; he gives them an asylum; he builds them a dwelling; +he furnishes them with costly raiment; he makes their altars smoke with +delicious food; he proffers to their acceptance the earliest flowers of +spring; the finest fruits of autumn; the rich grain of summer; in short +he sets before them all those things which he thinks will please them +the most, because he himself places the highest value on them. These +dispositions enable us to account for the formation of tutelary gods, +of lares, of larvae, which every man makes to himself in savage and +unpolished nations. Thus we perceive that weak superstitious mortals, +ignorant of truth, devoid of experience, regard as the arbiters of their +fate, as the dispensers of good and evil, animals, stones, unformed +inanimate substances, which the effort of their heated imaginations +transform into gods, whom they invest with intelligence, whom they +clothe with desires, to whom they give volition. + +Another disposition which serves to deceive the savage man, which will +equally deceive those whom reason shall not enlighten on these subjects, +is his attachment to omens; or the fortuitous concurrence of certain +effects, with causes which have not produced them; the co-existence +of these effects with certain causes, which have not the slightest +connection with them, has frequently led astray very intelligent beings; +nations who considered themselves very enlightened; who have either been +disinclined or unable to disentangle the one from the other: thus the +savage attributes bounty or the will to render him service, to any +object whether animate or inanimate, such as a stone of a certain form, +a rock, a mountain, a tree, a serpent, an owl, &c. if every time he +encounters these objects in a certain position, it should so happen that +he is more than ordinarily successful in hunting, that he should take an +unusual quantity of fish, that he should be victorious in war, or that +he should compass any enterprize whatever that he may at that moment +undertake: the same savage will be quite as gratuitous in attaching +malice, wickedness, the determination to injure him, to either the same +object in a different position, or any others in a given posture, which +way have met his eyes on those days when he shall have suffered some +grievous accident, have been very unsuccessful in his undertakings, +unfortunate in the chace, disappointed in his draught of fish: incapable +of reasoning he connects these effects with causes, that reflection +would convince him have nothing in common with each other; that are +entirely due to physical causes, to necessary circumstances, over which +neither himself nor his omens have the least controul: nevertheless he +finds it much easier to attribute them to these imaginary causes; he +therefore _deifies_ them; looks upon them as either his guardian angels, +or else as his most inveterate enemies. Having invested them with +supernatural powers, he becomes anxious to explain to himself their mode +of action; his self-love prevents his seeking elsewhere for the model: +thus he assigns them all those motives that actuate himself; he endows +them with passions; he gives them design--intelligence--will--imagines +they can either injure him or benefit him, as he may render them +propitious or otherwise to his views: he ends with worshipping them; +with paying them divine honours; he appoints them priests; or at least +always consults them before he undertakes any object of moment: such +is their influence, that if they put on the evil position, he will lay +aside the most important undertaking. The savage in this is never more +than an infant, that is angry with the object that displeases him; just +like the dog who gnaws the stone by which he has been wounded, without +recurring to the hand by which it was thrown. + +Such is the foundation of man's faith, in either happy or unhappy omens: +devoid of experience, unaccustomed to reason with precision, fearing +to call in the evidence of truth, he looks upon them either as gods +themselves, or else as warnings given him by his other gods, to whom +he attributes the faculties of sagacity and foresight, of which he is +himself miserably deficient. Ignorance, when involved in disaster, when +immersed in trouble, believes a stone, a reptile, a bird, much better +instructed than himself. The slender observation of the ignorant only +serves to render him more superstitious; he sees certain birds announce +by their flight, by their cries, certain changes in the weather, such as +cold, heat, rain, storms; he beholds at certain periods, vapours arise +from the bottom of some particular caverns? there needs nothing further +to impress upon him the belief, that these beings possess the knowledge +of future events; enjoy the gifts of prophecy: he looks upon them as +supernatural agents, employed by his gods: it is thus he becomes the +dupe to his own credulity. + +If by degrees the truth flashing occasionally on his mind, experience +and reflection arrive at undeceiving him, with respect to the power, +the intelligence, the virtues actually residing in these objects; he at +least supposes them put in activity by some secret, some hidden cause; +that they are the instruments, employed by some invisible agent, who +is either friendly or inimical to his welfare. To this concealed +agent, therefore, he addresses himself; pays him his vows; emplores +his assistance; deprecates his wrath; seeks to propitiate him to his +interests; is willing to soften his anger; for this purpose he employs +the same means, of which he avails himself, either to appease or gain +over the beings of his own species. + +Societies in their origin, seeing themselves frequently afflicted +by nature, supposed either the elements, or the concealed powers who +regulated them, possessed a will, views, wants, desires, similar to +their own. From hence, the sacrifices imagined to nourish them; the +libations poured out to them; the steams, the incense to gratify their +olfactory nerves. Their superstition led them to believe these elements +or their irritated movers were to be appeased like irritated man, by +prayers, by humiliation, by presents. Their imagination was ransacked +to discover the presents that would be most acceptable in their eyes; +to ascertain the oblations that would be most agreeable, the sacrifices +that would most surely propitiate their kindness: as these did not make +known their inclinations, man differed with his fellow on those most +suitable; each followed his own disposition; or rather each offered what +was most estimable in his own eyes; hence arose differences never to be +reconciled the bitterest animosities; the most unconquerable aversions; +the most, destructive jealousies! Thus some brought the fruits of the +earth, others offered sheaves of corn: some strewed flowers over their +fanes; some decorated them with the most costly jewels; some served them +with meats; others sacrificed lambs, heifers, bulls; at length such +was their delirium, such the wildness of their imaginations, that they +stained their altars with human gore, made oblations of young children +immolated virgins, to appease the anger of these supposed deities. + +The old men, as having the most experience, were usually charged with +the conduct of these peace-offerings, from whence, the name PRIEST; +[Greek letters], _presbos_, in the Greek meaning an old man. These +accompanied them with ceremonies, instituted rites, used precautions by +consulting omens; adopted formalities, retraced to their fellow citizens +the notions transmitted to them by their forefathers; collected the +observations made by their ancestors; repeated the fables they had +received; added commentaries of their own; subjoined supplications +to the idols at whose shrine they were sacrificing. It is thus +the sacerdotal order was established; thus that public worship was +established; by degrees each community formed a body of tenets to be +observed by the citizens; these were transmitted from race to race; +held sacred out of reverence for their fathers; at length it was deemed +sacrilege to doubt these pandects in any one particular; even the +errors, that had crept into them with time, were beheld with reverential +awe; he that ventured to reason upon them, was looked upon as an enemy +to the commonwealth; as one whose impiety drew down upon them the +vengeance of these adored beings, to which alone imagination had given +birth; not contented with adopting the rituals, with following the +ceremonies invented by themselves, one community waged war against +another, to oblige it to receive their particular creeds; which the old +men who regulated them, declared would infallibly win them the favor of +their tutelary deities: thus very often to conciliate their favor, the +victorious party immolated on the altars of their gods, the bodies of +their unhappy captives; frequently they carried their savage barbarity +the length of exterminating whole nations, who happened to worship gods +different from their own: thus it frequently happened, that the friends +of the serpent, when victorious, covered his altars with the mangled +carcases of the worshippers of the stone, whom the fortune of war had +placed in their hands: such were the unformed, the precarious elements +of which rude nations every where availed themselves to compose +their superstitions: they were always a system of conduct invented by +imagination: conceived in ignorance, organized in misfortune, to render +the unknown powers, to whom they believed nature was submitted, either +favorable to their views, or to, induce them to cease those afflictions, +which natural causes, for the wisest purposes, were continually heaping +upon them; thus some irascible, at the same time placable being, was +always chosen for the basis of the adopted superstition; it was upon +these puerile tenets, upon these absurd notions, that the old men or the +priests rested their doctrines; founded their rights; established their +authority: it was to render these fanciful beings friendly to the race +of man, that they erected, temples, raised altars, loaded them with +wealth; in short, it was from such rude foundations, that arose the +magnificent structure of superstition; under which man trembled for +thousands of years: which governed the condition of society, which +determined the actions of the people, gave the tone to the character, +deluged the earth with blood, for such a long series of ages. But +although these superstitions were originally invented by savages, they +still have the power of regulating the fate of many civilized +nations, who are not less tenacious of their chimeras, than their rude +progenitors. These systems, so ruinous in their principles, have been +variously modified by the human mind, of which it is the essence, to +labour incessantly on unknown objects; it always, commences by attaching +to these, a very first-rate importance, which it afterwards never dares +coolly to examine. + +Such was the course of man's imagination, in the successive ideas which +he either formed to himself, or which he received from his fathers, upon +the divinity. The first theology of man was grounded on fear, modelled +by ignorance: either afflicted or benefitted by the elements, he adored +these elements themselves; by a parity of reasoning, if reasoning it can +be called, he extended his reverence to every material, coarse object; +he afterwards rendered his homage to the agents he supposed presiding +over these elements; to powerful genii; to inferior genii; to heroes; +to men endowed with either great or striking qualities. Time, aided by +reflection, with here and there a slight corruscation of truth, induced +him in some places to relinquish his original ideas; he believed +he simplified the thing by lessening the number of his gods, but he +achieved nothing by this towards attaining to the truth; in recurring +from cause to cause man finished by losing sight of every thing; in this +obscurity, in this dark abyss, his mind still laboured, he formed +new chimeras, he made new gods, or rather he formed a very complex +machinery; still, as before, whenever he could not account for any +phenomenon that struck his sight, he was unwilling to ascribe it to +physical causes; and the name of his Divinity, whatever that might +happen to be, was always brought in to supply his own ignorance of +natural causes. + +If a faithful account was rendered of man's ideas upon the Divinity, he +would be obliged to acknowledge, that for the most part the word _Gods_ +has been used to express the concealed, remote, unknown causes of the +effects he witnessed; that he applies this term when the spring of +natural, the source of known causes ceases to be visible: as soon as he +loses the thread of these causes, or as soon as his mind can no longer +follow the chain, he solves the difficulty, terminates his research, by +ascribing it to his gods; thus giving a vague definition to an unknown +cause, at which either his idleness, or his limited knowledge, obliges +him to stop. When, therefore, he ascribes to his gods the production +of some phenomenon, the novelty or the extent of which strikes him with +wonder, but of which his ignorance precludes him from unravelling the +true cause, or which he believes the natural powers with which he is +acquainted are inadequate to bring forth; does he, in fact, do any thing +more than substitute for the darkness of his own mind, a sound to which +he has been accustomed to listen with reverential awe? Ignorance may be +said to be the inheritance of the generality of men; these attribute to +their gods not only those uncommon effects that burst upon their senses +with an astounding force, but also the most simple events, the causes +of which are the most easy to be known to whoever shall be willing to +meditate upon them. In short, man has always respected those unknown +causes, those surprising effects which his ignorance prevented him from +fathoming. + +But does this afford us one single, correct idea of the _Divinity_? Can +it be possible we are acting rationally, thus eternally to make him +the agent of our stupidity, of our sloth, of our want of information on +natural causes? Do we, in fact, pay any kind of adoration to this being, +by thus bringing him forth on every trifling occasion, to solve the +difficulties ignorance throws in our way? Of whatever nature this great +cause of causes may be, it is evident to the slightest reflection that +he has been sedulous to conceal himself from our view; that he has +rendered it impossible for us to have the least acquaintance with +him, except through the medium of nature, which he has unquestionably +rendered competent to every thing: this is the rich banquet spread +before man; he is invited to partake, with a welcome he has no right to +dispute; to enjoy therefore is to obey; to be happy is to render that +worship which must make him most acceptable; _to be happy himself is +to make others happy; to make others happy is to be virtuous; to be +virtuous he must revere truth: to know what truth is, he must examine +with caution, scrutinize with severity, every opinion he adopts:_ this +granted, is it at all consistent with the majesty of the Divinity, is it +not insulting to such a being to clothe him with our wayward passions; +to ascribe to him designs similar to our narrow view of things; to +give him our filthy desires; to suppose he can be guided by our finite +conceptions; to bring him on a level with frail humanity, by investing +him with our qualities, however much we may exaggerate them; to indulge +an opinion that he can either act or think as we do; to imagine he can +in any manner resemble such a feeble play-thing, as is the greatest, the +most distinguished man? No! it is to degrade him in the eye of reason; +to violate every regard for truth; to set moral decency at defiance; to +fall back into the depth of cimmerian darkness. Let man therefore sit +down cheerfully to the feast; let him contentedly partake of what he +finds; but let him not worry the Divinity with his useless prayers, with +his shallow-sighted requests, to solicit at his hands that which, if +granted, would in all probability be the most injurious for himself; +these supplications are, in fact, at once to say, that with our limited +experience, with our slender knowledge, we better understand what is +suitable to our condition, what is convenient to our welfare, than the +mighty _Cause of all causes_ who has left us in the hands of nature: +it is to be presumptuous in the highest degree of presumption; it is +impiously to endeavour to lift up a veil which it is evidently forbidden +man to touch; that even his most strenuous efforts attempt in vain. + +It remains, then, to inquire, if man can reasonably flatter himself with +obtaining a perfect knowledge of the power of nature; of the properties +of the beings she contains; of the effects which may result from their +various combinations? Do we know why the magnet attracts iron? Are +we better acquainted with the cause of polar attraction? Are we in a +condition to explain the phenomena of light, electricity, elasticity? +Do we understand the mechanism by which that modification of our brain, +which we tall volition, puts our arm or our legs into motion? Can we +render to ourselves an account of the manner in which our eyes behold +objects, in which our ears receive sounds, in which our mind conceives +ideas? All we know upon these subjects is, that they are so. If then +we are incapable of accounting for the most ordinary phenomena, which +nature daily exhibits to us, by what chain of reasoning do we refuse to +her the power of producing other effects equally incomprehensible to +us? Shall we be more instructed, when every time we behold an effect of +which we are not in a capacity to develope the cause, we may idly say, +this effect is produced by the power, by the will of God? Undoubtedly it +is the great _Cause of causes_ must have produced every thing; but is +it not lessening the true dignity of the Divinity, to introduce him as +interfering in every operation of nature; nay, in every action of so +insignificant a creature as man? As a mere agent executing his own +eternal, immutable laws; when experience, when reflection, when the +evidence of all we contemplate, warrants the idea, that this ineffable +being has rendered nature competent to every effect, by giving her those +irrevocable laws, that eternal, unchangeable system, according to which +all the beings she contains must eternally act? Is it not more worthy +the exalted mind of the GREAT PARENT OF PARENTS, _ens entium_, more +consistent with truth, to suppose that his wisdom in giving these +immutable, these eternal laws to the macrocosm, foresaw every thing that +could possibly be requisite for the happiness of the beings contained in +it; that therefore he left it to the invariable operation of a system, +which never can produce any effect that is not the best possible that +circumstances however viewed will admit: that consequently the natural +activity of the human mind, which is itself the result of this eternal +action, was purposely given to man, that he might endeavour to +fathom, that he might strive to unravel, that he might seek out the +concatenation of these laws, in order to furnish remedies against the +evils produced by ignorance. How many discoveries in the great science +of natural philosophy has mankind progressively made, which the ignorant +prejudices of our forefathers on their first announcement considered +as impious, as displeasing to the Divinity, as heretical profanations, +which could only be expiated by the sacrifice of the enquiring +individuals; to whose labour their posterity owes such an infinity of +gratitude? Even in modern days we have seen a SOCRATES destroyed, a +GALLILEO condemned, whilst multitudes of other benefactors to mankind +have been held in contempt by their uninformed cotemporaries, for those +very researches into nature which the present generation hold in the +highest veneration. _Whenever ignorant priests are permitted to guide +the opinions of nations, science can make but a very slender progress:_ +natural discoveries will be always held inimical to the interest of +bigotted superstitious men. It may, to the minds of infatuated mortals, +to the shallow comprehension of prejudiced beings, appear very pious to +reply on every occasion our gods do this, our gods do that; but to the +contemplative philosopher, to the man of reason, to the real adorers of +the great _Cause of causes_, it will never be convincing, that a sound, +a mere word, can attach the reason of things; can have more than a fixed +sense; can suffice to explain problems. The word GOD is for the most +part used to denote the impenetrable cause of those effects which +astonish mankind; which man is not competent to explain. But is not this +wilful idleness? Is it not inconsistent with our nature? Is it not being +truly impious, to sit down with those fine faculties we have received, +and give the answer of a child to every thing we do not understand; or +rather which our own sloth, or our own want of industry has prevented us +from knowing? Ought we not rather to redouble our efforts to penetrate +the cause of those phenomena which strike our mind? Is not this, in +fact, the duty we owe to the great, the universal Parent? When we have +given this answer, what have we said? nothing but what every one knows. +Could the great _Cause of causes_ make the whole, without also making +its part? But does it of necessity follow that he executes every +trifling operation, when he has so noble an agent as his own nature, +whose laws he has rendered unchangeable, whose scale of operations can +never deviate from the eternal routine he has marked out for her and all +the beings she embraces? Whose secrets, if sought out, contain the true +balsam of life--the sovereign remedy for all the diseases of man. + +When we shall be ingenuous with ourselves, we shall be obliged to +agree that it was uniformly the ignorance in which our ancestors were +involved, their want of knowledge of natural causes, their unenlightened +ideas on the powers of nature, which gave birth to the gods they +worshipped; that it is, again, the impossibility which the greater +part of mankind find to withdraw, themselves out of this ignorance, the +difficulty they consequently find to form to themselves simple ideas +of the formation of things, the labour that is required to discover the +true sources of those events, which they either admire or fear, that +makes them believe these ideas are necessary to enable them to render an +account of those phenomena, to which their own sluggishness renders them +incompetent to recur. Here, without doubt, is the reason they treat all +those as irrational who do not see the necessity of admitting an unknown +agent, or some secret energy, which for want of being acquainted with +Nature, they have placed out of herself. + +The phenomena of nature necessarily breed various sentiments in man: +some he thinks favorable to him, some prejudicial, while the whole +is only what it can be. Some excite his love, his admiration, his +gratitude; others fill him with trouble, cause aversion, drive him to +despair. According to the various sensations he experiences, he either +loves or fears the causes to which he attributes the effects, +which produce in him these different passions: these sentiments +are commensurate with the effects he experiences; his admiration is +enhanced, his fears are augmented, in the same ratio as the phenomena +which strikes his senses are more or less extensive, more or less +irresistible or interesting to him. Man necessarily makes himself the +centre of nature; indeed he can only judge of things, as he is himself +affected by them; he can only love that which he thinks favorable to +his being; he hates, he fears every thing which causes him to suffer: +in short, as we have seen in the former volume, he calls confusion every +thing that deranges the economy of his machine; he believes all is in +order, as soon as he experiences nothing but what is suitable to his +peculiar mode of existence. By a necessary consequence of these ideas, +man firmly believes that the entire of nature was made for him alone; +that it was only himself which she had in view in all her works; or +rather that the powerful cause to which this nature was subordinate, had +only for object man and his convenience, in all the stupendous effects +which are produced in the universe. + +If there existed on this earth other thinking beings besides man, +they would fall exactly into similar prejudices with himself; it is +a sentiment founded upon that predilection which each individual +necessarily has for himself; a predilection that will subsist until +reason, aided by experience, in pointing out the truth, shall have +rectified his errors. + +Thus, whenever man is contented, whenever every thing is in order with +respect to himself, he either admires or loves the causes to which he +believes he is indebted for his welfare; when he becomes discontented +with his mode of existence, he either fears or hates the cause which +he supposes has produced these afflicting effects. But his welfare +confounds itself with his existence; it ceases to make itself felt when +it has become habitual, when it has been of long continuance; he then +thinks it is inherrent to his essence; he concludes from it that he is +formed to be always happy; he finds it natural that every thing should +concur to the maintenance of his being. It is by no means the same when +he experiences a mode of existence that is displeasing to himself: the +man who suffers is quite astonished at the change which his taken place +in his machine; he judges it to be contrary to the entire of nature, +because it is incommodious to his own particular nature; he, imagines +those events by which he is wounded, to be contrary to the order of +things; he believes that nature is deranged every time she does not +procure for him that mode of feeling which is suitable to his ideas: he +concludes from these suppositions that nature, or rather that the agent +who moves her; is irritated against him. + +It is thus that man, almost insensible to good, feels evil in a very +lively manner; the first he believes natural, the other he thinks +opposed to nature. He is either ignorant, or forgets, that he +constitutes part of a whole, formed by the assemblage of substances, of +which some are analogous, others heterogeneous; that the various beings +of which nature is composed, are endowed with a variety of properties, +by virtue of which they act diversely on the bodies who find themselves +within the sphere of their action; that some have an aptitude to +attraction, whilst it is of the essence of others to repel; that even +those bodies that attract at one distance, repel at another; that +the peculiar attractions and repulsions of the particles of bodies +perpetually oppose, invariably counteract the general ones of the masses +of matter: he does not perceive that these beings, as destitute of +goodness, as devoid of malice, act only according to their respective +essences; follow the laws their properties impose upon them; without +being in capacity to act otherwise than they do. It is, therefore, for +want of being acquainted with these things, that he looks upon the great +Author of nature, the great _Cause of causes_, as the immediate cause of +those evils to which he is submitted; that he judges erroneously when he +imagines that the Divinity is exasperated against him. + +The fact is, man believes that his welfare is a debt due to him from +nature; that when he suffers evil she does him an injustice; fully +persuaded that this nature was made solely for himself, he cannot +conceive she would make him, who is her lord paramount, suffer, if she +was not moved thereto by a power who is inimical to his happiness; +who has reasons with which he is unacquainted for afflicting, who has +motives which he wishes to discover, for punishing him. From hence it +will be obvious, that evil, much more than good, is the true motive of +those researches which man has made concerning the Divinity--of those +ideas which he has formed to himself--of the conduct he has held towards +him. The admiration of the works of nature, or the acknowledgement of +its goodness, seem never alone to have determined the human species to +recur painfully by thought to the source of these things; familiarized +at once with all those effects which are favourable to his existence, he +does not by any means give himself the same trouble to seek the causes, +that he does to discover those which disquiet him, or by which he is +afflicted. Thus, in reflecting upon the Divinity, it was generally +upon the cause of his evils that man meditated; his meditations were +fruitless, because the evil he experiences, as well as the good he +partakes, are equally necessary effects of natural causes, to which +his mind ought rather to have bent its force, than to have invented +fictitious causes of which he never could form to himself any but +false ideas; seeing that he always borrowed them, from his own peculiar +mariner of existing, acting, and feeling. Obstinately refusing to see +any thing, but himself, he never became acquainted with that universal +nature of which he constitutes such a very feeble part. + +The slightest reflection, however, would have been sufficient to +undeceive him on these erroneous ideas. Everything tends to prove that +good and evil are modes of existence that depend upon causes by which a +man is moved; that a sensible being is obliged to experience them. In +a nature composed of a multitude of beings infinitely varied, the +shock occasioned by the collision of discordant matter must necessarily +disturb the order, derange the mode of existence of those beings who +have no analogy with them: these act in every thing they do after +certain laws, which are in themselves immutable; the good or evil, +therefore, which man experiences, are necessary consequences of the +qualities inherent to the beings, within whose sphere of action he is +found. Our birth, which we call a benefit, is an effect as necessary as +our death, which we contemplate as an injustice of fate: it is of the +nature of all analogous beings to unite themselves to form a whole: it +is of the nature of all compound beings to be destroyed, or to dissolve +themselves; some maintain their union for a longer period than others; +some disperse very quickly, as the ephemeron; some endure for ages, as +the planets; every being in dissolving itself gives birth to new beings; +these are destroyed in their turn; to execute the eternal, the immutable +laws of a nature that only exists by the continual changes that all +its parts undergo. Thus nature cannot be accused of malice, since every +thing that takes place in it is necessary--is produced by an invariable +system, to which every other being, as well as herself, is eternally +subjected. The same igneous matter that in man is the principle of +life, frequently becomes the principle of his destruction, either by the +conflagration of a city, the explosion of a volcano, or his mad passion +for war. The aqueous fluid that circulates through his machine, so +essentially necessary to his actual existence, frequently becomes too +abundant, and terminates him by suffocation; is the cause of those +inundations which sometimes swallow up both the earth and its +inhabitants. The air, without which he is not able to respire, is the +cause of those hurricanes, of those tempests, which frequently render +useless the labour of mortals. These elements are obliged to burst their +bonds, when they are combined in a certain manner; their necessary but +fatal consequences are those ravages, those contagions, those famines, +those diseases, those various scourges, against which man, with +streaming eyes and violent emotions, vainly implores the aid of those +powers who are deaf to his cries: his prayers are never granted; but +the same necessity which afflicted him, the same immutable laws which +overwhelmed him with trouble, replaces things in the order he finds +suitable to his species: a relative order of things which was, is, and +always will be the only standard of his judgment. + +Man, however, made no such simple reflections: he either did not or +would not perceive that every thing in nature acted by invariable +laws; he continued stedfast in contemplating the good of which he was +partaker, as a favor; in considering the evil he experienced, as a sign +of anger in this nature, which he supposed to be animated by the same +passions as himself or at least that it was governed by secret agents, +who acted after his own manner, who obliged it to execute their will, +that was sometimes favourable, sometimes inimical to the human species. +It was to these supposed agents, with whom in the sunshine of his +prosperity he was but little occupied, that in the bosom of his calamity +he addressed his prayers; he thanked them, however, for their favours, +fearing lest their ingratitude might farther provoke their fury: thus +when assailed by disaster, when afflicted with disease, he invoked them +with fervor: he required them to change in his favor the mode of acting +which was the very essence of beings; he was willing that to make the +slightest evil he experienced cease, that the eternal chain of things +might be broken; and the unerring, undeviating course of nature might he +arrested. + +It was upon such ridiculous pretensions, that were founded those +supplications, those fervent prayers, which mortals, almost always +discontented with their fate, never in accord in their respective +desires, addressed to their gods. They were unceasingly upon their knees +before the altars, were ever prostrate before the power of the beings, +whom they judged had the right of commanding nature; who they supposed +to have sufficient energy to divert her course; who they considered to +possess the means to make her subservient to their particular views; +thus each hoped by presents, by humiliation, to induce them to oblige +this nature, to satisfy the discordant desires of their race. The sick +man, expiring in his bed, asks that the humours accumulated in his body +should in an instant lose those properties which renders them injurious +to his existence; that by an act of their puissance, his gods should +renew or recreate the springs of a machine worn out by infirmities. The +cultivator of a low swampy country, makes complaint of the abundance of +rain with which his fields are inundated; whilst the inhabitant of +the hill, raises his thanks for the favors he receives, solicits a +continuance of that which causes the despair of his neighbour. In this, +each is willing to have a god for himself, and asks according to his +momentary caprices, to his fluctuating wants, that the invariable +essence of things, should be continually changed in his favour. + +From this it must be obvious, that man every moment asks a _miracle_ to +be wrought in his support. It is not, therefore, at all surprising that +he displayed such ready credulity, that he adopted with such facility +the relation of the marvellous deeds which were universally announced to +him as the acts of the power, or the effects of the benevolence, of +the various gods which presided over the nations of the earth: these +wonderful tales, which were offered to his acceptance, as the most +indubitable proofs of the empire of these gods over nature, which man +always found deaf to his entreaties, were readily accredited by him; in +the expectation, that if he could gain them over to his interest, this +nature, which he found so sullen, so little disposed to lend herself to +his views, would then be controuled in his own favor. + +By a necessary consequence of these ideas, nature was despoiled of all +power; she was contemplated only as a passive instrument, who acted at +the will, under the influence of the numerous, all-powerful agents to +whom the various superstitions had rendered her subordinate. It was thus +for want of contemplating nature under her true point of view, that man +has mistaken her entirely, that he believed her incapable of producing +any thing by herself; that he ascribed the honor of all those +productions, whether advantageous or disadvantageous to the human +species, to fictitious powers, whom he always clothed with his own +peculiar dispositions, only he aggrandized their force. In short, it +was upon the ruins of nature, that man erected the imaginary colossus of +superstition, that he reared the _altars of a Jupiter, the temples of an +Apollo_. + +If the ignorance of nature gave birth to such a variety of gods, the +knowledge of this nature is calculated to destroy them. As soon as man +becomes enlightened, his powers augment, his resources increase in a +ratio with his knowledge; the sciences, the protecting arts, industrious +application, furnish him assistance; experience encourages his progress, +truth procures for him the means of resisting the efforts of many +causes, which cease to alarm him as soon as he obtains a correct +knowledge of them. In a word, his terrors dissipate in proportion as his +mind becomes enlightened, because his trepidation is ever commensurate +with his ignorance, and furnishes this great lesson, that _man, +instructed by truth, ceases to be superstitious_. + + + + + +CHAP. II. + +_Of Mythology, and Theology_. + + +The elements of nature were, as we have shewn, the first divinities +of man; he has generally commenced with adoring material beings; each +individual, as we have already said, as may be still seen in savage +nations, made to himself a particular god, of some physical object, +which he supposed to be the cause of those events, in which he was +himself interested; he never wandered to seek out of visible nature, +the source either of what happened to himself, or of those phenomena to +which he was a witness. As he every where saw only material effects, he +attributed them to causes of the same genus; incapable in his infancy +of those profound reveries, of those subtle speculations, which are +the fruit of time, the result of leisure, he did not imagine any cause +distinguished from the objects that met his sight, nor of any essence +totally different from every thing he beheld. + +The observation of nature was the first study of those who had leisure +to meditate: they could not avoid being struck with the phenomena of the +visible world. The rising and setting of the sun, the periodical return +of the seasons, the variations of the atmosphere, the fertility and +sterility of the earth, the advantages of irrigation, the damage caused +by floods, the useful effects of fire, the terrible consequences +of conflagration, were proper and suitable objects to occupy their +thoughts. It was natural for them to believe that those beings they saw +move of themselves, acted by their own peculiar energies; according as +their influence over the inhabitants of the earth was either favorable +or otherwise, they concluded them to have either the power to injure +them, or the disposition to confer benefits. Those who first acquired +the knowledge of gaining an ascendancy over man, then savage, wandering, +unpolished, or dispersed in woods, with but little attachment to the +soil, of which he had not yet learned to reap the advantage, were always +more practised observers--individuals more instructed in the ways of +nature, than the people, or rather the scattered hordes, whom they found +ignorant and destitute of experience: their superior knowledge placed +them in a capacity to render these services--to discover to them useful +inventions, which attracted the confidence of the unhappy beings to +whom they came to offer an assisting hand; savages who were naked, +half famished, exposed to the injuries of the weather, obnoxious to the +attacks of ferocious beasts, dispersed in caverns, scattered in forests, +occupied with hunting, painfully labouring to procure themselves a very +precarious subsistence, had not sufficient leisure to make discoveries +calculated to facilitate their labour, or to render it less incessant. +These discoveries are generally the fruit of society: isolated beings, +detached families, hardly ever make any discoveries--scarcely ever think +of making any. The savage is a being who lives in a perpetual state of +infancy, who never reaches maturity unless some one comes to draw him +out of his misery. At first repulsive, unsociable, intractable, he by +degrees familiarizes himself with those who render him service; once +gained by their kindness, he readily lends them his confidence; in the +end he goes the length of sacrificing to them his liberty. + +It was commonly from the bosom of civilized nations that have issued +those personages who have carried sociability, agriculture, art, laws, +gods, superstition, forms of worship, to those families or hordes as yet +scattered; who united them either to the body of some other nations, +or formed them into new nations, of which they themselves became the +leaders, sometimes the king, frequently the high priest, and often their +god. These softened their manners--gathered them together--taught +them to reap the advantages of their own powers--to render each other +reciprocal assistance--to satisfy their wants with greater facility. In +thus rendering their existence more comfortable, thus augmenting +their happiness, they attracted their love; obtained their veneration, +acquired the right of prescribing opinions to them, made them adopt +such as they had either invented themselves, or else drawn up in the +civilized countries from whence they came. History points out to us the +most famous legislators as men, who, enriched with useful knowledge they +had gleaned in the bosom of polished nations, carried to savages without +industry, needing assistance, those arts, of which, until then, these +rude people were ignorant: such were the Bacchus's, the Orpheus's, the +Triptolemus's, the Numa's, the Zamolixis's; in short, all those who +first gave to nations their gods--their worship--the rudiments of +agriculture, of science, of superstition, of jurisprudence, of religion, +&c. + +It will perhaps be enquired, If those nations which at the present day +we see assembled, were all originally dispersed? We reply, that this +dispersion may have been produced at various times, by those terrible +revolutions, of which it has before been remarked our globe has more +than once been the theatre; in times so remote, that history has not +been able to transmit us the detail. Perhaps the approach of more than +one comet may have produced on our earth several universal ravages, +which have at each time annihilated the greater portion of the human +species. + +These hypotheses will unquestionably appear bold to those who have not +sufficiently meditated on nature, but to the philosophic enquirer they +are by no means inconsistent. There may not only have been one general +deluge, but even a great number since the existence of our planet; this +globe itself may have been a new production in nature; it may not always +have occupied the place it does at present. Whatever idea may be adopted +on this subject, if it is very certain that, independent of those +exterior causes, which are competent to totally change its face, as the +impulse of a comet may do, this globe contains within itself, a cause +adequate to alter it entirely, since, besides the diurnal and sensible +motion of the earth, it has one extremely slow, almost imperceptible, by +which every thing must eventually be changed in it: this is the motion +from whence depends the _precession_ of the _equinoctial points_, +observed by _Hipparchus_ and other mathematicians, now well understood +by astronomers; by this motion, the earth must at the end of several +thousand years change totally: this motion will at length cause +the ocean to occupy that space which at present forms the lands or +continents. From this it will be obvious that our globe, as well as all +the beings in nature, has a continual disposition to change. This motion +was known to the ancients, and was what gave rise to what they called +their great year, which the Egyptians fixed at thirty-six thousand five +hundred and twenty-five years: the Sabines at thirty-six thousand four +hundred and twenty-five, whilst others have extended it to one hundred +thousand, some even to seven hundred and fifty-three thousand years. +Again, to those general revolutions which our planet has at different +times experienced, way he added those that have been partial, such as +inundations of the sea, earthquakes, subterraneous conflagrations, which +have sometimes had the effect of dispersing particular nations, and +to make them forget all those sciences with which they were, before +acquainted. It is also probable that the first volcanic fires, having +had no previous vent, were more central, and greater in quantity, before +they burst the crust of earth; as the sea washed the whole, it must +have rapidly sunk down into every opening, where, falling on the boiling +lava, it was instantly expanded into steam, producing irresistible +explosion: whence it is reasonable to conclude, that the primaeval +earthquakes wore more widely extended, and of much greater force, than +those which occur in our days. Other vapours may be produced by intense +heat, possessing a much greater elasticity, from substances that +evaporate, such as mercury, diamonds, &c.; the expansive force of these +vapours would be much greater than the steam of water, even at red hot +heat consequently they, way have had sufficient energy to raise islands, +continents, or even to have detached the moon from the earth; if the +moon, as has been supposed by some philosophers, was thrown out of the +great cavity which now contains the South Sea; the immense quantity of +water flowing in from the original ocean, and which then covered the +earth, would much contribute to leave the continents and islands, which +might be raised at the same time, above the surface of the water. In +later days we have accounts of huge stones falling, from the firmament, +which may have been thrown by explosion from some distant earthquake, +without having been impelled with a force sufficient to cause them to +circulate round the earth, and thus produce numerous small moons or +satellites. + +Those who were able to escape from the ruin of the world, filled +with consternation, plunged in misery, were but little conditioned to +preserve to their posterity a knowledge, effaced by those misfortunes, +of which they had been both the victims and the witnesses: overwhelmed +with dismay, trembling with fear, they were not able to hand down the +history of their frightful adventures, except by obscure traditions; +much less to transmit to us the opinions, the systems, the arts, the +sciences, anterior to these petrifying revolutions of our sphere. There +have been perhaps men upon the earth from all eternity; but at different +periods they may have been nearly annihilated, together with their +monuments, their sciences, and their arts; those who outlived these +periodical revolutions, each time formed a new race of men, who by dint +of time, labour, and experience, have by degrees withdrawn from +oblivion the inventions of the primitive races. It is, perhaps, to these +periodical revolutions of the human species, that is to be ascribed the +profound ignorance in which we see man yet plunged, upon those objects +that are the most interesting to him. This is, perhaps, the true source +of the imperfection of his knowledge--of the vices of his political +institutions--of the defect in his religion--of the growth of +superstition, over which terror has always presided; here, in all +probability, is the cause of that puerile inexperience, of those jejune +prejudices, which almost every where keep man in a state of infancy, and +which render him so little capable of either listening to reason or +of consulting truth. To judge by the slowness of his progress, by +the feebleness of his advance, in a number of respects, we should be +inclined to say, the human race has either just quitted its cradle, or +that he was never destined to attain the age of virility--to corroborate +his reason. + +However it may be with these conjectures, whether the human race may +always have existed upon the earth, whether it may have been a recent +production of nature, whether the larger animals we now behold were +originally derived from the smallest microscopic ones, who have +increased in bulk with the progression of time, or whether, as the +Egyptian philosophers thought, mankind were originally hermaphrodites, +who like the _aphis_ produced the sexual distinction after some +generations, which was also the opinion of Plato, and seems to have +been that of Moses, who was educated amongst these Egyptians, as may be +gathered from the 27th and 28th verses of the first chapter of GENESIS: +"So God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he +him; male and female created he them--And GOD blessed them, and GOD +said unto them, be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth, and +subdue it: and have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl +of the air, and over every living thing that moveth upon the earth:" it +is not therefore presuming too much to suppose, as the Egyptians were +a nation very fond of explaining their opinions by hieroglyphics, +that that part which describes Eve as taken out of Adam's rib, was an +hieroglyphic emblem: showing that mankind was in the primitive state of +both sexes, united, who was afterwards divided into males and females. +However, I say, this may be, it is extremely easy to recur to the origin +of many existing nations: we shall find them always in the savage state; +that is, to say, dispersed; composed of families detached from each +other; of wandering, hordes; these were collected together, approximated +at the voice of some missionary or legislator, from whom they +received great benefits, who gave them gods, opinions, and laws. These +personages, of whom the people newly congregated readily acknowledged +the superiority, fixed the national gods, leaving to each individual, +those which he had formed to himself, according to his own peculiar +ideas, or else substituting others brought from those regions, from +whence they themselves had emigrated. + +The better to imprint their lessons on the minds of their new subjects, +these men became the guides, the priests, the sovereigns, the masters +of these infant societies; they formed discourses by which they spoke to +the imagination of their willing auditors. POETRY seem best adapted to +strike the mind of these rude people, to engrave on their memory those +ideas with which they were willing to imbue them: its images, its +fictions, its numbers, its rhyme its harmony, all conspired to please +their fancy, to render permanent the impressions it made: thus, the +entire of nature, as well as all its parts, was personified, by its +beautiful allegories: at its soothing voice, trees, stones, rocks, +earth, air, fire, water, by imagination took intelligence, held +conversation with man, and with themselves; the elements were deified by +its songs, every thing was figuratively detailed in harmonious lays. +The sky, which according to the then philosophy, was an arched concave, +spreading over the earth, which was supposed to be a level plain; (for +the doctrine of _antipodes_ is of rather modern date) was itself made +a god; was considered a more suitable residence, as making a greater +distinction for these imaginary deities than the earth on which man +himself resided. Thus the firmament was filled with deities. + +Time, under the name of Saturn, was pictured as the son of heaven; +or Coelus by earth, called Terra, or Thea; he was represented as +an inexorable divinity--naturally artful, who devoured his own +children--who revenged the anger of his mother upon his father; for +which purpose she armed him with a scythe, formed of metals drawn from +her own bowels, with which he struck Coelus, in the act of uniting +himself to Thea, and so mutilated him, that he was ever after +incapacitated to increase the number of his children: he was said to +have divided the throne with Janus king of Italy, his reign seems to +have been so mild, so beneficent, that it was called the _golden +age_; human victims were sacrificed on his altars, until abolished by +Hercules, who substituted small images of clay. Festivals in honor of +this god, called Saturnalia, were instituted long antecedent to the +foundation of Rome they were celebrated about the middle of December, +either on the 16th, 17th, or 18th; they lasted in latter times +several days, originally but one. Universal liberty prevailed at the +celebration, slaves were permitted to ridicule their masters--to speak +freely on every subject--no criminals were executed--war never declared; +the priests made their human offerings with their heads uncovered; a +circumstance peculiar to the Saturnalia, not adopted at other festivals. + +The igneous matter, the etherial electric fluid, that invisible fire +which vivifies nature, that penetrates all beings, that fertilizes the +earth, which is the great principle of motion, the source of heat, was +deified under the name of Jupiter: his combination with every being in +nature was expressed by his metamorphoses--by the frequent adulteries +imputed to him. He was armed with thunder, to indicate he produced +meteors, to typify the electric fluid that is called lightning. He +married the winds, which were designated under the name of Juno, +therefore called the Goddess of the Winds, their nuptials were +celebrated with great solemnity; all the gods, the entire brute +creation, the whole of mankind attended, except one young woman named +Chelone, who laughed at the ceremonies, for which impiety she was +changed by Mercury into a tortoise, and condemned to perpetual silence. +He was the most powerful of all the gods, and considered as the king and +father both of gods and men: his worship was very extended, performed +with greater solemnity, than that of any other god. Upon his altars +smoked goats, sheep, and white bulls, in which he is said to have +particularly delighted; the oak was rendered sacred to him, because +he taught mankind to live upon acorns; he had many oracles where his +precepts were delivered, the most celebrated of these were at Dodona and +Ammon in Lybia; he was supposed to be invisible to the inhabitants of +the earth; the Lacedemonians erected his statue with four heads, thereby +indicating, that he listened readily to the solicitations of every +quarter of the earth. Minerva is represented as having no mother, but to +have come completely armed from his brains, when his head was opened by +Vulcan; by which it is meant to infer that wisdom is the result of +this ethereal fluid. Thus, following the same fictions, the sun, that +beneficent star which has such a marked influence over the earth, became +an Osiris, a Belus, a Mithras, an Adonis, an Apollo. Nature, rendered +sorrowful by his periodical absence, was an Isis, an Astarte, a Venus, +a Cybele. Astarte had a magnificent temple at Hieropolis served by three +hundred priests, who were always employed in offering sacrifices. The +priests of Cybele, called Corybantes, also Galli, were not admitted to +their sacred functions without previous mutilation. In the celebration +of their festivals these priests used all kinds of indecent expressions, +beat drums, cymbals, and behaved just like madmen: his worship extended +all over Phrygia, and was established in Greece under the name of +_Eleusinian mysteries_. In short, every thing was personified: the sea +was under the empire of Neptune; fire was adored by the Egyptians under +the name of Serapis; by the Persians, under that of Ormus or Oromaze; +and by the Romans, under that of Vesta and Vulcan. + +Such was the origin of mythology: it may be said to be the daughter of +natural philosophy, embellished by poetry; only destined to describe +nature and its parts. If antiquity is consulted, it will be perceived +without much trouble, that these famous sages, those legislators, those +priests, those conquerors, who were the instructors of infant nations, +themselves adored active nature, or the great whole considered +relatively to its different operations or qualities; that this was what +they caused the ignorant savages whom they had gathered together to +adore. It was the great whole they deified; it was its various parts +which they made their inferior gods; it was from the necessity of her +laws they made fate. The Greeks called it Nature, a divinity who had +a thousand names. Varro says, "I believe that God is the soul of the +universe, and that the universe is God." Cicero says "that in the +mysteries of Samothracia, of Lemnos, of Eleusis, it was nature much more +than the gods, they explained to the initiated." Pliny says, "we must +believe that the world, or that which is contained under the vast +extent of the heavens, is the Divinity; even eternal, infinite, without +beginning or end." It was these different modes of considering nature +that gave birth to Polytheism, to idolatry. Allegory masqued its mode +of action: it was at length parts of this great whole, that idolatry +represented by statues and symbols. + +To complete the proofs of what has been said; to shew distinctly that it +was the great whole, the universe, the nature of things, which was the +real object of the worship of Pagan antiquity, hardly any thing can be +more decisive than the beginning of the hymn of Orpheus addressed to the +god Pan. + +"O Pan! I invoke thee, O powerful god! O universal nature! the heavens, +the sea, the earth, who nourish all, and the eternal fire, because these +are thy members, O all powerful Pan," &c. Nothing can be more suitable +to confirm these ideas, than the ingenious explanation which is given +of the fable of Pan, as well as of the figure under which he is +represented. It is said, "Pan, according to the signification of his +name, is the emblem by which the ancients have designated the great +assemblage of things or beings: he represents the universe; and, in the +mind of the wisest philosophers of antiquity, he passed for the greatest +and most ancient of the gods. The features under which he is delineated +form the portrait of nature, and of the savage state in which she was +found in the beginning. The spotted skin of the leopard, which +serves him for a mantle, imagined the heavens filled with stars and +constellations. His person was compounded of parts, some of which were +suitable to a reasonable animal, that is to say, to man; and others to +the animal destitute of reason, such as the goat. It is thus," says +he, "that the universe is composed of an intelligence that governs the +whole, and of the prolific, fruitful elements of fire, water, earth, +air. Pan, loved to drink and to follow the nymphs; this announces the +occasion nature has for humidity in all her productions, and that this +god, like nature, is strongly inclined to propagation. According to the +Egyptians, and the most ancient Grecian philosophers, Pan had neither +father nor mother; he came out of Demogorgon at the same moment with +the Destinies, his fatal sisters; a fine method of expressing that the +universe was the work of an unknown power, and that it was formed after +the invariable relations, the eternal laws of necessity; but his most +significant symbol, that most suitable to express the harmony of the +universe, is his mysterious pipe, composed of seven unequal tubes, but +calculated to produce the nicest, the most perfect concord. The orbs +which compose the seven planets of our solar system, are of different +diameters; being bodies of unequal mass, they describe their revolutions +round the sun in various periods; nevertheless it is from the order of +their motion that results the harmony of the spheres," &c. + +Here then is the great macrocosm, the mighty whole, the assemblage of +things adored and deified by the philosophers of antiquity; whilst the +uninformed stopped at the emblem under which this nature was depicted; +at the symbols under which its various parts, its numerous functions +were personified; his narrow mind, his barbarous ignorance, never +permitted him to mount higher; they alone were deemed worthy of being, +initiated into the mysteries, who knew the realities masqued under these +emblems. Indeed, it is not to be doubted for an instant, that the wisest +among the Pagans adored nature; which ethnic theology designated under +a great variety of nomenclature, under an immense number of different +emblems. Apuleius, although a decided Platonist, accustomed to the +mysterious, unintelligible notions of his master, calls "Nature the +parent of all; the mother of the elements, the first offspring of the +world;" again, "the mother of the stars, the parent of the seasons, and +the governess of the whole world."--She was worshipped by many under the +appellation of the _mother of the gods_. Indeed, the first institutors +of nations, and their immediate successors in authority, only spoke to +the people by fables, allegories, enigmas, of which they reserved +to themselves the right of giving an explanation: this, in fact, +constituted the mysteries of the various worship paid to the Pagan +divinities. This mysterious tone they considered necessary, whether it +was to mask their own ignorance, or whether it was to preserve their +power over the uninformed, who for the most part only respect that which +is above their comprehension. Their explications were generally dictated +either by interest, or by a delirious imagination, frequently by +imposture; thus from age to age, they did no more than render nature and +its parts, which they had originally depicted, more unknown, until they +completely lost sight of the primitive ideas; these were replaced by a +multitude of fictitious personages, under whose features this nature had +primarily been represented to them. The people, either unaccustomed to +think, or deeply steeped in ignorance, adored these personages, without +penetrating into the true sense of the emblematical fables recounted to +them. These ideal beings, with material figures, in whom they believed +there resided a mysterious virtue, a divine power, were the objects of +their worship, the source of their fears, the fountain of their +hopes. The wonderful, the incredible actions ascribed to these fancied +divinities, were an inexhaustible fund of admiration, which gave +perpetual play to the fancy; which delighted not only the people of +those days, but even the children of latter ages. Thus were transmitted +from age to age, those marvellous accounts, which, although necessary to +the existence of the power usurped by the ministers of these gods, did, +in fact, nothing more than confirm the blindness of the ignorant: these +never supposed that it was nature, its various operations, its numerous +component parts--that it was the passions of man and his diverse +faculties that lay buried under an heap of allegories; they did not +perceive that the passions and faculties of human nature were used as +emblems, because man was ignorant of the true cause of the phenomena +he beheld. As strong passions seemed to hurry man along, in despite +of himself, they either attributed these passions to a god, or deified +them; frequently they did both: it was thus love became a deity; that +eloquence, poetry, industry, were transformed into gods, under the names +of Hermes, Mercury, Apollo; the stings of conscience were called the +Furies: the people, bowed down in stupid ignorance, had no eyes but +for these emblematical persons, under which nature was masked: they +attributed to their influence the good, to their displeasure the evil, +which they experienced: they entered into every kind of folly, into +the most delirious acts of madness, to render them propitious to their +views; thus, for want of being acquainted with the reality of things, +their worship frequently degenerated into the most cruel extravagance, +into the most ridiculous folly. + +Thus it is obvious, that every thing proves nature and its various +parts to have every where been the first divinities of man. +Natural philosophers studied these deities, either superficially or +profoundly,--explained some of their properties, detailed some of their +modes of action. Poets painted them to the imagination of mortals, +either in the most fascinating colours, or under the most +hideous deformities; embodied them--furnished them with reasoning +faculties--recounted their exploits--recorded their will. The statuary +executed sometimes with the most enrapturing art, the ideas of the +poets,--gave substance to their shadows--form to their airy nothings. +The priest decorated these united works with a thousand marvellous +qualities--with the most terrible passions--with the most inconceivable +attributes; gave them, "a local habitation and a name." The people +adored them; prostrated themselves before these gods, who were neither +susceptible of love or hatred, goodness, or malice; they became +persecuting, malevolent, cruel, unjust, in order to render themselves +acceptable to powers generally described to them under the most odious +features. + +By dint of reasoning upon these emblems, by meditating upon nature, +thus decorated, or rather disfigured, subsequent speculators no longer +recollected the source from whence their predecessors had drawn their +gods, nor the fantastic ornaments with which they had embellished +them. Natural philosophers and poets were transformed by leisure into +metaphysicians and theologians; tired with contemplating what they could +have understood, they believed they had made an important discovery +by subtilly distinguishing nature from herself--from her own peculiar +energies--from her faculty of action. By degrees they made an +incomprehensible being of this energy, which as before they personified, +this they called the mover of nature, divided it into two, one congenial +to man's happiness, the other inimical to his welfare; these they +deified in the same manner as they had before done nature with her +various parts. These abstract, metaphysical beings, became the +sole object of their thoughts; were the subject of their continual +contemplation; they looked upon them as realities of the highest +importance: thus nature quite disappeared; she was despoiled of her +rights; she was considered as nothing more than an unwieldy mass, +destitute of power; devoid of energy, as an heap of ignoble matter +purely passive: who, incapable of acting by herself, was not competent +to any of the operations they beheld, without the direct, the immediate +agency of the moving powers they had associated with her: which they had +made the fulcrum necessary to the action of the lever. They either did +not or would not perceive, that the _great Cause of causes, ens entium, +Parent of parents_, had, in unravelling chaotic matter, with a wisdom +for which man can never be sufficiently grateful, with a sagacity +which he can never sufficiently admire, foreseen every thing that could +contribute not only to his own individual happiness, but also to that of +all the beings in nature; that he had given this nature immutable laws, +according to which she is for ever regulated; after which she is obliged +invariably to act; that he has described for her an eternal course, from +which it is not permitted her to deviate, even for an instant; that she +is therefore, rendered competent to the production of every phenomena, +not only that he beholds, but of an infinity that he has never yet +contemplated; that she needs not any exterior energy for this purpose, +having received her powers from a hand far superior to any the feeble +weak imagination of man is able to form; that when this nature appears +to afflict him, it is only from the contraction of his own views, from +the narrowness of his own ideas, that he judges; that, in fact, what he +considers the evils of nature, are the greatest possible benefits he +can receive, if he was but in a condition to be acquainted with previous +causes, with subsequent effects. That the evils resulting to him from +his own vices, have equally their remedies in this nature, which it +is his duty to study; which if he does he will find, that the same +omnipotent goodness, who gave her irrefragable laws, also planted in her +bosom, balsams for all his maladies, whether physical or moral: but that +it is not given him to know what this great, this universal cause +is, for purposes of which he ought not to dispute the wisdom, when he +contemplates the mighty wonders that surround him. + +Thus man ever preferred an unknown power, to that of which he was +enabled to have some knowledge, if he had only deigned to consult +his experience; but he presently ceases to respect that which he +understands; to estimate those objects which are familiar to him: he +figures to himself something marvellous in every thing he does not +comprehend; his mind, above all, labours to seize upon that which +appears to escape his consideration; in default of experience, he no +longer consults any thing, but his imagination, which feeds him +with chimeras. In consequence, those speculators who have subtilly +distinguished nature from her own powers, have successively laboured +to clothe the powers thus separated with, a thousand incomprehensible +qualities: as they did not see this power, which is only a mode, they +made it a spirit--an intelligence--an incorporeal being; that is to say, +of a substance totally different from every thing of which we have a +knowledge. They never perceived that all their inventions, that all the +words which they imagined, only served to mask their real ignorance; +that all their pretended science was limited to saying, in what manner +nature acted, by a thousand subterfuges which they themselves found +it impossible to comprehend. Man always deceives himself for want of +studying nature; he leads himself astray, every time he is disposed to +go out of it; he is always quickly necessitated to return; he is even +in error when he substitutes words which he does not himself understand, +for things which he would much better comprehend if he was willing to +look at them without prejudice. + +Can a theologian ingenuously believe himself more enlightened, for +having substituted the vague words spirit, incorporeal substance, &c. to +the more intelligible terms nature, matter, mobility, necessity? However +this may be, these obscure words once imagined, it was necessary to +attach ideas to them; in doing this, he has not been able to draw them +from any other source than the beings of this despised nature, which are +ever the only beings of which he is enabled to have any knowledge. Man, +consequently, drew them up in himself; his own soul served for the model +of the universal soul, of which indeed according to some it only formed +a portion; his own mind was the standard of the mind that regulated +nature; his own passions, his own desires, were the prototypes of those +by which he actuated this being; his own intelligence was that from +which he formed that of the mover of nature; that which was suitable +to himself, he called the order of nature; this pretended order was the +scale by which he measured the wisdom of this being; in short, those +qualities which he calls perfections in himself, were the archetypes +in miniature, of the perfections of the being, he thus gratuitously +supposed to be the agent, who operated the phenomena of nature. It +was thus, that in despite of all their efforts, the theologians +were, perhaps always will be, true Anthropomorphites. A sect of this +denomination appeared in 359, in Egypt, they held the doctrine that +their god had a bodily shape. Indeed it is very difficult, if not +impossible to prevent man from making himself the sole model of his +divinity. Montaigne says "man is not able to be other than he is, nor +imagine but after his capacity; let him take what pains he may, he will +never have a knowledge of any soul but his own." Xenophanes said, "if +the ox or the elephant understood either sculpture or painting, they +would not fail to represent the divinity under their own peculiar figure +that in this, they would have as much reason as Polyclitus or Phidias, +who gave him the human form." It was said to a very celebrated man that +"God made man after his own image;" "man has returned the compliment," +replied the philosopher. Indeed, man generally sees in his God, nothing +but a man. Let him subtilize as he will, let him extend his own powers +as he may, let him swell his own perfections to the utmost, he will have +done nothing more than make a gigantic, exaggerated man, whom he will +render illusory by dint of heaping together incompatible qualities. He +will never see in such a god, but a being of the human species, in whom +he will strive to aggrandize the proportions, until he has formed a +being totally inconceivable. It is according to these dispositions that +he attributes intelligence, wisdom, goodness, justice, science, power, +to his divinity, because he is himself intelligent; because he has the +idea of wisdom in some beings of his own species; because he loves to +find in them ideas favourable to himself: because he esteems those +who display equity; because he has a knowledge, which he holds more +extensive in some individuals than himself; in short, because he enjoys +certain faculties which depend on his own organization. He presently +extends or exaggerates all these qualities in forming his god; the sight +of the phenomena of nature, which he feels he is himself incapable +of either producing or imitating, obliges him to make this difference +between the being he pourtrays and himself; but he knows not at what +point to stop; he fears lest he should deceive himself, if he should see +any limits to the qualities he assigns, the word infinite, therefore, is +the abstract, the vague term which he uses to characterize them. He says +that his power is infinite, which signifies that when he beholds those +stupendous effects which nature produces, he has no conception at what +point his power can rest; that his goodness, his wisdom, his knowledge +are infinite: this announces that he is ignorant how far these +perfections ma be carried in a being whose power so much surpasses +his own; that he is of infinite duration, because he is not capable +of conceiving he could have had a beginning or can ever cease to be; +because of this he considers a defect in those transitory beings of +whom he beholds the dissolution, whom he sees are subjected to death. He +presumes the cause of those effects to which he is a witness, of those +striking phenomena that assail his sight, is immutable, permanent, not +subjected to change, like all the evanescent beings whom he knows are +submitted to dissolution, to destruction, to change of form. This mover +of nature being always invisible to man, his mode of action being, +impenetrable, he believes that, like his soul or the concealed principle +which animates his own body, which he calls spiritual, a spirit, is the +moving power of the universe; in consequence he makes a spirit the +soul, the life, the principle of motion in nature. Thus when by dint of +subtilizing, he has arrived at believing the principle by which his body +is moved is a spiritual, immaterial substance, he makes the spirit of +the universe immaterial in like manner: he makes it immense, although +without extent; immoveable, although capable of moving nature: +immutable, although he supposes him to be the author of all the changes, +operated in the universe. + +The idea of the unity of God, which cost Socrates his life, because the +Athenians considered those Atheists who believed but in one, was the +tardy fruit of human meditation. Plato himself did not dare to +break entirely the doctrine of _Polytheism_; he preserved Venus, an +all-powerful Jupiter, and a Pallas, who was the goddess of the country. +The sight of those opposite, frequently contradictory effects, which man +saw take place in the world, had a tendency to persuade him there must +be a number of distinct powers or causes independent of each other. He +was unable to conceive that the various phenomena he beheld, sprung from +a single, from an unique cause; he therefore admitted many causes or +gods, acting upon different principles; some of which he considered +friendly, others as inimical to his race. Such is the origin of that +doctrine, so ancient, so universal, which supposed two principles in +nature, or two powers of opposite interests, who were perpetually at war +with each other; by the assistance of which he explained, that constant +mixture of good and evil, that blending of prosperity with misfortune, +in a word, those eternal vicissitudes to which in this world the human +being, is subjected. This is the source of those combats which all +antiquity has supposed to exist between good and wicked gods, between an +Osiris and a Typhoeus; between an Orosmadis and an Arimanis; between a +Jupiter and the Titanes; in these rencounters man for his own peculiar +interest always gave the palm of victory to the beneficent deity; this, +according to all the traditions handed down, ever remained in possession +of the field of battle; it was so far right, as it is evidently for the +benefit of mankind that the good should prevail over the wicked. + +When, however, man acknowledged only one God, he generally supposed the +different departments of nature were confided to powers subordinate to +his supreme orders, under whom the sovereign of the gods discharged +his care in the administration of the world. These subaltern gods were +prodigiously multiplied; each man, each town, each country, had +their local, their tutelary gods; every event, whether fortunate or +unfortunate, had a divine cause; was the consequence of a sovereign +decree; each natural effect, every operation of nature, each passion, +depended upon a divinity, which a theological imagination, disposed +to see gods every where, mistaking nature, either embellished or +disfigured. Poetry tuned its harmonious lays, on these occasions, +exaggerated the details, animated its pictures; credulous ignorance +received the portraits with eagerness--heard the doctrines with +submission. + +Such is the origin of Polytheism: indeed the Greek word _Theos_, [Greek +letters], is derived from _Theaomai_, [Greek letters], which implies +to contemplate, or take a view of secret or hidden things. Such are the +foundations, such the titles of the hierarchy, which man established +between himself and his gods, because he generally believed he was +incapable of the exalted privilege of immediately addressing himself +to the incomprehensible Being whom he had acknowledged for the only +sovereign of nature, without even having any distinct idea on the +subject: such is the true genealogy of those inferior gods whom the +uninformed place as, a proportional means between themselves and the +first of all other causes. In consequence, among the Greeks and the +Romans, we see the deities divided into two classes, the one were called +great gods, because the whole world were nearly in accord in deifying +the most striking parts of nature, such as the sun, fire; the sea, time, +&c. these formed a kind of aristocratic order, who were distinguished +from the minor gods, or from the multitude of ethnic divinities, who +were entirely local; that is to say, were reverenced only in particular +countries, or by individuals; as in Rome, where every citizen had +his familiar spirit, called lares; and household god, called penates. +Nevertheless, the first rank of these Pagan divinities, like the latter, +were submitted to Fate, that is, to destiny, which obviously is nothing +more than nature acting by immutable, rigorous, necessary laws; this +destiny was looked upon as the god of gods; it is evident, that this +was nothing more than necessity personified; that therefore it was a +weakness in the heathens to fatigue with their sacrifices, to solicit +with their prayers, those divinities whom they themselves believed were +submitted to the decrees of an inexorable destiny, of which it was never +possible for them to alter the mandates. _But man_, generally, _ceases +to reason, whenever his theological notions are either brought into +question, or are the subject of his inquiry_. + +What has been already said, serves to show the common source of that +multitude of intermediate powers, subordinate to the gods, but superior +to man, with which he filled the universe: they were venerated under +the names of nymphs, demi-gods, angels, daemons, good and evil genii, +spirits, heroes, saints, &c. Among the Romans they were called _Dei +medioxumi_, intermediate angels; they were looked upon as intercessors, +as mediators, as powers whom it was necessary to reverence, in order +either to obtain their favour, appease their anger, or divert their +malignant intentions; these constitute different classes of intermediate +divinities, who became either the foundation of their hopes, the object +of their fears, the means of consolation, or the source of dread to +those very mortals who only invented them when they found it +impossible to form to themselves distinct, perspicuous ideas of the +incomprehensible Being who governed the world in chief; or when they +despaired of being able to hold communication with him directly. + +Meditation and reflection diminished the number of those deities +which composed the ethnic polytheism: some who gave the subject more +consideration than others, reduced the whole to one all-powerful +Jupiter; but still they painted this being in the most hideous +colours, gave him the most revolting features, because they were still +obstinately bent on making man, his action and his passions, the model: +this folly led them into continual perplexities, because it heaped +together contradictory, incompatible, extravagant qualities; it was +quite natural it should do so: the limited views, the superficial +knowledge, the irregular desires of frail, feeble mortals, were but +little calculated to typify the mind of the real Divinity; of that great +_Cause of causes_, that _Parent of parents_, from whom every thing must +have emanated. Although they persuaded themselves it was sinning to give +him rivals, yet they described him as a jealous monarch who could not +bear a division of empire; thus taking the vanity of earthly princes for +their emblem, as if it was possible such a being could have a competitor +like a terrestrial monarch. Not having contemplated the immutable laws +with which he has invested nature, to which every thing it contains is +subjected, which are the result of the most perfect wisdom, they were +puzzled to account for the contrariety of those effects which their +weak minds led them to suppose as evils; seeing that sometimes those who +fulfilled in the most faithful manner their duties in this life, were +involved in the same ruin with the boldest, the most inconsiderate +violaters: thus in making him the immediate agent, instead of the first +author, the executive instead of the formative power, they caused him +to appear capricious, as unreasonably vindictive against his creatures, +when they ought to have known that his wisdom was unlimited, his +kindness without bounds, when he infused into nature that power which +produces these apparently contradictory effects; which, although they +seem injurious to man's interests, are, if he was but capacitated +to judge fairly, the most beneficial advantages that he can possibly +derive. Thus they made the Divinity appear improvident, by continually +employing him to destroy the work of his own hands: they, in fact, taxed +him with impotence, by the perpetual non-performance of those projects +of which their own imbecillity, their own erring judgment, had vainly +supposed him to be the contriver. + +To solve these difficulties, man created enemies to the Divinity, who +although subordinate to the supreme God, were nevertheless competent +to disturb his empire, to frustrate his views. Can any thing be worse +conceived, can any thing be more truly derogatory to the great _Parent +of parents_, than thus to make him resemble a king, who is surrounded +with adversaries, willing to dispute with him his diadem? Such, however, +is the origin of the _Fable of the Titanes_, or of the _rebellious +angels_, whose presumption caused them to be plunged into the abyss +of misery--who were changed into _demons_, or into evil genii: these +according to their mythology, had no other functions, than to render +abortive the projects of the Divinity; to seduce, to raise to rebellion, +those who were his subjects. Miserable invention, feeble subterfuge, +for the vices of mankind, although decorated with all the beauty of +language. Can then sublimity of versification, the harmony of numbers, +reconcile man to the idea that the puny offspring of natural causes is +adequate for a single instant to dispute the commands, to thwart the +desires, to render nugatory the decrees of a Being whose wisdom is of +the most polished perfection; whose goodness is boundless; whose power +must be more capacious than the human mind can possibly conceive? + +In consequence of this _Fable of the Titanes_, the monarch of nature was +represented as perpetually in a scuffle with the enemies he had himself +created; as unwilling totally to subdue those with whom these fabulists +have described him as dividing his authority--partaking his supreme +power. This again was borrowed from the conduct of earthly monarchs, +who, when they find a potent enemy, make a treaty with him; but this was +quite unnecessary for the great _Cause of causes_; and only shows that +man is utterly incapable of forming any other ideas than those which he +derives from the situation of those of his own race, or of the beings +by whom he is surrounded. According to this fable the subjects of the +universal Monarch were never properly submitted to his authority; like +an earthly king, he was in a continual state of hostility, and punished +those who had the misfortune to enter into the conspiracies of the +enemies of his glory: seeing that human legislators put forth laws, +issued decrees, they established similar institutions for the Divinity; +established oracles; his ministers pretended, through these mysterious +mediums, to convey to the people his heavenly mandates, to unveil his +concealed intentions: the ignorant multitude received these without +examination, they did not perceive that it was man, and not the +Divinity, who thus spoke to them; they did not feel that it must be +impossible for weak creatures to act contrary to the will of God. + +The _Fable of the Titanes, or rebellious angels_, is extremely ancient; +very generally diffused over the world; it serves for the foundation +of the theology of the Brachmins of Hindostan: according to these, all +living bodies are animated by _fallen angels_, who under these forms +expiate their rebellion. These contradictory notions were the basis of +nearly all the superstitions of the world; by these means they imagined +they accounted for the origin of evil--demonstrated the cause why the +human species experience misery. In short, the conduct of the most +arbitrary tyrants of the earth was but too frequently brought forth, too +often acted upon, in forming the character of the Divinity, held forth +to the worship of man: their imperfect jurisprudence was the source from +whence they drew that which they ascribed to their god. Pagan theology +was remarkable for displaying in the character of their divinities the +most dissolute vices; for making them vindictive; for causing them to +punish with extreme rigour those, crimes which the oracles predicted; to +doom to the most lasting torments those who sinned without knowing their +transgression; to hurl vengeance on those who were ignorant of their +obscure will, delivered in language which set comprehension at defiance; +unless it was by the priest who both made and fulminated it. It was upon +these unreasonable notions, that the theologians founded the worship +which man ought to render to the Divinity. Do not then let us be at all +surprised if the superstitious man was in a state of continual alarm: +if he experienced trances--if his mind was ever in the most tormenting +dread; the idea of his gods recalled to him unceasingly, that of a +pitiless tyrant who sported with the miseries of his subjects; who, +without being conscious of their own wrong, might at each moment incur +his displeasure: he could not avoid feeling that although they had +formed the universe entirely for man, yet justice did not regulate the +actions of these powerful beings, or rather those of the priests; but he +also believed that their elevated rank placed them infinitely above the +human species, that therefore they might afflict him at their pleasure. + +It is then for want of considering good and evil as equally necessary; +it is for want of attributing them to their true causes, that man has +created to himself fictitious powers, malicious divinities, respecting +whom it is found so difficult to undeceive him. Nevertheless, in +contemplating nature, he would have been able to have perceived, that +_physical evil_ is a necessary consequence of the peculiar properties of +some beings; he would have acknowledged that plague, contagion, +disease, are due to physical causes under particular circumstances; +to combinations, which, although extremely natural, are fatal to his +species; he would have sought--in the bosom of nature herself the +remedies suitable to diminish these evils, or to have caused the +cessation of those effects under which he suffered: he would have +seen in like manner that _moral evil_ was the necessary consequence +of defective institutions; that it was not to the Divinity, but to the +injustice of his fellows he ought to ascribe those wars, that +poverty, those famines, those reverses of fortune, those multitudinous +calamities, those vices, those crimes, under which he so frequently +groans. Thus to rid himself of these evils he would not have uselessly +extended his trembling hands towards shadows incapable of relieving him; +towards beings who were not the authors of his sorrows; he would have +sought remedies for these misfortunes in a more rational +administration of justice--in more equitable laws--in more I reasonable +institutions--in a greater degree of benevolence towards his fellow +man--in a more punctual performance of his own duties. + +As these gods were generally depicted to man as implacable to his +frailties as they denounced nothing but the most dreadful punishments +against those who involuntarily offended, it is not at all surprising +that the sentiment of fear prevailed over that of love: the gloomy +ideas presented to his mind were calculated to make him tremble, without +making him better; an attention to this truth will serve to explain the +foundation of that fantastical, irrational, frequently cruel worship, +which was paid to these divinities; he often committed the most cruel +extravagancies against his own person, the most hideous crimes against +the person of others, under the idea that in so doing, he disarmed the +anger, appeased the justice, recalled the clemency, deserved the mercy +of his gods. + +In general, the superstitious systems of man, his human and other +sacrifices, his prayers, his ceremonies, his customs; have had only for +their object either to divert the fury of his gods, whom he believed he +had offended; to render them propitious to his own selfish views; or +to excite in them that good disposition towards himself, which his own +perverse mode of thinking made him imagine they bestowed exclusively on +others: on the other hand, the efforts, the subtilties of theology, have +seldom had any other end, than to reconcile in the divinities it has +pourtrayed, those discordant ideas which its own dogmas has raised in +the minds of mortals. From what has preceded, it may fairly be concluded +that ethnic theology undermined itself by its own inconsistencies; +that the art of composing chimeras may therefore with great justice be +defined to be that of combining those qualities which are impossible to +be reconciled with each other. + + + + + +CHAP. III. + +_Of the confused and contradictory Ideas of Theology._ + + +Every thing that has been said, proves pretty clearly, that, in despite +of all his efforts, man has never been able to prevent himself from +drawing together from his own peculiar nature, the qualities he has +assigned to the Being who governs the universe. The contradictions +necessarily resulting from the incompatible assemblage of these human +qualities, which cannot become suitable to the same subject, seeing +that the existence of one destroys the existence of the other, have +been shewn:--the theologians themselves have felt the insurmountable +difficulties which their divinities presented to reason: they were +so substantive, that as they felt the impossibility of withdrawing +themselves out of the dilemma, they endeavoured to prevent man +from reasoning, by throwing his mind into confusion--by continually +augmenting the perplexity of those ideas, already so discordant, which +they offered him of the gods. By these means they enveloped them in +mystery, covered them with dense clouds, rendered them inaccessible to +mankind: thus they themselves became the interpreters, the masters of +explaining, according either to their fancy or their interest, the ways +of those enigmatical beings they made him adore. For this purpose they +exaggerated them more and more--neither time nor space, nor the +entire of nature could contain their immensity--every thing became an +impenetrable mystery. Although man has originally borrowed from himself +the traits, the colours, the primitive lineaments of which he composed +his gods; although he has made them jealous, powerful, vindictive +monarchs, yet his theology, by force of dreaming, entirely lost sight +of human nature. In order to render his divinities still more different +from their creatures, it assigned them, over and above the usual +qualities of man, properties so marvellous, so uncommon, so far removed +from every thing of which his mind could form a conception, that he lost +sight of them himself. From thence he persuaded himself these qualities +were divine, because he could no longer comprehend them; he believed +them worthy of his gods, because no man could figure to himself any one +distinct idea of them. Thus theology obtained the point of persuading +man he must believe that which he could not conceive; that he must +receive with submission improbable systems; that he must adopt, with +pious deference, conjectures contrary to his reason; that this reason +itself was the most agreeable sacrifice he could make on the altars of +his gods, who were unwilling he should use the gift they had bestowed +upon him. In short, it had made mortals implicitly believe that they +were not formed to comprehend the thing of all others the most important +to themselves. Thus it is evident that superstition founded its basis +upon the absurd principle that man is obliged to accredit firmly that +which he is in the most complete impossibility of comprehending. On +the other hand, man persuaded himself that the gigantic, the truly +incomprehensible attributes which were assigned to these celestial +monarchs, placed between them and their slaves a distance so immense, +that these could not be by any means offended with the comparison; that +these distinctions rendered them still greater; made them more powerful, +more marvellous, more inaccessible to observation. Man always entertains +the idea, that what he is not in a condition to conceive, is much more +noble, much wore respectable, than that which he has the capacity +to comprehend. The more a thing is removed from his reach, the more +valuable it always appears. + +These prejudices in man for the marvellous, appear to have been the +source that gave birth to those wonderful, unintelligible qualities with +which superstition clothed these divinities. The invincible ignorance +of the human mind, whose fears reduced him to despair, engendered those +obscure, vague notions, with which mythology decorated its gods. He +believed he could never displease them, provided he rendered them +incommensurable; impossible to be compared with any thing, of which he +had a knowledge; either with that which was most sublime, or that which +possessed the greatest magnitude, From hence the multitude of negative +attributes with which ingenious dreamers have successively embellished +their phantoms, to the end that they might more surely form a being +distinguished from all others, or which possessed nothing in common with +that which the human mind had the faculty of being acquainted with: they +did not perceive that after all their endeavours, it was nothing wore +than exaggerated human qualities, which they thus heaped together, with +no more skill than a painter would display who should delineate all the +members of the body of the same size, taking a giant for dimension. + +The theological attributes with which metaphysicians decorated these +divinities, were in fact nothing but pure negations of the qualities +found in man, or in those beings of which he has a knowledge; by these +attributes their gods were supposed exempted from every thing which they +considered weakness or imperfection in him, or in the beings by whom he +is surrounded: they called every quality infinite, which has been +shewn is only to affirm, that unlike man, or the beings with whom he +is acquainted, it is not circumscribed by the limits of space; this, +however, is what he can never in any manner comprehend, because he is +himself finite. Hobbes in his _Leviathan_, says, "whatsoever we imagine +is finite. Therefore there is no idea, or conception of any thing +we call infinite. No man can have in his mind an image of infinite +magnitude, nor conceive infinite swiftness, infinite time, infinite +force, or infinite power. When we say any thing is infinite, we signify +only, that we are not able to conceive the ends and bound of the thing +named, having no conception of the thing, but of our own inability." +Sherlock says, "the word infinite is only a negation, which signifies +that which has neither end, nor limits, nor extent, and, consequently, +that which has no positive and determinate nature, and is therefore +nothing;" he adds, "that nothing but custom has caused this word to +be adopted, which without that, would appear devoid of sense, and a +contradiction." + +When it is said these gods are eternal, it signifies they have not had, +like man or like every thing that exists, a beginning, and that they +will never have an end: to say they are immutable, is to say, that +unlike himself or every thing which he sees, they are not subject to +change: to say they are immaterial, is to advance, that their substance +or essence is of a nature not conceivable by himself, but which must +from that very circumstance be totally different from every thing of +which he has cognizance. + +It is from the confused collection of these negative qualities, that has +resulted the theological gods; those metaphysical wholes of which it +is impossible for man to form to himself any correct idea. In +these abstract beings every thing is infinity,--immensity,-- +spirituality,--omniscience,--order,--wisdom,--intelligence,-- +omnipotence. In combining these vague terms, or these modifications, the +ethnic priests believed they formed something, they extended these +qualities by thought, and they imagined they made gods, whilst they only +composed chimeras. They imagined that these perfections or these +qualities must be suitable to their gods, because they were not suitable +to any thing of which they had a knowledge; they believed that +incomprehensible beings must have inconceivable qualities. These were +the materials of which theology availed itself to compose those +inexplicable shadows before which they commanded the human race to bend +the knee. + +Nevertheless, experience soon proved that beings so vague, so impossible +to be conceived, so incapable of definition, so far removed from every +thing of which man could have any knowledge, were but little calculated +to fix his restless views; his mind requires to be arrested by qualities +which he is capacitated to ascertain; of which he is in a condition to +form a judgment. Thus after it had subtilized these metaphysical gods, +after it had rendered them so different in idea, from every thing that +acts upon the senses, theology found itself under the necessity of +again assimilating them to man, from whom it had so far removed them: it +therefore again made them human by the moral qualities which it assigned +them; it felt that without this it would not be able to persuade mankind +there could possibly exist any relation between him and such vague, +ethereal, fugitive, incommensurable beings; that it would never be +competent to secure for them his adoration. + +It began to perceive that these marvellous gods were only calculated +to exercise the imagination of some few thinkers, whose minds were +accustomed to labour upon chimerical subjects, or to take words for +realities; in short it found, that for the greater number of the +material children of the earth it was necessary to have gods more +analogous to themselves, more sensible, more known to them. In +consequence these divinities were re-clothed with human qualities; +theology never felt the incompatibility of these qualities with beings +it had made essentially different from man, who consequently could +neither have his properties, nor be modified like himself. It did not +see that gods who were immaterial, destitute of corporeal organs, were +neither able to think nor to act as material beings, whose peculiar +organizations render them susceptible of the qualities, the feelings +the will, the virtues, that are found in them. The necessity it felt to +assimilate the gods to their worshippers, to make an affinity +between them, made it pass over without consideration these palpable +contradictions--this want of keeping in their portrait: thus ethnic +theology obstinately continued to unite those incompatible qualities, +that discrepancy of character, which the human mind attempted in vain +either to conceive or to reconcile: according to it, pure spirits were +the movers of the material world; immense beings were enabled to occupy +space, without however excluding nature; immutable deities were the +causes of those continual changes operated in the world: omnipotent +beings did not prevent those evils which were displeasing to them; +the sources of order submitted to confusion: in short, the wonderful +properties of these theological beings every moment contradicted +themselves. + +There is not less discrepancy, less incompatibility, less discordance +in the human perfections, less contradiction in the moral qualities +attributed to them, to the end that man might be enabled to form to +himself some idea of these beings. These were all said to be _eminently_ +possessed by the gods, although they every moment contradicted each +other: by this means they formed a kind of patch-work character, +heterogeneous beings, discrepant phenomena, entirely inconceivable to +man, because nature had never constructed any thing like them, whereby +he was enabled to form a judgment. Man was assured they were eminently +good--that it was visible in all their actions. Now goodness is a known +quality, recognizable in some beings of the human species; this is, +above every other, a property he is desirous to find in all those upon +whom he is in a state of dependence; but he is unable to bestow the +title of good on any among his fellows, except their actions produce on +him those effects which he approves--that he finds in unison with his +existence--in conformity with his own peculiar modes of thinking. It was +evident, according to this reasoning, these ethnic gods did not impress +him with this idea; they were said to be equally the authors of his +pleasures, as of his pains, which were to be either secured or averted +by sacrifices: thus when man suffered by contagion, when he was the +victim of shipwreck, when his country was desolated by war, when he saw +whole nations devoured by rapacious earthquakes, when he was a prey to +the keenest sorrows, he at least was unable to conceive the bounty of +those beings. How could he perceive the beautiful order which they had +introduced into the world, while he groaned under such a multitude of +calamities? How was he able to discern the beneficence of men whom he +beheld sporting as it were with his species? How could he conceive the +consistency of those who destroyed that which he was assured they had +taken such pains to establish, solely for his own peculiar happiness? +But had his mind been properly enlightened, had he been taught to know, +that nature, acting by unerring laws, produces all the phenomena he +beholds as a necessary consequence of her primitive impulse--that +like the rest of nature he was himself subjected to the general +operation--that no peculiar exemption had been made in his behalf--that +sacrifices were useless--that the great _Parent of parents_, equally +mindful of all his creatures, had set in action with the most consummate +wisdom an invariable system, the apparent, casual evils of which were +ever counterbalanced by the resulting good; that without repining, it +was his duty, his interest, to submit; at the same time to examine with +sedulity, to search with earnestness, into the recesses of this nature +for remedies to the sorrows he endured. If he had been thus instructed, +we should never behold him arraigning either the kindness, the wisdom, +or the consistency of the gods; he would neither have ascribed his +sufferings to the malicious interference of inferior deities, so +derogatory to the divine majesty of the _Great Cause of causes_, nor +would he have taxed with either inconsistency or unkindness, that nature +which cannot act otherwise than she does. Perhaps of all the ideas that +can be infused into the mind of man, none is more really subversive of +his true happiness, none more incompatible with the reality of things, +than that which persuades him he is himself a privileged being, the king +of a nature where every thing is submitted to laws, the extent of which +his finite mind cannot possibly conceive. Even admitting it should +ultimately turn out to be a fact, he has yet no one positive evidence +to justify the assumption; experience, which after all must always prove +the best criterion for his judgment, daily proves, that in every thing +he is subjected, like every other part of nature, to those invariable +decrees from which nothing that he beholds is exempted. + +Feeble monarch! of whom a grain of sand, some atoms of bile, some +misplaced humours, destroy at once the existence and the reign: yet thou +pretendest every thing was made for thee! Thou desirest that the entire +of nature should be thy domain, and thou canst not even defend thyself +from the slightest of her shocks! Thou makest to thyself a god for +thyself alone; thou supposest that he unceasingly occupieth himself only +for thy peculiar happiness; thou imaginest every thing was made solely +for thy pleasure; and, following up thy presumptuous ideas, thou hast +the audacity to call nature good or bad as thy weak intellect inclines: +thou darest to think that the kindness exhibited towards thee, in common +with other beings, is contradicted by the evil genii thy fancy has +created! Dost thou not see that those beasts which thou supposest +submitted to thine empire, frequently devour thy fellow-creatures; +that fire consumeth them; that the ocean swalloweth them up; that those +elements of which thou sometimes admirest the order, which sometimes +thou accusest of confusion, frequently sweep them off the face of the +earth; dost thou not see that all this is necessarily what it must be; +that thou art not in any manner consulted in any of this phenomena? +Indeed, according to thine own ideas, if thou wast to examine them with +care, dost thou not admit that thy gods are the universal cause of all; +that they maintain the whole by the destruction of its parts. Are they +not then according to thyself, the gods of nature--of the ocean--of +rivers--of mountains--of the earth, in which they occupiest, so very +small a space--of all those other globes that thou seest roll in +the regions of space--of those orbs that revolve round the sun that +enlighteneth thee?--Cease, then, obstinately to persist in beholding +nothing but thy sickly self in nature; do not flatter thyself that the +human race, which reneweth itself, which disappeareth like the leaves +on the trees, can absorb all the care, can ingross all the tenderness +of that universal being, who, according to thyself, properly understood, +ruleth the destiny of all things. Submit thyself in silence to mandates +which thy unavailing prayers; can never change; to a wisdom which +thy imbecility cannot fathom; to the unerring shafts of a fate, which +nothing but thine own vanity, aided by thy perverse ignorance, could +ever question, being the best possible good that can befall thee! which +if thou couldst alter, thou wouldst with thy defective judgment render +worse! What is the human race compared to the earth? What is this earth +compared to the sun? What is our sun compared to those myriads of suns +which at immense distances occupy the regions of space? not for the +purpose of diverting thy weak eyes; not with a view to excite thy stupid +admiration, as thou vainly imaginest; since multitudes of them are +placed out of the range of thy visual organs: but to occupy the place +which necessity hath assigned them. Mortal, feeble and vain! restore +thyself to thy proper sphere; acknowledge every where the effect +of necessity; recognize in thy benefits, behold in thy sorrows, the +different modes of action of those various beings endowed with such a +variety of properties, which surround thee; of which the macrocosm is +the assemblage; and do not any longer suppose that this nature, much +less its great cause, can possess such incompatible qualities as would +be the result of human views or of visionary ideas, which have no +existence but in thyself. + +As long as theologians shall continue obstinately bent to make man the +model of their gods; as long ask they shall pertinaciously undertake to +explain the nature of these gods, which they will never be able to +do, but after human ideas, although they may associate the most +heterogeneous properties, the most discrepant functions; so long, I say, +experience will contradict at every moment the beneficent views they, +attach to their divinities; it will be in vain that they call them +good: man, reasoning thus, will never be able to find good but in those +objects which impel him in a manner favourable to his actual mode +of existence; he always finds confusion in that which fills him with +grievous sensations; he calls evil every thing that painfully affects +him, even cursorily; those beings that produce in him two modes of +feeling, so very opposite to each other, he will naturally conclude are +sometimes favourable, sometimes unfavourable to him; at least, if he +will not allow that they act necessarily, consequently are neither one +nor the other, he will say that a world where he experiences so much +evil cannot be submitted to men who are perfectly good; on the other +hand, he will also assume that a world in which man receives so many +benefits, cannot be governed by those who are without kindness. Thus +he is obliged to admit of two principles equally powerful, who are +in hostility with each other; or rather, he must agree that the same +persons are alternately kind and unkind; this after all is nothing more +than avowing they cannot be otherwise than they are; in this case it +would be useless to sacrifice to them--to make solicitation; seeing +it would be nothing but _destiny_--the necessity of things submitted +invariable rules. + +In order to justify these beings, constructed upon mortal principles, +from injustice, in consequence of the evils the human species +experience, the theologian is reduced to the necessity of calling them +punishments inflicted for the transgressions of man. But then these +general calamities include all men. Some, at least, may be supposed not +to have offended. Thus he involves contradictions he finds it difficult +to reconcile; to effectuate this he makes his _anthropomorphites_ +immaterial--incorporeal; that is, he says they are the negation of every +thing of which he has a knowledge; consequently, beings who can have no +relation with corporeal beings: and this avails him no better, as +will be evident by reasoning on the subject. To offend any one, is to +diminish the sum of his happiness; it is to afflict him, to deprive +him of something, to make him experience a painful sensation. How is it +possible man can operate on such beings; how can the physical actions +of a material substance have any influence over an immaterial substance, +devoid of parts, having no point of contact. How can a corporeal being +make an incorporeal being experience incommodious sensations? On the +other hand, _justice_, according to the only ideas man can ever form of +it, supposes, a permanent disposition to render to each what is due +to him; the theologian will not admit that the beings he has jumbled +together owe any thing to man; he insists that the benefits they bestow +are all the gratuitous effects of their own goodness; that they have +the right to dispose of the work of their hands according to their +own pleasure; to plunge it if they please into the abyss of misery; in +short, that their volition is the only guide of their conduct. It is +easy to see, that according to man's idea of justice, this does not +even contain the shadow of it; that it is, in fact, the mode of action +adopted by what he calls the most frightful tyrants. How then can he +be induced to call men just who act after this manner? Indeed, while +he sees innocence suffering, virtue in tears, crime triumphant, vice +recompensed, and at the same time, is told the beings whom theology has +invented are the authors, he will never be able to acknowledge them +to have _justice_. But he will find no such contradictory qualities in +nature, where every thing is the result of immutable laws: he will at +once perceive that these transient evils produce more permanent good; +that they are necessary to the conservation of the whole, or else result +from modifications of matter, which it is competent for him to change, +by altering his own mode of action; a lesson that nature herself teaches +him when he is willing to receive her instructions. But to form gods +with human passions, is to make them appear unjust; to say that such +beings chastise their friends for their own I good, is at once to +upset all the ideas he has either of kindness or unkindness: thus +the incompatible human qualities ascribed to these beings, do in fact +destroy their existence. If it be insisted they have the knowledge and +power of man, only that they are more extended, then it becomes a very +natural reply, to say, since they know every thing, they ought at least +to restrain mischief; because this would be the observation of man upon +the action of his fellows;--if it be urged these qualities are similar +to the same qualities possessed by man, then it may be fairly asked in +what do they differ? To this, if any answer be given, be what it may, it +will still be only changing the language: it will be invariably another +method of expressing the same thing; seeing that man with all his +ingenuity, will never be able to describe properties but after himself +or those of the beings by whom he is surrounded. + +Where is the man filled with kindness, endowed with humanity, who does +not desire with all his heart to render his fellow creatures happy? If +these beings, as the theologians assert, really have man's qualities +augmented, would they not, by the same reasoning, exercise their +infinite power to render them all happy? Nevertheless, in despite of +these theologists, we scarcely find any one who is perfectly satisfied +with his condition on earth: for one mortal that enjoys, we behold +a thousand who suffer; for one rich man who lives in the midst of +abundance, there are thousands of poor who want common necessaries: +whole nations groan in indigence, to satisfy the passions of some +avaricious princes, of some few nobles, who are not thereby rendered +more contented--who do not acknowledge themselves more fortunate on +that account. In short, under the dominion of these beings, the earth +is drenched with the tears of the miserable. What must be the inference +from all this? That they are either negligent of, or incompetent to, his +happiness. But the mythologists will tell you coolly, that the judgments +of his gods are impenetrable! How do we understand this term? Not to be +taught--not to be informed--impervious--not to be pierced: in this case +it would be an unreasonable question to inquire by what authority do you +reason upon them? How do you become acquainted with these impenetrable +mysteries? Upon what foundation do you attribute virtues which you +cannot penetrate? What idea do you form to yourself of a justice that +never resembles that of man? Or is it a truth that you yourself are not +a man, but one of those impenetrable beings whom you say you represent? + +To withdraw themselves from this, they will affirm that the justice of +these idols are tempered with mercy, with compassion, with goodness: +these again are human qualities: what, therefore, shall we understand by +them? What idea do we attach to mercy? Is it not a derogation from the +severe rules of an exact, a rigorous justice, which causes a +remission of some part of a merited punishment? Here hinges the great +incompatibility, the incongruity of those qualities, especially when +augmented by the word _omni_; which shews how little suitable human +properties are to the formation of divinities. In a prince, clemency is +either a violation of justice, or the exemption from a too severe law: +nevertheless, man approves of clemency in a sovereign, when its too +great facility does not become prejudicial to society; he esteems it, +because it announces humanity, mildness, a compassionate, noble soul; +qualities he prefers in his governors to rigour, cruelty, inflexibility: +besides, human laws are defective; they are frequently too severe; they +are not competent to foresee all the circumstances of every case: the +punishments they decree are not always commensurate with the offence: +he therefore does not always think them just: but he feels very well, +he understands distinctly, that when the sovereign extends his mercy, he +relaxes from his justice--that if mercy he merited, the punishment ought +not to take place--that then its exercise is no longer clemency, but +justice: thus he feels, that in his fellow creatures these two qualities +cannot exist at the same moment. How then is he to form his judgment of +beings who are represented to possess both in the extremest degree? Is +it not, in fact, announcing these beings to be men like ourselves, who +act with our imperfections on an enlarged scale? + +They then say, well, but in the next world these idols will reward you +for all the evils you suffer in this: this, indeed, is something to +look to, if it could be contemplated alone; unmixed with all they have +formerly asserted: if we could also find that there was an unison of +thinking on this point--if there was a reasonable comprehensible view of +it held forth: but alas! here again human pleasures, human feelings, are +the basis on which these rewards are rested; only they are promised in a +way we cannot comprehend them; houris, or females who are to remain for +ever virgins, notwithstanding the knowledge of man, are so opposed to +all human comprehension, so opposite to all experience, are such mystic +assertions, that the human mind cannot possibly embrace an idea of +them: besides this is only promised by one class of these beings; others +affirm it will be altogether different: in short, the number of modes +in which this hereafter reward is promised to him, obliges man to ask +himself one plain question, Which is the real history of these blissful +abodes? At this question he staggers--he seeks for advice: each assures +him that the other is in error--that his peculiar mode is that which +will really have place; that to believe the other is a crime. How is +he to judge now? Take what course he will, he runs the chance of being +wrong; he has no standard whereby to measure the correctness of these +contradictory assurances; his mind is held suspended; he feels the +impossibility of the whole being right; he knows not that which he ought +to elect! Again, they have positively asserted these beings owe nothing +to man: how then is he to expect in a future life, a more real happiness +than he enjoys in the present? This they parry, by assuring him it +is founded upon their promises, contained in their revealed oracles. +Granted: but is he quite certain these oracles have emanated from +themselves? If they are so different in their detail, may there not +be reasonable ground for suspecting some of them are not authentic? If +there is, which are the spurious, which are the genuine? By what rule +is he to guide himself in the choice; how, with his frail methods +of judging, is he to scrutinize oracles delivered by such powerful +beings--to discriminate the true from the false? The ministers of each +will give you an infallible method, one that, is according to their +own asseveration, cannot err; that is, by an implicit belief in the +particular doctrine each promulgates. + +Thus will be perceived the multitude of contradictions, the extravagant +hypotheses which these human attributes, with which theology clothes its +divinities, must necessarily produce. Beings embracing at one time so +many discordant qualities will always be undefinable--can only present a +train of ideas calculated to displace each other; they will consequently +ever remain beings of the imagination. These beings, say their +ministers, created the heavens, the earth, the creatures who inhabit +it, to manifest their own peculiar glory; they have neither rivals, nor +equals in nature; nothing which can be compared with them. Glory +is, again, a human passion: it is in man the desire of giving his +fellow-creatures an high opinion of him; this, passion is laudable when +it stimulates him to undertake great projects--when it determines him to +perform useful actions--but it is very frequently a weakness attached +to his nature; it is nothing more than a desire to be distinguished from +those beings with whom he compares himself, without exciting him to one +noble, one generous act. It is easy to perceive that beings who are so +much elevated above men, cannot be actuated by such a defective passion. +They say these beings are jealous of their prerogatives. Jealousy is +another human passion, not always of the most respectable kind: but it +is rather difficult to conceive the existence of jealousy with profound +wisdom, unlimited power, and the perfection of justice. Thus the +theologians by dint of heaping quality on quality, aggrandizing each as +is added, seem to have reduced themselves to the situation of a painter, +who spreading all his colours upon his canvas together, after thus +blending them into an unique mass, loses sight of the whole in the +composition. + +They will, nevertheless, reply to these difficulties, that goodness, +wisdom, justice, are in these beings qualities so pre-eminent, so +distinct, have so little affinity with these same qualities in man, that +they are totally dissimilar--have not the least relation. Admit this +to be the case, How then can he form to himself any idea of these +perfections, seeing they are totally unlike those with which he is +acquainted? They surely cannot mean to insinuate that they are the +reverse of every thing he understands; because that would, in effect, +bring them to a precise point which would not need any explanation; +it is therefore a matter of certainty this cannot be the case: then if +these qualities, when exercised by the beings they have described, are +only human actions so obscured, so hidden, as not to be recognizable by +man, How can weak mortals pretend to announce them, to have a knowledge +of them, to explain them to others? Does then theology impart to the +mind the ineffable boon of enabling it to conceive that which no man is +competent to understand? Does it procure for its agents the marvellous +faculty of having distinct ideas of beings composed of so many +contradictory properties? Does it, in fact, make the theologian himself +one of these incomprehensible beings. + +They will impose silence, by saying the oracles have spoken; that +through these mystical means they have made themselves known to mortals. +The next question would naturally be, When, where, or to whom have +these oracles spoken? Where are these oracles? An hundred voices raise +themselves in the same moment; hands of Briaraeus are immediately +stretched forth to shew them in a number of discordant collections, +which each maintains, with an equal degree of vehemence, is the true +code--the only doctrine man ought to believe: he runs them over, finds +they scarcely agree in any one particular; but that in all the heaviest +penalties are denounced against those who doubt the smallest part of +any one of them. These beings of consummate wisdom are made to speak an +obscure, irrational language; some of them, although their goodness +is proclaimed, have been cruel and sanguinary; others, although their +justice is held forth, have been partial, unjust, capricious; some, who +are represented as all merciful, destine to the most hideous punishments +the unhappy victims to their wrath: examine any one of them more +closely, he will find that they have never in any two countries held +literally the same language: that although they are said to have spoken +in many places, that they have always spoken variously: What is the +necessary result? The human mind, incapable of reconciling such manifest +contradictions, unable to obtain from their ministers any corroborative +evidence, that is not disputed by the others, falls into the strangest +perplexity; is involved in doubts, entangled in a labyrinth to which no +clue is to be found. + +Thus the relations, which are supposed to exist between man and these +theological idols, can only be founded on the moral qualities of these +beings: if these are not known to him, if he cannot in any manner +comprehend them, they cannot by any ingenuity of argument serve him for +models. In order that they may be imitated, it is needful that these +qualities were cognizable by the being who is to imitate them. How +can he imitate that goodness, that justice, that mercy, which does not +resemble either his own, or any thing he can conceive? If these beings +partake in nothing of that which forms man--if the properties they +do possess, although different, are not within the reach of his +comprehension--if, he cannot embrace the most distant idea of them, +which the theologian assures him he cannot, How is it possible he +can set about imitating them? How follow a conduct suitable to please +them--to render himself acceptable in their sight? What can in effect +be the motive of that worship, of that homage, of that obedience, which +these beings are said to exact--which he is informed he should offer +at their altars, if he does not establish it upon their goodness--their +veracity--their justice: in short, upon qualities which he is competent +to understand? How can he have clear, distinct ideas of those qualities, +if they are no longer of the same nature as those which he has learned +to reverence in the beings of his own species? + +To this they will reply, because none of them ever admit the least doubt +of the rectitude of their own individual creed, that there can be no +proportion between these idols and mortals, who are the work of their +hands; that it is not permitted to the clay to demand of the potter who +has formed it, "why ye have fashioned me thus;"--but if there can be +no common measure between the workman and his work--if there can be +no analogy between them, because the one is immaterial, the other +corporeal, How do they reciprocally act upon each other? How can the +gross organs of the one, comprehend the subtile quality of the other? +Reasoning in the only way he is capable, and it surely will never be +seriously argued that he is not to reason, will he not perceive that +the earthen vase could only have received the form which it pleased the +potter to give; that if it is formed badly, if it is rendered inadequate +to the use for which it was designed, the vase is not in this instance +to be blamed; the potter certainly has the power to break it; the vase +cannot prevent him; it will neither have motives nor means to soften his +anger; it will be obliged to submit to its destiny; but he will not +be able to prevent his mind from thinking the potter harsh in thus +punishing the vase, rather than by forming it anew, by giving it another +figure, render it competent to the purposes he intended. + +According to these notions the relations between man and these +theological beings have no existence, they owe nothing to him, are +dispensed from shewing him either goodness or justice; that man, on +the contrary, owes them every thing: but contradictions appear at every +step. If these have promised by their oracles any thing to man, it is +rather difficult for him to believe, that what is so solemnly promised +does not belong to him if he fulfils the condition of the promise. +The difference a theologian may choose to find in these relations will +hardly be convincing to a reasonable mind. The duties of man towards +these beings can, according to their own shewing, have no other +foundation than the happiness he expects from them: thus the relation +has a reciprocity, it is founded upon their goodness, upon their +justice, it demands obedience on his part, a conduct suitable to the +benefits he receives. Thus, in whatever manner the theological system +is viewed, it destroys itself. Will theology never feel that the more +it endeavours to exaggerate the human qualities, the less it exalts the +beings it pictures; the more incomprehensible it renders them, the more +it contributes to swell its own ocean of contradictions; that to take +human passions, mortal faculties at all, is perhaps the worst means it +can pursue to form a perfect being; but that if it must persist in this +method, then the further they remove them from man, the more they debase +him, the more they weaken the relations subsisting between them: that +in thus aggregating human properties, it should carefully abstain from +associating in these pictures those qualities which man finds detestable +in his fellows. Thus, despotism in man is looked upon as an unjust, +unreasonable power; if it introduces such a quality into its portraits, +it cannot rationally suppose them suitable to cultivate the esteem, to +attract the voluntary homage of the human race: if, however, the canvas +be examined, we shall frequently be struck, with perceiving this the +leading feature; we shall equally find a want of keeping through the +whole; that shadows are introduced, where lights ought to prevail; that +the colouring is incongruous--the design without harmony. + +The discrepancy of conduct which theology imputes to these idols, is not +less remarkable than the contrariety of qualities it ascribes to +them, or the inconsistency of the passions with which it invests them; +sometimes, according to this, they are the friends to reason, desirous +of the happiness of society; sometimes they are inimical to virtue; +interdict the use of reason; flattered with seeing society disturbed, +they sometimes afflict man without his being able to guess the cause of +their displeasure; sometimes they are favourable to mankind--at others, +indisposed towards the human species: sometimes they are represented as +permitting crimes for the pleasure of punishing them--at others, they +exert all their power to arrest crime in its birth; sometimes they elect +a small number to receive eternal happiness, predestinating the rest to +perpetual misery--to everlasting torments; at others, they throw open +the gates of mercy to all who choose to enter them; sometimes they are +pourtrayed as destroying the universe--at others, as establishing the +most beautiful order in the planet we inhabit; sometimes they are held +forth as countenancing deception--at others, as having the highest +reverence for truth--as holding deceit in abomination. This, again, is +the necessary result of the human faculties, the mortal passions, the +frail qualities of which they compose the beings they hold forth to the +admiration, to the worship, to the homage of the world. + +Perhaps the most fatal consequences have arisen from founding the moral +character of these divinities upon that of man. Those who first had the +confidence to tell man that in these matters it was not permitted him +to consult his reason, that the interests of society demanded its +sacrifice, evidently proposed to themselves to make him the sport of +their own wantonness--to make him the blind instrument of their own +unworthiness. It is from this radical error that has sprung all those +extravagances which the various superstitions have introduced upon +the earth: from hence has flowed that sacred fury which has frequently +deluged it with blood: here is the cause of those inhuman persecutions +which have so often desolated nations: in short, all those horrid +tragedies which have been acted on the vast theatre of the world, by +command of the different ministers of the various systems, whose gods +they have said ordained these shocking spectacles. + +The theologians themselves have thus been the means, of calumniating +the gods they pretended to serve, under the pretext of exalting their +name--of covering them with glory; in this they may have been said to be +true atheists, since they seem only to have been anxious to destroy the +idols they themselves had raised, by the actions they have attributed +to them--which has debased them in the eye of reason--rendered their +existence more than doubtful to the man of humanity. Indeed, it would +require more than human credulity to accredit the assertion that these +beings ever could order the atrocities committed in their name. Every +time they have been willing to disturb the harmony of mankind--whenever +they have been desirous to render him unsociable, they have cried out +that their gods ordained that he should be so. Thus they render mortals +uncertain, make the ethical system fluctuate by founding it upon +changeable, capricious idols, whom they represent much more frequently +cruel and unjust, than filled with bounty and benevolence. + +However it may be, admitting if they will for a moment that their idols +possess all the human virtues in an infinite degree of perfection, we +shall quickly be obliged to acknowledge that they cannot connect them +with those metaphysical, theological, negative attributes, of which we +have already spoken. If these beings are spirits that are immaterial, +how can they be able to act like man, who is a corporeal being? Pure +spirits, according to the only idea man can form of them, having no +organs, no parts, cannot see any thing; can neither hear our prayers, +attend to our solicitations, nor have compassion for our miseries. +They cannot be immutable, if their dispositions can suffer change: they +cannot be infinite, if the totality of nature, without being them, can +exist conjointly with them: they cannot be omnipotent, if they either +permit or do not prevent evil: they cannot be omnipresent, if they are +not every where: they must therefore be in the evil as well as in the +good. Thus in whatever manner they are contemplated, under whatever +point of view they are considered, the human qualities which are +assigned to them, necessarily destroy each other; neither can these +same properties in any possible manner combine themselves with the +supernatural attributes given to them by theology. + +With respect to the revealed will of these idols, by means of +their oracles, far from being a proof of their good will, of their +commisseration for man, it would rather seem evidence of their ill-will. +It supposes them capable of leaving mankind for a considerable season +unacquainted with truths highly important to their interests; these +oracles communicated to a small number of chosen men, are indicative of +partiality, of predilections, that are but little compatible with the +common Father of the human race. These oracles were ill imagined, +since they tend to injure the immutability ascribed to these idols, by +supposing that they permitted man to be ignorant at one time of their +will, whilst at another time they were willing he should be instructed +on the subject. Moreover, these oracles frequently predicted offences +for which afterwards severe punishments were inflicted on those who did +no more than fulfil them. This, according to the reasoning of man, would +be unjust. The ambiguous language in which they were delivered, the +almost impossibility of comprehending them, the inexplicable mysteries +they contained, seemed to render them doubtful; at least they are +not consistent with the ideas man is capable of forming of infinite +perfection: but the fact clearly is, they were thus rendered capable of +application to the contingency of events--could be made to suit +almost any circumstances: this would render it not a very improbable +conjecture, that these oracles were solely delivered by the priests +themselves. It these were tried by the only test of which he has any +knowledge--HIS REASON, it would naturally occur to the mind of man, that +mystery could never, on any occasion, be used in the promulgation of +substantive decrees meant to operate on the obedience, to actuate the +moral conduct of man: it is quite usual with most legislators to +render their laws as explicit as possible, to adapt them to the meanest +understanding; in short, it would be reckoned want of good faith in a +government, to throw a thick, mysterious veil over the announcement of +that conduct which it wished its citizens to adopt; they would be apt +to think such a procedure was either meant to cover its own peculiar +ignorance, or else to entrap them into a snare; at best, it would be +considered as furnishing a never-failing source of dispute, which a wise +government would endeavour to avoid. + +It will thus be obvious, that the ideas which theology has at various +times, under various systems, held forth to man, have for the most part +been confused, discordant, incompatible, and have had a general tendency +to disturb the repose of mankind. The obscure notions, the vague +speculations of these multiplied creeds, would be matter of great +indifference, if man was not taught to hold them as highly important +to his welfare--if he did not draw from them conclusions pernicious to +himself--if he did not learn from these theologians that he must sharpen +his asperity against those who do not contemplate them in the same point +of view with himself: as he perhaps, then, will never have a common +standard, a fixed rule, a regular graduated scale, whereby to form +his judgment on these points--as all efforts of the imagination must +necessarily assume divers shapes, undergo a variety of modifications, +which can never be assimilated to each other, it was little likely that +mankind would at all times be able to understand each other on this +subject; much less that they would be in accord in the opinions they +should adopt. From hence that diversity of superstitions which in +all ages have given rise to the most irrational disputes; which +have engendered the most sanguinary wars; which have caused the most +barbarous massacres; which have divided man from his fellow by the most +rancorous animosities, that will perhaps never be healed; because he has +been impelled to consider the peculiar tenets he adopted, not only as +immediately essential to his individual welfare, but also as intimately +connected with the happiness, closely interwoven with the tranquillity +of the nation of which he was a citizen. That such contrariety of +sentiment, such discrepancy of opinion should exist, is not in the least +surprising; it is, in fact, the natural result of those physical causes +to which, as long as he exists, he is at all times submitted. The man +of a heated imagination cannot accommodate himself to the god of a +phlegmatic, tranquil being: the infirm, bilious, discontented, angry +mortal, cannot view him under the same aspect as he who enjoys a sounder +constitution,--as the individual of a gay turn, who enjoys the +blessing of content, who wishes to live in peace. An equitable, kind, +compassionate, tender-hearted man, will not delineate to himself +the same portrait of his god, as the man who is of an harsh, unjust, +inflexible, wicked character. Each individual will modify his god after +his own peculiar manner of existing, after his own mode of thinking, +according to his particular mode of feeling. A wise, honest, rational +man will always figure to himself his god as humane and just. + +Nevertheless, as fear usually presided at the formation of those idols +man set up for the object of his worship; as the ideas of these beings +were generally associated with that of terror as the recollections +of sufferings, which he attributed to them, often made him tremble; +frequently awakened in his mind the most afflicting, reminiscence; as +it sometimes filled him with inquietude, sometimes inflamed his +imagination, sometimes overwhelmed him with dismay, the experience of +all ages proves, that these vague idols became the most important of all +considerations--was the affair which most seriously occupied the human +race: that they every where spread consternation--produced the most +frightful ravages, by the delirious inebriation resulting from the +opinions with which they intoxicated the mind. Indeed, it is extremely +difficult to prevent habitual fear, which of all human passions is the +most incommodious, from becoming a dangerous leaven; which in the long +run will sour, exasperate, and give malignancy to the most moderate +temperament. + +If a misanthrope, in hatred of his race, had formed the project +of throwing man into the greatest perplexity,--if a tyrant, in the +plenitude of his unruly desire to punish, had sought out the most +efficacious means; could either the one or the other have imagined that +which was so well calculated to gratify their revenge, as thus to occupy +him unceasingly with objects not only unknown to him, but which no +two of them should ever see with precisely the same eyes; which +notwithstanding they should be obliged to contemplate as the centre of +all their thoughts--as the only model of their conduct--as the end of +all their actions--as the subject of all their research--as a thing of +more importance to them than life itself; upon which all their present +felicity, all their future happiness, must necessarily depend? Could the +gods themselves, in their solicitude to punish the impious Prometheus, +for having stolen fire from the sun, have imagined a more certain method +of executing their wishes? Was not Pandora's box, though stuffed with +evils, trifling when compared with this? That at least left hope, to the +unfortunate Epimetheus; this effectually cut it off. + +If man was subjected to an absolute monarch, to a sultan who should keep +himself secluded from his subjects; who followed no rule but his own +desires; who did not feel himself bound by any duty; who could for ever +punish the offences committed against him; whose fury it was easy +to provoke; who was irritated even by the ideas, the thoughts of his +subjects; whose displeasure might be incurred without even their own +knowledge; the name of such a sovereign would assuredly be sufficient to +carry trouble, to spread terror, to diffuse consternation into the very +souls of those who should hear it pronounced; his idea would haunt them +every where--would unceasingly afflict them--would plunge them into +despair. What tortures would not their mind endure to discover this +formidable being, to ascertain the secret of pleasing him! What labour +would not their imagination bestow, to discover what mode of conduct +might be able to disarm his anger! What fears would assail them, lest +they might not have justly hit upon the means of assuaging his wrath! +What disputes would they not enter into upon the nature, the qualities +of a ruler, equally unknown to them all! What a variety of means would +not be adopted, to find favour in his eyes; to avert his chastisement! + +Such is the history of the effects superstition has produced upon the +earth. Man has always been panic-struck, because the systems adopted +never enable him to form any correct opinion, any fixed ideas, upon +a subject so material to his happiness; because every thing conspired +either to give his ideas a fallacious turn, or else to keep his mind in +the most profound ignorance; when he was willing to set himself +right, when he was sedulous to examine the path which conducted to his +felicity, when he was desirous of probing opinions so consequential to +his peace, involving so much mystery, yet combining both his hopes +and his fears, he was forbidden to employ the only proper method,--HIS +REASON, guided by his experience; he was assured this would be an +offence the most indelible. If he asked, Wherefore his reason had then +been given him, since he was not to use it in matters of such high +behest? he was answered, those were mysteries of which none but the +initiated could be informed; that it sufficed for him to know, that +the reason which he seemed so highly to prize, which he held in so +much esteem, was his most dangerous enemy--his most inveterate, most +determined foe. Where can be the propriety of such an argument? Can it +really be that reason is dangerous? If so, the Turks are justified in +their predilection for madmen: but to proceed, he is told that he must +believe in the gods, not question the mission of their priests; in +short, that he had nothing to do with the laws they imposed, but to +obey them: when he then required that these laws might at least be +made comprehensible to him; that he might be placed in a capacity +to understand them; the old answer was returned, that they were +_mysteries_; he must not inquire into them. But where is the necessity +for mystery in points of such vast importance? He might, indeed, +from time to time consult these oracles, when he was able to make the +sacrifices demanded; he would then receive precepts for his conduct: +these were always, however, given in such vague, indeterminate terms, +that he had scarcely the chance of acting right. At different times the +same oracles delivered different opinions: thus he had nothing, steady; +nothing permanent, whereby to guide his steps; like a blind man left to +himself in the streets, he was obliged to grope his way at the peril of +his existence. This will serve to shew the urgent necessity there is +for truth to throw its radiant lustre on systems big with so much +importance; that are so calculated to corroborate the animosities, +to confirm the bitterness of soul, between those whom nature intended +should always act as brothers. + +By the magical charms with which these idols were surrounded, the human +species has remained either as if it was benumbed, in a state of stupid +apathy, or else he has become furious with fanaticism: sometimes, +desponding with fear, man cringed like a slave who bends under the +scourge of an inexorable master, always ready to strike him; he trembled +under a yoke made too ponderous for his strength: he lived in continual +dread of a vengeance he was unceasingly striving to appease, without +ever knowing when he had succeeded: as he was always bathed in tears, +continually enveloped in misery--as he was never permitted to lose sight +of his fears--as he was continually exhorted to nourish his alarm, he +could neither labour for his own happiness nor contribute to that of +others; nothing could exhilirate him; he became the enemy of himself, +the persecutor of his fellow-creatures, because his felicity here below +was interdicted; he passed his time in heaving the most bitter sighs; +his reason being forbidden him, he fell into either a state of infancy +or delirium, which submitted him to authority; he was destined to this +servitude from the hour he quitted his mother's womb, until that in +which he was returned to his kindred dust; tyrannical opinion bound him +fast in her massive fetters; a prey to the terrors with which he was +inspired, he appeared to have come upon the earth for no other purpose +than to dream--with no other desire than to groan--with no other motives +than to sigh; his only view seemed to be to injure himself; to deprive +himself of every rational pleasure, to embitter his own existence; to +disturb the felicity of others. Thus, abject, slothful, irrational, he +frequently became wicked, under the idea of doing honour to his gods; +because they instilled into his mind that it was his duty to avenge +their cause, to sustain their honour, to propagate their worship. + +Mortals were prostrate from race to race, before vain idols to which +fear had given birth in the bosom of ignorance, during the calamities of +the earth; they tremblingly adored phantoms which credulity had placed +in the recesses of their own brain, where they found a sanctuary which +time only served to strengthen; nothing could undeceive them; nothing +was competent to make them feel, it was themselves they adored--that +they bent the knee before their own work--that they terrified themselves +with the extravagant pictures they had themselves delineated; they +obstinately persisted in prostrating themselves, in perplexing +themselves, in trembling; they even made a crime of endeavouring to +dissipate their fears; they mistook the production of their own folly; +their conduct resembled that of children, who having disfigured their +own features, become afraid of themselves when a mirror reflects the +extravagance they have committed. These notions so afflicting for +themselves, so grievous to others, have their epoch from the calamities +of man; they will continue, perhaps augment, until their mind, +enlightened by discarded reason, illumined by truth, shall set in +their true colours these various systems; until reflection guided by +experience, shall attach no more importance to them, than is consistent +with the happiness of society; until man, bursting the chains of +superstition--recalling to mind the great end of his existence--taking +a rational view of that which surrounds him, shall no longer refuse to +contemplate nature under her true character; shall no longer persist in +refusing to acknowledge she contains within herself the cause of that +wonderful phenomena which strikes on the dazzled optics of man: until +thoroughly persuaded of the weakness of their claim to the homage of +mankind, he shall make one pious, simultaneous, mighty effort, and +_overthrow the altars of Moloch and his priests_. + + + + + +CHAP. IV. + +_Examination of the Proofs of the Existence of the Divinity, as given by +CLARKE._ + + +The unanimity of man in acknowledging the Divinity, is commonly looked +upon as the strongest proof of his existence. There is not, it is said, +any people on the earth who have not some ideas, whether true or false, +of an all-powerful agent who governs the world. The rudest savages +as well as the most polished nations, are equally obliged to recur +by thought to the first cause of every thing that exists; thus it +is affirmed, the cry of Nature herself ought to convince us of the +existence of the Godhead, of which she has taken pains to engrave the +notion in the minds of men: they therefore conclude, that the idea of +God is innate. + +Perhaps there is nothing of which man should be more sedulously careful +than permitting a promiscuous assemblage of right with wrong--of +suffering false conclusions to be drawn from true propositions; +this will not improbably be found to be pretty much the case in this +instance; the existence of the great _Cause of causes_, the _Parent of +parents_, does not, I think, admit of any doubt in the mind of any +one who has reasoned: but, if this existence did not rest upon better +foundations than the unanimity of man on this subject, I am fearful +it would not be placed upon so solid a rock as those who make this +asseveration may imagine: the fact is, man is not generally agreed upon +this point; if he was, superstition could have no existence; the idea +of God cannot be _innate_, because, independent of the proofs offered on +every side of the almost impossibility of innate ideas, one simple fact +will set such an opinion for ever at rest, except with those who are +obstinately determined not to be convinced by even their own arguments: +if this idea was innate, it must be every where the same; seeing that +that which is antecedent to man's being, cannot have experienced the +modifications of his existence, which are posterior. Even if it were +waived, that the same idea should be expected from all mankind, but +that only every nation should have their ideas alike on this subject, +experience will not warrant the assertion, since nothing can be better +established than that the idea is not uniform even in the same town; +now this would be an insuperable quality in an innate idea. It not +unfrequently happens, that in the endeavour to prove too much, that +which stood firm before the attempt, is weakened; thus a bad advocate +frequently injures a good cause, although he may not be able to overturn +the rights on which it is rested. It would, therefore, perhaps, come +nearer to the point if it was said, "that the natural curiosity of +mankind have in all ages, and in all nations, led him to seek after the +primary cause of the phenomena he beholds; that owing to the variations +of his climate, to the difference of his organization, the greater +or less calamity he has experienced, the variety of his intellectual +faculties, and the circumstances under which he has been placed, man +has had the most opposite, contradictory, extravagant notions of the +Divinity, but that he has uniformly been in accord in acknowledging both +the existence, and the wisdom of his work--NATURE." + +If disengaged from prejudice, we analyze this proof, we shall see that +the universal consent of man, so diffused over the earth, actually +proves little more than that he has been in all countries exposed to +frightful revolutions, experienced disasters, been sensible to sorrows +of which he has mistaken the physical causes; that those events to which +he has been either the victim or the witness, have called forth his +admiration or excited his fear; that for want of being acquainted with +the powers of nature, for want of understanding her laws, for want of +comprehending her infinite resources, for want of knowing the effects +she must necessarily produce under given circumstances, he has believed +these phenomena were due to some secret agent of which he has had vague +ideas--to beings whom he has supposed conducted themselves after his own +manner; who were operated upon by similar motives with himself. + +The consent then of man in acknowledging a variety of gods, proves +nothing, except that in the bosom of ignorance he has either admired +the phenomena of nature, or trembled under their influence; that his +imagination was disturbed by what he beheld or suffered; that he has +sought in vain to relieve his perplexity, upon the unknown cause of +the phenomena he witnessed, which frequently obliged him to quake with +terror: the imagination of the human race has laboured variously upon +these causes, which have almost always been incomprehensible to him; +although every thing confessed his ignorance, his inability to define +these causes, yet he maintained that he was assured of their existence; +when pressed, he spoke of a spirit, (a word to which it was impossible +to attach any determinate idea) which taught nothing but the sloth, +which evidenced nothing but the stupidity of those who pronounced it. + +It ought, however, not to excite any surprise that man is incapable of +forming any substantive ideas, save of those things which act, or which +have heretofore acted upon his senses; it is very evident that the +only objects competent to move his organs are material,--that none but +physical beings can furnish him with ideas,--a truth which has been +rendered sufficiently clear in the commencement of this work, not to +need any further proof. It will suffice therefore to say that the idea +of God is not an innate, but an acquired notion; that it is the very +nature of this notion to vary from age to age; to differ in one country +from another; to be viewed variously by individuals. What do I say? +It is, in fact, an idea hardly ever constant in the same mortal. This +diversity, this fluctuation, this change, stamps it with the true +character of an acquired opinion. On the other hand, the strongest proof +that can be adduced that these ideas are founded in error, is, that man +by degrees has arrived at perfectioning all the sciences which have any +known objects for their basis, whilst the science of theology has not +advanced; it is almost every where at the same point; men seem equally +undecided on this subject; those who have most occupied themselves with +it, have effected but little; they seem, indeed, rather to have rendered +the primitive ideas man formed to himself on this head more obscure,--to +have involved in greater mystery all his original opinions. + +As soon as it is asked of man, what are the gods before whom he +prostrates himself, forthwith his sentiments are divided. In order that +his opinions should be in accord, it would be requisite that uniform +ideas, analogous sensations, unvaried perceptions, should every where +have given birth to his notions upon this subject: but this would +suppose organs perfectly similar, modified by sensations which have +a perfect affinity: this is what could not happen: because man, +essentially different by his temperament, who is found under +circumstances completely dissimilar, must necessarily have a great +diversity of ideas upon objects which each individual contemplates so +variously. Agreed in some general points, each made himself a god after +his own manner; he feared him, he served him, after his own mode. Thus +the god of one man, or of one nation, was hardly ever that of another +man, or of another nation. The god of a savage, unpolished people, is +commonly some material object, upon which the mind has exercised itself +but little; this god appears very ridiculous in the eyes of a more +polished community, whose minds have laboured more intensely upon the +subject. A spiritual god, whose adorers despise the worship paid by the +savage to a coarse, material object, is the subtle production of the +brain of thinkers, who, lolling in the lap of polished society quite at +their leisure, have deeply meditated, have long occupied themselves +with the subject. The theological god, although for the most part +incomprehensible, is the last effort of the human imagination; it is to +the god of the savage, what an inhabitant of the city of Sybaris, where +effiminacy and luxury reigned, where pomp and pageantry had reached +their climax, clothed with a curiously embroidered purple habit of silk, +was to a man either quite naked, or simply covered with the skin of +a beast perhaps newly slain. It is only in civilized societies, that +leisure affords the opportunity of dreaming--that ease procures the +facility of reasoning; in these associations, idle speculators meditate, +dispute, form metaphysics: the faculty of thought is almost void in the +savage, who is occupied either with hunting, with fishing, or with +the means of procuring a very precarious subsistence by dint of almost +incessant labour. The generality of men, however, have not more elevated +notions of the divinity, have not analyzed him more than the savage. A +spiritual, immaterial God, is formed only to occupy the leisure of some +subtle men, who have no occasion to labour for a subsistence. Theology, +although a science so much vaunted, considered so important to the +interests of man, is only useful to those who live at the expense of +others; or of those who arrogate to themselves the privilege of thinking +for all those who labour. This science becomes, in some polished +societies, who are not on that account more enlightened, a branch of +commerce extremely advantageous to its professors; equally unprofitable +to the citizens; above all when these have the folly to take a very +decided interest in their unintelligible system--in their discordant +opinions. + +What an infinite distance between an unformed stone, an animal, a star, +a statue, and the abstracted Deity, which theology hath clothed with +attributes under which it loses sight of him itself! The savage without +doubt deceives himself in the object to which he addresses his vows; +like a child he is smitten with the first object that strikes his +sight--that operates upon him in a lively manner; like the infant, his +fears are alarmed by that from which he conceives he has either +received an injury or suffered disgrace; still his ideas are fixed by a +substantive being, by an object which he can examine by his senses. The +Laplander who adores a rock,--the negro who prostrates himself before +a monstrous serpent, at least see the objects they adore. The idolater +falls upon his knees before a statue, in which he believes there resides +some concealed virtue, some powerful quality, which he judges may be +either useful or prejudicial to himself; but that subtle reasoner, +called a metaphysician, who in consequence of his unintelligible +science, believes he has a right to laugh at the savage, to deride the +Laplander, to scoff at the negro, to ridicule the idolater, doth +not perceive that he is himself prostrate before a being of his own +imagination, of which it is impossible he should form to himself any +correct idea, unless, like the savage, he re-enters into visible nature, +to clothe him with qualities capable of being brought within the range +of his comprehension. + +For the most part the notions on the Divinity, which obtain credit even +at the present day, are nothing more than a general terror diversely +acquired, variously modified in the mind of nations, which do not +tend to prove any thing, save that they have received them from their +trembling, ignorant ancestors. These gods have been successively +altered, decorated, subtilized, by those thinkers, those legislators, +those priests, who have meditated deeply upon them; who have prescribed +systems of worship to the uninformed; who have availed themselves +of their existing prejudices, to submit them to their yoke; who have +obtained a dominion over their mind, by seizing on their credulity,--by +making them participate in their errors,--by working on their fears; +these dispositions will always be a necessary consequence of man's +ignorance, when steeped in the sorrows of his heart. + +If it be true, as asserted, that the earth has never witnessed any +nation so unsociable, so savage, to be without some form of religious +worship--who did not adore some god--but little will result from it +respecting the Divinity. The word GOD, will rarely be found to designate +more than the unknown cause of those effects which man has either +admired or dreaded. Thus, this notion so generally diffused, upon which +so much stress is laid; will prove little more than that man in all +generations has been ignorant of natural causes,--that he has been +incompetent, from some cause or other, to account for those phenomena +which either excited his surprise or roused his fears. If at the present +day a people cannot be found destitute of some kind of worship, entirely +without superstition, who do not acknowledge a God, who have not adopted +a theology more or less subtle, it is because the uninformed ancestors +of these people have all endured misfortunes--have been alarmed by +terrifying effects, which they have attributed to unknown causes--have +beheld strange sights, which they have ascribed to powerful agents, +whose existence they could not fathom; the details of which, together +with their own bewildered notions, they have handed down to their +posterity who have not given them any kind of examination. + +It will readily be allowed, that the universality of an opinion by +no means proves its truth. Do we not see a great number of ignorant +prejudices, a multitude of barbarous errors, even at the present day, +receive the almost universal sanction of the human race? Are not nearly +all the inhabitants of the earth imbued with the idea of magic--in the +habit of acknowledging occult powers--given to divination--believers in +enchantment--the slaves to omens--supporters of witchcraft--thoroughly +persuaded of the existence of ghosts? If some of the most enlightened +persons are cured of these follies, they still find very zealous +partizans in the greater number of mankind, who accredit them with the +firmest confidence. It would not, however, be concluded by men of sound +sense, in many instances not by the theologian himself, that therefore +these chimeras actually have existence, although sanctioned with the +credence of the multitude. Before Copernicus, there was no one who did +not believe that the earth was stationary, that the sun described his +annual revolution round it. Was, however, this universal consent of +man upon a principle of astronomical science, which endured for so many +thousand years, less an error on that account? Yet to have doubted the +truth of such a generally-diffused opinion, one that had received +the sanction of so many learned men--that was clothed with the sacred +vestments of so many ages of credulity--that had been adopted by Moses, +acknowledged by Solomon, accredited by the Persian magi--that Elijah +himself had not refuted--that had obtained the fiat of the most +respectable universities, the most enlightened legislators, the wisest +kings, the most eloquent ministers; in short, a principle that embraced +all the stability that could be derived from the universal consent of +all ranks: to have doubted, I say, of this, would at one period have +been held as the highest degree of profanation, as the most presumptuous +scepticism, as an impious blasphemy, that would have threatened the very +existence of that unhappy country from whose unfortunate bosom such a +venomous, sacrilegious mortal could have arisen. It is well known what +opinion was entertained of Gallileo for maintaining the existence of the +antipodes. Pope Gregory excommunicated as atheists all those who gave it +credit. Thus each man has his God: But do all these gods exist? In reply +it will be said, somewhat triumphantly, each man hath his ideas of the +sun, do all these suns exist? However narrow may be the pass by which +superstition imagines it has thus guarded its favourite hypothesis, +nothing will perhaps be more easy than the answer: the existence of the +sun is a fact verified by the daily use of the senses; all the world see +the sun; no one bath ever said there is no sun; nearly all mankind have +acknowledged it to be both luminous and hot: however various may be the +opinions of man, upon this luminary, no one has ever yet pretended there +was more than one attached to our planetary system. But we may +perhaps be told, there is a wide difference between that which can be +contemplated by the visual organs, which can be understood by the sense +of feeling, and that which does not come under the cognizance of any +part of the organic structure of man. We must confess theology here +has the advantage; that we are unable to follow it through its devious +sinuosities; amidst its meandering labyrinths: but then it is the +advantage of those who see sounds, over those who only hear them; of +those who hear colours, over those who only see them; of the professors +of a science, where every thing is built upon laws inverted from those +common to the globe we inhabit; over those common understandings, who +cannot be sensible to any thing that does not give an impulse to some of +their organs. + +If man, therefore, had the courage to throw aside his prejudices, which +every thing conspires to render as durable as himself--if divested +of fear he would examine coolly--if guided by reason he would +dispassionately view the nature of things, the evidence adduced +in support of any given doctrine; he would, at least, be under +the necessity to acknowledge, that the idea of the Divinity is not +innate--that it is not anterior to his existence--that it is +the production of time, acquired by communication with his own +species--that, consequently, there was a period when it did not actually +exist in him: he would see clearly, that he holds it by tradition from +those who reared him: that these themselves received it from their +ancestors: that thus tracing it up, it will be found to have been +derived in the last resort, from ignorant savages, who were our first +fathers. The history of the world will shew that crafty legislators, +ambitious tyrants, blood-stained conquerors, have availed themselves of +the ignorance, the fears, the credulity of his progenitors, to turn +to their own profit an idea to which they rarely attached any other +substantive meaning than that of submitting them to the yoke of their +own domination. + +Without doubt there have been mortals who have dreamed they have seen +the Divinity. Mahomet, I believe, boasted he had a long conversation +with the Deity, who promulgated to him the system of the Mussulmans. But +are there not thousands, even of the theologians, who will exhaust their +breath, and fatigue their lungs with vociferating this man was a liar; +whose object was to take advantage of the simplicity, to profit by the +enthusiasm, to impose on the credulity of the Arabs; who promulgated +for truths, the crazy reveries of his own distempered imagination? +Nevertheless, is it not a truth, that this doctrine of the crafty Arab, +is at this day the creed of millions, transmitted to them by their +ancestors, rendered sacred by time, read to them in their mosques, +adorned with all the ceremonies of superstitious worship; of which the +inhabitants of a vast portion of the earth do not permit themselves for +an instant to doubt the veracity; who, on the contrary, hold those who +do not accredit it as dogs, as infidels, as beings of an inferior rank, +of meaner capacities than themselves? Indeed that man, even if he were +a theologian, would not experience the most gentle treatment from the +infuriated Mahometan, who should to his face venture to dispute the +divine mission of his prophet. Thus the ancestors of the Turk have +transmitted to their posterity, those ideas of the Divinity which they +manifestly received from those who deceived them; whose impositions, +modified from age to age, subtilized by the priests, clothed with +the reverential awe inspired by fear, have by degrees acquired that +solidity, received that corroboration, attained that veteran stability, +which is the natural result of public sanction, backed by theological +parade. + +The word God is, perhaps, among the first that vibrate on the ear of +man; it is reiterated to him incessantly; he is taught to lisp it +with respect; to listen to it with fear; to bend the knee when it is +reverberated: by dint of repetition, by listening to the fables of +antiquity, by hearing it pronounced by all ranks and persuasions, he +seriously believes all men bring the idea with them into the world; he +thus confounds a mechanical habit with instinct; whilst it is for want +of being able to recal to himself the first circumstances under which +his imagination was awakened by this name; for want of recollecting all +the recitals made to him during the course of his infancy; for want of +accurately defining what was instilled into him by his education; in +short, because his memory does not furnish him with the succession of +causes that have engraven it on his brain, that he believes this idea +is really inherent to his being; innate in all his species. Iamblicus, +indeed, who was a Pythagorean philosopher not in the highest repute +with the learned world, although one of those visionary priests in some +estimation with theologians, (at least if we may venture to judge by the +unlimited draughts they have made on the bank of his doctrines) who +was unquestionably a favourite with the emperor Julian, says, "that +anteriorly to all use of reason, the notion of the gods is inspired +by nature, and that we have even a sort of feeling of the Divinity, +preferable to the knowledge of him." It is, however, uniformly by habit, +that man admires, that he fears a being, whose name he has attended to +from his earliest infancy. As soon as he hears it uttered, he without +reflection mechanically associates it with those ideas with which +his imagination has been filled by the recitals of others; with those +sensations which he has been instructed to accompany it. Thus, if for a +season man would be ingenuous with himself, he would concede that in +the greater number of his race, the ideas of the gods, and of those +attributes with which they are clothed, have their foundation, +take their rise in, are the fruit of the opinions of his fathers, +traditionally infused into him by education--confirmed by +habit--corroborated by example--enforced by authority. That it very +rarely happens he examines these ideas; that they are for the most part +adopted by inexperience, propagated by tuition, rendered sacred by time, +inviolable from respect to his progenitors, reverenced as forming part +of those institutions he has most learned to value. He thinks he has +always had them, because he has had them from his infancy; he +considers them indubitable, because he is never permitted to question +them--because he never has the intrepidity to examine their basis. + +If it had been the destiny of a Brachman, or a Mussulman, to have drawn +his first breath on the shores of Africa, he would adore, with as much +simplicity, with as much fervour, the serpent reverenced by the Negroes, +as he does the God his own metaphysicians have offered to his reverence. +He would be equally indignant if any one should presumptuously dispute +the divinity of this reptile, which he would have learned to venerate +from the moment he quitted the womb of his mother, as the most zealous, +enthusiastic fakir, when the marvellous wonders of his prophet should +be brought into question; or as the most subtile theologian when +the inquiry turned upon the incongruous qualities with which he has +decorated his gods. Nevertheless, if this serpent god of the Negro +should be contested, they could not at least dispute his existence. +Simple as may be the mind of this dark son of nature, uncommon as may +be the qualities with which he has clothed his reptile, he still may be +evidenced by all who choose to exercise their organs of sight; not so +with the theologian; he absolutely questions the existence of every +other god but that which he himself has formed; which is questioned in +its turn by his brother metaphysician. They are by no means disposed to +admit the proofs offered by each other. Descartes, Paschal, and Doctor +Samuel Clarke himself, have been accused of atheism by the theologians +of their time. Subsequent reasoners have made use of their proofs, and +even given them as extremely valid. Doctor Bowman published a work, in +which he pretends all the proofs hitherto brought forward are crazy and +fragile: he of course substitutes his own; which in their turn have been +the subject of animadversion. Thus it would appear these theologians are +not more in accord with themselves than they are with Turks or Pagans. +They cannot even agree as to their proofs of existence: from age to +age new champions arise, new evidence is adduced, the old discarded, or +treated with contempt; profound philosophers, subtle metaphysicians, are +continually attacking each other for their ignorance on a point of the +very first importance. Amidst this variety of discussion, it is very +difficult for simple winds, for those who steadily search after truth, +who only wish to understand what they believe, to find a point upon +which they can fix with reliance--a standard round which they may rally +without fear of danger--a common measure that way serve them for a +beacon to avoid the quicksands of delusion--the sophistry of polemics. + +Men of very great genius have successively miscarried in their +demonstrations; have been held to have betrayed their cause by the +weakness of the arguments by which they have supported it; by the manner +in which they have attempted to establish their positions. Thus many +of them, when they believed they had surmounted a difficulty, had the +mortification to find they had only given birth to an hundred others. +They seem, indeed, not to be in a capacity to understand each other, +or to agree among themselves, when they reason upon the nature and +qualities of beings created by such a variety of imaginations, which +each contemplates diversely, upon which the natural self-love of each +disputant induces him to reject with vehement indignation every thing +that does not fall in with his own peculiar mode of thinking--that does +not quadrate either with his superstition or his ignorance, or sometimes +with both. + +The opponents of Clarke charge him with begging the question in his work +on _The Being and Attributes of God_. They say he has pretended to prove +this existence _a priori_, which they deem impossible, seeing there is +nothing anterior to the first of causes; that therefore it can only +be proved _a posteriori_, that is to say, by its effects. Law, in his +_Inquiry into the Ideas of Space, Time, Immensity, &c_. has attacked him +very triumphantly, for this manner of proof, which is stated to be so +very repugnant to the school-men. His arguments have been treated with +no more ceremony by Thomas D'Aquinas, John Scott, and others of the +schools. At the present day I believe he is held in more respect--that +his authority outweighs that of all his antagonists together. Be that as +it may, those who have followed him have done nothing more than either +repeat his ideas, or present his evidence under a new form. Tillotson +argues at great length, but it would be rather difficult to understand +which side of the question he adopts on this momentous subject; whether +he is a Necessitarian, or among the opposers of Fatalism. Speaking of +man, he says, "he is liable to many evils and miseries, which he can +neither prevent or redress; he is full of wants, which he cannot +supply, and compassed about with infirmities which he cannot remove, and +obnoxious to dangers which he can never sufficiently provide against: he +is apt to grieve for what he cannot help, and eagerly to desire what he +is never able to obtain." If the proofs of Clarke, who has drawn them up +in twelve propositions, are examined with attention, I think they may be +fairly shielded from the reproach with which they have been loaded; +it does not appear that he has proved his positions _a priori,_ but _a +posteriori,_ according to rule. It seems clear, however, that he has +mistaken the proof of the existence of the effects, for the proof of the +existence of the cause: but here he seems to have more reason than his +critics, who in their eagerness to prove that Clarke has not conformed +to the rules of the schools, would entirely overlook the best, the +surest foundation whereon to rest the existence of the _Great Cause of +causes,_ that _Parent of Parents_, whose wisdom shines so manifestly +in nature, of which Clarke's work may be said to be such a masterly +evidence. We shall follow, step by step, the different propositions +in which this learned divine developes the received opinions upon +the Divinity; which, when applied to nature, will be found to be so +accurate, so correct, as to leave no further room to doubt either the +existence or the wisdom of her great author, thus proved through her own +existence. Dr. Clarke sets out with saying: + +"_1st. Something has existed from all eternity_." + +This proposition is evident--hath no occasion for proofs. Matter has +existed from all eternity, its forms alone are evanescent; matter is the +great engine used by nature to produce all her phenomena, or rather it +is nature herself. We have some idea of matter, sufficient to warrant +the conclusion that this has always existed. First, that which exists, +supposes existence essential to its being. That which cannot, annihilate +itself, exists necessarily; it is impossible to conceive that that which +cannot cease to exist, or that which cannot annihilate itself, could +ever have had a beginning. If matter cannot be annihilated, it could +not commence to be. Thus we say to Dr. Clarke, that it is matter, it is +nature, acting by her own peculiar energy, of which no particle is ever +in an absolute state of rest, which hath always existed. The various +material bodies which this nature contains often change their form, +their combination, their properties, their mode of action: but their +principles or elements are indestructible--have never been able to +commence. What this great scholar actually understands, when he makes +the assertion "that an eternal duration is now actually past," is not +quite so clear; yet he affirms, "that not to believe it would be a real +and express contradiction." We may, however, safely admit his argument, +"that when once any proposition is clearly demonstrated to, be true, +it ought not to disturb us that there be perhaps some perplexing +difficulties on the other side, which merely for want of adequate ideas +of the manner of the existence of the things demonstrated, are not +easily to be cleared." + +_2nd, "There has existed from eternity some one unchangeable and +independent Being."_ + +We may fairly inquire what is this Being? Is it independent of its own +peculiar essence, or of those properties which constitute it such as +it is? We shall further inquire, if this Being, whatever it may be, +can make the other beings which it produces, or which it moves, act +otherwise than they do, according to the properties which it has given +them? And in this case we shall ask, if this Being, such as it way be +supposed to be, does not act necessarily; if it is not obliged to employ +indispensible means to fulfil its designs, to arrive at the end which it +either has, or may be supposed to have in view? Then we shall say, that +nature is obliged to act after her essence; that every thing which takes +place in her is necessary; but that she is independent of her forms. + +A man is said to be independent, when he is determined in his actions +only by the general causes which are accustomed to move him; he is +equally said to be dependent on another, when he cannot act but in +consequence of the determination which this last gives him. A body is +dependent on another body when it owes to it its existence, and its mode +of action. A being existing from eternity cannot owe his existence to +any other being; he cannot then be dependent upon him, except he owes +his action to him; but it is evident that an eternal or self-existent +Being contains in his own nature every thing that is necessary for him +to act: then, matter being eternal, is necessarily independent in the +sense we have explained; of course it hath no occasion for a mover upon +which it ought to depend. + +This eternal Being is also immutable, if by this attribute be understood +that he cannot change his nature; but if it be intended to infer by it +that he cannot change his mode of action or existence, it is without +doubt deceiving themselves, since even in supposing an immaterial being, +they would be obliged to acknowledge in him different modes of being, +different volitions, different ways of acting; particularly if he was +not supposed totally deprived of action, in which case he would be +perfectly useless. Indeed it follows of course that to change his mode +of action he must necessarily change his manner of being. From hence it +will be obvious, that the theologians, in making their gods immutable, +render them immoveable, consequently they cannot act. An immutable +being, could evidently neither have successive volition, nor produce +successive action; if this being hath created matter, or given birth to +the universe, there must have been a time in which he was willing that +this matter, this universe, should exist; and this time must have been +preceded by another time, in which he was willing that it might not yet +exist. If God be the author of all things, as well as of the motion and +of the combinations of matter, he is unceasingly occupied in producing +and destroying; in consequence, he cannot be called immutable, touching +his mode of existing. The material world always maintains itself by +motion, and the continual change of its parts; the sum of the beings who +compose it, or of the elements which act in it, is invariably the same; +in this sense the immutability of the universe is much more easy of +comprehension, much more demonstrable than that of an other being to +whom, they would attribute all the effects, all the mutations which take +place. Nature is not more to be accused of mutability, on account of the +succession of its forms, than the eternal Being is by the theologians, +by the diversity of his decrees. Here we shall be able to perceive that, +supposing the laws by which nature acts to be immutable, it does not +require tiny of these logical distinctions to account for the changes +that take place: the mutation which results, is, on the contrary, a +striking proof of the immutability of the system which produces them; +and completely brings mature under the range of this second proposition +as stated by Dr. Clarke. + +_3dly, "That unchangeable and independent Being which has existed +from eternity without any eternal cause of its existence, must be +self-existent, that is, necessarily existing."_ + +This proposition is merely a repetition of the first; we reply to it +by inquiring, Why matter, which is indestructible, should not be +self-existent? It is evident that a being who had no beginning, must be +self-existent; if he had existed by another, he would have commenced to +be; consequently he would not be eternal. + +_4thly, "What the substance or essence of that Being which is +self-existent, or necessarily existing, is, we have no idea; neither is +it at all possible for us to comprehend it."_ + +Dr. Clarke would perhaps have spoken more correctly if he had said +his essence is impossible to be known: nevertheless, we shall readily +concede that the essence of matter is incomprehensible, or at least that +we conceive it very feebly by the manner in which we are affected by it; +but without this we should be less able to conceive the Divinity, +who would then be impervious on any side. Thus it must necessarily be +concluded, that it is folly to argue upon it, since it is by matter +alone we can have any knowledge of him; that is to say, by which we can +assure ourselves of his existence,--by which we can at all guess at his +qualities. In short we must conclude, that every thing related of the +Divinity, either proves him material, or else proves the impossibility +in which the human mind will always find itself, of conceiving any being +different from matter; without extent, yet omnipresent; immaterial, +yet acting upon matter; spiritual, yet producing matter; immutable, yet +putting every thing in activity, &c. + +Indeed it must be allowed that the incomprehensibility of the Divinity +does not distinguish him from matter; this will not be more easy +of comprehension when we shall associate it with a being much less +comprehensible than itself; we have some slender knowledge of it through +some of its parts. We do not certainly know the essence of any being, +if by that word we are to understand that which constitutes its peculiar +nature. We only know matter by the sensations, the perceptions, the +ideas which it furnishes; it is according to these that we judge it +to be either favorable or unfavourable, following the particular +disposition of our organs. But when a being does not act upon any part +of our organic structure, it does not exist for us; we cannot, without +exhibiting folly, without betraying our ignorance, without falling into +obscurity, either speak of its nature, or assign its qualities; our +senses are the only channel by which we could have formed the slightest +idea of it; these not having received any impulse, we are, in point of +fact, unacquainted with its existence. The incomprehensibility of the +Divinity ought to convince man that it is a point at which he is bound +to stop; indeed he is placed in a state of utter incapacity to proceed: +this, however, would not suit with those speculators who are willing to +reason upon him continually, to shew the depth of their learning,--to +persuade the uninformed they understand that which is incomprehensible +to all men; by which they expect to be able to submit him to their own +views. Nevertheless, if the Divinity be incomprehensible, It would not +be straining a point beyond its tension, to conclude that a priest, or +metaphysician, did not comprehend him better than other men: it is not, +perhaps, either the wisest or the surest way to become acquainted with +him, to represent him to ourselves, by the imagination of a theologian. + +_5thly, "Though the substance, or essence of the self-existent Being, is +in itself absolutely incomprehensible to us, yet many of the essential +attributes of his nature are strictly demonstrable, as well as his +existence. Thus, in the first place, the self-existent Being must of +necessity be eternal."_ + +This proposition differs in nothing from the first, except Dr. Clarke +does not here understand that as the self-existent Being had no +beginning, he can have no end. However this may be, we must ever +inquire, Why this should not be matter? We shall further observe, +that matter not being capable of annihilation, exists necessarily, +consequently will never cease to exist; that the human mind has no means +of conceiving how matter should originate from that which is not itself +matter: is it not obvious, that matter is necessary; that there is +nothing, except its powers, its arrangement, its combinations, which are +contingent or evanescent? The general motion is necessary, but the +given motion is not so; only during the season that the particular +combinations subsist, of which this motion is the consequence, or +the effect: we may be competent to change the direction, to either +accelerate or retard, to suspend or arrest, a particular motion, but the +general motion can never possibly be annihilated. Man, in dying, ceases +to live; that is to say, he no longer either walks, thinks, or acts in +the mode which is peculiar to human organization: but the matter which +composed his body, the matter which formed his mind, does not cease to +move on that account: it simply becomes susceptible of another species +of motion. + +_6thly, "The self-existent Being must of necessity be infinite and +omnipresent."_ + +The word infinite presents only a negative idea--which excludes all +bounds: it is evident that a being who exists necessarily, who is +independent, cannot be limited by any thing which is out of himself; +he must consequently be his own limits; in this sense we may say he is +infinite. + +Touching what is said of his omnipresence, it is equally evident that +if there be nothing exterior to this being, either there is no place in +which he must not be present, or that there will be only himself and the +vacuum. This granted, I shall inquire if matter exists; if it does +not at least occupy a portion of space? In this case, matter, or the +universe, must exclude every other being who is not matter, from that +place which the material beings occupy in space. In asking whether the +gods of the theologians be by chance the abstract being which they call +the vacuum or space, they will reply, no! They will further insist, that +their gods, who are not matter, penetrate that which is matter. But it +must be obvious, that to penetrate matter, it is necessary to have some +correspondence with matter, consequently to have extent; now to have +extent, is to have one of the properties of matter. If the Divinity +penetrates matter, then he is material; by a necessary deduction he is +inseparable from matter; then if he is omnipresent, he will be in every +thing. This the theologian will not allow: he will say it is a mystery; +by which I shall understand that he is himself ignorant how to account +for his own positions; this will not be the case with making nature act +after immutable laws; she will of necessity be every where, in my body, +in my arm, in every other material being, because matter composes them +all. The Divinity who has given this invariable system, will without +any incongruous reasoning, without any subterfuge, be also present every +where, inasmuch as the laws he has prescribed will unchangeably act +through the whole; this does not seem inconsistent with reason to +suppose. + +_7th, "The Self-existent Being must of necessity be but one."_ + +If there he nothing exterior to a being who exists necessarily, it must +follow that he is unique. It will be obvious that this proposition is +the same with the preceding one; at least, if they are not willing to +deny the existence of the material world. + +_8th, "The self-existent and original Cause of all things, must be an +intelligent being."_ + +Here Dr. Clarke most unquestionably assigneth a human quality: +intelligence is a faculty appertaining to organized or animated beings, +of which we have no knowledge out of these beings. To have intelligence, +it is necessary to think; to think, it is requisite to have ideas; to +have ideas, supposes senses; when senses exist they are material; when +they are material, they cannot be a pure spirit, in the language of the +theologian. + +The necessary Being who comprehends, who contains, who produces animated +beings, contains, includes, and produceth intelligence. But has the +great whole a peculiar intelligence, which moveth it, which maketh +it act, which determineth it in the mode that intelligence moves and +determines animated bodies; or rather, is not this intelligence the +consequence of immutable laws, a certain modification resulting from +certain combinations of matter, which exists under one form of these +combinations, but is wanting under another form? This is assuredly what +nothing is competent absolutely, and demonstrably to prove. Man having +placed himself in the first rank in the universe, has been desirous to +judge of every thing after what he saw within himself, because he +hath pretended that in order to be perfect it was necessary to be +like himself. Here is the source of all his erroneous reasoning upon +nature--the foundation of his ideas upon his gods. He has therefore +concluded, perhaps not with the most polished wisdom, that it would be +indecorous in himself, injurious to the Divinity, not to invest him with +a quality which is found estimable in man--which he prizes highly--to +which he attaches the idea of perfection--which he considers as a +manifest proof of superiority. He sees his fellow-creature is offended +when he is thought to lack intelligence; he therefore judges it to be +the same with the Divinity. He denies this quality to nature, because +he considers her a mass of ignoble matter, incapable of self-action; +although she contains and produces intelligent beings. But this is +rather a personification of an abstract quality, than an attribute of +the Deity, with whose perfections, with whose mode of existence, he +cannot by any possible means become acquainted according to the fifth +proposition of Dr. Clarke himself. It is in the earth that is engendered +those living animals called worms; yet we do not say the earth is a +living creature. The bread which man eats, the wine that he drinks, are +not themselves thinking substances; yet they nourish, sustain, and cause +those beings to think, who are susceptible of this modification of +their existence. It is likewise in nature, that is formed intelligent, +feeling, thinking beings; yet it cannot be rationally said, that nature +feels, thinks, and is intelligent after the manner of these beings, who +nevertheless spring out of her bosom. + +How! cries the metaphysician, the subtilizing philosopher, what! refuse +to the Divinity, those qualities we discover in his creatures? Must, +then, the work be more perfect than the workman? Shall God, who made the +eye, not himself see? Shall God, who formed the ear, not himself hear! +This at a superficial view appears insuperable: but are the questioners, +however triumphantly they may make the inquiry, themselves aware of the +length this would carry them, even if their queries were answered with +the most unqualified affirmative? Have they sufficiently reflected +on the tendency of this mode of reasoning? If this be admitted as a +postulatum, are they prepared to follow it in all its extent? Suppose +their argument granted, what is to be done with all those other +qualities upon which man does not set so high a value? Are they also +to be ascribed to the Divinity, because we do not refuse him qualities +possessed by his creatures? By a parity of reasoning we should attach +faculties that would be degrading to the Divinity. Thus it ever happens +with those who travel out of the limits of their own knowledge; they +involve themselves in perpetual contradictions which they can never +reconcile; which only serve to prove that in arguing upon points, on +which universal ignorance prevails, the result is constantly that all +the deductions made from such unsteady principles, must of necessity be +at war with each other, in hostility with themselves. Thus, although +we cannot help feeling the profound wisdom, that must have dictated the +system we see act with such uniformity, with such constancy, with +such astonishing power, we cannot form the most slender idea of the +particular nature of that wisdom; because if we were for an instant to +assimilate it to our own, weak and feeble as it is, we should from that +instant be in a state of contradiction; seeing we could not then +avoid considering the evil we witness, the sorrow we experience, as a +dereliction of this wisdom, which at least proves one great truth, _that +we are utterly incapable of forming an idea of the Divinity_. But in +contemplating things as our own experience warrants in whatever we do +understand, in considering nature as acting by unchangeable laws, we +find good and evil necessarily existing, without at all involving the +wisdom of the great _Cause of causes_; who thus has no need to remedy +that, which the further progress of the eternal system will regulate of +itself, or which industry and patient research on our parts will enable +us to discover the means of futurely avoiding. + +_9th, "The self-existent and original Cause of all things, is not a +necessary agent, but a being endued with liberty and choice._" + +Man is called free, when he finds within himself motives that determine +him to action, or when his will meets no obstacle to the performance of +that to which his motives have determined him. The necessary Being of +which question is here made, doth he find no obstacles to the execution +of the projects which are attributed to him? Is he willing, adopting +their own hypothesis, that evil should be committed, or can he not +prevent it? In this latter case he is not free; if his will does meet +with obstacles, if he is willing to permit evil; then he suffers man +to restrain his liberty, by deranging his projects; if he has not these +projects, then they are themselves in error who ascribe them to him. +How will the metaphysicians draw themselves out of this perplexing +intricacy? + +The further a theologian goes, whilst considering his gods as +possessed of human qualities, as acting by mortal motives, the more he +flounders--the greater the mass of contradiction he heaps together: +thus if it be asked of him, can God reward crime, punish virtue, he will +immediately answer, no! In this answer he will have truth: but then this +truth, and the freedom which is ascribed to him, cannot, according to +human ideas, exist together; because if this being cannot love vice, +cannot hate virtue, and it is evident he cannot, he is in fact not more +free than man himself. Again, God is said to have made a covenant with +his creatures; now it is the very essence of a covenant to restrict +choice; and that being must be considered a necessary agent who is +under the necessity of fulfilling any given act. As it is impossible to +suppose the Divinity can act irrationally, it must be conceded that as +he made these laws, he is himself obliged to follow them: because if he +was not, as we must again suppose he does nothing without a good reason, +he would thereby imply, that the mode of action he adopted would be +wiser; which would again involve a contradiction. The theologians +fearing, without doubt, to restrain the liberty of the Divinity, have +supposed it was necessary that he should not be bound by his own laws, +in which they have shewn somewhat more ignorance of their subject than +they imagined. + +_10th, "The self-existent Being, the supreme Cause of all things, must +of necessity have infinite power."_ + +As nature is adequate to produce every thing we see--as she contains +the whole united power of the universe, her power has consequently no +limits: the being who conferred this power cannot have less. But if the +ideas of the theologians were adopted, this power would not appear +quite so unlimited; since, according to them, man is a free agent, +consequently has the means of acting contrary to this power, which at +once sets a boundary to it. An equitable monarch is perhaps nothing +less than he is a free agent; when he believes himself bound to act +conformably to the laws, which he has sworn to observe, or which he +cannot violate without wounding his justice. The theologian is a man who +may be very fairly estimated neuter; because he destroys with one hand +what he establishes with the other. + +_11th, "The Supreme Cause and Author of all things, must of necessity be +infinitely wise."_ + +As nature produces all things by certain immutable laws, it will require +no great difficulty to allow that she may be infinitely wise: indeed, +whatever side of the argument may be taken, this fact will result as +a necessary consequence. It will hardly admit of a question that all +things are produced by nature: if, therefore, we do not allow her wisdom +to be first rate, it would be an insult to the Divinity, who gave her +her system. If the theologian himself is to take the lead, he also +admits that nature operates under the immediate auspices of his gods; +whatever she does, must then, according to his own shewing, be executed +with the most polished wisdom. But the theologian is not satisfied with +going thus far: he will insist, not only that he knows what these +things are, but also that he knows the end they have in view: this, +unfortunately, is the rock he splits upon. According to his own +admission, the ways of God are impenetrable to man. If we grant his +position, what is the result? Why, that it is at random he speaks. If +these ways are impenetrable, by what means did he acquire his knowledge +of them? How did he discover the end proposed by the Deity? If they +are not impenetrable, they then can be equally known to other men as +to himself. The theologian would be puzzled to shew he has any more +privileges in nature than his fellow mortals. Again, if he has asserted +these things to be impenetrable, when they are not so, he is then in the +situation that he has himself placed Mahomet: he is no longer worthy of +being attended to, because he has swerved from veracity. It certainly is +not very consistent with the sublime idea of the Divinity that he should +be clothed with that weak, vain passion of man, called glory: the being +who had the faculty of producing such a system as it operated in nature, +could hardly be supposed to have such a frivolous passion as we know +this to be in our fellows: and as we can never reason but after what +we do know, it would appear nothing can be more inconsistent than thus +continually heaping together our own feeble, inconsistent views, and +then supposing the great _Cause of causes_ acts by such futile rules. + +_12th, "The supreme Cause and Author of all things must of necessity be +a being of infinite goodness, justice, and truth, and all other moral +perfections, such as become the supreme governor and judge of the +world."_ + +We must again repeat that these are human qualities drawn from the model +of man himself; they only suppose a being of the human species, who +should be divested of what we call imperfections: this is certainly +the highest point of view in which our finite minds are capable of +contemplating the Divinity: but as this being has neither species nor +cause, consequently no fellow creatures, he must necessarily be of +an order so different to man, that human faculties can in no wise +be appropriately assigned to him. The idea of perfection, as man +understands it, is an abstract, metaphysical, negative idea, of which +he has no archetype whereby to form a judgment: he would call that a +perfect being, who, similar to himself, was wanting in those qualities +which he finds prejudicial to him; but such a being would after all be +no wore than a man. It is always relatively to himself, to his own mode +of feeling and of thinking, that a thing is either perfect or imperfect; +it is according to this, that in his eyes a thing is more or less useful +or prejudicial; agreeable or disagreeable. Justice includes all moral +perfections. One of the most prominent features of justice, in the +ideas of man, is the equity of the relations subsisting between beings, +founded upon their mutual wants. According to the theologian, his gods +owe nothing to man. How then does he measure out his ideas of justice? +For a monarch to say he owed nothing to his subjects, would be +considered, even by this theologian himself, as rank injustice; +because he would expect the fulfilment of duties on their part, without +exercising those which devolved upon himself. Duties, according to +the only idea man can form of them, must be reciprocal. It is rather +stretching the human capabilities, to understand the relations between +a pure spirit and material beings--between finity and infinity--between +eternal beings and those which are transitory: thus it is, that +metaphysics hold forth an inconceivable being by the very attributes +with which they clothe him; for either he has these attributes, or +he has them not: whether he has them or has them not, man can only +understand them after his own powers of comprehension. If he does at +all understand them, he cannot have the slightest idea of justice +unaccompanied by duties, which are the very basis, the superstructure, +the pillars upon which this virtue rests. Whether we are to view it as +self-love or ignorance in the theologian, that he thus dresses up his +gods after himself, it certainly was not the happiest effort of his +imagination to work by an inverse rule: for, according to himself, +the qualities he describes are all the negation of what he calls them. +Doctor Clarke himself stumbles a little upon these points; he insists +upon free agency, and uses this extraordinary method to support his +argument; he says, "God is, by necessity, a free agent: and he can no +more possibly cease to be so, than he can cease to exist. He must of +necessity, every moment choose to act, or choose to forbear acting; +because two contradictories cannot possibly be true at once. Man also +is by necessity, not in the nature of things, but through God's +appointment, a free agent. And it is no otherwise in his power to cease +to be such, than by depriving himself of life." Will Doctor Clarke +permit us to put one simple question: If to be obligated to do a +certain given thing, is to be free, what is it to be coerced? Or if two +contradictories cannot be true at once, by what rule of logic are we +to measure the idea of that freedom which arises out of necessity. +Supposing necessity to be what Dr. Johnson, (using Milton as his +authority) says it is, "compulsion," "fatality," would it be considered +a man was less restrained in his actions because he was only compelled +to do what was right? The restraint would undoubtedly he beneficial to +him, but it would not therefore render him more a free agent. If the +Divinity cannot love wickedness, cannot hate goodness, (and surely +the theologians themselves will not pretend he can,) then the power of +choice has no existence as far as these two things are concerned; and +this upon Clarke's own principle, because two contradictories cannot be +true at once. Nothing could, I think, appear a greater contradiction, +than the idea that the _Great Cause of causes_ could by any possibility +love vice: if such a monstrous principle could for a moment have +existence, there would be an end of all the foundations of religion. + +The Doctor is very little happier in reasoning upon _immateriality_. +He says, by way of illustrating his argument, "that it is possible to +infinite power to create an immaterial cogitative substance, endued +with a power of beginning motion, and with a liberty of will or choice." +Again, "that immaterial substances are not impossible; or, that a +substance immaterial is not a contradictory notion. Now, whoever asserts +that it is contradictory, must affirm that whatever is not matter is +nothing; and that, to say any thing exists which is not matter, is +saying that there exists something which is nothing, which in other +words is plainly this,--that whatever we have not an idea of, is +nothing, and impossible to be." It could, I am apt to believe, never +have entered into any reasonable mind that a thing was impossible +because he could have no idea of it:--many things, on the contrary, are +possible, of which we have not the most slender notion: but it does +not, I presume, flow consecutively out of this admission, that therefore +every thing is, which is not impossible. Doctor Clarke then, rather begs +the question on this occasion. In the schools it is never considered +requisite to prove a negative; indeed, this is ranked by logicians +amongst those things impossible to be, but it is considered of +the highest importance to soundness of argument, to establish the +affirmative by the most conclusive reasoning. Taking this for granted, +we will apply the doctor's own reasoning. He says, "Nothing is that of +which every thing, can truly be affirmed. So that the idea of nothing, +if I may so speak, is absolutely the negative of all ideas; the idea, +therefore, either of a finite or infinite nothing is a contradiction +in terms." To affirm, of a thing with truth, it must be necessary to be +acquainted with that thing. To have ideas, as we have already proved, it +is necessary to have perceptions; to have perceptions, it is requisite +to have sensations; to have sensations, requires organs. An idea cannot +be, and not be, at the same moment: the idea of substance, it will +scarcely be denied, is that of a thing solid, real, according to Dryden; +capable of supporting accidents, according to Watts; something of which +we can say that it is, according to Davies; body, corporeal nature, +according to Newton; the idea of immaterial, according to Hooker, is +incorporeal. How then am I to understand immaterial substance? Is it +not, according to these definitions, that which cannot couple together? +If a thing be immaterial, it cannot be a substance; if a substance, it +cannot be immaterial: those I apprehend will not have many ideas, who do +not see this is a complete negative of all ideas. If, therefore, on the +outset, the doctor cannot find words, by which he can convey the idea of +that of which he is so desirous to prove the existence, by what chain of +reasoning does he flatter himself that he is to be understood? He will +endeavour to draw out of this dilemma, by assuring as there are things +which we can neither see nor touch, but which do not the less exist on +that account. Granted: but from thence we can neither reason upon +them, nor assign them qualities; we must at least either feel them or +something like them, before we can have any idea of them: this, however, +would not prove they were not substances, nor that substances can be +immaterial. A thing may with great possibility exist of which we have no +knowledge, and yet be material; but I maintain until we have a knowledge +of it, it exists not for us, any more than colours exist for a man born +blind; the man who has sight knows they do exist, can describe them to +his dark neighbour; from this description the blind man may form some +idea of them by analogy with what he himself already knows; or, perhaps, +having a finer tact than his neighbour, he may be enabled to distinguish +them by their surfaces; it would, therefore, be bad reasoning in the +man born blind, to deny the existence of colours; because although these +colours may have no relation with the senses in the absence of sight, +they have with those who have it in their power to see and to know +them: this blind man, however, would-appear a little ridiculous if he +undertook to define them with all their gradations of shade; with all +their variations under different masses of light. Again, if those who +were competent to discriminate these modifications of matter called +colours, were to define them to this blind man, as those modifications +of matter called sound, would the blind man be able to have any +conception of them? It certainly would not be wise in him to aver, that +such a thing as colorific sound had no existence, was impossible; but +at least he would be very justifiable in saying, they appeared +contradictions, because he had some ideas of sound which did not at +all aid him in forming those of colour; he would not, perhaps, be very +inconclusive if he suspected the competency of his informer to the +definition attempted, from his inability to convey to him in any +distinct, understood terms, his own ideas of colours. The theologian is +a blind man, who would explain to others who are also blind, the shades +and colours of a portrait whose original he has not even stumbled upon +in the dark. There is nothing incongruous in supposing that every thing +which has existence is matter; but it requires the complete inversion of +all our ideas, to conceive that which is immaterial; because, in point +of fact, this would be a quality of which "nothing can with truth be +affirmed." + +It is, indeed true, that Plato, who was a great creator of chimeras, +says, "those who admit nothing but what they can see and feel, are +stupid ignorant beings, who refuse to admit the reality of the existence +of invisible things." With all due deference to such an authority, we +may still venture to ask, is there then no difference, no shade, no +gradation, between an admission of possibilities and the proof of +realities. Theology would then be the only science in which it is +permitted to conclude that a thing is, as soon as it is possible to be. +Will the assertion of either Clarke or Plato stand absolutely in place +of all evidence? Would they themselves permit such to be convincing if +used against them? The theologians evidently hold this Platonic, this +dogmatical language; they have dreamed the dreams of their master; +perhaps if they were examined a little, they would be found nothing +more than the result of those obscure notions, those unintelligible +metaphysics, adopted by the Egyptian, Chaldean, and Assyrian priests, +among whom Plato drew up his philosophy. If, however, philosophy means +that which we are led to suppose it does, by the great John Locke, it is +"a system by which natural effects are explained." Taken in this sense +we shall be under the necessity of agreeing, that the Platonic doctrines +in no wise merit this distinction, seeing he has only drawn the human +mind from the contemplation of visible nature, to plunge it into the +unfathomable depths of invisibility--of intangibility--of suppositious +speculation, where it can find little other food except chimeras or +conjecture. Such a philosophy is rather fantastical, yet it would seem +we are required to subscribe to its positions without being allowed +to compare them with reason, to examine them through the medium of +experience, to try the gold by the action of fire: thus we have in +abundance the terms spirits, incorporeal substances, invisible powers, +supernatural effects, innate ideas, mysterious virtues, possessed by +demons, &c. &c. which render our senses entirely useless, which put +to flight every thing like experience; while we are gravely told that +"nothing is that, of which no thing can truly be affirmed." Whoever may +be willing to take the trouble of reading the works of Plato and his +disciples, such as Proclus, Iamblicus, Plotinus, and others, will not +fail to find in them almost every doctrine, every metaphysical +subject of the theologian; in fact, the theurgy of many of the modern +superstitions, which for the most part seems to be little more than a +slight variation of that adopted by the ethnic priests. Dreamers have +not had that variety in their follies, that has generally been imagined. +That some of these things should be extensively admitted, by no means +affords proof of their existence. Nothing appears more facile than to +make mankind admit the greatest absurdities, under the imposing name +of mysteries; after having imbued him from his infancy with maxims +calculated to hoodwink his reason--to lead him astray--to prevent him +from examining that which he is told he must believe. Of this there +cannot well exist a more decisive proof than the great extent of +country, the millions of human beings who faithfully and without +examination have adopted the idle dreams, the rank absurdities, of that +arch impostor Mahomet. However this may be, we shall be obliged again +to reply to Plato, and to those of his followers who impose upon us the +necessity of believing that which we cannot comprehend, that, in order +to know that a thing exists, it is at least necessary to have some idea +of it; that this idea can only come to us by the medium of our senses; +that consequently every thing of which our senses do not give us a +knowledge, is in fact nothing for us; and can only rest upon our faith; +upon that admission which is pretty generally, even by the theologian +himself, considered as rather a sandy foundation whereon to erect the +altar of truth: that if there be an absurdity in not accrediting the +existence of that which we do not know, there is no less extravagance in +assigning it qualities; in reasoning upon its properties; in clothing +it with faculties, which may or may not be suitable to its mode of +existence; in substituting idols of our own creation; in combining +incompatible attributes, which will neither bear the test of experience +nor the scrutiny of reason; and then endeavouring to make the whole pass +current by dint of the word infinite, which we will now examine. + +Infinite, according to Dennis, means "boundless, unlimited." Doctor +Clarke thus describes it:--he says, "The self-existent being must be a +most simple, unchangeable incorruptible being; without parts, figure, +motion, divisibility, or any other such properties as we find in matter. +For all these things do plainly and necessarily imply finiteness in +their very notion, and are utterly inconsistent with complete infinity." +Ingenuously, is it possible for man to form any true notion of such a +quality? The theologians themselves acknowledge he cannot. Further, the +Doctor allows, "That as to the particular manner of his being infinite, +or every where present, in opposition to the manner of created things +being present in such or such finite places, this is as impossible for +our finite understandings to comprehend or explain, as it is for us to +form an adequate idea of infinity." What is this, then, but that which +no man can explain or comprehend? If it cannot be comprehended, it +cannot be detailed; if it cannot be detailed, it is precisely "that of +which nothing can with truth be affirmed;" and this is Dr. Clarke's own +explanation of nothing. Indeed, is not the human mind obliged by its +very nature to join limited quantities to other quantities, which it can +only conceive as limited, in order to form to itself a sort of confused +idea of something beyond its own grasp, without ever reaching the point +of infinity, which eludes every attempt at definition? Then it would +appear that it is an abstraction, a mere negation of limitation. + +Our learned adversary seems to think it strange that the existence of +incorporeal, immaterial substances, the essence of which we are not +able to comprehend, should not be generally accredited. To enforce +this belief, he says, "There is not so mean and contemptible a plant +or animal, that does not confound the most enlarged understanding, upon +earth: nay, even the simplest and plainest of all inanimate beings +have their essence or substance hidden from us in the deepest and most +impenetrable obscurity." + +We shall reply to him, + +_First_, That the idea of an immaterial substance; or being without +extent, is only an absence of ideas, a negation of extent, as we have +already shewn; that when we are told a being is not matter, they speak +to us of that which is not, and do not teach us that which is; because +by insisting that a being is such, that it cannot act upon any of our +senses, they, in fact, inform us that we have no means of assuring +ourselves whether such being exists or not. + +_Secondly_, We shall avow without the least hesitation, that men of the +greatest genius, of the most indefatigable research, are not acquainted +with the essence of stones, plants, animals, nor with the secret springs +which constitute some, which make others vegetate or act: but then at +least we either feel them or see them; our senses have a knowledge of +them in some respects; we can perceive some of their effects; we have +something whereby to judge of them, either accurately or inaccurately; +we can conceive that which is matter, however varied, however subtle, +however minute, by analogy with other matter; but our senses cannot +compass that which is immaterial on any side; we cannot by any possible +means understand it; we have no means whatever of ascertaining its +existence; consequently we cannot even form an idea of it; such a being +is to us an occult principle, or rather a being which imagination has +composed, by deducting from it every known quality. If we are ignorant +of the intimate combination of the most material beings, we at least +discover, with the aid of experience, some of their relations with +ourselves: we have a knowledge of their surface, their extent, their +form, their colour, their softness, their density; by the impressions +they make on our senses, we are capable of discriminating them--of +comparing them--of judging of them in some manner--of seeing them--of +either avoiding or courting them, according to the different modes in +which we are affected by them; we cannot apply any of these tests to +immaterial beings; to spirits; neither can those men who are unceasingly +talking to mankind of these inconceivable things. + +_Thirdly_, We have a consciousness of certain modifications in +ourselves, which we call sentiment, thought, will, passions: for want +of being acquainted with our own peculiar essence; for want of precisely +understanding the energy of our own particular organization, we +attribute these effects to a concealed cause, distinguished from +ourselves; which the theologians call a spiritual cause, inasmuch as +it appears to act differently from our body. Nevertheless, reflection, +experience, every thing by which we are enabled to form any kind of +judgment, proves that material effects can only emanate from material +causes. We see nothing in the universe but physical, material effects, +these can only be produced by analogous causes; it is, then certainly +more rational to attribute them to nature herself, of which we may know +something, if we will but deign to meditate her with attention, rather +than to spiritual causes, of which we must for ever remain ignorant, let +us study them as long as we please. + +If incomprehensibility be not a sufficient reason for absolutely denying +the possibility of immateriality, it certainly is not of a cogency +to establish its existence; we shall always be less in a capacity +to comprehend a spiritual cause, than one that is material; because +materiality is a known quality; spirituality is an occult, an unknown +quality; or rather it is a mode of speech of which we avail ourselves +to throw a veil over our own ignorance. We are repeatedly told that our +senses only bring us acquainted with the external of things; that our +limited ideas are not capable of conceiving immaterial beings: we agree +frankly to this position; but then our senses do not even shew us the +external of these immaterial substances, Which the theologians will +nevertheless attempt to define to us; upon which they unceasingly +dispute among themselves; upon which even until this day they are not +in perfect unison with each other. The great John Locke in his familiar +letters, says, "I greatly esteem all those who faithfully defend their +opinions; but there are so few persons who, according to the manner they +do defend them, appear fully convinced of the opinions they profess, +that I am tempted to believe there are more sceptics in the world than +are generally imagined." + +Abady, one of the most strenuous supporters of immaterialism, says, "The +question is not what incorporeity is, but whether it be." To settle this +disputable point, it were necessary to have some data whereon to form +our judgment; but how assure ourselves of the existence of that, of +which we shall never be competent to have a knowledge? If we are not +told what this is; if some tangible evidence be not offered to the human +mind; how shall we feel ourselves capacitated to judge whether or not +its existence be even possible? How form an estimate of that picture +whose colours elude our sight, whose design we cannot perceive, whose +features have no means of becoming familiar to our mind, whose very +canvas refuses itself to our all research, of which the artist himself +can afford no other idea, no other description, but that it is, although +he himself can neither shew us how or where! We have seen the ruinous +foundations upon which men have hitherto erected this fanciful idea of +immateriality; we have examined the proofs which they have offered, +if proofs they can be called, in support of their hypothesis; we have +sifted the evidence they have been willing to have accredited, in +order to establish their position; we have pointed out the numberless +contradictions that result from their want of union on this subject, +from the irreconcileable qualities with which they clothe their +imaginary system. What conclusion, then, ought fairly, rationally, +consistently, to be drawn from the whole? Can we, or can we not admit +their argument to be conclusive, such as ought to be received by beings +who think themselves sane? Will it allow any other inference than that +it has no existence; that immateriality is a quality hitherto unproved; +the idea of which the mind of man has no means of compassing? Still they +will insist, "there are no contradictions between the qualities which +they attribute to these immaterial substances; but there is a difference +between the understanding of man and the nature of these substances." +This granted, are they nearer the point at which they labour? What +standard is it necessary man should possess, to enable him to judge +of these substances? Can they shew the test that will lead to an +acquaintance with them? Are not those who have thus given loose to their +imagination, who have given birth to this system, themselves men? Does +not the disproportion, of which they speak with such amazing confidence, +attach to themselves as well as to others? If it needs an infinite +mind to comprehend infinity--to form an idea of incorporeity--can the +theologian himself boast he is in a capacity to understand it? To what +purpose then is it they speak of these things to others? Why do they +attempt descriptions of that which they allow to be indescribable? Man, +who will never be an infinite being, will never be able to conceive +infinity; if, then, he has hitherto been incompetent to this perfection +of knowledge, can he reasonably flatter himself he will ever obtain it; +can he hope under any circumstances to conquer that which according to +the shewing of all is unconquerable? + +Nevertheless it is pretended, that it is absolutely necessary to know +these substances: but how prove the necessity of having a knowledge of +that which is impossible to be known? We are then told that good sense +and reason are sufficient to convince us of its existence: this is +taking new ground, when the old has been found untenable: for we are +also told that reason is a treacherous guide; one that frequently leads +us astray; that in religious matters it ought not to prevail: at least +then they ought to shew us the precise time when we must resume this +reason. Shall we consult it again, when the question is, whether what +they relate is probable; whether the discordant qualities which they +unite are consistently combined; whether their own arguments have all +that solidity which they would themselves wish them to possess? But we +have strangely mistaken them if they are willing that we should recur to +it upon these points; they will instead, insist we ought blindly to +be directed by that which they vouchsafe to inform us; that the most +certain road to happiness is to submit in all things to that which they +have thought proper to decide on the nature of things, of which they +avow their own ignorance, when they assert them to be beyond the reach +of mortals. Thus it would appear that when we should consent to accredit +these mysteries, it would never arise of our own knowledge; seeing this +can no otherwise obtain but by the effect of demonstrable evidence; +it would never arise from any intimate conviction of our minds; but it +would be entirely on the word of the theologian himself, that we should +ground our faith; that we should yield our belief. If these things are +to the human species what colours are to the man born blind, they have +at least no existence with relation to ourselves. It will avail the +blind man nothing to tell him these colours have no less existence, +because he cannot see them. But what shall we say of that portrait whose +colours the blind man attempts to explain, whose features he is willing +we should receive upon his authority, whose proportions are to be taken +from his description, merely because we know he cannot behold them? + +The Doctor, although unwilling to relinquish his subject, removes none +of the difficulty when he asks, "Are our five senses, by an absolute +necessity in the nature of the thing, all and the only possible ways of +perception? And is it impossible and contradictory there should be any +being in the universe, indued with ways of perception different from +these that are the result of our present composition? Or are these +things, on the contrary, purely arbitrary; and the same power that gave +us these, may have given others to other beings, and might, if he +had pleased have given to us others in this present state?" It seems +perfectly unnecessary to the true point of the argument to reason upon +what can or cannot be done: I therefore reply, that the fact is, we have +but five senses: by the aid of these man is not competent to form any +idea whatever of immateriality; but he is also in as absolute a state of +ignorance, upon what might be his capabilities of conception, if he had +more senses. It is rather acknowledging a weakness in his evidence, +on the part of the Doctor, to be thus obliged to rest it upon the +supposition of what might be the case, if man was a being different to +what he is; in other words, that they would be convincing to mankind +if the human race were not human beings. Therefore to demand what the +Divinity could have done in such a case, is to suppose the thing +in question, seeing we cannot form an idea how far the power of +the Divinity extends: but we may be reasonably allowed to use the +theological argument in elucidation; these men very gravely insist, +upon what authority must be best known to themselves, "that God cannot +communicate to his works that perfection which he himself possesses;" +at the same moment they do not fail to announce his omnipotence. Will +it require any capacity, more than is the common lot of a child, to +comprehend the absurd contradiction of the two assertions? As beings +possessing but five senses, we must then, of necessity, regulate our +judgment by the information they are capable of affording us: we cannot, +by any possibility, have a knowledge of those, which confer the capacity +to comprehend beings, of an order entirely distinguished from that +in which we occupy a place. We are ignorant of the mode in which even +plants vegetate, how then be acquainted with that which has no affinity +with ourselves? A man born blind, has only the use of four senses; he +has not the right, however, of assuming it as a fact, there does not +exist an extra sense for others; but he may very reasonably, and with +great truth aver, that he has no idea of the effects which would be +produced in him, by the sense which he lacks: notwithstanding, if this +blind man was surrounded by other men, whose birth had also left +them devoid or sight, might he not without any very unwarrantable +presumption, be authorized to inquire of them by what right, upon what +authority, they spoke to him of a sense they did not themselves +possess; how they were enabled to reason, to detail the minutiae of that +sensation upon which their own peculiar experience taught them nothing? + +In short, we can again reply to Dr. Clarke, and to the theologians, that +following up their own systems, the supposition is impossible, and ought +not to be made, seeing that the Divinity, who according to their own +shewing, made man, was not willing that he should have more than five +senses; in other words, that he should be nothing but what he actually +is; they all found the existence of these immaterial substances upon +the necessity of a power that has the faculty to give a commencement to +motion. But if matter has always existed, of which there does not seem +to exist a doubt, it has always had motion, which is as essential to it +as its extent, and flows from its primitive properties. Indeed the human +mind, with its five senses, is not more competent to comprehend matter +devoid of motion, than it is to understand the peculiar quality of +immateriality: motion therefore exists only in and by matter; mobility +is a consequence of its existence; not that the great whole can occupy +other parts of space than it actually does; the impossibility of +that needs no argument, but all its parts can change their respective +situations--do continually change them; it is from thence results the +preservation, the life of nature, which is always as a whole immutable: +but in supposing, as is done every day, that matter is inert, that is to +say, incapable of producing any thing by itself, without the assistance +of a moving power, which sets it in motion, are we by any means enabled +to conceive that material nature receives this activity from an agent, +who partakes in nothing of material substance? Can man really figure to +himself, even in idea, that that which has no one property of matter, +can create matter, draw it from its own peculiar source, arrange +it, penetrate it, give it play, guide its course? Is it not, on the +contrary, more rational to the mind, more consistent with truth, more +congenial to experience, to suppose that the being who made matter is +himself material: is there the smallest necessity to suppose otherwise? +Can it make man either better or worse, that he should consider the +whole that exists as material? Will it in any manner make him a worse +subject to his sovereign; a worse father to his children; a more unkind +husband; a more faithless friend? + +Motion, then, is co-eternal with matter: from all eternity the particles +of the universe have acted and reacted upon each other, by virtue +of their respective energies; of their peculiar essences; of their +primitive elements; of their various combinations. These particles must +have combined in consequence of their affinity; they must have been +either attracted or repelled by their respective relations with each +other; in virtue of these various essences, they must have gravitated +one upon the other; united when they were analagous; separated when that +analogy was dissolved, by the approach of heterogeneous matter; they +must have received their forms, undergone a change of figure, by the +continual collision of bodies. In a material world the acting powers +must be material: in a whole every part of which is essentially in +motion, there is no occasion for a power distinguished from itself; +the whole must be in perpetual motion by its own peculiar energy. The +general motion, as we have elsewhere proved, has its birth from the +individual motion, which beings ever active must uninterruptedly +communicate to each other. Thus every cause produces its effect; this +effect in its turn becomes a cause, which in like manner produces an +effect; this constitutes the eternal chain of things, which although +perpetually changing in its detail, suffers no change in its whole. + +Theology, after all, has seldom done more than personify this eternal +series of motion; the principle of mobility inherent to matter: it has +clothed this principle with human qualities, by which it has rendered it +unintelligible: in applying these properties, they have taken no means +of understanding how far they were suitable or not: in their eagerness +to make them assimilate, they have extended them beyond their own +conception; they have heaped them together without any judgment; +and they have been surprised when these qualities, contradictory in +themselves, did not enable them satisfactorily to account for all the +phenomena they beheld; from thence they have wrangled; accused each +other of imbecility; yet infuriated themselves against whoever had the +temerity to question that which they did not themselves understand; in +short, they have acted like a man who should insist that all other men +should have precisely the same vision that he himself had dreamed. + +Be this as it may, the greater portion of what either Dr. Clarke or +the theologians tell us, becomes, in some respects, sufficiently +intelligible as soon as applied to nature--to matter: it is eternal, +that is to say, it cannot have had a commencement, it never will have +an end; it is infinite, that is to say, we have no conception of its +limits. Nevertheless, human qualities, which must be always borrowed +from ourselves, and with others we have a very slender acquaintance, +cannot be well suitable to the entire of nature; seeing that these +qualities are in themselves modes of being, or modes which appertain +only to particular beings: not to the great whole which contains them. + +Thus, to resume the answers which have been given to Dr. Clarke, we +shall say: _First_, we can conceive that matter has existed from all +eternity, seeing that we cannot conceive it to have been capable of +beginning. _Secondly_, that matter is independent, seeing there is +nothing exterior to itself; that it is immutable, seeing it cannot +change its nature, although it is unceasingly changing its form and its +combinations. _Thirdly_, that matter is self-existent, since not being +able to conceive it can be annihilated, we cannot possibly conceive +it can have commenced to exist. _Fourthly_, that we do not know the +essence, or the true nature of matter, although we have a knowledge of +some of its properties; of some of its qualities: according to the +mode in which they act upon us. _Fifthly_, that matter not having had a +beginning, will never have an end, although its numerous combinations, +its various forms, have necessarily a commencement and a period. +_Sixthly_, that if all that exists, or every thing our mind can conceive +is matter, this matter is infinite; that is to say, cannot be limited by +any thing; that it is omnipresent, seeing there is no place exterior +to itself, indeed, if there was a place exterior to it, that would be a +vacuum. _Seventhly_, that nature is unique, although its elements or +its parts may be varied to infinity, indued with properties extremely +opposite; with qualities essentially different. _Eighthly_, that matter, +arranged, modified, and combined in a certain mode, produces in some +beings what we call intelligence, which is one of its modes of being, +not one of its essential properties, _Ninthly_, that matter is not a +free agent, since it cannot act otherwise than it does, in virtue of the +laws of its nature, or of its existence; that consequently, heavy bodies +must necessarily fall; light bodies by the same necessity rise; fire +must burn; man must experience good and evil, according to the quality +of the beings whose action he experiences. _Tenthly_, that the power +or the energy of matter, has no other bounds than those which are +prescribed by its own existence. _Eleventhly_, that wisdom, justice, +goodness, &c. are qualities peculiar to matter combined and modified, +as it is found in some beings of the human species; that the idea of +perfection is an abstract, negative, metaphysical idea, or mode of +considering objects, which supposes nothing real to be exterior to +itself. _Twelfthly_, that matter is the principle of motion, which it +contains within itself: since matter alone is capable of either giving +or receiving motion: this is what cannot be conceived of immateriality +or simple beings destitute of parts, devoid of extent, without mass, +having no ponderosity, which consequently cannot either move itself or +other bodies. + + + + + +CHAP. V. + +_Examination of the Proofs offered by DESCARTES, MALEBRANCHE, NEWTON, +&c_. + + +If the evidence of Clarke did not prove satisfactory--if the theologians +of his day disputed the manner in which he handled his subject--if they +were disposed to think he had not established his argument upon +proper foundations, it did not seem probable that either the system of +Descartes, the sublime reveries of Malebranche, or the more methodical +mode adopted by Newton, were at all likely to meet with a better +reception; the same objections will lie against them all, that they have +not demonstrated the existence of their immaterial substances; although +they have incessantly spoken of them, as if they were things of which +they had the most intimate knowledge. Unfortunately this is a rock which +the most sublime geniuses have not been competent to avoid: the most +enlightened men have done little more than stammer upon a subject which +they have all concurred in considering of the highest importance; which +they unceasingly hold forth as the most necessary for man to know; +without at the same time considering he is not in a condition to +occupy himself with objects inaccessible to his senses--which his mind, +consequently, can never grasp--which his utmost research cannot bring +into that tangible shape by which alone he can be enabled to form a +judgment. + +To the end that we may be convinced of that want of solidity which the +greatest men have not known how to give to the proofs they have +offered, but which they have successively imagined has established their +positions, let us briefly examine what the most celebrated philosophers, +what the most subtile metaphysicians have said. For this purpose we will +begin with Descartes, the restorer of philosophy among the moderns, to +whose sublime errors we are indebted for the effulgent truths of the +Newtonian system. This great man himself tells us, "All the strength of +argument which I have hitherto used to prove the existence of immaterial +substances, consists in this, that I acknowledge it would not be +possible, my nature was such as it is, that is to say, that I should +have in me the idea of immateriality, if this incorporeity did not truly +exist; this same immateriality, of which the idea is in me, possesses +all those high perfections of which our mind can have some slight idea, +without however being able to comprehend them." In another place he +says, "We must necessarily conclude from this alone, that because I +exist, and have the idea of immateriality, that is to say, of a most +perfect being, the existence is therefore most evidently demonstrated." +There are not, perhaps, many except Descartes himself, to whom this +would appear quite so conclusive; who would be impressed with the +conviction which he seems to imagine is so very substantive. + +_First_, We shall reply to Descartes, it is not a warrantable deduction, +that because we have an idea of a thing, we must therefore conclude it +exists; to give validity to such a mode of reasoning would be productive +of the greatest mischief; would, in fact, tend to subvert all human +institutions. Our imagination presents us with the idea of a sphinx, or +of an hippogriff, besides a thousand other fantastical beings; are we, +on that authority, to insist that these things really exist? Is the +mere circumstance of our having an idea of various parts of nature, +discrepantly jumbled together, without any other evidence as to the +assemblage, a sufficient warrantry for calling upon mankind to accredit +the existence of such heterogeneous masses? If a philosopher of the most +consummate experience, of the greatest celebrity, one who enjoyed the +confidence of mankind above every other, was to detail the faculties +and perfections of these visionary beings, although he should hold them +forth as the perfection of all natural combinations, would, I say, any +reasonable being lend himself to the asseveration? + +_Secondly_, It is obvious that the mere circumstance of existence, +does not prove the absolute existence of any thing anterior to itself; +although in man, as well as the other beings of nature, it is evidence +that something has existed before him. If this argument was to be +admitted, are they aware how far it, would carry them? To maintain +that the existence of one being demonstrably proves the existence of +an anterior being, would be, in fact, denying that any thing was +self-existent. The fallacy of such a position is too glaring to need +refutation. + +_Thirdly_, It is not possible he should have a distinct, positive idea +of immateriality, of which be, as well as the theologian, labours to +prove the existence. It is impossible for man, for a material being, to +form to himself a correct idea, or indeed any idea, of incorporeity; of +a substance without extent, acting upon nature, which is corporeal; +a truth which it may not be presuming too much to say we have already +sufficiently proved. + +_Fourthly_, It is equally impossible for man to have any clear, decided +idea of perfection, of infinity, of immensity, and other theological +attributes. To Descartes we must therefore reply as we have done to Dr. +Clarke on his twelfth proposition. + +Thus nothing can well be less conclusive than the proofs upon which +Descartes rests the existence of immateriality. He gives it thought +and intelligence, but how conceive these qualities without a subject to +which they may adhere? He pretends that we cannot conceive it but "as a +power which applies itself successively to the parts of the universe." +Again, he says, "that an immaterial substance cannot be said to have +extent, but as we say of fire contained in a piece of iron, which has not, +properly speaking, any other extension than that of the iron itself." +According to these notions we shall be justified in taxing him with +having announced in a very clear, in a most unequivocal manner, +that this is nature herself: this indeed is a pure Spinosism; it was +decidedly on the principles of Descartes that Spinosa drew up his +system; in fact it flows out of it consecutively. + +We might, therefore, with great reason, accuse Descartes of atheism, +seeing that he very effectually destroys the feeble proofs he adduces +in support of his own hypothesis; we have solid foundation for insisting +that his system overturns the idea of the creation, because if from +the modification we subtract the subject, the modification itself +disappears: and if, according to the Cartesians, this immateriality is +nothing without nature, they are complete Spinosians, with another name. +If incorporeity is the motive-power of this nature, it no longer exists +independently; it, in fact, exists no longer than the subject to which +it is inherent subsists. Thus no longer existing independently, it will +exist only while the nature which it moves shall endure; without +matter, without a subject to move, to preserve, what is to become of it, +according to this doctrine, or rather according to this elucidation of a +system which is in itself untenable? + +It will be obvious from this, that Descartes, far from establishing on +a rocky foundation the existence of this immateriality, totally destroys +his own system. The same thing will necessarily happen to all those who +reason upon his principles; they will always finish by confuting him, +and by contradicting themselves. The same want of just inference, the +same discrepancy, will obtrude themselves in the principles of the +celebrated Father Malebranche; which, if considered with the slightest +attention, appear to conduct directly to Spinosism; in fact, can any +thing be more in unison with the language of Spinosa himself, than to +say, as does Malebranche, "that the universe is only an emanation from +God; that we see every thing in God, that every thing we see is only +God; that God alone does every thing that is done; that all the action, +with every operation that takes place in nature, is God himself; in a +word, that God is every being and the only being." Is not this formally +asserting that nature herself is God? Moreover, at the same time +Malebranche assures us we see every thing in God, he pretends that it is +not yet clearly demonstrated that matter and bodies have existence; that +faith alone teaches us these mysteries, of which, without it, we should +not have any knowledge whatever. In reply, it might be a very fair +question, how the existence of the being who created matter can be +demonstrated, if the existence of this matter itself be yet a problem? +He himself acknowledges "that we can have no distinct demonstration of +the existence of any other being than of that which is necessary;" he +further adds, "that if it be closely examined, it will be seen, that it +is not even possible to know with certitude, if God be or be not truly +the creator of a material, of a sensible world." According to these +notions, it is evident, that, following up the system of Malebranche, +man has only his faith to guarantee the existence of the world; yet +faith itself supposes its existence; if it be not, however, certain that +it does exist, and the Bishop of Cloyne, Dr. Berkeley, has also held +this in doubt, how shall we be persuaded that we must believe the +oracles which have been delivered to a visionary world? + +On the other hand, these notions of Malebranche completely overturns all +the theological doctrines of free agency. How can the liberty of man's +action be reconciled with the idea that it is the Divinity who is the +immediate mover of nature; who actually gives impulse to matter and +bodies, without whose immediate interference nothing takes place; who +pre-determines his creatures to every thing they do? How can it be +pretended, if this doctrine is to be accredited, that human souls have +the faculty of forming thoughts--have the power of volition--are in +a condition to move themselves--have the capacity to modify their +existence? If it be supposed with the theologians, that the conservation +of the creatures in the universe is a continued creation, must it not +appear, that being thus perpetually recreated, they are enabled to +commit evil? It will then be a self-evident fact, that, admitting the +system of Malebranche, God does every thing, and that his creatures +are no more than passive instruments in his hands. Under this idea they +could not be answerable for their sins, because they would have no means +of avoiding them. Under this notion they could neither have merit or +demerit; they would be like a sharp instrument in their own hands, which +whether it was applied to a good or to an evil purpose, it would +attach to themselves, not to the instrument: this would annihilate +all religion: it is thus that theology is continually occupied with +committing suicide. + +Let us now see, if the immortal Newton, the great luminary of science, +the champion of astronomical truth, will afford us clearer notions, more +distinct ideas, more certain evidence of the existence of immaterial +substances. This great man, whose comprehensive genius unravelled +nature, whose capacious mind developed her laws, seems to have +bewildered himself, the instant he lost sight of them. A slave to the +prejudices of his infancy, he had not the courage to hold the lamp +of his own enlightened understanding to the agent theology has so +gratuitously associated with nature; he has not been able to allow +that her own peculiar powers were adequate to the production of that +beautiful phenomena, he has with such masterly talents so luminously +explained. In short, the sublime Newton himself becomes an infant when +he quits physics, when he lays aside demonstration, to lose himself in +the devious sinuosities, in the inextricable labyrinths, in the delusive +regions of theology. This is the manner in which he speaks of the +Divinity: + +"This God," says he, "governs all, not as the soul of the world, but +as the lord and sovereign of all things. It is in consequence of +his sovereignty that he is called the Lord God, [Greek letters], +_pantokrator_, the universal emperor. Indeed the word God is relative +and relates itself with slaves; the Deity is the dominion or the +sovereignty of God, not over his own body, as those think who look upon +God as the soul of the world, but over slaves." + +From this it will be seen that Newton, as well as the theologians, makes +the Divinity a pure spirit, who presides over the universe as a monarch, +as a lord paramount; that is to say, what man defines in earthly +governors, despot, absolute princes, powerful monarchs, whose +governments have no model but their own will, who exercise an unlimited +power over their subjects, transformed into slaves; whom they usually +compel to feel in a very grievous manner the weight of their authority. +But according to the ideas of Newton, the world has not existed from +eternity, the staves of God have been formed in the course of time; from +this it would be a just inference, that before the creation of the world +the god of Newton was a sovereign without subjects. Let us see if this +truly great philosopher is more in unison with himself in the subsequent +ideas which he delivers on this subject. + +"The supreme God," he says, "is an eternal, infinite, and absolutely +perfect being; but however perfect a being may be, if he has no +sovereignty he is not the supreme God. The word God signifies Lord, +but every lord is not god; it is the sovereignty of the spiritual Being +which constitutes God; it is the true sovereignty which constitutes the +true God; it is the supreme sovereignty which constitutes the supreme +God; it is a false sovereignty which constitutes a false god. From true +sovereignty, it follows, that the true God is living, intelligent, +and powerful; and from his other perfections, it follows, that he is +supremely or sovereignly perfect. He is eternal, infinite, omniscient; +that is to say, he exists from eternity, and will never have an end; he +governs all, and he knows every thing that is done, or that can be done. +He is neither eternity nor infinity, but he is eternal and infinite; he +is not space or duration, but he exists and is present." The term here +used is _adest_, which appears to have been placed there to avoid saying +that God is contained in space. + +In all this unintelligible series, nothing is to be found but incredible +efforts to reconcile the theological attributes, the abstract with the +human qualities, which have been ascribed to the Divinity; we see in +it negative qualities, which can no longer be suitable to man, given, +however, to the Sovereign of nature, whom he has supposed a king. +However it may be, this picture always supposes the Supreme God to have +occasion for subjects to establish his sovereignty. It makes God stand +in need of man for the exercise of his empire; without these, according +to the text, he would not be a king; he could have had no empire when +there was nothing: but if this description of Newton was just, if it +really represented the Divinity, we might be very fairly permitted to +ask, Does not this Spiritual King exercise his spiritual empire in vain, +upon refractory beings, who do not at all times do that which he is +willing they should; who are continually struggling against his power; +who spread disorder in his states? This Spiritual Monarch, who is master +of the minds, of the souls, of the wills, of the passions of his slaves, +does he leave them the freedom of revolting against him? This infinite +Monarch, who fills every thing with his immensity, who governs all, does +he also govern the man who sins; does he direct his actions; is he +in him when he offends his God? The devil, the false god, the evil +principle, hath he not, according to this, a more extensive empire than +the true God, whose projects, if we are to believe the theologians, he +is unceasingly overturning? In earthly governments the true sovereign +is generally considered to be him whose power in a state influences the +greater number of his subjects. If, then, we could suppose him to be +omnipresent, that is, present in all places, should we not say he was +the sad witness to all the outrages committed against his authority, +and we should not entertain a very exalted opinion of his power if he +permitted them to continue. This, it is true, would be arguing upon a +monarch of this world, still it would be the language held by observers. + +Is the spirituality of the Divinity well supported by those who say he +fills all space, who from that instant give him extent, ascribe to him +volume, make him correspond with the various points of space? This is +the very reverse of an immaterial substance. + +"God is one," continues Newton, "and he is the same for ever, and every +where, not only by his virtue alone, or by his energy, but also by his +substance." But how are we to conceive that a being who is in continual +activity, who produces all the changes which beings undergo, can always +be himself the same? What is to be understood by either this virtue or +this energy? These are relative terms, which do not present any clear, +distinct idea to our mind, except as they apply to man: what are we, +however, to understand by the divine substance? If this substance be +spiritual, that is, devoid of extent, how can there exist in it any +parts? How can it give impulse to matter, how set it in motion? How can +it even be conceived by mortals? + +Nevertheless Newton informs us, "that all things are contained in him, +and are moved in him, but without reciprocity of action: God experiences +nothing by the motion of bodies; these experience no resistance whatever +by his omnipresence." It would here appear that he clothes the Divinity +with that which bears the character of vacuum--of nothing; without +that, it would be almost impossible not to have a reciprocal action +or relation between these substances, which are either penetrated or +encompassed on all sides. It must be obvious, that in this instance our +scientific author does not distinctly understand himself. + +He proceeds, "It is an incontestible truth, that God exists necessarily, +and the same necessity obliges to exist always and every where: from +whence it follows, that he is in every thing similar to itself; he is +all eyes, all ears, all brains, all arms, all feeling, all intelligence, +all action; but in a mode by no means human, by no means corporeal, and +which is totally unknown to us. In the same manner as a blind man has +no idea of colours, it is that we have no idea of the mode in which +God feels and understands." The necessary existence of the Divinity +is precisely the thing in question; it is this existence that it was +needful to have verified by proofs as clear, by evidence as distinct, by +demonstration as strong, as gravitation and attraction. One would have +hardly thought it possible the expansive capabilities of Newton +would not have compassed it. But oh, unrivalled genius! so mighty, +so powerful, so colossal, while yet you was a geometrician; so +insignificant, so weak, so inconsistent; when you became a theologian; +that is to say, when you reasoned upon that which can neither be +calculated, nor submitted to experience; how could you think of speaking +to us on a subject which, by your own confession is to you just what a +picture is to a man born blind? Wherefore quit nature, which had already +explained to you so much? Why seek in imaginary spaces those causes, +those powers, that energy, which she would have distinctly pointed +out to you, had you been willing to have consulted her with your usual +sagacity? The gigantic, the intelligent Newton, suffers himself to be +hoodwinked--to be blinded by prejudice; he has not courage to look a +question fairly in the face, when that question involves notions which +habit has rendered sacred to him; he turns his eyes from truth, he casts +behind him his experience, he lulls to sleep his reason, when it becomes +necessary to probe opinions full of contradictions, yet fraught with the +best interests of humanity. + +Let us, however, continue to examine how far the most transcendent +genius is capable of leading himself astray, when once he abandons +experience, when once he chains up his reason, when once he suffers +himself to be guided by his imagination. + +"God," continues the father of modern philosophy, "is totally destitute +of body and of corporeal figure; here is the reason why he cannot be +either seen, touched, or understood; and ought not to be adored under +any corporeal form." What idea, however, can be formed of a being who +is resembled by nothing of which we have any knowledge? What are the +relations that can be supposed to exist between such very dissimilar +beings? When man renders this being his adoration, does he not, in fact, +in despite of himself, make him a being similar to his own species; does +he not suppose that, like himself, he is sensible to homage--to be won +by presents--gained by flattery; in short, he is treated like a king +of the earth, who exacts the respect, demands the fealty, requires the +obedience of all who are submitted to him. Newton adds, "we have ideas +of his attributes, but we do not know that it is any one substance; we +only see the figures and the colours of bodies; we only hear sounds; we +only touch the exterior surfaces; we only scent odours; we only taste +flavours: no one of our senses, no one of our reflections, can shew us +the intimate nature of substances: we have still less ideas of God." + +If we have an idea of the attributes of God, it is only because we +clothe him with those which belong to ourselves; which we never do more +than aggrandize, which we only augment or exaggerate; we then mistake +them for those qualities with which we were at first acquainted. If in +all those substances which are pervious to our senses, we only know them +by the effects they produce on us, after which we assign them qualities, +at least these qualities are something tangible, they give birth to +clear and distinct ideas. This superficial knowledge, however slender +it may be, with which our senses furnish us, is the only one we can +possibly have; constituted as we are, we find ourselves under the +necessity of resting contented with it, and we discover that it is +sufficient for our wants; but we have not even the most superficial idea +of immateriality, or a substance distinguished from all those with which +we have the slightest acquaintance. Nevertheless, we hear men hourly +reasoning upon it, disputing about its properties, advancing its +faculties, as if they had the most demonstrable evidence of the fact; +tearing each other in pieces, because the one does not readily admit +what the other asserts, upon a subject which no man is competent to +understand. + +Our author goes on "We only have a knowledge of God by his attributes, +by his properties, by the excellent and wise arrangement which he +has given to all things, and by their FINAL CAUSES: we admire him +in consequence of his perfections." I repeat, that we have no real +knowledge of the Divinity; that we borrow his attributes from ourselves; +but it is evident these cannot be suitable to the Universal Being, who +neither can have the same nature nor the same properties as particular +beings; it is nevertheless after ourselves that we assign him +intelligence, wisdom, perfection, in subtracting from them what we call +defects. As to the order, or the arrangement of the universe, man finds +it excellent, esteems it the perfection of wisdom, as long as it is +favorable to his species; or when the causes which are co-existent with +himself do not disturb his own peculiar existence; otherwise he is apt +to complain of confusion, and final causes vanish: he then attributes to +an immutable God, motives equally borrowed from his own peculiar mode +of action, for deranging the beautiful order he so much admires in the +universe. Thus it is always in himself, that is, in his own individual +mode of feeling, that he draws up the ideas of the order, the wisdom, +the excellence, the perfection which he ascribes to the Deity; whilst +the good as well as the evil which take place in the world, are +the necessary consequence of the essence of things; of the general, +immutable laws of nature; in short, of the gravitation, of the repulsion +of matter; of those unchangeable laws of motion, which Newton himself +has so ably thrown into light; but which he has by a strange fatuity +forborne to apply when the question was concerning the cause of these +phenomena, which prejudice has refused to the capabilities of nature. He +goes on, "We revere, and we adore God, on account of his sovereignty: +we worship him like his slaves; a God destitute of sovereignty, of +providence, and of final causes, would be no more than nature and +destiny." It is true that superstition enjoins man to adore its gods +like ignorant slaves, who tremble under a master whom they know not; he +certainly prays to them on all occasions, sometimes requesting nothing +less than an entire change in the essence of things, to gratify +his capricious desires, and it is perhaps well for him they are not +competent to grant his request: in the origin, as we have shewn, these +gods were nothing more than nature acting by necessary laws, clothed +under a variety of fables; or necessity personified under a multitude of +names. However this may be, we do not believe that true religion, +that sterling worship which renders man grateful, whilst it exalts the +majesty of the Divinity, requires any such meanness from man that +he should act like a slave; he is rather expected to sit down to the +banquet prepared for him, with all the dignity of an invited guest; +under the cheering consciousness of a welcome that is never accorded +to slaves; nothing is required at his hands, but that he should conduct +himself temperately in the banquetting-house; that he should be grateful +for the good cheer he receives; that he should have virtue; (which we +have already sufficiently explained is to render himself useful, by +making others happy); that he should not by pertinaciously setting up +whimsical opinions, and insisting on their adoption by his neighbour, +disturb the harmony of the feast; that he should be sufficiently +intelligent to know when he is really felicitous, and not seek to put +down the gaiety of his fellow guests; but that he should rise from +the board satisfied with himself, contented with others; in short, to +comprise the whole in a trite axiom of one of the Greek philosophers, he +should learn the invaluable secret, "to _bear_ and _forbear_." + +But to proceed. Newton tells us, "that from a physical and blind +necessity, which should preside every where, and be always the same, +there could not emanate any variety in the beings; the diversity which +we behold, could only have its origin in the ideas and in the will of a +being which exists necessarily;" but wherefore should not this diversity +spring out of natural causes, from matter acting upon matter; the action +of which either attracts and combines various yet analogous elements, or +else separates beings by the intervention of those substances which have +not a disposition to unite? Is not bread the result of the combination +of flour, yeast and water? As for the blind necessity, as it is +elsewhere said, we must acknowledge it is that of which we are ignorant, +either of its properties or its energies; of which being blind ourselves +we have no knowledge of its mode of action. Philosophers explain all the +phenomena that occur by the properties of matter; and though they feel +the want of a more intimate acquaintance with natural causes, they do +not therefore the less believe them deducible from these properties or +these causes. Are, therefore, the philosophers atheists, because they +do not reply, it is God who is the author of these effects? Is the +industrious workman, who makes gunpowder, to be challenged as an +atheist, because he says the terrible effects of this destructive +material, which inspired the native Americans with such awe, which +raised in their winds such wonder, are to be ascribed to the junction of +the apparently harmless substances of nitre, charcoal and sulpher, set +in activity by the accession of trivial scintillations, produced from +the collision of steel with flint, merely because some bigoted _Priest +of the Sun_, who is ignorant of the composition, chooses to think it is +not possible such a striking phenomenon could be the work of any thing +short of the secret agents, whom he has himself appointed to govern the +world? + +"It is allegorically said that God sees, hears, speaks, smiles, loves, +hates, desires, gives, receives, rejoices, grows angry, fights, makes, +or fashions, &c. because all that is said of God, is borrowed from the +conduct of man, by an imperfect analogy." Man has not been able to act +otherwise, for want of being acquainted with nature and her eternal +course: whenever he has imagined a peculiar energy which he has not been +able to fathom, he has given it the name of God; and he has then made +him act upon the self-same principles, as he himself would adopt, +according to which he would act if he was the master. It is from this +proneness to _Theanthropy_, that has flowed all those absurd, and +frequently dangerous ideas, upon which are founded the superstitions of +the world; who all adore in their gods either natural causes of which +they are ignorant, or else powerful mortals of whose malice they stand +in awe. The sequel will shew the fatal effects that have resulted +to mankind from the absurd ideas they have very frequently formed to +themselves of the Divinity; that nothing could be more degrading to +him, more injurious to themselves, than the idea of comparing him to +an absolute sovereign, to a despot, to a tyrant. For the present let +us continue to examine the proofs offered in support of their various +systems. + +It is unceasingly repeated that the regular action, the invariable +order, which reigns in the universe, the benefits heaped upon mortals, +announce a wisdom, an intelligence, a goodness, which we cannot refuse +to acknowledge, in the cause which produces these marvellous effects. To +this we must reply, that it is unquestionably true that not only these +things, but all the phenomena he beholds, indicate the existence of +something gifted very superiorly to erring man; the great question, +however, is one that perhaps will never be solved, what is this being? +Is this question answered by heaping together the estimable qualities +of man? Speaking with relation to ourselves, which is all that the +theologian really does, although in such numerous regions he pretends +to do a great deal more, we can apply the terms goodness, wisdom, +intelligence, the best with which we are acquainted, to this being for +the want of having those that may be appropriate; but I maintain, this +does not, in point of fact, afford us one single idea of the _Great +Cause of causes_; we admire his works; and knowing that what we approve +highly in our own species, we attribute to their being wise, we say the +Divinity displays wisdom. So far it is well; but this, after all, is a +human quality. If we consult experience, we shall presently be convinced +that our wisdom does not bear the least affinity to the actions +attributed to the Divinity. To get at this a little closer, we must +endeavour to find out what we do not call wisdom in man; this will help +us to form an estimate, how very incompetent we are to describe the +qualities of a being that differs so very materially from ourselves. +We most certainly should not call him a wise man, who having built a +beautiful residence, should himself set it on fire; and thus destroy +what he had laboured so much to bring to perfection: yet this happens +every day in nature, without its being in any manner a warrantry for +us to charge her with folly. If therefore we were to form our judgments +after our own puny ideas of wisdom, what should we say? Why, in point +of fact, just what the man does, who, thinking he has had too much rain, +implores fine weather? Which, properly translated, is neither more nor +less than giving the Divinity to understand he best knows what is proper +for himself. The just, the only fair inference to be drawn from this, +is, that we positively know nothing about the matter; that those who +pretend they do, would, if it was upon any other subject, he suspected +of having an unsound mind. We do not mean to insist that we are in the +right, but we mean to aver that the object of this work is not so much +either to build up new systems, or to put down old ones, as by shewing +man the inconclusiveness of his reasonings upon matters not accessible +to his comprehension--to induce him to be more tolerant to his +neighbour--to invite him to be less rancorous against those who do not +see with his eyes--to hold forth to him motives for forbearance, against +those whose system of faith may not exactly harmonize with his own--to +render him less ferocious in support of opinions, which, if he will +but discard his prejudices, he may find not so solidly bottomed as he +imagines. All we know is scarcely more than that the motion we witness +in the universe is the necessary consequence of the laws of matter; that +the uniformity of this motion is evidence of their immutability; that it +is not too much to say it cannot cease to act in the manner it does, as +long as the same causes operate, governed by the same circumstances. +We evidently see that motion, however regular in our mind, that order, +however beautiful to our admiring optics, yields to what we term +disorder, to that which we designate frightful confusion, as soon as new +causes, not analogous to the preceding, either disturb or suspend +their action. We further know that a better knowledge of nature, +the consequence of time, the result of patient, laborious, physical +researches, with the comparison of facts and the application of +experience, has enabled man in many instances to divert from himself the +evil effects of inevitable causes, which anterior to these discoveries +overwhelmed his unhappy progenitors with ruin. How far these salutary +developements are to be carried by industry, what may be achieved by +honesty, what light is to be gathered from the recession of prejudice, +the wisest among men is not competent to decide. Certain it is, that +phenomena which for ages were supposed to denounce the anger of the +Deity against mankind, are now well understood to be common effects of +natural causes. + +Order, as we have elsewhere shewn, is only the effects which result +to ourselves from a series of motion; there cannot be any disorder +relatively to the great whole; in which all that takes place is +necessary; in which every thing is determined by laws which nothing can +change. The order of nature may be damaged or destroyed relatively to +ourselves, but it is never contradicted relatively to herself, since she +cannot act otherwise than she does: if we attribute to her the evils we +sustain, we are equally obliged to acknowledge we owe to her the good we +experience. + +It in said, that animals furnish a convincing proof of the powerful +cause of their existence; that the admirable harmony of their parts, the +mutual assistance they lend each other, the regularity with which +they fulfill their functions, the preservation of these parts, the +conservation of such complicated wholes, announce a workman who unites +wisdom with power; in short, whole tracts of anatomy and botany have +been copied to prove nothing more than that these things exist, for of +the power that produced them there cannot remain a doubt. We shall never +learn more from these erudite tracts, save that there exists in nature +certain elements with an aptitude to attraction; a disposition to unite, +suitable to form wholes, to induce combinations capable of producing +very striking effects. To be surprised that the brain, the heart, the +arteries, the veins, the eyes, the ears of an animal, act as we see +them--that the roots of plants attract juices, or that trees produce +fruit, is to be surprised that a tree, a plant, or an animal exists at +all. These beings would not exist, or would no longer be that which we +know they are, if they ceased to act as they do: this is what happens +when they die. If the formation, the combination, the modes of action, +variously possessed by these beings, if their conservation for a season, +followed by their destruction or dissolution, prove any thing, it is the +immutability of those laws which operate in nature: we cannot doubt +the power of nature; she produces all the animals we behold, by the +combination, of matter, continually in motion; the harmony that subsists +between the component parts of these beings, is a consequence of the +necessary laws of their nature, and of that which results from their +combination. As soon as this accord ceases, the animal is necessarily +destroyed: from this we must conclude that every mutation in nature +is necessary; is only a consequence of its laws; that it could not be +otherwise than it is, under the circumstances in which it is placed. + +Man, who looks upon himself as the _chef d'oeuvre_, furnishes more than +any other production a proof of the immutability of the laws of nature: +in this sensible, intelligent, thinking being, whose vanity leads him +to believe himself the sole object of the divine predilection, who forms +his God after his own peculiar model, we see only a more inconstant, +a more brittle machine; one more subject to be deranged by its +extreme complication, than the grosser beings: beasts destitute of our +knowledge, plants that vegetate, stones devoid of feeling, are in many +respects beings more highly favored than man: they are at least exempted +from the sorrows of the mind--from the torments of reflection--from that +devouring, chagrin to which he is so frequently a prey. Who is he who +would not be a plant or a stone, every time reminiscence forces upon his +imagination the irreparable loss of a beloved object? Would it not +be better to be an inanimate mass, than a restless, turbulent, +superstitious being, who does nothing but tremble under the imaginary +displeasure of beings of his own creation; who to support his own gloomy +opinions, immolates his fellow creatures at the shrine of his idol; who +ravages the country, and deluges the earth with the blood of those who +happen to differ from him on a speculative point of an unintelligible +creed? Beings destitute of life, bereft of feeling, without memory, not +having the faculties of thought, at least are not afflicted by the idea +of either the past, the present, or the future; they do not at any rate +believe themselves in danger of becoming eternally unhappy, because they +way have reasoned badly; or because they happened to be born in a land +where truth has never yet shed its refulgent beams on the darkened mind +of perplexed mortals. + +Let it not then be said that we cannot have an idea of a work, without +also having an idea of the workman, as distinguished from his work: the +savage, when he first beheld the terrible operation of gunpowder, +did not form the most distant idea that it was the work of a man like +himself. Nature is not to be contemplated as a work of this kind; she is +self-existent. In her bosom every thing is produced: she is an immense +elaboratory, provided with materials, who makes the instruments of which +she avails herself in her operations. All her works are the effects of +her own energies; of those agents which she herself produces; of those +immutable laws by which she sets every thing in activity. Eternal, +indestructible elements, ever in motion, combine themselves variously, +and thus give birth to all beings, to all the phenomena which fill the +weak eyes of erring mortals with wonder and dismay; to all the effects, +whether good or bad, of which man experiences the influence; to all the +vicissitudes he undergoes, from the moment of his birth until that of +his death; to order and to confusion, which he never discriminates but +by the various modes in which he is affected: in short, to all those +miraculous spectacles with which he occupies his meditation--upon which +he exercises his reason--which frequently spread consternation over the +surface of the earth. These elements need nothing when circumstances +favour their junction, save their own peculiar properties, whether +individual or united, with the motion that is essential to them, to +produce all those phenomena which powerfully striking the senses of +mankind, either fill him with admiration, or stagger him with alarm. + +But supposing for a moment that it was impossible to conceive the work, +without also conceiving the workman, who watches over his work, where +must we place this workman? Shall it be interior or exterior to his +production? Is he matter and motion, or is he only space or the vacuum? +In all these cases either he would be nothing, or he would be contained +in nature: as nature contains only matter and motion, it must be +concluded that the agent who moves it is material; that he is corporeal; +if this agent be exterior to nature, then we can no longer form any +idea of the place which he occupieth: neither can we better conceive an +immaterial being; nor the mode in which a spirit without extent can +act upon matter from which it is separated. These unknown spaces, which +imagination has placed beyond the visible world, can have no existence +for a being, who with difficulty sees down to his feet; he cannot paint +to his mind any image of the power which inhabit them; but if he is +compelled to form some kind of a picture, he must combine at random the +fantastical colours which he is ever obliged to draw from the world he +inhabits: in this case he will really do no more than reproduce in idea, +part or parcels of that which he has actually seen; he will form a whole +which perhaps has no existence in nature, but which it will be in vain +he strives to distinguish from her; to place out of her bosom. When he +shall be ingenuous with himself, When he shall be no longer willing to +delude others, he will be obliged to acknowledge, that the portrait he +has painted, although in its combination it resembles nothing in the +universe, is nevertheless in all its constituent members an exact +delineation of that which nature presents to our view. Hobbes in his +_Leviathan_ says, "The universe, the whole mass of things, is corporeal, +that is to say, body; and hath the dimensions of magnitude, namely, +length, breadth, and depth: also every part of body is likewise body, +and hath the like dimensions; and consequently every part of the +universe is body; and that which is not body, is no part of the +universe; and because the universe is all, that which is no part of it +is nothing; and consequently no where: nor does it follow from hence, +that spirits are nothing, for they have dimensions, and are therefore +really bodies; though that name in common speech be given to such bodies +only as are visible, or palpable, that is, that have some degree of +opacity: but for spirits they call them incorporeal; which is a name +of more honour, and may therefore with more piety be attributed to God +himself, in whom we consider not what attribute expresseth best his +nature, which is incomprehensible; but what best expresseth our desire +to honour him." + +It will be insisted that if a statue or a watch were shewn to a savage, +who had never before seen either, he would not be able to prevent +himself from acknowledging that these things were the works of some +intelligent agent of greater ability, possessing more industry than +himself: it will be concluded from thence, that we are in like manner +obliged to acknowledge that the universe, that man, that the various +phenomena, are the works of an agent, whose intelligence is more +comprehensive, whose power far surpasses our own. Granted: who has ever +doubted it? the proposition is self-evident; it cannot admit of even a +cavil. Nevertheless we reply, in the _first place_, that it is not to +be doubted that nature is extremely powerful; diligently industrious: +we admire her activity every time we are surprised by the extent, every +time we contemplate the variety, every time we behold those complicated +effects which are displayed in her works; or whenever we take the pains +to meditate upon them: nevertheless, she is not really more industrious +in one of her works than she is in another; she is not fathomed with +more ease in those we call her most contemptible productions, than she +is in her most sublime efforts: we no more understand how she has been +capable of producing a stone or a metal, than the means by which she +organized a head like that of the illustrious Newton. We call that +man industrious who can accomplish things which we cannot; nature is +competent to every thing: as soon therefore as a thing exists, it is a +proof she has been capable of producing it: but it is never more than +relatively to ourselves that we judge beings to be industrious: we +then compare them to ourselves; and as we enjoy a quality which we call +intelligence, by the assistance of which we accomplish things, by which +we display our diligence, we naturally conclude from it, that those +works which most astonish us, do not belong to her, but are to be +ascribed to an intelligent being like ourselves, but in whom we make the +intelligence commensurate with the astonishment these phenomena excite +in us; that is to say, in other words, to our own peculiar ignorance, +and the weakness incident to our nature. + +In the _second place_, we must observe, that the savage, to whom either +the statue or the watch is brought, will or will not have ideas of human +industry: if he has ideas of it, he will feel that this watch or +this statue, way be the work of a being of his own species, enjoying +faculties of which he is himself deficient: if he has no idea of it, if +he has no comprehension of the resources of human art, when he beholds +the spontaneous motion of the watch, he will be impressed with the +belief that it is an animal, which cannot be the work of man. Multiplied +experience confirms this mode of thinking which is ascribed to the +savage. The Peruvians mistook the Spaniards for gods, because they made +use of gunpowder, rode on horseback, and came in vessels which sailed +quite alone. The inhabitants of the island of Tenian being ignorant +of fire before the arrival of Europeans, the first time they saw it, +conceived it to be an animal who devoured the wood. Thus it is, that the +savage, in the same manner as many great and learned men, who believe +themselves much more acute, will attribute the strange effects that +strike his organs, to a genius or to a spirit; that is to say, to an +unknown power; to whom he will ascribe capabilities of which he believes +the beings of his own species are entirely destitute: by this he will +prove nothing, except that he is himself ignorant of what man is capable +of producing. It is thus that a raw unpolished people raise their eyes +to heaven, every time they witness some unusual phenomenon. It is thus +that the people denominate all those strange effects, with the natural +causes of which they are ignorant, miraculous, supernatural, divine; but +these are not by reasonable persons therefore considered proofs of what +they assert: as the multitude are generally unacquainted with the cause +of any thing, every object becomes a miracle in their eyes; at least +they imagine God is the immediate cause of the good they enjoy--of the +evil they suffer. In short, it is thus that the theologians themselves +solve every difficulty that starts in their road; they ascribe to God +all those phenomena, of the causes of which either they are themselves +ignorant, or else unwilling that man should be acquainted with the +source. + +In the _third place_, the savage, in opening the watch, and examining +its parts, will perhaps feel, that this machinery announces a work which +can only be the result of human labour. He will perhaps perceive, that +they very obviously differ from the immediate productions of nature, +whom he has not observed to produce wheels made of polished metal. He +will further notice, perhaps, that these parts when separated, no longer +act as they did when they were combined; that the motion he so much +admired, ceases when their union is broken. After these observations, he +will attribute the watch to the ingenuity of man; that is to say, to +a being like himself, of whom he has some ideas, but whom he +judges capable to construct machines to which he is himself utterly +incompetent. In short, he will ascribe the honour of his watch to a +being known to him in some respects, provided with faculties very far +superior to his own; but he will be at an immense distance from the +belief, that this material work, whose ingenuity pleases him so much, +can be the effect of an immaterial cause; or of an agent destitute of +organs, without extent; whose action upon material beings cannot be +within, the sphere of his comprehension. Nevertheless, man, when he +cannot embrace the causes of things, does not scruple to insist that +they are impossible to be the production of nature, although he is +entirely ignorant how far the powers of this nature extend; to what +her capabilities are equal. In viewing the world, we must acknowledge +material causes for many of those phenomena which take place in it; +those who study nature are continually adding fresh discoveries to +this list of physical causes; science, as she enriches the intellectual +stores of human enjoyment, every day throws a broader light on the +energies of nature, which _prejudice_, aided by its almost inseparable +companion, _ignorance_, would for ever bind down in the fetters of +impotence. + +Let us not, however, be told, that pursuing this hypothesis, we +attribute every thing to a blind cause--to the fortuitous concurrence +of atoms--to chance. Those only are called blind causes of which we know +not either the combination, the laws, or the power. Those effects are +called fortuitous, with whose causes man is unacquainted; to which his +experience affords him no clue; which his ignorance prevents him from +foreseeing. All those effects, of which he does not see the necessary +connection with their causes, he attributes to chance. Nature is not a +blind cause; she never acts by chance; nothing that she does would +ever be considered fortuitous, by him who should understand her mode of +action--who had a knowledge of her resources--who was intelligent in her +ways. Every thing that she produces is strictly necessary--is never more +than a consequence of her eternal, immutable laws; all is connected in +her by invisible bonds; every effect we witness flows necessarily from +its cause, whether we are in a condition to fathom it, or whether we are +obliged to let it remain hidden from our view. It is very possible there +should be ignorance on our part; but the words spirit, intelligence, +will not remedy this ignorance; they will rather redouble it, by +arresting our research; by preventing us from conquering those +impediments which obstruct us in probing the natural causes of the +effects, with which our visual faculties bring us acquainted. + +This may serve for an answer to the clamour of those who raise perpetual +objections to the partizans of nature, by unceasingly accusing them with +attributing every thing to chance. Chance is a word devoid of sense, +which furnishes no substantive idea; at least it indicates only the +ignorance of its employers. Nevertheless, we are triumphantly told, it +is reiterated continually, that a regular work cannot be ascribed to the +concurrence of chance. Never, we are informed, will it be possible to +arrive at the formation of a poem such as the Iliad, by means of letters +thrown together promiscuously or combined at random. We agree to it +without hesitation; but, ingenuously, are the letters which compose a +poem thrown with the hand in the manner of dice? It would avail as much +to say, we could not pronounce a discourse with the feet. It is nature, +who combines according to necessary laws, under given circumstances, a +head organized in a mode suitable to bring forth a poem: it is nature +who assembles the elements, which furnish man with a brain competent to +give birth to such a work: it is nature, who, through the medium of the +imagination, by means of the passions, in consequence of the temperament +which she bestows upon man, capacitates him to produce such a +masterpiece of fancy; such a never-fading effort of the mind: it is his +brain modified in a certain manner, crowded with ideas, decorated with +images, made fruitful by circumstances, that alone can become the matrix +in which a poem can be conceived--in which the matter of it can be +digested: this is the only womb whose activity could usher to an +admiring world, the sublime stanzas which develope the story of the +unfortunate Priam, and immortalize their author. A head organized like +that of Homer, furnished with the same vigour, glowing with the same +vivid imagination, enriched with the same erudition, placed under the +same circumstances, would necessarily, and not by chance, produce the +poem of the Iliad; at least, unless it be denied that causes similar in +every thing must produce effects perfectly identical. We should without +doubt be surprised, if there were in a dice-box a hundred thousand dice, +to see a hundred thousand sixes follow in succession; but if these dice +were all cogged or loaded, our surprise would cease: the particles of +matter may be compared to cogged dice, that is to say, always producing +certain determinate effects under certain given circumstances; these +particles being essentially varied in themselves, countless in their +combinations, they are cogged in myriads of different modes. The head +of Homer, or of Virgil, was no more than an assemblage of particles, +possessing peculiar properties; or if they will, of dice cogged by +nature; that is to say, of beings so combined, of matter so wrought, as +to produce the beautiful poems of the Iliad or the Aeneid. As much may +be said of all other productions: indeed, what are men themselves but +cogged dice--machines into which nature has infused the bias requisite +to produce effects of a certain description? A man of genius produces a +good work, in the same manner as a tree of a good species, placed in +a prolific soil, cultivated with care, grafted with judgment, produces +excellent fruit. + +Then is it not either knavery or puerility, to talk of composing a +work by scattering letters with the hand; by promiscuously mingling +characters; or gathering together by chance, that which can only result +from a human brain, with a peculiar organization, modified after a +certain manner? The principle of human generation does not develope +itself by chance; it cannot be nourished with effect, expanded into +life, but in the womb of a woman: a confused heap of characters, a +jumble of symbols, is nothing more than an assemblage of signs, whose +proper arrangement is adequate to paint human ideas; but in order that +these ideas may be correctly delineated, it is previously requisite that +they should have been conceived, combined, nourished, connected, +and developed in the brain of a poet; where circumstances make them +fructify, mature them, and bring them forth in perfection, by reason of +the fecundity, generated by the genial warmth and the peculiar energy +of the matrix, in which these intellectual seeds shall have been placed. +Ideas in combining, expanding, connecting, and associating themselves, +form a whole, like all the other bodies of nature: this whole affords +us pleasure, becomes a source of enjoyment, when it gives birth to +agreeable sensations in the mind; when it offers to our examination +pictures calculated to move us in a lively manner. It is thus that the +history of the Trojan war, as digested in the head of Homer, ushered +into the world with all the fascinating harmony of numbers peculiar to +himself, has the power of giving a pleasurable impulse to heads, who by +their analogy with that of this incomparable Grecian, are in a capacity +to feel its beauties. + +From this it will be obvious, that nothing can be produced by chance; +that no effect can exist without an adequate cause for its existence; +that the one must ever be commensurate with the other. All the works of +nature grow out of the uniform action of invariable laws, whether our +mind can with facility follow the concatenation of the successive causes +which operate; or whether, as in her more complicated productions, +we find ourselves in the impossibility of distinguishing the various +springs which she sets in motion to give birth to her phenomena. To +nature, the difficulty is not more to produce a great poet, capable of +writing an admirable poem, than to form a glittering stone or a shining +metal which gravitates towards a centre. The mode she adopts to give +birth to these various beings, is equally unknown to us, when we have +not meditated upon it; frequently the most sedulous attention, the most +patient investigation affords us no information; sometimes, however, +the unwearied industry of the philosopher is rewarded, by throwing into +light the most mysterious operations. Thus the keen penetration of a +Newton, aided by uncommon diligence, developed the starry system, +which, for so many thousand years, had eluded the research of all the +astronomers by whom he was preceded. Thus the sagacity of a Harvey +giving vigour to his application, brought out of the obscurity in which +for almost countless centuries it had been buried, the true course +pursued by the sanguinary fluid, when circulating through the veins and +arteries of man, giving activity to his machine, diffusing life +through his system, and enabling him to perform those actions which +so frequently strike an astonished world with wonder and regret. Thus +Gallileo, by a quickness of perception, a depth of reasoning peculiar to +himself, held up to an admiring world, the actual form and situation of +the planet we inhabit; which until then had escaped the observation of +the most profound geniuses--the most subtle metaphysicians--the +whole host of priests; which when first promulgated was considered +so extraordinary, so contradictory to all the then received opinions, +either sacred or profane, that he was ranked as an atheist, as an +impious blasphemer, to hold communion with whom, would secure to the +communers a place in the regions of everlasting torment; in short, it +was held an heresy of such an indelible dye, that notwithstanding the +infallibility of his sacred function, Pope Gregory, who then filled the +papal chair, excommunicated all those who had the temerity to accredit +so abominable a doctrine. + +Man is born by the necessary concurrence of those elements suitable to +his construction; he increases in bulk, corroborates his system, expands +his powers, in the same manner as a plant or a stone; which as well +as himself, are augmented in their volume, invigorated in their +capabilities, by the addition of homogeneous matter, that exists within +the sphere of their attraction. Man feels, thinks, receives ideas, +acts after a certain manner, that is to say, according to his organic +structure, which is peculiar to himself; that renders him susceptible of +modifications, of which the stone and the plant are utterly incapable. +On the other hand, the organization of these beings is of a nature +to enable them to receive other modifications, which man is not more +capacitated to experience, than the stone or the plant are those which +constitute him what he is. In consequence of this peculiar arrangement, +the man of genius produces works of merit; the plant when it is healthy +yields delicious fruits the stone when it is placed in a suitable matrix +possesses a glittering brilliance which dazzles the eyes of mortals; +each in their sphere of action both surprise and delight us; because we +feel that they excite in us sensations, that harmonize with what we call +order; in consequence of the pleasure they infuse, by the rarity, by the +magnitude, and by the variety of the effects which they occasion us +to experience. Nevertheless, that which is found most admirable in the +productions of nature, that which is most esteemed in the actions of +man, most highly valued in animals, most sought after in vegetation, +most in request among fossils, is never more than the natural effects +of the different particles of matter, diversely arranged, variously +combined, submitted to numerous modifications; from matter thus united +result organs, brains, temperament, taste, talents, all the multifarious +properties, all the multitudinous qualities, which discriminate the +beings whose multiplied activity make up the sum of what is designated +animated nature. + +Nature then produces nothing but what is necessary; it is not by +fortuitous combinations, by chance throws, that she exhibits to our +view the beings we behold; all her throws are sure, all the causes +she employs have infallibly their effects. Whenever she gives birth to +extraordinary, marvellous, rare beings, it is, that the requisite order +of things the concurrence of the necessary productive causes, happens +but seldom. As soon as those beings exist, they are to be ascribed to +nature, equally with the most familiar of her productions; to nature +every thing is equally possible, equally facile, when she assembles +together the instruments or the causes necessary to act. Thus it seems +presumption in man to set limits to the powers of nature, which he so +very imperfectly understands. The combinations, or if they will, the +throws that she makes in an eternity of existence, can easily produce +all the beings that have existed: her eternal march must necessarily +bring forth, again and again, the most astonishing circumstances; the +most rare occurrences; those most calculated to rouse the wonder, to +elicit the admiration of beings, who are only in a condition to give +them a momentary consideration; who can get nothing more than a glimpse, +without ever having either the leisure or the means to search into +causes, which lie hid from their weak eyes, in the depths of Cimmerian +obscurity. Countless throws during eternity, with elements and +combinations varied almost to infinity, quite with relation to man, +suffice to produce every thing of which he has a knowledge, with +multitudes of other effects, of which he will never have the least +conception. + +Thus, we cannot too often repeat to the metaphysicians, to the +supporters of immateriality, to the inconsistent theologians, who +commonly ascribe to their adversaries the most ridiculous opinions, in +order to obtain an easy, short-lived triumph in the prejudiced eyes +of the multitude; or in the stagnant minds of those who never examine +deeply; that chance is nothing but a word, as well as many other words, +imagined solely to cover the ignorance of those to whom the course of +nature is inexplicable--to shield the idleness of others who are too +slothful to seek into the properties of acting causes. It is not chance +that has produced the universe, it is self-existent; nature exists +necessarily from all eternity: she is omnipotent because every thing +is produced by her energies; she is omnipresent, because she fills +all space; she is omniscient, because every thing can only be what +it actually is; she is immovable, because as a whole she cannot be +displaced; she is immutable, because her essence cannot change, although +her forms may vary; she is infinite, because she cannot have any bounds; +she is all perfect, because she contains every thing: in short, she has +all the abstract qualities of the metaphysician, all the moral faculties +of the theologian, without involving any contradiction, since that which +is the assemblage of all, must of necessity contain the properties of +all. + +However concealed may be her ways, the existence of nature is +indubitable; her mode of action is in some respects known to us. +Experience amply demonstrates we might, if we were more industrious, +become better acquainted with her secrets; but with an immaterial +substance, with a pure spirit, the mind of man can never become +familiar: he has no means by which he can picture to himself this +incomprehensible, this inconceivable quality: in despite therefore of +the roundness of assertion adopted by the theologian, notwithstanding +all the subtilties of the metaphysician, it will always be for man, +while he remains such as he now is, in the language of Doctor Samuel +Clarke, that, _of which nothing can with truth be affirmed_. + + + + + +CHAP. VI. + +_Of Pantheism; or of the Natural Ideas of the Divinity._ + + +The false principle that matter is not self-existent; that by its nature +it is in an impossibility to move itself; consequently incompetent to +the production of those striking phenomena which arrest our wondering +eyes in the wide expanse of the universe; it will be obvious, to all who +seriously attend to what has preceded, is the origin of the proofs +upon which theology rests the existence of immateriality. After these +suppositions, as gratuitous as they are erroneous, the fallacy of which +we have exposed elsewhere, it has been believed that matter did not +always exist, but that its existence, as well as its motion, is a +production of time; due to a cause distinguished from itself; to an +unknown agent to whom it is subordinate. As man finds in his own species +a quality which he calls intelligence, which presides over all his +actions, by the aid of which he arrives at the end he proposes to +himself; he has clothed this invisible agent with this quality, which +he has extended beyond the limits of his own conception: he magnified it +thus, because, having made him the author of effects of which he found +himself incapable, he did not conceive it possible that the intelligence +he himself possessed, unless it was prodigiously amplified, would +be sufficient to account for those productions, to which his erring +judgment led him to conclude the natural energy of physical causes were +not adequate. + +As this agent was invisible, as his mode of action was inconceivable, he +made him a spirit, a word that really means nothing more than that he +is ignorant of his essence, or that he acts like the breath of which +he cannot trace the motion. Thus, in speaking of spirituality, he +designated an occult quality, which he deemed suitable to a concealed +being, whose mode of action was always imperceptible to the senses. It +would appear, however, that originally the word spirit was not meant to +designate immateriality; but a matter of a more subtile nature than +that which acted coarsely on the organs: still of a nature capable +of penetrating the grosser matter--of communicating to it +motion--of instilling into it active life--of giving birth to those +combinations--of imparting to them those modifications, which his +organic structure rendered him competent to discover. Such was, as +has been shewn, that all-powerful Jupiter, who in the theology of the +ancients, was originally destined to represent the etherial, subtile +matter that penetrates, vivifies, and gives activity to all the bodies +of which nature is the common assemblage. + +It would be grossly deceiving ourselves to believe that the idea of +spirituality, such as the subtilty of dreaming metaphysicians present it +in these days, was that which offered itself to our forefathers in the +early stages of the human mind. This immateriality, which excludes all +analogy with any thing but itself--which bears no resemblance to any +thing of which man is capacitated to have a knowledge, was, as we have +already observed, the slow, the tardy fruit of his imagination, after +he had quitted experience, and renounced his reason. Men reared in +luxurious leisure, unceasingly meditating, without the assistance +of those natural helps with which attentive observation would +have furnished them, by degrees arrived at the formation of this +incomprehensible quality, which is so fugitive, that although man has +been compelled to reverence it, to accredit it against all the evidence +of his senses, they have never yet been enabled to give any other +explanation of its nature, than by using a term to which it is +impossible to attach any intelligible idea. Seraphis said, with tears +in his eyes, "that in making him adopt the opinion of spirituality, they +had deprived him of his God." Many fathers of the church have given a +human form to the Divinity, and treated all those as heretics who made +him spiritual. Thus by dint of reasoning, by force of subtilizing, the +word spirit no longer presents any one image upon which the mind can fix +itself; when they are desirous to speak of it, it becomes impossible +to understand them, seeing that each visionary paints it after his own +manner; and in the portrait he forms, consults only his own temperament, +follows nothing but his own imagination, adopts nothing but his own +peculiar reveries; the only point in which they are at all in unison, is +in assigning to it inconceivable qualities, which they naturally +enough believe are best suited to the incomprehensible beings they have +delineated: from the incompatible heap of these qualities, generally +resulted a whole, whose existence they thus rendered impossible. In +short, this word, which has occupied the research of so many learned and +intelligent men; which is considered of such importance to mankind, has +been, in consequence of theological reveries, always fluctuating: +these never bearing the least resemblance to each other, it has become +destitute of any fixed sense, a mere sound, to which each who echoes it +affixes his own peculiar ideas, which are never in harmony with those of +his neighbour; which indeed are not even steady in himself, but like +the camelion, assume the colour of every differing circumstance. This +unintelligible word has been substituted for the more intelligible +one of matter; man, when clothed with power, has entertained the most +rancorous antipathies, pursued the most barbarous persecutions, against +those who have not been enabled to contemplate this changeable idea +under the same point of view with himself. + +There have, however, been men who had sufficient courage to resist this +torrent of opinion--to oppose themselves to this delirium; who have +believed, that the object which was announced as the most important +for mortals, as the sole object worthy of their thoughts, demanded an +attentive examination; who apprehended that if experience could be of +any utility, if judgment could afford any advantage, if reason was of +any use whatever, it must, most unquestionably be, to consider this +quality so opposed to every thing in nature, which was said to regulate +all the beings which she contains. These quickly saw they could not +subscribe to the general opinion of the uninformed, who never examine +any thing, who take every thing upon the credit of others; much less was +it consistent with sound sense to agree with their guides, who, either +deceivers or deceived, forbade others to submit it to the scrutiny of +reason; who were themselves frequently in an utter incapacity to pass it +under such an ordeal. Thus some thinkers, disgusted with the obscure +and contradictory notions which others had through habit mechanically +attached to this incomprehensible property, had the temerity to shake +off the yoke which had been imposed upon them from their infancy: +calling reason to their aid against those terrors with which they +alarmed the ignorant, revolting at the hideous descriptions under which +they attempted to defend their hypothesis, they had the intrepidity to +tear the veil of delusion; to rend asunder the barriers of imposture; +they considered with calm resolution, this formidable prejudice, +contemplated with a serene eye this unsupported opinion, examined with +cool deliberation this fluctuating notion, which had become the object +of all the hopes, the source of all the fears, the spring of all the +quarrels which distracted the mind, and disturbed the harmony of blind, +confiding mortals. + +The result of these inquiries has uniformly been, a conviction that no +rational proof has ever been adduced in support of this hypothesis; +that from the nature of the thing itself, none can be offered; that +an incorporeity is inconceivable to corporeal beings; that these only +behold nature acting after invariable laws, in which every thing is +material; that all the phenomena of which the world is the theatre, +spring out of natural causes; that man as well as all the other beings +is the work or this nature, is only an instrument in her hand, obliged +to accomplish the eternal decrees of an imperious necessity. + +Whatever efforts the philosopher makes to penetrate the secrets of +nature, he never finds more, as we have many times repeated, than +matter; various in itself, diversely modified in consequence of the +motion it undergoes. Its whole, as well as its parts, displays only +necessary causes producing necessary effects, which flow necessarily +one out of the other: of which the mind, aided by experience, is more +or less competent to discover the concatenation. In virtue of their +specific properties, all the beings that come under our review, +gravitate towards a centre--attract analogous matter--repel that which +is unsuitable to combination--mutually receive and give impulse--acquire +qualities--undergo modifications which maintain them in existence for a +season--are born and dissolved by the operation of an inexorable +decree, that obliges every thing, we behold to pass into a new mode of +existence. It is to these continued vicissitudes that are to be +ascribed all the phenomena, whether trivial or of magnitude; ordinary +or extraordinary; known or unknown; simple or complicated; which are +operated in the universe. It is by these mutations alone that we have +any knowledge of nature: she is only mysterious to those who contemplate +her through the veil of prejudice: her course is always simple to those +who look at her without prepossession. + +To attribute the effects to which we are witnesses, to nature, to +matter, variously combined with the motion that is inherent to it, is +to give them an intelligible and known cause; to attempt to penetrate +deeper, is to plunge ourselves into imaginary regions, where we find +only a chaos of obscurities--where we are lost in an unfathomable abyss +of incertitude. Let us then be content with contemplating nature, who, +being self-existent, must in her essence possess motion; which cannot +be conceived without properties, from which result perpetual action +and re-action; or those continual efforts which give birth to such a +numerous train of circumstances; in which a single molecule cannot be +found, that does not necessarily occupy the place assigned to it, by +immutable and necessary laws--that is for an instant in an absolute +state of repose. What necessity can there exist to seek out of matter +for a power to give it play, since its motion flows as necessarily out +of its existence as its bulk, its form, its gravity, &c. since nature in +inaction would no longer be nature? + +If it be demanded, How can we figure to ourselves, that matter by its +own peculiar energy can produce all the effects we witness? I shall +reply, that if by matter it is obstinately determined to understand +nothing but a dead, inert mass, destitute of every property, incapable +of moving itself, we shall no longer have a single idea of matter; we +shall no longer be able to account for any thing. As soon, however, +as it exists, it must have properties; as soon as it has properties, +without which it could not exist, it must act by virtue of those +properties; since it is only by its action we can have a knowledge of +its existence, be conscious of its properties. It is evident that if +by matter be understood that which it is not, or if its existence +be denied, those phenomena which strike our visual organs cannot be +attributed to it. But if by nature be understood (that which she really +is), an heap of existing matter, possessing various properties, we shall +be obliged to acknowledge that nature must be competent to move herself; +by the diversity of her motion, must have the capability, independent +of foreign aid, to produce the effects we behold; we shall find that +nothing can be made from nothing; that nothing is made by chance; that +the mode of action of every particle of matter, however minute, is +necessarily determined by its own peculiar, or by its individual +properties. + +We have elsewhere said, that that which cannot be annihilated--that +which in its nature is indestructible--cannot have been inchoate, cannot +have had a beginning to its existence, but exists necessarily from all +eternity; contains within itself a sufficient cause for its own peculiar +existence. It becomes then perfectly useless to seek out of nature a +cause for her action which is in some respects known to us; with which +indefatigable research may, judging of the future by the past, render us +more familiar. As we know some of the general properties of matter; +as we can discover some of its qualities, wherefore should we seek its +motion in an unintelligible cause, of which we are not in a condition to +become acquainted with any one of its properties? Can we conceive that +immateriality could ever draw matter from its own source? Impossible; it +is not within the grasp of human intellect. If creation is an eduction +from nothing, there must have been a time when matter had not existence; +there must consequently be a time when it will cease to be: this latter +is acknowledged by many theologians themselves to be impossible. Do +those who are continually talking of this mysterious act of omnipotence, +by which a mass of matter has been, all at once, substituted to nothing, +perfectly understand what they tell us? Is there a man on earth who +conceives that a being devoid of extent can exist, become the cause of +the existence of beings who have extent--act upon matter--draw it +from his own peculiar essence--set it in motion? In truth, the more we +consider theology, the more we must be convinced that it has invented +words destitute of sense; substituted sounds to intelligible realities. + +For want of consulting experience, for want or studying nature, for +want of examining the material world, we have plunged ourselves into an +intellectual vacuum, which we have peopled with chimeras, We have not +stooped to consider matter, to study its different periods, to follow it +through its numerous, changes. We have either ridiculously or knavishly +confounded dissolution, decomposition, the separation of the elementary +particles of bodies, with their radical destruction; we have been +unwilling to see that the elements are indestructible; although the +forms are fleeting, and depend upon transitory combination. We have +not distinguished the change of figure, the alteration of position, the +mutation of texture, to which matter is liable, from its annihilation, +which is impossible; we have falsely concluded, that matter Was not a +necessary being--that it commenced to exist--that this existence was +derived from that which possessed nothing in common with itself--that +that which was not substance, could give birth to that which is. Thus an +unintelligible name has been substituted for matter, which furnishes us +with true ideas of nature; of which at each instant we experience the +influence, of which we undergo the action, of which we feel the power, +and of which we should have a much better knowledge, if our abstract +opinions did not continually fasten a bandage over our eyes. + +Indeed the most simple notions of philosophy shew us, that, although +bodies change and disappear, nothing is however lost in nature; the +various produce of the decomposition of a body serves for elements, +supplies materials, forms the basis, lays the foundation for accretions, +contributes to the maintenance of other bodies. The whole of nature +subsists, and is conserved only by the circulation, the transmigration, +the exchange, the perpetual displacement of insensible atoms--the +continual mutation of the sensible combinations of matter. It is by +this palingenesia, this regeneration, that the great whole, the mighty +macrocosm subsists; who, like the Saturn of the ancients, is perpetually +occupied with devouring her own children. + +It will not then be inconsistent with observation, repugnant to reason, +contrary to good sense, to acknowledge that matter is self-existent; +that it acts by an energy peculiar to itself; that it will never be +annihilated. Let us then say, that matter is eternal; that nature has +been, is, and ever will be occupied with producing and destroying; +with doing and undoing; with combining and separating; in short, with +following a system of laws resulting from its necessary existence. For +every thing that she doth, she needs only to combine the elements of +matter; these, essentially diverse, necessarily either attract or repel +each other; come into collision, from whence results either their +union or dissolution; by the same laws that one approximates, the other +recedes from their respective spheres of action. It is thus that she +brings forth plants, fossils, animals, men; thus she gives existence +to organized, sensible, thinking beings, as well as to those who are +destitute of either feeling or thought. All these act for the season of +their respective duration, according to immutable laws, determined by +their various properties; arising out of their configuration; depending +on their masses; resulting from their ponderosity, &c. Here is the true +origin of every thing which is presented to our view; this indicates +the mode by which nature, according to her own peculiar powers, is in +a state to produce all those astonishing effects which assail our +wondering eyes; all that phenomena to which mankind is the witness; as +well as all the bodies who act diversely upon the organs with which +he is furnished, of which he can only judge according to the manner in +which these organs are affected. He says they are good, when they are +analogous to his own mode of existence--when they contribute to the +maintenance of the harmony of his machine: he says they are bad, when +they disturb this harmony. It is thus he ascribes views, ideas, designs, +to the being he supposes to be the power by which nature is moved; +although all the experience we are able to collect, unequivocally +proves, that she acts after an invariable, eternal code of laws. + +Nature is destitute of those views which actuate man; she acts +necessarily, because she exists: her system is immutable, and founded +upon the essence of things. It is the essence of the seed of the +male, composed of primitive elements, which serve for the basis of an +organized being, to unite itself with that of the female; to fructify +it; to produce, by this combination, a new organized being; who, feeble +in his origin, not having yet acquired a sufficient quantity of material +particles to give him consistence, corroborates himself by degrees; +strengthens himself by the daily accretion of analogous matter; is +nourished by the modifications appropriate to his existence: matured +by the continuation of circumstances calculated to give vigour to +his frame; thus he lives, thinks, acts, engenders in his turn other +organized beings similar to himself. By a consequence of his temperament +and of physical laws, this generation does not take place, except when +the circumstances necessary to its production find themselves united. +Thus this procreation is not operated by chance; the animal does not +fructify, but with an animal of his own species, because this is the +only one analogous to himself, who unites the qualities, who combines +the circumstances, suitable to produce a being resembling himself; +without this he would not produce any thing, or he would only give +birth to a being who would be denominated a monster, because it would be +dissimilar to himself. It is of the essence of the grain of plants, to +be impregnated by the pollen or seed of the stygma of the flower; in +this state of copulation they in consequence develope themselves in +the bowels of the earth; expand by the aid of water; shoot forth by +the accession of heat; attract analogous particles to corroborate their +system: thus by degrees they form a plant, a shrub, a tree, susceptible +of that life, filled with that motion, capable of that action which +is suitable to vegetable existence. It is of the essence of particular +particles of earth, homogeneous in their nature, when separated by +circumstances, attenuated by water, elaborated by heat, to unite +themselves in the bosom of mountains, with other atoms which are +analogous; to form by their aggregation, according to their various +affinities, those bodies possessing more or less solidity; having more +or less purity, which are called diamonds, chrystals, stones, metals, +minerals. It is of the essence of exhalations raised by the heat of +the atmosphere, to combine, to collect themselves, to dash against each +other, and either by their union or their collision to produce meteors, +to generate thunder. It is of the essence of some inflammable matter +to gather itself together, to ferment in the caverns of the earth, to +increase its active force by augmenting its heat, and then explode, +by the accession of other matter suitable to the operation, with that +tremendous force which we call earthquakes; by which mountains are +destroyed; cities overturned; the inhabitants of the plains thrown into +a state of consternation; these full of alarm, unused to meditate on +natural effects, unconscious of the extent of physical powers, stretch +forth their hands in dismay, heave the most desponding sighs, utter +aloud their complaints, and earnestly implore a cessation of those +evils, which nature, acting by necessary laws, obliges them to +experience as necessarily as she does those benefits by which she fills +them with the most extravagant joy. In short, it is of the essence of +certain climates to produce men so organized, whose temperament is so +modified, that they become either extremely useful or very prejudicial +to their species, in the same manner as it is the property of certain +portions of the land, to bring forth either delicious fruits or +dangerous poisons. + +In all this nature acts necessarily; she pursues an undeviating course, +which we are bound to consider the perfection of wisdom; because she +exists necessarily, has her modes of action determined by certain, +invariable laws, which themselves flow out of the constituent properties +of the various beings she contains, and those circumstances, which the +eternal motion she is in must necessarily bring about. It is ourselves +who have a necessary aim, which is our own conservation; it is by this +that we regulate all the ideas we form to ourselves of the causes acting +in nature; it is according to this standard we judge of every thing +we see or feel. Animated ourselves, existing after a certain manner, +possessing a soul endowed with rare and peculiar qualities, we, like the +savage, ascribe a soul and animated life to every thing that acts upon +us. Thinking and intelligent ourselves, we give these, faculties to +those beings whom we suppose to be more powerful than mortals; but as we +see the generality of matter incapable of modifying itself, we suppose +it must receive its impulse from some concealed agent, some external +cause, which our imagination pictures as similar to ourselves. +Necessarily attracted by that which is advantageous to us, repelling by +an equal necessity that which is prejudicial to our manner of existence; +we cease to reflect that our modes of feeling are due to our peculiar +organization, modified by physical causes: in this state, either of +inattention or ignorance, we mistake the natural results of our own +peculiar structure, for instruments employed by a being whom we clothe +with our own passions--whom we suppose actuated by our own views--who, +possessing our ideas, embraces a mode of thinking and acting similar to +ourselves. + +If after this it be asked, What is the end of nature? We shall reply +that on this head we are ignorant; that it is more than probable no man +will ever fathom the secret; but we shall also say, it is evidently to +exist, to act, to conserve her whole. If then it be demanded, Wherefore +she exists? We shall again reply, of this we know nothing at present, +possibly never shall; but we shall also say, she exists necessarily, +that her operations, her motion, her phenomena, are the necessary +consequences of her necessary existence. There necessarily exists +something; this is nature or the universe, this nature necessarily acts +as she does. If it be wished to substitute any other word for nature, +the question will still remain as it did, as to the cause of her +existence; the end she has in view. It is not by changing of terms that +a geometrician can solve problems; one word will throw no more light +on a subject than another, unless that word carries a certain degree +of conviction in the ideas which it generates. As long as we speak of +matter, if we cannot develope all its properties, we shall at least have +fixed, determinate ideas; something tangible, of which we have a slight +knowledge, that we can submit to the examination of our senses: but +from the moment we begin to talk of immateriality, of incorporeity, +from thence our ideas become confused; we are lost in a labyrinth of +conjecture--we have no one means of seizing the subject on any +side--we are, after the most elaborate arguments, after the most subtle +reasoning, obliged to acknowledge we cannot form the most slender +opinion respecting it, that has any thing substantive for its support. +In short, that it is precisely that thing "of which every thing may be +denied, but of which nothing can with truth be affirmed." Let us clothe +this incomprehensible being with whatever qualities we may, it will be +always in ourselves we seek the model; they will be our own faculties +that we delineate, our own passions that we describe. In like manner +man, as long as he is ignorant, will always conjecture that it is for +himself alone the universe was formed; not withstanding, he has nothing +more to do, than to open his eyes in order to be undeceived. He will +then see, that he undergoes a common destiny, equally partakes with all +other beings of the benefits, shares with them without exception the +evils of life; like them he is submitted to an imperious necessity, +inexorable in its decrees; which is itself nothing more than the sum +total of those laws which nature herself is obliged to follow. + +Thus every thing proves that nature, or matter, exists necessarily; that +it cannot in any moment swerve from those laws imposed upon it by its +existence. If it cannot be annihilated, it cannot have been inchoate. +The theologian himself agrees that it requires a miracle to annihilate +an atom. But is it possible to derogate from the necessary laws of +existence? Can that which exists necessarily, act but according to the +laws peculiar to itself? Miracle is another word invented to shield our +own sloth, to cover our own ignorance; it is that by which we wish to +designate those rare occurrences, those solitary effects of natural +causes, whose infrequency do not afford us means of diving into their +springs. It is only saying by another expression, that an unknown cause +hath by modes which we cannot trace, produced an uncommon effect which +we did not expect, which therefore appears strange to us. This granted, +the intervention of words, far from removing the ignorance in which we +found ourselves with respect to the power and capabilities of nature, +only serves to augment it, to give it more durability. The creation +of matter becomes to our mind as incomprehensible, and appears as +impossible as its annihilation. + +Let us then conclude that all those words which do not present to the +mind any determinate idea, ought to be banished the language of those +who are desirous of speaking so as to be understood; that abstract +terms, invented by ignorance, are only calculated to satisfy men +destitute of experience; who are too slothful to study nature, too timid +to search into her ways; that they are suitable only to content those +enthusiasts, whose curious imagination pleases itself with making +fruitless endeavours to spring beyond the visible world; who occupy +themselves with chimeras of their own creation: in short, that these +words are useful only to those whose sole profession it is to feed the +ears of the uninformed with pompous sounds, that are not comprehended +by themselves--upon the sense of which they are in a state of perpetual +hostility with each other--upon the true meaning of which they have +never yet been able to come to a common agreement; which each sees after +his own peculiar manner of contemplating objects, in which there never +was, nor probably never will be, the least harmony of feeling. + +Man is a material being; he cannot consequently have any ideas, but of +that which like himself is material; that is to say, of that which is +in a capacity to act upon his organs, which has some qualities analogous +with his own. In despite of himself, he always assigns material +properties to his gods; the impossibility he finds in compassing them, +has made him suppose them to be spiritual; distinguished from the +material world. Indeed he, must be content, either not to understand +himself, or he must have material ideas of the Divinity; the human mind +may torture itself as long as it pleases, it will never, after all its +efforts, be enabled to comprehend, that material effects can emanate +from immaterial causes; or that such causes can have any relation with +material beings. Here is the reason why man, as we have seen, believes +himself obliged to give to his gods, these morals which he so much so +highly esteems, in those beings of his race, who are fortunate enough +to possess them: he forgets that a being who is spiritual, adopting the +theological hypothesis, cannot from thence either have his organization, +or his ideas; that it cannot think in his mode, nor act after his +manner; that consequently it cannot possess what he calls intelligence, +wisdom, goodness, anger, justice, &c. as he himself understands those +terms. Thus, in truth, the moral qualities with which he has clothed +the Divinity, supposes him material, and the most abstract +theological notions, are, after all, founded upon a direct, undeniable +_Anthropomorphism_. + +In despite of all their subtilties, the theologians cannot do otherwise; +like all the beings of the human species, they have a knowledge of +matter alone: they have no real idea of a pure spirit. When they speak +of the intelligence, of the wisdom, of the designs of their gods, they +are always those of men which they describe, that they obstinately +persist in giving to beings, of which, according to their own shewing, +to the evidence they themselves adduce, their essence does not render +them susceptible; who if they had those qualities with which they clothe +them, would from that very moment cease to be incorporeal; would be in +the truest sense of the word, substantive matter. How shall we reconcile +the assertion, that beings who have not occasion for any thing--who are +sufficient to them selves--whose projects must be executed as soon as +they are formed; can have volition, passions, desires? How shall we +attribute anger to beings without either blood or bile? How can we +conceive an omnipotent being (whose wisdom we admire in the striking +order he has himself established in the universe,) can permit that this +beautiful arrangement should be continually disturbed, either by the +elements in discord, or by the crimes of human beings? In short, this +being cannot have any one of the human qualities, which always depend +upon the peculiar organization of man--upon his wants--upon his +institutions, which are themselves always relative to the society +in which he lives. The theologian vainly strives to aggrandize, to +exaggerate in idea, to carry to perfection by dint of abstraction, the +moral qualities of man; they are unsuitable to the Divinity; in vain it +is asserted they are in him of a different nature from what they are +in his creatures; that they are perfect; infinite; supreme; eminent; in +holding this language, they no longer understand themselves; they can +have no one idea of the qualities they are describing, seeing that +man can never have a conception of them, but inasmuch as they bear an +analogy to the same qualities in himself. + +It is thus that by force of metaphysical subtilty, mortals have no +longer any fixed, any determinate idea of the beings to which they have +given birth. But little contented with understanding physical causes, +with contemplating active nature; weary of examining matter, which +experience proves is competent to the production of every thing, man +has been desirous to despoil it of the energy which it is its essence +to possess, in order to invest it in a pure spirit; in an immaterial +substance; which he is under the necessity of re-making a material +being, whenever he has an inclination either to form an idea of it to +himself, or make it understood by others. In assembling the parts +of man, which he does no more than enlarge, which he swells out to +infinity, he believes he forms an immaterial being, who, for that +reason, acquires the capability of performing all those phenomena, with +the true causes of which he is ignorant; nevertheless those operations +of which he does comprehend the spring, he as sedulously denies to be +due to the powers of this being; time, therefore, according to these +ideas, as he advances the progress of science, as he further developes +the secrets of nature, is continually diminishing the number of actions +ascribed to this being--is constantly circumscribing his sphere of +action. It is upon the model of the human soul that he forms the soul +of nature, or that secret agent from which she receives impulse. After +having made himself double, he makes nature in like manner twofold, and +then he supposes she is vivified by an intelligence, which he borrows +from himself, Placed in an impossibility of becoming acquainted with +this agent, as well as with that which he has gratuitously distinguished +from his own body; he has invented the word spiritual to cover up +his ignorance; which is only in other words avowing it is a substance +entirely unknown to him. From that moment, however, he has no ideas +whatever of what he himself has done; because he first clothes it with +all the qualities he esteems in his fellows, and then destroys them by +an assurance, that they in no wise resemble the qualities he has been +so anxious to bestow. To remedy this inconvenience, he concludes this +spiritual substance much more noble than matter; that its prodigious +subtilty, which he calls simplicity, but which is only the effect +of metaphysical abstraction, secures it from decomposition, from +dissolution, from all those revolutions, to which material bodies, as +produced by nature, are evidently exposed. + +It is thus, that man always prefers the marvellous to the simple; the +unintelligible to the intelligible; that which he cannot comprehend, to +that which is within the range of his understanding; he despises those +objects which are familiar to him; he estimates those alone with which +he is incapable of having any intercourse: that of which he has only +confused vague ideas, he concludes must contain something important for +him to know--must have something supernatural in its construction. +In short, he needs mystery to move his imagination--to exercise his +mind--to feed his curiosity; which never labours harder, than when it is +occupied with enigmas impossible to be guessed at; which from that very +circumstance, he judges to be extremely worthy of his research. +This, without doubt, is the reason he looks upon matter, which he +has continually under his eyes, which he sees perpetually in action, +eternally changing its form, as a contemptible thing--as a contingent +being, that does not exist necessarily; consequently, that cannot exist +independently: this is the reason why he has imagined a spirit, which he +will never be able to conceive; which on that account he declares to be +superior to matter; which he roundly asserts to be anterior to nature, +and the only self-existent being. The human wind found food in these +mystical ideas, they unceasingly occupied it; the imagination had play, +it embellished them after its own manner: ignorance fed itself with the +fables to which these mysteries gave rise; habit identified them with +the existence of man himself: when each could ask the other concerning +these ideas, without any one being in a capacity to return a direct +answer, he felt himself gratified, he immediately concluded that the +general impossibility of reply stamped them with the wondrous faculty +of immediately interesting his welfare; of involving his most prominent +interests, more than all the things put together, with which he had +any possible means of becoming intimately acquainted. Thus they became +necessary to his happiness; he believed he fell into a vacuum without +them; he became the decided enemy to all those who endeavoured to lead +him back to nature, which he had learned to despise; to consider only as +an impotent mass, an heap of inert matter, not possessing any energy +but what it received from causes exterior to itself; as a contemptible +assemblage of fragile combinations, whose forms were continually subject +to perish. + +In distinguishing nature from her mover, man has fallen into the same +absurdity as when he separated his soul from his body; life from the +living being; the faculty of thought from the thinking being: deceived +on his own peculiar nature, having taken up an erroneous opinion upon +the energy of his own organs, he has in like manner been deceived upon +the organization of the universe; he has distinguished nature from +herself; the life of nature from living nature; the action of nature +from active nature. It was this soul of the world--this energy of +nature--this principle of activity, which man first personified, then +separated by abstraction; sometimes decorated with imaginary attributes; +sometimes with qualities borrowed from his own peculiar essence. Such +were the aerial materials of which man availed himself to construct the +incomprehensible, immaterial substances, which have filled the world +with disputes--which have divided man from his fellow--which to this day +he has never been able to define, even to his own satisfaction. His own +soul was the model. Deceived upon the nature of this, he never had any +just ideas of the Divinity, who was, in his mind, nothing more than a +copy exaggerated or disfigured to that degree, as to make him mistake +the prototype upon which it had been originally formed. + +If, because man has distinguished himself from his own existence, it has +been impossible for him ever to form to himself any true idea of his +own nature; it is also because he has distinguished nature from herself, +that both herself and her ways have been mistaken. Man has ceased to +study nature, that he might, recur by thought to a substance which +possesses nothing in common with her; this substance he has made the +mover of nature, without which she would not be capable of any thing; to +whom every thing that takes place in her system, must be attributed; +the conduct of this being has appeared mysterious, has been held up as +marvellous, because he seemed to be a continual contradiction: when if +man had but recurred to the immutability of the laws of nature, to the +invariable system she pursues, all would have appeared intelligible; +every thing would have been reconciled; the apparent contrariety +would have vanished. By thus taking a wrong view of things, wisdom and +intelligence appeared to be opposed by confusion and disorder; goodness +to be rendered nugatory by evil; while all is only just what it must +inevitably be, under the given circumstances. In consequence of these +erroneous opinions, in the place of applying himself to the study of +nature, to discover the method of obtaining her favors, or to seek the +means of throwing aside his misfortunes; in the room of consulting his +experience; in lieu of labouring usefully to his own happiness; he has +been only occupied with expecting these things by channels through +which they do not flow; he has been disputing upon objects be never can +understand, while he has totally neglected that which was within the +compass of his own powers; which he might have rendered propitious to +his views, by a more industrious application of his own talent; by a +patient investigation, for the purpose of drawing at the fountain of +truth, the limpid balsam that alone can heal the sorrows or his heart. + +Nothing could be well more prejudicial to his race, than this +extravagant theory; which, as we shall prove, has become the source of +innumerable evils. Man has been for thousands of years trembling before +idols of his own creation--bowing down before them with the most servile +homage--occupied with disarming their wrath--sedulously employed in +propitiating their kindness, without ever advancing a single step on +the road he so much desires to travel. He will perhaps continue the same +course for centuries to come, unless by some unlooked for exertion on +his part, he shall happen to discard the prejudices which blind him; to +lay aside his enthusiasm for the marvellous; to quit his fondness for +the enigmatical; rally round the standard of his reason: unless, taking +experience for his guide, he march undauntedly forward under the banner +of truth, and put to the rout that host of unintelligible jargon, under +the cumbrous load of which he has lost sight of his own happiness; +which has but too frequently prevented him from seeking the only means +adequate either to satisfy his wants, or to ameliorate the evils which +he is necessarily obliged to experience. + +Let us then re-conduct bewildered mortals to the altar of nature; let us +endeavour to destroy that delusion which the ignorance of man, aided by +a disordered imagination, has induced him to elevate to her throne; let +us strive to dissipate that heavy mist which obscures to him the paths +of truth; let us seek to banish from his mind those visionary ideas +which prevent him from giving activity to his experience; let us teach +him if possible not to seek out of nature herself, the causes of the +phenomena he admires--to rest satisfied that she contains remedies for +all his evils--that she has manifold benefits in store for those, who, +rallying their industry, are willingly patiently to investigate her +laws--that she rarely withholds her secrets from the researches of those +who diligently labour to unravel them. Let us assure him that reason +alone can render him happy; that reason is nothing more than the science +of nature, applied to the conduct of man in society; that this reason +teaches that every thing is necessary; that his pleasures as well as +his sorrows are the effects of nature, who in all her works follows only +laws which nothing can make her revoke; that his interest demands he +should learn to support with equanimity of mind, all those evils +which natural means do not enable him to put aside. In short, let us +unceasingly repeat to him, it is in rendering his fellow creature happy, +that he will himself arrive at a felicity he will in vain expect from +others, when his own conduct refuses it to him. + +Nature is self-existent; she will always exist; she produces every +thing; contains within herself the cause of every thing; her motion is a +necessary consequence of her existence; without motion we could form +no conception of nature; under this collective name we designate the +assemblage of matter acting by virtue of its peculiar energies. Every +thing proves to us, that it is not out of nature man ought to seek the +Divinity. If we have only an incomplete knowledge of nature and her +ways--if we have only superficial, imperfect ideas of matter, how shall +we be able to flatter ourselves with understanding or having any certain +notions of immateriality, of beings so much more fugitive, so much more +difficult to compass, even by thought, than the material elements; +so much more shy of access than either the constituent principles of +bodies, their primitive properties, their various modes of acting, or +their different manner of existing? If we cannot recur to first causes, +let its content ourselves with second causes, with those effects which +we can submit to experience, let us collect the facts with which we have +an acquaintance; they will enable us to judge of what we do not know: +let us at least confine ourselves to the feeble glimmerings of truth +with which our senses furnish us, since we do not possess means whereby +to acquire broader masses of light. + +Do not let us mistake for real sciences, those which have no other +basis than our imagination; we shall find that such can at most be but +visionary: let us cling close to nature which we see, which we feel, +of which we experience the action; of which at least we understand the +general laws. If we are ignorant of her detail, if we cannot fathom the +secret principles she employs in her most complicated productions, +we are at least certain she acts in a permanent, uniform, analogous, +necessary manner. Let us then observe this nature; let us watch her +movements; but never let us endeavour to quit the routine she prescribes +for the beings of our species: if we do, we shall not only be obliged to +return, but we shall also infallibly be punished with numberless errors, +which will darken our mind, estrange us from reason; the necessary +consequence will be countless sorrows, which we may otherwise avoid. +Let us consider we are sensible parts of a whole, in which the forms are +only produced to be destroyed; in which combinations are ushered into +life, that they may again quit it, after having subsisted for a longer +or a shorter season. Let us look upon nature as an immense elaboratory +which contains every thing necessary for her action; who lacks nothing +requisite for the production of all the phenomena she displays to our +sight. Let us acknowledge her power to be inherent in her essence; amply +commensurate to her eternal march; fully adequate to the happiness of +all the beings she contains. Let us consider her as a whole, who can +only maintain herself by what we call the discord of the elements; that +she exists by the continual dissolution and re-union of her parts; that +from this springs the universal harmony; that from this the general +stability has its birth. Let us then re-establish omnipotent nature, so +long mistaken by man, in her legitimate rights. Let us place her on that +adamantine throne, which it is for the felicity of the human race she +should occupy. Let us surround her with those ministers who can never +deceive, who can never forfeit our confidence--_Justice and Practical +Knowledge_. Let us listen to her eternal voice; she neither speaks +ambiguously, nor in an unintelligible language; she may be easily +comprehended by the people of all nations; because _Reason_ is her +faithful interpreter. She offers nothing to our contemplation but +immutable truths. Let us then for ever impose silence on that enthusiasm +which leads us astray; let us put to the blush that imposture which +would riot on our credulity; let us discard that gloomy superstition, +which has drawn us aside from the only worship suitable to intelligent +beings. Above all, never let us forget that the temple of happiness can +only be reached through the groves of virtue, which surround it on every +side; that the paths which lead to these beautiful walks can only be +entered by the road of experience, the portals of which are alone opened +to those who apply to them the key of truth: this key is of very simple +structure, has no complicated intricacy of wards, and is easily formed +on the anvil of social intercourse, merely by _not doing unto others +that which you would not wish they should do unto you._ + + + + + +CHAP. VII. + +_Of Theism.--Of the System of Optimism.--Of final Causes_. + + +Very few men have either the courage or the industry to examine +opinions, which every one is in agreement to acknowledge; there is +scarcely any one who ventures to doubt their truth, even when no solid +arguments have been adduced in their support. The natural supineness +of man readily receives them without examination upon the authority +of others--communicates them to his successors in the season of their +infancy; thus is transmitted from race to race, notions which once +having obtained the sanction of time, are contemplated as clothed with +a sacred character, although perhaps to an unprejudiced mind, who should +be bent on searching into their foundation, no proofs will appear, that +they ever were verified. It is thus with immateriality: it has passed +current from father to son for many ages, without these having done any +thing more than habitually consign to their brain those obscure ideas +which were at first attached to it, which it is evident, from the +admission even of its advocates, can never be removed, to admit others +of a more enlightened nature. Indeed how can it possibly be, that light +can be thrown upon an incomprehensible subject: each therefore modifies +it after his own manner; each gives it that colouring that most +harmonizes with his own peculiar existence; each contemplates it under +that perspective which is the issue of his own particular vision: this +from the nature of things cannot be the same in every individual: there +must then of necessity be a great contrariety in the opinions resulting. +It is thus also that each man forms to himself a God in particular, +after his own peculiar temperament--according to his own natural +dispositions: the individual circumstances under which he is found, the +warmth of his imagination, the prejudices he has received, the mode in +which he is at different times affected, have all their influence in the +picture he forms. The contented, healthy man, does not see him with the +same eyes as the man who is chagrined and sick; the man with a heated +blood, who has an ardent imagination, or is subject to bile, does not +pourtray him under the same traits as he who enjoys a more peaceable +soul, who has a cooler fancy, who is of a more phlegmatic habit. This is +not all; even the same individual does not view him in the same manner +at different periods of his life: he undergoes all the variations of +his machine--all the revolutions of his temperament--all those continual +vicissitudes which his existence experiences. The idea of the Divinity +is said to be innate; on the contrary, it is perpetually fluctuating in +the mind of each individual; varies every moment in all the beings +of the human species; so much so, that there are not two who admit +precisely the same Deity; there is not a single one, who, under +different circumstances, does not see him variously. + +Do not then let us be surprised at the variety of systems adopted by +mankind on this subject; it ought not to astonish us that there is so +little harmony existing among men upon a point of such consequence; it +ought not to appear strange that so much contradiction should prevail +in the various doctrines held forth; that they should have such +little consistency, such slender connection with each other; that the +professors should dispute continually upon the rectitude of the opinions +adopted by each: they must necessarily wrangle upon that which each +contemplates so variously--upon which there is hardly a single mortal +who is constantly in accord with himself. + +All men are pretty well agreed upon those objects which they are enabled +to submit to the test of experience; we do not hear any disputes upon +the principles of geometry; those truths that are evident, that are +easily demonstrable, never vary in our mind; we never doubt that +the part is less than the whole; that two and two make four; that +benevolence is an amiable quality; that equity is necessary to man in +society. But we find nothing but perpetual controversy upon all those +systems which have the Divinity for their object; they are full of +incertitude; subject to continual variations: we do not see any harmony +either in the principles of theology, or in the principles of its +graduates. Even the proofs offered of his existence have been the +subject of cavil; they have either been thought too feeble, have been +brought forward against rule, or else have not been taken up with +sufficient zeal to please the various reasoners who advocate the cause; +the corollaries drawn from the premises laid down, are not the same in +any two nations, scarcely in two individuals; the thinkers of all +ages, in all countries, are perpetually in rivalry with each other; +unceasingly quarrel upon all the points of religion; can never agree +either upon their theological hypotheses, or upon the fundamental +truths which should serve for their basis; even the attributes, the +very qualities ascribed, are as warmly contested by some, as they are +zealously defended by others. + +These never-ending disputes, these perpetual variations, ought, at +least, to convince the unprejudiced, that the ideas of the Divinity have +neither the generally-admitted evidence, nor the certitude which are +attributed to them; on the contrary, these contrarieties in the opinions +of the theologians, if submitted to the logic of the schools, might be +fatal to the whole of them: according to that mode of reasoning, which +at least has the sanction of our universities, all the probabilities in +the world cannot acquire the force of a demonstration; a truth is +not made evident but when constant experience, reiterated reflection, +exhibits it always under the same point of view; the evidence of a +proposition cannot be admitted unless it carries with it a substantive +demonstration; from the constant relation which is made by well +constituted senses, results that evidence, that certitude, which alone +can produce full conviction: if the major proposition of a syllogism +should be overturned by the minor, the whole falls to the ground. +Cicero, who is no mean authority on such a subject, says expressly, "No +reasoning can render that false, which experience has demonstrated as +evident." Wolff, in his Ontology, says; "That which is repugnant in +itself, cannot possibly be understood; that those things which are in +themselves contradictions, must always be deficient of evidence." St. +Thomas says, "Being, is all that which is not repugnant to existence." + +However it may be with these qualities, which the theologians assign to +their immaterial beings, whether they may be irreconcileable, or whether +they are totally incomprehensible, what can result to the human species +in supposing them to have intelligence and views? Can an universal +intelligence, whose care must be equally extended to every thing that +exists, have more direct, more intimate relations with man, who only +forms an insensible portion of the great whole? Can we seriously believe +that it is to make joyful the insects, to gratify the ants of his +garden, that the Monarch of the universe has constructed and embellished +his habitation? Would our feeble eyes, therefore, become stronger--would +our narrow views of things be enlarged--should we be better capacitated +to understand his projects--could we with more certitude divine +his plans, enter into his designs--would our exility of judgment be +competent to measure his wisdom, to follow the eternal order he has +established? Will those effects, which flow from his omnipotence, +emanate from his providence--whether we estimate them as good, or +whether we tax them as evil--whether we consider them beneficial, or +view them as prejudicial--be less the necessary results of his wisdom, +of his justice, of his eternal decrees? In this case can we reasonably +suppose that a Being, so wise, so just, so intelligent, will derange +his system, change his plan, for such weak beings as ourselves? Can we +rationally believe we have the capacity to address worthy prayers, to +make suitable requests, to point out proper modes of conduct to such a +Being? Can we at all flatter ourselves that to please us, to gratify our +discordant wishes, he will alter his immutable laws? Can we imagine +that at our entreaty he will take from the beings who surround us their +essences, their properties, their various modes of action? Have we +any right to expect he will abrogate in our behalf the eternal laws of +nature, that he will disturb her eternal march, arrest her ever-lasting +course, which his wisdom has planned; which his goodness has conferred; +which are, in fact, the admiration of mankind? Can we hope that in our +favour fire will cease to burn, when we approximate it too closely; that +fever shall not consume our habit, when contagion has penetrated our +system; that gout shall not torment us, when an intemperate mode of +life shall have amassed the humours that necessarily result from such +conduct; that an edifice tumbling in ruins shall not crush us by its +fall, when we are within the vortex of its action? Will our vain cries, +our most fervent supplications, prevent a country from being unhappy, +when it shall be devastated by an ambitious conqueror; when it shall +be submitted to the capricious will of unfeeling tyrants, who bend it +beneath the iron rod of their oppression? + +If this infinite intelligence gives a free course to those events which +his wisdom has prepared; if nothing happens in this world but after +his impenetrable designs; we ought silently to submit; we have in fact +nothing to ask; we should be madmen to oppose our own weak intellect to +such capacious wisdom; we should offer an insult to his prudence if we +were desirous to regulate them. Man must not flatter himself that he +is wiser than his God; that he is in a capacity to make him change his +will; with having power to determine him to take other means than those +which he has chosen to accomplish his decrees. An intelligent Divinity +can only have taken those measures which embrace complete justice; can +only have availed himself of those means which are best calculated to +arrive at his end; if he was capable of changing them, he could neither +be called wise, immutable, nor provident. If it was to be granted, +that the Divinity did for a single instant suspend those laws which he +himself has given, if he was to change any thing in his plan, it would +be supposing he had not foreseen the motives of this suspension; that he +had not calculated the causes of this change; if he did not make these +motives enter into his plan, it would be saying he had not foreseen +the causes that render them necessary: if he has foreseen them without +making them part of his system, it would be arraigning the perfection of +the whole. Thus in whatever manner these things are contemplated, under +whatever point of view they are examined, it is evident that the +prayers which man addresses to the Divinity, which are sanctioned by the +different modes of worship, always suppose he is supplicating a being +whose wisdom and providence are defective; in fact, that his own is more +appropriate to his situation. To suppose he is capable of change in his +conduct, is to bring his omniscience into question; to vitally attack +his omnipotence; to arraign his goodness; at once to say, that he either +is not willing or not competent to judge what would be most +expedient for man; for whose sole advantage and pleasure they +will, notwithstanding, insist he created the universe: such are the +inconsistent doctrines of theology; such the imbecile efforts of +metaphysics. + +It is, however, upon these notions, extravagant as they may appear, +ill directed as they assuredly are, inconclusive as they must +be acknowledged by unprejudiced minds, that are founded all the +superstitions and many of the religions of the earth. It is by no means +an uncommon sight, to see man upon his knees before an all-wise God, +whose conduct he is endeavouring to regulate; whose decrees he wishes to +avert; whose plan he is desirous to reform. These inconsistent objects +he is occupied with gaining, by means equally repugnant to sound sense; +equally injurious to the dignity of the Divinity: adopting his own +sensations as the criterion of the feelings of the Deity; in some places +he tries to win him to his interests by presents; sometimes we behold +even the princes of the earth attempting to direct his views, by +offering him splendid garments, upon which their own fatuity sets an +inordinate value, merely because they have laboured at them themselves; +some strive to disarm his justice by the most splendid pageantry; others +by practices the most revolting to humanity; some think his immutability +will yield to idle ceremonies; others to the most discordant prayers; +it not unfrequently happens that to induce him to change in their favour +his eternal decrees, those who have opposite interests to promote, each +returns him thanks for that which the others consider as the greatest +curse that can befal them. In short, man is almost every where prostrate +before an omnipotent God, who, if we were to judge by the discrepancy of +their requests, never has rendered his creatures such as they ought +to be; who to accomplish his divine views has never taken the proper +measures, who to fulfil his wisdom has continual need of the admonitions +of man, conveyed either in the form of thanks or prayers. + +We see, then, that superstition is founded upon manifest contradictions, +which man must always fall into when he mistakes the natural causes of +things--when he shall attribute the good or evil which he experiences to +an intelligent cause, distinguished from nature, of which he will never +be competent to form to himself any certain ideas. Indeed, man will +always be reduced, as we have so frequently repeated, to the necessity +of clothing his gods with his own imbecile qualities: as he is himself +a changeable being, whose intelligence is limited; who, placed in divers +circumstances, appears to be frequently in contradiction with himself; +although he thinks he honours his gods in giving them his own peculiar +qualities, he in fact does nothing more than lend them his own +inconstancy, cover them with his own weakness, invest them with his own +vices. It is thus that in reasoning, he is unable to account for the +necessity of things--that he imagines there is a confusion which his +prayers will have a tendency to remove--that he thinks the evils of +life more than commensurate with the good: he does not perceive that an +undeviating system, by operating upon beings diversely organized, whose +circumstances are different, whose modes of action are at variance, must +of necessity sometimes appear to be inimical to the interests of +the individual, while it embraces the general good of the whole. The +theologian may subtilize, exaggerate, render as unintelligible as he +pleases, the attributes with which he clothes his divinities, he +will never be able to remove the contradictions which arise from the +discordant qualities which he thus heaps together; neither will he be +able to give man any other mode of judging than what arises from the +exercise of his senses, such as they are actually found. He will never +be able to furnish the idea of an immutable being, while he shall +represent this being as capable of being irritated and appeased by the +prayers of mortals. He will never delineate the features of omnipotence +under the portrait of a being who cannot restrain the actions of his +inferiors. He will never hold up a standard of justice, while he shall +mingle it with mercy, however amiable the quality; or while he shall +represent it as punishing those actions, which the perpetrators were +under the necessity of committing. Neither will he be able, under any +circumstances, to make a finite mind comprehend infinity; much less when +he shall represent this infinity as bounded by finity itself. + +From this it will be obvious, that immaterial substances, such as are +depicted by the theologians, can only be looked upon as the offspring +of a metaphysical brain, unsupported by any of those proofs which are +usually required to establish the propositions laid down among men; +all the qualities which they ascribe to them, are only those which are +suitable to material substances; all the abstract properties with which +they invest them, are incomprehensible by material beings; the whole +taken together, is one confused mass of contradictions: they have held +forth to man, that it highly imported to his interests to know, to +understand these substances; he has consequently set his intellect +in action to discover some means of compassing an end, said to be so +consequential to his welfare; he has, however, been unable to make any +progress, because no clue could be offered to him of the road he must +pursue; all was mere assertion unsupported by evidence; the whole was +enveloped in complete darkness, into which the least scintillation of +light could never penetrate. Notwithstanding, as soon as man believes +himself greatly interested in knowing a thing, he labors to form to +himself an idea of that, the knowledge of which he thinks so important; +if insuperable obstacles impede his inquiries--if difficulties of a +magnitude to alarm his industry intervene--if with immense labour he +makes but little progress, then the slender success that attends +his research, aided by a slothful disposition, while it wearies +his diligence disposes him to credulity. It was thus, that a crafty +ambitious Arab, subtle and knavish in his manners, insinuating in his +address, profiting by this credulous inclination, made his countrymen +adopt his own fanciful reveries as permanent truths, of which it was not +permitted them for an instant to doubt; following up these opinions with +enthusiasm, he stimulated them on to become conquerors; obliging the +conquered to lend themselves to his system, he gave currency to a creed, +invented solely for the purpose of enslaving mankind, which now spreads +over immense regions inhabited by a numerous population, although like +other systems it does not escape sectarianism, having above seventy +branches. Thus ignorance, despair, sloth, the want of reflecting habits, +place the human race in a state of dependance upon those who build up +systems, while upon the objects which are the foundations, they have +no one settled idea: once adopted, however, whenever these systems are +brought into question, man either reasons in a very strange manner, or +else is the dupe of very deceitful arguments: when they are agitated, +and he finds it impossible to understand what is said concerning them +when his mind cannot embrace the ambiguity of these doctrines, he +imagines those who speak to him are better acquainted with the +objects of their discourse than himself; these seizing the favourable +opportunity, do not let it slip, they reiterate to him with Stentorian +lungs, "That the most certain way is to agree with what they tell him; +to allow himself to be guided by them;" in short, they persuade him to +shut his eyes, that he may with greater perspicuity distinguish the +road he is to travel: once arrived at this influence, they indelibly fix +their lessons; irrevocably chain him to the oar; by holding up to his +view the punishments intended for him by these imaginary beings, in case +he refuses to accredit, in the most liberal manner, their marvellous +inventions; this argument, although it only supposes the thing in +question, serves to close his mouth--to put an end to his research; +alarmed, confused, bewildered, he seems convinced by this victorious +reasoning--attaches to it a sacredness that fills him with awe--blindly +conceives that they have much clearer ideas of the subject than +himself--fears to perceive the palpable contradictions of the doctrines +announced to him, until, perhaps, some being, more subtle than those who +have enslaved him, by labouring the point incessantly, attacking him on +the weak side of his interest, arrives at throwing the absurdity of his +system into light, and finally succeeds by inducing him to adopt that +of another set of speculators. The uninformed man generally believes +his priests have more senses than himself; he takes them for superior +beings; for divine men. He only sees that which these priests inform +him he must contemplate; to every thing else his eyes are completely +hoodwinked; thus the authority of the priests frequently decides, +without appeal, that which is useful perhaps only to the priesthood. + +When we shall be disposed to recur to the origin of things, we shall +ever find that it has been man's imagination, guided by his ignorance, +under the influence of fear, which gave birth to his gods; that +enthusiasm or imposture have generally either embellished or disfigured +them; that credulity readily adopted the fabulous accounts which +interested duplicity promulgated respecting them; that these +dispositions, sanctioned by time, became habitual. Tyrants finding their +advantage in sustaining them, have usually established their power upon +the blindness of mankind, and the superstitious fears with which it is +always accompanied. Thus, under whatever point of view it is considered, +it will always be found that _error cannot be useful to the human +species._ + +Nevertheless, the happy enthusiast, when his soul is sensible of its +enjoyments, when his softened imagination has occasion to paint to +itself a seducing object, to which he can render thanks for the kindness +he experiences, will ask, "Wherefore deprive me of a being that I see +under the character of a sovereign, filled with wisdom, abounding in +goodness? What comfort do I not find in figuring to myself a powerful, +intelligent, indulgent monarch, of whom I am the favorite; who +continually occupies himself with my welfare--unceasingly watches over +my safety--who perpetually administers to my wants--who always consents +that under him I shall command the whole of nature? I believe I behold +him constantly showering his benefits on man; I see his Providence +labouring for his advantage without relaxation; he covers the earth +with verdure to delight him; he loads the trees with delicious fruits +to gratify his palate; he fills the forests with animals suitable to his +nourishment; he suspends over his head planets with innumerable stars, +to enlighten him by day, to guide his erring steps by night; he extends +around him the azure firmament to gladden his sight; he decorates the +meadows with flowers to please his fancy; he causes crystal fountains to +flow with limpid streams to slake his thirst; he makes rivulets meander +through his lands to fructify the earth; he washes his residence with +noble rivers, that yield him fish in abundance. Ah! suffer me to thank +thee, Author of so many benefits: do not deprive me of my charming +sensations. I shall not find my illusions so sweet, so consolatory in a +severe destiny--in a rigid necessity--in a blind inanimate matter--in a +nature destitute of intelligence, devoid of feeling." + +"Wherefore," will say the unfortunate, from whom his destiny has +rigorously withheld those benefits which have been lavished on so many +others; "wherefore ravish from me an error that is dear to me? Wherefore +annihilate to me a being, whose consoling idea dries up the source of my +tears--who serves to calm my sorrows? Wherefore deprive me of an object +which I represent to myself as a compassionate, tender father; who +reproves me in this world, but into whose arms I throw myself with +confidence, when the whole of nature appears to have abandoned me? +Supposing it no more than a chimera, the unhappy have occasion for it, +to guarantee them against frightful despair: is it not cruel, is it not +inhuman, to be desirous of plunging them into a vacuum, by seeking to +undeceive them? Is it not an useful error, preferable to those truths +which deprive the mind of every consolation, which do not hold forth any +relief from its sorrows?" + +Thus will equally reason the Negro, the Mussulman, the Brachman, and +others. We shall reply to these enthusiasts, no! truth can never render +you unhappy; it is this which really consoles us; it is a concealed +treasure, much superior to all the superstitions ever invented by fear; +it can cheer the heart; give it courage to support the burthens of +life; make us smile under adversity; elevate the soul; render it +active; furnishes it with means to resist the attacks of fate; to combat +misfortunes with success. This will shew clearly that the good and evil +of life are distributed with an equal hand, without respect to man's +peculiar comforts; that all beings are equally regarded in the universe; +that every thing is submitted to necessary laws; that man has no right +whatever to think himself a being peculiarly favoured--who is exempted +from the common operations of the eternal routine; that it is folly to +think he is the only being considered--one for whose enjoyment alone +every thing is produced; an attention to facts will suffice to put an +end to this delusion, however pleasant may be the indulgence of such +a notion; the most superficial glance of the eye will be sufficient +to undeceive us in the idea, that he is the _final cause_ of the +creation--the constant object of the labours of nature, or of its +Author. Let us seriously ask him, if he does not witness good constantly +blended with evil? If he does not equally partake of them with the other +beings in nature? To be obstinately bent to see only the evil, is as +irrational as to be willing only to notice the good. Providence seems to +be just as much occupied for one class of beings as for another. We see +the calm succeed the storm; sickness give place to health; the blessings +of peace follow the calamities of war; the earth in every country +bring forth roots necessary for the nourishment of man, produce others +suitable to his destruction. Each individual of the human species is +a compound of good and bad qualities; all nations present a varied +spectacle of virtues, growing up beside vices; that which gladdens one +being, plunges another into sadness--no event takes place that does not +give birth to advantages for some, to disadvantages for others. Insects +find a safe retreat in the ruin of the palace, which crushes man in +its fall; man by his death furnishes food for myriads of contemptible +insects; animals are destroyed by thousands that he may increase his +bulk; linger out for a season a feverish existence. We see beings +engaged in perpetual hostility, each living at his neighbour's expence; +the one banquetting upon that which causes the desolation of the other; +some luxuriously growing into flesh upon the misery which wears others +into skeletons--profiting by misfortunes, rioting upon disasters, which +ultimately, reciprocally destroy them. The most deadly poisons spring up +beside the most wholesome fruits the earth equally nourishes the fatal +steel which terminates man's career, and the fruitful corn that prolongs +his existence; the bane and its antidote are near neighbours, repose on +the same bosom, ripen under the same sun, equally court the hand of the +incautious stranger. The rivers which man believes flow for no other +purpose than to irrigate his residence, sometimes swell their waters, +overtop their banks, inundate his fields, overturn his dwelling, and +sweep away the flock and shepherd. The ocean, which he vainly imagines +was only collected together to facilitate his commerce supply him with +fish, and wash his shores; often wrecks his ships, frequently bursts its +boundaries, lays waste his lands, destroys the produce of his industry, +and commits the most frightful ravages. The halcyon, delighted with the +tempest, voluntarily mingles with the storm; rides contentedly upon the +surge; rejoiced by the fearful howlings of the northern blast, plays +with happy buoyancy upon the foaming billows, that have ruthlessly +dashed in pieces the vessel of the unfortunate mariner; who, plunged +into an abyss of misery, with tremulous emotion clings to the wreck; +views with horrific despair, the premature destruction of his indulged +hopes; sighs deeply at the thoughts of home; with aching heart, thinks +of the cherished friends his streaming eyes will never more behold in an +agony of soul dwells upon the faithful affection of an adored wife, who +will never again repose her drooping head upon his manly bosom; grows +wild with the appalling remembrance of beloved children, his wearied +arms will never more encircle with parental fondness; then sinks for +ever, the unhappy victim of circumstances that fill with glee the +fluttering bird, who sees him yield to the overwhelming force of the +infuriate waves. The conqueror displays his military skill, fights a +sanguinary battle, puts his enemy to the rout, lays waste his country, +slaughters thousands of his fellows, plunges whole districts into tears, +fills the land with the moans of the fatherless, the wailings of the +widow, in order that the crows may have a banquet--that ferocious beasts +may gluttonously gorge themselves with human gore--that worms may riot +in luxury. + +Thus when there is a question concerning an agent we see act so +variously; whose motives seem sometimes to be advantageous, sometimes +disadvantageous for the human race; at least each individual will judge +after the peculiar mode in which he is himself affected; there will +consequently be no fixed point, no general standard in the opinions +men will form to themselves. Indeed our mode of judging will always +be governed by our manner of seeing, by our way of feeling. This +will depend upon our temperament, which itself springs out of our +organization, and the peculiarity of the circumstances in which we are +placed; these can never be the same for all the beings of our species. +These individual modes of being affected, then, will always furnish the +colours of the portrait which man may paint to himself of the Divinity; +it must therefore be obvious they can never be determinate--can have +no fixity--can never be reduced to any graduated scale; the inductions +which they may draw from them, can never be either constant or uniform; +each will always judge after himself, will never see any thing but +himself or his own peculiar situation in the picture he delineates. + +This granted, the man who has a contented, sensible soul, with a lively +imagination, will paint the Divinity under the most charming traits; he +will believe that he sees in the whole of nature nothing but proofs of +benevolence, evidence of goodness, because it will unceasingly cause him +agreeable sensations. In his poetical extacy he will imagine he every +where perceives the impression of a perfect intelligence--of an infinite +wisdom--of a providence tenderly occupied with the welfare of man; +self-love joining itself to these exalted qualities, will put the +finishing hand to his persuasion, that the universe is made solely for +the human race; he will strive in imagination to kiss with transport the +hand from which he believes he receives so many benefits; touched with +his kindness, gratified with the perfume of roses whose thorns he does +not perceive, or which his extatic delirium prevents him from feeling, +he will think he can never sufficiently acknowledge the necessary +effects, which he will look upon as indubitable testimony of the divine +predilection for man. Completely inebriated with these feelings, this +enthusiast will not behold those sorrows, will not notice that confusion +of which the universe is the theatre: or if it so happens, he cannot +prevent himself from being a witness, he will be persuaded that in the +views of an indulgent providence, these calamities are necessary to +conduct man to a higher state of felicity; the reliance which he has in +the Divinity, upon whom he imagines they depend, induces him to believe, +that man only suffers for his good; that this being, who is fruitful in +resources, will know how to make him reap advantage from the evils which +he experiences in this world: his mind thus pre-occupied, from thence +sees nothing that does not elicit his admiration call forth his +gratitude; excite his confidence; even those effects which are the most +natural, the most necessary, appear in his eyes miracles of benevolence; +prodigies of goodness: he shuts his eyes to the disorders which could +bring these amiable qualities into question: the most cruel calamities, +the most afflicting events, the most heart-rending circumstances, cease +to be disorders in his eyes, and do nothing, more than furnish him with +new proofs of the divine perfections; he persuades himself that what +appears defective or imperfect, is only so in appearance; he admires the +wisdom, acknowledges the bounty of the Divinity, even in those effects +which are the most terrible for his race--most suitable to discourage +his species--most fraught with misery for his fellow. + +It is, without doubt, to this happy disposition of the human mind, +in some beings of his order, that is to be ascribed the system of +_Optimism_, by which enthusiasts, furnished with a romantic imagination, +seem to have renounced the evidence of their senses: to find that even +for man every thing is good in nature, where the good has constantly its +concomitant evil, and where minds less prejudiced, less poetical, would +judge that every thing is only that which it can be--that the good +and the evil are equally necessary--that they have their source in +the nature of things; moreover, in order to attribute any particular +character to the events that take place, it would be needful to know the +aim of the whole: now the whole cannot have an aim, because if it had a +tendency, an aim, or end, it would no longer be the whole, seeing that +that to which it tended would be a part not included. + +It will be asserted by some, that the evils which we behold in this +world are only relative, merely apparent; that they prove nothing +against the good: but does not man almost uniformly judge after his own +mode of feeling; after his manner of co-existing with those causes +by which he is encompassed; which constitute the order of nature with +relation to himself; consequently, he ascribes wisdom and goodness to +all that which affects him pleasantly, disorder to that state of things +by which he is injured. Nevertheless every thing which we witness in +the world conspires to prove to us, that whatever is, is necessary; that +nothing is done by chance; that all the events, good or bad, whether +for us or for beings of a different order, are brought about by causes +acting after certain and determinate laws; that nothing can he +a sufficient warrantry in us to clothe with any one of our human +qualities, either nature or the motive-power which has been given to +her. + +With respect to those who pretend that supreme wisdom will know how +to draw the greatest benefits for us, even out of the bosom of those +calamities which it is permitted we shall experience in this world; we +shall ask them, if they are themselves the confidents of the Divinity; +or upon what they found these assertions so flattering to their hopes? +They will, without doubt, tell us they judge by analogy; that from the +actual proofs of goodness and wisdom, they have a just right to conclude +in favour of future bounty. Would it not be a fair reply to ask, If they +reason by analogy, and man has not been rendered completely happy in +this world, what analogy informs them he will be so in another? If, +according to their own shewing, man is sometimes made the victim of evil +in his present existence, in order that he may attain a greater good, +does not analogical reasoning, which they say they adopt, clearly +warrant a deduction, that the same afflictions, for the same purposes, +will be equally proper, equally requisite in the world to come? + +Thus this language founds itself upon ruinous hypotheses, which have +for their bases only a prejudiced imagination. It, in fact, signifies +nothing more than that man once persuaded, without any evidence, of his +future happiness, will not believe it possible he can be permitted to be +unhappy: but might it not be inquired what testimony does he find, what +substantive knowledge has he obtained of the peculiar good that results +to the human species from those sterilities, from those famines, from +those contagions, from those sanguinary conflicts, which cause so many +millions of men to perish; which unceasingly depopulate the earth, +and desolate the world we inhabit? Is there any one who has sufficient +compass of comprehension to ascertain the advantages that result from +the evils that besiege us on all sides? Do we not daily witness beings +consecrated to misfortune, from the moment they quitted the womb of the +parent who brought them into existence, until that which re-committed +them to the earth, to sleep in peace with their fathers; who with great +difficulty found time to respire; lived the constant sport of fortune; +overwhelmed with affliction, immersed in grief, enduring the most cruel +reverses? Who is to measure the precise quantity of misery required to +derive a certain portion of good? Who is to say when the measure of evil +will be full which it is necessary to suffer? + +The most enthusiastic Optimists, the _Theists_ themselves, the partizans +of _Natural Religion_, as well as the most credulous and superstitious, +are obliged to recur to the system of another life, to remedy the evils +man is decreed to suffer in the present; but have they really any just +foundation to suppose the next world will afford him a happiness +denied him in this? If it is necessary to recur to a doctrine so little +probable as that of a future existence, by what chain of reasoning do +they establish their opinion, that when he shall no longer have organs, +by the aid of which he is at present alone enabled either to enjoy or +to suffer, he shall be able to compensate the evils he has endured; to +enjoy a felicity, to partake of a pleasure this organic structure has +refused him while on his pilgrimage through the land of his fathers. + +From this it will be seen, that the proofs of a sovereign intelligence, +or of a magnified human quality drawn from the order, from the harmony, +from the beauty of the universe, are never more than those which are +derived from men who are organized and modified after a certain mode; +or whose cheerful imagination is so constructed as to give birth to +agreeable chimeras which they embellish according to their fancy: these +illusions, however, must be frequently dissipated even in themselves, +whenever their machine becomes deranged; when sorrows assail them, when +misfortune corrodes their mind; the spectacle of nature, which under +certain circumstances has appeared to them so delightful, so seducing, +must then give place to disorder, must yield to confusion. A man +of melancholy temperament, soured by misfortunes, made irritable +by infirmities, cannot view nature and her author under the same +perspective, as the healthy man of a sprightly humour, who is contented +with every thing. Deprived of happiness, the fretful man can only find +disorder, can see nothing but deformity, can find nothing but subjects +to afflict himself with; he only contemplates the universe as the +theatre of malice, as the stage for tyrants to execute their vengeance; +he grows superstitious, he gives way to credulity, and not unfrequently +becomes cruel, in order to serve a master whom he believes he has +offended. + +In consequence of these ideas, which have their growth in an unhappy +temperament, which originate in a peevish humour, which are the +offspring of a disturbed imagination, the superstitious are constantly +infected with terror, are the slaves to mistrust, the creatures of +discontent, continually in a state of fearful alarm. Nature cannot have +charms for them; her countless beauties pass by unheeded; they do +not participate in her cheerful scenes; they look upon this world, so +marvellous to the happy man, so good to the contented enthusiast, as a +_valley of tears_, in which a vindictive fate has placed them only to +expiate crimes committed either by themselves or by their fathers; they +consider themselves as sent here for no other purpose than to be the +sharers of calamity; the sport of a capricious fortune; that they are +the children of sorrow, destined to undergo the severest trials, to the +end that they may everlastingly arrive at a new existence, in which they +shall be either happy or miserable, according to their conduct towards +the ministers of a being who holds their destiny in his hands. These +dismal notions have been the source of all the irrational systems +that have ever prevailed; they have given birth to the most revolting +practices, currency to the most absurd customs. History abounds with +details of the most atrocious cruelties, under the imposing name of +public worship; nothing has been considered either too fantastical or +too flagitious by the votaries of superstition. Parents have immolated +their children; lovers have sacrificed the objects of their affection; +friends have destroyed each other: the most bloody disputes have been +fomented; the most interminable animosities have been engendered, to +gratify the whim of implacable priests, who by crafty inventions have +obtained an influence over the people; to please blind zealots, who have +never been able either to give fixity to their ideas, or to define +their own feelings. Idle dreamers nourished with bile, intoxicated +with theologic fury--atrabilarians, whose melancholic humour frequently +disposes them to wickedness--visionaries, whose devious imaginations, +heated with intemperate zeal, generally leads them to the extremes of +fanaticism, working upon ignorance, whose usual bias is credulity, +have incessantly disturbed the harmony of mankind, kindled the +inextinguishable flame of discord, and in an almost uninterrupted +succession, strewed the earth with the mangled carcasses of the +multitudinous victims to mad-brained error, whose only crime has been +their incapacity to dream according to the rules prescribed by these +infuriate maniacs; although these have never been uniform--never +assimilated in any two countries--never borne the same features in +any two ages, nor even had the united concurrence of the persecuting +contemporaries. + +It is then in the diversity of temperament, arising from variety of +organization--in the contrariety of passions, springing out of this +miscellany, modified by the most opposite circumstances, that must +be sought the difference we find in the opinions of the theist, +the optimist, the happy enthusiast, the zealot, the devotee, the +superstitious of all denominations; they are all equally irrational--the +dupes of their imagination--the blind children of error. What one +contemplates under a favorable point of view, the other never looks +upon but on the dark side; that which is the object of the most sedulous +research to one set, is that which the others most seek to avoid: each +insists he is right; no one offers the least shadow of substantive proof +of what he asserts; each points out the great importance of his mission, +yet cannot even agree with his colleagues in the embassy, either upon +the nature of their instructions, or the means to be adopted. It is thus +whenever man sets forth a false supposition, all the reasonings he makes +on it are only a long tissue of errors, which entail on him an endless +series of misfortunes; every time he renounces the evidence of +his senses, it is impossible to calculate the bounds at which his +imagination will stop; when he once quits the road of experience, when +he travels out of nature, when he loses sight of his reason, to strike +into the labyrinths of conjecture, it is difficult to ascertain where +his folly will lead him--into what mischievous swamps this _ignis +fatuus_ of the mind may beguile his wandering steps. It is certainly +true, the ideas of the happy enthusiast will be less dangerous to +himself, less baneful to others, than those of the atrabilarious +fanatic, whose temperament may render him both cowardly and cruel; +nevertheless the opinions of the one and of the other will not be less +chimerical; the only difference will be, that of the first will produce +agreeable, cheerful dreams; while that of the second will present +the most appalling visions, terrific spectres, the fruit of a peevish +transport of the brain: there will, however, never be more than a step +between them all; the smallest revolution in the machine, a slight +infirmity, an unforeseen affliction, suffices to change the course +of the humours--to vitiate the temperament--to endanger the +organization--to overturn the whole system of opinions of the happiest. +As soon as the portrait is found disfigured, the beautiful order +of things is overthrown relatively to himself; melancholy grapples +him--pusillanimity benumbs his faculties--by degrees plunges, him into +the rankest depths of gloomy superstition; he then degenerates into all +those irregularities which are the dismal harvest of fanatic ignorance +ploughed with credulity. + +Those ideas, which have no archetype but in the imagination of man, +must necessarily take their complexion from his own character; must be +clothed with his own passions; must constantly follow the revolutions of +his machine; be lively or gloomy; favourable or prejudicial; friendly +or inimical; sociable or savage; humane or cruel; according as he whose +brain they inhabit shall himself be disposed; in fact, they can never be +more than the shadow of the substance he himself interposes between the +light and the ground on which they are thrown. A mortal plunged from a +state of happiness into misery, whose health merges into sickness, whose +joy is changed into affliction, cannot in these vicissitudes preserve +the same ideas; these naturally depend every instant upon the +variations, which physical sensations oblige his organs to undergo. +It will not therefore appear strange that these opinions should be +fluctuating, when they depend upon the state of the nervous fluid, upon +the greater or less portion of igneous matter floating in the sanguinary +vessels. + +_Theism_, or what is called _Natural Religion_, cannot have certain +principles; those who profess it must necessarily be subject to vary in +their opinions--to fluctuate in their conduct, which flows out of +them. A system founded upon wisdom and intelligence, which can never +contradict itself, when circumstances change will presently be converted +into fanaticism; rapidly degenerate into superstition; such a system, +successively meditated by enthusiasts of very distinct characters, +must of necessity experience vicissitudes, and quickly depart from its +primitive simplicity. The greater part of those philosophers who have +been disposed to substitute theism for superstition, have not felt +that it was formed to corrupt itself--to degenerate. Striking examples, +however, prove this fatal truth. Theism is almost every where corrupted; +it has by degrees given way to those superstitions, to those extravagant +sects, to those prejudicial opinions with which the human species is +degraded. As soon as man consents to acknowledge invisible powers out +of nature, upon which his restless mind will never be able invariably to +fix his ideas--which his imagination alone will be capable of painting +to him; whenever he shall not dare to consult his reason relatively to +those powers, it must necessarily be, that the first false step leads +him astray, that his conduct as well as his opinions becomes in the long +run perfectly absurd. + +Those are usually called Theists, who, undeceived upon the greater +number of grosser errors to which the uninformed, the superstitiously +ignorant, tend the most determined support, simply hold the notion of +unknown agents endowed with intelligence, wisdom, power and goodness, in +short, full of infinite perfections, whom they distinguish from nature, +but whom they clothe after their own fashion; to whom they ascribe their +own limited views; whom they make act according to their own absurd +passions. The religion of Abraham appears to have originally been a kind +of theism, imagined to reform the superstition of the Chaldeans; Moses +modified it, and gave it the Judaical form. Socrates was a theist, who +lost his life in his attack on polytheism; his disciple Aristocles, or +Plato, as he was afterwards called from his large shoulders, embellished +the theism of his master, with the mystical colours which he borrowed +from the Egyptian and Chaldean priests, which he modified in his own +poetical brain, and preserved a remnant of polytheism. The disciples +of Plato, such as Proclus, Ammonius, Jamblicus. Plotinus, Longinus, +Porphyrus, and others, dressed it up still more fantastically, added a +great deal of superstitious mummery, blended it with magic, and other +unintelligible doctrines. The first doctors of Christianity were +Platonists, who combined the reformed Judaism with the philosophy taught +in Academia. Mahomet, in combating the polytheism of his country, seems +to have been desirous of restoring the primitive theism of Abraham, and +his son Ishmael; yet this has now seventy-two sects. Thus it will be +obvious, that theism has no fixed point, no standard, no common measure +more than other systems: that it runs from one supposition to another, +to find in what manner evil has crept into the world. Indeed it has been +for this purpose, which perhaps after all will never be satisfactorily +explained, that the doctrine of free-agency was introduced; that the +fable of Prometheus and the box of Pandora was imagined; that the +history of the Titanes was invented; notwithstanding, it must be evident +that these things as well as all the other trappings of superstition, +are not more difficult of comprehension than the immaterial substances +of the theists; the mind who can admit that beings devoid of parts, +destitute of organs, without bulk, can move matter, think like man, have +the moral qualities of human nature, need not hesitate to allow that +ceremonies, certain motions of the body, words, rites, temples, statues, +can equally contain secret virtues; has no occasion to withhold its +faith from the concealed powers of magic, theurgy, enchantments, charms, +talismans, &c.; can shew no good reason why it should not accredit +inspirations, dreams, visions, omens, soothsayers, metamorphoses, and +all the host of occult sciences: when things so contradictory to the +dictates of reason, so completely opposed to good sense are freely +admitted, there can no longer be an thing which ought to possess the +right to make credulity revolt; those who give sanction to the one, +may without much hesitation believe whatever else is offered to their +credence. It would be impossible to mark the precise point at which +imagination ought to arrest itself--the exact boundary that should +circumscribe belief--the true dose of folly that may be permitted them; +or the degree of indulgence that can with safety be extended to +those priests who are in the habit of teaching so variously, so +contradictorily, what man ought to think on the subjects they handle +so advantageously to themselves; who when it becomes a question what +remuneration is due from mankind for their unwearied exertions in +his favour, are, in spite of all their other differences, in the most +perfect union; except perhaps when they come to the division of +the spoil: in this, indeed, the apple of discord sometimes takes a +tremendous roll. Thus it will be clear that there can be no substantive +grounds for separating the theists from the most superstitious; that it +becomes impossible to fix the line of demarcation, which divides them +from the most credulous of men; to shew the land-marks by which they +can be discriminated from those who reason with the least conclusive +persuasion. If the theist refuses to follow up the fanatic in every step +of his cullibility, he is at least more inconsequent than the last, who +having admitted upon hearsay an inconsistent, whimsical doctrine, also +adopts upon report the ridiculous, strange means which it furnishes him. +The first sets forth with an absurd supposition, of which he rejects +the necessary consequences; the other admits both the principle and the +conclusion. There are no degrees in fiction any more than in truth. If +we admit the superstition, we are bound to receive every thing which +its ministers promulgate, as emanating from its principle. None of +the reveries of superstition embrace any thing more incredible than +immateriality; these reveries are only corollaries drawn with more +or less subtilty from unintelligible subjects, by those who have an +interest in supporting the system. The inductions which dreamers have +made, by dint of meditating on impenetrable materials, are nothing +more than ingenious conclusions, which have been drawn with wonderful +accuracy, from unknown premises, that are modestly offered to the +sanction of mankind by enthusiasts, who claim an unconditional assent, +because they assure us no one of the human race is in a capacity either +to see, feel, or comprehend the object of their contemplation. Does not +this somewhat remind us of what Rabelais describes as the employment of +Queen Whim's officers, in his fifth book and twenty-second chapter? + +Let us then acknowledge, that the man who is this most credulously +superstitious, reasons in a more conclusive manner, or is at least more +consistent in his credulity, than those, who, after having admitted a +certain position of which they have no one idea, stop short all at once, +and refuse to accredit that system of conduct which is the immediate, +the necessary result of a radical and primitive error. As soon as they +subscribe to a principle fatally opposed to reason, by what right do +they dispute its consequences, however absurd they may be found? We +cannot too often repeat, for the happiness of mankind, that the human +mind, let it torture itself as much as it will, when it quits visible +nature leads itself astray; for want of an intelligent guide it wanders +in tracks that bewilder its powers, and is quickly obliged, to return +into that with which it has at least some, acquaintance. If man mistakes +nature and her energies, it is because he does not sufficiently study +her--because he does not submit to the test of experience the phenomena +he beholds; if he will obstinately deprive her of motion, he can +no longer have any ideas of her. Does, he, however, elucidate his +embarrassments, by submitting her action to the agency of a being of +which he makes himself the model? Does he think he forms a god, when +he assembles into one heterogeneous mass, his own discrepant qualities, +magnified until his optics are no longer competent to recognize them, +and then unites to them certain abstract properties of which he cannot +form to himself any one conception? Does he, in fact, do more than +collect together that which becomes, in consequence of its association, +perfectly unintelligible? Yet, strange as it may appear, when he no +longer understands himself--when his mind, lost in its own fictions, +becomes inadequate to decipher the characters he has thus promiscuously +assembled--when he has huddled together a heap of incomprehensible, +abstract qualities, which he is obliged to acknowledge are the mere +creatures of imagination, not within the reach of human intellect, +he firmly persuades himself he has made a most accurate and beautiful +portrait of the Divinity; he ostentatiously displays his picture, +demands the eulogy of the spectator, and quarrels with all those who do +not agree to adulate his creative powers, by adopting the inconceivable +being he holds forth to their worship; in short, to question the +existence of his extravaganza, rouses his most bitter reproaches; +elicits his everlasting scorn; entails on the incredulous his eternal +hatred. + +On the other hand, what could we expect from such a being, as they have +supposed him to be? What could we consistently ask of him? How make +an immaterial being, who has neither organs, space, point, or contact, +understand that modification of matter called voice? Admit that this +is the being who moves nature--who establishes her laws--who gives to +beings their various essences--who endows them with their respective +properties; if every thing that takes place is the fruit of his infinite +providence--the proof of his profound wisdom, to what end shall we +address our prayers to him? Shall we solicit him to acknowledge that +the wisdom and providence with which we have clothed him, are in fact +erroneous, by entreating him to alter in our favour his eternal laws? +Shall we give him to understand our wisdom exceeds his own, by asking, +him for our pleasure to change the properties of bodies--to annihilate +his immutable decrees--to trace back the invariable course of things--to +make beings act in opposition to the essences with which he has thought +it right to invest them? Will he at our intercession prevent a body +ponderous and hard by its nature, such as a stone, for example, from +wounding, in its fall a sensitive being such as the human frame? Again, +should we not, in fact, challenge impossibilities, if the discordant +attributes brought into union by the theologians were correct; would +not immutability oppose itself to omnipotence; mercy to the exercise +of rigid justice; omniscience, to the changes that might be required in +foreseen plans? In physics, in consequence of the general research +after a perpetual motion, science has drawn forth the discovery, that +by amalgamating metals of contrary properties, the contractile powers +of one kind, under given circumstances which cause the dilation of the +other, by their opposite tendencies neutralize the actual effects +of each, taken separately, and thus produce an equality in the +oscillations, that, neither possessed individually. + +It will perhaps, be insisted, that the infinite science of the Creator +of all things, is acquainted with resources in the beings he has formed, +which are concealed from imbecile mortals; that consequently without +changing any thing, either in the laws of nature, or in the essence +of things, he is competent to produce effects which surpass the +comprehension of our feeble understanding; that these, effects will in +no wise be contrary to that order which he himself has established in +nature. Granted: but then I reply, _first_, that every thing which is +conformable to the nature of things, can neither be called +supernatural nor miraculous: many things are, unquestionably, above +our comprehension; but then all that is operated in the world is +natural--grows out of those immutable laws by which nature is regulated. +In the _second_ place, it will be requisite to observe, that by the +word miracle an effect is designed, of which, for want of understanding +nature, she is believed incapable. In the _third_ place, it is worthy of +remark, that the theologians, almost universally, insist that by miracle +is meant not an extraordinary effort of nature, but an effect directly +opposite to her laws, which nevertheless they equally challenge to +have been prescribed by the Divinity. Buddaeus says, "a miracle is an +operation by which the laws of nature, upon which depend the order +and the preservation of the universe, are suspended." If, however, the +Deity, in those phenomena that most excite our surprise, does nothing +more than give play to springs unknown to mortals, there is, then, +nothing in nature, which, in this sense, may not be looked upon as a +miracle; because the cause by which a stone falls is as unknown to us, +as that which makes our globe turn on its own axis. Thus, to explain +the phenomena of nature by a miracle, is, in other words, to say we are +ignorant of the actuating causes; to attribute them to the Divinity, +is to agree we do not comprehend the resources of nature: it is +little better than accrediting magic. To attribute to a sovereignly +intelligent, immutable, provident, wise being, those miracles by which +he derogates from his own laws, is at one blow to annihilate all these +qualities: it is an inconsistency that would shame a child. It cannot be +supposed that omnipotence has need of miracles to govern the universe, +nor to convince his creatures, whose minds and hearts must be in his +own hands. The last refuge of the theologian, when driven off all other +ground, is the possibility of every thing he asserts, couched in the +dogma, "that nothing is impossible to the Divinity." He makes this +asseveration with a degree of self-complacency, with an air of triumph, +that would almost persuade one he could not be mistaken; most assuredly, +with those who dip no further than the surface, he carries complete +conviction. But we must take leave to examine a little the nature of +this proposition, and we do apprehend that a very slight degree of +consideration will shew that it is untenable. In the _first_ place, as +we have before observed, the possibility of a thing by no means proves +its absolute existence: a thing may be extremely possible, and yet not +be. _Secondly_, if this was once to become an admitted argument, there +would be, in fact, an end of all morality and religion. The Bishop of +Chester, Doctor John Wilkins, says, "would not such men be generally +accounted out of their wits, who could please themselves by entertaining +actual hopes of any thing, merely upon account of the possibility of +it, or torment themselves with actual fears of all such evils as are +possible? Is there any thing imaginable wore wild and extravagant +amongst those in bedlam than this would be?" _Thirdly_, the +impossibility would reasonably appear to be on the other side, so far +from nothing being impossible, every thing that is erroneous would seem +to be actually so; the Divinity could not possibly either love vice, +cherish crime, be pleased with depravity, or commit wrong; this +decidedly turns the argument against them; they must either admit the +most monstrous of all suppositions, or retire from behind the shield +with which they have imagined they rendered themselves invulnerable. + +To those who may be inclined to inquire, whether it would not be better +that all things were operated by a good, wise, intelligent Being, than +by a blind nature, in which not one consoling quality is found; by a +fatal necessity always inexorable to human intreaty? It may be replied, +_first_, that our interest does not decide the reality of things, and +that when this should be even wore advantageous than it is pointed out, +it would prove nothing. _Secondly_, that as we are obliged to admit +some things are operated by nature, it is certainly on the side of +probability that she performs the others; especially as her capabilities +are more substantively proved by every age as it advances. _Thirdly_, +that nature duly studied furnishes every thing necessary to render us +as, happy as our essence admits. When, guided by experience, we shall +consult her, with cultivated reason; she will discover to us our +duties, that is to say, the indispensable means to which her eternal and +necessary laws have attached our preservation, our own happiness, +and that of society. It is decidedly in her bosom that we shall find +wherewith to satisfy our physical wants; whatever is out of nature, can +have no existence relatively to ourselves. + +Nature, then, is not a step-mother to us; we do not depend upon an +inexorable destiny. Let us therefore endeavour to become more familiar +with her resources; she will procure us a multitude of benefits when we +shall pay her the attention she deserves: when we shall feel disposed +to consult her, she will supply us with the requisites to alleviate both +our physical and moral evils: she only punishes us with rigour, when, +regardless of her admonitions, we plunge into excesses that disgrace us. +Has the voluptuary any reason to complain of the sharp pains inflicted +by the gout, when experience, if he had but attended to its counsels, +has so often warned him, that the grossness of sensual indulgence must +inevitably amass in his machine those humours which give birth to the +agony he so acutely feels? Has the superstitious bigot any cause +for repining at the misery of his uncertain ideas, when an attentive +examination of that nature, he holds of such small account, would have +convinced him that the idols under whom he trembles, are nothing but +personifications of herself, disguised under some other name? It is +evidently by incertitude, discord, blindness, delirium, she chastises +those who refuse to, acknowledge the justice of her claims. + +In the mean time, it cannot be denied, that a pure Theism, or what is +called Natural Religion, may not be preferable to superstition, in the +same manner as reform has banished many of the abuses of those countries +who have embraced it; but there is nothing short of an unlimited and +inviolable liberty of thought, that can permanently assure the repose +of the mind. The opinions of men are only dangerous when they are +restrained, or when it is imagined necessary to make others think as +we ourselves think. No opinions, not even those of superstition itself, +would be dangerous, if the superstitious did not think themselves +obliged to enforce their adoption, or had not the power to persecute +those who refused. It is this prejudice, which, for the benefit +of mankind, it is essential to annihilate; and if the thing be not +achievable, then the next object which philosophy may reasonably propose +to itself, will be to make the depositaries of power feel that +they never ought to permit their subjects to commit evil for either +superstitious or religious opinions. In this case, wars would be almost +unheard of amongst men: instead of beholding the melancholy spectacle of +man cutting the throat of his fellow man, because this cannot see +with his eyes, we shall witness him essentially labouring to his own +happiness by promoting that of his neighbour; cultivating the earth +in peace; quietly bringing forth the productions of nature, instead of +puzzling his brain with theological disputes, which can never be of the +smallest advantage, except to the priests. It must be a self-evident +truth, that an argument by men, upon that which is not accessible to +man, _could only have been invented by knaves, who, like the professors +of legerdemain, were determined to riot luxuriously on the ignorance and +credulity of mankind._ + + + + + +CHAP. VIII. + +_Examination of the Advantages which result from Man's Notions on +the Divinity.--Of their Influence upon Mortals;--upon Politics;--upon +Science;--upon the Happiness of Nations, and that of Individuals._ + + +The slender foundation of those ideas which men form to themselves of +their gods, must have appeared obvious in what has preceded; the proofs +which have been offered in support of the existence of immaterial +substances, have been examined; the want of harmony that exists in the +opinions upon this subject, which all concur in agreeing to be equally +impossible to be known to the inhabitants of the earth, has been shewn; +the incompatibility of the attributes with which, theology has clothed +incorporeity, has been explained. It has been proved, that the idols +which man sets up for adoration, have usually had their birth, either in +the bosom of misfortune, when ignorance was at a loss to account for the +calamities of the earth upon natural principles, or else have been the +shapeless fruit of melancholy, working upon an alarmed mind, coupled +with enthusiasm and an unbridled imagination. It has been pointed out +how these prejudices, transmitted by tradition from father to son, +grafting themselves upon infant minds, cultivated by education, +nourished by fear, corroborated by habit, have been maintained by +authority; perpetuated by example. In short, every thing must have +distinctly evidenced to us, that the ideas of the gods, so generally +diffused over the earth, has been little more than an universal delusion +of the human race. It remains now to examine if this error has been +useful. + +It needs little to prove error can never be advantageous for mankind; +it is ever founded upon his ignorance, which is itself an acknowledged +evil; it springs out of the blindness of his mind to acknowledged +truths, and his want of experience, which it must be admitted are +prejudicial to his interests: the more importance, therefore, he +shall attach to these errors, the more fatal will be the consequences +resulting from their adoption. Bacon, the illustrious sophist, who first +brought philosophy out of the schools, had great reason when he said, +"The worst of all things is deified error." Indeed, the mischiefs +springing from superstition or religious errors, have been, and always +will be, the most terrible in their consequences--the most extensive in +their devastation. The more these errors are respected, the more play +they give to the passions; the more value is attached to them, the +more the mind is disturbed; the more they are insisted upon, the +more irrational they render those, who are seized with the rage for +proselytism; the more they are cherished, the greater influence they +have on the whole conduct of our lives. Indeed, there can he but little +likelihood that he who renounces his reason, in the thing which he +considers as most essential to his happiness, will listen to it on any +other occasion. + +The slightest reflection will afford ample proof to this sad truth: in +those fatal notions which man has cherished on this subject, are to be +traced the true sources of all those prejudices, the fountain of all +those sorrows, to which he is the victim. Nevertheless, as we have +elsewhere said, utility ought to be the only standard, the uniform +scale, by which to form a judgment on either the opinions, the +institutions, the systems, or the actions of intelligent beings; it is +according to the measure of happiness which these things procure for us, +that we ought either to cover them with our esteem, or expose them to +our contempt. Whenever they are useless it is our duty to despise them; +as soon as they become pernicious, it is imperative to reject +them; reason imperiously prescribes that our detestation should be +commensurate with the evils which they cause. + +Taking these principles for a land-mark, which are founded on our +nature, which must appear incontestible to every reasonable being, with +experience for a beacon, let us coolly examine the effects which these +notions have produced on the earth. We have already, in more than one +part of the work, given a glimpse of the doctrine of that morals, which +having only for object the preservation of man, and his conduct in +society, can have nothing, in common with imaginary systems: it has been +shewn, that the essence of a sensitive, intelligent, rational being, +properly meditated, would discover motives competent to moderate +the fury of his passions--to induce him to resist his vicious +propensities--to make him fly criminal habits--to invite him to render +himself useful to those beings for whom his own necessities have a +continual occasion; thus, to endear himself to his, fellow mortals, to +become respectable in his own esteem. These motives will unquestionably +be admitted to possess more solidity, to embrace greater, potency, to +involve more truth, than those which are borrowed from systems that want +stability; that assume more shapes than there are languages; that are +not tangible to the tact of humanity; that must of necessity present a +different perspective to all who shall view them through the medium of +prejudice. From what has been advanced, it will be felt that education, +which should make man in early life contract good habits, adopt +favorable dispositions, fortified by a respect for public opinion, +invigorated by ideas of decency, strengthened by wholesome laws, +corroborated by the desire of meriting the friendship of others, +stimulated by the fear of losing his own esteem, would be fully adequate +to accustom him to a laudable conduct, amply sufficient to divert +him from even those secret crimes, from which he is obliged to punish +himself by remorse; which costs him the most incessant labour to keep +concealed, by the dread of that shame, which must always follow their +publicity. Experience demonstrates in the clearest manner, that the +success of a first crime disposes him to commit a second; impunity leads +on to the third, this to a lamentable sequel that frequently closes a +wretched career with the most ignominious exhibition; thus the first +delinquency is the commencement of a habit: there is much less distance +from this to the hundredth, than from innocence to criminality: the man, +however, who lends himself to a series of bad actions, under even the +assurance of impunity, is most woefully deceived, because he cannot +avoid castigating himself: moreover, he cannot know at what point of +iniquity he shall stop. It has been shewn, that those punishments which +society, for its own preservation, has the right to inflict on those +who disturb its harmony, are more substantive, more efficacious, more +salutary in their effects, than all the distant torments held forth by +the priests; they intervene a more immediate obstacle to the stubborn +propensities of those obdurate wretches, who, insensible to the charms +of virtue, are deaf to the advantages that spring from its practice, +than can be opposed by the denunciations, held forth in an hereafter +existence, which he is at the same moment taught may be avoided by +repentance, that shall only take place when the ability to commit +further wrong has ceased. In short, one would be led to think it obvious +to the slightest reflection, that politics, founded upon the nature of +man, upon the principles of society, armed with equitable laws, vigilant +over morals, faithful in rewarding virtue, constant in visiting crime, +would be more suitable to clothe ethics with respectability, to throw a +sacred mantle over moral goodness, to lend stability to public virtue, +than any authority that can be derived from contested systems, the +conduct of whose professors frequently disgrace the doctrines they lay +down, which after all seldom do more than restrain those whose mildness +of temperament effectually prevents them from running into excess; those +who, already given to justice, require no coercion. On the other hand, +we have endeavoured to prove that nothing can be more absurd, nothing +actually more dangerous, than attributing human qualities to the +Divinity which cannot but choose to find themselves in a perpetual +contradiction. + +Plato has said "that virtue consists in resembling God." But how is man +to resemble a being, who, it is acknowledged, is incomprehensible to +mankind--who cannot be conceived by any of those means, by which he is +alone capable of having perceptions? If this being, who is shewn to man +under such various aspects, who is said to owe nothing to his creatures, +is the author of all the good, as well as all the evil that takes +place, how can he be the model for the conduct of the human race +living together in society? At most he can only follow one side of the +character, because among his fellows, he alone is reputed virtuous who +does not deviate in his conduct from justice; who abstains from evil; +who performs with punctuality those duties he owes to his fellows. If it +be taken up, and insisted he is not the author of the evil, only of +the good, I say very well: that is precisely what I wanted to know; +you thereby acknowledge he is not the author of every thing; we are no +longer at issue; you are inconclusive to your own premises, consequently +ought not to demand an implicit reliance on what you choose to assert. + +But, replies the subtle theologian, that is not the affair; you must +seek it in the creed I have set forth--in the religion of which I am a +pillar. Very good: Is it then actually in the system of fanatics, that +man should draw up his ideas of virtue? Is it in the doctrines which +these codes hold forth, that he is to seek for a model? Alas! do they +not pourtray their idols: under the most unwholesome colours; do they +not represent them as following their caprice in every thing, who love +or hate, who choose or reject, who approve or condemn according to their +whim, who delight in carnage, who send discord amongst men, who act +irrationally, who commit wantonness, who sport with their feeble +subjects, who lay continual snares for them, who rigorously interdict +the use of their reason? What, let us seriously ask, would become of +morality, if men proposed to themselves such portraits for models! + +It was, however, for the most part, systems of this temper that nations +adopted. At was in consequence of these principles that what has been +called religion in most countries, was far removed from being +favourable to morality; on the contrary, it often shook it to its +foundation--frequently left no vestige of its existence. It divided +man, instead of drawing closer the bonds of union; in the place of +that mutual love, that reciprocity of succour, which ought ever to +distinguish human society, it introduced hatred and persecution; it made +them seize every opportunity to cut each other's throat for speculative +opinions, equally irrational; it engendered the most violent +heart-burnings--the most rancorous animosities--the most sovereign +contempt. The slightest difference in their received opinions rendered +them the most mortal enemies; separated their interests for ever; made +them despise each other; and seek every means to render their existence +miserable. For these theological conjectures, nations become opposed to +nations; the sovereign frequently armed himself against his subjects; +subjects waged war with their sovereign; citizens gave activity to the +most sanguinary hostility against each other; parents detested their +offspring; children plunged the pointed steel, the barbed arrow, +into the bosoms of those who gave them existence; husbands and wives +disunited, became the scourges of each other; relations forgetting the +ties of consanguinity, tore each other to pieces, or else reciprocally +consigned them to oblivion; all the bonds of society were rent asunder; +the social compact was broken up; society committed suicide: whilst in +the midst of this fearful wreck--regardless of the horrid shrieks called +forth by this dreadful confusion--unmindful of the havock going forward +on all sides--each pretended that he conformed to the views of his +idol, detailed to him by his priest--fulminated by the oracles. Far +from making himself any reproach, for the misery he spread abroad, each +lauded his own individual conduct; gloried in the crimes he committed in +support of his sacred cause. + +The same spirit of maniacal fury pervaded the rites, the ceremonies, +the customs, which the worship, adopted by superstition, placed so much +above all the social virtues. In one country, tender mothers delivered +up their children to moisten with their innocent blood the altars of +their idols; in another, the people assembled, performed the ceremony +of consolation to their deities, for the outrages they committed against +them, and finished by immolating to their anger human victims; in +another, a frantic enthusiast lacerated his body, condemned himself for +life to the most rigorous tortures, to appease the wrath of his gods. +The Jupiter of the Pagans was a lascivious monster; the Moloch of the +Phenicians was a cannibal; the savage idol of the Mexican requires +thousands of mortals to bleed on his shrine, in order to satisfy his +sanguinary appetite. + +Such are the models superstition holds out to the imitation of man; is +it then surprising that the name of these despots became the signal for +mad-brained enthusiasm to exercise its outrageous fury; the standard +under which cowardice wreaked its cruelty; the watchword for the +inhumanity of nations to muster their barbarous strength; a sound which +spreads terror wherever its echo could reach; a continual pretext for +the most barefaced breaches of public decorum; for the most shameless +violation of the moral duties? It was the frightful character men gave +of their gods, that banished kindness from their hearts--virtue from +their conduct--felicity from their habitations--reason from their mind: +almost every where it was some idol, who was disturbed by the mode in +which unhappy mortals thought; this armed them with poignards against +each other; made them stifle the cries of nature; rendered them +barbarous to themselves; atrocious to their fellow creatures: in short, +they became irrational, breathed forth vengeance, outraged humanity, +every time that, instigated by the priest, they were inclined to imitate +the gods of their idolatry, to display their zeal, to render themselves +acceptable in their temples. + +It is not, then, in such systems, man ought to seek either for models of +virtue, or rules of conduct suitable to live in society. He needs human +morality, founded upon his own nature; built upon invariable experience; +submitted to reason. The ethics of superstition will always he +prejudicial to the earth; cruel masters cannot be well served, but by +those who resemble them: what then becomes of the great advantages which +have been imagined resulted to man, from the notions which have +been unceasingly infused into him of his gods? We see that almost +all nations acknowledge them; yet, to conform themselves +to their views, they trampled under foot the clearest rights of +nature--the most evident duties of humanity; they appeared to act as +if it was only by madness the most incurable--by folly the most +preposterous--by the most flagitious crimes, committed with an unsparing +hand, that they hoped to draw down upon themselves the favor of +heaven--the blessings of the sovereign intelligence they so much boast +of serving with unabated zeal; with the most devotional fervor; with the +most unlimited obedience. As soon, therefore, as the priests give them +to understand their deities command the commission of crime, or whenever +there is a question of their respective creeds, although they are wrapt +in the most impenetrable obscurity, they make it a duty with themselves +to unbridle their rancour--to give loose to the most furious passions; +they mistake the clearest precepts of morality; they credulously +believe the remission of their own sins will be the reward of their +transgressions against their neighbour. Would it not be better to be +an inhabitant of Soldania in Africa, where never yet form of worship +entered, or the name of God resounded, than thus to pollute the land +with superstitious castigation--with the enmity of priests against each +other? + +Indeed, it is not generally in those revered mortals, spread over the +earth to announce the oracles of the gods, that will be found the most +sterling virtues. These men, who think themselves so enlightened, who +call themselves the ministers of heaven, frequently preach nothing but +hatred, discord, and fury in its name: the fear of the gods, far from +having a salutary influence over their own morals, far from submitting +them to a wholesome discipline, frequently do nothing more than increase +their avarice, augment their ambition, inflate their pride, extend their +covetousness, render them obstinately stubborn, and harden their hearts. +We may see them unceasingly occupied in giving birth to the most lasting +animosities, by their unintelligible disputes. We see them hostilely +wrestling with the sovereign power, which they contend is subordinate to +their own. We see them arm the chiefs of nations against the legitimate +magistrates; distribute to the credulous multitude the most mortal +weapons, to massacre each other in the prosecution of those futile +controversies, which sacerdotal vanity clothes with the most interesting +importance. Do these men, who advance the beauty of their theories, who +menace the people with eternal vengeance, avail themselves of their own +marvellous notions to moderate their pride--to abate their vanity--to +lessen their cupidity--to restrain their turbulence--to bring their +vindictive humours under control? Are they, even in those countries +where their empire is established upon pillars of brass, fixed on +adamantine rocks, decorated with the most curious efforts of human +ingenuity--where the sacred mantle of public opinion shields them with +impunity--where credulity, planted in the hot-bed of ignorance, strikes +the roots of their authority into the very centre of the earth; are +they, I would ask, the enemies to debauchery, the foes to intemperance, +the haters of those excesses which they insist a severe God interdicts +to his adorers? On the contrary, are they not seen to be emboldened in +crime; intrepid in iniquity; committing the most shameful atrocities; +giving free scope to their irregularities; indulging their hatred; +glutting their vengeance; exercising the most savage cruelties on the +miserable victims to their cowardly suspicion? In short, it may be +safely advanced, without fear of contradiction, that scarcely any +thing is more frequent, than that those men who announce these terrible +creeds--who make men tremble under their yoke--who are unceasingly +haranguing upon the eternity and dreadful nature of their +punishments--who declare themselves the chosen ministers of their +oracular laws--who make all the duties of morality centre in themselves; +are those whom superstition least contributes to render virtuous; are +men who possess the least milk of human kindness; the fewest feelings +of tenderness; who are the most intolerant to their neighbours; the most +indulgent to themselves; the most unsociable in their habits; the most +licentious in their manners; the most unforgiving in their disposition. +In contemplating their conduct, we should be tempted to accredit, that +they were perfectly undeceived with respect to the idols whom they +serve; that no one was less the dupe to those menaces which they so +solemnly pronounce in their name, than themselves. In the hands of the +priests of almost all countries, their divinities resembled the head of +Medusa, which, without injuring him who shewed it, petrified all others. +The priests are generally the most crafty of men, and many among them +are substantively wicked. + +Does the idea of these avenging, these remunerating systems, impose upon +some princes of the earth, who found their titles, who rest their power +upon them; who avail themselves of their terrific power to intimidate +their subjects; to make the people, often rendered unhappy by their +caprice, hold them in reverence? Alas! the theological, the supernatural +ideas, adopted by the pride of some sovereigns, have done nothing more +than corrupt politics--than metamorphose, them into an abject tyranny. +The ministers of these idols, always tyrants themselves, or the +cherishers of despots, are unceasingly crying out to monarchs that +they are the images of the Divinity. Do they not inform the credulous +multitude that heaven is willing they should groan under the most cruel +bondage; writhe under the most multifarious injustice; that to suffer +is their inheritance; that their princes have the indubitable right +to appropriate the goods, dispose of the persons, coerce the liberty; +command the lives of their subjects? Do not some of these chiefs of +nations, thus poisoned in the name of deified idols, imagine that every +indulgence of their wayward humour is freely permitted to them? At once +competitors, representatives, and rivals of the celestial powers, do +they not, in some instances, exercise after their example the most +arbitrary despotism? Do they not, in the intoxication into which +sacerdotal flattery has plunged them, think that like their idols, they +are not accountable to man for their actions, that they owe nothing +to the rest of mortals, that they are bound by no bonds but their own +unruly will, to their miserable subjects? + +Then it is evident that it is to theological notions, to the loose +flattery of its ministers, that are to be ascribed the despotism, +the tyrannical injustice, the corruption, the licentiousness of some +princes, and the blindness of those people, to whom in heaven's name +they interdict the love of liberty; who are forbid to labour effectually +to their own happiness; to oppose themselves to violence, however +flagrant; to exercise their natural rights, however conducive to their +welfare. These intoxicated rulers, even while adoring their avenging +gods, in the act of bending others to their worship, do not scruple to +outrage them by their irregularities--by their want of moral virtue. +What morality is this, but that of men who offer themselves as living +images, as animated representatives of the Divinity? Are those monarchs, +then, who are habitually unjust, who wrest without remorse the bread +from the hands of a famished people, to administer to the profligacy of +their insatiable courtiers--to pamper the luxury of the vile instruments +of their enormities, atheists? Are, then, those ambitious conquerors, +who not contented with oppressing their own slaves, carry desolation, +spread misery, deal out death among the subjects of others, atheists? +Do we not witness in some of those potentates who rule over nations by +_divine right_, (a patent of power, which every usurper claims as his +own) ambitious mortals, whose exterminating fury nothing can arrest; +with hearts perfectly insensible to the sorrows of mankind; with minds +without energy; with souls without virtue; who neglect their most +evident duties, with which they do not even deign to become acquainted; +powerful men, who insolently set themselves above the rules of equity; +knaves who make a sport of honesty? Generally speaking, is there +the least sincerity in the alliances which these rulers form among +themselves? Do they ever last longer than for the season of their +convenience? Do we find substantive virtues adorn those who most +abjectly submit themselves to all the follies of superstition? Do they +not tax each other as violators of property--as faithlessly aggrandizing +themselves at the expence of their neighbour; in fact, do we not see +them endeavouring to surprise, anxious to over-reach, ready to injure +each other, without being arrested by the menaces of their creeds, or at +all yielding to the calls of humanity? In general, they are too haughty +to be humane; too inflated with ambition to be virtuous; they make a +code for themselves, which they cannot help violating. Charles the Fifth +used to say, "that being a warrior, it was impossible for him to have +either conscience or religion." His general, the Marquis de Piscaire, +observed, that "nothing was more difficult, than to serve at one and the +same time, the god _Mars_ and _Jesus Christ_." Indeed, nothing can be +more opposed to the true spirit of Christianity than the profession +of arms; notwithstanding the Christian princes have the most numerous +armies, and are in perpetual hostility with each other: perhaps the +clergy themselves do not hold forth the most peaceable examples of the +doctrine they teach; they sometimes wrangle for tithes, dispute +for trifling enjoyments, quarrel for worldly opinion, with as much +determined obstinacy, with as, much settled rancour, with as little +charity, as could possibly inhabit the bosom of the most unenlightened +Pagan, whose ignorance they despise--whose superstition they rank as the +grossest effort of idolatrous debasement. It might almost admit of +doubt whether they would be quite pleased to see the mild maxims of the +Evangelists, the true Christian meekness, rigidly followed--whether they +might not think the complete working of their own system would clash +with their own immediate interests? Is it a demonstrable axiom that +the ministers of the Christian faith do not think soldiers are beings +extremely well calculated to give efficacy to their doctrine--solidity +to their advantages--durability to their claims? Be this as it may, +priests as well as monarchs have occasionally waged war for the most +futile interests; impoverished a people from the anti-christian motives; +wrested from each other with all the venom of furies, the bloody remnant +of the nations they have laid waste; in fact, to judge by their conduct +on certain occasions, it might have been a question if they were not +disputing who should have the credit of making the greater number of +miserable beings upon earth. At length, either wearied with their own +fury, exhausted by their own devouring passions, or compelled by the +stern hand of necessity, they have permitted suffering humanity to take +breath; they have allowed the miseries concomitant on war, to cease for +an instant their devastating havoc; they have made peace in the name of +that God, whose decrees, as attested by themselves, they have been so +wantonly outraging,--still ready, however, to violate their most solemn +pledges, when the smallest interest could offer them a pretext. + +Thus it will be obvious, in what manner the idea of the Divinity +operates on the priest, as well as upon those who are called his images; +who insist they have no account to render but to him alone. Among these +representatives of the Divine Majesty, it is with difficulty during +thousands of years we find some few who have equity, sensibility, +virtue, or even the most ordinary talent. History points out some +of these vicegerents of the Deity, who in the exacerbation of their +delirious rage, have insisted upon displacing him, by exalting +themselves into gods; and exacting the most obsequious worship; who have +inflicted the most cruel torments on those who have opposed themselves +to their madness, and refused to acknowledge the Divinity of their +persons. These men, whose licentiousness knew no limits, from the +impunity which attended their actions, notwithstanding they had learned +to despise public opinion, to set decency at defiance, to indulge in the +most shameless vice: in spite of the power they possessed; of the homage +they received; of the terror they inspired: although they had learned +to counterfeit, with great effect, the whole catalogue of human virtues; +found it impossible, even with the addition of their enormous wealth, +wrenched from the necessities of laborious honesty, to counterfeit the +animating blush, which modest merit brings forth, when eulogized by some +happy being whose felicity he has occasioned, by following the great +law of nature--which says, "_love thy neighbour as thyself_." On the +contrary, we see them grow listless with satiety; disgusted with their +own inordinate indulgences; obliged to recur to strange pleasures, to +awaken their benumbed faculties; to run headlong into the most costly +follies, in the fruitless attempt to keep up the activity of their +souls, the spring of which they had for ever relaxed, by the profligacy +of their enjoyment. + +History, although it describes a multitude of vicious rulers, whose +irregular propensities were of the most mischievous consequence to the +human race, nevertheless, shews us but few who have been atheists. The +annals of nations, on the contrary, offer to our view great numbers of +superstitious princes, governed by their mistresses, led by unworthy +favorites, leagued with priests, who passed their lives plunged in +luxury; indulging the most effeminate pursuits; following the most +childish pleasures; pleased with ostentatious show; slaves even to the +fashion of the vestments that covered them; but strangers to every manly +virtue; insensible to the sorrows of their subjects; although uniformly +good to their hungry courtiers, invariably kind to those cringing +sycophants who surrounded their persons, and poisoned their ears with +the most fulsome flattery: in short, superstitious persecutors, who, +to render themselves acceptable to their priests, to expiate their +own shameful irregularities, added to all their other vices that of +tyrannizing over the mind, of fettering the conscience, of destroying +their subjects for their opinions, when they were in hostility with +their own received doctrines. Indeed, superstition in princes frequently +allied itself with the most horrid crimes; they have almost all +professed religion, although very few of them have had a just knowledge +of morality--have practiced any useful substantive virtue. Superstitious +notions, on the contrary, often serve to render them more blind, to +augment their evil inclinations; to set them at a greater distance from +moral goodness. They for the most part believe themselves assured of the +favor of heaven; they think they faithfully serve their gods, that the +anger of their divinities is appeased, if for a short season they +shew themselves attached to futile customs--lend themselves to absurd +rites--perform some ridiculous duties, which superstition imposes on +them, with a view to obtain their assistance in the prosecution of its +own plans, very rarely in strict unison with their immediate interest. +Nero, the cruel, sanguinary, matricidal Nero, his hands yet reeking with +the blood of that unfortunate being who had borne him in her womb, who +had, with agonizing pains, given the monster to the world that +plunged the dagger in her heart, was desirous to be initiated into the +_Eleusinian Mysteries_. The odious Constantine himself, found in the +priests, accomplices disposed to expiate his crimes. The infamous +Philip, whose ungovernable ambition caused him to be called the daemon +of the south, whilst he assassinated his wife and son, caused the +throats of the wretched Batavians to be cut for their religious +opinions. It is thus, that the priests of superstition sometimes +persuade sovereigns they can atone for crimes, by committing others of a +more atrocious kind--of an increased magnitude. + +It would be fair to conclude, from the conduct of so many princes, who +had so much superstition, but so slender a portion of virtue, that the +notion of their gods, far from being useful to them, only served to +render them wore corrupt--to make them more abominable than they already +were; that the idea of an avenging power, placed in the perspective +of futurity, imposed but little restraint on the turbulence of deified +tyrants, who were sufficiently powerful not to fear the reproaches of +their subjects--who had the insensibility to be deaf to the censure of +their fellows--who were gifted with an obduracy of soul, that prevented +their having compassion for the miseries of mankind, from whom they +fancied themselves so pre-eminently distinguished; which, in fact, they +were, if crime can be allowed for the standard of distinction. Neither +heaven nor earth furnishes a balsam of sufficient efficacy to heal the +inveterate wounds of beings cankered to this degree: for such chronic +diseases, there is "no balm in Gilead:" there is no curb sufficiently +coercive to rein in the passions, to which superstition itself +gives activity; which only makes them more unruly; renders them more +inveterately rash. Whenever men flatter themselves with easily expiating +their sins--when they soothe themselves with the consolitary idea of +appeasing the anger of the gods by a show of earnestness, they then +deliver themselves up, with the most unrestrained freedom, to the bent +of their criminal pursuits. The most dissolute men are frequently in +appearance extremely attached to superstition: it furnishes them with a +means of compensating by ceremonies, that of which they are deficient +in morals: it is much easier for them to adopt a faith, to believe in +a doctrine, to conform themselves to certain rituals, than to renounce +their habits, resist their passions, or relinquish the pursuit of that +pleasure, which results to unprincipled minds from the prosecution of +the most diabolical schemes. + +Under chiefs, depraved even by superstition, nations continued +necessarily to be corrupted. The great conformed themselves to the +vices of their masters; the example of these distinguished men, whom the +uninformed erroneously believe to be happy, was followed by the people; +courts thus became the sinks from whence issued the epidemic contagion +of licentious indulgence. The law only held forth pictures of honesty; +the dispensers of jurisprudence were partial, partook of the mania of +the times, were labouring under the general disease; Justice suffered +her balance to rust, occasionally removed her bandage, although she +always wore it in the presence of the poor; genuine ideas of equity +had grown into disuse; distinct notions of right and wrong became +troublesome and unfashionable; education was neglected; it served only +to produce prejudiced beings, grounded in ignorance--devotees, always +ready to injure themselves--fanatics, eager to shew their zeal ever +willing to annoy their unfortunate neighbours. Superstition, sustained +by tyranny, ousted every other feeling, hoodwinked its destined victims, +rendered those tractable whom it had the intention to despoil. Whoever +doubts of these truisms, has only to turn over the pages of history, +he will find myriads of evidence to much more than is here stated. +Machiavel, in his _Political Discourses upon Titus Livius_, labours the +point hard, to shew the utility of superstition to the Roman Republic: +unfortunately, however, the examples he brings forward in its support, +incontestibly prove that none but the senate profited by the infatuation +of the people, who availed itself of their blindness more effectually to +bend them to its yoke. + +Thus it was that nations, destitute of equitable laws, deficient in the +administration of justice, submitted to irrational government, continued +in slavery by the monarch, chained up in ignorance by the priest, for +want of enlightened institutions, deprived of reasonable education, +became corrupt, superstitious, and flagitious. The nature of man, the +just interests of society, the real advantage of the sovereign, the true +happiness of the people, once mistaken, were completely lost sight +of; the morality of nature, founded upon the essence of man living +in society, was equally unknown; lay buried under an enormous load +of prejudice, that no common efforts were competent to remove. It was +entirely forgotten that man has wants; that society was formed that he +might, with greater security, facilitate the means of satisfying +them; that government, to be legitimate, ought to have for object, the +happiness--for end, the means of maintaining the indivisibility of the +community; that consequently it ought to give activity to springs, full +play to motives suitable to have a favorable influence over sensible +beings. It was quite overlooked, that virtue faithfully rewarded, +vice as regularly visited, had an elastic force, of which the public +authorities could efficaciously avail themselves, to determine their +citizens to blend their interests; to work out their own felicity, by +labouring to the happiness of the body of which they were members. The +social virtues were unknown, the _amor patriae_ became a chimera. Men +thus associated, thus blinded by their superstitious bias, credulously +believed their own immediate interest consisted in injuring each other; +they were solely occupied with meriting the favor of those men, who +fatally accreditted the doctrine of clerical flatterers, of silver-toned +courtiers, which taught that they wore distinctly interested in injuring +the whole. + +This is the mode in which the human heart has become perverted; here +is the genuine source of moral evil; the hot-bed of that epidemical +depravity, the cause of that hereditary corruption, the fountain of +that inveterate delinquency, which pervaded the earth; rendering the +abundance of nature nothing better than a curse; blasting the fairest +prospects of humanity; degrading man below the beast of the forest; +sinking his intellectual faculties in the most savage barbarity; +rendering him the vile instrument of lawless ambition; the wretched tool +by which the fetters of his species were firmly rivetted; obliging him +to moisten his harvest with the bitter tears of the most abject slavery. +For the purpose of remedying so many crying evils, grown insupportable, +recourse was had to new superstitions. Notwithstanding this alone had +produced them, it was still imagined, that the menaces of heaven would +restrain passions which every thing conspired to rouse in all hearts; +fatuity persuaded monarchs that ideal, metaphysical barriers, terrible +fables, distant phantoms, would be competent to curb those inordinate +desires, to rein in that impetuous propensity to crime, that rendered +society incommodious to itself; credulity fancied that invisible powers +would be more efficacious, than those visible motives that evidently +invited mortals to the commission of mischief. Every thing was +understood to be achieved, by occupying man's mind with gloomy chimeras, +with vague, undefinable terrors, with avenging angels; and politics +madly believed that its own interests grew out of the blind submission +of its subjects, to the ministers of these delusive doctrines. + +What was the result? Nations had only sacerdotal laws; theological +morality; accommodated to the interests of the hierarchy--suitable to +the views of subtle priests: who substituted reveries for realities, +opinions for reason, rank fallacies for sterling truths; who made +ceremonies supply the place of virtue; a pious blindness supersede the +necessity of an enlightened understanding; undermined the sacredness +of oaths, and placed fanaticism on the altars of sociability. By a +necessary consequence of that confidence which the people were compelled +to give to the ministers of superstition, two distinct authorities +were established in each state, who were substantially at variance, in +continual hostility with each other. The priest fought the sovereign +with the formidable weapon of opinion; it generally proved sufficiently +powerful to shake the most established thrones. Thus, although the +hierarchy was unceasingly admonishing the people to submit themselves +to the divine authority of their sovereigns, because it was derived +immediately from heaven, yet, whenever it so happened that the monarch +did not repay their advocacy, by blindly yielding his own authority to +the supervisance of the priests, these made no scruple of threatening +him with loss of his temporalities; fulminated their anathemas, +interdicted his dominions, and sometimes went the length of absolving +his subjects from allegiance. Superstition, in general, only upholds +despotism, that it may with greater certainty direct its blows against +its enemies; it overthrows it whenever it is found to clash with its +interests. The ministers of invisible powers preach up obedience to +visible powers, only when they find these humbly devoted to themselves. +Thus the sovereign was never at rest, but when abjectly cringing to his +priest, he tractably received his lessons--lent himself to his frantic +zeal--and piously enabled him to carry on the furious occupation of +proselytism. These priests, always restless, full of ambition, burning +with intolerance, frequently excited the sovereign to ravage his own +states--encouraged him to tyranny: when, pursuing this sacerdotal mania, +he feared to have outraged humanity, to have incurred the displeasure +of heaven, he was quickly reconciled to himself, upon promise of +undertaking some distant expedition, for the purpose of bringing some +unfortunate nation within the pale of their own particular creed. When +the two rival powers united themselves, morality gained nothing by the +junction; the people were neither more happy, nor more virtuous; their +morals, their welfare, their liberty, were equally overwhelmed by the +combined powers. Thus, superstitious princes always felt interested in +the maintenance of theological opinions, which were rendered flattering +to their vanity, favorable to their power. Like the grateful perfumes +of Arabia, that are used to cover the ill scent of a deadly poison, the +priest lulled them into security by administering to their sensualities; +these, in return, made common cause with him: fully persuaded that the +superstition which they themselves adopted, must be the most wholesome +for their subjects, most conducive to their interests, those who refused +to receive the boon, thus gratuitously forced upon them, were treated +as enemies, held up to public scorn, and rendered the victims of +punishment. The most superstitious sovereign became, either politically +or through piety, the executioner of one part of his slaves; he was +taught to believe it a sacred duty to tyrannize over the mind--to +overwhelm the refractory--to crush the enemy of his priest, under an +idea that he was therefore hostile to his own authority. In cutting the +throats of these unfortunate sceptics, he imagined he at once discharged +his obligations to heaven, and gave security to his own power. He did, +not perceive, that by immolating victims to his priest, he in fact +strengthened the arm of his most formidable foe--the real enemy to +his authority--the rival of his greatness--the least subjected of his +subjects. + +But the prevalence of these false notions, with which both the minds of +the sovereign and the people were prepossessed, it was found that every +thing in society concurred to gratify the avidity, to bolster the pride, +to glut the vengeance of the sacerdotal order: every where, it was to be +observed, that the most turbulent, the most dangerous, the most useless +men, were those who were the most amply rewarded. The strange spectacle +presented itself, of beholding those who were born the bitterest enemies +to sovereign power, cherished by its fostering care--honoured at its +hands: the most rebellious subjects were looked upon as the pillars of +the throne; the corrupters of the people were rendered the exclusive +masters of education; the least laborious of the citizens were richly +rewarded for their idleness--munificently remunerated for the most +futile speculations--held in respect for their fatal discord--gorged +with benefits for their inefficacious prayers: they swept off the fat of +the land for their expiations, so destructive to morals, so calculated +to give permanency to crime. Thus, by a strange fatuity, the viper that +could, and frequently did, inflict the most deadly sting on the bosom of +confiding credulity, was pampered and nourished by the unsuspecting hand +of its destined victim. + +For thousands of years, nations as well as sovereigns were emulously +despoiling themselves to enrich the expounders of superstition; to +enable them to wallow in abundance: they loaded them with honors, +decorated them with titles, invested them with privileges, granted them +immunities, for no other purpose than to make them bad citizens, unruly +subjects, mischievous beings, who revenged upon society the advantages +they had received. What was the fruit that kings and people gathered +from their imprudent kindness? What was the harvest these men yielded +to their labour? Did princes really become more powerful; were nations +rendered more happy; did they grow more flourishing; did men become more +rational? No! Unquestionably, the sovereign lost the greater portion +of his authority; he was the slave of his priest; and when he wished to +preserve the remnant that was left, or to recover some part of what +had been wrested from him, he was obliged to be continually wrestling +against the men his own indulgence, his own weakness, had furnished +with means, to set his authority at defiance: the riches of society were +lavished to support the idleness, maintain the splendour, satiate the +luxury of the most useless, the most arrogant, the most dangerous of its +members. + +Did the morals of the people improve under the pastoral care of these +guides, who were so liberally rewarded? Alas! the superstitious never +knew them, their fanatic creed had usurped the place of every virtue; +its ministers, satisfied with upholding the doctrines, with preserving +the ceremonies so useful to their own interests, only invented +fictitious crimes--multiplied painful penances--instituted absurd +customs; to the end, that they might turn even the transgressions of +their slaves to their own immediate profit. Every where they exercised +a monopoly of expiatory indulgences; they made a lucrative traffic of +pretended pardons from above; they established a tariff, according to +which crime was no longer contraband, but freely admitted upon paying +the customs. Those subjected to the heaviest impost, were always such as +the hierarchy judged most inimical to its own stability; you might at a +very easy rate obtain permission to attack the dignity of the sovereign, +to undermine the temporal power, but it was enormously dear to be +allowed to touch even the hem of the sacerdotal garments. Thus heresy, +sacrilege, &c. were considered crimes of a much deeper dye, that fixed +an indelible stain on the perpetrator, alarmed the mind of the priestly +order, much more seriously than the most inveterate villainy, the +most determined delinquency, which more immediately involved the true +interests of society. Thence the ideas of the people were completely +overturned, imaginary crimes terrified them, while real crimes had +no effect upon their obdurate hearts. A man, whose opinions were at +variance with the received doctrines, whose abstract systems did not +harmonize with those of his priest, was more loathed than a corrupter of +youth; more abhorred than an assassin; more hated than an oppressor; was +held in greater contempt than a robber; was punished with greater +rigor than the seducer of innocence. The acme of all wickedness, was +to despise that which the priest was desirous should be looked upon as +sacred. The celebrated Gordon says, "the most abominable of heresies, +is to believe there is any other god than the clergy." The civil laws +concurred to aid this confusion of ideas; they inflicted the most +serious penalties, punished in the most atrocious manner those unknown +crimes which imagination had magnified into the most flagitious actions; +heretics, infidels, were brought to the stake, and publicly burnt with +the utmost refinement of cruelty; the brain was tortured to find means +of augmenting the sufferings of the unhappy victims to sacerdotal fury; +whilst calumniators of innocence, adulterers, depredators of every +description, knaves of all kinds, were at a trifling cost absolved from +their past iniquity, and opened a new account of future delinquency. + +Under such instructors what could become of youth? The period of +juvenility was shamefully sacrificed to superstition. Man, from his +earliest infancy, was poisoned with unintelligible notions; fed with +mysteries; crammed with fables; drenched with doctrines, in which he was +compelled to acquiesce without being able to comprehend. His brain was +disturbed with phantoms, alarmed with chimeras, rendered frantic by +visions. His genius was cramped with puerile pursuits, mechanical +devotions, sacred trifles. Superstition at length so fascinated +the human mind, made such mere automata of mankind, that the people +consented to address their gods in a dialect they did not themselves +understand: women occupied their whole lives in singing Latin, +without comprehending a word of the language; the people assisted very +punctually, without being competent to explain any part of the +worship, under an idea that it was taken kindly they should thus weary +themselves; that it was sufficient to shew their persons in the sacred +temples, which were beautifully decorated to fascinate their senses. +Thus man wasted his most precious moments in absurd customs; spent his +life in idle ceremonies; his bead was crowded with sophisms, his mind +was loaded with errors; intoxicated with fanaticism, he was the declared +enemy to reason; for ever prepossessed against truth, the energy of +his soul was resisted by shackles too ponderous for its elasticity; +the spring gave way, and he sunk into sloth and wretchedness: from this +humiliating state he could never again soar; he could no longer become +useful either to himself or to his associates: the importance he +attached to his imaginary science, or rather the systematic ignorance +which served for its basis, rendered it impossible for the most fertile +soil to produce any thing but thorns; for the best proportioned tree to +yield any thing but crabs. + +Does a superstitious, sacerdotal education, form intrepid citizens, +intelligent fathers of families, kind husbands, just masters, faithful +servants, loyal subjects, pacific associates? No! it either makes +peevish enthusiasts or morose devotees, who are incommodious to +themselves, vexatious to others: men without principle, who quickly +pour the waters of Lethe over the terrors with which they have been +disturbed; who know no moral obligation, who respect no virtue. Thus +superstition, elevated above every thing else, held forth the fanatical +dogma, "Better to obey the gods than men;" in consequence, man believed +he must revolt against his prince, detach himself from his wife, detest +his children, estrange himself from his friends, cut the throats of his +fellow-citizens, every time they questioned the veracity of his faith: +in short, a superstitious education, when it had its effect, only served +to corrupt the juvenile heart--to fascinate youthful winds with its +pageantry--to degrade the human soul--to make man mistake the duties +he owed to himself, his obligations to society, his relations with the +beings by whom he was surrounded. + +What advantages might not nations have reaped, if they would have +employed on useful objects, those riches, which ignorance has so +shamefully lavished on the expounders of superstition; which fatuity has +bestowed on the most useless ceremonies? What might not have been the +progress of genius, if it had enjoyed those ample remunerations, granted +during so many ages to those priests who at all times opposed its +elevation? What perfection might not science have attained, what height +might not the arts have reached, if they had had the same succours that +were held forth with a prodigal hand to enthusiasm and futility? Upon +what rocks might not morality have been rested, what solid foundations +might not politics have found, with what majestic grandeur might not +truth have illumined the human horizon, if they had experienced the +same fostering cares, the same animating countenance, the same +public sanction, which accompanied imposture--which was showered +upon fanaticism--which shielded falsehood from the rude attack of +investigation--which gave impunity to its ministers? + +It is then obvious, that superstitious, theological notions, have not +produced any of those solid advantages that have been held forth; if may +be doubted whether they were not always, and ever will remain, contrary +to healthy politics, opposed to sound morality; they frequently change +sovereigns into restless, jealous, mischievous, divinities; they +transform their subjects into envious, wicked slaves, who by idle +pageantry, by futile ceremonies, by an exterior acquiescence in +unintelligible opinions, imagine themselves amply compensated for +the evil they commit against each other. Those who have never had +the confidence to examine these sublimated opinions; those who feel +persuaded that their duties spring out of these abstruse doctrines; +those who are actually commanded to live in peace, to cherish each +other, to lend mutual assistance, to abstain from evil, and to do good, +presently lose sight of these sterile speculations, as soon as present +interests, ungovernable passions, inveterate habits, or irresistible +whims, hurry them away. Where are we to look for that equity, that union +of interest, that peace, that concord, which these unsettled notions, +supported by superstition, backed with the full force of authority, +promise to the societies placed under their surveillance? Under the +influence of corrupt courts, of time-serving priests, who, either +impostors or fanatics, are never in harmony with each other, are only +to be discerned vicious men, degraded by ignorance--enslaved by +criminal habits--swayed by transient interests--guided by shameful +pleasures--sunk in a vortex of dissipation; who do not even think of +the Divinity. In despite of his theological ideas, the subtle courtier +continues to weave his dark plots, labours to gratify his ambition, +seeks to satisfy his avidity, to indulge his hatred, to wreak his +vengeance, to give full swing to all the passions inherent to the +perversity of his being: maugre that frightful hell, of which the idea +alone makes her tremble, the woman of intrigue persists in her amours; +continues her harlotry, revels in her adulteries. Notwithstanding their +dissipated conduct, their dissolute manners, their entire want of moral +principle, the greater part of those who swarm in courts, who crowd in +cities, would recoil with horror, if the smallest doubt was exhibited of +the truth of that creed which they outrage every moment, of their +lives. What advantage, then, has resulted to the human race from those +opinions, so universal, at the same time so barren? They seem rarely to +have had any other kind of influence than to serve as a pretext for the +most dangerous passions--as a mantle of security for the most criminal +indulgences. Does not the superstitious despot, who would scruple to +omit the least part of the ceremonies of his persuasion, on quitting +the altars at which he has been sacrificing, on leaving the temple where +they have been delivering the oracles and terrifying crime in the name +of heaven, return to his vices, reiterate his injustice, increase his +political crimes, augment his transgressions against society? Issuing +from the sacred fane, their ears still ringing with the doctrines they +have heard, the minister returns to his vexations, the courtier to +his intrigues, the courtezan to her prostitution, the publican to his +extortions, the merchant to his frauds, the trader to his tricks. + +Will it be pretended that those cowardly assassins, those dastardly +robbers, those miserable criminals, whom evil institutions, the +negligence of government, the laxity of morals, continually multiply; +from whom the laws, in many instances too sanguinary, frequently wrest +their existence; will it, I say, be pretended that the malefactors who +regularly furnish the gibbets, who daily crowd the scaffolds, are either +incredulous or atheists? No! Unquestionably, these unfortunate beings, +these wretched outcasts, these children of turpitude, firmly believe in +God; his name has been repeated to them from their infancy; they have +been informed of the punishment destined for sinners: they have been +habituated in early life to tremble at his judgments; nevertheless they +have outraged society; their unruly passions, stronger than their fears, +not having been coerced by visible motives, have not, for much more +cogent reasons, been restrained by those which are invisible: distant, +concealed punishments will never be competent to arrest those excesses +which present and assured torments are incapable of preventing. + +In short, does not every day's experience furnish us the lesson, +that men, persuaded that an all-seeing Deity views them, hears them, +encompasses them, do not on that account arrest their progress when +the furor exists, either for gratifying their licentious passions, or +committing the most dishonest actions? The same individual who would +fear the inspection of the meanest of his fellows, whom the presence of +another man would prevent from committing a bad action, from delivering +himself up to some scandalous vice, freely sins, cheerfully lends +himself to crime, when he believes no eyes beholds him but those of his +God. What purpose, then, does the conviction of the omniscience, the +ubiquity, the omnipotence of the Divinity answer, if it imposes +much less on the conduct of the human being, than the idea of being +overlooked by the least of his fellow men? He who would not have the +temerity to commit a crime, even in the presence of a child, will make +no scruple of boldly committing it, when he shall have only his God for +a witness. These facts, which are indubitable, ill serve for a reply to +those who insist that the fear of God is more suitable to restrain the +actions of men, than wholesome laws, with strict discipline. When man +believes he has only his God to dread, he commonly permits nothing to +interrupt his course. + +Those persons who do not in the least suspect the power of superstitious +notions, who have the most perfect reliance on their efficacy, very +rarely, however, employ them, when they are desirous to influence the +conduct of those who are subordinate to them; when they are disposed +to re-conduct them to the paths of reason. In the advice which a father +gives to his vicious, criminal son, he rather represents to him the +present temporal inconveniencies to which his conduct exposes him, than +the danger he encounters in offending an avenging God; he points out to +him the natural consequences of his irregularities, his health damaged +by debaucheries; the loss of his reputation by criminal pursuits; the +ruin of his fortune by gambling; the punishments of society, &c. Thus +the DEICOLIST himself, on the most important occasions of life, reckons +more stedfastly upon the force of natural motives, than upon those +supernatural inducements furnished by superstition: the same man, who +vilifies the motives that an atheist can have to do good and abstain +from evil, makes use of them himself on this occasion, because he feels +they are the most substantive he can employ. + +Almost all men believe in an avenging and remunerating God; yet nearly +in all countries the number of the wicked bears a larger proportion +than that of the good. If the true cause of this general corruption be +traced, it will be more frequently found in the superstitious notions +inculcated by theology, than in those imaginary sources which the +various superstitions have invented to account for human depravity. Man +is always corrupt wherever he is badly governed; wherever superstition +deifies the sovereign, his government becomes unworthy: this perverted +and assured of impunity, necessarily render his people miserable; +misery, when it exceeds the point of endurance, as necessarily renders +them wicked. When the people are submitted to irrational masters, they +are never guided by reason. If they are blinded by priests, who are +either deceived or impostors, their reason become useless. Tyrants, when +combined with priests, have generally been successful in their efforts +to prevent nations from becoming enlightened--from seeking after +truth--from ameliorating their condition--from perfectioning their +morals; and never has the union smiled upon liberty: the people, unable +to resist the mighty torrent produced by the confluence of two such +rivers, have usually sunk into the most abject slavery. It is only by +enlightening the mass of mankind, by demonstrating truth, that we can +promise to render him better; that we can indulge the hope of making him +happy. It is by causing both sovereigns and subjects to feel their true +relations with each other, that their actual interests will be improved; +that their politics will be perfectioned: it will then be felt and +accredited, that the true art of governing mortals, the sure method of +gaining their affections, is not the art of blinding them, of deceiving +them, or of tyrannizing over them. Let us, then, good humouredly consult +reason, avail ourselves of experience, interrogate nature; we shall, +perhaps, find what is requisite to be done, in order to labour +efficaciously to the happiness of the human race. We shall most +assuredly perceive, that error is the true source of the evils +which embitter our existence; that it is in cheering the hearts, in +dissipating those vain phantoms which alarm the ignorant, in laying the +axe to the root of superstition, that we can peaceably seek after truth; +that it is only in the conflagration of this baneful tree, we can ever +expect to light the torch which shall illumine the road to felicity. +Then let man study nature; observe her immutable laws; let him dive into +his own essence; let him cure himself of his prejudices: these means +will conduct him by a gentle declivity to that virtue, without which he +must feel he can never be permanently happy in the world he inhabits. + +If man could once cease to fear, from that moment he would be truly +happy. Superstition is a domestic enemy which he always carries within +himself: those who will seriously occupy themselves with this formidable +phantom, must be content to endure continual agonies, to live in +perpetual inquietude: if they will neglect the objects most worthy +of interesting them, to run after chimeras, they will commonly pass +a melancholy existence, in groaning, in praying, in sacrificing, +in expiating faults, either real or imaginary, which they believe +calculated to offend their priests; frequently in their irrational fury +they will torment themselves, they will make it a duty to inflict on +their own persons the most barbarous punishments: but society will reap +no benefit from these mournful opinions--from the tortures of these +pious irrationals; because their mind, completely absorbed by their +gloomy reveries, their time dissipated in the most absurd ceremonies, +will leave them no opportunity of being really advantageous to the +community of which they are members. The most superstitions men are +commonly misanthropists, quite useless to the world, and very injurious +to themselves: if ever they display energy, it is only to devise means +by which they can increase their own affliction; to discover new methods +to torture their mind; to find out the most efficacious means to deprive +themselves of those objects which their nature renders desirable. It is +common in the world to behold penitents, who are intimately persuaded +that by dint of barbarous inflictions on their own persons, by means +of a lingering suicide, they shall merit the favor of heaven. Madmen of +this species are to be seen every where; superstition has in all ages, +in all places, given birth to the most cruel extravagances, to the most +injurious follies. + +If, indeed, these irrational devotees only injure themselves, and +deprive society of that assistance which they owe to it, they without +doubt do less mischief than those turbulent, zealous fanatics, who, +infuriated with their superstitious ideas, believe themselves bound to +disturb the world, to commit actual crimes, to sustain the cause of +what they denominate the true faith. It not unfrequently happens that in +outraging morality, the zealous enthusiast supposes he renders himself +agreeable to his God. He makes perfection consist either in tormenting +himself, or in rending asunder, in favour of his fanatical ideas, the +most sacred ties that connect mortals with each other. + +Let us, then, acknowledge, that the notions of superstition, are not +more suitable to procure the welfare, to establish the content, to +confirm the peace of individuals, than they are of the society of which +they are members. If some peaceable, honest, inconclusive enthusiasts, +find either comfort or consolation in them, there are millions who, more +conclusive to their principles, are unhappy during their whole life; +who are perpetually assailed by the most melancholy ideas; to whom their +disordered imagination shews these notions, as every instant involving +them in the most cruel punishments. Under such formidable systems, a +tranquil, sociable devotee, is a man who has not reasoned upon them. + +In short, every thing serves to prove, that superstitious opinions have +the strongest influence over men; that they torment them unceasingly, +divide them from their dearest connections, inflame their minds, envenom +their passions, render them miserable without ever restraining their +actions, except when their own temperament proves too feeble to propel +them forward: all this holds forth one great lesson, that _superstition +is incompatible with liberty, and can never furnish good citizens_. + + + + + +CHAP. IX. + +_Theological Notions cannot be the Basis of Morality.--Comparison +between Theological Ethics and Natural Morality.--Theology prejudicial +to the human Mind._ + + +Felicity is the great end of human existence; a supposition therefore, +to be actually useful to man, should render him happy. By what parity +of reasoning can he flatter himself that an hypothesis, which does not +facilitate his happiness in his present duration, may one day conduct +him to permanent bliss? If mortals only sigh, tremble, and groan in this +world, of which they have a knowledge, upon what foundation is it they +expect a more felicitous existence hereafter, in a world of which they +know nothing? If man is every where the child of calamity, the victim to +necessary evil, the unhappy sufferer under an immutable system, ought he +reasonably to indulge a greater confidence in future happiness? + +On the other hand, a supposition which should throw light on every +thing, which should supply an easy solution to all the questions to +which it could be applied, when even it should not be competent to +demonstrate the certitude, would probably be true: but that system which +should only obscure the clearest notions, render more insoluble the +problems desired to be resolved by its means, would most assuredly +be looked upon as fallacious; as either useless or dangerous. To be +convinced of this principle, let us examine, without prejudice, if the +theological ideas of the Divinity have ever given the solution to any +one difficulty. Has the human understanding progressed a single step +by the assistance of this metaphysical science? Has it not, on the +contrary, had a tendency to obscure the wore certain science of morals? +Has it not, in many instances, rendered the most essential duties of +our nature problematical? Has it not in a great measure confounded the +notions of virtue and vice, of justice and injustice? Indeed, what +is virtue, in the eyes of the generality of theologians? They will +instantly reply, "that which is conformable to the will of the +incomprehensible beings who govern nature." But way it not be asked, +without offence to the individual opinions of any one, what are these +beings, of whom they are unceasingly talking, without having the +capacity to comprehend them? How can we acquire a knowledge of their +will? They will forthwith reply, with a confidence that is meant to +strike conviction on uninformed minds, by recounting what they are not, +without even attempting to inform us what they are. If they do undertake +to furnish an idea of them, they will heap upon their hypothetical +beings a multitude, of contradictory, incompatible attributes, with +which they will form a whole, at once impossible for the human mind to +conceive or else they will refer to oracles, by which they insist their +intentions have been promulgated to mankind. If, however, they are +requested to prove the authenticity of these oracles, which are at such +variance with each other, they will refer to miracles in support of what +they assert: these miracles, independent of the difficulty there must +exist to repose in them our faith, when, as we have seen, they are +admitted even by the theologians themselves, to be contrary to the +intelligence, the immutability, to the omnipotency of their immaterial +substances, are, moreover, warmly disputed by each particular sect, +as being impositions, practised by the others for their own individual +advantage. As a last resource, then, it will be necessary to accredit +the integrity, to rely on the veracity, to rest on the good faith of +the priests, who announce these oracles. On this again, there arises two +almost insuperable difficulties, in the _first_ place, who shall assure +us of their actual mission? are we quite certain none of them may be +mistaken? how shall we be justified in giving credence to their powers? +are they not these priests themselves, who announce to us that they are +the infallible interpreters of a being whom they acknowledge they do +not at all know? In the _second_ place, which set of these oracular +developements are we to adopt? For to give currency to the whole, would, +in point of fact, annihilate them entirely; seeing, that no two of them +run in unison with each other. This granted, the priests, that is to +say, men extremely suspicious, but little in harmony with each other, +will be the arbiters of morality; they will decide (according to their +own uncertain knowledge, after their various passions, in conformity to +the different perspectives under which they view these things,) on the +whole system of ethics; upon which absolutely rests the repose of +the world--the sterling happiness of each individual. Would this be +a desirable state? would it be that from which humanity has the best +founded prospect of that felicity, which is the desired object of his +research? Again; do we not see that either enthusiasm or interest is the +only standard of their decisions? that their morals are as variable as +their caprice? those who listen to them, very rarely discover to what +line they will adhere. In their various writings, we have evidence of +the most bitter animosities; we find continual contradictions; endless +disputes upon what they themselves acknowledge to be the most essential +points; upon those premises, in the substantive proof of which their +whole system depends; the very beings they depict as their source of +their various creeds, are pourtrayed as variable as themselves; as +frequently changing their plans as these are their arguments. What +results from all this to a rational man? It will be natural for him to +conclude, that neither inconstant gods, nor vacillating priests, whose +opinions are more fluctuating than the seasons, can be the proper +models of a moral system, which should be as regular, as determinate, +as invariable as the laws of nature herself; as that eternal march, from +which we never see her derogate. + +No! Arbitrary, inconclusive, contradictory notions, abstract, +unintelligible speculations, can never be the sterling bases of the +ethical science! They must be evident, demonstrable principles, deduced +from the nature of man, founded upon his wants, inspired by rational +education, rendered familiar by habit, made sacred by wholesome laws, +that will flash conviction on our mind, render systems useful to +mankind, make virtue dear to us--that will people nations with honest +men--fill up the ranks with faithful subjects--crowd them with +intrepid citizens. Incomprehensible beings can present nothing to our +imagination, save vague ideas, which will never embrace any common point +of union amongst those who shall contemplate them. If these beings are +painted as terrible, the mind is led astray; if changeable, it always +precludes us from ascertaining the road we ought to pursue. The menaces +held forth by those, who, in despite of their own assertions, say they +are acquainted with the views, with the determination of these beings, +will seldom do more than render virtue unpleasant; fear alone will +then make us practise with reluctance, that which reason, which our +own immediate interest, ought to make us execute with pleasure. The +inculcation of terrible ideas will only serve to disturb honest persons, +without in the least arresting the progress of the profligate, or +diverting the course of the flagitious: the greater number of men, +when they shall be disposed to sin, to deliver themselves up to vicious +propensities, will cease to contemplate these terrific ideas, will only +behold a merciful God, who is filled with goodness, who will pardon the +transgressions of their weakness. Man never views things but on that +side which is most conformable to his desires. + +The goodness of God cheers the wicked; his rigour disturbs the honest +man. Thus, the qualities with which theology clothes its immaterial +substances, themselves turn out disadvantageous to sound morality. It +is upon this infinite goodness that the most corrupt men will have the +audacity to reckon, when they are either hurried along by crime, or +given up to habitual vice. If, then, they are reminded of their criminal +courses, they reply, "God is good, his mercy is infinite, his clemency +boundless:" thus it may be said that religion itself is pressed into the +service of vice, by the children of turpitude. Superstition, above all, +rather abets crime than represses it, by holding forth to mortals that +by the assistance of certain ceremonies, the performance of certain +rites, the repetition of certain prayers, aided by the payment of +certain sums of money, they can appease the anger of their gods, assuage +the wrath of heaven, wash out the stains of their sins, and be received +with open arms into the happy number of the elect--be placed in +the blissful abodes of eternity. In short, do not the priests of +superstition universally affirm, that they possess infallible secrets, +for reconciling the most perverse to the pale of their respective +systems? + +It must be concluded from this, that however these systems are viewed, +in whatever manner they are considered, they cannot serve for the basis +of morality, which in its very nature is formed to be invariably the +same. Irascible systems are only useful to those who find an interest in +terrifying the ignorance of mankind, that they may advantage themselves +of his fears--profit by his expiations. The nobles of the earth, who are +frequently men not gifted with the most exemplary morals--who do not +on all occasions exhibit the most perfect specimens of self-denial--who +would not, perhaps, be at all times held up as mirrors of virtue, will +not see these formidable systems, when they shall be inclined to listen +to their passions; to lend themselves to the indulgence of their unruly +desires: they will, however, feel no repugnance to make use of them +to frighten others, to the end that they may preserve unimpaired their +superiority; that they may keep entire their prerogatives; that they may +more effectually bind them to servitude. Like the rest of mankind, they +will see their God under the traits of his benevolence; they will always +believe him indulgent to those outrages they may commit against their +fellows, provided they shew due respect for him themselves: superstition +will furnish them with easy means to turn aside his Wrath; its ministers +seldom omit a profitable opportunity, to expiate the crimes of human +nature. + +Morality is not made to follow the caprices of the imagination, the fury +of the passions, the fluctuating interests of men: it ought to possess +stability; to be at all times the same, for all the individuals of the +human race; it ought neither to vary in one country, nor in one race +from another: neither superstition nor religion, has a privilege to make +its immutability subservient to the changeable laws of their systems. +There is but one method to give ethics this solidity; it has been more +than once pointed out in the course of this work: it is only to be +founded upon the nature of man, bottomed upon his duties, rested upon +the relations subsisting between intelligent beings, who are in love, +with their happiness, who are occupied with their own preservation, who +live together in society that they may With greater facility ascertain +these ends. In short we must take for the basis of morality the +necessity of things. + +In weighing these principles, which are self evident, confirmed by +constant experience, approved by reason, drawn from nature herself, we +shall have an undeviating tone of conduct; a sure system of morality, +that will never be in contradiction with itself. Man will have no +occasion to recur to theological speculations to regulate his conduct +in the visible world. We shall then be capacitated to reply to those who +pretend that without them there can be no morality. If we reflect upon +the long tissue of errors, upon the immense chain of wanderings, that +flow from the obscure notions these various systems hold forth--of the +sinister ideas which superstition in all countries inculcates; it would +be much more conformable to truth to say, that all sound ethics, all +morality, either useful to individuals or beneficial to society, is +totally incompatible with systems which never represent their gods +but under the form of absolute monarchs, whose good qualities are +continually eclipsed by dangerous caprices. Consequently, we shall +be obliged to acknowledge, that to establish morality upon a steady +foundation, we must necessarily commence by at least quitting those +chimerical systems upon which the ruinous edifice of supernatural +morality has hitherto been constructed, which during such a number +of ages, has been so uselessly preached up to a great portion of the +inhabitants of the earth. + +Whatever may have been the cause that placed man in his present abode, +that gave him the faculties he possesses; whether the human species be +considered as the work of nature, or whether it be supposed that he owes +his existence to an intelligent being, distinguished from nature; the +existence of man, such as he is, is a fact; we behold in him a being who +thinks, who feels, who has intelligence, who loves himself, who tends +to his own conservation, who in every moment of his duration strives +to render his existence agreeable; who, the more easily to satisfy +his wants and to procure himself pleasure, congregates in society with +beings similar to himself; of whom his conduct can either conciliate +the favour, or draw upon him the disaffection. It is, then, upon these +general sentiments, inherent in his nature, which will subsist as long +as his race shall endure, that we ought to found morality; which is only +a science embracing, the duties of men living together in society. + +These duties have their spring in our nature, they are founded upon our +necessities, because we cannot reach the goal of happiness, if we do not +employ the requisite means: these means constitute the moral science. To +be permanently felicitous, we must so comport ourselves as to merit the +affection, so act as to secure the assistance of those, beings with whom +we are associated; these will only accord us their love, lend us their +esteem, aid us in our projects, labour to our peculiar happiness, but in +proportion as our own exertions shall be employed for their advantage. +It is this necessity, flowing naturally out of the relations of mankind, +that is called MORAL OBLIGATION. It is founded upon reflection, rested +upon those motives competent to determine sensible, intelligent beings, +to pursue that line of conduct, which in best calculated to achieve that +happiness towards which they are continually verging. These motives +in the human species, never can be other than the desire, always +regenerating, of procuring good and avoiding evil. Pleasure and pain, +the hope of happiness, or the fear of misery, are the only motives +suitable to have an efficacious influence on the volition of sensible +beings. To impel them towards this end, it is sufficient these motives +exist and be understood to have a knowledge of them, it is only +requisite to consider our own constitution: according to this, we shall +find we can only love those actions, approve that conduct, from whence +result actual and reciprocal utility; this constitutes VIRTUE. In +consequence, to conserve ourselves, to make our own happiness, to enjoy +security, we are compelled to follow the routine which conducts to +this end; to interest others in our own preservation, we are obliged +to display an interest in theirs; we must do nothing that can have a +tendency to interrupt that mutual co-operation which alone can lead +to the felicity desired. Such is the true establishment of moral +obligation. + +Whenever it is attempted to give any other basis to morality than the +nature of man, we shall always deceive ourselves; none other can have +the least stability; none can be more solid. Some authors, even of great +integrity, have thought, that to give ethics more respectability in the +eyes of man, to render more inviolable those duties which his nature +imposes on him, it was needful to clothe them with the authority of a +being whom they have made superior to nature--whom they have rendered +more powerful than necessity. Theology, seizing on these ideas, with its +own general want of just inference, has in consequence invaded morality; +has endeavoured to connect it with its various systems. By some it has +been imagined, this union would render virtue more sacred; that the fear +attached to invisible powers, who govern nature, would lend more weight, +would give more efficacy to its laws; in short, it has been believed +that man, persuaded, of the necessity of the moral system, seeing it +united with superstition, would contemplate superstition itself as +necessary to his happiness. Indeed it is the supposition that these +systems are essential to morality, that sustains the theological +ideas--that gives permanency to the greater part of all the creeds on +earth; it is erroneously imagined that without them man would neither +understand nor practise the duties he owes to others. This prejudice +once established, gives currency to the opinion that the vague ideas +growing out of these systems are in such a manner connected with +morality, are so linked with the actual welfare of society, that they +cannot be attacked without overturning the social duties that bind man +to his fellow. It is thought that the reciprocity of wants, the desire +of happiness, the evident interests of the community, would be mere +skeleton motives, devoid of all active energy, if they did not borrow +their substance from these various systems; if they were not invested +with the force derived from these numerous creeds; if they were not +clothed with the sanction of those ideas which have been made the +arbiters of all things. + +Nothing, however, is more borne out by the evidence of experience, +nothing has more thoroughly impressed itself on the minds of reflecting +men, than the danger always arising from connecting truth with fiction; +the known with the unknown; the delirium of enthusiasm, with the +tranquillity of reason. Indeed what has resulted from the confused +alliance, from the marvellous speculations, which theology has made with +the most substantive realities? of mixing up its evanescent conjectures +with the confirmed aphorisms of time? The imagination bewildered, has +mistaken truth: superstition, by aid of its gratuitous suppositions, has +commanded nature--made reason bow, under its bulky yoke,--submitted man +to its own peculiar caprices; very frequently in the name of its gods +obliged him to stifle his nature, to piously violate the most sacred +duties of morality. When these superstitions have been desirous of +restraining mortals whom they had previously hood-winked, whom they had +rendered irrational, it gave them only ideal curbs, imaginary motives; +it substituted unsubstantial causes, for those which were substantive; +marvellous supernatural powers, for those which were natural, and +well understood; it supplied actual realities, by ideal romances and +visionary fables. By this inversion of principle, morality had no +longer any fixed basis: nature, reason, virtue, demonstration, were laid +prostrate before the most undefinable systems; were made to depend +upon oracular promulgations, which never spake distinctly; indeed, they +generally silenced reason, were often delivered by fanatics, which time +proved to be impostors; by those who, always adopting the appellation +of inspired beings, gave forth nothing but the wanderings of their own +delirium, or else were desirous of profiting by the errors which +they themselves instilled into mankind. Thus these men became +deeply interested in preaching abject submission, non-resistance, +passive-obedience, factitious virtues, frivolous ceremonies; in short, +an arbitrary morality, conformable to their own reigning passions; +frequently prejudicial to the rest of the human race. + +It was thus, in making ethics flow from these various systems, they in +point of fact submitted it to the dominant passions of men, who had a +direct interest in moulding it to their own advantage. In being disposed +to found it upon undemonstrated theories, they founded it upon nothing; +in deriving it from imaginary sources, of which each individual forms to +himself his own notion, generally adverse to that of his neighbour; +in resting it upon obscure oracles, always delivered ambiguously, +frequently interpreted by men in the height of delirium, sometimes +by knaves, who had immediate interests to promote, they rendered it +unsteady--devoid of fixed principle,--too frequently left it to the +mercy of the most crafty of mankind. In proposing to man the changeable +creeds of the theologians for a model, they weakened the moral system +of human actions; frequently annihilated that which was furnished by +nature; often substituted in its place nothing but the most perplexing +incertitude; the most ruinous inconsistency. These systems, by the +qualities which are ascribed, to them, become inexplicable enigmas, +which each expounds as best suits himself; which each explains after his +own peculiar mode of thinking; in which the theologian ever finds that +which most harmonizes with his designs; which he can bend to his own +sinister purposes; which he offers as irrefragible evidence of the +rectitude of those actions, which at bottom have nothing but his own +advantage in view. If they exhort the gentle, indulgent, equitable man, +to be good, compassionate, benevolent; they equally excite the furious, +who is destitute of these qualities, to be intolerant, inhuman, +pitiless. The morality of these systems varies in each individual; +differs in one country from another; in fact, those actions which +some men look upon as sacred, which they have learned to consider +meritorious, make others shudder with horror--fill them with the most +painful recollections. Some see the Divinity filled with gentleness and +mercy; others behold him as full of wrath and fury, whose anger is to be +assuaged by the commission of the most shocking cruelties. + +The morality of nature is clear, it is evident even to those who outrage +it. It is not thus with superstitious morality; this is as obscure +as the systems which prescribe it; or rather as fluctuating as the +passions, as changeable as the temperaments, of those who expound them; +if it was left to the theologians, ethics ought to be considered as the +science of all others the most problematical, the most unsteady, the +most difficult to bring to a point; it would require the most profound, +penetrating genius, the most active, vigorous mind, to discover the +principles of those duties man owes to himself, that he ought to +exercise towards others; this would render the sources of the moral +system attainable by a very small number of individuals; would +effectually lock them up in the cabinets of the metaphysicians; place +them under the treacherous guardianship of priests: to derive it from +those systems, which are in themselves undefinable, with the foundations +of which no one is actually acquainted, which each contemplates after +his own mode, modifies after his own peculiar ideas, is at once to +submit it to the caprice of every individual; it is completely to +acknowledge, we know not from whence it is derived, nor whence it has +its principles. Whatever may be the agent upon whom they make nature, or +the beings she contains, to depend; with whatever power they way suppose +him invested, it is very certain that man either does, or does not +exist; but as soon as his existence is acknowledged, as soon as it is +admitted to be what it actually is, when he shall be allowed to be a +sensible being living in society, in love with his own felicity, they +cannot without either annihilating him, or new modelling him, cause +him to exist otherwise than he does. Therefore, according to his actual +essence, agreeable to his absolute qualities, conformable to those +modifications which constitute him a being, of the human species, +morality becomes necessary to him, and the desire of conserving himself +will make him prefer virtue to vice, by the same necessity that +he prefers pleasure to pain. If, following up the doctrine of the +theologians, "that man hath occasion for supernatural grace to enable +him to do good," it must be very injurious to sound principles of +morality; because he will always wait for "the call from above," to +exercise that virtue, which is indispensable to his welfare. Tertullian, +nevertheless says expressly, "wherefore will ye trouble yourselves, +seeking after the law of God, whilst ye have that which is common to all +the world, and which is written on the tablets of nature?" + +To say, that man cannot possess any moral sentiments without embracing +the discordant systems offered to his acceptance, is, in point of fact, +saying, that he cannot distinguish virtue from vice; it is to pretend +that without these systems, man would not feel the necessity of eating +to live, would not make the least distinction, would be absolutely +without choice in his food: it is to pretend, that unless he is fully +acquainted with the name, character, and qualities of the individual +who prepares a mess for him, he is not competent to discriminate whether +this mess be agreeable or disagreeable, good or bad. He who does not +feel himself satisfied what opinions to adopt, upon the foundation and +moral attributes of these systems, or who even formally denies them, +cannot at least doubt his own existence-his own functions--his own +qualities--his own mode of feeling--his own method of judging; neither +can he doubt the existence of other organized beings similar to himself; +in whom every thing discovers to him qualities analogous with his own; +of whom he can, by certain actions, either gain the love or incur the +hatred--secure the assistance or attract the ill-will--merit the esteem +or elicit the contempt; this knowledge is sufficient to enable him +to distinguish moral good and evil. In short, every man enjoying +a well-ordered organization, possessing the faculty of making true +experience, will only need to contemplate himself in order to discover +what he owes to others: his own nature will enlighten him much more +effectually upon his duties, than those systems in which he will consult +either his own unruly passions, those of some enthusiast, or those of +an impostor. He will allow, that to conserve himself, to secure his own +permanent welfare, he is frequently obliged to resist the blind impulse +of his own desires; that to conciliate the benevolence of others, he +must act in a mode conformable to their advantage; in reasoning thus, +he will find out what virtue actually is; if he puts his theory into +practice, he will be virtuous; he will be rewarded for his conduct by +the harmony of his own machine; by the legitimate esteem of himself, +confirmed by the good opinion of others, whose kindness he will have +secured: if he acts in a contrary mode, the trouble that will ensue, the +disorder of his frame, will quickly warn him that nature, thwarted by +his actions, disapproves his conduct, which is injurious to himself; +to which he will be obliged to add the condemnation of others, who will +hate him. If the wanderings of his mind prevent him from seeing the more +immediate consequences of his irregularities, neither will he perceive +the distant rewards, the remote punishments, which these systems +hold forth; because they will never speak to him so distinctly as his +conscience, which will either reward or punish him on the spot. Theology +has never yet known how to give a true definition of virtue: according +to it, it is an effort of grace, that disposes man to do that which is +agreeable to the Divinity. But what is this grace? How doth it act +upon man? How shall we know what is agreeable to a Divinity who is +incomprehensible to all men? + +Every thing that has been advanced evidently proves, that superstitious +morality is an infinite loser when compared with the morality of nature, +with which, indeed, it is found in perpetual contradiction. Nature +invites man to love himself, to preserve his existence, to incessantly +augment the sum of his happiness: superstition teaches him to be in love +only with formidable doctrines, calculated to generate his dislike; +to detest himself; to sacrifice to his idols his most pleasing +sensations--the most legitimate pleasures of his heart. Nature counsels +man to consult reason, to adopt it for his guide; superstition +pourtrays this reason as corrupted, as a treacherous director, that +will infallibly lead him astray. Nature warns him to enlighten his +understanding, to search after truth, to inform himself of his duties; +superstition enjoins him not to examine any thing, to remain in +ignorance, to fear truth; it persuades him there are no relations so +important to his interest, as those which subsist between himself and +systems which he can never understand. Nature tells the being who is +in love with his welfare, to moderate his passions, to resist them when +they are found destructive to himself, to counteract them by substantive +motives collected from experience; superstition desires a sensible being +to have no passions, to be an insensible mass, or else to combat his +propensities by motives borrowed from the imagination, which are as +variable as itself. Nature exhorts man to be sociable, to love his +fellow creatures, to be just, peaceable, indulgent, benevolent, to +permit his associates to freely enjoy their opinions; superstition +admonishes him to fly society, to detach himself from his fellow +mortals, to hate them when their imagination does not procure them +dreams conformable to his own; to break through the most sacred bonds, +to maintain his own opinions, or to frustrate those of his neighbour; to +torment, to persecute, to massacre, those who will not be mad after his +own peculiar manner. Nature exacts that man in society should cherish +glory, labour to render himself estimable, endeavour to establish an +imperishable name, to be active, courageous, industrious; superstition +tells him to be abject, pusillanimous, to live in obscurity, to occupy +himself with ceremonies; it says to him, be useless to thyself, and do +nothing for others. Nature proposes to the citizen, for his model, men +endued with honest, noble, energetic souls, who have usefully served +their fellow citizens; superstition recommends to his imitation mean, +cringing sycophants; extols pious enthusiasts, frantic penitents, +zealous fanatics, who for the most ridiculous opinions have disturbed +the tranquility of empires. Nature urges the husband to be tender, to +attach himself to the company of his mate, to cherish her in his bosom; +superstition makes a crime of his susceptibility, frequently obliges +him to look upon the conjugal bonds as a state of pollution, as the +offspring of imperfection. Nature calls to the father to nurture his +children, to cherish their affection, to make them useful members of +society; superstition advises him to rear them in fear of its systems, +to hoodwink them, to make them superstitious, which renders them +incapable of actually serving society, but extremely well calculated to +disturb its repose. Nature cries out to children to honor their parents, +to listen to their admonitions, to be the support of their old age; +superstition says, prefer the oracles; in support of the systems of +which you are an admitted member, trample father and mother under your +feet. Nature holds out to the philosopher that he should occupy +himself with useful objects, consecrate his cares to his country, make +advantageous discoveries, suitable to perfect the condition of mankind; +superstition saith, occupy thyself with useless reveries; employ thy +time in endless dispute; scatter about with a lavish hand the seeds of +discord, calculated to induce the carnage of thy fellows; obstinately +maintain opinions which thou thyself canst never understand. Nature +points out to the perverse man, that he should blush for his vices, that +he should feel sorrow for his disgraceful propensities, that he should +be ashamed of crime; it shews him, that his most secret irregularities +will necessarily have an influence over his own felicity; superstition +crieth to the most corrupt men, to the most flagitious mortals, "do not +irritate the gods, whom thou knowest not; but if, peradventure, against +their express command, thou dost deliver thyself up to crime, remember +that their mercy is infinite, that their compassion endureth for ever, +that therefore they may be easily appeased; thou hast nothing more to +do than to go into their temples, prostrate thyself before their +altars, humiliate thyself at the feet of their ministers; expiate thy +transgressions by largesses, by sacrifices, by offerings, by ceremonies, +and by prayer; these things done with a willing spirit, and a contrite +heart, will pacify thine own conscience, and cleanse thee in the eyes of +heaven." + +The rights of the citizen, or the man in society, are not less injured +by superstition, which is always in contradiction with sound politics. +Nature says distinctly to man, "thou art free; no power on earth can +justly deprive thee of thy rights, without thine own consent; and even +then, thou canst not legitimately make thyself a slave to thy like." +Superstition tells him he is a slave, condemned to groan all his life +under the iron rod of the representatives of its system. Nature commands +man to love the country which gave him birth, to serve it faithfully, +to blend his interests with it, to unite against all those who shall +attempt to injure it; superstition generally orders him to obey without +murmur the tyrants who oppress it, to serve them against its best +interests, to merit their favors by contributing to enslave their fellow +citizens to their ungovernable caprices: notwithstanding these general +orders, if the sovereign be not sufficiently devoted to the priest, +superstition quickly changes its language, it then calls upon subjects +to become rebels; it makes it a duty in them to resist their masters; +it cries out to them, "it is better to obey the gods than men." Nature +acquaints princes that they are men: that it is not by their capricious +whims that they can decide what is just; that it is not their wayward +humours that can mark what is unjust; that the public will maketh the +law. Superstition often insinuates to them that they are gods, to whom +nothing in this world ought to offer resistance; sometimes, indeed, it +transforms them into tyrants, whom enraged heaven is desirous should be +immolated to its wrath. + +Superstition corrupts princes; these corrupt the law, which, like +themselves, becomes unjust; from thence institutions are perverted; +education only forms men who are worthless, blinded with prejudice, +smitten with vain objects, enamoured of wealth, devoted to pleasures, +which they must obtain by iniquitous means: thus nature, mistaken, is +disdained; virtue is only a shadow quickly sacrificed to the slightest +interest, while superstition, far from remedying these evils to which +it has given birth, does nothing more than render them still more +inveterate; or else engenders sterile regrets which it presently +effaces: thus, by its operation, man is obliged to yield to the force of +habit, to the general example, to the stream of those propensities, to +those causes of confusion, which conspire to hurry all his species, who +are not willing to renounce their own welfare, on to the commission of +crime. + +Here is the mode by which superstition, united with politics, exert +their efforts to pervert, abuse, and poison the heart of man; the +generality of human institutions appear to have only for their object to +abase the human character, to render it more flagitiously wicked. Do +not then let us be at all astonished if morality is almost every where +a barren speculation, from which every one is obliged to deviate in +practice, if he will not risk the rendering himself unhappy. Men can +only have sound morals, when, renouncing his prejudices, he consults +his nature; but the continued impulse which his soul is every moment +receiving, on the part of more powerful motives, quickly compels him +to forget those ethical rules which nature points out to him. He is +continually floating between vice and virtue; we behold him unceasingly +in contradiction with himself; if, sometimes, he justly appreciates the +value of an honest, upright conduct, experience very soon shews him, +that this cannot lead him to any thing, which he has been taught to +desire, on the contrary, that it may be an invincible obstacle to the +happiness which his heart never ceases for an instant to search after. +In corrupt societies it is necessary to become corrupt, in order to +become happy. + +Citizens, led astray at the same time both by their spiritual and +temporal guides, neither knew reason nor virtue. The slaves both of +their superstitious systems, and of men like themselves, they had all +the vices attached to slavery; kept in a perpetual state of infancy, +they had neither knowledge nor principles; those who preached virtue to +them, knew nothing of it themselves, and could not undeceive them +with respect to those baubles in which they had learned to make their +happiness consist. In vain they cried out to them to stifle those +passions which every thing conspired to unloose: in vain they made the +thunder of the gods roll to intimidate men whose tumultuous passions +rendered them deaf. It was soon discovered that the gods of the heavens +were much less feared than those of the earth; that the favour of the +latter procured a much more substantive welfare than the promises of +the former; that the riches of this world were more tangible than the +treasures reserved for favorites in the next; that it was much more +advantageous for men to conform themselves to the views of visible +powers than to those of powers who were not within the compass of their +visual faculties. + +Thus society, corrupted by its priests, guided by their caprice, could +only bring forth a corrupt offspring. It gave birth to avaricious, +ambitious, jealous, dissolute citizens, who never saw any thing happy +but crime; who beheld meanness rewarded; incapacity honoured; wealth +adored; debauchery held in esteem; who almost every where found talents +discouraged; virtue neglected; truth proscribed; elevation of soul +crushed; justice trodden under foot; moderation languishing in misery; +liberality of mind obligated to groan under the ponderous bulk of +haughty injustice. + +In the midst of this disorder, in this confusion of ideas, the precepts +of morality could only be vague declamations, incapable of convincing +any one. What barrier could superstition, with its imaginary motives, +oppose to the general corruption? When it spake reason, it could not be +heard; its gods themselves were not sufficiently powerful to resist the +torrent; its menaces failed of effect, on those hearts which every thing +hurried along to crime; its distant promises could not counterbalance +present advantages; its expiations, always ready to cleanse mortals from +their sins, emboldened them to persevere in their criminal pursuits; its +frivolous ceremonies calmed their consciences; its zeal, its disputes, +its caprices, only multiplied the evils, with which society found itself +afflicted; only gave them an inveteracy that rendered them more +widely mischievous; in short, in the most vitiated nations there was +a multitude of devotees, and but very few honest men. Great and small +listened to the doctrines of superstition, when they appeared favorable +to their dominant passions; when they were desirous to counteract +them, they listened no longer. Whenever superstition was conformable to +morality, it appeared incommodious, it was only followed when it +either combatted ethics or destroyed them. The despot himself found +it marvellous, when it assured him he was a god upon earth; that his +subjects were born to adore him alone, to administer to his phantasms. +He neglected it when it told him to be just; from thence he saw it was +in contradiction with itself, that it was useless to preach equity to +a deified mortal; besides, he was assured the gods would pardon every +thing, as soon as he should consent to recur to his priests, always +ready to reconcile them; the most wicked of their subjects reckoned in +the same manner upon their divine assistance: thus superstition, far +from restraining vice, assured its impunity; its menaces could not +destroy the effects which its unworthy flattery had produced in princes; +these same menaces could not annihilate the hope which its expiations +had furnished to all. Sovereigns, either inflated with pride, or always +confident of washing out their crimes by timely sacrifices, no longer +actually feared their gods; become gods themselves, they believed they +were permitted any thing against poor pitiful mortals, whom they no +longer considered under any other light than as playthings destined for +their earthly amusement. + +If the nature of man was consulted in his politics which supernatural +ideas have so woefully depraved, it would completely rectify those false +notions that are entertained equally by sovereigns and by subjects; +it would contribute more amply than all the superstitions existing, +to render society happy, powerful, and flourishing under rational +authority. Nature would teach man, it is for the purpose of enjoying +a greater portion of happiness, that mortals live together in society; +that it is its own preservation, its own immediate felicity, that +society should have for its determinate, unchangeable object: that +without equity, a nation only resembles a congregation of enemies; that +his most cruel foe, is the man who deceives him in order that he may +enslave him; that the scourges most to be feared, are those priests who +corrupt his chiefs, who, in the name of the gods assure them of +impunity for their crimes: she would prove to him that association is a +misfortune under unjust, negligent, destructive governments. + +This nature, interrogated by princes, would teach them they are men and +not gods; that their power is only derived from the consent of other +men; that they themselves are citizens, charged by other citizens, with +the care of watching over the safety of the whole; that the law ought +to be only the expression of the public will; that it is never permitted +them to counteract nature, or to thwart the invariable end of society. +This nature would make monarchs feel, that to be truly great, to be +decidedly powerful, they ought to command elevated, virtuous souls; not +minds degraded by despotism, vitiated by superstition. This nature would +teach sovereigns, that in order to be cherished by their subjects, they +ought to afford them succour; to cause them to enjoy those benefits +which their wants render imperative, that they should at all times +maintain them, inviolably, in the possession of their rights, of which +they are the appointed defenders--of which they are the constituted +guardians. This nature would prove to all those princes who should deign +to consult her, that it is only by good actions, by kindness, they can +either merit the love, or secure the attachment of the people; that +oppression does nothing more than raise up enemies against them; that +violence only makes their power unsteady; that force, however +brutally used, cannot confer on them any legitimate right; that beings +essentially in love with happiness, must sooner or later finish by +revolting against an authority that establishes itself by injustice; +that only makes itself felt by the outrage it commits: this is the +manner in which nature, the sovereign of all beings, in whose system all +are equal, would speak to one of these superb monarchs, whom flattery +has deified:--"Untoward, headstrong child! Pigmy, so proud of commanding +pigmies! Have they then assured thee that thou art a god? Have they +flattered thee that thou art something supernatural? Know there is +nothing superior to myself. Contemplate thine own insignificance, +acknowledge thine impotence against the slightest of my blows. I can +break thy sceptre; I can take away thine existence; I can level thy +throne with the dust; I can scatter thy people; I can destroy even the +earth which thou inhabitest; and yet thou hast the folly to believe thou +art a god. Be then, again, thyself; honestly avow that thou art a man, +formed to submit to my laws equally with the meanest of thy subjects. +Learn then, and never let it escape thy memory, that thou art the man of +thy people; the minister of thy nation; the interpreter of its laws; +the executer of its will; the fellow-citizen of those whom thou hast the +right of commanding, only because they consent to obey thee, in view of +that well being which thou promisest to procure for them. Reign, then, +on these conditions; fulfil thy sacred engagements. Be benevolent: above +all, equitable. If thou art willing to have thy power assured to thee, +never abuse it; let it be circumscribed by the immovable limits of +eternal justice. Be the father of thy people, and they will cherish thee +as thy children. But, if unmindful of thy duties, thou neglectest them; +if negligent of thine own interest, thou separatest them from those of +thy great family, if thou refusest to thy subjects that happiness which +thou owest them; if, heedless of thy own security, thou armest thyself +against them; thou shall be like all tyrants, the slave to gloomy care, +the bondman of alarm, the vassal of cruel suspicion: thou wilt become +the victim to thine own folly. Thy people, reduced to despair, shorn of +their felicity, will no longer acknowledge thy divine rights. In vain, +then, thou wouldst sue for aid to that superstition which hath deified +thee; it can avail nothing with thy people, whom sharp misery had +rendered deaf; heaven will abandon thee to the fury of those enemies +to which thy frenzy shall have given birth. Superstitious systems can +effect nothing against my irrevocable decrees, which will that man shall +ever irritate himself against the cause of his sorrows." + +In short, every thing would make known to rational princes, that they +have no occasion for superstition to be faithfully obeyed on earth; that +all the powers contained in these systems will not sustain them when +they shall act the tyrant; that their true friends are those who +undeceive the people in their delusions; that their real enemies are +those who intoxicate them with flattery--who harden them in crime--who +make the road to heaven too easy for them--who feed them with fanciful, +chimerical doctrines, calculated to make them swerve from those cares, +to divert them from those sentiments, which they justly owe to their +nations. + +It is then, I repeat it, only by re-conducting man to nature, that we +can procure him distinct notions, evident opinions, certain knowledge; +it is only by shewing him his true relations with his fellows, that +we can place him on the road to happiness. The human mind, blinded +by theology, has scarcely advanced a single step. Man's superstitious +systems have rendered him sceptical on the most demonstrable truths. +Superstition, while it pervaded every thing, while it had an universal +influence, served to corrupt the whole: philosophy, dragged in its +train, although it swelled its triumphant procession, was no longer any +thing but an imaginary science: it quitted the real world to plunge into +the sinuosities of the ideal, inconceivable labyrinths of metaphysics; +it neglected nature, who spontaneously opened her book to its +examination, to occupy itself with systems filled with spirits, with +invisible powers, which only served to render all questions more +obscure; which, the more they were probed, the more inexplicable +they became; which took delight in promulgating that which no one was +competent to understand. In all difficulties it introduced the Divinity; +from thence things only became more and more perplexed, until nothing +could be explained. Theological notions appear only to have been +invented to put man's reason to flight; to confound his judgment; to +deceive his mind; to overturn his clearest ideas in every science. In +the hands of the theologian, logic, or the art of reasoning, was nothing +more than an unintelligible jargon, calculated to support sophism, +to countenance falsehood, to attempt to prove the most palpable +contradictions. Morality, as we have seen, became wavering and +uncertain, because it was founded on ideal systems, never in harmony +with themselves, which, on the contrary, were continually contradicting +their own most positive assertions. Politics, as we have elsewhere said, +were cruelly perverted by the fallacious ideas given to sovereigns of +their actual rights. Jurisprudence was determinately submitted to the +caprices of superstition, which shackled labour, chained down human +industry, controuled activity, and fettered the commerce of nations. +Every thing, in short, was sacrificed to the immediate interests of +these theologians: in the place of every rational science, they taught +nothing but an obscure, quarrelsome metaphysics, which but too often +caused the blood of those unhappy people to flow copiously who were +incapable of understanding its hallucinations. + +Born an enemy to experience, theology, that supernatural science, was +an invincible obstacle to the progress of the natural sciences, as +it almost always threw itself in their way. It was not permitted to +experimental philosophy, to natural history, to anatomy, to see any +thing but through the jaundiced eye of superstition. The most evident +facts were rejected with disdain, proscribed with horror, when ever they +could not be made to quadrate with the idle hypotheses of superstition. +Virgil, the Bishop of Saltzburg, was condemned by the church, for having +dared to maintain the existence of the antipodes; Gallileo suffered the +most cruel persecutions, for asserting that the sun did not make its +revolution round the earth. Descartes was obliged to die in a foreign +land. Priests, indeed, have a right to be the enemies to the sciences; +the progress of reason must, sooner or later, annihilate superstitious +ideas. Nothing that is founded upon nature, that is bottomed upon truth, +can ever be lost; while the systems of imaginations, the creeds of +imposture, must be overturned. Theology unceasingly opposed itself to +the happiness of nations--to the progress of the human mind--to useful +researches--to the freedom of thought; it kept man in ignorance; all +his steps being guided by it, he was no more than a tissue of errors. +Indeed, is it resolving a question in natural philosophy, to say that +an effect which excites our surprise, that an unusual phenomenon, that a +volcano, a deluge, a hurricane, a comet, &c. are either signs of divine +wrath, or works contrary to the laws of nature? In persuading nations, +as it has done, that the calamities, whether physical or moral, which +they experience, are the effects of the divine anger, or chastisements +which his power inflicts on them, has it not, in fact, prevented them +from seeking after remedies for these evils? Would it not have been more +useful to have studied the nature of things, to have sought in nature +herself, or in human industry, for succours against those sorrows +with which mortals are afflicted, than to attribute the evil which +man experiences to an unknown power, against whose will it cannot be +supposed there exists any relief? The study of nature, the search after +truth, elevates the soul, expands the genius, is calculated to render +man active, to make him courageous. Theological notions appear to +have been made to debase him, to contract his mind, to plunge him into +despondence. In the place of attributing to the divine vengeance those +wars, those famines, those sterilities, those contagions, that multitude +of calamities, which desolate the earth; would it not have been more +useful, more consistent with truth, to have shewn man that these evils +were to be ascribed to his own folly, or rather to the unruly passions, +to the want of energy, to the tyranny of some princes, who sacrifice +nations to their frightful delirium? The irrational people, instead of +amusing themselves with expiations for their pretended crimes, seeking +to render themselves acceptable to imaginary powers; should they not +rather have sought in a more healthy administration, the true means of +avoiding those scourges, to which they were the victims? Natural evils +demand natural remedies: ought not experience then long since to +have convinced mortals of the inefficacy of supernatural remedies, of +expiatory sacrifices, of fastings, of processions, &c. which almost all +the people of the earth have vainly opposed to the disasters which they +experienced? + +Let us then conclude, that theology with its notions, far from being +useful to the human species, is the true source of all those sorrows +which afflict the earth of all those errors by which man is blinded; of +those prejudices which benumb mankind; of that ignorance which renders +him credulous; of those vices which torment him; of those governments +which oppress him. Let us be fully persuaded that those theological, +supernatural ideas, with which man is inspired from his infancy, are +the actual causes of his habitual folly; are the springs of his +superstitious quarrels; of his sacred dissensions; of his inhuman +persecutions. Let us, at length, acknowledge, that they are these fatal +ideas which have obscured morality; corrupted polities; retarded the +progress of the sciences; annihilated happiness; banished peace from the +bosom of mankind, Then let it be no longer dissimulated, that all those +calamities, for which man turns his eyes towards heaven, bathed in +tears, have their spring in the imaginary systems he has adopted: +let him, therefore, cease to expect relief from them; let him seek +in nature, let him search in his own energies, those resources, which +superstition, deaf to his cries, will never procure for him. Let him +consult the legitimate desires of his heart, and he will find that which +he oweth to himself, also that which he oweth to others; let him examine +his own essence, let him dive into the aim of society, from thence he +will no longer be a slave; let him consult experience, he will find +truth, and he will discover, that _error can never possible render him +happy._ + + + + + +CHAP. X. + +_Man can form no Conclusion from the Ideas which are offered him of the +Divinity.--Of their want of just Inference.--Of the Inutility of his +Conduct._ + + +It has been already stated, that ideas to be useful, must be founded +upon truth; that experience must at all times demonstrate their justice: +if, therefore, as we have proved, the erroneous ideas which man has in +almost all ages formed to himself of the Divinity, far from being of +utility, are prejudicial to morality, to politics, to the happiness of +society, to the welfare of the individuals who compose it, in short, to +the progress of the human understanding; reason, and our interest, ought +to make us feel the necessity of banishing from our mind these illusive, +futile opinions, which can never do more than confound it--which can +only disturb the tranquillity of our hearts. In vain should we flatter +ourselves with arriving at the correction of theological notions; +erroneous in their principles, they are not susceptible of reform. Under +whatever shape an error presents itself, as soon as man shall attach an +undue importance to it, it will, sooner or later, finish by producing +consequences dangerous in proportion to their extent. Besides, the +inutility of those researches, which in all ages have been made after +the true nature of the Divinity, the notions that have hitherto been +entertained, have done little more than throw it into greater obscurity, +even to those who have most profoundly meditated on the subject; then, +ought not this very inutility to convince us that this subject is not +within the reach of our capacity that this being will not be better +known to us, or by our descendants, than it hath been to our ancestors, +either the most savage or the most ignorant? The object, which of all +others man has at all times reasoned upon the most, written upon the +most, nevertheless remains the least known; far from progressing in his +research, time, with the aid of theological ideas, has only rendered +it more impossible to be conceived. If the Divinity be such as dreaming +theology depicts, he must himself be a Divinity who is competent to form +an idea of him. We know little of man, we hardly know ourselves, or our +own faculties, yet we are disposed to reason upon a being inaccessible +to our senses. Let us, then, travel in peace over the line described for +us by nature, without having a wish to diverge from it, to hunt after +vague systems; let us occupy ourselves with our true happiness; let us +profit of the benefits spread before us; let us labour to multiply them, +by diminishing the number of our errors; let us quietly submit to those +evils we cannot avoid, and not augment them by filling our mind with +prejudices calculated to lead us astray. When we shall give it serious +reflection, every thing will clearly prove that the pretended science of +theology is, in truth, nothing but presumptuous ignorance, masked under +pompous, unintelligible words. In short, let us terminate unfruitful +researches; be content at least to acknowledge our invincible ignorance; +it will clearly be more substantively advantageous, than an arrogant +science, which has hitherto done little more than sow discord on the +earth--affliction in the heart of man. + +In supposing a sovereign intelligence who governs the world; in +supposing a Divinity who exacts from his creatures that they should +have a knowledge of him, that they should understand his attributes, +his wisdom, his power; who is desirous they should render him homage; it +must be allowed, that no man on earth in this respect completely fulfils +the views of providence. Indeed, nothing is more demonstrable than the +impossibility in which the theologians find themselves, to form to their +mind any idea whatever of the Divinity. Procopius, the first bishop of +the Goths, says in the most solemn manner: "I esteem it a very foolish +temerity to be disposed to penetrate into the knowledge of the nature of +God;" and further on he acknowledges, "that he has nothing more to say +of him, except that he is perfectly good. He who knoweth more, whether +he be ecclesiastic or layman, has only to tell it." The weakness, the +obscurity of the proofs offered, of the systems attributed to him, the +manifest contradictions into which they fall, the sophisms, the begging +of the question, which are employed, evidently prove they are themselves +in the greatest incertitude upon the nature of that being with whom it +is their profession to occupy their thoughts: even the author of _A +New View of Society_ acknowledges, "that up to this moment it is, not +possible yet to say which is right or which is wrong: that had any one +of the various opposing systems which until this day have governed the +world, and disunited man from man, been true, without any mixture of +error; that system, very speedily after its public promulgation, would +have pervaded society, and compelled all men to have acknowledged its +truth." But granting that they have a knowledge of this being, that +his essence, his attributes, his systems, were so fully demonstrated to +them, as no longer to leave any doubt in their mind, do the rest of the +human race enjoy the same advantages? Are they, in fact, in a condition +to be charged with this knowledge? Ingenuously, how many persons are +to be found in the world, who have the leisure, the capacity, the +penetration, necessary to understand what is meant to be designated +under the name of an immaterial being--of a pure spirit, who moveth +matter without being himself matter; who is the motive of all the powers +of nature, without being contained in nature--without being able to +touch it? Are there, in the most religious societies, many persons who +are competent to follow their spiritual guides, in the subtle proofs +which they adduce in evidence of their creeds, upon which they bottom +their systems of theology? + +Without question very few men are capable of profound, connected +meditation; the exercise of intense thought is, for the greater number, +a species of labour as painful as it is unusual. The people, obliged +to toil hard, in order to obtain subsistence, are commonly incapable of +reflection; nobles, men of the world, women, young people, occupied with +their own immediate affairs, taken up with gratifying their passions, +employed in procuring themselves pleasure, as rarely think deeply as the +uninformed. There are not, perhaps, two men in an hundred thousand, +who have seriously asked themselves the question, _What it is they +understand by the word God?_ Whilst it is extremely rare to find persons +to whom the nature of God is a problem. Nevertheless, as we have said, +conviction supposes that evidence alone has banished doubt from the +mind. Where, then, are the web who are convinced of the rectitude +of these systems? Who are those in whom we shall find the complete +certitude of these truths, so important to all? Who are the persons, who +have given themselves an accurate account of the ideas they have +formed upon the Divinity, upon his attributes, upon his essence? Alas! +throughout the whole world, are only to be seen some speculators, who, +by dint of occupying themselves with the idea, have, with great fatuity, +believed they have discovered something decisive in the confused, +unconnected wanderings of their own imagination; they have, in +consequence, endeavoured to form a whole, which, chimerical as it is, +they have accustomed themselves to consider as actually existing: by +force of musing upon it, they have sometimes persuaded themselves they, +saw it distinctly; these have not unfrequently succeeded in making +others believe, their reveries, although they may not have mused upon it +quite so much as themselves. + +It is seldom more than hearsay, that the mass of the people adopt +either the systems of their fathers, or of their priests: authority, +confidence, submission, habit, take place of conviction--supersede +proof; they prostrate themselves before idols, lend themselves to +different creeds, because their ancestors have taught them to fall down, +and worship; but never do they inquire wherefore they bend the knee: it +is only because, in times far distant, their legislators, their guides, +have imposed it upon them as a duty; these have said, "adore and believe +those gods, whom ye cannot comprehend; yield yourselves in this +instance to our profound wisdom; we know more than ye do respecting +the Divinity." But wherefore, it might be inquired, should I take this +system upon your authority? It is, they will reply, because the gods +will have it thus; because they will punish you, if you dare to resist. +But are not these gods the thing in question? Nevertheless, man has +always been satisfied with this circle of errors; the idleness of his +mind made him find it most easy to yield to the judgment of others. +All superstitions are uniformly founded upon error, established by +authority; equally forbid examination; are equally indisposed to permit +that man should reason upon them; it is power that wills he should +unconditionally accredit them: they are rested solely upon the influence +of some few men, who pretend to a knowledge of things, which they admit +are incomprehensible for all their species; who, at the same time, +affirm they are sent as missionaries to announce them to the inhabitants +of the earth: these inconceivable systems, formed in the brain of some +enthusiastic persons, have most unquestionably occasion for men to +expound them to their fellows. Man is generally credulous as a child +upon those objects which relate to superstition; he is told he must +believe them; as he generally understands nothing of the matter, he +imagines he runs no risk in joining sentiments with his priest, whom he +supposes has been competent to discover what he himself is not able to +comprehend. The most rational people argue thus: "What shall I do? What +interest can so many persons have to deceive?" But, seriously, does this +prove that they do not deceive? They may do it from two motives: either +because they are themselves deceived, or because they have a great +interest in deceiving. By the confession of the theologians themselves, +man is, for the greater part, without _religion_: he has only +_superstition_. Superstition, according to them, "is a worship of the +Divinity, either badly understood or irrational," or else, "worship +rendered to a false Divinity." But where are the people or the clergy +who will allow, either that their Divinity is false, or their worship +irrational? How shall it be decided who is right, or who is wrong? It +is evident that in this affair great numbers must be wrong. Indeed, +Buddaeus, in his _Treatise on Atheism_, tells us, "in order that a +religion may be true, not only the object of the worship must be true, +but we must also have a just idea of it. He, then, who adoreth God +without knowing him, adoreth him in a perverse and corrupt manner, and +is generally guilty of superstition." This granted, would it not be fair +to demand of the theologians, if they themselves can boast of having a +_just idea_ or real knowledge of the Divinity? + +Admit for a moment they have, would it not then be evident, that it is +for the priest, for the inspired, for the metaphysician, that this +idea, which is said to be so necessary for the whole human race, is +exclusively reserved? If we examine, however, we shall not find any +harmony among the theological notions of these various inspired men, or +of that hierarchy which is scattered over the earth: even those who +make a profession of the same system, are not in unison upon the +leading points. Are they ever contented with the proofs offered by their +colleagues? Do they unanimously subscribe to each other's ideas? +Are they agreed upon the conduct to be adopted; upon the manner of +explaining their texts; upon the interpretation of the various oracles? +Does there exist one country upon the whole earth, where the science of +theology is actually perfectioned?--where the ideas of the Divinity are +rendered so clear, as not to admit of cavil? Has this science obtained +any of that steadiness, any of that consistency, any of that uniformity, +which is found attached to other branches of human knowledge; even to +the most futile arts, or to those trades which are most despised? +Has the multitude of subtle distinctions, with which theology in some +countries is filled throughout; have the words spirit, immateriality, +incorporeity, predestination, grace, with other ingenious inventions, +imagined by sublime thinkers, who during so many ages have succeeded +each other, actually had any other effect than to perplex things; to +render the whole obscure; decidedly unintelligible? Alas! do, they not +offer practical demonstration, that the science held forth as the most +necessary to man, has not, hitherto, been able to acquire the least +degree of stability; has remained in the most determined state of +indecision; has entirely failed in obtaining solidity? For thousands of +years the most idle dreamers have been relieving each other, meditating +on systems, diving into concealed ways, inventing hypothesis suitable +to develope this important enigma. Their slender success has not at all +discouraged theological vanity; the priests have always spoken of it as +of a thing with which they were most intimately acquainted; they have +disputed with all the pertinancy of demonstrated argument; they +have destroyed each other with the most savage barbarity; yet, +notwithstanding, to this moment, this sublime science remains entirely +unauthenticated; almost unexamined. Indeed, if things were coolly +contemplated, it would be obvious that these theories are not formed for +the generality of mankind, who for the most part are utterly incompetent +to comprehend the aerial subtilities upon which they rest. Who is the +man, that understandeth any thing of the fundamental principles of +these systems? Whose capacity embraces spirituality, immateriality, +incorporeity, or the mysteries of which he is every day informed? Are +there many persons who can boast of perfectly understanding the state of +the question, in those theological disputations, which have frequently +had the potency to disturb the repose of mankind? Nevertheless, even +women believe themselves obliged to take part in the quarrels excited by +these idle speculators, who are of less actual utility, to society, than +the meanest artizan. + +Man would, perhaps, have been too happy, if confining himself to those +visible objects which interest him, he had employed half that energy +which he has wasted in researches after incomprehensible systems, upon +perfectioning the real sciences; in giving consistency to his laws; in +establishing his morals upon solid foundations; in spreading a wholesome +education among his fellows. He would, unquestionably, have been much +wiser, more fortunate, if he had agreed to let his idle, unemployed +guides quarrel among themselves unheeded; if he had permitted them +to fathom those depths calculated to astound the mind, to amaze the +intellect, without intermeddling with their irrational disputes. But it +is the essence of ignorance, to attach great importance to every thing +which it doth not understand. Human vanity makes the mind bear up +against difficulties. The more an object eludes our inquiry, the more +efforts we make to compass it; because from thence our pride is spurred +on, our curiosity is set afloat, our passions are irritated, and it +assumes the character of being highly interesting to us. On the other +hand, the more continued, the more laborious our researches have been, +the more importance we attach to either our real or our pretended +discoveries; the more we are desirous not to have wasted our time; +besides, we are always ready warmly to defend the soundness of our own +judgment. Do not let us then be surprised at the interest that ignorant +persons have at all times taken in the discoveries of their priests; nor +at the obstinate pertinacity which they have ever manifested in their +disputes. Indeed, in combating for his own peculiar system, each only +fought for the interests of his own vanity, which of all human passions +is the most quickly alarmed, the most calculated to lead man on to the +commission of great follies. + +Theology is truly the vessel of the Danaides. By dint of contradictory +qualities, by means of bold assertions, it has so shackled its own +systems as to render it impossible they should act. Indeed, when even we +should suppose the existence of these theological systems, the reality +of codes so discordant with each other and with themselves, we can +conclude nothing from them to authorize the conduct, or sanction the +mode of worship which they prescribe. If their gods are infinitely good, +wherefore should we dread them? If they are infinitely wise, what reason +have we to disturb ourselves with our condition? If they are omniscient, +wherefore inform them of our wants, why fatigue them with our requests? +If they are omnipresent, of what use can it be to erect temples to them? +If they are lords of all, why make sacrifices to them; why bring them +offerings of what already belongs to them? If they are just, upon what +foundation believe that they will punish those creatures whom they have +filled with imbecility? If their grace works every thing in man, what +reason can there be why he should be rewarded? If they are omnipotent, +how can they be offended; how can we resist them? If they are rational, +how can the enrage themselves against blind mortals, to whom they have +left the liberty of acting irrationally? If they are immutable, by what +right shall we pretend to make them change their decrees? If they are +inconceivable, wherefore should we occupy ourselves with them? If the +knowledge of these systems be the most necessary thing, wherefore are +they not more evident, more consistent, more manifest? + +This granted, he who can undeceive himself on the afflicting notions +of these theories, hath this advantage over the credulous, trembling, +superstitious mortal--that he establishes in his heart a momentary +tranquility, which, at least, rendereth him happy in this life. If the +study of nature hath banished from his mind, those chimeras with which +the superstitions man is infested, he, at least, enjoys a security of +which this sees himself deprived. In consulting this nature, his +fears are dissipated, his opinions, whether true or false, acquire a +steadiness of character; a calm succeeds the storm, which panic terror, +the result of wavering notions, excite in the hearts of all men who +occupy themselves with these systems. If the human soul, cheered by +philosophy, had the boldness to consider things coolly; it would no +longer behold the universe submitted to implacable systems, under which +man is continually trembling. If he was rational, he would perceive that +in committing evil he did not disturb nature; that he either injureth +himself alone, or injures other beings capable of feeling the effects of +his conduct, from thence he would know the line of his duties; he would +prefer virtue to vice, for his own permanent repose: he would, for +his own satisfaction, for his own felicity in this world, find himself +deeply interested in the practice of moral goodness; in rendering +virtue habitual; in making it dear to the feeling of his heart: his +own immediate welfare would be concerned in avoiding vice, in detesting +crime, during the short season of his abode among intelligent, sensible +beings, from whom he expects his happiness. By attaching himself to +these rules, he would live contented with his own conduct; he would +be cherished by those who are capable of feeling the influence of his +actions; he would expect without inquietude the term when his existence +should have a period; he would have no reason to dread the existence +which _might_ follow the one he at present enjoys: he would not fear to +be deceived in his reasonings. Guided by demonstration, led gently along +by honesty, he would perceive, that he could have nothing to dread from +a beneficent Divinity, who would not punish him for those involuntary +errors which depend upon the organization, which without his own consent +he has received. + +Such a man so conducting himself, would have nothing to apprehend, +whether at the moment of his death, he falls asleep for ever; or whether +that sleep is only a prelude to another existence, in which he shall +find himself in the presence of his God. Addressing himself to the +Divinity, he might with confidence say, + +"O God! Father, who hath rendered thyself invisible to thy child! +Inconceivable, hidden Author of all, whom I could not discover! Pardon +me, if my limited understanding hath not been able to know thee, in a +nature, where every thing hath appeared to me to be necessary! Excuse +me, if my sensible heart hath not discerned thine august traits among +those numerous systems which superstitious mortals tremblingly adore: +if, in that assemblage of irreconcileable qualities, with which the +imagination hath clothed thee, I could only see a phantom. How could my +coarse eyes perceive thee in nature, in which all my senses have +never been able to bring me acquainted but with material beings, with, +perishable forms? Could I, by the aid of these senses, discover thy +spiritual essence, of which no one could furnish me any idea? Could +my feeble brain, obliged to form its judgments after its own capacity, +discern thy plans, measure thy wisdom, conceive thine intelligence, +whilst the universe presented to my view a continued mixture of order +and confusion--of good and evil--of formation and destruction? Have I +been able to render homage to the justice of thy priests, whilst I so +frequently beheld crime triumphant, virtue in tears? Could I possibly +acknowledge the voice of a being filled with wisdom, in those ambiguous, +puerile, contradictory oracles, published in thy name in the different +countries of the earth I have quitted? If I have not known thy peculiar +existence, it is because I have not known either what thou couldst be, +where thou couldst be placed, or the qualities which could be assigned +thee. My ignorance is excusable, because it was invincible: my mind +could not bend itself under the authority of men, who acknowledged they +were as little enlightened upon thine essence as myself; who were for +ever disputing among themselves; who were in harmony only in imperiously +crying out to me, to sacrifice to them that reason which thou hadst +given to me; But, oh God! If thou cherishest thy creatures, I also, like +thee, have cherished them; I have endeavoured to render them happy, in +the sphere in which I have lived. If thou art the author of reason, +I have always listened to it--have ever endeavoured to follow it; if +virtue pleaseth thee, my heart hath always honoured it; I have never +willingly outraged it: when my powers have permitted me, I have myself +practised it; I was an affectionate husband, a tender father, a +sincere friend, a faithful subject, a zealous citizen; I have held out +consolation to the afflicted; and if the foibles of my nature have been +either injurious to myself or incommodious to others, I have not at +least made the unfortunate groan under the weight of my injustice. I +have not devoured the substance of the poor--I have not seen without +pity the widow's tears; I have not heard without commiseration the cries +of the orphan. If thou didst render man sociable, if thou was disposed +that society should subsist, if thou wast desirous the community might +be happy, I have been the enemy to all who oppressed him, the decided +foe to all those who deceived him, in order that they might advantage +themselves of his misfortunes. + +"If I have not thought properly of thee, it is because my understanding +could not conceive thee; if I have spoken ill of thy systems, it is +because my heart, partaking too much of human nature, revolted against +the odious portrait under which they depicted thee. My wanderings have +been the effect of the temperament which thou hast given me; of the +circumstances in which, without my consent, thou hast placed me; of +those ideas, which in despite of me, have entered into my mind. As thou +art good, as thou art just, (as we are assured thou art) thou wilt not +punish me for the wanderings of mine imagination; for faults caused by +my passions, which are the necessary consequence of the organization +which I have received from thee. Thus I cannot doubt thy justice, I +cannot dread the condition which thou preparest for me. Thy goodness +cannot have permitted that I should incur punishment for inevitable +errors. Thou wouldst rather prevent my being born, than have called me +into the rank of intelligent beings, there to enjoy the fatal liberty of +rendering myself eternally unhappy." + +It is thus that a disciple of nature, who, transported all at once into +the regions of space, should find himself in the presence of his God, +would be able to speak, although he should not have been in a condition +to lend himself to all the abstract systems of theology which appear to +have been invented for no other purpose than to overturn in his mind all +natural ideas. This illusory science seems bent an forming its systems +in a manner the most contradictory to human reason; notwithstanding +we are obliged to judge in this world according to its dictates; if, +however, in the succeeding world, there is nothing conformable to this, +what can be of more inutility, than to think of it or reason upon it? +Besides, wherefore should we leave it to the judgment of men, who are, +themselves, only enabled to act after our manner? + +Without a very marked derangement of our organs, our sentiments hardly +ever vary upon those objects which either our senses experience, or +which reason has clearly demonstrated, In whatever circumstances we are +found, we have no doubt either upon the whiteness of snow, the light +of day, or the utility of virtue. It is not so with those objects which +depend solely upon our imagination--which are not proved to us by the +constant evidence of our senses; we judge of them variously, according +to the dispositions in which we find ourselves. These dispositions +fluctuate by reason of the involuntary impulse which our organs every +instant receive, on the part of an infinity of causes, either exterior +to ourselves, or else contained within our own frame. These organs are, +without our knowledge, perpetually modified, either relaxed or braced +by the density, more or less, of the atmosphere; by heat and by cold; by +dryness and by humidity; by health and by sickness; by the heat of the +blood; by the abundance of bile; by the state of the nervous system, &c. +These various causes have necessarily an influence upon the momentary +ideas, upon the instantaneous thoughts, upon the fleeting opinions of +man, He is, consequently, obliged to see under a great variety of hues, +those objects which his imagination presents to him; without it all +times having the capacity to correct them by experience: to compare them +by memory. This, without doubt, is the reason why man is continually +obliged to view his gods, to contemplate his superstitious systems, +under such a diversity of aspects, in different periods of his +existence. In the moment, when his fibres find themselves disposed to +he tremulous, he will be cowardly, pusillanimous; he will think of these +systems only with fear and trembling. In the moment, when these same +fibres shall have more tension, he will possess more firmness, he will +then view these systems with greater coolness. The theologian will call +his pusillanimity, "inward feeling;" "warning from heaven;" "secret +inspiration;" but he who knoweth man, will say that this is nothing +more than a mechanical motion, produced by a physical or natural cause. +Indeed, it is by a pure physical mechanism, that we can explain all the +revolutions that take place in the system, frequently from one minute +to another; all the fluctuations in the opinions of mankind; all the +variations of his judgment: in consequence of which we sometimes see him +reasoning justly, sometimes in the most irrational manner. + +This is the mode by which, without recurring to grace, to inspirations, +to visions, to supernatural notions, we can render ourselves an account +of that uncertain, that wavering state into which we sometimes behold +persons fall, when there is a question respecting their superstition, +who are otherwise extremely enlightened. Frequently, in despite of all +reasoning, momentary dispositions re-conduct them to the prejudices of +their infancy, upon which on other occasions they appear to be +entirely undeceived. These changes are very apparent, especially under +infirmities, in sickness, or at approach of death. The barometer of the +understanding is then frequently obliged to fall. Those chimeras which +he despised, or which in a state of health, he set down at their true +value, are then realized. He trembles, because his machine is enfeebled; +he is irrational because his brain is incapable of fulfilling its +functions with exactitude. It is evident these are the actual causes +of those changes which the priests well know how to make use of against +what they call incredulity; from which they draw proofs of the reality +of their sublimated opinions. Those conversions, or those alterations, +which take place, in the ideas of man, have always their origin in some +derangement of his machine; brought on either by chagrin or by some +other natural or known cause. + +Submitted to the continual influence of physical causes, our systems +invariably follow the variations of the body; we reason well when the +body is healthy--when it is soundly constituted; we reason badly when +the corporeal faculties are deranged; from thence our ideas become +disconnected, we are no longer equal to the task of associating them +with precision; we are incapable of finding principles, or to draw +from them just inferences; the brain, in fact, is shaken; we no longer +contemplate any thing under its actual point of view. It is a man of +this kind, who does not see things in frosty weather, under the same +traits as when the season is cloudy, or when it is rainy; he does not +view them in the same manner in sorrow as in gaiety; when in company +as when alone. Good sense suggests to us, that it is when the body is +sound, when the mind is undisturbed by any mist, that we can reason with +accuracy; this state can furnish us with a general standard, calculated +to regulate our judgment; even to rectify our ideas, when unexpected +causes shall make them waver. + +If the opinions even of the same individual, are fluctuating, subject to +vaccillate, how many changes must they experience in the various beings +who compose the human race? If there do not, perhaps, exist two persons +who see a physical object under the same exact form or colour, what much +greater variety must they not have in their mode of contemplating those +things which have existence only in their imagination? What an infinity +of combinations, what a multitude of ideas, must not minds essentially +different, form to themselves when they endeavour to compose an ideal +being, which each moment of their existence must present to them under +a different aspect? It would, then, be a most irrational enterprise, +to attempt to prescribe to man what he ought to think of superstition, +which is entirely under the cognizance of his imagination; for the +admeasurement of which, as we have very frequently repeated, mortals +will never have any common standard. To oppugn the superstitious +opinions of man, is to commence hostilities with his imagination--to +attack his fancy--to be at war with his organization--to enter the lists +with his habits, which are of themselves sufficient to identify with +his existence, the most absurd, the most unfounded ideas. The more +imagination man has, the greater enthusiast he will be in matters of +superstition; reason will have the less ability to undeceive him in +his chimeras. In proportion as his fancy is powerful, these chimeras +themselves will become food necessary to its ardency. In fine, to battle +with the superstitious notions of man, is to combat the passions he +usually indulges for the marvellous; it is to assail him on that side +where he is least vulnerable; to force him in that position where he +unites all his strength--where he keeps the most vigilant guard. In +despite of reason, those persons who have a lively imagination, are +perpetually re-conducted to those chimeras which habit renders dear to +them, even when they are found troublesome; although they should prove +fatal. Thus a tender soul hath occasion for a God that loveth him; +the happy enthusiast needeth a God who rewardeth him; the unfortunate +visionary wants a God who taketh part in his sorrows; the melancholy +devotee requireth a God who chastiseth him, who maintaineth him in that +trouble which has become necessary to his diseased organization; the +frantic penitent exacteth a God, who imposes upon him an obligation to +be inhuman towards himself; whilst the furious fanatic would believe +himself unhappy, if he was deprived of a God who commanded him to make +others experience the effect of his inflamed humours, of his unruly +passions. + +He is, without question, a less dangerous enthusiast who feeds himself +with agreeable illusions, than he whose soul is tormented with odious +spectres. If a placid, tender soul, does not commit ravages in society, +a mind agitated by incommodious passions, cannot fall to become, sooner +or later, troublesome to his fellow creatures. The God of a Socrates, or +a Fenelon, may be suitable to souls as gentle as theirs; but he cannot +be that of a whole nation, in which it is extremely rare men of their +temper are found: if honest men only view their gods as fitted with +benefits; vicious, restless, inflexible individuals, will give them +their own peculiar character, from thence will authorize themselves to +indulge, a free course to their passions. Each will view his deities +with eyes only open to his own reigning prejudice; the number of those +who will paint them as afflicting will always be greater, much more to +be feared, than those who shall delineate them under seducing colors: +for one mortal that those ideas will render happy, there will be +thousands who will be made miserable; they will, sooner or later, +become an inexhaustible source of contention; a never failing spring of +extravagant folly; they will disturb the mind of the ignorant, over whom +impostors will always gain ascendancy--over whom fanatics will ever +have an influence: they will frighten the cowardly, terrify the +pussillanimous, whose imbecility will incline them to perfidy, whose +weakness will render them cruel; they will cause the most upright to +tremble, who, even while practising virtue, will fear incurring the +divine displeasure; but they will not arrest the progress of the wicked, +who will easily cast them aside, that they may the more commodiously +deliver themselves up to crime; or who will even take advantage of these +principles, to justify their transgression. In short, in the hands +of tyrants, these systems will only serve to crush the liberty of the +people; will be the pretext for violating, with impunity, all equitable +rights. In the hands of priests they will become talismans, suitable +to intoxicate the mind; calculated to hoodwink the people; competent +to subjugate equally the sovereign as the subject; in the hands of the +multitude, they will be a two-edged sword, with which they will inflict, +at the same moment, the most dreadful wounds on themselves--the most +serious injuries on their associates. + +On the other hand, these theological systems, as we have seen, being +only an heap of contradictions, which represent the Divinity under the +most incompatible characters, seem to doubt his wisdom, when they invite +mortals to address their prayers to him, for the gratification of their +desires; to pray to him to grant that which he has not thought it +proper to accord to them. Is it not, in other words, to accuse him with +neglecting his creatures? Is it not to ask him to alter the eternal +decrees of his justice; to change the invariable laws which he hath +himself determined? Is it not to say to him, "O, my God! I acknowledge +thy wisdom, thine omniscience, thine infinite goodness; nevertheless, +thou forgettest thy servant; thou losest sight of thy creature; thou +art ignorant, or thou feignest ignorance, of that which he wanteth: dost +thou not see that I suffer from the marvellous arrangement, which thy +wise laws have made in the universe? Nature, against thy commands, +actually renders my existence painful: change then, I beseech thee, the +essence which thy will has given to all beings. Grant that the elements, +at this moment, lose in my favor their distinguishing properties; so +order it, that heavy bodies shall not fall, that fire shall not burn, +that the brittle frame which I have received at thine hands, shall not +suffer those shocks which it every instant experiences. Rectify, I pray +thee, for my happiness, the plan which thine infinite prudence hath +marked out from all eternity." Such is very nearly the euchology +which man adopts; such are the discordant, absurd requests which he +continually puts up to the Divinity, whose wisdom he extols; whose +intelligence he holds forth to admiration; whose providence he +eulogizes; whose equity he applauds; whilst he is hardly ever contented +with the effects of the divine perfections. + +Man is not more consequent in those thanksgivings which he believes +himself obliged to offer to the throne of grace. Is it not just, he +exclaims, to thank the Divinity for his kindness? Would it not be +the height of ingratitude to refuse our homage to the Author of our +existence; to withhold our acknowledgements from the Giver of every +thing that contributes to render it agreeable? But does he not +frequently offer up his thanksgivings for actions that overwhelm his +neighbour with misery? Does not the husbandman on the hill, return +thanks for the rain that irrigates his lands parched with drought, +whilst the cultivator of the valley is imploring a cessation of those +showers which deluge his fields--that render useless the labour of his +hands? Thus each becomes thankful for that which his own limited views +points out to him as his immediate interest, regardless of the general +effect produced by those circumstances on the welfare of his fellows. +Each believes that it is either a peculiar dispensation of providence +in his own favor, or a signal of the heavenly wrath directed against +himself; whilst the slightest reflection would clearly evince it to +be nothing more than the inevitable order of things, which take place +without the least regard to his individual comforts. From this it will +be obvious, that these systems do not teach their votaries, practically, +to love their neighbour as themselves. But in matters of superstition, +mortals never reason; they only follow the impulse of their fears; the +direction of their imagination; the force of their temperament; the +bent of their own peculiar passions; or those of the guides, who have +acquired the right of controling their understanding. Fear has generally +created these systems; terror unceasingly accompanies them; it is +impossible to reason while we tremble. + +We do not, however, flatter ourselves that reason will be capable, all +at once, to deliver the human race from those errors with which so +many causes united have contributed to poison him. The vainest of +all projects would be the expectation of curing, in an instant, those +epidemical follies, those hereditary fallacies, rooted during so many +ages; continually fed by ignorance; corroborated by custom; borne along +by the passions made inveterate by interest; grounded upon the fears, +established upon the ever regenerating calamities of nations. The +ancient disasters of the earth gave birth to the first systems of +theology, new revolutions would equally produce others; even if the +old ones should chance to be forgotton. Ignorant, miserable, trembling +beings, will always either form to themselves systems, or else adopt +those which imposture shall announce--which fanaticism shall be disposed +to give them. + +It would therefore be useless to propose more than to hold out reason to +those who are competent to understand it; to present truth to those who +can sustain its lustre; who can with serenity contemplate its refulgent +beauty; to undeceive those who shall not be inclined to oppose obstacles +to demonstration; to enlighten those who shall not desire pertinaciously +to persist in error. Let us, then, infuse courage into those who want +power to break with their illusions; let us cheer up the honest man, who +is much more alarmed by his fears than the wicked, who, in despite of +his opinions, always follows the rule of his passions: let us console +the unfortunate, who groans under a load of prejudices which he has not +examined: let us dissipate the incertitude of those whose doubts +render them unhappy; who ingenuously seek after truth, but who find in +philosophy itself only wavering opinions little calculated to determine +their fluctuating minds. Let us banish from the man of genius those +chimerical speculations which cause him to waste his time; let us wrest +his gloomy superstition from the intimidated mortal, who, duped by +his vain fears, becomes useless to society; let us remove from the +atrabilarious being those systems that afflict him, that exasperate his +mind, that do nothing more than kindle his anger against his incredulous +neighbour; let us tear from the fanatic those terrible ideas which arm +him with poniards against the happiness of his fellows; let us pluck +from tyrants, let us snatch from impostors, those opinions which enable +them to terrify, to enslave, and to despoil the human species. In +removing from honest men their formidable notions let us not encourage +those of the wicked, who are the enemies of society; let us deprive the +latter of those illegitimate sources, upon which they reckon to expiate +their transgressions; let us substitute actual, present terrors, to +those which are distant and uncertain to those which do not arrest the +most licentious excesses; let us make the profligate blush at beholding +themselves what they really are; let the ministers of superstition +tremble at finding their conspiracies discovered; let them dread the +arrival of the day, when mortals, cured of those errors with which they +have abused them, will no longer be enslaved by their artifice. + +If we cannot induce nations to lay aside their inveterate prejudices, +let us, at least, endeavour to prevent them from relapsing into those +excesses, to the commission of which superstition has so frequently +hurried them; let mankind form to himself chimeras, if he cannot do +without them; let him think as he may feel inclined, provided his +reveries do not make him forget that he is a man; that he does not cease +to remember that a sociable being is not formed to resemble the most +ferocious animals. Let us try to balance the fictitious interests +of superstition, by the more immediate advantages of the earth. Let +sovereigns, as well as their subjects, at length acknowledge that the +benefits resulting from truth, the happiness arising from justice, +the tranquillity springing out of wholesome laws, the blessings to be +derived from a rational education, the superiority to be obtained from a +physical, peaceable morality, are much more substantive than those they +vainly expect from their respective superstitious systems, Let them +feel, that advantages so tangible, benefits so precious, ought not to be +sacrificed to uncertain hopes, so frequently contradicted by experience. +In order to convince themselves of these truths, let every rational man +consider the numberless crimes which superstition has caused upon our +globe; let them study the frightful history of theology: let them read +over the biography of its more odious ministers, who have too often +fanned the spirit of discord--kindled the flame of fury--stirred up +the raging fire of madness: let the prince and the people, at least, +sometimes learn to resist the demoniacal passions of these interpreters +of unintelligible systems, which they acknowledge they do not themselves +at all understand, especially when they shall invoke them to be +inhuman; when they shall preach up intolerance; when they invite them to +barbarity; above all, when they shall command them, in the name of their +gods, to stifle the cries of nature; to put down the voice of equity; to +be deaf to the remonstrances of reason; to be blind to the interest of +society. + +Feeble mortals! led astray by error, how long will ye permit your +imagination, so active, so prompt to seize on the marvellous, to +continue to seek out of the universe pretexts to render you baneful +to yourselves, injurious to the beings with whom ye live in society? +Wherefore do ye not follow in peace, the simple, easy route marked out +for ye by nature? To what purpose do ye scatter thorns on the road +of life? What avails it, that ye multiply those sorrows to which your +destiny exposes ye? What advantages can ye derive from systems with +which the united efforts of the whole human species have not been +competent to bring ye acquainted? Be content, then, to remain ignorant +of that, which the human mind is not formed to comprehend; which human +intellect is not adequate to embrace: occupy yourselves with truth; +learn the invaluable art of living happy; perfection your morals; give +rationality to your governments; simplify your laws, and rest them on +the pillars of justice; watch over education, and see that it is of +an invigorating quality; give attention to agriculture, and encourage +beneficial improvements; foster those sciences which are actually +useful, and place their professors in the most honorable stations; labor +with ardour, and munificently reward those whose assiduity promotes +the general welfare; oblige nature by your industry to open her immense +stores, to become propitious to your exertions; do these things, and the +gods will oppose nothing to your felicity. Leave to idle thinkers, to +soporific dreamers, to waking visionaries, to useless enthusiasts, the +unproductive task, the unfruitful occupation, of fathoming depths, +from which ye ought sedulously to divert your attention; enjoy with +moderation, the benefits attached to your present existence; augment +their number when reason sanctions the multiplication; but never attempt +to spring yourselves forward, beyond the sphere destined for your +action. If you must have chimeras, permit your fellow creatures to have +theirs also; but never cut the throats of your brethren, when, they +cannot rave in your own manner. If ye will have unintelligible +systems, if ye cannot be contented without marvellous doctrines, if the +infirmities of your nature require an invisible crutch, adopt such as +may best suit with your humour; select those which you may think most +calculated to support your tottering frame; if ye can, let your own +imagination give birth to them; but do not insist on your neighbours +making the same choice with yourself: do not suffer these imaginary +theories to infuriate your mind: let them not so far intoxicate your +understandings, as to make ye mistake the duties ye owe to the real +beings with whom ye are associated. Always remember, that amongst these +duties, the foremost, the most consequential, the most immediate in +its bearing upon the felicity of the human race, stands, _a reasonable +indulgence for the foibles of others_. + + + + + +CHAP. XI. + +_Defence of the Sentiments contained in this Work.--Of Impiety.--Do +there exist Atheists?_ + + +What has been said in the course of this work, ought sufficiently to +undeceive those who are capable of reasoning on the prejudices to which +they attached so much importance. But the most evident truths frequently +crouch under fear; are kept at bay by habit; prove abortive against +the force of enthusiasm. Nothing is more difficult to remove from its +resting place than error, especially when long prescription has given +it full possession of the human mind. It is almost unassailable when +supported by general consent; when it is propagated by education; when +it has acquired inveteracy by custom: it commonly resists every effort +to disturb it, when it is either fortified by example, maintained +by authority, nourished by the hopes, or cherished by the fears of a +people, who have learned to look upon these delusions as the most potent +remedies for their sorrows. Such are the united forces which sustain +the empire of unintelligible systems over the inhabitants of this world; +they appear to give stability to their throne; to render their power +immoveable; to make their reign as lasting as the human race. + +We need not, then, be surprised at seeing the multitude cherish their +own blindness; encourage their superstitious notions; exhibit the most +sensitive fear of truth. Every where we behold mortals obstinately +attached to phantoms from which they expect their happiness; +notwithstanding these fallacies are evidently the source of all their +sorrows. Deeply smitten with the marvellous, disdaining the simple, +despising that which is easy of comprehension, but little instructed in +the ways of nature, accustomed to neglect the use of their reason, the +uninformed, from age to age, prostrate themselves before those invisible +powers which they have been taught to adore. To these they address their +most fervent prayers; implore them in their misfortunes, offer them +the fruits of their labour; they are unceasingly occupied either with +thanking their vain idols for benefits they have not received at their +bands, or else in requesting from them favors which they can never +obtain. Neither experience nor reflection can undeceive them; they do +not perceive these idols, the work of their own hands, have always been +deaf to their intreaties; they ascribe it to their own conduct; believe +them to be violently irritated: they tremble, groan out the most dismal +lamentations; sigh bitterly in their temples; strew their altars with +presents; load their priests with their largesses; it never strikes +their attention that these beings, whom they imagine so powerful, are +themselves submitted to nature; are never propitious to their wishes, +but when nature herself is favourable. It is thus that nations are the +accomplices of those who deceive them; are themselves as much opposed to +truth as those who lead them astray. + +In matters of superstition, there are very few persons who do not +partake, more or less, of the opinions of the illiterate. Every man who +throws aside the received ideas, is generally considered a madman; is +looked upon as a presumptuous being, who insolently believes himself +much wiser than his associates. At the magical sound of superstition, a +sudden panic, a tremulous terror takes possession of the human species: +whenever it is attacked, society is alarmed; each individual imagines +he already sees the celestial monarch lift his avenging arm against +the country in which rebellious nature has produced a monster with +sufficient temerity to brave these sacred opinions. Even the most +moderate persons tax with folly, brand with sedition, whoever dares +combat with these imaginary systems, the rights of which good sense has +never yet examined. In consequence, the man who undertakes to tear the +bandeau of prejudice, appears an irrational being--a dangerous citizen; +his sentence is pronounced with a voice almost unanimous; the public +indignation, roused by fanaticism, stirred up by imposture, renders +it impossible for him to be heard in his defence; every one believes +himself culpable, if he does not exhibit his fury against him; if he +does not display his zeal in hunting him down; it is by such means man +seeks to gain the favor of the angry gods, whose wrath is supposed to be +provoked. Thus the individual who consults his reason, the disciple of +nature, is looked upon as a public pest; the enemy to superstition +is regarded as the enemy to the human race; he who would establish a +lasting peace amongst men, is treated as the disturber of society; the +man who would be disposed to cheer affrighted mortals by breaking those +idols, before whom prejudice has obliged them to tremble, is unanimously +proscribed as an atheist. At the bare name of atheist the superstitious +man quakes; the deist himself is alarmed; the priest enters the +judgement chair with fury glaring in his eyes; tyranny prepares his +funeral pile, the vulgar applaud the punishments which irrational, +partial laws, decree against the true friend of the human species. + +Such are the sentiments which every man must expect to excite, who shall +dare to present his fellow creatures with that truth which all appear to +be in search of, but which all either fear to find, or else mistake +what we are disposed to shew it to them. But what is this man, who is +so foully calumniated as an atheist? He is one who destroyeth chimeras +prejudicial to the human race; who endeavours to re-conduct wandering +mortals back to nature; who is desirous to place them upon the road +of experience; who is anxious that they should actively employ their +reason. He is a thinker, who, having meditated upon matter, its +energies, its properties, its modes of acting, hath no occasion to +invent ideal powers, to recur to imaginary systems, in order to explain +the phenomena of the universe--to develope the operations of nature; who +needs not creatures of the imagination, which far from making him better +understand nature, do no more than render it wholly inexplicable, an +unintelligible mass, useless to the happiness of mankind. + +Thus, the only men who can have pure, simple, actual ideas of nature, +are considered either as absurd or knavish speculators. Those who +form to themselves distinct, intelligible notions of the powers of the +universe, are accused of denying the existence of this power: those +who found every thing that is operated in this world, upon determinate, +immutable laws, are accused with attributing every thing to chance; are +taxed with blindness, branded with delirium, by those very enthusiasts +themselves, whose imagination, always wandering in a vacuum, regularly +attribute the effects of nature to fictitious causes, which have no +existence but in their own heated brain; to fanciful beings of their +own creation; to chimerical powers, which they obstinately persist in +preferring to actual, demonstrable causes. No man in his proper senses +can deny the energy of nature, or the existence of a power by virtue of +which matter acts; by which it puts itself in motion; but no man can, +without renouncing his reason, attribute this power to an immaterial +substance; to a power placed out of nature; distinguished from matter; +having nothing in common with it. Is it not saying, this power does not +exist, to pretend that it resides in an unknown being, formed by an heap +of unintelligible qualities, of incompatible attributes, from +whence necessarily results a whole, impossible to have existence? +Indestructible elements, the atoms of Epicurus, of which it is said the +motion, the collision, the combination, have produced all beings, +are, unquestionably, much more tangible than the numerous theological +systems, broached in various parts of the earth. Thus, to speak +precisely, they are the partizans of imaginary theories, the advocates +of contradictory beings, the defenders of creeds, impossible to be +conceived, the contrivers of substances which the human mind +cannot embrace on any side, who are either absurd or knavish; those +enthusiasts, who offer us nothing but vague names, of which every thing +is denied, of which nothing is affirmed, are the real _Atheists_; those, +I say, who make such beings the authors of motion, the preservers of the +universe, are either blind or irrational. Are not those dreamers, who +are incapable of attaching any one positive idea to the causes of which +they unceasingly speak, true deniers? Are not those visionaries, who +make a pure nothing the source of all beings, men really groping in +the dark? Is it not the height of folly to personify abstractions, to +organize negative ideas, and then to prostrate ourselves before the +figments of our own brain? + +Nevertheless, they are men of this temper who regulate the opinions +of the world; who hold up to public scorn, those who are consistent to +principle; who expose to the most infuriate vengeance, those who are +more rational than themselves. If you will but accredit those profound +dreamers, there is nothing short of madness, nothing on this side +the most complete derangement of intellect, that can reject a totally +incomprehensible motive-power in nature. Is it, then, delirium to prefer +the known to the unknown? Is it a crime to consult experience, to call +in the evidence of our senses, in the examination of that which we are +informed is the most important to be understood? Is it a horrid outrage +to address ourselves to reason; to prefer its oracles to the sublime +decisions of some sophists, who themselves acknowledge they do not +comprehend any thing of the systems they announce? Nevertheless, +according to these men, there is no crime more worthy of +punishment--there is no enterprize more dangerous to morals--no treason +more substantive against society, than to despoil these immaterial +substances, which they know nothing about, of those inconceivable +qualities which these learned doctors ascribe to them--of that equipage +with which a fanatical imagination has furnished them--of those +miraculous properties with which ignorance, fear, and imposture have +emulated each other in surrounding them: there is nothing more impious +than to call forth man's reason upon superstitious creeds; nothing more +heretical than to cheer up mortals against systems, of which the idea +alone is the source of all their sorrows; there is nothing more pious, +nothing more orthodox, than to exterminate those audacious beings who +have had sufficient temerity to attempt to break an invisible charm that +keeps the human species benumbed in error: if we are to put faith in the +asseverations of the hierarchy, to be disposed to break man's chains is +to rend asunder his most sacred bonds. + +In consequence of these clamours, perpetually renovated by the disciples +of imposture, kept constantly afloat by the theologians, reiterated +by ignorance, those nations, which reason, in all ages, has sought to +undeceive, have never dared to hearken to its benevolent lessons: they +have stood aghast at the very name of physical truth. The friends of +mankind were never listened to, because they were the enemies to his +superstition--the examiners of the doctrines of his priest. Thus the +people continued to tremble; very few philosophers had the courage to +cheer them; scarcely any one dared brave public opinion; completely +inoculated by superstition, they dreaded the power of imposture, +the menaces of tyranny, which always sought to uphold themselves +by delusion. The yell of triumphant ignorance, the rant of haughty +fanaticism, at all time stifled the feeble voice of the disciple of +nature; his lessons were quickly forgotten; he was obliged to keep +silence; when he even dared to speak, it was frequently only in an +enigmatical language, perfectly unintelligible to the great mass of +mankind. How should the uninformed, who with difficulty compass the most +evident truths, those that are the most distinctly announced, be able to +comprehend the mysteries of nature, presented under half words, couched +under intricate emblems. + +In contemplating the outrageous language which is excited among +theologians, by the opinions of those whom they choose to call atheists; +in looking at the punishments which at their instigation were frequently +decreed against them, should we not be authorized to conclude, that +these doctors either are not so certain as they say they are, of the +infallibility of their respective systems; or else that they do not +consider the opinions of their adversaries so absurd as they pretend? +It is always either distrust, weakness, or fear, frequently the whole +united, that render men cruel; they have no anger against those whom +they despise; they do not look upon folly as a punishable crime. We +should be content with laughing at an irrational mortal, who should deny +the existence of the sun; we should not think of punishing him, unless +we had, ourselves, taken leave of our senses. Theological fury never +proves more than the imbecility of its cause. Lucian describes Jupiter, +who disputing with Menippus, is disposed to strike him to the earth with +his thunder; upon which the philosopher says to him, "Ah! thou vexest +thyself, thou usest thy thunder! then thou art in the wrong." The +inhumanity of these men-monsters, whose profession it was to announce +chimerical systems to nations, incontestibly proves, that they alone +have an interest in the invisible powers they describe; of which they +successfully avail themselves to terrify, mortals: they are these +tyrants of the mind, however, who, but little consequent to their own +principles, undo with one hand that which they rear up with the other: +they are these profound logicians who, after having formed a deity +filled with goodness, wisdom and equity, traduce, disgrace, and +completely annihilate him, by saving he is cruel, capricious, unjust, +and despotic: this granted, these men are truly impious; decidedly +heretical. + +He who knoweth not this system, cannot do it any injury, consequently +cannot be called impious. "To be impious," says Epicurus, "is not +to take away from the illiterate the gods which they have; it is to +attribute to these gods the opinions of the vulgar." To be impious is to +insult systems which we believe; it is knowingly to outrage them. To be +impious, is to admit a benevolent, just God, at the same time we preach +up persecution and carnage. To be impious, is to deceive men in the +name of a Deity, whom we make use of as a pretext for our own unworthy +passions. To be impious, is to speak falsely on the part of a God, whom +we suppose to be the enemy of falsehood. In fine, to be impious, is to +make use of the name of the Divinity in order to disturb society--to +enslave it to tyrants--to persuade man that the cause of imposture +is the cause of God; it is to impute to God those crimes which would +annihilate his divine perfections. To be impious, and irrational, at +the same time, is to make, by the aggregation of discrepant qualities, a +mere chimera of the God we adore. + +On the other hand, to be pious, is to serve our country with fidelity; +it is to be useful to our fellow creatures; to labour to the welfare of +society. Every one can put in his claim to this piety, according to his +faculties; he who meditates can render himself useful, when he has the +courage to announce truth--to attack error--to battle those prejudices +which everywhere oppose themselves to the happiness of mankind; it is to +be truly useful, it is even a duty, to wrest from the hands of mortals +those homicidal weapons which wretched fanatics so profusely distribute +among them; it is highly praiseworthy to deprive imposture of its +influence; it is loving our neighbour as ourself to despoil tyranny of +its fatal empire over opinion, which at all times it so successfully +employs to elevate knaves at the expence of public happiness; to erect +its power upon the ruins of liberty; to establish unruly passions upon +the wreck of public security. To be truly pious, is religiously to +observe the wholesome laws of nature; to follow up faithfully those +duties which she prescribes to us; in short, to be pious is to be +humane, equitable, benevolent: it is to respect the rights of mankind. +To be pious and rational at the same time, is to reject those reveries +which would be competent to make us mistake the sober counsels of +reason. + +Thus, whatever fanaticism, whatever imposture may say, he who denieth +the solidity of systems which have no other foundation than an alarmed +imagination; he who rejecteth creeds continually in contradiction with +themselves; he who banisheth from his heart, doctrines perpetually +wrestling with nature, always in hostility with reason, ever at war +with the happiness of man; he, I repeat, who undeceiveth himself on +such dangerous chimeras, when his conduct shall not deviate from those +invariable rules which sound morality dictates, which nature approves, +which reason prescribes, may be fairly reputed pious, honest, and +virtuous. Because a man refuseth to admit contradictory systems, as well +as the obscure oracles, which are issued in the name of the gods, does +it then follow, that such a man refuses to acknowledge the evident, +the demonstrable laws of nature, upon which he depends, of which he in +obliged to fulfil the necessary duties, under pain of being punished in +this world; whatever he may be in the in the next? It is true, that if +virtue could by any chance consist in an ignominious renunciation of +reason, in a destructive fanaticism, in useless customs, the atheist, +as he is called, could not pass for a virtuous being: but if virtue +actually consists in doing to society all the good of which we are +capable, this miscalled atheist may fairly lay claim to its practice: +his courageous, tender soul, will not be found guilty, for hurling his +legitimate indignation against prejudices, fatal to the happiness of the +human species. + +Let us listen, however, to the imputations which the theologians lay +upon those men they falsely denominate atheists; let us coolly, without +any peevish humour, examine the calumnies which they vomit forth against +them: it appears to them that atheism, (as they call differing in +opinion from themselves,) is the highest degree of delirium that can +assail the human mind; the greatest stretch of perversity that can +infect the human heart; interested in blackening their adversaries, they +make incredulity the undeniable offspring of folly; the absolute effect +of crime. "We do not," say they to us, "see those men fall into the +horrors of atheism, who have reason to hope the future state will be for +them a state of happiness." In short, according to these metaphysical +doctors, it is the interest of their passions which makes them seek to +doubt systems, at whose tribunals they are accountable for the abuses +of this life; it is the fear of punishment which is alone known to +atheists; they are unceasingly repeating the words of a Hebrew prophet, +who pretends that nothing but folly makes men deny these systems; +perhaps, however, if he had suppressed his negation, he would have +more closely aproximated the truth. Doctor Bentley, in his _Folly of +Atheism_, has let loose the whole Billingsgate of theological spleen, +which he has scattered about with all the venom of the most filthy +reptiles: if he and other expounders are to be believed, "nothing is +blacker than the heart of an atheist; nothing is more false than his +mind. Atheism," according to them, "can only be the offspring of a +tortured conscience, that seeks to disengage itself from the cause of +its trouble. We have a right", says Derham, "to look upon an atheist +as a monster among rational beings; as one of those extraordinary +productions which we hardly ever meet with in the whole human species; +and who, opposing himself to all other men, revolts not only against +reason and human nature, but against the Divinity himself." + +We shall simply reply to all these calumnies by saying, it is for the +reader to judge if the system which these men call atheism, be as absurd +as these profound speculators (who are perpetually in dispute on the +uninformed, ill organized, contradictory, whimsical productions of their +own brain) would have it believed to be! It is true, perhaps, that the +system of naturalism hitherto has not been developed in all its extent: +unprejudiced persons however, will, at least, be enabled to know whether +the author has reasoned well or ill; whether or not he has attempted to +disguise the most important difficulties; distinctly to see if he has +been disingenuous; they will be competent to observe if, like unto the +enemies of human reason, he has recourse to subterfuges, to sophisms, to +subtle discriminations, which ought always to make it suspected of those +who use them, either that they do not understand or else that they +fear the truth. It belongs then to candour, it is the province of +disinterestedness, it is the duty of reason to judge, if the natural +principles which have been here ushered to the world be destitute of +foundation; it is to these upright jurisconsults that a disciple of +nature submits his opinions: he has a right to except against the +judgment of enthusiasm; he has the prescription to enter his caveat +against the decision of presumptuous ignorance; above all, he is +entitled to challenge the verdict of interested knavery. Those persons +who are accustomed to think, will, at least find reasons to doubt many +of those marvellous notions, which appear as incontestable truths only +to those, who have never assayed them by the standard of good sense. + +We agree with Derham, that atheists are rare; but then we also say, +that superstition has so disfigured nature, so entangled her +rights--enthusiasm has so dazzled the human mind-terror has so disturbed +the heart of man--imposture has so bewildered his imagination--tyranny +has so enslaved his thoughts: in fine, error, ignorance, and delirium +have so perplexed and confused the clearest ideas, that nothing is +more uncommon than to find men who have sufficient courage to undeceive +themselves on notions which every thing conspires to identify with their +very existence. Indeed, many theologians in despite of those bitter +invectives with which they attempt to overwhelm the men they choose +to call atheists, appear frequently to have doubted whether any ever +existed in the world. Tertullian, who, according to modern systems, +would be ranked as an atheist, because he admitted a corporeal God, +says, "Christianity has dissipated the ignorance in which the Pagans +were immersed respecting the divine essence, and there is not an artizan +among the Christians who does not see God, and who does not know him." +This uncertainty of the theologic professors was, unquestionably, +founded upon those absurd ideas, which they ascribe to their +adversaries, whom they have unceasingly accused with attributing every +thing to chance--to blind causes--to dead, inert matter, incapable of +self-action. We have, I think, sufficiently justified the partizans +of nature against these ridiculous accusations; we have throughout the +whole proved, and we repeat it, that chance is a word devoid of sense, +which as well as all other unintelligible words, announces nothing but +ignorance of actual causes. We have demonstrated that matter is not +dead; that nature, essentially active and self-existent, has sufficient +energy to produce all the beings which she contains--all the phenomena +we behold. We have, throughout, made it evident that this cause is much +more tangible, more easy of comprehension, than the inconceivable theory +to which theology assigns these stupendous effects. We have represented, +that the incomprehensibility of natural effects was not a sufficient +reason for assigning to them a system still more incomprehensible than +any of those of which, at least, we have a slight knowledge. In fine, if +the incomprehensibility of a system does not authorize the denial of +its existence, it is at least certain that the incompatibility of the +attributes with which it is clothed, authorizes the assertion, that +those which unite them cannot be any thing more than chimeras, of which +the existence is impossible. + +This granted, we shall be competent to fix the sense that ought to be +attached to the name of atheist; which, notwithstanding, the theologians +lavish on all those who deviate in any thing from their opinions. If, +by atheist, be designated a man who denieth the existence of a power +inherent in matter, without which we cannot conceive nature, and if it +be to this power that the name of God is given, then there do not exist +any atheists, and the word under which they are denominated would only +announce fools. But if by atheists be understood men without enthusiasm; +who are guided by experience; who follow the evidence of their senses; +who see nothing in nature but what they actually find to have existence, +or that which they are capacitated to know; who neither do, nor can +perceive any thing but matter essentially active, moveable, diversely +combined, in the full enjoyment of various properties, capable of +producing all the beings who display themselves to our visual faculties, +if by atheists be understood natural philosophers, who are convinced +that without recurring to chimerical causes, they can explain every +thing, simply by the laws of motion; by the relation subsisting between +beings; by their affinities; by their analogies; by their aptitude to +attraction; by their repulsive powers; by their proportions; by their +combinations; by their decomposition: if by atheists be meant these +persons who do not understand what _Pneumatology_ is, who do +not perceive the necessity of spiritualizing, or of rendering +incomprehensible, those corporeal, sensible, natural causes, which +they see act uniformly; who do not find it requisite to separate the +motive-power from the universe; who do not see, that to ascribe +this power to an immaterial substance, to that whose essence is from +thenceforth totally inconceivable, is a means of becoming more familiar +with it: if by atheists are to be pourtrayed those men who ingenuously +admit that their mind can neither receive nor reconcile the union of the +negative attributes and the theological abstractions, with the human +and moral qualities which are given to the Divinity; or those men who +pretend that from such an incompatible alliance, there could only result +an imaginary being; seeing that a pure spirit is destitute of the organs +necessary to exercise the qualities, to give play to the faculties of +human nature: if by atheists are described those men who reject systems, +whose odious and discrepant qualities are solely calculated to disturb +the human species--to plunge it into very prejudicial follies: if, +I repeat it, thinkers of this description are those who are called +atheists, it is not possible to doubt their existence; and their number +would be considerable, if the light of sound natural philosophy was more +generally diffused; if the torch of reason burnt more distinctly; or +if it was not obscured by the theological bushel: from thence, however, +they would be considered neither as irrational; nor as furious beings, +but as men devoid of prejudice, of whose opinions, or if they prefer it, +whose ignorance, would be much more useful to the human race, than those +ideal sciences, those vain hypotheses, which for so many ages have been +the actual causes of all man's tribulation. + +Doctor Cudworth, in his _Intellectual System_, reckons four species of +atheists among the ancients. + +First.--The disciples of Anaximander, called _Hylopathians_, who +attributed every thing to matter destitute of feeling. His doctrine was, +that men were born of earth united with water, and vivified by the +beams of the sun; his crime seems to have been, that he made the first +geographical maps and sun-dials; declared the earth moveable and of a +cylindrical form. + +Secondly.--The _Atomists_, or the disciples of Democritus, who attribute +every thing, to the concurrence of atoms. His crime was, having first +taught that the milky way was occasioned by the confused light from a +multitude of stars. + +Thirdly.--The _Stoics_, or the disciples of Zeno, who admitted a blind +nature acting after certain laws. His crime appears to be, that he +practised virtue with unwearied perseverance, and taught that this +quality alone would render mankind happy. + +Fourthly.--The _Hylozoists_, or the disciples of Strato, who attributed +life to matter. His crime consisted in being one of the most acute +natural philosophers of his day, enjoying high favour with Ptolemy +Philadelphus, an intelligent prince, whose preceptor be was. + +If, however, by atheists, are meant those men, who are obliged to avow, +that they have not one idea of the system they adore, or which they +announce to others; who cannot give any satisfactory account, either +of the nature or of the essence of their immaterial substances; who +can never agree amongst themselves on the proofs which they adduce in +support of their System; on the qualities or on the modes of action +of their incorporeities, which by dint of negations they render a mere +nothing; who either prostrate themselves, or cause others to bow +down, before the absurd fictions of their own delirium: if, I say, +by atheists, be denominated men of this stamp, we shall be under the +necessity of allowing, that the world is filled with them: we shall even +be obliged to place in this number some of the most active theologians, +who are unceasingly reasoning upon that Which they do not understand; +who are eternally disputing upon points which they cannot demonstrate; +who by their contradictions very efficaciously undermine their own +systems; who annihilate all their own assertions of perfection, by the +numberless imperfections with which they clothe them; who rebel against +their gods by the atrocious character under which they depict them. In +short, we shall be able to consider as true atheists, those credulous, +weak persons, who upon hearsay and from tradition, bend the knee before +idols, of whom they have no other ideas, than those which are furnished +them by their spiritual guides, who themselves acknowledge that they +comprehend nothing about the matter. + +What has been said amply proves that the theologians themselves have not +always known the sense they could affix to the word atheist; they have +vaguely attacked, in an indistinct manner, calumniated with it, those +persons whose sentiments and principles were opposed to their own. +Indeed, we find that these sublime professors, always infatuated with +their own particular opinions, have frequently been extremely lavish in +their accusations of atheism, against all those whom they felt a +desire to injure; whose characters it was their pleasure to paint in +unfavourable colours; whose doctrines they wished to blacken; whose +systems they sought to render odious: they were certain of alarming +the illiterate, of rousing the antipathies of the silly, by a loose +imputation, or by a word, to which ignorance attaches the idea of +horror, merely because it is unacquainted with its true sense. In +consequence of this policy, it has been no uncommon spectacle to see the +partizans of the same sect, the adorers of the same gods, reciprocally +treat each other as atheists, in the fervour of their theological +quarrels; to be an atheist, in this sense, is not to have, in every +point, exactly the same opinions as those with whom we dispute, either +on superstitious or religious subjects. In all times the uninformed +have considered those as atheists, who did not think upon the Divinity +precisely in the same manner as the guides whom they were accustomed +to follow. Socrates, the adorer of a unique God, was no more than an +atheist in the eyes of the Athenian people. + +Still more, as we have already observed, those persons have frequently +been accused of atheism, who have taken the greatest pains to establish +the existence of the gods, but who have not produced satisfactory +proofs: when their enemies wished to take advantage of them, it was easy +to make them pass for atheists, who had wickedly betrayed their cause, +by defending it too feebly. The theologians have frequently been very +highly incensed against those who believed they had discovered the most +forcible proof of the existence of their gods, because they were obliged +to discover that their adversaries could make very contrary inductions +from their propositions; they did not perceive that it was next to +impossible not to lay themselves open to attack, in establishing +principles visibly founded upon that which each man sees variously. +Thus Paschal says, "I have examined if this God, of whom all the world +speaks, might not have left some marks of himself. I look every where, +and every where I see nothing but obscurity. Nature offers one nothing, +that may not be a matter of doubt and inquietude. If I saw nothing in +nature which indicated a Divinity, I should determine with myself, to +believe nothing about it. If every where I saw the sign of a creator, I +should repose myself in peace, in the belief of one. But seeing too +much to deny, and too little to assure me of his existence, I am in a +situation that I lament, and in which I have an hundred times wished, +that if a God doth sustain nature, he would give unequivocal marks of +it, and that if the signs which he hath given be deceitful, that he +would suppress them entirely; that he said all or nothing, to the end +that I might see which side I ought to follow." + +In a word, those who have most vigorously taken up the cause of the +theological systems, have been taxed with atheism and irreligion; the +most zealous partizans have been looked upon as deserters, have been +contemplated as traitors; the most orthodox theologians have not been +able to guarantee themselves from this reproach; they have mutually +bespatered each other; prodigally lavished, with malignant reciprocity, +the most abusive terms: nearly all have, without doubt, merited these +invectives, if in the term atheist be included those men who have +not any idea of their various systems, that does not destroy itself, +whenever they are willing to submit it to the touchstone of reason. From +whence we may conclude, without subjecting ourselves to the reproach of +being hasty, that error will not stand the test of investigation; that +it will not pass the ordeal of comparison; that it is in its hues a +perfect chamelion; that consequently it can never do more than lead to +the most absurd deductions: that the most ingenious systems, when they +have their foundations in hallucination, crumble like dust under the +rude band of the assayer; that the most sublimated doctrines, when they +lack the substantive quality of rectitude, evaporate under the scrutiny +of the sturdy examiner, who tries them in the crucible; that it is +not by levelling abusive language against those who investigate +sophisticated theories, they will either be purged of their absurdities, +acquire solidity, or find an establishment to give them perpetuity; that +moral obliquities, can never be made rectilinear by the mere application +of unintelligible terms, or by the inconsiderate jumble of discrepant +properties, however gaudy the assemblage: in short, that the only +criterion of truth is, _that it is ever consistent with itself_. + + + + + +CHAP. XII. + +_Is what is termed Atheism compatible with Morality?_ + + +After having proved the existence of those whom the superstitious bigot, +the heated theologian, the inconsequent theist, calls _atheists_, let us +return to the calumnies which are so profusely showered upon them by +the deicolists. According to Abady, in his _Treatise on the Truth of the +Christian Religion_, "an atheist cannot be virtuous: to him virtue is +only a chimera; probity no more than a vain scruple; honesty nothing +but foolishness;--he knoweth no other law than his interest: where this +sentiment prevails, conscience is only a prejudice; the law of nature +only an illusion; right no more than an error; benevolence hath no +longer any foundation; the bonds of society are loosened; the ties of +fidelity are removed; friend is ready to betray friend; the citizen to +deliver up his country; the son to assassinate his father, in order +to enjoy his inheritance, whenever they shall find occasion, and that +authority or silence shall shield them from the arm of the secular +power, which alone is to be feared. The most inviolable rights, and +most sacred laws, must no longer be considered, except as dreams +and visions." Such, perhaps, would be the conduct, not of a feeling, +thinking, reflecting being, susceptible of reason; but of a ferocious +brute, of an irrational wretch, who should not have any idea of the +natural relations which subsist between beings, reciprocally necessary +to each other's happiness. Can it actually be supposed, that a man +capable of experience, furnished with the faintest glimmerings of sound +sense, would lend himself to the conduct which is here ascribed to the +atheist; that is to say, to a man who is conversant with the evidence of +facts; who ardently seeks after truth; who is sufficiently susceptible +of reflection, to undeceive himself by reasoning upon those prejudices +which every one strives to shew him as important; which all voices +endeavour to announce to him as sacred? Can it, I repeat, be supposed, +that any enlightened, any polished society, contains a citizen so +completely blind, not to acknowledge his most natural duties; so very +absurd, not to admit his dearest interests; so completely besotted not +to perceive the danger he incurs in incessantly disturbing his fellow +creatures; or in following no other rule, than his momentary appetites? +Is not every human being who reasons in the least possible manner, +obliged to feel that society is advantageous to him; that he hath need +of assistance; that the esteem of his fellows is necessary to his own +individual happiness; provoked, that he has every thing to fear from +the wrath of his associates; that the laws menace whoever shall dare to +infringe them? Every man who has received a virtuous education, who +has in his infancy experienced the tender cares of a parent; who has in +consequence tasted the sweets of friendship; who has received kindness; +who knows the worth of benevolence; who sets a just value upon equity; +who feels the pleasure which the affection of our fellow creatures +procures for us; who endures the inconveniences which result from their +aversion who smarts under the sting which is inflicted by their +scorn, is obliged to tremble at losing, by his measures, such manifest +advantages--at incurring such, imminent danger. Will not the hatred of +others, the fear of punishment, his own contempt of himself, disturb his +repose every time that, turning, inwardly upon his own conduct, he shall +contemplate it under the same perspective as does his neighbour? Is +there then no remorse but for those who believe in incomprehensible +systems? Is the idea that we are tinder the eye of beings of whom we +have but vague notions, more forcible than the thought that we are +viewed by our fellow men; than the fear of being detected by ourselves; +than the dread of exposure; than the cruel necessity of becoming +despicable in our own eyes; than the wretched alternative, to be +constrained to blush guiltily, when we reflect on our wild career, and +the sentiments which it must infallibly inspire? + +This granted, we shall reply deliberately to this Abady, that an atheist +is a man who understands nature, who studies her laws; who knows his own +nature; who feels what it imposes upon him. An atheist hath experience; +this experience proves to him every moment that vice can injure him; +that his most concealed faults, his most secret dispositions, may be +detected--may display his character in open day; this experience proves +to him that society is useful to his happiness; that his interest +authoritatively demands he should attach himself to the country that +protects him, which enables him to enjoy in security the benefits of +nature; every thing shews him that in order to be happy he must make +himself beloved; that his parent is for him the most certain of friends; +that ingratitude would remove him from his benefactor; that justice is +necessary to the maintenance of every association; that no man, whatever +way he his power, can be content with himself, when he knows he is an +object of public hatred. He who has maturely reflected upon himself, +upon his own nature, upon that of his associates, upon his own wants, +upon the means of procuring them, cannot prevent himself from becoming +acquainted with his duties--from discovering the obligations he owes to +himself, as well as those which he owes to others; from thence he has +morality, he has actual motives to confirm himself to its dictates; he +is obliged to feel, that these duties are imperious: if his reason be +not disturbed by blind passions, if his mind be not contaminated by +vicious habits, he will find that virtue is the surest road to felicity. +The atheists, as they are styled, or the fatalists, build their system +upon necessity: thus, their moral speculations, founded upon the nature +of things, are at least much more permanent, much more invariable, than +those which only rest upon systems that alter their aspect according +to the various dispositions of their adherents--in conformity with the +wayward passions of those who contemplate, them. The essence of things, +and the immutable laws of nature, are not subject to fluctuate; it +is imperative with the atheist, as he is facetiously called by the +theologian, to call whatever injures himself either vice or folly; to +designate that which injures others, crime; to describe all that is +advantageous to society, every thing which contributes to its permanent +happiness, virtue. + +It will be obvious, then, that the principles of the miscalled atheist +are much less liable to be shaken, than those of the enthusiast, who +shall have studied a baby from his earliest Infancy; who should have +devoted not only his days, but his nights, to gleaning the scanty +portion of actual information that he scatters through his volumes; +they will have a much more substantive foundation than those of the +theologian, who shall construct his morality upon the harlequin scenery +of systems that so frequently change, even in his own distempered brain. +If the atheist, as they please to call those who differ in opinion with +themselves, objects to the correctness, of--their systems, he cannot +deny his own existence, nor that of beings similar to himself, by whom +he is surrounded; he cannot doubt the reciprocity of the relations that +subsist between them; he cannot question the duties which spring out +of these relations; Pyrrhonism, then, cannot enter his mind upon the +actual principles of morality; which is nothing more than the science of +the relations of beings living together in society. + +If, however, satisfied with a barren, speculative knowledge of his +duties, the atheist of the theologian should not apply them in +his conduct--if, hurried along by the current of his ungovernable +passions--if, borne forward by criminal habits--if, abandoned to +shameful vices-if, possessing a vicious temperament, which he has +not been sedulous to correct--if, lending himself to the stream of +outrageous desires, he appears to forget his moral obligations, it by no +means follows, either that he hath no principles, or that his principles +are false: it can only be concluded from such conduct, that in the +intoxication of his passions, in the delirium of his habits, in the +confusion of his reason, he does not give activity to doctrines grounded +upon truth; that he forgets to give currency to ascertained principles; +that he may follow those propensities which lead him astray. In this, +indeed, he will have dreadfully descended to the miserable level of +the theologian, but he will nevertheless find him the partner of his +folly--the partaker of his insanity--the companion of his crime. + +Nothing is, perhaps, more common among men, than a very marked +discrepancy between the mind and the heart; that is to say, between the +temperament, the passions, the habits the caprices, the imagination, and +the judgment, assisted by reflection. Nothing is, in fact, more rare, +than to find these harmoniously running upon all fours with each other; +it is, however, only when they do, that we see speculation influence +practice. The most certain virtues are those which are founded upon +the temperament of man. Indeed, do we not every day behold mortals +in contradiction with themselves? Does not their more sober judgment +unceasingly condemn the extravagancies to which their undisciplined +passions deliver them up? In short, doth not every thing prove to us +hourly, that men, with the very best theory, have sometimes the very +worst practice; that others with the most vicious theory, frequently +adopt the most amiable line of conduct? In the blindest systems, in +the most atrocious superstitions, in those which are most contrary to +reason, we meet with virtuous men, the mildness of whose character, the +sensibility of whose hearts, the excellence of whose temperament, re +conducts them to humanity, makes them fall back upon the laws of nature, +in despite of their furious theories. Among the adorers of the most +cruel, vindictive, jealous gods, are found peaceable, souls, who are +enemies to persecution; who set their faces against violence; who are +decidedly opposed to cruelty: among the disciples of a God filled with +mercy, abounding in clemency, are seen barbarous monsters; inhuman +cannibals: nevertheless, both the one and the other acknowledge, that +their gods ought to serve them for a model. Wherefore, then, do they not +in all things conform themselves? It is because the most wicked systems +cannot always corrupt a virtuous soul; that those which are most bland, +most gentle in their precepts, cannot always restrain hearts driven +along by the impetuosity of vice. The organization will, perhaps, be +always more potential than either superstition or religion. Present +objects, momentary interests, rooted habits, public opinion, have much +more efficacy than unintelligible theories, than imaginary systems, +which themselves depend upon the organic structure of the human frame. + +The point in question then is, to examine if the principles of the +atheist, as he is erroneously called, be true, and not whether his +conduct be commendable? An atheist, having an excellent theory, founded +upon nature, grafted upon experience, constructed upon reason, who +delivers himself up to excesses, dangerous to himself, injurious to +society, is, without doubt, an inconsistent man. But he is not more to +be feared than a superstitious bigot; than a zealous enthusiast; or +than even a religious man who, believing in a good, confiding in an +equitable, relying on a perfect God, does not scruple to commit the +most frightful devastations in his name. An atheistical tyrant would +assuredly not be more to be dreaded than a fanatical despot. An +incredulous philosopher, however, is not so mischievous a being as an +enthusiastic priest, who either fans the flame of discord among his +fellow subjects, or rises in rebellion against his legitimate monarch. +Would, then, an atheist clothed with power, be equally dangerous as a +persecuting priest-ridden king; as a savage inquisitor; as a whimsical +devotee; or, as a morose bigot? These are assuredly more numerous in the +world than atheists, as they are ludicrously termed, whose opinions, or +whose vices are far from being in a condition to have an influence +upon society; which is ever too much hoodwinked by the priest, too much +blinded by prejudice, too much the slave of superstition, to be disposed +to give them a patient hearing. + +An intemperate, voluptuous atheist, is not more dangerous to society +than a superstitions bigot, who knows how to connect licentiousness, +punic faith, ingratitude, libertinism, corruption of morals, with his +theological notions. Can it, however, be ingeniously imagined, that a +man, because he is falsely termed an atheist, or because he does not +subscribe to the vengeance of the most contradictory systems, will +therefore be a profligate debaucheé, malicious, and persecuting; that he +will corrupt the wife of his friend; will turn his own wife adrift; +will consume both his time and his money in the most frivolous +gratifications; will be the slave to the most childish amusements; the +companion of the most dissolute men; that he will discard all his +old friends; that he will select his bosom confidents from the brazen +betrayers of their native land--from among the hoary despoilers of +connubial happiness--from out of the ranks of veteran gamblers; that he +will either break into his neighbour's dwelling, or cut his throat; +in short, that he will lend himself to all those excesses, the most +injurious to society, the most prejudicial to himself, the most +deserving public castigation? The blemishes of an atheist, then, as the +theologian styles him, have not any thing more extraordinary in them +than those of the superstitious man; they possess nothing with which his +doctrine can be fairly reproached. A tyrant, who should be incredulous, +would not be a more incommodious scourge to his subjects, than a +theological autocrat, who should wield his sceptre to the misery of his +people. Would the nation of the latter feel more happy, from the +mere circumstance that the tyger who governed it believed in the most +abstract systems, heaped the most sumptuous presents on the priests, and +humiliated himself at their shrine? At least it must be acknowledged, +according to the shewing of the theologian himself, that under +the dominion of the atheist, a nation would not have to apprehend +superstitious vexations; to dread persecutions for opinion; to fear +proscriptions for ill-digested systems; neither would it witness those +strange outrages that have sometimes been Committed for the interests +of heaven, even under the mildest monarchs. If it was the victim to the +turbulent passions of an unbelieving prince, the sacrifice to the folly +of a sovereign who should be an infidel, it would not, at least, suffer +from his blind infatuation, for theological systems which he does not +understand; nor from his fanatical zeal, which of all the passions +that infest monarchs, is ever the most destructive, always the most +dangerous. An atheistical tyrant, who should persecute for opinions, +would be a man not consistent with his own principles; he could not +exist; he would not, indeed, according to the theologian, be an atheist +at most, he would only furnish one more example, that mortals much +more frequently follow the blind impulse of their passions, the more +immediate stimulus of their interest, the irresistible torrent of their +temperament, than their speculations, however grave, however wise. +It is, at least, evident, that an atheist has one pretext less than a +credulous prince, for exercising his natural wickedness. + +Indeed, if men condescended to examine things coolly, they would find +that on this earth the name of God is but too frequently made use of as +a motive to indulge the worst of human passions. Ambition, imposture, +and tyranny, have often formed a league to avail themselves of its +influence, to the end that they might blind the people, and bend them +beneath a galling yoke: the monarch sometimes employs it to give a +divine lustre to his person--the sanction of heaven to his rights--the +confidence of its votaries to his most unjust, most extravagant whims. +The priest frequently uses it to give currency to his pretensions, to +the end that he may with impunity gratify his avarice, minister to his +pride, secure his independence. The vindictive, enraged, superstitious +being, introduces the cause of his gods, that he may give free scope to +his fury, which he qualifies with zeal. In short, superstition becomes +dangerous, because it justifies those passions, lends legitimacy to +those crimes, holds forth as commendable those excesses, of which it +does not fail to gather the fruit: according to its ministers, every +thing is permitted to revenge the most high: thus the name of the +Divinity is made use of to authorize the most baneful actions, to +palliate the most injurious transgressions. The atheist, as he is +called, when he commits crimes, cannot, at least, pretend that it is +his gods who command them, or who clothe them with the mantle of their +approval, this is the excuse the superstitious being offers for his +perversity; the tyrant for his persecutions; the priest for his cruelty, +and for his sedition; the fanatic for the ebullition of his boiling +passions; the penitent for his inutility. + +"They are not," says Bayle, "the general opinions of the mind, but the +passions, which determine us to act." Atheism, as it is called, is a +system which will not make a good man wicked but it may, perhaps, make +a wicked man good. "Those," says the same author, "who embraced the +sect of Epicurus, did not become debaucheés because they had adopted +the doctrine of Epicurus; they only lent themselves to the system, then +badly understood, because they were debaucheés." In the same manner, a +perverse man may embrace atheism, because he will flatter himself, that +this system will give full scope to his passions: he will nevertheless +be deceived. Atheism, as it is called, if well understood, is founded +upon nature and upon reason, which never can, like superstition, either +justify or expiate the crimes of the profligate. + +From the diffusion of doctrines which make morality depend upon +unintelligible, incomprehensible systems, that are proposed to man for +a model, there has unquestionably resulted very great inconvenience. +Corrupt souls, in discovering, how much each of these suppositions +are erroneous or doubtful, give loose to the rein of their vices, and +conclude there are not more substantive motives for acting well; they +imagine that virtue, like these fragile systems, is merely chimerical; +that there is not any cogent solid reason for practising it in this +world. Nevertheless, it must be evident, that it is not as the disciples +of any particular tenet, that we are bound to fulfil the duties of +morality; it is as men, living together in society, as sensible beings +seeking to secure to ourselves a happy existence, that we should feel +the moral obligation. Whether these systems maintain their ground, or +whether the do not, our duties will remain the same; our nature, if +consulted, will incontestibly prove, that _vice is a decided evil, that +virtue is an actual, a substantial good_. + +If, then, there be found atheists who have denied the distinction +of good and evil, or who have dared to strike at the foundations of +morality; we ought to conclude, that upon this point they have reasoned +badly; that they have neither been acquainted with the nature of man, +nor known the true source of his duties; that they have falsely imagined +that ethics, as well as theology, was only an ideal science; that the +fleeting systems once destroyed, there no longer remained any bonds +to connect mortals. Nevertheless, the slightest reflection would have +incontestibly proved, that morality is founded upon immutable relations +subsisting between sensible, intelligent, sociable beings; that without +virtue, no society can maintain itself; that without putting the curb on +his desires, no mortal can conserve himself: man is constrained from +his nature to love virtue, to dread crime, by the same necessity that +obliges him to seek happiness, and fly from sorrow: thus nature compels +him to place a distinction between those objects which please, and those +objects Which injure him. Ask a man, who is sufficiently irrational to +deny the difference between virtue and vice, if it would be indifferent +to him to be beaten, robbed, calumniated, treated with ingratitude, +dishonoured by his wife, insulted by his children, betrayed by his +friend? His answer will prove to you, that whatever he may say, he +discriminates the actions of mankind; that the distinction between good +and evil, does not depend either upon the conventions of men, or +upon the ideas which they may have of particular systems; upon the +punishments or upon the recompenses which attend mortals in a future +existence. + +On the contrary, an atheist, as he is denominated, who should reason +with justness, would feel himself more interested than another in +practising those virtues to which he finds his happiness attached in +this world. If his views do not extend themselves beyond the limits of +his present existence, he must, at least, desire to see his days roll +on in happiness and in peace. Every man, who during the calm of his +passions, falls back upon himself, will feel that his interest invites +him to his own preservation; that his felicity rigorously demands he +should take the necessary means to enjoy life peaceably that it becomes +an imperative duty to himself to keep his actual abode free from alarm; +his mind untainted by remorse. Man oweth something to man, not merely +because he would offend any particular system, if he was to injure his +fellow creature; but because in doing him an injury he would offend a +man; would violate the laws of equity; in the maintenance of which every +human being finds himself interested. + +We every day see persons who are possessed of great talents, who have +very extensive knowledge, who enjoy very keen penetration, join to +these advantages a very corrupt heart; who lend, themselves to the most +hideous vices: their opinions may be true in some respects, false in a +great many others; their principles may be just, but their inductions +are frequently defective; very often precipitate. A man may embrace +sufficient knowledge to detect some of his errors, yet command too +little energy to divest himself of his vicious propensities. Man is +a being whose character depends upon his organization, modified +by habit--upon his temperament, regulated by education--upon his +propensities, marshalled by example--upon his; passions, guided by +his government; in short, he is only what transitory or permanent +circumstances make him: his superstitious ideas are obliged to yield to +this temperament; his imaginary systems feel a necessity to accommodate +themselves to his propensities; his theories give way to his interests. +If the system which constitutes man an atheist in the eyes of this +theologic friend, does not remove him from the vices with which he was +anteriorly tainted, neither does it tincture him with any new ones; +whereas, superstition furnishes its disciples with a thousand pretexts +for committing evil without repugnance; induces them even to applaud +themselves for the commission of crime. Atheism, at least, leaves men +such as they are; it will neither increase a man's intemperance, nor +add to his debaucheries, it will not render him more cruel than his +temperament before invited him to be: whereas superstition either +lacks the rein to the most terrible passions, gives loose to the most +abominable suggestions, or else procures easy expiations for the most +dishonourable vices. "Atheism," says Chancellor Bacon, "leaves to man +reason, philosophy, natural piety, laws, reputation, and every thing +that can serve to conduct him to virtue; but superstition destroys all +these things, and erects itself into a tyranny over the understandings +of men: this is the reason why atheism never disturbs the government, +but renders man more clear-sighted, as seeing nothing beyond the bounds +of this life." The same author adds, "that the times in which men +have turned towards atheism, have been the most tranquil; whereas +superstition has always inflamed their minds, and carried them on to +the greatest disorders; because it infatuates the people with novelties, +which wrest from and carry with them all the authority of government." + +Men, habituated to meditate, accustomed to make study a pleasure, are +not commonly dangerous citizens: whatever may be their speculations, +they never produce sudden revolutions upon the earth. The winds of the +people, at all times susceptible to be inflamed by the marvellous, their +dormant passions liable to be aroused by enthusiasm, obstinately resist +the light of simple truths; never heat themselves for systems that +demand a long train of reflection--that require the depth of the +most acute reasoning. The system of atheism, as the priests choose to +denominate it, can only be the result of long meditation; the fruit of +connected study; the produce of an imagination cooled by experience: it +is the child of reason. The peaceable Epicurus never disturbed Greece; +his philosophy was publicly taught in Athens during many centuries; he +was in incredible favour with his countrymen, who caused statues to be +erected to him; he had a prodigious number of friends, and his school +subsisted for a very long period. Cicero, although a decided enemy +to the Epicureans, gives a brilliant testimony to the probity both +of Epicurus and his disciples, who were remarkable for the inviolable +friendship they bore each other. In the time of Marcus Aurelius, there +was at Athens a public professor of the philosophy of Epicurus, paid +by that emperor, who was himself a stoic. Hobbes did not cause blood to +flow in England, although in his time, religious fanaticism made a king +perish on the scaffold. The poem of Lucretius caused no civil wars +in Rome; the writings of Spinosa did not excite the same troubles in +Holland as the disputes of Gomar and D'Arminius. In short, we can defy +the enemies to human reason to cite a single example, which proves in a +decisive manner that opinions purely philosophical, or directly contrary +to superstition, have ever excited disturbances in the state. Tumults +have generally arisen from theological notions, because both princes and +people have always foolishly believed they ought to take a part in +them. There is nothing so dangerous as that empty philosophy, which +the theologians have combined with their systems. It is to philosophy, +corrupted by priests, that it peculiarly belongs to blow up the embers +of discord; to invite the people to rebellion; to drench the earth with +human blood. There is, perhaps, no theological question, which has not +been the source of immense mischief to man; whilst all the writings of +those denominated atheists, whether ancient or modern, have never caused +any evil but to their authors; whom dominant imposture has frequently +immolated at his deceptive shrine. + +The principles of atheism are not formed for the mass of the people, +who are commonly under the tutelage of their priests; they are +not calculated for those frivolous capacities, not suited to those +dissipated minds, who fill society with their vices, who hourly afford +evidence of their own inutility; they will not gratify the ambitious; +neither are they adapted to intriguers, nor fitted for those restless +beings who find their immediate interest in disturbing the harmony +of the social compact: much less are they made for a great number of +persons, who, enlightened in other respects, have not sufficient courage +to divorce themselves from the received prejudices. + +So many causes unite themselves to confirm man in those errors which he +draws in with his mother's milk, that every step that removes him from +these endeared fallacies, costs him uncommon pain. Those persons who +are most enlightened, frequently cling on some side to the general +prepossession. By giving up these revered ideas, we feel ourselves, as +it were, isolated in society: whenever we stand alone in our opinions, +we no longer seem to speak the language of our associates; we are apt +to fancy ourselves placed on a barren, desert island, in sight of a +populous, fruitful country, which we can never reach: it therefore +requires great courage to adopt a mode of thinking that has but few +approvers. In those countries where human knowledge has made some +progress; where, besides, a certain freedom of thinking is enjoyed, may +easily be found a great number of deicolists, theists, or incredulous +beings, who, contented with having trampled under foot the grosser +prejudices of the illiterate, have not dared to go back to the +source--to cite the more subtle systems before the tribunal of reason. +If these thinkers did not stop on the road, reflection would quickly +prove to them that those systems which they have not the fortitude +to examine, are equally injurious to sound ratiocination, fully +as revolting to good sense, quite as repugnant to the evidence +of experience, as any of those doctrines, mysteries, fables, or +superstitious customs, of which they have already acknowledged the +futility; they would feel, as we have already proved, that all these +things are nothing more than the necessary consequences of those +primitive errors which man has indulged for so many ages in succession; +that in admitting these errors, they no longer have any rational cause +to reject the deductions which the imagination has drawn from them. A +little attention would distinctly shew them, that it is precisely these +errors that are the true cause of all the evils of society; that those +endless disputes, those sanguinary quarrels, to which superstition and +the spirit of party every instant give birth, are the inevitable effects +of the importance they attach to errors which possess all the means of +distraction, that scarcely ever fail to put the mind of man into a state +of combustion. In short, nothing is more easy than to convince ourselves +that imaginary systems, not reducible to comprehension, which are always +painted under terrific aspects, must act upon the imagination in a +very lively manner, must sooner or later produce disputes--engender +enthusiasm--give birth to fanaticism--end in delirium. + +Many persons acknowledge, that the extravagances to which superstition +lends activity, are real evils; many complain of the abuse of +superstition, but there are very few who feel that this abuse, together +with the evils, are the necessary consequences of the fundamental +principles of all superstition; which are founded upon the most grievous +notions, which rest themselves on the most tormenting opinions. We +daily see persons undeceived upon superstitious ideas, who nevertheless +pretend that this superstition "is salutary for the people;" that +without its supernatural magic, they could not be kept within due +bounds; in other words, could not be made the voluntary slaves of the +priest. But, to reason thus, is it not to say, poison is beneficial to +mankind, that therefore it is proper to poison them, to prevent them +from making an improper use of their power? Is it not in fact to pretend +it is advantageous to render them absurd; that it is a profitable course +to make them extravagant; wholesome to give them an irrational bias; +that they have need of hobgoblins to blind them; require the most +incomprehensible systems to make them giddy; that it is imperative +to submit them either to impostors or to fanatics, who will avail +themselves of their follies to disturb the repose of the world? Again, +is it an ascertained fact, does experience warrant the conclusion, that +superstition has a useful influence over the morals of the people? It +appears much more evident, is much better borne out by observation, +falls more in with the evidence of the senses, that it enslaves them +without rendering them better; that it constitutes an herd of ignorant +beings, whom panic terrors keep under the yoke of their task-masters; +whom their useless fears render the wretched instruments of towering +ambition--of rapacious tyrants; of the subtle craft of designing +priests: that it forms stupid slaves, who are acquainted with no other +virtue, save a blind submission to the most futile customs, to which +they attach a much more substantive value than to the actual virtues +springing out of the duties of morality; or issuing from the social +compact which has never been made known to them. If by any chance, +superstition does restrain some few individuals, it has no effect on +the greater number, who suffer themselves to be hurried along by the +epidemical vices with which they are infected: they are placed by it +upon the stream of corruption, and the tide either sweeps them away, +or else, swelling the waters, breaks through its feeble mounds, and +involves the whole in one undistinguished mass of ruin. It is in those +countries where superstition has the greatest power, that will always +be found the least morality. Virtue is incompatible with ignorance; it +cannot coalesce with superstition; it cannot exist with slavery: slaves +can only be kept in subordination by the fear of punishment; ignorant +children are for a moment intimidated by imaginary terrors. But freemen, +the children of truth, have no fears but of themselves; are neither to +be lulled into submission by visionary duties, nor coerced by fanciful +systems; they yield ready obedience to the evident demonstrations of +virtue; are the faithful, the invulnerable supporters of solid systems; +cling with ardour to the dictates of reason; form impenetrable +ramparts round their legitimate sovereigns; and fix their thrones on an +immoveable basis, unknown to the theologian; that cannot be touched with +unhallowed hands; whose duration will be commensurate with the existence +of time itself. To form freemen, however, to have virtuous citizens, +it is necessary to enlighten them; it is incumbent to exhibit truth to +them; it is imperative to reason with them; it is indispensable to make +them feel their interests; it is paramount to learn them to respect +themselves; they must be instructed to fear shame; they must be excited +to have a just idea of honour; they must be made familiar with the value +of virtue, they must be shewn substantive motives for following its +lessons. How can these happy effects ever be expected from the polluted +fountains of superstition, whose waters do nothing more than degrade +mankind? Or how are they to be obtained from the ponderous, bulky yoke +of tyranny, which proposes nothing more to itself, than to vanquish them +by dividing them; to keep them in the most abject condition by means of +lascivious vices, and the most detestable crimes? + +The false idea, which so many persons have of the utility of +superstition, which they, at least, judge to be calculated to restrain +the licentiousness of the illiterate, arise from the fatal prejudice +that it is a useful error; that truth may be dangerous. This principle +has complete efficacy to eternize the sorrows of the earth: whoever +shall have the requisite courage to examine these things, will without +hesitation acknowledge, that all the miseries of the human race are to +be ascribed to his errors; that of these, superstitious error must he +the most prejudicial, from the importance which is usually attached to +it; from the haughtiness with which it inspires sovereigns; from the +worthless condition which it prescribes to subjects; from the phrenzy +which it excites among the vulgar. We shall, therefore, be obliged to +conclude, that the superstitious errors of man, rendered sacred by time, +are exactly those which for the permanent interest of mankind, for the +well-being of society, for the security of the monarch himself, +demand the most complete destruction; that it is principally to their +annihilation, the efforts of a sound philosophy ought to be directed. It +is not to be feared, that this attempt will produce either disorders or +revolutions: the more freedom shall accompany the voice of truth, the +more convincing it will appear; although the more simple it shall +be, the less it will influence men, who are only smitten with the +marvellous; even those individuals who most sedulously seek after truth, +who pursue it with the greatest ardour, have frequently an irresistible +inclination, that urges them on, and incessantly disposes them to +reconcile error with its antipode. That great master of the art of +thinking, who holds forth to his disciples such able advice, says, with +abundant reason, "that there is nothing but a good and solid philosophy, +which can, like another Hercules, exterminate those monsters called +popular errors: it is that alone which can give freedom to the human +mind." + +Here is, unquestionably, the true reason why atheism, as it is called, +of which hitherto the principles have not been sufficiently developed, +appears to alarm even those persons who are the most destitute of +prejudice. They find the interval too great between vulgar superstition +and an absolute renunciation of it; they imagine they take a wise medium +in compounding with error; they therefore reject the consequences, while +they admit the principle; they preserve the shadow and throw away the +substance, without foreseeing that, sooner or later, it must, by its +obstetric art, usher into the world, one after another, the same +follies which now fill the heads of bewildered human beings, lost in +the labyrinths of incomprehensible systems. The major part of the +incredulous, the greater number of reformers, do no more than prune a +cankered tree, to whose root they dare not apply the axe; they do +not perceive that this tree will in the end produce the same fruit. +Theology, or superstition, will always be an heap of combustible matter: +brooded in the imagination of mankind, it will always finish by causing +the most terrible explosions. As long as the sacerdotal order shall have +the privilege of infecting youth--of habituating their minds to tremble +before unmeaning words--of alarming nations with the most terrific +systems, so long will fanaticism be master of the human mind; imposture +will, at its pleasure, cast the apple of discord among the members of +the state. The most simple error, perpetually fed, unceasingly modified, +continually exaggerated by the imagination of man, will by degrees +assume a collossal figure, sufficiently powerful to upset every +institution; amply competent to the overthrow of empires. Theism is a +system at which the human mind cannot make a long sojourn; founded upon +error, it will, sooner or later, degenerate into the most absurd, the +most dangerous superstition. + +Many incredulous beings, many theists, are to be met with in those +countries where freedom of opinion reigns; that is to say, where the +civil power has known how to balance superstition. But, above all, +atheists as they are termed, will be found in those nations where, +superstition, backed by the sovereign authority, most enforces the +ponderosity of its yoke; most impresses the volume of its severity; +imprudently abuses its unlimited power. Indeed, when in these kind of +countries, science, talents, the seeds of reflection, are not entirely +stifled, the greater part of the men who think, revolt at the crying +abuses of superstition; are ashamed of its multifarious follies; are +shocked at the corruption of its professors; scandalized at the tyranny +of its priests: are struck with horror at those massive chains which +it imposes on the credulous. Believing with great reason, that they can +never remove themselves too far from its savage principles, the system +that serves for the basis of such a creed, becomes as odious as the +superstition itself; they feel that terrific systems can only be +detailed by cruel ministers; these become detestable objects to every +enlightened, to every honest mind, in which either the love of equity, +or the sacred fire of freedom resides; to every one who is the advocate +of humanity--the indignant spurner of tyranny. Oppression gives a spring +to the soul; it obliges man to examine closely into the cause of his +sorrows; misfortune is a powerful incentive, that turns the mind to +the side of truth. How formidable a foe must not outraged reason be to +falsehood? It at least throws it into confusion, when it tears away its +mask; when it follows it into its last entrenchment; when it proves, +beyond contradiction, that _nothing is so dastardly as delusion +detected, or tyrannic power held at bay._ + + + + + +CHAP. XIII. + +_Of the motives which lead to what is falsely called Atheism.--Can this +System be dangerous?--Can it be embraced by the Illiterate?_ + + +The reflections, as well as the facts which have preceded, will furnish +a reply to those who inquire what interest man has in not admitting +unintelligible systems? The tyrannies, the persecutions, the numberless +outrages committed under these systems; the stupidity, the slavery, +into which their ministers almost every where plunge the people; the +sanguinary disputes to which they give birth; the multitude of unhappy +beings with which their fatal notions fill the world; are surely +abundantly sufficient to create the most powerful, the most interesting +motives, to determine all sensible men, who possess the faculty of +thought, to examine into the authenticity of doctrines, which cause so +many serious evils to the inhabitants of the earth. + +A theist, very estimable for his talents, asks, "if there can be any +other cause than an evil disposition, which can make men atheists?" I +reply to him, yes, there are other causes. There is the desire, a very +laudable one, of having a knowledge of interesting truths; there is the +powerful interest of knowing what opinions we ought to hold upon the +object which is announced to us as the most important; there is the fear +of deceiving ourselves upon systems which are occupied with the opinions +of mankind, which do not permit he should deceive himself respecting +them with impunity. But when these motives, these causes, should not +subsist, is not indignation, or if they will, an evil disposition, a +legitimate cause, a good and powerful motive, for closely examining the +pretensions, for searching into the rights of systems, in whose name so +many crimes are perpetrated? Can any man who feels, who thinks, who +has any elasticity in his soul, avoid being incensed against austere +theories, which are visibly the pretext, undeniably the source, of all +those evils, which on every side assail the human race? Are they not +these fatal systems which are at once the cause and the ostensible +reason of that iron yoke that oppresses mankind; of that wretched +slavery in which he lives; of that blindness which hides from him +his happiness; of that superstition, which disgraces him; of those +irrational customs which torment him; of those sanguinary quarrels which +divide him; of all the outrages which he experiences? Must not every +breast in which humanity is not extinguished, irritate itself against +that theoretical speculation, which in almost every country is made to +speak the language of capricious, inhuman, irrational tyrants? + +To motives so natural, so substantive, we shall join those which are +still more urgent, more personal to every reflecting man: namely, that +benumbing terror, that incommodious fear, which must be unceasingly +nourished by the idea of capricious theories, which lay man open to the +most severe penalties, even for secret thoughts, over which he himself +has not any controul; that dreadful anxiety arising out of inexorable +systems, against which he may sin without even his own knowledge; of +morose doctrines, the measure of which he can never be certain of having +fulfilled; which so far from being equitable, make all the obligations +lay on one side; which with the most ample means of enforcing restraint, +freely permit evil, although they hold out the most excruciating +punishments for the delinquents? Does it not then, embrace the best +interests of humanity, become of the highest importance to the welfare +of mankind, of the greatest consequence to the quiet of his existence, +to verify the correctness of these systems? Can any thing be more +rational than to probe to the core these astounding theories? Is it +possible that any thing can be more just, than to inquire rigorously +into the rights, sedulously to examine the foundations, to try by +every known test, the stability of doctrines, that involve in their +operations, consequences of such colossal magnitude; that embrace, in +their dictatory mandates, matters of such high behest; that implicate +the eternal felicity of such countless millions in the vortex of their +action? Would it not be the height of folly to wear such a tremendous +yoke without inquiry; to let such overwhelming notions pass current +unauthenticated; to permit the soi-disant ministers of these terrific +systems to establish their power, without the most ample verification +of their patents of mission? Would it, I repeat, be at all wonderful, if +the frightful qualities of some of these systems, as exhibited by +their official expounders, whom the accredited functionaries of similar +systems, do not scruple, in the face of day, to brand as impostors, +should induce rational beings to drive them entirely from their hearts; +to shake off such an intolerable burden of misery; to even deny the +existence of such appalling doctrines, of such petrifying systems, +which the superstitious themselves, whilst paying them their homage, +frequently curse from the very bottom of their hearts? + +The theist, however, will not fail to tell the atheist, as he calls him, +that these systems are not such as superstition paints them; that the +colours are coarse, too glaring, ill assorted, the perspective out of +all keeping; he will then exhibit his own picture, in which the tints +are certainly blended with more mellowness, the colouring of a more +pleasing hue, the whole more harmonious, but the distances equally +indistinct: the atheist, in reply, will say, that superstition itself, +with all the absurd prejudices, all the mischievous notions to which it +gives birth, are only corollaries drawn from the fallacious ideas, from +those obscure principles, which the deicolist himself indulges. That his +own incomprehensible system authorizes the incomprehensible absurdities, +the inconceivable mysteries, with which superstition abounds; that they +flow consecutively from his own premises; that when once the mind of +mortals is bewildered in the dark, inextricable mazes of an ill-directed +imagination, it will incessantly multiply its chimeras. To assure the +repose of mankind, fundamental errors must be annihilated; that he may +understand his true relations, be acquainted with his imperative duties, +primary delusions must be rectified; to procure him that serenity of +soul, without which there can be no substantive happiness, original +fallacies must be undermined. If the systems of the superstitious +be revolting, if their theories be gloomy, if their dogmas are +unintelligible, those of the theist will always be contradictory; will +prove fatal, when he shall be disposed to meditate upon them; will +become the source of illusions, with which, sooner or later, imposture +will not omit to abuse his credulity. Nature alone, with the truths she +discovers, is capable of lending to the human mind that firmness +which falsehood will never be able to shake; to the human heart that +self-possession, against which imposture will in vain direct its +attacks. + +Let us again reply to those who unceasingly repeat that the interest of +the passions alone conduct man to what is termed atheism: that it is the +dread of future punishment that determines corrupt individuals to make +the most strenuous efforts to break up a system they have reason to +dread. We shall, without hesitation, agree that it is the interest of +man's passions which excites him to make inquiries; without interest, +no man is tempted to seek; without passion, no man will seek vigorously. +The question, then, to be examined, is, if the passions and interests, +which determine some thinkers to dive into the stability or the systems +held forth to their adoption, are or are not legitimate? These interests +have, already been exposed, from which it has been proved, that every +rational man finds in his inquietudes, in his fears, reasonable motives +to ascertain, whether or not it be necessary to pass his life in +perpetual dread; in never ceasing agonies? Will it be said, that an +unhappy being, unjustly condemned to groan in chains, has not the right +of being willing to render them asunder; to take some means to liberate +himself from his prison; to adopt some plan to escape from those +punishments, which every instant threaten him? Will it be pretended that +his passion for liberty has no legitimate foundation, that he does an +injury to the companions of his misery, in withdrawing himself from the +shafts of tyrannical infliction; or in furnishing, them also with means +to escape from its cruel strokes? Is, then, an incredulous man, any +thing more than one who has taken flight from the general prison, +in which despotic superstition detains nearly all mankind? Is not an +atheist, as he is called, who writes, one who has broken his fetters, +who supplies to those of his associates who have sufficient courage to +follow him, the means of setting themselves free from the terrors that +menace them? The priests unceasingly repeat that it is pride, vanity, +the desire of distinguishing himself from the generality of mankind, +that determines man to incredulity. In this they are like some of those +wealthy mortals, who treat all those as insolent who refuse to cringe +before them. Would not every rational man have a right to ask the +priest, where is thy superiority in matters of reasoning? What motives +can I have to submit my reason to thy delirium? On the other hand, way +it not be said to the hierarchy, that it is interest which makes them +priests; that it is interest which renders them theologians; that it is +for the interest of their passions, to inflate their pride, to gratify +their avarice, to minister to their ambition, &c. that they attach +themselves to systems, of which they alone reap the benefits? Whatever +it may be, the priesthood, contented with exercising their power over +the illiterate, ought to permit those men who do think, to be excused +from bending the knee before their vain, illusive idols. + +We also agree, that frequently the corruption of morals, a life of +debauchery, a licentiousness of conduct, even levity of mind, may +conduct man to incredulity; but is it not possible to be a libertine, to +be irreligious, to make a parade of incredulity, without being on that +account an atheist? There is unquestionably a difference between those +who are led to renounce belief in unintelligible systems by dint of +reasoning, and those who reject or despise superstition, only because +they look upon it as a melancholy object, or an incommodious restraint. +Many persons, no doubt, renounce received prejudices, through vanity or +upon hearsay; these pretended strong minds have not examined any thing +for themselves; they act upon the authority of others, whom they suppose +to have weighed things more maturely. This kind of incredulous beings, +have not, then, any distinct ideas, any substantive opinions, and are +but little capacitated to reason for themselves; they are indeed hardly +in a state to follow the reasoning of others. They are irreligious in +the same manner as the majority of mankind are superstitious, that is to +say, by credulity like the people; or through interest like the +priest. A voluptuary devoted to his appetites; a debaucheé drowned +in drunkenness; an ambitious mortal given up to his own schemes of +aggrandizement; an intriguer surrounded by his plots; a frivolous, +dissipated mortal, absorbed by his gewgaws, addicted to his puerile +pursuits, buried in his filthy enjoyments; a loose woman abandoned to +her irregular desires; a choice spirit of the day: are these I say, +personages, actually competent to form a sound judgment of superstition, +which they have never examined? Are they in a condition to maturely +weigh theories that require the utmost depth of thought? Have they the +capabilities to feel the force of a subtle argument; to compass the +whole of a system: to embrace the various ramifications of an extended +doctrine? If some feeble scintillations occasionally break in upon the +cimmerian darkness of their minds; if by any accident they discover +some faint glimmerings of truth amidst the tumult of their passions; if +occasionally a sudden calm, suspending, for a short season, the tempest +of their contending vices, permits the bandeau of their unruly desires +by which they are blinded, to drop for an instant from their hoodwinked +eyes, these leave on them only evanescent traces; scarcely sooner +received than obliterated. Corrupt men only attack the gods when they +conceive them to be the enemies to their vile passions. Arrian says, +"that when men imagine the gods are in opposition to their passions, +they abuse them, and overturn their altars." The Chinese, I believe, do +the same. The honest man makes war against systems which he finds are +inimical to virtue--injurious to his own happiness--baneful to that of +his fellow mortals--contradictory to the repose, fatal to the interests +of the human species. The bolder, therefore, the sentiments of the +honest atheist, the more strange his ideas, the more suspicious they +appear to other men, the more strictly he ought to observe his own +obligations; the more scrupulously he should perform his duties; +especially if he be not desirous that his morals shall calumniate his +system; which duly weighed, will make the necessity of sound ethics, the +certitude of morality, felt in all its force; but which every species of +superstition tends to render problematical, or to corrupt. + +Whenever our will is moved by concealed and complicated motives, it is +extremely difficult to decide what determines it; a wicked man may be +conducted to incredulity or to scepticism by those motives which he dare +not avow, even to himself; in believing he seeks after truth, he +may form an illusion to his mind, only to follow the interest of his +passions; the fear of an avenging system will perhaps determine him to +deny their existence without examination; uniformly because he feels +them incommodious. Nevertheless, the passions sometimes happen to be +just; a great interest carries us on to examine things more minutely; +it may frequently make a discovery of the truth, even to him who seeks +after it the least, or who is only desirous to be lulled to sleep, who +is only solicitous to deceive himself. It is the same with a perverse +man who stumbles upon truth, as it is with him, who flying from an +imaginary danger, should encounter in his road a dangerous serpent, +which in his haste he should destroy; he does that by accident, without +design, which a man, less disturbed in his mind, would have done with +premeditated deliberation. + +To judge properly of things, it is necessary to be disinterested; it +is requisite to have an enlightened mind, to have connected ideas to +compass a great system. It belongs, in fact, only to the honest man +to examine the proofs of systems--to scrutinize the principles of +superstition; it belongs only to the man acquainted with nature, +conversant with her ways, to embrace with intelligence the cause of the +SYSTEM OF NATURE. The wicked are incapable of judging with temper; +the ignorant are inadequate to reason with accuracy; the honest, the +virtuous, are alone competent judges in so weighty an affair. What do +I say? Is not the virtuous man, from thence in a condition to ardently +desire the existence of a system that remunerates the goodness of men? +If he renounces those advantages, which his virtue confers upon him +the right to hope, it is, undoubtedly, because he finds them imaginary. +Indeed, every man who reflects will quickly perceive, that for one timid +mortal, of whom these systems restrain the feeble passions, there are +millions whose voice they cannot curb, of whom, on the contrary, they +excite the fury; for one that they console, there are millions whom they +affright, whom they afflict; whom they make unhappy: in short, he finds, +that against one inconsistent enthusiast, which these systems, which +are thought so excellent, render happy, they carry discord, carnage, +wretchedness into vast countries; plunge whole nations into misery; +deluge them with tears. + +However this may be, do not let us inquire into motives which may +determine a man to embrace a system; let us rather examine the system +itself; let us convince ourselves of its rectitude; if we shall find +that it is founded upon truth, we shall never, be able to esteem it +dangerous. It is always falsehood that is injurious to man; if error be +visibly the source of his sorrows, reason is the true remedy for them; +this is the panacea that can alone carry consolation to his afflictions. +Do not let us farther examine the conduct of a man who presents us with +a system; his ideas, as we have already said, may be extremely sound, +when even his actions are highly deserving of censure. If the system of +atheism cannot make him perverse, who is not so by his temperament, it +cannot render him good, who does not otherwise know the motives +that should conduct him to virtue. At least we have proved, that the +superstitious man, when he has strong passions, when he possesses a +depraved heart, finds even in his creed a thousand pretexts more than +the atheist, for injuring the human species. The atheist has not, at +least, the mantle of zeal to cover his vengeance; he has not the command +of his priest to palliate his transports; he has not the glory of his +gods to countenance his fury; the atheist does not enjoy the faculty of +expiating, at the expence of a sum of money, the transgressions of his +life; of availing himself of certain ceremonies, by the aid of which he +may atone for the outrages he may have committed against society; he +has not the advantage of being able to reconcile himself with heaven, by +some easy custom; to quiet the remorse of his disturbed conscience, by +an attention to outward forms: if crime has not deadened every feeling +of his heart, he is obliged continually to carry within himself an +inexorable judge, who unceasingly reproaches him for his odious conduct; +who forces him to blush for his own folly; who compels him to hate +himself; who imperiously obliges him to fear examination, to dread the +resentment of others. The superstitious man, if he be wicked, gives +himself up to crime, which is followed by remorse; but his superstition +quickly furnishes him with the means a getting rid of it; his life is +generally no more than a long series of error and grief, of sin and +expiation, following each other in alternate succession; still more, he +frequently, as we have seen, perpetrates crimes of greater magnitude, +in order to wash away the first. Destitute of any permanent ideas on +morality, he accustoms himself to look upon nothing as criminal, but +that which the ministers, the official expounders of his system, forbid +him to commit: he considers actions of the blackest dye as virtues, or +as the means of effacing those transgressions, which are frequently held +out to him as faithfully executing the duties of his creed. It is thus +we have seen fanatics expiate their adulteries by the most atrocious +persecutions; cleanse their souls from infamy by the most unrelenting +cruelty; make atonement for unjust wars by the foulest means; qualify +their usurpations by outraging every principle of virtue; in order +to wash away their iniquities, bathe themselves in the blood of those +superstitious victims, whose infatuation made them martyrs. + +An atheist, as he is falsely called, if he has reasoned justly, if he +has consulted nature, hath principles more determinate, more humane, +than the superstitious; his system, whether gloomy or enthusiastic, +always conducts the latter either to folly or cruelty; the imagination +of the former will never be intoxicated to that degree, to make him +believe that violence, injustice, persecution, or assassination +are either virtuous or legitimate actions. We every day see that +superstition, or the cause of heaven, as it is called, hoodwinks even +those persons who on every other occasion are humane, equitable, and +rational; so much so, that they make it a paramount duty to treat with +determined barbarity, those men who happen to step aside from their mode +of thinking. An heretic, an incredulous being, ceases to be a man, in +the eyes of the superstitious. Every society, infected with the venom of +bigotry, offers innumerable examples of juridical assassination, which +the tribunals commit without scruple, even without remorse. Judges who +are equitable on every other occasion, are no longer so when there is a +question of theological opinions; in steeping their hands in the blood +of their victims, they believe, on the authority of the priests, they +conform themselves to the views of the Divinity. Almost every where the +laws are subordinate to superstition; make themselves accomplices in its +fanatical fury; they legitimate those actions most opposed to the gentle +voice of humanity; they even transform into imperative duties, the most +barbarous cruelties. The president Grammont relates, with a satisfaction +truly worthy of a cannibal, the particulars of the punishment of Vanini, +who was burned at Thoulouse, although he had disavowed the opinions with +which he was accused; this president carries his demoniac prejudices +so far, as to find wickedness in the piercing cries, in the +dreadful howlings, which torment wrested from this unhappy victim +to superstitious vengeance. Are not all these avengers of the gods +miserable men, blinded by their piety, who, under the impression of +duty, wantonly immolate at the shrine of superstition, those wretched +victims whom the priests deliver over to them? Are they not savage +tyrants, who have the rank injustice to violate thought; who have the +folly to believe they can enslave it? Are they not delirious fanatics, +on whom the law, dictated by the most inhuman prejudices, imposes the +necessity of acting like ferocious brutes? Are not all those sovereigns, +who to gratify the vanity of the priesthood, torment and persecute their +subjects, who sacrifice to their anthropophagite gods human victims, +men whom superstitious zeal has converted into tygers? Are not those +priests, so careful of the soul's health, who insolently break into the +sacred sanctuary of man's mind, to the end that they may find in his +opinions motives for doing him an injury, abominable knaves, disturbers +of the public repose, whom superstition honours, but whom virtue +detests? What villains are more odious in the eyes of humanity, what +depredators more hateful to the eye of reason, than those infamous +inquisitors, who by the blindness of princes, by the delirium of +monarchs, enjoy the advantage of passing judgment on their own enemies; +who ruthlessly commit them to the charity of the flames? Nevertheless, +the fatuity of the people makes even these monsters respected; the +favour of kings covers them with kindness; the mantle of superstitious +opinion shields them from the effect of the just execration of every +honest man. Do not a thousand examples prove, that superstition has +every where produced the most frightful ravages: that it has continually +justified the most unaccountable horrors? Has it not a thousand times +armed its votaries with the dagger of the homicide; let loose passions +much wore terrible than those which it pretended to restrain; broken up +the most sacred bonds by which mortals are connected with each other? +Has it not, under the pretext of duty, under the colour of faith, +under the semblance of zeal, under the sacred name of piety, favoured +cupidity, lent wings to ambition, countenanced cruelty, given a spring +to tyranny? Has it not legitimatized murder; given a system to perfidy; +organized rebellion; made a virtue of regicide? Have not those princes +who have been foremost as the avengers of heaven, who have been the +lictors of superstition, frequently themselves become its victims? In +short, has it not been the signal for the most dismal follies, the most +wicked outrages, the most horrible massacres? Has not its altars been +drenched with human gore? Under whatever form it has been exhibited, +has it not always been the ostensible cause of the most bare-faced +violation--of the sacred rights of humanity? + +Never will an atheist, as he is called, as called, as he enjoys his +proper senses, persuade himself that similar actions can be justifiable; +never will he believe that he who commits them can be an estimable man; +there is no one but the superstitious, whose blindness makes him forget +the most evident principles of morality, whose callous soul renders +him deaf to the voice of nature, whose zeal causes him to overlook +the dictates of reason, who can by any possibility imagine the most +destructive crimes are the most prominent features of virtue. If the +atheist be perverse, he, at least, knows that he acts wrong; neither +these systems, nor their priests, will be able to persuade him that he +does right: one thing, however, is certain, whatever crimes he may allow +himself to commit, he will never be capable of exceeding those which +superstition perpetrates without scruple; that it encourages in those +whom it intoxicates with its fury; to whom it frequently holds forth +wickedness itself, either as expiations for offences, or else as +orthodox, meritorious actions. + +Thus the atheist, however wicked he may be supposed, will at most be +upon a level with the devotee, whose superstition encourages him to +commit crimes, which it transforms into virtue. As to conduct, if he +be debauched, voluptuous, intemperate, adulterous, the atheist in +this differs in nothing from the most credulously superstitious, who +frequently knows how to connect these vices with his credulity, to +blend with his superstition certain atrocities, for which his priests, +provided he renders due homage to their power, especially if he augments +their exchequer, will always find means to pardon him. If he be in +Hindoostan, his brahmins will wash him in the sacred waters of the +Ganges, while reciting a prayer. If he be a Jew, upon making an +offering, his sins will be effaced. If he be in Japan, he will be +cleansed by performing a pilgrimage. If he be a Mahometan, he will be +reputed a saint, for having visited the tomb of his prophet; the Roman +pontiff himself will sell him indulgences; but none of them will ever +censure him for those crimes he may have committed in the support of +their several faiths. + +We are constantly told, that the indecent behaviour of the official +expounders of superstition, the criminal conduct of the priests, or of +their sectaries, proves nothing against the goodness of their systems. +Admitted: but wherefore do they not say the same thing of the conduct of +those whom they call atheists, who, as we have already proved, way +have a very substantive, a very correct system of morality, even while +leading a very dissolute life? If it be necessary to judge the opinions +of mankind according to their conduct, which is the theory that would +bear the scrutiny? Let us, then, examine the opinion of the atheist, +without approving his conduct; let us adopt his mode of thinking, if we +find it marked by the truth; if it shall appear useful; if it shall be +proved rational; but let us reject his mode of action, if that should be +found blameable. At the sight of a work performed with truth, we do not +embarrass ourselves with the morals of the workman: of what importance +is it to the universe, whether the illustrious Newton was a sober, +discreet citizen, or a debauched intemperate man? It only remains for us +to examine his theory; we want nothing more than to know whether he +has reasoned acutely; if his principles be steady; if the parts of his +system are connected; if his work contains more demonstrable truths, +than bold ideas? Let us judge in the same manner of the principles of +the atheist; if they appear strange, if they are unusual, that is a +solid reason for probing them more strictly; if he has spoken truth, +if he has demonstrated his positions, let us yield to the weight of +evidence; if he be deceived in some parts, let us distinguish the true +from the false; but do not let us fall into the hacknied prejudice, +which on account of one error in the detail, rejects a multitude of +incontestible truisms. Doctor Johnson, I think, says in his preface to +his Dictionary, "when a man shall have executed his task with all the +accuracy possible, he will only be allowed to have done his duty; but if +he commits the slightest error, a thousand snarlers are ready to point +it out." The atheist, when he is deceived, has unquestionably as +much right to throw his faults on the fragility of his nature, as the +superstitious man. An atheist may have vices, may be defective, he +may reason badly; but his errors will never have the consequences of +superstitious novelties; they will not, like these, kindle up the fire +of discord in the bosom of nations; the atheist will not justify his +vices, defend his wanderings by superstition; he will not pretend to +infallibility, like those self-conceited theologians who attach the +Divine sanction to their follies; who initiate that heaven authorizes +those sophisms, gives currency to those falsehoods, approves those +errors, which they believe themselves warranted to distribute over the +face of the earth. + +It will perhaps be said, that the refusal to believe in these systems, +will rend asunder one of the most powerful bonds of society, by making +the sacredness of an oath vanish. I reply, that perjury is by no means +rare, even in the most superstitious nations, nor even among the +most religious, or among those who boast of being the most thoroughly +convinced of the rectitude of their theories. Diagoras, superstitious as +he was, and it was not well possible to be more so, it is said became +an atheist, on seeing that the gods did not thunder their vengeance on +a man who had taken them as evidence to a falsity. Upon this principle, +how many atheists ought there to be? From the systems that have made +invisible unknown beings the depositaries of man's engagements, we do +not always see it result that they are better observed; or that the +most solemn contracts have acquired a greater solidity. If history +was consulted, it would now and then be in evidence, that even the +conductors of nations, those who have said they were the images of the +Divinity, who have declared that they held their right of governing +immediately from his hands, have sometimes taken the Deity as the +witness to their oaths, have made him the guarantee of their treaties, +without its having had all the effect that might have been expected, +when very trifling interests have intervened; it would appear, unless +historians are incorrect, that they did not always religiously observe +those sacred engagements they made with their allies, much less with +their subjects. To form a judgment from these historic documents, +we should be inclined to say, there have been those who had much +superstition, joined with very little probity; who made a mockery +both of gods and men; who perhaps blushed when they reviewed their own +conduct: nor can this be at all surprising, when it not unfrequently +happened that superstition itself absolved them from their oaths. In +fact, does not superstition sometimes inculcate perfidy; prescribe +violation of plighted faith? Above all, when there is a question of its +own interests, does it not dispense with engagements, however solemn, +made with those whom it condemns? It is, I believe, a maxim in the +Romish church, that _"no faith is to be held with heretics."_ The +general council of Constance decided thus, when, notwithstanding the +emperor's passport, it decreed John Hus and Jerome of Prague to be +burnt. The Roman pontiff has, it is well known, the right of relieving +his sectaries from their oaths; of annulling their vows: this same +pontiff has frequently arrogated to himself the right of deposing kings; +of absolving their subjects from their oaths of fidelity. Indeed, it +is rather extraordinary that oaths should be prescribed, by the laws +of those nations which profess Christianity, seeing that Christ +has expressly forbidden the use of them. If things were considered +attentively, it would be obvious that under such management, +superstition and politics are schools of perjury. They render it common: +thus knaves of every description never recoil, when it is necessary to +attest the name of the Divinity to the most manifest frauds, for the +vilest interests. What end, then, do oaths answer? They are snares, in +which simplicity alone can suffer itself to be caught: oaths, almost +every where, are vain formalities, that impose nothing upon villains; +nor do they add any thing to the sacredness of the engagements of honest +men; who would neither have the temerity nor the wish to violate them; +who would not think themselves less bound without an oath. A perfidious, +perjured, superstitious being, has not any advantage over an atheist, +who should fail in his promises: neither the one nor the other any +longer deserves the confidence of their fellow citizens nor the esteem +of good men; if one does not respect his gods, in whom he believes, the +other neither respects his reason, his reputation, nor public opinion, +in which all rational men cannot refuse to believe. Hobbes says, "an +oath adds nothing to the obligation. For a covenant, if lawful, binds +in the sight of God, without the oath, as much as with it: if unlawful, +bindeth not at all: though it be confirmed with an oath." The heathen +form was, "let Jupiter kill me else, as I kill this beast." Adjuration +only augments, in the imagination of him who swears, the fear of +violating an engagement, which he would have been obliged to keep, even +without the ceremony of an oath. + +It has frequently been asked, if there ever was a nation that had no +idea of the Divinity: and if a people, uniformly composed of atheists, +would be able to subsist? Whatever some speculators may say, it does not +appear likely that there ever has been upon our globe, a numerous people +who have not had an idea of some invisible power, to whom they have +shewn marks of respect and submission: it has been sometimes believed +that the Chinese were atheists: but this is an error, due to the +Christian missionaries, who are accustomed to treat all those as +atheists, who do not hold opinions similar with their own upon Divinity. +It always appears that the Chinese are a people extremely addicted +to superstition, but that they are governed by chiefs who are not so, +without however their being atheists for that reason. If the empire of +China be as flourishing as it is said to be, it at least furnishes +a very forcible proof that those who govern have no occasion to be +themselves superstitious, in order to govern with propriety a people +who are so. It is pretended that the Greenlanders have no idea of the +Divinity. Nevertheless, it is difficult to believe it of a nation so +savage. Man, inasmuch as he is a fearful, ignorant animal, necessarily +becomes superstitious in his misfortunes: either he forms gods for +himself, or he admits the gods which others are disposed to give him; +it does not then appear, that we can rationally suppose there may have +been, or that there actually is, a people on the earth a total stranger +to some Divinity. One will shew us the sun, the moon, or the stars; the +other will shew us the sea, the lakes, the rivers, which furnish him his +subsistence, the trees which afford him an asylum against the inclemency +of the weather; another will shew us a rock of an odd form; a lofty +mountain; or a volcano that frequently astonishes him by its emission +of lava; another will present you with his crocodile, whose malignity +he fears; his dangerous serpent, the reptile to which he attributes his +good or bad fortune. In short, each individual will make you behold his +phantasm or his tutelary or domestic gods with respect. + +But from the existence of his gods, the savage does not draw the same +inductions as the civilized, polished man: the savage does not believe +it a duty to reason continually upon their qualities; he does not +imagine that they ought to influence his morals, nor entirely occupy his +thoughts: content with a gross, simple, exterior worship, he does not +believe that these invisible powers trouble themselves with his conduct +towards his fellow creatures; in short, he does not connect his morality +with his superstition. This morality is coarse, as must be that of all +ignorant people; it is proportioned to his wants, which are few; it +is frequently irrational, because it is the fruit of ignorance; of +inexperience; of the passions of men but slightly restrained, or to +say thus, in their infancy. It is only numerous, stationary, civilized +societies, where man's wants are multiplied, where his interests clash, +that he is obliged to have recourse to government, to laws, to +public worship, in order to maintain concord. It is then, that men +approximating, reason together, combine their ideas, refine their +notions, subtilize their theories; it is then also, that those who +govern them avail themselves of invisible powers, to keep them within +bounds, to render them docile, to enforce their obedience, to oblige +them to live peaceably. It was thus, that by degrees, morals and +politics found themselves associated with superstitious systems. The +chiefs of nations, frequently, themselves, the children of superstition, +but little enlightened upon their actual interests; slenderly versed +in sound morality; with an extreme exilty of knowledge on the actuating +motives of the human heart; believed they had effected every thing +requisite for the stability of their own authority; as well as achieved +all that could guarantee the repose of society, that could consolidate +the happiness of the people, in rendering their subjects superstitious +like themselves; by menacing them with the wrath of invisible powers; in +treating them like infants who are appeased with fables, like children +who are terrified by shadows. By the assistance of these marvellous +inventions, to which even the chiefs, the conductors of nations, are +themselves frequently the dupes; which are transmitted as heirlooms from +race to race; sovereigns were dispensed from the trouble of instructing +themselves in their duties; they in consequence neglected the laws, +enervated themselves in luxurious ease, rusted in sloth; followed +nothing but their caprice: the care of restraining their subjects was +reposed in their deities; the instruction of the people was confided to +their priests, who were commissioned to train them to obedience, to make +them submissive, to render them devout, to teach them at an early age to +tremble under the yoke of both the visible and invisible gods. + +It was thus that nations, kept by their tutors in a perpetual state of +infancy, were only restrained by vain, chimerical theories. It was thus +that politics, jurisprudence, education, morality, were almost every +where infected with superstition; that man no longer knew any duties, +save those which grew out of its precepts: the ideas of virtue were thus +falsely associated with those of imaginary systems, to which imposture +generally gave that language which was most conducive to its own +immediate interests: mankind thus fully persuaded, that without these +marvellous systems, there could not exist any sound morality, princes, +as well as subjects, equally blind to their actual interests, to the +duties of nature, to their reciprocal rights, habituated themselves +to consider superstition as necessary to mortals--as indispensibly +requisite to govern men--as the most effectual method of preserving +power--as the most certain means of attaining happiness. + +It is from these dispositions, of which we have so frequently +demonstrated the fallacy, that so many persons, otherwise extremely +enlightened, look upon it as an impossibility that a society formed of +atheists, as they are termed, could subsist for any length of time. It +does not admit a question, that a numerous society, who should neither +have religion, morality, government, laws, education, nor principles, +could not maintain itself; that it would simply congregate beings +disposed to injure each other, or children who would follow nothing but +the blindest impulse; but then is it not a lamentable fact, that with +all the superstition that floats in the world, the greater number of +human societies are nearly in this state? Are not the sovereigns +of almost every country in a continual state of warfare with their +subjects? Are not the people, in despite of their superstition, not +withstanding the terrific notions which it holds forth, unceasingly +occupied with reciprocally injuring each other; with rendering +themselves mutually unhappy? Does not superstition itself, with its +supernatural notions, unremittingly flatter the vanity of monarchs, +unbridle the passions of princes, throw oil into the fire of discord, +which it kindles between those citizens who are divided in their +opinion? Could those infernal powers, who are supposed to be ever on the +alert to mischief mankind, be capable of inflicting greater evils upon +the human race than spring from fanaticism, than arise out of the fury +to which theology gives birth? Could atheists, however irrational they +may be supposed, if assembled together in society, conduct themselves +in a more criminal manner? In short, is it possible they could act worse +than the superstitious, who, saturated with the most pernicious vices, +guided by the most extravagant systems, during so many successive ages, +have done nothing more than torment themselves with the most cruel +inflictions; savagely cut each other's throats, without a shadow of +reason; make a merit of mutual extermination? It cannot be pretended +they would. On the contrary, we boldly assert, that a community of +atheists, as the theologian calls them, because they cannot fall in +with his mysteries, destitute of all superstition, governed by wholesome +laws, formed by a salutary education, invited to the practice of +virtue by instantaneous recompences, deterred from crime by immediate +punishments, disentangled from illusive theories, unsophisticated by +falsehood, would be decidedly more honest, incalculably more virtuous, +than those superstitious societies, in which every thing contributes to +intoxicate the mind; where every thing conspires to corrupt the heart. + +When we shall be disposed usefully to occupy ourselves with the +happiness of mankind, it is with superstition that the reform must +commence; it is by abstracting these imaginary theories, destined to +affright the ignorant, who are completely in a state of infancy, that we +shall be able to promise ourselves the desirable harvest of conducting +man to a state of maturity. It cannot be too often repeated, there can +be no morality without consulting the nature of man, without studying +his actual relations with the beings of his own species; there can be +no fixed principle for man's conduct, while it is regulated upon unjust +theories; upon capricious doctrines; upon corrupt systems; there can +be no sound politics without attending to human temperament, without +contemplating him as a being associated for the purpose of satisfying +his wants, consolidating his happiness, and assuring its enjoyment. No +wise government can found itself upon despotic systems; they will always +make tyrants of their representatives. No laws can be wholesome, that +do not bottom themselves upon the strictest equity; which have not for +their object the great end of human society. No jurisprudence can +be advantageous for nations, if its administration be regulated by +capricious systems, or by human passions deified. No education can be +salutary, unless it be founded upon reason; to be efficacious to its +proposed end, it must neither be construed upon chimerical theories, nor +upon received prejudices. In short, there can be no probity, no talents, +no virtue, either under corrupt masters, or under the conduct of those +priests who render man the enemy to himself--the determined foe +to others; who seek to stifle in his bosom the germ of reason; who +endeavour to smother science, or who try to damp his courage. + +It will, perhaps, be asked, if we can reasonably flatter ourselves with +ever reaching the point to make a whole people entirely forget their +superstitious opinions; or abandon the ideas which they have of their +gods? I reply, that the thing appears utterly impossible; that this is +not the end we can propose to ourselves. These ideas, inculcated from +the earliest ages, do not appear of a nature to admit eradication +from the mind of the majority of mankind: it would, perhaps be equally +arduous to give them to those persons, who, arrived at a certain time of +life, should never have heard them spoken of, as to banish them from +the minds of those, who have been imbued with them from their tenderest +infancy. Thus, it cannot be reckoned possible to make a whole nation +pass from the abyss of superstition, that is to say, from the bosom of +ignorance, from the ravings of delirium, into absolute naturalism, or +as the priests of superstition would denominate it, into atheism; +which supposes reflection--requires intense study--demands extensive +knowledge--exacts a long series of experience--includes the habit of +contemplating nature--the faculty of observing her laws; which, in +short, embraces the expansive science of the causes producing her +various phenomena; her multiplied combinations, together with the +diversified actions of the beings she contains, as well as their +numerous properties. In order to be an atheist, or to be assured of +the capabilities of nature, it is imperative to have meditated +her profoundly: a superficial glance of the eye will not bring man +acquainted with her resources; optics but little practised on her +powers, will unceasingly be deceived; the ignorance of actual causes +will always induce the supposition of those which are imaginary; +credulity will, thus re-conduct the natural philosopher himself to the +feet of superstitious phantoms, in which either his limited vision, or +his habitual sloth, will make him believe he shall find the solution to +every difficulty. + +Atheism, then, as well as philosophy, like all profound abstruse +sciences, is not calculated for the vulgar; neither is it suitable +to the great mass of mankind. There are, in all populous, civilized +nations, persons whose circumstances enable them to devote their time +to meditation, whose easy finances afford them leisure to make deep +researches into the nature of things, who frequently make useful +discoveries, which, sooner or later, after they have been submitted +to the infallible test of experience, when they have passed the fiery +ordeal of truth, extend widely their salutary effects, become extremely +beneficial to society, highly advantageous to individuals. The +geometrician, the chemist, the mechanic, the natural philosopher, the +civilian, the artizan himself, are industriously employed, either +in their closets, or in their workshops, seeking the means to serve +society, each in his sphere: nevertheless, not one of their sciences +or professions are familiar to the illiterate; not one of the arts with +which they are respectively occupied, are known to the uninitiated: +these, however, do not fail, in the long run, to profit by them, to reap +substantive advantages from those labours, of which they themselves have +no idea. It is for the mariner, that the astronomer explores his arduous +science; it is for him the geometrician calculates; for his use the +mechanic plies his craft: it is for the mason, for the carpenter, for +the labourer, that the skilful architect studies his orders, lays down +well-proportioned elaborate plans. Whatever may be the pretended utility +of Pneumatology, whatever may be the vaunted advantages of superstitious +opinions, the wrangling polemic, the subtle theologian, cannot boast +either of toiling, of writing, or of disputing for the advantage of the +people, whom, notwithstanding, he contrives to tax, very exorbitantly, +for those systems they can never understand; from whom he levies the +most oppressive contributions, as a remuneration for the detail of those +mysteries, which under any possible circumstances, cannot, at any time +whatever, be of the slightest benefit to them. It is not, then, for the +multitude that a philosopher should propose to himself, either to write +or to meditate: the Code of Nature, or the principles of atheism, as +the priest calls it, are not, as we have shewn, even calculated for +the meridian of a great number of persons, who are frequently too much +prepossessed in favour of the received prejudices, although extremely +enlightened on other points. It is extremely rare to find men, who, to +an enlarged mind, extensive knowledge, great talents, join either a well +regulated imagination, or the courage necessary to successfully oppugn +habitual errors; triumphantly to attack those chimerical systems, with +which the brain has been inoculated from the first hour of its birth. +A secret bias, an invincible inclination, frequently, in despite of all +reasoning, re-conducts the most comprehensive, the best fortified, the +most liberal minds, to those prejudices which have a wide-spreading +establishment; of which they have themselves taken copious draughts +during the early stages of life. Nevertheless, those principles, which +at first appear strange, which by their boldness seem revolting, from +which timidity flies with trepidation, when they have the sanction +of truth, gradually insinuate themselves into the human mind, become +familiar to its exercise, extend their happy influence on every side, +and finally produce the most substantive advantages to society. In time, +men habituate themselves to ideas which originally they looked upon +as absurd; which on a superficial glance they contemplated as either +noxious or irrational: at least, they cease to consider those as odious, +who profess opinions upon subjects on which experience makes it evident +they may be permitted to have doubts, without imminent danger to public +tranquillity. + +Then the diffusion of ideas among mankind is not an event to be dreaded: +if they are truths, they will of necessity be useful: by degrees they +will fructify. The man who writes, must neither fix his eyes upon the +time in which he lives, upon his actual fellow citizens, nor upon the +country he inhabits. He must speak to the human race; he must instruct +future generations; he must extend his views into the bosom of futurity; +in vain he will expect the eulogies of his contemporaries; in vain will +he flatter himself with seeing his reasoning adopted; in vain he +will soothe himself with the pleasing reflection, that his precocious +principles will be received with kindness; if he has exhibited truisms, +the ages that shall follow will do justice to his efforts; unborn +nations shall applaud his exertions; his future countrymen shall crown +his sturdy attempts with those laurels, which interested prejudice +withholds from him in his own days; it must therefore be from posterity, +he is to expect the need of applause due to his services; the present +race is hermetically sealed against him: meantime let him content +himself with having done well; with the secret suffrages of those few +friends to veracity who are so thinly spread over the surface of the +earth. It is after his death, that the trusty reasoner, the faithful +writer, the promulgator of sterling principles, the child of simplicity, +triumphs; it is then that the stings of hatred, the shafts of envy, the +arrows of malice, either exhausted or blunted, enable mankind to judge +with impartiality; to yield to conviction; to establish eternal truth +upon its own imperishable altars, which from its essence must survive +all the error of the earth. It is then that calumny, crushed like the +devouring snail by the careful gardener, ceases to besmear the character +of an honest man, while its venomous slime, glazed by the sun, enables +the observant spectator to trace the filthy progress it had made. + +It is a problem with many people, _if truth may not be injurious?_ +The best intentioned persons are frequently in great doubt upon this +important point. The fact is, _it never injures any but those who +deceive mankind_: this has, however, the greatest interest in being +undeceived. Truth may be injurious to the individual who announces it, +but it can never by any possibility harm the human species; never can it +be too distinctly presented to beings, always either little disposed to +listen to its dictates, or too slothful to comprehend its efficacy. If +all those who write to publish important truths, which, of all others, +are ever considered the most dangerous, were sufficiently ardent for the +public welfare to speak freely, even at the risk of displeasing their +readers, the human race would be much more enlightened, much happier +than it now is. To write in ambiguous terms, is very frequently to +write to nobody. The human mind is idle; we must spare it, as much +as possible, the trouble of reflection; we must relieve it from the +embarrassment of intense thinking. What time does it not consume, +what study does it not require, at the present day, to unravel the +amphibological oracles of the ancient philosophers, whose actual +sentiments are almost entirely lost to the present race of men? If truth +be useful to human beings, it is an injustice to deprive them of +its advantages; if truth ought to be admitted, we must admit its +consequences, which are also truths. Man, taken generally, is fond of +truth, but its consequences often inspire him with so much dread, so +alarm his imbecility, that, frequently, he prefers remaining in error, +of which a confirmed habit prevents him from feeling the deplorable +effects. Besides, we shall say with Hobbes, "that we cannot do men any +harm by proposing truth to them; the worst mode is to leave them in +doubt, to let them remain in dispute." If an author who writes be +deceived, it is because he may have reasoned badly. Has he laid down +false principles? It remains to examine them. Is his system fallacious? +Is it ridiculous? It will serve to make truth appear with the greatest +splendor: his work will fall into contempt; the writer, if he be witness +to its fall, will be sufficiently punished for his temerity; if he +be defunct, the living cannot disturb his ashes. No man writes with a +design to injure his fellow creatures; he always proposes to himself +to merit their suffrages, either by amusing them, by exciting their +curiosity, or by communicating to them discoveries, which he believes +useful. Above all, no work can be really dangerous, if it contains +truth. It would not be so, even if it contained principles evidently +contrary to experience--opposed to good sense. Indeed, what would +result from a work that should now tell us the sun is not luminous; that +parricide is legitimate; that robbery is allowable; that adultery is not +a crime? The smallest reflection would make us feet the falsity of these +principles; the whole human race would protest against them. Men would +laugh at the folly of the author; presently his book, together with his +name, would be known only by its ridiculous extravagancies. There is +nothing but superstitious follies that are pernicious to mortals; and +wherefore? It is because authority always pretends to establish them by +violence; to make them pass for substantive virtues; rigorously punishes +those who shall be disposed to smile at their inconsistency, or examine +into their pretensions. If man was more rational, he would examine +superstitious opinions as he examines every thing else; he would look +upon theological theories with the same eyes that he contemplates +systems of natural philosophy, or problems in geometry: the latter never +disturbs the repose of society, although they sometimes excite very +warm disputes in the learned world. Theological quarrels would never +be attended with any evil consequences, if man could gain the desirable +point of making those who exercise power, feel that the disputes of +persons, who do not themselves understand the marvellous questions upon +which they never cease wrangling, ought not to give birth to any other +sensations than those of indifference; to rouse no other passion than +that of contempt. + +It is, at least, this indifference not speculative theories, so just, so +rational, so advantageous for states, that sound philosophy may propose +to introduce, gradually, upon the earth. Would not the human race be +much happier--if the sovereigns of the world, occupied with the welfare +of their subjects, leaving to superstitious theologians their futile +contests, making their various systems yield to healthy politics; +obliged these haughty ministers to become citizens; carefully prevented +their disputes from interrupting the public tranquillity? What advantage +might there not result to science; what a start would be given to the +progress of the human mind, to the cause of sound morality, to +the advancement of equitable jurisprudence, to the improvement of +legislation, to the diffusion of education, from an unlimited freedom +of thought? At present, genius every where finds trammels; superstition +invariably opposes itself to its course; man, straitened with bandages, +scarcely enjoys the free use of any one of his faculties; his mind +itself is cramped; it appears continually wrapped up in the swaddling +clothes of infancy. The civil power, leagued with spiritual domination, +appears only disposed to rule over brutalized slaves, shut up in a dark +prison, where they reciprocally goad each other with the efferverscence +of their mutual ill humour. Sovereigns, in general, detest liberty +of thought, because they fear truth; this appears formidable to them, +because it would condemn their excesses; these irregularities are dear +to them, because they do not, better than their subjects, understand +their true interests; properly considered, these ought to blend +themselves into one uniform mass. + +Let not the courage of the philosopher, however, be abated by so many +united obstacles, which would appear for ever to exclude truth from its +proper dominion; to banish reason from the mind of man; to spoil nature +of her imprescriptible rights. The thousandth part of those cares which +are bestowed to infect the human mind, would be amply sufficient to make +it whole. Let us not, then, despair of the case: do not let us do man +the injury to believe that truth is not made for him; his mind seeks +after it incessantly; his heart desires it faithfully; his happiness +demands it with an imperious voice; he only either fears it, or mistakes +it, because superstition, which has thrown all his ideas into confusion, +perpetually keeps the bandeau of delusion fast bound over his eyes; +strives, with an almost irresistible force, to render him an entire +stranger to virtue. + +Maugre the prodigious exertions that are made to drive truth from the +earth; in spite of the extraordinary pains used to exile reason--of +the uninterrupted efforts to expel true science from the residence of +mortals; time, assisted by the progressive knowledge of ages, may one +day be able to enlighten even those princes who are the most outrageous +in their opposition to the illumination of the human mind; who appear +such decided enemies to justice, so very determined against the +liberties of mankind. Destiny will, perhaps, when least expected, +conduct these wandering outcasts to the throne of some enlightened, +equitable, courageous, generous, benevolent sovereign, who, smitten with +the charms of virtue, shall throw aside duplicity, frankly acknowledge +the true source of human misery, and apply to it those remedies with +which wisdom has furnished him: perhaps he may feel, that those systems, +from whence it is pretended he derives his power, are the true scourges +of his people; the actual cause of his own weakness: that the official +expounders of these systems are his most substantial enemies--his most +formidable rivals; he may find that superstition, which he has been +taught to look upon as the main support to his authority, in point +of fact only enfeebles it--renders it tottering: that superstitious +morality, false in its principles, is only calculated to pervert his +subjects; to break down their intrepidity; to render them perfidious; +in short, to give them the vices of slaves, in lieu of the virtues +of citizens. A prince thus disentangled from prejudice, will perhaps +behold, in superstitious errors, the fruitful source of human sorrows, +and commiserations, the condition of his race, it may be, will +generously declare, that they are incompatible with every equitable +administration. + +Until this epoch, so desirable for humanity, shall arrive, the +principles of naturalism will be adopted only by a small number of +liberal-minded men, who shall dive below the surface; these cannot +flatter themselves either with making proselytes, or having a great +number of approvers: on the contrary, they will meet with zealous +adversaries, with ardent contemners, even in those persons who upon +every other subject discover the most acute minds; display the most +consummate knowledge. Those men who possess the greatest share of +ability, as we have already observed, cannot always resolve to divorce +themselves completely from their superstitious ideas; imagination, +so necessary to splendid talents, frequently forms in them an +insurmountable obstacle to the total extinction of prejudice; this +depends much more upon the judgment than upon the mind. To this +disposition, already so prompt to form illusions to them, is also to +be joined the force of habit; to a great number of men, it would +he wresting from them a portion of themselves to take away their +superstitious notions; it would be depriving them of an accustomed +aliment; plunging them into a dreadful vacuum: obliging their +distempered minds to perish for want of exercise. Menage remarks, "that +history speaks of very few incredulous women, or female atheists:" +this is not surprising; their organization renders them fearful; their +nervous system undergoes periodical variations; the education they +receive disposes them to credulity. Those among them who have a sound +constitution, who have a well ordered imagination, have occasion for +chimeras suitable to occupy their leisure; above all, when the world +abandons them, then superstitious devotion, with its attractive +ceremonies, becomes either a business or an amusement. + +Let us not be surprised, if very intelligent, extremely learned men, +either obstinately shut their eyes, or run counter to their ordinary +sagacity, every time there is a question respecting an object which they +have not the courage to examine with that attention they lend to many +others. Lord Chancellor Bacon pretends, "that a little philosophy +disposes men to atheism, but that great depth re-conducts them to +religion." If we analyze this proposition, we shall find it signifies, +that even moderate, indifferent thinkers, are quickly enabled to +perceive the gross absurdities of superstition; but that very little +accustomed to meditate, or else destitute of those fixed principles +which could serve them for a guide, their imagination presently replaces +them in the theological labyrinth, from whence reason, too weak for the +purpose, appeared disposed to withdraw them: these timid souls, who fear +to take courage, with minds disciplined to be satisfied with theological +solutions, no longer see in nature any thing but an inexplicable enigma; +an abyss which it is impossible for them to fathom: these, habituated to +fix their eyes upon an ideal, mathematical point, which they have made +the centre of every thing, whenever they lose sight of it, find the +universe becomes an unintelligible jumble to them; then the confusion in +which they feel themselves involved, makes them rather prefer returning +to the prejudices of their infancy, which appear to explain every thing, +than to float in the vacuum, or quit a foundation which they judge to +be immoveable. Thus the proposition of Bacon should seem, to indicate +nothing, except it be that the most experienced persons cannot at all +times defend themselves against the illusions of their imagination; the +impetuosity of which resists the strongest reasoning. + +Nevertheless, a deliberate study of nature is sufficient to undeceive +every man who will calmly consider things: he will discover that the +phenomena of the world is connected by links, invisible to superficial +notice, equally concealed from the too impetuous observer, but extremely +intelligible to him who views her with serenity. He will find that the +most unusual, the most marvellous, as well as the most trifling, or +ordinary effects, are equally inexplicable, but that they all equally +flow from natural causes; that supernatural causes, under whatever name +they way be designated, with whatever qualities they may be decorated, +will never do more than increase difficulties; will only make chimeras +multiply. The simplest observation will incontestibly prove to him +that every thing is necessary; that all the effects he perceives are +material; that they can only originate in causes of the same nature, +when he even shall not be able to recur to them by the assistance of his +senses. Thus his mind, properly directed, every where show him nothing +but matter, sometimes acting in a manner which his organs permit him to +follow, at others in a mode imperceptible by the faculties he possesses: +he will see that all beings follow constant invariable laws, by which +all combinations are united and destroyed; he will find that all forms +change, but that, nevertheless, the great whole ever remains the same. +Thus, cured of the idle notions with which he was imbued, undeceived +in those erroneous ideas, which from habit be attached to imaginary +systems, he will cheerfully consent to be ignorant of whatever his +organs do not enable him to compass; he will know that obscure terms, +devoid of sense, are not calculated to explain difficulties; guided +by reason, he will throw aside all hypothesis of the imagination; the +champion of rectitude, he will attach himself to realities, which are +confirmed by experience, which are evidenced by truth. + +The greater number of those who study nature, frequently do not +consider, that prejudiced eyes will never discover more than that which +they have previously determined to find: as soon as they perceive facts +contrary to their own ideas, they quickly turn aside, and believe their +visual organs have deceived them; if they return to the task, it is in +hopes to find means by which they may reconcile the facts to the +notions with which their own mind is previously tinctured. Thus we find +enthusiastic philosophers, whose determined prepossession shews them +what they denominate incontestible evidences of the systems with which +they are pre-occupied, even in those things, that most openly contradict +their hypothesis: hence those pretended demonstrations of the existence +of theories, which are drawn from final causes--from the order of +nature--from the kindness evinced to man, &c. Do these same enthusiasts +perceive disorder, witness calamities? They induct new proofs of the +wisdom, fresh evidence of the intelligence, additional testimony to +the bounty of their system, whilst all these occurrences as visibly +contradict these qualities, as the first seem to confirm or to establish +them. These prejudiced observers are in an ecstacy at the sight of the +periodical motions of the planets; at the order of the stars; at the +various productions of the earth; at the astonishing harmony in the +component parts of animals: in that moment, however, they forget the +laws of motion; the powers of gravitation; the force of attraction and +repulsion; they assign all these striking phenomena to unknown causes, +of which they have no one substantive idea. In short, in the fervor of +their imagination they place man in the centre of nature; they believe +him to be the object, the end, of all that exists; that it is for his +convenience every thing is made; that it is to rejoice his mind, to +pleasure his senses, that the whole was created; whilst they do not +perceive, that very frequently the entire of nature appears to be loosed +against his weakness; that the elements themselves overwhelm him with +calamity; that destiny obstinately persists in rendering him the most +miserable of beings. The progress of sound philosophy will always be +fatal to superstition, whose notions will be continually contradicted by +nature. + +Astronomy has caused judiciary astrology to vanish; experimental +philosophy, the study of natural history and chemistry, have rendered +it impossible for jugglers, priests or sorcerers, any longer to perform +miracles. Nature, profoundly studied, must necessarily cause the +overthrow of those chimerical theories, which ignorance has substituted +to her powers. + +Atheism, as it is termed, is only so rare, because every thing conspires +to intoxicate man with a dazzling enthusiasm, from his most tender age; +to inflate him from his earliest infancy, with systematic error, with +organized ignorance, which of all others is the most difficult to +vanquish, the most arduous to root out. Theology is nothing more than a +science of words, which by dint of repetition we accustom ourselves to +substitute for things: as soon as we feel disposed to analyze them, we +are astonished to find they do not present us with any actual sense. +There are, in the whole world, very few men who think deeply: who render +to themselves a faithful account of their own ideas; who have keen +penetrating minds. Justness of intellect is one of the rarest gifts +which nature bestows on the human species. It is not, however, to be +understood by this, that nature has any choice in the formation of +her beings; it is merely to be considered, that the circumstances very +rarely occur which enable the junction of a certain quantity of +those atoms or parts, necessary to form the human machine in such due +proportions, that one disposition shall not overbalance the others; and +thus render the judgment erroneous, by giving it a particular bias. +We know the general process of making gunpowder; nevertheless, it will +sometimes happen that the ingredients have been so happily blended, that +this destructive article is of a superior quality to the general produce +of the manufactory, without, however, the chemist being on that account +entitled to any particular commendation; circumstances have been +decidedly favorable, and these seldom occur. Too lively an imagination, +an over eager curiosity, are as powerful obstacles to the discovery of +truth, as too much phlegm, a slow conception, indolence of mind, or +the want of a thinking habit: all men have more or less imagination, +curiosity, phlegm, bile, indolence, activity: it is from the happy +equilibrium which nature has observed in their organization, that +depends that invaluable blessing, correctness of mind. Nevertheless, +as we have heretofore said, the organic structure of man is subject +to change; the accuracy of his mind varies with the mutations of his +machine: from hence may be traced those almost perpetual revolutions +that take place in the ideas of mortals; above all when there is a +question concerning those objects, upon which experience does not +furnish any fixed basis whereon to rest their merits. + +To search after right, to discover truth, requires a keen, penetrating, +just, active mind; because every thing strives to conceal from us its +beauties: it needs an upright heart, one in good faith with itself, +joined to an imagination tempered with reason, because our habitual +fears make us frequently dread its radiance, sometimes bursting like a +meteor on our darkened faculties; besides, it not unfrequently happens, +that we are actually the accomplices of those who lead us astray, by an +inclination we too often manifest to dissimilate with ourselves on this +important measure. Truth never reveals itself either to the enthusiast +smitten with his own reveries; to the fellifluous fanatic enslaved +by his prejudices; to the vain glorious mortal puffed up with his own +presumptuous ignorance; to the voluptuary devoted to his pleasures; or +to the wily reasoner, who, disingenuous with himself, has a peculiar +spontaneity to form illusions to his mind. Blessed, however, with a +heart, gifted with a mind such as described, man will surely discover +this _rara avis:_ thus constituted, the attentive philosopher, the +geometrician, the moralist, the politician, the theologian himself, when +he shall sincerely seek truth, will find that the corner-stone which +serves for the foundation of all superstitious systems, is evidently +rested upon fiction. The philosopher will discover in matter a +sufficient cause for its existence; he will perceive that its motion, +its combination, its modes of acting, are always regulated by general +laws, incapable of variation. The geometrician, without quiting nature, +will calculate the active force of matter; it will then become obvious +to him, that to explain its phenomena, it is by no means necessary to +have recourse to that which is incommensurable with all known powers. +The politician, instructed in the true spring which can act upon the +mind of nations, will feel distinctly, that it is not imperative to +recur to imaginary theories, whilst there are actual motives to +give play to the volition of the citizens; to induce them to labour +efficaciously to the maintenance of their association; he will readily +acknowledge that fictitious systems are calculated either to slaken the +exertions, or to disturb the motion of so complicated a machine an human +society. He who shall more honor truth than the vain subtilities of +theology, will quickly perceive that this pompous science is nothing +more than an unintelligible jumble of false hypothesis; that it +continually begs its principles; is full of sophisms; contains only +vitiated circles; embraces the most subdolous distinctions; is ushered +to mankind by the most disingenuous arguments, from which it is not +possible, under any given circumstances, there should result any thing +but puerilities--the most endless disputes. In short, all men who +have sound ideas of morality, whose notions of virtue are correct, who +understand what is useful to the human being in society, whether it be +to conserve himself individually, or the body of which he is a member, +will acknowledge, that in order to discover his relations, to ascertain +his duties, he has only to consult his own nature; that he ought to be +particularly careful neither to found them upon discrepant systems, nor +to borrow them from models that never can do more than disturb his mind; +that will only render his conduct fluctuating; that will leave him for +ever uncertain of its proper character. + +Thus, every rational thinker, who renounces his prejudices, will be +enabled to feel the inutility, to comprehend the fallacy of so many +abstract systems; he will perceive that they have hitherto answered +no other purpose than to confound the notions of mankind; to render +doubtful the clearest truths. In quitting the regions of the empyreum, +where his mind can only bewilder itself, in re-entering his proper +sphere, in consulting reason, man will discover that of which he +needs the knowledge; he will be able to undeceive himself upon those +chimerical theories, which enthusiasm has substituted for actual natural +causes; to detect those figments, by which imposture has almost every +where superseded the real motives that can give activity in nature; out +of which the human mind never rambles, without going woefully astray; +without laying the foundation of future misery. + +The Deicolists, as well as the theologians, continually reproach their +adversaries with their taste for paradoxes--with their attachment to +systems; whilst they themselves found all their reasoning upon imaginary +hypothesis--upon visionary theories; make a principle of submitting +their understanding to the yoke of authority; of renouncing experience; +of setting down as nothing the evidence of their senses. Would it not +be justifiable in the disciples of nature, to say to these men, who thus +despise her, "We only assure ourselves of that which we see; we yield to +nothing but evidence; if we have a system, it is one founded upon +facts; we perceive in ourselves, we behold every where else, nothing +but matter; we therefore conclude from it that matter can both feel +and think: we see that the motion of the universe is operated after +mechanical laws; that the whole results from the properties, is the +effect of the combination, the immediate consequence of the modification +of matter; thus, we are content, we seek no other explication of the +phenomena which nature presents. We conceive only an unique world, in +which every thing is connected; where each effect is linked to a natural +cause, either known or unknown, which it produces according to necessary +laws; we affirm nothing that is not demonstrable; nothing that you are +not obliged to admit as well as ourselves: the principles we lay down +are distinct: they are self-evident: they are facts. If we find +some things unintelligible, if causes frequently become arduous, we +ingenuously agree to their obscurity; that is to say, to the limits +of our own knowledge. But in order to explain these effects, we do not +imagine an hypothesis; we either consent to be for ever ignorant +of them, or else we wait patiently until time, experience, with the +progress of the human mind, shall throw them into light: is not, then, +our manner of philosophizing consistent with truth? Indeed, in whatever +we advance upon the subject of nature, we proceed precisely in the same +manner as our opponents themselves pursue in all the other sciences, +such as natural history, experimental philosophy, mathematics, +chemistry, &c. We scrupulously confine ourselves to what comes to our +knowledge through the medium of our senses; the only instruments with +which nature has furnished us to discover truth. What is the conduct of +our adversaries? In order to expound things of which they are ignorant, +they imagine theories still more incomprehensible than what they are +desirous to explain; theories of which they themselves are obliged to +acknowledge they have not the most slender notion. Thus they invert the +true principles of logic, which require we should proceed gradually from +that which is most known, to that with which we are least acquainted. +Again, upon what do they found the existence of these theories, by whose +aid they pretend to solve all difficulties? It is upon the universal +ignorance of mankind; upon the inexperience of man; upon his fears; upon +his disordered imagination; upon a pretended _intimate sense_, which in +reality is nothing more than the effect of vulgar prejudice; the result +of dread; the consequence of the want of a reflecting habit, which +induces them to crouch to the opinions of others; to be guided by the +mandates of authority, rather than take the trouble to examine for their +own information. Such, O theologians! are the ruinous foundations upon +which you erect the superstructure of your doctrine. Accordingly, you +find it impossible to form to yourselves any distinct idea of those +theories which serve for the basis of your systems; you are unable to +comprehend either their attributes, their existence, the nature of their +localities, or their mode of action. Thus, even by your own confession, +ye are in a state of profound ignorance, on the primary elements of that +which ye constitute the cause of all that exists: of which, according +to your own account, it is imperative to have a correct knowledge. +Under whatever point of view, therefore, ye are contemplated, it must be +admitted ye are the founders of aerial systems; of fanciful theories: +of all systematizers, ye are consequently the most absurd; because in +challenging your imagination to create a cause, this cause, at least, +ought to diffuse light over the whole; it would be upon this condition +alone that its incomprehensibility could be pardonable; but to speak +ingenuously, does this cause serve to explain any thing? Does it make us +conceive more clearly the origin of the world; bring us more distinctly +acquainted with the actual nature of man; does it more intelligibly +elucidate the faculties of the soul; or point out with more perspicuity +the source of good and evil? No! unquestionably: these subtle +theories explain nothing, although they multiply to infinity their own +difficulties; they, in fact, embarrass elucidation, by plunging into +greater obscurity those matters in which they are interposed. Whatever +may be the question agitated, it becomes complicated: as soon as these +theories are introduced, they envelope the most demonstrable sciences +with a thick, impenetrable mist; render the most simple notions complex; +give opacity to the most diaphanous ideas; turn the most evident +opinions into insolvable enigmas. What exposition of morality does the +theories, upon which ye found all the virtue, present to man? Do not +all your oracles breathe inconsistency? Does not your doctrines embrace +every gradation of character, however discrepant: every known property, +however opposed. All your ingenious systems, all your mysteries, all the +subtilties which ye have invented, are they capable of reconciling that +discordant assemblage of amiable and unamiable qualities, with which +ye have dressed up your figments? In short, is it not by these theories +that ye disturb the harmony of the universe; is it not in their name +ye follow up your barbarous proscriptions; in their support, that ye +so inhumanly exterminate all who refuse to subscribe to your organized +reveries; who withhold assent to those efforts of the imagination which +ye have collectively decorated with the pompous name of religion; but +which, individually, ye brand as superstition, always excepting that to +which ye lend yourselves. Agree, then, O Theologians! Acknowledge, +then, ye subtle metaphysicians! Consent, then, ye organizers of fanciful +theories! that not only are ye systematically absurd, but also that ye +finish by being atrocious; because whenever ye obtain the ascendancy one +over the other, your unfortunate pre-eminence is distinguished by the +most malevolent persecution; your domination is ushered in with cruelty; +your career is described with blood: from the importance which your own +interest attaches to your ruinous dogmas; from the pride with which ye +tumble down the less fortunate systems of those who started with you for +the prize of plunder; _from that savage ferocity, under which ye +equally overwhelm human reason, the happiness of the individual, and the +felicity of nations._" + + + + + +CHAP. XIV. + +_A Summary of the Code of Nature_. + + +Truth is the only object worthy the research of every wise man; since +that which is false cannot be useful to him: whatever constantly injures +him cannot be founded upon truth; consequently, ought to be for ever +proscribed. It is, then, to assist the human mind, truly to labour for +his happiness, to point out to him the clew by which he may extricate +himself from those frightful labyrinths in which his imagination +wanders; from those sinuosities whose devious course makes him err, +without ever finding a termination to his incertitude. Nature alone, +known through experience, can furnish him with this desirable thread; +her eternal energies can alone supply the means of attacking the +Minotaur; of exterminating the figments of hypocrisy; of destroying +those monsters, who during so many ages, have devoured the unhappy +victims, which the tyranny of the ministers of Moloch have exacted as +a cruel tribute from affrighted mortals. By steadily grasping this +inestimable clew, rendered still more precious by the beauty of the +donor, man can never be led astray--will never ramble out of his course; +but if, careless of its invaluable properties, for a single instant he +suffers it to drop from his hand; if, like another Theseus, ungrateful +for the favour, he abandons the fair bestower, he will infallibly fall +again into his ancient wanderings; most assuredly become the prey to the +cannibal offspring of the White Bull. In vain shall he carry his views +above his head, to find resources which are at his feet; so long as man, +infatuated with his superstitious notions, shall seek in an imaginary +world the rule of his earthly conduct, he will be without principles; +while he shall pertinaciously contemplate the regions of a distempered +fancy, so long he will grope in those where he actually finds himself; +his uncertain steps will never encounter the welfare he desires; never +lead him to that repose after which he so ardently sighs, nor conduct +him to that surety which is so decidedly requisite to consolidate his +happiness. + +But man, blinded by his prejudices; rendered obstinate in injuring his +fellow, by his enthusiasm; ranges himself in hostility even against +those who are sincerely desirous of procuring for him the most +substantive benefits. Accustomed to be deceived, he is in a state of +continual suspicion; habituated to mistrust himself, to view his reason +with diffidence, to look upon truth as dangerous, he treats as enemies +even those who most eagerly strive to encourage him; forewarned in early +life against delusion, by the subtilty of imposture, he believes himself +imperatively called upon to guard with the most sedulous activity the +bandeau with which they have hoodwinked him; he thinks his eternal +welfare involved in keeping it for ever over his eyes; he therefore +wrestles with all those who attempt to tear it from his obscured optics. +If his visual organs, accustomed to darkness, are for a moment opened, +the light offends them; he is distressed by its effulgence; he thinks it +criminal to be enlightened; he darts with fury upon those who hold the +flambeau by which he is dazzled. In consequence, the atheist, as the +arch rogue from whom he differs ludicrously calls him, is looked upon as +a malignant pest, as a public poison, which like another Upas, destroys +every thing within the vortex of its influence; he who dares to arouse +mortals from the lethargic habit which the narcotic doses administered +by the theologians have induced passes for a perturbator; he who +attempts to calm their frantic transports, to moderate the fury of +their maniacal paroxysms, is himself viewed as a madman, who ought to +be closely chained down in the dungeons appropriated to lunatics; he +who invites his associates to rend their chains asunder, to break their +galling fetters, appears only like an irrational, inconsiderate being, +even to the wretched captives themselves: who have been taught to +believe that nature formed them for no other purpose than to tremble: +only called them into existence that they might be loaded with shackles. +In consequence of these fatal prepossessions, the _Disciple of Nature_ +is generally treated as an assassin; is commonly received by his fellow +citizens in the same manner as the feathered race receive the doleful +bird of night, which as soon as it quits its retreat, all the other +birds follow with a common hatred, uttering a variety of doleful cries. + +No, mortals blended by terror! The friend of nature is not your enemy; +its interpreter is not the minister of falsehood; the destroyer of your +vain phantoms is not the devastator of those truths necessary to your +happiness; the disciple of reason is not an irrational being, who either +seeks to poison you, or to infect you with a dangerous delirium. If +he is desirous to wrest the thunder from those terrible theories that +affright ye, it is that ye way discontinue your march, in the midst +of storms, over roads that ye can only distinguish by the sudden, but +evanescent glimmerings of the electric fluid. If he breaks those idols, +which fear has served with myrrh and frankencense--which superstition +has surrounded by gloomy despondency--which fanaticism has imbrued with +blood; it is to substitute in their place those consoling truths that +are calculated to heal the desperate wounds ye have received; that are +suitable to inspire you with courage, sturdily to oppose yourselves +to such dangerous errors; that have power to enable you to resist such +formidable enemies. If he throws down the temples, overturns the altars, +so frequently bathed with the bitter tears of the unfortunate, blackened +by the most cruel sacrifices, smoked with servile incense, it is that he +may erect a fane sacred to peace; a hall dedicated to reason; a durable +monument to virtue, in which ye may at all times find an asylum against +your own phrenzy; a refuge from your own ungovernable passions; a +sanctuary against those powerful dogmatists, by whom ye are oppressed. +If he attacks the haughty pretensions of deified tyrants, who crush ye +with an iron sceptre, it is that ye may enjoy the rights of your nature; +it is to the end that ye may be substantively freemen, in mind as well +as in body; that ye may not be slaves, eternally chained to the oar of +misery; it is that ye may at length be governed by men who are citizens, +who may cherish their own semblances, who way protect mortals like +themselves, who may actually consult the interests of those from +whom they hold their power. If he battles with imposture, it is to +re-establish truth in those rights which have been so long usurped by +fiction. If he undermines the base of that unsteady, fanatical morality, +which has hitherto done nothing more than perplex your minds, without +correcting your hearts; it is to give to ethics an immovable basis, a +solid foundation, secured upon your own nature; upon the reciprocity of +those wants which are continually regenerating in sensible beings: dare, +then, to listen to his voice; you will find it much more intelligible +than those ambiguous oracles, which are announced to you as the +offspring of capricious theories; as imperious decrees that are +unceasingly at variance with themselves. Listen then to nature, she +never contradicts her own eternal laws. + +"O thou!" cries this nature to man, "who, following the impulse I +have given you, during your whole existence, incessantly tend towards +happiness, do not strive to resist my sovereign law. Labour to your own +felicity; partake without fear of the banquet which is spread before +you, with the most hearty welcome; you will find the means legibly +written on your own heart. Vainly dost thou, O superstitious being! seek +after thine happiness beyond the limits of the universe, in which my +hand hath placed thee: vainly shalt thou search it in those inexorable +theories, which thine imagination, ever prone to wander, would establish +upon my eternal throne: vainly dost thou expect it in those fanciful +regions, to which thine own delirium hath given a locality and a shame: +vainly dost thou reckon upon capricious systems, with whose advantages +thou art in such ecstasies; whilst they only fill thine abode with +calamity--thine heart with dread--thy mind with illusions--thy bosom +with groans. Know that when thou neglectest my counsels, the gods will +refuse their aid. Dare, then, to affranchise thyself from the trammels +of superstition, my self-conceited, pragmatic rival, who mistakes +my rights; renounce those empty theories, which are usurpers of my +privileges; return under the dominion of my laws, which, however severe, +are mild in comparison with those of bigotry. It is in my empire +alone that true liberty reigns. Tyranny is unknown to its soil; equity +unceasingly watches over the rights of all my subjects, maintains +them in the possession of their just claims; benevolence, grafted upon +humanity, connects them by amicable bonds; truth enlightens them; never +can imposture blind them with his obscuring mists. Return, then, +my child, to thy fostering mother's arms! Deserter, trace back thy +wandering steps to nature! She will console thee for thine evils; she +will drive from thine heart those appalling fears which overwhelm thee; +those inquietudes that distract thee; those transports which agitate +thee; those hatreds that separate thee from thy fellow man, whom thou +shouldst love as thyself. Return to nature, to humanity, to thyself! +Strew flowers over the road of life: cease to contemplate the future; +live to thine own happiness; exist for thy fellow creatures; retire into +thyself, examine thine own heart, then consider the sensitive beings by +whom thou art surrounded: leave to their inventors those systems which +can effect nothing towards thy felicity. Enjoy thyself, and cause others +also to enjoy, those comforts which I have placed with a liberal hand, +for all the children of the earth; who all equally emanate from my +bosom: assist them to support the sorrows to which necessity has +submitted them in common with thyself. Know, that I approve thy +pleasures, when without injuring thyself, they are not fatal to thy +brethren, whom I have rendered indispensably necessary to thine own +individual happiness. These pleasures are freely permitted thee, if thou +indulgest them with moderation; with that discretion which I myself have +fixed. Be happy, then, O man! Nature invites thee to participate in it; +but always remember, thou canst not be so alone; because I invite all +mortals to happiness as well as thyself; thou will find it is only in +securing their felicity that thou canst consolidate thine own. Such is +the decree of thy destiny: if thou shalt attempt to withdraw thyself +from its operation, recollect that hatred will pursue thee; vengeance +overtake thy steps; and remorse be ever ready at hand to punish the +infractions of its irrevocable mandates. + +"Follow then, O man! in whatever station thou findest thyself, the +routine I have described for thee, to obtain that happiness to which +thou hast an indispensable right to challenge pretension. Let the +sensations of humanity interest thee for the condition of other men, who +are thy fellow creatures; let thine heart have commisseration for their +misfortunes: let thy generous hand spontaneously stretch forth to lend +succour to the unhappy mortal who is overwhelmed by his destiny; always +bearing in thy recollection, that it may fall heavy upon thyself, as +it now does upon him. Acknowledge, then, without guile, that every +unfortunate has an inalienable right to thy kindness. Above all, wipe +from the eyes of oppressed innocence the trickling crystals of agonized +feeling; let the tears of virtue in distress, fall upon thy sympathizing +bosom; let the genial glow of sincere friendship animate thine honest +heart; let the fond attachment of a mate, cherished by thy warmest +affection, make thee forget the sorrows of life: be faithful to her +love, responsible to her tenderness, that she may reward thee by +a reciprocity of feeling; that under the eyes of parents united in +virtuous esteem, thy offspring may learn to set a proper value on +practical virtue; that after having occupied thy riper years, they may +comfort thy declining age, gild with content thy setting sun, cheer the +evening of thine existence, by a dutiful return of that care which thou +shalt have bestowed on their imbecile infancy. + +"Be just, because equity is the support of human society! Be good, +because goodness connects all hearts in adamantine bonds! Be indulgent, +because feeble thyself, thou livest with beings who partake of thy +weakness! Be gentle, because mildness attracts attention! Be thankful, +because gratitude feeds benevolence, nourishes generosity! Be modest, +because haughtiness is disgusting to beings at all times well with +themselves. Forgive injuries, because revenge perpetuates hatred! Do +good to him who injureth thee, in order to shew thyself more noble than +he is; to make a friend of him, who was once thine enemy! Be reserved +in thy demeanor, temperate in thine enjoyment, chaste in thy pleasures, +because voluptuousness begets weariness, intemperance engenders disease; +forward manners are revolting: excess at all times relaxes the springs +of thy machine, will ultimately destroy thy being, and render thee +hateful to thyself, contemptible to others. + +"Be a faithful citizen; because the community is necessary to thine own +security; to the enjoyment of thine own existence; to the furtherance +of thine own happiness. Be loyal, but be brave; submit to legitimate +authority; because it is requisite to the maintenance of that society +which is necessary to thyself. Be obedient to the laws; because they +_are_, or _ought to be_, the expression of the public will, to which +thine own particular will ought ever to be subordinate. Defend thy +country with zeal; because it is that which renders thee happy, which +contains thy property, as well as those beings dearest to thine heart: +do not permit this common parent of thyself, as well as of thy fellow +citizens, to fall under the shackles of tyranny; because from thence +it will be no more than thy common prison. If thy country, deaf to the +equity of thy claims, refuses thee happiness--if, submitted to an unjust +power, it suffers thee to be oppressed, withdraw thyself from its bosom +in silence, but never disturb its peace. + +"In short, be a man; be a sensible, rational being; be a faithful +husband; a tender father; an equitable master; a zealous citizen; labour +to serve thy country by thy prowess; by thy talents; by thine industry; +above all, by thy virtues. Participate with thine associates those gifts +which nature has bestowed upon thee; diffuse happiness, among thy fellow +mortals; inspire thy fellow citizens with content; spread joy over all +those who approach thee, that the sphere of thine actions, enlivened by +thy kindness, illumined by thy benevolence, may re-act upon thyself; be +assured that the man who makes others happy cannot himself be miserable. +In thus conducting thyself, whatever may be the injustice of others, +whatever may be the blindness of those beings with whom it is thy +destiny to live, thou wilt never be totally bereft of the recompense +which is thy due; no power on earth be able to ravish from thee that +never failing source of the purest felicity, inward content; at each +moment thou wilt fall back with pleasure upon thyself; thou wilt neither +feel the rankling of shame, the terror of internal alarm, nor find +thy heart corroded by remorse. Thou wilt esteem thyself; thou wilt be +cherished by the virtuous, applauded and loved by all good men, whose +suffrages are much more valuable than those of the bewildered +multitude. Nevertheless, if externals occupy thy contemplation, smiling +countenances will greet thy presence; happy faces will express the +interest they have in thy welfare; jocund beings will make thee +participate in their placid feelings. A life so spent, will each moment +be marked by the serenity of thine own soul, by the affection of the +beings who environ thee; will be made cheerful by the friendship of thy +fellows; will enable thee to rise a contented, satisfied guest from the +general feast; conduct thee gently down the declivity of life, lead thee +peaceably to the period of thy days; for die thou must: but already +thou wilt survive thyself in thought; thou wilt always live in the +remembrance of thy friends; in the grateful recollection of those beings +whose comforts have been augmented by thy friendly attentions; thy +virtues will, beforehand have erected to thy fame an imperishable +monument: if heaven occupies itself with thee, it will feel satisfied +with thy conduct, when it shall thus have contented the earth. + +"Beware, then, how thou complainest of thy condition; be just, be kind, +be virtuous, and thou canst never be wholly destitute of felicity. Take +heed how thou enviest the transient pleasure of seductive crime; the +deceitful power of victorious tyranny; the specious tranquillity of +interested imposture; the plausible manners of venal justice; the shewy, +ostentatious parade of hardened opulence. Never be tempted to increase +the number of sycophants to an ambitious despot; to swell the catalogue +of slaves to an unjust tyrant; never suffer thyself to be allured to +infamy, to the practice of extortion, to the commission of outrage, by +the fatal privilege of oppressing thy fellows; always recollect it will +be at the expence of the most bitter remorse thou wilt acquire this +baneful advantage. Never be the mercenary accomplice of the spoilers of +thy country; they are obliged to blush secretly whenever they meet the +public eye. + +"For, do not deceive thyself, it is I who punish, with an unerring hand, +all the crimes of the earth; the wicked may escape the laws of man, but +they never escape mine. It is I who have formed the hearts, as well +an the bodies of mortals; it is I who have fixed the laws which govern +them. If thou deliverest thyself up to voluptuous enjoyment, the +companions of thy debaucheries may applaud thee; but I shall punish thee +with the most cruel infirmities; these will terminate a life of shame +with deserved contempt. If thou givest, thyself up to intemperate +indulgences, human laws may not correct thee, but I shall castigate thee +severely by abridging thy days. If thou art vicious, thy fatal habits +will recoil on thine own head. Princes, those terrestrial divinities, +whose power places them above the laws of mankind, are nevertheless +obliged to tremble under the silent operation of my decrees. It is I who +chastise them; it is I who fill their breasts with suspicion; it is +I who inspire them with terror; it is I who make them writhe under +inquietude; it is I who make them shudder with horror, at the very name +of august truth; it is I who, amidst the crowd of nobles who surround +them, make them feel the inward workings of shame; the keen anguish of +guilt; the poisoned arrows of regret; the cruel stings of remorse; it is +I who, when they abuse my bounty, diffuse weariness over their benumbed +souls; it is I who follow uncreated, eternal justice; it is I who, +without distinction of persons, know how to make the balance even; to +adjust the chastisement to the fault; to make the misery bear its due +proportion to the depravity; to inflict punishment commensurate with the +crime. The laws of man are just, only when they are in conformity with +mine; his judgements are rational, only when I have dictated them: my +laws alone are immutable, universal, irrefragable; formed to regulate +the condition of the human race, in all ages, in all places, under all +circumstances. + +"If thou doubtest mine authority, if thou questionest the irresistible +power I possess over mortals, contemplate the vengeance I wreak on all +those who resist my decrees. Dive into the recesses of the hearts of +those various criminals, whose countenances, assuming a forced smile, +cover souls torn with anguish. Dost thou not behold ambition tormented +day and night, with an ardour which nothing can extinguish? Dost not +thou see the mighty conquerer become the lord of devastated solitudes; +his victorious career, marked by a blasted cultivation, reign +sorrowfully over smoking ruins; govern unhappy wretches who curse him in +their hearts; while his soul, gnawed by remorse, sickens at the gloomy +aspect of his own triumphs? Dost thou believe that the tyrant, encircled +with his flatterers, who stun him with their praise, is unconscious of +the hatred which his oppression excites; of the contempt which his vices +draw upon him; of the sneers which his inutility call forth; of the +scorn which his debaucheries entail upon his name? Dost thou think that +the haughty courtier does not inwardly blush at the galling insults he +brooks; despise, from the bottom of his soul, those meannesses by +which he is compelled to purchase favours; feel at his heart's core the +wretched dependence in which his cupidity places him. + +"Contemplate the indolent child of wealth, behold him a prey to the +lassitude of unmeasured enjoyment, corroded by the satiety which always +follows his exhausted pleasures. View the miser with an emaciated +countenance, the consequence of his own penurious disposition, whose +callous heart is inaccessible to the calls of misery, groaning over the +accumulating load of useless treasure, which at the expense of himself, +he has laboured to amass. Behold the gay voluptuary, the smiling +debaucheé, secretly lament the health they have so inconsiderately +damaged so prodigally thrown away: see disdain, joined to hatred, reign +between those adulterous married couples, who have reciprocally violated +the sacred vows they mutually pledged at the altar of Hymen; whose +appetencies have rendered them the scorn of the world; the jest of their +acquaintance; polluted tributaries to the surgeon. See the liar +deprived of all confidence; the knave stript of all trust; the hypocrite +fearfully avoiding the penetrating looks of his inquisitive neighbour; +the impostor trembling at the very name of formidable truth. Bring under +your review the heart of the envious, uselessly dishonored; that withers +at the sight of his neighbour's prosperity. Cast your eyes on the frozen +soul of the ungrateful wretch, whom no kindness can warm, no benevolence +thaw, no beneficence convert into a genial fluid. Survey the iron +feelings of that monster whom the sighs of the unfortunate cannot +mollify. Behold the revengeful being nourished with venemous gall, whose +very thoughts are serpents; who in his rage consumes himself. Envy, if +thou canst, the waking slumbers of the homicide; the startings of the +iniquitous judge; the restlessness of the oppressor of innocence; the +fearful visions of the extortioner; whose couches are infested with the +torches of the furies. Thou tremblest without doubt at the sight of +that distraction which, amidst their splendid luxuries, agitates those +farmers of the revenue, who fatten upon public calamnity--who devour the +substance of the orphan--who consume the means of the widow--who grind +the hard earnings of the poor: thou shudderest at witnessing the remorse +which rends the souls of those reverend criminals, whom the uninformed +believe to be happy, whilst the contempt which they have for themselves, +the unerring shafts of secret upbraidings, are incessantly revenging +an outraged nation. Thou seest, that content is for ever banished the +heart; quiet for ever driven from the habitations of those miserable +wretches on whose minds I have indelibly engraved the scorn, the infamy, +the chastisement which they deserve. But, no! thine eyes cannot sustain +the tragic spectacle of my vengeance. Humanity obliges thee to partake +of their merited sufferings; thou art moved to pity for these unhappy +people, to whom consecrated errors renders vice necessary; whose fatal +habits make them familiar with crime. Yes; thou shunnest them without +hating them; thou wouldst succour them, if their contumacious perversity +had left thee the means. When thou comparest thine own condition, when +thou examinest thine own soul, thou wilt have just cause to felicitate +thyself, if thou shalt find that peace has taken up her abode with thee; +that contentment dwells at the bottom of thine own heart. In short, thou +seest accomplished upon them, as well as, upon thyself, the unalterable +decrees of destiny, which imperiously demand, that crime shall punish +itself, that virtue never shall be destitute Of remuneration." + +Such is the sum of those truths which are contained in the _Code of +Nature_; such are the doctrines, which its disciples can announce. They +are unquestionably preferable to that supernatural superstition which +never does any thing but mischief to the human species. Such is the +worship that is taught by that sacred reason, which is the object of +contempt with the theologian; which meets the insult of the fanatic; +who only estimates that which man can neither conceive nor practise; who +make his morality consist in fictitious duties; his virtue in actions +generally useless, frequently pernicious to the welfare of society; who +for want of being acquainted with nature, which is before their eyes, +believe themselves obliged to seek in ideal worlds imaginary motives, of +which every thing proves the inefficacy. The motive which the morality +of nature employs, is the self-evident interest of each individual, +of each community, of the whole human species, in all times, in every +country, under all circumstances. Its worship is the sacrifice of vice, +the practise of real virtues; its object is the conservation of the +human race, the happiness of the individual, the peace of mankind; +its recompences are affection, esteem, and glory; or in their default, +contentment of mind, with merited self-esteem, of which no power will +ever be able to deprive virtuous mortals; its punishments, are hatred, +contempt, and indignation; which society always reserves for those +who outrage its interests; from which even the most powerful can never +effectually shield themselves. + +Those nations who shall be disposed to practise a morality so wise, who +shall inculcate it in infancy, whose laws shall unceasingly confirm it, +will neither have occasion for superstition, nor for chimeras. Those +who shall obstinately prefer figments to their dearest interests, will +certainly march forward to ruin. If they maintain themselves for a +season, it is because the power of nature sometimes drives them back to +reason, in despite of those prejudices which appear to lead them on to +certain destruction. Superstition, leagued with tyranny, for the waste +of the human species, are themselves frequently obliged to implore +the assistance of a reason which they contemn; of a nature which they +disdain; which they debase; which they endeavour to crush under the +ponderous bulk of artificial theories. Superstition, in all times so +fatal to mortals, when attacked by reason, assumes the sacred mantle of +public utility; rests its importance on false grounds, founds its +rights upon the indissoluble alliance which it pretends subsists between +morality and itself; notwithstanding it never ceases for a single +instant to wage against it the most cruel hostility. It is, +unquestionably, by this artifice, that it has seduced so many sages. +In the honesty of their hearts, they believe it useful to politics; +necessary to restrain the ungovernable fury of the passions; thus +hypocritical superstition, in order to mask to superficial observers, +its own hideous character, like the ass with the lion's skin, always +knows how to cover itself with the sacred armour of utility; to buckle +on the invulnerable shield of virtue; it has therefore, been believed +imperative to respect it, notwithstanding it felt awkward under these +incumbrances; it consequently has become a duty to favor imposture, +because it has artfully entrenched itself behind the altars of truth; +its ears, however, discover its worthlessness; its natural cowardice +betrays itself; it is from this intrenchment we ought to drive it; it +should be dragged forth to public view; stripped of its surreptitious +panoply; exposed in its native deformity; in order that the human race +may become acquainted with its dissimulation; that mankind may have a +knowledge of its crimes; that the universe may behold its sacrilegious +hands, armed with homicidal poniards, stained with the blood of nations, +whom it either intoxicates with its fury, or immolates without pity to +the violence of its passions. + +The MORALITY OF NATURE is the only creed which her interpreter offers to +his fellow citizens; to nations; to the human species; to future races, +weaned from those prejudices which have so frequently disturbed the +felicity of their ancestors. The friend of mankind cannot be the friend +of delusion, which at all times has been a real scourge to the earth. +The APOSTLE OF NATURE will not be the instrument of deceitful chimeras, +by which this world is made only an abode of illusions; the adorer of +truth will not compromise with falsehood; he will make no covenant with +error; conscious it must always be fatal to mortals. He knows that the +happiness of the human race imperiously exacts that the dark unsteady +edifice of superstition should be razed to its foundations; in order +to elevate on its ruins a temple suitable to peace--a fane sacred to +virtue. He feels it is only by extirpating, even to the most slender +fibres, the poisonous tree, that during so many ages has overshadowed +the universe, that the inhabitants of this world will be able to use +their own optics--to bear with steadiness that light which is competent +to illumine their understanding--to guide their wayward steps--to give +the necessary ardency to their souls. If his efforts should be vain; if +he cannot inspire with courage, beings too much accustomed to tremble; +he will, at least, applaud himself for having dared the attempt. +Nevertheless, he will not judge his exertions fruitless, if he has +only been enabled to make a single mortal happy: if his principles have +calmed the conflicting transports of one honest soul; if his reasonings +have cheered up some few virtuous hearts. At least he will have the +advantage of having banished from his own mind the importunate terror +of superstition; of having expelled from his own heart the gall which +exasperates zeal; of having trodden under foot those chimeras with which +the uninformed are tormented. Thus, escaped from the peril of the storm, +he will calmly contemplate from the summit of his rock, those tremendous +hurricanes which superstition excites; he will hold forth a succouring +hand to those who shall be willing to accept it; he will encourage them +with his voice; he will second them with his best exertions, and in the +warmth of his own compassionate heart, he will exclaim: + +O NATURE; sovereign of all beings! and ye, her adorable daughters, +VIRTUE, REASON, and TRUTH! remain for ever our revered protectors: it is +to you that belong the praises of the human race; to you appertains the +homage of the earth. Shew, us then, O NATURE! that which man ought +to do, in order to obtain the happiness which thou makest him desire. +VIRTUE! Animate him with thy beneficent fire. REASON! Conduct his +uncertain steps through the paths of life. TRUTH! Let thy torch illumine +his intellect, dissipate the darkness of his road. Unite, O assisting +deities! your powers, in order to submit the hearts of mankind to +your dominion. Banish error from our mind; wickedness from our hearts; +confusion from our footsteps; cause knowledge to extend its salubrious +reign; goodness to occupy our souls; serenity to dwell in our bosoms. +Let imposture, confounded, never again dare to shew its head. Let our +eyes, so long, either dazzled or blindfolded, be at length fixed +upon those objects we ought to seek. Dispel for ever those mists +of ignorance, those hideous phantoms, together with those seducing +chimeras, which only serve to lead us astray. Extricate us from that +dark abyss into which we are plunged by superstition; overthrow the +fatal empire of delusion; crumble the throne of falsehood; wrest from +their polluted hands the power they have usurped. Command men, without +sharing your authority with mortals: break the chains that bind them +down in slavery: tear away the bandeau by which they are hoodwinked; +allay the fury that intoxicates them; break in the hands of sanguinary, +lawless tyrants, that iron sceptre with which they are crushed to +exile; the imaginary regions, from whence fear has imported them, those +theories by which they are afflicted. Inspire the intelligent being with +courage; infuse energy into his system, that, at length, he may feel his +own dignity; that he may dare to love himself; to esteem his own actions +when they are worthy; that a slave only to your eternal laws, he may no +longer fear to enfranchise himself from all other trammels; that blest +with freedom, he may have the wisdom to cherish his fellow creature; and +become happy by learning to perfection his own condition; instruct him +in the great lesson, that the high road to felicity, is prudently to +partake himself, and also to cause others to enjoy, the rich banquet +which thou, O Nature! hast so bountifully set before him. Console thy +children for those sorrows to which their destiny submits them, by +those pleasures which wisdom allows them to partake; teach them to be +contented with their condition; to banish envy from their mind; to yield +silently to necessity. Conduct them without alarm to that period which +all beings must find; _let them learn that time changes all things, that +consequently they are made neither to avoid its scythe nor to fear its +arrival._ + + + + + +[TRANSLATOR'S APPENDIX] + +A BRIEF SKETCH + +OF THE + +LIFE AND WRITINGS + +OF + +M. DE. MIRABAUD. + + +At a time when we are on the eve of an important change in our +political affairs, which must evidently lead either to the recovery and +re-establishment of our liberties, or to a military despotism, those who +are connected with the press ought to use every exertion to enlighten +their fellow-citizens, and to assert their right of canvassing, in the +most free and unrestrained manner, every subject connected with the +happiness of man. + +The priesthood have ever been convenient tools in the hands of +tyrants, to keep the bulk of the people in a degraded servility. By the +superstitious and slavish doctrines which they infuse into their minds, +they prevent them from thinking for themselves and asserting their own +independence. At a moment when national schools are erecting in every +quarter of the country, not with a sincere desire of enlightening the +rising generation, but with the insidious design of instilling into +their minds the doctrines of "Church and King," in order to bolster up +a little longer the present rotten, tottering, and corrupt system: at +a moment, too, when thousands of fanatic preachers are traversing the +country, with a view to subjugate the human mind to the baleful empire +of visonary enthusiasm and sectarian bigotry to the utter extinction +of every noble, manly, liberal, and pilanthropic principle;--at such a +moment as this, we thought that the "SYSTEM OF NATURE" could not fail +to render essential service to the cause both of civil and religious +liberty. No work, ancient or modern, has surpassed it, in the eloquence +and sublimity of its language, or in the facility with which it treats +the most abtruse and difficult subjects. It is, without exception, the +boldest effort the human mind has yet produced, in the investigation +of morals and theology--in the destruction of priestcraft and +superstition--and in developing the sources of all those passions and +prejudices which have proved so fatal to the tranquillity of the world. + +The republic of letters has never produced an author whose pen was so +well calculated to emancipate mankind from all those trammels with which +the nurse, the schoolmaster and the priest have successively locked +up their noblest faculties, before they were capable of reasoning and +judging for themselves. The frightful apprehensions of the gloomy +bigot, and all the appalling terrors of superstition, are here utterly +annihilated, to the complete satisfaction of every unbiassed and +impartial person.--These we considered as necessary observations to +make, previous to any attempt at the biography of the author. + +Biography may be reckoned among the most interesting of literary +productions. Its intrinsic value is such, that, though capable of +extraordinary embellishment from the hand of genius, yet no inferiority +of execution can so degrade it, as to deprive it of utility. Whatever +relates even to man in general, considered only as an aggregate of +active and intelligent beings, has a strong claim upon our notice; but +that which relates to our author, as distinguished from the rest of his +species, moving in a more exalted sphere, and towering above them by +the resplendent excellencies of his mind, seems to me to be peculiarly +calculated for our contemplation, and ought to form the highest pleasure +of our lives. There is a principle of curiosity implanted in us, which +leads us, in an especial manner, to investigate our fellow creatures; +the eager inquisitiveness with which the mechanic seeks to know the +history of his fellow-workmen and the ardour with which the philosopher, +the poet, or the historian hunts for details that may familiarize +him with, a Descartes or a Newton, with a Milton, a Hume, or a +Gibbon--spring from the same source. Their object, however, may +perhaps vary; for, in the former, it may be for the sake of detraction, +invidious cavil, or malice; in the latter, it is a sweet homage paid by +the human heart to the memory of departed genius. + +It has been repeatedly observed that the life of a scholar affords few +materials for biography. This is only negatively true;--could every +scholar have a Boswell, the remark would vanish; or were every scholar +a Rousseau, a Gibbon, or a Cumberland it would be equally nugatory. +What can present higher objects of contemplation--what can claim +more forcibly our attention--where can we seek for subjects of a more +precious nature, than in the elucidation of the operations of mind, +the acquisition of knowledge, the gradual expansion of genius; its +application, its felicities, its sorrows, its wreaths of fame, its cold, +undeserved neglect? Such scenes, painted by, the artist himself, are a +rich bequest to mankind: even when traced by the hand of friendship +or the pencil of admiration, they possess a permanent interest in our +hearts. I cannot conceive a life more worthy of public notice, more +important, more interesting to human nature, than the life of a literary +man, were it executed according to the ideas I have formed of it: did +it exhibit a faithful delineation of the progress of intellect, from the +cradle upwards; did it portray, in accurate colors, the production of +what we call genius: by what accident it was first awakened; what were +its first tendencies; how directed to a particular object; by what means +it was nourished and unfolded; the gradual progress of its operation +in the production of a work; its hopes and fears; its delights; its +miseries; its inspirations; and all the thousand fleeting joys that so +often invest its path but for a moment, and then fade like the dews +of the morning. Let it contain too a transcript of the many nameless +transports that float round the heart, that dance in the gay circle +before the ardent gazing eye, when the first conception of some future +effort strikes the mind; how it pictures undefined delights of fame and +popular applause; how it anticipates the bright moments of invention, +and dwells with prophetic ecstasy on the felicitous execution of +particular parts, that already start into existence by the magic touch +of a heated imagination. Let it depict the tender feelings of solitude, +the breathings of midnight silence, the scenes of mimic life, of imaged +trial, that often occupy the musing mind; let it be such a work, so +drawn, so coloured, and who shall pronounce it inferior? Who rather +will not confess that it presents a picture of human nature, where every +heart may find some corresponding harmony? When, therefore, it is said, +that the life of a scholar is barren, it is so only because it has never +been properly delineated; because those parts only have been selected +which are common, and fail to distinguish him from the common man; +because we have never penetrated into his closet, or into his heart; +because we have drawn him only as an outward figure, and left unnoticed +that internal structure that would delight, astonish, and improve. And +then, when we compare the life of such a man with the more active one +of a soldier, a statesman, or a lawyer, we pronounce it insipid, +uninteresting. True;--the man of study has not fought for hire--he has +not slaughtered at the command of a master: he would disdain to do +so. Though unaccompanied with the glaring actions of public men, which +confound and dazzle by their publicity, but shrink from the estimation +of moral truth, it would present a far nobler picture; yes, and a more +instructive one:--the calm disciple of reason meditates in silence; he +walks his road with innoxious humility; he is poor, but his mind is his +treasure; he cultivates his reason, and she lifts him to the pinnacle of +truth; he learns to tear away the veil of self-love, folly, pride, and +prejudice, and bares the human heart to his inspection; he corrects and +amends; he repairs the breaches made by passion; the proud man passes +him by, and looks upon him with scorn; but he feels his own worth, that +ennobling consciousness which swells in every vein, and inspires him +with true pride--with manly independence: to such a man I could sooner +bow in reverence, than to the haughtiest, most successful candidate for +the world's ambition. But of such men, for the reason I have already +mentioned, our information is scanty. While of others, who have +commanded a greater share of public notoriety, venal or mistaken +admiration has given more than we wished to know. Among these respected +individuals of human nature, may be placed Mirabaud. Had Mirabaud been +an Englishman, who doubts but that we should have possessed at least +ample details of the usual subjects of biographical notice; while all +that has been collected among his own countrymen, is a scanty memoir in +a common dictionary. That we are doomed to remain ignorant of the life +of such men, speaks a loud disgrace.--I lament it. + +JOHN BAPTISTE MIRABAUD, was born at Paris in the year 1674. He +prosecuted his infantile studies under the direction of his parents, and +was afterwards entered a member of the _Congregation of the Priests of +the Oratory_, where he passed several years, and produced some very bold +writings, which were never intended for publication. + +He was subsequently appointed tutor to the princesses of the House of +Orleans, and then took the resolution of destroying the greater part of +the manuscripts that he produced while a member of the _Congregation_; +but the treachery of some of his friends, to whom he had confided his +manuscripts, rendered this precaution useless, for some of his works +were published during the time he remained the preceptor to his royal +pupils; among which number may be reckoned his "New Liberties of +Thought," a work but little calculated for gaining him friends in the +purlieus of the Court of Orleans. The "Origin and Antiquity of the +World," in three parts, was also published at this period, and from the +publication of this work, may be dated the resolution of M. de Mirabaud +to quit his office of preceptor, which he relinquished, having become +more independent; he now gave himself up entirely to his philosophical +studies, and produced the "System of Nature," with which he was assisted +by Diderot, D'Alembert, Baron D'Olbac, and others. + +The profound metaphysical knowledge displayed throughout the System +of Nature, and the doctrines which are therein advanced, warrants the +conclusion, that it is at once the most decisive, boldest, and most +extraordinary work, that the human understanding ever had the courage to +produce. The study of metaphysics his generally been considered the most +terrific to the indolent mind; but the clear and perspicuous reasoning +of a Mirabaud, who has united the most profound argument, with the most +fascinating eloquence, charm and instruct us at the same time. But it +was not, to be expected that such doctrines as are contained in the +System of Nature, would be advanced without meeting with some opposition +from the superficial and bigoted metaphysicians, who feel an interest +in upholding a system of delusion and superstition. No! certainly not, +Their interest was threatened, and their _craft_ in danger, and the +consequence was, that the _Atheist_ or _Disciple of Nature_, has +been abused with every scurrilous epithet, "full of sound and fury, +signifying nothing." + +Atheism is stigmatized with having "opened a wide door for libertinism, +destroying the social and moral compact; and striking a deadly blow +at religion. It is asserted that the atheist, who by his opinions has +deprived himself of the hope and consolation of a future life, has no +motive for the practise of virtue, or to contribute to the well being of +society. Deprived of a chimera which religion every where presents him, +he wanders through the cheerless gloom of scepticism, regardless of the +consequences of an abandoned life. Without a God, he acknowledges no +benefactor; without divine laws, he knows no rule for the conduct of +life, and submits to no law but his passions. An enemy to all social +order, he spurns at human laws, and breaks through every barrier opposed +to his wickedness." Under such colours is an atheist painted: a short +digression must be suffered to examine this picture, and to disprove the +assertions so sweepingly made. + +I admit that atheism strikes a deadly blow at religion; because under +the cloak of religion, mankind have been oppressed in all ages; but that +it encourages libertinism, or destroys the "social and moral compact," I +have yet to learn. In all organized governments, men are restrained from +crime and compelled to submission by laws supposed to be made for the +general benefit. These laws are the effect of the first formation of +society for mutual preservation. Here then is a sufficient motive +for the one as well as the other, to contribute to the well-being of +society. The laws of Nature are the same in effect on the atheist +and the religionist. If man be led captive by his passions, and gives +himself to debauchery and voluptuousness, nature will punish him with +bodily infirmities and a debilitated mind. If he be intemperate, she +will shorten his days and bring him to the grave with the most poignant +remorse. The fatal effects of his vicious propensities will fall upon +his own head. A disturber of social order will live in continual fear +of the vengeance of society, and that very fear is a more dreadful +punishment than the just vengeance which perhaps he escapes. It renders +life burdensome, and makes a man hateful to himself. Can men have +stronger motives for the practise of virtue? The atheist is in full +possession of these motives, and the religionist is most completely +swayed by them, whatever may be his pretensions to others derived +from religion. But we are assured he has other motives; more powerful +incentives, in the promise of future rewards and punishments. This, like +all other chimerical doctrines, cannot be maintained if we look at the +general practise of mankind. Let us trace the effects of this doctrine, +or rather let us examine the actions, conduct, and character of men +professing it, and we shall see how little influence it has over them. +The bulk of society believe they shall answer in a future life for the +deeds done in the present. Nay, I hardly think one in a hundred thousand +will say they doubt it. What then is its effect? With this dreadful +sentence, _"Thou shalt go into everlasting punishment,"_ continually +sounded in their ears, do we not daily see the greatest enormities +committed? Are not the most horrid crimes perpetrated in all parts +of the world? The most vicious propensities and the most extravagant +follies are almost indiscriminately gratified. Is not vice frequently +triumphant, and virtue compelled to seek her own reward in retirement? +The laws of society are broken by the most flagrant injustice, and the +laws of nature outraged by the most shocking depravity. All this evil +exists in nations believing themselves to be accountable beings after +death. Where then are the beneficial effects arising, to mankind from +the promulgation of this doctrine? Men who cannot be restrained from +doing evil by human laws, have no dread of any other. Their whole lives +and conduct confirm this. Others who live in submission to the laws of +society, give themselves up to those vicious habits, (without fear of +divine laws) which the law does not take cognizance of. Men, not wholly +depraved, or not without the pale of society, generally respect the +laws, and fear the bad opinion of others. Hence we observe, when +interest or passion leads them into secret vices, they invariably play +the hypocrite; and although they are aware of the denunciations of their +God, whom they acknowledge is a witness to all their actions, while they +preserve their fair fame they still persevere. In fact, they live as if +they disbelieved in his existence; and yet the greatest criminal, the +most depraved wretch, would shudder at being told there is no God. The +atheist, as a man, is liable to commit the same crimes, and fall into +the same vices as the believer; but because he is an atheist, is he a +worse criminal than the other? In one respect, I conceive he is not so +bad. He only acts in defiance of _human_ laws,--he only offends men; the +other infringes _both divine_ and _human_;--he defies both God and man. +Both are injurious to society and themselves, and both are actuated by +the came motives. + +Again we are told, that the well disposed part of mankind are rendered +more virtuous, and the vicious less vicious by this doctrine. How are +we to know that? If the virtuous man acts uprightly, does good to his +fellow creatures, restrains his passions, and returns good for evil, +experience teaches him it is his interest so to do. Those who are +viciously disposed are only deterred from crime by penal laws. Societies +cannot long exist, where evil has the ascendency. Without social +laws, this would really be the case, notwithstanding the threats of an +avenging God. If men were told they would not be answerable for the evil +committed in this life to human laws, but that God would punish them +after death, it is evident the human race would soon be exterminated. +On the other hand, tell them their crimes will never be punished by God, +or, in other words, there is no other God than NATURE, but that the laws +of men will avenge the offences against society; so long as those +laws are administered with justice and impartiality, so long will such +society continue to improve. Hence it is evident that the system which +will maintain order in society by itself, must be the best and most +rational. A good government without religion would be more solid and +lasting, and tend more to the preservation of mankind, than all the +theocratical or ecclesiastical governments that ever the world was +subject to.--Thus much for the opponents of atheism. + +It has been asserted with a perverse obstinacy, by the advocates for the +existence of a deity, that the SYSTEM OF NATURE was never written by +the author whose name it bears.--It is granted that it was not published +during his life: but that circumstance forms no reason why such a +conclusion should be drawn. The persecutions which the atheists have +endured, were a sufficient excuse for the work not appearing in any form +during the life time of its venerable author. The Athenians sought to +try Diagoras the Melian, for atheism; but he fled from Athens, and a +price was offered for his head. Protagoras was banished from Athens, and +his books burnt, because he ventured to assert, that he knew nothing of +the gods. Stephen Dolet was burnt at Paris for atheism. Giordano Bruno +was burnt by the Inquisitors in Italy. Lucilio Vanini was burnt at +Thoulouse, through the kind offices of an Attorney-General. Bayle +was under the necessity of fleeing to Holland. Casimio Liszynski was +executed at Grodno;--and Akenhead at Edinborough. And the body of the +eloquent and erudite Hume, was obliged to be watched many nights by his +friends, lest it should be taken up by the fanatics, who considered him +one of the greatest monsters of iniquity, because he did not happen to +believe as they believed.--With these pictures of Christian persecution +before his eyes, is it surprising that M. de Mirabaud should adopt the +resolution of suffering the SYSTEM OF NATURE to appear as a posthumous +work? That the same fate would have attended him, the most devout +Christian will not undertake to deny. + +However the sentiments of M. de Mirabaud may be condemned by the +fanatics, all those who knew him bear the most brilliant testimony of +his integrity, candour, and the soundness of his understanding; in a +word, to his social virtues, and the innocence of his manners. He died +universally regretted, at Paris, the twenty-fourth of June, 1760, in the +eighty-sixth year of his age. + +The following works, written by him at different periods, were never +published:--_The Life of Jesus Christ. Impartial Reflections on the +Gospel. The Morality of Nature. An Abridged History of the Priesthood; +Ancient and Modern. The Opinions of the Ancients concerning the Jews._ A +wretched mutilated edition of this last work was published at Amsterdam, +in 1740, in two small volumes, under the title of _Miscellaneous +Dissertations_. + + +FINIS. + + + + + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The System of Nature, Volume 2, by +Paul Henri Thiery (Baron D'Holbach) + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE SYSTEM OF NATURE, VOLUME 2 *** + +***** This file should be named 8910-8.txt or 8910-8.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/8/9/1/8910/ + +Produced by Freethought Archives and Distributed Proofreaders + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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