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+The Project Gutenberg EBook of The System of Nature, Volume 1, by
+Paul Henri Thiery (Baron D'Holbach)
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+Title: The System of Nature, Volume 1
+
+Author: Paul Henri Thiery (Baron D'Holbach)
+
+Commentator: Robert D. Richardson, Jr
+
+
+Release Date: September, 2005 [EBook #8909]
+This file was first posted on August 23, 2003
+Last Updated: June 7, 2013
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1
+
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE SYSTEM OF NATURE, VOLUME 1 ***
+
+
+
+
+Produced by Freethought Archives and Distributed Proofreaders
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+THE SYSTEM OF NATURE, VOLUME I (of II)
+
+
+By Paul Henri Thiery (Baron d'Holbach)
+
+
+Introduction by Robert D. Richardson, Jr.
+
+
+
+
+PRODUCTION NOTES: First published in French in 1770 under the pseudonym
+of Mirabaud. This e-book based on a facsimile reprint of an English
+translation originally published 1820-21. This e-text covers the first
+of the original two volumes.
+
+
+
+
+
+INTRODUCTION
+
+
+Paul Henri Thiery, Baron d'Holbach (1723-1789), was the center of the
+radical wing of the _philosophes_. He was friend, host, and patron to
+a wide circle that included Diderot, D'Alembert, Helvetius, and Hume.
+Holbach wrote, translated, edited, and issued a stream of books and
+pamphlets, often under other names, that has made him the despair of
+bibliographers but has connected his name, by innuendo, gossip, and
+association, with most of what was written in defense of atheistic
+materialism in late eighteenth-century France.
+
+Holbach is best known for _The System of Nature_ (1770) and deservedly,
+since it is a clear and reasonably systematic exposition of his main
+ideas. His initial position determines all the rest of his argument.
+"There is not, there can be nothing out of that Nature which includes
+all beings." Conceiving of nature as strictly limited to matter and
+motion, both of which have always existed, he flatly denies that there
+is any such thing as spirit or a supernatural. Mythology began, Holbach
+claims, when men were still in a state of nature and at the point when
+wise, strong, and for the most part benign men were arising as leaders
+and lawgivers. These leaders "formed discourses by which they spoke to
+the imaginations of their willing auditors," using the medium of poetry,
+because it "seem{ed} best adapted to strike the mind." Through poetry,
+then, and by means of "its images, its fictions, its numbers, its rhyme,
+its harmony... the entire of nature, as well as all its parts, was
+personified, by its beautiful allegories." Thus mythology is given
+an essentially political origin. These early poets are literally
+legislators of mankind. "The first institutors of nations, and their
+immediate successors in authority, only spoke to the people by fables,
+allegories, enigmas, of which they reserved to themselves the right
+of giving an explanation." Holbach is rather condescending about the
+process, but since mythology is a representation of nature itself, he
+is far more tolerant of mythology than he is of the next step. "Natural
+philosophers and poets were transformed by leisure into metaphysicians
+and theologians," and at this point a fatal error was introduced: the
+theologians made a distinction between the power of nature and nature
+itself, separated the two, made the power of nature prior to nature, and
+called it God. Thus man was left with an abstract and chimerical being
+on one side and a despoiled inert nature, destitute of power, on the
+other. In Holbach's critique the point at which theology split off from
+mythology marks the moment of nature's alienation from itself and paves
+the way for man's alienation from nature.
+
+Holbach is thus significant for Romantic interest in myth in two ways.
+First, he provides a clear statement of what can be loosely called the
+antimythic position, that rationalist condescension and derogation of
+all myth and all religion that was never far from the surface during
+the Romantic era. Holbach was and is a reminder that the Romantic
+affirmation of myth was never easy, uncritical, or unopposed. Any new
+endorsement of myth had to be made in the teeth of Holbach and the other
+skeptics. The very vigor of the Holbachian critique of myth impelled the
+Romantics to think more deeply and defend more carefully any new claim
+for myth. Secondly, although Holbach's argument generally drove against
+myth and religion both, he did make an important, indeed a saving
+distinction between mythology and theology. Mythology is the more or
+less harmless personification of the power in and of nature; theology
+concerns itself with what for Holbach was the nonexistent power beyond
+or behind nature. By exploiting this distinction it would
+become possible for a Shelley, for example, to take a strong
+antitheological--even an anti-Christian--position without having to
+abandon myth.
+
+Holbach was one of William Godwin's major sources for his ideas about
+political justice, and Shelley, who discussed Holbach with Godwin,
+quotes extensively from _The System of Nature_ in _Queen Mab_.
+Furthermore, Volney's _Ruins_, another important book for Shelley,
+is directly descended from _The System of Nature_. On the other side,
+Holbach was a standing challenge to such writers as Coleridge and Goethe
+and was reprinted and retranslated extensively in America, where his
+work was well known to the rationalist circle around Jefferson and
+Barlow.
+
+Issued in 1770 as though by Jean Baptiste de Mirabaud (a former
+perpetual secretary to the Académie française who had died ten years
+before), _La Système de la nature_ was translated and reprinted
+frequently. The Samuel Wilkinson translation we have chosen to reprint
+was the most often reprinted or pirated version in English. A useful
+starting point for Holbach's work is Jerome Vercruysse, _Bibliographie
+descriptive des écrits du baron d'Holbach_ (Paris, 1971). The difficult
+subject of the essentially clandestine evolution of biblical criticism
+as an anti-Christian and antimyth critique in the early part of the
+eighteenth century, before the well-documented era of the biblical
+critic Eichhorn in Germany, is illuminated in Ira Wade, _The Clandestine
+Organization and Diffusion of Philosophic Ideas in France from
+1700-1750_ (Princeton Univ. Press, 1938).
+
+
+Robert D. Richardson, Jr.
+
+University of Denver
+
+
+* * * * *
+
+
+
+{Illustration: Parke sculp't M. DE MIRABAUD}
+
+
+
+
+THE SYSTEM OF NATURE; OR, _THE LAWS_ OF THE MORAL AND PHYSICAL WORLD.
+
+
+
+TRANSLATED FROM THE ORIGINAL FRENCH OF M. DE MIRABAUD
+
+
+
+VOL. I.
+
+
+
+
+CONTENTS
+
+Preface
+
+
+     PART I--Laws of Nature.--Of man.--The faculties of the soul.
+     --Doctrine of immortality.--On happiness.
+
+
+CHAP. I. Nature and her laws.
+
+CHAP. II. Of motion and its origin.
+
+CHAP. III. Of matter--of its various combinations--of its diversified
+motion--or of the course of Nature.
+
+CHAP. IV. Laws of motion common to every being of Nature--attraction and
+repulsion--inert force-necessity.
+
+CHAP. V. Order and confusion--intelligence--chance.
+
+CHAP. VI. Moral and physical distinctions of man--his origin.
+
+CHAP. VII. The soul and the spiritual system.
+
+CHAP. VII. The soul and the spiritual system.
+
+CHAP. VIII. The intellectual faculties derived from the faculty of
+feeling.
+
+CHAP. IX. The diversity of the intellectual faculties; they depend on
+physical causes, as do their moral qualities.--The natural principles of
+society--morals--politics.
+
+CHAP. X. The soul does not derive its ideas from itself--it has no
+innate ideas.
+
+CHAP. XI. Of the system of man's free-agency.
+
+CHAP. XII. An examination of the opinion which pretends that the system
+of fatalism is dangerous.
+
+CHAP. XIII. Of the immortality of the soul--of the doctrine of a future
+state--of the fear of death.
+
+CHAP. XIV. Education, morals, and the laws suffice to restrain man--of
+the desire of immortality--of suicide.
+
+CHAP. XV. Of man's true interest, or of the ideas he forms to himself of
+happiness.--Man cannot be happy without virtue.
+
+CHAP. XVI. The errors of man.--Upon what constitutes happiness.--The
+true source of his evils.--Remedies that may be applied.
+
+CHAP. XVII. Those ideas which are true, or founded upon Nature, are the
+only remedies for the evil of man.--Recapitulation.--Conclusions of the
+First Part.
+
+
+
+
+PREFACE
+
+_The source of man's unhappiness is his ignorance of Nature. The
+pertinacity with which he clings to blind opinions imbibed in his
+infancy, which interweave themselves with his existence, the consequent
+prejudice that warps his mind, that prevents its expansion, that renders
+him the slave of fiction, appears to doom him to continual error. He
+resembles a child destitute of experience, full of ideal notions: a
+dangerous leaven mixes itself with all his knowledge: it is of necessity
+obscure, it is vacillating and false:--He takes the tone of his ideas
+on the authority of others, who are themselves in error, or else have
+an interest in deceiving him. To remove this Cimmerian darkness, these
+barriers to the improvement of his condition; to disentangle him from
+the clouds of error that envelope him; to guide him out of this Cretan
+labyrinth, requires the clue of Ariadne, with all the love she could
+bestow on Theseus. It exacts more than common exertion; it needs a most
+determined, a most undaunted courage--it is never effected but by a
+persevering resolution to act, to think for himself; to examine with
+rigour and impartiality the opinions he has adopted. He will find that
+the most noxious weeds have sprung up beside beautiful flowers; entwined
+themselves around their stems, overshadowed them with an exuberance of
+foliage, choaked the ground, enfeebled their growth, diminished their
+petals; dimmed the brilliancy of their colours; that deceived by
+their apparent freshness of their verdure, by the rapidity of their
+exfoliation, he has given them cultivation, watered them, nurtured them,
+when he ought to have plucked out their very roots.
+
+Man seeks to range out of his sphere: notwithstanding the reiterated
+checks his ambitious folly experiences, he still attempts the
+impossible; strives to carry his researches beyond the visible world;
+and hunts out misery in imaginary regions. He would be a metaphysician
+before he has become a practical philosopher. He quits the contemplation
+of realities to meditate on chimeras. He neglects experience to feed on
+conjecture, to indulge in hypothesis. He dares not cultivate his
+reason, because from his earliest days he has been taught to consider
+it criminal. He pretends to know his date in the indistinct abodes of
+another life, before he has considered of the means by which he is to
+render himself happy in the world he inhabits: in short, man disdains
+the study of Nature, except it be partially: he pursues phantoms
+that resemble an _ignis-fatuus_, which at once dazzle, bewilders, and
+affright: like the benighted traveller led astray by these deceptive
+exhalations of a swampy soil, he frequently quits the plain, the simple
+road of truth, by pursuing of which, he can alone ever reasonably hope
+to reach the goal of happiness.
+
+The most important of our duties, then, is to seek means by which we may
+destroy delusions that can never do more than mislead us. The remedies
+for these evils must be sought for in Nature herself; it is only in
+the abundance of her resources, that we can rationally expect to find
+antidotes to the mischiefs brought upon us by an ill directed, by an
+overpowering enthusiasm. It is time these remedies were sought; it is
+time to look the evil boldly in the face, to examine its foundations,
+to scrutinize its superstructure: reason, with its faithful guide
+experience, must attack in their entrenchments those prejudices, to
+which the human race has but too long been the victim. For this purpose
+reason must be restored to its proper rank,--it must be rescued from
+the evil company with which it is associated. It has been too long
+degraded--too long neglected--cowardice has rendered it subservient to
+delirium, the slave to falsehood. It must no longer be held down by the
+massive claims of ignorant prejudice.
+
+Truth is invariable--it is requisite to man--it can never harm him--his
+very necessities, sooner or later, make him sensible of this; oblige him
+to acknowledge it. Let us then discover it to mortals--let us exhibit
+its charms--let us shed it effulgence over the darkened road; it is
+the only mode by which man can become disgusted with that disgraceful
+superstition which leads him into error, and which but too often usurps
+his homage by treacherously covering itself with the mask of truth--its
+lustre can wound none but those enemies to the human race whose power is
+bottomed solely on the ignorance, on the darkness in which they have in
+almost every claimed contrived to involve the mind of man.
+
+Truth speaks not to those perverse beings:--her voice can only be heard
+by generous souls accustomed to reflection, whose sensibilities make
+them lament the numberless calamities showered on the earth by political
+and religious tyranny--whose enlightened minds contemplate with horror
+the immensity, the ponderosity of that series of misfortunes which error
+has in all ages overwhelmed mankind.
+
+To error must be attributed those insupportable chains which tyrants,
+which priests have forged for most nations. To error must be equally
+attributed that abject slavery into which the people of almost every
+country have fallen. Nature designed they should pursue their happiness
+by the most perfect freedom.--To error must be attributed those
+religious terrors which, in almost every climate, have either petrified
+man with fear, or caused him to destroy himself for coarse or fanciful
+beings. To error must be attributed those inveterate hatreds, those
+barbarous persecutions, those numerous massacres, those dreadful
+tragedies, of which, under pretext of serving the interests of heaven,
+the earth has been but too frequently made the theatre. It is error
+consecrated by religious enthusiasm, which produces that ignorance,
+that uncertainty in which man ever finds himself with regard to his most
+evident duties, his clearest rights, the most demonstrable truths.
+In short, man is almost everywhere a poor degraded captive, devoid of
+greatness of soul, of reason, or of virtue, whom his inhuman gaolers
+have never permitted to see the light of day.
+
+Let us then endeavour to disperse those clouds of ignorance, those
+mists of darkness, which impede man on his journey, which obscure his
+progress, which prevent his marching through life with a firm, with a
+steady grip. Let us try to inspire him with courage--with respect for
+his reason--with an inextinguishable love for truth--with a remembrance
+of Gallileo--to the end that he may learn to know himself--to know his
+legitimate rights--that he may learn to consult his experience, and no
+longer be the dupe of an imagination led astray by authority--that he
+may renounce the prejudices of his childhood--that he may learn to
+found his morals on his nature, on his wants, on the real advantage of
+society--that he may dare to love himself--that he may learn to pursue
+his true happiness by promoting that of others--in short, that he may no
+longer occupy himself with reveries either useless or dangerous--that he
+may become a virtuous, a rational being, in which case he cannot fail to
+become happy.
+
+If he must have his chimeras, let him at least learn to permit others
+to form theirs after their own fashion; since nothing can be more
+immaterial than the manner of men's thinking on subjects not accessible
+to reason, provided those thoughts be not suffered to embody themselves
+into actions injurious to others: above all, let him be fully persuaded
+that it is of the utmost importance to the inhabitants of this world to
+be JUST, KIND, and PEACEABLE.
+
+Far from injuring the cause of virtue, an impartial examination of the
+principles of this work will shew that its object is to restore truth
+to its proper temple, to build up an altar whose foundations shall be
+consolidated by morality, reason, and justice: from this sacred pane,
+virtue guarded by truth, clothed with experience, shall shed forth her
+radiance on delighted mortals; whose homage flowing consecutively shall
+open to the world a new aera, by rendering general the belief that
+happiness, the true end of man's existence, can never be attained but BY
+PROMOTING THAT OF HIS FELLOW CREATURE.
+
+In short, man should learn to know, that happiness is simply an
+emanative quality formed by reflection; that each individual ought to
+be the sun of his own system, continually shedding around him his genial
+rays; that these, re-acting, will keep his own existence constantly
+supplied with the requisite heat to enable him to put forth kindly
+fruit._
+
+
+
+
+MIRABAUD'S SYSTEM OF NATURE
+
+
+Translated from the Original, By Samuel Wilkinson.
+
+
+
+
+PART I.
+
+LAWS OF NATURE--OF MAN--THE FACULTIES OF THE SOUL--DOCTRINE OF
+IMMORTALITY--ON HAPPINESS.
+
+
+
+
+CHAP. I.
+
+_Nature and her Laws_.
+
+
+Man has always deceived himself when he abandoned experience to follow
+imaginary systems.--He is the work of nature.--He exists in Nature.--He
+is submitted to the laws of Nature.--He cannot deliver himself from
+them:--cannot step beyond them even in thought. It is in vain his mind
+would spring forward beyond the visible world: direful and imperious
+necessity ever compels his return--being formed by Nature, he is
+circumscribed by her laws; there exists nothing beyond the great whole
+of which he forms a part, of which he experiences the influence. The
+beings his fancy pictures as above nature, or distinguished from her,
+are always chimeras formed after that which he has already seen, but of
+which it is utterly impossible he should ever form any finished idea,
+either as to the place they occupy, or their manner of acting--for him
+there is not, there can be nothing out of that Nature which includes all
+beings.
+
+Therefore, instead of seeking out of the world he inhabits for beings
+who can procure him a happiness denied to him by Nature, let him study
+this Nature, learn her laws, contemplate her energies, observe the
+immutable rules by which she acts.--Let him apply these discoveries to
+his own felicity, and submit in silence to her precepts, which nothing
+can alter.--Let him cheerfully consent to be ignorant of causes hid from
+him under the most impenetrable veil.--Let him yield to the decrees of
+a universal power, which can never be brought within his comprehension,
+nor ever emancipate him from those laws imposed on him by his essence.
+
+The distinction which has been so often made between the _physical_ and
+the _moral_ being, is evidently an abuse of terms. Man is a being
+purely physical: the moral man is nothing more than this physical being
+considered under a certain point of view; that is to say, with
+relation to some of his modes of action, arising out of his individual
+organization. But is not this organization itself the work of Nature?
+The motion or impulse to action, of which he is susceptible, is that
+not physical? His visible actions, as well as the invisible motion
+interiorly excited by his will or his thoughts, are equally the natural
+effects, the necessary consequences, of his peculiar construction,
+and the impulse he receives from those beings by whom he is always
+surrounded. All that the human mind has successively invented, with a
+view to change or perfect his being, to render himself happy, was never
+more than the necessary consequence of man's peculiar essence, and that
+of the beings who act upon him. The object of all his institutions, all
+his reflections, all his knowledge, is only to procure that happiness
+toward which he is continually impelled by the peculiarity of his
+nature. All that he does, all that he thinks, all that he is, all that
+he will be, is nothing more than what Universal Nature has made him.
+His ideas, his actions, his will, are the necessary effects of those
+properties infused into him by Nature, and of those circumstances in
+which she has placed him. In short, art is nothing but Nature acting
+with the tools she has furnished.
+
+Nature sends man naked and destitute into this world which is to be his
+abode: he quickly learns to cover his nakedness--to shelter himself from
+the inclemencies of the weather, first with artlessly constructed huts,
+and the skins of the beasts of the forest; by degrees he mends their
+appearance, renders them more convenient: he establishes manufactories
+to supply his immediate wants; he digs clay, gold, and other fossils
+from the bowels of the earth; converts them into bricks for his house,
+into vessels for his use, gradually improves their shape, and augments
+their beauty. To a being exalted above our terrestrial globe, man would
+not appear less subjected to the laws of Nature when naked in the forest
+painfully seeking his sustenance, than when living in civilized society
+surrounded with ease, or enriched with greater experience, plunged in
+luxury, where he every day invents a thousand new wants and discovers
+a thousand new modes of supplying them. All the steps taken by man to
+regulate his existence, ought only to be considered as a long succession
+of causes and effects, which are nothing more than the development of
+the first impulse given him by nature.
+
+The same animal, by virtue of his organization, passes successively from
+the most simple to the most complicated wants; it is nevertheless the
+consequence of his nature. The butterfly whose beauty we admire, whose
+colours are so rich, whose appearance is so brilliant, commences as
+an inanimate unattractive egg; from this, heat produces a worm, this
+becomes a chrysalis, then changes into that beautiful insect adorned
+with the most vivid tints: arrived at this stage he reproduces,
+he generates; at last despoiled of his ornaments, he is obliged to
+disappear, having fulfilled the task imposed on him by Nature, having
+performed the circle of transformation marked out for beings of his
+order.
+
+The same course, the same change takes place in the vegetable world. It
+is by a series of combinations originally interwoven with the energies
+of the aloe, that this plant is insensibly regulated, gradually
+expanded, and at the end of a number of years produces those flowers
+which announce its dissolution.
+
+It is equally so with man, who in all his motion, all the changes
+he undergoes, never acts but according to the laws peculiar to his
+organization, and to the matter of which he is composed.
+
+The _physical man_, is he who acts by the causes our faculties make us
+understand.
+
+The _moral man_, is he who acts by physical causes, with which our
+prejudices preclude us from becoming perfectly acquainted.
+
+The _wild man_ is a child destitute of experience, incapable of
+proceeding in his happiness, because he has not learnt how to oppose
+resistance to the impulses he receives from those beings by whom he is
+surrounded.
+
+The _civilized man_, is he whom experience and sociality have enabled to
+draw from nature the means of his own happiness, because he has learned
+to oppose resistance to those impulses he receives from exterior beings,
+when experience has taught him they would be destructive to his welfare.
+
+The _enlightened man_ is man in his maturity, in his perfection; who
+is capable of advancing his own felicity, because he has learned to
+examine, to think for himself, and not to take that for truth upon
+the authority of others, which experience has taught him a critical
+disquisition will frequently prove erroneous.
+
+The _happy man_ is he who knows how to enjoy the benefits bestowed
+upon him by nature: in other words, he who thinks for himself; who is
+thankful for the good he possesses; who does not envy the welfare of
+others, nor sigh after imaginary benefits always beyond his grasp.
+
+The _unhappy man_ is he who is incapacitated to enjoy the benefits of
+nature; that is, he who suffers others to think for him; who neglects
+the absolute good he possesses, in a fruitless search after ideal
+benefits; who vainly sighs after that which ever eludes his pursuit.
+
+It necessarily results, that man in his enquiry ought always to
+contemplate experience, and natural philosophy: These are what he should
+consult in his religion,--in his morals,--in his legislation,--in
+his political government,--in the arts,--in the sciences,--in his
+pleasures,--above all, in his misfortunes. Experience teaches that
+Nature acts by simple, regular, and invariable laws. It is by his
+senses, man is bound to this universal Nature; it is by his perception
+he must penetrate her secrets; it is from his senses he must draw
+experience of her laws. Therefore, whenever he neglects to acquire
+experience or quits its path, he stumbles into an abyss; his imagination
+leads him astray.
+
+All the errors of man are physical: he never deceives himself but when
+he neglects to return back to nature, to consult her laws, to call
+practical knowledge to his aid. It is for want of practical knowledge
+he forms such imperfect ideas of matter, of its properties, of its
+combinations, of its power, of its mode of action, and of the energies
+which spring from its essence. Wanting this experience, the whole
+universe, to him, is but one vast scene of error. The most ordinary
+results appear to him the most astonishing phenomena; he wonders at
+every thing, understands nothing, and yields the guidance of his actions
+to those interested in betraying his interests. He is ignorant of
+Nature, and he has mistaken her laws; he has not contemplated the
+necessary routine which she has marked out for every thing she holds.
+Mistaken the laws of Nature, did I say? He has mistaken himself: the
+consequence is, that all his systems, all his conjectures, all his
+reasonings, from which he has banished experience, are nothing more than
+a tissue of errors, a long chain of inconsistencies.
+
+Error is always prejudicial to man: it is by deceiving himself, the
+human race is plunged into misery. He neglected Nature; he did not
+comprehend her laws; he formed gods of the most preposterous and
+ridiculous kinds: these became the sole objects of his hope, and the
+creatures of his fear: he was unhappy, he trembled under these visionary
+deities; under the supposed influence of visionary beings created by
+himself; under the terror inspired by blocks of stone; by logs of
+wood; by flying fish; or the frowns of men, mortal as himself, whom
+his disturbed fancy had elevated above that Nature of which alone he
+is capable of forming any idea. His very posterity laughs at his folly,
+because experience has convinced them of the absurdity of his groundless
+fears--of his misplaced worship. Thus has passed away the ancient
+mythology, with all the trifling and nonsensical attributes attached to
+it by ignorance.
+
+Not understanding that Nature, equal in her distributions, entirely
+destitute of malice, follows only necessary and immutable laws, when
+she either produces beings or destroys them, when she causes those to
+suffer, whose construction creates sensibility; when she scatters among
+them good and evil; when she subjects them to incessant change--he did
+not perceive it was in the breast of Nature herself, that it was in her
+exuberance he ought to seek to satisfy his deficiencies; for remedies
+against his pains; for the means of rendering himself happy: he expected
+to derive these benefits from fantastic beings, whom he supposed to
+be above Nature; whom he mistakingly imagined to be the authors of his
+pleasures, and the cause of his misfortunes. From hence it appears that
+to his ignorance of Nature, man owes the creation of those illusive
+powers; under which he has so long trembled with fear; that
+superstitious worship, which has been the source of all his misery, and
+the evils entailed upon posterity.
+
+For want of clearly comprehending his own peculiar nature, his proper
+course, his wants, and his rights, man has fallen in society, from
+FREEDOM into SLAVERY. He had forgotten the purpose of his existence, or
+else he believed himself obliged to suppress the natural desires of his
+heart, to sacrifice his welfare to the caprice of chiefs, either elected
+by himself, or submitted to without examination. He was ignorant of the
+true policy of association--of the object of government; he disdained to
+listen to the voice of Nature, which loudly proclaimed the price of all
+submission to be protection and happiness: the end of all government
+is the benefit of the governed, not the exclusive advantage of the
+governors. He gave himself up without enquiry to men like himself, whom
+his prejudices induced him to contemplate as beings of a superior order,
+as Gods upon earth, they profited by his ignorance, took advantage of
+his prejudices, corrupted him, rendered him vicious, enslaved him, and
+made him miserable. Thus man, intended by Nature for the full enjoyment
+of liberty, to patiently search out her laws, to investigate her
+secrets, to cling to his experience; has, from a neglect of her salutary
+admonitions, from an inexcusable ignorance of his own peculiar essence,
+fallen into servility: has been wickedly governed.
+
+Having mistaken himself, he has remained ignorant of the indispensable
+affinity that subsists between him, and the beings of his own species:
+having mistaken his duty to himself, it consequently follows, he has
+mistaken his duty to others. He made a calculation in error of what his
+happiness required; he did not perceive, what he owed to himself, the
+excesses he ought to avoid, the desires he ought to resist, the impulses
+he ought to follow, in order to consolidate his felicity, to promote his
+comfort, and to further his advantage. In short, he was ignorant of his
+true interests; hence his irregularities, his excesses, his shameful
+extravagance, with that long train of vices, to which he has abandoned
+himself, at the expense of his preservation, at the hazard of his
+permanent prosperity.
+
+It is, therefore, ignorance of himself that has hindered man from
+enlightening his morals. The corrupt authorities to which he had
+submitted, felt an interest in obstructing the practice of his duties,
+even when he knew them. Time, with the influence of ignorance, aided by
+his corruption, gave them a strength not to be resisted by his enfeebled
+voice. His duties continued unperformed, and he fell into contempt both
+with himself and with others.
+
+The ignorance of Man has endured so long, he has taken such slow,
+such irresolute steps to ameliorate his condition, only because he has
+neglected to study Nature, to scrutinize her laws, to search out her
+expedients, to discover her properties, that his sluggishness finds its
+account, in permitting himself to be guided by example, rather than to
+follow experience, which demands activity; to be led by routine, rather
+than by his reason, which enjoins reflection; to take that for truth
+upon the authority of others, which would require a diligent and patient
+investigation. From hence may be traced the hatred man betrays for every
+thing that deviates from those rules to which he has been accustomed;
+hence his stupid, his scrupulous respect for antiquity, for the most
+silly, the most absurd and ridiculous institutions of his fathers:
+hence those fears that seize him, when the most beneficial changes are
+proposed to him, or the most likely attempts are made to better his
+condition. He dreads to examine, because he has been taught to hold
+it irreverent of something immediately connected with his welfare; his
+credulity suffers him to believe the interested advice, and spurns at
+those who wish to show him the danger of the road he is travelling.
+
+This is the reason why nations linger on in the most shameful lethargy,
+suffering under abuses handed down from century to century, trembling at
+the very idea of that which alone can repair their calamities.
+
+It is for want of energy, for want of consulting experience, that
+medicine, natural philosophy, agriculture, painting, in fact, all the
+useful sciences, have so long remained under the fetters of authority,
+have progressed so little: those who profess these sciences, prefer
+treading the beaten paths, however imperfect, rather than strike out
+new ones,--they prefer the phrensy of their imagination, their voluntary
+conjectures, to that laboured experience which alone can extract her
+secrets from Nature.
+
+Man, in short, whether from sloth or from terror, having abnegated the
+evidence of his senses, has been guided in all his actions, in all his
+enterprizes, by imagination, by enthusiasm, by habit, by preconceived
+opinions, but above all, by the influence of authority, which knew
+well how to deceive him, to turn his ignorance to esteem, his sloth
+to advantage. Thus imaginary, unsubstantial systems, have supplied the
+place of experience--of mature reflection--of reason. Man, petrified
+with his fears, intoxicated with the marvellous, stupified with sloth,
+surrendered his experience: guided by his credulity, he was unable to
+fall back upon it; he became consequently inexperienced; from thence he
+gave birth to the most ridiculous opinions, or else adopted all those
+vague chimeras, all those idle notions offered to him by men whose
+interest it was to continue him in that lamentable state of ignorance.
+
+Thus the human race has continued so long in a state of infancy, because
+man has been inattentive to Nature; has neglected her ways,
+because he has disdained experience--because he has thrown by his
+reason--because he has been enraptured with the marvellous and the
+supernatural,--because he has unnecessarily TREMBLED. These are the
+reasons there is so much trouble in conducting him from this state of
+childhood to that of manhood. He has had nothing but the most trifling
+hypotheses, of which he has never dared to examine either the principles
+or the proofs, because he has been accustomed to hold them sacred, to
+consider them as the most perfect truths, and which he is not permitted
+to doubt, even for an instant. His ignorance made him credulous; his
+curiosity made him swallow the wonderful: time confirmed him in his
+opinions, and he passed his conjectures from race to race for realities;
+a tyrannical power maintained him in his notions, because by those alone
+could society be enslaved. It was in vain that some faint glimmerings
+of Nature occasionally attempted the recall of his reason--that slight
+corruscations of experience sometimes threw his darkness into light, the
+interest of the few was founded on his enthusiasm; their pre-eminence
+depended on his love of the marvellous; their very existence rested on
+the firmness of his ignorance; they consequently suffered no opportunity
+to escape, of smothering even the transient flame of intelligence.
+The many were thus first deceived into credulity, then forced into
+submission. At length the whole science of man became a confused mass
+of darkness, falsehood, and contradictions, with here and there a feeble
+ray of truth, furnished by that Nature, of which he can never entirely
+divest himself; because, without his perception, his necessities are
+continually bringing him back to her resources.
+
+Let us then, if possible, raise ourselves above these clouds of
+prepossession! Let us quit the heavy atmosphere in which we are
+enucleated; let us in a more unsullied medium--in a more elastic
+current, contemplate the opinions of men, and observe their various
+systems. Let us learn to distrust a disordered conception; let us take
+that faithful monitor, experience, for our guide; let us consult Nature,
+examine her laws, dive into her stores; let us draw from herself, our
+ideas of the beings she contains; let us recover our senses, which
+interested error has taught us to suspect; let us consult that reason,
+which, for the vilest purposes has been so infamously calumniated, so
+cruelly dishonoured; let us examine with attention the visible world;
+let us try, if it will not enable us to form a supportable judgment of
+the invisible territory of the intellectual world: perhaps it may be
+found there has been no sufficient reason for distinguishing them--that
+it is not without motives, well worthy our enquiry, that two empires
+have been separated, which are equally the inheritance of nature.
+
+The universe, that vast assemblage of every thing that exists, presents
+only matter and motion: the whole offers to our contemplation, nothing
+but an immense, an uninterrupted succession of causes and effects; some
+of these causes are known to us, because they either strike immediately
+on our senses, or have been brought under their cognizance, by the
+examination of long experience; others are unknown to us, because they
+act upon us by effects, frequently very remote from their primary cause.
+An immense variety of matter, combined under an infinity of forms,
+incessantly communicates, unceasingly receives a diversity of impulses.
+The different qualities of this matter, its innumerable combinations,
+its various methods of action, which are the necessary consequence of
+these associations, constitute for man what he calls the ESSENCE of
+beings: it is from these varied essences that spring the orders, the
+classes, or the systems, which these beings respectively possess, of
+which the sum total makes up that which is known by the term _nature_.
+
+Nature, therefore, in its most significant meaning, is the great
+whole that results from the collection of matter, under its various
+combinations, with that contrariety of motion, which the universe
+presents to our view. Nature, in a less extended sense, or considered in
+each individual, is the whole that results from its essence; that is
+to say, the peculiar qualities, the combination, the impulse, and the
+various modes of action, by which it is discriminated from other beings.
+It is thus that MAN is, as a whole, or in his nature, the result of
+a certain combination of matter, endowed with peculiar properties,
+competent to give, capable of receiving, certain impulses, the
+arrangement of which is called _organization_; of which the essence is,
+to feel, to think, to act, to move, after a manner distinguished from
+other beings, with which he can be compared. Man, therefore, ranks in
+an order, in a system, in a class by himself, which differs from that of
+other animals, in whom we do not perceive those properties of which he
+is possessed. The different systems of beings, or if they will, their
+_particular natures_, depend on the general system of the great whole,
+or that Universal Nature, of which they form a part; to which every
+thing that exists is necessarily submitted and attached.
+
+Having described the proper definition that should be applied to the
+word NATURE, I must advise the reader, once for all, that whenever in
+the course of this work the expression occurs, that "Nature produces
+such or such an effect," there is no intention of personifying that
+nature which is purely an abstract being; it merely indicates that the
+effect spoken of necessarily springs from the peculiar properties of
+those beings which compose the mighty macrocosm. When, therefore, it is
+said, _Nature demands that man should pursue his own happiness_, it is
+to prevent circumlocution--to avoid tautology; it is to be understood,
+that it is the property of a being that feels, that thinks, that acts,
+to labour to its own happiness; in short, that is called _natural_,
+which is conformable to the essence of things, or to the laws, which
+Nature prescribes to the beings she contains, in the different orders
+they occupy, under the various circumstances through which they are
+obliged to pass. Thus health is _natural_ to man in a certain state;
+disease is _natural_ to him under other circumstances; dissolution, or
+if they will, death, is a _natural_ state for a body, deprived of some
+of those things, necessary to maintain the existence of the animal, &c.
+By ESSENCE is to be understood, that which constitutes a being, such as
+it is; the whole of the properties or qualities by which it acts as it
+does. Thus, when it is said, it is the _essence_ of a stone to fall, it
+is the same as saying that its descent is the necessary effect of its
+gravity--of its density--of the cohesion of its parts--of the elements
+of which it is composed. In short, the _essence_ of a being is its
+particular, its individual nature.
+
+
+
+
+
+CHAP. II.
+
+_Of Motion, and its Origin._
+
+
+Motion is an effect by which a body either changes, or has a tendency
+to change, its position: that is to say, by which it successively
+corresponds with different parts of space, or changes its relative
+distance to other bodies. It is motion alone that establishes the
+relation between our senses and exterior or interior beings: it is only
+by motion that these beings are impressed upon us--that we know their
+existence--that we judge of their properties--that we distinguish the
+one from the other--that we distribute them into classes.
+
+The beings, the substances, or the various bodies of which Nature is
+the assemblage, are themselves effects of certain combinations or causes
+which become causes in their turn. A CAUSE is a being which puts another
+in motion, or which produces some change in it. The EFFECT is the change
+produced in one body, by the motion or presence of another.
+
+Each being, by its essence, by its peculiar nature, has the faculty of
+producing, is capable of receiving, has the power of communicating, a
+variety of motion. Thus some beings are proper to strike our organs;
+these organs are competent to receiving the impression, are adequate to
+undergoing changes by their presence. Those which cannot act on any of
+our organs, either immediately and by themselves, or immediately by the
+intervention of other bodies, exist not for us; since they can neither
+move us, nor consequently furnish us with ideas: they can neither be
+known to us, nor of course be judged of by us. To know an object, is to
+have felt it; to feel it, it is requisite to have been moved by it. To
+see, is to have been moved, by something acting on the visual organs;
+to hear, is to have been struck, by something on our auditory nerves. In
+short, in whatever mode a body may act upon us, whatever impulse we may
+receive from it, we can have no other knowledge of it than by the change
+it produces in us.
+
+Nature, as we have already said, is the assemblage of all the beings,
+consequently of all the motion of which we have a knowledge, as well
+as of many others of which we know nothing, because they have not yet
+become accessible to our senses. From the continual action and re-action
+of these beings, result a series of causes and effects; or a chain
+of motion guided by the constant and invariable laws peculiar to each
+being; which are necessary or inherent to its particular nature--which
+make it always act or move after a determinate manner. The different
+principles of this motion are unknown to us, because we are in many
+instances, if not in all, ignorant of what constitutes the essence of
+beings. The elements of bodies escape our senses; we know them only in
+the mass: we are neither acquainted with their intimate combination,
+nor the proportion of these combinations; from whence must necessarily
+result their mode of action, their impulse, or their different effects.
+
+Our senses bring us generally acquainted with two sorts of motion in the
+beings that surround us: the one is the motion of the mass, by which an
+entire body is transferred from one place to another. Of the motion of
+this genus we are perfectly sensible.--Thus, we see a stone fall, a ball
+roll, an arm move, or change its position. The other is an internal or
+concealed motion, which always depends on the peculiar energies of a
+body: that is to say, on its _essence_, or the combination, the action,
+and re-action of the minute--of the insensible particles of matter, of
+which that body is composed. This motion we do not see; we know it only
+by the alteration or change, which after some time we discover in
+these bodies or mixtures. Of this genus is that concealed motion which
+fermentation produces in the particles that compose flour, which,
+however scattered, however separated, unite, and form that mass which
+we call BREAD. Such also is the imperceptible motion by which we see a
+plant or animal enlarge, strengthen, undergo changes, and acquire new
+qualities, without our eyes being competent to follow its progression,
+or to perceive the causes which have produced these effects. Such also
+is the internal motion that takes place in man, which is called his
+INTELLECTUAL FACULTIES, his THOUGHTS, his PASSIONS, his will. Of these
+we have no other mode of judging, than by their action; that is, by
+those sensible effects which either accompany or follow them. Thus, when
+we see a man run away, we judge him to be interiorly actuated by the
+passion of fear.
+
+Motion, whether visible or concealed, is styled ACQUIRED, when it is
+impressed on one body by another; either by a cause to which we are
+a stranger, or by an exterior agent which our senses enable us to
+discover. Thus we call that _acquired motion_, which the wind gives
+to the sails of a ship. That motion which is excited in a body, that
+contains within itself the causes of those changes we see it undergo, is
+called SPONTANEOUS. Then it is said, this body acts or moves by its own
+peculiar energies. Of this kind is the motion of the man who walks,
+who talks, who thinks. Nevertheless, if we examine the matter a little
+closer, we shall be convinced, that, strictly speaking, there is no
+such thing as spontaneous motion in any of the various bodies of Nature;
+seeing they are perpetually acting one upon the other; that all their
+changes are to be attributed to the causes, either visible or concealed,
+by which they are moved. The will of man is secretly moved or determined
+by some exterior cause that produces a change in him: we believe he
+moves of himself, because we neither see the cause that determined him,
+the mode in which it acted, nor the organ that it put in motion.
+
+That is called SIMPLE MOTION, which is excited in a body by a single
+cause. COMPOUND MOTION, that which is produced by two or more
+different causes; whether these causes are equal or unequal, conspiring
+differently, acting together or in succession, known or unknown.
+
+Let the motion of beings be of whatsoever nature it may, it is always
+the necessary consequence of their essence, or of the properties which
+compose them, and of those causes of which they experience the action.
+Each being can only move and act after a particular manner; that is to
+say, conformably to those laws which result from its peculiar essence,
+its particular combination, its individual nature: in short, from its
+specific energies, and those of the bodies from which it receives an
+impulse. It is this that constitutes the invariable laws of motion:
+I say _invariable_, because they can never change, without producing
+confusion in the essence of things. It is thus that a heavy body must
+necessarily fall, if it meets with no obstacle sufficient to arrest its
+descent; that a sensible body must naturally seek pleasure, and avoid
+pain; that fire must necessarily burn, and diffuse light.
+
+Each being, then, has laws of motion, that are adapted to itself, and
+constantly acts or moves according to these laws; at least when
+no superior cause interrupts its action. Thus, fire ceases to burn
+combustible matter, as soon as sufficient water is thrown into it, to
+arrest its progress. Thus, a sensible being ceases to seek pleasure, as
+soon as he fears that pain will be the result.
+
+The communication of motion, or the medium of action, from one body to
+another, also follows certain and necessary laws; one being can only
+communicate motion to another, by the affinity, by the resemblance, by
+the conformity, by the analogy, or by the point of contact, which it
+has with that other being. Fire can only propagate when it finds matter
+analogous to itself: it extinguishes when it encounters bodies which it
+cannot embrace; that is to say, that do not bear towards it a certain
+degree of relation or affinity.
+
+Every thing in the universe is in motion: the essence of matter is to
+act: if we consider its parts, attentively, we shall discover there is
+not a particle that enjoys absolute repose. Those which appear to us to
+be without motion, are, in fact, only in relative or apparent rest;
+they experience such an imperceptible motion, and expose it so little
+on their surfaces, that we cannot perceive the changes they undergo. All
+that appears to us to be at rest, does not, however, remain one instant
+in the same state. All beings are continually breeding, increasing,
+decreasing, or dispersing, with more or less dullness or rapidity. The
+insect called EPHEMERON, is produced and perishes in the same day;
+of consequence, it experiences the greatest changes of its being very
+rapidly, in our eyes. Those combinations which form the most solid
+bodies, which appear to enjoy the most perfect repose, are nevertheless
+decomposed, and dissolved in the course of time. The hardest stones, by
+degrees, give way to the contact of air. A mass of iron, which time, and
+the action of the atmosphere, has gnawed into rust, must have been in
+motion, from the moment of its formation, in the bowels of the earth,
+until the instant we behold it in this state of dissolution.
+
+Natural philosophers, for the most part, seem not to have sufficiently
+reflected on what they call the _nisus_; that is to say, the incessant
+efforts one body is making on another, but which, notwithstanding
+appear, to our superficial observation, to enjoy the most perfect
+repose. A stone of five hundred weight seems to rest quiet on the earth,
+nevertheless, it never ceases for an instant, to press with force upon
+the earth, which resists or repulses it in its turn. Will the assertion
+be ventured, that the stone and earth do not act? Do they wish to be
+undeceived? They have nothing to do but interpose their hand betwixt the
+earth and the stone; it will then be discovered, that notwithstanding
+its seeming repose, the stone has power adequate to bruise it;
+because the hand has not energies sufficient, within itself, to resist
+effectually both the stone and earth.--Action cannot exist in bodies
+without re-action. A body that experiences an impulse, an attraction,
+or a pressure of any kind, if it resists, clearly demonstrates by such
+resistance that it re-acts; from whence it follows, there is a concealed
+force, called by these philosophers _vis inertia_, that displays itself
+against another force; and this clearly demonstrates, that this inert
+force is capable of both acting and re-acting. In short, it will be
+found, on close investigation, that those powers which are called
+_dead_, and those which are termed _live_ or _moving_, are powers of
+the same kind; which only display themselves after a different manner.
+Permit us to go a greater distance yet. May we not say, that in those
+bodies, or masses, of which their whole become evident from appearances
+to us to be at rest, there is notwithstanding, a continual action, and
+counter-action, constant efforts, uninterrupted or communicated force,
+and continued opposition? In short, a _nisus_, by which the constituting
+portions of these bodies press one upon another, mutually resisting
+each other, acting and re-acting incessantly? that this reciprocity of
+action, this simultaneous re-action, keeps them united, causes their
+particles to form a mass, a body, and a combination, which, viewed in
+its whole, has the appearance of complete rest, notwithstanding no one
+of its particles really ceases to be in motion for a single instant?
+These collective masses appear to be at rest, simply by the equality of
+the motion--by the responsory impulse of the powers acting in them.
+
+Thus it appears that bodies enjoying perfect repose, really receive,
+whether upon their surface, or in their interior, a continual
+communicated force, from those bodies by which they are either
+surrounded or penetrated, dilated or contracted, rarified or condensed:
+in fact, from those which compose them; whereby their particles are
+incessantly acting and re-acting, or in continual motion, the effects
+of which are displayed by extraordinary changes. Thus heat rarifies and
+dilates metals, which is evidence deducible that a bar of iron, from the
+change of the atmosphere alone, must be in continual motion; that there
+is not a single particle in it that can be said to enjoy rest even for a
+single moment. In those hard bodies, indeed, the particles of which are
+in actual contact, and which are closely united, how is it possible to
+conceive, that air, cold, or heat, can act upon one of these particles,
+even exteriorly, without the motion being communicated to those which
+are most intimate and minute in their union? Without motion, how should
+we be able to comprehend the manner in which our sense of smelling is
+affected, by emanations escaping from the most solid bodies, of which
+all the particles appear to be at perfect rest? How could we, even by
+the assistance of a telescope, see the most distant stars, if there was
+not a progressive motion of light from these stars to the retina of our
+eye?
+
+Observation and reflection ought to convince us, that every thing in
+Nature is in continual motion--that there is not a single part, however
+small, that enjoys repose--that Nature acts in all--that she would cease
+to be Nature if she did not act. Practical knowledge teaches us, that
+without unceasing motion, nothing could be preserved--nothing could
+be produced--nothing could act in this Nature. Thus the idea of Nature
+necessarily includes that of motion. But it will be asked, and not a
+little triumphantly, from whence did she derive her motion? Our reply
+is, we know not, neither do they--that _we_ never shall, that _they_
+never will. It is a secret hidden from us, concealed from them, by the
+most impenetrable veil. We also reply, that it is fair to infer, unless
+they can logically prove to the contrary, that it is in herself, since
+she is the great whole, out of which nothing can exist. We say this
+motion is a manner of existence, that flows, necessarily, out of the
+nature of matter; that matter moves by its own peculiar energies; that
+its motion is to be attributed to the force which is inherent in itself;
+that the variety of motion, and the phenomena which result, proceed from
+the diversity of the properties--of the qualities--of the combinations,
+which are originally found in the primitive matter, of which Nature is
+the assemblage.
+
+Natural philosophers, for the most part, have regarded as inanimate, or
+as deprived of the faculty of motion, those bodies which are only
+moved by the intervention of some agent or exterior cause; they have
+considered themselves justified in concluding, that the matter which
+forms these bodies is perfectly inert in its nature. They have not
+forsaken this error, although they must have observed, that whenever
+a body is left to itself, or disengaged from those obstructions which
+oppose themselves to its descent, it has a tendency to fall or to
+approach the centre of the earth, by a motion uniformly accelerated;
+they have rather chosen to suppose a visionary exterior cause, of which
+they themselves had but an imperfect idea, than admit that these bodies
+held their motion from their own peculiar nature.
+
+These philosophers, also, notwithstanding they saw above them an
+infinite number of globes that moved with great rapidity round a common
+centre, still adhered to their favourite opinions; and never ceased to
+suppose some whimsical causes for these movements, until the immortal
+NEWTON clearly demonstrated that it was the effect of the gravitation
+of these celestial bodies towards each other. Experimental philosophers,
+however, and amongst them the great Newton himself, have held the cause
+of gravitation as inexplicable. Notwithstanding the great weight of this
+authority, it appears manifest that it may be deduced from the motion of
+matter, by which bodies are diversely determined. Gravitation is nothing
+more than a mode of moving--a tendency towards a centre: to speak
+strictly, all motion is relative gravitation; since that which falls
+relatively to us, rises, with relation to other bodies. From this
+it follows, that every motion in our microcosm is the effect of
+gravitation; seeing that there is not in the universe either top or
+bottom, nor any absolute centre. It should appear, that the weight of
+bodies depends on their configuration, as well external as internal,
+which gives them that form of action which is called gravitation. Thus,
+for instance, a piece of lead, spherically formed, falls quickly and
+direct: reduce this ball into very thin plates, it will be sustained
+in the air for a much longer time: apply to it the action of fire, this
+lead will rise in the atmosphere: here, then, the same metal, variously
+modified, has very different modes of action.
+
+A very simple observation would have sufficed to make the philosophers,
+antecedent to Newton, feel the inadequateness of the causes they
+admitted to operate with such powerful effect. They had a sufficiency
+to convince themselves, in the collision of two bodies, which they could
+contemplate, and in the known laws of that motion, which these always
+communicate by reason of their greater or less compactness; from whence
+they ought to have inferred, that the density of _subtle_ or _ethereal_
+matter, being considerably less than that of the planets, it could only
+communicate to them a very feeble motion, quite insufficient to produce
+that velocity of action, of which they could not possibly avoid being
+the witnesses.
+
+If Nature had been viewed uninfluenced by prejudice, they must have been
+long since convinced that matter acts by its own peculiar activity; that
+it needs no exterior communicative force to set it in motion. They might
+have perceived that whenever mixed bodies were placed in a situation to
+act on each other, motion was instantly excited; and that these mixtures
+acted with a force capable of producing the most surprising results.
+
+If particles of iron, sulphur, and water be mixed together, these
+bodies thus capacitated to act on each other, are heated by degrees, and
+ultimately produce a violent combustion. If flour be wetted with water,
+and the mixture closed up, it will be found, after some lapse of time,
+(by the aid of a microscope) to have produced organized beings that
+enjoy life, of which the water and the flour were believed incapable:
+it is thus that inanimate matter can pass into life, or animate matter,
+which is in itself only an assemblage of motion.
+
+Reasoning from analogy, which the philosophers of the present day do not
+hold incompatible, the production of a man, independent of the ordinary
+means, would not be more astonishing than that of an insect with flour
+and water. Fermentation and putrid substances, evidently produce living
+animals. We have here the principle; with proper materials, principles
+can always be brought into action. That generation which is styled
+_uncertain_ is only so for those who do not reflect, or who do not
+permit themselves, attentively, to observe the operations of Nature.
+
+The generative of motion, and its developement, as well as the energy of
+matter, may be seen everywhere; more particularly in those unitions in
+which fire, air, and water, find themselves combined. These elements, or
+rather these mixed bodies, are the most volatile, the most fugitive
+of beings; nevertheless in the hands of Nature, they are the essential
+agents employed to produce the most striking phenomena. To these we must
+ascribe the effects of thunder, the eruption of volcanoes, earthquakes,
+&c. Science offers to our consideration an agent of astonishing force,
+in gunpowder, the instant it comes in contact with fire. In short, the
+most terrible effects result from the combination of matter, which is
+generally believed to be dead and inert.
+
+These facts prove, beyond a doubt, that motion is produced, is
+augmented, is accelerated in matter, without the help of any exterior
+agent: therefore it is reasonable to conclude that motion is the
+necessary consequence of immutable laws, resulting from the essence,
+from the properties existing in the different elements, and the
+various combinations of these elements. Are we not justified, then,
+in concluding, from these precedents, that there may be an infinity of
+other combinations, with which we are unacquainted, competent to produce
+a great variety of motion in matter, without being under the necessity
+of having recourse, for the explanation, to agents who are more
+difficult to comprehend than even the effects which are attributed to
+them?
+
+Had man but paid proper attention to what passed under his review, he
+would not have sought out of Nature, a power distinguished from herself,
+to set her in action, and without which he believes she cannot move. If,
+indeed, by Nature is meant a heap of dead matter, destitute of peculiar
+qualities purely passive, we must unquestionably seek out of this Nature
+the principle of her motion. But if by Nature be understood, what it
+really is, a whole, of which the numerous parts are endowed with various
+properties, which oblige them to act according to these properties;
+which are in a perpetual ternateness of action and reaction; which
+press, which gravitate towards a common center, whilst others depart
+from and fly off towards the periphery, or circumference; which attract
+and repel; which by continual approximation and constant collision,
+produce and decompose all the bodies we behold; then, I say, there is
+no necessity to have recourse to supernatural powers, to account for the
+formation of things, and those extraordinary appearances which are the
+result of motion.
+
+Those who admit a cause exterior to matter, are obliged to believe that
+this cause produced all the motion by which matter is agitated in giving
+it existence. This belief rests on another, namely, that matter could
+begin to exist; an hypothesis that, until this moment, has never been
+satisfactorily demonstrated. To produce from nothing, or the CREATION,
+is a term that cannot give us the least idea of the formation of the
+universe; it presents no sense, upon which the mind can rely. In fact,
+the human mind is not adequate to conceive a moment of non-existence, or
+when all shall have passed away; even admitting this to be a truth, it
+is no truth for us, because by the very nature of our organization, we
+cannot admit positions as facts, of which no evidence can be adduced
+that has relation to our senses; we may, indeed, consent to believe it,
+because others say it; but will any rational being be satisfied with
+such an admission? Can any moral good spring from such blind assurance?
+Is it consistent with sound doctrine, with philosophy, or with reason?
+Do we, in fact, pay any respect to the intellectual powers of another,
+when we say to him, "I will believe this, because in all the attempts
+you have ventured, for the purpose of proving what you say, you have
+entirely failed; and have been at last obliged to acknowledge you know
+nothing about the matter?" What moral reliance ought we to have on such
+people? Hypothesis may succeed hypothesis; system may destroy system: a
+new set of ideas may overturn the ideas of a former day. Other
+Gallileos may be condemned to death--other Newtons may arise--we may
+reason--argue--dispute--quarrel--punish and destroy: nay, we may even
+exterminate those who differ from us in opinion; but when we have
+done all this, we shall be obliged to fall back upon our original
+darkness--to confess, that that which has no relation with our senses,
+that which cannot manifest itself to us by some of the ordinary modes
+by which other things are manifested, has no existence for us--is not
+comprehensible by us--can never entirely remove our doubt--can never
+seize on our stedfast belief; seeing it is that of which we cannot form
+even a notion; in short, that it is that, which as long as we remain
+what we are, must be hidden from us by a veil, which no power, no
+faculty, no energy we possess, is able to remove. All who are not
+enslaved by prejudice agree to the truth of the position, that _nothing
+can be made of nothing_. Many theologians have acknowledged Nature to
+be an active whole. Almost all the ancient philosophers were agreed to
+regard the world as eternal. OCELLUS LUCANUS, speaking of the universe,
+says, "_it has always been, and it always will be_." VATABLE and GROTIUS
+assure us, that to render the Hebrew phrase in the first chapter of
+GENESIS correctly, we must say, "_when God made heaven and earth, matter
+was without form._" If this be true, and every Hebraist can judge for
+himself, then the word which has been rendered _created_, means only
+to fashion, form, arrange. We know that the Greek words _create_ and
+_form_, have always indicated the same thing. According to ST. JEROME,
+_creare_ has the same meaning as _condere_, to found, to build. The
+Bible does not anywhere say in a clear manner, that the world was made
+of nothing. TERTULLIAN and the father PETAU both admit, that "_this is
+a truth established more by reason than by authority._" ST. JUSTIN seems
+to have contemplated matter as eternal, since he commends PLATO for
+having said, that "_God, in the creation of the world, only gave impulse
+to matter, and fashioned it._" BURNET and PYTHAGORAS were entirely of
+this opinion, and even our Church Service may be adduced in support; for
+although it admits by implication a beginning, it expressly denies an
+end: "_As it was in the beginning, is now, and ever shall be, world
+without end._" It is easy to perceive that that which cannot cease to
+exist, must have always been.
+
+Motion becomes still more obscure, when creation, or the formation of
+matter, is attributed to a SPIRITUAL being; that is to say, to a being
+which has no analogy, no point of contact, with it--to a being which
+has neither extent or parts, and cannot, therefore, be susceptible of
+motion, as we understand the term; this being only the change of one
+body, relatively to another body, in which the body moved presents
+successively different parts to different points of space. Moreover,
+as all the world are nearly agreed that matter can never be totally
+annihilated, or cease to exist; by what reasoning, I would ask, do they
+comprehend--how understand--that that which cannot cease to be, could
+ever have had a beginning?
+
+If, therefore, it be asked, whence came matter? it is very reasonable to
+say it has always existed. If it be inquired, whence proceeds the motion
+that agitates matter? the same reasoning furnishes the answer; namely,
+that as motion is coeval with matter, it must have existed from all
+eternity, seeing that motion is the necessary consequence of its
+existence--of its essence--of its primitive properties, such as its
+extent, its gravity, its impenetrability, its figure, &c. By virtue
+of these essential constituent properties, inherent in all matter, and
+without which it is impossible to form an idea of it, the various matter
+of which the universe is composed must from all eternity have
+pressed against, each other--have gravitated towards a center--have
+clashed--have come in contact--have been attracted--have been
+repelled--have been combined--have been separated: in short, must have
+acted and moved according to the essence and energy peculiar to each
+genus, and to each of its combinations.
+
+Existence supposes properties in the thing that exists: whenever it
+has properties, its mode of action must necessarily flow from those
+properties which constitute, its mode of being. Thus, when a body is
+ponderous, it must fall; when it falls, it must come in collision with
+the bodies it meets in its descent; when it is dense, when it is solid,
+it must, by reason of this density, communicate motion to the bodies
+with which it clashes; when it has analogy, when it has affinity with
+these bodies, it must be attracted, must be united with them; when it
+has no point of analogy with them, it must be repulsed.
+
+From which it may be fairly inferred, that in supposing, as we are under
+the necessity of doing, the existence of matter, we must suppose it to
+have some kind of properties; from which its motion, or modes of action,
+must necessarily flow. To form the universe, DESCARTES asked but matter
+and motion: a diversity of matter sufficed for him; variety of motion
+was the consequence of its existence, of its essence, of its properties:
+its different modes of action would be the necessary consequence of
+its different modes of being. Matter without properties would be a mere
+nothing; therefore, as soon as matter exists, it must act; as soon as
+it is various, it must act variously; if it cannot commence to exist,
+it must have existed from all eternity; if it has always existed, it can
+never cease to be: if it can never cease to be, it can never cease to
+act by its own energy. Motion is a manner of being, which matter derives
+from its peculiar existence.
+
+The existence, then, of matter is a fact: the existence of motion is
+another fact. Our visual organs point out to us matter with different
+essences, forming a variety of combinations, endowed with various
+properties that discriminate them. Indeed, it is a palpable error to
+believe that matter is a homogeneous body, of which the parts differ
+from each other only by their various modifications. Among the
+individuals of the same species that come under our notice, no two
+resemble exactly; and it is therefore evident that the difference
+of situation alone will, necessarily, carry a diversity more or less
+sensible, not only in the modifications, but also in the essence, in
+the properties, in the entire system of beings. This truth was well
+understood by the profound and subtle LEIBNITZ.
+
+If this principle be properly digested, and experience seems always to
+produce evidence of its truth, we must be convinced that the matter or
+primitive elements which enter into the composition of bodies, are
+not of the same nature, and consequently, can neither have the same
+properties, nor the same modifications; and if so, they cannot have
+the same mode of moving and acting. Their activity or motion, already
+different, can be diversified to infinity, augmented or diminished,
+accelerated or retarded, according to the combinations, the proportions,
+the pressure, the density, the volume of the matter, that enters their
+composition. The endless variety to be produced, will need no further
+illustration than the commonest book of arithmetic furnishes us, where
+it will be found, that to ring all the changes that can be produced on
+twelve bells only, would occupy a space of more than ninety-one years.
+The element of fire is visibly more active and more inconstant than that
+of earth. This is more solid and ponderous than fire, air, or water.
+According to the quantity of these elements, which enter the composition
+of bodies, these must act diversely, and their motion must in some
+measure partake the motion peculiar to each of their constituent parts.
+Elementary fire appears to be in Nature the principle of activity;
+it may be compared to a fruitful leaven, that puts the mass into
+fermentation and gives it life. Earth appears to be the principle of
+solidity in bodies, from its impenetrability, and by the firm coherence
+of its parts. Water is a medium, to facilitate the combination of
+bodies, into which it enters itself, as a constituent part. Air is a
+fluid whose business it seems to be, to furnish the other elements with
+the space requisite to expand, to exercise their motion, and which is,
+moreover, found proper to combine with them. These elements, which
+our senses never discover in a pure state--which are continually and
+reciprocally set in motion by each other--which are always acting and
+re-acting, combining and separating, attracting and repelling--are
+sufficient to explain to us the formation of all the beings we behold.
+Their motion is uninterruptedly and reciprocally produced from each
+other; they are alternately causes and effects. Thus, they form a vast
+circle of generation and destruction--of combination and decomposition,
+which, it is quite reasonable to suppose, could never have had a
+beginning, and which, consequently can never have an end. In short,
+Nature is but an immense chain of causes and effects, which unceasingly
+flow from each other. The motion of particular beings depends on the
+general motion, which is itself maintained by individual motion. This
+is strengthened or weakened, accelerated or retarded, simplified or
+complicated, procreated or destroyed, by a variety of combinations and
+circumstances, which every moment change the directions, the tendency,
+the modes of existing, and of acting, of the different beings that
+receive its impulse.
+
+If it were true, as has been asserted by some philosophers, that every
+thing has a tendency to form one unique or single mass, and in that
+unique mass the instant should arrive when all was in _nisus_, all would
+eternally remain in this state; to all eternity there would be no more
+than one Being and one effort: this would be eternal and universal
+death.
+
+If we desire to go beyond this, to find the principle of action in
+matter, to trace the origin of things, it is for ever to fall back upon
+difficulties; it is absolutely to abridge the evidence of our senses; by
+which only we can understand, by which alone we can judge of the causes
+acting upon them, or the impulse by which they are set in action.
+
+Let us, therefore, content ourselves with saying WHAT is supported by
+our experience, and by all the evidence we are capable of understanding;
+against the truth of which not a shadow of proof, such as our reason can
+admit, has ever been adduced--which has been maintained by philosophers
+in every age--which theologians themselves have not denied, but which
+many of them have upheld; namely, that _matter always existed; that
+it moves by virtue of its essence; that all the phenomena of Nature
+is ascribable to the diversified motion of the variety of matter she
+contains; and which, like the phoenix, is continually regenerating out
+of its own ashes._
+
+
+
+
+
+CHAP. III.
+
+_Of Matter.--Of its various Combinations.--Of its diversified Motion, or
+of the Course of Nature._
+
+
+We know nothing of the elements of bodies, but we know some of their
+properties or qualities; and we distinguish their various matter by the
+effect or change produced on our senses; that is to say, by the variety
+of motion their presence excites in us. In consequence, we discover
+in them, extent, mobility, divisibility, solidity, gravity, and inert
+force. From these general and primitive properties flow a number
+of others, such as density, figure, colour, ponderosity, &c. Thus,
+relatively to us, matter is all that affects our senses in any manner
+whatever; the various properties we attribute to matter, by which we
+discriminate its diversity, are founded on the different impressions we
+receive on the changes they produce in us.
+
+A satisfactory definition of matter has not yet been given. Man,
+deceived and led astray by his prejudices, formed but vague,
+superficial, and imperfect notions concerning it. He looked upon it
+as an unique being, gross and passive, incapable of either moving by
+itself, of forming combinations, or of producing any thing by its
+own energies. Instead of this unintelligible jargon, he ought to have
+contemplated it as a _genus_ of beings, of which the individuals,
+although they might possess some common properties, such as extent,
+divisibility, figure, &c. should not, however, be all ranked in the same
+class, nor comprised under the same general denomination.
+
+An example will serve more fully to explain what we have asserted,
+throw its correctness into light, and facilitate the application.
+The properties common to all matter, are extent, divisibility,
+impenetrability, figure, mobility, or the property of being moved in
+mass. FIRE, beside these general properties, common to all matter,
+enjoys also the peculiar property of being put into activity by a motion
+that produces on our organs of feeling the sensation of heat; and by
+another, that communicates to our visual organs the sensation of light.
+Iron, in common with matter in general, has extent and figure; is
+divisible, and moveable in mass: if fire be combined with it in a
+certain proportion, the iron acquires two new properties; namely, those
+of exciting in us similar sensations of heat and light, which were
+excited by the element of fire, but which the iron had not, before its
+combination with the igneous matter. These distinguishing properties
+are inseparable from matter, and the phenomena that result, may, in the
+strictest sense of the word, be said to result necessarily.
+
+If we contemplate a little the paths of Nature--if, for a time, we trace
+the beings in this Nature, under the different states through which,
+by reason of their properties, they are compelled to pass; we shall
+discover, that it is to motion, and motion only, that is to be ascribed
+all the changes, all the combinations, all the forms, in short, all the
+various modifications of matter. That it is by motion every thing that
+exists is produced, experiences change, expands, and is destroyed. It
+is motion that alters the aspect of beings; that adds to, or takes away
+from their properties; which obliges each of them, by a consequence of
+its nature, after having occupied a certain rank or order, to quit it,
+to occupy another, and to contribute to the generation, maintenance, and
+decomposition of other beings, totally different in their bulk, rank,
+and essence.
+
+In what experimental philosophers have styled the THREE ORDERS OF
+NATURE, that is to say, the _mineral_, the _vegetable_, and _animal_
+worlds, they have established, by the aid of motion, a transmigration,
+an exchange, a continual circulation in the particles of matter. Nature
+has occasion in one place, for those particles which, for a time, she
+has placed in another. These particles, after having, by particular
+combinations, constituted beings endued with peculiar essences, with
+specific properties, with determinate modes of action, dissolve and
+separate with more or less facility; and combining in a new manner, they
+form new beings. The attentive observer sees this law execute itself, in
+a manner more or less prominent, through all the beings by which he is
+surrounded. He sees nature full of _erratic germe_, some of which expand
+themselves, whilst others wait until motion has placed them in their
+proper situation, in suitable wombs or matrices, in the necessary
+circumstances, to unfold, to increase, to render them more perceptible
+by the addition of other substances of matter analogous to their
+primitive being. In all this we see nothing but the effect of motion,
+necessarily guided, modified, accelerated or slackened, strengthened or
+weakened, by reason of the various properties that beings successively
+acquire and lose; which, every moment, infallibly produces alterations
+in bodies more or less marked. Indeed, these bodies cannot be, strictly
+speaking, the same in any two successive moments of their existence;
+they must, every instant, either acquire or lose: in short, they are
+obliged to undergo continual variations in their essences, in their
+properties, in their energies, in their masses, in their qualities, in
+their mode of existence.
+
+Animals, after they have been expanded in, and brought out of, the wombs
+that are suitable to the elements of their machine, enlarge, strengthen,
+acquire new properties, new energies, new faculties; either by deriving
+nourishment from plants analogous to their being, or by devouring other
+animals whose substance is suitable to their preservation; that is to
+say, to repair the continual deperdition or loss of some portion of
+their own substance, that is disengaging itself every instant. These
+same animals are nourished, preserved, strengthened, and enlarged, by
+the aid of air, water, earth, and fire. Deprived of air, or of the fluid
+that surrounds them, that presses on them, that penetrates them, that
+gives them their elasticity, they presently cease to live. Water,
+combined with this air, enters into their whole mechanism of which
+it facilitates the motion. Earth serves them for a basis, by giving
+solidity to their texture: it is conveyed by air and water, which carry
+it to those parts of the body with which it can combine. Fire itself,
+disguised and enveloped under an infinity of forms, continually received
+into the animal, procures him heat, continues him in life, renders him
+capable of exercising his functions. The aliments, charged with these
+various principles, entering into the stomach, re-establish the nervous
+system, and restore, by their activity, and the elements which compose
+them, the machine which begins to languish, to be depressed, by the loss
+it has sustained. Forthwith the animal experiences a change in his
+whole system; he has more energy, more activity; he feels more courage;
+displays more gaiety; he acts, he moves, he thinks, after a different
+manner; all his faculties are exercised with more ease. This igneous
+matter, so congenial to generation--so restorative in its effect--so
+necessary to life, was the JUPITER of the ancients: from all that has
+preceded, it is clear, that what are called the elements, or primitive
+parts of matter, variously combined, are, by the agency of motion,
+continually united to, and assimilated with, the substance of
+animals--that they visibly modify their being--have an evident influence
+over their actions, that is to say, upon the motion they undergo,
+whether visible or concealed.
+
+The same elements, which under certain circumstances serve to nourish,
+to strengthen, to maintain the animal, become, under others, the
+principles of his weakness, the instruments of his dissolution--of his
+death: they work his destruction, whenever they are not in that just
+proportion which renders them proper to maintain his existence: thus,
+when water becomes too abundant in the body of the animal, it enervates
+him, it relaxes the fibres, and impedes the necessary action of the
+other elements: thus, fire admitted in excess, excites in him disorderly
+motion destructive of his machine: thus, air, charged with principles
+not analogous to his mechanism, brings upon him dangerous diseases and
+contagion. In fine, the aliments modified after certain modes, in the
+room of nourishing, destroy the animal, and conduce to his ruin: the
+animal is preserved no longer than these substances are analogous to his
+system. They ruin him when they want that just equilibrium that renders
+them suitable to maintain his existence.
+
+Plants that serve to nourish and restore animals are themselves
+nourished by earth; they expand on its bosom, enlarge and strengthen at
+its expense, continually receiving into their texture, by their
+roots and their pores, water, air, and igneous matter: water visibly
+reanimates them whenever their vegetation or genus of life languishes;
+it conveys to them those analogous principles by which they are enabled
+to reach perfection: air is requisite to their expansion, and furnishes
+them with water, earth, and the igneous matter with which it is charged.
+By these means they receive more or less of the inflammable matter; the
+different proportions of these principles, their numerous combinations,
+from whence result an infinity of properties, a variety of forms,
+constitute the various families and classes into which botanists have
+distributed plants: it is thus we see the cedar and the hyssop develop
+their growth; the one rises to the clouds, the other creep humbly on
+the earth. Thus, by degrees, from an acorn springs the majestic oak,
+accumulating, with time, its numerous branches, and overshadowing us
+with its foliage. Thus, a grain of corn, after having drawn its own
+nourishment from the juices of the earth, serves, in its turn, for
+the nourishment of man, into whose system it conveys the elements or
+principles by which it has been itself expanded, combined, and modified
+in such a manner, as to render this vegetable proper to assimilate and
+unite with the human frame; that is to say, with the fluids and solids
+of which it is composed.
+
+The same elements, the same principles, are found in the formation
+of minerals, as well as in their decomposition, whether natural or
+artificial. We find that earth, diversely modified, wrought, and
+combined, serves to increase their bulk, and give them more or less
+density and gravity. Air and water contribute to make their particles
+cohere; the igneous matter, or inflammable principle, tinges them with
+colour, and sometimes plainly indicates its presence, by the brilliant
+scintillation which motion elicits from them. These stones and metals,
+these bodies, so compact and solid, are disunited, are destroyed, by
+the agency of air, water, and fire; which the most ordinary analysis is
+sufficient to prove, as well as a multitude of experience, to which our
+eyes are the daily evidence.
+
+Animals, plants, and minerals, after a lapse of time, give back to
+Nature; that is to say, to the general mass of things, to the universal
+magazine, the elements, or principles, which they have borrowed: The
+earth retakes that portion of the body of which it formed the basis
+and the solidity; the air charges itself with these parts, that are,
+analogous to it, and with those particles which are light and subtle;
+water carries off that which is suitable to liquescency; fire, bursting
+its chains, disengages itself, and rushes into new combinations with
+other bodies.
+
+The elementary particles of the animal, being thus dissolved, disunited,
+and dispersed; assume new activity, and form new combinations: thus,
+they serve to nourish, to preserve, or destroy new beings; among others,
+plants, which arrived at their maturity, nourish and preserve new
+animals; these in their turn yielding to the same fate as the first.
+
+Such is the constant, the invariable course, of Nature; such is
+the eternal circle of mutation, which all that exists is obliged
+to describe. It is thus motion generates, preserves for a time, and
+successively, destroys, one part of the universe by the other; whilst
+the sum of existence remains eternally the same. Nature, by its
+combinations, produces suns, which place themselves in the centre of
+so many systems: she forms planets, which, by their peculiar essence,
+gravitate and describe their revolutions round these suns: by degrees
+the motion is changed altogether, and becomes eccentric: perhaps the day
+may arrive when these wondrous masses will disperse, of which man, in
+the short space of his existence, can only have a faint and transient
+glimpse.
+
+It is clear, then, that the continual motion inherent in matter, changes
+and destroys all beings; every instant depriving them of some of their
+properties, to substitute others: it is motion, which, in thus changing
+their actual essence, changes also their order, their direction, their
+tendency, and the laws which regulate their mode of acting and being:
+from the stone formed in the bowels of the earth, by the intimate
+combination and close coherence of similar and analogous particles, to
+the sun, that vast reservoir of igneous particles, which sheds torrents
+of light over the firmament; from the benumbed oyster, to the thoughtful
+and active man; we see an uninterrupted progression, a perpetual chain
+of motion and combination; from which is produced, beings that only
+differ from each other by the variety of their elementary matter--by the
+numerous combinations of these elements, from whence springs modes
+of action and existence, diversified to infinity. In generation, in
+nutrition, in preservation, we see nothing more than matter, variously
+combined, of which each has its peculiar motion, regulated by fixed and
+determinate laws, which oblige them to submit to necessary changes. We
+shall find, in the formation, in the growth, in the instantaneous
+life, of animals, vegetables, and minerals, nothing but matter; which
+combining, accumulating, aggregating, and expanding by degrees, forms
+beings, who are either feeling, living, vegetating, or else destitute
+of these faculties; which, having existed some time under one particular
+form, are obliged to contribute by their ruin to the production of other
+forms.
+
+Thus, to speak strictly, nothing in Nature is either born, or dies,
+according to the common acceptation of those terms. This truth was
+felt by many of the ancient philosophers. PLATO says, that according to
+tradition, "the living were born of the dead, the same as the dead did
+come of the living; and that this is the constant routine of Nature." He
+adds from himself, "who knows, if to live, be not to die; and if to die,
+be not to live?" This was the doctrine of PYTHAGORAS, a man of great
+talent and no less note. EMPEDOCLES asserts, "there is neither birth nor
+death, for any mortal; but only a combination, and a separation of that
+which was combined, and that this is what amongst men they call birth,
+and death." Again he remarks, "those are infants, or short-sighted
+persons, with very contracted understandings, who imagine any thing is
+born, which did not exist before, or that any thing can die or perish
+totally."
+
+
+
+
+
+CHAP. IV.
+
+_Laws of Motion, common to every Being of Nature.--Attraction and
+Repulsion.--Inert Force.--Necessity._
+
+
+Man is never surprised at those effects, of which he thinks he knows the
+cause; he believes he does know the cause, as soon as he sees them act
+in an uniform and determinate manner, or when the motion excited is
+simple: the descent of a stone, that falls by its own peculiar weight,
+is an object of contemplation to the philosopher only; to whom the mode
+by which the most immediate causes act, and the most simple motion, are
+no less impenetrable mysteries than the most complex motion, and the
+manner by which the most complicated causes give impulse. The uninformed
+are seldom tempted either to examine the effects which are familiar to
+them, or to recur to first principles. They think they see nothing in
+the descent of a stone, which ought to elicit their surprise, or become
+the object of their research: it requires a NEWTON to feel that the
+descent of heavy bodies is a phenomenon, worthy his whole, his most
+serious attention; it requires the sagacity of a profound experimental
+philosopher, to discover the laws by which heavy bodies fall, by which
+they communicate to others their peculiar motion. In short, the mind
+that is most practised in philosophical observation, has frequently the
+chagrin to find, that the most simple and most common effects escape all
+his researches, and remain inexplicable to him.
+
+When any extraordinary, any unusual, effect is produced, to which our
+eyes have not been accustomed; or when we are ignorant of the energies
+of the cause, the action of which so forcibly strikes our senses, we
+are tempted to meditate upon it, and take it into our consideration.
+The European, accustomed to the use of GUNPOWDER, passes it by, without
+thinking much of its extraordinary energies; the workman, who labours to
+manufacture it, finds nothing marvellous in its properties, because he
+daily handles the matter that forms its composition. The American, to
+whom this powder was a stranger, who had never beheld its operation,
+looked upon it as a divine power, and its energies as supernatural. The
+uninformed, who are ignorant of the true cause of THUNDER, contemplate
+it as the instrument of divine vengeance. The experimental philosopher
+considers it as the effect of the electric matter, which, nevertheless,
+is itself a cause which he is very far from perfectly understanding.--It
+required the keen, the penetrating mind of a FRANKLIN, to throw light
+on the nature of this subtle fluid--to develop the means by which
+its effects might be rendered harmless--to turn to useful purposes, a
+phenomenon that made the ignorant tremble--that filled their minds with
+terror, their hearts with dismay, as indicating the anger of the gods:
+impressed with this idea, they prostrated themselves, they sacrificed to
+JUPITER, to deprecate his wrath.
+
+Be this as it may, whenever we see a cause act, we look upon its effect
+as natural: when this cause becomes familiar to the sight, when we are
+accustomed to it, we think we understand it, and its effects surprise
+us no longer. Whenever any unusual effect is perceived, without our
+discovering the cause, the mind sets to work, becomes uneasy; this
+uneasiness increases in proportion to its extent: as soon as it is
+believed to threaten our preservation, we become completely agitated; we
+seek after the cause with an earnestness proportioned to our alarm;
+our perplexity augments in a ratio equivalent to the persuasion we are
+under: how essentially requisite it is, we should become acquainted with
+the cause that has affected us in so lively a manner. As it frequently
+happens that our senses can teach us nothing respecting this cause
+which so deeply interests us--which we seek with so much ardour, we have
+recourse to our imagination; this, disturbed with alarm, enervated by
+fear, becomes a suspicious, a fallacious guide: we create chimeras,
+fictitious causes, to whom we give the credit, to whom we ascribe the
+honour of those phenomena by which we have been so much alarmed. It is
+to this disposition of the human mind that must be attributed, as will
+be seen in the sequel, the religious errors of man, who, despairing of
+the capacity to trace the natural causes of those perplexing phenomena
+to which he was the witness, and sometimes the victim, created in his
+brain (heated with terror) imaginary causes, which have become to him a
+source of the most extravagant folly.
+
+In Nature, however, there can be only natural causes and effects; all
+motion excited in this Nature, follows constant and necessary laws: the
+natural operations, to the knowledge of which we are competent, of which
+we are in a capacity to judge, are of themselves sufficient to enable us
+to discover those which elude our sight; we can at least judge of them
+by analogy. If we study Nature with attention, the modes of action which
+she displays to our senses will teach us not to be disconcerted by those
+which she refuses to discover. Those causes which are the most remote
+from their effects, unquestionably act by intermediate causes; by the
+aid of these, we can frequently trace out the first. If in the chain of
+these causes we sometimes meet with obstacles that oppose themselves
+to our research, we ought to endeavour by patience and diligence to
+overcome them; when it so happens we cannot surmount the difficulties
+that occur, we still are never justified in concluding the chain to be
+broken, or that the cause which acts is SUPER-NATURAL. Let us, then, be
+content with an honest avowal, that Nature contains resources of which
+we are ignorant; but never let us substitute phantoms, fictions, or
+imaginary causes, senseless terms, for those causes which escape our
+research; because, by such means we only confirm ourselves in ignorance,
+impede our enquiries, and obstinately remain in error.
+
+In spite of our ignorance with respect to the meanderings of Nature,
+(for of the essence of being, of their properties, their elements, their
+combinations, their proportions, we yet know the simple and general
+laws, according to which bodies move;) we see clearly, that some of
+these laws, common to all beings, never contradict themselves; although,
+on some occasions, they appear to vary, we are frequently competent to
+discover that the cause becoming complex, from combination with other
+causes, either impedes or prevents its mode of action being such as
+in its primitive state we had a right to expect. We know that active,
+igneous matter, applied to gunpowder, must necessarily cause it to
+explode: whenever this effect does not follow the combination of the
+igneous matter with the gunpowder--whenever our senses do not give us
+evidence of the fact, we are justified in concluding, either that the
+powder is damp, or that it is united with some other substance that
+counteracts its explosion. We know that all the actions of man have a
+tendency to render him happy: whenever, therefore, we see him labouring
+to injure or destroy himself, it is just to infer that he is moved by
+some cause opposed to his natural tendency; that he is deceived by some
+prejudice; that, for want of experience, he is blind to consequences:
+that he does not see whither his actions will lead him.
+
+If the motion excited in beings was always simple; if their actions did
+not blend and combine with each other, it would be easy to know, and we
+should be assured, in the first instance, of the effect a cause would
+produce. I know that a stone, when descending, ought to describe a
+perpendicular: I also know, that if it encounters any other body which
+changes its course, it is obliged to take an oblique direction, but if
+its fall be interrupted by several contrary powers, which act upon it
+alternately, I am no longer competent to determine what line it will
+describe. It may be a parabola, an ellipsis, spiral, circular, &c. this
+will depend on the impulse, it receives, and the powers by which it is
+impelled.
+
+The most complex motion, however, is never more than the result of
+simple motion combined: therefore as soon as we know the general laws of
+beings and their action, we have only to decompose, to analyse them, in
+order to discover those of which they are combined; experience teaches
+us the effects we are to expect. Thus it is clear, the simplest motion
+causes that necessary junction of different matter, of which all bodies
+are composed: that matter, varied in its essence, in its properties,
+in its combinations, has each its several modes of action or motion,
+peculiar to itself; the whole motion of a body is consequently the sum
+total of each particular motion that is combined.
+
+Amongst the matter we behold, some is constantly disposed to unite,
+whilst other is incapable of union; that which is suitable to unite,
+forms combinations, more or less intimate, possessing more or less
+durability: that is to say, with more or less capacity to preserve their
+union, to resist dissolution. Those bodies which are called SOLIDS,
+receive into their composition a great number of homogeneous, similar,
+and analogous particles, disposed to unite themselves with energies
+conspiring or tending to the same point. The primitive beings, or
+elements of bodies, have need of supports, of props; that is to say, of
+the presence of each other, for the purpose of preserving themselves;
+of acquiring consistence or solidity: a truth, which applies with equal
+uniformity to what is called _physical_, as to what is termed _moral_.
+
+It is upon this disposition in matter and bodies, with relation to each
+other, that is founded those modes of action which natural philosophers
+designate by the terms _attraction, repulsion, sympathy, antipathy,
+affinities, relations_; that moralists describe under the names of
+_love, hatred, friendship, aversion_. Man, like all the beings in
+nature, experiences the impulse of attraction and repulsion; the motion
+excited in him differing from that of other beings, only, because it is
+more concealed, and frequently so hidden, that neither the causes which
+excite it, nor their mode of action are known. This system of attraction
+and repulsion is very ancient, although it required a NEWTON to develop
+it. That love, to which the ancients attributed the unfolding, or
+disentanglement of chaos, appears to have been nothing more than a
+personification of the principle of attraction. All their allegories and
+fables upon chaos, evidently indicate nothing more than the accord or
+union that exists between analogous and homogeneous substances; from
+whence resulted the existence of the universe: whilst discord or
+repulsion, which they called SOIS, was the cause of dissolution,
+confusion, and disorder; there can scarcely remain a doubt, but this was
+the origin of the doctrines of the TWO PRINCIPLES. According to DIOGENES
+LAERTIUS, the philosopher, EMPEDOCLES, asserted, that "_there is a
+kind of affection by which the elements unite themselves; and a sort of
+discord, by which they separate or remove themselves._"
+
+However it may be, it is sufficient for us to know that by an invariable
+law, certain bodies are disposed to unite with more or less facility;
+whilst others cannot combine or unite themselves: water combines itself
+readily with salt, but will not blend with oil. Some combinations are
+very strong, cohering with great force, as metals; others are extremely
+feeble, their cohesion slight and easily decomposed, as in fugitive
+colours. Some bodies, incapable of uniting by themselves, become
+susceptible of union by the agency of other bodies, which serve for
+common bonds or MEDIUMS. Thus, oil and water, naturally heterogeneous,
+combine and make soap, by the intervention of alkaline salt. From matter
+diversely combined, in proportions varied almost to infinity, result
+all physical and moral bodies; the properties and qualities of which are
+essentially different, with modes of action more or less complex: which
+are either understood with facility, or difficult of comprehension,
+according to the elements or matter that has entered into their
+composition, and the various modifications this matter has undergone.
+
+It is thus, from the reciprocity of their attraction, the primitive
+imperceptible particles of matter, which constitute bodies, become
+perceptible, form compound substances, aggregate masses; by the union
+of similar and analogous matter, whose essences fit them to cohere. The
+same bodies are dissolved, their union broken, whenever they undergo the
+action of matter inimical to their junction. Thus by degrees are formed,
+plants, metals, animals, men; each grows, expands, and increases in its
+own system or order; sustaining itself in its respective existence,
+by the continual attraction of analogous matter; to which it becomes
+united, and by which it is preserved and strengthened. Thus, certain
+aliments become fit for the sustenance of man, whilst others destroy his
+existence: some are pleasant to him, strengthen his habit; others
+are repugnant to him, weaken his system: in short, never to separate
+physical from moral laws, it is thus that men, mutually attracted
+to each other by their reciprocal wants, form those unions which we
+designate by the terms, MARRIAGE, FAMILIES, SOCIETIES, FRIENDSHIPS,
+CONNEXIONS: it is thus that virtue strengthens and consolidates them;
+that vice relaxes or totally dissolves them.
+
+Of whatever nature may be the combination of beings, their motion has
+always one direction or tendency: without direction we could not have
+any idea of motion: this direction is regulated by the properties of
+each being; as soon as they have any given properties, they necessarily
+act in obedience to them: that is to say, they follow the law invariably
+determined by these same properties; which, of themselves, constitute
+the being such as he is found, and settle his mode of action, which
+is always the consequence of his manner of existence. But what is the
+general direction, or common tendency, we see in all beings? What is
+the visible and known end of all their motion? It is to conserve their
+actual existence--to preserve themselves--to strengthen their several
+bodies--to attract that which is favorable to them--to repel that
+which is injurious them--to avoid that which can harm them--to resist
+impulsions contrary to their manner of existence, and to their natural
+tendency.
+
+To exist, is to experience the motion peculiar to a determinate essence:
+to conserve this existence, is to give and receive that motion from
+which results its maintenance:--it is to attract matter suitable
+to corroborate its being--to avoid that by which it may be either
+endangered or enfeebled. Thus, all beings of which we have any
+knowledge, have a tendency to conserve themselves, each after its
+peculiar manner: the stone, by the firm adhesion of its particles,
+opposes resistance to its destruction. Organized beings conserve
+themselves by more complicated means, but which are, nevertheless,
+calculated to maintain their existence against that by which it may
+be injured. Man, both in his physical and in his moral capacity, is
+a living, feeling, thinking, active being; who, every instant of his
+duration, strives equally to avoid that which may be injurious, and to
+procure that which is pleasing to him, or that which is suitable to his
+mode of existence; all his actions tending solely to conserve himself.
+ST. AUGUSTINE admits this tendency in all whether organized or not.
+
+Conservation, then, is the common point to which all the energies, all
+the powers, all the faculties of beings, seem continually directed.
+Natural philosophers call this direction or tendency, SELF-GRAVITATION:
+NEWTON calls it INERT FORCE: moralists denominate it in man, SELF-LOVE
+which is nothing more than the tendency he has to preserve himself--a
+desire of happiness--a love of his own welfare--a wish for pleasure--a
+promptitude in seizing on every thing that appears favourable to
+his conservation--a marked aversion to all that either disturbs his
+happiness, or menaces his existence--primitive sentiments, that are
+common to all beings of the human species; which all their faculties are
+continually striving to satisfy; which all their passions, their wills,
+their actions, have eternally for their object and their end. This
+self-gravitation, then, is clearly a necessary disposition in man,
+and in all other beings; which, by a variety means, contribute to the
+preservation of the existence they have received, as long as nothing
+deranges the order of their machine, or its primitive tendency.
+
+Cause always produces effect; there can be no effect without cause.
+Impulse is always followed by some motion, more or less sensible; by
+some change, more or less remarkable in the body which receives it.
+But motion, and its various modes of displaying itself, is, as has been
+already shewn, determined by the nature, the essence, the properties,
+the combinations of the beings acting. It must, then, be concluded that
+motion, or the modes by which beings act, arises from some cause; that
+as this cause is not able to move or act, but in conformity with the
+manner of its being or its essential properties, it must equally be
+concluded, that all the phenomena we perceive are necessary; that every
+being in Nature, under the circumstances in which it is placed, and with
+the given properties it possesses, cannot act otherwise than it does.
+
+Necessity is the constant and infallible relation of causes with their
+effects. Fire consumes, of necessity, combustible matter plated within
+its circuit of action: man, by fatality, desires either that which
+really is, or appears to be serviceable to his welfare. Nature, in all
+the extraordinary appearances she exhibits, necessarily acts after her
+own peculiar essence: all the beings she contains, necessarily act each
+after its own a individual nature: it is by motion that the whole has
+relation with its parts; and these parts with the whole: it is thus
+that in the general system every thing is connected: it is itself but
+an immense chain of causes and effects, which flow without ceasing, one
+from the other. If we reflect, we shall be obliged to acknowledge that
+every thing we see is necessary; that it cannot be otherwise than it is;
+that all the beings we behold, as well as those which escape our
+sight, act by invariable laws. According to these laws, heavy
+bodies fall--light bodies ascend--analogous substances attract each
+other--beings tend to preserve themselves--man cherishes himself; loves
+that which he thinks advantageous--detests that which he has an idea may
+prove unfavourable to him.--In fine, we are obliged to admit, there
+can be no perfectly independent energy--no separated cause--no detached
+action, in a nature where all the beings are in a reciprocity of
+action--who, without interruption, mutually impel and resist each
+other--who is herself nothing more than an eternal circle of motion,
+given and received according to necessary laws; which under the same
+given incidents, invariably produce the same effect.
+
+Two examples will serve to throw the principle here laid down, into
+light--one shall be taken from physics, the other from morals.
+
+In a whirlwind of dust, raised by elemental force, confused as it
+appears to our eyes, in the most frightful tempest excited by contrary
+winds, when the waves roll high as mountains, there is not a single
+particle of dust, or drop of water, that has been placed by CHANCE, that
+has not a cause for occupying the place where it is found; that does
+not, in the most rigorous sense of the word, act after the manner in
+which it ought to act; that is, according to its own peculiar essence,
+and that of the beings from whom it receives this communicated force.
+A geometrician exactly knew the different energies acting in each case,
+with the properties of the particles moved, could demonstrate that after
+the causes given, each particle acted precisely as it ought to act, and
+that it could not have acted otherwise than it did.
+
+In those terrible convulsions that sometimes agitate political
+societies, shake their foundations, and frequently produce the overthrow
+of an empire; there is not a single action, a single word, a single
+thought, a single will, a single passion in the agents, whether they act
+as destroyers, or as victims, that is not the necessary result of the
+causes operating; that does not act, as, of necessity, it must act, from
+the peculiar essence of the beings who give the impulse, and that of the
+agents who receive it, according to the situation these agents fill in
+the moral whirlwind. This could be evidently proved by an understanding
+capacitated to rate all the action and re-action, of the minds and
+bodies of those who contributed to the revolution.
+
+In fact, if all be connected in Nature, if all motion be produced,
+the one from the other, notwithstanding their secret communications
+frequently elude our sight; we ought to feel convinced of this truth,
+that there is no cause, however minute, however remote, that does not
+sometimes produce the greatest and most immediate effects on man. It
+may, perhaps, be in the parched plains of Lybia, that are amassed
+the first elements of a storm or tempest, which, borne by the winds,
+approach our climate, render our atmosphere dense, and thus operating
+on the temperament, may influence the passions of a man, whose
+circumstances shall have capacitated him to influence many others, who
+shall decide after his will the fate of many nations.
+
+Man, in fact, finds himself in Nature, and makes a part of it: he acts
+according to laws, which are appropriate to him; he receives in a manner
+more or less distinct, the action and impulse of the beings who surround
+him; who themselves act after laws that are peculiar to their essence.
+Thus he is variously modified; but his actions are always the result of
+his own energy, and that of the beings who act upon him, and by whom he
+is modified. This is what gives such variety to his determinations--what
+generally produces such contradiction in his thoughts, his opinions,
+his will, his actions; in short, in that motion, whether concealed or
+visible, by which he is agitated. We shall have occasion, in the sequel,
+to place this truth, at present so much contested, in a clearer light:
+it will be sufficient for our purpose at present to prove, generally,
+that every thing in Nature is necessary--that nothing to be found in it
+can act otherwise than it does.
+
+Motion, alternately communicated and received, establishes the
+connection or relation between the different orders of beings: when they
+are in the sphere of reciprocal action, attraction approximates
+them; repulsion dissolves and separates them; the one strengthens and
+preserves them; the other enfeebles and destroys them. Once combined,
+they have a tendency to conserve themselves in that mode of existence,
+by virtue of their _inert force_; in this they cannot succeed, because
+they are exposed to the continual influence of all other beings, who
+perpetually and successively act upon them; their change of form, their
+dissolution, is requisite to the preservation of Nature herself: this is
+the sole end we are able to assign her--to which we see her tend without
+intermission--which she follows without interruption, by the destruction
+and reproduction of all subordinate beings, who are obliged to submit to
+her laws--to concur, by their mode of action, to the maintenance of her
+active existence, so essentially requisite to the GREAT WHOLE.
+
+It is thus each being is an individual, who, in the great family,
+performs his necessary portion of the general labour--who executes the
+unavoidable task assigned to him. All bodies act according to laws,
+inherent in their peculiar essence, without the capability to swerve,
+even for a single instant, from those according to which Nature herself
+acts. This is the central power, to which all other powers, essences,
+and energies, are submitted: she regulates the motions of beings, by the
+necessity of her own peculiar essence: she makes them concur by various
+modes to the general plan: this appears to be nothing more than the
+life, action, and maintenance of the whole, by the continual change of
+its parts. This object she obtains, in removing them, one by the other;
+by that which establishes, and by that which destroys, the relation
+subsisting between them; by that which gives them, and that which
+deprives them of, their forms, combinations, proportions, and qualities,
+according to which they act for a time, after a given mode; these are
+afterwards taken from them, to make them act after a different manner.
+It is thus that Nature makes them expand and change, grow and decline,
+augment and diminish, approximate and remove, forms and destroys them,
+according as she finds it requisite to maintain the whole; towards the
+conservation which this Nature is herself essentially necessitated to
+have a tendency.
+
+This irresistible power, this universal necessity, this general energy,
+then, is only a consequence of the nature of things; by virtue of which
+every thing acts, without intermission, after constant and immutable
+laws: these laws not varying more for the whole than for the beings of
+which it is composed. Nature is an active living whole, to which all its
+parts necessarily concur; of which, without their own knowledge, they
+maintain the activity, the life, and the existence. Nature acts and
+exists necessarily: all that she contains, necessarily conspires to
+perpetuate her active existence. This is the decided opinion of PLATO,
+when he says, "_matter and necessity are the same thing; this necessity
+is the mother of the world._" In point of fact, we cannot go beyond this
+aphorism, MATTER ACTS, BECAUSE IT EXISTS; AND EXISTS, TO ACT. If it be
+enquired how, or for why, matter exists? We answer, we know not: but
+reasoning by analogy, of what we do not know by that which we do, we
+should be of opinion it exists necessarily, or because it contains
+within itself a sufficient reason for its existence. In supposing it to
+be created or produced by a being distinguished from it, or less known
+than itself, (which it may be, for any thing we know to the contrary,)
+we must still admit, that this being is necessary, and includes a
+sufficient reason for his own existence. We have not then removed any of
+the difficulty, we have not thrown a clearer light upon the subject, we
+have not advanced a single step; we have simply laid aside a being,
+of which we know some few of the properties, but of which we are still
+extremely ignorant, to have recourse to a power, of which it is utterly
+impossible we can, as long as we are men, form any distinct idea; of
+which, notwithstanding it may be a truth, we cannot, by any means we
+possess, demonstrate the existence. As, therefore, these must be at best
+but speculative points of belief, which each individual, by reason of
+its obscurity, may contemplate with different optics, under various
+aspects, they surely ought to be left free for each to judge after his
+own fashion: the Hindoo can have no just cause of enmity against
+the Christian for his faith: this has no moral right to question
+the Mussulman upon his; the numerous sects of each of the various
+persuasions spread over the face of the earth, ought to make it a creed
+to look with an eye of complacency on the deviation of the others;
+and rest upon that great moral axiom, which is strictly conformable
+to Nature, which contains the whole of man's happiness--"_Do not unto
+another, that which do you not wish another should do unto you_;" for it
+is evident, according to their own doctrines, out of all the variety of
+systems, one only can be right.
+
+We shall see in the sequel, how much man's imagination labours to
+form an idea, of the energies of that Nature he has personified, and
+distinguished from herself: in short, we shall examine some of the
+ridiculous and pernicious inventions, which, for want of understanding
+Nature, have been imagined to impede her course, to suspend her eternal
+laws, to place obstacles to the necessity of things.
+
+
+
+
+
+CHAP. V.
+
+_Order and Confusion.--Intelligence.--Chance._
+
+
+The observation of the necessary, regular, and periodical motion in the
+universe, generated in the mind of man the idea of ORDER; this term,
+in its original signification, represents nothing more than a mode of
+considering, a facility of perceiving, together and separately, the
+different relations of a whole; in which is discovered, by its manner of
+existing and acting, a certain affinity or conformity with his own. Man,
+in extending this idea to the universe, carried with him those methods
+of considering things which are peculiar to himself: he has consequently
+supposed there really existed in Nature affinities and relations, which
+he classed under the name of ORDER; and others which appeared to him not
+to conform to those, which he has ranked under the term of CONFUSION.
+
+It is easy to comprehend, that this idea of order and confusion can have
+no absolute existence in Nature, where every thing is necessary; where
+the whole follows constant and invariable laws, which oblige each being,
+in every moment of its duration, to submit to other laws, which
+flow from its own peculiar mode of existence. Therefore it is in his
+imagination, only, man finds a model of that which he terms order or
+confusion; which, like all his abstract, metaphysical ideas, supposes
+nothing beyond his reach. Order, however, is never more than the faculty
+of conforming himself with the beings by whom he is environed, or with
+the whole of which he forms a part.
+
+Nevertheless, if the idea of order be applied to Nature, it will be
+found to be nothing but a series of action or motion, which he judges
+to conspire to one common end. Thus, in a body that moves, order is the
+chain of action, the series of motion, proper to constitute it what it
+is, and to maintain it in its actual state. Order, relatively to the
+whole of Nature, is the concatenation of causes and effects, necessary
+to her _active_ existence--to maintaining her constantly together; but,
+as it has been proved in the chapter preceding, every individual being
+is obliged to concur to this end, in the different ranks they occupy;
+from whence it is a necessary deduction, that what is called the ORDER
+OF NATURE, can never be more than a certain manner of considering the
+necessity of things, to which all, of which man has any knowledge, is
+submitted. That which is styled CONFUSION, is only a relative term, used
+to designate that series of necessary action, that chain of requisite
+motion, by which an individual being is necessarily changed or disturbed
+in its mode of existence--by which it is instantaneously obliged to
+alter its manner of action; but no one of these actions, no part of
+this motion is capable, even for a single instant, of contradicting
+or deranging the general order of Nature; from which all beings derive
+their existence, their properties, the motion appropriate to each.
+
+What is termed confusion in a being, is nothing more than its passage
+into a new class, a new mode of existence; which necessarily carries
+with it a new series of action, a new chain of motion, different from
+that of which this being found itself susceptible in the preceding
+rank it occupied. That which is called order, in Nature, is a mode of
+existence, or a disposition of its particles, strictly _necessary_. In
+every other assemblage of causes and effects, of worlds, as well as
+in that which we inhabit, some sort of arrangement, some kind of order
+would necessarily be established. Suppose the most incongruous, the
+most heterogeneous substances were put into activity, and assembled by
+a concatenation of extraordinary circumstances; they would form amongst
+themselves, a complete order, a perfect arrangement. This is the true
+notion of a property, which may be defined, an aptitude to constitute a
+being, such as it is actually found, such as it is with respect to the
+whole of which it makes a part.
+
+Order, then, is nothing but necessity, considered relatively to the
+series of actions, or the connected chain of causes and effects, that
+it produces in the universe. What is the motion in our planetary system;
+but a series of phenomena, operated upon according to necessary laws,
+that regulate the bodies of which it is composed? In conformity to these
+laws, the sun occupies the centre; the planets gravitate towards it, and
+revolve round it, in regulated periods: the satellites of these planets
+gravitate towards those which are in the centre of their sphere of
+action, and describe round them their periodical route. One of these
+planets, the earth which man inhabits, turns on its own axis; and by the
+various aspects which its revolution obliges it to present to the sun,
+experiences those regular variations which are called SEASONS. By a
+sequence of the sun's action upon different parts of this globe, all its
+productions undergo vicissitudes: plants, animals, men, are in a sort of
+morbid drowsiness during _Winter_: in _Spring_, these beings re-animate,
+to come as it were out of a long lethargy. In short, the mode in
+which the earth receives the sun's beams, has an influence on all its
+productions; these rays, when darted obliquely, do not act in the same
+manner as when they fall perpendicularly; their periodical absence,
+caused by the revolution of this sphere on itself, produces _night_ and
+_day_. However, in all this, man never witnesses more than necessary
+effects, flowing from the nature of things, which, whilst that remains
+the same, can never be opposed with propriety. These effects are owing
+to gravitation, attraction, centrifugal power, &c.
+
+On the other hand, this _order_, which man admires as a supernatural
+effect, is sometimes disturbed, or changed into what he calls
+_confusion_: this confusion is, however, always a necessary consequence
+of the laws of Nature; in which it is requisite to the support of the
+whole that some of her parts should be deranged and thrown out of the
+ordinary course. It is thus, COMETS present themselves so unexpectedly
+to man's wondering eyes; their eccentric motion disturbs the
+tranquillity of his planetary system; they excite the terror of the
+misinstructed to whom every thing unusual is marvellous. The natural
+philosopher, himself, conjectures that in former ages, these comets
+have overthrown the surface of this mundane ball, and caused great
+revolutions on the earth. Independent of this extraordinary _confusion_,
+he is exposed to others more familiar to him: sometimes, the seasons
+appear to have usurped each other's place; to have quitted their regular
+order: sometimes the opposing elements seem to dispute among themselves
+the dominion of the world; the sea bursts its limits; the solid earth
+is shaken and rent asunder; mountains are in a state of conflagration;
+pestilential diseases destroy both men and animals; sterility desolates
+a country: then affrighted man utters piercing cries, offers up his
+prayers to recall order; tremblingly raises his hands towards the Being
+he supposes to be the author of all these calamities; nevertheless, the
+whole of this afflicting confusion are necessary effects, produced by
+natural causes; which act according to fixed laws, determined by their
+own peculiar essence, and the universal essence of Nature: in which
+every thing must necessarily be changed, moved, and dissolved; where
+that which is called ORDER, must sometimes be disturbed and altered into
+a new mode of existence; which to his deluded mind, to his imagination,
+led astray by ignorance and want of reflection, appears CONFUSION.
+
+There cannot possibly exist what is generally termed _a confusion of
+Nature_: man finds order in every thing that is conformable to his
+own mode of being; confusion in every thing by which it is opposed:
+nevertheless, in Nature, all is in order; because none of her parts are
+ever able to emancipate themselves from those invariable rules which
+flow from their respective essences: there _is_ not, there _cannot_
+be confusion in a whole, to the maintenance of which what is _called_
+confusion is absolutely requisite; of which the general course can never
+be discomposed, although individuals may be, and necessarily are; where
+all the effects produced are the consequence of natural causes, that
+under the circumstances in which they are placed, act only as they
+infallibly are obliged to act.
+
+It therefore follows, there can be neither monsters nor prodigies;
+wonders nor miracles in Nature: those which are designated MONSTERS, are
+certain combinations, with which the eyes of man are not familiarized;
+but which, therefore, are not less the necessary effects of natural
+causes. Those which he terms PRODIGIES, WONDERS, or SUPERNATURAL
+effects, are phenomena of Nature, with whose mode of action he is
+unacquainted; of which his ignorance does not permit him to ascertain
+the principles; whose causes he cannot trace; but which his impatience,
+his heated imagination, aided by a desire to explain, makes him
+foolishly attribute to imaginary causes; which, like the idea of order,
+have no existence but in himself; and which, that he may conceal his
+own ignorance, that he may obtain more respect with the uninformed,
+he places beyond Nature, out of which his experience is every instant
+demonstrably proving that none of these things can have existence.
+
+As for those effects which are called MIRACLES, that is to say, contrary
+to the unalterable laws of Nature, it must be felt such things are
+impossible; because, nothing can, for an instant, suspend the necessary
+course of beings, without the whole of Nature was arrested; without
+she was disturbed in her tendency. There have neither been wonders nor
+miracles in Nature; except for those, who have not sufficiently studied
+the laws, who consequently do not feel, that those laws can never be
+contradicted, even in the most minute parts, without the whole being
+destroyed, or at least without changing her essence, her mode of action;
+that it is the height of folly to recur to supernatural causes to
+explain the phenomena man beholds, before he becomes fully acquainted
+with natural causes--with the powers and capabilities which Nature
+herself contains.
+
+_Order_ and _Confusion_, then, are only relative terms, by which man
+designates the state in which particular beings find themselves. He
+says, a being is in order, when all the motion it undergoes conspires to
+favor its tendency to its own preservation; when it is conducive to the
+maintenance of its actual existence: that it is in confusion when the
+causes which move it disturb the harmony of its existence, or have a
+tendency to destroy the equilibrium necessary to the conservation of its
+actual state. Nevertheless, confusion, as we have shown, is nothing but
+the passage of a being into a new order; the more rapid the progress,
+the greater the confusion for the being that is submitted to it: that
+which conducts man to what is called death, is, for him, the greatest
+of all possible confusion. Yet this death is nothing more than a passage
+into a new mode of existence: it is the eternal, the invariable, the
+unconquerable law of Nature, to which the individuals of his order, each
+in his turn, is obliged to submit.
+
+The human body is said to be in order, when its various component parts
+act in that mode, from which results the conservation of the whole; from
+which emanates that which is the tendency of his actual existence;
+in other words, when all the impulse he receives, all the motion he
+communicates, tends to preserve his health, to render him happy, by
+promoting the happiness of his fellow men. He is said to be in health
+when the fluids and solids of his body concur to render him robust, to
+keep his mind in vigour; when each lends mutual aid towards this end. He
+is said to be in _confusion_, or in ill health, whenever this tendency
+is disturbed; when any of the essential parts of his body cease to
+concur to his preservation, or to fulfil its peculiar functions. This
+it is that happens in a state of sickness, in which, however, the motion
+excited in the human machine is as necessary, is regulated by laws as
+certain, as natural, as invariable, as that which concurs to produce
+health. Sickness merely produces in him a new order of motion, a new
+series of action, a new chain of things. Man dies: to him, this appears
+the greatest confusion he can experience; his body is no longer what it
+was--its parts no longer concur to the same end--his blood has lost
+its circulation--he is deprived of feeling--his ideas have vanished--he
+thinks no more--his desires have fled--death is the epoch, the cessation
+of his human existence.--His frame becomes an inanimate mass, by the
+subtraction of those principles by which it was animated; that is, which
+made it act after a determinate manner: its tendency has received a
+new direction; its action is changed; the motion excited in its ruins
+conspires to a new end. To that motion, the harmony of which he calls
+order, which produced life, sentiment, thought, passions, health,
+succeeds a series of motion of another species; that, nevertheless,
+follows laws as necessary as the first; all the parts of the dead
+man conspire to produce what is called dissolution, fermentation,
+putrefaction: these new modes of being, of acting, are just as natural
+to man, reduced to this state, as sensibility, thought, the periodical
+motion of the blood, &c. were to the living man: his essence having
+changed, his mode of action can no longer be the same. To that regulated
+motion, to that necessary action, which conspired to the production
+of life, succeeds that determinate motion, that series of action which
+concurs to produce the dissolution of the dead carcass; the dispersion
+of its parts; the formation of new combinations, from which result new
+beings; and which, as we have before seen, is the immutable order of
+active Nature.
+
+How then can it be too often repeated, that relatively to the great
+whole, all the motion of beings, all their modes of action, can never be
+but in order, that is to say, are always conformable to Nature; that in
+all the stages through which beings are obliged to pass, they invariably
+act after a mode necessarily subordinate to the universal whole? To say
+more, each individual being always acts in order; all its actions,
+the whole system of its motion, are the necessary consequence of its
+peculiar mode of existence; whether that be momentary or durable. Order,
+in political society, is the effect of a necessary series of ideas,
+of wills, of actions, in those who compose it; whose movements are
+regulated in a manner, either calculated to maintain its indivisibility,
+or to hasten its dissolution. Man constituted, or modified, in the
+manner we term virtuous, acts necessarily in that mode, from whence
+results the welfare of his associates: the man we stile wicked, acts
+necessarily in that mode, from whence springs the misery of his fellows:
+his Nature, being essentially different, he must necessarily act after
+a different mode: his individual order is at variance, but his relative
+order is complete: it is equally the essence of the one, to promote
+happiness, as it is of the other to induce misery.
+
+Thus, order and confusion in individual beings, is nothing more than
+the manner of man's considering the natural and necessary effects, which
+they produce relatively to himself. He fears the wicked man; he says
+that he will carry confusion into society, because he disturbs its
+tendency and places obstacles to its happiness. He avoids a falling
+stone, because it will derange in him the order necessary to his
+conservation. Nevertheless, order and confusion, are always, as we
+have shewn, consequences, equally necessary to either the transient or
+durable state of beings. It is in order that fire burns, because it
+is of its essence to burn; on the other hand, it is in order, that an
+intelligent being should remove himself from whatever can disturb his
+mode of existence. A being, whose organization renders him sensible,
+must in virtue of his essence, fly from every thing that can injure his
+organs, or that can place his existence in danger.
+
+Man calls those beings _intelligent_, who are organized after his
+own manner; in whom he sees faculties proper for their preservation;
+suitable to maintain their existence in the order that is convenient to
+them; that can enable them to take the necessary measures towards this
+end, with a consciousness of the motion they undergo. From hence, it
+will be perceived, that the faculty called intelligence, consists in a
+possessing capacity to act comformably to a known end, in the being
+to which it is attributed. He looks upon these beings as deprived of
+intelligence, in which he finds no conformity with himself; in whom
+he discovers neither the same construction, nor the same faculties:
+of which he knows neither the essence, the end to which they tend, the
+energies by which they act, nor the order that is necessary to them. The
+whole cannot have a distinct name, or end, because there is nothing out
+of itself, to which it can have a tendency. If it be in himself, that
+he arranges the idea of _order_, it is also in himself, that he draws up
+that of _intelligence_. He refuses to ascribe it to those beings, who
+do not act after his own manner: he accords it to all those whom he
+supposes to act like himself: the latter he calls intelligent agents:
+the former blind causes; that is to say, intelligent agents who act
+by _chance_: thus chance is an empty word without sense, but which
+is always opposed to that of intelligence, without attaching any
+determinate, or any certain idea.
+
+Man, in fact, attributes to _chance_ all those effects, of which the
+connection they have with their causes is not seen. Thus he uses the
+word _chance_, to cover his ignorance of those natural causes, which
+produce visible effects, by means which he cannot form an idea of; or
+that act by a mode of which he does not perceive the order; or whose
+system is not followed by actions conformable to his own. As soon as he
+sees, or believes he sees, the order of action, or the manner of motion,
+he attributes this order to an _intelligence_; which is nothing more
+than a quality borrowed from himself--from his own peculiar mode of
+action--from the manner in which he is himself affected.
+
+Thus an _intelligent being_ is one who thinks, who wills, and who acts,
+to compass an end. If so, he must have organs, an aim conformable to
+those of man: therefore, to say Nature is governed by an intelligence,
+is to affirm that she is governed by a being, furnished with organs;
+seeing that without this organic construction, he can neither have
+sensations, perceptions, ideas, thought, will, plan, nor action which he
+understands.
+
+Man always makes himself the center of the universe: it is to himself
+that he relates all he beholds. As soon as he believes he discovers a
+mode of action that has a conformity with his own, or some phenomenon
+that interests his feelings, he attributes it to a cause that resembles
+himself--that acts after his manner--that has faculties similar to those
+he possesses--whose interests are like his own--whose projects are in
+unison with and have the same tendency as those he himself indulges: in
+short, it is from himself, or the properties which actuate him, that he
+forms the model of this cause. It is thus that man beholds, out of his
+own species, nothing but beings who act differently from himself;
+yet believes that he remarks in Nature an order similar to his own
+ideas--views conformable to those which he himself possesses. He
+imagines that Nature is governed by a cause whose intelligence is
+conformable to his own, to whom he ascribes the honor of the order which
+he believes he witnesses--of those views that fall in with those that
+are peculiar to himself--of an aim which quadrates with that which is
+the great end of all his own actions. It is true that man, feeling his
+incapability of producing the vast, the multiplied effects of which he
+witnesses the operation, when contemplating the universe, was under the
+necessity of making a distinction between himself and the cause which
+he supposed to be the author of such stupendous effects; he believed
+he removed every difficulty, by amplifying in this cause all those
+faculties of which he was himself in possession; adding others of which
+his own self-love made him desirous, or which he thought would render
+his being more perfect: thus, he gave JUPITER wings, with the faculty of
+assuming any form he might deem convenient: it was thus, by degrees,
+he arrived at forming an idea of that intelligent cause, which he has
+placed above Nature, to preside over action--to give her that motion
+of which he has chosen to believe she was in herself incapable. He
+obstinately persists in regarding this Nature as a heap of dead, inert
+matter, without form, which has not within itself the power of producing
+any of those great effects, those regular phenomena, from which emanates
+what he styles _the order of the Universe_. ANAXAGORAS is said to have
+been the first who supposed the universe created and governed by an
+intelligence: ARISTOTLE reproaches him with having made an automaton
+of this intelligence; or in other words, with ascribing to it the
+production of things, only when he was at a loss to account for their
+appearance. From whence it may be deduced, that it is for want of being
+acquainted with the powers of Nature, or the properties of matter, that
+man has multiplied beings without necessity--that he has supposed the
+universe under the government of an intelligent cause, which he is, and
+perhaps always will be, himself the model: in fine, this cause has been
+personified under such a variety of shapes, sexes, and names, that
+a list of the deities he has at various times supposed to guide this
+Nature, or to whom he has submitted her, makes a large volume that
+occupies some years of his youthful education to understand. He only
+rendered this cause more inconceivable, when he extended in it his own
+faculties too much. He either annihilates, or renders it altogether
+impossible, when he would attach to it incompatible qualities, which
+he is obliged to do, to enable him to account for the contradictory and
+disorderly effects he beholds in the world. In fact, he sees confusion
+in the world; yet, notwithstanding his confusion contradicts the
+plan, the power, the wisdom, the bounty of this intelligence, and the
+miraculous order which he ascribes to it; he says, the extreme beautiful
+arrangement of the whole, obliges him to suppose it to be the work of
+a sovereign intelligence: unable, however, to reconcile this seeming
+confusion with the benevolence he attaches to this cause, he had
+recourse to another effort of his imagination; he made a new cause,
+to whom he ascribed all the evil, all the misery, resulting from this
+confusion: still, his own person served for the model; to which he
+added those deformities which he had learned to hold in disrespect: in
+multiplying these counter or destroying causes, he peopled Pandemonium.
+
+It will no doubt be argued, that as Nature contains and produces
+intelligent beings, either she must be herself intelligent, or else she
+must be governed by an intelligent cause. We reply, intelligence is
+a faculty peculiar to organized beings, that it is to say, to beings
+constituted and combined after a determinate manner; from whence results
+certain modes of action, which are designated under various names;
+according to the different effects which these beings produce: wine
+has not the properties called _wit_ and _courage_; nevertheless, it
+is sometimes seen that it communicates those qualities to men, who are
+supposed to be in themselves entirely devoid of them. It cannot be
+said Nature is intelligent after the manner of any of the beings she
+contains; but she can produce intelligent beings by assembling matter
+suitable to their particular organization, from whose peculiar modes of
+action will result the faculty called intelligence; who shall be capable
+of producing certain effects which are the necessary consequence of this
+property. I therefore repeat, that to have intelligence, designs and
+views, it is requisite to have ideas; to the production of ideas, organs
+or senses are necessary: this is what is neither said of Nature nor
+of the causes he has supposed to preside over her actions. In short
+experience warrants the assertion, it does more, it proves beyond
+a doubt, that matter, which is regarded as inert and dead, assumes
+sensible action, intelligence, and life, when it is combined and
+organized after particular modes.
+
+From what has been said, it must rationally be concluded that _order_ is
+never more than the necessary or uniform connection of causes with
+their effects; or that series of action which flows from the peculiar
+properties of beings, so long as they remain in a given state; that
+_confusion_ is nothing more than the change of this state; that in the
+universe, all is necessarily in order, because every thing acts and
+moves according to the various properties of the different beings it
+contains; that in Nature there cannot be either confusion or real evil,
+since every thing follows the laws of its natural existence; that there
+is neither _chance_ nor any thing fortuitous in this Nature, where no
+effect is produced without a sufficient, without a substantial cause;
+where all causes act necessarily according to fixed and certain laws,
+which are themselves dependant on the essential properties of these
+causes or beings, as well as on the combination, which constitutes
+either their transitory or permanent state; that intelligence is a mode
+of acting, a method of existence natural to some particular beings; that
+if this intelligence should be attributed to Nature, it would then be
+nothing more than the faculty of conserving herself in active existence
+by necessary means. In refusing to Nature the intelligence he himself
+enjoys--in rejecting the intelligent cause which is supposed to be the
+contriver of this Nature, or the principle of that _order_ he discovers
+in her course, nothing is given to _chance_, nothing to a blind cause,
+nothing to a power which is indistinguishable; but every thing he
+beholds is attributed to real, to known causes; or to those which by
+analogy are easy of comprehension. All that exists is acknowledged to
+be a consequence of the inherent properties of eternal matter, which by
+contact, by blending, by combination, by change of form, produces order
+and confusion; with all those varieties which assail his sight, it
+is himself who is blind, when he imagines blind causes:--man only
+manifested his ignorance of the powers of motion, of the laws of Nature,
+when he attributed, any of its effects to _chance_. He did not shew a
+more enlightened feeling when he ascribed them to an intelligence, the
+idea of which he borrowed from himself, but which is never in conformity
+with the effects which he attributes to its intervention--he only
+imagined words to supply the place of things--he made JUPITER, SATURN,
+JUNO, and a thousand others, operate that which he found himself
+inadequate to perform; he distinguished them from Nature, gave them an
+amplification of his own properties, and believed he understood them by
+thus obscuring ideas, which he never dared either define or analyze.
+
+
+
+
+
+CHAP. VI.
+
+_Moral and Physical Distinctions of Man.--His Origin._
+
+
+Let us now apply the general laws we have scrutinized, to those beings
+of Nature who interest us the most. Let us see in what man differs from
+the other beings by which he is surrounded. Let us examine if he has not
+certain points in conformity with them, that oblige him, notwithstanding
+the different properties they respectively possess, to act in certain
+respects according to the universal laws to which every thing is
+submitted. Finally, let us enquire if the ideas he has formed of himself
+in meditating on his own peculiar mode of existence, be chimerical, or
+founded in reason.
+
+Man occupies a place amidst that crowd, that multitude of beings,
+of which Nature is the assemblage. His essence, that is to say, the
+peculiar manner of existence, by which he is distinguished from other
+beings, renders him susceptible of various modes of action, of a variety
+of motion, some of which are simple and visible, others concealed and
+complicated. His life itself is nothing more than a long series, a
+succession of necessary and connected motion; which operates perpetual
+changes in his machine; which has for its principle either causes
+contained within himself, such as blood, nerves, fibres, flesh, bones;
+in short, the matter, as well solid as fluid, of which his body is
+composed--or those exterior causes, which, by acting upon him, modify
+him diversely; such as the air with which he is encompassed, the
+aliments by which he is nourished, and all those objects from which
+he receives any impulse whatever, by the impression they make on his
+senses.
+
+Man, like all other beings in Nature, tends to his own destruction--he
+experiences inert force--he gravitates upon himself--he is attracted by
+objects that are contrary or repugnant to his existence--he seeks after
+some--he flies, or endeavours to remove himself from others. It is this
+variety of action, this diversity of modification of which the human
+being is susceptible, that has been designated under such different
+names, by such varied nomenclature. It will be necessary, presently, to
+examine these closely and go more into detail.
+
+However marvellous, however hidden, however secret, however complicated
+may be the modes of action, which the human frame undergoes, whether
+interiorly or exteriorly; whatever may be, or appear to be the impulse
+he either receives or communicates, examined closely, it will be found
+that all his motion, all his operations, all his changes, all his
+various states, all his revolutions, are constantly regulated by the
+same laws, which Nature has prescribed to all the beings she brings
+forth--which she developes--which she enriches with faculties--of which
+she increases the bulk--which she conserves for a season--which she ends
+by decomposing, by destroying: obliging them to change their form.
+
+Man, in his origin, is an imperceptible point, a speck, of which the
+parts are without form; of which the mobility, the life, escapes his
+senses; in short, in which he does not perceive any sign of those
+qualities, called SENTIMENT, FEELING, THOUGHT, INTELLIGENCE, FORCE,
+REASON, &c. Placed in the womb suitable to his expansion, this point
+unfolds, extends, increases, by the continual addition of matter he
+attracts, that is analogous to his being, which consequently assimilates
+itself with him. Having quitted this womb, so appropriate to conserve
+his existence, to unfold his qualities, to strengthen his habits; so
+competent to give, for a season, consistence to the weak rudiments of
+his frame; he travels through the stage of infancy; he becomes adult:
+his body has then acquired a considerable extension of bulk, his motion
+is marked, his action is visible, he is sensible in all his parts; he is
+a living, an active mass; that is to say, a combination that feels and
+thinks; that fulfils the functions peculiar to beings of his species.
+But how has he become sensible? Because he has been by degrees
+nourished, enlarged, repaired by the continual attraction that takes
+place within himself, of that kind of matter which is pronounced inert,
+insensible, inanimate; which is, nevertheless, continually combining
+itself with his machine; of which it forms an active whole, that is
+living, that feels, judges, reasons, wills, deliberates, chooses,
+elects; that has the capability of labouring, more or less
+efficaciously, to his own individual preservation; that is to say, to
+the maintenance of the harmony of his existence.
+
+All the motion and changes that man experiences in the course of his
+life, whether it be from exterior objects or from those substances
+contained within himself, are either favorable or prejudicial to his
+existence; either maintain its order, or throw it into confusion; are
+either in conformity with, or repugnant to, the essential tendency of
+his peculiar mode of being. He is compelled by Nature to approve of
+some, to disapprove of others; some of necessity render him happy,
+others contribute to his misery; some become the objects of his most
+ardent desire, others of his determined aversion: some elicit his
+confidence, others make him tremble with fear.
+
+In all the phenomena man presents, from the moment he quits the womb
+of his mother, to that wherein he becomes the inhabitant of the silent
+tomb, he perceives nothing but a succession of necessary causes and
+effects, which are strictly conformable to those laws that are common
+to all the beings in Nature. All his modes of action--all his
+sensations--all his ideas--all his passions--every act of his
+will--every impulse which he either gives or receives, are the necessary
+consequences of his own peculiar properties, and those which he finds in
+the various beings by whom he is moved. Every thing he does--every thing
+that passes within himself--his concealed motion--his visible action,
+are the effects of inert force--of self-gravitation--the attractive or
+repulsive powers contained in his machine--of the tendency he has, in
+common with other beings, to his own individual preservation; in short,
+of that energy which is the common property of every being he beholds.
+Nature, in man, does nothing more than shew, in a decided manner, what
+belongs to the peculiar nature by which he is distinguished from the
+beings of a different system or order.
+
+The source of those errors into which man has fallen, when he has
+contemplated himself, has its rise, as will presently be shown, in the
+opinion he has entertained, that he moved by himself--that he always
+acts by his own natural energy--that in his actions, in the will that
+gave him impulse, he was independent of the general laws of Nature; and
+of those objects which, frequently, without his knowledge, always in
+spite of him, in obedience to these laws, are continually acting upon
+him. If he had examined himself attentively, he must have acknowledged,
+that none of the motion he underwent was spontaneous--he must have
+discovered, that even his birth depended on causes, wholly out of the
+reach of his own powers--that, it was without his own consent he entered
+into the system in which he occupies a place--that, from the moment
+in which he is born, until that in which he dies, he is continually
+impelled by causes, which, in spite of himself, influence his frame,
+modify his existence, dispose of his conduct. Would not the slightest
+reflection have sufficed to prove to him, that the fluids, the solids,
+of which his body is composed, as well as that concealed mechanism,
+which he believes to be independent of exterior causes, are, in fact,
+perpetually under the influence of these causes; that without them he
+finds himself in a total incapacity to act? Would he not have seen,
+that his temperament, his constitution, did in no wise depend on
+himself--that his passions are the necessary consequence of this
+temperament--that his will is influenced, his actions determined by
+these passions; consequently by opinions, which he has not given to
+himself, of which he is not the master? His blood, more or less heated
+or abundant; his nerves more or less braced, his fibres more or less
+relaxed, give him dispositions either transitory or durable--are not
+these, at every moment decisive of his ideas; of his thoughts: of his
+desires: of his fears: of his motion, whether visible or concealed? The
+state in which he finds himself, does it not necessarily depend on the
+air which surrounds him diversely modified; on the various properties
+of the aliments which nourish him; on the secret combinations that form
+themselves in his machine, which either preserve its order, or throw it
+into confusion? In short, had man fairly studied himself, every thing
+must have convinced him, that in every moment of his duration, he was
+nothing more than a passive instrument in the hands of necessity.
+
+Thus it must appear, that where all is connected, where all the causes
+are linked one to the other, where the whole forms but one immense
+chain, there cannot be any independent, any isolated energy; any
+detached power. It follows then, that Nature, always in action, marks
+out to man each point of the line he is bound to describe; establishes
+the route, by which he must travel. It is Nature that elaborates, that
+combines the elements of which he must be composed;--It is Nature that
+gives him his being, his tendency, his peculiar mode of action. It is
+Nature that develops him, expands him, strengthens him, increases his
+bulk--preserves him for a season, during which he is obliged to fulfil
+the task imposed on him. It is Nature, that in his journey through life,
+strews on the road those objects, those events; those adventures,
+that modify him in a variety of ways, that give him impulses which
+are sometimes agreeable and beneficial, at others prejudicial and
+disagreeable. It is Nature, that in giving him feeling, in supplying him
+with sentiment, has endowed him with capacity to choose, the means to
+elect those objects, to take those methods that are most conducive, most
+suitable, most natural, to his conservation. It is Nature, who when he
+has run his race, when he has finished his career, when he has
+described the circle marked out for him, conducts him in his turn to
+his destruction; dissolves the union of his elementary particles,
+and obliges him to undergo the constant, the universal law; from the
+operation of which nothing is exempted. It is thus, motion places man in
+the matrix of his mother; brings him forth out of her womb; sustains
+him for a season; at length destroys him; obliges him to return into
+the bosom of Nature; who speedily reproduces him, scattered under an
+infinity of forms; in which each of his particles run over again, in the
+same manner, the different stages, as necessary as the whole had before
+run over those of his preceding existence.
+
+The beings of the human species, as well as all other beings, are
+susceptible of two sorts of motion: the one, that of the mass, by which
+an entire body, or some of its parts, are visibly transferred from one
+place to another; the other, internal and concealed, of some of which
+man is sensible, while some takes place without his knowledge, and is
+not even to be guessed at, but by the effect it outwardly produces. In a
+machine so extremely complex as man, formed by the combination of such
+a multiplicity of matter, so diversified in its properties, so different
+in its proportions, so varied in its modes of action, the motion
+necessarily becomes of the most complicated kind; its dullness, as well
+as its rapidity, frequently escapes the observation of those themselves,
+in whom it takes place.
+
+Let us not, then, be surprised, if, when man would account to himself
+for his existence, for his manner of acting, finding so many obstacles
+to encounter, he invented such strange hypotheses to explain the
+concealed spring of his machine--if then this motion appeared to him,
+to be different from that of other bodies, he conceived an idea, that he
+moved and acted in a manner altogether distinct from the other beings in
+Nature. He clearly perceived that his body, as well as different parts
+of it, did act; but, frequently, he was unable to discover what
+brought them into action: from whence he received the impulse: he then
+conjectured he contained within himself a moving principle distinguished
+from his machine, which secretly gave an impulse to the springs which
+set this machine in motion; that moved him by its own natural energy;
+that consequently he acted according to laws totally distinct from those
+which regulated the motion of other beings: he was conscious of certain
+internal motion, which he could not help feeling; but how could he
+conceive, that this invisible motion was so frequently competent to
+produce such striking effects? How could he comprehend, that a fugitive
+idea, an imperceptible act of thought, was so frequently capacitated
+to bring his whole being into trouble and confusion? He fell into the
+belief, that he perceived within himself a substance distinguished from
+that self, endowed with a secret force; in which he supposed existed
+qualities distinctly differing from those, of either the visible
+causes that acted on his organs, or those organs themselves. He did not
+sufficiently understand, that the primitive cause which makes a stone
+fall, or his arm move, are perhaps as difficult of comprehension,
+as arduous to be explained, as those internal impulses, of which his
+thought or his will are the effects. Thus, for want of meditating
+Nature--of considering her under her true point of view--of remarking
+the conformity--of noticing the simultaneity, the unity of the motion
+of this fancied motive-power with that of his body--of his material
+organs--he conjectured he was not only a distinct being, but that he was
+set apart, with different energies, from all the other beings in Nature;
+that he was of a more simple essence having nothing in common with any
+thing by which he was surrounded; nothing that connected him with all
+that he beheld.
+
+It is from thence has successively sprung his notions of SPIRITUALITY,
+IMMATERIALITY, IMMORTALITY; in short, all those vague unmeaning words
+he has invented by degrees, in order to subtilize and designate the
+attributes of the unknown power, which he believes he contains within
+himself; which he conjectures to be the concealed principle of all his
+visible actions when man once imbibes an idea that he cannot comprehend,
+he meditates upon it until he has given it a complete personification:
+Thus he saw, or fancied he saw, the igneous matter pervade every thing;
+he conjectured that it was the only principle of life and activity; he
+proceeded to embody it; he gave it his own form; called it JUPITER, and
+ended by worshipping this image of his own creation, as the power from
+whom he derived every good he experienced, every evil he sustained.
+To crown the bold conjectures he ventured to make on this internal
+motive-power, he supposed, that different from all other beings, even
+from the body that served to envelope it, it was not bound to undergo
+dissolution; that such was its perfect simplicity, that it could not
+be decomposed, nor even change its form; in short, that it was by
+its essence exempted from those revolutions to which he saw the body
+subjected, as well as all the compound beings with which Nature is
+filled.
+
+Thus man, in his own ideas, became double; he looked upon himself as a
+whole, composed by the inconceivable assemblage of two different, two
+distinct natures, which have no point of analogy between themselves: he
+distinguished two substances in himself; one evidently submitted to
+the influence of gross beings, composed of coarse inert matter: this
+he called BODY;--the other, which he supposed to be simple, of a purer
+essence, was contemplated as acting from itself: giving motion to the
+body, with which it found itself so miraculously united: this he called
+SOUL, or SPIRIT; the functions of the one, he denominated _physical,
+corporeal, material_; the functions of the other he styled _spiritual,
+intellectual._ Man, considered relatively to the first, was termed the
+PHYSICAL MAN; viewed with relation to the last, he was designated the
+MORAL MAN. These distinctions, although adopted by the greater number of
+the philosophers of the present day, are, nevertheless, only founded
+on gratuitous suppositions. Man has always believed he remedied his
+ignorance of things, by inventing words to which he could never attach
+any true sense or meaning. He imagined he understood matter, its
+properties, its faculties, its resources, its different combinations,
+because he had a superficial glimpse of some of its qualities: he has,
+however, in reality, done nothing more than obscure the faint ideas he
+has been capacitated to form of this matter, by associating it with a
+substance much less intelligible than itself. It is thus, speculative
+man, in forming words, in multiplying beings, has only plunged himself
+into greater difficulties than those he endeavoured to avoid; and
+thereby placed obstacles to the progress of his knowledge: whenever he
+has been deficient of facts, he has had recourse to conjecture, which he
+quickly changed into fancied realities. Thus, his imagination, no longer
+guided by experience, hurried on by his new ideas, was lost, without
+hope of return, in the labyrinth of an ideal, of an intellectual world,
+to which he had himself given birth; it was next to impossible to
+withdraw him from this delusion, to place him in the right road, of
+which nothing but experience can furnish him the clue. Nature points out
+to man, that in himself, as well as in all those objects which act upon
+him, there is never more than matter endowed with various properties,
+diversely modified, that acts by reason of these properties: that man is
+an organized whole, composed of a variety of matter; that like all the
+other productions of Nature, he follows general and known laws, as
+well as those laws or modes of action which are peculiar to himself and
+unknown.
+
+Thus, when it shall be inquired, what is man?
+
+We say, he is a material being, organized after a peculiar manner;
+conformed to a certain mode of thinking--of feeling; capable
+of modification in certain modes peculiar to himself--to his
+organization--to that particular combination of matter which is found
+assembled in him.
+
+If, again, it be asked, what origin we give to beings of the human
+species?
+
+We reply, that, like all other beings, man is a production of Nature,
+who resembles them in some respects, and finds himself submitted to
+the same laws; who differs from them in other respects, and follows
+particular laws, determined by the diversity of his conformation.
+
+If, then, it be demanded, whence came man?
+
+We answer, our experience on this head does not capacitate us to resolve
+the question: but that it cannot interest us, as it suffices for us to
+know that man exists; that he is so constituted, as to be competent to
+the effects we witness.
+
+But it will be urged, has man always existed? Has the human species
+existed from all eternity; or is it only an instantaneous production of
+Nature? Have there been always men like ourselves? Will there always
+be such? Have there been, in all times, males and females? Was there a
+first man, from whom all others are descended? Was the animal anterior
+to the egg, or did the egg precede the animal? Is this species without
+beginning? Will it also be without end? The species itself, is it
+indestructible, or does it pass away like its individuals? Has man
+always been what he now is; or has he, before he arrived at the state in
+which we see him, been obliged to pass under an infinity of successive
+developements? Can man at last flatter himself with having arrived at
+a fixed being, or must the human species again change? If man is the
+production of Nature, it will perhaps be asked, Is this Nature competent
+to the production of new beings, to make the old species disappear?
+Adopting this supposition, it may be inquired, why Nature does not
+produce under our own eyes new beings--new species?
+
+It would appear on reviewing these questions, to be perfectly
+indifferent, as to the stability of the argument we have used, which
+side was taken; that, for want of experience, hypothesis must settle a
+curiosity that always endeavours to spring forward beyond the boundaries
+prescribed to our mind. This granted, the contemplator of Nature will
+say, that he sees no contradiction, in supposing the human species, such
+as it is at the present day, was either produced in the course of time,
+or from all eternity: he will not perceive any advantage that can arise
+from supposing that it has arrived by different stages, or successive
+developements, to that state in which it is actually found. Matter is
+eternal, it is necessary, but its forms are evanescent and contingent.
+It may be asked of man, is he any thing more than matter combined, of
+which the former varies every instant?
+
+Notwithstanding, some reflections seem to favor the supposition, to
+render more probable the hypothesis, that man is a production formed in
+the course of time; who is peculiar to the globe he inhabits, who is the
+result of the peculiar laws by which it is directed; who, consequently,
+can only date his formation as coeval with that of his planet. Existence
+is essential to the universe, or the total assemblage of matter
+essentially varied that presents itself to our contemplation; the
+combinations, the forms, however, are not essential. This granted,
+although the matter of which the earth is composed has always existed,
+this earth may not always have had its present form--its actual
+properties; perhaps it may be a mass detached in the course of time from
+some other celestial body;--perhaps it is the result of the spots, or
+those encrustations which astronomers discover in the sun's disk,
+which have had the faculty to diffuse themselves over our planetary
+system;--perhaps the sphere we inhabit may be an extinguished or a
+displaced comet, which heretofore occupied some other place in the
+regions of space;--which, consequently, was then competent to produce
+beings very different from those we now behold spread over its surface;
+seeing that its then position, its nature, must have rendered its
+productions different from those which at this day it offers to our
+view.
+
+Whatever may be the supposition adopted, plants, animals, men, can only
+be regarded as productions inherent in and natural to our globe, in the
+position and in the circumstances in which it is actually found: these
+productions it would be reasonable to infer would be changed, if this
+globe by any revolution should happen to shift its situation. What
+appears to strengthen this hypothesis, is, that on our ball itself, all
+the productions vary, by reason of its different climates: men, animals,
+vegetables, minerals, are not the same on every part of it: they vary
+sometimes in a very sensible manner, at very inconsiderable distances.
+The elephant is indigenous to, or native of the torrid zone: the rein
+deer is peculiar to the frozen climates of the North; Indostan is the
+womb that matures the diamond; we do not find it produced in our own
+country: the pine-apple grows in the common atmosphere of America; in
+our climate it is never produced in the open ground, never until art has
+furnished a sun analogous to that which it requires--the European in his
+own climate finds not this delicious fruit. Man in different climates
+varies in his colour, in his size, in his conformation, in his powers,
+in his industry, in his courage, and in the faculties of his mind. But,
+what is it that constitutes climate? It is the different position of
+parts of the same globe, relatively to the sun; positions that suffice
+to make a sensible variety in its productions.
+
+There is, then, sufficient foundation to conjecture that if by any
+accident our globe should become displaced, all its productions would of
+necessity be changed; seeing that causes being no longer the same, or
+no longer acting after the same manner, the effects would necessarily no
+longer be what they now are, all productions, that they may be able to
+conserve themselves, or maintain their actual existence, have occasion
+to co-order themselves with the whole from which they have emanated.
+Without this they would no longer be in a capacity to subsist: it is
+this faculty of co-ordering themselves,--this relative adaption, which
+is called the ORDER OF THE UNIVERSE: the want of it is called CONFUSION.
+Those productions which are treated as MONSTROUS, are such as are unable
+to co-order themselves with the general or particular laws of the beings
+who surround them, or with the whole in which they find themselves
+placed: they have had the faculty in their formation to accommodate
+themselves to these laws; but these very laws are opposed to their
+perfection: for this reason they are unable to subsist. It is thus that
+by a certain analogy of conformation, which exists between animals of
+different species, mules are easily produced; but these mules, unable to
+co-order themselves with the beings that surround them, are not able to
+reach perfection, consequently cannot propagate their species. Man can
+live only in air, fish only in water: put the man into the water, the
+fish into the air, not being able to co-order themselves with the fluids
+which surround them, these animals will quickly be destroyed. Transport
+by imagination, a man from our planet into SATURN, his lungs will
+presently be rent by an atmosphere too rarified for his mode of being,
+his members will be frozen with the intensity of the cold; he will
+perish for want of finding elements analogous to his actual existence:
+transport another into MERCURY, the excess of heat, beyond what his mode
+of existence can bear, will quickly destroy him.
+
+Thus, every thing seems to authorise the conjecture, that the human
+species is a production peculiar to our sphere, in the position in which
+it is found: that when this position may happen to change, the human
+species will, of consequence, either be changed or will be obliged to
+disappear; seeing that there would not then be that with which man could
+co-order himself with the whole, or connect himself with that which can
+enable him to subsist. It is this aptitude in man to co-order himself
+with the whole, that not only furnishes him with the idea of order, but
+also makes him exclaim "_whatever is, is right_;" whilst every thing is
+only that which it can be, as long as the whole is necessarily what it
+is; whilst it is positively neither good nor bad, as we understand those
+terms: it is only requisite to displace a man, to make him accuse the
+universe of confusion.
+
+These reflections would appear to contradict the ideas of those, who
+are willing to conjecture that the other planets, like our own, are
+inhabited by beings resembling ourselves. But if the LAPLANDER differs
+in so marked a manner from the HOTTENTOT, what difference ought we not
+rationally to suppose between an inhabitant of our planet and one of
+SATURN or of VENUS?
+
+However it may be, if we are obliged to recur by imagination to the
+origin of things, to the infancy of the human species, we may say that
+it is probable that man was a necessary consequence of the disentangling
+of our globe; or one of the results of the qualities, of the
+properties, of the energies, of which it is susceptible in its present
+position--that he was born male and female--that his existence is
+co-ordinate with that of the globe, under its present position--that as
+long as this co-ordination shall subsist, the human specie will conserve
+himself, will propagate himself, according to the impulse, after
+the primitive laws, which he has originally received--that if this
+co-ordination should happen to cease; if the earth, displaced, should
+cease to receive the same impulse, the same influence, on the part of
+those causes which actually act upon it, or which give it energy; that
+then the human species would change, to make place for new beings,
+suitable to co-order themselves with the state that should succeed to
+that which we now see subsist.
+
+In thus supposing the changes in the position of our globe, the
+primitive man did, perhaps, differ more from the actual man, than the
+quadruped differs from the insect. Thus man, the same as every thing
+else that exists on our planet, as well as in all the others, may be
+regarded as in a state of continual vicissitude: thus the last term of
+the existence of man is to us as unknown and as indistinct as the first:
+there is, therefore, no contradiction in the belief that the species
+vary incessantly--that to us it is as impossible to know what he will
+become, as to know what he has been.
+
+With respect to those who may ask why Nature does not produce new
+beings? we may enquire of them in turn, upon what foundation they
+suppose this fact? What it is that authorizes them to believe this
+sterility in Nature? Know they if, in the various combinations which
+she is every instant forming, Nature be not occupied in producing new
+beings, without the cognizance of these observers? Who has informed them
+that this Nature is not actually assembling, in her immense elaboratory,
+the elements suitable to bring to light, generations entirely new,
+that will have nothing in common with those of the species at present
+existing? What absurdity then, or what want of just inference would
+there be, to imagine that the man, the horse, the fish, the bird, will
+be no more? Are these animals so indispensably requisite to Nature, that
+without them she cannot continue her eternal course? Does not all change
+around us? Do we not ourselves change? Is it not evident that the whole
+universe has not been, in its anterior eternal duration, rigorously the
+same that it now is? that it is impossible, in its posterior eternal
+duration, it can be rigidly in the same state that it now is for a
+single instant? How, then, pretend to divine that, to which the
+infinite succession of destruction, of reproduction, of combination, of
+dissolution, of metamorphosis, of change, of transposition, may be able
+eventually to conduct it by their consequence? Suns encrust themselves,
+and are extinguished; planets perish and disperse themselves in the vast
+plains of air; other suns are kindled, and illumine their systems; new
+planets form themselves, either to make revolutions round these suns,
+or to describe new routes; and man, an infinitely small portion of the
+globe, which is itself but an imperceptible point in the immensity
+of space, vainly believes it is for himself this universe is made;
+foolishly imagines he ought to be the confident of Nature; confidently
+flatters himself he is eternal: and calls himself KING OF THE
+UNIVERSE!!!
+
+O man! wilt thou never conceive, that thou art but an ephemeron? All
+changes in the great macrocosm: nothing remains the same an instant, in
+the planet thou inhabitest: Nature contains no one constant form, yet
+thou pretendest thy species can never disappear; that thou shalt be
+exempted from the universal law, that wills all shall experience
+change! Alas! In thy actual being, art not thou submitted to continual
+alterations? Thou, who in thy folly, arrogantly assumest to thyself the
+title of KING OF NATURE! Thou, who measurest the earth and the heavens!
+Thou, who in thy vanity imaginest, that the whole was made, because thou
+art intelligent! There requires but a very slight accident, a single
+atom to be displaced, to make thee perish; to degrade thee; to ravish
+from thee this intelligence of which thou appearest so proud.
+
+If all the preceding conjectures be refused by those opposed to us; if
+it be pretended that Nature acts by a certain quantum of immutable and
+general laws; if it be believed that men, quadrupeds, fish, insects,
+plants, are from all eternity, and will remain eternally, what they now
+are: if I say it be contended, that from all eternity the stars have
+shone, in the immense regions of space, have illuminated the firmament;
+if it be insisted, we must no more demand why man is such as he appears,
+then ask why Nature is such as we behold her, or why the world exists?
+We are no longer opposed to such arguments. Whatever may be the system
+adopted, it will perhaps reply equally well to the difficulties with
+which our opponents endeavour to embarrass the way: examined closely, it
+will be perceived they make nothing against those truths, which we have
+gathered from experience. It is not given to man to know every thing--it
+is not given him to know his origin--it is not given him to penetrate
+into the essence of things, nor to recur to first principles--but it is
+given him, to have reason, to have honesty, to ingenuously allow he
+is ignorant of that which he cannot know, and not to substitute
+unintelligible words, absurd suppositions, for his uncertainty. Thus, we
+say to those, who to solve difficulties far above their reach, pretend
+that the human species descended from a first man and a first woman,
+created diversely according to different creeds;--that we have some
+ideas of Nature, but that we have none of creation;--that the human mind
+is incapable of comprehending the period when all was nothing;--that to
+use words we cannot understand, is only in other terms to acknowledge
+our ignorance of the powers of Nature;--that we are unable to fathom
+the means by which she has been capacitated to produce the phenomena we
+behold.
+
+Let us then conclude, that man has no just, no solid reason to believe
+himself a privileged being in Nature; because he is subject to the same
+vicissitudes, as all her other productions. His pretended prerogatives
+have their foundation in error, arising from mistaken opinions
+concerning his existence. Let him but elevate himself by his thoughts
+above the globe he inhabits, he will look upon his own species with
+the same eyes he does all other beings in Nature: He will then clearly
+perceive that in the same manner that each tree produces its fruit, by
+reason of its energies, in consequence of its species: so each man acts
+by reason of his particular energy; that he produces fruit, actions,
+works, equally necessary: he will feel that the illusion which he
+anticipates in favour of himself, arises from his being, at one and the
+same time, a spectator and a part of the universe. He will acknowledge,
+that the idea of excellence which he attaches to his being, has no other
+foundation than his own peculiar interest; than the predilection he
+has in favour of himself--that the doctrine he has broached with such
+seeming confidence, bottoms itself on a very suspicious foundation,
+namely IGNORANCE and SELF-LOVE.
+
+
+
+
+
+CHAP. VII.
+
+_The Soul and the Spiritual System_.
+
+
+Man, after having gratuitously supposed himself composed of two distinct
+independent substances, that have no common properties, relatively with
+each other; has pretended, as we have seen, that that which actuated him
+interiorly, that motion which is invisible, that impulse which is
+placed within himself, is essentially different from those which act
+exteriorly. The first he designated, as we have already said, by the
+name of a SPIRIT or a SOUL. If however it be asked, what is a spirit?
+The moderns will reply, that the whole fruit of their metaphysical
+researches is limited to learning that this motive-power, which they
+state to be the spring of man's action, is a substance of an unknown
+nature; so simple, so indivisible, so deprived of extent, so invisible,
+so impossible to be discovered by the senses, that its parts cannot be
+separated, even by abstraction or thought. The question then arises, how
+can we conceive such a substance, which is only the negation of every
+thing of which we have a knowledge? How form to ourselves an idea of a
+substance, void of extent, yet acting on our senses; that is to say,
+on those organs which are material, which have extent? How can a
+being without extent be moveable; how put matter in action? How can a
+substance devoid of parts, correspond successively with different parts
+of space? But a very cogent question presents itself on this occasion:
+if this distinct substance that is said to form one of the component
+parts of man, be really what it is reported, and if it be not, it is
+not what it is described; if it be unknown, if it be not pervious to
+the senses; if it be invisible, by what means did the metaphysicians
+themselves become acquainted with it? How did they form ideas of a
+substance, that taking their own account of it, is not, under any of its
+circumstances, either directly or by analogy, cognizable to the mind of
+man? If they could positively achieve this, there would no longer be any
+mystery in Nature: it would be as easy to conceive the time when all was
+nothing, when all shall have passed away, to account for the
+production of every thing we behold, as to dig in a garden or read a
+lecture.--Doubt would vanish from the human species; there could no
+longer be any difference of opinion, since all must necessarily be of
+one mind on a subject so accessible to every enquirer.
+
+But it will be replied, the materialist himself admits, the natural
+philosophers of all ages have admitted, elements and atoms, beings
+simple and indivisible, of which bodies are composed:--granted; they
+have no more: they have also admitted that many of these atoms, many
+of these elements, if not all, are unknown to them: nevertheless, these
+simple beings, these atoms of the materialist, are not the same thing
+with the spirit, or the soul of the metaphysician. When the natural
+philosopher talks of atoms--when he describes them as simple beings,
+he indicates nothing more than that they are homogeneous, pure, without
+mixture: but then he allows that they have extent, consequently parts,
+are separable by thought, although no other natural agent with which
+he is acquainted is capable of dividing them: that the simple beings
+of this genus are susceptible of motion--can impart action--receive
+impulse--are material--are placed in Nature--are indestructible;--that
+consequently, if he cannot know them from themselves, he can form some
+idea of them by analogy: thus he has done that intelligibly, which the
+metaphysician would do unintelligibly: the latter, with a view to render
+man immortal, finding difficulties to his wish, from seeing that
+the body decayed--that it has submitted to the great, the universal
+law--has, to solve the difficulty, to remove the impediment, given him a
+soul, distinct from the body, which he says is exempted from the action
+of the general law: to account for this, he has called it a spiritual
+being, whose properties are the negation of all known properties,
+consequently inconceivable: had he, however, had recourse to the atoms
+of the former--had he made this substance the last possible term of the
+division of matter--it would at least have been intelligible; it would
+also have been immortal, since, according to the reasonings of all men,
+whether metaphysicians, theologians, or natural philosophers, an atom is
+an indestructible element, that must exist to all eternity.
+
+All men are agreed in this position, that motion is the successive
+change of the relations of one body with other bodies, or with
+the different parts of space. If that which is called _spirit_ be
+susceptible of communicating or receiving motion--if it acts--if
+it gives play to the organs of body--to produce these effects, it
+necessarily follows that this being changes successively its relation,
+its tendency, its correspondence, the position of its parts, either
+relatively to the different points of space, or to the different organs
+of the body which it puts in action: but to change its relation
+with space, with the organs to which it gives impulse, it follows of
+necessity that this spirit most have extent, solidity, consequently
+distinct parts: whenever a substance possesses these qualities, it
+is what we call MATTER, it can no longer be regarded as a simple pure
+being, in the sense attached to it by the moderns, or by theologians.
+
+Thus it will be seen, that those who, to conquer insurmountable
+difficulties, have supposed in man an immaterial substance,
+distinguished from his body, have not thoroughly understood themselves;
+indeed they have done nothing more than imagined a negative quality,
+of which they cannot have any correct idea: matter alone is capable of
+acting on our senses; without this action nothing would be capable
+of making itself known to us. They have not seen that a being without
+extent is neither in a capacity to move itself, nor has the capability
+of communicating motion to the body; since such a being, having no
+parts, has not the faculty of changing its relation, or its distance,
+relatively to other bodies, nor of exciting motion in the human body,
+which is itself material. That which is called our soul moves itself
+with us; now motion is a property of matter--this soul gives impulse to
+the arm; the arm, moved by it, makes an impression, a blow, that follows
+the general law of motion: in this case, the force remaining the same,
+if the mass was two-fold, the blow should be double. This soul again
+evinces its materiality in the invincible obstacles it encounters on
+the part of the body. If the arm be moved by its impulse when nothing
+opposes it, yet this arm can no longer move, when it is charged with
+a weight beyond its strength. Here then is a mass of matter that
+annihilates the impulse given by a spiritual cause, which spiritual
+cause having no analogy with matter, ought not to find more difficulty
+in moving the whole world, than in moving a single atom, nor an atom,
+than the universe. From this, it is fair to conclude, such a substance
+is a chimera--a being of the imagination. That it required a being
+differently endowed, differently constituted, to set matter in
+motion--to create all the phenomena we behold: nevertheless, it is a
+being the metaphysicians have made the contriver, the Author of Nature.
+As man, in all his speculations, takes himself for the model, he no
+sooner imagined a spirit within himself, than giving it extent, he
+made it universal; then ascribed to it all those causes with which his
+ignorance prevents him from becoming acquainted, thus he identified
+himself with the Author of Nature--then availed himself of the
+supposition to explain the connection of the soul with the body: his
+self-complacency prevented his perceiving that he was only enlarging the
+circle of his errors, by pretending to understand that which it is
+more than possible he will never be permitted to know; his self-love
+prevented him from feeling, that whenever he punished another for not
+thinking as he did, that he committed the greatest injustice, unless he
+was satisfactorily able to prove that other wrong, and himself right:
+that if he himself was obliged to have recourse to hypothesis--to
+gratuitous suppositions, whereon to found his doctrine, that from the
+very fallibility of his nature, these might be erroneous: thus GALLILEO
+was persecuted, because the metaphysicians, the theologians of his day,
+chose to make others believe what it was evident they did not themselves
+understand.
+
+As soon as I feel an impulse, or experience motion, I am under the
+necessity to acknowledge extent, solidity, density, impenetrability in
+the substance I see move, or from which I receive impulse: thus, when
+action is attributed to any cause whatever, I am obliged to consider
+it MATERIAL. I may be ignorant of its individual nature, of its mode
+of action, or of its generic properties; but I cannot deceive myself in
+general properties, which are common to all matter: this ignorance will
+only be increased, when I shall take that for granted of a being, of
+which from that moment I am precluded by what I admit from forming any
+idea, which moreover deprives it completely either of the faculty of
+moving itself, giving an impulse, or acting. Thus, according to the
+received idea of the term, a spiritual substance that moves itself, that
+gives motion to matter, and that acts, implies a contradiction, that
+necessarily infers a total impossibility.
+
+The partizans of spirituality believe they answer the difficulties they
+have accumulated, by asserting that "_the soul is entire--is whole under
+each point of its extent_." If an absurd answer will solve difficulties,
+they certainly have done it. But let us examine this reply:--it will
+be found that this indivisible part which is called soul, however
+insensible or however minute, must yet remain something: then an
+infinity of unextended substances, or the same substance having no
+dimensions, repeated an infinity of times, would constitute a substance
+that has extent: this cannot be what they mean, because according to
+this principle, the human soul would then be as infinite as the Author
+of Nature; seeing that they have stated this to be a being without
+extent, who is an infinity of times whole in each part of the universe.
+But when there shall appear as much solidity in the answer as there is
+a want of it, it must be acknowledged that in whatever manner the spirit
+or the soul finds itself in its extent, when the body moves forward the
+soul does not remain behind; if so, it has a quality in common with
+the body, peculiar to matter; since it is conveyed from place to place
+jointly with the body. Thus, when even the soul should be admitted to
+be immaterial, what conclusion must be drawn? Entirely submitted to the
+motion of the body, without this body it would remain dead and inert.
+This soul would only be part of a two-fold machine, necessarily impelled
+forward by a concatenation, or connection with the whole. It would
+resemble a bird, which a child conducts at its pleasure, by the string
+with which it is bound.
+
+Thus, it is for want of consulting experience, by not attending to
+reason, that man has darkened his ideas upon the concealed principle of
+his motion. If, disentangled from prejudice--if, destitute of gratuitous
+suppositions--if, throwing aside error, he would contemplate his soul,
+or the moving principle that acts within him, he would be convinced that
+it forms a part of its body, that it cannot be distinguished from
+it, but by abstraction; that it is only the body itself, considered
+relatively with some of its functions, or with those faculties of which
+its nature, or its peculiar organization, renders it susceptible:--he
+will perceive that this soul is obliged to undergo the same changes as
+the body; that it is born with it; that it expands itself with it;
+that like the body, it passes through a state of infancy, a period of
+weakness, a season of inexperience; that it enlarges itself, that it
+strengthens itself, in the same progression; that like the body, it
+arrives at an adult age or reaches maturity; that it is then, and not
+till then, it obtains the faculty of fulfilling certain functions; that
+it is in this stage, and in no other, that it enjoys reason; that it
+displays more or less wit, judgment, and manly activity; that like the
+body, it is subject to those vicissitudes which exterior causes obliges
+it to undergo by their influence; that, conjointly with the body, it
+suffers, enjoys, partakes of its pleasures, shares its pains, is sound
+when the body is healthy, and diseased when the body is oppressed
+with sickness; that like the body, it is continually modified by the
+different degrees of density in the atmosphere; by the variety of the
+seasons, and by the various properties of the aliments received into
+the stomach: in short, he would be obliged to acknowledge that at some
+periods it manifests visible signs of torpor, stupefaction, decrepitude,
+and death.
+
+In despite of this analogy, or rather this continual identity, of
+the soul with the body, man has been desirous of distinguishing their
+essence; he has therefore made the soul an inconceivable being: but
+in order that he might form to himself some idea of it, he was,
+notwithstanding, obliged to have recourse to material beings, and to
+their manner of acting. The word _spirit_, therefore, presents to the
+mind no other ideas than those of breathing, of respiration, of wind.
+Thus, when it is said the _soul is a spirit_, it really means nothing
+more than that its mode of action is like that of breathing: which
+though invisible in itself, or acting without being seen, nevertheless
+produces very visible effects. But breath, it is acknowledged, is a
+material cause; it is allowed to be air modified; it is not, therefore,
+a simple or pure substance, such as the moderns designate under the name
+of SPIRIT.
+
+It is rather singular that in the Hebrew, the Greek, and the Latin, the
+synonymy, or corresponding term for spirit should signify _breath_.
+The metaphysicians themselves can best say why they have adopted such
+a word, to designate the substance they have distinguished from matter:
+some of them, fearful they should not have distinct beings enough, have
+gone farther, and compounded man of three substances, BODY, SOUL, and
+INTELLECT.
+
+Although the word _spirit_ is so very ancient among men, the sense
+attached to it by the moderns is quite new: the idea of spirituality, as
+admitted at this day, is a recent production of the imagination. Neither
+PYTHAGORAS nor PLATO, however heated their brain, however decided
+their taste for the marvellous, appear to have understood by spirit an
+immaterial substance, or one without extent, devoid of parts; such as
+that of which the moderns have formed the human soul, the concealed
+author of motion. The ancients, by the word spirit, were desirous to
+define matter of an extreme subtilty, of a purer quality than that which
+acted grossly on our senses. In consequence, some have regarded the soul
+as an ethereal substance; others as igneous matter; others again have
+compared it to light. DEMOCRITUS made it consist in motion, consequently
+gave it a manner of existence. ARISTOXENES, who was himself a musician,
+made it harmony. ARISTOTLE regarded the soul as the moving faculty, upon
+which depended the motion of living bodies.
+
+The earliest doctors of Christianity had no other idea of the soul,
+than that it was material. TERTULLIAN, ARNOBIUS, CLEMENT of ALEXANDRIA,
+ORIGEN, SAINT JUSTIN, IRENAEUS, have all of them discoursed upon it; but
+have never spoken of it other than as a corporeal substance--as matter.
+It was reserved for their successors at a great distance of time, to
+make the human soul and the soul of the world _pure spirits_; that is
+to say, immaterial substances, of which it is impossible they could
+form any accurate idea: by degrees this incomprehensible doctrine of
+spirituality, conformable without doubt to the views of those who make
+it a principle to annihilate reason, prevailed over the others: But
+it might be fairly asked, if the pretended proofs of this doctrine owe
+themselves to a man, who on a much more comprehensible point has been
+proved in error; if, on that which time has shewn was accessible to
+man's reason, the great champion in support of this dogma was deceived;
+are we not bound to examine, with the most rigorous investigation, the
+reasonings, the evidence, of one who was the decided, the proven child
+of enthusiasm and error? Yet DESCARTES, to whose sublime errors the
+world is indebted for the Newtonian system, although before him the
+soul had been considered spiritual, was the first who established that,
+"_that which thinks ought to be distinguished from matter_;" from whence
+he concludes rather hastily, that the soul, or that which thinks in man,
+is a spirit; or a simple indivisible substance. Perhaps it would have
+been more logical, more consistent with reason, to have said, since
+man, who is matter, who has no idea but of matter, enjoys the faculty of
+thought, matter can think; that is, it is susceptible of that particular
+modification called thought.
+
+However this may be, this doctrine was believed divine, supernatural,
+because it was inconceivable to man. Those who dared believe even that
+which was believed before; namely, _that the soul was material_, were
+held as rash inconsiderate madmen, or else treated as enemies to the
+welfare and happiness of the human race. When man had once renounced
+experience; when he had abjured his reason; when he had joined the
+banner of this enthusiastic novelty; he did nothing more, day after day,
+than subtilize the delirium, the ravings of his imagination: he pleased
+himself by continually sinking deeper into the most unfathomable depths
+of error: he felicitated himself on his discoveries; on his pretended
+knowledge; in an exact ratio as his understanding became enveloped in
+the mists of darkness, environed with the clouds of ignorance. Thus,
+in consequence of man's reasoning upon false principles; of having
+relinquished the evidence of his senses; the moving principle within
+him, the concealed author of motion, has been made a mere chimera, a
+mere being of the imagination, because he has divested it of all known
+properties; because he has attached to it nothing but properties
+which, from the very nature of his existence, he is incapacitated to
+comprehend.
+
+The doctrine of spirituality, such as it now exists, offers nothing but
+vague ideas; or rather is the absense of all ideas. What does it present
+to the mind, but a substance which possesses nothing of which our senses
+enable us to have a knowledge? Can it be truth that a man is able to
+figure to himself a being not material, having neither extent nor
+parts, which, nevertheless, acts upon matter without having any point
+of contact, any kind of analogy with it; and which itself receives the
+impulse of matter by means of material organs, which announce to it the
+presence of other beings? Is it possible to conceive the union of the
+soul with the body; to comprehend how this material body can bind,
+enclose, constrain, determine a fugitive being which escapes all our
+senses? Is it honest, is it plain dealing, to solve these difficulties,
+by saying there is a mystery in them; that they are the effects of a
+power, more inconceivable than the human soul; than its mode of acting,
+however concealed from our view? When to resolve these problems, man is
+obliged to have recourse to miracles or to make the Divinity interfere,
+does he not avow his own ignorance? When, notwithstanding the ignorance
+he is thus obliged to avow by availing himself of the divine agency,
+he tells us, this immaterial substance, this soul, shall experience the
+action of the element of fire, which he allows to be material; when he
+confidently says this soul shall be burnt; shall suffer in purgatory;
+have we not a right to believe, that either he has a design to deceive
+us, or else that he does not himself understand that which he is so
+anxious we should take upon his word?
+
+Let us not then be surprised at those subtile hypotheses, as ingenious
+as they are unsatisfactory, to which theological prejudice has obliged
+the most profound modern speculators to recur; when they have undertaken
+to reconcile the spirituality of the soul, with the physical action of
+material beings, on this incorporeal substance; its re-action upon these
+beings; its union with the body. When the human mind permits itself to
+be guided by authority without proof, to be led forward by enthusiasm;
+when it renounces the evidence of its senses; what can it do more
+than sink into error? Let those who doubt this, read the metaphysical
+romances of LEIBNITZ, DESCARTES, MALEBRANCHE, CUDWORTH, and many others:
+let them coolly examine the ingenious, but fanciful systems entitled
+_the pre-established harmony of occasional causes; physical pre-motion,
+&c._
+
+If man wishes to form to himself clear, perspicuous ideas of his soul,
+let him throw himself back on his experience--let him renounce his
+prejudices--let him avoid theological conjecture--let him tear the
+bandages which he has been taught to think necessary, but with which he
+has been blind-folded, only to confound his reason. If it be wished to
+draw man to virtue, let the natural philosopher, let the anatomist,
+let the physician, unite their experience; let them compare their
+observations, in order to show what ought to be thought of a substance,
+so disguised, so hidden by absurdities, as not easily to be known. Their
+discoveries may perhaps teach moralists the true motive-power that ought
+to influence the actions of man--legislators, the true motives that
+should actuate him, that should excite him to labour to the welfare of
+society--sovereigns, the means of rendering their subjects truly happy;
+of giving solidity to the power of the nations committed to their
+charge. Physical souls have physical wants, and demand physical
+happiness. These are real, are preferable objects, to that variety of
+fanciful chimeras, each in its turn giving place to the other, with
+which the mind of man has been fed during so many ages. Let us, then,
+labour to perfect the morality of man; let us make it agreeable to him;
+let us excite in him an ardent thirst for its purity: we shall presently
+see his morals become better, himself become happier; his soul become
+calm and serene; his will determined to virtue, by the natural, by the
+palpable motives held out to him. By the diligence, by the care which
+legislators shall bestow on natural philosophy, they will form citizens
+of sound understandings; robust and well constituted; who, finding
+themselves happy, will be themselves accessary to that useful impulse so
+necessary for their soul. When the body is suffering, when nations are
+unhappy, the soul cannot be in a proper state. _Mens sana in corpore
+sano_, a sound mind in a sound body, will be always able to make a good
+citizen.
+
+The more man reflects, the more he will be convinced that the soul, very
+far from being distinguished from the body, is only the body itself,
+considered relatively to some of its functions, or to some of the modes
+of existing or acting, of which it is susceptible whilst it enjoys life.
+Thus, the soul is man, considered relatively to the faculty he has of
+feeling, of thinking, of acting in a mode resulting from his peculiar
+nature; that is to say, from his properties, from his particular
+organization: from the modifications, whether durable or transitory,
+which the beings who act upon him cause his machine to undergo.
+
+Those who have distinguished the soul from the body, appear only to
+have distinguished their brain from themselves. Indeed, the brain is the
+common center, where all the nerves, distributed through every part of
+the body, meet and blend themselves: it is by the aid of this interior
+organ that all those operations are performed which are attributed to
+the soul: it is the impulse, or the motion, communicated to the nerve,
+which modifies the brain: in consequence, it re-acts, or gives play to
+the bodily organs; or rather it acts upon itself, and becomes capable
+of producing within itself a great variety of motion, which has been
+designated _intellectual faculties_.
+
+From this it may be seen that some philosophers have been desirous to
+make a spiritual substance of the brain. It is evidently nothing but
+ignorance that has given birth to and accredited this system, which
+embraces so little, either of the natural or the rational. It is from
+not having studied himself, that man has supposed he was compounded with
+an agent, essentially different from his body: in examining this body,
+he will find that it is quite useless to recur to hypothesis for the
+explanation of the various phenomena it presents to his contemplation;
+that hypothesis can do nothing more than lead him out of the right road
+to the information after which he seeks. What obscures this question,
+arises from this, that man cannot see himself: indeed, for this purpose,
+that would be requisite which is impossible; namely, that he could he
+at one and the same moment both within and without himself: he may be
+compared to an Eolian harp, that issues sounds of itself, and should
+demand what it is that causes it to give them forth? It does not
+perceive that the sensitive quality of its chords causes the air to
+brace them; that being so braced, it is rendered sonorous by every gust
+of wind with which it happens to come in contact.
+
+When a theologian, obstinately bent on admitting into man two substances
+essentially different, is asked why he multiplies beings without
+necessity? he will reply, because _"thought cannot be a property of
+matter."_ If, then, it be enquired of him, _cannot God give to matter
+the faculty of thought?_ he will answer, _"no! seeing that God cannot
+do impossible things!"_ According to his principles, it is as impossible
+that spirit or thought can produce matter, as it is impossible that
+matter can produce spirit or thought: it might, therefore, be concluded
+against him, that the world was not made by a spirit, any more than a
+spirit was made by the world. But in this case, does not the theologian,
+according to his own assertion, acknowledge himself to be the true
+atheist? Does he not, in fact, circumscribe the attributes of the
+Deity, and deny his power, to suit his own purpose? Yet these men demand
+implicit belief in doctrines, which they are obliged to maintain by the
+most contradictory assertions.
+
+The more experience we collect, the more we shall be convinced that the
+word _spirit_, in its present received usage, conveys no one sense
+that is tangible, either to ourselves or to those that invented it;
+consequently cannot be of the least use, either in physics or morals.
+What modern metaphysicians believe and understand by the word, is
+nothing more than an _occult_ power, imagined to explain _occult_
+qualities and actions, but which, in fact, explains nothing. Savage
+nations admit of spirits, to account to themselves for those effects,
+which to them appear marvellous, as long as their ignorance knows
+not the cause to which they ought to be attributed. In attributing to
+spirits the phenomena of Nature, as well as those of the human body, do
+we, in fact, do any thing more than reason like savages? Man has filled
+Nature with spirits, because he has almost always been ignorant of
+the true causes of those effects by which he was astonished. Not being
+acquainted with the powers of Nature, he has supposed her to be animated
+by a _great spirit_: not understanding the energy of the human frame,
+he has in like manner conjectured it to be animated by a _minor spirit_:
+from this it would appear, that whenever he wished to indicate the
+unknown cause of a phenomena, he knew not how to explain in a natural
+manner, he had recourse to the word _spirit_. In short, _spirit_ was a
+term by which he solved all his doubts, and cleared up his ignorance to
+himself. It was according to these principles that when the AMERICANS
+first beheld the terrible effects of gunpowder, they ascribed the cause
+to wrathful spirits, to their enraged divinities: it was by adopting
+these principles, that our ancestors believed in a plurality of gods, in
+ghosts, in genii, &c. Pursuing the same track, we ought to attribute
+to spirits gravitation, electricity, magnetism, &c. &c. It is somewhat
+singular, that priests have in all ages so strenuously upheld those
+systems which time has exploded; that they have appeared to be either
+the most crafty or the most ignorant of men. Where are now the priests
+of Apollo, of Juno, of the Sun, and a thousand others? Yet these are the
+men, who in all times have persecuted those who have been the first
+to give natural explanations of the phenomena of Nature, as witness
+ANAXAGORAS, ARISTOTLE, GALLILEO, DESCARTES, &c. &c.
+
+
+
+
+
+CHAP. VIII.
+
+_The Intellectual Faculties derived from the Faculty of Feeling_.
+
+
+To convince ourselves that the faculties called _intellectual_, are
+only certain modes of existence, or determinate manners of acting,
+which result from the peculiar organization of the body, we have only
+to analyze them; we shall then see that all the operations which are
+attributed to the soul, are nothing more than certain modifications
+of the body; of which a substance that is without extent, that has no
+parts, that is immaterial, is not susceptible.
+
+The first faculty we behold in the living man, and that from which all
+his others flow, is _feeling_: however inexplicable this faculty may
+appear, on a first view, if it be examined closely, it will be found
+to be a consequence of the essence, or a result of the properties
+of organized beings; the same as _gravity, magnetism, elasticity,
+electricity_, &c. result from the essence or nature of some others. We
+shall also find these last phenomena are not less inexplicable than that
+of feeling. Nevertheless, if we wish to define to ourselves a clear and
+precise idea of it, we shall find that feeling is a particular manner of
+being moved--a mode of receiving an impulse peculiar to certain organs
+of animated bodies, which is occasioned by the presence of a material
+object that acts upon these organs, and transmit the impulse or shock to
+the brain.
+
+Man only feels by the aid of nerves dispersed through his body; which is
+itself, to speak correctly, nothing more than a great nerve; or may
+be said to resemble a large tree, of which the branches experience the
+action of the root, communicated through the trunk. In man the nerves
+unite and lose themselves in the brain; that intestine is the true seat
+of feeling: like the spider in the centre of his web, it is quickly
+warned of all the changes that happen to the body, even at the
+extremities to which it sends its filaments and branches. Experience
+enables us to ascertain, that man ceases to feel in those parts of his
+body of which the communication with the brain is intercepted; he feels
+very little, or not at all, whenever this organ is itself deranged or
+affected in too lively a manner. A proof of this is afforded in the
+transactions of the Royal Academy of Sciences at Paris: they inform us
+of a man who had his scull taken off, in the room of which his brain was
+recovered with skin; in proportion as a pressure was made by the hand on
+his brain, the man fell into a kind of insensibility, which deprived
+him of all feeling. BARTOLIN says, the brain of a man is twice as big as
+that of an ox. This observation had been already made by ARISTOTLE.
+In the dead body of an idiot dissected by WILLIS, the brain was found
+smaller than ordinary: he says the greatest difference he found between
+the parts of the body of this idiot, and those of wiser men, was, that
+the plexus of the intercostal nerves, which is the mediator between the
+brain and the heart, was extremely small, accompanied by a less number
+of nerves than usual. According to WILLIS, the ape is, of all animals,
+that which has the largest brain, relatively to his size: he is also,
+after man, that which has the most intelligence: this is further
+confirmed, by the name he bears in the soil, to which he is indigenous,
+which is _ourang outang_, or the man beast. There is, therefore, every
+reason to believe that it is entirely in the brain, that consists the
+difference, that is found not only between man and beasts, but also
+between the man of wit, and the fool: between the thinking man, and he
+who is ignorant; between the man of sound understanding, and the madman:
+a multitude of experience, serves to prove, that those persons who are
+most accustomed to use their intellectual faculties, have their brain
+more extended than others: the same has been remarked of watermen, that
+they have arms much longer than other men.
+
+However this may be, the sensibility of the brain, and all its parts, is
+a fact: if it be asked, whence comes this property? We shall reply,
+it is the result of an arrangement, of a combination, peculiar to the
+animal: it is thus that milk, bread, wine, change themselves in the
+substance of man, who is a sensible being: this insensible matter
+becomes sensible, in combining itself with a sensible whole. Some
+philosophers think that sensibility is a universal quality of matter:
+in this case, it would be useless to seek from whence this property is
+derived, as we know it by its effects. If this hypothesis be admitted,
+in like manner as two kinds of motion are distinguished in Nature, the
+one called _live_ force, the other _dead_, or _inert_ force, two sorts
+of sensibility will be distinguished, the one active or alive, the other
+inert or dead. Then to animalize a substance, is only to destroy
+the obstacles that prevent its being active or sensible. In fact,
+sensibility is either a quality which communicates itself like motion,
+and which is acquired by combination; or this sensibility is a property
+inherent in all matter: in both, or either case, an unextended being,
+without parts, such as the human soul is said to be, can neither be the
+cause of it nor submitted to its operation; but we may fairly conclude,
+that all the parts of Nature enjoy the capability to arrive at
+animation; the obstacle is only in the state, not in the quality. Life
+is the perfection of Nature: she has no parts which do not tend to
+it--which do not attain it by the same means. Life in an insect, a dog,
+a man, has no other difference, than that this act is more perfect,
+relatively to ourselves in proportion to the structure of the organs:
+if, therefore, it be asked, what is requisite to animate a body? we
+reply, it needs no foreign aid; it is sufficient that the power of
+Nature be joined to its organization.
+
+The conformation, the arrangement, the texture, the delicacy of the
+organs, as well exterior as interior, which compose men and animals,
+render their parts extremely mobile, or make their machine susceptible
+of being moved with great facility. In a body, which is only a heap
+of fibres, a mass of nerves, contiguous one to the other, united in a
+common center, always ready to act; in a whole, composed of fluids and
+solids, of which the parts are in equilibrium, the smallest touching
+each other, are active in their motion, communicating reciprocally,
+alternately and in succession, the impression, oscillations, and shocks
+they receive; in such a composition, it is not surprising that the
+slightest impulse propagates itself with celerity; that the shocks
+excited in its remotest parts, make themselves quickly felt in the
+brain, whose delicate texture renders it susceptible of being itself
+very easily modified. Air, fire, water, agents the most inconstant,
+possessing the most rapid motion, circulate continually in the fibres,
+incessantly penetrate the nerves: without doubt these contribute to that
+incredible celerity with which the brain is acquainted with what passes
+at the extremities of the body.
+
+Notwithstanding the great mobility with which man's organization renders
+him susceptible, although exterior as well as interior causes are
+continually acting upon him, he does not always feel in a distinct, in
+a decided manner, the impulse given to his senses: indeed, he does not
+feel it, until it has produced some change, or given some shock to his
+brain. Thus, although completely environed by air, he does not feel its
+action, until it is so modified, as to strike with a sufficient degree
+of force on his organs; to penetrate his skin, through which his brain
+is warned of its presence. Thus, during a profound and tranquil sleep,
+undisturbed by any dream, man ceases to feel. In short, notwithstanding
+the continued motion that agitates his frame, man does not appear to
+feel, when this motion acts in a convenient order; he does not perceive
+a state of health, but he discovers a state of grief or sickness;
+because, in the first, his brain does not receive too lively an impulse,
+whilst in the others, his nerves are contracted, shocked, and agitated,
+with violent, with disorderly motion: these communicating with his
+brain, give notice that some cause acts strongly upon them--impels
+them in a manner that bears no analogy with their natural habit: this
+constitutes, in him, that peculiar mode of existing which he calls
+_grief_.
+
+On the other hand, it sometimes happens that exterior objects produce
+very considerable changes on his body, without his perceiving them at
+the moment. Often, in the heat of battle, the soldier perceives not
+that he is dangerously wounded, because, at the time, the rapidity, the
+multiplicity of impetuous motion that assails his brain, does not
+permit him to distinguish the particular change a part of his body has
+undergone by the wound. In short, when a great number of causes are
+simultaneously acting on him with too much vivacity, he sinks under
+their accumulated pressure,--he swoons--he loses his senses--he is
+deprived of feeling.
+
+In general, feeling only obtains, when the brain can distinguish
+distinctly, the impressions made on the organs with which it has
+communication; it is the distinct shock, the decided modification man
+undergoes, that constitutes _conscience_. Doctor Clarke, says to this
+effect: "Conscience is the act of reflecting, by means of which I know
+that I think, and that my thoughts, or my actions belong to me, and
+not to another." From this it will appear, that _feeling_ is a mode of
+being, a marked change, produced on our brain, occasioned by the impulse
+communicated to our organs, whether by interior or exterior agents, by
+which it is modified either in a durable or transient manner: it is
+not always requisite that man's organs should be moved by an exterior
+object, to enable him to feel that he should be conscious of the changes
+effected in him: he can feel them within himself by means of an interior
+impulse; his brain is then modified, or rather he renews within himself
+the anterior modifications. We are not to be astonished that the brain
+should be necessarily warned of the shocks, of the impediments, of the
+changes that may happen to so complicated a machine as the human body,
+in which, notwithstanding all the parts are contiguous to the brain,
+and concentrate themselves in this brain, and are by their essence in a
+continual state of action and re-action.
+
+When a man experiences the pains of the gout, he is conscious of them;
+in other words, he feels interiorly, that it has produced very marked,
+very distinct changes in him, without his perceiving, that he has
+received an impulse from any exterior cause; nevertheless, if he will
+recur to the true source of these changes, he will find that they have
+been wholly produced by exterior agents: they have been the consequence,
+either of his temperament; of the organization received from his
+parents; of the aliments with which his frame has been nourished;
+besides a thousand trivial, inappreciable causes, which congregating
+themselves by degrees produce in him the gouty humour; the effect of
+which is to make him feel in an acute and very lively manner. The pain
+of the gout engenders in his brain an idea, so modifies it that it
+acquires the faculty of representing to itself, of reiterating as it
+were, this pain when even he shall be no longer tormented with the gout:
+his brain, by a series of motion interiorly excited, is again placed
+in a state analogous to that in which it was when he really experienced
+this pain: but if he had never felt it, he would never have been in a
+capacity to form to himself any just idea of its excruciating torments.
+
+The visible organs of man's body, by the intervention of which his brain
+is modified, take the name of _senses_. The various modifications which
+his brain receives by the aid of these senses, assumes a variety of
+names. _Sensation_, _perception_, and _idea_, are terms that designate
+nothing more than the changes produced in this interior organ, in
+consequence of impressions made on the exterior organs by bodies
+acting on them: these changes considered by themselves, are called
+_sensations_; they adopt the term _perception_ when the brain is warned
+of their presence; _ideas_ is that state of them in which the brain is
+able to ascribe them to the objects by which they have been produced.
+
+Every _sensation_, then, is nothing more than the shock given to the
+organs, every _perception_ is this shock propagated to the brain;
+every _idea_ is the image of the object to which the sensation and the
+perception is to be ascribed. From whence it will be seen, that if the
+senses be not moved, there can neither be sensations, perceptions, nor
+ideas: this will be proved to those, who can yet permit themselves to
+doubt so demonstrable and striking a truth.
+
+It is the extreme mobility of which man is capable, owing to his
+peculiar organization, that distinguishes him from other beings that are
+called insensible or inanimate; the different degrees of this mobility,
+of which the individuals of his species are susceptible, discriminate
+them from each other; make that incredible variety, that infinity of
+difference which is to be found, as well in their corporeal faculties,
+as in those which are mental or intellectual. From this mobility,
+more or less remarkable in each human being, results wit, sensibility,
+imagination, taste, &c.: for the present, however, let us follow the
+operation of the senses; let us examine in what manner they are
+acted upon, and are modified by exterior objects:--we will afterwards
+scrutinize the re-action of the interior organ or brain.
+
+The eyes are very delicate, very movable organs, by means of which the
+sensation of light or colour is experienced: these give to the brain
+a distinct perception, in consequence of which, man forms an idea,
+generated by the action of luminous or coloured bodies: as soon as the
+eyelids are opened, the retina is affected in a peculiar manner; the
+fluid, the fibres, the nerves, of which they are composed, are excited
+by shocks which they communicate to the brain; to which they delineate
+the images of the bodies from which they have received the impulse; by
+this means, an idea is acquired of the colour, the size, the form, the
+distance of these bodies: it is thus that may be explained the mechanism
+of _sight_.
+
+The mobility and the elasticity of which the skin is rendered
+susceptible, by the fibres and nerves which form its texture, accounts
+for the rapidity with which this envelope to the human body is affected
+when applied to any other body; by their agency, the brain has notice of
+its presence, of its extent, of its roughness, of its smoothness, of its
+surface, of its pressure of its ponderosity, &c. Qualities from which
+the brain derives distinct perceptions, which breed in it a diversity of
+ideas; it is this that constitutes the _touch_ or _feeling_.
+
+The delicacy of the membrane by which the interior of the nostrils is
+covered, renders them easily susceptible of irritation, even by the
+invisible and impalpable corpuscles that emanate from odorous bodies:
+by these means sensations are excited, the brain has perceptions, and
+generates ideas: it is this that forms the sense of _smelling_.
+
+The mouth, filled with nervous, sensible, movable, irritable glands,
+saturated with juices suitable to the dissolution of saline substances,
+is affected in a very lively manner by the aliments which pass through
+it for the nourishment of the body; these glands transmit to the brain
+the impressions received: perceptions are of consequence; ideas follow:
+it is from this mechanism that results _taste_.
+
+The ear, whose conformation fits it to receive the various impulses
+of air, diversely modified, communicates to the brain the shocks or
+sensations; these breed the perception of sound, and generate the idea
+of sonorous bodies: it is this that constitutes _hearing_.
+
+Such are the only means by which man receives sensations, perceptions,
+and ideas. These successive modifications of his brain are effects
+produced by objects that give impulse to his senses; they become
+themselves causes, producing in his soul new modifications, which are
+denominated _thought, reflection, memory, imagination, judgment, will,
+action_; the basis, however, of all these is _sensation_.
+
+To form a precise notion of _thought_, it will be requisite to examine,
+step by step, what passes in man during the presence of any object
+whatever. Suppose for a moment this object to be a peach: this fruit
+makes, at the first view, two different impressions on his eyes; that
+is to say, it produces two modifications, which are transmitted to the
+brain, which on this occasion experiences two new perceptions, or has
+two new ideas or modes of existence, designated by the terms _colour_
+and _rotundity_; in consequence, he has an idea of a body possessing
+roundness and colour: if he places his hand on this fruit, the organ
+of feeling having been set in action, his hand experiences three new
+impressions, which are called _softness, coolness, weight_, from whence
+result three new perceptions in the brain, he has consequently three
+new ideas: if he approximates this peach to his nose, the organ of
+_smelling_ receives an impulse, which, communicated to the brain, a new
+perception arises, by which he acquires a new idea, called _odour_: if
+he carries this fruit to his mouth, the organ of taste becomes affected
+in a very lively manner: this impulse communicated to the brain, is
+followed by a perception that generates in him the idea of _flavour_. In
+re-uniting all these impressions, or these various modifications of his
+organs, which it have been consequently transmitted to his brain; that
+is to say, in combining the different sensations, perceptions, and
+ideas, that result from the impulse he has received, he has an idea of
+a whole, which he designates by the name of a peach, with which he can
+then occupy his thoughts.
+
+From this it is sufficiently proved that thought has a commencement, a
+duration, an end; or rather a generation, a succession, a dissolution,
+like all the other modifications of matter; like them, thought is
+excited, is determined, is increased, is divided, is compounded, is
+simplified, &c. If, therefore, the soul, or the principle that thinks,
+be indivisible; how does it happen, that this soul has the faculty of
+memory, or of forgetfulness; is capacitated to think successively, to
+divide, to abstract, to combine, to extend its ideas, to retain them,
+or to lose them? How can it cease to think? If forms appear divisible in
+matter, it is only in considering them by abstraction, after the method,
+of geometricians; but this divisibility of form exists not in Nature, in
+which there is neither a point, an atom, nor form perfectly regular;
+it must therefore be concluded, that the forms of matter are not less
+indivisible than thought.
+
+What has been said is sufficient to show the generation of sensations,
+of perceptions, of ideas, with their association, or connection in the
+brain: it will be seen that these various modifications are nothing more
+than the consequence of successive impulses, which the exterior organs
+transmit to the interior organ, which enjoys the faculty of thought,
+that is to say, to feel in itself the different modifications it has
+received, or to perceive the various ideas which it has generated; to
+combine them, to separate them, to extend them, to abridge them, to
+compare them, to renew them, &c. From whence it will be seen, that
+thought is nothing more than the perception of certain modifications,
+which the brain either gives to itself, or has received from exterior
+objects.
+
+Indeed, not only the interior organ perceives the modifications it
+receives from without, but again it has the faculty of modifying itself;
+of considering the changes which take place in it, the motion by which
+it is agitated in its peculiar operations, from which it imbibes new
+perceptions and new ideas. It is the exercise of this power to fall back
+upon itself, that is called _reflection_.
+
+From this it will appear, that for man to think and to reflect, is to
+feel, or perceive within himself the impressions, the sensations, the
+ideas, which have been furnished to his brain by those objects which
+give impulse to his senses, with the various changes which his brain
+produced on itself in consequence.
+
+_Memory_ is the faculty which the brain has of renewing in itself the
+modifications it has received, or rather, to restore itself to a state
+similar to that in which it has been placed by the sensations, the
+perceptions, the ideas, produced by exterior objects, in the exact order
+it received them, without any new action on the part of these objects,
+or even when these objects are absent; the brain perceives that these
+modifications assimilate with those it formerly experienced in the
+presence of the objects to which it relates, or attributes them. Memory
+is faithful, when these modifications are precisely the same; it
+is treacherous, when they differ from those which the organs have
+exteriorly experienced.
+
+_Imagination_ in man is only the faculty which the brain has of
+modifying itself, or of forming to itself new perceptions, upon the
+model of those which it has anteriorly received through the action of
+exterior objects on the senses. The brain, then, does nothing more than
+combine ideas which it has already formed, which it recalls to itself,
+from which it forms a whole, or a collection of modifications, which
+it has not received, which exists no-where but in itself, although the
+individual ideas, or the parts of which this ideal whole is composed,
+have been previously communicated to it, in consequence of the impulse
+given to the senses by exterior objects: it is thus man forms to himself
+the idea of _centaurs_, or a being composed of a man and a horse, of
+_hyppogriffs_, or a being composed of a horse with wings and a griffin,
+besides a thousand other objects, equally ridiculous. By memory, the
+brain renews in itself the sensations, the perceptions, and the ideas
+which it has received or generated; represents to itself the objects
+which have actually moved its organs. By imagination it combines them
+variously: forms objects in their place which have not moved its organs,
+although it is perfectly acquainted with the elements or ideas of which
+it composes them. It is thus that man, by combining a great number
+of ideas borrowed from himself, such as justice, wisdom, goodness,
+intelligence, &c. by the aid of imagination, has formed various ideal
+beings, or imaginary wholes, which he has called JUPITER, JUNO, BRAMAH,
+SATURN, &c.
+
+_Judgment_ is the faculty which the brain possesses of comparing with
+each other the modifications it receives, the ideas it engenders, or
+which it has the power of awakening within itself, to the end that it
+may discover their relations, or their effects.
+
+_Will_ is a modification of the brain, by which it is disposed to
+action, that is to say, to give such an impulse to the organs of the
+body, as can induce to act in a manner, that will procure for itself
+what is requisite to modify it in a mode analogous to its own existence,
+or to enable it to avoid that by which it can be injured. To _will_ is
+to be disposed to _action_. The exterior objects, or the interior ideas,
+which give birth to this disposition are called _motives_, because they
+are the springs or movements which determine it to act, that is to say,
+which give play to the organs of the body. Thus, _voluntary actions_
+are the motion of the body, determined by the modification of the
+brain. Fruit hanging on a tree, through the agency of the visual organs,
+modifies the brain in such a manner as to dispose the arm to stretch
+itself forth to cull it; again, it modifies it in another manner, by
+which it excites the hand to carry it to the mouth.
+
+All the modifications which the interior organ or the brain receives,
+all the sensations, all the perceptions, all the ideas that are
+generated by the objects which give impulse to the senses, or which
+it renews within itself by its own peculiar faculties, are either
+favourable or prejudicial to man's mode of existence, whether that be
+transitory or habitual: they dispose the interior organ to action, which
+it exercises by reason of its own peculiar energy: this action is not,
+however, the same in all the individuals of the human species, depending
+much on their respective temperaments. From hence the PASSIONS have
+their birth: these are more or less violent; they are, however, nothing
+more than the motion of the will, determined by the objects which give
+it activity; consequently composed of the analogy or of the discordance
+which is found between these objects, man's peculiar mode of existence,
+and the force of his temperament. From this it results, that the
+passions are modes of existence or modifications of the brain; which
+either attract or repel those objects by which man is surrounded; that
+consequently they are submitted in their action to the physical laws of
+attraction and repulsion.
+
+The faculty of perceiving or of being modified, as well by itself as
+exterior objects which the brain enjoys is sometimes designated by the
+term _understanding_. To the assemblage of the various faculties
+of which this interior organ is susceptible, is applied the name of
+_intelligence_. To a determined mode in which the brain exercises the
+faculties peculiar to itself, is given the appellation of _reason_. The
+dispositions or the modifications of the brain, some of them constant,
+others transitory, which give impulse to the beings of the human
+species, causing them to act, are styled _wit, wisdom, goodness,
+prudence, virtue, &c_.
+
+In short, as there will be an opportunity presently to prove, all
+the intellectual faculties--that is to say, all the modes of action
+attributed to the soul, may be reduced to the modifications, to the
+qualities, to the modes of existence, to the changes produced by the
+motion of the brain; which is visibly in man the seat of feeling, the
+principle of all his actions. These modifications are to be attributed
+to the objects that strike on his senses; of which the impression is
+transmitted to the brain, or rather to the ideas, which the perceptions
+caused by the action of these objects on his senses have there
+generated, and which it has the faculty to re-produce. This brain moves
+itself in its turn, re-acts upon itself, gives play to the organs, which
+concentrate themselves in it, or which are rather nothing more than an
+extension of its own peculiar substance. It is thus the concealed motion
+of the interior organ, renders itself sensible by outward and visible
+signs. The brain, affected by a modification which is called FEAR,
+diffuses a paleness over the countenance, excites a tremulous motion in
+the limbs called trembling. The brain, affected by a sensation of GRIEF,
+causes tears to flow from the eyes, even without being moved by any
+exterior object; an idea which it retraces with great strength, suffices
+to give it very little modifications, which visibly have an influence on
+the whole frame.
+
+In all this, nothing more is to be perceived than the same substance
+which acts diversely on the various parts of the body. If it be objected
+that this mechanism does not sufficiently explain the principles of the
+motion or the faculties of the soul; we reply, that it is in the same
+situation as all the other bodies of Nature, in which the most simple
+motion, the most ordinary phenomena, the most common modes of action are
+inexplicable mysteries, of which we shall never be able to fathom the
+first principles. Indeed, how can we flatter ourselves we shall ever be
+enabled to compass the true principle of that gravity by which a stone
+falls? Are we acquainted with the mechanism which produces attraction in
+some substances, repulsion in others? Are we in a condition to explain
+the communication of motion from one body to another? But it may be
+fairly asked,--Are the difficulties that occur, when attempting to
+explain the manner in which the soul acts, removed by making it a
+_spiritual being_, a substance of which we have not, nor cannot form one
+idea, which consequently must bewilder all the notions we are capable
+of forming to ourselves of this being? Let us then be contented to know
+that the soul moves itself, modifies itself, in consequence of material
+causes, which act upon it which give it activity: from whence the
+conclusion may be said to flow consecutively, that all its operations,
+all its faculties, prove that it is itself _material_.
+
+
+
+
+
+CHAP. IX.
+
+_The Diversity of the Intellectual Faculties: they depend on Physical
+Causes, as do their Moral Qualities.--The Natural Principles of
+Society.--Morals.--Politics_.
+
+
+Nature is under the necessity of diversifying all her works. Elementary
+matter, different in its essence, must necessarily form different
+beings, various in their combinations, in their properties, in their
+modes of action, in their manner of existence. There is not, neither
+can there be, two beings, two combinations, which are mathematically
+and rigorously the same; because the place, the circumstances, the
+relations; the proportions, the modifications, never being exactly
+alike, the beings that result can never bear a perfect resemblance to
+each other: their modes of action must of necessity vary in something,
+even when we believe we find between them the greatest conformity.
+
+In consequence of this principle, which every thing we see conspires to
+prove to be a truth, there are not two individuals of the human species
+who have precisely the same traits--who think exactly in the same
+manner--who view things under the same identical point of sight--who
+have decidedly the same ideas; consequently no two of them have
+uniformly the same system of conduct. The visible organs of man, as well
+as his concealed organs, have indeed some analogy, some common points
+of resemblance, some general conformity; which makes them appear,
+when viewed in the gross, to be affected in the same manner by certain
+causes: but the difference is infinite in the detail. The human soul
+may be compared to those instruments, of which the chords, already
+diversified in themselves, by the manner in which they have been spun,
+are also strung upon different notes: struck by the same impulse, each
+chord gives forth the sound that is peculiar to itself; that is to
+say, that which depends on its texture, its tension, its volume, on the
+momentary state in which it is placed by the circumambient air. It is
+this that produces the diversified spectacle, the varied scene, which
+the moral world offers to our view: it is from this that results the
+striking contrariety that is to be found in the minds, in the faculties,
+in the passions, in the energies, in the taste, in the imagination, in
+the ideas, in the opinions of man. This diversity is as great as that of
+his physical powers: like them it depends on his temperament, which
+is as much varied as his physiognomy. This variety gives birth to that
+continual series of action and reaction, which constitutes the life of
+the moral world: from this discordance results the harmony which at once
+maintains and preserves the human race.
+
+The diversity found among the individuals of the human species, causes
+inequalities between man and man: this inequality constitutes the
+support of society. If all men were equal in their bodily powers, in
+their mental talents, they would not have any occasion for each other:
+it is the variation of his faculties, the inequality which this places
+him in, with regard to his fellows, that renders morals necessary
+to man: without these, he would live by himself, he would remain an
+isolated being. From whence it may be perceived, that this inequality
+of which man so often complains without cause--this impossibility which
+each man finds when in an isolated state, when left to himself, when
+unassociated with his fellow men, to labour efficaciously to his own
+welfare, to make his own security, to ensure his own conservation;
+places him in the happy situation of associating with his like, of
+depending on his fellow associates, of meriting their succour, of
+propitiating them to his views, of attracting their regard, of calling
+in their aid to chase away, by common and united efforts, that which
+would have the power to trouble or derange the order of his existence.
+In consequence of man's diversity, of the inequality that results, the
+weaker is obliged to seek the protection of the stronger; this, in his
+turn, recurs to the understanding, to the talents, to the industry of
+the weaker, whenever his judgment points out he can be useful to him:
+this natural inequality furnishes the reason why nations distinguish
+those citizens who have rendered their country eminent services. It is
+in consequence of his exigencies that man honors and recompenses those
+whose understanding, good deeds, assistance, or virtues, have procured
+for him real or supposed advantages, pleasures, or agreeable sensations
+of any sort: it is by this means that genius gains an ascendancy over
+the mind of man, and obliges a whole people to acknowledge its powers.
+Thus, the diversity and inequality of the faculties, as well corporeal
+as mental or intellectual, renders man necessary to his fellow man,
+makes him a social being, and incontestibly proves to him the necessity
+of morals.
+
+According to this diversity of faculties, the individuals of the human
+species are divided into different classes, each in proportion to the
+effects produced, or the different qualities that may be remarked: all
+these varieties in man flow from the individual properties of his soul,
+or from the particular modification of his brain. It is thus, that
+wit, imagination, sensibility, talents, &c. diversify to infinity the
+differences that are to be found in man. It is thus, that some are
+called good, others wicked; some are denominated virtuous, others
+vicious; some are ranked as learned, others as ignorant; some are
+considered reasonable, others unreasonable, &c.
+
+If all the various faculties attributed to the soul are examined, it
+will be found that like those of the body they are to be ascribed to
+physical causes, to which it will be very easy to recur. It will be
+found that the powers of the soul are the same as those of the body;
+that they always depend on the organization of this body, on its
+peculiar properties, on the permanent or transitory modifications that
+it undergoes; in a word, on its temperament.
+
+_Temperament_ is, in each individual, the habitual state in which he
+finds the fluids and the solids of which his body is composed. This
+temperament varies, by reason of the elements or matter that predominate
+in him, in consequence of the different combinations, of the various
+modifications, which this matter, diversified in itself, undergoes in
+his machine. Thus, in one, the blood is superabundant; in another, the
+bile; in a third, phlegm, &c.
+
+It is from Nature--from his parents--from causes, which from the first
+moment of his existence have unceasingly modified him, that man derives
+his temperament. It is in his mother's womb that he has attracted the
+matter which, during his whole life, shall have an influence on his
+intellectual faculties--on his energies--on his passions--on his
+conduct. The very nourishment he takes, the quality of the air he
+respires, the climate he inhabits, the education he receives, the
+ideas that are presented to him, the opinions he imbibes, modify this
+temperament. As these circumstances can never be rigorously the same in
+every point for any two men, it is by no means surprising that such an
+amazing variety, so great a contrariety, should be found in man; or
+that there should exist as many different temperaments, as there are
+individuals in the human species.
+
+Thus, although man may bear a general resemblance, he differs
+essentially, as well by the texture of his fibres and the disposition of
+his nerves, as by the nature, the quality, the quantity of matter that
+gives them play, that sets his organs in motion. Man, already different
+from his fellow, by the elasticity of his fibres, the tension of
+his nerves, becomes still more distinguished by a variety of other
+circumstances: he is more active, more robust, when he receives
+nourishing aliments, when he drinks wine, when he takes exercise: whilst
+another, who drinks nothing but water, who takes less juicy nourishment,
+who languishes in idleness, shall be sluggish and feeble.
+
+All these causes have necessarily an influence on the mind, on the
+passions, on the will; in a word, on what are called the intellectual
+faculties. Thus, it may be observed, that a man of a sanguine
+constitution, is commonly lively, ingenious, full of imagination,
+passionate, voluptuous, enterprising; whilst the phlegmatic man is dull,
+of a heavy understanding, slow of conception, inactive, difficult to be
+moved, pusillanimous, without imagination, or possessing it in a less
+lively degree, incapable of taking any strong measures, or of willing
+resolutely.
+
+If experience was consulted, in the room of prejudice, the physician
+would collect from morals, the key to the human heart: in curing the
+body, he would sometimes be assured of curing the mind. Man, in making
+a spiritual substance of his soul, has contented himself with
+administering to it spiritual remedies, which either have no influence
+over his temperament, or do it an injury. The doctrine of the
+spirituality of the soul has rendered morals a conjectural science, that
+does not furnish a knowledge of the true motives which ought to be
+put in activity, in order to influence man to his welfare. If, calling
+experience to his assistance, man sought out the elements which form the
+basis of his temperament, or of the greater number of the individuals
+composing a nation, he would then discover what would be most proper
+for him,--that which could be most convenient to his mode of
+existence--which could most conduce to his true interest--what laws
+would be necessary to his happiness--what institutions would be most
+useful for him--what regulations would be most beneficial. In short,
+morals and politics would be equally enabled to draw from _materialism_,
+advantages which the dogma of spirituality can never supply, of which
+it even precludes the idea. Man will ever remain a mystery, to those
+who shall obstinately persist in viewing him with eyes prepossessed
+by metaphysics; he will always be an enigma to those who shall
+pertinaciously attribute his actions to a principle, of which it is
+impossible to form to themselves any distinct idea. When man shall be
+seriously inclined to understand himself, let him sedulously endeavour
+to discover the matter that enters into his combination, which
+constitutes his temperament; these discoveries will furnish him with the
+clue to the nature of his desires, to the quality of his passions, to
+the bent of his inclinations--will enable him to foresee his conduct
+on given occasions--will indicate the remedies that may be successfully
+employed to correct the defects of a vicious organization, of a
+temperament, as injurious to himself as to the society of which he is a
+member.
+
+Indeed, it is not to be doubted that man's temperament is capable of
+being corrected, of being modified, of being changed, by causes as
+physical as the matter of which it is constituted. We are all in some
+measure capable of forming our own temperament: a man of a sanguine
+constitution, by taking less juicy nourishment, by abating its quantity,
+by abstaining from strong liquor, &c. may achieve the correction of
+the nature, the quality, the quantity, the tendency, the motion of the
+fluids, which predominate in his machine. A bilious man, or one who is
+melancholy, may, by the aid of certain remedies, diminish the mass of
+this bilious fluid; he may correct the blemish of his humours, by the
+assistance of exercise; he may dissipate his gloom, by the gaiety which
+results from increased motion. An European transplanted into Hindostan,
+will, by degrees, become quite a different man in his humours, in his
+ideas, in his temperament, in his character.
+
+Although but few experiments have been made with a view to learn what
+constitutes the temperament of man, there are still enough if he would
+but deign to make use of them--if he would vouchsafe to apply to useful
+purposes the little experience he has gleaned. It would appear, speaking
+generally, that the igneous principle which chemists designate under the
+name of _phlogiston_, or inflammable matter, is that which in man
+yields him the most active life, furnishes him with the greatest energy,
+affords the greatest mobility to his frame, supplies the greatest spring
+to his organs, gives the greatest elasticity to his fibres, the greatest
+tension to his nerves, the greatest rapidity to his fluids. From these
+causes, which are entirely material, commonly result the dispositions
+or faculties called sensibility, wit, imagination, genius, vivacity, &c.
+which give the tone to the passions, to the will, to the moral
+actions of man. In this sense, it is with great justice we apply the
+expressions, 'warmth of soul,' 'ardency of imagination,' 'fire of
+genius,' &c.
+
+It is this fiery element, diffused unequally, distributed in various
+proportions through the beings of the human species, that sets man in
+motion, gives him activity, supplies him with animal heat, and which, if
+we may be allowed the expression, renders him more or less alive. This
+igneous matter, so active, so subtle, dissipates itself with great
+facility, then requires to be reinstated in his system by means of
+aliments that contain it, which thereby become proper to restore
+his machine, to lend new warmth to the brain, to furnish it with the
+elasticity requisite to the performance of those functions which are
+called intellectual. It is this ardent matter contained in wine, in
+strong liquor, that gives to the most torpid, to the dullest, to
+the most sluggish man, a vivacity of which, without it, he would be
+incapable--which urges even the coward on to battle. When this fiery
+element is too abundant in man, whilst he is labouring under certain
+diseases, it plunges him into delirium; when it is in too weak or in too
+small a quantity, he swoons, he sinks to the earth. This igneous matter
+diminishes in his old age--it totally dissipates at his death. It would
+not be unreasonable to suppose, that what physicians call the nervous
+fluid, which so promptly gives notice to the brain of all that happens
+to the body, is nothing more than electric matter; that the various
+proportions of this matter diffused through his system, is the cause
+of that great diversity to be discovered in the human being, and in the
+faculties he possesses.
+
+If the intellectual faculties of man, or his moral qualities, be
+examined according to the principles here laid down, the conviction must
+be complete that they are to be attributed to material causes, which
+have an influence more or less marked, either transitory or durable,
+over his peculiar organization. But where does he derive this
+organization, except it be from the parents from whom he receives the
+elements of a machine necessarily analogous to their own? From whence
+does he derive the greater or less quantity of igneous matter, or
+vivifying heat, that decides upon, that gives the tone to his mental
+qualities? It is from the mother who bore him in her womb, who has
+communicated to him a portion of that fire with which she was herself
+animated, which circulated through her veins with her blood;--it is
+from the aliments that have nourished him,--it is from the climate he
+inhabits,--it is from the atmosphere that surrounds: all these causes
+have an influence over his fluids, over his solids, and decide on his
+natural dispositions. In examining these dispositions, from whence his
+faculties depend, it will ever be found, that they are _corporeal_, that
+they are _material_.
+
+The most prominent of these dispositions in man, is that physical
+sensibility from which flows all his intellectual or moral qualities. To
+feel, according to what has been said, is to receive an impulse, to be
+moved, to have a consciousness of the changes operated on his system.
+To have sensibility is nothing more than to be so constituted as to feel
+promptly, and in a very lively manner, the impressions of those objects
+which act upon him. A sensible soul is only man's brain, disposed in a
+mode to receive the motion communicated to it with facility, to re-act
+with promptness, by giving an instantaneous impulse to the organs.
+Thus the man is called sensible, whom the sight of the distressed, the
+contemplation of the unhappy, the recital of a melancholy tale, the
+witnessing of an afflicting catastrophe, or the idea of a dreadful
+spectacle, touches in so lively a manner as to enable the brain to give
+play to his lachrymal organs, which cause him to shed tears; a sign by
+which we recognize the effect of great grief, of extreme anguish in the
+human being. The man in whom musical sounds excite a degree of pleasure,
+or produce very remarkable effects, is said to have a _sensible_ or a
+fine ear. In short, when it is perceived that eloquence--the beauty of
+the arts--the various objects that strike his senses, excite in him very
+lively emotions, he is said to possess a soul full of sensibility.
+
+_Wit_, is a consequence of this physical sensibility; indeed, wit is
+nothing more than the facility which some beings, of the human species
+possess, of seizing with promptitude, of developing with quickness, a
+whole, with its different relations to other objects. _Genius_, is the
+facility with which some men comprehend this whole, and its various
+relations when they are difficult to be known, but useful to forward
+great and mighty projects. Wit may be compared to a piercing eye which
+perceives things quickly. Genius is an eye that comprehends at one view,
+all the points of an extended horizon: or what the French term _coup
+d'oeil_. True wit is that which perceives objects with their relations
+such as they really are. False wit is that which catches at relations,
+which do not apply to the object, or which arises from some blemish in
+the organization. True wit resembles the direction on a hand-post.
+
+_Imagination_ is the faculty of combining with promptitude ideas or
+images; it consists in the power man possesses of re-producing with ease
+the modifications of his brain: of connecting them, of attaching them to
+the objects to which they are suitable. When imagination does this, it
+gives pleasure; its fictions are approved, it embellishes Nature, it
+is a proof of the soundness of the mind, it aids truth: when on the
+contrary, it combines ideas, not formed to associate themselves with
+each other--when it paints nothing but disagreeable phantoms, it
+disgusts, its fictions are censured, it distorts Nature, it advocates
+falsehood, it is the proof of a disordered, of a deranged mind: thus
+poetry, calculated to render Nature more pathetic, more touching,
+pleases when it creates ideal beings, but which move us agreeably: we,
+therefore, forgive the illusions it has held forth, on account of the
+pleasure we have reaped from them. The hideous chimeras of superstition
+displease, because they are nothing more than the productions of a
+distempered imagination, that can only awaken the most afflicting
+sensations, fills us with the most disagreeable ideas.
+
+Imagination, when it wanders, produces fanaticism, superstitious
+terrors, inconsiderate zeal, phrenzy, and the most enormous crimes: when
+it is well regulated, it gives birth to a strong predilection for useful
+objects, an energetic passion for virtue, an enthusiastic love of our
+country, and the most ardent friendship: the man who is divested
+of imagination, is commonly one in whose torpid constitution phlegm
+predominates over the igneous fluid, over that sacred fire, which is
+the great principle of his mobility, of that warmth of sentiment, which
+vivifies all his intellectual faculties. There must be enthusiasm for
+transcendent virtues as well as for atrocious crimes; enthusiasm places
+the soul in a state similar to that of drunkenness; both the one and the
+other excite in man that rapidity of motion which is approved, when
+good results, when its effects are beneficial; but which is censured,
+is called folly, delirium, crime, fury; when it produces nothing but
+disorder and confusion.
+
+The mind is out of order, it is incapable of judging sanely--the
+imagination is badly regulated, whenever man's organization is not so
+modified, as to perform its functions with precision. At each moment of
+his existence, man gathers experience; every sensation he has, furnishes
+a fact that deposits in his brain an idea which his memory recalls with
+more or less fidelity: these facts connect themselves, these ideas
+are associated; their chain constitutes _experience_; this lays the
+foundation of _science_. Knowledge is that consciousness which arises
+from reiterated experience--from experiments made with precision of the
+sensations, of the ideas, of the effects which an object is capable of
+producing, either in ourselves or in others. All science, to be just,
+must be founded on truth. Truth itself rests on the constant, the
+faithful relation of our senses. Thus, _truth_ is that conformity, that
+perpetual affinity, which man's senses, when well constituted, when
+aided by experience, discover to him, between the objects of which he
+has a knowledge, and the qualities with which he clothes them. In short,
+truth is nothing more than the just, the precise association of his
+ideas. But how can he, without experience, assure himself of the
+accuracy, of the justness of this association? How, if he does not
+reiterate this experience, can he compare it? how prove its truth? If
+his senses are vitiated, how is it possible they can convey to him with
+precision, the sensations, the facts, with which they store his brain?
+It is only by multiplied, by diversified, by repeated experience, that
+he is enabled to rectify the errors of his first conceptions.
+
+Man is in error every time his organs, either originally defective in
+their nature, or vitiated by the durable or transitory modifications
+which they undergo, render him incapable of judging soundly of objects.
+Error consists in the false association of ideas, by which qualities are
+attributed to objects which they do not possess. Man is in error, when
+he supposes those beings really to have existence, which have no
+local habitation but in his own imagination: he is in error, when he
+associates the idea of happiness with objects capable of injuring him,
+whether immediately or by remote consequences which he cannot foresee.
+
+But how can he foresee effects of which he has not yet any knowledge?
+It is by the aid of experience: by the assistance which this experience
+affords, it is known that analogous, that like causes, produce
+analogous, produce like effects. Memory, by recalling these effects,
+enables him to form a judgment of those he may expect, whether it be
+from the same causes, or from causes that bear a relation to those of
+which he has already experienced the action. From this it will appear,
+that _prudence_, _foresight_, are faculties that are ascribable to, that
+grow out of experience. If he has felt that fire excited in his organs
+painful sensation, this experience suffices him to know, to foresee,
+that fire so applied, will consequently excite the same sensations.
+If he has discovered that certain actions, on his part, stirred up the
+hatred, elicited the contempt of others, this experience sufficiently
+enables him to foresee, that every time he shall act in a similar
+manner, he will be either hated or despised.
+
+The faculty man has of gathering experience, of recalling it to himself,
+of foreseeing effects by which he is enabled to avoid whatever may have
+the power to injure him, to procure that which may be useful to the
+conservation of his existence, which may contribute to that which is
+the sole end of all his actions, whether corporeal or mental,--his
+felicity--constitutes that, which, in one word, is designated under the
+name of _Reason_. Sentiment, imagination, temperament, may be capable
+of leading him astray--may have the power to deceive him; but experience
+and reflection will rectify his errors, point out his mistakes, place
+him in the right road, teach him what can really conduce to, what can
+truly conduct him to happiness. From this, it will appear, that _reason_
+is man's nature, modified by experience, moulded by judgment, regulated
+by reflection: it supposes a moderate, sober temperament; a just, a
+sound mind; a well-regulated, orderly imagination; a knowledge of truth,
+grounded upon tried, upon reiterated experience; in fact, prudence
+and foresight: this will serve to prove, that although nothing is more
+commonly asserted, although the phrase is repeated daily, nay, hourly,
+that _man is a reasonable being_, yet there are but a very small number
+of the individuals who compose the human species, of whom it can with
+truth be said; who really enjoy the faculty of reason, or who combine
+the dispositions, the experience, by which it is constituted. It ought
+not, then to excite surprise, that the individuals of the human race,
+who are in a capacity to make true experience, are so few in number.
+Man, when he is born, brings with him into the world organs susceptible
+of receiving impulse, amassing ideas, of collecting experience; but
+whether it be from the vice of his system, the imperfection of his
+organization, or from those causes by which it is modified, his
+experience is false, his ideas are confused, his images are badly
+associated, his judgment is erroneous, his brain is saturated with
+vicious, with wicked systems, which necessarily have an influence over
+his conduct, which are continually disturbing his mind, and confounding
+his reason.
+
+Man's senses, as it has been shewn, are the only means by which he is
+enabled to ascertain whether his opinions are true or false, whether
+his conduct is useful to himself and beneficial to others, whether it is
+advantageous or disadvantageous. But that his senses may be competent to
+make a faithful relation--that they may be in a capacity to impress true
+ideas on his brain, it is requisite they should be sound; that is to
+say, in the state necessary to maintain his existence; in that
+order which is suitable to his preservation--that condition which is
+calculated to ensure his permanent felicity. It is also indispensable
+that his brain itself should be healthy, or in the proper circumstances
+to enable it to fulfil its functions with precision, to exercise its
+faculties with vigour. It is necessary that memory should faithfully
+delineate its anterior sensations, should accurately retrace its former
+ideas; to the end, that he may be competent to judge, to foresee the
+effects he may have to hope, the consequences he may have to fear, from
+those actions to which he may be determined by his will. If his organic
+system be vicious, if his interior or exterior organs be defective,
+whether by their natural conformation or from those causes by which they
+are regulated, he feels but imperfectly--in a manner less distinct than
+is requisite; his ideas are either false or suspicious, he judges badly,
+he is in a delusion, in a state of ebriety, in a sort of intoxication
+that prevents his grasping the true relation of things. In short, if
+his memory is faulty, if it is treacherous, his reflection is void,
+his imagination leads him astray, his mind deceives him, whilst the
+sensibility of his organs, simultaneously assailed by a crowd of
+impressions, shocked by a variety of impulsions, oppose him to prudence,
+to foresight, to the exercise of his reason. On the other hand, if the
+conformation of his organs, as it happens with those of a phlegmatic
+temperament, of a dull habit, does not permit him to move, except with
+feebleness, in a sluggish manner, his experience is slow, frequently
+unprofitable. The tortoise and the butterfly are alike incapable of
+preventing their destruction. The stupid man, equally with him who is
+intoxicated, are in that state which renders it impossible for them to
+arrive at or attain the end they have in view.
+
+But what is the end? What is the aim of man in the sphere he occupies?
+It is to preserve himself; to render his existence happy. It becomes
+then of the utmost importance, that he should understand the true means
+which reason points out, which prudence teaches him to use, in order
+that he may with certainty, that he may constantly arrive at the
+end which he proposes to himself. These he will find are his natural
+faculties--his mind--his talents--his industry--his actions, determined
+by those passions of which his nature renders him susceptible, which
+give more or less activity to his will. Experience and reason again shew
+him, that the men with whom he is associated are necessary to him,
+are capable of contributing to his happiness, are in a capacity to
+administer to his pleasures, are competent to assist him by those
+faculties which are peculiar to them; experience teaches him the mode he
+must adopt to induce them to concur in his designs, to determine them to
+will and incline them to act in his favour. This points out to him the
+actions they approve--those which displease them--the conduct which
+attracts them--that which repels them--the judgment by which they are
+swayed--the advantages that occur--the prejudicial effects that result
+to him from their various modes of existence and from their diverse
+manner of acting. This experience furnishes him with the ideas of virtue
+and of vice, of justice and of injustice, of goodness and of wickedness,
+of decency and of indecency, of probity and of knavery: In short,
+he learns to form a judgment of men--to estimate their actions--to
+distinguish the various sentiments excited in them, according to the
+diversity of those effects which they make him experience. It is
+upon the necessary diversity of these effects that is founded the
+discrimination between good and evil--between virtue and vice;
+distinctions which do not rest, as some thinkers have believed, on the
+conventions made between men; still less, as some metaphysicians have
+asserted, upon the chimerical will of supernatural beings: but upon the
+solid, the invariable, the eternal relations that subsist between beings
+of the human species congregated together, and living in society: which
+relations will have existence as long as man shall remain, as long as
+society shall continue to exist.
+
+Thus _virtue_ is every thing that is truly beneficial, every thing
+that is constantly useful to the individuals of the human race, living
+together in society; _vice_ every thing that is really prejudicial,
+every thing that is permanently injurious to them. The greatest virtues
+are those which procure for man the most durable advantages, from which
+he derives the most solid happiness, which preserves the greatest degree
+of order in his association: the greatest vices, are those which most
+disturb his tendency to happiness, which perpetuate error, which most
+interrupt the necessary order of society.
+
+The _virtuous man_, is he whose actions tend uniformly to the welfare,
+constantly to the happiness, of his fellow creatures. The _vicious man_,
+is he whose conduct tends to the misery, whose propensities form the
+unhappiness of those with whom he lives; from whence his own peculiar
+misery most commonly results.
+
+Every thing that procures for a man true and permanent happiness is
+reasonable; every thing that disturbs his individual felicity, or that
+of the beings necessary to his happiness, is foolish and unreasonable.
+The man who injures others, is wicked; the man who injures himself, is
+an imprudent being, who neither has a knowledge of reason, of his own
+peculiar interests, nor of truth.
+
+Man's _duties_ are the means pointed out to him by experience, the
+circle which reason describes for him, by which he is to arrive at that
+goal he proposes to himself; these duties are the necessary consequence
+of the relations subsisting between mortals, who equally desire
+happiness, who are equally anxious to preserve their existence. When it
+is said these duties _compel him_, it signifies nothing more than that,
+without taking these means, he could not reach the end proposed to him
+by his nature. Thus, _moral obligation_ is the necessity of employing
+the natural means to render the beings with whom he lives happy; to
+the end that he may determine them in turn to contribute to his own
+individual happiness: his obligation toward himself, is the necessity
+he is under to take those means, without which he would be incapable to
+conserve himself, or render his existence solidly and permanently
+happy. Morals, like the universe, is founded upon necessity, or upon the
+eternal relation of things.
+
+_Happiness_ is a mode of existence of which man naturally wishes the
+duration, or in which he is willing to continue. It is measured by its
+duration, by its vivacity. The greatest happiness is that which has the
+longest continuance: transient happiness, or that which has only a
+short duration, is called _Pleasure_; the more lively it is, the more
+fugitive, because man's senses are only susceptible of a certain quantum
+of motion. When pleasure exceeds this given quantity, it is changed into
+_anguish_, or into that painful mode of existence, of which he ardently
+desires the cessation: this is the reason why pleasure and pain
+frequently so closely approximate each other as scarcely to be
+discriminated. Immoderate pleasure is the forerunner of regret. It is
+succeeded by ennui, it is followed by weariness, it ends in disgust:
+transient happiness frequently converts itself into durable misfortune.
+According to these principles it will be seen that man, who in each
+moment of his duration seeks necessarily after happiness, ought, when
+he is reasonable, to manage, to husband, to regulate his pleasures; to
+refuse himself to all those of which the indulgence would be succeeded
+by regret; to avoid those which can convert themselves into pain; in
+order that he may procure for himself the most permanent felicity.
+
+Happiness cannot be the same for all the beings of the human species;
+the same pleasures cannot equally affect men whose conformation is
+different, whose modification is diverse. This no doubt, is the true
+reason why the greater number of moral philosophers are so little
+in accord upon those objects in which they have made man's happiness
+consist, as well as on the means by which it may be obtained.
+Nevertheless, in general, happiness appears to be a state, whether
+momentary or durable, in which man readily acquiesces, because he finds
+it conformable to his being. This state results from the accord,
+springs out of the conformity, which is found between himself and
+those circumstances in which he has been placed by Nature; or, if it be
+preferred, _happiness is the co-ordination of man, with the causes that
+give him impulse_.
+
+The ideas which man forms to himself of happiness depend not only on his
+temperament, on his individual conformation, but also upon the habits he
+has contracted. _Habit_ is, in man, a mode of existence--of thinking--of
+acting, which his organs, as well interior as exterior, contract, by the
+frequent reiteration of the same motion; from whence results the faculty
+of performing these actions with promptitude, of executing them with
+facility.
+
+If things be attentively considered, it will be found that almost
+the whole conduct of man--the entire system of his actions--his
+occupations--his connexions--his studies--his amusements--his
+manners--his customs--his very garments--even his aliments, are the
+effect of habit. He owes equally to habit, the facility with which
+he exercises his mental faculties of thought--of judgment--of wit--of
+reason--of taste, &c. It is to habit he owes the greater part of his
+inclinations--of his desires--of his opinions--of his prejudices--of the
+ideas, true or false, he forms to himself of his welfare. In short, it
+is to habit, consecrated by time, that he owes those errors into
+which everything strives to precipitate him; from which every thing
+is calculated to prevent him emancipating himself. It is habit that
+attaches him either to virtue or to vice: experience proves this:
+observation teaches incontrovertibly that the first crime is always
+accompanied by more pangs of remorse than the second; this again, by
+more than the third; so on to those that follow. A first action is the
+commencement of a habit; those which succeed confirm it: by force
+of combatting the obstacles that prevent the commission of criminal
+actions, man arrives at the power of vanquishing them with ease; of
+conquering them with facility. Thus he frequently becomes wicked from
+habit.
+
+Man is so much modified by habit, that it is frequently confounded
+with his nature: from hence results, as will presently be seen, those
+opinions or those ideas, which he has called _innate_: because he has
+been unwilling to recur back to the source from whence they sprung:
+which has, as it were, identified itself with his brain. However this
+may be, he adheres with great strength of attachment to all those things
+to which he is habituated; his mind experiences a sort of violence, an
+incommodious revulsion, a troublesome distaste, when it is endeavoured
+to make him change the course of his ideas: a fatal predilection
+frequently conducts him back to the old track in despite of reason.
+
+It is by a pure mechanism that may be explained the phenomena of habit,
+as well physical as moral; the soul, notwithstanding its spirituality,
+is modified exactly in the same manner as the body. Habit, in man,
+causes the organs of voice to learn the mode of expressing quickly the
+ideas consigned to his brain, by means of certain motion, which, during
+his infancy, the tongue acquires the power of executing with facility:
+his tongue, once habituated to move itself in a certain manner, finds
+much trouble, has great pain, to move itself after another mode; the
+throat yields with difficulty to those inflections which are exacted by
+a language different from that to which he has, been accustomed. It is
+the same with regard to his ideas; his brain, his interior organ, his
+soul, inured to a given manner of modification, accustomed to attach
+certain ideas to certain objects, long used to form to itself a system
+connected with certain opinions, whether true or false, experiences a
+painful sensation, whenever he undertakes to give it a new impulse, or
+alter the direction of its habitual motion. It is nearly as difficult to
+make him change his opinions as his language.
+
+Here, then, without doubt, is the cause of that almost invincible
+attachment which man displays to those customs--those prejudices--those
+institutions of which it is in vain that reason, experience, good sense
+prove to him the inutility, or even the danger. Habit opposes itself to
+the clearest, the most evident demonstrations; these can avail
+nothing against those passions, those vices, which time has rooted
+in him--against the most ridiculous systems--against the most absurd
+notions--against the most extravagant hypotheses--against the strangest
+customs: above all, when he has learned to attach to them the ideas
+of utility, of common interest, of the welfare of society. Such is the
+source of that obstinacy, of that stubbornness, which man evinces for
+his religion, for ancient usages, for unreasonable customs, for laws so
+little accordant with justice, for abuses, which so frequently make him
+suffer, for prejudices of which he sometimes acknowledges the absurdity,
+yet is unwilling to divest himself of them. Here is the reason
+why nations contemplate the most useful novelties as mischievous
+innovations--why they believe they would be lost, if they were to
+remedy those evils to which they have become habituated; which they have
+learned to consider as necessary to their repose; which they have been
+taught to consider dangerous to be cured.
+
+_Education_ is only the art of making man contract, in early life,
+that is to say, when his organs are extremely flexible, the habits, the
+opinions, the modes of existence, adopted by the society in which he
+is placed. The first moments of his infancy are employed in collecting
+experience; those who are charged with the care of rearing him, or who
+are entrusted to bring him up, teach him how to apply it: it is they who
+develope reason in him: the first impulse they give him commonly decides
+upon his condition, upon his passions, upon the ideas he forms to
+himself of happiness, upon the means he shall employ to procure it,
+upon his virtues, and upon his vices. Under the eyes of his masters,
+the infant acquires ideas: under their tuition he learns to associate
+them,--to think in a certain manner,--to judge well or ill. They point
+out to him various objects, which they accustom him either to love or
+to hate, to desire or to avoid, to esteem or to despise. It is thus
+opinions are transmitted from fathers, mothers, nurses, and masters,
+to man in his infantine state. It is thus, that his mind by degrees
+saturates itself with truth, or fills itself with error; after which
+he regulates his conduct, which renders him either happy or miserable,
+virtuous or vicious, estimable or hateful. It is thus he becomes either
+contented or discontented with his destiny, according to the objects
+towards which they have directed his passions--towards which they have
+bent the energies of his mind; that is to say, in which they have shewn
+him his interest, in which they have taught him to place his felicity:
+in consequence, he loves and searches after that which they have taught
+him to revere--that which they have made the object of his research; he
+has those tastes, those inclinations, those phantasms, which, during the
+whole course of his life, he is forward to indulge, which he is eager to
+satisfy, in proportion to the activity they have excited in him, and the
+capacity with which he has been provided by Nature.
+
+_Politics_ ought to be the art of regulating the passions of man--of
+directing them to the welfare of society--of diverting them into a
+genial current of happiness--of making them flow gently to the
+general benefit of all: but too frequently it is nothing more than the
+detestible art of arming the passions of the various members of society
+against each other,--of making them the engines to accomplish their
+mutual destruction,--of converting them into agents which embitter
+their existence, create jealousies among them, and fill with rancorous
+animosities that association from which, if properly managed, man ought
+to derive his felicity. Society is commonly so vicious because it is not
+founded upon Nature, upon experience, and upon general utility; but
+on the contrary, upon the passions, upon the caprices, and upon the
+particular interests of those by whom it is governed. In short, it is
+for the most part the advantage of the few opposed to the prosperity of
+the many.
+
+Politics, to be useful, should found its principles upon Nature; that is
+to say, should conform itself to the essence of man, should mould itself
+to the great end of society: but what is society? and what is its end?
+It is a whole, formed by the union of a great number of families, or by
+a collection of individuals, assembled from a reciprocity of interest,
+in order that they may satisfy with greater facility their reciprocal
+wants--that they may, with more certainty, procure the advantages they
+desire--that they may obtain mutual succours--above all, that they may
+gain the faculty of enjoying, in security, those benefits with which
+Nature and industry may furnish them: it follows, of course, that
+politics, which are intended to maintain society, and to consolidate
+the interests of this congregation, ought to enter into its views, to
+facilitate the means of giving them efficiency, to remove all those
+obstacles that have a tendency to counteract the intention with which
+man entered into association.
+
+Man, in approximating to his fellow man, to live with him in society,
+has made, either formally or tacitly, a covenant; by which he engages
+to render mutual services, to do nothing that can be prejudicial to his
+neighbour. But as the nature of each individual impels him each instant
+to seek after his own welfare, which he has mistaken to consist in the
+gratification of his passions, and the indulgence of his transitory
+caprices, without any regard to the convenience of his fellows; there
+needed a power to conduct him back to his duty, to oblige him to conform
+himself to his obligations, and to recall him to his engagements, which
+the hurry of his passions frequently make him forget. This power is the
+_law_; it is, or ought to be, the collection of the will of society,
+reunited to fix the conduct of its members, to direct their action in
+such a mode, that it may concur to the great end of his association--the
+general good.
+
+But as society, more especially when very numerous, is incapable of
+assembling itself, unless with great difficulty, as it cannot with
+tumult make known its intentions, it is obliged to choose citizens in
+whom it places a confidence, whom it makes the interpreter of its will,
+whom it constitutes the depositaries of the power requisite to carry
+it into execution. Such is the origin of all _government_, which to be
+legitimate can only be founded on the free consent of society. Those
+who are charged with the care of governing, call themselves sovereigns,
+chiefs, legislators: according to the form which society has been
+willing to give to its government: these sovereigns are styled monarchs,
+magistrates, representatives, &c. Government only borrows its power from
+society: being established for no other purpose than its welfare, it is
+evident society can revoke this power whenever its interest shall exact
+it; change the form of its government; extend or limit the power which
+it has confided to its chiefs, over whom, by the immutable laws of
+Nature, it always conserves a supreme authority: because these laws
+enjoin, that the part shall always remain subordinate to the whole.
+
+Thus sovereigns are the ministers of society, its interpreters, the
+depositaries of a greater or of a less portion of its power; but they
+are not its absolute masters, neither are they the proprietors of
+nations. By a _covenant_, either expressed or implied, they engage
+themselves to watch over the maintenance, to occupy themselves with the
+welfare of society; it is only upon these conditions society consents to
+obey them. The price of obedience is protection. There is or ought to
+be a reciprocity of interest between the governed and the governor:
+whenever this reciprocity is wanting, society is in that state of
+confusion of which we spoke in the fifth chapter: it is verging on
+destruction. No society upon earth was ever willing or competent to
+confer irrevocably upon its chiefs the power, the right, of doing it
+injury. Such a concession, such a compact, would be annulled, would be
+rendered void by Nature; because she wills that each society, the
+same as each individual of the human species shall tend to its own
+conservation; it has not therefore the capacity to consent to its
+permanent unhappiness. _Laws_, in order that they may be just, ought
+invariably to have for their end, the general interest of society; that
+is to say, to assure to the greater number of citizens those advantages
+for which man originally associated. These advantages are _liberty,
+property, security_.
+
+_Liberty_, to man, is the faculty of doing, for his own peculiar
+happiness, every thing which does not injure or diminish the happiness
+of his associates: in associating, each individual renounced the
+exercise of that portion of his natural liberty which would be able to
+prejudice or injure the liberty of his fellows. The exercise of that
+liberty which is injurious to society is called _licentiousness_.
+
+_Property_, to man, is the faculty of enjoying those advantages which
+spring from labour; those benefits which industry or talent has procured
+to each member of society.
+
+_Security_, to man, is the certitude, the assurance, that each
+individual ought to have, of enjoying in his person, of finding for
+his property the protection of the laws, as long as he shall faithfully
+observe, as long as he shall punctually perform, his engagements with
+society.
+
+_Justice_, to man, assures to all the members of society, the possession
+of these advantages, the enjoyment of those rights, which belong to
+them. From this, it will appear, that without justice, society is not in
+a condition to procure the happiness of any man. Justice is also called
+_equity_, because by the assistance of the laws made to command the
+whole, she reduces all its members to a state of equality; that is
+to say, she prevents them from prevailing one over the other, by
+the inequality which Nature or industry may have made between their
+respective powers.
+
+_Rights_, to man, are every thing which society, by equitable laws,
+permits each individual to do for his own peculiar felicity. These
+rights are evidently limited by the invariable end of all association:
+society has, on its part, rights over all its members, by virtue of the
+advantages which it procures for them; all its members, in turn, have
+a right to claim, to exact from society, or secure from its ministers
+those advantages for the procuring of which they congregated, in favour
+of which they renounced a portion of their natural liberty. A society,
+of which the chiefs, aided by the laws, do not procure any good for its
+members, evidently loses its right over them: those chiefs who injure
+society lose the right of commanding. It is not our country, without
+it secures the welfare of its inhabitants; a society without equity
+contains only enemies; a society oppressed is composed only of tyrants
+and slaves; slaves are incapable of being citizens; it is liberty,
+property, and security, that render our country dear to us; it is the
+true love of his country that forms the citizen.
+
+For want of having a proper knowledge of these truths, or for want
+of applying them when known, some nations have become unhappy--have
+contained nothing but a vile heap of slaves, separated from each other,
+detached from society, which neither procures for them any good, nor
+secures to them any one advantage. In consequence of the imprudence of
+some nations, or of the craft, cunning, and violence of those to whom
+they have confided the power of making laws, and carrying them into
+execution, their sovereigns have rendered themselves absolute masters of
+society. These, mistaking the true source of their power, pretended to
+hold it from heaven, to be accountable for their actions to God alone,
+to owe nothing, not to have any obligation to society, in a word, to
+be gods upon earth, to possess the right of governing arbitrarily.
+From thence politics became corrupted: they were only a mockery. Such
+nations, disgraced and grown contemptible, did not dare resist the will
+of their chiefs; their laws were nothing more than the expression of the
+caprice of these chiefs; public welfare was sacrificed to their peculiar
+interests; the force of society was turned against itself; its members
+withdrew to attach themselves to its oppressors, to its tyrants; these
+to seduce them, permitted them to injure it with impunity and to profit
+by its misfortunes. Thus liberty, justice, security, and virtue, were
+banished from many nations; politics was no longer any thing more than
+the art of availing itself of the forces of a people and of the treasure
+of society; of dividing it on the subject of its interest, in order to
+subjugate it by itself; at length a stupid, a mechanical habit, made
+them cherish their oppressors, and love their chains.
+
+Man when he has nothing to fear, presently becomes wicked; he who
+believes he has not occasion for his fellow, persuades himself he may
+follow the inclinations of his heart without caution or discretion. Thus
+fear is the only obstacle society can effectually oppose to the passions
+of its chiefs; without it they will quickly become corrupt, and will
+not scruple to avail themselves of the means society has placed in their
+hands, to make them accomplices in their iniquity. To prevent these
+abuses, it is requisite society should set bounds to its confidence;
+should limit the power which it delegates to its chiefs; should reserve
+to itself a sufficient portion of authority to prevent them from
+injuring it; it must establish prudent checks: it must cautiously divide
+the power it confers, because re-united, it will by such reunion be
+infallibly oppressed. The slightest reflection, the most scanty
+review, will make men feel that the burthen of governing and weight
+of administration, is too ponderous and overpowering to be borne by an
+individual; that the scope of his jurisdiction, that the range of his
+surveillance, and multiplicity of his duties must always render him
+negligent; that the extent of his power has ever a tendency to render
+him mischievous. In short, the experience of all ages will convince
+nations that man is continually tempted to the abuse of power: that as
+an abundance of strong liquor intoxicates his brain, so unlimited power
+corrupts his heart; that therefore the sovereign ought to be subject to
+the law, not the law to the sovereign.
+
+_Government_ has necessarily an equal influence over the philosophy, as
+over the morals of nations. In the same manner that its care produces
+labour, activity, abundance, salubrity and justice; its negligence
+induces idleness, sloth, discouragement, penury, contagion, injustice,
+vices and crimes. It depends upon government either to foster industry,
+mature genius, give a spring to talents, or stifle them. Indeed
+government, the disturber of dignities, of riches, of rewards, and
+punishments; the master of those objects in which man from his infancy
+has learned to place his felicity, and contemplate as the means of his
+happiness; acquires a necessary influence over his conduct: it kindles
+his passions; gives them direction; makes him instrumental to whatever
+purpose it pleases; it modifies him; determines his manners; which in
+a whole people, as in the individual, is nothing more than the conduct,
+the general system of wills, of actions that necessarily result from his
+education, government, laws, and religious opinions--his institutions,
+whether rational or irrational. In short, manners are the habits of a
+people: these are good whenever society draws from them true felicity
+and solid happiness; they are bad, they are detestable in the eye of
+reason, when the happiness of society does not spring from them; they
+are unwholesome when they have nothing more in their favour than the
+suffrage of time, and the countenance of prejudice which rarely
+consults experience, which is almost ever at variance with good sense:
+notwithstanding they may have the sanction of the law, custom, religion,
+public opinion, or example, they may be unworthy and may be disgraceful,
+provided society is in disorder; that crime abounds; that virtue shrinks
+beneath the basilisk eye of triumphant vice; they may then be said to
+resemble the UPAS, whose luxuriant yet poisonous foliage, the produce
+of a rank soil, becomes more baneful to those who are submitted to
+its vortex, in proportion as it extends its branches. If experience he
+consulted, it will be found there is no action, however abominable, that
+has not received the applause, that has not obtained the approbation of
+some people. Parricide, the sacrifice of children, robbery, usurpation,
+cruelty, intolerance, and prostitution, have all in their turn been
+licensed actions; have been advocated; have been deemed laudable
+and meritorious deeds with some nations of the earth. Above all,
+_superstition_ has consecrated the most unreasonable, the most revolting
+customs.
+
+Man's passions result from and depend on the motion of attraction or
+repulsion, of which he is rendered susceptible by Nature; who enables
+him, by his peculiar essence, to be attracted by those objects which
+appear useful to him, to be repelled by those which he considers
+prejudicial; it follows that government, by holding the magnet, can put
+these passions into activity, has the power either of restraining them,
+or of giving them a favorable or an unfavorable direction. All his
+passions are constantly limited by either loving or hating, seeking
+or avoiding, desiring or fearing. These passions, so necessary to the
+conservation of man, are a consequence of his organization; they display
+themselves with more or less energy, according to his temperament;
+education and habit develope them; government gives them play, conducts
+them towards those objects, which it believes itself interested in
+making desirable to its subjects. The various names which have been
+given to these passions, are relative to the different objects by which
+they are excited, such as pleasure, grandeur, or riches, which produce
+voluptuousness, ambition, vanity and avarice. If the source of those
+passions which predominate in nations be attentively examined it will
+be commonly found in their governments. It is the impulse received
+from their chiefs that renders them sometimes warlike, sometimes
+superstitious, sometimes aspiring after glory, sometimes greedy after
+wealth, sometimes rational, and sometimes unreasonable; if sovereigns,
+in order to enlighten and render happy their dominions, were to employ
+only the _tenth_ part of the vast expenditures which they lavish, only
+a _tythe_ of the pains which they employ to render them brutish, to
+stupify them, to deceive them, and to afflict them; their subjects
+would presently be as wise, would quickly be as happy, as they are now
+remarkable for being blind, ignorant, and miserable.
+
+Let the vain project of destroying, the delusive attempt at rooting his
+passions from the heart of man, he abandoned; let an effort be made to
+direct them towards objects that may be useful to himself, beneficial to
+his associates. Let education, let government, let the laws, habituate
+him to restrain his passions within those just bounds that experience
+fixes and reason prescribes. Let the ambitious have honours, titles,
+distinctions, and power, when they shall have usefully served their
+country; let riches be given to those who covet them, when they shall
+have rendered themselves necessary to their fellow citizens; let
+commendations, let eulogies, encourage those who shall be actuated by
+the love of glory. In short, let the passions of man have a free, an
+uninterrupted course, whenever there shall result from their exercise,
+real, substantial, and durable advantages to society. Let education
+kindle only those, which are truly beneficial to the human species; let
+it favour those alone which are really necessary to the maintenance of
+society. The passions of man are dangerous, only because every thing
+conspires to give them an evil direction.
+
+Nature does not make man either good or wicked: she combines machines
+more or less active, mobile, and energetic; she furnishes him with
+organs and temperament, of which his passions, more or less impetuous,
+are the necessary consequence; these passions have always his happiness
+for their object, his welfare for their end: in consequence they are
+legitimate, they are natural, they can only be called bad or good,
+relatively, to the influence they have on the beings of his species.
+Nature gives man legs proper to sustain his weight, and necessary to
+transport him from one place to another; the care of those who rear them
+strengthens them, habituates him to avail himself of him, accustoms
+him to make either a good or a bad use of them. The arm which he has
+received from Nature is neither good nor bad; it is necessary to a great
+number of the actions of life; nevertheless, the use of this arm
+becomes criminal, if he has contracted the habit of using it to rob, to
+assassinate, with a view to obtain that money which he has been taught
+from his infancy to desire, and which the society in which he lives
+renders necessary to him, but which his industry will enable him to
+obtain without doing injury to his fellow man.
+
+The heart of man is a soil which Nature has made equally suitable to the
+production of brambles, or of useful grain--of deleterous poison, or of
+refreshing fruit, by virtue of the seeds which may be sown in it--by the
+cultivation that may be bestowed upon it, In his infancy, those objects
+are pointed out to him which he is to estimate or to despise, to
+seek after or to avoid, to love or to hate. It is his parents,
+his instructors, who render him either virtuous or wicked, wise or
+unreasonable, studious or dissipated, steady or trifling, solid or
+vain. Their example, their discourse, modify him through his whole life,
+teaching him what are the things he ought either to desire or to avoid;
+what the objects he ought to fear or to love: he desires them, in
+consequence; and he imposes on himself the task of obtaining them,
+according to the energy of his temperament, which ever decides the
+force of his passions. It is thus that education, by inspiring him with
+opinions, by infusing into him ideas, whether true or false, gives
+him those primitive impulsions after which he acts, in a manner either
+advantageous or prejudicial both to himself and to others. Man, at
+his birth, brings with him into the world nothing but the necessity
+of conserving himself, of rendering his existence happy: instruction,
+example, the customs of the world, present him with the means, either
+real or imaginary, of achieving it; habit procures for him the facility
+of employing these means: he attaches himself strongly to those he
+judges best calculated, most proper to secure to him the possession of
+those objects which they have taught him, which he has learned to
+desire as the preferable good attached to his existence. Whenever his
+education--whenever the examples which have been afforded him--whenever
+the means with which he has been provided, are approved by reason, are
+the result of experience, every thing concurs to render him virtuous;
+habit strengthens these dispositions in him; he becomes, in consequence,
+a useful member of society; to the interests of which, every thing ought
+to prove to him his own permanent well-being, his own durable felicity,
+is necessarily allied. If, on the contrary, his education--his
+institutions--the examples which are set before him--the opinions which
+are suggested to him in his infancy, are of a nature to exhibit to his
+mind virtue as useless and repugnant--vice as useful and congenial to
+his own individual happiness, he will become vicious; he will believe
+himself interested in injuring society, in rendering his associates
+unhappy; he will be carried along by the general current: he will
+renounce virtue, which to him will no longer be any thing more than
+a vain idol, without attractions to induce him to follow it; without
+charms to tempt his adoration; because it will appear to exact, that he
+should immolate at its shrine, that he should sacrifice at its altar all
+those objects which he has been constantly taught to consider the most
+dear to himself; to contemplate as benefits the most desirable.
+
+In order that man may become virtuous, it is absolutely requisite that
+he should have an interest, that he should find advantages in practising
+virtue. For this end, it is necessary that education should implant in
+him reasonable ideas; that public opinion should lean towards virtue, as
+the most desirable good; that example should point it out as the object
+most worthy esteem; that government should faithfully recompense, should
+regularly reward it; that honor should always accompany its practice;
+that vice should constantly be despised; that crime should invariably be
+punished. Is virtue in this situation amongst men? does the education of
+man infuse into him just, faithful ideas of happiness--true notions of
+virtue--dispositions really favourable to the beings with whom he is to
+live? The examples spread before him, are they suitable to innocence and
+manners? are they calculated to make him respect decency--to cause him
+to love probity--to practice honesty--to value good faith--to esteem
+equity--to revere conjugal fidelity--to observe exactitude in fulfilling
+his duties? Religion, which alone pretends to regulate his manners, does
+it render him sociable--does it make him pacific--does it teach him to
+be humane? The arbiters, the sovereigns of society, are they faithful
+in recompensing, punctual in rewarding, those who have best served their
+country? in punishing those who have pillaged, who have robbed, who have
+plundered, who have divided, who have ruined it? Justice, does she hold
+her scales with a firm, with an even hand, between all the citizens
+of the state? The laws, do they never support the strong against the
+weak--favor the rich against the poor--uphold the happy against the
+miserable? In short, is it an uncommon spectacle to behold crime
+frequently justified, often applauded, sometimes crowned with success,
+insolently triumphing, arrogantly striding over that merit which it
+disdains, over that virtue which it outrages? Well then, in societies
+thus constituted, virtue can only be heard by a very small number of
+peaceable citizens, a few generous souls, who know how to estimate its
+value, who enjoy it in secret. For the others, it is only a disgusting
+object; they see in it nothing but the supposed enemy to their
+happiness, or the censor of their individual conduct.
+
+If man, according to his nature, is necessitated to desire his welfare,
+he is equally obliged to love and cherish the means by which he believes
+it is to be acquired: it would be useless, it would perhaps be unjust,
+to demand that a man should be virtuous, if he could not be so without
+rendering himself miserable. Whenever he thinks vice renders him happy,
+he must necessarily love vice; whenever he sees inutility recompensed,
+crime rewarded--whenever he witnesses either or both of them
+honored,--what interest will he find in occupying himself with the
+happiness of his fellow-creatures? what advantage will he discover in
+restraining the fury of his passions? Whenever his mind is saturated
+with false ideas, filled with dangerous opinions, it follows, of course,
+that his whole conduct will become nothing more than a long chain of
+errors, a tissue of mistakes, a series of depraved actions.
+
+We are informed, that the savages, in order to flatten the heads
+of their children, squeeze them between two boards, by that means
+preventing them from taking the shape designed for them by Nature. It is
+pretty nearly the same thing with the institutions of man; they commonly
+conspire to counteract Nature, to constrain and divert, to extinguish
+the impulse Nature has given him, to substitute others which are the
+source of all his misfortunes. In almost all the countries of the
+earth, man is bereft of truth, is fed with falsehoods, and amused with
+marvellous chimeras: he is treated like those children whose members
+are, by the imprudent care of their nurses, swathed with little fillets,
+bound up with rollers, which deprive them of the free use of their
+limbs, obstruct their growth, prevent their activity, and oppose
+themselves to their health.
+
+Most of the superstitious opinions of man have for their object only to
+display to him his supreme felicity in those illusions for which they
+kindle his passions: but as the phantoms which are presented to his
+imagination are incapable of being considered in the same light by all
+who contemplate them, he is perpetually in dispute concerning these
+objects; he hates his fellow, he persecutes his neighbour, his neighbour
+in turn persecutes him, and he believes that in doing this he is doing
+well: that in committing the greatest crimes to sustain his opinions
+he is acting right. It is thus superstition infatuates man from his
+infancy, fills him with vanity, and enslaves him with fanaticism: if he
+has a heated imagination, it drives him on to fury; if he has activity,
+it makes him a madman, who is frequently as cruel himself, as he is
+dangerous to his fellow-creatures, as he is incommodious to others: if,
+on the contrary, he be phlegmatic, and of a slothful habit, he becomes
+melancholy and useless to society.
+
+_Public opinion_ every instant offers to man's contemplation false ideas
+of honor, and wrong notions of glory: it attaches his esteem not only
+to frivolous advantages, but also to prejudicial interests and injurious
+actions; which example authorizes, which prejudice consecrates, which
+habit precludes him from viewing with the disgust and horror which they
+merit. Indeed, habit familiarizes his mind with the most absurd
+ideas, the most unreasonable customs, the most blameable actions; with
+prejudices the most contrary to his own interests, and detrimental
+to the society in which he lives. He finds nothing strange, nothing
+singular, nothing despicable, nothing ridiculous, except those opinions
+and objects to which he is himself unaccustomed. There are countries
+in which the most laudable actions appear very blameable and
+ridiculous--where the foulest and most diabolical actions pass for very
+honest and perfectly rational conduct. In some nations they kill the old
+men; in some the children strangle their fathers. The Phoenicians and
+Carthaginians immolated their children to their gods. Europeans approve
+duels; he who refuses to cut the throat of another, or to blow out the
+brains of his neighbour, is contemplated by them as dishonoured. The
+Spaniards and Portuguese think it meritorious to burn an heretic. In
+some countries women prostitute themselves without dishonour; in others
+it is the height of hospitality for a man to present his wife to the
+embraces of the stranger: the refusal to accept this, excites his scorn
+and calls forth his resentment.
+
+_Authority_ commonly believes itself interested in maintaining the
+received opinions: those prejudices and errors which it considers
+requisite to the maintenance of its power and the consolidation of its
+interests, are sustained by force, which is never rational. Princes
+themselves, filled with deceptive images of happiness, mistaken notions
+of power, erroneous opinions of grandeur, and false ideas of glory, are
+surrounded with flattering courtiers, who are interested in keeping
+up the delusion of their masters: these contemptible men have acquired
+ideas of virtue, only that they may outrage it: by degrees they
+corrupt the people, these become depraved, lend themselves to their
+debaucheries, pander to the vices of the great, then make a merit of
+imitating them in their irregularities. A court is too frequently the
+true focus of the corruption of a people.
+
+This is the true source of moral evil. It is thus that every thing
+conspires to render man vicious, and give a fatal impulse to his soul:
+from whence results the general confusion of society, which becomes
+unhappy, from the misery of almost every one of its members. The
+strongest motive-powers are put in action to inspire man with a passion
+for futile objects which are indifferent to him; which make him become
+dangerous to his fellow man, by the means which he is compelled to
+employ, in order to obtain them. Those who have the charge of guiding
+his steps, either impostors themselves, or the dupes to their own
+prejudices, forbid him to hearken to reason; they make truth appear
+dangerous to him; they exhibit error as requisite to his welfare, not
+only in this world, but in the next. In short, habit strongly attaches
+him to his irrational opinions, to his perilous inclinations, and to his
+blind passion for objects either useless or dangerous. Here, then,
+is the reason why for the most part man finds himself necessarily
+determined to evil; the reason why the passions, inherent in his
+Nature and necessary to his conservation, become the instruments of his
+destruction, and the bane of that society, which properly conducted,
+they ought to preserve; the reason why society becomes a state of
+warfare; why it does nothing but assemble enemies, who are envious of
+each other, and are always rivals for the prize. If some virtuous beings
+are to be found in these societies, they must be sought for in the
+very small number of those, who born with a phlegmatic temperament have
+moderate passions, who therefore, either do not desire at all, or desire
+very feebly, those objects with which their associates are continually
+inebriated.
+
+Man's nature, diversely cultivated, decides upon his faculties, as
+well corporeal as intellectual; upon his qualities, as well moral
+as physical. The man who is of a sanguine, robust constitution, must
+necessarily have strong passions; he who is of a bilious, melancholy
+habit, will as necessarily have fantastical and gloomy passions; the man
+of a gay turn, of a sprightly imagination, will have cheerful passions;
+while the man in whom phlegm abounds, will have those which are gentle,
+or which have a very slight degree of violence. It appears to be upon
+the equilibrium of the humours, that depends the state of the man who
+is called _virtuous_; his temperament seems to be the result of a
+combination, in which the elements or principles are balanced with such
+precision that no one passion predominates over another, or carries into
+his machine more disorder than its neighbour.
+
+Habit, as we have seen, is man's nature modified: this latter furnishes
+the matter; education, domestic example, national manners, give it the
+form: these, acting on his temperament, make him either reasonable, or
+irrational--enlightened, or stupid--a fanatic, or a hero--an enthusiast
+for the public good, or an unbridled criminal--a wise man, smitten with
+the advantages of virtue, or a libertine, plunged into every kind of
+vice. All the varieties of the moral man, depend on the diversity of his
+ideas; which are themselves arranged and combined in his brain by the
+intervention of his senses. His temperament is the produce of physical
+substances, his habits are the effect of physical modifications; the
+opinions, whether good or bad, injurious or beneficial, true or false,
+which form themselves in his mind, are never more than the effect of
+those physical impulsions which the brain receives by the medium of the
+senses.
+
+
+
+
+
+CHAP. X.
+
+_The Soul does not derive its ideas from itself--It has no innate
+Ideas._
+
+
+What has preceded suffices to prove, that the interior organ of man,
+which is called his _soul_, is purely material. He will be enabled to
+convince himself of this truth, by the manner in which he acquires his
+ideas,--from those impressions which material objects successively make
+on his organs, which are themselves acknowledged to be material. It has
+been seen, that the faculties which are called intellectual, are to be
+ascribed to that of feeling; the different qualities of those faculties
+which are called moral, have been explained after the necessary laws
+of a very simple mechanism: it now remains, to reply to those who still
+obstinately persist in making the soul a substance distinguished from
+the body, or who insist on giving it an essence totally distinct. They
+seem to found their distinction upon this, that this interior organ has
+the faculty of drawing its ideas from within itself; they will have it,
+that man, at his birth, brings with him ideas into the world, which,
+according to this wonderful notion, they have called _innate_. The Jews
+have a similar doctrine which they borrowed from the Chaldeans: their
+rabbins taught, that each soul, before it was united to the seed that
+must form an infant in the womb of a woman, is confided to the care of
+an angel, which causes him to behold heaven, earth, and hell: this, they
+pretend, is done by the assistance of a lamp, which extinguishes itself
+as soon as the infant comes into the world. Some ancient philosophers
+have held, that the soul originally contains the principles of several
+notions or doctrines: the Stoics designated this by the term PROLEPSIS,
+_anticipated opinions_; the Greek mathematicians, KOINAS ENNOIAS,
+_universal ideas_. They have believed that the soul, by a special
+privilege, in a nature where every thing is connected, enjoyed the
+faculty of moving itself without receiving any impulse; of creating to
+itself ideas, of thinking on a subject, without being determined to
+such action, by any exterior object; which by moving its organs should
+furnish it with an image of the subject of its thoughts. In consequence
+of these gratuitous suppositions, of these extraordinary pretensions,
+which it is only requisite to expose, in order to confute some very able
+speculators, who were prepossessed by their superstitious prejudices;
+have ventured the length to assert, that without model, without
+prototype to act on the senses, the soul is competent to delineate to
+itself, the whole universe with all the beings it contains. DESCARTES
+and his disciples have assured us, that the body went absolutely for
+nothing, in the sensations, in the perceptions, in the ideas of the
+soul; that it can feel, that it can perceive, that it can understand,
+that it can taste, that it can touch, even when there should exist
+nothing that is corporeal or material exterior to ourselves. But what
+shall be said of a BERKELEY, who has endeavoured, who has laboured to
+prove to man, that every thing in this world is nothing more than a
+chimerical illusion; that the universe exists nowhere but in himself;
+that it has no identity but in his imagination; who has rendered the
+existence of all things problematical by the aid of sophisms, insolvable
+even to those who maintain the doctrine of the spirituality of the soul.
+
+Extravagant as this doctrine of the BISHOP OF CLOYNE may appear, it
+cannot well be more so than that of MALEBRANCHE, the champion of innate
+ideas; who makes the divinity the common bond between the soul and the
+body: or than that of those metaphysicians, who maintain that the soul
+is a substance heterogeneous to the body; who by ascribing to this soul
+the thoughts of man, have in fact rendered the body superfluous. They
+have not perceived they were liable to one solid objection, which is,
+that if the ideas of man are innate, if he derives them from a superior
+being, independent of exterior causes, if he sees every thing in God;
+how comes it that so many false ideas are afloat, that so many errors
+prevail, with which the human mind is saturated? From whence comes these
+opinions, which according to the theologians are so displeasing to God?
+Might it not be a question to the Malebranchists, was it in the Divinity
+that SPINOZA beheld his system?
+
+Nevertheless, to justify such monstrous opinions, they assert that ideas
+are only the objects of thought. But according to the last analysis,
+these ideas can only reach man from exterior objects, which in giving
+impulse to his senses modify his brain; or from the material beings
+contained within the interior of his machine, who make some parts of his
+body experience those sensations which he perceives, which furnish him
+with ideas, which he relates, faithfully or otherwise, to the cause that
+moves him. Each idea is an effect, but however difficult it may be to
+recur to the cause, can we possibly suppose it is not ascribable to
+a cause? If we can only form ideas of material substances, how can we
+suppose the cause of our ideas can possibly be immaterial? To pretend
+that man without the aid of exterior objects, without the intervention
+of his senses, is competent to form ideas of the universe, is to assert,
+that a blind man is in a capacity to form a true idea of a picture, that
+represents some fact of which he has never heard any one speak.
+
+It is very easy to perceive the source of those errors, into which men,
+otherwise extremely profound and very enlightened have fallen, when they
+have been desirous to speak of the soul: to describe its operations.
+Obliged either by their own prejudices, or by the fear of combatting the
+opinions of some imperious theologian, they have become the advocates of
+the principle, that the soul was a pure spirit: an immaterial substance;
+of an essence directly different from that of the body; from every thing
+we behold: this granted, they have been incompetent to conceive how
+material objects could operate, in what manner gross and corporeal
+organs were enabled to act on a substance, that had no kind of analogy
+with them; how they were in a capacity to modify it by conveying its
+ideas; in the impossibility of explaining this phenomenon, at the same
+time perceiving that the soul had ideas, they concluded that it must
+draw them from itself, and not from those beings, which according to
+their own hypothesis, were incapable of acting on it, or rather, of
+which they could not conceive the manner of action; they therefore
+imagined that all the modifications, all the actions of this soul,
+sprung from its own peculiar energy, were imprinted on it from its first
+formation, by the Author of Nature: that these did not in any manner
+depend upon the beings of which we have a knowledge, or which act upon
+it, by the gross means of our senses.
+
+There are, however, some phenomena, which, considered superficially,
+appear to support the opinion of these philosophers; to announce a
+faculty in the human soul of producing ideas within itself, without any
+exterior aid; these are _dreams_, in which the interior organ of man,
+deprived of objects that move it visibly, does not, however, cease to
+have ideas--to be set in activity--to be modified in a manner that is
+sufficiently sensible--to have an influence upon his body. But if a
+little reflection be called in, the solution to this difficulty will
+be found: it will be perceived that, even during sleep, his brain is
+supplied with a multitude of ideas, with which the eye or time before
+has stocked it; these ideas were communicated to it by exterior or
+corporeal objects, by which they have been modified: it will be found
+that these modifications renew themselves, not by any spontaneous,
+not by any voluntary motion on its part, but by a chain of involuntary
+movements which take place in his machine, which determine, which excite
+those that give play to the brain; these modifications renew themselves
+with more or less fidelity, with a greater or lesser degree of
+conformity to those which it has anteriorly experienced. Sometimes in
+dreaming, he has memory, then he retraces to himself the objects which
+have struck him faithfully;--at other times, these modifications renew
+themselves without order, and without connection, very differently from
+those, which real objects have before excited in his interior organ. If
+in a dream he believes he sees a friend, his brain renews in itself the
+modifications or the ideas which this friend had formerly excited--in
+the same order that they arranged themselves when his eyes really beheld
+him--this is nothing more than an effect of memory. If in his dream he
+fancies he sees a monster which has no model in nature, his brain is
+then modified in the same manner that it was by the particular, by the
+detached ideas, with which it then does nothing more than compose an
+ideal whole; by assembling, and associating, in a ridiculous manner, the
+scattered ideas that were consigned to its keeping; it is then, that in
+dreaming he has imagination.
+
+Those dreams that are troublesome, extravagant, whimsical, or
+unconnected, are commonly the effect of some confusion in his machine;
+such as painful indigestion--an overheated blood--a prejudicial
+fermentation, &c.--these material causes excite in his body a disorderly
+motion, which precludes the brain from being modified in the same manner
+it was on the day before; in consequence of this irregular motion the
+brain is disturbed, it only represents to itself confused ideas that
+want connection. When in a dream, he believes he sees a Sphinx, a being
+supposed by the poets to have a head and face like a woman, a body like
+a dog, wings like a bird, and claws like a lion, who put forth riddles
+and killed those who could not expound them; either, he has seen the
+representation of one when he was awake, or else the disorderly motion
+of the brain is such that it causes it to combine ideas, to connect
+parts, from which there results a whole without model, of which the
+parts were not formed to be united. It is thus, that his brain combines
+the head of a woman, of which it already has the idea, with the body of
+a lioness, of which it also has the image. In this his head acts in the
+same manner, as when by any defect in the interior organ, his disordered
+imagination paints to him some objects, notwithstanding he is awake. He
+frequently dreams, without being asleep: his dreams never produce any
+thing so strange but that they have some resemblance, with the
+objects which have anteriorly acted on his senses; which have already
+communicated ideas to his brain. The watchful theologians have composed,
+at their leisure, in their waking hours, those phantoms, of which they
+avail themselves, to terrify or frighten man; they have done nothing
+more than assemble the scattered traits which they have found in the
+most terrible beings of their own species; by exaggerating the powers,
+by enlarging the rights claimed by tyrants, they have formed ideal
+beings, before whom man trembles, and is afraid.
+
+Thus, it is seen, that dreams, far from proving that the soul acts by
+its own peculiar energy, that it draws its ideas from its own recesses;
+prove, on the contrary, that in sleep it is intirely passive, that it
+does not even renew its modifications, but according to the involuntary
+confusion, which physical causes produce in the body, of which every
+thing tends to shew the identity, the consubstantiality with the soul.
+What appears to have led those into a mistake, who maintained that the
+soul drew its ideas from itself, is this, they have contemplated these
+ideas, as if they were real beings, when, in point of fact, they are
+nothing more than the modifications produced in the brain of man, by
+objects to which this brain is a stranger; they are these objects,
+who are the true models, who are the real archetypes to which it is
+necessary to recur: here is the source of all their errors.
+
+In the individual who dreams, the soul does not act more from itself,
+than it does in the man who is drunk, that is to say, who is modified
+by some spirituous liquor: or than it does in the sick man, when he is
+delirious, that is to say, when he is modified by those physical causes
+which disturb his machine, which obstruct it in the performance of its
+functions; or than it, does in him, whose brain is disordered: dreams,
+like these various states, announce nothing more than a physical
+confusion in the human machine, under the influence of which the brain
+ceases to act, after a precise and regular manner: this disorder may
+be traced to physical causes, such as the aliments--the humours--the
+combinations--the fermentations, which are but little analogous to the
+salutary state of man; from hence it will appear, that his brain is
+necessarily confused, whenever his body is agitated in an extraordinary
+manner.
+
+Do not let him, therefore, believe that his soul acts by itself, or
+without a cause, in any one moment of his existence; it is, conjointly
+with the body, submitted to the impulse of beings, who act on him
+necessarily, according to their various properties. Wine taken in too
+great a quantity, necessarily disturbs his ideas, causes confusion in
+his corporeal functions, occasions disorder in his mental faculties.
+
+If there really existed a being in Nature, with the capability of moving
+itself by its own peculiar energies, that is to say, able to produce
+motion, independent of all other causes, such a being would have the
+power of arresting itself, or of suspending the motion of the universe;
+which is nothing more than an immense chain of causes linked one to
+another, acting and re-acting by necessary immutable laws, and which
+cannot be changed, which are incapable of being suspended, unless the
+essences of every thing in it were changed, without the properties
+of every thing were annihilated. In the general system of the world,
+nothing more can be perceived than a long series of motion, received
+and communicated in succession, by beings capacitated to give impulse to
+each other: it is thus, that each body is moved by the collision of some
+other body. The invisible motion of some soul is to be attributed to
+causes concealed within himself; he believes that it is moved by itself,
+because he does not see the springs which put it in motion, or because
+he conceives those powers are incapable of producing the effects he
+so much admires: but, does he more clearly conceive, how a spark in
+exploding gunpowder, is capable of producing the terrible effects he
+witnesses? The source of his errors arise from this, that he regards his
+body as gross and inert, whilst this body is a sensible machine, which
+has necessarily an instantaneous conscience the moment it receives an
+impression; which is conscious of its own existence by the recollection
+of impressions successively experienced; memory by resuscitating an
+impression anteriorly received, by detaining it, or by causing an
+impression which it receives to remain, whilst it associates it with
+another, then with a third, gives all the mechanism of _reasoning_.
+
+An idea, which is only an imperceptible modification of the brain, gives
+play to the organ of speech, which displays itself by the motion it
+excites in the tongue: this, in its turn, breeds ideas, thoughts, and
+passions, in those beings who are provided with organs susceptible of
+receiving analagous motion; in consequence of which, the wills of
+a great number of men are influenced, who, combining their efforts,
+produce a revolution in a state, or even have an influence over the
+entire globe. It is thus, that an ALEXANDER decided the fate of Asia, it
+is thus, that a MAHOMET changed the face of the earth; it is thus,
+that imperceptible causes produce the most terrible, the most extended
+effects, by a series of necessary motion imprinted on the brain of man.
+
+The difficulty of comprehending the effects produced on the soul of man,
+has made him attribute to it those incomprehensible qualities which have
+been examined. By the aid of imagination, by the power of thought, this
+soul appears to quit his body, to carry itself with the greatest ease,
+to transport itself with the utmost facility towards the most distant
+objects; to run over, to approximate in the twinkling of an eye, all the
+points of the universe: he has therefore believed, that a being who is
+susceptible of such rapid motion, must be of a nature very distinguished
+from all others; he has persuaded himself that this soul in reality does
+travel, that it actually springs over the immense space necessary to
+meet these various objects; he did not perceive, that to do it in
+an instant, it had only to run over itself to approximate the ideas
+consigned to its keeping, by means of the senses.
+
+Indeed, it is never by any other means than by his senses, that
+beings become known to man, or furnish him with ideas; it is only
+in consequence of the impulse given to his body, that his brain is
+modified, or that his soul thinks, wills, and acts. If, as ARISTOTLE
+asserted more than two thousand years ago,--"_nothing enters the mind
+of man but through the medium of his senses_,"--it follows as a
+consequence, that every thing that issues from it must find some
+sensible object to which it can attach its ideas, whether immediately,
+as a man, a tree, a bird, &c. or in the last analysis or decomposition,
+such as pleasure, happiness, vice, virtue, &c. This principle, so true,
+so luminous, so important in its consequence, has been set forth in all
+its lustre, by a great number of philosophers; among the rest, by the
+great LOCKE. Whenever, therefore, a word or its idea does not connect
+itself with some sensible object to which it can be related, this word
+or this idea is unmeaning, and void of sense; it were better for man
+that the idea was banished from his mind, struck out of his language:
+this principle is only the converse of the axiom of ARISTOTLE,--"_if
+the direct be evident, the inverse must be so likewise_." How has it
+happened, that the profound LOCKE, who, to the great mortification
+of the metaphysicians, has placed this principle of ARISTOTLE in the
+clearest point of view? how is it, that all those who, like him, have
+recognized the absurdity of the system of innate ideas, have not drawn
+the immediate, the necessary consequences? How has it come to pass, that
+they have not had sufficient courage to apply so clear a principle to
+all those fanciful chimeras with which the human mind has for such a
+length of time been so vainly occupied? did they not perceive that
+their principle sapped the very foundations of those metaphysical
+speculations, which never occupy man but with those objects of which, as
+they are inaccessible to his senses, he consequently can never form
+to himself any accurate idea? But prejudice, when it is generally held
+sacred, prevents him from seeing the most simple application of the most
+self-evident principles. In metaphysical researches, the greatest men
+are frequently nothing more than children, who are incapable of either
+foreseeing or deducing the consequence of their own data.
+
+LOCKE, as well as all those who have adopted his system, which is so
+demonstrable,--or to the axiom of ARISTOTLE, which is so clear, ought
+to have concluded from it that all those wonderful things with
+which metaphysicians have amused themselves, are mere chimeras; mere
+wanderings of the imagination; that an immaterial spirit or substance,
+without extent, without parts, is, in fact, nothing more than an
+absence of ideas; in short, they ought to have felt that the ineffable
+intelligence which they have supposed to preside at the helm of the
+world, is after all nothing more than a being of their own imagination,
+on which man has never been in accord, whom he has pictured under all
+the variety of forms, to which he has at different periods, in different
+climes, ascribed every kind of attribute, good or bad; but of which
+it is impossible his senses can ever prove either the existence or the
+qualities.
+
+For the same reason, moral philosophers ought to have concluded, that
+what is called moral sentiment, _moral instinct_, that is, innate
+ideas of virtue, anterior to all experience of the good or bad effects
+resulting from its practice, are mere chimerical notions, which, like a
+great many others, have for their guarantee and base only metaphysical
+speculation. Before man can judge, he must feel; before he can
+distinguish good from evil, he must compare. _Morals_, is a science of
+facts: to found them, therefore, on an hypothesis inaccessible to his
+senses, of which he has no means of proving the reality, is to render
+them uncertain; it is to cast the log of discord into his lap, to cause
+him unceasingly to dispute upon that which he can never understand.
+To assert that the ideas of morals are _innate_, or the effect of
+_instinct_, is to pretend that man knows how to read before he has
+learned the letters of the alphabet; that he is acquainted with the laws
+of society before they are either made or promulgated.
+
+To undeceive him, with respect to innate ideas or modifications,
+imprinted on his soul, at the moment of his birth, it is simply
+requisite to recur to their source; he will then see that those with
+which he is familiar, which have, as it were, identified themselves with
+his existence, have all come to him through the medium of some of
+his senses; that they are sometimes engraven on his brain with great
+difficulty,--that they have never been permanent,--that they have
+perpetually varied in him: he will see that these pretended inherent
+ideas of his soul, are the effect of education, of example, above all,
+of habit, which by reiterated motion has taught his brain to associate
+his ideas either in a confused or a perspicuous manner; to familiarize
+itself with systems either rational or absurd. In short, he takes those
+for innate ideas of which he has forgotten the origin; he no longer
+recals to himself, either the precise epoch, or the successive
+circumstances when these ideas were first consigned to his brain:
+arrived at a certain age he believes he has always had the same notions;
+his memory, crowded with experience, loaded with a multitude of facts,
+is no longer able to distinguish the particular circumstances which
+have contributed to give his brain its present modifications; its
+instantaneous mode of thinking; its actual opinions. For example, not
+one of his race, perhaps, recollects the first time the word God struck
+his ears--the first ideas that it formed in him--the first thoughts that
+it produced in him; nevertheless, it is certain that from thence he
+has searched for some being with whom to connect the idea which he has
+either formed to himself, or which has been suggested to him: accustomed
+to hear God continually spoken of, he has, when in other respects, the
+most enlightened, regarded this idea as if it were infused into him by
+Nature; whilst it is visibly to be attributed to those delineations of
+it, which his parents or his instructors have made to him; which he has,
+in consequence, modified according to his own particular organization,
+and the circumstances in which he has been placed; it is thus, that each
+individual forms to himself a God, of which he is himself the model, or
+which he modifies after his own fashion.
+
+His ideas of morals, although more real than those of metaphysics, are
+not however innate: the moral sentiments he forms on the will, or the
+judgment he passes on the actions of man, are founded on experience;
+which alone can enable him to discriminate those which are either useful
+or prejudicial, virtuous or vicious, honest or dishonest, worthy his
+esteem, or deserving his censure. His moral sentiments are the fruit
+of a multitude of experience that is frequently very long and very
+complicated. He gathers it with time; it is more or less faithful, by
+reason of his particular organization and the causes by which he is
+modified; he ultimately applies this experience with greater or less
+facility; to this is to be attributed his habit of judging. The celerity
+with which he applies his experience when he judges of the moral actions
+of his fellow man, is what has been termed _moral instinct_.
+
+That which in natural philosophy is called _instinct_, is only the
+effect of some want of the body, the consequence of some attraction or
+some repulsion in man or animals. The child that is newly born, sucks
+for the first time; the nipple of the breast is put into his mouth:
+by the natural analogy, that is found between the conglomerate glands,
+filled with nerves; which line his mouth, and the milk which flows from
+the bosom of the nurse, through the medium of the nipple, causes
+the child to press it with his mouth, in order to express the fluid
+appropriate to nourish his tender age; from all this the infant gathers
+experience; by degrees the idea of a nipple, of milk, of pleasure,
+associate themselves in his brain: every time he sees the nipple, he
+seizes it, promptly conveys it to his mouth, and applies it to the use
+for which it is designed.
+
+What has been said, will enable us to judge of those prompt and sudden
+sentiments, which have been designated _the force of blood_.
+Those sentiments of love, which fathers and mothers have for their
+children--those feelings of affection, which children, with good
+inclinations, bear towards their parents, are by no means _innate
+sentiments_; they are nothing more, than the effect of experience, of
+reflection, of habit, in souls of sensibility. These sentiments do not
+even exist in a great number of human beings. We but too often witness
+tyrannical parents, occupied with making enemies of their children, who
+appear to have been formed, only to be the victims of their irrational
+caprices or their unreasonable desires.
+
+From the instant in which man commences, until that in which he ceases
+to exist, he feels--he is moved either agreeably or unpleasantly--he
+collects facts--he gathers experience; these produce ideas in his brain,
+that are either cheerful or gloomy. Not one individual has all this
+experience present to his memory at the same time, it does not ever
+represent to him the whole clew at once: it is, however, this experience
+that mechanically directs him, without his knowledge, in all his
+actions; it was to designate the rapidity with, which he applied this
+experience, of which he so frequently loses the connection--of which he
+is so often at a loss to render himself an account, that he imagined the
+word _instinct_: it appears to be the effect of magic, the operation of
+a supernatural power, to the greater number of individuals: it is a word
+devoid of sense to many others; but to the philosopher it is the effect
+of a very lively feeling to him it consists in the faculty of combining,
+promptly, a multitude of experience--of arranging with facility--of
+comparing with quickness, a long and numerous train of extremely
+complicated ideas. It is want that causes the inexplicable instinct we
+behold in animals which have been denied souls without reason,
+whilst they are susceptible of an infinity of actions that prove they
+think--judge--have memory--are capable of experience--can combine
+ideas--can apply them with more or less facility to satisfy the wants
+engendered by their particular organization; in short, that prove they
+have passions that are capable of being modified. Nothing but the
+height of folly can refuse intellectual faculties to animals; they feel,
+choose, deliberate, express love, show hatred; in many instances their
+senses are much keener than those of man. Fish will return periodically
+to the spot where it is the custom to throw them bread.
+
+It is well known the embarrassments which animals have thrown in the
+way of the partizans of the doctrine of spirituality; they have been
+fearful, if they allowed them to have a spiritual soul, of elevating
+them to the condition of human creatures; on the other hand, in not
+allowing them to have a soul, they have furnished their adversaries
+with authority to deny it in like manner to man, who thus finds himself
+debased to the condition of the animal. Metaphysicians have never known
+how to extricate themselves from this difficulty. DESCARTES fancied he
+solved it by saying that beasts have no souls, but are mere machines.
+Nothing can be nearer the surface, than the absurdity of this principle.
+Whoever contemplates Nature without prejudice, will readily acknowledge
+that there is no other difference between the man and the beast, than
+that which is to be attributed to the diversity of his organization.
+
+In some beings of the human species, who appear to be endowed with a
+greater sensibility of organs than others, may be seen an instinct,
+by the assistance of which they very promptly judge of the concealed
+dispositions of their fellows, simply by inspecting the lineaments of
+their face. Those who are denominated _physiognomists_, are only men of
+very acute feelings; who have gathered an experience of which others,
+whether from the coarseness of their organs, from the little attention
+they have paid, or from some defect in their senses, are totally
+incapable: these last do not believe in the science of physiognomy,
+which appears to them perfectly ideal. Nevertheless, it is certain,
+that the action of this soul, which has been made spiritual, makes
+impressions that are extremely marked upon the exterior of the body;
+these impressions, continually reiterated, their image remains: thus the
+habitual passions of man paint themselves on his countenance; by which
+the attentive observer, who is endowed with acute feeling, is enabled to
+judge with great rapidity of his mode of existence, and even to foresee
+his actions, his inclinations, his desires, his predominant passions,
+&c. Although the science of physiognomy appears chimerical to a great
+number of persons, yet there are few who have not a clear idea of
+a tender regard--of a cruel eye--of an austere aspect--of a false,
+dissimulating look--of an open countenance, &c. Keen practised optics
+acquire without doubt the faculty of penetrating the concealed motion
+of the soul, by the visible traces it leaves upon features that it has
+continually modified. Above all, the eyes of man very quickly undergo
+changes according to the motion which is excited in him: these delicate
+organs are visibly altered by the smallest shock communicated to his
+brain. Serene eyes announce a tranquil soul; wild eyes indicate a
+restless mind; fiery eyes pourtray a choleric, sanguine temperament;
+fickle or inconstant eyes give room to suspect a soul either alarmed or
+dissimulating. It is the study of this variety of shades that renders
+man practised and acute: upon the spot he combines a multitude of
+acquired experience, in order to form his judgment of the person he
+beholds. His judgment, thus rapidly formed, partakes in nothing of
+the supernatural, in nothing of the wonderful: such a man is only
+distinguished by the fineness of his organs, and by the celerity with
+which his brain performs its functions.
+
+It is the same with some beings of the human species, in whom may be
+discovered an extraordinary sagacity, which, to the uninformed, appears
+miraculous. The most skilful practitioners in medicine, are, no
+doubt, men endowed with very acute feelings, similar to that of the
+physiognomists, by the assistance of which they judge with great
+facility of diseases, and very promptly draw their prognostics. Indeed,
+we see men who are capable of appreciating in the twinkling of an eye a
+multitude of circumstances, who have sometimes the faculty of foreseeing
+the most distant events; yet, this species of prophetic talent has
+nothing in it of the supernatural; it indicates nothing more than great
+experience, with an extremely delicate organization, from which they
+derive the faculty of judging with extreme faculty of causes, of
+foreseeing their very remote effects. This faculty, however, is also
+found in animals, who foresee much better than man, the variations of
+the atmosphere with the various changes of the weather. Birds have long
+been the prophets, and even the guides of several nations who pretend to
+be extremely enlightened.
+
+It is, then, to their organization, exercised after a particular manner,
+that must be attributed those wonderous faculties which distinguish
+some beings, that astonish others. To have _instinct_, only signifies
+to judge quickly, without requiring to make a long, reasoning on the
+subject. Man's ideas upon vice and upon virtue, are by no means innate;
+they are, like all others, acquired: the judgment he forms, is
+founded upon experience, whether true or false,--this depends upon his
+conformation, and upon the habits that have modified him. The infant
+has no ideas either of the Divinity or of virtue; it is from those who
+instruct him that he receives these ideas; he makes more or less use of
+them, according to his natural organization, or as his dispositions have
+been more or less exercised. Nature gives man legs, the nurse teaches
+him their use, his agility depends upon their natural conformation, and
+the manner in which he exercises them.
+
+What is called _taste_, in the fine arts, is to be attributed, in the
+same manner, only to the acuteness of man's organs, practised by the
+habit of seeing, of comparing, of judging certain objects; from whence
+results, to some of his species, the faculty of judging with great
+rapidity, in the twinkling of an eye, the whole with its various
+relations. It is by the force of seeing, of feeling, of experiencing
+objects, that he attains to a knowledge of them; it is in consequence of
+reiterating this experience, that he acquires the power, that he gains
+the habit of judging with celerity. But this experience is by no means
+innate, he did not possess it before he was born; he is neither able to
+think, to judge, nor to have ideas, before he has feeling; he is neither
+in a capacity to love, nor to hate; to approve, nor to blame, before he
+has been moved, either agreeably or disagreeably. Nevertheless, this is
+precisely what must be supposed by those who are desirous to make
+man admit of innate ideas, of opinions; infused by Nature, whether in
+morals, metaphysics, or any other science. That his mind should have the
+faculty of thought, that it should occupy itself with an object, it is
+requisite it should be acquainted with its qualities; that it may have a
+knowledge of these qualities, it is necessary some of his senses should
+have been struck by them: those objects, therefore, of which he does not
+know any of the qualities, are nullities; or at least they do not exist
+for him.
+
+It will be asserted, perhaps, that the universal consent of man, upon
+certain propositions, such as _the whole is greater than its part_, upon
+all geometrical demonstrations, appear to warrant the supposition
+of certain primary notions that are innate, not acquired. It may be
+replied, that these notions are always acquired; that they are the
+fruit of an experience more or less prompt; that it is requisite to have
+compared the whole with its part, before conviction can ensue, that the
+whole is the greater of the two. Man when he is born, does not bring
+with him the idea that two and two make four; but he is, nevertheless,
+speedily convinced of its truth. Before forming any judgment whatever,
+it is absolutely necessary to have compared facts.
+
+It is evident, that those who have gratuitously supposed innate ideas,
+or notions inherent in man, have confounded his organization, or his
+natural dispositions, with the habit by which he is modified; with the
+greater or less aptitude he has of making experience, and of applying
+it in his judgment. A man who has taste in painting, has, without doubt,
+brought with him into the world eyes more acute, more penetrating than
+another; but these eyes would by no means enable him to judge with
+promptitude, if he had never had occasion to exercise them; much less,
+in some respects, can those dispositions which are called _natural_, be
+regarded as innate. Man is not, at twenty years of age, the same as
+he was when he came into the world; the physical causes that are
+continually acting upon him, necessarily have an influence upon his
+organization, and so modify it, that his natural dispositions themselves
+are not at one period what they are at another. La Motte Le Vayer says,
+"We think quite otherwise of things at one time than at another; when
+young than when old--when hungry than when our appetite is satisfied--in
+the night than in the day--when peevish than when cheerful. Thus,
+varying every hour, by a thousand other circumstances, which keep us in
+a state of perpetual inconstancy and instability." Every day may be seen
+children, who, to a certain age--display a great deal of ingenuity, a
+strong aptitude for the sciences, who finish by falling into stupidity.
+Others may be observed, who, during their infancy, have shown
+dispositions but little favourable to improvement, yet develope
+themselves in the end, and astonish us by an exhibition of those
+qualities of which we hardly thought them susceptible: there arrives
+a moment in which the mind takes a spring, makes use of a multitude of
+experience which it has amassed, without its having been perceived; and,
+if I may be allowed the expression, without their own knowledge.
+
+Thus, it cannot be too often repeated, all the ideas, all the notions,
+all the modes of existence, and all the thoughts of man, are acquired.
+His mind cannot act, cannot exercise itself, but upon that of which it
+has knowledge; it can understand either well or ill, only those things
+which it has previously felt. Such of his ideas that do not suppose some
+exterior material object for their model, or one to which he is able to
+relate them, which are therefore called _abstract ideas_, are only modes
+in which his interior organ considers its own peculiar modifications, of
+which it chooses some without respect to others. The words which he uses
+to designate these ideas, such as _bounty, beauty, order, intelligence,
+virtue_, &c. do not offer any one sense, if he does not relate them to,
+or if he does not explain them by, those objects which his senses have
+shewn him to be susceptible of those qualities, or of those modes of
+existence, of that manner of acting, which is known to him. What is it
+that points out to him the vague idea of _beauty_, if he does not attach
+it to some object that has struck his senses in a peculiar manner,
+to which, in consequence, he attributes this quality? What is it that
+represents the word _intelligence_, if he does not connect it with a
+certain mode of being and of acting? Does the word _order_ signify any
+thing, if he does not relate it to a series of actions, to a chain of
+motion, by which he is affected in a certain manner? Is not the word
+_virtue_ void of sense, if he does not apply it to those dispositions
+of his fellows which produce known effects, different from those
+which result from contrary inclinations? What do the words _pain_ and
+_pleasure_ offer to his mind in the moment when his organs neither
+suffer nor enjoy, if it be not the modes in which he has been affected,
+of which his brain conserves the remembrance, of those impressions,
+which experience has shewn him to be either useful or prejudicial? But
+when he bears the words spirituality, immateriality, incorporeality, &c.
+pronounced, neither his senses nor his memory afford him any assistance;
+they do not furnish him with any means by which he can form an idea of
+their qualities, or of the objects to which he ought to apply them; in
+that which is not matter he can only see vacuum and emptiness, which as
+long as he remains what he is, cannot, to his mind, be susceptible of
+any one quality.
+
+All the errors, all the disputes of men, have their foundation in this,
+that they have renounced experience, have surrendered the evidence of
+their senses, to give themselves up to the guidance of notions which
+they have believed infused or innate; although in reality they are no
+more than the effect of a distempered imagination, of prejudices, in
+which they have been instructed from their infancy, with which habit
+has familiarized them, which authority has obliged them to conserve.
+Languages are filled with abstract words, to which are attached confused
+and vague ideas; of which, when they come to be examined, no model can
+be found in Nature; no object to which they can be related. When man
+gives himself the trouble to analyze things, he is quite surprised to
+find, that those words which are continually in the mouths of men,
+never present any fixed or determinate idea: he hears them unceasingly
+speaking of spirits--of the soul and its faculties--of duration--of
+space--of immensity--of infinity--of perfection--of virtue--of
+reason--of sentiment--of instinct--of taste, &c. without his being
+able to tell precisely, what they themselves understand by these words.
+Nevertheless, they do not appear to have been invented, but for the
+purpose of representing the images of things; or to paint, by the
+assistance of the senses, those known objects on which the mind is able
+to meditate, which it is competent to appreciate, to compare, and to
+judge.
+
+For man to think of that which has not acted on any of his senses, is to
+think on words; it is for his senses to dream; it is to seek in his own
+imagination for objects to which he can attach his wandering ideas: to
+assign qualities to these objects is, unquestionably, to redouble his
+extravagance, to set no limits to his folly. If a word be destined to
+represent to him an object that has not the capacity to act on any one
+of his organs; of which, it is impossible for him to prove either the
+existence or the qualities; his imagination, by dint of racking itself,
+will nevertheless, in some measure, supply him with the ideas he wants;
+he composes some kind of a picture, with the images or colours he is
+always obliged to borrow, from the objects of which he has a knowledge:
+thus the Divinity has been represented by some under the character of
+a venerable old man; by others, under that of a puissant monarch; by
+others, as an exasperated, irritated being, &c. It is evident, however,
+that man, with some of his qualities, has served for the model of these
+pictures: but if he be informed of objects that are represented as pure
+spirits--that have neither body nor extent--that are not contained in
+space--that are beyond nature,--here then he is plunged into emptiness;
+his mind no longer has any ideas--it no longer knows upon what it
+meditates. This, as will be seen in the sequel, no doubt, is the source
+of those unformed notions which some men have formed of the Divinity;
+they themselves frequently annihilate him, by assembling incompatible
+and contradictory attributes. In giving him morals--in composing him of
+known qualities,--they make him a man;--in assigning him the negative
+attributes of every thing they know, they render him inaccessible to
+their senses--they destroy all antecedent ideas--they make him a mere
+nothing. From this it will appear, that those sublime sciences which are
+called _Theology, Psychology, Metaphysics_, have been mere sciences of
+words: morals and politics, with which they very frequently mix, have,
+in consequence, become inexplicable enigmas, which there is nothing
+short of the study of Nature can enable us to expound.
+
+Man has occasion for truth; it consists in a knowledge of the true
+relations he has with those beings competent to have an influence on
+his welfare; these relations are to be known only by experience: without
+experience there can be no reason; without reason man is only a blind
+creature, who conducts himself by chance. But, how is he to acquire
+experience upon ideal objects, which his senses neither enable him to
+know nor to examine? How is he to assure himself of the existence, how
+ascertain the qualities of beings he is not able to feel? How can he
+judge whether there objects be favorable or prejudicial to him? How is
+he to know, without the evidence of his senses, what he ought to love,
+what he should hate, what to seek after, what to shun, what to do, what
+to leave undone? It is, however, upon this knowledge that his condition
+in this world rests; it is upon this knowledge that morals is founded.
+From whence it may be seen, that, by causing him to blend vague
+metaphysical notions with morals, or the science of the certain and
+invariable relations which subsist between mankind; or by weakly
+establishing them upon chimerical ideas, which have no existence but in
+his imagination; these morals, upon which the welfare of society so much
+depends, are rendered uncertain, are made arbitrary, are abandoned to
+the caprices of fancy, are not fixed upon any solid basis.
+
+Beings essentially different by their natural organization, by the
+modifications they experience, by the habits they contract, by the
+opinions they acquire, must of necessity think differently. His
+temperament, as we have seen, decides the mental qualities of man:
+this temperament itself is diversely modified in him: from whence it
+consecutively follows, his imagination cannot possibly be the same;
+neither can it create to him the same images. Each individual is a
+connected whole, of which all the parts have a necessary correspondence.
+Different eyes must see differently, must give extremely varied ideas
+of the objects they contemplate, even when these objects are real. What,
+then, must be the diversity of these ideas, if the objects meditated
+upon do not act upon the senses? Mankind have pretty nearly the same
+ideas, in the gross, of those substances that act upon his organs with
+vivacity; he is sufficiently in unison upon some qualities which he
+contemplates very nearly in the same manner; I say, very nearly, because
+the intelligence, the notion, the conviction of any one proposition,
+however simple, however evident, however clear it may be supposed, is
+not, nor cannot be, strictly the same, in any two men. Indeed, one man
+not being another man, the first cannot, for example, have rigorously
+and mathematically the same notion of unity as the second; seeing that
+an identical effect cannot be the result of two different causes. Thus,
+when men are in accord in their ideas, in their modes of thinking, in
+their judgment, in their passions, in their desires, in, their tastes,
+their consent does not arise from their seeing or feeling the same
+objects precisely in the same manner, but pretty nearly; language is
+not, nor cannot be, sufficiently copious to designate the vast variety
+of shades, the multiplicity of imperceptible differences, which is to be
+found in their modes of seeing and thinking. Each man, then, has, to say
+thus, a language which is peculiar to himself alone, and this language
+is incommunicable to others. What harmony, what unison, then, can
+possibly exist between them, when they discourse with each other, upon
+objects only known to their imagination? Can this imagination in
+one individual ever be the same as in another? How can they possibly
+understand each other, when they assign to those objects qualities that
+can only be attributed to the particular manner in which their brain is
+affected.
+
+For one man to exact from another that he shall think like himself, is
+to insist that he shall be organized precisely in the same manner--that
+he shall have been modified exactly the same in every moment of his
+existence: that he shall have received the same temperament, the same
+nourishment, the same education: in a word, that he shall require that
+other to be himself. Wherefore is it not exacted that all men shall have
+the same features? Is man more the master of his opinions? Are not his
+opinions the necessary consequence of his Nature, and of those peculiar
+circumstances which, from his infancy, have necessarily had an influence
+upon his mode of thinking, and his manner of acting? If man be a
+connected whole, whenever a single feature differs from his own, ought
+he not to conclude that it is not possible his brain can either think,
+associate ideas, imagine, or dream precisely in the same manner with
+that other.
+
+The diversity in the temperament of man, is the natural, the necessary
+source of the diversity of his passions, of his taste, of his ideas of
+happiness, of his opinions of every kind. Thus, this same diversity will
+be the fatal source of his disputes, of his hatreds, of his injustice,
+every time he shall reason upon unknown objects, but to which he shall
+attach the greatest importance. He will never understand either himself
+or others, in speaking of a spiritual soul, or of immaterial substances
+distinguished from Nature; he will, from that moment, cease to speak
+the same language, and he will never attach the same ideas to the same
+words. What, then, shall be, the common standard that shall decide which
+is the man that thinks with the greatest justice? What the scale by
+which to measure who has the best regulated imagination? What balance
+shall be found sufficiently exact to determine whose knowledge is most
+certain, when he agitates subjects, which experience cannot enable him
+to examine, that escape all his senses, that have no model, that are
+above reason? Each individual, each legislator, each speculator, each
+nation, has ever formed to himself different ideas of these things; each
+believes, that his own peculiar reveries ought to be preferred to those
+of his neighbours; which always appear to him an absurd, ridiculous, and
+false as his own can possibly have appeared to his fellow; each clings
+to his own opinion, because each retains his own peculiar mode of
+existence; each believes his happiness depends upon his attachment
+to his prejudices, which he never adopts but because he believes them
+beneficial to his welfare. Propose to a man to change his religion
+for yours, he will believe you a madman; you will only excite his
+indignation, elicit his contempt; he will propose to you, in his turn,
+to adopt his own peculiar opinions; after much reasoning, you will treat
+each other as absurd beings, ridiculously opiniated, pertinaciously
+stubborn: and he will display the least folly, who shall first yield.
+But if the adversaries become heated in the dispute, which always
+happens, when they suppose the matter important, or when they would
+defend the cause of their own self-love; from thence their passions
+sharpen, they grow angry, quarrels are provoked, they hate each other,
+and end by reciprocal injury. It is thus, that for opinions, which no
+man can demonstrate, we see the Brahmin despised; the Mahommedan hated;
+the Pagan held in contempt; that they oppress and disdain each with the
+most rancorous animosity: the Christian burns the Jew at what is called
+an _auto-de-fe_, because he clings to the faith of his fathers: the
+Roman Catholic condemns the Protestant to the flames, and makes a
+conscience of massacring him in cold blood: this re-acts in his turn;
+sometimes the various sects of Christians league together against the
+incredulous Turk, and for a moment suspend their own bloody disputes
+that they may chastise the enemies to the true faith: then, having
+glutted their revenge, return with redoubled fury, to wreak over again
+their infuriated vengeance on each other.
+
+If the imaginations of men were the same, the chimeras which they bring
+forth would be every where the same; there would be no disputes among
+them on this subject, if they all dreamt in the same manner; great
+numbers of human beings would be spared, if man occupied his mind with
+objects capable of being known, of which the existence was proved,
+of which he was competent to discover the true qualities, by sure,
+by reiterated experience. _Systems of Philosophy_ are not subject
+to dispute but when their principles are not sufficiently proved;
+by degrees experience, in pointing out the truth and detecting
+their errors, terminates these quarrels. There is no variance among
+_geometricians_ upon the principles of their science; it is only
+raised, when their suppositions are false, or their objects too much
+complicated. _Theologians_ find so much difficulty in agreeing among
+themselves, simply, because, in their contests, they divide without
+ceasing, not known and examined propositions, but prejudices with which
+they have been imbued in their youth--in the schools--by each other's
+books, &c. They are perpetually reasoning, not upon real objects, of
+which the existence is demonstrated, but upon imaginary systems of which
+they have never examined the reality; they found these disputes,
+not upon averred experience, or constant facts, but upon gratuitious
+suppositions, which each endeavours to convince the other are without
+solidity. Finding these ideas of long standing, that few people, refuse
+to admit them, they take them for incontestible truths, that ought to
+be received merely upon being announced; whenever they attach great
+importance to them, they irritate themselves against the temerity of
+those who have the audacity to doubt, or even to examine them.
+
+If prejudice had been laid aside, it would perhaps have been discovered
+that many of those objects, which have given birth to the most shocking,
+the most sanguinary disputes among men, were mere phantoms; which a
+little examination would have shown to be unworthy their notice: _the
+priests of Apollo_ would have been harmless, if man had examined for
+himself, without prejudice, the tenets they held forth: he would have
+found, that he was fighting, that he was cutting his neighbour's throat,
+for words void of sense; or, at the least, he would have learned to
+doubt his right to act in the manner he did; he would have renounced
+that dogmatical, that imperious tone he assumed, by which he would
+oblige his fellow to unite with him in opinion. The most trifling
+reflection would have shewn him the necessity of this diversity in his
+notions, of this contrariety in his imagination, which depends upon
+his Natural conformation diversely modified: which necessarily has an
+influence over his thoughts, over his will, and over his actions. In
+short, if he had consulted morals, if he had fallen back upon reason,
+every thing would have conspired to prove to him, that beings who call
+themselves rational, were made to think variously; on that account were
+designed to live peaceable with each other, to love each other, to lend
+each other mutual succours whatever may be their opinions upon subjects,
+either impossible to be known, or to be contemplated under the same
+point of view: every thing would have joined in evidence to convince
+him of the unreasonable tyranny, of the unjust violence, of the useless
+cruelty of those men of blood, who persecute, who destroy mankind, in
+order that they may mould him to their own peculiar opinions; every
+thing would have conducted mortals to _mildness_, to _indulgence_, to
+_toleration_; virtues, unquestionably of more real importance, much more
+necessary to the welfare of society, than the marvellous speculations by
+which it is divided, by which it is frequently hurried on to sacrifice
+to a maniacal fury, the pretended enemies to these revered flights of
+the imagination.
+
+From this it must be evident, of what importance it is to _morals_ to
+examine the ideas, to which it has been agreed to attach so much worth;
+to which man is continually sacrificing his own peculiar happiness; to
+which he is immolating the tranquillity of nations, at the irrational
+command of fanatical cruel guides. Let him fall back on his experience;
+let him return to Nature; let him occupy himself with reason; let him
+consult those objects that are real, which are useful to his permanent
+felicity; let him study Nature's laws; let him study himself; let him
+consult the bonds which unite him to his fellow mortals; let him examine
+the fictitious bonds that enchain him to the most baneful prejudices.
+If his imagination must always feed itself with illusions, if he remains
+steadfast in his own opinions, if his prejudices are dear to him, let
+him at least permit others to ramble in their own manner, or seek after
+truth as best suits their inclination; but let him always recollect,
+that all the opinions--all the ideas--all the systems--all the
+wills--all the actions of man, are the necessary consequence of his
+nature, of his temperament, of his organization, and of those causes,
+either transitory or constant, which modify hint: in short, that _man is
+not more a free agent to think than to act:_ a truth that will be again
+proved in the following chapter.
+
+
+
+
+
+CHAP. XI
+
+_Of the System of Man's free agency._
+
+
+Those who have pretended that the _soul_ is distinguished from the body,
+is immaterial, draws its ideas from its own peculiar source, acts by its
+own energies without the aid of any exterior object; by a consequence
+of their own system, have enfranchised it from those physical laws,
+according to which all beings of which we have a knowledge are obliged
+to act. They have believed that the foul is mistress of its own conduct,
+is able to regulate its own peculiar operations; has the faculty to
+determine its will by its own natural energy; in a word, they have
+pretended man is a _free agent_.
+
+It has been already sufficiently proved, that the soul is nothing more
+than the body, considered relatively to some of its functions, more
+concealed than others: it has been shewn, that this soul, even when it
+shall be supposed immaterial, is continually modified conjointly with
+the body; is submitted to all its motion; that without this it would
+remain inert and dead: that, consequently, it is subjected to the
+influence of those material, to the operation those physical causes,
+which give impulse to the body; of which the mode of existence, whether
+habitual or transitory, depends upon the material elements by which it
+is surrounded; that form its texture; that constitute its temperament;
+that enter into it by the means of the aliments; that penetrate it by
+their subtility; the faculties which are called intellectual, and those
+qualities which are styled moral, have been explained in a manner purely
+physical; entirely natural: in the last place, it has been demonstrated,
+that all the ideas, all the systems, all the affections, all the
+opinions, whether true or false, which man forms to himself, are to be
+attributed to his physical powers; are to be ascribed to his material
+senses. Thus man is a being purely physical; in whatever manner he
+is considered, he is connected to universal Nature: submitted to the
+necessary, to the immutable laws that she imposes on all the beings
+she contains, according to their peculiar essences; conformable to the
+respective properties with which, without consulting them, she endows
+each particular species. Man's life is a line that Nature commands him
+to describe upon the surface of the earth: without his ever being
+able to swerve from it even for an instant. He is born without his own
+consent; his organizations does in no wise depend upon himself; his
+ideas come to him involuntarily; his habits are in the power of those
+who cause him to contract them; he is unceasingly modified by causes,
+whether visible or concealed, over which he has no controul; give the
+hue to his way of thinking, and determine his manner of acting. He
+is good or bad--happy or miserable--wise or foolish--reasonable or
+irrational, without his will going for anything in these various states.
+Nevertheless, in despite of the shackles by which he is bound, it is
+pretended he is a free agent, or that independent of the causes by which
+he is moved, he determines his own will; regulates his own condition.
+
+However slender the foundation of this opinion, of which every thing
+ought to point out to him the error; it is current at this day for
+an incontestible truth, and believed enlightened; it is the basis or
+religion, which has been incapable of imagining how man could either
+merit reward or deserve punishment if he was not a free agent. Society
+has been believed interested in this system, because an idea has gone
+abroad, that if all the actions of man were to be contemplated as
+necessary, the right of punishing those who injure their associates
+would no longer exist. At length human vanity accommodated itself to an
+hypothesis which, unquestionable, appears to distinguish man from all
+other physical beings, by assigning to him the special privilege of
+a total independence of all other causes; but of which a very little
+reflection would have shewn him the absurdity or even the impossibility.
+
+As a part, subordinate to the great whole, man is obliged to experience
+its influence. To be a free agent it were needful that each individual
+was of greater strength than the entire of Nature; or, that he was out
+of this Nature: who, always in action herself, obliges all the beings
+she embraces, to act, and to concur to her general motion; or, as it
+has been said elsewhere, to conserve her active existence, by the motion
+that all beings produce in consequence of their particular energies,
+which result from their being submitted to fixed, eternal, and immutable
+laws. In order that man might be a free agent, it were needful that
+all beings should lose their essences; it is equally necessary that
+he himself should no longer enjoy physical sensibility; that he should
+neither know good nor evil; pleasure nor pain; but if this was the case,
+from that moment he would no longer be in a state to conserve himself,
+or render his existence happy; all beings would become indifferent to
+him; he would no longer have any choice; he would cease to know what he
+ought to love; what it was right he should fear; he would not have any
+acquaintance with that which he should seek after; or with that which it
+is requisite he should avoid. In short, man would be an unnatural being;
+totally incapable of acting in the manner we behold. It is the actual
+essence of man to tend to his well-being; to be desirous to conserve
+his existence; if all the motion of his machine springs as a necessary
+consequence from this primitive impulse; if pain warns him of that which
+he ought to avoid; if pleasure announces to him that which he should
+desire; if it is in his essence to love that which either excites
+delight, or, that from which he expects agreeable sensations; to hate
+that which makes him either fear contrary impressions; or, that which
+afflicts him with uneasiness; it must necessarily be, that he will be
+attracted by that which he deems advantageous; that his will shall be
+determined by those objects which he judges useful; that he will be
+repelled by those beings which he believes prejudicial, either to his
+habitual, or to his transitory mode of existence; by that which he
+considers disadvantageous. It is only by the aid of experience, that man
+acquires the faculty of understanding what he ought to love; of knowing
+what he ought to fear. Are his organs sound? his experience will be
+true: are they unsound? it will be false: in the first instance he will
+have reason, prudence, foresight; he will frequently foresee very remote
+effects; he will know, that what he sometimes contemplates as a good,
+may possibly become an evil, by its necessary or probable consequences:
+that what must be to him a transient evil, may by its result procure him
+a solid and durable good. It is thus experience enables him to foresee
+that the amputation of a limb will cause him painful sensation, he
+consequently is obliged to fear this operation, and he endeavours
+to avoid the pain; but if experience has also shewn him, that the
+transitory pain this amputation will cause him may be the means of
+saving his life; the preservation, of his existence being of necessity
+dear to him, he is obliged to submit himself to the momentary pain with
+a view to procuring a permanent good, by which it will be overbalanced.
+
+The will, as we have elsewhere said, is a modification of the brain, by
+which it is disposed to action or prepared to give play to the organs.
+This will is necessarily determined by the qualities, good or bad,
+agreeable or painful, of the object or the motive that acts upon his
+senses; or of which the idea remains with him, and is resuscitated
+by his memory. In consequence, he acts necessarily; his action is the
+result of the impulse he receives either from the motive, from the
+object, or from the idea, which has modified his brain, or disposed
+his will. When he does not act according to this impulse, it is because
+there comes some new cause, some new motive, some new idea, which
+modifies his brain in a different manner, gives him a new impulse,
+determines his will in another way; by which the action of the former
+impulse is suspended: thus, the sight of an agreeable object, or its
+idea, determines his will to set him in action to procure it; but if a
+new object or a new idea more powerfully attracts him, it gives a
+new direction to his will, annihilates the effect of the former, and
+prevents the action by which it was to be procured. This is the mode in
+which reflection, experience, reason, necessarily arrests or suspends
+the action of man's will; without this, he would, of necessity, have
+followed the anterior impulse which carried him towards a then desirable
+object. In all this he always acts according to necessary laws, from
+which he has no means of emancipating himself.
+
+If, when tormented with violent thirst, he figures to himself an idea,
+or really perceives a fountain, whose limpid streams might cool his
+feverish habit, is he sufficient master of himself to desire or not
+to desire the object competent to satisfy so lively a want? It will no
+doubt be conceded, that it is impossible he should not be desirous to
+satisfy it; but it will be said,--If at this moment it is announced
+to him, the water he so ardently desires is poisoned, he will,
+notwithstanding his vehement thirst, abstain from drinking it; and it
+has, therefore, been falsely concluded that he is a free agent. The
+fact, however, is, that the motive in either case is exactly the same:
+his own conservation. The same necessity that determined him to drink,
+before he knew the water was deleterious, upon this new discovery,
+equally determines him not to drink; the desire of conserving himself,
+either annihilates or suspends the former impulse; the second motive
+becomes stronger than the preceding; that is, the fear of death, or
+the desire of preserving himself, necessarily prevails over the painful
+sensation caused by his eagerness to drink. But, (it will be said) if
+the thirst is very parching, an inconsiderate man, without regarding
+the danger, will risque swallowing the water. Nothing is gained by this
+remark: in this case, the anterior impulse only regains the ascendency;
+he is persuaded, that life may possibly be longer preserved, or that
+he shall derive a greater good by drinking the poisoned water, than by
+enduring the torment, which, to his mind, threatens instant dissolution:
+thus, the first becomes the strongest, and necessarily urges him on to
+action. Nevertheless, in either case, whether he partakes of the water,
+or whether he does not, the two actions will be equally necessary; they
+will be the effect of that motive which finds itself most puissant;
+which consequently acts in a most coercive manner upon his will.
+
+This example will serve to explain the whole phaenomena of the human
+will. This will, or rather the brain, finds itself in the same situation
+as a bowl, which although it has received an impulse that drives it
+forward in a straight line, is deranged in its course, whenever a force,
+superior to the first, obliges it to change its direction. The man who
+drinks the poisoned water, appears a madman; but the actions of fools
+are as necessary as those of the most prudent individuals. The motives
+that determine the voluptuary, that actuate the debauchee to risk their
+health, are as powerful, their actions are as necessary, as those
+which decide the wise man to manage his. But, it will be insisted, the
+debauchee may be prevailed on to change his conduct; this does not imply
+that he is a free agent; but, that motives may be found sufficiently
+powerful to annihilate the effect of those that previously acted upon
+him; then these new motives determine his will to the new mode of
+conduct he may adopt, as necessarily as the former did to the old mode.
+
+Man is said to _deliberate_ when the action of the will is suspended;
+this happens when two opposite motives act alternately upon him.
+To deliberate, is to hate and to love in succession; it is to be
+alternately attracted and repelled; it is to be moved sometimes by one
+motive, sometimes by another. Man only deliberates when he does not
+distinctly understand the quality of the objects from which he receives
+impulse, or when experience has not sufficiently apprised him of the
+effects, more or less remote, which his actions will produce. He
+would take the air, but the weather is uncertain; he deliberates in
+consequence; he weighs the various motives that urge his will to go out
+or to stay at home; he is at length determined by that motive which is
+most probable; this removes his indecision, which necessarily settles
+his will either to remain within or to go abroad: this motive is always
+either the immediate or ultimate advantage he finds or thinks he finds
+in the action to which he is persuaded.
+
+Man's will frequently fluctuates between two objects, of which either
+the presence or the ideas move him alternately: he waits until he has
+contemplated the objects or the ideas they have left in his brain; which
+solicit him to different actions; he then compares these objects or
+ideas: but even in the time of deliberation, during the comparison,
+pending these alternatives of love and hatred, which succeed each other
+sometimes with the utmost rapidity, he is not a free agent for a single
+instant; the good or the evil which he believes he finds successively in
+the objects, are the necessary motives of these momentary wills; of
+the rapid motion of desire or fear that he experiences as long as his
+uncertainty continues. From this it will be obvious, that deliberation
+is necessary; that uncertainty is necessary; that whatever part he
+takes, in consequence of this deliberation, it will always necessarily
+be that which he has judged, whether well or ill, is most probable to
+turn to his advantage.
+
+When the soul is assailed by two motives that act alternately upon it,
+or modify it successively, it deliberates; the brain is in a sort of
+equilibrium, accompanied with perpetual oscillations, sometimes towards
+one object, sometimes towards the other, until the most forcible carries
+the point, and thereby extricates it, from this state of suspense,
+in which consists the indecision of his will. But when the brain is
+simultaneously assailed by causes equally strong, that move it in
+opposite directions; agreeable to the general law of all bodies, when
+they are struck equally by contrary powers, it stops, it is in _nisu_;
+it is neither capable to will nor to act; it waits until one of the
+two causes has obtained sufficient force to overpower the other, to
+determine its will, to attract it in such a manner that it may prevail
+over the efforts of the other cause.
+
+This mechanism, so simple, so natural, suffices to demonstrate, why
+uncertainty is painful; why suspense is always a violent state for
+man. The brain, an organ so delicate, so mobile, experiences such rapid
+modifications, that it is fatigued; or when it is urged in contrary
+directions, by causes equally powerful, it suffers a kind of
+compression, that prevents the activity which is suitable to the
+preservation of the whole, which is necessary to procure what is
+advantageous to its existence. This mechanism will also explain the
+irregularity, the indecision, the inconstancy of man; and account for
+that conduct, which frequently appears an inexplicable mystery, which
+indeed it is, under the received systems. In consulting experience, it
+will be found that the soul is submitted to precisely the same physical
+laws as the material body. If the will of each individual, during a
+given time, was only moved by a single cause or passion, nothing would
+be more easy than to foresee his actions; but his heart is frequently
+assailed by contrary powers, by adverse motives, which either act on him
+simultaneously or in succession; then his brain, attracted in opposite
+directions, is either fatigued, or else tormented by a state of
+compression, which deprives it of activity. Sometimes it is in a state
+of incommodious inaction; sometimes it is the sport of the alternate
+shocks it undergoes. Such, no doubt, is the state in which man finds
+himself, when a lively passion solicits him to the commission of crime,
+whilst fear points out to him the danger by which it is attended: such,
+also, is the condition of him whom remorse, by the continued labour
+of his distracted soul, prevents from enjoying the objects he has
+criminally obtained.
+
+If the powers or causes, whether exterior or interior, acting on the
+mind of man, tend towards opposite points, his soul, is well as all
+other bodies, will take a mean direction between the two; in consequence
+of the violence with which his soul is urged, his condition becomes
+sometimes so painful that his existence is troublesome: he has no longer
+a tendency to his own peculiar conservation; he seeks after death, as a
+sanctuary against himself--as the only remedy to his despair: it is
+thus we behold men, miserable and discontented, voluntarily destroy
+themselves, whenever life becomes insupportable. Man is competent to
+cherish his existence, no longer than life holds out charms to him;
+when he is wrought upon by painful sensations, or drawn by contrary
+impulsions, his natural tendency is deranged, he is under the necessity
+to follow a new route; this conducts him to his end, which it even
+displays to him as the most desirable good. In this manner may be
+explained, the conduct of those melancholy beings, whose vicious
+temperaments, whose tortured consciences, whose chagrin, whose _ennui_,
+sometimes determine them to renounce life.
+
+The various powers, frequently very complicated, that act either
+successively or simultaneously upon the brain of man, which modify him
+so diversely in the different periods of his existence, are the true
+causes of that obscurity in morals, of that difficulty which is found,
+when it is desired to unravel the concealed springs of his enigmatical
+conduct. The heart of man is a labyrinth, only because it very rarely
+happens that we possess the necessary gift of judging it; from whence
+it will appear, that his circumstances, his indecision, his conduct,
+whether ridiculous, or unexpected, are the necessary consequences of
+the changes operated in him; are nothing but the effect of motives that
+successively determine his will; which are dependent on the frequent
+variations experienced by his machine. According to these variations,
+the same motives have not, always, the same influence over his will,
+the same objects no longer enjoy the faculty of pleasing him; his
+temperament has changed, either for the moment, or for ever. It follows
+as a consequence, that his taste, his desires, his passions, will
+change; there can be no kind of uniformity in his conduct, nor any
+certitude in the effects to be expected.
+
+Choice by no means proves the free-agency of man; he only deliberates
+when he does not yet know which to choose of the many objects that move
+him, he is then in an embarrassment, which does not terminate, until his
+will as decided by the greater advantage he believes be shall find in
+the object he chooses, or the action he undertakes. From whence it may
+be seen that choice is necessary, because he would not determine for an
+object, or for an action, if he did not believe that he should find
+in it some direct advantage. That man should have free-agency, it were
+needful that he should be able to will or choose without motive; or,
+that he could prevent motives coercing his will. Action always being the
+effect of his will once determined, as his will cannot be determined but
+by a motive, which is not in his own power, it follows that he is
+never the master of the determination of his own peculiar will; that
+consequently he never acts as a free agent. It has been believed that
+man was a free agent, because he had a will with the power of choosing;
+but attention has not been paid to the fact, that even his will is moved
+by causes independent of himself, is owing to that which is inherent
+in his own organization, or which belongs to the nature of the beings
+acting on him. Indeed, man passes a great portion of his life without
+even willing. His will attends the motive by which it is determined. If
+he was to render an exact account of every thing he does in the course
+of each day, from rising in the morning to lying down at night, he would
+find, that not one of his actions have been in the least voluntary; that
+they have been mechanical, habitual, determined by causes he was not
+able to foresee, to which he was either obliged to, yield, or with which
+he was allured to acquiesce; he would discover, that all the motives of
+his labours, of his amusements, of his discourses, of his thoughts, have
+been necessary; that they have evidently either seduced him or drawn him
+along. Is he the master of willing, not to withdraw his hand from the
+fire when he fears it will be burnt? Or has he the power to take away
+from fire the property which makes him fear it? Is he the master of not
+choosing a dish of meat which he knows to be agreeable, or analogous
+to his palate; of not preferring it to that which he knows to be
+disagreeable or dangerous? It is always according to his sensations, to
+his own peculiar experience, or to his suppositions, that he judges of
+things either well or ill; but whatever way be his judgment, it depends
+necessarily on his mode of feeling, whether habitual or accidental,
+and the qualities he finds in the causes that move him, which exist in
+despite of himself.
+
+All the causes which by his will is actuated, must act upon him in a
+manner sufficiently marked, to give him some sensation, some perception,
+some idea, whether complete or incomplete, true or false; as soon as
+his will is determined, he must have felt, either strongly or feebly; if
+this was not the case he would have determined without motive: thus, to
+speak correctly, there are no causes which are truly indifferent to the
+will: however faint the impulse he receives, whether on the part of the
+objects themselves, or on the part of their images or ideas, as soon
+as his will acts, the impulse has been competent to determine him. In
+consequence of a slight, of a feeble impulse, the will is weak, it is
+this weakness of the will that is called _indifference_. His brain with
+difficulty perceives the sensation, it has received; it consequently
+acts with less vigour, either to obtain or remove the object or the idea
+that has modified it. If the impulse is powerful, the will is strong,
+it makes him act vigorously, to obtain or to remove the object which
+appears to him either very agreeable or very incommodious.
+
+It has been believed man was a free agent, because it has been imagined
+that his soul could at will recall ideas, which sometimes suffice
+to check his most unruly desires. Thus, the idea of a remote evil
+frequently prevents him from enjoying a present and actual good: thus,
+remembrance, which is an almost insensible, a slight modification of his
+brain, annihilates, at each instant, the real objects that act upon
+his will. But he is not master of recalling to himself his ideas at
+pleasure; their association is independent of him; they are arranged in
+his brain, in despite of him, without his own knowledge, where they have
+made an impression more or less profound; his memory itself depends upon
+his organization; its fidelity depends upon the habitual or momentary
+state in which he finds himself; when his will is vigorously determined
+to some object or idea that excites a very lively passion in him, those
+objects or ideas that would be able to arrest his action no longer
+present themselves to his mind; in those moments his eyes are shut
+to the dangers that menace him, of which the idea ought to make him
+forbear; he marches forward headlong towards the object by whose image
+he is hurried on; reflection cannot operate upon him in any way; he sees
+nothing but the object of his desires; the salutary ideas which might be
+able to arrest his progress disappear, or else display themselves either
+too faintly or too late to prevent his acting. Such is the case with
+all those who, blinded by some strong passion, are not in a condition
+to recal to themselves those motives, of which the idea alone, in cooler
+moments, would be sufficient to deter them from proceeding; the disorder
+in which they are, prevents their judging soundly; render them incapable
+of foreseeing the consequence of their actions; precludes them from
+applying to their experience; from making use of their reason; natural
+operations, which suppose a justness in the manner of associating
+their ideas; but to which their brain is then not more competent, in
+consequence of the momentary delirium it suffers, than their hand is to
+write whilst they are taking violent exercise.
+
+Man's mode of thinking is necessarily determined by his manner of
+being; it must, therefore, depend on his natural organization, and the
+modification his system receives independently of his will. From this we
+are obliged to conclude, that his thoughts, his reflections, his manner
+of viewing things, of feeling, of judging, of combining ideas, is
+neither voluntary nor free. In a word, that his soul is neither mistress
+of the motion excited in it, nor of representing to itself, when wanted,
+those images or ideas that are capable of counterbalancing the impulse
+it receives. This is the reason why man, when in a passion, ceases to
+reason; at that moment reason is as impossible to be heard, as it is
+during an extacy, or in a fit of drunkenness. The wicked are never more
+than men who are either drunk or mad: if they reason, it is not until
+tranquillity is re-established in their machine; then, and not till
+then, the tardy ideas that present themselves to their mind, enable them
+to see the consequence of their actions, and give birth to ideas,
+that bring on them that trouble, which is designated _shame, regret,
+remorse_.
+
+The errors of philosophers on the free-agency of man, have arisen from
+their regarding his will as the _primum mobile_, the original motive
+of his actions; for want of recurring back, they have not perceived the
+multiplied, the complicated causes, which, independently of him, give
+motion to the will itself, or which dispose and modify his brain, whilst
+he himself is purely passive in the motion he receives. Is he the master
+of desiring or not desiring an object that appears desirable to him?
+Without doubt it will be answered, No: but he is the master of resisting
+his desire, if he reflects on the consequences. But, I ask, is he
+capable of reflecting on these consequences when his soul is hurried
+along by a very lively passion, which entirely depends upon his natural
+organization, and the causes by which he is modified? Is it in his power
+to add to these consequences all the weight necessary to counterbalance
+his desire? Is he the master of preventing the qualities which render an
+object desirable from residing in it? I shall be told, he ought to have
+learned to resist his passions; to contract a habit of putting a curb on
+his desires. I agree to it without any difficulty: but in reply, I again
+ask, Is his nature susceptible of this modification? Does his boiling
+blood, his unruly imagination, the igneous fluid that circulates in his
+veins, permit him to make, enable him to apply true experience in the
+moment when it is wanted? And, even when his temperament has capacitated
+him, has his education, the examples set before him, the ideas with
+which he has been inspired in early life, been suitable to make him
+contract this habit of repressing his desires? Have not all these things
+rather contributed to induce him to seek with avidity, to make him
+actually desire those objects which you say he ought to resist.
+
+The _ambitious man_ cries out,--You will have me resist my passion, but
+have they not unceasingly repeated to me, that rank, honours, power,
+are the most desirable advantages in life? Have I not seen my
+fellow-citizens envy them--the nobles of my country sacrifice every
+thing to obtain them? In the society in which I live, am I not obliged
+to feel, that if I am deprived of these advantages, I must expect to
+languish in contempt, to cringe under the rod of oppression?
+
+The _miser_ says,--You forbid me to love money, to seek after the means
+of acquiring it: alas! does not every thing tell me, that in this world
+money is the greatest blessing; that it is amply sufficient to render
+me happy? In the country I inhabit, do I not see all my fellow-citizens
+covetous of riches? but do I not also witness that they are little
+scrupulous in the means of obtaining wealth? As soon as they are
+enriched by the means which you censure, are they not cherished,
+considered, and respected? By what authority, then, do you object to my
+amassing treasure? what right have you to prevent my using means,
+which although you call them sordid and criminal, I see approved by the
+sovereign? Will you have me renounce my happiness?
+
+The _voluptuary_ argues,--You pretend that I should resist my desires;
+but was I the maker of my own temperament, which unceasingly invites me
+to pleasure? You call my pleasures disgraceful; but in the country in
+which I live, do I not witness the most dissipated men enjoying the most
+distinguished rank? Do I not behold, that no one is ashamed of adultery
+but the husband it has outraged? do not I see men making trophies
+of their debaucheries, boasting of their libertinism, rewarded, with
+applause?
+
+The _choleric_ man vociferates,--You advise me to put a curb on my
+passions; to resist the desire of avenging myself: but can I conquer my
+nature? Can I alter the received opinions of the world? Shall I not be
+for ever disgraced, infallibly dishonoured in society, if I do not wash
+out, in the blood of my fellow-creature, the injuries I have received?
+
+The _zealous enthusiast_ exclaims,--You recommend to me mildness,
+you advise me to be tolerant, to be indulgent to the opinions of my
+fellow-men; but is not my temperament violent? Do I not ardently love my
+God? Do they not assure me that zeal is pleasing to him; that sanguinary
+inhuman persecutors have been his friends? That those who do not think
+as I do are his enemies? I wish to render myself acceptable in his
+sight, I therefore adopt the means you reprobate.
+
+In short, the actions of man are never free; they are always the
+necessary consequence of his temperament, of the received ideas, of
+the notions, either true or false, which he has formed to himself
+of happiness: of his opinions, strengthened by example, forfeited
+by education, consolidated by daily experience. So many crimes are
+witnessed on the earth, only because every thing conspires to render man
+vicious, to make him criminal; very frequently, the superstitions he
+has adopted, his government, his education, the examples set before him,
+irresistibly drive him on to evil: under these circumstances morality
+preaches virtue to him in vain. In those societies where vice is
+esteemed, where crime is crowned, where venality is constantly
+recompenced, where the most dreadful disorders are punished, only in
+those who are too weak to enjoy the privilege of committing them with
+impunity; the practice of virtue is considered nothing more than a
+painful sacrifice of fancied happiness. Such societies chastise, in the
+lower orders, those excesses which they respect in the higher ranks; and
+frequently have the injustice to condemn those in penalty of death,
+whom public prejudices, maintained by constant example, have rendered
+criminal.
+
+Man, then, is not a free agent in any one instant of his life; he is
+necessarily guided in each step by those advantages, whether real or
+fictitious, that he attaches to the objects by which his passions
+are roused: these passions themselves are necessary in a being who,
+unceasingly tends towards his own happiness; their energy is necessary,
+since that depends on his temperament; his temperament is necessary,
+because it depends on the physical elements which enter into his
+composition; the modification of this temperament is necessary, as it
+is the infallible result, the inevitable consequence of the impulse he
+receives from the incessant action of moral and physical beings.
+
+In despite of these proofs of the want of free-agency in man, so clear
+to unprejudiced minds, it will, perhaps, be insisted upon with no small
+feeling of triumph, that if it be proposed to any one to move or not to
+move his hand, an action in the number of those called _indifferent_,
+he evidently appears to be the master of choosing; from which it is
+concluded, evidence has been offered of his free-agency. The reply is,
+this example is perfectly simple; man in performing some action which he
+is resolved on doing, does not by any means prove his free-agency: the
+very desire of displaying this quality, excited by the dispute, becomes
+a necessary motive which decides his will either for the one or the
+other of these actions: what deludes him in this instance, or that which
+persuades him he is a free agent at this moment, is, that he does not
+discern the true motive which sets him in action; which is neither more
+nor less than the desire of convincing his opponent: if in the heat of
+the dispute he insists and asks, "Am I not the master of throwing myself
+out of the window?" I shall answer him, no; that whilst he preserves his
+reason, there is not even a probability that the desire of proving his
+free-agency, will become a motive sufficiently powerful, to make him
+sacrifice his life to the attempt; if, notwithstanding this, to prove he
+is a free agent, he should actually precipitate himself from the window,
+it would not be a sufficient warrantry to conclude he acted freely, but
+rather that it was the violence of his temperament which spurred him
+on to this folly. Madness is a state that depends upon the heat of
+the blood, not upon the will. A fanatic or a hero, braves death as
+necessarily as a more phlegmatic man or a coward flies from it. There
+is, in point of fact, no difference between the man who is cast out of
+the window by another, and the man who throws himself out of it, except
+that the impulse in the first instance comes immediately from without,
+whilst that which determines the fall in the second case, springs from
+within his own peculiar machine, having its more remote cause also
+exterior. When Mutius Scaevola held his hand in the fire, he was as much
+acting under the influence of necessity, caused by interior motives,
+that urged him to this strange action, as if his arm had been held by
+strong men; pride, despair, the desire of braving his enemy, a wish
+to astonish him, an anxiety to intimidate him, &c. were the invisible
+chains that held his hand bound to the fire. The love of glory,
+enthusiasm for their country, in like manner, caused Codrus and Decius
+to devote themselves for their fellow citizens. The Indian Calanus and
+the philosopher Peregrinus were equally obliged to burn themselves, by
+the desire of exciting the astonishment of the Grecian assembly.
+
+It is said that free-agency is the absence of those obstacles competent
+to oppose themselves to the actions of man, or to the exercise of his
+faculties: it is pretended that he is a free agent, whenever, making use
+of these faculties, he produces the effect he has proposed to himself.
+In reply to this reasoning, it is sufficient to consider that it in no
+wise depends upon himself to place or remove the obstacles that either
+determine or resist him; the motive that causes his action is no more in
+his own power than the obstacle that impedes him, whether this obstacle
+or motive be within his own machine or exterior of his person: he is not
+master of the thought presented to his mind which determines his will;
+this thought is excited by some cause independent of himself.
+
+To be undeceived on the system of his free-agency, man has simply to
+recur to the motive by which his will is determined, he will always find
+this motive is out of his own controul. It is said, that in consequence
+of an idea to which the mind gives birth, man acts freely if he
+encounters no obstacle. But the question is, what gives birth to this
+idea in his brain? has he the power either to prevent it from presenting
+itself, or from renewing itself in his brain? Does not this idea
+depend either upon objects that strike him exteriorly and in despite of
+himself, or upon causes that without his knowledge act within himself
+and modify his brain? Can he prevent his eyes, cast without design upon
+any object whatever, from giving him an idea of this object, from
+moving his brain? He is not more master of the obstacles; they are the
+necessary effects of either interior or exterior causes, which always
+act according to their given properties. A man insults a coward, who is
+necessarily irritated against his insulter, but his will cannot vanquish
+the obstacle that cowardice places to the object of his desire, which
+is, to resent the insult; because his natural conformation, which does
+not depend upon himself, prevents his having courage. In this case
+the coward is insulted in despite of himself, and against his will is
+obliged patiently to brook the insult he has received.
+
+The partizans of the system of free-agency appear ever to have
+confounded constraint with necessity. Man believes he acts as a free
+agent, every time he does not see any thing that places obstacles to his
+actions; he does not perceive that the motive which causes him to will
+is always necessary, is ever independent of himself. A prisoner loaded
+with chains is compelled to remain in prison, but he is not a free
+agent, he is not able to resist the desire to emancipate himself;
+his chains prevent him from acting, but they do not prevent him from
+willing; he would save himself if they would loose his fetters, but he
+would not save himself as a free agent, fear or the idea of punishment
+would be sufficient motives for his action.
+
+Man may therefore cease to be restrained, without, for that reason,
+becoming a free agent: in whatever manner he acts, he will act
+necessarily; according to motives by which he shall be determined.
+He may be compared to a heavy body, that finds itself arrested in its
+descent by any obstacle whatever: take away this obstacle, it will
+gravitate or continue to fall; but who shall say this dense body is
+free to fall or not? Is not its descent the necessary effect of its own
+specific gravity? The virtuous Socrates submitted to the laws of his
+country, although they were unjust; notwithstanding the doors of his
+gaol were left open to him he would not save himself; but in this he
+did not act as a free agent; the invisible chains of opinion, the secret
+love of decorum, the inward respect for the laws, even when they were
+iniquitous, the fear of tarnishing his glory, kept him in his prison:
+they were motives sufficiently powerful, with this enthusiast for
+virtue, to induce him to wait death with tranquillity; it was not in
+his power to save himself, because he could find no potential motive to
+bring him to depart, even for an instant, from those principles to which
+his mind was accustomed.
+
+Man, says he, frequently acts against his inclination, from whence
+he has falsely concluded he is a free agent; when he appears to act
+contrary to his inclination, he is determined to it by some motive
+sufficiently efficacious to vanquish this inclination. A sick man, with
+a view to his cure, arrives at conquering his repugnance to the most
+disgusting remedies: the fear of pain, the dread of death, then become
+necessary and intelligent motives; consequently, this sick man cannot be
+said, with truth, by any means, to act freely.
+
+When it is said, that man is not a free agent, it is not pretended to
+compare him to a body moved by a simple impulsive cause: he contains
+within himself causes inherent to his existence; he is moved by an
+interior organ, which has its own peculiar laws; which is itself
+necessarily determined, in consequence of ideas formed from perceptions,
+resulting from sensations, which it receives from exterior objects. As
+the mechanism of these sensations, of these perceptions, and the manner
+they engrave ideas on the brain of man, are not known to him, because he
+is unable to unravel all these motions; because he cannot perceive
+the chain of operations in his soul, or the motive-principle that
+acts within him, he supposes himself a free agent; which, literally
+translated, signifies that he moves himself by himself; that he
+determines himself without cause; when he rather ought to say, he is
+ignorant how or for why he acts in the manner he does. It is true the
+soul enjoys an activity peculiar to itself, but it is equally certain
+that this activity would never be displayed if some motive or some cause
+did not put it in a condition to exercise itself, at least it will not
+be pretended that the soul is able either to love or to hate without
+being moved, without knowing the objects, without having some idea of
+their qualities. Gunpowder has unquestionably a particular activity, but
+this activity will never display itself, unless fire be applied to it;
+this, however, immediately sets in motion.
+
+It is the great complication of motion in man, it is the variety of
+his action, it is the multiplicity of causes that move him, whether
+simultaneously or in continual succession, that persuades him he is a
+free agent: if all his motions were simple, if the causes that move him
+did not confound themselves with each other, if they were distinct, if
+his machine was less complicated, he would perceive that all his actions
+were necessary, because he would be enabled to recur instantly to
+the cause that made him act. A man who should be always obliged to
+go towards the west would always go on that side, but he would feel
+extremely well, that in so going he was not a free agent: if he had
+another sense, as his actions or his motion augmented by a sixth would
+be still more varied, much more complicated, he would believe himself
+still more a free agent than he does with his five senses.
+
+It is, then, for want of recurring to the causes that move him, for
+want of being able to analyse, from not being competent to decompose
+the complicated motion of his machine, that man believes himself a free
+agent; it is only upon his own ignorance that he founds the profound
+yet deceitful notion he has of his free-agency, that he builds those
+opinions which he brings forward as a striking proof of his pretended
+freedom of action. If, for a short time, each man was willing to examine
+his own peculiar actions, to search out their true motives, to discover
+their concatenation, he would remain convinced that the sentiment he has
+of his natural free-agency is a chimera that must speedily be destroyed
+by experience.
+
+Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that the multiplicity, the
+diversity of the causes which continually act upon man, frequently
+without even his knowledge, render it impossible, or at least extremely
+difficult, for him to recur to the true principles of his own peculiar
+actions, much less the actions of others; they frequently depend
+upon causes so fugitive, so remote from their effects, and which,
+superficially examined, appear to have so little analogy, so slender
+a relation with them, that it requires singular sagacity to bring them
+into light. This is what renders the study of the moral man a task of
+such difficulty; this is the reason why his heart is an abyss, of which
+it is frequently impossible for him to fathom the depth. He is, then,
+obliged to content himself with a knowledge of the general and necessary
+laws by which the human heart is regulated; for the individuals of his
+own species these laws are pretty nearly the same, they vary only in
+consequence of the organization that is peculiar to each, and of the
+modification it undergoes; this, however, is not, cannot be rigorously
+the same in any two. It suffices to know that by his essence man tends
+to conserve himself, to render his existence happy: this granted,
+whatever may be his actions, if he recurs back to this first principle,
+to this general, this necessary tendency of his will, he never can be
+deceived with regard to his motives. Man, without doubt, for want of
+cultivating reason, being destitute of experience, frequently deceives
+himself upon the means of arriving at this end; sometimes the means he
+employs are unpleasant to his fellows, because they are prejudicial
+to their interests; or else those of which he avails himself appear
+irrational, because they remove him from the end to which he would
+approximate: but whatever may be these means, they have always
+necessarily and invariably for object, either an existing or imaginary
+happiness; are directed to preserve himself in a state analogous to his
+mode of existence, to his manner of feeling, to his way of thinking;
+whether durable or transitory. It is from having mistaken this truth,
+that the greater number of moral philosophers have made rather the
+romance, than the history of the human heart; they have attributed the
+actions of man to fictitious causes; at least they have not sought out
+the necessary motives of his conduct. Politicians and legislators have
+been in the same state of ignorance; or else impostors have found it
+much shorter to employ imaginary motive-powers, than those which really
+have existence: they have rather chosen to make man wander out of his
+way, to make him tremble under incommodious phantoms, than guide him to
+virtue by the direct road to happiness; notwithstanding the conformity
+of the latter with the natural desires of his heart. So true it is, that
+_error can never possibly be useful, to the human species_.
+
+However this may be, man either sees or believes he sees, much more
+distinctly, the necessary relation of effects with their causes in
+natural philosophy than in the human heart; at least he sees in the
+former sensible causes constantly produce sensible effects, ever the
+same, when the circumstances are alike. After this, he hesitates not
+to look upon physical effects as necessary, whilst he refuses to
+acknowledge necessity in the acts of the human will; these he has,
+without any just foundation, attributed to a motive-power that acts
+independently by its own peculiar energy, that is capable of modifying
+itself without the concurrence of exterior causes, and which is
+distinguished from all material or physical beings. _Agriculture_ is
+founded upon the assurance afforded by experience, that the earth,
+cultivated and sown in a certain manner, when it has otherwise the
+requisite qualities, will furnish grain, fruit, and flowers, either
+necessary for subsistence or pleasing to the senses. If things were
+considered without prejudice, it would be perceived, that in morals
+education is nothing more than _the agriculture of the mind_; that like
+the earth, by reason of its natural disposition, of the culture bestowed
+upon it, of the seeds with which it is sown, of the seasons, more or
+less favorable, that conduct it to maturity, we may be assured that
+the soul will produce either virtue or vice; _moral fruit_ that will be
+either salubrious for man or baneful to society. _Morals_ is the science
+of the relations that subsist between the minds, the wills, and the
+actions of men; in the same manner that _geometry_ is the science of the
+relations that are found between bodies. Morals would be a chimera,
+it would have no certain principles, if it was not founded upon the
+knowledge of the motives which must necessarily have an influence upon
+the human will, and which must necessarily determine the actions of
+human beings.
+
+If in the moral as well as in the physical world, a cause of which the
+action is not interrupted be necessarily followed by a given effect, it
+flows consecutively that a _reasonable education_, grafted upon truth,
+founded upon wise laws,--that honest principles instilled during youth,
+virtuous examples continually held forth, esteem attached solely to
+merit, recompense awarded to none but good actions, contempt regularly
+visiting vice, shame following falsehood as its shadow, rigorous
+chastisements applied without distinction to crime, are causes that
+would necessarily act on the will of man; that would determine the
+greater number of his species to exhibit virtue, to love it for its own
+sake, to seek after it as the most desirable good, as the surest road
+to the happiness he so ardently desires. But if, on the contrary,
+superstition, politics, example, public opinion, all labour to
+countenance wickedness, to train man viciously; if, instead of fanning
+his virtues, they stifle good principles; if, instead of directing his
+studies to his advantage, they render his education either useless or
+unprofitable; if this education itself, instead of grounding him in
+virtue, only inoculates him with vice; if, instead of inculcating
+reason, it imbues him with prejudice; if, instead of making him
+enamoured of truth, it furnishes him with false notions; if, instead
+of storing his mind with just ideas drawn from experience, it fills
+him with dangerous opinions; if, instead of fostering mildness and
+forbearance, it kindles in his breast only those passions which are
+incommodious to himself and hurtful to others; it must be of necessity,
+that the will of the greater number shall determine them to evil; shall
+render them unworthy, make them baneful to society. Many authors have
+acknowledged the importance of a good education, that youth was the
+season to feed the human heart with wholesome diet; but they have not
+felt, that a good education is incompatible, nay, impossible, with the
+superstition of man, since this commences with giving his mind a false
+bias: that it is equally inconsistent with arbitrary government, because
+this always dreads lest he should become enlightened, and is ever
+sedulous to render him servile, mean, contemptible, and cringing; that
+it is incongruous with laws that are not founded in equity, that are
+frequently bottomed on injustice; that it cannot obtain with those
+received customs that are opposed to good sense; that it cannot exist
+whilst public opinion is unfavourable to virtue; above all, that it is
+absurd to expect it from incapable instructors, from masters with weak
+minds, who have only the ability to infuse into their scholars those
+false ideas with which they are themselves infected. Here, without
+doubt, is the real source from whence springs that universal corruption,
+that wide-spreading depravity, of which moralists, with great justice,
+so loudly complain; without, however, pointing out those causes of the
+evil, which are true as they are necessary: instead of this, they search
+for it in human nature, say it is corrupt, blame man for loving himself,
+and for seeking after his own happiness, insist that he must have
+supernatural assistance, some marvellous interference, to enable him to
+become good: this is a very prejudicial doctrine for him, it is directly
+subversive of his true happiness; by teaching him to hold himself in
+contempt, it tends necessarily to discourage him; it either makes him
+sluggish, or drives him to despair whilst waiting for this grace: is it
+not easy to be perceived, that he would always have it if he was well
+educated; if he was honestly governed? There cannot well exist a
+wilder or a stranger system of morals, than that of the theologians who
+attribute all moral evil to an original sin, and all moral good to the
+pardon of it. It ought not to excite surprise if such a system is of no
+efficacy; what can reasonably be the result of such an hypothesis? Yet,
+notwithstanding the supposed, the boasted free-agency of man, it
+is insisted that nothing less than the Author of Nature himself is
+necessary to destroy the wicked desires of his heart: but, alas! no
+power whatever is found sufficiently efficacious to resist those unhappy
+propensities, which, under the fatal constitution of things, the most
+vigorous motives, as before observed, are continually infusing into
+the will of man; no agency seems competent to turn the course of that
+unhappy direction these are perpetually giving to the stream of his
+natural passions. He is, indeed, incessantly exhorted to resist these
+passions, to stifle them, and to root them out of his heart; but is it
+not evident they are necessary to his welfare? Can it not be perceived
+they are inherent in his nature? Does not experience prove them to be
+useful to his conservation, since they have for object, only to avoid
+that which may be injurious to him; to procure that which may be
+advantageous to his mode of existence? In short, is it not easy to
+be seen, that these passions, well directed, that is to say, carried
+towards objects that are truly useful, that are really interesting
+to himself, which embrace the happiness of others, would necessarily
+contribute to the substantial, to the permanent well-being of society?
+Theologians themselves have felt, they have acknowledged the necessity
+of the passions: many of the fathers of the church have broached this
+doctrine; among the rest Father Senault has written a book expressly on
+the subject: the passions of man are like fire, at once necessary to
+the wants of life, suitable to ameliorate the condition of humanity,
+and equally capable of producing the most terrible ravages, the most
+frightful devastation.
+
+Every thing becomes an impulse to the will; a single word frequently
+suffices to modify a man for the whole course of his life, to decide
+for ever his propensities; an infant who has burned his finger by having
+approached it too near the flame of a lighted taper, is warned from
+thence, that he ought to abstain from indulging a similar temptation; a
+man, once punished and despised for having committed a dishonest
+action, is not often tempted to continue so unfavourable a course. Under
+whatever point of man is considered, he never acts but after the impulse
+given to his will, whether it be by the will of others, or by more
+perceptible physical causes. The particular organization decides
+the nature of the impulse; souls act upon souls that are analogous;
+inflamed, fiery imaginations, act with facility upon strong passions;
+upon imaginations easy to be inflamed, the surprising progress of
+enthusiasm; the hereditary propagation of superstition; the transmission
+of religious errors from race to race, the excessive ardour with which
+man seizes on the marvellous, are effects as necessary as those which
+result from the action and re-action of bodies.
+
+In despite of the gratuitous ideas which man has formed to himself on
+his pretended free-agency; in defiance of the illusions of this suppose
+intimate sense, which, contrary to his experience, persuades him that
+he is master of his will,--all his institutions are really founded upon
+necessity: on this, as on a variety of other occasions, practice throws
+aside speculation. Indeed, if it was not believed that certain motives
+embraced the power requisite to determine the will of man, to arrest the
+progress of his passions, to direct them towards an end, to modify him;
+of what use would be the faculty of speech? What benefit could arise
+from education itself? What does education achieve, save give the first
+impulse to the human will, make man contract habits, oblige him to
+persist in them, furnish him with motives, whether true or false, to
+act after a given manner? When the father either menaces his son with
+punishment, or promises him a reward, is he not convinced these things
+will act upon his will? What does legislation attempt, except it be
+to present to the citizens of a state those motives which are supposed
+necessary to determine them to perform some actions that are considered
+worthy; to abstain from committing others that are looked upon as
+unworthy? What is the object of morals, if it be not to shew man that
+his interest exacts he should suppress the momentary ebullition of
+his passions, with a view to promote a more certain happiness, a more
+lasting well-being, than can possibly result from the gratification of
+his transitory desires? Does not the religion of all countries suppose
+the human race, together with the entire of Nature, submitted to the
+irresistible will of a necessary being, who regulates their condition
+after the eternal laws of immutable wisdom? Is not God the absolute
+master of their destiny? Is it not this divine being who chooses and
+rejects? The anathemas fulminated by religion, the promises it holds
+forth, are they not founded upon the idea of the effects they will
+necessarily produce upon mankind? Is not man brought into existence
+without his own knowledge? Is he not obliged to play a part against his
+will? Does not either his happiness or his misery depend on the part he
+plays?
+
+All religion has been evidently founded upon _Fatalism_. Among the
+Greeks they supposed men were punished for their necessary faults,
+as may be seen in Orestes, in Oedipus, &c. who only committed crimes
+predicted by the oracles. It is rather singular that the theological
+defenders of the doctrine of _free-agency_, which they endeavour
+to oppose to that of _predestination_,--which according to them is
+irreconcileable with _Christianity_, inasmuch as it is a false and
+dangerous system,--should not have been aware that the doctrines of _the
+fall of angels, original sin, the small number of the elect, the system
+of grace, &c._ were most incontestibly supporting, by the most cogent
+arguments, a _true system of fatalism_.
+
+_Education_, then, is only necessity shewn to children: _legislation_
+is necessity shewn to the members of the body politic: _morals_ is the
+necessity of the relations subsisting between men, shewn to reasonable
+beings: in short, man grants _necessity_ in every thing for which he
+believes he has certain, unerring experience: that of which he does
+not comprehend the necessary connection of causes with their effects
+he styles _probability_: he would not act as he does, if he was not
+convinced, or, at least, if he did not presume he was, that certain
+effects will necessarily follow his actions. The _moralist_ preaches
+reason, because he believes it necessary to man: the _philosopher_
+writes, because he believes truth must, sooner or later, prevail over
+falsehood: _tyrants_ and _fanatical priests_ necessarily hate truth,
+despise reason, because they believe them prejudicial to their
+interests: the _sovereign_, who strives to terrify crime by the
+severity of his laws, but who nevertheless, from motives of state policy
+sometimes renders it useful and even necessary to his purposes, presumes
+the motives he employs will be sufficient to keep his subjects within
+bounds. All reckon equally upon the power or upon the necessity of the
+motives they make use of; each individual flatters himself, either with
+or without reason, that these motives will have an influence on the
+conduct of mankind. The education of man is commonly so defective, so
+inefficacious, so little calculated to promote the end he has in view,
+because it is regulated by prejudice: even when this education is good,
+it is but too often speedily counteracted, by almost every thing that
+takes place in society. Legislation and politics are very frequently
+iniquitous, and serve no better purpose than to kindle passions in the
+bosom of man, which once set afloat, they are no longer competent to
+restrain. The great art of the moralist should be, to point out to man,
+to convince those who are entrusted with the sacred office of regulating
+his will, that their interests are identified; that their reciprocal
+happiness depends upon the harmony of their passions; that the safety,
+the power, the duration of empires, necessarily depend on the good
+sense diffused among the individual members; on the truth of the notions
+inculcated in the mind of the citizens, on the moral goodness that
+is sown in their hearts, on the virtues that are cultivated in their
+breasts; religion should not be admissible, unless it truly fortified,
+unless it really strengthened these motives. But in the miserable
+state into which error has plunged a considerable portion of the human
+species, man, for the most part, is seduced to be wicked: he injures his
+fellow-creature as a matter of conscience, because the strongest motives
+are held out to him to be persecuting; because his institutions invite
+him to the commission of evil, under the lure of promoting his own
+immediate happiness. In most countries superstition renders him a
+useless being, makes him an abject slave, causes him to tremble under
+its terrors, or else turns him into a furious fanatic, who is at once
+cruel, intolerant, and inhuman: in a great number of states arbitrary
+power crushes him, obliges him to become a cringing sycophant, renders
+him completely vicious: in those despotic states the law rarely visits
+crime with punishment, except in those who are too feeble to oppose
+its course? or when it has become incapable of restraining the violent
+excesses to which a bad government gives birth. In short, rational
+education is neglected; a prudent culture of the human mind is despised;
+it depends, but too frequently, upon bigotted, superstitious priests,
+who are interested in deceiving man, and who are sometimes impostors;
+or else upon parents or masters without understanding, who are devoid
+of morals, who impress on the ductile mind of their scholars those vices
+with which they are themselves tormented; who transmit to them the false
+opinions, which they believe they have an interest in making them adopt.
+
+All this proves the necessity of falling back to man's original errors,
+and recurring to the primitive source of his wanderings, if it be
+seriously intended to furnish him with suitable remedies for such
+enormous maladies: it is useless to dream of correcting his mistakes,
+of curing him of his depravity, until the true causes that move his will
+are unravelled; until more real, more beneficial, more certain motives
+are substituted for those which are found so inefficacious; which prove
+so dangerous both to society and to himself. It is for those who guide
+the human will, who regulate the condition of nations, who hold the
+real happiness of man in their grasp, to seek after these motives,--with
+which reason will readily furnish them--which experience will enable
+them to apply with success: even a good book, by touching the heart of
+a great prince, may become a very powerful cause that shall necessarily
+have an influence over the conduct of a whole people, and decide upon
+the felicity of a portion of the human race.
+
+From all that has been advanced in this chapter, it results, that in no
+one moment of his existence man is a free agent: he is not the architect
+of his own conformation; this he holds from Nature, he has no controul
+over his own ideas, or over the modification of his brain; these are
+due to causes, that, in despite of him, very frequently without his own
+knowledge, unceasingly act upon him; he is not the master of not loving
+that which he finds amiable; of not coveting that which appears to
+him desirable; he is not capable of refusing to deliberate, when he
+is uncertain of the effects certain objects will produce upon him; he
+cannot avoid choosing that which he believes will be most advantageous
+to him: in the moment when his will is determined by his choice, he is
+not competent to act otherwise than he does: in what instance, then, is
+he the master of his own actions? In what moment is he a free agent?
+
+That which a man is about to do is always a consequence of that which
+he has been--of that which he is--of that which he has done up to the
+moment of the action: his total and actual existence, considered under
+all its possible circumstances, contains the sum of all the motives
+to the action he is about to commit; this is a principle, the truth of
+which no thinking, being will be able to refuse accrediting: his life
+is a series of necessary moments; his conduct, whether good or bad,
+virtuous or vicious, useful or prejudicial, either to himself or to
+others, is a concatenation of action, a chain of causes and effects, as
+necessary as all the moments of his existence. To _live_, is to exist in
+a necessary mode during the points of its duration, which succeed each
+other necessarily: to _will_, is to acquiesce or not in remaining such
+as he is: to be _free_, is to yield to the necessary motives that he
+carries within himself.
+
+If he understood the play of his organs, if he was able to recal to
+himself all the impulsions they have received, all the modifications
+they have undergone, all the effects they have produced, he would
+perceive, that all his actions are submitted to that _fatality_ which
+regulates his own particular system, as it does the entire system of the
+universe: no one effect in him, any more than in Nature, produce itself
+by _chance_; this, as has been before proved, is a word void of sense.
+All that passes in him, all that is done by him, as well as all that
+happens in Nature, or that is attributed to her, is derived from
+necessary laws, which produce necessary effects; from whence necessarily
+flow others.
+
+_Fatality_ is the eternal, the immutable, the necessary order
+established in Nature, or the indispensible connection of causes that
+act with the effects they operate. Conforming to this order, heavy
+bodies fall, light bodies rise; that which is analogous in matter,
+reciprocally attracts; that which is heterogeneous, mutually repels; man
+congregates himself in society, modifies each his fellow, becomes either
+virtuous or wicked; either contributes to his mutual happiness, or
+reciprocates his misery; either loves his neighbour, or hates his
+companion necessarily; according to the manner in which the one acts
+upon the other. From whence it may be seen, that the same necessity
+which regulates the physical, also regulates the moral world: in which
+every thing is in consequence submitted to fatality. Man, in running
+over, frequently without his own knowledge, often in despite of himself,
+the route which Nature has marked out for him, resembles a swimmer who
+is obliged to follow the current that carries him along; he believes
+himself a free agent, because he sometimes consents, sometimes does
+not consent, to glide with the stream; which, notwithstanding, always
+hurries him forward; he believes himself the master of his condition,
+because he is obliged to use his arms under the fear of sinking.
+
+The false ideas he has formed to himself upon free-agency, are
+in general thus founded: there are certain events which he judges
+_necessary_; either because he sees they are effects that are
+constantly, are invariably linked to certain causes, which nothing seems
+to prevent; or because he believes he has discovered the chain of causes
+and effects that is put in play to produce those events: whilst he
+contemplates as _contingent_, other events, of whose causes he is
+ignorant; the concatenation of which he does not perceive; with whose
+mode of acting he is unacquainted: but in Nature, where every thing is
+connected by one common bond, there exists no effect without a cause. In
+the moral as well as in the physical world, every thing that happens is
+a necessary consequence of causes, either visible or concealed; which
+are, of necessity, obliged to act after their peculiar essences.
+_In man, free-agency is nothing more than necessity contained within
+himself_.
+
+
+
+
+
+CHAP. XII.
+
+_An examination of the Opinion which pretends that the System of
+Fatalism is dangerous._
+
+
+For a being whose essence obliges him to have a constant tendency to
+his own conservation, to continually seek to render himself happy,
+experience is indispensible: without it he cannot discover truth, which
+is nothing more, as has been already said, than a knowledge of the
+constant relations which subsist between man, and those objects that
+act upon him; according to his experience he denominates those that
+contribute to his permanent welfare useful and salutary; those that
+procure him pleasure, more or less durable, he calls agreeable. Truth
+itself becomes the object of his desires, only when he believes it is
+useful; he dreads it, whenever he presumes it will injure him. But has
+truth the power to injure him? Is it possible that evil can result to
+man from a correct understanding of the relations he has with other
+beings? Can it be true, that he can be harmed by becoming acquainted
+with those things, of which, for his own happiness, he is interested in
+having a knowledge? No: unquestionably not. It is upon its utility that
+truth founds its worth; upon this that it builds its rights; sometimes
+it may be disagreeable to individuals--it may even appear contrary to
+their interests--but it will ever be beneficial to them in the end;
+it will always be useful to the whole human species; it will eternally
+benefit the great bulk of mankind; whose interests must for ever remain
+distinct from those of men, who, duped by their own peculiar passions,
+believe their advantage consists in plunging others into error.
+
+_Utility_, then, is the touchstone of his systems, the test of his
+opinions, the criterion of the actions of man; it is the standard of the
+esteem, the measure of the love he owes to truth itself: the most useful
+truths are the most estimable: those truths which are most interesting
+for his species, he styles _eminent_; those of which the utility limits
+itself to the amusement of some individuals who have not correspondent
+ideas, similar modes of feeling, wants analogous to his own, he either
+disdains, or else calls them _barren_.
+
+It is according to this standard, that the principles laid down in this
+work, ought to be judged. Those who are acquainted with the immense
+chain of mischief produced on the earth by erroneous systems of
+superstition, will acknowledge the importance of opposing to them
+systems more accordant with truth, schemes drawn from Nature, sciences
+founded on experience. Those who are, or believe they are, interested in
+maintaining the established errors, will contemplate, with horror, the
+truths here presented to them: in short, those infatuated mortals, who
+do not feel, or who only feel very faintly, the enormous load of misery
+brought upon mankind by metaphysical speculation; the heavy yoke of
+slavery under which prejudice makes him groan, will regard all our
+principles as useless; or, at most, as sterile truths, calculated to
+amuse the idle hours of a few speculators.
+
+No astonishment, therefore, need be excited at the various judgments
+formed by man: his interests never being the same, any more than his
+notions of utility, he condemns or disdains every thing that does not
+accord with his own peculiar ideas. This granted, let us examine, if
+in the eyes of the disinterested man, who is not entangled by
+prejudice--who is sensible to the happiness of his species--who delights
+in truth--the _doctrine of fatalism_ be useful or dangerous? Let us
+see if it is a barren speculation, that his not any influence upon the
+felicity of the human race? At has been already shewn, that it will
+furnish morals with efficacious arguments, with real motives to
+determine the will, supply politics with the true lever to raise the
+proper activity in the mind of man. It will also be seen that it
+serves to explain in a simple manner the mechanism of man's actions; to
+develope in an easy way the arcana of the most striking phenomena of
+the human heart: on the other hand, if his ideas are only the result of
+unfruitful speculations, they cannot interest the happiness of the
+human species. Whether he believes himself a free agent, or whether
+he acknowledges the necessity of things, he always equally follows the
+desires imprinted on his soul; which are to preserve his existence and
+render himself happy. A rational education, honest habits, wise systems,
+equitable laws, rewards uprightly distributed, punishments justly
+inflicted, will conduct man to happiness by making him virtuous; while
+thorny speculations, filled with difficulties, can at most only have an
+influence over persons unaccustomed to think.
+
+After these reflections, it will be very easy to remove the difficulties
+that are unceasingly opposed to the system of fatalism, which so many
+persons, blinded by their superstitious prejudices, are desirous to have
+considered as dangerous--as deserving of punishment--as calculated
+to disturb public tranquility--as tending to unchain the passions--to
+undermine the opinions man ought to have; and to confound his ideas of
+vice and of virtue.
+
+The opposers of necessity, say, that if all the actions of man are
+necessary, no right whatever exists to punish bad ones, or even to he
+angry with those who commit them: that nothing ought to be imputed to
+them; that the laws would be unjust if they should decree punishment for
+necessary actions; in short, that under this system man could neither
+have merit nor demerit. In reply, it may be argued, that, to impute an
+action to any one, is to attribute that action to him; to acknowledge
+him for the author: thus, when even an action was supposed to be the
+effect of an agent, and that agent _necessity_, the imputation would
+lie: the merit or demerit, that is ascribed to an action are ideas
+originating in the effects, whether favourable or pernicious, that
+result to those who experience its operation; when, therefore, it should
+be conceded, that the agent was necessity, it is not less certain, that
+the action would be either good or bad; estimable or contemptible, to
+those who must feel its influence; in short that it would be capable of
+either eliciting their love, or exciting their anger. Love and anger
+are modes of existence, suitable to modify, beings of the human species:
+when, therefore, man irritates himself against his fellow, he intends
+to excite his fear, or even to punish him, in order to deter him from
+committing that which is displeasing to him. Moreover his anger is
+necessary; it is the result of his Nature; the consequence of his
+temperament. The painful sensation produced by a stone that falls on the
+arm, does not displease the less, because it comes from a cause deprived
+of will; which acts by the necessity of its Nature. In contemplating
+man as acting necessarily, it is impossible to avoid distinguishing that
+mode of action or being which is agreeable, which elicits approbation,
+from that which is afflicting, which irritates, which Nature obliges him
+to blame and to prevent. From this it will be seen, that the system of
+fatalism, does not in any manner change the actual state of things, and
+is by no means calculated to confound man's ideas of virtue and vice.
+
+Man's Nature always revolts against that which opposes it: there are men
+so choleric, that they infuriate themselves even against insensible and
+inanimate objects; reflection on their own impotence to modify these
+objects ought to conduct them back to reason. Parents are frequently
+very much to be blamed for correcting their children with anger: they
+should be contemplated as beings who are not yet modified; or who have,
+perhaps, been very badly modified by themselves: nothing is more common
+in life, than to see men punish faults of which they are themselves the
+cause.
+
+Laws are made with a view to maintain society; to uphold its existence;
+to prevent man associated, from injuring his neighbour; they are
+therefore competent to punish those who disturb its harmony, or those
+who commit actions that are injurious to their fellows; whether these
+associates may be the agents of necessity, or whether they are free
+agents, it suffices to know they are susceptible of modification, and
+are therefore submitted to the operation of the law. Penal laws are,
+or ought to be, those motives which experience has shewn capable of
+restraining the inordinate passions of man, or of annihilating the
+impulse these passions give to his will; from whatever necessary cause
+man may derive these passions, the legislator proposes to arrest their
+effect, when he takes suitable means, when he adopts proper methods,
+he is certain of success. The Judge, in decreeing to crime, gibbets,
+tortures, or any other chastisement whatever, does nothing more than is
+done by the architect, who in building a house, places gutters to carry
+off the rain, and prevent it from sapping the foundation.
+
+Whatever may be the cause that obliges man to act, society possesses
+the right to crush the effects, as much as the man whose land would be
+ruined by a river, has to restrain its waters by a bank: or even, if he
+is able, to turn its course. It is by virtue of this right that society
+has the power to intimidate, the faculty to punish, with a view to its
+own conservation, those who may be tempted to injure it; or those who
+commit actions which are acknowledged really to interrupt its repose; to
+be inimical to its security; repugnant to its happiness.
+
+It will, perhaps, be argued, that society does not, usually, punish
+those faults in which the will has no share; that, in fact, it punishes
+the will alone; that this it is which decides the nature of the crime,
+and the degree of its atrocity; that if this will be not free, it ought
+not to be punished. I reply, that society is an assemblage of sensible
+beings, susceptible of reason, who desire their own welfare; who fear
+evil, and seek after good. These dispositions enable their will to be so
+modified or determined, that they are capable of holding such a conduct
+as will conduce to the end they have in view. Education, the laws,
+public opinion, example, habit, fear, are the causes that must modify
+associated man, influence his will, regulate his passions, restrain the
+actions of him who is capable of injuring the end of his association,
+and thereby make him concur to the general happiness. These causes are
+of a nature to make impressions on every man, whose organization, whose
+essence, whose sanity, places him in a capacity to contract the habits,
+to imbibe the modes of thinking, to adopt the manner of acting, with
+which society is willing to inspire him. All the individuals of the
+human species are susceptible of fear, from whence it flows as a natural
+consequence, that the fear of punishment, or the privation of the
+happiness he desires, are motives that must necessarily more or less
+influence his will, and regulate his actions. If the man is to be found
+who is so badly constituted as to resist, whose organization is so
+vicious as to be insensible to those motives which operate upon all his
+fellows, he is not fit to live in society; he would contradict the very
+end of his association: he would be its enemy; he would place obstacles
+to its natural tendency; his rebellious disposition, his unsociable
+will, not being susceptible of that modification which is convenient
+to his own true interests and to the interests of his fellow-citizens;
+these would unite themselves against such an enemy; and the law which
+is, or ought to be the expression of the general will, would visit with
+condign punishment that refractory individual upon whom the motives
+presented to him by society, had not the effect which it had been
+induced to expect: in consequence, such an unsociable man would be
+chastised; he would be rendered miserable, and according to the nature
+of his crime he would be excluded from society as a being but little
+calculated to concur in its views.
+
+If society has the right to conserve itself, it has also the right
+to take the means: these means are the laws which present or ought to
+present to the will of man those motives which are most suitable to
+deter him from committing injurious actions. If these motives fail of
+the proper effect, if they are unable to influence him, society, for its
+own peculiar good, is obliged to wrest from him the power of doing it
+further injury. From whatever source his actions may arise, therefore,
+whether they are the result of free-agency, or whether they are the
+offspring of necessity, society coerces him if, after having furnished
+him with motives, sufficiently powerful to act upon reasonable beings,
+it perceives that these motives have not been competent to vanquish his
+depraved nature. It punishes him with justice, when the actions from
+which it dissuades him are truly injurious to society; it has an
+unquestionable right to punish, when it only commands those things
+that are conformable to the end proposed by man in his association; or
+defends the commission of those acts, which are contrary to this
+end; which are hostile to the nature of beings associated for their
+reciprocal advantage. But, on the other hand, the law has not acquired
+the right to punish him: if it has failed to present to him the motives
+necessary to have an influence over his will, it has not the right to
+coerce him if the negligence of society has deprived him of the means
+of subsisting; of exercising his talents; of exerting his industry; of
+labouring for its welfare. It is unjust, when it punishes those to whom
+it has, neither given an education, nor honest principles; whom it has
+not enabled to contract habits necessary to the maintenance of society:
+it is unjust when it punishes them for faults which the wants of their
+nature, or the constitution of society has rendered necessary to them:
+it is unjust, it is irrational, whenever it chastises them for having
+followed those propensities, which example, which public opinion, which
+the institutions, which society itself conspires to give them. In short,
+the law is defective when it does not proportion the punishment to the
+real evil which society has sustained. The last degree of injustice, the
+acme of folly is, when society is so blinded as to inflict punishment on
+those citizens who have served it usefully.
+
+The _penal_ laws, in exhibiting terrifying objects to man, who must be
+supposed susceptible of fear, presents him with motives calculated to
+have an influence over his will. The idea of pain, the privation of
+liberty, the fear of death, are, to a being well constituted, in the
+full enjoyment of his faculties, very puissant obstacles, that strongly
+oppose themselves to the impulse of his unruly desires: when these do
+not coerce his will, when they fail to arrest his progress, he is
+an irrational being; a madman; a being badly organized; against whom
+society has the right to guarantee itself; against whom it has a right
+to take measures for its own security. Madness is, without doubt, an
+involuntary, a necessary state; nevertheless, no one feels it unjust to
+deprive the insane of their liberty, although their actions can only
+be imputed to the derangement of their brain. The wicked are men whose
+brain is either constantly or transitorily disturbed; still they must be
+punished by reason of the evil they commit; they must always be placed
+in the impossibility of injuring society: if no hope remains of bringing
+them back to a reasonable conduct--if every prospect of recalling them
+to their duty has vanished--if they cannot be made to adopt a mode of
+action conformable to the great end of association--they must be for
+ever excluded its benefits.
+
+It will not be requisite to examine here, how far the punishments which
+society inflicts upon those who offend against it, may be reasonably
+carried. Reason should seem to indicate that the law ought to shew to
+the necessary crimes of man, all the indulgence that is compatible with
+the conservation of society. The system of fatalism, as we have seen,
+does not leave crime unpunished; but it is, at least, calculated to
+moderate the barbarity with which a number of nations punish the victims
+to their anger. This cruelty becomes still more absurd, when experience
+has shewn its inutility: the habit of witnessing ferocious punishments
+familiarizes criminals with the idea. If it be true that society
+possesses the right of taking away the life of its members--if it be
+really a fact, that the death of a criminal, thenceforth useless, can
+be advantageous for society, which it will be necessary to examine,
+humanity, at least, exacts that this death should not be accompanied
+with useless tortures; with which laws, perhaps in this instance too
+rigorous, frequently seem to delight in overwhelming their victim. This
+cruelty seems to defeat its own end, it only serves to make the culprit,
+who is immolated to the public vengeance, suffer without any advantage
+to society; it moves the compassion of the spectator, interests him
+in favor of the miserable offender who groans under its weight; it
+impresses nothing upon the wicked, but the sight of those cruelties
+destined for himself; which but too frequently renders him more
+ferocious, more cruel, more the enemy of his associates: if the
+example of death was less frequent, even without being accompanied with
+tortures, it would be more efficacious. If experience was consulted, it
+would be found that the greater number of criminals only look upon death
+as a _bad quarter of an hour_. It is an unquestionable fact, that a
+thief seeing one of his comrades, display a want of firmness under the
+punishment, said to him: _"Is not this what I have often told you,
+that in our business, we have one evil more than the rest of mankind?"_
+Robberies are daily committed, even at the foot of the scaffolds where
+criminals are punished. In those nations, where the penalty of death is
+so lightly inflicted, has sufficient attention been paid to the fact,
+that society is yearly deprived of a great number of individuals who
+would be able to render it very useful service, if made to work, and
+thus indemnify the community for the injuries they have committed?
+The facility with which the lives of men are taken away, proves
+the incapacity of counsellors; is an evidence of the negligence of
+legislators: they find it a much shorter road, that it gives them less
+trouble to destroy the citizens than to seek after the means to render
+them better.
+
+What shall be said for the unjust cruelty of some nations, in which
+the law, that ought to have for its object the advantage of the whole,
+appears to be made only for the security of the most powerful? How shall
+we account for the inhumanity of those societies, in which punishments
+the most disproportionate to the crime, unmercifully take away the lives
+of men, whom the most urgent necessity, the dreadful alternative of
+famishing in a land of plenty, has obliged to become criminal? It
+is thus that in a great number of civilized nations, the life of the
+citizen is placed in the same scales with money; that the unhappy wretch
+who is perishing from hunger, who is writhing under the most abject
+misery, is put to death for having taken a pitiful portion of the
+superfluity of another whom he beholds rolling in abundance! It is this
+that, in many otherwise very enlightened societies, is called _justice_,
+or making the punishment commensurate with the crime.
+
+Let the man of humanity, whose tender feelings are alive to the welfare
+of his species--let the moralist, who preaches virtue, who holds out
+forbearance to man--let the philosopher, who dives into the secrets of
+Nature--let the theologian himself say, if this dreadful iniquity, this
+heinous sin, does not become yet more crying, when the laws decree the
+most cruel tortures for crimes to which the most irrational customs gave
+birth--which bad institutions engender--which evil examples multiply? Is
+not this something like building a sorry, inconvenient hovel, and then
+punishing the inhabitant, because he does not find all the conveniences
+of the most complete mansion, of the most finished structure? Man, as
+at cannot be too frequently repeated, is so prone to evil, only because
+every thing appears to urge him on to the commission of it, by too
+frequently shewing him vice triumphant: his education is void in a great
+number of states, perhaps defective in nearly all; in many places
+he receives from society no other principles, save those of an
+unintelligible superstition; which make but a feeble barrier against
+those propensities that are excited by dissolute manners; which are
+encouraged by corrupt examples: in vain the law cries out to him:
+"abstain from the goods of thy neighbour;" his wants, more powerful,
+loudly declare to him that he must live: unaccustomed to reason, having
+never been submitted to a wholesome discipline, he conceives he must
+do it at the expence of a society who has done nothing for him: who
+condemns him to groan in misery, to languish in indigence: frequently
+deprived of the common necessaries requisite to support his existence,
+which his essence, of which he is not the master, compels him to
+conserve. He compensates himself by theft, he revenges himself by
+assassination, he becomes a plunderer by profession, a murderer by
+trade; he plunges into crime, and seeks at the risque of his life, to
+satisfy those wants, whether real or imaginary, to which every thing
+around him conspires to give birth. Deprived of education, he has
+not been taught to restrain the fury of his temperament--to guide his
+passions with discretion--to curb his inclinations. Without ideas of
+decency, destitute of the true principles of honour, he engages in
+criminal pursuits that injure his country: which at the same time has
+been to him nothing more than a step-mother. In the paroxysm of his
+rage, in the exacerbation of his mind, he loses sight of his neighbour's
+rights, he overlooks the gibbet, he forgets the torture; his unruly
+desires have become too potent--they have completely absorbed his mind;
+by a criminal indulgence they have given an inveteracy to his habits
+which preclude him from changing them; laziness has made him torpid:
+remorse has gnawed his peace; despair has rendered him blind; he rushes
+on to death; and society is compelled to punish him rigorously, for
+those fatal, those necessary dispositions, which it has perhaps itself
+engendered in his heart by evil example: or which at least, it has not
+taken the pains seasonably to root out; which it has neglected to
+oppose by suitable motives--by those calculated to give him honest
+principles--to excite him to industrious habits, to imbue him with
+virtuous inclinations. Thus, society frequently punishes those
+propensities of which it is itself the author, or which its negligence
+has suffered to spring up in the mind of man: it acts like those
+unjust fathers, who chastise their children for vices which they have
+themselves made them contract.
+
+However unjust, however unreasonable this conduct may be, or appear to
+be, it is not the less necessary: society, such as it is, whatever may
+be its corruption, whatever vices may pervade its institutions, like
+every thing else in Nature, is willing to subsist; tends to conserve
+itself: in consequence, it is obliged to punish those excesses which
+its own vicious constitution has produced: in despite of its peculiar
+prejudices, notwithstanding its vices, it feels cogently that its own
+immediate security demands that it should destroy the conspiracies of
+those who make war against its tranquillity: if these, hurried on by the
+foul current of their necessary propensities, disturb its repose--if,
+borne on the stream of their ill-directed desires, they injure its
+interests, this following the natural law, which obliges it to labour
+to its own peculiar conservation, removes them out of its road; punishes
+them with more or less rigor, according to the objects to which it
+attaches the greatest importance, or which it supposes best suited to
+further its own peculiar welfare: without doubt, it deceives itself
+frequently, both upon these objects and the means; but it deceives
+itself necessarily, for want of the knowledge calculated to enlighten
+it, with regard to its true interests; for want of those, who regulate
+its movements possessing proper vigilance--suitable talents--the
+requisite virtue. From this it will appear, that the injustice of
+a society badly constituted, and blinded by its prejudices, is as
+necessary, as the crimes of those by whom it is hostilely attacked--by
+whose vices it is distracted. The body politic, when in a state of
+insanity, cannot act more consistently with reason, than one of its
+members whose brain is disturbed by madness.
+
+It will still be said that these maxims, by submitting every thing
+to necessity, must confound, or even destroy the notions man forms of
+justice and injustice; of good and evil; of merit and demerit: I deny
+it. Although man, in every thing he does, acts necessarily, his actions
+are good, they are just, they are meritorious, every time they tend
+to the real utility of his fellows; of the society of which he makes a
+part: they are, of necessity, distinguished from those which are really
+prejudicial to the welfare of his associates. Society is just, it is
+good, it is worthy our reverence, when it procures for all its members,
+their physical wants, when it affords them protection, when it secures
+their liberty, when it puts them in possession of their natural rights.
+It is ill this that consists all the happiness of which the social
+compact is susceptible: society is unjust, it is bad, it is unworthy
+our esteem, when it is partial to a few, when it is cruel to the greater
+number: it is then that it multiplies its enemies, obliges them to
+revenge themselves by criminal actions which it is under the necessity
+to punish. It is not upon the caprices of political society that depend
+the true notions of justice and injustice--the right ideas of moral
+good and evil--a just appreciation of merit and demerit; it is upon
+_utility_, upon the necessity of things, which always forces man to feel
+that there exists a mode of acting on which he implicitly relies, which
+he is obliged to venerate, which he cannot help approving either in
+his fellows, in himself, or in society: whilst there is another mode to
+which he cannot lend his confidence, which his nature makes him to hate,
+which his feelings compel him to condemn. It is upon his own peculiar
+essence that man founds his ideas of pleasure and of pain--of right and
+of wrong--of vice and of virtue: the only difference between these is,
+that pleasure and pain make them instantaneously felt in his brain;
+he becomes conscious of their existence upon the spot; in the place of
+which, the advantages that accrue to him from justice, the benefit that
+he derives from virtue, frequently do not display themselves but after
+a long train of reflections--after multiplied experience and complicated
+attention; which many, either from a defect in their conformation, or
+from the peculiarity of the circumstances under which they are placed,
+are prevented from making, or at least from making correctly.
+
+By a necessary consequence of this truism, the system of fatalism,
+although it has frequently been so accused, does not tend to encourage
+man in crime, to make remorse vanish from his mind. His propensities are
+to be ascribed to his nature; the use he makes of his passions depends
+upon his habits, upon his opinions, upon the ideas he has received in
+his education; upon the examples held forth by the society in which he
+lives. These things are what necessarily decide his conduct. Thus,
+when his temperament renders him susceptible of strong passions, he is
+violent in his desires, whatever may be his speculations.
+
+_Remorse_ is the painful sentiment excited in him by grief, caused
+either by the immediate or probable future effect of his indulged
+passions: if these effects were always useful to him, he would not
+experience remorse; but, as soon as he is assured that his actions
+render him hateful, that his passions make him contemptible; or, as
+soon as he fears he shall be punished in some mode or other, he becomes
+restless, discontented with himself--he reproaches himself with his own
+conduct--he feels ashamed--he fears the judgement of those beings whose
+affection he has learned to esteem--in whose good-will he finds his own
+comfort deeply interested. His experience proves to him that the wicked
+man is odious to all those upon whom his actions have any influence:
+if these actions are concealed at the moment of commission, he knows
+it very rarely happens they remain so for ever. The smallest reflection
+convinces him that there is no wicked man who is not ashamed of his
+own conduct--who is truly contented with himself--who does not envy the
+condition of the good man--who is not obliged to acknowledge that he has
+paid very dearly for those advantages he is never able to enjoy, without
+experiencing the most troublesome sensations, without making the most
+bitter reproaches against himself; then he feels ashamed, despises
+himself, hates himself, his conscience becomes alarmed, remorse follows
+in it train. To be convinced of the truth of this principle it is only
+requisite to cast our eyes on the extreme precautions that tyrants
+and villains, who are otherwise sufficiently powerful not to dread the
+punishment of man, take to prevent exposure;--to what lengths they push
+their cruelties against some, to what meannesses they stoop to others of
+those who are able to hold them up to public scorn. Have they not, then,
+a consciousness of their own iniquities? Do they not know that they
+are hateful and contemptible? Have they not remorse? Is their condition
+happy? Persons well brought up acquire these sentiments in their
+education; which are either strengthened or enfeebled by public opinion,
+by habit, or by the examples set before them. In a depraved society,
+remorse either does not exist, or presently disappears; because, in
+all his actions, it is ever the judgment of his fellow-man that man is
+obliged necessarily to regard. He never feels either shame or remorse
+for actions he sees approved, that are practised by the world.
+Under corrupt governments, venal souls, avaricious being, mercenary
+individuals, do not blush either at meanness, robbery, or rapine, when
+it is authorized by example; in licentious nations, no one blushes
+at adultery except the husband, at whose expence it is committed; in
+superstitious countries, man does not blush to assassinate his fellow
+for his opinions. It will be obvious, therefore, that his remorse, as
+well as the ideas, whether right or wrong, which man has of decency,
+virtue, justice, &c. are the necessary consequence of his temperament,
+modified by the society in which he lives: assassins and thieves, when
+they live only among themselves, have neither shame nor remorse.
+
+Thus, I repeat, all the actions of man are necessary those which are
+always useful, which constantly contribute to the real, tend to the
+permanent happiness of his species, are called _virtues_, and are
+necessarily pleasing to all who experience their influence; at least,
+if their passions or false opinions do not oblige them to judge in that
+manner which is but little accordant with the nature of things: each man
+acts, each individual judges, necessarily, according to his own peculiar
+mode of existence--after the ideas, whether true or false, which he has
+formed with regard to his happiness. There are necessary actions
+which man is obliged to approve; there are others, that, in despite of
+himself, he is compelled to censure; of which the idea generates shame
+when his reflection permits him to contemplate them under the same point
+of view that they are regarded by his associates. The virtuous man and
+the wicked man act from motives equally necessary: they differ simply in
+their organization--in the ideas they form to themselves of happiness:
+we love the one necessarily--we detest the other from the same
+necessity. The law of his nature, which wills that a sensible being
+shall constantly labour to preserve himself, has not left to man the
+power to choose, or the free-agency to prefer pain to pleasure--vice to
+utility--crime to virtue. It is, then, the essence of man himself that
+obliges him to discriminate those actions which are advantageous to him,
+form those which are prejudicial to his interest, from those which are
+baneful to his felicity.
+
+This distinction subsists even in the most corrupt societies, in which
+the ideas of virtue, although completely effaced from their conduct,
+remain the same in their mind. Let us suppose a matt, who had decidedly
+determined for villainy, who should say to himself--"It is folly to
+be virtuous in a society that is depraved, in a community that is
+debauched." Let us suppose also, that he has sufficient address, the
+unlooked-for good fortune to escape censure or punishment, during a
+long series of years; I say, that in despite of all these circumstances,
+apparently so advantageous for himself, such a man has neither been
+happy nor contented with his own conduct, He has been in continual
+agonies--ever at war with his own actions--in a state of constant
+agitation. How much pain, how much anxiety, has he not endured in this
+perpetual conflict with himself? How many precautions, what excessive
+labour, what endless solicitude, has he not been compelled to employ in
+this continued struggle; how many embarrassments, how many cares, has
+he not experienced in this eternal wrestling with his associates, whose
+penetration he dreads, whose scorn he fears will follow a true knowledge
+of his pursuits. Demand of him what he thinks of himself, he will shrink
+from the question. Approach the bedside of this villain at the moment
+he is dying; ask him if he would be willing to recommence, at the same
+price, a life of similar agitation? If he is ingenuous, he will avow
+that he has tasted neither repose nor happiness; that each crime filled
+him with inquietude--that reflection prevented him from sleeping--that
+the world has been to him only one continued scene of alarm--an
+uninterrupted concatenation of terror--an everlasting, anxiety of
+mind;--that to live peaceably upon bread and water, appears to him to be
+a much happier, a more easy condition, than to possess riches, credit,
+reputation, honours, on the same terms that he has himself acquired
+them. If this villain, notwithstanding all his success, finds his
+condition so deplorable, what must be thought of the feelings of those
+who have neither the same resources nor the same advantages to succeed
+in their criminal projects.
+
+Thus, the system of necessity is a truth not only founded upon certain
+experience, but, again, it establishes morals upon an immoveable basis.
+Far from sapping the foundations of virtue, it points out its necessity;
+it clearly shows the invariable sentiments it must excite--sentiments
+so necessary, so strong, so congenial to his existence, that all the
+prejudices of man--all the vices of his institutions--all the effect of
+evil example, have never been able entirely to eradicate them from his
+mind. When he mistakes the advantages of virtue, it ought to be ascribed
+to the errors that are infused into him--to the irrationality of
+his institutions: all his wanderings are the fatal consequences of
+error,--the necessary result of prejudices which have identified
+themselves with his existence. Let it not, therefore, any longer be
+imputed to his nature that he has become wicked, but to those baneful
+opinions which he has imbibed with his mother's milk,--that have
+rendered him ambitious, avaricious, envious, haughty, arrogant,
+debauched, intolerant, obstinate, prejudiced, incommodious to his
+fellows, mischievous to himself. It is education that carries into his
+system the germ of those vices which necessarily torment him during the
+whole course of his life.
+
+_Fatalism_ is reproached with discouraging man--with damping the ardour
+of his soul--with plunging him into apathy--with destroying the bonds
+that should connect him with society. Its opponents say, "If every thing
+is necessary, we must let things go on, and not be disturbed by any
+thing." But does it depend on man to be sensible or not? Is he master
+of feeling or not feeling pain? If Nature has endowed him with a humane,
+with a tender soul, is it possible he should not interest himself in a
+very lively manner, in the welfare of beings whom he knows are necessary
+to his own peculiar happiness? His feelings are necessary: they depend
+on his own peculiar nature, cultivated by education. His imagination,
+prompt to concern itself with the felicity of his race, causes his
+heart to be oppressed at the sight of those evils his fellow-creature is
+obliged to endure,--makes his soul tremble in the contemplation of
+the misery arising from the despotism that crushes him--from the
+superstition that leads him astray--from the passions that distract
+him in a state of warfare against his neighbour. Although he knows that
+death is the fatal, the necessary period to the form of all beings, his
+soul is not affected in a less lively manner at the loss of a beloved
+wife,--at the demise of a child calculated to console his old age,--at
+the final separation from an esteemed friend who had become dear to his
+heart. Although he is not ignorant that it is the essence of fire to
+burn, he does not believe he is dispensed from using his utmost efforts
+to arrest the progress of a conflagration. Although he is intimately
+convinced that the evils to which he is a witness, are the necessary
+consequence of primitive errors with which his fellow-citizens are
+imbued, he feels he ought to display truth to them, if Nature has given
+him the necessary courage; under the conviction, that if they listen to
+it, it will, by degrees, become a certain remedy for their sufferings,
+that it will produce those necessary effects which it is of its essence
+to operate.
+
+If the speculations of man modify his conduct, if they change his
+temperament, he ought not to doubt that the system of necessity would
+have the most advantageous influence over him; not only is it suitable
+to calm the greater part of his inquietude, but it will also contribute
+to inspire him with a useful submission, a rational resignation, to the
+decrees of a destiny with which his too great sensibility frequently
+causes him to be overwhelmed. This happy apathy, without doubt, would
+be, desirable to those whose souls, too tender to brook the inequalities
+of life, frequently render them the deplorable sport of their fate; or
+whose organs, too weak to make resistance to the buffettings of fortune,
+incessantly expose them to be dashed in pieces under the rude blows of
+adversity.
+
+But, of all the important advantages the human race would be enabled
+to derive from the doctrine of fatalism, if man was to apply it to
+his conduct, none would be of greater magnitude, none of more happy
+consequence, none that would more efficaciously corroborate his
+happiness, than that general indulgence, that universal toleration, that
+must necessarily spring from the opinion, that _all is necessary_. In
+consequence, of the adoption of this principle, the fatalist, if he
+had a sensible soul, would commisserate the prejudices of his
+fellow-man--would lament over his wanderings--would seek to undeceive
+him--would try by gentleness to lead him into the right path, without
+ever irritating himself against his weakness, without ever insulting
+his misery. Indeed, what right have we to hate or despise man for his
+opinions? His ignorance, his prejudices, his imbecility, his vices,
+his passions, his weakness, are they not the inevitable consequence of
+vicious institutions? Is he not sufficiently punished by the multitude
+of evils that afflict him on every side? Those despots who crush him
+with an iron sceptre, are they not continual victims to their own
+peculiar restlessness--mancipated to their perpetual diffidence--eternal
+slaves to their suspicions? Is there one wicked individual who enjoys
+a pure, an unmixed, a real happiness? Do not nations unceasingly
+suffer from their follies? Are they not the incessant dupes to their
+prejudices? Is not the ignorance of chiefs, the ill-will they bear to
+reason, the hatred they have for truth, punished by the imbecility of
+their citizens, by the ruin of the states they govern? In short, the
+fatalist would grieve to witness necessity each moment exercising its
+severe decrees upon mortals who are ignorant of its power, or who feel
+its castigation, without being willing to acknowledge the hand from
+whence it proceeds; he will perceive that ignorance is necessary, that
+credulity is the necessary result of ignorance--that slavery and bondage
+are necessary consequences of ignorant credulity--that corruption of
+manners springs necessarily from slavery--that the miseries of society,
+the unhappiness of its members, are the necessary offspring of this
+corruption. The fatalist, in consequence, of these ideas, will neither
+be a gloomy misanthrope, nor a dangerous citizen; he will pardon in
+his brethren those wanderings, he will forgive them those errors--which
+their vitiated nature, by a thousand causes, has rendered necessary--he
+will offer them consolation--he will endeavour to inspire them with
+courage--he will be sedulous to undeceive them in their idle notions,
+in their chimerical ideas; but he will never display against them
+bitterness of soul--he will never show them that rancorous animosity
+which is more suitable, to make them revolt from his doctrines, than to
+attract them to reason;--he will not disturb the repose of society--he
+will not raise the people to insurrection against the sovereign
+authority; on the contrary, he will feel that the miserable blindness of
+the great, and the wretched perverseness, the fatal obstinacy of so many
+conductors of the people, are the necessary consequence of that flattery
+that is administered to them in their infancy--that feeds their hopes
+with allusive falsehoods--of the depraved malice of those who surround
+them--who wickedly corrupt them, that they may profit by their
+folly--that they may take advantage of their weakness: in short, that
+these things are the inevitable effect of that profound ignorance of
+their true interest, in which every thing strives to keep them.
+
+The fatalist has no right to be vain of his peculiar talents; no
+privilege to be proud of his virtues; he knows that these qualities
+are only the consequence of his natural organization, modified by
+circumstances that have in no wise depended upon himself. He will
+neither have hatred nor feel contempt for those whom Nature and
+circumstances have not favoured in a similar manner. It is the fatalist
+who ought to be humble, who should be modest from principle: is he
+not obliged to acknowledge, that he possesses nothing that he has not
+previously received?
+
+In fact, will not every thing conduct to indulgence the fatalist whom
+experience has convinced of the necessity of things? Will he not see
+with pain, that it is the essence of a society badly constituted,
+unwisely governed, enslaved to prejudice, attached to unreasonable
+customs, submitted to irrational laws, degraded under despotism,
+corrupted by luxury, inebriated by false opinions, to be filled with
+trifling members; to be composed of vicious citizens; to be made up
+of cringing slaves, who are proud of their chains; of ambitious men,
+without idea of true glory; of misers and prodigals; of fanatics and
+libertines! Convinced of the necessary connection of things, he will
+not be surprised to see that the supineness of their chiefs carries
+discouragement into their country, or that the influence of their
+governors stirs up bloody wars by which it is depopulated, and causes
+useless expenditures that impoverish it; that all these excesses united,
+is the reason why so many nations contain only men wanting happiness,
+without understanding to attain it; who are devoid of morals, destitute
+of virtue. In all this he will contemplate nothing more than the
+necessary action and re-action of physics upon morals, of morals upon
+physics. In short, all who acknowledge fatality, will remain persuaded
+that a nation badly governed is a soil very fruitful in venomous
+reptiles--very abundant in poisonous plants; that these have such a
+plentiful growth as to crowd each other and choak themselves. It is in a
+country cultivated by the hands of a Lycurgus, that he will witness
+the production of intrepid citizens, of noble-minded individuals,
+of disinterested men, who are strangers to irregular pleasures. In a
+country cultivated by a Tiberius, he will find nothing but villains with
+depraved hearts, men with mean contemptible souls, despicable informers,
+execrable traitors. It is the soil, it is the circumstances in which
+man finds himself placed, that renders him either a useful object or
+a prejudicial being: the wise man avoids the one, as he would those
+dangerous reptiles whose nature it is to sting and communicate their
+deadly venom; he attaches himself to the other, esteems him, loves him,
+as he does those delicious fruits with whose rich maturity his palate
+is pleasantly gratified, with whose cooling juices he finds himself
+agreeably refreshed: he sees the wicked without anger--he cherishes the
+good with pleasure--he delights in the bountiful: he knows full well
+that the tree which is languishing without culture in the arid, sandy
+desert, that is stunted for want of attention, leafless for want of
+moisture, that has grown crooked from neglect, become barren from
+want of loam, whose tender bark is gnawed by rapacious beasts of prey,
+pierced by innumerable insects, would perhaps have expanded far and wide
+its verdant boughs from a straight and stately stem, have brought forth
+delectable fruit, have afforded from its luxuriant foliage under its
+lambent leaves an umbrageous refreshing retreat from the scorching rays
+of a meridian sun, have offered beneath its swelling branches, under
+its matted tufts a shelter from the pitiless storm, it its seed had
+been fortunately sown in a more fertile soil, placed in a more congenial
+climate, had experienced the fostering cares of a skilful cultivator.
+
+Let it not then be said, that it is degrading man reduce his functions
+to a pure mechanism; that it is shamefully to undervalue him,
+scandalously to abuse him, to compare him to a tree; to an abject
+vegetation. The philosopher devoid of prejudice does not understand this
+language, invented by those who are ignorant of what constitutes the
+true dignity of man. A tree is an object which, in its station, joins
+the useful with the agreeable; it merits our approbation when it
+produces sweet and pleasant fruit; when it affords a favourable shade.
+All machines are precious, when they are truly useful, when they
+faithfully perform the functions for which they are designed. Yes, I
+speak it with courage, reiterate it with pleasure, the honest man, when
+he has talents, when he possesses virtue, is, for the beings of his
+species, a tree that furnishes them with delicious fruit, that affords
+them refreshing shelter: the honest man is a machine of which the
+springs are adapted to fulfil its functions in a manner that must
+gratify the expectation of all his fellows. No, I should not blush, I
+should not feel degraded, to be a machine of this sort; and my heart
+would leap with joy, if I could foresee that the fruit of my reflections
+would one day be useful to my race, consoling to my fellow-man.
+
+Is not Nature herself a vast machine, of which the human species is but
+a very feeble spring? I see nothing contemptible either in her or her
+productions; all the beings who come out of her hands are good, are
+noble, are sublime, whenever they co-operate to the production of
+another, to the maintenance of harmony in the sphere where they must
+act. Of whatever nature the soul may be, whether it is made mortal, or
+whether it be supposed immortal; whether it is regarded as a spirit,
+or whether it be looked upon as a portion of the body; it will be found
+noble, it will be estimated great, it will be ranked good, it will be
+considered sublime, in a Socrates, in an Aristides, in a Cato: it will
+be thought abject, it will be viewed as despicable, it will be called
+corrupt, in a Claudius, in a Sejanus, in a Nero: its energies will be
+admired, we shall be delighted with its manner, fascinated with
+its efforts, in a Shakespeare, in a Corneille, in a Newton, in a
+Montesquieu: its baseness will be lamented, when we behold mean,
+contemptible men, who flatter tyranny, or who servilely cringe at the
+foot of superstition.
+
+All that has been said in the course of this work, proves clearly
+that every thing is necessary; that every thing is always in order,
+relatively to Nature; where all beings do nothing more than follow the
+laws that are imposed on their respective classes. It is part of her
+plan, that certain portions of the earth shall bring forth delicious
+fruits, shall blossom beauteous flowers; whilst others shall only
+furnish brambles, shall yield nothing but noxious vegetables: she has
+been willing that some societies should produce wise men, great heroes;
+that others should only give birth to abject souls, contemptible
+men, without energy, destitute of virtue. Passions, winds, tempests,
+hurricanes, volcanoes, wars, plagues, famines, diseases, death, are as
+necessary to her eternal march as the beneficent heat of the sun, the
+serenity of the atmosphere, the gentle showers of spring, plentiful
+years, peace, health, harmony, life: vice and virtue, darkness and
+light, and science are equally necessary; the one are not benefits,
+the other are not evils, except for those beings whose happiness they
+influence by either favouring or deranging their peculiar mode of
+existence. _The whole cannot be miserable, but it may contain unhappy
+individuals._
+
+Nature, then, distributes with the same hand that which is called
+_order_, and that which is called _disorder_; that which is called
+_pleasure_, and that which is called _pain_: in short, she diffuses by
+the necessity of her existence, good and evil in the world we inhabit.
+Let not man, therefore, either arraign her bounty, or tax her
+with malice; let him not imagine that his feeble cries, his weak
+supplications, can never arrest her colossal power, always acting after
+immutable laws; let him submit silently to his condition; and when he
+suffers, let him not seek a remedy by recurring to chimeras that his
+own distempered imagination has created; let him draw from the stores
+of Nature herself, the remedies which she offers for the evil she brings
+upon him: if she sends him diseases, let him search in her bosom for
+those salutary productions to which she has given birth, which will cure
+them: if she gives him errors, she also furnishes him with experience to
+counteract them; in truth, she supplies him with an antidote suitable
+to destroy their fatal effects. If she permits man to groan under the
+pressure of his vices, beneath the load of his follies, she also shews
+him in virtue, a sure remedy for his infirmities: if the evils that
+some societies experience are necessary, when they shall have become
+too incommodious they will be irresistibly obliged to search for those
+remedies which Nature will always point out to them. If this Nature has
+rendered existence insupportable, to some unfortunate beings, whom she
+appears to have selected for her victims, still death, is a door
+that will surely be opened to them--that will deliver them from their
+misfortunes, although in their puny, imbecile, wayward judgment, they
+may be deemed impossible of cure.
+
+Let not man, then, accuse Nature with being inexorable to him, since
+there does not exist in her whole circle an evil for which she has not
+furnished the remedy, to those who have the courage to seek it, who have
+the fortitude to apply it. Nature follows general and necessary laws
+in all her operations; physical calamity and moral evil are not to
+be ascribed to her want of kindness, but to the necessity of things.
+Physical calamity is the derangement produced in man's organs by
+physical causes which he sees act: moral evil is the derangement
+produced in him by physical causes of which the action is to him a
+secret. These causes always terminate by producing sensible effects,
+which are capable of striking his senses; neither the thoughts nor the
+will of man ever shew themselves, but by the marked effects they
+produce either in himself or upon those beings whom Nature has rendered
+susceptible of feeling their impulse. He suffers, because it is of the
+essence of some beings to derange the economy of his machine; he enjoys,
+because the properties of some beings are analogous to his own mode of
+existence; he is born, because it is of the nature of some matter to
+combine itself under a determinate form; he lives, he acts, he thinks,
+because it is of the essence of certain combinations to maintain
+themselves in existence by given means for a season; at length he dies,
+because a necessary law prescribes that all the combinations which are
+formed, shall either be destroyed or dissolve themselves. From all this
+it results, that Nature is impartial to all its productions; she submits
+man, like all other beings, to those eternal laws from which she has
+not even exempted herself; if she was to suspend these laws, even for
+an instant, from that moment disorder would reign in her, system; her
+harmony would be disturbed.
+
+Those who wish to study Nature, must take experience for their guide;
+this, and this only, can enable them to dive into her secrets, to
+unravel by degrees, the frequently imperceptible woof of those slender
+causes, of which she avails herself to operate the greatest phenomena:
+by the aid of experience, man often discovers in her properties,
+perceives modes of action entirely unknown to the ages which have
+preceded him; those effects which his grandfathers contemplated as
+marvellous, which they regarded as supernatural efforts, looked upon
+as miracles, have become familiar to him in the present day, and are at
+this moment contemplated as simple and natural consequences, of which he
+comprehends the mechanism--of which he understands the cause--of which
+he can unfold the manner of action. Man, in fathoming Nature, has
+arrived at discovering the true causes of earthquakes; of the periodical
+motion of the sea; of subterraneous conflagrations; of meteors; of the
+electrical fluid, the whole of which were considered by his ancestors,
+and are still so by the ignorant, by the uninformed, as indubitable
+signs of heaven's wrath. His posterity, in following up, in rectifying
+the experience already made, will perhaps go further, and discover those
+causes which are totally veiled from present eyes. The united efforts of
+the human species will one day perhaps penetrate even into the sanctuary
+of Nature, and throw into light many of those mysteries which up to the
+present time she seems to have refused to all his researches.
+
+In contemplating man under his true aspect; in quitting authority
+to follow experience; in laying aside error to consult reason; in
+submitting every thing to physical laws, from which his imagination has
+vainly exerted its utmost power to withdraw them; it will be found that
+the phenomena of the moral world follow exactly the same general rules
+as those of the physical; that the greater part of those astonishing
+effects, which ignorance, aided by his prejudices, make him consider as
+inexplicable, and regard as wonderful, are natural consequences flowing
+from simple causes. He will find that the eruption of a volcano and the
+birth of a Tamerlane are to Nature the same thing; in recurring to
+the primitive causes of those striking events which he beholds with
+consternation, which he contemplates with fearful alarm, in falling
+back to the sources of those terrible revolutions, those frightful
+convulsions, those dreadful explosions that distract mankind, lay waste
+the fairest works of Nature, ravage nations, and tear up society by
+the roots; he will find the wills that compassed the most surprising
+changes, that operated the most extensive alterations in the state of
+things, that brought about the most unlooked-for events, were moved
+by physical causes, whose exility made him treat them as contemptible;
+whose want of consequence in his own purblind eyes led him to believe
+them utterly incapable to give birth to the phenomena whose magnitude
+strikes him with such awe, whose stupendous range fills him with such
+amazement.
+
+If man was to judge of causes by their effects, there would be no small
+causes in the universe. In a Nature where every thing is connected,
+where every thing acts and re-acts, moves and changes, composes and
+decomposes, forms and destroys, there is not an atom which does not play
+an important part--that does not occupy a necessary station; there
+is not an imperceptible particle, however minute, which, placed in
+convenient circumstances, does not operate the most prodigious effects.
+If man was in a capacity to follow the eternal chain, to pursue the
+concatenated links, that connect with their causes all the effects he
+witnesses, without losing sight of any one of its rings,--if he could
+unravel the ends of those insensible threads that give impulse to the
+thoughts, decision to the will, direction to the passions of those men
+who are called mighty, according to their actions, he would find, they
+are true atoms which Nature employs to move the moral world; that it is
+the unexpected but necessary function of these indiscernible particles
+of matter, it is their aggregation, their combination, their proportion,
+their fermentation, which modifying the individual by degrees, in
+despite of himself, frequently without his own knowledge, make him
+think, will, and act, in a determinate, but necessary mode. If, then,
+the will and the actions of this individual have an influence over a
+great number of other men, here is the moral world in a state of the
+greatest combustion, and those consequences ensue which man contemplates
+with fearful wonder. Too much acrimony in the bile of a fanatic--blood
+too much inflamed in the heart of a conqueror--a painful indigestion in
+the stomach of a monarch--a whim that passes in the mind of a woman--are
+sometimes causes sufficient to bring on war--to send millions of men
+to the slaughter--to root out an entire people--to overthrow walls--to
+reduce cities into ashes--to plunge nations into slavery--to put a
+whole people into mourning--to breed famine in a land--to engender
+pestilence--to propagate calamity--to extend misery--to spread
+desolation far and wide upon the surface of our globe, through a long
+series of ages.
+
+The dominant passion of an individual of the human species, when it
+disposes of the passions of many others, arrives at combining their
+will, at uniting their efforts, and thus decides the condition of man.
+It is after this manner that an ambitious, crafty, and voluptuous
+Arab, gave to his countrymen an impulse of which the effect was the
+subjugation and desolation of vast countries in Asia, in Africa, and in
+Europe; whose consequences were sufficiently potential to erect a new,
+extensive, but slavish empire; to give a novel system of religion to
+millions of human beings; to overturn the altars of their former gods;
+in short, to alter the opinions, to change the customs of a considerable
+portion of the population of the earth. But in examining the primitive
+sources of this strange revolution, what were the concealed causes that
+had an influence over this man--that excited his peculiar passions, and
+modified his temperament? What was the matter from the combination of
+which resulted a crafty, ambitious, enthusiastic, and eloquent man; in
+short, a personage competent to impose on his fellow-creatures--capable
+of making them concur in his most extravagant views. They were,
+undoubtedly, the insensible particles of his blood; the imperceptible
+texture of his fibres; the salts, more or less acrid, that stimulated
+his nerves; the proportion of igneous fluid that circulated in his
+system. From whence came these elements? It was from the womb of his
+mother; from the aliments which nourished him; from the climate in which
+he had his birth; from the ideas he received; from the air which
+he respired; without reckoning a thousand inappreciable, a thousand
+transitory causes, that in the instance given had modified, had
+determined the passions of this importent being, who had thereby
+acquired the capacity to change the face of this mundane sphere.
+
+To causes so weak in their principles, if in the origin the slightest
+obstacle had been opposed, these wonderful events, which have astounded
+man, would never have been produced. The fit of an ague, the consequence
+of bile a little too much inflamed, had sufficed, perhaps, to have
+rendered abortive all the vast projects, of the legislator of the
+Mussulmen. Spare diet, a glass of water, a sanguinary evacuation, would
+sometimes have been sufficient to have saved kingdoms.
+
+It will be seen, then, that the condition of the human species, as well
+as that of each of its individuals, every instant depends on insensible
+causes, to which circumstances, frequently fugitive, give birth; that
+opportunity developes, that convenience puts in action: man attributes
+their effects to chance, whilst these causes operate necessarily, act
+according to fixed rules: he has frequently neither the sagacity nor
+the honesty to recur to their true principles; he regards such feeble
+motives with contempt, because he has been taught to consider them as
+incapable of producing such stupendous events. They are, however, these
+motives, weak as they may appear to be, these springs, so pitiful in his
+eyes, is which according to her necessary laws, suffice in the hands of
+Nature to move the universe. The conquests of a Gengis-Khan have nothing
+in them that is more strange to the eye of a philosopher than the
+explosion of a mine, caused in its principle by a feeble spark, which
+commences with setting fire to a single grain of powder; this presently
+communicates itself to many millions of other contiguous grains, of
+which the united force, the multiplied powers, terminate by blowing
+up mountains, overthrowing fortifications, or converting populous,
+well-built cities, into heaps of ruins.
+
+Thus, imperceptible causes, concealed in the bosom of Nature, until the
+moment their action is displayed, frequently decide the fate of man.
+The happiness or the wretchedness, the prosperity or the misery of each
+individual, as well as that of whole nations, are attached to powers
+which it is impossible for him to foresee, which he cannot appreciate,
+of which he is incapable to arrest the action. Perhaps at this moment
+atoms are amassing, insensible particles are combining, of which the
+assemblage shall form a sovereign, who will be either the scourge or the
+saviour of a mighty empire. Man cannot answer for his own destiny one
+single instant; he has no cognizance of what is passing within himself;
+he is ignorant of the causes which act in the interior of his machine;
+he knows nothing of the circumstances that will give them activity:
+he is unacquainted with what may develope their energy; it is,
+nevertheless, on these causes, impossible to be unravelled by him, that
+depends his condition in life. Frequently, an unforeseen rencontre
+gives birth to a passion in his soul, of which the consequences shall,
+necessarily, have an influence over his felicity. It is thus that
+the most virtuous man, by a whimsical combination of unlooked-for
+circumstances, may become in an instant the most criminal of his
+species.
+
+This truth, without doubt, will be found frightful--this fact will
+unquestionably appear terrible: but at bottom, what has it more
+revolting than that which teaches him that an infinity of accidents, as
+irremediable as they are unforeseen, may every instant wrest from him
+that life to which he is so strongly attached? Fatalism reconciles the
+good man easily to death: it makes him contemplate it as a certain means
+of withdrawing himself from wickedness; this system shews death, even
+to the happy man himself, as a medium between him and those misfortunes
+which frequently terminate by poisoning his happiness; that end with
+embittering the most fortunate existence.
+
+Let man, then, submit to necessity: in despite of himself it will always
+hurry him forward: let him resign himself to Nature, let him accept the
+good with which she presents him: let him oppose to the necessary evil
+which she makes him experience, those necessary remedies which she
+consents to afford him; let him not disturb his mind with useless
+inquietude; let him enjoy with moderation, because he will find that
+pain is the necessary companion of excess: let him follow the paths of
+virtue, because every thing will prove to him, even in this world of
+perverseness, that it is absolutely necessary to render him estimable in
+the eyes of others, to make him contented with himself.
+
+Feeble, vain mortal, thou pretendest to be a free agent. Alas! dost thou
+not see all the threads which enchain thee? Dost thou not perceive that
+they are atoms which form thee; that they are atoms which move thee;
+that they are circumstances independent of thyself, that modify
+thy being; that they are circumstances over which thou hast not any
+controul, that rule thy destiny? In the puissant Nature that environs
+thee, shalt thou pretend to be the only being who is able to resist her
+power? Dost thou really believe that thy weak prayers will induce her
+to stop in her eternal march; that thy sickly desires can oblige her to
+change her everlasting course?
+
+
+
+
+
+CHAP. XIII.
+
+_Of the Immortality of the Soul;--of the Doctrine of a future State;--of
+the Fear of Death._
+
+
+The reflections presented to the reader in this work, tend to shew what
+ought to be thought of the human soul, as well as of its operations and
+faculties: every thing proves, in the most convincing manner, that it
+acts, that it moves according to laws similar to those prescribed to the
+other beings of Nature; that it cannot be distinguished from the body;
+that it is born with it; that it grows up with it; that it is modified
+in the same progression; in short, every thing ought to make man
+conclude that it perishes with it. This soul, as well as the body,
+passes through a state of weakness and infancy; it is in this stage of
+its existence, that it is assailed by a multitude of modifications; that
+it is stored with an infinity of ideas, which it receives from exterior
+objects through the medium of the organs; that it amasses facts, that
+it collects experience, whether true or false, that it forms to itself
+a system of conduct, according to which it thinks, in conformity with
+which it acts, from whence results either its happiness or its misery,
+its reason or its delirium, its virtues or its vices; arrived with the
+body at its full powers, having in conjunction with it reached maturity,
+it does not cease for a single instant to partake in common of its
+sensations, whether these are agreeable or disagreeable; it participates
+in all its pleasures; it shares in all its pains; in consequence it
+conjointly approves or disapproves its state; like it, it is either
+sound or diseased; active or languishing; awake or asleep. In old age
+man extinguishes entirely, his fibres become rigid, his nerves loose
+their elasticity, his senses are obtunded, his sight grows dim, his ears
+lose their quickness, his ideas become unconnected, his memory fails,
+his imagination cools: what then becomes of his soul? Alas! it sinks
+down with the body; it gets benumbed as this loses its feeling; becomes
+sluggish as this decays in activity; like it, when enfeebled by years
+it fulfils its functions with pain; this substance, which is deemed
+spiritual, which is considered immaterial, which it is endeavoured to
+distinguish from matter, undergoes the same revolutions, experiences the
+same vicissitudes, submits to the same modifications, as does the body
+itself.
+
+In despite of this proof of the materiality of the soul, of its identity
+with the body, so convincing to the unprejudiced, some thinkers have
+supposed, that although the latter is perishable, the former does
+not perish: that this portion of man enjoys the especial privilege
+of _immortality_; that it is exempt from dissolution: free from those
+changes of form all the beings in Nature undergo: in consequence of
+this, man has persuaded himself, that this privileged soul does not die:
+its immortality, above all, appears indubitable to those who suppose it
+spiritual: after having made it a simple being, without extent, devoid
+of parts, totally different from any thing of which he has a knowledge,
+he pretended that it was not subjected to the laws of decomposition
+common to all beings, of which experience shews him the continual
+operation.
+
+Man, feeling within himself a concealed force, that insensibly produced
+action, that imperceptibly gave direction to the motion of his machine,
+believed that the entire of Nature, of whose energies he is ignorant,
+with whose modes of acting he is unacquainted, owed its motion to an
+agent analogous to his own soul; who acted upon the great macrocosm, in
+the same manner that this soul acted upon his body. Man, having supposed
+himself double, made Nature double also: he distinguished her from her
+own peculiar energy; he separated her from her mover, which by degrees
+he made spiritual. Thus Nature, distinguished from herself, was regarded
+as the soul of the world; and the soul of man was considered as opinions
+emanating from this universal soul. This notion upon the origin of the
+soul is of very remote antiquity. It was that of the Egyptians, of the
+Chaldeans, of the Hebrews, of the greater number of the _wise men of
+the east._ It should appear that Moses believed with the Egyptians the
+divine emanation of souls: according to him, _"God formed man of the
+dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life;
+and man became a living soul:"_ nevertheless, the Catholic, at this day,
+rejects this system of _divine emanation,_ seeing that it supposes the
+Divinity divisible: which would have, been inconvenient to the Romish
+idea of purgatory, or to the system of everlasting punishment. Although
+Moses, in the above quotation, seems to indicate that the soul was a
+portion of the Divinity, it does not appear that the doctrine of the
+_immortality of the soul_ was established in any one of the books
+attributed to him. It was during the Babylonish captivity, that the
+Jews learned the doctrine of future rewards and punishments, taught
+by Zoroaster to the Persians, but which the Hebrew legislator did not
+understand, or, at least, he left his people ignorant on the subject. It
+was in those schools, that Pherecydes, Pythagoras, and Plato, drew up a
+doctrine so flattering to the vanity of human nature--so gratifying to
+the imagination of mortals. Man thus believed himself a portion of
+the Divinity; immortal, like the Godhead, in one part of himself:
+nevertheless, subsequent religions have renounced these advantages,
+which they judged incompatible with the other parts of their systems;
+they held forth that the Sovereign of Nature, or her contriver was not
+the soul of man, but, that, in virtue of his omnipotence, he created
+human souls, in proportion as he produced the bodies which they must
+animate; and they taught, that these souls once produced, by an effect
+of the same omnipotence, enjoyed immortality.
+
+However it may be with these variations upon the origin of souls, those
+who supposed them emanating from the Divinity, believed that after the
+death of the body, which served them for an envelope, they returned, by
+refunding to their first source. Those who, without adopting the opinion
+of divine emanation, admired the spirituality, believed the immortality
+of the soul, were under the necessity to suppose a region, to find out
+an abode for these souls, which their imagination painted to them, each
+according to his fears, his hopes, his desires, and his prejudices.
+
+Nothing is more popular than the doctrine of the _immortality of the
+soul;_ nothing is more universally diffused than the expectation of
+another life. Nature having inspired man with the most ardent love for
+his existence, the desire of preserving himself for ever was a necessary
+consequence; this desire was presently converted into certainty: from
+that desire of existing eternally which Nature has implanted in him, he
+made an argument, to prove that man would never cease to exist. Abady
+says, "our soul has no useless desires, it naturally desires an eternal
+life;" and by a very strange logic, he concludes that this desire
+could not fail to be fulfilled. Cicero, before Abady, had declared the
+immortality of the soul to be an innate idea in man; yet, strange
+to tell, in another part of his works he considers Pherecydes as the
+inventor of the doctrine. However this may be, man, thus disposed,
+listened with avidity to those who announced to him systems so
+conformable to his wishes. Nevertheless, he ought not to regard as
+supernatural the desire of existing, which always was, and always will
+be, of the essence man; it ought not to excite surprise, if he received
+with eagerness an hypothesis that flattered his hopes, by promising
+that his desire would one day be gratified; but let him beware how he
+concludes that this desire itself is an indubitable proof of the reality
+of this future life, with which at present he seems to be so much
+occupied. The passion for existence is in man only a natural consequence
+of the tendency of a sensible being, whose essence it is to be willing
+to conserve himself: in the human being it follows the energy of his
+soul--keeps pace with the force of his imagination--always ready to
+realize that which he strongly desires. He desires the life of the body,
+nevertheless this desire is frustrated; wherefore should not the desire
+for the life of the soul be frustrated like the other? The partizans of
+the doctrine of the immortality of the soul reason thus: "All men
+desire to live for ever, therefore they will live for ever." Suppose
+the argument retorted on them; would it be believed? If it was asserted,
+"All men naturally desire to be rich; therefore all men will one day be
+rich," how many partizans would this doctrine find?
+
+The most simple reflection upon the nature of his soul, ought to
+convince man that the idea of its immortality is only an illusion of the
+brain. Indeed what is his soul, save the principle of sensibility? What
+is it, to think, to enjoy, to suffer; is it not to feel? What is life,
+except it be the assemblage of modifications, the congregation of
+motion, peculiar to an organized being? Thus, as soon as the body
+ceases to live, its sensibility can no longer exercise itself; when its
+sensibility is no more, it can no longer have ideas, nor in consequence
+thoughts. Ideas, as we have proved, can only reach man through his
+senses; now, how will they have it, that once deprived of his senses,
+he is yet capable of receiving sensations, of having perceptions, of
+forming ideas? As they have made the soul of man a being separated
+from the animated body, wherefore have they not made life a being
+distinguished from the living body? Life in a body is the totality of
+this motion; feeling and thought make a part of this motion: thus it is
+reasonable to suppose, that in the dead man these motions will cease,
+like all the others.
+
+Indeed, by what reasoning will it be proved, that this soul, which
+cannot feel, think, will, or act, but by aid of man's organs, can suffer
+pain, be susceptible of pleasure, or even have a consciousness of its
+own existence, when the organs which should warn it of their presence
+are decomposed or destroyed? Is it not evident, that the soul depends
+on the arrangement of the various parts of the body; on the order with
+which these parts conspire to perform their functions; on the combined
+motion of the whole? Thus the organic structure once destroyed, can it
+be reasonably doubted the soul will be destroyed also? Is it not seen,
+that during the whole course of human life this soul is stimulated,
+changed, deranged, disturbed, by all the changes man's organs
+experience? And yet it will be insisted, that this soul acts, thinks,
+subsists, when these same organs have entirely disappeared!
+
+An organized being may be compared to a clock, which once broken, is no
+longer suitable to the use for which it was designed. To say, that the
+soul shall feel, shall think, shall enjoy, shall suffer after the
+death of the body; is to pretend that a clock, shivered into a thousand
+pieces, will continue to strike the hour; shall yet have the faculty
+of marking the progress of time. Those who say, that the soul of man is
+able to subsist, notwithstanding the destruction of the body, evidently
+support the position, that the modification of a body will be enabled
+to conserve itself after the subject is destroyed: this on any other
+occasion would be considered as completely absurd.
+
+It will be said that the conservation of the soul after the death of the
+body, is an effect of the Divine Omnipotence: but this is supporting an
+absurdity by a gratuitous hypothesis. It surely is not meant by Divine
+Omnipotence, of whatever nature it may be supposed, that a thing shall
+exist and not exist at the same time: unless this be granted, it will be
+rather difficult to prove, that a soul shall feel and think without the
+intermediates necessary to thought.
+
+Let them then, at least, forbear asserting, that reason is not wounded
+by the doctrine of the immortality of the soul; or by the expectation
+of a future life. These notions, formed to flatter man, to disturb the
+imagination of the uninformed, who do not reason, cannot appear either
+convincing or probable to enlightened minds. Reason, exempted from the
+illusions of prejudice, is, without doubt, wounded by the supposition of
+a soul, that feels, that thinks, that is afflicted, that rejoices, that
+has ideas, without having organs; that is to say, destitute of the only
+known medium, wanting all the natural means, by which, according to
+what we can understand, it is possible for it to feel sensations, have
+perceptions, or form ideas. If it be replied, other means are able to
+exist, which are _supernatural_ or _unknown_, it may be answered, that
+these means of transmitting ideas to the soul, separated from the body,
+are not better known to, or more within the reach of, those who suppose
+it, that they are of other men. It is, at least, very certain, it cannot
+admit even of a controversy, that all those who reject the system of
+innate ideas, cannot, without contradicting their own principles, admit
+the doctrine of the immortality of the soul.
+
+In defiance of the consolation that so many persons pretend to find in
+the notion of an eternal existence; in despite of that firm persuasion
+which such numbers of men assure us they have, that their souls will
+survive their bodies, they seem so very much alarmed at the dissolution
+of this body, that they do not contemplate their end, which they ought
+to desire as the period of so many miseries, but with the greatest
+inquietude; so true it is, that the real, the present, even accompanied
+with pain, has much more influence over mankind, than the most beautiful
+chimeras of the future; which he never views but through the clouds
+of uncertainty. Indeed the most religious men, notwithstanding the
+conviction they express of a blessed eternity, do not find these
+flattering hopes sufficiently consoling to repress their fears; to
+prevent their trembling, when they think on the necessary dissolution of
+their bodies. Death was always, for mortals, the most frightful point of
+view; they regard it as a strange phenomenon, contrary to the order
+of things, opposed to Nature; in a word, as an effect of the celestial
+vengeance, as the _wages of sin_. Although every thing proves to man
+that death is inevitable, he is never able to familiarize himself with
+its idea; he never thinks on it without shuddering; the assurance of
+possessing an immortal soul but feebly indemnifies him for the grief he
+feels in the deprivation of his perishable body. Two causes contribute
+to strengthen his fears, to nourish his alarm; the one is, that this
+death, commonly accompanied with pain, wrests from him an existence that
+pleases him--with which he is acquainted--to which he is accustomed;
+the other is the uncertainty of the state that must succeed his actual
+existence.
+
+The illustrious Bacon has said, that "men fear death for the same reason
+that children dread being alone in darkness." Man naturally challenges
+every thing with which he is unacquainted; he is desirous to see clearly
+to the end, that he may guarantee himself against those objects which
+may menace his safety; that he may also be enabled to procure for
+himself those which may be useful to him; the man who exists cannot form
+to himself any idea of non-existence; as this circumstance disturbs him,
+for want of experience, his imagination sets to work; this points out to
+him, either well or ill, this uncertain state: accustomed to think, to
+feel, to be stimulated into activity, to enjoy society, he contemplates
+as the greatest misfortune, a dissolution that will strip him of these
+objects, that will deprive him of those sensations which his present
+nature has rendered necessary to him; he views with dismay a situation
+that will prevent his being warned of his own existence--that shall
+bereave him of his pleasures--to plunge him into nothing. In supposing
+it even exempt from pain, he always looks upon this nothing as an
+afflicting solitude--as an heap of profound darkness; he sees himself in
+a state of general desolation; destitute of all assistance; and he
+feels keenly all the rigour of this frightful situation. But does not
+a profound sleep help to give him a true idea of this nothing? Does not
+that deprive him of every thing? Does it not appear to annihilate the
+universe to him, and him to the universe? Is death any thing more than
+a profound, a permanent steep? It is for want of being able to form an
+idea of death that man dreads it; if he could figure to himself a true
+image of this state of annihilation, he would from thence cease to fear
+it; but he is not able to conceive a state in which there is no feeling;
+he therefore believes, that when he shall no longer exist, he will have
+the same feelings, the same consciousness of things, which, during his
+existence, appear so sad to his mind; which his fancy paints in such
+gloomy colours. Imagination pictures to him his funeral pomp--the grave
+they are digging for him--the lamentations that will accompany him to
+his last abode-the epicedium that surviving friendship may dictate;
+he persuades himself that these melancholy objects will affect him as
+painfully even after his decease, as they do in his present condition,
+in which he is in full possession of his senses.
+
+Mortal, led astray by fear! after thy death thine eyes will see no more;
+thine ears will hear no longer; in the depth of thy grave thou wilt
+no more be witness to this scene, which thine imagination, at present,
+represents to thee under such dismal colours; thou wilt no longer take
+part in what shall be done in the world; thou wilt no more be occupied
+with what may befal thine inanimate remains, than thou wast able to
+be the day previous to that which ranked thee among the beings of thy
+species. To die is to cease to think; to lack feeling; no longer to
+enjoy; to find a period to suffering; thine ideas will perish with thee;
+thy sorrows will not follow thee to the silent tomb. Think of death,
+not to feed thy fears--not to nourish thy melancholy--but to accustom
+thyself to look upon it with a peaceable eye; to cheer thee up against
+those false terrors with which the enemies to thy repose labour to
+inspire thee! The fears of death are vain illusions, that must disappear
+as soon as we learn to contemplate this necessary event under its true
+point of view. A great man has defined philosophy to be _a meditation on
+death;_ he is not desirous by that to have it understood that man ought
+to occupy himself sorrowfully with his end, with a view to nourish his
+fears; on the contrary, he wishes to invite him to familiarize himself
+with an object that Nature has rendered necessary to him; to accustom
+himself to expect it with a serene countenance. If life is a benefit, if
+it be necessary to love it, it is no less necessary to quit it; reason
+ought to teach him a calm resignation to the decrees of fate: his
+welfare exacts that he should contract the habit of contemplating with
+placidity, of viewing without alarm, an event that his essence has
+rendered inevitable: his interest demands that he should not brood
+gloomily over his misfortune; that he should not, by continual dread,
+embitter his life; the charms of which he must inevitably destroy, if
+he can never view its termination but with trepidation. Reason and his
+interest then, concur to assure him against those vague terrors with
+which his imagination inspires him, in this respect. If he was to call
+them to his assistance, they would reconcile him to an object that only
+startles him, because he has no knowledge of it; because it is only
+shewn to him with those hideous accompaniments with which it is clothed
+by superstition. Let him then, endeavour to despoil death of these vain
+illusions, and he will perceive that it is only the sleep of life;
+that this sleep will not be disturbed with disagreeable dreams; that an
+unpleasant awakening is never likely to follow it. To die is to sleep;
+it is to enter into that state of insensibility in which he was previous
+to his birth; before he had senses; before he was conscious of his
+actual existence. Laws, as necessary as those which gave him birth, will
+make him return into the bosom of Nature, from whence he was drawn, in
+order to reproduce him afterwards under some new form, which it would be
+useless for him to know: without consulting him, Nature places him for
+a season in the order of organized beings; without his consent, she will
+oblige him to quit it, to occupy some other order.
+
+Let him not complain then, that Nature is callous; she only makes him
+undergo a law from which she does not exempt any one being she contains.
+Man complains of the short duration of life--of the rapidity with which
+time flies away; yet the greater number of men do not know how to employ
+either time or life. If all are born and perish--if every thing is
+changed and destroyed--if the birth of a being is never more than the
+first step towards its end; how is it possible to expect that man, whose
+machine is so frail, of which the parts are so complicated, the whole
+of which possesses such extreme mobility, should be exempted from the
+common law; which decrees, that even the solid earth he inhabits shall
+experience change--shall undergo alteration--perhaps be destroyed!
+Feeble, frail mortal! Thou pretendest to exist for ever; whit thou,
+then, that for thee alone eternal Nature shall change her undeviating
+course? Dost thou not behold in those eccentric comets with which thine
+eyes are sometimes astonished, that the planets themselves are subject
+to death? Live then in peace for the season that Nature permits thee; if
+thy mind be enlightened by reason thou wilt die without terror!
+
+Notwithstanding the simplicity of these reflections; nothing is more
+rare than the sight of men truly fortified against the fears of death:
+the wise man himself turns pale at its approach; he has occasion to
+collect the whole force of his mind, to expect it with serenity. It
+cannot then, furnish matter for surprise, if the idea of death is so
+revolting to the generality of mortals; it terrifies the young--it
+redoubles the chagrin of the middle-aged--it even augments the sorrow
+of the old, who are worn down with infirmity: indeed the aged, although
+enfeebled by time, dread it much more than the young, who are in the
+full vigour of life; the man of many lustres is more accustomed to live
+years as they roll over his head, confirm his attachment to existence;
+nevertheless, long unwearied exertions weaken the powers of his mind;
+labour, sickness, and pain, waste his animal strength; he has less
+energy; his volition becomes faint, superstitious terrors easily
+appal him; at length disease consumes him; sometimes with excruciating
+tortures: the unhappy wretch, thus plunged into misfortune, has,
+notwithstanding, scarcely ever dared to contemplate death; which he
+ought to consider as the period to all his anguish.
+
+If the source of this pusillanimity be sought, it will be found in his
+nature, which attaches him to life; in that deficiency of energy in his
+soul, which hardly any thing tends to corroborate, but which every
+thing strives to enfeeble: which superstition, instead of strengthening,
+contributes to bruise. Almost all human institutions, nearly all the
+opinions of man, conspire to augment his fears; to render his ideas
+of death more terrible; to make them more revolting to his feelings.
+Indeed, superstition pleases itself with exhibiting death under the
+most frightful traits: it represents it to man under the most disgusting
+colours; as a dreadful moment, which not only puts an end to his
+pleasures, but gives him up without defence to the strange rigour of
+a pitiless decree, which nothing can soften. According to this
+superstition, the most virtuous man has reason to tremble for the
+severity of his fate; is never certain of being happy; the most dreadful
+torments, endless punishments, await the victim to involuntary weakness;
+to the necessary faults of a short-lived existence; his infirmities,
+his momentary offences, the propensities that have been planted in his
+heart, the errors of his mind, the opinions he has imbibed, even in the
+society in which he was born without his own consent, the ideas he has
+formed, the passions he has indulged above all, his not being able to
+comprehend all the extravagant dogmas offered to his acceptance, are to
+be implacably avenged with the most severe and never-ending penalties.
+Ixion is for ever fastened to his wheel; Sisyphus must to all eternity
+roll his stone without ever being able to reach the apex of his
+mountain; the vulture must perpetually prey on the liver of the
+unfortunate Prometheus: those who dare to think for themselves--those
+who have refused to listen to their enthusiastic guides--those who have
+not reverenced the oracles--those who have had the audacity to consult
+their reason--those who have boldly ventured to detect impostors--those
+who have doubted the divine mission of the Phythonissa--those who
+believe that Jupiter violated decency in his visit to Danae--those who
+look upon Apollo as no better than a strolling musician--those who think
+that Mahomet was an arch knave--are to smart everlastingly in flaming
+oceans of burning sulpher; are to float to all eternity in the most
+excruciating agonies on seas of liquid brimstone, wailing and gnashing
+their teeth: what wonder, then, if man dreads to be cast into these
+hideous gulfs; if his mind loathes the horrific picture; if he wishes
+to defer for a season these dreadful punishments; if he clings to an
+existence, painful as it may be, rather than encounter such revolting
+cruelties.
+
+Such, then, are the afflicting objects with which superstition occupies
+its unhappy, its credulous disciples; such are the fears which the
+tyrant of human thoughts points out to them as salutary. In defiance Of
+the exility of the effect which these notions produce oil the greater
+number, even of those who say they are, or who believe themselves
+persuaded, they are held forth as the most powerful rampart that can
+be opposed to the irregularities of man. Nevertheless, as will be
+seen presently, it will be found that these systems, or rather these
+chimeras, so terrible to behold, operate little or nothing on the larger
+portion of mankind, who dream of them but seldom, never in the moment
+that passion, interest, pleasure, or example, hurries them along. If
+these fears act, it is commonly on those, who have but little occasion
+to abstain from evil; they make honest hearts tremble, but fail of
+effect on the perverse. They torment sensible souls, but leave those
+that are hardened in repose; they disturb tractable, gentle minds, but
+cause no trouble to rebellious spirits: thus they alarm none but those
+who are already sufficiently alarmed; they coerce only those who are
+already restrained.
+
+These notions, then, impress nothing on the wicked; when by accident
+they do act on them, it is only to redouble the wickedness of their
+natural character--to justify them in their own eyes--to furnish them
+with pretexts to exercise it without fear--to follow it without scruple.
+Indeed, the experience of a great number of ages has shewn to what
+excess of wickedness, to what lengths, the passions of man have carried
+him, when they have been authorized by the priesthood--when they have
+been unchained by superstition--or, at least, when he has been enabled
+to cover himself with its mantle. Man has never been more ambitious,
+never more covetous, never more crafty, never more cruel, never
+more seditious, than when he has persuaded himself that superstition
+permitted or commanded him to be so: thus, superstition did nothing more
+than lend an invincible force to his natural passions, which under
+its sacred auspices he could exercise with impunity, indulge without
+remorse; still more, the greatest villains, in giving free vent to the
+detestable propensities of their natural wickedness, have under its
+influence believed, that, by displaying an over-heated zeal, they
+merited well of heaven; that they exempted themselves by new crimes,
+from that chastisement which they thought their anterior conduct had
+richly merited.
+
+These, then, are the effects which what are called the _salutary_
+notions of superstition, produce on mortals. These reflections will
+furnish an answer to those who say that, "If heaven was promised equally
+to the wicked as to the righteous, there would be found none incredulous
+of another life." We reply, that, in point of fact, superstition does
+accord heaven to the wicked, since it frequently places in this happy
+abode the most useless, the most depraved of men. Is not Mahomet himself
+enthroned in the empyrean by this superstition? If the calendar of
+the Romish saints was examined, would it be found to contain none but
+righteous, none but good men? Does not Mahometanism cut off from all
+chance of future existence, consequently from all hope of reaching
+heaven, the female part of mankind? Have the Jews exalted no one to the
+celestial regions, save the virtuous? When the Jew is condemned to the
+devouring flames, do not the men who thus torture an unhappy wretch,
+whose only crime is adherence to the religion of his forefathers, expect
+to be rewarded for the deed with everlasting happiness? Are they not
+promised eternal salvation for their orthodoxy? Was Constantine, was St.
+Cyril, was St. Athanasius, was St. Dominic, worthy beatification? Were
+Jupiter, Thor, Mercury, Woden, and a thousand others, deserving of
+celestial diadems? Is erring, feeble man, with all his imbecilities,
+competent to form a judgment of the heavenly deserts of his fellows?
+Can be, with his dim optics, with his limited vision, fathom the human
+heart? Can he sound its depths, trace its meanderings, dive into its
+recesses, with sufficient precision, to determine who amongst his
+race is or is not possessed of the requisite merit to enjoy a blessed
+eternity? Thus wicked men are held up as models by superstition,
+which as we shall see, sharpens the passions of evil-disposed men, by
+legitimating those crimes, at which, without this sanction, they would
+shudder; which they would fear to commit; or for which, at least, they
+would feel shame; for which they would experience remorse. In short, the
+ministers of superstition furnish to the most profligate men the power
+of indulging their inflamed passions, and then hold forth to them means
+of diverting from their own heads the thunderbolt that should strike
+their crimes, by spreading before them fresh incentives to intolerant
+persecution, with the promise of a never-fading happiness.
+
+With respect to the incredulous, without doubt, there may be amongst
+them wicked men, as well as amongst the most credulous; but incredulity
+no more supposes wickedness, than credulity supposes righteousness. On
+the contrary, the man who thinks, who meditates, knows far better the
+true motives to goodness, than he who suffers himself to be blindly
+guided by uncertain motives, or by the interest of others. Sensible men
+have the greatest advantage in examining opinions, which it is pretended
+must have an influence over their eternal happiness: if these are found
+false, if they appear injurious to their present life, they will not
+therefore conclude, that they have not another life either to fear or to
+hope; that they are permitted to deliver themselves up with impunity to
+vice, which would do an injury to themselves, that would draw upon them
+the contempt of their neighbour, which would subject them to the anger
+of society: the man who does not expect another life, is only more
+interested in prolonging his existence in this; in rendering himself
+dear to his fellows, by cultivating virtue; by performing all his duties
+with more strictness, in the only life of which he has any knowledge:
+he has made a great stride towards felicity, in disengaging himself
+from those terrors which afflict others, which frequently prevent their
+acting. Such a man has nothing to fear, but every thing to hope; if,
+contrary to what he is able to judge, there should be an hereafter
+existence, will not his actions have been so regulated by virtue, will
+he not have so comported himself in his present existence, as to stand
+a fair chance of enjoying in their fullest extent those felicities
+prepared for his species?
+
+_Superstition_, in fact, takes a pride in rendering man slothful,
+in moulding him to credulity, in making him pusillanimous. It is its
+principle to afflict him without intermission; to redouble in him the
+horrors of death: ever ingenious in tormenting him, it has extended
+his inquietudes beyond even his own existence; its ministers, the more
+securely to dispose of him in this world, invented, in future regions,
+a variety of rewards and punishments, reserving to themselves the
+privilege of awarding these heavenly recompences to those who yielded
+most implicitly to their arbitrary laws; of decreeing punishment
+to those refractory beings who rebelled against their power: thus,
+according to them, Tantalus for divulging their secrets, must eternally
+fear, engulphed in burning sulphur, the stone ready to fall on his
+devoted head; whilst Romulus was beatified and worshipped as a god
+under the name of Quirinus. The same system of superstition caused the
+philosopher Callisthenes to be put to death, for opposing the worship of
+Alexander; and elevated the monk Athanasius to be a saint in heaven. Far
+from holding forth consolation to mortals, far from cultivating man's
+reason, far from teaching him to yield under the hands of necessity,
+superstition, in a great many countries, strives to render death still
+more bitter to him; to make its yoke sit heavy; to fill up its retinue
+with a multitude of hideous phantoms; to paint it in the most frightful
+colours; to render its approach terrible: by this means it has crowded
+the world with enthusiasts, whom it seduces by vague promises; with
+contemptible slaves, whom it coerces with the fear of imaginary evils:
+it has at length persuaded man, that his actual existence is only
+a journey, by which he will arrive at a more important life: this
+doctrine, whether it be rational or irrational, prevents him from
+occupying himself with his true happiness; from even dreaming of
+ameliorating his institutions, of improving his laws, of advancing the
+progress of science, of perfectioning his morals. Vain and gloomy
+ideas have absorbed his attention: he consents to groan under fanatical
+tyranny--to writhe under political inflictions--to live in error--to
+languish in misfortune--in the hope, when he shall be no more, of being
+one day happier; in the firm confidence, that after he has disappeared,
+his calamities, his patience, will conduct him to a never-ending
+felicity: he has believed himself submitted to cruel priests, who are
+willing to make him purchase his future welfare at the expence of every
+thing most dear to his peace, most valuable to his existence here below:
+they have pictured heaven as irritated against him, as disposed to
+appease itself by punishing him eternally, for any efforts he should
+make to withdraw himself from, their power. It is thus the doctrine of
+a future life has been made fatal to the human species: it plunged whole
+nations into sloth, made them languid, filled them with indifference to
+their present welfare, or else precipitated them, into the most furious
+enthusiasm, which hurried them on to such lengths that they tore each
+other in pieces in order to merit the promised heaven.
+
+It will be asked, perhaps, by what road has man been conducted to form
+to himself these gratuitous ideas of another world? I reply, that it is
+a truth man has no idea of a future life, they are the ideas of the past
+and the present that furnish his imagination with the materials of which
+he constructs the edifice of the regions of futurity. Hobbes says, "We
+believe that, that which is will always be, and that the same causes
+will have the same effects." Man in his actual state, has two modes
+of feeling, one that he approves, another that he disapproves: thus,
+persuaded that these two modes of feeling must accompany him, even
+beyond his present existence, he placed in the regions of eternity two
+distinguished abodes, one destined to felicity, the other to misery: the
+one must contain those who obey the calls of superstition, who believe
+in its dogmas; the other is a prison, destined to avenge the cause of
+heaven, on all those who shall not faithfully believe the doctrines
+promulgated by the ministers of a vast variety of superstitions. Has
+sufficient attention been paid to the fact that results as a necessary
+consequence from this reasoning; which on examination will be found
+to have rendered the first place entirely useless, seeing, that by the
+number and contradiction of these various systems, let man believe which
+ever he may, let him follow it in the most faithful manner, still he
+must be ranked as an infidel, as a rebel to the Divinity, because
+he cannot believe in all; and those from which he dissents, by a
+consequence of their own creed, condemn him to the prison-house?
+
+Such is the origin of the ideas upon a future life, so diffused among
+mankind. Every where may be seen an Elysium and a Tartarus; a Paradise
+and a Hell; in a word, two distinguished abodes, constructed according
+to the imagination of the enthusiasts who have invented them, who have
+accommodated them to their own peculiar prejudices, to the hopes, to the
+fears, of the people who believe in them. The Indian figures the first
+of these abodes as one of in-action, of permanent repose, because, being
+the inhabitant of a hot climate, he has learned to contemplate rest
+as the extreme of felicity: the Mussulman promises himself corporeal
+pleasures, similar to those that actually constitute the object of his
+research in this life: each figures to himself, that on which he has
+learned to set the greatest value.
+
+Of whatever nature these pleasures may be, man apprehended that a
+body was needful, in order that his soul might be enabled to enjoy the
+pleasures, or to experience the pains in reserve for him: from hence the
+doctrine of the _resurrection_; but as he beheld this body putrify, as
+he saw it dissolve, as he witnessed its decomposition, after death, he
+was at a loss how to form anew what he conceived so necessary to his
+system he therefore had recourse to the Divine Omnipotence, by whose
+interposition he now believes it will be effected. This opinion, so
+incomprehensible, is said to have originated in Persia, among the Magi,
+and finds a great number of adherents, who have never given it a serious
+examination: but the doctrine of the resurrection appears perfectly
+useless to all those, who believe in the existence of a soul that feels,
+thinks, suffers, and enjoys, after a separation from the body: indeed,
+there are already sects who begin to maintain, that the body is not
+necessary; that therefore it will not be resurrected. Like Berkeley,
+they conceive that "the soul has need neither of body nor any exterior
+being, either to experience sensations, or to have ideas:" the
+Malebranchists, in particular, must suppose that the rejected souls
+will see every thing in the Divinity; will feel themselves burn, without
+having occasion for bodies for that purpose. Others, incapable of
+elevating themselves to these sublime notions, believed, that under
+divers forms, man animated successively different animals of various
+species; that he never ceased to be an inhabitant of the earth; such was
+the opinion of those who adopted the doctrine of Metempsychosis.
+
+As for the miserable abode of souls, the imagination of fanatics, who
+were desirous of governing the people, strove to assemble the most
+frightful images, to render it still more terrible: fire is of all
+beings that which produces in man the most pungent sensation; not
+finding any thing more cruel, the enemies to the several dogmas were to
+be everlastingly punished with this torturing element: fire, therefore,
+was the point at which their imagination was obliged to stop. The
+ministers of the various systems agreed pretty generally, that fire
+would one day avenge their offended divinities: thus they painted the
+victims to the anger of the gods, or rather those who questioned their
+own creeds, as confined in fiery dungeons, as perpetually rolling in a
+vortex of bituminous flames, as plunged in unfathomable gulphs of
+liquid sulphur, making the infernal caverns resound with their useless
+groanings, with their unavailing gnashing of teeth.
+
+But it will, perhaps, be enquired, how could man reconcile himself to
+the belief of an existence accompanied with eternal torments; above all,
+as many according to their own superstitions had reason to fear it for
+themselves? Many causes have concurred to make him adopt so revolting
+an opinion: in the first place, very few thinking men have ever believed
+such an absurdity, when they have deigned to make use of their reason;
+or, when they have accredited it, this notion was always counterbalanced
+by the idea of the goodness, by a reliance on the mercy, which they
+attributed to their respective divinities: in the second place, those
+who were blinded by their fears, never rendered to themselves any
+account of these strange doctrines, which they either received with
+awe from their legislators, or which were transmitted to them by their
+fathers: in the third place, each sees the object of his terrors only at
+a favourable distance: moreover, superstition promises him the means of
+escaping the tortures he believes he has merited. At length, like those
+sick people whom we see cling with fondness, even to the most painful
+life, man preferred the idea of an unhappy, though unknown existence, to
+that of non-existence, which he looked upon as the most frightful evil
+that could befal him; either because he could form no idea of it, or
+because his imagination painted to him this non-existence this nothing,
+as the confused assemblage of all evils. A known evil, of whatever
+magnitude, alarmed him less (above all, when there remained the hope
+of being able to avoid it), than an evil of which he knew nothing, upon
+which, consequently, his imagination was painfully employed, but to
+which he knew not how to oppose a remedy.
+
+It will be seen, then, that _superstition_, far from consoling man upon
+the necessity of death, only redoubles his terrors, by the evils with
+which it pretends his decease will be followed; these terrors are
+so strong, that the miserable wretches who believe strictly in these
+formidable doctrines, pass their days in affliction, bathed in the
+most bitter tears. What shall be said of an opinion so destructive to
+society, yet adopted by so many nations, which announces to them, that
+a severe fate may at each instant take them unprovided; that at each
+moment they are liable to pass under the most rigorous judgment? What
+idea can be better suited to terrify man--what more likely to discourage
+him--what more calculated to damp the desire of ameliorating his
+condition--than the afflicting prospect of a world always on the brink
+of dissolution; of a Divinity seated upon the ruins of Nature, ready to
+pass judgment on the human species? Such are, nevertheless, the fatal
+opinions with which the mind of nations has been fed for thousands of
+years: they are so dangerous, that if by a happy want of just inference,
+he did not derogate in his conduct from these afflicting ideas, he would
+fall into the most abject stupidity. How could man occupy himself with a
+perishable world, ready every moment to crumble into atoms? How dream
+of rendering himself happy on earth, when it is only the porch to an
+eternal kingdom? Is it then, surprising, that the superstitions to which
+similar doctrines serve for a basis, have prescribed to their disciples
+a total detachment from things below--an entire renunciation of the
+most innocent pleasures; have given birth to a sluggishness, to a
+pusillanimity, to an abjection of soul, to an insociability, that
+renders him useless to himself, dangerous to others? If necessity
+did not oblige man to depart in his practice from these irrational
+systems--if his wants did not bring him back to reason, in despite of
+these superstitious doctrines--the whole world would presently become a
+vast desert, inhabited by some few isolated savages, who would not even
+have courage to multiply themselves. What are these, but notions which
+he must necessarily put aside, in order that human association may
+subsist?
+
+Nevertheless, the doctrine of a future life, accompanied with rewards
+and punishments, has been regarded for a great number of ages as the
+most powerful, or even as the only motive capable of coercing the
+passions of man; as the sole means that can oblige him to be virtuous:
+by degrees, this doctrine has become the basis of almost all religions
+and political systems, so much so, that at this day it is said, this
+prejudice cannot be attacked without absolutely rending asunder the
+bonds of society. The founders of superstition have made use of it to
+attach their credulous disciples; legislators have looked upon it as
+the curb best calculated to keep mankind under discipline; religion
+considers it necessary to his happiness; many philosophers themselves
+have believed with sincerity, that this doctrine was requisite
+to terrify man, was the only means to divert him from crime:
+notwithstanding, when the doctrine of the immortality of the soul first
+came out of the school of Plato; when it first diffused itself among
+the Greeks, it caused the greatest ravages; it determined a multitude
+of men, who were discontented with their condition, to terminate their
+existence: Ptolemy Philadelphus, king of Egypt, seeing the effect
+this doctrine, which at the present day is looked upon as so salutary,
+produced on the brains of his subjects, prohibited the teaching of it
+under the penalty of death.
+
+It must, indeed, be allowed that this doctrine has been of the greatest
+utility to those who have given superstitions to nations, who at the
+same time made themselves its ministers; it was the foundation of
+their power, the source of their wealth, the permanent cause of that
+blindness, the solid basis of those terrors, which it was their interest
+to nourish in the human race. It was by this doctrine the priest became
+first the rival, then the master of kings: it is by this dogma that
+nations are filled with enthusiasts inebriated with superstition, always
+more disposed to listen to its menaces, than to the counsels of reasons,
+to the orders of the sovereign, to the cries of Nature, or to the laws
+of society. Politics itself was enslaved to the caprice of the priest;
+the temporal monarch was obliged to bend under the yoke of the monarch
+of superstition; the one only disposed of this perishable world, the
+other extended his power into the world to come; much more important
+for man than the earth, on which he is only a pilgrim, a mere passenger.
+Thus the doctrine of another life placed the government itself in a
+state of dependance upon the priest; the monarch was nothing more than
+his first subject; he was never obeyed, but when the two were in accord.
+Nature in vain cried out to man, to be careful of his present happiness;
+the priest ordered him to be unhappy, in the expectation of future
+felicity; reason in vain exhorted him to be peaceable; the priest
+breathed forth fanaticism, fulminated fury, obliged him to disturb the
+public tranquillity, every time there was a question of the supposed
+interests of the invisible monarch of another life, and the real
+interests of his ministers in this.
+
+Such is the fruit that politics has gathered from the doctrine of
+a future life; the regions of the world to come have enabled the
+priesthood to conquer the present world. The expectation of celestial
+happiness, and the dread of future tortures, only served to prevent man
+from seeking after the means to render himself happy here below. Thus
+error, under whatever aspect it is considered, will never be more than a
+source of evil for mankind. The doctrine of another life, in presenting
+to mortals an ideal happiness, will render them enthusiasts; in
+overwhelming them with fears, it will make useless beings; generate
+cowards; form atrabilarious or furious men; who will lose sight of their
+present abode, to occupy themselves with the pictured regions of a world
+to come, with those dreadful evils which they must fear after their
+death.
+
+If it be insisted that the doctrine of future rewards and punishments is
+the most powerful curb to restrain the passions of man, we shall reply
+by calling in daily experience. If we only cast our eyes around, if for
+a moment we examine what passes in review before us, we shall see this
+assertion contradicted; we shall find that these marvellous speculations
+do not in any manner diminish the number of the wicked, because they
+are incapable of changing the temperament of man, of annihilating those
+passions which the vices of society engender in his heart. In those
+nations who appear the most thoroughly convinced of this future
+punishment, may be seen assassins, thieves, crafty knaves, oppressors,
+adulterers, voluptuaries; all these pretend they are firmly persuaded of
+the reality of an hereafter; yet in the whirlwind of dissipation, in the
+vortex of pleasure, in the fury of their passions, they no longer behold
+this formidable future existence, which in those moments has no kind of
+influence over their earthly conduct.
+
+In short, in many of those countries where the doctrine of another life
+is so firmly established, that each individual irritates himself against
+whoever may have the temerity to combat the opinion, or even to doubt
+it, we see that it is utterly incapable of impressing any thing on
+rulers who are unjust, who are negligent of the welfare of their people,
+who are, debauched, on courtezans who are lewd in their habits, on
+covetous misers, on flinty extortioners who fatten on the substance of
+a nation, on women without modesty, on a vast multitude of drunken,
+intemperate, vicious men, on great numbers even amongst those priests,
+whose function it is to preach this future state, who are paid to
+announce the vengeance of heaven, against vices which they themselves
+encourage by their example. If it be enquired of them, how they dare to
+give themselves up to such scandalous actions, which they ought to know
+are certain to draw upon them eternal punishment? They will reply, that
+the madness of their passions, the force of their habits, the contagion
+of example, or even the power of circumstances, have hurried them along;
+have made them forget the dreadful consequences in which their conduct
+is likely to involve them; besides, they will say, that the treasures
+of the divine mercy are infinite; that repentance suffices to efface the
+foulest transgressions; to cleanse the blackest guilt; to blot out the
+most enormous crimes: in this multitude of wretched beings, who each
+after his own manner desolates society with his criminal pursuits, you
+will find only a small number who are sufficiently intimidated by the
+fears of the miserable hereafter, to resist their evil propensities.
+What did I say? These propensities are in themselves too weak to carry
+them forward without the aid of the doctrine of another life; without
+this, the law and the fear of censure would have been motives sufficient
+to prevent them from rendering themselves criminal.
+
+It is indeed, fearful, timorous souls, upon whom the terrors of another
+life make a profound impression; human beings of this sort come into the
+world with moderate passions, are of a weakly organization, possess a
+cool imagination; it is not therefore surprising, that in such men, who
+are already restrained by their nature, the fear of future punishment
+counterbalances the weak efforts of their feeble passions; but it is
+by no means the same with those determined sinners, with those hardened
+criminals, with those men who are habitually vicious, whose unseemly
+excesses nothing can arrest, who in their violence shut their eyes to
+the fear of the laws of this world, despising still more those of the
+other. Nevertheless, how many persons say they are, and even believe
+themselves, restrained by the fears of the life to come? But, either
+they deceive us, or they impose upon themselves, by attributing to these
+fears, that which is only the effect of motives much nearer at
+hand; such as the feebleness of their machine, the mildness of their
+temperament, the slender energy of their souls, their natural timidity,
+the ideas imbibed in their education, the fear of consequences
+immediately resulting from criminal actions, the physical evils
+attendant on unbridled irregularities: these are the true motives that
+restrain them; not the notions of a future life: which men, who say they
+are most firmly persuaded of its existence, forget whenever a powerful
+interest solicits them to sin. If for a time man would pay attention to
+what passes before his eyes, he would perceive that he ascribes to the
+fear of the gods that which is in reality only the effect of peculiar
+weakness, of pusillanimity, of the small interest found to commit evil:
+these men would not act otherwise than they do, if they had not this
+fear before them; if, therefore he reflected, he would feel that it is
+always necessity that makes men act as they do.
+
+Man cannot be restrained, when he does not find within himself motives
+sufficiently powerful to conduct him back to reason. There is nothing,
+either in this world or in the other, that can render him virtuous,
+when an untoward organization--a mind badly cultivated--a
+violent imagination--inveterate habits--fatal examples--powerful
+interests--invite him from every quarter to the commission of crime.
+No speculations are capable of restraining the man who braves public
+opinion, who despises the law, who is careless of its censure, who turns
+a deaf ear to the cries of conscience, whose power in this world places
+him out of the reach of punishment; in the violence of his transports,
+he will fear still less a distant futurity, of which the idea always
+recedes before that which he believes necessary to his immediate
+interests, consistent with his present happiness. All lively passions
+blind man to every thing that is not its immediate object; the terrors
+of a future life, of which his passions always possess the secret to
+diminish to him the probability, can effect nothing upon the wicked man,
+who does not fear even the much nearer punishment of the law; who sets
+at nought the assured hatred of those by whom he is surrounded. Man,
+when he delivers himself up to crime, sees nothing certain except the
+supposed advantage which attends it; the rest always appear to him
+either false or problematical.
+
+If man would but open his eyes, even for a moment, he would clearly
+perceive, that to effect any thing upon hearts hardened by crime, he
+must not reckon upon the chastisement of an avenging Divinity, which the
+self-love natural to man always shews him as pacified in the long run.
+He who has arrived at persuading himself he cannot be happy without
+crime, will always readily deliver himself up to it, notwithstanding
+the menaces of religion. Whoever is sufficiently blind not to read his
+infamy in his own heart, to see his own vileness in the countenances of
+his associates, his own condemnation in the anger of his fellow-men, his
+own unworthiness in the indignation of the judges established to punish
+the offences he may commit: such a man, I say, will never feel the
+impression his crimes shall make on the features of a judge, that is
+either hidden from his view, or that he only contemplates at a distance.
+The tyrant who with dry eyes can hear the cries of the distressed, who
+with callous heart can behold the tears of a whole people, of whose
+misery he is the cause, will not see the angry countenance of a more
+powerful master: like another Menippus, he may indeed destroy himself
+from desperation, to avoid reiterated reproach; which only proves,
+that when a haughty, arrogant despot pretends to be accountable for his
+actions to the Divinity alone, it is because he fears his nation more
+than he does his God.
+
+On the other hand, does not superstition itself, does not even religion,
+annihilate the effects of those fears which it announces as salutary?
+Does it not furnish its disciples with the means of extricating
+themselves from the punishments with which it has so frequently menaced
+them? Does it not tell them, that a steril repentance will, even at the
+moment of death, disarm the celestial wrath; that it will purify the
+filthy souls of sinners? Do not even the priests, in some superstitions,
+arrogate to themselves the right of remitting to the dying the
+punishment due to the crimes committed during the course of a disorderly
+life? In short, do not the most perverse men, encouraged in iniquity,
+countenanced in debauchery, upheld in crime, reckon, even to the last
+moment, either upon the assistance of superstition, or upon the aid
+of religion, that promises them the infallible means of reconciling
+themselves to the Divinity, whom they have irritated; of avoiding the
+rigorous punishments pronounced against their enormities?
+
+In consequence of these notions, so favourable to the wicked, so
+suitable to tranquillize their fears, we see that the hope of an easy
+expiation, far from correcting man, engages him to persist, until death,
+in the most crying disorders. Indeed, in despite of the numberless
+advantages which he is assured flows from the doctrine of a life to
+come, in defiance of its pretended efficacy to repress the passions
+of men, do not the priests themselves, although so interested in the
+maintenance of this system, every day complain of its insufficiency?
+They acknowledge, that mortals, who from their infancy they have
+imbued with these ideas, are not less hurried forward by their evil
+propensities--less sunk in the vortex of dissipation--less the slaves to
+their pleasures--less captivated by bad habits--less driven along by the
+torrent of the world--less seduced by their present interest--which
+make them forget equally the recompense and the chastisement of a future
+existence. In a word, the interpreters of superstition, the ministers of
+religion themselves, allow that their disciples, for the greater part,
+conduct themselves in this world as if they had nothing either to hope
+or fear in another.
+
+In short, let it be supposed for a moment, that the doctrine of eternal
+punishments was of some utility; that it really restrained a small
+number of individuals; what are these feeble advantages compared to the
+numberless evils that flow from it? Against one timid man whom this idea
+restrains, there are thousands upon whom it operates nothing; there are
+thousands whom it makes irrational; whom it renders savage persecutors;
+whom it converts into fanatics; there are thousands whose mind it
+disturbs; whom it diverts from their duties towards society; there
+are an infinity whom it grievously afflicts, whom it troubles without
+producing any real good for their associates.
+
+Notwithstanding so many are inclined to consider those who do not fall
+in with this doctrine as the enemies of society; it will be found on
+examination that the wisest the most enlightened men of antiquity, as
+well as many of the moderns, have believed not only that the soul is
+material and perishes with the body, but also that they have attacked
+without subterfuge the opinion of future everlasting punishments; it
+will also be found that many of the systems, set up to establish the
+immortality of the soul, are in themselves the best evidence that can be
+adduced of the futility of this doctrine; if for a moment we only follow
+up the natural the just inferences that are to be drawn from them. This
+sentiment was far from being, as some have supposed, peculiar to
+the Epicureans, it has been adopted by philosophers of all sects, by
+Pythagoreans, by Stoics, by Peripatetics, by Academics; in short by the
+most godly the most virtuous men of Greece and of Rome.
+
+Pythagoras, according to Ovid, speaks strongly to the fact. Timaeus
+of Locris, who was a Pythagorean, admits that the doctrine of future
+punishments was fabulous, solely destined for the imbecility of the
+uninformed; but little calculated for those who cultivate their reason.
+
+Aristotle expressly says, that "man has neither good to hope nor evil to
+fear after death."
+
+Zeno, according to Cicero, supposed the soul to be an igneous substance,
+from whence he concluded it destroyed itself.
+
+Cicero, the philosophical orator, who was of the sect of Academics,
+although he is not on all occasions, in accord with himself, treats
+openly as fables the torments of Hell; and looks upon death as the end
+of every thing for man.
+
+Seneca, the philosopher, is filled with passages which contemplate death
+as a state of total annihilation, particularly in speaking of it to his
+brother: and nothing can be more decisive of his holding this opinion,
+than what he writes to Marcia, to console him.
+
+Seneca, the tragedian, explains himself in the same manner as the
+philosopher.
+
+The Platonists, who made the soul immortal, could not have an idea of
+future punishments, because the soul according to them was a portion
+of the divinity which after the dissolution of the body it returned to
+rejoin.
+
+Epictetus has the same idea. In a passage reported by Arrian, he says,
+"but where are you going? It cannot be to a place of suffering: you will
+only return to the place from whence you came; you are about to be again
+peaceably associated with the elements from which you are derived. That
+which in your composition, is of the nature of fire, will return to
+the element of fire; that which is of the nature of earth, will rejoin
+itself to the earth; that which is air, will re-unite itself with air;
+that which is water, will resolve itself into water; there is no Hell,
+no Acheron, no Cocytus, no Phlegethon."
+
+In another place he says, "the hour of death approaches; but do not
+aggravate your evil, nor render things worse than they are: represent
+them to yourself under their true point of view. The time is come when
+the materials of which you are composed, go to resolve themselves into
+the elements from whence they were originally borrowed. What is there
+that is terrible or grievous in that? Is there any thing in the world
+that perishes totally?"
+
+The sage and pious Antoninus says, "he who fears death, either fears
+to be deprived of all feeling, or dreads to experience different
+sensations. If you lose all feeling, you will no longer be subject
+either to pain or to misery. If you are provided with other senses of
+a different nature, you will become a creature of a different species."
+This great emperor further says, "that we must expect death with
+tranquillity, seeing, that it is only a dissolution of the elements of
+which each animal is composed."
+
+To the evidence of so many great men of _Pagan antiquity_, may be
+joined, that of the author of Ecclesiastes, who speaks of death, and of
+the condition of the human soul, like an _epicurean_; he says, "for
+that which befalleth the sons of men, befalleth beasts; even one thing
+befalleth them: as the one dieth, so dieth the other; yea, they have all
+one breath: so that a man hath no pre-eminence above a beast; for all is
+vanity. All go unto one place; all are of the dust, and all turn to dust
+again." And further, "wherefore I perceive that there is nothing
+better than that a man should rejoice in his own works; for that is his
+portion: for who shall bring him to see what shall be after him."
+
+In short, how can the utility or the necessity of this doctrine be
+reconciled with the fact, that the great _legislator of the Jews_; who
+is supposed to have been inspired by the Divinity, should have remained
+silent on a subject, that is said to be of so much importance? In the
+third chapter of Genesis it, is said, "In the sweat of thy face shalt
+thou eat bread, till thou return unto the ground; for out of it wast
+thou taken: for dust thou art, and unto dust shalt thou return."
+
+
+
+
+
+CHAP. XIV.
+
+_Education, Morals, and the Laws suffice to restrain Man.--Of the desire
+of Immortality.--Of Suicide._
+
+
+It is not then in an ideal world, existing no where perhaps, but in the
+imagination of man, that he must seek to collect motives calculated to
+make him act properly in this; it is in the visible world that will be
+found incitements to divert him from crime; to rouse him to virtue.
+It is in Nature,--in experience,--in truth, that he must search out
+remedies for the evils of his species; for motives suitable to infuse
+into the human heart, propensities truely useful to society; calculated
+to promote its advantage; to conduce to the end for which it was
+designed.
+
+If attention has been paid to what has been said In the course of this
+work, it will be seen that above all it is _education_ that will best
+furnish the true means of rectifying the errors, of recalling the
+wanderings of mankind. It is this that should scatter the Seeds in
+his heart; cultivate the tender shoots; make a profitable use of his
+dispositions; turn to account those faculties, which depend on his
+organization: which should cherish the fire of his imagination, kindle
+it for useful objects; damp it, or extinguish it for others; in short,
+it is this which should make sensible souls contract habits which are
+advantageous for society and beneficial to the individual. Brought up in
+this manner, man would not have occasion for celestial punishments,
+to teach him the value of virtue; he would not need to behold burning
+gulphs of brimstone under his feet, to induce him to feel horror for
+crime; Nature without these fables, would teach much better what he owes
+to himself; the law would point out what he owes to the body politic, of
+which he is a member. It is thus, that education grounded upon utility,
+would form valuable citizens to the state; the depositaries of power
+would distinguish those whom education should have thus formed, by
+reason of the advantages which they would procure for their country;
+they would punish those who should be found injurious to it; it would
+make the citizens see, that the promises of reward which education held
+forth, the punishments denounced by morals, are by no means vain; that
+in a state well constituted, _virtue_ is the true, the only road to
+happiness; _talents_ the way to gain respect; that _inutility_ conducts
+to misfortune: that _crime_ leads to contempt.
+
+A just, enlightened, virtuous, and vigilant government, who should
+honestly propose the public good, would have no occasion either for
+fables or for falsehoods, to govern reasonable subjects; it would blush
+to make use of imposture, to deceive its citizens; who, instructed in
+their duties, would find their interest in submitting to equitable laws;
+who would be capable of feeling the benefit these have the power of
+conferring on them; it would feel, that habit is sufficient to inspire
+them with horror, even for those concealed crimes that escape the eyes
+of society; it would understand that the visible punishments of this
+world impose much more on the generality of men, than those of an
+uncertain and distant futurity: in short, it would ascertain that
+the sensible benefits within the compass of the sovereign power to
+distribute, touch the imagination of mortals more keenly, than those
+vague recompences which are held forth to them in a future existence:
+above all, it would discover that those on whom these distant advantages
+do operate, would be still more attached to virtue by receiving their
+reward both here and hereafter.
+
+Man is almost every where so wicked, so corrupt, so rebellious to
+reason, only because he is not governed according to his Nature, nor
+properly instructed in her necessary laws: he is almost in every climate
+fed with superstitious chimeras; submitted to masters who neglect his
+instruction or who seek to deceive him. On the face of this globe, may
+be frequently witnessed unjust sovereigns, who, enervated by luxury,
+corrupted by flattery, depraved by licentiousness, made wicked by
+impunity, devoid of talents, without morals, destitute of virtue, are
+incapable of exerting any energy for the benefit of the states they
+govern; they are consequently but little occupied with the welfare of
+their people; indifferent to their duties; of which indeed they are
+often ignorant. Such governors suffer their whole attention to be
+absorbed by frivolous amusement; stimulated by the desire of continually
+finding means to feed their insatiable ambition they engage in useless
+depopulating wars; and never occupy their mind with those objects which
+are the most important to the happiness of their nation: yet these weak
+men feel interested in maintaining the received prejudices, and visit
+with severity those who consider the means of curing them: in short
+themselves deprived of that understanding, which teaches man that it is
+his interest to be kind, just, and virtuous; they ordinarily reward
+only those crimes which their imbecility makes them imagine as useful to
+them; they generally punish those virtues which are opposed to their own
+imprudent passions, but which reason would point out as truly beneficial
+to their interests. Under such masters is it surprising that society
+should be ravaged; that weak beings should be willing to imitate them;
+that perverse men should emulate each other in oppressing its members;
+in sacrificing its dearest interests; in despoiling its happiness?
+The state of society in such countries, is a state of hostility of the
+sovereign against the whole, of each of its members the one against
+the other. Man is wicked, not because he is born so, but because he is
+rendered so; the great, the powerful, crush with impunity the indigent
+and the unhappy; these, at the risk of their lives seek to retaliate, to
+render back the evil they have received: they attack either openly or in
+secret a country, who to them is a step-mother, who gives all to some of
+her children, and deprives the others of every thing: they punish it for
+its partiality, and clearly shew that the motives borrowed from a life
+hereafter are impotent against the fury of those passions to which
+a corrupt administration has given birth; that the terror of the
+punishments in this world are too feeble against necessity; against
+criminal habits; against dangerous organization uncorrected by
+education.
+
+In many countries the morals of the people are neglected; the government
+is occupied only with rendering them timid; with making them miserable.
+Man is almost every where a slave; it must then follow of necessity,
+that he is base, interested, dissimulating, without honour, in a word
+that he has the vices of the state of which he is a citizen. Almost
+every where he is deceived; encouraged in ignorance; prevented from
+cultivating his reason; of course he must be stupid, irrational, and
+wicked almost every where he sees vice applauded, and crime honoured;
+thence he concludes vice to be a good; virtue, only a useless sacrifice
+of himself: almost every where he is miserable, therefore he injures his
+fellow-men in a fruitless attempt to relieve his own anguish: it is in
+vain to shew him heaven in order to restrain him; his views presently
+descend again to earth; he is willing to be happy at any price;
+therefore, the laws which have neither provided for his instruction, for
+his morals, nor his happiness, menace him uselessly; he plunges on in
+his pursuits, and these ultimately punish him, for the unjust negligence
+of his legislators. If politics more enlightened, did seriously occupy
+itself with the instruction, with the welfare of the people; if laws
+were more equitable; if each society, less partial, bestowed on its
+members the care, the education, and the assistance which they have a
+right to expect; if governments less covetous, and more vigilant, were
+sedulous to render their subjects more happy, there would not be seen
+such numbers of malefactors, of robbers, of murderers, who every where
+infest society; they would not be obliged to destroy life, in order to
+punish wickedness; which is commonly ascribable to the vices of their
+own institutions: it would be unnecessary to seek in another life for
+fanciful chimeras, which always prove abortive against the infuriate
+passions; against the real wants of man. In short, if the people were
+instructed, they would be more happy; politics would no longer be
+reduced to the exigency of deceiving them, in order to restrain them;
+nor to destroy so many unfortunates, for having procured necessaries, at
+the expence of their hard-hearted fellow-citizens.
+
+When it shall be desired to enlighten man, let him always have truth
+laid before him. Instead of kindling his imagination by the idea of
+those punishments that a future state has in reserve for him, let him
+be solaced--let him be succoured; or, at least, let him be permitted to
+enjoy the fruit of his labour--let not his substance be ravished from
+him by cruel imposts--let him not be discouraged from work, by finding
+all his labour inadequate to support his existence; let him not be
+driven into that idleness, that will surely lead him on to crime: let
+him consider his present existence, without carrying his views to that
+which may attend him after his death; let his industry be excited--let
+his talents be rewarded--let him be rendered active, laborious,
+beneficent, and virtuous, in the world he inhabits; let it be shewn
+to him, that his actions are capable of having an influence over
+his fellow-men. Let him not be menaced with the tortures of a future
+existence when he shall be no more; let him behold society armed against
+those who disturb its repose; let him see the consequence of the hatred
+of his associates; let him learn to feel the value of their affection;
+let him be taught to esteem himself; let him understand, that to obtain
+it, he must have virtue; above all, that the virtuous man in society has
+nothing to fear, but every thing to hope.
+
+If it be desired to form honest, courageous, industrious citizens, who
+may be useful to their country, let them beware of inspiring man
+from his infancy with an ill-founded dread of death; of amusing his
+imagination with marvellous fables; of occupying his mind with his
+destiny in a future life, quite useless to be known, which has nothing
+in common with his real felicity. Let them speak of immortality to
+intrepid, noble souls; let them shew it as the price of their labours
+to energetic minds, who are solely occupied with virtue; who springing
+forward beyond the boundaries of their actual existence--who, little
+satisfied with eliciting the admiration, with gaining the love of
+their contemporaries, are will also to wrest the homage, to secure
+the affection of future races. Indeed, this is an immortality to which
+genius, talents, above all virtue, has a just right to pretend; do not
+therefore let them censure--do not let them endeavour to stifle so
+noble a passion in man; which is founded upon his nature; which is
+so calculated to render him happy; from which society gather the most
+advantageous fruits.
+
+The idea of being buried in total oblivion, of having nothing in
+common after his death with the beings of his species; of losing all
+possibility of again having any influence over them, is a thought
+extremely painful to man; it is above all afflicting to those who
+possess an ardent imagination. The _desire of immortality_, or of living
+in the memory of his fellow men, was always the passion of great souls;
+it was the motive to the actions of all those who have played a great
+part on the earth. _Heroes_ whether virtuous or criminal, _philosophers_
+as well as _conquerors, men of genius_ and _men of talents_, those
+sublime personages who have done honor to their species, as well as
+those illustrious villains who have debased and ravaged it, have had
+an eye to posterity in all their enterprises; have flattered themselves
+with the hope of acting upon the souls of men, even when they themselves
+should no longer exist. If man in general does not carry his views so
+far, he is at least sensible to the idea of seeing himself regenerated
+in his children; whom he knows are destined to survive him; to transmit
+his name; to preserve his memory; to represent him in society; it is
+for them that he rebuilds his cottage; it is for them that he plants the
+tree which his eyes will never behold in its vigour; it is that they may
+be happy that he labours. The sorrow which embitters the life of those
+rich men, frequently so useless to the world, when they have lost the
+hope of continuing their race, has its source in the fear of being
+entirely forgotten: they feel that the useless man dies entirely. The
+idea that his name will be in the mouths of men, the thought that it
+will be pronounced with tenderness, that it will be recollected with
+kindness, that it will excite in their hearts favourable sentiments, is
+an illusion that is useful; is a vision suitable to flatter even those
+who know that nothing will result from it. Man pleases himself with
+dreaming that he shall have power, that he shall pass for something in
+the universe, even after the term of his human existence; he partakes
+by imagination in the projects, in the actions, in the discussions
+of future ages, and would be extremely unhappy if he believed himself
+entirely excluded from their society. The laws in all countries have
+entered into these views; they have so far been willing to console
+their citizens for the necessity of dying, by giving them the means
+of exercising their will, even for a long time after their death: this
+condescension goes to that length, that the dead frequently regulate the
+condition of the living during a long series of years.
+
+Every thing serves to prove the desire in man of surviving himself.
+_Pyramids, mausoleums, monuments, epitaphs,_ all shew that he is willing
+to prolong his existence even beyond his decease. He, is not insensible
+to the judgment of posterity; it is for him the philosopher writes; it
+is to astonish him that the monarch erects sumptuous edifices, gorgeous
+palaces; it is his praises, it is his commendations, that the great man
+already hears echo in his ears; it is to him that the virtuous citizen
+appeals from unjust laws; from prejudiced contemporaries--happy chimera!
+generous illusion! mild vision! its power is so consoling, so bland,
+that it realizes itself to ardent imaginations; it is calculated to give
+birth, to sustain, to nurture, to mature enthusiasm of genius, constancy
+of courage, grandeur of soul, transcendency of talent; its force is so
+gentle, its influence so pleasing, that it is sometimes able to repress
+the vices, to restrain the excesses of the most powerful men; who
+are, as experience has shewn, frequently very much disquieted for the
+judgment of their posterity; from a conviction that this will sooner or
+later avenge the living of the foul injustice which they may be inclined
+to make them suffer.
+
+No man, therefore, can consent to be entirely effaced from the
+remembrance of his fellows; some men have not the temerity to place
+themselves above the judgment of the future human species, to degrade
+themselves in his eyes. Where is the being who is insensible to the
+pleasure of exciting the tears of those who shall survive him; of again
+acting upon their souls; of once more occupying their thoughts; of
+exercising upon them his power even from the bottom of his grave? Let
+then eternal silence be imposed upon those superstitious beings, upon
+those melancholy men, upon those furious bigots, who censure a sentiment
+from which society derives so many real advantages; let not mankind
+listen to those passionless philosophers who are willing to smother
+this great, this noble spring of his soul; let him not be seduced by the
+sarcasms of those voluptuaries, who pretend to despise an immortality,
+towards which they lack the power to set forward; the desire of pleasing
+posterity, of rendering his name agreeable to generations yet to come,
+is a respectable, a laudable motive, when it causes him to undertake
+those things, of which the utility may be felt, of which the advantages
+may have an influence not only over his contemporaries, but also over
+nations who have not yet an existence. Let him not treat as irrational,
+the enthusiasm of those beneficent beings, of those mighty geniuses, of
+those stupendous talents, whose keen, whose penetrating regards, have
+foreseen him even in their day; who have occupied themselves for him;
+for his welfare; for his happiness; who have desired his suffrage; who
+have written for him; who have enriched him by their discoveries; who
+have cured him of some of his errors. Let him render them the homage
+which they have expected at his hands; let him, at least, reverence
+their memory for the benefits he has derived from them; let him treat
+their mouldering remains with respect, for the pleasure he receives
+from their labours; let him pay to their ashes a tribute of grateful
+recollection, for the happiness they have been sedulous to procure
+for him. Let him sprinkle with his tears, let him hallow with his
+remembrance, let him consecrate with his finest sensibilities, the urns
+of Socrates, of Phocion; of Archimedes; of Anaxarchus; let him wash out
+the stain that their punishment has made on the human species; let him
+expiate by his regret the Athenian ingratitude, the savage barbarity
+of Nicocreon; let him learn by their example to dread superstitious
+fanaticism; to hold political intolerance in abhorrence; let him fear to
+harrass merit; let him be cautious how he insults virtue, in persecuting
+those who may happen to differ from him in his prejudices.
+
+Let him strew flowers over the tombs of an Homer--of a Tasso--of a
+Shakespeare--of a Milton--of a Goldsmith; let him revere the immortal
+shades of those happy geniuses, whose songs yet vibrate on his ears;
+whose harmonious lays excite in his soul the most tender sentiments; let
+him bless the memory of all those benefactors to the people, who were
+the delight of the human race; let him adore the virtues Of a Titus--of
+a Trajan--of an Antoninus--of a Julian: let him merit in his sphere, the
+eulogies of future ages; let him always remember, that to carry with
+him to the grave the regret of his fellow man, he must display talents;
+evince integrity; practice virtue. The funeral ceremonies of the most
+powerful monarchs, have rarely been wetted with the tears of the people,
+they have commonly drained them while living. The names of tyrants
+excite the horror of those who bear them pronounced. Tremble then cruel
+kings! ye who plunge your subjects into misery; who bathe them with
+bitter tears--who ravage nations--who deluge the land with the vital
+stream--who change the fruitful earth into a barren cemetery; tremble
+for the sanguinary traits under which the future historian will paint
+you, to generations yet unborn: neither your splendid monuments--your
+imposing victories--your innumerable armies, nor your sycophant
+courtiers, can prevent posterity from avenging their grandfathers; from
+insulting your odious manes; from treating your execrable memories with
+scorn; from showering their contempt on your transcendant crimes.
+
+Not only man sees his dissolution with pain, but again, he wishes his
+death may be an interesting event for others. But, as we have already
+said, he must have talents--he must have beneficence--he must have
+virtue, in order, that those who surround him, may interest themselves
+in his condition; that those who survive him, may give regret to his
+ashes. Is it, then, surprising if the greater number of men, occupied
+entirely with themselves, completely absorbed by their own vanity,
+devoted to their own puerile objects, for ever busied with the care of
+gratifying their vile passions, at the expence, perhaps, of their family
+happiness, unheedful of the wants of a wife, unmindful of the necessity
+of their children, careless of the calls of friendship, regardless of
+their duty to society, do not by their death excite the sensibilities of
+their survivors; or that they should be presently forgotten? There is an
+infinity of monarchs of which history does not tell us any thing, save
+that they have lived. In despite of the inutility in which men for the
+most part pass their existence, maugre the little care they bestow, to
+render themselves dear to the beings who environ them; notwithstanding
+the numerous actions they commit to displease their associates; the
+self love of each individual, persuades him, that his death must be
+an interesting occurrence: few men but think themselves an Euryalus in
+friendship, all expect to find a Nisus, thus man's over-weening philauty
+shews him to say thus the order of things are overturned at his decease.
+O mortal! feeble and vain! Dost thou not know the Sesostris's, the
+Alexanders, the Caesars are dead? Yet the course of the universe is not
+arrested; the demise of those famous conquerors, afflicting to some few
+favoured slaves, was a subject of delight for the whole human race.
+Dost thou then foolishly believe that thy talents ought to interest thy
+species, that they are of sufficient extent to put it into mourning at
+thy decease? Alas! The Corneilles, the Lockes, the Newtons, the Boyles,
+the Harveys, the Montesquieus, the Sheridans are no more! Regretted by a
+small number of friends, who have presently consoled themselves by their
+necessary avocations, their death was indifferent to the greater number
+of their fellow citizens. Darest thou then flatter thyself, that
+thy reputation, thy titles, thy riches, thy sumptuous repasts, thy
+diversified pleasures, will make thy funeral a melancholy event! It will
+be spoken of by some few for two days, and do not be at all surprised:
+learn that there have died in former ages, in Babylon, in Sardis, in
+Carthage, in Athens, in Rome, millions of citizens more illustrious,
+more powerful, more opulent, more voluptuous, than thou art; of whom,
+however, no one has taken care to transmit to thee even the names. Be
+then virtuous, O man! in whatever station thy destiny assigns thee, and
+thou shalt be happy in thy life time; do thou good and thou shalt be
+cherished; acquire talents and thou shalt be respected; posterity
+shall admire thee, if those talents, by becoming beneficial to their
+interests, shall bring them acquainted with the name under which they
+formerly designated thy annihilated being. But the universe will not be
+disturbed by thy loss; and when thou comest to die, whilst thy wife, thy
+children, thy friends, fondly leaning over thy sickly couch, shall be
+occupied with the melancholy task of closing thine eyes, thy nearest
+neighbour shall perhaps be exulting with joy!
+
+Let not then man occupy himself with his condition that may be to come,
+but let him sedulously endeavour to make himself useful, to those with
+whom he lives; let him for his own peculiar happiness render himself
+dutiful to his parents--faithful to his wife--attentive to his
+children--kind to his relations---true to his friends--lenient to his
+servants; let him strive to become estimable in the eyes of his fellow
+citizens; let him faithfully serve a country which assures to him his
+welfare; let the desire of pleasing posterity, of meriting its applause,
+excite him to those labours that shall elicit their eulogies: let a
+legitimate self-love, when he shall be worthy of it, make him taste
+in advance those commendations which he is willing to deserve; let him
+learn to love himself--to esteem himself; but never let him consent that
+concealed vices, that sacred crimes, shall degrade him in his own eyes;
+shall oblige him to be ashamed of his own conduct.
+
+Thus disposed, let him contemplate his own decease with the same
+indifference, that it will be looked upon by the greater number of his
+fellows; let him expect death with constancy; wait for it with calm
+resignation; let him learn to shake off those vain terrors with which
+superstition, would overwhelm him; let him leave to the enthusiast his
+vague hopes; to the fanatic his mad-brained speculations; to the bigot
+those fears with which he ministers to his own melancholy; but let his
+heart, fortified by reason, corroborated by a love of virtue, no longer
+dread a dissolution that will destroy all feeling.
+
+Whatever may be the attachment man has to life, whatever may be his
+fear of death, it is every day witnessed, that habit, that opinion,
+that prejudice, are motives sufficiently powerful to annihilate these
+passions in his breast; to make him brave danger; to cause him to hazard
+his existence. Ambition, pride, jealousy, love, vanity, avarice, the
+desire of glory, that deference of opinion which is decorated with the
+sounding title of _a point of honour_, have the efficacy to make him
+shut his eyes to danger; to laugh at peril; to push him on to death:
+vexation, anxiety of mind, disgrace, want of success, softens to him
+its hard features; makes him regard it as a door that will afford him
+shelter from the injustice of mankind: indigence, trouble, adversity,
+familiarizes him with this death, so terrible to the happy. The poor
+man, condemned to labour, inured to privations, deprived of the comforts
+of life, views its approach with indifference: the unfortunate, when
+he is unhappy, when he is without resource, embraces it in despair; the
+wretched accelerates its march as soon as he sees that happiness is no
+longer within his grasp.
+
+Man in different ages, in different countries, has formed opinions
+extremely various upon the conduct of those, who have had the temerity
+to put an end to their own existence. His ideas upon this subject, as
+upon all others, have taken their tone from his religion, have been
+governed by his superstitious systems, have been modified by his
+political institutions. The Greeks, the Romans, and other nations, which
+every thing conspired to make intrepid, to render courageous, to lead
+to magnanimity, regarded as heroes, contemplated as Gods, those who
+voluntarily cut the thread of life. In Hindoostan, the Brahmin yet knows
+how to inspire even women with sufficient fortitude to burn themselves
+upon the dead bodies of their husbands. The Japanese, upon the most
+trifling occasion, takes no kind of difficulty in plunging a dagger into
+his bosom.
+
+Among the people of our own country, religion renders man less prodigal
+of life; it teaches that it is offensive to the Deity that he should
+destroy himself. Some moralists, abstracting the height of religious
+ideas, have held that it is never permitted to man to break the
+conditions of the covenant that he has made with society. Others
+have looked upon suicide as cowardice; they have thought that it was
+weakness, that it displayed pusillanimity, to suffer, himself to be
+overwhelmed with the shafts of his destiny; and have held that there
+would be much more courage, more elevation of soul, in supporting his
+afflictions, in resisting the blows of fate.
+
+If nature be consulted upon this point, it will be found that all the
+actions of man, that feeble plaything in the hands of necessity, are
+indispensable; that they depend on causes which move him in despite of
+himself--that without his knowledge, make him accomplish at each moment
+of his existence some one of its decrees. If the same power that obliges
+all intelligent beings to cherish their existence, renders that of
+man so painful, so cruel, that he finds it insupportable he quits his
+species; order is destroyed for him, he accomplishes a decree of Nature,
+that wills he shall no longer exist. This Nature has laboured during
+thousands of years, to form in the bowels of the earth the iron that
+must number his days.
+
+If the relation of man with Nature be examined, it will be found that
+his engagement was neither voluntary on his part, nor reciprocal on the
+part of Nature. The volition of his will had no share in his birth;
+it is commonly against his will that he is obliged to finish life; his
+actions are, as we have proved, only the necessary effects of unknown
+causes which determine his will. He is, in the hands of Nature, that
+which a sword is in his own hands; he can fall upon it without its being
+able to accuse him with breaking his engagements; or of stamping with
+ingratitude the hand that holds it: man can only love his existence on
+condition of being happy; as soon as the entire of nature refuses him
+this happiness; as soon as all that surrounds him becomes incommodious
+to him, as soon as his melancholy ideas offer nothing but afflicting
+pictures to his imagination; he already exists no longer; he is
+suspended in the void; he quits a rank which no longer suits him; in
+which he finds no one interest; which offers him no protection; which
+overwhelms him with calamity; in which he can no more be useful either
+to himself or to others.
+
+If the covenant which unites man to society be considered, it will be
+obvious that every contract is conditional, must be reciprocal; that is
+to say, supposes mutual advantages between the contracting parties. The
+citizen cannot be bound to his country, to his associates, but by the
+bonds of happiness. Are these bonds cut asunder? He is restored to
+liberty. Society, or those who represent it, do they use him with
+harshness, do they treat him with injustice, do they render his
+existence painful? Does disgrace hold him out to the finger of scorn;
+does indigence menace him in an obdurate world? Perfidious friends, do
+they forsake him in adversity? An unfaithful wife, does she outrage his
+heart? Rebellious, ungrateful children, do they afflict his old age?
+Has he placed his happiness exclusively on some object which it is
+impossible for him to procure? Chagrin, remorse, melancholy, and
+despair, have they disfigured to him the spectacle of the universe? In
+short, for whatever cause it may be: if he is not able to support
+his evils, he quits a world, which from henceforth, is for him only a
+frightful desert he removes himself for ever from a country he thinks
+no longer willing to reckon him amongst the number of her children--he
+quits a house that to his mind is ready to bury him under its ruins--he
+renounces a society, to the happiness of which he can no longer
+contribute; which his own peculiar felicity alone can render dear to
+him: and could the man be blamed, who, finding himself useless; who
+being without resources, in the town where destiny gave him birth,
+should quit it in chagrin, to plunge himself in solitude? Death appears
+to the wretched the only remedy for despair; it is then the sword seems
+the only friend, the only comfort that is left to the unhappy: as long
+as hope remains the tenant of his bosom--as long as his evils appear to
+him at all supportable--as long as he flatters himself with seeing them
+brought to a termination--as long as he finds some comfort in existence,
+however slender, he will not consent to deprive himself of life: but
+when nothing any longer sustains in him the love of this existence, then
+to live, is to him the greatest of evils; to die, the only mode by which
+he can avoid the excess of despair. This has been the opinion of many
+great men: Seneca, the moralist, whom Lactantius calls the divine Pagan,
+who has been praised equally by St. Austin and St. Augustine, endeavours
+by every kind of argument to make death a matter of indifference to man.
+Cato has always been commended, because he would not survive the cause
+of liberty; for that he would not live a slave. Curtius, who rode
+voluntarily into the gap, to save his country, has always been held
+forth as a model of heroic virtue. Is it not evident, that those martyrs
+who have delivered themselves up to punishment, have preferred quitting
+the world to living in it contrary to their own ideals of happiness?
+When Samson wished to be revenged on the Philistines, did he not consent
+to die with them as the only means? If our country is attacked, do we
+not voluntarily sacrifice our lives in its defence?
+
+That society who has not the ability, or who is not willing to procure
+man any one benefit, loses all its rights over him; Nature, when it has
+rendered his existence completely miserable, has in fact, ordered him to
+quit it: in dying he does no more than fulfil one of her decrees, as
+he did when he first drew his breath. To him who is fearless of death,
+there is no evil without a remedy; for him who refuses to die, there
+yet exists benefits which attach him to the world; in this case let him
+rally his powers--let him oppose courage to a destiny that oppresses
+him--let him call forth those resources with which Nature yet furnishes
+him; she cannot have totally abandoned him, while she yet leaves him the
+sensation of pleasure; the hopes of seeing a period to his pains.
+
+Man regulates his judgment on his fellows, only by his own peculiar
+mode of feeling; he deems as folly, he calls delirium all those violent
+actions which he believes but little commensurate with their causes; or
+which appear to him calculated to deprive him of that happiness, towards
+which he supposes a being in the enjoyment of his senses, cannot cease
+to have a tendency: he treats his associate as a weak creature, when he
+sees him affected with that which touches him but lightly; or when he is
+incapable of supporting those evils, which his self-love flatters him,
+he would himself be able to endure with more fortitude. He accuses with
+madness whoever deprives himself of life, for objects that he thinks
+unworthy so dear a sacrifice; he taxes him with phrenzy, because he has
+himself learned to regard this life as the greatest blessing. It is
+thus that he always erects himself into a judge of the happiness of
+others--of their mode of seeing--of their manner of feeling: a miser who
+destroys himself after the loss of his treasure, appears a fool in
+the eyes of him who is less attached to riches; he does not feel, that
+without money, life to this miser is only a continued torture; that
+nothing in the world is capable of diverting him from his painful
+sensations: he will proudly tell you, that in his place he had not done
+so much; but to be exactly in the place of another man, it is needful to
+have his organization--his temperament--his passions--his ideas; it
+is in fact needful to be that other; to be placed exactly in the same
+circumstances; to be moved by the same causes; and in this case all men,
+like the miser, would sacrifice their life, after being deprived of the
+only source of their happiness.
+
+He who deprives himself of his existence, does not adopt this extremity,
+so repugnant to his natural tendency; but when nothing in this world has
+the faculty of rejoicing him; when no means are left of diverting his
+affliction; when reason no longer acts; his misfortune whatever it may
+be, for him is real; his organization, be it strong, or be it weak, is
+his own, not that of another: a man who is sick only in imagination,
+really suffers considerably; even troublesome dreams place him in a very
+uncomfortable situation. Thus when a man kills himself, it ought to be
+concluded, that life, in the room of being a benefit, had become a very
+great evil to him; that existence had lost all its charms in his eyes;
+that the entire of nature was to him destitute of attraction; that it
+no longer contained any thing that could seduce him; that after the
+comparison which his disturbed imagination had made of existence with
+non-existence, the latter appeared to him preferable to the first.
+
+Many will consider these maxims as dangerous; they certainly account why
+the unhappy cut the thread of life, in a manner not corresponding with
+the received prejudices; but, nevertheless, it is a temperament soured
+by chagrin, a bilious constitution, a melancholy habit, a defect in the
+organization, a derangement in the mind; it is in fact necessity and
+not reasonable speculations, that breed in man the design of destroying
+himself. Nothing invites him to this step so long as reason remains
+with him; or whilst he yet possesses hope, that sovereign balm for every
+evil: as for the unfortunate, who cannot lose sight of his sorrows--who
+cannot forget his pains--who has his evils always present to his
+mind; he is obliged to take counsel from these alone: besides, what
+assistance, what advantage can society promise to himself, from a
+miserable wretch reduced to despair; from a misanthrope overwhelmed
+with grief; from a wretch tormented with remorse, who has no longer
+any motive to render himself useful to others--who has abandoned
+himself--who finds no more interest in preserving his life? Frequently,
+those who destroy themselves are such, that had they lived, the offended
+laws must have ultimately been obliged to remove them from a society
+which they disgraced; from a country which they had injured.
+
+As life is commonly the greatest blessing for man, it is to be presumed
+that he who deprives himself of it, is compelled to it by an invincible
+force. It is the excess of misery, the height of despair, the
+derangement of his brain, caused by melancholy, that urges man on to
+destroy himself. Agitated by contrary impulsions, he is, as we have
+before said, obliged to follow a middle course that conducts him to his
+death; if man be not a free-agent, in any one instant of his life, he is
+again much less so in the act by which it is terminated.
+
+It will be seen then, that he who kills himself, does not, as it is
+pretended, commit an outrage on nature. He follows an impulse which
+has deprived him of reason; adopts the only means left him to quit his
+anguish; he goes out of a door which she leaves open to him; he cannot
+offend in accomplishing a law of necessity: the iron hand of this having
+broken the spring that renders life desirable to him; which urged him to
+self-conservation, shews him he ought to quit a rank or system where he
+finds himself too miserable to have the desire of remaining. His country
+or his family have no right to complain of a member, whom it has no
+means of rendering happy; from whom consequently they have nothing more
+to hope: to be useful to either, it is necessary he should cherish his
+own peculiar existence; that he should have an interest in conserving
+himself--that he should love the bonds by which he is united to
+others--that he should be capable of occupying himself with their
+felicity--that he should have a sound mind. That the suicide should
+repent of his precipitancy, he should outlive himself, he should carry
+with him into his future residence, his organs, his senses, his memory,
+his ideas, his actual mode of existing, his determinate manner of
+thinking.
+
+In short, nothing is more useful for society, than to inspire man with
+a contempt for death; to banish from his mind the false ideas he has of
+its consequences. The fear of death can never do more than make
+cowards; the fear of its consequences will make nothing but fanatics
+or melancholy beings, who are useless to themselves, unprofitable to
+others. Death is a resource that ought not by any means to be taken away
+from oppressed virtue; which the injustice of man frequently reduces
+to despair. If man feared death less, he would neither be a slave nor
+superstitious; truth would find defenders more zealous; the rights of
+mankind would be more hardily sustained; virtue would be intrepidly
+upheld: error would be more powerfully opposed; tyranny would be
+banished from nations: cowardice nourishes it, fear perpetuates it. In
+fact, _man can neither be contented nor happy whilst his opinions shall
+oblige him to tremble_.
+
+
+
+
+
+CHAP. XV.
+
+_Of Man's true Interest, or of the Ideas he forms to himself of
+Happiness.--Man cannot be happy without Virtue._
+
+
+Utility, as has been before observed, ought to be the only standard of
+the judgment of man. To be useful, is to contribute to the happiness
+of his fellow creatures; to be prejudicial, is to further their
+misery. This granted, let us examine if the principles we have hitherto
+established be prejudicial or advantageous, useful or useless, to the
+human race. If man unceasingly seeks after his happiness, he can only
+approve of that which procures for him his object, or furnishes him the
+means by which it is to be obtained.
+
+What has been already said will serve in fixing our ideas upon what
+constitutes this happiness: it has been already shewn that it is only
+continued pleasure: but in order that an object may please, it is
+necessary that the impressions it makes, the perceptions it gives,
+the ideas which it leaves, in short, that the motion it excites in man
+should be analogous to his organization; conformable to his temperament;
+assimilated to his individual nature:--modified as it is by habit,
+determined as it is by an infinity of circumstances, it is necessary
+that the action of the object by which he is moved, or of which the idea
+remains with him, far from enfeebling him, far from annihilating his
+feelings, should tend to strengthen him; it is necessary, that without
+fatiguing his mind, exhausting his faculties, or deranging his organs,
+this object should impart to his machine that degree of activity for
+which it continually has occasion. What is the object that unites
+all these qualities? Where is the man whose organs are susceptible
+of continual agitation without being fatigued; without experiencing a
+painful sensation; without sinking? Man is always willing to be warned
+of his existence in the most lively manner, as long as he can be so
+without pain. What do I say? He consents frequently to suffer, rather
+than not feel. He accustoms himself to a thousand things which at first
+must have affected him in a disagreeable manner; but which frequently
+end either by converting themselves into wants, or by no longer
+affecting him any way: of this truth tobacco, coffee, and above all
+brandy furnish examples: this is the reason he runs to see tragedies;
+that he witnesses the execution of criminals. In short, the desire
+of feeling, of being powerfully moved, appears to be the principle of
+curiosity; of that avidity with which man seizes on the marvellous;
+of that earnestness with which he clings to the supernatural; of the
+disposition he evinces for the incomprehensible. Where, indeed, can
+he always find objects in nature capable of continually supplying
+the stimulus requisite to keep him in activity, that shall be ever
+proportioned to the state of his own organization; which his extreme
+mobility renders subject to perpetual variation? The most lively
+pleasures are always the least durable, seeing they are those which
+exhaust him most.
+
+That man should be uninterruptedly happy, it would be requisite that his
+powers were infinite; it would require that to his mobility he joined
+a vigor, attached a solidity, which nothing could change; or else it is
+necessary that the objects from which he receives impulse, should either
+acquire or lose properties, according to the different states through
+which his machine is successively obliged to pass; it would need that
+the essences of beings should be changed in the same proportion as
+his dispositions; should be submitted to the continual influence of a
+thousand causes, which modify him without his knowledge, and in despite
+of himself. If, at each moment, his machine undergoes changes more
+or less marked, which are ascribable to the different degrees of
+elasticity, of density, of serenity of the atmosphere; to the portion
+of igneous fluid circulating through his blood; to the harmony of his
+organs; to the order that exists between the various parts of his body;
+if, at every period of his existence, his nerves have not the same
+tensions, his fibres the same elasticity, his mind the same activity,
+his imagination the same ardour, &c. it is evident that the same causes
+in preserving to him only the same qualities, cannot always affect him
+in the same manner. Here is the reason why those objects that please
+him in one season displease him in another: these objects have not
+themselves sensibly changed; but his organs, his dispositions, his
+ideas, his mode of seeing, his manner of feeling, have changed:--such is
+the source of man's inconstancy.
+
+If the same objects are not constantly in that state competent to form
+the happiness of the same individual, it is easy to perceive that they
+are yet less in a capacity to please all men; or that the same happiness
+cannot be suitable to all. Beings already various by their temperament,
+unlike in their faculties, diversified in their organization, different
+in their imagination, dissimilar in their ideas, of distinct opinions,
+of contrary habits, which an infinity of circumstances, whether physical
+or moral, have variously modified, must necessarily form very different
+notions of happiness. Those of a MISER cannot be the same as those of
+a PRODIGAL; those of a VOLUPTUARY, the same as those of one who is
+PHLEGMATIC; those of an intemperate, the same as those of a rational
+man, who husbands his health. The happiness of each, is in consequence
+composed of his natural organization, and of those circumstances, of
+those habits, of those ideas, whether true or false, that have modified
+him: this organization and these circumstances, never being the same
+in any two men, it follows, that what is the object of one man's views,
+must be indifferent, or even displeasing to another; thus, as we
+have before said, no one can be capable of judging of that which may
+contribute to the felicity of his fellow man.
+
+_Interest_ is the object to which each individual according to his
+temperament and his own peculiar ideas, attaches his welfare; from which
+it will be perceived that this interest is never more than that which
+each contemplates as necessary to his happiness. It must, therefore, be
+concluded, that no man is totally without interest. That of the miser to
+amass wealth; that of the prodigal to dissipate it: the interest of the
+ambitious is to obtain power; that of the modest philosopher to enjoy
+tranquillity; the interest of the debauchee is to give himself up,
+without reserve, to all sorts of pleasure; that of the prudent man, to
+abstain from those which may injure him: the interest of the wicked is
+to gratify his passions at any price: that of the virtuous to merit
+by his conduct the love, to elicit by his actions the approbation of
+others; to do nothing that can degrade himself in his own eyes.
+
+Thus, when it is said that _Interest is the only motive of human
+actions;_ it is meant to indicate that each man labours after his own
+manner, to his own peculiar happiness; that he places it in some object
+either visible or concealed; either real or imaginary; that the whole
+system of his conduct is directed to its attainment. This granted, no
+man can be called disinterested; this appellation is only applied to
+those of whose motives we are ignorant; or whose interest we approve.
+Thus the man who finds a greater pleasure in assisting his friends in
+misfortune than preserving in his coffers useless treasure, is called
+generous, faithful, and disinterested; in like manner all men are
+denominated disinterested, who feel their glory far more precious than
+their fortune. In short, all men are designated disinterested who place
+their happiness in making sacrifices which man considers costly, because
+he does not attach the same value to the object for which the sacrifice
+is made.
+
+Man frequently judges very erroneously of the interest of others, either
+because the motives that animate them are too complicated for him to
+unravel; or because to be enabled to judge of them fairly, it is needful
+to have the same eyes, the same organs the same passions, the same
+opinions: nevertheless, obliged to form his judgment of the actions
+of mankind, by their effect on himself, he approves the interest that
+actuates them whenever the result is advantageous for his species:
+thus, he admires valour, generosity, the love of liberty, great talents,
+virtue, &c. he then only approves of the objects in which the beings
+he applauds have placed their happiness; he approves these dispositions
+even when he is not in a capacity to feel their effects; but in this
+judgment he is not himself disinterested; experience, reflection, habit,
+reason, have given him a taste for morals, and he finds as much pleasure
+in being witness to a great and generous action, as the man of _virtu_
+finds in the sight of a fine picture of which he is not the proprietor.
+He who has formed to himself a habit of practising virtue, is a man who
+has unceasingly before his eyes the interest that he has in meriting
+the affection, in deserving the esteem, in securing the assistance of
+others, as well as to love and esteem himself: impressed with these
+ideas which have become habitual to him, he abstains even from concealed
+crimes, since these would degrade him in his own eyes: he resembles a
+man who having from his infancy contracted the habit of cleanliness,
+would be painfully affected at seeing himself dirty, even when no one
+should witness it. The honest man is he to whom truth has shewn his
+interest or his happiness in a mode of acting that others are obliged
+to love, are under the necessity to approve for their own peculiar
+interest.
+
+These principles, duly developed, are the true basis of morals; nothing
+is more chimerical than those which are founded upon imaginary motives
+placed out of nature; or upon innate sentiments; which some speculators
+have regarded as anterior to man's experience; as wholly independant of
+those advantages which result to him from its use: it is the essence of
+man to love himself; to tend to his own conservation; to seek to render
+his existence happy: thus interest, or the desire of happiness, is the
+only real motive of all his actions; this interest depends upon his
+natural organization, rests itself upon his wants, is bottomed upon his
+acquired ideas, springs from the habits he has contracted: he is without
+doubt in error, when either a vitiated organization or false opinions
+shew him his welfare in objects either useless or injurious to himself,
+as well as to others; he marches steadily in the paths of virtue when
+true ideas have made him rest his happiness on a conduct useful to
+his species; in that which is approved by others; which renders him an
+interesting object to his associates. _Morals_ would be a vain science
+if it did not incontestibly prove to man that _his interest consists in
+being virtuous._ Obligation of whatever kind, can only be founded upon
+the probability or the certitude of either obtaining a good or avoiding
+an evil.
+
+Indeed, in no one instant of his duration, can a sensible, an
+intelligent being, either lose sight of his own preservation or forget
+his own welfare; he owes happiness to himself; but experience quickly
+proves to him, that bereaved of assistance, quite alone, left entirely
+to himself, he cannot procure all those objects which are requisite to
+his felicity: he lives with sensible, with intelligent beings, occupied
+like himself with their own peculiar happiness; but capable of assisting
+him, in obtaining those objects he most desires; he discovers that these
+beings will not be favorable to his views, but when they find their
+interest involved; from which he concludes, that his own happiness
+demands, that his own wants render it necessary he should conduct
+himself at all times in a manner suitable to conciliate the attachment,
+to obtain the approbation, to elicit the esteem, to secure the
+assistance of those beings who are most capacitated to further his
+designs. He perceives, that it is man who is most necessary to the
+welfare of man: that to induce him to join in his interests, he ought to
+make him find real advantages in recording his projects: but to procure
+real advantages to the beings of the human species, is to have virtue;
+the reasonable man, therefore, is obliged to feel that it is his
+interest to be virtuous. _Virtue is only the art of rendering
+himself happy, by the felicity of others_. The virtuous man is he who
+communicates happiness to those beings who are capable of rendering his
+own condition happy; who are necessary to his conservation; who have the
+ability to procure him a felicitous existence.
+
+Such, then, is the true foundation of all morals; merit and virtue are
+founded upon the nature of man; have their dependance upon his wants. It
+is virtue alone that can render him truly happy: without virtue society
+can neither be useful nor indeed subsist; it can only have real utility
+when it assembles beings animated with the desire of pleasing each
+other, and disposed to labour to their reciprocal advantage: there
+exists no comfort in those families whose members are not in the
+happy disposition to lend each other mutual succours; who have not a
+reciprocity of feeling that stimulates them to assist one another; that
+induces them to cling to each other, to support the sorrows of life;
+to unite their efforts, to put away those evils to which nature has
+subjected them; the conjugal bonds, are sweet only in proportion as they
+identify the interest of two beings, united by the want of legitimate
+pleasure; from whence results the maintenance of political society, and
+the means of furnishing it with citizens. Friendship has charms only
+when it more particularly associates two virtuous beings; that is to
+say, animated with the sincere desire of conspiring to their reciprocal
+happiness. In short, it is only by displaying virtue, that man can merit
+the benevolence, can win the confidence, can gain the esteem, of all
+those with whom he has relation; in a word, no man can be independently
+happy.
+
+Indeed, the happiness of each human individual depends on those
+sentiments to which he gives birth, on those feelings which he nourishes
+in the beings amongst whom his destiny has placed him; grandeur may
+dazzle them; power may wrest from them an involuntary homage; force may
+compel an unwilling obedience; opulence may seduce mean, may attract
+venal souls; but it is humanity, it is benevolence, it is compassion, it
+is equity, that unassisted by these, can without efforts obtain for
+him, from those by whom he is surrounded, those delicious sentiments of
+attachments, those soothing feelings of tenderness, those sweet ideas of
+esteem, of which all reasonable men feel the necessity. To be virtuous
+then, is to place his interest in that which accords with the interest
+of others; it is to enjoy those benefits, to partake of that pleasure
+which he himself diffuses over his fellows. He whom, his nature, his
+education, his reflections, his habits, have rendered susceptible of
+these dispositions, and to whom his circumstances have given him the
+faculty of gratifying them, becomes an interesting object to all those
+who approach him: he enjoys every instant, he reads with satisfaction
+the contentment, he contemplates with pleasure the joy which he has
+diffused over all countenances: his wife, his children, his friends, his
+servants greet him with gay, serene faces, indicative of that content,
+harbingers of that peace, which he recognizes for his own work: every
+thing that environs him is ready to partake his pleasures; to share
+his pains; cherished, respected, looked up to by others, every thing
+conducts him to agreeable reflections; he knows the rights he has
+acquired over their hearts; he applauds himself for being the source
+of a felicity that captivates all the world; his own condition, his
+sentiments of self-love, become an hundred times more delicious when he
+sees them participated by all those with whom his destiny has connected
+him. The habit of virtue creates for him no wants but those which virtue
+itself suffices to satisfy; it is thus that _virtue is always its own
+peculiar reward_, that it remunerates itself with all the advantages
+which it incessantly procures for others.
+
+It will be said, and perhaps even proved, that under the present
+constitution of things, virtue far from procuring the welfare of those
+who practice it frequently plunges man into misfortune; often places
+continual obstacles to his felicity; that almost every where it is
+without recompence. What do I say? A thousand examples could be adduced
+as evidence, that in almost every country it is hated, persecuted,
+obliged to lament the ingratitude of human nature. I reply with avowing,
+that by a necessary consequence of the errors of his race, virtue
+rarely conducts man to those objects in which the uninformed make their
+happiness consist. The greater number of societies, too frequently ruled
+by those whose ignorance makes them abuse their power,--whose prejudices
+render them enemies of virtue,--who flattered by sycophants, secure in
+the impunity their actions enjoy, commonly lavish their esteem, bestow
+their kindness, on none but the most unworthy objects; reward only the
+most frivolous, recompence none but the most prejudicial qualities; and
+hardly ever accord that justice to merit which is unquestionably its
+due. But the truly honest man, is neither ambitious of renumeration, nor
+sedulous of the suffrages of a society thus badly constituted: contented
+with domestic happiness, he seeks not to augment relations, which would
+do no more than increase his danger; he knows that a vitiated community
+is a whirlwind, with which an honest man cannot co-order himself: he
+therefore steps aside; quits the beaten path, by continuing in which he
+would infallibly be crushed. He does all the good of which he is capable
+in his sphere; he leaves the road free to the wicked, who are willing
+to wade through its mire; he laments the heavy strokes they inflict on
+themselves; he applauds mediocrity that affords him security: he pities
+those nations made miserable by their errors,--rendered unhappy by those
+passions which are the fatal but necessary consequence; he sees they
+contain nothing but wretched citizens, who far from cultivating their
+true interest, far from labouring to their mutual felicity, far from
+feeling the real value of virtue, unconscious how dear it ought to be
+to them, do nothing but either openly attack, or secretly injure it;
+in short, who detests a quality which would restrain their disorderly
+propensities.
+
+In saying that virtue is its own peculiar reward, it is simply meant to
+announce, that in a society whose views were guided by truth, trained
+by experience, conducted by reason, each individual would be acquainted
+with his real interests; would understand the true end of association;
+would have sound motives to perform his duties; find real advantages in
+fulfilling them; in fact, it would be convinced, that to render himself
+solidly happy, he should occupy his actions with the welfare of his
+fellows; by their utility merit their esteem, elicit their kindness, and
+secure their assistance. In a well-constituted society, the government,
+the laws, education, example, would all conspire to prove to the
+citizen, that the nation of which he forms a part, is a whole that
+cannot be happy, that cannot subsist without virtue; experience would,
+at each step, convince him that the welfare of its parts can only result
+from that of the whole body corporate; justice would make him feel, that
+no society, can be advantageous to its members, where the volition of
+wills in those who act, is not so conformable to the interests of the
+whole, as to produce an advantageous re-action.
+
+But, alas! by the confusion which the errors of man have carried into
+his ideas: virtue disgraced, banished, and persecuted, finds not one
+of those advantages it has a right to expect: man is indeed shewn those
+rewards for it in a future life, of which he is almost always deprived
+in his actual existence. It is thought necessary to deceive, considered
+proper to seduce, right to intimidate him, in order to induce him to
+follow that virtue which every thing renders incommodious to him; he
+is fed with distant hopes, in order to solicit him to practice virtue,
+while contemplation of the world makes it hateful to him; he is
+alarmed by remote terrors, to deter him from committing evil, which his
+associates paint as amiable; which all conspires to render necessary.
+It is thus that politics, thus that superstition, by the formation of
+chimeras, by the creation of fictitious interests pretend to supply
+those true, those real motives which nature furnishes,--which
+experience would point out,--which an enlightened government should
+hold forth,--which the law ought to enforce,--which instruction should
+sanction,--which example should encourage,-which rational opinions would
+render pleasant. Man, blinded by his passions, not less dangerous than
+necessary, led away by precedent, authorised by custom, enslaved by
+habit, pays no attention to these uncertain promises, is regardless of
+the menaces held out; the actual interests of his immediate pleasures,
+the force of his passions, the inveteracy of his habits, always rise
+superior to the distant interests pointed out in his future welfare,
+or the remote evils with which he is threatened; which always appear
+doubtful, whenever he compares them with present advantages.
+
+Thus _superstition, far from making man virtuous by principle, does
+nothing more than impose upon him a yoke as severe as it is useless_; it
+is borne by none but enthusiasts, or by the pusillanimous; who, without
+becoming better, tremblingly champ the feeble bit put into their mouth;
+who are either rendered unhappy by their opinions, or dangerous by their
+tenets; indeed, experience, that faithful monitor, incontestibly
+proves, that superstition is a dyke inadequate to resist the torrent
+of corruption, to which so many accumulated causes give an irresistible
+force: nay more, does not this superstition itself augment the public
+disorder, by the dangerous passions which it lets loose, by the conduct
+which it sanctions, by the actions which it consecrates? Virtue, in
+almost every climate, is confined to some few rational souls, who have
+sufficient strength of mind to resist the stream of prejudice; who are
+contented by remunerating themselves with the benefits they difuse over
+society: whose temperate dispositions are gratified with the suffrages
+of a small number of virtuous approvers; in short, who are detached
+from those frivolous advantages which the injustice of society but too
+commonly accords only to baseness, which it rarely bestows, except to
+intrigue, with which in general it rewards nothing but crime.
+
+In despite of the injustice that reigns in the world, there are,
+however, some virtuous men in the bosom even of the most degenerate
+nations; notwithstanding the general depravity, there are some
+benevolent beings, still enamoured of virtue; who are fully acquainted
+with its true value; who are sufficiently enlightened to know that
+it exacts homage even from its enemies; who to use the language of
+ECCLESIASTES, "_rejoice in their own works_;" who are, at least, happy in
+possessing contented minds, who are satisfied with concealed pleasures,
+those internal recompences of which no earthly power is competent to
+deprive them. The honest man acquires a right to the esteem, has a just
+claim to the veneration, wins the confidence, gains the love, even of
+those whose conduct is exposed by a contrast with his own. In short,
+vice is obliged to cede to virtue; of which it blushingly, though
+unwillingly, acknowledges the superiority. Independent of this
+ascendancy so gentle, of this superiority so grand, of this pre-eminence
+so infallible, when even the whole universe should be unjust to him,
+when even every tongue should cover him with venom, when even every arm
+should menace him with hostility, there yet remains to the honest man
+the sublime advantage of loving his own conduct; the ineffable pleasure
+of esteeming himself; the unalloyed gratification of diving with
+satisfaction into the recesses of his own heart; the tranquil delight
+of contemplating his own actions with that delicious complacency that
+others ought to do, if they were not hood-winked, No power is adequate
+to ravish from him the merited esteem of himself; no authority is
+sufficiently potent to give it to him when he deserves it not; the
+mightiest monarch cannot lend stability to this esteem, when it is
+not well founded; it is then a ridiculous sentiment: it ought to be
+considered, it really is "_vanity and vexation of spirit_," it is
+not wisdom, but folly in the extreme; it ought to be censured when it
+displays itself in a mode that is mortifying to its neighbour, in a
+manner that is troublesome to others; it is then called ARROGANCE; it
+is called VANITY; but when it cannot be condemned, when it is known for
+legitimate when it is discovered to have a solid foundation, when it
+bottoms itself upon talents, when it rises upon great actions that are
+useful to the community, when it erects its edifice upon virtue; even
+though society should not set these merits at their just price, it is
+NOBLE PRIDE, ELEVATION OF MIND, and GRANDEUR OF SOUL.
+
+Of what consequence then, is it to listen to those superstitious beings,
+those enemies to man's happiness, who have been desirous of destroying
+it, even in the inmost recesses of his heart; who have prescribed to him
+hatred of his follower; who have filled him with contempt for himself;
+who pretend to wrest from the honest man that self-respect which is
+frequently the only reward that remains to virtue, in a perverse world.
+To annihilate in him this sentiment, so full in justice, this love
+of himself, is to break the most powerful spring, to weaken the most
+efficacious stimulus, that urges him to act right; that spurs him on to
+do good to his fellow mortals. What motive, indeed, except it be this,
+remains for him in the greater part of human societies? Is not
+virtue discouraged? Is not honesty contemned? Is not audacious crime
+encouraged? Is not subtle intrigue eulogized? Is not cunning vice
+rewarded? Is not love of the public weal taxed as folly; exactitude in
+fulfilling duties looked upon as a bubble? Is not compassion laughed
+to scorn? ARE NOT TRAITORS DISTINGUISHED BY PUBLIC HONORS? Is not
+negligence of morals applauded,--sensibility derided,--tenderness
+scoffed,--conjugal fidelity jeered,--sincerity despised,--enviolable
+friendship treated with ridicule: while seduction, adultery,
+hard-heartedness, punic faith, avarice, and fraud, stalk forth
+unabashed, decked in gorgeous array, lauded by the world? Man must have
+motives for action: he neither acts well nor ill, but with a view to his
+own happiness: that which he judges will conduce to this "_consummation
+so devoutly to be wished_," he thinks his interest; he does nothing
+gratuitously; when reward for useful actions is withheld from him, he is
+reduced either to become as abandoned as others, or else to remunerate
+himself with his own applause.
+
+This granted; the honest man can never be completely unhappy; he can
+never be entirely deprived of the recompence which is his due; virtue is
+competent to repay him for all the benefits he may bestow on others;
+can amply make up to him all the happiness denied him by public opinion;
+_but nothing can compensate to him the want of virtue_. It does not
+follow that the honest man will be exempted from afflictions: like, the
+wicked, he is subject to physical evils; he may pine in indigence; he
+may be deprived of friendship; he may be worn down with disease; he may
+frequently be the subject of calumny; he may be the victim to injustice;
+he may be treated with ingratitude; he may be exposed to hatred; but in
+the midst of all his misfortunes, in the very bosom of his sorrows,
+in the extremity of his vexation, he finds support in himself; he is
+contented with his own conduct; he respects himself; he feels his own
+dignity; he knows the equity of his rights; he consoles himself with
+the confidence inspired by the justness of his cause; he cheers himself
+amidst the most sullen circumstances. These supports are not calculated
+for the wicked; they avail him nothing: equally liable with the honest
+man to infirmities, equally submitted to the caprices of his destiny,
+equally the sport of a fluctuating world, he finds the recesses of his
+own heart filled with dreadful alarms; diseased with care; cankered
+with solitude; corroded with regret; gnawed by remorse; he dies within
+himself; his conscience sustains him not but loads him with reproach;
+his mind, overwhelmed, sinks beneath its own turpitude; his reflection
+is the bitter dregs of hemlock; maddening anguish holds him to the
+mirror that shews him his own deformity; that recalls unhallowed deeds;
+gloomy thoughts rush on his too faithful memory; despondence benumbs
+him; his body, simultaneously assailed on all sides, bends under the
+storm of--his own unruly passions; at last despair grapples him to her
+filthy bosom, he flies from himself. The honest man is not an insensible
+Stoic; virtue does not procure impassibility; honesty gives no exemption
+from misfortune, but it enables him to bear cheerly up against it; to
+cast off despair, to keep his own company: if he is infirm, if he is
+worn with disease, he has less to complain of than the vicious being
+who is oppressed with sickness, who is enfeebled by years; if he is
+indigent, he is less unhappy in his poverty; if he is in disgrace, he
+can endure it with fortitude, he is not overwhelmed by its pressure,
+like the wretched slave to crime.
+
+Thus the happiness of each individual depends on the cultivation of his
+temperament; nature makes both the happy and the unhappy; it is culture
+that gives value to the soil nature has formed; it is instruction that
+makes the fruit it produces palatable; It is reflection that makes it
+useful. For man to be happily born, is to have received from nature a
+sound body, organs that act with precision--a just mind, a heart
+whose passions are analogous, whose desires are conformable to the
+circumstances in which his destiny has placed him: nature, then, has
+done every thing for him, when she has joined to these faculties the
+quantum of vigour, the portion of energy, sufficient to enable him to
+obtain those Proper things, which his station, his mode of thinking,
+his temperament, have rendered desirable. Nature has made him a fatal
+present, when she has filled his sanguinary vessels with an over-heated
+fluid; when she has given him an imagination too active; when she has
+infused into him desires too impetuous; when he has a hankering
+after objects either impossible or improper to be obtained under
+his circumstances; or which at least he cannot procure without those
+incredible efforts, that either place his own welfare in danger or
+disturb the repose of society. The most happy man, is commonly he who
+possesses a peaceful soul; who only desires those things which he can
+procure by labour, suitable to maintain his activity; which he can
+obtain without causing those shocks, that are either too violent for
+society, or troublesome to his associates. A philosopher whose wants are
+easily satisfied, who is a stranger, to ambition, who is contented with
+the limited circle of a small number of friends, is, without doubt a
+being much more happily constituted than an ambitious conqueror, whose
+greedy imagination is reduced to despair by having only one world to
+ravage. He who is happily born, or whom nature has rendered susceptible
+of being conveniently modified, is not a being injurious to society: it
+is generally disturbed by men who are unhappily born, whose organization
+renders them turbulent; who are discontented with their destiny; who are
+inebriated with their own licentious passions; who are infatuated with
+their own vile schemes; who are smitten with difficult enterprises; who
+set the world in combustion, to gather imaginary benefits in order to
+attain which they must inflict he heaviest curses on mankind, but in
+which they make their own happiness consist. An ALEXANDER requires the
+destruction of empires, nations to be deluged with blood, cities to
+be laid in ashes, its inhabitants to be exterminated, to content that
+passion for glory, of which he has formed to himself a false idea;
+but which his too ardent imagination, his too vehement mind anxiously
+thirsts after: for a DIOGENES there needs only a tub with the liberty
+of appearing whimsical; a SOCRATES wants nothing but the pleasure of
+forming disciples to virtue.
+
+Man by his organization is a being to whom motion is always necessary;
+he must therefore always desire it: this is the reason why too much
+facility In procuring the objects of his search, renders them quickly
+insipid. To feel happiness, it is necessary to make efforts to obtain
+it; to find charms in its enjoyment, it is necessary that the desire
+should be whetted by obstacles; he is presently disgusted with those
+benefits which have cost him but little pains. The expectation of
+happiness, the labour requisite to procure it, the varied prospects it
+holds forth, the multiplied pictures which his imagination forms to him,
+supply his brain with that motion for which it has occasion; this gives
+impulse to his organs, puts his whole machine into activity, exercises
+his faculties, sets all his springs in play, in a word, puts him
+into that agreeable activity, for the want of which the enjoyment of
+happiness itself cannot compensate him. Action is the true element of
+the human mind; as soon as it ceases to act, it falls into disgust,
+sinks into lassitude. His soul has the same occasion for ideas, his
+stomach has for aliment.
+
+Thus the impulse given him by desire, is itself a great benefit; it is
+to the mind what exercise is to the body; without it he would not derive
+any pleasure in the aliments presented to him; it is thirst that renders
+the pleasure of drinking so agreeable; life is a perpetual circle of
+regenerated desires and wants satisfied: repose is only a pleasure to
+him who labours; it is a source of weariness, the cause of sorrow,
+the spring of vice to him who has nothing to do. To enjoy without
+interruption is not to enjoy any thing: the man who has nothing to
+desire is certainly more unhappy than he who suffers.
+
+These reflections, grounded upon experience, drawn from the fountain of
+truth, ought to prove to man, that good as well as evil depends on the
+essence of things. Happiness to be felt cannot be continued. Labour
+is necessary, to make intervals between his pleasures; his body has
+occasion for exercise, to co-order him with the beings who surround him;
+his heart must have desires; trouble alone can give him the right
+relish of his welfare; it is this which puts in the shadows, this which
+furnishes the true perspective to the picture of human life. By an
+irrevocable law of his destiny, man is obliged to be discontented with
+his present condition; to make efforts to change it; to reciprocally
+envy that felicity which no individual enjoys perfectly. Thus the
+poor man envies the opulence of his richer neighbour, although this is
+frequently more unhappy than his needy maligner; thus the rich man views
+with pain the advantages of a poverty, which he sees active, healthy,
+and frequently jocund, even in the bosom of penury.
+
+If man was perfectly contented, there would no longer be any activity in
+the world; it is necessary that he should desire; it is requisite that
+he should act; it is incumbent he should labour, in order that he may
+be happy: such is the course of nature of which the life consists in
+action. Human societies can only subsist, by the continual exchange of
+those things in which man places his happiness. The poor man is obliged
+to desire, he is necessitated to labour, that he may procure what he
+knows is requisite to the preservation of his existence; the primary
+wants given to him by nature, are to nourish himself, clothe himself,
+lodge himself, and propagate his species; has he satisfied these? He
+is quickly obliged to create others entirely new; or rather, his
+imagination only refines upon the first; he seeks to diversify them; he
+is willing to give them fresh zest; arrived at opulence, when he has run
+over the whole circle of wants, when he has completely exhausted their
+combinations, he falls into disgust. Dispensed from labour, his body
+amasses humours; destitute of desires, his heart feels a languor;
+deprived of activity, he is obliged to participate his riches, with
+beings more active, more laborious than himself: these, following their
+own peculiar interests, take upon themselves the task of labouring
+for his advantage; of procuring for him means to satisfy his want;
+of ministering to his caprices, in order to remove the languor that
+oppresses him. It is thus the great, the rich excite the energies, give
+play to the activity, rouse the faculties, spur on the industry of the
+indigent; these labour to their own peculiar welfare by working for
+others: thus the desire of ameliorating his condition, renders man
+necessary to his fellow man; thus wants, always regenerating, never
+satisfied, are the principles of life,--the soul of activity,--the
+source of health,--the basis of society. If each individual was
+competent to the supply of his own exigencies, there would be no
+occasion for him to congregate in society; but it is his wants, his
+desires, his whims, that place him in a state of dependence on others:
+these are the causes that each individual, in order to further his
+own peculiar interest, is obliged to be useful to those, who have the
+capability of procuring for him the objects which he himself has not. A
+nation is nothing more than the union of a great number of individuals,
+connected with each other by the reciprocity of their wants; by their
+mutual desire of pleasure. The most happy man is he who has the fewest
+wants, and who has the most numerous means of satisfying them. The
+man who would be truly rich, has no need to increase his fortune, it
+suffices he should diminish his wants.
+
+In the individuals of the human species, as well as in political
+society, the progression of wants, is a thing absolutely necessary; it
+is founded upon the essence of man, it is requisite that the natural
+wants once satisfied, should be replaced by those which he calls
+_Imaginary, or wants of the Fancy:_ these become as necessary to his
+happiness as the first. Custom, which permits the native American to go
+quite naked, obliges the more civilized inhabitant of Europe to clothe
+himself; the poor man contents himself with very simple attire, which
+equally serve him for winter and for summer, for autumn and for spring;
+the rich man desires to have garments suitable to each mutation of
+these seasons; he would experience pain if he had not the convenience
+of changing his raiment with every variation of his climate; he would be
+wretched if he was obliged to wear the same habiliments in the heat of
+summer, which he uses in the winter; in short, he would be unhappy
+if the expence and variety of his costume did not display to the
+surrounding multitude his opulence, mark his rank, announce his
+superiority. It is thus habit multiplies, the wants of the wealthy; it
+is thus that vanity itself becomes a want which sets a thousand hands
+in, motion, a thousand heads to work, who are all eager to gratify its
+cravings; in short, this very vanity procures for the necessitous man,
+the means of subsisting at the expense of his opulent neighbours He
+who is accustomed to pomp, who is used to ostentatious splendour, whose
+habits are luxurious, whenever he is deprived of these insignia of
+opulence, to which he has attached the idea of happiness, finds himself
+just as unhappy as the needy wretch who has not wherewith to cover his
+nakedness. The civilized nations of the present day were in their origin
+savages composed of erratic tribes,--mere wanderers who were occupied
+with war; employed in, the chace; painfully obliged to seek precarious
+subsistence by hunting in those woods which the industry of their
+successors has cleared; which their labour has covered with yellow
+waving ears of nutritious corn; in time they have become stationary:
+they first applied themselves to Agriculture, afterwards to commerce:
+by degrees they have refined on their primitive wants, extended their
+sphere of action, given birth to a thousand new wants, imagined a
+thousand new means to satisfy them; this is the natural course, the
+necessary progression, the regular march of active beings, who cannot
+live without feeling; who to be happy, must of necessity diversify their
+sensations. In proportion as man's wants multiply the means to satisfy
+them becomes more difficult, he is obliged to depend on a greater
+number of his fellow creatures; his interest obliges him to rouse their
+activity; to engage them to concur with his views; consequently he is
+obliged to procure for them those objects by which they can be excited;
+he is under the necessity of contenting their desires, which increase
+like his own, by the very food that satisfies them. The savage
+needs only put forth his hand to gather the fruit that offers
+itself spontaneously to his reach: this he finds sufficient for his
+nourishment. The opulent citizen of a flourishing society is obliged to
+set innumerable hands to work to produce the sumptuous repast; the four
+quarters of the globe are ransacked to procure the far-fetched viands
+become necessary to revive his languid appetite; the merchant,
+the sailor, the mechanic, leave nothing unattempted to flatter his
+inordinate vanity. From this it will appear, that in the same proportion
+the wants of man are multiplied, he is obliged to augment the means to
+satisfy them. Riches are nothing more than the measure of a convention,
+by the assistance of which man is enabled to make a great number of
+his fellows concur in the gratification of his desires; by which he
+is capacitated to invite them, for their own peculiar interests, to
+contribute to his pleasures. What, in fact, does the rich man do,
+except announce to the needy, that he can furnish him with the means of
+subsistence if he consents to lend himself to his will? What does the
+man in power, except shew to others, that he is in a state to supply
+the requisites to render them happy? Sovereigns, nobles, men of wealth,
+appear to be happy, only because they possess the ability, are masters
+of the motives sufficient to determine a great number of individuals to
+occupy themselves with their respective felicity.
+
+The more things are considered the more man will be convinced that his
+false opinion are the true source of his misery; the clearer it will
+appear to him that happiness is so rare, only because he attaches it
+to objects either indifferent or useless to his welfare; which, when
+enjoyed, convert themselves into real evils; which afflict him; which
+become the cause of his misfortune.
+
+_Riches_ are indifferent in themselves, it is only by their application,
+by the purposes they compass, that they either become objects of utility
+to man, or are rendered prejudicial to his welfare.
+
+_Money_, useless to the savage who understands not its value, is amassed
+by the miser, for fear it should be employed uselessly; lest it should
+be squandered by the prodigal; or dissipated by the voluptuary; who make
+no other use of it than to purchase infirmities; to buy regret.
+
+Pleasures are nothing for the man who is incapable of feeling them;
+they become real evils when they are too freely indulged, when they
+are destructive to his health,--when they derange the economy of
+his machine,--when they entail diseases on himself and on his
+posterity,--when they make him neglect his duties,--when they render him
+despicable in the eyes of others.
+
+Power is nothing in itself, it is useless to man if he does not avail
+himself of it to promote his own peculiar felicity, by augmenting the
+happiness of his species; it becomes fatal to him as soon as he abuses
+it; it becomes odious whenever he employs it to render others miserable;
+it is always the cause of his own misery whenever he stretches it beyond
+the due bounds prescribed by nature.
+
+For want of being enlightened on his true interest, the man who enjoys
+all the means of rendering himself completely happy, scarcely ever
+discovers the secret of making those means truly subservient to his own
+peculiar felicity: the art of enjoying, is that which of all others is
+least understood; man should learn this art before he begins to desire;
+the earth is covered with individuals who only occupy themselves with
+the care of procuring the means without ever being acquainted with the
+end. All the world desire fortune, solicit power, seek after pleasure,
+yet very few, indeed, are those whom objects render truly happy.
+
+It is quite natural in man, it is extremely reasonable, it is absolutely
+necessary, to desire those things which can contribute to augment the
+sum of his felicity. _Pleasure, riches, power,_ are objects worthy his
+ambition, deserving his most strenuous efforts, when he has learned how
+to employ them; when he has acquired the faculty of making them render
+his existence really more agreeable. It is impossible to censure him who
+desires them, to despise him who commands them, but when to obtain them
+he employs odious means; or when after he has obtained them he makes a
+pernicious use of them, injurious to himself, prejudicial to others; let
+him wish for power, let him seek after grandeur, let him be ambitious
+of reputation, when he can shew just pretensions to them; when he can
+obtain them, without making the purchase at the expence of his own
+repose, or that of the beings with whom he lives: let him desire riches,
+when he knows how to make a use of them that is truly advantageous for
+himself, really beneficial for others; but never let him employ those
+means to procure them of which he may be ashamed; with which he may be
+obliged to reproach himself; which may draw upon him the hatred of his
+associates; or which may render him obnoxious to the castigation of
+society: let him always recollect, that his solid happiness should rest
+its foundations upon its own esteem,--upon the advantages he procures
+for others; above all, never let him for a moment forget, that of all
+the objects to which his ambition may point, the most impracticable for
+a being who lives in society, is that of _attempting to render himself
+exclusively happy_.
+
+
+
+
+
+CHAP. XVI
+
+_The Errors of Man,--upon what constitutes Happiness.--the true Source
+of his Evil.--Remedies that may be applied._
+
+
+Reason by no means forbids man from forming capacious desires; ambition
+is a passion useful to his species when it has for, its object the
+happiness of his race. Great minds, elevated souls, are desirous of
+acting on an extended sphere; geniuses who are powerful, beings who are
+enlightened, men who are beneficent, distribute very widely their benign
+influence; they must necessarily, in order to promote their own peculiar
+felicity, render great numbers happy. So many princes fail to enjoy true
+happiness only, because their feeble, narrow souls, are obliged to act
+in a sphere too extensive for their energies: it is thus that by the
+supineness, the indolence, the incapacity of their chiefs, nations
+frequently pine in misery; are often submitted to masters, whose
+exility of mind is as little calculated to promote their own immediate
+happiness, as it is to further that of their miserable subjects. On
+the other hand, souls too vehement, too much inflamed, too active, are
+themselves tormented by the narrow sphere that confines them; their
+ardour misplaced, becomes the scourge of the human race. Alexander was
+a monarch who was equally injurious to the earth, equally discontented
+with his condition, as the indolent despot whom he dethroned. The souls
+of neither were by any means commensurate with their sphere of action.
+
+The happiness of man will never be more than the result of the harmony
+that subsists between his desires and his circumstances. The sovereign
+power to him who knows not how to apply it to the advantage of his
+citizens, is as nothing; it cannot even conduce to his own peculiar
+happiness. If it renders him miserable, it is a real evil; if it
+produces the misfortune of a portion of the human race, it is a
+detestable abuse. The most powerful princes are ordinarily such
+strangers to happiness, their subjects are commonly so unfortunate, only
+because the first possess all the means of rendering themselves happy
+without ever giving them activity; or because the only knowledge they
+have of them, is their abuse. A wise man seated on a throne, would be
+the most happy of mortals. A monarch is a man for whom his power, let
+it be of whatever extent, cannot procure other organs, other modes of
+feeling, than the meanest of his subjects; if he has an advantage
+over them, it is by the grandeur, the variety, the multiplicity of the
+objects with which he can occupy himself; which by giving perpetual
+activity to his mind, can prevent it from decay; from falling into
+sloth. If his soul is virtuous, if his mind is expansive, his ambition
+finds continual food in the contemplation of the power he possesses,
+to unite by gentleness, to consolidate by kindness, the will of his
+subjects with his own; to interest them in his own conservation, to
+merit their affections,--to draw forth the respect of strangers,--to
+render luminous the page of history--to elicit the eulogies of all
+nations--to clothe the orphan,--to dry the widow's tears. Such are
+the conquests that reason proposes to all those whose destiny it is to
+govern the fate of empires; they are sufficiently grand to satisfy the
+most ardent imagination, of a sublimity to gratify the most capacious
+ambition: for a monarch they are paramount duties.--KINGS are the most
+happy of men, only because they have the power of making others happy;
+because they possess the means of multiplying the causes of legitimate
+content with themselves.
+
+The advantages of the sovereign power are participated by all those who
+contribute to the government of states. Thus grandeur, rank, reputation,
+are desirable, are legitimate objects for all who are acquainted with
+the means of rendering them subservient to their own peculiar felicity;
+they are useless, they are illegitimate to those ordinary men who
+have neither the energy nor the capacity to employ them in a mode
+advantageous to themselves; they are detestable whenever to obtain them
+man compromises his own happiness, when he implicates the welfare of
+society: this society itself is in an error every time it respects men
+who only employ to its destruction, a power, the exercise of which it
+ought never to approve but when it reaps from it substantial benefits.
+
+Riches, useless to the miser, who is no more than their miserable
+gaoler; prejudicial to the debauchee, for whom they only procure
+infirmities; injurious to the voluptuary, to whom they only bring
+disgust--whom they oppress with satiety; can in the hands of the honest
+man produce unnumbered means of augmenting the sum of his happiness; but
+before man covets wealth it is proper he should know how to employ it;
+money is only a token, a representative of happiness; to enjoy it is so
+to use it as to make others happy: this is the great secret, this is the
+talisman, this is the reality. Money, according to the compact of man,
+procures for him all those benefits he can desire; there is only one,
+which it will not procure, that is, _the knowledge how to apply it
+properly_. For man to have money, without the true secret how to
+enjoy it, is to possess the key of a commodious palace to which he is
+interdicted entrance; to lavish it, prodigally, is to throw the key
+into the river; to make a bad use of it, is only to make it the means of
+wounding himself. Give the most ample treasures to the enlightened man,
+he will not be overwhelmed with them; if he has a capacious mind, if he
+has a noble soul, he will only extend more widely his benevolence; he
+will deserve the affection of a greater number of his fellow men; he
+will attract the love, he will secure the homage, of all those who
+surround him; he will restrain himself in his pleasures, in order that
+he may be enabled truly to enjoy them; he will know that money
+cannot re-establish a soul worn out with enjoyment; cannot give fresh
+elasticity to organs enfeebled by excess; cannot give fresh tension to
+nerves grown flaccid by abuse; cannot invigorate a body enervated
+by debauchery; cannot corroborate a machine, from thenceforth become
+incapable of sustaining him, except by the necessity of privations; he
+will know that the licentiousness of the voluptuary stifles pleasure in
+its source; that all the treasure in the world cannot renew his senses.
+
+From this, it will be obvious, that nothing is more frivolous than the
+declamations of a gloomy philosophy against the desire of power;
+nothing more absurd than the rant of superstition against the pursuit
+of grandeur; nothing more inconsistent than homilies against the
+acquisition of riches; nothing more unreasonable than dogmas that forbid
+the enjoyment of pleasure. These objects are desirable for man, whenever
+his situation allows him to make pretensions to them; they are useful
+to society, conducive to public happiness, whenever he has acquired the
+knowledge of making them turn to his own real advantage; reason cannot
+censure him, virtue cannot despise him, when in order to obtain them,
+he never travels out of the road of truth; when in their acquisition,
+he wounds no one's interest; when he pursues only legitimate means: his
+associates will applaud him; his contemporaries will esteem him: he will
+respect himself, when he only employs their agency to secure his own
+happiness, and that of his fellows. Pleasure is a benefit, it is of
+the essence of man to love, it is even rational when it renders his
+existence really valuable to himself--when it does not injure him in his
+own esteem; when its consequences are not grievous to others. _Riches_
+are the symbols of the great majority of the benefits of this life; they
+become a reality in the hands of the man who has the clew to their just
+application. _Power_ is the most sterling of all benefits, when he who
+is its depositary has received from nature a soul sufficiently noble, a
+mind sufficiently elevated, a heart sufficiently benevolent, faculties
+sufficiently energetic, above all, when he has derived from education a
+true regard for virtue, that sacred love for truth which enables him to
+extend his happy influence over whole nations; which by this means
+he places in, a state of legitimate dependence on his will; _man only
+acquires the right of commanding men, when he renders them happy._
+
+The right of man over his fellow man can only be founded either upon the
+actual happiness he secures to him, or that which he gives him reason to
+hope he will procure for him; without this, the power he exercises would
+be violence, usurpation, manifest tyranny; it is only upon the faculty
+of rendering him happy, that legitimate authority builds its structure;
+without this it is the "_baseless fabric of a vision." No man derives
+from nature the right of commanding another_; but it is voluntarily
+accorded to those, from whom he expects his welfare. _Government_ is the
+right of commanding, conferred on the sovereign only for the advantage
+of those who are governed. Sovereigns are the defenders of the persons,
+the guardians of the property, the protectors of the liberty of their
+subjects: this is the price of their obedience; it is only on this
+condition these consent to obey; government would not be better than
+a robbery whenever it availed itself of the powers confided to it,
+to render society unhappy. _The empire of religion_ is founded on the
+opinion man entertains of its having power to render nations happy;
+government and religion are reasonable institutions; but only so,
+inasmuch as they equally contribute to the felicity of man: it would
+be folly in him to submit himself to a yoke from which there resulted
+nothing but evil. It would be folly to expect that man should bind
+himself to misery; it would be rank injustice to oblige him to renounce
+his rights without some corresponding advantage!
+
+The authority which a father exercises over his family is only founded
+on the advantages which he is supposed to procure for it. Rank, in
+political society, has only for its basis the real or imaginary utility
+of some citizens for which the others are willing to distinguish
+them--agree to respect them--consent to obey them. The rich acquire
+rights over the indigent, the wealthy claim the homage of the needy,
+only by virtue of the welfare they are conditioned to procure
+them. Genius, talents, science, arts, have rights over man, only
+in consequence of their utility; of the delight they confer; of the
+advantages they procure for society. In a word, it is happiness, it is
+the expectation of happiness, it is its image that man cherishes--that
+he esteems--that he unceasingly adores. Monarchs, the rich, the great,
+may easily impose on him, may dazzle him, may intimidate him, but they
+will never be able to obtain the voluntary submission of his heart,
+which alone can confer upon them legitimate rights, without they make
+him experience real benefits--without they display virtue. Utility is
+nothing more than true happiness; to be useful is to be virtuous; to be
+virtuous is to make others happy.
+
+The happiness which man derives from them is the invariable, the
+necessary standard of his sentiments, for the beings of his species; for
+the objects he desires; for the opinions he embrases; for those actions
+on which he decides. He is the dupe of his prejudices every time he
+ceases to avail himself of this standard to regulate his judgment. He
+will never run the risk of deceiving himself, when he shall examine
+strictly what is the real utility resulting to his species from the
+religion, from the superstition, from the laws, from the institutions,
+from the inventions, from the various actions of all mankind.
+
+A superficial view may sometimes seduce him; but experience, aided
+by reflection, will reconduct him to reason, which is incapable of
+deceiving him. This teaches him that pleasure is a momentary happiness,
+which frequently becomes an evil; that evil is a fleeting trouble that
+frequently becomes a good: it makes him understand the true nature of
+objects, enables him to foresee the effects he may expect; it makes
+him distinguish those desires to which his welfare permits him to lend
+himself, from those to whose seduction he ought to make resistance. In
+short, it will always convince him that the true interest of intelligent
+beings, who love happiness, who desire to render their own existence
+felicitous, demands that they should root out all those phantoms,
+abolish all those chimerical ideas, destroy all those prejudices, which
+by traducing virtue, obstruct their felicity in this world.
+
+If he consults experience, he will perceive that it is in illusions, in
+false opinions, rendered sacred by time, that he ought to search out the
+source of that multitude of evils which almost every where overwhelms
+mankind. From ignorance of natural causes, man has created imaginary
+causes; not knowing to what cause to attribute thunder, he ascribed it
+to an imaginary being whom he called JUPITER; imposture availing itself
+of this disposition, rendered these causes terrible to him; these fatal
+ideas haunted him without rendering him better; made him tremble without
+either benefit to himself or to others; filled his mind with chimeras
+that opposed themselves to the progress of his reason; that prevented
+him from really seeking after his happiness. His vain fears rendered him
+the slave of those who deceived him, under pretence of consulting his
+welfare; he committed evil, because they persuaded him his gods demanded
+sacrifices; he lived in misfortune, because they made him believe these
+gods condemned him to be miserable; the slave of beings, to which his
+own imagination had given birth, he never dared to disentangle himself
+from his chains; the artful ministers of these divinities gave him to
+understand that stupidity, the renunciation of reason, sloth of mind,
+abjection of soul, were the sure means of obtaining eternal felicity.
+
+Prejudices, not less dangerous, have blinded man upon the true nature of
+government. Nations in general are ignorant of the true foundations
+of authority; they dare not demand happiness from those kings who are
+charged with the care of procuring it for them: some have believed their
+sovereigns were gods disguised, who received with their birth the right
+of commanding the rest of mankind; that they could at their pleasure
+dispose of the felicity of the people; that they were not accountable
+for the misery they engendered. By a necessary consequence of these
+erroneous opinions, politics have almost every where degenerated into
+the fatal art of sacrificing the interests of the many, either to the
+caprice of an individual, or to some few privileged irrational beings.
+In despite of the evils which assailed them, nations fell down in
+adoration before the idols they themselves had made: foolishly respected
+the instruments of their misery; had a stupid veneration for those who
+possessed the sovereign power of injuring them; obeyed their unjust
+will; lavished their blood; exhausted their treasure; sacrificed their
+lives, to glut the ambition, to feed the cupidity to minister to the
+regenerated phantasms, to gratify the never-ending caprices of these
+men; they bend the knee to established opinion, bowed to rank, yielded
+to title, to opulence, to pageantry, to ostentation: at length victims
+to their prejudices, they in vain expected their welfare at the hands of
+men who were themselves unhappy from their own vices; whose neglect of
+virtue, had rendered them incapable of enjoying true felicity; who are
+but little disposed to occupy themselves with their prosperity: under
+such chiefs their physical and moral happiness were equally neglected or
+even annihilated.
+
+The same blindness may be perceived in the science of morals.
+Superstition, which never had any thing but ignorance for its basis,
+which never had more than a disordered imagination for its guide, did
+not found ethics upon man's nature; upon his relations with his fellows;
+upon those duties which necessarily flow from these relations; it
+preferred, as more in unison with itself, founding them upon imaginary
+relations which it pretended subsisted between him and those invisible
+powers it had so gratuitously imagined; that were delivered by oracles
+which their priests had the address to make him believe spoke the will
+of the Divinity: thus, TROPHONIUS, from his cave made affrightened
+mortals tremble; shook the stoutest nerves; made them turn pale with
+fear; his miserable, deluded supplicants, who were obliged to sacrifice
+to him, anointed their bodies with oil, bathed in certain rivers, and
+after they had offered their cake of honey and received their destiny,
+became so dejected, so wretchedly forlorn, that to this day their
+descendants, when they behold a malencholy man, exclaim, "_He has
+consulted the oracle of Trophonius_." It was these invisible gods, which
+superstition always paints as furious tyrants, who were declared the
+arbiters of man's destiny; the models of his conduct: when he was
+willing to imitate them, when he was willing to conform himself to
+the lessons of their interpreters, he became wicked, was an unsociable
+creature, an useless being or else a turbulent maniac--a zealous
+fanatic. It was these alone who profited by superstition, who advantaged
+themselves by the darkness in which they contrived to involve the human
+mind; nations were ignorant of nature; they knew nothing of reason; they
+understood not truth; they had only a gloomy superstition, without one
+certain idea of either morals or virtue. When man committed evil against
+his fellow creature, he believed he had offended these gods; but he also
+believed himself forgiven, as soon as he had prostrated himself before
+them; as soon as he had by costly presents gained over the priest to his
+interest. Thus superstition, far from giving a sure, far from affording
+a natural, far from introducing a known basis to morals, only rested it
+on an unsteady foundation; made it consist in ideal duties impossible
+to be accurately understood. What did I say? It first corrupted him,
+and his expiations finished by ruining him. Thus when superstition was
+desirous to combat the unruly passions of man it attempted it in vain;
+always enthusiastic, ever deprived of experience, it knew nothing of the
+true remedies: those which it applied were disgusting, only suitable to
+make the sick revolt against them; it made them pass for divine, because
+they were not made of man; they were inefficacious, because chimeras
+could effectuate nothing against those substantive passions to which
+motives more real, impulsions more powerful, concurred to give birth,
+which every thing conspired, to flourish in his heart. The voice of
+superstition or of the gods, could not make itself heard amidst the
+tumult of society--where all was in confusion--where the priest cried
+out to man, that he could not render himself happy without injuring his
+fellow creatures, who happened to differ from him in opinion: these
+vain clamours only made virtue hateful to him, because they always
+represented it as the enemy to his happiness; as the bane of human
+pleasures: he consequently failed in the observation of his duties,
+because real motives were never held forth to induce him to make the
+requisite sacrifice; the present prevailed over the future; the visible
+over the invisible; the known over the unknown: man became wicked
+because every thing informed him he must be so, in order to obtain the
+happiness after which he sighed.
+
+Thus the sum of human misery was never diminished; on the contrary, it
+was accumulating either by his superstition, by his government, by his
+education, by his opinions or by the institutions he adopted under
+the idea of rendering his condition more pleasant: it not unfrequently
+happened that the whole of these acted upon him simultaneously; he was
+then completely wretched. It cannot be too often repeated, _it is in
+error that man will find the true spring of those evils with which the
+human race is afflicted;_ it is not nature that renders him miserable;
+it is not nature that makes him unhappy; it is not an irritated
+Divinity who is desirous he should live in tears; it is not hereditary
+depravation that has caused him to be wicked; it is to error, to
+long cherished, consecrated error, to error identified with his very
+existence, that these deplorable effects are to be ascribed.
+
+The sovereign good, so much sought after by some philosophers, announced
+with so much emphasis by others, may be considered as a chimera, like
+unto that marvellous panacea which some adepts have been willing to pass
+upon mankind for an universal remedy. All men are diseased; the moment
+of their birth delivers them over to the contagion of error; but
+individuals are variously affected by it by a consequence of their
+natural organization; of their peculiar circumstances. If there is a
+sovereign remedy, which can be indiscriminately applied to the diseases
+of man, there is without doubt only ONE, this catholic balsam is TRUTH,
+Which he must draw from nature.
+
+At the afflicting sight of those errors which blind the greater number
+of mortals--of those delusions which man is doomed to suck in with his
+mother's milk; viewing with painful sensations those irregular desires,
+those disgusting propensities, by which he is perpetually agitated;
+seeing the terrible effect of those licentious passions which torment
+him; of those lasting inquietudes which gnaw his repose; of those
+stupendous evils, as well physical as moral, which assail him on every
+side: the contemplator of humanity would be tempted to believe that
+happiness was not made for this world; that any effort to cure those
+minds which every thing unites to poison, would be a vain enterprize;
+that it was an Augean stable, requiring the strength of another
+Hercules. When he considers those numerous superstitions by which man
+is kept in a continual state of alarm--that divide him from his
+fellow--that render him vindictive, persecuting, and irrational; when he
+beholds the many despotic governments that oppress him; when he examines
+those multitudinous, unintelligible, contradictory laws that torture
+him; the manifold injustice under which he groans; when he turns his
+mind to the barbarous ignorance in which he is steeped, almost over the
+whole surface of the earth; when he witnesses those enormous crimes that
+debase society; when he unmasks those rooted vices that render it so
+hateful to almost every individual; he has great difficulty to prevent
+his mind from embracing the idea that misfortune is the only appendage
+of the human species; that this world is made solely to assemble the
+unhappy; that human felicity is a chimera, or at least a point so
+fugitive, that it is impossible it can be fixed.
+
+Thus superstitious mortals, atrabilious men, beings nourished in
+melancholy, unceasingly see either nature or its author exasperated
+against the human race; they suppose that man is the constant object
+of heaven's wrath; that he irritates it even by his desires: that he
+renders himself criminal by seeking a felicity which is not made for
+him: struck with beholding that those objects which he covets in the
+most lively manner, are never competent to content his heart, they have
+decried them as abominations, as things prejudicial to his interest, as
+odious to his gods; they prescribe him abstinence from all search after
+them; that he should entirely shun them; they have endeavoured to put to
+the rout all his passions, without any distinction even of those which
+are the most useful to himself, the most beneficial to those beings with
+whom he lives: they have been willing that man should render himself
+insensible; should become his own enemy; that he should separate himself
+from his fellow creatures; that he should renounce all pleasure; that
+he should refuse happiness; in short, _that he should cease to be a man,
+that he should become unnatural_. "Mortals!" have they said, "ye were
+born to be unhappy; the author of your existence has destined ye for
+misfortune; enter then into his views, and render yourselves miserable.
+Combat those rebellious desires which have felicity for their object;
+renounce those pleasures which it is your essence to love; attach
+yourselves to nothing in this world; by a society that only serves to
+inflame your imagination, to make you sigh after benefits you ought not
+to enjoy; break up the spring of your souls; repress that activity that
+seeks to put a period to your sufferings; suffer, afflict yourselves,
+groan, be wretched; such is for you the true road to happiness."
+
+Blind physicians! who have mistaken for a disease the natural state
+of man! they have not seen that his desires were necessary; that
+his passions were essential to him; that to defend him from loving
+legitimate pleasures; to interdict him from desiring them, is to deprive
+him of that activity which is the vital principle of society; that to
+tell him to hate, to desire him to despise himself, is to take from him
+the most substantive motive, that can conduct him to virtue. It is thus,
+by its supernatural remedies, by its wretched panacea, superstition, far
+from curing those evils which render man decrepid, which bend him almost
+to the earth, has only increased them; made them more desperate; in the
+room of calming his passions, it gives them inveteracy; makes them more
+dangerous; renders them more venomous; turns that into a curse which
+nature has given him for his preservation; to be the means of his own
+happiness. It is not by extinguishing the passions of man that he is
+to be rendered happier; it is by turning them into proper channels, by
+directing them towards useful objects, which by being truly advantageous
+to himself, must of necessity be beneficial to others.
+
+In despite of the errors which blind the human race, in despite of
+the extravagance of man's superstition, maugre the imbecility of his
+political institutions, notwithstanding the complaints, in defiance of
+the murmurs he is continually breathing forth against his destiny, there
+are yet happy individuals on the earth. Man has sometimes the felicity
+to behold sovereigns animated by the noble passion to render nations
+flourishing; full of the laudable ambition to make their people happy;
+now and then he encounters an ANTONINUS, a TRAJAN, a JULIAN, an ALFRED,
+a WASHINGTON; he meets with elevated minds who place their glory in
+encouraging merit--who rest their happiness in succouring indigence--who
+think it honourable to lend a helping hand to oppressed virtue: he sees
+genius occupied with the desire of meriting the eulogies of posterity;
+of eliciting the admiration of his fellow-citizens by serving them
+usefully, satisfied with enjoying that happiness he procures for others.
+
+Let it not be believed that the man of poverty himself is excluded
+from happiness: mediocrity and indigence frequently procure for him
+advantages that opulence and grandeur are obliged to acknowledge; which
+title and wealth are constrained to envy: the soul of the needy man,
+always in action, never ceases to form desires which his activity places
+within his reach; whilst the rich, the powerful, are frequently in the
+afflicting embarrassment, of either not knowing what to wish for, or
+else of desiring those objects which their listlessness renders it
+impossible for them to obtain. The poor man's body, habituated to
+labour, knows the sweets of repose; this repose of the body, is the most
+troublesome fatigue to him who is wearied with his idleness; exercise,
+and frugality, procure for the one vigour, health, and contentment; the
+intemperance and sloth of the other, furnish him only with disgust--load
+him with infirmities. Indigence sets all the springs of the soul to
+work; it is the mother of industry; from its bosom arises genius; it is
+the parent of talents, the hot-bed of that merit to which opulence is
+obliged to pay tribute; to which grandeur bows its homage. In short the
+blows of fate find in the poor man a flexible reed, who bends without
+breaking, whilst the storms of adversity tear the rich man like the
+sturdy oak in the forest, up by the very roots.
+
+Thus Nature is not a step-mother to the greater number of her children.
+He whom fortune has placed in an obscure station is ignorant of that
+ambition which devours the courtier; knows nothing of the inquietude
+which deprives the intriguer of his rest; is a stranger to the remorse,
+an alien to the disgust, is unconscious of the weariness of the man,
+who, enriched with the spoils of a nation, does not know how to turn
+them to his profit. The more the body labours, the more the imagination
+reposes itself; it is the diversity of the objects man runs over that
+kindles it; it is the satiety of those objects that causes him disgust;
+the imagination of the indigent is circumscribed by necessity: he
+receives but few ideas: he is acquainted with but few objects: in
+consequence, he has but little to desire; he contents himself with that
+little: whilst the entire of nature with difficulty suffices to satisfy
+the insatiable desires, to gratify the imaginary wants of the man,
+plunged in luxury, who has run over and exhausted all common objects.
+Those, whom prejudice contemplates; as the most unhappy of men,
+frequently enjoy advantages more real, happiness much greater, than
+those who oppress them--who despise them--but who are nevertheless
+often reduced to the misery of envying them. Limited desires are a real
+benefit: the man of meaner condition, in his humble fortune, desires
+only bread: he obtains it by the sweat of his brow; he would eat it with
+pleasure if injustice did not sometimes render it bitter to him. By the
+delirium of some governments, those who roll in abundance, without
+for that reason being more happy, dispute with the cultivator even the
+fruits which the earth yields to the labour of his hands. _Princes_
+sometimes sacrifice their true happiness, as well as that of their
+states, to these passions--to those caprices which discourage the
+people; which plunge their provinces in misery: which make millions
+unhappy, without any advantage to themselves. _Tyrants_ oblige the
+subjects to curse their existence; to abandon labour; take from them
+the courage of propagating a progeny who would be as unhappy as their
+fathers: the excess of oppression sometimes obliges them to revolt;
+makes them avenge themselves by wicked outrages of the injustice it
+has heaped on their devoted heads: injustice, by reducing indigence to
+despair, obliges it to seek in crime, resources, against its misery. An
+unjust government, produces discouragement in the soul: its vexations
+depopulate a country; under its influence, the earth remains without
+culture; from thence is bred frightful famine, which gives birth to
+contagion and plague. The misery of a people produce revolutions;
+soured by misfortunes, their minds get into a state of fermentation;
+the overthrow of an empire, is the necessary effect. It is thus that
+_physics_ and _morals_ are always connected, or rather are the _same
+thing_.
+
+If the bad morals of chiefs do not always produce such marked effects,
+at least they generate slothfulness, of which their effect is to fill
+society with mendicants; to crowd it with malefactors; whose vicious
+course neither superstition nor the terror of the laws can arrest; which
+nothing can induce to remain the unhappy spectators of a welfare they
+are not permitted to participate. They seek a fleeting happiness at the
+expence even of their lives, when injustice has shut up to them the road
+of labour, those paths of industry which would have rendered them both
+useful and honest.
+
+Let it not then be said that no government can render all its subjects
+happy; without doubt it cannot flatter itself with contenting the
+capricious humours of some idle citizens who are obliged to rack their
+imagination, to appease the disgust arising from lassitude: but it can,
+and it ought to occupy itself with ministering to the real wants of the
+multitude, with giving a useful activity to the whole body politic. A
+society enjoys all the happiness of which it is susceptible whenever the
+greater number of its members are wholesomely fed, decently cloathed,
+comfortably lodged--in short when they can without an excess of toil
+beyond their strength, procure wherewith to satisfy those wants which
+nature has made necessary to their existence. Their mind rests contented
+as soon as they are convinced no power can ravish from them the fruits
+of their industry; that they labour for themselves; that the sweat of
+their brow is for the immediate comfort of their own families. By a
+consequence of human folly in some regions, whole nations are obliged to
+toil incessantly, to waste their strength, to sweat under their burdens
+to undulate the air with their sighs, to drench the earth with their
+tears, in order to maintain the luxury, to gratify the whims, to support
+the corruption of a small number of irrational beings; of some few
+useless men to whom happiness has become impossible, because their
+bewildered imaginations no longer know any bounds. It is thus that
+superstitious, thus that political errors have changed the fair face of
+nature into a valley of tears.
+
+For want of consulting reason, for want of knowing the value of virtue,
+for want of being instructed in their true interest, for want of being
+acquainted with what constitutes solid happiness, in what consists real
+felicity, the prince and the people, the rich and the poor, the great
+and the little, are unquestionably, frequently very far removed from
+content; nevertheless if an impartial eye be glanced over the human
+race, it will be found to comprise a greater number of benefits than of
+evils. No man is entirely happy, but he is so in detail; those who make
+the most bitter complaints of the rigour of their fate, are however,
+held in existence by threads frequently imperceptible; are prevented
+from the desire of quitting it by circumstances of which they are not
+aware. In short, habit lightens to man the burden of his troubles; grief
+suspended becomes true enjoyment; every want is a pleasure in the moment
+when it is satisfied; freedom from chagrin, the absence of disease, is a
+happy state which he enjoys secretly, without even perceiving it; hope,
+which rarely abandons him entirely, helps him to support the most
+cruel disasters. The PRISONER laughs in his irons. The wearied VILLAGER
+returns singing to his cottage. In short, the man who calls himself the
+most unfortunate, never sees death approach without dismay, at least, if
+despair has not totally disfigured nature in his eyes.
+
+As long as man desires the continuation of his being, he has no right
+to call himself completely unhappy; whilst hope sustains him, he still
+enjoys a great benefit. If man was more just, in rendering to himself an
+account of his pleasures, in estimating his pains, he would acknowledge
+that the sum of the first exceeds by much the amount of the last; he
+would perceive that he keeps a very exact ledger of the evil, but a very
+unfaithful journal of the good: indeed he would avow, that there are but
+few days entirely unhappy during the whole course of his existence. His
+periodical wants procure for him the pleasure of satisfying them; his
+soul is perpetually moved by a thousand objects, of which, the variety,
+the multiplicity, the novelty, rejoices him, suspends his sorrows,
+diverts his chagrin. His physical evils, are they violent? They are not
+of long duration; they conduct him quickly to his end: the sorrows of
+his mind, when too powerful, conduct him to it equally. At the same time
+nature refuses him every happiness, she opens to him a door by which he
+quits life; does he refuse to enter it? It is that he yet finds pleasure
+in existence. Are nations reduced to despair? Are they completely
+miserable? They have recourse to arms; at the risque of perishing, they
+make the most violent efforts to terminate there sufferings.
+
+Thus because he sees so many of his fellows cling to life, man ought
+to conclude they are not so unhappy as he thinks. Then let him not
+exaggerate the evils of the human race, but let him impose silence on
+that gloomy humour that persuades him these evils are without remedy;
+let him only diminish by degrees the number of his errors, his
+calamities will vanish in the same proportion; he is not to conclude
+himself infelicitous because his heart never ceases to form new desires,
+which he finds it difficult, sometimes impossible to gratify. Since his
+body daily requires nourishment, let him infer that it is sound, that it
+fulfils its functions. As long as he has desires, the proper deduction
+ought to be, that his mind is kept in the necessary activity; he should
+gather from all this that passions are essential to him, that they
+constitute the happiness of a being who feels; are indispensable to a
+man who thinks; are requisite to furnish him with ideas; that they are
+a vital principle with a creature who must necessarily love that which
+procures him comfort, who must equally desire that which promises him
+a mode of existence analogous to his natural energies. As long as he
+exists, as long as the spring of his soul maintains its elasticity, this
+soul desires; as long as it desires, he experiences the activity which
+is necessary to him; as long as he acts, so long he lives. Human life
+may be compared to a river, of which the waters succeed each other,
+drive each other forward, and flow on without interruption; these
+waters, obliged to roll over an unequal bed, encounter at intervals
+those obstacles which prevent their stagnation; they never cease
+to undulate; sometimes they recoil, then again rush forward, thus
+continuing to run with more or less velocity, until they are restored to
+_the ocean of nature_.
+
+
+
+
+
+CHAP. XVII.
+
+_Those Ideas which are true, or founded upon Nature, are the only
+Remedies for the Evils of Man.--Recapitulation.--Conclusion of the first
+Part._
+
+
+Whenever man ceases to take experience for his guide, he falls into
+error. His errors become yet more dangerous, assume a more determined
+inveteracy, when they are clothed with the sanction of superstition; it
+is then that he hardly ever consents to return into the paths of truth;
+he believes himself deeply interested in no longer seeing clearly that
+which lies before him; he fancies he has an essential advantage in no
+longer understanding himself; he supposes his happiness exacts that he
+should shut his eyes to truth. If the majority of moral philosophers
+have mistaken the human heart--if they have deceived themselves upon its
+diseases--if they have miscalculated the remedies that are suitable--if
+the remedies they have administered have been inefficacious or even
+dangerous--it is because they have abandoned nature--because they have
+resisted experience--because they have not had sufficient steadiness to
+consult their reason--because they have renounced the evidence of their
+senses--because they have only followed the caprices of an imagination
+either dazzled by enthusiasm or disturbed by fear; because they have
+preferred the illusions it has held forth to the realities of nature,
+_who never deceives_.
+
+It is for want of having felt that an intelligent being cannot for an
+instant lose sight of his own peculiar conservation--of his particular
+interests, either real or fictitious--of his own welfare, whether
+permanent or transitory; in short, of his happiness, either true or
+false. It is for want of having considered that desires are natural,
+that passions are essential, that both the one and the other are motions
+necessary to the soul of man,--that the physicians of the, human mind
+have supposed supernatural causes for his wanderings; have only applied
+to his evils topical remedies, either useless or dangerous. Indeed,
+in desiring him to stifle his desires, to combat his propensities, to
+annihilate his passions, they have done no more than give him sterile
+precepts, at once vague and impracticable; these vain lessons have
+influenced no one; they have at most restrained some few mortals whom a
+quiet imagination but feebly solicited to evil; the terrors with which
+they have accompanied them have disturbed the tranquillity of those
+persons who were moderate by their nature, without ever arresting the
+ungovernable temperament of those who were inebriated by their passions,
+or hurried along; by the torrent of habit. In short, the promises of
+superstition, as well as the menaces it holds forth, have only formed
+fanatics, given birth to enthusiasts, who are either dangerous or
+useless to society, without ever making man truly virtuous; that is to
+say, useful to his fellow creatures.
+
+These, empirics guided by a blind routine have, not seen that man as
+long as he exists, is obliged to feel, to desire, to have passions,
+to satisfy them in proportion to the energy which his organization has
+given him; they have not perceived that education planted these desires
+in his heart--that habit rooted them--that his government, frequently
+vicious, corroborated their growth--that public opinion stamped them
+with its approbation--that--experience render them necessary--that
+to tell men thus constituted to destroy their passions, was either to
+plunge them into despair or else to order them remedies too revolting
+for their temperament. In the actual state of opulent societies, to say
+to a man who knows by experience that riches procure every pleasure,
+that he must not desire them; that he must not make any efforts to
+obtain them; that he ought to detach himself from them: is to persuade
+him to render himself miserable. To tell an ambitious man not to desire
+grandeur, not to covet power, which every thing conspires to point out
+to him as the height of felicity, is to order him to overturn at one
+blow the habitual system of his ideas; it is to speak, to a deaf man. To
+tell a lover of an impetuous temperament to stifle his passions for the
+object that enchants him, is to make him understand, that he ought to
+renounce his happiness. To oppose superstition to such substantive, such
+puissant interests is to combat realities by chimerical speculations.
+
+Indeed, if things were examined without prepossession, it would be found
+that the greater part of the precepts inculcated by superstition, which
+fanatical dogmas hold forth, which, supernatural mortals give to man,
+are as ridiculous as they are impossible to be put into practice.
+To interdict passion to man, is to desire of him not to be a human
+creature; to counsel an individual of a violent imagination to moderate
+his desires, is to advise him to change his temperament--is to request
+his blood to flow more sluggishly. To tell a man to renounce his habits,
+is to be willing that a citizen, accustomed to clothe himself, should
+consent to walk quite naked; it would avail as much, to desire him
+to change the lineament of his face, to destroy his configuration, to
+extinguish his imagination, to alter the course of his fluids, as to
+command him not to have passions which excite an activity analogous with
+his natural energy; or to lay aside those which confirmed habit has made
+him contract; which his circumstances, by a long succession of causes
+and effects, have converted into wants. Such are, however, the so much
+boasted remedies which the greater number of moral philosophers apply to
+human depravity. Is it, then surprising they do not produce the desired
+effect, or that they only reduce man to a state of despair by the
+effervescence that results from the continual conflict which they excite
+between the passions of his heart and these fanciful doctrines; between
+his vices and his virtues; between his habits and those chimerical fears
+with which superstition is at all times ready to overwhelm him? The
+vices of society, aided by the objects of which it avails itself to what
+the desires of man, the pleasures, the riches, the grandeur which
+his government holds forth to him as so many seductive magnets, the
+advantage which education, the benefits which example, the interests
+which public opinion render dear to him, attract him on one side; whilst
+a gloomy morality, founded upon superstitious illusions, vainly solicit
+him on the other; thus, superstition plunges him into misery; holds
+a violent struggle with his heart, without scarcely ever gaining the
+victory; when by accident it does prevail against so many united forces,
+it renders him unhappy; it completely destroys the spring of his soul.
+
+Passions are the true counterpoise to passions; then let him not seek
+to destroy them; but let him endeavour to direct them; let him balance
+those which are prejudicial, by those which are useful to society.
+_Reason_, the fruit of experience, is only the art of choosing those
+passions to which for his own peculiar happiness he ought to listen.
+_Education_ is the true art of disseminating the proper method of
+cultivating advantageous passions in the heart of man. _Legislation_ is
+the art of restraining dangerous passions; of exciting those which may
+be conducive to the public welfare. _Superstition_ is only the miserable
+art of planting the unproductive labour--of nourishing in the soul
+of man those chimeras, those illusions, those impostures, those
+incertitudes from whence spring passions fatal to himself as well as to
+others: it is only by bearing up with fortitude against these that he
+can securely place himself on the road to happiness. _True religion_
+is the art of advocating truth--of renouncing error--of contemplating
+reality--of drawing wisdom from experience--of cultivating man's nature
+to his own felicity, by teaching him to contribute to that of his
+associates; in short it is _reason, education_, and _legislation_,
+united to further the great end of human existence, by causing the
+passions of man to flow in a current genial to his own happiness.
+
+_Reason_ and _morals_ cannot effect any thing on mankind if they do not
+point out to each individual that his true interest is attached to a
+conduct that is either useful to others or beneficial to himself; this
+conduct to be useful must conciliate for him the benevolence, gain for
+him the favor of these beings who are necessary to his happiness: it is
+then for the interest of mankind, for the happiness of the human race,
+it is for the esteem of himself, for the love of his fellows, for the
+advantages which ensue, that education in early life should kindle the
+imagination of the citizen; this is the true means of obtaining those
+happy results with which habit should familiarize him; which public
+opinion should render dear to his heart; for which example ought
+continually to rouse his faculties; after which he should be taught to
+search with unceasing attention. _Government_ by the aid of recompences,
+ought to encourage him to follow this plan; by visiting crime with
+punishment it ought to deter those who are willing to interrupt it.
+Thus the hope of a true welfare, the fear of real evil, will be passions
+suitable to countervail those which by their impetuosity would injure
+society; these last will at least become very rare, if instead of
+feeding man's mind with unintelligible speculations, in lieu of
+vibrating on his ears words void of sense, he is only spoken to of
+realities, only shewn those interests which are in unison with truth.
+
+Man is frequently so wicked, only, because he almost always feels
+himself interested in being so; let him be more enlightened, more
+familiarized with truth, more accustomed to virtue, he will be made more
+happy; he will necessarily become better. An equitable government,
+a vigilant administration, will presently fill the state with honest
+citizens; it will hold forth to them present reasons for benevolence;
+real advantages in truth; palpable motives to be virtuous; it will
+instruct them in their duties; it will foster them with its cares; it
+will allure them by the assurance of their own peculiar happiness; its
+promises faithfully fulfilled--its menaces regularly executed,
+will unquestionably have much more weight than those of a gloomy
+superstition, which never exhibits to their view other than illusory
+benefits, fallacious punishments, which the man hardened in wickedness
+will doubt every time he finds an interest in questioning them: present
+motives will tell more home to his heart than those which are distant
+and at best uncertain. The vicious and the wicked are so common upon
+the earth, so pertinacious in their evil courses, so attached to their
+irregularities, only because there are but few governments that make
+man feel the advantage of being just, the pleasure of being honest, the
+happiness of being benevolent on the contrary, there is hardly any
+place where the most powerful interests do not solicit him to crime, by
+favouring the propensities of a vicious organization; by countenancing
+those appetencies which nothing has attempted to rectify or lead
+towards virtue. A savage, who in his horde knows not the value of money,
+certainly would not commit a crime, if when transplanted into civilized
+society, he should presently learn to desire it, should make efforts to
+obtain it, and if he could without danger finish by stealing it; above
+all, if he had not been taught to respect the property of the beings who
+environ him. The savages and the child are precisely in the same
+state; it is the negligence of society, of those entrusted with their
+education, that renders both the one and the other wicked. The son of
+a noble, from his infancy learns to desire power, at a riper age he
+becomes ambitious; if he has the address to insinuate himself into
+favor, he perhaps becomes wicked, because in some societies he has been
+taught to know he may be so with impunity when he can command the ear
+of his sovereign. It is not therefore nature that makes man wicked, they
+are his institutions which determine him to vice. The infant brought up
+amongst robbers, can generally become nothing but a malefactor; if he
+had been reared with honest people, the chance is he would have been a
+virtuous man.
+
+If the source be traced of that profound ignorance in which man is with
+respect to his morals, to the motives that can give volition to his
+will, it will be found in those false ideas which the greater number of
+speculators have formed to themselves, of human nature. The science of
+morals has become an enigma which it is impossible to unrevel; because
+man has made himself double; has distinguished his soul from his body;
+supposed it of a nature different from all known beings, with modes of
+action, with properties distinct from all other bodies, because he
+has emancipated this soul from physical laws, in order to submit it to
+capricious laws emanating from men who have pretended they are derived
+from imaginary regions, placed at very remote distances: metaphysicians
+seized upon these gratuitous suppositions, and by dint of subtilizing
+them, have rendered them completely unintelligible. These moralists have
+not perceived that motion is essential to the soul as well as to the
+living body; that both the one and the other are never moved but
+by material, by physical objects; that the want of each regenerate
+themselves unceasingly; that the wants of the soul, as well as those of
+the body are purely physical; that the most intimate, the most constant
+connection subsists between the soul and the body; or rather they have
+been unwilling to allow that they ate only the same thing considered
+under different points of view. Obstinate in their supernatural,
+unintelligible opinions, they have refused to open their eyes, which
+would have convinced them that the body in suffering rendered the soul
+miserable; that the soul afflicted undermined the body and brought it to
+decay; that both the pleasures and agonies of the mind have an influence
+over the body, either plunge it into sloth or give it activity: they
+have rather chosen to believe, that the soul draws its thoughts, whether
+pleasant or gloomy, from its own peculiar sources, while the fact is,
+that it derives its ideas only from material objects that strike on the
+physical organs; that it is neither determined to gaiety nor led on to
+sorrow, but by the actual state, whether permanent or transitory, in
+which the fluids and solids of the body are found. In short, they have
+been loath to acknowledge that the soul, purely passive, undergoes
+the same changes which the body experiences; is only moved by its
+intervention; acts only by its assistance, receives its sensations, its
+perceptions, forms its ideas, derives either its happiness or its misery
+from physical objects, through the medium of the organs of which the
+body is composed; frequently without its own cognizance, often in
+despite of itself.
+
+By a consequence of these opinions, connected with marvellous systems,
+or systems invented to justify them, they have supposed the human soul
+to be a free agent; that is to say, that it has the faculty of moving
+itself; that it enjoys the privilege of acting independent of the
+impulse received from exterior objects, through the organs of the body;
+that regardless of these impulsions it can even resist them, and follow
+its own directions by its own energies; that it is not only different in
+its nature from all other beings, but has a separate mode of action; in
+other words, that it is an insolated point which is, not submitted to
+that uninterrupted chain of motion which bodies communicate to each
+other in a nature, whose parts are always in action. Smitten with
+their sublime notions, these speculators were not aware that in thus
+distinguishing the soul from the body and from all known beings, they
+rendered it an impossibility to form any true ideas of it, either to
+themselves or to others: they were unwilling to perceive the perfect
+analogy which is found between the manner of the soul's action and that
+by which the body is afflicted; they shut their eyes to the necessary
+and continual correspondence which is found between the soul and the
+body; they perhaps did not perceive that like the body it is subjected
+to the motion of attraction and repulsion; has an aptitude to be
+attracted, a disposition to repel, which is ascribable to qualities
+inherent in those physical subsistances, which give play to the
+organs of the body; that the volition of its will, the activity of its
+passions, the continual regeneration of its desires, are never more than
+consequences of that activity which is produced in the body by material
+objects which are not under its controul; that these objects render
+it either happy or miserable, active or languishing, contented or
+discontented, in despite of itself,--in defiance of all the efforts it
+is capable of making to render it otherwise; they have rather chosen to
+seek in the heavens for unknown powers to set it in motion; they have
+held forth to man distant, imaginary interests: under the pretext of
+procuring for him future happiness, he has been prevented from labouring
+to his present felicity, which has been studiously withheld from his
+knowledge: his regards have been fixed upon the heavens, that he might
+lose sight of the earth: truth has been concealed from him; and it has
+been pretended he would be rendered happy by dint of terrors, always at
+an immense distance; by means of shadows, with whose substances he
+could never come in contact; of chimeras formed by his own bewildered
+imagination, which changed nearly as often as the governments to which
+he was submitted. In short, hoodwinked by his fears, blinded by his own
+credulity, _he was only guided through the flexuous paths of life, by
+men blind as himself, where both the one and the other were frequently
+lost in the maze_.
+
+
+
+
+
+CONCLUSION.
+
+
+From every thing which has been hitherto said, it evidently results that
+all the errors of mankind, of whatever nature they may be, arise from
+man's having renounced reason, quitted experience, and refused
+the evidence of his senses that he might be guided by imagination,
+frequently deceitful; by authority, always suspicious. Man will ever
+mistake his true happiness as long as he neglects to study nature, to
+investigate her laws, to seek in her alone the remedies for those
+evils which are the consequence of his errors: he will be an enigma to
+himself, as long as he shall believe himself double; that he is moved by
+an inconceivable spiritual power, of the laws and nature of which he is
+ignorant; his intellectual, as well as his moral faculties, will remain
+unintelligible to him if he does not contemplate them with the same
+eyes as he does his corporeal qualities; if he does not view them as
+submitted in every thing to the same impulse, as governed by the same
+regulations. The system of his pretended free agency is without support;
+experience contradicts it every instant, and proves that he never ceases
+to be under the influence of necessity in all his actions; this truth,
+far from being dangerous to man, far from being destructive of his
+morals, furnishes him with their true basis by making him feel the
+necessity of those relations which subsists between sensible beings
+united in society: who have congregated with a view of uniting their
+common efforts for their reciprocal felicity. From the necessity of
+these relations, spring the necessity of his duties; these point out to
+him the sentiments of love, which he should accord to virtuous conduct;
+that aversion he should have for what is vicious; the horror he should
+feel for every thing criminal. From hence the true foundation of _Moral
+Obligation_ will be obvious, which is only the necessity of talking
+means to obtain the end man proposes to himself by uniting in society;
+in which each individual for his own peculiar interest, his own
+particular happiness, his own personal security, is obliged to display
+dispositions requisite to conciliate the affections of his associates;
+to hold a conduct suitable to the preservation of the community; to
+contribute by his actions to the happiness of the whole. In a word, it
+is upon the necessary action and re-action of the human will upon the
+necessary attraction and repulsion of man's soul, that all his morals
+are bottomed: it is the unison of his will, the concert of his actions,
+that maintains society; it is rendered miserable by his discordance; it
+is dissolved by his want of union.
+
+From what has been said, it may be concluded that the names under which
+man has designated the concealed causes acting in nature, and their
+various effects, are never more than _necessity_ considered under
+different points of view, with the original cause of which--the great
+_cause of causes_--he must ever remain ignorant. It will be found that
+what he calls _order_, is a necessary consequence of causes and effects,
+of which he sees, or believes he sees, the entire connection, the
+complete routine, which pleases him as a whole, when he finds it
+conformable to his existence. In like manner it will be seen that what
+he calls _confusion_, is a consequence of like necessary causes and
+effects, of which he loses the concatenation, which he therefore thinks
+unfavourable to himself, or but little suitable to his being. That he
+has designated by the names of--
+
+_Intelligence_, those necessary causes that necessarily operate the
+chain of events which he comprises under the term _order_:
+
+_Divinity_, those necessary but invisible causes which give play to
+nature, in which every thing acts according to immutable and necessary
+laws:
+
+_Destiny_ or _fatality_, the necessary connection of those unknown
+causes and, effects which he beholds in the world:
+
+_Chance_, those effects which he is not able to foresee, or of which he
+is ignorant of the necessary connection, with their causes:
+
+_Intellectual_ and _moral faculties_, those effects and those
+modifications necessary to an organized being, whom he has supposed to
+be moved by an inconceivable agent; who he has believed distinguished
+from his body, of a nature totally different from it, and which he has
+designated by the word SOUL. In consequence, he has believed this agent
+immortal; not dissoluble like the body. It has been shewn that the
+marvellous doctrine of another life, is founded upon gratuitous
+suppositions, contradicted by reflections, unsupported by experience,
+that may or may not be, without man's knowing any thing on the subject.
+It has been proved, that the hypothesis is not only useless to man's
+morals, but again, that it is calculated to palsy his exertions; to
+divert him from actively pursuing the true road to his own happiness;
+to fill him with romantic caprices; to inebriate him with opinions
+prejudicial to his tranquillity; in short, to lull to slumber the
+vigilance of legislators; by dispensing them from giving to education,
+to the institutions, to the laws of society, all that attention, which
+it is the duty and for his interest they should bestow. It must have
+been felt, that _politics_ has unaccountably rested itself upon wrong
+opinions; upon ideas little capable of satisfying those passions, which
+every thing conspires to kindle in the heart of man; who ceases to view
+the future, while the present seduces and hurries him along. It has been
+shewn, that contempt of death is an advantageous sentiment, calculated
+to inspire man's mind with courage; to render him intrepid; to induce
+him to undertake that which may be truly useful to society; in short,
+from what has preceded, it will be obvious, what is competent to conduct
+man to happiness, and also what are the obstacles that error opposes to
+his felicity.
+
+Let us not then, be accused of demolishing prejudice, without edifying
+the mind; with combating error without substituting truth; with
+underrating the power of the great _cause of causes_; with sapping
+at one and the same time the foundations of superstition and of sound
+morals. The last is necessary to man; it is founded upon his nature; its
+duties are certain, they must last as long as the human race remains; it
+imposes obligations on him, because, without it, neither individuals
+nor society could be able to subsist, either obtain or enjoy those
+advantages which nature obliges them to desire.
+
+Listen then, O man! to those morals which are established upon,
+experience; which are grounded upon the necessity of things; do not
+lend thine ear to those superstitions founded upon reveries; rested upon
+imposture; built upon the capricious whims of a disordered imagination.
+Follow the lessons of those humane, those gentle morals, which conduct
+man to virtue, by the voice of happiness: turn a deaf ear to the
+inefficacious cries of superstition, which renders man really unhappy;
+which can never make him reverence VIRTUE; which renders truth hateful;
+which paints veracity in hideous colours; in short, let him see if
+REASON, without the assistance of a rival, who prohibits its use, will
+not more surely conduct him towards that great end, which is the object
+of his research, which is the natural tendency of all his views.
+
+Indeed, what benefit has the human race hitherto drawn from those
+sublime, those supernatural notions with which superstition has
+fed mortals during so many ages? All those phantoms conjured--up by
+ignorance--brooded by imagination; all those hypothesis, subtile as
+they are irrational; from which experience is banished, all those
+words devoid of meaning with which languages are crowded; all those
+fantastical hopes; those panic terrors which have been brought to
+operate on the will of man; what have they done? Has any or the whole of
+them rendered him better, more enlightened to his duties, more
+faithful in their performance? Have those marvellous systems, or those
+sophistical inventions, by which they have been supported, carried
+conviction to his mind, reason into his conduct, virtue into his heart?
+Have they led him to the least acquaintance with the great _Cause
+of Causes?_ Alas! it is a lamentable fact, that cannot be too often
+exposed, that all these things have done nothing more than plunge the
+human understanding into that darkness from which it is difficult to be
+withdrawn; sown in man's heart the most dangerous errors; of which it is
+scarcely possible to divest him; given birth to those fatal passions,
+in which may be found the true source of those evils, with which his
+species is afflicted: but have never enlightened his mind with truth,
+nor led him to that right healthy worship, which man best pays by a
+rational enjoyment of the faculties with which he is gifted.
+
+Cease then, O mortal! to let thyself he disturbed with chimeras, to
+let thy mind be troubled with phantoms which thine own imagination has
+created, or to which arch imposture has given birth. Renounce thy vague
+hopes, disengage thyself from thine overwhelming fears, follow without
+inquietude the necessary routine which nature has marked out for thee;
+strew the road with flowers if thy destiny permits; remove, if thou art
+able, the thorns scattered over it. Do not attempt to plunge thy views
+into an impenetrable futurity; its obscurity ought to be sufficient to
+prove to thee, that it is either useless or dangerous to fathom. Think
+of making thyself happy in that existence which is known to thee: if
+thou wouldst preserve thyself, be temperate, be moderate, be reasonable:
+if thou seekest to render thy existence durable, be not prodigal of
+pleasure; abstain from every thing that can be hurtful to thyself,
+injurious to others: be truly intelligent; that is to say, learn to
+esteem thyself, to preserve thy being, to fulfil that end which at each
+moment thou proposest to thyself. Be virtuous, to the end that thou
+mayest render thyself solidly happy, that thou mayest enjoy the
+affections, secure the esteem, partake of the assistance of those by
+whom thou art surrounded; of those beings whom nature has made necessary
+to thine own peculiar felicity. Even when they should be unjust, render
+thyself worthy of their applause, of thine own love, and thou shalt
+live content, thy serenity shall not be disturbed, the end of thy career
+shall not slander thy life; which will be exempted from remorse: death
+will be to thee the door to a new existence, a new order, in which
+thou wilt be submitted, as thou art at present, to the eternal laws of
+nature, which ordains, that to LIVE HAPPY HERE BELOW, THOU MUST MAKE
+OTHERS HAPPY. Suffer thyself then, to be drawn gently along thy journey,
+until thou shalt sleep peaceable on that bosom which has given thee
+birth: if contrary to thine expectation, there should be another life of
+eternal felicity, thou canst not fail being a partaker.
+
+For thou, wicked unfortunate! who art found in continual contradiction
+with thyself; thou whose disorderly machine can neither accord with
+thine own peculiar nature, nor with that of thine associates, whatever
+may be thy crimes, whatever may be thy fears of punishment in another
+life, thou art at least already cruelly punished in this? Do not thy
+follies, thy shameful habits, thy debaucheries, damage thine health?
+Dost thou not linger out life in disgust, fatigued with thine own
+excesses? Does not listlessness punish thee for thy satiated passions?
+Has not thy vigour, thy gaiety, thy content, already yielded to
+feebleness, crouched under infirmities, given place to regret? Do not
+thy vices every day dig thy grave? Every time thou hast stained thyself
+with crime, hast thou dared without horror to return into thyself, to
+examine thine own conscience? Hast thou not found remorse, error, shame,
+established in thine heart? Hast thou not dreaded the scrutiny of thy
+fellow man? Hast thou not trembled when alone; unceasingly feared, that
+truth, so terrible for thee, should unveil thy dark transgressions,
+throw into light thine enormous iniquities? Do not then any longer
+fear to part with thine existence, it will at least put an end to those
+richly merited torments thou hast inflicted on thyself; _Death, in
+delivering the earth from an incommodious burthen, will also deliver
+thee from thy most cruel enemy, thyself_.
+
+
+END OF PART I.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The System of Nature, Volume 1, by
+Paul Henri Thiery (Baron D'Holbach)
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