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diff --git a/8909-h/8909-h.htm b/8909-h/8909-h.htm new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7684683 --- /dev/null +++ b/8909-h/8909-h.htm @@ -0,0 +1,12404 @@ +<?xml version="1.0" encoding="iso-8859-1"?> + +<!DOCTYPE html + PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN" + "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd" > + +<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" lang="en"> + <head> + <title> + The System of Nature, Volume I (of Ii), by Paul Henri Thiery (baron + D'holbach) + </title> + <style type="text/css" xml:space="preserve"> + + body { margin:5%; background:#faebd0; text-align:justify} + P { text-indent: 1em; margin-top: .25em; margin-bottom: .25em; } + H1,H2,H3,H4,H5,H6 { text-align: center; margin-left: 15%; margin-right: 15%; } + hr { width: 50%; text-align: center;} + .foot { margin-left: 20%; margin-right: 20%; text-align: justify; text-indent: -3em; font-size: 90%; } + blockquote {font-size: 97%; font-style: italic; margin-left: 10%; margin-right: 10%;} + .mynote {background-color: #DDE; color: #000; padding: .5em; margin-left: 10%; margin-right: 10%; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: 95%;} + .toc { margin-left: 10%; margin-bottom: .75em;} + .toc2 { margin-left: 20%;} + div.fig { display:block; margin:0 auto; text-align:center; } + div.middle { margin-left: 10%; margin-right: 10%; text-align: justify; } + .figleft {float: left; margin-left: 0%; margin-right: 1%;} + .figright {float: right; margin-right: 0%; margin-left: 1%;} + .pagenum {display:inline; font-size: 70%; font-style:normal; + margin: 0; padding: 0; position: absolute; right: 1%; + text-align: right;} + .side { float: right; font-size: 75%; width: 25%; padding-left: 0.8em; + border-left: dashed thin; margin-left: 0.8em; text-align: left; + text-indent: 0; font-weight: bold; font-style: italic; + font-weight: bold; color: black; background: #eeeeee; border: solid 1px;} + pre { font-style: italic; font-size: 90%; margin-left: 10%;} + +</style> + </head> + <body> + + +<pre> + +The Project Gutenberg EBook of The System of Nature, Volume 1, by +Paul Henri Thiery (Baron D'Holbach) + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: The System of Nature, Volume 1 + +Author: Paul Henri Thiery (Baron D'Holbach) + +Commentator: Robert D. Richardson, Jr + + +Release Date: September, 2005 [EBook #8909] +This file was first posted on August 23, 2003 +Last Updated: June 7, 2013 + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE SYSTEM OF NATURE, VOLUME 1 *** + + + + +Text file produced by Freethought Archives and Distributed Proofreaders + +HTML file produced by David Widger + + + +</pre> + + <div style="height: 8em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h1> + THE SYSTEM OF NATURE, VOLUME I (of II) + </h1> + <h2> + By Paul Henri Thiery (Baron d'Holbach) + </h2> + <p> + <br /> + </p> + <h3> + Introduction by Robert D. Richardson, Jr. + </h3> + <p> + <br /> + </p> + <div class="middle"> + <p> + PRODUCTION NOTES: First published in French in 1770 under the pseudonym + of Mirabaud. This e-book based on a facsimile reprint of an English + translation originally published 1820-21. This e-text covers the first + of the original two volumes. + </p> + </div> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_INTR" id="link2H_INTR"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + INTRODUCTION + </h2> + <p> + Paul Henri Thiery, Baron d'Holbach (1723-1789), was the center of the + radical wing of the <i>philosophes</i>. He was friend, host, and patron to + a wide circle that included Diderot, D'Alembert, Helvetius, and Hume. + Holbach wrote, translated, edited, and issued a stream of books and + pamphlets, often under other names, that has made him the despair of + bibliographers but has connected his name, by innuendo, gossip, and + association, with most of what was written in defense of atheistic + materialism in late eighteenth-century France. + </p> + <p> + Holbach is best known for <i>The System of Nature</i> (1770) and + deservedly, since it is a clear and reasonably systematic exposition of + his main ideas. His initial position determines all the rest of his + argument. "There is not, there can be nothing out of that Nature which + includes all beings." Conceiving of nature as strictly limited to matter + and motion, both of which have always existed, he flatly denies that there + is any such thing as spirit or a supernatural. Mythology began, Holbach + claims, when men were still in a state of nature and at the point when + wise, strong, and for the most part benign men were arising as leaders and + lawgivers. These leaders "formed discourses by which they spoke to the + imaginations of their willing auditors," using the medium of poetry, + because it "seem{ed} best adapted to strike the mind." Through poetry, + then, and by means of "its images, its fictions, its numbers, its rhyme, + its harmony... the entire of nature, as well as all its parts, was + personified, by its beautiful allegories." Thus mythology is given an + essentially political origin. These early poets are literally legislators + of mankind. "The first institutors of nations, and their immediate + successors in authority, only spoke to the people by fables, allegories, + enigmas, of which they reserved to themselves the right of giving an + explanation." Holbach is rather condescending about the process, but since + mythology is a representation of nature itself, he is far more tolerant of + mythology than he is of the next step. "Natural philosophers and poets + were transformed by leisure into metaphysicians and theologians," and at + this point a fatal error was introduced: the theologians made a + distinction between the power of nature and nature itself, separated the + two, made the power of nature prior to nature, and called it God. Thus man + was left with an abstract and chimerical being on one side and a despoiled + inert nature, destitute of power, on the other. In Holbach's critique the + point at which theology split off from mythology marks the moment of + nature's alienation from itself and paves the way for man's alienation + from nature. + </p> + <p> + Holbach is thus significant for Romantic interest in myth in two ways. + First, he provides a clear statement of what can be loosely called the + antimythic position, that rationalist condescension and derogation of all + myth and all religion that was never far from the surface during the + Romantic era. Holbach was and is a reminder that the Romantic affirmation + of myth was never easy, uncritical, or unopposed. Any new endorsement of + myth had to be made in the teeth of Holbach and the other skeptics. The + very vigor of the Holbachian critique of myth impelled the Romantics to + think more deeply and defend more carefully any new claim for myth. + Secondly, although Holbach's argument generally drove against myth and + religion both, he did make an important, indeed a saving distinction + between mythology and theology. Mythology is the more or less harmless + personification of the power in and of nature; theology concerns itself + with what for Holbach was the nonexistent power beyond or behind nature. + By exploiting this distinction it would become possible for a Shelley, for + example, to take a strong antitheological—even an anti-Christian—position + without having to abandon myth. + </p> + <p> + Holbach was one of William Godwin's major sources for his ideas about + political justice, and Shelley, who discussed Holbach with Godwin, quotes + extensively from <i>The System of Nature</i> in <i>Queen Mab</i>. + Furthermore, Volney's <i>Ruins</i>, another important book for Shelley, is + directly descended from <i>The System of Nature</i>. On the other side, + Holbach was a standing challenge to such writers as Coleridge and Goethe + and was reprinted and retranslated extensively in America, where his work + was well known to the rationalist circle around Jefferson and Barlow. + </p> + <p> + Issued in 1770 as though by Jean Baptiste de Mirabaud (a former perpetual + secretary to the Académie française who had died ten years before), <i>La + Système de la nature</i> was translated and reprinted frequently. The + Samuel Wilkinson translation we have chosen to reprint was the most often + reprinted or pirated version in English. A useful starting point for + Holbach's work is Jerome Vercruysse, <i>Bibliographie descriptive des + écrits du baron d'Holbach</i> (Paris, 1971). The difficult subject of the + essentially clandestine evolution of biblical criticism as an + anti-Christian and antimyth critique in the early part of the eighteenth + century, before the well-documented era of the biblical critic Eichhorn in + Germany, is illuminated in Ira Wade, <i>The Clandestine Organization and + Diffusion of Philosophic Ideas in France from 1700-1750</i> (Princeton + Univ. Press, 1938). + </p> + <p> + Robert D. Richardson, Jr. + </p> + <p> + University of Denver + </p> + <p> + {Illustration: Parke sculp't M. DE MIRABAUD} + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0003" id="link2H_4_0003"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + THE SYSTEM OF NATURE; OR, <i>THE LAWS</i> OF THE MORAL AND PHYSICAL WORLD. + </h2> + <h3> + TRANSLATED FROM THE ORIGINAL FRENCH OF M. DE MIRABAUD + </h3> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0004" id="link2H_4_0004"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h1> + VOL. I. + </h1> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <p> + <b>CONTENTS</b> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_INTR"> INTRODUCTION </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0003"> THE SYSTEM OF NATURE; OR, <i>THE LAWS</i> OF THE + MORAL AND PHYSICAL WORLD. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0004"> VOL. I. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_TOC"> DETAILED CONTENTS </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_PREF"> PREFACE </a> + </p> + <p> + <br /> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0006"> <b>MIRABAUD'S SYSTEM OF NATURE</b> </a> + </p> + <p> + <br /> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_PART"> <b>PART I.</b> </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0008"> CHAP. I. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0009"> CHAP. II. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0010"> CHAP. III. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0011"> CHAP. IV. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0012"> CHAP. V. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0013"> CHAP. VI. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0014"> CHAP. VII. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0015"> CHAP. VIII. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0016"> CHAP. IX. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0017"> CHAP. X. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0018"> CHAP. XI </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0019"> CHAP. XII. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0020"> CHAP. XIII. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0021"> CHAP. XIV. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0022"> CHAP. XV. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0023"> CHAP. XVI </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0024"> CHAP. XVII. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_CONC"> CONCLUSION. </a> + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_TOC" id="link2H_TOC"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <div class="middle"> + <p> + <b>DETAILED CONTENTS</b> + </p> + Preface <br /> PART I—Laws of Nature.—Of man.—The + faculties of the soul. <br /> —Doctrine of immortality.—On + happiness. <br /> CHAP. I. Nature and her laws. <br /> CHAP. II. Of motion + and its origin. <br /> CHAP. III. Of matter—of its various + combinations—of its diversified <br /> motion—or of the course + of Nature. <br /> CHAP. IV. Laws of motion common to every being of Nature—attraction + and <br /> repulsion—inert force-necessity. <br /> CHAP. V. Order and + confusion—intelligence—chance. <br /> CHAP. VI. Moral and + physical distinctions of man—his origin. <br /> CHAP. VII. The soul + and the spiritual system. <br /> CHAP. VII. The soul and the spiritual + system. <br /> CHAP. VIII. The intellectual faculties derived from the + faculty of <br /> feeling. <br /> CHAP. IX. The diversity of the + intellectual faculties; they depend on <br /> physical causes, as do their + moral qualities.—The natural principles of <br /> society—morals—politics. + <br /> CHAP. X. The soul does not derive its ideas from itself—it has + no <br /> innate ideas. <br /> CHAP. XI. Of the system of man's free-agency. + <br /> CHAP. XII. An examination of the opinion which pretends that the + system <br /> of fatalism is dangerous. <br /> CHAP. XIII. Of the + immortality of the soul—of the doctrine of a future <br /> state—of + the fear of death. <br /> CHAP. XIV. Education, morals, and the laws + suffice to restrain man—of <br /> the desire of immortality—of + suicide. <br /> CHAP. XV. Of man's true interest, or of the ideas he forms + to himself of <br /> happiness.—Man cannot be happy without virtue. + <br /> CHAP. XVI. The errors of man.—Upon what constitutes happiness.—The + <br /> true source of his evils.—Remedies that may be applied. <br /> + CHAP. XVII. Those ideas which are true, or founded upon Nature, are the + <br /> only remedies for the evil of man.—Recapitulation.—Conclusions + of the <br /> First Part. <br /> + </div> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_PREF" id="link2H_PREF"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + PREFACE + </h2> + <p> + <i>The source of man's unhappiness is his ignorance of Nature. The + pertinacity with which he clings to blind opinions imbibed in his infancy, + which interweave themselves with his existence, the consequent prejudice + that warps his mind, that prevents its expansion, that renders him the + slave of fiction, appears to doom him to continual error. He resembles a + child destitute of experience, full of ideal notions: a dangerous leaven + mixes itself with all his knowledge: it is of necessity obscure, it is + vacillating and false:—He takes the tone of his ideas on the + authority of others, who are themselves in error, or else have an interest + in deceiving him. To remove this Cimmerian darkness, these barriers to the + improvement of his condition; to disentangle him from the clouds of error + that envelope him; to guide him out of this Cretan labyrinth, requires the + clue of Ariadne, with all the love she could bestow on Theseus. It exacts + more than common exertion; it needs a most determined, a most undaunted + courage—it is never effected but by a persevering resolution to act, + to think for himself; to examine with rigour and impartiality the opinions + he has adopted. He will find that the most noxious weeds have sprung up + beside beautiful flowers; entwined themselves around their stems, + overshadowed them with an exuberance of foliage, choaked the ground, + enfeebled their growth, diminished their petals; dimmed the brilliancy of + their colours; that deceived by their apparent freshness of their verdure, + by the rapidity of their exfoliation, he has given them cultivation, + watered them, nurtured them, when he ought to have plucked out their very + roots. </i> + </p> + <p> + Man seeks to range out of his sphere: notwithstanding the reiterated + checks his ambitious folly experiences, he still attempts the impossible; + strives to carry his researches beyond the visible world; and hunts out + misery in imaginary regions. He would be a metaphysician before he has + become a practical philosopher. He quits the contemplation of realities to + meditate on chimeras. He neglects experience to feed on conjecture, to + indulge in hypothesis. He dares not cultivate his reason, because from his + earliest days he has been taught to consider it criminal. He pretends to + know his date in the indistinct abodes of another life, before he has + considered of the means by which he is to render himself happy in the + world he inhabits: in short, man disdains the study of Nature, except it + be partially: he pursues phantoms that resemble an ignis-fatuus<i>, which + at once dazzle, bewilders, and affright: like the benighted traveller led + astray by these deceptive exhalations of a swampy soil, he frequently + quits the plain, the simple road of truth, by pursuing of which, he can + alone ever reasonably hope to reach the goal of happiness. </i> + </p> + <p> + The most important of our duties, then, is to seek means by which we may + destroy delusions that can never do more than mislead us. The remedies for + these evils must be sought for in Nature herself; it is only in the + abundance of her resources, that we can rationally expect to find + antidotes to the mischiefs brought upon us by an ill directed, by an + overpowering enthusiasm. It is time these remedies were sought; it is time + to look the evil boldly in the face, to examine its foundations, to + scrutinize its superstructure: reason, with its faithful guide experience, + must attack in their entrenchments those prejudices, to which the human + race has but too long been the victim. For this purpose reason must be + restored to its proper rank,—it must be rescued from the evil + company with which it is associated. It has been too long degraded—too + long neglected—cowardice has rendered it subservient to delirium, + the slave to falsehood. It must no longer be held down by the massive + claims of ignorant prejudice. + </p> + <p> + Truth is invariable—it is requisite to man—it can never harm + him—his very necessities, sooner or later, make him sensible of + this; oblige him to acknowledge it. Let us then discover it to mortals—let + us exhibit its charms—let us shed it effulgence over the darkened + road; it is the only mode by which man can become disgusted with that + disgraceful superstition which leads him into error, and which but too + often usurps his homage by treacherously covering itself with the mask of + truth—its lustre can wound none but those enemies to the human race + whose power is bottomed solely on the ignorance, on the darkness in which + they have in almost every claimed contrived to involve the mind of man. + </p> + <p> + Truth speaks not to those perverse beings:—her voice can only be + heard by generous souls accustomed to reflection, whose sensibilities make + them lament the numberless calamities showered on the earth by political + and religious tyranny—whose enlightened minds contemplate with + horror the immensity, the ponderosity of that series of misfortunes which + error has in all ages overwhelmed mankind. + </p> + <p> + To error must be attributed those insupportable chains which tyrants, + which priests have forged for most nations. To error must be equally + attributed that abject slavery into which the people of almost every + country have fallen. Nature designed they should pursue their happiness by + the most perfect freedom.—To error must be attributed those + religious terrors which, in almost every climate, have either petrified + man with fear, or caused him to destroy himself for coarse or fanciful + beings. To error must be attributed those inveterate hatreds, those + barbarous persecutions, those numerous massacres, those dreadful + tragedies, of which, under pretext of serving the interests of heaven, the + earth has been but too frequently made the theatre. It is error + consecrated by religious enthusiasm, which produces that ignorance, that + uncertainty in which man ever finds himself with regard to his most + evident duties, his clearest rights, the most demonstrable truths. In + short, man is almost everywhere a poor degraded captive, devoid of + greatness of soul, of reason, or of virtue, whom his inhuman gaolers have + never permitted to see the light of day. + </p> + <p> + Let us then endeavour to disperse those clouds of ignorance, those mists + of darkness, which impede man on his journey, which obscure his progress, + which prevent his marching through life with a firm, with a steady grip. + Let us try to inspire him with courage—with respect for his reason—with + an inextinguishable love for truth—with a remembrance of Gallileo—to + the end that he may learn to know himself—to know his legitimate + rights—that he may learn to consult his experience, and no longer be + the dupe of an imagination led astray by authority—that he may + renounce the prejudices of his childhood—that he may learn to found + his morals on his nature, on his wants, on the real advantage of society—that + he may dare to love himself—that he may learn to pursue his true + happiness by promoting that of others—in short, that he may no + longer occupy himself with reveries either useless or dangerous—that + he may become a virtuous, a rational being, in which case he cannot fail + to become happy. + </p> + <p> + If he must have his chimeras, let him at least learn to permit others to + form theirs after their own fashion; since nothing can be more immaterial + than the manner of men's thinking on subjects not accessible to reason, + provided those thoughts be not suffered to embody themselves into actions + injurious to others: above all, let him be fully persuaded that it is of + the utmost importance to the inhabitants of this world to be JUST, KIND, + and PEACEABLE. + </p> + <p> + Far from injuring the cause of virtue, an impartial examination of the + principles of this work will shew that its object is to restore truth to + its proper temple, to build up an altar whose foundations shall be + consolidated by morality, reason, and justice: from this sacred pane, + virtue guarded by truth, clothed with experience, shall shed forth her + radiance on delighted mortals; whose homage flowing consecutively shall + open to the world a new aera, by rendering general the belief that + happiness, the true end of man's existence, can never be attained but BY + PROMOTING THAT OF HIS FELLOW CREATURE. + </p> + <p> + In short, man should learn to know, that happiness is simply an emanative + quality formed by reflection; that each individual ought to be the sun of + his own system, continually shedding around him his genial rays; that + these, re-acting, will keep his own existence constantly supplied with the + requisite heat to enable him to put forth kindly fruit. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0006" id="link2H_4_0006"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + MIRABAUD'S SYSTEM OF NATURE + </h2> + <h3> + By Paul Henri Thiery (Baron D'Holbach) + </h3> + <h4> + Translated From The Original, by Samuel Wilkinson + </h4> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_PART" id="link2H_PART"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + PART I. + </h2> + <h3> + LAWS OF NATURE—OF MAN—THE FACULTIES OF THE SOUL—DOCTRINE + OF IMMORTALITY—ON HAPPINESS. + </h3> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0008" id="link2H_4_0008"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + CHAP. I. + </h2> + <h3> + <i>Nature and her Laws</i>. + </h3> + <p> + Man has always deceived himself when he abandoned experience to follow + imaginary systems.—He is the work of nature.—He exists in + Nature.—He is submitted to the laws of Nature.—He cannot + deliver himself from them:—cannot step beyond them even in thought. + It is in vain his mind would spring forward beyond the visible world: + direful and imperious necessity ever compels his return—being formed + by Nature, he is circumscribed by her laws; there exists nothing beyond + the great whole of which he forms a part, of which he experiences the + influence. The beings his fancy pictures as above nature, or distinguished + from her, are always chimeras formed after that which he has already seen, + but of which it is utterly impossible he should ever form any finished + idea, either as to the place they occupy, or their manner of acting—for + him there is not, there can be nothing out of that Nature which includes + all beings. + </p> + <p> + Therefore, instead of seeking out of the world he inhabits for beings who + can procure him a happiness denied to him by Nature, let him study this + Nature, learn her laws, contemplate her energies, observe the immutable + rules by which she acts.—Let him apply these discoveries to his own + felicity, and submit in silence to her precepts, which nothing can alter.—Let + him cheerfully consent to be ignorant of causes hid from him under the + most impenetrable veil.—Let him yield to the decrees of a universal + power, which can never be brought within his comprehension, nor ever + emancipate him from those laws imposed on him by his essence. + </p> + <p> + The distinction which has been so often made between the <i>physical</i> + and the <i>moral</i> being, is evidently an abuse of terms. Man is a being + purely physical: the moral man is nothing more than this physical being + considered under a certain point of view; that is to say, with relation to + some of his modes of action, arising out of his individual organization. + But is not this organization itself the work of Nature? The motion or + impulse to action, of which he is susceptible, is that not physical? His + visible actions, as well as the invisible motion interiorly excited by his + will or his thoughts, are equally the natural effects, the necessary + consequences, of his peculiar construction, and the impulse he receives + from those beings by whom he is always surrounded. All that the human mind + has successively invented, with a view to change or perfect his being, to + render himself happy, was never more than the necessary consequence of + man's peculiar essence, and that of the beings who act upon him. The + object of all his institutions, all his reflections, all his knowledge, is + only to procure that happiness toward which he is continually impelled by + the peculiarity of his nature. All that he does, all that he thinks, all + that he is, all that he will be, is nothing more than what Universal + Nature has made him. His ideas, his actions, his will, are the necessary + effects of those properties infused into him by Nature, and of those + circumstances in which she has placed him. In short, art is nothing but + Nature acting with the tools she has furnished. + </p> + <p> + Nature sends man naked and destitute into this world which is to be his + abode: he quickly learns to cover his nakedness—to shelter himself + from the inclemencies of the weather, first with artlessly constructed + huts, and the skins of the beasts of the forest; by degrees he mends their + appearance, renders them more convenient: he establishes manufactories to + supply his immediate wants; he digs clay, gold, and other fossils from the + bowels of the earth; converts them into bricks for his house, into vessels + for his use, gradually improves their shape, and augments their beauty. To + a being exalted above our terrestrial globe, man would not appear less + subjected to the laws of Nature when naked in the forest painfully seeking + his sustenance, than when living in civilized society surrounded with + ease, or enriched with greater experience, plunged in luxury, where he + every day invents a thousand new wants and discovers a thousand new modes + of supplying them. All the steps taken by man to regulate his existence, + ought only to be considered as a long succession of causes and effects, + which are nothing more than the development of the first impulse given him + by nature. + </p> + <p> + The same animal, by virtue of his organization, passes successively from + the most simple to the most complicated wants; it is nevertheless the + consequence of his nature. The butterfly whose beauty we admire, whose + colours are so rich, whose appearance is so brilliant, commences as an + inanimate unattractive egg; from this, heat produces a worm, this becomes + a chrysalis, then changes into that beautiful insect adorned with the most + vivid tints: arrived at this stage he reproduces, he generates; at last + despoiled of his ornaments, he is obliged to disappear, having fulfilled + the task imposed on him by Nature, having performed the circle of + transformation marked out for beings of his order. + </p> + <p> + The same course, the same change takes place in the vegetable world. It is + by a series of combinations originally interwoven with the energies of the + aloe, that this plant is insensibly regulated, gradually expanded, and at + the end of a number of years produces those flowers which announce its + dissolution. + </p> + <p> + It is equally so with man, who in all his motion, all the changes he + undergoes, never acts but according to the laws peculiar to his + organization, and to the matter of which he is composed. + </p> + <p> + The <i>physical man</i>, is he who acts by the causes our faculties make + us understand. + </p> + <p> + The <i>moral man</i>, is he who acts by physical causes, with which our + prejudices preclude us from becoming perfectly acquainted. + </p> + <p> + The <i>wild man</i> is a child destitute of experience, incapable of + proceeding in his happiness, because he has not learnt how to oppose + resistance to the impulses he receives from those beings by whom he is + surrounded. + </p> + <p> + The <i>civilized man</i>, is he whom experience and sociality have enabled + to draw from nature the means of his own happiness, because he has learned + to oppose resistance to those impulses he receives from exterior beings, + when experience has taught him they would be destructive to his welfare. + </p> + <p> + The <i>enlightened man</i> is man in his maturity, in his perfection; who + is capable of advancing his own felicity, because he has learned to + examine, to think for himself, and not to take that for truth upon the + authority of others, which experience has taught him a critical + disquisition will frequently prove erroneous. + </p> + <p> + The <i>happy man</i> is he who knows how to enjoy the benefits bestowed + upon him by nature: in other words, he who thinks for himself; who is + thankful for the good he possesses; who does not envy the welfare of + others, nor sigh after imaginary benefits always beyond his grasp. + </p> + <p> + The <i>unhappy man</i> is he who is incapacitated to enjoy the benefits of + nature; that is, he who suffers others to think for him; who neglects the + absolute good he possesses, in a fruitless search after ideal benefits; + who vainly sighs after that which ever eludes his pursuit. + </p> + <p> + It necessarily results, that man in his enquiry ought always to + contemplate experience, and natural philosophy: These are what he should + consult in his religion,—in his morals,—in his legislation,—in + his political government,—in the arts,—in the sciences,—in + his pleasures,—above all, in his misfortunes. Experience teaches + that Nature acts by simple, regular, and invariable laws. It is by his + senses, man is bound to this universal Nature; it is by his perception he + must penetrate her secrets; it is from his senses he must draw experience + of her laws. Therefore, whenever he neglects to acquire experience or + quits its path, he stumbles into an abyss; his imagination leads him + astray. + </p> + <p> + All the errors of man are physical: he never deceives himself but when he + neglects to return back to nature, to consult her laws, to call practical + knowledge to his aid. It is for want of practical knowledge he forms such + imperfect ideas of matter, of its properties, of its combinations, of its + power, of its mode of action, and of the energies which spring from its + essence. Wanting this experience, the whole universe, to him, is but one + vast scene of error. The most ordinary results appear to him the most + astonishing phenomena; he wonders at every thing, understands nothing, and + yields the guidance of his actions to those interested in betraying his + interests. He is ignorant of Nature, and he has mistaken her laws; he has + not contemplated the necessary routine which she has marked out for every + thing she holds. Mistaken the laws of Nature, did I say? He has mistaken + himself: the consequence is, that all his systems, all his conjectures, + all his reasonings, from which he has banished experience, are nothing + more than a tissue of errors, a long chain of inconsistencies. + </p> + <p> + Error is always prejudicial to man: it is by deceiving himself, the human + race is plunged into misery. He neglected Nature; he did not comprehend + her laws; he formed gods of the most preposterous and ridiculous kinds: + these became the sole objects of his hope, and the creatures of his fear: + he was unhappy, he trembled under these visionary deities; under the + supposed influence of visionary beings created by himself; under the + terror inspired by blocks of stone; by logs of wood; by flying fish; or + the frowns of men, mortal as himself, whom his disturbed fancy had + elevated above that Nature of which alone he is capable of forming any + idea. His very posterity laughs at his folly, because experience has + convinced them of the absurdity of his groundless fears—of his + misplaced worship. Thus has passed away the ancient mythology, with all + the trifling and nonsensical attributes attached to it by ignorance. + </p> + <p> + Not understanding that Nature, equal in her distributions, entirely + destitute of malice, follows only necessary and immutable laws, when she + either produces beings or destroys them, when she causes those to suffer, + whose construction creates sensibility; when she scatters among them good + and evil; when she subjects them to incessant change—he did not + perceive it was in the breast of Nature herself, that it was in her + exuberance he ought to seek to satisfy his deficiencies; for remedies + against his pains; for the means of rendering himself happy: he expected + to derive these benefits from fantastic beings, whom he supposed to be + above Nature; whom he mistakingly imagined to be the authors of his + pleasures, and the cause of his misfortunes. From hence it appears that to + his ignorance of Nature, man owes the creation of those illusive powers; + under which he has so long trembled with fear; that superstitious worship, + which has been the source of all his misery, and the evils entailed upon + posterity. + </p> + <p> + For want of clearly comprehending his own peculiar nature, his proper + course, his wants, and his rights, man has fallen in society, from FREEDOM + into SLAVERY. He had forgotten the purpose of his existence, or else he + believed himself obliged to suppress the natural desires of his heart, to + sacrifice his welfare to the caprice of chiefs, either elected by himself, + or submitted to without examination. He was ignorant of the true policy of + association—of the object of government; he disdained to listen to + the voice of Nature, which loudly proclaimed the price of all submission + to be protection and happiness: the end of all government is the benefit + of the governed, not the exclusive advantage of the governors. He gave + himself up without enquiry to men like himself, whom his prejudices + induced him to contemplate as beings of a superior order, as Gods upon + earth, they profited by his ignorance, took advantage of his prejudices, + corrupted him, rendered him vicious, enslaved him, and made him miserable. + Thus man, intended by Nature for the full enjoyment of liberty, to + patiently search out her laws, to investigate her secrets, to cling to his + experience; has, from a neglect of her salutary admonitions, from an + inexcusable ignorance of his own peculiar essence, fallen into servility: + has been wickedly governed. + </p> + <p> + Having mistaken himself, he has remained ignorant of the indispensable + affinity that subsists between him, and the beings of his own species: + having mistaken his duty to himself, it consequently follows, he has + mistaken his duty to others. He made a calculation in error of what his + happiness required; he did not perceive, what he owed to himself, the + excesses he ought to avoid, the desires he ought to resist, the impulses + he ought to follow, in order to consolidate his felicity, to promote his + comfort, and to further his advantage. In short, he was ignorant of his + true interests; hence his irregularities, his excesses, his shameful + extravagance, with that long train of vices, to which he has abandoned + himself, at the expense of his preservation, at the hazard of his + permanent prosperity. + </p> + <p> + It is, therefore, ignorance of himself that has hindered man from + enlightening his morals. The corrupt authorities to which he had + submitted, felt an interest in obstructing the practice of his duties, + even when he knew them. Time, with the influence of ignorance, aided by + his corruption, gave them a strength not to be resisted by his enfeebled + voice. His duties continued unperformed, and he fell into contempt both + with himself and with others. + </p> + <p> + The ignorance of Man has endured so long, he has taken such slow, such + irresolute steps to ameliorate his condition, only because he has + neglected to study Nature, to scrutinize her laws, to search out her + expedients, to discover her properties, that his sluggishness finds its + account, in permitting himself to be guided by example, rather than to + follow experience, which demands activity; to be led by routine, rather + than by his reason, which enjoins reflection; to take that for truth upon + the authority of others, which would require a diligent and patient + investigation. From hence may be traced the hatred man betrays for every + thing that deviates from those rules to which he has been accustomed; + hence his stupid, his scrupulous respect for antiquity, for the most + silly, the most absurd and ridiculous institutions of his fathers: hence + those fears that seize him, when the most beneficial changes are proposed + to him, or the most likely attempts are made to better his condition. He + dreads to examine, because he has been taught to hold it irreverent of + something immediately connected with his welfare; his credulity suffers + him to believe the interested advice, and spurns at those who wish to show + him the danger of the road he is travelling. + </p> + <p> + This is the reason why nations linger on in the most shameful lethargy, + suffering under abuses handed down from century to century, trembling at + the very idea of that which alone can repair their calamities. + </p> + <p> + It is for want of energy, for want of consulting experience, that + medicine, natural philosophy, agriculture, painting, in fact, all the + useful sciences, have so long remained under the fetters of authority, + have progressed so little: those who profess these sciences, prefer + treading the beaten paths, however imperfect, rather than strike out new + ones,—they prefer the phrensy of their imagination, their voluntary + conjectures, to that laboured experience which alone can extract her + secrets from Nature. + </p> + <p> + Man, in short, whether from sloth or from terror, having abnegated the + evidence of his senses, has been guided in all his actions, in all his + enterprizes, by imagination, by enthusiasm, by habit, by preconceived + opinions, but above all, by the influence of authority, which knew well + how to deceive him, to turn his ignorance to esteem, his sloth to + advantage. Thus imaginary, unsubstantial systems, have supplied the place + of experience—of mature reflection—of reason. Man, petrified + with his fears, intoxicated with the marvellous, stupified with sloth, + surrendered his experience: guided by his credulity, he was unable to fall + back upon it; he became consequently inexperienced; from thence he gave + birth to the most ridiculous opinions, or else adopted all those vague + chimeras, all those idle notions offered to him by men whose interest it + was to continue him in that lamentable state of ignorance. + </p> + <p> + Thus the human race has continued so long in a state of infancy, because + man has been inattentive to Nature; has neglected her ways, because he has + disdained experience—because he has thrown by his reason—because + he has been enraptured with the marvellous and the supernatural,—because + he has unnecessarily TREMBLED. These are the reasons there is so much + trouble in conducting him from this state of childhood to that of manhood. + He has had nothing but the most trifling hypotheses, of which he has never + dared to examine either the principles or the proofs, because he has been + accustomed to hold them sacred, to consider them as the most perfect + truths, and which he is not permitted to doubt, even for an instant. His + ignorance made him credulous; his curiosity made him swallow the + wonderful: time confirmed him in his opinions, and he passed his + conjectures from race to race for realities; a tyrannical power maintained + him in his notions, because by those alone could society be enslaved. It + was in vain that some faint glimmerings of Nature occasionally attempted + the recall of his reason—that slight corruscations of experience + sometimes threw his darkness into light, the interest of the few was + founded on his enthusiasm; their pre-eminence depended on his love of the + marvellous; their very existence rested on the firmness of his ignorance; + they consequently suffered no opportunity to escape, of smothering even + the transient flame of intelligence. The many were thus first deceived + into credulity, then forced into submission. At length the whole science + of man became a confused mass of darkness, falsehood, and contradictions, + with here and there a feeble ray of truth, furnished by that Nature, of + which he can never entirely divest himself; because, without his + perception, his necessities are continually bringing him back to her + resources. + </p> + <p> + Let us then, if possible, raise ourselves above these clouds of + prepossession! Let us quit the heavy atmosphere in which we are + enucleated; let us in a more unsullied medium—in a more elastic + current, contemplate the opinions of men, and observe their various + systems. Let us learn to distrust a disordered conception; let us take + that faithful monitor, experience, for our guide; let us consult Nature, + examine her laws, dive into her stores; let us draw from herself, our + ideas of the beings she contains; let us recover our senses, which + interested error has taught us to suspect; let us consult that reason, + which, for the vilest purposes has been so infamously calumniated, so + cruelly dishonoured; let us examine with attention the visible world; let + us try, if it will not enable us to form a supportable judgment of the + invisible territory of the intellectual world: perhaps it may be found + there has been no sufficient reason for distinguishing them—that it + is not without motives, well worthy our enquiry, that two empires have + been separated, which are equally the inheritance of nature. + </p> + <p> + The universe, that vast assemblage of every thing that exists, presents + only matter and motion: the whole offers to our contemplation, nothing but + an immense, an uninterrupted succession of causes and effects; some of + these causes are known to us, because they either strike immediately on + our senses, or have been brought under their cognizance, by the + examination of long experience; others are unknown to us, because they act + upon us by effects, frequently very remote from their primary cause. An + immense variety of matter, combined under an infinity of forms, + incessantly communicates, unceasingly receives a diversity of impulses. + The different qualities of this matter, its innumerable combinations, its + various methods of action, which are the necessary consequence of these + associations, constitute for man what he calls the ESSENCE of beings: it + is from these varied essences that spring the orders, the classes, or the + systems, which these beings respectively possess, of which the sum total + makes up that which is known by the term <i>nature</i>. + </p> + <p> + Nature, therefore, in its most significant meaning, is the great whole + that results from the collection of matter, under its various + combinations, with that contrariety of motion, which the universe presents + to our view. Nature, in a less extended sense, or considered in each + individual, is the whole that results from its essence; that is to say, + the peculiar qualities, the combination, the impulse, and the various + modes of action, by which it is discriminated from other beings. It is + thus that MAN is, as a whole, or in his nature, the result of a certain + combination of matter, endowed with peculiar properties, competent to + give, capable of receiving, certain impulses, the arrangement of which is + called <i>organization</i>; of which the essence is, to feel, to think, to + act, to move, after a manner distinguished from other beings, with which + he can be compared. Man, therefore, ranks in an order, in a system, in a + class by himself, which differs from that of other animals, in whom we do + not perceive those properties of which he is possessed. The different + systems of beings, or if they will, their <i>particular natures</i>, + depend on the general system of the great whole, or that Universal Nature, + of which they form a part; to which every thing that exists is necessarily + submitted and attached. + </p> + <p> + Having described the proper definition that should be applied to the word + NATURE, I must advise the reader, once for all, that whenever in the + course of this work the expression occurs, that "Nature produces such or + such an effect," there is no intention of personifying that nature which + is purely an abstract being; it merely indicates that the effect spoken of + necessarily springs from the peculiar properties of those beings which + compose the mighty macrocosm. When, therefore, it is said, <i>Nature + demands that man should pursue his own happiness</i>, it is to prevent + circumlocution—to avoid tautology; it is to be understood, that it + is the property of a being that feels, that thinks, that acts, to labour + to its own happiness; in short, that is called <i>natural</i>, which is + conformable to the essence of things, or to the laws, which Nature + prescribes to the beings she contains, in the different orders they + occupy, under the various circumstances through which they are obliged to + pass. Thus health is <i>natural</i> to man in a certain state; disease is + <i>natural</i> to him under other circumstances; dissolution, or if they + will, death, is a <i>natural</i> state for a body, deprived of some of + those things, necessary to maintain the existence of the animal, &c. + By ESSENCE is to be understood, that which constitutes a being, such as it + is; the whole of the properties or qualities by which it acts as it does. + Thus, when it is said, it is the <i>essence</i> of a stone to fall, it is + the same as saying that its descent is the necessary effect of its gravity—of + its density—of the cohesion of its parts—of the elements of + which it is composed. In short, the <i>essence</i> of a being is its + particular, its individual nature. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0009" id="link2H_4_0009"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + CHAP. II. + </h2> + <h3> + <i>Of Motion, and its Origin.</i> + </h3> + <p> + Motion is an effect by which a body either changes, or has a tendency to + change, its position: that is to say, by which it successively corresponds + with different parts of space, or changes its relative distance to other + bodies. It is motion alone that establishes the relation between our + senses and exterior or interior beings: it is only by motion that these + beings are impressed upon us—that we know their existence—that + we judge of their properties—that we distinguish the one from the + other—that we distribute them into classes. + </p> + <p> + The beings, the substances, or the various bodies of which Nature is the + assemblage, are themselves effects of certain combinations or causes which + become causes in their turn. A CAUSE is a being which puts another in + motion, or which produces some change in it. The EFFECT is the change + produced in one body, by the motion or presence of another. + </p> + <p> + Each being, by its essence, by its peculiar nature, has the faculty of + producing, is capable of receiving, has the power of communicating, a + variety of motion. Thus some beings are proper to strike our organs; these + organs are competent to receiving the impression, are adequate to + undergoing changes by their presence. Those which cannot act on any of our + organs, either immediately and by themselves, or immediately by the + intervention of other bodies, exist not for us; since they can neither + move us, nor consequently furnish us with ideas: they can neither be known + to us, nor of course be judged of by us. To know an object, is to have + felt it; to feel it, it is requisite to have been moved by it. To see, is + to have been moved, by something acting on the visual organs; to hear, is + to have been struck, by something on our auditory nerves. In short, in + whatever mode a body may act upon us, whatever impulse we may receive from + it, we can have no other knowledge of it than by the change it produces in + us. + </p> + <p> + Nature, as we have already said, is the assemblage of all the beings, + consequently of all the motion of which we have a knowledge, as well as of + many others of which we know nothing, because they have not yet become + accessible to our senses. From the continual action and re-action of these + beings, result a series of causes and effects; or a chain of motion guided + by the constant and invariable laws peculiar to each being; which are + necessary or inherent to its particular nature—which make it always + act or move after a determinate manner. The different principles of this + motion are unknown to us, because we are in many instances, if not in all, + ignorant of what constitutes the essence of beings. The elements of bodies + escape our senses; we know them only in the mass: we are neither + acquainted with their intimate combination, nor the proportion of these + combinations; from whence must necessarily result their mode of action, + their impulse, or their different effects. + </p> + <p> + Our senses bring us generally acquainted with two sorts of motion in the + beings that surround us: the one is the motion of the mass, by which an + entire body is transferred from one place to another. Of the motion of + this genus we are perfectly sensible.—Thus, we see a stone fall, a + ball roll, an arm move, or change its position. The other is an internal + or concealed motion, which always depends on the peculiar energies of a + body: that is to say, on its <i>essence</i>, or the combination, the + action, and re-action of the minute—of the insensible particles of + matter, of which that body is composed. This motion we do not see; we know + it only by the alteration or change, which after some time we discover in + these bodies or mixtures. Of this genus is that concealed motion which + fermentation produces in the particles that compose flour, which, however + scattered, however separated, unite, and form that mass which we call + BREAD. Such also is the imperceptible motion by which we see a plant or + animal enlarge, strengthen, undergo changes, and acquire new qualities, + without our eyes being competent to follow its progression, or to perceive + the causes which have produced these effects. Such also is the internal + motion that takes place in man, which is called his INTELLECTUAL + FACULTIES, his THOUGHTS, his PASSIONS, his will. Of these we have no other + mode of judging, than by their action; that is, by those sensible effects + which either accompany or follow them. Thus, when we see a man run away, + we judge him to be interiorly actuated by the passion of fear. + </p> + <p> + Motion, whether visible or concealed, is styled ACQUIRED, when it is + impressed on one body by another; either by a cause to which we are a + stranger, or by an exterior agent which our senses enable us to discover. + Thus we call that <i>acquired motion</i>, which the wind gives to the + sails of a ship. That motion which is excited in a body, that contains + within itself the causes of those changes we see it undergo, is called + SPONTANEOUS. Then it is said, this body acts or moves by its own peculiar + energies. Of this kind is the motion of the man who walks, who talks, who + thinks. Nevertheless, if we examine the matter a little closer, we shall + be convinced, that, strictly speaking, there is no such thing as + spontaneous motion in any of the various bodies of Nature; seeing they are + perpetually acting one upon the other; that all their changes are to be + attributed to the causes, either visible or concealed, by which they are + moved. The will of man is secretly moved or determined by some exterior + cause that produces a change in him: we believe he moves of himself, + because we neither see the cause that determined him, the mode in which it + acted, nor the organ that it put in motion. + </p> + <p> + That is called SIMPLE MOTION, which is excited in a body by a single + cause. COMPOUND MOTION, that which is produced by two or more different + causes; whether these causes are equal or unequal, conspiring differently, + acting together or in succession, known or unknown. + </p> + <p> + Let the motion of beings be of whatsoever nature it may, it is always the + necessary consequence of their essence, or of the properties which compose + them, and of those causes of which they experience the action. Each being + can only move and act after a particular manner; that is to say, + conformably to those laws which result from its peculiar essence, its + particular combination, its individual nature: in short, from its specific + energies, and those of the bodies from which it receives an impulse. It is + this that constitutes the invariable laws of motion: I say <i>invariable</i>, + because they can never change, without producing confusion in the essence + of things. It is thus that a heavy body must necessarily fall, if it meets + with no obstacle sufficient to arrest its descent; that a sensible body + must naturally seek pleasure, and avoid pain; that fire must necessarily + burn, and diffuse light. + </p> + <p> + Each being, then, has laws of motion, that are adapted to itself, and + constantly acts or moves according to these laws; at least when no + superior cause interrupts its action. Thus, fire ceases to burn + combustible matter, as soon as sufficient water is thrown into it, to + arrest its progress. Thus, a sensible being ceases to seek pleasure, as + soon as he fears that pain will be the result. + </p> + <p> + The communication of motion, or the medium of action, from one body to + another, also follows certain and necessary laws; one being can only + communicate motion to another, by the affinity, by the resemblance, by the + conformity, by the analogy, or by the point of contact, which it has with + that other being. Fire can only propagate when it finds matter analogous + to itself: it extinguishes when it encounters bodies which it cannot + embrace; that is to say, that do not bear towards it a certain degree of + relation or affinity. + </p> + <p> + Every thing in the universe is in motion: the essence of matter is to act: + if we consider its parts, attentively, we shall discover there is not a + particle that enjoys absolute repose. Those which appear to us to be + without motion, are, in fact, only in relative or apparent rest; they + experience such an imperceptible motion, and expose it so little on their + surfaces, that we cannot perceive the changes they undergo. All that + appears to us to be at rest, does not, however, remain one instant in the + same state. All beings are continually breeding, increasing, decreasing, + or dispersing, with more or less dullness or rapidity. The insect called + EPHEMERON, is produced and perishes in the same day; of consequence, it + experiences the greatest changes of its being very rapidly, in our eyes. + Those combinations which form the most solid bodies, which appear to enjoy + the most perfect repose, are nevertheless decomposed, and dissolved in the + course of time. The hardest stones, by degrees, give way to the contact of + air. A mass of iron, which time, and the action of the atmosphere, has + gnawed into rust, must have been in motion, from the moment of its + formation, in the bowels of the earth, until the instant we behold it in + this state of dissolution. + </p> + <p> + Natural philosophers, for the most part, seem not to have sufficiently + reflected on what they call the <i>nisus</i>; that is to say, the + incessant efforts one body is making on another, but which, + notwithstanding appear, to our superficial observation, to enjoy the most + perfect repose. A stone of five hundred weight seems to rest quiet on the + earth, nevertheless, it never ceases for an instant, to press with force + upon the earth, which resists or repulses it in its turn. Will the + assertion be ventured, that the stone and earth do not act? Do they wish + to be undeceived? They have nothing to do but interpose their hand betwixt + the earth and the stone; it will then be discovered, that notwithstanding + its seeming repose, the stone has power adequate to bruise it; because the + hand has not energies sufficient, within itself, to resist effectually + both the stone and earth.—Action cannot exist in bodies without + re-action. A body that experiences an impulse, an attraction, or a + pressure of any kind, if it resists, clearly demonstrates by such + resistance that it re-acts; from whence it follows, there is a concealed + force, called by these philosophers <i>vis inertia</i>, that displays + itself against another force; and this clearly demonstrates, that this + inert force is capable of both acting and re-acting. In short, it will be + found, on close investigation, that those powers which are called <i>dead</i>, + and those which are termed <i>live</i> or <i>moving</i>, are powers of the + same kind; which only display themselves after a different manner. Permit + us to go a greater distance yet. May we not say, that in those bodies, or + masses, of which their whole become evident from appearances to us to be + at rest, there is notwithstanding, a continual action, and counter-action, + constant efforts, uninterrupted or communicated force, and continued + opposition? In short, a <i>nisus</i>, by which the constituting portions + of these bodies press one upon another, mutually resisting each other, + acting and re-acting incessantly? that this reciprocity of action, this + simultaneous re-action, keeps them united, causes their particles to form + a mass, a body, and a combination, which, viewed in its whole, has the + appearance of complete rest, notwithstanding no one of its particles + really ceases to be in motion for a single instant? These collective + masses appear to be at rest, simply by the equality of the motion—by + the responsory impulse of the powers acting in them. + </p> + <p> + Thus it appears that bodies enjoying perfect repose, really receive, + whether upon their surface, or in their interior, a continual communicated + force, from those bodies by which they are either surrounded or + penetrated, dilated or contracted, rarified or condensed: in fact, from + those which compose them; whereby their particles are incessantly acting + and re-acting, or in continual motion, the effects of which are displayed + by extraordinary changes. Thus heat rarifies and dilates metals, which is + evidence deducible that a bar of iron, from the change of the atmosphere + alone, must be in continual motion; that there is not a single particle in + it that can be said to enjoy rest even for a single moment. In those hard + bodies, indeed, the particles of which are in actual contact, and which + are closely united, how is it possible to conceive, that air, cold, or + heat, can act upon one of these particles, even exteriorly, without the + motion being communicated to those which are most intimate and minute in + their union? Without motion, how should we be able to comprehend the + manner in which our sense of smelling is affected, by emanations escaping + from the most solid bodies, of which all the particles appear to be at + perfect rest? How could we, even by the assistance of a telescope, see the + most distant stars, if there was not a progressive motion of light from + these stars to the retina of our eye? + </p> + <p> + Observation and reflection ought to convince us, that every thing in + Nature is in continual motion—that there is not a single part, + however small, that enjoys repose—that Nature acts in all—that + she would cease to be Nature if she did not act. Practical knowledge + teaches us, that without unceasing motion, nothing could be preserved—nothing + could be produced—nothing could act in this Nature. Thus the idea of + Nature necessarily includes that of motion. But it will be asked, and not + a little triumphantly, from whence did she derive her motion? Our reply + is, we know not, neither do they—that <i>we</i> never shall, that <i>they</i> + never will. It is a secret hidden from us, concealed from them, by the + most impenetrable veil. We also reply, that it is fair to infer, unless + they can logically prove to the contrary, that it is in herself, since she + is the great whole, out of which nothing can exist. We say this motion is + a manner of existence, that flows, necessarily, out of the nature of + matter; that matter moves by its own peculiar energies; that its motion is + to be attributed to the force which is inherent in itself; that the + variety of motion, and the phenomena which result, proceed from the + diversity of the properties—of the qualities—of the + combinations, which are originally found in the primitive matter, of which + Nature is the assemblage. + </p> + <p> + Natural philosophers, for the most part, have regarded as inanimate, or as + deprived of the faculty of motion, those bodies which are only moved by + the intervention of some agent or exterior cause; they have considered + themselves justified in concluding, that the matter which forms these + bodies is perfectly inert in its nature. They have not forsaken this + error, although they must have observed, that whenever a body is left to + itself, or disengaged from those obstructions which oppose themselves to + its descent, it has a tendency to fall or to approach the centre of the + earth, by a motion uniformly accelerated; they have rather chosen to + suppose a visionary exterior cause, of which they themselves had but an + imperfect idea, than admit that these bodies held their motion from their + own peculiar nature. + </p> + <p> + These philosophers, also, notwithstanding they saw above them an infinite + number of globes that moved with great rapidity round a common centre, + still adhered to their favourite opinions; and never ceased to suppose + some whimsical causes for these movements, until the immortal NEWTON + clearly demonstrated that it was the effect of the gravitation of these + celestial bodies towards each other. Experimental philosophers, however, + and amongst them the great Newton himself, have held the cause of + gravitation as inexplicable. Notwithstanding the great weight of this + authority, it appears manifest that it may be deduced from the motion of + matter, by which bodies are diversely determined. Gravitation is nothing + more than a mode of moving—a tendency towards a centre: to speak + strictly, all motion is relative gravitation; since that which falls + relatively to us, rises, with relation to other bodies. From this it + follows, that every motion in our microcosm is the effect of gravitation; + seeing that there is not in the universe either top or bottom, nor any + absolute centre. It should appear, that the weight of bodies depends on + their configuration, as well external as internal, which gives them that + form of action which is called gravitation. Thus, for instance, a piece of + lead, spherically formed, falls quickly and direct: reduce this ball into + very thin plates, it will be sustained in the air for a much longer time: + apply to it the action of fire, this lead will rise in the atmosphere: + here, then, the same metal, variously modified, has very different modes + of action. + </p> + <p> + A very simple observation would have sufficed to make the philosophers, + antecedent to Newton, feel the inadequateness of the causes they admitted + to operate with such powerful effect. They had a sufficiency to convince + themselves, in the collision of two bodies, which they could contemplate, + and in the known laws of that motion, which these always communicate by + reason of their greater or less compactness; from whence they ought to + have inferred, that the density of <i>subtle</i> or <i>ethereal</i> + matter, being considerably less than that of the planets, it could only + communicate to them a very feeble motion, quite insufficient to produce + that velocity of action, of which they could not possibly avoid being the + witnesses. + </p> + <p> + If Nature had been viewed uninfluenced by prejudice, they must have been + long since convinced that matter acts by its own peculiar activity; that + it needs no exterior communicative force to set it in motion. They might + have perceived that whenever mixed bodies were placed in a situation to + act on each other, motion was instantly excited; and that these mixtures + acted with a force capable of producing the most surprising results. + </p> + <p> + If particles of iron, sulphur, and water be mixed together, these bodies + thus capacitated to act on each other, are heated by degrees, and + ultimately produce a violent combustion. If flour be wetted with water, + and the mixture closed up, it will be found, after some lapse of time, (by + the aid of a microscope) to have produced organized beings that enjoy + life, of which the water and the flour were believed incapable: it is thus + that inanimate matter can pass into life, or animate matter, which is in + itself only an assemblage of motion. + </p> + <p> + Reasoning from analogy, which the philosophers of the present day do not + hold incompatible, the production of a man, independent of the ordinary + means, would not be more astonishing than that of an insect with flour and + water. Fermentation and putrid substances, evidently produce living + animals. We have here the principle; with proper materials, principles can + always be brought into action. That generation which is styled <i>uncertain</i> + is only so for those who do not reflect, or who do not permit themselves, + attentively, to observe the operations of Nature. + </p> + <p> + The generative of motion, and its developement, as well as the energy of + matter, may be seen everywhere; more particularly in those unitions in + which fire, air, and water, find themselves combined. These elements, or + rather these mixed bodies, are the most volatile, the most fugitive of + beings; nevertheless in the hands of Nature, they are the essential agents + employed to produce the most striking phenomena. To these we must ascribe + the effects of thunder, the eruption of volcanoes, earthquakes, &c. + Science offers to our consideration an agent of astonishing force, in + gunpowder, the instant it comes in contact with fire. In short, the most + terrible effects result from the combination of matter, which is generally + believed to be dead and inert. + </p> + <p> + These facts prove, beyond a doubt, that motion is produced, is augmented, + is accelerated in matter, without the help of any exterior agent: + therefore it is reasonable to conclude that motion is the necessary + consequence of immutable laws, resulting from the essence, from the + properties existing in the different elements, and the various + combinations of these elements. Are we not justified, then, in concluding, + from these precedents, that there may be an infinity of other + combinations, with which we are unacquainted, competent to produce a great + variety of motion in matter, without being under the necessity of having + recourse, for the explanation, to agents who are more difficult to + comprehend than even the effects which are attributed to them? + </p> + <p> + Had man but paid proper attention to what passed under his review, he + would not have sought out of Nature, a power distinguished from herself, + to set her in action, and without which he believes she cannot move. If, + indeed, by Nature is meant a heap of dead matter, destitute of peculiar + qualities purely passive, we must unquestionably seek out of this Nature + the principle of her motion. But if by Nature be understood, what it + really is, a whole, of which the numerous parts are endowed with various + properties, which oblige them to act according to these properties; which + are in a perpetual ternateness of action and reaction; which press, which + gravitate towards a common center, whilst others depart from and fly off + towards the periphery, or circumference; which attract and repel; which by + continual approximation and constant collision, produce and decompose all + the bodies we behold; then, I say, there is no necessity to have recourse + to supernatural powers, to account for the formation of things, and those + extraordinary appearances which are the result of motion. + </p> + <p> + Those who admit a cause exterior to matter, are obliged to believe that + this cause produced all the motion by which matter is agitated in giving + it existence. This belief rests on another, namely, that matter could + begin to exist; an hypothesis that, until this moment, has never been + satisfactorily demonstrated. To produce from nothing, or the CREATION, is + a term that cannot give us the least idea of the formation of the + universe; it presents no sense, upon which the mind can rely. In fact, the + human mind is not adequate to conceive a moment of non-existence, or when + all shall have passed away; even admitting this to be a truth, it is no + truth for us, because by the very nature of our organization, we cannot + admit positions as facts, of which no evidence can be adduced that has + relation to our senses; we may, indeed, consent to believe it, because + others say it; but will any rational being be satisfied with such an + admission? Can any moral good spring from such blind assurance? Is it + consistent with sound doctrine, with philosophy, or with reason? Do we, in + fact, pay any respect to the intellectual powers of another, when we say + to him, "I will believe this, because in all the attempts you have + ventured, for the purpose of proving what you say, you have entirely + failed; and have been at last obliged to acknowledge you know nothing + about the matter?" What moral reliance ought we to have on such people? + Hypothesis may succeed hypothesis; system may destroy system: a new set of + ideas may overturn the ideas of a former day. Other Gallileos may be + condemned to death—other Newtons may arise—we may reason—argue—dispute—quarrel—punish + and destroy: nay, we may even exterminate those who differ from us in + opinion; but when we have done all this, we shall be obliged to fall back + upon our original darkness—to confess, that that which has no + relation with our senses, that which cannot manifest itself to us by some + of the ordinary modes by which other things are manifested, has no + existence for us—is not comprehensible by us—can never + entirely remove our doubt—can never seize on our stedfast belief; + seeing it is that of which we cannot form even a notion; in short, that it + is that, which as long as we remain what we are, must be hidden from us by + a veil, which no power, no faculty, no energy we possess, is able to + remove. All who are not enslaved by prejudice agree to the truth of the + position, that <i>nothing can be made of nothing</i>. Many theologians + have acknowledged Nature to be an active whole. Almost all the ancient + philosophers were agreed to regard the world as eternal. OCELLUS LUCANUS, + speaking of the universe, says, "<i>it has always been, and it always will + be</i>." VATABLE and GROTIUS assure us, that to render the Hebrew phrase + in the first chapter of GENESIS correctly, we must say, "<i>when God made + heaven and earth, matter was without form.</i>" If this be true, and every + Hebraist can judge for himself, then the word which has been rendered <i>created</i>, + means only to fashion, form, arrange. We know that the Greek words <i>create</i> + and <i>form</i>, have always indicated the same thing. According to ST. + JEROME, <i>creare</i> has the same meaning as <i>condere</i>, to found, to + build. The Bible does not anywhere say in a clear manner, that the world + was made of nothing. TERTULLIAN and the father PETAU both admit, that "<i>this + is a truth established more by reason than by authority.</i>" ST. JUSTIN + seems to have contemplated matter as eternal, since he commends PLATO for + having said, that "<i>God, in the creation of the world, only gave impulse + to matter, and fashioned it.</i>" BURNET and PYTHAGORAS were entirely of + this opinion, and even our Church Service may be adduced in support; for + although it admits by implication a beginning, it expressly denies an end: + "<i>As it was in the beginning, is now, and ever shall be, world without + end.</i>" It is easy to perceive that that which cannot cease to exist, + must have always been. + </p> + <p> + Motion becomes still more obscure, when creation, or the formation of + matter, is attributed to a SPIRITUAL being; that is to say, to a being + which has no analogy, no point of contact, with it—to a being which + has neither extent or parts, and cannot, therefore, be susceptible of + motion, as we understand the term; this being only the change of one body, + relatively to another body, in which the body moved presents successively + different parts to different points of space. Moreover, as all the world + are nearly agreed that matter can never be totally annihilated, or cease + to exist; by what reasoning, I would ask, do they comprehend—how + understand—that that which cannot cease to be, could ever have had a + beginning? + </p> + <p> + If, therefore, it be asked, whence came matter? it is very reasonable to + say it has always existed. If it be inquired, whence proceeds the motion + that agitates matter? the same reasoning furnishes the answer; namely, + that as motion is coeval with matter, it must have existed from all + eternity, seeing that motion is the necessary consequence of its existence—of + its essence—of its primitive properties, such as its extent, its + gravity, its impenetrability, its figure, &c. By virtue of these + essential constituent properties, inherent in all matter, and without + which it is impossible to form an idea of it, the various matter of which + the universe is composed must from all eternity have pressed against, each + other—have gravitated towards a center—have clashed—have + come in contact—have been attracted—have been repelled—have + been combined—have been separated: in short, must have acted and + moved according to the essence and energy peculiar to each genus, and to + each of its combinations. + </p> + <p> + Existence supposes properties in the thing that exists: whenever it has + properties, its mode of action must necessarily flow from those properties + which constitute, its mode of being. Thus, when a body is ponderous, it + must fall; when it falls, it must come in collision with the bodies it + meets in its descent; when it is dense, when it is solid, it must, by + reason of this density, communicate motion to the bodies with which it + clashes; when it has analogy, when it has affinity with these bodies, it + must be attracted, must be united with them; when it has no point of + analogy with them, it must be repulsed. + </p> + <p> + From which it may be fairly inferred, that in supposing, as we are under + the necessity of doing, the existence of matter, we must suppose it to + have some kind of properties; from which its motion, or modes of action, + must necessarily flow. To form the universe, DESCARTES asked but matter + and motion: a diversity of matter sufficed for him; variety of motion was + the consequence of its existence, of its essence, of its properties: its + different modes of action would be the necessary consequence of its + different modes of being. Matter without properties would be a mere + nothing; therefore, as soon as matter exists, it must act; as soon as it + is various, it must act variously; if it cannot commence to exist, it must + have existed from all eternity; if it has always existed, it can never + cease to be: if it can never cease to be, it can never cease to act by its + own energy. Motion is a manner of being, which matter derives from its + peculiar existence. + </p> + <p> + The existence, then, of matter is a fact: the existence of motion is + another fact. Our visual organs point out to us matter with different + essences, forming a variety of combinations, endowed with various + properties that discriminate them. Indeed, it is a palpable error to + believe that matter is a homogeneous body, of which the parts differ from + each other only by their various modifications. Among the individuals of + the same species that come under our notice, no two resemble exactly; and + it is therefore evident that the difference of situation alone will, + necessarily, carry a diversity more or less sensible, not only in the + modifications, but also in the essence, in the properties, in the entire + system of beings. This truth was well understood by the profound and + subtle LEIBNITZ. + </p> + <p> + If this principle be properly digested, and experience seems always to + produce evidence of its truth, we must be convinced that the matter or + primitive elements which enter into the composition of bodies, are not of + the same nature, and consequently, can neither have the same properties, + nor the same modifications; and if so, they cannot have the same mode of + moving and acting. Their activity or motion, already different, can be + diversified to infinity, augmented or diminished, accelerated or retarded, + according to the combinations, the proportions, the pressure, the density, + the volume of the matter, that enters their composition. The endless + variety to be produced, will need no further illustration than the + commonest book of arithmetic furnishes us, where it will be found, that to + ring all the changes that can be produced on twelve bells only, would + occupy a space of more than ninety-one years. The element of fire is + visibly more active and more inconstant than that of earth. This is more + solid and ponderous than fire, air, or water. According to the quantity of + these elements, which enter the composition of bodies, these must act + diversely, and their motion must in some measure partake the motion + peculiar to each of their constituent parts. Elementary fire appears to be + in Nature the principle of activity; it may be compared to a fruitful + leaven, that puts the mass into fermentation and gives it life. Earth + appears to be the principle of solidity in bodies, from its + impenetrability, and by the firm coherence of its parts. Water is a + medium, to facilitate the combination of bodies, into which it enters + itself, as a constituent part. Air is a fluid whose business it seems to + be, to furnish the other elements with the space requisite to expand, to + exercise their motion, and which is, moreover, found proper to combine + with them. These elements, which our senses never discover in a pure state—which + are continually and reciprocally set in motion by each other—which + are always acting and re-acting, combining and separating, attracting and + repelling—are sufficient to explain to us the formation of all the + beings we behold. Their motion is uninterruptedly and reciprocally + produced from each other; they are alternately causes and effects. Thus, + they form a vast circle of generation and destruction—of combination + and decomposition, which, it is quite reasonable to suppose, could never + have had a beginning, and which, consequently can never have an end. In + short, Nature is but an immense chain of causes and effects, which + unceasingly flow from each other. The motion of particular beings depends + on the general motion, which is itself maintained by individual motion. + This is strengthened or weakened, accelerated or retarded, simplified or + complicated, procreated or destroyed, by a variety of combinations and + circumstances, which every moment change the directions, the tendency, the + modes of existing, and of acting, of the different beings that receive its + impulse. + </p> + <p> + If it were true, as has been asserted by some philosophers, that every + thing has a tendency to form one unique or single mass, and in that unique + mass the instant should arrive when all was in <i>nisus</i>, all would + eternally remain in this state; to all eternity there would be no more + than one Being and one effort: this would be eternal and universal death. + </p> + <p> + If we desire to go beyond this, to find the principle of action in matter, + to trace the origin of things, it is for ever to fall back upon + difficulties; it is absolutely to abridge the evidence of our senses; by + which only we can understand, by which alone we can judge of the causes + acting upon them, or the impulse by which they are set in action. + </p> + <p> + Let us, therefore, content ourselves with saying WHAT is supported by our + experience, and by all the evidence we are capable of understanding; + against the truth of which not a shadow of proof, such as our reason can + admit, has ever been adduced—which has been maintained by + philosophers in every age—which theologians themselves have not + denied, but which many of them have upheld; namely, that <i>matter always + existed; that it moves by virtue of its essence; that all the phenomena of + Nature is ascribable to the diversified motion of the variety of matter + she contains; and which, like the phoenix, is continually regenerating out + of its own ashes.</i> + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0010" id="link2H_4_0010"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + CHAP. III. + </h2> + <p> + <i>Of Matter.—Of its various Combinations.—Of its diversified + Motion, or of the Course of Nature.</i> + </p> + <p> + We know nothing of the elements of bodies, but we know some of their + properties or qualities; and we distinguish their various matter by the + effect or change produced on our senses; that is to say, by the variety of + motion their presence excites in us. In consequence, we discover in them, + extent, mobility, divisibility, solidity, gravity, and inert force. From + these general and primitive properties flow a number of others, such as + density, figure, colour, ponderosity, &c. Thus, relatively to us, + matter is all that affects our senses in any manner whatever; the various + properties we attribute to matter, by which we discriminate its diversity, + are founded on the different impressions we receive on the changes they + produce in us. + </p> + <p> + A satisfactory definition of matter has not yet been given. Man, deceived + and led astray by his prejudices, formed but vague, superficial, and + imperfect notions concerning it. He looked upon it as an unique being, + gross and passive, incapable of either moving by itself, of forming + combinations, or of producing any thing by its own energies. Instead of + this unintelligible jargon, he ought to have contemplated it as a <i>genus</i> + of beings, of which the individuals, although they might possess some + common properties, such as extent, divisibility, figure, &c. should + not, however, be all ranked in the same class, nor comprised under the + same general denomination. + </p> + <p> + An example will serve more fully to explain what we have asserted, throw + its correctness into light, and facilitate the application. The properties + common to all matter, are extent, divisibility, impenetrability, figure, + mobility, or the property of being moved in mass. FIRE, beside these + general properties, common to all matter, enjoys also the peculiar + property of being put into activity by a motion that produces on our + organs of feeling the sensation of heat; and by another, that communicates + to our visual organs the sensation of light. Iron, in common with matter + in general, has extent and figure; is divisible, and moveable in mass: if + fire be combined with it in a certain proportion, the iron acquires two + new properties; namely, those of exciting in us similar sensations of heat + and light, which were excited by the element of fire, but which the iron + had not, before its combination with the igneous matter. These + distinguishing properties are inseparable from matter, and the phenomena + that result, may, in the strictest sense of the word, be said to result + necessarily. + </p> + <p> + If we contemplate a little the paths of Nature—if, for a time, we + trace the beings in this Nature, under the different states through which, + by reason of their properties, they are compelled to pass; we shall + discover, that it is to motion, and motion only, that is to be ascribed + all the changes, all the combinations, all the forms, in short, all the + various modifications of matter. That it is by motion every thing that + exists is produced, experiences change, expands, and is destroyed. It is + motion that alters the aspect of beings; that adds to, or takes away from + their properties; which obliges each of them, by a consequence of its + nature, after having occupied a certain rank or order, to quit it, to + occupy another, and to contribute to the generation, maintenance, and + decomposition of other beings, totally different in their bulk, rank, and + essence. + </p> + <p> + In what experimental philosophers have styled the THREE ORDERS OF NATURE, + that is to say, the <i>mineral</i>, the <i>vegetable</i>, and <i>animal</i> + worlds, they have established, by the aid of motion, a transmigration, an + exchange, a continual circulation in the particles of matter. Nature has + occasion in one place, for those particles which, for a time, she has + placed in another. These particles, after having, by particular + combinations, constituted beings endued with peculiar essences, with + specific properties, with determinate modes of action, dissolve and + separate with more or less facility; and combining in a new manner, they + form new beings. The attentive observer sees this law execute itself, in a + manner more or less prominent, through all the beings by which he is + surrounded. He sees nature full of <i>erratic germe</i>, some of which + expand themselves, whilst others wait until motion has placed them in + their proper situation, in suitable wombs or matrices, in the necessary + circumstances, to unfold, to increase, to render them more perceptible by + the addition of other substances of matter analogous to their primitive + being. In all this we see nothing but the effect of motion, necessarily + guided, modified, accelerated or slackened, strengthened or weakened, by + reason of the various properties that beings successively acquire and + lose; which, every moment, infallibly produces alterations in bodies more + or less marked. Indeed, these bodies cannot be, strictly speaking, the + same in any two successive moments of their existence; they must, every + instant, either acquire or lose: in short, they are obliged to undergo + continual variations in their essences, in their properties, in their + energies, in their masses, in their qualities, in their mode of existence. + </p> + <p> + Animals, after they have been expanded in, and brought out of, the wombs + that are suitable to the elements of their machine, enlarge, strengthen, + acquire new properties, new energies, new faculties; either by deriving + nourishment from plants analogous to their being, or by devouring other + animals whose substance is suitable to their preservation; that is to say, + to repair the continual deperdition or loss of some portion of their own + substance, that is disengaging itself every instant. These same animals + are nourished, preserved, strengthened, and enlarged, by the aid of air, + water, earth, and fire. Deprived of air, or of the fluid that surrounds + them, that presses on them, that penetrates them, that gives them their + elasticity, they presently cease to live. Water, combined with this air, + enters into their whole mechanism of which it facilitates the motion. + Earth serves them for a basis, by giving solidity to their texture: it is + conveyed by air and water, which carry it to those parts of the body with + which it can combine. Fire itself, disguised and enveloped under an + infinity of forms, continually received into the animal, procures him + heat, continues him in life, renders him capable of exercising his + functions. The aliments, charged with these various principles, entering + into the stomach, re-establish the nervous system, and restore, by their + activity, and the elements which compose them, the machine which begins to + languish, to be depressed, by the loss it has sustained. Forthwith the + animal experiences a change in his whole system; he has more energy, more + activity; he feels more courage; displays more gaiety; he acts, he moves, + he thinks, after a different manner; all his faculties are exercised with + more ease. This igneous matter, so congenial to generation—so + restorative in its effect—so necessary to life, was the JUPITER of + the ancients: from all that has preceded, it is clear, that what are + called the elements, or primitive parts of matter, variously combined, + are, by the agency of motion, continually united to, and assimilated with, + the substance of animals—that they visibly modify their being—have + an evident influence over their actions, that is to say, upon the motion + they undergo, whether visible or concealed. + </p> + <p> + The same elements, which under certain circumstances serve to nourish, to + strengthen, to maintain the animal, become, under others, the principles + of his weakness, the instruments of his dissolution—of his death: + they work his destruction, whenever they are not in that just proportion + which renders them proper to maintain his existence: thus, when water + becomes too abundant in the body of the animal, it enervates him, it + relaxes the fibres, and impedes the necessary action of the other + elements: thus, fire admitted in excess, excites in him disorderly motion + destructive of his machine: thus, air, charged with principles not + analogous to his mechanism, brings upon him dangerous diseases and + contagion. In fine, the aliments modified after certain modes, in the room + of nourishing, destroy the animal, and conduce to his ruin: the animal is + preserved no longer than these substances are analogous to his system. + They ruin him when they want that just equilibrium that renders them + suitable to maintain his existence. + </p> + <p> + Plants that serve to nourish and restore animals are themselves nourished + by earth; they expand on its bosom, enlarge and strengthen at its expense, + continually receiving into their texture, by their roots and their pores, + water, air, and igneous matter: water visibly reanimates them whenever + their vegetation or genus of life languishes; it conveys to them those + analogous principles by which they are enabled to reach perfection: air is + requisite to their expansion, and furnishes them with water, earth, and + the igneous matter with which it is charged. By these means they receive + more or less of the inflammable matter; the different proportions of these + principles, their numerous combinations, from whence result an infinity of + properties, a variety of forms, constitute the various families and + classes into which botanists have distributed plants: it is thus we see + the cedar and the hyssop develop their growth; the one rises to the + clouds, the other creep humbly on the earth. Thus, by degrees, from an + acorn springs the majestic oak, accumulating, with time, its numerous + branches, and overshadowing us with its foliage. Thus, a grain of corn, + after having drawn its own nourishment from the juices of the earth, + serves, in its turn, for the nourishment of man, into whose system it + conveys the elements or principles by which it has been itself expanded, + combined, and modified in such a manner, as to render this vegetable + proper to assimilate and unite with the human frame; that is to say, with + the fluids and solids of which it is composed. + </p> + <p> + The same elements, the same principles, are found in the formation of + minerals, as well as in their decomposition, whether natural or + artificial. We find that earth, diversely modified, wrought, and combined, + serves to increase their bulk, and give them more or less density and + gravity. Air and water contribute to make their particles cohere; the + igneous matter, or inflammable principle, tinges them with colour, and + sometimes plainly indicates its presence, by the brilliant scintillation + which motion elicits from them. These stones and metals, these bodies, so + compact and solid, are disunited, are destroyed, by the agency of air, + water, and fire; which the most ordinary analysis is sufficient to prove, + as well as a multitude of experience, to which our eyes are the daily + evidence. + </p> + <p> + Animals, plants, and minerals, after a lapse of time, give back to Nature; + that is to say, to the general mass of things, to the universal magazine, + the elements, or principles, which they have borrowed: The earth retakes + that portion of the body of which it formed the basis and the solidity; + the air charges itself with these parts, that are, analogous to it, and + with those particles which are light and subtle; water carries off that + which is suitable to liquescency; fire, bursting its chains, disengages + itself, and rushes into new combinations with other bodies. + </p> + <p> + The elementary particles of the animal, being thus dissolved, disunited, + and dispersed; assume new activity, and form new combinations: thus, they + serve to nourish, to preserve, or destroy new beings; among others, + plants, which arrived at their maturity, nourish and preserve new animals; + these in their turn yielding to the same fate as the first. + </p> + <p> + Such is the constant, the invariable course, of Nature; such is the + eternal circle of mutation, which all that exists is obliged to describe. + It is thus motion generates, preserves for a time, and successively, + destroys, one part of the universe by the other; whilst the sum of + existence remains eternally the same. Nature, by its combinations, + produces suns, which place themselves in the centre of so many systems: + she forms planets, which, by their peculiar essence, gravitate and + describe their revolutions round these suns: by degrees the motion is + changed altogether, and becomes eccentric: perhaps the day may arrive when + these wondrous masses will disperse, of which man, in the short space of + his existence, can only have a faint and transient glimpse. + </p> + <p> + It is clear, then, that the continual motion inherent in matter, changes + and destroys all beings; every instant depriving them of some of their + properties, to substitute others: it is motion, which, in thus changing + their actual essence, changes also their order, their direction, their + tendency, and the laws which regulate their mode of acting and being: from + the stone formed in the bowels of the earth, by the intimate combination + and close coherence of similar and analogous particles, to the sun, that + vast reservoir of igneous particles, which sheds torrents of light over + the firmament; from the benumbed oyster, to the thoughtful and active man; + we see an uninterrupted progression, a perpetual chain of motion and + combination; from which is produced, beings that only differ from each + other by the variety of their elementary matter—by the numerous + combinations of these elements, from whence springs modes of action and + existence, diversified to infinity. In generation, in nutrition, in + preservation, we see nothing more than matter, variously combined, of + which each has its peculiar motion, regulated by fixed and determinate + laws, which oblige them to submit to necessary changes. We shall find, in + the formation, in the growth, in the instantaneous life, of animals, + vegetables, and minerals, nothing but matter; which combining, + accumulating, aggregating, and expanding by degrees, forms beings, who are + either feeling, living, vegetating, or else destitute of these faculties; + which, having existed some time under one particular form, are obliged to + contribute by their ruin to the production of other forms. + </p> + <p> + Thus, to speak strictly, nothing in Nature is either born, or dies, + according to the common acceptation of those terms. This truth was felt by + many of the ancient philosophers. PLATO says, that according to tradition, + "the living were born of the dead, the same as the dead did come of the + living; and that this is the constant routine of Nature." He adds from + himself, "who knows, if to live, be not to die; and if to die, be not to + live?" This was the doctrine of PYTHAGORAS, a man of great talent and no + less note. EMPEDOCLES asserts, "there is neither birth nor death, for any + mortal; but only a combination, and a separation of that which was + combined, and that this is what amongst men they call birth, and death." + Again he remarks, "those are infants, or short-sighted persons, with very + contracted understandings, who imagine any thing is born, which did not + exist before, or that any thing can die or perish totally." + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0011" id="link2H_4_0011"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + CHAP. IV. + </h2> + <p> + <i>Laws of Motion, common to every Being of Nature.—Attraction and + Repulsion.—Inert Force.—Necessity.</i> + </p> + <p> + Man is never surprised at those effects, of which he thinks he knows the + cause; he believes he does know the cause, as soon as he sees them act in + an uniform and determinate manner, or when the motion excited is simple: + the descent of a stone, that falls by its own peculiar weight, is an + object of contemplation to the philosopher only; to whom the mode by which + the most immediate causes act, and the most simple motion, are no less + impenetrable mysteries than the most complex motion, and the manner by + which the most complicated causes give impulse. The uninformed are seldom + tempted either to examine the effects which are familiar to them, or to + recur to first principles. They think they see nothing in the descent of a + stone, which ought to elicit their surprise, or become the object of their + research: it requires a NEWTON to feel that the descent of heavy bodies is + a phenomenon, worthy his whole, his most serious attention; it requires + the sagacity of a profound experimental philosopher, to discover the laws + by which heavy bodies fall, by which they communicate to others their + peculiar motion. In short, the mind that is most practised in + philosophical observation, has frequently the chagrin to find, that the + most simple and most common effects escape all his researches, and remain + inexplicable to him. + </p> + <p> + When any extraordinary, any unusual, effect is produced, to which our eyes + have not been accustomed; or when we are ignorant of the energies of the + cause, the action of which so forcibly strikes our senses, we are tempted + to meditate upon it, and take it into our consideration. The European, + accustomed to the use of GUNPOWDER, passes it by, without thinking much of + its extraordinary energies; the workman, who labours to manufacture it, + finds nothing marvellous in its properties, because he daily handles the + matter that forms its composition. The American, to whom this powder was a + stranger, who had never beheld its operation, looked upon it as a divine + power, and its energies as supernatural. The uninformed, who are ignorant + of the true cause of THUNDER, contemplate it as the instrument of divine + vengeance. The experimental philosopher considers it as the effect of the + electric matter, which, nevertheless, is itself a cause which he is very + far from perfectly understanding.—It required the keen, the + penetrating mind of a FRANKLIN, to throw light on the nature of this + subtle fluid—to develop the means by which its effects might be + rendered harmless—to turn to useful purposes, a phenomenon that made + the ignorant tremble—that filled their minds with terror, their + hearts with dismay, as indicating the anger of the gods: impressed with + this idea, they prostrated themselves, they sacrificed to JUPITER, to + deprecate his wrath. + </p> + <p> + Be this as it may, whenever we see a cause act, we look upon its effect as + natural: when this cause becomes familiar to the sight, when we are + accustomed to it, we think we understand it, and its effects surprise us + no longer. Whenever any unusual effect is perceived, without our + discovering the cause, the mind sets to work, becomes uneasy; this + uneasiness increases in proportion to its extent: as soon as it is + believed to threaten our preservation, we become completely agitated; we + seek after the cause with an earnestness proportioned to our alarm; our + perplexity augments in a ratio equivalent to the persuasion we are under: + how essentially requisite it is, we should become acquainted with the + cause that has affected us in so lively a manner. As it frequently happens + that our senses can teach us nothing respecting this cause which so deeply + interests us—which we seek with so much ardour, we have recourse to + our imagination; this, disturbed with alarm, enervated by fear, becomes a + suspicious, a fallacious guide: we create chimeras, fictitious causes, to + whom we give the credit, to whom we ascribe the honour of those phenomena + by which we have been so much alarmed. It is to this disposition of the + human mind that must be attributed, as will be seen in the sequel, the + religious errors of man, who, despairing of the capacity to trace the + natural causes of those perplexing phenomena to which he was the witness, + and sometimes the victim, created in his brain (heated with terror) + imaginary causes, which have become to him a source of the most + extravagant folly. + </p> + <p> + In Nature, however, there can be only natural causes and effects; all + motion excited in this Nature, follows constant and necessary laws: the + natural operations, to the knowledge of which we are competent, of which + we are in a capacity to judge, are of themselves sufficient to enable us + to discover those which elude our sight; we can at least judge of them by + analogy. If we study Nature with attention, the modes of action which she + displays to our senses will teach us not to be disconcerted by those which + she refuses to discover. Those causes which are the most remote from their + effects, unquestionably act by intermediate causes; by the aid of these, + we can frequently trace out the first. If in the chain of these causes we + sometimes meet with obstacles that oppose themselves to our research, we + ought to endeavour by patience and diligence to overcome them; when it so + happens we cannot surmount the difficulties that occur, we still are never + justified in concluding the chain to be broken, or that the cause which + acts is SUPER-NATURAL. Let us, then, be content with an honest avowal, + that Nature contains resources of which we are ignorant; but never let us + substitute phantoms, fictions, or imaginary causes, senseless terms, for + those causes which escape our research; because, by such means we only + confirm ourselves in ignorance, impede our enquiries, and obstinately + remain in error. + </p> + <p> + In spite of our ignorance with respect to the meanderings of Nature, (for + of the essence of being, of their properties, their elements, their + combinations, their proportions, we yet know the simple and general laws, + according to which bodies move;) we see clearly, that some of these laws, + common to all beings, never contradict themselves; although, on some + occasions, they appear to vary, we are frequently competent to discover + that the cause becoming complex, from combination with other causes, + either impedes or prevents its mode of action being such as in its + primitive state we had a right to expect. We know that active, igneous + matter, applied to gunpowder, must necessarily cause it to explode: + whenever this effect does not follow the combination of the igneous matter + with the gunpowder—whenever our senses do not give us evidence of + the fact, we are justified in concluding, either that the powder is damp, + or that it is united with some other substance that counteracts its + explosion. We know that all the actions of man have a tendency to render + him happy: whenever, therefore, we see him labouring to injure or destroy + himself, it is just to infer that he is moved by some cause opposed to his + natural tendency; that he is deceived by some prejudice; that, for want of + experience, he is blind to consequences: that he does not see whither his + actions will lead him. + </p> + <p> + If the motion excited in beings was always simple; if their actions did + not blend and combine with each other, it would be easy to know, and we + should be assured, in the first instance, of the effect a cause would + produce. I know that a stone, when descending, ought to describe a + perpendicular: I also know, that if it encounters any other body which + changes its course, it is obliged to take an oblique direction, but if its + fall be interrupted by several contrary powers, which act upon it + alternately, I am no longer competent to determine what line it will + describe. It may be a parabola, an ellipsis, spiral, circular, &c. + this will depend on the impulse, it receives, and the powers by which it + is impelled. + </p> + <p> + The most complex motion, however, is never more than the result of simple + motion combined: therefore as soon as we know the general laws of beings + and their action, we have only to decompose, to analyse them, in order to + discover those of which they are combined; experience teaches us the + effects we are to expect. Thus it is clear, the simplest motion causes + that necessary junction of different matter, of which all bodies are + composed: that matter, varied in its essence, in its properties, in its + combinations, has each its several modes of action or motion, peculiar to + itself; the whole motion of a body is consequently the sum total of each + particular motion that is combined. + </p> + <p> + Amongst the matter we behold, some is constantly disposed to unite, whilst + other is incapable of union; that which is suitable to unite, forms + combinations, more or less intimate, possessing more or less durability: + that is to say, with more or less capacity to preserve their union, to + resist dissolution. Those bodies which are called SOLIDS, receive into + their composition a great number of homogeneous, similar, and analogous + particles, disposed to unite themselves with energies conspiring or + tending to the same point. The primitive beings, or elements of bodies, + have need of supports, of props; that is to say, of the presence of each + other, for the purpose of preserving themselves; of acquiring consistence + or solidity: a truth, which applies with equal uniformity to what is + called <i>physical</i>, as to what is termed <i>moral</i>. + </p> + <p> + It is upon this disposition in matter and bodies, with relation to each + other, that is founded those modes of action which natural philosophers + designate by the terms <i>attraction, repulsion, sympathy, antipathy, + affinities, relations</i>; that moralists describe under the names of <i>love, + hatred, friendship, aversion</i>. Man, like all the beings in nature, + experiences the impulse of attraction and repulsion; the motion excited in + him differing from that of other beings, only, because it is more + concealed, and frequently so hidden, that neither the causes which excite + it, nor their mode of action are known. This system of attraction and + repulsion is very ancient, although it required a NEWTON to develop it. + That love, to which the ancients attributed the unfolding, or + disentanglement of chaos, appears to have been nothing more than a + personification of the principle of attraction. All their allegories and + fables upon chaos, evidently indicate nothing more than the accord or + union that exists between analogous and homogeneous substances; from + whence resulted the existence of the universe: whilst discord or + repulsion, which they called SOIS, was the cause of dissolution, + confusion, and disorder; there can scarcely remain a doubt, but this was + the origin of the doctrines of the TWO PRINCIPLES. According to DIOGENES + LAERTIUS, the philosopher, EMPEDOCLES, asserted, that "<i>there is a kind + of affection by which the elements unite themselves; and a sort of + discord, by which they separate or remove themselves.</i>" + </p> + <p> + However it may be, it is sufficient for us to know that by an invariable + law, certain bodies are disposed to unite with more or less facility; + whilst others cannot combine or unite themselves: water combines itself + readily with salt, but will not blend with oil. Some combinations are very + strong, cohering with great force, as metals; others are extremely feeble, + their cohesion slight and easily decomposed, as in fugitive colours. Some + bodies, incapable of uniting by themselves, become susceptible of union by + the agency of other bodies, which serve for common bonds or MEDIUMS. Thus, + oil and water, naturally heterogeneous, combine and make soap, by the + intervention of alkaline salt. From matter diversely combined, in + proportions varied almost to infinity, result all physical and moral + bodies; the properties and qualities of which are essentially different, + with modes of action more or less complex: which are either understood + with facility, or difficult of comprehension, according to the elements or + matter that has entered into their composition, and the various + modifications this matter has undergone. + </p> + <p> + It is thus, from the reciprocity of their attraction, the primitive + imperceptible particles of matter, which constitute bodies, become + perceptible, form compound substances, aggregate masses; by the union of + similar and analogous matter, whose essences fit them to cohere. The same + bodies are dissolved, their union broken, whenever they undergo the action + of matter inimical to their junction. Thus by degrees are formed, plants, + metals, animals, men; each grows, expands, and increases in its own system + or order; sustaining itself in its respective existence, by the continual + attraction of analogous matter; to which it becomes united, and by which + it is preserved and strengthened. Thus, certain aliments become fit for + the sustenance of man, whilst others destroy his existence: some are + pleasant to him, strengthen his habit; others are repugnant to him, weaken + his system: in short, never to separate physical from moral laws, it is + thus that men, mutually attracted to each other by their reciprocal wants, + form those unions which we designate by the terms, MARRIAGE, FAMILIES, + SOCIETIES, FRIENDSHIPS, CONNEXIONS: it is thus that virtue strengthens and + consolidates them; that vice relaxes or totally dissolves them. + </p> + <p> + Of whatever nature may be the combination of beings, their motion has + always one direction or tendency: without direction we could not have any + idea of motion: this direction is regulated by the properties of each + being; as soon as they have any given properties, they necessarily act in + obedience to them: that is to say, they follow the law invariably + determined by these same properties; which, of themselves, constitute the + being such as he is found, and settle his mode of action, which is always + the consequence of his manner of existence. But what is the general + direction, or common tendency, we see in all beings? What is the visible + and known end of all their motion? It is to conserve their actual + existence—to preserve themselves—to strengthen their several + bodies—to attract that which is favorable to them—to repel + that which is injurious them—to avoid that which can harm them—to + resist impulsions contrary to their manner of existence, and to their + natural tendency. + </p> + <p> + To exist, is to experience the motion peculiar to a determinate essence: + to conserve this existence, is to give and receive that motion from which + results its maintenance:—it is to attract matter suitable to + corroborate its being—to avoid that by which it may be either + endangered or enfeebled. Thus, all beings of which we have any knowledge, + have a tendency to conserve themselves, each after its peculiar manner: + the stone, by the firm adhesion of its particles, opposes resistance to + its destruction. Organized beings conserve themselves by more complicated + means, but which are, nevertheless, calculated to maintain their existence + against that by which it may be injured. Man, both in his physical and in + his moral capacity, is a living, feeling, thinking, active being; who, + every instant of his duration, strives equally to avoid that which may be + injurious, and to procure that which is pleasing to him, or that which is + suitable to his mode of existence; all his actions tending solely to + conserve himself. ST. AUGUSTINE admits this tendency in all whether + organized or not. + </p> + <p> + Conservation, then, is the common point to which all the energies, all the + powers, all the faculties of beings, seem continually directed. Natural + philosophers call this direction or tendency, SELF-GRAVITATION: NEWTON + calls it INERT FORCE: moralists denominate it in man, SELF-LOVE which is + nothing more than the tendency he has to preserve himself—a desire + of happiness—a love of his own welfare—a wish for pleasure—a + promptitude in seizing on every thing that appears favourable to his + conservation—a marked aversion to all that either disturbs his + happiness, or menaces his existence—primitive sentiments, that are + common to all beings of the human species; which all their faculties are + continually striving to satisfy; which all their passions, their wills, + their actions, have eternally for their object and their end. This + self-gravitation, then, is clearly a necessary disposition in man, and in + all other beings; which, by a variety means, contribute to the + preservation of the existence they have received, as long as nothing + deranges the order of their machine, or its primitive tendency. + </p> + <p> + Cause always produces effect; there can be no effect without cause. + Impulse is always followed by some motion, more or less sensible; by some + change, more or less remarkable in the body which receives it. But motion, + and its various modes of displaying itself, is, as has been already shewn, + determined by the nature, the essence, the properties, the combinations of + the beings acting. It must, then, be concluded that motion, or the modes + by which beings act, arises from some cause; that as this cause is not + able to move or act, but in conformity with the manner of its being or its + essential properties, it must equally be concluded, that all the phenomena + we perceive are necessary; that every being in Nature, under the + circumstances in which it is placed, and with the given properties it + possesses, cannot act otherwise than it does. + </p> + <p> + Necessity is the constant and infallible relation of causes with their + effects. Fire consumes, of necessity, combustible matter plated within its + circuit of action: man, by fatality, desires either that which really is, + or appears to be serviceable to his welfare. Nature, in all the + extraordinary appearances she exhibits, necessarily acts after her own + peculiar essence: all the beings she contains, necessarily act each after + its own a individual nature: it is by motion that the whole has relation + with its parts; and these parts with the whole: it is thus that in the + general system every thing is connected: it is itself but an immense chain + of causes and effects, which flow without ceasing, one from the other. If + we reflect, we shall be obliged to acknowledge that every thing we see is + necessary; that it cannot be otherwise than it is; that all the beings we + behold, as well as those which escape our sight, act by invariable laws. + According to these laws, heavy bodies fall—light bodies ascend—analogous + substances attract each other—beings tend to preserve themselves—man + cherishes himself; loves that which he thinks advantageous—detests + that which he has an idea may prove unfavourable to him.—In fine, we + are obliged to admit, there can be no perfectly independent energy—no + separated cause—no detached action, in a nature where all the beings + are in a reciprocity of action—who, without interruption, mutually + impel and resist each other—who is herself nothing more than an + eternal circle of motion, given and received according to necessary laws; + which under the same given incidents, invariably produce the same effect. + </p> + <p> + Two examples will serve to throw the principle here laid down, into light—one + shall be taken from physics, the other from morals. + </p> + <p> + In a whirlwind of dust, raised by elemental force, confused as it appears + to our eyes, in the most frightful tempest excited by contrary winds, when + the waves roll high as mountains, there is not a single particle of dust, + or drop of water, that has been placed by CHANCE, that has not a cause for + occupying the place where it is found; that does not, in the most rigorous + sense of the word, act after the manner in which it ought to act; that is, + according to its own peculiar essence, and that of the beings from whom it + receives this communicated force. A geometrician exactly knew the + different energies acting in each case, with the properties of the + particles moved, could demonstrate that after the causes given, each + particle acted precisely as it ought to act, and that it could not have + acted otherwise than it did. + </p> + <p> + In those terrible convulsions that sometimes agitate political societies, + shake their foundations, and frequently produce the overthrow of an + empire; there is not a single action, a single word, a single thought, a + single will, a single passion in the agents, whether they act as + destroyers, or as victims, that is not the necessary result of the causes + operating; that does not act, as, of necessity, it must act, from the + peculiar essence of the beings who give the impulse, and that of the + agents who receive it, according to the situation these agents fill in the + moral whirlwind. This could be evidently proved by an understanding + capacitated to rate all the action and re-action, of the minds and bodies + of those who contributed to the revolution. + </p> + <p> + In fact, if all be connected in Nature, if all motion be produced, the one + from the other, notwithstanding their secret communications frequently + elude our sight; we ought to feel convinced of this truth, that there is + no cause, however minute, however remote, that does not sometimes produce + the greatest and most immediate effects on man. It may, perhaps, be in the + parched plains of Lybia, that are amassed the first elements of a storm or + tempest, which, borne by the winds, approach our climate, render our + atmosphere dense, and thus operating on the temperament, may influence the + passions of a man, whose circumstances shall have capacitated him to + influence many others, who shall decide after his will the fate of many + nations. + </p> + <p> + Man, in fact, finds himself in Nature, and makes a part of it: he acts + according to laws, which are appropriate to him; he receives in a manner + more or less distinct, the action and impulse of the beings who surround + him; who themselves act after laws that are peculiar to their essence. + Thus he is variously modified; but his actions are always the result of + his own energy, and that of the beings who act upon him, and by whom he is + modified. This is what gives such variety to his determinations—what + generally produces such contradiction in his thoughts, his opinions, his + will, his actions; in short, in that motion, whether concealed or visible, + by which he is agitated. We shall have occasion, in the sequel, to place + this truth, at present so much contested, in a clearer light: it will be + sufficient for our purpose at present to prove, generally, that every + thing in Nature is necessary—that nothing to be found in it can act + otherwise than it does. + </p> + <p> + Motion, alternately communicated and received, establishes the connection + or relation between the different orders of beings: when they are in the + sphere of reciprocal action, attraction approximates them; repulsion + dissolves and separates them; the one strengthens and preserves them; the + other enfeebles and destroys them. Once combined, they have a tendency to + conserve themselves in that mode of existence, by virtue of their <i>inert + force</i>; in this they cannot succeed, because they are exposed to the + continual influence of all other beings, who perpetually and successively + act upon them; their change of form, their dissolution, is requisite to + the preservation of Nature herself: this is the sole end we are able to + assign her—to which we see her tend without intermission—which + she follows without interruption, by the destruction and reproduction of + all subordinate beings, who are obliged to submit to her laws—to + concur, by their mode of action, to the maintenance of her active + existence, so essentially requisite to the GREAT WHOLE. + </p> + <p> + It is thus each being is an individual, who, in the great family, performs + his necessary portion of the general labour—who executes the + unavoidable task assigned to him. All bodies act according to laws, + inherent in their peculiar essence, without the capability to swerve, even + for a single instant, from those according to which Nature herself acts. + This is the central power, to which all other powers, essences, and + energies, are submitted: she regulates the motions of beings, by the + necessity of her own peculiar essence: she makes them concur by various + modes to the general plan: this appears to be nothing more than the life, + action, and maintenance of the whole, by the continual change of its + parts. This object she obtains, in removing them, one by the other; by + that which establishes, and by that which destroys, the relation + subsisting between them; by that which gives them, and that which deprives + them of, their forms, combinations, proportions, and qualities, according + to which they act for a time, after a given mode; these are afterwards + taken from them, to make them act after a different manner. It is thus + that Nature makes them expand and change, grow and decline, augment and + diminish, approximate and remove, forms and destroys them, according as + she finds it requisite to maintain the whole; towards the conservation + which this Nature is herself essentially necessitated to have a tendency. + </p> + <p> + This irresistible power, this universal necessity, this general energy, + then, is only a consequence of the nature of things; by virtue of which + every thing acts, without intermission, after constant and immutable laws: + these laws not varying more for the whole than for the beings of which it + is composed. Nature is an active living whole, to which all its parts + necessarily concur; of which, without their own knowledge, they maintain + the activity, the life, and the existence. Nature acts and exists + necessarily: all that she contains, necessarily conspires to perpetuate + her active existence. This is the decided opinion of PLATO, when he says, + "<i>matter and necessity are the same thing; this necessity is the mother + of the world.</i>" In point of fact, we cannot go beyond this aphorism, + MATTER ACTS, BECAUSE IT EXISTS; AND EXISTS, TO ACT. If it be enquired how, + or for why, matter exists? We answer, we know not: but reasoning by + analogy, of what we do not know by that which we do, we should be of + opinion it exists necessarily, or because it contains within itself a + sufficient reason for its existence. In supposing it to be created or + produced by a being distinguished from it, or less known than itself, + (which it may be, for any thing we know to the contrary,) we must still + admit, that this being is necessary, and includes a sufficient reason for + his own existence. We have not then removed any of the difficulty, we have + not thrown a clearer light upon the subject, we have not advanced a single + step; we have simply laid aside a being, of which we know some few of the + properties, but of which we are still extremely ignorant, to have recourse + to a power, of which it is utterly impossible we can, as long as we are + men, form any distinct idea; of which, notwithstanding it may be a truth, + we cannot, by any means we possess, demonstrate the existence. As, + therefore, these must be at best but speculative points of belief, which + each individual, by reason of its obscurity, may contemplate with + different optics, under various aspects, they surely ought to be left free + for each to judge after his own fashion: the Hindoo can have no just cause + of enmity against the Christian for his faith: this has no moral right to + question the Mussulman upon his; the numerous sects of each of the various + persuasions spread over the face of the earth, ought to make it a creed to + look with an eye of complacency on the deviation of the others; and rest + upon that great moral axiom, which is strictly conformable to Nature, + which contains the whole of man's happiness—"<i>Do not unto another, + that which do you not wish another should do unto you</i>;" for it is + evident, according to their own doctrines, out of all the variety of + systems, one only can be right. + </p> + <p> + We shall see in the sequel, how much man's imagination labours to form an + idea, of the energies of that Nature he has personified, and distinguished + from herself: in short, we shall examine some of the ridiculous and + pernicious inventions, which, for want of understanding Nature, have been + imagined to impede her course, to suspend her eternal laws, to place + obstacles to the necessity of things. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0012" id="link2H_4_0012"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + CHAP. V. + </h2> + <h3> + <i>Order and Confusion.—Intelligence.—Chance.</i> + </h3> + <p> + The observation of the necessary, regular, and periodical motion in the + universe, generated in the mind of man the idea of ORDER; this term, in + its original signification, represents nothing more than a mode of + considering, a facility of perceiving, together and separately, the + different relations of a whole; in which is discovered, by its manner of + existing and acting, a certain affinity or conformity with his own. Man, + in extending this idea to the universe, carried with him those methods of + considering things which are peculiar to himself: he has consequently + supposed there really existed in Nature affinities and relations, which he + classed under the name of ORDER; and others which appeared to him not to + conform to those, which he has ranked under the term of CONFUSION. + </p> + <p> + It is easy to comprehend, that this idea of order and confusion can have + no absolute existence in Nature, where every thing is necessary; where the + whole follows constant and invariable laws, which oblige each being, in + every moment of its duration, to submit to other laws, which flow from its + own peculiar mode of existence. Therefore it is in his imagination, only, + man finds a model of that which he terms order or confusion; which, like + all his abstract, metaphysical ideas, supposes nothing beyond his reach. + Order, however, is never more than the faculty of conforming himself with + the beings by whom he is environed, or with the whole of which he forms a + part. + </p> + <p> + Nevertheless, if the idea of order be applied to Nature, it will be found + to be nothing but a series of action or motion, which he judges to + conspire to one common end. Thus, in a body that moves, order is the chain + of action, the series of motion, proper to constitute it what it is, and + to maintain it in its actual state. Order, relatively to the whole of + Nature, is the concatenation of causes and effects, necessary to her <i>active</i> + existence—to maintaining her constantly together; but, as it has + been proved in the chapter preceding, every individual being is obliged to + concur to this end, in the different ranks they occupy; from whence it is + a necessary deduction, that what is called the ORDER OF NATURE, can never + be more than a certain manner of considering the necessity of things, to + which all, of which man has any knowledge, is submitted. That which is + styled CONFUSION, is only a relative term, used to designate that series + of necessary action, that chain of requisite motion, by which an + individual being is necessarily changed or disturbed in its mode of + existence—by which it is instantaneously obliged to alter its manner + of action; but no one of these actions, no part of this motion is capable, + even for a single instant, of contradicting or deranging the general order + of Nature; from which all beings derive their existence, their properties, + the motion appropriate to each. + </p> + <p> + What is termed confusion in a being, is nothing more than its passage into + a new class, a new mode of existence; which necessarily carries with it a + new series of action, a new chain of motion, different from that of which + this being found itself susceptible in the preceding rank it occupied. + That which is called order, in Nature, is a mode of existence, or a + disposition of its particles, strictly <i>necessary</i>. In every other + assemblage of causes and effects, of worlds, as well as in that which we + inhabit, some sort of arrangement, some kind of order would necessarily be + established. Suppose the most incongruous, the most heterogeneous + substances were put into activity, and assembled by a concatenation of + extraordinary circumstances; they would form amongst themselves, a + complete order, a perfect arrangement. This is the true notion of a + property, which may be defined, an aptitude to constitute a being, such as + it is actually found, such as it is with respect to the whole of which it + makes a part. + </p> + <p> + Order, then, is nothing but necessity, considered relatively to the series + of actions, or the connected chain of causes and effects, that it produces + in the universe. What is the motion in our planetary system; but a series + of phenomena, operated upon according to necessary laws, that regulate the + bodies of which it is composed? In conformity to these laws, the sun + occupies the centre; the planets gravitate towards it, and revolve round + it, in regulated periods: the satellites of these planets gravitate + towards those which are in the centre of their sphere of action, and + describe round them their periodical route. One of these planets, the + earth which man inhabits, turns on its own axis; and by the various + aspects which its revolution obliges it to present to the sun, experiences + those regular variations which are called SEASONS. By a sequence of the + sun's action upon different parts of this globe, all its productions + undergo vicissitudes: plants, animals, men, are in a sort of morbid + drowsiness during <i>Winter</i>: in <i>Spring</i>, these beings + re-animate, to come as it were out of a long lethargy. In short, the mode + in which the earth receives the sun's beams, has an influence on all its + productions; these rays, when darted obliquely, do not act in the same + manner as when they fall perpendicularly; their periodical absence, caused + by the revolution of this sphere on itself, produces <i>night</i> and <i>day</i>. + However, in all this, man never witnesses more than necessary effects, + flowing from the nature of things, which, whilst that remains the same, + can never be opposed with propriety. These effects are owing to + gravitation, attraction, centrifugal power, &c. + </p> + <p> + On the other hand, this <i>order</i>, which man admires as a supernatural + effect, is sometimes disturbed, or changed into what he calls <i>confusion</i>: + this confusion is, however, always a necessary consequence of the laws of + Nature; in which it is requisite to the support of the whole that some of + her parts should be deranged and thrown out of the ordinary course. It is + thus, COMETS present themselves so unexpectedly to man's wondering eyes; + their eccentric motion disturbs the tranquillity of his planetary system; + they excite the terror of the misinstructed to whom every thing unusual is + marvellous. The natural philosopher, himself, conjectures that in former + ages, these comets have overthrown the surface of this mundane ball, and + caused great revolutions on the earth. Independent of this extraordinary + <i>confusion</i>, he is exposed to others more familiar to him: sometimes, + the seasons appear to have usurped each other's place; to have quitted + their regular order: sometimes the opposing elements seem to dispute among + themselves the dominion of the world; the sea bursts its limits; the solid + earth is shaken and rent asunder; mountains are in a state of + conflagration; pestilential diseases destroy both men and animals; + sterility desolates a country: then affrighted man utters piercing cries, + offers up his prayers to recall order; tremblingly raises his hands + towards the Being he supposes to be the author of all these calamities; + nevertheless, the whole of this afflicting confusion are necessary + effects, produced by natural causes; which act according to fixed laws, + determined by their own peculiar essence, and the universal essence of + Nature: in which every thing must necessarily be changed, moved, and + dissolved; where that which is called ORDER, must sometimes be disturbed + and altered into a new mode of existence; which to his deluded mind, to + his imagination, led astray by ignorance and want of reflection, appears + CONFUSION. + </p> + <p> + There cannot possibly exist what is generally termed <i>a confusion of + Nature</i>: man finds order in every thing that is conformable to his own + mode of being; confusion in every thing by which it is opposed: + nevertheless, in Nature, all is in order; because none of her parts are + ever able to emancipate themselves from those invariable rules which flow + from their respective essences: there <i>is</i> not, there <i>cannot</i> + be confusion in a whole, to the maintenance of which what is <i>called</i> + confusion is absolutely requisite; of which the general course can never + be discomposed, although individuals may be, and necessarily are; where + all the effects produced are the consequence of natural causes, that under + the circumstances in which they are placed, act only as they infallibly + are obliged to act. + </p> + <p> + It therefore follows, there can be neither monsters nor prodigies; wonders + nor miracles in Nature: those which are designated MONSTERS, are certain + combinations, with which the eyes of man are not familiarized; but which, + therefore, are not less the necessary effects of natural causes. Those + which he terms PRODIGIES, WONDERS, or SUPERNATURAL effects, are phenomena + of Nature, with whose mode of action he is unacquainted; of which his + ignorance does not permit him to ascertain the principles; whose causes he + cannot trace; but which his impatience, his heated imagination, aided by a + desire to explain, makes him foolishly attribute to imaginary causes; + which, like the idea of order, have no existence but in himself; and + which, that he may conceal his own ignorance, that he may obtain more + respect with the uninformed, he places beyond Nature, out of which his + experience is every instant demonstrably proving that none of these things + can have existence. + </p> + <p> + As for those effects which are called MIRACLES, that is to say, contrary + to the unalterable laws of Nature, it must be felt such things are + impossible; because, nothing can, for an instant, suspend the necessary + course of beings, without the whole of Nature was arrested; without she + was disturbed in her tendency. There have neither been wonders nor + miracles in Nature; except for those, who have not sufficiently studied + the laws, who consequently do not feel, that those laws can never be + contradicted, even in the most minute parts, without the whole being + destroyed, or at least without changing her essence, her mode of action; + that it is the height of folly to recur to supernatural causes to explain + the phenomena man beholds, before he becomes fully acquainted with natural + causes—with the powers and capabilities which Nature herself + contains. + </p> + <p> + <i>Order</i> and <i>Confusion</i>, then, are only relative terms, by which + man designates the state in which particular beings find themselves. He + says, a being is in order, when all the motion it undergoes conspires to + favor its tendency to its own preservation; when it is conducive to the + maintenance of its actual existence: that it is in confusion when the + causes which move it disturb the harmony of its existence, or have a + tendency to destroy the equilibrium necessary to the conservation of its + actual state. Nevertheless, confusion, as we have shown, is nothing but + the passage of a being into a new order; the more rapid the progress, the + greater the confusion for the being that is submitted to it: that which + conducts man to what is called death, is, for him, the greatest of all + possible confusion. Yet this death is nothing more than a passage into a + new mode of existence: it is the eternal, the invariable, the + unconquerable law of Nature, to which the individuals of his order, each + in his turn, is obliged to submit. + </p> + <p> + The human body is said to be in order, when its various component parts + act in that mode, from which results the conservation of the whole; from + which emanates that which is the tendency of his actual existence; in + other words, when all the impulse he receives, all the motion he + communicates, tends to preserve his health, to render him happy, by + promoting the happiness of his fellow men. He is said to be in health when + the fluids and solids of his body concur to render him robust, to keep his + mind in vigour; when each lends mutual aid towards this end. He is said to + be in <i>confusion</i>, or in ill health, whenever this tendency is + disturbed; when any of the essential parts of his body cease to concur to + his preservation, or to fulfil its peculiar functions. This it is that + happens in a state of sickness, in which, however, the motion excited in + the human machine is as necessary, is regulated by laws as certain, as + natural, as invariable, as that which concurs to produce health. Sickness + merely produces in him a new order of motion, a new series of action, a + new chain of things. Man dies: to him, this appears the greatest confusion + he can experience; his body is no longer what it was—its parts no + longer concur to the same end—his blood has lost its circulation—he + is deprived of feeling—his ideas have vanished—he thinks no + more—his desires have fled—death is the epoch, the cessation + of his human existence.—His frame becomes an inanimate mass, by the + subtraction of those principles by which it was animated; that is, which + made it act after a determinate manner: its tendency has received a new + direction; its action is changed; the motion excited in its ruins + conspires to a new end. To that motion, the harmony of which he calls + order, which produced life, sentiment, thought, passions, health, succeeds + a series of motion of another species; that, nevertheless, follows laws as + necessary as the first; all the parts of the dead man conspire to produce + what is called dissolution, fermentation, putrefaction: these new modes of + being, of acting, are just as natural to man, reduced to this state, as + sensibility, thought, the periodical motion of the blood, &c. were to + the living man: his essence having changed, his mode of action can no + longer be the same. To that regulated motion, to that necessary action, + which conspired to the production of life, succeeds that determinate + motion, that series of action which concurs to produce the dissolution of + the dead carcass; the dispersion of its parts; the formation of new + combinations, from which result new beings; and which, as we have before + seen, is the immutable order of active Nature. + </p> + <p> + How then can it be too often repeated, that relatively to the great whole, + all the motion of beings, all their modes of action, can never be but in + order, that is to say, are always conformable to Nature; that in all the + stages through which beings are obliged to pass, they invariably act after + a mode necessarily subordinate to the universal whole? To say more, each + individual being always acts in order; all its actions, the whole system + of its motion, are the necessary consequence of its peculiar mode of + existence; whether that be momentary or durable. Order, in political + society, is the effect of a necessary series of ideas, of wills, of + actions, in those who compose it; whose movements are regulated in a + manner, either calculated to maintain its indivisibility, or to hasten its + dissolution. Man constituted, or modified, in the manner we term virtuous, + acts necessarily in that mode, from whence results the welfare of his + associates: the man we stile wicked, acts necessarily in that mode, from + whence springs the misery of his fellows: his Nature, being essentially + different, he must necessarily act after a different mode: his individual + order is at variance, but his relative order is complete: it is equally + the essence of the one, to promote happiness, as it is of the other to + induce misery. + </p> + <p> + Thus, order and confusion in individual beings, is nothing more than the + manner of man's considering the natural and necessary effects, which they + produce relatively to himself. He fears the wicked man; he says that he + will carry confusion into society, because he disturbs its tendency and + places obstacles to its happiness. He avoids a falling stone, because it + will derange in him the order necessary to his conservation. Nevertheless, + order and confusion, are always, as we have shewn, consequences, equally + necessary to either the transient or durable state of beings. It is in + order that fire burns, because it is of its essence to burn; on the other + hand, it is in order, that an intelligent being should remove himself from + whatever can disturb his mode of existence. A being, whose organization + renders him sensible, must in virtue of his essence, fly from every thing + that can injure his organs, or that can place his existence in danger. + </p> + <p> + Man calls those beings <i>intelligent</i>, who are organized after his own + manner; in whom he sees faculties proper for their preservation; suitable + to maintain their existence in the order that is convenient to them; that + can enable them to take the necessary measures towards this end, with a + consciousness of the motion they undergo. From hence, it will be + perceived, that the faculty called intelligence, consists in a possessing + capacity to act comformably to a known end, in the being to which it is + attributed. He looks upon these beings as deprived of intelligence, in + which he finds no conformity with himself; in whom he discovers neither + the same construction, nor the same faculties: of which he knows neither + the essence, the end to which they tend, the energies by which they act, + nor the order that is necessary to them. The whole cannot have a distinct + name, or end, because there is nothing out of itself, to which it can have + a tendency. If it be in himself, that he arranges the idea of <i>order</i>, + it is also in himself, that he draws up that of <i>intelligence</i>. He + refuses to ascribe it to those beings, who do not act after his own + manner: he accords it to all those whom he supposes to act like himself: + the latter he calls intelligent agents: the former blind causes; that is + to say, intelligent agents who act by <i>chance</i>: thus chance is an + empty word without sense, but which is always opposed to that of + intelligence, without attaching any determinate, or any certain idea. + </p> + <p> + Man, in fact, attributes to <i>chance</i> all those effects, of which the + connection they have with their causes is not seen. Thus he uses the word + <i>chance</i>, to cover his ignorance of those natural causes, which + produce visible effects, by means which he cannot form an idea of; or that + act by a mode of which he does not perceive the order; or whose system is + not followed by actions conformable to his own. As soon as he sees, or + believes he sees, the order of action, or the manner of motion, he + attributes this order to an <i>intelligence</i>; which is nothing more + than a quality borrowed from himself—from his own peculiar mode of + action—from the manner in which he is himself affected. + </p> + <p> + Thus an <i>intelligent being</i> is one who thinks, who wills, and who + acts, to compass an end. If so, he must have organs, an aim conformable to + those of man: therefore, to say Nature is governed by an intelligence, is + to affirm that she is governed by a being, furnished with organs; seeing + that without this organic construction, he can neither have sensations, + perceptions, ideas, thought, will, plan, nor action which he understands. + </p> + <p> + Man always makes himself the center of the universe: it is to himself that + he relates all he beholds. As soon as he believes he discovers a mode of + action that has a conformity with his own, or some phenomenon that + interests his feelings, he attributes it to a cause that resembles himself—that + acts after his manner—that has faculties similar to those he + possesses—whose interests are like his own—whose projects are + in unison with and have the same tendency as those he himself indulges: in + short, it is from himself, or the properties which actuate him, that he + forms the model of this cause. It is thus that man beholds, out of his own + species, nothing but beings who act differently from himself; yet believes + that he remarks in Nature an order similar to his own ideas—views + conformable to those which he himself possesses. He imagines that Nature + is governed by a cause whose intelligence is conformable to his own, to + whom he ascribes the honor of the order which he believes he witnesses—of + those views that fall in with those that are peculiar to himself—of + an aim which quadrates with that which is the great end of all his own + actions. It is true that man, feeling his incapability of producing the + vast, the multiplied effects of which he witnesses the operation, when + contemplating the universe, was under the necessity of making a + distinction between himself and the cause which he supposed to be the + author of such stupendous effects; he believed he removed every + difficulty, by amplifying in this cause all those faculties of which he + was himself in possession; adding others of which his own self-love made + him desirous, or which he thought would render his being more perfect: + thus, he gave JUPITER wings, with the faculty of assuming any form he + might deem convenient: it was thus, by degrees, he arrived at forming an + idea of that intelligent cause, which he has placed above Nature, to + preside over action—to give her that motion of which he has chosen + to believe she was in herself incapable. He obstinately persists in + regarding this Nature as a heap of dead, inert matter, without form, which + has not within itself the power of producing any of those great effects, + those regular phenomena, from which emanates what he styles <i>the order + of the Universe</i>. ANAXAGORAS is said to have been the first who + supposed the universe created and governed by an intelligence: ARISTOTLE + reproaches him with having made an automaton of this intelligence; or in + other words, with ascribing to it the production of things, only when he + was at a loss to account for their appearance. From whence it may be + deduced, that it is for want of being acquainted with the powers of + Nature, or the properties of matter, that man has multiplied beings + without necessity—that he has supposed the universe under the + government of an intelligent cause, which he is, and perhaps always will + be, himself the model: in fine, this cause has been personified under such + a variety of shapes, sexes, and names, that a list of the deities he has + at various times supposed to guide this Nature, or to whom he has + submitted her, makes a large volume that occupies some years of his + youthful education to understand. He only rendered this cause more + inconceivable, when he extended in it his own faculties too much. He + either annihilates, or renders it altogether impossible, when he would + attach to it incompatible qualities, which he is obliged to do, to enable + him to account for the contradictory and disorderly effects he beholds in + the world. In fact, he sees confusion in the world; yet, notwithstanding + his confusion contradicts the plan, the power, the wisdom, the bounty of + this intelligence, and the miraculous order which he ascribes to it; he + says, the extreme beautiful arrangement of the whole, obliges him to + suppose it to be the work of a sovereign intelligence: unable, however, to + reconcile this seeming confusion with the benevolence he attaches to this + cause, he had recourse to another effort of his imagination; he made a new + cause, to whom he ascribed all the evil, all the misery, resulting from + this confusion: still, his own person served for the model; to which he + added those deformities which he had learned to hold in disrespect: in + multiplying these counter or destroying causes, he peopled Pandemonium. + </p> + <p> + It will no doubt be argued, that as Nature contains and produces + intelligent beings, either she must be herself intelligent, or else she + must be governed by an intelligent cause. We reply, intelligence is a + faculty peculiar to organized beings, that it is to say, to beings + constituted and combined after a determinate manner; from whence results + certain modes of action, which are designated under various names; + according to the different effects which these beings produce: wine has + not the properties called <i>wit</i> and <i>courage</i>; nevertheless, it + is sometimes seen that it communicates those qualities to men, who are + supposed to be in themselves entirely devoid of them. It cannot be said + Nature is intelligent after the manner of any of the beings she contains; + but she can produce intelligent beings by assembling matter suitable to + their particular organization, from whose peculiar modes of action will + result the faculty called intelligence; who shall be capable of producing + certain effects which are the necessary consequence of this property. I + therefore repeat, that to have intelligence, designs and views, it is + requisite to have ideas; to the production of ideas, organs or senses are + necessary: this is what is neither said of Nature nor of the causes he has + supposed to preside over her actions. In short experience warrants the + assertion, it does more, it proves beyond a doubt, that matter, which is + regarded as inert and dead, assumes sensible action, intelligence, and + life, when it is combined and organized after particular modes. + </p> + <p> + From what has been said, it must rationally be concluded that <i>order</i> + is never more than the necessary or uniform connection of causes with + their effects; or that series of action which flows from the peculiar + properties of beings, so long as they remain in a given state; that <i>confusion</i> + is nothing more than the change of this state; that in the universe, all + is necessarily in order, because every thing acts and moves according to + the various properties of the different beings it contains; that in Nature + there cannot be either confusion or real evil, since every thing follows + the laws of its natural existence; that there is neither <i>chance</i> nor + any thing fortuitous in this Nature, where no effect is produced without a + sufficient, without a substantial cause; where all causes act necessarily + according to fixed and certain laws, which are themselves dependant on the + essential properties of these causes or beings, as well as on the + combination, which constitutes either their transitory or permanent state; + that intelligence is a mode of acting, a method of existence natural to + some particular beings; that if this intelligence should be attributed to + Nature, it would then be nothing more than the faculty of conserving + herself in active existence by necessary means. In refusing to Nature the + intelligence he himself enjoys—in rejecting the intelligent cause + which is supposed to be the contriver of this Nature, or the principle of + that <i>order</i> he discovers in her course, nothing is given to <i>chance</i>, + nothing to a blind cause, nothing to a power which is indistinguishable; + but every thing he beholds is attributed to real, to known causes; or to + those which by analogy are easy of comprehension. All that exists is + acknowledged to be a consequence of the inherent properties of eternal + matter, which by contact, by blending, by combination, by change of form, + produces order and confusion; with all those varieties which assail his + sight, it is himself who is blind, when he imagines blind causes:—man + only manifested his ignorance of the powers of motion, of the laws of + Nature, when he attributed, any of its effects to <i>chance</i>. He did + not shew a more enlightened feeling when he ascribed them to an + intelligence, the idea of which he borrowed from himself, but which is + never in conformity with the effects which he attributes to its + intervention—he only imagined words to supply the place of things—he + made JUPITER, SATURN, JUNO, and a thousand others, operate that which he + found himself inadequate to perform; he distinguished them from Nature, + gave them an amplification of his own properties, and believed he + understood them by thus obscuring ideas, which he never dared either + define or analyze. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0013" id="link2H_4_0013"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + CHAP. VI. + </h2> + <h3> + <i>Moral and Physical Distinctions of Man.—His Origin.</i> + </h3> + <p> + Let us now apply the general laws we have scrutinized, to those beings of + Nature who interest us the most. Let us see in what man differs from the + other beings by which he is surrounded. Let us examine if he has not + certain points in conformity with them, that oblige him, notwithstanding + the different properties they respectively possess, to act in certain + respects according to the universal laws to which every thing is + submitted. Finally, let us enquire if the ideas he has formed of himself + in meditating on his own peculiar mode of existence, be chimerical, or + founded in reason. + </p> + <p> + Man occupies a place amidst that crowd, that multitude of beings, of which + Nature is the assemblage. His essence, that is to say, the peculiar manner + of existence, by which he is distinguished from other beings, renders him + susceptible of various modes of action, of a variety of motion, some of + which are simple and visible, others concealed and complicated. His life + itself is nothing more than a long series, a succession of necessary and + connected motion; which operates perpetual changes in his machine; which + has for its principle either causes contained within himself, such as + blood, nerves, fibres, flesh, bones; in short, the matter, as well solid + as fluid, of which his body is composed—or those exterior causes, + which, by acting upon him, modify him diversely; such as the air with + which he is encompassed, the aliments by which he is nourished, and all + those objects from which he receives any impulse whatever, by the + impression they make on his senses. + </p> + <p> + Man, like all other beings in Nature, tends to his own destruction—he + experiences inert force—he gravitates upon himself—he is + attracted by objects that are contrary or repugnant to his existence—he + seeks after some—he flies, or endeavours to remove himself from + others. It is this variety of action, this diversity of modification of + which the human being is susceptible, that has been designated under such + different names, by such varied nomenclature. It will be necessary, + presently, to examine these closely and go more into detail. + </p> + <p> + However marvellous, however hidden, however secret, however complicated + may be the modes of action, which the human frame undergoes, whether + interiorly or exteriorly; whatever may be, or appear to be the impulse he + either receives or communicates, examined closely, it will be found that + all his motion, all his operations, all his changes, all his various + states, all his revolutions, are constantly regulated by the same laws, + which Nature has prescribed to all the beings she brings forth—which + she developes—which she enriches with faculties—of which she + increases the bulk—which she conserves for a season—which she + ends by decomposing, by destroying: obliging them to change their form. + </p> + <p> + Man, in his origin, is an imperceptible point, a speck, of which the parts + are without form; of which the mobility, the life, escapes his senses; in + short, in which he does not perceive any sign of those qualities, called + SENTIMENT, FEELING, THOUGHT, INTELLIGENCE, FORCE, REASON, &c. Placed + in the womb suitable to his expansion, this point unfolds, extends, + increases, by the continual addition of matter he attracts, that is + analogous to his being, which consequently assimilates itself with him. + Having quitted this womb, so appropriate to conserve his existence, to + unfold his qualities, to strengthen his habits; so competent to give, for + a season, consistence to the weak rudiments of his frame; he travels + through the stage of infancy; he becomes adult: his body has then acquired + a considerable extension of bulk, his motion is marked, his action is + visible, he is sensible in all his parts; he is a living, an active mass; + that is to say, a combination that feels and thinks; that fulfils the + functions peculiar to beings of his species. But how has he become + sensible? Because he has been by degrees nourished, enlarged, repaired by + the continual attraction that takes place within himself, of that kind of + matter which is pronounced inert, insensible, inanimate; which is, + nevertheless, continually combining itself with his machine; of which it + forms an active whole, that is living, that feels, judges, reasons, wills, + deliberates, chooses, elects; that has the capability of labouring, more + or less efficaciously, to his own individual preservation; that is to say, + to the maintenance of the harmony of his existence. + </p> + <p> + All the motion and changes that man experiences in the course of his life, + whether it be from exterior objects or from those substances contained + within himself, are either favorable or prejudicial to his existence; + either maintain its order, or throw it into confusion; are either in + conformity with, or repugnant to, the essential tendency of his peculiar + mode of being. He is compelled by Nature to approve of some, to disapprove + of others; some of necessity render him happy, others contribute to his + misery; some become the objects of his most ardent desire, others of his + determined aversion: some elicit his confidence, others make him tremble + with fear. + </p> + <p> + In all the phenomena man presents, from the moment he quits the womb of + his mother, to that wherein he becomes the inhabitant of the silent tomb, + he perceives nothing but a succession of necessary causes and effects, + which are strictly conformable to those laws that are common to all the + beings in Nature. All his modes of action—all his sensations—all + his ideas—all his passions—every act of his will—every + impulse which he either gives or receives, are the necessary consequences + of his own peculiar properties, and those which he finds in the various + beings by whom he is moved. Every thing he does—every thing that + passes within himself—his concealed motion—his visible action, + are the effects of inert force—of self-gravitation—the + attractive or repulsive powers contained in his machine—of the + tendency he has, in common with other beings, to his own individual + preservation; in short, of that energy which is the common property of + every being he beholds. Nature, in man, does nothing more than shew, in a + decided manner, what belongs to the peculiar nature by which he is + distinguished from the beings of a different system or order. + </p> + <p> + The source of those errors into which man has fallen, when he has + contemplated himself, has its rise, as will presently be shown, in the + opinion he has entertained, that he moved by himself—that he always + acts by his own natural energy—that in his actions, in the will that + gave him impulse, he was independent of the general laws of Nature; and of + those objects which, frequently, without his knowledge, always in spite of + him, in obedience to these laws, are continually acting upon him. If he + had examined himself attentively, he must have acknowledged, that none of + the motion he underwent was spontaneous—he must have discovered, + that even his birth depended on causes, wholly out of the reach of his own + powers—that, it was without his own consent he entered into the + system in which he occupies a place—that, from the moment in which + he is born, until that in which he dies, he is continually impelled by + causes, which, in spite of himself, influence his frame, modify his + existence, dispose of his conduct. Would not the slightest reflection have + sufficed to prove to him, that the fluids, the solids, of which his body + is composed, as well as that concealed mechanism, which he believes to be + independent of exterior causes, are, in fact, perpetually under the + influence of these causes; that without them he finds himself in a total + incapacity to act? Would he not have seen, that his temperament, his + constitution, did in no wise depend on himself—that his passions are + the necessary consequence of this temperament—that his will is + influenced, his actions determined by these passions; consequently by + opinions, which he has not given to himself, of which he is not the + master? His blood, more or less heated or abundant; his nerves more or + less braced, his fibres more or less relaxed, give him dispositions either + transitory or durable—are not these, at every moment decisive of his + ideas; of his thoughts: of his desires: of his fears: of his motion, + whether visible or concealed? The state in which he finds himself, does it + not necessarily depend on the air which surrounds him diversely modified; + on the various properties of the aliments which nourish him; on the secret + combinations that form themselves in his machine, which either preserve + its order, or throw it into confusion? In short, had man fairly studied + himself, every thing must have convinced him, that in every moment of his + duration, he was nothing more than a passive instrument in the hands of + necessity. + </p> + <p> + Thus it must appear, that where all is connected, where all the causes are + linked one to the other, where the whole forms but one immense chain, + there cannot be any independent, any isolated energy; any detached power. + It follows then, that Nature, always in action, marks out to man each + point of the line he is bound to describe; establishes the route, by which + he must travel. It is Nature that elaborates, that combines the elements + of which he must be composed;—It is Nature that gives him his being, + his tendency, his peculiar mode of action. It is Nature that develops him, + expands him, strengthens him, increases his bulk—preserves him for a + season, during which he is obliged to fulfil the task imposed on him. It + is Nature, that in his journey through life, strews on the road those + objects, those events; those adventures, that modify him in a variety of + ways, that give him impulses which are sometimes agreeable and beneficial, + at others prejudicial and disagreeable. It is Nature, that in giving him + feeling, in supplying him with sentiment, has endowed him with capacity to + choose, the means to elect those objects, to take those methods that are + most conducive, most suitable, most natural, to his conservation. It is + Nature, who when he has run his race, when he has finished his career, + when he has described the circle marked out for him, conducts him in his + turn to his destruction; dissolves the union of his elementary particles, + and obliges him to undergo the constant, the universal law; from the + operation of which nothing is exempted. It is thus, motion places man in + the matrix of his mother; brings him forth out of her womb; sustains him + for a season; at length destroys him; obliges him to return into the bosom + of Nature; who speedily reproduces him, scattered under an infinity of + forms; in which each of his particles run over again, in the same manner, + the different stages, as necessary as the whole had before run over those + of his preceding existence. + </p> + <p> + The beings of the human species, as well as all other beings, are + susceptible of two sorts of motion: the one, that of the mass, by which an + entire body, or some of its parts, are visibly transferred from one place + to another; the other, internal and concealed, of some of which man is + sensible, while some takes place without his knowledge, and is not even to + be guessed at, but by the effect it outwardly produces. In a machine so + extremely complex as man, formed by the combination of such a multiplicity + of matter, so diversified in its properties, so different in its + proportions, so varied in its modes of action, the motion necessarily + becomes of the most complicated kind; its dullness, as well as its + rapidity, frequently escapes the observation of those themselves, in whom + it takes place. + </p> + <p> + Let us not, then, be surprised, if, when man would account to himself for + his existence, for his manner of acting, finding so many obstacles to + encounter, he invented such strange hypotheses to explain the concealed + spring of his machine—if then this motion appeared to him, to be + different from that of other bodies, he conceived an idea, that he moved + and acted in a manner altogether distinct from the other beings in Nature. + He clearly perceived that his body, as well as different parts of it, did + act; but, frequently, he was unable to discover what brought them into + action: from whence he received the impulse: he then conjectured he + contained within himself a moving principle distinguished from his + machine, which secretly gave an impulse to the springs which set this + machine in motion; that moved him by its own natural energy; that + consequently he acted according to laws totally distinct from those which + regulated the motion of other beings: he was conscious of certain internal + motion, which he could not help feeling; but how could he conceive, that + this invisible motion was so frequently competent to produce such striking + effects? How could he comprehend, that a fugitive idea, an imperceptible + act of thought, was so frequently capacitated to bring his whole being + into trouble and confusion? He fell into the belief, that he perceived + within himself a substance distinguished from that self, endowed with a + secret force; in which he supposed existed qualities distinctly differing + from those, of either the visible causes that acted on his organs, or + those organs themselves. He did not sufficiently understand, that the + primitive cause which makes a stone fall, or his arm move, are perhaps as + difficult of comprehension, as arduous to be explained, as those internal + impulses, of which his thought or his will are the effects. Thus, for want + of meditating Nature—of considering her under her true point of view—of + remarking the conformity—of noticing the simultaneity, the unity of + the motion of this fancied motive-power with that of his body—of his + material organs—he conjectured he was not only a distinct being, but + that he was set apart, with different energies, from all the other beings + in Nature; that he was of a more simple essence having nothing in common + with any thing by which he was surrounded; nothing that connected him with + all that he beheld. + </p> + <p> + It is from thence has successively sprung his notions of SPIRITUALITY, + IMMATERIALITY, IMMORTALITY; in short, all those vague unmeaning words he + has invented by degrees, in order to subtilize and designate the + attributes of the unknown power, which he believes he contains within + himself; which he conjectures to be the concealed principle of all his + visible actions when man once imbibes an idea that he cannot comprehend, + he meditates upon it until he has given it a complete personification: + Thus he saw, or fancied he saw, the igneous matter pervade every thing; he + conjectured that it was the only principle of life and activity; he + proceeded to embody it; he gave it his own form; called it JUPITER, and + ended by worshipping this image of his own creation, as the power from + whom he derived every good he experienced, every evil he sustained. To + crown the bold conjectures he ventured to make on this internal + motive-power, he supposed, that different from all other beings, even from + the body that served to envelope it, it was not bound to undergo + dissolution; that such was its perfect simplicity, that it could not be + decomposed, nor even change its form; in short, that it was by its essence + exempted from those revolutions to which he saw the body subjected, as + well as all the compound beings with which Nature is filled. + </p> + <p> + Thus man, in his own ideas, became double; he looked upon himself as a + whole, composed by the inconceivable assemblage of two different, two + distinct natures, which have no point of analogy between themselves: he + distinguished two substances in himself; one evidently submitted to the + influence of gross beings, composed of coarse inert matter: this he called + BODY;—the other, which he supposed to be simple, of a purer essence, + was contemplated as acting from itself: giving motion to the body, with + which it found itself so miraculously united: this he called SOUL, or + SPIRIT; the functions of the one, he denominated <i>physical, corporeal, + material</i>; the functions of the other he styled <i>spiritual, + intellectual.</i> Man, considered relatively to the first, was termed the + PHYSICAL MAN; viewed with relation to the last, he was designated the + MORAL MAN. These distinctions, although adopted by the greater number of + the philosophers of the present day, are, nevertheless, only founded on + gratuitous suppositions. Man has always believed he remedied his ignorance + of things, by inventing words to which he could never attach any true + sense or meaning. He imagined he understood matter, its properties, its + faculties, its resources, its different combinations, because he had a + superficial glimpse of some of its qualities: he has, however, in reality, + done nothing more than obscure the faint ideas he has been capacitated to + form of this matter, by associating it with a substance much less + intelligible than itself. It is thus, speculative man, in forming words, + in multiplying beings, has only plunged himself into greater difficulties + than those he endeavoured to avoid; and thereby placed obstacles to the + progress of his knowledge: whenever he has been deficient of facts, he has + had recourse to conjecture, which he quickly changed into fancied + realities. Thus, his imagination, no longer guided by experience, hurried + on by his new ideas, was lost, without hope of return, in the labyrinth of + an ideal, of an intellectual world, to which he had himself given birth; + it was next to impossible to withdraw him from this delusion, to place him + in the right road, of which nothing but experience can furnish him the + clue. Nature points out to man, that in himself, as well as in all those + objects which act upon him, there is never more than matter endowed with + various properties, diversely modified, that acts by reason of these + properties: that man is an organized whole, composed of a variety of + matter; that like all the other productions of Nature, he follows general + and known laws, as well as those laws or modes of action which are + peculiar to himself and unknown. + </p> + <p> + Thus, when it shall be inquired, what is man? + </p> + <p> + We say, he is a material being, organized after a peculiar manner; + conformed to a certain mode of thinking—of feeling; capable of + modification in certain modes peculiar to himself—to his + organization—to that particular combination of matter which is found + assembled in him. + </p> + <p> + If, again, it be asked, what origin we give to beings of the human + species? + </p> + <p> + We reply, that, like all other beings, man is a production of Nature, who + resembles them in some respects, and finds himself submitted to the same + laws; who differs from them in other respects, and follows particular + laws, determined by the diversity of his conformation. + </p> + <p> + If, then, it be demanded, whence came man? + </p> + <p> + We answer, our experience on this head does not capacitate us to resolve + the question: but that it cannot interest us, as it suffices for us to + know that man exists; that he is so constituted, as to be competent to the + effects we witness. + </p> + <p> + But it will be urged, has man always existed? Has the human species + existed from all eternity; or is it only an instantaneous production of + Nature? Have there been always men like ourselves? Will there always be + such? Have there been, in all times, males and females? Was there a first + man, from whom all others are descended? Was the animal anterior to the + egg, or did the egg precede the animal? Is this species without beginning? + Will it also be without end? The species itself, is it indestructible, or + does it pass away like its individuals? Has man always been what he now + is; or has he, before he arrived at the state in which we see him, been + obliged to pass under an infinity of successive developements? Can man at + last flatter himself with having arrived at a fixed being, or must the + human species again change? If man is the production of Nature, it will + perhaps be asked, Is this Nature competent to the production of new + beings, to make the old species disappear? Adopting this supposition, it + may be inquired, why Nature does not produce under our own eyes new beings—new + species? + </p> + <p> + It would appear on reviewing these questions, to be perfectly indifferent, + as to the stability of the argument we have used, which side was taken; + that, for want of experience, hypothesis must settle a curiosity that + always endeavours to spring forward beyond the boundaries prescribed to + our mind. This granted, the contemplator of Nature will say, that he sees + no contradiction, in supposing the human species, such as it is at the + present day, was either produced in the course of time, or from all + eternity: he will not perceive any advantage that can arise from supposing + that it has arrived by different stages, or successive developements, to + that state in which it is actually found. Matter is eternal, it is + necessary, but its forms are evanescent and contingent. It may be asked of + man, is he any thing more than matter combined, of which the former varies + every instant? + </p> + <p> + Notwithstanding, some reflections seem to favor the supposition, to render + more probable the hypothesis, that man is a production formed in the + course of time; who is peculiar to the globe he inhabits, who is the + result of the peculiar laws by which it is directed; who, consequently, + can only date his formation as coeval with that of his planet. Existence + is essential to the universe, or the total assemblage of matter + essentially varied that presents itself to our contemplation; the + combinations, the forms, however, are not essential. This granted, + although the matter of which the earth is composed has always existed, + this earth may not always have had its present form—its actual + properties; perhaps it may be a mass detached in the course of time from + some other celestial body;—perhaps it is the result of the spots, or + those encrustations which astronomers discover in the sun's disk, which + have had the faculty to diffuse themselves over our planetary system;—perhaps + the sphere we inhabit may be an extinguished or a displaced comet, which + heretofore occupied some other place in the regions of space;—which, + consequently, was then competent to produce beings very different from + those we now behold spread over its surface; seeing that its then + position, its nature, must have rendered its productions different from + those which at this day it offers to our view. + </p> + <p> + Whatever may be the supposition adopted, plants, animals, men, can only be + regarded as productions inherent in and natural to our globe, in the + position and in the circumstances in which it is actually found: these + productions it would be reasonable to infer would be changed, if this + globe by any revolution should happen to shift its situation. What appears + to strengthen this hypothesis, is, that on our ball itself, all the + productions vary, by reason of its different climates: men, animals, + vegetables, minerals, are not the same on every part of it: they vary + sometimes in a very sensible manner, at very inconsiderable distances. The + elephant is indigenous to, or native of the torrid zone: the rein deer is + peculiar to the frozen climates of the North; Indostan is the womb that + matures the diamond; we do not find it produced in our own country: the + pine-apple grows in the common atmosphere of America; in our climate it is + never produced in the open ground, never until art has furnished a sun + analogous to that which it requires—the European in his own climate + finds not this delicious fruit. Man in different climates varies in his + colour, in his size, in his conformation, in his powers, in his industry, + in his courage, and in the faculties of his mind. But, what is it that + constitutes climate? It is the different position of parts of the same + globe, relatively to the sun; positions that suffice to make a sensible + variety in its productions. + </p> + <p> + There is, then, sufficient foundation to conjecture that if by any + accident our globe should become displaced, all its productions would of + necessity be changed; seeing that causes being no longer the same, or no + longer acting after the same manner, the effects would necessarily no + longer be what they now are, all productions, that they may be able to + conserve themselves, or maintain their actual existence, have occasion to + co-order themselves with the whole from which they have emanated. Without + this they would no longer be in a capacity to subsist: it is this faculty + of co-ordering themselves,—this relative adaption, which is called + the ORDER OF THE UNIVERSE: the want of it is called CONFUSION. Those + productions which are treated as MONSTROUS, are such as are unable to + co-order themselves with the general or particular laws of the beings who + surround them, or with the whole in which they find themselves placed: + they have had the faculty in their formation to accommodate themselves to + these laws; but these very laws are opposed to their perfection: for this + reason they are unable to subsist. It is thus that by a certain analogy of + conformation, which exists between animals of different species, mules are + easily produced; but these mules, unable to co-order themselves with the + beings that surround them, are not able to reach perfection, consequently + cannot propagate their species. Man can live only in air, fish only in + water: put the man into the water, the fish into the air, not being able + to co-order themselves with the fluids which surround them, these animals + will quickly be destroyed. Transport by imagination, a man from our planet + into SATURN, his lungs will presently be rent by an atmosphere too + rarified for his mode of being, his members will be frozen with the + intensity of the cold; he will perish for want of finding elements + analogous to his actual existence: transport another into MERCURY, the + excess of heat, beyond what his mode of existence can bear, will quickly + destroy him. + </p> + <p> + Thus, every thing seems to authorise the conjecture, that the human + species is a production peculiar to our sphere, in the position in which + it is found: that when this position may happen to change, the human + species will, of consequence, either be changed or will be obliged to + disappear; seeing that there would not then be that with which man could + co-order himself with the whole, or connect himself with that which can + enable him to subsist. It is this aptitude in man to co-order himself with + the whole, that not only furnishes him with the idea of order, but also + makes him exclaim "<i>whatever is, is right</i>;" whilst every thing is + only that which it can be, as long as the whole is necessarily what it is; + whilst it is positively neither good nor bad, as we understand those + terms: it is only requisite to displace a man, to make him accuse the + universe of confusion. + </p> + <p> + These reflections would appear to contradict the ideas of those, who are + willing to conjecture that the other planets, like our own, are inhabited + by beings resembling ourselves. But if the LAPLANDER differs in so marked + a manner from the HOTTENTOT, what difference ought we not rationally to + suppose between an inhabitant of our planet and one of SATURN or of VENUS? + </p> + <p> + However it may be, if we are obliged to recur by imagination to the origin + of things, to the infancy of the human species, we may say that it is + probable that man was a necessary consequence of the disentangling of our + globe; or one of the results of the qualities, of the properties, of the + energies, of which it is susceptible in its present position—that he + was born male and female—that his existence is co-ordinate with that + of the globe, under its present position—that as long as this + co-ordination shall subsist, the human specie will conserve himself, will + propagate himself, according to the impulse, after the primitive laws, + which he has originally received—that if this co-ordination should + happen to cease; if the earth, displaced, should cease to receive the same + impulse, the same influence, on the part of those causes which actually + act upon it, or which give it energy; that then the human species would + change, to make place for new beings, suitable to co-order themselves with + the state that should succeed to that which we now see subsist. + </p> + <p> + In thus supposing the changes in the position of our globe, the primitive + man did, perhaps, differ more from the actual man, than the quadruped + differs from the insect. Thus man, the same as every thing else that + exists on our planet, as well as in all the others, may be regarded as in + a state of continual vicissitude: thus the last term of the existence of + man is to us as unknown and as indistinct as the first: there is, + therefore, no contradiction in the belief that the species vary + incessantly—that to us it is as impossible to know what he will + become, as to know what he has been. + </p> + <p> + With respect to those who may ask why Nature does not produce new beings? + we may enquire of them in turn, upon what foundation they suppose this + fact? What it is that authorizes them to believe this sterility in Nature? + Know they if, in the various combinations which she is every instant + forming, Nature be not occupied in producing new beings, without the + cognizance of these observers? Who has informed them that this Nature is + not actually assembling, in her immense elaboratory, the elements suitable + to bring to light, generations entirely new, that will have nothing in + common with those of the species at present existing? What absurdity then, + or what want of just inference would there be, to imagine that the man, + the horse, the fish, the bird, will be no more? Are these animals so + indispensably requisite to Nature, that without them she cannot continue + her eternal course? Does not all change around us? Do we not ourselves + change? Is it not evident that the whole universe has not been, in its + anterior eternal duration, rigorously the same that it now is? that it is + impossible, in its posterior eternal duration, it can be rigidly in the + same state that it now is for a single instant? How, then, pretend to + divine that, to which the infinite succession of destruction, of + reproduction, of combination, of dissolution, of metamorphosis, of change, + of transposition, may be able eventually to conduct it by their + consequence? Suns encrust themselves, and are extinguished; planets perish + and disperse themselves in the vast plains of air; other suns are kindled, + and illumine their systems; new planets form themselves, either to make + revolutions round these suns, or to describe new routes; and man, an + infinitely small portion of the globe, which is itself but an + imperceptible point in the immensity of space, vainly believes it is for + himself this universe is made; foolishly imagines he ought to be the + confident of Nature; confidently flatters himself he is eternal: and calls + himself KING OF THE UNIVERSE!!! + </p> + <p> + O man! wilt thou never conceive, that thou art but an ephemeron? All + changes in the great macrocosm: nothing remains the same an instant, in + the planet thou inhabitest: Nature contains no one constant form, yet thou + pretendest thy species can never disappear; that thou shalt be exempted + from the universal law, that wills all shall experience change! Alas! In + thy actual being, art not thou submitted to continual alterations? Thou, + who in thy folly, arrogantly assumest to thyself the title of KING OF + NATURE! Thou, who measurest the earth and the heavens! Thou, who in thy + vanity imaginest, that the whole was made, because thou art intelligent! + There requires but a very slight accident, a single atom to be displaced, + to make thee perish; to degrade thee; to ravish from thee this + intelligence of which thou appearest so proud. + </p> + <p> + If all the preceding conjectures be refused by those opposed to us; if it + be pretended that Nature acts by a certain quantum of immutable and + general laws; if it be believed that men, quadrupeds, fish, insects, + plants, are from all eternity, and will remain eternally, what they now + are: if I say it be contended, that from all eternity the stars have + shone, in the immense regions of space, have illuminated the firmament; if + it be insisted, we must no more demand why man is such as he appears, then + ask why Nature is such as we behold her, or why the world exists? We are + no longer opposed to such arguments. Whatever may be the system adopted, + it will perhaps reply equally well to the difficulties with which our + opponents endeavour to embarrass the way: examined closely, it will be + perceived they make nothing against those truths, which we have gathered + from experience. It is not given to man to know every thing—it is + not given him to know his origin—it is not given him to penetrate + into the essence of things, nor to recur to first principles—but it + is given him, to have reason, to have honesty, to ingenuously allow he is + ignorant of that which he cannot know, and not to substitute + unintelligible words, absurd suppositions, for his uncertainty. Thus, we + say to those, who to solve difficulties far above their reach, pretend + that the human species descended from a first man and a first woman, + created diversely according to different creeds;—that we have some + ideas of Nature, but that we have none of creation;—that the human + mind is incapable of comprehending the period when all was nothing;—that + to use words we cannot understand, is only in other terms to acknowledge + our ignorance of the powers of Nature;—that we are unable to fathom + the means by which she has been capacitated to produce the phenomena we + behold. + </p> + <p> + Let us then conclude, that man has no just, no solid reason to believe + himself a privileged being in Nature; because he is subject to the same + vicissitudes, as all her other productions. His pretended prerogatives + have their foundation in error, arising from mistaken opinions concerning + his existence. Let him but elevate himself by his thoughts above the globe + he inhabits, he will look upon his own species with the same eyes he does + all other beings in Nature: He will then clearly perceive that in the same + manner that each tree produces its fruit, by reason of its energies, in + consequence of its species: so each man acts by reason of his particular + energy; that he produces fruit, actions, works, equally necessary: he will + feel that the illusion which he anticipates in favour of himself, arises + from his being, at one and the same time, a spectator and a part of the + universe. He will acknowledge, that the idea of excellence which he + attaches to his being, has no other foundation than his own peculiar + interest; than the predilection he has in favour of himself—that the + doctrine he has broached with such seeming confidence, bottoms itself on a + very suspicious foundation, namely IGNORANCE and SELF-LOVE. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0014" id="link2H_4_0014"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + CHAP. VII. + </h2> + <h3> + <i>The Soul and the Spiritual System</i>. + </h3> + <p> + Man, after having gratuitously supposed himself composed of two distinct + independent substances, that have no common properties, relatively with + each other; has pretended, as we have seen, that that which actuated him + interiorly, that motion which is invisible, that impulse which is placed + within himself, is essentially different from those which act exteriorly. + The first he designated, as we have already said, by the name of a SPIRIT + or a SOUL. If however it be asked, what is a spirit? The moderns will + reply, that the whole fruit of their metaphysical researches is limited to + learning that this motive-power, which they state to be the spring of + man's action, is a substance of an unknown nature; so simple, so + indivisible, so deprived of extent, so invisible, so impossible to be + discovered by the senses, that its parts cannot be separated, even by + abstraction or thought. The question then arises, how can we conceive such + a substance, which is only the negation of every thing of which we have a + knowledge? How form to ourselves an idea of a substance, void of extent, + yet acting on our senses; that is to say, on those organs which are + material, which have extent? How can a being without extent be moveable; + how put matter in action? How can a substance devoid of parts, correspond + successively with different parts of space? But a very cogent question + presents itself on this occasion: if this distinct substance that is said + to form one of the component parts of man, be really what it is reported, + and if it be not, it is not what it is described; if it be unknown, if it + be not pervious to the senses; if it be invisible, by what means did the + metaphysicians themselves become acquainted with it? How did they form + ideas of a substance, that taking their own account of it, is not, under + any of its circumstances, either directly or by analogy, cognizable to the + mind of man? If they could positively achieve this, there would no longer + be any mystery in Nature: it would be as easy to conceive the time when + all was nothing, when all shall have passed away, to account for the + production of every thing we behold, as to dig in a garden or read a + lecture.—Doubt would vanish from the human species; there could no + longer be any difference of opinion, since all must necessarily be of one + mind on a subject so accessible to every enquirer. + </p> + <p> + But it will be replied, the materialist himself admits, the natural + philosophers of all ages have admitted, elements and atoms, beings simple + and indivisible, of which bodies are composed:—granted; they have no + more: they have also admitted that many of these atoms, many of these + elements, if not all, are unknown to them: nevertheless, these simple + beings, these atoms of the materialist, are not the same thing with the + spirit, or the soul of the metaphysician. When the natural philosopher + talks of atoms—when he describes them as simple beings, he indicates + nothing more than that they are homogeneous, pure, without mixture: but + then he allows that they have extent, consequently parts, are separable by + thought, although no other natural agent with which he is acquainted is + capable of dividing them: that the simple beings of this genus are + susceptible of motion—can impart action—receive impulse—are + material—are placed in Nature—are indestructible;—that + consequently, if he cannot know them from themselves, he can form some + idea of them by analogy: thus he has done that intelligibly, which the + metaphysician would do unintelligibly: the latter, with a view to render + man immortal, finding difficulties to his wish, from seeing that the body + decayed—that it has submitted to the great, the universal law—has, + to solve the difficulty, to remove the impediment, given him a soul, + distinct from the body, which he says is exempted from the action of the + general law: to account for this, he has called it a spiritual being, + whose properties are the negation of all known properties, consequently + inconceivable: had he, however, had recourse to the atoms of the former—had + he made this substance the last possible term of the division of matter—it + would at least have been intelligible; it would also have been immortal, + since, according to the reasonings of all men, whether metaphysicians, + theologians, or natural philosophers, an atom is an indestructible + element, that must exist to all eternity. + </p> + <p> + All men are agreed in this position, that motion is the successive change + of the relations of one body with other bodies, or with the different + parts of space. If that which is called <i>spirit</i> be susceptible of + communicating or receiving motion—if it acts—if it gives play + to the organs of body—to produce these effects, it necessarily + follows that this being changes successively its relation, its tendency, + its correspondence, the position of its parts, either relatively to the + different points of space, or to the different organs of the body which it + puts in action: but to change its relation with space, with the organs to + which it gives impulse, it follows of necessity that this spirit most have + extent, solidity, consequently distinct parts: whenever a substance + possesses these qualities, it is what we call MATTER, it can no longer be + regarded as a simple pure being, in the sense attached to it by the + moderns, or by theologians. + </p> + <p> + Thus it will be seen, that those who, to conquer insurmountable + difficulties, have supposed in man an immaterial substance, distinguished + from his body, have not thoroughly understood themselves; indeed they have + done nothing more than imagined a negative quality, of which they cannot + have any correct idea: matter alone is capable of acting on our senses; + without this action nothing would be capable of making itself known to us. + They have not seen that a being without extent is neither in a capacity to + move itself, nor has the capability of communicating motion to the body; + since such a being, having no parts, has not the faculty of changing its + relation, or its distance, relatively to other bodies, nor of exciting + motion in the human body, which is itself material. That which is called + our soul moves itself with us; now motion is a property of matter—this + soul gives impulse to the arm; the arm, moved by it, makes an impression, + a blow, that follows the general law of motion: in this case, the force + remaining the same, if the mass was two-fold, the blow should be double. + This soul again evinces its materiality in the invincible obstacles it + encounters on the part of the body. If the arm be moved by its impulse + when nothing opposes it, yet this arm can no longer move, when it is + charged with a weight beyond its strength. Here then is a mass of matter + that annihilates the impulse given by a spiritual cause, which spiritual + cause having no analogy with matter, ought not to find more difficulty in + moving the whole world, than in moving a single atom, nor an atom, than + the universe. From this, it is fair to conclude, such a substance is a + chimera—a being of the imagination. That it required a being + differently endowed, differently constituted, to set matter in motion—to + create all the phenomena we behold: nevertheless, it is a being the + metaphysicians have made the contriver, the Author of Nature. As man, in + all his speculations, takes himself for the model, he no sooner imagined a + spirit within himself, than giving it extent, he made it universal; then + ascribed to it all those causes with which his ignorance prevents him from + becoming acquainted, thus he identified himself with the Author of Nature—then + availed himself of the supposition to explain the connection of the soul + with the body: his self-complacency prevented his perceiving that he was + only enlarging the circle of his errors, by pretending to understand that + which it is more than possible he will never be permitted to know; his + self-love prevented him from feeling, that whenever he punished another + for not thinking as he did, that he committed the greatest injustice, + unless he was satisfactorily able to prove that other wrong, and himself + right: that if he himself was obliged to have recourse to hypothesis—to + gratuitous suppositions, whereon to found his doctrine, that from the very + fallibility of his nature, these might be erroneous: thus GALLILEO was + persecuted, because the metaphysicians, the theologians of his day, chose + to make others believe what it was evident they did not themselves + understand. + </p> + <p> + As soon as I feel an impulse, or experience motion, I am under the + necessity to acknowledge extent, solidity, density, impenetrability in the + substance I see move, or from which I receive impulse: thus, when action + is attributed to any cause whatever, I am obliged to consider it MATERIAL. + I may be ignorant of its individual nature, of its mode of action, or of + its generic properties; but I cannot deceive myself in general properties, + which are common to all matter: this ignorance will only be increased, + when I shall take that for granted of a being, of which from that moment I + am precluded by what I admit from forming any idea, which moreover + deprives it completely either of the faculty of moving itself, giving an + impulse, or acting. Thus, according to the received idea of the term, a + spiritual substance that moves itself, that gives motion to matter, and + that acts, implies a contradiction, that necessarily infers a total + impossibility. + </p> + <p> + The partizans of spirituality believe they answer the difficulties they + have accumulated, by asserting that "<i>the soul is entire—is whole + under each point of its extent</i>." If an absurd answer will solve + difficulties, they certainly have done it. But let us examine this reply:—it + will be found that this indivisible part which is called soul, however + insensible or however minute, must yet remain something: then an infinity + of unextended substances, or the same substance having no dimensions, + repeated an infinity of times, would constitute a substance that has + extent: this cannot be what they mean, because according to this + principle, the human soul would then be as infinite as the Author of + Nature; seeing that they have stated this to be a being without extent, + who is an infinity of times whole in each part of the universe. But when + there shall appear as much solidity in the answer as there is a want of + it, it must be acknowledged that in whatever manner the spirit or the soul + finds itself in its extent, when the body moves forward the soul does not + remain behind; if so, it has a quality in common with the body, peculiar + to matter; since it is conveyed from place to place jointly with the body. + Thus, when even the soul should be admitted to be immaterial, what + conclusion must be drawn? Entirely submitted to the motion of the body, + without this body it would remain dead and inert. This soul would only be + part of a two-fold machine, necessarily impelled forward by a + concatenation, or connection with the whole. It would resemble a bird, + which a child conducts at its pleasure, by the string with which it is + bound. + </p> + <p> + Thus, it is for want of consulting experience, by not attending to reason, + that man has darkened his ideas upon the concealed principle of his + motion. If, disentangled from prejudice—if, destitute of gratuitous + suppositions—if, throwing aside error, he would contemplate his + soul, or the moving principle that acts within him, he would be convinced + that it forms a part of its body, that it cannot be distinguished from it, + but by abstraction; that it is only the body itself, considered relatively + with some of its functions, or with those faculties of which its nature, + or its peculiar organization, renders it susceptible:—he will + perceive that this soul is obliged to undergo the same changes as the + body; that it is born with it; that it expands itself with it; that like + the body, it passes through a state of infancy, a period of weakness, a + season of inexperience; that it enlarges itself, that it strengthens + itself, in the same progression; that like the body, it arrives at an + adult age or reaches maturity; that it is then, and not till then, it + obtains the faculty of fulfilling certain functions; that it is in this + stage, and in no other, that it enjoys reason; that it displays more or + less wit, judgment, and manly activity; that like the body, it is subject + to those vicissitudes which exterior causes obliges it to undergo by their + influence; that, conjointly with the body, it suffers, enjoys, partakes of + its pleasures, shares its pains, is sound when the body is healthy, and + diseased when the body is oppressed with sickness; that like the body, it + is continually modified by the different degrees of density in the + atmosphere; by the variety of the seasons, and by the various properties + of the aliments received into the stomach: in short, he would be obliged + to acknowledge that at some periods it manifests visible signs of torpor, + stupefaction, decrepitude, and death. + </p> + <p> + In despite of this analogy, or rather this continual identity, of the soul + with the body, man has been desirous of distinguishing their essence; he + has therefore made the soul an inconceivable being: but in order that he + might form to himself some idea of it, he was, notwithstanding, obliged to + have recourse to material beings, and to their manner of acting. The word + <i>spirit</i>, therefore, presents to the mind no other ideas than those + of breathing, of respiration, of wind. Thus, when it is said the <i>soul + is a spirit</i>, it really means nothing more than that its mode of action + is like that of breathing: which though invisible in itself, or acting + without being seen, nevertheless produces very visible effects. But + breath, it is acknowledged, is a material cause; it is allowed to be air + modified; it is not, therefore, a simple or pure substance, such as the + moderns designate under the name of SPIRIT. + </p> + <p> + It is rather singular that in the Hebrew, the Greek, and the Latin, the + synonymy, or corresponding term for spirit should signify <i>breath</i>. + The metaphysicians themselves can best say why they have adopted such a + word, to designate the substance they have distinguished from matter: some + of them, fearful they should not have distinct beings enough, have gone + farther, and compounded man of three substances, BODY, SOUL, and + INTELLECT. + </p> + <p> + Although the word <i>spirit</i> is so very ancient among men, the sense + attached to it by the moderns is quite new: the idea of spirituality, as + admitted at this day, is a recent production of the imagination. Neither + PYTHAGORAS nor PLATO, however heated their brain, however decided their + taste for the marvellous, appear to have understood by spirit an + immaterial substance, or one without extent, devoid of parts; such as that + of which the moderns have formed the human soul, the concealed author of + motion. The ancients, by the word spirit, were desirous to define matter + of an extreme subtilty, of a purer quality than that which acted grossly + on our senses. In consequence, some have regarded the soul as an ethereal + substance; others as igneous matter; others again have compared it to + light. DEMOCRITUS made it consist in motion, consequently gave it a manner + of existence. ARISTOXENES, who was himself a musician, made it harmony. + ARISTOTLE regarded the soul as the moving faculty, upon which depended the + motion of living bodies. + </p> + <p> + The earliest doctors of Christianity had no other idea of the soul, than + that it was material. TERTULLIAN, ARNOBIUS, CLEMENT of ALEXANDRIA, ORIGEN, + SAINT JUSTIN, IRENAEUS, have all of them discoursed upon it; but have + never spoken of it other than as a corporeal substance—as matter. It + was reserved for their successors at a great distance of time, to make the + human soul and the soul of the world <i>pure spirits</i>; that is to say, + immaterial substances, of which it is impossible they could form any + accurate idea: by degrees this incomprehensible doctrine of spirituality, + conformable without doubt to the views of those who make it a principle to + annihilate reason, prevailed over the others: But it might be fairly + asked, if the pretended proofs of this doctrine owe themselves to a man, + who on a much more comprehensible point has been proved in error; if, on + that which time has shewn was accessible to man's reason, the great + champion in support of this dogma was deceived; are we not bound to + examine, with the most rigorous investigation, the reasonings, the + evidence, of one who was the decided, the proven child of enthusiasm and + error? Yet DESCARTES, to whose sublime errors the world is indebted for + the Newtonian system, although before him the soul had been considered + spiritual, was the first who established that, "<i>that which thinks ought + to be distinguished from matter</i>;" from whence he concludes rather + hastily, that the soul, or that which thinks in man, is a spirit; or a + simple indivisible substance. Perhaps it would have been more logical, + more consistent with reason, to have said, since man, who is matter, who + has no idea but of matter, enjoys the faculty of thought, matter can + think; that is, it is susceptible of that particular modification called + thought. + </p> + <p> + However this may be, this doctrine was believed divine, supernatural, + because it was inconceivable to man. Those who dared believe even that + which was believed before; namely, <i>that the soul was material</i>, were + held as rash inconsiderate madmen, or else treated as enemies to the + welfare and happiness of the human race. When man had once renounced + experience; when he had abjured his reason; when he had joined the banner + of this enthusiastic novelty; he did nothing more, day after day, than + subtilize the delirium, the ravings of his imagination: he pleased himself + by continually sinking deeper into the most unfathomable depths of error: + he felicitated himself on his discoveries; on his pretended knowledge; in + an exact ratio as his understanding became enveloped in the mists of + darkness, environed with the clouds of ignorance. Thus, in consequence of + man's reasoning upon false principles; of having relinquished the evidence + of his senses; the moving principle within him, the concealed author of + motion, has been made a mere chimera, a mere being of the imagination, + because he has divested it of all known properties; because he has + attached to it nothing but properties which, from the very nature of his + existence, he is incapacitated to comprehend. + </p> + <p> + The doctrine of spirituality, such as it now exists, offers nothing but + vague ideas; or rather is the absense of all ideas. What does it present + to the mind, but a substance which possesses nothing of which our senses + enable us to have a knowledge? Can it be truth that a man is able to + figure to himself a being not material, having neither extent nor parts, + which, nevertheless, acts upon matter without having any point of contact, + any kind of analogy with it; and which itself receives the impulse of + matter by means of material organs, which announce to it the presence of + other beings? Is it possible to conceive the union of the soul with the + body; to comprehend how this material body can bind, enclose, constrain, + determine a fugitive being which escapes all our senses? Is it honest, is + it plain dealing, to solve these difficulties, by saying there is a + mystery in them; that they are the effects of a power, more inconceivable + than the human soul; than its mode of acting, however concealed from our + view? When to resolve these problems, man is obliged to have recourse to + miracles or to make the Divinity interfere, does he not avow his own + ignorance? When, notwithstanding the ignorance he is thus obliged to avow + by availing himself of the divine agency, he tells us, this immaterial + substance, this soul, shall experience the action of the element of fire, + which he allows to be material; when he confidently says this soul shall + be burnt; shall suffer in purgatory; have we not a right to believe, that + either he has a design to deceive us, or else that he does not himself + understand that which he is so anxious we should take upon his word? + </p> + <p> + Let us not then be surprised at those subtile hypotheses, as ingenious as + they are unsatisfactory, to which theological prejudice has obliged the + most profound modern speculators to recur; when they have undertaken to + reconcile the spirituality of the soul, with the physical action of + material beings, on this incorporeal substance; its re-action upon these + beings; its union with the body. When the human mind permits itself to be + guided by authority without proof, to be led forward by enthusiasm; when + it renounces the evidence of its senses; what can it do more than sink + into error? Let those who doubt this, read the metaphysical romances of + LEIBNITZ, DESCARTES, MALEBRANCHE, CUDWORTH, and many others: let them + coolly examine the ingenious, but fanciful systems entitled <i>the + pre-established harmony of occasional causes; physical pre-motion, &c.</i> + </p> + <p> + If man wishes to form to himself clear, perspicuous ideas of his soul, let + him throw himself back on his experience—let him renounce his + prejudices—let him avoid theological conjecture—let him tear + the bandages which he has been taught to think necessary, but with which + he has been blind-folded, only to confound his reason. If it be wished to + draw man to virtue, let the natural philosopher, let the anatomist, let + the physician, unite their experience; let them compare their + observations, in order to show what ought to be thought of a substance, so + disguised, so hidden by absurdities, as not easily to be known. Their + discoveries may perhaps teach moralists the true motive-power that ought + to influence the actions of man—legislators, the true motives that + should actuate him, that should excite him to labour to the welfare of + society—sovereigns, the means of rendering their subjects truly + happy; of giving solidity to the power of the nations committed to their + charge. Physical souls have physical wants, and demand physical happiness. + These are real, are preferable objects, to that variety of fanciful + chimeras, each in its turn giving place to the other, with which the mind + of man has been fed during so many ages. Let us, then, labour to perfect + the morality of man; let us make it agreeable to him; let us excite in him + an ardent thirst for its purity: we shall presently see his morals become + better, himself become happier; his soul become calm and serene; his will + determined to virtue, by the natural, by the palpable motives held out to + him. By the diligence, by the care which legislators shall bestow on + natural philosophy, they will form citizens of sound understandings; + robust and well constituted; who, finding themselves happy, will be + themselves accessary to that useful impulse so necessary for their soul. + When the body is suffering, when nations are unhappy, the soul cannot be + in a proper state. <i>Mens sana in corpore sano</i>, a sound mind in a + sound body, will be always able to make a good citizen. + </p> + <p> + The more man reflects, the more he will be convinced that the soul, very + far from being distinguished from the body, is only the body itself, + considered relatively to some of its functions, or to some of the modes of + existing or acting, of which it is susceptible whilst it enjoys life. + Thus, the soul is man, considered relatively to the faculty he has of + feeling, of thinking, of acting in a mode resulting from his peculiar + nature; that is to say, from his properties, from his particular + organization: from the modifications, whether durable or transitory, which + the beings who act upon him cause his machine to undergo. + </p> + <p> + Those who have distinguished the soul from the body, appear only to have + distinguished their brain from themselves. Indeed, the brain is the common + center, where all the nerves, distributed through every part of the body, + meet and blend themselves: it is by the aid of this interior organ that + all those operations are performed which are attributed to the soul: it is + the impulse, or the motion, communicated to the nerve, which modifies the + brain: in consequence, it re-acts, or gives play to the bodily organs; or + rather it acts upon itself, and becomes capable of producing within itself + a great variety of motion, which has been designated <i>intellectual + faculties</i>. + </p> + <p> + From this it may be seen that some philosophers have been desirous to make + a spiritual substance of the brain. It is evidently nothing but ignorance + that has given birth to and accredited this system, which embraces so + little, either of the natural or the rational. It is from not having + studied himself, that man has supposed he was compounded with an agent, + essentially different from his body: in examining this body, he will find + that it is quite useless to recur to hypothesis for the explanation of the + various phenomena it presents to his contemplation; that hypothesis can do + nothing more than lead him out of the right road to the information after + which he seeks. What obscures this question, arises from this, that man + cannot see himself: indeed, for this purpose, that would be requisite + which is impossible; namely, that he could he at one and the same moment + both within and without himself: he may be compared to an Eolian harp, + that issues sounds of itself, and should demand what it is that causes it + to give them forth? It does not perceive that the sensitive quality of its + chords causes the air to brace them; that being so braced, it is rendered + sonorous by every gust of wind with which it happens to come in contact. + </p> + <p> + When a theologian, obstinately bent on admitting into man two substances + essentially different, is asked why he multiplies beings without + necessity? he will reply, because <i>"thought cannot be a property of + matter."</i> If, then, it be enquired of him, <i>cannot God give to matter + the faculty of thought?</i> he will answer, <i>"no! seeing that God cannot + do impossible things!"</i> According to his principles, it is as + impossible that spirit or thought can produce matter, as it is impossible + that matter can produce spirit or thought: it might, therefore, be + concluded against him, that the world was not made by a spirit, any more + than a spirit was made by the world. But in this case, does not the + theologian, according to his own assertion, acknowledge himself to be the + true atheist? Does he not, in fact, circumscribe the attributes of the + Deity, and deny his power, to suit his own purpose? Yet these men demand + implicit belief in doctrines, which they are obliged to maintain by the + most contradictory assertions. + </p> + <p> + The more experience we collect, the more we shall be convinced that the + word <i>spirit</i>, in its present received usage, conveys no one sense + that is tangible, either to ourselves or to those that invented it; + consequently cannot be of the least use, either in physics or morals. What + modern metaphysicians believe and understand by the word, is nothing more + than an <i>occult</i> power, imagined to explain <i>occult</i> qualities + and actions, but which, in fact, explains nothing. Savage nations admit of + spirits, to account to themselves for those effects, which to them appear + marvellous, as long as their ignorance knows not the cause to which they + ought to be attributed. In attributing to spirits the phenomena of Nature, + as well as those of the human body, do we, in fact, do any thing more than + reason like savages? Man has filled Nature with spirits, because he has + almost always been ignorant of the true causes of those effects by which + he was astonished. Not being acquainted with the powers of Nature, he has + supposed her to be animated by a <i>great spirit</i>: not understanding + the energy of the human frame, he has in like manner conjectured it to be + animated by a <i>minor spirit</i>: from this it would appear, that + whenever he wished to indicate the unknown cause of a phenomena, he knew + not how to explain in a natural manner, he had recourse to the word <i>spirit</i>. + In short, <i>spirit</i> was a term by which he solved all his doubts, and + cleared up his ignorance to himself. It was according to these principles + that when the AMERICANS first beheld the terrible effects of gunpowder, + they ascribed the cause to wrathful spirits, to their enraged divinities: + it was by adopting these principles, that our ancestors believed in a + plurality of gods, in ghosts, in genii, &c. Pursuing the same track, + we ought to attribute to spirits gravitation, electricity, magnetism, + &c. &c. It is somewhat singular, that priests have in all ages so + strenuously upheld those systems which time has exploded; that they have + appeared to be either the most crafty or the most ignorant of men. Where + are now the priests of Apollo, of Juno, of the Sun, and a thousand others? + Yet these are the men, who in all times have persecuted those who have + been the first to give natural explanations of the phenomena of Nature, as + witness ANAXAGORAS, ARISTOTLE, GALLILEO, DESCARTES, &c. &c. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0015" id="link2H_4_0015"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + CHAP. VIII. + </h2> + <h3> + <i>The Intellectual Faculties derived from the Faculty of Feeling</i>. + </h3> + <p> + To convince ourselves that the faculties called <i>intellectual</i>, are + only certain modes of existence, or determinate manners of acting, which + result from the peculiar organization of the body, we have only to analyze + them; we shall then see that all the operations which are attributed to + the soul, are nothing more than certain modifications of the body; of + which a substance that is without extent, that has no parts, that is + immaterial, is not susceptible. + </p> + <p> + The first faculty we behold in the living man, and that from which all his + others flow, is <i>feeling</i>: however inexplicable this faculty may + appear, on a first view, if it be examined closely, it will be found to be + a consequence of the essence, or a result of the properties of organized + beings; the same as <i>gravity, magnetism, elasticity, electricity</i>, + &c. result from the essence or nature of some others. We shall also + find these last phenomena are not less inexplicable than that of feeling. + Nevertheless, if we wish to define to ourselves a clear and precise idea + of it, we shall find that feeling is a particular manner of being moved—a + mode of receiving an impulse peculiar to certain organs of animated + bodies, which is occasioned by the presence of a material object that acts + upon these organs, and transmit the impulse or shock to the brain. + </p> + <p> + Man only feels by the aid of nerves dispersed through his body; which is + itself, to speak correctly, nothing more than a great nerve; or may be + said to resemble a large tree, of which the branches experience the action + of the root, communicated through the trunk. In man the nerves unite and + lose themselves in the brain; that intestine is the true seat of feeling: + like the spider in the centre of his web, it is quickly warned of all the + changes that happen to the body, even at the extremities to which it sends + its filaments and branches. Experience enables us to ascertain, that man + ceases to feel in those parts of his body of which the communication with + the brain is intercepted; he feels very little, or not at all, whenever + this organ is itself deranged or affected in too lively a manner. A proof + of this is afforded in the transactions of the Royal Academy of Sciences + at Paris: they inform us of a man who had his scull taken off, in the room + of which his brain was recovered with skin; in proportion as a pressure + was made by the hand on his brain, the man fell into a kind of + insensibility, which deprived him of all feeling. BARTOLIN says, the brain + of a man is twice as big as that of an ox. This observation had been + already made by ARISTOTLE. In the dead body of an idiot dissected by + WILLIS, the brain was found smaller than ordinary: he says the greatest + difference he found between the parts of the body of this idiot, and those + of wiser men, was, that the plexus of the intercostal nerves, which is the + mediator between the brain and the heart, was extremely small, accompanied + by a less number of nerves than usual. According to WILLIS, the ape is, of + all animals, that which has the largest brain, relatively to his size: he + is also, after man, that which has the most intelligence: this is further + confirmed, by the name he bears in the soil, to which he is indigenous, + which is <i>ourang outang</i>, or the man beast. There is, therefore, + every reason to believe that it is entirely in the brain, that consists + the difference, that is found not only between man and beasts, but also + between the man of wit, and the fool: between the thinking man, and he who + is ignorant; between the man of sound understanding, and the madman: a + multitude of experience, serves to prove, that those persons who are most + accustomed to use their intellectual faculties, have their brain more + extended than others: the same has been remarked of watermen, that they + have arms much longer than other men. + </p> + <p> + However this may be, the sensibility of the brain, and all its parts, is a + fact: if it be asked, whence comes this property? We shall reply, it is + the result of an arrangement, of a combination, peculiar to the animal: it + is thus that milk, bread, wine, change themselves in the substance of man, + who is a sensible being: this insensible matter becomes sensible, in + combining itself with a sensible whole. Some philosophers think that + sensibility is a universal quality of matter: in this case, it would be + useless to seek from whence this property is derived, as we know it by its + effects. If this hypothesis be admitted, in like manner as two kinds of + motion are distinguished in Nature, the one called <i>live</i> force, the + other <i>dead</i>, or <i>inert</i> force, two sorts of sensibility will be + distinguished, the one active or alive, the other inert or dead. Then to + animalize a substance, is only to destroy the obstacles that prevent its + being active or sensible. In fact, sensibility is either a quality which + communicates itself like motion, and which is acquired by combination; or + this sensibility is a property inherent in all matter: in both, or either + case, an unextended being, without parts, such as the human soul is said + to be, can neither be the cause of it nor submitted to its operation; but + we may fairly conclude, that all the parts of Nature enjoy the capability + to arrive at animation; the obstacle is only in the state, not in the + quality. Life is the perfection of Nature: she has no parts which do not + tend to it—which do not attain it by the same means. Life in an + insect, a dog, a man, has no other difference, than that this act is more + perfect, relatively to ourselves in proportion to the structure of the + organs: if, therefore, it be asked, what is requisite to animate a body? + we reply, it needs no foreign aid; it is sufficient that the power of + Nature be joined to its organization. + </p> + <p> + The conformation, the arrangement, the texture, the delicacy of the + organs, as well exterior as interior, which compose men and animals, + render their parts extremely mobile, or make their machine susceptible of + being moved with great facility. In a body, which is only a heap of + fibres, a mass of nerves, contiguous one to the other, united in a common + center, always ready to act; in a whole, composed of fluids and solids, of + which the parts are in equilibrium, the smallest touching each other, are + active in their motion, communicating reciprocally, alternately and in + succession, the impression, oscillations, and shocks they receive; in such + a composition, it is not surprising that the slightest impulse propagates + itself with celerity; that the shocks excited in its remotest parts, make + themselves quickly felt in the brain, whose delicate texture renders it + susceptible of being itself very easily modified. Air, fire, water, agents + the most inconstant, possessing the most rapid motion, circulate + continually in the fibres, incessantly penetrate the nerves: without doubt + these contribute to that incredible celerity with which the brain is + acquainted with what passes at the extremities of the body. + </p> + <p> + Notwithstanding the great mobility with which man's organization renders + him susceptible, although exterior as well as interior causes are + continually acting upon him, he does not always feel in a distinct, in a + decided manner, the impulse given to his senses: indeed, he does not feel + it, until it has produced some change, or given some shock to his brain. + Thus, although completely environed by air, he does not feel its action, + until it is so modified, as to strike with a sufficient degree of force on + his organs; to penetrate his skin, through which his brain is warned of + its presence. Thus, during a profound and tranquil sleep, undisturbed by + any dream, man ceases to feel. In short, notwithstanding the continued + motion that agitates his frame, man does not appear to feel, when this + motion acts in a convenient order; he does not perceive a state of health, + but he discovers a state of grief or sickness; because, in the first, his + brain does not receive too lively an impulse, whilst in the others, his + nerves are contracted, shocked, and agitated, with violent, with + disorderly motion: these communicating with his brain, give notice that + some cause acts strongly upon them—impels them in a manner that + bears no analogy with their natural habit: this constitutes, in him, that + peculiar mode of existing which he calls <i>grief</i>. + </p> + <p> + On the other hand, it sometimes happens that exterior objects produce very + considerable changes on his body, without his perceiving them at the + moment. Often, in the heat of battle, the soldier perceives not that he is + dangerously wounded, because, at the time, the rapidity, the multiplicity + of impetuous motion that assails his brain, does not permit him to + distinguish the particular change a part of his body has undergone by the + wound. In short, when a great number of causes are simultaneously acting + on him with too much vivacity, he sinks under their accumulated pressure,—he + swoons—he loses his senses—he is deprived of feeling. + </p> + <p> + In general, feeling only obtains, when the brain can distinguish + distinctly, the impressions made on the organs with which it has + communication; it is the distinct shock, the decided modification man + undergoes, that constitutes <i>conscience</i>. Doctor Clarke, says to this + effect: "Conscience is the act of reflecting, by means of which I know + that I think, and that my thoughts, or my actions belong to me, and not to + another." From this it will appear, that <i>feeling</i> is a mode of + being, a marked change, produced on our brain, occasioned by the impulse + communicated to our organs, whether by interior or exterior agents, by + which it is modified either in a durable or transient manner: it is not + always requisite that man's organs should be moved by an exterior object, + to enable him to feel that he should be conscious of the changes effected + in him: he can feel them within himself by means of an interior impulse; + his brain is then modified, or rather he renews within himself the + anterior modifications. We are not to be astonished that the brain should + be necessarily warned of the shocks, of the impediments, of the changes + that may happen to so complicated a machine as the human body, in which, + notwithstanding all the parts are contiguous to the brain, and concentrate + themselves in this brain, and are by their essence in a continual state of + action and re-action. + </p> + <p> + When a man experiences the pains of the gout, he is conscious of them; in + other words, he feels interiorly, that it has produced very marked, very + distinct changes in him, without his perceiving, that he has received an + impulse from any exterior cause; nevertheless, if he will recur to the + true source of these changes, he will find that they have been wholly + produced by exterior agents: they have been the consequence, either of his + temperament; of the organization received from his parents; of the + aliments with which his frame has been nourished; besides a thousand + trivial, inappreciable causes, which congregating themselves by degrees + produce in him the gouty humour; the effect of which is to make him feel + in an acute and very lively manner. The pain of the gout engenders in his + brain an idea, so modifies it that it acquires the faculty of representing + to itself, of reiterating as it were, this pain when even he shall be no + longer tormented with the gout: his brain, by a series of motion + interiorly excited, is again placed in a state analogous to that in which + it was when he really experienced this pain: but if he had never felt it, + he would never have been in a capacity to form to himself any just idea of + its excruciating torments. + </p> + <p> + The visible organs of man's body, by the intervention of which his brain + is modified, take the name of <i>senses</i>. The various modifications + which his brain receives by the aid of these senses, assumes a variety of + names. <i>Sensation</i>, <i>perception</i>, and <i>idea</i>, are terms + that designate nothing more than the changes produced in this interior + organ, in consequence of impressions made on the exterior organs by bodies + acting on them: these changes considered by themselves, are called <i>sensations</i>; + they adopt the term <i>perception</i> when the brain is warned of their + presence; <i>ideas</i> is that state of them in which the brain is able to + ascribe them to the objects by which they have been produced. + </p> + <p> + Every <i>sensation</i>, then, is nothing more than the shock given to the + organs, every <i>perception</i> is this shock propagated to the brain; + every <i>idea</i> is the image of the object to which the sensation and + the perception is to be ascribed. From whence it will be seen, that if the + senses be not moved, there can neither be sensations, perceptions, nor + ideas: this will be proved to those, who can yet permit themselves to + doubt so demonstrable and striking a truth. + </p> + <p> + It is the extreme mobility of which man is capable, owing to his peculiar + organization, that distinguishes him from other beings that are called + insensible or inanimate; the different degrees of this mobility, of which + the individuals of his species are susceptible, discriminate them from + each other; make that incredible variety, that infinity of difference + which is to be found, as well in their corporeal faculties, as in those + which are mental or intellectual. From this mobility, more or less + remarkable in each human being, results wit, sensibility, imagination, + taste, &c.: for the present, however, let us follow the operation of + the senses; let us examine in what manner they are acted upon, and are + modified by exterior objects:—we will afterwards scrutinize the + re-action of the interior organ or brain. + </p> + <p> + The eyes are very delicate, very movable organs, by means of which the + sensation of light or colour is experienced: these give to the brain a + distinct perception, in consequence of which, man forms an idea, generated + by the action of luminous or coloured bodies: as soon as the eyelids are + opened, the retina is affected in a peculiar manner; the fluid, the + fibres, the nerves, of which they are composed, are excited by shocks + which they communicate to the brain; to which they delineate the images of + the bodies from which they have received the impulse; by this means, an + idea is acquired of the colour, the size, the form, the distance of these + bodies: it is thus that may be explained the mechanism of <i>sight</i>. + </p> + <p> + The mobility and the elasticity of which the skin is rendered susceptible, + by the fibres and nerves which form its texture, accounts for the rapidity + with which this envelope to the human body is affected when applied to any + other body; by their agency, the brain has notice of its presence, of its + extent, of its roughness, of its smoothness, of its surface, of its + pressure of its ponderosity, &c. Qualities from which the brain + derives distinct perceptions, which breed in it a diversity of ideas; it + is this that constitutes the <i>touch</i> or <i>feeling</i>. + </p> + <p> + The delicacy of the membrane by which the interior of the nostrils is + covered, renders them easily susceptible of irritation, even by the + invisible and impalpable corpuscles that emanate from odorous bodies: by + these means sensations are excited, the brain has perceptions, and + generates ideas: it is this that forms the sense of <i>smelling</i>. + </p> + <p> + The mouth, filled with nervous, sensible, movable, irritable glands, + saturated with juices suitable to the dissolution of saline substances, is + affected in a very lively manner by the aliments which pass through it for + the nourishment of the body; these glands transmit to the brain the + impressions received: perceptions are of consequence; ideas follow: it is + from this mechanism that results <i>taste</i>. + </p> + <p> + The ear, whose conformation fits it to receive the various impulses of + air, diversely modified, communicates to the brain the shocks or + sensations; these breed the perception of sound, and generate the idea of + sonorous bodies: it is this that constitutes <i>hearing</i>. + </p> + <p> + Such are the only means by which man receives sensations, perceptions, and + ideas. These successive modifications of his brain are effects produced by + objects that give impulse to his senses; they become themselves causes, + producing in his soul new modifications, which are denominated <i>thought, + reflection, memory, imagination, judgment, will, action</i>; the basis, + however, of all these is <i>sensation</i>. + </p> + <p> + To form a precise notion of <i>thought</i>, it will be requisite to + examine, step by step, what passes in man during the presence of any + object whatever. Suppose for a moment this object to be a peach: this + fruit makes, at the first view, two different impressions on his eyes; + that is to say, it produces two modifications, which are transmitted to + the brain, which on this occasion experiences two new perceptions, or has + two new ideas or modes of existence, designated by the terms <i>colour</i> + and <i>rotundity</i>; in consequence, he has an idea of a body possessing + roundness and colour: if he places his hand on this fruit, the organ of + feeling having been set in action, his hand experiences three new + impressions, which are called <i>softness, coolness, weight</i>, from + whence result three new perceptions in the brain, he has consequently + three new ideas: if he approximates this peach to his nose, the organ of + <i>smelling</i> receives an impulse, which, communicated to the brain, a + new perception arises, by which he acquires a new idea, called <i>odour</i>: + if he carries this fruit to his mouth, the organ of taste becomes affected + in a very lively manner: this impulse communicated to the brain, is + followed by a perception that generates in him the idea of <i>flavour</i>. + In re-uniting all these impressions, or these various modifications of his + organs, which it have been consequently transmitted to his brain; that is + to say, in combining the different sensations, perceptions, and ideas, + that result from the impulse he has received, he has an idea of a whole, + which he designates by the name of a peach, with which he can then occupy + his thoughts. + </p> + <p> + From this it is sufficiently proved that thought has a commencement, a + duration, an end; or rather a generation, a succession, a dissolution, + like all the other modifications of matter; like them, thought is excited, + is determined, is increased, is divided, is compounded, is simplified, + &c. If, therefore, the soul, or the principle that thinks, be + indivisible; how does it happen, that this soul has the faculty of memory, + or of forgetfulness; is capacitated to think successively, to divide, to + abstract, to combine, to extend its ideas, to retain them, or to lose + them? How can it cease to think? If forms appear divisible in matter, it + is only in considering them by abstraction, after the method, of + geometricians; but this divisibility of form exists not in Nature, in + which there is neither a point, an atom, nor form perfectly regular; it + must therefore be concluded, that the forms of matter are not less + indivisible than thought. + </p> + <p> + What has been said is sufficient to show the generation of sensations, of + perceptions, of ideas, with their association, or connection in the brain: + it will be seen that these various modifications are nothing more than the + consequence of successive impulses, which the exterior organs transmit to + the interior organ, which enjoys the faculty of thought, that is to say, + to feel in itself the different modifications it has received, or to + perceive the various ideas which it has generated; to combine them, to + separate them, to extend them, to abridge them, to compare them, to renew + them, &c. From whence it will be seen, that thought is nothing more + than the perception of certain modifications, which the brain either gives + to itself, or has received from exterior objects. + </p> + <p> + Indeed, not only the interior organ perceives the modifications it + receives from without, but again it has the faculty of modifying itself; + of considering the changes which take place in it, the motion by which it + is agitated in its peculiar operations, from which it imbibes new + perceptions and new ideas. It is the exercise of this power to fall back + upon itself, that is called <i>reflection</i>. + </p> + <p> + From this it will appear, that for man to think and to reflect, is to + feel, or perceive within himself the impressions, the sensations, the + ideas, which have been furnished to his brain by those objects which give + impulse to his senses, with the various changes which his brain produced + on itself in consequence. + </p> + <p> + <i>Memory</i> is the faculty which the brain has of renewing in itself the + modifications it has received, or rather, to restore itself to a state + similar to that in which it has been placed by the sensations, the + perceptions, the ideas, produced by exterior objects, in the exact order + it received them, without any new action on the part of these objects, or + even when these objects are absent; the brain perceives that these + modifications assimilate with those it formerly experienced in the + presence of the objects to which it relates, or attributes them. Memory is + faithful, when these modifications are precisely the same; it is + treacherous, when they differ from those which the organs have exteriorly + experienced. + </p> + <p> + <i>Imagination</i> in man is only the faculty which the brain has of + modifying itself, or of forming to itself new perceptions, upon the model + of those which it has anteriorly received through the action of exterior + objects on the senses. The brain, then, does nothing more than combine + ideas which it has already formed, which it recalls to itself, from which + it forms a whole, or a collection of modifications, which it has not + received, which exists no-where but in itself, although the individual + ideas, or the parts of which this ideal whole is composed, have been + previously communicated to it, in consequence of the impulse given to the + senses by exterior objects: it is thus man forms to himself the idea of <i>centaurs</i>, + or a being composed of a man and a horse, of <i>hyppogriffs</i>, or a + being composed of a horse with wings and a griffin, besides a thousand + other objects, equally ridiculous. By memory, the brain renews in itself + the sensations, the perceptions, and the ideas which it has received or + generated; represents to itself the objects which have actually moved its + organs. By imagination it combines them variously: forms objects in their + place which have not moved its organs, although it is perfectly acquainted + with the elements or ideas of which it composes them. It is thus that man, + by combining a great number of ideas borrowed from himself, such as + justice, wisdom, goodness, intelligence, &c. by the aid of + imagination, has formed various ideal beings, or imaginary wholes, which + he has called JUPITER, JUNO, BRAMAH, SATURN, &c. + </p> + <p> + <i>Judgment</i> is the faculty which the brain possesses of comparing with + each other the modifications it receives, the ideas it engenders, or which + it has the power of awakening within itself, to the end that it may + discover their relations, or their effects. + </p> + <p> + <i>Will</i> is a modification of the brain, by which it is disposed to + action, that is to say, to give such an impulse to the organs of the body, + as can induce to act in a manner, that will procure for itself what is + requisite to modify it in a mode analogous to its own existence, or to + enable it to avoid that by which it can be injured. To <i>will</i> is to + be disposed to <i>action</i>. The exterior objects, or the interior ideas, + which give birth to this disposition are called <i>motives</i>, because + they are the springs or movements which determine it to act, that is to + say, which give play to the organs of the body. Thus, <i>voluntary actions</i> + are the motion of the body, determined by the modification of the brain. + Fruit hanging on a tree, through the agency of the visual organs, modifies + the brain in such a manner as to dispose the arm to stretch itself forth + to cull it; again, it modifies it in another manner, by which it excites + the hand to carry it to the mouth. + </p> + <p> + All the modifications which the interior organ or the brain receives, all + the sensations, all the perceptions, all the ideas that are generated by + the objects which give impulse to the senses, or which it renews within + itself by its own peculiar faculties, are either favourable or prejudicial + to man's mode of existence, whether that be transitory or habitual: they + dispose the interior organ to action, which it exercises by reason of its + own peculiar energy: this action is not, however, the same in all the + individuals of the human species, depending much on their respective + temperaments. From hence the PASSIONS have their birth: these are more or + less violent; they are, however, nothing more than the motion of the will, + determined by the objects which give it activity; consequently composed of + the analogy or of the discordance which is found between these objects, + man's peculiar mode of existence, and the force of his temperament. From + this it results, that the passions are modes of existence or modifications + of the brain; which either attract or repel those objects by which man is + surrounded; that consequently they are submitted in their action to the + physical laws of attraction and repulsion. + </p> + <p> + The faculty of perceiving or of being modified, as well by itself as + exterior objects which the brain enjoys is sometimes designated by the + term <i>understanding</i>. To the assemblage of the various faculties of + which this interior organ is susceptible, is applied the name of <i>intelligence</i>. + To a determined mode in which the brain exercises the faculties peculiar + to itself, is given the appellation of <i>reason</i>. The dispositions or + the modifications of the brain, some of them constant, others transitory, + which give impulse to the beings of the human species, causing them to + act, are styled <i>wit, wisdom, goodness, prudence, virtue, &c</i>. + </p> + <p> + In short, as there will be an opportunity presently to prove, all the + intellectual faculties—that is to say, all the modes of action + attributed to the soul, may be reduced to the modifications, to the + qualities, to the modes of existence, to the changes produced by the + motion of the brain; which is visibly in man the seat of feeling, the + principle of all his actions. These modifications are to be attributed to + the objects that strike on his senses; of which the impression is + transmitted to the brain, or rather to the ideas, which the perceptions + caused by the action of these objects on his senses have there generated, + and which it has the faculty to re-produce. This brain moves itself in its + turn, re-acts upon itself, gives play to the organs, which concentrate + themselves in it, or which are rather nothing more than an extension of + its own peculiar substance. It is thus the concealed motion of the + interior organ, renders itself sensible by outward and visible signs. The + brain, affected by a modification which is called FEAR, diffuses a + paleness over the countenance, excites a tremulous motion in the limbs + called trembling. The brain, affected by a sensation of GRIEF, causes + tears to flow from the eyes, even without being moved by any exterior + object; an idea which it retraces with great strength, suffices to give it + very little modifications, which visibly have an influence on the whole + frame. + </p> + <p> + In all this, nothing more is to be perceived than the same substance which + acts diversely on the various parts of the body. If it be objected that + this mechanism does not sufficiently explain the principles of the motion + or the faculties of the soul; we reply, that it is in the same situation + as all the other bodies of Nature, in which the most simple motion, the + most ordinary phenomena, the most common modes of action are inexplicable + mysteries, of which we shall never be able to fathom the first principles. + Indeed, how can we flatter ourselves we shall ever be enabled to compass + the true principle of that gravity by which a stone falls? Are we + acquainted with the mechanism which produces attraction in some + substances, repulsion in others? Are we in a condition to explain the + communication of motion from one body to another? But it may be fairly + asked,—Are the difficulties that occur, when attempting to explain + the manner in which the soul acts, removed by making it a <i>spiritual + being</i>, a substance of which we have not, nor cannot form one idea, + which consequently must bewilder all the notions we are capable of forming + to ourselves of this being? Let us then be contented to know that the soul + moves itself, modifies itself, in consequence of material causes, which + act upon it which give it activity: from whence the conclusion may be said + to flow consecutively, that all its operations, all its faculties, prove + that it is itself <i>material</i>. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0016" id="link2H_4_0016"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + CHAP. IX. + </h2> + <p> + <i>The Diversity of the Intellectual Faculties: they depend on Physical + Causes, as do their Moral Qualities.—The Natural Principles of + Society.—Morals.—Politics</i>. + </p> + <p> + Nature is under the necessity of diversifying all her works. Elementary + matter, different in its essence, must necessarily form different beings, + various in their combinations, in their properties, in their modes of + action, in their manner of existence. There is not, neither can there be, + two beings, two combinations, which are mathematically and rigorously the + same; because the place, the circumstances, the relations; the + proportions, the modifications, never being exactly alike, the beings that + result can never bear a perfect resemblance to each other: their modes of + action must of necessity vary in something, even when we believe we find + between them the greatest conformity. + </p> + <p> + In consequence of this principle, which every thing we see conspires to + prove to be a truth, there are not two individuals of the human species + who have precisely the same traits—who think exactly in the same + manner—who view things under the same identical point of sight—who + have decidedly the same ideas; consequently no two of them have uniformly + the same system of conduct. The visible organs of man, as well as his + concealed organs, have indeed some analogy, some common points of + resemblance, some general conformity; which makes them appear, when viewed + in the gross, to be affected in the same manner by certain causes: but the + difference is infinite in the detail. The human soul may be compared to + those instruments, of which the chords, already diversified in themselves, + by the manner in which they have been spun, are also strung upon different + notes: struck by the same impulse, each chord gives forth the sound that + is peculiar to itself; that is to say, that which depends on its texture, + its tension, its volume, on the momentary state in which it is placed by + the circumambient air. It is this that produces the diversified spectacle, + the varied scene, which the moral world offers to our view: it is from + this that results the striking contrariety that is to be found in the + minds, in the faculties, in the passions, in the energies, in the taste, + in the imagination, in the ideas, in the opinions of man. This diversity + is as great as that of his physical powers: like them it depends on his + temperament, which is as much varied as his physiognomy. This variety + gives birth to that continual series of action and reaction, which + constitutes the life of the moral world: from this discordance results the + harmony which at once maintains and preserves the human race. + </p> + <p> + The diversity found among the individuals of the human species, causes + inequalities between man and man: this inequality constitutes the support + of society. If all men were equal in their bodily powers, in their mental + talents, they would not have any occasion for each other: it is the + variation of his faculties, the inequality which this places him in, with + regard to his fellows, that renders morals necessary to man: without + these, he would live by himself, he would remain an isolated being. From + whence it may be perceived, that this inequality of which man so often + complains without cause—this impossibility which each man finds when + in an isolated state, when left to himself, when unassociated with his + fellow men, to labour efficaciously to his own welfare, to make his own + security, to ensure his own conservation; places him in the happy + situation of associating with his like, of depending on his fellow + associates, of meriting their succour, of propitiating them to his views, + of attracting their regard, of calling in their aid to chase away, by + common and united efforts, that which would have the power to trouble or + derange the order of his existence. In consequence of man's diversity, of + the inequality that results, the weaker is obliged to seek the protection + of the stronger; this, in his turn, recurs to the understanding, to the + talents, to the industry of the weaker, whenever his judgment points out + he can be useful to him: this natural inequality furnishes the reason why + nations distinguish those citizens who have rendered their country eminent + services. It is in consequence of his exigencies that man honors and + recompenses those whose understanding, good deeds, assistance, or virtues, + have procured for him real or supposed advantages, pleasures, or agreeable + sensations of any sort: it is by this means that genius gains an + ascendancy over the mind of man, and obliges a whole people to acknowledge + its powers. Thus, the diversity and inequality of the faculties, as well + corporeal as mental or intellectual, renders man necessary to his fellow + man, makes him a social being, and incontestibly proves to him the + necessity of morals. + </p> + <p> + According to this diversity of faculties, the individuals of the human + species are divided into different classes, each in proportion to the + effects produced, or the different qualities that may be remarked: all + these varieties in man flow from the individual properties of his soul, or + from the particular modification of his brain. It is thus, that wit, + imagination, sensibility, talents, &c. diversify to infinity the + differences that are to be found in man. It is thus, that some are called + good, others wicked; some are denominated virtuous, others vicious; some + are ranked as learned, others as ignorant; some are considered reasonable, + others unreasonable, &c. + </p> + <p> + If all the various faculties attributed to the soul are examined, it will + be found that like those of the body they are to be ascribed to physical + causes, to which it will be very easy to recur. It will be found that the + powers of the soul are the same as those of the body; that they always + depend on the organization of this body, on its peculiar properties, on + the permanent or transitory modifications that it undergoes; in a word, on + its temperament. + </p> + <p> + <i>Temperament</i> is, in each individual, the habitual state in which he + finds the fluids and the solids of which his body is composed. This + temperament varies, by reason of the elements or matter that predominate + in him, in consequence of the different combinations, of the various + modifications, which this matter, diversified in itself, undergoes in his + machine. Thus, in one, the blood is superabundant; in another, the bile; + in a third, phlegm, &c. + </p> + <p> + It is from Nature—from his parents—from causes, which from the + first moment of his existence have unceasingly modified him, that man + derives his temperament. It is in his mother's womb that he has attracted + the matter which, during his whole life, shall have an influence on his + intellectual faculties—on his energies—on his passions—on + his conduct. The very nourishment he takes, the quality of the air he + respires, the climate he inhabits, the education he receives, the ideas + that are presented to him, the opinions he imbibes, modify this + temperament. As these circumstances can never be rigorously the same in + every point for any two men, it is by no means surprising that such an + amazing variety, so great a contrariety, should be found in man; or that + there should exist as many different temperaments, as there are + individuals in the human species. + </p> + <p> + Thus, although man may bear a general resemblance, he differs essentially, + as well by the texture of his fibres and the disposition of his nerves, as + by the nature, the quality, the quantity of matter that gives them play, + that sets his organs in motion. Man, already different from his fellow, by + the elasticity of his fibres, the tension of his nerves, becomes still + more distinguished by a variety of other circumstances: he is more active, + more robust, when he receives nourishing aliments, when he drinks wine, + when he takes exercise: whilst another, who drinks nothing but water, who + takes less juicy nourishment, who languishes in idleness, shall be + sluggish and feeble. + </p> + <p> + All these causes have necessarily an influence on the mind, on the + passions, on the will; in a word, on what are called the intellectual + faculties. Thus, it may be observed, that a man of a sanguine + constitution, is commonly lively, ingenious, full of imagination, + passionate, voluptuous, enterprising; whilst the phlegmatic man is dull, + of a heavy understanding, slow of conception, inactive, difficult to be + moved, pusillanimous, without imagination, or possessing it in a less + lively degree, incapable of taking any strong measures, or of willing + resolutely. + </p> + <p> + If experience was consulted, in the room of prejudice, the physician would + collect from morals, the key to the human heart: in curing the body, he + would sometimes be assured of curing the mind. Man, in making a spiritual + substance of his soul, has contented himself with administering to it + spiritual remedies, which either have no influence over his temperament, + or do it an injury. The doctrine of the spirituality of the soul has + rendered morals a conjectural science, that does not furnish a knowledge + of the true motives which ought to be put in activity, in order to + influence man to his welfare. If, calling experience to his assistance, + man sought out the elements which form the basis of his temperament, or of + the greater number of the individuals composing a nation, he would then + discover what would be most proper for him,—that which could be most + convenient to his mode of existence—which could most conduce to his + true interest—what laws would be necessary to his happiness—what + institutions would be most useful for him—what regulations would be + most beneficial. In short, morals and politics would be equally enabled to + draw from <i>materialism</i>, advantages which the dogma of spirituality + can never supply, of which it even precludes the idea. Man will ever + remain a mystery, to those who shall obstinately persist in viewing him + with eyes prepossessed by metaphysics; he will always be an enigma to + those who shall pertinaciously attribute his actions to a principle, of + which it is impossible to form to themselves any distinct idea. When man + shall be seriously inclined to understand himself, let him sedulously + endeavour to discover the matter that enters into his combination, which + constitutes his temperament; these discoveries will furnish him with the + clue to the nature of his desires, to the quality of his passions, to the + bent of his inclinations—will enable him to foresee his conduct on + given occasions—will indicate the remedies that may be successfully + employed to correct the defects of a vicious organization, of a + temperament, as injurious to himself as to the society of which he is a + member. + </p> + <p> + Indeed, it is not to be doubted that man's temperament is capable of being + corrected, of being modified, of being changed, by causes as physical as + the matter of which it is constituted. We are all in some measure capable + of forming our own temperament: a man of a sanguine constitution, by + taking less juicy nourishment, by abating its quantity, by abstaining from + strong liquor, &c. may achieve the correction of the nature, the + quality, the quantity, the tendency, the motion of the fluids, which + predominate in his machine. A bilious man, or one who is melancholy, may, + by the aid of certain remedies, diminish the mass of this bilious fluid; + he may correct the blemish of his humours, by the assistance of exercise; + he may dissipate his gloom, by the gaiety which results from increased + motion. An European transplanted into Hindostan, will, by degrees, become + quite a different man in his humours, in his ideas, in his temperament, in + his character. + </p> + <p> + Although but few experiments have been made with a view to learn what + constitutes the temperament of man, there are still enough if he would but + deign to make use of them—if he would vouchsafe to apply to useful + purposes the little experience he has gleaned. It would appear, speaking + generally, that the igneous principle which chemists designate under the + name of <i>phlogiston</i>, or inflammable matter, is that which in man + yields him the most active life, furnishes him with the greatest energy, + affords the greatest mobility to his frame, supplies the greatest spring + to his organs, gives the greatest elasticity to his fibres, the greatest + tension to his nerves, the greatest rapidity to his fluids. From these + causes, which are entirely material, commonly result the dispositions or + faculties called sensibility, wit, imagination, genius, vivacity, &c. + which give the tone to the passions, to the will, to the moral actions of + man. In this sense, it is with great justice we apply the expressions, + 'warmth of soul,' 'ardency of imagination,' 'fire of genius,' &c. + </p> + <p> + It is this fiery element, diffused unequally, distributed in various + proportions through the beings of the human species, that sets man in + motion, gives him activity, supplies him with animal heat, and which, if + we may be allowed the expression, renders him more or less alive. This + igneous matter, so active, so subtle, dissipates itself with great + facility, then requires to be reinstated in his system by means of + aliments that contain it, which thereby become proper to restore his + machine, to lend new warmth to the brain, to furnish it with the + elasticity requisite to the performance of those functions which are + called intellectual. It is this ardent matter contained in wine, in strong + liquor, that gives to the most torpid, to the dullest, to the most + sluggish man, a vivacity of which, without it, he would be incapable—which + urges even the coward on to battle. When this fiery element is too + abundant in man, whilst he is labouring under certain diseases, it plunges + him into delirium; when it is in too weak or in too small a quantity, he + swoons, he sinks to the earth. This igneous matter diminishes in his old + age—it totally dissipates at his death. It would not be unreasonable + to suppose, that what physicians call the nervous fluid, which so promptly + gives notice to the brain of all that happens to the body, is nothing more + than electric matter; that the various proportions of this matter diffused + through his system, is the cause of that great diversity to be discovered + in the human being, and in the faculties he possesses. + </p> + <p> + If the intellectual faculties of man, or his moral qualities, be examined + according to the principles here laid down, the conviction must be + complete that they are to be attributed to material causes, which have an + influence more or less marked, either transitory or durable, over his + peculiar organization. But where does he derive this organization, except + it be from the parents from whom he receives the elements of a machine + necessarily analogous to their own? From whence does he derive the greater + or less quantity of igneous matter, or vivifying heat, that decides upon, + that gives the tone to his mental qualities? It is from the mother who + bore him in her womb, who has communicated to him a portion of that fire + with which she was herself animated, which circulated through her veins + with her blood;—it is from the aliments that have nourished him,—it + is from the climate he inhabits,—it is from the atmosphere that + surrounds: all these causes have an influence over his fluids, over his + solids, and decide on his natural dispositions. In examining these + dispositions, from whence his faculties depend, it will ever be found, + that they are <i>corporeal</i>, that they are <i>material</i>. + </p> + <p> + The most prominent of these dispositions in man, is that physical + sensibility from which flows all his intellectual or moral qualities. To + feel, according to what has been said, is to receive an impulse, to be + moved, to have a consciousness of the changes operated on his system. To + have sensibility is nothing more than to be so constituted as to feel + promptly, and in a very lively manner, the impressions of those objects + which act upon him. A sensible soul is only man's brain, disposed in a + mode to receive the motion communicated to it with facility, to re-act + with promptness, by giving an instantaneous impulse to the organs. Thus + the man is called sensible, whom the sight of the distressed, the + contemplation of the unhappy, the recital of a melancholy tale, the + witnessing of an afflicting catastrophe, or the idea of a dreadful + spectacle, touches in so lively a manner as to enable the brain to give + play to his lachrymal organs, which cause him to shed tears; a sign by + which we recognize the effect of great grief, of extreme anguish in the + human being. The man in whom musical sounds excite a degree of pleasure, + or produce very remarkable effects, is said to have a <i>sensible</i> or a + fine ear. In short, when it is perceived that eloquence—the beauty + of the arts—the various objects that strike his senses, excite in + him very lively emotions, he is said to possess a soul full of + sensibility. + </p> + <p> + <i>Wit</i>, is a consequence of this physical sensibility; indeed, wit is + nothing more than the facility which some beings, of the human species + possess, of seizing with promptitude, of developing with quickness, a + whole, with its different relations to other objects. <i>Genius</i>, is + the facility with which some men comprehend this whole, and its various + relations when they are difficult to be known, but useful to forward great + and mighty projects. Wit may be compared to a piercing eye which perceives + things quickly. Genius is an eye that comprehends at one view, all the + points of an extended horizon: or what the French term <i>coup d'oeil</i>. + True wit is that which perceives objects with their relations such as they + really are. False wit is that which catches at relations, which do not + apply to the object, or which arises from some blemish in the + organization. True wit resembles the direction on a hand-post. + </p> + <p> + <i>Imagination</i> is the faculty of combining with promptitude ideas or + images; it consists in the power man possesses of re-producing with ease + the modifications of his brain: of connecting them, of attaching them to + the objects to which they are suitable. When imagination does this, it + gives pleasure; its fictions are approved, it embellishes Nature, it is a + proof of the soundness of the mind, it aids truth: when on the contrary, + it combines ideas, not formed to associate themselves with each other—when + it paints nothing but disagreeable phantoms, it disgusts, its fictions are + censured, it distorts Nature, it advocates falsehood, it is the proof of a + disordered, of a deranged mind: thus poetry, calculated to render Nature + more pathetic, more touching, pleases when it creates ideal beings, but + which move us agreeably: we, therefore, forgive the illusions it has held + forth, on account of the pleasure we have reaped from them. The hideous + chimeras of superstition displease, because they are nothing more than the + productions of a distempered imagination, that can only awaken the most + afflicting sensations, fills us with the most disagreeable ideas. + </p> + <p> + Imagination, when it wanders, produces fanaticism, superstitious terrors, + inconsiderate zeal, phrenzy, and the most enormous crimes: when it is well + regulated, it gives birth to a strong predilection for useful objects, an + energetic passion for virtue, an enthusiastic love of our country, and the + most ardent friendship: the man who is divested of imagination, is + commonly one in whose torpid constitution phlegm predominates over the + igneous fluid, over that sacred fire, which is the great principle of his + mobility, of that warmth of sentiment, which vivifies all his intellectual + faculties. There must be enthusiasm for transcendent virtues as well as + for atrocious crimes; enthusiasm places the soul in a state similar to + that of drunkenness; both the one and the other excite in man that + rapidity of motion which is approved, when good results, when its effects + are beneficial; but which is censured, is called folly, delirium, crime, + fury; when it produces nothing but disorder and confusion. + </p> + <p> + The mind is out of order, it is incapable of judging sanely—the + imagination is badly regulated, whenever man's organization is not so + modified, as to perform its functions with precision. At each moment of + his existence, man gathers experience; every sensation he has, furnishes a + fact that deposits in his brain an idea which his memory recalls with more + or less fidelity: these facts connect themselves, these ideas are + associated; their chain constitutes <i>experience</i>; this lays the + foundation of <i>science</i>. Knowledge is that consciousness which arises + from reiterated experience—from experiments made with precision of + the sensations, of the ideas, of the effects which an object is capable of + producing, either in ourselves or in others. All science, to be just, must + be founded on truth. Truth itself rests on the constant, the faithful + relation of our senses. Thus, <i>truth</i> is that conformity, that + perpetual affinity, which man's senses, when well constituted, when aided + by experience, discover to him, between the objects of which he has a + knowledge, and the qualities with which he clothes them. In short, truth + is nothing more than the just, the precise association of his ideas. But + how can he, without experience, assure himself of the accuracy, of the + justness of this association? How, if he does not reiterate this + experience, can he compare it? how prove its truth? If his senses are + vitiated, how is it possible they can convey to him with precision, the + sensations, the facts, with which they store his brain? It is only by + multiplied, by diversified, by repeated experience, that he is enabled to + rectify the errors of his first conceptions. + </p> + <p> + Man is in error every time his organs, either originally defective in + their nature, or vitiated by the durable or transitory modifications which + they undergo, render him incapable of judging soundly of objects. Error + consists in the false association of ideas, by which qualities are + attributed to objects which they do not possess. Man is in error, when he + supposes those beings really to have existence, which have no local + habitation but in his own imagination: he is in error, when he associates + the idea of happiness with objects capable of injuring him, whether + immediately or by remote consequences which he cannot foresee. + </p> + <p> + But how can he foresee effects of which he has not yet any knowledge? It + is by the aid of experience: by the assistance which this experience + affords, it is known that analogous, that like causes, produce analogous, + produce like effects. Memory, by recalling these effects, enables him to + form a judgment of those he may expect, whether it be from the same + causes, or from causes that bear a relation to those of which he has + already experienced the action. From this it will appear, that <i>prudence</i>, + <i>foresight</i>, are faculties that are ascribable to, that grow out of + experience. If he has felt that fire excited in his organs painful + sensation, this experience suffices him to know, to foresee, that fire so + applied, will consequently excite the same sensations. If he has + discovered that certain actions, on his part, stirred up the hatred, + elicited the contempt of others, this experience sufficiently enables him + to foresee, that every time he shall act in a similar manner, he will be + either hated or despised. + </p> + <p> + The faculty man has of gathering experience, of recalling it to himself, + of foreseeing effects by which he is enabled to avoid whatever may have + the power to injure him, to procure that which may be useful to the + conservation of his existence, which may contribute to that which is the + sole end of all his actions, whether corporeal or mental,—his + felicity—constitutes that, which, in one word, is designated under + the name of <i>Reason</i>. Sentiment, imagination, temperament, may be + capable of leading him astray—may have the power to deceive him; but + experience and reflection will rectify his errors, point out his mistakes, + place him in the right road, teach him what can really conduce to, what + can truly conduct him to happiness. From this, it will appear, that <i>reason</i> + is man's nature, modified by experience, moulded by judgment, regulated by + reflection: it supposes a moderate, sober temperament; a just, a sound + mind; a well-regulated, orderly imagination; a knowledge of truth, + grounded upon tried, upon reiterated experience; in fact, prudence and + foresight: this will serve to prove, that although nothing is more + commonly asserted, although the phrase is repeated daily, nay, hourly, + that <i>man is a reasonable being</i>, yet there are but a very small + number of the individuals who compose the human species, of whom it can + with truth be said; who really enjoy the faculty of reason, or who combine + the dispositions, the experience, by which it is constituted. It ought + not, then to excite surprise, that the individuals of the human race, who + are in a capacity to make true experience, are so few in number. Man, when + he is born, brings with him into the world organs susceptible of receiving + impulse, amassing ideas, of collecting experience; but whether it be from + the vice of his system, the imperfection of his organization, or from + those causes by which it is modified, his experience is false, his ideas + are confused, his images are badly associated, his judgment is erroneous, + his brain is saturated with vicious, with wicked systems, which + necessarily have an influence over his conduct, which are continually + disturbing his mind, and confounding his reason. + </p> + <p> + Man's senses, as it has been shewn, are the only means by which he is + enabled to ascertain whether his opinions are true or false, whether his + conduct is useful to himself and beneficial to others, whether it is + advantageous or disadvantageous. But that his senses may be competent to + make a faithful relation—that they may be in a capacity to impress + true ideas on his brain, it is requisite they should be sound; that is to + say, in the state necessary to maintain his existence; in that order which + is suitable to his preservation—that condition which is calculated + to ensure his permanent felicity. It is also indispensable that his brain + itself should be healthy, or in the proper circumstances to enable it to + fulfil its functions with precision, to exercise its faculties with + vigour. It is necessary that memory should faithfully delineate its + anterior sensations, should accurately retrace its former ideas; to the + end, that he may be competent to judge, to foresee the effects he may have + to hope, the consequences he may have to fear, from those actions to which + he may be determined by his will. If his organic system be vicious, if his + interior or exterior organs be defective, whether by their natural + conformation or from those causes by which they are regulated, he feels + but imperfectly—in a manner less distinct than is requisite; his + ideas are either false or suspicious, he judges badly, he is in a + delusion, in a state of ebriety, in a sort of intoxication that prevents + his grasping the true relation of things. In short, if his memory is + faulty, if it is treacherous, his reflection is void, his imagination + leads him astray, his mind deceives him, whilst the sensibility of his + organs, simultaneously assailed by a crowd of impressions, shocked by a + variety of impulsions, oppose him to prudence, to foresight, to the + exercise of his reason. On the other hand, if the conformation of his + organs, as it happens with those of a phlegmatic temperament, of a dull + habit, does not permit him to move, except with feebleness, in a sluggish + manner, his experience is slow, frequently unprofitable. The tortoise and + the butterfly are alike incapable of preventing their destruction. The + stupid man, equally with him who is intoxicated, are in that state which + renders it impossible for them to arrive at or attain the end they have in + view. + </p> + <p> + But what is the end? What is the aim of man in the sphere he occupies? It + is to preserve himself; to render his existence happy. It becomes then of + the utmost importance, that he should understand the true means which + reason points out, which prudence teaches him to use, in order that he may + with certainty, that he may constantly arrive at the end which he proposes + to himself. These he will find are his natural faculties—his mind—his + talents—his industry—his actions, determined by those passions + of which his nature renders him susceptible, which give more or less + activity to his will. Experience and reason again shew him, that the men + with whom he is associated are necessary to him, are capable of + contributing to his happiness, are in a capacity to administer to his + pleasures, are competent to assist him by those faculties which are + peculiar to them; experience teaches him the mode he must adopt to induce + them to concur in his designs, to determine them to will and incline them + to act in his favour. This points out to him the actions they approve—those + which displease them—the conduct which attracts them—that + which repels them—the judgment by which they are swayed—the + advantages that occur—the prejudicial effects that result to him + from their various modes of existence and from their diverse manner of + acting. This experience furnishes him with the ideas of virtue and of + vice, of justice and of injustice, of goodness and of wickedness, of + decency and of indecency, of probity and of knavery: In short, he learns + to form a judgment of men—to estimate their actions—to + distinguish the various sentiments excited in them, according to the + diversity of those effects which they make him experience. It is upon the + necessary diversity of these effects that is founded the discrimination + between good and evil—between virtue and vice; distinctions which do + not rest, as some thinkers have believed, on the conventions made between + men; still less, as some metaphysicians have asserted, upon the chimerical + will of supernatural beings: but upon the solid, the invariable, the + eternal relations that subsist between beings of the human species + congregated together, and living in society: which relations will have + existence as long as man shall remain, as long as society shall continue + to exist. + </p> + <p> + Thus <i>virtue</i> is every thing that is truly beneficial, every thing + that is constantly useful to the individuals of the human race, living + together in society; <i>vice</i> every thing that is really prejudicial, + every thing that is permanently injurious to them. The greatest virtues + are those which procure for man the most durable advantages, from which he + derives the most solid happiness, which preserves the greatest degree of + order in his association: the greatest vices, are those which most disturb + his tendency to happiness, which perpetuate error, which most interrupt + the necessary order of society. + </p> + <p> + The <i>virtuous man</i>, is he whose actions tend uniformly to the + welfare, constantly to the happiness, of his fellow creatures. The <i>vicious + man</i>, is he whose conduct tends to the misery, whose propensities form + the unhappiness of those with whom he lives; from whence his own peculiar + misery most commonly results. + </p> + <p> + Every thing that procures for a man true and permanent happiness is + reasonable; every thing that disturbs his individual felicity, or that of + the beings necessary to his happiness, is foolish and unreasonable. The + man who injures others, is wicked; the man who injures himself, is an + imprudent being, who neither has a knowledge of reason, of his own + peculiar interests, nor of truth. + </p> + <p> + Man's <i>duties</i> are the means pointed out to him by experience, the + circle which reason describes for him, by which he is to arrive at that + goal he proposes to himself; these duties are the necessary consequence of + the relations subsisting between mortals, who equally desire happiness, + who are equally anxious to preserve their existence. When it is said these + duties <i>compel him</i>, it signifies nothing more than that, without + taking these means, he could not reach the end proposed to him by his + nature. Thus, <i>moral obligation</i> is the necessity of employing the + natural means to render the beings with whom he lives happy; to the end + that he may determine them in turn to contribute to his own individual + happiness: his obligation toward himself, is the necessity he is under to + take those means, without which he would be incapable to conserve himself, + or render his existence solidly and permanently happy. Morals, like the + universe, is founded upon necessity, or upon the eternal relation of + things. + </p> + <p> + <i>Happiness</i> is a mode of existence of which man naturally wishes the + duration, or in which he is willing to continue. It is measured by its + duration, by its vivacity. The greatest happiness is that which has the + longest continuance: transient happiness, or that which has only a short + duration, is called <i>Pleasure</i>; the more lively it is, the more + fugitive, because man's senses are only susceptible of a certain quantum + of motion. When pleasure exceeds this given quantity, it is changed into + <i>anguish</i>, or into that painful mode of existence, of which he + ardently desires the cessation: this is the reason why pleasure and pain + frequently so closely approximate each other as scarcely to be + discriminated. Immoderate pleasure is the forerunner of regret. It is + succeeded by ennui, it is followed by weariness, it ends in disgust: + transient happiness frequently converts itself into durable misfortune. + According to these principles it will be seen that man, who in each moment + of his duration seeks necessarily after happiness, ought, when he is + reasonable, to manage, to husband, to regulate his pleasures; to refuse + himself to all those of which the indulgence would be succeeded by regret; + to avoid those which can convert themselves into pain; in order that he + may procure for himself the most permanent felicity. + </p> + <p> + Happiness cannot be the same for all the beings of the human species; the + same pleasures cannot equally affect men whose conformation is different, + whose modification is diverse. This no doubt, is the true reason why the + greater number of moral philosophers are so little in accord upon those + objects in which they have made man's happiness consist, as well as on the + means by which it may be obtained. Nevertheless, in general, happiness + appears to be a state, whether momentary or durable, in which man readily + acquiesces, because he finds it conformable to his being. This state + results from the accord, springs out of the conformity, which is found + between himself and those circumstances in which he has been placed by + Nature; or, if it be preferred, <i>happiness is the co-ordination of man, + with the causes that give him impulse</i>. + </p> + <p> + The ideas which man forms to himself of happiness depend not only on his + temperament, on his individual conformation, but also upon the habits he + has contracted. <i>Habit</i> is, in man, a mode of existence—of + thinking—of acting, which his organs, as well interior as exterior, + contract, by the frequent reiteration of the same motion; from whence + results the faculty of performing these actions with promptitude, of + executing them with facility. + </p> + <p> + If things be attentively considered, it will be found that almost the + whole conduct of man—the entire system of his actions—his + occupations—his connexions—his studies—his amusements—his + manners—his customs—his very garments—even his aliments, + are the effect of habit. He owes equally to habit, the facility with which + he exercises his mental faculties of thought—of judgment—of + wit—of reason—of taste, &c. It is to habit he owes the + greater part of his inclinations—of his desires—of his + opinions—of his prejudices—of the ideas, true or false, he + forms to himself of his welfare. In short, it is to habit, consecrated by + time, that he owes those errors into which everything strives to + precipitate him; from which every thing is calculated to prevent him + emancipating himself. It is habit that attaches him either to virtue or to + vice: experience proves this: observation teaches incontrovertibly that + the first crime is always accompanied by more pangs of remorse than the + second; this again, by more than the third; so on to those that follow. A + first action is the commencement of a habit; those which succeed confirm + it: by force of combatting the obstacles that prevent the commission of + criminal actions, man arrives at the power of vanquishing them with ease; + of conquering them with facility. Thus he frequently becomes wicked from + habit. + </p> + <p> + Man is so much modified by habit, that it is frequently confounded with + his nature: from hence results, as will presently be seen, those opinions + or those ideas, which he has called <i>innate</i>: because he has been + unwilling to recur back to the source from whence they sprung: which has, + as it were, identified itself with his brain. However this may be, he + adheres with great strength of attachment to all those things to which he + is habituated; his mind experiences a sort of violence, an incommodious + revulsion, a troublesome distaste, when it is endeavoured to make him + change the course of his ideas: a fatal predilection frequently conducts + him back to the old track in despite of reason. + </p> + <p> + It is by a pure mechanism that may be explained the phenomena of habit, as + well physical as moral; the soul, notwithstanding its spirituality, is + modified exactly in the same manner as the body. Habit, in man, causes the + organs of voice to learn the mode of expressing quickly the ideas + consigned to his brain, by means of certain motion, which, during his + infancy, the tongue acquires the power of executing with facility: his + tongue, once habituated to move itself in a certain manner, finds much + trouble, has great pain, to move itself after another mode; the throat + yields with difficulty to those inflections which are exacted by a + language different from that to which he has, been accustomed. It is the + same with regard to his ideas; his brain, his interior organ, his soul, + inured to a given manner of modification, accustomed to attach certain + ideas to certain objects, long used to form to itself a system connected + with certain opinions, whether true or false, experiences a painful + sensation, whenever he undertakes to give it a new impulse, or alter the + direction of its habitual motion. It is nearly as difficult to make him + change his opinions as his language. + </p> + <p> + Here, then, without doubt, is the cause of that almost invincible + attachment which man displays to those customs—those prejudices—those + institutions of which it is in vain that reason, experience, good sense + prove to him the inutility, or even the danger. Habit opposes itself to + the clearest, the most evident demonstrations; these can avail nothing + against those passions, those vices, which time has rooted in him—against + the most ridiculous systems—against the most absurd notions—against + the most extravagant hypotheses—against the strangest customs: above + all, when he has learned to attach to them the ideas of utility, of common + interest, of the welfare of society. Such is the source of that obstinacy, + of that stubbornness, which man evinces for his religion, for ancient + usages, for unreasonable customs, for laws so little accordant with + justice, for abuses, which so frequently make him suffer, for prejudices + of which he sometimes acknowledges the absurdity, yet is unwilling to + divest himself of them. Here is the reason why nations contemplate the + most useful novelties as mischievous innovations—why they believe + they would be lost, if they were to remedy those evils to which they have + become habituated; which they have learned to consider as necessary to + their repose; which they have been taught to consider dangerous to be + cured. + </p> + <p> + <i>Education</i> is only the art of making man contract, in early life, + that is to say, when his organs are extremely flexible, the habits, the + opinions, the modes of existence, adopted by the society in which he is + placed. The first moments of his infancy are employed in collecting + experience; those who are charged with the care of rearing him, or who are + entrusted to bring him up, teach him how to apply it: it is they who + develope reason in him: the first impulse they give him commonly decides + upon his condition, upon his passions, upon the ideas he forms to himself + of happiness, upon the means he shall employ to procure it, upon his + virtues, and upon his vices. Under the eyes of his masters, the infant + acquires ideas: under their tuition he learns to associate them,—to + think in a certain manner,—to judge well or ill. They point out to + him various objects, which they accustom him either to love or to hate, to + desire or to avoid, to esteem or to despise. It is thus opinions are + transmitted from fathers, mothers, nurses, and masters, to man in his + infantine state. It is thus, that his mind by degrees saturates itself + with truth, or fills itself with error; after which he regulates his + conduct, which renders him either happy or miserable, virtuous or vicious, + estimable or hateful. It is thus he becomes either contented or + discontented with his destiny, according to the objects towards which they + have directed his passions—towards which they have bent the energies + of his mind; that is to say, in which they have shewn him his interest, in + which they have taught him to place his felicity: in consequence, he loves + and searches after that which they have taught him to revere—that + which they have made the object of his research; he has those tastes, + those inclinations, those phantasms, which, during the whole course of his + life, he is forward to indulge, which he is eager to satisfy, in + proportion to the activity they have excited in him, and the capacity with + which he has been provided by Nature. + </p> + <p> + <i>Politics</i> ought to be the art of regulating the passions of man—of + directing them to the welfare of society—of diverting them into a + genial current of happiness—of making them flow gently to the + general benefit of all: but too frequently it is nothing more than the + detestible art of arming the passions of the various members of society + against each other,—of making them the engines to accomplish their + mutual destruction,—of converting them into agents which embitter + their existence, create jealousies among them, and fill with rancorous + animosities that association from which, if properly managed, man ought to + derive his felicity. Society is commonly so vicious because it is not + founded upon Nature, upon experience, and upon general utility; but on the + contrary, upon the passions, upon the caprices, and upon the particular + interests of those by whom it is governed. In short, it is for the most + part the advantage of the few opposed to the prosperity of the many. + </p> + <p> + Politics, to be useful, should found its principles upon Nature; that is + to say, should conform itself to the essence of man, should mould itself + to the great end of society: but what is society? and what is its end? It + is a whole, formed by the union of a great number of families, or by a + collection of individuals, assembled from a reciprocity of interest, in + order that they may satisfy with greater facility their reciprocal wants—that + they may, with more certainty, procure the advantages they desire—that + they may obtain mutual succours—above all, that they may gain the + faculty of enjoying, in security, those benefits with which Nature and + industry may furnish them: it follows, of course, that politics, which are + intended to maintain society, and to consolidate the interests of this + congregation, ought to enter into its views, to facilitate the means of + giving them efficiency, to remove all those obstacles that have a tendency + to counteract the intention with which man entered into association. + </p> + <p> + Man, in approximating to his fellow man, to live with him in society, has + made, either formally or tacitly, a covenant; by which he engages to + render mutual services, to do nothing that can be prejudicial to his + neighbour. But as the nature of each individual impels him each instant to + seek after his own welfare, which he has mistaken to consist in the + gratification of his passions, and the indulgence of his transitory + caprices, without any regard to the convenience of his fellows; there + needed a power to conduct him back to his duty, to oblige him to conform + himself to his obligations, and to recall him to his engagements, which + the hurry of his passions frequently make him forget. This power is the <i>law</i>; + it is, or ought to be, the collection of the will of society, reunited to + fix the conduct of its members, to direct their action in such a mode, + that it may concur to the great end of his association—the general + good. + </p> + <p> + But as society, more especially when very numerous, is incapable of + assembling itself, unless with great difficulty, as it cannot with tumult + make known its intentions, it is obliged to choose citizens in whom it + places a confidence, whom it makes the interpreter of its will, whom it + constitutes the depositaries of the power requisite to carry it into + execution. Such is the origin of all <i>government</i>, which to be + legitimate can only be founded on the free consent of society. Those who + are charged with the care of governing, call themselves sovereigns, + chiefs, legislators: according to the form which society has been willing + to give to its government: these sovereigns are styled monarchs, + magistrates, representatives, &c. Government only borrows its power + from society: being established for no other purpose than its welfare, it + is evident society can revoke this power whenever its interest shall exact + it; change the form of its government; extend or limit the power which it + has confided to its chiefs, over whom, by the immutable laws of Nature, it + always conserves a supreme authority: because these laws enjoin, that the + part shall always remain subordinate to the whole. + </p> + <p> + Thus sovereigns are the ministers of society, its interpreters, the + depositaries of a greater or of a less portion of its power; but they are + not its absolute masters, neither are they the proprietors of nations. By + a <i>covenant</i>, either expressed or implied, they engage themselves to + watch over the maintenance, to occupy themselves with the welfare of + society; it is only upon these conditions society consents to obey them. + The price of obedience is protection. There is or ought to be a + reciprocity of interest between the governed and the governor: whenever + this reciprocity is wanting, society is in that state of confusion of + which we spoke in the fifth chapter: it is verging on destruction. No + society upon earth was ever willing or competent to confer irrevocably + upon its chiefs the power, the right, of doing it injury. Such a + concession, such a compact, would be annulled, would be rendered void by + Nature; because she wills that each society, the same as each individual + of the human species shall tend to its own conservation; it has not + therefore the capacity to consent to its permanent unhappiness. <i>Laws</i>, + in order that they may be just, ought invariably to have for their end, + the general interest of society; that is to say, to assure to the greater + number of citizens those advantages for which man originally associated. + These advantages are <i>liberty, property, security</i>. + </p> + <p> + <i>Liberty</i>, to man, is the faculty of doing, for his own peculiar + happiness, every thing which does not injure or diminish the happiness of + his associates: in associating, each individual renounced the exercise of + that portion of his natural liberty which would be able to prejudice or + injure the liberty of his fellows. The exercise of that liberty which is + injurious to society is called <i>licentiousness</i>. + </p> + <p> + <i>Property</i>, to man, is the faculty of enjoying those advantages which + spring from labour; those benefits which industry or talent has procured + to each member of society. + </p> + <p> + <i>Security</i>, to man, is the certitude, the assurance, that each + individual ought to have, of enjoying in his person, of finding for his + property the protection of the laws, as long as he shall faithfully + observe, as long as he shall punctually perform, his engagements with + society. + </p> + <p> + <i>Justice</i>, to man, assures to all the members of society, the + possession of these advantages, the enjoyment of those rights, which + belong to them. From this, it will appear, that without justice, society + is not in a condition to procure the happiness of any man. Justice is also + called <i>equity</i>, because by the assistance of the laws made to + command the whole, she reduces all its members to a state of equality; + that is to say, she prevents them from prevailing one over the other, by + the inequality which Nature or industry may have made between their + respective powers. + </p> + <p> + <i>Rights</i>, to man, are every thing which society, by equitable laws, + permits each individual to do for his own peculiar felicity. These rights + are evidently limited by the invariable end of all association: society + has, on its part, rights over all its members, by virtue of the advantages + which it procures for them; all its members, in turn, have a right to + claim, to exact from society, or secure from its ministers those + advantages for the procuring of which they congregated, in favour of which + they renounced a portion of their natural liberty. A society, of which the + chiefs, aided by the laws, do not procure any good for its members, + evidently loses its right over them: those chiefs who injure society lose + the right of commanding. It is not our country, without it secures the + welfare of its inhabitants; a society without equity contains only + enemies; a society oppressed is composed only of tyrants and slaves; + slaves are incapable of being citizens; it is liberty, property, and + security, that render our country dear to us; it is the true love of his + country that forms the citizen. + </p> + <p> + For want of having a proper knowledge of these truths, or for want of + applying them when known, some nations have become unhappy—have + contained nothing but a vile heap of slaves, separated from each other, + detached from society, which neither procures for them any good, nor + secures to them any one advantage. In consequence of the imprudence of + some nations, or of the craft, cunning, and violence of those to whom they + have confided the power of making laws, and carrying them into execution, + their sovereigns have rendered themselves absolute masters of society. + These, mistaking the true source of their power, pretended to hold it from + heaven, to be accountable for their actions to God alone, to owe nothing, + not to have any obligation to society, in a word, to be gods upon earth, + to possess the right of governing arbitrarily. From thence politics became + corrupted: they were only a mockery. Such nations, disgraced and grown + contemptible, did not dare resist the will of their chiefs; their laws + were nothing more than the expression of the caprice of these chiefs; + public welfare was sacrificed to their peculiar interests; the force of + society was turned against itself; its members withdrew to attach + themselves to its oppressors, to its tyrants; these to seduce them, + permitted them to injure it with impunity and to profit by its + misfortunes. Thus liberty, justice, security, and virtue, were banished + from many nations; politics was no longer any thing more than the art of + availing itself of the forces of a people and of the treasure of society; + of dividing it on the subject of its interest, in order to subjugate it by + itself; at length a stupid, a mechanical habit, made them cherish their + oppressors, and love their chains. + </p> + <p> + Man when he has nothing to fear, presently becomes wicked; he who believes + he has not occasion for his fellow, persuades himself he may follow the + inclinations of his heart without caution or discretion. Thus fear is the + only obstacle society can effectually oppose to the passions of its + chiefs; without it they will quickly become corrupt, and will not scruple + to avail themselves of the means society has placed in their hands, to + make them accomplices in their iniquity. To prevent these abuses, it is + requisite society should set bounds to its confidence; should limit the + power which it delegates to its chiefs; should reserve to itself a + sufficient portion of authority to prevent them from injuring it; it must + establish prudent checks: it must cautiously divide the power it confers, + because re-united, it will by such reunion be infallibly oppressed. The + slightest reflection, the most scanty review, will make men feel that the + burthen of governing and weight of administration, is too ponderous and + overpowering to be borne by an individual; that the scope of his + jurisdiction, that the range of his surveillance, and multiplicity of his + duties must always render him negligent; that the extent of his power has + ever a tendency to render him mischievous. In short, the experience of all + ages will convince nations that man is continually tempted to the abuse of + power: that as an abundance of strong liquor intoxicates his brain, so + unlimited power corrupts his heart; that therefore the sovereign ought to + be subject to the law, not the law to the sovereign. + </p> + <p> + <i>Government</i> has necessarily an equal influence over the philosophy, + as over the morals of nations. In the same manner that its care produces + labour, activity, abundance, salubrity and justice; its negligence induces + idleness, sloth, discouragement, penury, contagion, injustice, vices and + crimes. It depends upon government either to foster industry, mature + genius, give a spring to talents, or stifle them. Indeed government, the + disturber of dignities, of riches, of rewards, and punishments; the master + of those objects in which man from his infancy has learned to place his + felicity, and contemplate as the means of his happiness; acquires a + necessary influence over his conduct: it kindles his passions; gives them + direction; makes him instrumental to whatever purpose it pleases; it + modifies him; determines his manners; which in a whole people, as in the + individual, is nothing more than the conduct, the general system of wills, + of actions that necessarily result from his education, government, laws, + and religious opinions—his institutions, whether rational or + irrational. In short, manners are the habits of a people: these are good + whenever society draws from them true felicity and solid happiness; they + are bad, they are detestable in the eye of reason, when the happiness of + society does not spring from them; they are unwholesome when they have + nothing more in their favour than the suffrage of time, and the + countenance of prejudice which rarely consults experience, which is almost + ever at variance with good sense: notwithstanding they may have the + sanction of the law, custom, religion, public opinion, or example, they + may be unworthy and may be disgraceful, provided society is in disorder; + that crime abounds; that virtue shrinks beneath the basilisk eye of + triumphant vice; they may then be said to resemble the UPAS, whose + luxuriant yet poisonous foliage, the produce of a rank soil, becomes more + baneful to those who are submitted to its vortex, in proportion as it + extends its branches. If experience he consulted, it will be found there + is no action, however abominable, that has not received the applause, that + has not obtained the approbation of some people. Parricide, the sacrifice + of children, robbery, usurpation, cruelty, intolerance, and prostitution, + have all in their turn been licensed actions; have been advocated; have + been deemed laudable and meritorious deeds with some nations of the earth. + Above all, <i>superstition</i> has consecrated the most unreasonable, the + most revolting customs. + </p> + <p> + Man's passions result from and depend on the motion of attraction or + repulsion, of which he is rendered susceptible by Nature; who enables him, + by his peculiar essence, to be attracted by those objects which appear + useful to him, to be repelled by those which he considers prejudicial; it + follows that government, by holding the magnet, can put these passions + into activity, has the power either of restraining them, or of giving them + a favorable or an unfavorable direction. All his passions are constantly + limited by either loving or hating, seeking or avoiding, desiring or + fearing. These passions, so necessary to the conservation of man, are a + consequence of his organization; they display themselves with more or less + energy, according to his temperament; education and habit develope them; + government gives them play, conducts them towards those objects, which it + believes itself interested in making desirable to its subjects. The + various names which have been given to these passions, are relative to the + different objects by which they are excited, such as pleasure, grandeur, + or riches, which produce voluptuousness, ambition, vanity and avarice. If + the source of those passions which predominate in nations be attentively + examined it will be commonly found in their governments. It is the impulse + received from their chiefs that renders them sometimes warlike, sometimes + superstitious, sometimes aspiring after glory, sometimes greedy after + wealth, sometimes rational, and sometimes unreasonable; if sovereigns, in + order to enlighten and render happy their dominions, were to employ only + the <i>tenth</i> part of the vast expenditures which they lavish, only a + <i>tythe</i> of the pains which they employ to render them brutish, to + stupify them, to deceive them, and to afflict them; their subjects would + presently be as wise, would quickly be as happy, as they are now + remarkable for being blind, ignorant, and miserable. + </p> + <p> + Let the vain project of destroying, the delusive attempt at rooting his + passions from the heart of man, he abandoned; let an effort be made to + direct them towards objects that may be useful to himself, beneficial to + his associates. Let education, let government, let the laws, habituate him + to restrain his passions within those just bounds that experience fixes + and reason prescribes. Let the ambitious have honours, titles, + distinctions, and power, when they shall have usefully served their + country; let riches be given to those who covet them, when they shall have + rendered themselves necessary to their fellow citizens; let commendations, + let eulogies, encourage those who shall be actuated by the love of glory. + In short, let the passions of man have a free, an uninterrupted course, + whenever there shall result from their exercise, real, substantial, and + durable advantages to society. Let education kindle only those, which are + truly beneficial to the human species; let it favour those alone which are + really necessary to the maintenance of society. The passions of man are + dangerous, only because every thing conspires to give them an evil + direction. + </p> + <p> + Nature does not make man either good or wicked: she combines machines more + or less active, mobile, and energetic; she furnishes him with organs and + temperament, of which his passions, more or less impetuous, are the + necessary consequence; these passions have always his happiness for their + object, his welfare for their end: in consequence they are legitimate, + they are natural, they can only be called bad or good, relatively, to the + influence they have on the beings of his species. Nature gives man legs + proper to sustain his weight, and necessary to transport him from one + place to another; the care of those who rear them strengthens them, + habituates him to avail himself of him, accustoms him to make either a + good or a bad use of them. The arm which he has received from Nature is + neither good nor bad; it is necessary to a great number of the actions of + life; nevertheless, the use of this arm becomes criminal, if he has + contracted the habit of using it to rob, to assassinate, with a view to + obtain that money which he has been taught from his infancy to desire, and + which the society in which he lives renders necessary to him, but which + his industry will enable him to obtain without doing injury to his fellow + man. + </p> + <p> + The heart of man is a soil which Nature has made equally suitable to the + production of brambles, or of useful grain—of deleterous poison, or + of refreshing fruit, by virtue of the seeds which may be sown in it—by + the cultivation that may be bestowed upon it, In his infancy, those + objects are pointed out to him which he is to estimate or to despise, to + seek after or to avoid, to love or to hate. It is his parents, his + instructors, who render him either virtuous or wicked, wise or + unreasonable, studious or dissipated, steady or trifling, solid or vain. + Their example, their discourse, modify him through his whole life, + teaching him what are the things he ought either to desire or to avoid; + what the objects he ought to fear or to love: he desires them, in + consequence; and he imposes on himself the task of obtaining them, + according to the energy of his temperament, which ever decides the force + of his passions. It is thus that education, by inspiring him with + opinions, by infusing into him ideas, whether true or false, gives him + those primitive impulsions after which he acts, in a manner either + advantageous or prejudicial both to himself and to others. Man, at his + birth, brings with him into the world nothing but the necessity of + conserving himself, of rendering his existence happy: instruction, + example, the customs of the world, present him with the means, either real + or imaginary, of achieving it; habit procures for him the facility of + employing these means: he attaches himself strongly to those he judges + best calculated, most proper to secure to him the possession of those + objects which they have taught him, which he has learned to desire as the + preferable good attached to his existence. Whenever his education—whenever + the examples which have been afforded him—whenever the means with + which he has been provided, are approved by reason, are the result of + experience, every thing concurs to render him virtuous; habit strengthens + these dispositions in him; he becomes, in consequence, a useful member of + society; to the interests of which, every thing ought to prove to him his + own permanent well-being, his own durable felicity, is necessarily allied. + If, on the contrary, his education—his institutions—the + examples which are set before him—the opinions which are suggested + to him in his infancy, are of a nature to exhibit to his mind virtue as + useless and repugnant—vice as useful and congenial to his own + individual happiness, he will become vicious; he will believe himself + interested in injuring society, in rendering his associates unhappy; he + will be carried along by the general current: he will renounce virtue, + which to him will no longer be any thing more than a vain idol, without + attractions to induce him to follow it; without charms to tempt his + adoration; because it will appear to exact, that he should immolate at its + shrine, that he should sacrifice at its altar all those objects which he + has been constantly taught to consider the most dear to himself; to + contemplate as benefits the most desirable. + </p> + <p> + In order that man may become virtuous, it is absolutely requisite that he + should have an interest, that he should find advantages in practising + virtue. For this end, it is necessary that education should implant in him + reasonable ideas; that public opinion should lean towards virtue, as the + most desirable good; that example should point it out as the object most + worthy esteem; that government should faithfully recompense, should + regularly reward it; that honor should always accompany its practice; that + vice should constantly be despised; that crime should invariably be + punished. Is virtue in this situation amongst men? does the education of + man infuse into him just, faithful ideas of happiness—true notions + of virtue—dispositions really favourable to the beings with whom he + is to live? The examples spread before him, are they suitable to innocence + and manners? are they calculated to make him respect decency—to + cause him to love probity—to practice honesty—to value good + faith—to esteem equity—to revere conjugal fidelity—to + observe exactitude in fulfilling his duties? Religion, which alone + pretends to regulate his manners, does it render him sociable—does + it make him pacific—does it teach him to be humane? The arbiters, + the sovereigns of society, are they faithful in recompensing, punctual in + rewarding, those who have best served their country? in punishing those + who have pillaged, who have robbed, who have plundered, who have divided, + who have ruined it? Justice, does she hold her scales with a firm, with an + even hand, between all the citizens of the state? The laws, do they never + support the strong against the weak—favor the rich against the poor—uphold + the happy against the miserable? In short, is it an uncommon spectacle to + behold crime frequently justified, often applauded, sometimes crowned with + success, insolently triumphing, arrogantly striding over that merit which + it disdains, over that virtue which it outrages? Well then, in societies + thus constituted, virtue can only be heard by a very small number of + peaceable citizens, a few generous souls, who know how to estimate its + value, who enjoy it in secret. For the others, it is only a disgusting + object; they see in it nothing but the supposed enemy to their happiness, + or the censor of their individual conduct. + </p> + <p> + If man, according to his nature, is necessitated to desire his welfare, he + is equally obliged to love and cherish the means by which he believes it + is to be acquired: it would be useless, it would perhaps be unjust, to + demand that a man should be virtuous, if he could not be so without + rendering himself miserable. Whenever he thinks vice renders him happy, he + must necessarily love vice; whenever he sees inutility recompensed, crime + rewarded—whenever he witnesses either or both of them honored,—what + interest will he find in occupying himself with the happiness of his + fellow-creatures? what advantage will he discover in restraining the fury + of his passions? Whenever his mind is saturated with false ideas, filled + with dangerous opinions, it follows, of course, that his whole conduct + will become nothing more than a long chain of errors, a tissue of + mistakes, a series of depraved actions. + </p> + <p> + We are informed, that the savages, in order to flatten the heads of their + children, squeeze them between two boards, by that means preventing them + from taking the shape designed for them by Nature. It is pretty nearly the + same thing with the institutions of man; they commonly conspire to + counteract Nature, to constrain and divert, to extinguish the impulse + Nature has given him, to substitute others which are the source of all his + misfortunes. In almost all the countries of the earth, man is bereft of + truth, is fed with falsehoods, and amused with marvellous chimeras: he is + treated like those children whose members are, by the imprudent care of + their nurses, swathed with little fillets, bound up with rollers, which + deprive them of the free use of their limbs, obstruct their growth, + prevent their activity, and oppose themselves to their health. + </p> + <p> + Most of the superstitious opinions of man have for their object only to + display to him his supreme felicity in those illusions for which they + kindle his passions: but as the phantoms which are presented to his + imagination are incapable of being considered in the same light by all who + contemplate them, he is perpetually in dispute concerning these objects; + he hates his fellow, he persecutes his neighbour, his neighbour in turn + persecutes him, and he believes that in doing this he is doing well: that + in committing the greatest crimes to sustain his opinions he is acting + right. It is thus superstition infatuates man from his infancy, fills him + with vanity, and enslaves him with fanaticism: if he has a heated + imagination, it drives him on to fury; if he has activity, it makes him a + madman, who is frequently as cruel himself, as he is dangerous to his + fellow-creatures, as he is incommodious to others: if, on the contrary, he + be phlegmatic, and of a slothful habit, he becomes melancholy and useless + to society. + </p> + <p> + <i>Public opinion</i> every instant offers to man's contemplation false + ideas of honor, and wrong notions of glory: it attaches his esteem not + only to frivolous advantages, but also to prejudicial interests and + injurious actions; which example authorizes, which prejudice consecrates, + which habit precludes him from viewing with the disgust and horror which + they merit. Indeed, habit familiarizes his mind with the most absurd + ideas, the most unreasonable customs, the most blameable actions; with + prejudices the most contrary to his own interests, and detrimental to the + society in which he lives. He finds nothing strange, nothing singular, + nothing despicable, nothing ridiculous, except those opinions and objects + to which he is himself unaccustomed. There are countries in which the most + laudable actions appear very blameable and ridiculous—where the + foulest and most diabolical actions pass for very honest and perfectly + rational conduct. In some nations they kill the old men; in some the + children strangle their fathers. The Phoenicians and Carthaginians + immolated their children to their gods. Europeans approve duels; he who + refuses to cut the throat of another, or to blow out the brains of his + neighbour, is contemplated by them as dishonoured. The Spaniards and + Portuguese think it meritorious to burn an heretic. In some countries + women prostitute themselves without dishonour; in others it is the height + of hospitality for a man to present his wife to the embraces of the + stranger: the refusal to accept this, excites his scorn and calls forth + his resentment. + </p> + <p> + <i>Authority</i> commonly believes itself interested in maintaining the + received opinions: those prejudices and errors which it considers + requisite to the maintenance of its power and the consolidation of its + interests, are sustained by force, which is never rational. Princes + themselves, filled with deceptive images of happiness, mistaken notions of + power, erroneous opinions of grandeur, and false ideas of glory, are + surrounded with flattering courtiers, who are interested in keeping up the + delusion of their masters: these contemptible men have acquired ideas of + virtue, only that they may outrage it: by degrees they corrupt the people, + these become depraved, lend themselves to their debaucheries, pander to + the vices of the great, then make a merit of imitating them in their + irregularities. A court is too frequently the true focus of the corruption + of a people. + </p> + <p> + This is the true source of moral evil. It is thus that every thing + conspires to render man vicious, and give a fatal impulse to his soul: + from whence results the general confusion of society, which becomes + unhappy, from the misery of almost every one of its members. The strongest + motive-powers are put in action to inspire man with a passion for futile + objects which are indifferent to him; which make him become dangerous to + his fellow man, by the means which he is compelled to employ, in order to + obtain them. Those who have the charge of guiding his steps, either + impostors themselves, or the dupes to their own prejudices, forbid him to + hearken to reason; they make truth appear dangerous to him; they exhibit + error as requisite to his welfare, not only in this world, but in the + next. In short, habit strongly attaches him to his irrational opinions, to + his perilous inclinations, and to his blind passion for objects either + useless or dangerous. Here, then, is the reason why for the most part man + finds himself necessarily determined to evil; the reason why the passions, + inherent in his Nature and necessary to his conservation, become the + instruments of his destruction, and the bane of that society, which + properly conducted, they ought to preserve; the reason why society becomes + a state of warfare; why it does nothing but assemble enemies, who are + envious of each other, and are always rivals for the prize. If some + virtuous beings are to be found in these societies, they must be sought + for in the very small number of those, who born with a phlegmatic + temperament have moderate passions, who therefore, either do not desire at + all, or desire very feebly, those objects with which their associates are + continually inebriated. + </p> + <p> + Man's nature, diversely cultivated, decides upon his faculties, as well + corporeal as intellectual; upon his qualities, as well moral as physical. + The man who is of a sanguine, robust constitution, must necessarily have + strong passions; he who is of a bilious, melancholy habit, will as + necessarily have fantastical and gloomy passions; the man of a gay turn, + of a sprightly imagination, will have cheerful passions; while the man in + whom phlegm abounds, will have those which are gentle, or which have a + very slight degree of violence. It appears to be upon the equilibrium of + the humours, that depends the state of the man who is called <i>virtuous</i>; + his temperament seems to be the result of a combination, in which the + elements or principles are balanced with such precision that no one + passion predominates over another, or carries into his machine more + disorder than its neighbour. + </p> + <p> + Habit, as we have seen, is man's nature modified: this latter furnishes + the matter; education, domestic example, national manners, give it the + form: these, acting on his temperament, make him either reasonable, or + irrational—enlightened, or stupid—a fanatic, or a hero—an + enthusiast for the public good, or an unbridled criminal—a wise man, + smitten with the advantages of virtue, or a libertine, plunged into every + kind of vice. All the varieties of the moral man, depend on the diversity + of his ideas; which are themselves arranged and combined in his brain by + the intervention of his senses. His temperament is the produce of physical + substances, his habits are the effect of physical modifications; the + opinions, whether good or bad, injurious or beneficial, true or false, + which form themselves in his mind, are never more than the effect of those + physical impulsions which the brain receives by the medium of the senses. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0017" id="link2H_4_0017"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + CHAP. X. + </h2> + <p> + <i>The Soul does not derive its ideas from itself—It has no innate + Ideas.</i> + </p> + <p> + What has preceded suffices to prove, that the interior organ of man, which + is called his <i>soul</i>, is purely material. He will be enabled to + convince himself of this truth, by the manner in which he acquires his + ideas,—from those impressions which material objects successively + make on his organs, which are themselves acknowledged to be material. It + has been seen, that the faculties which are called intellectual, are to be + ascribed to that of feeling; the different qualities of those faculties + which are called moral, have been explained after the necessary laws of a + very simple mechanism: it now remains, to reply to those who still + obstinately persist in making the soul a substance distinguished from the + body, or who insist on giving it an essence totally distinct. They seem to + found their distinction upon this, that this interior organ has the + faculty of drawing its ideas from within itself; they will have it, that + man, at his birth, brings with him ideas into the world, which, according + to this wonderful notion, they have called <i>innate</i>. The Jews have a + similar doctrine which they borrowed from the Chaldeans: their rabbins + taught, that each soul, before it was united to the seed that must form an + infant in the womb of a woman, is confided to the care of an angel, which + causes him to behold heaven, earth, and hell: this, they pretend, is done + by the assistance of a lamp, which extinguishes itself as soon as the + infant comes into the world. Some ancient philosophers have held, that the + soul originally contains the principles of several notions or doctrines: + the Stoics designated this by the term PROLEPSIS, <i>anticipated opinions</i>; + the Greek mathematicians, KOINAS ENNOIAS, <i>universal ideas</i>. They + have believed that the soul, by a special privilege, in a nature where + every thing is connected, enjoyed the faculty of moving itself without + receiving any impulse; of creating to itself ideas, of thinking on a + subject, without being determined to such action, by any exterior object; + which by moving its organs should furnish it with an image of the subject + of its thoughts. In consequence of these gratuitous suppositions, of these + extraordinary pretensions, which it is only requisite to expose, in order + to confute some very able speculators, who were prepossessed by their + superstitious prejudices; have ventured the length to assert, that without + model, without prototype to act on the senses, the soul is competent to + delineate to itself, the whole universe with all the beings it contains. + DESCARTES and his disciples have assured us, that the body went absolutely + for nothing, in the sensations, in the perceptions, in the ideas of the + soul; that it can feel, that it can perceive, that it can understand, that + it can taste, that it can touch, even when there should exist nothing that + is corporeal or material exterior to ourselves. But what shall be said of + a BERKELEY, who has endeavoured, who has laboured to prove to man, that + every thing in this world is nothing more than a chimerical illusion; that + the universe exists nowhere but in himself; that it has no identity but in + his imagination; who has rendered the existence of all things + problematical by the aid of sophisms, insolvable even to those who + maintain the doctrine of the spirituality of the soul. + </p> + <p> + Extravagant as this doctrine of the BISHOP OF CLOYNE may appear, it cannot + well be more so than that of MALEBRANCHE, the champion of innate ideas; + who makes the divinity the common bond between the soul and the body: or + than that of those metaphysicians, who maintain that the soul is a + substance heterogeneous to the body; who by ascribing to this soul the + thoughts of man, have in fact rendered the body superfluous. They have not + perceived they were liable to one solid objection, which is, that if the + ideas of man are innate, if he derives them from a superior being, + independent of exterior causes, if he sees every thing in God; how comes + it that so many false ideas are afloat, that so many errors prevail, with + which the human mind is saturated? From whence comes these opinions, which + according to the theologians are so displeasing to God? Might it not be a + question to the Malebranchists, was it in the Divinity that SPINOZA beheld + his system? + </p> + <p> + Nevertheless, to justify such monstrous opinions, they assert that ideas + are only the objects of thought. But according to the last analysis, these + ideas can only reach man from exterior objects, which in giving impulse to + his senses modify his brain; or from the material beings contained within + the interior of his machine, who make some parts of his body experience + those sensations which he perceives, which furnish him with ideas, which + he relates, faithfully or otherwise, to the cause that moves him. Each + idea is an effect, but however difficult it may be to recur to the cause, + can we possibly suppose it is not ascribable to a cause? If we can only + form ideas of material substances, how can we suppose the cause of our + ideas can possibly be immaterial? To pretend that man without the aid of + exterior objects, without the intervention of his senses, is competent to + form ideas of the universe, is to assert, that a blind man is in a + capacity to form a true idea of a picture, that represents some fact of + which he has never heard any one speak. + </p> + <p> + It is very easy to perceive the source of those errors, into which men, + otherwise extremely profound and very enlightened have fallen, when they + have been desirous to speak of the soul: to describe its operations. + Obliged either by their own prejudices, or by the fear of combatting the + opinions of some imperious theologian, they have become the advocates of + the principle, that the soul was a pure spirit: an immaterial substance; + of an essence directly different from that of the body; from every thing + we behold: this granted, they have been incompetent to conceive how + material objects could operate, in what manner gross and corporeal organs + were enabled to act on a substance, that had no kind of analogy with them; + how they were in a capacity to modify it by conveying its ideas; in the + impossibility of explaining this phenomenon, at the same time perceiving + that the soul had ideas, they concluded that it must draw them from + itself, and not from those beings, which according to their own + hypothesis, were incapable of acting on it, or rather, of which they could + not conceive the manner of action; they therefore imagined that all the + modifications, all the actions of this soul, sprung from its own peculiar + energy, were imprinted on it from its first formation, by the Author of + Nature: that these did not in any manner depend upon the beings of which + we have a knowledge, or which act upon it, by the gross means of our + senses. + </p> + <p> + There are, however, some phenomena, which, considered superficially, + appear to support the opinion of these philosophers; to announce a faculty + in the human soul of producing ideas within itself, without any exterior + aid; these are <i>dreams</i>, in which the interior organ of man, deprived + of objects that move it visibly, does not, however, cease to have ideas—to + be set in activity—to be modified in a manner that is sufficiently + sensible—to have an influence upon his body. But if a little + reflection be called in, the solution to this difficulty will be found: it + will be perceived that, even during sleep, his brain is supplied with a + multitude of ideas, with which the eye or time before has stocked it; + these ideas were communicated to it by exterior or corporeal objects, by + which they have been modified: it will be found that these modifications + renew themselves, not by any spontaneous, not by any voluntary motion on + its part, but by a chain of involuntary movements which take place in his + machine, which determine, which excite those that give play to the brain; + these modifications renew themselves with more or less fidelity, with a + greater or lesser degree of conformity to those which it has anteriorly + experienced. Sometimes in dreaming, he has memory, then he retraces to + himself the objects which have struck him faithfully;—at other + times, these modifications renew themselves without order, and without + connection, very differently from those, which real objects have before + excited in his interior organ. If in a dream he believes he sees a friend, + his brain renews in itself the modifications or the ideas which this + friend had formerly excited—in the same order that they arranged + themselves when his eyes really beheld him—this is nothing more than + an effect of memory. If in his dream he fancies he sees a monster which + has no model in nature, his brain is then modified in the same manner that + it was by the particular, by the detached ideas, with which it then does + nothing more than compose an ideal whole; by assembling, and associating, + in a ridiculous manner, the scattered ideas that were consigned to its + keeping; it is then, that in dreaming he has imagination. + </p> + <p> + Those dreams that are troublesome, extravagant, whimsical, or unconnected, + are commonly the effect of some confusion in his machine; such as painful + indigestion—an overheated blood—a prejudicial fermentation, + &c.—these material causes excite in his body a disorderly + motion, which precludes the brain from being modified in the same manner + it was on the day before; in consequence of this irregular motion the + brain is disturbed, it only represents to itself confused ideas that want + connection. When in a dream, he believes he sees a Sphinx, a being + supposed by the poets to have a head and face like a woman, a body like a + dog, wings like a bird, and claws like a lion, who put forth riddles and + killed those who could not expound them; either, he has seen the + representation of one when he was awake, or else the disorderly motion of + the brain is such that it causes it to combine ideas, to connect parts, + from which there results a whole without model, of which the parts were + not formed to be united. It is thus, that his brain combines the head of a + woman, of which it already has the idea, with the body of a lioness, of + which it also has the image. In this his head acts in the same manner, as + when by any defect in the interior organ, his disordered imagination + paints to him some objects, notwithstanding he is awake. He frequently + dreams, without being asleep: his dreams never produce any thing so + strange but that they have some resemblance, with the objects which have + anteriorly acted on his senses; which have already communicated ideas to + his brain. The watchful theologians have composed, at their leisure, in + their waking hours, those phantoms, of which they avail themselves, to + terrify or frighten man; they have done nothing more than assemble the + scattered traits which they have found in the most terrible beings of + their own species; by exaggerating the powers, by enlarging the rights + claimed by tyrants, they have formed ideal beings, before whom man + trembles, and is afraid. + </p> + <p> + Thus, it is seen, that dreams, far from proving that the soul acts by its + own peculiar energy, that it draws its ideas from its own recesses; prove, + on the contrary, that in sleep it is intirely passive, that it does not + even renew its modifications, but according to the involuntary confusion, + which physical causes produce in the body, of which every thing tends to + shew the identity, the consubstantiality with the soul. What appears to + have led those into a mistake, who maintained that the soul drew its ideas + from itself, is this, they have contemplated these ideas, as if they were + real beings, when, in point of fact, they are nothing more than the + modifications produced in the brain of man, by objects to which this brain + is a stranger; they are these objects, who are the true models, who are + the real archetypes to which it is necessary to recur: here is the source + of all their errors. + </p> + <p> + In the individual who dreams, the soul does not act more from itself, than + it does in the man who is drunk, that is to say, who is modified by some + spirituous liquor: or than it does in the sick man, when he is delirious, + that is to say, when he is modified by those physical causes which disturb + his machine, which obstruct it in the performance of its functions; or + than it, does in him, whose brain is disordered: dreams, like these + various states, announce nothing more than a physical confusion in the + human machine, under the influence of which the brain ceases to act, after + a precise and regular manner: this disorder may be traced to physical + causes, such as the aliments—the humours—the combinations—the + fermentations, which are but little analogous to the salutary state of + man; from hence it will appear, that his brain is necessarily confused, + whenever his body is agitated in an extraordinary manner. + </p> + <p> + Do not let him, therefore, believe that his soul acts by itself, or + without a cause, in any one moment of his existence; it is, conjointly + with the body, submitted to the impulse of beings, who act on him + necessarily, according to their various properties. Wine taken in too + great a quantity, necessarily disturbs his ideas, causes confusion in his + corporeal functions, occasions disorder in his mental faculties. + </p> + <p> + If there really existed a being in Nature, with the capability of moving + itself by its own peculiar energies, that is to say, able to produce + motion, independent of all other causes, such a being would have the power + of arresting itself, or of suspending the motion of the universe; which is + nothing more than an immense chain of causes linked one to another, acting + and re-acting by necessary immutable laws, and which cannot be changed, + which are incapable of being suspended, unless the essences of every thing + in it were changed, without the properties of every thing were + annihilated. In the general system of the world, nothing more can be + perceived than a long series of motion, received and communicated in + succession, by beings capacitated to give impulse to each other: it is + thus, that each body is moved by the collision of some other body. The + invisible motion of some soul is to be attributed to causes concealed + within himself; he believes that it is moved by itself, because he does + not see the springs which put it in motion, or because he conceives those + powers are incapable of producing the effects he so much admires: but, + does he more clearly conceive, how a spark in exploding gunpowder, is + capable of producing the terrible effects he witnesses? The source of his + errors arise from this, that he regards his body as gross and inert, + whilst this body is a sensible machine, which has necessarily an + instantaneous conscience the moment it receives an impression; which is + conscious of its own existence by the recollection of impressions + successively experienced; memory by resuscitating an impression anteriorly + received, by detaining it, or by causing an impression which it receives + to remain, whilst it associates it with another, then with a third, gives + all the mechanism of <i>reasoning</i>. + </p> + <p> + An idea, which is only an imperceptible modification of the brain, gives + play to the organ of speech, which displays itself by the motion it + excites in the tongue: this, in its turn, breeds ideas, thoughts, and + passions, in those beings who are provided with organs susceptible of + receiving analagous motion; in consequence of which, the wills of a great + number of men are influenced, who, combining their efforts, produce a + revolution in a state, or even have an influence over the entire globe. It + is thus, that an ALEXANDER decided the fate of Asia, it is thus, that a + MAHOMET changed the face of the earth; it is thus, that imperceptible + causes produce the most terrible, the most extended effects, by a series + of necessary motion imprinted on the brain of man. + </p> + <p> + The difficulty of comprehending the effects produced on the soul of man, + has made him attribute to it those incomprehensible qualities which have + been examined. By the aid of imagination, by the power of thought, this + soul appears to quit his body, to carry itself with the greatest ease, to + transport itself with the utmost facility towards the most distant + objects; to run over, to approximate in the twinkling of an eye, all the + points of the universe: he has therefore believed, that a being who is + susceptible of such rapid motion, must be of a nature very distinguished + from all others; he has persuaded himself that this soul in reality does + travel, that it actually springs over the immense space necessary to meet + these various objects; he did not perceive, that to do it in an instant, + it had only to run over itself to approximate the ideas consigned to its + keeping, by means of the senses. + </p> + <p> + Indeed, it is never by any other means than by his senses, that beings + become known to man, or furnish him with ideas; it is only in consequence + of the impulse given to his body, that his brain is modified, or that his + soul thinks, wills, and acts. If, as ARISTOTLE asserted more than two + thousand years ago,—"<i>nothing enters the mind of man but through + the medium of his senses</i>,"—it follows as a consequence, that + every thing that issues from it must find some sensible object to which it + can attach its ideas, whether immediately, as a man, a tree, a bird, &c. + or in the last analysis or decomposition, such as pleasure, happiness, + vice, virtue, &c. This principle, so true, so luminous, so important + in its consequence, has been set forth in all its lustre, by a great + number of philosophers; among the rest, by the great LOCKE. Whenever, + therefore, a word or its idea does not connect itself with some sensible + object to which it can be related, this word or this idea is unmeaning, + and void of sense; it were better for man that the idea was banished from + his mind, struck out of his language: this principle is only the converse + of the axiom of ARISTOTLE,—"<i>if the direct be evident, the inverse + must be so likewise</i>." How has it happened, that the profound LOCKE, + who, to the great mortification of the metaphysicians, has placed this + principle of ARISTOTLE in the clearest point of view? how is it, that all + those who, like him, have recognized the absurdity of the system of innate + ideas, have not drawn the immediate, the necessary consequences? How has + it come to pass, that they have not had sufficient courage to apply so + clear a principle to all those fanciful chimeras with which the human mind + has for such a length of time been so vainly occupied? did they not + perceive that their principle sapped the very foundations of those + metaphysical speculations, which never occupy man but with those objects + of which, as they are inaccessible to his senses, he consequently can + never form to himself any accurate idea? But prejudice, when it is + generally held sacred, prevents him from seeing the most simple + application of the most self-evident principles. In metaphysical + researches, the greatest men are frequently nothing more than children, + who are incapable of either foreseeing or deducing the consequence of + their own data. + </p> + <p> + LOCKE, as well as all those who have adopted his system, which is so + demonstrable,—or to the axiom of ARISTOTLE, which is so clear, ought + to have concluded from it that all those wonderful things with which + metaphysicians have amused themselves, are mere chimeras; mere wanderings + of the imagination; that an immaterial spirit or substance, without + extent, without parts, is, in fact, nothing more than an absence of ideas; + in short, they ought to have felt that the ineffable intelligence which + they have supposed to preside at the helm of the world, is after all + nothing more than a being of their own imagination, on which man has never + been in accord, whom he has pictured under all the variety of forms, to + which he has at different periods, in different climes, ascribed every + kind of attribute, good or bad; but of which it is impossible his senses + can ever prove either the existence or the qualities. + </p> + <p> + For the same reason, moral philosophers ought to have concluded, that what + is called moral sentiment, <i>moral instinct</i>, that is, innate ideas of + virtue, anterior to all experience of the good or bad effects resulting + from its practice, are mere chimerical notions, which, like a great many + others, have for their guarantee and base only metaphysical speculation. + Before man can judge, he must feel; before he can distinguish good from + evil, he must compare. <i>Morals</i>, is a science of facts: to found + them, therefore, on an hypothesis inaccessible to his senses, of which he + has no means of proving the reality, is to render them uncertain; it is to + cast the log of discord into his lap, to cause him unceasingly to dispute + upon that which he can never understand. To assert that the ideas of + morals are <i>innate</i>, or the effect of <i>instinct</i>, is to pretend + that man knows how to read before he has learned the letters of the + alphabet; that he is acquainted with the laws of society before they are + either made or promulgated. + </p> + <p> + To undeceive him, with respect to innate ideas or modifications, imprinted + on his soul, at the moment of his birth, it is simply requisite to recur + to their source; he will then see that those with which he is familiar, + which have, as it were, identified themselves with his existence, have all + come to him through the medium of some of his senses; that they are + sometimes engraven on his brain with great difficulty,—that they + have never been permanent,—that they have perpetually varied in him: + he will see that these pretended inherent ideas of his soul, are the + effect of education, of example, above all, of habit, which by reiterated + motion has taught his brain to associate his ideas either in a confused or + a perspicuous manner; to familiarize itself with systems either rational + or absurd. In short, he takes those for innate ideas of which he has + forgotten the origin; he no longer recals to himself, either the precise + epoch, or the successive circumstances when these ideas were first + consigned to his brain: arrived at a certain age he believes he has always + had the same notions; his memory, crowded with experience, loaded with a + multitude of facts, is no longer able to distinguish the particular + circumstances which have contributed to give his brain its present + modifications; its instantaneous mode of thinking; its actual opinions. + For example, not one of his race, perhaps, recollects the first time the + word God struck his ears—the first ideas that it formed in him—the + first thoughts that it produced in him; nevertheless, it is certain that + from thence he has searched for some being with whom to connect the idea + which he has either formed to himself, or which has been suggested to him: + accustomed to hear God continually spoken of, he has, when in other + respects, the most enlightened, regarded this idea as if it were infused + into him by Nature; whilst it is visibly to be attributed to those + delineations of it, which his parents or his instructors have made to him; + which he has, in consequence, modified according to his own particular + organization, and the circumstances in which he has been placed; it is + thus, that each individual forms to himself a God, of which he is himself + the model, or which he modifies after his own fashion. + </p> + <p> + His ideas of morals, although more real than those of metaphysics, are not + however innate: the moral sentiments he forms on the will, or the judgment + he passes on the actions of man, are founded on experience; which alone + can enable him to discriminate those which are either useful or + prejudicial, virtuous or vicious, honest or dishonest, worthy his esteem, + or deserving his censure. His moral sentiments are the fruit of a + multitude of experience that is frequently very long and very complicated. + He gathers it with time; it is more or less faithful, by reason of his + particular organization and the causes by which he is modified; he + ultimately applies this experience with greater or less facility; to this + is to be attributed his habit of judging. The celerity with which he + applies his experience when he judges of the moral actions of his fellow + man, is what has been termed <i>moral instinct</i>. + </p> + <p> + That which in natural philosophy is called <i>instinct</i>, is only the + effect of some want of the body, the consequence of some attraction or + some repulsion in man or animals. The child that is newly born, sucks for + the first time; the nipple of the breast is put into his mouth: by the + natural analogy, that is found between the conglomerate glands, filled + with nerves; which line his mouth, and the milk which flows from the bosom + of the nurse, through the medium of the nipple, causes the child to press + it with his mouth, in order to express the fluid appropriate to nourish + his tender age; from all this the infant gathers experience; by degrees + the idea of a nipple, of milk, of pleasure, associate themselves in his + brain: every time he sees the nipple, he seizes it, promptly conveys it to + his mouth, and applies it to the use for which it is designed. + </p> + <p> + What has been said, will enable us to judge of those prompt and sudden + sentiments, which have been designated <i>the force of blood</i>. Those + sentiments of love, which fathers and mothers have for their children—those + feelings of affection, which children, with good inclinations, bear + towards their parents, are by no means <i>innate sentiments</i>; they are + nothing more, than the effect of experience, of reflection, of habit, in + souls of sensibility. These sentiments do not even exist in a great number + of human beings. We but too often witness tyrannical parents, occupied + with making enemies of their children, who appear to have been formed, + only to be the victims of their irrational caprices or their unreasonable + desires. + </p> + <p> + From the instant in which man commences, until that in which he ceases to + exist, he feels—he is moved either agreeably or unpleasantly—he + collects facts—he gathers experience; these produce ideas in his + brain, that are either cheerful or gloomy. Not one individual has all this + experience present to his memory at the same time, it does not ever + represent to him the whole clew at once: it is, however, this experience + that mechanically directs him, without his knowledge, in all his actions; + it was to designate the rapidity with, which he applied this experience, + of which he so frequently loses the connection—of which he is so + often at a loss to render himself an account, that he imagined the word <i>instinct</i>: + it appears to be the effect of magic, the operation of a supernatural + power, to the greater number of individuals: it is a word devoid of sense + to many others; but to the philosopher it is the effect of a very lively + feeling to him it consists in the faculty of combining, promptly, a + multitude of experience—of arranging with facility—of + comparing with quickness, a long and numerous train of extremely + complicated ideas. It is want that causes the inexplicable instinct we + behold in animals which have been denied souls without reason, whilst they + are susceptible of an infinity of actions that prove they think—judge—have + memory—are capable of experience—can combine ideas—can + apply them with more or less facility to satisfy the wants engendered by + their particular organization; in short, that prove they have passions + that are capable of being modified. Nothing but the height of folly can + refuse intellectual faculties to animals; they feel, choose, deliberate, + express love, show hatred; in many instances their senses are much keener + than those of man. Fish will return periodically to the spot where it is + the custom to throw them bread. + </p> + <p> + It is well known the embarrassments which animals have thrown in the way + of the partizans of the doctrine of spirituality; they have been fearful, + if they allowed them to have a spiritual soul, of elevating them to the + condition of human creatures; on the other hand, in not allowing them to + have a soul, they have furnished their adversaries with authority to deny + it in like manner to man, who thus finds himself debased to the condition + of the animal. Metaphysicians have never known how to extricate themselves + from this difficulty. DESCARTES fancied he solved it by saying that beasts + have no souls, but are mere machines. Nothing can be nearer the surface, + than the absurdity of this principle. Whoever contemplates Nature without + prejudice, will readily acknowledge that there is no other difference + between the man and the beast, than that which is to be attributed to the + diversity of his organization. + </p> + <p> + In some beings of the human species, who appear to be endowed with a + greater sensibility of organs than others, may be seen an instinct, by the + assistance of which they very promptly judge of the concealed dispositions + of their fellows, simply by inspecting the lineaments of their face. Those + who are denominated <i>physiognomists</i>, are only men of very acute + feelings; who have gathered an experience of which others, whether from + the coarseness of their organs, from the little attention they have paid, + or from some defect in their senses, are totally incapable: these last do + not believe in the science of physiognomy, which appears to them perfectly + ideal. Nevertheless, it is certain, that the action of this soul, which + has been made spiritual, makes impressions that are extremely marked upon + the exterior of the body; these impressions, continually reiterated, their + image remains: thus the habitual passions of man paint themselves on his + countenance; by which the attentive observer, who is endowed with acute + feeling, is enabled to judge with great rapidity of his mode of existence, + and even to foresee his actions, his inclinations, his desires, his + predominant passions, &c. Although the science of physiognomy appears + chimerical to a great number of persons, yet there are few who have not a + clear idea of a tender regard—of a cruel eye—of an austere + aspect—of a false, dissimulating look—of an open countenance, + &c. Keen practised optics acquire without doubt the faculty of + penetrating the concealed motion of the soul, by the visible traces it + leaves upon features that it has continually modified. Above all, the eyes + of man very quickly undergo changes according to the motion which is + excited in him: these delicate organs are visibly altered by the smallest + shock communicated to his brain. Serene eyes announce a tranquil soul; + wild eyes indicate a restless mind; fiery eyes pourtray a choleric, + sanguine temperament; fickle or inconstant eyes give room to suspect a + soul either alarmed or dissimulating. It is the study of this variety of + shades that renders man practised and acute: upon the spot he combines a + multitude of acquired experience, in order to form his judgment of the + person he beholds. His judgment, thus rapidly formed, partakes in nothing + of the supernatural, in nothing of the wonderful: such a man is only + distinguished by the fineness of his organs, and by the celerity with + which his brain performs its functions. + </p> + <p> + It is the same with some beings of the human species, in whom may be + discovered an extraordinary sagacity, which, to the uninformed, appears + miraculous. The most skilful practitioners in medicine, are, no doubt, men + endowed with very acute feelings, similar to that of the physiognomists, + by the assistance of which they judge with great facility of diseases, and + very promptly draw their prognostics. Indeed, we see men who are capable + of appreciating in the twinkling of an eye a multitude of circumstances, + who have sometimes the faculty of foreseeing the most distant events; yet, + this species of prophetic talent has nothing in it of the supernatural; it + indicates nothing more than great experience, with an extremely delicate + organization, from which they derive the faculty of judging with extreme + faculty of causes, of foreseeing their very remote effects. This faculty, + however, is also found in animals, who foresee much better than man, the + variations of the atmosphere with the various changes of the weather. + Birds have long been the prophets, and even the guides of several nations + who pretend to be extremely enlightened. + </p> + <p> + It is, then, to their organization, exercised after a particular manner, + that must be attributed those wonderous faculties which distinguish some + beings, that astonish others. To have <i>instinct</i>, only signifies to + judge quickly, without requiring to make a long, reasoning on the subject. + Man's ideas upon vice and upon virtue, are by no means innate; they are, + like all others, acquired: the judgment he forms, is founded upon + experience, whether true or false,—this depends upon his + conformation, and upon the habits that have modified him. The infant has + no ideas either of the Divinity or of virtue; it is from those who + instruct him that he receives these ideas; he makes more or less use of + them, according to his natural organization, or as his dispositions have + been more or less exercised. Nature gives man legs, the nurse teaches him + their use, his agility depends upon their natural conformation, and the + manner in which he exercises them. + </p> + <p> + What is called <i>taste</i>, in the fine arts, is to be attributed, in the + same manner, only to the acuteness of man's organs, practised by the habit + of seeing, of comparing, of judging certain objects; from whence results, + to some of his species, the faculty of judging with great rapidity, in the + twinkling of an eye, the whole with its various relations. It is by the + force of seeing, of feeling, of experiencing objects, that he attains to a + knowledge of them; it is in consequence of reiterating this experience, + that he acquires the power, that he gains the habit of judging with + celerity. But this experience is by no means innate, he did not possess it + before he was born; he is neither able to think, to judge, nor to have + ideas, before he has feeling; he is neither in a capacity to love, nor to + hate; to approve, nor to blame, before he has been moved, either agreeably + or disagreeably. Nevertheless, this is precisely what must be supposed by + those who are desirous to make man admit of innate ideas, of opinions; + infused by Nature, whether in morals, metaphysics, or any other science. + That his mind should have the faculty of thought, that it should occupy + itself with an object, it is requisite it should be acquainted with its + qualities; that it may have a knowledge of these qualities, it is + necessary some of his senses should have been struck by them: those + objects, therefore, of which he does not know any of the qualities, are + nullities; or at least they do not exist for him. + </p> + <p> + It will be asserted, perhaps, that the universal consent of man, upon + certain propositions, such as <i>the whole is greater than its part</i>, + upon all geometrical demonstrations, appear to warrant the supposition of + certain primary notions that are innate, not acquired. It may be replied, + that these notions are always acquired; that they are the fruit of an + experience more or less prompt; that it is requisite to have compared the + whole with its part, before conviction can ensue, that the whole is the + greater of the two. Man when he is born, does not bring with him the idea + that two and two make four; but he is, nevertheless, speedily convinced of + its truth. Before forming any judgment whatever, it is absolutely + necessary to have compared facts. + </p> + <p> + It is evident, that those who have gratuitously supposed innate ideas, or + notions inherent in man, have confounded his organization, or his natural + dispositions, with the habit by which he is modified; with the greater or + less aptitude he has of making experience, and of applying it in his + judgment. A man who has taste in painting, has, without doubt, brought + with him into the world eyes more acute, more penetrating than another; + but these eyes would by no means enable him to judge with promptitude, if + he had never had occasion to exercise them; much less, in some respects, + can those dispositions which are called <i>natural</i>, be regarded as + innate. Man is not, at twenty years of age, the same as he was when he + came into the world; the physical causes that are continually acting upon + him, necessarily have an influence upon his organization, and so modify + it, that his natural dispositions themselves are not at one period what + they are at another. La Motte Le Vayer says, "We think quite otherwise of + things at one time than at another; when young than when old—when + hungry than when our appetite is satisfied—in the night than in the + day—when peevish than when cheerful. Thus, varying every hour, by a + thousand other circumstances, which keep us in a state of perpetual + inconstancy and instability." Every day may be seen children, who, to a + certain age—display a great deal of ingenuity, a strong aptitude for + the sciences, who finish by falling into stupidity. Others may be + observed, who, during their infancy, have shown dispositions but little + favourable to improvement, yet develope themselves in the end, and + astonish us by an exhibition of those qualities of which we hardly thought + them susceptible: there arrives a moment in which the mind takes a spring, + makes use of a multitude of experience which it has amassed, without its + having been perceived; and, if I may be allowed the expression, without + their own knowledge. + </p> + <p> + Thus, it cannot be too often repeated, all the ideas, all the notions, all + the modes of existence, and all the thoughts of man, are acquired. His + mind cannot act, cannot exercise itself, but upon that of which it has + knowledge; it can understand either well or ill, only those things which + it has previously felt. Such of his ideas that do not suppose some + exterior material object for their model, or one to which he is able to + relate them, which are therefore called <i>abstract ideas</i>, are only + modes in which his interior organ considers its own peculiar + modifications, of which it chooses some without respect to others. The + words which he uses to designate these ideas, such as <i>bounty, beauty, + order, intelligence, virtue</i>, &c. do not offer any one sense, if he + does not relate them to, or if he does not explain them by, those objects + which his senses have shewn him to be susceptible of those qualities, or + of those modes of existence, of that manner of acting, which is known to + him. What is it that points out to him the vague idea of <i>beauty</i>, if + he does not attach it to some object that has struck his senses in a + peculiar manner, to which, in consequence, he attributes this quality? + What is it that represents the word <i>intelligence</i>, if he does not + connect it with a certain mode of being and of acting? Does the word <i>order</i> + signify any thing, if he does not relate it to a series of actions, to a + chain of motion, by which he is affected in a certain manner? Is not the + word <i>virtue</i> void of sense, if he does not apply it to those + dispositions of his fellows which produce known effects, different from + those which result from contrary inclinations? What do the words <i>pain</i> + and <i>pleasure</i> offer to his mind in the moment when his organs + neither suffer nor enjoy, if it be not the modes in which he has been + affected, of which his brain conserves the remembrance, of those + impressions, which experience has shewn him to be either useful or + prejudicial? But when he bears the words spirituality, immateriality, + incorporeality, &c. pronounced, neither his senses nor his memory + afford him any assistance; they do not furnish him with any means by which + he can form an idea of their qualities, or of the objects to which he + ought to apply them; in that which is not matter he can only see vacuum + and emptiness, which as long as he remains what he is, cannot, to his + mind, be susceptible of any one quality. + </p> + <p> + All the errors, all the disputes of men, have their foundation in this, + that they have renounced experience, have surrendered the evidence of + their senses, to give themselves up to the guidance of notions which they + have believed infused or innate; although in reality they are no more than + the effect of a distempered imagination, of prejudices, in which they have + been instructed from their infancy, with which habit has familiarized + them, which authority has obliged them to conserve. Languages are filled + with abstract words, to which are attached confused and vague ideas; of + which, when they come to be examined, no model can be found in Nature; no + object to which they can be related. When man gives himself the trouble to + analyze things, he is quite surprised to find, that those words which are + continually in the mouths of men, never present any fixed or determinate + idea: he hears them unceasingly speaking of spirits—of the soul and + its faculties—of duration—of space—of immensity—of + infinity—of perfection—of virtue—of reason—of + sentiment—of instinct—of taste, &c. without his being able + to tell precisely, what they themselves understand by these words. + Nevertheless, they do not appear to have been invented, but for the + purpose of representing the images of things; or to paint, by the + assistance of the senses, those known objects on which the mind is able to + meditate, which it is competent to appreciate, to compare, and to judge. + </p> + <p> + For man to think of that which has not acted on any of his senses, is to + think on words; it is for his senses to dream; it is to seek in his own + imagination for objects to which he can attach his wandering ideas: to + assign qualities to these objects is, unquestionably, to redouble his + extravagance, to set no limits to his folly. If a word be destined to + represent to him an object that has not the capacity to act on any one of + his organs; of which, it is impossible for him to prove either the + existence or the qualities; his imagination, by dint of racking itself, + will nevertheless, in some measure, supply him with the ideas he wants; he + composes some kind of a picture, with the images or colours he is always + obliged to borrow, from the objects of which he has a knowledge: thus the + Divinity has been represented by some under the character of a venerable + old man; by others, under that of a puissant monarch; by others, as an + exasperated, irritated being, &c. It is evident, however, that man, + with some of his qualities, has served for the model of these pictures: + but if he be informed of objects that are represented as pure spirits—that + have neither body nor extent—that are not contained in space—that + are beyond nature,—here then he is plunged into emptiness; his mind + no longer has any ideas—it no longer knows upon what it meditates. + This, as will be seen in the sequel, no doubt, is the source of those + unformed notions which some men have formed of the Divinity; they + themselves frequently annihilate him, by assembling incompatible and + contradictory attributes. In giving him morals—in composing him of + known qualities,—they make him a man;—in assigning him the + negative attributes of every thing they know, they render him inaccessible + to their senses—they destroy all antecedent ideas—they make + him a mere nothing. From this it will appear, that those sublime sciences + which are called <i>Theology, Psychology, Metaphysics</i>, have been mere + sciences of words: morals and politics, with which they very frequently + mix, have, in consequence, become inexplicable enigmas, which there is + nothing short of the study of Nature can enable us to expound. + </p> + <p> + Man has occasion for truth; it consists in a knowledge of the true + relations he has with those beings competent to have an influence on his + welfare; these relations are to be known only by experience: without + experience there can be no reason; without reason man is only a blind + creature, who conducts himself by chance. But, how is he to acquire + experience upon ideal objects, which his senses neither enable him to know + nor to examine? How is he to assure himself of the existence, how + ascertain the qualities of beings he is not able to feel? How can he judge + whether there objects be favorable or prejudicial to him? How is he to + know, without the evidence of his senses, what he ought to love, what he + should hate, what to seek after, what to shun, what to do, what to leave + undone? It is, however, upon this knowledge that his condition in this + world rests; it is upon this knowledge that morals is founded. From whence + it may be seen, that, by causing him to blend vague metaphysical notions + with morals, or the science of the certain and invariable relations which + subsist between mankind; or by weakly establishing them upon chimerical + ideas, which have no existence but in his imagination; these morals, upon + which the welfare of society so much depends, are rendered uncertain, are + made arbitrary, are abandoned to the caprices of fancy, are not fixed upon + any solid basis. + </p> + <p> + Beings essentially different by their natural organization, by the + modifications they experience, by the habits they contract, by the + opinions they acquire, must of necessity think differently. His + temperament, as we have seen, decides the mental qualities of man: this + temperament itself is diversely modified in him: from whence it + consecutively follows, his imagination cannot possibly be the same; + neither can it create to him the same images. Each individual is a + connected whole, of which all the parts have a necessary correspondence. + Different eyes must see differently, must give extremely varied ideas of + the objects they contemplate, even when these objects are real. What, + then, must be the diversity of these ideas, if the objects meditated upon + do not act upon the senses? Mankind have pretty nearly the same ideas, in + the gross, of those substances that act upon his organs with vivacity; he + is sufficiently in unison upon some qualities which he contemplates very + nearly in the same manner; I say, very nearly, because the intelligence, + the notion, the conviction of any one proposition, however simple, however + evident, however clear it may be supposed, is not, nor cannot be, strictly + the same, in any two men. Indeed, one man not being another man, the first + cannot, for example, have rigorously and mathematically the same notion of + unity as the second; seeing that an identical effect cannot be the result + of two different causes. Thus, when men are in accord in their ideas, in + their modes of thinking, in their judgment, in their passions, in their + desires, in, their tastes, their consent does not arise from their seeing + or feeling the same objects precisely in the same manner, but pretty + nearly; language is not, nor cannot be, sufficiently copious to designate + the vast variety of shades, the multiplicity of imperceptible differences, + which is to be found in their modes of seeing and thinking. Each man, + then, has, to say thus, a language which is peculiar to himself alone, and + this language is incommunicable to others. What harmony, what unison, + then, can possibly exist between them, when they discourse with each + other, upon objects only known to their imagination? Can this imagination + in one individual ever be the same as in another? How can they possibly + understand each other, when they assign to those objects qualities that + can only be attributed to the particular manner in which their brain is + affected. + </p> + <p> + For one man to exact from another that he shall think like himself, is to + insist that he shall be organized precisely in the same manner—that + he shall have been modified exactly the same in every moment of his + existence: that he shall have received the same temperament, the same + nourishment, the same education: in a word, that he shall require that + other to be himself. Wherefore is it not exacted that all men shall have + the same features? Is man more the master of his opinions? Are not his + opinions the necessary consequence of his Nature, and of those peculiar + circumstances which, from his infancy, have necessarily had an influence + upon his mode of thinking, and his manner of acting? If man be a connected + whole, whenever a single feature differs from his own, ought he not to + conclude that it is not possible his brain can either think, associate + ideas, imagine, or dream precisely in the same manner with that other. + </p> + <p> + The diversity in the temperament of man, is the natural, the necessary + source of the diversity of his passions, of his taste, of his ideas of + happiness, of his opinions of every kind. Thus, this same diversity will + be the fatal source of his disputes, of his hatreds, of his injustice, + every time he shall reason upon unknown objects, but to which he shall + attach the greatest importance. He will never understand either himself or + others, in speaking of a spiritual soul, or of immaterial substances + distinguished from Nature; he will, from that moment, cease to speak the + same language, and he will never attach the same ideas to the same words. + What, then, shall be, the common standard that shall decide which is the + man that thinks with the greatest justice? What the scale by which to + measure who has the best regulated imagination? What balance shall be + found sufficiently exact to determine whose knowledge is most certain, + when he agitates subjects, which experience cannot enable him to examine, + that escape all his senses, that have no model, that are above reason? + Each individual, each legislator, each speculator, each nation, has ever + formed to himself different ideas of these things; each believes, that his + own peculiar reveries ought to be preferred to those of his neighbours; + which always appear to him an absurd, ridiculous, and false as his own can + possibly have appeared to his fellow; each clings to his own opinion, + because each retains his own peculiar mode of existence; each believes his + happiness depends upon his attachment to his prejudices, which he never + adopts but because he believes them beneficial to his welfare. Propose to + a man to change his religion for yours, he will believe you a madman; you + will only excite his indignation, elicit his contempt; he will propose to + you, in his turn, to adopt his own peculiar opinions; after much + reasoning, you will treat each other as absurd beings, ridiculously + opiniated, pertinaciously stubborn: and he will display the least folly, + who shall first yield. But if the adversaries become heated in the + dispute, which always happens, when they suppose the matter important, or + when they would defend the cause of their own self-love; from thence their + passions sharpen, they grow angry, quarrels are provoked, they hate each + other, and end by reciprocal injury. It is thus, that for opinions, which + no man can demonstrate, we see the Brahmin despised; the Mahommedan hated; + the Pagan held in contempt; that they oppress and disdain each with the + most rancorous animosity: the Christian burns the Jew at what is called an + <i>auto-de-fe</i>, because he clings to the faith of his fathers: the + Roman Catholic condemns the Protestant to the flames, and makes a + conscience of massacring him in cold blood: this re-acts in his turn; + sometimes the various sects of Christians league together against the + incredulous Turk, and for a moment suspend their own bloody disputes that + they may chastise the enemies to the true faith: then, having glutted + their revenge, return with redoubled fury, to wreak over again their + infuriated vengeance on each other. + </p> + <p> + If the imaginations of men were the same, the chimeras which they bring + forth would be every where the same; there would be no disputes among them + on this subject, if they all dreamt in the same manner; great numbers of + human beings would be spared, if man occupied his mind with objects + capable of being known, of which the existence was proved, of which he was + competent to discover the true qualities, by sure, by reiterated + experience. <i>Systems of Philosophy</i> are not subject to dispute but + when their principles are not sufficiently proved; by degrees experience, + in pointing out the truth and detecting their errors, terminates these + quarrels. There is no variance among <i>geometricians</i> upon the + principles of their science; it is only raised, when their suppositions + are false, or their objects too much complicated. <i>Theologians</i> find + so much difficulty in agreeing among themselves, simply, because, in their + contests, they divide without ceasing, not known and examined + propositions, but prejudices with which they have been imbued in their + youth—in the schools—by each other's books, &c. They are + perpetually reasoning, not upon real objects, of which the existence is + demonstrated, but upon imaginary systems of which they have never examined + the reality; they found these disputes, not upon averred experience, or + constant facts, but upon gratuitious suppositions, which each endeavours + to convince the other are without solidity. Finding these ideas of long + standing, that few people, refuse to admit them, they take them for + incontestible truths, that ought to be received merely upon being + announced; whenever they attach great importance to them, they irritate + themselves against the temerity of those who have the audacity to doubt, + or even to examine them. + </p> + <p> + If prejudice had been laid aside, it would perhaps have been discovered + that many of those objects, which have given birth to the most shocking, + the most sanguinary disputes among men, were mere phantoms; which a little + examination would have shown to be unworthy their notice: <i>the priests + of Apollo</i> would have been harmless, if man had examined for himself, + without prejudice, the tenets they held forth: he would have found, that + he was fighting, that he was cutting his neighbour's throat, for words + void of sense; or, at the least, he would have learned to doubt his right + to act in the manner he did; he would have renounced that dogmatical, that + imperious tone he assumed, by which he would oblige his fellow to unite + with him in opinion. The most trifling reflection would have shewn him the + necessity of this diversity in his notions, of this contrariety in his + imagination, which depends upon his Natural conformation diversely + modified: which necessarily has an influence over his thoughts, over his + will, and over his actions. In short, if he had consulted morals, if he + had fallen back upon reason, every thing would have conspired to prove to + him, that beings who call themselves rational, were made to think + variously; on that account were designed to live peaceable with each + other, to love each other, to lend each other mutual succours whatever may + be their opinions upon subjects, either impossible to be known, or to be + contemplated under the same point of view: every thing would have joined + in evidence to convince him of the unreasonable tyranny, of the unjust + violence, of the useless cruelty of those men of blood, who persecute, who + destroy mankind, in order that they may mould him to their own peculiar + opinions; every thing would have conducted mortals to <i>mildness</i>, to + <i>indulgence</i>, to <i>toleration</i>; virtues, unquestionably of more + real importance, much more necessary to the welfare of society, than the + marvellous speculations by which it is divided, by which it is frequently + hurried on to sacrifice to a maniacal fury, the pretended enemies to these + revered flights of the imagination. + </p> + <p> + From this it must be evident, of what importance it is to <i>morals</i> to + examine the ideas, to which it has been agreed to attach so much worth; to + which man is continually sacrificing his own peculiar happiness; to which + he is immolating the tranquillity of nations, at the irrational command of + fanatical cruel guides. Let him fall back on his experience; let him + return to Nature; let him occupy himself with reason; let him consult + those objects that are real, which are useful to his permanent felicity; + let him study Nature's laws; let him study himself; let him consult the + bonds which unite him to his fellow mortals; let him examine the + fictitious bonds that enchain him to the most baneful prejudices. If his + imagination must always feed itself with illusions, if he remains + steadfast in his own opinions, if his prejudices are dear to him, let him + at least permit others to ramble in their own manner, or seek after truth + as best suits their inclination; but let him always recollect, that all + the opinions—all the ideas—all the systems—all the wills—all + the actions of man, are the necessary consequence of his nature, of his + temperament, of his organization, and of those causes, either transitory + or constant, which modify hint: in short, that <i>man is not more a free + agent to think than to act:</i> a truth that will be again proved in the + following chapter. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0018" id="link2H_4_0018"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + CHAP. XI + </h2> + <h3> + <i>Of the System of Man's free agency.</i> + </h3> + <p> + Those who have pretended that the <i>soul</i> is distinguished from the + body, is immaterial, draws its ideas from its own peculiar source, acts by + its own energies without the aid of any exterior object; by a consequence + of their own system, have enfranchised it from those physical laws, + according to which all beings of which we have a knowledge are obliged to + act. They have believed that the foul is mistress of its own conduct, is + able to regulate its own peculiar operations; has the faculty to determine + its will by its own natural energy; in a word, they have pretended man is + a <i>free agent</i>. + </p> + <p> + It has been already sufficiently proved, that the soul is nothing more + than the body, considered relatively to some of its functions, more + concealed than others: it has been shewn, that this soul, even when it + shall be supposed immaterial, is continually modified conjointly with the + body; is submitted to all its motion; that without this it would remain + inert and dead: that, consequently, it is subjected to the influence of + those material, to the operation those physical causes, which give impulse + to the body; of which the mode of existence, whether habitual or + transitory, depends upon the material elements by which it is surrounded; + that form its texture; that constitute its temperament; that enter into it + by the means of the aliments; that penetrate it by their subtility; the + faculties which are called intellectual, and those qualities which are + styled moral, have been explained in a manner purely physical; entirely + natural: in the last place, it has been demonstrated, that all the ideas, + all the systems, all the affections, all the opinions, whether true or + false, which man forms to himself, are to be attributed to his physical + powers; are to be ascribed to his material senses. Thus man is a being + purely physical; in whatever manner he is considered, he is connected to + universal Nature: submitted to the necessary, to the immutable laws that + she imposes on all the beings she contains, according to their peculiar + essences; conformable to the respective properties with which, without + consulting them, she endows each particular species. Man's life is a line + that Nature commands him to describe upon the surface of the earth: + without his ever being able to swerve from it even for an instant. He is + born without his own consent; his organizations does in no wise depend + upon himself; his ideas come to him involuntarily; his habits are in the + power of those who cause him to contract them; he is unceasingly modified + by causes, whether visible or concealed, over which he has no controul; + give the hue to his way of thinking, and determine his manner of acting. + He is good or bad—happy or miserable—wise or foolish—reasonable + or irrational, without his will going for anything in these various + states. Nevertheless, in despite of the shackles by which he is bound, it + is pretended he is a free agent, or that independent of the causes by + which he is moved, he determines his own will; regulates his own + condition. + </p> + <p> + However slender the foundation of this opinion, of which every thing ought + to point out to him the error; it is current at this day for an + incontestible truth, and believed enlightened; it is the basis or + religion, which has been incapable of imagining how man could either merit + reward or deserve punishment if he was not a free agent. Society has been + believed interested in this system, because an idea has gone abroad, that + if all the actions of man were to be contemplated as necessary, the right + of punishing those who injure their associates would no longer exist. At + length human vanity accommodated itself to an hypothesis which, + unquestionable, appears to distinguish man from all other physical beings, + by assigning to him the special privilege of a total independence of all + other causes; but of which a very little reflection would have shewn him + the absurdity or even the impossibility. + </p> + <p> + As a part, subordinate to the great whole, man is obliged to experience + its influence. To be a free agent it were needful that each individual was + of greater strength than the entire of Nature; or, that he was out of this + Nature: who, always in action herself, obliges all the beings she + embraces, to act, and to concur to her general motion; or, as it has been + said elsewhere, to conserve her active existence, by the motion that all + beings produce in consequence of their particular energies, which result + from their being submitted to fixed, eternal, and immutable laws. In order + that man might be a free agent, it were needful that all beings should + lose their essences; it is equally necessary that he himself should no + longer enjoy physical sensibility; that he should neither know good nor + evil; pleasure nor pain; but if this was the case, from that moment he + would no longer be in a state to conserve himself, or render his existence + happy; all beings would become indifferent to him; he would no longer have + any choice; he would cease to know what he ought to love; what it was + right he should fear; he would not have any acquaintance with that which + he should seek after; or with that which it is requisite he should avoid. + In short, man would be an unnatural being; totally incapable of acting in + the manner we behold. It is the actual essence of man to tend to his + well-being; to be desirous to conserve his existence; if all the motion of + his machine springs as a necessary consequence from this primitive + impulse; if pain warns him of that which he ought to avoid; if pleasure + announces to him that which he should desire; if it is in his essence to + love that which either excites delight, or, that from which he expects + agreeable sensations; to hate that which makes him either fear contrary + impressions; or, that which afflicts him with uneasiness; it must + necessarily be, that he will be attracted by that which he deems + advantageous; that his will shall be determined by those objects which he + judges useful; that he will be repelled by those beings which he believes + prejudicial, either to his habitual, or to his transitory mode of + existence; by that which he considers disadvantageous. It is only by the + aid of experience, that man acquires the faculty of understanding what he + ought to love; of knowing what he ought to fear. Are his organs sound? his + experience will be true: are they unsound? it will be false: in the first + instance he will have reason, prudence, foresight; he will frequently + foresee very remote effects; he will know, that what he sometimes + contemplates as a good, may possibly become an evil, by its necessary or + probable consequences: that what must be to him a transient evil, may by + its result procure him a solid and durable good. It is thus experience + enables him to foresee that the amputation of a limb will cause him + painful sensation, he consequently is obliged to fear this operation, and + he endeavours to avoid the pain; but if experience has also shewn him, + that the transitory pain this amputation will cause him may be the means + of saving his life; the preservation, of his existence being of necessity + dear to him, he is obliged to submit himself to the momentary pain with a + view to procuring a permanent good, by which it will be overbalanced. + </p> + <p> + The will, as we have elsewhere said, is a modification of the brain, by + which it is disposed to action or prepared to give play to the organs. + This will is necessarily determined by the qualities, good or bad, + agreeable or painful, of the object or the motive that acts upon his + senses; or of which the idea remains with him, and is resuscitated by his + memory. In consequence, he acts necessarily; his action is the result of + the impulse he receives either from the motive, from the object, or from + the idea, which has modified his brain, or disposed his will. When he does + not act according to this impulse, it is because there comes some new + cause, some new motive, some new idea, which modifies his brain in a + different manner, gives him a new impulse, determines his will in another + way; by which the action of the former impulse is suspended: thus, the + sight of an agreeable object, or its idea, determines his will to set him + in action to procure it; but if a new object or a new idea more powerfully + attracts him, it gives a new direction to his will, annihilates the effect + of the former, and prevents the action by which it was to be procured. + This is the mode in which reflection, experience, reason, necessarily + arrests or suspends the action of man's will; without this, he would, of + necessity, have followed the anterior impulse which carried him towards a + then desirable object. In all this he always acts according to necessary + laws, from which he has no means of emancipating himself. + </p> + <p> + If, when tormented with violent thirst, he figures to himself an idea, or + really perceives a fountain, whose limpid streams might cool his feverish + habit, is he sufficient master of himself to desire or not to desire the + object competent to satisfy so lively a want? It will no doubt be + conceded, that it is impossible he should not be desirous to satisfy it; + but it will be said,—If at this moment it is announced to him, the + water he so ardently desires is poisoned, he will, notwithstanding his + vehement thirst, abstain from drinking it; and it has, therefore, been + falsely concluded that he is a free agent. The fact, however, is, that the + motive in either case is exactly the same: his own conservation. The same + necessity that determined him to drink, before he knew the water was + deleterious, upon this new discovery, equally determines him not to drink; + the desire of conserving himself, either annihilates or suspends the + former impulse; the second motive becomes stronger than the preceding; + that is, the fear of death, or the desire of preserving himself, + necessarily prevails over the painful sensation caused by his eagerness to + drink. But, (it will be said) if the thirst is very parching, an + inconsiderate man, without regarding the danger, will risque swallowing + the water. Nothing is gained by this remark: in this case, the anterior + impulse only regains the ascendency; he is persuaded, that life may + possibly be longer preserved, or that he shall derive a greater good by + drinking the poisoned water, than by enduring the torment, which, to his + mind, threatens instant dissolution: thus, the first becomes the + strongest, and necessarily urges him on to action. Nevertheless, in either + case, whether he partakes of the water, or whether he does not, the two + actions will be equally necessary; they will be the effect of that motive + which finds itself most puissant; which consequently acts in a most + coercive manner upon his will. + </p> + <p> + This example will serve to explain the whole phaenomena of the human will. + This will, or rather the brain, finds itself in the same situation as a + bowl, which although it has received an impulse that drives it forward in + a straight line, is deranged in its course, whenever a force, superior to + the first, obliges it to change its direction. The man who drinks the + poisoned water, appears a madman; but the actions of fools are as + necessary as those of the most prudent individuals. The motives that + determine the voluptuary, that actuate the debauchee to risk their health, + are as powerful, their actions are as necessary, as those which decide the + wise man to manage his. But, it will be insisted, the debauchee may be + prevailed on to change his conduct; this does not imply that he is a free + agent; but, that motives may be found sufficiently powerful to annihilate + the effect of those that previously acted upon him; then these new motives + determine his will to the new mode of conduct he may adopt, as necessarily + as the former did to the old mode. + </p> + <p> + Man is said to <i>deliberate</i> when the action of the will is suspended; + this happens when two opposite motives act alternately upon him. To + deliberate, is to hate and to love in succession; it is to be alternately + attracted and repelled; it is to be moved sometimes by one motive, + sometimes by another. Man only deliberates when he does not distinctly + understand the quality of the objects from which he receives impulse, or + when experience has not sufficiently apprised him of the effects, more or + less remote, which his actions will produce. He would take the air, but + the weather is uncertain; he deliberates in consequence; he weighs the + various motives that urge his will to go out or to stay at home; he is at + length determined by that motive which is most probable; this removes his + indecision, which necessarily settles his will either to remain within or + to go abroad: this motive is always either the immediate or ultimate + advantage he finds or thinks he finds in the action to which he is + persuaded. + </p> + <p> + Man's will frequently fluctuates between two objects, of which either the + presence or the ideas move him alternately: he waits until he has + contemplated the objects or the ideas they have left in his brain; which + solicit him to different actions; he then compares these objects or ideas: + but even in the time of deliberation, during the comparison, pending these + alternatives of love and hatred, which succeed each other sometimes with + the utmost rapidity, he is not a free agent for a single instant; the good + or the evil which he believes he finds successively in the objects, are + the necessary motives of these momentary wills; of the rapid motion of + desire or fear that he experiences as long as his uncertainty continues. + From this it will be obvious, that deliberation is necessary; that + uncertainty is necessary; that whatever part he takes, in consequence of + this deliberation, it will always necessarily be that which he has judged, + whether well or ill, is most probable to turn to his advantage. + </p> + <p> + When the soul is assailed by two motives that act alternately upon it, or + modify it successively, it deliberates; the brain is in a sort of + equilibrium, accompanied with perpetual oscillations, sometimes towards + one object, sometimes towards the other, until the most forcible carries + the point, and thereby extricates it, from this state of suspense, in + which consists the indecision of his will. But when the brain is + simultaneously assailed by causes equally strong, that move it in opposite + directions; agreeable to the general law of all bodies, when they are + struck equally by contrary powers, it stops, it is in <i>nisu</i>; it is + neither capable to will nor to act; it waits until one of the two causes + has obtained sufficient force to overpower the other, to determine its + will, to attract it in such a manner that it may prevail over the efforts + of the other cause. + </p> + <p> + This mechanism, so simple, so natural, suffices to demonstrate, why + uncertainty is painful; why suspense is always a violent state for man. + The brain, an organ so delicate, so mobile, experiences such rapid + modifications, that it is fatigued; or when it is urged in contrary + directions, by causes equally powerful, it suffers a kind of compression, + that prevents the activity which is suitable to the preservation of the + whole, which is necessary to procure what is advantageous to its + existence. This mechanism will also explain the irregularity, the + indecision, the inconstancy of man; and account for that conduct, which + frequently appears an inexplicable mystery, which indeed it is, under the + received systems. In consulting experience, it will be found that the soul + is submitted to precisely the same physical laws as the material body. If + the will of each individual, during a given time, was only moved by a + single cause or passion, nothing would be more easy than to foresee his + actions; but his heart is frequently assailed by contrary powers, by + adverse motives, which either act on him simultaneously or in succession; + then his brain, attracted in opposite directions, is either fatigued, or + else tormented by a state of compression, which deprives it of activity. + Sometimes it is in a state of incommodious inaction; sometimes it is the + sport of the alternate shocks it undergoes. Such, no doubt, is the state + in which man finds himself, when a lively passion solicits him to the + commission of crime, whilst fear points out to him the danger by which it + is attended: such, also, is the condition of him whom remorse, by the + continued labour of his distracted soul, prevents from enjoying the + objects he has criminally obtained. + </p> + <p> + If the powers or causes, whether exterior or interior, acting on the mind + of man, tend towards opposite points, his soul, is well as all other + bodies, will take a mean direction between the two; in consequence of the + violence with which his soul is urged, his condition becomes sometimes so + painful that his existence is troublesome: he has no longer a tendency to + his own peculiar conservation; he seeks after death, as a sanctuary + against himself—as the only remedy to his despair: it is thus we + behold men, miserable and discontented, voluntarily destroy themselves, + whenever life becomes insupportable. Man is competent to cherish his + existence, no longer than life holds out charms to him; when he is wrought + upon by painful sensations, or drawn by contrary impulsions, his natural + tendency is deranged, he is under the necessity to follow a new route; + this conducts him to his end, which it even displays to him as the most + desirable good. In this manner may be explained, the conduct of those + melancholy beings, whose vicious temperaments, whose tortured consciences, + whose chagrin, whose <i>ennui</i>, sometimes determine them to renounce + life. + </p> + <p> + The various powers, frequently very complicated, that act either + successively or simultaneously upon the brain of man, which modify him so + diversely in the different periods of his existence, are the true causes + of that obscurity in morals, of that difficulty which is found, when it is + desired to unravel the concealed springs of his enigmatical conduct. The + heart of man is a labyrinth, only because it very rarely happens that we + possess the necessary gift of judging it; from whence it will appear, that + his circumstances, his indecision, his conduct, whether ridiculous, or + unexpected, are the necessary consequences of the changes operated in him; + are nothing but the effect of motives that successively determine his + will; which are dependent on the frequent variations experienced by his + machine. According to these variations, the same motives have not, always, + the same influence over his will, the same objects no longer enjoy the + faculty of pleasing him; his temperament has changed, either for the + moment, or for ever. It follows as a consequence, that his taste, his + desires, his passions, will change; there can be no kind of uniformity in + his conduct, nor any certitude in the effects to be expected. + </p> + <p> + Choice by no means proves the free-agency of man; he only deliberates when + he does not yet know which to choose of the many objects that move him, he + is then in an embarrassment, which does not terminate, until his will as + decided by the greater advantage he believes be shall find in the object + he chooses, or the action he undertakes. From whence it may be seen that + choice is necessary, because he would not determine for an object, or for + an action, if he did not believe that he should find in it some direct + advantage. That man should have free-agency, it were needful that he + should be able to will or choose without motive; or, that he could prevent + motives coercing his will. Action always being the effect of his will once + determined, as his will cannot be determined but by a motive, which is not + in his own power, it follows that he is never the master of the + determination of his own peculiar will; that consequently he never acts as + a free agent. It has been believed that man was a free agent, because he + had a will with the power of choosing; but attention has not been paid to + the fact, that even his will is moved by causes independent of himself, is + owing to that which is inherent in his own organization, or which belongs + to the nature of the beings acting on him. Indeed, man passes a great + portion of his life without even willing. His will attends the motive by + which it is determined. If he was to render an exact account of every + thing he does in the course of each day, from rising in the morning to + lying down at night, he would find, that not one of his actions have been + in the least voluntary; that they have been mechanical, habitual, + determined by causes he was not able to foresee, to which he was either + obliged to, yield, or with which he was allured to acquiesce; he would + discover, that all the motives of his labours, of his amusements, of his + discourses, of his thoughts, have been necessary; that they have evidently + either seduced him or drawn him along. Is he the master of willing, not to + withdraw his hand from the fire when he fears it will be burnt? Or has he + the power to take away from fire the property which makes him fear it? Is + he the master of not choosing a dish of meat which he knows to be + agreeable, or analogous to his palate; of not preferring it to that which + he knows to be disagreeable or dangerous? It is always according to his + sensations, to his own peculiar experience, or to his suppositions, that + he judges of things either well or ill; but whatever way be his judgment, + it depends necessarily on his mode of feeling, whether habitual or + accidental, and the qualities he finds in the causes that move him, which + exist in despite of himself. + </p> + <p> + All the causes which by his will is actuated, must act upon him in a + manner sufficiently marked, to give him some sensation, some perception, + some idea, whether complete or incomplete, true or false; as soon as his + will is determined, he must have felt, either strongly or feebly; if this + was not the case he would have determined without motive: thus, to speak + correctly, there are no causes which are truly indifferent to the will: + however faint the impulse he receives, whether on the part of the objects + themselves, or on the part of their images or ideas, as soon as his will + acts, the impulse has been competent to determine him. In consequence of a + slight, of a feeble impulse, the will is weak, it is this weakness of the + will that is called <i>indifference</i>. His brain with difficulty + perceives the sensation, it has received; it consequently acts with less + vigour, either to obtain or remove the object or the idea that has + modified it. If the impulse is powerful, the will is strong, it makes him + act vigorously, to obtain or to remove the object which appears to him + either very agreeable or very incommodious. + </p> + <p> + It has been believed man was a free agent, because it has been imagined + that his soul could at will recall ideas, which sometimes suffice to check + his most unruly desires. Thus, the idea of a remote evil frequently + prevents him from enjoying a present and actual good: thus, remembrance, + which is an almost insensible, a slight modification of his brain, + annihilates, at each instant, the real objects that act upon his will. But + he is not master of recalling to himself his ideas at pleasure; their + association is independent of him; they are arranged in his brain, in + despite of him, without his own knowledge, where they have made an + impression more or less profound; his memory itself depends upon his + organization; its fidelity depends upon the habitual or momentary state in + which he finds himself; when his will is vigorously determined to some + object or idea that excites a very lively passion in him, those objects or + ideas that would be able to arrest his action no longer present themselves + to his mind; in those moments his eyes are shut to the dangers that menace + him, of which the idea ought to make him forbear; he marches forward + headlong towards the object by whose image he is hurried on; reflection + cannot operate upon him in any way; he sees nothing but the object of his + desires; the salutary ideas which might be able to arrest his progress + disappear, or else display themselves either too faintly or too late to + prevent his acting. Such is the case with all those who, blinded by some + strong passion, are not in a condition to recal to themselves those + motives, of which the idea alone, in cooler moments, would be sufficient + to deter them from proceeding; the disorder in which they are, prevents + their judging soundly; render them incapable of foreseeing the consequence + of their actions; precludes them from applying to their experience; from + making use of their reason; natural operations, which suppose a justness + in the manner of associating their ideas; but to which their brain is then + not more competent, in consequence of the momentary delirium it suffers, + than their hand is to write whilst they are taking violent exercise. + </p> + <p> + Man's mode of thinking is necessarily determined by his manner of being; + it must, therefore, depend on his natural organization, and the + modification his system receives independently of his will. From this we + are obliged to conclude, that his thoughts, his reflections, his manner of + viewing things, of feeling, of judging, of combining ideas, is neither + voluntary nor free. In a word, that his soul is neither mistress of the + motion excited in it, nor of representing to itself, when wanted, those + images or ideas that are capable of counterbalancing the impulse it + receives. This is the reason why man, when in a passion, ceases to reason; + at that moment reason is as impossible to be heard, as it is during an + extacy, or in a fit of drunkenness. The wicked are never more than men who + are either drunk or mad: if they reason, it is not until tranquillity is + re-established in their machine; then, and not till then, the tardy ideas + that present themselves to their mind, enable them to see the consequence + of their actions, and give birth to ideas, that bring on them that + trouble, which is designated <i>shame, regret, remorse</i>. + </p> + <p> + The errors of philosophers on the free-agency of man, have arisen from + their regarding his will as the <i>primum mobile</i>, the original motive + of his actions; for want of recurring back, they have not perceived the + multiplied, the complicated causes, which, independently of him, give + motion to the will itself, or which dispose and modify his brain, whilst + he himself is purely passive in the motion he receives. Is he the master + of desiring or not desiring an object that appears desirable to him? + Without doubt it will be answered, No: but he is the master of resisting + his desire, if he reflects on the consequences. But, I ask, is he capable + of reflecting on these consequences when his soul is hurried along by a + very lively passion, which entirely depends upon his natural organization, + and the causes by which he is modified? Is it in his power to add to these + consequences all the weight necessary to counterbalance his desire? Is he + the master of preventing the qualities which render an object desirable + from residing in it? I shall be told, he ought to have learned to resist + his passions; to contract a habit of putting a curb on his desires. I + agree to it without any difficulty: but in reply, I again ask, Is his + nature susceptible of this modification? Does his boiling blood, his + unruly imagination, the igneous fluid that circulates in his veins, permit + him to make, enable him to apply true experience in the moment when it is + wanted? And, even when his temperament has capacitated him, has his + education, the examples set before him, the ideas with which he has been + inspired in early life, been suitable to make him contract this habit of + repressing his desires? Have not all these things rather contributed to + induce him to seek with avidity, to make him actually desire those objects + which you say he ought to resist. + </p> + <p> + The <i>ambitious man</i> cries out,—You will have me resist my + passion, but have they not unceasingly repeated to me, that rank, honours, + power, are the most desirable advantages in life? Have I not seen my + fellow-citizens envy them—the nobles of my country sacrifice every + thing to obtain them? In the society in which I live, am I not obliged to + feel, that if I am deprived of these advantages, I must expect to languish + in contempt, to cringe under the rod of oppression? + </p> + <p> + The <i>miser</i> says,—You forbid me to love money, to seek after + the means of acquiring it: alas! does not every thing tell me, that in + this world money is the greatest blessing; that it is amply sufficient to + render me happy? In the country I inhabit, do I not see all my + fellow-citizens covetous of riches? but do I not also witness that they + are little scrupulous in the means of obtaining wealth? As soon as they + are enriched by the means which you censure, are they not cherished, + considered, and respected? By what authority, then, do you object to my + amassing treasure? what right have you to prevent my using means, which + although you call them sordid and criminal, I see approved by the + sovereign? Will you have me renounce my happiness? + </p> + <p> + The <i>voluptuary</i> argues,—You pretend that I should resist my + desires; but was I the maker of my own temperament, which unceasingly + invites me to pleasure? You call my pleasures disgraceful; but in the + country in which I live, do I not witness the most dissipated men enjoying + the most distinguished rank? Do I not behold, that no one is ashamed of + adultery but the husband it has outraged? do not I see men making trophies + of their debaucheries, boasting of their libertinism, rewarded, with + applause? + </p> + <p> + The <i>choleric</i> man vociferates,—You advise me to put a curb on + my passions; to resist the desire of avenging myself: but can I conquer my + nature? Can I alter the received opinions of the world? Shall I not be for + ever disgraced, infallibly dishonoured in society, if I do not wash out, + in the blood of my fellow-creature, the injuries I have received? + </p> + <p> + The <i>zealous enthusiast</i> exclaims,—You recommend to me + mildness, you advise me to be tolerant, to be indulgent to the opinions of + my fellow-men; but is not my temperament violent? Do I not ardently love + my God? Do they not assure me that zeal is pleasing to him; that + sanguinary inhuman persecutors have been his friends? That those who do + not think as I do are his enemies? I wish to render myself acceptable in + his sight, I therefore adopt the means you reprobate. + </p> + <p> + In short, the actions of man are never free; they are always the necessary + consequence of his temperament, of the received ideas, of the notions, + either true or false, which he has formed to himself of happiness: of his + opinions, strengthened by example, forfeited by education, consolidated by + daily experience. So many crimes are witnessed on the earth, only because + every thing conspires to render man vicious, to make him criminal; very + frequently, the superstitions he has adopted, his government, his + education, the examples set before him, irresistibly drive him on to evil: + under these circumstances morality preaches virtue to him in vain. In + those societies where vice is esteemed, where crime is crowned, where + venality is constantly recompenced, where the most dreadful disorders are + punished, only in those who are too weak to enjoy the privilege of + committing them with impunity; the practice of virtue is considered + nothing more than a painful sacrifice of fancied happiness. Such societies + chastise, in the lower orders, those excesses which they respect in the + higher ranks; and frequently have the injustice to condemn those in + penalty of death, whom public prejudices, maintained by constant example, + have rendered criminal. + </p> + <p> + Man, then, is not a free agent in any one instant of his life; he is + necessarily guided in each step by those advantages, whether real or + fictitious, that he attaches to the objects by which his passions are + roused: these passions themselves are necessary in a being who, + unceasingly tends towards his own happiness; their energy is necessary, + since that depends on his temperament; his temperament is necessary, + because it depends on the physical elements which enter into his + composition; the modification of this temperament is necessary, as it is + the infallible result, the inevitable consequence of the impulse he + receives from the incessant action of moral and physical beings. + </p> + <p> + In despite of these proofs of the want of free-agency in man, so clear to + unprejudiced minds, it will, perhaps, be insisted upon with no small + feeling of triumph, that if it be proposed to any one to move or not to + move his hand, an action in the number of those called <i>indifferent</i>, + he evidently appears to be the master of choosing; from which it is + concluded, evidence has been offered of his free-agency. The reply is, + this example is perfectly simple; man in performing some action which he + is resolved on doing, does not by any means prove his free-agency: the + very desire of displaying this quality, excited by the dispute, becomes a + necessary motive which decides his will either for the one or the other of + these actions: what deludes him in this instance, or that which persuades + him he is a free agent at this moment, is, that he does not discern the + true motive which sets him in action; which is neither more nor less than + the desire of convincing his opponent: if in the heat of the dispute he + insists and asks, "Am I not the master of throwing myself out of the + window?" I shall answer him, no; that whilst he preserves his reason, + there is not even a probability that the desire of proving his + free-agency, will become a motive sufficiently powerful, to make him + sacrifice his life to the attempt; if, notwithstanding this, to prove he + is a free agent, he should actually precipitate himself from the window, + it would not be a sufficient warrantry to conclude he acted freely, but + rather that it was the violence of his temperament which spurred him on to + this folly. Madness is a state that depends upon the heat of the blood, + not upon the will. A fanatic or a hero, braves death as necessarily as a + more phlegmatic man or a coward flies from it. There is, in point of fact, + no difference between the man who is cast out of the window by another, + and the man who throws himself out of it, except that the impulse in the + first instance comes immediately from without, whilst that which + determines the fall in the second case, springs from within his own + peculiar machine, having its more remote cause also exterior. When Mutius + Scaevola held his hand in the fire, he was as much acting under the + influence of necessity, caused by interior motives, that urged him to this + strange action, as if his arm had been held by strong men; pride, despair, + the desire of braving his enemy, a wish to astonish him, an anxiety to + intimidate him, &c. were the invisible chains that held his hand bound + to the fire. The love of glory, enthusiasm for their country, in like + manner, caused Codrus and Decius to devote themselves for their fellow + citizens. The Indian Calanus and the philosopher Peregrinus were equally + obliged to burn themselves, by the desire of exciting the astonishment of + the Grecian assembly. + </p> + <p> + It is said that free-agency is the absence of those obstacles competent to + oppose themselves to the actions of man, or to the exercise of his + faculties: it is pretended that he is a free agent, whenever, making use + of these faculties, he produces the effect he has proposed to himself. In + reply to this reasoning, it is sufficient to consider that it in no wise + depends upon himself to place or remove the obstacles that either + determine or resist him; the motive that causes his action is no more in + his own power than the obstacle that impedes him, whether this obstacle or + motive be within his own machine or exterior of his person: he is not + master of the thought presented to his mind which determines his will; + this thought is excited by some cause independent of himself. + </p> + <p> + To be undeceived on the system of his free-agency, man has simply to recur + to the motive by which his will is determined, he will always find this + motive is out of his own controul. It is said, that in consequence of an + idea to which the mind gives birth, man acts freely if he encounters no + obstacle. But the question is, what gives birth to this idea in his brain? + has he the power either to prevent it from presenting itself, or from + renewing itself in his brain? Does not this idea depend either upon + objects that strike him exteriorly and in despite of himself, or upon + causes that without his knowledge act within himself and modify his brain? + Can he prevent his eyes, cast without design upon any object whatever, + from giving him an idea of this object, from moving his brain? He is not + more master of the obstacles; they are the necessary effects of either + interior or exterior causes, which always act according to their given + properties. A man insults a coward, who is necessarily irritated against + his insulter, but his will cannot vanquish the obstacle that cowardice + places to the object of his desire, which is, to resent the insult; + because his natural conformation, which does not depend upon himself, + prevents his having courage. In this case the coward is insulted in + despite of himself, and against his will is obliged patiently to brook the + insult he has received. + </p> + <p> + The partizans of the system of free-agency appear ever to have confounded + constraint with necessity. Man believes he acts as a free agent, every + time he does not see any thing that places obstacles to his actions; he + does not perceive that the motive which causes him to will is always + necessary, is ever independent of himself. A prisoner loaded with chains + is compelled to remain in prison, but he is not a free agent, he is not + able to resist the desire to emancipate himself; his chains prevent him + from acting, but they do not prevent him from willing; he would save + himself if they would loose his fetters, but he would not save himself as + a free agent, fear or the idea of punishment would be sufficient motives + for his action. + </p> + <p> + Man may therefore cease to be restrained, without, for that reason, + becoming a free agent: in whatever manner he acts, he will act + necessarily; according to motives by which he shall be determined. He may + be compared to a heavy body, that finds itself arrested in its descent by + any obstacle whatever: take away this obstacle, it will gravitate or + continue to fall; but who shall say this dense body is free to fall or + not? Is not its descent the necessary effect of its own specific gravity? + The virtuous Socrates submitted to the laws of his country, although they + were unjust; notwithstanding the doors of his gaol were left open to him + he would not save himself; but in this he did not act as a free agent; the + invisible chains of opinion, the secret love of decorum, the inward + respect for the laws, even when they were iniquitous, the fear of + tarnishing his glory, kept him in his prison: they were motives + sufficiently powerful, with this enthusiast for virtue, to induce him to + wait death with tranquillity; it was not in his power to save himself, + because he could find no potential motive to bring him to depart, even for + an instant, from those principles to which his mind was accustomed. + </p> + <p> + Man, says he, frequently acts against his inclination, from whence he has + falsely concluded he is a free agent; when he appears to act contrary to + his inclination, he is determined to it by some motive sufficiently + efficacious to vanquish this inclination. A sick man, with a view to his + cure, arrives at conquering his repugnance to the most disgusting + remedies: the fear of pain, the dread of death, then become necessary and + intelligent motives; consequently, this sick man cannot be said, with + truth, by any means, to act freely. + </p> + <p> + When it is said, that man is not a free agent, it is not pretended to + compare him to a body moved by a simple impulsive cause: he contains + within himself causes inherent to his existence; he is moved by an + interior organ, which has its own peculiar laws; which is itself + necessarily determined, in consequence of ideas formed from perceptions, + resulting from sensations, which it receives from exterior objects. As the + mechanism of these sensations, of these perceptions, and the manner they + engrave ideas on the brain of man, are not known to him, because he is + unable to unravel all these motions; because he cannot perceive the chain + of operations in his soul, or the motive-principle that acts within him, + he supposes himself a free agent; which, literally translated, signifies + that he moves himself by himself; that he determines himself without + cause; when he rather ought to say, he is ignorant how or for why he acts + in the manner he does. It is true the soul enjoys an activity peculiar to + itself, but it is equally certain that this activity would never be + displayed if some motive or some cause did not put it in a condition to + exercise itself, at least it will not be pretended that the soul is able + either to love or to hate without being moved, without knowing the + objects, without having some idea of their qualities. Gunpowder has + unquestionably a particular activity, but this activity will never display + itself, unless fire be applied to it; this, however, immediately sets in + motion. + </p> + <p> + It is the great complication of motion in man, it is the variety of his + action, it is the multiplicity of causes that move him, whether + simultaneously or in continual succession, that persuades him he is a free + agent: if all his motions were simple, if the causes that move him did not + confound themselves with each other, if they were distinct, if his machine + was less complicated, he would perceive that all his actions were + necessary, because he would be enabled to recur instantly to the cause + that made him act. A man who should be always obliged to go towards the + west would always go on that side, but he would feel extremely well, that + in so going he was not a free agent: if he had another sense, as his + actions or his motion augmented by a sixth would be still more varied, + much more complicated, he would believe himself still more a free agent + than he does with his five senses. + </p> + <p> + It is, then, for want of recurring to the causes that move him, for want + of being able to analyse, from not being competent to decompose the + complicated motion of his machine, that man believes himself a free agent; + it is only upon his own ignorance that he founds the profound yet + deceitful notion he has of his free-agency, that he builds those opinions + which he brings forward as a striking proof of his pretended freedom of + action. If, for a short time, each man was willing to examine his own + peculiar actions, to search out their true motives, to discover their + concatenation, he would remain convinced that the sentiment he has of his + natural free-agency is a chimera that must speedily be destroyed by + experience. + </p> + <p> + Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that the multiplicity, the diversity + of the causes which continually act upon man, frequently without even his + knowledge, render it impossible, or at least extremely difficult, for him + to recur to the true principles of his own peculiar actions, much less the + actions of others; they frequently depend upon causes so fugitive, so + remote from their effects, and which, superficially examined, appear to + have so little analogy, so slender a relation with them, that it requires + singular sagacity to bring them into light. This is what renders the study + of the moral man a task of such difficulty; this is the reason why his + heart is an abyss, of which it is frequently impossible for him to fathom + the depth. He is, then, obliged to content himself with a knowledge of the + general and necessary laws by which the human heart is regulated; for the + individuals of his own species these laws are pretty nearly the same, they + vary only in consequence of the organization that is peculiar to each, and + of the modification it undergoes; this, however, is not, cannot be + rigorously the same in any two. It suffices to know that by his essence + man tends to conserve himself, to render his existence happy: this + granted, whatever may be his actions, if he recurs back to this first + principle, to this general, this necessary tendency of his will, he never + can be deceived with regard to his motives. Man, without doubt, for want + of cultivating reason, being destitute of experience, frequently deceives + himself upon the means of arriving at this end; sometimes the means he + employs are unpleasant to his fellows, because they are prejudicial to + their interests; or else those of which he avails himself appear + irrational, because they remove him from the end to which he would + approximate: but whatever may be these means, they have always necessarily + and invariably for object, either an existing or imaginary happiness; are + directed to preserve himself in a state analogous to his mode of + existence, to his manner of feeling, to his way of thinking; whether + durable or transitory. It is from having mistaken this truth, that the + greater number of moral philosophers have made rather the romance, than + the history of the human heart; they have attributed the actions of man to + fictitious causes; at least they have not sought out the necessary motives + of his conduct. Politicians and legislators have been in the same state of + ignorance; or else impostors have found it much shorter to employ + imaginary motive-powers, than those which really have existence: they have + rather chosen to make man wander out of his way, to make him tremble under + incommodious phantoms, than guide him to virtue by the direct road to + happiness; notwithstanding the conformity of the latter with the natural + desires of his heart. So true it is, that <i>error can never possibly be + useful, to the human species</i>. + </p> + <p> + However this may be, man either sees or believes he sees, much more + distinctly, the necessary relation of effects with their causes in natural + philosophy than in the human heart; at least he sees in the former + sensible causes constantly produce sensible effects, ever the same, when + the circumstances are alike. After this, he hesitates not to look upon + physical effects as necessary, whilst he refuses to acknowledge necessity + in the acts of the human will; these he has, without any just foundation, + attributed to a motive-power that acts independently by its own peculiar + energy, that is capable of modifying itself without the concurrence of + exterior causes, and which is distinguished from all material or physical + beings. <i>Agriculture</i> is founded upon the assurance afforded by + experience, that the earth, cultivated and sown in a certain manner, when + it has otherwise the requisite qualities, will furnish grain, fruit, and + flowers, either necessary for subsistence or pleasing to the senses. If + things were considered without prejudice, it would be perceived, that in + morals education is nothing more than <i>the agriculture of the mind</i>; + that like the earth, by reason of its natural disposition, of the culture + bestowed upon it, of the seeds with which it is sown, of the seasons, more + or less favorable, that conduct it to maturity, we may be assured that the + soul will produce either virtue or vice; <i>moral fruit</i> that will be + either salubrious for man or baneful to society. <i>Morals</i> is the + science of the relations that subsist between the minds, the wills, and + the actions of men; in the same manner that <i>geometry</i> is the science + of the relations that are found between bodies. Morals would be a chimera, + it would have no certain principles, if it was not founded upon the + knowledge of the motives which must necessarily have an influence upon the + human will, and which must necessarily determine the actions of human + beings. + </p> + <p> + If in the moral as well as in the physical world, a cause of which the + action is not interrupted be necessarily followed by a given effect, it + flows consecutively that a <i>reasonable education</i>, grafted upon + truth, founded upon wise laws,—that honest principles instilled + during youth, virtuous examples continually held forth, esteem attached + solely to merit, recompense awarded to none but good actions, contempt + regularly visiting vice, shame following falsehood as its shadow, rigorous + chastisements applied without distinction to crime, are causes that would + necessarily act on the will of man; that would determine the greater + number of his species to exhibit virtue, to love it for its own sake, to + seek after it as the most desirable good, as the surest road to the + happiness he so ardently desires. But if, on the contrary, superstition, + politics, example, public opinion, all labour to countenance wickedness, + to train man viciously; if, instead of fanning his virtues, they stifle + good principles; if, instead of directing his studies to his advantage, + they render his education either useless or unprofitable; if this + education itself, instead of grounding him in virtue, only inoculates him + with vice; if, instead of inculcating reason, it imbues him with + prejudice; if, instead of making him enamoured of truth, it furnishes him + with false notions; if, instead of storing his mind with just ideas drawn + from experience, it fills him with dangerous opinions; if, instead of + fostering mildness and forbearance, it kindles in his breast only those + passions which are incommodious to himself and hurtful to others; it must + be of necessity, that the will of the greater number shall determine them + to evil; shall render them unworthy, make them baneful to society. Many + authors have acknowledged the importance of a good education, that youth + was the season to feed the human heart with wholesome diet; but they have + not felt, that a good education is incompatible, nay, impossible, with the + superstition of man, since this commences with giving his mind a false + bias: that it is equally inconsistent with arbitrary government, because + this always dreads lest he should become enlightened, and is ever sedulous + to render him servile, mean, contemptible, and cringing; that it is + incongruous with laws that are not founded in equity, that are frequently + bottomed on injustice; that it cannot obtain with those received customs + that are opposed to good sense; that it cannot exist whilst public opinion + is unfavourable to virtue; above all, that it is absurd to expect it from + incapable instructors, from masters with weak minds, who have only the + ability to infuse into their scholars those false ideas with which they + are themselves infected. Here, without doubt, is the real source from + whence springs that universal corruption, that wide-spreading depravity, + of which moralists, with great justice, so loudly complain; without, + however, pointing out those causes of the evil, which are true as they are + necessary: instead of this, they search for it in human nature, say it is + corrupt, blame man for loving himself, and for seeking after his own + happiness, insist that he must have supernatural assistance, some + marvellous interference, to enable him to become good: this is a very + prejudicial doctrine for him, it is directly subversive of his true + happiness; by teaching him to hold himself in contempt, it tends + necessarily to discourage him; it either makes him sluggish, or drives him + to despair whilst waiting for this grace: is it not easy to be perceived, + that he would always have it if he was well educated; if he was honestly + governed? There cannot well exist a wilder or a stranger system of morals, + than that of the theologians who attribute all moral evil to an original + sin, and all moral good to the pardon of it. It ought not to excite + surprise if such a system is of no efficacy; what can reasonably be the + result of such an hypothesis? Yet, notwithstanding the supposed, the + boasted free-agency of man, it is insisted that nothing less than the + Author of Nature himself is necessary to destroy the wicked desires of his + heart: but, alas! no power whatever is found sufficiently efficacious to + resist those unhappy propensities, which, under the fatal constitution of + things, the most vigorous motives, as before observed, are continually + infusing into the will of man; no agency seems competent to turn the + course of that unhappy direction these are perpetually giving to the + stream of his natural passions. He is, indeed, incessantly exhorted to + resist these passions, to stifle them, and to root them out of his heart; + but is it not evident they are necessary to his welfare? Can it not be + perceived they are inherent in his nature? Does not experience prove them + to be useful to his conservation, since they have for object, only to + avoid that which may be injurious to him; to procure that which may be + advantageous to his mode of existence? In short, is it not easy to be + seen, that these passions, well directed, that is to say, carried towards + objects that are truly useful, that are really interesting to himself, + which embrace the happiness of others, would necessarily contribute to the + substantial, to the permanent well-being of society? Theologians + themselves have felt, they have acknowledged the necessity of the + passions: many of the fathers of the church have broached this doctrine; + among the rest Father Senault has written a book expressly on the subject: + the passions of man are like fire, at once necessary to the wants of life, + suitable to ameliorate the condition of humanity, and equally capable of + producing the most terrible ravages, the most frightful devastation. + </p> + <p> + Every thing becomes an impulse to the will; a single word frequently + suffices to modify a man for the whole course of his life, to decide for + ever his propensities; an infant who has burned his finger by having + approached it too near the flame of a lighted taper, is warned from + thence, that he ought to abstain from indulging a similar temptation; a + man, once punished and despised for having committed a dishonest action, + is not often tempted to continue so unfavourable a course. Under whatever + point of man is considered, he never acts but after the impulse given to + his will, whether it be by the will of others, or by more perceptible + physical causes. The particular organization decides the nature of the + impulse; souls act upon souls that are analogous; inflamed, fiery + imaginations, act with facility upon strong passions; upon imaginations + easy to be inflamed, the surprising progress of enthusiasm; the hereditary + propagation of superstition; the transmission of religious errors from + race to race, the excessive ardour with which man seizes on the + marvellous, are effects as necessary as those which result from the action + and re-action of bodies. + </p> + <p> + In despite of the gratuitous ideas which man has formed to himself on his + pretended free-agency; in defiance of the illusions of this suppose + intimate sense, which, contrary to his experience, persuades him that he + is master of his will,—all his institutions are really founded upon + necessity: on this, as on a variety of other occasions, practice throws + aside speculation. Indeed, if it was not believed that certain motives + embraced the power requisite to determine the will of man, to arrest the + progress of his passions, to direct them towards an end, to modify him; of + what use would be the faculty of speech? What benefit could arise from + education itself? What does education achieve, save give the first impulse + to the human will, make man contract habits, oblige him to persist in + them, furnish him with motives, whether true or false, to act after a + given manner? When the father either menaces his son with punishment, or + promises him a reward, is he not convinced these things will act upon his + will? What does legislation attempt, except it be to present to the + citizens of a state those motives which are supposed necessary to + determine them to perform some actions that are considered worthy; to + abstain from committing others that are looked upon as unworthy? What is + the object of morals, if it be not to shew man that his interest exacts he + should suppress the momentary ebullition of his passions, with a view to + promote a more certain happiness, a more lasting well-being, than can + possibly result from the gratification of his transitory desires? Does not + the religion of all countries suppose the human race, together with the + entire of Nature, submitted to the irresistible will of a necessary being, + who regulates their condition after the eternal laws of immutable wisdom? + Is not God the absolute master of their destiny? Is it not this divine + being who chooses and rejects? The anathemas fulminated by religion, the + promises it holds forth, are they not founded upon the idea of the effects + they will necessarily produce upon mankind? Is not man brought into + existence without his own knowledge? Is he not obliged to play a part + against his will? Does not either his happiness or his misery depend on + the part he plays? + </p> + <p> + All religion has been evidently founded upon <i>Fatalism</i>. Among the + Greeks they supposed men were punished for their necessary faults, as may + be seen in Orestes, in Oedipus, &c. who only committed crimes + predicted by the oracles. It is rather singular that the theological + defenders of the doctrine of <i>free-agency</i>, which they endeavour to + oppose to that of <i>predestination</i>,—which according to them is + irreconcileable with <i>Christianity</i>, inasmuch as it is a false and + dangerous system,—should not have been aware that the doctrines of + <i>the fall of angels, original sin, the small number of the elect, the + system of grace, &c.</i> were most incontestibly supporting, by the + most cogent arguments, a <i>true system of fatalism</i>. + </p> + <p> + <i>Education</i>, then, is only necessity shewn to children: <i>legislation</i> + is necessity shewn to the members of the body politic: <i>morals</i> is + the necessity of the relations subsisting between men, shewn to reasonable + beings: in short, man grants <i>necessity</i> in every thing for which he + believes he has certain, unerring experience: that of which he does not + comprehend the necessary connection of causes with their effects he styles + <i>probability</i>: he would not act as he does, if he was not convinced, + or, at least, if he did not presume he was, that certain effects will + necessarily follow his actions. The <i>moralist</i> preaches reason, + because he believes it necessary to man: the <i>philosopher</i> writes, + because he believes truth must, sooner or later, prevail over falsehood: + <i>tyrants</i> and <i>fanatical priests</i> necessarily hate truth, + despise reason, because they believe them prejudicial to their interests: + the <i>sovereign</i>, who strives to terrify crime by the severity of his + laws, but who nevertheless, from motives of state policy sometimes renders + it useful and even necessary to his purposes, presumes the motives he + employs will be sufficient to keep his subjects within bounds. All reckon + equally upon the power or upon the necessity of the motives they make use + of; each individual flatters himself, either with or without reason, that + these motives will have an influence on the conduct of mankind. The + education of man is commonly so defective, so inefficacious, so little + calculated to promote the end he has in view, because it is regulated by + prejudice: even when this education is good, it is but too often speedily + counteracted, by almost every thing that takes place in society. + Legislation and politics are very frequently iniquitous, and serve no + better purpose than to kindle passions in the bosom of man, which once set + afloat, they are no longer competent to restrain. The great art of the + moralist should be, to point out to man, to convince those who are + entrusted with the sacred office of regulating his will, that their + interests are identified; that their reciprocal happiness depends upon the + harmony of their passions; that the safety, the power, the duration of + empires, necessarily depend on the good sense diffused among the + individual members; on the truth of the notions inculcated in the mind of + the citizens, on the moral goodness that is sown in their hearts, on the + virtues that are cultivated in their breasts; religion should not be + admissible, unless it truly fortified, unless it really strengthened these + motives. But in the miserable state into which error has plunged a + considerable portion of the human species, man, for the most part, is + seduced to be wicked: he injures his fellow-creature as a matter of + conscience, because the strongest motives are held out to him to be + persecuting; because his institutions invite him to the commission of + evil, under the lure of promoting his own immediate happiness. In most + countries superstition renders him a useless being, makes him an abject + slave, causes him to tremble under its terrors, or else turns him into a + furious fanatic, who is at once cruel, intolerant, and inhuman: in a great + number of states arbitrary power crushes him, obliges him to become a + cringing sycophant, renders him completely vicious: in those despotic + states the law rarely visits crime with punishment, except in those who + are too feeble to oppose its course? or when it has become incapable of + restraining the violent excesses to which a bad government gives birth. In + short, rational education is neglected; a prudent culture of the human + mind is despised; it depends, but too frequently, upon bigotted, + superstitious priests, who are interested in deceiving man, and who are + sometimes impostors; or else upon parents or masters without + understanding, who are devoid of morals, who impress on the ductile mind + of their scholars those vices with which they are themselves tormented; + who transmit to them the false opinions, which they believe they have an + interest in making them adopt. + </p> + <p> + All this proves the necessity of falling back to man's original errors, + and recurring to the primitive source of his wanderings, if it be + seriously intended to furnish him with suitable remedies for such enormous + maladies: it is useless to dream of correcting his mistakes, of curing him + of his depravity, until the true causes that move his will are unravelled; + until more real, more beneficial, more certain motives are substituted for + those which are found so inefficacious; which prove so dangerous both to + society and to himself. It is for those who guide the human will, who + regulate the condition of nations, who hold the real happiness of man in + their grasp, to seek after these motives,—with which reason will + readily furnish them—which experience will enable them to apply with + success: even a good book, by touching the heart of a great prince, may + become a very powerful cause that shall necessarily have an influence over + the conduct of a whole people, and decide upon the felicity of a portion + of the human race. + </p> + <p> + From all that has been advanced in this chapter, it results, that in no + one moment of his existence man is a free agent: he is not the architect + of his own conformation; this he holds from Nature, he has no controul + over his own ideas, or over the modification of his brain; these are due + to causes, that, in despite of him, very frequently without his own + knowledge, unceasingly act upon him; he is not the master of not loving + that which he finds amiable; of not coveting that which appears to him + desirable; he is not capable of refusing to deliberate, when he is + uncertain of the effects certain objects will produce upon him; he cannot + avoid choosing that which he believes will be most advantageous to him: in + the moment when his will is determined by his choice, he is not competent + to act otherwise than he does: in what instance, then, is he the master of + his own actions? In what moment is he a free agent? + </p> + <p> + That which a man is about to do is always a consequence of that which he + has been—of that which he is—of that which he has done up to + the moment of the action: his total and actual existence, considered under + all its possible circumstances, contains the sum of all the motives to the + action he is about to commit; this is a principle, the truth of which no + thinking, being will be able to refuse accrediting: his life is a series + of necessary moments; his conduct, whether good or bad, virtuous or + vicious, useful or prejudicial, either to himself or to others, is a + concatenation of action, a chain of causes and effects, as necessary as + all the moments of his existence. To <i>live</i>, is to exist in a + necessary mode during the points of its duration, which succeed each other + necessarily: to <i>will</i>, is to acquiesce or not in remaining such as + he is: to be <i>free</i>, is to yield to the necessary motives that he + carries within himself. + </p> + <p> + If he understood the play of his organs, if he was able to recal to + himself all the impulsions they have received, all the modifications they + have undergone, all the effects they have produced, he would perceive, + that all his actions are submitted to that <i>fatality</i> which regulates + his own particular system, as it does the entire system of the universe: + no one effect in him, any more than in Nature, produce itself by <i>chance</i>; + this, as has been before proved, is a word void of sense. All that passes + in him, all that is done by him, as well as all that happens in Nature, or + that is attributed to her, is derived from necessary laws, which produce + necessary effects; from whence necessarily flow others. + </p> + <p> + <i>Fatality</i> is the eternal, the immutable, the necessary order + established in Nature, or the indispensible connection of causes that act + with the effects they operate. Conforming to this order, heavy bodies + fall, light bodies rise; that which is analogous in matter, reciprocally + attracts; that which is heterogeneous, mutually repels; man congregates + himself in society, modifies each his fellow, becomes either virtuous or + wicked; either contributes to his mutual happiness, or reciprocates his + misery; either loves his neighbour, or hates his companion necessarily; + according to the manner in which the one acts upon the other. From whence + it may be seen, that the same necessity which regulates the physical, also + regulates the moral world: in which every thing is in consequence + submitted to fatality. Man, in running over, frequently without his own + knowledge, often in despite of himself, the route which Nature has marked + out for him, resembles a swimmer who is obliged to follow the current that + carries him along; he believes himself a free agent, because he sometimes + consents, sometimes does not consent, to glide with the stream; which, + notwithstanding, always hurries him forward; he believes himself the + master of his condition, because he is obliged to use his arms under the + fear of sinking. + </p> + <p> + The false ideas he has formed to himself upon free-agency, are in general + thus founded: there are certain events which he judges <i>necessary</i>; + either because he sees they are effects that are constantly, are + invariably linked to certain causes, which nothing seems to prevent; or + because he believes he has discovered the chain of causes and effects that + is put in play to produce those events: whilst he contemplates as <i>contingent</i>, + other events, of whose causes he is ignorant; the concatenation of which + he does not perceive; with whose mode of acting he is unacquainted: but in + Nature, where every thing is connected by one common bond, there exists no + effect without a cause. In the moral as well as in the physical world, + every thing that happens is a necessary consequence of causes, either + visible or concealed; which are, of necessity, obliged to act after their + peculiar essences. <i>In man, free-agency is nothing more than necessity + contained within himself</i>. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0019" id="link2H_4_0019"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + CHAP. XII. + </h2> + <p> + <i>An examination of the Opinion which pretends that the System of + Fatalism is dangerous.</i> + </p> + <p> + For a being whose essence obliges him to have a constant tendency to his + own conservation, to continually seek to render himself happy, experience + is indispensible: without it he cannot discover truth, which is nothing + more, as has been already said, than a knowledge of the constant relations + which subsist between man, and those objects that act upon him; according + to his experience he denominates those that contribute to his permanent + welfare useful and salutary; those that procure him pleasure, more or less + durable, he calls agreeable. Truth itself becomes the object of his + desires, only when he believes it is useful; he dreads it, whenever he + presumes it will injure him. But has truth the power to injure him? Is it + possible that evil can result to man from a correct understanding of the + relations he has with other beings? Can it be true, that he can be harmed + by becoming acquainted with those things, of which, for his own happiness, + he is interested in having a knowledge? No: unquestionably not. It is upon + its utility that truth founds its worth; upon this that it builds its + rights; sometimes it may be disagreeable to individuals—it may even + appear contrary to their interests—but it will ever be beneficial to + them in the end; it will always be useful to the whole human species; it + will eternally benefit the great bulk of mankind; whose interests must for + ever remain distinct from those of men, who, duped by their own peculiar + passions, believe their advantage consists in plunging others into error. + </p> + <p> + <i>Utility</i>, then, is the touchstone of his systems, the test of his + opinions, the criterion of the actions of man; it is the standard of the + esteem, the measure of the love he owes to truth itself: the most useful + truths are the most estimable: those truths which are most interesting for + his species, he styles <i>eminent</i>; those of which the utility limits + itself to the amusement of some individuals who have not correspondent + ideas, similar modes of feeling, wants analogous to his own, he either + disdains, or else calls them <i>barren</i>. + </p> + <p> + It is according to this standard, that the principles laid down in this + work, ought to be judged. Those who are acquainted with the immense chain + of mischief produced on the earth by erroneous systems of superstition, + will acknowledge the importance of opposing to them systems more accordant + with truth, schemes drawn from Nature, sciences founded on experience. + Those who are, or believe they are, interested in maintaining the + established errors, will contemplate, with horror, the truths here + presented to them: in short, those infatuated mortals, who do not feel, or + who only feel very faintly, the enormous load of misery brought upon + mankind by metaphysical speculation; the heavy yoke of slavery under which + prejudice makes him groan, will regard all our principles as useless; or, + at most, as sterile truths, calculated to amuse the idle hours of a few + speculators. + </p> + <p> + No astonishment, therefore, need be excited at the various judgments + formed by man: his interests never being the same, any more than his + notions of utility, he condemns or disdains every thing that does not + accord with his own peculiar ideas. This granted, let us examine, if in + the eyes of the disinterested man, who is not entangled by prejudice—who + is sensible to the happiness of his species—who delights in truth—the + <i>doctrine of fatalism</i> be useful or dangerous? Let us see if it is a + barren speculation, that his not any influence upon the felicity of the + human race? At has been already shewn, that it will furnish morals with + efficacious arguments, with real motives to determine the will, supply + politics with the true lever to raise the proper activity in the mind of + man. It will also be seen that it serves to explain in a simple manner the + mechanism of man's actions; to develope in an easy way the arcana of the + most striking phenomena of the human heart: on the other hand, if his + ideas are only the result of unfruitful speculations, they cannot interest + the happiness of the human species. Whether he believes himself a free + agent, or whether he acknowledges the necessity of things, he always + equally follows the desires imprinted on his soul; which are to preserve + his existence and render himself happy. A rational education, honest + habits, wise systems, equitable laws, rewards uprightly distributed, + punishments justly inflicted, will conduct man to happiness by making him + virtuous; while thorny speculations, filled with difficulties, can at most + only have an influence over persons unaccustomed to think. + </p> + <p> + After these reflections, it will be very easy to remove the difficulties + that are unceasingly opposed to the system of fatalism, which so many + persons, blinded by their superstitious prejudices, are desirous to have + considered as dangerous—as deserving of punishment—as + calculated to disturb public tranquility—as tending to unchain the + passions—to undermine the opinions man ought to have; and to + confound his ideas of vice and of virtue. + </p> + <p> + The opposers of necessity, say, that if all the actions of man are + necessary, no right whatever exists to punish bad ones, or even to he + angry with those who commit them: that nothing ought to be imputed to + them; that the laws would be unjust if they should decree punishment for + necessary actions; in short, that under this system man could neither have + merit nor demerit. In reply, it may be argued, that, to impute an action + to any one, is to attribute that action to him; to acknowledge him for the + author: thus, when even an action was supposed to be the effect of an + agent, and that agent <i>necessity</i>, the imputation would lie: the + merit or demerit, that is ascribed to an action are ideas originating in + the effects, whether favourable or pernicious, that result to those who + experience its operation; when, therefore, it should be conceded, that the + agent was necessity, it is not less certain, that the action would be + either good or bad; estimable or contemptible, to those who must feel its + influence; in short that it would be capable of either eliciting their + love, or exciting their anger. Love and anger are modes of existence, + suitable to modify, beings of the human species: when, therefore, man + irritates himself against his fellow, he intends to excite his fear, or + even to punish him, in order to deter him from committing that which is + displeasing to him. Moreover his anger is necessary; it is the result of + his Nature; the consequence of his temperament. The painful sensation + produced by a stone that falls on the arm, does not displease the less, + because it comes from a cause deprived of will; which acts by the + necessity of its Nature. In contemplating man as acting necessarily, it is + impossible to avoid distinguishing that mode of action or being which is + agreeable, which elicits approbation, from that which is afflicting, which + irritates, which Nature obliges him to blame and to prevent. From this it + will be seen, that the system of fatalism, does not in any manner change + the actual state of things, and is by no means calculated to confound + man's ideas of virtue and vice. + </p> + <p> + Man's Nature always revolts against that which opposes it: there are men + so choleric, that they infuriate themselves even against insensible and + inanimate objects; reflection on their own impotence to modify these + objects ought to conduct them back to reason. Parents are frequently very + much to be blamed for correcting their children with anger: they should be + contemplated as beings who are not yet modified; or who have, perhaps, + been very badly modified by themselves: nothing is more common in life, + than to see men punish faults of which they are themselves the cause. + </p> + <p> + Laws are made with a view to maintain society; to uphold its existence; to + prevent man associated, from injuring his neighbour; they are therefore + competent to punish those who disturb its harmony, or those who commit + actions that are injurious to their fellows; whether these associates may + be the agents of necessity, or whether they are free agents, it suffices + to know they are susceptible of modification, and are therefore submitted + to the operation of the law. Penal laws are, or ought to be, those motives + which experience has shewn capable of restraining the inordinate passions + of man, or of annihilating the impulse these passions give to his will; + from whatever necessary cause man may derive these passions, the + legislator proposes to arrest their effect, when he takes suitable means, + when he adopts proper methods, he is certain of success. The Judge, in + decreeing to crime, gibbets, tortures, or any other chastisement whatever, + does nothing more than is done by the architect, who in building a house, + places gutters to carry off the rain, and prevent it from sapping the + foundation. + </p> + <p> + Whatever may be the cause that obliges man to act, society possesses the + right to crush the effects, as much as the man whose land would be ruined + by a river, has to restrain its waters by a bank: or even, if he is able, + to turn its course. It is by virtue of this right that society has the + power to intimidate, the faculty to punish, with a view to its own + conservation, those who may be tempted to injure it; or those who commit + actions which are acknowledged really to interrupt its repose; to be + inimical to its security; repugnant to its happiness. + </p> + <p> + It will, perhaps, be argued, that society does not, usually, punish those + faults in which the will has no share; that, in fact, it punishes the will + alone; that this it is which decides the nature of the crime, and the + degree of its atrocity; that if this will be not free, it ought not to be + punished. I reply, that society is an assemblage of sensible beings, + susceptible of reason, who desire their own welfare; who fear evil, and + seek after good. These dispositions enable their will to be so modified or + determined, that they are capable of holding such a conduct as will + conduce to the end they have in view. Education, the laws, public opinion, + example, habit, fear, are the causes that must modify associated man, + influence his will, regulate his passions, restrain the actions of him who + is capable of injuring the end of his association, and thereby make him + concur to the general happiness. These causes are of a nature to make + impressions on every man, whose organization, whose essence, whose sanity, + places him in a capacity to contract the habits, to imbibe the modes of + thinking, to adopt the manner of acting, with which society is willing to + inspire him. All the individuals of the human species are susceptible of + fear, from whence it flows as a natural consequence, that the fear of + punishment, or the privation of the happiness he desires, are motives that + must necessarily more or less influence his will, and regulate his + actions. If the man is to be found who is so badly constituted as to + resist, whose organization is so vicious as to be insensible to those + motives which operate upon all his fellows, he is not fit to live in + society; he would contradict the very end of his association: he would be + its enemy; he would place obstacles to its natural tendency; his + rebellious disposition, his unsociable will, not being susceptible of that + modification which is convenient to his own true interests and to the + interests of his fellow-citizens; these would unite themselves against + such an enemy; and the law which is, or ought to be the expression of the + general will, would visit with condign punishment that refractory + individual upon whom the motives presented to him by society, had not the + effect which it had been induced to expect: in consequence, such an + unsociable man would be chastised; he would be rendered miserable, and + according to the nature of his crime he would be excluded from society as + a being but little calculated to concur in its views. + </p> + <p> + If society has the right to conserve itself, it has also the right to take + the means: these means are the laws which present or ought to present to + the will of man those motives which are most suitable to deter him from + committing injurious actions. If these motives fail of the proper effect, + if they are unable to influence him, society, for its own peculiar good, + is obliged to wrest from him the power of doing it further injury. From + whatever source his actions may arise, therefore, whether they are the + result of free-agency, or whether they are the offspring of necessity, + society coerces him if, after having furnished him with motives, + sufficiently powerful to act upon reasonable beings, it perceives that + these motives have not been competent to vanquish his depraved nature. It + punishes him with justice, when the actions from which it dissuades him + are truly injurious to society; it has an unquestionable right to punish, + when it only commands those things that are conformable to the end + proposed by man in his association; or defends the commission of those + acts, which are contrary to this end; which are hostile to the nature of + beings associated for their reciprocal advantage. But, on the other hand, + the law has not acquired the right to punish him: if it has failed to + present to him the motives necessary to have an influence over his will, + it has not the right to coerce him if the negligence of society has + deprived him of the means of subsisting; of exercising his talents; of + exerting his industry; of labouring for its welfare. It is unjust, when it + punishes those to whom it has, neither given an education, nor honest + principles; whom it has not enabled to contract habits necessary to the + maintenance of society: it is unjust when it punishes them for faults + which the wants of their nature, or the constitution of society has + rendered necessary to them: it is unjust, it is irrational, whenever it + chastises them for having followed those propensities, which example, + which public opinion, which the institutions, which society itself + conspires to give them. In short, the law is defective when it does not + proportion the punishment to the real evil which society has sustained. + The last degree of injustice, the acme of folly is, when society is so + blinded as to inflict punishment on those citizens who have served it + usefully. + </p> + <p> + The <i>penal</i> laws, in exhibiting terrifying objects to man, who must + be supposed susceptible of fear, presents him with motives calculated to + have an influence over his will. The idea of pain, the privation of + liberty, the fear of death, are, to a being well constituted, in the full + enjoyment of his faculties, very puissant obstacles, that strongly oppose + themselves to the impulse of his unruly desires: when these do not coerce + his will, when they fail to arrest his progress, he is an irrational + being; a madman; a being badly organized; against whom society has the + right to guarantee itself; against whom it has a right to take measures + for its own security. Madness is, without doubt, an involuntary, a + necessary state; nevertheless, no one feels it unjust to deprive the + insane of their liberty, although their actions can only be imputed to the + derangement of their brain. The wicked are men whose brain is either + constantly or transitorily disturbed; still they must be punished by + reason of the evil they commit; they must always be placed in the + impossibility of injuring society: if no hope remains of bringing them + back to a reasonable conduct—if every prospect of recalling them to + their duty has vanished—if they cannot be made to adopt a mode of + action conformable to the great end of association—they must be for + ever excluded its benefits. + </p> + <p> + It will not be requisite to examine here, how far the punishments which + society inflicts upon those who offend against it, may be reasonably + carried. Reason should seem to indicate that the law ought to shew to the + necessary crimes of man, all the indulgence that is compatible with the + conservation of society. The system of fatalism, as we have seen, does not + leave crime unpunished; but it is, at least, calculated to moderate the + barbarity with which a number of nations punish the victims to their + anger. This cruelty becomes still more absurd, when experience has shewn + its inutility: the habit of witnessing ferocious punishments familiarizes + criminals with the idea. If it be true that society possesses the right of + taking away the life of its members—if it be really a fact, that the + death of a criminal, thenceforth useless, can be advantageous for society, + which it will be necessary to examine, humanity, at least, exacts that + this death should not be accompanied with useless tortures; with which + laws, perhaps in this instance too rigorous, frequently seem to delight in + overwhelming their victim. This cruelty seems to defeat its own end, it + only serves to make the culprit, who is immolated to the public vengeance, + suffer without any advantage to society; it moves the compassion of the + spectator, interests him in favor of the miserable offender who groans + under its weight; it impresses nothing upon the wicked, but the sight of + those cruelties destined for himself; which but too frequently renders him + more ferocious, more cruel, more the enemy of his associates: if the + example of death was less frequent, even without being accompanied with + tortures, it would be more efficacious. If experience was consulted, it + would be found that the greater number of criminals only look upon death + as a <i>bad quarter of an hour</i>. It is an unquestionable fact, that a + thief seeing one of his comrades, display a want of firmness under the + punishment, said to him: <i>"Is not this what I have often told you, that + in our business, we have one evil more than the rest of mankind?"</i> + Robberies are daily committed, even at the foot of the scaffolds where + criminals are punished. In those nations, where the penalty of death is so + lightly inflicted, has sufficient attention been paid to the fact, that + society is yearly deprived of a great number of individuals who would be + able to render it very useful service, if made to work, and thus indemnify + the community for the injuries they have committed? The facility with + which the lives of men are taken away, proves the incapacity of + counsellors; is an evidence of the negligence of legislators: they find it + a much shorter road, that it gives them less trouble to destroy the + citizens than to seek after the means to render them better. + </p> + <p> + What shall be said for the unjust cruelty of some nations, in which the + law, that ought to have for its object the advantage of the whole, appears + to be made only for the security of the most powerful? How shall we + account for the inhumanity of those societies, in which punishments the + most disproportionate to the crime, unmercifully take away the lives of + men, whom the most urgent necessity, the dreadful alternative of famishing + in a land of plenty, has obliged to become criminal? It is thus that in a + great number of civilized nations, the life of the citizen is placed in + the same scales with money; that the unhappy wretch who is perishing from + hunger, who is writhing under the most abject misery, is put to death for + having taken a pitiful portion of the superfluity of another whom he + beholds rolling in abundance! It is this that, in many otherwise very + enlightened societies, is called <i>justice</i>, or making the punishment + commensurate with the crime. + </p> + <p> + Let the man of humanity, whose tender feelings are alive to the welfare of + his species—let the moralist, who preaches virtue, who holds out + forbearance to man—let the philosopher, who dives into the secrets + of Nature—let the theologian himself say, if this dreadful iniquity, + this heinous sin, does not become yet more crying, when the laws decree + the most cruel tortures for crimes to which the most irrational customs + gave birth—which bad institutions engender—which evil examples + multiply? Is not this something like building a sorry, inconvenient hovel, + and then punishing the inhabitant, because he does not find all the + conveniences of the most complete mansion, of the most finished structure? + Man, as at cannot be too frequently repeated, is so prone to evil, only + because every thing appears to urge him on to the commission of it, by too + frequently shewing him vice triumphant: his education is void in a great + number of states, perhaps defective in nearly all; in many places he + receives from society no other principles, save those of an unintelligible + superstition; which make but a feeble barrier against those propensities + that are excited by dissolute manners; which are encouraged by corrupt + examples: in vain the law cries out to him: "abstain from the goods of thy + neighbour;" his wants, more powerful, loudly declare to him that he must + live: unaccustomed to reason, having never been submitted to a wholesome + discipline, he conceives he must do it at the expence of a society who has + done nothing for him: who condemns him to groan in misery, to languish in + indigence: frequently deprived of the common necessaries requisite to + support his existence, which his essence, of which he is not the master, + compels him to conserve. He compensates himself by theft, he revenges + himself by assassination, he becomes a plunderer by profession, a murderer + by trade; he plunges into crime, and seeks at the risque of his life, to + satisfy those wants, whether real or imaginary, to which every thing + around him conspires to give birth. Deprived of education, he has not been + taught to restrain the fury of his temperament—to guide his passions + with discretion—to curb his inclinations. Without ideas of decency, + destitute of the true principles of honour, he engages in criminal + pursuits that injure his country: which at the same time has been to him + nothing more than a step-mother. In the paroxysm of his rage, in the + exacerbation of his mind, he loses sight of his neighbour's rights, he + overlooks the gibbet, he forgets the torture; his unruly desires have + become too potent—they have completely absorbed his mind; by a + criminal indulgence they have given an inveteracy to his habits which + preclude him from changing them; laziness has made him torpid: remorse has + gnawed his peace; despair has rendered him blind; he rushes on to death; + and society is compelled to punish him rigorously, for those fatal, those + necessary dispositions, which it has perhaps itself engendered in his + heart by evil example: or which at least, it has not taken the pains + seasonably to root out; which it has neglected to oppose by suitable + motives—by those calculated to give him honest principles—to + excite him to industrious habits, to imbue him with virtuous inclinations. + Thus, society frequently punishes those propensities of which it is itself + the author, or which its negligence has suffered to spring up in the mind + of man: it acts like those unjust fathers, who chastise their children for + vices which they have themselves made them contract. + </p> + <p> + However unjust, however unreasonable this conduct may be, or appear to be, + it is not the less necessary: society, such as it is, whatever may be its + corruption, whatever vices may pervade its institutions, like every thing + else in Nature, is willing to subsist; tends to conserve itself: in + consequence, it is obliged to punish those excesses which its own vicious + constitution has produced: in despite of its peculiar prejudices, + notwithstanding its vices, it feels cogently that its own immediate + security demands that it should destroy the conspiracies of those who make + war against its tranquillity: if these, hurried on by the foul current of + their necessary propensities, disturb its repose—if, borne on the + stream of their ill-directed desires, they injure its interests, this + following the natural law, which obliges it to labour to its own peculiar + conservation, removes them out of its road; punishes them with more or + less rigor, according to the objects to which it attaches the greatest + importance, or which it supposes best suited to further its own peculiar + welfare: without doubt, it deceives itself frequently, both upon these + objects and the means; but it deceives itself necessarily, for want of the + knowledge calculated to enlighten it, with regard to its true interests; + for want of those, who regulate its movements possessing proper vigilance—suitable + talents—the requisite virtue. From this it will appear, that the + injustice of a society badly constituted, and blinded by its prejudices, + is as necessary, as the crimes of those by whom it is hostilely attacked—by + whose vices it is distracted. The body politic, when in a state of + insanity, cannot act more consistently with reason, than one of its + members whose brain is disturbed by madness. + </p> + <p> + It will still be said that these maxims, by submitting every thing to + necessity, must confound, or even destroy the notions man forms of justice + and injustice; of good and evil; of merit and demerit: I deny it. Although + man, in every thing he does, acts necessarily, his actions are good, they + are just, they are meritorious, every time they tend to the real utility + of his fellows; of the society of which he makes a part: they are, of + necessity, distinguished from those which are really prejudicial to the + welfare of his associates. Society is just, it is good, it is worthy our + reverence, when it procures for all its members, their physical wants, + when it affords them protection, when it secures their liberty, when it + puts them in possession of their natural rights. It is ill this that + consists all the happiness of which the social compact is susceptible: + society is unjust, it is bad, it is unworthy our esteem, when it is + partial to a few, when it is cruel to the greater number: it is then that + it multiplies its enemies, obliges them to revenge themselves by criminal + actions which it is under the necessity to punish. It is not upon the + caprices of political society that depend the true notions of justice and + injustice—the right ideas of moral good and evil—a just + appreciation of merit and demerit; it is upon <i>utility</i>, upon the + necessity of things, which always forces man to feel that there exists a + mode of acting on which he implicitly relies, which he is obliged to + venerate, which he cannot help approving either in his fellows, in + himself, or in society: whilst there is another mode to which he cannot + lend his confidence, which his nature makes him to hate, which his + feelings compel him to condemn. It is upon his own peculiar essence that + man founds his ideas of pleasure and of pain—of right and of wrong—of + vice and of virtue: the only difference between these is, that pleasure + and pain make them instantaneously felt in his brain; he becomes conscious + of their existence upon the spot; in the place of which, the advantages + that accrue to him from justice, the benefit that he derives from virtue, + frequently do not display themselves but after a long train of reflections—after + multiplied experience and complicated attention; which many, either from a + defect in their conformation, or from the peculiarity of the circumstances + under which they are placed, are prevented from making, or at least from + making correctly. + </p> + <p> + By a necessary consequence of this truism, the system of fatalism, + although it has frequently been so accused, does not tend to encourage man + in crime, to make remorse vanish from his mind. His propensities are to be + ascribed to his nature; the use he makes of his passions depends upon his + habits, upon his opinions, upon the ideas he has received in his + education; upon the examples held forth by the society in which he lives. + These things are what necessarily decide his conduct. Thus, when his + temperament renders him susceptible of strong passions, he is violent in + his desires, whatever may be his speculations. + </p> + <p> + <i>Remorse</i> is the painful sentiment excited in him by grief, caused + either by the immediate or probable future effect of his indulged + passions: if these effects were always useful to him, he would not + experience remorse; but, as soon as he is assured that his actions render + him hateful, that his passions make him contemptible; or, as soon as he + fears he shall be punished in some mode or other, he becomes restless, + discontented with himself—he reproaches himself with his own conduct—he + feels ashamed—he fears the judgement of those beings whose affection + he has learned to esteem—in whose good-will he finds his own comfort + deeply interested. His experience proves to him that the wicked man is + odious to all those upon whom his actions have any influence: if these + actions are concealed at the moment of commission, he knows it very rarely + happens they remain so for ever. The smallest reflection convinces him + that there is no wicked man who is not ashamed of his own conduct—who + is truly contented with himself—who does not envy the condition of + the good man—who is not obliged to acknowledge that he has paid very + dearly for those advantages he is never able to enjoy, without + experiencing the most troublesome sensations, without making the most + bitter reproaches against himself; then he feels ashamed, despises + himself, hates himself, his conscience becomes alarmed, remorse follows in + it train. To be convinced of the truth of this principle it is only + requisite to cast our eyes on the extreme precautions that tyrants and + villains, who are otherwise sufficiently powerful not to dread the + punishment of man, take to prevent exposure;—to what lengths they + push their cruelties against some, to what meannesses they stoop to others + of those who are able to hold them up to public scorn. Have they not, + then, a consciousness of their own iniquities? Do they not know that they + are hateful and contemptible? Have they not remorse? Is their condition + happy? Persons well brought up acquire these sentiments in their + education; which are either strengthened or enfeebled by public opinion, + by habit, or by the examples set before them. In a depraved society, + remorse either does not exist, or presently disappears; because, in all + his actions, it is ever the judgment of his fellow-man that man is obliged + necessarily to regard. He never feels either shame or remorse for actions + he sees approved, that are practised by the world. Under corrupt + governments, venal souls, avaricious being, mercenary individuals, do not + blush either at meanness, robbery, or rapine, when it is authorized by + example; in licentious nations, no one blushes at adultery except the + husband, at whose expence it is committed; in superstitious countries, man + does not blush to assassinate his fellow for his opinions. It will be + obvious, therefore, that his remorse, as well as the ideas, whether right + or wrong, which man has of decency, virtue, justice, &c. are the + necessary consequence of his temperament, modified by the society in which + he lives: assassins and thieves, when they live only among themselves, + have neither shame nor remorse. + </p> + <p> + Thus, I repeat, all the actions of man are necessary those which are + always useful, which constantly contribute to the real, tend to the + permanent happiness of his species, are called <i>virtues</i>, and are + necessarily pleasing to all who experience their influence; at least, if + their passions or false opinions do not oblige them to judge in that + manner which is but little accordant with the nature of things: each man + acts, each individual judges, necessarily, according to his own peculiar + mode of existence—after the ideas, whether true or false, which he + has formed with regard to his happiness. There are necessary actions which + man is obliged to approve; there are others, that, in despite of himself, + he is compelled to censure; of which the idea generates shame when his + reflection permits him to contemplate them under the same point of view + that they are regarded by his associates. The virtuous man and the wicked + man act from motives equally necessary: they differ simply in their + organization—in the ideas they form to themselves of happiness: we + love the one necessarily—we detest the other from the same + necessity. The law of his nature, which wills that a sensible being shall + constantly labour to preserve himself, has not left to man the power to + choose, or the free-agency to prefer pain to pleasure—vice to + utility—crime to virtue. It is, then, the essence of man himself + that obliges him to discriminate those actions which are advantageous to + him, form those which are prejudicial to his interest, from those which + are baneful to his felicity. + </p> + <p> + This distinction subsists even in the most corrupt societies, in which the + ideas of virtue, although completely effaced from their conduct, remain + the same in their mind. Let us suppose a matt, who had decidedly + determined for villainy, who should say to himself—"It is folly to + be virtuous in a society that is depraved, in a community that is + debauched." Let us suppose also, that he has sufficient address, the + unlooked-for good fortune to escape censure or punishment, during a long + series of years; I say, that in despite of all these circumstances, + apparently so advantageous for himself, such a man has neither been happy + nor contented with his own conduct, He has been in continual agonies—ever + at war with his own actions—in a state of constant agitation. How + much pain, how much anxiety, has he not endured in this perpetual conflict + with himself? How many precautions, what excessive labour, what endless + solicitude, has he not been compelled to employ in this continued + struggle; how many embarrassments, how many cares, has he not experienced + in this eternal wrestling with his associates, whose penetration he + dreads, whose scorn he fears will follow a true knowledge of his pursuits. + Demand of him what he thinks of himself, he will shrink from the question. + Approach the bedside of this villain at the moment he is dying; ask him if + he would be willing to recommence, at the same price, a life of similar + agitation? If he is ingenuous, he will avow that he has tasted neither + repose nor happiness; that each crime filled him with inquietude—that + reflection prevented him from sleeping—that the world has been to + him only one continued scene of alarm—an uninterrupted concatenation + of terror—an everlasting, anxiety of mind;—that to live + peaceably upon bread and water, appears to him to be a much happier, a + more easy condition, than to possess riches, credit, reputation, honours, + on the same terms that he has himself acquired them. If this villain, + notwithstanding all his success, finds his condition so deplorable, what + must be thought of the feelings of those who have neither the same + resources nor the same advantages to succeed in their criminal projects. + </p> + <p> + Thus, the system of necessity is a truth not only founded upon certain + experience, but, again, it establishes morals upon an immoveable basis. + Far from sapping the foundations of virtue, it points out its necessity; + it clearly shows the invariable sentiments it must excite—sentiments + so necessary, so strong, so congenial to his existence, that all the + prejudices of man—all the vices of his institutions—all the + effect of evil example, have never been able entirely to eradicate them + from his mind. When he mistakes the advantages of virtue, it ought to be + ascribed to the errors that are infused into him—to the + irrationality of his institutions: all his wanderings are the fatal + consequences of error,—the necessary result of prejudices which have + identified themselves with his existence. Let it not, therefore, any + longer be imputed to his nature that he has become wicked, but to those + baneful opinions which he has imbibed with his mother's milk,—that + have rendered him ambitious, avaricious, envious, haughty, arrogant, + debauched, intolerant, obstinate, prejudiced, incommodious to his fellows, + mischievous to himself. It is education that carries into his system the + germ of those vices which necessarily torment him during the whole course + of his life. + </p> + <p> + <i>Fatalism</i> is reproached with discouraging man—with damping the + ardour of his soul—with plunging him into apathy—with + destroying the bonds that should connect him with society. Its opponents + say, "If every thing is necessary, we must let things go on, and not be + disturbed by any thing." But does it depend on man to be sensible or not? + Is he master of feeling or not feeling pain? If Nature has endowed him + with a humane, with a tender soul, is it possible he should not interest + himself in a very lively manner, in the welfare of beings whom he knows + are necessary to his own peculiar happiness? His feelings are necessary: + they depend on his own peculiar nature, cultivated by education. His + imagination, prompt to concern itself with the felicity of his race, + causes his heart to be oppressed at the sight of those evils his + fellow-creature is obliged to endure,—makes his soul tremble in the + contemplation of the misery arising from the despotism that crushes him—from + the superstition that leads him astray—from the passions that + distract him in a state of warfare against his neighbour. Although he + knows that death is the fatal, the necessary period to the form of all + beings, his soul is not affected in a less lively manner at the loss of a + beloved wife,—at the demise of a child calculated to console his old + age,—at the final separation from an esteemed friend who had become + dear to his heart. Although he is not ignorant that it is the essence of + fire to burn, he does not believe he is dispensed from using his utmost + efforts to arrest the progress of a conflagration. Although he is + intimately convinced that the evils to which he is a witness, are the + necessary consequence of primitive errors with which his fellow-citizens + are imbued, he feels he ought to display truth to them, if Nature has + given him the necessary courage; under the conviction, that if they listen + to it, it will, by degrees, become a certain remedy for their sufferings, + that it will produce those necessary effects which it is of its essence to + operate. + </p> + <p> + If the speculations of man modify his conduct, if they change his + temperament, he ought not to doubt that the system of necessity would have + the most advantageous influence over him; not only is it suitable to calm + the greater part of his inquietude, but it will also contribute to inspire + him with a useful submission, a rational resignation, to the decrees of a + destiny with which his too great sensibility frequently causes him to be + overwhelmed. This happy apathy, without doubt, would be, desirable to + those whose souls, too tender to brook the inequalities of life, + frequently render them the deplorable sport of their fate; or whose + organs, too weak to make resistance to the buffettings of fortune, + incessantly expose them to be dashed in pieces under the rude blows of + adversity. + </p> + <p> + But, of all the important advantages the human race would be enabled to + derive from the doctrine of fatalism, if man was to apply it to his + conduct, none would be of greater magnitude, none of more happy + consequence, none that would more efficaciously corroborate his happiness, + than that general indulgence, that universal toleration, that must + necessarily spring from the opinion, that <i>all is necessary</i>. In + consequence, of the adoption of this principle, the fatalist, if he had a + sensible soul, would commisserate the prejudices of his fellow-man—would + lament over his wanderings—would seek to undeceive him—would + try by gentleness to lead him into the right path, without ever irritating + himself against his weakness, without ever insulting his misery. Indeed, + what right have we to hate or despise man for his opinions? His ignorance, + his prejudices, his imbecility, his vices, his passions, his weakness, are + they not the inevitable consequence of vicious institutions? Is he not + sufficiently punished by the multitude of evils that afflict him on every + side? Those despots who crush him with an iron sceptre, are they not + continual victims to their own peculiar restlessness—mancipated to + their perpetual diffidence—eternal slaves to their suspicions? Is + there one wicked individual who enjoys a pure, an unmixed, a real + happiness? Do not nations unceasingly suffer from their follies? Are they + not the incessant dupes to their prejudices? Is not the ignorance of + chiefs, the ill-will they bear to reason, the hatred they have for truth, + punished by the imbecility of their citizens, by the ruin of the states + they govern? In short, the fatalist would grieve to witness necessity each + moment exercising its severe decrees upon mortals who are ignorant of its + power, or who feel its castigation, without being willing to acknowledge + the hand from whence it proceeds; he will perceive that ignorance is + necessary, that credulity is the necessary result of ignorance—that + slavery and bondage are necessary consequences of ignorant credulity—that + corruption of manners springs necessarily from slavery—that the + miseries of society, the unhappiness of its members, are the necessary + offspring of this corruption. The fatalist, in consequence, of these + ideas, will neither be a gloomy misanthrope, nor a dangerous citizen; he + will pardon in his brethren those wanderings, he will forgive them those + errors—which their vitiated nature, by a thousand causes, has + rendered necessary—he will offer them consolation—he will + endeavour to inspire them with courage—he will be sedulous to + undeceive them in their idle notions, in their chimerical ideas; but he + will never display against them bitterness of soul—he will never + show them that rancorous animosity which is more suitable, to make them + revolt from his doctrines, than to attract them to reason;—he will + not disturb the repose of society—he will not raise the people to + insurrection against the sovereign authority; on the contrary, he will + feel that the miserable blindness of the great, and the wretched + perverseness, the fatal obstinacy of so many conductors of the people, are + the necessary consequence of that flattery that is administered to them in + their infancy—that feeds their hopes with allusive falsehoods—of + the depraved malice of those who surround them—who wickedly corrupt + them, that they may profit by their folly—that they may take + advantage of their weakness: in short, that these things are the + inevitable effect of that profound ignorance of their true interest, in + which every thing strives to keep them. + </p> + <p> + The fatalist has no right to be vain of his peculiar talents; no privilege + to be proud of his virtues; he knows that these qualities are only the + consequence of his natural organization, modified by circumstances that + have in no wise depended upon himself. He will neither have hatred nor + feel contempt for those whom Nature and circumstances have not favoured in + a similar manner. It is the fatalist who ought to be humble, who should be + modest from principle: is he not obliged to acknowledge, that he possesses + nothing that he has not previously received? + </p> + <p> + In fact, will not every thing conduct to indulgence the fatalist whom + experience has convinced of the necessity of things? Will he not see with + pain, that it is the essence of a society badly constituted, unwisely + governed, enslaved to prejudice, attached to unreasonable customs, + submitted to irrational laws, degraded under despotism, corrupted by + luxury, inebriated by false opinions, to be filled with trifling members; + to be composed of vicious citizens; to be made up of cringing slaves, who + are proud of their chains; of ambitious men, without idea of true glory; + of misers and prodigals; of fanatics and libertines! Convinced of the + necessary connection of things, he will not be surprised to see that the + supineness of their chiefs carries discouragement into their country, or + that the influence of their governors stirs up bloody wars by which it is + depopulated, and causes useless expenditures that impoverish it; that all + these excesses united, is the reason why so many nations contain only men + wanting happiness, without understanding to attain it; who are devoid of + morals, destitute of virtue. In all this he will contemplate nothing more + than the necessary action and re-action of physics upon morals, of morals + upon physics. In short, all who acknowledge fatality, will remain + persuaded that a nation badly governed is a soil very fruitful in venomous + reptiles—very abundant in poisonous plants; that these have such a + plentiful growth as to crowd each other and choak themselves. It is in a + country cultivated by the hands of a Lycurgus, that he will witness the + production of intrepid citizens, of noble-minded individuals, of + disinterested men, who are strangers to irregular pleasures. In a country + cultivated by a Tiberius, he will find nothing but villains with depraved + hearts, men with mean contemptible souls, despicable informers, execrable + traitors. It is the soil, it is the circumstances in which man finds + himself placed, that renders him either a useful object or a prejudicial + being: the wise man avoids the one, as he would those dangerous reptiles + whose nature it is to sting and communicate their deadly venom; he + attaches himself to the other, esteems him, loves him, as he does those + delicious fruits with whose rich maturity his palate is pleasantly + gratified, with whose cooling juices he finds himself agreeably refreshed: + he sees the wicked without anger—he cherishes the good with pleasure—he + delights in the bountiful: he knows full well that the tree which is + languishing without culture in the arid, sandy desert, that is stunted for + want of attention, leafless for want of moisture, that has grown crooked + from neglect, become barren from want of loam, whose tender bark is gnawed + by rapacious beasts of prey, pierced by innumerable insects, would perhaps + have expanded far and wide its verdant boughs from a straight and stately + stem, have brought forth delectable fruit, have afforded from its + luxuriant foliage under its lambent leaves an umbrageous refreshing + retreat from the scorching rays of a meridian sun, have offered beneath + its swelling branches, under its matted tufts a shelter from the pitiless + storm, it its seed had been fortunately sown in a more fertile soil, + placed in a more congenial climate, had experienced the fostering cares of + a skilful cultivator. + </p> + <p> + Let it not then be said, that it is degrading man reduce his functions to + a pure mechanism; that it is shamefully to undervalue him, scandalously to + abuse him, to compare him to a tree; to an abject vegetation. The + philosopher devoid of prejudice does not understand this language, + invented by those who are ignorant of what constitutes the true dignity of + man. A tree is an object which, in its station, joins the useful with the + agreeable; it merits our approbation when it produces sweet and pleasant + fruit; when it affords a favourable shade. All machines are precious, when + they are truly useful, when they faithfully perform the functions for + which they are designed. Yes, I speak it with courage, reiterate it with + pleasure, the honest man, when he has talents, when he possesses virtue, + is, for the beings of his species, a tree that furnishes them with + delicious fruit, that affords them refreshing shelter: the honest man is a + machine of which the springs are adapted to fulfil its functions in a + manner that must gratify the expectation of all his fellows. No, I should + not blush, I should not feel degraded, to be a machine of this sort; and + my heart would leap with joy, if I could foresee that the fruit of my + reflections would one day be useful to my race, consoling to my + fellow-man. + </p> + <p> + Is not Nature herself a vast machine, of which the human species is but a + very feeble spring? I see nothing contemptible either in her or her + productions; all the beings who come out of her hands are good, are noble, + are sublime, whenever they co-operate to the production of another, to the + maintenance of harmony in the sphere where they must act. Of whatever + nature the soul may be, whether it is made mortal, or whether it be + supposed immortal; whether it is regarded as a spirit, or whether it be + looked upon as a portion of the body; it will be found noble, it will be + estimated great, it will be ranked good, it will be considered sublime, in + a Socrates, in an Aristides, in a Cato: it will be thought abject, it will + be viewed as despicable, it will be called corrupt, in a Claudius, in a + Sejanus, in a Nero: its energies will be admired, we shall be delighted + with its manner, fascinated with its efforts, in a Shakespeare, in a + Corneille, in a Newton, in a Montesquieu: its baseness will be lamented, + when we behold mean, contemptible men, who flatter tyranny, or who + servilely cringe at the foot of superstition. + </p> + <p> + All that has been said in the course of this work, proves clearly that + every thing is necessary; that every thing is always in order, relatively + to Nature; where all beings do nothing more than follow the laws that are + imposed on their respective classes. It is part of her plan, that certain + portions of the earth shall bring forth delicious fruits, shall blossom + beauteous flowers; whilst others shall only furnish brambles, shall yield + nothing but noxious vegetables: she has been willing that some societies + should produce wise men, great heroes; that others should only give birth + to abject souls, contemptible men, without energy, destitute of virtue. + Passions, winds, tempests, hurricanes, volcanoes, wars, plagues, famines, + diseases, death, are as necessary to her eternal march as the beneficent + heat of the sun, the serenity of the atmosphere, the gentle showers of + spring, plentiful years, peace, health, harmony, life: vice and virtue, + darkness and light, and science are equally necessary; the one are not + benefits, the other are not evils, except for those beings whose happiness + they influence by either favouring or deranging their peculiar mode of + existence. <i>The whole cannot be miserable, but it may contain unhappy + individuals.</i> + </p> + <p> + Nature, then, distributes with the same hand that which is called <i>order</i>, + and that which is called <i>disorder</i>; that which is called <i>pleasure</i>, + and that which is called <i>pain</i>: in short, she diffuses by the + necessity of her existence, good and evil in the world we inhabit. Let not + man, therefore, either arraign her bounty, or tax her with malice; let him + not imagine that his feeble cries, his weak supplications, can never + arrest her colossal power, always acting after immutable laws; let him + submit silently to his condition; and when he suffers, let him not seek a + remedy by recurring to chimeras that his own distempered imagination has + created; let him draw from the stores of Nature herself, the remedies + which she offers for the evil she brings upon him: if she sends him + diseases, let him search in her bosom for those salutary productions to + which she has given birth, which will cure them: if she gives him errors, + she also furnishes him with experience to counteract them; in truth, she + supplies him with an antidote suitable to destroy their fatal effects. If + she permits man to groan under the pressure of his vices, beneath the load + of his follies, she also shews him in virtue, a sure remedy for his + infirmities: if the evils that some societies experience are necessary, + when they shall have become too incommodious they will be irresistibly + obliged to search for those remedies which Nature will always point out to + them. If this Nature has rendered existence insupportable, to some + unfortunate beings, whom she appears to have selected for her victims, + still death, is a door that will surely be opened to them—that will + deliver them from their misfortunes, although in their puny, imbecile, + wayward judgment, they may be deemed impossible of cure. + </p> + <p> + Let not man, then, accuse Nature with being inexorable to him, since there + does not exist in her whole circle an evil for which she has not furnished + the remedy, to those who have the courage to seek it, who have the + fortitude to apply it. Nature follows general and necessary laws in all + her operations; physical calamity and moral evil are not to be ascribed to + her want of kindness, but to the necessity of things. Physical calamity is + the derangement produced in man's organs by physical causes which he sees + act: moral evil is the derangement produced in him by physical causes of + which the action is to him a secret. These causes always terminate by + producing sensible effects, which are capable of striking his senses; + neither the thoughts nor the will of man ever shew themselves, but by the + marked effects they produce either in himself or upon those beings whom + Nature has rendered susceptible of feeling their impulse. He suffers, + because it is of the essence of some beings to derange the economy of his + machine; he enjoys, because the properties of some beings are analogous to + his own mode of existence; he is born, because it is of the nature of some + matter to combine itself under a determinate form; he lives, he acts, he + thinks, because it is of the essence of certain combinations to maintain + themselves in existence by given means for a season; at length he dies, + because a necessary law prescribes that all the combinations which are + formed, shall either be destroyed or dissolve themselves. From all this it + results, that Nature is impartial to all its productions; she submits man, + like all other beings, to those eternal laws from which she has not even + exempted herself; if she was to suspend these laws, even for an instant, + from that moment disorder would reign in her, system; her harmony would be + disturbed. + </p> + <p> + Those who wish to study Nature, must take experience for their guide; + this, and this only, can enable them to dive into her secrets, to unravel + by degrees, the frequently imperceptible woof of those slender causes, of + which she avails herself to operate the greatest phenomena: by the aid of + experience, man often discovers in her properties, perceives modes of + action entirely unknown to the ages which have preceded him; those effects + which his grandfathers contemplated as marvellous, which they regarded as + supernatural efforts, looked upon as miracles, have become familiar to him + in the present day, and are at this moment contemplated as simple and + natural consequences, of which he comprehends the mechanism—of which + he understands the cause—of which he can unfold the manner of + action. Man, in fathoming Nature, has arrived at discovering the true + causes of earthquakes; of the periodical motion of the sea; of + subterraneous conflagrations; of meteors; of the electrical fluid, the + whole of which were considered by his ancestors, and are still so by the + ignorant, by the uninformed, as indubitable signs of heaven's wrath. His + posterity, in following up, in rectifying the experience already made, + will perhaps go further, and discover those causes which are totally + veiled from present eyes. The united efforts of the human species will one + day perhaps penetrate even into the sanctuary of Nature, and throw into + light many of those mysteries which up to the present time she seems to + have refused to all his researches. + </p> + <p> + In contemplating man under his true aspect; in quitting authority to + follow experience; in laying aside error to consult reason; in submitting + every thing to physical laws, from which his imagination has vainly + exerted its utmost power to withdraw them; it will be found that the + phenomena of the moral world follow exactly the same general rules as + those of the physical; that the greater part of those astonishing effects, + which ignorance, aided by his prejudices, make him consider as + inexplicable, and regard as wonderful, are natural consequences flowing + from simple causes. He will find that the eruption of a volcano and the + birth of a Tamerlane are to Nature the same thing; in recurring to the + primitive causes of those striking events which he beholds with + consternation, which he contemplates with fearful alarm, in falling back + to the sources of those terrible revolutions, those frightful convulsions, + those dreadful explosions that distract mankind, lay waste the fairest + works of Nature, ravage nations, and tear up society by the roots; he will + find the wills that compassed the most surprising changes, that operated + the most extensive alterations in the state of things, that brought about + the most unlooked-for events, were moved by physical causes, whose exility + made him treat them as contemptible; whose want of consequence in his own + purblind eyes led him to believe them utterly incapable to give birth to + the phenomena whose magnitude strikes him with such awe, whose stupendous + range fills him with such amazement. + </p> + <p> + If man was to judge of causes by their effects, there would be no small + causes in the universe. In a Nature where every thing is connected, where + every thing acts and re-acts, moves and changes, composes and decomposes, + forms and destroys, there is not an atom which does not play an important + part—that does not occupy a necessary station; there is not an + imperceptible particle, however minute, which, placed in convenient + circumstances, does not operate the most prodigious effects. If man was in + a capacity to follow the eternal chain, to pursue the concatenated links, + that connect with their causes all the effects he witnesses, without + losing sight of any one of its rings,—if he could unravel the ends + of those insensible threads that give impulse to the thoughts, decision to + the will, direction to the passions of those men who are called mighty, + according to their actions, he would find, they are true atoms which + Nature employs to move the moral world; that it is the unexpected but + necessary function of these indiscernible particles of matter, it is their + aggregation, their combination, their proportion, their fermentation, + which modifying the individual by degrees, in despite of himself, + frequently without his own knowledge, make him think, will, and act, in a + determinate, but necessary mode. If, then, the will and the actions of + this individual have an influence over a great number of other men, here + is the moral world in a state of the greatest combustion, and those + consequences ensue which man contemplates with fearful wonder. Too much + acrimony in the bile of a fanatic—blood too much inflamed in the + heart of a conqueror—a painful indigestion in the stomach of a + monarch—a whim that passes in the mind of a woman—are + sometimes causes sufficient to bring on war—to send millions of men + to the slaughter—to root out an entire people—to overthrow + walls—to reduce cities into ashes—to plunge nations into + slavery—to put a whole people into mourning—to breed famine in + a land—to engender pestilence—to propagate calamity—to + extend misery—to spread desolation far and wide upon the surface of + our globe, through a long series of ages. + </p> + <p> + The dominant passion of an individual of the human species, when it + disposes of the passions of many others, arrives at combining their will, + at uniting their efforts, and thus decides the condition of man. It is + after this manner that an ambitious, crafty, and voluptuous Arab, gave to + his countrymen an impulse of which the effect was the subjugation and + desolation of vast countries in Asia, in Africa, and in Europe; whose + consequences were sufficiently potential to erect a new, extensive, but + slavish empire; to give a novel system of religion to millions of human + beings; to overturn the altars of their former gods; in short, to alter + the opinions, to change the customs of a considerable portion of the + population of the earth. But in examining the primitive sources of this + strange revolution, what were the concealed causes that had an influence + over this man—that excited his peculiar passions, and modified his + temperament? What was the matter from the combination of which resulted a + crafty, ambitious, enthusiastic, and eloquent man; in short, a personage + competent to impose on his fellow-creatures—capable of making them + concur in his most extravagant views. They were, undoubtedly, the + insensible particles of his blood; the imperceptible texture of his + fibres; the salts, more or less acrid, that stimulated his nerves; the + proportion of igneous fluid that circulated in his system. From whence + came these elements? It was from the womb of his mother; from the aliments + which nourished him; from the climate in which he had his birth; from the + ideas he received; from the air which he respired; without reckoning a + thousand inappreciable, a thousand transitory causes, that in the instance + given had modified, had determined the passions of this importent being, + who had thereby acquired the capacity to change the face of this mundane + sphere. + </p> + <p> + To causes so weak in their principles, if in the origin the slightest + obstacle had been opposed, these wonderful events, which have astounded + man, would never have been produced. The fit of an ague, the consequence + of bile a little too much inflamed, had sufficed, perhaps, to have + rendered abortive all the vast projects, of the legislator of the + Mussulmen. Spare diet, a glass of water, a sanguinary evacuation, would + sometimes have been sufficient to have saved kingdoms. + </p> + <p> + It will be seen, then, that the condition of the human species, as well as + that of each of its individuals, every instant depends on insensible + causes, to which circumstances, frequently fugitive, give birth; that + opportunity developes, that convenience puts in action: man attributes + their effects to chance, whilst these causes operate necessarily, act + according to fixed rules: he has frequently neither the sagacity nor the + honesty to recur to their true principles; he regards such feeble motives + with contempt, because he has been taught to consider them as incapable of + producing such stupendous events. They are, however, these motives, weak + as they may appear to be, these springs, so pitiful in his eyes, is which + according to her necessary laws, suffice in the hands of Nature to move + the universe. The conquests of a Gengis-Khan have nothing in them that is + more strange to the eye of a philosopher than the explosion of a mine, + caused in its principle by a feeble spark, which commences with setting + fire to a single grain of powder; this presently communicates itself to + many millions of other contiguous grains, of which the united force, the + multiplied powers, terminate by blowing up mountains, overthrowing + fortifications, or converting populous, well-built cities, into heaps of + ruins. + </p> + <p> + Thus, imperceptible causes, concealed in the bosom of Nature, until the + moment their action is displayed, frequently decide the fate of man. The + happiness or the wretchedness, the prosperity or the misery of each + individual, as well as that of whole nations, are attached to powers which + it is impossible for him to foresee, which he cannot appreciate, of which + he is incapable to arrest the action. Perhaps at this moment atoms are + amassing, insensible particles are combining, of which the assemblage + shall form a sovereign, who will be either the scourge or the saviour of a + mighty empire. Man cannot answer for his own destiny one single instant; + he has no cognizance of what is passing within himself; he is ignorant of + the causes which act in the interior of his machine; he knows nothing of + the circumstances that will give them activity: he is unacquainted with + what may develope their energy; it is, nevertheless, on these causes, + impossible to be unravelled by him, that depends his condition in life. + Frequently, an unforeseen rencontre gives birth to a passion in his soul, + of which the consequences shall, necessarily, have an influence over his + felicity. It is thus that the most virtuous man, by a whimsical + combination of unlooked-for circumstances, may become in an instant the + most criminal of his species. + </p> + <p> + This truth, without doubt, will be found frightful—this fact will + unquestionably appear terrible: but at bottom, what has it more revolting + than that which teaches him that an infinity of accidents, as irremediable + as they are unforeseen, may every instant wrest from him that life to + which he is so strongly attached? Fatalism reconciles the good man easily + to death: it makes him contemplate it as a certain means of withdrawing + himself from wickedness; this system shews death, even to the happy man + himself, as a medium between him and those misfortunes which frequently + terminate by poisoning his happiness; that end with embittering the most + fortunate existence. + </p> + <p> + Let man, then, submit to necessity: in despite of himself it will always + hurry him forward: let him resign himself to Nature, let him accept the + good with which she presents him: let him oppose to the necessary evil + which she makes him experience, those necessary remedies which she + consents to afford him; let him not disturb his mind with useless + inquietude; let him enjoy with moderation, because he will find that pain + is the necessary companion of excess: let him follow the paths of virtue, + because every thing will prove to him, even in this world of perverseness, + that it is absolutely necessary to render him estimable in the eyes of + others, to make him contented with himself. + </p> + <p> + Feeble, vain mortal, thou pretendest to be a free agent. Alas! dost thou + not see all the threads which enchain thee? Dost thou not perceive that + they are atoms which form thee; that they are atoms which move thee; that + they are circumstances independent of thyself, that modify thy being; that + they are circumstances over which thou hast not any controul, that rule + thy destiny? In the puissant Nature that environs thee, shalt thou pretend + to be the only being who is able to resist her power? Dost thou really + believe that thy weak prayers will induce her to stop in her eternal + march; that thy sickly desires can oblige her to change her everlasting + course? + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0020" id="link2H_4_0020"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + CHAP. XIII. + </h2> + <p> + <i>Of the Immortality of the Soul;—of the Doctrine of a future + State;—of the Fear of Death.</i> + </p> + <p> + The reflections presented to the reader in this work, tend to shew what + ought to be thought of the human soul, as well as of its operations and + faculties: every thing proves, in the most convincing manner, that it + acts, that it moves according to laws similar to those prescribed to the + other beings of Nature; that it cannot be distinguished from the body; + that it is born with it; that it grows up with it; that it is modified in + the same progression; in short, every thing ought to make man conclude + that it perishes with it. This soul, as well as the body, passes through a + state of weakness and infancy; it is in this stage of its existence, that + it is assailed by a multitude of modifications; that it is stored with an + infinity of ideas, which it receives from exterior objects through the + medium of the organs; that it amasses facts, that it collects experience, + whether true or false, that it forms to itself a system of conduct, + according to which it thinks, in conformity with which it acts, from + whence results either its happiness or its misery, its reason or its + delirium, its virtues or its vices; arrived with the body at its full + powers, having in conjunction with it reached maturity, it does not cease + for a single instant to partake in common of its sensations, whether these + are agreeable or disagreeable; it participates in all its pleasures; it + shares in all its pains; in consequence it conjointly approves or + disapproves its state; like it, it is either sound or diseased; active or + languishing; awake or asleep. In old age man extinguishes entirely, his + fibres become rigid, his nerves loose their elasticity, his senses are + obtunded, his sight grows dim, his ears lose their quickness, his ideas + become unconnected, his memory fails, his imagination cools: what then + becomes of his soul? Alas! it sinks down with the body; it gets benumbed + as this loses its feeling; becomes sluggish as this decays in activity; + like it, when enfeebled by years it fulfils its functions with pain; this + substance, which is deemed spiritual, which is considered immaterial, + which it is endeavoured to distinguish from matter, undergoes the same + revolutions, experiences the same vicissitudes, submits to the same + modifications, as does the body itself. + </p> + <p> + In despite of this proof of the materiality of the soul, of its identity + with the body, so convincing to the unprejudiced, some thinkers have + supposed, that although the latter is perishable, the former does not + perish: that this portion of man enjoys the especial privilege of <i>immortality</i>; + that it is exempt from dissolution: free from those changes of form all + the beings in Nature undergo: in consequence of this, man has persuaded + himself, that this privileged soul does not die: its immortality, above + all, appears indubitable to those who suppose it spiritual: after having + made it a simple being, without extent, devoid of parts, totally different + from any thing of which he has a knowledge, he pretended that it was not + subjected to the laws of decomposition common to all beings, of which + experience shews him the continual operation. + </p> + <p> + Man, feeling within himself a concealed force, that insensibly produced + action, that imperceptibly gave direction to the motion of his machine, + believed that the entire of Nature, of whose energies he is ignorant, with + whose modes of acting he is unacquainted, owed its motion to an agent + analogous to his own soul; who acted upon the great macrocosm, in the same + manner that this soul acted upon his body. Man, having supposed himself + double, made Nature double also: he distinguished her from her own + peculiar energy; he separated her from her mover, which by degrees he made + spiritual. Thus Nature, distinguished from herself, was regarded as the + soul of the world; and the soul of man was considered as opinions + emanating from this universal soul. This notion upon the origin of the + soul is of very remote antiquity. It was that of the Egyptians, of the + Chaldeans, of the Hebrews, of the greater number of the <i>wise men of the + east.</i> It should appear that Moses believed with the Egyptians the + divine emanation of souls: according to him, <i>"God formed man of the + dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and + man became a living soul:"</i> nevertheless, the Catholic, at this day, + rejects this system of <i>divine emanation,</i> seeing that it supposes + the Divinity divisible: which would have, been inconvenient to the Romish + idea of purgatory, or to the system of everlasting punishment. Although + Moses, in the above quotation, seems to indicate that the soul was a + portion of the Divinity, it does not appear that the doctrine of the <i>immortality + of the soul</i> was established in any one of the books attributed to him. + It was during the Babylonish captivity, that the Jews learned the doctrine + of future rewards and punishments, taught by Zoroaster to the Persians, + but which the Hebrew legislator did not understand, or, at least, he left + his people ignorant on the subject. It was in those schools, that + Pherecydes, Pythagoras, and Plato, drew up a doctrine so flattering to the + vanity of human nature—so gratifying to the imagination of mortals. + Man thus believed himself a portion of the Divinity; immortal, like the + Godhead, in one part of himself: nevertheless, subsequent religions have + renounced these advantages, which they judged incompatible with the other + parts of their systems; they held forth that the Sovereign of Nature, or + her contriver was not the soul of man, but, that, in virtue of his + omnipotence, he created human souls, in proportion as he produced the + bodies which they must animate; and they taught, that these souls once + produced, by an effect of the same omnipotence, enjoyed immortality. + </p> + <p> + However it may be with these variations upon the origin of souls, those + who supposed them emanating from the Divinity, believed that after the + death of the body, which served them for an envelope, they returned, by + refunding to their first source. Those who, without adopting the opinion + of divine emanation, admired the spirituality, believed the immortality of + the soul, were under the necessity to suppose a region, to find out an + abode for these souls, which their imagination painted to them, each + according to his fears, his hopes, his desires, and his prejudices. + </p> + <p> + Nothing is more popular than the doctrine of the <i>immortality of the + soul;</i> nothing is more universally diffused than the expectation of + another life. Nature having inspired man with the most ardent love for his + existence, the desire of preserving himself for ever was a necessary + consequence; this desire was presently converted into certainty: from that + desire of existing eternally which Nature has implanted in him, he made an + argument, to prove that man would never cease to exist. Abady says, "our + soul has no useless desires, it naturally desires an eternal life;" and by + a very strange logic, he concludes that this desire could not fail to be + fulfilled. Cicero, before Abady, had declared the immortality of the soul + to be an innate idea in man; yet, strange to tell, in another part of his + works he considers Pherecydes as the inventor of the doctrine. However + this may be, man, thus disposed, listened with avidity to those who + announced to him systems so conformable to his wishes. Nevertheless, he + ought not to regard as supernatural the desire of existing, which always + was, and always will be, of the essence man; it ought not to excite + surprise, if he received with eagerness an hypothesis that flattered his + hopes, by promising that his desire would one day be gratified; but let + him beware how he concludes that this desire itself is an indubitable + proof of the reality of this future life, with which at present he seems + to be so much occupied. The passion for existence is in man only a natural + consequence of the tendency of a sensible being, whose essence it is to be + willing to conserve himself: in the human being it follows the energy of + his soul—keeps pace with the force of his imagination—always + ready to realize that which he strongly desires. He desires the life of + the body, nevertheless this desire is frustrated; wherefore should not the + desire for the life of the soul be frustrated like the other? The + partizans of the doctrine of the immortality of the soul reason thus: "All + men desire to live for ever, therefore they will live for ever." Suppose + the argument retorted on them; would it be believed? If it was asserted, + "All men naturally desire to be rich; therefore all men will one day be + rich," how many partizans would this doctrine find? + </p> + <p> + The most simple reflection upon the nature of his soul, ought to convince + man that the idea of its immortality is only an illusion of the brain. + Indeed what is his soul, save the principle of sensibility? What is it, to + think, to enjoy, to suffer; is it not to feel? What is life, except it be + the assemblage of modifications, the congregation of motion, peculiar to + an organized being? Thus, as soon as the body ceases to live, its + sensibility can no longer exercise itself; when its sensibility is no + more, it can no longer have ideas, nor in consequence thoughts. Ideas, as + we have proved, can only reach man through his senses; now, how will they + have it, that once deprived of his senses, he is yet capable of receiving + sensations, of having perceptions, of forming ideas? As they have made the + soul of man a being separated from the animated body, wherefore have they + not made life a being distinguished from the living body? Life in a body + is the totality of this motion; feeling and thought make a part of this + motion: thus it is reasonable to suppose, that in the dead man these + motions will cease, like all the others. + </p> + <p> + Indeed, by what reasoning will it be proved, that this soul, which cannot + feel, think, will, or act, but by aid of man's organs, can suffer pain, be + susceptible of pleasure, or even have a consciousness of its own + existence, when the organs which should warn it of their presence are + decomposed or destroyed? Is it not evident, that the soul depends on the + arrangement of the various parts of the body; on the order with which + these parts conspire to perform their functions; on the combined motion of + the whole? Thus the organic structure once destroyed, can it be reasonably + doubted the soul will be destroyed also? Is it not seen, that during the + whole course of human life this soul is stimulated, changed, deranged, + disturbed, by all the changes man's organs experience? And yet it will be + insisted, that this soul acts, thinks, subsists, when these same organs + have entirely disappeared! + </p> + <p> + An organized being may be compared to a clock, which once broken, is no + longer suitable to the use for which it was designed. To say, that the + soul shall feel, shall think, shall enjoy, shall suffer after the death of + the body; is to pretend that a clock, shivered into a thousand pieces, + will continue to strike the hour; shall yet have the faculty of marking + the progress of time. Those who say, that the soul of man is able to + subsist, notwithstanding the destruction of the body, evidently support + the position, that the modification of a body will be enabled to conserve + itself after the subject is destroyed: this on any other occasion would be + considered as completely absurd. + </p> + <p> + It will be said that the conservation of the soul after the death of the + body, is an effect of the Divine Omnipotence: but this is supporting an + absurdity by a gratuitous hypothesis. It surely is not meant by Divine + Omnipotence, of whatever nature it may be supposed, that a thing shall + exist and not exist at the same time: unless this be granted, it will be + rather difficult to prove, that a soul shall feel and think without the + intermediates necessary to thought. + </p> + <p> + Let them then, at least, forbear asserting, that reason is not wounded by + the doctrine of the immortality of the soul; or by the expectation of a + future life. These notions, formed to flatter man, to disturb the + imagination of the uninformed, who do not reason, cannot appear either + convincing or probable to enlightened minds. Reason, exempted from the + illusions of prejudice, is, without doubt, wounded by the supposition of a + soul, that feels, that thinks, that is afflicted, that rejoices, that has + ideas, without having organs; that is to say, destitute of the only known + medium, wanting all the natural means, by which, according to what we can + understand, it is possible for it to feel sensations, have perceptions, or + form ideas. If it be replied, other means are able to exist, which are <i>supernatural</i> + or <i>unknown</i>, it may be answered, that these means of transmitting + ideas to the soul, separated from the body, are not better known to, or + more within the reach of, those who suppose it, that they are of other + men. It is, at least, very certain, it cannot admit even of a controversy, + that all those who reject the system of innate ideas, cannot, without + contradicting their own principles, admit the doctrine of the immortality + of the soul. + </p> + <p> + In defiance of the consolation that so many persons pretend to find in the + notion of an eternal existence; in despite of that firm persuasion which + such numbers of men assure us they have, that their souls will survive + their bodies, they seem so very much alarmed at the dissolution of this + body, that they do not contemplate their end, which they ought to desire + as the period of so many miseries, but with the greatest inquietude; so + true it is, that the real, the present, even accompanied with pain, has + much more influence over mankind, than the most beautiful chimeras of the + future; which he never views but through the clouds of uncertainty. Indeed + the most religious men, notwithstanding the conviction they express of a + blessed eternity, do not find these flattering hopes sufficiently + consoling to repress their fears; to prevent their trembling, when they + think on the necessary dissolution of their bodies. Death was always, for + mortals, the most frightful point of view; they regard it as a strange + phenomenon, contrary to the order of things, opposed to Nature; in a word, + as an effect of the celestial vengeance, as the <i>wages of sin</i>. + Although every thing proves to man that death is inevitable, he is never + able to familiarize himself with its idea; he never thinks on it without + shuddering; the assurance of possessing an immortal soul but feebly + indemnifies him for the grief he feels in the deprivation of his + perishable body. Two causes contribute to strengthen his fears, to nourish + his alarm; the one is, that this death, commonly accompanied with pain, + wrests from him an existence that pleases him—with which he is + acquainted—to which he is accustomed; the other is the uncertainty + of the state that must succeed his actual existence. + </p> + <p> + The illustrious Bacon has said, that "men fear death for the same reason + that children dread being alone in darkness." Man naturally challenges + every thing with which he is unacquainted; he is desirous to see clearly + to the end, that he may guarantee himself against those objects which may + menace his safety; that he may also be enabled to procure for himself + those which may be useful to him; the man who exists cannot form to + himself any idea of non-existence; as this circumstance disturbs him, for + want of experience, his imagination sets to work; this points out to him, + either well or ill, this uncertain state: accustomed to think, to feel, to + be stimulated into activity, to enjoy society, he contemplates as the + greatest misfortune, a dissolution that will strip him of these objects, + that will deprive him of those sensations which his present nature has + rendered necessary to him; he views with dismay a situation that will + prevent his being warned of his own existence—that shall bereave him + of his pleasures—to plunge him into nothing. In supposing it even + exempt from pain, he always looks upon this nothing as an afflicting + solitude—as an heap of profound darkness; he sees himself in a state + of general desolation; destitute of all assistance; and he feels keenly + all the rigour of this frightful situation. But does not a profound sleep + help to give him a true idea of this nothing? Does not that deprive him of + every thing? Does it not appear to annihilate the universe to him, and him + to the universe? Is death any thing more than a profound, a permanent + steep? It is for want of being able to form an idea of death that man + dreads it; if he could figure to himself a true image of this state of + annihilation, he would from thence cease to fear it; but he is not able to + conceive a state in which there is no feeling; he therefore believes, that + when he shall no longer exist, he will have the same feelings, the same + consciousness of things, which, during his existence, appear so sad to his + mind; which his fancy paints in such gloomy colours. Imagination pictures + to him his funeral pomp—the grave they are digging for him—the + lamentations that will accompany him to his last abode-the epicedium that + surviving friendship may dictate; he persuades himself that these + melancholy objects will affect him as painfully even after his decease, as + they do in his present condition, in which he is in full possession of his + senses. + </p> + <p> + Mortal, led astray by fear! after thy death thine eyes will see no more; + thine ears will hear no longer; in the depth of thy grave thou wilt no + more be witness to this scene, which thine imagination, at present, + represents to thee under such dismal colours; thou wilt no longer take + part in what shall be done in the world; thou wilt no more be occupied + with what may befal thine inanimate remains, than thou wast able to be the + day previous to that which ranked thee among the beings of thy species. To + die is to cease to think; to lack feeling; no longer to enjoy; to find a + period to suffering; thine ideas will perish with thee; thy sorrows will + not follow thee to the silent tomb. Think of death, not to feed thy fears—not + to nourish thy melancholy—but to accustom thyself to look upon it + with a peaceable eye; to cheer thee up against those false terrors with + which the enemies to thy repose labour to inspire thee! The fears of death + are vain illusions, that must disappear as soon as we learn to contemplate + this necessary event under its true point of view. A great man has defined + philosophy to be <i>a meditation on death;</i> he is not desirous by that + to have it understood that man ought to occupy himself sorrowfully with + his end, with a view to nourish his fears; on the contrary, he wishes to + invite him to familiarize himself with an object that Nature has rendered + necessary to him; to accustom himself to expect it with a serene + countenance. If life is a benefit, if it be necessary to love it, it is no + less necessary to quit it; reason ought to teach him a calm resignation to + the decrees of fate: his welfare exacts that he should contract the habit + of contemplating with placidity, of viewing without alarm, an event that + his essence has rendered inevitable: his interest demands that he should + not brood gloomily over his misfortune; that he should not, by continual + dread, embitter his life; the charms of which he must inevitably destroy, + if he can never view its termination but with trepidation. Reason and his + interest then, concur to assure him against those vague terrors with which + his imagination inspires him, in this respect. If he was to call them to + his assistance, they would reconcile him to an object that only startles + him, because he has no knowledge of it; because it is only shewn to him + with those hideous accompaniments with which it is clothed by + superstition. Let him then, endeavour to despoil death of these vain + illusions, and he will perceive that it is only the sleep of life; that + this sleep will not be disturbed with disagreeable dreams; that an + unpleasant awakening is never likely to follow it. To die is to sleep; it + is to enter into that state of insensibility in which he was previous to + his birth; before he had senses; before he was conscious of his actual + existence. Laws, as necessary as those which gave him birth, will make him + return into the bosom of Nature, from whence he was drawn, in order to + reproduce him afterwards under some new form, which it would be useless + for him to know: without consulting him, Nature places him for a season in + the order of organized beings; without his consent, she will oblige him to + quit it, to occupy some other order. + </p> + <p> + Let him not complain then, that Nature is callous; she only makes him + undergo a law from which she does not exempt any one being she contains. + Man complains of the short duration of life—of the rapidity with + which time flies away; yet the greater number of men do not know how to + employ either time or life. If all are born and perish—if every + thing is changed and destroyed—if the birth of a being is never more + than the first step towards its end; how is it possible to expect that + man, whose machine is so frail, of which the parts are so complicated, the + whole of which possesses such extreme mobility, should be exempted from + the common law; which decrees, that even the solid earth he inhabits shall + experience change—shall undergo alteration—perhaps be + destroyed! Feeble, frail mortal! Thou pretendest to exist for ever; whit + thou, then, that for thee alone eternal Nature shall change her + undeviating course? Dost thou not behold in those eccentric comets with + which thine eyes are sometimes astonished, that the planets themselves are + subject to death? Live then in peace for the season that Nature permits + thee; if thy mind be enlightened by reason thou wilt die without terror! + </p> + <p> + Notwithstanding the simplicity of these reflections; nothing is more rare + than the sight of men truly fortified against the fears of death: the wise + man himself turns pale at its approach; he has occasion to collect the + whole force of his mind, to expect it with serenity. It cannot then, + furnish matter for surprise, if the idea of death is so revolting to the + generality of mortals; it terrifies the young—it redoubles the + chagrin of the middle-aged—it even augments the sorrow of the old, + who are worn down with infirmity: indeed the aged, although enfeebled by + time, dread it much more than the young, who are in the full vigour of + life; the man of many lustres is more accustomed to live years as they + roll over his head, confirm his attachment to existence; nevertheless, + long unwearied exertions weaken the powers of his mind; labour, sickness, + and pain, waste his animal strength; he has less energy; his volition + becomes faint, superstitious terrors easily appal him; at length disease + consumes him; sometimes with excruciating tortures: the unhappy wretch, + thus plunged into misfortune, has, notwithstanding, scarcely ever dared to + contemplate death; which he ought to consider as the period to all his + anguish. + </p> + <p> + If the source of this pusillanimity be sought, it will be found in his + nature, which attaches him to life; in that deficiency of energy in his + soul, which hardly any thing tends to corroborate, but which every thing + strives to enfeeble: which superstition, instead of strengthening, + contributes to bruise. Almost all human institutions, nearly all the + opinions of man, conspire to augment his fears; to render his ideas of + death more terrible; to make them more revolting to his feelings. Indeed, + superstition pleases itself with exhibiting death under the most frightful + traits: it represents it to man under the most disgusting colours; as a + dreadful moment, which not only puts an end to his pleasures, but gives + him up without defence to the strange rigour of a pitiless decree, which + nothing can soften. According to this superstition, the most virtuous man + has reason to tremble for the severity of his fate; is never certain of + being happy; the most dreadful torments, endless punishments, await the + victim to involuntary weakness; to the necessary faults of a short-lived + existence; his infirmities, his momentary offences, the propensities that + have been planted in his heart, the errors of his mind, the opinions he + has imbibed, even in the society in which he was born without his own + consent, the ideas he has formed, the passions he has indulged above all, + his not being able to comprehend all the extravagant dogmas offered to his + acceptance, are to be implacably avenged with the most severe and + never-ending penalties. Ixion is for ever fastened to his wheel; Sisyphus + must to all eternity roll his stone without ever being able to reach the + apex of his mountain; the vulture must perpetually prey on the liver of + the unfortunate Prometheus: those who dare to think for themselves—those + who have refused to listen to their enthusiastic guides—those who + have not reverenced the oracles—those who have had the audacity to + consult their reason—those who have boldly ventured to detect + impostors—those who have doubted the divine mission of the + Phythonissa—those who believe that Jupiter violated decency in his + visit to Danae—those who look upon Apollo as no better than a + strolling musician—those who think that Mahomet was an arch knave—are + to smart everlastingly in flaming oceans of burning sulpher; are to float + to all eternity in the most excruciating agonies on seas of liquid + brimstone, wailing and gnashing their teeth: what wonder, then, if man + dreads to be cast into these hideous gulfs; if his mind loathes the + horrific picture; if he wishes to defer for a season these dreadful + punishments; if he clings to an existence, painful as it may be, rather + than encounter such revolting cruelties. + </p> + <p> + Such, then, are the afflicting objects with which superstition occupies + its unhappy, its credulous disciples; such are the fears which the tyrant + of human thoughts points out to them as salutary. In defiance Of the + exility of the effect which these notions produce oil the greater number, + even of those who say they are, or who believe themselves persuaded, they + are held forth as the most powerful rampart that can be opposed to the + irregularities of man. Nevertheless, as will be seen presently, it will be + found that these systems, or rather these chimeras, so terrible to behold, + operate little or nothing on the larger portion of mankind, who dream of + them but seldom, never in the moment that passion, interest, pleasure, or + example, hurries them along. If these fears act, it is commonly on those, + who have but little occasion to abstain from evil; they make honest hearts + tremble, but fail of effect on the perverse. They torment sensible souls, + but leave those that are hardened in repose; they disturb tractable, + gentle minds, but cause no trouble to rebellious spirits: thus they alarm + none but those who are already sufficiently alarmed; they coerce only + those who are already restrained. + </p> + <p> + These notions, then, impress nothing on the wicked; when by accident they + do act on them, it is only to redouble the wickedness of their natural + character—to justify them in their own eyes—to furnish them + with pretexts to exercise it without fear—to follow it without + scruple. Indeed, the experience of a great number of ages has shewn to + what excess of wickedness, to what lengths, the passions of man have + carried him, when they have been authorized by the priesthood—when + they have been unchained by superstition—or, at least, when he has + been enabled to cover himself with its mantle. Man has never been more + ambitious, never more covetous, never more crafty, never more cruel, never + more seditious, than when he has persuaded himself that superstition + permitted or commanded him to be so: thus, superstition did nothing more + than lend an invincible force to his natural passions, which under its + sacred auspices he could exercise with impunity, indulge without remorse; + still more, the greatest villains, in giving free vent to the detestable + propensities of their natural wickedness, have under its influence + believed, that, by displaying an over-heated zeal, they merited well of + heaven; that they exempted themselves by new crimes, from that + chastisement which they thought their anterior conduct had richly merited. + </p> + <p> + These, then, are the effects which what are called the <i>salutary</i> + notions of superstition, produce on mortals. These reflections will + furnish an answer to those who say that, "If heaven was promised equally + to the wicked as to the righteous, there would be found none incredulous + of another life." We reply, that, in point of fact, superstition does + accord heaven to the wicked, since it frequently places in this happy + abode the most useless, the most depraved of men. Is not Mahomet himself + enthroned in the empyrean by this superstition? If the calendar of the + Romish saints was examined, would it be found to contain none but + righteous, none but good men? Does not Mahometanism cut off from all + chance of future existence, consequently from all hope of reaching heaven, + the female part of mankind? Have the Jews exalted no one to the celestial + regions, save the virtuous? When the Jew is condemned to the devouring + flames, do not the men who thus torture an unhappy wretch, whose only + crime is adherence to the religion of his forefathers, expect to be + rewarded for the deed with everlasting happiness? Are they not promised + eternal salvation for their orthodoxy? Was Constantine, was St. Cyril, was + St. Athanasius, was St. Dominic, worthy beatification? Were Jupiter, Thor, + Mercury, Woden, and a thousand others, deserving of celestial diadems? Is + erring, feeble man, with all his imbecilities, competent to form a + judgment of the heavenly deserts of his fellows? Can be, with his dim + optics, with his limited vision, fathom the human heart? Can he sound its + depths, trace its meanderings, dive into its recesses, with sufficient + precision, to determine who amongst his race is or is not possessed of the + requisite merit to enjoy a blessed eternity? Thus wicked men are held up + as models by superstition, which as we shall see, sharpens the passions of + evil-disposed men, by legitimating those crimes, at which, without this + sanction, they would shudder; which they would fear to commit; or for + which, at least, they would feel shame; for which they would experience + remorse. In short, the ministers of superstition furnish to the most + profligate men the power of indulging their inflamed passions, and then + hold forth to them means of diverting from their own heads the thunderbolt + that should strike their crimes, by spreading before them fresh incentives + to intolerant persecution, with the promise of a never-fading happiness. + </p> + <p> + With respect to the incredulous, without doubt, there may be amongst them + wicked men, as well as amongst the most credulous; but incredulity no more + supposes wickedness, than credulity supposes righteousness. On the + contrary, the man who thinks, who meditates, knows far better the true + motives to goodness, than he who suffers himself to be blindly guided by + uncertain motives, or by the interest of others. Sensible men have the + greatest advantage in examining opinions, which it is pretended must have + an influence over their eternal happiness: if these are found false, if + they appear injurious to their present life, they will not therefore + conclude, that they have not another life either to fear or to hope; that + they are permitted to deliver themselves up with impunity to vice, which + would do an injury to themselves, that would draw upon them the contempt + of their neighbour, which would subject them to the anger of society: the + man who does not expect another life, is only more interested in + prolonging his existence in this; in rendering himself dear to his + fellows, by cultivating virtue; by performing all his duties with more + strictness, in the only life of which he has any knowledge: he has made a + great stride towards felicity, in disengaging himself from those terrors + which afflict others, which frequently prevent their acting. Such a man + has nothing to fear, but every thing to hope; if, contrary to what he is + able to judge, there should be an hereafter existence, will not his + actions have been so regulated by virtue, will he not have so comported + himself in his present existence, as to stand a fair chance of enjoying in + their fullest extent those felicities prepared for his species? + </p> + <p> + <i>Superstition</i>, in fact, takes a pride in rendering man slothful, in + moulding him to credulity, in making him pusillanimous. It is its + principle to afflict him without intermission; to redouble in him the + horrors of death: ever ingenious in tormenting him, it has extended his + inquietudes beyond even his own existence; its ministers, the more + securely to dispose of him in this world, invented, in future regions, a + variety of rewards and punishments, reserving to themselves the privilege + of awarding these heavenly recompences to those who yielded most + implicitly to their arbitrary laws; of decreeing punishment to those + refractory beings who rebelled against their power: thus, according to + them, Tantalus for divulging their secrets, must eternally fear, engulphed + in burning sulphur, the stone ready to fall on his devoted head; whilst + Romulus was beatified and worshipped as a god under the name of Quirinus. + The same system of superstition caused the philosopher Callisthenes to be + put to death, for opposing the worship of Alexander; and elevated the monk + Athanasius to be a saint in heaven. Far from holding forth consolation to + mortals, far from cultivating man's reason, far from teaching him to yield + under the hands of necessity, superstition, in a great many countries, + strives to render death still more bitter to him; to make its yoke sit + heavy; to fill up its retinue with a multitude of hideous phantoms; to + paint it in the most frightful colours; to render its approach terrible: + by this means it has crowded the world with enthusiasts, whom it seduces + by vague promises; with contemptible slaves, whom it coerces with the fear + of imaginary evils: it has at length persuaded man, that his actual + existence is only a journey, by which he will arrive at a more important + life: this doctrine, whether it be rational or irrational, prevents him + from occupying himself with his true happiness; from even dreaming of + ameliorating his institutions, of improving his laws, of advancing the + progress of science, of perfectioning his morals. Vain and gloomy ideas + have absorbed his attention: he consents to groan under fanatical tyranny—to + writhe under political inflictions—to live in error—to + languish in misfortune—in the hope, when he shall be no more, of + being one day happier; in the firm confidence, that after he has + disappeared, his calamities, his patience, will conduct him to a + never-ending felicity: he has believed himself submitted to cruel priests, + who are willing to make him purchase his future welfare at the expence of + every thing most dear to his peace, most valuable to his existence here + below: they have pictured heaven as irritated against him, as disposed to + appease itself by punishing him eternally, for any efforts he should make + to withdraw himself from, their power. It is thus the doctrine of a future + life has been made fatal to the human species: it plunged whole nations + into sloth, made them languid, filled them with indifference to their + present welfare, or else precipitated them, into the most furious + enthusiasm, which hurried them on to such lengths that they tore each + other in pieces in order to merit the promised heaven. + </p> + <p> + It will be asked, perhaps, by what road has man been conducted to form to + himself these gratuitous ideas of another world? I reply, that it is a + truth man has no idea of a future life, they are the ideas of the past and + the present that furnish his imagination with the materials of which he + constructs the edifice of the regions of futurity. Hobbes says, "We + believe that, that which is will always be, and that the same causes will + have the same effects." Man in his actual state, has two modes of feeling, + one that he approves, another that he disapproves: thus, persuaded that + these two modes of feeling must accompany him, even beyond his present + existence, he placed in the regions of eternity two distinguished abodes, + one destined to felicity, the other to misery: the one must contain those + who obey the calls of superstition, who believe in its dogmas; the other + is a prison, destined to avenge the cause of heaven, on all those who + shall not faithfully believe the doctrines promulgated by the ministers of + a vast variety of superstitions. Has sufficient attention been paid to the + fact that results as a necessary consequence from this reasoning; which on + examination will be found to have rendered the first place entirely + useless, seeing, that by the number and contradiction of these various + systems, let man believe which ever he may, let him follow it in the most + faithful manner, still he must be ranked as an infidel, as a rebel to the + Divinity, because he cannot believe in all; and those from which he + dissents, by a consequence of their own creed, condemn him to the + prison-house? + </p> + <p> + Such is the origin of the ideas upon a future life, so diffused among + mankind. Every where may be seen an Elysium and a Tartarus; a Paradise and + a Hell; in a word, two distinguished abodes, constructed according to the + imagination of the enthusiasts who have invented them, who have + accommodated them to their own peculiar prejudices, to the hopes, to the + fears, of the people who believe in them. The Indian figures the first of + these abodes as one of in-action, of permanent repose, because, being the + inhabitant of a hot climate, he has learned to contemplate rest as the + extreme of felicity: the Mussulman promises himself corporeal pleasures, + similar to those that actually constitute the object of his research in + this life: each figures to himself, that on which he has learned to set + the greatest value. + </p> + <p> + Of whatever nature these pleasures may be, man apprehended that a body was + needful, in order that his soul might be enabled to enjoy the pleasures, + or to experience the pains in reserve for him: from hence the doctrine of + the <i>resurrection</i>; but as he beheld this body putrify, as he saw it + dissolve, as he witnessed its decomposition, after death, he was at a loss + how to form anew what he conceived so necessary to his system he therefore + had recourse to the Divine Omnipotence, by whose interposition he now + believes it will be effected. This opinion, so incomprehensible, is said + to have originated in Persia, among the Magi, and finds a great number of + adherents, who have never given it a serious examination: but the doctrine + of the resurrection appears perfectly useless to all those, who believe in + the existence of a soul that feels, thinks, suffers, and enjoys, after a + separation from the body: indeed, there are already sects who begin to + maintain, that the body is not necessary; that therefore it will not be + resurrected. Like Berkeley, they conceive that "the soul has need neither + of body nor any exterior being, either to experience sensations, or to + have ideas:" the Malebranchists, in particular, must suppose that the + rejected souls will see every thing in the Divinity; will feel themselves + burn, without having occasion for bodies for that purpose. Others, + incapable of elevating themselves to these sublime notions, believed, that + under divers forms, man animated successively different animals of various + species; that he never ceased to be an inhabitant of the earth; such was + the opinion of those who adopted the doctrine of Metempsychosis. + </p> + <p> + As for the miserable abode of souls, the imagination of fanatics, who were + desirous of governing the people, strove to assemble the most frightful + images, to render it still more terrible: fire is of all beings that which + produces in man the most pungent sensation; not finding any thing more + cruel, the enemies to the several dogmas were to be everlastingly punished + with this torturing element: fire, therefore, was the point at which their + imagination was obliged to stop. The ministers of the various systems + agreed pretty generally, that fire would one day avenge their offended + divinities: thus they painted the victims to the anger of the gods, or + rather those who questioned their own creeds, as confined in fiery + dungeons, as perpetually rolling in a vortex of bituminous flames, as + plunged in unfathomable gulphs of liquid sulphur, making the infernal + caverns resound with their useless groanings, with their unavailing + gnashing of teeth. + </p> + <p> + But it will, perhaps, be enquired, how could man reconcile himself to the + belief of an existence accompanied with eternal torments; above all, as + many according to their own superstitions had reason to fear it for + themselves? Many causes have concurred to make him adopt so revolting an + opinion: in the first place, very few thinking men have ever believed such + an absurdity, when they have deigned to make use of their reason; or, when + they have accredited it, this notion was always counterbalanced by the + idea of the goodness, by a reliance on the mercy, which they attributed to + their respective divinities: in the second place, those who were blinded + by their fears, never rendered to themselves any account of these strange + doctrines, which they either received with awe from their legislators, or + which were transmitted to them by their fathers: in the third place, each + sees the object of his terrors only at a favourable distance: moreover, + superstition promises him the means of escaping the tortures he believes + he has merited. At length, like those sick people whom we see cling with + fondness, even to the most painful life, man preferred the idea of an + unhappy, though unknown existence, to that of non-existence, which he + looked upon as the most frightful evil that could befal him; either + because he could form no idea of it, or because his imagination painted to + him this non-existence this nothing, as the confused assemblage of all + evils. A known evil, of whatever magnitude, alarmed him less (above all, + when there remained the hope of being able to avoid it), than an evil of + which he knew nothing, upon which, consequently, his imagination was + painfully employed, but to which he knew not how to oppose a remedy. + </p> + <p> + It will be seen, then, that <i>superstition</i>, far from consoling man + upon the necessity of death, only redoubles his terrors, by the evils with + which it pretends his decease will be followed; these terrors are so + strong, that the miserable wretches who believe strictly in these + formidable doctrines, pass their days in affliction, bathed in the most + bitter tears. What shall be said of an opinion so destructive to society, + yet adopted by so many nations, which announces to them, that a severe + fate may at each instant take them unprovided; that at each moment they + are liable to pass under the most rigorous judgment? What idea can be + better suited to terrify man—what more likely to discourage him—what + more calculated to damp the desire of ameliorating his condition—than + the afflicting prospect of a world always on the brink of dissolution; of + a Divinity seated upon the ruins of Nature, ready to pass judgment on the + human species? Such are, nevertheless, the fatal opinions with which the + mind of nations has been fed for thousands of years: they are so + dangerous, that if by a happy want of just inference, he did not derogate + in his conduct from these afflicting ideas, he would fall into the most + abject stupidity. How could man occupy himself with a perishable world, + ready every moment to crumble into atoms? How dream of rendering himself + happy on earth, when it is only the porch to an eternal kingdom? Is it + then, surprising, that the superstitions to which similar doctrines serve + for a basis, have prescribed to their disciples a total detachment from + things below—an entire renunciation of the most innocent pleasures; + have given birth to a sluggishness, to a pusillanimity, to an abjection of + soul, to an insociability, that renders him useless to himself, dangerous + to others? If necessity did not oblige man to depart in his practice from + these irrational systems—if his wants did not bring him back to + reason, in despite of these superstitious doctrines—the whole world + would presently become a vast desert, inhabited by some few isolated + savages, who would not even have courage to multiply themselves. What are + these, but notions which he must necessarily put aside, in order that + human association may subsist? + </p> + <p> + Nevertheless, the doctrine of a future life, accompanied with rewards and + punishments, has been regarded for a great number of ages as the most + powerful, or even as the only motive capable of coercing the passions of + man; as the sole means that can oblige him to be virtuous: by degrees, + this doctrine has become the basis of almost all religions and political + systems, so much so, that at this day it is said, this prejudice cannot be + attacked without absolutely rending asunder the bonds of society. The + founders of superstition have made use of it to attach their credulous + disciples; legislators have looked upon it as the curb best calculated to + keep mankind under discipline; religion considers it necessary to his + happiness; many philosophers themselves have believed with sincerity, that + this doctrine was requisite to terrify man, was the only means to divert + him from crime: notwithstanding, when the doctrine of the immortality of + the soul first came out of the school of Plato; when it first diffused + itself among the Greeks, it caused the greatest ravages; it determined a + multitude of men, who were discontented with their condition, to terminate + their existence: Ptolemy Philadelphus, king of Egypt, seeing the effect + this doctrine, which at the present day is looked upon as so salutary, + produced on the brains of his subjects, prohibited the teaching of it + under the penalty of death. + </p> + <p> + It must, indeed, be allowed that this doctrine has been of the greatest + utility to those who have given superstitions to nations, who at the same + time made themselves its ministers; it was the foundation of their power, + the source of their wealth, the permanent cause of that blindness, the + solid basis of those terrors, which it was their interest to nourish in + the human race. It was by this doctrine the priest became first the rival, + then the master of kings: it is by this dogma that nations are filled with + enthusiasts inebriated with superstition, always more disposed to listen + to its menaces, than to the counsels of reasons, to the orders of the + sovereign, to the cries of Nature, or to the laws of society. Politics + itself was enslaved to the caprice of the priest; the temporal monarch was + obliged to bend under the yoke of the monarch of superstition; the one + only disposed of this perishable world, the other extended his power into + the world to come; much more important for man than the earth, on which he + is only a pilgrim, a mere passenger. Thus the doctrine of another life + placed the government itself in a state of dependance upon the priest; the + monarch was nothing more than his first subject; he was never obeyed, but + when the two were in accord. Nature in vain cried out to man, to be + careful of his present happiness; the priest ordered him to be unhappy, in + the expectation of future felicity; reason in vain exhorted him to be + peaceable; the priest breathed forth fanaticism, fulminated fury, obliged + him to disturb the public tranquillity, every time there was a question of + the supposed interests of the invisible monarch of another life, and the + real interests of his ministers in this. + </p> + <p> + Such is the fruit that politics has gathered from the doctrine of a future + life; the regions of the world to come have enabled the priesthood to + conquer the present world. The expectation of celestial happiness, and the + dread of future tortures, only served to prevent man from seeking after + the means to render himself happy here below. Thus error, under whatever + aspect it is considered, will never be more than a source of evil for + mankind. The doctrine of another life, in presenting to mortals an ideal + happiness, will render them enthusiasts; in overwhelming them with fears, + it will make useless beings; generate cowards; form atrabilarious or + furious men; who will lose sight of their present abode, to occupy + themselves with the pictured regions of a world to come, with those + dreadful evils which they must fear after their death. + </p> + <p> + If it be insisted that the doctrine of future rewards and punishments is + the most powerful curb to restrain the passions of man, we shall reply by + calling in daily experience. If we only cast our eyes around, if for a + moment we examine what passes in review before us, we shall see this + assertion contradicted; we shall find that these marvellous speculations + do not in any manner diminish the number of the wicked, because they are + incapable of changing the temperament of man, of annihilating those + passions which the vices of society engender in his heart. In those + nations who appear the most thoroughly convinced of this future + punishment, may be seen assassins, thieves, crafty knaves, oppressors, + adulterers, voluptuaries; all these pretend they are firmly persuaded of + the reality of an hereafter; yet in the whirlwind of dissipation, in the + vortex of pleasure, in the fury of their passions, they no longer behold + this formidable future existence, which in those moments has no kind of + influence over their earthly conduct. + </p> + <p> + In short, in many of those countries where the doctrine of another life is + so firmly established, that each individual irritates himself against + whoever may have the temerity to combat the opinion, or even to doubt it, + we see that it is utterly incapable of impressing any thing on rulers who + are unjust, who are negligent of the welfare of their people, who are, + debauched, on courtezans who are lewd in their habits, on covetous misers, + on flinty extortioners who fatten on the substance of a nation, on women + without modesty, on a vast multitude of drunken, intemperate, vicious men, + on great numbers even amongst those priests, whose function it is to + preach this future state, who are paid to announce the vengeance of + heaven, against vices which they themselves encourage by their example. If + it be enquired of them, how they dare to give themselves up to such + scandalous actions, which they ought to know are certain to draw upon them + eternal punishment? They will reply, that the madness of their passions, + the force of their habits, the contagion of example, or even the power of + circumstances, have hurried them along; have made them forget the dreadful + consequences in which their conduct is likely to involve them; besides, + they will say, that the treasures of the divine mercy are infinite; that + repentance suffices to efface the foulest transgressions; to cleanse the + blackest guilt; to blot out the most enormous crimes: in this multitude of + wretched beings, who each after his own manner desolates society with his + criminal pursuits, you will find only a small number who are sufficiently + intimidated by the fears of the miserable hereafter, to resist their evil + propensities. What did I say? These propensities are in themselves too + weak to carry them forward without the aid of the doctrine of another + life; without this, the law and the fear of censure would have been + motives sufficient to prevent them from rendering themselves criminal. + </p> + <p> + It is indeed, fearful, timorous souls, upon whom the terrors of another + life make a profound impression; human beings of this sort come into the + world with moderate passions, are of a weakly organization, possess a cool + imagination; it is not therefore surprising, that in such men, who are + already restrained by their nature, the fear of future punishment + counterbalances the weak efforts of their feeble passions; but it is by no + means the same with those determined sinners, with those hardened + criminals, with those men who are habitually vicious, whose unseemly + excesses nothing can arrest, who in their violence shut their eyes to the + fear of the laws of this world, despising still more those of the other. + Nevertheless, how many persons say they are, and even believe themselves, + restrained by the fears of the life to come? But, either they deceive us, + or they impose upon themselves, by attributing to these fears, that which + is only the effect of motives much nearer at hand; such as the feebleness + of their machine, the mildness of their temperament, the slender energy of + their souls, their natural timidity, the ideas imbibed in their education, + the fear of consequences immediately resulting from criminal actions, the + physical evils attendant on unbridled irregularities: these are the true + motives that restrain them; not the notions of a future life: which men, + who say they are most firmly persuaded of its existence, forget whenever a + powerful interest solicits them to sin. If for a time man would pay + attention to what passes before his eyes, he would perceive that he + ascribes to the fear of the gods that which is in reality only the effect + of peculiar weakness, of pusillanimity, of the small interest found to + commit evil: these men would not act otherwise than they do, if they had + not this fear before them; if, therefore he reflected, he would feel that + it is always necessity that makes men act as they do. + </p> + <p> + Man cannot be restrained, when he does not find within himself motives + sufficiently powerful to conduct him back to reason. There is nothing, + either in this world or in the other, that can render him virtuous, when + an untoward organization—a mind badly cultivated—a violent + imagination—inveterate habits—fatal examples—powerful + interests—invite him from every quarter to the commission of crime. + No speculations are capable of restraining the man who braves public + opinion, who despises the law, who is careless of its censure, who turns a + deaf ear to the cries of conscience, whose power in this world places him + out of the reach of punishment; in the violence of his transports, he will + fear still less a distant futurity, of which the idea always recedes + before that which he believes necessary to his immediate interests, + consistent with his present happiness. All lively passions blind man to + every thing that is not its immediate object; the terrors of a future + life, of which his passions always possess the secret to diminish to him + the probability, can effect nothing upon the wicked man, who does not fear + even the much nearer punishment of the law; who sets at nought the assured + hatred of those by whom he is surrounded. Man, when he delivers himself up + to crime, sees nothing certain except the supposed advantage which attends + it; the rest always appear to him either false or problematical. + </p> + <p> + If man would but open his eyes, even for a moment, he would clearly + perceive, that to effect any thing upon hearts hardened by crime, he must + not reckon upon the chastisement of an avenging Divinity, which the + self-love natural to man always shews him as pacified in the long run. He + who has arrived at persuading himself he cannot be happy without crime, + will always readily deliver himself up to it, notwithstanding the menaces + of religion. Whoever is sufficiently blind not to read his infamy in his + own heart, to see his own vileness in the countenances of his associates, + his own condemnation in the anger of his fellow-men, his own unworthiness + in the indignation of the judges established to punish the offences he may + commit: such a man, I say, will never feel the impression his crimes shall + make on the features of a judge, that is either hidden from his view, or + that he only contemplates at a distance. The tyrant who with dry eyes can + hear the cries of the distressed, who with callous heart can behold the + tears of a whole people, of whose misery he is the cause, will not see the + angry countenance of a more powerful master: like another Menippus, he may + indeed destroy himself from desperation, to avoid reiterated reproach; + which only proves, that when a haughty, arrogant despot pretends to be + accountable for his actions to the Divinity alone, it is because he fears + his nation more than he does his God. + </p> + <p> + On the other hand, does not superstition itself, does not even religion, + annihilate the effects of those fears which it announces as salutary? Does + it not furnish its disciples with the means of extricating themselves from + the punishments with which it has so frequently menaced them? Does it not + tell them, that a steril repentance will, even at the moment of death, + disarm the celestial wrath; that it will purify the filthy souls of + sinners? Do not even the priests, in some superstitions, arrogate to + themselves the right of remitting to the dying the punishment due to the + crimes committed during the course of a disorderly life? In short, do not + the most perverse men, encouraged in iniquity, countenanced in debauchery, + upheld in crime, reckon, even to the last moment, either upon the + assistance of superstition, or upon the aid of religion, that promises + them the infallible means of reconciling themselves to the Divinity, whom + they have irritated; of avoiding the rigorous punishments pronounced + against their enormities? + </p> + <p> + In consequence of these notions, so favourable to the wicked, so suitable + to tranquillize their fears, we see that the hope of an easy expiation, + far from correcting man, engages him to persist, until death, in the most + crying disorders. Indeed, in despite of the numberless advantages which he + is assured flows from the doctrine of a life to come, in defiance of its + pretended efficacy to repress the passions of men, do not the priests + themselves, although so interested in the maintenance of this system, + every day complain of its insufficiency? They acknowledge, that mortals, + who from their infancy they have imbued with these ideas, are not less + hurried forward by their evil propensities—less sunk in the vortex + of dissipation—less the slaves to their pleasures—less + captivated by bad habits—less driven along by the torrent of the + world—less seduced by their present interest—which make them + forget equally the recompense and the chastisement of a future existence. + In a word, the interpreters of superstition, the ministers of religion + themselves, allow that their disciples, for the greater part, conduct + themselves in this world as if they had nothing either to hope or fear in + another. + </p> + <p> + In short, let it be supposed for a moment, that the doctrine of eternal + punishments was of some utility; that it really restrained a small number + of individuals; what are these feeble advantages compared to the + numberless evils that flow from it? Against one timid man whom this idea + restrains, there are thousands upon whom it operates nothing; there are + thousands whom it makes irrational; whom it renders savage persecutors; + whom it converts into fanatics; there are thousands whose mind it + disturbs; whom it diverts from their duties towards society; there are an + infinity whom it grievously afflicts, whom it troubles without producing + any real good for their associates. + </p> + <p> + Notwithstanding so many are inclined to consider those who do not fall in + with this doctrine as the enemies of society; it will be found on + examination that the wisest the most enlightened men of antiquity, as well + as many of the moderns, have believed not only that the soul is material + and perishes with the body, but also that they have attacked without + subterfuge the opinion of future everlasting punishments; it will also be + found that many of the systems, set up to establish the immortality of the + soul, are in themselves the best evidence that can be adduced of the + futility of this doctrine; if for a moment we only follow up the natural + the just inferences that are to be drawn from them. This sentiment was far + from being, as some have supposed, peculiar to the Epicureans, it has been + adopted by philosophers of all sects, by Pythagoreans, by Stoics, by + Peripatetics, by Academics; in short by the most godly the most virtuous + men of Greece and of Rome. + </p> + <p> + Pythagoras, according to Ovid, speaks strongly to the fact. Timaeus of + Locris, who was a Pythagorean, admits that the doctrine of future + punishments was fabulous, solely destined for the imbecility of the + uninformed; but little calculated for those who cultivate their reason. + </p> + <p> + Aristotle expressly says, that "man has neither good to hope nor evil to + fear after death." + </p> + <p> + Zeno, according to Cicero, supposed the soul to be an igneous substance, + from whence he concluded it destroyed itself. + </p> + <p> + Cicero, the philosophical orator, who was of the sect of Academics, + although he is not on all occasions, in accord with himself, treats openly + as fables the torments of Hell; and looks upon death as the end of every + thing for man. + </p> + <p> + Seneca, the philosopher, is filled with passages which contemplate death + as a state of total annihilation, particularly in speaking of it to his + brother: and nothing can be more decisive of his holding this opinion, + than what he writes to Marcia, to console him. + </p> + <p> + Seneca, the tragedian, explains himself in the same manner as the + philosopher. + </p> + <p> + The Platonists, who made the soul immortal, could not have an idea of + future punishments, because the soul according to them was a portion of + the divinity which after the dissolution of the body it returned to + rejoin. + </p> + <p> + Epictetus has the same idea. In a passage reported by Arrian, he says, + "but where are you going? It cannot be to a place of suffering: you will + only return to the place from whence you came; you are about to be again + peaceably associated with the elements from which you are derived. That + which in your composition, is of the nature of fire, will return to the + element of fire; that which is of the nature of earth, will rejoin itself + to the earth; that which is air, will re-unite itself with air; that which + is water, will resolve itself into water; there is no Hell, no Acheron, no + Cocytus, no Phlegethon." + </p> + <p> + In another place he says, "the hour of death approaches; but do not + aggravate your evil, nor render things worse than they are: represent them + to yourself under their true point of view. The time is come when the + materials of which you are composed, go to resolve themselves into the + elements from whence they were originally borrowed. What is there that is + terrible or grievous in that? Is there any thing in the world that + perishes totally?" + </p> + <p> + The sage and pious Antoninus says, "he who fears death, either fears to be + deprived of all feeling, or dreads to experience different sensations. If + you lose all feeling, you will no longer be subject either to pain or to + misery. If you are provided with other senses of a different nature, you + will become a creature of a different species." This great emperor further + says, "that we must expect death with tranquillity, seeing, that it is + only a dissolution of the elements of which each animal is composed." + </p> + <p> + To the evidence of so many great men of <i>Pagan antiquity</i>, may be + joined, that of the author of Ecclesiastes, who speaks of death, and of + the condition of the human soul, like an <i>epicurean</i>; he says, "for + that which befalleth the sons of men, befalleth beasts; even one thing + befalleth them: as the one dieth, so dieth the other; yea, they have all + one breath: so that a man hath no pre-eminence above a beast; for all is + vanity. All go unto one place; all are of the dust, and all turn to dust + again." And further, "wherefore I perceive that there is nothing better + than that a man should rejoice in his own works; for that is his portion: + for who shall bring him to see what shall be after him." + </p> + <p> + In short, how can the utility or the necessity of this doctrine be + reconciled with the fact, that the great <i>legislator of the Jews</i>; + who is supposed to have been inspired by the Divinity, should have + remained silent on a subject, that is said to be of so much importance? In + the third chapter of Genesis it, is said, "In the sweat of thy face shalt + thou eat bread, till thou return unto the ground; for out of it wast thou + taken: for dust thou art, and unto dust shalt thou return." + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0021" id="link2H_4_0021"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + CHAP. XIV. + </h2> + <p> + <i>Education, Morals, and the Laws suffice to restrain Man.—Of the + desire of Immortality.—Of Suicide.</i> + </p> + <p> + It is not then in an ideal world, existing no where perhaps, but in the + imagination of man, that he must seek to collect motives calculated to + make him act properly in this; it is in the visible world that will be + found incitements to divert him from crime; to rouse him to virtue. It is + in Nature,—in experience,—in truth, that he must search out + remedies for the evils of his species; for motives suitable to infuse into + the human heart, propensities truely useful to society; calculated to + promote its advantage; to conduce to the end for which it was designed. + </p> + <p> + If attention has been paid to what has been said In the course of this + work, it will be seen that above all it is <i>education</i> that will best + furnish the true means of rectifying the errors, of recalling the + wanderings of mankind. It is this that should scatter the Seeds in his + heart; cultivate the tender shoots; make a profitable use of his + dispositions; turn to account those faculties, which depend on his + organization: which should cherish the fire of his imagination, kindle it + for useful objects; damp it, or extinguish it for others; in short, it is + this which should make sensible souls contract habits which are + advantageous for society and beneficial to the individual. Brought up in + this manner, man would not have occasion for celestial punishments, to + teach him the value of virtue; he would not need to behold burning gulphs + of brimstone under his feet, to induce him to feel horror for crime; + Nature without these fables, would teach much better what he owes to + himself; the law would point out what he owes to the body politic, of + which he is a member. It is thus, that education grounded upon utility, + would form valuable citizens to the state; the depositaries of power would + distinguish those whom education should have thus formed, by reason of the + advantages which they would procure for their country; they would punish + those who should be found injurious to it; it would make the citizens see, + that the promises of reward which education held forth, the punishments + denounced by morals, are by no means vain; that in a state well + constituted, <i>virtue</i> is the true, the only road to happiness; <i>talents</i> + the way to gain respect; that <i>inutility</i> conducts to misfortune: + that <i>crime</i> leads to contempt. + </p> + <p> + A just, enlightened, virtuous, and vigilant government, who should + honestly propose the public good, would have no occasion either for fables + or for falsehoods, to govern reasonable subjects; it would blush to make + use of imposture, to deceive its citizens; who, instructed in their + duties, would find their interest in submitting to equitable laws; who + would be capable of feeling the benefit these have the power of conferring + on them; it would feel, that habit is sufficient to inspire them with + horror, even for those concealed crimes that escape the eyes of society; + it would understand that the visible punishments of this world impose much + more on the generality of men, than those of an uncertain and distant + futurity: in short, it would ascertain that the sensible benefits within + the compass of the sovereign power to distribute, touch the imagination of + mortals more keenly, than those vague recompences which are held forth to + them in a future existence: above all, it would discover that those on + whom these distant advantages do operate, would be still more attached to + virtue by receiving their reward both here and hereafter. + </p> + <p> + Man is almost every where so wicked, so corrupt, so rebellious to reason, + only because he is not governed according to his Nature, nor properly + instructed in her necessary laws: he is almost in every climate fed with + superstitious chimeras; submitted to masters who neglect his instruction + or who seek to deceive him. On the face of this globe, may be frequently + witnessed unjust sovereigns, who, enervated by luxury, corrupted by + flattery, depraved by licentiousness, made wicked by impunity, devoid of + talents, without morals, destitute of virtue, are incapable of exerting + any energy for the benefit of the states they govern; they are + consequently but little occupied with the welfare of their people; + indifferent to their duties; of which indeed they are often ignorant. Such + governors suffer their whole attention to be absorbed by frivolous + amusement; stimulated by the desire of continually finding means to feed + their insatiable ambition they engage in useless depopulating wars; and + never occupy their mind with those objects which are the most important to + the happiness of their nation: yet these weak men feel interested in + maintaining the received prejudices, and visit with severity those who + consider the means of curing them: in short themselves deprived of that + understanding, which teaches man that it is his interest to be kind, just, + and virtuous; they ordinarily reward only those crimes which their + imbecility makes them imagine as useful to them; they generally punish + those virtues which are opposed to their own imprudent passions, but which + reason would point out as truly beneficial to their interests. Under such + masters is it surprising that society should be ravaged; that weak beings + should be willing to imitate them; that perverse men should emulate each + other in oppressing its members; in sacrificing its dearest interests; in + despoiling its happiness? The state of society in such countries, is a + state of hostility of the sovereign against the whole, of each of its + members the one against the other. Man is wicked, not because he is born + so, but because he is rendered so; the great, the powerful, crush with + impunity the indigent and the unhappy; these, at the risk of their lives + seek to retaliate, to render back the evil they have received: they attack + either openly or in secret a country, who to them is a step-mother, who + gives all to some of her children, and deprives the others of every thing: + they punish it for its partiality, and clearly shew that the motives + borrowed from a life hereafter are impotent against the fury of those + passions to which a corrupt administration has given birth; that the + terror of the punishments in this world are too feeble against necessity; + against criminal habits; against dangerous organization uncorrected by + education. + </p> + <p> + In many countries the morals of the people are neglected; the government + is occupied only with rendering them timid; with making them miserable. + Man is almost every where a slave; it must then follow of necessity, that + he is base, interested, dissimulating, without honour, in a word that he + has the vices of the state of which he is a citizen. Almost every where he + is deceived; encouraged in ignorance; prevented from cultivating his + reason; of course he must be stupid, irrational, and wicked almost every + where he sees vice applauded, and crime honoured; thence he concludes vice + to be a good; virtue, only a useless sacrifice of himself: almost every + where he is miserable, therefore he injures his fellow-men in a fruitless + attempt to relieve his own anguish: it is in vain to shew him heaven in + order to restrain him; his views presently descend again to earth; he is + willing to be happy at any price; therefore, the laws which have neither + provided for his instruction, for his morals, nor his happiness, menace + him uselessly; he plunges on in his pursuits, and these ultimately punish + him, for the unjust negligence of his legislators. If politics more + enlightened, did seriously occupy itself with the instruction, with the + welfare of the people; if laws were more equitable; if each society, less + partial, bestowed on its members the care, the education, and the + assistance which they have a right to expect; if governments less + covetous, and more vigilant, were sedulous to render their subjects more + happy, there would not be seen such numbers of malefactors, of robbers, of + murderers, who every where infest society; they would not be obliged to + destroy life, in order to punish wickedness; which is commonly ascribable + to the vices of their own institutions: it would be unnecessary to seek in + another life for fanciful chimeras, which always prove abortive against + the infuriate passions; against the real wants of man. In short, if the + people were instructed, they would be more happy; politics would no longer + be reduced to the exigency of deceiving them, in order to restrain them; + nor to destroy so many unfortunates, for having procured necessaries, at + the expence of their hard-hearted fellow-citizens. + </p> + <p> + When it shall be desired to enlighten man, let him always have truth laid + before him. Instead of kindling his imagination by the idea of those + punishments that a future state has in reserve for him, let him be solaced—let + him be succoured; or, at least, let him be permitted to enjoy the fruit of + his labour—let not his substance be ravished from him by cruel + imposts—let him not be discouraged from work, by finding all his + labour inadequate to support his existence; let him not be driven into + that idleness, that will surely lead him on to crime: let him consider his + present existence, without carrying his views to that which may attend him + after his death; let his industry be excited—let his talents be + rewarded—let him be rendered active, laborious, beneficent, and + virtuous, in the world he inhabits; let it be shewn to him, that his + actions are capable of having an influence over his fellow-men. Let him + not be menaced with the tortures of a future existence when he shall be no + more; let him behold society armed against those who disturb its repose; + let him see the consequence of the hatred of his associates; let him learn + to feel the value of their affection; let him be taught to esteem himself; + let him understand, that to obtain it, he must have virtue; above all, + that the virtuous man in society has nothing to fear, but every thing to + hope. + </p> + <p> + If it be desired to form honest, courageous, industrious citizens, who may + be useful to their country, let them beware of inspiring man from his + infancy with an ill-founded dread of death; of amusing his imagination + with marvellous fables; of occupying his mind with his destiny in a future + life, quite useless to be known, which has nothing in common with his real + felicity. Let them speak of immortality to intrepid, noble souls; let them + shew it as the price of their labours to energetic minds, who are solely + occupied with virtue; who springing forward beyond the boundaries of their + actual existence—who, little satisfied with eliciting the + admiration, with gaining the love of their contemporaries, are will also + to wrest the homage, to secure the affection of future races. Indeed, this + is an immortality to which genius, talents, above all virtue, has a just + right to pretend; do not therefore let them censure—do not let them + endeavour to stifle so noble a passion in man; which is founded upon his + nature; which is so calculated to render him happy; from which society + gather the most advantageous fruits. + </p> + <p> + The idea of being buried in total oblivion, of having nothing in common + after his death with the beings of his species; of losing all possibility + of again having any influence over them, is a thought extremely painful to + man; it is above all afflicting to those who possess an ardent + imagination. The <i>desire of immortality</i>, or of living in the memory + of his fellow men, was always the passion of great souls; it was the + motive to the actions of all those who have played a great part on the + earth. <i>Heroes</i> whether virtuous or criminal, <i>philosophers</i> as + well as <i>conquerors, men of genius</i> and <i>men of talents</i>, those + sublime personages who have done honor to their species, as well as those + illustrious villains who have debased and ravaged it, have had an eye to + posterity in all their enterprises; have flattered themselves with the + hope of acting upon the souls of men, even when they themselves should no + longer exist. If man in general does not carry his views so far, he is at + least sensible to the idea of seeing himself regenerated in his children; + whom he knows are destined to survive him; to transmit his name; to + preserve his memory; to represent him in society; it is for them that he + rebuilds his cottage; it is for them that he plants the tree which his + eyes will never behold in its vigour; it is that they may be happy that he + labours. The sorrow which embitters the life of those rich men, frequently + so useless to the world, when they have lost the hope of continuing their + race, has its source in the fear of being entirely forgotten: they feel + that the useless man dies entirely. The idea that his name will be in the + mouths of men, the thought that it will be pronounced with tenderness, + that it will be recollected with kindness, that it will excite in their + hearts favourable sentiments, is an illusion that is useful; is a vision + suitable to flatter even those who know that nothing will result from it. + Man pleases himself with dreaming that he shall have power, that he shall + pass for something in the universe, even after the term of his human + existence; he partakes by imagination in the projects, in the actions, in + the discussions of future ages, and would be extremely unhappy if he + believed himself entirely excluded from their society. The laws in all + countries have entered into these views; they have so far been willing to + console their citizens for the necessity of dying, by giving them the + means of exercising their will, even for a long time after their death: + this condescension goes to that length, that the dead frequently regulate + the condition of the living during a long series of years. + </p> + <p> + Every thing serves to prove the desire in man of surviving himself. <i>Pyramids, + mausoleums, monuments, epitaphs,</i> all shew that he is willing to + prolong his existence even beyond his decease. He, is not insensible to + the judgment of posterity; it is for him the philosopher writes; it is to + astonish him that the monarch erects sumptuous edifices, gorgeous palaces; + it is his praises, it is his commendations, that the great man already + hears echo in his ears; it is to him that the virtuous citizen appeals + from unjust laws; from prejudiced contemporaries—happy chimera! + generous illusion! mild vision! its power is so consoling, so bland, that + it realizes itself to ardent imaginations; it is calculated to give birth, + to sustain, to nurture, to mature enthusiasm of genius, constancy of + courage, grandeur of soul, transcendency of talent; its force is so + gentle, its influence so pleasing, that it is sometimes able to repress + the vices, to restrain the excesses of the most powerful men; who are, as + experience has shewn, frequently very much disquieted for the judgment of + their posterity; from a conviction that this will sooner or later avenge + the living of the foul injustice which they may be inclined to make them + suffer. + </p> + <p> + No man, therefore, can consent to be entirely effaced from the remembrance + of his fellows; some men have not the temerity to place themselves above + the judgment of the future human species, to degrade themselves in his + eyes. Where is the being who is insensible to the pleasure of exciting the + tears of those who shall survive him; of again acting upon their souls; of + once more occupying their thoughts; of exercising upon them his power even + from the bottom of his grave? Let then eternal silence be imposed upon + those superstitious beings, upon those melancholy men, upon those furious + bigots, who censure a sentiment from which society derives so many real + advantages; let not mankind listen to those passionless philosophers who + are willing to smother this great, this noble spring of his soul; let him + not be seduced by the sarcasms of those voluptuaries, who pretend to + despise an immortality, towards which they lack the power to set forward; + the desire of pleasing posterity, of rendering his name agreeable to + generations yet to come, is a respectable, a laudable motive, when it + causes him to undertake those things, of which the utility may be felt, of + which the advantages may have an influence not only over his + contemporaries, but also over nations who have not yet an existence. Let + him not treat as irrational, the enthusiasm of those beneficent beings, of + those mighty geniuses, of those stupendous talents, whose keen, whose + penetrating regards, have foreseen him even in their day; who have + occupied themselves for him; for his welfare; for his happiness; who have + desired his suffrage; who have written for him; who have enriched him by + their discoveries; who have cured him of some of his errors. Let him + render them the homage which they have expected at his hands; let him, at + least, reverence their memory for the benefits he has derived from them; + let him treat their mouldering remains with respect, for the pleasure he + receives from their labours; let him pay to their ashes a tribute of + grateful recollection, for the happiness they have been sedulous to + procure for him. Let him sprinkle with his tears, let him hallow with his + remembrance, let him consecrate with his finest sensibilities, the urns of + Socrates, of Phocion; of Archimedes; of Anaxarchus; let him wash out the + stain that their punishment has made on the human species; let him expiate + by his regret the Athenian ingratitude, the savage barbarity of Nicocreon; + let him learn by their example to dread superstitious fanaticism; to hold + political intolerance in abhorrence; let him fear to harrass merit; let + him be cautious how he insults virtue, in persecuting those who may happen + to differ from him in his prejudices. + </p> + <p> + Let him strew flowers over the tombs of an Homer—of a Tasso—of + a Shakespeare—of a Milton—of a Goldsmith; let him revere the + immortal shades of those happy geniuses, whose songs yet vibrate on his + ears; whose harmonious lays excite in his soul the most tender sentiments; + let him bless the memory of all those benefactors to the people, who were + the delight of the human race; let him adore the virtues Of a Titus—of + a Trajan—of an Antoninus—of a Julian: let him merit in his + sphere, the eulogies of future ages; let him always remember, that to + carry with him to the grave the regret of his fellow man, he must display + talents; evince integrity; practice virtue. The funeral ceremonies of the + most powerful monarchs, have rarely been wetted with the tears of the + people, they have commonly drained them while living. The names of tyrants + excite the horror of those who bear them pronounced. Tremble then cruel + kings! ye who plunge your subjects into misery; who bathe them with bitter + tears—who ravage nations—who deluge the land with the vital + stream—who change the fruitful earth into a barren cemetery; tremble + for the sanguinary traits under which the future historian will paint you, + to generations yet unborn: neither your splendid monuments—your + imposing victories—your innumerable armies, nor your sycophant + courtiers, can prevent posterity from avenging their grandfathers; from + insulting your odious manes; from treating your execrable memories with + scorn; from showering their contempt on your transcendant crimes. + </p> + <p> + Not only man sees his dissolution with pain, but again, he wishes his + death may be an interesting event for others. But, as we have already + said, he must have talents—he must have beneficence—he must + have virtue, in order, that those who surround him, may interest + themselves in his condition; that those who survive him, may give regret + to his ashes. Is it, then, surprising if the greater number of men, + occupied entirely with themselves, completely absorbed by their own + vanity, devoted to their own puerile objects, for ever busied with the + care of gratifying their vile passions, at the expence, perhaps, of their + family happiness, unheedful of the wants of a wife, unmindful of the + necessity of their children, careless of the calls of friendship, + regardless of their duty to society, do not by their death excite the + sensibilities of their survivors; or that they should be presently + forgotten? There is an infinity of monarchs of which history does not tell + us any thing, save that they have lived. In despite of the inutility in + which men for the most part pass their existence, maugre the little care + they bestow, to render themselves dear to the beings who environ them; + notwithstanding the numerous actions they commit to displease their + associates; the self love of each individual, persuades him, that his + death must be an interesting occurrence: few men but think themselves an + Euryalus in friendship, all expect to find a Nisus, thus man's + over-weening philauty shews him to say thus the order of things are + overturned at his decease. O mortal! feeble and vain! Dost thou not know + the Sesostris's, the Alexanders, the Caesars are dead? Yet the course of + the universe is not arrested; the demise of those famous conquerors, + afflicting to some few favoured slaves, was a subject of delight for the + whole human race. Dost thou then foolishly believe that thy talents ought + to interest thy species, that they are of sufficient extent to put it into + mourning at thy decease? Alas! The Corneilles, the Lockes, the Newtons, + the Boyles, the Harveys, the Montesquieus, the Sheridans are no more! + Regretted by a small number of friends, who have presently consoled + themselves by their necessary avocations, their death was indifferent to + the greater number of their fellow citizens. Darest thou then flatter + thyself, that thy reputation, thy titles, thy riches, thy sumptuous + repasts, thy diversified pleasures, will make thy funeral a melancholy + event! It will be spoken of by some few for two days, and do not be at all + surprised: learn that there have died in former ages, in Babylon, in + Sardis, in Carthage, in Athens, in Rome, millions of citizens more + illustrious, more powerful, more opulent, more voluptuous, than thou art; + of whom, however, no one has taken care to transmit to thee even the + names. Be then virtuous, O man! in whatever station thy destiny assigns + thee, and thou shalt be happy in thy life time; do thou good and thou + shalt be cherished; acquire talents and thou shalt be respected; posterity + shall admire thee, if those talents, by becoming beneficial to their + interests, shall bring them acquainted with the name under which they + formerly designated thy annihilated being. But the universe will not be + disturbed by thy loss; and when thou comest to die, whilst thy wife, thy + children, thy friends, fondly leaning over thy sickly couch, shall be + occupied with the melancholy task of closing thine eyes, thy nearest + neighbour shall perhaps be exulting with joy! + </p> + <p> + Let not then man occupy himself with his condition that may be to come, + but let him sedulously endeavour to make himself useful, to those with + whom he lives; let him for his own peculiar happiness render himself + dutiful to his parents—faithful to his wife—attentive to his + children—kind to his relations—-true to his friends—lenient + to his servants; let him strive to become estimable in the eyes of his + fellow citizens; let him faithfully serve a country which assures to him + his welfare; let the desire of pleasing posterity, of meriting its + applause, excite him to those labours that shall elicit their eulogies: + let a legitimate self-love, when he shall be worthy of it, make him taste + in advance those commendations which he is willing to deserve; let him + learn to love himself—to esteem himself; but never let him consent + that concealed vices, that sacred crimes, shall degrade him in his own + eyes; shall oblige him to be ashamed of his own conduct. + </p> + <p> + Thus disposed, let him contemplate his own decease with the same + indifference, that it will be looked upon by the greater number of his + fellows; let him expect death with constancy; wait for it with calm + resignation; let him learn to shake off those vain terrors with which + superstition, would overwhelm him; let him leave to the enthusiast his + vague hopes; to the fanatic his mad-brained speculations; to the bigot + those fears with which he ministers to his own melancholy; but let his + heart, fortified by reason, corroborated by a love of virtue, no longer + dread a dissolution that will destroy all feeling. + </p> + <p> + Whatever may be the attachment man has to life, whatever may be his fear + of death, it is every day witnessed, that habit, that opinion, that + prejudice, are motives sufficiently powerful to annihilate these passions + in his breast; to make him brave danger; to cause him to hazard his + existence. Ambition, pride, jealousy, love, vanity, avarice, the desire of + glory, that deference of opinion which is decorated with the sounding + title of <i>a point of honour</i>, have the efficacy to make him shut his + eyes to danger; to laugh at peril; to push him on to death: vexation, + anxiety of mind, disgrace, want of success, softens to him its hard + features; makes him regard it as a door that will afford him shelter from + the injustice of mankind: indigence, trouble, adversity, familiarizes him + with this death, so terrible to the happy. The poor man, condemned to + labour, inured to privations, deprived of the comforts of life, views its + approach with indifference: the unfortunate, when he is unhappy, when he + is without resource, embraces it in despair; the wretched accelerates its + march as soon as he sees that happiness is no longer within his grasp. + </p> + <p> + Man in different ages, in different countries, has formed opinions + extremely various upon the conduct of those, who have had the temerity to + put an end to their own existence. His ideas upon this subject, as upon + all others, have taken their tone from his religion, have been governed by + his superstitious systems, have been modified by his political + institutions. The Greeks, the Romans, and other nations, which every thing + conspired to make intrepid, to render courageous, to lead to magnanimity, + regarded as heroes, contemplated as Gods, those who voluntarily cut the + thread of life. In Hindoostan, the Brahmin yet knows how to inspire even + women with sufficient fortitude to burn themselves upon the dead bodies of + their husbands. The Japanese, upon the most trifling occasion, takes no + kind of difficulty in plunging a dagger into his bosom. + </p> + <p> + Among the people of our own country, religion renders man less prodigal of + life; it teaches that it is offensive to the Deity that he should destroy + himself. Some moralists, abstracting the height of religious ideas, have + held that it is never permitted to man to break the conditions of the + covenant that he has made with society. Others have looked upon suicide as + cowardice; they have thought that it was weakness, that it displayed + pusillanimity, to suffer, himself to be overwhelmed with the shafts of his + destiny; and have held that there would be much more courage, more + elevation of soul, in supporting his afflictions, in resisting the blows + of fate. + </p> + <p> + If nature be consulted upon this point, it will be found that all the + actions of man, that feeble plaything in the hands of necessity, are + indispensable; that they depend on causes which move him in despite of + himself—that without his knowledge, make him accomplish at each + moment of his existence some one of its decrees. If the same power that + obliges all intelligent beings to cherish their existence, renders that of + man so painful, so cruel, that he finds it insupportable he quits his + species; order is destroyed for him, he accomplishes a decree of Nature, + that wills he shall no longer exist. This Nature has laboured during + thousands of years, to form in the bowels of the earth the iron that must + number his days. + </p> + <p> + If the relation of man with Nature be examined, it will be found that his + engagement was neither voluntary on his part, nor reciprocal on the part + of Nature. The volition of his will had no share in his birth; it is + commonly against his will that he is obliged to finish life; his actions + are, as we have proved, only the necessary effects of unknown causes which + determine his will. He is, in the hands of Nature, that which a sword is + in his own hands; he can fall upon it without its being able to accuse him + with breaking his engagements; or of stamping with ingratitude the hand + that holds it: man can only love his existence on condition of being + happy; as soon as the entire of nature refuses him this happiness; as soon + as all that surrounds him becomes incommodious to him, as soon as his + melancholy ideas offer nothing but afflicting pictures to his imagination; + he already exists no longer; he is suspended in the void; he quits a rank + which no longer suits him; in which he finds no one interest; which offers + him no protection; which overwhelms him with calamity; in which he can no + more be useful either to himself or to others. + </p> + <p> + If the covenant which unites man to society be considered, it will be + obvious that every contract is conditional, must be reciprocal; that is to + say, supposes mutual advantages between the contracting parties. The + citizen cannot be bound to his country, to his associates, but by the + bonds of happiness. Are these bonds cut asunder? He is restored to + liberty. Society, or those who represent it, do they use him with + harshness, do they treat him with injustice, do they render his existence + painful? Does disgrace hold him out to the finger of scorn; does indigence + menace him in an obdurate world? Perfidious friends, do they forsake him + in adversity? An unfaithful wife, does she outrage his heart? Rebellious, + ungrateful children, do they afflict his old age? Has he placed his + happiness exclusively on some object which it is impossible for him to + procure? Chagrin, remorse, melancholy, and despair, have they disfigured + to him the spectacle of the universe? In short, for whatever cause it may + be: if he is not able to support his evils, he quits a world, which from + henceforth, is for him only a frightful desert he removes himself for ever + from a country he thinks no longer willing to reckon him amongst the + number of her children—he quits a house that to his mind is ready to + bury him under its ruins—he renounces a society, to the happiness of + which he can no longer contribute; which his own peculiar felicity alone + can render dear to him: and could the man be blamed, who, finding himself + useless; who being without resources, in the town where destiny gave him + birth, should quit it in chagrin, to plunge himself in solitude? Death + appears to the wretched the only remedy for despair; it is then the sword + seems the only friend, the only comfort that is left to the unhappy: as + long as hope remains the tenant of his bosom—as long as his evils + appear to him at all supportable—as long as he flatters himself with + seeing them brought to a termination—as long as he finds some + comfort in existence, however slender, he will not consent to deprive + himself of life: but when nothing any longer sustains in him the love of + this existence, then to live, is to him the greatest of evils; to die, the + only mode by which he can avoid the excess of despair. This has been the + opinion of many great men: Seneca, the moralist, whom Lactantius calls the + divine Pagan, who has been praised equally by St. Austin and St. + Augustine, endeavours by every kind of argument to make death a matter of + indifference to man. Cato has always been commended, because he would not + survive the cause of liberty; for that he would not live a slave. Curtius, + who rode voluntarily into the gap, to save his country, has always been + held forth as a model of heroic virtue. Is it not evident, that those + martyrs who have delivered themselves up to punishment, have preferred + quitting the world to living in it contrary to their own ideals of + happiness? When Samson wished to be revenged on the Philistines, did he + not consent to die with them as the only means? If our country is + attacked, do we not voluntarily sacrifice our lives in its defence? + </p> + <p> + That society who has not the ability, or who is not willing to procure man + any one benefit, loses all its rights over him; Nature, when it has + rendered his existence completely miserable, has in fact, ordered him to + quit it: in dying he does no more than fulfil one of her decrees, as he + did when he first drew his breath. To him who is fearless of death, there + is no evil without a remedy; for him who refuses to die, there yet exists + benefits which attach him to the world; in this case let him rally his + powers—let him oppose courage to a destiny that oppresses him—let + him call forth those resources with which Nature yet furnishes him; she + cannot have totally abandoned him, while she yet leaves him the sensation + of pleasure; the hopes of seeing a period to his pains. + </p> + <p> + Man regulates his judgment on his fellows, only by his own peculiar mode + of feeling; he deems as folly, he calls delirium all those violent actions + which he believes but little commensurate with their causes; or which + appear to him calculated to deprive him of that happiness, towards which + he supposes a being in the enjoyment of his senses, cannot cease to have a + tendency: he treats his associate as a weak creature, when he sees him + affected with that which touches him but lightly; or when he is incapable + of supporting those evils, which his self-love flatters him, he would + himself be able to endure with more fortitude. He accuses with madness + whoever deprives himself of life, for objects that he thinks unworthy so + dear a sacrifice; he taxes him with phrenzy, because he has himself + learned to regard this life as the greatest blessing. It is thus that he + always erects himself into a judge of the happiness of others—of + their mode of seeing—of their manner of feeling: a miser who + destroys himself after the loss of his treasure, appears a fool in the + eyes of him who is less attached to riches; he does not feel, that without + money, life to this miser is only a continued torture; that nothing in the + world is capable of diverting him from his painful sensations: he will + proudly tell you, that in his place he had not done so much; but to be + exactly in the place of another man, it is needful to have his + organization—his temperament—his passions—his ideas; it + is in fact needful to be that other; to be placed exactly in the same + circumstances; to be moved by the same causes; and in this case all men, + like the miser, would sacrifice their life, after being deprived of the + only source of their happiness. + </p> + <p> + He who deprives himself of his existence, does not adopt this extremity, + so repugnant to his natural tendency; but when nothing in this world has + the faculty of rejoicing him; when no means are left of diverting his + affliction; when reason no longer acts; his misfortune whatever it may be, + for him is real; his organization, be it strong, or be it weak, is his + own, not that of another: a man who is sick only in imagination, really + suffers considerably; even troublesome dreams place him in a very + uncomfortable situation. Thus when a man kills himself, it ought to be + concluded, that life, in the room of being a benefit, had become a very + great evil to him; that existence had lost all its charms in his eyes; + that the entire of nature was to him destitute of attraction; that it no + longer contained any thing that could seduce him; that after the + comparison which his disturbed imagination had made of existence with + non-existence, the latter appeared to him preferable to the first. + </p> + <p> + Many will consider these maxims as dangerous; they certainly account why + the unhappy cut the thread of life, in a manner not corresponding with the + received prejudices; but, nevertheless, it is a temperament soured by + chagrin, a bilious constitution, a melancholy habit, a defect in the + organization, a derangement in the mind; it is in fact necessity and not + reasonable speculations, that breed in man the design of destroying + himself. Nothing invites him to this step so long as reason remains with + him; or whilst he yet possesses hope, that sovereign balm for every evil: + as for the unfortunate, who cannot lose sight of his sorrows—who + cannot forget his pains—who has his evils always present to his + mind; he is obliged to take counsel from these alone: besides, what + assistance, what advantage can society promise to himself, from a + miserable wretch reduced to despair; from a misanthrope overwhelmed with + grief; from a wretch tormented with remorse, who has no longer any motive + to render himself useful to others—who has abandoned himself—who + finds no more interest in preserving his life? Frequently, those who + destroy themselves are such, that had they lived, the offended laws must + have ultimately been obliged to remove them from a society which they + disgraced; from a country which they had injured. + </p> + <p> + As life is commonly the greatest blessing for man, it is to be presumed + that he who deprives himself of it, is compelled to it by an invincible + force. It is the excess of misery, the height of despair, the derangement + of his brain, caused by melancholy, that urges man on to destroy himself. + Agitated by contrary impulsions, he is, as we have before said, obliged to + follow a middle course that conducts him to his death; if man be not a + free-agent, in any one instant of his life, he is again much less so in + the act by which it is terminated. + </p> + <p> + It will be seen then, that he who kills himself, does not, as it is + pretended, commit an outrage on nature. He follows an impulse which has + deprived him of reason; adopts the only means left him to quit his + anguish; he goes out of a door which she leaves open to him; he cannot + offend in accomplishing a law of necessity: the iron hand of this having + broken the spring that renders life desirable to him; which urged him to + self-conservation, shews him he ought to quit a rank or system where he + finds himself too miserable to have the desire of remaining. His country + or his family have no right to complain of a member, whom it has no means + of rendering happy; from whom consequently they have nothing more to hope: + to be useful to either, it is necessary he should cherish his own peculiar + existence; that he should have an interest in conserving himself—that + he should love the bonds by which he is united to others—that he + should be capable of occupying himself with their felicity—that he + should have a sound mind. That the suicide should repent of his + precipitancy, he should outlive himself, he should carry with him into his + future residence, his organs, his senses, his memory, his ideas, his + actual mode of existing, his determinate manner of thinking. + </p> + <p> + In short, nothing is more useful for society, than to inspire man with a + contempt for death; to banish from his mind the false ideas he has of its + consequences. The fear of death can never do more than make cowards; the + fear of its consequences will make nothing but fanatics or melancholy + beings, who are useless to themselves, unprofitable to others. Death is a + resource that ought not by any means to be taken away from oppressed + virtue; which the injustice of man frequently reduces to despair. If man + feared death less, he would neither be a slave nor superstitious; truth + would find defenders more zealous; the rights of mankind would be more + hardily sustained; virtue would be intrepidly upheld: error would be more + powerfully opposed; tyranny would be banished from nations: cowardice + nourishes it, fear perpetuates it. In fact, <i>man can neither be + contented nor happy whilst his opinions shall oblige him to tremble</i>. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0022" id="link2H_4_0022"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + CHAP. XV. + </h2> + <p> + <i>Of Man's true Interest, or of the Ideas he forms to himself of + Happiness.—Man cannot be happy without Virtue.</i> + </p> + <p> + Utility, as has been before observed, ought to be the only standard of the + judgment of man. To be useful, is to contribute to the happiness of his + fellow creatures; to be prejudicial, is to further their misery. This + granted, let us examine if the principles we have hitherto established be + prejudicial or advantageous, useful or useless, to the human race. If man + unceasingly seeks after his happiness, he can only approve of that which + procures for him his object, or furnishes him the means by which it is to + be obtained. + </p> + <p> + What has been already said will serve in fixing our ideas upon what + constitutes this happiness: it has been already shewn that it is only + continued pleasure: but in order that an object may please, it is + necessary that the impressions it makes, the perceptions it gives, the + ideas which it leaves, in short, that the motion it excites in man should + be analogous to his organization; conformable to his temperament; + assimilated to his individual nature:—modified as it is by habit, + determined as it is by an infinity of circumstances, it is necessary that + the action of the object by which he is moved, or of which the idea + remains with him, far from enfeebling him, far from annihilating his + feelings, should tend to strengthen him; it is necessary, that without + fatiguing his mind, exhausting his faculties, or deranging his organs, + this object should impart to his machine that degree of activity for which + it continually has occasion. What is the object that unites all these + qualities? Where is the man whose organs are susceptible of continual + agitation without being fatigued; without experiencing a painful + sensation; without sinking? Man is always willing to be warned of his + existence in the most lively manner, as long as he can be so without pain. + What do I say? He consents frequently to suffer, rather than not feel. He + accustoms himself to a thousand things which at first must have affected + him in a disagreeable manner; but which frequently end either by + converting themselves into wants, or by no longer affecting him any way: + of this truth tobacco, coffee, and above all brandy furnish examples: this + is the reason he runs to see tragedies; that he witnesses the execution of + criminals. In short, the desire of feeling, of being powerfully moved, + appears to be the principle of curiosity; of that avidity with which man + seizes on the marvellous; of that earnestness with which he clings to the + supernatural; of the disposition he evinces for the incomprehensible. + Where, indeed, can he always find objects in nature capable of continually + supplying the stimulus requisite to keep him in activity, that shall be + ever proportioned to the state of his own organization; which his extreme + mobility renders subject to perpetual variation? The most lively pleasures + are always the least durable, seeing they are those which exhaust him + most. + </p> + <p> + That man should be uninterruptedly happy, it would be requisite that his + powers were infinite; it would require that to his mobility he joined a + vigor, attached a solidity, which nothing could change; or else it is + necessary that the objects from which he receives impulse, should either + acquire or lose properties, according to the different states through + which his machine is successively obliged to pass; it would need that the + essences of beings should be changed in the same proportion as his + dispositions; should be submitted to the continual influence of a thousand + causes, which modify him without his knowledge, and in despite of himself. + If, at each moment, his machine undergoes changes more or less marked, + which are ascribable to the different degrees of elasticity, of density, + of serenity of the atmosphere; to the portion of igneous fluid circulating + through his blood; to the harmony of his organs; to the order that exists + between the various parts of his body; if, at every period of his + existence, his nerves have not the same tensions, his fibres the same + elasticity, his mind the same activity, his imagination the same ardour, + &c. it is evident that the same causes in preserving to him only the + same qualities, cannot always affect him in the same manner. Here is the + reason why those objects that please him in one season displease him in + another: these objects have not themselves sensibly changed; but his + organs, his dispositions, his ideas, his mode of seeing, his manner of + feeling, have changed:—such is the source of man's inconstancy. + </p> + <p> + If the same objects are not constantly in that state competent to form the + happiness of the same individual, it is easy to perceive that they are yet + less in a capacity to please all men; or that the same happiness cannot be + suitable to all. Beings already various by their temperament, unlike in + their faculties, diversified in their organization, different in their + imagination, dissimilar in their ideas, of distinct opinions, of contrary + habits, which an infinity of circumstances, whether physical or moral, + have variously modified, must necessarily form very different notions of + happiness. Those of a MISER cannot be the same as those of a PRODIGAL; + those of a VOLUPTUARY, the same as those of one who is PHLEGMATIC; those + of an intemperate, the same as those of a rational man, who husbands his + health. The happiness of each, is in consequence composed of his natural + organization, and of those circumstances, of those habits, of those ideas, + whether true or false, that have modified him: this organization and these + circumstances, never being the same in any two men, it follows, that what + is the object of one man's views, must be indifferent, or even displeasing + to another; thus, as we have before said, no one can be capable of judging + of that which may contribute to the felicity of his fellow man. + </p> + <p> + <i>Interest</i> is the object to which each individual according to his + temperament and his own peculiar ideas, attaches his welfare; from which + it will be perceived that this interest is never more than that which each + contemplates as necessary to his happiness. It must, therefore, be + concluded, that no man is totally without interest. That of the miser to + amass wealth; that of the prodigal to dissipate it: the interest of the + ambitious is to obtain power; that of the modest philosopher to enjoy + tranquillity; the interest of the debauchee is to give himself up, without + reserve, to all sorts of pleasure; that of the prudent man, to abstain + from those which may injure him: the interest of the wicked is to gratify + his passions at any price: that of the virtuous to merit by his conduct + the love, to elicit by his actions the approbation of others; to do + nothing that can degrade himself in his own eyes. + </p> + <p> + Thus, when it is said that <i>Interest is the only motive of human + actions;</i> it is meant to indicate that each man labours after his own + manner, to his own peculiar happiness; that he places it in some object + either visible or concealed; either real or imaginary; that the whole + system of his conduct is directed to its attainment. This granted, no man + can be called disinterested; this appellation is only applied to those of + whose motives we are ignorant; or whose interest we approve. Thus the man + who finds a greater pleasure in assisting his friends in misfortune than + preserving in his coffers useless treasure, is called generous, faithful, + and disinterested; in like manner all men are denominated disinterested, + who feel their glory far more precious than their fortune. In short, all + men are designated disinterested who place their happiness in making + sacrifices which man considers costly, because he does not attach the same + value to the object for which the sacrifice is made. + </p> + <p> + Man frequently judges very erroneously of the interest of others, either + because the motives that animate them are too complicated for him to + unravel; or because to be enabled to judge of them fairly, it is needful + to have the same eyes, the same organs the same passions, the same + opinions: nevertheless, obliged to form his judgment of the actions of + mankind, by their effect on himself, he approves the interest that + actuates them whenever the result is advantageous for his species: thus, + he admires valour, generosity, the love of liberty, great talents, virtue, + &c. he then only approves of the objects in which the beings he + applauds have placed their happiness; he approves these dispositions even + when he is not in a capacity to feel their effects; but in this judgment + he is not himself disinterested; experience, reflection, habit, reason, + have given him a taste for morals, and he finds as much pleasure in being + witness to a great and generous action, as the man of <i>virtu</i> finds + in the sight of a fine picture of which he is not the proprietor. He who + has formed to himself a habit of practising virtue, is a man who has + unceasingly before his eyes the interest that he has in meriting the + affection, in deserving the esteem, in securing the assistance of others, + as well as to love and esteem himself: impressed with these ideas which + have become habitual to him, he abstains even from concealed crimes, since + these would degrade him in his own eyes: he resembles a man who having + from his infancy contracted the habit of cleanliness, would be painfully + affected at seeing himself dirty, even when no one should witness it. The + honest man is he to whom truth has shewn his interest or his happiness in + a mode of acting that others are obliged to love, are under the necessity + to approve for their own peculiar interest. + </p> + <p> + These principles, duly developed, are the true basis of morals; nothing is + more chimerical than those which are founded upon imaginary motives placed + out of nature; or upon innate sentiments; which some speculators have + regarded as anterior to man's experience; as wholly independant of those + advantages which result to him from its use: it is the essence of man to + love himself; to tend to his own conservation; to seek to render his + existence happy: thus interest, or the desire of happiness, is the only + real motive of all his actions; this interest depends upon his natural + organization, rests itself upon his wants, is bottomed upon his acquired + ideas, springs from the habits he has contracted: he is without doubt in + error, when either a vitiated organization or false opinions shew him his + welfare in objects either useless or injurious to himself, as well as to + others; he marches steadily in the paths of virtue when true ideas have + made him rest his happiness on a conduct useful to his species; in that + which is approved by others; which renders him an interesting object to + his associates. <i>Morals</i> would be a vain science if it did not + incontestibly prove to man that <i>his interest consists in being + virtuous.</i> Obligation of whatever kind, can only be founded upon the + probability or the certitude of either obtaining a good or avoiding an + evil. + </p> + <p> + Indeed, in no one instant of his duration, can a sensible, an intelligent + being, either lose sight of his own preservation or forget his own + welfare; he owes happiness to himself; but experience quickly proves to + him, that bereaved of assistance, quite alone, left entirely to himself, + he cannot procure all those objects which are requisite to his felicity: + he lives with sensible, with intelligent beings, occupied like himself + with their own peculiar happiness; but capable of assisting him, in + obtaining those objects he most desires; he discovers that these beings + will not be favorable to his views, but when they find their interest + involved; from which he concludes, that his own happiness demands, that + his own wants render it necessary he should conduct himself at all times + in a manner suitable to conciliate the attachment, to obtain the + approbation, to elicit the esteem, to secure the assistance of those + beings who are most capacitated to further his designs. He perceives, that + it is man who is most necessary to the welfare of man: that to induce him + to join in his interests, he ought to make him find real advantages in + recording his projects: but to procure real advantages to the beings of + the human species, is to have virtue; the reasonable man, therefore, is + obliged to feel that it is his interest to be virtuous. <i>Virtue is only + the art of rendering himself happy, by the felicity of others</i>. The + virtuous man is he who communicates happiness to those beings who are + capable of rendering his own condition happy; who are necessary to his + conservation; who have the ability to procure him a felicitous existence. + </p> + <p> + Such, then, is the true foundation of all morals; merit and virtue are + founded upon the nature of man; have their dependance upon his wants. It + is virtue alone that can render him truly happy: without virtue society + can neither be useful nor indeed subsist; it can only have real utility + when it assembles beings animated with the desire of pleasing each other, + and disposed to labour to their reciprocal advantage: there exists no + comfort in those families whose members are not in the happy disposition + to lend each other mutual succours; who have not a reciprocity of feeling + that stimulates them to assist one another; that induces them to cling to + each other, to support the sorrows of life; to unite their efforts, to put + away those evils to which nature has subjected them; the conjugal bonds, + are sweet only in proportion as they identify the interest of two beings, + united by the want of legitimate pleasure; from whence results the + maintenance of political society, and the means of furnishing it with + citizens. Friendship has charms only when it more particularly associates + two virtuous beings; that is to say, animated with the sincere desire of + conspiring to their reciprocal happiness. In short, it is only by + displaying virtue, that man can merit the benevolence, can win the + confidence, can gain the esteem, of all those with whom he has relation; + in a word, no man can be independently happy. + </p> + <p> + Indeed, the happiness of each human individual depends on those sentiments + to which he gives birth, on those feelings which he nourishes in the + beings amongst whom his destiny has placed him; grandeur may dazzle them; + power may wrest from them an involuntary homage; force may compel an + unwilling obedience; opulence may seduce mean, may attract venal souls; + but it is humanity, it is benevolence, it is compassion, it is equity, + that unassisted by these, can without efforts obtain for him, from those + by whom he is surrounded, those delicious sentiments of attachments, those + soothing feelings of tenderness, those sweet ideas of esteem, of which all + reasonable men feel the necessity. To be virtuous then, is to place his + interest in that which accords with the interest of others; it is to enjoy + those benefits, to partake of that pleasure which he himself diffuses over + his fellows. He whom, his nature, his education, his reflections, his + habits, have rendered susceptible of these dispositions, and to whom his + circumstances have given him the faculty of gratifying them, becomes an + interesting object to all those who approach him: he enjoys every instant, + he reads with satisfaction the contentment, he contemplates with pleasure + the joy which he has diffused over all countenances: his wife, his + children, his friends, his servants greet him with gay, serene faces, + indicative of that content, harbingers of that peace, which he recognizes + for his own work: every thing that environs him is ready to partake his + pleasures; to share his pains; cherished, respected, looked up to by + others, every thing conducts him to agreeable reflections; he knows the + rights he has acquired over their hearts; he applauds himself for being + the source of a felicity that captivates all the world; his own condition, + his sentiments of self-love, become an hundred times more delicious when + he sees them participated by all those with whom his destiny has connected + him. The habit of virtue creates for him no wants but those which virtue + itself suffices to satisfy; it is thus that <i>virtue is always its own + peculiar reward</i>, that it remunerates itself with all the advantages + which it incessantly procures for others. + </p> + <p> + It will be said, and perhaps even proved, that under the present + constitution of things, virtue far from procuring the welfare of those who + practice it frequently plunges man into misfortune; often places continual + obstacles to his felicity; that almost every where it is without + recompence. What do I say? A thousand examples could be adduced as + evidence, that in almost every country it is hated, persecuted, obliged to + lament the ingratitude of human nature. I reply with avowing, that by a + necessary consequence of the errors of his race, virtue rarely conducts + man to those objects in which the uninformed make their happiness consist. + The greater number of societies, too frequently ruled by those whose + ignorance makes them abuse their power,—whose prejudices render them + enemies of virtue,—who flattered by sycophants, secure in the + impunity their actions enjoy, commonly lavish their esteem, bestow their + kindness, on none but the most unworthy objects; reward only the most + frivolous, recompence none but the most prejudicial qualities; and hardly + ever accord that justice to merit which is unquestionably its due. But the + truly honest man, is neither ambitious of renumeration, nor sedulous of + the suffrages of a society thus badly constituted: contented with domestic + happiness, he seeks not to augment relations, which would do no more than + increase his danger; he knows that a vitiated community is a whirlwind, + with which an honest man cannot co-order himself: he therefore steps + aside; quits the beaten path, by continuing in which he would infallibly + be crushed. He does all the good of which he is capable in his sphere; he + leaves the road free to the wicked, who are willing to wade through its + mire; he laments the heavy strokes they inflict on themselves; he applauds + mediocrity that affords him security: he pities those nations made + miserable by their errors,—rendered unhappy by those passions which + are the fatal but necessary consequence; he sees they contain nothing but + wretched citizens, who far from cultivating their true interest, far from + labouring to their mutual felicity, far from feeling the real value of + virtue, unconscious how dear it ought to be to them, do nothing but either + openly attack, or secretly injure it; in short, who detests a quality + which would restrain their disorderly propensities. + </p> + <p> + In saying that virtue is its own peculiar reward, it is simply meant to + announce, that in a society whose views were guided by truth, trained by + experience, conducted by reason, each individual would be acquainted with + his real interests; would understand the true end of association; would + have sound motives to perform his duties; find real advantages in + fulfilling them; in fact, it would be convinced, that to render himself + solidly happy, he should occupy his actions with the welfare of his + fellows; by their utility merit their esteem, elicit their kindness, and + secure their assistance. In a well-constituted society, the government, + the laws, education, example, would all conspire to prove to the citizen, + that the nation of which he forms a part, is a whole that cannot be happy, + that cannot subsist without virtue; experience would, at each step, + convince him that the welfare of its parts can only result from that of + the whole body corporate; justice would make him feel, that no society, + can be advantageous to its members, where the volition of wills in those + who act, is not so conformable to the interests of the whole, as to + produce an advantageous re-action. + </p> + <p> + But, alas! by the confusion which the errors of man have carried into his + ideas: virtue disgraced, banished, and persecuted, finds not one of those + advantages it has a right to expect: man is indeed shewn those rewards for + it in a future life, of which he is almost always deprived in his actual + existence. It is thought necessary to deceive, considered proper to + seduce, right to intimidate him, in order to induce him to follow that + virtue which every thing renders incommodious to him; he is fed with + distant hopes, in order to solicit him to practice virtue, while + contemplation of the world makes it hateful to him; he is alarmed by + remote terrors, to deter him from committing evil, which his associates + paint as amiable; which all conspires to render necessary. It is thus that + politics, thus that superstition, by the formation of chimeras, by the + creation of fictitious interests pretend to supply those true, those real + motives which nature furnishes,—which experience would point out,—which + an enlightened government should hold forth,—which the law ought to + enforce,—which instruction should sanction,—which example + should encourage,-which rational opinions would render pleasant. Man, + blinded by his passions, not less dangerous than necessary, led away by + precedent, authorised by custom, enslaved by habit, pays no attention to + these uncertain promises, is regardless of the menaces held out; the + actual interests of his immediate pleasures, the force of his passions, + the inveteracy of his habits, always rise superior to the distant + interests pointed out in his future welfare, or the remote evils with + which he is threatened; which always appear doubtful, whenever he compares + them with present advantages. + </p> + <p> + Thus <i>superstition, far from making man virtuous by principle, does + nothing more than impose upon him a yoke as severe as it is useless</i>; + it is borne by none but enthusiasts, or by the pusillanimous; who, without + becoming better, tremblingly champ the feeble bit put into their mouth; + who are either rendered unhappy by their opinions, or dangerous by their + tenets; indeed, experience, that faithful monitor, incontestibly proves, + that superstition is a dyke inadequate to resist the torrent of + corruption, to which so many accumulated causes give an irresistible + force: nay more, does not this superstition itself augment the public + disorder, by the dangerous passions which it lets loose, by the conduct + which it sanctions, by the actions which it consecrates? Virtue, in almost + every climate, is confined to some few rational souls, who have sufficient + strength of mind to resist the stream of prejudice; who are contented by + remunerating themselves with the benefits they difuse over society: whose + temperate dispositions are gratified with the suffrages of a small number + of virtuous approvers; in short, who are detached from those frivolous + advantages which the injustice of society but too commonly accords only to + baseness, which it rarely bestows, except to intrigue, with which in + general it rewards nothing but crime. + </p> + <p> + In despite of the injustice that reigns in the world, there are, however, + some virtuous men in the bosom even of the most degenerate nations; + notwithstanding the general depravity, there are some benevolent beings, + still enamoured of virtue; who are fully acquainted with its true value; + who are sufficiently enlightened to know that it exacts homage even from + its enemies; who to use the language of ECCLESIASTES, "<i>rejoice in their + own works</i>;" who are, at least, happy in possessing contented minds, + who are satisfied with concealed pleasures, those internal recompences of + which no earthly power is competent to deprive them. The honest man + acquires a right to the esteem, has a just claim to the veneration, wins + the confidence, gains the love, even of those whose conduct is exposed by + a contrast with his own. In short, vice is obliged to cede to virtue; of + which it blushingly, though unwillingly, acknowledges the superiority. + Independent of this ascendancy so gentle, of this superiority so grand, of + this pre-eminence so infallible, when even the whole universe should be + unjust to him, when even every tongue should cover him with venom, when + even every arm should menace him with hostility, there yet remains to the + honest man the sublime advantage of loving his own conduct; the ineffable + pleasure of esteeming himself; the unalloyed gratification of diving with + satisfaction into the recesses of his own heart; the tranquil delight of + contemplating his own actions with that delicious complacency that others + ought to do, if they were not hood-winked, No power is adequate to ravish + from him the merited esteem of himself; no authority is sufficiently + potent to give it to him when he deserves it not; the mightiest monarch + cannot lend stability to this esteem, when it is not well founded; it is + then a ridiculous sentiment: it ought to be considered, it really is "<i>vanity + and vexation of spirit</i>," it is not wisdom, but folly in the extreme; + it ought to be censured when it displays itself in a mode that is + mortifying to its neighbour, in a manner that is troublesome to others; it + is then called ARROGANCE; it is called VANITY; but when it cannot be + condemned, when it is known for legitimate when it is discovered to have a + solid foundation, when it bottoms itself upon talents, when it rises upon + great actions that are useful to the community, when it erects its edifice + upon virtue; even though society should not set these merits at their just + price, it is NOBLE PRIDE, ELEVATION OF MIND, and GRANDEUR OF SOUL. + </p> + <p> + Of what consequence then, is it to listen to those superstitious beings, + those enemies to man's happiness, who have been desirous of destroying it, + even in the inmost recesses of his heart; who have prescribed to him + hatred of his follower; who have filled him with contempt for himself; who + pretend to wrest from the honest man that self-respect which is frequently + the only reward that remains to virtue, in a perverse world. To annihilate + in him this sentiment, so full in justice, this love of himself, is to + break the most powerful spring, to weaken the most efficacious stimulus, + that urges him to act right; that spurs him on to do good to his fellow + mortals. What motive, indeed, except it be this, remains for him in the + greater part of human societies? Is not virtue discouraged? Is not honesty + contemned? Is not audacious crime encouraged? Is not subtle intrigue + eulogized? Is not cunning vice rewarded? Is not love of the public weal + taxed as folly; exactitude in fulfilling duties looked upon as a bubble? + Is not compassion laughed to scorn? ARE NOT TRAITORS DISTINGUISHED BY + PUBLIC HONORS? Is not negligence of morals applauded,—sensibility + derided,—tenderness scoffed,—conjugal fidelity jeered,—sincerity + despised,—enviolable friendship treated with ridicule: while + seduction, adultery, hard-heartedness, punic faith, avarice, and fraud, + stalk forth unabashed, decked in gorgeous array, lauded by the world? Man + must have motives for action: he neither acts well nor ill, but with a + view to his own happiness: that which he judges will conduce to this "<i>consummation + so devoutly to be wished</i>," he thinks his interest; he does nothing + gratuitously; when reward for useful actions is withheld from him, he is + reduced either to become as abandoned as others, or else to remunerate + himself with his own applause. + </p> + <p> + This granted; the honest man can never be completely unhappy; he can never + be entirely deprived of the recompence which is his due; virtue is + competent to repay him for all the benefits he may bestow on others; can + amply make up to him all the happiness denied him by public opinion; <i>but + nothing can compensate to him the want of virtue</i>. It does not follow + that the honest man will be exempted from afflictions: like, the wicked, + he is subject to physical evils; he may pine in indigence; he may be + deprived of friendship; he may be worn down with disease; he may + frequently be the subject of calumny; he may be the victim to injustice; + he may be treated with ingratitude; he may be exposed to hatred; but in + the midst of all his misfortunes, in the very bosom of his sorrows, in the + extremity of his vexation, he finds support in himself; he is contented + with his own conduct; he respects himself; he feels his own dignity; he + knows the equity of his rights; he consoles himself with the confidence + inspired by the justness of his cause; he cheers himself amidst the most + sullen circumstances. These supports are not calculated for the wicked; + they avail him nothing: equally liable with the honest man to infirmities, + equally submitted to the caprices of his destiny, equally the sport of a + fluctuating world, he finds the recesses of his own heart filled with + dreadful alarms; diseased with care; cankered with solitude; corroded with + regret; gnawed by remorse; he dies within himself; his conscience sustains + him not but loads him with reproach; his mind, overwhelmed, sinks beneath + its own turpitude; his reflection is the bitter dregs of hemlock; + maddening anguish holds him to the mirror that shews him his own + deformity; that recalls unhallowed deeds; gloomy thoughts rush on his too + faithful memory; despondence benumbs him; his body, simultaneously + assailed on all sides, bends under the storm of—his own unruly + passions; at last despair grapples him to her filthy bosom, he flies from + himself. The honest man is not an insensible Stoic; virtue does not + procure impassibility; honesty gives no exemption from misfortune, but it + enables him to bear cheerly up against it; to cast off despair, to keep + his own company: if he is infirm, if he is worn with disease, he has less + to complain of than the vicious being who is oppressed with sickness, who + is enfeebled by years; if he is indigent, he is less unhappy in his + poverty; if he is in disgrace, he can endure it with fortitude, he is not + overwhelmed by its pressure, like the wretched slave to crime. + </p> + <p> + Thus the happiness of each individual depends on the cultivation of his + temperament; nature makes both the happy and the unhappy; it is culture + that gives value to the soil nature has formed; it is instruction that + makes the fruit it produces palatable; It is reflection that makes it + useful. For man to be happily born, is to have received from nature a + sound body, organs that act with precision—a just mind, a heart + whose passions are analogous, whose desires are conformable to the + circumstances in which his destiny has placed him: nature, then, has done + every thing for him, when she has joined to these faculties the quantum of + vigour, the portion of energy, sufficient to enable him to obtain those + Proper things, which his station, his mode of thinking, his temperament, + have rendered desirable. Nature has made him a fatal present, when she has + filled his sanguinary vessels with an over-heated fluid; when she has + given him an imagination too active; when she has infused into him desires + too impetuous; when he has a hankering after objects either impossible or + improper to be obtained under his circumstances; or which at least he + cannot procure without those incredible efforts, that either place his own + welfare in danger or disturb the repose of society. The most happy man, is + commonly he who possesses a peaceful soul; who only desires those things + which he can procure by labour, suitable to maintain his activity; which + he can obtain without causing those shocks, that are either too violent + for society, or troublesome to his associates. A philosopher whose wants + are easily satisfied, who is a stranger, to ambition, who is contented + with the limited circle of a small number of friends, is, without doubt a + being much more happily constituted than an ambitious conqueror, whose + greedy imagination is reduced to despair by having only one world to + ravage. He who is happily born, or whom nature has rendered susceptible of + being conveniently modified, is not a being injurious to society: it is + generally disturbed by men who are unhappily born, whose organization + renders them turbulent; who are discontented with their destiny; who are + inebriated with their own licentious passions; who are infatuated with + their own vile schemes; who are smitten with difficult enterprises; who + set the world in combustion, to gather imaginary benefits in order to + attain which they must inflict he heaviest curses on mankind, but in which + they make their own happiness consist. An ALEXANDER requires the + destruction of empires, nations to be deluged with blood, cities to be + laid in ashes, its inhabitants to be exterminated, to content that passion + for glory, of which he has formed to himself a false idea; but which his + too ardent imagination, his too vehement mind anxiously thirsts after: for + a DIOGENES there needs only a tub with the liberty of appearing whimsical; + a SOCRATES wants nothing but the pleasure of forming disciples to virtue. + </p> + <p> + Man by his organization is a being to whom motion is always necessary; he + must therefore always desire it: this is the reason why too much facility + In procuring the objects of his search, renders them quickly insipid. To + feel happiness, it is necessary to make efforts to obtain it; to find + charms in its enjoyment, it is necessary that the desire should be whetted + by obstacles; he is presently disgusted with those benefits which have + cost him but little pains. The expectation of happiness, the labour + requisite to procure it, the varied prospects it holds forth, the + multiplied pictures which his imagination forms to him, supply his brain + with that motion for which it has occasion; this gives impulse to his + organs, puts his whole machine into activity, exercises his faculties, + sets all his springs in play, in a word, puts him into that agreeable + activity, for the want of which the enjoyment of happiness itself cannot + compensate him. Action is the true element of the human mind; as soon as + it ceases to act, it falls into disgust, sinks into lassitude. His soul + has the same occasion for ideas, his stomach has for aliment. + </p> + <p> + Thus the impulse given him by desire, is itself a great benefit; it is to + the mind what exercise is to the body; without it he would not derive any + pleasure in the aliments presented to him; it is thirst that renders the + pleasure of drinking so agreeable; life is a perpetual circle of + regenerated desires and wants satisfied: repose is only a pleasure to him + who labours; it is a source of weariness, the cause of sorrow, the spring + of vice to him who has nothing to do. To enjoy without interruption is not + to enjoy any thing: the man who has nothing to desire is certainly more + unhappy than he who suffers. + </p> + <p> + These reflections, grounded upon experience, drawn from the fountain of + truth, ought to prove to man, that good as well as evil depends on the + essence of things. Happiness to be felt cannot be continued. Labour is + necessary, to make intervals between his pleasures; his body has occasion + for exercise, to co-order him with the beings who surround him; his heart + must have desires; trouble alone can give him the right relish of his + welfare; it is this which puts in the shadows, this which furnishes the + true perspective to the picture of human life. By an irrevocable law of + his destiny, man is obliged to be discontented with his present condition; + to make efforts to change it; to reciprocally envy that felicity which no + individual enjoys perfectly. Thus the poor man envies the opulence of his + richer neighbour, although this is frequently more unhappy than his needy + maligner; thus the rich man views with pain the advantages of a poverty, + which he sees active, healthy, and frequently jocund, even in the bosom of + penury. + </p> + <p> + If man was perfectly contented, there would no longer be any activity in + the world; it is necessary that he should desire; it is requisite that he + should act; it is incumbent he should labour, in order that he may be + happy: such is the course of nature of which the life consists in action. + Human societies can only subsist, by the continual exchange of those + things in which man places his happiness. The poor man is obliged to + desire, he is necessitated to labour, that he may procure what he knows is + requisite to the preservation of his existence; the primary wants given to + him by nature, are to nourish himself, clothe himself, lodge himself, and + propagate his species; has he satisfied these? He is quickly obliged to + create others entirely new; or rather, his imagination only refines upon + the first; he seeks to diversify them; he is willing to give them fresh + zest; arrived at opulence, when he has run over the whole circle of wants, + when he has completely exhausted their combinations, he falls into + disgust. Dispensed from labour, his body amasses humours; destitute of + desires, his heart feels a languor; deprived of activity, he is obliged to + participate his riches, with beings more active, more laborious than + himself: these, following their own peculiar interests, take upon + themselves the task of labouring for his advantage; of procuring for him + means to satisfy his want; of ministering to his caprices, in order to + remove the languor that oppresses him. It is thus the great, the rich + excite the energies, give play to the activity, rouse the faculties, spur + on the industry of the indigent; these labour to their own peculiar + welfare by working for others: thus the desire of ameliorating his + condition, renders man necessary to his fellow man; thus wants, always + regenerating, never satisfied, are the principles of life,—the soul + of activity,—the source of health,—the basis of society. If + each individual was competent to the supply of his own exigencies, there + would be no occasion for him to congregate in society; but it is his + wants, his desires, his whims, that place him in a state of dependence on + others: these are the causes that each individual, in order to further his + own peculiar interest, is obliged to be useful to those, who have the + capability of procuring for him the objects which he himself has not. A + nation is nothing more than the union of a great number of individuals, + connected with each other by the reciprocity of their wants; by their + mutual desire of pleasure. The most happy man is he who has the fewest + wants, and who has the most numerous means of satisfying them. The man who + would be truly rich, has no need to increase his fortune, it suffices he + should diminish his wants. + </p> + <p> + In the individuals of the human species, as well as in political society, + the progression of wants, is a thing absolutely necessary; it is founded + upon the essence of man, it is requisite that the natural wants once + satisfied, should be replaced by those which he calls <i>Imaginary, or + wants of the Fancy:</i> these become as necessary to his happiness as the + first. Custom, which permits the native American to go quite naked, + obliges the more civilized inhabitant of Europe to clothe himself; the + poor man contents himself with very simple attire, which equally serve him + for winter and for summer, for autumn and for spring; the rich man desires + to have garments suitable to each mutation of these seasons; he would + experience pain if he had not the convenience of changing his raiment with + every variation of his climate; he would be wretched if he was obliged to + wear the same habiliments in the heat of summer, which he uses in the + winter; in short, he would be unhappy if the expence and variety of his + costume did not display to the surrounding multitude his opulence, mark + his rank, announce his superiority. It is thus habit multiplies, the wants + of the wealthy; it is thus that vanity itself becomes a want which sets a + thousand hands in, motion, a thousand heads to work, who are all eager to + gratify its cravings; in short, this very vanity procures for the + necessitous man, the means of subsisting at the expense of his opulent + neighbours He who is accustomed to pomp, who is used to ostentatious + splendour, whose habits are luxurious, whenever he is deprived of these + insignia of opulence, to which he has attached the idea of happiness, + finds himself just as unhappy as the needy wretch who has not wherewith to + cover his nakedness. The civilized nations of the present day were in + their origin savages composed of erratic tribes,—mere wanderers who + were occupied with war; employed in, the chace; painfully obliged to seek + precarious subsistence by hunting in those woods which the industry of + their successors has cleared; which their labour has covered with yellow + waving ears of nutritious corn; in time they have become stationary: they + first applied themselves to Agriculture, afterwards to commerce: by + degrees they have refined on their primitive wants, extended their sphere + of action, given birth to a thousand new wants, imagined a thousand new + means to satisfy them; this is the natural course, the necessary + progression, the regular march of active beings, who cannot live without + feeling; who to be happy, must of necessity diversify their sensations. In + proportion as man's wants multiply the means to satisfy them becomes more + difficult, he is obliged to depend on a greater number of his fellow + creatures; his interest obliges him to rouse their activity; to engage + them to concur with his views; consequently he is obliged to procure for + them those objects by which they can be excited; he is under the necessity + of contenting their desires, which increase like his own, by the very food + that satisfies them. The savage needs only put forth his hand to gather + the fruit that offers itself spontaneously to his reach: this he finds + sufficient for his nourishment. The opulent citizen of a flourishing + society is obliged to set innumerable hands to work to produce the + sumptuous repast; the four quarters of the globe are ransacked to procure + the far-fetched viands become necessary to revive his languid appetite; + the merchant, the sailor, the mechanic, leave nothing unattempted to + flatter his inordinate vanity. From this it will appear, that in the same + proportion the wants of man are multiplied, he is obliged to augment the + means to satisfy them. Riches are nothing more than the measure of a + convention, by the assistance of which man is enabled to make a great + number of his fellows concur in the gratification of his desires; by which + he is capacitated to invite them, for their own peculiar interests, to + contribute to his pleasures. What, in fact, does the rich man do, except + announce to the needy, that he can furnish him with the means of + subsistence if he consents to lend himself to his will? What does the man + in power, except shew to others, that he is in a state to supply the + requisites to render them happy? Sovereigns, nobles, men of wealth, appear + to be happy, only because they possess the ability, are masters of the + motives sufficient to determine a great number of individuals to occupy + themselves with their respective felicity. + </p> + <p> + The more things are considered the more man will be convinced that his + false opinion are the true source of his misery; the clearer it will + appear to him that happiness is so rare, only because he attaches it to + objects either indifferent or useless to his welfare; which, when enjoyed, + convert themselves into real evils; which afflict him; which become the + cause of his misfortune. + </p> + <p> + <i>Riches</i> are indifferent in themselves, it is only by their + application, by the purposes they compass, that they either become objects + of utility to man, or are rendered prejudicial to his welfare. + </p> + <p> + <i>Money</i>, useless to the savage who understands not its value, is + amassed by the miser, for fear it should be employed uselessly; lest it + should be squandered by the prodigal; or dissipated by the voluptuary; who + make no other use of it than to purchase infirmities; to buy regret. + </p> + <p> + Pleasures are nothing for the man who is incapable of feeling them; they + become real evils when they are too freely indulged, when they are + destructive to his health,—when they derange the economy of his + machine,—when they entail diseases on himself and on his posterity,—when + they make him neglect his duties,—when they render him despicable in + the eyes of others. + </p> + <p> + Power is nothing in itself, it is useless to man if he does not avail + himself of it to promote his own peculiar felicity, by augmenting the + happiness of his species; it becomes fatal to him as soon as he abuses it; + it becomes odious whenever he employs it to render others miserable; it is + always the cause of his own misery whenever he stretches it beyond the due + bounds prescribed by nature. + </p> + <p> + For want of being enlightened on his true interest, the man who enjoys all + the means of rendering himself completely happy, scarcely ever discovers + the secret of making those means truly subservient to his own peculiar + felicity: the art of enjoying, is that which of all others is least + understood; man should learn this art before he begins to desire; the + earth is covered with individuals who only occupy themselves with the care + of procuring the means without ever being acquainted with the end. All the + world desire fortune, solicit power, seek after pleasure, yet very few, + indeed, are those whom objects render truly happy. + </p> + <p> + It is quite natural in man, it is extremely reasonable, it is absolutely + necessary, to desire those things which can contribute to augment the sum + of his felicity. <i>Pleasure, riches, power,</i> are objects worthy his + ambition, deserving his most strenuous efforts, when he has learned how to + employ them; when he has acquired the faculty of making them render his + existence really more agreeable. It is impossible to censure him who + desires them, to despise him who commands them, but when to obtain them he + employs odious means; or when after he has obtained them he makes a + pernicious use of them, injurious to himself, prejudicial to others; let + him wish for power, let him seek after grandeur, let him be ambitious of + reputation, when he can shew just pretensions to them; when he can obtain + them, without making the purchase at the expence of his own repose, or + that of the beings with whom he lives: let him desire riches, when he + knows how to make a use of them that is truly advantageous for himself, + really beneficial for others; but never let him employ those means to + procure them of which he may be ashamed; with which he may be obliged to + reproach himself; which may draw upon him the hatred of his associates; or + which may render him obnoxious to the castigation of society: let him + always recollect, that his solid happiness should rest its foundations + upon its own esteem,—upon the advantages he procures for others; + above all, never let him for a moment forget, that of all the objects to + which his ambition may point, the most impracticable for a being who lives + in society, is that of <i>attempting to render himself exclusively happy</i>. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0023" id="link2H_4_0023"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + CHAP. XVI + </h2> + <p> + <i>The Errors of Man,—upon what constitutes Happiness.—the + true Source of his Evil.—Remedies that may be applied.</i> + </p> + <p> + Reason by no means forbids man from forming capacious desires; ambition is + a passion useful to his species when it has for, its object the happiness + of his race. Great minds, elevated souls, are desirous of acting on an + extended sphere; geniuses who are powerful, beings who are enlightened, + men who are beneficent, distribute very widely their benign influence; + they must necessarily, in order to promote their own peculiar felicity, + render great numbers happy. So many princes fail to enjoy true happiness + only, because their feeble, narrow souls, are obliged to act in a sphere + too extensive for their energies: it is thus that by the supineness, the + indolence, the incapacity of their chiefs, nations frequently pine in + misery; are often submitted to masters, whose exility of mind is as little + calculated to promote their own immediate happiness, as it is to further + that of their miserable subjects. On the other hand, souls too vehement, + too much inflamed, too active, are themselves tormented by the narrow + sphere that confines them; their ardour misplaced, becomes the scourge of + the human race. Alexander was a monarch who was equally injurious to the + earth, equally discontented with his condition, as the indolent despot + whom he dethroned. The souls of neither were by any means commensurate + with their sphere of action. + </p> + <p> + The happiness of man will never be more than the result of the harmony + that subsists between his desires and his circumstances. The sovereign + power to him who knows not how to apply it to the advantage of his + citizens, is as nothing; it cannot even conduce to his own peculiar + happiness. If it renders him miserable, it is a real evil; if it produces + the misfortune of a portion of the human race, it is a detestable abuse. + The most powerful princes are ordinarily such strangers to happiness, + their subjects are commonly so unfortunate, only because the first possess + all the means of rendering themselves happy without ever giving them + activity; or because the only knowledge they have of them, is their abuse. + A wise man seated on a throne, would be the most happy of mortals. A + monarch is a man for whom his power, let it be of whatever extent, cannot + procure other organs, other modes of feeling, than the meanest of his + subjects; if he has an advantage over them, it is by the grandeur, the + variety, the multiplicity of the objects with which he can occupy himself; + which by giving perpetual activity to his mind, can prevent it from decay; + from falling into sloth. If his soul is virtuous, if his mind is + expansive, his ambition finds continual food in the contemplation of the + power he possesses, to unite by gentleness, to consolidate by kindness, + the will of his subjects with his own; to interest them in his own + conservation, to merit their affections,—to draw forth the respect + of strangers,—to render luminous the page of history—to elicit + the eulogies of all nations—to clothe the orphan,—to dry the + widow's tears. Such are the conquests that reason proposes to all those + whose destiny it is to govern the fate of empires; they are sufficiently + grand to satisfy the most ardent imagination, of a sublimity to gratify + the most capacious ambition: for a monarch they are paramount duties.—KINGS + are the most happy of men, only because they have the power of making + others happy; because they possess the means of multiplying the causes of + legitimate content with themselves. + </p> + <p> + The advantages of the sovereign power are participated by all those who + contribute to the government of states. Thus grandeur, rank, reputation, + are desirable, are legitimate objects for all who are acquainted with the + means of rendering them subservient to their own peculiar felicity; they + are useless, they are illegitimate to those ordinary men who have neither + the energy nor the capacity to employ them in a mode advantageous to + themselves; they are detestable whenever to obtain them man compromises + his own happiness, when he implicates the welfare of society: this society + itself is in an error every time it respects men who only employ to its + destruction, a power, the exercise of which it ought never to approve but + when it reaps from it substantial benefits. + </p> + <p> + Riches, useless to the miser, who is no more than their miserable gaoler; + prejudicial to the debauchee, for whom they only procure infirmities; + injurious to the voluptuary, to whom they only bring disgust—whom + they oppress with satiety; can in the hands of the honest man produce + unnumbered means of augmenting the sum of his happiness; but before man + covets wealth it is proper he should know how to employ it; money is only + a token, a representative of happiness; to enjoy it is so to use it as to + make others happy: this is the great secret, this is the talisman, this is + the reality. Money, according to the compact of man, procures for him all + those benefits he can desire; there is only one, which it will not + procure, that is, <i>the knowledge how to apply it properly</i>. For man + to have money, without the true secret how to enjoy it, is to possess the + key of a commodious palace to which he is interdicted entrance; to lavish + it, prodigally, is to throw the key into the river; to make a bad use of + it, is only to make it the means of wounding himself. Give the most ample + treasures to the enlightened man, he will not be overwhelmed with them; if + he has a capacious mind, if he has a noble soul, he will only extend more + widely his benevolence; he will deserve the affection of a greater number + of his fellow men; he will attract the love, he will secure the homage, of + all those who surround him; he will restrain himself in his pleasures, in + order that he may be enabled truly to enjoy them; he will know that money + cannot re-establish a soul worn out with enjoyment; cannot give fresh + elasticity to organs enfeebled by excess; cannot give fresh tension to + nerves grown flaccid by abuse; cannot invigorate a body enervated by + debauchery; cannot corroborate a machine, from thenceforth become + incapable of sustaining him, except by the necessity of privations; he + will know that the licentiousness of the voluptuary stifles pleasure in + its source; that all the treasure in the world cannot renew his senses. + </p> + <p> + From this, it will be obvious, that nothing is more frivolous than the + declamations of a gloomy philosophy against the desire of power; nothing + more absurd than the rant of superstition against the pursuit of grandeur; + nothing more inconsistent than homilies against the acquisition of riches; + nothing more unreasonable than dogmas that forbid the enjoyment of + pleasure. These objects are desirable for man, whenever his situation + allows him to make pretensions to them; they are useful to society, + conducive to public happiness, whenever he has acquired the knowledge of + making them turn to his own real advantage; reason cannot censure him, + virtue cannot despise him, when in order to obtain them, he never travels + out of the road of truth; when in their acquisition, he wounds no one's + interest; when he pursues only legitimate means: his associates will + applaud him; his contemporaries will esteem him: he will respect himself, + when he only employs their agency to secure his own happiness, and that of + his fellows. Pleasure is a benefit, it is of the essence of man to love, + it is even rational when it renders his existence really valuable to + himself—when it does not injure him in his own esteem; when its + consequences are not grievous to others. <i>Riches</i> are the symbols of + the great majority of the benefits of this life; they become a reality in + the hands of the man who has the clew to their just application. <i>Power</i> + is the most sterling of all benefits, when he who is its depositary has + received from nature a soul sufficiently noble, a mind sufficiently + elevated, a heart sufficiently benevolent, faculties sufficiently + energetic, above all, when he has derived from education a true regard for + virtue, that sacred love for truth which enables him to extend his happy + influence over whole nations; which by this means he places in, a state of + legitimate dependence on his will; <i>man only acquires the right of + commanding men, when he renders them happy.</i> + </p> + <p> + The right of man over his fellow man can only be founded either upon the + actual happiness he secures to him, or that which he gives him reason to + hope he will procure for him; without this, the power he exercises would + be violence, usurpation, manifest tyranny; it is only upon the faculty of + rendering him happy, that legitimate authority builds its structure; + without this it is the "<i>baseless fabric of a vision." No man derives + from nature the right of commanding another</i>; but it is voluntarily + accorded to those, from whom he expects his welfare. <i>Government</i> is + the right of commanding, conferred on the sovereign only for the advantage + of those who are governed. Sovereigns are the defenders of the persons, + the guardians of the property, the protectors of the liberty of their + subjects: this is the price of their obedience; it is only on this + condition these consent to obey; government would not be better than a + robbery whenever it availed itself of the powers confided to it, to render + society unhappy. <i>The empire of religion</i> is founded on the opinion + man entertains of its having power to render nations happy; government and + religion are reasonable institutions; but only so, inasmuch as they + equally contribute to the felicity of man: it would be folly in him to + submit himself to a yoke from which there resulted nothing but evil. It + would be folly to expect that man should bind himself to misery; it would + be rank injustice to oblige him to renounce his rights without some + corresponding advantage! + </p> + <p> + The authority which a father exercises over his family is only founded on + the advantages which he is supposed to procure for it. Rank, in political + society, has only for its basis the real or imaginary utility of some + citizens for which the others are willing to distinguish them—agree + to respect them—consent to obey them. The rich acquire rights over + the indigent, the wealthy claim the homage of the needy, only by virtue of + the welfare they are conditioned to procure them. Genius, talents, + science, arts, have rights over man, only in consequence of their utility; + of the delight they confer; of the advantages they procure for society. In + a word, it is happiness, it is the expectation of happiness, it is its + image that man cherishes—that he esteems—that he unceasingly + adores. Monarchs, the rich, the great, may easily impose on him, may + dazzle him, may intimidate him, but they will never be able to obtain the + voluntary submission of his heart, which alone can confer upon them + legitimate rights, without they make him experience real benefits—without + they display virtue. Utility is nothing more than true happiness; to be + useful is to be virtuous; to be virtuous is to make others happy. + </p> + <p> + The happiness which man derives from them is the invariable, the necessary + standard of his sentiments, for the beings of his species; for the objects + he desires; for the opinions he embrases; for those actions on which he + decides. He is the dupe of his prejudices every time he ceases to avail + himself of this standard to regulate his judgment. He will never run the + risk of deceiving himself, when he shall examine strictly what is the real + utility resulting to his species from the religion, from the superstition, + from the laws, from the institutions, from the inventions, from the + various actions of all mankind. + </p> + <p> + A superficial view may sometimes seduce him; but experience, aided by + reflection, will reconduct him to reason, which is incapable of deceiving + him. This teaches him that pleasure is a momentary happiness, which + frequently becomes an evil; that evil is a fleeting trouble that + frequently becomes a good: it makes him understand the true nature of + objects, enables him to foresee the effects he may expect; it makes him + distinguish those desires to which his welfare permits him to lend + himself, from those to whose seduction he ought to make resistance. In + short, it will always convince him that the true interest of intelligent + beings, who love happiness, who desire to render their own existence + felicitous, demands that they should root out all those phantoms, abolish + all those chimerical ideas, destroy all those prejudices, which by + traducing virtue, obstruct their felicity in this world. + </p> + <p> + If he consults experience, he will perceive that it is in illusions, in + false opinions, rendered sacred by time, that he ought to search out the + source of that multitude of evils which almost every where overwhelms + mankind. From ignorance of natural causes, man has created imaginary + causes; not knowing to what cause to attribute thunder, he ascribed it to + an imaginary being whom he called JUPITER; imposture availing itself of + this disposition, rendered these causes terrible to him; these fatal ideas + haunted him without rendering him better; made him tremble without either + benefit to himself or to others; filled his mind with chimeras that + opposed themselves to the progress of his reason; that prevented him from + really seeking after his happiness. His vain fears rendered him the slave + of those who deceived him, under pretence of consulting his welfare; he + committed evil, because they persuaded him his gods demanded sacrifices; + he lived in misfortune, because they made him believe these gods condemned + him to be miserable; the slave of beings, to which his own imagination had + given birth, he never dared to disentangle himself from his chains; the + artful ministers of these divinities gave him to understand that + stupidity, the renunciation of reason, sloth of mind, abjection of soul, + were the sure means of obtaining eternal felicity. + </p> + <p> + Prejudices, not less dangerous, have blinded man upon the true nature of + government. Nations in general are ignorant of the true foundations of + authority; they dare not demand happiness from those kings who are charged + with the care of procuring it for them: some have believed their + sovereigns were gods disguised, who received with their birth the right of + commanding the rest of mankind; that they could at their pleasure dispose + of the felicity of the people; that they were not accountable for the + misery they engendered. By a necessary consequence of these erroneous + opinions, politics have almost every where degenerated into the fatal art + of sacrificing the interests of the many, either to the caprice of an + individual, or to some few privileged irrational beings. In despite of the + evils which assailed them, nations fell down in adoration before the idols + they themselves had made: foolishly respected the instruments of their + misery; had a stupid veneration for those who possessed the sovereign + power of injuring them; obeyed their unjust will; lavished their blood; + exhausted their treasure; sacrificed their lives, to glut the ambition, to + feed the cupidity to minister to the regenerated phantasms, to gratify the + never-ending caprices of these men; they bend the knee to established + opinion, bowed to rank, yielded to title, to opulence, to pageantry, to + ostentation: at length victims to their prejudices, they in vain expected + their welfare at the hands of men who were themselves unhappy from their + own vices; whose neglect of virtue, had rendered them incapable of + enjoying true felicity; who are but little disposed to occupy themselves + with their prosperity: under such chiefs their physical and moral + happiness were equally neglected or even annihilated. + </p> + <p> + The same blindness may be perceived in the science of morals. + Superstition, which never had any thing but ignorance for its basis, which + never had more than a disordered imagination for its guide, did not found + ethics upon man's nature; upon his relations with his fellows; upon those + duties which necessarily flow from these relations; it preferred, as more + in unison with itself, founding them upon imaginary relations which it + pretended subsisted between him and those invisible powers it had so + gratuitously imagined; that were delivered by oracles which their priests + had the address to make him believe spoke the will of the Divinity: thus, + TROPHONIUS, from his cave made affrightened mortals tremble; shook the + stoutest nerves; made them turn pale with fear; his miserable, deluded + supplicants, who were obliged to sacrifice to him, anointed their bodies + with oil, bathed in certain rivers, and after they had offered their cake + of honey and received their destiny, became so dejected, so wretchedly + forlorn, that to this day their descendants, when they behold a malencholy + man, exclaim, "<i>He has consulted the oracle of Trophonius</i>." It was + these invisible gods, which superstition always paints as furious tyrants, + who were declared the arbiters of man's destiny; the models of his + conduct: when he was willing to imitate them, when he was willing to + conform himself to the lessons of their interpreters, he became wicked, + was an unsociable creature, an useless being or else a turbulent maniac—a + zealous fanatic. It was these alone who profited by superstition, who + advantaged themselves by the darkness in which they contrived to involve + the human mind; nations were ignorant of nature; they knew nothing of + reason; they understood not truth; they had only a gloomy superstition, + without one certain idea of either morals or virtue. When man committed + evil against his fellow creature, he believed he had offended these gods; + but he also believed himself forgiven, as soon as he had prostrated + himself before them; as soon as he had by costly presents gained over the + priest to his interest. Thus superstition, far from giving a sure, far + from affording a natural, far from introducing a known basis to morals, + only rested it on an unsteady foundation; made it consist in ideal duties + impossible to be accurately understood. What did I say? It first corrupted + him, and his expiations finished by ruining him. Thus when superstition + was desirous to combat the unruly passions of man it attempted it in vain; + always enthusiastic, ever deprived of experience, it knew nothing of the + true remedies: those which it applied were disgusting, only suitable to + make the sick revolt against them; it made them pass for divine, because + they were not made of man; they were inefficacious, because chimeras could + effectuate nothing against those substantive passions to which motives + more real, impulsions more powerful, concurred to give birth, which every + thing conspired, to flourish in his heart. The voice of superstition or of + the gods, could not make itself heard amidst the tumult of society—where + all was in confusion—where the priest cried out to man, that he + could not render himself happy without injuring his fellow creatures, who + happened to differ from him in opinion: these vain clamours only made + virtue hateful to him, because they always represented it as the enemy to + his happiness; as the bane of human pleasures: he consequently failed in + the observation of his duties, because real motives were never held forth + to induce him to make the requisite sacrifice; the present prevailed over + the future; the visible over the invisible; the known over the unknown: + man became wicked because every thing informed him he must be so, in order + to obtain the happiness after which he sighed. + </p> + <p> + Thus the sum of human misery was never diminished; on the contrary, it was + accumulating either by his superstition, by his government, by his + education, by his opinions or by the institutions he adopted under the + idea of rendering his condition more pleasant: it not unfrequently + happened that the whole of these acted upon him simultaneously; he was + then completely wretched. It cannot be too often repeated, <i>it is in + error that man will find the true spring of those evils with which the + human race is afflicted;</i> it is not nature that renders him miserable; + it is not nature that makes him unhappy; it is not an irritated Divinity + who is desirous he should live in tears; it is not hereditary depravation + that has caused him to be wicked; it is to error, to long cherished, + consecrated error, to error identified with his very existence, that these + deplorable effects are to be ascribed. + </p> + <p> + The sovereign good, so much sought after by some philosophers, announced + with so much emphasis by others, may be considered as a chimera, like unto + that marvellous panacea which some adepts have been willing to pass upon + mankind for an universal remedy. All men are diseased; the moment of their + birth delivers them over to the contagion of error; but individuals are + variously affected by it by a consequence of their natural organization; + of their peculiar circumstances. If there is a sovereign remedy, which can + be indiscriminately applied to the diseases of man, there is without doubt + only ONE, this catholic balsam is TRUTH, Which he must draw from nature. + </p> + <p> + At the afflicting sight of those errors which blind the greater number of + mortals—of those delusions which man is doomed to suck in with his + mother's milk; viewing with painful sensations those irregular desires, + those disgusting propensities, by which he is perpetually agitated; seeing + the terrible effect of those licentious passions which torment him; of + those lasting inquietudes which gnaw his repose; of those stupendous + evils, as well physical as moral, which assail him on every side: the + contemplator of humanity would be tempted to believe that happiness was + not made for this world; that any effort to cure those minds which every + thing unites to poison, would be a vain enterprize; that it was an Augean + stable, requiring the strength of another Hercules. When he considers + those numerous superstitions by which man is kept in a continual state of + alarm—that divide him from his fellow—that render him + vindictive, persecuting, and irrational; when he beholds the many despotic + governments that oppress him; when he examines those multitudinous, + unintelligible, contradictory laws that torture him; the manifold + injustice under which he groans; when he turns his mind to the barbarous + ignorance in which he is steeped, almost over the whole surface of the + earth; when he witnesses those enormous crimes that debase society; when + he unmasks those rooted vices that render it so hateful to almost every + individual; he has great difficulty to prevent his mind from embracing the + idea that misfortune is the only appendage of the human species; that this + world is made solely to assemble the unhappy; that human felicity is a + chimera, or at least a point so fugitive, that it is impossible it can be + fixed. + </p> + <p> + Thus superstitious mortals, atrabilious men, beings nourished in + melancholy, unceasingly see either nature or its author exasperated + against the human race; they suppose that man is the constant object of + heaven's wrath; that he irritates it even by his desires: that he renders + himself criminal by seeking a felicity which is not made for him: struck + with beholding that those objects which he covets in the most lively + manner, are never competent to content his heart, they have decried them + as abominations, as things prejudicial to his interest, as odious to his + gods; they prescribe him abstinence from all search after them; that he + should entirely shun them; they have endeavoured to put to the rout all + his passions, without any distinction even of those which are the most + useful to himself, the most beneficial to those beings with whom he lives: + they have been willing that man should render himself insensible; should + become his own enemy; that he should separate himself from his fellow + creatures; that he should renounce all pleasure; that he should refuse + happiness; in short, <i>that he should cease to be a man, that he should + become unnatural</i>. "Mortals!" have they said, "ye were born to be + unhappy; the author of your existence has destined ye for misfortune; + enter then into his views, and render yourselves miserable. Combat those + rebellious desires which have felicity for their object; renounce those + pleasures which it is your essence to love; attach yourselves to nothing + in this world; by a society that only serves to inflame your imagination, + to make you sigh after benefits you ought not to enjoy; break up the + spring of your souls; repress that activity that seeks to put a period to + your sufferings; suffer, afflict yourselves, groan, be wretched; such is + for you the true road to happiness." + </p> + <p> + Blind physicians! who have mistaken for a disease the natural state of + man! they have not seen that his desires were necessary; that his passions + were essential to him; that to defend him from loving legitimate + pleasures; to interdict him from desiring them, is to deprive him of that + activity which is the vital principle of society; that to tell him to + hate, to desire him to despise himself, is to take from him the most + substantive motive, that can conduct him to virtue. It is thus, by its + supernatural remedies, by its wretched panacea, superstition, far from + curing those evils which render man decrepid, which bend him almost to the + earth, has only increased them; made them more desperate; in the room of + calming his passions, it gives them inveteracy; makes them more dangerous; + renders them more venomous; turns that into a curse which nature has given + him for his preservation; to be the means of his own happiness. It is not + by extinguishing the passions of man that he is to be rendered happier; it + is by turning them into proper channels, by directing them towards useful + objects, which by being truly advantageous to himself, must of necessity + be beneficial to others. + </p> + <p> + In despite of the errors which blind the human race, in despite of the + extravagance of man's superstition, maugre the imbecility of his political + institutions, notwithstanding the complaints, in defiance of the murmurs + he is continually breathing forth against his destiny, there are yet happy + individuals on the earth. Man has sometimes the felicity to behold + sovereigns animated by the noble passion to render nations flourishing; + full of the laudable ambition to make their people happy; now and then he + encounters an ANTONINUS, a TRAJAN, a JULIAN, an ALFRED, a WASHINGTON; he + meets with elevated minds who place their glory in encouraging merit—who + rest their happiness in succouring indigence—who think it honourable + to lend a helping hand to oppressed virtue: he sees genius occupied with + the desire of meriting the eulogies of posterity; of eliciting the + admiration of his fellow-citizens by serving them usefully, satisfied with + enjoying that happiness he procures for others. + </p> + <p> + Let it not be believed that the man of poverty himself is excluded from + happiness: mediocrity and indigence frequently procure for him advantages + that opulence and grandeur are obliged to acknowledge; which title and + wealth are constrained to envy: the soul of the needy man, always in + action, never ceases to form desires which his activity places within his + reach; whilst the rich, the powerful, are frequently in the afflicting + embarrassment, of either not knowing what to wish for, or else of desiring + those objects which their listlessness renders it impossible for them to + obtain. The poor man's body, habituated to labour, knows the sweets of + repose; this repose of the body, is the most troublesome fatigue to him + who is wearied with his idleness; exercise, and frugality, procure for the + one vigour, health, and contentment; the intemperance and sloth of the + other, furnish him only with disgust—load him with infirmities. + Indigence sets all the springs of the soul to work; it is the mother of + industry; from its bosom arises genius; it is the parent of talents, the + hot-bed of that merit to which opulence is obliged to pay tribute; to + which grandeur bows its homage. In short the blows of fate find in the + poor man a flexible reed, who bends without breaking, whilst the storms of + adversity tear the rich man like the sturdy oak in the forest, up by the + very roots. + </p> + <p> + Thus Nature is not a step-mother to the greater number of her children. He + whom fortune has placed in an obscure station is ignorant of that ambition + which devours the courtier; knows nothing of the inquietude which deprives + the intriguer of his rest; is a stranger to the remorse, an alien to the + disgust, is unconscious of the weariness of the man, who, enriched with + the spoils of a nation, does not know how to turn them to his profit. The + more the body labours, the more the imagination reposes itself; it is the + diversity of the objects man runs over that kindles it; it is the satiety + of those objects that causes him disgust; the imagination of the indigent + is circumscribed by necessity: he receives but few ideas: he is acquainted + with but few objects: in consequence, he has but little to desire; he + contents himself with that little: whilst the entire of nature with + difficulty suffices to satisfy the insatiable desires, to gratify the + imaginary wants of the man, plunged in luxury, who has run over and + exhausted all common objects. Those, whom prejudice contemplates; as the + most unhappy of men, frequently enjoy advantages more real, happiness much + greater, than those who oppress them—who despise them—but who + are nevertheless often reduced to the misery of envying them. Limited + desires are a real benefit: the man of meaner condition, in his humble + fortune, desires only bread: he obtains it by the sweat of his brow; he + would eat it with pleasure if injustice did not sometimes render it bitter + to him. By the delirium of some governments, those who roll in abundance, + without for that reason being more happy, dispute with the cultivator even + the fruits which the earth yields to the labour of his hands. <i>Princes</i> + sometimes sacrifice their true happiness, as well as that of their states, + to these passions—to those caprices which discourage the people; + which plunge their provinces in misery: which make millions unhappy, + without any advantage to themselves. <i>Tyrants</i> oblige the subjects to + curse their existence; to abandon labour; take from them the courage of + propagating a progeny who would be as unhappy as their fathers: the excess + of oppression sometimes obliges them to revolt; makes them avenge + themselves by wicked outrages of the injustice it has heaped on their + devoted heads: injustice, by reducing indigence to despair, obliges it to + seek in crime, resources, against its misery. An unjust government, + produces discouragement in the soul: its vexations depopulate a country; + under its influence, the earth remains without culture; from thence is + bred frightful famine, which gives birth to contagion and plague. The + misery of a people produce revolutions; soured by misfortunes, their minds + get into a state of fermentation; the overthrow of an empire, is the + necessary effect. It is thus that <i>physics</i> and <i>morals</i> are + always connected, or rather are the <i>same thing</i>. + </p> + <p> + If the bad morals of chiefs do not always produce such marked effects, at + least they generate slothfulness, of which their effect is to fill society + with mendicants; to crowd it with malefactors; whose vicious course + neither superstition nor the terror of the laws can arrest; which nothing + can induce to remain the unhappy spectators of a welfare they are not + permitted to participate. They seek a fleeting happiness at the expence + even of their lives, when injustice has shut up to them the road of + labour, those paths of industry which would have rendered them both useful + and honest. + </p> + <p> + Let it not then be said that no government can render all its subjects + happy; without doubt it cannot flatter itself with contenting the + capricious humours of some idle citizens who are obliged to rack their + imagination, to appease the disgust arising from lassitude: but it can, + and it ought to occupy itself with ministering to the real wants of the + multitude, with giving a useful activity to the whole body politic. A + society enjoys all the happiness of which it is susceptible whenever the + greater number of its members are wholesomely fed, decently cloathed, + comfortably lodged—in short when they can without an excess of toil + beyond their strength, procure wherewith to satisfy those wants which + nature has made necessary to their existence. Their mind rests contented + as soon as they are convinced no power can ravish from them the fruits of + their industry; that they labour for themselves; that the sweat of their + brow is for the immediate comfort of their own families. By a consequence + of human folly in some regions, whole nations are obliged to toil + incessantly, to waste their strength, to sweat under their burdens to + undulate the air with their sighs, to drench the earth with their tears, + in order to maintain the luxury, to gratify the whims, to support the + corruption of a small number of irrational beings; of some few useless men + to whom happiness has become impossible, because their bewildered + imaginations no longer know any bounds. It is thus that superstitious, + thus that political errors have changed the fair face of nature into a + valley of tears. + </p> + <p> + For want of consulting reason, for want of knowing the value of virtue, + for want of being instructed in their true interest, for want of being + acquainted with what constitutes solid happiness, in what consists real + felicity, the prince and the people, the rich and the poor, the great and + the little, are unquestionably, frequently very far removed from content; + nevertheless if an impartial eye be glanced over the human race, it will + be found to comprise a greater number of benefits than of evils. No man is + entirely happy, but he is so in detail; those who make the most bitter + complaints of the rigour of their fate, are however, held in existence by + threads frequently imperceptible; are prevented from the desire of + quitting it by circumstances of which they are not aware. In short, habit + lightens to man the burden of his troubles; grief suspended becomes true + enjoyment; every want is a pleasure in the moment when it is satisfied; + freedom from chagrin, the absence of disease, is a happy state which he + enjoys secretly, without even perceiving it; hope, which rarely abandons + him entirely, helps him to support the most cruel disasters. The PRISONER + laughs in his irons. The wearied VILLAGER returns singing to his cottage. + In short, the man who calls himself the most unfortunate, never sees death + approach without dismay, at least, if despair has not totally disfigured + nature in his eyes. + </p> + <p> + As long as man desires the continuation of his being, he has no right to + call himself completely unhappy; whilst hope sustains him, he still enjoys + a great benefit. If man was more just, in rendering to himself an account + of his pleasures, in estimating his pains, he would acknowledge that the + sum of the first exceeds by much the amount of the last; he would perceive + that he keeps a very exact ledger of the evil, but a very unfaithful + journal of the good: indeed he would avow, that there are but few days + entirely unhappy during the whole course of his existence. His periodical + wants procure for him the pleasure of satisfying them; his soul is + perpetually moved by a thousand objects, of which, the variety, the + multiplicity, the novelty, rejoices him, suspends his sorrows, diverts his + chagrin. His physical evils, are they violent? They are not of long + duration; they conduct him quickly to his end: the sorrows of his mind, + when too powerful, conduct him to it equally. At the same time nature + refuses him every happiness, she opens to him a door by which he quits + life; does he refuse to enter it? It is that he yet finds pleasure in + existence. Are nations reduced to despair? Are they completely miserable? + They have recourse to arms; at the risque of perishing, they make the most + violent efforts to terminate there sufferings. + </p> + <p> + Thus because he sees so many of his fellows cling to life, man ought to + conclude they are not so unhappy as he thinks. Then let him not exaggerate + the evils of the human race, but let him impose silence on that gloomy + humour that persuades him these evils are without remedy; let him only + diminish by degrees the number of his errors, his calamities will vanish + in the same proportion; he is not to conclude himself infelicitous because + his heart never ceases to form new desires, which he finds it difficult, + sometimes impossible to gratify. Since his body daily requires + nourishment, let him infer that it is sound, that it fulfils its + functions. As long as he has desires, the proper deduction ought to be, + that his mind is kept in the necessary activity; he should gather from all + this that passions are essential to him, that they constitute the + happiness of a being who feels; are indispensable to a man who thinks; are + requisite to furnish him with ideas; that they are a vital principle with + a creature who must necessarily love that which procures him comfort, who + must equally desire that which promises him a mode of existence analogous + to his natural energies. As long as he exists, as long as the spring of + his soul maintains its elasticity, this soul desires; as long as it + desires, he experiences the activity which is necessary to him; as long as + he acts, so long he lives. Human life may be compared to a river, of which + the waters succeed each other, drive each other forward, and flow on + without interruption; these waters, obliged to roll over an unequal bed, + encounter at intervals those obstacles which prevent their stagnation; + they never cease to undulate; sometimes they recoil, then again rush + forward, thus continuing to run with more or less velocity, until they are + restored to <i>the ocean of nature</i>. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0024" id="link2H_4_0024"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + CHAP. XVII. + </h2> + <p> + <i>Those Ideas which are true, or founded upon Nature, are the only + Remedies for the Evils of Man.—Recapitulation.—Conclusion of + the first Part.</i> + </p> + <p> + Whenever man ceases to take experience for his guide, he falls into error. + His errors become yet more dangerous, assume a more determined inveteracy, + when they are clothed with the sanction of superstition; it is then that + he hardly ever consents to return into the paths of truth; he believes + himself deeply interested in no longer seeing clearly that which lies + before him; he fancies he has an essential advantage in no longer + understanding himself; he supposes his happiness exacts that he should + shut his eyes to truth. If the majority of moral philosophers have + mistaken the human heart—if they have deceived themselves upon its + diseases—if they have miscalculated the remedies that are suitable—if + the remedies they have administered have been inefficacious or even + dangerous—it is because they have abandoned nature—because + they have resisted experience—because they have not had sufficient + steadiness to consult their reason—because they have renounced the + evidence of their senses—because they have only followed the + caprices of an imagination either dazzled by enthusiasm or disturbed by + fear; because they have preferred the illusions it has held forth to the + realities of nature, <i>who never deceives</i>. + </p> + <p> + It is for want of having felt that an intelligent being cannot for an + instant lose sight of his own peculiar conservation—of his + particular interests, either real or fictitious—of his own welfare, + whether permanent or transitory; in short, of his happiness, either true + or false. It is for want of having considered that desires are natural, + that passions are essential, that both the one and the other are motions + necessary to the soul of man,—that the physicians of the, human mind + have supposed supernatural causes for his wanderings; have only applied to + his evils topical remedies, either useless or dangerous. Indeed, in + desiring him to stifle his desires, to combat his propensities, to + annihilate his passions, they have done no more than give him sterile + precepts, at once vague and impracticable; these vain lessons have + influenced no one; they have at most restrained some few mortals whom a + quiet imagination but feebly solicited to evil; the terrors with which + they have accompanied them have disturbed the tranquillity of those + persons who were moderate by their nature, without ever arresting the + ungovernable temperament of those who were inebriated by their passions, + or hurried along; by the torrent of habit. In short, the promises of + superstition, as well as the menaces it holds forth, have only formed + fanatics, given birth to enthusiasts, who are either dangerous or useless + to society, without ever making man truly virtuous; that is to say, useful + to his fellow creatures. + </p> + <p> + These, empirics guided by a blind routine have, not seen that man as long + as he exists, is obliged to feel, to desire, to have passions, to satisfy + them in proportion to the energy which his organization has given him; + they have not perceived that education planted these desires in his heart—that + habit rooted them—that his government, frequently vicious, + corroborated their growth—that public opinion stamped them with its + approbation—that—experience render them necessary—that + to tell men thus constituted to destroy their passions, was either to + plunge them into despair or else to order them remedies too revolting for + their temperament. In the actual state of opulent societies, to say to a + man who knows by experience that riches procure every pleasure, that he + must not desire them; that he must not make any efforts to obtain them; + that he ought to detach himself from them: is to persuade him to render + himself miserable. To tell an ambitious man not to desire grandeur, not to + covet power, which every thing conspires to point out to him as the height + of felicity, is to order him to overturn at one blow the habitual system + of his ideas; it is to speak, to a deaf man. To tell a lover of an + impetuous temperament to stifle his passions for the object that enchants + him, is to make him understand, that he ought to renounce his happiness. + To oppose superstition to such substantive, such puissant interests is to + combat realities by chimerical speculations. + </p> + <p> + Indeed, if things were examined without prepossession, it would be found + that the greater part of the precepts inculcated by superstition, which + fanatical dogmas hold forth, which, supernatural mortals give to man, are + as ridiculous as they are impossible to be put into practice. To interdict + passion to man, is to desire of him not to be a human creature; to counsel + an individual of a violent imagination to moderate his desires, is to + advise him to change his temperament—is to request his blood to flow + more sluggishly. To tell a man to renounce his habits, is to be willing + that a citizen, accustomed to clothe himself, should consent to walk quite + naked; it would avail as much, to desire him to change the lineament of + his face, to destroy his configuration, to extinguish his imagination, to + alter the course of his fluids, as to command him not to have passions + which excite an activity analogous with his natural energy; or to lay + aside those which confirmed habit has made him contract; which his + circumstances, by a long succession of causes and effects, have converted + into wants. Such are, however, the so much boasted remedies which the + greater number of moral philosophers apply to human depravity. Is it, then + surprising they do not produce the desired effect, or that they only + reduce man to a state of despair by the effervescence that results from + the continual conflict which they excite between the passions of his heart + and these fanciful doctrines; between his vices and his virtues; between + his habits and those chimerical fears with which superstition is at all + times ready to overwhelm him? The vices of society, aided by the objects + of which it avails itself to what the desires of man, the pleasures, the + riches, the grandeur which his government holds forth to him as so many + seductive magnets, the advantage which education, the benefits which + example, the interests which public opinion render dear to him, attract + him on one side; whilst a gloomy morality, founded upon superstitious + illusions, vainly solicit him on the other; thus, superstition plunges him + into misery; holds a violent struggle with his heart, without scarcely + ever gaining the victory; when by accident it does prevail against so many + united forces, it renders him unhappy; it completely destroys the spring + of his soul. + </p> + <p> + Passions are the true counterpoise to passions; then let him not seek to + destroy them; but let him endeavour to direct them; let him balance those + which are prejudicial, by those which are useful to society. <i>Reason</i>, + the fruit of experience, is only the art of choosing those passions to + which for his own peculiar happiness he ought to listen. <i>Education</i> + is the true art of disseminating the proper method of cultivating + advantageous passions in the heart of man. <i>Legislation</i> is the art + of restraining dangerous passions; of exciting those which may be + conducive to the public welfare. <i>Superstition</i> is only the miserable + art of planting the unproductive labour—of nourishing in the soul of + man those chimeras, those illusions, those impostures, those incertitudes + from whence spring passions fatal to himself as well as to others: it is + only by bearing up with fortitude against these that he can securely place + himself on the road to happiness. <i>True religion</i> is the art of + advocating truth—of renouncing error—of contemplating reality—of + drawing wisdom from experience—of cultivating man's nature to his + own felicity, by teaching him to contribute to that of his associates; in + short it is <i>reason, education</i>, and <i>legislation</i>, united to + further the great end of human existence, by causing the passions of man + to flow in a current genial to his own happiness. + </p> + <p> + <i>Reason</i> and <i>morals</i> cannot effect any thing on mankind if they + do not point out to each individual that his true interest is attached to + a conduct that is either useful to others or beneficial to himself; this + conduct to be useful must conciliate for him the benevolence, gain for him + the favor of these beings who are necessary to his happiness: it is then + for the interest of mankind, for the happiness of the human race, it is + for the esteem of himself, for the love of his fellows, for the advantages + which ensue, that education in early life should kindle the imagination of + the citizen; this is the true means of obtaining those happy results with + which habit should familiarize him; which public opinion should render + dear to his heart; for which example ought continually to rouse his + faculties; after which he should be taught to search with unceasing + attention. <i>Government</i> by the aid of recompences, ought to encourage + him to follow this plan; by visiting crime with punishment it ought to + deter those who are willing to interrupt it. Thus the hope of a true + welfare, the fear of real evil, will be passions suitable to countervail + those which by their impetuosity would injure society; these last will at + least become very rare, if instead of feeding man's mind with + unintelligible speculations, in lieu of vibrating on his ears words void + of sense, he is only spoken to of realities, only shewn those interests + which are in unison with truth. + </p> + <p> + Man is frequently so wicked, only, because he almost always feels himself + interested in being so; let him be more enlightened, more familiarized + with truth, more accustomed to virtue, he will be made more happy; he will + necessarily become better. An equitable government, a vigilant + administration, will presently fill the state with honest citizens; it + will hold forth to them present reasons for benevolence; real advantages + in truth; palpable motives to be virtuous; it will instruct them in their + duties; it will foster them with its cares; it will allure them by the + assurance of their own peculiar happiness; its promises faithfully + fulfilled—its menaces regularly executed, will unquestionably have + much more weight than those of a gloomy superstition, which never exhibits + to their view other than illusory benefits, fallacious punishments, which + the man hardened in wickedness will doubt every time he finds an interest + in questioning them: present motives will tell more home to his heart than + those which are distant and at best uncertain. The vicious and the wicked + are so common upon the earth, so pertinacious in their evil courses, so + attached to their irregularities, only because there are but few + governments that make man feel the advantage of being just, the pleasure + of being honest, the happiness of being benevolent on the contrary, there + is hardly any place where the most powerful interests do not solicit him + to crime, by favouring the propensities of a vicious organization; by + countenancing those appetencies which nothing has attempted to rectify or + lead towards virtue. A savage, who in his horde knows not the value of + money, certainly would not commit a crime, if when transplanted into + civilized society, he should presently learn to desire it, should make + efforts to obtain it, and if he could without danger finish by stealing + it; above all, if he had not been taught to respect the property of the + beings who environ him. The savages and the child are precisely in the + same state; it is the negligence of society, of those entrusted with their + education, that renders both the one and the other wicked. The son of a + noble, from his infancy learns to desire power, at a riper age he becomes + ambitious; if he has the address to insinuate himself into favor, he + perhaps becomes wicked, because in some societies he has been taught to + know he may be so with impunity when he can command the ear of his + sovereign. It is not therefore nature that makes man wicked, they are his + institutions which determine him to vice. The infant brought up amongst + robbers, can generally become nothing but a malefactor; if he had been + reared with honest people, the chance is he would have been a virtuous + man. + </p> + <p> + If the source be traced of that profound ignorance in which man is with + respect to his morals, to the motives that can give volition to his will, + it will be found in those false ideas which the greater number of + speculators have formed to themselves, of human nature. The science of + morals has become an enigma which it is impossible to unrevel; because man + has made himself double; has distinguished his soul from his body; + supposed it of a nature different from all known beings, with modes of + action, with properties distinct from all other bodies, because he has + emancipated this soul from physical laws, in order to submit it to + capricious laws emanating from men who have pretended they are derived + from imaginary regions, placed at very remote distances: metaphysicians + seized upon these gratuitous suppositions, and by dint of subtilizing + them, have rendered them completely unintelligible. These moralists have + not perceived that motion is essential to the soul as well as to the + living body; that both the one and the other are never moved but by + material, by physical objects; that the want of each regenerate themselves + unceasingly; that the wants of the soul, as well as those of the body are + purely physical; that the most intimate, the most constant connection + subsists between the soul and the body; or rather they have been unwilling + to allow that they ate only the same thing considered under different + points of view. Obstinate in their supernatural, unintelligible opinions, + they have refused to open their eyes, which would have convinced them that + the body in suffering rendered the soul miserable; that the soul afflicted + undermined the body and brought it to decay; that both the pleasures and + agonies of the mind have an influence over the body, either plunge it into + sloth or give it activity: they have rather chosen to believe, that the + soul draws its thoughts, whether pleasant or gloomy, from its own peculiar + sources, while the fact is, that it derives its ideas only from material + objects that strike on the physical organs; that it is neither determined + to gaiety nor led on to sorrow, but by the actual state, whether permanent + or transitory, in which the fluids and solids of the body are found. In + short, they have been loath to acknowledge that the soul, purely passive, + undergoes the same changes which the body experiences; is only moved by + its intervention; acts only by its assistance, receives its sensations, + its perceptions, forms its ideas, derives either its happiness or its + misery from physical objects, through the medium of the organs of which + the body is composed; frequently without its own cognizance, often in + despite of itself. + </p> + <p> + By a consequence of these opinions, connected with marvellous systems, or + systems invented to justify them, they have supposed the human soul to be + a free agent; that is to say, that it has the faculty of moving itself; + that it enjoys the privilege of acting independent of the impulse received + from exterior objects, through the organs of the body; that regardless of + these impulsions it can even resist them, and follow its own directions by + its own energies; that it is not only different in its nature from all + other beings, but has a separate mode of action; in other words, that it + is an insolated point which is, not submitted to that uninterrupted chain + of motion which bodies communicate to each other in a nature, whose parts + are always in action. Smitten with their sublime notions, these + speculators were not aware that in thus distinguishing the soul from the + body and from all known beings, they rendered it an impossibility to form + any true ideas of it, either to themselves or to others: they were + unwilling to perceive the perfect analogy which is found between the + manner of the soul's action and that by which the body is afflicted; they + shut their eyes to the necessary and continual correspondence which is + found between the soul and the body; they perhaps did not perceive that + like the body it is subjected to the motion of attraction and repulsion; + has an aptitude to be attracted, a disposition to repel, which is + ascribable to qualities inherent in those physical subsistances, which + give play to the organs of the body; that the volition of its will, the + activity of its passions, the continual regeneration of its desires, are + never more than consequences of that activity which is produced in the + body by material objects which are not under its controul; that these + objects render it either happy or miserable, active or languishing, + contented or discontented, in despite of itself,—in defiance of all + the efforts it is capable of making to render it otherwise; they have + rather chosen to seek in the heavens for unknown powers to set it in + motion; they have held forth to man distant, imaginary interests: under + the pretext of procuring for him future happiness, he has been prevented + from labouring to his present felicity, which has been studiously withheld + from his knowledge: his regards have been fixed upon the heavens, that he + might lose sight of the earth: truth has been concealed from him; and it + has been pretended he would be rendered happy by dint of terrors, always + at an immense distance; by means of shadows, with whose substances he + could never come in contact; of chimeras formed by his own bewildered + imagination, which changed nearly as often as the governments to which he + was submitted. In short, hoodwinked by his fears, blinded by his own + credulity, <i>he was only guided through the flexuous paths of life, by + men blind as himself, where both the one and the other were frequently + lost in the maze</i>. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <a name="link2H_CONC" id="link2H_CONC"> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + CONCLUSION. + </h2> + <p> + From every thing which has been hitherto said, it evidently results that + all the errors of mankind, of whatever nature they may be, arise from + man's having renounced reason, quitted experience, and refused the + evidence of his senses that he might be guided by imagination, frequently + deceitful; by authority, always suspicious. Man will ever mistake his true + happiness as long as he neglects to study nature, to investigate her laws, + to seek in her alone the remedies for those evils which are the + consequence of his errors: he will be an enigma to himself, as long as he + shall believe himself double; that he is moved by an inconceivable + spiritual power, of the laws and nature of which he is ignorant; his + intellectual, as well as his moral faculties, will remain unintelligible + to him if he does not contemplate them with the same eyes as he does his + corporeal qualities; if he does not view them as submitted in every thing + to the same impulse, as governed by the same regulations. The system of + his pretended free agency is without support; experience contradicts it + every instant, and proves that he never ceases to be under the influence + of necessity in all his actions; this truth, far from being dangerous to + man, far from being destructive of his morals, furnishes him with their + true basis by making him feel the necessity of those relations which + subsists between sensible beings united in society: who have congregated + with a view of uniting their common efforts for their reciprocal felicity. + From the necessity of these relations, spring the necessity of his duties; + these point out to him the sentiments of love, which he should accord to + virtuous conduct; that aversion he should have for what is vicious; the + horror he should feel for every thing criminal. From hence the true + foundation of <i>Moral Obligation</i> will be obvious, which is only the + necessity of talking means to obtain the end man proposes to himself by + uniting in society; in which each individual for his own peculiar + interest, his own particular happiness, his own personal security, is + obliged to display dispositions requisite to conciliate the affections of + his associates; to hold a conduct suitable to the preservation of the + community; to contribute by his actions to the happiness of the whole. In + a word, it is upon the necessary action and re-action of the human will + upon the necessary attraction and repulsion of man's soul, that all his + morals are bottomed: it is the unison of his will, the concert of his + actions, that maintains society; it is rendered miserable by his + discordance; it is dissolved by his want of union. + </p> + <p> + From what has been said, it may be concluded that the names under which + man has designated the concealed causes acting in nature, and their + various effects, are never more than <i>necessity</i> considered under + different points of view, with the original cause of which—the great + <i>cause of causes</i>—he must ever remain ignorant. It will be + found that what he calls <i>order</i>, is a necessary consequence of + causes and effects, of which he sees, or believes he sees, the entire + connection, the complete routine, which pleases him as a whole, when he + finds it conformable to his existence. In like manner it will be seen that + what he calls <i>confusion</i>, is a consequence of like necessary causes + and effects, of which he loses the concatenation, which he therefore + thinks unfavourable to himself, or but little suitable to his being. That + he has designated by the names of— + </p> + <p> + <i>Intelligence</i>, those necessary causes that necessarily operate the + chain of events which he comprises under the term <i>order</i>: + </p> + <p> + <i>Divinity</i>, those necessary but invisible causes which give play to + nature, in which every thing acts according to immutable and necessary + laws: + </p> + <p> + <i>Destiny</i> or <i>fatality</i>, the necessary connection of those + unknown causes and, effects which he beholds in the world: + </p> + <p> + <i>Chance</i>, those effects which he is not able to foresee, or of which + he is ignorant of the necessary connection, with their causes: + </p> + <p> + <i>Intellectual</i> and <i>moral faculties</i>, those effects and those + modifications necessary to an organized being, whom he has supposed to be + moved by an inconceivable agent; who he has believed distinguished from + his body, of a nature totally different from it, and which he has + designated by the word SOUL. In consequence, he has believed this agent + immortal; not dissoluble like the body. It has been shewn that the + marvellous doctrine of another life, is founded upon gratuitous + suppositions, contradicted by reflections, unsupported by experience, that + may or may not be, without man's knowing any thing on the subject. It has + been proved, that the hypothesis is not only useless to man's morals, but + again, that it is calculated to palsy his exertions; to divert him from + actively pursuing the true road to his own happiness; to fill him with + romantic caprices; to inebriate him with opinions prejudicial to his + tranquillity; in short, to lull to slumber the vigilance of legislators; + by dispensing them from giving to education, to the institutions, to the + laws of society, all that attention, which it is the duty and for his + interest they should bestow. It must have been felt, that <i>politics</i> + has unaccountably rested itself upon wrong opinions; upon ideas little + capable of satisfying those passions, which every thing conspires to + kindle in the heart of man; who ceases to view the future, while the + present seduces and hurries him along. It has been shewn, that contempt of + death is an advantageous sentiment, calculated to inspire man's mind with + courage; to render him intrepid; to induce him to undertake that which may + be truly useful to society; in short, from what has preceded, it will be + obvious, what is competent to conduct man to happiness, and also what are + the obstacles that error opposes to his felicity. + </p> + <p> + Let us not then, be accused of demolishing prejudice, without edifying the + mind; with combating error without substituting truth; with underrating + the power of the great <i>cause of causes</i>; with sapping at one and the + same time the foundations of superstition and of sound morals. The last is + necessary to man; it is founded upon his nature; its duties are certain, + they must last as long as the human race remains; it imposes obligations + on him, because, without it, neither individuals nor society could be able + to subsist, either obtain or enjoy those advantages which nature obliges + them to desire. + </p> + <p> + Listen then, O man! to those morals which are established upon, + experience; which are grounded upon the necessity of things; do not lend + thine ear to those superstitions founded upon reveries; rested upon + imposture; built upon the capricious whims of a disordered imagination. + Follow the lessons of those humane, those gentle morals, which conduct man + to virtue, by the voice of happiness: turn a deaf ear to the inefficacious + cries of superstition, which renders man really unhappy; which can never + make him reverence VIRTUE; which renders truth hateful; which paints + veracity in hideous colours; in short, let him see if REASON, without the + assistance of a rival, who prohibits its use, will not more surely conduct + him towards that great end, which is the object of his research, which is + the natural tendency of all his views. + </p> + <p> + Indeed, what benefit has the human race hitherto drawn from those sublime, + those supernatural notions with which superstition has fed mortals during + so many ages? All those phantoms conjured—up by ignorance—brooded + by imagination; all those hypothesis, subtile as they are irrational; from + which experience is banished, all those words devoid of meaning with which + languages are crowded; all those fantastical hopes; those panic terrors + which have been brought to operate on the will of man; what have they + done? Has any or the whole of them rendered him better, more enlightened + to his duties, more faithful in their performance? Have those marvellous + systems, or those sophistical inventions, by which they have been + supported, carried conviction to his mind, reason into his conduct, virtue + into his heart? Have they led him to the least acquaintance with the great + <i>Cause of Causes?</i> Alas! it is a lamentable fact, that cannot be too + often exposed, that all these things have done nothing more than plunge + the human understanding into that darkness from which it is difficult to + be withdrawn; sown in man's heart the most dangerous errors; of which it + is scarcely possible to divest him; given birth to those fatal passions, + in which may be found the true source of those evils, with which his + species is afflicted: but have never enlightened his mind with truth, nor + led him to that right healthy worship, which man best pays by a rational + enjoyment of the faculties with which he is gifted. + </p> + <p> + Cease then, O mortal! to let thyself he disturbed with chimeras, to let + thy mind be troubled with phantoms which thine own imagination has + created, or to which arch imposture has given birth. Renounce thy vague + hopes, disengage thyself from thine overwhelming fears, follow without + inquietude the necessary routine which nature has marked out for thee; + strew the road with flowers if thy destiny permits; remove, if thou art + able, the thorns scattered over it. Do not attempt to plunge thy views + into an impenetrable futurity; its obscurity ought to be sufficient to + prove to thee, that it is either useless or dangerous to fathom. Think of + making thyself happy in that existence which is known to thee: if thou + wouldst preserve thyself, be temperate, be moderate, be reasonable: if + thou seekest to render thy existence durable, be not prodigal of pleasure; + abstain from every thing that can be hurtful to thyself, injurious to + others: be truly intelligent; that is to say, learn to esteem thyself, to + preserve thy being, to fulfil that end which at each moment thou proposest + to thyself. Be virtuous, to the end that thou mayest render thyself + solidly happy, that thou mayest enjoy the affections, secure the esteem, + partake of the assistance of those by whom thou art surrounded; of those + beings whom nature has made necessary to thine own peculiar felicity. Even + when they should be unjust, render thyself worthy of their applause, of + thine own love, and thou shalt live content, thy serenity shall not be + disturbed, the end of thy career shall not slander thy life; which will be + exempted from remorse: death will be to thee the door to a new existence, + a new order, in which thou wilt be submitted, as thou art at present, to + the eternal laws of nature, which ordains, that to LIVE HAPPY HERE BELOW, + THOU MUST MAKE OTHERS HAPPY. Suffer thyself then, to be drawn gently along + thy journey, until thou shalt sleep peaceable on that bosom which has + given thee birth: if contrary to thine expectation, there should be + another life of eternal felicity, thou canst not fail being a partaker. + </p> + <p> + For thou, wicked unfortunate! who art found in continual contradiction + with thyself; thou whose disorderly machine can neither accord with thine + own peculiar nature, nor with that of thine associates, whatever may be + thy crimes, whatever may be thy fears of punishment in another life, thou + art at least already cruelly punished in this? Do not thy follies, thy + shameful habits, thy debaucheries, damage thine health? Dost thou not + linger out life in disgust, fatigued with thine own excesses? Does not + listlessness punish thee for thy satiated passions? Has not thy vigour, + thy gaiety, thy content, already yielded to feebleness, crouched under + infirmities, given place to regret? Do not thy vices every day dig thy + grave? Every time thou hast stained thyself with crime, hast thou dared + without horror to return into thyself, to examine thine own conscience? + Hast thou not found remorse, error, shame, established in thine heart? + Hast thou not dreaded the scrutiny of thy fellow man? Hast thou not + trembled when alone; unceasingly feared, that truth, so terrible for thee, + should unveil thy dark transgressions, throw into light thine enormous + iniquities? Do not then any longer fear to part with thine existence, it + will at least put an end to those richly merited torments thou hast + inflicted on thyself; <i>Death, in delivering the earth from an + incommodious burthen, will also deliver thee from thy most cruel enemy, + thyself</i>. + </p> + <h3> + END OF PART I. + </h3> + <div style="height: 6em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + + + + + + + +<pre> + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The System of Nature, Volume 1, by +Paul Henri Thiery (Baron D'Holbach) + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE SYSTEM OF NATURE, VOLUME 1 *** + +***** This file should be named 8909-h.htm or 8909-h.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/8/9/0/8909/ + + +Text file produced by Freethought Archives and Distributed Proofreaders + +HTML file produced by David Widger + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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