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diff --git a/old/dmedu10.txt b/old/dmedu10.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b9e6183 --- /dev/null +++ b/old/dmedu10.txt @@ -0,0 +1,14452 @@ +The Project Gutenberg Etext of Democracy and Education, by Dewey +#1 in our series by John Dewey + +Copyright laws are changing all over the world, be sure to check +the copyright laws for your country before posting these files!! + +Please take a look at the important information in this header. +We encourage you to keep this file on your own disk, keeping an +electronic path open for the next readers. Do not remove this. + + +**Welcome To The World of Free Plain Vanilla Electronic Texts** + +**Etexts Readable By Both Humans and By Computers, Since 1971** + +*These Etexts Prepared By Hundreds of Volunteers and Donations* + +Information on contacting Project Gutenberg to get Etexts, and +further information is included below. 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David Reed + +I would like to dedicate this etext to my mother who was a +elementary school teacher for more years than I can remember. +Thanks. + + + + + +Democracy and Education +by John Dewey + + +Chapter One: Education as a Necessity of Life +Chapter Two: Education as a Social Function +Chapter Three: Education as Direction +Chapter Four: Education as Growth +Chapter Five: Preparation, Unfolding, and Formal Discipline +Chapter Six: Education as Conservative and Progressive +Chapter Seven: The Democratic Conception in Education +Chapter Eight: Aims in Education +Chapter Nine: Natural Development and Social Efficiency as Aims +Chapter Ten: Interest and Discipline +Chapter Eleven: Experience and Thinking +Chapter Twelve: Thinking in Education +Chapter Thirteen: The Nature of Method +Chapter Fourteen: The Nature of Subject Matter +Chapter Fifteen: Play and Work in the Curriculum +Chapter Sixteen: The Significance of Geography and History +Chapter Seventeen: Science in the Course of Study +Chapter Eighteen: Educational Values +Chapter Nineteen: Labor and Leisure +Chapter Twenty: Intellectual and Practical Studies +Chapter Twenty-one: Physical and Social Studies: Naturalism and + Humanism +Chapter Twenty-two: The Individual and the World +Chapter Twenty-Three: Vocational Aspects of Education +Chapter Twenty-four: Philosophy of Education +Chapter Twenty-five: Theories of Knowledge +Chapter Twenty-six: Theories of Morals + + +Chapter One: Education as a Necessity of Life + +1. Renewal of Life by Transmission. The most notable +distinction between living and inanimate things is that the +former maintain themselves by renewal. A stone when struck +resists. If its resistance is greater than the force of the blow +struck, it remains outwardly unchanged. Otherwise, it is +shattered into smaller bits. Never does the stone attempt to +react in such a way that it may maintain itself against the blow, +much less so as to render the blow a contributing factor to its +own continued action. While the living thing may easily be +crushed by superior force, it none the less tries to turn the +energies which act upon it into means of its own further +existence. If it cannot do so, it does not just split into +smaller pieces (at least in the higher forms of life), but loses +its identity as a living thing. + +As long as it endures, it struggles to use surrounding energies +in its own behalf. It uses light, air, moisture, and the +material of soil. To say that it uses them is to say that it +turns them into means of its own conservation. As long as it is +growing, the energy it expends in thus turning the environment to +account is more than compensated for by the return it gets: it +grows. Understanding the word "control" in this sense, it may be +said that a living being is one that subjugates and controls for +its own continued activity the energies that would otherwise use +it up. Life is a self-renewing process through action upon the +environment. + +In all the higher forms this process cannot be kept up +indefinitely. After a while they succumb; they die. The +creature is not equal to the task of indefinite self-renewal. +But continuity of the life process is not dependent upon the +prolongation of the existence of any one individual. +Reproduction of other forms of life goes on in continuous +sequence. And though, as the geological record shows, not merely +individuals but also species die out, the life process continues +in increasingly complex forms. As some species die out, forms +better adapted to utilize the obstacles against which they +struggled in vain come into being. Continuity of life means +continual readaptation of the environment to the needs of living +organisms. + +We have been speaking of life in its lowest terms -- as a +physical thing. But we use the word "Life" to denote the whole +range of experience, individual and racial. When we see a book +called the Life of Lincoln we do not expect to find within its +covers a treatise on physiology. We look for an account of +social antecedents; a description of early surroundings, of the +conditions and occupation of the family; of the chief episodes in +the development of character; of signal struggles and +achievements; of the individual's hopes, tastes, joys and +sufferings. In precisely similar fashion we speak of the life of +a savage tribe, of the Athenian people, of the American nation. +"Life" covers customs, institutions, beliefs, victories and +defeats, recreations and occupations. + +We employ the word "experience" in the same pregnant sense. And +to it, as well as to life in the bare physiological sense, the +principle of continuity through renewal applies. With the +renewal of physical existence goes, in the case of human beings, +the recreation of beliefs, ideals, hopes, happiness, misery, and +practices. The continuity of any experience, through renewing of +the social group, is a literal fact. Education, in its broadest +sense, is the means of this social continuity of life. Every one +of the constituent elements of a social group, in a modern city +as in a savage tribe, is born immature, helpless, without +language, beliefs, ideas, or social standards. Each individual, +each unit who is the carrier of the life-experience of his group, +in time passes away. Yet the life of the group goes on. + +The primary ineluctable facts of the birth and death of each one +of the constituent members in a social group determine the +necessity of education. On one hand, there is the contrast +between the immaturity of the new-born members of the group -- +its future sole representatives -- and the maturity of the adult +members who possess the knowledge and customs of the group. On +the other hand, there is the necessity that these immature +members be not merely physically preserved in adequate numbers, +but that they be initiated into the interests, purposes, +information, skill, and practices of the mature members: +otherwise the group will cease its characteristic life. Even in +a savage tribe, the achievements of adults are far beyond what +the immature members would be capable of if left to themselves. +With the growth of civilization, the gap between the original +capacities of the immature and the standards and customs of the +elders increases. Mere physical growing up, mere mastery of the +bare necessities of subsistence will not suffice to reproduce the +life of the group. Deliberate effort and the taking of +thoughtful pains are required. Beings who are born not only +unaware of, but quite indifferent to, the aims and habits of the +social group have to be rendered cognizant of them and actively +interested. Education, and education alone, spans the gap. + +Society exists through a process of transmission quite as much as +biological life. This transmission occurs by means of +communication of habits of doing, thinking, and feeling from the +older to the younger. Without this communication of ideals, +hopes, expectations, standards, opinions, from those members of +society who are passing out of the group life to those who are +coming into it, social life could not survive. If the members +who compose a society lived on continuously, they might educate +the new-born members, but it would be a task directed by personal +interest rather than social need. Now it is a work of +necessity. + +If a plague carried off the members of a society all at once, it +is obvious that the group would be permanently done for. Yet the +death of each of its constituent members is as certain as if an +epidemic took them all at once. But the graded difference in +age, the fact that some are born as some die, makes possible +through transmission of ideas and practices the constant +reweaving of the social fabric. Yet this renewal is not +automatic. Unless pains are taken to see that genuine and +thorough transmission takes place, the most civilized group will +relapse into barbarism and then into savagery. In fact, the +human young are so immature that if they were left to themselves +without the guidance and succor of others, they could not acquire +the rudimentary abilities necessary for physical existence. The +young of human beings compare so poorly in original efficiency +with the young of many of the lower animals, that even the powers +needed for physical sustentation have to be acquired under +tuition. How much more, then, is this the case with respect to +all the technological, artistic, scientific, and moral +achievements of humanity! + +2. Education and Communication. So obvious, indeed, is the +necessity of teaching and learning for the continued existence of +a society that we may seem to be dwelling unduly on a truism. +But justification is found in the fact that such emphasis is a +means of getting us away from an unduly scholastic and formal +notion of education. Schools are, indeed, one important method +of the transmission which forms the dispositions of the immature; +but it is only one means, and, compared with other agencies, a +relatively superficial means. Only as we have grasped the +necessity of more fundamental and persistent modes of tuition can +we make sure of placing the scholastic methods in their true +context. + +Society not only continues to exist by transmission, by +communication, but it may fairly be said to exist in +transmission, in communication. There is more than a verbal tie +between the words common, community, and communication. Men live +in a community in virtue of the things which they have in common; +and communication is the way in which they come to possess things +in common. What they must have in common in order to form a +community or society are aims, beliefs, aspirations, knowledge--a +common understanding -- like-mindedness as the + +sociologists say. Such things cannot be passed physically from +one to another, like bricks; they cannot be shared as persons +would share a pie by dividing it into physical pieces. The +communication which insures participation in a common +understanding is one which secures similar emotional and +intellectual dispositions -- like ways of responding to +expectations and requirements. + +Persons do not become a society by living in physical proximity, +any more than a man ceases to be socially influenced by being so +many feet or miles removed from others. A book or a letter may +institute a more intimate association between human beings +separated thousands of miles from each other than exists between +dwellers under the same roof. Individuals do not even compose a +social group because they all work for a common end. The parts +of a machine work with a maximum of cooperativeness for a common +result, but they do not form a community. If, however, they were +all cognizant of the common end and all interested in it so that +they regulated their specific activity in view of it, then they +would form a community. But this would involve communication. +Each would have to know what the other was about and would have +to have some way of keeping the other informed as to his own +purpose and progress. Consensus demands communication. + +We are thus compelled to recognize that within even the most +social group there are many relations which are not as yet +social. A large number of human relationships in any social +group are still upon the machine-like plane. Individuals use one +another so as to get desired results, without reference to the +emotional and intellectual disposition and consent of those used. +Such uses express physical superiority, or superiority of +position, skill, technical ability, and command of tools, +mechanical or fiscal. So far as the relations of parent and +child, teacher and pupil, employer and employee, governor and +governed, remain upon this level, they form no true social group, +no matter how closely their respective activities touch one +another. Giving and taking of orders modifies action and +results, but does not of itself effect a sharing of purposes, a +communication of interests. + +Not only is social life identical with communication, but all +communication (and hence all genuine social life) is educative. +To be a recipient of a communication is to have an enlarged and +changed experience. One shares in what another has thought and +felt and in so far, meagerly or amply, has his own attitude +modified. Nor is the one who communicates left unaffected. Try +the experiment of communicating, with fullness and accuracy, some +experience to another, especially if it be somewhat complicated, +and you will find your own attitude toward your experience +changing; otherwise you resort to expletives and ejaculations. +The experience has to be formulated in order to be communicated. +To formulate requires getting outside of it, seeing it as another +would see it, considering what points of contact it has with the +life of another so that it may be got into such form that he can +appreciate its meaning. Except in dealing with commonplaces and +catch phrases one has to assimilate, imaginatively, something of +another's experience in order to tell him intelligently of one's +own experience. All communication is like art. It may fairly be +said, therefore, that any social arrangement that remains vitally +social, or vitally shared, is educative to those who participate +in it. Only when it becomes cast in a mold and runs in a routine +way does it lose its educative power. + +In final account, then, not only does social life demand teaching +and learning for its own permanence, but the very process of +living together educates. It enlarges and enlightens experience; +it stimulates and enriches imagination; it creates responsibility +for accuracy and vividness of statement and thought. A man +really living alone (alone mentally as well as physically) would +have little or no occasion to reflect upon his past experience to +extract its net meaning. The inequality of achievement between +the mature and the immature not only necessitates teaching the +young, but the necessity of this teaching gives an immense +stimulus to reducing experience to that order and form which will +render it most easily communicable and hence most usable. + +3. The Place of Formal Education. There is, accordingly, a +marked difference between the education which every one gets from +living with others, as long as he really lives instead of just +continuing to subsist, and the deliberate educating of the young. +In the former case the education is incidental; it is natural and +important, but it is not the express reason of the association. +While it may be said, without exaggeration, that the measure of +the worth of any social institution, economic, domestic, +political, legal, religious, is its effect in enlarging and +improving experience; yet this effect is not a part of its +original motive, which is limited and more immediately practical. +Religious associations began, for example, in the desire to +secure the favor of overruling powers and to ward off evil +influences; family life in the desire to gratify appetites and +secure family perpetuity; systematic labor, for the most part, +because of enslavement to others, etc. Only gradually was the +by-product of the institution, its effect upon the quality and +extent of conscious life, noted, and only more gradually still +was this effect considered as a directive factor in the conduct +of the institution. Even today, in our industrial life, apart +from certain values of industriousness and thrift, the +intellectual and emotional reaction of the forms of human +association under which the world's work is carried on receives +little attention as compared with physical output. + +But in dealing with the young, the fact of association itself as +an immediate human fact, gains in importance. While it is easy +to ignore in our contact with them the effect of our acts upon +their disposition, or to subordinate that educative effect to +some external and tangible result, it is not so easy as in +dealing with adults. The need of training is too evident; the +pressure to accomplish a change in their attitude and habits is +too urgent to leave these consequences wholly out of account. +Since our chief business with them is to enable them to share in +a common life we cannot help considering whether or no we are +forming the powers which will secure this ability. If humanity +has made some headway in realizing that the ultimate value of +every institution is its distinctively human effect -- its effect +upon conscious experience -- we may well believe that this lesson +has been learned largely through dealings with the young. + +We are thus led to distinguish, within the broad educational +process which we have been so far considering, a more formal kind +of education -- that of direct tuition or schooling. In +undeveloped social groups, we find very little formal teaching +and training. Savage groups mainly rely for instilling needed +dispositions into the young upon the same sort of association +which keeps adults loyal to their group. They have no special +devices, material, or institutions for teaching save in +connection with initiation ceremonies by which the youth are +inducted into full social membership. For the most part, they +depend upon children learning the customs of the adults, +acquiring their emotional set and stock of ideas, by sharing in +what the elders are doing. In part, this sharing is direct, +taking part in the occupations of adults and thus serving an +apprenticeship; in part, it is indirect, through the dramatic +plays in which children reproduce the actions of grown-ups and +thus learn to know what they are like. To savages it would seem +preposterous to seek out a place where nothing but learning was +going on in order that one might learn. + +But as civilization advances, the gap between the capacities of +the young and the concerns of adults widens. Learning by direct +sharing in the pursuits of grown-ups becomes increasingly +difficult except in the case of the less advanced occupations. +Much of what adults do is so remote in space and in meaning that +playful imitation is less and less adequate to reproduce its +spirit. Ability to share effectively in adult activities thus +depends upon a prior training given with this end in view. +Intentional agencies -- schools--and explicit material -- studies +-- are devised. The task of teaching certain things is delegated +to a special group of persons. + +Without such formal education, it is not possible to transmit all +the resources and achievements of a complex society. It also +opens a way to a kind of experience which would not be accessible +to the young, if they were left to pick up their training in +informal association with others, since books and the symbols of +knowledge are mastered. + +But there are conspicuous dangers attendant upon the transition +from indirect to formal education. Sharing in actual pursuit, +whether directly or vicariously in play, is at least personal and +vital. These qualities compensate, in some measure, for the +narrowness of available opportunities. Formal instruction, on +the contrary, easily becomes remote and dead -- abstract and +bookish, to use the ordinary words of depreciation. What +accumulated knowledge exists in low grade societies is at least +put into practice; it is transmuted into character; it exists +with the depth of meaning that attaches to its coming within +urgent daily interests. + +But in an advanced culture much which has to be learned is stored +in symbols. It is far from translation into familiar acts and +objects. Such material is relatively technical and superficial. +Taking the ordinary standard of reality as a measure, it is +artificial. For this measure is connection with practical +concerns. Such material exists in a world by itself, +unassimilated to ordinary customs of thought and expression. +There is the standing danger that the material of formal +instruction will be merely the subject matter of the schools, +isolated from the subject matter of life- experience. The +permanent social interests are likely to be lost from view. +Those which have not been carried over into the structure of +social life, but which remain largely matters of technical +information expressed in symbols, are made conspicuous in +schools. Thus we reach the ordinary notion of education: the +notion which ignores its social necessity and its identity with +all human association that affects conscious life, and which +identifies it with imparting information about remote matters and +the conveying of learning through verbal signs: the acquisition +of literacy. + +Hence one of the weightiest problems with which the philosophy of +education has to cope is the method of keeping a proper balance +between the informal and the formal, the incidental and the +intentional, modes of education. When the acquiring of +information and of technical intellectual skill do not influence +the formation of a social disposition, ordinary vital experience +fails to gain in meaning, while schooling, in so far, creates +only "sharps" in learning -- that is, egoistic specialists. To +avoid a split between what men consciously know because they are +aware of having learned it by a specific job of learning, and +what they unconsciously know because they have absorbed it in the +formation of their characters by intercourse with others, becomes +an increasingly delicate task with every development of special +schooling. + +Summary. It is the very nature of life to strive to continue in +being. Since this continuance can be secured only by constant +renewals, life is a self-renewing process. What nutrition and +reproduction are to physiological life, education is to social +life. This education consists primarily in transmission through +communication. Communication is a process of sharing experience +till it becomes a common possession. It modifies the disposition +of both the parties who partake in it. That the ulterior +significance of every mode of human association lies in the +contribution which it makes to the improvement of the quality of +experience is a fact most easily recognized in dealing with the +immature. That is to say, while every social arrangement is +educative in effect, the educative effect first becomes an +important part of the purpose of the association in connection +with the association of the older with the younger. As societies +become more complex in structure and resources, the need of +formal or intentional teaching and learning increases. As formal +teaching and training grow in extent, there is the danger of +creating an undesirable split between the experience gained in +more direct associations and what is acquired in school. This +danger was never greater than at the present time, on account of +the rapid growth in the last few centuries of knowledge and +technical modes of skill. + +Chapter Two: Education as a Social Function + +1. The Nature and Meaning of Environment. We have seen that a +community or social group sustains itself through continuous +self-renewal, and that this renewal takes place by means of the +educational growth of the immature members of the group. By +various agencies, unintentional and designed, a society +transforms uninitiated and seemingly alien beings into robust +trustees of its own resources and ideals. Education is thus a +fostering, a nurturing, a cultivating, process. All of these +words mean that it implies attention to the conditions of growth. +We also speak of rearing, raising, bringing up -- words which +express the difference of level which education aims to cover. +Etymologically, the word education means just a process of +leading or bringing up. When we have the outcome of the process +in mind, we speak of education as shaping, forming, molding +activity -- that is, a shaping into the standard form of social +activity. In this chapter we are concerned with the general +features of the way in which a social group brings up its +immature members into its own social form. + +Since what is required is a transformation of the quality of +experience till it partakes in the interests, purposes, and ideas +current in the social group, the problem is evidently not one of +mere physical forming. Things can be physically transported in +space; they may be bodily conveyed. Beliefs and aspirations +cannot be physically extracted and inserted. How then are they +communicated? Given the impossibility of direct contagion or +literal inculcation, our problem is to discover the method by +which the young assimilate the point of view of the old, or the +older bring the young into like-mindedness with themselves. +The answer, in general formulation, is: By means of the action of +the environment in calling out certain responses. The required +beliefs cannot be hammered in; the needed attitudes cannot be +plastered on. But the particular medium in which an individual +exists leads him to see and feel one thing rather than another; +it leads him to have certain plans in order that he may act +successfully with others; it strengthens some beliefs and weakens +others as a condition of winning the approval of others. Thus it +gradually produces in him a certain system of behavior, a certain +disposition of action. The words "environment," "medium" denote +something more than surroundings which encompass an individual. +They denote the specific continuity of the surroundings with his +own active tendencies. An inanimate being is, of course, +continuous with its surroundings; but the environing +circumstances do not, save metaphorically, constitute an +environment. For the inorganic being is not concerned in the +influences which affect it. On the other hand, some things which +are remote in space and time from a living creature, especially a +human creature, may form his environment even more truly than +some of the things close to him. The things with which a man +varies are his genuine environment. Thus the activities of the +astronomer vary with the stars at which he gazes or about which +he calculates. Of his immediate surroundings, his telescope is +most intimately his environment. The environment of an +antiquarian, as an antiquarian, consists of the remote epoch of +human life with which he is concerned, and the relics, +inscriptions, etc., by which he establishes connections with that +period. + +In brief, the environment consists of those conditions that +promote or hinder, stimulate or inhibit, the characteristic +activities of a living being. Water is the environment of a fish +because it is necessary to the fish's activities -- to its life. +The north pole is a significant element in the environment of an +arctic explorer, whether he succeeds in reaching it or not, +because it defines his activities, makes them what they +distinctively are. Just because life signifies not bare passive +existence (supposing there is such a thing), but a way of acting, +environment or medium signifies what enters into this activity as +a sustaining or frustrating condition. + +2. The Social Environment. A being whose activities are +associated with others has a social environment. What he does +and what he can do depend upon the expectations, demands, +approvals, and condemnations of others. A being connected with +other beings cannot perform his own activities without taking the +activities of others into account. For they are the +indispensable conditions of the realization of his tendencies. +When he moves he stirs them and reciprocally. We might as well +try to imagine a business man doing business, buying and selling, +all by himself, as to conceive it possible to define the +activities of an individual in terms of his isolated actions. +The manufacturer moreover is as truly socially guided in his +activities when he is laying plans in the privacy of his own +counting house as when he is buying his raw material or selling +his finished goods. Thinking and feeling that have to do with +action in association with others is as much a social mode of +behavior as is the most overt cooperative or hostile act. + +What we have more especially to indicate is how the social medium +nurtures its immature members. There is no great difficulty in +seeing how it shapes the external habits of action. Even dogs +and horses have their actions modified by association with human +beings; they form different habits because human beings are +concerned with what they do. Human beings control animals by +controlling the natural stimuli which influence them; by creating +a certain environment in other words. Food, bits and bridles, +noises, vehicles, are used to direct the ways in which the +natural or instinctive responses of horses occur. By operating +steadily to call out certain acts, habits are formed which +function with the same uniformity as the original stimuli. If a +rat is put in a maze and finds food only by making a given number +of turns in a given sequence, his activity is gradually modified +till he habitually takes that course rather than another when he +is hungry. + +Human actions are modified in a like fashion. A burnt child +dreads the fire; if a parent arranged conditions so that every +time a child touched a certain toy he got burned, the child would +learn to avoid that toy as automatically as he avoids touching +fire. So far, however, we are dealing with what may be called +training in distinction from educative teaching. The changes +considered are in outer action rather than in mental and +emotional dispositions of behavior. The distinction is not, +however, a sharp one. The child might conceivably generate in +time a violent antipathy, not only to that particular toy, but to +the class of toys resembling it. The aversion might even persist +after he had forgotten about the original burns; later on he +might even invent some reason to account for his seemingly +irrational antipathy. In some cases, altering the external habit +of action by changing the environment to affect the stimuli to +action will also alter the mental disposition concerned in the +action. Yet this does not always happen; a person trained to +dodge a threatening blow, dodges automatically with no +corresponding thought or emotion. We have to find, then, some +differentia of training from education. + +A clew may be found in the fact that the horse does not really +share in the social use to which his action is put. Some one +else uses the horse to secure a result which is advantageous by +making it advantageous to the horse to perform the act -- he gets +food, etc. But the horse, presumably, does not get any new +interest. He remains interested in food, not in the service he +is rendering. He is not a partner in a shared activity. Were he +to become a copartner, he would, in engaging in the conjoint +activity, have the same interest in its accomplishment which +others have. He would share their ideas and emotions. + +Now in many cases -- too many cases -- the activity of the +immature human being is simply played upon to secure habits which +are useful. He is trained like an animal rather than educated +like a human being. His instincts remain attached to their +original objects of pain or pleasure. But to get happiness or to +avoid the pain of failure he has to act in a way agreeable to +others. In other cases, he really shares or participates in the +common activity. In this case, his original impulse is modified. +He not merely acts in a way agreeing with the actions of others, +but, in so acting, the same ideas and emotions are aroused in him +that animate the others. A tribe, let us say, is warlike. The +successes for which it strives, the achievements upon which it +sets store, are connected with fighting and victory. The +presence of this medium incites bellicose exhibitions in a boy, +first in games, then in fact when he is strong enough. As he +fights he wins approval and advancement; as he refrains, he is +disliked, ridiculed, shut out from favorable recognition. It is +not surprising that his original belligerent tendencies and +emotions are strengthened at the expense of others, and that his +ideas turn to things connected with war. Only in this way can he +become fully a recognized member of his group. Thus his mental +habitudes are gradually assimilated to those of his group. + +If we formulate the principle involved in this illustration, we +shall perceive that the social medium neither implants certain +desires and ideas directly, nor yet merely establishes certain +purely muscular habits of action, like "instinctively" winking or +dodging a blow. Setting up conditions which stimulate certain +visible and tangible ways of acting is the first step. Making +the individual a sharer or partner in the associated activity so +that he feels its success as his success, its failure as his +failure, is the completing step. As soon as he is possessed by +the emotional attitude of the group, he will be alert to +recognize the special ends at which it aims and the means +employed to secure success. His beliefs and ideas, in other +words, will take a form similar to those of others in the group. +He will also achieve pretty much the same stock of knowledge +since that knowledge is an ingredient of his habitual pursuits. + +The importance of language in gaining knowledge is doubtless the +chief cause of the common notion that knowledge may be passed +directly from one to another. It almost seems as if all we have +to do to convey an idea into the mind of another is to convey a +sound into his ear. Thus imparting knowledge gets assimilated to +a purely physical process. But learning from language will be +found, when analyzed, to confirm the principle just laid down. +It would probably be admitted with little hesitation that a child +gets the idea of, say, a hat by using it as other persons do; by +covering the head with it, giving it to others to wear, having it +put on by others when going out, etc. But it may be asked how +this principle of shared activity applies to getting through +speech or reading the idea of, say, a Greek helmet, where no +direct use of any kind enters in. What shared activity is there +in learning from books about the discovery of America? + +Since language tends to become the chief instrument of learning +about many things, let us see how it works. The baby begins of +course with mere sounds, noises, and tones having no meaning, +expressing, that is, no idea. Sounds are just one kind of +stimulus to direct response, some having a soothing effect, +others tending to make one jump, and so on. The sound h-a-t +would remain as meaningless as a sound in Choctaw, a seemingly +inarticulate grunt, if it were not uttered in connection with an +action which is participated in by a number of people. When the +mother is taking the infant out of doors, she says "hat" as she +puts something on the baby's head. Being taken out becomes an +interest to the child; mother and child not only go out with each +other physically, but both are concerned in the going out; they +enjoy it in common. By conjunction with the other factors in +activity the sound "hat" soon gets the same meaning for the child +that it has for the parent; it becomes a sign of the activity +into which it enters. The bare fact that language consists of +sounds which are mutually intelligible is enough of itself to +show that its meaning depends upon connection with a shared +experience. + +In short, the sound h-a-t gains meaning in precisely the same way +that the thing "hat" gains it, by being used in a given way. And +they acquire the same meaning with the child which they have with +the adult because they are used in a common experience by both. +The guarantee for the same manner of use is found in the fact +that the thing and the sound are first employed in a joint +activity, as a means of setting up an active connection between +the child and a grownup. Similar ideas or meanings spring up +because both persons are engaged as partners in an action where +what each does depends upon and influences what the other does. +If two savages were engaged in a joint hunt for game, and a +certain signal meant "move to the right" to the one who uttered +it, and "move to the left" to the one who heard it, they +obviously could not successfully carry on their hunt together. +Understanding one another means that objects, including sounds, +have the same value for both with respect to carrying on a common +pursuit. + +After sounds have got meaning through connection with other +things employed in a joint undertaking, they can be used in +connection with other like sounds to develop new meanings, +precisely as the things for which they stand are combined. Thus +the words in which a child learns about, say, the Greek helmet +originally got a meaning (or were understood) by use in an action +having a common interest and end. They now arouse a new meaning +by inciting the one who hears or reads to rehearse imaginatively +the activities in which the helmet has its use. For the time +being, the one who understands the words "Greek helmet" becomes +mentally a partner with those who used the helmet. He engages, +through his imagination, in a shared activity. It is not easy to +get the full meaning of words. Most persons probably stop with +the idea that "helmet" denotes a queer kind of headgear a people +called the Greeks once wore. We conclude, accordingly, that the +use of language to convey and acquire ideas is an extension and +refinement of the principle that things gain meaning by being +used in a shared experience or joint action; in no sense does it +contravene that principle. When words do not enter as factors +into a shared situation, either overtly or imaginatively, they +operate as pure physical stimuli, not as having a meaning or +intellectual value. They set activity running in a given groove, +but there is no accompanying conscious purpose or meaning. Thus, +for example, the plus sign may be a stimulus to perform the act +of writing one number under another and adding the numbers, but +the person performing the act will operate much as an automaton +would unless he realizes the meaning of what he does. + +3. The Social Medium as Educative. Our net result thus far is +that social environment forms the mental and emotional +disposition of behavior in individuals by engaging them in +activities that arouse and strengthen certain impulses, that have +certain purposes and entail certain consequences. A child +growing up in a family of musicians will inevitably have whatever +capacities he has in music stimulated, and, relatively, +stimulated more than other impulses which might have been +awakened in another environment. Save as he takes an interest in +music and gains a certain competency in it, he is "out of it"; he +is unable to share in the life of the group to which he belongs. +Some kinds of participation in the life of those with whom the +individual is connected are inevitable; with respect to them, the +social environment exercises an educative or formative influence +unconsciously and apart from any set purpose. + +In savage and barbarian communities, such direct participation +(constituting the indirect or incidental education of which we +have spoken) furnishes almost the sole influence for rearing the +young into the practices and beliefs of the group. Even in +present-day societies, it furnishes the basic nurture of even the +most insistently schooled youth. In accord with the interests +and occupations of the group, certain things become objects of +high esteem; others of aversion. Association does not create +impulses or affection and dislike, but it furnishes the objects +to which they attach themselves. The way our group or class does +things tends to determine the proper objects of attention, and +thus to prescribe the directions and limits of observation and +memory. What is strange or foreign (that is to say outside the +activities of the groups) tends to be morally forbidden and +intellectually suspect. It seems almost incredible to us, for +example, that things which we know very well could have escaped +recognition in past ages. We incline to account for it by +attributing congenital stupidity to our forerunners and by +assuming superior native intelligence on our own part. But the +explanation is that their modes of life did not call for +attention to such facts, but held their minds riveted to other +things. Just as the senses require sensible objects to stimulate +them, so our powers of observation, recollection, and imagination +do not work spontaneously, but are set in motion by the demands +set up by current social occupations. The main texture of +disposition is formed, independently of schooling, by such +influences. What conscious, deliberate teaching can do is at +most to free the capacities thus formed for fuller exercise, to +purge them of some of their grossness, and to furnish objects +which make their activity more productive of meaning. + +While this "unconscious influence of the environment" is so +subtle and pervasive that it affects every fiber of character and +mind, it may be worth while to specify a few directions in which +its effect is most marked. First, the habits of language. +Fundamental modes of speech, the bulk of the vocabulary, are +formed in the ordinary intercourse of life, carried on not as a +set means of instruction but as a social necessity. The babe +acquires, as we well say, the mother tongue. While speech habits +thus contracted may be corrected or even displaced by conscious +teaching, yet, in times of excitement, intentionally acquired +modes of speech often fall away, and individuals relapse into +their really native tongue. Secondly, manners. Example is +notoriously more potent than precept. Good manners come, as we +say, from good breeding or rather are good breeding; and breeding +is acquired by habitual action, in response to habitual stimuli, +not by conveying information. Despite the never ending play of +conscious correction and instruction, the surrounding atmosphere +and spirit is in the end the chief agent in forming manners. And +manners are but minor morals. Moreover, in major morals, +conscious instruction is likely to be efficacious only in the +degree in which it falls in with the general "walk and +conversation" of those who constitute the child's social +environment. Thirdly, good taste and esthetic appreciation. If +the eye is constantly greeted by harmonious objects, having +elegance of form and color, a standard of taste naturally grows +up. The effect of a tawdry, unarranged, and over-decorated +environment works for the deterioration of taste, just as meager +and barren surroundings starve out the desire for beauty. +Against such odds, conscious teaching can hardly do more than +convey second-hand information as to what others think. Such +taste never becomes spontaneous and personally engrained, but +remains a labored reminder of what those think to whom one has +been taught to look up. To say that the deeper standards of +judgments of value are framed by the situations into which a +person habitually enters is not so much to mention a fourth +point, as it is to point out a fusion of those already mentioned. +We rarely recognize the extent in which our conscious estimates +of what is worth while and what is not, are due to standards of +which we are not conscious at all. But in general it may be said +that the things which we take for granted without inquiry or +reflection are just the things which determine our conscious +thinking and decide our conclusions. And these habitudes which +lie below the level of reflection are just those which have been +formed in the constant give and take of relationship with others. + +4. The School as a Special Environment. The chief importance of +this foregoing statement of the educative process which goes on +willy-nilly is to lead us to note that the only way in which +adults consciously control the kind of education which the +immature get is by controlling the environment in which they act, +and hence think and feel. We never educate directly, but +indirectly by means of the environment. Whether we permit chance +environments to do the work, or whether we design environments +for the purpose makes a great difference. And any environment is +a chance environment so far as its educative influence is +concerned unless it has been deliberately regulated with +reference to its educative effect. An intelligent home differs +from an unintelligent one chiefly in that the habits of life and +intercourse which prevail are chosen, or at least colored, by the +thought of their bearing upon the development of children. But +schools remain, of course, the typical instance of environments +framed with express reference to influencing the mental and moral +disposition of their members. + +Roughly speaking, they come into existence when social traditions +are so complex that a considerable part of the social store is +committed to writing and transmitted through written symbols. +Written symbols are even more artificial or conventional than +spoken; they cannot be picked up in accidental intercourse with +others. In addition, the written form tends to select and record +matters which are comparatively foreign to everyday life. The +achievements accumulated from generation to generation are +deposited in it even though some of them have fallen temporarily +out of use. Consequently as soon as a community depends to any +considerable extent upon what lies beyond its own territory and +its own immediate generation, it must rely upon the set agency of +schools to insure adequate transmission of all its resources. To +take an obvious illustration: The life of the ancient Greeks and +Romans has profoundly influenced our own, and yet the ways in +which they affect us do not present themselves on the surface of +our ordinary experiences. In similar fashion, peoples still +existing, but remote in space, British, Germans, Italians, +directly concern our own social affairs, but the nature of the +interaction cannot be understood without explicit statement and +attention. In precisely similar fashion, our daily associations +cannot be trusted to make clear to the young the part played in +our activities by remote physical energies, and by invisible +structures. Hence a special mode of social intercourse is +instituted, the school, to care for such matters. + +This mode of association has three functions sufficiently +specific, as compared with ordinary associations of life, to be +noted. First, a complex civilization is too complex to be +assimilated in toto. It has to be broken up into portions, as it +were, and assimilated piecemeal, in a gradual and graded way. +The relationships of our present social life are so numerous and +so interwoven that a child placed in the most favorable position +could not readily share in many of the most important of them. +Not sharing in them, their meaning would not be communicated to +him, would not become a part of his own mental disposition. +There would be no seeing the trees because of the forest. +Business, politics, art, science, religion, would make all at +once a clamor for attention; confusion would be the outcome. The +first office of the social organ we call the school is to provide +a simplified environment. It selects the features which are +fairly fundamental and capable of being responded to by the +young. Then it establishes a progressive order, using the +factors first acquired as means of gaining insight into what is +more complicated. + +In the second place, it is the business of the school environment +to eliminate, so far as possible, the unworthy features of the +existing environment from influence upon mental habitudes. It +establishes a purified medium of action. Selection aims not only +at simplifying but at weeding out what is undesirable. Every +society gets encumbered with what is trivial, with dead wood from +the past, and with what is positively perverse. The school has +the duty of omitting such things from the environment which it +supplies, and thereby doing what it can to counteract their +influence in the ordinary social environment. By selecting the +best for its exclusive use, it strives to reinforce the power of +this best. As a society becomes more enlightened, it realizes +that it is responsible not to transmit and conserve the whole of +its existing achievements, but only such as make for a better +future society. The school is its chief agency for the +accomplishment of this end. + +In the third place, it is the office of the school environment to +balance the various elements in the social environment, and to +see to it that each individual gets an opportunity to escape from +the limitations of the social group in which he was born, and to +come into living contact with a broader environment. Such words +as "society" and "community" are likely to be misleading, for +they have a tendency to make us think there is a single thing +corresponding to the single word. As a matter of fact, a modern +society is many societies more or less loosely connected. Each +household with its immediate extension of friends makes a +society; the village or street group of playmates is a community; +each business group, each club, is another. Passing beyond these +more intimate groups, there is in a country like our own a +variety of races, religious affiliations, economic divisions. +Inside the modern city, in spite of its nominal political unity, +there are probably more communities, more differing customs, +traditions, aspirations, and forms of government or control, than +existed in an entire continent at an earlier epoch. + +Each such group exercises a formative influence on the active +dispositions of its members. A clique, a club, a gang, a Fagin's +household of thieves, the prisoners in a jail, provide educative +environments for those who enter into their collective or +conjoint activities, as truly as a church, a labor union, a +business partnership, or a political party. Each of them is a +mode of associated or community life, quite as much as is a +family, a town, or a state. There are also communities whose +members have little or no direct contact with one another, like +the guild of artists, the republic of letters, the members of the +professional learned class scattered over the face of the earth. +For they have aims in common, and the activity of each member is +directly modified by knowledge of what others are doing. + +In the olden times, the diversity of groups was largely a +geographical matter. There were many societies, but each, within +its own territory, was comparatively homogeneous. But with the +development of commerce, transportation, intercommunication, and +emigration, countries like the United States are composed of a +combination of different groups with different traditional +customs. It is this situation which has, perhaps more than any +other one cause, forced the demand for an educational institution +which shall provide something like a homogeneous and balanced +environment for the young. Only in this way can the centrifugal +forces set up by juxtaposition of different groups within one and +the same political unit be counteracted. The intermingling in +the school of youth of different races, differing religions, and +unlike customs creates for all a new and broader environment. +Common subject matter accustoms all to a unity of outlook upon a +broader horizon than is visible to the members of any group while +it is isolated. The assimilative force of the American public +school is eloquent testimony to the efficacy of the common and +balanced appeal. + +The school has the function also of coordinating within the +disposition of each individual the diverse influences of the +various social environments into which he enters. One code +prevails in the family; another, on the street; a third, in the +workshop or store; a fourth, in the religious association. As a +person passes from one of the environments to another, he is +subjected to antagonistic pulls, and is in danger of being split +into a being having different standards of judgment and emotion +for different occasions. This danger imposes upon the school a +steadying and integrating office. + + +Summary. The development within the young of the attitudes and +dispositions necessary to the continuous and progressive life of +a society cannot take place by direct conveyance of beliefs, +emotions, and knowledge. It takes place through the intermediary +of the environment. The environment consists of the sum total of +conditions which are concerned in the execution of the activity +characteristic of a living being. The social environment +consists of all the activities of fellow beings that are bound up +in the carrying on of the activities of any one of its members. +It is truly educative in its effect in the degree in which an +individual shares or participates in some conjoint activity. By +doing his share in the associated activity, the individual +appropriates the purpose which actuates it, becomes familiar with +its methods and subject matters, acquires needed skill, and is +saturated with its emotional spirit. + +The deeper and more intimate educative formation of disposition +comes, without conscious intent, as the young gradually partake +of the activities of the various groups to which they may belong. +As a society becomes more complex, however, it is found necessary +to provide a special social environment which shall especially +look after nurturing the capacities of the immature. Three of +the more important functions of this special environment are: +simplifying and ordering the factors of the disposition it is +wished to develop; purifying and idealizing the existing social +customs; creating a wider and better balanced environment than +that by which the young would be likely, if left to themselves, +to be influenced. + +Chapter Three: Education as Direction + +1. The Environment as Directive. + +We now pass to one of the special forms which the general +function of education assumes: namely, that of direction, +control, or guidance. Of these three words, direction, control, +and guidance, the last best conveys the idea of assisting through +cooperation the natural capacities of the individuals guided; +control conveys rather the notion of an energy brought to bear +from without and meeting some resistance from the one controlled; +direction is a more neutral term and suggests the fact that the +active tendencies of those directed are led in a certain +continuous course, instead of dispersing aimlessly. Direction +expresses the basic function, which tends at one extreme to +become a guiding assistance and at another, a regulation or +ruling. But in any case, we must carefully avoid a meaning +sometimes read into the term "control." It is sometimes assumed, +explicitly or unconsciously, that an individual's tendencies are +naturally purely individualistic or egoistic, and thus +antisocial. Control then denotes the process by which he is +brought to subordinate his natural impulses to public or common +ends. Since, by conception, his own nature is quite alien to +this process and opposes it rather than helps it, control has in +this view a flavor of coercion or compulsion about it. Systems +of government and theories of the state have been built upon this +notion, and it has seriously affected educational ideas and +practices. But there is no ground for any such view. +Individuals are certainly interested, at times, in having their +own way, and their own way may go contrary to the ways of others. +But they are also interested, and chiefly interested upon the +whole, in entering into the activities of others and taking part +in conjoint and cooperative doings. Otherwise, no such thing as +a community would be possible. And there would not even be any +one interested in furnishing the policeman to keep a semblance of +harmony unless he thought that thereby he could gain some +personal advantage. Control, in truth, means only an emphatic +form of direction of powers, and covers the regulation gained by +an individual through his own efforts quite as much as that +brought about when others take the lead. + +In general, every stimulus directs activity. It does not simply +excite it or stir it up, but directs it toward an object. Put +the other way around, a response is not just a re-action, a +protest, as it were, against being disturbed; it is, as the word +indicates, an answer. It meets the stimulus, and corresponds +with it. There is an adaptation of the stimulus and response to +each other. A light is the stimulus to the eye to see something, +and the business of the eye is to see. If the eyes are open and +there is light, seeing occurs; the stimulus is but a condition of +the fulfillment of the proper function of the organ, not an +outside interruption. To some extent, then, all direction or +control is a guiding of activity to its own end; it is an +assistance in doing fully what some organ is already tending to +do. + +This general statement needs, however, to be qualified in two +respects. In the first place, except in the case of a small +number of instincts, the stimuli to which an immature human being +is subject are not sufficiently definite to call out, in the +beginning, specific responses. There is always a great deal of +superfluous energy aroused. This energy may be wasted, going +aside from the point; it may also go against the successful +performance of an act. It does harm by getting in the way. +Compare the behavior of a beginner in riding a bicycle with that +of the expert. There is little axis of direction in the energies +put forth; they are largely dispersive and centrifugal. +Direction involves a focusing and fixating of action in order +that it may be truly a response, and this requires an elimination +of unnecessary and confusing movements. In the second place, +although no activity can be produced in which the person does not +cooperate to some extent, yet a response may be of a kind which +does not fit into the sequence and continuity of action. A +person boxing may dodge a particular blow successfully, but in +such a way as to expose himself the next instant to a still +harder blow. Adequate control means that the successive acts are +brought into a continuous order; each act not only meets its +immediate stimulus but helps the acts which follow. + +In short, direction is both simultaneous and successive. At a +given time, it requires that, from all the tendencies that are +partially called out, those be selected which center energy upon +the point of need. Successively, it requires that each act be +balanced with those which precede and come after, so that order +of activity is achieved. Focusing and ordering are thus the two +aspects of direction, one spatial, the other temporal. The first +insures hitting the mark; the second keeps the balance required +for further action. Obviously, it is not possible to separate +them in practice as we have distinguished them in idea. Activity +must be centered at a given time in such a way as to prepare for +what comes next. The problem of the immediate response is +complicated by one's having to be on the lookout for future +occurrences. + +Two conclusions emerge from these general statements. On the one +hand, purely external direction is impossible. The environment +can at most only supply stimuli to call out responses. These +responses proceed from tendencies already possessed by the +individual. Even when a person is frightened by threats into +doing something, the threats work only because the person has an +instinct of fear. If he has not, or if, though having it, it is +under his own control, the threat has no more influence upon him +than light has in causing a person to see who has no eyes. While +the customs and rules of adults furnish stimuli which direct as +well as evoke the activities of the young, the young, after all, +participate in the direction which their actions finally take. +In the strict sense, nothing can be forced upon them or into +them. To overlook this fact means to distort and pervert human +nature. To take into account the contribution made by the +existing instincts and habits of those directed is to direct them +economically and wisely. Speaking accurately, all direction is +but re-direction; it shifts the activities already going on into +another channel. Unless one is cognizant of the energies which +are already in operation, one's attempts at direction will almost +surely go amiss. + +On the other hand, the control afforded by the customs and +regulations of others may be short-sighted. It may accomplish +its immediate effect, but at the expense of throwing the +subsequent action of the person out of balance. A threat may, +for example, prevent a person from doing something to which he is +naturally inclined by arousing fear of disagreeable consequences +if he persists. But he may be left in the position which exposes +him later on to influences which will lead him to do even worse +things. His instincts of cunning and slyness may be aroused, so +that things henceforth appeal to him on the side of evasion and +trickery more than would otherwise have been the case. Those +engaged in directing the actions of others are always in danger +of overlooking the importance of the sequential development of +those they direct. + +2. Modes of Social Direction. Adults are naturally most +conscious of directing the conduct of others when they are +immediately aiming so to do. As a rule, they have such an aim +consciously when they find themselves resisted; when others are +doing things they do not wish them to do. But the more permanent +and influential modes of control are those which operate from +moment to moment continuously without such deliberate intention +on our part. + +1. When others are not doing what we would like them to or are +threatening disobedience, we are most conscious of the need of +controlling them and of the influences by which they are +controlled. In such cases, our control becomes most direct, and +at this point we are most likely to make the mistakes just spoken +of. We are even likely to take the influence of superior force +for control, forgetting that while we may lead a horse to water +we cannot make him drink; and that while we can shut a man up in +a penitentiary we cannot make him penitent. In all such cases of +immediate action upon others, we need to discriminate between +physical results and moral results. A person may be in such a +condition that forcible feeding or enforced confinement is +necessary for his own good. A child may have to be snatched with +roughness away from a fire so that he shall not be burnt. But no +improvement of disposition, no educative effect, need follow. A +harsh and commanding tone may be effectual in keeping a child +away from the fire, and the same desirable physical effect will +follow as if he had been snatched away. But there may be no more +obedience of a moral sort in one case than in the other. A man +can be prevented from breaking into other persons' houses by +shutting him up, but shutting him up may not alter his +disposition to commit burglary. When we confuse a physical with +an educative result, we always lose the chance of enlisting the +person's own participating disposition in getting the result +desired, and thereby of developing within him an intrinsic and +persisting direction in the right way. + +In general, the occasion for the more conscious acts of control +should be limited to acts which are so instinctive or impulsive +that the one performing them has no means of foreseeing their +outcome. If a person cannot foresee the consequences of his act, +and is not capable of understanding what he is told about its +outcome by those with more experience, it is impossible for him +to guide his act intelligently. In such a state, every act is +alike to him. Whatever moves him does move him, and that is all +there is to it. In some cases, it is well to permit him to +experiment, and to discover the consequences for himself in order +that he may act intelligently next time under similar +circumstances. But some courses of action are too discommoding +and obnoxious to others to allow of this course being pursued. +Direct disapproval is now resorted to. Shaming, ridicule, +disfavor, rebuke, and punishment are used. Or contrary +tendencies in the child are appealed to to divert him from his +troublesome line of behavior. His sensitiveness to approbation, +his hope of winning favor by an agreeable act, are made use of to +induce action in another direction. + +2. These methods of control are so obvious (because so +intentionally employed) that it would hardly be worth while to +mention them if it were not that notice may now be taken, by way +of contrast, of the other more important and permanent mode of +control. This other method resides in the ways in which persons, +with whom the immature being is associated, use things; the +instrumentalities with which they accomplish their own ends. The +very existence of the social medium in which an individual lives, +moves, and has his being is the standing effective agency of +directing his activity. + +This fact makes it necessary for us to examine in greater detail +what is meant by the social environment. We are given to +separating from each other the physical and social environments +in which we live. The separation is responsible on one hand for +an exaggeration of the moral importance of the more direct or +personal modes of control of which we have been speaking; and on +the other hand for an exaggeration, in current psychology and +philosophy, of the intellectual possibilities of contact with a +purely physical environment. There is not, in fact, any such +thing as the direct influence of one human being on another apart +from use of the physical environment as an intermediary. A +smile, a frown, a rebuke, a word of warning or encouragement, all +involve some physical change. Otherwise, the attitude of one +would not get over to alter the attitude of another. +Comparatively speaking, such modes of influence may be regarded +as personal. The physical medium is reduced to a mere means of +personal contact. In contrast with such direct modes of mutual +influence, stand associations in common pursuits involving the +use of things as means and as measures of results. Even if the +mother never told her daughter to help her, or never rebuked her +for not helping, the child would be subjected to direction in her +activities by the mere fact that she was engaged, along with the +parent, in the household life. Imitation, emulation, the need of +working together, enforce control. + +If the mother hands the child something needed, the latter must +reach the thing in order to get it. Where there is giving there +must be taking. The way the child handles the thing after it is +got, the use to which it is put, is surely influenced by the fact +that the child has watched the mother. When the child sees the +parent looking for something, it is as natural for it also to +look for the object and to give it over when it finds it, as it +was, under other circumstances, to receive it. Multiply such an +instance by the thousand details of daily intercourse, and one +has a picture of the most permanent and enduring method of giving +direction to the activities of the young. + +In saying this, we are only repeating what was said previously +about participating in a joint activity as the chief way of +forming disposition. We have explicitly added, however, the +recognition of the part played in the joint activity by the use +of things. The philosophy of learning has been unduly dominated +by a false psychology. It is frequently stated that a person +learns by merely having the qualities of things impressed upon +his mind through the gateway of the senses. Having received a +store of sensory impressions, association or some power of mental +synthesis is supposed to combine them into ideas--into things +with a meaning. An object, stone, orange, tree, chair, is +supposed to convey different impressions of color, shape, size, +hardness, smell, taste, etc., which aggregated together +constitute the characteristic meaning of each thing. But as +matter of fact, it is the characteristic use to which the thing +is put, because of its specific qualities, which supplies the +meaning with which it is identified. A chair is a thing which is +put to one use; a table, a thing which is employed for another +purpose; an orange is a thing which costs so much, which is grown +in warm climes, which is eaten, and when eaten has an agreeable +odor and refreshing taste, etc. + +The difference between an adjustment to a physical stimulus and a +mental act is that the latter involves response to a thing in its +meaning; the former does not. A noise may make me jump without +my mind being implicated. When I hear a noise and run and get +water and put out a blaze, I respond intelligently; the sound +meant fire, and fire meant need of being extinguished. I bump +into a stone, and kick it to one side purely physically. I put +it to one side for fear some one will stumble upon it, +intelligently; I respond to a meaning which the thing has. I am +startled by a thunderclap whether I recognize it or not -- more +likely, if I do not recognize it. But if I say, either out loud +or to myself, that is thunder, I respond to the disturbance as a +meaning. My behavior has a mental quality. When things have a +meaning for us, we mean (intend, propose) what we do: when they +do not, we act blindly, unconsciously, unintelligently. + +In both kinds of responsive adjustment, our activities are +directed or controlled. But in the merely blind response, +direction is also blind. There may be training, but there is no +education. Repeated responses to recurrent stimuli may fix a +habit of acting in a certain way. All of us have many habits of +whose import we are quite unaware, since they were formed without +our knowing what we were about. Consequently they possess us, +rather than we them. They move us; they control us. Unless we +become aware of what they accomplish, and pass judgment upon the +worth of the result, we do not control them. A child might be +made to bow every time he met a certain person by pressure on his +neck muscles, and bowing would finally become automatic. It +would not, however, be an act of recognition or deference on his +part, till he did it with a certain end in view -- as having a +certain meaning. And not till he knew what he was about and +performed the act for the sake of its meaning could he be said to +be "brought up" or educated to act in a certain way. To have an +idea of a thing is thus not just to get certain sensations from +it. It is to be able to respond to the thing in view of its +place in an inclusive scheme of action; it is to foresee the +drift and probable consequence of the action of the thing upon us +and of our action upon it. To have the same ideas about things +which others have, to be like-minded with them, and thus to be +really members of a social group, is therefore to attach the same +meanings to things and to acts which others attach. Otherwise, +there is no common understanding, and no community life. But in +a shared activity, each person refers what he is doing to what +the other is doing and vice-versa. That is, the activity of each +is placed in the same inclusive situation. To pull at a rope at +which others happen to be pulling is not a shared or conjoint +activity, unless the pulling is done with knowledge that others +are pulling and for the sake of either helping or hindering what +they are doing. A pin may pass in the course of its manufacture +through the hands of many persons. But each may do his part +without knowledge of what others do or without any reference to +what they do; each may operate simply for the sake of a separate +result--his own pay. There is, in this case, no common +consequence to which the several acts are referred, and hence no +genuine intercourse or association, in spite of juxtaposition, +and in spite of the fact that their respective doings contribute +to a single outcome. But if each views the consequences of his +own acts as having a bearing upon what others are doing and takes +into account the consequences of their behavior upon himself, +then there is a common mind; a common intent in behavior. There +is an understanding set up between the different contributors; +and this common understanding controls the action of each. +Suppose that conditions were so arranged that one person +automatically caught a ball and then threw it to another person +who caught and automatically returned it; and that each so acted +without knowing where the ball came from or went to. Clearly, +such action would be without point or meaning. It might be +physically controlled, but it would not be socially directed. +But suppose that each becomes aware of what the other is doing, +and becomes interested in the other's action and thereby +interested in what he is doing himself as connected with the +action of the other. The behavior of each would then be +intelligent; and socially intelligent and guided. Take one more +example of a less imaginary kind. An infant is hungry, and cries +while food is prepared in his presence. If he does not connect +his own state with what others are doing, nor what they are doing +with his own satisfaction, he simply reacts with increasing +impatience to his own increasing discomfort. He is physically +controlled by his own organic state. But when he makes a back +and forth reference, his whole attitude changes. He takes an +interest, as we say; he takes note and watches what others are +doing. He no longer reacts just to his own hunger, but behaves +in the light of what others are doing for its prospective +satisfaction. In that way, he also no longer just gives way to +hunger without knowing it, but he notes, or recognizes, or +identifies his own state. It becomes an object for him. His +attitude toward it becomes in some degree intelligent. And in +such noting of the meaning of the actions of others and of his +own state, he is socially directed. + +It will be recalled that our main proposition had two sides. One +of them has now been dealt with: namely, that physical things do +not influence mind (or form ideas and beliefs) except as they are +implicated in action for prospective consequences. The other +point is persons modify one another's dispositions only through +the special use they make of physical conditions. Consider first +the case of so-called expressive movements to which others are +sensitive; blushing, smiling, frowning, clinching of fists, +natural gestures of all kinds. In themselves, these are not +expressive. They are organic parts of a person's attitude. One +does not blush to show modesty or embarrassment to others, but +because the capillary circulation alters in response to stimuli. +But others use the blush, or a slightly perceptible tightening of +the muscles of a person with whom they are associated, as a sign +of the state in which that person finds himself, and as an +indication of what course to pursue. The frown signifies an +imminent rebuke for which one must prepare, or an uncertainty and +hesitation which one must, if possible, remove by saying or doing +something to restore confidence. A man at some distance is +waving his arms wildly. One has only to preserve an attitude of +detached indifference, and the motions of the other person will +be on the level of any remote physical change which we happen to +note. If we have no concern or interest, the waving of the arms +is as meaningless to us as the gyrations of the arms of a +windmill. But if interest is aroused, we begin to participate. +We refer his action to something we are doing ourselves or that +we should do. We have to judge the meaning of his act in order +to decide what to do. Is he beckoning for help? Is he warning us +of an explosion to be set off, against which we should guard +ourselves? In one case, his action means to run toward him; in +the other case, to run away. In any case, it is the change he +effects in the physical environment which is a sign to us of how +we should conduct ourselves. Our action is socially controlled +because we endeavor to refer what we are to do to the same +situation in which he is acting. + +Language is, as we have already seen (ante, p. 15) a case of this +joint reference of our own action and that of another to a common +situation. Hence its unrivaled significance as a means of social +direction. But language would not be this efficacious instrument +were it not that it takes place upon a background of coarser and +more tangible use of physical means to accomplish results. A +child sees persons with whom he lives using chairs, hats, tables, +spades, saws, plows, horses, money in certain ways. If he has +any share at all in what they are doing, he is led thereby to use +things in the same way, or to use other things in a way which +will fit in. If a chair is drawn up to a table, it is a sign +that he is to sit in it; if a person extends his right hand, he +is to extend his; and so on in a never ending stream of detail. +The prevailing habits of using the products of human art and the +raw materials of nature constitute by all odds the deepest and +most pervasive mode of social control. When children go to +school, they already have "minds" -- they have knowledge and +dispositions of judgment which may be appealed to through the use +of language. But these "minds" are the organized habits of +intelligent response which they have previously required by +putting things to use in connection with the way other persons +use things. The control is inescapable; it saturates +disposition. The net outcome of the discussion is that the +fundamental means of control is not personal but intellectual. +It is not "moral" in the sense that a person is moved by direct +personal appeal from others, important as is this method at +critical junctures. It consists in the habits of understanding, +which are set up in using objects in correspondence with others, +whether by way of cooperation and assistance or rivalry and +competition. Mind as a concrete thing is precisely the power to +understand things in terms of the use made of them; a socialized +mind is the power to understand them in terms of the use to which +they are turned in joint or shared situations. And mind in this +sense is the method of social control. + +3. Imitation and Social Psychology. We have already noted the +defects of a psychology of learning which places the individual +mind naked, as it were, in contact with physical objects, and +which believes that knowledge, ideas, and beliefs accrue from +their interaction. Only comparatively recently has the +predominating influence of association with fellow beings in the +formation of mental and moral disposition been perceived. Even +now it is usually treated as a kind of adjunct to an alleged +method of learning by direct contact with things, and as merely +supplementing knowledge of the physical world with knowledge of +persons. The purport of our discussion is that such a view makes +an absurd and impossible separation between persons and things. +Interaction with things may form habits of external adjustment. +But it leads to activity having a meaning and conscious intent +only when things are used to produce a result. And the only way +one person can modify the mind of another is by using physical +conditions, crude or artificial, so as to evoke some answering +activity from him. Such are our two main conclusions. It is +desirable to amplify and enforce them by placing them in contrast +with the theory which uses a psychology of supposed direct +relationships of human beings to one another as an adjunct to the +psychology of the supposed direct relation of an individual to +physical objects. In substance, this so-called social psychology +has been built upon the notion of imitation. Consequently, we +shall discuss the nature and role of imitation in the formation +of mental disposition. + +According to this theory, social control of individuals rests +upon the instinctive tendency of individuals to imitate or copy +the actions of others. The latter serve as models. The +imitative instinct is so strong that the young devote themselves +to conforming to the patterns set by others and reproducing them +in their own scheme of behavior. According to our theory, what +is here called imitation is a misleading name for partaking with +others in a use of things which leads to consequences of common +interest. The basic error in the current notion of imitation is +that it puts the cart before the horse. It takes an effect for +the cause of the effect. There can be no doubt that individuals +in forming a social group are like-minded; they understand one +another. They tend to act with the same controlling ideas, +beliefs, and intentions, given similar circumstances. Looked at +from without, they might be said to be engaged in "imitating" one +another. In the sense that they are doing much the same sort of +thing in much the same sort of way, this would be true enough. +But "imitation" throws no light upon why they so act; it repeats +the fact as an explanation of itself. It is an explanation of +the same order as the famous saying that opium puts men to sleep +because of its dormitive power. + +Objective likeness of acts and the mental satisfaction found in +being in conformity with others are baptized by the name +imitation. This social fact is then taken for a psychological +force, which produced the likeness. A considerable portion of +what is called imitation is simply the fact that persons being +alike in structure respond in the same way to like stimuli. +Quite independently of imitation, men on being insulted get angry +and attack the insulter. This statement may be met by citing the +undoubted fact that response to an insult takes place in +different ways in groups having different customs. In one group, +it may be met by recourse to fisticuffs, in another by a +challenge to a duel, in a third by an exhibition of contemptuous +disregard. This happens, so it is said, because the model set +for imitation is different. But there is no need to appeal to +imitation. The mere fact that customs are different means that +the actual stimuli to behavior are different. Conscious +instruction plays a part; prior approvals and disapprovals have a +large influence. Still more effective is the fact that unless an +individual acts in the way current in his group, he is literally +out of it. He can associate with others on intimate and equal +terms only by behaving in the way in which they behave. The +pressure that comes from the fact that one is let into the group +action by acting in one way and shut out by acting in another way +is unremitting. What is called the effect of imitation is mainly +the product of conscious instruction and of the selective +influence exercised by the unconscious confirmations and +ratifications of those with whom one associates. + +Suppose that some one rolls a ball to a child; he catches it and +rolls it back, and the game goes on. Here the stimulus is not +just the sight of the ball, or the sight of the other rolling it. +It is the situation -- the game which is playing. The response +is not merely rolling the ball back; it is rolling it back so +that the other one may catch and return it, -- that the game may +continue. The "pattern" or model is not the action of the other +person. The whole situation requires that each should adapt his +action in view of what the other person has done and is to do. +Imitation may come in but its role is subordinate. The child has +an interest on his own account; he wants to keep it going. He +may then note how the other person catches and holds the ball in +order to improve his own acts. He imitates the means of doing, +not the end or thing to be done. And he imitates the means +because he wishes, on his own behalf, as part of his own +initiative, to take an effective part in the game. One has only +to consider how completely the child is dependent from his +earliest days for successful execution of his purposes upon +fitting his acts into those of others to see what a premium is +put upon behaving as others behave, and of developing an +understanding of them in order that he may so behave. The +pressure for likemindedness in action from this source is so +great that it is quite superfluous to appeal to imitation. As +matter of fact, imitation of ends, as distinct from imitation of +means which help to reach ends, is a superficial and transitory +affair which leaves little effect upon disposition. Idiots are +especially apt at this kind of imitation; it affects outward acts +but not the meaning of their performance. When we find children +engaging in this sort of mimicry, instead of encouraging them (as +we would do if it were an important means of social control) we +are more likely to rebuke them as apes, monkeys, parrots, or copy +cats. Imitation of means of accomplishment is, on the other +hand, an intelligent act. It involves close observation, and +judicious selection of what will enable one to do better +something which he already is trying to do. Used for a purpose, +the imitative instinct may, like any other instinct, become a +factor in the development of effective action. + +This excursus should, accordingly, have the effect of reinforcing +the conclusion that genuine social control means the formation of +a certain mental disposition; a way of understanding objects, +events, and acts which enables one to participate effectively in +associated activities. Only the friction engendered by meeting +resistance from others leads to the view that it takes place by +forcing a line of action contrary to natural inclinations. Only +failure to take account of the situations in which persons are +mutually concerned (or interested in acting responsively to one +another) leads to treating imitation as the chief agent in +promoting social control. + +4. Some Applications to Education. Why does a savage group +perpetuate savagery, and a civilized group civilization? +Doubtless the first answer to occur to mind is because savages +are savages; being of low-grade intelligence and perhaps +defective moral sense. But careful study has made it doubtful +whether their native capacities are appreciably inferior to those +of civilized man. It has made it certain that native differences +are not sufficient to account for the difference in culture. In +a sense the mind of savage peoples is an effect, rather than a +cause, of their backward institutions. Their social activities +are such as to restrict their objects of attention and interest, +and hence to limit the stimuli to mental development. Even as +regards the objects that come within the scope of attention, +primitive social customs tend to arrest observation and +imagination upon qualities which do not fructify in the mind. +Lack of control of natural forces means that a scant number of +natural objects enter into associated behavior. Only a small +number of natural resources are utilized and they are not worked +for what they are worth. The advance of civilization means that +a larger number of natural forces and objects have been +transformed into instrumentalities of action, into means for +securing ends. We start not so much with superior capacities as +with superior stimuli for evocation and direction of our +capacities. The savage deals largely with crude stimuli; we have +weighted stimuli. Prior human efforts have made over natural +conditions. As they originally existed they were indifferent to +human endeavors. Every domesticated plant and animal, every +tool, every utensil, every appliance, every manufactured article, +every esthetic decoration, every work of art means a +transformation of conditions once hostile or indifferent to +characteristic human activities into friendly and favoring +conditions. Because the activities of children today are +controlled by these selected and charged stimuli, children are +able to traverse in a short lifetime what the race has needed +slow, tortured ages to attain. The dice have been loaded by all +the successes which have preceded. + +Stimuli conducive to economical and effective response, such as +our system of roads and means of transportation, our ready +command of heat, light, and electricity, our ready-made machines +and apparatus for every purpose, do not, by themselves or in +their aggregate, constitute a civilization. But the uses to +which they are put are civilization, and without the things the +uses would be impossible. Time otherwise necessarily devoted to +wresting a livelihood from a grudging environment and securing a +precarious protection against its inclemencies is freed. A body +of knowledge is transmitted, the legitimacy of which is +guaranteed by the fact that the physical equipment in which it is +incarnated leads to results that square with the other facts of +nature. Thus these appliances of art supply a protection, +perhaps our chief protection, against a recrudescence of these +superstitious beliefs, those fanciful myths and infertile +imaginings about nature in which so much of the best intellectual +power of the past has been spent. If we add one other factor, +namely, that such appliances be not only used, but used in the +interests of a truly shared or associated life, then the +appliances become the positive resources of civilization. If +Greece, with a scant tithe of our material resources, achieved a +worthy and noble intellectual and artistic career, it is because +Greece operated for social ends such resources as it had. +But whatever the situation, whether one of barbarism or +civilization, whether one of stinted control of physical forces, +or of partial enslavement to a mechanism not yet made tributary +to a shared experience, things as they enter into action furnish +the educative conditions of daily life and direct the formation +of mental and moral disposition. + +Intentional education signifies, as we have already seen, a +specially selected environment, the selection being made on the +basis of materials and method specifically promoting growth in +the desired direction. Since language represents the physical +conditions that have been subjected to the maximum transformation +in the interests of social life -- physical things which have +lost their original quality in becoming social tools -- it is +appropriate that language should play a large part compared with +other appliances. By it we are led to share vicariously in past +human experience, thus widening and enriching the experience of +the present. We are enabled, symbolically and imaginatively, to +anticipate situations. In countless ways, language condenses +meanings that record social outcomes and presage social +outlooks. So significant is it of a liberal share in what is +worth while in life that unlettered and uneducated have become +almost synonymous. + +The emphasis in school upon this particular tool has, however, +its dangers -- dangers which are not theoretical but exhibited in +practice. Why is it, in spite of the fact that teaching by +pouring in, learning by a passive absorption, are universally +condemned, that they are still so entrenched in practice? That +education is not an affair of "telling" and being told, but an +active and constructive process, is a principle almost as +generally violated in practice as conceded in theory. Is not +this deplorable situation due to the fact that the doctrine is +itself merely told? It is preached; it is lectured; it is written +about. But its enactment into practice requires that the school +environment be equipped with agencies for doing, with tools and +physical materials, to an extent rarely attained. It requires +that methods of instruction and administration be modified to +allow and to secure direct and continuous occupations with +things. Not that the use of language as an educational resource +should lessen; but that its use should be more vital and fruitful +by having its normal connection with shared activities. "These +things ought ye to have done, and not to have left the others +undone." And for the school "these things" mean equipment with +the instrumentalities of cooperative or joint activity. + +For when the schools depart from the educational conditions +effective in the out-of-school environment, they necessarily +substitute a bookish, a pseudo-intellectual spirit for a social +spirit. Children doubtless go to school to learn, but it has yet +to be proved that learning occurs most adequately when it is made +a separate conscious business. When treating it as a business of +this sort tends to preclude the social sense which comes from +sharing in an activity of common concern and value, the effort at +isolated intellectual learning contradicts its own aim. We may +secure motor activity and sensory excitation by keeping an +individual by himself, but we cannot thereby get him to +understand the meaning which things have in the life of which he +is a part. We may secure technical specialized ability in +algebra, Latin, or botany, but not the kind of intelligence which +directs ability to useful ends. Only by engaging in a joint +activity, where one person's use of material and tools is +consciously referred to the use other persons are making of their +capacities and appliances, is a social direction of disposition +attained. + +Summary. The natural or native impulses of the young do not +agree with the life-customs of the group into which they are +born. Consequently they have to be directed or guided. This +control is not the same thing as physical compulsion; it consists +in centering the impulses acting at any one time upon some +specific end and in introducing an order of continuity into the +sequence of acts. The action of others is always influenced by +deciding what stimuli shall call out their actions. But in some +cases as in commands, prohibitions, approvals, and disapprovals, +the stimuli proceed from persons with a direct view to +influencing action. Since in such cases we are most conscious of +controlling the action of others, we are likely to exaggerate the +importance of this sort of control at the expense of a more +permanent and effective method. The basic control resides in the +nature of the situations in which the young take part. In social +situations the young have to refer their way of acting to what +others are doing and make it fit in. This directs their action +to a common result, and gives an understanding common to the +participants. For all mean the same thing, even when performing +different acts. This common understanding of the means and ends +of action is the essence of social control. It is indirect, or +emotional and intellectual, not direct or personal. Moreover it +is intrinsic to the disposition of the person, not external and +coercive. To achieve this internal control through identity of +interest and understanding is the business of education. While +books and conversation can do much, these agencies are usually +relied upon too exclusively. Schools require for their full +efficiency more opportunity for conjoint activities in which +those instructed take part, so that they may acquire a social +sense of their own powers and of the materials and appliances +used. + + +Chapter Four: Education as Growth + +1. The Conditions of Growth. + +In directing the activities of the young, society determines its +own future in determining that of the young. Since the young at +a given time will at some later date compose the society of that +period, the latter's nature will largely turn upon the direction +children's activities were given at an earlier period. This +cumulative movement of action toward a later result is what is +meant by growth. + +The primary condition of growth is immaturity. This may seem to +be a mere truism -- saying that a being can develop only in some +point in which he is undeveloped. But the prefix "im" of the +word immaturity means something positive, not a mere void or +lack. It is noteworthy that the terms "capacity" and +"potentiality" have a double meaning, one sense being negative, +the other positive. Capacity may denote mere receptivity, like +the capacity of a quart measure. We may mean by potentiality a +merely dormant or quiescent state -- a capacity to become +something different under external influences. But we also mean +by capacity an ability, a power; and by potentiality potency, +force. Now when we say that immaturity means the possibility of +growth, we are not referring to absence of powers which may exist +at a later time; we express a force positively present -- the +ability to develop. + +Our tendency to take immaturity as mere lack, and growth as +something which fills up the gap between the immature and the +mature is due to regarding childhood comparatively, instead of +intrinsically. We treat it simply as a privation because we are +measuring it by adulthood as a fixed standard. This fixes +attention upon what the child has not, and will not have till he +becomes a man. This comparative standpoint is legitimate enough +for some purposes, but if we make it final, the question arises +whether we are not guilty of an overweening presumption. +Children, if they could express themselves articulately and +sincerely, would tell a different tale; and there is excellent +adult authority for the conviction that for certain moral and +intellectual purposes adults must become as little children. +The seriousness of the assumption of the negative quality of the +possibilities of immaturity is apparent when we reflect that it +sets up as an ideal and standard a static end. The fulfillment +of growing is taken to mean an accomplished growth: that is to +say, an Ungrowth, something which is no longer growing. The +futility of the assumption is seen in the fact that every adult +resents the imputation of having no further possibilities of +growth; and so far as he finds that they are closed to him mourns +the fact as evidence of loss, instead of falling back on the +achieved as adequate manifestation of power. Why an unequal +measure for child and man? + +Taken absolutely, instead of comparatively, immaturity designates +a positive force or ability, -- the pouter to grow. We do not +have to draw out or educe positive activities from a child, as +some educational doctrines would have it. Where there is life, +there are already eager and impassioned activities. Growth is +not something done to them; it is something they do. The +positive and constructive aspect of possibility gives the key to +understanding the two chief traits of immaturity, dependence and +plasticity. + +(1) It sounds absurd to hear dependence spoken of as something +positive, still more absurd as a power. Yet if helplessness were +all there were in dependence, no development could ever take +place. A merely impotent being has to be carried, forever, by +others. The fact that dependence is accompanied by growth in +ability, not by an ever increasing lapse into parasitism, +suggests that it is already something constructive. Being merely +sheltered by others would not promote growth. For + +(2) it would only build a wall around impotence. With reference +to the physical world, the child is helpless. He lacks at birth +and for a long time thereafter power to make his way physically, +to make his own living. If he had to do that by himself, he +would hardly survive an hour. On this side his helplessness is +almost complete. The young of the brutes are immeasurably his +superiors. He is physically weak and not able to turn the +strength which he possesses to coping with the physical +environment. + +1. The thoroughgoing character of this helplessness suggests, +however, some compensating power. The relative ability of the +young of brute animals to adapt themselves fairly well to +physical conditions from an early period suggests the fact that +their life is not intimately bound up with the life of those +about them. They are compelled, so to speak, to have physical +gifts because they are lacking in social gifts. Human infants, +on the other hand, can get along with physical incapacity just +because of their social capacity. We sometimes talk and think as +if they simply happened to be physically in a social environment; +as if social forces exclusively existed in the adults who take +care of them, they being passive recipients. If it were said +that children are themselves marvelously endowed with power to +enlist the cooperative attention of others, this would be thought +to be a backhanded way of saying that others are marvelously +attentive to the needs of children. But observation shows that +children are gifted with an equipment of the first order for +social intercourse. Few grown-up persons retain all of the +flexible and sensitive ability of children to vibrate +sympathetically with the attitudes and doings of those about +them. Inattention to physical things (going with incapacity to +control them) is accompanied by a corresponding intensification +of interest and attention as to the doings of people. The native +mechanism of the child and his impulses all tend to facile social +responsiveness. The statement that children, before adolescence, +are egotistically self-centered, even if it were true, would not +contradict the truth of this statement. It would simply indicate +that their social responsiveness is employed on their own behalf, +not that it does not exist. But the statement is not true as +matter of fact. The facts which are cited in support of the +alleged pure egoism of children really show the intensity and +directness with which they go to their mark. If the ends which +form the mark seem narrow and selfish to adults, it is only +because adults (by means of a similar engrossment in their day) +have mastered these ends, which have consequently ceased to +interest them. Most of the remainder of children's alleged +native egoism is simply an egoism which runs counter to an +adult's egoism. To a grown-up person who is too absorbed in his +own affairs to take an interest in children's affairs, children +doubtless seem unreasonably engrossed in their own affairs. + +From a social standpoint, dependence denotes a power rather than +a weakness; it involves interdependence. There is always a +danger that increased personal independence will decrease the +social capacity of an individual. In making him more +self-reliant, it may make him more self-sufficient; it may lead +to aloofness and indifference. It often makes an individual so +insensitive in his relations to others as to develop an illusion +of being really able to stand and act alone -- an unnamed form of +insanity which is responsible for a large part of the remediable +suffering of the world. + +2. The specific adaptability of an immature creature for growth +constitutes his plasticity. This is something quite different +from the plasticity of putty or wax. It is not a capacity to +take on change of form in accord with external pressure. It lies +near the pliable elasticity by which some persons take on the +color of their surroundings while retaining their own bent. But +it is something deeper than this. It is essentially the ability +to learn from experience; the power to retain from one experience +something which is of avail in coping with the difficulties of a +later situation. This means power to modify actions on the basis +of the results of prior experiences, the power to develop +dispositions. Without it, the acquisition of habits is +impossible. + +It is a familiar fact that the young of the higher animals, and +especially the human young, have to learn to utilize their +instinctive reactions. The human being is born with a greater +number of instinctive tendencies than other animals. But the +instincts of the lower animals perfect themselves for appropriate +action at an early period after birth, while most of those of the +human infant are of little account just as they stand. An +original specialized power of adjustment secures immediate +efficiency, but, like a railway ticket, it is good for one route +only. A being who, in order to use his eyes, ears, hands, and +legs, has to experiment in making varied combinations of their +reactions, achieves a control that is flexible and varied. A +chick, for example, pecks accurately at a bit of food in a few +hours after hatching. This means that definite coordinations of +activities of the eyes in seeing and of the body and head in +striking are perfected in a few trials. An infant requires about +six months to be able to gauge with approximate accuracy the +action in reaching which will coordinate with his visual +activities; to be able, that is, to tell whether he can reach a +seen object and just how to execute the reaching. As a result, +the chick is limited by the relative perfection of its original +endowment. The infant has the advantage of the multitude of +instinctive tentative reactions and of the experiences that +accompany them, even though he is at a temporary disadvantage +because they cross one another. In learning an action, instead +of having it given ready-made, one of necessity learns to vary +its factors, to make varied combinations of them, according to +change of circumstances. A possibility of continuing progress is +opened up by the fact that in learning one act, methods are +developed good for use in other situations. Still more important +is the fact that the human being acquires a habit of learning. +He learns to learn. + +The importance for human life of the two facts of dependence and +variable control has been summed up in the doctrine of the +significance of prolonged infancy. 1 This prolongation is +significant from the standpoint of the adult members of the group +as well as from that of the young. The presence of dependent and +learning beings is a stimulus to nurture and affection. The need +for constant continued care was probably a chief means in +transforming temporary cohabitations into permanent unions. It +certainly was a chief influence in forming habits of affectionate +and sympathetic watchfulness; that constructive interest in the +well-being of others which is essential to associated life. +Intellectually, this moral development meant the introduction of +many new objects of attention; it stimulated foresight and +planning for the future. Thus there is a reciprocal influence. +Increasing complexity of social life requires a longer period of +infancy in which to acquire the needed powers; this prolongation +of dependence means prolongation of plasticity, or power of +acquiring variable and novel modes of control. Hence it provides +a further push to social progress. + +2. Habits as Expressions of Growth. We have already noted that +plasticity is the capacity to retain and carry over from prior +experience factors which modify subsequent activities. This +signifies the capacity to acquire habits, or develop definite +dispositions. We have now to consider the salient features of +habits. In the first place, a habit is a form of executive +skill, of efficiency in doing. A habit means an ability to use +natural conditions as means to ends. It is an active control of +the environment through control of the organs of action. We are +perhaps apt to emphasize the control of the body at the expense +of control of the environment. We think of walking, talking, +playing the piano, the specialized skills characteristic of the +etcher, the surgeon, the bridge-builder, as if they were simply +ease, deftness, and accuracy on the part of the organism. They +are that, of course; but the measure of the value of these +qualities lies in the economical and effective control of the +environment which they secure. To be able to walk is to have +certain properties of nature at our disposal--and so with all +other habits. + +Education is not infrequently defined as consisting in the +acquisition of those habits that effect an adjustment of an +individual and his environment. The definition expresses an +essential phase of growth. But it is essential that adjustment +be understood in its active sense of control of means for +achieving ends. If we think of a habit simply as a change +wrought in the organism, ignoring the fact that this change +consists in ability to effect subsequent changes in the +environment, we shall be led to think of "adjustment" as a +conformity to environment as wax conforms to the seal which +impresses it. The environment is thought of as something fixed, +providing in its fixity the end and standard of changes taking +place in the organism; adjustment is just fitting ourselves to +this fixity of external conditions. 2 Habit as habituation is +indeed something relatively passive; we get used to our +surroundings -- to our clothing, our shoes, and gloves; to the +atmosphere as long as it is fairly equable; to our daily +associates, etc. Conformity to the environment, a change wrought +in the organism without reference to ability to modify +surroundings, is a marked trait of such habituations. Aside from +the fact that we are not entitled to carry over the traits of +such adjustments (which might well be called accommodations, to +mark them off from active adjustments) into habits of active use +of our surroundings, two features of habituations are worth +notice. In the first place, we get used to things by first using +them. + +Consider getting used to a strange city. At first, there is +excessive stimulation and excessive and ill-adapted response. +Gradually certain stimuli are selected because of their +relevancy, and others are degraded. We can say either that we do +not respond to them any longer, or more truly that we have +effected a persistent response to them -- an equilibrium of +adjustment. This means, in the second place, that this enduring +adjustment supplies the background upon which are made specific +adjustments, as occasion arises. We are never interested in +changing the whole environment; there is much that we take for +granted and accept just as it already is. Upon this background +our activities focus at certain points in an endeavor to +introduce needed changes. Habituation is thus our adjustment to +an environment which at the time we are not concerned with +modifying, and which supplies a leverage to our active habits. +Adaptation, in fine, is quite as much adaptation of the +environment to our own activities as of our activities to the +environment. A savage tribe manages to live on a desert plain. +It adapts itself. But its adaptation involves a maximum of +accepting, tolerating, putting up with things as they are, a +maximum of passive acquiescence, and a minimum of active control, +of subjection to use. A civilized people enters upon the scene. +It also adapts itself. It introduces irrigation; it searches the +world for plants and animals that will flourish under such +conditions; it improves, by careful selection, those which are +growing there. As a consequence, the wilderness blossoms as a +rose. The savage is merely habituated; the civilized man has +habits which transform the environment. + +The significance of habit is not exhausted, however, in its +executive and motor phase. It means formation of intellectual +and emotional disposition as well as an increase in ease, +economy, and efficiency of action. Any habit marks an +inclination -- an active preference and choice for the conditions +involved in its exercise. A habit does not wait, Micawber-like, +for a stimulus to turn up so that it may get busy; it actively +seeks for occasions to pass into full operation. If its +expression is unduly blocked, inclination shows itself in +uneasiness and intense craving. A habit also marks an +intellectual disposition. Where there is a habit, there is +acquaintance with the materials and equipment to which action is +applied. There is a definite way of understanding the situations +in which the habit operates. Modes of thought, of observation +and reflection, enter as forms of skill and of desire into the +habits that make a man an engineer, an architect, a physician, or +a merchant. In unskilled forms of labor, the intellectual +factors are at minimum precisely because the habits involved are +not of a high grade. But there are habits of judging and +reasoning as truly as of handling a tool, painting a picture, or +conducting an experiment. Such statements are, however, +understatements. The habits of mind involved in habits of the +eye and hand supply the latter with their significance. Above +all, the intellectual element in a habit fixes the relation of +the habit to varied and elastic use, and hence to continued +growth. We speak of fixed habits. Well, the phrase may mean +powers so well established that their possessor always has them +as resources when needed. But the phrase is also used to mean +ruts, routine ways, with loss of freshness, open- mindedness, and +originality. Fixity of habit may mean that something has a fixed +hold upon us, instead of our having a free hold upon things. +This fact explains two points in a common notion about habits: +their identification with mechanical and external modes of action +to the neglect of mental and moral attitudes, and the tendency to +give them a bad meaning, an identification with "bad habits." +Many a person would feel surprised to have his aptitude in his +chosen profession called a habit, and would naturally think of +his use of tobacco, liquor, or profane language as typical of the +meaning of habit. A habit is to him something which has a hold +on him, something not easily thrown off even though judgment +condemn it. + +Habits reduce themselves to routine ways of acting, or degenerate +into ways of action to which we are enslaved just in the degree +in which intelligence is disconnected from them. Routine habits +are unthinking habits: "bad" habits are habits so severed from +reason that they are opposed to the conclusions of conscious +deliberation and decision. As we have seen, the acquiring of +habits is due to an original plasticity of our natures: to our +ability to vary responses till we find an appropriate and +efficient way of acting. Routine habits, and habits that possess +us instead of our possessing them, are habits which put an end to +plasticity. They mark the close of power to vary. There can be +no doubt of the tendency of organic plasticity, of the +physiological basis, to lessen with growing years. The +instinctively mobile and eagerly varying action of childhood, the +love of new stimuli and new developments, too easily passes into +a "settling down," which means aversion to change and a resting +on past achievements. Only an environment which secures the full +use of intelligence in the process of forming habits can +counteract this tendency. Of course, the same hardening of the +organic conditions affects the physiological structures which are +involved in thinking. But this fact only indicates the need of +persistent care to see to it that the function of intelligence is +invoked to its maximum possibility. The short-sighted method +which falls back on mechanical routine and repetition to secure +external efficiency of habit, motor skill without accompanying +thought, marks a deliberate closing in of surroundings upon +growth. + +3. The Educational Bearings of the Conception of Development. +We have had so far but little to say in this chapter about +education. We have been occupied with the conditions and +implications of growth. If our conclusions are justified, they +carry with them, however, definite educational consequences. +When it is said that education is development, everything depends +upon how development is conceived. Our net conclusion is that +life is development, and that developing, growing, is life. +Translated into its educational equivalents, that means (i) that +the educational process has no end beyond itself; it is its own +end; and that (ii) the educational process is one of continual +reorganizing, reconstructing, transforming. + +1. Development when it is interpreted in comparative terms, that +is, with respect to the special traits of child and adult life, +means the direction of power into special channels: the formation +of habits involving executive skill, definiteness of interest, +and specific objects of observation and thought. But the +comparative view is not final. The child has specific powers; to +ignore that fact is to stunt or distort the organs upon which his +growth depends. The adult uses his powers to transform his +environment, thereby occasioning new stimuli which redirect his +powers and keep them developing. Ignoring this fact means +arrested development, a passive accommodation. Normal child and +normal adult alike, in other words, are engaged in growing. The +difference between them is not the difference between growth and +no growth, but between the modes of growth appropriate to +different conditions. With respect to the development of powers +devoted to coping with specific scientific and economic problems +we may say the child should be growing in manhood. With respect +to sympathetic curiosity, unbiased responsiveness, and openness +of mind, we may say that the adult should be growing in +childlikeness. One statement is as true as the other. + +Three ideas which have been criticized, namely, the merely +privative nature of immaturity, static adjustment to a fixed +environment, and rigidity of habit, are all connected with a +false idea of growth or development, -- that it is a movement +toward a fixed goal. Growth is regarded as having an end, +instead of being an end. The educational counterparts of the +three fallacious ideas are first, failure to take account of the +instinctive or native powers of the young; secondly, failure to +develop initiative in coping with novel situations; thirdly, an +undue emphasis upon drill and other devices which secure +automatic skill at the expense of personal perception. In all +cases, the adult environment is accepted as a standard for the +child. He is to be brought up to it. + +Natural instincts are either disregarded or treated as nuisances +-- as obnoxious traits to be suppressed, or at all events to be +brought into conformity with external standards. Since +conformity is the aim, what is distinctively individual in a +young person is brushed aside, or regarded as a source of +mischief or anarchy. Conformity is made equivalent to +uniformity. Consequently, there are induced lack of interest in +the novel, aversion to progress, and dread of the uncertain and +the unknown. Since the end of growth is outside of and beyond +the process of growing, external agents have to be resorted to to +induce movement toward it. Whenever a method of education is +stigmatized as mechanical, we may be sure that external pressure +is brought to bear to reach an external end. + +2. Since in reality there is nothing to which growth is relative +save more growth, there is nothing to which education is +subordinate save more education. It is a commonplace to say that +education should not cease when one leaves school. The point of +this commonplace is that the purpose of school education is to +insure the continuance of education by organizing the powers that +insure growth. The inclination to learn from life itself and to +make the conditions of life such that all will learn in the +process of living is the finest product of schooling. + +When we abandon the attempt to define immaturity by means of +fixed comparison with adult accomplishments, we are compelled to +give up thinking of it as denoting lack of desired traits. +Abandoning this notion, we are also forced to surrender our habit +of thinking of instruction as a method of supplying this lack by +pouring knowledge into a mental and moral hole which awaits +filling. Since life means growth, a living creature lives as +truly and positively at one stage as at another, with the same +intrinsic fullness and the same absolute claims. Hence education +means the enterprise of supplying the conditions which insure +growth, or adequacy of life, irrespective of age. We first look +with impatience upon immaturity, regarding it as something to be +got over as rapidly as possible. Then the adult formed by such +educative methods looks back with impatient regret upon childhood +and youth as a scene of lost opportunities and wasted powers. +This ironical situation will endure till it is recognized that +living has its own intrinsic quality and that the business of +education is with that quality. Realization that life is growth +protects us from that so-called idealizing of childhood which in +effect is nothing but lazy indulgence. Life is not to be +identified with every superficial act and interest. Even though +it is not always easy to tell whether what appears to be mere +surface fooling is a sign of some nascent as yet untrained power, +we must remember that manifestations are not to be accepted as +ends in themselves. They are signs of possible growth. They are +to be turned into means of development, of carrying power +forward, not indulged or cultivated for their own sake. +Excessive attention to surface phenomena (even in the way of +rebuke as well as of encouragement) may lead to their fixation +and thus to arrested development. What impulses are moving +toward, not what they have been, is the important thing for +parent and teacher. The true principle of respect for immaturity +cannot be better put than in the words of Emerson: "Respect the +child. Be not too much his parent. Trespass not on his +solitude. But I hear the outcry which replies to this +suggestion: Would you verily throw up the reins of public and +private discipline; would you leave the young child to the mad +career of his own passions and whimsies, and call this anarchy a +respect for the child's nature? I answer, -- Respect the child, +respect him to the end, but also respect yourself.... The two +points in a boy's training are, to keep his naturel and train off +all but that; to keep his naturel, but stop off his uproar, +fooling, and horseplay; keep his nature and arm it with knowledge +in the very direction in which it points." And as Emerson goes on +to show this reverence for childhood and youth instead of opening +up an easy and easy-going path to the instructors, "involves at +once, immense claims on the time, the thought, on the life of the +teacher. It requires time, use, insight, event, all the great +lessons and assistances of God; and only to think of using it +implies character and profoundness." + +Summary. Power to grow depends upon need for others and +plasticity. Both of these conditions are at their height in +childhood and youth. Plasticity or the power to learn from +experience means the formation of habits. Habits give control +over the environment, power to utilize it for human purposes. +Habits take the form both of habituation, or a general and +persistent balance of organic activities with the surroundings, +and of active capacities to readjust activity to meet new +conditions. The former furnishes the background of growth; the +latter constitute growing. Active habits involve thought, +invention, and initiative in applying capacities to new aims. +They are opposed to routine which marks an arrest of growth. +Since growth is the characteristic of life, education is all one +with growing; it has no end beyond itself. The criterion of the +value of school education is the extent in which it creates a +desire for continued growth and supplies means for making the +desire effective in fact. + +1 Intimations of its significance are found in a number of +writers, but John Fiske, in his Excursions of an Evolutionist, is +accredited with its first systematic exposition. + +2 This conception is, of course, a logical correlate of the +conceptions of the external relation of stimulus and response, +considered in the last chapter, and of the negative conceptions +of immaturity and plasticity noted in this chapter. + + +Chapter Five: Preparation, Unfolding, and Formal Discipline + +1. Education as Preparation. We have laid it down that the +educative process is a continuous process of growth, having as +its aim at every stage an added capacity of growth. This +conception contrasts sharply with other ideas which have +influenced practice. By making the contrast explicit, the +meaning of the conception will be brought more clearly to light. +The first contrast is with the idea that education is a process +of preparation or getting ready. What is to be prepared for is, +of course, the responsibilities and privileges of adult life. +Children are not regarded as social members in full and regular +standing. They are looked upon as candidates; they are placed on +the waiting list. The conception is only carried a little +farther when the life of adults is considered as not having +meaning on its own account, but as a preparatory probation for +"another life." The idea is but another form of the notion of the +negative and privative character of growth already criticized; +hence we shall not repeat the criticisms, but pass on to the evil +consequences which flow from putting education on this basis. +In the first place, it involves loss of impetus. Motive power is +not utilized. Children proverbially live in the present; that is +not only a fact not to be evaded, but it is an excellence. The +future just as future lacks urgency and body. To get ready for +something, one knows not what nor why, is to throw away the +leverage that exists, and to seek for motive power in a vague +chance. Under such circumstances, there is, in the second place, +a premium put on shilly-shallying and procrastination. The +future prepared for is a long way off; plenty of time will +intervene before it becomes a present. Why be in a hurry about +getting ready for it? The temptation to postpone is much +increased because the present offers so many wonderful +opportunities and proffers such invitations to adventure. +Naturally attention and energy go to them; education accrues +naturally as an outcome, but a lesser education than if the full +stress of effort had been put upon making conditions as educative +as possible. A third undesirable result is the substitution of a +conventional average standard of expectation and requirement for +a standard which concerns the specific powers of the individual +under instruction. For a severe and definite judgment based upon +the strong and weak points of the individual is substituted a +vague and wavering opinion concerning what youth may be expected, +upon the average, to become in some more or less remote future; +say, at the end of the year, when promotions are to take place, +or by the time they are ready to go to college or to enter upon +what, in contrast with the probationary stage, is regarded as the +serious business of life. It is impossible to overestimate the +loss which results from the deflection of attention from the +strategic point to a comparatively unproductive point. It fails +most just where it thinks it is succeeding -- in getting a +preparation for the future. + +Finally, the principle of preparation makes necessary recourse on +a large scale to the use of adventitious motives of pleasure and +pain. The future having no stimulating and directing power when +severed from the possibilities of the present, something must be +hitched on to it to make it work. Promises of reward and threats +of pain are employed. Healthy work, done for present reasons and +as a factor in living, is largely unconscious. The stimulus +resides in the situation with which one is actually confronted. +But when this situation is ignored, pupils have to be told that +if they do not follow the prescribed course penalties will +accrue; while if they do, they may expect, some time in the +future, rewards for their present sacrifices. Everybody knows +how largely systems of punishment have had to be resorted to by +educational systems which neglect present possibilities in behalf +of preparation for a future. Then, in disgust with the harshness +and impotency of this method, the pendulum swings to the opposite +extreme, and the dose of information required against some later +day is sugar-coated, so that pupils may be fooled into taking +something which they do not care for. + +It is not of course a question whether education should prepare +for the future. If education is growth, it must progressively +realize present possibilities, and thus make individuals better +fitted to cope with later requirements. Growing is not something +which is completed in odd moments; it is a continuous leading +into the future. If the environment, in school and out, supplies +conditions which utilize adequately the present capacities of the +immature, the future which grows out of the present is surely +taken care of. The mistake is not in attaching importance to +preparation for future need, but in making it the mainspring of +present effort. Because the need of preparation for a +continually developing life is great, it is imperative that every +energy should be bent to making the present experience as rich +and significant as possible. Then as the present merges +insensibly into the future, the future is taken care of. + +2. Education as Unfolding. There is a conception of education +which professes to be based upon the idea of development. But it +takes back with one hand what it proffers with the other. +Development is conceived not as continuous growing, but as the +unfolding of latent powers toward a definite goal. The goal is +conceived of as completion, -perfection. Life at any stage short +of attainment of this goal is merely an unfolding toward it. +Logically the doctrine is only a variant of the preparation +theory. Practically the two differ in that the adherents of the +latter make much of the practical and professional duties for +which one is preparing, while the developmental doctrine speaks +of the ideal and spiritual qualities of the principle which is +unfolding. + +The conception that growth and progress are just approximations +to a final unchanging goal is the last infirmity of the mind in +its transition from a static to a dynamic understanding of life. +It simulates the style of the latter. It pays the tribute of +speaking much of development, process, progress. But all of +these operations are conceived to be merely transitional; they +lack meaning on their own account. They possess significance +only as movements toward something away from what is now going +on. Since growth is just a movement toward a completed being, +the final ideal is immobile. An abstract and indefinite future +is in control with all which that connotes in depreciation of +present power and opportunity. + +Since the goal of perfection, the standard of development, is +very far away, it is so beyond us that, strictly speaking, it is +unattainable. Consequently, in order to be available for present +guidance it must be translated into something which stands for +it. Otherwise we should be compelled to regard any and every +manifestation of the child as an unfolding from within, and hence +sacred. Unless we set up some definite criterion representing +the ideal end by which to judge whether a given attitude or act +is approximating or moving away, our sole alternative is to +withdraw all influences of the environment lest they interfere +with proper development. Since that is not practicable, a +working substitute is set up. Usually, of course, this is some +idea which an adult would like to have a child acquire. +Consequently, by "suggestive questioning" or some other +pedagogical device, the teacher proceeds to "draw out" from the +pupil what is desired. If what is desired is obtained, that is +evidence that the child is unfolding properly. But as the pupil +generally has no initiative of his own in this direction, the +result is a random groping after what is wanted, and the +formation of habits of dependence upon the cues furnished by +others. Just because such methods simulate a true principle and +claim to have its sanction they may do more harm than would +outright "telling," where, at least, it remains with the child +how much will stick. + +Within the sphere of philosophic thought there have been two +typical attempts to provide a working representative of the +absolute goal. Both start from the conception of a whole -- an +absolute -- which is "immanent" in human life. The perfect or +complete ideal is not a mere ideal; it is operative here and now. +But it is present only implicitly, "potentially," or in an +enfolded condition. What is termed development is the gradual +making explicit and outward of what is thus wrapped up. Froebel +and Hegel, the authors of the two philosophic schemes referred +to, have different ideas of the path by which the progressive +realization of manifestation of the complete principle is +effected. According to Hegel, it is worked out through a series +of historical institutions which embody the different factors in +the Absolute. According to Froebel, the actuating force is the +presentation of symbols, largely mathematical, corresponding to +the essential traits of the Absolute. When these are presented +to the child, the Whole, or perfection, sleeping within him, is +awakened. A single example may indicate the method. Every one +familiar with the kindergarten is acquainted with the circle in +which the children gather. It is not enough that the circle is a +convenient way of grouping the children. It must be used +"because it is a symbol of the collective life of mankind in +general." Froebel's recognition of the significance of the native +capacities of children, his loving attention to them, and his +influence in inducing others to study them, represent perhaps the +most effective single force in modern educational theory in +effecting widespread acknowledgment of the idea of growth. But +his formulation of the notion of development and his organization +of devices for promoting it were badly hampered by the fact that +he conceived development to be the unfolding of a ready-made +latent principle. He failed to see that growing is growth, +developing is development, and consequently placed the emphasis +upon the completed product. Thus he set up a goal which meant +the arrest of growth, and a criterion which is not applicable to +immediate guidance of powers, save through translation into +abstract and symbolic formulae. + +A remote goal of complete unfoldedness is, in technical +philosophic language, transcendental. That is, it is something +apart from direct experience and perception. So far as +experience is concerned, it is empty; it represents a vague +sentimental aspiration rather than anything which can be +intelligently grasped and stated. This vagueness must be +compensated for by some a priori formula. Froebel made the +connection between the concrete facts of experience and the +transcendental ideal of development by regarding the former as +symbols of the latter. To regard known things as symbols, +according to some arbitrary a priori formula -- and every a +priori conception must be arbitrary -- is an invitation to +romantic fancy to seize upon any analogies which appeal to it and +treat them as laws. After the scheme of symbolism has been +settled upon, some definite technique must be invented by which +the inner meaning of the sensible symbols used may be brought +home to children. Adults being the formulators of the symbolism +are naturally the authors and controllers of the technique. The +result was that Froebel's love of abstract symbolism often got +the better of his sympathetic insight; and there was substituted +for development as arbitrary and externally imposed a scheme of +dictation as the history of instruction has ever seen. + +With Hegel the necessity of finding some working concrete +counterpart of the inaccessible Absolute took an institutional, +rather than symbolic, form. His philosophy, like Froebel's, +marks in one direction an indispensable contribution to a valid +conception of the process of life. The weaknesses of an abstract +individualistic philosophy were evident to him; he saw the +impossibility of making a clean sweep of historical institutions, +of treating them as despotisms begot in artifice and nurtured in +fraud. In his philosophy of history and society culminated the +efforts of a whole series of German writers -- Lessing, Herder, +Kant, Schiller, Goethe -- to appreciate the nurturing influence +of the great collective institutional products of humanity. For +those who learned the lesson of this movement, it was henceforth +impossible to conceive of institutions or of culture as +artificial. It destroyed completely -- in idea, not in fact -- +the psychology that regarded "mind" as a ready-made possession of +a naked individual by showing the significance of "objective +mind" -- language, government, art, religion -- in the formation +of individual minds. But since Hegel was haunted by the +conception of an absolute goal, he was obliged to arrange +institutions as they concretely exist, on a stepladder of +ascending approximations. Each in its time and place is +absolutely necessary, because a stage in the self-realizing +process of the absolute mind. Taken as such a step or stage, its +existence is proof of its complete rationality, for it is an +integral element in the total, which is Reason. Against +institutions as they are, individuals have no spiritual rights; +personal development, and nurture, consist in obedient +assimilation of the spirit of existing institutions. Conformity, +not transformation, is the essence of education. Institutions +change as history shows; but their change, the rise and fall of +states, is the work of the "world-spirit." Individuals, save the +great "heroes" who are the chosen organs of the world-spirit, +have no share or lot in it. In the later nineteenth century, +this type of idealism was amalgamated with the doctrine of +biological evolution. + +"Evolution" was a force working itself out to its own end. As +against it, or as compared with it, the conscious ideas and +preference of individuals are impotent. Or, rather, they are but +the means by which it works itself out. Social progress is an +"organic growth," not an experimental selection. Reason is all +powerful, but only Absolute Reason has any power. + +The recognition (or rediscovery, for the idea was familiar to the +Greeks) that great historic institutions are active factors in +the intellectual nurture of mind was a great contribution to +educational philosophy. It indicated a genuine advance beyond +Rousseau, who had marred his assertion that education must be a +natural development and not something forced or grafted upon +individuals from without, by the notion that social conditions +are not natural. But in its notion of a complete and +all-inclusive end of development, the Hegelian theory swallowed +up concrete individualities, though magnifying The Individual in +the abstract. Some of Hegel's followers sought to reconcile the +claims of the Whole and of individuality by the conception of +society as an organic whole, or organism. That social +organization is presupposed in the adequate exercise of +individual capacity is not to be doubted. But the social +organism, interpreted after the relation of the organs of the +body to each other and to the whole body, means that each +individual has a certain limited place and function, requiring to +be supplemented by the place and functions of the other organs. +As one portion of the bodily tissue is differentiated so that it +can be the hand and the hand only, another, the eye, and so on, +all taken together making the organism, so one individual is +supposed to be differentiated for the exercise of the mechanical +operations of society, another for those of a statesman, another +for those of a scholar, and so on. The notion of "organism" is +thus used to give a philosophic sanction to class distinctions in +social organization--a notion which in its educational +application again means external dictation instead of growth. + +3. Education as Training of Faculties. A theory which has had +great vogue and which came into existence before the notion of +growth had much influence is known as the theory of "formal +discipline." It has in view a correct ideal; one outcome of +education should be the creation of specific powers of +accomplishment. A trained person is one who can do the chief +things which it is important for him to do better than he could +without training: "better" signifying greater ease, efficiency, +economy, promptness, etc. That this is an outcome of education +was indicated in what was said about habits as the product of +educative development. But the theory in question takes, as it +were, a short cut; it regards some powers (to be presently named) +as the direct and conscious aims of instruction, and not simply +as the results of growth. There is a definite number of powers +to be trained, as one might enumerate the kinds of strokes which +a golfer has to master. Consequently education should get +directly at the business of training them. But this implies that +they are already there in some untrained form; otherwise their +creation would have to be an indirect product of other activities +and agencies. Being there already in some crude form, all that +remains is to exercise them in constant and graded repetitions, +and they will inevitably be refined and perfected. In the phrase +"formal discipline" as applied to this conception, "discipline" +refers both to the outcome of trained power and to the method of +training through repeated exercise. + +The forms of powers in question are such things as the faculties +of perceiving, retaining, recalling, associating, attending, +willing, feeling, imagining, thinking, etc., which are then +shaped by exercise upon material presented. In its classic form, +this theory was expressed by Locke. On the one hand, the outer +world presents the material or content of knowledge through +passively received sensations. On the other hand, the mind has +certain ready powers, attention, observation, retention, +comparison, abstraction, compounding, etc. Knowledge results if +the mind discriminates and combines things as they are united and +divided in nature itself. But the important thing for education +is the exercise or practice of the faculties of the mind till +they become thoroughly established habitudes. The analogy +constantly employed is that of a billiard player or gymnast, who +by repeated use of certain muscles in a uniform way at last +secures automatic skill. Even the faculty of thinking was to be +formed into a trained habit by repeated exercises in making and +combining simple distinctions, for which, Locke thought, +mathematics affords unrivaled opportunity. + +Locke's statements fitted well into the dualism of his day. It +seemed to do justice to both mind and matter, the individual and +the world. One of the two supplied the matter of knowledge and +the object upon which mind should work. The other supplied +definite mental powers, which were few in number and which might +be trained by specific exercises. The scheme appeared to give +due weight to the subject matter of knowledge, and yet it +insisted that the end of education is not the bare reception and +storage of information, but the formation of personal powers of +attention, memory, observation, abstraction, and generalization. +It was realistic in its emphatic assertion that all material +whatever is received from without; it was idealistic in that +final stress fell upon the formation of intellectual powers. It +was objective and impersonal in its assertion that the individual +cannot possess or generate any true ideas on his own account; it +was individualistic in placing the end of education in the +perfecting of certain faculties possessed at the outset by the +individual. This kind of distribution of values expressed with +nicety the state of opinion in the generations following upon +Locke. It became, without explicit reference to Locke, a +common-place of educational theory and of psychology. +Practically, it seemed to provide the educator with definite, +instead of vague, tasks. It made the elaboration of a technique +of instruction relatively easy. All that was necessary was to +provide for sufficient practice of each of the powers. This +practice consists in repeated acts of attending, observing, +memorizing, etc. By grading the difficulty of the acts, making +each set of repetitions somewhat more difficult than the set +which preceded it, a complete scheme of instruction is evolved. +There are various ways, equally conclusive, of criticizing this +conception, in both its alleged foundations and in its +educational application. (1) Perhaps the most direct mode of +attack consists in pointing out that the supposed original +faculties of observation, recollection, willing, thinking, etc., +are purely mythological. There are no such ready-made powers +waiting to be exercised and thereby trained. There are, indeed, +a great number of original native tendencies, instinctive modes +of action, based on the original connections of neurones in the +central nervous system. There are impulsive tendencies of the +eyes to follow and fixate light; of the neck muscles to turn +toward light and sound; of the hands to reach and grasp; and turn +and twist and thump; of the vocal apparatus to make sounds; of +the mouth to spew out unpleasant substances; to gag and to curl +the lip, and so on in almost indefinite number. But these +tendencies (a) instead of being a small number sharply marked off +from one another, are of an indefinite variety, interweaving with +one another in all kinds of subtle ways. (b) Instead of being +latent intellectual powers, requiring only exercise for their +perfecting, they are tendencies to respond in certain ways to +changes in the environment so as to bring about other changes. +Something in the throat makes one cough; the tendency is to eject +the obnoxious particle and thus modify the subsequent stimulus. +The hand touches a hot thing; it is impulsively, wholly +unintellectually, snatched away. But the withdrawal alters the +stimuli operating, and tends to make them more consonant with the +needs of the organism. It is by such specific changes of organic +activities in response to specific changes in the medium that +that control of the environment of which we have spoken (see +ante, p. 24) is effected. Now all of our first seeings and +hearings and touchings and smellings and tastings are of this +kind. In any legitimate sense of the words mental or +intellectual or cognitive, they are lacking in these qualities, +and no amount of repetitious exercise could bestow any +intellectual properties of observation, judgment, or intentional +action (volition) upon them. + +(2) Consequently the training of our original impulsive +activities is not a refinement and perfecting achieved by +"exercise" as one might strengthen a muscle by practice. It +consists rather (a) in selecting from the diffused responses +which are evoked at a given time those which are especially +adapted to the utilization of the stimulus. That is to say, +among the reactions of the body in general + +occur upon stimulation of the eye by light, all except those +which are specifically adapted to reaching, grasping, and +manipulating the object effectively are gradually eliminated--or +else no training occurs. As we have already noted, the primary +reactions, with a very few exceptions are too diffused and +general to be practically of much use in the case of the human +infant. Hence the identity of training with selective response. +(Compare p. 25.) (b) Equally important is the specific +coordination of different factors of response which takes place. +There is not merely a selection of the hand reactions which +effect grasping, but of the particular visual stimuli which call +out just these reactions and no others, and an establishment of +connection between the two. But the coordinating does not stop +here. Characteristic temperature reactions may take place when +the object is grasped. These will also be brought in; later, the +temperature reaction may be connected directly with the optical +stimulus, the hand reaction being suppressed--as a bright flame, +independent of close contact, may steer one away. Or the child +in handling the object pounds with it, or crumples it, and a +sound issues. The ear response is then brought into the system +of response. If a certain sound (the conventional name) is made +by others and accompanies the activity, response of both ear and +the vocal apparatus connected with auditory stimulation will also +become an associated factor in the complex response. 2 + +(3) The more specialized the adjustment of response and stimulus +to each other (for, taking the sequence of activities into +account, the stimuli are adapted to reactions as well as +reactions to stimuli) the more rigid and the less generally +available is the training secured. In equivalent language, less +intellectual or educative quality attaches to the training. The +usual way of stating this fact is that the more specialized the +reaction, the less is the skill acquired in practicing and +perfecting it transferable to other modes of behavior. According +to the orthodox theory of formal discipline, a pupil in studying +his spelling lesson acquires, besides ability to spell those +particular words, an increase of power of observation, attention, +and recollection which may be employed whenever these powers are +needed. As matter of fact, the more he confines himself to +noticing and fixating the forms of words, irrespective of +connection with other things (such as the meaning of the words, +the context in which they are habitually used, the derivation and +classification of the verbal form, etc.) the less likely is he to +acquire an ability which can be used for anything except the mere +noting of verbal visual forms. He may not even be increasing his +ability to make accurate distinctions among geometrical forms, to +say nothing of ability to observe in general. He is merely +selecting the stimuli supplied by the forms of the letters and +the motor reactions of oral or written reproduction. The scope +of coordination (to use our prior terminology) is extremely +limited. The connections which are employed in other +observations and recollections (or reproductions) are +deliberately eliminated when the pupil is exercised merely upon +forms of letters and words. Having been excluded, they cannot be +restored when needed. The ability secured to observe and to +recall verbal forms is not available for perceiving and recalling +other things. In the ordinary phraseology, it is not +transferable. But the wider the context--that is to say, the +more varied the stimuli and responses coordinated--the more the +ability acquired is available for the effective performance of +other acts; not, strictly speaking, because there is any +"transfer," but because the wide range of factors employed in the +specific act is equivalent to a broad range of activity, to a +flexible, instead of to a narrow and rigid, coordination. +(4) Going to the root of the matter, the fundamental fallacy of +the theory is its dualism; that is to say, its separation of +activities and capacities from subject matter. There is no such +thing as an ability to see or hear or remember in general; there +is only the ability to see or hear or remember something. To +talk about training a power, mental or physical, in general, +apart from the subject matter involved in its exercise, is +nonsense. Exercise may react upon circulation, breathing, and +nutrition so as to develop vigor or strength, but this reservoir +is available for specific ends only by use in connection with the +material means which accomplish them. Vigor will enable a man to +play tennis or golf or to sail a boat better than he would if he +were weak. But only by employing ball and racket, ball and club, +sail and tiller, in definite ways does he become expert in any +one of them; and expertness in one secures expertness in another +only so far as it is either a sign of aptitude for fine muscular +coordinations or as the same kind of coordination is involved in +all of them. Moreover, the difference between the training of +ability to spell which comes from taking visual forms in a narrow +context and one which takes them in connection with the +activities required to grasp meaning, such as context, +affiliations of descent, etc., may be compared to the difference +between exercises in the gymnasium with pulley weights to +"develop" certain muscles, and a game or sport. The former is +uniform and mechanical; it is rigidly specialized. The latter is +varied from moment to moment; no two acts are quite alike; novel +emergencies have to be met; the coordinations forming have to be +kept flexible and elastic. Consequently, the training is much +more "general"; that is to say, it covers a wider territory and +includes more factors. Exactly the same thing holds of special +and general education of the mind. + +A monotonously uniform exercise may by practice give great skill +in one special act; but the skill is limited to that act, be it +bookkeeping or calculations in logarithms or experiments in +hydrocarbons. One may be an authority in a particular field and +yet of more than usually poor judgment in matters not closely +allied, unless the training in the special field has been of a +kind to ramify into the subject matter of the other fields. +(5) Consequently, such powers as observation, recollection, +judgment, esthetic taste, represent organized results of the +occupation of native active tendencies with certain subject +matters. A man does not observe closely and fully by pressing a +button for the observing faculty to get to work (in other words +by "willing" to observe); but if he has something to do which can +be accomplished successfully only through intensive and extensive +use of eye and hand, he naturally observes. Observation is an +outcome, a consequence, of the interaction of sense organ and +subject matter. It will vary, accordingly, with the subject +matter employed. + +It is consequently futile to set up even the ulterior development +of faculties of observation, memory, etc., unless we have first +determined what sort of subject matter we wish the pupil to +become expert in observing and recalling and for what purpose. +And it is only repeating in another form what has already been +said, to declare that the criterion here must be social. We want +the person to note and recall and judge those things which make +him an effective competent member of the group in which he is +associated with others. Otherwise we might as well set the pupil +to observing carefully cracks on the wall and set him to +memorizing meaningless lists of words in an unknown tongue--which +is about what we do in fact when we give way to the doctrine of +formal discipline. If the observing habits of a botanist or +chemist or engineer are better habits than those which are thus +formed, it is because they deal with subject matter which is more +significant in life. In concluding this portion of the +discussion, we note that the distinction between special and +general education has nothing to do with the transferability of +function or power. In the literal sense, any transfer is +miraculous and impossible. But some activities are broad; they +involve a coordination of many factors. Their development +demands continuous alternation and readjustment. As conditions +change, certain factors are subordinated, and others which had +been of minor importance come to the front. There is constant +redistribution of the focus of the action, as is seen in the +illustration of a game as over against pulling a fixed weight by +a series of uniform motions. Thus there is practice in prompt +making of new combinations with the focus of activity shifted to +meet change in subject matter. Wherever an activity is broad in +scope (that is, involves the coordinating of a large variety of +sub-activities), and is constantly and unexpectedly obliged to +change direction in its progressive development, general +education is bound to result. For this is what "general" means; +broad and flexible. In practice, education meets these +conditions, and hence is general, in the degree in which it takes +account of social relationships. A person may become expert in +technical philosophy, or philology, or mathematics or engineering +or financiering, and be inept and ill-advised in his action and +judgment outside of his specialty. If however his concern with +these technical subject matters has been connected with human +activities having social breadth, the range of active responses +called into play and flexibly integrated is much wider. +Isolation of subject matter from a social context is the chief +obstruction in current practice to securing a general training of +mind. Literature, art, religion, when thus dissociated, are just +as narrowing as the technical things which the professional +upholders of general education strenuously oppose. + +Summary. The conception that the result of the educative process +is capacity for further education stands in contrast with some +other ideas which have profoundly influenced practice. The first +contrasting conception considered is that of preparing or getting +ready for some future duty or privilege. Specific evil effects +were pointed out which result from the fact that this aim diverts +attention of both teacher and taught from the only point to which +it may be fruitfully directed -- namely, taking advantage of the +needs and possibilities of the immediate present. Consequently +it defeats its own professed purpose. The notion that education +is an unfolding from within appears to have more likeness to the +conception of growth which has been set forth. But as worked out +in the theories of Froebel and Hegel, it involves ignoring the +interaction of present organic tendencies with the present +environment, just as much as the notion of preparation. Some +implicit whole is regarded as given ready-made and the +significance of growth is merely transitory; it is not an end in +itself, but simply a means of making explicit what is already +implicit. Since that which is not explicit cannot be made +definite use of, something has to be found to represent it. +According to Froebel, the mystic symbolic value of certain +objects and acts (largely mathematical) stand for the Absolute +Whole which is in process of unfolding. According to Hegel, +existing institutions are its effective actual representatives. +Emphasis upon symbols and institutions tends to divert perception +from the direct growth of experience in richness of meaning. +Another influential but defective theory is that which conceives +that mind has, at birth, certain mental faculties or powers, such +as perceiving, remembering, willing, judging, generalizing, +attending, etc., and that education is the training of these +faculties through repeated exercise. This theory treats subject +matter as comparatively external and indifferent, its value +residing simply in the fact that it may occasion exercise of the +general powers. Criticism was directed upon this separation of +the alleged powers from one another and from the material upon +which they act. The outcome of the theory in practice was shown +to be an undue emphasis upon the training of narrow specialized +modes of skill at the expense of initiative, inventiveness, and +readaptability -- qualities which depend upon the broad and +consecutive interaction of specific activities with one another. +1 As matter of fact, the interconnection is so great, there are +so many paths of construction, that every stimulus brings about +some change in all of the organs of response. We are accustomed +however to ignore most of these modifications of the total +organic activity, concentrating upon that one which is most +specifically adapted to the most urgent stimulus of the moment. +2 This statement should be compared with what was said earlier +about the sequential ordering of responses (p. 25). It is +merely a more explicit statement of the way in which that +consecutive arrangement occurs. + + +Chapter Six: Education as Conservative and Progressive + +1. Education as Formation. We now come to a type of theory +which denies the existence of faculties and emphasizes the unique +role of subject matter in the development of mental and +moral disposition. According to it, education is neither a +process of unfolding from within nor is it a training of +faculties resident in mind itself. It is rather the formation of +mind by setting up certain associations or connections of content +by means of a subject matter presented from without. Education +proceeds by instruction taken in a strictly literal sense, a +building into the mind from without. That education is formative +of mind is not questioned; it is the conception already +propounded. But formation here has a technical meaning dependent +upon the idea of something operating from without. Herbart is +the best historical representative of this type of theory. He +denies absolutely the existence of innate faculties. The mind is +simply endowed with the power of producing various qualities in +reaction to the various realities which act upon it. These +qualitatively different reactions are called presentations +(Vorstellungen). Every presentation once called into being +persists; it may be driven below the "threshold" of consciousness +by new and stronger presentations, produced by the reaction of +the soul to new material, but its activity continues by its own +inherent momentum, below the surface of consciousness. What are +termed faculties -- attention, memory, thinking, perception, even +the sentiments, are arrangements, associations, and +complications, formed by the interaction of these submerged +presentations with one another and with new presentations. +Perception, for example, is the complication of presentations +which result from the rise of old presentations to greet and +combine with new ones; memory is the evoking of an old +presentation above the threshold of consciousness by getting +entangled with another presentation, etc. Pleasure is the result +of reinforcement among the independent activities of +presentations; pain of their pulling different ways, etc. + +The concrete character of mind consists, then, wholly of the +various arrangements formed by the various presentations in their +different qualities. The "furniture" of the mind is the mind. +Mind is wholly a matter of "contents." The educational +implications of this doctrine are threefold. + +(1) This or that kind of mind is formed by the use of objects +which evoke this or that kind of reaction and which produce this +or that arrangement among the reactions called out. The +formation of mind is wholly a matter of the presentation of the +proper educational materials. + +(2) Since the earlier presentations constitute the "apperceiving +organs" which control the assimilation of new presentations, +their character is all important. The effect of new +presentations is to reinforce groupings previously formed. The +business of the educator is, first, to select the proper material +in order to fix the nature of the original reactions, and, +secondly, to arrange the sequence of subsequent presentations on +the basis of the store of ideas secured by prior transactions. +The control is from behind, from the past, instead of, as in the +unfolding conception, in the ultimate goal. + +(3) Certain formal steps of all method in teaching may be laid +down. Presentation of new subject matter is obviously the +central thing, but since knowing consists in the way in which +this interacts with the contents already submerged below +consciousness, the first thing is the step of "preparation," -- +that is, calling into special activity and getting above the +floor of consciousness those older presentations which are to +assimilate the new one. Then after the presentation, follow the +processes of interaction of new and old; then comes the +application of the newly formed content to the performance of +some task. Everything must go through this course; consequently +there is a perfectly uniform method in instruction in all +subjects for all pupils of all ages. + +Herbart's great service lay in taking the work of teaching out of +the region of routine and accident. He brought it into the +sphere of conscious method; it became a conscious business with a +definite aim and procedure, instead of being a compound of casual +inspiration and subservience to tradition. Moreover, everything +in teaching and discipline could be specified, instead of our +having to be content with vague and more or less mystic +generalities about ultimate ideals and speculative spiritual +symbols. He abolished the notion of ready-made faculties, which +might be trained by exercise upon any sort of material, and made +attention to concrete subject matter, to the content, +all-important. Herbart undoubtedly has had a greater influence +in bringing to the front questions connected with the material of +study than any other educational philosopher. He stated problems +of method from the standpoint of their connection with subject +matter: method having to do with the manner and sequence of +presenting new subject matter to insure its proper interaction +with old. + +The fundamental theoretical defect of this view lies in ignoring +the existence in a living being of active and specific functions +which are developed in the redirection and combination which +occur as they are occupied with their environment. The theory +represents the Schoolmaster come to his own. This fact expresses +at once its strength and its weakness. The conception that the +mind consists of what has been taught, and that the importance of +what has been taught consists in its availability for further +teaching, reflects the pedagogue's view of life. The philosophy +is eloquent about the duty of the teacher in instructing pupils; +it is almost silent regarding his privilege of learning. It +emphasizes the influence of intellectual environment upon the +mind; it slurs over the fact that the environment involves a +personal sharing in common experiences. It exaggerates beyond +reason the possibilities of consciously formulated and used +methods, and underestimates the role of vital, unconscious, +attitudes. It insists upon the old, the past, and passes lightly +over the operation of the genuinely novel and unforeseeable. It +takes, in brief, everything educational into account save its +essence, -- vital energy seeking opportunity for effective +exercise. All education forms character, mental and moral, but +formation consists in the selection and coordination of native +activities so that they may utilize the subject matter of the +social environment. Moreover, the formation is not only a +formation of native activities, but it takes place through them. +It is a process of reconstruction, reorganization. + +2. Education as Recapitulation and Retrospection. A peculiar +combination of the ideas of development and formation from +without has given rise to the recapitulation theory of education, +biological and cultural. The individual develops, but his proper +development consists in repeating in orderly stages the past +evolution of animal life and human history. The former +recapitulation occurs physiologically; the latter should be made +to occur by means of education. The alleged biological truth +that the individual in his growth from the simple embryo to +maturity repeats the history of the evolution of animal life in +the progress of forms from the simplest to the most complex (or +expressed technically, that ontogenesis parallels phylogenesis) +does not concern us, save as it is supposed to afford scientific +foundation for cultural recapitulation of the past. Cultural +recapitulation says, first, that children at a certain age are in +the mental and moral condition of savagery; their instincts are +vagrant and predatory because their ancestors at one time lived +such a life. Consequently (so it is concluded) the proper +subject matter of their education at this time is the +material -- especially the literary material of myths, folk-tale, +and song -- produced by humanity in the analogous stage. Then +the child passes on to something corresponding, say, to the +pastoral stage, and so on till at the time when he is ready to +take part in contemporary life, he arrives at the present epoch +of culture. + +In this detailed and consistent form, the theory, outside of a +small school in Germany (followers of Herbart for the most part), +has had little currency. But the idea which underlies it is +that education is essentially retrospective; that it looks +primarily to the past and especially to the literary products of +the past, and that mind is adequately formed in the degree in +which it is patterned upon the spiritual heritage of the past. +This idea has had such immense influence upon higher instruction +especially, that it is worth examination in its extreme +formulation. + +In the first place, its biological basis is fallacious. +Embyronic growth of the human infant preserves, without doubt, +some of the traits of lower forms of life. But in no respect is +it a strict traversing of past stages. If there were any strict +"law" of repetition, evolutionary development would clearly not +have taken place. Each new generation would simply have repeated +its predecessors' existence. Development, in short, has taken +place by the entrance of shortcuts and alterations in the prior +scheme of growth. And this suggests that the aim of education is +to facilitate such short-circuited growth. The great advantage +of immaturity, educationally speaking, is that it enables us to +emancipate the young from the need of dwelling in an outgrown +past. The business of education is rather to liberate the young +from reviving and retraversing the past than to lead them to a +recapitulation of it. The social environment of the young is +constituted by the presence and action of the habits of thinking +and feeling of civilized men. To ignore the directive influence +of this present environment upon the young is simply to abdicate +the educational function. A biologist has said: "The history of +development in different animals . . . offers to us . . . a +series of ingenious, determined, varied but more or less +unsuccessful efforts to escape from the necessity of +recapitulating, and to substitute for the ancestral method a more +direct method." Surely it would be foolish if education did not +deliberately attempt to facilitate similar efforts in conscious +experience so that they become increasingly successful. + +The two factors of truth in the conception may easily be +disentangled from association with the false context which +perverts them. On the biological side we have simply the fact +that any infant starts with precisely the assortment of impulsive +activities with which he does start, they being blind, and many +of them conflicting with one another, casual, sporadic, and +unadapted to their immediate environment. The other point is +that it is a part of wisdom to utilize the products of past +history so far as they are of help for the future. Since they +represent the results of prior experience, their value for future +experience may, of course, be indefinitely great. Literatures +produced in the past are, so far as men are now in possession and +use of them, a part of the present environment of individuals; +but there is an enormous difference between availing ourselves of +them as present resources and taking them as standards and +patterns in their retrospective character. + +(1) The distortion of the first point usually comes about through +misuse of the idea of heredity. It is assumed that heredity +means that past life has somehow predetermined the main traits of +an individual, and that they are so fixed that little serious +change can be introduced into them. Thus taken, the influence of +heredity is opposed to that of the environment, and the efficacy +of the latter belittled. But for educational purposes heredity +means neither more nor less than the original endowment of an +individual. Education must take the being as he is; that a +particular individual has just such and such an equipment of +native activities is a basic fact. That they were produced in +such and such a way, or that they are derived from one's +ancestry, is not especially important for the educator, however +it may be with the biologist, as compared with the fact that they +now exist. Suppose one had to advise or direct a person +regarding his inheritance of property. The fallacy of assuming +that the fact it is an inheritance, predetermines its future use, +is obvious. The advisor is concerned with making the best use of +what is there -- putting it at work under the most favorable +conditions. Obviously he cannot utilize what is not there; +neither can the educator. In this sense, heredity is a limit of +education. Recognition of this fact prevents the waste of energy +and the irritation that ensue from the too prevalent habit of +trying to make by instruction something out of an individual +which he is not naturally fitted to become. But the doctrine +does not determine what use shall be made of the capacities which +exist. And, except in the case of the imbecile, these original +capacities are much more varied and potential, even in the case +of the more stupid, than we as yet know properly how to utilize. +Consequently, while a careful study of the native aptitudes and +deficiencies of an individual is always a preliminary necessity, +the subsequent and important step is to furnish an environment +which will adequately function whatever activities are present. +The relation of heredity and environment is well expressed in the +case of language. If a being had no vocal organs from which +issue articulate sounds, if he had no auditory or other sense- +receptors and no connections between the two sets of apparatus, +it would be a sheer waste of time to try to teach him to +converse. He is born short in that respect, and education must +accept the limitation. But if he has this native equipment, its +possession in no way guarantees that he will ever talk any +language or what language he will talk. The environment in which +his activities occur and by which they are carried into execution +settles these things. If he lived in a dumb unsocial environment +where men refused to talk to one another and used only that +minimum of gestures without which they could not get along, vocal +language would be as unachieved by him as if he had no vocal +organs. If the sounds which he makes occur in a medium of +persons speaking the Chinese language, the activities which make +like sounds will be selected and coordinated. This illustration +may be applied to the entire range of the educability of any +individual. It places the heritage from the past in its right +connection with the demands and opportunities of the present. + +(2) The theory that the proper subject matter of instruction is +found in the culture-products of past ages (either in general, or +more specifically in the particular literatures which were +produced in the culture epoch which is supposed to correspond +with the stage of development of those taught) affords another +instance of that divorce between the process and product of +growth which has been criticized. To keep the process alive, to +keep it alive in ways which make it easier to keep it alive in +the future, is the function of educational subject matter. But +an individual can live only in the present. The present is not +just something which comes after the past; much less something +produced by it. It is what life is in leaving the past behind +it. The study of past products will not help us understand the +present, because the present is not due to the products, but to +the life of which they were the products. A knowledge of the +past and its heritage is of great significance when it enters +into the present, but not otherwise. And the mistake of making +the records and remains of the past the main material of +education is that it cuts the vital connection of present and +past, and tends to make the past a rival of the present and the +present a more or less futile imitation of the past. Under such +circumstances, culture becomes an ornament and solace; a refuge +and an asylum. Men escape from the crudities of the present to +live in its imagined refinements, instead of using what the past +offers as an agency for ripening these crudities. The present, +in short, generates the problems which lead us to search the past +for suggestion, and which supplies meaning to what we find when +we search. The past is the past precisely because it does not +include what is characteristic in the present. The moving +present includes the past on condition that it uses the past to +direct its own movement. The past is a great resource for the +imagination; it adds a new dimension to life, but OD condition +that it be seen as the past of the present, and not as another +and disconnected world. The principle which makes little of the +present act of living and operation of growing, the only thing +always present, naturally looks to the past because the future +goal which it sets up is remote and empty. But having turned its +back upon the present, it has no way of returning to it laden +with the spoils of the past. A mind that is adequately sensitive +to the needs and occasions of the present actuality will have the +liveliest of motives for interest in the background of the +present, and will never have to hunt for a way back because it +will never have lost connection. + +3. Education as Reconstruction. In its contrast with the ideas +both of unfolding of latent powers from within, and of the +formation from without, whether by physical nature or by the +cultural products of the past, the ideal of growth results in the +conception that education is a constant reorganizing or +reconstructing of experience. It has all the time an immediate +end, and so far as activity is educative, it reaches that +end -- the direct transformation of the quality of experience. +Infancy, youth, adult life, -- all stand on the same educative +level in the sense that what is really learned at any and every +stage of experience constitutes the value of that experience, and +in the sense that it is the chief business of life at every point +to make living thus contribute to an enrichment of its own +perceptible meaning. + +We thus reach a technical definition of education: It is that +reconstruction or reorganization of experience which adds to the +meaning of experience, and which increases ability to direct the +course of subsequent experience. (1) The increment of meaning +corresponds to the increased perception of the connections and +continuities of the activities in which we are engaged. The +activity begins in an impulsive form; that is, it is blind. It +does not know what it is about; that is to say, what are its +interactions with other activities. An activity which brings +education or instruction with it makes one aware of some of the +connections which had been imperceptible. To recur to our simple +example, a child who reaches for a bright light gets burned. +Henceforth he knows that a certain act of touching in connection +with a certain act of vision (and vice-versa) means heat and +pain; or, a certain light means a source of heat. The acts by +which a scientific man in his laboratory learns more about flame +differ no whit in principle. By doing certain things, he makes +perceptible certain connections of heat with other things, which +had been previously ignored. Thus his acts in relation to these +things get more meaning; he knows better what he is doing or "is +about" when he has to do with them; he can intend consequences +instead of just letting them happen -- all synonymous ways of +saying the same thing. At the same stroke, the flame has gained +in meaning; all that is known about combustion, oxidation, about +light and temperature, may become an intrinsic part of its +intellectual content. + +(2) The other side of an educative experience is an added power +of subsequent direction or control. To say that one knows what +he is about, or can intend certain consequences, is to say, of +course, that he can better anticipate what is going to happen; +that he can, therefore, get ready or prepare in advance so as to +secure beneficial consequences and avert undesirable ones. A +genuinely educative experience, then, one in which instruction is +conveyed and ability increased, is contradistinguished from a +routine activity on one hand, and a capricious activity on the +other. (a) In the latter one "does not care what happens"; one +just lets himself go and avoids connecting the consequences of +one's act (the evidences of its connections with other things) +with the act. It is customary to frown upon such aimless random +activity, treating it as willful mischief or carelessness or +lawlessness. But there is a tendency to seek the cause of such +aimless activities in the youth's own disposition, isolated from +everything else. But in fact such activity is explosive, and due +to maladjustment with surroundings. Individuals act capriciously +whenever they act under external dictation, or from being told, +without having a purpose of their own or perceiving the bearing +of the deed upon other acts. One may learn by doing something +which he does not understand; even in the most intelligent +action, we do much which we do not mean, because the largest +portion of the connections of the act we consciously intend are +not perceived or anticipated. But we learn only because after +the act is performed we note results which we had not noted +before. But much work in school consists in setting up rules by +which pupils are to act of such a sort that even after pupils +have acted, they are not led to see the connection between the +result -- say the answer -- and the method pursued. So far as +they are concerned, the whole thing is a trick and a kind of +miracle. Such action is essentially capricious, and leads to +capricious habits. (b) Routine action, action which is +automatic, may increase skill to do a particular thing. In so +far, it might be said to have an educative effect. But it does +not lead to new perceptions of bearings and connections; it +limits rather than widens the meaning-horizon. And since the +environment changes and our way of acting has to be modified in +order successfully to keep a balanced connection with things, an +isolated uniform way of acting becomes disastrous at some +critical moment. The vaunted "skill" turns out gross ineptitude. + +The essential contrast of the idea of education as continuous +reconstruction with the other one-sided conceptions which have +been criticized in this and the previous chapter is that it +identifies the end (the result) and the process. This is +verbally self-contradictory, but only verbally. It means that +experience as an active process occupies time and that its later +period completes its earlier portion; it brings to light +connections involved, but hitherto unperceived. The later +outcome thus reveals the meaning of the earlier, while the +experience as a whole establishes a bent or disposition toward +the things possessing this meaning. Every such continuous +experience or activity is educative, and all education resides in +having such experiences. + +It remains only to point out (what will receive more ample +attention later) that the reconstruction of experience may be +social as well as personal. For purposes of simplification we +have spoken in the earlier chapters somewhat as if the education +of the immature which fills them with the spirit of the social +group to which they belong, were a sort of catching up of the +child with the aptitudes and resources of the adult group. In +static societies, societies which make the maintenance of +established custom their measure of value, this conception +applies in the main. But not in progressive communities. They +endeavor to shape the experiences of the young so that instead of +reproducing current habits, better habits shall be formed, and +thus the future adult society be an improvement on their own. +Men have long had some intimation of the extent to which +education may be consciously used to eliminate obvious social +evils through starting the young on paths which shall not produce +these ills, and some idea of the extent in which education may be +made an instrument of realizing the better hopes of men. But we +are doubtless far from realizing the potential efficacy of +education as a constructive agency of improving society, from +realizing that it represents not only a development of children +and youth but also of the future society of which they will be +the constituents. + +Summary. Education may be conceived either retrospectively or +prospectively. That is to say, it may be treated as process of +accommodating the future to the past, or as an utilization of the +past for a resource in a developing future. The former finds its +standards and patterns in what has gone before. The mind may be +regarded as a group of contents resulting from having certain +things presented. In this case, the earlier presentations +constitute the material to which the later are to be assimilated. +Emphasis upon the value of the early experiences of immature +beings is most important, especially because of the tendency to +regard them as of little account. But these experiences do not +consist of externally presented material, but of interaction of +native activities with the environment which progressively +modifies both the activities and the environment. The defect of +the Herbartian theory of formation through presentations +consists in slighting this constant interaction and change. +The same principle of criticism applies to theories which find +the primary subject matter of study in the cultural products -- +especially the literary products -- of man's history. Isolated +from their connection with the present environment in which +individuals have to act, they become a kind of rival and +distracting environment. Their value lies in their use to +increase the meaning of the things with which we have actively to +do at the present time. The idea of education advanced in these +chapters is formally summed up in the idea of continuous +reconstruction of experience, an idea which is marked off from +education as preparation for a remote future, as unfolding, as +external formation, and as recapitulation of the past. + + +Chapter Seven: The Democratic Conception in Education + +For the most part, save incidentally, we have hitherto been +concerned with education as it may exist in any social group. We +have now to make explicit the differences in the spirit, +material, and method of education as it operates in different +types of community life. To say that education is a social +function, securing direction and development in the immature +through their participation in the life of the group to which +they belong, is to say in effect that education will vary with +the quality of life which prevails in a group. Particularly is +it true that a society which not only changes but-which has the +ideal of such change as will improve it, will have different +standards and methods of education from one which aims simply at +the perpetuation of its own customs. To make the general ideas +set forth applicable to our own educational practice, it is, +therefore, necessary to come to closer quarters with the nature +of present social life. + +1. The Implications of Human Association. Society is one word, +but many things. Men associate together in all kinds of ways and +for all kinds of purposes. One man is concerned in a multitude +of diverse groups, in which his associates may be quite +different. It often seems as if they had nothing in common +except that they are modes of associated life. Within every +larger social organization there are numerous minor groups: not +only political subdivisions, but industrial, scientific, +religious, associations. There are political parties with +differing aims, social sets, cliques, gangs, corporations, +partnerships, groups bound closely together by ties of blood, and +so on in endless variety. In many modern states and in some +ancient, there is great diversity of populations, of varying +languages, religions, moral codes, and traditions. From this +standpoint, many a minor political unit, one of our large cities, +for example, is a congeries of loosely associated societies, +rather than an inclusive and permeating community of action and +thought. (See ante, p. 20.) + +The terms society, community, are thus ambiguous. They have both +a eulogistic or normative sense, and a descriptive sense; a +meaning de jure and a meaning de facto. In social philosophy, +the former connotation is almost always uppermost. Society is +conceived as one by its very nature. The qualities which +accompany this unity, praiseworthy community of purpose and +welfare, loyalty to public ends, mutuality of sympathy, are +emphasized. But when we look at the facts which the term denotes +instead of confining our attention to its intrinsic connotation, +we find not unity, but a plurality of societies, good and bad. +Men banded together in a criminal conspiracy, business +aggregations that prey upon the public while serving it, +political machines held together by the interest of plunder, are +included. If it is said that such organizations are not +societies because they do not meet the ideal requirements of the +notion of society, the answer, in part, is that the conception of +society is then made so "ideal" as to be of no use, having no +reference to facts; and in part, that each of these +organizations, no matter how opposed to the interests of other +groups, has something of the praiseworthy qualities of "Society" +which hold it together. There is honor among thieves, and a band +of robbers has a common interest as respects its members. Gangs +are marked by fraternal feeling, and narrow cliques by intense +loyalty to their own codes. Family life may be marked by +exclusiveness, suspicion, and jealousy as to those without, and +yet be a model of amity and mutual aid within. Any education +given by a group tends to socialize its members, but the quality +and value of the socialization depends upon the habits and aims +of the group. Hence, once more, the need of a measure for the +worth of any given mode of social life. In seeking this measure, +we have to avoid two extremes. We cannot set up, out of our +heads, something we regard as an ideal society. We must base our +conception upon societies which actually exist, in order to have +any assurance that our ideal is a practicable one. But, as we +have just seen, the ideal cannot simply repeat the traits which +are actually found. The problem is to extract the desirable +traits of forms of community life which actually exist, and +employ them to criticize undesirable features and suggest +improvement. Now in any social group whatever, even in a gang of +thieves, we find some interest held in common, and we find a +certain amount of interaction and cooperative intercourse with +other groups. From these two traits we derive our standard. How +numerous and varied are the interests which are consciously +shared? How full and free is the interplay with other forms of +association? If we apply these considerations to, say, a criminal +band, we find that the ties which consciously hold the members +together are few in number, reducible almost to a common interest +in plunder; and that they are of such a nature as to isolate the +group from other groups with respect to give and take of the +values of life. Hence, the education such a society gives is +partial and distorted. If we take, on the other hand, the kind +of family life which illustrates the standard, we find that there +are material, intellectual, aesthetic interests in which all +participate and that the progress of one member has worth for the +experience of other members -- it is readily communicable -- and +that the family is not an isolated whole, but enters intimately +into relationships with business groups, with schools, with all +the agencies of culture, as well as with other similar groups, +and that it plays a due part in the political organization and in +return receives support from it. In short, there are many +interests consciously communicated and shared; and there are +varied and free points of contact with other modes of +association. + +I. Let us apply the first element in this criterion to a +despotically governed state. It is not true there is no common +interest in such an organization between governed and governors. +The authorities in command must make some appeal to the native +activities of the subjects, must call some of their powers into +play. Talleyrand said that a government could do everything with +bayonets except sit on them. This cynical declaration is at +least a recognition that the bond of union is not merely one of +coercive force. It may be said, however, that the activities +appealed to are themselves unworthy and degrading -- that such a +government calls into functioning activity simply capacity for +fear. In a way, this statement is true. But it overlooks the +fact that fear need not be an undesirable factor in experience. +Caution, circumspection, prudence, desire to foresee future +events so as to avert what is harmful, these desirable traits are +as much a product of calling the impulse of fear into play as is +cowardice and abject submission. The real difficulty is that the +appeal to fear is isolated. In evoking dread and hope of +specific tangible reward -- say comfort and ease -- many other +capacities are left untouched. Or rather, they are affected, but +in such a way as to pervert them. Instead of operating on their +own account they are reduced to mere servants of attaining +pleasure and avoiding pain. + +This is equivalent to saying that there is no extensive number of +common interests; there is no free play back and forth among the +members of the social group. Stimulation and response are +exceedingly one-sided. In order to have a large number of values +in common, all the members of the group must have an equable +opportunity to receive and to take from others. There must be a +large variety of shared undertakings and experiences. Otherwise, +the influences which educate some into masters, educate others +into slaves. And the experience of each party loses in meaning, +when the free interchange of varying modes of life-experience is +arrested. A separation into a privileged and a subject-class +prevents social endosmosis. The evils thereby affecting the +superior class are less material and less perceptible, but +equally real. Their culture tends to be sterile, to be turned +back to feed on itself; their art becomes a showy display and +artificial; their wealth luxurious; their knowledge +overspecialized; their manners fastidious rather than humane. + +Lack of the free and equitable intercourse which springs from a +variety of shared interests makes intellectual stimulation +unbalanced. Diversity of stimulation means novelty, and novelty +means challenge to thought. The more activity is restricted to a +few definite lines -- as it is when there are rigid class lines +preventing adequate interplay of experiences -- the more action +tends to become routine on the part of the class at a +disadvantage, and capricious, aimless, and explosive on the part +of the class having the materially fortunate position. Plato +defined a slave as one who accepts from another the purposes +which control his conduct. This condition obtains even where +there is no slavery in the legal sense. It is found wherever men +are engaged in activity which is socially serviceable, but whose +service they do not understand and have no personal interest in. +Much is said about scientific management of work. It is a narrow +view which restricts the science which secures efficiency of +operation to movements of the muscles. The chief opportunity for +science is the discovery of the relations of a man to his +work--including his relations to others who take part -- which +will enlist his intelligent interest in what he is doing. +Efficiency in production often demands division of labor. But it +is reduced to a mechanical routine unless workers see the +technical, intellectual, and social relationships involved in +what they do, and engage in their work because of the motivation +furnished by such perceptions. The tendency to reduce such +things as efficiency of activity and scientific management to +purely technical externals is evidence of the one-sided +stimulation of thought given to those in control of industry -- +those who supply its aims. Because of their lack of all-round +and well-balanced social interest, there is not sufficient +stimulus for attention to the human factors and relationships in +industry. Intelligence is narrowed to the factors concerned with +technical production and marketing of goods. No doubt, a very +acute and intense intelligence in these narrow lines can be +developed, but the failure to take into account the significant +social factors means none the less an absence of mind, and a +corresponding distortion of emotional life. II. This +illustration (whose point is to be extended to all associations +lacking reciprocity of interest) brings us to our second point. +The isolation and exclusiveness of a gang or clique brings its +antisocial spirit into relief. But this same spirit is found +wherever one group has interests "of its own" which shut it out +from full interaction with other groups, so that its prevailing +purpose is the protection of what it has got, instead of +reorganization and progress through wider relationships. It +marks nations in their isolation from one another; families which +seclude their domestic concerns as if they had no connection with +a larger life; schools when separated from the interest of home +and community; the divisions of rich and poor; learned and +unlearned. The essential point is that isolation makes for +rigidity and formal institutionalizing of life, for static and +selfish ideals within the group. That savage tribes regard +aliens and enemies as synonymous is not accidental. It springs +from the fact that they have identified their experience with +rigid adherence to their past customs. On such a basis it is +wholly logical to fear intercourse with others, for such contact +might dissolve custom. It would certainly occasion +reconstruction. It is a commonplace that an alert and expanding +mental life depends upon an enlarging range of contact with the +physical environment. But the principle applies even more +significantly to the field where we are apt to ignore it -- the +sphere of social contacts. Every expansive era in the history of +mankind has coincided with the operation of factors which have +tended to eliminate distance between peoples and classes +previously hemmed off from one another. Even the alleged +benefits of war, so far as more than alleged, spring from the +fact that conflict of peoples at least enforces intercourse +between them and thus accidentally enables them to learn from one +another, and thereby to expand their horizons. Travel, economic +and commercial tendencies, have at present gone far to break down +external barriers; to bring peoples and classes into closer and +more perceptible connection with one another. It remains for the +most part to secure the intellectual and emotional significance +of this physical annihilation of space. + +2. The Democratic Ideal. The two elements in our criterion both +point to democracy. The first signifies not only more numerous +and more varied points of shared common interest, but greater +reliance upon the recognition of mutual interests as a factor in +social control. The second means not only freer interaction +between social groups (once isolated so far as intention could +keep up a separation) but change in social habit -- its +continuous readjustment through meeting the new situations +produced by varied intercourse. And these two traits are +precisely what characterize the democratically constituted +society. + +Upon the educational side, we note first that the realization of +a form of social life in which interests are mutually +interpenetrating, and where progress, or readjustment, is an +important consideration, makes a democratic community more +interested than other communities have cause to be in deliberate +and systematic education. The devotion of democracy to education +is a familiar fact. The superficial explanation is that a +government resting upon popular suffrage cannot be successful +unless those who elect and who obey their governors are educated. +Since a democratic society repudiates the principle of external +authority, it must find a substitute in voluntary disposition and +interest; these can be created only by education. But there is a +deeper explanation. A democracy is more than a form of +government; it is primarily a mode of associated living, of +conjoint communicated experience. The extension in space of the +number of individuals who participate in an interest so that each +has to refer his own action to that of others, and to consider +the action of others to give point and direction to his own, is +equivalent to the breaking down of those barriers of class, race, +and national territory which kept men from perceiving the full +import of their activity. These more numerous and more varied +points of contact denote a greater diversity of stimuli to which +an individual has to respond; they consequently put a premium on +variation in his action. They secure a liberation of powers +which remain suppressed as long as the incitations to action are +partial, as they must be in a group which in its exclusiveness +shuts out many interests. + +The widening of the area of shared concerns, and the liberation +of a greater diversity of personal capacities which characterize +a democracy, are not of course the product of deliberation and +conscious effort. On the contrary, they were caused by the +development of modes of manufacture and commerce, travel, +migration, and intercommunication which flowed from the command +of science over natural energy. But after greater +individualization on one hand, and a broader community of +interest on the other have come into existence, it is a matter of +deliberate effort to sustain and extend them. Obviously a +society to which stratification into separate classes would be +fatal, must see to it that intellectual opportunities are +accessible to all on equable and easy terms. A society marked +off into classes need he specially attentive only to the +education of its ruling elements. A society which is mobile, +which is full of channels for the distribution of a change +occurring anywhere, must see to it that its members are educated +to personal initiative and adaptability. Otherwise, they will be +overwhelmed by the changes in which they are caught and whose +significance or connections they do not perceive. The result +will be a confusion in which a few will appropriate to themselves +the results of the blind and externally directed activities of +others. + +3. The Platonic Educational Philosophy. Subsequent chapters +will be devoted to making explicit the implications of the +democratic ideas in education. In the remaining portions of this +chapter, we shall consider the educational theories which have +been evolved in three epochs when the social import of education +was especially conspicuous. The first one to be considered is +that of Plato. No one could better express than did he the fact +that a society is stably organized when each individual is doing +that for which he has aptitude by nature in such a way as to be +useful to others (or to contribute to the whole to which he +belongs); and that it is the business of education to discover +these aptitudes and progressively to train them for social use. +Much which has been said so far is borrowed from what Plato first +consciously taught the world. But conditions which he could not +intellectually control led him to restrict these ideas in their +application. He never got any conception of the indefinite +plurality of activities which may characterize an individual and +a social group, and consequently limited his view to a limited +number of classes of capacities and of social arrangements. +Plato's starting point is that the organization of society +depends ultimately upon knowledge of the end of existence. If we +do not know its end, we shall be at the mercy of accident and +caprice. Unless we know the end, the good, we shall have no +criterion for rationally deciding what the possibilities are +which should be promoted, nor how social arrangements are to be +ordered. We shall have no conception of the proper limits and +distribution of activities -- what he called justice -- as a +trait of both individual and social organization. But how is the +knowledge of the final and permanent good to be achieved? In +dealing with this question we come upon the seemingly insuperable +obstacle that such knowledge is not possible save in a just and +harmonious social order. Everywhere else the mind is distracted +and misled by false valuations and false perspectives. A +disorganized and factional society sets up a number of different +models and standards. Under such conditions it is impossible for +the individual to attain consistency of mind. Only a complete +whole is fully self-consistent. A society which rests upon the +supremacy of some factor over another irrespective of its +rational or proportionate claims, inevitably leads thought +astray. It puts a premium on certain things and slurs over +others, and creates a mind whose seeming unity is forced and +distorted. Education proceeds ultimately from the patterns +furnished by institutions, customs, and laws. Only in a just +state will these be such as to give the right education; and only +those who have rightly trained minds will be able to recognize +the end, and ordering principle of things. We seem to be caught +in a hopeless circle. However, Plato suggested a way out. A few +men, philosophers or lovers of wisdom -- or truth -- may by study +learn at least in outline the proper patterns of true existence. +If a powerful ruler should form a state after these patterns, +then its regulations could be preserved. An education could be +given which would sift individuals, discovering what they were +good for, and supplying a method of assigning each to the work in +life for which his nature fits him. Each doing his own part, and +never transgressing, the order and unity of the whole would be +maintained. + +It would be impossible to find in any scheme of philosophic +thought a more adequate recognition on one hand of the +educational significance of social arrangements and, on the +other, of the dependence of those arrangements upon the means +used to educate the young. It would be impossible to find a +deeper sense of the function of education in discovering and +developing personal capacities, and training them so that they +would connect with the activities of others. Yet the society in +which the theory was propounded was so undemocratic that Plato +could not work out a solution for the problem whose terms he +clearly saw. + +While he affirmed with emphasis that the place of the individual +in society should not be determined by birth or wealth or any +conventional status, but by his own nature as discovered in the +process of education, he had no perception of the uniqueness of +individuals. For him they fall by nature into classes, and into +a very small number of classes at that. Consequently the testing +and sifting function of education only shows to which one of +three classes an individual belongs. There being no recognition +that each individual constitutes his own class, there could be no +recognition of the infinite diversity of active tendencies and +combinations of tendencies of which an individual is capable. +There were only three types of faculties or powers in the +individual's constitution. Hence education would soon reach a +static limit in each class, for only diversity makes change and +progress. + +In some individuals, appetites naturally dominate; they are +assigned to the laboring and trading class, which expresses and +supplies human wants. Others reveal, upon education, that over +and above appetites, they have a generous, outgoing, assertively +courageous disposition. They become the citizen-subjects of the +state; its defenders in war; its internal guardians in peace. +But their limit is fixed by their lack of reason, which is a +capacity to grasp the universal. Those who possess this are +capable of the highest kind of education, and become in time the +legislators of the state -- for laws are the universals which +control the particulars of experience. Thus it is not true that +in intent, Plato subordinated the individual to the social whole. +But it is true that lacking the perception of the uniqueness of +every individual, his incommensurability with others, and +consequently not recognizing that a society might change and yet +be stable, his doctrine of limited powers and classes came in net +effect to the idea of the subordination of individuality. We +cannot better Plato's conviction that an individual is happy and +society well organized when each individual engages in those +activities for which he has a natural equipment, nor his +conviction that it is the primary office of education to discover +this equipment to its possessor and train him for its effective +use. But progress in knowledge has made us aware of the +superficiality of Plato's lumping of individuals and their +original powers into a few sharply marked-off classes; it has +taught us that original capacities are indefinitely numerous and +variable. It is but the other side of this fact to say that in +the degree in which society has become democratic, social +organization means utilization of the specific and variable +qualities of individuals, not stratification by classes. +Although his educational philosophy was revolutionary, it was +none the less in bondage to static ideals. He thought that +change or alteration was evidence of lawless flux; that true +reality was unchangeable. Hence while he would radically change +the existing state of society, his aim was to construct a state +in which change would subsequently have no place. The final end +of life is fixed; given a state framed with this end in view, not +even minor details are to be altered. Though they might not be +inherently important, yet if permitted they would inure the minds +of men to the idea of change, and hence be dissolving and +anarchic. The breakdown of his philosophy is made apparent in +the fact that he could not trust to gradual improvements in +education to bring about a better society which should then +improve education, and so on indefinitely. Correct education +could not come into existence until an ideal state existed, and +after that education would be devoted simply to its conservation. +For the existence of this state he was obliged to trust to some +happy accident by which philosophic wisdom should happen to +coincide with possession of ruling power in the state. + +4. The "Individualistic" Ideal of the Eighteenth Century. In +the eighteenth-century philosophy we find ourselves in a very +different circle of ideas. "Nature" still means something +antithetical to existing social organization; Plato exercised a +great influence upon Rousseau. But the voice of nature now +speaks for the diversity of individual talent and for the need of +free development of individuality in all its variety. Education +in accord with nature furnishes the goal and the method of +instruction and discipline. Moreover, the native or original +endowment was conceived, in extreme cases, as nonsocial or even +as antisocial. Social arrangements were thought of as mere +external expedients by which these nonsocial individuals might +secure a greater amount of private happiness for themselves. +Nevertheless, these statements convey only an inadequate idea of +the true significance of the movement. In reality its chief +interest was in progress and in social progress. The seeming +antisocial philosophy was a somewhat transparent mask for an +impetus toward a wider and freer society -- toward cosmopolitanism. +The positive ideal was humanity. In membership in humanity, as +distinct from a state, man's capacities would be liberated; while +in existing political organizations his powers were hampered and +distorted to meet the requirements and selfish interests of the +rulers of the state. The doctrine of extreme individualism was +but the counterpart, the obverse, of ideals of the indefinite +perfectibility of man and of a social organization having a scope +as wide as humanity. The emancipated individual was to become +the organ and agent of a comprehensive and progressive society. + +The heralds of this gospel were acutely conscious of the evils of +the social estate in which they found themselves. They +attributed these evils to the limitations imposed upon the free +powers of man. Such limitation was both distorting and +corrupting. Their impassioned devotion to emancipation of life +from external restrictions which operated to the exclusive +advantage of the class to whom a past feudal system consigned +power, found intellectual formulation in a worship of nature. To +give "nature" full swing was to replace an artificial, corrupt, +and inequitable social order by a new and better kingdom of +humanity. Unrestrained faith in Nature as both a model and a +working power was strengthened by the advances of natural +science. Inquiry freed from prejudice and artificial restraints +of church and state had revealed that the world is a scene of +law. The Newtonian solar system, which expressed the reign of +natural law, was a scene of wonderful harmony, where every force +balanced with every other. Natural law would accomplish the same +result in human relations, if men would only get rid of the +artificial man-imposed coercive restrictions. + +Education in accord with nature was thought to be the first step +in insuring this more social society. It was plainly seen that +economic and political limitations were ultimately dependent upon +limitations of thought and feeling. The first step in freeing +men from external chains was to emancipate them from the internal +chains of false beliefs and ideals. What was called social life, +existing institutions, were too false and corrupt to be intrusted +with this work. How could it be expected to undertake it when +the undertaking meant its own destruction? "Nature" must then be +the power to which the enterprise was to be left. Even the +extreme sensationalistic theory of knowledge which was current +derived itself from this conception. To insist that mind is +originally passive and empty was one way of glorifying the +possibilities of education. If the mind was a wax tablet to be +written upon by objects, there were no limits to the possibility +of education by means of the natural environment. And since the +natural world of objects is a scene of harmonious "truth," this +education would infallibly produce minds filled with the truth. + +5. Education as National and as Social. As soon as the first +enthusiasm for freedom waned, the weakness of the theory upon the +constructive side became obvious. Merely to leave everything to +nature was, after all, but to negate the very idea of education; +it was to trust to the accidents of circumstance. Not only was +some method required but also some positive organ, some +administrative agency for carrying on the process of instruction. +The "complete and harmonious development of all powers," having +as its social counterpart an enlightened and progressive +humanity, required definite organization for its realization. +Private individuals here and there could proclaim the gospel; +they could not execute the work. A Pestalozzi could try +experiments and exhort philanthropically inclined persons having +wealth and power to follow his example. But even Pestalozzi saw +that any effective pursuit of the new educational ideal required +the support of the state. The realization of the new education +destined to produce a new society was, after all, dependent upon +the activities of existing states. The movement for the +democratic idea inevitably became a movement for publicly +conducted and administered schools. + +So far as Europe was concerned, the historic situation identified +the movement for a state-supported education with the +nationalistic movement in political life -- a fact of +incalculable significance for subsequent movements. Under the +influence of German thought in particular, education became a +civic function and the civic function was identified with the +realization of the ideal of the national state. The "state" was +substituted for humanity; cosmopolitanism gave way to +nationalism. To form the citizen, not the "man," became the aim +of education. 1 The historic situation to which reference is +made is the after-effects of the Napoleonic conquests, especially +in Germany. The German states felt (and subsequent events +demonstrate the correctness of the belief) that systematic +attention to education was the best means of recovering and +maintaining their political integrity and power. Externally they +were weak and divided. Under the leadership of Prussian +statesmen they made this condition a stimulus to the development +of an extensive and thoroughly grounded system of public +education. + +This change in practice necessarily brought about a change in +theory. The individualistic theory receded into the background. +The state furnished not only the instrumentalities of public +education but also its goal. When the actual practice was such +that the school system, from the elementary grades through the +university faculties, supplied the patriotic citizen and soldier +and the future state official and administrator and furnished the +means for military, industrial, and political defense and +expansion, it was impossible for theory not to emphasize the aim +of social efficiency. And with the immense importance attached +to the nationalistic state, surrounded by other competing and +more or less hostile states, it was equally impossible to +interpret social efficiency in terms of a vague cosmopolitan +humanitarianism. Since the maintenance of a particular national +sovereignty required subordination of individuals to the superior +interests of the state both in military defense and in struggles +for international supremacy in commerce, social efficiency was +understood to imply a like subordination. The educational +process was taken to be one of disciplinary training rather than +of personal development. Since, however, the ideal of culture as +complete development of personality persisted, educational +philosophy attempted a reconciliation of the two ideas. The +reconciliation took the form of the conception of the "organic" +character of the state. The individual in his isolation is +nothing; only in and through an absorption of the aims and +meaning of organized institutions does he attain true +personality. What appears to be his subordination to political +authority and the demand for sacrifice of himself to the commands +of his superiors is in reality but making his own the objective +reason manifested in the state -- the only way in which he can +become truly rational. The notion of development which we have +seen to be characteristic of institutional idealism (as in the +Hegelian philosophy) was just such a deliberate effort to combine +the two ideas of complete realization of personality and +thoroughgoing "disciplinary" subordination to existing +institutions. The extent of the transformation of educational +philosophy which occurred in Germany in the generation occupied +by the struggle against Napoleon for national independence, may +be gathered from Kant, who well expresses the earlier +individual-cosmopolitan ideal. In his treatise on Pedagogics, +consisting of lectures given in the later years of the eighteenth +century, he defines education as the process by which man becomes +man. Mankind begins its history submerged in nature -- not as +Man who is a creature of reason, while nature furnishes only +instinct and appetite. Nature offers simply the germs which +education is to develop and perfect. The peculiarity of truly +human life is that man has to create himself by his own voluntary +efforts; he has to make himself a truly moral, rational, and free +being. This creative effort is carried on by the educational +activities of slow generations. Its acceleration depends upon +men consciously striving to educate their successors not for the +existing state of affairs but so as to make possible a future +better humanity. But there is the great difficulty. Each +generation is inclined to educate its young so as to get along in +the present world instead of with a view to the proper end of +education: the promotion of the best possible realization of +humanity as humanity. Parents educate their children so that +they may get on; princes educate their subjects as instruments of +their own purposes. + +Who, then, shall conduct education so that humanity may improve? +We must depend upon the efforts of enlightened men in their +private capacity. "All culture begins with private men and +spreads outward from them. Simply through the efforts of persons +of enlarged inclinations, who are capable of grasping the ideal +of a future better condition, is the gradual approximation of +human nature to its end possible. Rulers are simply interested +in such training as will make their subjects better tools for +their own intentions." Even the subsidy by rulers of privately +conducted schools must be carefully safeguarded. For the rulers' +interest in the welfare of their own nation instead of in what is +best for humanity, will make them, if they give money for the +schools, wish to draw their plans. We have in this view an +express statement of the points characteristic of the eighteenth +century individualistic cosmopolitanism. The full development of +private personality is identified with the aims of humanity as a +whole and with the idea of progress. In addition we have an +explicit fear of the hampering influence of a state-conducted and +state-regulated education upon the attainment of these ideas. +But in less than two decades after this time, Kant's philosophic +successors, Fichte and Hegel, elaborated the idea that the chief +function of the state is educational; that in particular the +regeneration of Germany is to be accomplished by an education +carried on in the interests of the state, and that the private +individual is of necessity an egoistic, irrational being, +enslaved to his appetites and to circumstances unless he submits +voluntarily to the educative discipline of state institutions and +laws. In this spirit, Germany was the first country to undertake +a public, universal, and compulsory system of education extending +from the primary school through the university, and to submit to +jealous state regulation and supervision all private educational +enterprises. Two results should stand out from this brief +historical survey. The first is that such terms as the +individual and the social conceptions of education are quite +meaningless taken at large, or apart from their context. Plato +had the ideal of an education which should equate individual +realization and social coherency and stability. His situation +forced his ideal into the notion of a society organized in +stratified classes, losing the individual in the class. The +eighteenth century educational philosophy was highly +individualistic in form, but this form was inspired by a noble +and generous social ideal: that of a society organized to include +humanity, and providing for the indefinite perfectibility of +mankind. The idealistic philosophy of Germany in the early +nineteenth century endeavored again to equate the ideals of a +free and complete development of cultured personality with social +discipline and political subordination. It made the national +state an intermediary between the realization of private +personality on one side and of humanity on the other. +Consequently, it is equally possible to state its animating +principle with equal truth either in the classic terms of +"harmonious development of all the powers of personality" or in +the more recent terminology of "social efficiency." All this +reinforces the statement which opens this chapter: The conception +of education as a social process and function has no definite +meaning until we define the kind of society we have in mind. +These considerations pave the way for our second conclusion. One +of the fundamental problems of education in and for a democratic +society is set by the conflict of a nationalistic and a wider +social aim. The earlier cosmopolitan and "humanitarian" +conception suffered both from vagueness and from lack of definite +organs of execution and agencies of administration. In Europe, +in the Continental states particularly, the new idea of the +importance of education for human welfare and progress was +captured by national interests and harnessed to do a work whose +social aim was definitely narrow and exclusive. The social aim +of education and its national aim were identified, and the result +was a marked obscuring of the meaning of a social aim. + +This confusion corresponds to the existing situation of human +intercourse. On the one hand, science, commerce, and art +transcend national boundaries. They are largely international in +quality and method. They involve interdependencies and +cooperation among the peoples inhabiting different countries. At +the same time, the idea of national sovereignty has never been as +accentuated in politics as it is at the present time. Each +nation lives in a state of suppressed hostility and incipient war +with its neighbors. Each is supposed to be the supreme judge of +its own interests, and it is assumed as matter of course that +each has interests which are exclusively its own. To question +this is to question the very idea of national sovereignty which +is assumed to be basic to political practice and political +science. This contradiction (for it is nothing less) between the +wider sphere of associated and mutually helpful social life and +the narrower sphere of exclusive and hence potentially hostile +pursuits and purposes, exacts of educational theory a clearer +conception of the meaning of "social" as a function and test of +education than has yet been attained. Is it possible for an +educational system to be conducted by a national state and yet +the full social ends of the educative process not be restricted, +constrained, and corrupted? Internally, the question has to face +the tendencies, due to present economic conditions, which split +society into classes some of which are made merely tools for the +higher culture of others. Externally, the question is concerned +with the reconciliation of national loyalty, of patriotism, with +superior devotion to the things which unite men in common ends, +irrespective of national political boundaries. Neither phase of +the problem can be worked out by merely negative means. It is +not enough to see to it that education is not actively used as an +instrument to make easier the exploitation of one class by +another. School facilities must be secured of such amplitude and +efficiency as will in fact and not simply in name discount the +effects of economic inequalities, and secure to all the wards of +the nation equality of equipment for their future careers. +Accomplishment of this end demands not only adequate +administrative provision of school facilities, and such +supplementation of family resources as will enable youth to take +advantage of them, but also such modification of traditional +ideals of culture, traditional subjects of study and traditional +methods of teaching and discipline as will retain all the youth +under educational influences until they are equipped to be +masters of their own economic and social careers. The ideal may +seem remote of execution, but the democratic ideal of education +is a farcical yet tragic delusion except as the ideal more and +more dominates our public system of education. The same +principle has application on the side of the considerations which +concern the relations of one nation to another. It is not enough +to teach the horrors of war and to avoid everything which would +stimulate international jealousy and animosity. The emphasis +must be put upon whatever binds people together in cooperative +human pursuits and results, apart from geographical limitations. +The secondary and provisional character of national sovereignty +in respect to the fuller, freer, and more fruitful association +and intercourse of all human beings with one another must be +instilled as a working disposition of mind. If these +applications seem to be remote from a consideration of the +philosophy of education, the impression shows that the meaning of +the idea of education previously developed has not been +adequately grasped. This conclusion is bound up with the very +idea of education as a freeing of individual capacity in a +progressive growth directed to social aims. Otherwise a +democratic criterion of education can only be inconsistently +applied. + +Summary. Since education is a social process, and there are many +kinds of societies, a criterion for educational criticism and +construction implies a particular social ideal. The two points +selected by which to measure the worth of a form of social life +are the extent in which the interests of a group are shared by +all its members, and the fullness and freedom with which it +interacts with other groups. An undesirable society, in other +words, is one which internally and externally sets up barriers to +free intercourse and communication of experience. A society +which makes provision for participation in its good of all its +members on equal terms and which secures flexible readjustment of +its institutions through interaction of the different forms of +associated life is in so far democratic. Such a society must +have a type of education which gives individuals a personal +interest in social relationships and control, and the habits of +mind which secure social changes without introducing disorder. +Three typical historic philosophies of education were considered +from this point of view. The Platonic was found to have an ideal +formally quite similar to that stated, but which was compromised +in its working out by making a class rather than an individual +the social unit. The so-called individualism of the eighteenth- +century enlightenment was found to involve the notion of a +society as broad as humanity, of whose progress the individual +was to be the organ. But it lacked any agency for securing the +development of its ideal as was evidenced in its falling back +upon Nature. The institutional idealistic philosophies of the +nineteenth century supplied this lack by making the national +state the agency, but in so doing narrowed the conception of the +social aim to those who were members of the same political unit, +and reintroduced the idea of the subordination of the individual +to the institution. 1 There is a much neglected strain in +Rousseau tending intellectually in this direction. He opposed +the existing state of affairs on the ground that it formed +neither the citizen nor the man. Under existing conditions, he +preferred to try for the latter rather than for the former. But +there are many sayings of his which point to the formation of the +citizen as ideally the higher, and which indicate that his own +endeavor, as embodied in the Emile, was simply the best makeshift +the corruption of the times permitted him to sketch. + + +Chapter Eight: Aims in Education + +1. The Nature of an Aim. + +The account of education given in our earlier chapters virtually +anticipated the results reached in a discussion of the purport of +education in a democratic community. For it assumed that the aim +of education is to enable individuals to continue their education +-- or that the object and reward of learning is continued +capacity for growth. Now this idea cannot be applied to all the +members of a society except where intercourse of man with man is +mutual, and except where there is adequate provision for the +reconstruction of social habits and institutions by means of wide +stimulation arising from equitably distributed interests. And +this means a democratic society. In our search for aims in +education, we are not concerned, therefore, with finding an end +outside of the educative process to which education is +subordinate. Our whole conception forbids. We are rather +concerned with the contrast which exists when aims belong within +the process in which they operate and when they are set up from +without. And the latter state of affairs must obtain when social +relationships are not equitably balanced. For in that case, some +portions of the whole social group will find their aims +determined by an external dictation; their aims will not arise +from the free growth of their own experience, and their nominal +aims will be means to more ulterior ends of others rather than +truly their own. + +Our first question is to define the nature of an aim so far as it +falls within an activity, instead of being furnished from +without. We approach the definition by a contrast of mere +results with ends. Any exhibition of energy has results. The +wind blows about the sands of the desert; the position of the +grains is changed. Here is a result, an effect, but not an end. +For there is nothing in the outcome which completes or fulfills +what went before it. There is mere spatial redistribution. One +state of affairs is just as good as any other. Consequently +there is no basis upon which to select an earlier state of +affairs as a beginning, a later as an end, and to consider what +intervenes as a process of transformation and realization. + +Consider for example the activities of bees in contrast with the +changes in the sands when the wind blows them about. The results +of the bees' actions may be called ends not because they are +designed or consciously intended, but because they are true +terminations or completions of what has preceded. When the bees +gather pollen and make wax and build cells, each step prepares +the way for the next. When cells are built, the queen lays eggs +in them; when eggs are laid, they are sealed and bees brood them +and keep them at a temperature required to hatch them. When they +are hatched, bees feed the young till they can take care of +themselves. Now we are so familiar with such facts, that we are +apt to dismiss them on the ground that life and instinct are a +kind of miraculous thing anyway. Thus we fail to note what the +essential characteristic of the event is; namely, the +significance of the temporal place and order of each element; the +way each prior event leads into its successor while the successor +takes up what is furnished and utilizes it for some other stage, +until we arrive at the end, which, as it were, summarizes and +finishes off the process. Since aims relate always to results, +the first thing to look to when it is a question of aims, is +whether the work assigned possesses intrinsic continuity. Or is +it a mere serial aggregate of acts, first doing one thing and +then another? To talk about an educational aim when approximately +each act of a pupil is dictated by the teacher, when the only +order in the sequence of his acts is that which comes from the +assignment of lessons and the giving of directions by another, is +to talk nonsense. It is equally fatal to an aim to permit +capricious or discontinuous action in the name of spontaneous +self- expression. An aim implies an orderly and ordered +activity, one in which the order consists in the progressive +completing of a process. Given an activity having a time span +and cumulative growth within the time succession, an aim means +foresight in advance of the end or possible termination. If bees +anticipated the consequences of their activity, if they perceived +their end in imaginative foresight, they would have the primary +element in an aim. Hence it is nonsense to talk about the aim of +education--or any other undertaking--where conditions do not +permit of foresight of results, and do not stimulate a person to +look ahead to see what the outcome of a given activity is to be. +In the next place the aim as a foreseen end gives direction to +the activity; it is not an idle view of a mere spectator, but +influences the steps taken to reach the end. The foresight +functions in three ways. In the first place, it involves careful +observation of the given conditions to see what are the means +available for reaching the end, and to discover the hindrances in +the way. In the second place, it suggests the proper order or +sequence in the use of means. It facilitates an economical +selection and arrangement. In the third place, it makes choice +of alternatives possible. If we can predict the outcome of +acting this way or that, we can then compare the value of the two +courses of action; we can pass judgment upon their relative +desirability. If we know that stagnant water breeds mosquitoes +and that they are likely to carry disease, we can, disliking that +anticipated result, take steps to avert it. Since we do not +anticipate results as mere intellectual onlookers, but as persons +concerned in the outcome, we are partakers in the process which +produces the result. We intervene to bring about this result or +that. + +Of course these three points are closely connected with one +another. We can definitely foresee results only as we make +careful scrutiny of present conditions, and the importance of the +outcome supplies the motive for observations. The more adequate +our observations, the more varied is the scene of conditions and +obstructions that presents itself, and the more numerous are the +alternatives between which choice may be made. In turn, the more +numerous the recognized possibilities of the situation, or +alternatives of action, the more meaning does the chosen activity +possess, and the more flexibly controllable is it. Where only a +single outcome has been thought of, the mind has nothing else to +think of; the meaning attaching to the act is limited. One only +steams ahead toward the mark. Sometimes such a narrow course may +be effective. But if unexpected difficulties offer themselves, +one has not as many resources at command as if he had chosen the +same line of action after a broader survey of the possibilities +of the field. He cannot make needed readjustments readily. + +The net conclusion is that acting with an aim is all one with +acting intelligently. To foresee a terminus of an act is to have +a basis upon which to observe, to select, and to order objects +and our own capacities. To do these things means to have a mind +-- for mind is precisely intentional purposeful activity +controlled by perception of facts and their relationships to one +another. To have a mind to do a thing is to foresee a future +possibility; it is to have a plan for its accomplishment; it is +to note the means which make the plan capable of execution and +the obstructions in the way, -- or, if it is really a mind to do +the thing and not a vague aspiration -- it is to have a plan +which takes account of resources and difficulties. Mind is +capacity to refer present conditions to future results, and +future consequences to present conditions. And these traits are +just what is meant by having an aim or a purpose. A man is +stupid or blind or unintelligent -- lacking in mind -- just in +the degree in which in any activity he does not know what he is +about, namely, the probable consequences of his acts. A man is +imperfectly intelligent when he contents himself with looser +guesses about the outcome than is needful, just taking a chance +with his luck, or when he forms plans apart from study of the +actual conditions, including his own capacities. Such relative +absence of mind means to make our feelings the measure of what is +to happen. To be intelligent we must "stop, look, listen" in +making the plan of an activity. + +To identify acting with an aim and intelligent activity is enough +to show its value -- its function in experience. We are only too +given to making an entity out of the abstract noun +"consciousness." We forget that it comes from the adjective +"conscious." To be conscious is to be aware of what we are about; +conscious signifies the deliberate, observant, planning traits of +activity. Consciousness is nothing which we have which gazes +idly on the scene around one or which has impressions made upon +it by physical things; it is a name for the purposeful quality of +an activity, for the fact that it is directed by an aim. Put the +other way about, to have an aim is to act with meaning, not like +an automatic machine; it is to mean to do something and to +perceive the meaning of things in the light of that intent. + +2. The Criteria of Good Aims. We may apply the results of our +discussion to a consideration of the criteria involved in a +correct establishing of aims. (1) The aim set up must be an +outgrowth of existing conditions. It must be based upon a +consideration of what is already going on; upon the resources and +difficulties of the situation. Theories about the proper end of +our activities -- educational and moral theories -- often violate +this principle. They assume ends lying outside our activities; +ends foreign to the concrete makeup of the situation; ends which +issue from some outside source. Then the problem is to bring our +activities to bear upon the realization of these externally +supplied ends. They are something for which we ought to act. In +any case such "aims" limit intelligence; they are not the +expression of mind in foresight, observation, and choice of the +better among alternative possibilities. They limit intelligence +because, given ready-made, they must be imposed by some authority +external to intelligence, leaving to the latter nothing but a +mechanical choice of means. + +(2) We have spoken as if aims could be completely formed prior to +the attempt to realize them. This impression must now be +qualified. The aim as it first emerges is a mere tentative +sketch. The act of striving to realize it tests its worth. If +it suffices to direct activity successfully, nothing more is +required, since its whole function is to set a mark in advance; +and at times a mere hint may suffice. But usually -- at least in +complicated situations -- acting upon it brings to light +conditions which had been overlooked. This calls for revision of +the original aim; it has to be added to and subtracted from. An +aim must, then, be flexible; it must be capable of alteration to +meet circumstances. An end established externally to the process +of action is always rigid. Being inserted or imposed from +without, it is not supposed to have a working relationship to the +concrete conditions of the situation. What happens in the course +of action neither confirms, refutes, nor alters it. Such an end +can only be insisted upon. The failure that results from its +lack of adaptation is attributed simply to the perverseness of +conditions, not to the fact that the end is not reasonable under +the circumstances. The value of a legitimate aim, on the +contrary, lies in the fact that we can use it to change +conditions. It is a method for dealing with conditions so as to +effect desirable alterations in them. A farmer who should +passively accept things just as he finds them would make as great +a mistake as he who framed his plans in complete disregard of +what soil, climate, etc., permit. One of the evils of an +abstract or remote external aim in education is that its very +inapplicability in practice is likely to react into a haphazard +snatching at immediate conditions. A good aim surveys the +present state of experience of pupils, and forming a tentative +plan of treatment, keeps the plan constantly in view and yet +modifies it as conditions develop. The aim, in short, is +experimental, and hence constantly growing as it is tested in +action. + +(3) The aim must always represent a freeing of activities. The +term end in view is suggestive, for it puts before the mind the +termination or conclusion of some process. The only way in which +we can define an activity is by putting before ourselves the +objects in which it terminates -- as one's aim in shooting is the +target. But we must remember that the object is only a mark or +sign by which the mind specifies the activity one desires to +carry out. Strictly speaking, not the target but hitting the +target is the end in view; one takes aim by means of the target, +but also by the sight on the gun. The different objects which +are thought of are means of directing the activity. Thus one +aims at, say, a rabbit; what he wants is to shoot straight: a +certain kind of activity. Or, if it is the rabbit he wants, it +is not rabbit apart from his activity, but as a factor in +activity; he wants to eat the rabbit, or to show it as evidence +of his marksmanship -- he wants to do something with it. The +doing with the thing, not the thing in isolation, is his end. +The object is but a phase of the active end, -- continuing the +activity successfully. This is what is meant by the phrase, used +above, "freeing activity." + +In contrast with fulfilling some process in order that activity +may go on, stands the static character of an end which is imposed +from without the activity. It is always conceived of as fixed; +it is something to be attained and possessed. When one has such +a notion, activity is a mere unavoidable means to something else; +it is not significant or important on its own account. As +compared with the end it is but a necessary evil; something which +must be gone through before one can reach the object which is +alone worth while. In other words, the external idea of the aim +leads to a separation of means from end, while an end which grows +up within an activity as plan for its direction is always both +ends and means, the distinction being only one of convenience. +Every means is a temporary end until we have attained it. Every +end becomes a means of carrying activity further as soon as it is +achieved. We call it end when it marks off the future direction +of the activity in which we are engaged; means when it marks off +the present direction. Every divorce of end from means +diminishes by that much the significance of the activity and +tends to reduce it to a drudgery from which one would escape if +he could. A farmer has to use plants and animals to carry on his +farming activities. It certainly makes a great difference to his +life whether he is fond of them, or whether he regards them +merely as means which he has to employ to get something else in +which alone he is interested. In the former case, his entire +course of activity is significant; each phase of it has its own +value. He has the experience of realizing his end at every +stage; the postponed aim, or end in view, being merely a sight +ahead by which to keep his activity going fully and freely. For +if he does not look ahead, he is more likely to find himself +blocked. The aim is as definitely a means of action as is any +other portion of an activity. + +3. Applications in Education. There is nothing peculiar about +educational aims. They are just like aims in any directed +occupation. The educator, like the farmer, has certain things to +do, certain resources with which to do, and certain obstacles +with which to contend. The conditions with which the farmer +deals, whether as obstacles or resources, have their own +structure and operation independently of any purpose of his. +Seeds sprout, rain falls, the sun shines, insects devour, blight +comes, the seasons change. His aim is simply to utilize these +various conditions; to make his activities and their energies +work together, instead of against one another. It would be +absurd if the farmer set up a purpose of farming, without any +reference to these conditions of soil, climate, characteristic of +plant growth, etc. His purpose is simply a foresight of the +consequences of his energies connected with those of the things +about him, a foresight used to direct his movements from day to +day. Foresight of possible consequences leads to more careful +and extensive observation of the nature and performances of the +things he had to do with, and to laying out a plan -- that is, of +a certain order in the acts to be performed. + +It is the same with the educator, whether parent or teacher. It +is as absurd for the latter to set up his "own" aims as the +proper objects of the growth of the children as it would be for +the farmer to set up an ideal of farming irrespective of +conditions. Aims mean acceptance of responsibility for the +observations, anticipations, and arrangements required in +carrying on a function -- whether farming or educating. Any aim +is of value so far as it assists observation, choice, and +planning in carrying on activity from moment to moment and hour +to hour; if it gets in the way of the individual's own common +sense (as it will surely do if imposed from without or accepted +on authority) it does harm. + +And it is well to remind ourselves that education as such has no +aims. Only persons, parents, and teachers, etc., have aims, not +an abstract idea like education. And consequently their purposes +are indefinitely varied, differing with different children, +changing as children grow and with the growth of experience on +the part of the one who teaches. Even the most valid aims which +can be put in words will, as words, do more harm than good unless +one recognizes that they are not aims, but rather suggestions to +educators as to how to observe, how to look ahead, and how to +choose in liberating and directing the energies of the concrete +situations in which they find themselves. As a recent writer has +said: "To lead this boy to read Scott's novels instead of old +Sleuth's stories; to teach this girl to sew; to root out the +habit of bullying from John's make-up; to prepare this class to +study medicine, -- these are samples of the millions of aims we +have actually before us in the concrete work of education." +Bearing these qualifications in mind, we shall proceed to state +some of the characteristics found in all good educational aims. +(1) An educational aim must be founded upon the intrinsic +activities and needs (including original instincts and acquired +habits) of the given individual to be educated. The tendency of +such an aim as preparation is, as we have seen, to omit existing +powers, and find the aim in some remote accomplishment or +responsibility. In general, there is a disposition to take +considerations which are dear to the hearts of adults and set +them up as ends irrespective of the capacities of those educated. +There is also an inclination to propound aims which are so +uniform as to neglect the specific powers and requirements of an +individual, forgetting that all learning is something which +happens to an individual at a given time and place. The larger +range of perception of the adult is of great value in observing +the abilities and weaknesses of the young, in deciding what they +may amount to. Thus the artistic capacities of the adult exhibit +what certain tendencies of the child are capable of; if we did +not have the adult achievements we should be without assurance as +to the significance of the drawing, reproducing, modeling, +coloring activities of childhood. So if it were not for adult +language, we should not be able to see the import of the babbling +impulses of infancy. But it is one thing to use adult +accomplishments as a context in which to place and survey the +doings of childhood and youth; it is quite another to set them up +as a fixed aim without regard to the concrete activities of those +educated. + +(2) An aim must be capable of translation into a method of +cooperating with the activities of those undergoing instruction. +It must suggest the kind of environment needed to liberate and to +organize their capacities. Unless it lends itself to the +construction of specific procedures, and unless these procedures +test, correct, and amplify the aim, the latter is worthless. +Instead of helping the specific task of teaching, it prevents the +use of ordinary judgment in observing and sizing up the +situation. It operates to exclude recognition of everything +except what squares up with the fixed end in view. Every rigid +aim just because it is rigidly given seems to render it +unnecessary to give careful attention to concrete conditions. +Since it must apply anyhow, what is the use of noting details +which do not count? + +The vice of externally imposed ends has deep roots. Teachers +receive them from superior authorities; these authorities accept +them from what is current in the community. The teachers impose +them upon children. As a first consequence, the intelligence of +the teacher is not free; it is confined to receiving the aims +laid down from above. Too rarely is the individual teacher so +free from the dictation of authoritative supervisor, textbook on +methods, prescribed course of study, etc., that he can let his +mind come to close quarters with the pupil's mind and the subject +matter. This distrust of the teacher's experience is then +reflected in lack of confidence in the responses of pupils. The +latter receive their aims through a double or treble external +imposition, and are constantly confused by the conflict between +the aims which are natural to their own experience at the time +and those in which they are taught to acquiesce. Until the +democratic criterion of the intrinsic significance of every +growing experience is recognized, we shall be intellectually +confused by the demand for adaptation to external aims. + +(3) Educators have to be on their guard against ends that are +alleged to be general and ultimate. Every activity, however +specific, is, of course, general in its ramified connections, for +it leads out indefinitely into other things. So far as a general +idea makes us more alive to these connections, it cannot be too +general. But "general" also means "abstract," or detached from +all specific context. And such abstractness means remoteness, +and throws us back, once more, upon teaching and learning as mere +means of getting ready for an end disconnected from the means. +That education is literally and all the time its own reward means +that no alleged study or discipline is educative unless it is +worth while in its own immediate having. A truly general aim +broadens the outlook; it stimulates one to take more consequences +(connections) into account. This means a wider and more flexible +observation of means. The more interacting forces, for example, +the farmer takes into account, the more varied will be his +immediate resources. He will see a greater number of possible +starting places, and a greater number of ways of getting at what +he wants to do. The fuller one's conception of possible future +achievements, the less his present activity is tied down to a +small number of alternatives. If one knew enough, one could +start almost anywhere and sustain his activities continuously and +fruitfully. + +Understanding then the term general or comprehensive aim simply +in the sense of a broad survey of the field of present +activities, we shall take up some of the larger ends which have +currency in the educational theories of the day, and consider +what light they throw upon the immediate concrete and diversified +aims which are always the educator's real concern. We premise +(as indeed immediately follows from what has been said) that +there is no need of making a choice among them or regarding them +as competitors. When we come to act in a tangible way we have to +select or choose a particular act at a particular time, but any +number of comprehensive ends may exist without competition, since +they mean simply different ways of looking at the same scene. +One cannot climb a number of different mountains simultaneously, +but the views had when different mountains are ascended +supplement one another: they do not set up incompatible, +competing worlds. Or, putting the matter in a slightly different +way, one statement of an end may suggest certain questions and +observations, and another statement another set of questions, +calling for other observations. Then the more general ends we +have, the better. One statement will emphasize what another +slurs over. What a plurality of hypotheses does for the +scientific investigator, a plurality of stated aims may do for +the instructor. + +Summary. An aim denotes the result of any natural process +brought to consciousness and made a factor in determining present +observation and choice of ways of acting. It signifies that an +activity has become intelligent. Specifically it means foresight +of the alternative consequences attendant upon acting in a given +situation in different ways, and the use of what is anticipated +to direct observation and experiment. A true aim is thus opposed +at every point to an aim which is imposed upon a process of +action from without. The latter is fixed and rigid; it is not a +stimulus to intelligence in the given situation, but is an +externally dictated order to do such and such things. Instead of +connecting directly with present activities, it is remote, +divorced from the means by which it is to be reached. Instead of +suggesting a freer and better balanced activity, it is a limit +set to activity. In education, the currency of these externally +imposed aims is responsible for the emphasis put upon the notion +of preparation for a remote future and for rendering the work of +both teacher and pupil mechanical and slavish. + + +Chapter Nine: Natural Development and Social Efficiency as Aims + +1. Nature as Supplying the Aim. We have just pointed out the +futility of trying to establish the aim of education--some one +final aim which subordinates all others to itself. We have +indicated that since general aims are but prospective points of +view from which to survey the existing conditions and estimate +their possibilities, we might have any number of them, all +consistent with one another. As matter of fact, a large number +have been stated at different times, all having great local +value. For the statement of aim is a matter of emphasis at a +given time. And we do not emphasize things which do not require +emphasis--that is, such things as are taking care of themselves +fairly well. We tend rather to frame our statement on the basis +of the defects and needs of the contemporary situation; we take +for granted, without explicit statement which would be of no use, +whatever is right or approximately so. We frame our explicit +aims in terms of some alteration to be brought about. It is, +then, DO paradox requiring explanation that a given epoch or +generation tends to emphasize in its conscious projections just +the things which it has least of in actual fact. A time of +domination by authority will call out as response the +desirability of great individual freedom; one of disorganized +individual activities the need of social control as an +educational aim. + +The actual and implicit practice and the conscious or stated aim +thus balance each other. At different times such aims as +complete living, better methods of language study, substitution +of things for words, social efficiency, personal culture, social +service, complete development of personality, encyclopedic +knowledge, discipline, a esthetic contemplation, utility, etc., +have served. The following discussion takes up three statements +of recent influence; certain others have been incidentally +discussed in the previous chapters, and others will be considered +later in a discussion of knowledge and of the values of studies. +We begin with a consideration that education is a process of +development in accordance with nature, taking Rousseau's +statement, which opposed natural to social (See ante, p. 91); +and then pass over to the antithetical conception of social +efficiency, which often opposes social to natural. + +(1) Educational reformers disgusted with the conventionality and +artificiality of the scholastic methods they find about them are +prone to resort to nature as a standard. Nature is supposed to +furnish the law and the end of development; ours it is to follow +and conform to her ways. The positive value of this conception +lies in the forcible way in which it calls attention to the +wrongness of aims which do not have regard to the natural +endowment of those educated. Its weakness is the ease with which +natural in the sense of normal is confused with the physical. +The constructive use of intelligence in foresight, and +contriving, is then discounted; we are just to get out of the way +and allow nature to do the work. Since no one has stated in the +doctrine both its truth and falsity better than Rousseau, we +shall turn to him. + +"Education," he says, "we receive from three sources--Nature, +men, and things. The spontaneous development of our organs and +capacities constitutes the education of Nature. The use to which +we are taught to put this development constitutes that education +given us by Men. The acquirement of personal experience from +surrounding objects constitutes that of things. Only when these +three kinds of education are consonant and make for the same end, +does a man tend towards his true goal. If we are asked what is +this end, the answer is that of Nature. For since the +concurrence of the three kinds of education is necessary to their +completeness, the kind which is entirely independent of our +control must necessarily regulate us in determining the other +two." Then he defines Nature to mean the capacities and +dispositions which are inborn, "as they exist prior to the +modification due to constraining habits and the influence of the +opinion of others." + +The wording of Rousseau will repay careful study. It contains as +fundamental truths as have been uttered about education in +conjunction with a curious twist. It would be impossible to say +better what is said in the first sentences. The three factors of +educative development are (a) the native structure of our bodily +organs and their functional activities; (b) the uses to which the +activities of these organs are put under the influence of other +persons; (c) their direct interaction with the environment. This +statement certainly covers the ground. His other two +propositions are equally sound; namely, (a) that only when the +three factors of education are consonant and cooperative does +adequate development of the individual occur, and (b) that the +native activities of the organs, being original, are basic in +conceiving consonance. But it requires but little reading +between the lines, supplemented by other statements of Rousseau, +to perceive that instead of regarding these three things as +factors which must work together to some extent in order that any +one of them may proceed educatively, he regards them as separate +and independent operations. Especially does he believe that +there is an independent and, as he says, "spontaneous" +development of the native organs and faculties. He thinks that +this development can go on irrespective of the use to which they +are put. And it is to this separate development that education +coming from social contact is to be subordinated. Now there is +an immense difference between a use of native activities in +accord with those activities themselves -- as distinct from +forcing them and perverting them -- and supposing that they have +a normal development apart from any use, which development +furnishes the standard and norm of all learning by use. To recur +to our previous illustration, the process of acquiring language +is a practically perfect model of proper educative growth. The +start is from native activities of the vocal apparatus, organs of +hearing, etc. But it is absurd to suppose that these have an +independent growth of their own, which left to itself would +evolve a perfect speech. Taken literally, Rousseau's principle +would mean that adults should accept and repeat the babblings and +noises of children not merely as the beginnings of the +development of articulate speech -- which they are -- but as +furnishing language itself -- the standard for all teaching of +language. + +The point may be summarized by saying that Rousseau was right, +introducing a much-needed reform into education, in holding that +the structure and activities of the organs furnish the conditions +of all teaching of the use of the organs; but profoundly wrong in +intimating that they supply not only the conditions but also the +ends of their development. As matter of fact, the native +activities develop, in contrast with random and capricious +exercise, through the uses to which they are put. And the office +of the social medium is, as we have seen, to direct growth +through putting powers to the best possible use. The instinctive +activities may be called, metaphorically, spontaneous, in the +sense that the organs give a strong bias for a certain sort of +operation, -- a bias so strong that we cannot go contrary to it, +though by trying to go contrary we may pervert, stunt, and +corrupt them. But the notion of a spontaneous normal development +of these activities is pure mythology. The natural, or native, +powers furnish the initiating and limiting forces in all +education; they do not furnish its ends or aims. There is no +learning except from a beginning in unlearned powers, but +learning is not a matter of the spontaneous overflow of the +unlearned powers. Rousseau's contrary opinion is doubtless due +to the fact that he identified God with Nature; to him the +original powers are wholly good, coming directly from a wise and +good creator. To paraphrase the old saying about the country and +the town, God made the original human organs and faculties, man +makes the uses to which they are put. Consequently the +development of the former furnishes the standard to which the +latter must be subordinated. When men attempt to determine the +uses to which the original activities shall be put, they +interfere with a divine plan. The interference by social +arrangements with Nature, God's work, is the primary source of +corruption in individuals. + +Rousseau's passionate assertion of the intrinsic goodness of all +natural tendencies was a reaction against the prevalent notion of +the total depravity of innate human nature, and has had a +powerful influence in modifying the attitude towards children's +interests. But it is hardly necessary to say that primitive +impulses are of themselves neither good nor evil, but become one +or the other according to the objects for which they are +employed. That neglect, suppression, and premature forcing of +some instincts at the expense of others, are responsible for many +avoidable ills, there can be no doubt. But the moral is not to +leave them alone to follow their own "spontaneous development," +but to provide an environment which shall organize them. + +Returning to the elements of truth contained in Rousseau's +statements, we find that natural development, as an aim, enables +him to point the means of correcting many evils in current +practices, and to indicate a number of desirable specific aims. +(1) Natural development as an aim fixes attention upon the bodily +organs and the need of health and vigor. The aim of natural +development says to parents and teachers: Make health an aim; +normal development cannot be had without regard to the vigor of +the body--an obvious enough fact and yet one whose due +recognition in practice would almost automatically revolutionize +many of our educational practices. "Nature" is indeed a vague +and metaphorical term, but one thing that "Nature" may be said to +utter is that there are conditions of educational efficiency, and +that till we have learned what these conditions are and have +learned to make our practices accord with them, the noblest and +most ideal of our aims are doomed to suffer -- are verbal and +sentimental rather than efficacious. + +(2) The aim of natural development translates into the aim of +respect for physical mobility. In Rousseau's words: "Children +are always in motion; a sedentary life is injurious." When he +says that "Nature's intention is to strengthen the body before +exercising the mind" he hardly states the fact fairly. But if he +had said that nature's "intention" (to adopt his poetical form of +speech) is to develop the mind especially by exercise of the +muscles of the body he would have stated a positive fact. In +other words, the aim of following nature means, in the concrete, +regard for the actual part played by use of the bodily organs in +explorations, in handling of materials, in plays and games. +(3) The general aim translates into the aim of regard for +individual differences among children. Nobody can take the +principle of consideration of native powers into account without +being struck by the fact that these powers differ in different +individuals. The difference applies not merely to their +intensity, but even more to their quality and arrangement. As +Rouseau said: "Each individual is born with a distinctive +temperament. We indiscriminately employ children of different +bents on the same exercises; their education destroys the special +bent and leaves a dull uniformity. Therefore after we have +wasted our efforts in stunting the true gifts of nature we see +the short-lived and illusory brilliance we have substituted die +away, while the natural abilities we have crushed do not +revive." + +Lastly, the aim of following nature means to note the origin, the +waxing, and waning, of preferences and interests. Capacities bud +and bloom irregularly; there is no even four-abreast development. +We must strike while the iron is hot. Especially precious are +the first dawnings of power. More than we imagine, the ways in +which the tendencies of early childhood are treated fix +fundamental dispositions and condition the turn taken by powers +that show themselves later. Educational concern with the early +years of life -- as distinct from inculcation of useful arts -- +dates almost entirely from the time of the emphasis by Pestalozzi +and Froebel, following Rousseau, of natural principles of growth. +The irregularity of growth and its significance is indicated in +the following passage of a student of the growth of the nervous +system. "While growth continues, things bodily and mental are +lopsided, for growth is never general, but is accentuated now at +one spot, now at another. The methods which shall recognize in +the presence of these enormous differences of endowment the +dynamic values of natural inequalities of growth, and utilize +them, preferring irregularity to the rounding out gained by +pruning will most closely follow that which takes place in the +body and thus prove most effective." 1 Observation of natural +tendencies is difficult under conditions of restraint. They show +themselves most readily in a child's spontaneous sayings and +doings, -- that is, in those he engages in when not put at set +tasks and when not aware of being under observation. It does not +follow that these tendencies are all desirable because they are +natural; but it does follow that since they are there, they are +operative and must be taken account of. We must see to it that +the desirable ones have an environment which keeps them active, +and that their activity shall control the direction the others +take and thereby induce the disuse of the latter because they +lead to nothing. Many tendencies that trouble parents when they +appear are likely to be transitory, and sometimes too much direct +attention to them only fixes a child's attention upon them. At +all events, adults too easily assume their own habits and wishes +as standards, and regard all deviations of children's impulses as +evils to be eliminated. That artificiality against which the +conception of following nature is so largely a protest, is the +outcome of attempts to force children directly into the mold of +grown-up standards. + +In conclusion, we note that the early history of the idea of +following nature combined two factors which had no inherent +connection with one another. Before the time of Rousseau +educational reformers had been inclined to urge the importance of +education by ascribing practically unlimited power to it. All +the differences between peoples and between classes and persons +among the same people were said to be due to differences of +training, of exercise, and practice. Originally, mind, reason, +understanding is, for all practical purposes, the same in all. +This essential identity of mind means the essential equality of +all and the possibility of bringing them all to the same level. +As a protest against this view, the doctrine of accord with +nature meant a much less formal and abstract view of mind and its +powers. It substituted specific instincts and impulses and +physiological capacities, differing from individual to individual +(just as they differ, as Rousseau pointed out, even in dogs of +the same litter), for abstract faculties of discernment, memory, +and generalization. Upon this side, the doctrine of educative +accord with nature has been reinforced by the development of +modern biology, physiology, and psychology. It means, in effect, +that great as is the significance of nurture, of modification, +and transformation through direct educational effort, nature, or +unlearned capacities, affords the foundation and ultimate +resources for such nurture. On the other hand, the doctrine of +following nature was a political dogma. It meant a rebellion +against existing social institutions, customs, and ideals (See +ante, p. 91). Rousseau's statement that everything is good as +it comes from the hands of the Creator has its signification only +in its contrast with the concluding part of the same sentence: +"Everything degenerates in the hands of man." And again he says: +"Natural man has an absolute value; he is a numerical unit, a +complete integer and has no relation save to himself and to his +fellow man. Civilized man is only a relative unit, the numerator +of a fraction whose value depends upon its dominator, its +relation to the integral body of society. Good political +institutions are those which make a man unnatural." It is upon +this conception of the artificial and harmful character of +organized social life as it now exists 2 that he rested the +notion that nature not merely furnishes prime forces which +initiate growth but also its plan and goal. That evil +institutions and customs work almost automatically to give a +wrong education which the most careful schooling cannot offset is +true enough; but the conclusion is not to education apart from +the environment, but to provide an environment in which native +powers will be put to better uses. + +2. Social Efficiency as Aim. A conception which made nature +supply the end of a true education and society the end of an evil +one, could hardly fail to call out a protest. The opposing +emphasis took the form of a doctrine that the business of +education is to supply precisely what nature fails to secure; +namely, habituation of an individual to social control; +subordination of natural powers to social rules. It is not +surprising to find that the value in the idea of social +efficiency resides largely in its protest against the points at +which the doctrine of natural development went astray; while its +misuse comes when it is employed to slur over the truth in that +conception. It is a fact that we must look to the activities and +achievements of associated life to find what the development of +power -- that is to say, efficiency -- means. The error is in +implying that we must adopt measures of subordination rather than +of utilization to secure efficiency. The doctrine is rendered +adequate when we recognize that social efficiency is attained not +by negative constraint but by positive use of native +individual capacities in occupations having a social meaning. +(1) Translated into specific aims, social efficiency indicates +the importance of industrial competency. Persons cannot live +without means of subsistence; the ways in which these means are +employed and consumed have a profound influence upon all the +relationships of persons to one another. If an individual is not +able to earn his own living and that of the children dependent +upon him, he is a drag or parasite upon the activities of others. +He misses for himself one of the most educative experiences of +life. If he is not trained in the right use of the products of +industry, there is grave danger that he may deprave himself and +injure others in his possession of wealth. No scheme of +education can afford to neglect such basic considerations. Yet +in the name of higher and more spiritual ideals, the arrangements +for higher education have often not only neglected them, but +looked at them with scorn as beneath the level of educative +concern. With the change from an oligarchical to a democratic +society, it is natural that the significance of an education +which should have as a result ability to make one's way +economically in the world, and to manage economic resources +usefully instead of for mere display and luxury, should receive +emphasis. + +There is, however, grave danger that in insisting upon this end, +existing economic conditions and standards will be accepted as +final. A democratic criterion requires us to develop capacity to +the point of competency to choose and make its own career. This +principle is violated when the attempt is made to fit individuals +in advance for definite industrial callings, selected not on the +basis of trained original capacities, but on that of the wealth +or social status of parents. As a matter of fact, industry at +the present time undergoes rapid and abrupt changes through the +evolution of new inventions. New industries spring up, and old +ones are revolutionized. Consequently an attempt to train for +too specific a mode of efficiency defeats its own purpose. When +the occupation changes its methods, such individuals are left +behind with even less ability to readjust themselves than if they +had a less definite training. But, most of all, the present +industrial constitution of society is, like every society which +has ever existed, full of inequities. It is the aim of +progressive education to take part in correcting unfair privilege +and unfair deprivation, not to perpetuate them. Wherever social +control means subordination of individual activities to class +authority, there is danger that industrial education will be +dominated by acceptance of the status quo. Differences of +economic opportunity then dictate what the future callings of +individuals are to be. We have an unconscious revival of the +defects of the Platonic scheme (ante, p. 89) without its +enlightened method of selection. + +(2) Civic efficiency, or good citizenship. It is, of course, +arbitrary to separate industrial competency from capacity in good +citizenship. But the latter term may be used to indicate a +number of qualifications which are vaguer than vocational +ability. These traits run from whatever make an individual a +more agreeable companion to citizenship in the political sense: +it denotes ability to judge men and measures wisely and to take a +determining part in making as well as obeying laws. The aim of +civic efficiency has at least the merit of protecting us from the +notion of a training of mental power at large. It calls +attention to the fact that power must be relative to doing +something, and to the fact that the things which most need to be +done are things which involve one's relationships with others. + +Here again we have to be on guard against understanding the aim +too narrowly. An over-definite interpretation would at certain +periods have excluded scientific discoveries, in spite of the +fact that in the last analysis security of social progress +depends upon them. For scientific men would have been thought to +be mere theoretical dreamers, totally lacking in social +efficiency. It must be borne in mind that ultimately social +efficiency means neither more nor less than capacity to share in +a give and take of experience. It covers all that makes one's +own experience more worth while to others, and all that enables +one to participate more richly in the worthwhile experiences of +others. Ability to produce and to enjoy art, capacity for +recreation, the significant utilization of leisure, are more +important elements in it than elements conventionally associated +oftentimes with citizenship. In the broadest sense, social +efficiency is nothing less than that socialization of mind which +is actively concerned in making experiences more communicable; in +breaking down the barriers of social stratification which make +individuals impervious to the interests of others. When social +efficiency is confined to the service rendered by overt acts, its +chief constituent (because its only guarantee) is omitted, -- +intelligent sympathy or good will. For sympathy as a desirable +quality is something more than mere feeling; it is a cultivated +imagination for what men have in common and a rebellion at +whatever unnecessarily divides them. What is sometimes called a +benevolent interest in others may be but an unwitting mask for an +attempt to dictate to them what their good shall be, instead of +an endeavor to free them so that they may seek and find the good +of their own choice. Social efficiency, even social service, are +hard and metallic things when severed from an active +acknowledgment of the diversity of goods which life may afford to +different persons, and from faith in the social utility of +encouraging every individual to make his own choice intelligent. + +3. Culture as Aim. Whether or not social efficiency is an aim +which is consistent with culture turns upon these considerations. +Culture means at least something cultivated, something ripened; +it is opposed to the raw and crude. When the "natural" is +identified with this rawness, culture is opposed to what is +called natural development. Culture is also something personal; +it is cultivation with respect to appreciation of ideas and art +and broad human interests. When efficiency is identified with a +narrow range of acts, instead of with the spirit and meaning of +activity, culture is opposed to efficiency. Whether called +culture or complete development of personality, the outcome is +identical with the true meaning of social efficiency whenever +attention is given to what is unique in an individual--and he +would not be an individual if there were not something +incommensurable about him. Its opposite is the mediocre, the +average. Whenever distinctive quality is developed, distinction +of personality results, and with it greater promise for a social +service which goes beyond the supply in quantity of material +commodities. For how can there be a society really worth serving +unless it is constituted of individuals of significant personal +qualities? + +The fact is that the opposition of high worth of personality to +social efficiency is a product of a feudally organized society +with its rigid division of inferior and superior. The latter are +supposed to have time and opportunity to develop themselves as +human beings; the former are confined to providing external +products. When social efficiency as measured by product or +output is urged as an ideal in a would-be democratic society, it +means that the depreciatory estimate of the masses characteristic +of an aristocratic community is accepted and carried over. But +if democracy has a moral and ideal meaning, it is that a social +return be demanded from all and that opportunity for development +of distinctive capacities be afforded all. The separation of the +two aims in education is fatal to democracy; the adoption of the +narrower meaning of efficiency deprives it of its essential +justification. + +The aim of efficiency (like any educational aim) must be included +within the process of experience. When it is measured by +tangible external products, and not by the achieving of a +distinctively valuable experience, it becomes materialistic. +Results in the way of commodities which may be the outgrowth of +an efficient personality are, in the strictest sense, by-products +of education: by-products which are inevitable and important, but +nevertheless by-products. To set up an external aim strengthens +by reaction the false conception of culture which identifies it +with something purely "inner." And the idea of perfecting an +"inner" personality is a sure sign of social divisions. What is +called inner is simply that which does not connect with +others -- which is not capable of free and full communication. +What is termed spiritual culture has usually been futile, with +something rotten about it, just because it has been conceived as +a thing which a man might have internally -- and therefore +exclusively. What one is as a person is what one is as +associated with others, in a free give and take of intercourse. +This transcends both the efficiency which consists in supplying +products to others and the culture which is an exclusive +refinement and polish. + +Any individual has missed his calling, farmer, physician, +teacher, student, who does not find that the accomplishments of +results of value to others is an accompaniment of a process of +experience inherently worth while. Why then should it be thought +that one must take his choice between sacrificing himself to +doing useful things for others, or sacrificing them to pursuit of +his own exclusive ends, whether the saving of his own soul or the +building of an inner spiritual life and personality? What happens +is that since neither of these things is persistently possible, +we get a compromise and an alternation. One tries each course by +turns. There is no greater tragedy than that so much of the +professedly spiritual and religious thought of the world has +emphasized the two ideals of self-sacrifice and spiritual +self-perfecting instead of throwing its weight against this +dualism of life. The dualism is too deeply established to be +easily overthrown; for that reason, it is the particular task of +education at the present time to struggle in behalf of an aim in +which social efficiency and personal culture are synonyms instead +of antagonists. + +Summary. General or comprehensive aims are points of view for +surveying the specific problems of education. Consequently it is +a test of the value of the manner in which any large end is +stated to see if it will translate readily and consistently into +the procedures which are suggested by another. We have applied +this test to three general aims: Development according to nature, +social efficiency, and culture or personal mental enrichment. In +each case we have seen that the aims when partially stated come +into conflict with each other. The partial statement of natural +development takes the primitive powers in an alleged spontaneous +development as the end-all. From this point of view training +which renders them useful to others is an abnormal constraint; +one which profoundly modifies them through deliberate nurture is +corrupting. But when we recognize that natural activities mean +native activities which develop only through the uses in which +they are nurtured, the conflict disappears. Similarly a social +efficiency which is defined in terms of rendering external +service to others is of necessity opposed to the aim of enriching +the meaning of experience, while a culture which is taken to +consist in an internal refinement of a mind is opposed to a +socialized disposition. But social efficiency as an educational +purpose should mean cultivation of power to join freely and fully +in shared or common activities. This is impossible without +culture, while it brings a reward in culture, because one cannot +share in intercourse with others without learning -- without +getting a broader point of view and perceiving things of which +one would otherwise be ignorant. And there is perhaps no better +definition of culture than that it is the capacity for constantly +expanding the range and accuracy of one's perception of +meanings. + +1 Donaldson, Growth of Brain, p. 356. + +2 We must not forget that Rousseau had the idea of a radically +different sort of society, a fraternal society whose end should +be identical with the good of all its members, which he thought +to be as much better than existing states as these are worse than +the state of nature. + + +Chapter Ten: Interest and Discipline + +1. The Meaning of the Terms. We have already noticed the +difference in the attitude of a spectator and of an agent or +participant. The former is indifferent to what is going on; one +result is just as good as another, since each is just something +to look at. The latter is bound up with what is going on; its +outcome makes a difference to him. His fortunes are more or less +at stake in the issue of events. Consequently he does whatever +he can to influence the direction present occurrences take. One +is like a man in a prison cell watching the rain out of the +window; it is all the same to him. The other is like a man who +has planned an outing for the next day which continuing rain will +frustrate. He cannot, to be sure, by his present reactions +affect to-morrow's weather, but he may take some steps which will +influence future happenings, if only to postpone the proposed +picnic. If a man sees a carriage coming which may run over him, +if he cannot stop its movement, he can at least get out of the +way if he foresees the consequence in time. In many instances, +he can intervene even more directly. The attitude of a +participant in the course of affairs is thus a double one: there +is solicitude, anxiety concerning future consequences, and a +tendency to act to assure better, and avert worse, consequences. +There are words which denote this attitude: concern, interest. +These words suggest that a person is bound up with the +possibilities inhering in objects; that he is accordingly on the +lookout for what they are likely to do to him; and that, on the +basis of his expectation or foresight, he is eager to act so as +to give things one turn rather than another. Interest and aims, +concern and purpose, are necessarily connected. Such words as +aim, intent, end, emphasize the results which are wanted and +striven for; they take for granted the personal attitude of +solicitude and attentive eagerness. Such words as interest, +affection, concern, motivation, emphasize the bearing of what is +foreseen upon the individual's fortunes, and his active desire to +act to secure a possible result. They take for granted the +objective changes. But the difference is but one of emphasis; +the meaning that is shaded in one set of words is illuminated in +the other. What is anticipated is objective and impersonal; +to-morrow's rain; the possibility of being run over. But for an +active being, a being who partakes of the consequences instead of +standing aloof from them, there is at the same time a personal +response. The difference imaginatively foreseen makes a present +difference, which finds expression in solicitude and effort. +While such words as affection, concern, and motive indicate an +attitude of personal preference, they are always attitudes toward +objects -- toward what is foreseen. We may call the phase of +objective foresight intellectual, and the phase of personal +concern emotional and volitional, but there is no separation in +the facts of the situation. + +Such a separation could exist only if the personal attitudes ran +their course in a world by themselves. But they are always +responses to what is going on in the situation of which they are +a part, and their successful or unsuccessful expression depends +upon their interaction with other changes. Life activities +flourish and fail only in connection with changes of the +environment. They are literally bound up with these changes; our +desires, emotions, and affections are but various ways in which +our doings are tied up with the doings of things and persons +about us. Instead of marking a purely personal or subjective +realm, separated from the objective and impersonal, they indicate +the non-existence of such a separate world. They afford +convincing evidence that changes in things are not alien to the +activities of a self, and that the career and welfare of the self +are bound up with the movement of persons and things. Interest, +concern, mean that self and world are engaged with each other in +a developing situation. + +The word interest, in its ordinary usage, expresses (i) the whole +state of active development, (ii) the objective results that are +foreseen and wanted, and (iii) the personal emotional +inclination. + +(I) An occupation, employment, pursuit, business is often +referred to as an interest. Thus we say that a man's interest is +politics, or journalism, or philanthropy, or +archaeology, or collecting Japanese prints, or banking. + +(ii) By an interest we also mean the point at which an object +touches or engages a man; the point where it influences him. In +some legal transactions a man has to prove "interest" in order to +have a standing at court. He has to show that some proposed step +concerns his affairs. A silent partner has an interest in a +business, although he takes no active part in its conduct because +its prosperity or decline affects his profits and liabilities. + +(iii) When we speak of a man as interested in this or that the +emphasis falls directly upon his personal attitude. To be +interested is to be absorbed in, wrapped up in, carried away by, +some object. To take an interest is to be on the alert, to care +about, to be attentive. We say of an interested person both that +he has lost himself in some affair and that he has found himself +in it. Both terms express the engrossment of the self in an +object. + +When the place of interest in education is spoken of in a +depreciatory way, it will be found that the second of the +meanings mentioned is first exaggerated and then isolated. +Interest is taken to mean merely the effect of an object upon +personal advantage or disadvantage, success or failure. +Separated from any objective development of affairs, these are +reduced to mere personal states of pleasure or pain. +Educationally, it then follows that to attach importance to +interest means to attach some feature of seductiveness to +material otherwise indifferent; to secure attention and effort by +offering a bribe of pleasure. This procedure is properly +stigmatized as "soft" pedagogy; as a "soup-kitchen" theory of +education. + +But the objection is based upon the fact -- or assumption -- that +the forms of skill to be acquired and the subject matter to be +appropriated have no interest on their own account: in other +words, they are supposed to be irrelevant to the normal +activities of the pupils. The remedy is not in finding fault +with the doctrine of interest, any more than it is to search for +some pleasant bait that may be hitched to the alien material. It +is to discover objects and modes of action, which are connected +with present powers. The function of this material in engaging +activity and carrying it on consistently and continuously is its +interest. If the material operates in this way, there is no call +either to hunt for devices which will make it interesting or to +appeal to arbitrary, semi-coerced effort. + +The word interest suggests, etymologically, what is between, -- +that which connects two things otherwise distant. In education, +the distance covered may be looked at as temporal. The fact that +a process takes time to mature is so obvious a fact that we +rarely make it explicit. We overlook the fact that in growth +there is ground to be covered between an initial stage of process +and the completing period; that there is something intervening. +In learning, the present powers of the pupil are the initial +stage; the aim of the teacher represents the remote limit. +Between the two lie means -- that is middle conditions: -- acts +to be performed; difficulties to be overcome; appliances to be +used. Only through them, in the literal time sense, will the +initial activities reach a satisfactory consummation. + +These intermediate conditions are of interest precisely because +the development of existing activities into the foreseen and +desired end depends upon them. To be means for the achieving of +present tendencies, to be "between" the agent and his end, to be +of interest, are different names for the same thing. When +material has to be made interesting, it signifies that as +presented, it lacks connection with purposes and present power: +or that if the connection be there, it is not perceived. To make +it interesting by leading one to realize the connection that +exists is simply good sense; to make it interesting by extraneous +and artificial inducements deserves all the bad names which have +been applied to the doctrine of interest in education. + +So much for the meaning of the term interest. Now for that of +discipline. Where an activity takes time, where many means and +obstacles lie between its initiation and completion, deliberation +and persistence are required. It is obvious that a very large +part of the everyday meaning of will is precisely the deliberate +or conscious disposition to persist and endure in a planned +course of action in spite of difficulties and contrary +solicitations. A man of strong will, in the popular usage of the +words, is a man who is neither fickle nor half-hearted in +achieving chosen ends. His ability is executive; that is, he +persistently and energetically strives to execute or carry out +his aims. A weak will is unstable as water. + +Clearly there are two factors in will. One has to do with the +foresight of results, the other with the depth of hold the +foreseen outcome has upon the person. + +(I) Obstinacy is persistence but it is not strength of volition. +Obstinacy may be mere animal inertia and insensitiveness. A man +keeps on doing a thing just because he has got started, not +because of any clearly thought-out purpose. In fact, the +obstinate man generally declines (although he may not be quite +aware of his refusal) to make clear to himself what his proposed +end is; he has a feeling that if he allowed himself to get a +clear and full idea of it, it might not be worth while. +Stubbornness shows itself even more in reluctance to criticize +ends which present themselves than it does in persistence and +energy in use of means to achieve the end. The really executive +man is a man who ponders his ends, who makes his ideas of the +results of his actions as clear and full as possible. The people +we called weak-willed or self-indulgent always deceive themselves +as to the consequences of their acts. They pick out some feature +which is agreeable and neglect all attendant circumstances. When +they begin to act, the disagreeable results they ignored begin to +show themselves. They are discouraged, or complain of being +thwarted in their good purpose by a hard fate, and shift to some +other line of action. That the primary difference between strong +and feeble volition is intellectual, consisting in the degree of +persistent firmness and fullness with which consequences are +thought out, cannot be over-emphasized. + +(ii) There is, of course, such a thing as a speculative tracing +out of results. Ends are then foreseen, but they do not lay deep +hold of a person. They are something to look at and for +curiosity to play with rather than something to achieve. There +is no such thing as over-intellectuality, but there is such a +thing as a one-sided intellectuality. A person "takes it out" as +we say in considering the consequences of proposed lines of +action. A certain flabbiness of fiber prevents the contemplated +object from gripping him and engaging him in action. And most +persons are naturally diverted from a proposed course of action +by unusual, unforeseen obstacles, or by presentation of +inducements to an action that is directly more agreeable. + +A person who is trained to consider his actions, to undertake +them deliberately, is in so far forth disciplined. Add to this +ability a power to endure in an intelligently chosen course in +face of distraction, confusion, and difficulty, and you have the +essence of discipline. Discipline means power at command; +mastery of the resources available for carrying through the +action undertaken. To know what one is to do and to move to do +it promptly and by use of the requisite means is to be +disciplined, whether we are thinking of an army or a mind. +Discipline is positive. To cow the spirit, to subdue +inclination, to compel obedience, to mortify the flesh, to make a +subordinate perform an uncongenial task -- these things are or +are not disciplinary according as they do or do not tend to the +development of power to recognize what one is about and to +persistence in accomplishment. + +It is hardly necessary to press the point that interest and +discipline are connected, not opposed. + +(i) Even the more purely intellectual phase of trained power -- +apprehension of what one is doing as exhibited in consequences -- +is not possible without interest. Deliberation will be +perfunctory and superficial where there is no interest. Parents +and teachers often complain -- and correctly -- that children "do +not want to hear, or want to understand." Their minds are not +upon the subject precisely because it does not touch them; it +does not enter into their concerns. This is a state of things +that needs to be remedied, but the remedy is not in the use of +methods which increase indifference and aversion. Even punishing +a child for inattention is one way of trying to make him realize +that the matter is not a thing of complete unconcern; it is one +way of arousing "interest," or bringing about a sense of +connection. In the long run, its value is measured by whether it +supplies a mere physical excitation to act in the way desired by +the adult or whether it leads the child "to think"--that is, to +reflect upon his acts and impregnate them with aims. + +(ii) That interest is requisite for executive persistence is even +more obvious. Employers do not advertise for workmen who are not +interested in what they are doing. If one were engaging a lawyer +or a doctor, it would never occur to one to reason that the +person engaged would stick to his work more conscientiously if it +was so uncongenial to him that he did it merely from a sense of +obligation. Interest measures -- or rather is -- the depth of +the grip which the foreseen end has upon one, moving one to act +for its realization. + +2. The Importance of the Idea of Interest in Education. +Interest represents the moving force of objects -- whether +perceived or presented in imagination -- in any experience having +a purpose. In the concrete, the value of recognizing the dynamic +place of interest in an educative development is that it leads to +considering individual children in their specific capabilities, +needs, and preferences. One who recognizes the importance of +interest will not assume that all minds work in the same way +because they happen to have the same teacher and textbook. +Attitudes and methods of approach and response vary with the +specific appeal the same material makes, this appeal itself +varying with difference of natural aptitude, of past experience, +of plan of life, and so on. But the facts of interest also +supply considerations of general value to the philosophy of +education. Rightly understood, they put us on our guard against +certain conceptions of mind and of subject matter which have had +great vogue in philosophic thought in the past, and which +exercise a serious hampering influence upon the conduct of +instruction and discipline. Too frequently mind is set over the +world of things and facts to be known; it is regarded as +something existing in isolation, with mental states and +operations that exist independently. Knowledge is then regarded +as an external application of purely mental existences to the +things to be known, or else as a result of the impressions which +this outside subject matter makes on mind, or as a combination of +the two. Subject matter is then regarded as something complete +in itself; it is just something to be learned or known, either by +the voluntary application of mind to it or through the +impressions it makes on mind. + +The facts of interest show that these conceptions are mythical. +Mind appears in experience as ability to respond to present +stimuli on the basis of anticipation of future possible +consequences, and with a view to controlling the kind of +consequences that are to take place. The things, the subject +matter known, consist of whatever is recognized as having a +bearing upon the anticipated course of events, whether assisting +or retarding it. These statements are too formal to be very +intelligible. An illustration may clear up their significance. +You are engaged in a certain occupation, say writing with a +typewriter. If you are an expert, your formed habits take care +of the physical movements and leave your thoughts free to +consider your topic. Suppose, however, you are not skilled, or +that, even if you are, the machine does not work well. You then +have to use intelligence. You do not wish to strike the keys at +random and let the consequences be what they may; you wish to +record certain words in a given order so as to make sense. You +attend to the keys, to what you have written, to your movements, +to the ribbon or the mechanism of the machine. Your attention is +not distributed indifferently and miscellaneously to any and +every detail. It is centered upon whatever has a bearing upon +the effective pursuit of your occupation. Your look is ahead, +and you are concerned to note the existing facts because and in +so far as they are factors in the achievement of the result +intended. You have to find out what your resources are, what +conditions are at command, and what the difficulties and +obstacles are. This foresight and this survey with reference to +what is foreseen constitute mind. Action that does not involve +such a forecast of results and such an examination of means and +hindrances is either a matter of habit or else it is blind. In +neither case is it intelligent. To be vague and uncertain as to +what is intended and careless in observation of conditions of its +realization is to be, in that degree, stupid or partially +intelligent. + +If we recur to the case where mind is not concerned with the +physical manipulation of the instruments but with what one +intends to write, the case is the same. There is an activity in +process; one is taken up with the development of a theme. Unless +one writes as a phonograph talks, this means intelligence; +namely, alertness in foreseeing the various conclusions to which +present data and considerations are tending, together with +continually renewed observation and recollection to get hold of +the subject matter which bears upon the conclusions to be +reached. The whole attitude is one of concern with what is to +be, and with what is so far as the latter enters into the +movement toward the end. Leave out the direction which depends +upon foresight of possible future results, and there is no +intelligence in present behavior. Let there be imaginative +forecast but no attention to the conditions upon which its +attainment depends, and there is self-deception or idle +dreaming -- abortive intelligence. + +If this illustration is typical, mind is not a name for something +complete by itself; it is a name for a course of action in so far +as that is intelligently directed; in so far, that is to say, as +aims, ends, enter into it, with selection of means to further the +attainment of aims. Intelligence is not a peculiar possession +which a person owns; but a person is intelligent in so far as the +activities in which he plays a part have the qualities mentioned. +Nor are the activities in which a person engages, whether +intelligently or not, exclusive properties of himself; they are +something in which he engages and partakes. Other things, the +independent changes of other things and persons, cooperate and +hinder. The individual's act may be initial in a course of +events, but the outcome depends upon the interaction of his +response with energies supplied by other agencies. Conceive mind +as anything but one factor partaking along with others in the +production of consequences, and it becomes meaningless. + +The problem of instruction is thus that of finding material which +will engage a person in specific activities having an aim or +purpose of moment or interest to him, and dealing with things not +as gymnastic appliances but as conditions for the attainment of +ends. The remedy for the evils attending the doctrine of formal +discipline previously spoken of, is not to be found by +substituting a doctrine of specialized disciplines, but by +reforming the notion of mind and its training. Discovery of +typical modes of activity, whether play or useful occupations, in +which individuals are concerned, in whose outcome they recognize +they have something at stake, and which cannot be carried through +without reflection and use of judgment to select material of +observation and recollection, is the remedy. In short, the root +of the error long prevalent in the conception of training of mind +consists in leaving out of account movements of things to future +results in which an individual shares, and in the direction of +which observation, imagination, and memory are enlisted. It +consists in regarding mind as complete in itself, ready to be +directly applied to a present material. + +In historic practice the error has cut two ways. On one hand, it +has screened and protected traditional studies and methods of +teaching from intelligent criticism and needed revisions. To say +that they are "disciplinary" has safeguarded them from all +inquiry. It has not been enough to show that they were of no use +in life or that they did not really contribute to the cultivation +of the self. That they were "disciplinary" stifled every +question, subdued every doubt, and removed the subject from the +realm of rational discussion. By its nature, the allegation +could not be checked up. Even when discipline did not accrue as +matter of fact, when the pupil even grew in laxity of application +and lost power of intelligent self-direction, the fault lay with +him, not with the study or the methods of teaching. His failure +was but proof that he needed more discipline, and thus afforded a +reason for retaining the old methods. The responsibility was +transferred from the educator to the pupil because the material +did not have to meet specific tests; it did not have to be shown +that it fulfilled any particular need or served any specific end. +It was designed to discipline in general, and if it failed, it +was because the individual was unwilling to be disciplined. +In the other direction, the tendency was towards a negative +conception of discipline, instead of an identification of it with +growth in constructive power of achievement. As we have already +seen, will means an attitude toward the future, toward the +production of possible consequences, an attitude involving effort +to foresee clearly and comprehensively the probable results of +ways of acting, and an active identification with some +anticipated consequences. Identification of will, or effort, +with mere strain, results when a mind is set up, endowed with +powers that are only to be applied to existing material. A +person just either will or will not apply himself to the matter +in hand. The more indifferent the subject matter, the less +concern it has for the habits and preferences of the individual, +the more demand there is for an effort to bring the mind to bear +upon it--and hence the more discipline of will. To attend to +material because there is something to be done in which the +person is concerned is not disciplinary in this view; not even if +it results in a desirable increase of constructive power. +Application just for the sake of application, for the sake of +training, is alone disciplinary. This is more likely to occur if +the subject matter presented is uncongenial, for then there is no +motive (so it is supposed) except the acknowledgment of duty or +the value of discipline. The logical result is expressed with +literal truth in the words of an American humorist: "It makes no +difference what you teach a boy so long as he doesn't like it." + +The counterpart of the isolation of mind from activities dealing +with objects to accomplish ends is isolation of the subject +matter to be learned. In the traditional schemes of education, +subject matter means so much material to be studied. Various +branches of study represent so many independent branches, each +having its principles of arrangement complete within itself. +History is one such group of facts; algebra another; geography +another, and so on till we have run through the entire +curriculum. Having a ready- made existence on their own account, +their relation to mind is exhausted in what they furnish it to +acquire. This idea corresponds to the conventional practice in +which the program of school work, for the day, month, and +successive years, consists of "studies" all marked off from one +another, and each supposed to be complete by itself -- for +educational purposes at least. + +Later on a chapter is devoted to the special consideration of the +meaning of the subject matter of instruction. At this point, we +need only to say that, in contrast with the traditional theory, +anything which intelligence studies represents things in the part +which they play in the carrying forward of active lines of +interest. Just as one "studies" his typewriter as part of the +operation of putting it to use to effect results, so with any +fact or truth. It becomes an object of study -- that is, of +inquiry and reflection -- when it figures as a factor to be +reckoned with in the completion of a course of events in which +one is engaged and by whose outcome one is affected. Numbers are +not objects of study just because they are numbers already +constituting a branch of learning called mathematics, but because +they represent qualities and relations of the world in which our +action goes on, because they are factors upon which the +accomplishment of our purposes depends. Stated thus broadly, the +formula may appear abstract. Translated into details, it means +that the act of learning or studying is artificial and +ineffective in the degree in which pupils are merely presented +with a lesson to be learned. Study is effectual in the degree in +which the pupil realizes the place of the numerical truth he is +dealing with in carrying to fruition activities in which he is +concerned. This connection of an object and a topic with the +promotion of an activity having a purpose is the first and the +last word of a genuine theory of interest in education. + +3. Some Social Aspects of the Question. While the theoretical +errors of which we have been speaking have their expressions in +the conduct of schools, they are themselves the outcome of +conditions of social life. A change confined to the theoretical +conviction of educators will not remove the difficulties, though +it should render more effective efforts to modify social +conditions. Men's fundamental attitudes toward the world are +fixed by the scope and qualities of the activities in which they +partake. The ideal of interest is exemplified in the artistic +attitude. Art is neither merely internal nor merely external; +merely mental nor merely physical. Like every mode of action, it +brings about changes in the world. The changes made by some +actions (those which by contrast may be called mechanical) are +external; they are shifting things about. No ideal reward, no +enrichment of emotion and intellect, accompanies them. Others +contribute to the maintenance of life, and to its external +adornment and display. Many of our existing social activities, +industrial and political, fall in these two classes. Neither the +people who engage in them, nor those who are directly affected by +them, are capable of full and free interest in their work. +Because of the lack of any purpose in the work for the one doing +it, or because of the restricted character of its aim, +intelligence is not adequately engaged. The same conditions +force many people back upon themselves. They take refuge in an +inner play of sentiment and fancies. They are aesthetic but not +artistic, since their feelings and ideas are turned upon +themselves, instead of being methods in acts which modify +conditions. Their mental life is sentimental; an enjoyment of an +inner landscape. Even the pursuit of science may become an +asylum of refuge from the hard conditions of life -- not a +temporary retreat for the sake of recuperation and clarification +in future dealings with the world. The very word art may become +associated not with specific transformation of things, making +them more significant for mind, but with stimulations of +eccentric fancy and with emotional indulgences. The separation +and mutual contempt of the "practical" man and the man of theory +or culture, the divorce of fine and industrial arts, are +indications of this situation. Thus interest and mind are either +narrowed, or else made perverse. Compare what was said in an +earlier chapter about the one-sided meanings which have come to +attach to the ideas of efficiency and of culture. + +This state of affairs must exist so far as society is organized +on a basis of division between laboring classes and leisure +classes. The intelligence of those who do things becomes hard in +the unremitting struggle with things; that of those freed from +the discipline of occupation becomes luxurious and effeminate. +Moreover, the majority of human beings still lack economic +freedom. Their pursuits are fixed by accident and necessity of +circumstance; they are not the normal expression of their own +powers interacting with the needs and resources of the +environment. Our economic conditions still relegate many men to +a servile status. As a consequence, the intelligence of those in +control of the practical situation is not liberal. Instead of +playing freely upon the subjugation of the world for human ends, +it is devoted to the manipulation of other men for ends that are +non-human in so far as they are exclusive. + +This state of affairs explains many things in our historic +educational traditions. It throws light upon the clash of aims +manifested in different portions of the school system; the +narrowly utilitarian character of most elementary education, and +the narrowly disciplinary or cultural character of most higher +education. It accounts for the tendency to isolate intellectual +matters till knowledge is scholastic, academic, and +professionally technical, and for the widespread conviction that +liberal education is opposed to the requirements of an education +which shall count in the vocations of life. But it also helps +define the peculiar problem of present education. The school +cannot immediately escape from the ideals set by prior social +conditions. But it should contribute through the type of +intellectual and emotional disposition which it forms to the +improvement of those conditions. And just here the true +conceptions of interest and discipline are full of significance. +Persons whose interests have been enlarged and intelligence +trained by dealing with things and facts in active occupations +having a purpose (whether in play or work) will be those most +likely to escape the alternatives of an academic and aloof +knowledge and a hard, narrow, and merely "practical" practice. +To organize education so that natural active tendencies shall be +fully enlisted in doing something, while seeing to it that the +doing requires observation, the acquisition of information, and +the use of a constructive imagination, is what most needs to be +done to improve social conditions. To oscillate between drill +exercises that strive to attain efficiency in outward doing +without the use of intelligence, and an accumulation of knowledge +that is supposed to be an ultimate end in itself, means that +education accepts the present social conditions as final, and +thereby takes upon itself the responsibility for perpetuating +them. A reorganization of education so that learning takes place +in connection with the intelligent carrying forward of purposeful +activities is a slow work. It can only be accomplished +piecemeal, a step at a time. But this is not a reason for +nominally accepting one educational philosophy and accommodating +ourselves in practice to another. It is a challenge to undertake +the task of reorganization courageously and to keep at it +persistently. + +Summary. Interest and discipline are correlative aspects of +activity having an aim. Interest means that one is identified +with the objects which define the activity and which furnish the +means and obstacles to its realization. Any activity with an aim +implies a distinction between an earlier incomplete phase and +later completing phase; it implies also intermediate steps. To +have an interest is to take things as entering into such a +continuously developing situation, instead of taking them in +isolation. The time difference between the given incomplete +state of affairs and the desired fulfillment exacts effort in +transformation, it demands continuity of attention and endurance. +This attitude is what is practically meant by will. Discipline +or development of power of continuous attention is its fruit. +The significance of this doctrine for the theory of education is +twofold. On the one hand it protects us from the notion that +mind and mental states are something complete in themselves, +which then happen to be applied to some ready-made objects and +topics so that knowledge results. It shows that mind and +intelligent or purposeful engagement in a course of action into +which things enter are identical. Hence to develop and train +mind is to provide an environment which induces such activity. +On the other side, it protects us from the notion that subject +matter on its side is something isolated and independent. It +shows that subject matter of learning is identical with all the +objects, ideas, and principles which enter as resources or +obstacles into the continuous intentional pursuit of a course of +action. The developing course of action, whose end and +conditions are perceived, is the unity which holds together what +are often divided into an independent mind on one side and an +independent world of objects and facts on the other. + + +Chapter Eleven: Experience and Thinking + +1. The Nature of Experience. The nature of experience can be +understood only by noting that it includes an active and a +passive element peculiarly combined. On the active hand, +experience is trying -- a meaning which is made explicit in the +connected term experiment. On the passive, it is undergoing. +When we experience something we act upon it, we do something with +it; then we suffer or undergo the consequences. We do something +to the thing and then it does something to us in return: such is +the peculiar combination. The connection of these two phases of +experience measures the fruitfulness or value of the experience. +Mere activity does not constitute experience. It is dispersive, +centrifugal, dissipating. Experience as trying involves change, +but change is meaningless transition unless it is consciously +connected with the return wave of consequences which flow from +it. When an activity is continued into the undergoing of +consequences, when the change made by action is reflected back +into a change made in us, the mere flux is loaded with +significance. We learn something. It is not experience when a +child merely sticks his finger into a flame; it is experience +when the movement is connected with the pain which he undergoes +in consequence. Henceforth the sticking of the finger into flame +means a burn. Being burned is a mere physical change, like the +burning of a stick of wood, if it is not perceived as a +consequence of some other action. Blind and capricious impulses +hurry us on heedlessly from one thing to another. So far as this +happens, everything is writ in water. There is none of that +cumulative growth which makes an experience in any vital sense of +that term. On the other hand, many things happen to us in the +way of pleasure and pain which we do not connect with any prior +activity of our own. They are mere accidents so far as we are +concerned. There is no before or after to such experience; no +retrospect nor outlook, and consequently no meaning. We get +nothing which may be carried over to foresee what is likely to +happen next, and no gain in ability to adjust ourselves to what +is coming--no added control. Only by courtesy can such an +experience be called experience. To "learn from experience" is +to make a backward and forward connection between what we do to +things and what we enjoy or suffer from things in consequence. +Under such conditions, doing becomes a trying; an experiment with +the world to find out what it is like; the undergoing becomes +instruction--discovery of the connection of things. + +Two conclusions important for education follow. (1) Experience +is primarily an active-passive affair; it is not primarily +cognitive. But (2) the measure of the value of an experience +lies in the perception of relationships or continuities to which +it leads up. It includes cognition in the degree in which it is +cumulative or amounts to something, or has meaning. In schools, +those under instruction are too customarily looked upon as +acquiring knowledge as theoretical spectators, minds which +appropriate knowledge by direct energy of intellect. The very +word pupil has almost come to mean one who is engaged not in +having fruitful experiences but in absorbing knowledge directly. +Something which is called mind or consciousness is severed from +the physical organs of activity. The former is then thought to +be purely intellectual and cognitive; the latter to be an +irrelevant and intruding physical factor. The intimate union of +activity and undergoing its consequences which leads to +recognition of meaning is broken; instead we have two fragments: +mere bodily action on one side, and meaning directly grasped by +"spiritual" activity on the other. + +It would be impossible to state adequately the evil results which +have flowed from this dualism of mind and body, much less to +exaggerate them. Some of the more striking effects, may, +however, be enumerated. (a) In part bodily activity becomes an +intruder. Having nothing, so it is thought, to do with mental +activity, it becomes a distraction, an evil to be contended with. +For the pupil has a body, and brings it to school along with his +mind. And the body is, of necessity, a wellspring of energy; it +has to do something. But its activities, not being utilized in +occupation with things which yield significant results, have to +be frowned upon. They lead the pupil away from the lesson with +which his "mind" ought to be occupied; they are sources of +mischief. The chief source of the "problem of discipline" in +schools is that the teacher has often to spend the larger part of +the time in suppressing the bodily activities which take the mind +away from its material. A premium is put on physical quietude; +on silence, on rigid uniformity of posture and movement; upon a +machine-like simulation of the attitudes of intelligent interest. +The teachers' business is to hold the pupils up to these +requirements and to punish the inevitable deviations which occur. + +The nervous strain and fatigue which result with both teacher and +pupil are a necessary consequence of the abnormality of the +situation in which bodily activity is divorced from the +perception of meaning. Callous indifference and explosions from +strain alternate. The neglected body, having no organized +fruitful channels of activity, breaks forth, without knowing why +or how, into meaningless boisterousness, or settles into equally +meaningless fooling -- both very different from the normal play +of children. Physically active children become restless and +unruly; the more quiescent, so-called conscientious ones spend +what energy they have in the negative task of keeping their +instincts and active tendencies suppressed, instead of in a +positive one of constructive planning and execution; they are +thus educated not into responsibility for the significant and +graceful use of bodily powers, but into an enforced duty not to +give them free play. It may be seriously asserted that a chief +cause for the remarkable achievements of Greek education was that +it was never misled by false notions into an attempted separation +of mind and body. + +(b) Even, however, with respect to the lessons which have to be +learned by the application of "mind," some bodily activities have +to be used. The senses -- especially the eye and ear -- have to +be employed to take in what the book, the map, the blackboard, +and the teacher say. The lips and vocal organs, and the hands, +have to be used to reproduce in speech and writing what has been +stowed away. The senses are then regarded as a kind of +mysterious conduit through which information is conducted from +the external world into the mind; they are spoken of as gateways +and avenues of knowledge. To keep the eyes on the book and the +ears open to the teacher's words is a mysterious source of +intellectual grace. Moreover, reading, writing, and +figuring -- important school arts -- demand muscular or motor +training. The muscles of eye, hand, and vocal organs accordingly +have to be trained to act as pipes for carrying knowledge back +out of the mind into external action. For it happens that using +the muscles repeatedly in the same way fixes in them an +automatic tendency to repeat. + +The obvious result is a mechanical use of the bodily activities +which (in spite of the generally obtrusive and interfering +character of the body in mental action) have to be employed more +or less. For the senses and muscles are used not as organic +participants in having an instructive experience, but as external +inlets and outlets of mind. Before the child goes to school, he +learns with his hand, eye, and ear, because they are organs of +the process of doing something from which meaning results. The +boy flying a kite has to keep his eye on the kite, and has to +note the various pressures of the string on his hand. His senses +are avenues of knowledge not because external facts are somehow +"conveyed" to the brain, but because they are used in doing +something with a purpose. The qualities of seen and touched +things have a bearing on what is done, and are alertly perceived; +they have a meaning. But when pupils are expected to use their +eyes to note the form of words, irrespective of their meaning, in +order to reproduce them in spelling or reading, the resulting +training is simply of isolated sense organs and muscles. It is +such isolation of an act from a purpose which makes it +mechanical. It is customary for teachers to urge children to +read with expression, so as to bring out the meaning. But if +they originally learned the sensory- motor technique of reading +-- the ability to identify forms and to reproduce the sounds they +stand for -- by methods which did not call for attention to +meaning, a mechanical habit was established which makes it +difficult to read subsequently with intelligence. The vocal +organs have been trained to go their own way automatically in +isolation; and meaning cannot be tied on at will. Drawing, +singing, and writing may be taught in the same mechanical way; +for, we repeat, any way is mechanical which narrows down the +bodily activity so that a separation of body from mind -- that +is, from recognition of meaning -- is set up. Mathematics, even +in its higher branches, when undue emphasis is put upon the +technique of calculation, and science, when laboratory exercises +are given for their own sake, suffer from the same evil. + +(c) On the intellectual side, the separation of "mind" from +direct occupation with things throws emphasis on things at the +expense of relations or connections. It is altogether too common +to separate perceptions and even ideas from judgments. The +latter are thought to come after the former in order to compare +them. It is alleged that the mind perceives things apart from +relations; that it forms ideas of them in isolation from their +connections -- with what goes before and comes after. Then +judgment or thought is called upon to combine the separated items +of "knowledge" so that their resemblance or causal connection +shall be brought out. As matter of fact, every perception and +every idea is a sense of the bearings, use, and cause, of a +thing. We do not really know a chair or have an idea of it by +inventorying and enumerating its various isolated qualities, but +only by bringing these qualities into connection with something +else -- the purpose which makes it a chair and not a table; or +its difference from the kind of chair we are accustomed to, or +the "period" which it represents, and so on. A wagon is not +perceived when all its parts are summed up; it is the +characteristic connection of the parts which makes it a wagon. +And these connections are not those of mere physical +juxtaposition; they involve connection with the animals that draw +it, the things that are carried on it, and so on. Judgment is +employed in the perception; otherwise the perception is mere +sensory excitation or else a recognition of the result of a prior +judgment, as in the case of familiar objects. + +Words, the counters for ideals, are, however, easily taken for +ideas. And in just the degree in which mental activity is +separated from active concern with the world, from doing +something and connecting the doing with what is undergone, words, +symbols, come to take the place of ideas. The substitution is +the more subtle because some meaning is recognized. But we are +very easily trained to be content with a minimum of meaning, and +to fail to note how restricted is our perception of the relations +which confer significance. We get so thoroughly used to a kind +of pseudo-idea, a half perception, that we are not aware how +half-dead our mental action is, and how much keener and more +extensive our observations and ideas would be if we formed them +under conditions of a vital experience which required us to use +judgment: to hunt for the connections of the thing dealt with. +There is no difference of opinion as to the theory of the matter. +All authorities agree that that discernment of relationships is +the genuinely intellectual matter; hence, the educative matter. +The failure arises in supposing that relationships can become +perceptible without experience -- without that conjoint trying +and undergoing of which we have spoken. It is assumed that +"mind" can grasp them if it will only give attention, and that +this attention may be given at will irrespective of the +situation. Hence the deluge of half-observations, of verbal +ideas, and unassimilated "knowledge" which afflicts the world. +An ounce of experience is better than a ton of theory simply +because it is only in experience that any theory has vital and +verifiable significance. An experience, a very humble +experience, is capable of generating and carrying any amount of +theory (or intellectual content), but a theory apart from an +experience cannot be definitely grasped even as theory. It tends +to become a mere verbal formula, a set of catchwords used to +render thinking, or genuine theorizing, unnecessary and +impossible. Because of our education we use words, thinking they +are ideas, to dispose of questions, the disposal being in reality +simply such an obscuring of perception as prevents us from seeing +any longer the difficulty. + +2. Reflection in Experience. Thought or reflection, as we have +already seen virtually if not explicitly, is the discernment of +the relation between what we try to do and what happens in +consequence. No experience having a meaning is possible without +some element of thought. But we may contrast two types of +experience according to the proportion of reflection found in +them. All our experiences have a phase of "cut and try" in them +-- what psychologists call the method of trial and error. We +simply do something, and when it fails, we do something else, and +keep on trying till we hit upon something which works, and then +we adopt that method as a rule of thumb measure in subsequent +procedure. Some experiences have very little else in them than +this hit and miss or succeed process. We see that a certain way +of acting and a certain consequence are connected, but we do not +see how they are. We do not see the details of the connection; +the links are missing. Our discernment is very gross. In other +cases we push our observation farther. We analyze to see just +what lies between so as to bind together cause and effect, +activity and consequence. This extension of our insight makes +foresight more accurate and comprehensive. The action which +rests simply upon the trial and error method is at the mercy of +circumstances; they may change so that the act performed does not +operate in the way it was expected to. But if we know in detail +upon what the result depends, we can look to see whether the +required conditions are there. The method extends our practical +control. For if some of the conditions are missing, we may, if +we know what the needed antecedents for an effect are, set to +work to supply them; or, if they are such as to produce +undesirable effects as well, we may eliminate some of the +superfluous causes and economize effort. + +In discovery of the detailed connections of our activities and +what happens in consequence, the thought implied in cut and try +experience is made explicit. Its quantity increases so that its +proportionate value is very different. Hence the quality of the +experience changes; the change is so significant that we may call +this type of experience reflective -- that is, reflective par +excellence. The deliberate cultivation of this phase of thought +constitutes thinking as a distinctive experience. Thinking, in +other words, is the intentional endeavor to discover specific +connections between something which we do and the consequences +which result, so that the two become continuous. Their +isolation, and consequently their purely arbitrary going +together, is canceled; a unified developing situation takes its +place. The occurrence is now understood; it is explained; it is +reasonable, as we say, that the thing should happen as it does. + +Thinking is thus equivalent to an explicit rendering of the +intelligent element in our experience. It makes it possible to +act with an end in view. It is the condition of our having aims. +As soon as an infant begins to expect he begins to use something +which is now going on as a sign of something to follow; he is, in +however simple a fashion, judging. For he takes one thing as +evidence of something else, and so recognizes a relationship. +Any future development, however elaborate it may be, is only an +extending and a refining of this simple act of inference. All +that the wisest man can do is to observe what is going on more +widely and more minutely and then select more carefully from what +is noted just those factors which point to something to happen. +The opposites, once more, to thoughtful action are routine and +capricious behavior. The former accepts what has been customary +as a full measure of possibility and omits to take into account +the connections of the particular things done. The latter makes +the momentary act a measure of value, and ignores the connections +of our personal action with the energies of the environment. It +says, virtually, "things are to be just as I happen to like them +at this instant," as routine says in effect "let things continue +just as I have found them in the past." Both refuse to +acknowledge responsibility for the future consequences which flow +from present action. Reflection is the acceptance of such +responsibility. + +The starting point of any process of thinking is something going +on, something which just as it stands is incomplete or +unfulfilled. Its point, its meaning lies literally in what it is +going to be, in how it is going to turn out. As this is written, +the world is filled with the clang of contending armies. For an +active participant in the war, it is clear that the momentous +thing is the issue, the future consequences, of this and that +happening. He is identified, for the time at least, with the +issue; his fate hangs upon the course things are taking. But +even for an onlooker in a neutral country, the significance of +every move made, of every advance here and retreat there, lies in +what it portends. To think upon the news as it comes to us is to +attempt to see what is indicated as probable or possible +regarding an outcome. To fill our heads, like a scrapbook, with +this and that item as a finished and done-for thing, is not to +think. It is to turn ourselves into a piece of registering +apparatus. To consider the bearing of the occurrence upon what +may be, but is not yet, is to think. Nor will the reflective +experience be different in kind if we substitute distance in time +for separation in space. Imagine the war done with, and a future +historian giving an account of it. The episode is, by +assumption, past. But he cannot give a thoughtful account of the +war save as he preserves the time sequence; the meaning of each +occurrence, as he deals with it, lies in what was future for it, +though not for the historian. To take it by itself as a complete +existence is to take it unreflectively. Reflection also implies +concern with the issue -- a certain sympathetic identification of +our own destiny, if only dramatic, with the outcome of the course +of events. For the general in the war, or a common soldier, or a +citizen of one of the contending nations, the stimulus to +thinking is direct and urgent. For neutrals, it is indirect and +dependent upon imagination. But the flagrant partisanship of +human nature is evidence of the intensity of the tendency to +identify ourselves with one possible course of events, and to +reject the other as foreign. If we cannot take sides in overt +action, and throw in our little weight to help determine the +final balance, we take sides emotionally and imaginatively. We +desire this or that outcome. One wholly indifferent to the +outcome does not follow or think about what is happening at all. +From this dependence of the act of thinking upon a sense of +sharing in the consequences of what goes on, flows one of the +chief paradoxes of thought. Born in partiality, in order to +accomplish its tasks it must achieve a certain detached +impartiality. The general who allows his hopes and desires to +affect his observations and interpretations of the existing +situation will surely make a mistake in calculation. While hopes +and fears may be the chief motive for a thoughtful following of +the war on the part of an onlooker in a neutral country, he too +will think ineffectively in the degree in which his preferences +modify the stuff of his observations and reasonings. There is, +however, no incompatibility between the fact that the occasion of +reflection lies in a personal sharing in what is going on and the +fact that the value of the reflection lies upon keeping one's +self out of the data. The almost insurmountable difficulty of +achieving this detachment is evidence that thinking originates in +situations where the course of thinking is an actual part of the +course of events and is designed to influence the result. Only +gradually and with a widening of the area of vision through a +growth of social sympathies does thinking develop to include what +lies beyond our direct interests: a fact of great significance +for education. + +To say that thinking occurs with reference to situations which +are still going on, and incomplete, is to say that thinking +occurs when things are uncertain or doubtful or problematic. +Only what is finished, completed, is wholly assured. Where there +is reflection there is suspense. The object of thinking is to +help reach a conclusion, to project a possible termination on the +basis of what is already given. Certain other facts about +thinking accompany this feature. Since the situation in which +thinking occurs is a doubtful one, thinking is a process of +inquiry, of looking into things, of investigating. Acquiring is +always secondary, and instrumental to the act of inquiring. It +is seeking, a quest, for something that is not at hand. We +sometimes talk as if "original research" were a peculiar +prerogative of scientists or at least of advanced students. But +all thinking is research, and all research is native, original, +with him who carries it on, even if everybody else in the world +already is sure of what he is still looking for. + +It also follows that all thinking involves a risk. Certainty +cannot be guaranteed in advance. The invasion of the unknown is +of the nature of an adventure; we cannot be sure in advance. The +conclusions of thinking, till confirmed by the event, are, +accordingly, more or less tentative or hypothetical. Their +dogmatic assertion as final is unwarranted, short of the issue, +in fact. The Greeks acutely raised the question: How can we +learn? For either we know already what we are after, or else we +do not know. In neither case is learning possible; on the first +alternative because we know already; on the second, because we do +not know what to look for, nor if, by chance, we find it can we +tell that it is what we were after. The dilemma makes no +provision for coming to know, for learning; it assumes either +complete knowledge or complete ignorance. Nevertheless the +twilight zone of inquiry, of thinking, exists. The possibility +of hypothetical conclusions, of tentative results, is the fact +which the Greek dilemma overlooked. The perplexities of the +situation suggest certain ways out. We try these ways, and +either push our way out, in which case we know we have found what +we were looking for, or the situation gets darker and more +confused--in which case, we know we are still ignorant. +Tentative means trying out, feeling one's way along +provisionally. Taken by itself, the Greek argument is a nice +piece of formal logic. But it is also true that as long as men +kept a sharp disjunction between knowledge and ignorance, science +made only slow and accidental advance. Systematic advance in +invention and discovery began when men recognized that they could +utilize doubt for purposes of inquiry by forming conjectures to +guide action in tentative explorations, whose development would +confirm, refute, or modify the guiding conjecture. While the +Greeks made knowledge more than learning, modern science makes +conserved knowledge only a means to learning, to discovery. To +recur to our illustration. A commanding general cannot base his +actions upon either absolute certainty or absolute ignorance. He +has a certain amount of information at hand which is, we will +assume, reasonably trustworthy. He then infers certain +prospective movements, thus assigning meaning to the bare facts +of the given situation. His inference is more or less dubious +and hypothetical. But he acts upon it. He develops a plan of +procedure, a method of dealing with the situation. The +consequences which directly follow from his acting this way +rather than that test and reveal the worth of his reflections. +What he already knows functions and has value in what he learns. +But will this account apply in the case of the one in a neutral +country who is thoughtfully following as best he can the progress +of events? In form, yes, though not of course in content. It is +self-evident that his guesses about the future indicated by +present facts, guesses by which he attempts to supply meaning to +a multitude of disconnected data, cannot be the basis of a method +which shall take effect in the campaign. That is not his +problem. But in the degree in which he is actively thinking, and +not merely passively following the course of events, his +tentative inferences will take effect in a method of procedure +appropriate to his situation. He will anticipate certain future +moves, and will be on the alert to see whether they happen or +not. In the degree in which he is intellectually concerned, or +thoughtful, he will be actively on the lookout; he will take +steps which although they do not affect the campaign, modify in +some degree his subsequent actions. Otherwise his later "I told +you so" has no intellectual quality at all; it does not mark any +testing or verification of prior thinking, but only a coincidence +that yields emotional satisfaction -- and includes a large factor +of self-deception. The case is comparable to that of an +astronomer who from given data has been led to foresee (infer) a +future eclipse. No matter how great the mathematical +probability, the inference is hypothetical -- a matter of +probability. 1 The hypothesis as to the date and position of the +anticipated eclipse becomes the material of forming a method of +future conduct. Apparatus is arranged; possibly an expedition is +made to some far part of the globe. In any case, some active +steps are taken which actually change some physical conditions. +And apart from such steps and the consequent modification of the +situation, there is no completion of the act of thinking. It +remains suspended. Knowledge, already attained knowledge, +controls thinking and makes it fruitful. + +So much for the general features of a reflective experience. +They are (i) perplexity, confusion, doubt, due to the fact that +one is implicated in an incomplete situation whose full character +is not yet determined; (ii) a conjectural anticipation -- a +tentative interpretation of the given elements, attributing to +them a tendency to effect certain consequences; (iii) a careful +survey (examination, inspection, exploration, analysis) of all +attainable consideration which will define and clarify the +problem in hand; (iv) a consequent elaboration of the tentative +hypothesis to make it more precise and more consistent, because +squaring with a wider range of facts; (v) taking one stand upon +the projected hypothesis as a plan of action which is applied to +the existing state of affairs: doing something overtly to bring +about the anticipated result, and thereby testing the hypothesis. +It is the extent and accuracy of steps three and four which mark +off a distinctive reflective experience from one on the trial and +error plane. They make thinking itself into an experience. +Nevertheless, we never get wholly beyond the trial and error +situation. Our most elaborate and rationally consistent thought +has to be tried in the world and thereby tried out. And since it +can never take into account all the connections, it can never +cover with perfect accuracy all the consequences. Yet a +thoughtful survey of conditions is so careful, and the guessing +at results so controlled, that we have a right to mark off the +reflective experience from the grosser trial and error forms of +action. + +Summary. In determining the place of thinking in experience we +first noted that experience involves a connection of doing or +trying with something which is undergone in consequence. A +separation of the active doing phase from the passive undergoing +phase destroys the vital meaning of an experience. Thinking is +the accurate and deliberate instituting of connections between +what is done and its consequences. It notes not only that they +are connected, but the details of the connection. It makes +connecting links explicit in the form of relationships. The +stimulus to thinking is found when we wish to determine the +significance of some act, performed or to be performed. Then we +anticipate consequences. This implies that the situation as it +stands is, either in fact or to us, incomplete and hence +indeterminate. The projection of consequences means a proposed +or tentative solution. To perfect this hypothesis, existing +conditions have to be carefully scrutinized and the implications +of the hypothesis developed -- an operation called reasoning. +Then the suggested solution -- the idea or theory -- has to be +tested by acting upon it. If it brings about certain +consequences, certain determinate changes, in the world, it is +accepted as valid. Otherwise it is modified, and another trial +made. Thinking includes all of these steps, -- the sense of a +problem, the observation of conditions, the formation and +rational elaboration of a suggested conclusion, and the active +experimental testing. While all thinking results in knowledge, +ultimately the value of knowledge is subordinate to its use in +thinking. For we live not in a settled and finished world, but +in one which is going on, and where our main task is prospective, +and where retrospect -- and all knowledge as distinct from +thought is retrospect -- is of value in the solidity, security, +and fertility it affords our dealings with the future. + +1 It is most important for the practice of science that men in +many cases can calculate the degree of probability and the amount +of probable error involved, but that does alter the features of +the situation as described. It refines them. + + +Chapter Twelve: Thinking in Education + +1. The Essentials of Method. No one doubts, theoretically, the +importance of fostering in school good habits of thinking. But +apart from the fact that the acknowledgment is not so great in +practice as in theory, there is not adequate theoretical +recognition that all which the school can or need do for pupils, +so far as their minds are concerned (that is, leaving out certain +specialized muscular abilities), is to develop their ability to +think. The parceling out of instruction among various ends such +as acquisition of skill (in reading, spelling, writing, drawing, +reciting); acquiring information (in history and geography), and +training of thinking is a measure of the ineffective way in which +we accomplish all three. Thinking which is not connected with +increase of efficiency in action, and with learning more about +ourselves and the world in which we live, has something the +matter with it just as thought (See ante, p. 147). And skill +obtained apart from thinking is not connected with any sense of +the purposes for which it is to be used. It consequently leaves +a man at the mercy of his routine habits and of the authoritative +control of others, who know what they are about and who are not +especially scrupulous as to their means of achievement. And +information severed from thoughtful action is dead, a +mind-crushing load. Since it simulates knowledge and thereby +develops the poison of conceit, it is a most powerful obstacle to +further growth in the grace of intelligence. The sole direct +path to enduring improvement in the methods of instruction and +learning consists in centering upon the conditions which exact, +promote, and test thinking. Thinking is the method of +intelligent learning, of learning that employs and rewards mind. +We speak, legitimately enough, about the method of thinking, but +the important thing to bear in mind about method is that +thinking is method, the method of intelligent experience in the +course which it takes. + +I. The initial stage of that developing experience which is +called thinking is experience. This remark may sound like a +silly truism. It ought to be one; but unfortunately it is not. +On the contrary, thinking is often regarded both in philosophic +theory and in educational practice as something cut off from +experience, and capable of being cultivated in isolation. In +fact, the inherent limitations of experience are often urged as +the sufficient ground for attention to thinking. Experience is +then thought to be confined to the senses and appetites; to a +mere material world, while thinking proceeds from a higher +faculty (of reason), and is occupied with spiritual or at least +literary things. So, oftentimes, a sharp distinction is made +between pure mathematics as a peculiarly fit subject matter of +thought (since it has nothing to do with physical existences) and +applied mathematics, which has utilitarian but not mental value. + +Speaking generally, the fundamental fallacy in methods of +instruction lies in supposing that experience on the part of +pupils may be assumed. What is here insisted upon is the +necessity of an actual empirical situation as the initiating +phase of thought. Experience is here taken as previously +defined: trying to do something and having the thing perceptibly +do something to one in return. The fallacy consists in supposing +that we can begin with ready-made subject matter of arithmetic, +or geography, or whatever, irrespective of some direct personal +experience of a situation. Even the kindergarten and Montessori +techniques are so anxious to get at intellectual distinctions, +without "waste of time," that they tend to ignore -- or reduce -- +the immediate crude handling of the familiar material of +experience, and to introduce pupils at once to material which +expresses the intellectual distinctions which adults have made. +But the first stage of contact with any new material, at whatever +age of maturity, must inevitably be of the trial and error sort. +An individual must actually try, in play or work, to do something +with material in carrying out his own impulsive activity, and +then note the interaction of his energy and that of the material +employed. This is what happens when a child at first begins to +build with blocks, and it is equally what happens when a +scientific man in his laboratory begins to experiment with +unfamiliar objects. + +Hence the first approach to any subject in school, if thought is +to be aroused and not words acquired, should be as unscholastic +as possible. To realize what an experience, or empirical +situation, means, we have to call to mind the sort of situation +that presents itself outside of school; the sort of occupations +that interest and engage activity in ordinary life. And careful +inspection of methods which are permanently successful in formal +education, whether in arithmetic or learning to read, or studying +geography, or learning physics or a foreign language, will reveal +that they depend for their efficiency upon the fact that they go +back to the type of the situation which causes reflection out of +school in ordinary life. They give the pupils something to do, +not something to learn; and the doing is of such a nature as to +demand thinking, or the intentional noting of connections; +learning naturally results. + +That the situation should be of such a nature as to arouse +thinking means of course that it should suggest something to do +which is not either routine or capricious--something, in other +words, presenting what is new (and hence uncertain or +problematic) and yet sufficiently connected with existing habits +to call out an effective response. An effective response means +one which accomplishes a perceptible result, in distinction from +a purely haphazard activity, where the consequences cannot be +mentally connected with what is done. The most significant +question which can be asked, accordingly, about any situation or +experience proposed to induce learning is what quality of problem +it involves. + +At first thought, it might seem as if usual school methods +measured well up to the standard here set. The giving of +problems, the putting of questions, the assigning of tasks, the +magnifying of difficulties, is a large part of school work. But +it is indispensable to discriminate between genuine and simulated +or mock problems. The following questions may aid in making such +discrimination. (a) Is there anything but a problem? Does the +question naturally suggest itself within some situation or +personal experience? Or is it an aloof thing, a problem only for +the purposes of conveying instruction in some school topic? Is it +the sort of trying that would arouse observation and engage +experimentation outside of school? (b) Is it the pupil's own +problem, or is it the teacher's or textbook's problem, made a +problem for the pupil only because he cannot get the required +mark or be promoted or win the teacher's approval, unless he +deals with it? Obviously, these two questions overlap. They are +two ways of getting at the same point: Is the experience a +personal thing of such a nature as inherently to stimulate and +direct observation of the connections involved, and to lead to +inference and its testing? Or is it imposed from without, and is +the pupil's problem simply to meet the external requirement? +Such questions may give us pause in deciding upon the extent to +which current practices are adapted to develop reflective habits. +The physical equipment and arrangements of the average schoolroom +are hostile to the existence of real situations of experience. +What is there similar to the conditions of everyday life which +will generate difficulties? Almost everything testifies to the +great premium put upon listening, reading, and the reproduction +of what is told and read. It is hardly possible to overstate the +contrast between such conditions and the situations of active +contact with things and persons in the home, on the playground, +in fulfilling of ordinary responsibilities of life. Much of it +is not even comparable with the questions which may arise in the +mind of a boy or girl in conversing with others or in reading +books outside of the school. No one has ever explained why +children are so full of questions outside of the school (so that +they pester grown-up persons if they get any encouragement), and +the conspicuous absence of display of curiosity about the subject +matter of school lessons. Reflection on this striking contrast +will throw light upon the question of how far customary school +conditions supply a context of experience in which problems +naturally suggest themselves. No amount of improvement in the +personal technique of the instructor will wholly remedy this +state of things. There must be more actual material, more stuff, +more appliances, and more opportunities for doing things, before +the gap can be overcome. And where children are engaged in doing +things and in discussing what arises in the course of their +doing, it is found, even with comparatively indifferent modes of +instruction, that children's inquiries are spontaneous and +numerous, and the proposals of solution advanced, varied, and +ingenious. + +As a consequence of the absence of the materials and occupations +which generate real problems, the pupil's problems are not his; +or, rather, they are his only as a pupil, not as a human being. +Hence the lamentable waste in carrying over such expertness as is +achieved in dealing with them to the affairs of life beyond the +schoolroom. A pupil has a problem, but it is the problem of +meeting the peculiar requirements set by the teacher. His +problem becomes that of finding out what the teacher wants, what +will satisfy the teacher in recitation and examination and +outward deportment. Relationship to subject matter is no longer +direct. The occasions and material of thought are not found in +the arithmetic or the history or geography itself, but in +skillfully adapting that material to the teacher's requirements. +The pupil studies, but unconsciously to himself the objects of +his study are the conventions and standards of the school system +and school authority, not the nominal "studies." The thinking +thus evoked is artificially one-sided at the best. At its worst, +the problem of the pupil is not how to meet the requirements of +school life, but how to seem to meet them -- or, how to come near +enough to meeting them to slide along without an undue amount of +friction. The type of judgment formed by these devices is not a +desirable addition to character. If these statements give too +highly colored a picture of usual school methods, the +exaggeration may at least serve to illustrate the point: the need +of active pursuits, involving the use of material to accomplish +purposes, if there are to be situations which normally generate +problems occasioning thoughtful inquiry. + +II. There must be data at command to supply the considerations +required in dealing with the specific difficulty which has +presented itself. Teachers following a "developing" method +sometimes tell children to think things out for themselves as if +they could spin them out of their own heads. The material of +thinking is not thoughts, but actions, facts, events, and the +relations of things. In other words, to think effectively one +must have had, or now have, experiences which will furnish him +resources for coping with the difficulty at hand. A difficulty +is an indispensable stimulus to thinking, but not all +difficulties call out thinking. Sometimes they overwhelm and +submerge and discourage. The perplexing situation must be +sufficiently like situations which have already been dealt with +so that pupils will have some control of the meanings of handling +it. A large part of the art of instruction lies in making the +difficulty of new problems large enough to challenge thought, and +small enough so that, in addition to the confusion naturally +attending the novel elements, there shall be luminous familiar +spots from which helpful suggestions may spring. + +In one sense, it is a matter of indifference by what +psychological means the subject matter for reflection is +provided. Memory, observation, reading, communication, are all +avenues for supplying data. The relative proportion to be +obtained from each is a matter of the specific features of the +particular problem in hand. It is foolish to insist upon +observation of objects presented to the senses if the student is +so familiar with the objects that he could just as well recall +the facts independently. It is possible to induce undue and +crippling dependence upon sense-presentations. No one can carry +around with him a museum of all the things whose properties will +assist the conduct of thought. A well-trained mind is one that +has a maximum of resources behind it, so to speak, and that is +accustomed to go over its past experiences to see what they +yield. On the other hand, a quality or relation of even a +familiar object may previously have been passed over, and be just +the fact that is helpful in dealing with the question. In this +case direct observation is called for. The same principle +applies to the use to be made of observation on one hand and of +reading and "telling" on the other. Direct observation is +naturally more vivid and vital. But it has its limitations; and +in any case it is a necessary part of education that one should +acquire the ability to supplement the narrowness of his +immediately personal experiences by utilizing the experiences of +others. Excessive reliance upon others for data (whether got +from reading or listening) is to be depreciated. Most +objectionable of all is the probability that others, the book or +the teacher, will supply solutions ready-made, instead of giving +material that the student has to adapt and apply to the question +in hand for himself. + +There is no inconsistency in saying that in schools there is +usually both too much and too little information supplied by +others. The accumulation and acquisition of information for +purposes of reproduction in recitation and examination is made +too much of. "Knowledge," in the sense of information, means the +working capital, the indispensable resources, of further inquiry; +of finding out, or learning, more things. Frequently it is +treated as an end itself, and then the goal becomes to heap it up +and display it when called for. This static, cold-storage ideal +of knowledge is inimical to educative development. It not only +lets occasions for thinking go unused, but it swamps thinking. +No one could construct a house on ground cluttered with +miscellaneous junk. Pupils who have stored their "minds" with +all kinds of material which they have never put to intellectual +uses are sure to be hampered when they try to think. They have +no practice in selecting what is appropriate, and no criterion to +go by; everything is on the same dead static level. On the other +hand, it is quite open to question whether, if information +actually functioned in experience through use in application to +the student's own purposes, there would not be need of more +varied resources in books, pictures, and talks than are usually +at command. + +III. The correlate in thinking of facts, data, knowledge already +acquired, is suggestions, inferences, conjectured meanings, +suppositions, tentative explanations:--ideas, in short. Careful +observation and recollection determine what is given, what is +already there, and hence assured. They cannot furnish what is +lacking. They define, clarify, and locate the question; they +cannot supply its answer. Projection, invention, ingenuity, +devising come in for that purpose. The data arouse suggestions, +and only by reference to the specific data can we pass upon the +appropriateness of the suggestions. But the suggestions run +beyond what is, as yet, actually given in experience. They +forecast possible results, things to do, not facts (things +already done). Inference is always an invasion of the unknown, a +leap from the known. + +In this sense, a thought (what a thing suggests but is not as it +is presented) is creative, -- an incursion into the novel. It +involves some inventiveness. What is suggested must, indeed, be +familiar in some context; the novelty, the inventive devising, +clings to the new light in which it is seen, the different use to +which it is put. When Newton thought of his theory of +gravitation, the creative aspect of his thought was not found in +its materials. They were familiar; many of them commonplaces -- +sun, moon, planets, weight, distance, mass, square of numbers. +These were not original ideas; they were established facts. His +originality lay in the use to which these familiar acquaintances +were put by introduction into an unfamiliar context. The same is +true of every striking scientific discovery, every great +invention, every admirable artistic production. Only silly folk +identify creative originality with the extraordinary and +fanciful; others recognize that its measure lies in putting +everyday things to uses which had not occurred to others. The +operation is novel, not the materials out of which it is +constructed. + +The educational conclusion which follows is that all thinking is +original in a projection of considerations which have not been +previously apprehended. The child of three who discovers what +can be done with blocks, or of six who finds out what he can make +by putting five cents and five cents together, is really a +discoverer, even though everybody else in the world knows it. +There is a genuine increment of experience; not another item +mechanically added on, but enrichment by a new quality. The +charm which the spontaneity of little children has for +sympathetic observers is due to perception of this intellectual +originality. The joy which children themselves experience is the +joy of intellectual constructiveness -- of creativeness, if the +word may be used without misunderstanding. The educational moral +I am chiefly concerned to draw is not, however, that teachers +would find their own work less of a grind and strain if school +conditions favored learning in the sense of discovery and not in +that of storing away what others pour into them; nor that it +would be possible to give even children and youth the delights of +personal intellectual productiveness -- true and important as are +these things. It is that no thought, no idea, can possibly be +conveyed as an idea from one person to another. When it is told, +it is, to the one to whom it is told, another given fact, not an +idea. The communication may stimulate the other person to +realize the question for himself and to think out a like idea, or +it may smother his intellectual interest and suppress his dawning +effort at thought. But what he directly gets cannot be an idea. +Only by wrestling with the conditions of the problem at first +hand, seeking and finding his own way out, does he think. When +the parent or teacher has provided the conditions which stimulate +thinking and has taken a sympathetic attitude toward the +activities of the learner by entering into a common or conjoint +experience, all has been done which a second party can do to +instigate learning. The rest lies with the one directly +concerned. If he cannot devise his own solution (not of course +in isolation, but in correspondence with the teacher and other +pupils) and find his own way out he will not learn, not even if +he can recite some correct answer with one hundred per cent +accuracy. We can and do supply ready-made "ideas" by the +thousand; we do not usually take much pains to see that the one +learning engages in significant situations where his own +activities generate, support, and clinch ideas -- that is, +perceived meanings or connections. This does not mean that the +teacher is to stand off and look on; the alternative to +furnishing ready-made subject matter and listening to the +accuracy with which it is reproduced is not quiescence, but +participation, sharing, in an activity. In such shared activity, +the teacher is a learner, and the learner is, without knowing it, +a teacher -- and upon the whole, the less consciousness there is, +on either side, of either giving or receiving instruction, the +better. IV. Ideas, as we have seen, whether they be humble +guesses or dignified theories, are anticipations of possible +solutions. They are anticipations of some continuity or +connection of an activity and a consequence which has not as yet +shown itself. They are therefore tested by the operation of +acting upon them. They are to guide and organize further +observations, recollections, and experiments. They are +intermediate in learning, not final. All educational reformers, +as we have had occasion to remark, are given to attacking the +passivity of traditional education. They have opposed pouring in +from without, and absorbing like a sponge; they have attacked +drilling in material as into hard and resisting rock. But it is +not easy to secure conditions which will make the getting of an +idea identical with having an experience which widens and makes +more precise our contact with the environment. Activity, even +self-activity, is too easily thought of as something merely +mental, cooped up within the head, or finding expression only +through the vocal organs. + +While the need of application of ideas gained in study is +acknowledged by all the more successful methods of instruction, +the exercises in application are sometimes treated as devices for +fixing what has already been learned and for getting greater +practical skill in its manipulation. These results are genuine +and not to be despised. But practice in applying what has been +gained in study ought primarily to have an intellectual quality. +As we have already seen, thoughts just as thoughts are +incomplete. At best they are tentative; they are suggestions, +indications. They are standpoints and methods for dealing with +situations of experience. Till they are applied in these +situations they lack full point and reality. Only application +tests them, and only testing confers full meaning and a sense of +their reality. Short of use made of them, they tend to segregate +into a peculiar world of their own. It may be seriously +questioned whether the philosophies (to which reference has been +made in section 2 of chapter X) which isolate mind and set it +over against the world did not have their origin in the fact that +the reflective or theoretical class of men elaborated a large +stock of ideas which social conditions did not allow them to act +upon and test. Consequently men were thrown back into their own +thoughts as ends in themselves. + +However this may be, there can be no doubt that a peculiar +artificiality attaches to much of what is learned in schools. It +can hardly be said that many students consciously think of the +subject matter as unreal; but it assuredly does not possess for +them the kind of reality which the subject matter of their vital +experiences possesses. They learn not to expect that sort of +reality of it; they become habituated to treating it as having +reality for the purposes of recitations, lessons, and +examinations. That it should remain inert for the experiences of +daily life is more or less a matter of course. The bad effects +are twofold. Ordinary experience does not receive the enrichment +which it should; it is not fertilized by school learning. And +the attitudes which spring from getting used to and accepting +half-understood and ill-digested material weaken vigor and +efficiency of thought. + +If we have dwelt especially on the negative side, it is for the +sake of suggesting positive measures adapted to the effectual +development of thought. Where schools are equipped with +laboratories, shops, and gardens, where dramatizations, plays, +and games are freely used, opportunities exist for reproducing +situations of life, and for acquiring and applying information +and ideas in the carrying forward of progressive experiences. +Ideas are not segregated, they do not form an isolated island. +They animate and enrich the ordinary course of life. Information +is vitalized by its function; by the place it occupies in +direction of action. The phrase "opportunities exist" is used +purposely. They may not be taken advantage of; it is possible to +employ manual and constructive activities in a physical way, as +means of getting just bodily skill; or they may be used almost +exclusively for "utilitarian," i.e., pecuniary, ends. But the +disposition on the part of upholders of "cultural" education to +assume that such activities are merely physical or professional +in quality, is itself a product of the philosophies which isolate +mind from direction of the course of experience and hence from +action upon and with things. When the "mental" is regarded as a +self-contained separate realm, a counterpart fate befalls bodily +activity and movements. They are regarded as at the best mere +external annexes to mind. They may be necessary for the +satisfaction of bodily needs and the attainment of external +decency and comfort, but they do not occupy a necessary place in +mind nor enact an indispensable role in the completion of +thought. Hence they have no place in a liberal education--i.e., +one which is concerned with the interests of intelligence. If +they come in at all, it is as a concession to the material needs +of the masses. That they should be allowed to invade the +education of the elite is unspeakable. This conclusion follows +irresistibly from the isolated conception of mind, but by the +same logic it disappears when we perceive what mind really is -- +namely, the purposive and directive factor in the +development of experience. While it is desirable that all +educational institutions should be equipped so as to give +students an opportunity for acquiring and testing ideas and +information in active pursuits typifying important social +situations, it will, doubtless, be a long time before all of them +are thus furnished. But this state of affairs does not afford +instructors an excuse for folding their hands and persisting in +methods which segregate school knowledge. Every recitation in +every subject gives an opportunity for establishing cross +connections between the subject matter of the lesson and the +wider and more direct experiences of everyday life. Classroom +instruction falls into three kinds. The least desirable treats +each lesson as an independent whole. It does not put upon the +student the responsibility of finding points of contact between +it and other lessons in the same subject, or other subjects of +study. Wiser teachers see to it that the student is +systematically led to utilize his earlier lessons to help +understand the present one, and also to use the present to throw +additional light upon what has already been acquired. Results +are better, but school subject matter is still isolated. Save by +accident, out-of-school experience is left in its crude and +comparatively irreflective state. It is not subject to the +refining and expanding influences of the more accurate and +comprehensive material of direct instruction. The latter is not +motivated and impregnated with a sense of reality by being +intermingled with the realities of everyday life. The best type +of teaching bears in mind the desirability of affecting this +interconnection. It puts the student in the habitual attitude of +finding points of contact and mutual bearings. + +Summary. Processes of instruction are unified in the degree in +which they center in the production of good habits of thinking. +While we may speak, without error, of the method of thought, the +important thing is that thinking is the method of an educative +experience. The essentials of method are therefore identical +with the essentials of reflection. They are first that the pupil +have a genuine situation of experience -- that there be a +continuous activity in which he is interested for its own sake; +secondly, that a genuine problem develop within this situation as +a stimulus to thought; third, that he possess the information and +make the observations needed to deal with it; fourth, that +suggested solutions occur to him which he shall be responsible +for developing in an orderly way; fifth, that he have opportunity +and occasion to test his ideas by application, to make their +meaning clear and to discover for himself their validity. + +Chapter Thirteen: The Nature of Method + +1. The Unity of Subject Matter and Method. + +The trinity of school topics is subject matter, methods, and +administration or government. We have been concerned with the +two former in recent chapters. It remains to disentangle them +from the context in which they have been referred to, and discuss +explicitly their nature. We shall begin with the topic of +method, since that lies closest to the considerations of the last +chapter. Before taking it up, it may be well, however, to call +express attention to one implication of our theory; the +connection of subject matter and method with each other. The +idea that mind and the world of things and persons are two +separate and independent realms -- a theory which philosophically +is known as dualism -- carries with it the conclusion that method +and subject matter of instruction are separate affairs. Subject +matter then becomes a ready-made systematized classification of +the facts and principles of the world of nature and man. Method +then has for its province a consideration of the ways in which +this antecedent subject matter may be best presented to and +impressed upon the mind; or, a consideration of the ways in which +the mind may be externally brought to bear upon the matter so as +to facilitate its acquisition and possession. In theory, at +least, one might deduce from a science of the mind as something +existing by itself a complete theory of methods of learning, with +no knowledge of the subjects to which the methods are to be +applied. Since many who are actually most proficient in various +branches of subject matter are wholly innocent of these methods, +this state of affairs gives opportunity for the retort that +pedagogy, as an alleged science of methods of the mind in +learning, is futile; -- a mere screen for concealing the +necessity a teacher is under of profound and accurate +acquaintance with the subject in hand. + +But since thinking is a directed movement of subject matter to a +completing issue, and since mind is the deliberate and +intentional phase of the process, the notion of any such split is +radically false. The fact that the material of a science is +organized is evidence that it has already been subjected to +intelligence; it has been methodized, so to say. Zoology as a +systematic branch of knowledge represents crude, scattered facts +of our ordinary acquaintance with animals after they have been +subjected to careful examination, to deliberate supplementation, +and to arrangement to bring out connections which assist +observation, memory, and further inquiry. Instead of furnishing +a starting point for learning, they mark out a consummation. +Method means that arrangement of subject matter which makes it +most effective in use. Never is method something outside of the +material. + +How about method from the standpoint of an individual who is +dealing with subject matter? Again, it is not something external. +It is simply an effective treatment of material -- efficiency +meaning such treatment as utilizes the material (puts it to a +purpose) with a minimum of waste of time and energy. We can +distinguish a way of acting, and discuss it by itself; but the +way exists only as way-of-dealing-with-material. Method is not +antithetical to subject matter; it is the effective direction of +subject matter to desired results. It is antithetical to random +and ill-considered action, -- ill-considered signifying +ill-adapted. + +The statement that method means directed movement of subject +matter towards ends is formal. An illustration may give it +content. Every artist must have a method, a technique, in doing +his work. Piano playing is not hitting the keys at random. It +is an orderly way of using them, and the order is not something +which exists ready- made in the musician's hands or brain prior +to an activity dealing with the piano. Order is found in the +disposition of acts which use the piano and the hands and brain +so as to achieve the result intended. It is the action of the +piano directed to accomplish the purpose of the piano as a +musical instrument. It is the same with "pedagogical" method. +The only difference is that the piano is a mechanism constructed +in advance for a single end; while the material of study is +capable of indefinite uses. But even in this regard the +illustration may apply if we consider the infinite variety of +kinds of music which a piano may produce, and the variations in +technique required in the different musical results secured. +Method in any case is but an effective way of employing some +material for some end. + +These considerations may be generalized by going back to the +conception of experience. Experience as the perception of the +connection between something tried and something undergone in +consequence is a process. Apart from effort to control the +course which the process takes, there is no distinction of +subject matter and method. There is simply an activity which +includes both what an individual does and what the environment +does. A piano player who had perfect mastery of his instrument +would have no occasion to distinguish between his contribution +and that of the piano. In well-formed, smooth-running functions +of any sort, -- skating, conversing, hearing music, enjoying a +landscape, -- there is no consciousness of separation of the +method of the person and of the subject matter. In whole-hearted +play and work there is the same phenomenon. + +When we reflect upon an experience instead of just having it, we +inevitably distinguish between our own attitude and the objects +toward which we sustain the attitude. When a man is eating, he +is eating food. He does not divide his act into eating and food. +But if he makes a scientific investigation of the act, such a +discrimination is the first thing he would effect. He would +examine on the one hand the properties of the nutritive material, +and on the other hand the acts of the organism in appropriating +and digesting. Such reflection upon experience gives rise to a +distinction of what we experience (the experienced) and the +experiencing -- the how. When we give names to this distinction +we have subject matter and method as our terms. There is the +thing seen, heard, loved, hated, imagined, and there is the act +of seeing, hearing, loving, hating, imagining, etc. + +This distinction is so natural and so important for certain +purposes, that we are only too apt to regard it as a separation +in existence and not as a distinction in thought. Then we make a +division between a self and the environment or world. This +separation is the root of the dualism of method and subject +matter. That is, we assume that knowing, feeling, willing, etc., +are things which belong to the self or mind in its isolation, and +which then may be brought to bear upon an independent subject +matter. We assume that the things which belong in isolation to +the self or mind have their own laws of operation irrespective of +the modes of active energy of the object. These laws are +supposed to furnish method. It would be no less absurd to +suppose that men can eat without eating something, or that the +structure and movements of the jaws, throat muscles, the +digestive activities of stomach, etc., are not what they are +because of the material with which their activity is engaged. +Just as the organs of the organism are a continuous part of the +very world in which food materials exist, so the capacities of +seeing, hearing, loving, imagining are intrinsically connected +with the subject matter of the world. They are more truly ways +in which the environment enters into experience and functions +there than they are independent acts brought to bear upon things. +Experience, in short, is not a combination of mind and world, +subject and object, method and subject matter, but is a single +continuous interaction of a great diversity (literally countless +in number) of energies. + +For the purpose of controlling the course or direction which the +moving unity of experience takes we draw a mental distinction +between the how and the what. While there is no way of walking +or of eating or of learning over and above the actual walking, +eating, and studying, there are certain elements in the act which +give the key to its more effective control. Special attention to +these elements makes them more obvious to perception (letting +other factors recede for the time being from conspicuous +recognition). Getting an idea of how the experience proceeds +indicates to us what factors must be secured or modified in order +that it may go on more successfully. This is only a somewhat +elaborate way of saying that if a man watches carefully the +growth of several plants, some of which do well and some of which +amount to little or nothing, he may be able to detect the special +conditions upon which the prosperous development of a plant +depends. These conditions, stated in an orderly sequence, would +constitute the method or way or manner of its growth. There is +no difference between the growth of a plant and the prosperous +development of an experience. It is not easy, in either case, to +seize upon just the factors which make for its best movement. +But study of cases of success and failure and minute and +extensive comparison, helps to seize upon causes. When we have +arranged these causes in order, we have a method of procedure or +a technique. + +A consideration of some evils in education that flow from the +isolation of method from subject matter will make the point more +definite. + +(I) In the first place, there is the neglect (of which we have +spoken) of concrete situations of experience. There can be no +discovery of a method without cases to be studied. The method is +derived from observation of what actually happens, with a view to +seeing that it happen better next time. But in instruction and +discipline, there is rarely sufficient opportunity for children +and youth to have the direct normal experiences from which +educators might derive an idea of method or order of best +development. Experiences are had under conditions of such +constraint that they throw little or no light upon the normal +course of an experience to its fruition. "Methods" have then to +be authoritatively recommended to teachers, instead of being an +expression of their own intelligent observations. Under such +circumstances, they have a mechanical uniformity, assumed to be +alike for all minds. Where flexible personal experiences are +promoted by providing an environment which calls out directed +occupations in work and play, the methods ascertained will vary +with individuals -- for it is certain that each individual has +something characteristic in his way of going at things. + +(ii) In the second place, the notion of methods isolated from +subject matter is responsible for the false conceptions of +discipline and interest already noted. When the effective way of +managing material is treated as something ready-made apart from +material, there are just three possible ways in which to +establish a relationship lacking by assumption. One is to +utilize excitement, shock of pleasure, tickling the palate. +Another is to make the consequences of not attending painful; we +may use the menace of harm to motivate concern with the alien +subject matter. Or a direct appeal may be made to the person to +put forth effort without any reason. We may rely upon immediate +strain of "will." In practice, however, the latter method is +effectual only when instigated by fear of unpleasant results. +(iii) In the third place, the act of learning is made a direct +and conscious end in itself. Under normal conditions, learning +is a product and reward of occupation with subject matter. +Children do not set out, consciously, to learn walking or +talking. One sets out to give his impulses for communication and +for fuller intercourse with others a show. He learns in +consequence of his direct activities. The better methods of +teaching a child, say, to read, follow the same road. They do +not fix his attention upon the fact that he has to learn +something and so make his attitude self-conscious and +constrained. They engage his activities, and in the process of +engagement he learns: the same is true of the more successful +methods in dealing with number or whatever. But when the subject +matter is not used in carrying forward impulses and habits to +significant results, it is just something to be learned. The +pupil's attitude to it is just that of having to learn it. +Conditions more unfavorable to an alert and concentrated response +would be hard to devise. Frontal attacks are even more wasteful +in learning than in war. This does not mean, however, that +students are to be seduced unaware into preoccupation with +lessons. It means that they shall be occupied with them for real +reasons or ends, and not just as something to be learned. This +is accomplished whenever the pupil perceives the place occupied +by the subject matter in the fulfilling of some experience. + +(iv) In the fourth place, under the influence of the conception +of the separation of mind and material, method tends to be +reduced to a cut and dried routine, to following mechanically +prescribed steps. No one can tell in how many schoolrooms +children reciting in arithmetic or grammar are compelled to go +through, under the alleged sanction of method, certain +preordained verbal formulae. Instead of being encouraged to +attack their topics directly, experimenting with methods that +seem promising and learning to discriminate by the consequences +that accrue, it is assumed that there is one fixed method to be +followed. It is also naively assumed that if the pupils make +their statements and explanations in a certain form of +"analysis," their mental habits will in time conform. Nothing +has brought pedagogical theory into greater disrepute than the +belief that it is identified with handing out to teachers recipes +and models to be followed in teaching. Flexibility and +initiative in dealing with problems are characteristic of any +conception to which method is a way of managing material to +develop a conclusion. Mechanical rigid woodenness is an +inevitable corollary of any theory which separates mind from +activity motivated by a purpose. + +2. Method as General and as Individual. In brief, the method of +teaching is the method of an art, of action intelligently +directed by ends. But the practice of a fine art is far from +being a matter of extemporized inspirations. Study of the +operations and results of those in the past who have greatly +succeeded is essential. There is always a tradition, or schools +of art, definite enough to impress beginners, and often to take +them captive. Methods of artists in every branch depend upon +thorough acquaintance with materials and tools; the painter must +know canvas, pigments, brushes, and the technique of +manipulation of all his appliances. Attainment of this knowledge +requires persistent and concentrated attention to objective +materials. The artist studies the progress of his own attempts +to see what succeeds and what fails. The assumption that there +are no alternatives between following ready-made rules and +trusting to native gifts, the inspiration of the moment and +undirected "hard work," is contradicted by the procedures of +every art. + +Such matters as knowledge of the past, of current technique, of +materials, of the ways in which one's own best results are +assured, supply the material for what may be called general +method. There exists a cumulative body of fairly stable methods +for reaching results, a body authorized by past experience and by +intellectual analysis, which an individual ignores at his peril. +As was pointed out in the discussion of habit-forming (ante, p. +49), there is always a danger that these methods will become +mechanized and rigid, mastering an agent instead of being powers +at command for his own ends. But it is also true that the +innovator who achieves anything enduring, whose work is more than +a passing sensation, utilizes classic methods more than may +appear to himself or to his critics. He devotes them to new +uses, and in so far transforms them. + + +Education also has its general methods. And if the application +of this remark is more obvious in the case of the teacher than of +the pupil, it is equally real in the case of the latter. Part of +his learning, a very important part, consists in becoming master +of the methods which the experience of others has shown to be +more efficient in like cases of getting knowledge. 1 These +general methods are in no way opposed to individual initiative +and originality -- to personal ways of doing things. On the +contrary they are reinforcements of them. For there is radical +difference between even the most general method and a prescribed +rule. The latter is a direct guide to action; the former +operates indirectly through the enlightenment it supplies as to +ends and means. It operates, that is to say, through +intelligence, and not through conformity to orders externally +imposed. Ability to use even in a masterly way an established +technique gives no warranty of artistic work, for the latter also +depends upon an animating idea. + +If knowledge of methods used by others does not directly tell us +what to do, or furnish ready-made models, how does it operate? +What is meant by calling a method intellectual? Take the case of +a physician. No mode of behavior more imperiously demands +knowledge of established modes of diagnosis and treatment than +does his. But after all, cases are like, not identical. To be +used intelligently, existing practices, however authorized they +may be, have to be adapted to the exigencies of particular cases. +Accordingly, recognized procedures indicate to the physician what +inquiries to set on foot for himself, what measures to try. They +are standpoints from which to carry on investigations; they +economize a survey of the features of the particular case by +suggesting the things to be especially looked into. The +physician's own personal attitudes, his own ways (individual +methods) of dealing with the situation in which he is concerned, +are not subordinated to the general principles of procedure, but +are facilitated and directed by the latter. The instance may +serve to point out the value to the teacher of a knowledge of the +psychological methods and the empirical devices found useful in +the past. When they get in the way of his own common sense, when +they come between him and the situation in which he has to act, +they are worse than useless. But if he has acquired them as +intellectual aids in sizing up the needs, resources, and +difficulties of the unique experiences in which he engages, they +are of constructive value. In the last resort, just because +everything depends upon his own methods of response, much depends +upon how far he can utilize, in making his own response, the +knowledge which has accrued in the experience of others. As +already intimated, every word of this account is directly +applicable also to the method of the pupil, the way of learning. +To suppose that students, whether in the primary school or in the +university, can be supplied with models of method to be followed +in acquiring and expounding a subject is to fall into a +self-deception that has lamentable consequences. (See ante, p. +169.) One must make his own reaction in any case. Indications of +the standardized or general methods used in like cases by +others--particularly by those who are already experts--are of +worth or of harm according as they make his personal reaction +more intelligent or as they induce a person to dispense with +exercise of his own judgment. If what was said earlier (See p. +159) about originality of thought seemed overstrained, demanding +more of education than the capacities of average human nature +permit, the difficulty is that we lie under the incubus of a +superstition. We have set up the notion of mind at large, of +intellectual method that is the same for all. Then we regard +individuals as differing in the quantity of mind with which they +are charged. Ordinary persons are then expected to be ordinary. +Only the exceptional are allowed to have originality. The +measure of difference between the average student and the genius +is a measure of the absence of originality in the former. But +this notion of mind in general is a fiction. How one person's +abilities compare in quantity with those of another is none of +the teacher's business. It is irrelevant to his work. What is +required is that every individual shall have opportunities to +employ his own powers in activities that have meaning. Mind, +individual method, originality (these are convertible terms) +signify the quality of purposive or directed action. If we act +upon this conviction, we shall secure more originality even by +the conventional standard than now develops. Imposing an alleged +uniform general method upon everybody breeds mediocrity in all +but the very exceptional. And measuring originality by deviation +from the mass breeds eccentricity in them. Thus we stifle the +distinctive quality of the many, and save in rare instances +(like, say, that of Darwin) infect the rare geniuses with an +unwholesome quality. + +3. The Traits of Individual Method. The most general features +of the method of knowing have been given in our chapter on +thinking. They are the features of the reflective situation: +Problem, collection and analysis of data, projection and +elaboration of suggestions or ideas, experimental application and +testing; the resulting conclusion or judgment. The specific +elements of an individual's method or way of attack upon a +problem are found ultimately in his native tendencies and his +acquired habits and interests. The method of one will vary from +that of another (and properly vary) as his original instinctive +capacities vary, as his past experiences and his preferences +vary. Those who have already studied these matters are in +possession of information which will help teachers in +understanding the responses different pupils make, and help them +in guiding these responses to greater efficiency. Child-study, +psychology, and a knowledge of social environment supplement the +personal acquaintance gained by the teacher. But methods remain +the personal concern, approach, and attack of an individual, and +no catalogue can ever exhaust their diversity of form and tint. + +Some attitudes may be named, however,-which are central in +effective intellectual ways of dealing with subject matter. +Among the most important are directness, open-mindedness, +single-mindedness (or whole-heartedness), and responsibility. + +1. It is easier to indicate what is meant by directness through +negative terms than in positive ones. Self-consciousness, +embarrassment, and constraint are its menacing foes. They +indicate that a person is not immediately concerned with subject +matter. Something has come between which deflects concern to +side issues. A self-conscious person is partly thinking about +his problem and partly about what others think of his +performances. Diverted energy means loss of power and confusion +of ideas. Taking an attitude is by no means identical with being +conscious of one's attitude. The former is spontaneous, naive, +and simple. It is a sign of whole-souled relationship between a +person and what he is dealing with. The latter is not of +necessity abnormal. It is sometimes the easiest way of +correcting a false method of approach, and of improving the +effectiveness of the means one is employing, -- as golf players, +piano players, public speakers, etc., have occasionally to give +especial attention to their position and movements. But this +need is occasional and temporary. When it is effectual a person +thinks of himself in terms of what is to be done, as one means +among others of the realization of an end -- as in the case of a +tennis player practicing to get the "feel" of a stroke. In +abnormal cases, one thinks of himself not as part of the agencies +of execution, but as a separate object -- as when the player +strikes an attitude thinking of the impression it will make upon +spectators, or is worried because of the impression he fears his +movements give rise to. + +Confidence is a good name for what is intended by the term +directness. It should not be confused, however, with +self-confidence which may be a form of self-consciousness--or of +"cheek." Confidence is not a name for what one thinks or feels +about his attitude it is not reflex. It denotes the +straightforwardness with which one goes at what he has to do. It +denotes not conscious trust in the efficacy of one's powers but +unconscious faith in the possibilities of the situation. It +signifies rising to the needs of the situation. We have already +pointed out (See p. 169) the objections to making students +emphatically aware of the fact that they are studying or +learning. Just in the degree in which they are induced by the +conditions to be so aware, they are not studying and learning. +They are in a divided and complicated attitude. Whatever methods +of a teacher call a pupil's attention off from what he has to do +and transfer it to his own attitude towards what he is doing +impair directness of concern and action. Persisted in, the pupil +acquires a permanent tendency to fumble, to gaze about aimlessly, +to look for some clew of action beside that which the subject +matter supplies. Dependence upon extraneous suggestions and +directions, a state of foggy confusion, take the place of that +sureness with which children (and grown-up people who have not +been sophisticated by "education") confront the situations of +life. + +2. Open-mindedness. Partiality is, as we have seen, an +accompaniment of the existence of interest, since this means +sharing, partaking, taking sides in some movement. All the more +reason, therefore, for an attitude of mind which actively +welcomes suggestions and relevant information from all sides. In +the chapter on Aims it was shown that foreseen ends are factors +in the development of a changing situation. They are the means +by which the direction of action is controlled. They are +subordinate to the situation, therefore, not the situation to +them. They are not ends in the sense of finalities to which +everything must be bent and sacrificed. They are, as foreseen, +means of guiding the development of a situation. A target is not +the future goal of shooting; it is the centering factor in a +present shooting. Openness of mind means accessibility of mind +to any and every consideration that will throw light upon the +situation that needs to be cleared up, and that will help +determine the consequences of acting this way or that. +Efficiency in accomplishing ends which have been settled upon as +unalterable can coexist with a narrowly opened mind. But +intellectual growth means constant expansion of horizons and +consequent formation of new purposes and new responses. These +are impossible without an active disposition to welcome points of +view hitherto alien; an active desire to entertain considerations +which modify existing purposes. Retention of capacity to grow is +the reward of such intellectual hospitality. The worst thing +about stubbornness of mind, about prejudices, is that they arrest +development; they shut the mind off from new stimuli. +Open-mindedness means retention of the childlike attitude; +closed-mindedness means premature intellectual old age. + +Exorbitant desire for uniformity of procedure and for prompt +external results are the chief foes which the open-minded +attitude meets in school. The teacher who does not permit and +encourage diversity of operation in dealing with questions is +imposing intellectual blinders upon pupils -- restricting their +vision to the one path the teacher's mind happens to approve. +Probably the chief cause of devotion to rigidity of method is, +however, that it seems to promise speedy, accurately measurable, +correct results. The zeal for "answers" is the explanation of +much of the zeal for rigid and mechanical methods. Forcing and +overpressure have the same origin, and the same result upon alert +and varied intellectual interest. + +Open-mindedness is not the same as empty-mindedness. To hang out +a sign saying "Come right in; there is no one at home" is not the +equivalent of hospitality. But there is a kind of passivity, +willingness to let experiences accumulate and sink in and ripen, +which is an essential of development. Results (external answers +or solutions) may be hurried; processes may not be forced. They +take their own time to mature. Were all instructors to realize +that the quality of mental process, not the production of correct +answers, is the measure of educative growth something hardly less +than a revolution in teaching would be worked. + +3. Single-mindedness. So far as the word is concerned, much +that was said under the head of "directness" is applicable. But +what the word is here intended to convey is completeness of +interest, unity of purpose; the absence of suppressed but +effectual ulterior aims for which the professed aim is but a +mask. It is equivalent to mental integrity. Absorption, +engrossment, full concern with subject matter for its own sake, +nurture it. Divided interest and evasion destroy it. + +Intellectual integrity, honesty, and sincerity are at bottom not +matters of conscious purpose but of quality of active response. +Their acquisition is fostered of course by conscious intent, but +self-deception is very easy. Desires are urgent. When the +demands and wishes of others forbid their direct expression they +are easily driven into subterranean and deep channels. Entire +surrender, and wholehearted adoption of the course of action +demanded by others are almost impossible. Deliberate revolt or +deliberate attempts to deceive others may result. But the more +frequent outcome is a confused and divided state of interest in +which one is fooled as to one's own real intent. One tries to +serve two masters at once. Social instincts, the strong desire +to please others and get their approval, social training, the +general sense of duty and of authority, apprehension of penalty, +all lead to a half-hearted effort to conform, to "pay attention +to the lesson," or whatever the requirement is. Amiable +individuals want to do what they are expected to do. Consciously +the pupil thinks he is doing this. But his own desires are not +abolished. Only their evident exhibition is suppressed. Strain +of attention to what is hostile to desire is irksome; in spite of +one's conscious wish, the underlying desires determine the main +course of thought, the deeper emotional responses. The mind +wanders from the nominal subject and devotes itself to what is +intrinsically more desirable. A systematized divided attention +expressing the duplicity of the state of desire is the result. +One has only to recall his own experiences in school or at the +present time when outwardly employed in actions which do not +engage one's desires and purposes, to realize how prevalent is +this attitude of divided attention -- double-mindedness. We are +so used to it that we take it for granted that a considerable +amount of it is necessary. It may be; if so, it is the more +important to face its bad intellectual effects. Obvious is the +loss of energy of thought immediately available when one is +consciously trying (or trying to seem to try) to attend to one +matter, while unconsciously one's imagination is spontaneously +going out to more congenial affairs. More subtle and more +permanently crippling to efficiency of intellectual activity is a +fostering of habitual self-deception, with the confused sense of +reality which accompanies it. A double standard of reality, one +for our own private and more or less concealed interests, and +another for public and acknowledged concerns, hampers, in most of +us, integrity and completeness of mental action. Equally serious +is the fact that a split is set up between conscious thought and +attention and impulsive blind affection and desire. Reflective +dealings with the material of instruction is constrained and +half-hearted; attention wanders. The topics to which it wanders +are unavowed and hence intellectually illicit; transactions with +them are furtive. The discipline that comes from regulating +response by deliberate inquiry having a purpose fails; worse than +that, the deepest concern and most congenial enterprises of the +imagination (since they center about the things dearest to +desire) are casual, concealed. They enter into action in ways +which are unacknowledged. Not subject to rectification by +consideration of consequences, they are demoralizing. + +School conditions favorable to this division of mind between +avowed, public, and socially responsible undertakings, and +private, ill-regulated, and suppressed indulgences of thought are +not hard to find. What is sometimes called "stern discipline," +i.e., external coercive pressure, has this tendency. Motivation +through rewards extraneous to the thing to be done has a like +effect. Everything that makes schooling merely preparatory (See +ante, p. 55) works in this direction. Ends being beyond the +pupil's present grasp, other agencies have to be found to procure +immediate attention to assigned tasks. Some responses are +secured, but desires and affections not enlisted must find other +outlets. Not less serious is exaggerated emphasis upon drill +exercises designed to produce skill in action, independent of any +engagement of thought -- exercises have no purpose but the +production of automatic skill. Nature abhors a mental vacuum. +What do teachers imagine is happening to thought and emotion when +the latter get no outlet in the things of immediate activity? +Were they merely kept in temporary abeyance, or even only +calloused, it would not be a matter of so much moment. But they +are not abolished; they are not suspended; they are not +suppressed--save with reference to the task in question. They +follow their own chaotic and undisciplined course. What is +native, spontaneous, and vital in mental reaction goes unused and +untested, and the habits formed are such that these qualities +become less and less available for public and avowed ends. + +4. Responsibility. By responsibility as an element in +intellectual attitude is meant the disposition to consider in +advance the probable consequences of any projected step and +deliberately to accept them: to accept them in the sense of +taking them into account, acknowledging them in action, not +yielding a mere verbal assent. Ideas, as we have seen, are +intrinsically standpoints and methods for bringing about a +solution of a perplexing situation; forecasts calculated to +influence responses. It is only too easy to think that one +accepts a statement or believes a suggested truth when one has +not considered its implications; when one has made but a cursory +and superficial survey of what further things one is committed to +by acceptance. Observation and recognition, belief and assent, +then become names for lazy acquiescence in what is externally +presented. + +It would be much better to have fewer facts and truths in +instruction -- that is, fewer things supposedly accepted, -- if a +smaller number of situations could be intellectually worked out +to the point where conviction meant something real -- some +identification of the self with the type of conduct demanded by +facts and foresight of results. The most permanent bad results +of undue complication of school subjects and congestion of school +studies and lessons are not the worry, nervous strain, and +superficial acquaintance that follow (serious as these are), but +the failure to make clear what is involved in really knowing and +believing a thing. Intellectual responsibility means severe +standards in this regard. These standards can be built up only +through practice in following up and acting upon the meaning of +what is acquired. + +Intellectual thoroughness is thus another name for the attitude +we are considering. There is a kind of thoroughness which is +almost purely physical: the kind that signifies mechanical and +exhausting drill upon all the details of a subject. Intellectual +thoroughness is seeing a thing through. It depends upon a unity +of purpose to which details are subordinated, not upon presenting +a multitude of disconnected details. It is manifested in the +firmness with which the full meaning of the purpose is developed, +not in attention, however "conscientious" it may be, to the steps +of action externally imposed and directed. + +Summary. Method is a statement of the way the subject matter of +an experience develops most effectively and fruitfully. It is +derived, accordingly, from observation of the course of +experiences where there is no conscious distinction of personal +attitude and manner from material dealt with. The assumption +that method is something separate is connected with the notion of +the isolation of mind and self from the world of things. It +makes instruction and learning formal, mechanical, constrained. +While methods are individualized, certain features of the normal +course of an experience to its fruition may be discriminated, +because of the fund of wisdom derived from prior experiences and +because of general similarities in the materials dealt with from +time to time. Expressed in terms of the attitude of the +individual the traits of good method are straightforwardness, +flexible intellectual interest or open-minded will to learn, +integrity of purpose, and acceptance of responsibility for the +consequences of one's activity including thought. + + +1 This point is developed below in a discussion of what are +termed psychological and logical methods respectively. See p. +219. + + +Chapter Fourteen: The Nature of Subject Matter + +1. Subject Matter of Educator and of Learner. So far as the +nature of subject matter in principle is concerned, there is +nothing to add to what has been said (See ante, p. 134). It +consists of the facts observed, recalled, read, and talked about, +and the ideas suggested, in course of a development of a +situation having a purpose. This statement needs to be rendered +more specific by connecting it with the materials of school +instruction, the studies which make up the curriculum. What is +the significance of our definition in application to reading, +writing, mathematics, history, nature study, drawing, singing, +physics, chemistry, modern and foreign languages, and so on? +Let us recur to two of the points made earlier in our discussion. +The educator's part in the enterprise of education is to furnish +the environment which stimulates responses and directs the +learner's course. In last analysis, all that the educator can do +is modify stimuli so that response will as surely as is possible +result in the formation of desirable intellectual and emotional +dispositions. Obviously studies or the subject matter of the +curriculum have intimately to do with this business of supplying +an environment. The other point is the necessity of a social +environment to give meaning to habits formed. In what we have +termed informal education, subject matter is carried directly in +the matrix of social intercourse. It is what the persons with +whom an individual associates do and say. This fact gives a clew +to the understanding of the subject matter of formal or +deliberate instruction. A connecting link is found in the +stories, traditions, songs, and liturgies which accompany the +doings and rites of a primitive social group. They represent the +stock of meanings which have been precipitated out of previous +experience, which are so prized by the group as to be identified +with their conception of their own collective life. Not being +obviously a part of the skill exhibited in the daily occupations +of eating, hunting, making war and peace, constructing rugs, +pottery, and baskets, etc., they are consciously impressed upon +the young; often, as in the initiation ceremonies, with intense +emotional fervor. Even more pains are consciously taken to +perpetuate the myths, legends, and sacred verbal formulae of the +group than to transmit the directly useful customs of the group +just because they cannot be picked up, as the latter can be in +the ordinary processes of association. + +As the social group grows more complex, involving a greater +number of acquired skills which are dependent, either in fact or +in the belief of the group, upon standard ideas deposited from +past experience, the content of social life gets more definitely +formulated for purposes of instruction. As we have previously +noted, probably the chief motive for consciously dwelling upon +the group life, extracting the meanings which are regarded as +most important and systematizing them in a coherent arrangement, +is just the need of instructing the young so as to perpetuate +group life. Once started on this road of selection, formulation, +and organization, no definite limit exists. The invention of +writing and of printing gives the operation an immense impetus. +Finally, the bonds which connect the subject matter of school +study with the habits and ideals of the social group are +disguised and covered up. The ties are so loosened that it often +appears as if there were none; as if subject matter existed +simply as knowledge on its own independent behoof, and as if +study were the mere act of mastering it for its own sake, +irrespective of any social values. Since it is highly important +for practical reasons to counter-act this tendency (See ante, p. +8) the chief purposes of our theoretical discussion are to make +clear the connection which is so readily lost from sight, and to +show in some detail the social content and function of the chief +constituents of the course of study. + +The points need to be considered from the standpoint of +instructor and of student. To the former, the significance of a +knowledge of subject matter, going far beyond the present +knowledge of pupils, is to supply definite standards and to +reveal to him the possibilities of the crude activities of the +immature. (i) The material of school studies translates into +concrete and detailed terms the meanings of current social life +which it is desirable to transmit. It puts clearly before the +instructor the essential ingredients of the culture to be +perpetuated, in such an organized form as to protect him from the +haphazard efforts he would be likely to indulge in if the +meanings had not been standardized. (ii) A knowledge of the +ideas which have been achieved in the past as the outcome of +activity places the educator in a position to perceive the +meaning of the seeming impulsive and aimless reactions of the +young, and to provide the stimuli needed to direct them so that +they will amount to something. The more the educator knows of +music the more he can perceive the possibilities of the inchoate +musical impulses of a child. Organized subject matter represents +the ripe fruitage of experiences like theirs, experiences +involving the same world, and powers and needs similar to theirs. +It does not represent perfection or infallible wisdom; but it is +the best at command to further new experiences which may, in some +respects at least, surpass the achievements embodied in existing +knowledge and works of art. + +From the standpoint of the educator, in other words, the various +studies represent working resources, available capital. Their +remoteness from the experience of the young is not, however, +seeming; it is real. The subject matter of the learner is not, +therefore, it cannot be, identical with the formulated, the +crystallized, and systematized subject matter of the adult; the +material as found in books and in works of art, etc. The latter +represents the possibilities of the former; not its existing +state. It enters directly into the activities of the expert and +the educator, not into that of the beginner, the learner. +Failure to bear in mind the difference in subject matter from the +respective standpoints of teacher and student is responsible for +most of the mistakes made in the use of texts and other +expressions of preexistent knowledge. + +The need for a knowledge of the constitution and functions, in +the concrete, of human nature is great just because the teacher's +attitude to subject matter is so different from that of the +pupil. The teacher presents in actuality what the pupil +represents only in posse. That is, the teacher already knows the +things which the student is only learning. Hence the problem of +the two is radically unlike. When engaged in the direct act of +teaching, the instructor needs to have subject matter at his +fingers' ends; his attention should be upon the attitude and +response of the pupil. To understand the latter in its interplay +with subject matter is his task, while the pupil's mind, +naturally, should be not on itself but on the topic in hand. Or +to state the same point in a somewhat different manner: the +teacher should be occupied not with subject matter in itself but +in its interaction with the pupils' present needs and capacities. +Hence simple scholarship is not enough. In fact, there are +certain features of scholarship or mastered subject matter -- +taken by itself -- which get in the way of effective teaching +unless the instructor's habitual attitude is one of concern with +its interplay in the pupil's own experience. In the first place, +his knowledge extends indefinitely beyond the range of the +pupil's acquaintance. It involves principles which are beyond +the immature pupil's understanding and interest. In and of +itself, it may no more represent the living world of the pupil's +experience than the astronomer's knowledge of Mars represents a +baby's acquaintance with the room in which he stays. In the +second place, the method of organization of the material of +achieved scholarship differs from that of the beginner. It is +not true that the experience of the young is unorganized -- that +it consists of isolated scraps. But it is organized in +connection with direct practical centers of interest. The +child's home is, for example, the organizing center of his +geographical knowledge. His own movements about the locality, +his journeys abroad, the tales of his friends, give the ties +which hold his items of information together. But the geography +of the geographer, of the one who has already developed the +implications of these smaller experiences, is organized on the +basis of the relationship which the various facts bear to one +another -- not the relations which they bear to his house, bodily +movements, and friends. To the one who is learned, subject +matter is extensive, accurately defined, and logically +interrelated. To the one who is learning, it is fluid, partial, +and connected through his personal occupations. 1 The problem of +teaching is to keep the experience of the student moving in the +direction of what the expert already knows. Hence the need that +the teacher know both subject matter and the characteristic needs +and capacities of the student. + + +2. The Development of Subject Matter in the Learner. It is +possible, without doing violence to the facts, to mark off three +fairly typical stages in the growth of subject matter in the +experience of the learner. In its first estate, knowledge exists +as the content of intelligent ability -- power to do. This kind +of subject matter, or known material, is expressed in familiarity +or acquaintance with things. Then this material gradually is +surcharged and deepened through communicated knowledge or +information. Finally, it is enlarged and worked over into +rationally or logically organized material -- that of the one +who, relatively speaking, is expert in the subject. + +I. The knowledge which comes first to persons, and that remains +most deeply ingrained, is knowledge of how to do; how to walk, +talk, read, write, skate, ride a bicycle, manage a machine, +calculate, drive a horse, sell goods, manage people, and so on +indefinitely. The popular tendency to regard instinctive acts +which are adapted to an end as a sort of miraculous knowledge, +while unjustifiable, is evidence of the strong tendency to +identify intelligent control of the means of action with +knowledge. When education, under the influence of a scholastic +conception of knowledge which ignores everything but +scientifically formulated facts and truths, fails to recognize +that primary or initial subject matter always exists as matter of +an active doing, involving the use of the body and the handling +of material, the subject matter of instruction is isolated from +the needs and purposes of the learner, and so becomes just a +something to be memorized and reproduced upon demand. +Recognition of the natural course of development, on the +contrary, always sets out with situations which involve learning +by doing. Arts and occupations form the initial stage of the +curriculum, corresponding as they do to knowing how to go about +the accomplishment of ends. Popular terms denoting knowledge +have always retained the connection with ability in action lost +by academic philosophies. Ken and can are allied words. +Attention means caring for a thing, in the sense of both +affection and of looking out for its welfare. Mind means +carrying out instructions in action -- as a child minds his +mother -- and taking care of something -- as a nurse minds the +baby. To be thoughtful, considerate, means to heed the claims of +others. Apprehension means dread of undesirable consequences, as +well as intellectual grasp. To have good sense or judgment is to +know the conduct a situation calls for; discernment is not making +distinctions for the sake of making them, an exercise reprobated +as hair splitting, but is insight into an affair with reference +to acting. Wisdom has never lost its association with the proper +direction of life. Only in education, never in the life of +farmer, sailor, merchant, physician, or laboratory experimenter, +does knowledge mean primarily a store of information aloof from +doing. Having to do with things in an intelligent way issues in +acquaintance or familiarity. The things we are best acquainted +with are the things we put to frequent use -- such things as +chairs, tables, pen, paper, clothes, food, knives and forks on +the commonplace level, differentiating into more special objects +according to a person's occupations in life. Knowledge of things +in that intimate and emotional sense suggested by the word +acquaintance is a precipitate from our employing them with a +purpose. We have acted with or upon the thing so frequently that +we can anticipate how it will act and react -- such is the +meaning of familiar acquaintance. We are ready for a familiar +thing; it does not catch us napping, or play unexpected tricks +with us. This attitude carries with it a sense of congeniality +or friendliness, of ease and illumination; while the things with +which we are not accustomed to deal are strange, foreign, cold, +remote, "abstract." + +II. But it is likely that elaborate statements regarding this +primary stage of knowledge will darken understanding. It +includes practically all of our knowledge which is not the result +of deliberate technical study. Modes of purposeful doing include +dealings with persons as well as things. Impulses of communication +and habits of intercourse have to be adapted to maintaining +successful connections with others; a large fund of social knowledge +accrues. As a part of this intercommunication one learns much from +others. They tell of their experiences and of the experiences which, +in turn, have been told them. In so far as one is interested or +concerned in these communications, their matter becomes a part of +one's own experience. Active connections with others are such an +intimate and vital part of our own concerns that it is impossible to +draw sharp lines, such as would enable us to say, "Here my +experience ends; there yours begins." In so far as we are partners +in common undertakings, the things which others communicate to us as +the consequences of their particular share in the enterprise blend +at once into the experience resulting from our own special doings. +The ear is as much an organ of experience as the eye or hand; the +eye is available for reading reports of what happens beyond its +horizon. Things remote in space and time affect the issue of our +actions quite as much as things which we can smell and handle. They +really concern us, and, consequently, any account of them which +assists us in dealing with things at hand falls within personal +experience. + +Information is the name usually given to this kind of subject +matter. The place of communication in personal doing supplies us +with a criterion for estimating the value of informational +material in school. Does it grow naturally out of some question +with which the student is concerned? Does it fit into his more +direct acquaintance so as to increase its efficacy and deepen its +meaning? If it meets these two requirements, it is educative. +The amount heard or read is of no importance--the more the +better, provided the student has a need for it and can apply it +in some situation of his own. + +But it is not so easy to fulfill these requirements in actual +practice as it is to lay them down in theory. The extension in +modern times of the area of intercommunication; the invention of +appliances for securing acquaintance with remote parts of the +heavens and bygone events of history; the cheapening of devices, +like printing, for recording and distributing information -- +genuine and alleged -- have created an immense bulk of +communicated subject matter. It is much easier to swamp a pupil +with this than to work it into his direct experiences. All too +frequently it forms another strange world which just overlies the +world of personal acquaintance. The sole problem of the student +is to learn, for school purposes, for purposes of recitations and +promotions, the constituent parts of this strange world. +Probably the most conspicuous connotation of the word knowledge +for most persons to-day is just the body of facts and truths +ascertained by others; the material found in the rows and rows of +atlases, cyclopedias, histories, biographies, books of travel, +scientific treatises, on the shelves of libraries. + +The imposing stupendous bulk of this material has unconsciously +influenced men's notions of the nature of knowledge itself. The +statements, the propositions, in which knowledge, the issue of +active concern with problems, is deposited, are taken to be +themselves knowledge. The record of knowledge, independent of +its place as an outcome of inquiry and a resource in further +inquiry, is taken to be knowledge. The mind of man is taken +captive by the spoils of its prior victories; the spoils, not the +weapons and the acts of waging the battle against the unknown, +are used to fix the meaning of knowledge, of fact, and truth. + +If this identification of knowledge with propositions stating +information has fastened itself upon logicians and philosophers, +it is not surprising that the same ideal has almost dominated +instruction. The "course of study" consists largely of +information distributed into various branches of study, each +study being subdivided into lessons presenting in serial cutoff +portions of the total store. In the seventeenth century, the +store was still small enough so that men set up the ideal of a +complete encyclopedic mastery of it. It is now so bulky that the +impossibility of any one man's coming into possession of it all +is obvious. But the educational ideal has not been much +affected. Acquisition of a modicum of information in each branch +of learning, or at least in a selected group, remains the +principle by which the curriculum, from elementary school through +college, is formed; the easier portions being assigned to the +earlier years, the more difficult to the later. The complaints +of educators that learning does not enter into character and +affect conduct; the protests against memoriter work, against +cramming, against gradgrind preoccupation with "facts," against +devotion to wire-drawn distinctions and ill-understood rules and +principles, all follow from this state of affairs. Knowledge +which is mainly second-hand, other men's knowledge, tends to +become merely verbal. It is no objection to information that it +is clothed in words; communication necessarily takes place +through words. But in the degree in which what is communicated +cannot be organized into the existing experience of the learner, +it becomes mere words: that is, pure sense-stimuli, lacking in +meaning. Then it operates to call out mechanical reactions, +ability to use the vocal organs to repeat statements, or the hand +to write or to do "sums." + +To be informed is to be posted; it is to have at command the +subject matter needed for an effective dealing with a problem, +and for giving added significance to the search for solution and +to the solution itself. Informational knowledge is the material +which can be fallen back upon as given, settled, established, +assured in a doubtful situation. It is a kind of bridge for mind +in its passage from doubt to discovery. It has the office of an +intellectual middleman. It condenses and records in available +form the net results of the prior experiences of mankind, as an +agency of enhancing the meaning of new experiences. When one is +told that Brutus assassinated Caesar, or that the length of the +year is three hundred sixty-five and one fourth days, or that the +ratio of the diameter of the circle to its circumference is +3.1415 . . . one receives what is indeed knowledge for others, +but for him it is a stimulus to knowing. His acquisition of +knowledge depends upon his response to what is communicated. + +3. Science or Rationalized Knowledge. Science is a name for +knowledge in its most characteristic form. It represents in its +degree, the perfected outcome of learning, -- its consummation. +What is known, in a given case, is what is sure, certain, +settled, disposed of; that which we think with rather than that +which we think about. In its honorable sense, knowledge is +distinguished from opinion, guesswork, speculation, and mere +tradition. In knowledge, things are ascertained; they are so and +not dubiously otherwise. But experience makes us aware that +there is difference between intellectual certainty of subject +matter and our certainty. We are made, so to speak, for belief; +credulity is natural. The undisciplined mind is averse to +suspense and intellectual hesitation; it is prone to assertion. +It likes things undisturbed, settled, and treats them as such +without due warrant. Familiarity, common repute, and +congeniality to desire are readily made measuring rods of truth. +Ignorance gives way to opinionated and current error, -- a +greater foe to learning than ignorance itself. A Socrates is +thus led to declare that consciousness of ignorance is the +beginning of effective love of wisdom, and a Descartes to say +that science is born of doubting. + +We have already dwelt upon the fact that subject matter, or data, +and ideas have to have their worth tested experimentally: that in +themselves they are tentative and provisional. Our predilection +for premature acceptance and assertion, our aversion to suspended +judgment, are signs that we tend naturally to cut short the +process of testing. We are satisfied with superficial and +immediate short-visioned applications. If these work out with +moderate satisfactoriness, we are content to suppose that our +assumptions have been confirmed. Even in the case of failure, we +are inclined to put the blame not on the inadequacy and +incorrectness of our data and thoughts, but upon our hard luck +and the hostility of circumstance. We charge the evil +consequence not to the error of our schemes and our incomplete +inquiry into conditions (thereby getting material for revising +the former and stimulus for extending the latter) but to untoward +fate. We even plume ourselves upon our firmness in clinging to +our conceptions in spite of the way in which they work out. + +Science represents the safeguard of the race against these +natural propensities and the evils which flow from them. It +consists of the special appliances and methods which the race has +slowly worked out in order to conduct reflection under conditions +whereby its procedures and results are tested. It is artificial +(an acquired art), not spontaneous; learned, not native. To this +fact is due the unique, the invaluable place of science in +education, and also the dangers which threaten its right use. +Without initiation into the scientific spirit one is not in +possession of the best tools which humanity has so far devised +for effectively directed reflection. One in that case not merely +conducts inquiry and learning without the use of the best +instruments, but fails to understand the full meaning of +knowledge. For he does not become acquainted with the traits +that mark off opinion and assent from authorized conviction. On +the other hand, the fact that science marks the perfecting of +knowing in highly specialized conditions of technique renders its +results, taken by themselves, remote from ordinary experience -- +a quality of aloofness that is popularly designated by the term +abstract. When this isolation appears in instruction, scientific +information is even more exposed to the dangers attendant upon +presenting ready-made subject matter than are other forms of +information. + +Science has been defined in terms of method of inquiry and +testing. At first sight, this definition may seem opposed to the +current conception that science is organized or systematized +knowledge. The opposition, however, is only seeming, and +disappears when the ordinary definition is completed. Not +organization but the kind of organization effected by adequate +methods of tested discovery marks off science. The knowledge of +a farmer is systematized in the degree in which he is competent. +It is organized on the basis of relation of means to ends -- +practically organized. Its organization as knowledge (that is, +in the eulogistic sense of adequately tested and confirmed) is +incidental to its organization with reference to securing crops, +live-stock, etc. But scientific subject matter is +organized with specific reference to the successful conduct of +the enterprise of discovery, to knowing as a specialized +undertaking. Reference to the kind of assurance attending +science will shed light upon this statement. It is rational +assurance, -- logical warranty. The ideal of scientific +organization is, therefore, that every conception and statement +shall be of such a kind as to follow from others and to lead to +others. Conceptions and propositions mutually imply and support +one another. This double relation of 'leading to and confirming" +is what is meant by the terms logical and rational. The everyday +conception of water is more available for ordinary uses of +drinking, washing, irrigation, etc., than the chemist's notion of +it. The latter's description of it as H20 is superior from the +standpoint of place and use in inquiry. It states the nature of +water in a way which connects it with knowledge of other things, +indicating to one who understands it how the knowledge is arrived +at and its bearings upon other portions of knowledge of the +structure of things. Strictly speaking, it does not indicate the +objective relations of water any more than does a statement that +water is transparent, fluid, without taste or odor, satisfying to +thirst, etc. It is just as true that water has these relations +as that it is constituted by two molecules of hydrogen in +combination with one of oxygen. But for the particular purpose +of conducting discovery with a view to ascertainment of fact, the +latter relations are fundamental. The more one emphasizes +organization as a mark of science, then, the more he is committed +to a recognition of the primacy of method in the definition of +science. For method defines the kind of organization in virtue +of which science is science. + +4. Subject Matter as Social. Our next chapters will take up +various school activities and studies and discuss them as +successive stages in that evolution of knowledge which we have +just been discussing. It remains to say a few words upon subject +matter as social, since our prior remarks have been mainly +concerned with its intellectual aspect. A difference in breadth +and depth exists even in vital knowledge; even in the data and +ideas which are relevant to real problems and which are motivated +by purposes. For there is a difference in the social scope of +purposes and the social importance of problems. With the wide +range of possible material to select from, it is important that +education (especially in all its phases short of the most +specialized) should use a criterion of social worth. All +information and systematized scientific subject matter have been +worked out under the conditions of social life and have been +transmitted by social means. But this does not prove that all is +of equal value for the purposes of forming the disposition and +supplying the equipment of members of present society. The +scheme of a curriculum must take account of the adaptation of +studies to the needs of the existing community life; it must +select with the intention of improving the life we live in common +so that the future shall be better than the past. Moreover, the +curriculum must be planned with reference to placing essentials +first, and refinements second. The things which are socially +most fundamental, that is, which have to do with the experiences +in which the widest groups share, are the essentials. The things +which represent the needs of specialized groups and technical +pursuits are secondary. There is truth in the saying that +education must first be human and only after that professional. +But those who utter the saying frequently have in mind in the +term human only a highly specialized class: the class of learned +men who preserve the classic traditions of the past. They forget +that material is humanized in the degree in which it connects +with the common interests of men as men. Democratic society is +peculiarly dependent for its maintenance upon the use in forming +a course of study of criteria which are broadly human. Democracy +cannot flourish where the chief influences in selecting subject +matter of instruction are utilitarian ends narrowly conceived for +the masses, and, for the higher education of the few, the +traditions of a specialized cultivated class. The notion that +the "essentials" of elementary education are the three R's +mechanically treated, is based upon ignorance of the essentials +needed for realization of democratic ideals. Unconsciously it +assumes that these ideals are unrealizable; it assumes that in +the future, as in the past, getting a livelihood, "making a +living," must signify for most men and women doing things which +are not significant, freely chosen, and ennobling to those who do +them; doing things which serve ends unrecognized by those engaged +in them, carried on under the direction of others for the sake of +pecuniary reward. For preparation of large numbers for a life of +this sort, and only for this purpose, are mechanical efficiency +in reading, writing, spelling and figuring, together with +attainment of a certain amount of muscular dexterity, +"essentials." Such conditions also infect the education called +liberal, with illiberality. They imply a somewhat parasitic +cultivation bought at the expense of not having the enlightenment +and discipline which come from concern with the deepest problems +of common humanity. A curriculum which acknowledges the social +responsibilities of education must present situations where +problems are relevant to the problems of living together, and +where observation and information are calculated to develop +social insight and interest. + +Summary. The subject matter of education consists primarily of +the meanings which supply content to existing social life. The +continuity of social life means that many of these meanings are +contributed to present activity by past collective experience. +As social life grows more complex, these factors increase in +number and import. There is need of special selection, +formulation, and organization in order that they may be +adequately transmitted to the new generation. But this very +process tends to set up subject matter as something of value just +by itself, apart from its function in promoting the realization +of the meanings implied in the present experience of the +immature. Especially is the educator exposed to the temptation +to conceive his task in terms of the pupil's ability to +appropriate and reproduce the subject matter in set statements, +irrespective of its organization into his activities as a +developing social member. The positive principle is maintained +when the young begin with active occupations having a social +origin and use, and proceed to a scientific insight in the +materials and laws involved, through assimilating into their more +direct experience the ideas and facts communicated by others who +have had a larger experience. 1 Since the learned man should +also still be a learner, it will be understood that these +contrasts are relative, not absolute. But in the earlier stages +of learning at least they are practically all-important. + + +Chapter Fifteen: Play and Work in the Curriculum + +1. The Place of Active Occupations in Education. In consequence +partly of the efforts of educational reformers, partly of +increased interest in child-psychology, and partly of the direct +experience of the schoolroom, the course of study has in the past +generation undergone considerable modification. The desirability +of starting from and with the experience and capacities of +learners, a lesson enforced from all three quarters, has led to +the introduction of forms of activity, in play and work, similar +to those in which children and youth engage outside of school. +Modern psychology has substituted for the general, ready-made +faculties of older theory a complex group of instinctive and +impulsive tendencies. Experience has shown that when children +have a chance at physical activities which bring their natural +impulses into play, going to school is a joy, management is less +of a burden, and learning is easier. Sometimes, perhaps, plays, +games, and constructive occupations are resorted to only for +these reasons, with emphasis upon relief from the tedium and +strain of "regular" school work. There is no reason, however, +for using them merely as agreeable diversions. Study of mental +life has made evident the fundamental worth of native tendencies +to explore, to manipulate tools and materials, to construct, to +give expression to joyous emotion, etc. When exercises which are +prompted by these instincts are a part of the regular school +program, the whole pupil is engaged, the artificial gap between +life in school and out is reduced, motives are afforded for +attention to a large variety of materials and processes +distinctly educative in effect, and cooperative associations +which give information in a social setting are provided. In +short, the grounds for assigning to play and active work a +definite place in the curriculum are intellectual and social, not +matters of temporary expediency and momentary agreeableness. +Without something of the kind, it is not possible to secure the +normal estate of effective learning; namely, that +knowledge-getting be an outgrowth of activities having their own +end, instead of a school task. More specifically, play and work +correspond, point for point, with the traits of the initial stage +of knowing, which consists, as we saw in the last chapter, in +learning how to do things and in acquaintance with things and +processes gained in the doing. It is suggestive that among the +Greeks, till the rise of conscious philosophy, the same word, +techne, was used for art and science. Plato gave his account of +knowledge on the basis of an analysis of the knowledge of +cobblers, carpenters, players of musical instruments, etc., +pointing out that their art (so far as it was not mere routine) +involved an end, mastery of material or stuff worked upon, +control of appliances, and a definite order of procedure--all of +which had to be known in order that there be intelligent skill or +art. + +Doubtless the fact that children normally engage in play and work +out of school has seemed to many educators a reason why they +should concern themselves in school with things radically +different. School time seemed too precious to spend in doing +over again what children were sure to do any way. In some social +conditions, this reason has weight. In pioneer times, for +example, outside occupations gave a definite and valuable +intellectual and moral training. Books and everything concerned +with them were, on the other hand, rare and difficult of access; +they were the only means of outlet from a narrow and crude +environment. Wherever such conditions obtain, much may be said +in favor of concentrating school activity upon books. The +situation is very different, however, in most communities to-day. +The kinds of work in which the young can engage, especially in +cities, are largely anti-educational. That prevention of child +labor is a social duty is evidence on this point. On the other +hand, printed matter has been so cheapened and is in such +universal circulation, and all the opportunities of intellectual +culture have been so multiplied, that the older type of book work +is far from having the force it used to possess. + +But it must not be forgotten that an educational result is a by- +product of play and work in most out-of-school conditions. It is +incidental, not primary. Consequently the educative growth +secured is more or less accidental. Much work shares in the +defects of existing industrial society -- defects next to fatal +to right development. Play tends to reproduce and affirm the +crudities, as well as the excellencies, of surrounding adult +life. It is the business of the school to set up an environment +in which play and work shall be conducted with reference to +facilitating desirable mental and moral growth. It is not enough +just to introduce plays and games, hand work and manual +exercises. Everything depends upon the way in which they are +employed. + +2. Available Occupations. A bare catalogue of the list of +activities which have already found their way into schools +indicates what a rich field is at hand. There is work with +paper, cardboard, wood, leather, cloth, yarns, clay and sand, and +the metals, with and without tools. Processes employed are +folding, cutting, pricking, measuring, molding, modeling, +pattern-making, heating and cooling, and the operations +characteristic of such tools as the hammer, saw, file, etc. +Outdoor excursions, gardening, cooking, sewing, printing, +book-binding, weaving, painting, drawing, singing, dramatization, +story-telling, reading and writing as active pursuits with social +aims (not as mere exercises for acquiring skill for future use), +in addition to a countless variety of plays and games, designate +some of the modes of occupation. + +The problem of the educator is to engage pupils in these +activities in such ways that while manual skill and technical +efficiency are gained and immediate satisfaction found in the +work, together with preparation for later usefulness, these +things shall be subordinated to education -- that is, to +intellectual results and the forming of a socialized disposition. +What does this principle signify? In the first place, the +principle rules out certain practices. Activities which follow +definite prescription and dictation or which reproduce without +modification ready-made models, may give muscular dexterity, but +they do not require the perception and elaboration of ends, nor +(what is the same thing in other words) do they permit the use of +judgment in selecting and adapting means. Not merely manual +training specifically so called but many traditional kindergarten +exercises have erred here. Moreover, opportunity for making +mistakes is an incidental requirement. Not because mistakes are +ever desirable, but because overzeal to select material and +appliances which forbid a chance for mistakes to occur, restricts +initiative, reduces judgment to a minimum, and compels the use of +methods which are so remote from the complex situations of life +that the power gained is of little availability. It is quite +true that children tend to exaggerate their powers of execution +and to select projects that are beyond them. But limitation of +capacity is one of the things which has to be learned; like other +things, it is learned through the experience of consequences. +The danger that children undertaking too complex projects will +simply muddle and mess, and produce not merely crude results +(which is a minor matter) but acquire crude standards (which is +an important matter) is great. But it is the fault of the +teacher if the pupil does not perceive in due season the +inadequacy of his performances, and thereby receive a stimulus to +attempt exercises which will perfect his powers. Meantime it is +more important to keep alive a creative and constructive attitude +than to secure an external perfection by engaging the pupil's +action in too minute and too closely regulated pieces of work. +Accuracy and finish of detail can be insisted upon in such +portions of a complex work as are within the pupil's capacity. + +Unconscious suspicion of native experience and consequent +overdoing of external control are shown quite as much in the +material supplied as in the matter of the teacher's orders. The +fear of raw material is shown in laboratory, manual training +shop, Froebelian kindergarten, and Montessori house of childhood. +The demand is for materials which have already been subjected to +the perfecting work of mind: a demand which shows itself in the +subject matter of active occupations quite as well as in academic +book learning. That such material will control the pupil's +operations so as to prevent errors is true. The notion that a +pupil operating with such material will somehow absorb the +intelligence that went originally to its shaping is fallacious. +Only by starting with crude material and subjecting it to +purposeful handling will he gain the intelligence embodied in +finished material. In practice, overemphasis upon formed +material leads to an exaggeration of mathematical qualities, +since intellect finds its profit in physical things from matters +of size, form, and proportion and the relations that flow from +them. But these are known only when their perception is a fruit +of acting upon purposes which require attention to them. The +more human the purpose, or the more it approximates the ends +which appeal in daily experience, the more real the knowledge. +When the purpose of the activity is restricted to ascertaining +these qualities, the resulting knowledge is only technical. + +To say that active occupations should be concerned primarily with +wholes is another statement of the same principle. Wholes for +purposes of education are not, however, physical affairs. +Intellectually the existence of a whole depends upon a concern or +interest; it is qualitative, the completeness of appeal made by a +situation. Exaggerated devotion to formation of efficient skill +irrespective of present purpose always shows itself in devising +exercises isolated from a purpose. Laboratory work is made to +consist of tasks of accurate measurement with a view to acquiring +knowledge of the fundamental units of physics, irrespective of +contact with the problems which make these units important; or of +operations designed to afford facility in the manipulation of +experimental apparatus. The technique is acquired independently +of the purposes of discovery and testing which alone give it +meaning. Kindergarten employments are calculated to give +information regarding cubes, spheres, etc., and to form certain +habits of manipulation of material (for everything must always be +done "just so"), the absence of more vital purposes being +supposedly compensated for by the alleged symbolism of the +material used. Manual training is reduced to a series of ordered +assignments calculated to secure the mastery of one tool after +another and technical ability in the various elements of +construction -- like the different joints. It is argued that +pupils must know how to use tools before they attack actual +making, -- assuming that pupils cannot learn how in the process +of making. Pestalozzi's just insistence upon the active use of +the senses, as a substitute for memorizing words, left behind it +in practice schemes for "object lessons" intended to acquaint +pupils with all the qualities of selected objects. The error is +the same: in all these cases it is assumed that before objects +can be intelligently used, their properties must be known. In +fact, the senses are normally used in the course of intelligent +(that is, purposeful) use of things, since the qualities +perceived are factors to be reckoned with in accomplishment. +Witness the different attitude of a boy in making, say, a kite, +with respect to the grain and other properties of wood, the +matter of size, angles, and proportion of parts, to the attitude +of a pupil who has an object-lesson on a piece of wood, where the +sole function of wood and its properties is to serve as subject +matter for the lesson. + +The failure to realize that the functional development of a +situation alone constitutes a "whole" for the purpose of mind is +the cause of the false notions which have prevailed in +instruction concerning the simple and the complex. For the +person approaching a subject, the simple thing is his +purpose--the use he desires to make of material, tool, or +technical process, no matter how complicated the process of +execution may be. The unity of the purpose, with the +concentration upon details which it entails, confers simplicity +upon the elements which have to be reckoned with in the course of +action. It furnishes each with a single meaning according to its +service in carrying on the whole enterprise. After one has gone +through the process, the constituent qualities and relations are +elements, each possessed with a definite meaning of its own. The +false notion referred to takes the standpoint of the expert, the +one for whom elements exist; isolates them from purposeful +action, and presents them to beginners as the "simple" things. +But it is time for a positive statement. Aside from the fact +that active occupations represent things to do, not studies, +their educational significance consists in the fact that they may +typify social situations. Men's fundamental common concerns +center about food, shelter, clothing, household furnishings, and +the appliances connected with production, exchange, and +consumption. + +Representing both the necessities of life and the adornments with +which the necessities have been clothed, they tap instincts at a +deep level; they are saturated with facts and principles having a +social quality. + +To charge that the various activities of gardening, weaving, +construction in wood, manipulation of metals, cooking, etc., +which carry over these fundamental human concerns into school +resources, have a merely bread and butter value is to miss their +point. If the mass of mankind has usually found in its +industrial occupations nothing but evils which had to be endured +for the sake of maintaining existence, the fault is not in the +occupations, but in the conditions under which they are carried +on. The continually increasing importance of economic factors in +contemporary life makes it the more needed that education should +reveal their scientific content and their social value. For in +schools, occupations are not carried on for pecuniary gain but +for their own content. Freed from extraneous associations and +from the pressure of wage-earning, they supply modes of +experience which are intrinsically valuable; they are truly +liberalizing in quality. + +Gardening, for example, need not be taught either for the sake of +preparing future gardeners, or as an agreeable way of passing +time. It affords an avenue of approach to knowledge of the place +farming and horticulture have had in the history of the race and +which they occupy in present social organization. Carried on in +an environment educationally controlled, they are means for +making a study of the facts of growth, the chemistry of soil, the +role of light, air, and moisture, injurious and helpful animal +life, etc. There is nothing in the elementary study of botany +which cannot be introduced in a vital way in connection with +caring for the growth of seeds. Instead of the subject matter +belonging to a peculiar study called botany, it will then belong +to life, and will find, moreover, its natural correlations with +the facts of soil, animal life, and human relations. As students +grow mature, they will perceive problems of interest which may be +pursued for the sake of discovery, independent of the original +direct interest in gardening -- problems connected with the +germination and nutrition of plants, the reproduction of fruits, +etc., thus making a transition to deliberate intellectual +investigations. + +The illustration is intended to apply, of course, to other school +occupations, -- wood-working, cooking, and on through the list. +It is pertinent to note that in the history of the race the +sciences grew gradually out from useful social occupations. +Physics developed slowly out of the use of tools and machines; +the important branch of physics known as mechanics testifies in +its name to its original associations. The lever, wheel, +inclined plane, etc., were among the first great intellectual +discoveries of mankind, and they are none the less intellectual +because they occurred in the course of seeking for means of +accomplishing practical ends. The great advance of electrical +science in the last generation was closely associated, as effect +and as cause, with application of electric agencies to means of +communication, transportation, lighting of cities and houses, and +more economical production of goods. These are social ends, +moreover, and if they are too closely associated with notions of +private profit, it is not because of anything in them, but +because they have been deflected to private uses: -- a fact which +puts upon the school the responsibility of restoring their +connection, in the mind of the coming generation, with public +scientific and social interests. In like ways, chemistry grew +out of processes of dying, bleaching, metal working, etc., and in +recent times has found innumerable new uses in industry. + +Mathematics is now a highly abstract science; geometry, however, +means literally earth-measuring: the practical use of number in +counting to keep track of things and in measuring is even more +important to-day than in the times when it was invented for these +purposes. Such considerations (which could be duplicated in the +history of any science) are not arguments for a recapitulation of +the history of the race or for dwelling long in the early rule of +thumb stage. But they indicate the possibilities--greater to-day +than ever before -- of using active occupations as opportunities +for scientific study. The opportunities are just as great on the +social side, whether we look at the life of collective humanity +in its past or in its future. The most direct road for +elementary students into civics and economics is found in +consideration of the place and office of industrial occupations +in social life. Even for older students, the social sciences +would be less abstract and formal if they were dealt with less as +sciences (less as formulated bodies of knowledge) and more in +their direct subject-matter as that is found in the daily life of +the social groups in which the student shares. + +Connection of occupations with the method of science is at least +as close as with its subject matter. The ages when scientific +progress was slow were the ages when learned men had contempt for +the material and processes of everyday life, especially for those +concerned with manual pursuits. Consequently they strove to +develop knowledge out of general principles -- almost out of +their heads -- by logical reasons. It seems as absurd that +learning should come from action on and with physical things, +like dropping acid on a stone to see what would happen, as that +it should come from sticking an awl with waxed thread through a +piece of leather. But the rise of experimental methods proved +that, given control of conditions, the latter operation is more +typical of the right way of knowledge than isolated logical +reasonings. Experiment developed in the seventeenth and +succeeding centuries and became the authorized way of knowing +when men's interests were centered in the question of control of +nature for human uses. The active occupations in which +appliances are brought to bear upon physical things with the +intention of effecting useful changes is the most vital +introduction to the experimental method. + +3. Work and Play. What has been termed active occupation +includes both play and work. In their intrinsic meaning, play +and industry are by no means so antithetical to one another as is +often assumed, any sharp contrast being due to undesirable social +conditions. Both involve ends consciously entertained and the +selection and adaptations of materials and processes designed to +effect the desired ends. The difference between them is largely +one of time-span, influencing the directness of the connection of +means and ends. In play, the interest is more direct -- a fact +frequently indicated by saying that in play the activity is its +own end, instead of its having an ulterior result. The statement +is correct, but it is falsely taken, if supposed to mean that +play activity is momentary, having no element of looking ahead +and none of pursuit. Hunting, for example, is one of the +commonest forms of adult play, but the existence of foresight and +the direction of present activity by what one is watching for are +obvious. When an activity is its own end in the sense that the +action of the moment is complete in itself, it is purely +physical; it has no meaning (See p. 77). The person is either +going through motions quite blindly, perhaps purely imitatively, +or else is in a state of excitement which is exhausting to mind +and nerves. Both results may be seen in some types of +kindergarten games where the idea of play is so highly symbolic +that only the adult is conscious of it. Unless the children +succeed in reading in some quite different idea of their own, +they move about either as if in a hypnotic daze, or they respond +to a direct excitation. + +The point of these remarks is that play has an end in the sense +of a directing idea which gives point to the successive acts. +Persons who play are not just doing something (pure physical +movement); they are trying to do or effect something, an +attitude that involves anticipatory forecasts which stimulate +their present responses. The anticipated result, however, is +rather a subsequent action than the production of a specific +change in things. Consequently play is free, plastic. Where +some definite external outcome is wanted, the end has to be held +to with some persistence, which increases as the contemplated +result is complex and requires a fairly long series of +intermediate adaptations. When the intended act is another +activity, it is not necessary to look far ahead and it is +possible to alter it easily and frequently. If a child is making +a toy boat, he must hold on to a single end and direct a +considerable number of acts by that one idea. If he is just +"playing boat" he may change the material that serves as a boat +almost at will, and introduce new factors as fancy suggests. The +imagination makes what it will of chairs, blocks, leaves, chips, +if they serve the purpose of carrying activity forward. + +From a very early age, however, there is no distinction of +exclusive periods of play activity and work activity, but only +one of emphasis. There are definite results which even young +children desire, and try to bring to pass. Their eager interest +in sharing the occupations of others, if nothing else, +accomplishes this. Children want to "help"; they are anxious to +engage in the pursuits of adults which effect external changes: +setting the table, washing dishes, helping care for animals, etc. +In their plays, they like to construct their own toys and +appliances. With increasing maturity, activity which does not +give back results of tangible and visible achievement loses its +interest. Play then changes to fooling and if habitually +indulged in is demoralizing. Observable results are necessary to +enable persons to get a sense and a measure of their own powers. +When make-believe is recognized to be make-believe, the device of +making objects in fancy alone is too easy to stimulate intense +action. One has only to observe the countenance of children +really playing to note that their attitude is one of serious +absorption; this attitude cannot be maintained when things cease +to afford adequate stimulation. + +When fairly remote results of a definite character are foreseen +and enlist persistent effort for their accomplishment, play +passes into work. Like play, it signifies purposeful activity +and differs not in that activity is subordinated to an external +result, but in the fact that a longer course of activity is +occasioned by the idea of a result. The demand for continuous +attention is greater, and more intelligence must be shown in +selecting and shaping means. To extend this account would be to +repeat what has been said under the caption of aim, interest, and +thinking. It is pertinent, however, to inquire why the idea is +so current that work involves subordination of an activity to an +ulterior material result. The extreme form of this +subordination, namely drudgery, offers a clew. Activity carried +on under conditions of external pressure or coercion is not +carried on for any significance attached to the doing. The +course of action is not intrinsically satisfying; it is a mere +means for avoiding some penalty, or for gaining some reward at +its conclusion. What is inherently repulsive is endured for the +sake of averting something still more repulsive or of securing a +gain hitched on by others. Under unfree economic conditions, +this state of affairs is bound to exist. Work or industry offers +little to engage the emotions and the imagination; it is a more +or less mechanical series of strains. Only the hold which the +completion of the work has upon a person will keep him going. +But the end should be intrinsic to the action; it should be its +end -- a part of its own course. Then it affords a stimulus to +effort very different from that arising from the thought of +results which have nothing to do with the intervening action. As +already mentioned, the absence of economic pressure in schools +supplies an opportunity for reproducing industrial situations of +mature life under conditions where the occupation can be carried +on for its own sake. If in some cases, pecuniary recognition is +also a result of an action, though not the chief motive for it, +that fact may well increase the significance of the occupation. +Where something approaching drudgery or the need of fulfilling +externally imposed tasks exists, the demand for play persists, +but tends to be perverted. The ordinary course of action fails +to give adequate stimulus to emotion and imagination. So in +leisure time, there is an imperious demand for their stimulation +by any kind of means; gambling, drink, etc., may be resorted to. +Or, in less extreme cases, there is recourse to idle amusement; +to anything which passes time with immediate agreeableness. +Recreation, as the word indicates, is recuperation of energy. No +demand of human nature is more urgent or less to be escaped. The +idea that the need can be suppressed is absolutely fallacious, +and the Puritanic tradition which disallows the need has entailed +an enormous crop of evils. If education does not afford +opportunity for wholesome recreation and train capacity for +seeking and finding it, the suppressed instincts find all sorts +of illicit outlets, sometimes overt, sometimes confined to +indulgence of the imagination. Education has no more serious +responsibility than making adequate provision for enjoyment of +recreative leisure; not only for the sake of immediate health, +but still more if possible for the sake of its lasting effect +upon habits of mind. Art is again the answer to this demand. + +Summary. In the previous chapter we found that the primary +subject matter of knowing is that contained in learning how to do +things of a fairly direct sort. The educational equivalent of +this principle is the consistent use of simple occupations which +appeal to the powers of youth and which typify general modes of +social activity. Skill and information about materials, tools, +and laws of energy are acquired while activities are carried on +for their own sake. The fact that they are socially +representative gives a quality to the skill and knowledge gained +which makes them transferable to out-of-school situations. +It is important not to confuse the psychological distinction +between play and work with the economic distinction. +Psychologically, the defining characteristic of play is not +amusement nor aimlessness. It is the fact that the aim is +thought of as more activity in the same line, without defining +continuity of action in reference to results produced. +Activities as they grow more complicated gain added meaning by +greater attention to specific results achieved. Thus they pass +gradually into work. Both are equally free and intrinsically +motivated, apart from false economic conditions which tend to +make play into idle excitement for the well to do, and work into +uncongenial labor for the poor. Work is psychologically simply +an activity which consciously includes regard for consequences as +a part of itself; it becomes constrained labor when the +consequences are outside of the activity as an end to which +activity is merely a means. Work which remains permeated with +the play attitude is art -- in quality if not in conventional +designation. + + +Chapter Sixteen: The Significance of Geography and History + +1. Extension of Meaning of Primary Activities. Nothing is more +striking than the difference between an activity as merely +physical and the wealth of meanings which the same activity +may assume. From the outside, an astronomer gazing through a +telescope is like a small boy looking through the same tube. In +each case, there is an arrangement of glass and metal, an eye, +and a little speck of light in the distance. Yet at a critical +moment, the activity of an astronomer might be concerned with the +birth of a world, and have whatever is known about the starry +heavens as its significant content. Physically speaking, what +man has effected on this globe in his progress from savagery is a +mere scratch on its surface, not perceptible at a distance which +is slight in comparison with the reaches even of the solar +system. Yet in meaning what has been accomplished measures just +the difference of civilization from savagery. Although the +activities, physically viewed, have changed somewhat, this change +is slight in comparison with the development of the meanings +attaching to the activities. There is no limit to the meaning +which an action may come to possess. It all depends upon the +context of perceived connections in which it is placed; the reach +of imagination in realizing connections is inexhaustible. +The advantage which the activity of man has in appropriating and +finding meanings makes his education something else than the +manufacture of a tool or the training of an animal. The latter +increase efficiency; they do not develop significance. The final +educational importance of such occupations in play and work as +were considered in the last chapter is that they afford the most +direct instrumentalities for such extension of meaning. Set +going under adequate conditions they are magnets for gathering +and retaining an indefinitely wide scope of intellectual +considerations. They provide vital centers for the reception and +assimilation of information. When information is purveyed in +chunks simply as information to be retained for its own sake, it +tends to stratify over vital experience. Entering as a factor +into an activity pursued for its own sake--whether as a means or +as a widening of the content of the aim--it is informing. The +insight directly gained fuses with what is told. Individual +experience is then capable of taking up and holding in solution +the net results of the experience of the group to which he +belongs--including the results of sufferings and trials over long +stretches of time. And such media have no fixed saturation point +where further absorption is impossible. The more that is taken +in, the greater capacity there is for further assimilation. New +receptiveness follows upon new curiosity, and new curiosity upon +information gained. + +The meanings with which activities become charged, concern nature +and man. This is an obvious truism, which however gains meaning +when translated into educational equivalents. So translated, it +signifies that geography and history supply subject matter which +gives background and outlook, intellectual perspective, to what +might otherwise be narrow personal actions or mere forms of +technical skill. With every increase of ability to place our own +doings in their time and space connections, our doings gain in +significant content. We realize that we are citizens of no mean +city in discovering the scene in space of which we are denizens, +and the continuous manifestation of endeavor in time of which we +are heirs and continuers. Thus our ordinary daily experiences +cease to be things of the moment and gain enduring substance. +Of course if geography and history are taught as ready-made +studies which a person studies simply because he is sent to +school, it easily happens that a large number of statements about +things remote and alien to everyday experience are learned. +Activity is divided, and two separate worlds are built up, +occupying activity at divided periods. No transmutation takes +place; ordinary experience is not enlarged in meaning by getting +its connections; what is studied is not animated and made real by +entering into immediate activity. Ordinary experience is not +even left as it was, narrow but vital. Rather, it loses +something of its mobility and sensitiveness to suggestions. It +is weighed down and pushed into a corner by a load of +unassimilated information. It parts with its flexible +responsiveness and alert eagerness for additional meaning. Mere +amassing of information apart from the direct interests of life +makes mind wooden; elasticity disappears. + +Normally every activity engaged in for its own sake reaches out +beyond its immediate self. It does not passively wait for +information to be bestowed which will increase its meaning; it +seeks it out. Curiosity is not an accidental isolated +possession; it is a necessary consequence of the fact that an +experience is a moving, changing thing, involving all kinds of +connections with other things. Curiosity is but the tendency to +make these conditions perceptible. It is the business of +educators to supply an environment so that this reaching out of +an experience may be fruitfully rewarded and kept continuously +active. Within a certain kind of environment, an activity may be +checked so that the only meaning which accrues is of its direct +and tangible isolated outcome. One may cook, or hammer, or walk, +and the resulting consequences may not take the mind any farther +than the consequences of cooking, hammering, and walking in the +literal -- or physical -- sense. But nevertheless the +consequences of the act remain far-reaching. To walk involves a +displacement and reaction of the resisting earth, whose thrill is +felt wherever there is matter. It involves the structure of the +limbs and the nervous system; the principles of mechanics. To +cook is to utilize heat and moisture to change the chemical +relations of food materials; it has a bearing upon the +assimilation of food and the growth of the body. The utmost that +the most learned men of science know in physics, chemistry, +physiology is not enough to make all these consequences and +connections perceptible. The task of education, once more, is to +see to it that such activities are performed in such ways and +under such conditions as render these conditions as perceptible +as possible. To "learn geography" is to gain in power to +perceive the spatial, the natural, connections of an ordinary +act; to "learn history" is essentially to gain in power to +recognize its human connections. For what is called geography as +a formulated study is simply the body of facts and principles +which have been discovered in other men's experience about the +natural medium in which we live, and in connection with which the +particular acts of our life have an explanation. So history as a +formulated study is but the body of known facts about the +activities and sufferings of the social groups with which our own +lives are continuous, and through reference to which our own +customs and institutions are illuminated. + +2. The Complementary Nature of History and Geography. History +and geography -- including in the latter, for reasons about to be +mentioned, nature study -- are the information studies par +excellence of the schools. Examination of the materials and the +method of their use will make clear that the difference between +penetration of this information into living experience and its +mere piling up in isolated heaps depends upon whether these +studies are faithful to the interdependence of man and nature +which affords these studies their justification. Nowhere, +however, is there greater danger that subject matter will be +accepted as appropriate educational material simply because it +has become customary to teach and learn it. The idea of a +philosophic reason for it, because of the function of the +material in a worthy transformation of experience, is looked upon +as a vain fancy, or as supplying a high-sounding phraseology in +support of what is already done. The words "history" and +"geography" suggest simply the matter which has been +traditionally sanctioned in the schools. The mass and variety of +this matter discourage an attempt to see what it really stands +for, and how it can be so taught as to fulfill its mission in the +experience of pupils. But unless the idea that there is a +unifying and social direction in education is a farcical +pretense, subjects that bulk as large in the curriculum as +history and geography, must represent a general function in the +development of a truly socialized and intellectualized +experience. The discovery of this function must be employed as a +criterion for trying and sifting the facts taught and the methods +used. + +The function of historical and geographical subject matter has +been stated; it is to enrich and liberate the more direct and +personal contacts of life by furnishing their context, their +background and outlook. While geography emphasizes the physical +side and history the social, these are only emphases in a common +topic, namely, the associated life of men. For this associated +life, with its experiments, its ways and means, its achievements +and failures, does not go on in the sky nor yet in a vacuum. It +takes place on the earth. This setting of nature does not bear +to social activities the relation that the scenery of a +theatrical performance bears to a dramatic representation; it +enters into the very make-up of the social happenings that form +history. Nature is the medium of social occurrences. It +furnishes original stimuli; it supplies obstacles and resources. +Civilization is the progressive mastery of its varied energies. +When this interdependence of the study of history, representing +the human emphasis, with the study of geography, representing the +natural, is ignored, history sinks to a listing of dates with an +appended inventory of events, labeled "important"; or else it +becomes a literary phantasy -- for in purely literary history the +natural environment is but stage scenery. + +Geography, of course, has its educative influence in a +counterpart connection of natural facts with social events and +their consequences. The classic definition of geography as an +account of the earth as the home of man expresses the educational +reality. But it is easier to give this definition than it is to +present specific geographical subject matter in its vital human +bearings. The residence, pursuits, successes, and failures of +men are the things that give the geographic data their reason for +inclusion in the material of instruction. But to hold the two +together requires an informed and cultivated imagination. When +the ties are broken, geography presents itself as that +hodge-podge of unrelated fragments too often found. It appears +as a veritable rag-bag of intellectual odds and ends: the height +of a mountain here, the course of a river there, the quantity of +shingles produced in this town, the tonnage of the shipping in +that, the boundary of a county, the capital of a state. The +earth as the home of man is humanizing and unified; the earth +viewed as a miscellany of facts is scattering and imaginatively +inert. Geography is a topic that originally appeals to +imagination -- even to the romantic imagination. It shares in +the wonder and glory that attach to adventure, travel, and +exploration. The variety of peoples and environments, their +contrast with familiar scenes, furnishes infinite stimulation. +The mind is moved from the monotony of the customary. And while +local or home geography is the natural starting point in the +reconstructive development of the natural environment, it is an +intellectual starting point for moving out into the unknown, not +an end in itself. When not treated as a basis for getting at the +large world beyond, the study of the home geography becomes as +deadly as do object lessons which simply summarize the properties +of familiar objects. The reason is the same. The imagination is +not fed, but is held down to recapitulating, cataloguing, and +refining what is already known. But when the familiar fences +that mark the limits of the village proprietors are signs that +introduce an understanding of the boundaries of great nations, +even fences are lighted with meaning. Sunlight, air, running +water, inequality of earth's surface, varied industries, civil +officers and their duties -- all these things are found in the +local environment. Treated as if their meaning began and ended +in those confines, they are curious facts to be laboriously +learned. As instruments for extending the limits of experience, +bringing within its scope peoples and things otherwise strange +and unknown, they are transfigured by the use to which they are +put. Sunlight, wind, stream, commerce, political relations come +from afar and lead the thoughts afar. To follow their course is +to enlarge the mind not by stuffing it with additional +information, but by remaking the meaning of what was previously a +matter of course. + +The same principle coordinates branches, or phases, of +geographical study which tend to become specialized and separate. +Mathematical or astronomical, physiographic, topographic, +political, commercial, geography, all make their claims. How are +they to be adjusted? By an external compromise that crowds in so +much of each? No other method is to be found unless it be +constantly borne in mind that the educational center of gravity +is in the cultural or humane aspects of the subject. From this +center, any material becomes relevant in so far as it is needed +to help appreciate the significance of human activities and +relations. The differences of civilization in cold and tropical +regions, the special inventions, industrial and political, of +peoples in the temperate regions, cannot be understood without +appeal to the earth as a member of the solar system. Economic +activities deeply influence social intercourse and political +organization on one side, and reflect physical conditions on the +other. The specializations of these topics are for the +specialists; their interaction concerns man as a being whose +experience is social. + +To include nature study within geography doubtless seems forced; +verbally, it is. But in educational idea there is but one +reality, and it is pity that in practice we have two names: for +the diversity of names tends to conceal the identity of meaning. +Nature and the earth should be equivalent terms, and so should +earth study and nature study. Everybody knows that nature study +has suffered in schools from scrappiness of subject matter, due +to dealing with a large number of isolated points. The parts of +a flower have been studied, for example, apart from the flower as +an organ; the flower apart from the plant; the plant apart from +the soil, air, and light in which and through which it lives. +The result is an inevitable deadness of topics to which attention +is invited, but which are so isolated that they do not feed +imagination. The lack of interest is so great that it was +seriously proposed to revive animism, to clothe natural facts and +events with myths in order that they might attract and hold the +mind. In numberless cases, more or less silly personifications +were resorted to. The method was silly, but it expressed a real +need for a human atmosphere. The facts had been torn to pieces +by being taken out of their context. They no longer belonged to +the earth; they had no abiding place anywhere. To compensate, +recourse was had to artificial and sentimental associations. The +real remedy is to make nature study a study of nature, not of +fragments made meaningless through complete removal from the +situations in which they are produced and in which they operate. +When nature is treated as a whole, like the earth in its +relations, its phenomena fall into their natural relations of +sympathy and association with human life, and artificial +substitutes are not needed. + +3. History and Present Social Life. The segregation which kills +the vitality of history is divorce from present modes and +concerns of social life. The past just as past is no longer our +affair. If it were wholly gone and done with, there would be +only one reasonable attitude toward it. Let the dead bury their +dead. But knowledge of the past is the key to understanding the +present. History deals with the past, but this past is the +history of the present. An intelligent study of the discovery, +explorations, colonization of America, of the pioneer movement +westward, of immigration, etc., should be a study of the United +States as it is to-day: of the country we now live in. Studying +it in process of formation makes much that is too complex to be +directly grasped open to comprehension. Genetic method was +perhaps the chief scientific achievement of the latter half of +the nineteenth century. Its principle is that the way to get +insight into any complex product is to trace the process of its +making, -- to follow it through the successive stages of its +growth. To apply this method to history as if it meant only the +truism that the present social state cannot be separated from its +past, is one-sided. It means equally that past events cannot be +separated from the living present and retain meaning. The true +starting point of history is always some present situation with +its problems. + +This general principle may be briefly applied to a consideration +of its bearing upon a number of points. The biographical method +is generally recommended as the natural mode of approach to +historical study. The lives of great men, of heroes and leaders, +make concrete and vital historic episodes otherwise abstract and +incomprehensible. They condense into vivid pictures complicated +and tangled series of events spread over so much space and time +that only a highly trained mind can follow and unravel them. +There can be no doubt of the psychological soundness of this +principle. But it is misused when employed to throw into +exaggerated relief the doings of a few individuals without +reference to the social situations which they represent. When a +biography is related just as an account of the doings of a man +isolated from the conditions that aroused him and to which his +activities were a response, we do not have a study of history, +for we have no study of social life, which is an affair of +individuals in association. We get only a sugar coating which +makes it easier to swallow certain fragments of information. +Much attention has been given of late to primitive life as an +introduction to learning history. Here also there is a right and +a wrong way of conceiving its value. The seemingly ready-made +character and the complexity of present conditions, their +apparently hard and fast character, is an almost insuperable +obstacle to gaining insight into their nature. Recourse to the +primitive may furnish the fundamental elements of the present +situation in immensely simplified form. It is like unraveling a +cloth so complex and so close to the eyes that its scheme cannot +be seen, until the larger coarser features of the pattern appear. +We cannot simplify the present situations by deliberate +experiment, but resort to primitive life presents us with the +sort of results we should desire from an experiment. Social +relationships and modes of organized action are reduced to their +lowest terms. When this social aim is overlooked, however, the +study of primitive life becomes simply a rehearsing of +sensational and exciting features of savagery. Primitive history +suggests industrial history. For one of the chief reasons for +going to more primitive conditions to resolve the present into +more easily perceived factors is that we may realize how the +fundamental problems of procuring subsistence, shelter, and +protection have been met; and by seeing how these were solved in +the earlier days of the human race, form some conception of the +long road which has had to be traveled, and of the successive +inventions by which the race has been brought forward in culture. +We do not need to go into disputes regarding the economic +interpretation of history to realize that the industrial history +of mankind gives insight into two important phases of social life +in a way which no other phase of history can possibly do. It +presents us with knowledge of the successive inventions by which +theoretical science has been applied to the control of nature in +the interests of security and prosperity of social life. It thus +reveals the successive causes of social progress. Its other +service is to put before us the things that fundamentally concern +all men in common -- the occupations and values connected with +getting a living. Economic history deals with the activities, +the career, and fortunes of the common man as does no other +branch of history. The one thing every individual must do is to +live; the one thing that society must do is to secure from each +individual his fair contribution to the general well being and +see to it that a just return is made to him. + +Economic history is more human, more democratic, and hence more +liberalizing than political history. It deals not with the rise +and fall of principalities and powers, but with the growth of the +effective liberties, through command of nature, of the common man +for whom powers and principalities exist. + +Industrial history also offers a more direct avenue of approach +to the realization of the intimate connection of man's struggles, +successes, and failures with nature than does political history +-- to say nothing of the military history into which political +history so easily runs when reduced to the level of youthful +comprehension. For industrial history is essentially an account +of the way in which man has learned to utilize natural energy +from the time when men mostly exploited the muscular energies of +other men to the time when, in promise if not in actuality, the +resources of nature are so under command as to enable men to +extend a common dominion over her. When the history of work, +when the conditions of using the soil, forest, mine, of +domesticating and cultivating grains and animals, of manufacture +and distribution, are left out of account, history tends to +become merely literary -- a systematized romance of a mythical +humanity living upon itself instead of upon the earth. + +Perhaps the most neglected branch of history in general education +is intellectual history. We are only just beginning to realize +that the great heroes who have advanced human destiny are not its +politicians, generals, and diplomatists, but the scientific +discoverers and inventors who have put into man's hands the +instrumentalities of an expanding and controlled experience, and +the artists and poets who have celebrated his struggles, +triumphs, and defeats in such language, pictorial, plastic, or +written, that their meaning is rendered universally accessible to +others. One of the advantages of industrial history as a history +of man's progressive adaptation of natural forces to social uses +is the opportunity which it affords for consideration of advance +in the methods and results of knowledge. At present men are +accustomed to eulogize intelligence and reason in general terms; +their fundamental importance is urged. But pupils often come +away from the conventional study of history, and think either +that the human intellect is a static quantity which has not +progressed by the invention of better methods, or else that +intelligence, save as a display of personal shrewdness, is a +negligible historic factor. Surely no better way could be +devised of instilling a genuine sense of the part which mind has +to play in life than a study of history which makes plain how the +entire advance of humanity from savagery to civilization has been +dependent upon intellectual discoveries and inventions, and the +extent to which the things which ordinarily figure most largely +in historical writings have been side issues, or even +obstructions for intelligence to overcome. + +Pursued in this fashion, history would most naturally become of +ethical value in teaching. Intelligent insight into present +forms of associated life is necessary for a character whose +morality is more than colorless innocence. Historical knowledge +helps provide such insight. It is an organ for analysis of the +warp and woof of the present social fabric, of making known the +forces which have woven the pattern. The use of history for +cultivating a socialized intelligence constitutes its moral +significance. It is possible to employ it as a kind of reservoir +of anecdotes to be drawn on to inculcate special moral lessons on +this virtue or that vice. But such teaching is not so much an +ethical use of history as it is an effort to create moral +impressions by means of more or less authentic material. At +best, it produces a temporary emotional glow; at worst, callous +indifference to moralizing. The assistance which may be given by +history to a more intelligent sympathetic understanding of the +social situations of the present in which individuals share is a +permanent and constructive moral asset. + +Summary. It is the nature of an experience to have implications +which go far beyond what is at first consciously noted in it. +Bringing these connections or implications to consciousness +enhances the meaning of the experience. Any experience, however +trivial in its first appearance, is capable of assuming an +indefinite richness of significance by extending its range of +perceived connections. Normal communication with others is the +readiest way of effecting this development, for it links up the +net results of the experience of the group and even the race with +the immediate experience of an individual. By normal +communication is meant that in which there is a joint interest, a +common interest, so that one is eager to give and the other to +take. It contrasts with telling or stating things simply for the +sake of impressing them upon another, merely in order to test him +to see how much he has retained and can literally reproduce. + +Geography and history are the two great school resources for +bringing about the enlargement of the significance of a direct +personal experience. The active occupations described in the +previous chapter reach out in space and time with respect to both +nature and man. Unless they are taught for external reasons or +as mere modes of skill their chief educational value is that they +provide the most direct and interesting roads out into the larger +world of meanings stated in history and geography. While history +makes human implications explicit and geography natural +connections, these subjects are two phases of the same living +whole, since the life of men in association goes on in nature, +not as an accidental setting, but as the material and medium of +development. + + +Chapter Seventeen: Science in the Course of Study + +1. The Logical and the Psychological. By science is meant, as +already stated, that knowledge which is the outcome of methods of +observation, reflection, and testing which are deliberately +adopted to secure a settled, assured subject matter. It involves +an intelligent and persistent endeavor to revise current beliefs +so as to weed out what is erroneous, to add to their accuracy, +and, above all, to give them such shape that the dependencies of +the various facts upon one another may be as obvious as possible. +It is, like all knowledge, an outcome of activity bringing about +certain changes in the environment. But in its case, the quality +of the resulting knowledge is the controlling factor and not an +incident of the activity. Both logically and educationally, +science is the perfecting of knowing, its last stage. + +Science, in short, signifies a realization of the logical +implications of any knowledge. Logical order is not a form +imposed upon what is known; it is the proper form of knowledge as +perfected. For it means that the statement of subject matter is +of a nature to exhibit to one who understands it the premises +from which it follows and the conclusions to which it points (See +ante, p. 190). As from a few bones the competent zoologist +reconstructs an animal; so from the form of a statement in +mathematics or physics the specialist in the subject can form an +idea of the system of truths in which it has its place. + +To the non-expert, however, this perfected form is a stumbling +block. Just because the material is stated with reference to the +furtherance of knowledge as an end in itself, its connections +with the material of everyday life are hidden. To the layman the +bones are a mere curiosity. Until he had mastered the principles +of zoology, his efforts to make anything out of them would be +random and blind. From the standpoint of the learner scientific +form is an ideal to be achieved, not a starting point from which +to set out. It is, nevertheless, a frequent practice to start in +instruction with the rudiments of science somewhat simplified. +The necessary consequence is an isolation of science from +significant experience. The pupil learns symbols without the key +to their meaning. He acquires a technical body of information +without ability to trace its connections with the objects and +operations with which he is familiar--often he acquires simply a +peculiar vocabulary. There is a strong temptation to assume that +presenting subject matter in its perfected form provides a royal +road to learning. What more natural than to suppose that the +immature can be saved time and energy, and be protected from +needless error by commencing where competent inquirers have left +off? The outcome is written large in the history of education. +Pupils begin their study of science with texts in which the +subject is organized into topics according to the order of the +specialist. Technical concepts, with their definitions, are +introduced at the outset. Laws are introduced at a very early +stage, with at best a few indications of the way in which they +were arrived at. The pupils learn a "science" instead of +learning the scientific way of treating the familiar material of +ordinary experience. The method of the advanced student +dominates college teaching; the approach of the college is +transferred into the high school, and so down the line, with such +omissions as may make the subject easier. + +The chronological method which begins with the experience of the +learner and develops from that the proper modes of scientific +treatment is often called the "psychological" method in +distinction from the logical method of the expert or specialist. +The apparent loss of time involved is more than made up for by +the superior understanding and vital interest secured. What the +pupil learns he at least understands. Moreover by following, in +connection with problems selected from the material of ordinary +acquaintance, the methods by which scientific men have reached +their perfected knowledge, he gains independent power to deal +with material within his range, and avoids the mental confusion +and intellectual distaste attendant upon studying matter whose +meaning is only symbolic. Since the mass of pupils are never +going to become scientific specialists, it is much more important +that they should get some insight into what scientific method +means than that they should copy at long range and second hand +the results which scientific men have reached. Students will not +go so far, perhaps, in the "ground covered," but they will be +sure and intelligent as far as they do go. And it is safe to say +that the few who go on to be scientific experts will have a +better preparation than if they had been swamped with a large +mass of purely technical and symbolically stated information. In +fact, those who do become successful men of science are those who +by their own power manage to avoid the pitfalls of a traditional +scholastic introduction into it. + +The contrast between the expectations of the men who a generation +or two ago strove, against great odds, to secure a place for +science in education, and the result generally achieved is +painful. Herbert Spencer, inquiring what knowledge is of most +worth, concluded that from all points of view scientific +knowledge is most valuable. But his argument unconsciously +assumed that scientific knowledge could be communicated in a +ready-made form. Passing over the methods by which the subject +matter of our ordinary activities is transmuted into scientific +form, it ignored the method by which alone science is science. +Instruction has too often proceeded upon an analogous plan. But +there is no magic attached to material stated in technically +correct scientific form. When learned in this condition it +remains a body of inert information. Moreover its form of +statement removes it further from fruitful contact with everyday +experiences than does the mode of statement proper to literature. +Nevertheless that the claims made for instruction in science were +unjustifiable does not follow. For material so taught is not +science to the pupil. + +Contact with things and laboratory exercises, while a great +improvement upon textbooks arranged upon the deductive plan, do +not of themselves suffice to meet the need. While they are an +indispensable portion of scientific method, they do not as a +matter of course constitute scientific method. Physical +materials may be manipulated with scientific apparatus, but the +materials may be disassociated in themselves and in the ways in +which they are handled, from the materials and processes used out +of school. The problems dealt with may be only problems of +science: problems, that is, which would occur to one already +initiated in the science of the subject. Our attention may be +devoted to getting skill in technical manipulation without +reference to the connection of laboratory exercises with a +problem belonging to subject matter. There is sometimes a ritual +of laboratory instruction as well as of heathen religion. 1 +It has been mentioned, incidentally, that scientific statements, +or logical form, implies the use of signs or symbols. The +statement applies, of course, to all use of language. But in the +vernacular, the mind proceeds directly from the symbol to the +thing signified. Association with familiar material is so close +that the mind does not pause upon the sign. The signs are +intended only to stand for things and acts. But scientific +terminology has an additional use. It is designed, as we have +seen, not to stand for the things directly in their practical use +in experience, but for the things placed in a cognitive system. +Ultimately, of course, they denote the things of our common sense +acquaintance. But immediately they do not designate them in +their common context, but translated into terms of scientific +inquiry. Atoms, molecules, chemical formulae, the mathematical +propositions in the study of physics -- all these have primarily +an intellectual value and only indirectly an empirical value. +They represent instruments for the carrying on of science. As in +the case of other tools, their significance can be learned only +by use. We cannot procure understanding of their meaning by +pointing to things, but only by pointing to their work when they +are employed as part of the technique of knowledge. Even the +circle, square, etc., of geometry exhibit a difference from the +squares and circles of familiar acquaintance, and the further one +proceeds in mathematical science the greater the remoteness from +the everyday empirical thing. Qualities which do not count for +the pursuit of knowledge about spatial relations are left out; +those which are important for this purpose are accentuated. If +one carries his study far enough, he will find even the +properties which are significant for spatial knowledge giving way +to those which facilitate knowledge of other things -- perhaps a +knowledge of the general relations of number. There will be +nothing in the conceptual definitions even to suggest spatial +form, size, or direction. This does not mean that they are +unreal mental inventions, but it indicates that direct physical +qualities have been transmuted into tools for a special end--the +end of intellectual organization. In every machine the primary +state of material has been modified by subordinating it to use +for a purpose. Not the stuff in its original form but in its +adaptation to an end is important. No one would have a knowledge +of a machine who could enumerate all the materials entering into +its structure, but only he who knew their uses and could tell why +they are employed as they are. In like fashion one has a +knowledge of mathematical conceptions only when he sees the +problems in which they function and their specific utility in +dealing with these problems. "Knowing" the definitions, rules, +formulae, etc., is like knowing the names of parts of a machine +without knowing what they do. In one case, as in the other, the +meaning, or intellectual content, is what the element +accomplishes in the system of which it is a member. + +2. Science and Social Progress. Assuming that the development +of the direct knowledge gained in occupations of social interest +is carried to a perfected logical form, the question arises as to +its place in experience. In general, the reply is that science +marks the emancipation of mind from devotion to customary +purposes and makes possible the systematic pursuit of new ends. +It is the agency of progress in action. Progress is sometimes +thought of as consisting in getting nearer to ends already +sought. But this is a minor form of progress, for it requires +only improvement of the means of action or technical advance. +More important modes of progress consist in enriching prior +purposes and in forming new ones. Desires are not a fixed +quantity, nor does progress mean only an increased amount of +satisfaction. With increased culture and new mastery of nature, +new desires, demands for new qualities of satisfaction, show +themselves, for intelligence perceives new possibilities of +action. This projection of new possibilities leads to search for +new means of execution, and progress takes place; while the +discovery of objects not already used leads to suggestion of new +ends. + +That science is the chief means of perfecting control of means of +action is witnessed by the great crop of inventions which +followed intellectual command of the secrets of nature. The +wonderful transformation of production and distribution known as +the industrial revolution is the fruit of experimental science. +Railways, steamboats, electric motors, telephone and telegraph, +automobiles, aeroplanes and dirigibles are conspicuous evidences +of the application of science in life. But none of them would be +of much importance without the thousands of less sensational +inventions by means of which natural science has been rendered +tributary to our daily life. + +It must be admitted that to a considerable extent the progress +thus procured has been only technical: it has provided more +efficient means for satisfying preexistent desires, rather than +modified the quality of human purposes. There is, for example, +no modern civilization which is the equal of Greek culture in all +respects. Science is still too recent to have been absorbed into +imaginative and emotional disposition. Men move more swiftly and +surely to the realization of their ends, but their ends too +largely remain what they were prior to scientific enlightenment. +This fact places upon education the responsibility of using +science in a way to modify the habitual attitude of imagination +and feeling, not leave it just an extension of our physical arms +and legs. + +The advance of science has already modified men's thoughts of the +purposes and goods of life to a sufficient extent to give some +idea of the nature of this responsibility and the ways of meeting +it. Science taking effect in human activity has broken down +physical barriers which formerly separated men; it has immensely +widened the area of intercourse. It has brought about +interdependence of interests on an enormous scale. It has +brought with it an established conviction of the possibility of +control of nature in the interests of mankind and thus has led +men to look to the future, instead of the past. The coincidence +of the ideal of progress with the advance of science is not a +mere coincidence. Before this advance men placed the golden age +in remote antiquity. Now they face the future with a firm belief +that intelligence properly used can do away with evils once +thought inevitable. To subjugate devastating disease is no +longer a dream; the hope of abolishing poverty is not utopian. +Science has familiarized men with the idea of development, taking +effect practically in persistent gradual amelioration of the +estate of our common humanity. + + +The problem of an educational use of science is then to create an +intelligence pregnant with belief in the possibility of the +direction of human affairs by itself. The method of science +engrained through education in habit means emancipation from rule +of thumb and from the routine generated by rule of thumb +procedure. The word empirical in its ordinary use does not mean +"connected with experiment," but rather crude and unrational. +Under the influence of conditions created by the non-existence of +experimental science, experience was opposed in all the ruling +philosophies of the past to reason and the truly rational. +Empirical knowledge meant the knowledge accumulated by a +multitude of past instances without intelligent insight into the +principles of any of them. To say that medicine was empirical +meant that it was not scientific, but a mode of practice based +upon accumulated observations of diseases and of remedies used +more or less at random. Such a mode of practice is of necessity +happy-go-lucky; success depends upon chance. It lends itself to +deception and quackery. Industry that is "empirically" +controlled forbids constructive applications of intelligence; it +depends upon following in an imitative slavish manner the models +set in the past. Experimental science means the possibility of +using past experiences as the servant, not the master, of mind. +It means that reason operates within experience, not beyond it, +to give it an intelligent or reasonable quality. Science is +experience becoming rational. The effect of science is thus to +change men's idea of the nature and inherent possibilities of +experience. By the same token, it changes the idea and the +operation of reason. Instead of being something beyond +experience, remote, aloof, concerned with a sublime region that +has nothing to do with the experienced facts of life, it is found +indigenous in experience: -- the factor by which past experiences +are purified and rendered into tools for discovery and advance. + +The term "abstract" has a rather bad name in popular speech, +being used to signify not only that which is abstruse and hard to +understand, but also that which is far away from life. But +abstraction is an indispensable trait in reflective direction of +activity. Situations do not literally repeat themselves. Habit +treats new occurrences as if they were identical with old ones; +it suffices, accordingly, when the different or novel element is +negligible for present purposes. But when the new element +requires especial attention, random reaction is the sole recourse +unless abstraction is brought into play. For abstraction +deliberately selects from the subject matter of former +experiences that which is thought helpful in dealing with the +new. It signifies conscious transfer of a meaning embedded in +past experience for use in a new one. It is the very artery of +intelligence, of the intentional rendering of one experience +available for guidance of another. + +Science carries on this working over of prior subject matter on a +large scale. It aims to free an experience from all which is +purely personal and strictly immediate; it aims to detach +whatever it has in common with the subject matter of other +experiences, and which, being common, may be saved for further +use. It is, thus, an indispensable factor in social progress. +In any experience just as it occurs there is much which, while it +may be of precious import to the individual implicated in the +experience, is peculiar and unreduplicable. From the standpoint +of science, this material is accidental, while the features which +are widely shared are essential. Whatever is unique in the +situation, since dependent upon the peculiarities of the +individual and the coincidence of circumstance, is not available +for others; so that unless what is shared is abstracted and fixed +by a suitable symbol, practically all the value of the experience +may perish in its passing. But abstraction and the use of terms +to record what is abstracted put the net value of individual +experience at the permanent disposal of mankind. No one can +foresee in detail when or how it may be of further use. The man +of science in developing his abstractions is like a manufacturer +of tools who does not know who will use them nor when. But +intellectual tools are indefinitely more flexible in their range +of adaptation than other mechanical tools. + +Generalization is the counterpart of abstraction. It is the +functioning of an abstraction in its application to a new +concrete experience, -- its extension to clarify and direct new +situations. Reference to these possible applications is +necessary in order that the abstraction may be fruitful, instead +of a barren formalism ending in itself. Generalization is +essentially a social device. When men identified their interests +exclusively with the concerns of a narrow group, their +generalizations were correspondingly restricted. The viewpoint +did not permit a wide and free survey. Men's thoughts were tied +down to a contracted space and a short time, -- limited to their +own established customs as a measure of all possible values. +Scientific abstraction and generalization are equivalent to +taking the point of view of any man, whatever his location in +time and space. While this emancipation from the conditions and +episodes of concrete experiences accounts for the remoteness, the +"abstractness," of science, it also accounts for its wide and +free range of fruitful novel applications in practice. Terms and +propositions record, fix, and convey what is abstracted. A +meaning detached from a given experience cannot remain hanging in +the air. It must acquire a local habitation. Names give +abstract meanings a physical locus and body. Formulation is thus +not an after-thought or by-product; it is essential to the +completion of the work of thought. Persons know many things +which they cannot express, but such knowledge remains practical, +direct, and personal. An individual can use it for himself; he +may be able to act upon it with efficiency. Artists and +executives often have their knowledge in this state. But it is +personal, untransferable, and, as it were, instinctive. To +formulate the significance of an experience a man must take into +conscious account the experiences of others. He must try to find +a standpoint which includes the experience of others as well as +his own. Otherwise his communication cannot be understood. He +talks a language which no one else knows. While literary art +furnishes the supreme successes in stating of experiences so that +they are vitally significant to others, the vocabulary of science +is designed, in another fashion, to express the meaning of +experienced things in symbols which any one will know who studies +the science. Aesthetic formulation reveals and enhances the +meaning of experiences one already has; scientific formulation +supplies one with tools for constructing new experiences with +transformed meanings. + +To sum up: Science represents the office of intelligence, in +projection and control of new experiences, pursued +systematically, intentionally, and on a scale due to freedom from +limitations of habit. It is the sole instrumentality of +conscious, as distinct from accidental, progress. And if its +generality, its remoteness from individual conditions, confer +upon it a certain technicality and aloofness, these qualities are +very different from those of merely speculative theorizing. The +latter are in permanent dislocation from practice; the former are +temporarily detached for the sake of wider and freer application +in later concrete action. There is a kind of idle theory which +is antithetical to practice; but genuinely scientific theory +falls within practice as the agency of its expansion and its +direction to new possibilities. + +3. Naturalism and Humanism in Education. There exists an +educational tradition which opposes science to literature and +history in the curriculum. The quarrel between the +representatives of the two interests is easily explicable +historically. Literature and language and a literary philosophy +were entrenched in all higher institutions of learning before +experimental science came into being. The latter had naturally +to win its way. No fortified and protected interest readily +surrenders any monopoly it may possess. But the assumption, from +whichever side, that language and literary products are +exclusively humanistic in quality, and that science is purely +physical in import, is a false notion which tends to cripple the +educational use of both studies. Human life does not occur in a +vacuum, nor is nature a mere stage setting for the enactment of +its drama (ante, p. 211). Man's life is bound up in the +processes of nature; his career, for success or defeat, depends +upon the way in which nature enters it. Man's power of +deliberate control of his own affairs depends upon ability to +direct natural energies to use: an ability which is in turn +dependent upon insight into nature's processes. Whatever natural +science may be for the specialist, for educational purposes it is +knowledge of the conditions of human action. To be aware of the +medium in which social intercourse goes on, and of the means and +obstacles to its progressive development is to be in command of a +knowledge which is thoroughly humanistic in quality. One who is +ignorant of the history of science is ignorant of the struggles +by which mankind has passed from routine and caprice, from +superstitious subjection to nature, from efforts to use it +magically, to intellectual self-possession. That science may be +taught as a set of formal and technical exercises is only too +true. This happens whenever information about the world is made +an end in itself. The failure of such instruction to procure +culture is not, however, evidence of the antithesis of natural +knowledge to humanistic concern, but evidence of a wrong +educational attitude. Dislike to employ scientific knowledge as +it functions in men's occupations is itself a survival of an +aristocratic culture. The notion that "applied" knowledge is +somehow less worthy than "pure" knowledge, was natural to a +society in which all useful work was performed by slaves and +serfs, and in which industry was controlled by the models set by +custom rather than by intelligence. Science, or the highest +knowing, was then identified with pure theorizing, apart from all +application in the uses of life; and knowledge relating to useful +arts suffered the stigma attaching to the classes who engaged in +them (See below, Ch. XIX). The idea of science thus generated +persisted after science had itself adopted the appliances of the +arts, using them for the production of knowledge, and after the +rise of democracy. Taking theory just as theory, however, that +which concerns humanity is of more significance for man than that +which concerns a merely physical world. In adopting the +criterion of knowledge laid down by a literary culture, aloof +from the practical needs of the mass of men, the educational +advocates of scientific education put themselves at a strategic +disadvantage. So far as they adopt the idea of science +appropriate to its experimental method and to the movements of a +democratic and industrial society, they have no difficulty in +showing that natural science is more humanistic than an alleged +humanism which bases its educational schemes upon the specialized +interests of a leisure class. For, as we have already stated, +humanistic studies when set in opposition to study of nature are +hampered. They tend to reduce themselves to exclusively literary +and linguistic studies, which in turn tend to shrink to "the +classics," to languages no longer spoken. For modern languages +may evidently be put to use, and hence fall under the ban. It +would be hard to find anything in history more ironical than the +educational practices which have identified the "humanities" +exclusively with a knowledge of Greek and Latin. Greek and Roman +art and institutions made such important contributions to our +civilization that there should always be the amplest +opportunities for making their acquaintance. But to regard them +as par excellence the humane studies involves a deliberate +neglect of the possibilities of the subject matter which is +accessible in education to the masses, and tends to cultivate a +narrow snobbery: that of a learned class whose insignia are the +accidents of exclusive opportunity. Knowledge is humanistic in +quality not because it is about human products in the past, but +because of what it does in liberating human intelligence and +human sympathy. Any subject matter which accomplishes this +result is humane, and any subject matter which does not +accomplish it is not even educational. + +Summary. Science represents the fruition of the cognitive +factors in experience. Instead of contenting itself with a mere +statement of what commends itself to personal or customary +experience, it aims at a statement which will reveal the sources, +grounds, and consequences of a belief. The achievement of this +aim gives logical character to the statements. Educationally, it +has to be noted that logical characteristics of method, since +they belong to subject matter which has reached a high degree of +intellectual elaboration, are different from the method of the +learner--the chronological order of passing from a cruder to a +more refined intellectual quality of experience. When this fact +is ignored, science is treated as so much bare information, which +however is less interesting and more remote than ordinary +information, being stated in an unusual and technical vocabulary. +The function which science has to perform in the curriculum is +that which it has performed for the race: emancipation from local +and temporary incidents of experience, and the opening of +intellectual vistas unobscured by the accidents of personal habit +and predilection. The logical traits of abstraction, +generalization, and definite formulation are all associated with +this function. In emancipating an idea from the particular +context in which it originated and giving it a wider reference +the results of the experience of any individual are put at the +disposal of all men. Thus ultimately and philosophically science +is the organ of general social progress. 1 Upon the positive +side, the value of problems arising in work in the garden, the +shop, etc., may be referred to (See p. 200). The laboratory may +be treated as an additional resource to supply conditions and +appliances for the better pursuit of these problems. + + +Chapter Eighteen: Educational Values + +The considerations involved in a discussion of educational values +have already been brought out in the discussion of aims and +interests. + +The specific values usually discussed in educational theories +coincide with aims which are usually urged. They are such things +as utility, culture, information, preparation for social +efficiency, mental discipline or power, and so on. The aspect of +these aims in virtue of which they are valuable has been treated +in our analysis of the nature of interest, and there is no +difference between speaking of art as an interest or concern and +referring to it as a value. It happens, however, that discussion +of values has usually been centered about a consideration of the +various ends subserved by specific subjects of the curriculum. +It has been a part of the attempt to justify those subjects by +pointing out the significant contributions to life accruing from +their study. An explicit discussion of educational values thus +affords an opportunity for reviewing the prior discussion of aims +and interests on one hand and of the curriculum on the other, by +bringing them into connection with one another. + +1. The Nature of Realization or Appreciation. Much of our +experience is indirect; it is dependent upon signs which +intervene between the things and ourselves, signs which stand for +or represent the former. It is one thing to have been engaged in +war, to have shared its dangers and hardships; it is another +thing to hear or read about it. All language, all symbols, are +implements of an indirect experience; in technical language the +experience which is procured by their means is "mediated." It +stands in contrast with an immediate, direct experience, +something in which we take part vitally and at first hand, +instead of through the intervention of representative media. As +we have seen, the scope of personal, vitally direct experience is +very limited. If it were not for the intervention of agencies +for representing absent and distant affairs, our experience would +remain almost on the level of that of the brutes. Every step +from savagery to civilization is dependent upon the invention of +media which enlarge the range of purely immediate experience and +give it deepened as well as wider meaning by connecting it with +things which can only be signified or symbolized. It is +doubtless this fact which is the cause of the disposition to +identify an uncultivated person with an illiterate person--so +dependent are we on letters for effective representative or +indirect experience. + +At the same time (as we have also had repeated occasion to see) +there is always a danger that symbols will not be truly +representative; danger that instead of really calling up the +absent and remote in a way to make it enter a present experience, +the linguistic media of representation will become an end in +themselves. Formal education is peculiarly exposed to this +danger, with the result that when literacy supervenes, mere +bookishness, what is popularly termed the academic, too often +comes with it. In colloquial speech, the phrase a "realizing +sense" is used to express the urgency, warmth, and intimacy of a +direct experience in contrast with the remote, pallid, and coldly +detached quality of a representative experience. The terms +"mental realization" and "appreciation" (or genuine appreciation) +are more elaborate names for the realizing sense of a thing. It +is not possible to define these ideas except by synonyms, like +"coming home to one" "really taking it in," etc., for the only +way to appreciate what is meant by a direct experience of a thing +is by having it. But it is the difference between reading a +technical description of a picture, and seeing it; or between +just seeing it and being moved by it; between learning +mathematical equations about light and being carried away by some +peculiarly glorious illumination of a misty landscape. We are +thus met by the danger of the tendency of technique and other +purely representative forms to encroach upon the sphere of direct +appreciations; in other words, the tendency to assume that pupils +have a foundation of direct realization of situations sufficient +for the superstructure of representative experience erected by +formulated school studies. This is not simply a matter of +quantity or bulk. Sufficient direct experience is even more a +matter of quality; it must be of a sort to connect readily and +fruitfully with the symbolic material of instruction. Before +teaching can safely enter upon conveying facts and ideas through +the media of signs, schooling must provide genuine situations in +which personal participation brings home the import of the +material and the problems which it conveys. From the standpoint +of the pupil, the resulting experiences are worth while on their +own account; from the standpoint of the teacher they are also +means of supplying subject matter required for understanding +instruction involving signs, and of evoking attitudes of +open-mindedness and concern as to the material symbolically +conveyed. + +In the outline given of the theory of educative subject matter, +the demand for this background of realization or appreciation is +met by the provision made for play and active occupations +embodying typical situations. Nothing need be added to what has +already been said except to point out that while the discussion +dealt explicitly with the subject matter of primary education, +where the demand for the available background of direct +experience is most obvious, the principle applies to the primary +or elementary phase of every subject. The first and basic +function of laboratory work, for example, in a high school or +college in a new field, is to familiarize the student at first +hand with a certain range of facts and problems -- to give him a +"feeling" for them. Getting command of technique and of methods +of reaching and testing generalizations is at first secondary to +getting appreciation. As regards the primary school activities, +it is to be borne in mind that the fundamental intent is not to +amuse nor to convey information with a minimum of vexation nor +yet to acquire skill, -- though these results may accrue as +by-products, -- but to enlarge and enrich the scope of +experience, and to keep alert and effective the interest in +intellectual progress. + +The rubric of appreciation supplies an appropriate head for +bringing out three further principles: the nature of effective or +real (as distinct from nominal) standards of value; the place of +the imagination in appreciative realizations; and the place of +the fine arts in the course of study. + +1. The nature of standards of valuation. Every adult has +acquired, in the course of his prior experience and education, +certain measures of the worth of various sorts of experience. He +has learned to look upon qualities like honesty, amiability, +perseverance, loyalty, as moral goods; upon certain classics of +literature, painting, music, as aesthetic values, and so on. Not +only this, but he has learned certain rules for these values -- +the golden rule in morals; harmony, balance, etc., proportionate +distribution in aesthetic goods; definition, clarity, system in +intellectual accomplishments. These principles are so important +as standards of judging the worth of new experiences that parents +and instructors are always tending to teach them directly to the +young. They overlook the danger that standards so taught will be +merely symbolic; that is, largely conventional and verbal. In +reality, working as distinct from professed standards depend upon +what an individual has himself specifically appreciated to be +deeply significant in concrete situations. An individual may +have learned that certain characteristics are conventionally +esteemed in music; he may be able to converse with some +correctness about classic music; he may even honestly believe +that these traits constitute his own musical standards. But if +in his own past experience, what he has been most accustomed to +and has most enjoyed is ragtime, his active or working measures +of valuation are fixed on the ragtime level. The appeal actually +made to him in his own personal realization fixes his attitude +much more deeply than what he has been taught as the proper thing +to say; his habitual disposition thus fixed forms his real "norm" +of valuation in subsequent musical experiences. + +Probably few would deny this statement as to musical taste. But +it applies equally well in judgments of moral and intellectual +worth. A youth who has had repeated experience of the full +meaning of the value of kindliness toward others built into his +disposition has a measure of the worth of generous treatment of +others. Without this vital appreciation, the duty and virtue of +unselfishness impressed upon him by others as a standard remains +purely a matter of symbols which he cannot adequately translate +into realities. His "knowledge" is second-handed; it is only a +knowledge that others prize unselfishness as an excellence, and +esteem him in the degree in which he exhibits it. Thus there +grows up a split between a person's professed standards and his +actual ones. A person may be aware of the results of this +struggle between his inclinations and his theoretical opinions; +he suffers from the conflict between doing what is really dear to +him and what he has learned will win the approval of others. But +of the split itself he is unaware; the result is a kind of +unconscious hypocrisy, an instability of disposition. In similar +fashion, a pupil who has worked through some confused +intellectual situation and fought his way to clearing up +obscurities in a definite outcome, appreciates the value of +clarity and definition. He has a standard which can be depended +upon. He may be trained externally to go through certain motions +of analysis and division of subject matter and may acquire +information about the value of these processes as standard +logical functions, but unless it somehow comes home to him at +some point as an appreciation of his own, the significance of the +logical norms -- so-called -- remains as much an external piece +of information as, say, the names of rivers in China. He may be +able to recite, but the recital is a mechanical rehearsal. + +It is, then, a serious mistake to regard appreciation as if it +were confined to such things as literature and pictures and +music. Its scope is as comprehensive as the work of education +itself. The formation of habits is a purely mechanical thing +unless habits are also tastes -- habitual modes of preference and +esteem, an effective sense of excellence. There are adequate +grounds for asserting that the premium so often put in schools +upon external "discipline," and upon marks and rewards, upon +promotion and keeping back, are the obverse of the lack of +attention given to life situations in which the meaning of facts, +ideas, principles, and problems is vitally brought home. + +2. Appreciative realizations are to be distinguished from +symbolic or representative experiences. They are not to be +distinguished from the work of the intellect or understanding. +Only a personal response involving imagination can possibly +procure realization even of pure "facts." The imagination is the +medium of appreciation in every field. The engagement of the +imagination is the only thing that makes any activity more than +mechanical. Unfortunately, it is too customary to identify the +imaginative with the imaginary, rather than with a warm and +intimate taking in of the full scope of a situation. This leads +to an exaggerated estimate of fairy tales, myths, fanciful +symbols, verse, and something labeled "Fine Art," as agencies for +developing imagination and appreciation; and, by neglecting +imaginative vision in other matters, leads to methods which +reduce much instruction to an unimaginative acquiring of +specialized skill and amassing of a load of information. Theory, +and -- to some extent -- practice, have advanced far enough to +recognize that play-activity is an imaginative enterprise. But +it is still usual to regard this activity as a specially marked- +off stage of childish growth, and to overlook the fact that the +difference between play and what is regarded as serious +employment should be not a difference between the presence and +absence of imagination, but a difference in the materials with +which imagination is occupied. The result is an unwholesome +exaggeration of the phantastic and "unreal" phases of childish +play and a deadly reduction of serious occupation to a routine +efficiency prized simply for its external tangible results. +Achievement comes to denote the sort of thing that a well-planned +machine can do better than a human being can, and the main effect +of education, the achieving of a life of rich significance, drops +by the wayside. Meantime mind-wandering and wayward fancy are +nothing but the unsuppressible imagination cut loose from concern +with what is done. + +An adequate recognition of the play of imagination as the medium +of realization of every kind of thing which lies beyond the scope +of direct physical response is the sole way of escape from +mechanical methods in teaching. The emphasis put in this book, +in accord with many tendencies in contemporary education, upon +activity, will be misleading if it is not recognized that the +imagination is as much a normal and integral part of human +activity as is muscular movement. The educative value of manual +activities and of laboratory exercises, as well as of play, +depends upon the extent in which they aid in bringing about a +sensing of the meaning of what is going on. In effect, if not in +name, they are dramatizations. Their utilitarian value in +forming habits of skill to be used for tangible results is +important, but not when isolated from the appreciative side. +Were it not for the accompanying play of imagination, there would +be no road from a direct activity to representative knowledge; +for it is by imagination that symbols are translated over into a +direct meaning and integrated with a narrower activity so as to +expand and enrich it. When the representative creative +imagination is made merely literary and mythological, symbols are +rendered mere means of directing physical reactions of the organs +of speech. + +3. In the account previously given nothing was explicitly said +about the place of literature and the fine arts in the course of +study. The omission at that point was intentional. At the +outset, there is no sharp demarcation of useful, or industrial, +arts and fine arts. The activities mentioned in Chapter XV +contain within themselves the factors later discriminated into +fine and useful arts. As engaging the emotions and the +imagination, they have the qualities which give the fine arts +their quality. As demanding method or skill, the adaptation of +tools to materials with constantly increasing perfection, they +involve the element of technique indispensable to artistic +production. From the standpoint of product, or the work of art, +they are naturally defective, though even in this respect when +they comprise genuine appreciation they often have a rudimentary +charm. As experiences they have both an artistic and an esthetic +quality. When they emerge into activities which are tested by +their product and when the socially serviceable value of the +product is emphasized, they pass into useful or industrial arts. +When they develop in the direction of an enhanced appreciation of +the immediate qualities which appeal to taste, they grow into +fine arts. + +In one of its meanings, appreciation is opposed to depreciation. +It denotes an enlarged, an intensified prizing, not merely a +prizing, much less -- like depreciation -- a lowered and degraded +prizing. This enhancement of the qualities which make any +ordinary experience appealing, appropriable -- capable of full +assimilation -- and enjoyable, constitutes the prime function of +literature, music, drawing, painting, etc., in education. They +are not the exclusive agencies of appreciation in the most +general sense of that word; but they are the chief agencies of an +intensified, enhanced appreciation. As such, they are not only +intrinsically and directly enjoyable, but they serve a purpose +beyond themselves. They have the office, in increased degree, of +all appreciation in fixing taste, in forming standards for the +worth of later experiences. They arouse discontent with +conditions which fall below their measure; they create a demand +for surroundings coming up to their own level. They reveal a +depth and range of meaning in experiences which otherwise might +be mediocre and trivial. They supply, that is, organs of vision. +Moreover, in their fullness they represent the concentration and +consummation of elements of good which are otherwise scattered +and incomplete. They select and focus the elements of enjoyable +worth which make any experience directly enjoyable. They are not +luxuries of education, but emphatic expressions of that which +makes any education worth while. + +2. The Valuation of Studies. The theory of educational values +involves not only an account of the nature of appreciation as +fixing the measure of subsequent valuations, but an account of +the specific directions in which these valuations occur. To +value means primarily to prize, to esteem; but secondarily it +means to apprise, to estimate. It means, that is, the act of +cherishing something, holding it dear, and also the act of +passing judgment upon the nature and amount of its value as +compared with something else. To value in the latter sense is to +valuate or evaluate. The distinction coincides with that +sometimes made between intrinsic and instrumental values. +Intrinsic values are not objects of judgment, they cannot (as +intrinsic) be compared, or regarded as greater and less, better +or worse. They are invaluable; and if a thing is invaluable, it +is neither more nor less so than any other invaluable. But +occasions present themselves when it is necessary to choose, when +we must let one thing go in order to take another. This +establishes an order of preference, a greater and less, better +and worse. Things judged or passed upon have to be estimated in +relation to some third thing, some further end. With respect to +that, they are means, or instrumental values. + +We may imagine a man who at one time thoroughly enjoys converse +with his friends, at another the hearing of a symphony; at +another the eating of his meals; at another the reading of a +book; at another the earning of money, and so on. As an +appreciative realization, each of these is an intrinsic value. +It occupies a particular place in life; it serves its own end, +which cannot be supplied by a substitute. There is no question +of comparative value, and hence none of valuation. Each is the +specific good which it is, and that is all that can be said. In +its own place, none is a means to anything beyond itself. But +there may arise a situation in which they compete or conflict, in +which a choice has to be made. Now comparison comes in. Since a +choice has to be made, we want to know the respective claims of +each competitor. What is to be said for it? What does it offer +in comparison with, as balanced over against, some other +possibility? Raising these questions means that a particular good +is no longer an end in itself, an intrinsic good. For if it +were, its claims would be incomparable, imperative. The question +is now as to its status as a means of realizing something else, +which is then the invaluable of that situation. If a man has +just eaten, or if he is well fed generally and the opportunity to +hear music is a rarity, he will probably prefer the music to +eating. In the given situation that will render the greater +contribution. If he is starving, or if he is satiated with music +for the time being, he will naturally judge food to have the +greater worth. In the abstract or at large, apart from the needs +of a particular situation in which choice has to be made, there +is no such thing as degrees or order of value. Certain +conclusions follow with respect to educational values. We cannot +establish a hierarchy of values among studies. It is futile to +attempt to arrange them in an order, beginning with one having +least worth and going on to that of maximum value. In so far as +any study has a unique or irreplaceable function in experience, +in so far as it marks a characteristic enrichment of life, its +worth is intrinsic or incomparable. Since education is not a +means to living, but is identical with the operation of living a +life which is fruitful and inherently significant, the only +ultimate value which can be set up is just the process of living +itself. And this is not an end to which studies and activities +are subordinate means; it is the whole of which they are +ingredients. And what has been said about appreciation means +that every study in one of its aspects ought to have just such +ultimate significance. It is true of arithmetic as it is of +poetry that in some place and at some time it ought to be a good +to be appreciated on its own account -- just as an enjoyable +experience, in short. If it is not, then when the time and place +come for it to be used as a means or +instrumentality, it will be in just that much handicapped. Never +having been realized or appreciated for itself, one will miss +something of its capacity as a resource for other ends. + +It equally follows that when we compare studies as to their +values, that is, treat them as means to something beyond +themselves, that which controls their proper valuation is found +in the specific situation in which they are to be used. The way +to enable a student to apprehend the instrumental value of +arithmetic is not to lecture him upon the benefit it will be to +him in some remote and uncertain future, but to let him discover +that success in something he is interested in doing depends upon +ability to use number. + +It also follows that the attempt to distribute distinct sorts of +value among different studies is a misguided one, in spite of the +amount of time recently devoted to the undertaking. Science for +example may have any kind of value, depending upon the situation +into which it enters as a means. To some the value of science +may be military; it may be an instrument in strengthening means +of offense or defense; it may be technological, a tool for +engineering; or it may be commercial -- an aid in the successful +conduct of business; under other conditions, its worth may be +philanthropic -- the service it renders in relieving human +suffering; or again it may be quite conventional -- of value in +establishing one's social status as an "educated" person. As +matter of fact, science serves all these purposes, and it would +be an arbitrary task to try to fix upon one of them as its "real" +end. All that we can be sure of educationally is that science +should be taught so as to be an end in itself in the lives of +students--something worth while on account of its own unique +intrinsic contribution to the experience of life. Primarily it +must have "appreciation value." If we take something which +seems to be at the opposite pole, like poetry, the same sort of +statement applies. It may be that, at the present time, its +chief value is the contribution it makes to the enjoyment of +leisure. But that may represent a degenerate condition rather +than anything necessary. Poetry has historically been allied +with religion and morals; it has served the purpose of +penetrating the mysterious depths of things. It has had an +enormous patriotic value. Homer to the Greeks was a Bible, a +textbook of morals, a history, and a national inspiration. In +any case, it may be said that an education which does not succeed +in making poetry a resource in the business of life as well as in +its leisure, has something the matter with it -- or else the +poetry is artificial poetry. + +The same considerations apply to the value of a study or a topic +of a study with reference to its motivating force. Those +responsible for planning and teaching the course of study should +have grounds for thinking that the studies and topics included +furnish both direct increments to the enriching of lives of the +pupils and also materials which they can put to use in other +concerns of direct interest. Since the curriculum is always +getting loaded down with purely inherited traditional matter and +with subjects which represent mainly the energy of some +influential person or group of persons in behalf of something +dear to them, it requires constant inspection, criticism, and +revision to make sure it is accomplishing its purpose. Then +there is always the probability that it represents the values of +adults rather than those of children and youth, or those of +pupils a generation ago rather than those of the present day. +Hence a further need for a critical outlook and survey. But +these considerations do not mean that for a subject to have +motivating value to a pupil (whether intrinsic or instrumental) +is the same thing as for him to be aware of the value, or to be +able to tell what the study is good for. + +In the first place, as long as any topic makes an immediate +appeal, it is not necessary to ask what it is good for. This is +a question which can be asked only about instrumental values. +Some goods are not good for anything; they are just goods. Any +other notion leads to an absurdity. For we cannot stop asking +the question about an instrumental good, one whose value lies in +its being good for something, unless there is at some point +something intrinsically good, good for itself. To a hungry, +healthy child, food is a good of the situation; we do not have to +bring him to consciousness of the ends subserved by food in order +to supply a motive to eat. The food in connection with his +appetite is a motive. The same thing holds of mentally eager +pupils with respect to many topics. Neither they nor the teacher +could possibly foretell with any exactness the purposes learning +is to accomplish in the future; nor as long as the eagerness +continues is it advisable to try to specify particular goods +which are to come of it. The proof of a good is found in the +fact that the pupil responds; his response is use. His response +to the material shows that the subject functions in his life. It +is unsound to urge that, say, Latin has a value per se in the +abstract, just as a study, as a sufficient justification for +teaching it. But it is equally absurd to argue that unless +teacher or pupil can point out some definite assignable future +use to which it is to be put, it lacks justifying value. When +pupils are genuinely concerned in learning Latin, that is of +itself proof that it possesses value. The most which one is +entitled to ask in such cases is whether in view of the shortness +of time, there are not other things of intrinsic value which in +addition have greater instrumental value. + +This brings us to the matter of instrumental values -- topics +studied because of some end beyond themselves. If a child is ill +and his appetite does not lead him to eat when food is presented, +or if his appetite is perverted so that he prefers candy to meat +and vegetables, conscious reference to results is indicated. He +needs to be made conscious of consequences as a justification of +the positive or negative value of certain objects. Or the state +of things may be normal enough, and yet an individual not be +moved by some matter because he does not grasp how his attainment +of some intrinsic good depends upon active concern with what is +presented. In such cases, it is obviously the part of wisdom to +establish consciousness of connection. In general what is +desirable is that a topic be presented in such a way that it +either have an immediate value, and require no justification, or +else be perceived to be a means of achieving something of +intrinsic value. An instrumental value then has the intrinsic +value of being a means to an end. It may be questioned whether +some of the present pedagogical interest in the matter of values +of studies is not either excessive or else too narrow. Sometimes +it appears to be a labored effort to furnish an apologetic for +topics which no longer operate to any purpose, direct or +indirect, in the lives of pupils. At other times, the reaction +against useless lumber seems to have gone to the extent of +supposing that no subject or topic should be taught unless some +quite definite future utility can be pointed out by those making +the course of study or by the pupil himself, unmindful of the +fact that life is its own excuse for being; and that definite +utilities which can be pointed out are themselves justified only +because they increase the experienced content of life itself. 3. +The Segregation and Organization of Values. It is of course +possible to classify in a general way the various valuable phases +of life. In order to get a survey of aims sufficiently wide (See +ante, p. 110) to give breadth and flexibility to the enterprise +of education, there is some advantage in such a classification. +But it is a great mistake to regard these values as ultimate ends +to which the concrete satisfactions of experience are +subordinate. They are nothing but generalizations, more or less +adequate, of concrete goods. Health, wealth, efficiency, +sociability, utility, culture, happiness itself are only abstract +terms which sum up a multitude of particulars. To regard such +things as standards for the valuation of concrete topics and +process of education is to subordinate to an abstraction the +concrete facts from which the abstraction is derived. They are +not in any true sense standards of valuation; these are found, as +we have previously seen, in the specific realizations which form +tastes and habits of preference. They are, however, of +significance as points of view elevated above the details of life +whence to survey the field and see how its constituent details +are distributed, and whether they are well proportioned. +No classification can have other than a provisional validity. +The following may prove of some help. We may say that the kind +of experience to which the work of the schools should contribute +is one marked by executive competency in the management of +resources and obstacles encountered (efficiency); by sociability, +or interest in the direct companionship of others; by aesthetic +taste or capacity to appreciate artistic excellence in at least +some of its classic forms; by trained intellectual method, or +interest in some mode of scientific achievement; and by +sensitiveness to the rights and claims of others -- +conscientiousness. And while these considerations are not +standards of value, they are useful criteria for survey, +criticism, and better organization of existing methods and +subject matter of instruction. + +The need of such general points of view is the greater because of +a tendency to segregate educational values due to the isolation +from one another of the various pursuits of life. The idea is +prevalent that different studies represent separate kinds of +values, and that the curriculum should, therefore, be constituted +by gathering together various studies till a sufficient variety +of independent values have been cared for. The following +quotation does not use the word value, but it contains the notion +of a curriculum constructed on the idea that there are a number +of separate ends to be reached, and that various studies may be +evaluated by referring each study to its respective end. "Memory +is trained by most studies, but best by languages and history; +taste is trained by the more advanced study of languages, and +still better by English literature; imagination by all higher +language teaching, but chiefly by Greek and Latin poetry; +observation by science work in the laboratory, though some +training is to be got from the earlier stages of Latin and Greek; +for expression, Greek and Latin composition comes first and +English composition next; for abstract reasoning, mathematics +stands almost alone; for concrete reasoning, science comes first, +then geometry; for social reasoning, the Greek and Roman +historians and orators come first, and general history next. +Hence the narrowest education which can claim to be at all +complete includes Latin, one modern language, some history, some +English literature, and one science." There is much in the +wording of this passage which is irrelevant to our point and +which must be discounted to make it clear. The phraseology +betrays the particular provincial tradition within which the +author is writing. There is the unquestioned assumption of +"faculties" to be trained, and a dominant interest in the ancient +languages; there is comparative disregard of the earth on which +men happen to live and the bodies they happen to carry around +with them. But with allowances made for these matters (even with +their complete abandonment) we find much in contemporary +educational philosophy which parallels the fundamental notion of +parceling out special values to segregated studies. Even when +some one end is set up as a standard of value, like social +efficiency or culture, it will often be found to be but a verbal +heading under which a variety of disconnected factors are +comprised. And although the general tendency is to allow a +greater variety of values to a given study than does the passage +quoted, yet the attempt to inventory a number of values +attaching to each study and to state the amount of each value +which the given study possesses emphasizes an implied +educational disintegration. + +As matter of fact, such schemes of values of studies are largely +but unconscious justifications of the curriculum with which one +is familiar. One accepts, for the most part, the studies of the +existing course and then assigns values to them as a sufficient +reason for their being taught. Mathematics is said to have, for +example, disciplinary value in habituating the pupil to accuracy +of statement and closeness of reasoning; it has utilitarian value +in giving command of the arts of calculation involved in trade +and the arts; culture value in its enlargement of the imagination +in dealing with the most general relations of things; even +religious value in its concept of the infinite and allied ideas. +But clearly mathematics does not accomplish such results, because +it is endowed with miraculous potencies called values; it has +these values if and when it accomplishes these results, and not +otherwise. The statements may help a teacher to a larger vision +of the possible results to be effected by instruction in +mathematical topics. But unfortunately, the tendency is to treat +the statement as indicating powers inherently residing in the +subject, whether they operate or not, and thus to give it a rigid +justification. If they do not operate, the blame is put not on +the subject as taught, but on the indifference and recalcitrancy +of pupils. + +This attitude toward subjects is the obverse side of the +conception of experience or life as a patchwork of independent +interests which exist side by side and limit one another. +Students of politics are familiar with a check and balance theory +of the powers of government. There are supposed to be +independent separate functions, like the legislative, executive, +judicial, administrative, and all goes well if each of these +checks all the others and thus creates an ideal balance. There +is a philosophy which might well be called the check and balance +theory of experience. Life presents a diversity of interests. +Left to themselves, they tend to encroach on one another. The +ideal is to prescribe a special territory for each till the whole +ground of experience is covered, and then see to it each remains +within its own boundaries. Politics, business, recreation, art, +science, the learned professions, polite intercourse, leisure, +represent such interests. Each of these ramifies into many +branches: business into manual occupations, executive positions, +bookkeeping, railroading, banking, agriculture, trade and +commerce, etc., and so with each of the others. An ideal +education would then supply the means of meeting these separate +and pigeon-holed interests. And when we look at the schools, it +is easy to get the impression that they accept this view of the +nature of adult life, and set for themselves the task of meeting +its demands. Each interest is acknowledged as a kind of fixed +institution to which something in the course of study must +correspond. The course of study must then have some civics and +history politically and patriotically viewed: some utilitarian +studies; some science; some art (mainly literature of course); +some provision for recreation; some moral education; and so on. +And it will be found that a large part of current agitation about +schools is concerned with clamor and controversy about the due +meed of recognition to be given to each of these interests, and +with struggles to secure for each its due share in the course of +study; or, if this does not seem feasible in the existing school +system, then to secure a new and separate kind of schooling to +meet the need. In the multitude of +educations education is forgotten. + +The obvious outcome is congestion of the course of study, +overpressure and distraction of pupils, and a narrow +specialization fatal to the very idea of education. But these +bad results usually lead to more of the same sort of thing as a +remedy. When it is perceived that after all the requirements of +a full life experience are not met, the deficiency is not laid to +the isolation and narrowness of the teaching of the existing +subjects, and this recognition made the basis of reorganization +of the system. No, the lack is something to be made up for by +the introduction of still another study, or, if necessary, +another kind of school. And as a rule those who object to the +resulting overcrowding and consequent superficiality and +distraction usually also have recourse to a merely quantitative +criterion: the remedy is to cut off a great many studies as fads +and frills, and return to the good old curriculum of the three +R's in elementary education and the equally good and equally +old-fashioned curriculum of the classics and mathematics in +higher education. + +The situation has, of course, its historic explanation. Various +epochs of the past have had their own characteristic struggles +and interests. Each of these great epochs has left behind itself +a kind of cultural deposit, like a geologic stratum. These +deposits have found their way into educational institutions in +the form of studies, distinct courses of study, distinct types of +schools. With the rapid change of political, scientific, and +economic interests in the last century, provision had to be made +for new values. Though the older courses resisted, they have had +at least in this country to retire their pretensions to a +monopoly. They have not, however, been reorganized in content +and aim; they have only been reduced in amount. The new studies, +representing the new interests, have not been used to transform +the method and aim of all instruction; they have been injected +and added on. The result is a conglomerate, the cement of which +consists in the mechanics of the school program or time table. +Thence arises the scheme of values and standards of value which +we have mentioned. + +This situation in education represents the divisions and +separations which obtain in social life. The variety of +interests which should mark any rich and balanced experience have +been torn asunder and deposited in separate institutions with +diverse and independent purposes and methods. Business is +business, science is science, art is art, politics is politics, +social intercourse is social intercourse, morals is morals, +recreation is recreation, and so on. Each possesses a separate +and independent province with its own peculiar aims and ways of +proceeding. Each contributes to the others only externally and +accidentally. All of them together make up the whole of life by +just apposition and addition. What does one expect from business +save that it should furnish money, to be used in turn for making +more money and for support of self and family, for buying books +and pictures, tickets to concerts which may afford culture, and +for paying taxes, charitable gifts and other things of social and +ethical value? How unreasonable to expect that the pursuit of +business should be itself a culture of the imagination, in +breadth and refinement; that it should directly, and not through +the money which it supplies, have social service for its +animating principle and be conducted as an enterprise in behalf +of social organization! The same thing is to be said, mutatis +mutandis, of the pursuit of art or science or politics or +religion. Each has become specialized not merely in its +appliances and its demands upon time, but in its aim and +animating spirit. Unconsciously, our course of studies and our +theories of the educational values of studies reflect this +division of interests. The point at issue in a theory of +educational value is then the unity or integrity of experience. +How shall it be full and varied without losing unity of spirit? +How shall it be one and yet not narrow and monotonous in its +unity? Ultimately, the question of values and a standard of +values is the moral question of the organization of the interests +of life. Educationally, the question concerns that organization +of schools, materials, and methods which will operate to achieve +breadth and richness of experience. How shall we secure breadth +of outlook without sacrificing efficiency of execution? How shall +we secure the diversity of interests, without paying the price of +isolation? How shall the individual be rendered executive in his +intelligence instead of at the cost of his intelligence? How +shall art, science, and politics reinforce one another in an +enriched temper of mind instead of constituting ends pursued at +one another's expense? How can the interests of life and the +studies which enforce them enrich the common experience of men +instead of dividing men from one another? With the questions of +reorganization thus suggested, we shall be concerned in the +concluding chapters. + +Summary. Fundamentally, the elements involved in a discussion of +value have been covered in the prior discussion of aims and +interests. But since educational values are generally discussed +in connection with the claims of the various studies of the +curriculum, the consideration of aim and interest is here resumed +from the point of view of special studies. The term "value" has +two quite different meanings. On the one hand, it denotes the +attitude of prizing a thing finding it worth while, for its own +sake, or intrinsically. This is a name for a full or complete +experience. To value in this sense is to appreciate. But to +value also means a distinctively intellectual act--an operation +of comparing and judging--to valuate. This occurs when direct +full experience is lacking, and the question arises which of the +various possibilities of a situation is to be preferred in order +to reach a full realization, or vital experience. + +We must not, however, divide the studies of the curriculum into +the appreciative, those concerned with intrinsic value, and the +instrumental, concerned with those which are of value or ends +beyond themselves. The formation of proper standards in any +subject depends upon a realization of the contribution which it +makes to the immediate significance of experience, upon a direct +appreciation. Literature and the fine arts are of peculiar value +because they represent appreciation at its best--a heightened +realization of meaning through selection and concentration. But +every subject at some phase of its development should possess, +what is for the individual concerned with it, an aesthetic +quality. + +Contribution to immediate intrinsic values in all their variety +in experience is the only criterion for determining the worth of +instrumental and derived values in studies. The tendency to +assign separate values to each study and to regard the curriculum +in its entirety as a kind of composite made by the aggregation of +segregated values is a result of the isolation of social groups +and classes. Hence it is the business of education in a +democratic social group to struggle against this isolation in +order that the various interests may reinforce and play into one +another. + +Chapter Nineteen: Labor and Leisure + +1. The Origin of the Opposition. + +The isolation of aims and values which we have been considering +leads to opposition between them. Probably the most deep-seated +antithesis which has shown itself in educational history is that +between education in preparation for useful labor and education +for a life of leisure. The bare terms "useful labor" and +"leisure" confirm the statement already made that the segregation +and conflict of values are not self-inclosed, but reflect a +division within social life. Were the two functions of gaining a +livelihood by work and enjoying in a cultivated way the +opportunities of leisure, distributed equally among the different +members of a community, it would not occur to any one that there +was any conflict of educational agencies and aims involved. It +would be self-evident that the question was how education could +contribute most effectively to both. And while it might be found +that some materials of instruction chiefly accomplished one +result and other subject matter the other, it would be evident +that care must be taken to secure as much overlapping as +conditions permit; that is, the education which had leisure more +directly in view should indirectly reinforce as much as possible +the efficiency and the enjoyment of work, while that aiming at +the latter should produce habits of emotion and intellect which +would procure a worthy cultivation of leisure. These general +considerations are amply borne out by the historical development +of educational philosophy. The separation of liberal education +from professional and industrial education goes back to the time +of the Greeks, and was formulated expressly on the basis of a +division of classes into those who had to labor for a living and +those who were relieved from this necessity. The conception that +liberal education, adapted to men in the latter class, is +intrinsically higher than the servile training given to the +latter class reflected the fact that one class was free and the +other servile in its social status. The latter class labored not +only for its own subsistence, but also for the means which +enabled the superior class to live without personally engaging in +occupations taking almost all the time and not of a nature to +engage or reward intelligence. + +That a certain amount of labor must be engaged in goes without +saying. Human beings have to live and it requires work to supply +the resources of life. Even if we insist that the interests +connected with getting a living are only material and hence +intrinsically lower than those connected with enjoyment of time +released from labor, and even if it were admitted that there is +something engrossing and insubordinate in material interests +which leads them to strive to usurp the place belonging to the +higher ideal interests, this would not--barring the fact of +socially divided classes -- lead to neglect of the kind of +education which trains men for the useful pursuits. It would +rather lead to scrupulous care for them, so that men were trained +to be efficient in them and yet to keep them in their place; +education would see to it that we avoided the evil results which +flow from their being allowed to flourish in obscure purlieus of +neglect. Only when a division of these interests coincides with +a division of an inferior and a superior social class will +preparation for useful work be looked down upon with contempt as +an unworthy thing: a fact which prepares one for the conclusion +that the rigid identification of work with material interests, +and leisure with ideal interests is itself a social product. +The educational formulations of the social situation made over +two thousand years ago have been so influential and give such a +clear and logical recognition of the implications of the division +into laboring and leisure classes, that they deserve especial +note. According to them, man occupies the highest place in the +scheme of animate existence. In part, he shares the constitution +and functions of plants and animals -- nutritive, reproductive, +motor or practical. The distinctively human function is reason +existing for the sake of beholding the spectacle of the universe. +Hence the truly human end is the fullest possible of this +distinctive human prerogative. The life of observation, +meditation, cogitation, and speculation pursued as an end in +itself is the proper life of man. From reason moreover proceeds +the proper control of the lower elements of human nature -- the +appetites and the active, motor, impulses. In themselves greedy, +insubordinate, lovers of excess, aiming only at their own +satiety, they observe moderation -- the law of the mean--and +serve desirable ends as they are subjected to the rule of reason. + +Such is the situation as an affair of theoretical psychology and +as most adequately stated by Aristotle. But this state of things +is reflected in the constitution of classes of men and hence in +the organization of society. Only in a comparatively small +number is the function of reason capable of operating as a law of +life. In the mass of people, vegetative and animal functions +dominate. Their energy of intelligence is so feeble and +inconstant that it is constantly overpowered by bodily appetite +and passion. Such persons are not truly ends in themselves, for +only reason constitutes a final end. Like plants, animals and +physical tools, they are means, appliances, for the attaining of +ends beyond themselves, although unlike them they have enough +intelligence to exercise a certain discretion in the execution of +the tasks committed to them. Thus by nature, and not merely by +social convention, there are those who are slaves--that is, means +for the ends of others. 1 The great body of artisans are in one +important respect worse off than even slaves. Like the latter +they are given up to the service of ends external to themselves; +but since they do not enjoy the intimate association with the +free superior class experienced by domestic slaves they remain on +a lower plane of excellence. Moreover, women are classed with +slaves and craftsmen as factors among the animate +instrumentalities of production and reproduction of the means for +a free or rational life. + +Individually and collectively there is a gulf between merely +living and living worthily. In order that one may live worthily +he must first live, and so with collective society. The time and +energy spent upon mere life, upon the gaining of subsistence, +detracts from that available for activities that have an inherent +rational meaning; they also unfit for the latter. Means are +menial, the serviceable is servile. The true life is possible +only in the degree in which the physical necessities are had +without effort and without attention. Hence slaves, artisans, +and women are employed in furnishing the means of subsistence in +order that others, those adequately equipped with intelligence, +may live the life of leisurely concern with things intrinsically +worth while. + +To these two modes of occupation, with their distinction of +servile and free activities (or "arts") correspond two types of +education: the base or mechanical and the liberal or +intellectual. Some persons are trained by suitable practical +exercises for capacity in doing things, for ability to use the +mechanical tools involved in turning out physical commodities and +rendering personal service. This training is a mere matter of +habituation and technical skill; it operates through repetition +and assiduity in application, not through awakening and nurturing +thought. Liberal education aims to train intelligence for its +proper office: to know. The less this knowledge has to do with +practical affairs, with making or producing, the more adequately +it engages intelligence. So consistently does Aristotle draw the +line between menial and liberal education that he puts what are +now called the "fine" arts, music, painting, sculpture, in the +same class with menial arts so far as their practice is +concerned. They involve physical agencies, assiduity of +practice, and external results. In discussing, for example, +education in music he raises the question how far the young +should be practiced in the playing of instruments. His answer is +that such practice and proficiency may be tolerated as conduce to +appreciation; that is, to understanding and enjoyment of music +when played by slaves or professionals. When professional power +is aimed at, music sinks from the liberal to the professional +level. One might then as well teach cooking, says Aristotle. +Even a liberal concern with the works of fine art depends upon +the existence of a hireling class of practitioners who have +subordinated the development of their own personality to +attaining skill in mechanical execution. The higher the activity +the more purely mental is it; the less does it have to do with +physical things or with the body. The more purely mental it is, +the more independent or self-sufficing is it. + +These last words remind us that Aristotle again makes a +distinction of superior and inferior even within those living the +life of reason. For there is a distinction in ends and in free +action, according as one's life is merely accompanied by reason +or as it makes reason its own medium. That is to say, the free +citizen who devotes himself to the public life of his community, +sharing in the management of its affairs and winning personal +honor and distinction, lives a life accompanied by reason. But +the thinker, the man who devotes himself to scientific inquiry +and philosophic speculation, works, so to speak, in reason, not +simply by *. Even the activity of the citizen in his civic +relations, in other words, retains some of the taint of practice, +of external or merely instrumental doing. This infection is +shown by the fact that civic activity and civic excellence need +the help of others; one cannot engage in public life all by +himself. But all needs, all desires imply, in the philosophy of +Aristotle, a material factor; they involve lack, privation; they +are dependent upon something beyond themselves for completion. A +purely intellectual life, however, one carries on by himself, in +himself; such assistance as he may derive from others is +accidental, rather than intrinsic. In knowing, in the life of +theory, reason finds its own full manifestation; knowing for the +sake of knowing irrespective of any application is alone +independent, or self-sufficing. Hence only the education that +makes for power to know as an end in itself, without reference +to the practice of even civic duties, is truly liberal or free. +2. The Present Situation. If the Aristotelian conception +represented just Aristotle's personal view, it would be a more or +less interesting historical curiosity. It could be dismissed as +an illustration of the lack of sympathy or the amount of academic +pedantry which may coexist with extraordinary intellectual gifts. +But Aristotle simply described without confusion and without that +insincerity always attendant upon mental confusion, the life that +was before him. That the actual social situation has greatly +changed since his day there is no need to say. But in spite of +these changes, in spite of the abolition of legal serfdom, and +the spread of democracy, with the extension of science and of +general education (in books, newspapers, travel, and general +intercourse as well as in schools), there remains enough of a +cleavage of society into a learned and an unlearned class, a +leisure and a laboring class, to make his point of view a most +enlightening one from which to criticize the separation between +culture and utility in present education. Behind the +intellectual and abstract distinction as it figures in +pedagogical discussion, there looms a social distinction between +those whose pursuits involve a minimum of self-directive thought +and aesthetic appreciation, and those who are concerned more +directly with things of the intelligence and with the control of +the activities of others. + +Aristotle was certainly permanently right when he said that "any +occupation or art or study deserves to be called mechanical if it +renders the body or soul or intellect of free persons unfit for +the exercise and practice of excellence." The force of the +statement is almost infinitely increased when we hold, as we +nominally do at present, that all persons, instead of a +comparatively few, are free. For when the mass of men and all +women were regarded as unfree by the very nature of their bodies +and minds, there was neither intellectual confusion nor moral +hypocrisy in giving them only the training which fitted them for +mechanical skill, irrespective of its ulterior effect upon their +capacity to share in a worthy life. He was permanently right +also when he went on to say that "all mercenary employments as +well as those which degrade the condition of the body are +mechanical, since they deprive the intellect of leisure and +dignity," -- permanently right, that is, if gainful pursuits as +matter of fact deprive the intellect of the conditions of its +exercise and so of its dignity. If his statements are false, it +is because they identify a phase of social custom with a natural +necessity. But a different view of the relations of mind and +matter, mind and body, intelligence and social service, is better +than Aristotle's conception only if it helps render the old idea +obsolete in fact -- in the actual conduct of life and education. +Aristotle was permanently right in assuming the inferiority and +subordination of mere skill in performance and mere accumulation +of external products to understanding, sympathy of appreciation, +and the free play of ideas. If there was an error, it lay in +assuming the necessary separation of the two: in supposing that +there is a natural divorce between efficiency in producing +commodities and rendering service, and self-directive thought; +between significant knowledge and practical achievement. We +hardly better matters if we just correct his theoretical +misapprehension, and tolerate the social state of affairs which +generated and sanctioned his conception. We lose rather than +gain in change from serfdom to free citizenship if the most +prized result of the change is simply an increase in the +mechanical efficiency of the human tools of production. So we +lose rather than gain in coming to think of intelligence as an +organ of control of nature through action, if we are content that +an unintelligent, unfree state persists in those who engage +directly in turning nature to use, and leave the intelligence +which controls to be the exclusive possession of remote +scientists and captains of industry. We are in a position +honestly to criticize the division of life into separate +functions and of society into separate classes only so far as we +are free from responsibility for perpetuating the educational +practices which train the many for pursuits involving mere skill +in production, and the few for a knowledge that is an ornament +and a cultural embellishment. In short, ability to transcend the +Greek philosophy of life and education is not secured by a mere +shifting about of the theoretical symbols meaning free, rational, +and worthy. It is not secured by a change of sentiment regarding +the dignity of labor, and the superiority of a life of service to +that of an aloof self-sufficing independence. Important as these +theoretical and emotional changes are, their importance consists +in their being turned to account in the development of a truly +democratic society, a society in which all share in useful +service and all enjoy a worthy leisure. It is not a mere change +in the concepts of culture -- or a liberal mind -- and social +service which requires an educational reorganization; but the +educational transformation is needed to give full and explicit +effect to the changes implied in social life. The increased +political and economic emancipation of the "masses" has shown +itself in education; it has effected the development of a common +school system of education, public and free. It has destroyed +the idea that learning is properly a monopoly of the few who are +predestined by nature to govern social affairs. But the +revolution is still incomplete. The idea still prevails that a +truly cultural or liberal education cannot have anything in +common, directly at least, with industrial affairs, and that the +education which is fit for the masses must be a useful or +practical education in a sense which opposes useful and practical +to nurture of appreciation and liberation of thought. As a +consequence, our actual system is an inconsistent mixture. +Certain studies and methods are retained on the supposition that +they have the sanction of peculiar liberality, the chief content +of the term liberal being uselessness for practical ends. This +aspect is chiefly visible in what is termed the higher education +-- that of the college and of preparation for it. But is has +filtered through into elementary education and largely controls +its processes and aims. But, on the other hand, certain +concessions have been made to the masses who must engage in +getting a livelihood and to the increased role of economic +activities in modern life. These concessions are exhibited in +special schools and courses for the professions, for engineering, +for manual training and commerce, in vocational and prevocational +courses; and in the spirit in which certain elementary subjects, +like the three R's, are taught. The result is a system in which +both "cultural" and "utilitarian" subjects exist in an inorganic +composite where the former are not by dominant purpose socially +serviceable and the latter not liberative of imagination or +thinking power. + +In the inherited situation, there is a curious intermingling, in +even the same study, of concession to usefulness and a survival +of traits once exclusively attributed to preparation for leisure. +The "utility" element is found in the motives assigned for the +study, the "liberal" element in methods of teaching. The outcome +of the mixture is perhaps less satisfactory than if either +principle were adhered to in its purity. The motive popularly +assigned for making the studies of the first four or five years +consist almost entirely of reading, spelling, writing, and +arithmetic, is, for example, that ability to read, write, and +figure accurately is indispensable to getting ahead. These +studies are treated as mere instruments for entering upon a +gainful employment or of later progress in the pursuit of +learning, according as pupils do not or do remain in school. +This attitude is reflected in the emphasis put upon drill and +practice for the sake of gaining automatic skill. If we turn to +Greek schooling, we find that from the earliest years the +acquisition of skill was subordinated as much as possible to +acquisition of literary content possessed of aesthetic and moral +significance. Not getting a tool for subsequent use but present +subject matter was the emphasized thing. Nevertheless the +isolation of these studies from practical application, their +reduction to purely symbolic devices, represents a survival of +the idea of a liberal training divorced from utility. A thorough +adoption of the idea of utility would have led to instruction +which tied up the studies to situations in which they were +directly needed and where they were rendered immediately and not +remotely helpful. It would be hard to find a subject in the +curriculum within which there are not found evil results of a +compromise between the two opposed ideals. Natural science is +recommended on the ground of its practical utility, but is taught +as a special accomplishment in removal from application. On the +other hand, music and literature are theoretically justified on +the ground of their culture value and are then taught with chief +emphasis upon forming technical modes of skill. + +If we had less compromise and resulting confusion, if we analyzed +more carefully the respective meanings of culture and utility, we +might find it easier to construct a course of study which should +be useful and liberal at the same time. Only superstition makes +us believe that the two are necessarily hostile so that a subject +is illiberal because it is useful and cultural because it is +useless. It will generally be found that instruction which, in +aiming at utilitarian results, sacrifices the development of +imagination, the refining of taste and the deepening of +intellectual insight -- surely cultural values -- also in the +same degree renders what is learned limited in its use. Not that +it makes it wholly unavailable but that its applicability is +restricted to routine activities carried on under the supervision +of others. Narrow modes of skill cannot be made useful beyond +themselves; any mode of skill which is achieved with deepening of +knowledge and perfecting of judgment is readily put to use in new +situations and is under personal control. It was not the bare +fact of social and economic utility which made certain activities +seem servile to the Greeks but the fact that the activities +directly connected with getting a livelihood were not, in their +days, the expression of a trained intelligence nor carried on +because of a personal appreciation of their meaning. So far as +farming and the trades were rule-of-thumb occupations and so far +as they were engaged in for results external to the minds of +agricultural laborers and mechanics, they were illiberal--but +only so far. The intellectual and social context has now +changed. The elements in industry due to mere custom and routine +have become subordinate in most economic callings to elements +derived from scientific inquiry. The most important occupations +of today represent and depend upon applied mathematics, physics, +and chemistry. The area of the human world influenced by +economic production and influencing consumption has been so +indefinitely widened that geographical and political +considerations of an almost infinitely wide scope enter in. It +was natural for Plato to deprecate the learning of geometry and +arithmetic for practical ends, because as matter of fact the +practical uses to which they were put were few, lacking in +content and mostly mercenary in quality. But as their social +uses have increased and enlarged, their liberalizing or +"intellectual" value and their practical value approach the same +limit. + +Doubtless the factor which chiefly prevents our full recognition +and employment of this identification is the conditions under +which so much work is still carried on. The invention of +machines has extended the amount of leisure which is possible +even while one is at work. It is a commonplace that the mastery +of skill in the form of established habits frees the mind for a +higher order of thinking. Something of the same kind is true of +the introduction of mechanically automatic operations in +industry. They may release the mind for thought upon other +topics. But when we confine the education of those who work with +their hands to a few years of schooling devoted for the most part +to acquiring the use of rudimentary symbols at the expense of +training in science, literature, and history, we fail to prepare +the minds of workers to take advantage of this opportunity. More +fundamental is the fact that the great majority of workers have +no insight into the social aims of their pursuits and no direct +personal interest in them. The results actually achieved are not +the ends of their actions, but only of their employers. They do +what they do, not freely and intelligently, but for the sake of +the wage earned. It is this fact which makes the action +illiberal, and which will make any education designed simply to +give skill in such undertakings illiberal and immoral. The +activity is not free because not freely participated in. + +Nevertheless, there is already an opportunity for an education +which, keeping in mind the larger features of work, will +reconcile liberal nurture with training in social +serviceableness, with ability to share efficiently and happily in +occupations which are productive. And such an education will of +itself tend to do away with the evils of the existing economic +situation. In the degree in which men have an active concern in +the ends that control their activity, their activity becomes free +or voluntary and loses its externally enforced and servile +quality, even though the physical aspect of behavior remain the +same. In what is termed politics, democratic social organization +makes provision for this direct participation in control: in the +economic region, control remains external and autocratic. Hence +the split between inner mental action and outer physical action +of which the traditional distinction between the liberal and the +utilitarian is the reflex. An education which should unify the +disposition of the members of society would do much to unify +society itself. + +Summary. Of the segregations of educational values discussed in +the last chapter, that between culture and utility is probably +the most fundamental. While the distinction is often thought to +be intrinsic and absolute, it is really historical and social. +It originated, so far as conscious formulation is concerned, in +Greece, and was based upon the fact that the truly human life was +lived only by a few who subsisted upon the results of the labor +of others. This fact affected the psychological doctrine of the +relation of intelligence and desire, theory and practice. It was +embodied in a political theory of a permanent division of human +beings into those capable of a life of reason and hence having +their own ends, and those capable only of desire and work, and +needing to have their ends provided by others. The two +distinctions, psychological and political, translated into +educational terms, effected a division between a liberal +education, having to do with the self-sufficing life of leisure +devoted to knowing for its own sake, and a useful, practical +training for mechanical occupations, devoid of intellectual and +aesthetic content. While the present situation is radically +diverse in theory and much changed in fact, the factors of the +older historic situation still persist sufficiently to maintain +the educational distinction, along with compromises which often +reduce the efficacy of the educational measures. The problem of +education in a democratic society is to do away with the dualism +and to construct a course of studies which makes thought a guide +of free practice for all and which makes leisure a reward of +accepting responsibility for service, rather than a state of +exemption from it. + +1 Aristotle does not hold that the class of actual slaves and of +natural slaves necessarily coincide. + + +Chapter Twenty: Intellectual and Practical Studies + +1. The Opposition of Experience and True Knowledge. As +livelihood and leisure are opposed, so are theory and practice, +intelligence and execution, knowledge and activity. The latter +set of oppositions doubtless springs from the same social +conditions which produce the former conflict; but certain +definite problems of education connected with them make it +desirable to discuss explicitly the matter of the relationship +and alleged separation of knowing and doing. + +The notion that knowledge is derived from a higher source than is +practical activity, and possesses a higher and more spiritual +worth, has a long history. The history so far as conscious +statement is concerned takes us back to the conceptions of +experience and of reason formulated by Plato and Aristotle. Much +as these thinkers differed in many respects, they agreed in +identifying experience with purely practical concerns; and hence +with material interests as to its purpose and with the body as to +its organ. Knowledge, on the other hand, existed for its own +sake free from practical reference, and found its source and +organ in a purely immaterial mind; it had to do with spiritual or +ideal interests. Again, experience always involved lack, need, +desire; it was never self-sufficing. Rational knowing on the +other hand, was complete and comprehensive within itself. Hence +the practical life was in a condition of perpetual flux, while +intellectual knowledge concerned eternal truth. + +This sharp antithesis is connected with the fact that Athenian +philosophy began as a criticism of custom and tradition as +standards of knowledge and conduct. In a search for something to +replace them, it hit upon reason as the only adequate guide of +belief and activity. Since custom and tradition were identified +with experience, it followed at once that reason was superior to +experience. Moreover, experience, not content with its proper +position of subordination, was the great foe to the +acknowledgment of the authority of reason. Since custom and +traditionary beliefs held men in bondage, the struggle of reason +for its legitimate supremacy could be won only by showing the +inherently unstable and inadequate nature of experience. The +statement of Plato that philosophers should be kings may best be +understood as a statement that rational intelligence and not +habit, appetite, impulse, and emotion should regulate human +affairs. The former secures unity, order, and law; the latter +signify multiplicity and discord, irrational fluctuations from +one estate to another. + +The grounds for the identification of experience with the +unsatisfactory condition of things, the state of affairs +represented by rule of mere custom, are not far to seek. +Increasing trade and travel, colonizations, migrations and wars, +had broadened the intellectual horizon. The customs and beliefs +of different communities were found to diverge sharply from one +another. Civil disturbance had become a custom in Athens; the +fortunes of the city seemed given over to strife of factions. +The increase of leisure coinciding with the broadening of the +horizon had brought into ken many new facts of nature and had +stimulated curiosity and speculation. The situation tended to +raise the question as to the existence of anything constant and +universal in the realm of nature and society. Reason was the +faculty by which the universal principle and essence is +apprehended; while the senses were the organs of perceiving +change, -- the unstable and the diverse as against the permanent +and uniform. The results of the work of the senses, preserved in +memory and imagination, and applied in the skill given by habit, +constituted experience. + +Experience at its best is thus represented in the various +handicrafts -- the arts of peace and war. The cobbler, the flute +player, the soldier, have undergone the discipline of experience +to acquire the skill they have. This means that the bodily +organs, particularly the senses, have had repeated contact with +things and that the result of these contacts has been preserved +and consolidated till ability in foresight and in practice had +been secured. Such was the essential meaning of the term +"empirical." It suggested a knowledge and an ability not based +upon insight into principles, but expressing the result of a +large number of separate trials. It expressed the idea now +conveyed by "method of trial and error," with especial emphasis +upon the more or less accidental character of the trials. So far +as ability of control, of management, was concerned, it amounted +to rule-of-thumb procedure, to routine. If new circumstances +resembled the past, it might work well enough; in the degree in +which they deviated, failure was likely. Even to-day to speak of +a physician as an empiricist is to imply that he lacks scientific +training, and that he is proceeding simply on the basis of what +he happens to have got out of the chance medley of his past +practice. Just because of the lack of science or reason in +"experience" it is hard to keep it at its poor best. The empiric +easily degenerates into the quack. He does not know where his +knowledge begins or leaves off, and so when he gets beyond +routine conditions he begins to pretend -- to make claims for +which there is no justification, and to trust to luck and to +ability to impose upon others -- to "bluff." Moreover, he assumes +that because he has learned one thing, he knows others -- as the +history of Athens showed that the common craftsmen thought they +could manage household affairs, education, and politics, because +they had learned to do the specific things of their trades. +Experience is always hovering, then, on the edge of pretense, of +sham, of seeming, and appearance, in distinction from the reality +upon which reason lays hold. + +The philosophers soon reached certain generalizations from this +state of affairs. The senses are connected with the appetites, +with wants and desires. They lay hold not on the reality of +things but on the relation which things have to our pleasures and +pains, to the satisfaction of wants and the welfare of the body. +They are important only for the life of the body, which is but a +fixed substratum for a higher life. Experience thus has a +definitely material character; it has to do with physical things +in relation to the body. In contrast, reason, or science, lays +hold of the immaterial, the ideal, the spiritual. There is +something morally dangerous about experience, as such words as +sensual, carnal, material, worldly, interests suggest; while pure +reason and spirit connote something morally praiseworthy. +Moreover, ineradicable connection with the changing, the +inexplicably shifting, and with the manifold, the diverse, clings +to experience. Its material is inherently variable and +untrustworthy. It is anarchic, because unstable. The man who +trusts to experience does not know what he depends upon, since it +changes from person to person, from day to day, to say nothing of +from country to country. Its connection with the "many," with +various particulars, has the same effect, and also carries +conflict in its train. + +Only the single, the uniform, assures coherence and harmony. Out +of experience come warrings, the conflict of opinions and acts +within the individual and between individuals. From experience +no standard of belief can issue, because it is the very nature of +experience to instigate all kinds of contrary beliefs, as +varieties of local custom proved. Its logical outcome is that +anything is good and true to the particular individual which his +experience leads him to believe true and good at a particular +time and place. Finally practice falls of necessity within +experience. Doing proceeds from needs and aims at change. To +produce or to make is to alter something; to consume is to alter. +All the obnoxious characters of change and diversity thus attach +themselves to doing while knowing is as permanent as its object. +To know, to grasp a thing intellectually or theoretically, is to +be out of the region of vicissitude, chance, and diversity. +Truth has no lack; it is untouched by the perturbations of the +world of sense. It deals with the eternal and the universal. +And the world of experience can be brought under control, can be +steadied and ordered, only through subjection to its law of +reason. + +It would not do, of course, to say that all these distinctions +persisted in full technical definiteness. But they all of them +profoundly influenced men's subsequent thinking and their ideas +about education. The contempt for physical as compared with +mathematical and logical science, for the senses and sense +observation; the feeling that knowledge is high and worthy in the +degree in which it deals with ideal symbols instead of with the +concrete; the scorn of particulars except as they are deductively +brought under a universal; the disregard for the body; the +depreciation of arts and crafts as intellectual +instrumentalities, all sought shelter and found sanction under +this estimate of the respective values of experience and +reason -- or, what came to the same thing, of the practical and +the intellectual. Medieval philosophy continued and reinforced +the tradition. To know reality meant to be in relation to the +supreme reality, or God, and to enjoy the eternal bliss of that +relation. Contemplation of supreme reality was the ultimate end +of man to which action is subordinate. Experience had to do with +mundane, profane, and secular affairs, practically necessary +indeed, but of little import in comparison with supernatural +objects of knowledge. When we add to this motive the force +derived from the literary character of the Roman education and +the Greek philosophic tradition, and conjoin to them the +preference for studies which obviously demarcated the +aristocratic class from the lower classes, we can readily +understand the tremendous power exercised by the persistent +preference of the "intellectual" over the "practical" not simply +in educational philosophies but in the higher schools. 2. The +Modern Theory of Experience and Knowledge. As we shall see +later, the development of experimentation as a method of +knowledge makes possible and necessitates a radical +transformation of the view just set forth. But before coming to +that, we have to note the theory of experience and knowledge +developed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In +general, it presents us with an almost complete reversal of the +classic doctrine of the relations of experience and reason. To +Plato experience meant habituation, or the conservation of the +net product of a lot of past chance trials. Reason meant the +principle of reform, of progress, of increase of control. +Devotion to the cause of reason meant breaking through the +limitations of custom and getting at things as they really were. +To the modern reformers, the situation was the other way around. +Reason, universal principles, a priori notions, meant either +blank forms which had to be filled in by experience, by sense +observations, in order to get significance and validity; or else +were mere indurated prejudices, dogmas imposed by authority, +which masqueraded and found protection under august names. The +great need was to break way from captivity to conceptions which, +as Bacon put it, "anticipated nature" and imposed merely human +opinions upon her, and to resort to experience to find out what +nature was like. Appeal to experience marked the breach with +authority. It meant openness to new impressions; eagerness in +discovery and invention instead of absorption in tabulating and +systematizing received ideas and "proving" them by means of the +relations they sustained to one another. It was the irruption +into the mind of the things as they really were, free from the +veil cast over them by preconceived ideas. + +The change was twofold. Experience lost the practical meaning +which it had borne from the time of Plato. It ceased to mean +ways of doing and being done to, and became a name for something +intellectual and cognitive. It meant the apprehension of +material which should ballast and check the exercise of +reasoning. By the modern philosophic empiricist and by his +opponent, experience has been looked upon just as a way of +knowing. The only question was how good a way it is. The result +was an even greater "intellectualism" than is found in ancient +philosophy, if that word be used to designate an emphatic and +almost exclusive interest in knowledge in its isolation. +Practice was not so much subordinated to knowledge as treated as +a kind of tag-end or aftermath of knowledge. The educational +result was only to confirm the exclusion of active pursuits from +the school, save as they might be brought in for purely +utilitarian ends -- the acquisition by drill of certain habits. +In the second place, the interest in experience as a means of +basing truth upon objects, upon nature, led to looking at the +mind as purely receptive. The more passive the mind is, the more +truly objects will impress themselves upon it. For the mind to +take a hand, so to speak, would be for it in the very process of +knowing to vitiate true knowledge -- to defeat its own purpose. +The ideal was a maximum of receptivity. Since the impressions +made upon the mind by objects were generally termed sensations, +empiricism thus became a doctrine of sensationalism -- that is to +say, a doctrine which identified knowledge with the reception and +association of sensory impressions. In John Locke, the most +influential of the empiricists, we find this sensationalism +mitigated by a recognition of certain mental faculties, like +discernment or discrimination, comparison, abstraction, and +generalization which work up the material of sense into definite +and organized forms and which even evolve new ideas on their own +account, such as the fundamental conceptions of morals and +mathematics. (See ante, p. 61.) But some of his successors, +especially in France in the latter part of the eighteenth +century, carried his doctrine to the limit; they regarded +discernment and judgment as peculiar sensations made in us by the +conjoint presence of other sensations. Locke had held that the +mind is a blank piece of paper, or a wax tablet with nothing +engraved on it at birth (a tabula rasa) so far as any contents of +ideas were concerned, but had endowed it with activities to be +exercised upon the material received. His French successors +razed away the powers and derived them also from impressions +received. + +As we have earlier noted, this notion was fostered by the new +interest in education as method of social reform. (See ante, p. +93.) The emptier the mind to begin with, the more it may be made +anything we wish by bringing the right influences to bear upon +it. Thus Helvetius, perhaps the most extreme and consistent +sensationalist, proclaimed that education could do anything--that +it was omnipotent. Within the sphere of school instruction, +empiricism found its directly beneficial office in protesting +against mere book learning. If knowledge comes from the +impressions made upon us by natural objects, it is impossible to +procure knowledge without the use of objects which impress the +mind. Words, all kinds of linguistic symbols, in the lack of +prior presentations of objects with which they may be associated, +convey nothing but sensations of their own shape and color -- +certainly not a very instructive kind of knowledge. +Sensationalism was an extremely handy weapon with which to combat +doctrines and opinions resting wholly upon tradition and +authority. With respect to all of them, it set up a test: Where +are the real objects from which these ideas and beliefs are +received? If such objects could not be produced, ideas were +explained as the result of false associations and combinations. +Empiricism also insisted upon a first-hand element. The +impression must be made upon me, upon my mind. The further we +get away from this direct, first-hand source of knowledge, the +more numerous the sources of error, and the vaguer the resulting +idea. + + +As might be expected, however, the philosophy was weak upon the +positive side. Of course, the value of natural objects and +firsthand acquaintance was not dependent upon the truth of the +theory. Introduced into the schools they would do their work, +even if the sensational theory about the way in which they did it +was quite wrong. So far, there is nothing to complain of. But +the emphasis upon sensationalism also operated to influence the +way in which natural objects were employed, and to prevent full +good being got from them. "Object lessons" tended to isolate the +mere sense-activity and make it an end in itself. The more +isolated the object, the more isolated the sensory quality, the +more distinct the sense-impression as a unit of knowledge. The +theory worked not only in the direction of this mechanical +isolation, which tended to reduce instruction to a kind of +physical gymnastic of the sense-organs (good like any gymnastic +of bodily organs, but not more so), but also to the neglect of +thinking. According to the theory there was no need of thinking +in connection with sense-observation; in fact, in strict theory +such thinking would be impossible till afterwards, for thinking +consisted simply in combining and separating sensory units which +had been received without any participation of judgment. + +As a matter of fact, accordingly, practically no scheme of +education upon a purely sensory basis has ever been +systematically tried, at least after the early years of infancy. +Its obvious deficiencies have caused it to be resorted to simply +for filling in "rationalistic" knowledge (that is to say, +knowledge of definitions, rules, classifications, and modes of +application conveyed through symbols), and as a device for +lending greater "interest" to barren symbols. There are at least +three serious defects of sensationalistic empiricism as an +educational philosophy of knowledge. (a) the historical value of +the theory was critical; it was a dissolvent of current beliefs +about the world and political institutions. It was a destructive +organ of criticism of hard and fast dogmas. But the work of +education is constructive, not critical. It assumes not old +beliefs to be eliminated and revised, but the need of building up +new experience into intellectual habitudes as correct as possible +from the start. Sensationalism is highly unfitted for this +constructive task. Mind, understanding, denotes responsiveness +to meanings (ante, p. 29), not response to direct physical +stimuli. And meaning exists only with reference to a context, +which is excluded by any scheme which identifies knowledge with a +combination of sense-impressions. The theory, so far as +educationally applied, led either to a magnification of mere +physical excitations or else to a mere heaping up of isolated +objects and qualities. + +(b) While direct impression has the advantage of being first +hand, it also has the disadvantage of being limited in range. +Direct acquaintance with the natural surroundings of the home +environment so as to give reality to ideas about portions of the +earth beyond the reach of the senses, and as a means of arousing +intellectual curiosity, is one thing. As an end-all and be-all +of geographical knowledge it is fatally restricted. In precisely +analogous fashion, beans, shoe pegs, and counters may be helpful +aids to a realization of numerical relations, but when employed +except as aids to thought -- the apprehension of meaning--they +become an obstacle to the growth of arithmetical understanding. +They arrest growth on a low plane, the plane of specific physical +symbols. Just as the race developed especial symbols as tools of +calculation and mathematical reasonings, because the use of the +fingers as numerical symbols got in the way, so the individual +must progress from concrete to abstract symbols -- that is, +symbols whose meaning is realized only through conceptual +thinking. And undue absorption at the outset in the physical +object of sense hampers this growth. (c) A thoroughly false +psychology of mental development underlay sensationalistic +empiricism. Experience is in truth a matter of activities, +instinctive and impulsive, in their interactions with things. +What even an infant "experiences" is not a passively received +quality impressed by an object, but the effect which some +activity of handling, throwing, pounding, tearing, etc., has upon +an object, and the consequent effect of the object upon the +direction of activities. (See ante, p. 140.) Fundamentally (as +we shall see in more detail), the ancient notion of experience as +a practical matter is truer to fact that the modern notion of it +as a mode of knowing by means of sensations. The neglect of the +deep-seated active and motor factors of experience is a fatal +defect of the traditional empirical philosophy. Nothing is more +uninteresting and mechanical than a scheme of object lessons +which ignores and as far as may be excludes the natural tendency +to learn about the qualities of objects by the uses to which they +are put through trying to do something with them. + +It is obvious, accordingly, that even if the philosophy of +experience represented by modern empiricism had received more +general theoretical assent than has been accorded to it, it could +not have furnished a satisfactory philosophy of the learning +process. Its educational influence was confined to injecting a +new factor into the older curriculum, with incidental +modifications of the older studies and methods. It introduced +greater regard for observation of things directly and through +pictures and graphic descriptions, and it reduced the importance +attached to verbal symbolization. But its own scope was so +meager that it required supplementation by information concerning +matters outside of sense-perception and by matters which appealed +more directly to thought. Consequently it left unimpaired the +scope of informational and abstract, or "rationalistic" studies. + +3. Experience as Experimentation. It has already been intimated +that sensational empiricism represents neither the idea of +experience justified by modern psychology nor the idea of +knowledge suggested by modern scientific procedure. With respect +to the former, it omits the primary position of active response +which puts things to use and which learns about them through +discovering the consequences that result from use. It would seem +as if five minutes' unprejudiced observation of the way an infant +gains knowledge would have sufficed to overthrow the notion that +he is passively engaged in receiving impressions of isolated +ready-made qualities of sound, color, hardness, etc. For it +would be seen that the infant reacts to stimuli by activities of +handling, reaching, etc., in order to see what results follow +upon motor response to a sensory stimulation; it would be seen +that what is learned are not isolated qualities, but the behavior +which may be expected from a thing, and the changes in things and +persons which an activity may be expected to produce. In other +words, what he learns are connections. Even such qualities as +red color, sound of a high pitch, have to be discriminated and +identified on the basis of the activities they call forth and the +consequences these activities effect. We learn what things are +hard and what are soft by finding out through active +experimentation what they respectively will do and what can be +done and what cannot be done with them. In like fashion, +children learn about persons by finding out what responsive +activities these persons exact and what these persons will do in +reply to the children's activities. And the combination of what +things do to us (not in impressing qualities on a passive mind) +in modifying our actions, furthering some of them and resisting +and checking others, and what we can do to them in producing new +changes constitutes experience. The methods of science by which +the revolution in our knowledge of the world dating from the +seventeenth century, was brought about, teach the same lesson. +For these methods are nothing but experimentation carried out +under conditions of deliberate control. To the Greek, it seemed +absurd that such an activity as, say, the cobbler punching holes +in leather, or using wax and needle and thread, could give an +adequate knowledge of the world. It seemed almost axiomatic that +for true knowledge we must have recourse to concepts coming from +a reason above experience. But the introduction of the +experimental method signified precisely that such operations, +carried on under conditions of control, are just the ways in +which fruitful ideas about nature are obtained and tested. In +other words, it is only needed to conduct such an operation as +the pouring of an acid on a metal for the purpose of getting +knowledge instead of for the purpose of getting a trade result, +in order to lay hold of the principle upon which the science of +nature was henceforth to depend. Sense perceptions were indeed +indispensable, but there was less reliance upon sense perceptions +in their natural or customary form than in the older science. +They were no longer regarded as containing within themselves some +"form" or "species" of universal kind in a disguised mask of +sense which could be stripped off by rational thought. On the +contrary, the first thing was to alter and extend the data of +sense perception: to act upon the given objects of sense by the +lens of the telescope and microscope, and by all sorts of +experimental devices. To accomplish this in a way which would +arouse new ideas (hypotheses, theories) required even more +general ideas (like those of mathematics) than were at the +command of ancient science. But these general conceptions were +no longer taken to give knowledge in themselves. They were +implements for instituting, conducting, interpreting experimental +inquiries and formulating their results. + +The logical outcome is a new philosophy of experience and +knowledge, a philosophy which no longer puts experience in +opposition to rational knowledge and explanation. Experience is +no longer a mere summarizing of what has been done in a more or +less chance way in the past; it is a deliberate control of what +is done with reference to making what happens to us and what we +do to things as fertile as possible of suggestions (of suggested +meanings) and a means for trying out the validity of the +suggestions. When trying, or experimenting, ceases to be blinded +by impulse or custom, when it is guided by an aim and conducted +by measure and method, it becomes reasonable -- rational. When +what we suffer from things, what we undergo at their hands, +ceases to be a matter of chance circumstance, when it is +transformed into a consequence of our own prior purposive +endeavors, it becomes rationally significant -- enlightening and +instructive. The antithesis of empiricism and rationalism loses +the support of the human situation which once gave it meaning and +relative justification. + +The bearing of this change upon the opposition of purely +practical and purely intellectual studies is self-evident. The +distinction is not intrinsic but is dependent upon conditions, +and upon conditions which can be regulated. Practical activities +may be intellectually narrow and trivial; they will be so in so +far as they are routine, carried on under the dictates of +authority, and having in view merely some external result. But +childhood and youth, the period of schooling, is just the time +when it is possible to carry them on in a different spirit. It +is inexpedient to repeat the discussions of our previous chapters +on thinking and on the evolution of educative subject matter from +childlike work and play to logically organized subject matter. +The discussions of this chapter and the prior one should, +however, give an added meaning to those results. + +(i) Experience itself primarily consists of the active relations +subsisting between a human being and his natural and social +surroundings. In some cases, the initiative in activity is on +the side of the environment; the human being undergoes or suffers +certain checkings and deflections of endeavors. In other cases, +the behavior of surrounding things and persons carries to a +successful issue the active tendencies of the individual, so that +in the end what the individual undergoes are consequences which +he has himself tried to produce. In just the degree in which +connections are established between what happens to a person and +what he does in response, and between what he does to his +environment and what it does in response to him, his acts and the +things about him acquire meaning. He learns to understand both +himself and the world of men and things. Purposive education or +schooling should present such an environment that this +interaction will effect acquisition of those meanings which are +so important that they become, in turn, instruments of further +learnings. (ante, Ch. XI.) As has been repeatedly pointed out, +activity out of school is carried on under conditions which have +not been deliberately adapted to promoting the function of +understanding and formation of effective intellectual +dispositions. The results are vital and genuine as far as they +go, but they are limited by all kinds of circumstances. Some +powers are left quite undeveloped and undirected; others get only +occasional and whimsical stimulations; others are formed into +habits of a routine skill at the expense of aims and resourceful +initiative and inventiveness. It is not the business of the +school to transport youth from an environment of activity into +one of cramped study of the records of other men's learning; but +to transport them from an environment of relatively chance +activities (accidental in the relation they bear to insight and +thought) into one of activities selected with reference to +guidance of learning. A slight inspection of the improved +methods which have already shown themselves effective in +education will reveal that they have laid hold, more or less +consciously, upon the fact that "intellectual" studies instead of +being opposed to active pursuits represent an intellectualizing +of practical pursuits. It remains to grasp the principle with +greater firmness. + +(ii) The changes which are taking place in the content of social +life tremendously facilitate selection of the sort of activities +which will intellectualize the play and work of the school. When +one bears in mind the social environment of the Greeks and the +people of the Middle Ages, where such practical activities as +could be successfully carried on were mostly of a routine and +external sort and even servile in nature, one is not surprised +that educators turned their backs upon them as unfitted to +cultivate intelligence. But now that even the occupations of the +household, agriculture, and manufacturing as well as +transportation and intercourse are instinct with applied science, +the case stands otherwise. It is true that many of those who now +engage in them are not aware of the intellectual content upon +which their personal actions depend. But this fact only gives an +added reason why schooling should use these pursuits so as to +enable the coming generation to acquire a comprehension now too +generally lacking, and thus enable persons to carry on their +pursuits intelligently instead of blindly. (iii) The most direct +blow at the traditional separation of doing and knowing and at +the traditional prestige of purely "intellectual" studies, +however, has been given by the progress of experimental science. +If this progress has demonstrated anything, it is that there is +no such thing as genuine knowledge and fruitful understanding +except as the offspring of doing. The analysis and rearrangement +of facts which is indispensable to the growth of knowledge and +power of explanation and right classification cannot be attained +purely mentally -- just inside the head. Men have to do +something to the things when they wish to find out something; +they have to alter conditions. This is the lesson of the +laboratory method, and the lesson which all education has to +learn. The laboratory is a discovery of the condition under +which labor may become intellectually fruitful and not merely +externally productive. If, in too many cases at present, it +results only in the acquisition of an additional mode of +technical skill, that is because it still remains too largely but +an isolated resource, not resorted to until pupils are mostly too +old to get the full advantage of it, and even then is surrounded +by other studies where traditional methods isolate intellect from +activity. + +Summary. The Greeks were induced to philosophize by the +increasing failure of their traditional customs and beliefs to +regulate life. Thus they were led to criticize custom adversely +and to look for some other source of authority in life and +belief. Since they desired a rational standard for the latter, +and had identified with experience the customs which had proved +unsatisfactory supports, they were led to a flat opposition of +reason and experience. The more the former was exalted, the more +the latter was depreciated. Since experience was identified with +what men do and suffer in particular and changing situations of +life, doing shared in the philosophic depreciation. This +influence fell in with many others to magnify, in higher +education, all the methods and topics which involved the least +use of sense-observation and bodily activity. The modern age +began with a revolt against this point of view, with an appeal to +experience, and an attack upon so-called purely rational concepts +on the ground that they either needed to be ballasted by the +results of concrete experiences, or else were mere expressions of +prejudice and institutionalized class interest, calling +themselves rational for protection. But various circumstances +led to considering experience as pure cognition, leaving out of +account its intrinsic active and emotional phases, and to +identifying it with a passive reception of isolated "sensations." +Hence the education reform effected by the new theory was +confined mainly to doing away with some of the bookishness of +prior methods; it did not accomplish a consistent +reorganization. + +Meantime, the advance of psychology, of industrial methods, and +of the experimental method in science makes another conception of +experience explicitly desirable and possible. This theory +reinstates the idea of the ancients that experience is primarily +practical, not cognitive -- a matter of doing and undergoing the +consequences of doing. But the ancient theory is transformed by +realizing that doing may be directed so as to take up into its +own content all which thought suggests, and so as to result in +securely tested knowledge. "Experience" then ceases to be +empirical and becomes experimental. Reason ceases to be a remote +and ideal faculty, and signifies all the resources by which +activity is made fruitful in meaning. Educationally, this change +denotes such a plan for the studies and method of instruction as +has been developed in the previous chapters. + + +Chapter Twenty-one: Physical and Social Studies: Naturalism and +Humanism + +ALLUSION has already been made to the conflict of natural science +with literary studies for a place in the curriculum. The +solution thus far reached consists essentially in a somewhat +mechanical compromise whereby the field is divided between +studies having nature and studies having man as their theme. The +situation thus presents us with another instance of the external +adjustment of educational values, and focuses attention upon the +philosophy of the connection of nature with human affairs. In +general, it may be said that the educational division finds a +reflection in the dualistic philosophies. Mind and the world are +regarded as two independent realms of existence having certain +points of contact with each other. From this point of view it is +natural that each sphere of existence should have its own +separate group of studies connected with it; it is even natural +that the growth of scientific studies should be viewed with +suspicion as marking a tendency of materialistic philosophy to +encroach upon the domain of spirit. Any theory of education +which contemplates a more unified scheme of education than now +exists is under the necessity of facing the question of the +relation of man to nature. + +1. The Historic Background of Humanistic Study. It is +noteworthy that classic Greek philosophy does not present the +problem in its modern form. Socrates indeed appears to have +thought that science of nature was not attainable and not very +important. The chief thing to know is the nature and end of man. +Upon that knowledge hangs all that is of deep significance--all +moral and social achievement. Plato, however, makes right +knowledge of man and society depend upon knowledge of the +essential features of nature. His chief treatise, entitled the +Republic, is at once a treatise on morals, on social +organization, and on the metaphysics and science of nature. +Since he accepts the Socratic doctrine that right achievement in +the former depends upon rational knowledge, he is compelled to +discuss the nature of knowledge. Since he accepts the idea that +the ultimate object of knowledge is the discovery of the good or +end of man, and is discontented with the Socratic conviction that +all we know is our own ignorance, he connects the discussion of +the good of man with consideration of the essential good or end +of nature itself. To attempt to determine the end of man apart +from a knowledge of the ruling end which gives law and unity to +nature is impossible. It is thus quite consistent with his +philosophy that he subordinates literary studies (under the name +of music) to mathematics and to physics as well as to logic and +metaphysics. But on the other hand, knowledge of nature is not +an end in itself; it is a necessary stage in bringing the mind to +a realization of the supreme purpose of existence as the law of +human action, corporate and individual. To use the modern +phraseology, naturalistic studies are indispensable, but they are +in the interests of humanistic and ideal ends. + +Aristotle goes even farther, if anything, in the direction of +naturalistic studies. He subordinates (ante, p. 254) civic +relations to the purely cognitive life. The highest end of man +is not human but divine -- participation in pure knowing which +constitutes the divine life. Such knowing deals with what is +universal and necessary, and finds, therefore, a more adequate +subject matter in nature at its best than in the transient things +of man. If we take what the philosophers stood for in Greek +life, rather than the details of what they say, we might +summarize by saying that the Greeks were too much interested in +free inquiry into natural fact and in the aesthetic enjoyment of +nature, and were too deeply conscious of the extent in which +society is rooted in nature and subject to its laws, to think of +bringing man and nature into conflict. Two factors conspire in +the later period of ancient life, however, to exalt literary and +humanistic studies. One is the increasingly reminiscent and +borrowed character of culture; the other is the political and +rhetorical bent of Roman life. + +Greek achievement in civilization was native; the civilization of +the Alexandrians and Romans was inherited from alien sources. +Consequently it looked back to the records upon which it drew, +instead of looking out directly upon nature and society, for +material and inspiration. We cannot do better than quote the +words of Hatch to indicate the consequences for educational +theory and practice. "Greece on one hand had lost political +power, and on the other possessed in her splendid literature an +inalienable heritage. It was natural that she should turn to +letters. It was natural also that the study of letters should be +reflected upon speech. The mass of men in the Greek world tended +to lay stress on that acquaintance with the literature of bygone +generations, and that habit of cultivated speech, which has ever +since been commonly spoken of as education. Our own comes by +direct tradition from it. It set a fashion which until recently +has uniformly prevailed over the entire civilized world. We +study literature rather than nature because the Greeks did so, +and because when the Romans and the Roman provincials resolved to +educate their sons, they employed Greek teachers and followed in +Greek paths." 1 + +The so-called practical bent of the Romans worked in the same +direction. In falling back upon the recorded ideas of the +Greeks, they not only took the short path to attaining a cultural +development, but they procured just the kind of material and +method suited to their administrative talents. For their +practical genius was not directed to the conquest and control of +nature but to the conquest and control of men. + +Mr. Hatch, in the passage quoted, takes a good deal of history +for granted in saying that we have studied literature rather than +nature because the Greeks, and the Romans whom they taught, did +so. What is the link that spans the intervening centuries? The +question suggests that barbarian Europe but repeated on a larger +scale and with increased intensity the Roman situation. It had +to go to school to Greco-Roman civilization; it also borrowed +rather than evolved its culture. Not merely for its general +ideas and their artistic presentation but for its models of law +it went to the records of alien peoples. And its dependence upon +tradition was increased by the dominant theological interests of +the period. For the authorities to which the Church appealed +were literatures composed in foreign tongues. Everything +converged to identify learning with linguistic training and to +make the language of the learned a literary language instead of +the mother speech. + +The full scope of this fact escapes us, moreover, until we +recognize that this subject matter compelled recourse to a +dialectical method. Scholasticism frequently has been used since +the time of the revival of learning as a term of reproach. But +all that it means is the method of The Schools, or of the School +Men. In its essence, it is nothing but a highly effective +systematization of the methods of teaching and learning which are +appropriate to transmit an authoritative body of truths. Where +literature rather than contemporary nature and society furnishes +material of study, methods must be adapted to defining, +expounding, and interpreting the received material, rather than +to inquiry, discovery, and invention. And at bottom what is +called Scholasticism is the whole-hearted and consistent +formulation and application of the methods which are suited to +instruction when the material of instruction is taken ready-made, +rather than as something which students are to find out for +themselves. So far as schools still teach from textbooks and +rely upon the principle of authority and acquisition rather than +upon that of discovery and inquiry, their methods are +Scholastic -- minus the logical accuracy and system of +Scholasticism at its best. Aside from laxity of method and +statement, the only difference is that geographies and histories +and botanies and astronomies are now part of the authoritative +literature which is to be mastered. + +As a consequence, the Greek tradition was lost in which a +humanistic interest was used as a basis of interest in nature, +and a knowledge of nature used to support the distinctively human +aims of man. Life found its support in authority, not in nature. +The latter was moreover an object of considerable suspicion. +Contemplation of it was dangerous, for it tended to draw man away +from reliance upon the documents in which the rules of living +were already contained. Moreover nature could be known only +through observation; it appealed to the senses -- which were +merely material as opposed to a purely immaterial mind. +Furthermore, the utilities of a knowledge of nature were purely +physical and secular; they connected with the bodily and temporal +welfare of man, while the literary tradition concerned his +spiritual and eternal well-being. + +2. The Modern Scientific Interest in Nature. The movement of +the fifteenth century which is variously termed the revival of +learning and the renascence was characterized by a new interest +in man's present life, and accordingly by a new interest in his +relationships with nature. It was naturalistic, in the sense +that it turned against the dominant supernaturalistic interest. +It is possible that the influence of a return to classic Greek +pagan literature in bringing about this changed mind has been +overestimated. Undoubtedly the change was mainly a product of +contemporary conditions. But there can be no doubt that educated +men, filled with the new point of view, turned eagerly to Greek +literature for congenial sustenance and reinforcement. And to a +considerable extent, this interest in Greek thought was not in +literature for its own sake, but in the spirit it expressed. The +mental freedom, the sense of the order and beauty of nature, +which animated Greek expression, aroused men to think and observe +in a similar untrammeled fashion. The history of science in the +sixteenth century shows that the dawning sciences of physical +nature largely borrowed their points of departure from the new +interest in Greek literature. As Windelband has said, the new +science of nature was the daughter of humanism. The favorite +notion of the time was that man was in microcosm that which the +universe was in macrocosm. + +This fact raises anew the question of how it was that nature and +man were later separated and a sharp division made between +language and literature and the physical sciences. Four reasons +may be suggested. (a) The old tradition was firmly entrenched in +institutions. Politics, law, and diplomacy remained of +necessity branches of authoritative literature, for the social +sciences did not develop until the methods of the sciences of +physics and chemistry, to say nothing of biology, were much +further advanced. The same is largely true of history. +Moreover, the methods used for effective teaching of the +languages were well developed; the inertia of academic custom was +on their side. Just as the new interest in literature, +especially Greek, had not been allowed at first to find lodgment +in the scholastically organized universities, so when it found +its way into them it joined hands with the older learning to +minimize the influence of experimental science. The men who +taught were rarely trained in science; the men who were +scientifically competent worked in private laboratories and +through the medium of academies which promoted research, but +which were not organized as teaching bodies. Finally, the +aristocratic tradition which looked down upon material things and +upon the senses and the hands was still mighty. + +(b) The Protestant revolt brought with it an immense increase of +interest in theological discussion and controversies. The appeal +on both sides was to literary documents. Each side had to train +men in ability to study and expound the records which were relied +upon. The demand for training men who could defend the chosen +faith against the other side, who were able to propagandize and +to prevent the encroachments of the other side, was such that it +is not too much to say that by the middle of the seventeenth +century the linguistic training of gymnasia and universities had +been captured by the revived theological interest, and used as a +tool of religious education and ecclesiastical controversy. Thus +the educational descent of the languages as they are found in +education to-day is not direct from the revival of learning, but +from its adaptation to theological ends. + +(c) The natural sciences were themselves conceived in a way which +sharpened the opposition of man and nature. Francis Bacon +presents an almost perfect example of the union of naturalistic +and humanistic interest. Science, adopting the methods of +observation and experimentation, was to give up the attempt to +"anticipate" nature -- to impose preconceived notions upon her -- +and was to become her humble interpreter. In obeying nature +intellectually, man would learn to command her practically. +"Knowledge is power." This aphorism meant that through science +man is to control nature and turn her energies to the execution +of his own ends. Bacon attacked the old learning and logic as +purely controversial, having to do with victory in argument, not +with discovery of the unknown. Through the new method of thought +which was set forth in his new logic an era of expansive +discoveries was to emerge, and these discoveries were to bear +fruit in inventions for the service of man. Men were to give up +their futile, never-finished effort to dominate one another to +engage in the cooperative task of dominating nature in the +interests of humanity. + +In the main, Bacon prophesied the direction of subsequent +progress. But he "anticipated" the advance. He did not see that +the new science was for a long time to be worked in the interest +of old ends of human exploitation. He thought that it would +rapidly give man new ends. Instead, it put at the disposal of a +class the means to secure their old ends of aggrandizement at the +expense of another class. The industrial revolution followed, as +he foresaw, upon a revolution in scientific method. But it is +taking the revolution many centuries to produce a new mind. +Feudalism was doomed by the applications of the new science, for +they transferred power from the landed nobility to the +manufacturing centers. But capitalism rather than a social +humanism took its place. Production and commerce were carried on +as if the new science had no moral lesson, but only technical +lessons as to economies in production and utilization of saving +in self-interest. Naturally, this application of physical +science (which was the most conspicuously perceptible one) +strengthened the claims of professed humanists that science was +materialistic in its tendencies. It left a void as to man's +distinctively human interests which go beyond making, saving, and +expending money; and languages and literature put in their claim +to represent the moral and ideal interests of humanity. + +(d) Moreover, the philosophy which professed itself based upon +science, which gave itself out as the accredited representative +of the net significance of science, was either dualistic in +character, marked by a sharp division between mind +(characterizing man) and matter, constituting nature; or else it +was openly mechanical, reducing the signal features of human life +to illusion. In the former case, it allowed the claims of +certain studies to be peculiar consignees of mental values, and +indirectly strengthened their claim to superiority, since human +beings would incline to regard human affairs as of chief +importance at least to themselves. In the latter case, it called +out a reaction which threw doubt and suspicion upon the value of +physical science, giving occasion for treating it as an enemy to +man's higher interests. + +Greek and medieval knowledge accepted the world in its +qualitative variety, and regarded nature's processes as having +ends, or in technical phrase as teleological. New science was +expounded so as to deny the reality of all qualities in real, or +objective, existence. Sounds, colors, ends, as well as goods and +bads, were regarded as purely subjective -- as mere impressions +in the mind. Objective existence was then treated as having only +quantitative aspects -- as so much mass in motion, its only +differences being that at one point in space there was a larger +aggregate mass than at another, and that in some spots there were +greater rates of motion than at others. Lacking qualitative +distinctions, nature lacked significant variety. Uniformities +were emphasized, not diversities; the ideal was supposed to be +the discovery of a single mathematical formula applying to the +whole universe at once from which all the seeming variety of +phenomena could be derived. This is what a mechanical philosophy +means. + +Such a philosophy does not represent the genuine purport of +science. It takes the technique for the thing itself; the +apparatus and the terminology for reality, the method for its +subject matter. Science does confine its statements to +conditions which enable us to predict and control the happening +of events, ignoring the qualities of the events. Hence its +mechanical and quantitative character. But in leaving them out +of account, it does not exclude them from reality, nor relegate +them to a purely mental region; it only furnishes means +utilizable for ends. Thus while in fact the progress of science +was increasing man's power over nature, enabling him to place his +cherished ends on a firmer basis than ever before, and also to +diversify his activities almost at will, the philosophy which +professed to formulate its accomplishments reduced the world to a +barren and monotonous redistribution of matter in space. Thus +the immediate effect of modern science was to accentuate the +dualism of matter and mind, and thereby to establish the physical +and the humanistic studies as two disconnected groups. Since the +difference between better and worse is bound up with the +qualities of experience, any philosophy of science which excludes +them from the genuine content of reality is bound to leave out +what is most interesting and most important to mankind. + +3. The Present Educational Problem. In truth, experience knows +no division between human concerns and a purely mechanical +physical world. Man's home is nature; his purposes and aims are +dependent for execution upon natural conditions. Separated from +such conditions they become empty dreams and idle indulgences of +fancy. From the standpoint of human experience, and hence of +educational +endeavor, any distinction which can be justly made between nature +and man is a distinction between the conditions which have to be +reckoned with in the formation and execution of our practical +aims, and the aims themselves. This philosophy is vouched for by +the doctrine of biological development which shows that man is +continuous with nature, not an alien entering her processes from +without. It is reinforced by the experimental method of science +which shows that knowledge accrues in virtue of an attempt to +direct physical energies in accord with ideas suggested in +dealing with natural objects in behalf of social uses. Every +step forward in the social sciences -- the studies termed +history, economics, politics, sociology -- shows that social +questions are capable of being intelligently coped with only in +the degree in which we employ the method of collected data, +forming hypotheses, and testing them in action which is +characteristic of natural science, and in the degree in which we +utilize in behalf of the promotion of social welfare the +technical knowledge ascertained by physics and chemistry. +Advanced methods of dealing with such perplexing problems as +insanity, intemperance, poverty, public sanitation, city +planning, the conservation of natural resources, the constructive +use of governmental agencies for furthering the public good +without weakening personal initiative, all illustrate the direct +dependence of our important social concerns upon the methods and +results of natural science. + +With respect then to both humanistic and naturalistic studies, +education should take its departure from this close +interdependence. It should aim not at keeping science as a study +of nature apart from literature as a record of human interests, +but at cross-fertilizing both the natural sciences and the +various human disciplines such as history, literature, economics, +and politics. Pedagogically, the problem is simpler than the +attempt to teach the sciences as mere technical bodies of +information and technical forms of physical manipulation, on one +side; and to teach humanistic studies as isolated subjects, on +the other. For the latter procedure institutes an artificial +separation in the pupils' experience. Outside of school pupils +meet with natural facts and principles in connection with various +modes of human action. (See ante, p. 30.) In all the social +activities in which they have shared they have had to understand +the material and processes involved. To start them in school +with a rupture of this intimate association breaks the continuity +of mental development, makes the student feel an indescribable +unreality in his studies, and deprives him of the normal motive +for interest in them. + +There is no doubt, of course, that the opportunities of education +should be such that all should have a chance who have the +disposition to advance to specialized ability in science, and +thus devote themselves to its pursuit as their particular +occupation in life. But at present, the pupil too often has a +choice only between beginning with a study of the results of +prior specialization where the material is isolated from his +daily experiences, or with miscellaneous nature study, where +material is presented at haphazard and does not lead anywhere in +particular. The habit of introducing college pupils into +segregated scientific subject matter, such as is appropriate to +the man who wishes to become an expert in a given field, is +carried back into the high schools. Pupils in the latter simply +get a more elementary treatment of the same thing, with +difficulties smoothed over and topics reduced to the level of +their supposed ability. The cause of this procedure lies in +following tradition, rather than in conscious adherence to a +dualistic philosophy. But the effect is the same as if the +purpose were to inculcate an idea that the sciences which deal +with nature have nothing to do with man, and vice versa. A large +part of the comparative ineffectiveness of the teaching of the +sciences, for those who never become scientific specialists, is +the result of a separation which is unavoidable when one begins +with technically organized subject matter. Even if all students +were embryonic scientific specialists, it is questionable whether +this is the most effective procedure. Considering that the great +majority are concerned with the study of sciences only for its +effect upon their mental habits -- in making them more alert, +more open-minded, more inclined to tentative acceptance and to +testing of ideas propounded or suggested, -- and for achieving a +better understanding of their daily environment, it is certainly +ill-advised. Too often the pupil comes out with a smattering +which is too superficial to be scientific and too technical to be +applicable to ordinary affairs. + +The utilization of ordinary experience to secure an advance into +scientific material and method, while keeping the latter +connected with familiar human interests, is easier to-day than it +ever was before. The usual experience of all persons in +civilized communities to-day is intimately associated with +industrial processes and results. These in turn are so many +cases of science in action. The stationary and traction steam +engine, gasoline engine, automobile, telegraph and telephone, the +electric motor enter directly into the lives of most individuals. +Pupils at an early age are practically acquainted with these +things. Not only does the business occupation of their parents +depend upon scientific applications, but household pursuits, the +maintenance of health, the sights seen upon the streets, embody +scientific achievements and stimulate interest in the connected +scientific principles. The obvious pedagogical starting point of +scientific instruction is not to teach things labeled science, +but to utilize the familiar occupations and appliances to direct +observation and experiment, until pupils have arrived at a +knowledge of some fundamental principles by understanding them in +their familiar practical workings. + +The opinion sometimes advanced that it is a derogation from the +"purity" of science to study it in its active incarnation, +instead of in theoretical abstraction, rests upon a +misunderstanding. AS matter of fact, any subject is cultural in +the degree in which it is apprehended in its widest possible +range of meanings. Perception of meanings depends upon +perception of connections, of context. To see a scientific fact +or law in its human as well as in its physical and technical +context is to enlarge its significance and give it increased +cultural value. Its direct economic application, if by economic +is meant +something having money worth, is incidental and secondary, but a +part of its actual connections. The important thing is that the +fact be grasped in its social connections -- its function in +life. + +On the other hand, "humanism" means at bottom being imbued with +an intelligent sense of human interests. The social interest, +identical in its deepest meaning with a moral interest, is +necessarily supreme with man. Knowledge about man, information +as to his past, familiarity with his documented records of +literature, may be as technical a possession as the accumulation +of physical details. Men may keep busy in a variety of ways, +making money, acquiring facility in laboratory manipulation, or +in amassing a store of facts about linguistic matters, or the +chronology of literary productions. Unless such activity reacts +to enlarge the imaginative vision of life, it is on a level with +the busy work of children. It has the letter without the spirit +of activity. It readily degenerates itself into a miser's +accumulation, and a man prides himself on what he has, and not on +the meaning he finds in the affairs of life. Any study so +pursued that it increases concern for the values of life, any +study producing greater sensitiveness to social well-being and +greater ability to promote that well-being is humane study. The +humanistic spirit of the Greeks was native and intense but it was +narrow in scope. Everybody outside the Hellenic circle was a +barbarian, and negligible save as a possible enemy. Acute as +were the social observations and speculations of Greek thinkers, +there is not a word in their writings to indicate that Greek +civilization was not self-inclosed and self-sufficient. There +was, apparently, no suspicion that its future was at the mercy of +the despised outsider. Within the Greek community, the intense +social spirit was limited by the fact that higher culture was +based on a substratum of slavery and economic serfdom--classes +necessary to the existence of the state, as Aristotle declared, +and yet not genuine parts of it. The development of science has +produced an industrial revolution which has brought different +peoples in such close contact with one another through +colonization and commerce that no matter how some nations may +still look down upon others, no country can harbor the illusion +that its career is decided wholly within itself. The same +revolution has abolished agricultural serfdom, and created a +class of more or less organized factory laborers with recognized +political rights, and who make claims for a responsible role in +the control of industry--claims which receive sympathetic +attention from many among the well-to- do, since they have been +brought into closer connections with the less fortunate classes +through the breaking down of class barriers. + +This state of affairs may be formulated by saying that the older +humanism omitted economic and industrial conditions from its +purview. Consequently, it was one sided. Culture, under such +circumstances, inevitably represented the intellectual and moral +outlook of the class which was in direct social control. Such a +tradition as to culture is, as we have seen (ante, p. 260), +aristocratic; it emphasizes what marks off one class from +another, rather than fundamental common interests. Its standards +are in the past; for the aim is to preserve what has been gained +rather than widely to extend the range of culture. + +The modifications which spring from taking greater account of +industry and of whatever has to do with making a living are +frequently condemned as attacks upon the culture derived from the +past. But a wider educational outlook would conceive industrial +activities as agencies for making intellectual resources more +accessible to the masses, and giving greater solidity to the +culture of those having superior resources. In short, when we +consider the close connection between science and industrial +development on the one hand, and between literary and aesthetic +cultivation and an aristocratic social organization on the other, +we get light on the opposition between technical scientific +studies and refining literary studies. We have before us the +need of overcoming this separation in education if society is to +be truly democratic. + +Summary. The philosophic dualism between man and nature is +reflected in the division of studies between the naturalistic and +the humanistic with a tendency to reduce the latter to the +literary records of the past. This dualism is not characteristic +(as were the others which we have noted) of Greek thought. It +arose partly because of the fact that the culture of Rome and of +barbarian Europe was not a native product, being borrowed +directly or indirectly from Greece, and partly because political +and ecclesiastic conditions emphasized dependence upon the +authority of past knowledge as that was transmitted in literary +documents. + +At the outset, the rise of modern science prophesied a +restoration of the intimate connection of nature and humanity, +for it viewed knowledge of nature as the means of securing human +progress and well-being. But the more immediate applications of +science were in the interests of a class rather than of men in +common; and the received philosophic formulations of scientific +doctrine tended either to mark it off as merely material from man +as spiritual and immaterial, or else to reduce mind to a +subjective illusion. In education, accordingly, the tendency was +to treat the sciences as a separate body of studies, consisting +of technical information regarding the physical world, and to +reserve the older literary studies as distinctively humanistic. +The account previously given of the evolution of knowledge, and +of the educational scheme of studies based upon it, are designed +to overcome the separation, and to secure recognition of the +place occupied by the subject matter of the natural sciences in +human affairs. + +1 The Influence of Greek Ideas and Usages upon the Christian +Church. pp. 43-44. + + +Chapter Twenty-two: The Individual and the World + +1. Mind as Purely Individual. We have been concerned with the +influences which have effected a division between work and +leisure, knowing and doing, man and nature. These influences +have resulted in splitting up the subject matter of education +into separate studies. They have also found formulation in +various philosophies which have opposed to each other body and +mind, theoretical knowledge and practice, physical mechanism and +ideal purpose. Upon the philosophical side, these various +dualisms culminate in a sharp demarcation of individual minds +from the world, and hence from one another. While the connection +of this philosophical position with educational procedure is not +so obvious as is that of the points considered in the last three +chapters, there are certain educational considerations which +correspond to it; such as the antithesis supposed to exist +between subject matter (the counterpart of the world) and method +(the counterpart of mind); such as the tendency to treat interest +as something purely private, without intrinsic connection with +the material studied. Aside from incidental educational +bearings, it will be shown in this chapter that the dualistic +philosophy of mind and the world implies an erroneous conception +of the +relationship between knowledge and social interests, and between +individuality or freedom, and social control and authority. +The identification of the mind with the individual self and of +the latter with a private psychic consciousness is comparatively +modern. In both the Greek and medieval periods, the rule was to +regard the individual as a channel through which a universal and +divine intelligence operated. The individual was in no true +sense the knower; the knower was the "Reason" which operated +through him. The individual interfered at his peril, and only to +the detriment of the truth. In the degree in which the +individual rather than reason "knew," conceit, error, and opinion +were substituted for true knowledge. In Greek life, observation +was acute and alert; and thinking was free almost to the point of +irresponsible speculations. Accordingly the consequences of the +theory were only such as were consequent upon the lack of an +experimental method. Without such a method individuals could not +engage in knowing, and be checked up by the results of the +inquiries of others. Without such liability to test by others, +the minds of men could not be intellectually responsible; results +were to be accepted because of their aesthetic consistency, +agreeable quality, or the prestige of their authors. In the +barbarian period, individuals were in a still more humble +attitude to truth; important knowledge was supposed to be +divinely revealed, and nothing remained for the minds of +individuals except to work it over after it had been received on +authority. Aside from the more consciously philosophic aspects +of these movements, it never occurs to any one to identify mind +and the personal self wherever beliefs are transmitted by custom. + +In the medieval period there was a religious individualism. The +deepest concern of life was the salvation of the individual soul. +In the later Middle Ages, this latent individualism found +conscious formulation in the nominalistic philosophies, which +treated the structure of knowledge as something built up within +the individual through his own acts, and mental states. With the +rise of economic and political individualism after the sixteenth +century, and with the development of Protestantism, the times +were ripe for an emphasis upon the rights and duties of the +individual in achieving knowledge for himself. This led to the +view that knowledge is won wholly through personal and private +experiences. As a consequence, mind, the source and possessor of +knowledge, was thought of as wholly individual. Thus upon the +educational side, we find educational reformers, like Montaigne, +Bacon, Locke, henceforth vehemently denouncing all learning which +is acquired on hearsay, and asserting that even if beliefs happen +to be true, they do not constitute knowledge unless they have +grown up in and been tested by personal experience. The reaction +against authority in all spheres of life, and the intensity of +the struggle, against great odds, for freedom of action and +inquiry, led to such an emphasis upon personal observations and +ideas as in effect to isolate mind, and set it apart from the +world to be known. + +This isolation is reflected in the great development of that +branch of philosophy known as epistemology--the theory of +knowledge. The identification of mind with the self, and the +setting up of the self as something independent and +self-sufficient, created such a gulf between the knowing mind and +the world that it became a question how knowledge was possible at +all. Given a subject - - the knower--and an object--the thing to +be known--wholly separate from one another, it is necessary to +frame a theory to explain how they get into connection with each +other so that valid knowledge may result. This problem, with the +allied one of the possibility of the world acting upon the mind +and the mind acting upon the world, became almost the exclusive +preoccupation of philosophic thought. + +The theories that we cannot know the world as it really is but +only the impressions made upon the mind, or that there is no +world beyond the individual mind, or that knowledge is only a +certain association of the mind's own states, were products of +this preoccupation. We are not directly concerned with their +truth; but the fact that such desperate solutions were widely +accepted is evidence of the extent to which mind had been set +over the world of realities. The increasing use of the term +"consciousness" as an equivalent for mind, in the supposition +that there is an inner world of conscious states and processes, +independent of any relationship to nature and society, an inner +world more truly and immediately known than anything else, is +evidence of the same fact. In short, practical individualism, or +struggle for greater freedom of thought in action, was translated +into philosophic subjectivism. + +2. Individual Mind as the Agent of Reorganization. It should be +obvious that this philosophic movement misconceived the +significance of the practical movement. Instead of being its +transcript, it was a perversion. Men were not actually engaged +in the absurdity of striving to be free from connection with +nature and one another. They were striving for greater freedom +in nature and society. They wanted greater power to initiate +changes in the world of things and fellow beings; greater scope +of movement and consequently greater freedom in observations and +ideas implied in movement. They wanted not isolation from the +world, but a more intimate connection with it. They wanted to +form their beliefs about it at first hand, instead of through +tradition. They wanted closer union with their fellows so that +they might influence one another more effectively and might +combine their respective actions for mutual aims. + +So far as their beliefs were concerned, they felt that a great +deal which passed for knowledge was merely the accumulated +opinions of the past, much of it absurd and its correct portions +not understood when accepted on authority. Men must observe for +themselves, and form their own theories and personally test them. +Such a method was the only alternative to the imposition of dogma +as truth, a procedure which reduced mind to the formal act of +acquiescing in truth. Such is the meaning of what is sometimes +called the substitution of inductive experimental methods of +knowing for deductive. In some sense, men had always used an +inductive method in dealing with their immediate practical +concerns. Architecture, agriculture, manufacture, etc., had to +be based upon observation of the activities of natural objects, +and ideas about such affairs had to be checked, to some extent, +by results. But even in such things there was an undue reliance +upon mere custom, followed blindly rather than understandingly. +And this observational-experimental method was restricted to +these "practical" matters, and a sharp distinction maintained +between practice and theoretical knowledge or truth. (See Ch. +XX.) The rise of free cities, the development of travel, +exploration, and commerce, the evolution of new methods of +producing commodities and doing business, threw men definitely +upon their own resources. The reformers of science like Galileo, +Descartes, and their successors, carried analogous methods into +ascertaining the facts about nature. An interest in discovery +took the place of an interest in systematizing and "proving" +received beliefs. + +A just philosophic interpretation of these movements would, +indeed, have emphasized the rights and responsibilities of the +individual in gaining knowledge and personally testing beliefs, +no matter by what authorities they were vouched for. But it +would not have isolated the individual from the world, and +consequently isolated individuals--in theory--from one another. +It would have perceived that such disconnection, such rupture of +continuity, denied in advance the possibility of success in their +endeavors. As matter of fact every individual has grown up, and +always must grow up, in a social medium. His responses grow +intelligent, or gain meaning, simply because he lives and acts in +a medium of accepted meanings and values. (See ante, p. 30.) +Through social intercourse, through sharing in the activities +embodying beliefs, he gradually acquires a mind of his own. The +conception of mind as a purely isolated possession of the self is +at the very antipodes of the truth. The self achieves mind in +the degree in which knowledge of things is incarnate in the life +about him; the self is not a separate mind building up knowledge +anew on its own account. + +Yet there is a valid distinction between knowledge which is +objective and impersonal, and thinking which is subjective and +personal. In one sense, knowledge is that which we take for +granted. It is that which is settled, disposed of, established, +under control. What we fully know, we do not need to think +about. In common phrase, it is certain, assured. And this does +not mean a mere feeling of certainty. It denotes not a +sentiment, but a practical attitude, a readiness to act without +reserve or quibble. Of course we may be mistaken. What is taken +for knowledge--for fact and truth--at a given time may not be +such. But everything which is assumed without question, which is +taken for granted in our intercourse with one another and nature +is what, at the given time, is called knowledge. Thinking on the +contrary, starts, as we have seen, from doubt or uncertainty. It +marks an inquiring, hunting, searching attitude, instead of one +of mastery and possession. Through its critical process true +knowledge is revised and extended, and our convictions as to the +state of things reorganized. Clearly the last few centuries have +been typically a period of revision and reorganization of +beliefs. Men did not really throw away all transmitted beliefs +concerning the realities of existence, and start afresh upon the +basis of their private, exclusive sensations and ideas. They +could not have done so if they had wished to, and if it had been +possible general imbecility would have been the only outcome. +Men set out from what had passed as knowledge, and critically +investigated the grounds upon which it rested; they noted +exceptions; they used new mechanical appliances to bring to light +data inconsistent with what had been believed; they used their +imaginations to conceive a world different from that in which +their forefathers had put their trust. The work was a piecemeal, +a retail, business. One problem was tackled at a time. The net +results of all the revisions amounted, however, to a revolution +of prior conceptions of the world. What occurred was a +reorganization of prior intellectual habitudes, infinitely more +efficient than a cutting loose from all connections would have +been. + +This state of affairs suggests a definition of the role of the +individual, or the self, in knowledge; namely, the redirection, +or reconstruction of accepted beliefs. Every new idea, every +conception of things differing from that authorized by current +belief, must have its origin in an individual. New ideas are +doubtless always sprouting, but a society governed by custom does +not encourage their development. On the contrary, it tends to +suppress them, just because they are deviations from what is +current. The man who looks at things differently from others is +in such a community a suspect character; for him to persist is +generally fatal. Even when social censorship of beliefs is not +so strict, social conditions may fail to provide the appliances +which are requisite if new ideas are to be adequately elaborated; +or they may fail to provide any material support and reward to +those who entertain them. Hence they remain mere fancies, +romantic castles in the air, or aimless speculations. The +freedom of observation and imagination involved in the modern +scientific revolution were not easily secured; they had to be +fought for; many suffered for their intellectual independence. +But, upon the whole, modern European society first permitted, and +then, in some fields at least, deliberately encouraged the +individual reactions which deviate from what custom prescribes. +Discovery, research, inquiry in new lines, inventions, finally +came to be either the social fashion, or in some degree +tolerable. However, as we have already noted, philosophic +theories of knowledge were not content to conceive mind in the +individual as the pivot upon which reconstruction of beliefs +turned, thus maintaining the continuity of the individual with +the world of nature and fellow men. They regarded the individual +mind as a separate entity, complete in each person, and isolated +from nature and hence from other minds. Thus a legitimate +intellectual individualism, the attitude of critical revision of +former beliefs which is indispensable to progress, was explicitly +formulated as a moral and social individualism. When the +activities of mind set out from customary beliefs and strive to +effect transformations of them which will in turn win general +conviction, there is no opposition between the individual and the +social. The intellectual variations of the individual in +observation, imagination, judgment, and invention are simply the +agencies of social progress, just as conformity to habit is the +agency of social conservation. But when knowledge is regarded as +originating and developing within an individual, the ties which +bind the mental life of one to that of his fellows are ignored +and denied. + +When the social quality of individualized mental operations is +denied, it becomes a problem to find connections which will unite +an individual with his fellows. Moral individualism is set up by +the conscious separation of different centers of life. It has +its roots in the notion that the consciousness of each person is +wholly private, a self-inclosed continent, intrinsically +independent of the ideas, wishes, purposes of everybody else. +But when men act, they act in a common and public world. This is +the problem to which the theory of isolated and independent +conscious minds gave rise: Given feelings, ideas, desires, which +have nothing to do with one another, how can actions proceeding +from them be controlled in a social or public interest? Given an +egoistic consciousness, how can action which has regard for +others take place? + +Moral philosophies which have started from such premises have +developed four typical ways of dealing with the question. (i) +One method represents the survival of the older authoritative +position, with such concessions and compromises as the progress +of events has made absolutely inevitable. The deviations and +departures characterizing an individual are still looked upon +with suspicion; in principle they are evidences of the +disturbances, revolts, and corruptions inhering in an individual +apart from external authoritative guidance. In fact, as distinct +from principle, intellectual individualism is tolerated in +certain technical regions -- in subjects like mathematics and +physics and astronomy, and in the technical inventions resulting +therefrom. But the applicability of a similar method to morals, +social, legal, and political matters, is denied. In such +matters, dogma is still to be supreme; certain eternal truths +made known by revelation, intuition, or the wisdom of our +forefathers set unpassable limits to individual observation and +speculation. The evils from which society suffers are set down +to the efforts of misguided individuals to transgress these +boundaries. Between the physical and the moral sciences, lie +intermediate sciences of life, where the territory is only +grudgingly yielded to freedom of inquiry under the pressure of +accomplished fact. Although past history has demonstrated that +the possibilities of human good are widened and made more secure +by trusting to a responsibility built up within the very process +of inquiry, the "authority" theory sets apart a sacred domain of +truth which must be protected from the inroads of variation of +beliefs. Educationally, emphasis may not be put on eternal +truth, but it is put on the authority of book and teacher, and +individual variation is discouraged. + +(ii) Another method is sometimes termed rationalism or abstract +intellectualism. A formal logical faculty is set up in +distinction from tradition and history and all concrete subject +matter. This faculty of reason is endowed with power to +influence conduct directly. Since it deals wholly with general +and impersonal forms, when different persons act in accord with +logical findings, their activities will be externally consistent. +There is no doubt of the services rendered by this philosophy. +It was a powerful factor in the negative and dissolving criticism +of doctrines having nothing but tradition and class interest +behind them; it accustomed men to freedom of discussion and to +the notion that beliefs had to be submitted to criteria of +reasonableness. It undermined the power of prejudice, +superstition, and brute force, by habituating men to reliance +upon argument, discussion, and persuasion. It made for clarity +and order of exposition. But its influence was greater in +destruction of old falsities than in the construction of new ties +and associations among men. Its formal and empty nature, due to +conceiving reason as something complete in itself apart from +subject matter, its hostile attitude toward historical +institutions, its disregard of the influence of habit, instinct, +and emotion, as operative factors in life, left it impotent in +the suggestion of specific aims and methods. Bare logic, however +important in arranging and criticizing existing subject matter, +cannot spin new subject matter out of itself. In education, the +correlative is trust in general ready-made rules and principles +to secure agreement, irrespective of seeing to it that the +pupil's ideas really agree with one another. + +(iii) While this rationalistic philosophy was developing in +France, English thought appealed to the intelligent self-interest +of individuals in order to secure outer unity in the acts which +issued from isolated streams of consciousness. Legal +arrangements, especially penal administration, and governmental +regulations, were to be such as to prevent the acts which +proceeded from regard for one's own private sensations from +interfering with the feelings of others. Education was to +instill in individuals a sense that non-interference with others +and some degree of positive regard for their welfare were +necessary for security in the pursuit of one's own happiness. +Chief emphasis was put, however, upon trade as a means of +bringing the conduct of one into harmony with that of others. In +commerce, each aims at the satisfaction of his own wants, but can +gain his own profit only by furnishing some commodity or service +to another. Thus in aiming at the increase of his own private +pleasurable states of consciousness, he contributes to the +consciousness of others. Again there is no doubt that this view +expressed and furthered a heightened perception of the values of +conscious life, and a recognition that institutional arrangements +are ultimately to be judged by the contributions which they make +to intensifying and enlarging the scope of conscious experience. +It also did much to rescue work, industry, and mechanical devices +from the contempt in which they had been held in communities +founded upon the control of a leisure class. In both ways, this +philosophy promoted a wider and more democratic social concern. +But it was tainted by the narrowness of its fundamental premise: +the doctrine that every individual acts only from regard for his +own pleasures and pains, and that so-called generous and +sympathetic acts are only indirect ways of procuring and assuring +one's own comfort. In other words, it made explicit the +consequences inhering in any doctrine which makes mental life a +self-inclosed thing, instead of an attempt to redirect and +readapt common concerns. It made union among men a matter of +calculation of externals. It lent itself to the contemptuous +assertions of Carlyle that it was a doctrine of anarchy plus a +constable, and recognized only a "cash nexus" among men. The +educational equivalents of this doctrine in the uses made of +pleasurable rewards and painful penalties are only too obvious. +(iv) Typical German philosophy followed another path. It started +from what was essentially the rationalistic philosophy of +Descartes and his French successors. But while French thought +upon the whole developed the idea of reason in opposition to the +religious conception of a divine mind residing in individuals, +German thought (as in Hegel) made a synthesis of the two. Reason +is absolute. Nature is incarnate reason. History is reason in +its progressive unfolding in man. An individual becomes rational +only as he absorbs into himself the content of rationality in +nature and in social institutions. For an absolute reason is +not, like the reason of rationalism, purely formal and empty; as +absolute it must include all content within itself. Thus the +real problem is not that of controlling individual freedom so +that some measure of social order and concord may result, but of +achieving individual freedom through developing individual +convictions in accord with the universal law found in the +organization of the state as objective Reason. While this +philosophy is usually termed absolute or objective idealism, it +might better be termed, for educational purposes at least, +institutional idealism. (See ante, p. 59.) It idealized +historical institutions by conceiving them as incarnations of an +immanent absolute mind. There can be no doubt that this +philosophy was a powerful influence in rescuing philosophy in the +beginning of the nineteenth century from the isolated +individualism into which it had fallen in France and England. It +served also to make the organization of the state more +constructively interested in matters of public concern. It left +less to chance, less to mere individual logical conviction, less +to the workings of private self-interest. It brought +intelligence to bear upon the conduct of affairs; it accentuated +the need of nationally organized education in the interests of +the corporate state. It sanctioned and promoted freedom of +inquiry in all technical details of natural and historical +phenomena. But in all ultimate moral matters, it tended to +reinstate the principle of authority. It made for efficiency of +organization more than did any of the types of philosophy +previously mentioned, but it made no provision for free +experimental modification of this organization. Political +democracy, with its belief in the right of individual desire and +purpose to take part in readapting even the fundamental +constitution of society, was foreign to it. + +3. Educational Equivalents. It is not necessary to consider in +detail the educational counterparts of the various defects found +in these various types of philosophy. It suffices to say that in +general the school has been the institution which exhibited with +greatest clearness the assumed antithesis between purely +individualistic methods of learning and social action, and +between freedom and social control. The antithesis is reflected +in the absence of a social atmosphere and motive for learning, +and the consequent separation, in the conduct of the school, +between method of instruction and methods of government; and in +the slight opportunity afforded individual variations. When +learning is a phase of active undertakings which involve mutual +exchange, social control enters into the very process of +learning. When the social factor is absent, learning becomes a +carrying over of some presented material into a purely individual +consciousness, and there is no inherent reason why it should give +a more socialized direction to mental and emotional disposition. +There is tendency on the part of both the upholders and the +opponents of freedom in school to identify it with absence of +social direction, or, sometimes, with merely physical +unconstraint of movement. But the essence of the demand for +freedom is the need of conditions which will enable an individual +to make his own special contribution to a group interest, and to +partake of its activities in such ways that social guidance shall +be a matter of his own mental attitude, and not a mere +authoritative dictation of his acts. Because what is often +called discipline and "government" has to do with the external +side of conduct alone, a similar meaning is attached, by +reaction, to freedom. But when it is perceived that each idea +signifies the quality of mind expressed in action, the supposed +opposition between them falls away. Freedom means essentially +the part played by thinking -- which is personal -- in learning: +-- it means intellectual initiative, independence in observation, +judicious invention, foresight of consequences, and ingenuity of +adaptation to them. + +But because these are the mental phase of behavior, the needed +play of individuality -- or freedom -- cannot be separated from +opportunity for free play of physical movements. Enforced +physical quietude may be unfavorable to realization of a problem, +to undertaking the observations needed to define it, and to +performance of the experiments which test the ideas suggested. +Much has been said about the importance of "self-activity" in +education, but the conception has too frequently been restricted +to something merely internal -- something excluding the free use +of sensory and motor organs. Those who are at the stage of +learning from symbols, or who are engaged in elaborating the +implications of a problem or idea preliminary to more carefully +thought-out activity, may need little perceptible overt activity. +But the whole cycle of self-activity demands an opportunity for +investigation and experimentation, for trying out one's ideas +upon things, discovering what can be done with materials and +appliances. And this is incompatible with closely restricted +physical activity. Individual activity has sometimes been taken +as meaning leaving a pupil to work by himself or alone. Relief +from need of attending to what any one else is doing is truly +required to secure calm and concentration. Children, like grown +persons, require a judicious amount of being let alone. But the +time, place, and amount of such separate work is a matter of +detail, not of principle. There is no inherent opposition +between working with others and working as an individual. On the +contrary, certain capacities of an individual are not brought out +except under the stimulus of associating with others. That a +child must work alone and not engage in group activities in order +to be free and let his individuality develop, is a notion which +measures individuality by spatial distance and makes a physical +thing of it. + +Individuality as a factor to be respected in education has a +double meaning. In the first place, one is mentally an +individual only as he has his own purpose and problem, and does +his own thinking. The phrase "think for one's self" is a +pleonasm. Unless one does it for one's self, it isn't thinking. +Only by a pupil's own observations, reflections, framing and +testing of suggestions can what he already knows be amplified and +rectified. Thinking is as much an individual matter as is the +digestion of food. In the second place, there are variations of +point of view, of appeal of objects, and of mode of attack, from +person to person. When these variations are suppressed in the +alleged interests of uniformity, and an attempt is made to have a +single mold of method of study and recitation, mental confusion +and artificiality inevitably result. Originality is gradually +destroyed, confidence in one's own quality of mental operation is +undermined, and a docile subjection to the opinion of others is +inculcated, or else ideas run wild. The harm is greater now than +when the whole community was governed by customary beliefs, +because the contrast between methods of learning in school and +those relied upon outside the school is greater. That systematic +advance in scientific discovery began when individuals were +allowed, and then encouraged, to utilize their own peculiarities +of response to subject matter, no one will deny. If it is said +in objection, that pupils in school are not capable of any such +originality, and hence must be confined to appropriating and +reproducing things already known by the better informed, the +reply is twofold. (i) We are concerned with originality of +attitude which is equivalent to the unforced response of one's +own individuality, not with originality as measured by product. +No one expects the young to make original discoveries of just the +same facts and principles as are embodied in the sciences of +nature and man. But it is not unreasonable to expect that +learning may take place under such conditions that from the +standpoint of the learner there is genuine discovery. While +immature students will not make discoveries from the standpoint +of advanced students, they make them from their own standpoint, +whenever there is genuine learning. (ii) In the normal process +of becoming acquainted with subject matter already known to +others, even young pupils react in unexpected ways. There is +something fresh, something not capable of being fully anticipated +by even the most experienced teacher, in the ways they go at the +topic, and in the particular ways in which things strike them. +Too often all this is brushed aside as irrelevant; pupils are +deliberately held to rehearsing material in the exact form in +which the older person conceives it. The result is that what is +instinctively original in individuality, that which marks off one +from another, goes unused and undirected. Teaching then ceases +to be an educative process for the teacher. At most he learns +simply to improve his existing technique; he does not get new +points of view; he fails to experience any intellectual +companionship. Hence both teaching and learning tend to become +conventional and mechanical with all the nervous strain on both +sides therein implied. + +As maturity increases and as the student has a greater background +of familiarity upon which a new topic is projected, the scope of +more or less random physical experimentation is reduced. +Activity is defined or specialized in certain channels. To the +eyes of others, the student may be in a position of complete +physical quietude, because his energies are confined to nerve +channels and to the connected apparatus of the eyes and vocal +organs. But because this attitude is evidence of intense mental +concentration on the part of the trained person, it does not +follow that it should be set up as a model for students who still +have to find their intellectual way about. And even with the +adult, it does not cover the whole circuit of mental energy. It +marks an intermediate period, capable of being lengthened with +increased mastery of a subject, but always coming between an +earlier period of more general and conspicuous organic action and +a later time of putting to use what has been apprehended. + +When, however, education takes cognizance of the union of mind +and body in acquiring knowledge, we are not obliged to insist +upon the need of obvious, or external, freedom. It is enough to +identify the freedom which is involved in teaching and studying +with the thinking by which what a person already knows and +believes is enlarged and refined. If attention is centered upon +the conditions which have to be met in order to secure a +situation favorable to effective thinking, freedom will take care +of itself. The individual who has a question which being really +a question to him instigates his curiosity, which feeds his +eagerness for information that will help him cope with it, and +who has at command an equipment which will permit these interests +to take effect, is intellectually free. Whatever initiative and +imaginative vision he possesses will be called into play and +control his impulses and habits. His own purposes will direct +his actions. Otherwise, his seeming attention, his docility, his +memorizings and reproductions, will partake of intellectual +servility. Such a condition of intellectual subjection is needed +for fitting the masses into a society where the many are not +expected to have aims or ideas of their own, but to take orders +from the few set in authority. It is not adapted to a society +which intends to be democratic. + +Summary. True individualism is a product of the relaxation of +the grip of the authority of custom and traditions as standards +of belief. Aside from sporadic instances, like the height of +Greek thought, it is a comparatively modern manifestation. Not +but that there have always been individual diversities, but that +a society dominated by conservative custom represses them or at +least does not utilize them and promote them. For various +reasons, however, the new individualism was interpreted +philosophically not as meaning development of agencies for +revising and transforming previously accepted beliefs, but as an +assertion that each individual's mind was complete in isolation +from everything else. In the theoretical phase of philosophy, +this produced the epistemological problem: the question as to the +possibility of any cognitive relationship of the individual to +the world. In its practical phase, it generated the problem of +the possibility of a purely individual consciousness acting on +behalf of general or social interests, -- the problem of social +direction. While the philosophies which have been elaborated to +deal with these questions have not affected education directly, +the assumptions underlying them have found expression in the +separation frequently made between study and government and +between freedom of individuality and control by others. +Regarding freedom, the important thing to bear in mind is that it +designates a mental attitude rather than external unconstraint of +movements, but that this quality of mind cannot develop without a +fair leeway of movements in exploration, experimentation, +application, etc. A society based on custom will utilize +individual variations only up to a limit of conformity with +usage; uniformity is the chief ideal within each class. A +progressive society counts individual variations as precious +since it finds in them the means of its own growth. Hence a +democratic society must, in consistency with its ideal, allow for +intellectual freedom and the play of diverse gifts and interests +in its educational measures. + + +Chapter Twenty-Three: Vocational Aspects of Education + +1. The Meaning of Vocation. At the present time the conflict of +philosophic theories focuses in discussion of the proper place +and function of vocational factors in education. The +bald statement that significant differences in fundamental +philosophical conceptions find their chief issue in connection +with this point may arouse incredulity: there seems to be too +great a gap between the remote and general terms in which +philosophic ideas are formulated and the practical and concrete +details of vocational education. But a mental review of the +intellectual presuppositions underlying the oppositions in +education of labor and leisure, theory and practice, body and +mind, mental states and the world, will show that they culminate +in the antithesis of vocational and cultural education. +Traditionally, liberal culture has been linked to the notions of +leisure, purely contemplative knowledge and a spiritual activity +not involving the active use of bodily organs. Culture has also +tended, latterly, to be associated with a purely private +refinement, a cultivation of certain states and attitudes of +consciousness, separate from either social direction or service. +It has been an escape from the former, and a solace for the +necessity of the latter. + +So deeply entangled are these philosophic dualisms with the whole +subject of vocational education, that it is necessary to define +the meaning of vocation with some fullness in order to avoid the +impression that an education which centers about it is narrowly +practical, if not merely pecuniary. A vocation means nothing but +such a direction of life activities as renders them perceptibly +significant to a person, because of the consequences they +accomplish, and also useful to his associates. The opposite of a +career is neither leisure nor culture, but aimlessness, +capriciousness, the absence of cumulative achievement in +experience, on the personal side, and idle display, parasitic +dependence upon the others, on the social side. Occupation is a +concrete term for continuity. It includes the development of +artistic capacity of any kind, of special scientific ability, of +effective citizenship, as well as professional and business +occupations, to say nothing of mechanical labor or engagement in +gainful pursuits. + +We must avoid not only limitation of conception of vocation to +the occupations where immediately tangible commodities are +produced, but also the notion that vocations are distributed in +an exclusive way, one and only one to each person. Such +restricted specialism is impossible; nothing could be more absurd +than to try to educate individuals with an eye to only one line +of activity. In the first place, each individual has of +necessity a variety of callings, in each of which he should be +intelligently effective; and in the second place any one +occupation loses its meaning and becomes a routine keeping busy +at something in the degree in which it is isolated from other +interests. (i) No one is just an artist and nothing else, and in +so far as one approximates that condition, he is so much the less +developed human being; he is a kind of monstrosity. He must, at +some period of his life, be a member of a family; he must have +friends and companions; he must either support himself or be +supported by others, and thus he has a business career. He is a +member of some organized political unit, and so on. We naturally +name his vocation from that one of the callings which +distinguishes him, rather than from those which he has in common +with all others. But we should not allow ourselves to be so +subject to words as to ignore and virtually deny his other +callings when it comes to a consideration of the vocational +phases of education. + +(ii) As a man's vocation as artist is but the emphatically +specialized phase of his diverse and variegated vocational +activities, so his efficiency in it, in the humane sense of +efficiency, is determined by its association with other callings. +A person must have experience, he must live, if his artistry is +to be more than a technical accomplishment. He cannot find the +subject matter of his artistic activity within his art; this must +be an expression of what he suffers and enjoys in other +relationships -- a thing which depends in turn upon the alertness +and sympathy of his interests. What is true of an artist is true +of any other special calling. There is doubtless--in general +accord with the principle of habit -- a tendency for every +distinctive vocation to become too dominant, too exclusive and +absorbing in its specialized aspect. This means emphasis upon +skill or technical method at the expense of meaning. Hence it is +not the business of education to foster this tendency, but rather +to safeguard against it, so that the scientific inquirer shall +not be merely the scientist, the teacher merely the pedagogue, +the clergyman merely one who wears the cloth, and so on. + +2. The Place of Vocational Aims in Education. Bearing in mind +the varied and connected content of the vocation, and the broad +background upon which a particular calling is projected, we shall +now consider education for the more distinctive activity of an +individual. + +1. An occupation is the only thing which balances the +distinctive capacity of an individual with his social service. +To find out what one is fitted to do and to secure an opportunity +to do it is the key to happiness. Nothing is more tragic than +failure to discover one's true business in life, or to find that +one has drifted or been forced by circumstance into an +uncongenial calling. A right occupation means simply that the +aptitudes of a person are in adequate play, working with the +minimum of friction and the maximum of satisfaction. With +reference to other members of a community, this adequacy of +action signifies, of course, that they are getting the best +service the person can render. It is generally believed, for +example, that slave labor was ultimately wasteful even from the +purely economic point of view -- that there was not sufficient +stimulus to direct the energies of slaves, and that there was +consequent wastage. Moreover, since slaves were confined to +certain prescribed callings, much talent must have remained +unavailable to the community, and hence there was a dead loss. +Slavery only illustrates on an obvious scale what happens in some +degree whenever an individual does not find himself in his work. +And he cannot completely find himself when vocations are looked +upon with contempt, and a conventional ideal of a culture which +is essentially the same for all is maintained. Plato (ante, p. +88) laid down the fundamental principle of a philosophy of +education when he asserted that it was the business of education +to discover what each person is good for, and to train him to +mastery of that mode of excellence, because such development +would also secure the fulfillment of social needs in the most +harmonious way. His error was not in qualitative principle, but +in his limited conception of the scope of vocations socially +needed; a limitation of vision which reacted to obscure his +perception of the infinite variety of capacities found in +different individuals. + +2. An occupation is a continuous activity having a purpose. +Education through occupations consequently combines within itself +more of the factors conducive to learning than any other method. +It calls instincts and habits into play; it is a foe to passive +receptivity. It has an end in view; results are to be +accomplished. Hence it appeals to thought; it demands that an +idea of an end be steadily maintained, so that activity cannot be +either routine or capricious. Since the movement of activity +must be progressive, leading from one stage to another, +observation and ingenuity are required at each stage to overcome +obstacles and to discover and readapt means of execution. In +short, an occupation, pursued under conditions where the +realization of the activity rather than merely the external +product is the aim, fulfills the requirements which were laid +down earlier in connection with the discussion of aims, interest, +and thinking. (See Chapters VIII, X, XII.) + +A calling is also of necessity an organizing principle for +information and ideas; for knowledge and intellectual growth. It +provides an axis which runs through an immense diversity of +detail; it causes different experiences, facts, items of +information to fall into order with one another. The lawyer, the +physician, the laboratory investigator in some branch of +chemistry, the parent, the citizen interested in his own +locality, has a constant working stimulus to note and relate +whatever has to do with his concern. He unconsciously, from the +motivation of his occupation, reaches out for all relevant +information, and holds to it. The vocation acts as both magnet +to attract and as glue to hold. Such organization of knowledge +is vital, because it has reference to needs; it is so expressed +and readjusted in action that it never becomes stagnant. No +classification, no selection and arrangement of facts, which is +consciously worked out for purely abstract ends, can ever compare +in solidity or effectiveness with that knit under the stress of +an occupation; in comparison the former sort is formal, +superficial, and cold. + +3. The only adequate training for occupations is training +through occupations. The principle stated early in this book +(see Chapter VI) that the educative process is its own end, and +that the only sufficient preparation for later responsibilities +comes by making the most of immediately present life, applies in +full force to the vocational phases of education. The dominant +vocation of all human beings at all times is living -- +intellectual and moral growth. In childhood and youth, with +their relative freedom from economic stress, this fact is naked +and unconcealed. To predetermine some future occupation for +which education is to be a strict preparation is to injure the +possibilities of present development and thereby to reduce the +adequacy of preparation for a future right employment. To repeat +the principle we have had occasion to appeal to so often, such +training may develop a machine-like skill in routine lines (it is +far from being sure to do so, since it may develop distaste, +aversion, and carelessness), but it will be at the expense of +those qualities of alert observation and coherent and ingenious +planning which make an occupation intellectually rewarding. In +an autocratically managed society, it is often a conscious object +to prevent the development of freedom and responsibility, a few +do the planning and ordering, the others follow directions and +are deliberately confined to narrow and prescribed channels of +endeavor. However much such a scheme may inure to the prestige +and profit of a class, it is evident that it limits the +development of the subject class; hardens and confines the +opportunities for learning through experience of the master +class, and in both ways hampers the life of the society as a +whole. (See ante, p. 260.) + +The only alternative is that all the earlier preparation for +vocations be indirect rather than direct; namely, through +engaging in those active occupations which are indicated by the +needs and interests of the pupil at the time. Only in this way +can there be on the part of the educator and of the one educated +a genuine discovery of personal aptitudes so that the proper +choice of a specialized pursuit in later life may be indicated. +Moreover, the discovery of capacity and aptitude will be a +constant process as long as growth continues. It is a +conventional and arbitrary view which assumes that discovery of +the work to be chosen for adult life is made once for all at some +particular date. One has discovered in himself, say, an +interest, intellectual and social, in the things which have to do +with engineering and has decided to make that his calling. At +most, this only blocks out in outline the field in which further +growth is to be directed. It is a sort of rough sketch for use +in direction of further activities. It is the discovery of a +profession in the sense in which Columbus discovered America when +he touched its shores. Future explorations of an indefinitely +more detailed and extensive sort remain to be made. When +educators conceive vocational guidance as something which leads +up to a definitive, irretrievable, and complete choice, both +education and the chosen vocation are likely to be rigid, +hampering further growth. In so far, the calling chosen will be +such as to leave the person concerned in a permanently +subordinate position, executing the intelligence of others who +have a calling which permits more flexible play and readjustment. +And while ordinary usages of language may not justify terming a +flexible attitude of readjustment a choice of a new and further +calling, it is such in effect. If even adults have to be on the +lookout to see that their calling does not shut down on them and +fossilize them, educators must certainly be careful that the +vocational preparation of youth is such as to engage them in a +continuous reorganization of aims and methods. + +3. Present Opportunities and Dangers. In the past, education +has been much more vocational in fact than in name. (i) The +education of the masses was distinctly utilitarian. It was +called apprenticeship rather than education, or else just +learning from experience. The schools devoted themselves to the +three R's in the degree in which ability to go through the forms +of reading, writing, and figuring were common elements in all +kinds of labor. Taking part in some special line of work, under +the direction of others, was the out-of-school phase of this +education. The two supplemented each other; the school work in +its narrow and formal character was as much a part of +apprenticeship to a calling as that explicitly so termed. + +(ii) To a considerable extent, the education of the dominant +classes was essentially vocational -- it only happened that their +pursuits of ruling and of enjoying were not called professions. +For only those things were named vocations or employments which +involved manual labor, laboring for a reward in keep, or its +commuted money equivalent, or the rendering of personal services +to specific persons. For a long time, for example, the +profession of the surgeon and physician ranked almost with that +of the valet or barber -- partly because it had so much to do +with the body, and partly because it involved rendering direct +service for pay to some definite person. But if we go behind +words, the business of directing social concerns, whether +politically or economically, whether in war or peace, is as much +a calling as anything else; and where education has not been +completely under the thumb of tradition, higher schools in the +past have been upon the whole calculated to give preparation for +this business. Moreover, display, the adornment of person, the +kind of social +companionship and entertainment which give prestige, and the +spending of money, have been made into definite callings. +Unconsciously to themselves the higher institutions of learning +have been made to contribute to preparation for these +employments. Even at present, what is called higher education is +for a certain class (much smaller than it once was) mainly +preparation for engaging effectively in these pursuits. + +In other respects, it is largely, especially in the most advanced +work, training for the calling of teaching and special research. +By a peculiar superstition, education which has to do chiefly +with preparation for the pursuit of conspicuous idleness, for +teaching, and for literary callings, and for leadership, has been +regarded as non-vocational and even as peculiarly cultural. The +literary training which indirectly fits for authorship, whether +of books, newspaper editorials, or magazine articles, is +especially subject to this superstition: many a teacher and +author writes and argues in behalf of a cultural and humane +education against the encroachments of a specialized practical +education, without recognizing that his own education, which he +calls liberal, has been mainly training for his own particular +calling. He has simply got into the habit of regarding his own +business as essentially cultural and of overlooking the cultural +possibilities of other employments. At the bottom of these +distinctions is undoubtedly the tradition which recognizes as +employment only those pursuits where one is responsible for his +work to a specific employer, rather than to the ultimate +employer, the community. + +There are, however, obvious causes for the present conscious +emphasis upon vocational education -- for the disposition to make +explicit and deliberate vocational implications previously tacit. +(i) In the first place, there is an increased esteem, in +democratic communities, of whatever has to do with manual labor, +commercial occupations, and the rendering of tangible services to +society. In theory, men and women are now expected to do +something in return for their support -- intellectual and +economic -- by society. Labor is extolled; service is a +much-lauded moral ideal. While there is still much admiration +and envy of those who can pursue lives of idle conspicuous +display, better moral sentiment condemns such lives. Social +responsibility for the use of time and personal capacity is more +generally recognized than it used to be. + +(ii) In the second place, those vocations which are specifically +industrial have gained tremendously in importance in the last +century and a half. Manufacturing and commerce are no longer +domestic and local, and consequently more or less incidental, but +are world-wide. They engage the best energies of an increasingly +large number of persons. The manufacturer, banker, and captain +of industry have practically displaced a hereditary landed gentry +as the immediate directors of social affairs. The problem of +social readjustment is openly industrial, having to do with the +relations of capital and labor. The great increase in the social +importance of conspicuous industrial processes has inevitably +brought to the front questions having to do with the relationship +of schooling to industrial life. No such vast social +readjustment could occur without offering a challenge to an +education inherited from different social conditions, and without +putting up to education new problems. + +(iii) In the third place, there is the fact already repeatedly +mentioned: Industry has ceased to be essentially an empirical, +rule-of-thumb procedure, handed down by custom. Its technique is +now technological: that is to say, based upon machinery resulting +from discoveries in mathematics, physics, chemistry, +bacteriology, etc. The economic revolution has stimulated +science by setting problems for solution, by producing greater +intellectual respect for mechanical appliances. And industry +received back payment from science with compound interest. As a +consequence, industrial occupations have infinitely greater +intellectual content and infinitely larger cultural possibilities +than they used to possess. The demand for such education as will +acquaint workers with the scientific and social bases and +bearings of their pursuits becomes imperative, since those who +are without it inevitably sink to the role of appendages to the +machines they operate. Under the old regime all workers in a +craft were approximately equals in their knowledge and outlook. +Personal knowledge and ingenuity were developed within at least a +narrow range, because work was done with tools under the direct +command of the worker. Now the operator has to adjust himself to +his machine, instead of his tool to his own purposes. While the +intellectual possibilities of industry have multiplied, +industrial conditions tend to make industry, for great masses, +less of an educative resource than it was in the days of hand +production for local markets. The burden of realizing the +intellectual possibilities inhering in work is thus thrown back +on the school. + +(iv) In the fourth place, the pursuit of +knowledge has become, in science, more experimental, less +dependent upon literary tradition, and less associated with +dialectical methods of reasoning, and with symbols. As a result, +the subject matter of industrial occupation presents not only +more of the content of science than it used to, but greater +opportunity for familiarity with the method by which knowledge is +made. The ordinary worker in the factory is of course under too +immediate economic pressure to have a chance to produce a +knowledge like that of the worker in the laboratory. But in +schools, association with machines and industrial processes may +be had under conditions where the chief conscious concern of the +students is insight. The separation of shop and laboratory, +where these conditions are fulfilled, is largely conventional, +the laboratory having the advantage of permitting the following +up of any intellectual interest a problem may suggest; the shop +the advantage of emphasizing the social bearings of the +scientific principle, as well as, with many pupils, of +stimulating a livelier interest. + +(v) Finally, the advances which have been made in the psychology +of learning in general and of childhood in particular fall into +line with the increased importance of industry in life. For +modern psychology emphasizes the radical importance of primitive +unlearned instincts of exploring, experimentation, and "trying +on." It reveals that learning is not the work of something +ready-made called mind, but that mind itself is an organization +of original capacities into activities having significance. As +we have already seen (ante, p. 204), in older pupils work is to +educative development of raw native activities what play is for +younger pupils. Moreover, the passage from play to work should +be gradual, not involving a radical change of attitude but +carrying into work the elements of play, plus continuous +reorganization in behalf of greater control. The reader will +remark that these five points practically resume the main +contentions of the previous part of the work. Both practically +and philosophically, the key to the present educational situation +lies in a gradual reconstruction of school materials and methods +so as to utilize various forms of occupation typifying social +callings, and to bring out their intellectual and moral content. +This reconstruction must relegate purely literary methods -- +including textbooks--and dialectical methods to the position of +necessary auxiliary tools in the intelligent development of +consecutive and cumulative activities. + +But our discussion has emphasized the fact that this educational +reorganization cannot be accomplished by merely trying to give a +technical preparation for industries and professions as they now +operate, much less by merely reproducing existing industrial +conditions in the school. The problem is not that of making the +schools an adjunct to manufacture and commerce, but of utilizing +the factors of industry to make school life more active, more +full of immediate meaning, more connected with out-of-school +experience. The problem is not easy of solution. There is a +standing danger that education will perpetuate the older +traditions for a select few, and effect its adjustment to the +newer economic conditions more or less on the basis of +acquiescence in the untransformed, unrationalized, and +unsocialized phases of our defective industrial regime. Put in +concrete terms, there is danger that vocational education will be +interpreted in theory and practice as trade education: as a means +of securing technical efficiency in specialized future pursuits. +Education would then become an instrument of perpetuating +unchanged the existing industrial order of society, instead of +operating as a means of its transformation. The desired +transformation is not difficult to define in a formal way. It +signifies a society in which every person shall be occupied in +something which makes the lives of others better worth living, +and which accordingly makes the ties which bind persons together +more perceptible -- which breaks down the barriers of distance +between them. It denotes a state of affairs in which the +interest of each in his work is uncoerced and intelligent: based +upon its congeniality to his own aptitudes. It goes without +saying that we are far from such a social state; in a literal and +quantitative sense, we may never arrive at it. But in principle, +the quality of social changes already accomplished lies in this +direction. There are more ample resources for its achievement +now than ever there have been before. No insuperable obstacles, +given the intelligent will for its realization, stand in the way. + +Success or failure in its realization depends more upon the +adoption of educational methods calculated to effect the change +than upon anything else. For the change is essentially a change +in the quality of mental disposition -- an educative change. +This does not mean that we can change character and mind by +direct instruction and exhortation, apart from a change in +industrial and political conditions. Such a conception +contradicts our basic idea that character and mind are attitudes +of participative response in social affairs. But it does mean +that we may produce in schools a projection in type of the +society we should like to realize, and by forming minds in accord +with it gradually modify the larger and more recalcitrant +features of adult society. Sentimentally, it may seem harsh to +say that the greatest evil of the present regime is not found in +poverty and in the suffering which it entails, but in the fact +that so many persons have callings which make no appeal to them, +which are pursued simply for the money reward that accrues. For +such callings constantly provoke one to aversion, ill will, and a +desire to slight and evade. Neither men's hearts nor their minds +are in their work. On the other hand, those who are not only +much better off in worldly goods, but who are in excessive, if +not monopolistic, control of the activities of the many are shut +off from equality and generality of social intercourse. They are +stimulated to pursuits of indulgence and display; they try to +make up for the distance which separates them from others by the +impression of force and superior possession and enjoyment which +they can make upon others. + +It would be quite possible for a narrowly conceived scheme of +vocational education to perpetuate this division in a hardened +form. Taking its stand upon a dogma of social predestination, it +would assume that some are to continue to be wage earners under +economic conditions like the present, and would aim simply to +give them what is termed a trade education -- that is, greater +technical efficiency. Technical proficiency is often sadly +lacking, and is surely desirable on all accounts -- not merely +for the sake of the production of better goods at less cost, but +for the greater happiness found in work. For no one cares for +what one cannot half do. But there is a great difference between +a proficiency limited to immediate work, and a competency +extended to insight into its social bearings; between efficiency +in carrying out the plans of others and in one forming one's own. +At present, intellectual and emotional limitation characterizes +both the employing and the employed class. While the latter +often have no concern with their occupation beyond the money +return it brings, the former's outlook may be confined to profit +and power. The latter interest generally involves much greater +intellectual initiation and larger survey of conditions. For it +involves the direction and combination of a large number of +diverse factors, while the interest in wages is restricted to +certain direct muscular movements. But none the less there is a +limitation of intelligence to technical and non- humane, +non-liberal channels, so far as the work does not take in its +social bearings. And when the animating motive is desire for +private profit or personal power, this limitation is inevitable. +In fact, the advantage in immediate social sympathy and humane +disposition often lies with the economically unfortunate, who +have not experienced the hardening effects of a one-sided control +of the affairs of others. + +Any scheme for vocational education which takes its point of +departure from the industrial regime that now exists, is likely +to assume and to perpetuate its divisions and weaknesses, and +thus to become an instrument in accomplishing the feudal dogma of +social predestination. Those who are in a position to make their +wishes good, will demand a liberal, a cultural occupation, and +one which fits for directive power the youth in whom they are +directly interested. To split the system, and give to others, +less fortunately situated, an education conceived mainly as +specific trade preparation, is to treat the schools as an agency +for transferring the older division of labor and leisure, culture +and service, mind and body, directed and directive class, into a +society nominally democratic. Such a vocational education +inevitably discounts the scientific and historic human +connections of the materials and processes dealt with. To +include such things in narrow trade education would be to waste +time; concern for them would not be "practical." They are +reserved for those who have leisure at command--the leisure due +to superior economic resources. Such things might even be +dangerous to the interests of the controlling class, arousing +discontent or ambitions "beyond the station" of those working +under the direction of others. But an education which +acknowledges the full intellectual and social meaning of a +vocation would include instruction in the historic background of +present conditions; training in science to give intelligence and +initiative in dealing with material and agencies of production; +and study of economics, civics, and politics, to bring the future +worker into touch with the problems of the day and the various +methods proposed for its improvement. Above all, it would train +power of readaptation to changing conditions so that future +workers would not become blindly subject to a fate imposed upon +them. This ideal has to contend not only with the inertia of +existing educational traditions, but also with the opposition of +those who are entrenched in command of the industrial machinery, +and who realize that such an educational system if made general +would threaten their ability to use others for their own ends. +But this very fact is the presage of a more equitable and +enlightened social order, for it gives evidence of the dependence +of social reorganization upon educational reconstruction. It is +accordingly an encouragement to those believing in a better order +to undertake the promotion of a vocational education which does +not subject youth to the demands and standards of the present +system, but which utilizes its scientific and social factors to +develop a courageous intelligence, and to make intelligence +practical and executive. + +Summary. A vocation signifies any form of continuous activity +which renders service to others and engages personal powers in +behalf of the accomplishment of results. The question of the +relation of vocation to education brings to a focus the various +problems previously discussed regarding the connection of thought +with bodily activity; of individual conscious development with +associated life; of theoretical culture with practical behavior +having definite results; of making a livelihood with the worthy +enjoyment of leisure. In general, the opposition to recognition +of the vocational phases of life in education (except for the +utilitarian three R's in elementary schooling) accompanies the +conservation of aristocratic ideals of the past. But, at the +present juncture, there is a movement in behalf of something +called vocational training which, if carried into effect, would +harden these ideas into a form adapted to the existing industrial +regime. This movement would continue the traditional liberal +or cultural education for the few economically able to enjoy it, +and would give to the masses a narrow technical trade education +for specialized callings, carried on under the control of others. +This scheme denotes, of course, simply a perpetuation of the +older social division, with its counterpart intellectual and +moral dualisms. But it means its continuation under conditions +where it has much less justification for existence. For +industrial life is now so dependent upon science and so +intimately affects all forms of social intercourse, that there is +an opportunity to utilize it for development of mind and +character. Moreover, a right educational use of it would react +upon intelligence and interest so as to modify, in connection +with legislation and administration, the socially obnoxious +features of the present industrial and commercial order. It +would turn the increasing fund of social sympathy to constructive +account, instead of leaving it a somewhat blind philanthropic +sentiment. + +It would give those who engage in industrial callings desire and +ability to share in social control, and ability to become masters +of their industrial fate. It would enable them to saturate with +meaning the technical and mechanical features which are so marked +a feature of our machine system of production and distribution. +So much for those who now have the poorer economic opportunities. +With the representatives of the more privileged portion of the +community, it would increase sympathy for labor, create a +disposition of mind which can discover the culturing elements in +useful activity, and increase a sense of social responsibility. +The crucial position of the question of vocational education at +present is due, in other words, to the fact that it concentrates +in a specific issue two fundamental questions: -- Whether +intelligence is best exercised apart from or within activity +which puts nature to human use, and whether individual culture is +best secured under egoistic or social conditions. No discussion +of details is undertaken in this chapter, because this +conclusion but summarizes the discussion of the previous +chapters, XV to XXII, inclusive. + + +Chapter Twenty-four: Philosophy of Education + +1. A Critical Review. Although we are dealing with the +philosophy of education, DO definition of philosophy has yet been +given; nor has there been an explicit consideration of the nature +of a philosophy of education. This topic is now introduced by a +summary account of the logical order implied in the previous +discussions, for the purpose of bringing out the philosophic +issues involved. Afterwards we shall undertake a brief +discussion, in more specifically philosophical terms, of the +theories of knowledge and of morals implied in different +educational ideals as they operate in practice. The prior +chapters fall logically into three parts. + +I. The first chapters deal with education as a social need and +function. Their purpose is to outline the general features of +education as the process by which social groups maintain their +continuous existence. Education was shown to be a process of +renewal of the meanings of experience through a process of +transmission, partly incidental to the ordinary companionship or +intercourse of adults and youth, partly deliberately instituted +to effect social continuity. This process was seen to involve +control and growth of both the immature individual and the group +in which he lives. + +This consideration was formal in that it took no specific account +of the quality of the social group concerned--the kind of society +aiming at its own perpetuation through education. The general +discussion was then specified by application to social groups +which are intentionally progressive, and which aim at a greater +variety of mutually shared interests in distinction from those +which aim simply at the preservation of established customs. +Such societies were found to be democratic in quality, because of +the greater freedom allowed the constituent members, and the +conscious need of securing in individuals a consciously +socialized interest, instead of trusting mainly to the force of +customs operating under the control of a superior class. The +sort of education appropriate to the development of a democratic +community was then explicitly taken as the criterion of the +further, more detailed analysis of education. + +II. This analysis, based upon the democratic criterion, was seen +to imply the ideal of a continuous reconstruction or reorganizing +of experience, of such a nature as to increase its recognized +meaning or social content, and as to increase the capacity of +individuals to act as directive guardians of this reorganization. +(See Chapters VI-VII.) This distinction was then used to outline +the respective characters of subject matter and method. It also +defined their unity, since method in study and learning upon this +basis is just the consciously directed movement of reorganization +of the subject matter of experience. From this point of view the +main principles of method and subject matter of learning were +developed (Chapters XIII-XIV.) + +III. Save for incidental criticisms designed to illustrate +principles by force of contrast, this phase of the discussion +took for granted the democratic criterion and its application in +present social life. In the subsequent chapters (XVIII-XXII) we +considered the present limitation of its actual realization. +They were found to spring from the notion that experience +consists of a variety of segregated domains, or interests, each +having its own independent value, material, and method, each +checking every other, and, when each is kept properly bounded by +the others, forming a kind of "balance of powers" in education. +We then proceeded to an analysis of the various assumptions +underlying this segregation. On the practical side, they were +found to have their cause in the divisions of society into more +or less rigidly marked-off classes and groups -- in other words, +in obstruction to full and flexible social interaction and +intercourse. These social ruptures of continuity were seen to +have their intellectual formulation in various dualisms or +antitheses -- such as that of labor and leisure, practical and +intellectual activity, man and nature, individuality and +association, culture and vocation. In this discussion, we found +that these different issues have their counterparts in +formulations which have been made in classic philosophic systems; +and that they involve the chief problems of philosophy -- such as +mind (or spirit) and matter, body and mind, the mind and the +world, the individual and his relationships to others, etc. +Underlying these various separations we found the fundamental +assumption to be an isolation of mind from activity involving +physical conditions, bodily organs, material appliances, and +natural objects. Consequently, there was indicated a philosophy +which recognizes the origin, place, and function of mind in an +activity which controls the environment. Thus we have completed +the circuit and returned to the conceptions of the first portion +of this book: such as the biological continuity of human impulses +and instincts with natural energies; the dependence of the growth +of mind upon participation in conjoint activities having a common +purpose; the influence of the physical environment through the +uses made of it in the social medium; the necessity of +utilization of individual variations in desire and thinking for a +progressively developing society; the essential unity of method +and subject matter; the intrinsic continuity of ends and means; +the recognition of mind as thinking which perceives and tests the +meanings of behavior. These conceptions are consistent with the +philosophy which sees intelligence to be the purposive +reorganization, through action, of the material of experience; +and they are inconsistent with each of the dualistic philosophies +mentioned. + +2. The Nature of Philosophy. Our further task is to extract and +make explicit the idea of philosophy implicit in these +considerations. We have already virtually described, though not +defined, philosophy in terms of the problems with which it deals: +and that thing nor even to the aggregate of known things, but to +the considerations which govern conduct. + +Hence philosophy cannot be defined simply from the side of +subject matter. For this reason, the definition of such +conceptions as generality, totality, and ultimateness is most +readily reached from the side of the disposition toward the world +which they connote. In any literal and quantitative sense, these +terms do not apply to the subject matter of knowledge, for +completeness and finality are out of the question. The very +nature of experience as an ongoing, changing process forbids. In +a less rigid sense, they apply to science rather than to +philosophy. For obviously it is to mathematics, physics, +chemistry, biology, anthropology, history, etc. that we must go, +not to philosophy, to find out the facts of the world. It is for +the sciences to say what generalizations are tenable about the +world and what they specifically are. But when we ask what sort +of permanent disposition of action toward the world the +scientific disclosures exact of us we are raising a philosophic +question. + + +From this point of view, "totality" does not mean the hopeless +task of a quantitative summation. It means rather consistency of +mode of response in reference to the plurality of events which +occur. Consistency does not mean literal identity; for since the +same thing does not happen twice, an exact repetition of a +reaction involves some maladjustment. Totality means +continuity -- the carrying on of a former habit of action with +the readaptation necessary to keep it alive and growing. Instead +of signifying a ready-made complete scheme of action, it means +keeping the balance in a multitude of diverse actions, so that +each borrows and gives significance to every other. Any person +who is open-minded and sensitive to new perceptions, and who has +concentration and responsibility in connecting them has, in so +far, a philosophic disposition. One of the popular senses of +philosophy is calm and endurance in the face of difficulty and +loss; it is even supposed to be a power to bear pain without +complaint. This meaning is a tribute to the influence of the +Stoic philosophy rather than an attribute of philosophy in +general. But in so far as it suggests that the wholeness +characteristic of philosophy is a power to learn, or to extract +meaning, from even the unpleasant vicissitudes of experience and +to embody what is learned in an ability to go on learning, it is +justified in any scheme. An analogous interpretation +applies to the generality and ultimateness of philosophy. Taken +literally, they are absurd pretensions; they indicate insanity. +Finality does not mean, however, that experience is ended and +exhausted, but means the disposition to penetrate to deeper +levels of meaning -- to go below the surface and find out the +connections of any event or object, and to keep at it. In like +manner the philosophic attitude is general in the sense that it +is averse to taking anything as isolated; it tries to place an +act in its context -- which constitutes its significance. +It is of assistance to connect philosophy with thinking in its +distinction from knowledge. Knowledge, grounded knowledge, is +science; it represents objects which have been settled, ordered, +disposed of rationally. Thinking, on the other hand, is +prospective in reference. It is occasioned by an unsettlement +and it aims at overcoming a disturbance. Philosophy is thinking +what the known demands of us -- what responsive attitude it +exacts. It is an idea of what is possible, not a record of +accomplished fact. Hence it is hypothetical, like all thinking. +It presents an assignment of something to be done -- something to +be tried. Its value lies not in furnishing solutions (which can +be achieved only in action) but in defining difficulties and +suggesting methods for dealing with them. Philosophy might +almost be +described as thinking which has become conscious of +itself -- which has generalized its place, function, and value in +experience. + +More specifically, the demand for a "total" attitude arises +because there is the need of integration in action of the +conflicting various interests in life. Where interests are so +superficial that they glide readily into one another, or where +they are not sufficiently organized to come into conflict with +one another, the need for philosophy is not perceptible. But +when the scientific interest conflicts with, say, the religious, +or the economic with the scientific or aesthetic, or when the +conservative concern for order is at odds with the progressive +interest in freedom, or when institutionalism clashes with +individuality, there is a stimulus to discover some more +comprehensive point of view from which the divergencies may be +brought together, and consistency or continuity of experience +recovered. Often these clashes may be settled by an individual +for himself; the area of the struggle of aims is limited and a +person works out his own rough accommodations. Such homespun +philosophies are genuine and often adequate. But they do not +result in systems of philosophy. These arise when the discrepant +claims of different ideals of conduct affect the community as a +whole, and the need for readjustment is general. These traits +explain some things which are often brought as objections against +philosophies, such as the part played in them by individual +speculation, and their controversial diversity, as well as the +fact that philosophy seems to be repeatedly occupied with much +the same questions differently stated. Without doubt, all these +things characterize historic philosophies more or less. But they +are not objections to philosophy so much as they are to human +nature, and even to the world in which human nature is set. If +there are genuine uncertainties in life, philosophies must +reflect that uncertainty. If there are different diagnoses of +the cause of a difficulty, and different proposals for dealing +with it; if, that is, the conflict of interests is more or less +embodied in different sets of persons, there must be divergent +competing philosophies. With respect to what has happened, +sufficient evidence is all that is needed to bring agreement and +certainty. The thing itself is sure. But with reference to what +it is wise to do in a complicated situation, discussion is +inevitable precisely because the thing itself is still +indeterminate. One would not expect a ruling class living at +ease to have the same philosophy of life as those who were having +a hard struggle for existence. If the possessing and the +dispossessed had the same fundamental disposition toward the +world, it would argue either insincerity or lack of seriousness. +A community devoted to industrial pursuits, active in business +and commerce, is not likely to see the needs and possibilities of +life in the same way as a country with high aesthetic culture and +little enterprise in turning the energies of nature to mechanical +account. A social group with a fairly continuous history will +respond mentally to a crisis in a very different way from one +which has felt the shock of abrupt breaks. Even if the same data +were present, they would be evaluated differently. But the +different sorts of experience attending different types of life +prevent just the same data from presenting themselves, as well as +lead to a different scheme of values. As for the similarity of +problems, this is often more a matter of appearance than of fact, +due to old discussions being translated into the terms of +contemporary perplexities. But in certain fundamental respects +the same predicaments of life recur from time to time with only +such changes as are due to change of social context, including +the growth of the sciences. + +The fact that philosophic problems arise because of widespread +and widely felt difficulties in social practice is disguised +because philosophers become a specialized class which uses a +technical language, unlike the vocabulary in which the direct +difficulties are stated. But where a system becomes influential, +its connection with a conflict of interests calling for some +program of social adjustment may always be discovered. At this +point, the intimate connection between philosophy and education +appears. In fact, education offers a vantage ground from which +to penetrate to the human, as distinct from the technical, +significance of philosophic discussions. The student of +philosophy "in itself" is always in danger of taking it as so +much nimble or severe intellectual exercise -- as something said +by philosophers and concerning them alone. But when philosophic +issues are approached from the side of the kind of mental +disposition to which they correspond, or the differences in +educational practice they make when acted upon, the +life-situations which they formulate can never be far from view. +If a theory makes no difference in educational endeavor, it must +be artificial. The educational point of view enables one to +envisage the philosophic problems where they arise and thrive, +where they are at home, and where acceptance or rejection makes a +difference in practice. If we are willing to conceive education +as the process of forming fundamental dispositions, intellectual +and emotional, toward nature and fellow men, philosophy may even +be defined as the general theory of education. Unless a +philosophy is to remain symbolic -- or verbal -- or a sentimental +indulgence for a few, or else mere arbitrary dogma, its auditing +of past experience and its program of values must take effect in +conduct. Public agitation, propaganda, legislative and +administrative action are effective in producing the change of +disposition which a philosophy indicates as desirable, but only +in the degree in which they are educative -- that is to say, in +the degree in which they modify mental and moral attitudes. And +at the best, such methods are compromised by the fact they are +used with those whose habits are already largely set, while +education of youth has a fairer and freer field of operation. On +the other side, the business of schooling tends to become a +routine empirical affair unless its aims and methods are +animated by such a broad and sympathetic survey of its place in +contemporary life as it is the business of philosophy to provide. +Positive science always implies practically the ends which the +community is concerned to achieve. Isolated from such ends, it +is matter of indifference whether its disclosures are used to +cure disease or to spread it; to increase the means of sustenance +of life or to manufacture war material to wipe life out. If +society is interested in one of these things rather than another, +science shows the way of attainment. Philosophy thus has a +double task: that of criticizing existing aims with respect to +the existing state of science, pointing out values which have +become obsolete with the command of new resources, showing what +values are merely sentimental because there are no means for +their realization; and also that of interpreting the results of +specialized science in their bearing on future social endeavor. +It is impossible that it should have any success in these tasks +without educational equivalents as to what to do and what not to +do. For philosophic theory has no Aladdin's lamp to summon into +immediate existence the values which it intellectually +constructs. In the mechanical arts, the sciences become methods +of managing things so as to utilize their energies for recognized +aims. By the educative arts philosophy may generate methods of +utilizing the energies of human beings in accord with serious and +thoughtful conceptions of life. Education is the laboratory in +which philosophic distinctions become concrete and are tested. + +It is suggestive that European philosophy originated (among the +Athenians) under the direct pressure of educational questions. +The earlier history of philosophy, developed by the Greeks in +Asia Minor and Italy, so far as its range of topics is concerned, +is mainly a chapter in the history of science rather than of +philosophy as that word is understood to-day. It had nature for +its subject, and speculated as to how things are made and +changed. Later the traveling teachers, known as the Sophists, +began to apply the results and the methods of the natural +philosophers to human conduct. + +When the Sophists, the first body of professional educators in +Europe, instructed the youth in virtue, the political arts, and +the management of city and household, philosophy began to deal +with the relation of the individual to the universal, to some +comprehensive class, or to some group; the relation of man and +nature, of tradition and reflection, of knowledge and action. +Can virtue, approved excellence in any line, be learned, they +asked? What is learning? It has to do with knowledge. What, +then, is knowledge? How is it achieved? Through the senses, or by +apprenticeship in some form of doing, or by reason that has +undergone a preliminary logical discipline? Since learning is +coming to know, it involves a passage from ignorance to wisdom, +from privation to fullness from defect to perfection, from +non-being to being, in the Greek way of putting it. How is such +a transition possible? Is change, becoming, development really +possible and if so, how? And supposing such questions answered, +what is the relation of instruction, of knowledge, to virtue? +This last question led to opening the problem of the relation of +reason to action, of theory to practice, since virtue clearly +dwelt in action. Was not knowing, the activity of reason, the +noblest attribute of man? And consequently was not purely +intellectual activity itself the highest of all excellences, +compared with which the virtues of neighborliness and the +citizen's life were secondary? Or, on the other hand, was the +vaunted intellectual knowledge more than empty and vain pretense, +demoralizing to character and destructive of the social ties that +bound men together in their community life? Was not the only +true, because the only moral, life gained through obedient +habituation to the customary practices of the community? And was +not the new education an enemy to good citizenship, because it +set up a rival standard to the established traditions of the +community? + +In the course of two or three generations such questions were cut +loose from their original practical bearing upon education and +were discussed on their own account; that is, as matters of +philosophy as an independent branch of inquiry. But the fact +that the stream of European philosophical thought arose as a +theory of educational procedure remains an eloquent witness to +the intimate connection of philosophy and education. "Philosophy +of education" is not an external application of ready-made ideas +to a system of practice having a radically different origin and +purpose: it is only an explicit formulation of the problems of +the formation of right mental and moral habitudes in respect to +the difficulties of contemporary social life. The most +penetrating definition of philosophy which can be given is, then, +that it is the theory of education in its most general phases. + +The reconstruction of philosophy, of education, and of social +ideals and methods thus go hand in hand. If there is especial +need of educational reconstruction at the present time, if this +need makes urgent a reconsideration of the basic ideas of +traditional philosophic systems, it is because of the +thoroughgoing change in social life accompanying the advance of +science, the industrial revolution, and the development of +democracy. Such practical changes cannot take place without +demanding an educational reformation to meet them, and without +leading men to ask what ideas and ideals are implicit in these +social changes, and what revisions they require of the ideas and +ideals which are inherited from older and unlike cultures. +Incidentally throughout the whole book, explicitly in the last +few chapters, we have been dealing with just these questions as +they affect the relationship of mind and body, theory and +practice, man and nature, the individual and social, etc. In our +concluding chapters we shall sum up the prior discussions with +respect first to the philosophy of knowledge, and then to the +philosophy of morals. + +Summary. After a review designed to bring out the philosophic +issues implicit in the previous discussions, philosophy was +defined as the generalized theory of education. Philosophy was +stated to be a form of thinking, which, like all thinking, finds +its origin in what is uncertain in the subject matter of +experience, which aims to locate the nature of the perplexity and +to frame hypotheses for its clearing up to be tested in action. +Philosophic thinking has for its differentia the fact that the +uncertainties with which it deals are found in widespread social +conditions and aims, consisting in a conflict of organized +interests and institutional claims. Since the only way of +bringing about a harmonious readjustment of the opposed +tendencies is through a modification of emotional and +intellectual disposition, philosophy is at once an explicit +formulation of the various interests of life and a propounding of +points of view and methods through which a better balance of +interests may be effected. Since education is the process +through which the needed transformation may be accomplished and +not remain a mere hypothesis as to what is desirable, we reach a +justification of the statement that philosophy is the theory of +education as a deliberately conducted practice. + + +Chapter Twenty-five: Theories of Knowledge + +1. Continuity versus Dualism. A number of theories of knowing +have been criticized in the previous pages. In spite of their +differences from one another, they all agree in one fundamental +respect which contrasts with the theory which has been positively +advanced. The latter assumes continuity; the former state or +imply certain basic divisions, separations, or antitheses, +technically called dualisms. The origin of these divisions we +have found in the hard and fast walls which mark off social +groups and classes within a group: like those between rich and +poor, men and women, noble and baseborn, ruler and ruled. These +barriers mean absence of fluent and free intercourse. This +absence is equivalent to the setting up of different types of +life-experience, each with isolated subject matter, aim, and +standard of values. Every such social condition must be +formulated in a dualistic philosophy, if philosophy is to be a +sincere account of experience. When it gets beyond dualism -- as +many philosophies do in form -- it can only be by appeal to +something higher than anything found in experience, by a flight +to some transcendental realm. And in denying duality in name +such theories restore it in fact, for they end in a division +between things of this world as mere appearances and an +inaccessible essence of reality. + +So far as these divisions persist and others are added to them, +each leaves its mark upon the educational system, until the +scheme of education, taken as a whole, is a deposit of various +purposes and procedures. The outcome is that kind of check and +balance of segregated factors and values which has been +described. (See Chapter XVIII.) The present discussion is simply +a formulation, in the terminology of philosophy, of various +antithetical conceptions involved in the theory of knowing. +In the first place, there is the opposition of empirical and +higher rational knowing. The first is connected with everyday +affairs, serves the purposes of the ordinary individual who has +no specialized intellectual + +pursuit, and brings his wants into some kind of working +connection with the immediate environment. Such knowing is +depreciated, if not despised, as purely utilitarian, lacking in +cultural significance. Rational knowledge is supposed to be +something which touches reality in ultimate, intellectual +fashion; to be pursued for its own sake and properly to terminate +in purely theoretical insight, not debased by application in +behavior. Socially, the distinction corresponds to that of the +intelligence used by the working classes and that used by a +learned class remote from concern with the means of living. +Philosophically, the difference turns about the distinction of +the particular and universal. Experience is an aggregate of more +or less isolated particulars, acquaintance with each of which +must be separately made. Reason deals with universals, with +general principles, with laws, which lie above the welter of +concrete details. In the educational precipitate, the pupil is +supposed to have to learn, on one hand, a lot of items of +specific information, each standing by itself, and upon the other +hand, to become familiar with a certain number of laws and +general relationships. Geography, as often taught, illustrates +the former; mathematics, beyond the rudiments of figuring, the +latter. For all practical purposes, they represent two +independent worlds. + +Another antithesis is suggested by the two senses of the word +"learning." On the one hand, learning is the sum total of what is +known, as that is handed down by books and learned men. It is +something external, an accumulation of cognitions as one might +store material commodities in a warehouse. Truth exists ready- +made somewhere. Study is then the process by which an individual +draws on what is in storage. On the other hand, learning means +something which the individual does when he studies. It is an +active, personally conducted affair. The dualism here is between +knowledge as something external, or, as it is often called, +objective, and knowing as something purely internal, subjective, +psychical. There is, on one side, a body of truth, ready-made, +and, on the other, a ready-made mind equipped with a faculty of +knowing -- if it only wills to exercise it, which it is often +strangely loath to do. The separation, often touched upon, +between subject matter and method is the educational equivalent +of this dualism. Socially the distinction has to do with the +part of life which is dependent upon authority and that where +individuals are free to advance. Another dualism is that of +activity and passivity in knowing. Purely empirical and physical +things are often supposed to be known by receiving impressions. +Physical things somehow stamp themselves upon the mind or convey +themselves into consciousness by means of the sense organs. +Rational knowledge and knowledge of spiritual things is supposed, +on the contrary, to spring from activity initiated within the +mind, an activity carried on better if it is kept remote from all +sullying touch of the senses and external objects. The +distinction between sense training and object lessons and +laboratory exercises, and pure ideas contained in books, and +appropriated -- so it is thought -- by some miraculous output of +mental energy, is a fair expression in education of this +distinction. Socially, it reflects a division between those who +are controlled by direct concern with things and those who are +free to cultivate themselves. + +Another current opposition is that said to exist between the +intellect and the emotions. The emotions are conceived to be +purely private and personal, having nothing to do with the work +of pure intelligence in apprehending facts and truths, -- except +perhaps the single emotion of intellectual curiosity. The +intellect is a pure light; the emotions are a disturbing heat. +The mind turns outward to truth; the emotions turn inward to +considerations of personal advantage and loss. Thus in education +we have that systematic depreciation of interest which has been +noted, plus the necessity in practice, with most pupils, of +recourse to extraneous and irrelevant rewards and penalties in +order to induce the person who has a mind (much as his clothes +have a pocket) to apply that mind to the truths to be known. +Thus we have the spectacle of professional educators decrying +appeal to interest while they uphold with great dignity the need +of reliance upon examinations, marks, promotions and emotions, +prizes, and the time-honored paraphernalia of rewards and +punishments. The effect of this situation in crippling the +teacher's sense of humor has not received the attention which it +deserves. + +All of these separations culminate in one between knowing and +doing, theory and practice, between mind as the end and spirit of +action and the body as its organ and means. We shall not repeat +what has been said about the source of this dualism in the +division of society into a class laboring with their muscles for +material sustenance and a class which, relieved from economic +pressure, devotes itself to the arts of expression and social +direction. Nor is it necessary to speak again of the educational +evils which spring from the separation. We shall be content to +summarize the forces which tend to make the untenability of this +conception obvious and to replace it by the idea of continuity. +(i) The advance of physiology and the psychology associated with +it have shown the connection of mental activity with that of the +nervous system. Too often recognition of connection has stopped +short at this point; the older dualism of soul and body has been +replaced by that of the brain and the rest of the body. But in +fact the nervous system is only a specialized mechanism for +keeping all bodily activities working together. Instead of being +isolated from them, as an organ of knowing from organs of motor +response, it is the organ by which they interact responsively +with one another. The brain is essentially an organ for +effecting the reciprocal adjustment to each other of the stimuli +received from the environment and responses directed upon it. +Note that the adjusting is reciprocal; the brain not only enables +organic activity to be brought to bear upon any object of the +environment in response to a sensory stimulation, but this +response also determines what the next stimulus will be. See +what happens, for example, when a carpenter is at work upon a +board, or an etcher upon his plate -- or in any case of a +consecutive activity. While each motor response is adjusted to +the state of affairs indicated through the sense organs, that +motor response shapes the next sensory stimulus. Generalizing +this illustration, the brain is the machinery for a constant +reorganizing of activity so as to maintain its continuity; that +is to say, to make such modifications in future action as are +required because of what has already been done. The continuity +of the work of the carpenter distinguishes it from a routine +repetition of identically the same motion, and from a random +activity where there is nothing cumulative. What makes it +continuous, consecutive, or concentrated is that each earlier act +prepares the way for later acts, while these take account of or +reckon with the results already attained -- the basis of all +responsibility. No one who has realized the full force of the +facts of the connection of knowing with the nervous system and of +the nervous system with the readjusting of activity continuously +to meet new conditions, will doubt that knowing has to do with +reorganizing activity, instead of being something isolated from +all activity, complete on its own account. + +(ii) The development of biology clinches this lesson, with its +discovery of evolution. For the philosophic significance of the +doctrine of evolution lies precisely in its emphasis upon +continuity of simpler and more complex organic forms until we +reach man. The development of organic forms begins with +structures where the adjustment of environment and organism is +obvious, and where anything which can be called mind is at a +minimum. As activity becomes more complex, coordinating a +greater number of factors in space and time, intelligence plays a +more and more marked role, for it has a larger span of the future +to forecast and plan for. The effect upon the theory of knowing +is to displace the notion that it is the activity of a mere +onlooker or spectator of the world, the notion which goes with +the idea of knowing as something complete in itself. For the +doctrine of organic development means that the living creature is +a part of the world, sharing its vicissitudes and fortunes, and +making itself secure in its precarious dependence only as it +intellectually identifies itself with the things about it, and, +forecasting the future consequences of what is going on, shapes +its own activities accordingly. If the living, experiencing +being is an intimate participant in the activities of the world +to which it belongs, then knowledge is a mode of participation, +valuable in the degree in which it is effective. It cannot be +the idle view of an unconcerned spectator. + +(iii) The development of the experimental method as the method of +getting knowledge and of making sure it is knowledge, and not +mere opinion -- the method of both discovery and proof -- is the +remaining great force in bringing about a transformation in the +theory of knowledge. The experimental method has two sides. (i) +On one hand, it means that we have no right to call anything +knowledge except where our activity has actually produced certain +physical changes in things, which agree with and confirm the +conception entertained. Short of such specific changes, our +beliefs are only hypotheses, theories, suggestions, guesses, and +are to be entertained tentatively and to be utilized as +indications of experiments to be tried. (ii) On the other hand, +the experimental method of thinking signifies that thinking is of +avail; that it is of avail in just the degree in which the +anticipation of future consequences is made on the basis of +thorough observation of present conditions. Experimentation, in +other words, is not equivalent to blind reacting. Such surplus +activity -- a surplus with reference to what has been observed +and is now anticipated -- is indeed an unescapable factor in all +our behavior, but it is not experiment save as consequences are +noted and are used to make predictions and plans in similar +situations in the future. The more the meaning of the +experimental method is perceived, the more our trying out of a +certain way of treating the material resources and obstacles +which confront us embodies a prior use of intelligence. What we +call magic was with respect to many things the experimental +method of the savage; but for him to try was to try his luck, not +his ideas. The scientific experimental method is, on the +contrary, a trial of ideas; hence even when practically -- or +immediately -- unsuccessful, it is intellectual, fruitful; for we +learn from our failures when our endeavors are seriously +thoughtful. + +The experimental method is new as a scientific resource--as a +systematized means of making knowledge, though as old as life as +a practical device. Hence it is not surprising that men have not +recognized its full scope. For the most part, its significance +is regarded as belonging to certain technical and merely physical +matters. It will doubtless take a long time to secure the +perception that it holds equally as to the forming and testing of +ideas in social and moral matters. Men still want the crutch of +dogma, of beliefs fixed by authority, to relieve them of the +trouble of thinking and the responsibility of directing their +activity by thought. They tend to confine their own thinking to +a consideration of which one among the rival systems of dogma +they will accept. Hence the schools are better adapted, as John +Stuart Mill said, to make disciples than inquirers. But every +advance in the influence of the experimental method is sure to +aid in outlawing the literary, dialectic, and authoritative +methods of forming beliefs which have governed the schools of the +past, and to transfer their prestige to methods which will +procure an active concern with things and persons, directed by +aims of increasing temporal reach and deploying greater range of +things in space. In time the theory of knowing must be derived +from the practice which is most successful in making knowledge; +and then that theory will be employed to improve the methods +which are less successful. + +2. Schools of Method. There are various systems of philosophy +with characteristically different conceptions of the method of +knowing. Some of them are named scholasticism, sensationalism, +rationalism, idealism, realism, empiricism, transcendentalism, +pragmatism, etc. Many of them have been criticized in connection +with the discussion of some educational problem. We are here +concerned with them as involving deviations from that method +which has proved most effective in achieving knowledge, for a +consideration of the deviations may render clearer the true place +of knowledge in experience. In brief, the function of knowledge +is to make one experience freely available in other experiences. +The word "freely" marks the difference between the principle of +knowledge and that of habit. Habit means that an individual +undergoes a modification through an experience, which +modification forms a predisposition to easier and more effective +action in a like direction in the future. Thus it also has the +function of making one experience available in subsequent +experiences. Within certain limits, it performs this function +successfully. But habit, apart from knowledge, does not make +allowance for change of conditions, for novelty. Prevision of +change is not part of its scope, for habit assumes the essential +likeness of the new situation with the old. Consequently it +often leads astray, or comes between a person and the successful +performance of his task, just as the skill, based on habit alone, +of the mechanic will desert him when something unexpected occurs +in the running of the machine. But a man who understands the +machine is the man who knows what he is about. He knows the +conditions under which a given habit works, and is in a position +to introduce the changes which will readapt it to new conditions. + +In other words, knowledge is a perception of those connections of +an object which determine its applicability in a given situation. +To take an extreme example; savages react to a flaming comet as +they are accustomed to react to other events which threaten the +security of their life. Since they try to frighten wild animals +or their enemies by shrieks, beating of gongs, brandishing of +weapons, etc., they use the same methods to scare away the comet. +To us, the method is plainly absurd -- so absurd that we fail to +note that savages are simply falling back upon habit in a way +which exhibits its limitations. The only reason we do not act in +some analogous fashion is because we do not take the comet as an +isolated, disconnected event, but apprehend it in its connections +with other events. We place it, as we say, in the astronomical +system. We respond to its connections and not simply to the +immediate occurrence. Thus our attitude to it is much freer. We +may approach it, so to speak, from any one of the angles provided +by its connections. We can bring into play, as we deem wise, any +one of the habits appropriate to any one of the connected +objects. Thus we get at a new event indirectly instead of +immediately -- by invention, ingenuity, resourcefulness. An +ideally perfect knowledge would represent such a network of +interconnections that any past experience would offer a point of +advantage from which to get at the problem presented in a new +experience. In fine, while a habit apart from knowledge supplies +us with a single fixed method of attack, knowledge means that +selection may be made from a much wider range of habits. + +Two aspects of this more general and freer availability of former +experiences for subsequent ones may be distinguished. (See ante, +p. 77.) (i) One, the more tangible, is increased power of +control. What cannot be managed directly may be handled +indirectly; or we can interpose barriers between us and +undesirable consequences; or we may evade them if we cannot +overcome them. Genuine knowledge has all the practical value +attaching to efficient habits in any case. (ii) But it also +increases the meaning, the experienced significance, attaching to +an experience. A situation to which we respond capriciously or +by routine has only a minimum of conscious significance; we get +nothing mentally from it. But wherever knowledge comes into play +in determining a new experience there is mental reward; even if +we fail practically in getting the needed control we have the +satisfaction of experiencing a meaning instead of merely +reacting physically. + +While the content of knowledge is what has happened, what is +taken as finished and hence settled and sure, the reference of +knowledge is future or prospective. For knowledge furnishes the +means of understanding or giving meaning to what is still going +on and what is to be done. The knowledge of a physician is what +he has found out by personal acquaintance and by study of what +others have ascertained and recorded. But it is knowledge to him +because it supplies the resources by which he interprets the +unknown things which confront him, fills out the partial obvious +facts with connected suggested phenomena, foresees their probable +future, and makes plans accordingly. When knowledge is cut off +from use in giving meaning to what is blind and baffling, it +drops out of consciousness entirely or else becomes an object of +aesthetic contemplation. There is much emotional satisfaction to +be had from a survey of the symmetry and order of possessed +knowledge, and the satisfaction is a legitimate one. But this +contemplative attitude is aesthetic, not intellectual. It is the +same sort of joy that comes from viewing a finished picture or a +well composed landscape. It would make no difference if the +subject matter were totally different, provided it had the same +harmonious organization. Indeed, it would make no difference if +it were wholly invented, a play of fancy. Applicability to the +world means not applicability to what is past and gone -- that is +out of the question by the nature of the case; it means +applicability to what is still going on, what is still unsettled, +in the moving scene in which we are implicated. The very fact +that we so easily overlook this trait, and regard statements of +what is past and out of reach as knowledge is because we assume +the continuity of past and future. We cannot entertain the +conception of a world in which knowledge of its past would not be +helpful in forecasting and giving meaning to its future. We +ignore the prospective reference just because it is so +irretrievably implied. + +Yet many of the philosophic schools of method which have been +mentioned transform the ignoring into a virtual denial. They +regard knowledge as something complete in itself irrespective of +its availability in dealing with what is yet to be. And it is +this omission which vitiates them and which makes them stand as +sponsors for educational methods which an adequate conception of +knowledge condemns. For one has only to call to mind what is +sometimes treated in schools as acquisition of knowledge to +realize how lacking it is in any fruitful connection with the +ongoing experience of the students -- how largely it seems to be +believed that the mere appropriation of subject matter which +happens to be stored in books constitutes knowledge. No matter +how true what is learned to those who found it out and in whose +experience it functioned, there is nothing which makes it +knowledge to the pupils. It might as well be something about +Mars or about some fanciful country unless it fructifies in the +individual's own life. + +At the time when scholastic method developed, it had relevancy to +social conditions. It was a method for systematizing and lending +rational sanction to material accepted on authority. This +subject matter meant so much that it vitalized the defining and +systematizing brought to bear upon it. Under present conditions +the scholastic method, for most persons, means a form of knowing +which has no especial connection with any particular subject +matter. It includes making distinctions, definitions, divisions, +and classifications for the mere sake of making them -- with no +objective in experience. The view of thought as a purely +physical activity having its own forms, which are applied to any +material as a seal may be stamped on any plastic stuff, the view +which underlies what is termed formal logic is essentially the +scholastic method generalized. The doctrine of formal discipline +in education is the natural counterpart of the scholastic method. + +The contrasting theories of the method of knowledge which go by +the name of sensationalism and rationalism correspond to an +exclusive emphasis upon the particular and the general +respectively -- or upon bare facts on one side and bare relations +on the other. In real knowledge, there is a particularizing and +a generalizing function working together. So far as a situation +is confused, it has to be cleared up; it has to be resolved into +details, as sharply defined as possible. Specified facts and +qualities constitute the elements of the problem to be dealt +with, and it is through our sense organs that they are specified. +As setting forth the problem, they may well be termed +particulars, for they are fragmentary. Since our task is to +discover their connections and to recombine them, for us at the +time they are partial. They are to be given meaning; hence, just +as they stand, they lack it. Anything which is to be known, +whose meaning has still to be made out, offers itself as +particular. But what is already known, if it has been worked +over with a view to making it applicable to intellectually +mastering new particulars, is general in function. Its function +of introducing connection into what is otherwise unconnected +constitutes its generality. Any fact is general if we use it to +give meaning to the elements of a new experience. "Reason" is +just the ability to bring the subject matter of prior experience +to bear to perceive the significance of the subject matter of a +new experience. A person is reasonable in the degree in which he +is habitually open to seeing an event which immediately strikes +his senses not as an isolated thing but in its connection with +the common experience of mankind. + +Without the particulars as they are discriminated by the active +responses of sense organs, there is no material for knowing and +no intellectual growth. Without placing these particulars in the +context of the meanings wrought out in the larger experience of +the past -- without the use of reason or thought -- particulars +are mere excitations or irritations. The mistake alike of the +sensational and the rationalistic schools is that each fails to +see that the function of sensory stimulation and thought is +relative to reorganizing experience in applying the old to the +new, thereby maintaining the continuity or consistency of life. +The theory of the method of knowing which is advanced in these +pages may be termed pragmatic. Its essential feature is to +maintain the continuity of knowing with an activity which +purposely modifies the environment. It holds that knowledge in +its strict sense of something possessed consists of our +intellectual resources -- of all the habits that render our +action intelligent. Only that which has been organized into our +disposition so as to enable us to adapt the environment to our +needs and to adapt our aims and desires to the situation in which +we live is really knowledge. Knowledge is not just something +which we are now conscious of, but consists of the dispositions +we consciously use in understanding what now happens. Knowledge +as an act is bringing some of our dispositions to consciousness +with a view to straightening out a perplexity, by conceiving the +connection between ourselves and the world in which we live. + +Summary. Such social divisions as interfere with free and full +intercourse react to make the intelligence and knowing of members +of the separated classes one-sided. Those whose experience has +to do with utilities cut off from the larger end they subserve +are practical empiricists; those who enjoy the contemplation of a +realm of meanings in whose active production they have had no +share are practical rationalists. Those who come in direct +contact with things and have to adapt their activities to them +immediately are, in effect, realists; those who isolate the +meanings of these things and put them in a religious or so-called +spiritual world aloof from things are, in effect, idealists. +Those concerned with progress, who are striving to change +received beliefs, emphasize the individual factor in knowing; +those whose chief business it is to withstand change and conserve +received truth emphasize the universal and the fixed -- and so +on. Philosophic systems in their opposed theories of knowledge +present an explicit formulation of the traits characteristic of +these cut-off and one-sided segments of experience -- one-sided +because barriers to intercourse prevent the experience of one +from being enriched and supplemented by that of others who are +differently situated. + +In an analogous way, since democracy stands in principle for free +interchange, for social continuity, it must develop a theory of +knowledge which sees in knowledge the method by which one +experience is made available in giving direction and meaning to +another. The recent advances in physiology, biology, and the +logic of the experimental sciences supply the specific +intellectual instrumentalities demanded to work out and formulate +such a theory. Their educational equivalent is the connection of +the acquisition of knowledge in the schools with activities, or +occupations, carried on in a medium of associated life. + + +Chapter Twenty-six: Theories of Morals + +1. The Inner and the Outer. + +Since morality is concerned with conduct, any dualisms which are +set up between mind and activity must reflect themselves in the +theory of morals. Since the formulations of the separation in +the philosophic theory of morals are used to justify and idealize +the practices employed in moral training, a brief critical +discussion is in place. It is a commonplace of educational +theory that the establishing of character is a comprehensive aim +of school instruction and discipline. Hence it is important that +we should be on our guard against a conception of the relations +of intelligence to character which hampers the realization of the +aim, and on the look-out for the conditions which have to be +provided in order that the aim may be successfully acted upon. +The first obstruction which meets us is the currency of moral +ideas which split the course of activity into two opposed +factors, often named respectively the inner and outer, or the +spiritual and the physical. This division is a culmination of +the dualism of mind and the world, soul and body, end and means, +which we have so frequently noted. In morals it takes the form +of a sharp demarcation of the motive of action from its +consequences, and of character from conduct. Motive and +character are regarded as something purely "inner," existing +exclusively in consciousness, while consequences and conduct are +regarded as outside of mind, conduct having to do simply with the +movements which carry out motives; consequences with what happens +as a result. Different schools identify morality with either the +inner state of mind or the outer act and results, each in +separation from the other. Action with a purpose is deliberate; +it involves a consciously foreseen end and a mental weighing of +considerations pro and eon. It also involves a conscious state +of longing or desire for the end. The deliberate choice of an +aim and of a settled disposition of desire takes time. During +this time complete overt action is suspended. A person who does +not have his mind made up, does not know what to do. Consequently +he postpones definite action so far as possible. His position +may be compared to that of a man considering jumping across a +ditch. If he were sure he could or could not make it, definite +activity in some direction would occur. But if he considers, he +is in doubt; he hesitates. During the time in which a single +overt line of action is in suspense, his activities are confined +to such redistributions of energy within the organism as will +prepare a determinate course of action. He measures the ditch +with his eyes; he brings himself taut to get a feel of the energy +at his disposal; he looks about for other ways across, he +reflects upon the importance of getting across. All this means +an accentuation of consciousness; it means a turning in upon the +individual's own attitudes, powers, wishes, etc. + +Obviously, however, this surging up of personal factors into +conscious recognition is a part of the whole activity in its +temporal development. There is not first a purely psychical +process, followed abruptly by a radically different physical one. +There is one continuous behavior, proceeding from a more +uncertain, divided, hesitating state to a more overt, +determinate, or complete state. The activity at first consists +mainly of certain tensions and adjustments within the organism; +as these are coordinated into a unified attitude, the organism as +a whole acts -- some definite act is undertaken. We may +distinguish, of course, the more explicitly conscious phase of +the continuous activity as mental or psychical. But that only +identifies the mental or psychical to mean the indeterminate, +formative state of an activity which in its fullness involves +putting forth of overt energy to modify the environment. + +Our conscious thoughts, observations, wishes, aversions are +important, because they represent inchoate, nascent activities. +They fulfill their destiny in issuing, later on, into specific +and perceptible acts. And these inchoate, budding organic +readjustments are important because they are our sole escape from +the dominion of routine habits and blind impulse. They are +activities having a new meaning in process of development. +Hence, normally, there is an accentuation of personal +consciousness whenever our instincts and ready formed habits find +themselves blocked by novel conditions. Then we are thrown back +upon ourselves to reorganize our own attitude before proceeding +to a definite and irretrievable course of action. Unless we try +to drive our way through by sheer brute force, we must modify our +organic resources to adapt them to the specific features of the +situation in which we find ourselves. The conscious deliberating +and desiring which precede overt action are, then, the methodic +personal readjustment implied in activity in uncertain +situations. This role of mind in continuous activity is not +always maintained, however. Desires for something different, +aversion to the given state of things caused by the blocking of +successful activity, stimulates the imagination. The picture of +a different state of things does not always function to aid +ingenious observation and recollection to find a way out and on. +Except where there is a disciplined disposition, the tendency is +for the imagination to run loose. Instead of its objects being +checked up by conditions with reference to their practicability +in execution, they are allowed to develop because of the +immediate emotional satisfaction which they yield. When we find +the successful display of our energies checked by uncongenial +surroundings, natural and social, the easiest way out is to build +castles in the air and let them be a substitute for an actual +achievement which involves the pains of thought. So in overt +action we acquiesce, and build up an imaginary world in, mind. +This break between thought and conduct is reflected in those +theories which make a sharp separation between mind as inner and +conduct and consequences as merely outer. + +For the split may be more than an incident of a particular +individual's experience. The social situation may be such as to +throw the class given to articulate reflection back into their +own thoughts and desires without providing the means by which +these ideas and aspirations can be used to reorganize the +environment. Under such conditions, men take revenge, as it +were, upon the alien and hostile environment by cultivating +contempt for it, by giving it a bad name. They seek refuge and +consolation within their own states of mind, their own imaginings +and wishes, which they compliment by calling both more real and +more ideal than the despised outer world. Such periods have +recurred in history. In the early centuries of the Christian +era, the influential moral systems of Stoicism, of monastic and +popular Christianity and other religious movements of the day, +took shape under the influence of such conditions. The more +action which might express prevailing ideals was checked, the +more the inner possession and cultivation of ideals was regarded +as self-sufficient -- as the essence of morality. The external +world in which activity belongs was thought of as morally +indifferent. Everything lay in having the right motive, even +though that motive was not a moving force in the world. Much the +same sort of situation recurred in Germany in the later +eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries; it led to the Kantian +insistence upon the good will as the sole moral good, the will +being regarded as something complete in itself, apart from action +and from the changes or consequences effected in the world. +Later it led to any idealization of existing institutions as +themselves the embodiment of reason. + +The purely internal morality of "meaning well," of having a good +disposition regardless of what comes of it, naturally led to a +reaction. This is generally known as either hedonism or +utilitarianism. It was said in effect that the important thing +morally is not what a man is inside of his own consciousness, but +what he does -- the consequences which issue, the charges he +actually effects. Inner morality was attacked as sentimental, +arbitrary, dogmatic, subjective -- as giving men leave to dignify +and shield any dogma congenial to their self-interest or any +caprice occurring to imagination by calling it an intuition or an +ideal of conscience. Results, conduct, are what counts; they +afford the sole measure of morality. Ordinary morality, and +hence that of the schoolroom, is likely to be an inconsistent +compromise of both views. On one hand, certain states of feeling +are made much of; the individual must "mean well," and if his +intentions are good, if he had the right sort of emotional +consciousness, he may be relieved of responsibility for full +results in conduct. But since, on the other hand, certain things +have to be done to meet the convenience and the requirements of +others, and of social order in general, there is great insistence +upon the doing of certain things, irrespective of whether the +individual has any concern or intelligence in their doing. He +must toe the mark; he must have his nose held to the grindstone; +he must obey; he must form useful habits; he must learn +self-control, -- all of these precepts being understood in a way +which emphasizes simply the immediate thing tangibly done, +irrespective of the spirit of thought and desire in which it is +done, and irrespective therefore of its effect upon other less +obvious doings. + +It is hoped that the prior discussion has sufficiently elaborated +the method by which both of these evils are avoided. One or both +of these evils must result wherever individuals, whether young or +old, cannot engage in a progressively cumulative undertaking +under conditions which engage their interest and require their +reflection. For only in such cases is it possible that the +disposition of desire and thinking should be an organic factor in +overt and obvious conduct. Given a consecutive activity +embodying the student's own interest, where a definite result is +to be obtained, and where neither routine habit nor the following +of dictated directions nor capricious improvising will suffice, +and there the rise of conscious purpose, conscious desire, and +deliberate reflection are inevitable. They are inevitable as the +spirit and quality of an activity having specific consequences, +not as forming an isolated realm of inner consciousness. + +2. The Opposition of Duty and Interest. Probably there is no +antithesis more often set up in moral discussion than that +between acting from "principle" and from "interest." To act on +principle is to act disinterestedly, according to a general law, +which is above all personal considerations. To act according to +interest is, so the allegation runs, to act selfishly, with one's +own personal profit in view. It substitutes the changing +expediency of the moment for devotion to unswerving moral law. +The false idea of interest underlying this opposition has already +been criticized (See Chapter X), but some moral aspects of the +question will now be considered. A clew to the matter may be +found in the fact that the supporters of the "interest" side of +the controversy habitually use the term "self-interest." Starting +from the premises that unless there is interest in an object or +idea, there is no motive force, they end with the conclusion that +even when a person claims to be acting from principle or from a +sense of duty, he really acts as he does because there "is +something in it" for himself. The premise is sound; the +conclusion false. In reply the other school argues that since +man is capable of generous self-forgetting and even +self-sacrificing action, he is capable of acting without +interest. Again the premise is sound, and the conclusion false. +The error on both sides lies in a false notion of the relation of +interest and the self. + +Both sides assume that the self is a fixed and hence isolated +quantity. As a consequence, there is a rigid dilemma between +acting for an interest of the self and without interest. If the +self is something fixed antecedent to action, then acting from +interest means trying to get more in the way of possessions for +the self -- whether in the way of fame, approval of others, power +over others, pecuniary profit, or pleasure. Then the reaction +from this view as a cynical depreciation of human nature leads to +the view that men who act nobly act with no interest at all. Yet +to an unbiased judgment it would appear plain that a man must be +interested in what he is doing or he would not do it. A +physician who continues to serve the sick in a plague at almost +certain danger to his own life must be interested in the +efficient performance of his profession -- more interested in +that than in the safety of his own bodily life. But it is +distorting facts to say that this interest is merely a mask for +an interest in something else which he gets by continuing his +customary services -- such as money or good repute or virtue; +that it is only a means to an ulterior selfish end. The moment +we recognize that the self is not something ready-made, but +something in continuous formation through choice of action, the +whole situation clears up. A man's interest in keeping at his +work in spite of danger to life means that his self is found in +that work; if he finally gave up, and preferred his personal +safety or comfort, it would mean that he preferred to be that +kind of a self. The mistake lies in making a separation between +interest and self, and supposing that the latter is the end to +which interest in objects and acts and others is a mere means. +In fact, self and interest are two names for the same fact; the +kind and amount of interest actively taken in a thing reveals and +measures the quality of selfhood which exists. Bear in mind that +interest means the active or moving identity of the self with a +certain object, and the whole alleged dilemma falls to the +ground. + +Unselfishness, for example, signifies neither lack of interest in +what is done (that would mean only machine-like indifference) nor +selflessness--which would mean absence of virility and character. +As employed everywhere outside of this particular theoretical +controversy, the term "unselfishness" refers to the kind of aims +and objects which habitually interest a man. And if we make a +mental survey of the kind of interests which evoke the use of +this epithet, we shall see that they have two intimately +associated features. (i) The generous self consciously +identifies itself with the full range of relationships implied in +its activity, instead of drawing a sharp line between itself and +considerations which are excluded as alien or indifferent; (ii) +it readjusts and expands its past ideas of itself to take in new +consequences as they become perceptible. When the physician +began his career he may not have thought of a pestilence; he may +not have consciously identified himself with service under such +conditions. But, if he has a normally growing or active self, +when he finds that his vocation involves such risks, he willingly +adopts them as integral portions of his activity. The wider or +larger self which means inclusion instead of denial of +relationships is identical with a self which enlarges in order to +assume previously unforeseen ties. + +In such crises of readjustment -- and the crisis may be slight as +well as great -- there may be a transitional conflict of +"principle" with "interest." It is the nature of a habit to +involve ease in the accustomed line of activity. It is the +nature of a readjusting of habit to involve an effort which is +disagreeable -- something to which a man has deliberately to hold +himself. In other words, there is a tendency to identify the +self -- or take interest -- in what one has got used to, and to +turn away the mind with aversion or irritation when an unexpected +thing which involves an unpleasant modification of habit comes +up. Since in the past one has done one's duty without having to +face such a disagreeable circumstance, why not go on as one has +been? To yield to this temptation means to narrow and isolate the +thought of the self -- to treat it as complete. Any habit, no +matter how efficient in the past, which has become set, may at +any time bring this temptation with it. To act from principle in +such an emergency is not to act on some abstract principle, or +duty at large; it is to act upon the principle of a course of +action, instead of upon the circumstances which have attended it. +The principle of a physician's conduct is its animating aim and +spirit -- the care for the diseased. The principle is not what +justifies an activity, for the principle is but another name for +the continuity of the activity. If the activity as manifested in +its consequences is undesirable, to act upon principle is to +accentuate its evil. And a man who prides himself upon acting +upon principle is likely to be a man who insists upon having his +own way without learning from experience what is the better way. +He fancies that some abstract principle justifies his course of +action without recognizing that his principle needs +justification. + +Assuming, however, that school conditions are such as to provide +desirable occupations, it is interest in the occupation as a +whole -- that is, in its continuous development -- which keeps a +pupil at his work in spite of temporary diversions and unpleasant +obstacles. Where there is no activity having a growing +significance, appeal to principle is either purely verbal, or a +form of obstinate pride or an appeal to extraneous considerations +clothed with a dignified title. Undoubtedly there are junctures +where momentary interest ceases and attention flags, and where +reinforcement is needed. But what carries a person over these +hard stretches is not loyalty to duty in the abstract, but +interest in his occupation. Duties are "offices" -- they are the +specific acts needed for the fulfilling of a function -- or, in +homely language -- doing one's job. And the man who is genuinely +interested in his job is the man who is able to stand temporary +discouragement, to persist in the face of obstacles, to take the +lean with the fat: he makes an interest out of meeting and +overcoming difficulties and distraction. + +3. Intelligence and Character. A noteworthy paradox often +accompanies discussions of morals. On the one hand, there is an +identification of the moral with the rational. Reason is set up +as a faculty from which proceed ultimate moral intuitions, and +sometimes, as in the Kantian theory, it is said to supply the +only proper moral motive. On the other hand, the value of +concrete, everyday intelligence is constantly underestimated, and +even deliberately depreciated. Morals is often thought to be an +affair with which ordinary knowledge has nothing to do. Moral +knowledge is thought to be a thing apart, and conscience is +thought of as something radically different from consciousness. +This separation, if valid, is of especial significance for +education. Moral education in school is practically hopeless +when we set up the development of character as a supreme end, and +at the same time treat the acquiring of knowledge and the +development of understanding, which of necessity occupy the chief +part of school time, as having nothing to do with character. On +such a basis, moral education is inevitably reduced to some kind +of catechetical instruction, or lessons about morals. Lessons +"about morals" signify as matter of course lessons in what other +people think about virtues and duties. It amounts to something +only in the degree in which pupils happen to be already animated +by a sympathetic and dignified regard for the sentiments of +others. Without such a regard, it has no more influence on +character than information about the mountains of Asia; with a +servile regard, it increases dependence upon others, and throws +upon those in authority the responsibility for conduct. As a +matter of fact, direct instruction in morals has been effective +only in social groups where it was a part of the authoritative +control of the many by the few. Not the teaching as such but the +reinforcement of it by the whole regime of which it was an +incident made it effective. To attempt to get similar results +from lessons about morals in a democratic society is to rely upon +sentimental magic. + +At the other end of the scale stands the Socratic-Platonic +teaching which identifies knowledge and virtue--which holds that +no man does evil knowingly but only because of ignorance of the +good. This doctrine is commonly attacked on the ground that +nothing is more common than for a man to know the good and yet do +the bad: not knowledge, but habituation or practice, and motive +are what is required. Aristotle, in fact, at once attacked the +Platonic teaching on the ground that moral virtue is like an art, +such as medicine; the experienced practitioner is better than a +man who has theoretical knowledge but no practical experience of +disease and remedies. The issue turns, however, upon what is +meant by knowledge. Aristotle's objection ignored the gist of +Plato's teaching to the effect that man could not attain a +theoretical insight into the good except as he had passed through +years of practical habituation and strenuous discipline. +Knowledge of the good was not a thing to be got either from books +or from others, but was achieved through a prolonged education. +It was the final and culminating grace of a mature experience of +life. Irrespective of Plato's position, it is easy to perceive +that the term knowledge is used to denote things as far apart as +intimate and vital personal realization, -- a conviction gained +and tested in experience, -- and a second- handed, largely +symbolic, recognition that persons in general believe so and so +-- a devitalized remote information. That the latter does not +guarantee conduct, that it does not profoundly affect character, +goes without saying. But if knowledge means something of the +same sort as our conviction gained by trying and testing that +sugar is sweet and quinine bitter, the case stands otherwise. +Every time a man sits on a chair rather than on a stove, carries +an umbrella when it rains, consults a doctor when ill -- or in +short performs any of the thousand acts which make up his daily +life, he proves that knowledge of a certain kind finds direct +issue in conduct. There is every reason to suppose that the same +sort of knowledge of good has a like expression; in fact "good" +is an empty term unless it includes the satisfactions experienced +in such situations as those mentioned. Knowledge that other +persons are supposed to know something might lead one to act so +as to win the approbation others attach to certain actions, or at +least so as to give others the impression that one agrees with +them; there is no reason why it should lead to personal +initiative and loyalty in behalf of the beliefs attributed to +them. + +It is not necessary, accordingly, to dispute about the proper +meaning of the term knowledge. It is enough for educational +purposes to note the different qualities covered by the one name, +to realize that it is knowledge gained at first hand through the +exigencies of experience which affects conduct in significant +ways. If a pupil learns things from books simply in connection +with school lessons and for the sake of reciting what he has +learned when called upon, then knowledge will have effect upon +some conduct -- namely upon that of reproducing statements at the +demand of others. There is nothing surprising that such +"knowledge" should not have much influence in the life out of +school. But this is not a reason for making a divorce between +knowledge and conduct, but for holding in low esteem this kind of +knowledge. The same thing may be said of knowledge which relates +merely to an isolated and technical specialty; it modifies action +but only in its own narrow line. In truth, the problem of moral +education in the schools is one with the problem of securing +knowledge -- the knowledge connected with the system of impulses +and habits. For the use to which any known fact is put depends +upon its connections. The knowledge of dynamite of a safecracker +may be identical in verbal form with that of a chemist; in fact, +it is different, for it is knit into connection with different +aims and habits, and thus has a different import. + +Our prior discussion of subject-matter as proceeding from direct +activity having an immediate aim, to the enlargement of meaning +found in geography and history, and then to scientifically +organized knowledge, was based upon the idea of maintaining a +vital connection between knowledge and activity. What is learned +and employed in an occupation having an aim and involving +cooperation with others is moral knowledge, whether consciously +so regarded or not. For it builds up a social interest and +confers the intelligence needed to make that interest effective +in practice. Just because the studies of the curriculum +represent standard factors in social life, they are organs of +initiation into social values. As mere school studies, their +acquisition has only a technical worth. Acquired under +conditions where their social significance is realized, they feed +moral interest and develop moral insight. Moreover, the +qualities of mind discussed under the topic of method of learning +are all of them intrinsically moral qualities. Open-mindedness, +single-mindedness, sincerity, breadth of outlook, thoroughness, +assumption of responsibility for developing the consequences of +ideas which are accepted, are moral traits. The habit of +identifying moral characteristics with external conformity to +authoritative prescriptions may lead us to ignore the ethical +value of these intellectual attitudes, but the same habit tends +to reduce morals to a dead and machinelike routine. Consequently +while such an attitude has moral results, the results are morally +undesirable -- above all in a democratic society where so much +depends upon personal disposition. + +4. The Social and the Moral. All of the separations which we +have been criticizing -- and which the idea of education set +forth in the previous chapters is designed to avoid -- spring +from taking morals too narrowly, -- giving them, on one side, a +sentimental goody-goody turn without reference to effective +ability to do what is socially needed, and, on the other side, +overemphasizing convention and tradition so as to limit morals to +a list of definitely stated acts. As a matter of fact, morals +are as broad as acts which concern our relationships with others. +And +potentially this includes all our acts, even though their social +bearing may not be thought of at the time of performance. For +every act, by the principle of habit, modifies disposition -- it +sets up a certain kind of inclination and desire. And it is +impossible to tell when the habit thus strengthened may have a +direct and perceptible influence on our association with others. +Certain traits of character have such an obvious connection with +our social relationships that we call them "moral" in an emphatic +sense -- truthfulness, honesty, chastity, amiability, etc. But +this only means that they are, as compared with some other +attitudes, central: -- that they carry other attitudes with them. +They are moral in an emphatic sense not because they are isolated +and exclusive, but because they are so intimately connected with +thousands of other attitudes which we do not explicitly +recognize -- which perhaps we have not even names for. To call +them virtues in their isolation is like taking the skeleton for +the living body. The bones are certainly important, but their +importance lies in the fact that they support other organs of the +body in such a way as to make them capable of integrated +effective activity. And the same is true of the qualities of +character which we specifically designate virtues. Morals +concern nothing less than the whole character, and the whole +character is identical with the man in all his concrete make-up +and manifestations. To possess virtue does not signify to have +cultivated a few namable and exclusive traits; it means to be +fully and adequately what one is capable of becoming through +association with others in all the offices of life. + +The moral and the social quality of conduct are, in the last +analysis, identical with each other. It is then but to restate +explicitly the import of our earlier chapters regarding the +social function of education to say that the measure of the worth +of the administration, curriculum, and methods of instruction of +the school is the extent to which they are animated by a social +spirit. And the great danger which threatens school work is the +absence of conditions which make possible a permeating social +spirit; this is the great enemy of effective moral training. For +this spirit can be actively present only when certain conditions +are met. + +(i) In the first place, the school must itself be a community +life in all which that implies. Social perceptions and interests +can be developed only in a genuinely social medium--one where +there is give and take in the building up of a common experience. +Informational statements about things can be acquired in relative +isolation by any one who previously has had enough intercourse +with others to have learned language. But realization of the +meaning of the linguistic signs is quite another matter. That +involves a context of work and play in association with others. +The plea which has been made for education through continued +constructive activities in this book rests upon the fact they +afford an opportunity for a social atmosphere. In place of a +school set apart from life as a place for learning lessons, we +have a miniature social group in which study and growth are +incidents of present shared experience. Playgrounds, shops, +workrooms, laboratories not only direct the natural active +tendencies of youth, but they involve intercourse, +communication, and cooperation, -- all extending the perception +of connections. + +(ii) The learning in school should be continuous with that out of +school. There should be a free interplay between the two. This +is possible only when there are numerous points of contact +between the social interests of the one and of the other. A +school is conceivable in which there should be a spirit of +companionship and shared activity, but where its social life +would no more represent or typify that of the world beyond the +school walls than that of a monastery. Social concern and +understanding would be developed, but they would not be available +outside; they would not carry over. The proverbial separation of +town and gown, the cultivation of academic seclusion, operate in +this direction. So does such adherence to the culture of the +past as generates a reminiscent social spirit, for this makes an +individual feel more at home in the life of other days than in +his own. A professedly cultural education is peculiarly exposed +to this danger. An idealized past becomes the refuge and solace +of the spirit; present-day concerns are found sordid, and +unworthy of attention. But as a rule, the absence of a social +environment in connection with which learning is a need and a +reward is the chief reason for the isolation of the school; and +this isolation renders school knowledge inapplicable to life and +so infertile in character. + + +A narrow and moralistic view of morals is responsible for the +failure to recognize that all the aims and values which are +desirable in education are themselves moral. Discipline, natural +development, culture, social efficiency, are moral traits -- +marks of a person who is a worthy member of that society which it +is the business of education to further. There is an old saying +to the effect that it is not enough for a man to be good; he must +be good for something. The something for which a man must be +good is capacity to live as a social member so that what he gets +from living with others balances with what he contributes. What +he gets and gives as a human being, a being with desires, +emotions, and ideas, is not external possessions, but a widening +and deepening of conscious life -- a more intense, disciplined, +and expanding realization of meanings. What he materially +receives and gives is at most opportunities and means for the +evolution of conscious life. Otherwise, it is neither giving nor +taking, but a shifting about of the position of things in space, +like the stirring of water and sand with a stick. Discipline, +culture, social efficiency, personal refinement, improvement of +character are but phases of the growth of capacity nobly to share +in such a balanced experience. And education is not a mere means +to such a life. Education is such a life. To maintain capacity +for such education is the essence of morals. For conscious life +is a continual beginning afresh. + +Summary. The most important problem of moral education in the +school concerns the relationship of knowledge and conduct. For +unless the learning which accrues in the regular course of study +affects character, it is futile to conceive the moral end as the +unifying and culminating end of education. When there is no +intimate organic connection between the methods and materials of +knowledge and moral growth, particular lessons and modes of +discipline have to be resorted to: knowledge is not integrated +into the usual springs of action and the outlook on life, while +morals become moralistic -- a scheme of separate virtues. + +The two theories chiefly associated with the separation of +learning from activity, and hence from morals, are those which +cut off inner disposition and motive -- the conscious personal +factor -- and deeds as purely physical and outer; and which set +action from interest in opposition to that from principle. Both +of these separations are overcome in an educational scheme where +learning is the accompaniment of continuous activities or +occupations which have a social aim and utilize the materials of +typical social situations. For under such conditions, the school +becomes itself a form of social life, a miniature community and +one in close interaction with other modes of associated +experience beyond school walls. All education which develops +power to share effectively in social life is moral. It forms a +character which not only does the particular deed socially +necessary but one which is interested in that continuous +readjustment which is essential to growth. Interest in learning +from all the contacts of life is the essential moral interest. + + + + + +End of The Project Gutenberg Etext of Democracy and Education, by Dewey + |